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Class and the Politics of the Personal in America

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Abstract

This study examines the extent to which class repertoires of everyday personal evaluation translate into political judgments. It compares Michèle Lamont's accounts (1992, 2000) of class patterns in personal boundary-drawing practices with thematically similar political evaluations recorded in National Election Studies surveys conducted between 1972 and 2004. The evidence suggests that working class people are comparatively likely to translate everyday ethical judgments into policy-related evaluations. In contrast, middle class people are more likely to apply personal judgments to political candidates. In addition, working class people seem more disposed to evaluate policies according to their distributional import, while middle class people are comparatively likely to look to politics as an arena in which individual values can be inculcated.

Introduction

  A central feature of culture is its "transposability:" cultural formulae for thought

and action can be applied across different social milieux (Sewell 1992, DiMaggio 1997).

This study sheds new light on cultural transposition in the context of a well-established

research question: the link between social class and political beliefs. In particular, I

examine whether people apply the principles they use to judge each other in everyday life

to the judgments they make about political parties and candidates. Michèle Lamont's

description of how class affects the personal qualities valued by American men serves as

my point of departure (Lamont 1992, 2000). Lamont argues that, compared to middle

class[1] men, working class Americans highly prize hard work, personal responsibility,

protectiveness, personal integrity and straightforwardness, and traditional morality.

Middle class men, by comparison, more highly value self-actualization, intelligence,

expertise, competence, and flexibility (Lamont 1992, 2000: 21). In this paper, I assess

whether these class-related patterns of judgment extend beyond everyday life and into the

realm of politics by comparing Lamont's observations with evaluations of political

parties and presidential candidates recorded in National Election Study (NES) surveys.

  These questions of social class and political perception have never been tested

using nationally representative U.S. data. There is a vast literature on class voting which

focuses on changing electoral allegiances over time (Lipset 1981, Kitschelt 1994, Manza

and Brooks 1999). But since its primary focus is on predicting voting, this literature pays

little attention to the influence of class culture on class perceptions of politics.

Ethnographic studies such as Jonathan Rieder's *Canarsie: the Jews and Italians of*

Brooklyn Against Liberalism (1985) lose in statistical representativeness what they gain

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[1] Lamont uses the term upper-middle class, which I abbreviate to middle class throughout the paper.

in intimacy. NES data capture open-ended evaluations of parties and candidates, providing an opportunity to overcome this methodological dilemma. The NES couples a nationally representative sample of respondents with the comparatively unconstrained political judgments that are more characteristic of in-depth interviews. This allows for something of a snapshot of social class contrasts in the political "mentalités" of contemporary Americans.

Extracting hypotheses from the literature

Because the sociological literature has paid relatively little attention to the overlap between everyday boundary-drawing and political evaluations, some work is needed to characterize the findings that existing scholarly claims would lead us to expect from the data.

Hypothesis 1: *Class patterns in political judgments track class patterns in everyday personal judgments.*

This hypothesis is simple. To furnish a concrete example, since working class people are more likely than middle class people to say they value personal integrity and straightforwardness, we would expect integrity and straightforwardness to figure more prominently in working-class evaluations of candidates and parties. This rather elementary prediction is consistent with John Zaller's idea that individual predispositions are the basis for political opinions (Zaller 1992: 22-39), Samuel Popkin's argument that people use personal judgments as "shortcuts" to political evaluations (Popkin 1991), Pierre Bourdieu's writing on class *habitus* and public opinion (1979, 1984) and Theodor Adorno (1950) and Seymour Martin Lipset's (1959, 1981) work tying authoritarian personality traits to authoritarian political attitudes among working-class people. Indeed,

any theory of public opinion that expects personal judgments to extend into the political realm will lead to this hypothesis about class patterns of political judgments.

Given this conjecture that personal and political evaluations are linked, the second hypothesis predicts how readily respondents make this linkage depending on what they are evaluating.

Hypothesis 2: *Compared to middle class people, working class respondents more readily translate everyday personal judgments into personal (or personalistic) judgments of parties and, especially, of candidates. Compared to working class respondents, middle class people translate their personal predispositions more readily into assessments of the policy positions of candidates and parties.*

Pierre Bourdieu argues that high-status people are better able to navigate the political realm than are low-status people. This means that they are able to make political judgments with the use of "a specific political culture, i.e., explicitly political principles of classification and analysis," while the less educated and less privileged, lacking this fluency, tend to fall back on "ad hoc" political judgments made "on the basis of ethical principles" (Bourdieu 1984: 409). Bourdieu quotes French working-class respondents evaluating politicians and political parties in quotidian ethical terms (see "Morality and Politics," p. 422 and "An Eye for Character," p. 425). He is somewhat coy about what constitute "explicitly political principles of classification and analysis," the most esteemed currency of the political field. I return to this ambiguity at the conclusion of the essay, but for present purposes, I treat policy and ideology as being the "explicitly

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political" (and culturally legitimate) criteria of judgment to which Bourdieu somewhat vaguely refers.[2]

While Bourdieu implies that less educated people resort to personalistic criteria when judging candidates *and* parties, the argument is more commonly made about evaluations of political candidates in particular. In his classic article on "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" (1964), Philip Converse outlines a hierarchy of political sophistication corresponding with education. Converse's next-to-least sophisticated stratum, which is populated largely by less educated respondents, includes people who pay attention to the personal qualities of the candidates and little else (217).[3]

Proceeding from a rational choice perspective, Samuel Popkin makes a similar argument in *The Reasoning Voter.* Voters are liable to judge candidates by "assess[ing] political character from personal character" (1991: 78). In part this is because personal narratives about candidates are more entertaining, more easily acquired, and more easily retained in memory than policy positions (78-9) We can add a class gradient to Popkin's generalizations by noting that less educated, working class respondents presumably find it even more arduous to gather substantive information about candidates than do their better educated, middle class compatriots. Thus, we can conjecture that working class people are more likely to resort to the "cognitive shortcut" of substituting character for policy and personality for substance when judging candidates.

In Figure 1, I summarize the effects proposed in Hypothesis 2. These can be thought of as enhancing or dampening the force of class evaluations as they are translated from the realm of the everyday to the political.

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[2] Ideology can be thought of as a consistent and principled way of generating policy preferences.
[3] Converse points to one group which is even less sophisticated than this one: the set of people who are unable to come up with any political judgments at all.

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A preview of findings

      Broadly speaking, this study confirms the first hypothesis. By and large, class patterns of everyday evaluation find a reflection in class political judgments. Indeed, the several instances in which the expected pattern is absent, or is actually reversed, point to some of the most interesting conclusions of this study. The second hypothesis fares less well when compared to the evidence. In the conclusion, I weave together an interpretation of these results to suggest better ways of understanding the interweaving of class and political judgment in American political culture.

Data and Method

Dependent Variables

      I use data from fifteen of the National Election Study (NES) surveys between 1972 and 2004. The NES is a series of nationally representative cross-sectional surveys conducted around the time of national elections (National Election Studies 2002, 2004). The bulk of the data analyzed in this paper comes from open-ended evaluations of presidential candidates and the Democratic and Republican parties recorded in the NES. In presidential election years, the NES asks "Is there anything in particular about [presidential candidate's name] that might make you want to vote for him?" Respondents who answer in the affirmative are probed for up to five reasons they favor a candidate. They are then asked for reasons they might vote against the candidate, and the procedure is repeated for the presidential contender's opponent. The NES also solicits opinions about third-party candidates in years with a significant contender (John Anderson in 1980, Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996, and Ralph Nader in 2000). The NES also solicits

open-ended opinions about the major political parties in presidential and congressional election years alike, asking "Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic [Republican] party?" and soliciting up to five "likes" and "dislikes" for each party.[4] NES coders have grouped together similar open-ended responses into numbered categories. For instance, survey respondents' comments about a candidate or party's support for spending on the poor are grouped together in a single category which the NES codebook appendix illustrates as follows: "Welfare/Poverty problems—Pro government aid/activity; pro give-aways" (code 906). While the nuances of individual responses are lost in the aggregated category—for instance, we do not know how many of the people expressing dislike for welfare programs called them "give-aways," though we are probably safe in assuming that few who *supported* them used this term—the NES coding captures the basic referent of the comment. Furthermore, because all responses of this sort are volunteered either as "likes" or "dislikes" of a party or as reasons to vote for or against a presidential candidate, we know whether the respondent considers a candidate or party's support for welfare programs to be attractive or a turn-off.

To select categories of political judgment for analysis, I rely on Michèle Lamont's description of class differences in the way American men evaluate people in everyday life. Only some of the open-ended judgments of parties and candidates that are recorded in the NES bear a clear resemblance to the contrasting evaluative criteria which Lamont uncovers in her interviews. I select these for analysis.

Working class criteria

Hardworkingness:

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[4] During the 1972-2004 period, this item was used in 1972, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, and 2004.

For working class men, "work signals a form of moral purity and is often mobilized to draw boundaries between decent people and the others. A strong work ethic is often construed as a matter of honor and an essential source of personal worth… Being hardworking is also often associated with other positive traits such as being responsible and caring for others, as if it were part of a package that characterizes 'good people'" (Lamont 2000: 24). In addition, "white workers often mentioned welfare recipients and the homeless in their discussions of worth, and they stigmatized these groups simultaneously for their socioeconomic and moral failings… The issue here is less social position than 'your outlook': people should be responsible and respect the implicit social contract to pull their weight and not give up—again, traits central to workers' own self-identity" (*ibid*: 132). These patterns lead to the predictions that the following considerations will figure more prominently in the political judgments of working class than of middle class respondents: opposition to spending on the poor and on welfare; advocacy of a strong work ethic; and approval of hard working and conscientious candidates.

Integrity and straightforwardness:

In contrast with middle class men, working class men perceive that "trust and predictability are not attained via conflict avoidance, team orientation, and flexibility but by being straightforward" (36). Working class people favor "'shooting from the hip,'" (36) and "standing up for one's principles even in the face of adversity…oppos[ing] their 'straight talk' and toughness to middle class gentility" (37). This suggests that working class respondents will make more of the trustworthiness, straightforwardness, and integrity of candidates and parties in their political judgments.

Protectiveness:

"The importance that workers put on protecting their families is illustrated by their repeated use of the term 'very protective' to describe qualities they appreciate in their friends" (31). "Workers are convinced that they *need* to protect their families. In contrast, protecting is less salient for professionals" (33). "Workers easily extend this imperative to the country at large, defending nationalist ideologies and the importance of fighting to preserve American international dominance through a show of physical strength if needed… [W]orkers are busy keeping moral order not only in their home and neighborhood but also in the world at large" (35-6). By these lights, we would expect the issues of crime, national defense and patriotism to loom particularly large in working class respondents' judgments of politicians and parties.

Traditional morality:

"[W]orkers resemble professionals and managers, who express a dislike for 'low-moral types.' However, they also draw much stronger boundaries against immoral people than do middle class men. They use traditional morality, like religion, to keep pollution at arm's length" (44). Thus, a concern with the moral traditionalism of candidates and parties should be more characteristic of working class as opposed to middle class judgments.

Middle class criteria

Intelligence and expertise:

"Given the importance that college education and expert knowledge play in defining the identity of members of the upper-middle class, it is not surprising that differences in level of education and intelligence are two of the most common bases on which [these]

respondents draw cultural boundaries" (Lamont 1992: 90). Given this finding, we can expect middle class respondents to judge politicians by their intelligence and knowledge of the issues more than working class respondents.

Flexibility, and openness to new ideas:

For middle class men, "flexibility…is essential for professional mobility" (38). "[T]o a certain extent, the cultural imperative for flexibility prevents American upper-middle-class men from putting personal integrity… at the forefront" (39). Middle class respondents should be more ready than working class respondents to commend political actors for their flexibility and openness to new ideas, both moral and instrumental.

Competence:

Among middle class Americans, "Competence is most highly valued…and it is often equated with honesty. Indeed, some Americans go so far as to consider competence a guarantee against dishonesty, as if it had intrinsic purifying virtues… American interviewees often draw extraordinarily clear boundaries against incompetence, and they do so with a violence only equaled by French diatribes against stupidity" (1992: 40). Competence, then, should feature in the characteristically middle class repertoire of political judgment.

Using open-ended responses as dependent variables

The advantages of open-ended responses

There are several advantages to the use of open-ended responses in an analysis of class repertoires of political judgment. The first, most elementary advantage is authenticity: open-ended responses are not determined by the alternatives presented by survey designers. A second advantage is consistency. Respondents are asked to render

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judgment on parties and candidates in the same free-form way year after year. This is

less often true of the NES's closed-ended items. Thirdly, open-ended evaluations are

more comparable to one another than closed-ended elicitations of judgments. If in

successive years people mention spending on welfare programs for the poor twice as

much as they mention military spending when they enumerate their "likes and dislikes"

of political parties, we have some grounds for supposing welfare spending to be more

important to their evaluations of political parties than is defense spending. Closed-ended

evaluations of party performance on military and welfare policy might provide a more

thorough canvassing of public opinions on these topics by making sure that all

respondents at least consider the issues at the moment the survey is conducted. But, on

their own, these items will be less helpful in evaluating the relative importance of the two

factors in people's attitudes toward political parties. I exploit the comparability of open-

ended evaluations of candidates and parties heavily in the analysis that follows. A fourth

advantage of open-ended responses is that they can potentially reveal nuances in the

framings of political judgments, though this depends on fortunate coding decisions by

NES researchers. To preview the study's findings, there is some evidence in the data of

class differences in the degree to which Americans emphasize the distributional

consequences of policy as opposed to the political championing of particular values. This

difference would have been unlikely to emerge from closed-ended judgments about

public policies. Fourthly, open-ended items do not contaminate responses with question-

wording effects such as opinion priming (influencing a judgment by framing it in a

particular manner) or acquiescence (respondents' tendency to agree with a statement),

both of which operate more strongly on less educated respondents and so are likely to

introduce systematic biases into a discussion of class differences in attitudes (Zaller 1992

on priming; Schaeffer and Presser 2003 on acquiescence). A final advantage is one of

political salience. Some force-choice questions in the NES solicit social attitudes but do

not explicitly connect these attitudes to *political* judgments. In contrast, the open-ended

responses which I analyze are explicitly framed as judgments of candidates and parties.

By way of illustration of these latter two points, consider the contrasts between

responses to 1) closed-ended items measuring moral traditionalism, 2) open-ended

responses citing moral decline as the most important problem facing the country and 3)

open-ended responses praising or censuring candidates and political parties for their

advocacy of traditional family values. Starting in 1986,[5] the NES has asked respondents

whether they strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat

disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements:

- "The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society."
- "The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes."
- "This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties."[6]
- "We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own."

These closed-ended responses can be fruitfully compared with open-ended mentions of

the same themes. Since 1974, the NES has asked respondents to identify the "most

important problem" facing the country, coding the open-ended responses in a manner

similar to the coding procedure used for political party and candidate "likes and

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[5] These items were included in every biennial NES survey through 2004, save the 2002 survey.
[6] In light of the argument that I develop later in the paper, it is interesting to note that the NES codebook summarizes this item "Should be More Emphasis on Traditional Values." This transmutes a statement about the strength of actual social relationships—"family ties"—into one about adherence to attitudes— "traditional values"—which can be internalized by individuals. The misrepresentation, no doubt an unconscious one, reflects what I argue to be a characteristically middle class American cultural emphasis.

dislikes."[7] NES summaries of the open-ended "most important problems" responses include the following categories: "General mention of moral/religious decay (of nation); sex, bad language, adult themes on TV" (code 380);" Family problems--divorce; proper treatment of children; decay of family" (code 381); "Problems of/with young people; drug/alcohol abuse among young people; sexual attitudes; lack of values/discipline; mixed-up thinking; lack of goals/ambition/ sense of responsibility; 'hippies'" (code 383).[8] In the direct evaluations of political parties and candidates solicited between 1972 and 2004, NES coders summarized responses that referred approvingly to those "in favor of strict/older/traditionalistic outlook, will improve/renew morality of country, pro-family, defends family values" (code 980) or faulted parties and candidates for having a "permissive/newer/modernistic outlook; not (strongly enough) pro-family; doesn't defend (strongly enough) family values" (code 981).

Figure 2 provides a simple univariate comparison by education of these closed-ended and open-ended measures of moral traditionalism.

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

A look at the distribution of responses to the closed-ended items measuring traditionalism provides some support for the frequent scholarly assertion that greater privilege in the social class hierarchy is correlated with more tolerant, libertarian attitudes (Lipset 1959, 1981; Houtman 2001; Lamont 2000; Kitschelt 1994). College education erodes agreement with the assertions that "the newer lifestyles" are contributing to social

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[7] In most years, the survey gives people the opportunity to name multiple important national problems and then asks them to identify the most important one among their list. Again, the open-ended "major problem facing the country" item appeared in biennial NES surveys through 2004 with the exception of the 2002 survey.
[8] The educational gradient of "most important national problem" responses excluding the code (383) which focuses on the moral deficiencies of youth.

breakdown and that more emphasis on "traditional family ties" would improve the state of the nation. On the other hand, respondents with a high school education or less are significantly more likely to agree with the stark moral relativism of the assertion that "The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes." People without a high school degree again appear as the most tolerant group in the population when presented with the claim that greater moral tolerance is needed. This set of contradictory findings strongly suggests the possibility of acquiescence or framing bias (Jackman 1973; Zaller 1992; Schaeffer and Presser 2003). While researchers have found these items taken together to be useful in predicting individual voting patterns (Miller and Shanks 1996: 302-6), any assessment of inter-educational differences in moral traditionalism by use of these items appears suspect.

The open-ended question asking people what they consider the most important problem facing the nation is *prima facie* a more reliable way to compare concern about the decay of traditional values across class lines. Furthermore, it registers the *salience* of this concern as opposed to simply recording their agreement or disagreement with a series of rather abstract platitudes about the changing times. The distribution of mentions shows people with a college education to be more likely to cite moral decay as their primary concern. Nor can this be a case of the less educated simply having no opinion about the plight of the nation close at hand, since I have excluded non-responses to the item from the tabulation. The strong educational gradient in mentions of moral decay as the most important national problem is not the product of different response rates, but of the fact that less educated people are more likely to cite something other than moral decay as the top problem.

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The final two open-ended measures of moral traditionalism included in Figure 2 link traditionalist concerns directly to political judgments. Given this paper's primary theoretical concern with how everyday personal judgments are related to political judgments, this is crucial. After all, believing that moral decay is the nation's most pressing issue does not necessarily imply any confidence that a political solution to the problem is possible. Concern about traditional morality could translate from the quotidian to the political realm at different rates among different social classes. In the event, it seems that considerations of presidential candidates' qualifications as defenders of public morality are an approximately equal share of judgments across educational groups, at least among respondents with at least a high school degree. When it comes to Americans' evaluations of the Democratic and Republican parties, however, there is a marked educational gradient: public morality occupies twice the share of college graduates' as opposed to high school graduates' concerns.

Open-ended responses thus provide an unusually transparent measure of the salience of particular criteria of political judgment to people across lines of social class. Nevertheless, open-ended responses are not problem-free. I discuss the drawbacks associated with them and my efforts to compensate as best as possible for these shortcomings in the following section.

Remedying the drawbacks of open-ended responses

The first and most obvious drawback of open-ended responses is that they rely upon only those issues which respondents are able to call to mind at the moment of the interview.[9] Closed-ended survey items have the advantage of forcing issues upon the

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[9] Luckily, these items are generally featured early on in the survey, before respondents have been prompted about (and exhausted by) a host of issue queries.

consciousness of respondents, thus ensuring that it receives the broadest possible consideration. (Naturally, this comes at some cost to the intrinsic worth of the judgments offered.) In the instance of judgments about presidential candidates' intelligence and morality, I employ data from closed-ended items to cross-check class differences in the salience of these criteria of judgment. I do this simply because these items happen to be available and are theoretically relevant. I otherwise build the analysis around open-ended evaluations, trusting that by aggregating responses across many years, momentary fluctuations in the salience of issues will be evened out. I also assume that the criteria of political judgment which are truly important to people will get represented in the data despite the vicissitudes of individual recall.

A second shortcoming of open-ended responses is that less educated, less socially privileged respondents are generally less articulate when it comes to political matters, and so have fewer specific political judgments at the tip of their tongue in an interview situation.[10] Thus, the most straightforward way of operationalizing open-ended responses as a dependent variable—by creating a dichotomous variable indicating whether a respondent mentions the consideration or not—will systematically bias class comparisons made on this basis. To compensate for this problem, I construct a "reliance score" for each respondent for each category of judgment. A respondent's "reliance score" for any given criterion of judgment is simply that criterion's proportional share of his or her total number of "likes and dislikes" about candidates or parties. The score is calculated

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[10] This generalization is widely recognized in the literature (e.g. Bourdieu 1979, 1984 and Miller and Shanks 1996) and in the case of the 1972-2004 NES data used here is corroborated in OLS regressions (not shown but available upon request from the author) on the total number of judgments that respondents make about parties and candidates respectively. Having a professional or managerial as opposed to an unskilled or skilled manual job, earning higher household income and having more education are all associated with a larger number of judgments (p<.001 for all distinctions).

separately for candidates and parties. The respondents who volunteer no judgments at all about candidates or none about parties are assigned missing reliance scores.

Throughout the analysis, I use these "reliance scores" as my dependent variables. To illustrate, between 1972 and 2004, 505 survey respondents mentioned candidates' hard work or dedication in the course of their open-ended evaluations of the presidential contenders. More specifically, the NES codes the judgment that a candidate is a "public servant, a man of duty, is conscientious or hard-working, would be a full-time President, is dedicated or is really interested in serving people" separately from its negative equivalent, i.e., that a candidate "doesn't take public service seriously, is lazy, would be a part-time President, is not dedicated, or is not really interested in serving people" (codes 407 & 408). A respondent's reliance score for the criterion of candidate "hardworkingness" is simply the number of times he or she mentions the quality when evaluating the competing candidates, whether invoking it as a reason to vote for a candidate or whether, noting his lack of it, as a reason to vote against him,[11] divided by the total number of "likes" and "dislikes" that a respondent mentions for all the candidates in the presidential race. The respondent's resulting reliance score, which ranges from 0 to 1, measures the predominance of hard work in a respondent's overall set of judgments of presidential candidates. Thus, a respondent who commented on one candidate's conscientious approach to the job and on the opposing candidate's laziness, together with a total of three other considerations about the contenders, would be assigned a reliance score of 0.4 for candidate hardworkingness. As it happens, the *average* reliance score for this criterion, across all respondents who offered at least one

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[11] For most such judgments, there is a smattering of counterintuitive uses of the category, e.g. mention of a candidate's laziness as a reason to vote for him. These I exclude when calculating salience scores.

judgment about one of the candidates between 1972 and 2004, is 0.56%, indicating that

the hard work occupied about a half of one percent of the total quantity of judgments

about presidential candidates among NES respondents of that period.[12]

Table 1 displays summary information on each category of political judgment

which I use in the analysis.[13] The table also details an omnibus category including all

assessments of the personal qualities of presidential candidates. I discuss this category

and the reason for its inclusion in greater depth in the "Findings" section of the paper.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

Some salient categories of judgment were mentioned too infrequently (fewer than

~150 respondents mentioning the category between 1972-2004) to permit reliable

statistical analysis.[14] Examples of categories which we might expect to be salient to

working class people but which were seldom mentioned are: candidates' championship or

neglect of a strong work ethic (79 mentions); parties' and candidates' attitudes or ties to

welfare recipients (as opposed to welfare policy itself) which garnered only 31 and 7

mentions respectively; positions on drug policy (113 mentions for candidates, 60 for

parties); and concerns about American prestige around the world (82 mentions for

candidates, 68 for parties). In the domain of judgments likely to be favored by middle

class respondents, comments about a candidate's educated or uneducated demeanor were

too sparse for analysis (83 mentions for candidates).

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[12] This interpretation of the average salience score is only approximate, since judgments made by otherwise laconic people will earn higher salience scores than judgments that are just as frequent but are made by people who mention more total "likes and dislikes" on average.

[13] The data contain significant numbers of judgments making an "inverted" use of the categories shown in the case of some of the policy mentions. Thus, for instance, a fair number of respondents express pro-welfare or anti-military sentiments (though not as many as the reverse.) I conducted supplementary analyses of these significant "mirror image" judgments and where appropriate mention them in passing in the exposition of findings.

[14] Regressions on dependent variable categories with fewer than 150 mentions tended to yield insignificant F tests of the regression's overall statistical power.

Independent Variables

The NES permits the use of education, income and occupation as parallel indicators of social class. Because I rely upon Lamont's findings as my baseline assessment of the criteria that characterize middle class and working class people's everyday personal judgments, I also follow her basic operationalization of the class dichotomy. Thus, I consider a high school degree or some years of college short of a bachelor's degree to be an indicator of "working class" status, and a college degree as a "middle class" level of education (Lamont 2000: 252). This excludes those with less than a high school degree from the "working class," an expedient which is necessary to preserve the integrity of the comparison I am attempting.

Lamont considers professionals, managers and "entrepreneurs" as upper middle class and "blue-collar or low status white-collar jobs" as working class (*ibid*). I adopt the classification used by Manza and Brooks (1999) in their study on social cleavages in voting, a six-category occupational classification comprised of 1) professionals, 2) managers and administrators, 3) self-employed proprietors of businesses (excepting self-employed professionals), 4) routine white collar workers, 5) skilled and craft workers, including foremen, and 6) unskilled or semiskilled workers such as factory operatives or low-skilled service workers. From this more detailed scheme, I treat professional and managerial occupations as indicators of middle class status and skilled/blue collar and semiskilled occupations as indicators of working class membership. I treat proprietors (who range from managers of their own car dealerships to shoe repairmen with their own shops) and routine white-collar employees as being neither middle class nor working class. These exclusions should, if anything, help to sharpen the class contrasts that I am

examining. Income, which Lamont does not consider in her analysis, is measured as

household income in constant 2004 dollars. My control variables include sex, race

(coded as black/all others), age and age squared (to control for non-linear age effects),

and census region. Table 2 displays the relevant summary statistics.

[Table 2 about here]

Method

I test differences in middle class and working class political evaluations by

conducting OLS regressions of education, income, occupation and control variables on

respondents' reliance scores for each criterion of political judgment.[15] In the interests of

statistical resolution, I aggregate the data between 1972 and 2004.[16] I expect class to

explain the kinds of political judgments made by respondents, and to do so independently

of age, sex, race, and region. I test interaction effects between sex and social class,

performing separate regressions by sex when a significant interaction emerges.[17] One

surprise of the empirical results was how rarely this procedure was called for, this despite

the fact that Lamont's conclusions about class differences are based on research on men

alone.

Using education, income and occupation as three separate dimensions of social

class allows for subtlety of analysis but also presents a data reduction challenge. I

resolve the issue in three steps. First, I highlight the major statistically significant

contrasts in political judgments for each component of class: income, education and

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[15] Robust standard errors are used for all OLS regressions, since the high rate of zeroes in the dependent variable is likely to generate non-normal standard errors.

[16] These years roughly straddle the period (late 1980s and early 1990s) when Lamont made the observations from which this study's hypotheses are derived.

[17] Since only about 10% of skilled workers were women, I disregard sex interactions for this category on the grounds that the group is so unusual.

occupation.[18] Second, I assess the *substantive* significance of these contrasts. I measure

substantive significance by comparing the estimated effect of the class contrast with the

judgment's mean reliance score across all respondents. For example, there is a

significant educational contrast in how people prioritize candidates' positions on law and

order. All else being equal, respondents with a high school degree rely on this criterion

by 0.37% more than respondents with a bachelor's degree. This statistic is quite

inscrutable until we compare it to the weight given the category in all respondents'

judgments of presidential candidates: 0.69%. The ratio between the former and the latter

figures (53%) provides a reasonable measure of the substantive significance of the

educational difference in pro-law-and-order judgments about candidates. I call this ratio

the class reliance ratio.[19] As a rule of thumb, I consider class reliance ratios in excess of

33 percent to indicate a sizeable gap in different social classes' reliance on a category.

Findings

Table 3 summarizes the findings of the regressions. The table highlights the most

prominent contrasts that emerged along each axis of class (income, education and

occupation). It also compares findings with the patterns that we would observe if

Hypothesis 1 were uniformly correct, i.e., if we were to see a straightforward transfer of

class patterns in evaluation from the personal to the political realm.[20]

[Table 3 about here]

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[18] On occasion, within-class differences in reliance on a particular type of judgment overwhelm between-class difference. Thus, for example, both managers and skilled workers cite the flexibility and innovativeness of political parties at a significantly lower rate than professionals, while unskilled workers are not significantly different from professionals in their use of this judgment. In such an event, I note the fact for the reader but otherwise ignore the data from the ambiguous dimension of class.

[19] In the terms I have just coined, this ratio is the difference in class reliance scores divided by the average reliance score.

[20] Appendix 1 shows the full results for all regressions.

Policy evaluations

In the most concrete areas of policy evaluation, the hypotheses predicting class patterns in political judgment based on everyday distinctions of personal worth fare very well. In keeping with Lamont's discussion of working class approbation for hard work and disapproval of people who want "something for nothing," opposition to welfare and other forms of spending on the poor (so-called "government give-aways") makes up a much larger proportion of working class as compared to middle-class evaluations of candidates and parties. While people tend to oppose welfare spending more if they have higher incomes, this effect is swamped by the countervailing impact of education and occupation.[21]

The same is true of policy judgments related to working class protectiveness. Approval of candidates and parties with a more hard-line approach to crime forms a larger share of working class than middle class people's political judgments. The same pattern holds for class patterns of enthusiasm for military preparedness. In this instance, however, the class division seems to hold primarily among men: pro-military considerations are no more prominent among working class women than among their middle class counterparts.[22]

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[21] I tested class differences in the use of evaluations of parties and candidates that *favor* spending on the poor. Disproportionate working class use of such judgments would call into question the hypothesis of working-class boundary-drawing against the poor. Instead, I found no substantive class differences in use of the category (by the standards spelled out above).

[22] The NES data also contain anti-militarist judgments of parties and candidates, phrased in the NES codebook as "favor Pentagon spending cutbacks, reducing the armed forces, against overkill, against the Strategic Defense Initiative/'Star Wars.'" Disproportionate working-class reliance on judgments of this sort would undermine the pattern of working class pro-military enthusiasm found above. Instead, there were no significant class differences in the share of men's judgments taken up by such mentions, while there was significant evidence that, when judging both candidates and parties, women with a college degree rely on the category more than those with high school only or some college education.

Among working class respondents, there are marked *intra-class* differences in the salience of these latter judgments when applied to candidates as opposed to parties. Less educated and less skilled respondents among the working class rely more heavily on these sorts of policy judgments when evaluating presidential candidates, whereas the more educated and more skilled members of the working class lead the way in judging political parties by these same criteria. I can think of two possible explanations for this pattern. The first is that less privileged segments of the working class may look more to presidential candidates than to parties for signals about novel policy commitments that are attractive to them, whereas better educated members of the working class may be more likely to abstract from presidential and congressional candidates' messages to the policy positions of parties. A second explanation is more partisan in nature. Education is inversely correlated with Democratic voting (Manza and Brooks 1999), and partisan loyalty alone may make less well-off members of the working class less willing to criticize the party for policy lapses; this inhibition might apply less to candidates, who are only partly identified with their party. Whatever the case, it seems likely that presidential candidates are particularly important as conduits of new policy ideas to less educated voters.

In two instances of policy-related evaluations, the relatively clear expression of quotidian working class concerns is entirely reversed. Both cases involve political commitments to promote particular values, namely a strong work ethic and traditional family values. These are priorities which we know from Lamont's work to be very important to working class people's assessment of themselves, so it is something of a

mystery as to why their promotion as values should be such a markedly middle class preoccupation. I defer deeper discussion of this point to later in the paper.

Turning to our second hypothesis as illustrated in Figure 1, what are we to make of the fact that working class assessments of everyday personal worth shine through very clearly in their evaluations of candidates' and parties' policy commitments? Hypothesis 2, after all, predicts that when moving from personal to political preferences, middle class people are more likely to focus on substance (policy) over style (personal qualities of candidates). Lamont puts forward no middle class patterns of everyday judgment which are likely to issue in clear-cut policy preferences. For present purposes, this limits the direct comparison of middle class and working class propensities to translate everyday judgments into policy preferences. Nevertheless, given our expectation that everyday ethical assessments of political actors should be an even greater working class propensity, we can get some indirect comparative purchase on this hypothesis.

The class politics of personal character

Contrary to the predictions of Hypothesis 2, we find that middle class respondents convert everyday standards of judgment into personal judgments of presidential candidates quite readily, while working class respondents do so less avidly. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which puts the relevant findings from Table 3 into a more readily digestible format.

[Insert Figure 3 about here]

None of the personal qualities which working class people particularly prize in everyday life turn out to be especially working class criteria when it comes to evaluating candidates. Neither a candidate's propensity for hard work nor his patriotism seems to

register unusually strongly with working class observers, despite the fact that protectiveness and a strong work ethic appear prominently in working class patterns of policy evaluation. A candidate's morality and religiosity comes closest to qualifying as a heavily working class criterion of evaluation, on the basis of income differences alone in reliance on the category.[23] Evaluations of a candidate's straightforwardness and personal integrity also show signs of the expected class valence without being substantively large enough to qualify as significant. The criterion of integrity and trustworthiness provides an instructive contrast, since NES respondents also invoke it frequently when evaluating political parties. As a criterion for judging political *parties*, integrity does show the expected pattern of disproportionately working class usage. Thus, there seems to be something about the personal qualities of candidates that is relatively less salient to working class respondents.

Middle class respondents are quicker to deploy their preferred criteria of everyday judgment in assessing the personal qualities of presidential candidates. They rely considerably more heavily on judgments about a candidate's intelligence, expertise and flexibility or openness to new ideas. This latter criterion also appears to be a relative favorite of middle class people when judging political parties. Only in the case of a candidate's competence does the expected middle-class slant in judgment not pan out. In the latter case, competence includes comments about politicians' ability to "get things done" and to "get programs off the ground." In light of the evidence for working-class concern about concrete policies, it is perhaps less surprising that they match middle class respondents in their reliance on this criterion of judgment for candidates and parties alike.

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[23] Between 1972 and 2004, 102 respondents complained of a candidate's excessive religiousness or praised him for not being so, but (unsurprisingly, given the low number of mentions) there was no statistically significant class patterning in the use of this judgment.

In sum, working-class ethical predispositions do not translate as effectively into evaluations of presidential candidates as do the distinctions of everyday middle class life. This result runs directly counter to what Bourdieu and Converse lead us to expect.

Taken as a whole, these results suggest that judgments about presidential candidates' personal merits may matter more in general to middle class than to working class respondents. Is this simply a matter of a working class tendency to express their personal opinion of candidates in less articulate terms than middle class people do? Perhaps it often happens that, rather than calling a candidate "trustworthy," a working class correspondent will simply say "He seems like a good guy," allowing the specific content of their evaluation slipping through the survey researcher's net. This reasoning fails to explain why everyday working class judgments show up quite distinctly in comments about a candidate's policy positions on crime, welfare spending and military defense but fail to do so when the judgments involve his personal qualities. Nevertheless, this possibility can be tested to at least some degree of precision with the available NES data. We can also shed some light empirically on the question of whether middle class people rely more heavily on personal judgments of candidates in making political assessments in general.

To do this, I aggregate all evaluations of candidates' personal traits, both character traits and leadership qualities, and as before convert these into reliance scores, or proportions of a respondent's total set of judgments. The choice of what counts as a "personal trait" is not always straightforward. In general, I attempt to include implicit answers to the question "What is he like as a person and a politician?" while excluding answers to the questions "Do I approve of what he will do/has done and whose interests

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will he represent/has represented in office?" or "What are his ideological, group, or partisan affiliations?" Among the evaluations of personal traits that I include, some are of the highly general sort that we might expect from less articulate working class respondents:

- General reference to him as 'a good/bad man or a good/bad guy'; respondent has heard good/bad things about him; qualifications; general ability; reference to his 'personality'

- Just like/dislike him; like everything/don't like anything about him; 'I was hoping he would win the (nomination/primaries)'

- Used to like him but don't now; have lost respect for him

- The opponent who the candidate ran against; the candidate was the better of the two in general; the candidate ran against someone I really dislike

- Speaks of candidate as good/bad protector; will/won't know what to do

These highly general judgments are indeed used more heavily by working class respondents. High school graduates rely on these judgments more heavily than college graduates (p<.001), and people with higher incomes rely on them less (p<.05).[24] Taking both educational and income differences into account, the high school-college difference in reliance on these general considerations comes to 29% of their average use.

These categories are likely to do a good job of capturing inarticulate respondents' personal assessments of candidates. Unfortunately, they are likely to do the job too well. The "good/bad things" that a respondent has heard about a presidential hopeful may have to do with the candidate's policy positions rather than with his personal aura. Certainly some of the respondents who say they like or dislike everything about a candidate may have in mind not only his leadership and personal qualities but also whether he is likely

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[24] The data also indicate that unskilled workers use these categories at a higher rate than professionals, though the difference is statistically marginal (p=.056).

to stick up for the little guy in his management of the economy or some other such consideration. Such judgments would be classified as comments on a candidate's policy positions if they were explicitly stated. To the extent that working class respondents are less articulate about their political judgments in general, these highly general categories will soak up more implicit policy judgments from working class respondents than from middle class ones. Classifying these comments as assessments of a candidate's personal qualities is thus likely to create the impression of greater working class concern with candidates' personal characteristics than is actually warranted.

Given these ambiguities, this approach will yield a conservative test of the hypothesis that middle class respondents judge political candidates more by their personal traits than do working class respondents. A regression with the same independent variables as those used elsewhere in the analysis reveals a statistically significant class gradient in judgments about a candidate's personal qualities. (For regression details, see Appendix 1). Personal judgments form a significantly larger chunk of college-educated respondents' "likes and dislikes" about a candidate than they do of less educated people's "likes and dislikes." Those with higher household incomes also rely significantly more heavily on such judgments (p<.001). At a substantive level, the class contrast is less striking, however. When income and educational effects are added together, the class reliance ratio is only about 9%.[25]

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[25] In a supplementary analysis, not shown but available upon request from the author, I control for the possibility that working class respondents simply have a less clear mental picture of candidates' personal characteristics because they pay less attention to politics. To do this, I use a simple measure of political knowledge and awareness that has been championed by John Zaller (1992) in his work on mass opinion. This consists of a simple 5-point rating of respondents' apparent knowledge of politics that interviewers note down after administering the NES survey. This entirely subjective measure performs surprisingly well alongside more objective measures of political knowledge, John Zaller reports in his influential book on public opinion. The measure, he claims, "performs about as well as a scale constructed from 10 to 15 direct knowledge tests" and does not appear to be systematically biased in favor of higher-status people

Using this conservative test, we thus confirm the proposition that middle class

Americans judge presidential candidates more heavily by personal criteria than do

working class Americans, though this finding is admittedly more statistically sound than

substantively impressive. Nevertheless, we can conclude that presidential politics is

more personal for higher-status respondents.

An alternative test of the cross-class salience of personal judgments about candidates

The NES data permit another worthwhile test of how much importance middle

class and working class people attach to class-resonant personal judgments of presidential

candidates. In 1984, 1988, 1992, 2000 and 2004, the NES canvassed respondents for

their assessments of how intelligent both presidential candidates seemed to them, and in

the presidential election years from 1980 to 2004, it asked for opinions about how moral

the candidates were. To cross-check the regressions on open-ended candidate

assessments shown in Table 3, I run logit regressions predicting the voting intentions of

respondents who had rated both presidential candidates on their intelligence and

morality.[26] The variable of interest—respondent assessments of candidate morality and

intelligence—is entered as the *difference* between the scores assigned to each candidate.[27]

The regressions include the same class and demographic variables used in the simple

regressions on open-ended data shown in the Appendix, but also feature a dummy

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(Zaller 1992: 338). I normalize the variable within each survey year, substituting a z score for the 5-increment scale. When added to the standard regression on the share of personalized political judgments about candidates, this political knowledge variable does not interact significantly with any of the indicators of class employed (education, income, or occupation). Nor is the main effect of political awareness significant at the standard levels of statistical significance (p=.075). Thus, the results reported above provide a reliable portrait of underlying class propensities to make personal judgments of presidential candidates, net of different levels of attentiveness to politics.

[26] For respondents who had not yet made up their mind, I substitute their voting choice as reported in the post-election survey, if the data are available.

[27] The responses to the item take the form of how well the respondent thinks the trait characterizes the candidate: "extremely well," "quite well," "not too well," or "not well at all," which I convert into a simple scale ranging from 0 to 3.

variable for each year (and education-year interactions) to balance out election-specific contingencies. One additional interaction term between relative candidate ratings and partisanship controls for the fact that more educated people also tend to be more partisan (Zaller 1992). The substantive interest of the regression centers on the interaction terms between relative candidate ratings and education.

This test yields a surprising result, in light of our earlier findings. Relative ratings of candidate intelligence have the same link to voting[28] amongst people with different education levels. In the case of candidates' morality ratings, however, college educated respondents tie their vote choices more tightly to their personal assessments of the candidates on offer than do less educated people. The regression estimates that if a college-educated person gives one candidate a slight edge over the other in terms of morality but is equally disposed to vote for either candidate, another person who is entirely alike except that she or he has only a high school diploma is estimated to be only 43% likely to favor the candidate whose superior moral virtue has pulled him even in the contest for the college-educated respondent's vote.[29]

This result turns the class priorities suggested by the open-ended data on their head. In place of a strongly middle-class valorization of intelligence and a mild working-class priority for morality, we get a class-neutral prioritization of intelligence and greater concern among the college-educated for candidate morality. While this finding runs counter to the patterns suggested in the open-ended data, it does confirm the impression that middle class Americans are more generally attentive to the personal characteristics of presidential candidates than working class people.

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[28] I use the phrase "link to" rather than "impact on" advisedly, since it is easy to imagine a reverse causal link here.
[29] The educational contrast is statistically significant at p=0.014.

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The middle class politics of values

The theme of middle-class concern with personal attributes extends beyond their attention to politicians' character and personal traits. It also surfaces in the arena of policy judgments. Recall our finding that characteristically working class themes of everyday personal judgments translate reliably into working class judgments about the policy positions of candidates and parties. This generalization breaks down dramatically in two cases, however. These discrepancies are all the more dramatic in that they are the *only* cases in which we find the diametrical opposites of the predicted class preferences for evaluative categories. In both cases, parties and candidates are characterized as promoting *values* as opposed to concrete policies.

The first of these instances involves likes or dislikes of political parties on the grounds that they support (or do not sufficiently support) a strong work ethic, self-reliance, etc. These judgments are disproportionately the province of middle class respondents. This is all the more curious when we consider that essentially the same criterion of judgment, only tied more concretely to opposition to welfare spending, gets disproportionate working class support. Let us examine the codebook wording for both categories once more: the *work ethic* phrasing, favored by middle class respondents, goes as follows: "Favors work ethic, believes in self reliance/in people working hard to get ahead," while the reverse includes the converse of these judgments together with "believes in government handouts." The *anti-welfare* phrasing, favored by working class respondents, is as follows: "anti government aid/activity [with regard to welfare/poverty problems], anti give-aways, pro self-help." There is some overlap between the two categories. But the differences between the two, differences which presumably are

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responsible for divergent class reliance on each, center on the preoccupation of the first with values, while the latter focuses on actual redistributive policy.

A similar pattern emerges with judgments about politicians' support for traditional moral values. While we would expect working class people to voice disproportionate support for traditional morality, they are no more likely than middle class respondents to rely on judgments about a candidate's "strict/older/traditionalistic outlook," his promise to "improve/renew morality of country," his "pro-family [stances or defence of] family values," or his deficiencies on these dimensions. When it comes to judging political parties, middle class respondents have a decided edge on working class people in their attentiveness to this same criterion.

Summary of findings

I summarize the empirical findings of the paper by revising the grid, shown as Figure 1, that graphically represents Hypothesis 2. The latter figure hypothesized a set of transformations mediating between people's everyday judgments and their evaluations of different objects in the political sphere. In face of the accumulated evidence, I summarize the new map of these transformations in Figure 4.

[Insert Figure 4 about here]

Discussion

Stepping back from the evidence, we can discern two major surprises that call out for explanation. The first is the fact that middle class people seem more concerned with candidates' personal attributes than do working class people. The second surprise is the middle class preoccupation with what we might call a "politics of values" as compared to a more concretely distributive and punitive working class approach to politics.

What explains middle class respondents' greater attention to the personal attributes of political leaders? After all, Pierre Bourdieu and Samuel Popkin can be read as suggesting that less educated, less privileged observers of politics might resort to ethical judgments as a "short-cut" around the more intellectually taxing task of evaluating policy positions. Instead, it seems to be the case that more privileged people lavish more attention on personal assessments of politicians. Perhaps this is an extension of the habits of personal evaluation required by professional and managerial jobs (Lamont 1992; Bernstein 1971). By this account, middle class people become connoisseurs of individual character and motivation because they are constantly required to consider these elements when navigating the relationships of the professional and business worlds.

In the American context, then, we may need to revise Bourdieu's extension of the Philip Converse argument that ideology occupies the pinnacle of the hierarchy of political sophistication while personal ethical evaluations remain at the bottom. Instead, in America, the propensity to pass personal and ethical judgment on candidates constitutes parallel hierarchy to that of ideological sophistication. From within the French political field sketched by Bourdieu in *Distinction* (1984), this may make American elites seem unsophisticated and naïvely preoccupied with "non-political" ethical matters. But if the elite *habitus* sets the tone for a field, we must admit personal judgments as a feature of the "dominant" American political style.

What about the sudden middle-class appropriation of apparently "working-class" themes of hard work and traditional morality when these priorities are expressed not in concrete policy judgments but as value orientations in policymaking? One possibility is that middle class people are simply more comfortable with the *language* of values. This

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might stem from nothing more than educated people's predilections for ideological abstraction. I want to suggest a different interpretation, however: middle class people may be genuinely more convinced that individual values can be cultivated through political action, whereas working class respondents are skeptical of this idea and simply want public policy to reward virtue and punish vice. I must confess that this second interpretation is attractive partly on the grounds that it is more interesting. But it also gives us a way of explaining the finding, illustrated in Figure 2, that more educated Americans are more likely to cite moral decay as a major problem facing the nation. We know from Clem Brooks's work that this sentiment was on the rise in presidential elections in the late 20th century, and that it influenced voting (Brooks 2002). So the comparatively well-educated group of people who are preoccupied with waning moral values also look to the political realm to redress the problem. There are good grounds for hypothesizing a general middle-class American tendency to seek out politically-assisted transformations in individual values.

I would like to suggest two possible theoretical explanations for this characteristic of the dominant American political culture. The first points to characteristics of middle class culture described in Annette Lareau's recent work (Lareau 2002, 2003). Lareau argues that upper middle class Americans intensively cultivate their children, expecting to shape their habits and desires, whereas working class parents set non-negotiable limits for children and care for their fundamental needs but expect their children to mature naturally (Lareau 2002, 2003). In a way, of course, these differences reflect upper middle class and working class people's experiences in the workplace. Managers and many professionals spend their working lives attempting to cultivate advantageous dispositions

in the people around them, be they employees or clients. For working class people, in contrast, work generally involves manipulating materials rather than influencing people. In addition, authority in the workplace and interactions with high-status professionals are more likely to appear as non-negotiable and constraining to working class individuals (Bernstein 1971 and Lareau 2003). Perhaps these class differences in experience leave traces not only in childrearing practices but also in citizens' implicit theories of politics. Whereas middle class people view individual motivation as being subject to active influence, making a politics of values actually possible, working class respondents may place less faith in the ability of politics to change people's ethical orientations. This would explain why working class political concerns instead focus on whether the rewards and punishments at the disposal of government are properly allocated.

A second interpretation of the middle class proclivity for a politics of individual values points not to the differing influences of middle class and working class occupations, but to broader characteristics of American political culture. Many observers have commented on the American tendency to conduct social movements urging moral renewal (e.g., Morone 2003; Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2004). While I have noted the politicized moral traditionalism of more educated Americans in this paper, the American quest for moral transformation has of course been a characteristic of the left as well. The civil rights and women's liberation movements of the 1960s and 70s were framed as efforts to transform individual moral attitudes. This habit of trying to change society by changing the hearts and minds of individuals is partly attributable to decentralized character of the American polity. It is so difficult to legislate in the U.S.

that transforming public opinion may appear as a necessary first step in achieving social change.

To the extent that this political reality has taken root in the taken-for-granted repertoires and assumptions of the dominant American political culture, it is likely to impress itself most heavily upon society's most educated members. John Zaller argues for a "mainstream effect" by which the logic of a political culture is internalized most fully by the most educated people in a society (Zaller 1992: 98-100). The flip side of this dynamic, of course, is that a society's most privileged stratum sets the tone for its culture (Bourdieu 1984). Here again, the contrast with Bourdieu's portrait of French political culture is instructive. Bourdieu implies that elite political culture in France is marked by ideological "hyper-coherence" (*ibid*: 421) and an appreciation of appropriately "political" considerations which are distinct from quotidian ethical predispositions. This ideological drive among the French may be the mirror image of an American tendency to assume that good politics arises out of, and produces, good personal qualities rather than sound ideological convictions.

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Table 1: Dependent variable descriptions and summary statistics

Category and codebook wording	Predicted class use	Candidates or parties	N using	Proportion of respondents using	Proportion of all judgments
Hard work Public servant, man of duty, conscientious, hard-working, would be a full-time President, dedicated, really interested in serving people	Working class +	Candidate	505	3.02%	0.56%
Work ethic Favors work ethic, believes in self reliance/in people working hard to get ahead (reverse includes: believes in government handouts). [No specific policy mentioned.]	Working class +	Party	596	2.49%	0.69%
Anti-poverty spending Welfare/poverty problems—Anti government aid/activity, anti give-aways, pro self-help	Working class +	Candidate	519	3.11%	0.68%
		Party	1,205	5.04%	1.62%
Integrity Honest/sincere, keeps promises, man of integrity, means what he says, fair, not tricky, open and candid, straightforward (for 1976, positive reference to Carter's openness in Playboy interview)	Working class +	Candidate	4,264	25.53%	6.11%
Can trust them, they keep their promises, you know where they stand	Working class +	Party	1,489	6.23%	2.60%
Law and order Pro-law and order, hard line on crime, blacks, campus demonstrators, criminal/organized crime/hoodlums/street crime, pro-power of the police, anti-interference with the courts, pro-death penalty	Working class +	Candidate	443	2.65%	0.69%
		Party	226	0.95%	0.27%
Pro-military preparedness In favor of a strong military position, military preparedness, weapons systems, Pentagon spending, Strategic Defense Initiative	Working class +	Candidate	783	4.69%	0.94%
		Party	777	3.25%	0.97%
Patriotism Makes people feel good about America/being Americans, is patriotic/loves the country, patriotic stand on Pledge of Allegiance issue	Working class +	Candidate	151	0.98%	0.17%
Morality, religiosity Religious, moral, God-fearing, (reverse includes judgment that Playboy interview reflects badly on Carter)	Working class +	Candidate	669	4.00%	0.87%

Public morality In favor of strict/older/traditionalistic outlook, will improve/renew morality of country, pro-family, defends family values	Working class +	Candidate	284	1.70%	0.30%
		Party	422	1.77%	0.50%
Expertise Understands the nation's problems, well informed, studies up on the issues (reverse includes: doesn't know what is going on in the country)	Middle class +	Candidate	751	4.50%	0.78%
Intelligence Intelligent, smart	Middle class +	Candidate	603	3.61%	0.60%
Flexibility Acceptance of change/new ideas, less bound to status quo, more open to new ideas/ways of doing things, flexible, innovative	Middle class +	Candidate	336	2.01%	0.29%
		Party	531	2.22%	0.67%
Competence Gets more done/ accomplishes as much/ more productive; (for candidates only, reverse includes: hasn't done anything, hasn't produced any results (general), has not been able to get programs off the ground)	Middle class +	Candidate	381	2.28%	0.46%
		Party	398	1.67%	0.59%
All references to candidate's personal qualities Includes references to candidate's qualities as a person and a leader. Excludes considerations of candidate's past or future performance, ideological or group affiliations, and policy positions.	Working class ?	Candidate	12,184	72.94%	41.12%

* Insufficient n for analysis

Table 2: Independent variable descriptions and summary statistics

Variable description	Proportion of sample in category - or - Mean
Class variables	
Education:	
Less than high school diploma	.2199
High school diploma only	.3409
Some college (incl. associate's degree)	.2330
College degree *(excluded category)*	.2062
Household income, in thousands of 2004 dollars	51.48
Occupation:	
Professional *(excluded category)*	.1235
Manager/administrator	.875
Routine white collar employee	.1241
Proprietor	.649
Skilled/blue collar worker	.647
Unskilled/semiskilled worker	.1403
Homemaker	.1356
Other not in workforce: student, retired, unemployed, completely disabled	.2593
Control variables	
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female)	.5568
Race (0 = non-black, 1 = black)	.1193
Census region:	
Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT) *(excluded category)*	.1892
North Central (Midwest) (IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI)	.2689
South (AL, AR, DE, D.C., FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV)	.3523
West (AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY)	.1895

Note: Samples for regressions on evaluations of candidates and parties do not overlap fully. These descriptive statistics reflect a pooled sample of all NES respondents between 1972-2004 presented with the opportunity to evaluate candidates or parties, or both.

Table 3: Summary of regression results comparing everyday personal and political judgments by class

| Criterion of Judgment	Most prominent class contrasts, by class dimension (income, education or occupation)									Class pattern in *everyday* use of judgment	Class pattern in *political* use of judgment
	Income		Education				Occupation				
	College vs. HS incomes		College vs. high school		College vs. some college						
	Stat. signif.	Reliance ratio	Stat. signif.	Reliance ratio	Stat. signif.	Reliance ratio	Largest occupation-al contrast	Stat. signif.	Reliance ratio		
Work ethic											
Hardworking (candidate)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Working class +	No class pattern
Pro-work ethic (party)	—	—	***	+63%	—	—	Managers vs. Unskilled workers	*	+44%	Working class +	Middle class +
Anti-welfare spending (candidate)	**	+12%	**	-63%	—	—	Professionals vs. Unskilled workers	*	-76%	Working class +	Working class +
Anti-welfare spending (party)	**	+15%	—	—	**	-31%	Professionals vs. Skilled workers	**	-62%	Working class +	Working class +
Integrity and straightforwardness											
Integrity (candidate)	***	+8%	**	-19%	—	—	—	—	—	Working class +	Modestly working class +
Integrity (party)	**	-7%	***	-36%	—	—	—	—	—	Working class +	Working class +
Protectiveness											
Pro-law and order (candidate)	—	—	**	-53%	—	—	—	—	—	Working class +	Working class +
Pro-law and order (party)	—	—	—	—	—	—	Managers vs. Skilled workers	*	-159%	Working class +	Working class +
Pro-military (candidate); male respondents only	*	+12%	***	-89%	—	—	—	—	—	Working class +	Working class +

Note: **Statistical significance** levels refer to class differences in reliance on categories of judgment, and are denoted as * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001 using two-tailed significance tests. Class **reliance ratios** compare differences in reliance scores between indicated groups with average reliance on a particular category of judgment. Class **reliance ratios** are given a plus sign to indicate greater middle class reliance on a category of judgment and a minus sign to indicate greater working class reliance on a category.

Table 3: Summary of regression results comparing everyday personal and political judgments by class

Criterion of Judgment	Most prominent class contrasts, by class dimension (income, education or occupation)									Class pattern in *everyday* use of judgment	Class pattern in *political* use of judgment
	Income		Education				Occupation				
	College vs. HS incomes		College vs. high school		College vs. some college						
	Stat. signif.	Reliance ratio	Stat. signif.	Reliance ratio	Stat. signif.	Reliance ratio	Largest occupation-al contrast	Stat. signif.	Reliance ratio		
Protectiveness (continued)											
Pro-military (candidate); female respondents only	—	—	*	-48%	—	—	Professionals vs. Unskilled workers	*	+79%	Working class +	No clear class pattern
Pro-military (party); male respondents only	—	—	—	—	**	-43%	—	—	—	Working class +	Working class +
Pro-military (party); female respondents only	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Working class +	No class pattern
Patriotism (candidate)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Working class +	No class pattern
Traditional morality											
Morality (candidate)	***	-19%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Working class +	Modestly working class +
Pro-public morality (candidate)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Working class +	No class pattern
Pro-public morality (party)	—	—	**	+70%	—	—	Professionals vs. Unskilled workers	*	+64%	Working class +	Middle class +
Intelligence and expertise											
Intelligence (candidate)	—	—	***	+91%	—	—	—	—	—	Middle class +	Middle class +
Expertise (candidate)	—	—	***	+56%	—	—	—	—	—	Middle class +	Middle class +

Note: **Statistical significance** levels refer to class differences in reliance on categories of judgment, and are denoted as * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, and *** $p<0.001$ using two-tailed significance tests. Class **reliance ratios** compare differences in reliance scores between indicated groups with average reliance on a particular category of judgment. Class **reliance ratios** are given a plus sign to indicate greater middle class reliance on a category of judgment and a minus sign to indicate greater working class reliance on a category.

Table 3: Summary of regression results comparing everyday personal and political judgments by class

Criterion of Judgment	Most prominent class contrasts, by class dimension (income, education or occupation)									Class pattern in *everyday* use of judgment	Class pattern in *political* use of judgment
	Income		Education				Occupation				
	College vs. HS incomes		College vs. high school		College vs. some college						
	Stat. signif.	Reliance ratio	Stat. signif.	Reliance ratio	Stat. signif.	Reliance ratio	Largest occupational contrast	Stat. signif.	Reliance ratio		
Flexibility and openness to ideas											
Flexibility, openness to new ideas (candidate)	—	—	*	+57%	—	—	—	—	—	Middle class +	Middle class +
Flexibility, openness to new ideas (party)	—	—	**	+43%	—	—	Intra-class diffces. exceed cross-class diffces.	—	—	Middle class +	Middle class +
Competence											
Competence (candidate)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Middle class +	No class pattern
Competence (party)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Middle class +	No class pattern
All judgments about personal qualities											
All personal judgments (candidate)	***	+2%	—	—	***	+7%	—	—	—	Working class?	Modestly middle class +

Note: **Statistical significance** levels refer to class differences in reliance on categories of judgment, and are denoted as * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, and *** $p<0.001$ using two-tailed significance tests. Class **reliance ratios** compare differences in reliance scores between indicated groups with average reliance on a particular category of judgment. Class **reliance ratios** are given a plus sign to indicate greater middle class reliance on a category of judgment and a minus sign to indicate greater working class reliance on a category.

Figure 1: Hypothesized influence of judgment *type* and *object* on political expression of class criteria of political judgment.

	Candidates	**Parties**
Personal judgments	Working class criteria **GREATLY ENHANCED** vs. middle class criteria	Working class criteria **ENHANCED** vs. middle class criteria
Policy judgments	Middle class criteria **ENHANCED** vs. working class criteria	Middle class criteria **ENHANCED** vs. working class criteria

Figure 2: Different measures of traditionalism, by education

Traditionalism by education level as measured by CLOSED-ENDED agree/disagree items from National Election Studies

Traditionalism by education level as measured by OPEN-ENDED items from National Election Studies

Figure 3: Expected and actual class patterns in personal evaluations of presidential candidates

Expected pattern in usage of judgment	Judgments for which hypothesis is **not** supported	Judgments for which hypothesis is only **modestly** supported	Judgments for which hypothesis is supported
Working class +	Hardworkingness Patriotism	Integrity Morality	—
Middle class +	Competence	—	Intelligence Expertise/ knowledgeableness Flexibility/openness to ideas

Figure 4: Findings about class propensities to convert everyday criteria of personal judgment into political judgments

	Candidates	**Parties**
Personal judgments	**Middle class criteria ENHANCED vs. working class criteria**	**Working class and middle class criteria BOTH EXPRESSED**
Policy judgments	Policies championing individual values **Middle class criteria ENHANCED vs. working class criteria**	Policies championing individual values **Middle class criteria ENHANCED vs. working class criteria**
	Distributive and punitive policies **Working class criteria EXPRESSED**	Distributive and punitive policies **Working class criteria EXPRESSED**

Hard work (candidate)				Pro work ethic (party)		
Number of obs = 13434	F (18, 13415) = 1.96			Number of obs = 14433	F (18, 14414) = 11.20	
R-squared = 0.0030	Prob > F = 0.0087			R-squared = 0.0110	Prob > F = 0.0000	
	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value		Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value
Manager	0.001656	0.001220	0.175	Manager	0.000288	0.001646	0.861
RWC	0.000439	0.001188	0.712	RWC	-0.000021	0.001554	0.989
Proprietor	-0.000589	0.001273	0.644	Proprietor	0.002000	0.002094	0.340
Skilled wkr	0.002471	0.001932	0.201	Skilled wkr	-0.001670	0.001794	0.352
Unskilled wkr	0.000481	0.001310	0.714	Unskilled wkr	-0.002782	0.001382	0.044
Homemaker	0.001263	0.001529	0.409	Homemaker	-0.000059	0.001557	0.970
Other	-0.001233	0.001130	0.275	Other	-0.000703	0.001480	0.635
Income	-0.000017	0.000009	0.055	Income	0.000023	0.000012	0.051
Less than HS	-0.000393	0.001249	0.753	Less than HS	-0.007447	0.001263	0.000
High school	-0.001329	0.000907	0.143	High school	-0.004317	0.001196	0.000
Some college	0.000853	0.000954	0.371	Some college	-0.001704	0.001235	0.168
Age	-0.000150	0.000088	0.086	Age	0.000343	0.000074	0.000
Age squared	0.000003	0.000001	0.027	Age squared	-0.000004	0.000001	0.000
Female	0.001793	0.000781	0.022	Female	-0.001810	0.000798	0.023
Midwest	0.000657	0.000814	0.420	Midwest	0.002242	0.001040	0.031
South	0.000693	0.000806	0.390	South	0.001293	0.000948	0.173
West	0.001917	0.001041	0.066	West	0.001534	0.001074	0.153
Black	0.000073	0.001159	0.950	Black	-0.002435	0.000734	0.001
Constant	0.005503	0.001489	0.000	Constant	0.004134	0.001647	0.012

Anti-welfare spending (candidate)				Anti-welfare spending (party)		
Number of obs = 13434	F (18, 13415) = 3.29			Number of obs = 14433	F (18, 14414) = 11.25	
R-squared = 0.0045	Prob > F = 0.0000			R-squared = 0.0109	Prob > F = 0.0000	
	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value		Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value
Manager	0.001414	0.001401	0.313	Manager	0.003113	0.002090	0.136
RWC	-0.001132	0.001539	0.462	RWC	0.002440	0.002274	0.283
Proprietor	0.002077	0.001783	0.244	Proprietor	0.010001	0.003082	0.001
Skilled wkr	0.002335	0.002003	0.244	Skilled wkr	0.010021	0.003592	0.005
Unskilled wkr	0.005171	0.002024	0.011	Unskilled wkr	0.003427	0.002502	0.171
Homemaker	-0.000024	0.001673	0.989	Homemaker	0.007259	0.002699	0.007
Other	0.001014	0.001322	0.443	Other	0.004050	0.002115	0.056
Income	0.000028	0.000011	0.008	Income	0.000084	0.000019	0.000
Less than HS	0.004776	0.001565	0.002	Less than HS	-0.004077	0.002022	0.044
High school	0.004265	0.001244	0.001	High school	0.000711	0.001831	0.698
Some college	0.003161	0.001132	0.005	Some college	0.005054	0.001818	0.005
Age	-0.000029	0.000093	0.758	Age	0.000558	0.000121	0.000
Age squared	-0.000001	0.000001	0.411	Age squared	-0.000008	0.000002	0.000
Female	0.001898	0.000965	0.049	Female	-0.000878	0.001321	0.506
Midwest	-0.000264	0.001169	0.822	Midwest	0.001563	0.001794	0.383
South	0.001402	0.001159	0.226	South	0.003409	0.001701	0.045
West	-0.000704	0.001075	0.513	West	-0.000811	0.001767	0.646
Black	0.001504	0.001874	0.422	Black	-0.010426	0.001299	0.000
Constant	0.001745	0.001705	0.306	Constant	-0.000503	0.002721	0.853

Note: Excluded categories are professionals, college graduates, men, residents of the Northeast and non-blacks. "RWC" are routine white collar employees, and "other" include students, retirees, the permanently disabled or unemployed, and other non-homemakers who are not in the workforce. Age and age squared are centered at age 18.

Integrity (candidate)				Integrity (party)		
Number of obs = 13434		F (18, 13415) = 9.95		Number of obs = 14433		F (18, 14414) = 5.84
R-squared =	0.0139	Prob > F = 0.0000		R-squared = 0.0059		Prob > F = 0.0000
	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value		Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value
Manager	-0.003837	0.004360	0.379	Manager	-0.003566	0.002779	0.199
RWC	-0.007914	0.004444	0.075	RWC	0.000022	0.003519	0.995
Proprietor	-0.005491	0.004950	0.267	Proprietor	-0.004224	0.003189	0.185
Skilled wkr	-0.007330	0.005433	0.177	Skilled wkr	0.002489	0.004542	0.584
Unskilled wkr	-0.004121	0.004665	0.377	Unskilled wkr	0.002127	0.003800	0.576
Homemaker	0.011209	0.005091	0.028	Homemaker	0.007686	0.003696	0.038
Other	-0.004566	0.004216	0.279	Other	0.003940	0.003198	0.218
Income	0.000172	0.000033	0.000	Income	-0.000067	0.000023	0.003
Less than HS	-0.002515	0.003976	0.527	Less than HS	0.006280	0.003334	0.060
High school	0.011325	0.003420	0.001	High school	0.009468	0.002567	0.000
Some college	-0.000656	0.003142	0.835	Some college	0.005475	0.002317	0.018
Age	0.000336	0.000254	0.186	Age	0.000223	0.000197	0.258
Age squared	0.000002	0.000004	0.596	Age squared	-0.000003	0.000003	0.372
Female	0.002303	0.002445	0.346	Female	-0.001335	0.001964	0.497
Midwest	-0.007164	0.003487	0.040	Midwest	-0.003668	0.002878	0.203
South	-0.016621	0.003292	0.000	South	-0.008568	0.002703	0.002
West	-0.005700	0.003666	0.120	West	-0.010757	0.002693	0.000
Black	-0.007025	0.003492	0.044	Black	0.002758	0.003021	0.361
Constant	0.047804	0.005353	0.000	Constant	0.025290	0.004095	0.000

Pro-military (candidate); male respondents only				Pro-military (candidate); female respondents only		
Number of obs = 6107		F (17, 6089) = 6.44		Number of obs = 7327		F (17, 7309) = 5.64
R-squared =	0.0142	Prob > F = 0.0000		R-squared = 0.0095		Prob > F = 0.0000
	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value		Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value
Manager	-0.001742	0.003013	0.563	Manager	-0.003477	0.002042	0.089
RWC	-0.006892	0.003514	0.050	RWC	0.000319	0.002056	0.877
Proprietor	-0.009405	0.002821	0.001	Proprietor	0.001916	0.004629	0.679
Skilled wkr	-0.004220	0.003638	0.246	Skilled wkr	-0.000430	0.005340	0.936
Unskilled wkr	-0.005948	0.003241	0.066	Unskilled wkr	-0.004732	0.001991	0.017
Homemaker	-0.018920	0.004804	0.000	Homemaker	-0.003094	0.001786	0.083
Other	-0.005440	0.002986	0.069	Other	-0.002913	0.001728	0.092
Income	0.000058	0.000025	0.023	Income	0.000020	0.000015	0.195
Less than HS	0.006444	0.002327	0.006	Less than HS	-0.000044	0.001404	0.975
High school	0.012108	0.002540	0.000	High school	0.002881	0.001445	0.046
Some college	0.010736	0.002191	0.000	Some college	0.002482	0.001462	0.090
Age	-0.000254	0.000189	0.178	Age	-0.000039	0.000098	0.691
Age squared	0.000001	0.000003	0.761	Age squared	-0.000001	0.000001	0.611
—				—			
Midwest	-0.002068	0.002035	0.310	Midwest	0.000786	0.001189	0.508
South	0.003725	0.002272	0.101	South	0.002380	0.001301	0.067
West	0.001573	0.002487	0.527	West	0.000638	0.001375	0.643
Black	-0.007601	0.002422	0.002	Black	-0.005821	0.000941	0.000
Constant	0.013041	0.003870	0.001	Constant	0.007023	0.002469	0.004

Note: Excluded categories are professionals, college graduates, men, residents of the Northeast and non-blacks. "RWC" are routine white collar employees, and "other" include students, retirees, the permanently disabled or unemployed, and other non-homemakers who are not in the workforce. Age and age squared are centered at age 18.

Pro-military (party); male respondents only

	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value
Number of obs = 6941		F (17, 6923) = 7.99	
R-squared =	0.0139	Prob > F = 0.0000	
Manager	0.000390	0.002669	0.884
RWC	0.001240	0.003957	0.754
Proprietor	-0.001008	0.003334	0.762
Skilled wkr	0.000288	0.003188	0.928
Unskilled wkr	0.000195	0.003427	0.955
Homemaker	0.010307	0.015977	0.519
Other	0.000684	0.003023	0.821
Income	0.000020	0.000024	0.391
Less than HS	0.004673	0.003105	0.132
High school	0.004574	0.002225	0.040
Some college	0.006228	0.002301	0.007
Age	-0.000445	0.000196	0.023
Age squared	0.000001	0.000003	0.771
—			
Midwest	0.001319	0.002013	0.512
South	0.007450	0.002235	0.001
West	0.002509	0.002147	0.242
Black	-0.009391	0.002729	0.001
Constant	0.018179	0.003933	0.000

Pro-military (party); female respondents only

	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value
Number of obs = 7492		F (17, 7474) = 3.18	
R-squared =	0.0074	Prob > F = 0.0000	
Manager	0.002571	0.002317	0.267
RWC	0.001298	0.001891	0.493
Proprietor	-0.003565	0.001639	0.030
Skilled wkr	0.018764	0.013685	0.170
Unskilled wkr	0.000616	0.002117	0.771
Homemaker	0.000266	0.001600	0.868
Other	-0.000334	0.001514	0.825
Income	0.000017	0.000015	0.237
Less than HS	-0.001510	0.001388	0.277
High school	0.000798	0.001417	0.573
Some college	-0.000350	0.001339	0.794
Age	-0.000162	0.000088	0.065
Age squared	0.000001	0.000001	0.317
—			
Midwest	-0.000562	0.001286	0.662
South	0.001396	0.001301	0.283
West	-0.000986	0.001282	0.442
Black	-0.004027	0.001020	0.000
Constant	0.007849	0.002100	0.000

Pro-law and order (candidate)

	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value
Number of obs = 13434		F (18, 13415) = 2.21	
R-squared =	0.0028	Prob > F = 0.0023	
Manager	0.001859	0.001650	0.260
RWC	0.003160	0.001933	0.102
Proprietor	-0.001446	0.001511	0.338
Skilled wkr	0.003130	0.002219	0.158
Unskilled wkr	0.000990	0.001803	0.583
Homemaker	0.001904	0.001847	0.303
Other	0.000090	0.001415	0.950
Income	0.000013	0.000013	0.321
Less than HS	0.003168	0.001507	0.036
High school	0.003660	0.001310	0.005
Some college	0.002634	0.001159	0.023
Age	0.000063	0.000092	0.493
Age squared	-0.000002	0.000001	0.177
Female	-0.000353	0.000924	0.702
Midwest	0.000683	0.001136	0.548
South	0.003102	0.001250	0.013
West	0.000756	0.001177	0.521
Black	-0.001602	0.001548	0.301
Constant	0.002036	0.001950	0.296

Pro-law and order (party)

	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value
Number of obs = 14433		F (18, 14414) = 1.19	
R-squared =	0.0027	Prob > F = 0.2629	
Manager	-0.000056	0.000744	0.940
RWC	0.000002	0.000850	0.998
Proprietor	-0.000378	0.000837	0.652
Skilled wkr	0.004144	0.001990	0.037
Unskilled wkr	0.000227	0.000885	0.797
Homemaker	0.001813	0.001260	0.150
Other	-0.000349	0.000748	0.641
Income	-0.000010	0.000007	0.129
Less than HS	-0.000303	0.000909	0.739
High school	-0.001024	0.000663	0.123
Some college	0.000796	0.000691	0.249
Age	0.000043	0.000044	0.333
Age squared	-0.000001	0.000001	0.204
Female	-0.000324	0.000428	0.449
Midwest	-0.001977	0.000828	0.017
South	-0.001406	0.000854	0.100
West	-0.000991	0.000983	0.314
Black	-0.000145	0.000779	0.852
Constant	0.004181	0.001077	0.000

Note: Excluded categories are professionals, college graduates, men, residents of the Northeast and non-blacks. "RWC" are routine white collar employees, and "other" include students, retirees, the permanently disabled or unemployed, and other non-homemakers who are not in the workforce. Age and age squared are centered at age 18.

Patriotism (candidate)				**Morality (candidate)**		
Number of obs = 13434	F (18, 13415) = 2.79			Number of obs = 13434	F (18, 13415) = 5.29	
R-squared = 0.0033	Prob > F = 0.0001			R-squared = 0.0092	Prob > F = 0.0000	
	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value		Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value
Manager	0.000003	0.000460	0.995	Manager	-0.000286	0.001409	0.839
RWC	0.000860	0.000650	0.186	RWC	0.000057	0.001550	0.970
Proprietor	0.002385	0.001372	0.082	Proprietor	0.002190	0.001862	0.240
Skilled wkr	0.000422	0.000668	0.528	Skilled wkr	-0.001365	0.001469	0.353
Unskilled wkr	0.000989	0.000674	0.142	Unskilled wkr	-0.000874	0.001683	0.603
Homemaker	0.001069	0.000738	0.148	Homemaker	0.004965	0.002194	0.024
Other	-0.000203	0.000556	0.715	Other	-0.003209	0.001485	0.031
Income	0.000011	0.000006	0.095	Income	-0.000056	0.000011	0.000
Less than HS	-0.000313	0.000657	0.634	Less than HS	0.000146	0.001616	0.928
High school	0.000422	0.000518	0.415	High school	-0.000117	0.001226	0.924
Some college	0.000058	0.000450	0.897	Some college	0.000165	0.001070	0.877
Age	-0.000032	0.000039	0.408	Age	0.000195	0.000093	0.036
Age squared	0.000001	0.000001	0.061	Age squared	-0.000001	0.000002	0.594
Female	-0.000666	0.000434	0.125	Female	0.003221	0.000916	0.000
Midwest	-0.000350	0.000594	0.556	Midwest	0.002197	0.001242	0.077
South	0.000025	0.000533	0.963	South	0.002149	0.001187	0.070
West	-0.000133	0.000577	0.818	West	-0.000046	0.001211	0.970
Black	-0.000950	0.000420	0.024	Black	-0.003768	0.001343	0.005
Constant	0.000535	0.000708	0.450	Constant	0.004747	0.001872	0.011

Pro-public morality (candidate)				**Pro-public morality (party)**		
Number of obs = 13434	F (18, 13415) = 3.69			Number of obs = 14433	F (18, 14414) = 6.99	
R-squared = 0.0038	Prob > F = 0.0000			R-squared = 0.0070	Prob > F = 0.0000	
	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value		Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value
Manager	-0.000399	0.001198	0.739	Manager	-0.002592	0.001484	0.081
RWC	-0.001019	0.001163	0.381	RWC	-0.001876	0.001611	0.244
Proprietor	0.000774	0.001279	0.545	Proprietor	-0.000402	0.001884	0.831
Skilled wkr	-0.000332	0.001083	0.759	Skilled wkr	-0.002380	0.001452	0.101
Unskilled wkr	-0.000454	0.001095	0.679	Unskilled wkr	-0.003161	0.001306	0.015
Homemaker	-0.001750	0.001206	0.147	Homemaker	0.000039	0.001889	0.984
Other	-0.000662	0.000954	0.488	Other	-0.002539	0.001380	0.066
Income	-0.000003	0.000007	0.696	Income	-0.000009	0.000010	0.327
Less than HS	-0.001632	0.000855	0.056	Less than HS	-0.005131	0.001158	0.000
High school	-0.000093	0.000852	0.913	High school	-0.003453	0.001103	0.002
Some college	0.000263	0.000764	0.731	Some college	-0.000876	0.001122	0.435
Age	0.000040	0.000054	0.459	Age	0.000019	0.000067	0.779
Age squared	-0.000001	0.000001	0.315	Age squared	-0.000001	0.000001	0.301
Female	0.002094	0.000584	0.000	Female	0.001450	0.000762	0.057
Midwest	0.002203	0.000714	0.002	Midwest	0.003566	0.000932	0.000
South	0.001767	0.000602	0.003	South	0.002419	0.000864	0.005
West	0.000875	0.000577	0.129	West	0.001665	0.000834	0.046
Black	-0.002556	0.000532	0.000	Black	-0.002628	0.000815	0.001
Constant	0.001765	0.001281	0.168	Constant	0.007493	0.001597	0.000

Note: Excluded categories are professionals, college graduates, men, residents of the Northeast and non-blacks. "RWC" are routine white collar employees, and "other" include students, retirees, the permanently disabled or unemployed, and other non-homemakers who are not in the workforce. Age and age squared are centered at age 18.

Intelligence (candidate)				Expertise (candidate)		
Number of obs = 13434	F (18, 13415) = 5.82			Number of obs = 13434	F (18, 13415) = 3.63	
R-squared = 0.0085	Prob > F = 0.0000			R-squared = 0.0045	Prob > F = 0.0000	
	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value		Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value
Manager	-0.001292	0.001611	0.423	Manager	0.001780	0.001526	0.243
RWC	-0.002451	0.001297	0.059	RWC	-0.000964	0.001378	0.484
Proprietor	-0.004214	0.001333	0.002	Proprietor	-0.000824	0.001653	0.618
Skilled wkr	-0.001608	0.001574	0.307	Skilled wkr	-0.001302	0.001534	0.396
Unskilled wkr	-0.002422	0.001292	0.061	Unskilled wkr	0.000447	0.001567	0.775
Homemaker	-0.001796	0.001460	0.219	Homemaker	-0.000628	0.001637	0.701
Other	-0.001090	0.001413	0.440	Other	-0.000101	0.001436	0.944
Income	0.000018	0.000009	0.057	Income	0.000000	0.000011	0.970
Less than HS	-0.004042	0.001263	0.001	Less than HS	-0.005962	0.001375	0.000
High school	-0.005442	0.000973	0.000	High school	-0.004372	0.001159	0.000
Some college	-0.003764	0.001057	0.000	Some college	-0.002347	0.001137	0.039
Age	-0.000017	0.000069	0.810	Age	-0.000042	0.000094	0.659
Age squared	0.000001	0.000001	0.303	Age squared	0.000002	0.000002	0.237
Female	-0.000071	0.000710	0.920	Female	0.001340	0.000858	0.119
Midwest	-0.000609	0.000918	0.507	Midwest	0.000161	0.001165	0.890
South	-0.000872	0.000840	0.299	South	-0.001293	0.001077	0.230
West	0.000877	0.000976	0.369	West	-0.001591	0.001122	0.156
Black	-0.002105	0.000837	0.012	Black	-0.002324	0.001118	0.038
Constant	0.009976	0.001584	0.000	Constant	0.010451	0.001994	0.000

Flexibility, openness to new ideas (candidate)				Flexibility, openness to new ideas (party)		
Number of obs = 13434	F (18, 13415) = 5.19			Number of obs = 14433	F (18, 14414) = 6.45	
R-squared = 0.0056	Prob > F = 0.0000			R-squared = 0.0071	Prob > F = 0.0000	
	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value		Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value
Manager	0.000936	0.000844	0.267	Manager	-0.003386	0.001474	0.022
RWC	0.000660	0.000851	0.438	RWC	-0.001403	0.001638	0.392
Proprietor	0.001121	0.001007	0.266	Proprietor	-0.001989	0.001829	0.277
Skilled wkr	0.001396	0.001195	0.243	Skilled wkr	-0.005226	0.001558	0.001
Unskilled wkr	0.000278	0.000798	0.728	Unskilled wkr	-0.001121	0.001943	0.564
Homemaker	-0.000907	0.000768	0.238	Homemaker	-0.001535	0.001790	0.391
Other	0.000066	0.000725	0.928	Other	-0.001127	0.001477	0.445
Income	0.000010	0.000005	0.067	Income	0.000017	0.000012	0.153
Less than HS	-0.002801	0.000643	0.000	Less than HS	-0.003787	0.001336	0.005
High school	-0.001636	0.000643	0.011	High school	-0.002918	0.001079	0.007
Some college	0.000064	0.000656	0.922	Some college	-0.000282	0.001202	0.814
Age	-0.000023	0.000040	0.568	Age	-0.000327	0.000094	0.001
Age squared	0.000001	0.000001	0.329	Age squared	0.000003	0.000001	0.025
Female	0.000536	0.000437	0.220	Female	-0.000035	0.000801	0.965
Midwest	0.000182	0.000511	0.722	Midwest	0.000086	0.001069	0.936
South	-0.000246	0.000484	0.612	South	0.000102	0.001010	0.920
West	0.001103	0.000602	0.067	West	0.001144	0.001175	0.330
Black	0.002199	0.000730	0.003	Black	-0.001190	0.001098	0.279
Constant	0.002439	0.000820	0.003	Constant	0.014888	0.002123	0.000

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Likeability (candidate)				**Competence (candidate)**		
Number of obs = 13434	F (18, 13415) = 1.52			Number of obs = 13434	F (18, 13415) = 1.48	
R-squared = 0.0019	Prob > F = 0.0713			R-squared = 0.0023	Prob > F = 0.0852	
	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value		Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value
Manager	0.000773	0.000732	0.291	Manager	0.002233	0.001060	0.035
RWC	0.000866	0.000905	0.339	RWC	-0.000351	0.000976	0.719
Proprietor	0.000479	0.000862	0.579	Proprietor	0.001927	0.001405	0.170
Skilled wkr	0.001374	0.001065	0.197	Skilled wkr	0.004630	0.002288	0.043
Unskilled wkr	0.000302	0.000910	0.740	Unskilled wkr	0.000260	0.001082	0.811
Homemaker	0.001100	0.001130	0.330	Homemaker	0.000758	0.001124	0.500
Other	0.002212	0.001149	0.054	Other	0.001378	0.001073	0.199
Income	-0.000005	0.000007	0.425	Income	-0.000006	0.000009	0.471
Less than HS	-0.001278	0.001060	0.228	Less than HS	0.001327	0.001120	0.236
High school	-0.000491	0.000795	0.536	High school	0.001431	0.000874	0.102
Some college	-0.001045	0.000711	0.142	Some college	0.000586	0.000739	0.428
Age	-0.000084	0.000081	0.301	Age	0.000074	0.000066	0.261
Age squared	0.000002	0.000001	0.206	Age squared	-0.000002	0.000001	0.137
Female	0.000819	0.000612	0.181	Female	-0.000372	0.000595	0.532
Midwest	0.000808	0.000649	0.214	Midwest	0.000624	0.001008	0.536
South	0.001338	0.000641	0.037	South	-0.000948	0.000847	0.263
West	0.001857	0.000834	0.026	West	-0.000250	0.000882	0.777
Black	0.000079	0.001078	0.941	Black	0.001482	0.001162	0.202
Constant	0.001874	0.001308	0.152	Constant	0.002647	0.001243	0.033
Competence (party)				**All references to candidate's personal qualities**		
Number of obs = 14433	F (18, 14414) = 1.45			Number of obs = 13434	F (18, 13415) = 31.59	
R-squared = 0.0021	Prob > F = 0.0969			R-squared = 0.0402	Prob > F = 0.0000	
	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value		Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	P value
Manager	0.001158	0.001253	0.355	Manager	0.008325	0.010109	0.410
RWC	0.001797	0.001661	0.279	RWC	0.009100	0.010585	0.390
Proprietor	0.001356	0.001628	0.405	Proprietor	0.013241	0.012164	0.276
Skilled wkr	-0.000375	0.001621	0.817	Skilled wkr	0.004551	0.012850	0.723
Unskilled wkr	0.003777	0.001908	0.048	Unskilled wkr	-0.003136	0.010788	0.771
Homemaker	0.000647	0.001561	0.679	Homemaker	0.031629	0.011230	0.005
Other	0.002240	0.001243	0.071	Other	0.007346	0.009890	0.458
Income	-0.000023	0.000013	0.081	Income	0.000344	0.000076	0.000
Less than HS	0.000196	0.001561	0.900	Less than HS	-0.058625	0.009702	0.000
High school	-0.000092	0.001235	0.941	High school	-0.026293	0.007883	0.001
Some college	0.001433	0.001151	0.213	Some college	-0.027819	0.007632	0.000
Age	-0.000057	0.000100	0.571	Age	0.000087	0.000587	0.882
Age squared	0.000000	0.000002	0.819	Age squared	0.000037	0.000009	0.000
Female	-0.001157	0.000959	0.228	Female	0.019464	0.005860	0.001
Midwest	-0.000507	0.001342	0.706	Midwest	-0.009035	0.007680	0.239
South	-0.001603	0.001224	0.190	South	-0.025510	0.007451	0.001
West	-0.001837	0.001202	0.127	West	-0.010997	0.008133	0.176
Black	-0.003888	0.000931	0.000	Black	-0.093651	0.008675	0.000
Constant	0.008595	0.002139	0.000	Constant	0.380341	0.012673	0.000

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