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### Author

Michel, Katherine Eleanor

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Between Regimes: Institutional Design in Transitional Groups

By

Katherine Eleanor Michel

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University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Michael S. Fish, Co-Chair  
Professor Jason Wittenberg, Co-Chair  
Professor Leonardo R. Arriola  
Professor Sarah F. Anzia

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Abstract

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by

Katherine Eleanor Michel

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Berkeley

Professor M. Steven Fish, Co-Chair  
Professor Jason Wittenberg, Co-Chair

This dissertation proposes a new framework from which to study political regime transitions, arguing from a basis in counterfactual reasoning that it is necessary to shift the focus from ex-post coding based on transition *outcomes* to ex-ante coding of cases with the *potential* for regime transition. Straddling the literatures on transitions, democratization, authoritarianism, founding elections, and power-sharing, I investigate the inner workings of a rarely studied transitional period, assessing the types of institutions that countries form during the foundational, yet often chaotic, moments of a regime transition.

I systematically characterize a number of paths that countries embark on in the period between regimes and, in so doing, identify a new unit of analysis that I term “transitional groups”: unelected, interim groups formed during potential regime transitions with the stated intent of holding elections and transferring power to a popularly legitimate government. I assemble a novel dataset that describes the existence of transitional groups over the period 1989 to 2010.

I then conduct statistical analysis on this data to analyze how transitional groups affect the extent and direction of regime change. I argue that, while the introduction of transitional groups can often accelerate the pace of democratization, in some circumstances—particularly, when power is either too consolidated in a few actors or too dispersed among many—the introduction of transitional groups can actually make democratization harder. My dissertation provides insights into transitional or foundational events and highlights how formalized transitional groups vary tremendously across space and time.

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## Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my yiayia, Katherine Nickolson. As a senior in high school, and well before being accepted, she told me “You will go to Berkeley.” She was right. May her memory be eternal.

Αφιερώνω αυτή η διατριβή για την γιαγιά μου, Κατερίνα Νικολάου. Όταν ήμουν στο τελευταίο χρόνο στο λύκειο, και πολύ πριν από έγινα δεκτός, μου είπε “θα πας στο Μπέρκλι.” Ήταν σωστή. Αιώνια αυτής η μνήμη.

## Chapter 1 Paths between Regimes: Fostering Stability from Chaos?

*“There are, in the life of nations, crises that can be transformed into turning-points of national rebirth.” – Konstantinos Karamanlis*

In the early morning hours of July 24, 1974, following seven years of military dictatorship, former Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis returned to Greece, confidently proclaiming these words. Seeking to transform a chaotic series of national crises into a stable future, he aimed to transform autocratic into democratic rule and to effectuate what he termed a “national rebirth.”

Autocratic rule in Greece began with a coup d'état on April 21, 1967,<sup>1</sup> when the “regime of the colonels,” a triumvirate of Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, Colonel Nikolaos Makarezos, and Brigadier Stylianos Pattakos, consolidated power in Athens, creating a 12-member “Revolutionary Council,” disbanding parliament, restricting the press, and imprisoning and torturing opponents.<sup>2</sup> For years, Papadopoulos' junta remained firmly in power, hand-picking an advisory committee to act as a “mini-parliament” rather than organizing parliamentary elections, abolishing the monarchy, and—despite already holding the positions of Regent, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Government Policy—running in uncontested presidential elections (Couloumbis 1974).

Yet, in 1973, crisis erupted. Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis overthrew Papadopoulos following a brutal November response to an uprising at Athens Polytechnic University. Several months later, Ioannidis' successor regime launched an attempt to unite Cyprus and Greece by overthrowing Cypriot President Makarios. After the Turkish military invaded Cyprus and Greek forces refused to engage in conflict in response, the military junta's downfall became imminent.

Karamanlis therefore returned to Greece to supervise a transition from military dictatorship to democracy—to transform the series of crises under the junta into a national turning-point. And supervise a democratic transition, he did. Within four months, Karamanlis facilitated general elections, held a popular referendum, and created a new constitution.

Based on these lofty and rapid accomplishments, during Greece's 1977 election campaign, Karamanlis' political party, New Democracy, assigned him generous credit, stating: “The great guarantee. He took over chaos. He created a state” (Clogg 1987: 73). In other words, he fostered stability from chaos.

### The Big Picture

Not all political regime transitions are as rapid or successful as Greece under Karamanlis. What differentiates cases that are and are not successful at fostering stability, defined here as reaching a stable political regime? In the wake of crises “that *can be* transformed into turning-points,” what transitional paths do states follow and which are most successful in *actually* completing a transformation? These are the questions that my dissertation addresses.

Before proceeding, a few foundational definitions are in order. First, my focus in this dissertation is on *political regimes*. A political regime is “the patterns, formal or informal and

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<sup>1</sup> Junta supporters instead described this event as the “revolution.” While a coup d'état changes leaders and functionaries, a revolution changes fundamental systemic conditions (Couloumbis 1974: 354).

<sup>2</sup> And even enforcing absurd rules, such as (at least until the tourist industry suffered considerably) banning tourists with miniskirts, beards, or long hair (Crampton 2002: 215).

explicit or implicit, that determine the channels of access to principal governmental positions; the characteristics of the actors who are admitted and excluded from such access; and the resources and strategies that they are allowed to use for gaining access” (O’Donnell 2001: 14).

Importantly, political regime is a concept distinct from both “state” and “government.” As Weber famously defined, a state enjoys “the legitimate monopoly of physical coercion over a given territory and population” (1946: 78). A state is thus the permanent bureaucratic apparatus within a sovereign political entity, and a government is the group of people in charge of running that state.


While the government under a particular regime within a state can act—by, for instance, declaring war, amending a constitution, or enacting new policy—the regime itself does not have this ability. A political regime is instead the rules of the game that govern access to political power, and these rules are often embodied in a state’s constitution.

As was implicit in Greek introductory example, scholars tend to contrast democratic and authoritarian regimes.<sup>3</sup> While a democratic regime must, at a minimum, specify a political system in which the principle positions of power are filled through a competitive struggle for the people’s vote (Schumpeter 1942),<sup>4</sup> an authoritarian regime (or, synonymously, an autocratic or a dictatorial regime) specifies no such conditions. Rather, a dictatorship is a political system that concentrates power in leaders who are not responsible to the people.

A political regime *transition*, then, is movement between distinct types of regimes, such as movement from a democratic to an authoritarian regime, or from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. In this dissertation, I will sometimes characterize a political regime transition toward democracy as a move toward more “open” politics and a political regime transition away from democracy as a move toward more “closed” politics.

With those definitions in mind, Figure 1-1 presents the big picture, specifying the varied paths that can occur within political regime transitions.

Figure 1-1. The big picture: transitional paths between political regimes.



<sup>3</sup> The appropriate way to think of differences in political regimes is on a spectrum, where the purest versions of autocracy and democracy anchor the two ends, and many types of hybrid regimes exist in between these pure types. While I specifically highlight democratic and authoritarian regimes here, scholars make many additional regime distinctions, such as sultanistic regimes (Chehabi and Linz 1998), totalitarian regimes (Linz 2000), and competitive-authoritarian hybrid regimes (Levitsky and Way 2001).

<sup>4</sup> A more robust definition requires that a democratic political system not only have competitive elections, but also contestation, participation, and the freedoms that make the vote truly meaningful, such as the freedom of association, the freedom of expression, and access to alternative sources of information (Dahl 1971). For an expanded discussion of Dahl’s definition of democracy and, more generally, an overview of what democracy is and is not, see Schmitter and Karl (1991), Collier and Levitsky (1997), Diamond (1999), and Collier (1999).

While Figure 1-1 contains a number of phrases like “transitional event” and “transitional period” that will become clear throughout this chapter, for now, the crucial thing to notice is simply that I identify varied processes occurring in the transition between regime one and regime two. In this dissertation, I focus on fully characterizing these transitional arrangements.

In the following sections, I iteratively build up to the big picture diagram. In section one, I situate my dissertation within the existing literature on regime transitions, highlighting the under-specification of the period of time between regime one and regime two. In section two, I further motivate the significance of this project by conducting an empirical analysis of newspaper coverage of transitional arrangements over the last 30 years. I then return to Figure 1-1 in section three and identify the two biggest contributions of this dissertation: (1) using counterfactual logic to create a framework through which to study regime transitions and (2) specifying the influence of transitional arrangements on the extent and direction of regime change. In section four, I conclude by presenting a roadmap of the dissertation.

## Building Up to the Big Picture

To reiterate, this dissertation examines the *process* of regime transition and asks: How do countries attempt to move from political chaos to stability? In what follows, I place this question in context by synthesizing the existing literature on authoritarian breakdown and regime transitions. The overriding point is the following: In discussing regime transitions, which often take place in chaotic, ill-specified, and information-poor environments, scholars tend to oversimplify the process. They focus on movement from “regime one,” an autocratic regime, to “regime two,” a democratic regime, but ignore a crucial middle step. This dissertation therefore aims to specify what occurs during the interregnum between regimes; it describes what happens between regime one and regime two.

### Authoritarian Resilience, Breakdown, and Uncertainty

Authoritarian regimes often exhibit an enduring quality: Dictatorships tend to be highly resilient, with stable leadership remaining in power for an extended period of time.<sup>5</sup> One need not look farther than the tenures of Kyrgyzstan’s Askar Akayev (14 years), Chile’s Augusto Pinochet (15 years), the Philippines’ Ferdinand Marcos (20 years), Iraq’s Saddam Hussein (nearly 24 years), Gambia’s Dawda Jawara (24 years), Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak (29 years), Togo’s Gnassingbé Eyadéma (nearly 38 years), or Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi (nearly 42 years) to recognize the common occurrence of resilient autocrats all over the world.

Yet in each of the examples of a long-tenure autocrat I list above, the dictator eventually fell from power.<sup>6</sup> And, when a dictator experiences demise—whether due to natural death (e.g., Eyadéma), a military coup d’état (e.g., Jawara), revolutionary overthrow (e.g., Mubarak), or international intervention (e.g., Hussein)—the question of leadership succession can introduce

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<sup>5</sup> For background on the resilient authoritarianism literature, see (among many others) Brownlee’s (2002) review article, Nathan (2003), Bellin (2004), and Pei (2012).

<sup>6</sup> Of course, many autocrats are able to completely resist overthrow and remain in power today. Assuming each of the following dictators remains as head of state throughout 2016, Paul Biya in Cameroon will reach 41 years in power; Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo in Equatorial Guinea and José Eduardo dos Santos in Angola will reach 37 years in power; Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe will reach 36 years in power; and Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, and Omar al-Bashir in Sudan will reach 27 years in power.

political instability (Herz 1952, Brownlee 2007). Who will rule next? Will dynastic or hereditary succession take place? Will an opposition leader emerge and push for regime transition?

Questions of succession may be especially destabilizing in cases ripe for transition *away from* a particular kind of authoritarianism, whether that transition is aimed toward democracy or toward another type of authoritarian regime. This is because, within an autocratic society (and especially within a severely repressive autocratic society), any knowledge of peoples' political preferences is incomplete. While the actors in charge under an authoritarian regime are clear, citizens and elites alike tend not to reveal their true preferences. Because there is little common knowledge of public opinion, in the case of a dictator's fall, there is also little insight into what citizens will support moving forward.<sup>7</sup> The demise of an autocrat therefore introduces real questions about who should be in charge and how power should be distributed.

Answering these questions depends on the level of development of both civil and political society. As Stepan (1988: 3-4) defines, civil society is "the arena where manifold social movements (such as neighborhood associations, women's groups, religious groupings, and intellectual currents) and civic organizations from all classes (such as lawyers, journalists, trade unions, and entrepreneurs) attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests." Political society, alternatively, is the "arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control over public power and the state apparatus." While civil society may be influential in bringing down an autocrat and signaling citizen preferences in the aftermath of a dictator's fall, a transition from authoritarianism additionally requires sustained development of political society, particularly if the intended transition is toward a more open political regime.

One problem, however, is that the vast amount of uncertainty resulting from a regime's fall complicates the development of political society. First, political institutions often remain after the fall of an autocrat, such as financial, judicial, military, or administrative bodies, which can impose constraints on leaders wishing to develop institutions for political contestation (Robinson and Acemoglu 2006, Acemoglu and Robinson 2008). Second, the influence of these institutions occurs only through a "prism of societal characteristics" and, because institution-makers lack complete information, they are only able to assign some probability distribution to what the relevant societal characteristics might be and then choose the rules to maximize their expected payoffs (Shvetsova 2003).<sup>8</sup> This means that it can be difficult for institution-makers to anticipate institutional effects, whether good or bad. Third, not only is predicting institutional effects difficult, but there is no consensus on the appropriate sequencing or speed of institutional changes (Carothers 2007). That is, it is unclear how the chosen ordering and rapidity of reforms relating to political contestation will influence the ultimate regime transition outcome.<sup>9</sup>

With the difficulties caused by uncertainty in mind, the question of how leaders approach a post-authoritarian period appears ripe for study. Who is in charge? How do those in charge

---

<sup>7</sup> For an overview of the literature surrounding the consequences of veiled preferences in authoritarian regimes, see Wintrobe (2001) and Scott (1987, 1990). For an overview of how the dynamic of missing information relates to revolutions and social movements, see Hirschman (1970, 1993), Kuran (1991), and Lohmann (1994).

<sup>8</sup> Shvetsova's work follows a wave of research on endogenous institutions. See, for example, Smith (1996, 2003), Andrews and Jackman (2005), Negretto (2008), Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009), and Meredith (2009).

<sup>9</sup> For instance, Mazucca and Robinson (2009) describe a successful transition from political chaos to stability in Colombia in 1905, arguing that the emergence of order was temporally correlated with the introduction of special institutional mechanisms for power-sharing between the two dominant political forces. Yet Carothers (2007) contends that, at times, focusing on sequencing institutional innovations (e.g., the rule of law) as a path to political contestation is misguided. Rather, he argues for the gradual introduction of political competition components.

attempt to develop institutions to move a state forward? How does political society develop and, in particular, how does it develop in the immediate aftermath of an autocrat's demise?

### Regime Transitions

Following the transition from military rule to democracy in the 1970s, the Portuguese termed this period after an autocrat's demise "Processo Revolucionário Em Curso," a period with the "revolutionary process under way." The Greeks, similarly, termed the period following the collapse of the military junta in 1974 "Metapolítevsi," a "political changeover." When discussing regime transitions, however, the political science literature tends to skim over this period's details.

Rather, studies of regime transition often focus on processes of democratization—moves from autocracy to democracy. Figure 1-2 presents a simplistic diagram that illustrates this focus, with a one-step move between regime one (autocracy) and regime two (democracy).

Figure 1-2. Map of the commonly-specified understanding of democratization.



Early modernization theorists proposed such a view, arguing that the "ideal type" regime transition toward democracy follows a clear sequence.<sup>10</sup> Beginning with O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), however, "transitologists" began to qualify this linear view by taking a "contingent approach" to transitions. They argued that transitions are abnormal periods of undetermined political change, marked by chaos and struggle, with uncertain outcomes. These authors' views represent the modal path of the "pacting" literature (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994): A transition begins when some moderate faction of the governing elite splits after recognizing that stability or development alone does not legitimate an authoritarian regime. These "soft-liners" therefore promote political opening through guarantees of civil and political rights and free and fair elections. Because "hard-liners" within the regime may threaten the transition, government and opposition leaders must forge a pact guaranteeing the major players' interests.

While this focus on process emphasizes the degree of control that outgoing rulers exert over the transition, empirically, the necessity of pacts to ensure successful transitions from authoritarian regimes to democracies is questionable (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 1997). A number of the early literature's assumptions, based heavily on the transition experiences of Southern Europe and Latin America, do not hold when examining more recent transition cases in the post-communist region and Africa: countries moving away from dictatorial rule do not necessarily approach democracy; democratization does not necessarily occur in clear stages; and political transitions are often initiated from within society—from the bottom-up, not the top-down

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<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Lipset (1959), Rostow (1959), and Rustow (1970). According to Rustow, assuming national unity, states go through three phases: (1) a preparatory phase with a prolonged political struggle, (2) a decision phase that institutionalizes some democratic procedures, and (3) a habituation phase where democratic success encourages contending forces to resolve other issues by democratic rules. Note that these early works on modernization theory sparked a huge amount of scholarship linking (and questioning the link) between economic development and democracy. See, as only two of many examples, Diamond (1992) and Pzeworski and Limongi (1997).

(Bunce 1995, 1998).<sup>11</sup> In reality, many transition countries occupy what Carothers (2002) terms a “political gray zone,” and do not follow the path illustrated in Figure 1-2.

Partly in response to the pacting literature, a number of scholars shifted focus to institutional characteristics of authoritarian regimes that define regime types. This complicates the leftmost box in Figure 1-2, as scholars no longer considered regime one as simply an autocracy, but as one of several types of autocracy. Geddes (1999, 2009), for instance, asserts that characteristics of regime leadership, such as whether access to power depends on a single person, the military, or a strong party (i.e., a personalist, military, or one-party authoritarian regime), leads to differential regime breakdown and transition outcomes.<sup>12</sup> In a similar vein, Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) argue that the level of authoritarian institutionalization affects transitional prospects, as rulers who under-institutionalize have shorter tenure than those who institutionalize to broaden their base of support. And, Ezrow and Frantz (2011), building on the assumption that all dictators seek to increase their power and will pursue strategies to maximize the likelihood of survival in office (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005, Bueno de Mequito and Smith 2011), add that transitional success depends on whether elites share membership in a unifying institution, like the military or a political party, and whether they have access to troops and weaponry.<sup>13</sup>

While usefully expanding on Figure 1-2, similar to the pacting literature, these authors focus on conditions that exist during an authoritarian regime and an outcome that occurs after a state holds elections; that is to say, these scholars still utilize a one-step map to link regimes. This link corresponds to two of the four crucial components that Linz and Stepan (1996) emphasize for democratic transitions: (1) sufficient agreement on the procedures to produce an elected government, (2) that the government comes to power through a free and popular vote, (3) that the government has the authority to generate new policies, and (4) that the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in the new democracy do not have to share power with other bodies. By focusing on steps (2) and (3), these scholars of transitions gloss over the intricacies of all middle steps in the process. Who, or what group, is in charge during the interregnum between regimes? Who designs the institutions with which to produce an elected government?

Adding to Figure 1-2 based on the discussion above, Figure 1-3 expands the regime one box, including the possibility of varying types of authoritarian regimes.<sup>14</sup> In addition, though, Figure 1-3 illustrates the remaining missing middle step in the process.

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
<sup>11</sup> In fact, in regard to the post-communist region, Nalepa (2010) terms pacting the “positional” view of transitions, which includes Przeworski’s (1991) model of “reformers” and “radicals.” She criticizes these works for ignoring the credible commitment problem inherent in making promises before a transition  $t$ , at time  $(t-1)$ , which must be kept after the transition, at times  $\{(t+1), (t+2), \dots\}$ . From case studies of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, she finds that authoritarian regimes negotiate transitional conditions when they have an informational advantage over the opposition, which fears its “skeletons in the closet.” In regard to Africa, Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) explain that pacting occurred in only a few cases with heritages of settler oligarchy, like South Africa and Zimbabwe. The vast majority of African cases experienced either managed transitions (particularly those cases with military oligarchies, like Ghana and Nigeria), national conferences (particularly those cases with plebiscitary one-party regimes, like Benin and Togo), or rapid elections (particularly those cases with competitive one-party legacies, like Cameroon and Kenya).

<sup>12</sup> For instance, between 1945 and the late 1990s, Geddes finds that 31 percent of transitions from military rule but only 16 percent of transitions from personalist rule resulted in stable democracies.

<sup>13</sup> Authors also identify this link in case studies; as one example, see Thompson (1996) for a discussion of the Philippines.

<sup>14</sup> Note that while I list three types of authoritarian regime in the leftmost box of Figure 1-3 to illustrate the useful expansion in thinking about regime one, these types do not represent an exhaustive list of all autocracies (e.g., the box excludes theocracies or mixes of the personalist, military, and one-party regime types).

Figure 1-3. Expanded map of the democratization process.



### The Transitional Period

Literature that explicitly discusses this middle step between regime one and regime two is scarce. While civil-military relations and post-conflict resolution scholars often allude to the importance of the transitional period,<sup>15</sup> Shain and Linz (1995) provide the earliest discussion of its theoretical implications. Defining the transitional period as the time from the start of a democratic transition until the assumption of power by a freely elected government, the authors examine interim governments—by definition temporary and with the goal of facilitating transition via elections—of four ideal-types: revolutionary-provisional, power-sharing, incumbent-caretaker, and international. Focusing on the dependent variables of regime type and the extent of public order, they argue that the legality of the state apparatus in the transitional period affects the new regime’s level of legitimacy.

Shain and Linz arguably provide the most thorough examination of the transitional period to date,<sup>16</sup> yet their analysis remains incomplete for two reasons. First, they focus only on regimes that hold free elections, meaning their study examines only transitions in which regime two is a democracy, rather than regime transitions in general. Second, Shain and Linz do not expand on the box linking regime one and regime two to include situations in which multiple versions of interim governmental arrangements exist sequentially, as in Greece (Tzortzis 2012), El Salvador and Guatemala (Stanley 2006), and a multitude of more recent cases.

Other scholars begin to remedy these shortcomings. Casper (2000) identifies what she terms the “benefits of difficult transitions” by exploring the impact of explanatory factors such as the length of transition, type of elite bargaining strategy, and difficulty of negotiations on subsequent regime type. In studies of Benin, Togo, and Mali, Seely (2005, 2009) and Wing (2008) argue that the process of decision-making during the transitional period, such as whether it is inclusive, competitive, or consensus-oriented, crucially affects long-term regime prospects. Rubin (1995) and Houngnikpo (2001) highlight how forward- rather than backward-looking debates during the transitional period bode well for democratization prospects. And Bermeo (1997) focuses on the tactics of citizen-led, popular organizations rather than elites, contending that successful democratization depends on the moderation of demands by radical organizations.

While all of these authors make strides in describing the effects of certain aspects of the transitional period on subsequent regime outcomes, because they focus on transitions toward democracy or small subsets of transitional cases (Munck 2001), the literature remains without a

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
<sup>15</sup> A large number of scholars in the civil-military relations literature discuss the necessity of reform after the fall of a dictatorial regime (e.g., Janowitz 1964, Huntington 1995, Trinkunas 2000, Acemoglu et al. 2008). For interesting analyses of how the rapidity of transition and fragmentation among the armed forces under the dictatorial regime affect post-transitional civil-military relations, see Barany (1997, 2011).

<sup>16</sup> Note that Gutteri and Piombo (2006, 2007) and Shain (2005) provide an extensive and very thorough treatment of international interim governments.



comprehensive understanding of the transitional periods of *all* regime transitions. Figure 1-4 therefore explicitly incorporates the transitional period in a map of the regime transition process.

Figure 1-4. Map of the regime transition process.



There are two especially notable aspects of Figure 1-4. First, this diagram illustrates the transitional period of *all* regime transitions. That is, unlike much of the existing literature, it makes no assumption that regime one is an autocracy and that regime two is a democracy. It is possible, in fact, that exactly the opposite is true; a move from democracy to autocracy is still a regime transition. Second, though adding a few details to the formerly unspecified black box between regimes, it leaves open a remaining hole: specifying the environment in which these details take place. Who decides on the decision-making process? Who specifies the length of transition? Where does the debate occur?

### A Glance at the Empirics: The Transitional Period Cross-Nationally

I characterize the political environment existing in the transitional period between regimes in a particular way. I ask: Under what circumstances are new, distinct transitional arrangements created? And, how do these arrangements differ across cases?

Anecdotally, there is clear variation to explore across regime transition cases during the transitional period. Some states create formal transitional bodies, such as António de Spínola's 1974 National Salvation Junta in Portugal and Ion Iliescu's 1989/1990 Provisional National Unity Council in Romania. Other states form unity governments, such as Konstantinos Karamanlis' 1974 government in Greece and Albert Zafy's 1991 government in Madagascar. And still other states navigate the transitional period without creating any type of formalized governmental body, such as East Germany, Hungary, and Poland in the late 1980s.

Yet skeptics may still read my criticism of the existing literature on regime transitions and think: There must be a reason that so few scholars focus on the details of the interregnum between regimes. Perhaps few cases use transitional arrangements; perhaps the transitional period is exceedingly short; or, in the cases that do have transitional arrangements, perhaps no significant reform occurs until a state reaches regime two.

To motivate the empirical importance of this research agenda systematically, I utilize this section to analyze newspaper coverage of transitional arrangements over the last 30 years. As will become clear, coverage of transitional arrangements appears time and again the world over, sustained coverage occurs frequently, and topics of reform vary substantially. To preview the bottom line: The transitional period between regimes produces a range of transitional arrangements that deserve serious theoretical consideration as part of the process of regime transition.

## Data Collection

Before analyzing the data to reach this bottom line, I must describe how I collect the newspaper articles.<sup>17</sup> For this exercise, I take Shain and Linz’s definition of the transitional period on its face: the time from the start of a transition until the assumption of power by a freely elected government. With this definition, the data comprises news articles published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*—two newspapers commonly considered foreign policy-focused in their coverage, and therefore likely to pick up stories relating to the transitional period between regimes worldwide. I collect articles dealing with common phrases describing transitional arrangements from LexisNexis over a 30-year span, from January 1, 1985 to January 1, 2015,<sup>18</sup> utilizing the following search query:

transition! OR provisional OR interim W/3 government  
AND democra! OR election! OR elect OR elected

The operator ! indicates that the search will return results including all endings of the word, such as transitional or transitioning and democratic or democracy.<sup>19</sup> The OR operator broadens the search by connecting a number of search terms. Namely, LexisNexis begins by searching for *any* instance of (1) transition! OR (2) provisional OR (3) interim. Yet this search returns a huge number of irrelevant results. The W/3 connector, then, narrows the search to the transitional arrangements of interest by specifying that any of terms (1), (2), or (3) must occur within three words of term (4): government.<sup>20</sup> To narrow the search further, the AND operator ensures that combinations of relevant words appear in each result. LexisNexis thus searches for articles with terms (1), (2), or (3) within three words of term (4) whenever the article *also* includes term (5), democra!, OR term (6), (7), or (8), each of which relates to elections.<sup>21</sup> This search query therefore combines common

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<sup>17</sup> I am incredibly thankful to Rochelle Terman for her generous assistance in designing this data collection procedure. For further discussion of the process, including a discussion of coding in R and Python, please visit Rochelle’s website at <http://rochelleterman.com/human-rights-coverage-over-time-a-tutorial-in-automated-text-analysis/>.

<sup>18</sup> LexisNexis provides access not only to *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, but also to *International New York Times*, *The New York Times Blogs*, *Washington Post Blogs*, *Washington Post Magazine*, and *WashingtonPost.com*. By examining initial search results and comparing across sources, I find that duplicate articles often arise when including the subsidiary categories. I therefore limit my searches to only *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*.

<sup>19</sup> I try a number of search queries. First, I query “transition! government” OR “provision! government” OR “interim government” AND democra!. This search misses a number of results containing words between transition!/provision!/interim and government, such as “transitional national unity government.” Second, I query transition! OR provision! OR interim AND government AND democra!. This search results in a number of irrelevant results, namely because of the common occurrence of the word “provision” as a noun (e.g., “A provision for policy X by government Y.”). Third, to try to avoid democratization bias, I add terms relating to dictatorial regimes to the query, such as dictator! OR authoritarian! OR autocr!. This search (1) results in a number of articles that simply describe a former leader in an off-handed manner, without referring to the transitional period of interest (e.g., “The former dictator, Hosni Mubarak, enacted policy X.”) and (2) contains many results that already appear when including search terms for elections.

<sup>20</sup> I try various versions of the W/n connector (where n represents the number of words), including within one or two words. This connector allows words to be *near* each other, such as “transitional national unity government,” and therefore broadens a search result beyond using quotation marks, but narrows a search result more than using the AND operator. W/3 represents the minimum value that LexisNexis considers for words “in approximately the same phrase” ([http://www.lexisnexis.com/help/global/US/en\\_US/connect\\_frameset.asp](http://www.lexisnexis.com/help/global/US/en_US/connect_frameset.asp)).

<sup>21</sup> I choose these election-related terms because elect! returns a large number of articles relating to electricity.

phrases describing transitional arrangements and Shain and Linz's definition of the transitional period.

This search produces a total of 8512 articles.<sup>22</sup> For each article, I obtain meta-data provided through the LexisNexis "SmartIndexing Technology."<sup>23</sup> This technology applies a rule-based automated classification system to analyze and determine certain features of an article. For the purposes of this analysis, the features of interest are (1) country and (2) subject. LexisNexis assigns the outputs of these features "relevance scores," which are percentages that show how salient a certain term is for a given article. In *The New York Times* article "Excerpts from Bush Speech on American Strategy in Iraq" from May 5, 2004, for instance, LexisNexis produces the following country output: Iraq (97%), United States (96%). It also produces the following subject output: terrorism (91%), terrorist organizations (90%), war on terror (78%), armies (78%), bombings (78%), war & conflict (78%), assassination (78%), transcripts (77%), Muslims and Islam (77%), terrorist attacks (75%), Al-Qaeda (73%), law of war (73%), and murder (55%). As LexisNexis considers any percentage greater than 85 to represent a "major term" in the article, these results indicate, first, that both Iraq and the United States are major country terms and, second, that LexisNexis considers only two of the subject terms major: terrorism and terrorist organizations.<sup>24</sup>

While the initial search produces 8512 articles, some of these articles are irrelevant to my sample. First, 418 articles combine short summaries of many different events.<sup>25</sup> While small portions of these articles relate to transitional arrangements, the majority of each article describes summaries of recent political or economic events across multiple countries. Including these multi-country summary articles introduces a host of subject terms unrelated to transitional arrangements and I therefore delete these cases, reducing my sample from 8512 to 8094. Second, a large number of articles—1569, or 18.4 percent of the original sample—relate only to the United States. These articles typically refer to transitions between elected officials, such as following a presidential, gubernatorial, or county-level election, and therefore introduce an irrelevant set of "transitions"

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<sup>22</sup> I employ LexisNexis's similarity analysis function as a first step toward deleting duplicate articles. This similarity analysis can delete articles based on "high similarity" or "moderate similarity." I try both options and find that using the high similarity setting misses duplicate articles that appear in both *The Washington Post* and washingtonpost.com. I therefore instead use the moderate similarity setting, which automatically throws out these duplicates. One problem with LexisNexis's similarity analysis function is that it only searches through batches of 200 articles at one time. As a second step, I therefore utilize the duplicated() function in the statistical computing program R to identify additional identical articles (which I then manually check to ensure the articles are actual duplicates).

<sup>23</sup> Note that this process also allows me to retain basic information, such as the publication venue (*The New York Times* or *The Washington Post*), the publication date, and the article's title, length, and text. In some articles, the text was especially long and, due to formatting issues during the download, truncated. While the majority of the text remains, a small portion of each article's text is missing, hindering the possibilities for unbiased text analysis.

<sup>24</sup> Of course, some articles return only one country while others return many more countries than two. *The Washington Post's* May 15, 2004 article "Powell Says Troops Would Leave Iraq if New Leader Asked," for instance, provides the following country meta-data result: United States (97%), Iraq (94%), Italy (90%), Japan (79%), France (79%), Israel (79%), and United Kingdom (79%). In this case, while neither Japan nor France are major countries, the United States, Iraq, and Italy are all major country terms.

<sup>25</sup> In particular, I manually search for article titles that recur throughout the sample. This alerts me to a number of article titles that appear on a weekly or monthly basis (for some portion of the 30-year span). I delete these articles according to their titles: "World in Brief," "World Briefing," "News Summary," "Inside," "Inside the Times," "World Digest," "Nation Digest," and "Business Digest." "Business Digest." While not specifically news summaries, this process additionally alerts me to the following titles, which I delete: "Corrections," "Answers to Quiz," "Obituaries," and "Books of the Times."

(i.e., not political regime transitions). After I delete these cases, the sample of 8094 decreases to 6525. The following two sub-sections analyze these 6525 articles.<sup>26</sup>

### Frequency and Spread of Coverage of Transitional Arrangements

To first address a skeptic’s claims that perhaps (1) few cases use transitional arrangements or (2) the transitional period is exceedingly short, I use the LexisNexis SmartIndexing Technology to identify the country that each article in the sample is *most likely* about. I emphasize “most likely” because identifying a country requires three steps: (1) identifying all countries that LexisNexis assigns a salience percentage of greater than 85; (2) in cases of more than one such country, extracting the country with the highest percentage;<sup>27</sup> and (3) in cases in which the United States or a regional term (e.g., Europe, Western Europe, or Eastern Europe) appears first, extracting the country with the second highest percentage.<sup>28</sup> Though noting that this procedure may introduce some amount of either over- or under-reporting for certain countries, Table 1-1 presents a list of the ten countries that appear most frequently, in descending order.

Table 1-1. Ten countries with the highest frequency of news articles, 1985-2014.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number of Articles</i>
Iraq	1443
Afghanistan	455
Haiti	381
Egypt	318
South Africa	260
Russia	236
Libya	173
Cambodia	144
Somalia	121
Liberia	120

*Notes:* This table contains counts of articles related to transitional arrangements published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* between January 1, 1985 and January 1, 2015.<sup>29</sup>

While Iraq is a huge outlier, comprising over one-fifth of articles in the dataset, the subsequent nine highest-frequency countries cover a wide-swath of territory, from various parts of Africa to the Caribbean to the Middle East. And, the coverage of these countries is not exceedingly short-lived. Figure 1-5 plots the trajectory of coverage within these ten countries over time.


<sup>26</sup> Specifically, I delete these articles based on (1) LexisNexis’s country meta-data and (2) manual reading of titles and texts of cases with missing meta-data (1030 articles). For (1), if LexisNexis returns (a) only one country in the meta-data and that country is the United States or (b) two countries in the meta-data, with one being the United States and the other being North America (the meta-data sometimes returns regions in addition to countries), I delete the article (1101 articles). For (2), after reading the titles and texts of articles with missing country meta-data, I identify all articles that discuss only US domestic policy (462 articles).

<sup>27</sup> When ties occur, I extract the alphabetically first country (the country that occurs first in the list).

<sup>28</sup> In a small number of cases, the first and second countries listed are the United States or a region, in which case I extract the third highest percentage country (assuming it exists and has a salience percentage greater than 85). If no country other than the US or a region exists, I code this article as missing country data (“NA”).

<sup>29</sup> While this table lists the top ten countries, there are additionally 194 articles with “NA” values.

Figure 1-5. Number of news articles over time in the ten most frequently occurring countries.



*Notes:* This plot contains counts of articles related to transitional arrangements that were published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* between January 1, 1985 and January 1, 2015.

Because a transitional period must follow the demise of regime one, it is no surprise that the peaks in Figure 1-5 surround regime-shaking events. For instance, Iraq peaks between 2003 and 2005 after the United States-led overthrow of Saddam Hussein, South Africa spikes in the early 1990s after the abolition of the apartheid system, and both Egypt and Libya peak after the overthrows in early 2011 of Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Qaddafi, respectively (though note a steady increase in coverage in both of these cases beginning in 2006). Even in tumultuous cases that spent much of the 30-year span engaged in war, small peaks surround potentially transitional events, such as the overthrow of Afghanistan’s Taliban government by the United States and its allies in 2001, the signing of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Charles Taylor’s resignation in Liberia in 2003, and the installation of the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia in 2004.<sup>30</sup>

And, this pattern holds if I look at the dataset (composed of a total of 149 unique countries) and aggregate countries by region. Again utilizing the meta-data provided by LexisNexis, I re-extract the data used to create my country variable, but alter step (3) in my procedure: In cases in which the United States appears first, I extract the country or region with the second highest percentage; in cases in which a regional term appears first (e.g., Africa, Southern Africa, or Western Africa), I retain the regional data.<sup>31</sup> With this altered country- and region-combined variable, I then classify each article into one of six world regions: Africa, Asia, Latin America,

<sup>30</sup> For a graph that more clearly shows the variation among the non-Iraqi cases above, please see Figure 1A-1 in Appendix 1A, which excludes Iraq and adds the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

<sup>31</sup> Note that I still worry about potential under- or over-reporting of regions here. However, because (1) ties among countries often occur *within regions* (as examples, Russia and Ukraine or Egypt and Tunisia) and (2) I retain regional classifications when they exhibit a higher percentage than the subsequent country, I believe that the region-level variable has higher validity than the country-level variable.

Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Post-Communist, and the West.<sup>32</sup> Table 1-2 presents the distribution of articles across these regions.

Table 1-2. Total number of articles across regions, 1985-2014.


<i>Region</i>	<i>Number of Articles</i>
Africa	1118
Asia	638
Latin America	745
MENA	2887
Post-Communist	640
West	337

*Notes:* This table contains counts of articles related to transitional arrangements, democracy, and/or elections published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* between January 1, 1985 and January 1, 2015. MENA represents the Middle East and North Africa region. The cells in the second column do not sum to 6525 because there are 160 articles with missing (“NA”) regional values.

Based on the previously-noted prevalence of articles about Iraq, it is no surprise that the MENA region far exceeds all others in the number of articles. Following MENA is Africa, with less than one-half as many articles as MENA, but still several hundred more than any other region. And, while Latin America, the post-communist region, and Asia contain a relatively similar number of articles, the West has 300 fewer than its closest neighbor. Across 149 countries and six regions, transitional arrangements appear to be a widely-used tool.

Moreover, there is sustained coverage of transitional arrangements not only across the top-ten countries, but also across regions. Figure 1-6 plots the proportion of news articles over time across the six world regions.<sup>33</sup> For ease of interpretation of often overlapping lines, I divide the plot in two and represent three regions in each panel.

Figure 1-6. Proportion of news articles over time and across regions.



<sup>32</sup> Three notes are in order relating to regional classifications: (1) the MENA region includes Afghanistan, while Asia includes Pakistan, (2) Latin America encompasses Caribbean states, and (3) the West comprises North America (excluding the United States), Europe, and Pacific island nations.

<sup>33</sup> To see a graph of the number of news articles over time and across regions, see Figure 1A-2 in Appendix 1A.

*Notes:* These plots contain the proportion of articles related to transitional arrangements that were published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* between January 1, 1985 and January 1, 2015. MENA represents the Middle East and North Africa region. I calculate the proportion in each year for each region (e.g., for Africa in 1985, I divide the number of articles in Africa in 1985 by the total number of articles in 1985).

From the plot on the left in Figure 1-6, large, multi-year peaks appear across each region: Asia between 2006 and 2008, with approximately 40 percent of articles about the region at the maximum; Latin America between 1986 and 1988, with over 60 percent of articles about the region in the maximal year; and MENA from 2001 through 2006 and between 2011 and 2013, in each case reaching approximately 85 percent of the articles in a given year at the maximum. Each of these peaks again surrounds regime-shaking events. For instance, both Bangladesh and Nepal faced states of emergency in the mid-2000s, causing the military to install a non-political caretaker government in the former and the king to consolidate power in the latter. And, Latin America's peak stems in part from the frequent leadership turnovers experienced in Haiti in the late 1980s.

While no region in the plot on the right exhibits as large of a proportion as the plot on the left, both Africa and the post-communist region also experience multiple peaks. Africa's largest peak, for example, appears between 1996 and 1998, covering approximately 65 percent of articles in the year at the peak's highest point. Many of these articles relate to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, at the time surrounding Laurent Kabila's overthrow of President Mobutu Sese Seko. The post-communist region's maximal proportion is of approximately the same magnitude and occurs just after Africa's peak, between 1998 and 2000, when crises in Serbia and Kosovo dominated newspaper coverage.<sup>34</sup>

To summarize the country-specific and regional evidence, coverage of transitional arrangements appears time and again the world over and sustained coverage over an extended transitional period occurs frequently.

### Reforms within Transitional Arrangements

A skeptic may also make a third claim that no significant reform occurs within the transitional period. Could it be the case that transitional arrangement leaders push off meaningful reform until a country reaches regime two?

Based on an analysis of the major subject terms that appear in the newspaper articles, this claim appears unlikely. Similar to the process used for the country and region variables above, I extract the top subject term that LexisNexis scores as greater than 85 percent in terms of salience. I then create lists of the top 20 most prevalent subject terms.<sup>35</sup> If leaders within transitional arrangements conduct meaningful reform, it seems likely that the subjects of debate will differ across countries. Because it is difficult to compare subject term lists across 149 countries, though, here I compare across regions. While less informative than country-specific subjects, subjects of debate likely also differ across regions.

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<sup>34</sup> Though, interestingly, the post-communist region's coverage in the late 1980s and early 1990s never reaches 30 percent of articles.

<sup>35</sup> In creating the lists of the 20 most prevalent subject terms, I exclude the following subject terms: politics, international relations, foreign relations, elections, campaign & elections, head of government election, presidential election, voters & voting, and political candidates. These terms stem almost directly from my initial LexisNexis search query and therefore are uninformative.

Unsurprisingly, a number of terms that one would expect in the aftermath of regime one's demise commonly appear.<sup>36</sup> Most prevalently, these terms relate to political institutions, such as prime ministers, legislative bodies, and political parties.<sup>37</sup> But, despite these similarities, the top 20 most prevalent subject terms also vary considerably. In Table 1-3, I list the unique subject terms across regions.

Table 1-3. Unique subject terms across regions, 1985-2014.

<i>Africa</i>	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Latin America</i>	<i>MENA</i>	<i>Post-Communist</i>	<i>West</i>
1. civil war	1. genocide	1. shootings	1. terrorism	1. separatism & secession	1. Euro
2. peacekeeping	2. corruption	2. international assistance	2. bombings	2. Ukrainian protests & uprising	2. budgets
3. conference & conventions		3. embargoes & sanctions	3. terrorist organizations	3. economic news	3. liberalism
4. paramilitary & militia		4. appointments		4. political organizations	4. economic crisis
				5. European Union	5. French presidents
					6. public finance
					7. resignations

*Notes:* These terms appear in the top 20 list of subject terms for each region, after ignoring terms relating to politics, international/foreign relations, and elections. The entries beneath region names appear in decreasing order. That is, while civil war appears as a subject term in Africa a total of 104 times, paramilitary & militia appears only 44 times.

Like the distribution of articles across regions, these subject terms relate to very particular regional events that require reform. In Africa, for instance, the subjects “civil war” and “peacekeeping” are unsurprising, as countries including Angola, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sudan experienced years of political instability and civil war, prompting the greatest number of United Nations-led peacekeeping operations around the world.<sup>38</sup> In the post-communist region, the subject “separatism & secession” fits a wide number of events, from the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, to separatist movements within Russia (most prominently, Chechnya), to the Russian annexation of Crimea, a Ukrainian territory. And, as a final example, the subjects “Euro,” “budgets,” “economic crisis,” and “public finance” all fit squarely within the West, as reforms related to financial crises have tended to dominate the discussion of any transitional period in these stable democracies.

To reiterate the bottom line: The transitional period between regimes includes transitional arrangements that cover various issues of reform across myriad cases, and these transitional arrangements deserve serious theoretical consideration as part of the process of regime transition.

## Returning to the Big Picture

The previous section demonstrates that, empirically, the transitional period between regimes varies significantly, commonly producing a range of transitional arrangements. This

<sup>36</sup> Additionally, the sentiment of articles (the proportion of positive versus negative words) is startlingly consistent across regions. For graphs, see Figures 1A-3 and 1A-4 in Appendix 1A.

<sup>37</sup> Table 1A in Appendix 1A provides a table of common terms across the regional lists.

<sup>38</sup> And, in fact, the Democratic Republic of Congo is the largest peacekeeping mission site throughout the world. For additional information about these missions, please see <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/>.



finding meshes with the overview that I present in Figure 1-1, in which I identify a series of paths between regime one and regime two. Because the existing literature tends to skim over this period, however, an overarching theoretical framework from which to study these transitional arrangements remains missing. I therefore now return to the big picture and describe two major contributions of this dissertation. In the following sub-section, I identify the first contribution, which is the development of a theoretical framework based in counterfactual logic that allows for unbiased analysis of the transitional period between regimes.

### Counterfactual Logic and the Transitional Period

How can a researcher study the transitional period between regimes? An initial idea is to utilize existing indices to define when and where a regime transition occurs. These indices, the most widely-utilized of which are Polity and Freedom House, provide expert-ranked annual measures of political regime for nearly all countries in the world. While the range of scores differs across Polity and Freedom House, each organization ranks countries on a scale from the most autocratic regime (e.g., North Korea) to the most democratic regime (e.g., Sweden).<sup>39</sup>

These scores have well-studied problems. For instance, scholars argue that the expert coding is subjective, that the aggregation rules that Polity and Freedom House use to collapse expert ratings into scores are arbitrary, and that the scales imposed by these organizations mean different things to different people (Cheibub, et al. 2010).

Setting aside these measurement issues, which really relate to the questions of how to define and operationalize democracy, the scores are equally problematic for defining when and where a regime transition occurs. Some indices explicitly provide a regime transition variable. Polity, for example, uses “RegTrans” to define a regime transition by the following threshold: a three-point change in the regime variable, with each continuous, sequential change (in the same general direction) occurring within three years or less of the previous change. But, other indices provide less guidance. Freedom House has a threshold-based regime classification only for its “Nations in Transit” report; if a country moves from a score of five to three, for instance, it shifts from a “semi-consolidated authoritarian regime” to a “semi-consolidated democracy.”<sup>40</sup> Rather than providing regime transition criteria for the entire sample of countries, this report includes only 29 former communist countries in Central Europe and Central Asia.<sup>41</sup>

In addition to the lack of consistency across indices, a large problem for defining regime transitions stems from the fact that expertly-ranking a country must occur after the fact; that is, annual expert-rankings are based on the events that occur within a country in a certain year and this, by definition, requires a backward-looking approach. Why is this a problem for defining regime transitions? By using a backward-looking approach, these indices provide only a sample

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<sup>39</sup> The Center for Systemic Peace produces Polity scores, in which countries are ranked on a 21-point scale from autocracy to democracy (-10 represents the most autocratic regime and 10 represents the most democratic regime). Rather than reporting a single rating, Freedom House separates regime type according to two dimensions: political rights and civil liberties. For each dimension, Freedom House ranks countries on a seven point scale, where a score of one represents the most democratic regime and a score of seven represents the most autocratic regime.

<sup>40</sup> For the full set of Freedom House countries, researchers tend to create their own definitions of regime transition based on either a shift in or reaching a threshold of points in the regime variable within a certain timeframe. Fish and Wittenberg (2009), for instance, use a threshold approach. Looking specifically at democratization, they define democratizers as countries that both failed to reach the 2.5 level in at least one year and had a score of 3.5 or better in at least one year over the period 1975-2007.


<sup>41</sup> For more information, see <https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit>.

of *completed* regime transitions and, for those wishing to peek inside the black box of the transitional period between regimes, this is a biased sample.

To counter this bias, the criteria used for case selection must be forward- rather than backward-looking. I therefore appeal to counterfactual reasoning as a way to study the interregnum between regimes. This allows me to correct two common selection biases: (1) as described in the literature review of this chapter, analyzing only a sample of cases that transition *to* democracy and (2) as described above, analyzing only a sample of cases that *successfully complete* regime transition.

Figure 1-7 provides an overview of my forward-looking approach, which begins with the identification of a “transitional event” as a way to mark a break with regime one. As this figure is based in counterfactual logic, it is useful to review it in some detail.

Figure 1-7. Counterfactual reasoning in political regime transitions.



Starting on the left, Figure 1-7 lists two types of cases: “treated” and “counterfactual.” To understand this distinction, I must briefly discuss causal inference and experimental research, the latter of which is often termed the “gold standard” in political science (McDermott 2002).

To conduct causal inference, meaning an investigation into the effect that some variable *X* has on an outcome *Y*, a researcher wants to calculate a causal effect. That is, for some case *C*, a researcher wants to measure the difference in *Y* between two conditions: (1) *C* with *X* and (2) *C* without *X*. This, however, is impossible. While a researcher can observe one outcome, *C* with *X* or *C* without *X*, s/he is not able to observe both *C* with *X* and *C* without *X*. This inability to observe all potential outcomes is known as the “fundamental problem of causal inference” (Rubin 1974, Holland 1986).

Experimental research provides an avenue around the fundamental problem of causal inference. In its simplest form, an experiment is a research design in which random assignment is used to assign some variable of interest—the treatment (e.g., a new medical drug), or *X* above—to one group of participants (the “treatment group”), but not to a second group of participants (the “control group”). By using random assignment, the researcher becomes confident that the treatment and control groups are, on average, balanced on all background characteristics. This provides a researcher certainty that any causal effect that s/he observes is due to the treatment itself

and not some confounding variable. In other words, the researcher believes that the control group provides *the best counterfactual* to the treatment group.

Of course, with many social processes of interest to political scientists, random assignment is not possible, and that is the case in this dissertation. Looking at Figure 1-7, it is never the case during a regime transition that a policymaker has the ability to randomly assign a country to use some “Process X,” like a certain type of transitional arrangement. Without random assignment, the questions become: What is the *implied* experiment? What is the relevant counterfactual?

The only way to analyze the impact of some “Process X” is to compare it with similar cases in which “Process X” does not occur. Figure 1-7 therefore depicts the post-regime one transitional periods of “treated” and “counterfactual” cases, the former of which have “Process X” and the latter of which do not.<sup>42</sup>

This is all very straightforward, until we consider the biases that I identify above. If I begin with a biased sample, I must truncate Figure 1-7 in a systematic way. First, if I begin with a biased sample of transitions *to* democracy, “regime two” must simply become “democracy,” losing any transitions to autocracy. If I begin with a biased sample of *completed* transitions, regime two must necessarily differ from regime one. And, if I combine the two biases, the sample must overwhelmingly comprise successful transitions from autocracy to democracy.

What I need to create is a set of cases that includes *all* potential outcomes, whether regime two describes a transition to democracy or autocracy, or whether regime two describes a successful or unsuccessful transition. I can only create this appropriate set of cases with a forward-looking approach. By forward-looking, I mean an approach by which I can identify cases with the *potential* for regime transition. I create this method by identifying transitional events, shown as a clear break from regime one in Figure 1-7.

A hypothetical example is useful here. Suppose that, at some point in the future, tension rises in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), disaffected citizens rally together, and a revolution spreads across the country that successfully ousts the Supreme Leader. What happens next? What process follows the transitional event breaking from regime one?

Ex ante, there is no way to know whether a successful transition will *actually* take place, but this case has the clear *potential* for a regime transition, and it is only from those potential cases that I can assess the processes occurring within the transitional period. I therefore identify transitional events as a starting point from which to include *all* potential “treated” cases and *all* potential “counterfactual” cases.

To summarize, the first major contribution of this dissertation stems from the theoretical framework that I use to create a foundational dataset for analysis. This framework allows scholars to (1) focus on cases that transition to *either* democracy *or* autocracy and (2) identify cases with the *potential* to embark on regime transition, making no assumption of whether or not the transition is successful. By correcting this double-selection bias, a topic that I greatly expand on in Chapter Two, it is possible to analyze regime two outcomes in a consistent and comprehensive manner.

### Transitional Arrangements and Regime Two

While the contribution that I identify above provides a general framework from which to study how the processes that occur during the transitional period influence regime two, it does not tell us *which* processes matter, or *why* these processes matter. This sub-section, focused on the

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<sup>42</sup> I surround “treated” and “counterfactual” with quotation marks to emphasize that there is no random assignment.

second major contribution of this dissertation, provides an overview of the argument for how transitional arrangements influence the extent and direction of regime change between regime one and regime two.<sup>43</sup>

Necessarily, by virtue of the magnitude of changes that can occur within the transitional period, I must make choices about the processes to examine. I thus choose to question: After a transitional event, does the introduction of transitional arrangements move a state toward a more open or more closed political regime? Are transitional arrangements a tool that accelerates democratization? Or, do transitional arrangements push states toward autocracy?

In addressing these questions, I contend with three conceptions of democracy and argue that the introduction of transitional arrangements induces trade-offs between the three: electoral, participatory, and deliberative. I argue that transitional arrangements have the ability to positively influence democratization prospects through processes aimed at strengthening each of these conceptions. There are, however, notable qualifications. Transitional arrangements are not a panacea that push states toward democratization; depending on their duration in power and composition, they are also a tool that powerful actors can instrumentally use to their advantage to push states in an antidemocratic direction. The question mark ending the title of this chapter, “Paths between Regimes: Fostering Stability from Chaos?” is therefore intentional; it is there to acknowledge these qualifications.

Most fundamentally, when assessing the extent and direction of regime change, I rely on an electoral conception of democracy, which emphasizes making rulers responsive to citizens through periodic competition for elected office. *If* transitional arrangements influence regime change, they *will* exert influence on the level of electoral democracy. This is because, as Lindberg, et al. (2014: 161) argue, “no regime should be called a ‘democracy’ of any type unless it builds on this foundation.” And, to simply turn that statement around, it is difficult to consider a regime an autocracy if it exhibits a high level of electoral competitiveness and responsiveness.

Transitional arrangements have the ability to influence levels of electoral democracy through formalized mechanisms of deliberation and consultation, the presence (lack) of which *can* strengthen (weaken) the deliberative and participatory conceptions of democracy.

First, a deliberative conception of democracy stresses that political decisions in pursuit of the public good should be informed by respectful and reasonable dialogue at all levels (Lindberg, et al. 2014). Considering the possibility of regime change toward democracy, transitional arrangements may provide a venue in which dialogue occurs, and, through repeated contact among participants, deliberative transitional arrangements may increase the cost of deception (Mackie 2003), may provide opportunities to change preferences in a non-coercive setting (Dryzek 2000), or may even shape outcomes independent of the motives of the participants (Elster 1998).

Second, a participatory conception of democracy expands beyond the process of deliberation inside deliberative forums to include structural features of the wider society (Pateman 2012). This participatory conception values expansive representation, direct rule, and active participation by citizens in all political processes (Pateman 1970; Lindberg, et al. 2014). Again considering the possibility of regime change toward democracy, transitional arrangements may

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
<sup>43</sup> This dependent variable is not measuring regime *consolidation*, but regime *change*. Though not the focus of this dissertation, a huge literature on democratic consolidation exists, which Svobik (2015) usefully breaks down into two approaches: substantive and prospective. The substantive approach to consolidation assesses the extent to which a democracy reaches a set of democratic outcomes, such as robust political competition or vibrant civil society. The prospective approach to consolidation “associates consolidation with the durability of democracy” (p. 715). For pieces representative of these approaches, see Gasiorowski and Power (1998), Schedler (1998), and Diamond (1999).

not only provide a venue for deliberation, but may also produce mechanisms that allow for direct citizen consultation. These more participatory processes may promote a common identity and invite participants to invest in the bargains required to move beyond the transitional period (Elkins, et al. 2009); they may also spur inclusiveness in constitutional and institutional outcomes (Carey 2009b; Eisenstadt, et al. 2015).

Due to the uncertainty and chaotic nature of the transitional period, however, these deliberative and consultative mechanisms can be easily usurped by powerful actors. If the powerful actors lean in a democratic direction, this can push states toward creating a more open regime; but, if the powerful actors lean in an autocratic direction, the impact can go the other way. The composition of a transitional arrangement and the duration of time the transitional arrangement remains in power therefore fundamentally condition the extent and direction of regime change. For example, on one hand, an especially long duration can push the extent of regime change in an autocratic direction if powerful actors employ election delays instrumentally as a way to prolong their tenure in power. But on the other, if powerful actors utilize an especially long duration to further encourage processes of deliberation, this duration can push the extent of regime change in a democratic direction.

To summarize what I will greatly expand in the coming chapters, I present a relational diagram describing the influence of transitional arrangements on the extent of regime change in Figure 1-8.

Figure 1-8. Connecting transitional arrangements to the extent of regime change.



In theory, a transitional arrangement can formalize mechanisms of deliberation and consultation, each of which have the ability to strengthen the likelihood of the transitional period producing a change toward more open politics. In reality, however, the influence of these mechanisms is moderated by two things: (1) the composition of the transitional arrangement and (2) the duration of the transitional period.

The second major contribution of the dissertation, then, is that I not only peek inside the transitional period black box, but I argue that what occurs during the transitional period—in particular, the development of transitional arrangements—actually matters for the extent and direction of regime change between regime one and regime two.

## Roadmap of the Dissertation

While I use this chapter to motivate and introduce the big picture of the dissertation, I step-by-step build the theoretical and empirical analysis of the transitional period over the next four chapters. In Chapter Two, I extensively expand on the counterfactual logic-based framework from which to think about political regime transitions. As described above, in order to study

characteristics of regime transitions, I argue that it is necessary to shift the focus from ex-post coding based on transition *outcomes* to ex-ante coding of cases with the *potential* for regime transition. I therefore specify a new unit of analysis, “potential regime transition,” which I define as a shift of power away from an incumbent regime. I argue that defining what are commonly termed regime transition cases in this way requires the identification of transitional events that occur *prior to*—and, at times, years earlier than—any regime transition outcome. In describing the foundational dataset for this dissertation. I identify transitional events for all potential regime transition cases over the period 1989 to 2010. This not only allows me to systematically compare the processes of attempted regime transition without bias, but also alters the cases included in common specifications of regime transitions (based on existing indices) substantially. In fact, over the period 1989-2010, using my forward-looking approach to identify cases adds 33 cases of *potential* regime transition and deletes 41 cases of supposed *actual* transition.

With this dataset composed of potential regime transitions, I further utilize Chapter Two to systematically introduce the idea of variation in transitional paths. In particular, I define what I term transitional arrangements in this introductory chapter as “transitional groups.” Transitional groups are (1) groups representing a non-continuation of the prior regime, (2) unelected interim bodies that negotiate institutional design, and (3) groups with the goal of arranging a transfer of power through elections. By presenting a series of descriptive statistics, I show that transitional groups occur in between 38.5 and 51.6 percent of potential regime transition cases, depending on the transitional group definition used; span across potential regime transition cases, but exhibit signs of regional clustering; and are more likely to form if the military controls the regime prior to a transitional event, if political closing occurs before the transitional event, or if the mode of transition is a violent rupture with the previous regime.

While, by definition, these transitional groups claim the goal of using elections to move states toward democracy, Chapter Three investigates this claim and asks: Do transitional groups *actually* accelerate democratic regime change? It turns out while that transitional groups accelerate democratic regime change in the short-term, these gains disappear in the long-term. In particular, transitional groups influence the short-term trajectories of potential regime transitions, by (1) increasing the probability of holding a constitutional referendum and (2) increasing the duration of time until the first presidential or parliamentary election is held. Yet, as this duration increases, (3) potential regime transition cases with transitional groups tend to conduct *lower* quality elections. I argue that this short-term democratization effect arises because transitional groups specialize in deliberation and consultation, but if transitional groups remain in power for too long, their organizational structure can provide a convenient forum for actors wishing to consolidate power in an anti-democratic direction.

To explore the impact that the actors within transitional groups have on the political regime change process, Chapter Four focuses on the composition of transitional groups and, in particular, on whether the level of inclusivity in the transitional group has an impact on regime change prospects. I describe a typology of transitional arrangements in which I separate transitional group composition into two dimensions of inclusivity: power-sharing and participation. I demonstrate that the power-sharing dimension of transitional group composition has a larger impact on regime change than the participation dimension and, on average, power-sharing transitional groups move toward democracy more quickly than non-power-sharing transitional groups.

However, I argue that ignoring the participation dimension of transitional group composition is a mistake because a transitional group’s choice of broad or restricted composition induces trade-offs between the electoral, deliberative, and participatory conceptions of democracy.

In particular, three election characteristics differ on the participation dimension of TG composition: the occurrence of a presidential election, the duration of time from the formation of a TG to the first national election, and whether parties accept the first election results. Together, these results demonstrate that, within a power-sharing structure, a group that is *not* broadly participatory may perform better in terms of electoral democracy, despite exhibiting less progress in terms of deliberative or participatory democracy.

Chapter Five summarizes the theoretical contributions and empirical findings described throughout the dissertation, considers implications for two post-2010 cases of potential regime transition, and suggests avenues for future research.

## Chapter 2 Rethinking Regime Transitions: Analyzing the Potential for Change through Transitional Groups

This chapter introduces a newly-collected dataset of potential regime transitions and transitional groups over the period 1989 to 2010. In describing my data collection process, I address the following two conceptual questions that relate to the counterfactual reasoning I describe in Chapter One: What are potential regime transitions? And, within potential regime transition cases, what are transitional groups? After discussing how these terms allow for a better theoretical understanding of regime transitions, I begin to descriptively analyze the data. Though I defer my full data analysis of the transitional period to Chapters Three and Four, in this chapter I question: Where do transitional groups exist? And, why are transitional groups created in some potential regime transition cases, but not in others?

In total, I make three arguments. First, I make a methodological argument relating to case selection: In order to study characteristics of regime transitions, researchers must shift their focus from ex-post coding based on transition *outcomes* to ex-ante coding of cases with the *potential* for regime transition. I therefore define a “potential regime transition” as a shift of power away from an incumbent regime and argue that this definition requires a researcher to identify well-defined transitional events that occur *prior to*—and, at times, years earlier than—any regime transition outcome. Second, I argue that potential regime transition cases sometimes include a largely-neglected unit of analysis that I term “transitional groups.” Transitional groups are (1) groups representing a non-continuation of the prior regime, (2) unelected interim bodies that negotiate institutional design, and (3) groups with the goal of arranging a transfer of power through elections. I show that these entities occur in between 38.5 and 51.6 percent of potential regime transition cases, depending on the transitional group definition used. Moreover, I demonstrate that transitional groups span across potential regime transition cases, but exhibit signs of regional clustering. Third, I argue that two variables help to understand where transitional group formation is most likely: (1) prior regime type and (2) mode of transition. In particular, the likelihood of forming a transitional group increases if the military controls the regime prior to a transitional event, if political closing occurs before the transitional event, or if the mode of transition is a violent rupture with the previous regime.

I organize this chapter as follows. First, I provide a motivating example that contrasts the post-uprising government structures in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010, leading to fundamental questions about the architecture of regime transitions. As highlighted in Chapter One, these questions suggest the need for a comprehensive analysis of the transitional period between regimes. Second, therefore, I describe my contribution to the literature by discussing my case selection process, in which I produce a dataset of 182 potential regime transition cases. Third, I present my coding methodology for identifying transitional groups. Fourth, I provide a descriptive analysis of my set of potential regime transition cases, addressing questions of where transitional groups exist and describing the effects of the variables listed above. Fifth, I conclude.

### An Introductory Comparison

Occurring only five years apart, Kyrgyzstan experienced short spurts of mass protests against the regimes of Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2005 and 2010, respectively.



The uprisings stemmed from many of the same issues, utilized similar tactics, and accomplished the same goal: ousting the autocratic leader. Yet despite these similarities, the post-uprising government structures differed substantially. How did two cases, both with successful uprisings against the incumbent regime, structure the transitional period following the autocrat's demise?

On March 24, 2005, Kyrgyzstan's "Tulip Revolution" succeeded in ousting President Askar Akayev. In power since October 27, 1990, the leader's 15-year tenure came to a decisive halt when protests forced him to flee Kyrgyzstan and seek refuge in Moscow. Akayev's rapid downfall began in the wake of reportedly rigged elections, with opposition candidates leveling accusations of electoral fraud and unwarranted candidate disqualifications at the ruling regime.<sup>44</sup> Only a few weeks before his forced departure, on March 3, the first large-scale demonstration against Akayev took place in the province of Jalalabad, with protesters citing not only electoral discrepancies, but also grievances relating to corruption and suppression of the media (*BBC* 2005). The following day, protesters stormed Jalalabad's regional-administration headquarters; within four days, protesters created an informal coordinating committee; and, within three weeks, the People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan (NDK)—a coalition of nine small political parties formed in September 2004—joined the informal committee to help mobilize protesters nationwide. The final mass demonstration held on March 24 in the capital city of Bishkek sealed Akayev's fate (Radnitz 2006).

Yet because protesters' main calls demanded the president's ouster rather than more substantial democratic reforms, Akayev's departure left Kyrgyzstan with no clear, elected, or legitimate political successor (Van Antwerp 2013). To stabilize the uncertain leadership, the previously-elected, outgoing parliament's lower house named the head of the opposition coordinating committee, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, as acting president.<sup>45</sup> With no external or popular validation, Bakiyev chose a cabinet—composed of a mix of Akayev holdovers and anti-Akayev activists—to act as an interim government, agreed to schedule presidential elections for July, and recognized the newly-elected (and mostly pro-Akayev) parliament, despite Akayev's formal resignation on April 4. That is, rather than scrapping the controversial election results and thus heeding opposition calls to declare the elections null and void, Bakiyev worked within the existing system, and subsequently won the presidential election of July 10, 2005.<sup>46</sup>

Because of this continuity with the previous regime, Radnitz describes the events in 2005 as neither a revolution nor a regime change, stating instead: "What the country had, by all appearances, was something decidedly more limited, namely, a transfer of power" (2006: 133).

If we jump ahead five years, we notice that this "transfer of power" culminated in a startlingly similar sequence of events. Like Akayev before him, on April 7, 2010, President Bakiyev fled the capital following mass protests against his regime. To understand the context for these protests, between his election in 2005 and ouster in 2010, Bakiyev embarked on a number of moves toward autocracy: He changed the constitution and electoral code based on a referendum with questionable credentials; called snap parliamentary elections, outlawed electoral blocs, and

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<sup>44</sup> The parliamentary elections for the 75-seat Supreme Council took place on February 27, 2005, with a runoff on March 13. Election results are available from the Inter-Parliamentary Union at [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2174\\_05.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2174_05.htm).

<sup>45</sup> Note that the outgoing parliament was bicameral but, as the result of a February 2, 2003 referendum that amended the Kyrgyz Constitution, the incoming parliament was unicameral.

<sup>46</sup> It was not until 2007 that legislative elections were held. After the Constitutional Court of Kyrgyzstan invalidated constitutional amendments proposed by Bakiyev in the wake of the Tulip Revolution, a popular referendum on the constitution and electoral law was held and approved on October 21, 2007. A legislative election for the newly-enlarged 90-member parliament then took place on December 16, 2007. Election results are available from the Inter-Parliamentary Union at [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2174\\_07.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2174_07.htm).

announced a short election timetable to hinder the opposition's ability to organize; personalized control over the security apparatus, installing his family members in key positions; and allowed his regime to engage in repressive acts, cracking down on the supposed freedoms of speech and assembly (Collins 2011).

Within this context, the Popular Assembly, a democratic opposition group led by Roza Otunbayeva, formed. On March 17, 2010, civil society and key opposition groups met to establish their common goals, culminating in a seven-point ultimatum for authorities. When their goals went unmet, the Popular Assembly coordinated provincial demonstrations. Beginning on April 6, and eerily similar to the events of 2005, protesters took control of state radio, television, and government buildings. Agitated by violent clashes with authorities, demonstrators turned out in even greater numbers the following day. But the violence continued and, when protesters in Bishkek stormed the presidential headquarters, the Kyrgyz Presidential Guard killed scores of people. Following this bloody incident, Bakiyev fled to Southern Kyrgyzstan, eventually settling in Belarus.

On the same day as Bakiyev's departure, April 7, Otunbayeva announced that she would head a provisional government with plans of creating a new constitution. As Erica Marat describes, this constitution was to be a coldly pragmatic document "...written on the assumption that all politicians are greedy and corrupt and that safeguards are needed to prevent any politician or party from concentrating too much power" (Standish 2015). It is precisely this pragmatism, a perspective significantly different from the previous regime's outlook, which marks the point at which the structure of the post-uprising events of 2005 and 2010 diverge.

Unlike Bakiyev's March 2005 decision to retain the pro-Akayev and fraudulently-elected parliament, Otunbayeva's 13-member interim government immediately dismissed institutions filled with Bakiyev-era holdovers. For example, the new government dissolved parliament, suspended the Constitutional Court, dissolved Bakiyev's old ruling party, and promised to hold elections within six months (Ahrens and Hoen 2013). The interim government guaranteed discontinuity with the Bakiyev regime as it worked to develop a new institutional structure.

So new was the structure, in fact, that on April 30 the interim government passed Provisional Government Resolution No. 29, forming a 75-member Constitutional Council made up mostly of representatives from non-governmental organizations, experts, and civil society activists (Dalbaeva 2010, Muzalevsky 2010). This Council worked rapidly to limit the constitutional powers of the president, submitting the final draft of the constitution to the interim government within only a few weeks. On May 21, the interim government approved the constitution, providing for a transitional period under Otunbayeva until the inauguration of a new president, which was to occur by January 2012. Not only was much of the institutional structure new, but the interim government was granted a finite tenure.

To validate these provisional government decisions—and, again, in a manner distinct from 2005 in its speed—a popular referendum was held on June 27, with voters overwhelmingly approving both the new constitution and Otunbayeva as transitional president. According to the provisional government's mandate, legislative elections were held first, on October 10, 2010,<sup>47</sup> and presidential elections were held on October 30, 2011. With the inauguration of President Almazbek Atambayev on December 1, the provisional government's tenure officially ended.

Events in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010 have many parallels: protesters reacted to like issues, utilized comparable tactics, and successfully completed the same goal of ousting the

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
<sup>47</sup> Election results are available from the Inter-Parliamentary Union at [http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2174\\_E.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2174_E.htm).

president. Yet despite these similarities, the comparison demonstrates how drastically the architecture of regime transitions can differ. While Kyrgyzstan in 2005 showed continuity with the previous regime by retaining the fraudulently-elected parliament filled with pro-Akayev forces, the provisional government in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 created a clear discontinuity with Bakiyev’s regime by dismissing parliament. While Bakiyev took over in 2005 with no clear mandate or definite tenure, Otunbayeva’s government moved quickly to write a new constitution and hold elections that would end their time in power.

How can we account for these differing regime transition paths? What occurs during the transitional period between the fall of one regime and the rise of another? Under what circumstances are new, distinct groups created to fill the potential leadership void? And, how do these groups differ across cases? As highlighted in the literature review in Chapter One, these questions suggest the need for a comprehensive analysis of the transitional period between regimes, and the rest of this chapter develops the foundational framework that allows me to code a dataset from which to conduct the analysis.

Figure 2-1 provides a preview of my conceptual mapping of the transitional period, which I describe over the next two sections.

Figure 2-1. Overall conceptual schema describing the transitional period.



In particular, I aim to answer the following questions: First, with what I term “transitional groups” as the unit of analysis of interest, how do I delineate the universe of cases? That is, how do I determine where transitional groups have the *potential* to exist? Second, once I describe the case space, how do I determine where transitional groups *actually* exist?

### Conceptual Mapping, Part One: Identifying Potential Regime Transitions

To answer the first question, I demarcate my case space by identifying all instances of what I call “potential regime transitions.” In the following three sub-sections, I describe my case selection procedure and define a potential regime transition. Briefly, a potential regime transition is a shift of power away from an incumbent regime and, therefore, a situation in which there is the *potential* for transitional group creation. As I describe in detail below, it is imperative to address the case selection question before considering whether or not a transitional group exists. It is only

with a consistent and comprehensive sample of potential regime transitions that I can accurately assess (1) the existence of transitional groups and (2) the ultimate regime transition outcome. These sub-sections, therefore, provide a theoretical understanding of regime transitions that is a necessary foundation for my subsequent empirical analyses in Chapters Three and Four. My universe of cases for this portion of the project contains all potential regime transitions between 1989 and 2010, a total of 182 cases.

### Case Selection

To create the universe of cases, I compile a list of regime transitions between 1989 and 2010 by aggregating and cross-checking cases from three sources.<sup>48</sup> I combine information from the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (GWF) “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions” dataset (2012); the Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (CGV) “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited” dataset (2010); and the Center for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV (Polity) dataset.

The GWF dataset looks specifically at authoritarian regimes, identifies instances of regime change within autocracies, and describes the events surrounding an autocratic regime’s demise. This dataset begins with the following premise: When an autocratic regime loses power, either someone from the incumbent group replaces the prior leader, the incumbent leadership group loses control to a different group that replaces it with a new autocracy, or democratically elected leaders replace the incumbent leadership group. In my initial list of regime transitions, I include all cases that GWF identifies.

While GWF is a useful and unique dataset because it explicitly highlights a common regime transition path—transition from one authoritarian regime to another type of autocracy—my list of regime transitions must also include transitions from non-autocracies. I therefore supplement GWF with Polity, which provides a more general “RegTrans” variable. Polity defines a regime transition by the following threshold: a three-point change in the regime variable,<sup>49</sup> with each continuous, sequential change (in the same general direction) occurring within three years or less of the previous change. The RegTrans variable provides a typology of regime transitions, which complements GWF in two ways: First, it adds non-autocratic cases that GWF (intentionally) ignores and, second, it cross-checks GWF to ensure that I include all autocratic regime transitions. I therefore add all Polity cases that take a non-zero value on RegTrans (excluding GWF duplicate cases).<sup>50</sup>

With this expanded GWF and Polity list, I utilize CGV as a final cross-check. This dataset offers two dummy variables, which indicate transitions to democracy and dictatorship. A coding of one on variable “ttd” indicates a transition to democracy; a coding of one on variable “tta”

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<sup>48</sup> Why 1989 to 2010? Following McFaul’s (2002) logic, I begin in 1989 to capture the large number of transitional events that took place in Eastern Europe and Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As McFaul relates, the “...transitions from communist rule to new regime types are so different from the third wave of democratic transitions in the 1970s and 1980s that they should not even be grouped under the same rubric. Instead, decommunization triggered a fourth wave of regime change—to democracy *and* dictatorship” (p. 213). As will become obvious in Chapters Three and Four, I end in 2010 to allow for a multi-year lag when I consider transitional group characteristics as independent variables.

<sup>49</sup> Polity IV scores its regime variable on a 21-point scale of autocracy to democracy. The score ranges from -10 to 10, where -10 represents the most autocratic regime and 10 represents the most democratic regime.

<sup>50</sup> RegTrans values include: 3, major democratic transition; 2, minor democratic transition; 1, positive regime change; 0, little or no change; -1, negative regime change; -2, adverse regime change; -77, complete collapse; -66, foreign interruption; 96, state disintegration; 97, state transformation; 98, state demise; or 99, state creation.

indicates a transition to dictatorship. As this is a less-fine-grained binary measure, my GWF and Polity list *should* already include all CGV cases. After performing the cross-check, I find that, in fact, CGV provides no additional cases to include.<sup>51</sup> Thus, my combined GWF and Polity list contains a total of 212 potential regime transitions between 1989 and 2010.

### Problems with Case Selection

While this initial sample of 212 includes a wide range of regime transition cases, it also exhibits several problems. First, scholars worry that non-binary regime indices, such as Polity, exhibit bias due to their lack of conceptual clarity, complex coding rules, reliance on expert surveys, and opaque aggregation procedures (Cheibub, et al. 2010).<sup>52</sup> A well-documented problem in the existing scholarly literature,<sup>53</sup> an especially difficult bias to overcome for case selection purposes is a bias in favor of regime transitions that culminate in moves toward democracy. If this bias exists in the Polity data, Polity will disproportionately include regime transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, while systematically missing potential regime transitions from democracy to authoritarianism, or from one type of authoritarianism to another. I minimize this bias by including all cases from GWF.

Though the use of GWF data minimizes my concern of democratization bias, utilizing this data does not remove all problems of bias in the sample. A second, and more worrisome, problem stems from my intended use of the regime transition case list. As a reminder, my goal is to examine when and where transitional *groups* exist. My initial list of 212 cases provides a set of regime transitions that potentially contain transitional groups. However, such a list systematically misses one subset of the transitional group population: Transitional groups that exist *without* a regime transition. That is, if transitional groups exist in cases that the three indicators described above do not recognize as regime transitions, the combined list will exclude them from the subsequent coding process.

There are two ways that the combined list may incorrectly exclude cases that have the potential for transitional groups. First, the list may exclude a country because no indicator identifies it as having a regime transition during the period of interest. Neither GWF nor Polity nor CGV list Bahrain, for instance, as having a regime transition between 1989 and 2010; the country of Bahrain does not appear in the combined list. But if, in fact, Bahrain exhibits a *potential* regime transition during this period, then Bahrain has the *potential* to create a transitional group, and the universe of cases should include Bahrain.

Second, the list may not exclude an entire country, but may exclude important country-year cases within countries that the indicators code as transitional. That is, the combined list of cases may capture some potential cases of a transitional group in a given country, but not all. Albania, for example, has two regime transitions according to GWF, Polity, and CGV, but if Albania actually exhibits three potential regime transitions between 1989 and 2010, each of which

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<sup>51</sup> Both the Polity IV and CGV datasets list a number of cases that simply show a one-year difference from GWF. For example, while one dataset identifies a regime transition in Benin in 1990, another dataset identifies the same regime transition in Benin in 1991. After verifying that these cases represent the same empirical observation, I update the year in my dataset to reflect the differences (i.e., Benin 1990-1).

<sup>52</sup> A second common regime index is Freedom House's "Freedom in the World" (<https://freedomhouse.org/reports-types/freedom-world>), which scores countries in terms of political rights and civil liberties on a scale from one to seven (one is most democratic, seven is most authoritarian). I do not use Freedom House data for case selection purposes because the organization does not provide rules with which to assess a regime transition.

<sup>53</sup> See, for example, Munck and Verkuilen (2002), Casper and Tufis (2003), and Treier and Jackman (2008).

has the potential to form a transitional group, the universe of cases should include all three Albanian instances.

How can I remedy these two concerns about bias in the combined list? Over the 1989 to 2010 period, I first examine each country that the three indicators *never identify* as having a regime transition and assess whether potential regime transition cases are missing.<sup>54</sup> I next examine each country that the three indicators *do identify* as having a regime transition and assess whether any country has missing potential regime transition cases in additional country-years.

### What is a “Potential Regime Transition,” Exactly?

I identify these potentially missing cases by reading country histories over the period of time in question—namely, by reading history overviews in Encyclopedia Britannica, election overviews available through the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s “PARLINE database on national parliaments,” and numerous country case studies.<sup>55</sup> In contrast to existing indices, I search for “potential regime transitions,” which I define as shifts of power away from an incumbent regime.

Specifically, I identify “shifts in power away from an incumbent regime” by searching for transitional events that occur prior to—and, at times, years earlier than—any regime transition outcome.<sup>56</sup> Rather than asking the ex-post question of where a regime transition occurred, I focus on the ex-ante question of where a regime transition *has the potential* to occur. If any of the following five questions holds true, each of which identifies a type of transitional event, I include the case as a potential regime transition:

1. Does the military perpetrate a coup d’état against the existing regime?
2. Does some faction overthrow the existing regime in a rebellion or civil war?
3. Does an international actor—a state, a group of states, or an international organization—forcibly intervene against the existing regime?
4. Do protests lead to involuntary changes in the structure of the existing regime?
5. Does the existing regime announce voluntary changes in the structure of its regime?

Using this process to identify transitional events leads me to add four new country cases of potential regime transition and 29 new country-year cases of potential regime transition to the combined list.<sup>57</sup> This increases the number of potential regime transitions between 1989 and 2010 from 212 to 245.

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<sup>54</sup> Note that I include states with small populations not analyzed by GWF or Polity (sometimes termed “micro-states”). Like Veenendaal and Corbett (2015), who provide an in-depth analysis of this issue relating to both the democratization and decentralization literatures, I find the exclusion of these states from many regime transition studies arbitrary and contrary to the principles of systematic case selection.

<sup>55</sup> PARLINE is available at <http://www.ipu.org/parline/parlinesearch.asp>. For a list of country-specific references, please see Coding Appendix B.

<sup>56</sup> Note that an incumbent regime can be either autocratic or democratic and, moreover, that the transitional event implies nothing about the subsequent regime type. That is, following a transitional event, any of the four logically possible transitions can occur: autocracy to autocracy, autocracy to democracy, democracy to autocracy, or democracy to democracy.

<sup>57</sup> The four potential regime transition cases that correspond to countries not already in the list are Bahrain 1999, Honduras 2009, Qatar 1995, and Seychelles 1991. The 29 additional potential regime transition cases that correspond to countries already in the list are as follows: Albania 1990; Algeria 1991; Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995; Burkina Faso 1991; Chad 1989 (1988); Comoros 1991, 1999; Congo-Kinshasa 1990; Croatia 1990; Djibouti 1992; Timor-Leste (East Timor) 1999; Gabon 1990; Guinea 1990; Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) 1990, 2003, 2007; Kenya 1991, 2008;

Before explaining these five transitional events in more detail, it is crucial to notice that, in minimizing the problems with case selection explained in the previous sub-section, my process of identifying transitional events differs from the coding procedures of GWF, Polity, and CGV. Rather than focusing on regime movement over time that culminates in a transition, I focus on observable instances of shifts in power from the existing regime. For consistency purposes, then, I additionally code each of the initial 212 cases according to their transitional event as outlined in the five questions above. If, for any of the 212 cases, the answer to *each* of the five questions above is no, I delete the case from the list.<sup>58</sup> According to my definition of potential regime transitions, such a case has no transitional event and, therefore, no potential to create a transitional group.<sup>59</sup> There are 41 such cases.<sup>60</sup>

The deletion of these 41 cases may seem paradoxical: How can a case experience regime change (as defined by GWF, Polity, and/or CGV), yet not have a transitional event? A succinct recapitulation of a point discussed in Chapter One is helpful here: The goal of this study is to use a forward-looking approach to analyze the *process* of regime change, and not to perform a backward-looking analysis based on the outcome of democratic consolidation. In many of the 41 cases that I delete, the “regime change” identified by GWF, Polity, and/or CGV signifies some level of democratic consolidation based on the successful completion of elections within a country (e.g., presidential elections in Afghanistan in 2009, Algeria in 2004, Iran in 1997, and Mexico in 2000). I therefore delete these cases because they signify the end of the regime transition process rather than the beginning.

In addition to the 41 cases without transitional events, the re-coding process alerts me to 22 duplicate cases in the dataset, which I delete.<sup>61</sup> Through this coding and re-coding process, then,

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Kosovo 1999; Lesotho 1991, 1994, 1998; Mauritania 1991; Nigeria 1993; Rwanda 1991; Sierra Leone 1991; Somalia 2000, 2004; Togo 2005.

<sup>58</sup> Prior to deleting cases, I conducted inter-coder reliability checks with four undergraduate research assistants at the University of California, Berkeley. The checks took the following form: Without knowledge of my coding, an undergraduate coded the case. If the undergraduate’s coding agreed with my own (five no answers), I deleted the case. If the undergraduate’s coding disagreed with my own (at least one yes answer), I sent the case to an additional undergraduate, who then coded the case to adjudicate the difference.

<sup>59</sup> Note that I do not consider a state’s declaration of independence as its own transitional event category. Independence alone does not define a shift in power from the old regime (a potential regime transition), as it signifies either (1) an *outcome* of a transitional process or (2) a formalization of an existing separation of entities. In the case of (1), the coding scheme already includes the case because it falls in one of the five transitional event categories; in the case of (2), no power shift occurs.

<sup>60</sup> The 41 cases without potential regime transitions from the list of 212 are the following: Afghanistan 2009; Algeria 2004; Comoros 2004; Croatia 1999-2000; Czech Republic 1993; Djibouti 1991; Estonia 1999-2000; Ethiopia 2005; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2002; Gabon 2009; Ghana 1996, 2000; Guinea-Bissau 2002; Iran 1997, 2004; Iraq 2010; Kenya 2002; Kosovo 2008; Malaysia 2008; Mexico 1994-7, 2000; Montenegro 2006; Nicaragua 1990; Pakistan 2008; Peru 1990; Romania 1996; Russia 2000; Senegal 2000; Serbia 2006; Slovak Republic 1993; Sri Lanka 1989, 1994; Taiwan 2000; Thailand 2007-8; Timor-Leste 2002; Uganda 1993; Venezuela 2005, 2006-9; Zambia 1996, 2001; and Zimbabwe 1999.

<sup>61</sup> The 22 duplicate cases from the list of 212 are the following: Angola 1992-7; Armenia 1995-6; Azerbaijan 1994-5; Bangladesh 2008, 2009; Belarus 1994; Burundi 1997-8, 2005; Cambodia 1998; Ethiopia 1994-5; Guinea-Bissau 2004; Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) 2000; Liberia 1997, 2006; Mauritania 2007; Mongolia 1993; Nepal 2008; Niger 1993; Paraguay 1993; Soviet Union 1991; Suriname 1991; and Taiwan 1996. Some of the duplicates are non-unique cases in which the year identified corresponds to an empirical situation already represented in another potential regime transition; other duplicates are non-unique cases in which the case identified is an aggregate country and all component cases are already represented in the dataset (for example, all component countries of the former Soviet Union are included, making the former Soviet Union itself unnecessary).

I create a comprehensive list of potential regime transitions over the period 1989 to 2010.<sup>62</sup> This list contains a total of 182 potential regime transition cases.

### Transitional Events

For these 182 potential regime transition cases, identifying the cases' transitional events serves two purposes, each of which allows for a better theoretical understanding of regime transitions. First, identifying a transitional event offers precision by focusing on ex-ante events rather than ex-post transition outcomes.<sup>63</sup> Existing indices report transition outcomes on a yearly basis (i.e., did a regime transition occur in year X?), but I report specific dates on which initial shifts in power occur. Second, classifying these shifts in power highlights their dependence within cases, as a large number of countries experience more than one transitional event. Examining transitional events over time, rather than completed regime transitions, can therefore provide an indication of regime instability. I will discuss each of the two points in turn.

#### *Precision*

Rather than assessing regime change based on ex-post transition outcomes, I utilize transitional events to date the start of a potential regime transition. If a country experiences a military coup d'état, for instance, the transitional event date is clear; the shift of power away from the existing regime occurs precisely on the date that military forces overthrow that regime. This date does not indicate that a regime transition *will* occur, but simply that there is the *possibility* for a regime transition due to a shift in the existing power structure.

But, what are all of the ways in which a rupture with the previous regime can occur? In a very broad sense, we can think of a rupture as a series of dichotomies: coerced or voluntary, violent or non-violent, elite- or mass-initiated, and so on. These dichotomous distinctions harken back to O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986) description of accommodation versus confrontation in the "reforma" and "ruptura" processes of Spain and Portugal, yet they describe little about the observable events that signify regime ruptures.<sup>64</sup>

In their descriptions of four ideal-type interim governments, Shain and Linz (1995) begin to push us toward identifying such events. In particular, the authors describe revolutionary provisional governments as tending to emerge after a regime falls violently through (1) internal revolution, (2) a coup d'état, or (3) forcible external intervention ousting the regime. Each of (1)

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<sup>62</sup> Through this process, I find a total of six cases in which the transitional event occurs prior to 1989 (I list my transitional event year in parentheses): Algeria 1989 (1988), Burundi 1993 (1987), Chad 1989 (1988), Chile 1989-90 (1987), Fiji 1990-2 (1987), and Namibia 1990 (1988). I leave these cases in the dataset, but note my alternate transitional event year.

<sup>63</sup> My focus on transitional events exhibits similarities to the "critical junctures" framework, which Collier and Collier (1991) describe as "concerned with a type of discontinuous political change in which critical junctures 'dislodge' older institutional patterns" (p. 17). These junctures "may range from relatively quick transitions—for example, 'moments of significant structural change'—to an extended period..." (p. 32).

<sup>64</sup> Various authors describe more complicated typologies of regime transitions. Munck and Leff (1997), for instance, describe modes of transition based on the identities of the actors involved and the strategies they employ. Their five types include (1) reform from below and (2) reform through rupture, where the push for reform comes from outside the incumbent elite, but elite strength varies; (3) reform through transaction and (4) reform through extrication, where reform proceeds through negotiations between existing elites and opposition forces, but goals are either opposing or similar; and (5) reform from above, where reform proceeds from within the ruling elite.



through (3) is an observable, dateable transitional event. Yet beyond revolutionary provisional governments, the authors' descriptions provide less guidance on transitional events: a power-sharing interim government tends to emerge without violence when an incumbent government under an authoritarian regime and democratic opposition share executive power temporarily; an incumbent caretaker government tends to emerge when members of the outgoing elite manage a transition until they transfer power to a democratically-elected government; and in an international interim government, the international community directs the process of democratic change.

The latter three types of interim governments show that a rupture may stem not only from a variety of violent means—a military coup d'état, overthrow in a civil war, or forcible international intervention—but also from a number of non-violent events, such as pacts among elites, sustained mass protests, heavy international pressure, and internationally-mediated peace agreements. To consider these modes of regime rupture, and as mentioned in the previous section, I identify five transitional event types. Table 2-1 displays these five event types, provides an overview of how I date the transitional event for each of the types, and shows the distribution of the 182 potential regime transition cases (*PRTs*) according to their transitional events.

Table 2-1. Overview of transitional events.

<i>Transitional event</i>	<i>Transitional event date</i>	<i>Number of PRTs</i>	<i>Percentage of PRTs</i>
Military coup d'état <sup>65</sup>	coup d'état	43	23.6
Rebellion/civil war	government overthrown	11	6.0
International intervention	government overthrown	9	4.9
Involuntary reform	(1) chief executive ousted (2) major political reform i. multi-party politics ii. multi-party elections iii. democratic transition announced iv. independence declared  <i>Alternative:</i> (1) large protests began (2) opposition founding congress/meeting	57	31.3
Voluntary reform	<i>Subtype one:</i> same as involuntary reform (above), but with no alternative protest date	62	34.1
	<i>Subtype two:</i> chief executive conducted “self-coup,” ruled by decree, suspended/annulled election results		
	<i>Subtype three:</i> peace agreement signed		

*Notes:* For each transitional event type, column two describes the precise date used to signify the event. In the rows for involuntary and voluntary reform, column two describes the iterative procedure that I use to date the transitional event. The third and fourth columns list the number and percentage,

<sup>65</sup> Based on the Center for Systemic Peace's database of “Coups d'État, 1946-2013,” between 1989 and 2010, there were 35 successful coups d'état. My initial dataset included 32 of these 35, but missed the following three: Liberia (1994), Qatar (1995), and Togo (2005). Additionally, in coding cases as coups, my dataset differed from this source in several instances. Rather than coding the case as a coup, I code (1) Liberia (1994) as international intervention, (2) Afghanistan (1992) as civil war, (3) Bulgaria (1989) as involuntary reform, (4) Congo-Brazzaville (1997) as civil war and international intervention, (5) Guinea-Bissau (1999) as civil war, (6) and Nepal (2002) as involuntary reform.

respectively, of potential regime transition cases (*PRTs*) in the dataset for each transitional event. I calculate the percentages by dividing the number in column three by the total number of potential regime transitions in the dataset ( $N=182$ ).

Sources widely-report the date of a violent overthrow of a regime—whether by military coup d'état, rebellion or civil war, or forcible international intervention—which simplifies the process of dating the transitional events. In the first two categories, I search for the dates on which the military or some faction removes, kills, or sends a leader into exile. In the third category, I search for the date on which international forces either (1) oust the regime outright or (2) force the withdrawal of an invading state's military forces.<sup>66</sup> To illustrate the different ways in which international actors can forcibly intervene, as an example of (1), on November 13, 2001 in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom's invading forces defeated the Taliban government in Kabul. Yet as an instance of (2), on June 10, 1999 in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Operation Allied Force's airstrikes compelled Yugoslav forces to withdraw from Kosovo. Of the three types of violent overthrow, military coups occur the most frequently, making up 23.6 percent of potential regime transition cases in the data. Civil war or rebellion and international intervention transitional events occur much less frequently, in only six and five percent of cases, respectively.

Unlike the three violent transitional event categories, the dates corresponding to the transitional events of involuntary and voluntary reform are less obvious. As a reminder, involuntary reform transitional events are those in which protests compel involuntary changes in the structure of the existing regime, which make up 31.3 percent of potential regime transitions. To date these involuntary changes, I use a sequential process. First, I search for the date on which protests force the chief executive to give up power. If the chief executive does not leave office, second, I search for the earliest date corresponding to a major political reform. Whenever possible, I use the creation date of a provision for multiparty politics; if impossible to find this date, I use the date on which the first multiparty election occurred, the date on which the leader announced democratic reforms, or the date of a state's declaration of independence.

While these transitional event dates reflect an involuntary change in the structure of the existing regime, the crucial component in involuntary reform transitional events is the protests that pressure the government to embark on these reforms. I therefore create an alternative transitional event date that dates the beginning of protests.<sup>67</sup> When it is especially difficult to find a protest date, I use the date of the first major opposition group's founding congress or meeting.

The protest component is what separates involuntary from voluntary transitional events, which are cases in which the government “voluntarily” announces changes in the structure of its regime. I put voluntary in quotation marks here because it is sometimes the case that the governments experience non-protest pressure to reform from the international community, such as

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<sup>66</sup> In some cases, two transitional events occur almost simultaneously. On September 28, 1995 in Comoros, for example, Colonel Bob Denard and a group of around 30 mercenaries overthrew President Saïd Mohamed Djohar in a military coup d'état. Only a few days later, on October 3, France intervened with Operation Azalee and forced Denard's provisional government to surrender. Generally, in instances of multiple transitional events extremely close together, I use the *earliest* transitional event date. In the Comoros case, then, I code the transitional event type as a military coup d'état.

<sup>67</sup> The alternative date always occurs *before* the transitional event date, but note that—at times—protest dates are estimates due to varying reports across sources. In addition to involuntary reform transitional events, there are five cases of either military coup d'état (Guinea 2008), civil war or rebellion (Congo-Kinshasa 1997), or international intervention (Lesotho 1998, Panama 1989, and Sierra Leone 1998) that exhibit protests prior to the transitional event. I also code alternative transitional event dates in these cases.

through sanctions, aid conditions, or internationally-brokered peace mediation. These cases, in total, make up 34.1 percent of potential regime transitions.

However, there are three distinct sub-types within voluntary reform. The first sub-type contains potential regime transitions in which the chief executive initiates democratic reforms, but there is no evidence that sustained protests spurred these policy changes (30 cases, or 16.5 percent of potential regime transitions). I code the transitional event date in these cases by following the same sequence as in involuntary reform cases, but without providing a protest date as an alternative. The second sub-type includes potential regime transitions in which the chief executive initiates changes of an autocratic nature (10 cases, or 5.5 percent of potential regime transitions). I search for the date when the chief executive either conducts a “self-coup,” declares rule by decree, or suspends or annuls election results, often dismissing the legislature at the same time.<sup>68</sup> The third sub-type represents potential regime transition cases that begin with the signing of a peace accord or agreement, which are often internationally-mediated (18 cases, or 9.9 percent of potential regime transitions). I provide a listing of all transitional event types, dates, and explanations in Appendix 2A.<sup>69</sup>

This appendix makes clear that the transitional event date signifies an observable event that marks an ex-ante power shift, rather than an ex-post regime transition. This is in stark contrast to the existing literature on regime transitions. It is thus unsurprising that the year in my transitional event date often differs from the year identified by the existing GWF, Polity, and CGV indices; in fact, the years differ in 41.8 percent of cases (in 76 of 182 cases).

While these existing indices describe completed regime transitions, the precision afforded by my transitional event dates—dates that mark the precise starting point for a *potential* regime transition—provide a consistent theoretical basis from which to investigate the transitional period and, ultimately, from which to assess whether potential regime transitions lead to *actual* regime transitions.

### *Dependence*

In addition to its first purpose of offering precision by focusing on ex-ante events, identifying transitional events has a second purpose: It highlights that a single country can experience more than one transitional event, even during what existing indices consider one period of regime transition. That is, identifying multiple transitional events in one country highlights the complicated back-and-forth nature of regime transitions. And, even when existing indices consider different transitional events as culminating in separate regime transitions, identifying the type of event (1) provides an indication of regime instability over time and (2) emphasizes the lack of independence between cases.

The dataset of 182 cases contains a total of 106 different countries. Of these 106 countries, 65 experience one potential regime transition (61.3 percent), while 41 experience more than one potential regime transition (38.7 percent) over the 1989-2010 period. The average number of potential regime transitions per case is 1.7, yet this number obscures the fact that certain countries

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<sup>68</sup> The dataset contains two examples of popularly-termed “self-coups”: Guatemala in 1993 and Peru in 1992. In the former, on May 25, 1993, Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano illegally suspended the constitution and dissolved the National Congress and Supreme Court; in the latter, on April 5, 1992, President Alberto Fujimori dissolved the Congress, suspended the judiciary, arrested several opposition leaders, and suspended the constitution.


<sup>69</sup> Note that in voluntary reform cases, I sometimes provide an alternative event date that precedes the transitional event date, but this *never* reflects protests.

experience two, three, four, or even five potential regime transitions. Table 2-2 presents the frequency distribution and Figure 2-2 illustrates this distribution on a world map.

Table 2-2. Frequency of potential regime transitions (*PRTs*) by country, 1989-2010.

<i>Number of PRTs per country</i>	<i>Frequency</i> <sup>70</sup>
1	65
2	17
3	16
4	5
5	3

Figure 2-2. World map of frequency of potential regime transitions (*PRTs*), 1989-2010.



Within the set of countries exhibiting two potential regime transitions, Chad illustrates how focusing on transitional events can help to highlight the back-and-forth nature of what is sometimes considered a single regime transition. Facing a large amount of French pressure in July 1988, President Hissène Habré and his ruling National Union for Independence and Revolution appointed a constitutional commission to begin creating plans to introduce democratic institutions. Yet slightly less than five months after the parliamentary elections of July 8, 1990, in the second transitional event, General Idriss Déby and a small group of Zaghawa rebels overthrew Habré in a military coup. Déby promised further reforms for democracy and political plurality, dissolved the newly-elected National Assembly, suspended the constitution, and formed a transitional Council of State (Lanne 2003). In Chad, within a span of only two years, two very different—though intimately related—transitional events occurred, illustrating the complicated nature of regime transition processes.

<sup>70</sup> The frequencies reported here are specific to 1989-2010. I report them to illustrate the widespread dependence within cases, but note that it is problematic to use them to extrapolate to pre-1989 or post-2010 potential regime transition cases.

Moreover, within the set of three countries exhibiting five potential regime transitions, Sierra Leone provides an example of both tumultuous regime instability and dependence between transitional events. Throughout the 1990s, and in the context of a civil war, Sierra Leone followed a recurring pattern of reform, then military coup d'état.

In the first transitional event of 1990, due to mounting pressure from both within and outside the country, President Joseph Saidu Momoh set up a 35-member National Constitutional Review Commission, which recommended that the country switch to a multiparty system. Shortly after the new constitution entered into force, on April 29, 1992, the second transitional event occurred, with Valentine Strasser overthrowing Momoh in a military coup, establishing the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), dissolving parliament, and banning all political parties. Several years later, on January 16, 1996, NPRC soldiers under Julius Maada Bio undertook a third transitional event, ousting Strasser and stating their support for returning to a democratically elected civilian government. Yet after Bio held both presidential and parliamentary elections, the fourth transitional event took place on May 25, 1997, in which 17 soldiers launched a coup, sending elected President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah into exile, establishing the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), suspending the constitution, and banning demonstrations. Finally, the fifth transitional event of February 13, 1998 occurred when Nigeria-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces overthrew the AFRC and reinstated Kabbah's government (Gberie 2005, Hirsch 2001). In less than a decade, Sierra Leone experienced a turbulent sequence of transitional events, each directly dependent on the events that preceded it.

### Summary

To recapitulate, what I argue in the previous sub-sections is that, in order to study characteristics of regime transitions, researchers must first endeavor to create a consistent, unbiased, and comprehensive sample. To ensure methodological consistency in case selection, I suggest that researchers interested in the process of regime transition shift their focus from ex-post coding based on transition *outcomes* to ex-ante coding of cases with the *potential* for regime transition.

In particular, I identify five transitional events that mark the beginning of a “potential regime transition”: a shift of power away from an incumbent regime. Because these events often occur years prior to any regime transition outcome, using them as a method to date the beginning of a potential regime transition affords researchers two opportunities: (1) to assess specific actors, actions, and institutional processes occurring within the transitional period and (2) to analyze ultimate regime transition outcomes without making assumptions about the direction of regime change (e.g., from autocracy to democracy). Moreover, defining potential regime transitions according to these transitional events provides researchers with coding precision, indications of regime stability, and a quantifiable sense of the amount of dependence between events.

### Conceptual Mapping, Part Two: Transitional Groups

In this section, I look specifically at the first opportunity I identify above: the chance to assess specific actors, actions, and institutional processes occurring within the transitional period. I argue that one such specific facet of potential regime transitions is the choice to create formalized “transitional groups” as a way to move a country forward. While each of the 182 potential regime transition cases identified in the previous section has the *potential* to create a transitional group, I

now move on to the second large question of this chapter: How do I determine where these groups *actually* exist? To preview the results, I find that transitional groups span across potential regime transitions, occurring in between 38.5 and 51.6 percent of cases, depending on the transitional group definition used.

### What is a “Transitional Group”?

In order to determine where transitional groups exist, I must create a coding system that reflects and builds on commonalities among existing definitions of transitional (or interim or provisional) governments.

A good starting point is Shain and Linz, who identify several defining characteristics: interim governments are temporary, lack a democratic mandate, promise to facilitate a country’s transition to a democratic political order in free and contested elections, have no politically-defined rules to consult, and must devise norms and regulations as they go (1995: 3-10). Other scholars define these governments more broadly. In their edited volume focusing on international interim regimes, Gutteri and Piombo define an interim regime as “an organization that rules a polity during the period between the fall of the ancien régime and the initiation of the next regime” (2007: 5). Yet, like Shain and Linz, these authors highlight the temporary nature of interim regimes and, in the same volume, Manning describes an interim government as “a temporary stopgap measure that addresses pressing needs but that holds final decisions about the allocation of political power in abeyance” (2007: 54). Seely similarly defines a transition government “as a temporary leadership body,” but adds the condition that it is “appointed by an existing government or occupying authority (rather than popularly elected) to serve for a limited term with the intention of creating conditions for new leadership to be chosen” (2009: 11).

For my purposes, the existing definitions are lacking in two ways. First, and as she notes in the text, Seely’s final condition removes the possibility of considering military juntas that come to power through coups d’état as potential transition governments. It additionally removes the potential for a transition government when some faction overthrows the existing government in a civil war. Because my menu of transitional events contains both of these options, I must broaden the definition to include them. Second, each of these existing definitions focuses heavily on interim *governments*, meaning transitional bodies with de facto power. In reality, however, the transitional period between regimes may contain various transitional institutions that complement, rather than replace, the government. Roundtable negotiations, national debates, and constitutional commissions, for example, can be formalized groups that have many of the attributes listed above—they can be temporary, unelected, and focused on creating rules for a democratic election.

Based on the commonalities among the existing definitions and considering my critiques, I therefore utilize the term “transitional group” to define a group that (1) represents a non-continuation of the prior regime (“regime one” in Figure 2-1), (2) is an unelected interim body that negotiates institutional design, and (3) states that its goal is to arrange a transfer of power through elections.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Crucially, the focus is on the *stated* goal of arranging a transfer of power through elections, rather than the sincerity of that statement. In some cases, elections never take place. On May 19, 1993 in Eritrea, for instance, Isaias Afewerki became president of a provisional government that was to oversee a four-year transition to constitutional rule and a pluralist political system. Yet, as of January 1, 2016, Eritrea has not held a national election. I therefore focus on the statement itself when identifying a transitional group because it is impossible to judge sincerity *ex ante*.

To systematically assess the question of where these groups exist, I develop a three-part coding system, with each part corresponding to one of a transitional group's definitional components.<sup>72</sup>

### The Coding System: Part One

I investigate the three definitional components sequentially. That is, I begin by coding each of the 182 potential regime transition cases on component one and, because this allows me to immediately code some cases as having no transitional group, I then move on to component two with fewer cases to assess. Similarly, because I code some cases as having no transitional group on component two, I move on to component three with even fewer cases to assess. In what follows, I present the transitional group definitional components in order, providing an overview of my coding rules and illustrating these rules through empirical examples.

*Definitional component one:* A transitional group is a group that represents a non-continuation of the prior regime.

With the first definitional component, I put forth the idea that a transitional group must work outside of the existing system; it cannot simply perpetuate the existing system under a new guise. Below, if the answer to *either* question one *or* question two is no *and* the answer to question three is no, the case remains in the sample of potential regime transitions to code on definitional component two:

1. After the transitional event (TE), does the pre-TE chief executive (e.g., the president or a military general) retain the same preeminence as before the TE?
2. After the TE, do non-chief executive, pre-TE government elites (e.g., cabinet or legislature members) retain the same preeminence as before the TE?
3.
  - a. If the TE ousts the chief executive, does succession occur according to a previously-defined process (e.g., the speaker of parliament takes over as specified in the constitution)?
  - b. If the TE does not oust the chief executive, do reforms occur solely from within an existing legislative body?

For question one, the coding is clearly no when the transitional event (TE) stems from or leads to the prior chief executive's death, ouster, or exile. The death of Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu in 1989 and Guinean President Lansana Conté in 2008, the ouster of Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid in 1992 and Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey in 1993, and the exile of Haitian President Prosper Avril in 1990 and Liberian President Charles Taylor in 2003 are all clear-cut instances in which the pre-TE chief executive was not able to retain preeminence following the TE. However, many instances of potential regime transition lack such clarity. In these opaque instances, I examine the actions of the prior chief executive to assess whether his or her preeminence changes following the TE.

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<sup>72</sup> For descriptions of each case in the dataset, please see Coding Appendix A. For corresponding case references, please see Coding Appendix B.

First, if the pre-TE chief executive announces future transition plans, but makes no attempt to alter his or her role—or the role of non-chief executive, prior regime elites—in the government, there is no transitional group. Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso, for instance, initiated a gradual liberalization of the military regime in 1991. Though he agreed to the adoption of a new multiparty constitution, he retained his role as president, controlled the liberalization process, and refused to hold a pre-election national conference with the opposition (Santiso and Loada 2003).

Second, if the pre-TE chief executive alters some aspect of the government, such as dismissing members of the cabinet, dissolving the legislature, or creating a new institutional body, yet retains his or her leading role without granting additional autonomy to the new or transformed organs of government, there is no transitional group. Djibouti's President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, as one example, appointed a 14-member commission in 1992 to write a new constitution that was to legalize political parties and plan for legislative elections. Despite creating this body, he filled it with members from his ruling party, the People's Rally for Progress, and refused opposition requests to form a transitional government (Shraeder 1993). In both Burkina Faso and Djibouti, rather than creating an autonomous group, the chief executive simply used surface-level reforms to perpetuate the existing system.

Third, and alternatively, if either (1) the pre-TE chief executive retains his or her leading role but alters some aspect of the regime, such as granting additional autonomy to new or transformed organs of government or (2) some other force, such as the opposition, an international actor, or the military, alters some aspect of the government, but chooses to include the pre-TE chief executive in this transformed system, there *may* be a transitional group. To illustrate this point, consider Chilean President Augusto Pinochet who, following economic collapse and mass civil resistance in the early 1980s, allowed for gradual political reform. Though retaining his leading role until early 1990, as early as 1983, Pinochet named a new civilian commission to draw up laws relating to the 1980 Constitution. Despite creating this new body, Pinochet was constrained by the Constitutional Court, which forced Pinochet's junta to enact laws ensuring that plebiscites would be used to ratify modifications of the constitution, requiring that the junta's candidate for the next presidential term be elected through a referendum, and creating a special electoral court (Hudson 1994, Munck and Leff 1997). Though Pinochet remained at the helm of the military dictatorship, the Constitutional Court's actions created significant changes between the pre- and post-TE systems.

Even in potential regime transition cases in which the answer to question one is yes, a transitional group may exist if the answer to question two is no. As a reminder, question two asks: After the TE, do non-chief executive, pre-TE government elites (e.g., cabinet or legislature members) retain the same preeminence as before the TE?

For this question, the coding is clearly no if the TE forces the dismissal or imprisonment of non-chief executive, prior regime elites. In cases lacking this transparency, I assess the preeminence of pre-TE regime elites by comparing their composition before and after the TE. If the composition before and after the TE is the same, there is no transitional group. Moreover, if the composition before and after the TE changes, but fails to include new members who were not part of the pre-TE regime elites, there is no transitional group.

If, however, non-chief executive, pre-TE regime elites retain *some* role—either in their existing cabinet or legislative positions or in a new group focused on transition—but are joined by non-pre-TE elite forces, there *may* be a transitional group. Here, the addition of non-pre-TE regime elites may temper the prior elites' influence or push forward a new agenda, and therefore constitutes an instance of non-continuation from the prior regime.



Which potential regime transition cases receive an answer of yes to *both* question one *and* question two? That is, which cases show no discontinuity in the regime? These cases tend to fall in one of two categories: (1) cases in which a state gains independence, but embarks on no further reforms or (2) cases in which a dominant leader unilaterally initiates political reforms.<sup>73</sup>

In category (1), a state gains independence, but has the same leader or party in charge before and after independence. For example, if a state holds a parliamentary election prior to independence and this elected parliament remains in charge following independence, there is continuity in the existing regime. Belarus, for instance, declared independence from the Soviet Union on August 25, 1991 and, on December 8, 1991, achieved formal independence. Elections were previously held for the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic on March 4, 1990. Following the independence declaration, existing Communist Party Chairman Vyacheslav Kebich simply transferred his authority to the new title of Prime Minister of Belarus (Fedor 1995, Widner 2004a). In the Belorussian case, there was no alteration in pre-TE elites; that is, there was no discontinuity with the prior regime before and after the TE.<sup>74</sup>

Similarly, non-independence cases with a dominant existing regime, those cases making up category (2), often show no discontinuity. These are cases in which a ruler, ruling party, or dominant-party legislature pushes through reforms unilaterally. In such cases, there is no group; if a transition is going to occur, it will occur without consultation among contending forces. On February 26, 2005 in Egypt, for example, President Hosni Mubarak asked the parliament to amend the constitution to allow for multi-candidate presidential elections for the first time in decades. The legislative People's Assembly—elected in 2000, with Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) winning 388 out of 454 seats (85.5 percent)<sup>75</sup>—had previously elected the president. After pushing through the reform for direct presidential elections, Mubarak's decision was ratified by referendum and the September 7, 2005 presidential election indeed had multiple candidates. Despite the reform, the electoral institutions and security apparatus remained firmly under Mubarak's control (MEDEA), signifying no discontinuity in the regime.

For cases that receive an answer of no to *either* question one *or* question two (i.e., those that show discontinuity in the regime), there is one final question, question three, that ensures that there is, in fact, a real break with the existing system. It assesses whether (a) a case follows a constitutionally-defined process for succession or (b) all reforms stem from an existing, unchanged legislature. If the answer to either (a) or (b) is yes, there is no discontinuity in the regime.

Two examples help to clarify the necessity of part (a). First, if pre-TE elites force a chief executive to resign, but then replace him or her via a direct election, there is no break with the previous regime; the new president is chosen by an existing system. This is precisely what occurred in Armenia in 1998, when Levon Ter-Petrosyan's ministers (along with the military) forced him to step down due to their disagreement with his compromise settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan. After Ter-Petrosyan stepped down, a new presidential election was held, leading to the presidency of Robert Kocharyan (Aaron 1998).

Second, if protests oust a chief executive and the next-in-line takes over, there is no break in the regime. When President Suharto resigned following student protests and military pressure in Indonesia in 1998, for instance, he named Vice President B.J. Habibie as his successor. The succession proceeded constitutionally and the subsequent transition was insider-dominated, with

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<sup>73</sup> It is possible for a case to represent *both* a case of independence and a dominant existing regime.

<sup>74</sup> This example relates to events in Belarus in 1991, prior to the election of Alexander Lukashenko in 1994.

<sup>75</sup> Egypt's 2000 parliamentary election results are available from the Inter-Parliamentary Union's PARLINE database at [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2097\\_00.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2097_00.htm).

Suharto screening all legislators prior to his resignation (Case 2000, Malley 2007). The Minister of Home Affairs even appointed the “Team of Seven”—a group composed mainly of academics and created to work on laws relating to elections, parties, and governmental structures—before Suharto’s resignation (Horowitz 2013). As is clear from the Armenian and Indonesian examples, cases with a yes answer to question three, part (a) often reflect situations in which elites replace an unruly or over-wielding leader through an enshrined constitutional process.

An additional, very messy example makes the necessity of question three, part (b) clear. In Azerbaijan in 1992, due in part to popular discontent with the handling of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a rapid sequence of leadership succession occurred (Curtis 1995). On March 6, 1992, President Ayaz Mutalibov resigned and was succeeded by the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet President Yakub Mamedov. After Mamedov held the position of acting president for two months, Mutalibov again replaced him, only to subsequently be deposed and replaced by an opposition-led Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) government. This government forced the Supreme Soviet to convene, elect APF official Isa Gambarov as acting president, dissolve itself, and cede all legislative power to the 50-member National Council to direct the country until new parliamentary elections could be held (Nichol 1995). This National Council was a “mini-legislature” created in November 1991 from the 1990-elected Supreme Soviet. Though it was composed of equal representation of communist and opposition members, 25 members of a “Democratic bloc” and 25 members of a “Communist bloc,” the members were selected directly from the existing legislature (Bolukbasi 2011). Reform in cases like Azerbaijan proceeds from within previously-existing institutions, showing continuity with the previous regime.<sup>76</sup>

After investigating each of the 182 potential regime transition cases according to questions one through three for component one, I reduce the sample of potential transitional groups by 41, from 182 to 141 cases.<sup>77</sup>

### The Coding System: Part Two

With these 141 remaining cases, I move on to assess the second definitional component of transitional groups.

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<sup>76</sup> Assuming that the answer to question three is no, it may appear strange that an answer of no to *either* question one *or* question two in component one—rather than an answer of no to *both* question one *and* question two—remains in the sample of potential transitional groups. This either/or characteristic allows for a country to move either toward or away from democracy. If, for example, an unelected president is overthrown in the hope of building a democratic system, the answer to question one is no. Yet similarly, if an elected president consolidates his or her power by dissolving the parliament unconstitutionally, the coding for question two is no.

<sup>77</sup> The 41 non-transitional group cases include the following 22 with answers of yes to questions one and two (where it differs from the existing indices, I list my transitional event year in parentheses): Albania 1990, Armenia 1994 (1991), Azerbaijan 1991, Belarus 1991 (1990), Burkina Faso 1991, Cameroon 1992 (1990), Djibouti 1992, Dominican Republic 1996 (1994), Egypt 2005, Ghana 1993 (1992), Guyana 1992 (1990), Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire, 1990), Jordan 1989, Kazakhstan 1991, Kenya 1991, Kyrgyzstan 1991, Lebanon 2005, Mauritania 1991, Sierra Leone 1990 (1991), Turkmenistan 1991, Uganda 2005, and Uzbekistan 1991. The 41 non-transitional group cases also include the following 19 that receive an answer of no to either question one or two, but yes to question three: Armenia 1998, Azerbaijan 1993, Bahrain 1999, Bhutan 2007, Chile 1989-90 (1987), Comoros 1990 (1989), Ecuador 2000, Georgia 2004 (2003), Guatemala 1995 (1993), Guinea-Bissau 1999-2000 (1999), Haiti 1999, Honduras 2009, Indonesia 1999 (1998), Panama 1989, Peru 2000-1 (2000), Solomon Islands 2000-3 (2000), Tajikistan 1991, Togo 2005, and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2000.

*Definitional component two:* A transitional group is a group that negotiates institutional design, but does not have a popular mandate.

This component adds that, for a transitional group to exist, there must not only be a non-continuation of the prior regime, but the group must also lack popular legitimacy and aim to design institutions for the new regime. To assess component two, I utilize the following questions:

1. Is the stated purpose of the group to design institutions for the future regime?
2. Is the group elected?

If the answer to question one is yes *and* the answer to question two is no, the case remains in the sample of potential regime transitions to code on component three.

For question one, I consider the goal of designing future institutions in a broad sense, meaning the group may focus on topics as diverse as elections, the constitution, the economy, or security issues. Due to this generality, it is only in rare circumstances that this question receives an answer of no. One such circumstance is if an individual overthrows a government with the specific goal of deposing or reinstating a single government official, such as in Cambodia in July 1997 or Lesotho in August 1994. In Cambodia, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen led a coup d'état against the ruling party (FUNCUNIPPEC) to replace First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh with Ung Huot (Croissant 2006); in Lesotho, King Letsie III staged a military-backed coup d'état in order to reinstate his father, Moshoeshe II, who had been sent into exile in 1990 (Rosenberg and Weisfelder 2013). In each case, once the official was deposed or reinstated, no further governmental reforms occurred.

Question two adds the condition that this institutional design body must be unelected. Though generally question two is straightforward, there are two notable exceptions. First, in some instances, an institutional design group is unelected, but must report its recommendations to an elected parliament.<sup>78</sup> For example, following various strikes and protests in Burkina Faso in the late 1990s, President Blaise Compaoré created two advisory commissions and held a 26-party meeting to examine clauses of the constitution, formulate rules governing political parties, and promote national reconciliation. Subsequently, all reform proposals created in these groups were presented in an extraordinary session of the previously-elected parliament (Englebert 2003, Santiso and Loada 2003). Though the small groups had the task of discussing various reforms, they had no autonomous power to enact the reforms. This power remained vested in an elected parliament, and I therefore code the case as yes on question two.

Second, if a legislature is elected and then conducts a vote of no confidence, it is often the case that the legislature installs a “caretaker government.” Technically, this caretaker government is unelected, which implies that it will receive an answer of no to question two. In this case, however, the legislature is working within the existing system to enact change according to a constitutional process. Such a process implies a continuation of the prior regime and, because this contradicts the tenets of definitional component one, this situation receives a coding of yes.

After investigating each of the 141 potential regime transition cases according to questions one and two for component two, I further reduce the sample of potential transitional groups by 46.<sup>79</sup> This leaves 95 potential regime transition cases to code on definitional component three.

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<sup>78</sup> As Elkins, et al. (2009) describe, this generates a risk of “self-dealing.”

<sup>79</sup> The 46 non-transitional group cases are the following (where it differs from the existing indices, I list my transitional event year in parentheses): Albania 1996-7 (1997); Algeria 1991; Angola 1991; Azerbaijan 1992; Bosnia-Herzegovina

## The Coding System: Part Three

As the final step in coding, I assess the third definitional component of transitional groups in each of the remaining 95 potential regime transition cases.

*Definitional component three:* A transitional group is a group that claims interim status.

This component adds that, for a transitional group to exist, it not only must be true that there is a non-continuation of the prior regime, the group aims to design institutions, and the group is unelected, but also that the group's purpose is to arrange a transfer of power. To assess component three, I utilize the following two questions:

1. Does the group state that it plans to hold a national election?
2. Does the group state that it will transfer power to a new regime after a national election?

If the answer to *either* question one *or* question two is no, then there is no transitional group; if the answer to *both* question one *and* question two is yes, then there is a transitional group.<sup>80</sup>

What types of groups express no plans to conduct elections or transfer power to a new regime? Such a situation typically occurs in one of two circumstances. First, a group may have other, more-pressing priorities, such as attempting to restore peace, regain territorial control, or enforce a ceasefire. The Somali Transitional National Government (TNG), established at a peace conference in Djibouti in 2000, for instance, failed to earn national recognition in Somalia. The TNG struggled to cope with the creation of a rival government by the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) and lacked territorial control over large areas beyond Mogadishu. These failed state conditions inhibited the TNG's ability to enact reforms, making elections and a transfer of power low-ranking priorities (Fartaag 2013, Tack 2012).

Second, such a situation may occur because a group takes over and works only to consolidate its power. Afghanistan under the Taliban illustrates this possibility. After Kabul fell to the Taliban on September 27, 1996, the Taliban created the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, installed a six-member council of mullahs headed by Mohammed Rabbani, instituted a highly repressive administration, and expressed no intention of transferring power to a popularly-legitimate regime (Magnus 1997, Blood 2001).

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1992-2008 (1990); Bulgaria 1990 (1989); Burkina Faso 2000-1 (1998); Cambodia 1997; Cape Verde 1990; Central African Republic 1990 (1991); Chad 1989 (1988); Croatia 1990; Czechoslovakia 1989; El Salvador 1994 (1992); Estonia 1991 (1990); Georgia 1991 (1989); East Germany 1990 (1989); Guinea-Bissau 1991-4 (1990); Haiti 1994; Hungary 1990 (1989); Kenya 1998 (1997); Kuwait 1990-2 (1990); Kyrgyzstan 2005; Latvia 1991 (1989); Lebanon 1989-2005 (1989); Lesotho 1994, 1998; Lithuania 1991 (1989); Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 1991; Maldives 2008 (2005); Moldova 1991 (1990); Mozambique 1994 (1990); Peru 1992; Poland 1989; Russia 1993 (1990); São Tomé and Príncipe 1991 (1989); Seychelles 1991; Slovenia 1991 (1989); Sierra Leone 1998; Suriname 1990; Tajikistan 1997-8 (1997); Thailand 1992; Ukraine 1991 (1990); Yemen 1990; Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1991 (1992); and Zambia 1991 (1990).

<sup>80</sup> It is important to note that a transitional group's plan to hold an election and transfer power says nothing about whether an election *actually* occurs or if power *actually* transfers to a new regime. Moreover, if an election does occur, the coding system says nothing about whether the election is legitimate or whether transitional group members are allowed to run. The question of whether a transitional group exists cannot depend on these assessments because the creation of a transitional group occurs *prior* to these empirical outcomes. In other words, the question of whether a transitional group exists is prior to the question of whether or not there is a "completed," "flawed," or "failed" regime transition. For analyses of how transitional groups influence elections, please see Chapters Three and Four.

After investigating each of the 95 potential regime transition cases according to questions one and two for component three, I find an additional 25 cases without transitional groups.<sup>81</sup> In my newly-created dataset of 182 potential regime transitions, then, I find that a total of 112 cases do not have transitional groups (61.5 percent) while 70 cases do have transitional groups (38.5 percent). How do these cases with and without transitional groups compare?

### Transitional Group Coding Variations

Before embarking on my descriptive data analysis comparing potential regime transition cases with and without transitional groups, a note is in order regarding the coding system. Some readers may find the coding system presented above too restrictive, arguing that it ignores a number of transitional arrangements that look similar to transitional groups. In anticipation of this critique, I create two alternative specifications of transitional groups, each of which iteratively loosens the restrictive nature of my transitional group coding. I will hereafter refer to the list of transitional groups coming from my original coding scheme as *TG-restrictive*.

In the first alternative specification, *TG-moderately permissive*, I identify a set of cases containing groups that appear similar to the transitional groups identified in *TG-restrictive* in every way except one: The group's recommendations were approved by an existing parliament. Though the group followed from a discontinuity with the previous regime, pursued institutional design, and claimed interim status, by virtue of the fact that the group's recommendations had to be approved by a relic from the prior regime, the case was coded as not having a transitional group.

Understandably, a reader may find this coding decision problematic. In some cases following a discontinuity with the prior regime, the parliament remains simply as a symbolic institution, with little real power, and stuck agreeing to the new groups' reforms; in other cases, the parliament retains real power, but reforms itself to align with the newly-formed groups' views.

To assuage concerns of incorrect group coding when a previously-existing parliament remains, *TG-moderately permissive* adds transitional group cases to *TG-restrictive* that take one of the following three forms: roundtable negotiations, multi-party debates, or non-sovereign national conferences.

As one illustrative example of a transitional group included in *TG-moderately permissive*, but not included in *TG-restrictive*, we can briefly consider the Central African Republic in the early 1990s. On July 7, 1991, in response to citizen protests and international pressure, President André Kolingba announced a constitutional amendment ensuring multiparty politics. After legalizing three opposition parties in August, the Kolingba administration agreed to convene a national debate that would include representatives of both the government and opposition. On August 1, 1992, the Grand National Debate opened, with 19 parties participating. At the end of August, the pre-existing National Assembly approved legislation in accordance with decisions of the Grand National Debate, including separation of powers and plans for national elections (Englebert 2003, Lansford 2013). In total, *TG-moderately permissive* adds 15 cases of transitional

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<sup>81</sup> The following 19 cases are coded as having no transitional group from definitional component three (where it differs from the existing indices, I list my transitional event year in parentheses): Afghanistan 1996; Algeria 1989 (1988); Belarus 1995-6 (1996); Burundi 1996; Comoros 1995; Fiji 2006-7 (2006); Haiti 1991; Kenya 2008; Pakistan 1999; Qatar 1995; Rwanda 1990 (1991); Sierra Leone 1997; Somalia 1991, 2000, 2004; Sudan 1989; Taiwan 1992 (1990); Tanzania 1995 (1992); and Zimbabwe 2009 (2008). In addition, the following six cases are deleted because they have no identifiable *group*, and therefore cannot claim interim status: Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995, Congo-Kinshasa 1997, Mongolia 1990, Namibia 1990, Niger 2009, and Paraguay 1989.


groups to the *TG-restrictive* coding, increasing the number of potential regime transition cases with transitional groups from 70 to 85 (an increase from 38.5 to 46.7 percent).<sup>82</sup>

In the second alternative specification, *TG-permissive*, I broaden *TG-moderately permissive* to include potential regime transition cases that create constitutional commissions outside of an existing parliament.<sup>83</sup> While constitutional commissions are groups that focus on institutional design, if they are the only group that exists in a certain case, they are not included in the *TG-restrictive* or *TG-moderately permissive* coding schemes because they generally lack the ability to specify election plans or transfer power to a new regime.

With that said, a reader may note that in certain instances elections are not held until after constitutional commissions complete their work, making them an integral part of the transitional period. Returning to Chad for a moment, on July 8, 1988, Habré appointed a constitutional commission to create plans to begin introducing democratic institutions. The new constitution was approved overwhelmingly by referendum on December 10, 1989 and specified that the unelected National Consultative Council was to be replaced with an elected National Assembly. Only after the constitution was completed did parliamentary elections take place (Widner 2004b).

In total, the *TG-permissive* coding specification adds nine cases to the *TG-moderately permissive* coding scheme, increasing the number of potential regime transition cases with transitional groups from 85 to 94 (an increase from 46.7 to 51.6 percent).<sup>84</sup> Figure 2-3 provides a visual comparison of the three coding schemes.

Figure 2-3. Comparison of transitional group (*TG*) coding variations.



In summary, depending on the level of restrictiveness in the coding scheme, I find that transitional groups—a rarely-discussed, and previously unquantified, component of regime


<sup>82</sup> *TG-moderately permissive* adds the following 15 transitional group cases to *TG-restrictive* (where it differs from the existing indices, I list my transitional event year in parentheses): Angola 1991, Bulgaria 1990 (1989), Burkina Faso 2000-1 (1999), Cameroon 1992 (1990), Cape Verde 1990, Central African Republic 1990 (1991), Czechoslovakia 1989, East Germany 1990 (1989), Guinea-Bissau 1991-4 (1990), Hungary 1990 (1989), Lesotho 1998, Mozambique 1994 (1990), Poland 1989, São Tomé and Príncipe 1991 (1989), and Sierra Leone 1998.

<sup>83</sup> This does not include cases like Belarus 1991 (1990) or FYROM 1991 (1990). In the former, the Supreme Soviet named a 74-member constitutional commission that excluded opposition forces. Though this commission included seven legal scholars, all other members were deputies or executive branch officials. In the latter, the parliament created a subcommittee to draft a new constitution, called the Constitutional Committee of the Republican Assembly.

<sup>84</sup> In addition to all transitional groups identified in *TG-moderately permissive*, *TG-permissive* adds the following nine transitional group cases: Algeria 1989 (1988), Chad 1989 (1988), El Salvador 1994 (1992), Estonia 1991 (1990), Ghana 1993 (1992), Kenya 1998 (1997), Maldives 2008 (2005), Tajikistan 1997-8 (1997), and Zambia 1991 (1990).

transition paths—exist in between 38.5 (most restrictive) and 51.6 (least restrictive) percent of potential regime transition cases over the period 1989-2010. Figure 2-4 provides an amended visualization of the transitional period conceptual schema presented in Figure 2-1, with the additional complications stemming from my alternative transitional group coding specifications highlighted in grey.

Figure 2-4. Revised overall conceptual schema, with additional paths highlighted in grey.



## Descriptive Data Analysis

Which potential regime transition paths include the creation of transitional groups? Which types of groups? Where do these groups exist? And, why do they exist in some cases, yet not in others? The following sub-sections offer an initial descriptive look at the data and show that transitional groups span across potential regime transition cases. Though the main empirical analyses in Chapters Three and Four will analyze the *effects* of transitional groups, I focus here on introducing three factors that, taken together, help to explain the *existence* of transitional groups: (1) regional effects, (2) prior regime type, and (3) mode of transition.

### Spatial Trends

Where do transitional groups exist? Table 2-3 presents an overview of the regional spread of transitional groups in potential regime transition (*PRT*) cases.<sup>85</sup> As you move from left to right in the table, the transitional group coding variations become more permissive (i.e., the three categories are not mutually exclusive).

<sup>85</sup> In Table 2-3, there are three important notes regarding the regional definitions. First, I include two Pacific countries in the Asian region: Fiji and Solomon Islands. If I separate Asia into sub-categories, the percentages of transitional groups for *TG-restrictive* are 0 in East Asia (with one potential regime transition, *PRT*), 57.1 in South-East Asia and the Pacific (seven *PRTs*), 63.6 in South Asia (11 *PRTs*), and 50.0 in the Pacific (four *PRTs*). If we look at the *TG-moderately permissive* and *TG-permissive* categories, there is only one change: For *TG-permissive*, South Asia's percentage of transitional groups increases to 72.2. Second, I include two Caribbean cases in the Latin American category: Guyana and Suriname. Neither case contains a transitional group, so excluding them increases the Latin American percentages slightly, to 27.3 (*TG-restrictive* and *TG-moderately permissive*) and 36.4 (*TG-permissive*). Third, I include Mongolia in the post-communist region.

Table 2-3. Transitional groups (TGs) by region, 1989-2010.

Region	Number of PRT Cases	TG-restrictive (%)	TG-moderately permissive (%)	TG-permissive (%)
Sub-Saharan Africa	87	54.0	65.5	70.1
Asia	23	56.5	56.5	60.9
Latin America	17	11.8	11.8	17.6
MENA	13	23.1	23.1	30.8
Post-Communist	42	11.9	26.2	28.6

Notes: The second column lists the number of potential regime transition (PRT) cases by region in the dataset ( $N = 182$ ). For comparison purposes, columns three through five list the percentages of each transitional group variety *within each region*. For example, column three shows that, of the 87 potential regime transitions in Sub-Saharan Africa, 54 percent contain the restrictive variety of transitional groups (or 47 out of 87 potential regime transition cases). By contrast, of the 17 potential regime transition cases in Latin America, only 11.8 percent (or 2 out of 17) contain the restrictive variety of transitional group.

Table 2-3 shows that the number of potential regime transition cases differs substantially across regions over the period 1989 to 2010, though the low number of cases in Latin America and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) compared to the post-communist region and Sub-Saharan Africa is unsurprising. Latin America's large thrust of potential regime transitions occurred prior to 1989, while the recent push for regime transition in MENA occurred after 2010. Still, among the potential regime transitions that exist over this time period, there are two clear patterns: (1) Latin American, MENA, and post-communist cases exhibit an especially small percentage of transitional groups and (2) Sub-Saharan African and Asian cases exhibit an especially large percentage of transitional groups—no matter the coding specification.

Comparing maps of the two regions with the largest numbers of potential regime transitions (PRTs), Sub-Saharan Africa and the post-communist region, gives a clearer depiction of this transitional group discrepancy.

Figure 2-5. Transitional groups (TGs) in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1989-2010.







Figure 2-6. Transitional groups (TGs) in the post-communist region, 1989-2010.



In both maps, the vast majority of states experience potential regime transitions. Yet while shades of teal cover Sub-Saharan Africa, the post-communist map is overwhelmingly grey—that is, potential regime transitions *without* transitional groups cover the region. Post-communist cases appear much less likely than Sub-Saharan African cases to use formalized groups during the process of attempted regime change. Moreover, where small pockets of transitional groups do exist in the post-communist region, the types of groups appear to regionally cluster. In Eastern Europe, *TG-moderately permissive* predominates, reflecting the fact that states like East Germany, Poland, and Hungary all used roundtable negotiations between the government and opposition as a transitional arrangement to negotiate the move away from communism.<sup>86</sup>

The map of Sub-Saharan Africa also shows indications of clustering, which provides some suggestive evidence that early transitional groups within a region may serve as models for future transitional groups in other regional cases. This notion of regional diffusion aligns with a common observation in the literature on democratization: Historically, democratization occurred in waves, with movement toward democracy in one country inspiring that country’s neighbors.<sup>87</sup>

Similarly, specific types of transitional groups tend to appear in waves. For example, a common phenomenon in the early 1990s in Sub-Saharan Africa was the “national conference,” in which conferences met for periods of time ranging between ten days and a few months to discuss institutional reform. At these conferences, large numbers of people participated, coming from political parties, national associations, civil society groups, and a variety of occupations.<sup>88</sup> Table 2-4 lists a timeline of the opening dates of these national conferences.

<sup>86</sup> Maps for the other three regions appear in Appendix 2B.

<sup>87</sup> Most famously, Samuel P. Huntington (1991) explicated the “third wave” of democratization, which begins with Portugal’s 1974 Carnation Revolution. For an overview of regional arguments in the democratization literature, see Bunce (2000). Notably, in the wake of the so-called “Arab Spring,” many journalists and bloggers (and a few scholars) debated whether the events constituted the beginning of a “fourth wave.”

<sup>88</sup> For detailed descriptions, please see Coding Appendix A.

Table 2-4. Timeline of national conference opening dates.

<i>Country</i>	<i>National Conference Opening Date</i>
São Tomé and Príncipe	December 5, 1989
Benin	February 19, 1990
Gabon	March 27, 1990
Guinea-Bissau	October 8, 1990
Congo-Brazzaville	February 25, 1991
Togo	July 8, 1991
Mali	July 29, 1991
Niger	July 29, 1991
Congo-Kinshasa	August 8, 1991
Comoros	January 10, 1992
Chad	January 15, 1993

As this table illustrates, the national conference phenomenon occurred during a short span of time between 1989 and 1993 and was concentrated in Francophone Africa. Of course, such a table can provide only speculative evidence of a regional demonstration effect, but the following detailed depiction of Benin’s conference provides further context:

“An instant media event throughout Francophone Africa, the story of Benin was carried live on Benin radio, rebroadcast on national television, given prominent international media coverage on Radio France International (RFI), reported and analyzed by the government media and the independent press in every Francophone African country, and held up as a model of political reform by the Paris-based journal, *Jeune Afrique*. The text of this political drama was preserved by the Benin government news agency, which produced a two-hour video tape of conference highlights. Over 400 copies of the video had been sold by the end of 1991, and untold numbers of pirated copies began to circulate.” (Robinson 1994: 576)

In combination with international influence from Paris, Reyntjens similarly describes the events in Benin as “...undoubtedly inspir[ing] the evolution elsewhere in Francophone Africa” (1991: 46). We see, therefore, that transitional groups not only span across potential regime transition cases, but also exhibit signs of regional clustering and diffusion.

### Prior Regime Type

The previous sub-section provided an indication of *where* transitional groups exist over the 1989-2010 period, but there is a remaining question of *why* transitional groups exist in some places but not in others. While any speculations about the *why* question are based only on descriptive evidence, one factor that likely influences transitional group formation is the type of regime that exists prior to the transitional event.

Building from Geddes, et al. (2012), I separate the notion of political regime into four types: democracy, military, personalist, and single-party.<sup>89</sup> What differentiates these types from one another is the agent who rules. In democracies, the people rule by choosing political leaders through competitive, multi-party elections. In authoritarian regimes, however, there are multiple potential ruling agents. In military regimes, a group of officers decides who rules and exercises influence on policy; in personalist regimes, access to office and resources depends on the discretion of an individual leader; and in single-party regimes, one party controls access to political office and policy decisions.

For consistency purposes when applying to my dataset, I make a few transformations to the Geddes, et al. data. First, the authors classify some regimes as a mixture of types. To avoid mixtures, I reclassify these regimes based on the first entry in the mixture (i.e., party-military becomes party, while military-party becomes military). Second, I add classifications for small states that the authors do not include. Third, to fill in missing data surrounding the former Yugoslav and Soviet states, I recode all of these instances as single-party regimes.<sup>90</sup> Table 5 presents the percentages of democratic, military, personalist, and single-party regime cases in the dataset that exhibit transitional groups.

Table 2-5. Transitional groups (*TGs*) by prior regime type, 1989-2010.

<i>Prior Regime Type</i>	<i>Number of PRT Cases</i>	<i>TG-restrictive (%)</i>	<i>TG-moderately permissive (%)</i>	<i>TG-permissive (%)</i>
<i>Democracy</i>	38	39.5	42.1	42.1
<i>Military</i>	22	63.6	68.2	72.7
<i>Personalist</i>	54	48.1	55.6	63.0
<i>Single-Party</i>	68	22.1	36.8	41.2

*Notes:* The second column lists the number of potential regime transition (*PRT*) cases in the dataset ( $N = 182$ ) that occur for each pre-transitional event regime type. For comparison purposes, columns three through five list the percentages of each transitional group variety *within each regime type*. For example, column three shows that, of the 22 potential regime transitions in military regimes, 63.6 percent contain the restrictive variety of transitional groups (or 14 out of 22 potential regime transition cases).

Across *TG-restrictive*, *TG-moderately permissive*, and *TG-permissive*, military regimes exhibit the largest percentage of transitional groups, followed by personalist, then democracy, and then single-party regimes.

In some sense, these results are unsurprising. Looking at the extreme category of military regimes first, it is typically the case that exclusive, small groups of senior officers are in charge. These groups tend to dismiss legislatures, suspend constitutions, and install military officers in key positions of power, leaving a weak institutional structure. A transitional group can help to move beyond the military regime, reintroduce civilian rule, and strengthen or reestablish institutions.

Contrary to the weakly-institutionalized setting of a military regime, at the opposite extreme, single-party regimes often have substantial institutional structure. It is common that

<sup>89</sup> Note that I ignore the categories of “monarchy” and “warlord” because they appear infrequently in my dataset. I recode the few cases of the former as personalist regimes; I recode the few cases of the latter based on the most recent prior regime of one of the other four types.

<sup>90</sup> Similarly, due to lack of independence, I code Eritrea as the same as Ethiopia.

single-party regimes have elections (though they occur in a one-party framework), a sitting legislature, a functioning judiciary, and various other organs of government. Compared to military regimes, this stronger institutional structure decreases the need for a transitional group, at least in the restrictive sense. In the less restrictive coding specifications of *TG-moderately permissive* and *TG-permissive*, there are notable increases in the percentage of previously single-party regimes with transitional groups. This jump occurs precisely because the existing institutional structure of single-party regimes allows them to create transitional bodies that function with specific tasks in addition to, rather than in replacement of, those undertaken by an existing legislature.

While these four regime types provide an initial sense of the level of institutionalization across regimes, they do not measure it directly. Possibly more telling than the coarse prior regime type categories is the amount of liberalization that a case experiences leading up to its transitional event. This indicates less about the institutional structure of the prior regime and more about whether the prior regime embarks on reforms, further entrenches itself, or makes few changes in the time period before its transitional event.

To approximate a measure of political liberalization, I take the difference in Freedom House’s political rights rating in the year of a country’s transitional event and three years before the transitional event.<sup>91</sup> If a country becomes more politically open during this period, the resulting difference is negative; if a country becomes more politically closed during this period, the resulting difference is positive. Table 2-6 presents the results for all potential regime transitions, separated by cases with and without transitional groups.

Table 2-6. Average difference in Freedom House’s political rights score across potential regime transition (*PRT*) cases with and without transitional groups.

<i>Transitional Group Coding</i>	<i>PRTs, without transitional group</i>	<i>PRTs, with transitional group</i>
<i>TG-restrictive</i>	-0.19	0.44
<i>TG-moderately permissive</i>	-0.08	0.21
<i>TG-permissive</i>	-0.05	0.15

*Notes:* The first column separates the three coding specifications of transitional groups. The second and third columns compare potential regime transition (*PRT*) cases with and without transitional groups, listing the average difference in Freedom House’s political rights score (year of transitional event – three years prior to transitional event).

Though the differences are not large, across the *TG-restrictive*, *TG-moderately permissive*, and *TG-permissive* coding specifications, cases without transitional groups experience political opening, with negative average movement on political rights. Contrarily, cases with transitional groups experience political closing in the years preceding the transitional event, as shown by their positive average movement on political rights.

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<sup>91</sup> Freedom House’s political rights score ranges from one (most democratic) to seven (most authoritarian). Just as with GWF, I fill in the missing values in the former Yugoslav and Soviet cases with the scores for Yugoslavia and the USSR. Additionally, for cases that gain independence in the transitional year, I use the occupying state’s scores for three years prior.

## Mode of Transition

What might explain why countries with transitional groups tend to experience political closing in the years preceding the transitional event? We may expect that transitional groups are more likely to form in instances of clear rupture with the prior regime and, if a regime has been entrenching its rule rather than opening the political system, a transitional event may be one of an especially extreme nature. But, does this expectation bear out empirically?

Table 2-7 breaks down the percentages of transitional groups by transitional event type. As a reminder, I identify five types of transitional events in the data: a military coup d'état, the overthrow of a leader in a rebellion or civil war, forcible intervention against the existing regime by international forces, protests that lead to reform in the structure of the existing regime (involuntary reform), and decisions from within the existing regime to change the regime structure (voluntary reform). With these five categories, I consider transitional events of an especially extreme nature to be coups d'état, the overthrow of a leader in civil war, and international intervention.

Table 2-7. Transitional groups (*TGs*) by transitional event type, 1989-2010.

<i>Transitional Event Type</i>	<i>Number of PRT Cases</i>	<i>TG-restrictive (%)</i>	<i>TG-moderately permissive (%)</i>	<i>TG-permissive (%)</i>
<i>Military coup d'état</i>	43	58.1	58.1	58.1
<i>Rebellion/civil war</i>	11	63.6	63.6	63.6
<i>Intl. intervention</i>	9	44.4	66.7	66.7
<i>Involuntary reform</i>	57	24.6	40.4	47.4
<i>Voluntary reform</i>	62	32.3	40.3	46.8

*Notes:* The second column lists the number of potential regime transition (*PRT*) cases in the dataset ( $N = 182$ ) that occur for each transitional event type. For comparison purposes, columns three through five list the percentages of each transitional group variety *within each transitional event type*. For example, column three shows that, of the 43 military coups d'état, 58.1 percent lead to the restrictive variety of transitional groups (or 25 out of 43).

Table 2-7 illustrates that, in fact, violent ruptures with the previous regime produce the most transitional groups.<sup>92</sup> Both military coup d'état and civil war transitional events produce transitional groups more often than not and, moreover, solely produce transitional groups that meet the most restrictive coding specification. There is no proclivity for moderately permissive or permissive transitional groups in these transitional event cases. Cases of international intervention also produce transitional groups more often than not, but only when considering cases of *TG-moderately permissive* or *TG-permissive*. Each of these three types of transitional event indicates a clear rupture with the previous regime—in all but a few cases, these transitional events lead to the complete overthrow of the existing leader. In such a scenario, the political vacuum created by the leader's absence increases the necessity for a transitional group.

Neither involuntary nor voluntary reform transitional events produce transitional groups as often as not. This is especially interesting in the case of involuntary reform, cases in which protests

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<sup>92</sup> For tables illustrating the interaction between prior regime type and mode of transition, please see Appendix 2C.

lead to changes in the structure of the regime. Unlike voluntary cases where the regime itself initiates reform and thus demonstrates a level of control over the situation that one would expect to decrease the likelihood of transitional group formation, involuntary reform cases are those that often earn popular “revolutionary” names (Velvet, Bulldozer, Rose, Orange, Cedar, Jasmine, and so on). That transitional groups appear in involuntary reform cases in only slightly more than one-fourth of cases in the *TG-restrictive* specification indicates that regimes are able to cope with protests in other ways, whether through repression or by appeasing protesters through concessions short of a restrictive transitional group (for example, notice the increase to just under 50 percent in the *TG-permissive* specification).

## Conclusion

To recapitulate, I began this chapter by presenting two sequences of events in Kyrgyzstan that took place only five years apart. Despite similar preconditions, protests, and outcomes (the ousting of a dictator), the subsequent processes by which leaders attempted to negotiate regime transition differed dramatically. I therefore asked: How can we account for these differing regime transition paths? And, more generally, what occurs during the transitional period between the fall of one regime and the rise of another?

I utilize this chapter to introduce a new theoretical framework from which to think about political regime transitions, which helps to answer these questions. I first argue that researchers must prioritize case selection by shifting their focus from ex-post coding based on transition *outcomes* to ex-ante coding of cases with the *potential* for regime transition. “Potential regime transitions,” then, are cases in which there is a shift of power away from an incumbent regime. A potential regime transition does not indicate that a regime transition *will* occur, but simply that there is the *possibility* for a regime transition due to a shift in the existing power structure. I contend that it is only by considering all potential regime transition cases that researchers can study processes of regime transition with an unbiased, consistent, and comprehensive sample.

To this end, I develop a coding system for potential regime transition cases, identify five observable transitional events that signify shifts of power away from an incumbent regime, and compile a 182-case dataset over the period 1989 to 2010. To my knowledge, this is the first dataset of its kind.

By closely examining each of the cases in this dataset, I secondly argue that countries choose to utilize formalized groups as part of the regime transition process in between 38.5 and 51.6 percent of potential regime transition cases. I identify these “transitional groups” as (1) groups representing a non-continuation of the prior regime, (2) unelected interim bodies that negotiate institutional design, and (3) groups with the goal of arranging a transfer of power through elections. I find that these groups span across cases, but are especially prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. In Latin America, MENA, and the post-communist region, transitional groups form much less frequently.

In addition to identifying these spatial trends, I thirdly argue that two variables—prior regime type and mode of transition—affect transitional group formation. Transitional groups are more likely to form if the prior regime type is a military regime, if political closing occurs in the years running up to the transitional event, or if the mode of transition is a violent rupture with the previous regime.

Based on this descriptive background of where and why transitional groups exist, a number of logical questions follow: How do transitional groups differ across cases? What are the distinct

types of transitional groups? While, by definition, these groups negotiate institutional design and have the stated goal of facilitating a transfer of power through elections, do transitional groups *actually* facilitate elections? Do transitional groups lead to successful regime change? And, if so, how? Chapter Three tackles these questions.

## Chapter 3 Transitional Groups, Democratization, and Founding Elections

On August 26, 2014, in response to the appointment of a new transitional government in the Central African Republic, United States' State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki "...call[ed] on all members of this newly appointed government to move forward quickly with the democratic transition process and to demonstrate by their actions that they govern in the interest of all Central Africans by including their voices in a broad-based, inclusive national dialogue."<sup>93</sup> Less than three months later, in response to events in Burkina Faso, Deputy Spokesperson for the United Nations' Secretary-General "...reiterate[d] [Ban Ki-moon's] call for an inclusive, civilian-led transition leading to full restoration of constitutional order through democratic elections."<sup>94</sup>

These quotations demonstrate two especially prevalent characteristics of international approaches to the formation of transitional arrangements: They typically focus on, first, the importance of transitional arrangements in promoting *democratic transition* through *elections*. Second, they generally laud the democracy-promoting qualities of *inclusive* transitional arrangements. The assumption behind such statements is that transitional arrangements—and, in particular, inclusive transitional arrangements—increase the probability of successful democratization. But, is there empirical support for this assumption?

Building from my discussion of potential regime transitions and transitional groups in Chapter Two, I utilize this and the following chapter to break apart this assumption in relation to transitional groups. While I defer questions of transitional group composition to Chapter Four, in this chapter I investigate if and how transitional groups are able to promote democratic transition through elections. While, by definition, transitional groups claim the goal of using elections to move states toward democracy, do they *actually* accelerate democratic regime change?

After presenting a review of Chapter Two's "revised conceptual scheme" in section one, I examine movement toward democracy in section two. I show that there are few aggregate differences in democratic movement between potential regime transition cases with and without transitional groups in the long-term. The introduction of a transitional group does not substantially increase the probability of democratization ten years after a transitional event. Contrarily, cases with transitional groups *do* accelerate democratic regime change in the short-term, defined as five years after a transitional event.

In section three, I build three interlocking pieces of evidence to account for this short-versus long-term discrepancy. I argue that the difference stems from transitional groups' short-term focus on reaching national elections, which allows them to rapidly increase the quality of democracy through the introduction of formalized deliberative and consultative processes. In particular, transitional groups (1) increase the probability of holding constitutional referenda, (2) increase the duration of time until the first presidential or parliamentary election, often termed the "founding election" after a transitional event, and (3) increase the likelihood of sequencing constitutional referenda prior to founding elections.

Each of these effects has a positive impact on the quality of democracy for potential regime transition cases with transitional groups. An increased likelihood of holding constitutional referenda indicates that transitional groups are more likely to push for major systemic change through a consultative process. An increased duration of time before national elections shows that transitional groups encourage extended deliberation among contending forces. And, the prevalent

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<sup>93</sup> Available at <http://translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/08/20140826307203.html#axzz3K2KDvfzL>.

<sup>94</sup> Available at <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/un-chief-calls-inclusive-civilian-led-transition-burkina-faso>.



sequencing of constitutional referenda before the first national election demonstrates that cases with transitional groups utilize the democratic mechanism of popular approval as a way to bolster their legitimacy. This deliberative nature of transitional groups, shown both through public consultation and through the choice to avoid premature elections, emphasizes increasing the quality of democracy and accounts for transitional groups’ short-term democratization gains.

As the duration to the first national election increases beyond a certain point, however, potential regime transition cases with transitional groups tend to conduct *lower* quality elections, meaning elections with higher levels of systematic irregularities. In the longer-term, cases with transitional groups may not accelerate democratic regime change, and may actually weaken the quality of democracy. Why, if an extended duration provides transitional groups with more time to collaborate and debate, does it not provide time to work through pressing issues, accommodate various actors’ interests, and build institutions to prevent or curtail electoral manipulation?


While transitional groups *can* positively impact the development of deliberative and participatory democracy, they can also undermine it, and I argue that a long duration before an election increases the likelihood of this happening. In particular, if transitional groups employ election delays instrumentally—as a way to prolong their tenure in power, rather than as a way to encourage deliberation and consultation—the prospect of successful democratization declines.

In section four, I therefore return to the “revised conceptual scheme” and present a series of examples to illustrate how the quality of democracy (approximated by election quality) in cases with extended-duration transitional groups can decline to a point at which long-term democratization prospects suffer. In particular, I contrast these long-duration transitional groups with a formerly-unspecified path of regime transition: delayed transitional groups, in which potential regime transition cases that initially exhibit no transitional group create a group months or years down the line. I argue that the delayed path can offer *better* long-term democratization prospects than the long-duration path, but only when the delayed transitional group is used to decrease the likelihood that one actor will consolidate power. Finally, in section five, I conclude.

### Potential Regime Transition Paths: A Revised Conceptual Scheme

Before moving to the empirical analysis, it is useful to briefly review the big picture. Figure 3-1 reprints a diagram from Chapter Two describing the transitional period between regimes.

Figure 3-1. Overview of the conceptual schema describing potential regime transition cases.




After a transitional event that marks a discontinuity from regime one, some political actors make a choice: to create a transitional group, an unelected interim body with the goal of arranging a transfer of power through elections, or to proceed through the transitional period without such a group. If interim leaders choose to embark on the transitional group path, they have a further choice to make: How much power will the group have? Table 3-1 summarizes the differences between the potential regime transition cases included in each category.<sup>95</sup>

Table 3-1. Summary of transitional group (TG) coding classifications for cases of potential regime transition.

<i>TG Coding Classification</i>	<i>Coding Criteria</i>	<i>Number of Cases</i>
TG-restrictive ( <i>TG-r</i> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Group exhibits a break in the prior regime's leadership</li> <li>- Group is unelected</li> <li>- Group negotiates institutional design</li> <li>- Group claims interim status</li> </ul>	70
TG-moderately permissive ( <i>TG-mp</i> )	Group exhibits all criteria in <i>TG-r</i> , <u>except</u> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Adds cases in which a group's recommendations must be approved by an existing parliament</li> </ul>	85
TG-permissive ( <i>TG-p</i> )	Group exhibits all criteria in <i>TG-mp</i> , <u>except</u> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Adds cases in which the type of group is a constitutional commission created outside of an existing parliament</li> </ul>	94

The question of how much power the transitional group will have is really a question of the size of the discontinuity with regime one. If the discontinuity is large, interim leaders may create a mostly-autonomous body (cases in *TG-r*); if the discontinuity is not as large, interim leaders may create less-autonomous bodies that must report to a previously-existing legislature (the 15 added cases in *TG-mp*) or must work solely on constitutional reform issues (the nine added cases in *TG-p*). It is therefore most appropriate to think of these transitional group coding classifications on a spectrum, which I illustrate in Figure 3-2.

Figure 3-2. Spectrum of interim arrangements during the transitional period.



<sup>95</sup> For a full discussion of the coding classifications and corresponding examples, please see Chapter Two.

Figure 3-2 shows a clear break between potential regime transition cases with and without transitional groups. To the left of the vertical black line are cases without transitional groups, which exhibit little to no discontinuity with regime one and therefore do not meet the coding criteria identified in Table 3-1. To the right of the vertical black line are cases with transitional groups, with cases of *TG-r* exhibiting the clearest discontinuity with regime one. As the coding classification loosens to include groups that must report their recommendations to a remaining parliament from regime one, the added cases in *TG-mp* show a less distinct discontinuity than those in *TG-r*. And, as the coding classification further loosens to include commissions that lack power beyond making recommendations about constitutional changes to a remaining parliament from regime one, the added cases in *TG-p* shows an even less distinct discontinuity than those in *TG-mp*. In other words, of the transitional group variations, the newly added *TG-p* cases look most similar to potential regime transition cases *without* transitional groups.

The next few sections describe *if* and *how* these choices affect regime two. I begin by asking: While, by definition, transitional groups claim they will move a state toward elections to transfer power to a popularly legitimate government, do they actually push regime change in a democratic direction more often than potential regime transition cases without transitional groups?

## Transitional Groups and Democratization

The question of how best to democratize is an ongoing debate. Contrary to policymakers' zealotry toward international democracy-promotion strategies,<sup>96</sup> Zakaria (1991) argues that rapid democratization frequently produces "illiberal democracies," democratically-elected regimes that routinely ignore constitutional limits on their power and deprive citizens of basic rights and freedoms. Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 2005) similarly describe normatively bad outcomes by demonstrating that weakly-institutionalized regimes in the early stages of democratic transition are more likely than other states to go to war. These authors suggest that a process of sequencing is necessary to increase the probability of successful democratization, whereby transitional regimes work to develop the rule of law and a well-functioning state *prior* to democratic reforms.<sup>97</sup> Democratization success is therefore contingent on commitment to broad institutional reform.

Because potential regime transition cases that utilize transitional groups make such a commitment by formalizing the transitional process and promising elections, it seems that, if these commitments are credible, they should have a positive impact on democratization prospects. Whether the commitments are credible depends, in part, on the type of transitional group (*TG*) observed. As described in the previous section, the *TG-restrictive*, *TG-moderately permissive*, and *TG-permissive* varieties differ in the size of discontinuity with the regime existing prior to the transitional event: While cases within the *TG-restrictive* coding scheme have the largest discontinuity, signifying clear breaks with the prior regime, the added cases in *TG-moderately permissive* and *TG-permissive* exhibit much smaller discontinuities.

The hypothesis that the level of discontinuity with the prior regime increases the probability of credible commitment to reform, and therefore exerts positive influence on democratization prospects, suggests the following observable implications: Potential regime transition cases

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<sup>96</sup> McFaul (2004) provides an overview of the development of the democracy promotion norm.

<sup>97</sup> Carothers (2007) amends the idea of sequencing—finding it problematic because it suggests that certain contexts may necessitate avoiding or putting off democratization indefinitely—and instead argues in favor of a gradualist approach.

without transitional groups will experience the smallest gains in democratization, followed by the *TG-permissive* variety, then *TG-moderately permissive*, and finally the *TG-restrictive* variety will show the largest gains in democratization.

In the aggregate, does this expectation hold? Utilizing the 182-case dataset I describe in Chapter Two, Table 3-2 uses annual data from the Freedom House organization to present the average differences in democracy on two dimensions, political rights and civil liberties, five and ten years after a case’s transitional event. Each of the political rights and civil liberties measures ranges from one (most democratic) to seven (most authoritarian), meaning that a negative score indicates a move toward democracy.<sup>98</sup>

Table 3-2. Change in the average level of democracy across potential regime transition cases with and without transitional groups (*TGs*), five and ten years after the transitional event.

	<i>Five-year difference</i>		<i>Ten-year difference</i>	
	<i>Political rights</i>	<i>Civil liberties</i>	<i>Political rights</i>	<i>Civil liberties</i>
<i>No TG</i>	-0.85	-0.43	-1.20	-0.66
<i>TG-permissive</i>	-1.44	-1.11	-1.44	-1.44
<i>TG-moderately permissive</i>	-2.33	-1.73	-2.27	-1.60
<i>TG-restrictive</i>	-1.26	-0.61	-1.21	-0.64

*Notes:* Data comes from the Freedom House organization’s “Freedom in the World” report. The number of cases in the dataset with no transitional group is 88; the number of added cases with *TG-permissive* is 9 and with *TG-moderately permissive* is 15; and the number of *TG-restrictive cases* is 70. Columns two and three show the following difference five years after the transitional event (*TE*): (FH<sub>TE+5</sub> – FH<sub>TE</sub>). Columns four and five therefore show the difference (FH<sub>TE+10</sub> – FH<sub>TE</sub>).

Table 3-2 presents mixed results. On average, all potential regime transition cases show moves toward democracy in terms of political rights and civil liberties, though the movement in all cases but one is greater on political rights (for the ten-year difference for *TG-permissive*, the

<sup>98</sup> Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” data is available at <https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VYJerPIViko>. To calculate the averages in Table 3-2, I make a few data adjustments. First, when data is missing due to the disintegration of a state or a state’s independence, I fill in missing values with the previously aggregated or occupying state’s scores. For example, in a number of former Soviet Union or Yugoslav cases, scores in the transitional year are missing, so I replace them with scores for Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, respectively. After the transitional event, in Czechoslovakia, I use scores for the Czech Republic; in East Germany, I use scores for Germany; and in Kosovo, I use scores for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). When examining five-year differences, two cases in the dataset have not yet reached five years since the transitional event: Kyrgyzstan 2010 and Niger 2010. In these cases, I replace the five-year scores with scores from 2014 and leave the ten-year scores as missing values. When examining ten-year differences, a number of cases have not yet reached ten years since the transitional event. In these cases, as long as the number of years since the transitional event is greater than five, I replace the ten-year data with the most recently available numbers, which are from 2014. This applies to the following 18 cases (as in Chapter Two, where different from the years presented in existing indices, I list my transitional event year in parentheses): Bangladesh 2007; Bhutan 2007; Egypt 2005; Fiji 2006-7 (2006); Guinea 2008; Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) 2007; Kenya 2008; Kyrgyzstan 2005; Lebanon 2005; Maldives 2008 (2005); Mauritania 2005, 2008; Nepal 2006 (2005); Sudan 2002-5 (2005); Thailand 2006; Togo 2005; Uganda 2005; and Zimbabwe 2009 (2008).

values are equal). Yet while potential regime transition cases without transitional groups show the least democratic progress on average as expected (in all cases but civil liberties ten years after the transitional event), the *TG-permissive*, *TG-moderately permissive*, and *TG-restrictive* varieties do not conform to expectations. Of these three varieties, *TG-moderately permissive* shows the most democratic progress, both at five years and ten years after the transitional event. After *TG-moderately permissive*, *TG-permissive* shows the most democratic progress, followed by *TG-restrictive*.

While noting these discrepancies across varieties of transitional groups, it is crucial to emphasize that the sample sizes for the added cases in both the *TG-moderately permissive* and *TG-permissive* coding classifications are small (15 and 9 cases, respectively) and, therefore, that the averages are susceptible to extreme observations.<sup>99</sup> I will therefore instead consider all types of transitional groups as one unit and compare cases with transitional groups to cases without transitional groups on the political rights dimension, which shows greater democratic movement than the civil liberties dimension.

Figure 3-3. Change in the average level of political rights across potential regime transition cases with and without transitional groups, five and ten years after the transitional event.



While some differences between potential regime transition cases with and without transitional groups appear in the short-term, in the longer-term sample, these transitional group average gains in democratization stagnate, making the two samples appear almost identical.<sup>100</sup> This pattern holds if I control for a number of variables that scholars commonly cite as influencing democratization prospects, such as region, level of development, prior level of democracy, level of conflict, and oil wealth.<sup>101</sup> In Table 3-3, I present the coefficients for the main independent

<sup>99</sup> For example, three added cases of the *TG-moderately permissive* coding classification—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany—move five points in five years, from political rights and civil liberties scores of seven (Bulgaria) and six (Czechoslovakia, East Germany) in 1989 to scores of two (Bulgaria) and one (Czechoslovakia, East Germany) in 1994.

<sup>100</sup> Note that if I remove the Panama 1989 outlier, the two samples appear even more similar.

<sup>101</sup> For a discussion of general conclusions regarding the influence of these variables on democratization, see Bunce (2000) and Geddes (2009). The control variables come from the following sources: the Varieties of Democracy project (gross domestic product, per capita; index of electoral democracy), the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (level of

variable of interest, transitional groups ( $\hat{\beta}_{TG}$ ), across three Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, in which I control for various combinations of the covariates mentioned above. In all cases, there is an effect of transitional groups on democratization (approximated here by political rights) in the short term (five years), but this effect disappears in the long-term (ten years).<sup>102</sup>

Table 3-3. Coefficient for transitional groups ( $\hat{\beta}_{TG}$ ) in OLS regressions for the dependent variables of five- and ten-year change in Freedom House’s (FH) political rights measure, with robust standard errors in parentheses.

<i>Control variables</i>	<i>Dependent Variable</i>	
	<i>five-year change in political rights</i>	<i>ten-year change in political rights</i>
<i>Region, level of development, level of democracy</i>	-0.47* (0.25)	-0.06 (0.23)
<i>Region, level of development, level of democracy, level of conflict</i>	-0.48* (0.25)	-0.06 (0.24)
<i>Region, level of development, level of democracy, level of conflict, oil wealth</i>	-0.71** (0.29)	-0.11 (0.28)

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Why might there exist a short-term, but not long-term, significance of transitional groups in potential regime transition cases’ moves toward democracy? What explains this discrepancy?

### Transitional Groups and “Founding Elections”

By claiming the goal of moving states toward democracy through elections, transitional groups play a critically significant role in determining the “political society,” what Stepan (1988: 3) describes as “the arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control over public power and the state apparatus.” The planning of “founding” elections following a transitional event, the first competitive multiparty election following a period of authoritarian rule (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986), is one such way to influence political society.<sup>103</sup> As Carothers aptly notes: “It may be true that in many countries democracy can barely live with elections, but in no country can it live without them” (2007: 21).

And, as Lindberg surmises, there is value inherent in the holding of elections: “Founding elections seem to be the cause—not the effect—of the first massive improvement in civil liberties” (2006: 142-3). Looking specifically at African cases, he describes how the struggle for political power that comes from holding elections, whether through citizens becoming voters or through the development of civic organizations and state institutions, leads to positive outcomes for democracy. While particularly true as the number of successive elections increases, “The inception

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intensity of conflict), and Ross’ (2013) measure of oil and gas exports per capita. While I use these results simply to motivate the importance of transitional group influence on elections, the full model results are available by request.

<sup>102</sup> The results in Table 3-3 hold if I substitute differences in Freedom House’s civil liberties measure as the dependent variable, though the significance in the five-year models decreases slightly. The results are available by request.

<sup>103</sup> Note that many scholars use the term “founding election” to indicate the installation of a democratic regime at the conclusion of the first election. This rationale often does not apply in the context of potential regime transitions, when a founding election is simply the first election following a transitional event, which may or may not lead to a democratic regime. Following Lindberg, I conceive of founding elections as “a step in the transition process rather than the founding of a democratic regime” (2006: 149).

of multiparty elections usually initiates liberalization, and repeated electoral activities create incentives for political actors, fostering the expansion and deepening of democratic values” (Lindberg 2009: 27).

The promise of founding elections can help to create an atmosphere of certainty about the pace of change, hold interim governments accountable to a schedule of liberalizing reforms, and offer opposition parties the prospect of gaining access to power and all the perks that power entails. These perks may include the broad goal of gaining representation in the country’s institutions (Benoit 2004), or more pointed aims like deciding the fate of prior regime elites, rewriting the “rules of the game,” or drafting a new constitution (Bermeo 1987, Reich 2001).

This planning process, however, faces two daunting trade-offs. First, electoral institutional choice in a transitional context requires a sense of urgency to replace status quo institutions, yet presents an open-ended range of possible alternatives from which to choose (Benoit and Schiemann 2001). The vast number of possibilities may increase the difficulty of arriving at institutions that are acceptable to all negotiating actors, and therefore make it difficult to reach elections. Second, and directly-related, even if transitional actors agree to institutional design, they face questions of timing: If elections occur too soon after a transitional event, the opposition will not have the ability to organize; if elections occur too late after a transitional event, the interim leader can consolidate power (Shain and Linz 1995).

Are potential regime transition cases with transitional groups, first, better able to organize elections than cases without transitional groups? And second, are cases with transitional groups able to find the “not too soon, not too late” middle ground that the second trade-off above requires?

In the following sub-sections, I answer these questions, building evidence to argue that the short- versus long-term democratization discrepancy stems from transitional groups’ focus on reaching national elections. I identify three ways in which transitional groups increase the quality of democracy in the short-term by introducing formalized deliberative and consultative processes: First, transitional groups increase the probability of holding constitutional referenda; second, transitional groups increase the likelihood of sequencing constitutional referenda prior to founding elections; and third, transitional groups increase the duration of time until the first presidential or parliamentary election.

### Founding Elections: Types and Sequencing

The question of whether potential regime transition cases with transitional groups are better able to organize elections than cases without transitional groups relates not only to the supposed “exceptionalism” of founding elections, but also to debates about the sequencing of these elections.

As Benoit (2007: 383-4) reviews, founding elections are commonly thought of as exceptional due to the uncertainty that exists in transitional contexts. There is a lack of reliable information and choices are heavily constrained by the political conditions of the transition, which often leads to miscalculation by political actors. In particular, there is an imperfect understanding of electoral rules and their consequences, which is only made worse by the fact that the process by which political actors choose an electoral system tends to be poorly-defined, taking place in extra-constitutional settings among unclear, diverse, malleable, or temporary political groupings. This exceptionalism makes agreeing on electoral rules during the transitional period a trying process.

In such uncertain environments following transitional events, transitional groups may provide the structure necessary to accommodate negotiation among diverse actors and facilitate compromise on electoral design. That is, in cases that would otherwise *not* reach elections,

transitional groups may act as a crucial organizational tool that increases the probability of successful election completion.

But, which cases are least likely to reach elections in the first place? Cases without elections in the dataset are often examples of conflict-ridden states, such as Afghanistan in 1992, Sierra Leone in 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990, and Burundi in 1996. In the first two cases, each of which had a transitional group, the question to assess is whether these cases would have been *even less likely* to hold elections had they *not* had a transitional group; in the last two cases, each of which did not have a transitional group, the question to assess is whether the creation of a transitional group would have made them *more likely* to hold elections. Yet due to the fundamental problem of causal inference, it is impossible to assess these relevant counterfactuals.<sup>104</sup>

If I instead simply compare the percentage of potential regime transition cases with and without transitional groups that reach elections, I find that there is little difference across cases. For ease of exposition, I limit the results in the remainder of the chapter to the restrictive variety of transitional groups (*TG-restrictive*—hereafter, simply “transitional group”).<sup>105</sup>

Table 3-4. Potential regime transition cases (*PRTs*) with and without transitional groups (*TGs*) that culminate in elections, in percentages.

<i>Election Type</i>	<i>PRTs with TG</i> (%)	<i>PRTs without TG</i> (%)
Any national election	85.7	88.3
Presidential election	61.4	66.1
Parliamentary election	85.7	86.6

*Notes:* For each election type in rows two through four, I calculate the numerical entries by dividing the number of *PRTs* with (without) transitional groups that experience elections by the number of *PRTs* with (without) transitional groups. There are 70 *PRTs* with *TGs* and 112 *PRTs* without *TGs*.

Whether looking at any national election or comparing across the presidential and parliamentary varieties, potential regime transition cases with and without transitional groups vary little; in all categories except presidential elections, they vary by less than three percentage points.

Rather, where cases with and without transitional groups do vary is in the *sequencing* of elections. And, as Shain and Linz describe, choosing between constitutional and electoral systems “profoundly affects the stability of the polity and the quality of its democratic performance” (1995: 83). If a state chooses to hold a presidential election first, it legitimates the winner to hold power for a fixed period of time independently of the confidence of a conference; if a state holds a

<sup>104</sup> As a reminder from Chapter One: The fundamental problem of causal inference is the following: It is impossible to observe the effect of more than one treatment on a single subject at one time. That is, if I consider a transitional group as a (clearly not randomly-assigned) “treatment,” it is impossible to observe *both* of the following outcomes for a single case, X: (1) whether X reaches the outcome of election *with* a transitional group *and* (2) whether X reaches the outcome of election *without* a transitional group. Empirically, I am only able to observe *either* (1) *or* (2). For an extended discussion of this problem, see Rubin (1974) and Holland (1986).

<sup>105</sup> All results that I report in the analysis hold if I substitute the sample from coding classification *TG-restrictive* with either *TG-moderately permissive* or *TG-permissive*. As expected, due to the less restrictive nature of the coding for these variables (that is, due to the fact that these variables more closely resemble cases *without* transitional group than does *TG-restrictive*), the magnitude of the differences between potential regime transition cases with and without transitional groups lessens. All additional results are available by request.



parliamentary election first, the elected legislature becomes the source of the government executive by giving its confidence to a prime minister or cabinet.<sup>106</sup>

Interestingly, when I subset the sample of potential regime transition cases to only those cases that hold *both* parliamentary and presidential elections ( $N=112$ ), I find that cases with transitional groups tend to hold presidential elections first more often than cases without transitional groups. In 42 cases with transitional groups, 18 hold presidential elections first (42.9 percent); in the 70 cases without transitional groups, 24 hold presidential elections first (34.3 percent).

Yet the differences do not stop there, as states are not limited to holding presidential or parliamentary elections and may opt to replace or complement these elections with constitutional referenda. And, rather than national elections, some scholars focus on constitutional design as a crucial part of transitional processes. Frazer (1995) defines the beginning of a transitional period as when a state initiates constitutional negotiations; Carey (2009a) argues that a country's "constitutional moment" is supremely important, with an inclusive moment ensuring the protection of minorities; Eisenstadt, et al. (2015) find that constitutions crafted with meaningful and transparent public involvement are more likely to contribute to democratization; and Varol (2012), while looking at cases of "democratic coups d'état" in which the military deposes an autocrat and temporarily governs until elections, warns against including the military in constitutional negotiations, as it will attempt to entrench its preferences in the new constitution.

Many states embark on whole-hearted constitution-writing during the transitional period, making decisions not only about minority protections or military exemptions, but choices as foundational as whether to adopt a parliamentary, presidential, or hybrid system.<sup>107</sup> If I compare the percentage of cases with and without transitional groups that hold constitutional referenda, a clear difference arises: Potential regime transition cases with transitional groups hold constitutional referenda 45.7 percent of time, while cases without transitional groups only hold constitutional referenda 29.5 percent of time.<sup>108</sup> This difference of over 16 percentage points suggests that cases with transitional groups are more likely to push for major systemic change through a consultative process.

Moreover, in terms of sequencing, cases with transitional groups schedule constitutional referenda prior to the first national election 81.3 percent of the time, while cases without

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<sup>106</sup> Linz and Stepan (1992) also describe how the sequencing of national and regional elections can affect democratization prospects via the holding together or breaking up of states. The authors compare outcomes in Spain, the former Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia—three transitional regimes facing "stateness" problems. In Spain, a series of national-level elections gave the national government legitimacy, even in the unstable Basque Country and Catalonia regions. In the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, however, regional elections reinforced republican (regional) identities, led to the success of nationalistic political parties in some republics, and thus led to the disintegration of the states.

<sup>107</sup> Scholars also debate the impact that this choice has on democratization. Duverger (1980) and Horowitz (1990) argue that the separation of powers inherent in presidential systems has democratic advantages. Because both the legislature and executive enjoy a source of electoral legitimacy, there are fewer dangers of large mistakes and, because the president is typically elected by the entire population, s/he embodies the will of the people. Other scholars disagree, preferring parliamentary systems. Linz and Valenzuela (1994), for example, consider parliamentary as superior to presidential systems because they have greater flexibility and the ability to guard against overly-powerful executives. See O'Donnell (1999) for a discussion of how weak legislatures undermine "horizontal accountability," Fish (2005, 2006) for a discussion of super-presidentialism in Russia and a comparison with Bulgaria's strong legislature, and Fish and Kroenig (2009) for a discussion linking strong legislatures to democracy.

<sup>108</sup> Note that, because I am here reporting the results for only *TG-restrictive*, the set of cases without transitional groups includes those *TG-permissive* cases that explicitly create groups for constitution-writing (and, therefore, cases that readers may expect to hold constitutional referenda *more* often).

transitional groups only schedule constitutional referenda first 60.6 percent of the time.<sup>109</sup> This prevalent sequencing of constitutional referenda *before* the first presidential or parliamentary election suggests that cases with transitional groups take steps to demonstrate that they value majority rule and utilize popular constitutional approval as a way to bolster democratic legitimacy.

As one example, following Benin's transitional event in 1990, President Mathieu Kérékou allowed for the formation of a broad-based National Conference, which suspended the constitution, declared its own sovereignty, created a High Council for the Republic (HCR) as a transitional group, and appointed a Constitutional Commission. This commission drafted a constitution, publicized it widely, and encouraged much debate in the press. Through this deliberative process, whether or not the constitution was to include an age limit for the president became an especially contentious issue—essentially a choice of how many times Kérékou would be allowed to seek reelection for the presidency under the new system. This touchy issue “was resolved by allowing the people to vote by referendum for one of two constitutions.” In the constitutional referendum of December 2, 1990, one version included an age range of 40 to 70, while the other version had no such range (Wing 2008: 41). Benin's choice to hold a constitutional referendum before national elections, first, invigorated participation and allowed for the early development of consultation as a democratic norm.<sup>110</sup> Second, by abiding by the decision of Béninois citizens to instate an age limit and thereby quell Kérékou's long-term hopes of retaining the presidency (he would turn 70 years old in 2003), the HCR showed a commitment to the democratic value of majority rule. Taken together, the HCR utilized the democratic mechanism of popular approval as a way to bolster its legitimacy.

Yet the Beninese example and the difference of over 16 percentage points in holding constitutional referenda between cases with and without transitional groups provide only an initial descriptive account of the data, and fail to consider any potential omitted variables. To ensure that this effect remains when I condition on other variables, I run a Linear Probability Model (LPM), with robust standard errors and all time-variant control variables lagged by one year prior to the transitional event.<sup>111</sup> The dependent variable is dichotomous: the occurrence of a constitutional referendum after a transitional event.<sup>112</sup>

While the main independent variable of interest is the existence of a transitional group, I introduce several additional control variables. I use these variables as controls in all models in the remainder of this chapter and, borrowing from Carothers (2007: 24), I conceptualize each of these factors as “core facilitators or nonfacilitators,” where they may make an outcome harder or easier to achieve, but neither certain nor impossible.

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<sup>109</sup> Potential regime transition cases with and without transitional groups differ significantly in terms of when they time constitutional referenda prior to national elections. Imagine that I split the transitional period between the transitional event and the first national election into four time quartiles: less than 25 percent of the way into the transitional period, between 25 and 50 percent of the way through, between 50 and 75 percent of the way through, and more than 75 percent of the way into the transitional period. In such a set-up, cases without transitional groups hold the majority of constitutional referenda in the middle 50 percent (63.2 percent of referenda), while only holding 15.8 percent in the bottom quartile (that is, closest to the transitional event) and 21.1 percent in the top quartile (that is, closest to the election). Contrarily, cases with transitional groups hold almost no constitutional referenda in the bottom quartile (3.8 percent) and hold the majority of referenda in the top quartile (57.7 percent). For transitional groups, the middle 50 percent contains 38.5 percent of constitutional referenda.

<sup>110</sup> In fact, 64 percent of registered voters participated in the constitutional referendum.

<sup>111</sup> I use a LPM here because the coefficients are intuitive to interpret, but a Logit analysis produces similarly significant results for the variable transitional group. All robust standard errors reported in this chapter are Newey-West, which I use in order to address concerns of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the data.

<sup>112</sup> And, if a country experiences multiple transitional events, *before* the subsequent event takes place.

First, I include a measure reflecting socioeconomic status, as countries with lower socioeconomic status may have a more difficult time organizing any type of election, including a referendum. I present the results using data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project on gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, but also substitute World Bank data, with similar results. Second, I include a measure of electoral democracy that also comes from the V-Dem project, as countries with a higher level of electoral democracy prior to the transitional event may have an easier time organizing elections after the fact and therefore be more likely to hold a constitutional referendum. This variable asks to what extent the ideal of electoral democracy is, in its fullest sense, achieved.<sup>113</sup> I also test the Freedom House organization’s political rights and civil liberties variables and a separate V-Dem index of liberal democracy. All political variables produce widely-similar results. Third, I include a structural variable of population density that represents two factors that may make running elections of any kind more difficult: (1) population, wherein it may be more difficult to run an election for a larger population because it requires more resources and (2) land area, wherein it may be more difficult to run an election over a greater expanse of area. Both of these variables come from the World Bank, and I divide them to create a population density variable.<sup>114</sup> Fourth, I include a control variable for level of conflict, as conflict may make organizing elections more difficult. I first use a measure of conflict intensity, which comes from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.<sup>115</sup> As an additional conflict variable, I replace conflict intensity with the magnitude of civil warfare or violence measure from Systemic Peace’s Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) data, with consistent results.<sup>116</sup> Fifth, I include regional controls. Table 3-5 presents the set of results for transitional groups, with included control variables for each model marked with an X; full results appear in Appendix 3A, Table 3A-1.

Table 3-5. LPM results for the dependent variable of the occurrence of a constitutional referendum, with robust standard errors in parentheses and all time-variant covariates lagged by one year prior to the transitional event.

	<i>Dependent Variable: Constitutional Referendum</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Transitional group	0.18*** (0.07)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.19** (0.08)	0.18*** (0.09)
GDP, per capita	X	X	X	X	X
Electoral democracy	X	X	X	X	X
Population density		X			X
Conflict intensity			X		X
Region				X	X
Observations	141	141	141	141	141
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.10	0.09

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

<sup>113</sup> The most current V-Dem data is available at <https://v-dem.net/en/data>. The data used in this chapter comes from V-Dem’s version 4. The electoral democracy index is called “v2x\_polyarchy.” Note that this version of the V-Dem data is systematically missing two cases that appear in my dataset: Bahrain and Kuwait.

<sup>114</sup> This data is available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator>.

<sup>115</sup> This data is available at [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp\\_prio\\_armed\\_conflict\\_dataset/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/).

<sup>116</sup> This data is available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>.

In each of models (1) through (5), transitional groups are statistically significant and positively associated with the holding of constitutional referenda. Across these models, when a transitional group exists, I expect an increase of between 0.18 and 0.19 in the probability of holding a constitutional referendum (holding all other model predictors constant).<sup>117</sup>

The facts that a potential regime transition case with a transitional group (1) has a higher probability of holding a constitutional referendum than a case without a transitional group and (2) has a higher probability of holding constitutional referenda before founding elections provides the first two pieces of evidence that transitional groups increase the quality of participatory democracy, helping to spur short-term democratization gains.

### Founding Elections and the Transitional Period Duration

Holding a constitutional referendum does not, however, remove the promise that all transitional groups make of holding national elections. And, scholars debate the question of whether a short or long duration between the start of a potential regime transition and the first national election bodes better for democratization prospects.

A longer duration may encourage discussion, deliberation, and participation and provide more time for opposition group organization, coordination, and the formation of coalitions (Huntington 1991). It may also guard against the danger of “premature elections,” particularly in post-conflict states. Kumar and Ottoway (1998), for example, argue that, though the international community has the ability to organize elections under even the most difficult circumstances, countries with no tradition of democratic contestation should delay elections to allow for negotiations between contending political groups. Reich (2001), similarly, argues that quick elections tend to act as referenda on the previous regime and do not allow time to incorporate broader policy struggles among a range of social actors.<sup>118</sup>

Yet a longer duration may also promote a proliferation of parties due to voters’ poorly-formed expectations about candidate success (Cox 1997), increase the amount of party fragmentation by providing time for the party system to splinter into numerous blocs (Reich 2004), or enable powerful actors to manipulate electoral rules to their advantages (Pastor 1999).<sup>119</sup>

To assess how the duration of time from transitional event until elections varies across cases with and without transitional groups, I turn now to look only at potential regime transition cases *with* elections ( $N=159$ ).<sup>120</sup> Table 3-6 presents the average duration from a transitional event to elections.

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<sup>117</sup> Readers may worry that the adjusted  $R^2$  values in these models are very low, topping out at 0.10 in Model (4). Because the adjusted  $R^2$  value is a measure of a model’s goodness of fit—in particular, a measure of the proportion of variation in the dependent variable explained by the model, taking into account the residual degrees of freedom—these low values suggest that the models do not fit well, and therefore should not be used for predictive purposes. The  $R^2$  says nothing, however, about the significance of coefficients. The fact that transitional group remains significant across all runs indicates that it is a result worth reporting.

<sup>118</sup> Such debate may be especially key for democratization, as anti-authoritarian forces that face initial pressure to unite must subsequently struggle against one another to establish their places within the new regime (Przeworski 1991).

<sup>119</sup> Of course, electoral manipulation can also occur with a short duration, but Di Palma argues that quick elections have the tendency to “curb chaos” and, even if manipulated, “energize and possibly protect democratization beyond the hopes or fears, and indeed beyond the understanding, of the principal actors” (1990: 85).

<sup>120</sup> There are 23 cases without elections, or 12.6 percent of the 182-case dataset. These cases make up two categories. First, the following 20 potential regime transition cases do not have a direct national election before a new transitional event occurs: Afghanistan 1992, 1996; Algeria 1992; Azerbaijan 1991; Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-8 (1990); Burundi

Table 3-6. Average duration (in days) from the date of a transitional event to election event types, across potential regime transition cases with and without transitional groups.


<i>Event Type</i>	<i>Transitional Group</i>	<i>No Transitional Group</i>	<i>Difference</i>
Presidential election	909.5	742.2	167.3
Parliamentary election	959.2	756.2	203
Earliest election	850.9	600.3	250.6
Latest election	1006.3	846.7	159.6

*Notes:* I calculate the averages in the cells above based on a subset of the initial 182 cases that includes all potential regime transition cases that reach elections ( $N=159$ ). I include rows four and five—the earliest and latest election event types—because some cases hold both presidential and parliamentary elections. If a case holds either a presidential or a parliamentary election, the earliest and latest elections are the same. The fourth column presents the difference between columns two and three (cases with and without transitional groups).

The differences in duration from transitional event to elections are extreme across potential regime transition cases with and without transitional groups. Cases with transitional groups take, on average, approximately five to seven months longer than cases without transitional groups to hold a presidential or parliamentary election. If I instead consider the length of time until the *earliest* national election (either presidential or parliamentary), cases with transitional groups take over eight months longer to reach them, on average.

These averages, however, may be misleading due to the presence of outliers. Looking at the shortest election duration, Figure 3-4 compares cases with and without transitional groups.

Figure 3-4. Shortest duration from a transitional event to a national election, across potential regime transition cases with and without transitional groups.



1996; Congo-Kinshasa 1990, 1997; Guinea-Bissau 1998; Haiti 1991; Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) 2003; Lesotho 1993 (1990); Liberia 1990; Nepal 2002; Rwanda 1990 (1991); Sierra Leone 1990 (1991), 1992, 1997; and Somalia 1991, 2000. I include Bosnia-Herzegovina in this list because, though they had a multiparty election while still part of the former Yugoslavia (as did all constituent republics), there was no post-independence election before the second transitional event in 1995. Second, the following three potential regime transition cases never have a direct national election (as of January 1, 2016): Eritrea 1993 (1991), Qatar 1995, and Somalia 2004.

*Notes:* Figure 3-4 presents a comparison of potential regime transition cases with transitional groups to cases without transitional groups. The red points identify four outliers in the data and I list case identifiers to the left of each point.

These outliers are not biasing the results. If I remove the four outliers, the difference between cases with and without transitional groups actually *increases*, with a difference of 265.9 days.<sup>121</sup> This means that potential regime transition cases with transitional groups, on average, have their first national election nearly nine months later than cases without transitional groups.

While this difference appears significant, there is an obvious potential omitted variable: Potential regime transition cases with transitional groups may simply be harder cases than those without transitional groups. If this is the case, then it is not the transitional group that matters for election duration, but the starting conditions prior to the transitional event. Perhaps, for instance, these cases exhibit lower levels of development or greater instability, each of which may make it more difficult to reach elections in a timely manner.

I assess this alternative explanation by running a set of models for count dependent values, as duration can only take positive integers and is a count of days. Because the data-generating process does not allow for any value of zero—it measures the number of days from the transitional event to the first national election<sup>122</sup>—I utilize a zero-truncated count model. Common choices are Poisson and Negative Binomial, depending on the level of over-dispersion in the data.<sup>123</sup> Here, the data *is* over-dispersed and I therefore present zero-truncated Negative Binomial models.<sup>124</sup>

Similar to the previous models, I include a number of controls, with all time-variant controls lagged by one year prior to the year of the transitional event. While the logic behind each control variable is the same as in the previous section, the expectations now relate to the *duration of time* until an election is held, rather than the simple dichotomy of election or not. That is, rather than expecting that a country that has a more democratic regime prior to the transitional event will have an easier time holding an election *at all*, the expectation is now that it will take *less time* to organize an election. In the opposite direction, a state with a large amount of conflict before the transitional event will be more likely to take *more time* to hold an election, rather than be less likely to hold an election *at all*. In Table 3-7, I exclude outliers and, as in Table 3-5, I present the results for transitional groups with control variables marked with an X.<sup>125</sup> Full results are available in Appendix 3A, Table 3A-2.

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<sup>121</sup> With outliers removed, the average for cases with transitional groups is 807.2 days, while the average for cases without transitional groups is 541.3 days.

<sup>122</sup> In cases without elections and with multiple transitional events, the duration measures the number of days until the subsequent transitional event. In cases without elections and no additional transitional events, the duration measures the number of days until January 1, 2015.

<sup>123</sup> Overly-dispersed data is data in which the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean. Due to the Poisson model's assumption that the conditional variance equals the conditional mean, it is preferable here to use the Negative Binomial model (Yee 2008, Gailmard 2014). To determine that the data is over-dispersed, I conduct an overdispersion test through the AER package in the statistical computing program R.

<sup>124</sup> In Appendix 3A, Tables 3A-3 and 3A-4, I additionally present ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results. Though OLS is generally considered inappropriate for count data, I include them simply to show that the results produced with OLS are very similar to the zero-truncated Negative Binomial models.

<sup>125</sup> All results that I report look similar when including the outliers, except those that include regional controls. The variable for transitional group loses significance when including regional controls, as the African control variable becomes highly significant (note that three of the four outliers are in Africa). I include the results for the sample including outliers in Appendix 3A, Table 3A-5.

Table 3-7. Zero-truncated Negative Binomial model results for the dependent variable of duration (in days) from the transitional event until the first national election, with all time-variant covariates lagged by one year prior to the transitional event.

<i>Dependent variable: Duration to First Election</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Transitional group	0.41**	0.43**	0.40**	0.36**	0.34**
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
GDP, per capita	X	X	X	X	X
Electoral democracy	X	X	X	X	X
Population density		X			X
Conflict intensity			X		X
Region				X	X
Alpha ( $\alpha$ )	0.32***	0.32***	0.32***	0.37***	0.38***
Log-likelihood	-874.48	-874.23	-874.23	-870.90	-869.96

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

The results show that in potential regime transition cases that hold elections, cases with transitional groups take longer to get to the elections.<sup>126</sup> Across the models, the value for the transitional group coefficient ( $\hat{\beta}_{TG}$ ) is positive, ranging between 0.34 and 0.43. Looking specifically at Model (5), where transitional groups exhibit the lowest coefficient value, this suggests that the log count for duration (number of days) for cases with transitional groups is 0.34 higher than for cases without transitional groups.

To provide a more meaningful interpretation of these coefficient values, I calculate “incidence rate ratios” (IRR) by exponentiating the coefficients. The IRR is “a ratio of ratios,” in which the base ratio is the incidence rate of counts having some characteristic out of a group consisting of the population of items from which the counts are a part (Hilbe 2008). Looking at the smallest and largest coefficients from models (1) through (5), the corresponding incidence rate ratios are the following:

$$IRR_{Model(5)} = e^{0.34} = 1.40$$

$$IRR_{Model(2)} = e^{0.43} = 1.54$$

What these numbers mean is that, depending on the model used, the duration until the first election (the “rate”) is between 1.40 and 1.54 times higher for a potential regime transition case with a transitional group than without a transitional group; the effect of transitional group is to increase the expected duration until the first election by between 40 and 54 percent.

To summarize the results from the previous two sub-sections, transitional groups’ short-term focus on reaching national elections allows them to increase the quality of democracy through the introduction of formalized deliberative and consultative processes. By (1) increasing the probability of holding constitutional referenda, (2) increasing the likelihood of sequencing constitutional referenda prior to founding elections, and (3) increasing the duration of time until

<sup>126</sup> For graphs of model fit, please see Appendix 3A, Figure 3A-1. The alpha ( $\alpha$ ) value reported at the bottom is the estimated parameter for over-dispersion.

the first presidential or parliamentary election, potential regime transition cases with transitional groups are more likely to push for major systemic change through a consultative process, utilize the democratic mechanism of popular approval as a way to bolster their legitimacy, and encourage extended deliberation among contending forces. These processes help to account for potential regime transition cases with transitional groups' short-term democratization gains over cases without transitional groups.

### Founding Election Quality

But, what about the lack of long-term democratization gains? A number of scholars express concerns over how consultation or deliberation among contending forces may actually not reduce attempts at electoral manipulation. Powerful actors tend to manipulate electoral systems to their advantage, such as by accelerating the election schedule; disqualifying candidates due to age requirements or nationality clauses (Monga 1997); manipulating the government's representativeness-accountability trade-off through choices of district magnitude (Carey and Hix 2011); creating seat quotas for former elites, military forces, women, or minority groups;<sup>127</sup> or imposing voting thresholds.<sup>128</sup>

Empirically, examples abound of electoral manipulation. In post-revolutionary Mexico, post-independence Zimbabwe, and Croatia under Tuđman, majoritarian electoral rules minimized the parliamentary representation of opposition parties. In Nicaragua after 1984, elites used a radical proportional representation system in legislative elections to split the anti-Sandinista camp (Schedler 2002). In the Polish Roundtable talks held in early 1989, the incumbent regime refused to legalize political parties (labeling Solidarity as only a trade union) and thus effectively took the option for a proportional representation system off of the table (Kaminski 1999). And, in the 2005 and 2010 Afghan elections, President Hamid Karzai decreed the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) electoral system in an effort to limit the emergence of organized opposition (Reynolds and Carey 2012).

But potentially good for democratization, despite all manipulation attempts, politicians tend to be bad predictors of electoral design consequences, particularly in transitional situations. This is, in part, because the influence of institutions occurs only through a "prism of societal characteristics." Because institution-makers lack information on societal characteristics, they can only assign some probability distribution to what the relevant characteristics might be and then choose the rules to maximize their expected payoffs (Shvetsova 2003).<sup>129</sup> In the Afghan case, for instance, Karzai's opposition-limiting SNTV system encouraged a huge number of candidates to participate, which subsequently produced a high proportion of votes for candidates who won no representation. In the more recent Tunisian case, had negotiators chosen a proportional system with a divisors-method rather than a remainders-method for the 2011 Constituent Assembly election, the largest political party would have won 69 percent of the seats—rather than less than

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<sup>127</sup> As three examples, (1) Augusto Pinochet's military junta in Chile created nine non-elected senate seats to be designated by the junta and decreed that all former presidents were to become "senators for life" (Barany 2012); (2) after Suharto's departure in Indonesia, the military retained a sizeable bloc of 38 seats (Case 2000); and (3) following Mubarak's ouster in Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces abolished the previously-existing gender quota, imposed a ten-seat quota of presidential appointees, and retained an "occupational quota," in which at least one winning candidate in each two-member district had to be a worker or a farmer (Reynolds and Carey 2011).

<sup>128</sup> For interesting examples from South Korea and Poland, see Brady and Mo (1992) and Kaminski (2002).

<sup>129</sup> For examples stemming from a wave of work on endogenous institutions, see (among others) Smith (1996, 2003), Andrews and Jackman (2005), Negretto (2008), Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009), and Meredith (2009).



a majority, as it did—and had the ability to dictate, rather than negotiate, the constitution (Carey 2013).<sup>130</sup>

Such uncertainty over the consequences of electoral design may enhance the appeal of more explicit forms of electoral manipulation, such as violent repression or intimidation tactics, and transitional groups may offer a venue within which this manipulation can take place.

I therefore examine the interaction between transitional groups and duration until elections. I ask: Does the fact that potential regime transition cases with transitional groups take a longer amount of time before holding elections enable them to curb electoral malfeasance and increase election quality?

On the following page, I present the results using the shortest election duration as the independent variable of interest, though the results hold if I instead use the longest election duration.<sup>131</sup> I utilize the same set of control variables as in the previous sections, and I introduce a new V-Dem variable to measure election quality as the dependent variable. This variable is the “Clean Elections Index,” which measures to what extent an election is free and fair, where “free and fair” means “an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence” (Coppedge, et al. 2014).<sup>132</sup> I additionally confirm that an alternative V-Dem measure of election quality, whether losing parties and candidates accept the national election results within three months, produces similar results.<sup>133</sup>

Unlike the earlier models presented in this chapter, the dependent variable is neither dichotomous nor does it represent count data. Instead, it is an index at the interval level of measurement. I therefore present Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression results for the dependent variable of free and fair elections, with robust standard errors. Table 3-8 presents the results for transitional group, election duration, and the interaction term, with the four outliers identified in the previous section excluded.<sup>134</sup> As before, I mark the control variables with an X; the full results appear in Appendix 3A, Table 3A-6.

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<sup>130</sup> The divisors-method uses the tallies of votes across party lists to establish a matrix of quotients pertaining to lists, then allocates seats in descending order until all the seats in a given district are awarded. The remainders-method uses a quota determined by dividing the total number of votes cast in a district by some number. It then awards as many seats in the district as full quotas of votes that a certain party wins. If not all seats in the district can be awarded on the basis of full quotas, any remaining seats are allocated, one per list, in descending order of the lists’ remaining votes.

<sup>131</sup> By using the shortest duration between the transitional event and a national election (presidential or parliamentary), the dependent variable for election quality relates to the earliest election held. In the runs that instead use the longest duration between the transitional event and a national election (presidential or parliamentary), the dependent variable relates to the latest election held. I present the latter results in Appendix 3A, Table 3A-7.

<sup>132</sup> This index (“v2xel\_frefair”) ranges from a value of zero (not at all clean elections) to one (totally clean elections). It is missing data for five cases in the dataset: Bahrain 1999, Fiji 2006-7 (2006), Kenya 2008, Madagascar 2009, and Zimbabwe 2009 (2008). Bahrain held a parliamentary election on October 24, 2002; Fiji held a parliamentary election on September 17, 2014; Kenya held both presidential and parliamentary elections on March 4, 2013; Madagascar held a presidential election on October 25, 2013 and a parliamentary election on December 20, 2013; and Zimbabwe held both presidential and parliamentary elections on July 31, 2013.

<sup>133</sup> These results are available in Appendix 3A, Tables 3A-8 and 3A-9. This variable (“v2elaccept”) is missing the five cases listed in the footnote above, plus three additional cases: Dominican Republic 1996 (1994), Jordan 1989, and Kuwait 1990-2 (1990). The Dominican Republic held a presidential election on May 16, 1996 and a parliamentary election on May 16, 1998; Jordan held a parliamentary election on November 8, 1989; and Kuwait held a parliamentary election on October 5, 1992.

<sup>134</sup> The results are nearly identical when including the outliers and are available by request.

Table 3-8. OLS regression model results for the dependent variable of free and fair elections, with robust standard errors in parentheses and all time-variant covariates lagged by one year prior to the transitional event.

	<i>Dependent Variable: Free and Fair Elections</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Transitional group (TG)	0.13** (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.13** (0.06)
Election duration (ED)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
TG*ED	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
GDP, per capita	X	X	X	X	X
Electoral democracy	X	X	X	X	X
Population density		X			X
Conflict intensity			X		X
Region				X	X
Observations	116	116	116	116	116
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.12

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Any regression that includes an interaction term is tricky to interpret. Here, I ask whether the effect of transitional group on election quality depends on the duration of time from the transitional event until the first election. That is, I ask whether it matters if a transitional group moves a country to its first election quickly or slowly.

If I look simply at Model (1), the coefficient for transitional group ( $\hat{\beta}_{TG}$ ) is statistically significant, with a positive value of 0.13. But,  $\hat{\beta}_{TG}$  describes the relationship between transitional group and election quality, *when the duration to the first election is zero*. That is,  $\hat{\beta}_{TG}$  is statistically significant and positive for the case in which a transitional event occurs on the same day as the first national election. Similarly, the insignificant coefficient for election duration ( $\hat{\beta}_{DUR}$ ), which equals 0.00007 if expanded, describes the effect of election duration on election quality, *when there is no transitional group*.

As the relationship of how transitional groups interact with election duration is of interest, such propositions provide little insight. I must therefore look at the *marginal effect* of transitional groups; that is, I must acknowledge that the effect of transitional group depends on election duration. Taking the partial derivative with respect to transitional group and then setting  $Y = 0$  to solve for the point at which the effect turns negative:


$$Y_{free\ and\ fair} = 0.12715 - (0.00016 * X_{duration})$$

$$X_{duration} = 794.69$$

I find that, though decreasing as duration increases, the effect of transitional group remains positive until 795 days, or slightly over 2 years (2.18 years, to be exact). Figure 3-5 plots the marginal

effect showing the relationship between transitional group and election quality for all the possible values of election duration.

Figure 3-5. Marginal effect of transitional group on election quality, moderated by the duration to the first national (presidential or parliamentary) election.



*Notes:* The solid line in this figure is the marginal effect, while the dotted lines represent a 95 percent confidence interval. The red dotted line identifies the point at which transitional group influence on election quality becomes negative.

This plot shows that transitional groups are sometimes positively and sometimes negatively associated with election quality, depending on the duration to the first election. Up to 794.7 days until the first national election, transitional groups are positively associated with election quality, but after 794.7 days, transitional groups are negatively associated with election quality; that is, there appears to be a founding election duration-quality trade-off.

This result helps to explain why potential regime transition cases with transitional groups do not exhibit aggregate long-term democratization gains over cases without transitional groups. As the duration to the first national election increases beyond a certain point, potential regime transition cases with transitional groups tend to conduct *lower* quality elections, meaning elections with higher levels of systematic irregularities. That is, while transitional groups *can* positively impact the development of deliberative and participatory democracy, they can also undermine it, and a long duration before an election increases the likelihood of this happening.


### The Duration-Quality Trade-Off: Revising the Potential Regime Transition Path Schema

If transitional groups employ election delays instrumentally—as a way to prolong their tenure in power, rather than as a way to encourage deliberation and consultation—the prospect of successful democratization declines. Rather than providing time to work through pressing issues, accommodate various actors’ interests, and build institutions to prevent or curtail electoral manipulation, in this scenario, a transitional group can weaken the quality of democracy and decrease the probability of successful long-term democratization.

To examine the cases of transitional groups that experience especially long durations between the transitional event and the founding elections, Figure 3-6 plots the relationship between

duration and election quality, illustrating the negative association discussed in the previous section.<sup>135</sup>

Figure 3-6. Relationship between the duration (in days) from the transitional event to the first national election and election quality.



*Notes:* Election quality is approximated by the V-Dem “Clean Elections Index” (free and fair elections). This scatter plot contains 59 points, the total number of potential regime transition cases in the dataset that *both* have a transitional group *and* reach a national election, excluding Rwanda.

In addition to showing the established negative relationship between duration and election quality, Figure 3-6 illustrates the wide spread of duration across transitional group cases. At one extreme, after Valentine Strasser was ousted in a coup d’état by his fellow National Provisional Ruling Council soldiers in Sierra Leone in 1996, it only took the Julius Maada Bio-led interim government 41 days to hold presidential and parliamentary elections.<sup>136</sup> At the other extreme, and not pictured in Figure 3-6 due to its outlier status, after Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, the genocide took place, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front gained control of the country—all within a few months in 1994—it took 3428 days (over nine years) to reach an election.<sup>137</sup> While Rwanda is an especially extreme case, Figure 3-6 demonstrates that a sizeable number of cases ( $N=24$ ) exceed the 794.7 day threshold after which the marginal effect of transitional group on election quality becomes negative.

What is especially interesting to notice among these cases of long duration, however, is that the duration of time from transitional event to election is not necessarily equal to the duration of time from transitional group creation to election. And, the point in the transitional period at

<sup>135</sup> In this graph, I remove the Rwandan case, as it is an extreme outlier in terms of duration (nearly 3500 days) that artificially pulls down the regression line (i.e., the slope of the regression line becomes much steeper due to the presence of the Rwandan point). With Rwanda included, the bivariate regression produces a highly significant slope term, with a p-value of 0.008. With Rwanda excluded (Figure 3-6), the slope term’s p-value increases slightly to 0.02.

<sup>136</sup> Bio, along with four other ranking National Provisional Ruling Council members, ousted Strasser on January 16, 1996. Presidential and legislative elections were held on February 26 and 27, 1996, with a runoff election on March 15. Bio then handed power over to newly-elected President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on March 29, 1996.


<sup>137</sup> Though Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6, 1994, presidential and parliamentary elections did not occur until August 25 and September 29–October 2, 2003, respectively.

which the transitional group is created may affect to what extent election delays are utilized as a means to extend a group’s time in power. In the following sub-section, I utilize a series of examples to demonstrate how a formerly-unspecified path of regime transition has the ability to temper the negative relationship between duration and election quality: delayed transitional groups, in which potential regime transition cases that initially exhibit no transitional group create a group months or years down the line. In transitional group cases with long durations until an election, this path may offer *better* long-term democratization prospects because it decreases the likelihood of one actor consolidating power.

### Delayed Transitional Groups


Potential regime transition paths of delayed transitional groups are cases that initially exhibit no transitional group, but create a group months or years down the line. Amending the revised schema presented in section one of this chapter, Figure 3-7 highlights this path in grey.

Figure 3-7. Paths of potential regime transitions: delayed transitional groups.



Compared to the top path illustrated in Figure 3-7—from transitional group directly to regime two—the more complicated second path containing a delayed transitional group considers the duration of time between a transitional event and the creation of a transitional group. Figure 3-8 graphs this distribution of times across all cases with transitional groups.

Figure 3-8. Delay (in days) in the initial onset of a transitional group after a transitional event.



*Notes:* I calculate the delay by subtracting the date of the transitional event from that which marks the beginning of a transitional group.<sup>138</sup>

While the vast majority of cases with transitional groups have less than one month between their transitional event and the creation of their transitional group, a substantial number of cases have a delay of between one month and one year, and a total of six cases have a delay of greater than one year. And, if we consider potential regime transition cases that have especially long transitional periods, Table 3-9 shows that these differences in transitional group delay quite drastically affect the average level of free and fair elections.

Table 3-9. Average level of free and fair elections, across all potential regime transition cases that reach elections in a duration greater than or equal to 794.7 days.<sup>139</sup>

<i>Type of Transitional Group (TG)</i>	<i>Average Level of Free and Fair Elections</i>
<i>No TG</i>	0.46
<i>TG, no delay (&lt;1 month)</i>	0.27
<i>TG, short delay (&gt;1 month, &lt;12 months)</i>	0.34
<i>TG, long delay (&gt;1 year)</i>	0.49

*Notes:* I calculate the average level of free and fair elections using V-Dem’s “Clean Elections Index,” which ranges from zero to one, with one indicating a better quality election.

From this sample of cases with long transitional periods, cases with transitional groups that experience short or long delays following the transitional event have higher average levels of free and fair elections than cases that experience no delays. And, cases with long delays actually achieve a higher average than cases without transitional groups. The small sample sizes of the various categories of transitional groups, however, makes inference based on these averages problematic. To illustrate a mechanism by which the amount of delay in transitional group formation may affect the probability of successful democratization, therefore, I rely on two sets of examples: (1) Nigeria in 1993 and the Gambia in 1994, each a case of long duration and no transitional group delay and (2) South Africa in 1990 and Burundi in 2000, each a case of long duration and transitional group delay. The former two examples show how one powerful actor (or group of actors) can dominate a transitional period, inhibit the ability of contending forces to organize by creating a group immediately, and delay and manipulate elections. The latter two examples, contrarily, show how the would-be founders of a transitional group can intentionally delay transitional group formation. This choice to delay transitional group formation enables pre-

<sup>138</sup> Whenever possible, this is the date on which a transitional group first met. In some instances, the date instead represents when the transitional group officially formed. For additional notes on the data collection for transitional group starting dates, please see Appendix 3B.

<sup>139</sup> Because the question of what comprises “especially long transitional periods” is subjective, I use the threshold identified in the final sub-section of section three here.

transitional group negotiations among contending forces, decreases the probability of one actor consolidating power in the long-run, and increases the likelihood of good-quality elections.<sup>140</sup>

The first two cases of long transitional periods with no transitional group delay are especially instructive in observing how the quick consolidation of power in a single actor—in particular, the military—can lead to election delays and poor election quality. First, Nigeria in 1993 is a case of rapid transitional group formation following a transitional event: On November 24, only seven days after General Sani Abacha ousted interim President Ernest Shonekan, reinstated the 1979 Constitution, dissolved all bodies created as part of a previous transitional process, and brought the government under military control, he announced the formation of an 11-member Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) (Mahmud 1993). The militarily-composed PRC claimed that it would facilitate a return to democracy, but ultimately ruled by decree over a transitional period lasting nearly 4.5 years. During his time in power, Abacha did make a few concessions to the opposition, such as (1) creating a 32-member Federal Executive Council that included some pro-democracy advocates and members of the previous Interim National Government and (2) eventually agreeing to hold elections. Yet his regime also expanded the PRC size to add more senior military officials to the interim government (Lea 2001) and arbitrarily arrested, detained, jailed, tortured, and murdered political activists and critics (Ogbondah 2000). By creating a transitional group immediately following the coup d'état, Abacha succeeded in installing a military dictatorship, quelling the organization of opposition forces, and (despite promises to the contrary) manipulating the electoral process, which ultimately led to a low-quality parliamentary election in April 1998 (with a free and fair index score of 0.17).

Similar to Nigeria, only four days after a group of soldiers led by Lieutenant Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh deposed President Dawda Jawara in the Gambia in July 1994, they created the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC). The AFPRC banned all opposition political activity, restricted the media, and impinged on protections for civil liberties and human rights (Ajayi 2003). Also similar to Nigeria, the AFPRC made some small concessions to the opposition, such as creating a National Consultative Committee (NCC) in December 1994 to review the transition process. But while Jammeh initially accepted the NCC's transition plan to return to democratic civilian government and included various provisions relating to elections in a new constitution, he ultimately set the exact electoral arrangements by AFPRC decree. By manipulating the electoral process, these military-led arrangements unsurprisingly benefited Jammeh (Wiseman 1998), who won the presidency in a low-quality election (with a free and fair index score of 0.21) in September 1996.

While the Nigerian and Gambian examples show how a powerful group of actors can easily dominate a transitional group created immediately following a transitional event by not allowing time for other actors to organize, the cases of Burundi and South Africa instead demonstrate how intentionally-delayed transitional groups within a lengthy transitional period can enable pre-transitional group negotiations, decreasing the probability of one actor consolidating power.

On August 28, 2000, after years of South African-mediated negotiations, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was signed. This agreement provided for a three-year transitional period to create a permanent constitution, but did not initially specify the structure of a transitional group. It was only after additional negotiations, including a 19 party-meeting in July 2001 mediated by Nelson Mandela, that the form of the transitional government was agreed on (Curtis 2007). On November 1, 2001, 430 days after the transitional event and following pre-transitional group negotiations, the transitional government for Burundi was inaugurated, with

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<sup>140</sup> Note that, in order to illustrate the mechanism, I intentionally select on the dependent variable.

representatives from previously-warring ethnicities agreeing to split the executive posts: Pierre Buyoya became president and Domitien Ndayizeye became vice president for the first 18 months, after which Ndayizeye became president for a second 18-month mandate. After additional negotiations, the largest remaining rebel group, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy, joined the transitional government in November 2003, further splitting power among contending forces. Two years later, in July 2005, moderate-quality legislative elections were held (with a free and fair index score of 0.46).

In South Africa, a canonical example of democratization success, the May 1994 elections leading to the inauguration of Nelson Mandela were of higher quality than in Burundi (with a free and fair index score of 0.56), and the intentionally-delayed transitional group facilitated early negotiations in an even more comprehensive manner. Shortly after F.W. de Klerk's National Party government lifted the ban on the African National Congress (ANC), unbanned other banned organizations, released Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, repealed censorship, and lifted the state of emergency in February 1990, negotiations between the ANC and the government began. These stop-and-start negotiations continued for years—from the December 1991 multiparty negotiations among 19 groups at the first meeting of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I), to a second (unsuccessful) session of CODESA in May 1992, to bilateral constitutional negotiations in late 1992, to a 26-party Multiparty Negotiating Forum (MPNF) in April 1993 (Barnes and De Klerk 2002)—but all the while the previously-existing parliament remained intact. It was not until September 23, 1993 that the existing parliament approved a bill establishing the Transitional Executive Council, which was the transitional group tasked with overseeing the transition to democracy and acting as an interim parliament. This body included 19 of the original 26 MPNF negotiating partners (Hatchard 1993), splitting power across many actors in the run-up to the May 1994 elections, and again demonstrating how an intentionally-delayed transitional group within a lengthy transitional period has the ability to decrease the probability of one actor consolidating power.

## Conclusion

This chapter investigates whether transitional groups—which, by definition, claim they will move a transitional country from an interim regime toward democracy through elections—accelerate democratization prospects. While finding few aggregate differences in democratic movement between potential regime transition cases with and without transitional groups in the long-term (ten years after a transitional event), I describe how transitional groups *do* appear to accelerate democratic regime change in the short-term (five years after a transitional event). I argue that this discrepancy stems from transitional groups' short-term focus on elections.

Three election-related results particularly stand out. First, potential regime transition cases with transitional groups are no more likely than cases without transitional groups to hold presidential or parliamentary elections (these occur in the vast majority of all potential regime transition cases). Contrarily, transitional groups increase the probability of a state holding a constitutional referendum, and particularly the probability of holding it prior to a national election. This sequencing of constitutional change prior to the inauguration of a popularly-legitimate regime indicates that transitional groups push for major systemic change through consultative processes, a result that bodes well for the quality of participatory democracy.

A recent example aptly demonstrates how interim leaders believe that the consultation mechanism can bolster a transitional group's democratic legitimacy. In June 2015, members of



Thailand's interim National Reform Council (NRC) debated the use of a referendum to approve (1) an interim draft charter (as a temporary replacement for the currently non-enforced permanent constitution) and (2) a proposal to increase the NRC's tenure by two years. As Chairman of the NRC Committee on Justice Reform, Seree Suwanpanont, relates: "...if the proposal receives mixed reactions a referendum can be used to reduce conflicts and will decide if the interim government has the legitimacy to stay on."<sup>141</sup>

In addition to this consultative mechanism, the second stand-out election result relates to deliberation: potential regime transition cases with transitional groups increase the duration of time until the first national election is held by over eight months, on average. Again boding well for the quality of democracy, the combination of the consultative and deliberative functions of transitional groups helps to account for transitional groups' short-term democratization gains over cases without transitional groups.

As the duration to the first national election increases beyond a certain point, however, the third stand-out election result becomes apparent: Potential regime transition cases with transitional groups tend to conduct *lower* quality elections. While transitional groups *can* positively impact the development of deliberative and participatory democracy, they can also undermine it. In particular, transitional groups that employ election delays instrumentally—as a way to prolong their tenure in power, rather than as a way to encourage deliberation and consultation—help to account for the stagnation in long-term democratization gains (as compared to potential regime transition cases without transitional groups).

Even with the addition of the delayed transitional group path to the potential regime transition conceptual scheme, an understanding of the impact of transitional groups on democratization prospects remains incomplete. In particular, I have yet to examine transitional group composition, which makes up the second half of the common assumption described in the introduction to this chapter: the idea that inclusive transitional arrangements increase the probability of successful democratization. Chapter Four therefore examines composition in detail, paying close attention to the distinction between "inclusive" and "exclusive" transitional arrangements.

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<sup>141</sup> Available at <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/584061/nrc-split-on-govt-tenure-plan>.

## Chapter 4 All for One and One for All? How “Inclusive” Transitional Groups May Hinder Democratization Prospects

While the previous chapter focused on how transitional groups promote short-term democratic transition through elections, this chapter focuses on characteristics of transitional groups and, in particular, on how their composition affects the extent of regime change. As described in the introduction to Chapter Three, international actors often approach negotiations surrounding the most appropriate model of transitional arrangements by lauding the democracy-promoting qualities of *inclusive* transitional arrangements. The assumption appears to be that inclusive transitional groups increase the probability of successful democratization.

Yet it is not only international actors that tend to recommend inclusive transitional arrangements as a path forward. Consider the sentiment expressed by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on March 30, 2016 that, *as long as he retained his executive post*, it would be “logical for there to be independent forces, opposition forces, and forces loyal to the government represented” in any transitional body.<sup>142</sup> But in the context of a brutal civil war that killed as many as 470,000 people between March 2011 and February 2016,<sup>143</sup> opposition forces find the prospect of including Assad in the future government unacceptable. Negotiating in United Nations-sponsored talks under the banner of the High Negotiations Committee, these opposition forces instead insist that Assad leave his post and give the transitional government all executive power.<sup>144</sup>

While, as of mid-April 2016, there is no agreement on a transitional government in the Syrian case, the negotiations alert us to important questions: What exactly is an “inclusive” transitional arrangement? Who does it include? Or, perhaps as importantly, who does it *not* include? And, in what circumstances does inclusiveness positively affect democratization prospects? This chapter investigates these questions.

I begin by separating the notion of “inclusion” into two dimensions: power-sharing and participation. Through examples and a theoretical discussion, I describe how transitional groups can vary on both dimensions and highlight a double-coordination problem that these dimensions can produce. I subsequently dichotomize each of the two dimensions and present a two-by-two typology of transitional groups: comprehensive, selective, pluralistic, and exclusionary.

I then apply these transitional group types to the 70 cases of the restrictive variety of transitional groups in the dataset introduced in Chapter Two. I analyze the data and systematically show that the effect a transitional group has on the extent of regime change depends on the group’s level of power-sharing versus participatory inclusiveness.

In particular, I first demonstrate that the power-sharing dimension of transitional group composition has a larger impact on democratization prospects than the participation dimension. By separating transitional groups into those with a power-sharing and a non-power-sharing structure, I find that, on average, power-sharing transitional groups move toward more open politics quicker than non-power-sharing transitional groups.

Second, however, I argue that ignoring the participation dimension of transitional group composition in light of my first finding is a mistake because a transitional group’s choice of broad

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<sup>142</sup> <http://www.bdlive.co.za/world/mideast/2016/03/30/assad-calls-for-inclusive-syrian-transitional-government>

<sup>143</sup> [http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/world/middleeast/death-toll-from-war-in-syria-now-470000-group-finds.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/world/middleeast/death-toll-from-war-in-syria-now-470000-group-finds.html?_r=0)

<sup>144</sup> <http://aranews.net/2016/04/syrian-regime-avoids-talks-political-transition/>

or restricted composition induces trade-offs between electoral, deliberative, and participatory conceptions of democracy. Of particular note, three election characteristics differ on the participation dimension of TG composition: the occurrence of a presidential election, the duration of time from the formation of a TG to the first national election, and whether parties accept the first election results. Together, these results demonstrate that, within a power-sharing structure, a group that is *not* broadly participatory may perform better in terms of electoral democracy, despite exhibiting less progress in terms of deliberative or participatory democracy.

Through a series of examples, I argue that this dynamic stems from the fact that totally inclusive transitional groups can suffer markedly from coordination problems that increase the transitional group's duration of time in power, effectively delaying democratization prospects. Through a comparison with cases making up a final path of potential regime transitions, sequential transitional groups, I additionally argue that, depending on the actors included in the transitional group, completely exclusive transitional groups can provide little incentive to transfer power to a popularly-legitimate regime, decreasing their probability of successfully democratizing.

Given a power-sharing or non-power-sharing structure, then, the greatest prospects for regime change toward democracy through transitional groups may come from *semi*-inclusive transitional groups: (1) groups that are power-sharing, but not participatory or (2) groups that are not power-sharing, but participatory.

### “Inclusive” Transitional Groups in Theory

The term “inclusive” lacks definitional clarity. While the adjective implies something about the process by which decisions are made within transitional groups—and, in particular, an expectation about the amount of compromise actors will have to embark on in order to reach decisions—its application to potential regime transition cases with transitional groups can take on two meanings related to group composition.

First, stemming from foundational work on consociationalism by Arend Lijphart (1968, 1977, 1999, 2002), inclusion in transitional groups may mean *power-sharing*: an arrangement in which the governing bodies of a state include representation from multiple parties, or in which multiple political elites have a stake in the decision-making process (Norris 2008).<sup>145</sup> Power-sharing rules and practices enable consensual governing and, especially in divided societies, may have the ability to foster peaceful relationships between groups with opposing interests (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003), such as ethnic groups, political parties, the armed forces, trade unions, non-governmental organizations, or other factions representing social cleavages.

A transitional group may therefore be inclusive in the sense that power is shared among a minimum of two actors. In the purest ideal-type, the relative strength of these actors in making transitional decisions would be near equal, precluding the possibility that one actor would overtly dominate and guaranteeing included actors a fair chance at influencing the extent and direction of regime change.

Second, even if not guaranteeing that power is shared among included actors, inclusion in transitional groups may mean *participation*. As Dahl (1971: 4) expresses, there is variation in “the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government: to participate, so to speak, in the system of public contestation.” A broadly participatory environment, in which a comparatively large proportion of

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<sup>145</sup> As opposed to “power-concentrating” arrangements, which limit office to a small range of actors.

the population controls the conduct of the governing bodies, forces actors with diverse points of view to learn to live with one another (Seely 2005). Especially in post-conflict settings, broad participation may convince warring actors to focus on non-violent strategies (Strasheim and Fjelde 2014), build trust, give a wide variety of actors a stake in the political process, and give actors opportunities to practice joint decision-making (Papagianni 2009).<sup>146</sup>

A transitional group may therefore be participatory in the sense that the group is pluralistic in composition. In the purest ideal-type, the group would include a wide variety of participants representative of a broad swath of a transitional state's society, increasing the number of viewpoints represented and the potential for bargaining among contending factions over the extent and direction of regime change.

### Inclusion and Regime Change

Of course, these ideal-type depictions never occur in the real world, and there exist significant questions as to whether and how these dimensions of inclusiveness influence the extent and direction of regime change. As hinted above, in the transitional period in post-conflict states, a common approach to post-conflict resolution is to guarantee warring groups representation in institutions in exchange for peace.<sup>147</sup> Take Mozambique between 1990 and 1992, for instance, when Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) forces demanded credible commitments for power-sharing from the Mozambique Liberation Front government (e.g., external monitoring by the United Nations, guarantees for inclusion in the new military) before agreeing to sign the Rome General Peace Accords and committing to disarm (Walter 1999). Such power-sharing accords in the aftermath of conflict may decrease the odds of conflict renewal by creating a more stable balance of power between groups (Snyder and Jervis 1999).

Yet the creation of a power-sharing and/or participatory arrangement is not solely a response to conflict. In cases as distinct as Benin and Romania in the early 1990s and Kyrgyzstan and Guinea in the 2000s, we observe attempts at broad-based inclusion following a transitional event in non-post-conflict societies.

And, while power-sharing may help to foster or maintain peace, power-sharing transitional arrangements may *not* help to push states toward more open politics. Theoretically, power-sharing actually runs counter to democratic ideals, such as by aiming to ensure that a government does not subject its citizens to policies seriously detrimental to their interests. In post-apartheid South

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<sup>146</sup> There is a huge peace-building literature that focuses on these post-conflict settings. See, as only a few examples, Doyle (2001), Ottaway and Lacina (2003), and Lyons (2004). Lyons (2004), for example, argues that the creation of diffuse electoral commissions in post-conflict environments helps to effect the complementary processes of war termination and democratization by (1) setting norms and precedents and (2) ensuring the demilitarization of politics. The latter, demilitarization, is often an attempt to protect against exclusive politics dominated by militarily-strong actors. As a blunt illustration of how a lack of demilitarization can maintain an exclusive form of governance (and, in this case, electoral manipulation), we can look to Charles Taylor's 1997 electoral slogan in Liberia: "He killed my Pa, he killed my Ma, I'll vote for him" (Polgreen 2006).

<sup>147</sup> Graham, et al. (2014: 4) distinguish between power-sharing and power-dividing arrangements. While a power-sharing arrangement "is an agreement that mandates or facilitates the participation of a broad set of decision makers in governance," a continuum of power-sharing arrangements exists. The authors separate power-sharing into three forms: (1) inclusive agreements, in which several parties jointly participate in decision-making processes (for example, through a unity government); (2) dispersive agreements, which divides or partitions power (for instance, by devolving power to subnational units); and (3) constraining agreements, which limits the power of any dominant party or social group (for example, through an ethnic party ban). The authors find that while inclusive and constraining agreements produce positive results for democratic survival, dispersive agreements provide no such encouraging outcomes.

Africa's power-sharing arrangement, negotiators insisted on protections for the white minority, such as guaranteed private property rights (Traniello 2008); in Burundi's early 2000s power-sharing arrangement, negotiators created a system of minority (Tutsi) over-representation within the central institutions of government, at the communal level, and in the armed forces (Lemarchand 2007). While perhaps an admirable venture, power-sharing institutions accomplish this goal of minority protection by (1) artificially creating an arrangement non-reflective of majority rule and thus displacing norms of political competition and by (2) limiting electoral responsiveness by forcing the allocation of power (LeVan 2011; Graham, et al. 2014). Each of these methods intentionally limits democratic practices by "freez[ing] ethnic division by group representation" (Jarstad 2008: 107), making the assumption that inclusion in the form of power-sharing will help states move toward more open politics appear dubious.

Broadly participatory transitional arrangements may also *not* help to push states toward more open politics. Empirically, the inclusion of a wide variety of actors in the process of choosing a transitional body proves to not be a save-all measure. After the Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, for example, various actors proposed types of interim governments, including the incumbents, the mujahideen, and international actors. Between 1987 and 1993, these actors attempted to create at least three different types of transitional bodies to organize Afghan elections: a "national reconciliation" interim government based on power-sharing between the incumbent Najibullah and resistance leaders, an "Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan" chosen by seven Sunni mujahideen parties that was essentially a government-in-exile, and an "Afghan gathering" to choose a broad-based *shura* that would subsequently select an interim government called a "leadership council" (Rubin 1995). Despite multiple attempts, by 1994, all plans—no matter how broadly participatory—failed to push the transitional state toward elections or democracy.

What the Afghan example highlights is that the success of participatory transitional arrangements depends fundamentally on the distribution of power across competing parties. If one party is dominant, it may exploit inclusive arrangements to strengthen its own interests. In Zimbabwe, for instance, after agreeing to the Global Political Agreement in 2008, an arrangement in which Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) agreed to share power with two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), ZANU-PF "found new means of deploying patronage, not just to military officials and party loyalists but also to potentially vulnerable [MDC—Tsvangirai (MDC-T)] voters." By using "a nationwide program of sustained ZANU-PF interference with MDC-T-controlled local councils" to woo voters, ZANU-PF capitalized on the supposed legitimacy of the inclusive government (LeBas 2014: 62).

And, if one party is not dominant, whether inclusive arrangements push for open politics may depend even more fundamentally on the power distribution. As Spears (2002) relates, power-sharing arrangements appeal to *both* actors with declining power *and* actors with rising power. For an actor in decline, power-sharing guarantees some amount of power that the actor might not otherwise retain; for an actor on the rise, power-sharing can offer side benefits like foreign aid or international legitimacy. Depending on how many and which (i.e., declining- or rising-power) actors are included, power-sharing arrangements may simply act as "coalitions of convenience," rather than compromise- or democracy-promoting bodies (Horowitz 1991: 175).


Conditional on the distribution of power among contending groups, then, *excluding* rebel groups from governing in a post-civil war framework, *excluding* members of the prior autocrat's

political party from running for office (Höglund 2008, Nilsson 2008),<sup>148</sup> and *excluding* the military from governing after a coup d'état or prolonged tenure in power (Janowitz 1964; Barany 1993, 1997; Huntington 1995, Feaver 1999; Trinkunas 2000) will fundamentally influence the extent and direction of regime change, and perhaps prove better for democratization prospects.

### The Inclusion Interaction

With these outstanding questions of how inclusiveness influences the extent and direction of regime change in the background, this sub-section considers how the two dimensions of inclusiveness, power-sharing and participation, interact. While power-sharing and participation reflect two understandings of inclusion, they are not mutually exclusive types. I therefore illustrate their intersection in Figure 4-1 and provide four illustrative examples of transitional groups (hereafter, TGs) in their approximate locations in the two-dimensional figure.

Figure 4-1. “Inclusion” as the intersection of participation and power-sharing.



Consider first the participation dimension, which I show here on the horizontal axis. Moving from left to right, the axis spans from an extreme case of only one societal group included in a TG—by which I mean a group of actors representing a set of common preferences (e.g., prior regime elites, opposition forces, the military, civil society actors)<sup>149</sup>—to the opposite extreme of all possible societal groups included in a TG.<sup>150</sup>

<sup>148</sup> These actors are often referred to as potential “spoilers” of peaceful democratization, which Stedman (1997: 5) defines as “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threaten their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.”

<sup>149</sup> Note that here I am *assuming* that individual actors within a group such as the military or former regime elites share preferences over (1) the desired reforms to conduct in a TG and (2) the desired direction and extent of regime change.

<sup>150</sup> Realistically, it would never be possible to include *all* societal groups in a TG, but it is a theoretical possibility.

Based on the approximate locations that I list for each case in Figure 4-1, there is a clear ranking in terms of participation. At the far left, Gambia's Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) in 1994 included only five military officers, representing one homogeneous group (i.e., the military). To the right of Gambia, Mali's 1991 Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (CTSP) included 25 participants encompassing two groups, with ten military and 15 civilian members. To the right of Mali is Georgia in 1992, with its Military Council and Political Consultative Council that together included just over 40 members with representation from the military, ten political parties, a group of intellectuals, and several opposition members of parliament. Finally, farthest to the right is Romania's 1989 Provisional National Unity Council (PNUC) with 253 members representing prominent dissidents, some former communist officials, military members, ethnic minorities, intellectuals, other political parties, and well-educated technocrats.

While these four illustrative cases demonstrate a wide spectrum of TGs in terms of participation, if one were to consider *only* their ranking on the participation dimension as representative of their level of "inclusion," the results would be misleading. This is because they also differ in terms of power-sharing, which I illustrate in Figure 4-1 on the vertical axis. At the bottom, all power is consolidated in one group (again, meaning a group of actors representing a set of common preferences); at the top, there is an equal power distribution among included groups.

Just as with the participation dimension, I can rank the illustrative examples from least to most in terms of power-sharing. Closest to the bottom, the Gambia's AFPRC shows the least amount of power-sharing as, after deposing President Dawda Jawara in a coup d'état, Head of State Lieutenant Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh and his military-composed AFPRC unilaterally banned all opposition political activity, restricted the media, and removed protections for civil liberties and human rights. Georgia falls slightly higher on the power-sharing dimension than the Gambia, but remains below Mali. This is because Georgia's Military Council only allowed the Political Consultative Council to offer recommendations, while Mali's CTSP appointed a civilian-led transitional government to write the constitutional framework for the transitional period, formulate the agenda for a national conference, and decide who would be able to participate in the conference. At the highest point on the vertical axis is Romania's PNUC, which was explicitly created with a power-sharing framework between the former interim body, the National Salvation Front (FSN), and other societal groups.


Again, the four examples illustrate much variation in terms of power-sharing, but even more importantly, they illustrate that the ranking of "inclusive" TGs changes if one considers *only* the participation dimension *or* the power-sharing dimension—namely, Mali and Georgia switch places. Considering both dimensions, how might a TG's composition influence the extent and direction of regime change?

### The Double-Coordination Problem

Together, the participation and power-sharing dimensions of inclusion create a double-coordination problem. First, as a TG's ranking on the participation component of inclusiveness moves to the right, toward "all groups included," coordination problems potentially increase. While a large TG size or varied TG composition may enhance representation and deliberation, these pluralistic characteristics may complicate bargaining and decision-making procedures, making agreement more difficult to come to or prolonging the transitional period. Second, as a TG's ranking on the power-sharing component of inclusiveness moves up, toward "equal power

among groups,” a similar concern arises: If actors share power, they may experience more difficulty reaching decisions than in a less power-sharing TG, in which a dominant actor can push through his or her preferred policies (whether democratic or authoritarian). Figure 4-2 illustrates this double-coordination problem.

Figure 4-2. Coordination problems within transitional groups.



In particular, Figure 4-2 illustrates that, as the number of groups included in a TG (the participation dimension) increases, shown through the horizontal arrow pointing to the right, the likelihood of coordination problems among actors increases. At the same time, as power among groups in a TG becomes more equal (the power-sharing dimension), shown through the vertical arrow pointing up, the likelihood of coordination problems among actors also increases. If the composition of a TG moves from left to right and simultaneously from bottom to top on this diagram, there is a doubly-compounded coordination problem.

An important caveat is in order: This double-coordination problem is conditional on the types of groups involved within a TG. Somewhat liberally applying lessons from Hardin’s *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (1997), a book that specifically focuses on *violent* group conflict, what a TG can accomplish in terms of the extent and direction of regime change depends on the commitments of its individual members (p. 46). If a TG has a high value on the participation dimension, but the most powerful group involved wants to move toward more open politics, prospects for moves toward democracy will likely increase. If, alternatively, a TG includes a group with anti-democratic preferences that is powerful enough to sabotage moves toward open politics, regime change may move in an authoritarian direction.

When individuals succeed in acting collectively, such as by organizing elections or amending a constitution in a TG, it is sometimes the case that the result will be “bad”—here, meaning regime change in an autocratic direction. This is particularly true if one group’s benefit comes from the suppression of another group’s interest (p. 5). It is entirely possible, then, that as



we move from left to right on the spectrum in Figure 4-2—a move toward more participatory democracy—the probability that a TG will include a group that pushes for autocratic outcomes will increase. And, if democratically- and non-democratically-oriented groups both exist within a TG, this may further compound the double-coordination issue that I highlight above.

Negotiating institutional design within a TG therefore depends on what Hardin (1997: 20-26) terms “cooperation power,” a type of interaction involving elements of both coordination and conflict, and fundamentally depending on the included groups’ preferences. Cooperation involves coordination in the sense that some negotiations within a TG, even when they require concessions from some group, may benefit all; cooperation involves conflict in the sense that other negotiations within a TG may *not* benefit all parties and, instead, one group’s loss may be another group’s gain. As noted above, I contend that problems with successfully coordinating plague TGs.

The problem, of course, is that my contention is incomplete due to the fact that preferences are unobservable (Mas-Collel, et al. 1995).<sup>151</sup> With the data at hand, there is no way to adjudicate between the observationally equivalent outcomes that could arise from coordination problems or sabotage by groups with autocratic preferences. That is, there is no way for me to identify the preferences of a range of disparate actors within TGs across cases.

When discussing TGs, however, I am dealing with a body designed with a common purpose in mind: the transfer of power through democratic elections. I therefore make a, perhaps questionable, assumption that *all* groups included within a TG wish to pursue democratization *or* wish to appear that they are pursuing democratization. Mobilizing a TG around any purpose will be easier if all included groups share that purpose (Hardin 1997: 34), and if there is the possibility that some groups *do not* share that purpose, that should simply compound coordination problems. Though, undoubtedly, actors’ preferences matter in myriad other ways (and I touch on some of these ways in the penultimate section of this chapter), this chapter analyzes the data in a way that emphasizes the double-coordination issue.


### Types of Transitional Groups

With this issue in mind, in Figure 4-3, I slightly change the depiction in Figures 4-1 and 4-2 to convert the intersection of power-sharing and participation into a typology of transitional groups. This requires that I dichotomize each characteristic into two rough categories: On the participation dimension, a transitional group can have *either* restricted *or* broad composition; on the power-sharing dimension, a transitional group can be *either* non-power-sharing *or* power-sharing. Within each quadrant, I name the transitional group that exemplifies the particular power-sharing/participation intersection point.

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<sup>151</sup> Note that discussing any type of preferences “of a TG” is rife with aggregation issues. A TG is made up of individuals, each with their own preferences. A TG is also made up, however, of groups of individuals with some set of similar preferences. By focusing on groups rather than individuals, I am making an assumption about the similarity of individual preferences within a group (e.g., the military or the previous regime). This assumption becomes less believable as the groups within the TG become more heterogeneous. Imagine, for instance, a case in which numerous newly-formed political parties or civil society groups coalesce into one “opposition” negotiating body. Despite agreeing to form a united front, each of the groups within the “opposition” has its own set of, potentially quite divergent, preferences. In addition to aggregation issues, the preferences of all actors (individuals and groups) may change over time. Because actors at the beginning of the transitional period are stuck with making decisions based in large part on their prior knowledge (Hardin 1997: 16), as knowledge becomes more open in a transitional setting, their interests may shift—and this shift could reflect in facilitating more open or more closed politics. I therefore leave questions regarding actors’ preferences as an open question for future research.

Figure 4-3. Typology of transitional groups (TGs), based on levels of inclusiveness.<sup>152</sup>



Notice that I italicize the dichotomous classifications along each axis and list the four transitional group categories in grey boxes within each quadrant. These dichotomous categories are, of course, an explicit simplification of reality; I utilize them to reduce the dimensionality in order to more easily conduct empirical comparisons. In what follows, I will contrast the types of transitional group to highlight that, despite the similar stated goal of leading to elections across group types, these rough binary distinctions lead to differing theoretical expectations regarding the extent of regime change.

Starting at the top right, comprehensive TGs appear in the most unquestionably inclusive quadrant above, exhibiting both a broad composition and a power-sharing structure. Despite their all-inclusive nature, and looking to the left of the y-axis, regime change prospects may suffer in comprehensive groups compared to selective groups. This expectation relies on the idea that comprehensive TGs are more likely to suffer from severe coordination problems than selective TGs. These coordination problems may increase the TG's duration of time in power due to prolonged bargaining efforts, effectively delaying regime change by creating an environment that is too factionalized to efficiently transfer power to a new regime.

<sup>152</sup> Note that, because this typology is based in ideas of group composition, it can encompass not only the restrictive variety of transitional groups (*TG-restrictive*), but can also accommodate the two types of transitional groups that do not meet the restrictive coding definition identified in Chapter Two: (1) transitional groups that focus on debate, existing simultaneously with a previously-elected parliament (those added with the *TG-moderately permissive* coding classification) and (2) transitional groups that focus solely on constitution-writing (those added with the *TG-permissive* coding classification).


Compared to comprehensive TGs, and looking below the x-axis, pluralistic TGs may have less difficulty in reaching consensus because, while they maintain a broad composition, they lack a power-sharing structure. This non-power-sharing structure may simplify the coordination issues faced in a comprehensive group, allowing a single actor (or a group of actors) to maintain control over the speed and efficacy of the reform process. At the same time as simplifying the decision-making process, however, a pluralistic TG retains a diverse composition of actors, enabling broad-based deliberation over reform proposals. This combination of many actors, few decision-makers may enhance prospects for regime change by increasing the likelihood of debate and diverse input during the transitional period while simultaneously decreasing the likelihood of stalled progress on reforms.

The opposite combination of few actors, multiple decision-makers—the power-sharing/participatory intersection point for selective TGs—may also, similar to pluralistic TGs, enhance regime change prospects by reducing the coordination problems that plague comprehensive TGs. Dissimilar to pluralistic TGs, however, selective TGs reduce coordination issues by restricting the diversity of forces included in the group. By contending with fewer actors, selective groups potentially reduce the number of disparate reform proposals and decrease the likelihood of encountering difficulties in converging on a path forward. While it is true that selective TGs face the same daunting task as do comprehensive TGs of fostering agreement on reform among near-equal actors due to their power-sharing structure, their restricted composition may reduce the set of viable reform initiatives to contend with during the transitional period. This simplification may provide selective TGs with clearer and more pointed reform proposals, offering better prospects for regime change than comprehensive TGs.

Exclusionary TGs make up the final category in Figure 4-3. These are groups with both a restricted composition and a non-power-sharing structure. This homogeneity may increase the likelihood of speedy or unopposed reform, decreasing coordination issues and providing the best prospects for regime change.

To summarize, unlike the conceptual schemes in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, which focused on the existence of transitional groups and the timing of transitional group formation, Figure 4-4 illustrates the appropriate conceptual scheme for the remaining portion of this chapter, highlighting the variation that exists within cases with transitional groups.

Figure 4-4. Conceptual schema mapping variations within potential regime transition cases with transitional groups (TGs).



## Inclusive Transitional Groups in Practice

While my theoretical expectations outlined in the previous section regarding coordination issues apply to regime change in general, the initial question of this chapter was the following: Do inclusive transitional groups promote *democratization*?

The following sub-sections tackle that question. First, I describe the data collection and coding process for transitional group composition.<sup>153</sup> Second, I analyze the 70 cases of the restrictive variety of transitional groups in the dataset described in Chapter Two.

### Participatory Dimension of Transitional Group (TG) Composition

To measure the participatory dimension of TG composition, I collect data on the *number of members* included in the TG. While in most cases this data collection process is straightforward, there are two important qualifications to note.<sup>154</sup>

First, the numbers that I report refer to the *initial* size of the TG.<sup>155</sup> This number may include solely executive branch members, such as in Madagascar's 44-member High Transitional Authority in 2009.<sup>156</sup> While occurring less commonly, this number may also include only legislative branch members, if a transitional legislature is the innovative transitional group. For example, soon after Liamine Zéroual became head of Algeria's collective presidency known as the High Council of State in early 1994 (a group that had been in power since a coup d'état forced President Chadli Bendjedid to resign two years earlier), he appointed a legislature called the National Transitional Council. With membership divided according to a quota system, this 190-member body was inaugurated for a three-year transitional period, making it the innovative TG in this case.<sup>157</sup> At times, the initial TG size may also include a combination of members from both

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<sup>153</sup> I provide a tabular summary of the data in Appendix 4A.

<sup>154</sup> In reporting the TG size, I verify the number of members across a minimum of two sources. At times, sources disagree on the total number of members included. When such a situation occurs, I use the most commonly-reported value (which must appear in at least two sources).

<sup>155</sup> Note that by reporting the initial TG size, I am ignoring shifts that occur over time. Because the type of TG may change over time due to these alterations, however, I also collect data on any shifts in the initial TG's size and composition. I do not report these shifts in detail in this chapter because, of the 70 cases of the restrictive variety of transitional group (*TG-restrictive*), only the following 14 experience composition shifts over time: Afghanistan 1992; Algeria 1992; Burundi 1987; Cambodia 1991; Chad 1990; Fiji 1987; Guinea 1990; Haiti 2004; Kosovo 1999; Liberia 1990, 1993; Nepal 2002; Nigeria 1993; and Romania 1989. In ten of these cases, the shift is an increase in the number of members included in the TG, but this shift does not change the TG type. For example, two months after the inauguration of Afghanistan's comprehensive TG on April 28, 1992, the group size increased by 15, yet remained a power-sharing (and thus comprehensive) group. And, in two of these cases, the shift is a decrease in the number of members included in the TG, but again, this shift does not change the TG type. Chad's pluralistic TG (initially inaugurated on December 4, 1990), for example, remained pluralistic after the March 5, 1991 two-member decrease in size. In total, then, 12 out of 14 shifted TG cases do not experience a shift in the TG type. The remaining two cases are Guinea 1990 and Nepal 2002. In Guinea, on January 9, 1992, the comprehensive TG experienced a 21-member decrease in size, which moved it to a selective TG. In Nepal, just over one month after creating an exclusionary TG on October 11, 2002, King Gyanendra shifted to a selective TG by adding technocrats, civil society members, businessmen, and leaders of small parties (and expanded the group size by 13). I report these shifts in Appendix 4B.

<sup>156</sup> When created, the High Transitional Authority did not include a transitional legislature. It was more than 18 months before the 256-member Transitional Congress and 90-member Higher Transitional Council were established.


<sup>157</sup> The cases in which a legislative body is the sole TG—details of which can be found in Coding Appendix A—are the following: Benin 1989; Congo-Brazzaville 1990; Congo-Kinshasa 1990; Lesotho 1990, 1991; Niger 1991; South Africa 1990; and Togo 1991.

the executive and legislative branches. In such a case, the size reported reflects the summation of the members in the two branches. This frequently (though not always) occurs in TGs created out of internationally-mediated peace agreements, such as the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (signed in 2000), the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement for the Democratic Republic of Congo (signed in 2002), and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan (signed in 2005). In each of these instances, the peace agreement sets out specific quotas for sharing power in both the executive and legislative branches of government.<sup>158</sup>

Second, while TGs may include members of either or both the legislative and executive branches, they may not include members of the judiciary. I exclude these potential members from the TG size because (1) the judicial branch’s involvement is inconsistently reported across cases and (2) it is uncommon that the judiciary has autonomous reform-making powers.<sup>159</sup>

Considering these caveats,<sup>160</sup> I use the size data as a way to measure the participatory dimension of TG composition. To differentiate between broad and restricted composition, I compute the median value for TG sizes (median = 27.5). While this size cut-off between restricted and broad composition may seem artificial, I choose the median rather than the mean as a threshold because several large outliers pull the mean up to a much higher value of 62.4. This is a problematic discrepancy because, for instance, the Transitional Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (stemming from the aforementioned Global and All-Inclusive Agreement) contained a total of 686 members. This massive transitional body consisted of over 200 more members than the next largest group (Sudan’s 2005 Government of National Unity). Using the median, then, provides a more accurate representation of the distribution’s central tendency. I illustrate this distribution in Figure 4-5 below, with the median marked with a red vertical line.

Figure 4-5. Histogram of transitional group size across the 70 cases in the dataset.



<sup>158</sup> The other cases in which both a legislative and executive body make up the TG—again, details of which can be found in Coding Appendix A—are the following: Eritrea 1991; Ethiopia 1991; Georgia 1992; Liberia 1990, 1993; Madagascar 1990; and Malawi 1992.

<sup>159</sup> Consider, for example, Liberia’s 1990 Interim National Unity Government, which included a five-member judiciary. While this judicial component existed as part of the TG set-up, all real power fell within the purview of the 35-member legislature and five-member executive branch.

<sup>160</sup> For an itemized list of data collection issues, please see Appendix 4C.

## Power-Sharing Dimension of Transitional Group (TG) Composition

To measure the power-sharing dimension of TG composition, I collect data on the *types of members* included in the TG. Unlike the participatory dimension that focuses on size alone, the power-sharing dimension asks the following questions: Does the TG contain a variety of members that represent different aspects of society? Are these members' voices strong enough to be heard within the TG? Does one group dominate or is there a power-sharing structure?

Because sources report widely differing levels of specificity about the types of members within TGs, I begin by considering whether a TG contains *any* members of the following four groups: prior regime officials, the military, organized opposition forces, or civil society. In order to have a power-sharing structure, at a minimum, a TG must contain members from at least two groups. Recall the Gambian example from the previous section, in which a five-member, militarily-composed Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council took power after the overthrow of Dawda Jawara in 1994. This example shows a non-power-sharing TG composed of members from only one of the four groups listed above.<sup>161</sup>

While the Gambian case clearly illustrates a non-power-sharing structure, simply having more than one group represented in a TG is not enough to indicate power-sharing. In addition, it is necessary that one group does not completely dominate. To understand the potential lack of power-sharing among TGs that include actors from at least two of the four groups of interest, consider Sierra Leone in 1992. After overthrowing Joseph Saidu Momoh in a military coup d'état, Valentine Strasser established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), which included 18 military officers and four civilians. This military-dominated junta dissolved parliament, banned all political parties, limited freedoms, and enacted a rule-by-decree policy, with military interests dominating over the included civilians. Despite the inclusion of two groups within the TG, this Sierra Leonean case exhibited no power-sharing.

To reflect concerns over one dominating actor, my coding process for power-sharing includes two additional conditions. First, a power-sharing TG must contain more than one or a few token members from a certain category. Fiji's 2000 interim government, for instance, consisted of 32 military-backed members and, among those, included only one opposition member and two members of the former coalition government. These token opposition and prior regime members did not represent a large enough portion of the TG to make meaningful reform contributions. Therefore, in order to ensure that a group contains a substantial number of members of all categories included, I only code power-sharing groups as those in which no category contains more than 75 percent of members.

Second, actors within a power-sharing TG need to enjoy more wide-ranging powers than only being able to make recommendations. Recall again from the previous section that Georgia's 1992 TG included an executive three-member Military Council and a legislative 40-member Political Consultative Council, but the Military Council only granted the legislative branch the right to make recommendations. Despite the fact that the Political Consultative Council included both organized opposition and civil society members, this action left real power in the military members' hands, and thus made the TG non-power-sharing.


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<sup>161</sup> Note that this logic applies not only to cases in which all TG members come from the military, though such situations are common occurrences in the wake of coups d'état. As an example of a non-power-sharing TG with no military members, consider Roza Otunbayeva's provisional government after the overthrow of Kurmanbek Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. This TG was filled only with organized opposition members who had rallied around Otunbayeva before and during the mass protests that forced Bakiyev's departure from power.

As with the participatory dimension of TG composition, there is at least one important note about the coding process for the power-sharing dimension. Namely, power-sharing does not prohibit the exclusion of some group from a TG. In the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) in 2001, for instance, the 30-member interim council contained a variety of opposition and civil society members—including an array of different ethnicities, with 11 Pashtuns, eight Tajiks, five Shi’a Hazara, three Uzbeks, and the remainder drawn from other minorities—yet explicitly excluded the Taliban from participating. Because power-sharing existed among the other members, despite the Taliban’s exclusion, I code the AIA as a TG with a power-sharing structure.

With that qualification in mind, from the coding procedures outlined above for both the participatory and power-sharing dimensions of TG composition, I separate the 70 cases of TGs into the four theoretical types: comprehensive TGs, with a broad composition and a power-sharing structure; selective TGs, with a restricted composition and a power-sharing structure; pluralistic TGs, with a broad composition and a non-power-sharing structure; and exclusionary TGs, with a restricted composition and a non-power-sharing structure. Figure 4-6 illustrates the number and percentage of each type in the dataset.

Figure 4-6. Distribution of transitional groups, by type.



*Notes:* This figure shows the number of each type of transitional group in the dataset using the restrictive coding classification for transitional groups (*TG-restrictive*). I list the corresponding percentages in parentheses, which are calculated by dividing the respective number of transitional groups by 70.

Figure 4-6 shows that comprehensive TGs appear most frequently in the dataset, making up 38.6 percent of TG cases. Selective TGs make up the second largest category, though exclusionary TGs occur in only one fewer case, with both types of TGs existing in approximately one-fourth of cases. Pluralistic TGs occur least frequently, making up just over 11 percent of TG cases. With this data in hand, I turn now to investigating the main question: What impact does a TG’s level of inclusiveness have on its democratization prospects?

## Power-Sharing and Democratization

To begin compiling evidence relating to this question, I analyze aggregate descriptive statistics about the differences in the extent and direction of regime change across the four types of transitional groups (TGs) using annual country-level data from the Freedom House organization. This data includes two measures relating to political regime, political rights and civil liberties, each of which ranges from one (most democratic) to seven (most authoritarian). Table 4-1 presents two sets of average differences in political regime movement across these measures: First, in columns two and three, the table shows the difference between one year before and one year after the formation of the TG; second, in columns four and five, the table shows the difference between one year before and five years after the formation of the TG.<sup>162</sup> A cell showing a negative difference indicates a move toward more open politics; a cell showing a positive difference shows a move toward more closed politics.

Table 4-1. Change in the average extent and direction of regime change across types of transitional groups (TGs), one and five years after the formation of the TG.

	<i>One-year difference</i>		<i>Five-year difference</i>	
	<i>Political rights</i>	<i>Civil liberties</i>	<i>Political rights</i>	<i>Civil liberties</i>
<i>Comprehensive TG</i>	-0.31	-0.73	-1.23	-0.92
<i>Selective TG</i>	-1.18	-0.82	-1.35	-0.88
<i>Pluralistic TG</i>	0.57	0.14	-0.29	-0.57
<i>Exclusionary TG</i>	0.94	0.59	0.24	0.29

*Notes:* Data comes from the Freedom House organization’s “Freedom in the World” report.<sup>163</sup> The number of cases in the dataset ( $N = 70$ ) with a comprehensive TG is 27, with a selective TG is 18, with a pluralistic TG is 8, and with an exclusionary TG is 17. Columns two and three show the following difference between one year before and one year after the formation of the TG:  $FH_{TG+1} - FH_{TG-1}$ . Columns four and five show the difference:  $FH_{TG+5} - FH_{TG-1}$ .

Table 4-1 provides several preliminary insights. First, when looking at the average one-year difference after the formation of a TG (columns two and three), both comprehensive and

<sup>162</sup> There are two differences between the Freedom House results presented in Chapter Three: Table 3-2 and those presented in Table 4-1 here. First, the differences presented in Table 4-1 depend on the year of transitional *group formation*, rather than the year of the transitional *event*. Using the year in which the TG forms is necessary to try to observe the influence of the TG itself, especially in cases of delayed TGs (for a description of delayed TGs, please see Chapter Three). Second, the numbers presented in Table 4-1 are one- and five-year differences, rather than five- and ten-year differences. This choice stems from the Chapter Three finding that—when comparing potential regime transition cases with TGs to potential regime transition cases without TGs—any gains in regime movement toward democracy for TGs appear in the short-term (five-year difference), but disappear in the long-term (ten-year difference).

<sup>163</sup> Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” data is available at <https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VYJerPIViko>. Similar to the procedure used in Chapter Three, to calculate the averages in Table 4-1, I make a few data adjustments. First, when data is missing due to the disintegration of a state or a state’s independence, I fill in missing values with the previously aggregated or occupying state’s scores. For example, in a number of former Soviet Union cases, scores in the year before the formation of the TG are missing, so I replace them with scores for the Soviet Union. In Kosovo, I use scores for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). When examining five-year differences, two cases in the dataset have not yet reached five years since the transitional event: Kyrgyzstan 2010 and Niger 2010. In these cases, I replace what will become the five-year scores with the most recent scores available (scores from 2014).



selective TGs show negative differences across the political rights and civil liberties dimensions, meaning that they show moves toward democracy. Contrarily, pluralistic and exclusionary TGs both show positive differences across the political rights and civil liberties dimensions, meaning they show moves toward autocracy. The power-sharing structure of comprehensive and selective TGs appears to bode well for quick regime change in a democratic direction.

Second, however, within this power-sharing category there is an apparent difference: Selective TGs, with their restricted composition, make larger moves toward democracy than comprehensive TGs, at least in terms of political rights. This finding follows the theoretical expectation outlined above that the broad composition of comprehensive TGs may induce coordination problems, making regime change more difficult.


Third, and while remaining in this comparative framework, when examining the non-power-sharing structure inherent in pluralistic and exclusionary TGs, exclusionary TGs show larger moves toward autocracy across both political rights and civil liberties. This, again, follows the theoretical expectations outlined above. Exclusionary TGs suffer from fewer coordination problems, which makes regime change easier—it just happens to be the case that the type of regime change runs counter to democracy.


Fourth, looking instead at the average five-year differences after the formation of a TG (columns four and five), the trend of exclusionary TGs moving toward autocracy—or, alternatively, performing poorly in terms of democratic gains—continues. In these columns, exclusionary TGs show autocratic backsliding while pluralistic TGs join comprehensive and selective TGs in showing moves toward democracy. Despite their non-power-sharing structure, perhaps over time the broad composition of pluralistic TGs helps states move toward open politics.

Given the consistent negative differences across comprehensive and selective TGs, the preliminary findings in Table 4-1 suggest that the power-sharing dimension of TG composition may be crucially important for the direction of regime change, especially in the very short-term. In addition, however, the averages within the sets of power-sharing or non-power-sharing TGs offer evidence of substantial differences across the participation dimension.

To provide a slightly different visualization of this point, consider the two charts in Figure 4-7. These charts use Freedom House’s rankings on political rights and civil liberties to illustrate the proportion of each TG type that shows movement toward autocracy (a positive change in the ranking), shows no movement (a change of zero in the ranking), or shows movement toward democracy (a negative change in the ranking).

Figure 4-7. Five-year regime change across transitional group types.





*Notes:* The number of TGs differs across types, with 27 comprehensive TGs, 18 selective TGs, 8 pluralistic TGs, and 17 exclusionary TGs ( $N=70$ ). The three bars for each TG type in each chart (autocratic movement, no movement, and democratic movement) sum to one.

Of particular note from these charts, first, across both political rights and civil liberties, selective TGs have the largest proportion of cases showing moves toward autocracy, despite their power-sharing structure.<sup>164</sup> Second, pluralistic TGs exhibit a higher proportion of cases moving toward democracy in terms of political rights and civil liberties than either comprehensive or selective TGs, despite their non-power-sharing structure. Considering only the power-sharing dimension of inclusion is thus an inadequate way to assess the impact of TG composition on regime change prospects; the participatory dimension of inclusion also matters.

While these descriptive results verify the need for a two-dimensional understanding of inclusion, they simultaneously suffer from problems of endogeneity and omitted variable bias. To bolster the findings, I therefore run a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions with one- and five-year differences in Freedom House scores as the dependent variables of interest.

In Table 4-2, I present the coefficients for the main covariate of interest across four sets of OLS regressions, with each set of models indicated both in column one and by the alternating row shading. In model set one, the covariate of interest is the participatory dimension of TG composition: TG size. In model set two, the covariate of interest is the power-sharing dimension of TG composition: a dichotomous measure of power-sharing. In model set three, the covariate of interest is the interaction of the participatory and power-sharing dimensions. Finally, in model set four, the covariate of interest is the categorical variable TG type: comprehensive, selective, pluralistic, or exclusionary (with exclusionary as the omitted category). In total, with four sets of models and four dependent variables, Table 4-2 presents the coefficients for the covariates of interest from 16 OLS regressions. I include Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses and bold any significant results.

In addition to the covariate of interest in each model, I attempt to reduce concerns over omitted variable bias by including six control variables in each of the 16 models, lagging any that vary over time by one year.<sup>165</sup> First, I include a measure of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. Second, I include a measure of prior

<sup>164</sup> Four selective TGs show five-year moves toward autocracy in terms of political rights: Gabon 1990, Guinea-Bissau 1998, Haiti 1990, and Niger 1991. Three selective TGs show five-year moves toward autocracy in terms of civil liberties: Comoros 1991, Haiti 1990, and Iraq 2003.

<sup>165</sup> Of course, with observational data, it is never possible to control for all confounding variables.

levels of electoral democracy, also from the V-Dem project.<sup>166</sup> Third, I include a measure of conflict intensity, which comes from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.<sup>167</sup> Fourth, I include regional controls. Scholars commonly cite each of these variables as influencing democratization prospects,<sup>168</sup> and it is likely that they also influence the formation and functioning of TGs.

The events leading to a TG's formation also crucially matter, as they influence who decides on the makeup of a TG's composition. I therefore include a fifth variable that controls for the type of transitional event leading to the formation of the TG. As a reminder from Chapter Two, the five types of transitional events are (1) military coup d'état, (2) civil war, (3) international intervention, (4) involuntary reform (i.e., reform forced by citizen protest), and (5) voluntary reform (i.e., reform initiated from within the existing regime leadership). Finally, I include a sixth control variable based on my Chapter Three finding that, among cases with long transitional periods, TGs that experience delays following a transitional event have higher average election quality. I therefore include the amount of TG delay as a control variable, measured as the number of days from the transitional event to the formation of the TG.<sup>169</sup>

Table 4-2. Coefficients for transitional group (TG) participation: size, TG power-sharing, the interaction of size and power-sharing, and TG type.

Set of Models	Covariate of Interest	Dependent Variable			
		one-year change in political rights	one-year change in civil liberties	five-year change in political rights	five-year change in civil liberties
One	TG size	0.0001 (0.001)	-0.0007 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.0008 (0.001)
Two	power-sharing	<b>-1.34**</b> <b>(0.54)</b>	<b>-1.08***</b> <b>(0.38)</b>	<b>-1.56***</b> <b>(0.45)</b>	-0.74 (0.44)
Three	TG size	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.02)
	power-sharing	<b>-2.23***</b> <b>(0.67)</b>	<b>-1.52**</b> <b>(0.70)</b>	<b>-2.45**</b> <b>(1.08)</b>	<b>-1.39*</b> <b>(0.72)</b>
	TG size*power-sharing	<b>0.05*</b> <b>(0.03)</b>	0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.05)	0.03 (0.02)
Four	TG type: comprehensive	-1.01 (0.69)	<b>-1.05*</b> <b>(0.55)</b>	<b>-1.70**</b> <b>(0.68)</b>	-0.88 (0.55)
	TG type: selective	<b>-1.96***</b> <b>(0.50)</b>	<b>-1.23**</b> <b>(0.50)</b>	<b>-1.59**</b> <b>(0.60)</b>	-0.91 (0.61)
	TG type: pluralistic	-0.25 (0.71)	-0.15 (0.54)	-0.33 (0.72)	-0.57 (0.50)

<sup>166</sup> The V-Dem data is available at <https://v-dem.net/en/data/>. This variable is called “v2x\_polyarchy.”

<sup>167</sup> This data is available at [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp\\_prio\\_armed\\_conflict\\_dataset/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/).

<sup>168</sup> For references, please see fn. 101 in Chapter Three.

<sup>169</sup> I perform a number of robustness checks by substituting variations of these control variables to ensure the results remain consistent. First, I recalculate the transitional group delay variable using the alternative transitional event date, which typically represents an earlier date on which protests within a potential regime transition case began. For details on the alternative event dates, please see Appendix 2A. Second, I replace V-Dem's measure of electoral democracy with a V-Dem measure that measures liberal democracy. Third, I replace the UNDP conflict variable with a measure of the magnitude of civil warfare or violence from Systemic Peace's Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV). In all cases, using the alternative variables produces consistent results. All results are available from the author.

*Notes:* The table shows results from running OLS regression models for the dependent variables of one- and five-year changes in Freedom House's political rights and civil liberties measures, with robust standard errors in parentheses and significant covariates of interest appearing in bold. Each of the OLS regressions includes the following control variables: GDP per capita, prior level of democracy, level of conflict intensity, region, transitional event type, and TG delay (measured as the number of days from the transitional event to the formation of the TG). I lag all time-variant control variables by one year. For transitional event type, international intervention is the omitted category; for TG type, a categorical/factor variable, exclusionary TG is the omitted category.

Table 4-2 bolsters the preliminary results from the average differences presented in Table 4-1 in several ways. First, it shows that the participatory dimension of TG composition, TG size (model set one), never attains statistical significance across the four dependent variables of interest. When considered as the sole indicator of inclusion, the value of the size coefficient across all models is effectively zero.

Second, and on the contrary, the power-sharing dimension of TG composition (model set two), attains a high level of statistical significance across three of the four dependent variables. Despite the coefficient not remaining significant in the five-year difference in civil liberties model, power-sharing consistently exhibits a negative coefficient, meaning that we expect the presence of power-sharing within a TG (a dichotomous variable) to lead to moves toward democracy.

Third, and perhaps unsurprisingly from the first and second results, the interaction of TG size and power-sharing (model set three) is only slightly significant in the model with the dependent variable of one-year change in political rights. What the first three results suggest, then, is that the power-sharing dimension of TG composition has a larger impact on regime change than the participation dimension. By separating TGs into those with a power-sharing and a non-power-sharing structure, I find that, on average, power-sharing TGs move toward democracy more quickly than non-power-sharing TGs. At the maximum, ignoring participation and holding all covariates constant, power-sharing reduces the five-year change in Freedom House's political rights ranking by 1.56. On a seven-point scale, this is a substantively significant reduction.

Yet, fourth, when the covariate of interest is the type of TG, the findings become more interesting and suggest the potential for a remaining role for the participation component of TG composition. Keeping in mind that the reference (omitted) TG category is exclusionary, the results for the fourth set of models indicate that, across all models but one, selective TGs perform significantly better than exclusionary TGs in moving toward democracy. Moreover, in two of the four models, comprehensive TGs perform significantly better than exclusionary TGs in moving toward democracy. This complements the findings above of the importance of power-sharing. However, while both types of power-sharing TGs always have negative coefficient values, selective TGs attain statistical significance and exhibit larger coefficient magnitudes for the dependent variables of one-year change. In a similar (though admittedly weaker) vein, while the pluralistic TG category never attains statistical significance, it shows the expected direction with its negative coefficient, meaning it exhibits moves toward democracy when compared to the exclusionary category.

These results regarding the type of TG therefore lead to further questions: While not as strongly related to regime change as the power-sharing dimension of TG composition, how exactly does the participation dimension influence transitional paths? If we hold the power-sharing dimension constant, does the restricted composition of selective TGs provide an advantage over the broad composition of comprehensive TGs in terms of regime change? And, does restricted composition advantage exclusionary over pluralistic TGs?

## Participation and Democratization

The participation dimension of TG composition may not have clear impacts on aggregate political regime movement toward democracy, but the difference between broad and restricted composition TGs has particularly interesting effects on aspects of the electoral, deliberative, and participatory conceptions of democracy. As a brief reminder from Chapter One, an electoral conception of democracy focuses on making rulers responsive to citizens through periodic competition for elected office, a deliberative conception stresses that political decisions in pursuit of the public good should be informed by respectful and reasonable dialogue at all levels (Lindberg, et al. 2014), and a participatory conception values expansive representation, direct rule, and active participation by citizens in all political processes (Pateman 1970).

As I argue in Chapter Three, a reason that potential regime transition cases with TGs show short-term democratization gains over cases without TGs is the TG focus on reaching elections. And, based on the theoretical expectations from this chapter, whether a TG has a broad or restricted composition should influence how difficult it is to organize elections. With a broad composition, coordination issues may multiply, extending the length of time required to make electoral decisions and resulting in more hotly debated contests. As I will show below, three election characteristics differ on the participation dimension of TG composition: (1) the occurrence of a presidential election, (2) the duration of time from the formation of a TG to the first national election, and (3) whether parties accept the first election results. To preview the bottom line for democratization: The choice regarding a TG's composition induces trade-offs between the three conceptions of democracy, and interim leaders may have to sacrifice certain parts of democracy to attain others.

First, if we examine a summary of the percentage of TG cases holding any national election (either parliamentary or presidential), the results vary only slightly across the types of TG. The first row of Table 4-3 presents this summary.

Table 4-3. Election outcomes across transitional group types, in percentages.

	<i>Type of Transitional Group</i>			
	<i>Comprehensive (broad)</i>	<i>Selective (restricted)</i>	<i>Pluralistic (broad)</i>	<i>Exclusionary (restricted)</i>
<i>Either parliamentary or presidential elections</i>	81.5 (27)	94.4 (18)	87.5 (8)	82.4 (17)
<i>Both parliamentary and presidential elections</i>	81.8 (22)	52.9 (17)	85.7 (7)	64.3 (14)

*Notes:* This table includes the number of cases for each cell in parentheses beneath the percentage. The first row provides the percentage of cases within each TG type that reach *any* national election. The second row shows, out of the cases that hold either a parliamentary or presidential election, the percentage within each TG type that reaches *both* parliamentary *and* presidential elections.

While selective TGs exhibit the highest percentage of cases reaching either parliamentary or presidential national elections, the difference across the participation dimension of composition—between broad, comprehensive and pluralistic TGs, and restricted, selective and exclusionary TGs—is not significant.<sup>170</sup>


<sup>170</sup> In a t-test comparison of the proportion of broad and restricted composition TGs holding *any* national election, the t-test produces a test statistic of 0.68, with a corresponding p-value of 0.50.

There is, however, a statistically significant difference across broad and restricted composition TGs in terms of whether TGs hold *both* parliamentary and presidential elections, the summary of which appears in the second row of Table 4-3. TGs with a broad composition hold *both* types of elections more frequently than TGs with a restricted composition. Because nearly all TG cases hold parliamentary elections, what these numbers effectively show is that TGs with a restricted composition are significantly less likely to hold presidential elections than TGs without a restricted composition.<sup>171</sup>

What does this first result tell us about democratization? As Shain and Linz (1995) explain, if a state chooses to hold a presidential election, it legitimates the winner to hold power for a fixed period of time independently of the confidence of a conference. And, as opposed to states that dole out executive power on the basis of parliamentary elections, presidential elections can decrease flexibility in government and risk the creation of overly-powerful executives (Linz and Valenzuela 1994). Because much evidence points to the presence of presidential elections as boding worse for democratization prospects than parliamentary elections (Bunce 2000), this result illustrates an interesting trade-off: Restricted composition TGs may enhance electoral democracy while simultaneously diminishing aspects of deliberative and participatory democracy through limitations on the number of actors allowed to negotiate within the TG.

Reinforcing this trade-off, the second statistically significant difference along the participation dimension of TG composition appears when examining the duration of time from the formation of the TG until the first national election. Figure 4-8, looking only at cases that hold elections ( $N=60$ ),<sup>172</sup> presents side-by-side boxplots of duration across the four types of TGs.

Figure 4-8. Shortest duration from a transitional group’s (TG’s) formation to a national election, across types of TGs.



*Notes:* This figure presents a boxplot comparison of the four types of TGs. The red points identify four outliers in the data and I list case identifiers to the right of each point.

<sup>171</sup> The t-test comparison of the proportion of broad and restricted composition TGs holding *presidential* elections produces a test statistic of -2.15, with a corresponding p-value of 0.04.

<sup>172</sup> The nine transitional group cases that do not have a national election before a new transitional event occurs are the following: Afghanistan 1992, Algeria 1992, Congo-Kinshasa 1990, Guinea-Bissau 1998, Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) 2003, Lesotho 1993 (1990), Liberia 1990, Nepal 2002, and Sierra Leone 1992. The final case, Eritrea 1993 (1991), has never (as of January 1, 2016) had a direct national election.

This figure shows substantial differences across the types of TGs, but the main separation clusters along the participation dimension. Despite the three outliers that appear in the restricted composition categories, one of which is exceedingly large (Rwanda 1994), the broad composition TGs have a much higher mean duration until the first national election: 930 versus 578 days. This average difference between TG formation and the earliest national election across broad and restricted composition TGs of nearly one year (352 days) is statistically significant.<sup>173</sup> As expected based on the theoretical argument for coordination problems, TGs with a large number or wide variety of participants take longer to organize and hold national elections.

And, based on the findings explicated in Chapter Three, taking an especially long time to hold national elections can have negative outcomes on democratization prospects. While not limiting who is represented in the dialogue within a TG, a positive note for leaders prioritizing deliberative and participatory conceptions of democracy, broad composition TGs may face the trade-off that long durations until elections hinder movement toward electoral democracy.

Building on the second result, the third statistically significant difference between broad and restricted composition TGs demonstrates exactly this point: Broad composition TGs perform worse in terms of election outcomes. In particular, utilizing a measure of whether losing parties and candidates accept the national election results within three months,<sup>174</sup> broad composition TGs exhibit a mean value of -0.25 while restricted composition TGs have a mean value of 0.11. The varying direction of these values indicates that restricted composition TGs perform significantly better in terms of parties accepting the election results. This reinforces the trade-off I highlight above: Though deemphasizing aspects of deliberative and participatory democracy by limiting actor dialogue within the TG, restricted composition TGs appear to enhance electoral democracy.

To summarize, while the prior sub-section demonstrated that the power-sharing dimension of TG composition is a consistently significant determinant of democratization prospects and the participation dimension of composition is not, I argue that, in fact, ignoring the participation dimension of TG composition is a mistake. This is because the difference between restricted and broad composition induces trade-offs between aspects of electoral, deliberative, and participatory democracy, and an interim leader's choice over which conception of democracy to prioritize crucially impacts the extent and direction of regime change.

## Discussion

Beyond illustrating the importance of the participation component of transitional group (TG) composition through statistically significant results, to understand its influence on a TG's prospects for regime change, we must consider it in relation to a TG's power-sharing or non-power-sharing structure. That is, we must consider the actors involved in the TG and ask: *Given a TG's position on the power-sharing dimension, how might the participation dimension influence regime change prospects?*

The problem with asking such a question is that the sample sizes for each TG type are very small, making statistical inference difficult. In this section, I therefore return to the dissertation's


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<sup>173</sup> The t-test comparison of the mean duration until the first national election for broad and restricted composition TGs produces a test statistic of -2.25, with a corresponding p-value of 0.03.

<sup>174</sup> This data comes from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, available at <https://v-dem.net/en/data/>. The variable "v2elaccept" takes on ordinal responses ranging from a value of zero ("none of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results of the election, or all opposition was banned") to a value of four ("all parties and candidates accepted the results"). The ordinal measure is then converted to an interval scale via a Bayesian measurement model.

overall schema of potential regime transitions (first presented in Figure 1-1) and introduce the final path: sequential TGs, in which cases that initially exhibit a TG replace it with a new and distinct TG and/or add complementary bodies to the existing TG to promote institutional development. Figure 4-9 illustrates this path.

Figure 4-9. Paths of potential regime transition: sequential transitional groups.



I use this path to touch on the importance of the actors involved in the TGs and expand on the problems that plague exclusionary TGs, those with both a broad composition and power-sharing structure, and comprehensive TGs, those with both a broad composition and power-sharing structure. I begin by considering the difficulties that can arise for different types of TGs within one country. Algeria provides such a comparison, with an exclusionary TG in 1992, followed by a pluralistic TG, and then a comprehensive TG in 1994. For a list of all potential regime transition cases that have sequential TGs that differ in terms of the power-sharing/participation quadrant, please see Appendix 4B.

On January 11, 1992, shortly after the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) dominated a first round of legislative elections in Algeria, members of President Chedli Bendjedid's cabinet conducted a military coup d'état. After the coup, the second round of elections was cancelled; parliament was dissolved; Bendjedid was forced to resign; and the FIS was banned, many members were arrested, and an FIS-led insurgency against the government began. The coup leaders appointed Sid Ahmed Ghazali as head of a six-member advisory body of military officials called the High Security Council (or Higher Security Council, HCS). The HCS then established an exclusionary TG called the High Council of State (HCE), a five-member collective presidency under the chairmanship of Mohamed Boudiaf.

The HCE suspended the constitution, but gave itself a mandate to rule only until 1993, after which it was to hand power over to a transitional government and resume the democratic process (Widner 2004). What precisely the HCE's goal was in the meantime is unclear, but what is certain is that it made no effort to hold elections. The exclusionary TG faced no coordination difficulties and easily pushed regime change in an autocratic direction.

Then, however, the HCE created a sequential TG in order to fill the existing legislative vacuum by unilaterally creating a National Consultative Council (CCN) composed of 60 business leaders, journalists, and academics (Martinez 1998). With the creation of the CCN, the HCE's exclusionary TG shifted to a pluralistic TG; the HCE was still firmly in charge, retaining its non-power-sharing structure, but its added participants shifted it from restricted to broad composition.

Did this sequencing offer any moves toward more open politics, the initial stated goal of the HCE? After contradicting its original, self-imposed mandate and extending the state of



emergency in February 1993—therefore prolonging its own time in power—the HCE did further expand representation in its transitional bodies. First, it formed a Committee of National Dialogue to negotiate an agreement on Algeria’s political future among the legal political parties, labor organizations, trade, and professional groups (Lansford 2013). Second, it attempted to hold a “national consensus” or “national dialogue” conference in January 1994 to appoint a president to succeed the HCE. In both cases, however, because the committees refused to allow the previous election-winners, the FIS, to join the negotiations (instead labeling all FIS members as fundamentalist terrorists), they alienated many remaining political and civil society groups and caused nearly all political parties to boycott the proceedings. The January 1994 conference, in fact, was attended only by some trade unions and minor interest groups (Metz 1994).

While perhaps expanding the amount of deliberative and participatory democracy slightly, the HCE’s stronghold over the pluralistic TG only left it with the option to move forward by choosing a new president from within the HCS/HCE ranks (that is, from within the military-dominated TG).

And choose a new president, it did. On January 31, 1994, Major General Liamine Zéroual officially took over and the HCE dissolved. Little did prior HCS/HCE leaders realize, however, that only one week after taking over Zéroual would announce a major change in strategy with his desire for a “dialogue that excluded no one” (Roberts 2003). He opened discussions with the FIS, announced his intentions to hold a national dialogue, attempted to release FIS leaders from prison, and embarked on a number of (mostly unsuccessful) attempts at dialogue with various parties (Stone 1997). Importantly, on May 18, 1994, he shut down the previously appointed National Consultative Council (CCN) and appointed a new transitional body called the National Transitional Council (CNT).

The CNT was a comprehensive TG, inaugurated for a three-year transitional period, with 190 members divided according to a quota system between the government, trade unions, political parties, and professional, social, and cultural organizations (Hill 2009). Despite the fact that the size could have been even larger had several political parties chosen not to boycott this council, even with the included members the CNT faced numerous delays and debates and was unable to agree on resolutions to address major problems plaguing Algerian society. Perhaps most notably, military hardliners and more moderate CNT members could not agree on a national reconciliation pact with the FIS and, after Zéroual was elected president in 1995, disagreed on constitutional amendments regarding strong presidential powers, the banning of religious political parties (Lansford 2013), and various facets of the electoral law such as the creation of a proportional voting system (Joffé 1998), rules governing pre-election air time on radio and television (Kaplan and Yacoubian 1997), and the setting up of multiple, independent, multi-party election monitoring commissions (NDI 1997). With deep divisions rampant within this comprehensive TG, legislative elections did not take place until June 1997.

What this three-part Algerian comparison illustrates is (1) how an exclusionary TG faces few coordination difficulties and can quickly complete regime change (in this case, in an autocratic direction), (2) how the success of sequential TGs depends fundamentally on the most powerful actors involved, and (3) how comprehensive TGs can face major delays when members disagree.

But, what about the transitional path of sequential TGs more generally? Among cases that suffer from severe coordination issues, might sequential TGs help to move along regime change?

Similar to the path of delayed transitional groups that I present in Chapter Three, I now examine sequential TGs as a duration of time among cases with especially long transitional periods. To be consistent with the cutoff I identify in Chapter Three, “especially long transitional

periods” are those greater than 794.7 days. The duration that I examine is the amount of time between the creation of the first transitional group and the creation of the second.<sup>175</sup>

In order to compare across cases, I must take into consideration the length of each case’s transitional period. Among cases with sequential transitional groups that have elections ( $N=15$ ), I therefore compute how far into the transitional period a given case is before it chooses to create a second transitional group. That is, I compute the following: (duration of transitional group one)/(duration of transitional period). Table 4-4 compares the election quality across cases.

Table 4-4. Average level of free and fair elections, across all transitional group (*TG*) cases that reach elections in a duration greater than or equal to 794.7 days.

<i>Type of TG</i>	<i>Average Level of Free and Fair Elections</i>
<i>TG, not sequential</i>	0.29
<i>TG, rapid sequential (&lt;median)</i>	0.24
<i>TG, extended sequential (&gt;median)</i>	0.41

*Notes:* I calculate the average level of free and fair elections using V-Dem’s “Clean Elections Index,” which ranges from zero to one, with one indicating a better quality election. Rows three and four split the sample based on how far into a transitional period a case creates a second transitional group. Row three represents cases that fall below the median value (0.36) while row four represents cases that fall above the median value. To be clear on how I calculate this median, suppose case X has a transitional period of 1000 days. At some point after its transitional event, X creates a transitional group. This group remains in power for 300 days, at which time X creates a second transitional group. X therefore creates a second transitional group 0.30 of the way through its transitional period. After similarly computing a proportion for each case, I calculate the median.

This table illustrates that the average level of free and fair elections among cases with especially long transitional periods changes dramatically depending on the presence of sequential groups. In particular, when a case with a transitional group sequences a second group early on in the transitional period, the average election quality is much lower than when a case sequences a second group later on in the transitional period.

Again, however, because these averages come from very small samples, I now two examples that describe how sequential group timing may impact election quality. The first describes the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) beginning in 1997, a case in which the interim regime created a complementary group a short time into the transitional period, but simply used this as a façade to consolidate—rather than diffuse—power. The second focuses on Iraq beginning in 2003, a case that contrasts the Republic of Congo markedly, as both replacement transitional groups and complementary institutions were created a significant amount of time into the transitional period. In this case, lengthy sequencing allowed for the completion of discrete tasks among groups, while also helping to diffuse power.

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<sup>175</sup> Note that it is theoretically possible for more than two transitional groups to exist in sequence, but it occurs rarely and therefore I limit myself to only the first two transitional groups here.

The situation in the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) beginning in late 1997 is similar in ways to the Nigerian and Gambian cases presented in Chapter Three. In the Congo, following a four-month conflict and Angolan intervention, President Pascal Lissouba—Congo’s first democratically elected president—and his government fell to former President Denis Sassou-Nguesso. On October 25, Sassou-Nguesso declared himself president and subsequently appointed a 33-member Government of National Unity, which included his former prime minister, Bernard Bakan Kolélas, and members of the military. Unlike the Nigerian and Gambian cases, the Sassou-Nguesso government did quickly move to hold discussions on the nature of the transitional period through a National Forum for Reconciliation in January 1998—a meeting reminiscent of the sub-Saharan African national conferences of the early 1990s. While this forum included over 1400 participants, it was dominated by forces loyal to the president. Unsurprisingly, when it declared that elections would not be held for three years and chose a complementary 75-member Transitional National Council (CNT) to replace the existing parliament, it stacked the transitional period institutions with Sassou-Nguesso loyalists (Clark and Decalo 2012). Only 81 days after the creation of the Government of National Unity, the Northerner- and loyalist-dominated CNT formed. By creating the interim legislative body so quickly, Sassou-Nguesso regime was able to consolidate, rather than diffuse, power, with the CNT acting as an “embarrassingly compliant rubber stamp” (Clark 2008: 260). The interim regime remained in control for several years, until low-quality presidential elections were eventually held (with a free and fair index score of 0.13) in March 2002.

Contrasting markedly with the Congolese case, shortly after Baghdad fell to invading forces in early April 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established to govern Iraq. Headed by Paul Bremer and composed mainly of United States’ government workers, the CPA focused on dissolving the Iraqi army, “de-Ba’athifying” the government, and reshaping politics and the economy (Diamond 2005). A few months into its occupying administration tenure, on July 13, 2003, the CPA appointed a 25-member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which was religiously and ethnically diverse—including a number of Iraqi expatriates in addition to former critics of the Hussein regime, and three women—and had the power to advise and nominate Iraqi ministers (Dawisha and Diamond 2006). The IGC additionally had the task of drafting a temporary constitution called the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which was to include a timetable for holding transitional elections, drafting a permanent constitution, and holding elections for a permanent government.

The completion of these discrete tasks meant that after promulgating the interim Constitution of the Iraqi Transitional Administrative Law, both the CPA and IGC could dissolve on June 28, 2004. 351 days into the transitional period, an additional transitional group formed: the 35-member Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) led by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. With an interim constitution and election timetable in place, Allawi was to govern until national elections could be held.

Due to continuing instability and simmering feelings that both the IGC and IIG had not been inclusive enough of the Iraqi population (Papagianni 2006, 2007), the United Nations appointed an additional complementary body called the Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission, which had no ties to political parties and the goal of assisting with elections. Months later, on January 30, 2005, elections were held for a 275-seat Transitional National Assembly (TNA), which subsequently worked on a permanent constitution and approved a new Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG).

With the IIG's governing mandate over, the ITG replaced the IIG in May 2005. After the TNA completed its work, a referendum for the new constitution took place in October 2005 and, two months later, moderate-quality legislative elections (with a free and fair index score of 0.53) were held. In this case, the combination of replacement transitional groups and complementary institutions helped to push Iraq toward elections incrementally, while slowly diffusing power within each iterative government along the way.

## Conclusion

This chapter began by questioning an assumption implicit in the creation of transitional arrangements: Does an "inclusive" transitional group accelerate regime change in a democratic direction? After separating the notion of an "inclusive" TG in two dimensions, power-sharing and participation, I presented four theoretical TG types: comprehensive (power-sharing and broad participation), selective (power-sharing and restricted participation), pluralistic (non-power-sharing and broad participation), and exclusionary (non-power-sharing and restricted participation).

I argued that power-sharing is a crucial component of TG composition, as power-sharing groups accelerate moves toward democracy in the very short term. I additionally argued that participation is a crucial component of TG composition, as it induces trade-offs between electoral, deliberative, and participatory conceptions of democracy. In particular, three election characteristics differ on the participation dimension of TG composition: the occurrence of a presidential election, the duration of time from the formation of a TG to the first national election, and whether parties accept the first election results. Together, these results demonstrate that, within a power-sharing structure, a group that is *not* broadly participatory may perform better in terms of electoral democracy, despite exhibiting less progress in terms of deliberative or participatory democracy.

I then introduced a final path of potential regime transition: sequential TGs. Through several examples, I showed that, depending on the actors included in the transitional group, completely exclusive transitional groups can provide little incentive to transfer power to a popularly-legitimate regime while totally inclusive transitional groups can suffer markedly from coordination problems that increase the transitional group's duration of time in power. When timed properly, sequential TGs can reduce these problems, at least in the sense of producing better quality elections.


Given a power-sharing or non-power-sharing structure, then, the greatest prospects for regime change in a democratic direction through transitional groups may come from *semi*-inclusive transitional groups: (1) groups that are power-sharing, but not participatory or (2) groups that are not power-sharing, but participatory.

## Chapter 5 Conclusion: Between Regimes

This dissertation began with a series of questions: In the wake of a political crisis that signifies a break with an existing political regime, how do states attempt to foster stability from chaos? In particular, what paths do states follow in an attempt to move to a stable political regime? What differentiates cases that successfully complete regime transition from those that do not?

The overriding goal was to specify *what occurs between regimes*; that is the say, to characterize the mechanisms linking the inner-workings of the transitional period between political regimes, the time between the fall of one regime and the rise of another, to the extent of regime change. Figure 5-1 reprints the first diagram presented in the dissertation (Figure 1-1), expanded slightly to include the four types of transitional groups identified in Chapter Four, and provides an overview of the varied transitional paths that exist between regimes.

Figure 5-1. Transitional paths between political regimes.



In this brief concluding chapter, I begin by recapitulating the main findings of the dissertation. I then consider the implications for two out-of-sample, post-2010 cases of potential regime transition. Finally, I suggest several avenues for future research.

### Recapitulation of Findings

I begin by asking a methodological question: How can researchers study the transitional period between regimes? In Chapter Two, I argue that, in order to study characteristics of regime transitions, researchers must shift their focus from ex-post coding based on transition *outcomes* to ex-ante coding of cases with the *potential* for regime transition. I specify a new unit of analysis, “potential regime transition,” which I define as a shift of power away from an incumbent regime. To date this shift in power, I develop a notion of transitional events. Any state that has a transitional event has the *potential* for regime transition. Figure 5-1, then, should perhaps have the more appropriate title “conceptual scheme of potential regime transitions.”

These transitional events occur *prior to*—and, at times, years earlier than—any regime transition outcome, and can take place in either autocratic or democratic regimes. A popular uprising may oust a dictator; a military coup d’état may oust a democratically-elected president. Each is an example of a transitional event, and each leaves a state with the potential to embark on

regime transition. In the former, a successful regime transition would move from an autocratic to a democratic regime; in the latter, a successful regime transition would move from a democratic to an autocratic regime. Such a framework includes *all* potential regime transitions and provides researchers with a consistent, comprehensive, and unbiased sample from which to study how processes within the transitional period influence the extent of regime change.

After specifying this framework, my question shifts: How do the transitional paths within potential regime transition cases vary? I describe how, in between 38.5 and 51.6 percent of cases in my dataset covering the years 1989 to 2010, political actors choose to create a formalized body that I term a “transitional group.” Transitional groups are (1) groups representing a non-continuation of the prior regime, (2) unelected interim bodies that negotiate institutional design, and (3) groups with the goal of arranging a transfer of power through elections. These groups span across potential regime transition cases, but exhibit signs of regional clustering, and are more likely to form if the military controls the regime prior to a transitional event, if political closing occurs before the transitional event, or if the mode of transition is a violent rupture with the previous regime.

By definition, these transitional groups claim the goal of using elections to move states toward democracy. Chapter Three thus investigates this claim, asking: Do transitional groups *actually* accelerate democratic regime change through the holding of free and fair elections?

I find that, while transitional groups accelerate democratic regime change in the short-term, these gains disappear in the long-term. I argue that this discrepancy stems from transitional groups’ short-term focus on elections and, in fact, transitional groups (1) increase the probability of holding a constitutional referendum and (2) increase the duration of time until the first presidential or parliamentary election is held. Each of these processes signals that transitional groups promote the development of consultative and deliberative mechanisms within a polity, positively affecting prospects for democratization in the short-term.

Yet, as this duration until the first national election increases beyond a certain point, potential regime transition cases with transitional groups (3) tend to conduct *lower* quality elections. Through a comparison with potential regime transition cases with delayed transitional groups, I argue that if transitional groups remain in power for too long, their formalized organizational structure can provide a convenient forum not for encouraging the development of deliberative or participatory conceptions of democracy, but for actors wishing to consolidate power in an anti-democratic direction.

Who are these actors? In Chapter Four, I focus on how the composition of transitional groups can impact the extent of regime change. I describe a typology of transitional arrangements in which I separate transitional group composition into two dimensions of inclusivity: power-sharing and participation. I demonstrate that the power-sharing dimension of transitional group composition has a larger impact on regime change than the participation dimension and, on average, power-sharing transitional groups move toward democracy more quickly than non-power-sharing transitional groups.

Utilizing a short-tenure, power-sharing transitional group is not necessarily propitious for regime change toward more open politics, however. The choice of broad versus restricted transitional group composition can crucially influence election prospects, either advancing or hindering the development of electoral democracy. Through a comparison with potential regime transition cases with sequential transitional groups, I show that within a power-sharing structure, a group that *is not* broadly participatory may push for more open politics while a group that *is* broadly participatory may lag due to a lack of coordination among participants. And, within a non-

power-sharing structure, a group that *is* broadly participatory may accelerate moves toward democracy while a group that *is not* broadly participatory may face little incentive to transfer power to a popularly-legitimate regime and thus consolidate power in an autocratic direction.

## Implications: Comparing Two Recent Potential Regime Transition Cases

How do these findings play out in more recent potential regime transition cases? Given that the dataset developed in this dissertation ends in 2010, how does the argument apply to out-of-sample cases? In this section, I briefly consider two such cases: Tunisia and Egypt.

In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the second half of the final month of 2010 marked a momentous sequence of events. On December 17, Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26 year old fruit and vegetable vendor living in the poverty-stricken Tunisian interior city of Sidi Bouzid, self-immolated. Acting out of desperation and protest following the authority's confiscation of his produce and scale, Bouazizi's action sparked lingering mass discontent with inequality, unemployment, food price increases, economic decline, and corruption; his self-immolation catalyzed an uprising that moved from rural areas to the capital, and quickly transformed into the oft-termed "Arab Spring."<sup>176</sup>

In Tunisia and Egypt, these mass uprisings culminated in analogous transitional events: the ouster of a previously-resilient dictator.<sup>177</sup> On January 14, 2011—not even one month after Tunisia's 23-year president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali visited Bouazizi's hospital room in an attempt to quell the uprising, and shortly after he promised 300,000 new jobs and a "national dialogue" to his citizens (Gelvin 2013)—he and his family left Tunisia for Saudi Arabia. Less than one month later, on February 11, Egypt's 29-year president Hosni Mubarak resigned his post, leaving Cairo for the coastal resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh.

With the demise of their respective long-serving dictators, Tunisia and Egypt embarked on potential regime transitions. While each state utilized transitional groups as a way to structure the transitional period, these groups differed dramatically in terms of composition and sequencing. How would we expect these differences to affect the extent and direction of regime change?

### Tunisia's Path during the Transitional Period

On January 15, 2011, one day after Ben Ali's fall, the power to govern as interim president transferred to Fouad Mebazza, former president of the lower house of parliament under Ben Ali. Despite Ben Ali's ouster, Mohamed el-Ghannouchi, Prime Minister of Tunisia since November 17, 1999, retained his position and formed a transitional government. While this transitional government included members of opposition parties—initially, three legal opposition party leaders

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<sup>176</sup> In addition to the citations that follow in the main text, for an overview of the conditions contributing to and paths taken after the uprisings, see (among others) Anderson 2011; Bellin 2012; Shehata 2014; and Brownlee, et al. 2015.

<sup>177</sup> Tunisia and Egypt were not the only North African countries that took part in the so-called "Arab Spring." Libya was another. I do not focus on the Libyan case here for three reasons. First, the sequence of events leading to the execution of nearly 42-year president Muammar Qaddafi took significantly longer than in either Tunisia or Egypt (he was killed on October 20, 2011). Second, the process included not only mass protests, but an armed insurrection, a NATO intervention, the creation of countless militias, and tens of thousands of civilian deaths. It was only after months of fighting (on August 23, 2011) that rebel forces overtook the Libyan capital, Tripoli. Third, as of April 2016, it remains unclear who is in charge in Libya, as three rival governments remain vying for control of the country: a Government of National Accord, brokered by the United Nations; a self-declared government and allied militias based in Tripoli; and a government based in Tobruk.

and three members of the Tunisian General Labor Union (Noueihed and Warren 2012)—it was laden with former regime figures and, despite el-Ghannouchi's efforts to remove Ben Ali supporters, protest against the inclusion of former regime elites soon forced his resignation (Joffé 2011, Aleya-Sghaier 2014).

Replacing Ghannouchi was Beji Caid el-Sebsi, a man active in the governments of Ben Ali's predecessor Habib Bourguiba, but not in those of Ben Ali. Departing from el-Ghannouchi's approach, el-Sebsi's 23-minister interim government included no Ben Ali stalwarts, giving this second-iteration transitional government the legitimacy to make key institutional decisions regarding Tunisia's future. As two examples, the interim government scheduled elections for a constituent assembly and dissolved the entire State Security Division, including the “political police,” a despised force under the former regime.<sup>178</sup>

Before the Tunisian Constituent Assembly (sometimes called the National Constituent Assembly, or NCA) election could take place, however, the transitional government needed to draw up an electoral code. For this purpose, it created a supplemental High Commission for the Fulfillment of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition, a group initially composed of 12 parties, 42 national figures, and 17 civil society organizations, though later expanded to strengthen the representation of parties, youth, women, regions, and independent figures (Maddy-Weitzman 2011). For the October 23, 2011 elections, this inclusive commission introduced, among other things, a proportional representation system with no voting threshold and a gender parity law, the first of its kind in the Arab world. This “zipper” law required each political party, of which there were a total of 117, to field an equal number of male and female candidates on its party list, with candidate names alternating by gender. This “regional breakthrough”<sup>179</sup> and “beacon of innovation”<sup>180</sup> led to the election of 49 women, slightly over 20 percent of seats.<sup>181</sup>

The NCA election produced a 217-member body tasked with governing and constitution-writing, which then elected Moncef Marzouki as interim president.<sup>182</sup> In an uncertain environment less than one year after Bouazizi's self-immolation sparked the first uprisings, Tunisia utilized a transitional group to promote an inclusive reform process leading to a national election.<sup>183</sup>

### Egypt's Path during the Transitional Period

Unlike Tunisia, after sustained and sophisticatedly-organized protests contributed to Mubarak's downfall, Egypt had neither the same semblance of sequential, inclusive, nor

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<sup>178</sup> <http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/Africa/03/07/tunisia.state.security/index.html>

<sup>179</sup> <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/04/2011421161714335465.html>

<sup>180</sup> <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/tunisia-vote.9kd>

<sup>181</sup> Seats in Tunisia are allocated according to closed lists, based on thresholds set as the quotient of votes cast divided by the seats contested. Interestingly, the gender parity law failed to stipulate whether a male or female name should appear first on the party list and, as a result, male names headed the vast majority. With no voting threshold law in place, in practical terms, this result shows that nearly all contesting parties received only enough votes to send one member to the Tunisian Constituent Assembly and, because these lists were headed by men, in all but a few cases this member was male (Carey 2013). Even though an-Nahda—the previously banned, moderately Islamist and largest seat-winning party with 89/217 seats—headed women on only two of its 33 lists, 42 out of the 49 women elected came from this party.

<sup>182</sup> Marzouki appointed Hamadi Jebali as prime minister of a coalition government. This coalition included participants from three parties: an-Nahda, the Congress of the Republic, and the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties (Larémont 2014).

<sup>183</sup> After the Constituent Assembly adopted a new constitution, Tunisia held parliamentary and presidential elections on October 26 and November 23, 2014, respectively.



consensus-based transitional groups. Rather, Mubarak handed power to the 21-member, militarily-composed Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) led by Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, which ultimately ruled Egypt until the June 2012 election of former President Mohamed Morsi.

Within a few weeks of gaining control, the SCAF acted unilaterally: it dissolved parliament, suspended the constitution, dismissed Mubarak's cabinet, reshuffled new Prime Minister Essam Sharaf's government,<sup>184</sup> and chose members for a Constitutional Amendment Committee authorized to draft changes to certain provisions in the Egyptian Constitution (Shahin 2012). Though 77.2 percent of voters approved these changes in a March 20 referendum, ten days later, the SCAF announced its own "Constitutional Declaration" that included various unapproved provisions. For example, the SCAF granted itself the status of a "constitutional actor," retaining governmental authority until a new president could assume power, even after parliamentary elections (Varol 2012).

The first round of those parliamentary elections took place in late November, around the same time that Prime Minister Sharaf resigned. To replace him, the SCAF appointed Prime Minister Kamal el-Ganzouri, a former Mubarak prime minister, and asked him to form a "Salvation Government." Sidelining the newly-elected parliament, the SCAF authorized this coalition government to remain in power until presidential elections. In former Member of Parliament Amr Hamazy's words, the SCAF acted as "a state above a state."<sup>185</sup>

With presidential election results looming, after voting rounds in May and June 2012, the SCAF further exerted its power, decreeing amendments giving itself war-making powers, control over all military operations and the military budget, and limiting the powers of the parliament and president (Rutherford 2013, Larémont 2014).

In total, the SCAF ruled for over 16 months, formally dissolving after new President Mohamed Morsi, chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, took office. During its tenure, the SCAF delivered more than 150 unilateral declarations (Stepan and Linz 2013). Very different from Tunisia, the exclusive, non-consensus-driven SCAF dominated Egypt's transitional period.

### Assessing the Extent of Regime Change

How did the structure of the transitional groups in Tunisia and Egypt affect the extent of regime change? Five years after their respective dictators' ousters, Tunisia and Egypt appear very different. While some instances of political violence marred Tunisia's experience after Ben Ali, the country followed a general trajectory toward open politics: In January 2014, the Constituent Assembly adopted a constitution and, in October and November 2014, citizens voted in parliamentary and presidential elections. These successes reflect in the Freedom House organization's *Freedom in the World* rating. Averaging the scores for political rights and civil liberties—each of which ranges from one (most democratic) to seven (most authoritarian)—Tunisia earned a robustly democratic score of two in 2015, a large improvement from its score of six in 2011.<sup>186</sup>

Despite facilitating democratic parliamentary and presidential elections, the SCAF's domination proved especially dire for regime change. Contrary to Tunisia's success, Egypt

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<sup>184</sup> Essam Sharaf replaced former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik, who resigned on March 3, 2011 following continuing protests against the presence of Mubarak regime holdovers in high-ranking positions.

<sup>185</sup> <http://news.egypt.com/english/permalink/125902.html>

<sup>186</sup> Freedom House data is available at <https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VW5gCs9Viko>.

experienced a second transitional event on July 3, 2013, only one year after holding its first post-Mubarak presidential elections. Following mass protests against Morsi's rule, the Egyptian military, led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, ousted Morsi in a coup d'état. Subsequently, the el-Sisi government (which replaced Morsi with Supreme Constitutional Court President Adly Mansour in an interim capacity) embraced authoritarian tendencies, such as severely and violently repressing protesters, especially those from the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>187</sup> In late May 2014, el-Sisi won a presidential election, but as *Time* magazine reports, el-Sisi's Egypt is "a far cry from the democracy millions dreamed of."<sup>188</sup> Egypt's 2015 *Freedom in the World* rating of 5.5, a rating that only matches that of 2011, similarly reveals an autocratic regime.

While noting that a host of background conditions also differ in Tunisia and Egypt, if we simply compare the Tunisian and Egyptian transitional groups on the power-sharing dimension, Tunisia's choice to create a power-sharing transitional group appears beneficial for regime change. Reaching this choice, however, was not easy. In fact, even after forcing Ben Ali's departure, the Tunisian elite followed constitutionally-prescribed succession rules, with existing Prime Minister Mohamed el-Ghannouchi and then Speaker of the Parliament Fouad Mebazaa forming an interim government. As noted above, however, because members of the former ruling party, the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), dominated this government, protesters continued to hold demonstrations, famously chanting "the people want the fall of *the regime*."

It was only once the RCD-dominated government fell that el-Sebsi's transitional group formed with a power-sharing component: A cabinet containing former regime members (though later excluded) with ministries dominated by technocrats, combined with a de facto legislature (the High Commission for the Fulfillment of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition) composed of members from political parties and civil society groups. This power-sharing structure prompted debate among actors, especially over the timing of the Tunisian Constituent Assembly elections, and encouraged compromise, such as through a law banning RCD members from participating in politics for 10 years, a reduction from the initially-proposed 23-year ban (Brownlee, et al. 2015). In Tunisia, the power-sharing arrangement prevented one actor from overtly dominating and gave all participants a better chance of pushing reforms forward.

Egypt's non-power-sharing structure, while allowing for some non-binding discussions with non-military forces such as liberal activists and the Muslim Brotherhood, contrarily allowed the military to dominate. To reiterate only a few examples of the lack of compromise during the SCAF's rule, the group unilaterally passed constitutional declarations, attained full executive and legislative authority within less than two months of Mubarak's fall, retained power even after democratic legislative elections, and gave the military a veto over the president regarding national security concerns (Brownlee, et al. 2015).

The remaining question, of course, is the counterfactual: Had Tunisia or Egypt utilized a different type of transitional group—or no transitional group at all—might the extent of regime change have differed?

If we look beyond the power-sharing dimension of transitional group composition and instead focus on participation, Tunisia falls in the broad composition category, making the transitional government a comprehensive transitional group, and Egypt falls in the restricted composition category, making the SCAF an exclusionary transitional group. Given the sustained protests in Tunisia to push for power-sharing and the military's crucial role in toppling Mubarak

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<sup>187</sup> For an extensive report covering incidents in July and August 2013, see *All According to Plan: The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt*, published by Human Rights Watch.

<sup>188</sup> <http://time.com/3911718/egypt-abdel-fattah-el-sissi/>

in Egypt, the likelihood of either a non-power-sharing transitional group developing in Tunisia or a power-sharing transitional group forming in Egypt appears low. If we assume the transitional group's observed power-sharing dimension was static in both cases, might switching a case's value on the participation dimension have altered the extent of regime change?

The answer to such a question is hypothetical and unobservable, but the findings in this dissertation suggest that the Egyptian and Tunisian transitional groups may have been better off switching their value on the participation component of composition. For instance, had Tunisia chosen to implement a selective rather than a comprehensive transitional group, thereby complementing a power-sharing structure with a restricted composition, it may have encouraged even quicker moves toward more open politics by reducing coordination problems or it may have more easily convinced parties to accept the election outcomes. Perhaps with fewer parties disagreeing on an election timetable, as one example, the Constituent Assembly election would not have been postponed by several months (from July to October 2011). Moreover, had Egypt chosen to form a pluralistic rather than an exclusionary transitional group, possibly by including lower-ranking military officers and/or a small number of non-military members in the SCAF, it may have encouraged discussion and debate, reducing the unilateral and often anti-democratic actions of the military.

## Looking Forward

From the observed design of the transitional groups in Tunisia and Egypt, it is no surprise that the compromise and debate encouraged through power-sharing in Tunisia helped to move the country toward open politics in the five years after Ben Ali's fall, while the overwhelming dominance of the military in Egypt did not induce the same democratization gains following Mubarak's ouster. This brief comparison suggests one avenue for future research: in-depth, case study comparisons to map out the decision processes among transitional group leaders. I conclude by suggesting two additional paths forward.

First, and complementing my suggestion for detailed case study research, this dissertation characterized the environment of the transitional period according to a number of observed transitional paths. While this is an essential step to understanding what occurs during the transitional period between regimes, it necessarily strips away much of the nuance involved in bargaining among transitional group participants. To understand the trade-offs that transitional group members face, a productive theoretical step forward would be the development of a dynamic bargaining model in which transitional groups bargain over institutions during the transitional period as a segue into another bargaining game under the subsequent regime. Because the transitional group sets the stage for yet another bargaining game, it must ensure that various actors will be willing to continue bargaining at a future point in time. Stronger players may thus be willing to give away some of their power during the transitional period in order to get weaker players to commit to the future polity, and analyzing this possibility is a worthwhile path forward.

Second, this dissertation focused on the extent of regime change as the overriding dependent variable of interest and specifically looked at mechanisms promoting electoral, deliberative, and participatory conceptions of democracy. But, transitional groups focus on a multitude of issues not relating to elections. They often focus on economic issues, such as economic development, property rights, budget decentralization, taxation, and the minimum wage. Any of these indicators would make worthwhile dependent variables. They also sometimes focus on dismantling remnants of the prior regime. Comparing how cases with and without transitional

groups approach reconfiguring a country's military and police forces or tackle questions of transitional justice would also prove fruitful. Finally, and particularly in post-conflict settings, transitional groups must deal with issues of security and peace. This suggests potential dependent variables of interest like the occurrence or type of violent conflict, the introduction or intensity of terrorist activity, or the ability to successfully conclude peace agreements.

In sum, future research should utilize the framework developed in this dissertation to analyze potential regime transitions, but focus on pushing the envelope further and adding insight into the dynamics that occur between regimes.

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
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# Appendices

## Appendix 1A: Additional Figures and Tables


Figure 1A-1. Number of news articles over time in the ten most frequently-occurring countries, excluding Iraq, 1985-2014.



*Notes:* The plot contains counts of articles related to transitional arrangements, democracy, and/or elections published by *The New York Times* or *The Washington Post* between January 1, 1985 and January 1, 2015. Unlike Figure 1-1 in the main text, this figure includes the Democratic Republic of Congo to replace the outlier of Iraq as one of the ten most frequently occurring countries. This is because Iraq experiences a huge spike in news coverage between 2003 and 2005 (corresponding to the United States-led invasion and occupation of Iraq). At its peak in 2004, articles about Iraq make up 80.48 percent of *all* articles in the 2004 sample (705/876 articles).



Figure 1A-2. Number of news articles over time and across regions.



Notes: The plot contains counts of articles related to transitional arrangements, democracy, and/or elections that were published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* between January 1, 1985 and January 1, 2015. MENA represents the Middle East and North Africa region.

Table 1A. Common subject terms across regions, 1985-2014.

<i>Subject Term</i>	<i>Africa</i>	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Latin America</i>	<i>MENA</i>	<i>Post-Communist</i>	<i>West</i>
<b>Common across six regions</b>						
Heads of State & Government	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Prime Ministers	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Legislative Bodies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political Parties	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
War & Conflict	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Rebellions & Insurgencies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Armed Forces	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Armies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Talks & Meetings	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>Common across five regions</b>						
Protests & Demonstrations	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
United Nations Institutions	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
State Departments & Foreign Services		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
U.S. Presidents		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>Common across three regions</b>						
Coups	✓	✓	✓			
Muslims & Islam	✓	✓		✓		
Agreements	✓				✓	✓
Military Weapons			✓	✓		✓

*Notes:* There are no common terms across four world regions. In addition to these common terms, the following terms appear in all or nearly all regions: politics, international relations, foreign relations, elections, campaigns & elections, head of government election, presidential election, voters & voting, and political candidates. I ignore these terms due to their close relationship with our initial search parameters.

Figure 1A-3. Proportion of positive and negative words across regions.





Figure 1A-4. Proportion of positive and negative words across regions, 1985-2014.



*Notes:* Both figures represent the number of “positive” or “negative” words within all articles for a given region, divided by the number of non-stop words for that region. Figure 1A-3 aggregates regional data over time, while Figure 1A-4 separates regional data by year. During pre-processing of the textual data, I remove all “stop words”—that is, all words falling within a set of the most common words in the English language. We use the list of stop words available at <http://jmlr.org/papers/volume5/lewis04a/a11-smart-stop-list/english.stop>. Because I remove these words, I use the number of non-stop words as the denominator, rather than the total number of words within an article. To classify positive and negative words, I utilize lists of words available through Neal Caren’s website: <http://nealcaren.web.unc.edu/>.

## Appendix 2A: Transitional Event Dates

<i>Country</i>	<i>Existing Year<sup>189</sup></i>	<i>Transitional Event Date</i>	<i>Transitional Event Explanation</i>	<i>Event Type<sup>190</sup></i>	<i>Alternative Date<sup>191</sup></i>	<i>Alternative Date Explanation</i>
Afghanistan	1992	4/16/1992	government ousted	CW	3/18/1992	president consented to resign
Afghanistan	1996	9/27/1996	Taliban took control	CW		
Afghanistan	2001	11/13/2001	Taliban defeated by invading forces	II		
Albania	N/A	12/19/1990	decree legalizing political parties approved	IR	12/9/1990	large protests began
Albania	1991	6/4/1991	government resigned	IR	4/1/1991	large protests began
Albania	1996-97	3/1/1997	government resigned	IR	1/16/1997	large protests began
Algeria	1989	10/12/1988	president announced multiparty transition	IR	10/5/1988	large protests began
Algeria	N/A	6/5/1991	government dismissed	IR	5/25/1991	large protests began
Algeria	1992	1/11/1992	coup d'état	MC		
Algeria	1995	2/7/1994	head of state announced inclusive dialogue	VR		
Angola	1991	5/31/1991	peace accord	VR	5/11/1991	multiparty politics legalized
Armenia	1994	9/21/1991	independence declared	IR	9/15/1989	large protests began
Armenia	1998	2/3/1998	president resigned	IR	9/26/1997	large protests began
Azerbaijan	1991	9/16/1991	communist party dissolved	IR	8/21/1991	large protests began
Azerbaijan	1992	3/6/1992	president resigned	IR	3/5/1992	large protests began
Azerbaijan	1993	6/9/1993	coup d'état	MC		
Bahrain	N/A	3/6/1999	emir died	IR	12/5/1994	large protests began
Bangladesh	1990	12/4/1990	president resigned	IR	10/10/1990	large protests began
Bangladesh	2007	1/11/2007	military intervened	MC		
Belarus	1991	7/20/1990	work on post-Soviet constitution began	IR	6/24/1989	opposition group founding congress
Belarus	1995-6	10/19/1996	president convened extra-constitutional meeting	VR		
Benin	1990-1	12/7/1989	president promised reforms	IR	1/9/1989	large protests began
Bhutan	2007	6/30/2007	multiparty politics legalized	VR		
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992-2008	7/30/1990	multiparty politics legalized	VR		
Bosnia-Herzegovina	N/A	9/20/1995	Operation Deliberate Forced ended	II		
Bulgaria	1990	11/10/1989	president removed	IR	10/16/1989	large protests began
Burkina Faso	N/A	6/2/1991	multiparty constitution adopted	VR		

<sup>189</sup> This column reflects the year of transition as reported by the GWF, Polity, and/or CGV indices.

<sup>190</sup> Note the following abbreviations: MC = military coup d'état, CW = rebellion or civil war, II = international intervention, IR = involuntary reform, VR = voluntary reform

<sup>191</sup> In six instances I am only able to find a month and year for the alternative transitional event date. In these cases, I list the transitional event date as the first of the month. This is relevant for the following cases: Central African Republic, March 1990; Comoros, April 1990; Gabon, January 1990; Ghana, May 1991; Nigeria, January 1986; and São Tomé and Príncipe, October 1987.

Burkina Faso	2000-1	6/1/1999	Collège des Sage founded	IR	12/13/1998	large protests began
Burundi	1993	9/3/1987	coup d'état	MC		
Burundi	1996	7/25/1996	coup d'état	MC		
Burundi	2003-5	8/28/2000	peace accord signed	VR		
Cambodia	1989-93	10/23/1991	peace accord signed	VR		
Cambodia	1997	7/5/1997	coup d'état	MC		
Cameroon	1992	12/19/1990	political parties legalized	IR	5/26/1990	opposition launching rally
Cape Verde	1990	4/4/1990	leaders agreed to multiparty system	VR	2/13/1990	multiparty negotiations began
Central African Republic	1990	7/7/1991	multiparty politics legalized	IR	3/1/1990	large protests began
Central African Republic	1993	10/25/1992	elections occurred, results subsequently annulled	VR		
Central African Republic	2003	3/15/2003	coup d'état	MC		
Chad	1989	7/8/1988	constitutional commission appointed	VR		
Chad	1990	12/2/1990	coup d'état	MC		
Chile	1989-90	3/11/1987	ban on political parties lifted	IR	5/11/1983	large protests began
Comoros	1990	11/29/1989	coup d'état	MC		
Comoros	1992	8/3/1991	president dismissed; state of emergency declared	VR	4/1/1990	multiparty plans announced
Comoros	1995	9/28/1995	coup d'état	MC		
Comoros	N/A	4/30/1999	coup d'état	MC		
Congo-Brazzaville	1991-2	12/27/1990	multiparty politics legalized	IR	9/14/1990	large protests began
Congo-Brazzaville	1997	10/25/1997	president overthrown	II		
Congo-Kinshasa	N/A	4/24/1990	ban on political parties lifted	VR		
Congo-Kinshasa	1997	5/17/1997	president overthrown	CW	4/14/1997	large protests began
Congo-Kinshasa	2004-6	12/17/2002	peace agreement signed	VR		
Croatia	N/A	2/15/1990	multiparty politics legalized	VR		
Czechoslovakia	1989	11/29/1989	communist party's leading role abolished	IR	11/17/1989	large protests began
Djibouti	N/A	1/21/1992	constitutional committee appointed	IR	11/11/1991	rebellion began
Dominican Republic	1996	8/2/1994	flawed election occurred, spurring protests	IR		
Ecuador	2000	1/21/2000	coup d'état	MC		
Egypt	2005	5/10/2005	multi-candidate presidential elections approved	VR	2/26/2005	president requested amendment
El Salvador	1994	1/16/1992	peace agreement signed	VR	4/4/1990	negotiation agreement reached
Eritrea	1993	5/29/1991	war of independence ended	CW		
Estonia	1991	3/18/1990	first multicandidate elections occurred	IR	10/1/1988	opposition founding congress
Ethiopia	1991	5/21/1991	president fled	CW		
Fiji	1990-2	9/25/1987	coup d'état	MC		
Fiji	2000	5/19/2000	coup d'état	MC		
Fiji	2006-7	12/4/2006	coup d'état	MC		
Gabon	N/A	4/21/1990	multiparty politics legalized	IR	1/1/1990	large protests began
Gambia	1994	7/22/1994	coup d'état	MC		

Georgia	1991	4/14/1989	leaders forced to resign	IR	11/12/1988	large protests began
Georgia	1992	1/6/1992	coup d'état	MC		
Georgia	2004	11/23/2003	president resigned	IR	11/2/2003	elections occurred, protests
East Germany (GDR)	1990	11/9/1989	Berlin Wall opened	IR	9/4/1989	large protests began
Ghana	1993	5/18/1992	multiparty politics legalized	VR	5/1/1991	recommendation accepted
Guatemala	1995	5/25/1993	president's "self-coup" occurred	VR		
Guinea	N/A	12/23/1990	constitution approved	VR	10/1/1989	two-party system promised
Guinea	2008	12/23/2008	president died, coup d'état	MC	1/10/2007	large protests began
Guinea-Bissau	1991-4	10/8/1990	national conference opened	VR		
Guinea-Bissau	1998	11/1/1998	peace accord signed	VR		
Guinea-Bissau	1999-2000	5/10/1999	president deposed	CW		
Guinea-Bissau	2003	9/14/2003	coup d'état	MC		
Guyana	1992	10/12/1990	electoral reforms began	VR		
Haiti	1990	3/10/1990	president went into exile	IR	3/5/1990	large protests began
Haiti	1991	9/29/1991	coup d'état	MC		
Haiti	1994	10/10/1994	de facto ruler resigned	VR		
Haiti	1999	1/11/1999	congress suspended	VR		
Haiti	2004	2/29/2004	president forced into exile	CW	2/5/2004	revolt began
Honduras	N/A	6/28/2009	coup d'état	MC		
Hungary	1990	2/11/1989	multiparty system ratified	IR	3/15/1988	large protests began
Indonesia	1999	5/21/1998	president resigned	IR	5/13/1998	large protests began
Iraq	2003	4/7/2003	Baghdad fell to invading forces	II		
Ivory Coast	N/A	5/3/1990	opposition parties legalized	IR	3/2/1990	large protests began
Ivory Coast	1999	12/24/1999	coup d'état	MC		
Ivory Coast	N/A	1/23/2003	peace agreement signed	VR		
Ivory Coast	N/A	3/4/2007	peace agreement signed	VR		
Jordan	1989	4/27/1989	king named caretaker government	IR	4/18/1989	large protests began
Kazakhstan	1991	12/16/1991	independence declared	VR		
Kenya	N/A	12/10/1991	one-party section of constitution repealed	IR	2/16/1990	large protests began
Kenya	1998	7/17/1997	constitutional reform began	IR	7/7/1997	large protests began
Kenya	N/A	2/28/2008	national accord signed	VR	12/30/2007	election results announced
Kosovo	N/A	6/10/1999	Operation Allied Force ended	II		
Kuwait	1990-2	8/2/1990	Iraqi forces invaded, emir fled	II		
Kyrgyzstan	1991	8/31/1991	independence declared	VR		
Kyrgyzstan	2005	3/24/2005	president fled	IR	2/27/2005	large protests began
Kyrgyzstan	2010	4/7/2010	president fled	IR	3/10/2010	large protests began
Latvia	1991	12/28/1989	communist party's leading role abolished	IR	8/8/1988	opposition founding congress
Lebanon	1989-2005	10/22/1989	peace agreement signed	VR		

Lebanon	2005	2/28/2005	government resigned	IR	2/21/2005	large protests began
Lesotho	1993	3/10/1990	king stripped of powers	VR		
Lesotho	N/A	5/2/1991	coup d'état	MC		
Lesotho	N/A	8/17/1994	coup d'état	MC		
Lesotho	N/A	9/22/1998	Operation Boleas began	II	8/4/1998	large protests began
Liberia	1990	9/10/1990	president killed	CW	8/24/1990	international force arrived
Liberia	1994	7/25/1993	peace accord signed	VR		
Liberia	2003	8/11/2003	president went into exile	CW		
Lithuania	1991	12/6/1989	communist party's leading role abolished	IR	6/24/1988	opposition launching rally
Macedonia (FYROM)	1991	9/6/1990	multiparty politics legalized	VR		
Madagascar	1993	3/1/1990	multiparty politics legalized	IR	3/12/1989	president's reelection led to riots
Madagascar	2009	3/17/2009	president resigned	IR	1/26/2009	large protests began
Malawi	1994	10/12/1992	president agreed to multiparty referendum	IR	3/10/1992	large protests began
Maldives	2008	6/2/2005	political parties legalized	IR	8/12/2004	large protests began
Mali	1991	3/26/1991	coup d'état	MC		
Mauritania	N/A	4/15/1991	president announced multiparty system	VR		
Mauritania	2005	8/3/2005	coup d'état	MC		
Mauritania	2008	8/6/2008	coup d'état	MC		
Moldova	1991	2/25/1990	first multicandidate elections occurred	IR	8/27/1989	large protests began
Mongolia	1990	3/9/1990	politburo resigned	IR	12/10/1989	large protests began
Mozambique	1994	11/2/1990	multiparty politics legalized	VR		
Namibia	1990	12/13/1988	peace accord signed	VR		
Nepal	1990-1	4/8/1990	ban on political parties lifted	IR	2/18/1990	large protests began
Nepal	2002	10/4/2002	king assumed executive powers	VR		
Nepal	2006	2/1/2005	king assumed executive powers	VR		
Niger	1991	4/24/1991	multiparty politics legalized	IR	2/9/1990	large protests began
Niger	1996	1/27/1996	coup d'état	MC		
Niger	1999-2000	4/9/1999	president assassinated	MC		
Niger	2009	6/26/2009	president ruled by decree	VR		
Niger	2010	2/18/2010	coup d'état	MC		
Nigeria	1993	5/3/1989	multiparty politics legalized	VR	1/1/1986	president announced transition plans
Nigeria	N/A	11/17/1993	coup d'état	MC	6/23/1993	election results annulled
Nigeria	1999	6/8/1998	president died	VR		
Pakistan	1999	10/12/1999	coup d'état	MC		
Panama	1989	12/20/1989	United States invaded, inaugurated new president	II	6/6/1987	large protests began
Paraguay	1989	2/3/1989	coup d'état	MC		
Peru	1992	4/5/1992	president's "self-coup" occurred	VR		
Peru	2000-1	11/20/2000	president fled	IR	4/10/2000	large protests began

Poland	1989	1/17/1989	union pluralism legalized	IR	4/21/1988	large protests began
Qatar	N/A	6/27/1995	coup d'état	MC		
Romania	1989-90	12/25/1989	president executed	IR	12/15/1989	large protests began
Russia	1993	3/4/1990	first multicandidate elections occurred	VR		
Rwanda	1990	6/10/1991	multiparty politics legalized	VR	7/5/1990	president agreed to reform
Rwanda	1994	4/6/1994	president killed	CW		
São Tomé and Príncipe	1991	12/5/1989	national conference opened	VR	10/1/1987	announced direct election intentions
Seychelles	N/A	12/3/1991	multiparty system announced	VR		
Sierra Leone	1990	10/1/1991	multiparty politics legalized	VR	10/1/1990	review commission created
Sierra Leone	1992	4/29/1992	coup d'état	MC		
Sierra Leone	1996	1/16/1996	coup d'état	MC		
Sierra Leone	1997	5/25/1997	coup d'état	MC		
Sierra Leone	1998	2/13/1998	government overthrown by international forces	II	8/18/1997	large protests began
Slovenia	1991	9/27/1989	multiparty politics legalized	IR	5/31/1988	opposition committee founded
Solomon Islands	2000-3	6/5/2000	coup d'état	MC		
Somalia	1991	1/26/1991	junta forced from power	CW		
Somalia	N/A	8/13/2000	transitional government established	VR		
Somalia	N/A	2/1/2004	Transitional Federal Charter adopted	VR		
South Africa	1994	2/2/1990	ban on ANC lifted	VR		
Sudan	1989	6/30/1989	coup d'état	MC		
Sudan	2002-5	1/9/2005	peace agreement signed	VR		
Suriname	1990	12/24/1990	coup d'état	MC		
Taiwan	1992	6/28/1990	National Affairs Conference opened	IR	3/16/1990	large protests began
Tajikistan	1991	9/9/1991	independence declared	IR	8/23/1991	large protests began
Tajikistan	1997-8	6/27/1997	peace agreement signed	VR		
Tanzania	1995	2/18/1992	restriction on political parties lifted	VR	2/27/1991	multiparty commission appointed
Thailand	1991	2/23/1991	coup d'état	MC		
Thailand	1992	5/24/1992	prime minister resigned	IR	5/17/1992	large protests began
Thailand	2006	9/19/2006	coup d'état	MC		
Timor-Leste	N/A	8/30/1999	independence referendum occurred	VR	1/27/1999	referendum announced
Togo	1991-3	4/11/1991	multiparty politics legalized	IR	10/5/1990	large protests began
Togo	N/A	2/5/2005	president died	MC		
Turkmenistan	1991	10/27/1991	independence declared	VR		
Uganda	2005	7/28/2005	multiparty referendum held	VR	1/23/2003	multiparty system suggested
Ukraine	1991	3/18/1990	first multicandidate elections occurred	VR		
Uzbekistan	1991	8/31/1991	independence declared	VR		
Yemen	1990	5/22/1990	South and North Yemen united	VR		
Yugoslavia	1991	7/19/1990	law on political organizations created	VR		



Yugoslavia (FRY)	2000	10/6/2000	president ousted	IR	10/1/2000	large protests began
Zambia	1991	12/17/1990	multiparty politics legalized	IR	6/25/1990	large protests began
Zimbabwe	2009	9/11/2008	power-sharing agreement reached	VR	5/2/2008	election results announced

## Chapter 2B: Additional Regional Maps

Figure A1. Transitional groups in Asia, 1989-2010.<sup>192</sup>






Figure A2. Transitional groups in Latin America, 1989-2010.



<sup>192</sup> Note that I exclude Fiji from this map for sizing purposes. Fiji has three potential regime transitions, with two cases of *TG-restrictive*.

Figure A3. Transitional groups in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 1989-2010.



## Appendix 2C: Interaction of Prior Regime Type and Mode of Transition

Table A1. Percentage of cases with *TG-restrictive* (number of potential regime transition cases per cell in parentheses).

<i>Prior Regime Type</i>	<i>Military Coup</i>	<i>Civil War</i>	<i>Intl. Intervention</i>	<i>Involuntary Reform</i>	<i>Voluntary Reform</i>
<i>Democracy</i>	40.9 (22)	0 (0)	50 (2)	33.3 (6)	37.5 (8)
<i>Military</i>	100 (3)	100 (3)	0 (1)	40 (5)	60 (10)
<i>Personalist</i>	80 (10)	50 (6)	33.3 (3)	40 (15)	40 (20)
<i>Single-Party</i>	62.5 (8)	50 (2)	66.7 (3)	12.9 (31)	12.5 (24)

Table A2. Percentage of cases with *TG-moderately permissive* (number of potential regime transition cases per cell in parentheses, differences from Table A1 in bold).

<i>Prior Regime Type</i>	<i>Military Coup</i>	<i>Civil War</i>	<i>Intl. Intervention</i>	<i>Involuntary Reform</i>	<i>Voluntary Reform</i>
<i>Democracy</i>	40.9 (22)	0 (0)	<b>100</b> (2)	33.3 (6)	<b>50</b> (8)
<i>Military</i>	100 (3)	100 (3)	0 (1)	<b>60</b> (5)	60 (10)
<i>Personalist</i>	80 (10)	50 (6)	<b>66.7</b> (3)	<b>53.3</b> (15)	<b>45</b> (20)
<i>Single-Party</i>	62.5 (8)	50 (2)	66.7 (3)	<b>32.3</b> (31)	<b>29.1</b> (24)

Table A3. Percentage of cases with *TG-permissive* (number of potential regime transition cases per cell in parentheses, differences from Table A2 in bold).

<i>Prior Regime Type</i>	<i>Military Coup</i>	<i>Civil War</i>	<i>Intl. Intervention</i>	<i>Involuntary Reform</i>	<i>Voluntary Reform</i>
<i>Democracy</i>	40.9 (22)	0 (0)	100 (2)	33.3 (6)	50 (8)
<i>Military</i>	100 (3)	100 (3)	0 (1)	60 (5)	<b>70</b> (10)
<i>Personalist</i>	80 (10)	50 (6)	66.7 (3)	<b>60</b> (15)	<b>60</b> (20)
<i>Single-Party</i>	62.5 (8)	50 (2)	66.7 (3)	<b>41.9</b> (31)	29.1 (24)

## Chapter 3A: Additional Figures and Tables

Figure 3A-1. Plots that compare the fitted values to the residuals for Models (1)-(8) from Table 6.




Table 3A-1. Full LPM results for the dependent variable of the occurrence of a constitutional referendum, with robust standard errors in parentheses and all time-variant covariates lagged by one year prior to the transitional event.

	<i>Dependent Variable: Constitutional Referendum</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Constant	0.10 (0.10)	0.11 (0.10)	0.16 (0.12)	0.14 (0.18)	0.15 (0.21)
Transitional group	0.18*** (0.07)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.19** (0.08)	0.18*** (0.07)
GDP, per capita	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Electoral democracy	0.49 (0.31)	0.51 (0.32)	0.44 (0.32)	0.63** (0.30)	0.61* (0.33)
Population density		-0.00 (0.00)			0.00 (0.00)
Conflict intensity			-0.08* (0.05)		-0.03 (0.04)
Latin America				-0.30* (0.18)	-0.31* (0.18)
MENA				0.23 (0.21)	0.23 (0.26)
Africa				-0.04 (0.18)	-0.04 (0.18)
Asia				-0.37*** (0.13)	-0.38*** (0.13)
Observations	141	141	141	141	141
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.10	0.09

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 3A-2. Full zero-truncated Negative Binomial model results for the dependent variable of duration (in days) from the transitional event until the first national election, with all time-variant covariates lagged by one year prior to the transitional event.

	<i>Dependent variable: Duration to First Election</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Constant	6.535***	6.56***	6.47***	5.93***	5.70***
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.32)	(0.35)
Transitional group	0.41**	0.43**	0.40**	0.36**	0.34**
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
GDP, per capita	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Electoral democracy	-0.39	-0.36	-0.29	-0.46	-0.21
	(0.54)	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.55)	(0.56)
Population density		-0.00			-0.00
		(0.00)			(0.00)
Conflict intensity			0.09		0.17
			(0.12)		(0.12)
Latin America				0.43	0.49
				(0.31)	(0.30)
MENA				0.23	0.36
				(0.38)	(0.38)
Africa				0.69***	0.78***
				(0.26)	(0.26)
Asia				0.38	0.40
				(0.33)	(0.34)
Alpha ( $\alpha$ )	0.32***	0.32***	0.32***	0.37***	0.38***
Log-likelihood	-874.48	-874.23	-874.23	-870.90	-869.96

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Table 3A-3. OLS regression results with robust standard errors, with outliers *excluded* from the sample.

*Dependent variable: Duration to First Election*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	749.08*** (141.58)	735.31*** (141.91)	731.55*** (149.71)	701.66*** (148.68)	573.16*** (146.08)	489.01** (146.47)
Transitional group	248.51*** (86.79)	240.98*** (90.43)	244.74*** (87.38)	246.11*** (87.84)	219.80** (85.00)	210.68** (100.92)
GDP, per capita	-394.52 (371.82)	-386.37 (365.72)	-388.43 (376.05)	-347.55 (371.59)	-120.09 (372.46)	-442.08 (416.14)
Electoral democracy	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Population density		0.00 (0.00)				
Land area			0.00 (0.00)			
Conflict intensity				69.62 (73.48)		
Civil war magnitude					87.92*** (24.69)	
Latin America						173.52 (171.55)
MENA						76.11 (140.42)
Africa						330.33** (137.33)
Asia						119.86 (150.23)
Observations	119	119	119	119	114	119
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.15	0.11

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01



Table 3A-4. OLS regression results with robust standard errors, with outliers *included* in the sample.

	<i>Dependent Variable: Duration to First Election</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	847.97*** (164.95)	843.34*** (167.65)	841.04*** (162.97)	795.94*** (162.52)	572.17*** (143.42)	522.55*** (150.52)
Transitional group	269.96*** (101.65)	267.25** (103.35)	268.68** (106.08)	266.03*** (100.34)	258.06*** (83.93)	227.27** (111.97)
GDP, per capita	-609.68 (408.44)	-607.48 (409.01)	-606.93 (401.75)	-560.31 (397.36)	-124.48 (389.24)	-648.11 (464.98)
Electoral democracy	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
Population		0.00 (0.00)				
Land area			0.00 (0.00)			
Conflict intensity				78.48 (67.07)		
Civil war magnitude					100.29*** (27.57)	
Latin America						206.55 (166.03)
MENA						67.14 (131.15)
Africa						404.76*** (152.82)
Asia						120.79 (156.34)
Observations	121	121	121	121	115	121
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.17	0.12

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 3A-5. Zero-truncated negative binomial regression results, with outliers *included* in the sample.

	<i>Dependent variable: Duration to First Election</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	6.70*** (0.24)	6.69*** (0.24)	6.71*** (0.26)	6.65*** (0.26)	6.25*** (0.25)	5.96*** (0.34)
Transitional group	0.41* (0.17)	0.41* (0.17)	0.41* (0.17)	0.40* (0.17)	0.37* (0.16)	0.36* (0.17)
GDP, per capita	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.0* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Electoral democracy	-0.77 (0.55)	-0.77 (0.54)	-0.78 (0.56)	-0.70 (0.56)	0.17 (0.55)	-0.73 (0.56)
Population		0.00 (0.00)				
Land area			-0.00 (0.00)			
Conflict intensity				0.07 (0.12)		
Civil war magnitude					0.13** (0.05)	
Latin America						0.48 (0.31)
MENA						0.23 (0.38)
Africa						0.80** (0.27)
Asia						0.40 (0.33)
Alpha ( $\alpha$ )	0.27*	0.27*	0.27*	0.27*	0.39**	0.34**
Log-likelihood	-896.43	-896.39	-896.42	-896.28	-848.36	-891.54

\*p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Table 3A-6. Full OLS regression model results for the dependent variable of free and fair elections, with robust standard errors in parentheses and all time-variant covariates lagged by one year prior to the transitional event.

<i>Dependent Variable: Free and Fair Elections</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Constant	0.21*** (0.07)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.21*** (0.07)	0.19** (0.08)	0.18** (0.08)
Transitional group (TG)	0.13** (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)
Election duration (ED)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
TG*ED	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
GDP, per capita	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Electoral democracy	0.24* (0.13)	0.24* (0.13)	0.24* (0.13)	0.17 (0.13)	0.16 (0.13)
Population density		0.00 (0.00)			0.00 (0.00)
Conflict intensity			-0.01 (0.02)		-0.00 (0.03)
Latin America				0.12* (0.07)	0.12* (0.07)
MENA				-0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)
Africa				0.04 (0.05)	0.05 (0.06)
Asia				0.00 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)
Observations	116	116	116	116	116
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.12

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Table 3A-7. Ordinary least squares regression results with robust standard errors and outliers *excluded* from the sample. The independent variable election duration signifies the *longest* duration between the transitional event and a national (presidential or parliamentary) election.

<i>Dependent Variable: Free and Fair Elections</i>								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Constant	0.25*** (0.06)	0.25*** (0.06)	0.25*** (0.06)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.07)	0.18* (0.09)	0.19** (0.09)	0.23** (0.09)
Transitional group (TG)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)
Election duration (ED)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
TG*ED	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
GDP, per capita	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Electoral democracy	0.22* (0.13)	0.22* (0.13)	0.22* (0.13)	0.21 (0.14)	0.21 (0.14)	0.14 (0.13)	0.13 (0.13)	0.13 (0.13)
Population		-0.00 (0.00)						
Land area			-0.00 (0.00)					
Conflict intensity				-0.02 (0.02)			-0.02 (0.02)	
Civil war magnitude					-0.01 (0.01)			-0.01 (0.01)
Latin America						0.17* (0.08)	0.17* (0.08)	0.12 (0.09)
MENA						0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)
Africa						0.09 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.04 (0.07)
Asia						0.04 (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)	0.00 (0.08)
Observations	116	116	116	116	111	116	116	111
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.10

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 3A-8. Ordinary least squares regression results with robust standard errors and outliers *excluded* from the sample. The independent variable election duration signifies the *shortest* duration between the transitional event and a national (presidential or parliamentary) election.

<i>Dependent variable: Election Results Acceptance</i> <sup>193</sup>								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Constant	-0.36 (0.31)	-0.36 (0.29)	-0.37 (0.29)	-0.32 (0.29)	-0.36 (0.30)	-0.37 (0.29)	-0.31 (0.27)	-0.37 (0.27)
Transitional group (TG)	0.48** (0.20)	0.48** (0.18)	0.48*** (0.18)	0.47** (0.20)	0.49** (0.20)	0.53** (0.21)	0.52** (0.20)	0.55*** (0.21)
Election duration (ED)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
TG*ED	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
GDP, per capita	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Electoral democracy	-0.04 (0.54)	-0.04 (0.56)	-0.04 (0.54)	-0.08 (0.53)	-0.02 (0.54)	-0.30 (0.51)	-0.34 (0.49)	-0.30 (0.49)
Population		-0.00 (0.00)						
Land area			0.00 (0.00)					
Conflict intensity				-0.06 (0.10)			-0.07 (0.11)	
Civil war magnitude					0.02 (0.04)			0.01 (0.05)
Latin America						0.45* (0.24)	0.45* (0.23)	0.46* (0.26)
MENA						-0.13 (0.30)	-0.16 (0.31)	-0.12 (0.33)
Africa						0.07 (0.23)	0.04 (0.23)	0.06 (0.27)
Asia						-0.07 (0.21)	-0.05 (0.22)	-0.07 (0.23)
Observations	114	114	114	114	109	114	114	109
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.08

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

<sup>193</sup> The V-Dem election result acceptance election variable is missing the following data: Bosnia-Herzegovina 1990; Dominican Republic 1994, 1996; Guinea 2013, Jordan 1989, Kenya 2013, Kuwait 1992, Madagascar 2013, Mauritania 2013, and Zimbabwe 2013. In addition, I replace the score for (1) Czechoslovakia 1990 with the Czech Republic 1990 and (2) the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1992, 2000, and 2002 with scores for Serbia 1992, 2000, and 2002.

Table 3A-9. Ordinary least squares regression results with robust standard errors and outliers *excluded* from the sample. The independent variable election duration signifies the *longest* duration between the transitional event and a national (presidential or parliamentary) election.

	<i>Dependent Variable: Election Results Acceptance</i>							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Constant	-0.30 (0.29)	-0.30 (0.29)	-0.34 (0.31)	-0.27 (0.29)	-0.36 (0.28)	-0.30 (0.32)	-0.25 (0.33)	-0.27 (0.30)
Transitional group (TG)	0.45** (0.21)	0.44** (0.21)	0.46** (0.21)	0.45** (0.21)	0.48** (0.22)	0.54** (0.23)	0.53** (0.22)	0.56** (0.22)
Election duration (ED)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
TG*ED	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
GDP, per capita	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Electoral democracy	0.21 (0.60)	0.22 (0.61)	0.23 (0.61)	0.18 (0.60)	0.32 (0.58)	-0.06 (0.53)	-0.10 (0.53)	0.04 (0.53)
Population		0.00 (0.00)						
Land area			0.00 (0.00)					
Conflict intensity				-0.05 (0.11)			-0.06 (0.12)	
Civil war magnitude					0.01 (0.04)			-0.00 (0.05)
Latin America						0.45* (0.26)	0.46* (0.26)	0.37 (0.27)
MENA						-0.15 (0.33)	-0.17 (0.34)	-0.21 (0.37)
Africa						0.02 (0.23)	0.00 (0.23)	-0.07 (0.26)
Asia						-0.12 (0.27)	-0.10 (0.28)	-0.20 (0.29)
Observations	114	114	114	114	109	114	114	109
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.07

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## Appendix 3B: Transitional Group Attributes—Data Issues

### Approximation one: transitional group starting date

#### *Algeria 1989 (1988)*

- I cannot find the exact date of the constitutional committee's appointment, but it occurred after Bendjedid's reelection. I therefore use his reelection date, December 22, 1988, for an approximate starting date.

#### *Ethiopia 1991*

- I use July 22, 1991 as the starting date, even though May 28 is the *de facto* starting date, as this enables me to find the group's size.

### Approximation two: transitional group ending date

#### *Algeria 1989 (1988)*

- The exact ending date of the constitutional committee appointment is unknown, so I use the date on which Benjedid accepted the constitution, February 4, 1989, for an approximate ending date.

#### *Eritrea 1993 (1991)*

- Because the constitution was never fully implemented and national elections never occurred, I use the date of constitutional approval, May 23, 1997, for an approximate ending date.
  - o Note that I therefore ignore the "Transitional National Assembly" as a transitional group.

#### *Estonia 1991 (1990)*

- For the Constitutional Assembly, I use the referendum date, June 28, 1992, for an approximate ending date.

#### *Ghana 1993 (1992)*

- For the Committee of Constitutional Experts, I use the referendum date, April 28, 1992, for an approximate ending date.

#### *Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire) 2003*

- For the Government of National Reconciliation and National Security Council, I use the date of the new prime minister appointment, December 7, 2005, for an approximate ending date.

#### *Maldives 2008 (2005)*

- For the People's Special Majlis, I use the date the constitution went into effect, August 7, 2008, for an approximate ending date.

#### *Niger 1999/2000 (1999)*

- For the Consultative Council of State Elders, I use the constitutional referendum date, July 18, 1999, for an approximate ending date.

#### *Niger 2010*

- For the National Consultative Council (CCN) and Transitional Constitutional Council (CTT), I use the constitutional referendum date, October 31, 2010, for an approximate ending date.

### Other notes on transitional group timing

#### *Ethiopia 1991*

- While a Constituent Assembly election took place prior to a parliamentary election, the TGE remained in power until the parliamentary election.

#### *Lesotho 1993 (1990) and 1991*

- These two cases are strange, as the same transitional group remained, despite the occurrence of two transitional events.

In three cases, the existence of a *TG-constitution* variety of transitional groups depends on whether I consider the transitional event date or the alternative event date.

#### *El Salvador 1994 (1992)*

- The constitutional negotiations took place before the transitional event date, but after/at the same time as the alternative event date.

#### *Ghana 1993 (1992)*

- The committee of constitutional experts met before the transitional event date, but after the alternative event date.

#### *Zambia 1991 (1990)*

- Constitution Commission of Inquiry met before the transitional event date, but after the alternative event date.



## Appendix 4A: Transitional Group Composition

<i>Country</i>	<i>TE Year</i> <sup>194</sup>	<i>TG name</i> <sup>195</sup>	<i>Size</i> <sup>196</sup>	<i>Broad composition</i> <sup>197</sup>	<i>Restricted composition</i>	<i>Power-sharing</i> <sup>198</sup>	<i>Non-power-sharing</i>	<i>TG type</i>
Afghanistan	1992	Provisional government	36	X		X		Comprehensive
Afghanistan	2001	Afghan Interim Authority	30	X		X		Comprehensive
Albania	1991	Government of National Stability	25		X	X		Selective
Algeria	1992	High Council of State	6		X		X	Exclusionary
Algeria	1994	National Transitional Council	190	X		X		Comprehensive
Bangladesh	1990	Council of Advisors	18		X	X		Selective
Bangladesh	2007	Caretaker government	6		X		X	Exclusionary
Benin	1989	High Council for the Republic	26		X	X		Selective
Burundi	1987	Tutsi Military for National Salvation	31	X			X	Pluralistic
Burundi	2000	Transitional government	249	X		X		Comprehensive
Cambodia	1991	Supreme National Council	12		X	X		Selective

<sup>194</sup> *TE year* is the year of the transitional event, as defined in Chapter Two.

<sup>195</sup> Following the convention used throughout this Chapter Four, this table refers only to the restrictive variety of transitional groups (*TG-r*). In cases with sequential transitional groups, this table refers only to the first transitional group; in cases with size shifts, this table refers only to the initial transitional group size.

<sup>196</sup> In calculating the transitional group size, it is sometimes necessary to add one or two to the reported size due to an executive's presence (for instance, an interim president, or an interim president and vice-president). As one example, in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, multiple sources report the formation of a 13-member transitional group, but that number fails to include leader Roza Otunbayeva. To acknowledge Otunbayeva's presence, the correct group size is 13+1=14.

<sup>197</sup> I define broad versus restricted composition based on the median size of transitional groups, which is 27.5. Broad composition is a size greater than or equal to 28; restricted composition is a size less than or equal to 27.

<sup>198</sup> I define a power-sharing transitional group as one that (1) includes members from at least two of following categories in the group: prior regime, opposition, military, or civil society forces; (2) of the categories included, no single category comprises more than 75 percent of transitional group members; and (3) all members of the group have the power to enact change beyond simply making recommendations.

CAR <sup>199</sup>	1992	Provisional National Political Council	3		X	X		Selective
CAR	2003	Transitional government	29	X		X		Comprehensive
Chad	1990	Council of State	33	X			X	Pluralistic
Comoros	1991	Government of National Unity	9		X	X		Selective
Comoros	1999	Committee of State, State Council	31	X		X		Comprehensive
Congo-Brazzaville	1990	High Council of the Republic	153	X		X		Comprehensive
Congo-Brazzaville	1997	Government of National Unity	33	X			X	Pluralistic
Congo-Kinshasa	1990	High Council of the Republic-Parliament of Transition	453	X		X		Comprehensive
Congo-Kinshasa	2002	Transitional Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo	686	X		X		Comprehensive
Eritrea	1991	Transitional government	175	X			X	Pluralistic
Ethiopia	1991	Transitional Government of Ethiopia	108	X		X		Comprehensive
Fiji	1987	Military government	22		X	X		Selective
Fiji	2000	Interim government	32	X			X	Pluralistic
Gabon	1990	Government of National Unity	24		X	X		Selective
Gambia	1994	Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council	5		X		X	Exclusionary
Georgia	1992	Military Council, Political Consultative Council	43	X			X	Pluralistic
Guinea	1990	Transitional Committee for National Recovery	36	X		X		Comprehensive
Guinea	2008	National Council for Democracy and Development	33	X			X	Pluralistic

<sup>199</sup> CAR is the Central African Republic.

Guinea-Bissau	1998	Government of National Unity	16		X	X		Selective
Guinea-Bissau	2003	Military Committee for the Restoration of Constitutional and Democratic Order	32	X			X	Pluralistic
Haiti	1990	Council of State	19		X	X		Selective
Haiti	2004	Council of the Wise	7		X	X		Selective
Iraq	2003	Iraqi Governing Council	25		X	X		Selective
Ivory Coast	1999	National Committee of Public Salvation	9		X		X	Exclusionary
Ivory Coast	2003	Government of National Reconciliation, National Security Council	41	X		X		Comprehensive
Ivory Coast	2007	Transitional government	35	X		X		Comprehensive
Kosovo	1999	Kosovo Transition Council	35	X		X		Comprehensive
Kyrgyzstan	2010	Provisional government	14		X		X	Exclusionary
Lesotho	1990	National Constituent Assembly	107	X		X		Comprehensive
Lesotho	1991	National Constituent Assembly	107	X		X		Comprehensive
Liberia	1990	Interim Government of National Unity	40	X		X		Comprehensive
Liberia	1993	Liberian National Transitional Government	40	X		X		Comprehensive
Liberia	2003	National Transitional Government of Liberia	98	X		X		Comprehensive
Madagascar	1990	High Authority of the State, Committee for Economic and Social Recovery	162	X		X		Comprehensive
Madagascar	2009	High Transitional Authority	44	X		X		Comprehensive
Malawi	1992	National Consultative/ Executive Council	63	X		X		Comprehensive

Mali	1991	Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People	25		X	X		Selective
Mauritania	2005	Military Council for Justice and Democracy	17		X		X	Exclusionary
Mauritania	2008	High Council of State	11		X		X	Exclusionary
Nepal	1990	Interim government	12		X	X		Selective
Nepal	2002	“clean” cabinet	9		X		X	Exclusionary
Nepal	2005	Council of Ministers	10		X		X	Exclusionary
Niger	1991	High Council of the Republic	15		X	X		Selective
Niger	1996	National Salvation Council	12		X		X	Exclusionary
Niger	1999	National Reconciliation Council	14		X		X	Exclusionary
Niger	2010	Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy	20		X		X	Exclusionary
Nigeria	1989	National Defense and Security Council, Transitional Council	43	X		X		Comprehensive
Nigeria	1993	Provisional Ruling Council	11		X		X	Exclusionary
Nigeria	1998	Federal Executive Council	32	X		X		Comprehensive
Romania	1989	National Salvation Front	39	X		X		Comprehensive
Rwanda	1994	Government of National Unity	21		X	X		Selective
Sierra Leone	1992	National Provisional Ruling Council	22		X		X	Exclusionary
Sierra Leone	1996	National Provisional Ruling Council	22		X		X	Exclusionary
South Africa	1990	Transitional Executive Council	19		X	X		Selective
Sudan	2005	Government of National Unity	479	X		X		Comprehensive
Thailand	1991	National Peace Keeping Council	6		X		X	Exclusionary

Thailand	2006	Council for Democratic Reform	6		X		X	Exclusionary
Timor-Leste	1999	National Consultative Council	15		X	X		Selective
Togo	1991	High Council for the Republic	79	X		X		Comprehensive

## Appendix 4B: Shifts in Transitional Groups

The following table lists potential regime transition cases with sequential transitional groups (TGs) of differing types in terms of the power-sharing-participation quadrant.<sup>200</sup> Two cases of shifted groups without a sequential TG appear highlighted in grey (see footnote 17).

<i>Case</i> <sup>201</sup>	<i>TG 1 Name</i>	<i>TG 2 Name</i>	<i>TG 1 Type</i>	<i>TG 2 Type</i>
Algeria 1992	High Security Council	National Consultative Council	Exclusionary	Pluralistic
Chad 1990	Council of State	Higher Transitional Council	Pluralistic	Comprehensive
Comoros 1999	Committee of State, State Council	National unity government	Comprehensive	Selective
Georgia 1992	Military Council/Political Consultative Council	State Council	Pluralistic	Comprehensive
Guinea 1990	Transitional Committee for National Recovery	N/A	Comprehensive	Selective
Guinea 2008	National Council for Democracy and Development	Government of national unity	Pluralistic	Comprehensive
Guinea-Bissau 2003	Military Committee for the Restoration of Constitutional and Democratic Order	Government of national unity	Pluralistic	Comprehensive
Iraq 2003	Iraqi Governing Council	Iraqi Interim Government	Selective	Comprehensive
Ivory Coast 1999	National Committee of Public Salvation	Transitional Government	Exclusionary	Pluralistic
Nepal 2002	“Clean” cabinet	N/A	Exclusionary	Selective

<sup>200</sup> Of the potential regime transition cases with sequential TGs, 10 cases include multiple TGs of the same type. That is, when a new TG forms, it falls in the same power-sharing-participation quadrant as the previous TG in terms of inclusiveness. I do not list these cases in Table A1. In particular, in the following seven cases, the group size increases with no change in power-sharing or non-power-sharing structure: Afghanistan 2001 (comprehensive TGs), Burundi 1987 (pluralistic TGs), Central African Republic 2003 (comprehensive TGs), Congo-Brazzaville 1997 (pluralistic TGs), Fiji 1987 (selective TGs), Madagascar 2009 (comprehensive TGs), and Romania 1989 (comprehensive TGs). In the following three cases, the group size decreases with no change in power-sharing or non-power-sharing structure: Albania 1991 (selective TGs), Nigeria 1989 (comprehensive TGs), and Timor-Leste 1999 (selective TGs).

<sup>201</sup> I exclude sequential TGs of an international nature in Table A1, as it is difficult to estimate the true size of the domestic TG force. For example, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) had a total size of over 25,000, yet the domestic component was only a small (and not well-documented) fraction of this large body. I additionally do not include constitutional commissions as examples of sequential TGs, as these groups complement rather than replace the existing TG (e.g., the constitutional commission created in Kyrgyzstan in 2010).

Nepal 2006 (2005) <sup>202,203</sup>	Council of Ministers	Legislative Parliament	Exclusionary	Comprehensive
Niger 1996	National Salvation Council	Coordinating Committee	Exclusionary	Pluralistic
Niger 1999/2000 (1999)	National Reconciliation Council	Council of State Elders	Exclusionary	Selective
Niger 2010	Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy	National Consultative Council	Exclusionary	Pluralistic
Rwanda 1994	National unity government	National Assembly of the Transition	Selective	Comprehensive
Thailand 1991	National Peace Keeping Council	National Legislative Assembly	Exclusionary	Comprehensive
Thailand 2005	Council for Democratic Reform	National Legislative Assembly	Exclusionary	Comprehensive

<sup>202</sup> As in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, the number in parentheses presents the transitional event year when it differs from existing coding schemes. Please see Chapter Two for details.

<sup>203</sup> Moving from an exclusionary TG to a comprehensive TG is rare, as this requires movement on both dimensions of inclusiveness (i.e., to move from exclusionary to comprehensive, a TG would have to not only expand its size, but also switch from a non-power-sharing to a power-sharing structure). In Nepal, on February 1, 2005, King Gyanendra imposed a state of emergency, dismissing the civilian government, assuming all executive power, and becoming chairman of an exclusionary TG, a ten-member Council of Ministers dominated by his own supporters. By announcing that he would rule directly for three years, Gyanendra spurred a joint, pro-democratic opposition response from the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists, who ultimately collaborated in a 19-day protest called the “People’s Movement II.” Gyanendra subsequently yielded executive authority on April 24 or 25, 2006, reinstating the 265-member, previously-elected parliament (which had been dissolved in 2002). This parliament declared itself sovereign, elected Girija Prasad Koirala as prime minister, and scrapped Gyanendra’s major powers. Because the parliament was previously elected, however, it was not a TG. After intense negotiations between the SPA and the Maoists, a Comprehensive Peace Accord was signed that specified the creation of a 330-member comprehensive TG called the Legislative Parliament. On January 15, 2007, 329 of these TG seats were filled (one seat remained vacant) with prior members of the parliament that had not opposed the People’s Movement II, 73 Maoists, and 48 members from unrepresented parties, professional organizations, and backward regions. The Legislative Parliament remained in power for just over one year, until elections were held on April 10, 2008 for a Constituent Assembly.

## Appendix 4C: Transitional Group Composition—Data Issues

### Approximation one: transitional group size<sup>204</sup>

#### *Angola 1991*

- The Multi-Party Conference (MPC) included 26 *parties*, but this does not necessarily indicate 26 *participants*. The size of 26 is likely an under-estimate.

#### *Cameroon 1992 (1990)*

- The Tripartite Conference included 47 *parties*, but this does not necessarily indicate 47 *participants*. The size of 47 is likely an under-estimate.

#### *Cape Verde 1990*

- The roundtable negotiations took place between three *parties*, but this does not necessarily indicate three *participants*. The size of three is likely an under-estimate.

#### *Central African Republic 1990 (1991)*

- The Grand National Debate included 19 *parties*, but this does not necessarily indicate 19 *participants*. The size of 19 is likely an under-estimate.

#### *Comoros 1992 (1991)*

- The National Conference included 23 *parties*, but this does not necessarily indicate 23 *participants*. The size of 23 is likely an under-estimate.

#### *Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of Congo) 1997*

- The National Forum of Reconciliation included “more than 1400” participants. The size of 1400 is therefore an under-estimate.

#### *Ethiopia 1991*

- Because I use July 22, 1991 as the starting date even though May 28 is the *de facto* starting date, the transitional group size of 108 may be an over-estimate for the approximately two months before July 22.

#### *Gabon 1990*

- The National Conference included “over 2000” participants. The size of 2000 is therefore an under-estimate.

#### *Georgia 1992*

- The Military Council included three members and the Political Consultative Council (PCC) included approximately 40 members. The size of 43 is therefore an approximation.
- The State Council size of 68 comes from May, not March, so I use it as an approximation for the March size.

#### *Malawi 1994 (1992)*

- The National Executive Council (NEC) included two members and the National Consultative Council (NCC) seven members from each political party. In November 1993, seven political parties existed, suggesting an approximate combined NEC and NCC size of 63.

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<sup>204</sup> Note that, in order to be comprehensive, these data issues refer to all varieties of transitional groups—restrictive (*TG-r*), debate (*TG-d*), and constitution (*TG-c*)—and not solely the cases of *TG-r* discussed in Chapter Four.



*South Africa 1994 (1990)*

- The Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF) had a 208-member Plenary (the main decision-making body), but in total included between 404 and 410 members. I use a size of 404, but this may be a slight under-estimate.

Missing data: transitional group size

*Angola 1991*

- For the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM), there was equal representation of the MPLA and UNITA, but the number of participants is unknown.

*Cambodia 1989-1993 (1991)*<sup>205</sup>

- The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) force included approximately 25,000 members, but because it is difficult to say how many of these members were there to facilitate elections, the size is unknown.

Other notes

*Afghanistan 1992*

- The Islamabad Accords were signed on March 7, 1993 by Burhanuddin Rabbani and his mujahideen opponents. This agreement created a new power-sharing interim government to try to end hostilities and enlisted Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of a major mujahideen faction, as prime minister. Despite Hekmatyar's appointment, fighting continued. Because this power-sharing plan broke down almost immediately, I do not include data regarding the second power-sharing government.

*Burundi 1993 (1987)*

- Burundi in 1993 shows a shift in transitional group composition over time, from exclusionary TG to pluralistic TG. This shift occurs in 1988 when, following violent massacres between Hutus and Tutsis, Pierre Buyoya and his 31-member Tutsi Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) opened institutions to Hutu officers. Buyoya appointed a Hutu prime minister, Adrien Sibomana, to head a 23-member national unity government and created a 24-member Commission for National Unity to address ethnic tensions. Because Buyoya and the CMSN remained the dominant decision-making body even after the introduction of the national unity government, the TG transitions from exclusionary to pluralistic.

*Niger 1996*

- For the sequential group in the Niger 1996 case, I combine the following three groups: (1) the 100-member "Conseil des sages," (2) the 32-member Coordinating Committee for the National Forum, and (3) the 700-member National Forum for Democratic Renewal. These groups were to submit proposals for constitutional changes and function free from military influence. Each of them included former state officials, traditional chiefs, religious leaders, and members of the judiciary.

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<sup>205</sup> Such a similar situation occurred in both Iraq 2003 and Timor-Leste (East Timor) 1999, in which a large international force acted as an umbrella organization for domestic reform. In Cambodia, however, UNTAC was specifically mandated to sponsor elections for the Constituent Assembly. It acted as a parallel counterpart to the Supreme National Council (SNC). In Iraq, I focus specifically on the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) within the Coalition Provisional Authority, then the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). In Timor-Leste, I focus on the National Consultative Council (NCC) within the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), then the East Timorese Transitional Authority (ETTA).

## Coding Appendix A: Potential Regime Transition Case Descriptions

This appendix contains information on every case included in the dataset.<sup>206</sup> I present each case in a standard format, which looks similar to the following:

### Country Year (my year)

- Description:
  - o Coding part one:
    - A (a)
    - B (b)
    - C
  - o Coding part two:
    - D (d)
  - o Coding part three:
    - E (e)
  - *Alternative coding:*

I first list the country and year of the potential regime transition. If I list a year in parentheses, this indicates that my coding of the starting year of the transition (what I term the “transitional event”) differs from that identified by the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (GWF); Polity IV; and/or Cheibub, Ghandhi, and Vreeland (CGV) datasets.<sup>207</sup>

I next list a description of the potential regime transition. The description begins with what I code as the transitional event, but often also includes events that occurred *before* and *after* the case year. I provide this additional information in order to give context to the events. By necessity, I leave out many details and selectively report events that allow me to code transitional groups for the potential regime transition. For a list of references used for each case, please see Coding Appendix Three.

Below the case description, I list my coding decisions, which correspond to the system described in Coding Appendix One. All decisions take the form of **yes** or **no**.

*Coding part one:* A (a) refers to questions one through six in Coding Appendix One. If A is **no**, there is no transitional group and coding ends. Because A is **yes** if any of questions one through six are **yes**, I list the corresponding variable coded as **yes** in (a) and move on to B (b).

*Coding part one:* B (b) refers to questions seven and eight in Coding Appendix One. If B is **no**, there is no transitional group and coding for the case ends. Because A is **yes** if either question seven or eight is **yes**, I list the corresponding variable(s) coded as **yes** in (b) and move on to C.

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<sup>206</sup> For information on case selection, please refer to the Chapter Two in *Between Regimes: Institutional Design in Transitional Groups*. Note that this appendix *excludes* 23 duplicates (that is, cases that—by my coding—represent a transition already included in the data set). The duplicate cases are the following: Angola 1992-7; Armenia 1995-6; Azerbaijan 1994-5; Bangladesh 2008, 2009; Belarus 1994; Burundi 1997-8, 2005; Cambodia 1998; Ethiopia 1994-5; Guinea-Bissau 2004; Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) 2000; Liberia 1997, 2006; Mauritania 2007; Mongolia 1993; Nepal 2008; Niger 1993; Paraguay 1993; Soviet Union 1991; Suriname 1991; Taiwan 1996; and Yugoslavia 1990.

<sup>207</sup> This dataset covers a total of 223 cases (the initial 246, minus 23 duplicates) and identifies 182 potential regime transition cases from 1989 to 2010. Based on my coding, there are a total of six cases identified by GWF, Polity IV, and/or CGV in which the transitional event occurs *prior* to 1989. These cases are the following (my recoded transitional event year is in parentheses): Algeria 1989 (1988), Burundi 1993 (1987), Chad 1989 (1988), Chile 1989-90 (1987), Fiji 1990-2 (1987), and Namibia 1990 (1988). Because other authors identify these cases as occurring in 1989 or later, I include case descriptions for each of them in this appendix.

*Coding part one:* *C* refers to question nine in Coding Appendix One. If *C* is **no**, there is no transitional group and coding for the case ends. If *C* is **yes**, I move on to *Coding part two: D (d)*.

*Coding part two:* *D (d)* reflects answers to questions ten and eleven in Coding Appendix One. If *D* is **no**, there is no transitional group and coding for the case ends. Because an answer of **no** to either question ten or question eleven leads to **no** for *D*, I list the corresponding variable(s) coded as **no** in (*d*). If *D* is **yes**, I move on to *Coding part three: E (e)*.

*Coding part three:* *E (e)* corresponds to questions twelve through fourteen in Coding Appendix One. If *E* is **no**, there is no transitional group. Because an answer of **no** to any of questions twelve, thirteen, or fourteen leads to **no** for *E*, I list the corresponding variable(s) coded as **no** in (*e*). If *E* is **yes**, there is a transitional group.

The coding decisions listed in this document correspond directly with the coding system described in detail in Coding Appendix One. In my dataset, the variable *TG-restrictive* reflects this coding scheme.

Below the coding decisions, in a total of 25 cases, I additionally list either *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive* or *Alternative coding: TG-permissive*. *TG-moderately permissive* and *TG-permissive* refer to two additional variables in my dataset (please see Chapter Two in *Between Regimes: Institutional Design in Transitional Groups* for a discussion of these variables). Each represents a more lenient coding scheme than *TG-restrictive*.

- *TG-moderately permissive* includes transitional group cases in which round table discussions, national debates, or non-sovereign national conferences existed that were not otherwise included in *TG-restrictive*. Typically, the additional cases that *TG-moderately permissive* identifies are groups that appear very similar to the transitional groups in *TG-restrictive*, with the caveat that the groups' decisions had to be approved by an existing parliament.
  - o The 15 additional cases—in comparison to *TG-restrictive*—that *TG-moderately permissive* identifies as having a transitional group are the following: Angola 1991, Bulgaria 1990 (1989), Burkina Faso 2000-2001 (1999), Cameroon 1992 (1990), Cape Verde 1990, Central African Republic 1990 (1991), Czechoslovakia 1989, East Germany 1990 (1989), Guinea-Bissau 1991-1994 (1990), Hungary 1990 (1989), Lesotho 1998, Mozambique 1994 (1990), Poland 1989, São Tomé and Príncipe 1991 (1989), and Sierra Leone 1998.
- *TG-permissive* includes transitional group cases in which constitutional committees—committees dedicated explicitly to discussing constitutional amendments—existed that were not otherwise included in *TG-moderately permissive*. These cases appear less similar to those included in *TG-restrictive* than do cases included in *TG-moderately permissive*.
  - o The nine additional cases—in comparison to *TG-moderately permissive*—that *TG-permissive* identifies are the following: Algeria 1989 (1988), Chad 1989 (1988), El Salvador 1994 (1992), Estonia 1991, Ghana 1993 (1992), Kenya 1998 (1997), Maldives 2008 (2005), Tajikistan 1997-1998 (1997), and Zambia 1991 (1990).

## Afghanistan 1992

- Description: On April 16, 1992, President Mohammed Najibullah's government was ousted. Approximately one month earlier, on March 18, 1992, Najibullah had announced his willingness to resign. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then the General Secretary of the United Nations, announced that a transitional council of 15 members would take over control of the Afghan government on April 28, 1992. Abad El Rahman Hatef, one of Najibullah's deputies, was appointed temporary acting president. He went to negotiate with Ahmed Shah Massoud—a leader of the mujahideen—but Massoud rejected his offers and continued to advance on Kabul. Massoud's mujahideen faction took control of Kabul shortly thereafter. On April 24, 1992 five mujahideen leaders signed the United Nations' plan known as the Peshawar Accords, which agreed on a power-sharing, provisional government. On April 28, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi (head of the National Liberation Front) became acting president for two months. On May 5, 1992, Mojaddedi established a 35-member cabinet that represented most of the mujahideen factions and included open seats for mujahideen movements that had not yet joined the transitional government. Mojaddedi announced his intention to remain in power for two additional years, leading to his deposition. On June 28, 1992, Mojaddedi was followed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was supposed to be acting president for four months. He was assisted by a 50-member council, which was composed of the leaders of various mujahideen parties, religious leaders, and intellectuals representing various guerrilla factions. According to the Peshawar Accords, at the end of the second interim period, in November 1992, elections were to be held. These elections, however, were postponed until January 1993 and, in the meantime, the council voted to extend Rabbani's mandate. Rabbani's government attempted to hold a council to vote on a new constitution and yet another interim government, but opposing mujahideen factions accused him of stacking the agreement in his own favor and no decision was reached. At the end of December, Rabbani postponed an assembly (*shura*) to choose an interim government and was reelected as president by the Resolution and Settlement Council—a group composed of 1335 tribal leaders (though several mujahideen factions refused to participate). Following additional fighting, on March 7, 1993, the Islamabad Accords were signed by Rabbani and his mujahideen opponents, which created a new power-sharing interim government to try to end hostilities with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—leader of a major mujahideen faction—as prime minister. This new power-sharing plan soon broke down, as fighting resumed almost immediately. On June 17, 1993, a new Council of Ministers was sworn in and Rabbani's tenure as president was extended by six months.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (CivilWar)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - yes
  - o Coding part three:
    - yes

## Afghanistan 1996

- Description: On September 27, 1996, Kabul fell to the Taliban. The Taliban created the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, though the Islamic State of Afghanistan government remained the internationally-recognized government of the country. The Taliban installed a six-member council of mullahs, headed by Mullah Mohammed Rabbani. The council instituted a highly repressive administration, based on a strict Islamic code. Ahmad Shah Massoud, Defense Minister of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and Burhanuddin Rabbani, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, created the United Front (commonly known as the Northern Alliance) in opposition to the Taliban. Abdul Rashid Dostum also aligned himself with Massoud, but though the United

Front controlled a small portion of Afghanistan, the Taliban was able to establish governance over the majority of the country.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (CivilWar)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

### **Afghanistan 2001**

- Description: On November 13, 2001, the Taliban government in Kabul was defeated by invading forces as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, which the United States and its allies began on October 7, 2001. Burhanuddin Rabbani, who had been organizing in opposition to the Taliban with the United Front (Northern Alliance), returned to Kabul and acted as temporary president from November until December 20, 2001. Rabbani had previously served as the President of Afghanistan until his government was overthrown by the Taliban in 1996. At the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan, the Bonn Agreement specified that an Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) would govern the country for six months, until an emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Council) would select a broad-based Transitional Authority to lead Afghanistan pending the election of a fully representative government within two years. Hamid Karzai was chosen to head the AIA. The AIA, which included no Taliban, was the highest authority in Afghanistan from December 22, 2001 until June 13, 2002. This interim power-sharing council contained 30 members, 11 Pashtuns, eight Tajiks, five Shi'a Hazara, three Uzbeks, and the remainder drawn from other minorities. Between June 10 and 21, 2002,<sup>208</sup> an Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ)—a grand council meeting, with 1501 people attending—was held to appoint a head of state and Transitional Authority. The new Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA) became the main Afghani authority in July 2002 and was in charge of overseeing the country's transition to elected governmental rule. The ELJ chose Karzai as the transitional president, who subsequently increased the number of Pashtuns in the interim administration from 11 to 16 (increasing the size of the transitional government from 30 to 35). In December 2003 and January 2004, a 502-member Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) met to draft and ratify a new constitution. The new constitution was ratified by the CLJ (by consensus) on January 4, 2004. The CLJ members were selected in UN-run caucuses and no militia commanders or government officials were allowed to take part. Presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004 and parliamentary elections occurred on September 18, 2005. The newly-elected government met for the first time on December 19, 2005.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (IntlInt)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

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<sup>208</sup> Note: Sources report slightly different dates for the ELJ (e.g., June 11 to 19), but I choose June 10 to 21 because this represents the range most frequently cited.

## **Afghanistan 2009**

- Description: On August 20, 2009, a presidential election was held. Throughout the year, the security situation deteriorated significantly, with the Taliban increasing its activities, particularly around the time of the election. The first round of elections was marred by fraud prompting the Electoral Complaints Commission to throw out 1.2 million illegitimate presidential votes. As a result, no candidate was left with the required majority for election, so a runoff race was announced (only after U.S. Senator John Kerry convinced President Hamid Karzai to follow constitutional protocol). Hamid Karzai won the election, though this result was also considered dubious. Karzai presented a list of 24 cabinet nominees to the Afghan parliament on December 19, 2009, but on January 2, 2010, the parliament rejected 17 of the nominees. Two weeks later, the parliament rejected 10 of the 17 replacement nominees. Karzai kept some of these nominees as “acting ministers,” despite not having parliamentary approval, and created a third list of minister nominees in the summer of 2010 (and eventually a fourth list in 2012). Legislative elections were held on September 18, 2010.
  - o Coding part one:
    - no

## **Albania 1990**

- Description: On December 19, 1990, a decree legalizing independent parties was approved. Beginning ten days earlier, on December 9, 1990, strikes and student demonstrations calling for a multiparty system occurred. Prior to this, in November 1990, President Ramiz Alia of the Party of Labour of Albania (PPSh, the communist party) appointed a commission to draft a new constitution and election law. The election law was adopted while Albania was still a one-party state. Then, on December 11, in a meeting with student representatives, Alia accepted demands for political pluralism when he announced that the Central Committee would allow “independent political organizations.” Despite the December 19 legalization of parties, the PPSh continued to control the main levers of power, including the military and secret police, and tensions mounted in January and February 1991. Alia responded at the end of February 1991 by assuming personal control over the country and announcing a new government. He removed various communist officials, appointed Fatos Nano as prime minister, and appointed a nine-member presidential council. This government was composed only of incumbent Labour Party of Albania (PPSh) officials and there was no negotiation with opposition parties about how the elections would be conducted. Multiparty elections began on March 31, 1991 (with later rounds held on April 7 and April 14, 1991), in which the PPSh won the majority.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - no

## **Albania 1991**

- Description: On June 4, 1991, following several weeks of strikes and demonstrations, the government resigned. This was only a few months after the first multiparty parliamentary elections were held, on March 31, 1991, in which the incumbent Party of Labour of Albania (PPSh) won. President Ramiz Alia of the PPSh was subsequently elected to retain his post. Due to changes in a new electoral law prohibiting the president from holding office in a political party, Alia resigned from his position as first secretary of the PPSh after his reelection. On April 29, the new legislature passed transitional legislation called the Law on the Main Constitutional Provisions, which essentially acted as an interim constitution until a more permanent agreement could be brokered between the communist majority and the minority opposition. Alia appointed Prime Minister Fatos Nano following the elections, but strikes and demonstrations—which started as early as April 1—continued to grow, forcing the National Assembly to disband completely, with Nano’s government resigning on June 4. Though Alia remained president, Albanian political parties then reached an



agreement to form an interim coalition government (which came to power on June 12, 1991) and to hold new elections in May or June 1992. The communists chose Ylli Bufi as prime minister, who formed a 24-member government of experts dominated by non-communists and dubbed the “Government of National Stability” (or the “National Salvation Government”). While the communists named 12 ministers, four of these were non-communist. The Democratic Party named seven ministers and other opposition parties named the rest. This government therefore included communists and non-communists from the five major parties (Socialist, Democratic, Republican, Social-Democratic, and Agrarian). The coalition government had the goal of steering the country toward new elections in 1992 and reorganizing the economy in response to economic problems, such as a massive food shortage. It, however, was largely ineffective and received much criticism, particularly from Democratic Party leader Sali Berisha. In December 1991, several coalition partners withdrew from the coalition government, leading Bufi to resign. Alia announced that new elections would be held on March 22, 1992. On December 18, Alia then replaced the first iteration coalition government with a caretaker government comprised of 19 non-party professionals and headed by Vilson Ahmeti. The mandate of this caretaker government was to attempt to restore law and order and prepare the country for new elections. On March 22, 1992, the Democratic Party won the parliamentary election, Alia resigned as president on April 3, 1992, and Sali Berisha was elected to the presidency by the parliament on April 9, 1992. On April 13, Alexander Meksi became prime minister.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

### **Albania 1996-1997 (1997)**

- Description: On March 1, 1997, Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi's government resigned and, on March 2, 1997, a state of emergency was declared. This followed an economic crisis beginning in late 1996, in which Ponzi schemes operating in the country failed. Between January 8 and January 16, 1997, the vast majority of the pyramid schemes collapsed. This led to mass civil unrest, with the first protest occurring on January 16. On January 24, a rebellion began and, starting in February 1997, thousands of citizens launched daily protests. Beginning on February 28, 1997, a ten day armed rebellion occurred. Because of the violence, Meksi's government was forced to resign. The day after the state of emergency was declared, on March 3, Berisha was reelected by the parliament to a new term of office, but by early March, government authority essentially collapsed. In fact, on March 4, the Committee of Public Salvation was formed, led by Albert Shyti, which acted as a parallel government in the south of the country. After internationally-mediated talks, a deal was brokered between Berisha and ten political parties on March 9, 1997. This provided for the creation of a 16-member national reconciliation government and early parliamentary elections in June 1997. On March 12, Berisha appointed Bashkim Fino from the Socialist Party of Albania as the new prime minister. This government was broad-based—including the Democrats, the Socialists, and seven other parties—and had the main goal of organizing new parliamentary elections. This transfer of power, however, did not halt the unrest and anarchy spread. As calls for Berisha's resignation intensified, on April 15, 1997, Operation Alba (“Dawn”) was launched, an Italian-led, multi-national mission to restore rule of law to the country. Berisha was further pressured to resign by his former western allies, the United States, and other Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) countries. On May 9, ten political parties signed a new electoral law. But,

because the previous parliament remained, on May 13, it voted for an electoral law that was very similar to the previous one. Berisha dissolved parliament on May 21 in anticipation of the parliamentary election, but due to the unrest, the OSCE actually conducted the election. It was held on June 29, 1997 and the Socialist Party won decisively, Berisha resigned on July 23, and Socialist Party member Rexhep Meidani replaced him. The new socialist-led coalition government was sworn in on July 25, 1997 under Prime Minister Fatos Nano.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (InvolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)

### Algeria 1989 (1988)

- Description: On October 12, 1988, President Chadli Bendjedid began to implement a transition toward multiparty democracy by announcing his intention to modify the constitution in order to decrease the ruling Front for National Liberation's (FLN) power. Earlier in the month, on October 5, youth protests, commonly known as the "October Riots," began to occur against Bendjedid and the FLN. The FLN was the sole legal party and the previous parliamentary election had occurred on February 26, 1987. In response to the October Riots, the military suppressed the rioters, officially killing over 150 people.<sup>209</sup> On October 12, Bendjedid announced that he would decrease the FLN's power, but it was not until October 29 that Bendjedid dismissed his second in command, Mohamed Chérif Messaadia, and the head of military security, General Mejdoub Lakehel-Ayat. These two positions were filled by Abdelhaid Mehri and Colonel Mohamed Bechine, respectively, both of whom were seen as more supportive of political reform than their predecessors. On November 3, a referendum was held, in which the president's plan for constitutional amendments was approved, which included making the president answer to Algeria's National Assembly for his government policies. Shortly after the referendum, a congress of the ruling party decided that opposition political parties would remain illegal and so, on December 22, Bendjedid ran unopposed for the presidency. After his reelection, Bendjedid appointed a three-member committee to draft a new constitution, which consulted with union leaders and civic groups. This provided "the right to create associations of a political character," was accepted by Bendjedid on February 4, and was approved on February 23, 1989 by constitutional referendum. Provincial elections were held on June 12, 1990, in which the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) defeated the FLN.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (InvolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-permissive*

### Algeria 1991

- Description: On June 5, 1991, President Chadli Bendjedid dismissed the government and appointed Sid Ahmed Ghazali, then the foreign minister, as the new civilian prime minister. This followed public demonstrations against electoral reforms that favored the ruling Front for National Liberation (FLN), which began on May 25. The strikes were organized by the Islamic Salvation

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<sup>209</sup> The exact number is disputed, with the reported number ranging from 159 to over 175 deaths.



Front (FIS), a major opposition party, who called the legitimacy of the government into question due to gerrymandering concerns. In response, on June 4, President Chadli Bendjedid called in the army and declared martial law. Furthermore, he postponed parliamentary elections that were supposed to be held later that year. On June 5, after the military arrested a large number of protesters and called for the resignation of Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche, Bendjedid dismissed the government. The existing parliament remained during this time, but on June 7, after holding talks with top FIS officials, Ghazali announced an agreement to hold parliamentary and presidential elections before the end of the year. On June 18, a new caretaker government under Ghazali was selected, which consisted mainly of unknown technocrats (Ghozali kept only six of 29 ministers who had served under Hamrouche) and had the goals of restoring civil peace and preparing conditions for the elections. On September 29, 1991, the state of emergency was lifted and, in October 1991, Ghazali's amendments to the electoral law were passed by the existing parliament. Parliamentary elections then occurred on December 26, 1991. The FIS took a large portion of seats and Bendjedid's FLN only won 16 seats. Before the second round of elections could take place, which had been scheduled for January 15, 1992, the military ousted Bendjedid's government. Bendjedid was forced to resign on January 11, 1992.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [no \(NoElec\)](#)

## Algeria 1992

- Description: On January 11, 1992, after the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) dominated the first round of legislative elections in December 1991, members of President Chadli Bendjedid's cabinet conducted a military coup. This coup was led by Sid Ahmed Ghazali, Minister of Defense/General Khaled Nezzar, and Minister of Interior/General Larbi Belkheir. After the coup, elections were cancelled and the FIS was banned (which triggered an insurgency and the Algerian Civil War), parliament was dissolved, and Bendjedid was forced to resign. The leaders appointed Ghazali as prime minister and head of the High Security Council (or Higher Security Council, HCS), a six-member advisory body of military officials. On January 14, the HCS established the High Council of State (HCE), a five-member collective presidency. Two days later, the exiled nationalist Mohamed Boudiaf returned to Algeria to act as HCE chairman. The HCE suspended the constitution, but gave itself a mandate only until 1993, when it would hand power over to a transition government to resume the democratic process. Though a state of emergency was declared on February 9, to fill the legislative vacuum, the National Consultative Council (CCN) was created on April 22. It consisted of 60 members, was originally led by Redha Malek, and had no members from the Front for National Liberation (FLN) or the FIS, consisting instead of business leaders, journalists, and academics. HCE Chairman Boudiaf was assassinated on June 29, 1992 and subsequently replaced by HCE member Ali Kafi. Shortly thereafter, on July 8, Ghazali resigned and was replaced by Belaid Abdessalam. The HCE subsequently extended the state of emergency on February 9, 1993. It later presented a blueprint for constitutional change. In October 1993, the HCE formed an eight person Committee of National Dialogue in an attempt to chart the country's political future, but because the HCE did not allow the FIS to join the negotiations, they alienated many political and civil society groups. In January 1994, the HCE attempted to hold a National Dialogue Conference, but many parties boycotted it. On January 27, 1994, the HCE chose Major General Liamine Zéroual as president, who officially took over on January 31.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(MilCoup\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)

- yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

#### **Algeria 1995 (1994)**

- Description: On February 7, 1994, head of the High Council of State (HCE) Liamine Zéroual announced his desire for a “dialogue that excluded no one.” Only one week earlier, on January 31, 1994 Zéroual became the head of the HCE collective presidency. While the Algerian Civil War continued, the HCE had held a “national consensus” or “national dialogue” conference, which was to prepare for a transitional government to reinstate democracy. Because this conference was boycotted by the main political parties and attended only by some trade unions and minor interest groups, the military essentially selected Zéroual. Soon after his inauguration, Zéroual opened discussions with the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and then announced his intentions to hold a national dialogue. Though alienating various military elites by this move and subsequent attempts to release FIS leaders from prison, Zéroual embarked on a number of (mostly unsuccessful) attempts at dialogue with various parties. On May 18, 1994, the National Consultative Council (CCN) stopped functioning and a new legislature, the National Transitional Council (CNT), was appointed. The CNT had 190 members that were divided according to a quota system between the government, trade unions, political parties, and professional, social, and cultural organizations. The CNT was inaugurated for a three-year transitional period. On November 16, 1995, Zéroual was elected president. In May 1996, Zéroual announced plans for a general election and, in November 1996, a new constitution was promulgated. Following a constitutional referendum on November 26, this new constitution was signed into law on December 7, 1996. The CNT dissolved on May 18, 1997 and a legislative election was held on June 5, 1997 (though note that the insurgent Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which had been legally excluded from government since 1992, was banned from running). The new government was formed on June 25, 1997.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

#### **Algeria 2004**

- Description: On April 8, 2004, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was reelected (previously elected in 1999). This followed an election which, by most accounts, was Algeria’s first truly open election. The military, normally a strong player in Algerian politics, decided to take an ostensibly neutral stance on the elections. Bouteflika captured 84.99 percent of the vote, leading to many accusations of electoral fraud. There had, however, been additional oversight by all parties involved at polling locations. In the first year of his new term, Bouteflika presented the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which attempted to bring closure to the Algerian Civil War by offering amnesty for most of the violence. A referendum on this charter was held on September 29, 2005 and passed almost unanimously.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

## Angola 1991

- Description: On May 31, 1991, after 16 years of civil war, President José Eduardo dos Santos signed a peace accord with Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Negotiations between the two sides began in April 1990 and culminated in the Bicesse Accords of May 1991. This peace agreement provided for free and fair elections of a new government and, to this end, in June 1991 the ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola—Labour Party (MPLA) abolished the one-party system (though the National Assembly had passed a law providing for a multiparty system on May 11). As part of the terms of the treaty, the government and UNITA formed the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM), which was to oversee political reconciliation. In addition to the CCPM, the Bicesse Accords established a subordinate Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF) and a Joint Commission for the Formation of the Armed Forces (CCFA). These groupings included equal numbers of representatives of the government and UNITA as members; representatives of Portugal, the U.S., and the Russian Federation as observers; and a United Nations’ representative (whose only role was to observe and verify progress toward the creation of a national army and elections). The MPLA agreed to transition under the supervision of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), with national elections to be held within 15-18 months of the ceasefire. For this purpose, a National Electoral Council (NEC) was created, which had representation of all legalized political parties. UNITA was given a consultative role in the development of the interim constitution; representatives worked with the government to draft amendment texts. However, all amendments had to be ratified by Angola’s previously-elected, single-party legislature, the Angolan People’s National Assembly. In accordance with the Bicesse Accords, between January 14 and 26, 1992, the MPLA government held a Multi-Party Conference (MPC) with 26 newly-recognized political parties (UNITA boycotted, but subsequently had bilateral talks with the MPLA). At the MPC, the MPLA consulted with opposition parties on “matters of common interest,” such as the proposed electoral law, the role of foreign electoral observers, the law for establishing political parties, and the role of the media. While some opposition leaders called for a sovereign national conference during the MPC, the MPLA government denied this request. The constitution was ratified on August 25, 1992 by the previously-elected legislature and parliamentary elections were held on September 29 and 30, 1992. While there was supposed to be a second round of elections, Jonas Savimbi claimed that the first round had been rigged and therefore refused to participate in the planned runoff election. On October 31, 1992, the election process broke down when government troops attacked UNITA, the “Halloween Massacre” occurred, and the country returned to civil war. On December 2, 1992, President dos Santos named a prime minister and announced the formation of a new government.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)
      - *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

## Armenia 1994 (1991)

- Description: On September 21, 1991, Armenia declared full independence from the Soviet Union. This followed various protests, which gained steam in May 1989—with a mass protest held on May 28, the anniversary of the 1918 Armenian Declaration of Independence—calling for the end to martial law and attention to violence in the Karabakh region (protests that related to an annexation referendum held in the Nagnorno-Karabakh’s region had occurred earlier, with demonstrations as early as February 1988, but these did not relate directly to Armenian independence). Protests that specifically called for secession began with a 250,000 person demonstration in Yerevan on

September 15, 1989. Parliamentary elections were held in August 1990 and the new Armenian government officially declared its intention to become independent. In September 1991, there was a referendum on independence and, on October 16, 1991, Levon Ter-Petrosyan was elected president. Prior to this, he had been Chairman of the Supreme Council (since May 20, 1990). On December 31, 1994, the Ter-Petrosyan government suspended the largest opposition party (Dashnak, HHD). After disqualifying additional parties and candidates, legislative elections and a constitutional referendum were held on July 5, 1995.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [no](#)

### **Armenia 1998**

- Description: On February 3, 1998, Levon Ter-Petrosyan and other high officials were forced to step down. This occurred following Ter-Petrosyan's attempt at creating a compromise settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Following a press conference in which he expressed this unpopular position on September 26, 1997, there were public protests and loss of support from government ministers. After Ter-Petrosyan stepped down, Parliament Speaker Babken Ararktsyan became acting head of state. An early presidential election took place on March 16, 1998, with a second round on March 30. Robert Kocharyan, who had been prime minister since March 20, 1997, won this election. On May 30, 1999, parliamentary elections took place.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriRul\)](#)
    - [no](#)

### **Azerbaijan 1991**

- Description: On September 16, 1991, Ayaz Mutalibov, the President of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic since May 1990, dissolved the communist party and proposed constitutional changes for direct presidential elections. Shortly thereafter, on October 18, 1991, Azerbaijan declared independence from the Soviet Union. These actions stemmed from pressure from popular demonstrations and the opposition Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), led by Abulfaz Elchibey, in response to Mutalibov's perceived support for the August 19-21 attempted coup in the Soviet Union against President Mikhail Gorbachev. In the presidential election, Mutalibov was the only candidate and thus was elected president. Parliamentary elections had been held in September 1990 under a state of martial law and, on November 26, 1991, the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet voted to establish an additional legislative body composed of its own members: the 50-deputy National Council. This "mini-legislature" met in continuous session and consisted of 25 pro-government deputies and 25 opposition deputies of the Supreme Soviet. The decision for independence was affirmed in a nationwide referendum in December 1991.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
    - [no](#)

### **Azerbaijan 1992**

- Description: On March 6, 1992, Ayaz Mutalibov resigned following opposition pressure and a popular uprising stemming from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia. After the "Khojaly Massacre" of February 25 and 26, the Azerbaijani National Council called a meeting on March 5, which attracted thousands of protesters calling on Mutalibov to resign. With Mutalibov's resignation on the follow day, President of Azerbaijan's Supreme Soviet, Yakub Mamedov, became acting president. Due to military defeats in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Mamedov was

subsequently forced from power. On May 14, 1992, Mutalibov was restored to power and vowed to ban all political parties and impose martial law. Very shortly thereafter, however, Mutalibov was deposed and went into exile. The next day, a new pro-Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) government was formed. Due to the Supreme Soviet's complicity in bringing Mutalibov to power, the new APF government forced the Supreme Soviet to convene, elect APF official Isa Gambarov as acting president, dissolve itself, and cede all legislative power to the 50-member National Council until new parliamentary elections could be held. The National Council was a "mini-legislature" created in November 1991 from the existing parliament and composed of equal representation of communist and opposition members—25 members of a "Democratic bloc" and 25 members of a "Communist bloc." On June 7, 1992, previously-scheduled presidential elections were held.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [no \(NoElec\)](#)

### **Azerbaijan 1993**

- Description: On June 9, 1993, Colonel Suret Huseynov led a military coup against elected President Abulfaz Elchibey. On June 15, 1993, civilian Heydar Aliyev was elected as the Chairman of the National Assembly. After Elchibey fled on June 24, 1993, Aliyev assumed temporary presidential powers and, within one week, the legislative National Council formally transferred Elchibey's powers to Aliyev until a new president could be elected. Aliyev then replaced Elchibey's ministers and other officials with his own appointees. In August 1993, Elchibey was stripped of his presidency by a nationwide referendum. On October 3, 1993, Aliyev was elected president. Legislative elections occurred in 1995.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(MilCoup\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriRul\)](#)
    - [no](#)

### **Bahrain 1999**

- Description: On March 6, 1999, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa ascended to the throne on his father's death. Years earlier, in late 1994, an uprising calling for democratic reforms began. During a marathon held on November 25, 1994, a protest occurred (namely, against the runners' sports clothing and route, which protesters had asked the government to alter out of respect for their religious beliefs), which led to a number of arrests. Following the arrest of protest leader and popular religious scholar Sheikh Ali Salman on December 5, 1994, mass protests calling for democratic reforms began. Through the rest of the 1990s, protests, repression, and violence took place. However, it was not King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa took over that major political reforms took place. His succession process followed a constitutional provision, which states that the office of emir passes from father to eldest son unless the emir designates another male relative to succeed him. Some of the reforms included repealing the emergency laws that had governed the country for nearly 25 years, allowing the formation of political societies and trade unions, and allowing women the right to participate as voters and candidates. On February 14 and 15, 2001, a referendum took place on the "National Action Charter," which was a document put forth to end the 1990s uprising and make constitutional changes for a partially elected parliament, a constitutional monarchy, and an independent judiciary. In 2002, a new constitution was promulgated. On October 24, 2002, the

first parliamentary elections in almost 30 years took place.<sup>210</sup> After three rounds of voting, the new parliament held its inaugural ceremony on December 14, 2002.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul\)](#)
  - [no](#)

## **Bangladesh 1990**

- Description: On December 4, 1990, Hussain Mohammad Ershad, who gained power in a coup in 1982, resigned (effective December 8). This followed a revolt of all major political parties, the public, a mass student uprising, and pressure from Western donors. The mass unrest began after university elections at schools across Bangladesh led to the widespread victory of the Nationalist Student Party (JCD). On October 1, 1990, at a meeting between elected student leaders, the JCD called for protests against Ershad's regime and demanded free and fair elections; protests began to occur around October 10 (earlier protests had occurred, with mass protests as early as July 1987, but they resulted in only minimal reforms). The student uprising spurred national opposition parties to action and, at a November 19 meeting between national opposition and student parties, the joint opposition issued a statement calling for Ershad to select an "acceptable" vice president and resign. On November 28, Ershad declared a state of emergency, but strikes and protests continued. Subsequent to Ershad's resignation on December 4, the statement called for the new vice president to schedule national elections and oversee an interim government that would design and monitor these elections. As a response, Ershad invited the opposition to nominate a new vice president; they chose Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed. On December 6, Ershad dissolved parliament and appointed Shahabuddin as acting president. Shahabuddin declared a state of emergency, restored civil liberties, and headed a neutral caretaker administration whose primary responsibility was to conduct a parliamentary election with all parties allowed to participate. Ahmed put together a transitional team in a Council of Advisors, who first met on December 15. This 17-member advisory board consisted of bureaucrats, academics, a former military officer and freedom fighter, and other professionals. President Shahabuddin invited a few highly respected senior people to serve on the council, but the majority of council members were nominees of particular parties or alliances. This council functioned as a consultative body, where all issues relating to the election and governance were discussed. The council also came under pressure from various opposition forces to try former President Ershad for corruption. Under special provisions of the Bangladeshi legal code, Ershad and many other former regime officials were detained, but were not officially tried until after the institution of the democratically-elected government. Elections were held on February 27, 1991, with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) winning 138 of the 298 parliamentary seats and forming a new government shortly thereafter. Begum Khaleda Zia, Bangladesh's first female prime minister, was sworn in on March 20, 1991.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
    - [yes](#)
  - Coding part two:
    - [yes](#)
  - Coding part three:
    - [yes](#)

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<sup>210</sup> Note that this election was for the 40 seats of one parliamentary chamber: al-Nuwab. The other chamber, the Shoura Council, also contained 40 members, but these were directly appointed by the king.



## **Bangladesh 2007**

- Description: On January 11, 2007, President Iajuddin Ahmed declared a state of emergency and the military intervened to install a non-political civilian government, drawn mostly from the professional sector. This was due in large part to disagreements about the head of what should have been the previous caretaker government, which caused the Awami League and its allies to withdraw from an election. According to the 1996 Constitution, the immediate past Chief Justice is appointed Chief Advisor during a caretaker government, which manages the government during an interim 90-day period until parliamentary elections. This caretaker government must be neutral and non-partisan in order to organize free and fair elections. However, in late October 2006 when Prime Minister Khaleda Zia dissolved parliament, the parties could not decide on the caretaker head. Because of this inability to choose the caretaker government, Ahmed retained his position as president and additionally became the Chief Advisor of the Caretaker Government. He appointed ten advisors to a council to act as ministers. When the military intervened on January 11, Ahmed resigned from his position as chief advisor, appointed the former Justice Fazlul Haque as Interim Chief Advisor, and imposed a state of emergency. The next day, on January 12, 2007, in consultation with the military, Ahmed appointed Fakhruddin Ahmed as the new Chief Advisor of the Caretaker Government. This military-backed caretaker government was non-partisan, with officials drawn primarily from the private sector. It contained five advisers in addition to Ahmed. The caretaker government focused on corruption issues and promised to return the country to democracy. On November 3, 2008, Ahmed announced that elections would be held in December and relaxed the state of emergency. The emergency state was lifted completely on December 17 and parliamentary elections were held on December 29, 2008. Members of parliament were sworn in on January 3, 2009. On January 6, Sheikh Hasina became prime minister and formed a new government, which officially terminated the mandate of the caretaker government.
  - o Coding part one:
    - [yes \(MilCoup\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
    - [yes](#)
  - o Coding part two:
    - [yes](#)
  - o Coding part three:
    - [yes](#)

## **Belarus 1991 (1990)**

- Description: On July 20, 1990, Belarus' Supreme Soviet (elected on March 4, 1990) began work on a post-Soviet constitution. The Supreme Soviet named a 74-member commission, composed of 63 deputies, seven legal scholars, and four executive branch officials. Because the large number of commission members had a difficult time coming to consensus, a 14-member "working group" was created in their place. Before the constitutional commission was created, however, protests had occurred to push the state toward independence. These began after the discovery of mass graves of victims of Stalinism outside Minsk in May and June 1988, which led to the formation of the opposition Belorussian Popular Front (BPF) in fall 1988. The BPF's founding congress took place on June 24 and 25, 1989 and organized various mass demonstrations against the regime prior. Eventually, on August 25, 1991, Belarus declared independence from the Soviet Union and, on December 8, 1991, achieved formal independence. Following the declaration of independence, Communist Party Chairman Vyacheslav Kebich became the Prime Minister of Belarus. The constitution was not yet complete at this time and, in fact, a large number of drafts were created over the coming years, with the final constitution being completed only in 1994. On March 15, 1994, the Supreme Soviet voted to accept the new constitution, which then came into force on March 30, 1994. Alexander Lukashenko was elected president in the first democratic presidential election in July 1994. Legislative elections were held in May and November 1995.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [no](#)

### **Belarus 1995-6 (1996)**

- Description: On October 19 and 20, 1996, President Alexander Lukashenko convened an extra-constitutional, 5000-member “All-Belorussian Peoples’ Meeting” by decree. Earlier in 1996, after Lukashenko was elected president, the Belorussian Constitution was amended to strengthen the role of the presidency. Lukashenko nominated a small committee of government officials and legal experts to draft the amendments, while giving specific guidelines for them to follow. Lukashenko wanted to send the draft to referendum, but the Constitutional Court ruled that the document was new, rather than just an amendment, and thus had to be passed by the legislature. In response, Lukashenko convened his extra-constitutional meeting to authorize his desired referendum, despite parliamentary opposition. The democratic opposition countered with an alternative version of the constitution, and then moved to impeach Lukashenko. Following Russian mediation, Lukashenko agreed to make the referendum “advisory” and appoint a joint parliamentary-executive conciliation committee. However, after the amendments were ratified in a November 24, 1996 referendum, Lukashenko declared the referendum binding. The new constitution radically increased Lukashenko’s power, with his decrees having the force of law. After the referendum, Lukashenko dismissed the Supreme Soviet and created a new parliamentary National Assembly from members of the parliament loyal to him. Parliamentary elections were eventually held on October 15 and 29, 2000. Presidential elections took place the following year, on September 9, 2001, with Lukashenko again victorious.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(VolRef\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
    - [yes](#)
  - Coding part two:
    - [yes](#)
  - Coding part three:
    - [no \(ElecPlan, PowTran\)](#)

### **Benin 1990-1991 (1989)**

- Description: On December 7, 1989, President Mathieu Kérékou renounced Marxism, accepted an IMF structural adjustment program, and promised political reforms. Kérékou’s moves occurred after protests broke out in 1989 due, in large part, to economic problems. As early as January 9, students went on strike. Demonstrations continued throughout the year. After promising reforms, Kérékou held an initial round table meeting to decide on the format of the constitution-making process and, by January 8, 1990, had announced that there would be a national conference to organize a transitional government and plan for free and fair elections. The national conference opened on February 19, 1990 and, on February 21, declared its own sovereignty in what has sometimes been termed a “civil coup d’état.” This conference was empowered to reflect on seven volumes of citizen input, to deliberate the issues for a draft constitution, to create a transitional constitution, and to select a transitional legislature. The conference had 488<sup>211</sup> delegates—including representatives of newly formed political parties, farmers, unions, the army, religious groups, and non-governmental organizations—for a period of ten days. On March 9, the 26-member High Council for the Republic (HCR) was created, which acted as a transitional interim legislature. The HCR was chosen by the national conference to represent different groups, including

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<sup>211</sup> The number of delegates reported varies slightly across sources, from 488 to 493 delegates. Because 488 appears in multiple sources, I use that number here.



regional representatives, union leaders, and Benin's surviving ex-presidents. It was led by Archbishop Isidore de Souza. This was necessary because the delegates suspended the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly. In addition, the delegates initiated plans for multiparty elections and chose Nicéphore Soglo to become the interim prime minister. Kérékou remained in office as head of state until elections were held in 1991, but he was stripped of most of his powers. Before the elections, a constitution was completed and passed by referendum on December 2, 1990. Parliamentary elections were held on February 17, 1991 and a presidential election was held on March 10 and 24, 1991. Soglo won the presidential election and was inaugurated on April 4, 1991.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

### **Bhutan 2007**

- Description: On June 30, 2007, political parties were legalized according to a royal decree. Months earlier, on December 14, 2006, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck abdicated the throne early and transferred power to his son, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck (though the new king was not officially crowned until November 1, 2008). This followed years of slow constitutional reform. In 2001, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck initiated a constitution-drafting process, with a launching ceremony for the process held on November 30, 2001. A draft constitution was released on March 26, 2005. After the new king took over and issued the royal decree, the first parliamentary elections occurred for the upper house of parliament in late 2007 and elections for the lower house occurred on March 24, 2008. The elected parliament then adopted the new constitution on July 18, 2008.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(VolRef\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriRul\)](#)
    - [no](#)

### **Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-2008 (1990)**

- Description: On July 30, 1990, the constitution was amended and declared Bosnia-Herzegovina as a democratic state of equal citizens. Several months later, on November 18, 1990, the first multiparty parliamentary election was held while Bosnia-Herzegovina was still part of Yugoslavia. The multiparty elections resulted in a national assembly where the communists were replaced by a coalition of three ethnically-based parties (the first two candidates of each of the three ethnic groups, plus one Yugoslav, were to be elected to a seven-member rotating presidency). Alija Izetbegović was the first president, gaining office on December 20, 1990. A declaration of sovereignty from Yugoslavia then occurred on October 15, 1991, followed by a referendum for independence in early 1992. Though a majority of Serbs boycotted the referendum, those who did turn out voted nearly unanimously for independence. On March 3, 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence from Yugoslavia. Soon after, war began and the state administration effectively ceased functioning. Though Izetbegović was supposed to retain the presidency for only one year according to the constitution, this arrangement was suspended due to the “extraordinary circumstances” of the war, and then, as the nationalistic parties split, the arrangement was abandoned altogether. Beginning on June 5, 1992, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission began in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which continued until March 31, 1995.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(VolRef\)](#)

- yes (NoPriReg)
- yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)

### **Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995**

- Description: Between August 30 and September 20, 1995, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaign took place, called Operation Deliberate Force. Following years of war, the siege of Sarajevo, and (most directly) the Srebrenica massacre of July 11-13, this NATO campaign targeted Bosnian Serb positions. Airstrikes ended by September 20, as Bosnian Serb forces complied with the conditions set out by the United Nations. A ceasefire came into effect on October 12 and peace talks began in Dayton, Ohio on November 1. On December 14, 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in Paris and brought a halt to fighting in the Bosnian War (which began in 1992). The Dayton Agreement was externally-imposed, established the basic structure of the state, and split Bosnia into two regions—Republika Srpska and the Federation. The agreement called for state-level elections within nine months to establish a power-sharing arrangement. There was to be one year of internationally-supervised transition during which there would be elections and the establishment of elected political institutions of the new state. Additionally, internationally-supervised economic, judicial, and human rights institutions would be established and supervised for five or six years. The state became an international protectorate, with ultimate governing authority vested in a United Nations-mandated High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Implementation Force (IFOR), a NATO-led peacekeeping force (Operation Joint Endeavour), was dispatched from December 20, 1995 to December 20, 1996. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) established a provisional election commission and ran elections on September 14, 1996. After these state-level elections, a power-sharing arrangement began and, on January 3, 1997, all elected representatives met for the first time and appointed a Council of Ministers. This power-sharing arrangement included a collective and rotating presidency with each of the three communities—Bosnian Muslim, Croat, and Serb—electing its own representative. It also included a legislature with two-thirds of seats given to representatives of the Federation and one-third of seats given to representatives of Republika Srpska. In December 1997, the “Bonn Powers” gave the High Representative the power to override Bosnian institutions to pass legislation and remove domestic officials from office. A large NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) was deployed to safeguard the peace. SFOR remained until December 2, 2004 when it was replaced by the European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (IntlInt)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - no (Group, PowTran)

### **Bulgaria 1990 (1989)**

- Description: On November 10, 1989, the ruling Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP)—in what is sometimes termed a “palace coup”—removed Todor Zhivkov as president, replacing him with Petar Mladenov. Before this move by BCP members, small protests had taken place, beginning during an international environmental conference. On October 16, 1989, the opposition group Ecoglasnost began protesting, which spurred additional opposition groups to protest over the next few weeks. These protests spurred the November removal of Zhivkov, which was planned by Mladenov, Finance Minister Andrey Lukanov, and Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov. On

November 9, a meeting took place in private, after which Zhivkov resigned. Mladenov took over and promised democratic reforms, but protests continued. On November 18, a mass demonstration of more than 50,000 people took place in Sofia. On December 11, 1989, Mladenov announced that a multiparty election would be held in the spring. On December 27, a spokesman for the Central Committee of the Communist Party announced that it had agreed with the umbrella opposition organization, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), to hold negotiations in a round table. On January 3 and 4, 1990, the first meeting was held, with representatives of the UDF on one side and the government (BCP) and the National Agrarian Union on the other. These groups negotiated an agreement to allow 43 participants for each side, with the UDF (under the leadership of Zhelyu Zhelev, a philosophy professor) and BCP allowed to choose representatives of any organization to be part of their delegations. The round table resumed on January 16 and had approval rights on all major legislation proposed by the government, prior to formal consideration by the National Assembly. It included key government figures, representatives of opposition groups (14 opposition groups became part of a delegation representing opposition forces), and trade union representatives. This group reached compromises on election law, major provisions of the new constitution, and economic reforms. On March 30, the round table concluded its most important work and adopted the Agreement on the Basic Ideas and Principles of the Draft Law on Amendments and Addenda to the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. In April, Mladenov abolished the State Council—an executive committee within the National Assembly—and became president. On June 10 and 17, 1990, legislative elections were held and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, the former communists) won a majority of seats. On August 1, 1990, the Grand National Assembly chose Zhelyu Zhelev as president. Following additional large demonstrations, Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov resigned. In late 1990, Zhelev convened a Political Consultative Council that united all major factions behind forming a coalition government. In November 1990, Dimitar Iliev Popov, a non-partisan judge, was chosen as prime minister to lead this transitional coalition government. A new constitution was adopted in July 1991, which allowed for direct presidential elections. Legislative elections occurred on October 13, 1991, with the newly elected government taking over on November 8. A presidential election was held on January 12, 1992, with Zhelev sworn in as president on January 22, 1992.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (InvolRef)
  - yes (NoPriRul)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

### **Burkina Faso 1991**

- Description: On June 2, 1991, a multiparty constitution was adopted. Years earlier, on October 15, 1987, Blaise Compaoré led a coup that killed President Thomas Sankara. Initially, Compaoré ruled with two others, Henri Zongo and Jean-Baptiste Boukary Lingani, but in September 1989 these two were arrested and executed. Following increasing international and domestic pressure to reform the political system, Compaoré initiated a gradual liberalization of the military regime in 1991 by adopting the new multiparty constitution. While the new constitution was approved by referendum, Compaoré largely controlled the liberalization process. On December 1, 1991, Compaoré was elected president, though the opposition boycotted the poll. The opposition called for a pre-election national conference to fully define the political reform process, but Compaoré refused. As a slight concession, Compaoré delayed the parliamentary election, which took place on May 24, 1992.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - no

### Burkina Faso 2000-2001 (1999)

- Description: On June 1, 1999,<sup>212</sup> President Blaise Compaoré established a 16-member “Collège des sages”—composed of state elders, three former heads of government, religious and ethnic leaders, and respected citizens—to work toward national reconciliation and to investigate unpunished political crimes. This followed a tumultuous few months. On November 15, 1998, Compaoré was reelected. Shortly thereafter, on December 13, 1998, a popular investigative journalist named Norbert Zongo was found dead with three colleagues. Norbert had been investigating the involvement of Compaoré’s Presidential Guard in the death of his brother’s chauffeur. After the four deaths were declared an accident, a political crisis occurred. Accusing Compaoré of being involved in the killings, opposition groups organized into the Collective of Democratic Mass Organizations and Political Parties to demand a full investigation. Compaoré did begin an investigation by the end of January 1999, but demonstrations and protests still occurred. In response, Compaoré established the Collège des sages. As strikes continued, on August 2, 1999, the Collège published a report recommending the creation of a Government of National Unity and Commission of Truth and Justice. In September 1999, Compaoré negotiated with the leaders of the major political parties, but many refused to participate in the national unity government. A new Council of Ministers was created, with only two opposition figures taking part. In line with the Collège des sages’ recommendations, Compaoré announced the creation of two advisory commissions in October—the Consultative Commission on Political Reforms and the National Reconciliation Commission—to examine clauses of the constitution, formulate rules governing political parties, and promote national reconciliation. Like with the national unity government, however, some opposition parties refused to participate in the advisory commissions. In January 2000, the advisory commission on political reform recommended modifying the electoral code, reforming the judiciary, and amending the constitution; in February, the advisory commission on national reconciliation published its own set of recommendations for reform, such as greater freedoms of speech and assembly and prosecuting individuals involved in political killings. Following additional protests, in April 2000, the National Assembly adopted a revised electoral code. Despite these actions, demonstrations continued. In early November 2000, Prime Minister Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo and his government resigned and Compaoré appointed Paramanga Ernest Yonli as the replacement prime minister. Following an accord between Yonli and representatives of seven political parties, a new 36-member Council of Ministers was formed as the new government that included 12 opposition members. This administration was intended to focus on national unity and govern by consensus. In February and March 2001, 26 political parties gathered to discuss electoral reforms, which were presented in an extraordinary session of parliament (previously elected on May 11, 1997) in July 2001. As examples of the new electoral reforms, a two-term limit on the presidency was introduced, military personnel were barred from standing for presidential elections, and the Independent National Election Commission (INEC) was created, which was the first time an independent structure was in charge of organizing elections since the return to a multiparty system. On May 5, 2002, legislative elections occurred and, on June 5, Prime Minister Yonli was reappointed.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

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<sup>212</sup> Sources disagree on whether the Collège des sages was established on May 21 or June 1, 1999. The majority of sources indicate that Compaoré promised reforms in an announcement on May 21, then established the Council on June 1, which is why I use May/June 1 here.

### **Burundi 1993 (1987)**

- Description: On September 3, 1987, Pierre Buyoya overthrew Jean-Baptiste Bagaza (who was traveling out of the country) in a coup. He dissolved the parliament, suspended the constitution, created a 31-member Tutsi Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN), and was sworn in as president on October 2. This military junta was to exercise provisional authority, with Buyoya promising that the military would remain in power for only a short period. Due to repression of Hutus by the Tutsi-dominated military and violent massacres between the two groups, Buyoya opened institutions to Hutu officers in 1988. On October 19, 1988, Buyoya appointed a Hutu prime minister, Adrien Sibomana, to head a 23-member national unity government with an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi cabinet members. In addition, he created a 24-member Commission for National Unity to address ethnic tensions, with both Hutu and Tutsi representatives (members included some from the Buyoya administration, Buyoya's party, the army, the private sector, and various religious faiths). Buyoya directed this commission "to Study the Question of National Unity." While this commission produced a Charter of National Unity in 1989, Buyoya remained as president and the CMSN remained the dominant decision-making body until late 1990. In the extraordinary party congress held between December 27 and 29, Buyoya disbanded the CMSN and transferred its functions to an 80-member central committee of his party, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA). The new central committee included 41 Hutus, 38 Tutsis, and one Twa. During the congress, Buyoya additionally presented a Charter of National Unity to his party, which was adopted by referendum on February 5, 1991. After this, on March 22, Buyoya instructed a 35-member Constitutional Commission started work on the constitution, which was to include a provision for a multiparty system. The constitution was published in September 1991, submitted to referendum on March 9, 1992, and officially adopted on March 13, 1992. Presidential elections were held on June 1, 1993 and parliamentary elections were held on June 29, 1993. On July 10, President Melchior Ndadaye was sworn in, appointed Prime Minister Sylvie Kimigi, and created a balanced Hutu and Tutsi government. On October 21, 1993, Ndadaye—of the majority Hutu community—was assassinated along with several other top government officials by a group of Tutsi officers in a failed coup attempt. This action created a political vacuum, led to massive amounts of violence, and moved Burundi back to a state of civil war.
  - o Coding part one:
    - [yes \(MilCoup\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
    - [yes](#)
  - o Coding part two:
    - [yes](#)
  - o Coding part three:
    - [yes](#)

### **Burundi 1996**

- Description: On July 25, 1996, amid continuing warfare, Pierre Buyoya returned to power in a military coup, ousting Interim President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya and suspending the National Assembly. Ntibantunganya had become president following several years of political turmoil. On October 21, 1993, there was a failed coup attempt in which President Melchior Ndadaye and a number of top regime officials were assassinated by army paratroopers. After Ndadaye's death, the insurgents proclaimed the creation of a National Committee for Public Salvation (CPSN), but—due to international condemnation and renewed ethnic massacres—this group lasted only four days. By October 28, the elected government was again in control and a number of the insurgents were arrested. Even with the elected government back in control under a new president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, large amounts of ethnic violence occurred and many thousands of Burundians were killed. In the wake of this violence, various power-sharing agreements were made including the Kigobe Accord of January 19, 1994 and the Kajaga Accord of February 4, 1994. On April 6,



Ntaryamira was killed along with Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana when the latter's aircraft was hit with a rocket. Ntibantunganya subsequently became interim president, according to the constitution. Additional power-sharing agreements were negotiated, such as the Rohero Agreement of July 12, 1994 and the Convention of Government of September 10, 1994, yet violent attacks continued. After Buyoya took power, then, he claimed that his main focus would be to restore peace. On June 6, 1998, Buyoya and the head of the Transitional National Assembly signed a "Transitional National Constitution," which had provisions for partnership with the main Hutu opposition. Members of the newly expanded 121-seat Transitional National Assembly were appointed (with representatives of the Hutu and Tutsi factions agreeing on the proportion of expanded seats they would receive, but each faction appointing its own representatives). This system of "partnership" lasted until 2001, with two vice presidents, Frédéric Banvuginyumvira, a Hutu, and Mathias Sinamenye, a Tutsi.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (MilCoup)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - no (ElecPlan)

#### **Burundi 2003-2005 (2000)**

- Description: On August 28, 2000, after years of South African-mediated negotiations, a peace agreement was signed in Arusha (the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi). This agreement provided for a three-year transitional period to create a permanent constitution. After additional negotiations—including a 19 party-meeting in July 2001 mediated by Nelson Mandela—the form of the transitional government was agreed on. On November 1, 2001, then, the transitional government for Burundi was inaugurated, with Pierre Buyoya as president and Domitien Ndayizeye as vice president for the first 18 months. The executive branch of this transitional government included 26 cabinet portfolios, 14 ministries of which went to Hutu groups and 12 ministries of which went to Tutsi groups. This transitional government also included a 170-member Transitional National Assembly and a 51-member Transitional Senate (as stipulated in the Arusha Agreement). The plan was to turn power over to Ndayizeye as president on May 1, 2003, who would then have a second 18-month mandate. As planned, on April 30, 2003, Pierre Buyoya handed power over. In November 2003, the largest remaining rebel group, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD), joined the transitional government. The transitional group was restructured accordingly, with the CNDD gaining four ministerial positions, 15 seats in the transitional national assembly, and 40 percent of the officer positions in the new Burundi National Defense Force. In February 2005, a new constitution was approved by referendum and elections for the National Assembly were held on July 4, 2005. On August 26, 2005, members of parliament elected Pierre Nkurunziza to replace Ndayizeye.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

### **Cambodia 1989-1993 (1991)**

- Description: On October 23, 1991, due to the Cambodian-Vietnamese War, peace efforts culminated in the Paris Comprehensive Peace Settlement. These peace efforts began in earnest with the Paris Peace Congress between July 30 and August 30, 1989 and, by the end of September of that year, Vietnam completed withdrawing all of its troops from Cambodia. With the peace agreement, the United Nations (UN) was given a mandate to enforce a ceasefire through the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). UNTAC was to control or supervise Cambodia's administrative structures and sponsor elections for the Constituent Assembly, in addition to being in charge of ensuring demobilization of all parties and supervising a ceasefire. In addition to UNTAC, a parallel domestic counterpart called the Supreme National Council (SNC), made up of the various domestic factions, was created and endowed with sovereignty. The 12-member SNC, under the presidency of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, held its first session on Cambodian soil on December 30, 1991. It contained six representatives of the Government of the State of Cambodia (SOC) and six representatives of the other three opposition factions (two representatives each): the Khmer Rouge, the FUNCINPEC, and the republican KPNLF. On July 17, 1991, the SNC increased to 13 members, with the president becoming a neutral member, rather than one of the two representatives of FUNCINPEC. Additionally, a Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) held its first session on December 28, 1991, with all four Cambodian parties participating. The UNTAC force was deployed on March 15, 1992, assumed control of key sectors of Cambodia's administrative structures, and remained until September 1993. UNTAC, a large force totaling over 25,000 members, was headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Yasushi Akashi. Parliamentary elections took place on May 23, 1993, the constitution was promulgated in late September, and a new government with two prime ministers was inaugurated on September 24, 1993.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - yes
  - o Coding part three:
    - yes

### **Cambodia 1997**

- Description: On July 5 and 6, 1997, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen led a coup against the political party United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Co-operative Cambodia (FUNCUNIPPEC) and First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Hun Sen replaced Ranariddh, who went into exile for a short time, with Ung Huot, but did not further change the composition of the legislature. A legislative election was held on July 26, 1998, with FUNCUNIPPEC and Ranariddh participating.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - no (InstDes, NoElec)

### **Cameroon 1992 (1990)**

- Description: On December 19, 1990, Paul Biya, who had become the president of a single-party system on November 6, 1982, legalized political parties in response to demonstrations, strikes, and protests for democratic reforms. These began with the launching of the opposition Social

Democratic Front at a rally on May 26, 1990. Shortly thereafter, in June 1990, Biya's government—composed of members of the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM)—announced that it was planning democratic reforms, including multiparty elections. Biya created the Fomane Akame Commission, which submitted proposals to the monolithic National Assembly. One of these proposals was the legalization of opposition political parties. In April 1991, Biya announced plans for a general election, but as late as June 1991, refused to allow for a sovereign national conference, calling it irrelevant. In response, in May 1991, the opposition organized an economic strike of the country (through a movement known as “Ghost Town, Ghost Country,” as part of the “Yaoundé Plan of Action”) in an attempt to destabilize the government. They additionally planned a march on the presidential palace on July 5. Neither of these actions worked as intended and Biya's government arrested various opposition leaders, used violence against protesters, cracked down on the press, and generally remained inflexible. Later that year, however, Biya did instruct his prime minister, Sadou Hayatou, to organize a Tripartite Conference of the CPDM, multiple (but not all) opposition parties, and members of civil society including religious ministers, media representatives, and elder statesmen. The Tripartite Conference was held from October 30 to November 18, 1991, but Biya did not take part in the negotiations. The talks addressed the electoral code, political party access to media, and constitutional questions and, on November 13, the Yaoundé Tripartite Declaration was signed by 40 out of the 47 political parties that participated. Furthermore, on November 17, they established a “Technical Committee on Constitutional Matters (TCCM),” an 11-member committee (four Anglophone, seven Francophone) with the mandate of creating an outline for a “new” constitution (ultimately, the committee simply amended the 1972 Constitution). Generally, Biya ignored the Tripartite Declaration and the TCCM was suspended on February 14, 1992 in preparation for parliamentary elections. These elections were held on March 1, 1992 (and boycotted by some opposition parties—namely, the SDF and CDU—due to Biya's refusal to institute an independent electoral commission or an electoral code). Later that year, on October 11, 1992, Biya won the presidential election (though there were allegations of fraud). He was sworn in again on November 3, 1992 and subsequently announced that his intentions to hold a national forum on constitutional reform.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [no](#)
- *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

## **Cape Verde 1990**

- Description: On April 4, 1990, the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) National Council—the party which had ruled for years as a one-party state—agreed to a multiparty system, a new electoral law, and direct presidential elections. This followed an emergency session of the 83-member National Congress (elected in 1985), which was held between February 13 and 17, 1990. At this congress, leaders of the PAICV (who had been in office since the 1985 elections) discussed constitutional changes that proposed to end one-party rule. The leaders also felt pressure to reform, especially after the opposition Movement for Democracy (MPD) formed on March 14 and openly called for a multiparty system. Several months after agreeing to a multiparty system, in September 1990, round table negotiations occurred between the government, the PAICV, and the MPD to decide on how to organize elections. These negotiations lasted from September 13 to 21. Ultimately, the previously-elected National Congress instituted the proposed changes. On September 28, 1990, Aristides Pereira stepped down as the General Secretary of PAICV, the one party state was abolished, and a new constitution was adopted. Multiparty parliamentary elections were held on January 13, 1991 and presidential elections took place on February 17. Newly-elected President António Mascarenhas Monteiro of the MPD took office on March 22.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(VolRef\)](#)



- yes (NoPriReg)
- yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

### **Central African Republic 1990 (1991)**

- Description: On July 7, 1991, President André Kolingba announced that the constitution had been amended to allow for a multiparty system. Slightly over one year earlier, however, Kolingba's ruling Central African Democratic Party (RDC) announced that the establishment of a multiparty system would be "incompatible" with the country's political and economic development. Even before this May 1990 proclamation, in March 1990, students and civil workers had protested for reforms. Following this announcement, then, a pro-democracy movement became more active, with prominent citizens petitioning for the establishment of a national conference. By late 1990, the government's unpopularity had greatly intensified, culminating in riots in October. Incumbent André Kolingba initially refused to hold a national conference, but pressure from international donor states and domestic strikes between April and July 1991 forced Kolingba to agree to a multiparty system in early July. In August 1991, Kolingba relinquished the RDC presidency and legalized three opposition parties. At the end of October, the Kolingba administration agreed to convene a national debate, which would be comprised of representatives from both the government and opposition. The Grand National Debate convened on August 1, 1992 with 19 parties participating. The main opposition grouping, the Concertation des Forces Démocratiques (CFD), and the Roman Catholic Church boycotted the debate. At the end of August 1992, the National Assembly approved legislation in accordance with decisions of the Grand National Debate, including separation of powers. Kolingba was granted temporary powers to rule by decree until the election of a multiparty legislature. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held on October 25, 1992, but the results were subsequently suspended by Kolingba when it became apparent that he would lose. The results were then annulled by the Supreme Court. Elections were later rescheduled for October 17, 1993.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)
      - *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

### **Central African Republic 1993 (1992)**

- Description: On October 25, 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections were suspended by President André Kolingba and then annulled by the Supreme Court. After taking this action, Kolingba was subject to international pressure and appointed General Timothée Malendoma as prime minister, claiming elections would be held quickly. In January 1993, Malendoma was dismissed and replaced by Enoch-Dérant Lakoué on February 26, leader of the Social Democratic Party (PSD). On February 3, 1993, Kolingba received additional international pressure to establish the Provisional National Political Council (CNPPR) as an administering body, naming a "Mixed Electoral Commission" with representatives of all political parties and the administration, and appointing one of his competitors as prime minister. The CNPPR—composed of only three members: David Dacko, Lakoué, and a close acquaintance of Kolingba—assumed legislative powers until a new legislature was elected. The first round of presidential and parliamentary elections were held on August 22, 1993, with a runoff presidential election held on October 19.

The new president, Ange-Félix Patassé, took office on October 22 and a new government was formed on October 30.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### Central African Republic 2003

- Description: On March 15, 2003, General François Bozizé launched a coup against President Ange-Félix Patassé, who had been elected in 1993. Bozizé suspended the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, named a new 28-member cabinet that included most opposition parties, and named Abel Goumba—who was president of the Patriotic Front for Progress (FPP), which had strongly opposed Patassé’s regime—as prime minister (on March 23). On May 30, Bozizé established a broad-based 98-member National Transitional Council (CNT) to assist with legislative work and draft a new constitution. This was an all-party body, including members of different ethnic origins and political affiliations, which was to serve as an interim legislative body. Bozizé announced that he would step down and run for office once the new constitution was approved. A “national debate” was held from September 15 to October 27, 2003, with around 350 people participating. The new constitution was approved by popular referendum on December 5, 2004. Parliamentary and presidential elections occurred on March 13, 2005. A runoff to decide the winner of the presidency took place on May 8, with Bozizé winning. Bozizé was sworn in on June 11, 2005.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

### Chad 1989 (1988)

- Description: On July 8, 1988, due in part to a large amount of French pressure, President Hissène Habré and his ruling party, the National Union for Independence and Revolution (UNIR), appointed a constitutional commission to begin creating plans to introduce some democratic institutions, though remaining in a single-party framework. Years earlier, in 1982, factional leaders and the government had agreed to a peace agreement in Baghdad, which provided a time limit for when a new constitution had to be drafted. This commission, then, was made up of two members from each of the 14 prefectures, two members from the National Consultative Council (CNC), and had Jean Alingué Bawoyeu—a member of the opposition—as president. Again in 1982, Habré had appointed the CNC as an interim legislature, which consisted of 30 advisers in 1988. The new constitution was approved overwhelmingly by referendum on December 10, 1989, and specified that the CNC was to be replaced with a 123-member elected National Assembly. Parliamentary elections occurred for the new National Assembly on July 8, 1990, though the elections still took place within a one-party system (note, however, that the UNIR did not officially put forward candidates, but all ran in a “free and individual” capacity). Alingué Bawoyeu was elected president

of the new National Assembly during their first meeting, on August 5, 1990. His tenure, however, was extremely short and he was deposed in December of the same year.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-permissive*

## Chad 1990

- Description: On December 2, 1990, General Idriss Déby and a small group of Zaghawa rebels (an ethnic minority in Chad) overthrew Hissène Habré in a military coup/rebellion (Déby was a former commander-in-chief of the Chadian army, but in 1989 Habré accused him of plotting a coup, which led him to flee to Libya). A few days after taking power, Déby promised democracy and political plurality, dissolved the National Assembly, suspended the constitution, attempted to reconcile rebel groups, and introduced multiparty politics. A 33-member transitional Council of State was formed with Déby as head of state. This group was composed mainly of Déby's Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) members and other allied parties. On February 28, 1991, the executive committee of the MPS announced a transitional national charter (which was adopted on March 1)—giving exorbitant power to the presidency and installing Déby as interim president—which was to be replaced by a new constitution drawn up by a sovereign national conference in 30 months. According to the charter, a new Council of Ministers and a 31-member legislative Council of the Republic would replace the Council of State. On March 4 and 5, the Council of State was dissolved, Déby was formally inaugurated as president, and Jean Bawoyeu Alingué was appointed prime minister. Following a period of instability, in May 1992, Déby formed an 80-member preparatory commission to create a plan for the national conference. A second commission, chaired by the minister of interior and including representatives of government, political parties, and civil society (the "Tripartite Commission") developed an initial text for the conference delegates to consider and appointed them. On January 15, 1993, the Sovereign National Conference (CNS) opened, with 830 members chosen by consensus by the Tripartite Commission (116 from the public administration; 264 from 37 authorized political parties and political-military organizations; 130 from civic associations, professional organizations, and unions; 176 members of the general population; and 144 resource people). On April 6, 1993, the delegates introduced a Transitional Charter, which was to take effect for a period of one year, and elected a 57-member interim legislature known as the Higher Transitional Council (CST). Fidèle Moungar was elected as prime minister of this transitional government and the CST reconfirmed Déby as head of state. This body's mandate was extended twice. In March 1996, a new constitution was created and, on March 31, 1997, there was a constitutional referendum. On June 2, 1996, there was a presidential election, which Déby won (and which were not considered free or fair). Déby was sworn in on August 8, 1996, but the CST retained legislative power until parliamentary elections were held. On January 5 and February 23, 1997, parliamentary elections were held, with the new legislature first meeting on April 4.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

### **Chile 1989-1990 (1987)**

- Description: On March 11, 1987, President Augusto Pinochet's junta approved a law legalizing and regulating political parties. This occurred following the 1982 economic collapse and mass civil resistance starting on May 11, 1983. Due to this pressure, Augusto Pinochet's government gradually permitted more freedoms. In August 1983, Pinochet named a civilian commission to draw up laws to put into place some of the 1980 Constitution's provisions, but this encountered opposition. The Constitutional Court then forced the government to enact a law ensuring that plebiscites would be used to ratify modifications of the constitution, a law requiring that the junta's candidate for the next presidential term be elected through a referendum, and that a special electoral court be created. All of this culminated in the January 1987 law legalizing political parties. On October 5, 1988, a national referendum was held according to the transitional provisions and Pinochet was denied a second eight-year term as president. According to constitutional provisions, Pinochet remained as president for an additional year. The opposition Coalition for Democracy, a 17-party group, proposed a Constitutional Convention and Pinochet responded by creating a government committee to study reform proposals advocated by the political parties. After the committee put forward very different proposals, in May 1989, the parties and government agreed to a "minimal constitutional pact" of 54 reforms to the 1980 Constitution. In June 1989, Pinochet signed a decree authorizing a referendum on this reform package; it was approved on July 30, 1989. On December 14, 1989, the president and congress were elected under the new constitution and on March 11, 1990, the military dictatorship came to an end.
  - o Coding part one:
    - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
    - **no**

### **Comoros 1990 (1989)**

- Description: On November 29, 1989, Colonel Bob Denard and the Presidential Guard (GP) seized control of the government in a bloody coup d'état in which 27 policemen were killed. Only a few days earlier, on the night of November 26, President Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane was assassinated at his residence. Though the assassin's identity is disputed, the incident revolved around Denard, his group of mercenaries, and members of GP. In the immediate aftermath of Abdallah's death, President of the Supreme Court Haribon Chebani (the constitutional successor) became interim president. When Denard and the GP seized control, however, they disarmed the army and ousted Chebani. In Chebani's place, the coup-plotters installed Saïd Mohamed Djohar—who had just become Supreme Court President after Chebani's promotion to provisional president and was thus the constitutional next in line for the presidency—as head of state. In reaction, both South Africa and France imposed sanctions and, on December 15, Denard and his mercenaries surrendered to French paratroopers and left the islands for South Africa. Subsequently, French military personnel took control of the military and GP. With the mercenaries gone, in late December, the constitutional head of state Djohar and the formerly banned opposition formed a provisional Government of National Unity. Djohar was then elected president in the March 4 and 11, 1990 election.
  - o Coding part one:
    - [yes \(MilCoup\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
    - **no**

### **Comoros 1992 (1991)**

Description: On August 3, 1991, the Supreme Court dismissed elected President Saïd Mohamed Djohar, to which Djohar responded by ordering the court members' arrests and declaring a state of emergency. These actions followed much back-and-forth between the government and opposition,

particularly since April 1990 when Djohar announced plans for the formal constitutional restoration of a multiparty political system. A little over one year later, in May 1991, a conference—meant to be composed of three representatives of each political association, but several boycotted—was held to discuss political reforms. The August 1991 actions, therefore, followed a context of lengthy instability. A few months after declaring his state of emergency, and realizing the need to accommodate a strengthening opposition, Djohar reached an agreement with the principal opposition leaders in November 1991. While Djohar promised to form a government of national unity and to convene a new constitutional conference, the opposition agreed to recognize the legitimacy of Djohar’s presidency. On January 6, 1992, therefore, a nine-member transitional Government of National Unity was formed under the leadership of opposition leader Mohamed Taki Abdul Karim. The transitional government included members of the regime and opposition groups. A few weeks after the transitional government was formed, starting on January 24, a national conference was held to draft a new constitution. The conference included both representatives of political associations supporting Djohar and of opposition parties—encompassing 23 parties—and agreed on a new constitution and an electoral calendar on April 8. On May 8, 1992, Djohar appointed a second coalition government. On June 7, the constitution was approved by popular referendum. Shortly thereafter, on July 10, Djohar dissolved the coalition government and dismissed Taki. Later in the year, there was much instability, including an attempted coup, which forced postponement of the elections. Parliamentary elections were held on November 22, 1992, with a runoff on November 27. Due to voting irregularities, six districts additionally had to conduct by-elections on December 13 and 20. On January 6, 1993, new Prime Minister Halidi Abderamane Ibrahim appointed the new government.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(VolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

## **Comoros 1995**

- Description: On September 28, 1995, Colonel Bob Denard and a group of approximately 30 mercenaries overthrew President Saïd Mohamed Djohar and Prime Minister Caabi el-Yachroutu Mohamed in a coup. Denard then installed a transitional military committee, led by Captain Ayouba Combo. Soon after, he installed a provisional government under Mohamed Taki Abdul Karim and Said Ali Kemal as joint civilian presidents. Only a few days later, on October 3, 1995, France intervened with Operation Azalee and forced Denard and his provisional government to surrender. Because Djohar was absent from the country, former Prime Minister Caabi el-Yachroutu Mohamed declared himself as interim president according to the constitution. In November 1995, he appointed a Government of National Unity. A National Reconciliation Conference subsequently decided that he would remain president pending new elections. In January 1996, Djohar was restored to the presidency, but only with symbolic powers. A presidential election was held on March 6, 1996. In October 1996, a new constitution was approved by popular referendum and parliamentary elections were held on December 1, 1996.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(MilCoup\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
    - [yes](#)
  - Coding part two:
    - [yes](#)

- Coding part three:
  - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

### Comoros 1999

- Description: On April 30, 1999, Colonel Azali Assoumani seized power in a bloodless coup, overthrowing interim President Tadjidine Ben Said Massoude. Massoude had been appointed after President Mohammed Taki Abdul Karim died on November 6, 1998. After Assoumani was formally sworn in as president on May 5, he dissolved all 29 elected institutions, suspended the constitution, and created a 12-person executive body called the Committee of State, which drew its members mostly from the military and a small minority of civilians. Members of the aforementioned 29 elected institutions were not represented in the Committee of State. Assoumani additionally created a State Council, which consisted of eight civilians and 11 army officers, and was to supervise the activities of the Committee of State. Assoumani pledged to reinstate democratic institutions once a new constitution was created. He thus began a process of reconciliation with the islands of Mohéli and Anjouan, which threatened secession. In February 2001, the country's leaders signed the Fomboni Agreement, which was a power-sharing deal aimed at formally reinstating Comoros as one federal state (the "Union of Comoros"). Nine politicians from Mohéli, Anjouan, and Grande Comoro participated in the negotiations, which created a "tripartite commission" to decide on transition modalities. In the agreement, every island was to enjoy autonomy and possess its own president and constitution. The federal presidency would rotate between the three islands every few years. There was a referendum on December 23, 2001, which supported the Fomboni Agreement and, for the first time since 1996, reestablished legislatures for each island. On January 20, 2002, a transitional Government of National Unity was installed under Prime Minister Hamada Madi ("Boléro"). This 14-member government included members of the former government, opposition representatives, and two separatist leaders, but the separatist leaders subsequently withdrew. In mid-February, in order to run in the presidential election, Assoumani temporarily stepped down and the transitional government was reestablished with Hamada Madi as interim president. On March 10 (Nzwani and Mwali) and April 7 (Ngazidja), additional referenda were approved on new constitutions for each island. Assoumani subsequently won a highly disputed presidential election on March 17 (with a runoff election on April 14). Though he was sworn in on May 26, his victory led to a constitutional crisis. Parliamentary elections did not take place until two years later, with a first round on April 18, 2004 and a second round on April 25, 2004.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

### Comoros 2004 (2003)

- Description: On December 20, 2003, the internationally-mediated Agreement on Transitional Arrangements in the Comoros (ATAC) was signed at Moroni by all four Comorian presidents. Despite the earlier 2001 Constitution, the Fomboni Agreement, and the 2002 presidential election, instability continued on the islands of Mohéli and Anjouan. Following the agreement, parliamentary elections were held on April 18, 2004 as the last phase of national reconciliation. The elections proved to be a huge loss for the Union President, Azali Assoumani, whose party, the Convention for the Renewal of the Comoros, only won four parliamentary seats. The parties loyal to the autonomous islands' presidents won 14 seats. Some reforms followed the elections, such as



the central government agreeing to maintain control of the army while relinquishing its hold on local police forces.

- Coding part one:
  - no

#### **Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of Congo) 1991-1992 (1990)**

- Description: On December 27, 1990, opposition political parties were formally legalized. A few months earlier, on September 14, 1990, the Congolese Trade Unions' Confederation (CSC) had held a general strike, which exerted heavy pressure on President Denis Sassou-Nguesso. The CSC continued its strikes into October, focusing mainly on ending privatization, stopping lay-offs, and increasing wages. On October 14, the government announced that it would halt further privatization and held a meeting with CSC representatives. Between December 3 and 7, Prime Minister Alphonse Poaty-Souchalaty resigned in opposition to the president's plan to introduce multiparty politics, an extraordinary congress of the ruling Congolese Party of Labour (PCT) renounced Marxism-Leninism, and the PCT created constitutional amendments to legalize multiparty politics. On January 8, 1991, General Louis Sylvain Goma was installed as prime minister to lead an interim government pending the transition to a multiparty system. From February 25 to June 10, 1991, a national conference took place, led by Monsignor Ernest N'kombo, which stripped Sassou-Nguesso of executive powers. Though Sassou-Nguesso retained his position as ceremonial head of state, the conference declared its own sovereignty, dissolved the People's National Assembly and 30 other state institutions, and created a 153-member High Council of the Republic (HCR) to serve as the legislature. Sassou-Nguesso was excluded from participating in the conference or the HCR. The conference itself had 1202 delegates, which included 67 political parties (eight representatives each), 40 academic societies (two representatives each), 11 non-governmental organizations (two representatives each), four major religious faiths (seven representatives each), 20 representatives of the transitional body, five unions (one representative each), five representatives from the chambers of commerce and agriculture, 158 representatives of national institutions, 21 representatives of parastatal organizations, 16 representatives of the public service, 19 representatives from the country's diplomatic service, 34 representatives from the country's missions to international organizations, nine traditional authorities, and 52 individuals. On March 15, 1992, there was a referendum, which approved constitutional changes to decrease executive powers. At its conclusion, the national conference chose André Milongo as prime minister for a transitional period. Parliamentary elections were held on June 24, 1992, with a runoff election on August 7. A presidential election was held on August 8, 1992, with a runoff on August 16. Pascal Lissouba was elected president and inaugurated on August 31, 1992. A prime minister and cabinet were appointed on September 7.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (InvolRef)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

#### **Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of Congo) 1997**

- Description: On October 25, 1997, former President Denis Sassou-Nguesso declared himself president. In mid-October, President Pascal Lissouba—the first democratically elected president—and his government fell to Sassou-Nguesso. Earlier in 1997, Lissouba and Sassou-Nguesso began fighting over power, which fueled a four-month conflict and, in October, Angola invaded Congo to install Sassou-Nguesso in power. After Sassou-Nguesso declared himself president, he appointed

a 33-member Government of National Unity, which included his former prime minister, Bernard Bakan Kolélas, and members of the military. Lissouba fled to England and played no part in the transitional government. Between January 5 and 14, 1998, the Sassou-Nguesso government held a National Forum for Reconciliation—a ten-day conference similar to the National Conference held years earlier—to determine the nature of the transitional period. This forum, which included over 1400 participants but was dominated by forces loyal to the president, declared that elections should be held in three years, elected a 75-member Transitional National Council (CNT) in place of the parliament, and announced that a constitutional convention would draft a constitution. The CNT was dominated by Northerners and Sassou-Nguesso loyalists. A new constitution was created in May 2001 and approved in a national referendum on January 20, 2002. Presidential elections were held on March 10, 2002 and legislative elections were held on May 26, 2002. Runoff elections concluded on June 23, 2002 and the legislature had its first sitting on August 10.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(IntlInt\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

#### **Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo) 1990**

- Description: On April 24, 1990, President Mobutu Sese Seko lifted the ban on political parties and announced plans for a transition to a multiparty system. Subsequent actions called his commitment to regime transition into question, however, such as the May 1990 brutal repression of student protesters. Starting in August 1991, he did allow a national conference to begin, but this conference subsequently experienced months of instability. First, the national conference was initiated on August 7, 1991, but suspended just eight days later, on August 15. It subsequently resumed and appointed Étienne Tshisekedi—leader of the opposition Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDSP)—as prime minister on September 30, 1991. Due to pressure from donor countries and the Vatican, this conference did declare itself sovereign (called the Sovereign National Conference, or CNS), though it kept Mobutu as the official head of state. Despite only being sworn in on October 6, Mobutu dismissed Tshisekedi just over two weeks later, appointing first Bernardin Mungul Diaka (October 23) and then Jean Nguza (November 25) to take over the prime minister position. On December 12, Archbishop Monsengwo Pasinya was elected CNS president, but the conference was again suspended from January 14 to April 6, 1992. During this period, Mobutu maintained control of the security services and important ministries. He additionally suspended the conference on June 21. On August 15, the reconvened CNS elected Tshisekedi as prime minister and created a draft Transitional Act to serve as a provisional constitution. This draft established a transitional government composed of a figurehead president, an independent judiciary, and a transitional parliament called the High Council of the Republic (HCR) that was to elect the prime minister. On August 15, the CNS elected Tshisekedi as prime minister. The constitutional draft was adopted by the CNS on November 18 and the CNS officially closed on December 6, 1992. On March 17, 1993, however, Mobutu additionally defied the CNS by appointing Faustin Birindwa as prime minister. This action essentially created two governments, one pro-Mobutu and one anti-Mobutu under Tshisekedi. To move forward, on April 9, 1994, the two groups joined to create a 453-member High Council of Republic-Parliament of Transition (HCR-PT), led by Prime Minister Léon Kengo wa Dondo. On June 30, 1995, the HCR-PT voted to extend the transitional period until July 9, 1997, postponing elections by two years (though they never took place). The HCR-PT completed a draft constitution that was to be submitted to a national referendum in February 1997. Before this



referendum actually took place, a military offensive led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila overthrew Mobutu and the HCR-PT on May 17, 1997.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### **Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo) 1997**

- Description: On May 17, 1997, in the First Congo War and following mass general strikes that began on April 14, Mobutu Sese Seko was overthrown and expelled from the country by Laurent Kabila and his rebel forces, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL). Kabila was sworn in as president on May 20, suspended the constitution, banned party and political activities (except his own party), and changed the name of the country from Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He chose to govern by decree without a prime minister, gave 13 cabinet ministries to his loyal lieutenants, and gave the other ministries to men associated with political opposition to Mobutu Sese Seko (though notably not the popular politician Etienne Tshisekedi, who had been named prime minister by a national conference in the early 1990s). Kabila announced that a commission would write a new constitution by October 1998, a referendum would occur by December, and legislative and presidential elections would follow in April 1999. However, the Second Congo War began in August 1998, with rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda rising up against Kabila.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (CivilWar)
    - yes (NoPriRul)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - no (Group)

### **Congo-Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo) 2004-2006 (2002)**

- Description: On December 17, 2002, the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement between various Congolese parties in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue was signed. This was the final agreement in a line of peace deals, including the April 19, 2002 peace agreement at Sun City and the July 30, 2002 Pretoria Accord, which was signed between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The final December 2002 deal specified the form of a transitional government, which was to be composed of the various groups that participated in the Inter Congolese Dialogue. On June 30, 2003, the Transitional Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was sworn in, with Joseph Kabila (Laurent Kabila's son, who assumed power on January 26, 2001, ten days after his father was assassinated) as president. The government included four vice presidents, who represented the former government, former rebel groups, and the political opposition; 36 cabinet ministries divided among the different armed groups, the unarmed political opposition, and the Forces Vives (civil society); 25 vice ministers divided among the groups; a 500-member National Assembly; and a 120-member Senate (with all members designated by parties). A transitional constitution was put in place on April 1, 2003. Subsequently, a new permanent constitution was approved and a general election was held on July 30, 2006. The newly-elected National Assembly held its first session on September 22, but presidential runoff elections did not take place until

October 29. In this runoff, Kabila was formally elected as president. He was sworn in on December 6, 2006.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### **Croatia 1990**

- Description: On February 15, 1990, though still part of Yugoslavia, the Croatian Parliament adopted several constitutional amendments, which included the legalization of multiparty elections. Shortly after adopting the constitutional amendments, in April and May 1990, the first multiparty parliamentary election was held. Franjo Tuđman, who founded the political party the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in July 1989, became the first president on May 30, 1990. The Croatian Parliament adopted a new constitution on December 21, 1990 and, on October 8, 1991, Croatia's declaration of independence from Yugoslavia came into effect. On August 2, 1992, general elections were held, but Croatia's war with Yugoslavia (Serbian-Croatian Civil War/Croatian War of Independence) did not effectively end until August 1995.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)

### **Croatia 1999-2000 (1999)**

- Description: On December 10, 1999, Franjo Tuđman was declared dead. Tuđman had been declared "incapacitated" on November 26, 1999. Only a month after his passing, Tuđman's party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), lost its control over the lower house of Croatia's Parliament to an anti-Tuđman coalition of parties led by Social-Democrat Ivica Račan. Vlatko Pavletić took over as acting president until the Croatian Parliament elected Zlatko Tomčić as the new acting president on February 2, 2000. The new parliament went on to enact more changes including the introduction of a proportional representation system to their elections.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### **Czech Republic 1993**

- Description: On January 1, 1993, Czechoslovakia peacefully split into two independent states, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. The former Czech National Council, elected in June 1992, was transformed into the national legislature (the Chamber of Deputies).
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### **Czechoslovakia 1989**

- Description: On November 29, 1989, the communist party's leading role was abolished from the constitution. This followed directly from actions of the "Velvet Revolution," which began on November 17 with popular demonstrations against the one-party government. On November 18, the Civic Forum was created (Václav Havel was one founder), an umbrella organization of

disparate groups that was created as a preliminary step to an open discussion on the future of Czechoslovakia. The communist party attempted to remove the most discredited members of the Central Committee, but demonstrations continued. On November 24, an extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee took place in which General Secretary of the Communist Party Miloš Jakeš resigned (replaced by Karel Urbánek) and various reforms were promised, but only the most discredited members of the Central Committee were removed. The day after the largest strike at Letná, November 26, many members of the Central Committee were dismissed and were joined by a mixture of engineers and workers. Once the communist party's leading role was dissolved, the new leadership agreed to form a federal government by December 3 with representation for the citizens' initiatives and independents. On December 3, a newly reconstructed government of the communist Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec was presented to the public, with 15 out of 20 ministries given to communist party members. This led to further demonstrations and, on December 10, 1989, to the appointment of a Government of National Understanding. On this day, President Gustáv Husák appointed the first largely non-communist government, under Prime Minister Marián Čalfa, and resigned. The government was composed of ten communists, two members of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, two members of the Czechoslovak People's Party, and seven members with no political affiliation (activists from the Civic Forum or the Public Against Violence, the Slovak equivalent of Civic Forum). Soon after the government's appointment, Čalfa left the communist party, along with several other high ranking officials (two of which were in the 21-member Government of National Understanding). Čalfa was acting president of this government until Václav Havel was elected by the existing legislature on Dec 29, 1989. The government still retained some members of the prior regime and the legislature was still largely filled with previous communist leaders, but the principal task of the interim government was to guide the country to democratic elections in June 1990. A new electoral law was drafted in round table talks among representatives of all political trends and passed by the parliament on March 2, 1990. Parliamentary elections were held on June 8 and 9, 1990 and the new cabinet was sworn in on June 27.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [no \(NoElec\)](#)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

## Djibouti 1992

- Description: On January 21, 1992, President Hassan Gouled Aptidon appointed a 14-member, single party (from his ruling People's Rally for Progress, or RPP) commission to write a new constitution. This action occurred in response to the civil war that broke out on November 11, 1991 (between the government, primarily composed of ethnic Issas, and the Front pour le Restauration de l'Unité et la Democrati (FRUD), a militia made up primarily of ethnic Afars). In early January, Aptidon announced that political parties would be legalized and legislative elections would take place. The reforms were additionally encouraged by France, which sent a peace mission to the country and withheld economic aid. The negotiation process was fraught with strife, with the opposition calling for the immediate imposition of a transitional government with a new prime minister at its head, a measure that Aptidon refused to consider. On June 26, 1992, Aptidon announced that there would be a referendum on a new constitution, which was held on September 4, 1992. Following the constitution's approval, there were parliamentary elections on December 18, 1992, with two parties competing (though four had been permitted).
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)

- no

### Djibouti 1999

- Description: On February 4, 1999, President Hassan Gouled Aptidon announced that he would retire at the time of the next election. Subsequently, Aptidon's nephew Ismail Omar Guelleh was chosen by the People's Rally for Progress Party (RPP) as the presidential candidate and won the election.
  - o Coding part one:
    - no

### Dominican Republic 1996 (1994)

- Description: On August 2, 1994, Joaquín Balaguer defeated José Francisco Peña Gomez, but the elections were flawed. This led to domestic protests, strikes, and international pressure. On August 10, 1994, the competing political parties signed a "Pact for Democracy," which reduced Balaguer's term from four to two years, set early presidential elections (that Balaguer would not contest), and reformed the constitution (no head of state could serve consecutive terms). A new Central Electoral Board was created to work on electoral reform, but the 1994-elected legislature remained. The new presidential election took place on May 16, 1996.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - no

### Ecuador 2000

- Description: On January 21, 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez staged a military coup against elected President Jamil Mahuad. Earlier that day, indigenous Indian protesters seized control of offices in the legislative building, proclaimed the overthrow of Mahuad, and declared the parliament dissolved. Military officers led by Gutiérrez joined this group and, once the coup was complete, declared a three-man junta called a "triumvirate." This grouping lasted for only a few hours, however, as on January 22 senior military officers installed Vice President Gustavo Noboa as president, according to the constitution. Congress then formally ratified Noboa's presidency.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul)
    - no

### Ecuador 2002

- Description: On October 20, 2002, presidential and parliamentary elections were held, with Lucio Gutiérrez winning the presidency. Two years earlier, on January 21, 2000, Gutiérrez led a military coup that deposed President Jamil Mahuad. Several years after his election, Gutiérrez faced a political crisis. On April 15, 2005, following large protests against the government, Gutiérrez declared a state of emergency and dismissed the Supreme Court. Gutiérrez's proclamation of a state of emergency followed several months of political crisis. Beginning on December 8, 2004, Gutiérrez's allies in the parliament fired 27 of the 31 judges in the Supreme Court, with Gutiérrez claiming that its members were biased against him. Opponents, however, claimed that the judges' dismissals were part of a political deal between Gutiérrez and members of former President Abdalá Bucaram's party. At the time, the judges were trying to prosecute Bucaram for crimes committed during his presidency. When the newly-appointed, replacement Supreme Court judges dropped corruption charges against Bucaram in March 2005, large street protests erupted. These street protests led to the state of emergency, which—because citizens disobeyed it and the army refused to enforce it—was lifted after only one day (on April 16, 2005). Following a week of massive

demonstrations, on April 20, 2005, the Congress of Ecuador voted to remove Gutiérrez from the presidency. The parliament appointed Vice President Alfredo Palacio to the presidency.

- Coding part one:
  - no

### **Egypt 2005**

- Description: On May 10, 2005, the Egyptian Parliament approved an amendment to allow multi-candidate presidential elections for the first time in decades. A few months earlier, on February 26, 2005, President Hosni Mubarak had asked the parliament (elected in 2000) to amend the constitution in this way. Before the amendment was enacted, the president was elected by the legislature, the People's Assembly. After the Egyptian Parliament approved the amendment, the decision was ratified by referendum on May 25. The September 7, 2005 presidential election was a multiple candidate election, but the electoral institutions and security apparatus remained under Mubarak's control. Parliamentary elections were subsequently held in November and December 2005.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - no

### **El Salvador 1994 (1992)**

- Description: On January 16, 1992, the UN-sponsored Chapultepec Peace Agreement was signed by the government and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), ending the Salvadoran Civil War. This followed almost two years of negotiations (beginning as early as April 4, 1990, when both parties agreed to accept UN mediation in the peace process), popular protests calling for a ceasefire and reforms, and heavy United States' pressure (a major aid donor) to negotiate. Starting one year after the initial agreement to negotiate, on April 4, 1991, the two sides began work on drafting amendments to the constitution. Each of the government and FMLN had four members present and the UN mediated the negotiations. On April 27, the sides were able to come to a compromise. The draft was then approved by the previously-elected legislature. Legislative elections had been held on March 10, 1991, which were the first elections in which the FMLN ordered their followers not to disrupt the polling. Despite these early constitutional negotiations, the Chapultepec Peace Agreement was not signed until January 1992. A little over two years later, on March 20, 1994, a new round of presidential and legislative elections took place within the framework of the peace agreement and with the FMLN participating. These elections were monitored by the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL, which had been established on May 20, 1991).
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)
      - *Alternative coding: TG-permissive*

### **Eritrea 1993 (1991)**

- Description: On May 29, 1991, the Eritrean War of Independence ended. This occurred a little more than one week after President Mengistu Haile Mariam fled Ethiopia, on May 21. In this war, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF, though its name changed in February 1994 to the People's Front for Democracy and Justice, or PFDJ), played a major role in defeating Ethiopia's "Derg" government (under Mengistu). After defeating the Ethiopian forces, the EPLF forces gained control of Eritrea and established a provisional government under Isaias Afewerki. Between July 1

and 5, 1991, the Addis Ababa Transitional Conference was held—which the EPLF attended—at which a transitional government for Ethiopia was established. At this conference, the transitional government recognized the right of Eritreans to conduct an independence referendum. Between April 23 and 25, 1993, then, the Eritrean people voted almost unanimously (99.3 percent) for independence from Ethiopia under the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea (UNOVER). On May 19, 1993, by decree, members from the EPLF became the provisional government, with Afewerki as president. The transitional government was to oversee a four-year transition to constitutional rule and a pluralist political system. The transitional government contained three main institutions: the Consultative Council, the National Assembly, and the judiciary. In June 1993, Afewerki appointed a new Consultative Council, with 14 ministers from the EPLF Politburo and ten regional governors. The legislative branch, the National Assembly, was initially composed of 75 EPLF Central Committee members and 75 handpicked representatives from regional assemblies. This assembly elected Isaias Afewerki as president, though this position was mostly symbolic. The government declared a Transitional Charter that served as an interim constitution and tasked the National Assembly with drafting a new constitution. Much of the work on the constitution was highly inclusive, with more than 1000 meetings throughout the country for popular consultation (though no opponents of the regime were invited to contribute). Most of the work was done by a 50-member, National Assembly-nominated Constitutional Commission, which formally took office on April 17, 1994. The commission included members chosen to represent both rural and urban populations, different ethnic and social groups, former guerrilla members, and Eritreans residing abroad. After over two years, the constitutional text was submitted for ratification to a 527-member constituent assembly, which contained 150 members of the National Assembly, representatives of Eritreans residing abroad, and representatives elected by regional assemblies. The constitution was approved on May 23, 1997 and the constituent assembly disbanded. Despite its ratification, the constitution was never fully implemented. A Transitional National Assembly did replace the constituent assembly—comprised of 75 members of the PFDJ, 60 members of the Constituent Assembly, and 15 representatives of Eritreans residing abroad—but national-level elections were never held.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (CivilWar)
  - yes (NoPriR eg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### **Estonia 1991 (1990)**

- Description: On March 18, 1990, Estonia held the first multicandidate elections to the Supreme Soviet with relatively free competition. These elections followed years of action, beginning in 1987 with the “Singing Revolution.” This was a cycle of mass demonstrations, taking place in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Further intensifying calls for reform, in April 1988 the Estonian Popular Front was founded, with its inaugural congress held on October 10. At the end of February and beginning of March 1990, elections were held for a rival quasi-legislative body called the Estonian Congress. This 495-member body was elected in a privately-organized campaign with the goal of setting up a parallel government. On August 20, 1991, Estonia declared formal independence and formed a transitional government under Edgar Savisaar (following the March 1990 elections, on April 3, 1990, Savisaar had become the Chairman of the Council of Ministers). At the same time as the independence declaration, it was decided that a Constitutional Assembly would be convened. On September 7, following negotiations between leaders of the Supreme Soviet (later renamed the Supreme Council) and the Estonian Congress, the Constitutional Assembly was formed. This



constitution-making body included a total of 60 members, 30 members elected by the Supreme Council and 30 members elected by the Estonian Congress. Its members reflected a wide swath of political forces: around 20 members from the Popular Front, 20 national radicals, 13 moderates and reform communists, and seven Russian representatives (and, interestingly, 18 members had been members of *both* the Supreme Council and Estonian Congress). The first Constitutional Assembly meeting took place on September 13. Several months later, on January 23, 1992, Savisaar resigned and his transportation minister, Tiit Vähi, formed a new government (starting on January 30, 1992). The Constitutional Assembly's meetings, however, continued through June 1992. After the Constitutional Assembly finished its work, the constitution was ratified by popular referendum on June 28. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held on September 20, 1992. No presidential candidate won the requisite majority of votes, but no runoff election took place. Instead, per the stipulations of the Estonian Constitution, the final decision was given to the legislature. Lennart Meri was therefore appointed as president on October 5, 1992. A new coalition government was sworn in on October 21, 1992.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [no \(NoElec\)](#)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-permissive*

### **Estonia 1999-2000 (1999)**

- Description: On March 7, 1999, parliamentary elections were held. While the party system was still not fully established, there were two general sides: the center-left coalition and the center-right coalition. After the election, a new government was formed under Prime Minister Mart Laar on March 25, 1999.
  - Coding part one:
    - [no](#)

### **Ethiopia 1991**

- Description: On May 21, 1991, President Mengistu Haile Mariam fled Ethiopia. One week later, on May 28, an interim government was formed by Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) leader Meles Zenawi after he took control of Addis Ababa (concurrently, Isaias Afewerki announced a government for neighboring Eritrea). Years earlier, on September 10, 1987, Mengistu had adopted a new constitution, which abolished the previous "Derg" junta. He, however, remained president and other Derg members who had retired from the military headed the Politburo. In May 1991, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)—composed of the TPLF and the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement—advanced on Addis Ababa, leading Mengistu to flee. A short time later, on July 1, 1991, the Addis Ababa Transitional Conference was held (sometimes called the Multiparty National Conference or Peace and Democracy Conference). This conference had 83 delegates representing 28 organizations in attendance and agreed to hold a referendum for Eritrean independence in 1993. Additionally, on July 22, the EPRDF regime—led by Zenawi and de facto in power since May 28—was constituted as the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) on the basis of a transitional charter. A Transitional Period Charter for the TGE was adopted by the EPRDF along with the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO) and the Ethiopian Democratic Officers' Revolutionary Movement (EDORM) at the conference. This charter specified that the TGE would hand over power after national elections, which were to be held within two years. It additionally provided the TGE with an 87-member Council of Representatives to act as a legislature (with 32 parties represented); a 17-member Council of Ministers; and a President, Vice President, Prime Minister, and Secretary to the Council of Representatives (a total TGE size of

108). During the two-year TGE period, Ethiopians were expected to elect a 40-member constituent assembly, write a new constitution, and organize national elections. On June 5, 1994, a 547-member Constituent Assembly was elected to draft a new constitution and, in December 1994, a constitution was adopted that ended the transitional period. On May 7, 1995, parliamentary elections were held, which entailed the break-up of the transitional government. Meles Zenawi, the new prime minister, was inaugurated on August 23, 1995 and he appointed his cabinet one day later.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (CivilWar)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### **Ethiopia 2005**

- Description: On May 15, 2005, a highly-disputed parliamentary election took place after 14 years of continuous rule by the coalition Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Election results showed a massive loss of support for the EPRDF, with most of these votes going to the Coalition for Democracy and Unity (CUD). Starting on November 1, 2005, opposition parties led by CUD accused the government of election fraud and organized street protests, citing election results in constituencies that went overwhelmingly for the EPRDF. These protests led to a large number of deaths and arrests.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### **Fiji 1990-1992 (1987)**

- Description: On September 25, 1987, the second of two coups by then Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka—the third in command of Fiji's military—occurred. On October 7, the new regime declared Fiji a republic, revoking the 1970 Constitution and installing Rabuka as the head of the military government. He formed a cabinet of 21 ministers, which later expanded to 24. This cabinet consisted of 17 members of the nationalist Taukei Movement (which had opposed the coalition government elected earlier that year), some military officials, and members of the former regime. On December 5, 1987, Rabuka handed power to an interim civilian administration, headed by Penaia Ganilau as president and Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara as prime minister.<sup>213</sup> Rabuka retained his positions as Commander of the Army and Minister of Home Affairs. Ganilau appointed his 21-member cabinet, which formed a three-member sub-committee to write an initial draft for a new constitution. A round table discussion then occurred between incumbent political leaders, the Coalition (which represented the Indo-Fijian and urban groups), and the Alliance (which represented ethnic Fijian groups). A draft was then sent to the Manueli Commission, which took public comment. The final revision was approved by a 71-voting member Great Council of Chiefs. The Council's members were chosen either by presidential appointment or by the Melanesian and Polynesian chiefs in Fiji (but not Indo-Fijian chiefs). Rabuka handed over full civilian control when he stepped down from governmental leadership on January 5, 1990. A new constitution that established specific communal reservations for Fijians was ratified on July 25, 1990. Parliamentary elections occurred between May 23 and 30, 1992. Rabuka was appointed to prime minister on June 2 and formed a government on June 3, 1992.
  - Coding part one:

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<sup>213</sup> Rabuka had already named Penaia as president on November 17, but the events of December 5 represented the formal transfer of power.



- yes (MilCoup)
- yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
- yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

## **Fiji 2000**

- Description: On May 19, 2000, a group led by George Speight entered parliament buildings, held Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry and others hostages for 56 days, and declared Speight as the head of state. During this time, the group tried to negotiate with President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. Mara responded by dismissing the government from office and assuming executive authority eight days after the hostage crisis began (May 27, 2000). He named Ratu Tevita Moemoedone acting prime minister of an interim government that was to oversee Fiji until new elections could take place. However, as conditions in Fiji continued to worsen, Commodore Frank Bainimarama took over the government, forcing Mara to resign on May 29. Bainimarama imposed martial law and began negotiating with Speight over possible choices for the next government. On July 10, 2000, Bainimarama and Speight signed the Muanikau Accord, which led to the release of the hostages on July 13 and the appointment of Vice President Josefa Iloilo to the position of acting president. On July 18, Bainimarama returned power to an interim government, whose members were selected by the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC). The interim government was led by newly-appointed Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase and President Iloilo, backed by the military, and consisted of 32 members. This included one opposition member and two ministers from the former coalition government. On July 27, Speight and many of his followers were arrested following a clash with the military; Speight was later charged with treason. On March 14, 2000, Prime Minister Qarase resigned and President Iloilo named Tevita Momoedunu as temporary prime minister of the interim government. The constitution was restored on November 15, 2000 after the Supreme Court ruled that the interim government was ruling unconstitutionally. The interim government appealed this ruling, but it was upheld on March 1, 2001. Under pressure from local and international organizations, in addition to the Supreme Court, the interim government agreed to hold general elections and maintain power only until the newly elected government took over. Parliamentary elections were held between August 25 and September 1, 2001, in which Qarase's party won a plurality of seats. Prime Minister Qarase was therefore sworn in on September 10 and announced the formation of his cabinet on September 12, 2001.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

## **Fiji 2006-2007 (2006)**

- Description: On December 4, 2006, a military coup took place, beginning with a weapons seizure and culminating with the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) ousting Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase's government. On December 5, key ministers were put under house arrest; on the same day, President Ratu Josefa Iloilo was pressured into signing an order dissolving parliament. On December 5, Commodore Frank Bainimarama announced that the military had taken executive authority, with Bainimarama as the president, and appointed Jona Senilagakali as a caretaker prime

minister. Bainimarama subsequently announced a series of populist measures to bolster support for his political “clean-up campaign,” which was especially related to allegations of corruption in the deposed government. Military officers took over key positions in the civil security institutions and existing officials—including executives of state-owned enterprises—were purged. On January 4, 2007, Bainimarama directly reappointed Iloilo to the presidency. The next day, Bainimarama was sworn in as the prime minister. A 16-member interim cabinet was subsequently announced and efforts began to normalize the situation. Parliamentary elections were eventually held on September 17, 2014, with Bainimarama’s political party, FijiFirst, winning the election. Bainimarama was sworn in as prime minister on September 22; parliament convened for the first time on October 6.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (MilCoup)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

### **Gabon 1990**

- Description: On April 21, 1990, opposition political parties were legalized. This followed from demonstrations and strikes in early 1990, which forced President Omar Bongo to negotiate with various sectors. He set up a “Special Commission for Democracy,” which conveyed to Bongo that one-party rule was no longer acceptable. In response, Bongo added “neutral” members to the government, but eventually promised to open up the one-party state. He organized a national conference, which opened on March 27, 1990 with Monsignor Basile Mvé as leader. The ruling party, the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG), and 74 political organizations attended the conference, which totaled over 2000 delegates. Conference delegates wanted constituent assembly status, but Bongo said acts of the national conference were simply recommendations. Bongo suspended the national conference on April 2 and only reopened it after the request for sovereignty was dropped. As a result of the conference, Bongo agreed to resign as PDG chairman and create a transitional government. After legalizing opposition parties, on April 27, he formed a broad-based coalition transitional government called the Government of National Unity, with Casimir Oyé-Mba as prime minister. This 24-member government included eight representatives from opposition parties. National Assembly elections were initially held on September 16, 1990, but required three additional rounds of voting in some constituencies due to irregularities and violence, with the final round concluding on November 4. With the announcement of government members on November 27, the newly elected National Assembly—who reelected Oyé-Mba as prime minister—took over control from the transitional government. The RSDG drafted a constitution, which was reviewed by a constitutional committee and the legislature and was approved in March 1991. Presidential elections were not held until December 5, 1993, when Omar Bongo (controversially) won. He was sworn in on January 22, 1994.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (InvolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

## **Gabon 2009**

- Description: On June 8, 2009, President Omar Bongo died. In accordance with the constitution, President of the Senate Rose Francine Rogombé became interim president until presidential elections were held on August 30, 2009. Omar Bongo's son, Ali Bongo Ondimba, won the election, leading to opposition riots. In response, the Constitutional Court conducted a recount and again declared Bongo the winner.
  - o Coding part one:
    - no

## **Gambia 1994**

- Description: On July 22, 1994, a group of soldiers led by Lieutenant Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh deposed President Dawda Jawara in a coup. On July 26, they created the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) and banned all opposition political activity. The AFPRC contained five military officers, ruled by Jammeh as head of state and joined by four of his co-conspirators: Sana Sabally, Sadibou Hydar, Edward Singhateh, and Yankuba Touray. The AFPRC created new policies restricting the media and protections for civil liberties and human rights. In October 1994, the AFPRC announced that military rule would last for four years but then, due to an unsuccessful coup attempt and much international and domestic condemnation, created a National Consultative Committee (NCC) on December 7, 1994. The NCC's mandate was to review the transition process and, on January 27, 1995, reported that most Gambians favored a maximum transition period of two years. In February, Jammeh announced the AFPRC's acceptance of the NCC's transition plan to return to democratic civilian government. On April 20, a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) was appointed, which presented a report to the government on November 20. One month later, on December 20, the AFPRC established the Provisional Independent Electoral Commission to conduct national elections. All pre-1994 parties were banned, including the former ruling party. On August 8, 1996, a new constitution was approved in a national referendum. Presidential elections occurred on September 26, 1996 and legislative elections were held on January 2, 1997. President Jammeh appointed a new cabinet on March 7, 1997.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - yes
  - o Coding part three:
    - yes

## **Georgia 1991 (1989)**

- Description: On April 14, 1989, top communist leaders were forced to resign, including leader Jumber Patiashvili. This followed the events of April 9, 1989 when Soviet troops were used to break up a peaceful demonstration in Tbilisi, killing a number of people. This led to mass pro-independence rallies, the first instances of which had actually occurred several months earlier. On November 12, 1988, a mass demonstration of up to one hundred thousand people occurred, with protests continuing throughout the month. After Patiashvili was forced out, he was replaced by Givi Gumbaridze, the head of the Georgian branch of the Committee for State Security. Gumbaridze allowed nationalist policies to be incorporated into the communist party program and, by early fall, even the communist party called for national sovereignty. The opposition, under leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia, pressured the government to institute multiparty elections and, on October 28, 1990, Georgia held its first multiparty elections. The opposition Round Table of National Liberation Alliance won a majority of the Supreme Soviet seats and, on November 14, 1990, Gamsakhurdia was elected Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia. On

March 31, 1991, there was a referendum on independence and, on April 9, 1991, Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union. On May 26, 1991, Gamsakhurdia was elected president.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (InvolRef)
  - yes (NoPriRul)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)

### Georgia 1992

- Description: Starting on December 22, 1991 and lasting until January 6, 1992, a coup led by military figures Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba Ioseliani and former Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua ousted President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. This followed much opposition to Gamsakhurdia's election (on May 26, 1991) and forced him to flee the country on January 6. After Gamsakhurdia's ouster, the three coup-leaders formed a Military Council, parliament stopped functioning, and an interim Political Consultative Council was formed in its place. This council included representatives of ten political parties, a group of intellectuals, and several opposition members of parliament (with a total size of approximately 40 members). It was to serve as a substitute parliament, but it only had the right to make recommendations.<sup>214</sup> In early March 1992, the Political Consultative Council was replaced by the State Council, which was endowed with both legislative and executive powers. This council invited former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to return to Georgia. Shevardnadze joined the leaders of the coup to head the State Council on March 10, where he stressed the temporary nature of the new power structure and called for elections to be held as soon as possible. By May 1992, the State Council had 68 members of more than 30 political parties and 20 social movements that had opposed Gamsakhurdia. On October 11, 1992, a one-chamber parliament was elected. It chose Shevardnadze as chairman on November 4. The parliament was meant to be an interim body, which would have the task of writing a new Georgian Constitution. On February 16, 1993, a constitutional commission was created, chaired by Shevardnadze and broadly representative of political parties, major economic groups, social groups, religious leaders, and local authorities. This constitution went into effect on November 26, 1995. Multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections were held on November 5, 1995, with a runoff on November 19. Shevardnadze won the election and was inaugurated on November 26, 1995.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

### Georgia 2004 (2003)

- Description: On November 23, 2003, President Eduard Shevardnadze was forced to resign due to widespread protests in the "Rose Revolution." This uprising was led by Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania, and Nino Burjanadze and began immediately after the parliamentary elections of November 2. These elections were believed to be marred by fraud. After Shevardnadze's exit, power was transferred to Burjanadze, who was the chairman of the old parliament. Because the courts canceled the election results, fresh voting was held on January 4, 2004. Saakashvili won

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<sup>214</sup> During this time, Gamsakhurdia claimed to be a "government in exile," as he controlled the region of Samegrelo. He continued to claim to be the legitimate head of state until his death on December 31, 1993.

easily and assumed the presidency on January 25, 2004. New parliamentary elections occurred in March 2004.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [no](#)

### **East Germany 1990 (1989)**

- Description: On November 9, 1989, sections of the Berlin Wall opened. This followed several months of mass protests, beginning in Leipzig on September 4, 1989. These protests recurred on a weekly basis and grew to be mass demonstrations. On October 18, 1989, these widespread demonstrations—in addition to large-scale departures from the country—led Erich Honecker to resign. Egon Krenz replaced Honecker, assumed the chairmanship of the Council of State, and ordered all police actions against demonstrators to be discontinued. On November 4, the largest demonstration took place and a few days later, on November 7 and 8, the government resigned. Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Krenz swore in a new coalition government and gave unlimited power to the Special Congress and he, along with his Politburo, resigned. A caretaker government was created under longtime East German politician Hans Modrow, which existed from December 3 to January 22. During its tenure, protests continued, even despite the holding of round table negotiations. These round tables were created at both the district and city levels throughout East Germany, but on December 7, the first meeting of the 39-member Central Round Table (CRT) took place with church moderators. The participants included the communists, four old parties, three new parties, six civic groups, and three organizations. The CRT—which was treated as an advisory council, with none of its resolutions binding—continued meeting throughout December 1989 and the beginning of January 1990, with the goal of drafting a new constitution and preparing for free elections to the parliament. The Modrow government, however, did not interact with the CRT until additional protests—which were especially focused on the need to dismantle the secret police force (Stasi)—forced a meeting on January 15. Because of this continuing instability, Modrow invited eight prominent dissidents who were taking part in the Central Round Table to join a 28-member, power-sharing Government of National Responsibility (as ministers without portfolios). This new government came into effect on February 5. Legislative elections were held on March 18, 1990, with the inaugural session of parliament occurring on April 5. There were no presidential elections because, on October 3, 1990, East Germany united with West Germany.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [no \(NoElec\)](#)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

### **Ghana 1993 (1992)**

- Description: On May 18, 1992, political parties were legalized. This followed several years of reforms. In July 1990, Jerry John Rawlings, who had been head of state since he perpetrated a coup in 1979, and his Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) ordered the National Commission on Democracy (NCD)—which had existed as an agency since 1982—to suggest how to transition to democracy by holding consultations in ten regional capitals. These consultations occurred from July 5 to November 9, 1990. This action stemmed, at least in part, from pressure from Ghana's banned opposition parties, led mainly by the Movement of Freedom and Justice (MFJ). The NCD gathered public opinion on the future democratic system and submitted a report on March 26, 1991 that advocated a multiparty system. Following the NCD report, the PNDC announced that it

accepted the commission's recommendations and appointed a nine-member committee of constitutional experts to create a draft constitution (though the PNDC listed some of the essential elements that needed to be included). The nine members included five lawyers, one retired judge, two economists, and one traditional ruler. On May 17, 1991, the PNDC set up a 258-member National Consultative Assembly, which was to deliberate and vote on the draft constitution. It was composed of 22 members appointed by the PNDC, 121 members elected by 62 "established organizations" (corporate groups), and 117 members indirectly elected by District Assemblies (the Bar Association and National Union of Ghana Students boycotted their seats due to the composition of the assembly). Throughout the drafting process, the PNDC retained the right to alter the constitution—they exercised this right, as one example, by adding a blanket indemnity clause for PNDC members. In November 1991, an Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established and, on March 5 or 6, 1992, Rawlings announced plans to return to civilian rule by January 7, 1993. On April 28, 1992, a referendum on the constitution took place, passing easily. Rawlings resigned from the armed forces, legalized political parties on May 18, and founded the National Democratic Congress on July 28, 1992. On November 3, a presidential election was held and, on December 29, parliamentary elections took place. Rawlings became the first president of the Fourth Republic and was sworn in on January 7, 1993.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - no
  - *Alternative coding: TG-permissive*

#### **Ghana 1996**

- Description: On December 7, 1996, simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections took place. The ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) won a majority of seats and President Jerry Rawlings was reelected as president.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

#### **Ghana 2000**

- Description: On December 28, 2000, the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) lost the second round of a presidential election to John Kufuor. On January 6, 2001, President Jerry Rawlings stepped down, following the constitutional mandate.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

#### **Guatemala 1995 (1993)**

- Description: On May 25, 1993, President Jorge Serrano illegally suspended the constitution, dissolved the National Congress, and dissolved the Supreme Court (termed, by some, a "self-coup"). These actions sparked protests, international condemnation, army dissatisfaction, and a declaration that they were illegal by the Constitutional Court. Due to mounting pressure, Serrano resigned on June 1, 1993 and fled. Initially, the army appointed Serrano's vice president, Gustavo Adolfo Espina, as interim president. But after only four days, on June 5, the legislature forced him to resign. On that day, the National Congress voted to make Ramiro de León Carpio president, who then appointed a National Unity Cabinet and requested the voluntary resignation of the congress and Supreme Court. A new constitution was approved by referendum on January 30, 1994. Newly-elected president Álvaro Arzú took over on January 14, 1996. Parliamentary elections were held on August 14, 1994.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)



- no

### Guinea 1990

- Description: On December 23, 1990, a new constitution was approved by referendum. This stemmed from actions of President Lansana Conté—who had come to power in a military coup d'état in 1984—a little over one year earlier. On October 1, 1989, Conté initiated transition, promising that a new Transitional Committee for National Recovery (CTRN) would oversee a five-year transitional period, culminating in a two-party system with an elected president and legislature. After the new constitution was approved, on January 16, 1991, the Military Committee of National Recovery (CMRN) disbanded. It was replaced by the 36-member Transitional Committee for National Recovery (CTRN). The CTRN was chaired by Conté, had an equal number of military and civilian personnel, but had military officers in the most important positions. Initially, the plan had been for the CTRN to oversee a five-year transitional period prior to the establishment of a two-party political system under an elected president and legislature. In October 1991, following several months with some instability, however, Conté announced that the registration of an unlimited number of political parties would come into effect on April 3, 1992 and legislative elections would take place in a full multiparty system. The CTRN was therefore to govern the country until the election of an all-civilian administration. On January 9, 1992, Conté ceded the presidency of the CTRN and reduced its membership to 15. In the following month, most military officers were removed from the government. On April 3, 1992, legislation introducing a multiparty system came into effect. A presidential election was held on December 19, 1993, with Conté emerging as the victor. Legislative elections were held on June 11, 1995.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

### Guinea 2008

- Description: On December 23, 2008, President Lansana Conté died. Conté's death occurred following two years of intermittent strike activity. Beginning with a general strike from January 10 to 27, 2007, strikers and Conté engaged in back-and-forth debate, with protesters demanding various political reforms—including a union-approved prime minister—and Conté vacillating between a declaration of martial law and granting the strikers some concessions. A few hours after Conté's death, Moussa Dadis Camara seized control as the head of a junta, called the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD), and suspended the constitution. In the CNDD's takeover announcement, the officers claimed that elections would be held within 60 days, with an interim president and prime minister appointed until that date. The CNDD appointed a civilian prime minister, Kabiné Komara, and created the cabinet by presidential decree, with 10 of 29 ministries taken by military officers. The 32-member CNDD was composed of 26 military officers and six civilians (plus Camara, giving a total transitional group size of 63). Ethnically, the CNDD was split between ethnic Malinke and *Forestiers*, a collective term for several small ethnic groups based in Southeast Guinea. Camara declared himself president and the junta pledged to hold elections after a two-year transitional period. Camara promised that neither he nor any member of the CNDD would run for president, yet filled government positions with CNDD members. On December 3, 2009, Camara was shot in an assassination attempt and Vice President Sékouba Konaté took over. Following international pressure that culminated in the Joint Declaration of Ouagadougou (between Camara, Konaté, and Compaoré), a Government of National Unity was

formed on January 15, 2010. This declaration specified that the prime minister had to be from the Forum of Active Forces (FFV), an opposition coalition. While the CNDD was not dissolved and Konaté remained interim president, on January 21, 2010, Jean-Marie Doré was appointed prime minister of a six-month transitional government that would lead to elections. Doré's cabinet had 24 civilians and ten officers selected by the CNDD; Konaté separately appointed a 23-member presidential cabinet of advisers. Additionally, a National Transition Council (CNT)—a quasi-legislative, unelected body with a temporary mandate until legislative elections were held—was appointed under Hadja Rabiou Sérah Diallo. This was a mostly civilian body with 155 members and composed of members of civil society, political parties, religious bodies, trade unions, the judiciary, youth organizations, the media, and representatives of the military. On June 27, 2010, the first round of presidential elections were held. Following the second round of elections, Alpha Condé, a veteran opposition leader who had been a vocal critic of past Guinean leaders, was elected president and assumed office on December 21, 2010. The CNT remained, however, until parliamentary elections were held on September 28, 2013. The first session of the new parliament took place on January 13, 2014.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (MilCoup)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

#### **Guinea-Bissau 1991-1994 (1990)**

- Description: On October 8, 1990, a national conference on a transition to multiparty democracy opened. This conference lasted until October 13 and stemmed from various pressure emanating from the international community and opposition groups like the Democratic Front (FD). The conference included 350 representatives from the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), civil society, and private organizations, and met to discuss the rules for democratization in Guinea-Bissau. A few months later, on January 20, 1991, President João Bernardo Vieira confirmed that the transition to multiparty democracy would be completed by 1993. In May 1991, the legislative People's National Assembly approved amendments to the constitution, with the single-party system officially abolished on May 8. The first multiparty legislative and presidential elections were held on July 3, 1994, with a second presidential round on August 7, 1994.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)
      - *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

#### **Guinea-Bissau 1998**

- Description: On November 1, 1998, the Abuja Peace Accord was signed. This followed a civil war, which began on June 7, 1998 after there was an attempted coup against President João Bernardo Vieira by soldier Ansumane Mané. The Abuja Peace Accord provided for the establishment of a Government of National Unity in order to include rebel representatives. On December 4, President Vieira appointed Francisco Fadul (an advisor to Mané) as the prime minister, and a United Nations' resolution passed that called for elections to be held by March 1999. On December 15, the rebels



and the government signed an additional agreement that created the structure of unity government, which was a power-sharing council including eight members from each side: five ministers and three secretaries of state chosen by Vieira; four ministers and four secretaries of state chosen by Mané's junta. On February 20, 1999, the interim government was sworn in and was to remain in power until new elections in March. However, in May, Vieira announced that the elections would be delayed until December 28, 1999. A few days later, on May 7, the military junta ousted Vieira, who officially surrendered on May 10, 1999.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### **Guinea-Bissau 1999-2000 (1999)**

- Description: On May 10, 1999, President João Bernardo Vieira was deposed when he signed an unconditional surrender to end the civil war. This occurred after numerous ceasefire violations. Ansumane Mané became temporary head of state until May 14 when President of the National People's Assembly, Malam Bacai Sanhá, was appointed acting president until elections. The Government of National Unity under Prime Minister Francisco Fadul—and including ministers appointed by Vieira—remained in office during this time. Presidential and legislative elections were held in November 1999.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (CivilWar)
    - yes (NoPriRul)
    - no

### **Guinea-Bissau 2002**

- Description: President Kumba Ialá dissolved parliament on November 14, 2002. He appointed Mário Pires as caretaker prime minister and called early elections for February 2003.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### **Guinea-Bissau 2003**

- Description: On September 14, 2003, President Kumba Ialá (Yalá) was detained and placed under house arrest in a coup led by General Veríssimo Correia Seabra. Immediately afterward, Seabra's 32-member junta—the Military Committee for the Restoration of Constitutional and Democratic Order (MCRCEO)—created an ad hoc commission including political parties, trade unions, representatives of the Catholic and Muslim religious communities, and representatives of the armed forces. This commission, comprised of 12 civilians and four members from the military, were to define the terms of reference for a transitional government and consultative council. They agreed to form a broad-based transitional government, which would prepare the way for free and fair legislative elections. On September 17, Ialá announced that he would resign to allow for the nomination of a civilian government. The MCRCEO adopted a Charter of Political Transition (with the approval of 22 political and civil society groups), which partially suspended the constitution, created new political institutions for the transitional period, and determined that legislative elections would be held within six months and presidential elections one year after that. On September 28, Henrique Rosa and Artur Sanhá were sworn in as president and prime minister, respectively. And on October 2, a transitional government was sworn in (sometimes referred to as

the Government of National Unity). The charter additionally established a 56-member National Transition Council (CNT) as the highest body of state administration until legislative elections would occur. It was comprised of members of the military committee, as well as other signatories to the Charter, with Seabra as chairman. Seabra additionally supervised a national electoral commission, composed of 25 junta members, 23 political party members, and eight civil society representatives. Under interim President Rosa and Prime Minister Sanhá, the transitional government was to govern until legislative elections occurred and provide a constitutional roadmap. This group did not include any well-known politicians (mainly because any politician who served in the transitional government would not be allowed to contest legislative elections). Legislative elections began on March 28, 2004, with the former ruling Party for Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) winning the largest number of seats. The National Assembly was sworn in on May 7, 2004 and replaced Sanhá's transitional government. Later in the year, on October 6, 2004, there was a mutiny of military factions caused, at least in part, by tension over unpaid government salaries. This resulted in Seabra's death and caused widespread unrest. On June 19, 2005, a presidential election was held, with a runoff on July 24. Former President João Bernardo Vieira (previously ousted in 1999) won the election and was sworn in on October 1, 2005, replacing Rosa and ending the Government of National Unity and MCRRCDO.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(MilCoup\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

### **Guyana 1992 (1990)**

- Description: On October 12, 1990, President Desmond Hoyte agreed to some reforms, like reconstituting the Elections Commission, allowing observers to monitor the upcoming election, and fixing the tainted voter list. Earlier, in the late 1980s, after President Forbes Burnham's death in 1985, Hoyte—like Burnham, head of the People's National Congress (PNC)—made gradual reforms, though more economic than political. The opposition Patriotic Coalition for Democracy (PCD), headed by Cheddi Jagan, lobbied international bodies and other governments to pressure the Hoyte government for reform. By 1990, financial assistance from some countries—notably, the United States—was linked to the certification of the electoral process. Due in part to this pressure, Hoyte agreed to additional reforms in October 1990. In 1992, Hoyte's PNC had been in power for 28 years. But, after parliamentary, presidential, and local elections were held on October 5, 1992, Hoyte handed over power to Cheddi Jagan and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) by constitutionally-sanctioned means.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(VolRef\)](#)
    - [no](#)

### **Haiti 1990**

- Description: On March 10, 1990, street protests forced Prosper Avril, who had come to power in a 1988 coup, into exile. While this immediately followed massive protests that began with the March 5 protest in which government forces fired on student protesters and killed an 11-year old girl, it additionally stemmed from years of political turmoil. Several years earlier, on February 7, 1986, Jean-Claude Duvalier resigned following heavy pressure. He set up the National Council of Government (or National Governing Council, CNG), a joint military and civilian provisional government, led by Henri Namphy and composed of five members, three military and two civilian.

Protests against the CNG took place, with protesters demanding the installation of a civilian government. On March 20, 1986, the first council was dissolved and, one day later, a second national council with three constituents was established. This version ruled until February 7, 1988, when Leslie Manigat took office as elected president. But, on June 20, 1988, Manigat was overthrown in a coup led by Henri Namphy. Then, on September 17, 1988, a group of non-commissioned officers overthrew Namphy, bringing General Prosper Avril to power. After Avril went into exile in early March 1990, Hérard Abraham became acting president, but gave up power three days later. The Haitian Constitution provided that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was next in line for the presidency, but a group of 12 political parties—known as the “Group of 12”—rejected that candidate because he had ties to Avril. On March 13, 1990, then, a provisional government was formed under the leadership of former Supreme Court Justice Ertha Pascal-Trouillot. Pascal-Trouillot acted as provisional president of a 19-member Council of State, which had the ability to overturn her decisions. This group—eight members of which corresponded to the eight departments (or states, excluding the capital) and 11 members of which were chosen by various civic, religious, professional, and labor groups—restored the 1987 Constitution and promised to lead the country to free and fair elections. These elections were facilitated by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), which was composed of nine members, each from a different professional sector of Haiti. During Pascal-Trouillot’s 11-month tenure, she requested an observer mission for elections, the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH). The first round of presidential and parliamentary elections were held on December 16, 1990, with a second round on January 20, 1991. Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president with the National Front for Change and Democracy and sworn in on February 7, 1991.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

## Haiti 1991

- Description: On September 29, 1991, elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was deposed in a coup led by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras, Army Chief of Staff Philippe Biamby, and Chief of the National Police Joseph-Michel François. Aristide was forced into exile (September 30, 1991), François became the chief of the police and secret police, and Cédras became de facto ruler as commander of the armed forces. On October 7, military forces surrounded the Haitian parliament building and induced lawmakers to approve the coup. They did so and named Joseph Nérette, a Supreme Court Justice, as provisional president (this was in line with the 1987 Haitian Constitution). Nérette was sworn in on October 8 and subsequently appointed Jean-Jacques Honorat, a leader of the Haitian Center for Human Rights and foe of Aristide, to be prime minister. During this time, the Organization of American States, the United States, and the United Nations became involved in trying to negotiate Aristide’s restoration, which continued over the next few years. Though Cédras was the de facto ruler, Nérette was provisional president from October 8, 1991 to June 19, 1992 and Marc Louis Bazin was provisional president from June 19, 1992 to June 15, 1993. Bazin was not immediately replaced, but then Émile Jonassaint acted as provisional president from May 12 to October 12, 1994.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(MilCoup\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
    - [yes](#)

- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

#### Haiti 1994

- Description: On October 10, 1994, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras, commander-in-chief of the High Command of the Haitian Armed Forces (FADH), resigned. A few days later, on October 15, exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide returned to Haiti to finish his elected term. This followed a period of time in which Cédras acted as de facto leader of Haiti following a 1991 coup against Aristide. After failed negotiations, in June 1993, the United Nations Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti, which forced Cédras to agree to hold talks about the potential for a Government of National Unity. On July 3, 1993, Cédras agreed to let Aristide return to Haiti in October and to appoint a new head of the armed forces. The agreement also set up the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), but because the military authorities did not comply with the July agreement, in October 1993 the international agencies left Haiti. Due in large part to pressure from the United Nations—through Operation Uphold (Restore) Democracy, led by the United States, where troops were ready to invade if necessary—provisional President Émile Jonassaint and Cédras negotiated the return of Aristide. On October 10, 1994, in return for parliamentary guarantees of amnesty, the military leadership resigned. When Aristide returned from exile, Jonassaint stepped down. Parliamentary elections took place in June 1995 and presidential elections subsequently took place in December 1995.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)

#### Haiti 1999

- Description: On January 11, 1999, President René Préval suspended the entire congress and two-thirds of the senate, began to rule by decree, and set the date for legislative elections. These actions followed a 17-month stalemate that had left Haiti without a budget or a functioning government. Parliament had not ratified four of Préval's nominees for prime minister. Préval instructed his final candidate, Jacques-Édouard Alexis, to select a cabinet. Préval then decreed this to be the new government, which took over on March 26, 1999. A nine-member Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) was created to oversee elections. During this time, there was some political violence against opposition forces, mainly from Fanmi Lavalas, Jean-Bertrand Aristide's party. Legislative elections occurred in May 2000 and a presidential election was held in November 2000.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - no

#### Haiti 2004

- Description: On February 29, 2004, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was forced into exile. Three weeks earlier, beginning on February 5, a revolt began in Northern Haiti that eventually reached the capital and forced Aristide's departure. An international peacekeeping force headed by the United States (along with French and United Nations' troops) was dispatched to Haiti to help stabilize the country. On March 8, Boniface Alexandre, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and thus next in line of succession, became acting president. Not according to the constitution, however,

a seven-member “Council of the Wise”—with one member of Aristide’s Lavalas family movement, four members of the political opposition, and two members from churches— was created and supposed to govern until elections could be held. This panel was named by the coup forces, in consultation with the international community (namely the United States), on March 5, 2004, three days before Alexandre’s installation. It chose the new prime minister, Gérard Latortue, who was still living in the United States at the time. This decision was announced on March 9, only one day after Alexandre was sworn in. Latortue was sworn in on March 12, 2004 and, on March 17, an interim government was created. Under the new interim government, Prime Minister Latortue acted as the head of government while Alexandre remained head of state. The “Democratic Convergence” and “Group of 184” were included, but Fanmi Lavalas was excluded. The interim government consisted of 13 ministers of state. On April 30, 2004, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was created. A new electoral law was published on February 11, 2005. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held on February 7, 2006 to replace the interim government. Former President René Préval won the election, just clearing the threshold to avoid a runoff election with 51.2 percent of the vote. His inauguration was delayed until May 14 to accommodate a legislative runoff election that took place on April 21. Préval’s May 14, 2006 inauguration marked the formation of the new government and appointment of the new prime minister and cabinet.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(CivilWar\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

### **Honduras 2009**

- Description: On June 28, 2009, the military ousted President Manuel Zelaya, who was sent into exile. The coup occurred after there had been a political dispute between the president and much of the rest of the government about rewriting the constitution. On the same day as the coup, the National Congress voted to remove Zelaya. Roberto Micheletti, the President of Congress who was constitutionally next in line for the presidency (because Vice President Elvin Ernesto Santos had resigned in December 2008 to run for president), was sworn in as interim president. Of the existing 128 National Congress deputies, 19 refused to recognize Micheletti. The parliament passed various emergency decrees to limit public gatherings, restrict news organizations, and even declared a 45-day “state of exception” in which they suspended civil liberties. On November 29, 2009, presidential and parliamentary elections occurred. On January 27, 2010, a newly-elected president, Porfirio Lobo, was inaugurated.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(MilCoup\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriRul\)](#)
    - [no](#)

### **Hungary 1990 (1989)**

- Description: On February 11, 1989, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) Central Committee ratified the Politburo’s decision to accept a transition to a multiparty system. This was a calculated move by the MSZMP to install its preferred institutions following the “social rumblings” from the Network of Free Initiatives (SZKH), later transformed into the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), and the Hungarian Civic Alliance (FIDESZ). These forces held demonstrations—with the first mass demonstration occurring on March 15, 1988—and called for

a multiparty system, free elections, a new constitution, national sovereignty, and a market economy. From February 11 to March 22, 1989, the MSZMP held bilateral consultative talks with various opposition parties. On March 15, 1989, a mass demonstration took place against the MSZMP regime. Between March 22 and May 29, the opposition united in the Opposition Round Table (EKA), which created unified demands to send to the MSZMP. Following back-and-forth proposals, on June 10, 1989, a framework for National Roundtable Talks (NKA) was signed by representatives of the MSZMP, the EKA, and the “third side” composed of MSZMP satellite organizations. Substantive talks opened three days later, on June 13. In addition to the Communist Party, the other two negotiating sides represented 16 organizations (nine in the EKA and seven in the “third side”). In total, 573 individuals participated in the NKA. These talks focused on various reforms including “defining the principles and rules constituting the democratic political transition,” and had a consensus-based decision rule. The Round Table Agreement was signed on September 18, 1989. By-elections were held in July and August 1989 in which opposition members gained seats in the legislature. On October 23, Speaker of the National Assembly Mátyás Szűrös became acting president. This followed legislative action that amended the constitution and laid a roadmap for the country’s transition to elections. Parliamentary elections were held in two rounds on March 25 and April 8, 1990. The new government took office on May 23. Due to insufficient turnout, a referendum for direct presidential elections failed on July 29, 1990. On August 3, the legislature elected Árpád Göncz—who had previously been selected as acting president on May 2—to a five-year term as president.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [no \(NoElec\)](#)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

### **Indonesia 1999 (1998)**

- Description: On May 21, 1998, President Suharto resigned. His resignation followed mass protests. Earlier in May 1998, student protests were repressed, which led to mass riots on May 13 and 14. The military split and some former allies deserted President Suharto. This forced Suharto to resign and name B.J. Habibie, his vice president, as his successor. This succession occurred constitutionally, with Habibie succeeding Suharto based on the rules put in place by the authoritarian regime. Members of the outgoing regime controlled the transition—the transition was insider-dominated, as Suharto had screened all legislators prior to his resignation—though their term in office was limited because Habibie committed to holding elections quickly. Within a few days of taking office, Habibie freed many political prisoners, recognized trade unions, and restored freedom of speech and the press. He announced early legislative elections, to be held within one year. Before Suharto resigned, his Minister of Home Affairs had appointed a team to work on laws relating to elections, parties, and governmental structures. When Habibie took office, this “Team of Seven” remained, chaired by an academically-oriented senior civil servant, a student leader, and six academics. The Team of Seven worked on various law proposals and the House of Representatives—which had been previously elected on May 29, 1997—decided that elections would be held early, Suharto’s corruption would be investigated, and the military’s power would be reduced. Preceding constitutional change, legislative elections were held on June 7, 1999 and an indirect presidential election was held in October 1999, with Abdurrahman Wahid elected president.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriRul\)](#)



- no

### Iran 1997

- Description: On May 23, 1997, Mohammad Khatami was elected president, succeeding Akbar Hashsemi Rafsanjani on August 2, 1997. His campaign had focused on the rule of law, democracy, and inclusive decision-making. Khatami was also a proponent of free market ideals and his foreign policy theory “Dialogues among Civilizations.” He defeated his opponent, Nateq-Nuri, who was officially endorsed by the Supreme Leader, Khamenei. After his election, Khatami worked toward repealing some restrictions on civil liberty and campaigned for more tolerance of free thinking among intellectuals and young people.
  - o Coding part one:
    - no

### Iran 2004

- Description: In January, 2004, prior to a legislative election, the Guardian Council disqualified 3600 candidates thought to be “too progressive.” With President Mohammad Khatami's intervention along with a threat of boycott from provincial governors, one-third of those disqualified were reinstated. This small proportion provoked the resignation of 109 members of parliament, followed by the resignation of 124 others a few days later. In February 2004, legislative elections were held, which led to a victory of more conservative elements of the Iranian government.
  - o Coding part one:
    - no

### Iraq 2003

- Description: On April 7, 2003, Baghdad fell to invading forces, only a short time after a United-States-led coalition invaded (beginning on March 20). The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was subsequently established on April 21 to govern Iraq. The CPA had executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the Iraqi government during its tenure. Headed by Paul Bremer (who arrived in Iraq on May 13) and composed mainly of United States’ government workers rather than domestic Iraqi forces, the CPA acted as an occupation administration, focusing on dissolving the Iraqi army, “de-Ba’athifying” the government, and reshaping politics and the economy. On July 13, 2003, the CPA appointed a 25-member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which had the power to advise and nominate Iraqi ministers. In addition, the IGC was tasked with drafting a temporary constitution called the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The TAL was to include a timetable for holding transitional elections, drafting a permanent constitution, and holding elections for a permanent government. In terms of composition, the IGC was religiously and ethnically diverse, included a number of Iraqi expatriates in addition to former critics of the Hussein regime, and three women. On November 15, the CPA and IGC agreed on a timetable for the TAL and, in late February and early March 2004, the IGC adopted and signed an interim constitution. After promulgating the interim Constitution of the Iraqi Transitional Administrative Law, both the CPA and IGC were dissolved on June 28, 2004. This made way for the 35-member Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) under Prime Minister Iyad Allawi to take over as the sovereign government of Iraq. Allawi had been chosen by the IGC and was to govern the country until national elections could be held. In June 2004, a United Nations’ electoral assistance mission appointed a seven-member Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission, which had no ties to political parties. Months later, on January 30, 2005, elections were held for the 275-seat Transitional National Assembly (TNA). The TNA’s main task was to prepare a draft constitution. Several months later, at the end of April, the TNA approved a new Iraqi Transitional Government, which replaced the IIG on May 3. After the TNA completed its work, a referendum for the new constitution took place on October 15, 2005. Two months later, on December 15, elections for the 275-seat Council of Representatives

of Iraq were held, with the new government inaugurated on March 16, 2006 under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Jalal Talabani, who had been selected as president earlier in 2005 by the TNA, continued as president.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (IntlInt)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### **Iraq 2010**

- Description: On March 7, 2010, legislative elections were held. Before the election, the Supreme Court ruled that the existing electoral law was unconstitutional, so changes were made to the electoral system. A large number of candidates were banned by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) due to supposed links with the Ba'ath Party in 2009. Although the decision was appealed, the court ruled that the bans would remain until after the 2010 election. After this election, Ayad Allawi's party ticket, Iiraqiyya, or the Iraqi National Movement, gained a plurality of votes, but the U.S. backed Nouri al-Maliki for the position of prime minister. In the end, a power-sharing government was established.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### **Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire) 1990**

- Description: On May 3, 1990, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny announced the legalization of opposition political parties and his intentions to hold multiparty elections. This announcement followed protests in March and April in which hundreds of civil servants and students took to the streets. Due in part to an economic crisis, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny and his Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDIC) responded to the protests with political reform. On October 28, 1990, a presidential election was held and, on November 25, 1990, legislative elections were held.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - no

### **Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire) 1999**

- Description: On December 24, 1999, President Henri Konan Bédié, who assumed the presidency after Houphouët-Boigny's death in December 1993, was overthrown in a military coup and fled. This coup occurred, in part, due to unmet military salary demands, corruption, economic instability, and increased ethnic tension between the Muslim North and Christian South. Following the coup, retired general Robert Guéï became president, suspended the constitution, courts, and parliament, and created a nine-man, all military National Committee of Public Salvation (CNSP). The CNSP consisted of Guéï, seven other military officers, one naval enlisted man, and one soldier who participated in the coup. Shortly after the coup, Guéï met with political party leaders, asked them to submit candidates for a transitional cabinet, and then announced that the transitional regime would have a 21-member cabinet, with political parties choosing 11 of the members and the junta appointing ten. The 11 members included representatives from five political parties and civil society members. Guéï promised an orderly return to democracy, including the rewriting of the constitution and elections within one year. He reshuffled the cabinet many times, effectively ridding the transitional government of members of the opposition, particularly those associated with the Republican Rally (RDR), the party of former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara. After the



transitional government was established, on January 31, 2000, a 27-member Consultative Commission on Constitutional and Electoral Matters (CCCE) was sworn in and composed of representatives of the main political parties, civil society, labor organizations, and religious institutions. The new constitution was passed by referendum on July 23 and 24, 2000 and presidential elections occurred on October 22, 2000. Guéi claimed victory in the presidential election, but street protests forced him to flee. The Supreme Court then declared Laurent Gbagbo—the only significant opposition candidate—as president. Legislative elections were held on December 10, 2000, with the inaugural session held on January 22, 2001.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(MilCoup\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

### **Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) 2003**

- Description: On January 23, 2003, after eight days of negotiations surrounding the First Ivorian Civil War—which began on September 19, 2002—the negotiating parties signed a deal at Linas-Marcoussis. The rebellion stemmed from the 2000 presidential election, in which Alassane Ouattara, many northerners’ preferred candidate, had been prevented from running. Robert Guéi had claimed victory in this election, but street protests forced him to flee. Subsequently, Laurent Gbagbo—the only significant opposition candidate who had been allowed to participate—became president. The northerners thus began a rebellion against Gbagbo, with violence beginning around September 19, 2002. In response, France sent in a peacekeeping operation known as Operation Unicorn. Eventually, the January 2003 agreement was signed by all political parties represented in the government and the three rebel organizations (the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire, MPCl; the Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West, MPIGO; and the New Forces of Côte d’Ivoire, MJP). President Laurent Gbagbo was to retain power, with opponents invited in to a Government of National Reconciliation under a “consensus” prime minister and given two senior ministry positions. Seydou Diarra was appointed as prime minister and a National Security Council was established, which gave representation to all parties and had 41 ministers. To enforce the agreement, both French and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS/CEDEAO) soldiers were on the ground, in addition to the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI), which formed on May 13, 2003 (and was subsequently replaced by the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) on April 4, 2004). The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement called for post-conflict elections and the end of the civil war was proclaimed on July 4, 2003. Elections were not held and, in 2005, a crisis surrounding the delayed elections and an extension of Gbagbo’s tenure in office developed. This led to the appointment of Charles Konan Banny as prime minister on December 7, 2005.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(VolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

### **Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) 2007**

- Description: On March 4, 2007, after one month of intense “direct dialogue” negotiations, the Ouagadougou Political Agreement—mediated by Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré—was signed as a way to bring peace to the armed conflict between the government and the “New Forces.” On April 4, New Forces leader Guillaume Soro became prime minister, with Gbagbo remaining as president. A new transitional government with 33 cabinet ministers was created and the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’s (ONUCI) buffer zone began to be dismantled (though forces remained on the ground). On November 27, 2007, Gbagbo and Soro signed another agreement to hold an election before the end of June 2008. They were postponed, however, until November 2009 and then again until 2010 due to issues with the voter registration. Presidential elections eventually occurred on October 31, 2010 (though Soro was prevented from running), with a runoff taking place on November 28 between former Prime Minister Ouattara and President Gbagbo. Amid controversial circumstances, both candidates claimed victory and Ouattara swore himself in on December 4. The international community agreed that Ouattara had won the election, much violence occurred, and Gbagbo was arrested in April 2011. After Gbagbo’s arrest, Ouattara was officially sworn in on May 6. Due to the violence following the presidential election, parliamentary elections had been postponed, but were eventually held on December 11, 2011. The newly elected legislature held its first session on March 12, 2012.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - yes
  - o Coding part three:
    - yes

### **Jordan 1989**

- Description: On April 27, 1989, King Hussein bin Talal accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifai’s government and appointed an interim government under his relative and a former military commander, Zaid bin Shaker. The king’s actions followed riots, which erupted on April 18 in the city of Ma’an after consumer prices increased. Following the riots, King Hussein bin Talal announced that he planned to hold parliamentary elections and thus accepted the resignation of al-Rifai’s government. In May, King Hussein proposed a new National Charter, which was to provide a framework for future democratic development. On November 8, 1989, parliamentary elections took place but, because there was still a ban on formal political parties, candidates had to run on individual platforms. This election followed the election law previously promulgated on April 26, 1986. In April 1990, King Hussein appointed a 60-member royal commission—including members of the government, business figures, leftist party members, and Muslim Brotherhood members—to draft guidelines for party activity in a National Charter. This, however, did not occur until after the first parliamentary elections took place. Subsequently, on June 9, 1991, the National Charter was endorsed by the king. He appointed Tahir al-Masri as prime minister and ended martial law. In 1992, he legalized political parties and, on November 8, 1993, held the second (but first multiparty) parliamentary election.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - no

### **Kazakhstan 1991**

- Description: On December 16, 1991, following the failed Moscow coup d’état, Kazakhstan declared independence from the Soviet Union (though Kazakhstan had declared sovereignty as a

republic in October 1990). Supreme Soviet elections were held on March 25, 1990 and Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had been Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, was named president on April 24, 1990. Nazarbayev remained president following independence. He appointed a 14-member working group, including the Vice-Chair of the Supreme Soviet, lawyers, academics, and government officials, to draft the initial text of the new constitution, a procedure consistent with the existing constitution. The 1990-elected Supreme Soviet maintained final authority over the document. This constitution was adopted on January 28, 1993. The outgoing Supreme Soviet dissolved itself on December 13, 1993 and legislative elections were held on March 7, 1994.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(VolRef\)](#)
  - [no](#)

### **Kenya 1991**

- Description: On December 10, 1991, after mass opposition (in particular, calls for the legalization of political opposition) and foreign pressure (in particular, the withholding of foreign aid), parliament repealed the one-party section of the constitution. Protests started to occur as early as February 16, 1990, following the murder of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Robert Ouko. Later, in August 1991, opposition leaders created a united front (the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy, FORD) to call for an election boycott unless a national conference was held, but the ruling party—led by Daniel arap Moi—refused to heed these calls until foreign actors suspended financial assistance. Moi then pushed through the reform for a multiparty system at the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) conference. Parliamentary elections were held on December 29, 1992.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [no](#)

### **Kenya 1998 (1997)**

- Description: On July 7, 1997, pro-reform rallies were held throughout the country and repressed, with a number of people dying. On July 17, 1997, after violence, pressure from civil society groups, and pressure from international donors, President Daniel arap Moi agreed to some constitutional reforms. Beginning on August 28, Moi and his Kenya African National Union (KANU) negotiated with the Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG)—composed of around 75<sup>215</sup> members of parliament from both KANU and the opposition parties—and agreed to a framework for a comprehensive constitutional reform process. The IPPG reform package was negotiated between August and November, leading to promises of the repeal of a number of colonial-era laws and the Constitution of Kenya Act. While this effect four large changes—making explicit that Kenya would remain a multiparty state, increasing the upper limit on the number of Electoral Commission members and requiring opposition representatives, providing constitutional protection against sexual discrimination, and replacing the president’s unilateral authority to appoint 12 members of parliament with a proportional system—these reforms did not lead to much change before the December 1997 presidential and parliamentary elections. Moi dissolved the National Assembly on November 10 and then elections took place on December 29 and 30. After the elections, ethnic violence occurred.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)

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<sup>215</sup> Sources debate the number of parliamentarians. While one source claims 120 members participated, several sources use the figure 75, which is why I use that here.

- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-permissive*

### Kenya 2002

- Description: On December 27, 2002, a presidential election took place, in which long-time President Daniel arap Moi was constitutionally barred from running. Legislative elections were also held in 2002. These elections represented the first time that the opposition was able to offer a coherent challenge to the Kenya African National Union (KANU). In the past, KANU's victory had been due to a conflicted and divided opposition, as well as widespread campaigns of bribery and corruption. In the early 2000s, however, KANU realized that it stood very little chance against a united opposition and therefore, in 2002, KANU leaders appeared to hold an attitude of acceptance that they were going to lose. This meant that corruption, election rigging, and bribery to ensure KANU's victory was not widespread in this election. For the most part, voting was relatively free, fair, and peaceful. Nevertheless, the margin of the Party of National Unity's (PNU) victory was unprecedented. Mwai Kibaki of the PNU won the presidential contest. A National Constitutional Conference was called and began discussing a draft constitution on April 28, 2003. The constitution was voted down in a constitutional referendum on November 21, 2005.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### Kenya 2008

- Description: On February 28, 2008, a national accord was signed. This followed two months of violence stemming from the December 30, 2007 announcement that Mwai Kibaki had won the presidential election, which was widely disputed. United Nations' Secretary General Kofi Annan—backed by the African Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom—mediated talks, which led to the main presidential election opponent, Raila Odinga, and Kibaki signing the accord. This was to create a power-sharing regime. The National Assembly of Kenya temporarily reestablished the position of prime minister in the National Accord and Reconciliation Bill (passed on March 18, 2008). This power-sharing regime was sworn in on April 17, 2008, with Kibaki as president and Odinga as prime minister. Additionally, there were two deputy prime ministers, one from each member of the coalition. The cabinet, called the Grand Coalition Government, had 50 percent Kibaki-appointed ministers and 50 percent Raila-appointed ministers. On August 4, 2010, a popular referendum enacted a new constitution.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

### Kosovo 1999

- Description: On June 10, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Operation Allied Force ended. This operation began on March 24, 1999, during the Kosovo War, and was an airstrike campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). On June 10, NATO suspended the airstrikes, as Yugoslav forces agreed to withdraw from Kosovo. On the same day, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which placed Kosovo under a transitional United Nations administration and authorized a NATO-led peacekeeping force (KFOR). Kosovo's institutions were replaced by the Joint Interim Administrative Structure

established by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK additionally exercised executive and legislative authority through consultative bodies, such as the 35-member Kosovo Transition Council (KTC), composed of both Albanian and Serb representatives, which was established on July 25, 1999. The KTC (under the chairmanship of the UN's Special Representative) was the highest consultative body to UNMIK. After months of negotiations, on December 15, the KTC reached an agreement to establish the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). The KTC remained, but was expanded to 36 members. Additionally, an Interim Administrative Council was created, made up of eight members. This included Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) leader Ibrahim Rugova, Hashim Thaçi of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and Rexhep Qosja of the United Democratic Movement. One seat on the council was reserved for a member of the Serb community (an ethnic minority representing about ten percent of the population of Kosovo in 1999) and four seats were for international members. The agreement also created a number of administrative departments that were to be jointly administered by international and domestic staff. The JIAS had little actual authority and played mainly a consultative role. On May 15, 2001, the “constitutional framework for provisional self-government” was adopted and UNMIK began transferring administrative competencies to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). The PISG included three institutions: the presidency, the government, and the assembly. Despite PISG's existence, UNMIK retained ultimate authority on constitutional and legal matters. Parliamentary elections were held on November 17, 2001, in which Thaçi's Democratic Party of Kosovo won a plurality. On December 10, 2001, Kosovo's first elected legislature was inaugurated. The new legislature elected an administrative presidency (cabinet) after their first session, but it was not until March 4, 2002 that Ibrahim Rugova, who had been president during the war, was appointed president.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(IntlInt\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

### **Kosovo 2008**

- Description: On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia. A new constitution entered into force on June 15, 2008. Parliamentary elections had been held in 2007 and were next held in 2010.
  - Coding part one:
    - [no](#)

### **Kuwait 1990-1992 (1990)**

- Description: On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and annexed Kuwait, claiming that their forces were requested by revolutionaries who had already staged a coup d'état deposing Kuwaiti Emir Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah. The emir fled to Saudi Arabia, where he ran a government-in-exile. Only one day after invading Kuwait, on August 4, the Iraqis established the Provisional Government of Free Kuwait, a nine-member military grouping led by Alaa Hussein Ali. This provisional government initially announced that it would dissolve parliament and rule temporarily, but within only a few days—on August 8—the Iraqi government annexed Kuwait, announcing a “merger” of the two countries and obviating the need for a provisional government. Meanwhile, the exiled royal family appealed for international support in ousting the Iraqi puppet regime. In early October 1990, the royal family held a conference in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in which they addressed approximately 1000 Kuwaiti citizens—including “opposition” members of the National

Assembly, which the Emir had dissolved in 1986—and agreed to establish committees to advise the government on political, social, and financial matters. The ruling family also pledged that, after the liberation of Kuwait, the country’s constitution and legislature would be restored and that free elections would be held. A few months later, on February 28, 1991, a United Nations-mandated, United States-led coalition succeeded in removing Iraqi forces. On March 14, the emir returned to Kuwait under a three-month period of martial law. On March 20, the government formed prior to the invasion (under Saad Abdallah) resigned. Many members of the opposition refused to join in a new government and, on April 20, Saad Abdallah formed a government without them. This consisted of two members from the emir’s al-Ahmad branch, three members from Saad Abdallah’s al-Salim branch, and nine newcomers (though no opposition), including former civil servants, a judge, and a professor. In response to the new government formation, there was much opposition pressure. On June 26, the emir ended martial law and announced that parliamentary elections would be held in June 1992. In July, the pro-government, partly appointed National Assembly (which had been inaugurated before the invasion) was reconvened. On October 5, 1992, parliamentary elections were held. Political parties were banned and voters elected individuals, who often had affiliations with “movements” or “tendencies.”

- Coding part one:
  - yes (IntlInt)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (InstDes)

### **Kyrgyzstan 1991**

- Description: On August 31, 1991, following Moscow’s failed coup d’état, Kyrgyzstan declared independence from the Soviet Union. On October 27, 1990, Askar Akayev was elected as president by the Supreme Soviet. He ran unopposed in a presidential election one year later, on October 13, 1991. Kyrgyzstan gained full independence on December 25, 1991. A new constitution was passed in May 1993 and parliamentary elections were held on February 5, 1995 (with a second round on February 19). Previously, Supreme Soviet elections had been held on February 25, 1990 (with a second round on April 7), but the only legal party in the country was the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - no

### **Kyrgyzstan 2005**

- Description: On March 24, 2005, President Askar Akayev fled. This action occurred after the “Tulip Revolution,” which used massive protests to contest the parliamentary election results of March 2005. The outgoing parliament named the head of the opposition coordinating committee, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, as acting president. Bakiyev chose a cabinet—which had a balance of regional representation and a mix of Akayev holdovers and anti-Akayev activists—to act as an interim government. He agreed to schedule new elections for July, recognized the newly elected parliament, and encouraged Akayev to resign (which occurred on April 4, 2005). A presidential election was held on July 10, 2005 (which Bakiyev won); a referendum on constitutional issues was held on October 21, 2007; and parliamentary elections occurred on December 16, 2007.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:



- no (NoElec)

### **Kyrgyzstan 2010**

- Description: On April 7, 2010, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev fled the capital. This followed protests against Bakiyev's regime, which began in early 2010. By March 2010, the democratic opposition Popular Assembly formed, led by Roza Otunbayeva. On March 17, 2010, civil society and key opposition groups met to establish their common goals, which culminated in a seven point ultimatum for authorities. On April 6, provincial demonstrations began and protesters were able to take control of state radio, television, and government buildings. Bakiyev declared a state of emergency and, on April 7, fled. On the same day, Otunbayeva announced that she would head a provisional government with plans of creating a new constitution. Just over one week later, on April 15, Bakiyev signed a resignation letter (though he later claimed that he was still the legitimate president). Otunbayeva's 13-member interim government dissolved parliament, suspended the Constitutional Court, and promised to hold elections within six months. On April 30, a 75-member Constitutional Council was formed by Provisional Government Resolution (no. 29), which submitted the final draft of the constitution to the interim government on May 19. This Constitutional Council—which received advice from several international organizations, such as the Venice Commission—was made up mostly of representatives from non-governmental organizations, experts, and civil society activists. The interim government approved the constitution on May 21, which provided for a transitional period under Otunbayeva until January 2012 when a new president would be inaugurated (and Otunbayeva would not be allowed to run). On June 27, the constitution was approved by referendum and on October 10, 2010 legislative elections were held. Presidential elections were held on October 30, 2011, with Almazbek Atambayev sworn in as president on December 1, 2011.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - yes
  - o Coding part three:
    - yes

### **Latvia 1991 (1989)**

- Description: On December 28, 1989, the Latvian Supreme Soviet abolished the leading role of the communist party and permitted opposition parties to form. This followed two years of demonstrations, which began in the 1987 "Singing Revolution," a cycle of mass demonstrations occurring in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. On February 28, 1987, the Environmental Protection Club was founded, which became a large mass movement calling for Latvia's independence. Various other opposition organizations formed during the late 1980s and led to the creation of the Popular Front of Latvia (LTF). In October 1988, the LTF held its first formal congress and a mass public demonstration calling for independence occurred. The LTF essentially became a de facto second government and pushed the Latvian Supreme Soviet to adopt a declaration of sovereignty in July 1989. In December 1989, the Latvian Supreme Soviet ended the communist party's monopoly on political power and, on March 18, 1990, the first free parliamentary election occurred for the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR (which was renamed the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia). On May 3, the new Supreme Council reelected communist party-member Anatolijs Gorbunovs as its chairman, but he later resigned from the communist party (and the party was banned one year later). On May 4, 1990, a Declaration of Independence motion was adopted and the Supreme Council became the transitional parliament. On August 21, 1991, full independence was declared. Parliamentary elections occurred on June 5 and June 6, 1993.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (InvolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)

### **Lebanon 1989-2005 (1989)**

- Description: On October 22, 1989, the Taif Agreement was signed. This agreement stemmed from the September 16 issuance of a peace plan by a Saudi-Moroccan-Algerian committee. This plan addressed how to end the Lebanese Civil War (ongoing since 1975). The plan was accepted by 62 Lebanese National Assembly members who had been elected in 1972 (31 Christian and 31 Muslim). This Taif Agreement addressed disarmament, reform, and the role of Syria in Lebanese affairs. It included provisions for key posts to be divided among the main religious groups of the country (president, prime minister, and chairman of the National Assembly) and for the National Assembly to be equally divided between Christian and Muslims. After the agreement was ratified on November 4, 1989, the parliament elected René Mouawad as president (previous president Amine Gemayel had vacated his position on September 22, 1988, went into self-imposed exile, and the National Assembly failed to elect a successor), but he was assassinated 17 days later. Elias Hrawi succeeded him, but General Michel Aoun continued to fight. It was not until Syria launched an operation against Aoun on October 13, 1990 that his forces were cleared. In May 1991, the militias (other than Hezbollah) were dissolved. Parliamentary elections were held in August and September 1992.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)

### **Lebanon 2005**

- Description: On February 28, 2005, Prime Minister Omar Karami's government resigned, calling for new elections. This followed a tumultuous two weeks, beginning with former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's assassination on February 14. Anger at the assassination combined with anger over a September 3, 2004 action, in which President Émile Lahoud's mandate had been extended until 2007 after a vote by the parliament (under Syrian pressure). The combination of these events led to the "Cedar Revolution," or the "Independence Uprising," which was a series of demonstrations beginning on February 21, 2005. The demonstrations called for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, more independent leadership, the organization of parliamentary elections free from Syrian influence, and an investigation into Hariri's death. On February 28, 2005, Prime Minister Omar Karami's government resigned, calling for new elections. At President Émile Lahoud's request, Karami attempted to form a new government in March, but was unable to do so. Lahoud then appointed Najib Mikati as prime minister on April 15, 2005. By April 26, 2005, the last Syrian troops had withdrawn. Parliamentary elections were held in May and June 2005.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - no

### **Lesotho 1993 (1990)**

- Description: On March 10, 1990, retired General Justin Metsing Lekhanya, Chairman of the Military Council, stripped King Moshoeshoe II of his executive and legislative powers and forced



him into exile. Previously, in January 1986, Lekhanya had ousted Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan. In the 1986 coup, Lekhanya installed a six-man Military Council and granted powers to King Moshoeshoe II. Starting in February 1990, however, a power struggle developed between Lekhanya and Moshoeshoe, which precipitated Lekhanya's actions. After forcing Moshoeshoe into exile (which made his son, Letsie III, the king), Lekhanya purged the Council of Ministers and promised to return Lesotho to civilian rule by June 1992. Under pressure from various factions of political and civil society, Lekhanya soon announced the creation of a National Constituent Assembly (NCA), a 107-member assembly with the powers of a lawfully constituted parliament, to create a new constitution. Its mandate was to chart a way forward to democratic elections. Established on June 28, 1990, the NCA was appointed and composed of army officers, civil servants, prominent persons, and recognized politicians. Namely, the NCA included 17 members of the government, 20 "District Development Councillors," 22 "Principal Chiefs," 20 recognized politicians, ten "representatives of the public interest" (appointed by the Military Council), eight members of the armed forces, and ten representatives of urban councils. Due in part to issues surrounding soldier wages, Lekhanya was deposed on May 2, 1991 by Elias Phisoana Ramaema.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - yes (NoPriRul)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

#### **Lesotho 1991**

- Description: On May 2, 1991, due in part to issues surrounding soldier wages, Colonel Elias Phisoana Ramaema deposed Chairman of the Military Council General Justin Metsing Lekhanya. Lekhanya had ruled since 1986. Ramaema became head of the six-member Military Council and retained Lekhanya's National Constituent Assembly (*see details in Lesotho 1993 (1990) case description above*). Subsequently, Ramaema lifted the ban on political party activity and dropped a clause from the draft constitution that enshrined a military presence in the cabinet. By July 1991, the NCA finished drafting a new constitution, which largely left the king without executive authority and banned him from participating in political affairs. Parliamentary elections occurred on March 27, 1993, with the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) winning the majority of seats. The BCP's leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, was selected as prime minister and sworn in on April 2, 1993.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

#### **Lesotho 1994**

- Description: On August 17, 1994, King Letsie III staged a military-backed coup that deposed Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle's elected government. Mokhehle's government had refused to reinstate Letsie's father, Moshoeshoe II, who had been sent into exile in 1990 by former leader Justin Metsing Lekhanya. Letsie's coup replaced Mokhehle's government with a ruling council, with Hae Phoofolo as interim prime minister. During this time, Letsie III conducted negotiations with the BCP government, which agreed to reinstate King Moshoeshoe II. With this, Mokhehle's

government returned on September 14, 1994. Letsie III then abdicated the throne in favor of his father in 1995.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (MilCoup)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (InstDes)

### **Lesotho 1998**

- Description: On September 22, 1998, Operation Boleas commenced, with South African and Botswanan troops intervening. This international action followed a tense period. In June 1997, the ruling Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) split into two parties. The new party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), was led by Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle and governed after the split. On June 16, in opposition to this move, a coalition of opposition groups organized a large march in protest and called for Mokhehle's resignation. On May 23, 1998, legislative elections took place, with the LCD winning overwhelmingly. The election results led the opposition to accuse the LCD of fraud, continue their marches, and escalate the demonstrations, with large numbers of protesters camping in front of the royal palace (beginning on August 4, 1998). In September, junior members of the armed services mutinied in an attempted coup d'état, which forced the government to request the help of a South African Development Community (SADC) task force. Operation Boleas therefore began and, in October, the LCD government and opposition parties began negotiating. The SADC operation, combined with the negotiations, left the LCD in power, yet established an Interim Political Authority (IPA) on December 3, 1998. The IPA had two representatives from each of the 12 main political parties, with 24 total members. It was external to parliament, dominated by opposition minor parties, and had the task of creating a new electoral system to guarantee more broadly-based representation. The SADC task force withdrew in May 1999. Together, the IPA and LCD-led government hashed out the details of the electoral system. In November 2001, the previously-elected parliament (elected in May 1998) agreed to the IPA's recommendations and adopted a new electoral law (which increased the number of seats in the National Assembly to 120, with 80 seats decided in a first-past-the-post system and 40 seats decided through proportional representation). On May 25, 2002, parliamentary elections were held. The results were announced on May 28, with the LCD winning over 50 percent of the votes and the majority of seats in the National Assembly, and the IPA dissolved one day later. Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili was sworn in on June 4, 2002.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (IntlInt)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

### **Liberia 1990**

- Description: On September 10 or 11, 1990, Samuel Doe was killed (after being captured and tortured on September 9). This stemmed from the First Liberian Civil War, which Charles Taylor's guerrilla forces began on December 24, 1989. Taylor controlled around 90 percent of Liberia by 1990. At that time, Prince Johnson—a senior commander in Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)—broke away and formed the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). On August 24, 1990, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) arrived in the country. Shortly thereafter, Doe was captured and killed by Johnson.

For the next two months, both Charles Taylor and Prince Johnson claimed the presidency. Despite this instability, an emergency conference in the Gambia (the National Conference of All Liberian Political Parties, Patriotic Fronts, Interest Groups and Concerned Citizens)—with a delegation of 35 Liberians representing seven political parties and eleven interest groups—met to discuss the creation of an interim government. On November 22, 1990, then, the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was created, with Amos Sawyer as president (sworn in November 23) and Peter Naigow of the INPFL as vice president. In addition to a five-member executive branch, conference participants agreed to a five-member judiciary and an interim legislature of 35 participants: 13 members from the thirteen counties of Liberia, 12 from the six existing political parties, six from the NPFL, and four from the INPFL. The factions of the Liberian Civil War signed a ceasefire on November 28, yet instability and peace negotiations continued. Between March 15 and April 20, 1991, the All Liberian Conference (which included the IGNU, members of the international community in ECOMOG, INPFL members, and civilians) took place. On April 4 and 6, the conference created a 25-member legislature dubbed the Interim National Assembly. This group represented most of the country’s principal political organizations and had a six-month mandate to move the country to elections. Despite the interim government, fighting continued. By late 1992, the IGNU’s control declined and ULIMO—another rebel group—attacked the NPFL from Sierra Leone. On October 15, 1992, the NPFL attacked Monrovia (which the IGNU controlled) and sent the country back to civil war. Even with continuing fighting, Sawyer’s government technically remained in power until March 7, 1994 (*see case description below for details*).

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(CivilWar\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

### **Liberia 1994 (1993)**

- Description: On July 25, 1993, a peace accord was signed in Cotonou, Benin, brokered by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The accord led to the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), with the goal of supporting ECOMOG in implementing the peace agreement. The accord included the formation of a new five-member interim government called the Council of State (CS). Each of the existing interim government, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) were to have one representative in the council and the remaining two representatives would be elected from a list of nine people nominated by the parties. This transitional council formed on August 16, 1993, but the transfer of power from President Sawyer’s government to the CS was delayed, prompting the United Nations to establish UNOMIL to oversee implementation of the Cotonou Accords on September 22. The council was to make decisions by consensus. On March 7, 1994, then, interim President Amos Sawyer was succeeded by David Donald Kpormakpor, who became chairman of the CS. The Cotonou Accords excluded any of the major warlords from the CS. The accord also replaced the interim National Assembly with a 35-member Transitional Legislative Assembly (as part of the Liberian National Transitional Government, or LNTG), with 13 representatives from the NPFL and the interim government and nine from ULIMO (making the total size of government 40 members). Fighting continued, leading to over a dozen peace accords, including the Akosombo Peace Accord of September 12, 1994, the Accra Peace Accord of December 21, 1994, and the Abuja Accord of August 19, 1995. Following the Abuja Accord, a ruling council of six members was formed on September 1, 1995. This new transitional government

included the three main warlords (Charles Taylor, Alhaji Kromah, and George Boley), along with Chief Tamba Taylor (a nonpartisan local political figure in his early 90s), a writer named Wilton Sankawulo (who acted as chairman), and Oscar Quiah (of the Liberian National Conference). On September 3, the new six person CS (a collective presidency of the LNTG) announced the formation of a new transitional government. Unfortunately, the civil war continued until a final peace agreement was signed in Abuja in August 1996, further altering the leadership of the transitional government. On September 3, 1996, Sankawulo stepped down as CS chairman and was replaced by Ruth Perry. On July 19, 1997, presidential and parliamentary elections were held. The new government officials (led by Charles Taylor) were inaugurated on August 2, and Taylor formed a cabinet primarily made up of his National Patriotic Party later that month.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(VolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

### **Liberia 2003**

- Description: On August 11, 2003, President Charles Taylor resigned and went into exile in Nigeria, giving Vice President Moses Blah the role of president until a transitional government was established. This followed the Second Liberian Civil War, which broke out in 1999. By June or July 2003, Taylor's government controlled only one-third of the country. Following negotiations between June 4 and August 18, 2003, the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (ACPA) was signed by the government, two irregular armed forces (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, LURD, and Movement for Democracy in Liberia, MODEL), and 18 political parties. The ACPA specified that presidential and parliamentary elections would be postponed until no later than October 2005 and set up the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). No representative of a warring faction was allowed to hold the position of chairman or vice-chairman of the NTGL (these positions had to be given to members of political parties or civil society), so—beginning on October 14, 2003—this government was led by independent businessman Gyude Bryant. There were 21 ministries, which were to be divided between the two rebel movements and the former Taylor government (five posts each) and the remaining six given to political parties and civil society. A 76-member National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) was also appointed in October 2003 and composed of the three warring parties (12 seats each), political parties (18), civil society and special interest groups (7), and one representative each for the different counties (15). The NTLA replaced the previously bicameral parliament. The first round of legislative and presidential elections occurred on October 11, 2005, with runoffs held on November 8. On January 16, 2006, new President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was sworn in.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(CivilWar\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
    - [yes](#)
  - Coding part two:
    - [yes](#)
  - Coding part three:
    - [yes](#)

### **Lithuania 1991 (1989)**

- Description: On December 6, 1989, the communist party's leading role was abolished. This followed organized protests, beginning with the "Singing Revolution," a cycle of mass demonstrations occurring in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (which began in 1987). On June 3, 1988, Sąjūdis, a pro-democracy movement, was established, led by Vytautas Landsbergis. This was a council composed equally of communist party members and non-party members and, on June 24, 1988, the first mass gathering organized by Sąjūdis took place. In October 1988, Algirdas Brazauskas was appointed First Secretary of the Communist Party and the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union was created, with Sąjūdis candidates allowed to participate. After the communist party's leading role was abolished, in the February 1990 elections, Sąjūdis representatives won an absolute majority in the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR. Landsbergis was elected chairman and, on March 11, 1990, independence was declared (though most countries didn't recognize Lithuania's independence until August 1991).
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)

### **Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 1991 (1990)**

- Description: On September 6, 1990, while still a part of Yugoslavia, FYROM's communist parliament approved an amendment introducing a presidency and 120-seat legislature for the upcoming multiparty elections. Even earlier than this, in October 1989, the parliament had formally adopted a series of amendments to the constitution. On November 11, 1990, the first multiparty parliamentary election was held. In January 1991, after Communist President Vladimir Mitkov resigned, the new parliament elected Kiro Gligorov. A subcommittee of parliament, the Constitutional Committee of the Republican Assembly, drafted a new constitution and, on September 8, 1991, an independence referendum was held and the new constitution was approved almost unanimously. On September 25, 1991, the independence declaration was formally adopted and, on November 17, 1991, the new constitution was approved by the parliament. The constitution and independence took effect on November 21, 1991. Parliamentary and presidential elections were held on October 16, 1994.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)

### **Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2002 (2001)**

- Description: On January 22, 2001, the National Liberation Army (NLA)—made up of ethnic Albanians—began an insurgency. European Union officials negotiated a ceasefire in June 2001 in which ethnic Albanians would gain greater civil rights and the guerrilla groups would relinquish their weapons. On August 13, 2001, the Ohrid Framework was signed, which ended the violence and called for a new constitution. The peace agreement was signed by representatives of the four major Macedonian parties—VMRO, SDSM, DPA, and PDP. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers conducted Operations Essential Harvest to retrieve the insurgents' arms. NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) oversaw the constitutional changes, which mainly dealt with the civil rights of minority ethnic Albanians. Among other things, the changes aimed at decentralizing power, granting bureaucratic reservations for ethnic Albanians,

and including Albanian as a second national language. The new constitution was approved on September 24, 2001, but full ratification of all proposed amendments was not completed until November 16, 2001. In January 2002, one of the last and most contested amendments, the law on local self-government, was passed by the two-thirds majority in parliament required for all legislation regarding ethnic minority rights. Parliamentary elections were held on September 15, 2002.

- Coding part one:
  - no

### **Madagascar 1993 (1990)**

- Description: On March 1, 1990, President Didier Ratsiraka lifted the ban on opposition parties by presidential decree. At this time, Ratsiraka's popularity was quickly waning. Following what was considered by many a fraudulent election in 1989, riots broke out and church leaders urged political leaders and nascent opposition leaders to meet in “Consultations Nationales.” These meetings began in August 1990. Despite the new political parties and these meetings, however, mass demonstrations broke out in May 1991 and continued into July. These demonstrations were organized by Albert Zafy, who coordinated the Forces Vives (FV, though also called Hery Velona), a coalition of 16 opposition parties and various organizations. On July 23, Ratsiraka declared a state of emergency. Zafy was arrested on July 27 and, one day later, Ratsiraka dissolved the government and announced that he would call for constitutional reforms. While demonstrations continued, he appointed Guy Willy Razanamasy as prime minister on August 8 and, two days later, presidential guards opened fire on unarmed protesters. On August 26, Razanamasy announced his new government, which included no representatives of the FV. As a result of these various events, the opposition launched protests and a general strike and Zafy set up a parallel government. Zafy proclaimed himself prime minister and created the “Haute Autorité” from FV members, which was to act as the legislature. Due to continued unrest and the existence of this shadow government, Ratsiraka, the FV, and several other parties signed the Panorama Convention on October 31. This convention officially established a transitional government for a period of 18 months until elections; stated that the government would include representatives of the opposition, religious groups, and the armed forces; and stripped Ratsiraka of most of his powers. Though, officially, Ratsiraka remained president and Razanamasy prime minister, opposition leader Zafy became head of the newly established 31-member High Authority of the State (HAE). The HAE included 18 members of the FV, seven members of the Movement for the Progress of Madagascar (MPM), and six members of the Militant Movement for Malagasy Socialism (MMSM). In addition to the HAE, a 131-member Committee for Economic and Social Recovery (CRES) was created under co-presidents Manandafy Rakotonirina and Richard Andriamanjato. Together, the HAE and CRES replaced the existing Supreme Revolutionary Council and National Assembly. In November and December, Razanamasy attempted to form a new interim government, but it wasn't until January 1992 that all political factions agreed to participate in a 36-member government. After this government formed, a 1400-member National Forum was held to draft a new constitution, which convened between March 22 and 29, 1992. The constitution was approved by popular referendum on August 19 and ratified on September 12, 1992. Presidential elections occurred on November 25, with a runoff taking place on February 10, 1993. Legislative elections were held on June 16, 1993. The newly-elected legislature chose a prime minister on August 9, who formed a cabinet on August 27, 1993.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes



- Coding part three:
  - yes

### **Madagascar 2009**

- Description: On March 17, 2009, President Marc Ravalomanana announced that he was resigning. A couple of months earlier, on January 26, 2009, the political opposition movement led by Andry Rajoelina made clear that they sought to oust Ravalomanana. Anti-government protests were spurred by various factors, including dissatisfaction over economic conditions, allegations of government corruption, and accusations of state restrictions on the freedom of expression. In late January, the protests turned violent, Rajoelina (backed by a group of opposition parties) called for the establishment of a two-year democratic transition, and the military helped to push Ravalomanana out. After Ravalomanana announced that he was resigning, Rajoelina was declared the president of a High Transitional Authority (HAT). The HAT dissolved the parliament and announced new elections within 24 months. The HAT had 44 members—encompassing representatives of various regions and political parties, including all political parties of former presidents—who were appointed on March 31, 2009. On October 7, 2010, Rajoelina established a transitional parliament comprising a 256-member Transitional Congress and a 90-member Higher Transitional Council. A constitutional referendum was approved on November 17, 2010, but the crisis continued and in March 2011, a draft roadmap to elections was presented by the South African Development Community and Rajoelina formed a new government. In this iteration—agreed to and signed in the capital on September 15, 2011—three-quarters of ministerial positions were held by new political parties, some of which included former members of Ravalomanana’s party. The roadmap increased the number of members of the Transitional Congress to 417 and the Higher Transitional Council to 189. A presidential election was held on October 25, 2013, with a second round held at the same time as legislative elections, on December 20, 2013. On February 18, 2014, an election court officially confirmed Ravalomanana’s victory in the presidential election and the National Assembly convened.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

### **Malawi 1994 (1992)**

- Description: On October 12, 1992, President Hastings Banda agreed to hold a referendum on introducing multiparty democracy. Starting in the early 1990s, opposition to the Banda regime existed, which coalesced in March 1992 into the Interim Committee for Democratic Alliance, a broad-based organization that challenged the Banda regime. On March 8, 1992, a letter critical of the Banda regime was published by a number of Catholic bishops and read throughout churches in Malawi. Two days later, the bishops were arrested, leading to protests against the regime. These protests intensified, with large anti-government demonstrations occurring in early May. After a pro-democracy activist was arrested and riots broke out, Banda dissolved the parliament and agreed to hold elections in June 1992 for 91 of the 141 parliamentary seats. This election had the lowest turnout in the country’s history, yet saw almost half of the members of parliament defeated, including those endorsed by Banda. The 1992 riots and demonstrations continued, which forced Banda to capitulate and agree to hold a referendum on introducing multiparty democracy. Facing additional international and domestic pressure for political freedom, Banda entered into discussions with organized political groups. On June 14, 1993, the populace voted for multiparty democracy

and, by June 29, the constitution was amended to provide for a multiparty system. Following the referendum, Banda insisted that he would remain in power until elections were held while the opposition called for an interim government. At the end of July, the government (represented by the Presidential Committee on Dialogue, or PCD) and opposition (represented by the Public Affairs Committee, or PAC) met to establish the agenda for the transition period. As a compromise, by mid-August 1993, the PCD and PAC agreed on the establishment of two bodies: a National Consultative Council (NCC) and a National Executive Council (NEC). The NCC was formed on August 14 and held its first meeting on August 24 to work out the transitional arrangements and was composed of representatives of social groups, major identity groups, the armed forces, and seven members from each political party. The chairmanship of the NCC rotated among the various parties. The NEC was also composed of equal participation of each registered political party (two members each). As of November 1993, seven political parties existed, suggesting a NEC size of 14 and a NCC size of at least 49 (or at least 63 total). Though already existing for several months, the two transitional bodies were formally legalized in November. Between January and May 1993, the NCC drew up a timetable to implement legal changes for multiparty politics, charted the progress toward elections, and held a National Constitutional Conference in which it worked on drafting the new constitution. The completed draft was enacted as an interim constitution on May 16, 1994. The next day, the first presidential and parliamentary elections were held, with the United Democratic Front (UDF) gaining a majority in the National Assembly and its candidate, Bakili Muluzi, winning the presidential election. Muluzi was sworn in on May 21, 1994 and the constitution officially came into force on May 18, 1995.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

### **Malaysia 2008**

- Description: On November 10, 2007, the Bersih Rally took place, which called for electoral reform. Following parliament's dissolution in anticipation of elections, a parliamentary election was held on March 8, 2008, in which the longtime ruling coalition—the Barisan Nasional—lost significant numbers in parliament. One year later, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi stepped down from his position.
  - Coding part one:
    - [no](#)

### **Maldives 2008 (2005)**

- Description: On June 2, 2005, parliament members passed a law allowing political parties. Previously, on May 28, 2004, partial elections were held for a People's Special Majlis—composed of the 50 members of parliament, 42 elected members, eight presidentially-appointed members, and the cabinet—which had the task of amending the constitution. This Special Majlis was sworn in on June 15 and convened on July 19, but because 24 members walked out, it was suspended. In June, President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom presented proposals for reform to the parliament. Yet despite these proposed reforms, protests took place and, on August 13, 2004, “Black Friday” occurred. This was an armed forces crackdown on a peaceful protest, which began the previous night. The demonstration was the largest protest in the country's history, called for the freedom of detained pro-reformists, and demanded Gayoom resign. Gayoom then declared a State of Emergency for nearly two months, which was lifted on October 10. Two days later, on October 12,



the Special Majlis resumed, with the task of writing a new constitution by November 2007. One year later, in August 2005 and commemorating the anniversary of Black Friday, civil unrest broke out again and opposition leader Mohamed Nasheed was arrested. In March 2006, Gayoom created a “Roadmap for the Reform Agenda” and, in July 2007, the first-ever referendum to decide on country's future political system was held. A new constitution, created by the People’s Special Majlis, went into effect on August 7, 2008. In October 2008, the first democratic presidential elections occurred and pushed Gayoom out of power for the first time since 1978. On May 9, 2009, the first multiparty legislative elections were held.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (InvolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)
  - *Alternative coding: TG-permissive*

### **Mali 1991**

- Description: On March 26, 1991, a coup by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré overthrew President Moussa Traoré. In the late 1980s, in response to demands for multiparty democracy, Moussa Traoré’s regime had allowed some limited liberalization, but refused to usher in full democracy. In 1990, cohesive opposition movements and student protests began to emerge. Mass pro-democracy rallies occurred from March 22 to 26, 1991, which led to the coup. Under Touré, a Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (CTSP) was created, which had the goal of overseeing democratic transition. The CTSP had 25 members, ten military and 15 civilian, with no female representation. On April 3, 1991, Touré appointed civilian Soumana Sacko as the prime minister of a civilian-led transitional government. The goals of the CTSP and transitional government role were to write the constitutional framework for the transitional period, formulate the agenda for a national conference, and decide who would be able to participate in the conference. Beginning on July 29, 1991, then, Touré presided over the national conference, which lasted until August 13, 1991. There were three participants from each party, one participant for each registered association, and no participants “who had blocked democratic progress,” which totaled over 2000 participants. Subsequently, opposition parties were legalized, a new constitution was drafted, and parliamentary elections were held on February 23, 1992. Presidential elections were then held on March 22, 1992. Alpha Oumar Konaré was elected president and on June 9, the day after Konaré’s inauguration, the CTSP was disbanded.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

### **Mauritania 1991**

- Description: On April 15, 1991, President Maaouya Ould Sid’ Ahmed Taya announced that within the following several months, a new constitution would be created and submitted to the public for approval via referendum. He also announced that political parties and other voluntary associations would be legalized and that competitive presidential and parliamentary elections would take place in 1992. Ould Taya did not allow for a national conference, but a popular referendum for the new constitution was held on July 12, 1991. On January 24, 1992, a presidential election took place,

with Ould Taya retaining the presidency. In March 1992, parliamentary elections were held. Because Ould Taya remained president, opposition parties boycotted this election. Ould Taya retired from the military and appointed a mostly-civilian cabinet in April 1992.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(VolRef\)](#)
  - [no](#)

### **Mauritania 2005**

- Description: On August 3, 2005, Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall staged a military coup against President Ould Taya. The Military Council for Justice and Democracy (MCJD) took over, with Vall as president and 16 other officers as members of the council. On August 5, parliament was dissolved. On August 7, Vall appointed Sidi Mohamed Ould Boubacar as prime minister and, on August 10, announced a new cabinet composed mainly of technocrats. The MCJD promised a quick return to civilian government, but excluded the religious Salafists from any participation in the new government. On June 26, 2006, the MCJD presented constitutional amendments in a national referendum that provided for new legislative and presidential elections. Parliamentary elections were held on November 19, 2006, and a presidential election was held on March 11, 2007, with Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi elected president. He was inaugurated on April 19, 2007, which brought about the end of the MCJD.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(MilCoup\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
    - [yes](#)
  - Coding part two:
    - [yes](#)
  - Coding part three:
    - [yes](#)

### **Mauritania 2008**

- Description: On August 6, 2008, a military coup against President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi occurred, coordinated by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. The coup-plotters—including seven members who had also taken part in the 2005 coup—first met to plan the coup one day earlier, on August 5. On August 7, there was an official statement released that terminated Abdallahi's powers. The statement explained that Mauritania would be governed on a transitional basis by an all-military, 11-member High Council of State, with Abdel Aziz as the President of the Council. The High Council of State announced that it would oversee the government until it could hold elections. Abdel Aziz claimed that the military was putting the country back on a democratic course. Only a few days later, on August 14, 2008, Abdel Aziz appointed Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf, a diplomat, as prime minister. Laghdaf formed a new government, which included four ministers from the previous government. On April 15, 2009, Abdel Aziz stepped down as president so as to be able to run in the presidential election. Ba Mamadou Mbaré succeeded him in an interim capacity. There was a presidential election on July 18, 2009, in which coup-leader Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz won. He was sworn in on August 5, 2009. Parliamentary elections were due in 2011, but were not held until November 23, 2013, with a second round on December 21, 2013. The newly-elected parliament first met on January 27, 2014.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(MilCoup\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
    - [yes](#)
  - Coding part two:
    - [yes](#)

- Coding part three:
  - yes

#### **Mexico 1994-1997 (1994)**

- Description: On January 1, 1994, NAFTA came into effect and the Zapatista Army of National Liberation started a two-week long armed rebellion against the federal government. In addition to the armed rebellion, 1994 saw the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio Murrieta, the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI, who had been in power since 1929) top candidate, and the collapse of the economy. Despite a great deal of political instability, the 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections were considered a large stride toward democratization. The PRI still managed to maintain power, leading to the election of President Ernesto Zedillo, but most observers judged the elections as more free and fair than previous elections. In 1996, there were significant electoral reforms, with the autonomous Federal Election Institute being created (so that elections would no longer be managed by the Ministry of the Interior). The 1997 parliamentary election was an even bigger stride toward democratization, with the PRI failing to win a majority of seats for the first time since the 1920s.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

#### **Mexico 2000**

- Description: After 71 years, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost a presidential election to Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN).
  - Coding part one:
    - no

#### **Moldova 1991 (1990)**

- Description: On February 25, 1990, the first competitive elections to the Supreme Soviet occurred. In this election, opposition candidates were allowed to run (as individuals, not parties). Previously, on August 27, 1989, a demonstration organized by the opposition Popular Front occurred known as the "Grand National Assembly." This action forced the Supreme Soviet to adopt a new language law and subsequently hold the elections. In these elections, the Popular Front won easily and Prime Minister Mircea Druc formed a government with Mircea Snegur as president (he had previously been Chairman of the Supreme Soviet). On June 23, 1990, parliament adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova and then, on August 27, 1991, Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet Union. In December 1991, a presidential election was held. In July 1992, a Government of National Accord was approved, led by Snegur (who had held the position since September 3, 1990). On February 27, 1994, parliamentary elections were held.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)

#### **Mongolia 1990**

- Description: On March 9, 1990, the Mongolian Politburo resigned. This followed popular demonstrations against the regime, which began on December 10, 1989 and continued through early March 1990. These demonstrations were led by the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU) who demanded various reforms, including a multiparty system. Jambyn Batmönkh, chairman of the Politburo of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party's (MPRP) Central Committee, promised to hold negotiations with the MDU, but protests continued. In March 1990, Batmönkh

announced that he would resign and that the Politburo would step down. On March 15, the MPRP held a special party congress to elect a new Politburo. The Great People's Hural (GPH), the main legislative body, met on March 21 and subsequently decided to reconvene in May to revise the constitution to, among other things, allow for free and fair elections. Further protests ensued and, on April 30, the MPRP agreed to meet with opposition groups to discuss constitutional change. Parliamentary elections were then held in July 1990. The new parliament appointed a 20-member constitution drafting committee from its members, intensely debated the contents, and approved a new constitution. This constitution came into effect on February 12, 1992. The first presidential election occurred in June 1993.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (InvolRef)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - no (Group)

### **Montenegro 2006**

- Description: On May 21, 2006, a referendum was held, in which voters approved Montenegrin independence from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. On June 3, 2006, the parliament declared independence. On September 10, 2006, new elections were held to elect an enlarged 81-member parliament that was tasked with adopting a new constitution.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### **Mozambique 1994 (1990)**

- Description: On November 2, 1990, a new constitution was enacted that provided for a multiparty political system. Prior to this, in 1986, Joaquim Chissano became president and introduced sweeping reforms, including peace talks with the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). A civil war had been going on since 1977 and, during these peace talks, issues such as the constitution and a framework for an election were discussed. The peace talks ended in 1992 with the Rome General Peace Accords. Due to a delay in the deployment of forces for the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) to oversee the transition period and the creation of an army, general elections were postponed. A peacekeeping force of 7500 oversaw a two-year transition to democracy, creating a large number of commissions to attack various restructuring tasks, such as the Ceasefire Commission (CCF), the Supervision and Control Commission (SCS), and the Reintegration Commission (CORE). Each of these commissions was chaired by the UN and composed of a wide variety of forces, some domestic and some international. Focusing specifically on elections, starting on April 27, 1993 the Multi-Party Conference was held between the government, RENAMO, and 12 other political parties. In total, 20 representatives participated—ten were nominated by the government, seven were nominated by RENAMO, and three were named by the unarmed opposition. The conference was a four-day forum in which all legally registered parties were allowed to comment on a draft electoral law before it would be submitted to parliament. After much disagreement leading to a stalemate, then the conference's subsequent (but short-lived) resumption on August 2, the electoral law was passed by the Mozambican National Assembly and took effect in January 1994. Subsequently, a National Elections Commission (CNE) was set up, which culminated in legislative and presidential elections on October 27-29, 1994. The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO, the party that had already been in power) retained a majority of seats. The new government was sworn in on December 8, 1994 and President Chissano was sworn in on December 9.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

### **Namibia 1990 (1988)**

- Description: On December 13, 1988, the Brazzaville Accord (brokered by the Western Contact Group) was signed, which laid the groundwork for a year-long United Nations-supervised transition to independence. At this time, the Namibian War of Independence against South Africa was ongoing; in 1985, South Africa had installed an interim government in Namibia. In April 1989, a combined United Nations’ civilian and peacekeeping force called the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) deployed to monitor the peace process, elections, and supervise military withdrawals. SWAPO combatants—which included the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF)—were demobilized. In November 1989, UN-supervised Constituent Assembly elections were held and UNTAG remained until March 1990. The 72-member Constituent Assembly had a standing committee that had representatives in proportion to their share of the seats in the legislature. It appointed Sam Nujoma (who had been in exile for many years) as president. The constitution was adopted on February 9, 1990 and Namibia obtained full independence from South Africa on March, 21 1990 (with exceptions of Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands until 1994). Elections for the president and legislature were held in December 1994.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - no (Group)

### **Nepal 1990-1991 (1990)**

- Description: On April 8, 1990, King Birenda lifted the ban on political parties. The king’s move followed large protests, which began on February 18, 1990 when a mass movement was launched to end the “Panchayat” regime. Nepal was governed by the party-less Panchayat system until the “Jan Andolan” (People’s Movement) forced King Birenda to accept constitutional reforms and establish a multiparty system. On April 6, 1990, the government was dismissed. After lifting the party ban, on April 12, a joint meeting of the Nepali Congress and the United Left Front (ULF) demanded the dissolution of the National Panchayat and Council of Ministers, the repeal of all provisions of the 1962 Constitution that conflicted with a multiparty system, and the formation of a constitution commission with “adequate representation” of the Nepali Congress and ULF. On April 15, five government ministers and five representatives of the Nepali Congress and the ULF began negotiating. Over the next two days, the king issued a royal proclamation dissolving the National Panchayat and named Nepali Congress Party President K.P. Bhattarai as prime minister and head of an interim government. Bhattarai’s cabinet consisted of 11 members—four from the Nepali Congress Party, three from the United Left Front, two human rights activists, and two royal nominees—and was entrusted with preparing a new constitution and holding a general election. On May 22, the king vested the legislative and executive powers of the dissolved National Panchayat in the interim government. At the end of May, the interim government appointed a nine-member

independent Constitution Recommendation Commission to represent the main opposition factions and to prepare a new constitution. The constitution was approved by the king and Nepal became a constitutional monarchy on November 9, 1990. Parliamentary elections were held on May 12, 1991 and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai was selected as prime minister on May 31.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

## Nepal 2002

- Description: On October 4, 2002, King Gyanendra dismissed the government and assumed executive powers. This followed several months of instability, starting on May 22, 2002, when Gyanendra dissolved parliament and ordered new elections. Starting on November 26, 2001, Nepal was put under a state of emergency due to a civil war with Maoist insurgents. Initially, the emergency period was only to last for six months, but nearing the end of that period, it became obvious to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba that he would not be able to find the two-thirds majority of parliament that he needed to extend the state of emergency. All opposition parties and many within Deuba's Nepali Congress opposed the state of emergency. Because of this, on May 22, Deuba asked Gyanendra to dissolve parliament and hold new parliamentary elections according to a constitutional provision. The constitutionality of this request was confirmed by the Supreme Court on August 6, 2002. Because of his request for the parliament's dissolution, six of Deuba's 39 cabinet ministers resigned, leaving 33 members to carry on the transitional process. In mid-July, the term for local governmental bodies ended and, rather than extending the term of the elected bodies, the government dissolved them and set local elections for April 4, 2003. Parliamentary elections were delayed, so the political parties mutually agreed to install an all-party government. Gyanendra subsequently dismissed this government, assumed executive powers, and then nominated a nine-member "clean" cabinet with Lokendra Bahadur Chand—leader of the pro-palace Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), who had acted as prime minister three times previously, and headed two governments during the party-less, autocratic "Panchayat" period—as prime minister one week later. This government had three tasks: ensuring the comprehensive participation of other political parties in the government, holding elections for the House of Representatives, and introducing a peace process with the Maoist insurgents. Though he held consultation with several political parties about the consensus prime minister position, Gyanendra largely ignored their input about the interim cabinet's composition. He announced the inclusion of one member from the previously-dismissed parliament, several members of governments from the Panchayat-era, and several non-partisan or technocratic figures. On November 18, Gyanendra expanded the cabinet to 22 members, adding technocrats, civil society members, businessmen, and leaders of small parties. In May 2003, following protests from several parties, Prime Minister Chand resigned. Rather than replacing him with a recommendation from a number of parties, Chand was replaced by Surya Bahadur Thapa, another previous Panchayat prime minister. Despite this interim government's stated goal of holding elections, the king declared a state of emergency and assumed all executive powers on February 1, 2005—before any parliamentary election was held.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(VolRef\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
    - [yes](#)
  - Coding part two:



- yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### **Nepal 2006 (2005)**

- Description: On February 1, 2005, King Gyanendra imposed a state of emergency, dismissing the civilian government and assuming all executive power. He claimed that this move was a response to the continuing Maoist insurgency in the country. One day later, on February 2, Gyanendra assumed the chairmanship of his handpicked ten-member Council of Ministers—dominated by his own supporters and technocrats—and announced that he would rule directly for three years. These actions led to the creation of the Seven Party Alliance (SPA)—seven political parties in the parliament organized into a pro-democracy movement. Because of their unified opposition to the king’s move, the SPA and the Maoists began negotiating and, in September 2005, the Maoists announced a ceasefire. Starting on April 5, 2006, the SPA and the banned political party Unified Communist Party of Nepal (CPN Maoist) staged underground protests against Gyanendra's direct rule. These protests—termed “People’s Movement II”—lasted for 19 days. After over 20 protesters were killed, King Gyanendra announced that he would yield executive authority to a new prime minister chosen by the political parties to oversee the return of democracy. After yielding executive authority, on April 24 or 25, 2006, Gyanendra reinstated the 265-member, previously-elected parliament (which had been dissolved in 2002). The parliament declared itself sovereign and elected Girija Prasad Koirala as prime minister. On May 18, parliament scrapped the major powers of the king. After intense negotiations between SPA and the Maoists, a Comprehensive Peace Accord was signed on November 21, 2006. This agreement specified that a 330-member interim legislature, the Legislative Parliament, would be formed from existing members of the parliament (minus those who opposed the People’s Movement II), 73 Maoists, and 48 members from unrepresented parties, professional organizations, and backward regions. The National Assembly was dissolved on January 15, 2007 and replaced by the 329-member Legislative Parliament (one seat remained vacant). On April 10, 2008, elections were held for a 601-member Constituent Assembly, which was sworn in on May 27, 2008.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

### **Nicaragua 1990**

- Description: In 1990, there was a general election in which a coalition of anti-Sandinista parties led by Violeta Chamorro defeated the Sandinistas. This followed over a decade of events. On July 17, 1979, following the Nicaraguan Revolution led by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), Anastasio Somoza DeBayle resigned. The Junta of National Reconstruction ruled until January 1985. In 1984, elections were held for the National Constituent Assembly, which was to write a new constitution to move toward a transitional period. A new constitution was created in 1987. In 1989, the Tela Accord was signed, which ended the Contra War.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

## Niger 1991

- Description: On April 24, 1991, the government revised the constitution to allow for multiparty politics. Prior to this, in 1989, President Ali Saibou had approved a new constitution, but then ran as the sole presidential candidate. In the early part of 1990, student and worker demonstrations began. In particular, on February 9, 1990, a student demonstration ended with fatalities, which spurred additional student and worker demonstrations. Eventually, these demonstrations led the government to agree to hold a national conference. Several months before the national conference convened, the existing parliament legalized political parties and Saibou created a preparatory commission for the conference. This commission included two representatives for each of 18 registered political parties, seven union delegates, seven students, seven representatives of government, two delegates from the teachers' union, two representatives from a civil servants' union, and seven delegates from other groups. From July 29 to November 3, 1991, an 884-member national conference met under the leadership of André Salifou. Saibou's party had 100 delegates, 100 delegates came from unions and student groups, and an additional 320 "resource persons" were included, though they had no voting power. Political parties were allowed to send 14 representatives each to the conference and accredited associations were allowed to send two delegates each. There were also 64 rural representatives, 40 from the army, and 30 from the state administration. The conference ultimately dismantled one-party rule, leaving Saibou mostly ineffective. It declared itself sovereign, dissolved the government, and dismissed the army commander. On October 29, 1991, the national conference decided that a transitional government would be appointed for 15 months in order to guide Niger toward democracy. This transitional government included several institutions: the Office of the President of the Republic, which would have only protocol functions, since the national conference had stripped it of all executive and legislative powers; a High Council of the Republic (HCR), which would have legislative powers as well as supervisory powers over the executive; and a prime minister and cabinet, who would have executive powers. While Saibou retained his position as party leader at first, in November 1991, he was replaced by Mamadou Tandja. Saibou did remain president, but was generally powerless. Salifou was elected president of the HCR, and Amadou Cheiffou was elected to the position of prime minister. These elections were conducted in the national conference, which also decided that none of the three transition officers would be allowed to contest future presidential elections. In the HCR council, which first met on November 2, 1991, there were a total of 15 members, both military and civilian. Legislative elections were held on February 14, 1993 and a presidential election was held on February 27, 1993, with a second round held one month later. On April 16, new President Mahamane Ousmane assumed office and appointed Mahamadou Issoufou as prime minister one day later.
  - o Coding part one:
    - [yes \(InvolRef\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
    - [yes](#)
  - o Coding part two:
    - [yes](#)
  - o Coding part three:
    - [yes](#)

## Niger 1996

- Description: On January 27, 1996, Brigadier General Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara ousted President Mahamane Ousmane in a coup. Maïnassara declared himself head of the 12-member, militarily-composed National Salvation Council (CSN). Three days later, the CSN named Boukary Adji as the new prime minister, and created an all-civilian cabinet. On February 13, the ousted president, prime minister, and president of the National Assembly signed a declaration accepting the coup's legitimacy and agreeing to participate in a transitional period to renew democracy. The CSN



suspended political parties and unions, dissolved the National Assembly, and published a preliminary timetable for a return to civilian rule. In late February, the CSN replaced the parliament with two coordinating committees: a 100-member “Conseil des sages” to act as an advisory council and a 32-member Coordinating Committee for the National Forum. These groups were to submit proposals for constitutional changes and function free from military influence. Each of the groups included former state officials, traditional chiefs, religious leaders, and members of the judiciary. On March 27, the CSN created a new 700-member group called the National Forum for Democratic Renewal that was to adopt constitutional revisions. This forum convened on April 1 and included the members of the two coordinating committees, representatives of the dissolved parliament, and representatives of worker and employer organizations. On May 12, the new constitution was approved by referendum. A presidential election was held on July 7, 1996, with Maïnassara as the victor, and legislative elections were held on November 23, 1996. The CSN was formally dissolved on December 12, 1996 and a new Council of Ministers under Prime Minister Cissé Amadou was formed on December 21.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (MilCoup)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

#### **Niger 1999/2000 (1999)**

- Description: On April 9, 1999, members of the Presidential Guard assassinated President Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara at the Niamey Airport. On April 11, 1999, the constitution was suspended; the legislature, Supreme Court, and Council of Ministers were dissolved; and coup leader Daouda Malam Wanké became head of state. A military National Reconciliation Council (CRN) was created, composed of 14 members. The CRN was to exercise executive and legislative authority during a nine-month transitional period prior to the restoration of elected civilian institutions. Wanké signed an ordinance on interim political authority, which was to function as an interim constitution. On April 12, Ibrahim Maiyaki—the former prime minister—was reappointed to his post to head a transitional government. On May 19, Issaka Souma was appointed to chair the 32-member Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and a 15-member consultative council of state elders (also called *Conseil Consultatif National*) was inaugurated to consider options for a draft constitution. This council was composed of military officials, former state officials, representatives of the religious and civilian communities, and traditional leaders. The new constitution was adopted in a July 18, 1999 referendum. The first round of presidential elections was held on October 17, 1999, with runoffs coinciding with parliamentary elections on November 24, 1999. Mamadou Tandja won the presidential election and was inaugurated on December 22, 1999.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

## Niger 2009

- Description: On June 26, 2009, President Mamadou Tandja began to rule by decree. This followed a constitutional crisis in which a pro-Tandja movement developed, which called for a change in the constitution that would allow Tandja to run for a third term. In response, opposition leaders dissented and declared their dissatisfaction with this idea. Tandja wanted to hold a referendum on the new constitution, but on May 25, the Constitutional Court ruled this unconstitutional. The following day, Tandja dissolved the National Assembly. On June 26, Tandja announced to the nation that he was invoking an article of the constitution that applies to situations in which the independence of the nation is under threat. From this point on, Tandja ruled the country by presidential decree. On June 29, Tandja dissolved the Constitutional Court and appointed a new one two days later. He signed various decrees to establish a committee to draft a new constitution and called for a constitutional referendum in August. The constitution was approved and validated by the new Constitutional Court. Tandja then called for parliamentary elections, which were held on October 20, 2009.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - yes
  - o Coding part three:
    - no (Group, ElecPlan, PowTran)

## Niger 2010

- Description: On February 18, 2010, rebel soldiers attacked and deposed President Mamadou Tandja. They established a military junta called the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD), headed by Salou Djibo. The junta dissolved all state institutions, suspended the constitution, and stated that its main objectives included restoring democracy through free and fair elections within 12 months. On February 23, the CSRD appointed Mahamadou Danda as prime minister and, on March 1, a 20-member interim government was appointed. This interim government included both military forces (five members) and civilians (15 members, including five women), but the CSRD retained both executive and legislative power. The CSRD also created a National Consultative Council (CCN), which was to advise on draft laws, such as the constitution, electoral laws, political party laws, and laws governing the status of the opposition. On April 7, the CCN was officially installed under President Marou Amadou. Its 131 members represented many of the country's political forces. In addition to the CCN, the CSRD also established an 11-member Transitional Constitutional Council (CCT) under Fatoumata Bazèye. On May 27, the CSRD accepted the CCN's draft electoral law and, on June 14, created an independent election commission (CENI). On October 31, a new constitution was approved by referendum. Several months later, on January 31, 2011, presidential and parliamentary elections took place (with a runoff on March 12). Mahamadou Issoufou was elected president and sworn in on April 8, 2011.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - yes
  - o Coding part three:
    - yes

## **Nigeria 1993 (1989)**

- Description: On May 3, 1989, President Ibrahim Babangida's regime lifted the ban on political parties. Years earlier, on August 27, 1985, Babangida had conducted a coup against Muhammadu Buhari, declared himself head of state, and began to rule with his Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). In January 1986, he announced that the military regime would transfer power to a civilian government on October 1, 1990, though this was later postponed to 1992. Babangida planned reforms, which included a constitution-drafting process and a return to democracy. In April and May 1989, a draft constitution was presented by the constituent assembly and the regime lifted the ban on political parties. On July 4, 1992, a parliamentary election was held. However, the military regime subsequently decided that it was unconstitutional for the elected parliament to start sitting prior to the presidential election, which was not to be held for nearly one year. On January 2, 1993, then, Babangida abolished the AFRC and the Council of Ministers and replaced them with a 14-member, militarily-composed National Defense and Security Council (NDSC, chaired by Babangida). This was the highest national decision-making structure. In addition, however, Babangida appointed a 29-member Transitional Council to act as a temporary government, replacing the National Council of Ministers. The Transitional Council was composed of (appointed) civilians, led by businessman Ernest Shonekan, and charged with administering the government and reform process (like a cabinet, though accountable to the NDSC). The National Assembly, including both a Senate and House of Representatives, also became a functional legislative body during this time, but was composed of elected civilians. On June 12, 1993, the presidential election was held, but less than two weeks later, on June 23, the results were annulled by the ruling military government under Babangida. This annulment led to civilian protests, which subsequently forced Babangida to resign, dissolve the NDSC, and relinquish office to a civilian-run government. On August 26, 1993, he appointed Ernest Shonekan as president of a 32-member civilian Interim Federal Executive Council as part of the Interim National Government (ING). The ING government was in charge of arranging another presidential election, included many members of the earlier Transitional Council and some former NDSC members (that is, it was composed of politicians and members of the outgoing military regime), and was supposed to hand over power to an elected civilian president by March 31, 1994. However, the ING was unable to facilitate elections because it was overthrown on November 17, 1993 by General Sani Abacha.
  - o Coding part one:
    - [yes \(VolRef\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
    - [yes](#)
  - o Coding part two:
    - [yes](#)
  - o Coding part three:
    - [yes](#)

## **Nigeria 1993**

- Description: On November 17, 1993, General Sani Abacha (the Minister of Defense) ousted interim President Ernest Shonekan, reinstated the 1979 Constitution, dissolved all bodies created as part of the transitional process, and brought the government back under military control. On November 24, Abacha announced the formation of an 11-member Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), which ruled by decree and was to include senior military officials and the principal members of a new Federal Executive Council (FEC). The 32-member FEC included some remnants of the previous Interim National Government (ING), but was additionally composed of some pro-democracy and human rights advocates. It was also established on November 24. Abacha insisted that he planned to hand power over to a civilian government and promised to hold a conference to discuss the constitution. In April 1994, the government announced plans for a National Constitutional

Conference (NCC), with 273 delegates elected in May and 96 delegates nominated by the government. This conference convened on June 27. On September 27, 1994, Abacha expanded the PRC to 25 members, all of whom were senior military officials. Between October 1994 and April 1995, the NCC adopted various constitutional proposals and in December accepted a proposal that the government would relinquish power on January 1, 1996. This was later amended and, in October 1995, a three-year transitional program aimed at restoring civilian rule was announced by the government. In September 1996, the political party system was reestablished by the PRC. On April 25, 1998, parliamentary elections were held (though later annulled).

- Coding part one:
  - yes (MilCoup)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### **Nigeria 1999 (1998)**

- Description: On June 8, 1998, President Sani Abacha died. He was succeeded by Abdulsalami Abubakar, who was appointed by the 11-member Nigerian Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) and sworn in on June 9. In July, due to mounting domestic and international pressure, Abubakar promised to hold elections within one year—on May 29, 1999—and transfer power to an elected president. He cancelled Abacha’s “transition program,” released a large number political prisoners, and began a new transition program. Previously, legislative elections had taken place on April 25, 1998, but Abubakar annulled these elections. In early August, a new 32-member Federal Executive Council (FEC) was appointed to remain in office pending the formal transition to civilian rule. The FEC included a number of civilians. Additionally, an Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established, which began work in August 1998. Additionally, in an effort to finish a new constitution—a draft of which had been published June 1995—a 25-member Constitutional Debate Coordinating Committee of experts was appointed. This body offered its recommendations for constitutional amendments, which the PRC accepted. New legislative elections took place on February 20, 1999 and a presidential election took place on February 27, 1999. Abubakar handed power to the newly elected president, Olusegun Obasanjo, on May 29, 1999. The PRC was dissolved and the new constitution came into effect on May 31, 1999 and parliament held its first session on June 3, 1999.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

### **Pakistan 1999**

- Description: On October 12, 1999, General Pervez Musharraf led a coup ousting elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his government. President Rafiq Tara, who had been installed by Sharif, continued to hold his office, but Musharraf’s recommendations became binding on the president. Musharraf proclaimed himself “chief executive,” dismissed the federal and provincial governments, suspended parliament and the constitution, continued emergency rule, and issued a Provisional Constitutional Order. He established the seven-man National Security Council as a

ruling body, made up of the commanders of the military services, the civilian prime minister, and several civilian ministers. The Supreme Court of Pakistan declared the coup legal, but ordered that army rule be limited to three years. The military rulers set out seven priorities and stated that they did not intend to hold elections until substantial progress was made toward achieving those priorities. They did not set out a time frame for a return to democracy.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (MilCoup)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

### **Pakistan 2008**

- Description: On October 2, 2007, President Pervez Musharraf resigned from the military. On October 6, 2007, he was reelected president (indirectly). He declared a state of emergency on November 3, 2007, suspending the constitution and dismissing the federal cabinet, which lasted until December 15, 2007. The constitution allows the president to declare a state of emergency when he is satisfied that a situation exists that warrants its imposition (then the National Assembly must approve it within 30 days). In December 2007, Benazir Bhutto was assassinated; her Pakistan People's Party (PPP) won the largest number of seats in the 2008 election. On August 18, 2008, Musharraf resigned from the presidency when threatened with impeachment. He was succeeded by Asif Ali Zardari, Bhutto's widower and her replacement as head of the PPP.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### **Panama 1989**

- Description: On December 20, 1989, the United States invaded to depose Manuel Noriega under Operation Just Cause. This followed a tumultuous few years. On June 6, 1987, an army commander accused Noriega of electoral fraud and political murder, leading to the creation of the opposition group Cruzada Civilista, which began to organize protests and actions of civil disobedience against Noriega's regime. On June 10, Noriega's military dictatorship suspended constitutional rights and declared a state of emergency. Despite continued protests, on May 7, 1989, parliamentary and presidential elections were held. In this election, candidates who opposed Noriega's regime won, which led the Noriega government to annul the results on May 10. After annulling the election results, on August 31, 1989, the Council of State dissolved the National Assembly and named a provisional government under Francisco Rodríguez. On December 15, the appointed National Assembly declared Noriega the "Maximum Leader." Five days later, the United States invaded. While attempting to depose Noriega, United States' forces inaugurated Guillermo Endara as president. Endara won the May 1989 election, but subsequently took refuge in the Panama Canal Zone (under United States' control). On December 27, Panama's Electoral Tribunal reinstated the May 1989 election results. Following Operation Nifty Package—an operation utilizing psychological warfare—Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (IntlInt)
    - yes (NoPriRul)
    - no

## Paraguay 1989

- Description: On February 3, 1989, Alfredo Stroessner was overthrown in a military coup by General Andrés Rodríguez. Rodríguez had been Stroessner's longtime aide. He became head of a provisional government, dissolved congress (previously elected in February 1988), and announced new presidential and parliamentary elections for May 1, 1989. In preparation for these elections, the traditionalist sector of Stroessner's dominant Colorado Party established an agreement with all dissident factions, except for a small group of militants who were removed in the coup with Stroessner. On May 1, 1989, elections took place, with Rodríguez winning the presidency. On election day, Rodríguez stated that all reforms for a full transition to democracy would be made before the next elections in 1993. As two examples, the electoral law was revised and a new constitution was created. These reforms occurred within the elected parliament. In May 1993, Juan Carlos Wasmosy was elected as the first civilian president and, on August 15, 1993, Rodríguez stepped down.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - yes
  - o Coding part three:
    - no (Group)

## Peru 1990

- Description: On April 8, 1990, legislative and presidential elections were held concurrently. Alberto Fujimori won the presidency.
  - o Coding part one:
    - no

## Peru 1992

- Description: On April 5, 1992, President Alberto Fujimori, with military support, dissolved congress, suspended the judiciary, arrested several opposition leaders, and suspended the 1979 Constitution. Fujimori exercised legislative power with the approval of the Council of Ministers, which he claimed was necessary due to economic problems and the "Shining Path" (a Maoist terrorist group) insurgency. This has sometimes been referred to as a "self-coup." On April 21, Fujimori suggested a timetable for a return to democracy and, on May 18, 1992 (prior to a meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States), pledged to hold elections for a Constitutional Congress. On November 22, 1992, the elections for the 80-member Democratic Constituent Congress (CCD, to act as an interim parliament) occurred, though some of the opposition refused to participate and others failed to qualify. Fujimori's "Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría" coalition took a majority of seats and the remaining seats were distributed between eight opposition parties. In January 1993, the CCD was inaugurated. It created a 13-member subcommittee to write the draft of the new constitution. On October 31, 1993, the new constitution was approved in a popular referendum and it entered into force on December 29, 1993. The CCD retained legislative power until general elections occurred on April 9, 1995. Fujimori won the presidency and his ruling coalition also won a majority of seats in the legislature. He was inaugurated to his second term in office on July 28, 1995.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:



- no (NoElec)

### Peru 2000-2001 (2000)

- Description: On November 20, 2000, President Alberto Fujimori resigned and fled. The president's actions followed a sequence of events, beginning on April 9, 2000 when legislative and presidential elections were held (with a second presidential round on May 28). Fujimori won the election, but the opposition claimed that the elections were fraudulent and, in fact, both the Organization of American States and the Carter Center withdrew from observing the election before any votes were cast. Protests began the day after the election, on April 10, and continued to escalate after the second round. On July 27, a mass demonstration against Fujimori occurred in Lima (called the "March of the Four Directions"). After a video showing bribery surfaced on September 14, the protests became strong enough to force Fujimori to call for new elections. Numerous members of congress that had previously been Fujimori's allies defected to the opposition. After the President of the Congress, a Fujimori supporter, was dismissed, Valentín Paniagua was elected as the new acting president. Fujimori then fled Peru and resigned. The following day, on November 21, Fujimori's cabinet—including his First Vice President Francisco Tudela, next in the line of succession—resigned. According to the constitution, then, Second Vice President Ricardo Márquez should have been next in succession, but the parliament refused (because Márquez was still loyal to Fujimori); Márquez subsequently resigned. The next in line of succession was the acting congressional president, Valentín Paniagua, who thus assumed the role of interim president. He appointed Javier Pérez de Cuéllar as prime minister and established the Unity and Reconciliation Government. New elections were held on April 8, 2001.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - no

### Poland 1989

- Description: On January 17, 1989, the ruling Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) passed a resolution permitting union pluralism, which paved the way for the relegalization of Solidarity. One day later, on January 18, 1989, General Wojciech Jaruzelski got party backing for formal negotiations with Solidarity. These actions followed a tumultuous year. In April and May 1988—beginning on April 21—a wave of strikes and demonstrations broke out. A second more powerful wave of strikes occurred in July and August. In August, Interior Minister General Kiszczak asked opposition Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa if he would like to negotiate with communist authorities and, on August 31, Kiszczak met Wałęsa for the first time to discuss the framework for negotiations. Preparatory talks continued through the fall and winter of 1988. After securing formal approval for negotiations in January 1989, round table discussions began. They lasted from February 6 to April 5, 1989 and concluded with the signing of the Round Table Compact. These negotiations included a total of 57 participants, with representatives from the ruling party, Solidarity, and members of other groups like the pro-regime Democratic and United Peasants' parties, the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ), the church, and anti- and pro-regime lay Catholic associations. For the opposition, the goal was institutional political pluralism. The compact legalized Solidarity, created an amended version of the 1952 Constitution as an interim document, and set up partly free parliamentary elections for June 4 and 18, 1989. In these elections, Solidarity won all 160 of the non-reserved seats in the 460-member lower house of parliament and 99 out of 100 seats in the newly-established upper house of parliament. A presidential election was held on November 25, but no winner was decided. A second round, runoff election was held on December 9, 1990. Lech Wałęsa won the presidential election and was inaugurated for a five-year term on December 22. Fully free parliamentary elections occurred on October 27, 1991, but

fragmentation made coalition-building a lengthy process. A new government was formed on December 23, 1991.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (InvolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

### **Qatar 1995**

- Description: On June 27, 1995, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa deposed his father, Emir Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad bin Abdullah bin Jassim bin Muhammed Al Thani, in a coup. In November 1998, the new emir announced a commission to produce a permanent constitution. In July 1999, he nominated 32 people to a Constitutional Commission, which was to work on the constitution for three years. Rather than a fully elected parliament, the commission decided on a Shura Consultative Council, which was to have 30 elected and 15 emir-appointed members. The commission did not, however, make plans for when an election for this council would take place and, until the election, all members would remain appointed by the emir. The constitution was approved by popular referendum on April 29, 2003 and came into effect in June 2005.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

### **Romania 1989-1990 (1989)**

- Description: On December 25, 1989, President Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife Elena were executed. Their fall from power began earlier in December 1989, when—in part due to discontent over food shortages—demonstrations against Ceaușescu’s regime began. After a December 15 demonstration against the harassment of a dissident priest, protests quickly spread. While Ceaușescu held a mass meeting on December 21 in an attempt to quell demonstrations, open revolt spread to all major cities by the next day. The National Salvation Front (FSN)—a coalition of groups opposed to Ceaușescu’s rule—took over Bucharest on December 22, 1989 and, because of the unrest, Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu fled the capital. They were caught, turned over to the army, and executed on Christmas day. On December 26, Petre Roman was named prime minister and, on December 27, the FSN abolished the one party system and called for elections. The FSN was structurally complicated and far-reaching, but two bodies were particularly important: the Executive Bureau and the Council. The 11-member FSN Executive Bureau (of the Council) under President Ion Iliescu was responsible for determining the composition of the larger Council and acting on the Council’s behalf between its meeting sessions. The FSN Council itself initially comprised 39 members, but grew quickly. By December 30, it reached 145 members. The Council acted as the governing body until elections. It was composed of a wide range of members, including prominent dissidents, some former communist officials (though only one that had been named a Central Committee member at the 14<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in November 1989), military members, ethnic minorities, intellectuals, and well-educated technocrats. The FSN initially ruled by decree—with Iliescu even appointing all government ministers—but after deciding to participate in the elections as a political party (on January 23, 1990), protests occurred



and the FSN agreed to share power with other groups. This led to the creation of the 253-member Provisional National Unity Council (PNUC) on February 9, which extended membership to other parties and was to remain in charge pending elections. The PNUC elected a 21-member Executive Bureau, again with Iliescu as president. On May 20, 1990, simultaneous legislative and presidential elections took place, with Iliescu elected president. He was inaugurated one month later, again appointed Roman to head a new government, and announced his cabinet (June 28). The new parliament appointed a 26-member commission of parliamentarians and extra-parliamentary legal experts to draft a new constitution. After work on the constitution was completed, it was approved in a popular referendum on December 8, 1991.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (InvolRef)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### **Romania 1996**

- Description: On November 3, 1996, parliamentary and presidential elections were held. The first round of the presidential election produced no winner, so runoff elections were held between the three top vote getters, Emil Constantinescu of the Democratic Convention (DCR), Petre Roman of the Social Democratic Union (SDU), and the incumbent President Ion Iliescu of the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PSDR). Emil Constantinescu won the presidential election and replaced Ion Iliescu, who had been in power since the fall of the communist regime in December 1989. Constantinescu formed a cabinet based on a coalition of his party (the DCR), the SDU, and the Magyars' Democratic Union (MDU). In addition, control of the government moved from Iliescu's Social Democracy Party of Romania (PDSR) to a new coalition of the DCR, the Democratic Party (PD), and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). The new coalition government renegotiated loans with the IMF and World Bank after taking power and also initiated plans to liberalize Romanian currency, overturning controls set in place by Iliescu's government.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### **Russia 1993 (1990)**

- Description: On March 4, 1990, the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia was elected in multi-candidate, but not multiparty, elections. The congress chose a bicameral Supreme Soviet from among their members to lead. In June 1990, the legislature appointed a Constitutional Commission, which was composed of 100 deputies and legal experts and chaired by Boris Yeltsin. A year later, in June 1991, Yeltsin was elected President of Russia. On December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved into 15 post-Soviet states and the Russian Federation came into existence. After the Soviet Union dissolved, Yeltsin remained as the chair of the constitutional commission, but also created his own constitution draft. Due to this impasse between the executive and legislature regarding the constitution, on April 25, 1993, there was a referendum in which voters agreed that they had confidence in Yeltsin. Therefore, on May 12, 1993, Yeltsin appointed a 45-member committee composed of government ministers, legal experts, and regional leaders to revise his draft. On June 5, 1993, a Constitutional Conference opened to discuss the draft, which consisted of 750 members, including regional leaders, members of parliament, leaders of political parties, legal experts, and representatives of trade unions and other social organizations. On July 12, 1993, the conference approved the constitution, but the legislature denounced it. Therefore, on September 21, 1993, Yeltsin suspended parliament by decree and called for elections, a move that violated the

constitution. Because some parliamentarians refused to leave, the military closed parliament on October 4, 1993. Legislative elections were held December 12, 1993 and the new constitution came into force on December 25, 1993.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)

### **Russia 2000**

- Description: On March 26, 2000, Vladimir Putin won the presidential election. Prior to this, he had become acting president, according to the constitution, after Boris Yeltsin resigned from the presidency six months early, on December 31, 1999. This followed the beginning of the Second Chechen War on August 26, 1999, with Russian troops entering Chechnya on October 1, 1999.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### **Rwanda 1990 (1991)**

- Description: On June 10, 1991, a constitutional amendment was adopted that made multiple political parties legal. Events leading up to this constitutional adoption began around one year earlier when President Juvénal Habyarimana faced pressure from both donors and demonstrations. On July 5, 1990, Habyarimana agreed to discuss political reform. On September 20, he convened a 33-member national commission to study how best to implement reforms. This commission recommended that a multiparty system should be put in place. Months before the constitutional amendment was passed, however, on October 1, 1990, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF, a rebel group composed mostly of Tutsi refugees) invaded, initiating the Rwandan Civil War. Habyarimana reorganized his government in both October and December 1991, but he ignored demands to include any opposition ministers. By early 1992, due to the war and opposition organization, Habyarimana's authority had been weakened substantially and mass demonstrations forced him to create a coalition with the domestic opposition. On April 16, 1992, then, a coalition government called a “government of transition” took office. Habyarimana continued as president, with his National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) retaining nine of the 19 cabinet posts. From the opposition, the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR) obtained the post of prime minister and two other ministries, the Liberal Party (PL) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) had three seats each, and the Democratic Christian Party (PDC) had one seat (a new party, the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR), was not included). The United Nations became actively involved in 1993 with the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). In August 1993, the Arusha Accords were signed, which called for a democratically-elected government and provided for the establishment of a broad-based transitional government until elections. In October 1993, another international force was established, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to help support the transitional government. Because of various issues and large amounts of violence, the inauguration of the transitional government never occurred.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:

- no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

#### Rwanda 1994

- Description: On April 6, 1994, President Juvénal Habyarimana's plane was shot down and he was killed. The Rwandan Genocide followed, with massive ethnic violence—estimates of the number killed range from approximately 800,000 to 1,000,000—for several months. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) gained control of the country by mid-July 1994. After taking over Rwanda, the RPF reaffirmed the previously-agreed on Arusha Accord and installed a transitional government based on the accord. On July 19, 1994, the RPF established a 21-member Government of National Unity with four other political parties—the RPF had eight members, the Liberal Party (PL) had three, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) had three, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) had one, the Republican Democratic Movement (MDR) had four, and two members were independents. Habyarimana's former party, the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND), and the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) were excluded from the unity government. Additionally, several groups that were responsible for the genocide were excluded from the new regime. On December 12, a 70-member National Assembly of the Transition was appointed, which included representatives of the RPF, the four other original parties, three additional smaller parties (the Islamic Party, PDI; the Socialist Party, PSR; and the Democratic Union for Rwandese People, UDPR), and six representatives of the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA). These institutions were established under President Pasteur Bizimungu and Vice President/Defense Minister Paul Kagame. While, in the wake of the genocide, there were immediate crucial tasks for the government such as ensuring peace and security and creating transitional justice measures, the government took on other reform measures as well. Eventually, on May 26, 2003, a new constitution was adopted by referendum. Presidential elections did not take place until after this, on August 25, 2003. Similarly, parliamentary elections did not take place until September 29-October 2, 2003. The newly elected parliament held its first session on October 10, 2003.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (CivilWar)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - yes

#### São Tomé and Príncipe 1991 (1989)

- Description: On December 5, 1989, a national conference opened. This followed a couple of years of reform, beginning in October 1987, when the Central Committee of the Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe (MLSTP) announced that it wanted to introduce direct elections for the legislature and presidency. In December, the committee nominated an internal group to consider possible constitutional amendments. Over the next year, reforms were announced, such as the opening of party membership to a wider section of society and plans for a national conference. On December 5 through December 7, 1989, a national conference of 600 delegates was held, including a large number of party delegates (including reformists), representatives of independent professions, and the nascent opposition. The national conference recommended a multiparty system to the ruling party (the previous parliamentary election was held in 1985), which was ratified on December 12, 1989. On August 22, 1990, a popular referendum approved the amended constitution. Parliamentary elections were held on January 20, 1991 and presidential elections were held on March 3, 1991. Miguel Trovoada, the only contender for the presidency (his two opponents withdrew), was inaugurated on April 3, 1991.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

### Senegal 2000

- Description: In the 2000 presidential election, President Abdou Diouf lost to Abdoulaye Wade. He conceded defeat and left office on April 1, 2000. Wade then dissolved the National Assembly—elected in 1998 and was dominated by former President Diouf’s Socialist Party (PS)—and called for early elections. These were held on April 29, 2001. Many reforms were instituted and new limits on the presidency were set (decreased from seven to five years, with a two-term limit).
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### Serbia 2006

- Description: On June 5, 2006, after the Montenegrin referendum approving independence from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (before 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Serbia proclaimed independence. Boris Tadić had been elected in June 2004 and remained president after independence. On October 28, 2006, a new constitution was approved by referendum. On January 21, 2007, parliamentary elections were held.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### Seychelles 1991

- Description: On December 3, 1991, President France-Albert René announced a return to a multiparty system during an extraordinary congress of the ruling Seychelles People's Progressive Front (SPPF). Earlier in the year, in April 1991, the SPPF passed a resolution stating that Seychelles would forever remain a one-party state. However, because René faced a large amount of political pressure from the Commonwealth and domestic critics to restore multiparty politics—in particular, from French, British, and American diplomats who threatened to suspend aid—he decided to allow for multiparty politics. In July 1992, elections were held for the Constitutional Commission, whose 23 members first met to begin drafting the constitution on August 27, 1992. The constitution was approved by popular referendum on June 18, 1993. Two days later, presidential and parliamentary elections were held.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)

### Sierra Leone 1990 (1991)

- Description: On October 1, 1991, a new constitution establishing a multiparty system entered into force. This followed a year of proposed reforms. On October 1, 1990, due to mounting pressure from both within and outside the country, President Joseph Saidu Momoh set up a 35-member National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) to assess the 1978 one-party constitution. The NCRC recommended that the country switch to a multiparty system. On March 23, 1991, violence broke out when the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) launched a border war (from Liberia) with the ruling All People’s Ruling Congress (APC). After a popular referendum,

on October 1, 1991, the new constitution was approved by Momoh and the parliament—composed exclusively of Momoh’s party (All People's Congress) members—and entered into force.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(VolRef\)](#)
  - [no](#)

### **Sierra Leone 1992**

- Description: On April 29, 1992, Joseph Saidu Momoh was overthrown in a military coup by Valentine Strasser and went into exile. This occurred as part of the Sierra Leone Civil War, which began on March 23, 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attempted to overthrow the government. After the coup, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was established with Strasser as chairman. It was composed of 18 officers and four civilians. The Deputy Chairman of the NPRC was Julius Maada Bio, who acted as Chairman of the Supreme Council of State (SCS). The SCS included NPRC members, other military officers, and one civilian. The junta dissolved parliament, banned all political parties, limited freedoms, enacted a rule-by-decree policy, and promised to end the war and restore peace. While the constitution technically remained in force, the junta issued a number of decrees that limited its application. On November 26, 1993, Strasser announced that the junta intended to return Sierra Leone to a multiparty democracy, with general elections in late 1995 (he additionally announced a unilateral ceasefire and amnesty for rebels to attempt to quell the fighting). The junta set up the National Advisory Council to work on amending the NPRC-created “Working Document on the Constitution.” In 1994, the junta created an Interim National Election Commission (INEC) composed of technocrats that was to ensure the timetable for the return to democratic rule was achieved. Finally, between August 15 and 17, 1995, the junta convened a National Consultative Conference on the Electoral Progress to discuss issues like security and the election date and campaign laws. Before elections could occur, Strasser was ousted in a coup on January 16, 1996.
  - Coding part one:
    - [yes \(MilCoup\)](#)
    - [yes \(NoPriRul, NoPriReg\)](#)
    - [yes](#)
  - Coding part two:
    - [yes](#)
  - Coding part three:
    - [yes](#)

### **Sierra Leone 1996**

- Description: On January 16, 1996, Valentine Strasser was ousted in a coup by his fellow National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) soldiers, led by Deputy Brigadier Julius Maada Bio and supported by four other ranking NPRC members. The NPRC had been in power since 1992 (*please see case description above*) and, in December 1995, set a date for national elections in February and March 1996. Prior to these elections, Strasser attempted to lower the mandatory age requirement for the president from 45 to 30 so that he could run, but this action led to his downfall. In Bio’s first public broadcast after the coup, he stated his support for returning to a democratically elected civilian government and committed to ending the civil war. A few days after the coup, on January 19, Bio reshuffled the new cabinet and created a reconstituted Supreme Council of State, making changes such as sacking the existing finance minister and appointing Paul Karama—a well-known human rights campaigner who harshly criticized the NPRC—as the minister of lands, housing, and environment. Presidential and legislative elections were held on February 26 and 27, 1996, with a runoff election on March 15. Bio handed power over to Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on March 29, 1996 after the conclusion of the elections. Kabbah opened dialogue with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and signed the Abidjan Peace Accord on November 20, 1996.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (MilCoup)
  - yes (NoPriRul)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### Sierra Leone 1997

- Description: On May 25, 1997, 17 soldiers led by Corporal Tamba Gborie (loyal to Major General Johnny Paul Koroma, who was detained at the time) launched a coup that sent President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah into exile. They established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), released Koroma from prison, and installed him as their chairman and head of state. Koroma suspended the constitution, banned demonstrations, shut down all private radio, and invited the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to join the junta government.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

### Sierra Leone 1998

- Description: On February 13, 1998, General Johnny Paul Koroma's Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)—the junta that had conducted a successful coup against the democratically-elected government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah (of the Sierra Leone People's Party, SLPP) on May 25, 1997—was overthrown by the Nigeria-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces. Prior to international action, the various labor groups and students organized strikes. On August 18, 1997, the AFRC violently repressed a mass demonstration organized by students, spurring additional protests, strikes, and mass emigration. After ECOMOG overthrew the junta, Kabbah's government was officially reinstated on March 10, 1998, but the AFRC and rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) continued to fight against the government and controlled a large part of the country. In June 1998, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was established, but it was not until May 1999 that renewed peace negotiations took place. These negotiations between the government and the RUF culminated in the Lomé Peace Accord of July 7, 1999. At Lomé, the parties agreed to total cessation of hostilities and a power-sharing arrangement, which was to remain in place until the next elections could be held (which, according to the constitution, were to be held in 2001). On October 22, 1999, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established. On November 21, the Government of National Unity was announced—a coalition cabinet with 21 members, which Kabbah expanded beyond the initial Lomé-agreed on 18—with the RUF gaining the position of vice president (with RUF-leader Foday Sankoh becoming the chairman of the newly-created Commission of Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, CMRRD), one senior ministry, three other cabinet posts, and four deputy ministries. The aim of this power-sharing arrangement was to ensure peace and transform the RUF into a political party that would participate in the democratic process. However, fighting between the various forces continued, coming to a head in May 2000. Starting on May 1, the RUF began attacking peacekeeping forces, kidnapping 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers over subsequent days. On May 8,



RUF members shot and as many as 20 people demonstrating outside of Sankoh's house. Due to this violence, the government revoked the RUF's seats in the cabinet, effectively ending the power-sharing arrangement. Sankoh disappeared for just over one week, but was captured and arrested on May 17. In May 2001, a final ceasefire agreement was signed and, on January 18, 2002, Kabbah declared the end of the war. On May 14, 2002, presidential and parliamentary elections were held.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (IntlInt)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (InstDes)
    - *Alternative coding: TG-moderately permissive*

### **Slovak Republic 1993**

- Description: On January 1, 1993, Czechoslovakia peacefully split into the independent Czech Republic and Slovak Republic. The Slovak National Council, which was elected in June 1992, was retained after the break-up and adopted a new constitution in September (drafting the constitution actually started in September 1990). Parliamentary elections were next held on September 30 and October 1, 1994.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### **Slovenia 1991 (1989)**

- Description: On September 27, 1989, while still part of Yugoslavia, the Slovenian Assembly passed constitutional amendments to introduce parliamentary democracy. Prior to this, beginning in 1987, civil unrest broke out against the communist regime. By the end of the year, the first independent trade union was established. Led by various political organizations—such as the Social Democratic Union of Slovenia and the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (the latter of which was founded on May 31, 1988)—a mass movement pushed the communists toward democracy. After the constitutional amendments then, on February 4, 1990, the League of Communists of Slovenia, the sole legal party, changed its name to the Party of Democratic Reform (SDP) and began negotiations with the Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (DEMOS) about how to establish the multiparty system. In April 1990, the first direct parliamentary and presidential elections took place. On May 16, 1990, an amendment was passed that declared full independence and formed a new government, announcing a one-year time period for creating a new constitution. To draft the new constitution, and following a process enshrined in the previous constitution, the government appointed a constitutional commission of experts. On December 23, 1990, the electorate voted for independence and on June 25, 1991, Slovenia became independent. There was a brief Ten-Day War with Yugoslavia, but then a new constitution was adopted in December 1991. Parliamentary and presidential elections were held on December 6, 1992, with the new government approved on January 25, 1993.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)

### **Solomon Islands 2000-2003 (2000)**

- Description: On June 5, 2000, Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu was kidnapped by Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF) militia members. The rebel forces set up roadblocks around the capital, took

over a number of installations, and held the prime minister hostage. Subsequently, in exchange for his release, the rebels forced the prime minister to resign. Prior to this, due to civil unrest, Ulufa'alu had declared a four-month state of emergency in late 1999. On June 30, 2000, Manasseh Sogavare was elected as the new prime minister by the parliament. In October 2000, the Townsville Peace Agreement was signed by two warring militias, the MEF and the Istabu Freedom Movement (IFB). In December 2001, elections were held. In July 2003, Australian and Pacific Island troops arrived under the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI).

- Coding part one:
  - yes (MilCoup)
  - yes (NoPriRul)
  - no

### **Somalia 1991**

- Description: On January 26, 1991, during the Somali Civil War, Mohamed Siad Barre's military junta was forced from power by a coalition of armed opposition groups. The United Somali Congress (USC) attempted to establish a provisional government, despite the fact that it did not control the entire country. The USC chose Ali Mahdi Mahammad as provisional president, who subsequently named Umar Arteh Ghalib as prime minister. Ghalib's cabinet, called the Provisional Government of National Unity, was initially composed of 27 full ministers and eight deputy ministers. Mahammad announced that elections for a permanent government would be held as soon as security was reestablished, but continuing political disturbances in the country prevented the formulation of any definite election plans. By September 1991, intense rivalry among the leaders of the USC-dominated interim government degenerated into violence.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (CivilWar)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

### **Somalia 2000**

- Description: On August 13, 2000, the Arta Declaration established a Transitional National Government (TNG). This declaration followed the Somalia National Peace Conference (held in Arta, Djibouti and sometimes referred to as the Djibouti Conference), between May and August 2000. The conference included a large number of intellectuals, clan elders, religious leaders, and business community members. On August 13, conference participants agreed to the creation of the TNG and a Transitional National Assembly (TNA). The 245-member TNA was based on clan representation, with 44 deputies from each of the four major clans, 24 from the minority clans, and 25 women, five from each of the four major and five from the minority clans. On August 26, 2000, the TNA elected Abdiqasim Salad Hassan as president. He was sworn in the following day. While the TNG had the support of various international actors—such as the United Nations, African Union, European Union, and the United States—it struggled to earn national recognition in Somalia, never being considered the legitimate national government. It managed to reestablish a parliamentary system in which parliamentary seats were apportioned to Somalia's four major clans, with a half-share going to minority clans (though it is worth noting that the majority of the members of parliament were chosen by former warlords or leaders of Islamic militias). It did not, however, plan for transitional security arrangements or institutional reform. In April 2001, a rival pan-Somali movement called the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) was set up, which



attempted to form a rival national government. While Hassan's administration was able to control Mogadishu, much of the rest of the country remained under the control of various faction leaders.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

#### **Somalia 2004**

- Description: On February 1, 2004, the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) was adopted. This followed several reconciliation conferences, including the Somali National Reconciliation Conference of September 2003 and the Nairobi Conference from January 9 to 24, 2004, both held in Kenya. At the latter conference, the existing Transitional National Government (TNG) and its rival pan-Somali movement called the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) reconciled. After the reconciliation, a new transitional government was needed. According to the TFC, then, a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed as the successor to the TNG. On August 24, 2004, a 275-member Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) was appointed by the principal Somali clans and sub-clans and inaugurated. The TFP consisted of the four major clans (61 seats each) and an alliance of minority clans (31 seats). The TFP elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as interim president on October 10, 2004. On November 3, he appointed Ali Muhammad Gedi as prime minister. Despite not being based in Somalia (the TFG performed its tasks from Kenya) and the existence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that ruled over Southern Somalia, the TFG was Somalia's internationally recognized government, backed by the United Nations, African Union, and the United States. It was not until 2007 that, with the help of Ethiopian military forces, the TFG was able to relocate to Mogadishu. Following the Ethiopian invasion, the ICU split and the more moderate faction, led by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, engaged in negotiations and eventually a peace deal with the TFG. The more extreme faction rejected any deal and transformed into the militant group al-Shabab. In January 2009, a new TFP and TFG were formed, with Sheikh Sharif Ahmed indirectly elected as president and the size of the TFP increased from 275 to 550, with 200 of the 275-newly created seats allotted to members representing the Islamist Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). The transitional period was also extended by two years. A provisional constitution was adopted on August 1, 2012 and the TFG's tenure officially ended on August 20. At this time, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was inaugurated. Due to the dire security situation, general elections were not held, but a Federal Parliament was appointed and an indirect presidential election was held on September 10, 2012.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

#### **South Africa 1994 (1990)**

- Description: On February 2, 1990, F.W. de Klerk's National Party government lifted the ban on the African National Congress (ANC), unbanned other banned organizations, released Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, repealed censorship, and lifted the state of emergency. This followed

popular pressure from outside the regime, led by the ANC, and business dissatisfaction from within the regime. Earlier, between 1987 and 1989, President P.W. Botha had attempted to contain this pressure by informally negotiating with the ANC without actually changing the institutions of apartheid. These secretive, informal negotiations—which included Nelson Mandela at times—continued after Botha’s resignation and F.W. de Klerk’s assumption to the presidency. On May 4, 1990, formal negotiations began with a meeting between the ANC and the government. The National Peace Accord was signed on September 14, 1991 by 27 political organizations and national and homeland governments. On December 20, 1991, multiparty negotiations began at the first meeting of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I), with 19 groups represented (in addition to the government) and 228 total delegates. The next day, participants decided to set up a Management Committee and five working groups (relating to free and fair elections, the constitution, an interim government, the independent “TBVC states,” and time frames). These working groups were to report their findings at a second CODESA session in a few months. The Management Committee included one delegate and one adviser from each party and each of the five working groups consisted of two delegates and two advisers from each of the 19 parties. Between February and April 1992, both the ANC and government submitted proposals for the interim, transitional period to CODESA. On May 15, the second session of CODESA (CODESA II) began, but talks ended in deadlock the following day. Following violence in June—notably the Boipatong Massacre of June 17—the ANC suspended all negotiations with the government. Several months later, on September 21, F.W. de Klerk and Mandela agreed to resume constitutional negotiations, with various bilateral meetings over the next few months. On March 5 and 6, 1993, a multi-party planning commission decided to establish a new forum to restart constitutional negotiations. This Multiparty Negotiating Forum (MPNF)—with representation from 26 parties, including several new parties that had not taken part in CODESA—met for first time on April 1. It contained various committees and councils, with the highest decision-making body (the Plenary) including 208 members. With all committees included, the MPNF had between 404 and 410 members. The MPNF additionally met over subsequent months and outlined the key points for a first draft of the interim constitution in July. On September 23, the existing parliament approved a bill establishing the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), which was to oversee the transition to democracy. On November 18, an interim constitution was ratified and, on December 6, the TEC’s first session occurred. The TEC was to act as an interim parliament and oversee the government until elections were held for a constituent assembly. It included one member of each of the parties that participated in the MPNF. Parties that had walked out of the talks—notably members of the Freedom Alliance—declined membership in the TEC, as did the Pan Africanist Congress. In the end, 19 of the original 26 negotiating partners were represented in the TEC. In addition to the TEC, an Independent Media Commission, an Independent Electoral Commission, and an Independent Broadcasting Authority were created. The first elections were held on April 26, 1994. The ANC garnered 62 percent of the vote and appointed ANC leader Nelson Mandela as president. Mandela was inaugurated on May 10, 1994 and the TEC subsequently disbanded.

- Coding part one:
  - [yes \(VolRef\)](#)
  - [yes \(NoPriReg\)](#)
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part two:
  - [yes](#)
- Coding part three:
  - [yes](#)

### **Sri Lanka 1989**

- Description: On February 15, 1989, a parliamentary election was held. Ranasinghe Premadasa won a presidential election in 1988 and took office on January 2, 1989. Prior to this, beginning in 1987,

the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed, which provided a temporary ceasefire in the Sri Lankan Civil War (with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE). As part of the agreement, an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was stationed in Sri Lanka, with the goal of disarming militant groups. This force began withdrawing in 1989 and the last members of IPKF left the country in March 1990.

- Coding part one:
  - no

#### **Sri Lanka 1994**

- Description: On August 16, 1994, parliamentary elections were held and, on November 9, 1994, presidential elections occurred. Chandrika Kumaratunga was elected as president. Prior to this, on May 1, 1993, President Ranasinghe Premadasa was assassinated. On May 7, 1993, Dingiri Bana Wijetunga was elected by parliament to complete the remainder of Premadasa's term.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

#### **Sudan 1989**

- Description: On June 30, 1989, Colonel Omar al-Bashir led a military coup. The military government released a number of constitutional decrees. It declared a state of emergency, suspended political parties, dissolved various institutions including the constituent assembly, introduced Islamic legal code on the national level, banned associations, and banned newspapers. Nine days after the coup, a 15-member all-military Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC) was established. It contained seven brigadiers (included al-Bashir), five colonels, two lieutenant-colonels, and one major. In October, the RCC formally established a government. The RCC was the legislative and sovereign authority, with powers to appoint and dismiss ministers. The RCC claimed that peace was its main priority. The regime staged a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) of hand-picked participants, which issued a number of decrees but said nothing about multiparty democracy. On February 24, 1992, a 300-member, wholly appointed Transitional National Assembly held its first session. On October 16, 1993, al-Bashir appointed himself president, disbanded the Revolutionary Command Council, and took on the legislative and executive powers of the council. In February 1996, a national conference was held where 125 members of the 400-member parliament were chosen; in March 1996, elections occurred for the remaining 275 seats.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - yes
  - Coding part three:
    - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

#### **Sudan 2002-2005 (2005)**

- Description: On January 9, 2005, in an attempt to end the Second Sudanese Civil War, the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the government signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) at Naivasha. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established to support the agreement's implementation. On July 6, 2005, an interim constitution was adopted, which allowed for the creation of a Government of National Unity. This interim government included co-vice president positions, with one representing the south and one representing the north. John Garang, the leader of the SPLM, initially took on this role for the south. On August 31, 2005, President Omar al-Bashir appointed all 450 members of the National

Assembly by decree, with 234 seats going to the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), 126 seats going to the SPLM, 63 seats going to other northern parties, and 27 seats to other southern groups. Additionally, the 29-member cabinet of ministers was sworn in, with 16 seats remaining in the hands of the NCP, nine seats going to the former rebels, and four seats going to other political parties. The agreement called for a transition to democracy and stipulated that national elections would be held during the interim period. The CPA also granted Southern Sudan autonomy for six years, which was to be followed by an independence referendum. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held between April 11 and 15, 2010. The legislature held its first session on May 24, 2010.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### **Suriname 1990**

- Description: On December 24, 1990, Dési Bouterse ousted President R. Shankar in the “telephone coup,” in which he dismissed the government with a phone call. In the following days, the National Assembly—previously elected in 1987—selected Johan Kraag and Jules Wijdenbosch as president and vice-president, respectively. Bouterse promised new parliamentary elections within 100 days, which occurred on May 25, 1991.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec, InstDes)

### **Taiwan (Republic of China) 1992 (1990)**

- Description: On June 28, 1990, a National Affairs Conference (NAC) opened, in which President Lee Teng-hui invited leaders—including both Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leaders—to discuss reforms. The conference occurred several months after the Wild Lily Student Movement (also known as the March Student Movement). On March 16, 1990, members of the Wild Lily Student Movement began demonstrating for full democracy, calling for direct elections for the executive and new elections for the legislature. Facing this pressure, then, President Lee Teng-hui held the NAC, which opened on June 28 and lasted until July 4, 1990. One major point of discussion was how a future president would be directly elected. The NAC, while a forum for debate, had no statutory powers. In April 1991, the KMT convened an extraordinary session of the First National Assembly to consider various reforms. Among other things, it added articles to the 1947 Constitution that would formalize national elections to replace all senior national representatives. This change provided for a total renewal of the three parliamentary bodies between 1991 and 1993. It also stated that the mandates of the parliamentary bodies who had been elected decades earlier would expire as of December 31, 1991. The first major national election for the Second National Assembly occurred on December 21, 1991; the first direct legislative election was held on December 19, 1992; and the first direct presidential elections were held on March 23, 1996.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)

- yes (NoPriReg)
- yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

### Taiwan 2000

- Description: In 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected as the first non-Kuomintang (KMT) president. The KMT had dominated the political scene in Taiwan since the founding of the country, but prior to the election (in 1999) a large earthquake hit the island. This caused significant structural damage and led to public dissatisfaction with the government relief efforts. This dissatisfaction helped the opposition candidates to garner support in the election.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### Tajikistan 1991

- Description: On September 9, 1991, Tajikistan’s Supreme Soviet declared independence from the Soviet Union. Shortly before the independence declaration, on August 23, 1991, President Qahhor Mahkamov had supported the failed “August Coup” in the Soviet Union. Upset with Mahkamov’s support, protesters took to the streets demanding his ouster. Mahkamov had been appointed as the first president of Tajikistan in 1990 and, on August 31, 1991, he resigned. Qadriddin Aslonov was elected as acting president (he was the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet at the time, which had been elected in February 1990) and retained this position between August 31 and September 23, 1991. After declaring independence, on September 23, 1991, parliament elected Rahmon Nabiyeu president; on December 2, 1991, Nabiyeu won the presidential election.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul)
    - no

### Tajikistan 1997-1998 (1997)

- Description: On June 27, 1997, the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan was signed, which ended the Tajikistani civil war that began in 1992. This conflict, fought between the central government’s armed forces, the People’s Front of Tajikistan (PFT), and the militias of minority ethnic groups excluded from the government led to the deaths of over 50,000. This led to several years of peace talks (beginning in April 1994) between the parliament and the opposition under the banner of the United Tajikistan Opposition (UTO). As part of the peace agreement, a 26-member Commission on National Reconciliation (NRC) was created, which first met on September 15, 1997 and consisted of an equal number of members from each side in the civil war. The NRC was responsible for developing amendments to the constitution (which had been previously adopted in 1994) to then submit for public approval. Additionally, the NRC was tasked with addressing a large number of issues, including the functioning of political parties, parliamentary election law (to be approved by the parliament previously elected in 1995), government reform, and disarmament. On January 15, 1998, citing the government’s failure to give the correct percentage of administration posts, the UTO pulled out of the NRC, though it later rejoined. A little over one year later, on February 10, 1999, the NRC approved a recommendation for creating a bicameral parliament—its first recommendation since its inception. On September 26, constitutional amendments were approved by popular referendum. In the run-up to the November 6 presidential election, the UTO again pulled out of the NRC (on October 18). This election resulted in a victory for the incumbent, Emomali Rahmon. Subsequently, on November 9,

the UTO again rejoined the NRC. Although called for as early as 1998, parliamentary elections for the newly-created bicameral legislature were not held until early 2000. On February 27, 2000, elections for the lower house were held. Three days after elections for the upper house of parliament were held, on March 26, 2000, the NRC held its final session (the final stipulation of the peace agreement was the holding of legislative elections).

- Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)
- *Alternative coding: TG-permissive*

### **United Republic of Tanzania 1995 (1992)**

- Description: On February 18, 1992 and 19, 1992, the restriction on political parties was lifted during an extraordinary national congress of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Two years earlier, in February 1990, the CCM's National Executive Committee (NEC) organized a national symposium for public discussion on a political system. Elections were held, but Tanzania remained a one-party state. After the symposium, on February 27, 1991, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi appointed a 20-person Presidential Commission on a One-Party or Multi-Party Political System—led by Chief Justice Francis Nyalali (sometimes called the Nyalali or Presidential Commission)—to consolidate the many views expressed. After the commission finished, the restriction on political parties was lifted. Despite opposition groups' calls for an all-party "National Constitutional Conference," the government refused to convene one. The government also did not accept all of the Nyalali Commission's recommendations and decided that it would stick to the five-year interval between elections. A National Electoral Commission was appointed prior to the first multiparty elections. The first multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections occurred on October 29, 1995.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

### **Thailand 1991**

- Description: On February 23, 1991, there was a military coup against Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan's regime by a junta called the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC). The NPKC took control of the government the day after the coup, which was made up of six top military commanders. The coup was led by General Sunthorn Kongsompong, who abrogated the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, and enforced martial law. The NPKC brought in a civilian prime minister, Anand Panyarachun, whose cabinet was dominated by civilians but was also composed of well-known technocrats, retired government officers, and military leaders. The NPKC created an interim constitution in March and promised to hold elections within 1991 or early 1992. On March 15, the NPKC appointed a 292-member National Legislative Assembly (NLA). The NLA set up a 20-member committee to draft a new constitution, which was composed of legal and constitutional experts, former elected members of parliament, and political scientists. On May 3, martial law was lifted and, four months after the constitutional committee began work, the constitution was completed. This new constitution came into effect in December 1991 and there



was an election on March 22, 1992. Despite announcing the new government on April 17, unrest caused the government to be unable to form a coalition. Due to this civil unrest, a second parliamentary election was held on September 13, 1992.

- Coding part one:
  - yes (MilCoup)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### Thailand 1992

- Description: On May 24, 1992, Prime Minister Suchinda Kraprayoon resigned. A previous coup leader, he was appointed to the position of prime minister after the March 22, 1992 elections by the winning coalition, even though he had not been a candidate in the election. This appointment led to massive demonstrations, peaking between May 17 and 19. The military tried to suppress these demonstrations with force, which led to a massacre and riots. On May 20, 1992, King Bhumibol Adulyadej intervened by holding a televised meeting, which ended with Suchinda's resignation. After Suchinda resigned, Deputy Prime Minister Meechai Ruchuphan became caretaker prime minister for an interim period of 17 days. The 360-member National Assembly (elected in March) passed four bills in response to general protests on June 10; the first three limited the powers within parliament, and the fourth required the prime minister to be an elected member of parliament. Soon after, the elected assembly speaker asked Anand Panyarachun, who had been prime minister under the prior National Peace Keeping Council's government, to lead the government. Once Anand Panyarachun was again in power, he formed a 35-member cabinet (with many technocrats), dissolved the parliament on June 29, and called for new elections. These were held on September 13, 1992. The newly-elected National Assembly selected Chuan Leekpai as prime minister on September 20.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)

### Thailand 2006

- Description: On September 19, 2006, the Royal Thai Army, led by Sonthi Boonyaratglin, staged a coup against the elected caretaker government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The next day, the military cancelled the upcoming elections, abrogated the constitution, dissolved the parliament and the constitutional court, banned protests, suppressed the media, and declared martial law. They organized in a Council for Democratic Reform (CDR) that, on September 21, issued a statement committing to restore democratic government within one year. The CDR contained six military members: Sonthi Boonyaratglin (head of state), Sathiraphan Keyanon, Chalit Pookpasuk, Kowit Wattana, Winai Phatthiyakul, and Ruangroj Mahasaranon. On October 1, General Surayud Chulanont was sworn in as prime minister. The king appointed a 242-member interim legislative body called the National Legislative Assembly on October 12, 2006 and a new constitution was adopted on August 19, 2007. Elections were held on December 23, 2007, though the Thai Rak Thai party did not participate (the CDR banned them from being politically active for five years). The legislature held its first session on January 21, 2008.
  - Coding part one:

- yes (MilCoup)
- yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
- yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

#### **Thailand 2007-2008 (2007)**

- Description: On December 23, 2007, a legislative election was held, which was the first since the military coup of 2006. Allies of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra won the election, which led to protests by the anti-Thaksin “Yellow Shirts” in May 1998. In December 1998, the Constitutional Court dissolved several parties on electoral fraud charges and dismissed Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat. According to the constitution, Chaovarat Chanweerakul acted as a replacement until the parliament elected Abhisit Vejjajiva as the new prime minister.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

#### **Timor-Leste (East Timor) 1999**

- Description: On August 30, 1999, a popular referendum for independence took place. This followed a series of events beginning on January 27, 1999 when, after the resignation of Suharto in Indonesia, new Indonesian President B.J. Habibie announced that he would consider “broad autonomy” for East Timor in upcoming discussions with Portugal at the United Nations (UN). During these discussions, the various parties came to an agreement and, on March 11, announced that a referendum would be held in East Timor on the question of independence from Indonesia. On August 30, 1999, then, the UN supervised the popular referendum, which overwhelmingly approved independence. There was a campaign of violence from a pro-integration militia, which led to an Australian-led international peacekeeping force. There were several UN organizations involved (INTERFET, the Australian force, and the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) among them), but on October 25, 1999, the administration of East Timor was taken over by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). This was in part a peacekeeping mission, but also an interim civil administration. The UN Transitional Administration, in consultation with an umbrella group of Timorese organizations that had opposed Indonesian control of the country, the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), created the constitution-drafting procedures. Because this group had a large amount of popular legitimacy and had non-military networks throughout the country, it acted as a de facto government in many areas. UNTAET also formally collaborated with the National Consultative Council (NCC), a body composed of 11 East Timorese members—seven from the CNRT, three from other political groups, and one representative of the Roman Catholic Church—and four senior UNTAET staff members. This later morphed into the Timorese National Council and was accompanied by the creation of a coalition cabinet of transitional government, the East Timorese Transitional Authority (ETTA), with four Timorese positions and four international positions (established on August 7, 2000). On August 30, 2001, elections were held to choose 88 members of the Constituent Assembly, which had the goal of creating a constitution in preparation for full independence in 2002. The Constituent Assembly replaced the National Council and became the parliament following formal independence. Shortly thereafter, 24 members of the new all-East Timorese Council of Ministers of the Second Transitional Government were sworn into office. This council replaced the Transitional Cabinet created in 2000. The Constituent Assembly and new government were to govern East Timor during the remaining transitional period before its independence. Xanana Gusmão—a prominent East Timorian involved in UNTAET—had been elected president on April 14, 2002 and assumed this role at formal independence on May 20, 2002.



- Coding part one:
  - yes (VolRef)
  - yes (NoPriRul, NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### **Timor-Leste (East Timor) 2002**

- Description: On March 22, 2002, the Constituent Assembly signed into force the constitution. On April 14, following a presidential election, Xanana Gusmão became president. On May 20, 2002, independence was formalized and the first government was sworn in. This government was composed mainly of the pre-independence Council of Ministers. On the same day, the United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET) was established. UNMISET was to continue providing assistance to East Timor over a two-year period (extended for one year) until all operational responsibilities were fully devolved to the East Timor authorities. UNMISET successfully completed its mandate on May 20, 2005 and replaced with the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL).
  - Coding part one:
    - no

### **Togo 1991-1993 (1991)**

- Description: On April 11, 1991, political parties were legalized. This action followed antigovernment protests, which began on October 5, 1990. In April 1991, the government began negotiations with the opposition and agreed to hold a “National Dialogue Forum.” After legalizing political parties, though, an indefinitely-long general strike began on June 6. In the June 12 Accords, the government agreed to a non-sovereign national conference that was to establish a transition government and organize new elections. An interim constitution gave the conference the power to draft a new constitution. It opened on July 8, 1991 and immediately declared itself to be a sovereign national conference, setting up a transitional government. The 962-member conference—composed of representatives from all political parties, major economic groups, the diaspora, local officials, student representatives, and religious leaders—drafted an interim constitution that called for a one-year transitional regime that would organize free elections. The conference selected Joseph Kokou Koffigoh as transitional prime minister, but kept President Gnassingbé Eyadéma as chief of state. The conference adopted a transitional constitution on August 24, 1991 and appointed a 79-member transitional legislature called the High Council for the Republic (HCR), heavily weighted with members from the south of Togo. In total, the HCR’s composition was reshuffled four times. It voted to dissolve Eyadéma’s party in November 1991, but the army intervened and Koffigoh had to establish a second transitional government on January 1, 1992 with substantial participation by ministers of Eyadéma’s party. In July and August 1992, a Joint Consultative Council met to discuss the constitution and mediate differences between the ruling party, the president, and the opposition parties. On September 27, 1992, the public approved the new constitution in a referendum. In January 1993, Eyadéma declared the transition complete, but protests and violence followed. Eyadéma then entered negotiations with the opposition, which ended in the July 11 Ouagadougou Agreement. Presidential elections occurred on August 25, 1993 and parliamentary elections were held on February 6, 1994, with a second round held on February 20. With the major opposition parties boycotting the election, President Eyadéma was reelected. He subsequently appointed Edem Kodjo as prime minister on April 23, a controversial appointment because he was not part of the parliamentary majority group. Kodjo’s new government was announced on May 25 (and boycotted by those in the parliamentary majority).

- Coding part one:
  - yes (InvolRef)
  - yes (NoPriReg)
  - yes
- Coding part two:
  - yes
- Coding part three:
  - yes

### **Togo 2005**

- Description: On February 5, 2005, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, president since 1967, died. The head of the army, Zakary Nandja, pronounced Eyadéma's son Faure Gnassingbé as the new president. The President of the Commission of the African Union, Alpha Oumar Konaré, immediately declared this act to be a coup. Under heavy pressure, Gnassingbé stepped down on February 25 and the National Assembly appointed Bonfoh Abass, who was elected as President of the National Assembly and thus became the acting president, to replace him until the presidential election of April 25, 2005.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (MilCoup)
    - yes (NoPriRul)
    - no

### **Turkmenistan 1991**

- Description: On October 27, 1991, following Moscow's failed coup d'état and a national referendum, Turkmenistan declared independence from the Soviet Union. Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbasy) continued as chief of state, replacing communism with a regime based mainly around a cult of personality. There was a constitution created in 1992, but no mediators were included in the drafting process. Elections were held on December 11, 1994 for all members of the legislative Mejlis, but no opposition parties or groups were officially registered. The previous Supreme Soviet elections were held on January 7, 1990, but the only registered party was the Communist Party of Turkmenistan.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - no

### **Uganda 1993 (1994)**

- Description: On March 28, 1994, an election for a Constituent Assembly was held. The legislature, which had been elected in February 1989, retained its role even after this election. Prior to this, President Yoweri Museveni had gained power on January 29, 1986, banned political party activities, created a no-party system called "the Movement," and gradually introduced some reforms. The legislature approved the formation of a 21-member Constitutional Commission, appointed by the president, which was to draft a new constitution. The Constituent Assembly elections were for 214 of the 284 seats, with 39 seats reserved for women and the rest reserved for representatives of trade unions, youth, each political party that had contested the 1980 elections, the army, and ten presidential nominees. This body was to write the country's constitution. After the constitution was completed in October 1995, there were parliamentary elections on June 27, 1996.
  - Coding part one:
    - no

## Uganda 2005

- Description: On July 28, 2005, following international donor pressure, a referendum led to the reintroduction of a multiparty system. Since 1986, President Yoweri Museveni had banned political party activities and created a no-party system called “the Movement.” On January 23, 2003, however, Museveni suggested to his National Executive Committee (NEC) (of the Movement) to open up the country to multiparty politics. In March 2003, the NEC proposed two major constitutional amendments: to lift the ban on political parties and to remove the presidential term limits. Following the 2005 referendum, then, the “Political Parties and Organisations Act” came into existence. Despite the reintroduction of multiparty politics, the two-term limit on the presidency was removed, which allowed Museveni to run again. On February 23, 2006, parliamentary and presidential elections were held.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - no

## Ukraine 1991 (1990)

- Description: Between March 4 and 18, 1990, parliamentary elections took place in which some non-communist candidates, including representatives of the Democratic Bloc, were allowed to participate. On July 16, 1990, the elected parliament adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, but it was not until August 24, 1991 that the Act of Independence was adopted, officially declaring Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union. On December 1, 1991, a referendum and a presidential election took place. Leonid Kravchuk, who had been the chairman of parliament since July 23, 1990, became president. In late March and early April 1994, parliamentary elections were held.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)

## Uzbekistan 1991

- Description: On August 31, 1991, after the failed Moscow coup d’état, Uzbekistan declared independence from the Soviet Union. A few months later, on December 29, the first multi-candidate presidential election was held and Islam Karimov was elected as the president (he had been president of the Uzbek Republic since March 24, 1990). A new constitution was approved in December 1992, which created a smaller parliament. A legislative election occurred on December 25, 1994 (with run-offs on January 8 and 22, 1995). Supreme Soviet elections had previously occurred in 1990, but the two main opposition movements—Unity (“Birlik”), formed in 1988, and Freedom (“Erk”), formed in 1990—were prevented from standing as candidates.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - no

## Venezuela 2005

- Description: Legislative elections occurred on December 4, 2005. In August 2004, Hugo Chávez won a recall election. After this, various reforms were undertaken and intimidation tactics were used to benefit Chávez. For the legislative election, the five largest opposition parties boycotted and only 25 percent of registered voters turned out to vote. Because of all of this, Chávez supporters won all seats in parliament.
  - o Coding part one:

- no

#### Venezuela 2006-2009 (2006)

- Description: In December 2006, President Hugo Chávez was elected for a third term. After his reelection, Chávez instituted a number of reforms, but the primary constitutional change surrounded term limit (this occurred through a citizen referendum). The National Assembly passed a new electoral law in July 2009.
  - o Coding part one:
    - no

#### Yemen 1990

- Description: On May 22, 1990, South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) united with the North (Yemen Arab Republic). With the decline of the Soviet Union, South Yemen had suffered a loss of more than half of its aid from the USSR from 1986-89. Prior to this, South Yemen was an openly communist regime. When Yemen integrated (negotiations for which began in 1988), Ali Abdullah Saleh (of the North) became head of state and Ali Salim al-Beid (of the South) became head of government. A 30-month transitional period for completing unification of the two political and economic systems was set, with claims that the new Republic of Yemen would bring democracy to the Arabian Peninsula. Some aspects of the power-sharing arrangement were formalized, like having the government based for six months of the year in North Yemen and six months in South Yemen, but other aspects were agreed to informally between Saleh and al-Beid. For example, they created a five-person transitional "Presidential Council," with three members from the North and two members from the South. The Presidential Council was jointly elected by the 26-member Yemen Arab Republic advisory council and the 17-member People's Democratic Republic of Yemen presidium. There was a 301-seat provisional unified parliament, called the Chamber of Deputies, with 159 northern members, 111 southern members, and 31 independent members appointed by the chairman of the council (note that South Yemen's legislature was previously elected in 1986 and North Yemen's legislature was previously elected in 1988). In May 1990, a unity constitution was agreed upon. It was ratified by the populace in May 1991. Parliamentary elections occurred on April 27, 1993.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - no (noElec)

#### Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 1991 (1990)

- Description: On July 19, 1990, while still a part of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro introduced multiparty politics with the passing of the "Law on Political Organizations." Along with the other republics, this law enabled the official dismantling of the one-party system in Yugoslavia. Following this action, across Yugoslavia, communists lost power to nationalist parties in the first multiparty elections. In Serbia and Montenegro, elections occurred on December 9, 1990. Yugoslavia subsequently began to break up, with all republics except Serbia and Montenegro proclaiming independence. Because of this, on December 26, 1991, a smaller Federal Republic of Yugoslavia containing only Serbia and Montenegro was proclaimed. On April 27, 1992, the Federal Republic officially came into effect with a new constitution, which provided for parliamentary representation for Serbia (with autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina) and Montenegro. Parliamentary elections were held on May 31, 1992.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)

- yes (NoPriReg)
- yes
- Coding part two:
  - no (NoElec)

### **Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 2000**

- Description: On October 6, 2000, in what is sometimes termed the “Bulldozer Revolution,” massive demonstrations forced President Slobodan Milošević to concede defeat in a televised address. These protests occurred after the presidential elections of September 24, 2000, in which opposition parties accused Milošević of fraud. The first large post-election protest was a strike by coal miners on October 1, followed by a general strike on the next day. It is worth noting, however, that before the election, protests had been occurring for some time. On August 19, 1999, a massive anti-Milošević rally took place; on January 10, 2000, 16 anti-Milosevic parties issued a joint statement calling for early elections. Protests continued in the spring and, by May 2000, spread throughout Serbia, forcing Milošević to schedule elections. After Milošević’s ouster, on October 7, Vojislav Koštunica, who beat Milošević in the first round, was formally inaugurated as president and, on November 4, a new cabinet was sworn in. Parliamentary elections were held in Serbia on December 23, 2000.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - yes (NoPriRul)
    - no

### **Zambia 1991 (1990)**

- Description: On December 17, 1990, President Kenneth Kaunda’s government ended the monopoly of his ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). This action followed a series of events. In March 1990, Kaunda’s government rejected proposals to create a multiparty system. Between June 25 and 29, riots broke out regarding a drastic increase in the price of maize meal. These anti-government riots were against Kaunda, his 16-member cabinet, and the UNIP. On June 30, there was an attempted coup. All of these events increased international pressure on the Kaunda regime. In July 1990, a National Interim Committee for Multiparty Democracy formed in order to draw together the various organized interests in society. This was led by Arthur Wina, Frederick Chiluba, and Vernon Mwaanga. As protests magnified, by September 1990, Kaunda gave in to the opposition’s demand for multiparty elections, but refused to lift the existing state of emergency (which gave him the power to supersede the constitution). On October 8, 1990, Kaunda appointed a 22-member Constitution Commission of Inquiry (the Mvunga Commission), 20 members of which gathered recommendations for the constitution (the other two members boycotted the commission, as did the opposition Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, or MMD). This commission released a report on April 25, 1991. The government released a draft constitution in June 1991, but the newly-legalized main opposition Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) opposed it. Because of this stalemate, on July 24, 1991, a committee of ten delegates—five from UNIP and five from MMD—met to negotiate constitutional changes. The parliament approved the constitution on August 2, Kaunda dissolved the National Assembly on September 4, and elections for parliament and the presidency were held on October 31, 1991. Kaunda left office when Frederick Chiluba was inaugurated as president on November 2, 1991.
  - Coding part one:
    - yes (InvolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - Coding part two:
    - no (NoElec)

- *Alternative coding: TG-permissive*

### **Zambia 1996**

- Description: On November 18, 1996, presidential and legislative elections were held. Earlier, constitutional amendments were passed on May 21, 1996.
  - o Coding part one:
    - no

### **Zambia 2001**

- Description: On December 27, 2001, parliamentary elections were held.
  - o Coding part one:
    - no

### **Zimbabwe 1999**

- Description: In September 1999, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed as a challenge to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). During the 1990s, students and workers had often demonstrated to express disapproval with President Robert Mugabe's rule. In February 2000, the ZANU-PF suffered its first defeat in a constitutional referendum. There was political violence between the constitutional referendum and the general elections, which occurred on June 24 and 25, 2000. Despite the MDC's presence, ZANU-PF won these elections.
  - o Coding part one:
    - no

### **Zimbabwe 2009 (2008)**

- Description: On September 11, 2008, a power-sharing agreement was reached between incumbent President Robert Mugabe and his opponents. Earlier in the year, on March 29, general elections were held. On May 2, following a delay in reporting the results, the presidential election were announced, with a run-off necessary between incumbent Robert Mugabe and his opponent Morgan Tsvangirai. This process stirred up controversy and sparked violence in the lead-up to the presidential run-off of June 27. On June 22, Tsvangirai withdrew and, therefore, Robert Mugabe was reelected, leaving the country in a political stalemate. Following several months of negotiations mediated by South African President Thabo Mbeki, on September 11 2008, the two main parties, Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and two factions of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), signed a power-sharing agreement known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA), which was to last for 18 months. Under this agreement, Robert Mugabe remained president while Morgan Tsvangirai became prime minister. Five months later, in February 2009, a coalition Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed, with 40 ministers and 20 deputy ministers. ZANU-PF had 21 ministers and 10 deputy ministers, Tsvangirai's faction of the MDC had 16 ministers and 10 deputy ministers, and Arthur Mutambara's faction of the MDC had three ministerial portfolios. Though new elections were supposed to be held in 2011, they were postponed and presidential and parliamentary elections were held on July 31, 2013.
  - o Coding part one:
    - yes (VolRef)
    - yes (NoPriReg)
    - yes
  - o Coding part two:
    - yes
  - o Coding part three:
    - no (ElecPlan, PowTran)

## Coding Appendix B: Case-Specific References for Coding Appendix A

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