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the CID Report

Vol. 2 No. 3 CENTER FOR INNOVATIVE DIPLOMACY May/June 1985

One Percent for Peace

CID Begins Campaign for a Palo Alto Peace Council

Imagine peace becoming a local priority, taking its place in the city budget as well as in city hall, right alongside parks, sidewalk repairs, and police services. Imagine listening to a dozen candidates debating what the appropriate municipal foreign policies might be and then voting your favorites into office. And imagine these elected council members overseeing a dozen well-paid, highly qualified staff members, equipped with modern office and printing facilities. Now stop imagining—and start believing. Welcome to the Palo Alto Peace Council!

This summer, CID Special Project Directors Beth Jacklin and Betsy Randolph are launching an unprecedented effort to create a "Peace Council" within the Palo Alto city government. If established this new institution would launch some of the following activities:

- hold local hearings on foreign affairs issues;
- study the local economic impacts of military spending;
- lobby Congress to restore vital social programs like revenue sharing that have been cut to support the military budget;
- enhance the role of Palo Alto in international trade and cultural exchange, particularly with the Soviet Union and China;
- draft, debate, and pass "sense of the city" resolutions on foreign affairs; and,
- help educate Palo Altans on the requisites for long-term peace and international security through curriculum

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

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Detente in Bits and Bytes

The spread of computers and computer networks in the Soviet Union, fostered by citizen diplomats, offers superpower relations new hope. . . . . *page 4*



LETTERS

I AGREE WITH you that average citizens are our only hope. We need to find ways of persuading them that they will have to work together to save themselves because our current economic and political leaders aren't going to do it. It was their type of thinking which created this situation in the first place. But how can we reach these average citizens with our message? I have come to believe that this is the biggest problem we face. . . . In my opinion, you are on the right track in trying to convince Americans that Russians are people. In my area, most citizens have allowed the government to make them believe that Russia is inhabited by demons, who will cast a spell on us if we don't kill them first. This mindset would fall apart if they could see that Russians actually behave like other human beings. . . . Since I am 72 years old, I may not be here long enough to see how all of this turns out, but it might make a great deal of difference to my children and my grandchildren.

L. D. Ginger
Crawfordsville, Indiana

A FRIEND OF mine . . . just wrote about your work and what you call "citizen diplomacy." . . . One of the committees of our Peace Commission has been making a study of the problems on nuclear issues that decision makers face and the theological and ethical response to them. . . . Important as that is, what is more important—to get to the grass roots and stir people to action. While we need to be more informed, we also need to act. . . .

Charles Martin
Headmaster Emeritus
St. Albans School
Canon, Washington Cathedral
Chairman, Commission on Peace for the Espiscopal Diocese of Washington DC

I HAVE READ with great interest the circular of the Center for Innovative Diplomacy, and have sent a contribution to become a charter supporter. . . . Nothing is more important to assure survival of humanity in the nuclear age than promoting people-to-people involvement. When enough people agree, governments had better get out of their way, said Ike, so that dependence on military force can be overcome, and world peace established. . . . We send best wishes for success of the CID program.

Milton Lowenthal
Union of American and Japanese Professionals Against Nuclear Omnicide
Chair, Central Pennsylvania Chapter
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania



JANE WILLIAMS

The Peace Council's Dynamic Duo

BETH JACKLIN *(left)*, a Bay Area native, will enter her senior year this autumn at Occidental College in Los Angeles, studying international relations and philosophy. A year ago, she began studying in Spain with a "Spanish anarchist philosopher." She then went to Washington, D.C., where she worked for the Council for a Livable World, a prominent arms control lobby. With a strong background in international and national politics, and a strong commitment "to living in a world free of nuclear weapons," Jacklin brings a wealth of experience to CID.

BETSY RANDOLPH *(right)* left "the land-o-lakes, wild rice, and Guindon"—otherwise known as Minnesota—at the age of 15 to attend the Phillips Exeter Academy, where she co-founded and directed the school's Committee on Nuclear Awareness. She then enrolled at Stanford University "site unseen," where she became active in the Stanford International Development Organization. Now a sophomore studying English, Randolph will spend next year studying in Paris. Her summer position at CID was made possible by a public service grant awarded her by Stanford President Donald Kennedy.

CID

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The Center for Innovative Diplomacy is a non-profit, non-partisan research organization striving to prevent nuclear and conventional war by increasing citizen participation in foreign affairs.

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guides, pamphlets, newsletters, billboards, and parades.

While other cities like Boulder, Cambridge, and Washington, D.C. have created municipally run institutions for peace, the Palo Alto Peace Council would be the first institution run by a directly elected council. Moreover, the Palo Alto effort would be the first institution receiving substantial municipal financial support. The current plan is to spend one percent of the city budget—or three quarters of a million dollars. Hence the campaign slogan: "One Percent for Peace."

If Jacklin and Randolph succeed, the Palo Alto Peace Council will also be the first institution of its kind established in a politically moderate community. Indeed, Palo Alto has a rather unpredictable political landscape; with successful Silicon Valley entrepreneurs living side-by-side with Stanford University students and staff, the community often votes for a Republican congressman while supporting radical city programs for energy conservation and recycling. "By establishing the Peace Council in Palo Alto," says Jacklin, "we'll have a better chance of serving as a model for other communities. If Berkeley established a Peace Council, people would say 'so what else is new.' But if we succeed in Palo Alto, then people might say, 'hey, maybe we can do that here, too.'"

A Worthy Long-Shot

Jacklin and Randolph realize they face an uphill battle. While the Palo Alto City Council has supported the nuclear freeze and "Jobs With Peace" resolutions, a number of council members have publicly expressed their skepticism about deeper community involvement in international affairs.

To beat the odds, Jacklin and Randolph have carefully mapped out a three part strategy. First, they will prepare a comprehensive "Prospectus" on the Peace Council: its goals, its programs, its design, and its rationale. They then will carry the "Prospectus" to other community members to spark a vigorous public dialogue. During this stage, the "Prospectus" will undergo continual revision until sufficient community support coalesces. At that point, they will then draw up a precise ordinance and begin organizing a community movement to pass it.

Thus far, Jacklin and Randolph, aided by a half dozen enthusiastic volunteers, have spent most of their time defining what exactly the city government and local organizations are—and are not—doing. Among their preliminary findings:

- Even though military contracting may account for as much as one-quarter of the local economy, no serious study of economic impacts of military spending has ever been undertaken.
- While Palo Alto has an active "sister cities" program with cities in Mexico, Holland, and the Philippines, few efforts have been made to connect Palo Altans with people in the Soviet Union or China.

"We're giving citizens a pragmatic alternative to indifference."

- And while both the Soviet Union and China have expressed increasing interest in purchasing locally produced "high technology" (see "Citizen Diplomacy" column in this issue), no one in the local Chamber of Commerce has much interest—let alone expertise—in promoting trade with these countries.

As Jacklin and Randolph now complete the "Prospectus," they are already developing a number of important community allies—including high-level Palo Alto officials and some local peace group leaders. "The response so far is terrific," said Randolph. "The proposed Peace Council gives otherwise powerless citizens a unique opportunity to get directly involved in foreign policy, and respond to the threat of nuclear war."

CID's Role

The Peace Council represents one of the most exciting and pragmatic embodiment of CID's basic principles. It builds on CID's proposals for creating "municipal state departments" (*see The CID Report*, January/February 1985) to amplify citizens' desires for peace with stronger funding, visibility, and legitimacy. "Empowered local governments," contends Jacklin, "have tremendous unrealized potential as building blocks for international structures."

The Peace Council also incorporates CID's citizen diplomacy theme. It will give Palo Altans new opportunities to reduce global tensions and prejudice through business and cultural exchanges abroad. Says Jacklin, "'People to people' contact promoted by the Peace Council will help to eliminate fears, biases, and stereotypes—and thus reduce the likelihood of war."

Most importantly, the Peace Council will provide Palo Altans with a "municipal megaphone" for participating more actively in all foreign affairs. Working through their own city hall, Palo Altans will be able to discover, discuss, and modify the various connections between international and local affairs. "The Peace Council," Randolph claims, "is an upbeat, hopeful answer to the anxiety we all feel about the danger of nuclear war. Political participation needs to find a way back into American idiom and practice. We have a dynamic democratic process at our disposal. Why not use it to make peace possible?"

"In preparing our "Prospectus" and distributing it not only to Palo Altans but also to other localities, we're giving citizens a pragmatic alternative to indifference," states Randolph. "Why should we accept cynicism, despair, or apathy as the only possible response to the nuclear arms race, environmental devastation, and general global tension and violence? Americans certainly do not want war, but how can we get a 'grip' on peace?" The creation of municipal peace councils in towns and cities around the country provides citizens with a healthy, exciting alternative." ■

Your Role

If you're interested in helping out with the Palo Alto Peace Council, please call us. We especially need help with a large fundraising event we'll be holding on the California coast this coming October.

If you're interested in establishing a peace council in your own community, drop us a letter and we'll send you a copy of our "Prospectus" to help you get started.

Citizen Diplomacy

Detente Through Bits and Bytes

In 1983, the book *Beyond Containment* made a minor splash in the American political science community. The book's editor, Aaron Wildavsky, a conservative political science professor at U.C. Berkeley, urged the U.S. government to initiate anti-Soviet policies "of pluralization [that] would amplify every one of these [dissenting] voices, making their thoughts more widely available. Small, lightweight printers now exist for home computers that could be made available to lessen the Communist Party's monopoly of publication." As Loren R. Graham, a professor of the Massachussetts Institute of Technology specializing in Soviet science policy, reports,"There are some people who think we should airdrop [personal computers] like CARE packages because they allow such personal freedom and fast communication that they will break up the society."

But these anti-Soviet recommendations do not disclose one minor detail—the principal impediments to the spread of computers in the Soviet Union has come from hardliners, not in the Kremlin, but in the Pentagon. Indeed, right now, the Soviet Union is beginning a daring entry into the computer age that ultimately may reshape Soviet society.

In the early 1980s, the United States government had a firm policy of preventing any computer sales to the Soviet Union. The rationale, propounded by the Pentagon, was that all microcomputer exports would inevitably help the Soviet Union simulate and monitor missile launchings.

Citizen diplomacy is a regular column written by Michael Shuman describing recent, innovative efforts by individuals and communities to influence foreign affairs.

Throughout this period, however, numerous nonmilitary advisors tried convincing the President that the policy was irrational. The Department of Commerce argued that federal restrictions only opened the Soviet market to Japanese and British computer vendors. Computer business executives couldn't agree more; as one put it, microcomputers are now available from so many sources that "it would be a waste of everyone's time to try to stop them." Similar arguments were made by the Japanese and European governments in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Exports Controls, better known as "Cocom," where the western nations try to harmonize their trade rules.

Finally, within the past year the Pentagon's views were soundly rejected. Following a new Cocom accord, the Commerce Department issued new regulations creating three levels of controls on personal computer exports. For older computers, no export licenses are required. The most common and up-to-date personal computers (8 and 16 bit machines) require export licenses but they are presumed exportable. Only at the third level, involving more sophisticated machines like I.B.M.'s PC-AT and Apple's Macintosh that have a strong graphics capability, are restrictions still in place.

As the West's export restrictions have crumbled, so has the Soviet government's resistance to acquiring microcomputers. This is a remarkable turnabout for Soviet policy, which for years has strictly controlled printing presses and Xerox machines to prevent the dissemination of dissident viewpoints. But the Soviet government has gradually learned that information is a double-edged sword—that the same technology which could be useful to dissidents is also essential for the efficient functioning of state business and state government.

In recent years the Soviet Union has tried to computerize some of its official functions, while appearing reluctant to distribute the technology to the Soviet public. With the United States banning computer sales, the Soviets had only two alternatives for computerization: a domestic computer program and black market purchases. Neither strategy worked very well. The Soviet Union's efforts to build its own clone of the Apple II, the "Agat," faltered so badly that even the government's ideological journal, *Kommunist*, contended that foreign products were superior. Out on the black market, the government bought a number of personal computers but had to pay five times the value of the machines. In the final analysis, the Soviets could no longer afford the hard currency to purchase microcomputers in large quantities.



ILLUSTRATION BY CHRIS HANSEN

Within weeks of the West liberalizing its trade rules, the Soviet Union began shopping for I.B.M. and Apple personal computers as well as for comparable equipment from Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan. As Albert A. Eisenstat, a vice president of Apple, remarked, "It is a great opportunity for us,



Joel Schatz has played a pioneering role in opening communications between the Soviet Union and other nations, particularly the United States. *The CID Report* will feature further information about his activities in upcoming issues. Meanwhile, you can get information by writing directly to: The Ark Communications Institute, 3278 Sacramento St., San Francisco, CA 94115.

in a marketplace that has gone begging up to now because of the rules that were in place." Reports then appeared that Britain's Sinclair Research would be selling basic personal computers to the Soviet Ministry of Education, while more sophisticated I.B.M. and Apple machines were going to the Soviet Academy of Science.

By January, the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided to put microcomputers in all 60,000 Soviet high schools, a program that would reach more than eight million students. Shortly thereafter, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and the Politburo ordered schools to prepare teaching their computer courses by this September. According to a government communique, "It was emphasized that the all-round and thorough mastery of computer technology by young people must become an important factor in accelerating scientific and technological progress in this country."

With these developments, Apple's Eisenstat predicts that the Soviets will now be purchasing tens of thousands of personal computers—perhaps even hundreds of thousands. In the short run, this influx of computer technology will not beget much political change. "[L]et's not fool ourselves," says professor Graham, "you aren't going to see any Apples and I.B.M.'s on Russia's retail shelves." So long as western computer purchases require foreign exchange, few Soviet consumers will be able to purchase them.

In the longer run, however, state-sponsored computerization may have a dramatic impact on the Soviet Union's internal and external relations. This is the view of Joel Schatz, who, as director of the U.S./Soviet Special Projects Division of the California-based Ark Communications Institute, has shuttled repeatedly to Moscow over the past two years to open new communication channels between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.

Schatz has been impressed with the commitment of Gorbachev and other aspiring members of the Soviet government to open up the Soviet economy and culture. The root of their motivation, Schatz believes, is to increase government efficiency. In addition, there's a need to keep up with their computer-hungry communist competitors to the South—the Chinese. But whatever the Soviets' purpose, Schatz is convinced that soon the Soviet Union will be "wired for planetary communication."

As evidence of the new Soviet attitude, Schatz points to various articles prominent Soviets have contributed to a peace book being jointly published in the United States and Soviet Union. These articles, written by top Soviet experts in architecture, art, humor, philosophy, and rocketry, put forth all their visions of how new communications technologies —ranging from computer networks to "Live Aid"-style global television simulcasts—can help contribute to global understanding and peace.

Schatz himself has played a prominent role in these developments. Last year,

The Soviet Union is beginning a daring entry into the computer age that may reshape Soviet society.

Schatz was one of a number of westerners who introduced high level Soviet leaders to Radio Shack lap-held computers. More recently, he has worked closely with Professor Oleg Smirnov, Director of the Institute of Automated Systems, which was set up in 1982 as a part of both the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the State Committeee for Science and Technology to interconnect Soviet computers and link these computers with the outside world. From Smirnov's office, Schatz set up a "slow scan television experiment," in which participants in one country sent still pictures to a television set in the other over a telephone line.

Just recently, Schatz and Smirnov have created an active network between American and Soviet computer users via the international data channel Telenet. Working with a half dozen of each nation's top computer scientists, they are building a network through the Electronic Information Exchange System (EIES) in New Jersey that will soon facilitate computer conferencing between scientists, educators, and businessmen in both countries. Discussions are also underway for establishing a "computer teleport" in Moscow that would enable

A. PODDUBNY/SOVFOTO/TASS

Computer literacy for Soviet high school students is now required.

Soviets—or foreign visitors—to engage easily in all forms of communication with computers abroad. (Actually, foreigners already have a limited capability to lease time on Moscow computers for home communications.) And this communication will not just be one way. A recent article in *The Japan Times* reports that western computer users have now been granted permission to tap a number of central Soviet data bases.

All together, Schatz believes these developments are transforming Soviet society: "They are entering the computer age in three important ways: they are purchasing thousands of machines; they are building a communication infrastructure linking these machines together; and they are trying to connect this infrastructure with systems in the west for interactive exchange."

Schatz concedes that, at first, computers will remain in the hands of privileged Soviets. But in time, he contends, as the advantages of computerized communication become more apparent, more and more Soviets will be given access. And with this access may come millions of new daily dialogues between Soviets and Americans. "These electronic planetary interconnections are becoming so diverse," Schatz believes, "that they are extending the traditional boundaries of all nation states to the planet as a whole." ■

Profiles in Diplomacy

GALE WARNER

Riding in Tandem: Christopher Senie

When his train rolled into Moscow on the morning of July 4, 1983, Christopher Senie had a lot on his mind. The long, restless ride from Finland had given him too much time to think. What if the Soviets didn't meet them at the station? What if the Soviets were insulted that his Americans were not top-quality athletes? What if someone got injured? What if the visas didn't come through? What if. . . . "The train just stopped all of a sudden, and I heard this voice on the loudspeaker calling out my name. I didn't have my shoes on, it was raining, there was all this commotion, and all the Americans were looking at me for directions. Then I saw all these beautiful Russian women ready to give us flowers, and a huge sign that must have been fifty feet tall saying "Welcome to Bike for Peace 1983" in English and Russian. And the next thing I know I have a bouquet of roses in my arms and the head of the Soviet Peace Committee is shaking my hand and wishing me Happy Independence Day."

According to Russian folklore, it is good luck if it is raining when you arrive at a place and it is raining when you leave. If so, then the thirty-two cyclists who rode from Moscow to Leningrad, Helsinki, Stockholm, Oslo, and finally Washington, D.C. in the first Bike for Peace were blessed more times than they care to remember. It was raining when the train carrying the American and Scandinavian riders arrived in Moscow; it was raining two days later, when it was time to board their bikes. A crowd of several hundred people huddled under umbrellas to see the bikers off.

Christopher Senie, who had been tending to last-minute administrative details at the American embassy all morning, had jumped into a taxi and arrived at their starting point just in time to be buttonholed for a speech. The already soggy riders climbed on their bikes; a pistol shot was fired; Bike for Peace '83 was underway. Soon the first bikers escaped from the crowd and were out of sight. So far as Christopher Senie was concerned, there was only one problem: in all the bustle, he had lost track of his own bicycle.

The message of Bike for Peace—we can work together, and if we don't, we'll crash—was applauded everywhere.

Though he didn't know it, his partner Tore Naerland, the Norwegian originator and primary organizer of Bike for Peace, had arrived in Moscow with a plot in mind. Like Christopher Senie, Tore Naerland is 31 years old and a deep believer in the power of long-distance bicycle rides to teach both participants and bystanders the value of cooperation. Unlike Chris, Tore has only about 10% of normal vision and thus does all of his bicycling from the back seat of a tandem. Tore Naerland knew what a powerful living symbol it would be to have an American and a Soviet rider team up on a tandem for the duration of Bike for Peace '83. When Chris ran up to him that morning, breathless, panicked, demanding to know the whereabouts of his own ten-speed bicycle, Tore was ready.

"Take the tandem! Take the tandem!" Chris heard Tore yell as he rode out of sight on his own tandem.

Mystified, Chris searched the group's supply bus and found a white Peugeot tandem bicycle. He had just swung a leg over it and was about to ride away when he heard a voice in the crowd call out, "Christopher! Christopher!" A young, muscular Russian man ran up to him, introduced himself as Vladimir, and climbed on the back seat. It was soon apparent that Vladimir spoke no English and Chris spoke no Russian. It was also soon apparent, when it came time to shift gears, that Chris had never before ridden a tandem. This embarrassed him then; it embarrassed him still more when he found out that his tandem partner was Vladimir Semenets, 1972 Olympic gold medalist in the tandem sprint.

By the end of the trip it had become a standard joke among the bikers that the world would be a much safer place if superpower leaders would have a go at riding a tandem. Newspaper cartoonists picked up on the idea and sketched tandem bicycles with two empty seats marked: "Reserved for Ronald Reagan and Yuri Andropov." The first rule of riding a tandem, explains Chris, is that if you don't work together, you crash.

The message of Bike for Peace—we *can* work together, and if we don't, we'll crash—was applauded by spectators wherever the bikers went. Two days into their journey, in the small city of Kalinnin, north of Moscow, an enthusiastic crowd of nearly 3000 people awaited them in a parking lot near the city center. Returning soldiers couldn't have been given a more heartfelt welcome, and indeed the bikers resembled a triumphant army—an army, though, on a peace campaign. And efficient, non-polluting, modern, gumption-fueled *bicycles* seemed the perfect choice of vehicles for a peace army.

The bikers walked in the door of a large sports complex and "three thousand more people stood up and started applauding. The crowd outside was just the crowd that couldn't get inside," says Chris. A huge banner with a white outline of a dove hung on the back wall. Chris took the microphone and began explaining why Vladimir had begun riding in the front seat by pointing to Vladimir's sturdy legs and comparing them to his own skinny ones. "Today while riding on the tandem, I leaned back, closed my eyes, and listened," he said. "I heard the wheels coming off the pavement, and the gears changing, and the voices shouting back and forth in many languages. Pretty soon I noticed the Americans are shouting 'vnimanie' instead of 'attention' when they saw a hole in the road, and the Soviets are

"Profiles in Diplomacy" is a regular feature of The CID Report *describing the personal stories of individuals who have undertaken noteworthy diplomatic initiatives. The following piece is an abridged version of a chapter in a forthcoming CID book entitled* The New Diplomats, *written by Gale Warner, a freelance writer now living in Cambridge, Massachussetts.*

The weather continuously gave riders a taste of "Russian good luck" at every turn.

shouting 'attention' instead of 'vnimanie.' I listened very carefully, and I heard a very exciting sound—the sound of peace. Today it was louder than it was yesterday, and by the time we get to Washington it's going to be loud enough to be heard by hundreds of thousands of people."

Teamworks Is Born

At first glance, Christopher Senie could be fairly described as a Yuppie. Tall, rangy, with disorganized curly brown hair and emphatic eyebrows, he appears equally as comfortable in a buttondown shirt and tie as he does in a T-shirt and cycling shorts. For four years he has practiced law with the firm of Senie, Stock, and LaChance in Westport, Connecticut, where he is now a junior partner. The office is located in a three story brick building called "the Marketplace," where Muzak plays in the halls every day, even on Sundays. Downstairs is the office of Teamworks, Inc., the non-profit corporation that Chris created to run the American portion of Bike for Peace '83.

The Teamworks office is not, at the moment, prepossessing, consisting as it does of a couple of file cabinets, a desk, and a bulletin board. But the Teamworks, Inc. brochure exudes confidence and energy. The word "Teamworks" itself has become a tandem bicycle; the "A" and the "O" have sprockets and pedals. Teamworks, Inc., according to the brochure, is "aimed at improving international, intercultural, and intercommunity relations . . . by sponsoring challenging 'teamwork' projects, which bring people of different backgrounds and perspectives together to work toward shared goals."

Chris claims he "had no interest whatsoever" in the Soviet Union until January 1981, the beginning of his last semester of law school at the University of Bridgeport, when he took a course in Soviet law because it happened to fit his schedule. "I became fascinated after the second or third class, when I realized I knew *nothing* about the Soviet Union—I didn't even know they *had* a legal system." At the end of the course his professor announced that he was organizing an August 1982 trip of American lawyers and judges to meet their Soviet counterparts. Chris was the first to sign up. "At that time it was news to me that it was even possible to *go* to the Soviet Union."

Chris decided to make a film or videotape on the Soviet legal system, and in March 1982, five months before his trip, he attended a meeting of a local exchange group to ask for help. There he heard someone speak about a citizen diplomacy project called Tennis for Peace that had failed. Chris drove home thinking about bicycles instead of lawyers. Visions of American and Soviet bikers riding together danced in his head. "I knew this was just a magic idea," he says, "and that this kind of inspirational, emotional event wasn't going to take any warheads off of any missiles right away, but would be fun and exciting and have that emotional appeal."

In March 1983, Howard Frazier, director of a Connecticut-based group called Promoting Enduring Peace, called to tell him that three young Norwegians had organized a very similar project, called Bike for Peace, and had already obtained Soviet permission for American, Scandinavian, and Soviet cyclists to ride from Moscow across Scandinavia to Oslo, and fly from there to the United States. The Norwegians were coming to the United

> ***"I became fascinated [with Soviet law] when I realized I knew* nothing *about the Soviet Union—I didn't even realize they* had *a legal system."***

States the following week to arrange the American leg. Frazier invited Chris to meet them at a press conference in New Haven.

Christopher Senie had anticipated many problems with his Bike Ride for Peace idea, but never that someone else would think of it first. At first, Chris was so disappointed that he decided to aban-

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continued from page 7
don the project altogether. Ultimately, however, Chris realized that the Norwegians badly needed his experience and energy to organize the American segment, and that by becoming their American coordinator, "I would have a hand in making the first Bike for Peace happen."

Chris arrived at Kennedy Airport at 5 p.m. on March 16, 1983, only a few hours before the Norweigians, Tore Naerland and Andrew Kroglund, were to board their plane. "There we were, all of us already exhausted, with a glass of wine in our hands," remembers Chris, "toasting Bike for Peace and feeling as though our lives were about to take on a new and very important dimension."

Two days later, Chris went to the Westport Bank and Trust Company and borrowed $32,000. He formed a non-profit group called Bike for Peace, Inc., applied for tax-exempt status, set up an office, arranged for secretarial, phone answering, and telex services, printed stationery, obtained insurance, and began assembling a staff. Chris's younger sister, Allyson, who had just graduated from Ithaca College with a degree in political science, moved to Washington, D.C. and began drumming up congressional support.

Chris knew that his concept of Bike for Peace differed slightly from the Norwegians' and the Soviets'. On a brief trip to Moscow and Oslo in May 1983, Chris signed a protocol with the Norwegians, identical to one that the Soviets had signed, which laid out the principles of Bike for Peace and dedicated the ride to the United Nations' World Disarmament Campaign.

Chris concedes that the Soviets endorsed Bike for Peace to "help build their image at home and abroad as a government that wants peace. We were used by the Soviet government to some extent." What he does not accept is that this invalidates the event's significance. "If you want to make things happen, if you want to take a step forward, sometimes you have to be willing to be used. Sure, it would be purer to have four Americans and four Soviets bicycling together in the Soviet Union without either government knowing about it. But that's *impossible*. You have to be willing to play by some rules, to become partners *with* them, to let them help you shape it. And that's not such a frightening thing."

The Green Americans

Chris had expected the Soviet delegation to consist of top-notch athletes, but he was not prepared for "Olympic champion followed by national champion followed by this guy who was the first to climb Mt. Everest, and so on," says Chris. "And here I had to get up there and say, well, here's a bartender from Norwalk." Publicly, he did his best to make it sound as if all his Americans were superior bikers. Privately, he took the Soviet leaders aside and confessed that he had some novices along. To his surprise, the Soviets told him not to worry about it.

Wherever the bikers went, they were showered with feasts, flowers, decorations, and good will.

In retrospect, says Chris, the greenness of the American group was a blessing. "If we'd had better riders it would have been harder to establish that this was not a competition," he says. "But we took ourselves out of any competition right away—it was all we could do to just keep up. The Soviets never tried to make fun of us, though, and they couldn't have cared less that we didn't give them a good run for their money athletically."

Allyson, who had never before done any long-distance bicycle-riding and who had not had much of a chance to train, remembers hitting the first hill outside of Moscow and wondering what she

> ***"The Soviets never made fun of us and couldn't have cared less that we didn't give them a good run for their money athletically."***

was doing on a bicycle in the pouring rain, in the Soviet Union, trying to keep up with world-class athletes. "Then I just felt this hand on my back, and it was one of the Soviets *pushing* me to help get me up that hill." Allyson wasn't the only one to get a helping hand that day, and from then on, the stronger riders habitually pushed the weaker riders up hills. It was never discussed, she says, but it was clear that the Soviets each adopted particular riders as their "buddies." "I'd say 90% of that awkward feeling at the beginning was gone after that first day, because we were touching each other, and pushing each other up hills, and saying thank-you, and we were smiling and sweating and cold together."

Before they set off, the Soviet press had featured photographs and stories about Bike for Peace; many Soviet citizens thus knew their route and lined up to wait for them. Farmworkers in baggy shirts, old women in blue headscarves, and children in rubber boots left their field work to gawk at the riders. In the towns, "people came running from their houses to wave to us and throw us flowers," says Chris. The bikers became adept at steering with one hand.

The cyclists usually rode about twenty

Chris Senie ***(left)*** *and Vladimir Semenets* ***(right)****, celebrating their triumph.*

miles in the morning before a "technical stop." At lunch there would invariably be a reception and speeches, often by the mayor of the town. Children were given time off from school or camp and would appear with balloons and handpainted banners. Girls in white kneesocks and boys in blue blazers shyly asked for autographs and presented flowers. Often Chris used such breaks to add his own touch of theater by selecting a young boy or girl from the crowd and giving them a spin around the town square on the back of the tandem.

When they arrived at their destination, there would again be a reception, speeches, food, and sometimes entertainment. The town mayor would then sign the bikers' petition, which urged "the leading politicans of the greater powers to take responsibility for the people of the world so that humanity, and the basis for all life on earth, will not be destroyed by nuclear war."

At first the Westerners were suspicious of all this pageantry. But it was soon evident that the warmth and friendliness were unmanufactured. Long after the official receptions ended, local people lingered to talk with the bikers and shower them with gifts of pins, flowers, and food. Some Soviets who didn't have paper on hand asked the bikers to autograph their clothing. Frequently, they asked them to take a message back to their home countries that the Russian people want peace.

In the evening, the bikers often explored local bars and discotheques. Tired muscles were shaken out with enthusiastic dancing, and long conversations with local young people were initiated over vodka. Wrote Norwegian leader Andrew Kroglund about these encounters: "Forgotten are the last tough kilometers; forgotten are the swollen knees and the threatening cramps; forgotten are the minor disputes which always seem more important than they deserve to be. You sit there totally at ease letting your eyes glide from American to Russian to Scandinavian—and you feel the brotherhood of man pulsating in your veins; you feel you are a part of something important; you feel love."

Only Bikers Get The Blues

One night one of the American women, exhausted and homesick, started to cry and said it was because she had not had a Pepsi for more than a week. "Vladimir Kokashvili and Eugene Oskolsky got into a taxi with her and went racing around Leningrad trying to find her a Pepsi," recalls Chris (Pepsico, Inc. has a sales agreement with the USSR). The next day, at the morning technical stop, there were literally hundreds of bottles of Pepsi waiting for them on long tables.

The Soviets also found the ride stressful at times. At the border between Finland and the Soviet Union, where it was raining (their Russian good luck was holding), the Soviets clustered nervously around their leaders as they tried to fill out the Finnish customs forms. Their uneasiness, says Chris, was exacerbated by the "somewhat overzealous exclamations" of a few Scandinavians and Americans about how glad they were to be back in the West.

By far the biggest strain on all the riders was caused by the U.S. State Department. Vladimir Semenets told a crowd of nearly 10,000 people in his hometown of Leningrad that "if Christopher and I are able to ride our tandems all the way to Washington, D.C., that victory will mean more to me than winning the gold medal." But at that moment it appeared unlikely that the U.S. State Department would grant entry visas to the Soviet riders.

Only after weeks of frantic phone calls did the entry visas appear—two days before they were scheduled to leave the Soviet Union. The nagging uncertainty of the visas put all of the leaders under stress and magnified minor disputes. One issue they repeatedly confronted was speechmaking. The riders took turns giving short speeches at the frequent receptions, and all had a chance to speak at least once during the trip. While Chris and the Soviets wanted to keep their message upbeat and non-political, concentrating on the potential for friendship and cooperation that Bike for Peace symbolized, the Norwegians felt that speeches should be straightforward calls to action against the arms race. Chris feared, however, that politicizing the bikers' messages would divide the group over which superpower was more at fault. "The Americans and the Soviets had a very similar philosophy—we both had something to be defensive about," he says. Often during the trip the American and Soviet leaders joined together to persuade the Norwegian delegation to tone down their speeches. The Norwegians, for their part, felt the frustration of letting political opportunities slip away. The levels of tension remained high on both sides.

The speechmaking issue flared in Karlsskoga, Sweden, when one of the Soviet riders, Valery Chaplygan, told a crowd of about 500 people: "Isn't it a shame that the only person who has refused to sign our petition is the Ameri-

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can ambassador to Sweden." Chris walked away from the group, feeling that these fault-finding political references were fraying the unity of Bike for Peace. "I was watching the group become divided in ways the critics would love to see, just to prove we couldn't do it," he says. Several people, including Eugene Oskolsky, came over to apologize for Valery's comment. Their Swedish hosts took them into a room hung with chandeliers and filled with tables set with fine silver and crystal for lunch. Chris approached Vladimir Kokashvili and said he had to address the group immediately. Would he translate for him? Of course, said Vladimir, but he pointed out that the mayor of the town was present. Was it necessary to speak right then? Chris said yes.

"I made what I considered to be the most important speech of the whole trip," he says. "First I said that no one asked anyone at the American embassy, much less the Ambassador, to sign our petition. Then I said that if we think our slogans and our petition are going to be as enthusiastically embraced in the West as they have been in the East, we're really fooling ourselves. I spoke about what I thought Bike for Peace was about and what we'd done together. We'd ridden 900 miles together, we had told stories, we had drunk vodka at night together, we'd patched flat tires for each other, we had gone to each other's homes, we had *lived* together for two weeks, and there was no reason why we had to start arguing with one another over what these governments are doing. That's not what Bike for Peace is about. Bike for Peace is about compassion, the compassion of ordinary people, and the possibilities that exist for ordinary people to work together and to advance to the point where our governments will stop these things. And I went on and on and I was in tears." When he sat down, there was a burst of applause. Later Valery Chaplygan apologized to Chris and they gave each other a hug.

> ***"Bike for Peace is about compassion, the compassion of ordinary people, and the possibilities that exist for ordinary people to work together."***

Negotiations Collapse

After the time they flew into New York and Bike for Peace had successfully crossed the ocean, their good luck seemed destined to hold: it was pouring rain. But the healthy working relationships among the five leaders were soon to be severely tested. Chris had made arrangements for the group to ride into United Nations Plaza and hold a reception and press conference with officials from the United Nations Disarmament Office. The night before, Vladimir Kokashvili and Eugene Oskolsky rounded up Chris, Tore, and Andrew for an emergency meeting and suggested cancelling the next morning's reception because the staff of the Soviet Permament Mission to the U.N. had managed to arrange a meeting for Bike for Peace with United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. Chris protested that he and his staff had worked hard to set up the next day's reception and it seemed too late to be switching plans.

Up to this point the five leaders had made every decision by consensus. For the first and last time, they took a vote. The vote was four to one in favor of scrapping the Disarmament Office reception; Tore and Andrew were excited by this opportunity to present their petition to Cuellar. Chris's vehement opposition fell on deaf ears. Vladimir and Eugene told him that the Soviet U.N. staff would cancel the next morning's meeting. Chris went to bed thinking the matter out of his hands.

The next evening in Princeton, New Jersey, Chris called his Westport office. "My staff told me that the United Nations had been on the phone three times that day, and that they were absolutely furious at me, because we had stood them up. The Soviets hadn't cancelled the reception. There were over forty officials and press people waiting for us, with buns and drinks and signs and cameras, and we simply never showed up." Chris's normally calm, even voice crescendoes as he remembers. "And I was *absolutely* as angry as I'd ever felt."

Chris shakes his head. "The emotions had just reached the level where I had had it. I was absolutely not going to talk to them, I was so furious." He stares at his hands, clearly still puzzled by the tangle of emotions and events that created the crisis. "You have to understand that I have always felt that people should never leave the negotiating table, that that's the worst thing you can do. And here I was in the middle of Bike for Peace, choosing to stop talking to my partners. I went to the American participants, and I said, we are not going to see the Secretary-General on the ninth of August, and I want you to back me up, and they all said yes."

A pall fell on the formerly jolly group. The next morning, at the Philadelphia Art Museum, Chris tersely told the others that he and the other Americans would have no part of the meeting with the Secretary-General. Between Philadelphia and Newark, Delaware, the Norwegians and Soviets lobbied him to change his mind. Apologies, proposals, and counterproposals flew back and forth.

"Eugene Oskolsky, a really warm and

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compassionate man, volunteered to take the rap for me. He told Andrew that he would write a telegram to the head of the Disarmament Office saying that it had been his mistake not to cancel the reception. And as it turned out, it wasn't his fault. Somebody they had told at the Soviet mission to cancel it didn't do it." The telegram was sent and Chris mellowed his mood somewhat. But when the bikers arrived at Newark, Delaware, "I was still absolutely mad and still feeling sorry for myself," says Chris.

As he sat there, alone, after dinner, "listening to this lousy jazz," Vladimir Kokashvili came up to him and offered to take him to his hotel room so that they could settle some financial matters. When they arrived, Eugene was in the room, but he quickly excused himself. After settling the money, Vladimir asked Chris if he wanted a drink. Chris said yes. They started talking. "I said to him, 'Vladimir, why is it that on this entire trip you have never said the words 'I'm sorry?' I have never heard those words come out of your mouth. And I am apologizing left and right for things." They kept talking. "It was the most amazing meeting I've ever had," says Chris. "We

"Our biggest victory was that we could each go our own way with a raised head and know we succeeded where governments fail."

started talking about Vladimir, and his father, and his lifestyle and his personality, and why he wasn't very good at saying 'I'm sorry.' And then we started talking about my background and my personality. And after forty-five minutes of talking about what makes us tick," he says, "we wound up hugging each other in tears."

Vladimir and Chris went into the adjoining room to look for Eugene, and found the entire Soviet delegation tensely waiting for them. "Those Soviets couldn't go to bed that night until their bosses and me had made up. They were so upset that I was angry at their leaders that everybody was out of sorts, and they really wanted to clear the air." Chris and all of the Soviets then did the only logical thing under the circumstances: they had a party. "We sat there until the early hours of the morning drinking a lot of vodka and eating a lot of dried fish until we were all friends again. And I agreed to go meet the Secretary-General."

"The situation with those five leaders was a little mini-microcosm of the situation of government leaders trying to negotiate arms agreements," says Chris. "That experience convinced me that the one ingredient that's been missing so far in negotiations is *desire*. The governments have not really wanted to make those agreements yet. And now I understand that you have to really *want* to get there. Because it's hard. It's harder than I ever thought it was. Emotions get involved, feelings and pride get involved, you get defensive, you feel the other guy did something just to hurt you, things do break down. And now I know that you've got to care a lot, because it's hard. The Soviets brought me back in, by wanting so much to make me feel better. But the tension, the pressure we were all under . . ." he pauses. "There was even a time when Andrew hit Vladimir. That's how tough this whole project was. I'm telling you this because I think it makes it all the more brilliant an experience. It shows how deeply we were all committed to a common goal, or things would have simply fallen apart. It was like an acting company that fights with one another, but when the curtain goes up they put on a beautiful performance anyway."

The Final Performance

On August 6th, 1983, the evening of Hiroshima day, Congressman Bruce Morrison honored the bikers at a dinner in Washington, D.C., and the following day they took a bus back to Westport, Connecticut for a final farewell dinner on the grounds of a local church. As they disembarked, they formed a circle, held hands aloft, and sang "We Shall Overcome." Reporters interviewing the bikers heard the word "family" reiterated by nearly every participant. That night the staid walls of "The Marketplace" reverberated with the sounds of Soviet songs and dancing as the bikers celebrated a last party. All were dreading the next day's trip to the airport.

"Bike for Peace was successful in ways that were never discussed in the newspapers," muses Chris. "The success that was always talked about was that we rode 1200 miles, and we all became buddies, and it all seemed so easy. The real success story is that we did it even though it was hard. Our ultimate goals were the same, but our surface-level goals were slightly different, and that caused tensions. We had come at it from slightly different angles, for slightly different reasons, yet we hung in there even when we went through very bitter times, when there was a lot of anger and a lot of hurt feelings. Those five leaders struggled through this thing together. And at the end, we were saying good-bye to family."

The new language of diplomacy.

A few days later, Chris, Vladimir, Andrew, and Eugene presented their petition to Secretary-General Cuellar at a United Nations ceremony. "You are all truly an important part of our diplomatic corps," wrote Senator Gary Hart in one of the many notes and telegrams of congratulations that poured in. "None of us really believed we would revolutionize the world. We do believe, though, that we have done just as good a month's job as have the professional diplomats and negotiators in Vienna, Geneva, and Madrid," wrote Andrew in his journal. "We worked as a team and got beyond the language of diplomacy. We spoke our minds and thus could respect each other. When we finished, our biggest victory was that we could each go our own way with a raised head and know that we succeeded where governments fail." ■

Working Papers Available from CID

Each of the following CID Working Papers is available for $4.00 ($2.00 for members).

1. **"Living Without Harvard: A Critique of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group,"** ***by Michael H. Shuman, November 1983.***

In their highly publicized study *Living with Nuclear Weapons,* five professors and a graduate student from Harvard University argue that disarmament is a "fictional utopia" and that our only recourse is to continue modernizing our nuclear arsenals and negotiating modest arms control treaties. This paper criticizes Harvard's analysis on four points. First, Harvard refuses to face up to the ultimate need for disarmament for human survival. Second, it caricatures disarmament as requiring a tyrannical "world government," when, in fact, it really requires a concerted policy of international institution building. Third, Harvard places too much reliance on balance-of-forces arms control agreements, which have failed to sustain the kind of long-term public movement necessary for real arms control. Finally, Harvard pays inadequate attention to the concept of minimal deterrence, by which we could strengthen our national security with perhaps five percent as many weapons.

2. **"International Institution Building: The Missing Link for Peace,"** ***by Michael H. Shuman, August 1984.***

"World order has become everbody's favorite whipping boy, even the peace movement's" argues Michael Shuman in this critique of Jonathan Schell, Freeman Dyson, and the Harvard Nuclear Study Group. These analysts all focus their arguments on technical modifications of existing arsenals and refuse to endorse a political strategy of international institution building. Rather than dismissing world order out of hand as utopian, these authors should reconsider the necessity of forging stronger international institutions through such measures as United Nations reform, and increasing the power of the International Court of Justice. Even more important is the encouragement of greater international activity by non-state actors so that global political alliances can develop that transcend national identities. Without the political institutions for enforcement, the paper concludes, any disarmament scheme is bound to fail.

3. **"Computers, Information and the Peace Movement: An Overview,"** ***by Hal Harvey and Eric Horvitz, October 1984.***

Not all computers are necessarily calculating missile trajectories and laminar flows around ICBMs. This paper explains how computer communication can help the peace movement through electronic bulletin boards, mail systems, discussion trees, research databases, and office automation. It also gives an overview of existing resources such as USENET, ARPANET, and the ACCN (Arms Control and Computer Network). Finally, the paper describes C-NET, a prototype arms control communications network now being assembled in Northern California

4. **"Precision Guided Munitions and the Defense of Western Europe,"** ***by Hal Harvey, October 1984.***

This paper suggests how the "Defense Department," formerly "War Department," might finally be able to live up to its newer title. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) are non-nuclear munitions which home in on their targets either through remote control or advanced internal sensors. Small, inexpensive PGMs can reliably destroy tanks, ships, and airplanes costing hundreds or even thousands of times more than the PGM. The paper describes recent developments in PGM technology, which may soon enable the U.S. and its NATO allies to abandon nuclear weapons altogether and adopt a truly defensive defense with conventional weapons.

5. **Policy and Action Statement of the Conference on the Fate of the Earth, (including Legislative Action Agenda),** ***September 1984.***

Complete text of the statement warning of the environmental and nuclear dangers facing the earth and prescribing new strategies for reversing these threats. Includes complete list of 20 Nobel Laureate signatories as well as those of over 200 leaders of environmental, arms control, and disarmament groups.

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