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An Analysis of Question Particles in Solf Swedish,
with Implications for the Study of Passive Clauses
and the Language of Persuasion

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Abstract

Solf Swedish is a dialect of Swedish spoken in Finland. Although questions in Solf can be formed by the standard Swedish means of subject-predicate inversion, very few questions in the conversational material analyzed for this study relied solely on inversion. Both in WH-questions and in yes-no questions, the Solf speakers make an abundant use of a number of sentence-final pragmatic particles. The most important of these particles are *tå*, *då*, *elå*, and *na*. None of these particles can, however, be regarded as fully grammaticized question particles. Still, a question without a particle is often regarded as an unacceptable way of requesting information or confirmation in an everyday face-to-face interaction.

Question particles in Solf are also analyzed with respect to sociological variables like age and sex, and in a psychological experiment, which measured the amount of aggressiveness, friendliness, and politeness that the use of a particle communicates in a sentence. From a comparison with the use of question particles in Finnish, I suggest a typological difference between languages so that a language either tends to make use of prosodic means, or of particles to form questions. Solf is a borderline case between the two language types.

The question particles in Solf have to be given a prototype definition over their syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic behavior. I suggest the Level Analysis as a general format for the pragmatic analysis of language. Pragmatic aspects of

language are to be seen in relation to the three parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. Pragmatics is distinguished from semantics with reference to the concepts 'implicit' and 'explicit,' respectively. An implicit (i.e. pragmatic) choice is one that the speaker does not have to take responsibility for.

The Level Analysis is illustrated by an analysis of the question particles in Solf, and in brief discussions of the pragmatics of passive constructions, and of persuasive discourse.

Robin T. Lakoff
Charles J. Fillmore

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The work that has led up to the present thesis started more than ten years ago. The direction of my thinking has naturally changed several times over this period of time, but in principle it has been an attempt to find a plausible alternative to the semantics of the philosophy of language, which I came in contact with and studied in the early 1970's. The fact that the present thesis does not have the term 'semantics' in its title, but rather 'pragmatics,' is an indication of the general direction in which my interest has moved.

There are many people who at one point or another have influenced my views over this decade, and thus in effect have also influenced the contents of the final

product. I do not want to imply that I can remember everyone that has been influential for my development, but I am willing to make an attempt.

Nils Erik Enkvist, Geoffrey Phillips, and Håkan Ringbom of the English Department, and Krister Segerberg and Bengt-Olof Qvarnström of the Philosophy Department at Åbo Akademi were all in one way or another responsible for getting me into linguistics in the early 1970's. Other teachers and colleagues at Åbo Akademi that have influenced me later on include Erik Andersson, Bengt Loman, Barbro Wiik, Marketta Sundman, and Brita Wårvik. Other Finnish linguists that definitely need to be mentioned here include Fred Karlsson, Auli Hakulinen, Viljo Kohonen, and Marja Leinonen.

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some of whom I know well, others I have never even met - whose ideas have had an immense influence on my own work; in particular, John Rupert Firth, Benjamin Lee Whorf, Dwight L. Bolinger, William Haas, M.A.K. Halliday, Jef Verschueren, D. Robert Ladd, Kenneth Lee Pike, and Charles F. Hockett.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Problems and aims

In the last decade or so, studies within what used to be known as the hyphenated areas of linguistics have shifted their emphasis from being language-centered to being culture-centered. Whereas the main tendency in the 1960's and early 1970's was to discuss social, psychological, anthropological, rhetorical, and textual issues from the point of view of - and with the methods of - core linguistics (in the structuralist and generative-grammar sense), the tendency today is more and more to see language as a manifestation of the social, psychological, and cultural behavior of human beings. This does not mean that the interest in core linguistics and in core-centered sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics has diminished, nor that there is any greater consensus today about the realm of linguistic science.

The recent and overwhelming interest in language use and in language function which is subsumed under the name **pragmatics** has focused on the points where language in the structural sense meets its context. The bridge between structure and context is already a long way towards being built, and it is therefore somewhat surprising that linguists who start out from a structural perspective often do not consider what context - or, more generally, human behavior - looks like, and what it can offer for linguistic

study.

On a very general level, the aim of this study is to shed some further light on the way social and psychological factors influence human language, or, even more generally, how language and culture interact. To be able to study the interaction between language and culture, we need to have access both to a structural description of the language in question, and to an account of the society and the people living in that society. (Although we cannot in practice separate language from its interaction with the everyday lives of the speakers of that language, we still need to be able to separate the two theoretically and make abstractions which we can refer to at a meta-level.)

Empirically, the foremost aim of the study is to shed some light on one aspect of the grammar of Solf, a dialect of Swedish spoken in Finland. The grammatical aspect to be analyzed is that of question formation. Although I draw on whatever models that fit the data in the tentative analyses in Chapters 2 and 3, I try not to tie the discussion down to any particular linguistic theory or model. Having thus approached question formation from a wide variety of angles, I then embark on a theoretical discussion of what large-scale components, or parameters, a theory of language use would need in order to enable us to talk about all these angles and issues in a coherent manner.

The theoretical aim of the study, then, is to suggest

an approach to pragmatics which starts out from pragmatics itself, from the point of view of human behavior as it is embedded in some culture. But at the same time – from the point of view of discourse itself – the study is an investigation of the textual, interactive, and emotional factors that govern a speaker's linguistic choices in a discourse.

*

The study is primarily done in the empirical tradition of Malinowski – Firth – Ethnography of speaking – Conversational analysis, rather than in the more philosophically oriented speech-acts tradition. But rather than being a critical essay against more formal approaches to pragmatics, the study attempts to constitute a constructive contribution to the disciplines Levinson (1983:279,280-1) mentions in the following passage:

> speech act theory is being currently undermined from the outside by the growth of disciplines concerned with the empirical study of natural language use ...
> For example, questions in actual usage are just too variable and situation-dependent in nature to be captured by any set (or indeed many different sets) of felicity conditions ...

The linguistic problem that will receive most attention in the present study has to do precisely with the general linguistic category of questions. Syntactically, we

generally take for granted that a question can be related to a statement in an obvious and unique manner. Semantically, questions are interrogatives as opposed to declaratives and imperatives. And pragmatically they form a subclass of directives. In principle, a tripartition into the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of questions is reasonable as long as we recognize that concepts like 'question,' 'interrogative,' and 'directive' are abstractions that the linguist uses as his/her tools in attempts to describe particular languages or to find universal linguistic rules. Problems with such analyses do, however, occur when the abstract categories themselves take on empirical status. At that point linguistic data run the risk of being adapted to the linguist's tools, rather than the other way around.

There is no lack of studies showing the potential variety in pragmatic force of a syntactically well-formed question. Questions have also been related to the semantic concepts of epistemicity and modality. It is further well-known that certain languages, like English, rely heavily on the use of certain intonation contours, for instance, in order to indicate that a sentence with statement syntax is to be understood as a question. In all these cases, however, analysts take for granted a grammatically defined category, that of 'questions,' and investigate its behavior. In this way a category can take on empirical status for the analyst.

A category like 'questions' is, however, only a

specific manifestation, or group of manifestations, of human behavior. It has received special status in language and linguistic descriptions because of what we might call 'the written language bias in linguistics,' following Linell (1982). A sentence is seen as a question if it can be so characterized on the basis of its segmental structure or on the basis of a written-down representation of it with a particular punctuation mark. (The question mark can be seen as a conventionalization of the function of intonation in languages that make use of intonation for grammatical purposes.) What such characterizations miss is the global aspect of questions in language. To achieve such a global perspective it is not enough to look at the grammatical category of questions, nor is it enough to relate questions to modality or to the general class of directives. Any particular sentence has to be related to the situation in which it occurs, to the purpose for which it is uttered, and to the effect which it achieves in that situation. Factors like these will determine whether a sentence is to be interpreted as a question or not, in relation to the speaker of that sentence. Thus, if our account of a particular language is to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, it is obvious that we also have to take the speakers of that language into consideration.

Bolinger (1981) has shown that gestures such as raising one's eye-brows and stretching one's hand forward with the palm of the hand upward is just as effective an

indicator that an utterance is a question as is a particular intonation contour. The purpose of this study is not to investigate the interrelationship of gestures and questions, but rather the interaction between questions (in a broad sense) and the behavior of a set of pragmatic particles. Like gestures, pragmatic particles are not taken to have a clearly specifiable propositional content in an utterance. Rather, they relate to aspects in the situational context.

Among the pragmatic particles to be found in Solf there is a subclass which I refer to as question particles. In my analysis of these question particles, I show that they cannot be seen as grammatical question particles, nor can they be regarded as pragmatic particles with no propositional impact. Rather, they form a prototype class of elements, which is not definable in lexical terms, but over syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic features of language. The question particles in Solf defy attempts to be placed within any of the traditional boxes of syntax, semantics, or pragmatics. Rather, they have certain syntactic features in common, features that are traditionally treated in semantic terms, and they have certain pragmatic forces in common. But they form a prototype class in the sense that none of these features are by themselves sufficient or necessary. In effect, the behavior of the question particles in Solf is a manifestation of language as a communicative system, where language is seen as a Gestalt concept,

rather than as a conglomerate of different parts inter-
acting.

But before the analyst can accept the issue as it
is described in the preceding paragraph, the question
particles in Solf forces him/her to explore all other
possible avenues. Such an exploration leads into the
general problem of the realms of pragmatics. And this is
where the second major aim of this study is to be found.
Although pragmatics as a discipline within linguistics is
certainly accepted at present, there is considerable
disagreement as to its core and delimitation. (Cf. Östman
1985.) On the basis of the problems encountered in my
analysis of the question particles in Solf, and the
solutions I propose for these problems, I go on to sketch
up a different approach to pragmatics, and show how this
approach can deal not only with the question particles, but
also with a host of other linguistic phenomena.

The global aim of the study is thus in the last
resort one of delimitation. If we want to make use of the
traditional tripartition into syntax, semantics, and
pragmatics, we also have to discuss whether or not it is
feasible to separate the manifestations of language as
structure and of language as goal-oriented action with
respect to these three components. The resulting picture
that emerges from the different analyses in this study is
presented in the concluding chapter.

*

In the rest of this chapter I set the scene for the present study with a discussion of the realm of pragmatics in more general terms. The chapter also introduces a distinction between explicit and implicit pragmatics.

In Chapters 2, 3, and 4 I give a detailed analysis of question formation in Solf. In particular, I find a division of labor between inversion, prosody, and, most interestingly, the use of a set of pragmatic particles in forming interrogative utterances. The implications of this study for the analysis of questions, and for the study of pragmatic particles is discussed. In Chapter 4 I introduce the pragmatic parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement, and the Level Analysis for analyzing discourse pragmatically. The chapter ends with an application of the Level Analysis to question particles in Solf.

In Chapter 5 I show the feasibility of the theoretical framework of Chapter 4 by applying it to two other areas. On the one hand, I show how one type of language, persuasive discourse, draws on the three parameters of pragmatics, and how each parameter gets manifested in discourse. On the other hand, I take one element of language, passive constructions, and show how they can be used to transmit pragmatic information of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement.

Chapter 6 concludes the study by summarizing my major findings, and by making a tentative suggestion of how the pragmatic parameters, and pragmatics in general, fit into

an overall theory of language.

1.2. Pragmatics

"Pragmatics prior to 1957," says Stephen Levinson (1983:xii), "... was practiced (if in an informal way) without being preached." However, the term 'pragmatics' itself - even within linguistics (or semiotics) - antedates 1957 by several decades. Charles Morris is usually regarded as the one who introduced the term into linguistics, but the connection - of both Morris and the term - to the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James cannot be overlooked.

If we take as our starting point a loose definition of pragmatics as the study of language usage, and/or the function of language in contexts and situations, we will find a great number of practitioners of pragmatics before 1957. In fact, Charles Morris immediately connects us up with the founding father of modern linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure, since it was in an attempt to make explicit de Saussure's science of semiosis that Morris introduced his now famous three-way distinction between syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics.

On the European continent we can go back at least as far as the Stoics, and their 'pre-speech-act' theory of language (cf. Kretzmann 1967, Östman 1979a). But if we keep to somewhat more recent times, we can single out

the sociological writings of Durkheim as a starting point also for sociological and anthropological investigations of language in Europe. In closer connection to modern linguistics the investigations by the members of the Prague Circle and later developments of their work have to be mentioned as forerunners to present-day pragmatics.

As for the development of theories taking into account the use of language in Great Britain, we have to mention at least two parallel approaches. One is the philosophical approach starting with Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, and continuing (although there are difficulties in proving a causal relation here) in the form of ordinary language philosophy, with representatives like Gilbert Ryle, P.F. Strawson, and, in particular, J.L. Austin and his influential How to Do Things with Words. The other source of inspiration for students of the functions of language in Britain came from the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, via J.R. Firth, and leading on to the research of M.A.K. Halliday, and, more recently, to discourse analysts like John Sinclair, Malcolm Coulthard, and David Brazil.

The United States is able to show a long list of empirical linguists that never lost sight of the importance of the context, the situation, even the cultural frameworks that languages always are embedded in. In particular we need to mention Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf – famous among other things for the 'Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis

of Linguistic Relativity.' Other linguists that deserve mentioning in this connection include Charles Hockett, Dwight Bolinger, and the linguists at S.I.L., notably Kenneth Lee Pike and his monumental work Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of Human Behavior. But also outside 'linguistics proper' we find a number of people interested in how people use language. I have in mind sociologists like Gregory Bateson and Erving Goffman; and 'general semanticists' like Alfred Korzybski.

<div align="center">*</div>

During the last fifteen or so years that pragmatics has been more or less an integrated part of language studies we can distinguish two major directions or approaches to the phenomena that have been treated as belonging to the field. One approach, let us call it the 'structural approach,' can be seen as a direct continuation of recent trends in the study of syntax and semantics. This approach was to a large extent based on discussions within philosophy (cf. e.g. Austin 1962, Grice 1975, Searle 1969) and can be said to have an epitome in Gordon & Lakoff 1975. The main characteristics of the structural approach is that it attempts to treat pragmatic matters as phenomena of the same kind as we find elsewhere in the systematicity of language structures. Pragmatics is looked upon as a new box on a par with those of syntax, semantics, and phonology in classical transformational-generative grammar. The same kinds of rules are devised for the explan-

ation of pragmatic phenomena as had been devised for talking about syntactic phenomena.

The other approach, the 'behavioral approach,' starts from the speaker-hearer, from the outside, rather than from the inside of language. Instead of trying, like the structural approach, to base pragmatic investigations on some or other form of classical logic, and to this add on presuppositions and implicatures, interpreted in a logical format, the behavioral approach takes indirect speech acts, correction devices, hedges, and other speech-act qualifiers not as deviations from some underlying logic, but as manifestations of a **different kind** of logic, the logic of 'common sense,' that individuals follow in their daily behavior. In present-day philosophy we talk about the individual as being **coherent** rather than as being logical (cf. Margolis 1984, Ziff 1984).

Research in pragmatics has so far - with a few notable exceptions - mainly been carried out in accordance with the methods of the structural approach. In various places in this study (especially in Chapter 4) I will indicate what a framework for a more behavioral approach to pragmatics might look like.

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In terms of the three correlates (sign vehicle, designatum, interpreter) of the triadic relation of semiosis, a number of other dyadic relations may be abstracted for study. One may study the relations of

signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable. This relation will be called **the semantical dimension of semiosis,** ... ; the study of this dimension will be called **semantics.** Or the subject of study may be the relation of signs to interpreters. This relation will be called **the pragmatical dimension of semiosis,** ... , and the study of this dimension will be named **pragmatics.**

One important relation of signs has not yet been introduced: the formal relation of signs to one another. ... This third dimension will be called **the syntactical dimension of semiosis,** ..., and the study of this dimension will be named **syntactics.**

(Morris 1938:84-5)

Based on the definition set down by Morris in the quotation above, it has been customary to talk about syntax as the relation of one sign to another, of semantics as the relation between a sign and what it stands for, an 'object,' and of pragmatics as the relation between a sign and the user of that sign. Such a characterization seems somewhat oversimplified, and it seems more profitable to say instead that syntax should indeed deal **primarily** with **form,** but it should do this **in relation to** meaning and use; similarly, **semantics** should deal primarily with **meaning,** but in relation to form and use; and **pragmatics** should deal primarily with **use,** but in relation to form and meaning. (Cf. also Fillmore 1974.)

That is, if there are things in human languages that can be said to have no relation to anything else than the particular form the unit (phrase, sentence, text) has, then such phenomena are part of syntax[1] par excellence; but it should also be the task of syntax to account for how the particular forms relate to their 'potential' meaning(s) and 'actual' use. At least, syntax should indicate that such relations exist. The same applies to semantics: it should not only deal with propositional meanings, and their relation to form. And pragmatics cannot be seen solely as a relation between form/sign and user; the prototypical meanings associated with the forms have to be taken into account when we explicate language use.

We need to remind ourselves of the fact that these sub-areas of linguistic research that we call syntax, semantics, and pragmatics are to a large extent creations of the linguist. They are abstractions with strict border-lines, whereas in **language** there are no such borderlines. (Cf. also Firth 1950, 1951, Silverstein 1979.) Consequently, there are – in ordinary language – no areas that can be separated out and investigated **only** of and in themselves, without reference to the whole of the system of human language.

*

Even though the quotation from Morris 1938 above is the one most often referred to in discussions of the roots of linguistic pragmatics, Morris himself clearly

had a view of pragmatics that goes beyond a straightforward interpretation of the sign - user relationship. Compare the following excerpt.

> Since most, if not all, signs have as their interpreters living organisms, it is a sufficiently accurate characterization of pragmatics to say that it deals with the biotic aspects of semiosis, that is, with all the psychological, biological, and sociological phenomena which occur in the functioning of signs.

(Morris 1938:108)

And a couple of pages later - in a discussion of pragmatic and other rules - we find the following statement.

> Any rule when actually in use operates as a type of behavior, and in this sense there is a pragmatical component in all rules. But in some languages there are sign vehicles governed by rules over and above any syntactical and semantical rules which may govern those sign vehicles, and such rules are pragmatical rules. Interjections such as 'Oh!,' commands such as 'Come here!,' value terms such as 'fortunately,' expressions such as 'Good morning!,' and various rhetorical and poetical devices occur only under certain definite conditions in the users of the language; ...

(Morris 1938:113)[2]

In other words, when Morris talks about pragmatics and the user, he does not think of the user **in vacuo**; he realizes that for a language user to be able to interpret language, s/he needs to make constant reference to his/her prior experience in life, and to the whole of the situation surrounding him/her at a given point in time.

Pragmatics thus becomes the study of language (form and content) in relation to the whole of the speaker-hearer; where the speaker-hearer represents not only him/herself as a person, but also as the result of a cultural development (i.e. his/her psychological, biological, and sociological background).

Levinson (1983:7) seems to imply that sociological, psychological and cultural aspects cannot be the concern of pragmatics, since these fields are already covered by sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics. Against this I would argue that we need to be able to talk about psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic phenomena in language not as epiphenomena that are half linguistic and half something else, **but rather as** aspects of linguistic study par excellence. That is, we need a larger framework for psychological, sociological and cultural aspects of language; and this framework is what pragmatics should be able to offer to us.

*

Following Morris 1938, I define pragmatics as the study of language (form and content) in relation to

language users, where 'language users' not only stands
for individuals as biological beings, but also for in-
dividuals as part of their culture (including their
psychological make up, sociological background, and the
specific context in which a communicative act is carried
out). Pragmatics accounts for these aspects to the extent
they influence language use. (In the following section
(1.3.), in Chapter 4, and in the concluding Chapter of this
study I will specify in more detail how I define pragmatics
theoretically, what its internal characteristics are, and
what its relation is to other linguistic components.)

1.3. Implicitness

The major problem for the pragmaticist is that s/he
is up against the everyday things around him/her that have
always been there. For sure, linguists need to be able to
talk about these things in more specific terms, but it is
not a matter of discovering a completely new object that
can be placed under a microscope.

The first point I would like to make for the char-
acterization of pragmatics more in detail is that we have
to start from **within** pragmatics itself, and look at
language through the features of our socio-cultural
environment. The factors that characterize pragmatics do
so in a **pragmatic perspective.** Taking Morris's large-scale
view of pragmatics (cf. 1.2.) as my starting point, I

relate pragmatics to the speaker-hearer, in particular, to the individual in relation to the world of other individuals that surround him/her. In the last resort, this means that pragmatics deals with culture. (Cf. Chapter 4.)

My second major point involves drawing a distinction between what I call **explicit** and **implicit** in pragmatics. If pragmatics is viewed in general terms as making reference to context, explicit reference to context would include truth-functional aspects of pragmatics, propositionally relevant aspects of pragmatics, and spatio-temporal reference. Implicit reference to context would be references to language use that are not covered by these.

The truth-functional and propositionally relevant aspects of a message are straightforward in that they are to be dealt with in a theory of semantics, or alternatively, as lying on the borderline between semantics and pragmatics.[3] The distinction in terms of spatio-temporality can best be illustrated from the area of deixis. If I say I am here now., all the elements of my utterance are obligatory from a propositional point of view. And in this respect deixis - although interpretation of deictic elements requires reference to the on-going context - deals with explicitly anchoring an utterance to a situation. And in this sense, too, deixis is just as much part of semantics as it is part of pragmatics.

If, on the other hand, I say Well, y'know, I'm here now., the initial elements of my utterance do not anchor

my utterance directly and explicitly to an on-going situational context. Rather, I have certain attitudes about the context I am in, and with particles like <u>well</u> and <u>y'know</u> I can reveal these attitudes. The spatio-temporal context becomes one step removed: the particles do not qualify the propositional content of my utterance as such, but aspects of the interaction itself. Furthermore, from a propositional point of view, <u>well</u> and <u>y'know</u> are not obligatory elements of utterances. I would thus say that such particles **implicitly** anchor an utterance to (attitudes and feelings about) a context of situation.

In general, some aspects of a message are explicitly communicated and accepted by addressees at face value, whereas others are implicitly transmitted, and only potentially acknowledged by addressees. Austin (1962) in fact argues that implicit performatives (expressed with intonation, particles, etc.) are primary in language, and explicit performatives (expressed with first person singular, present indicative of verb, and <u>hereby</u>) are secondary. But for a linguist, an implicit performative also has to be expressible in some way. In this study, the expressibility of implicit pragmatic characteristics of a message is in terms of the three parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement, which will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 4.

A useful rule of thumb for distinguishing between the explicit and the implicit in a message is the follow-

ing: if you can be held **responsible** for what you have said (or done) - ultimately: in a court of law - then you have said it (or done it) explicitly. So, if I use the conventional non-verbal gesture of bending my fore-finger repeatedly, preferably holding my hand in an almost upright, vertical position, and, preferably also holding the other fingers in a fist-like manner; and if I with that gesture manage to direct the attention of somebody else, then I have EXPLICITLY asked that person to approach me. And if a witness is asked in a court of law whether I asked that person to approach me, the witness can truthfully reply that I did so.

If, however, I use another non-verbal gesture, which is not as conventional (we are, of course, moving on a scale of explicit --- implicit[4]), say, I move both of my eyes rapidly upward to the left, and accompany the movement with a barely noticeable head-movement in the same direction, perhaps also contracting my eye-brows slightly. With this gesture I might succeed in getting the person this is directed toward, to approach me. However, a witness in court cannot (or should not) swear that I called upon that person. The witness can, of course, infer that this is what I tried to communicate, but the IMPLICITNESS of my gesture should be obvious.

If X says to Y: <u>You're a s-o-b!</u>, Y can take X to court. X has explicitly said something mean about Y, and he can be charged with slander. However, if X says to

Y: <u>You're just like my mother!</u>, Y will have a great deal more problems proving to a jury that this is necessarily an offence. Of course, Y probably had every good reason for taking X to court, but if X admits in court that he said that Y was just like his mother, the tone of voice has probably changed, a witness can probably not exactly repeat the tone of voice used, and the situation in court is a very different one. (I take for granted that the mother does not have a reputation equal to that of the Boston strangler.) In this case, then, I would say that X IMPLICITLY offends Y.

<center>*</center>

The distinction between explicit and implicit is close to that made by Leech (1983:24-7) in terms of conventional vs. non-conventional, respectively. Roughly, conventional means arbitrary in the de Saussurean sense: the sense is deducible from the rules of grammar. The pragmatic force, however, is non-conventional and arrived at by means of motivated principles in terms of conversational goals.

However, Leech (1983:34-5) argues that pragmatic analysis should be concerned only with "the meaning that is publicly available for interpretation," and that the force and meaning of an utterance have to be recognized by the addressee. In opposition to this, my approach also takes into account the perspective of the speaker in an interaction, and argues that even meanings that are recognized

only by the analyst (and not necessarily by the addressee) should be treated by pragmatics. Thus, as I will argue in Chapter 5, often if the force of a piece of persuasive discourse is recognized as persuasive language by the addressee, its effect on the addressee will diminish - if not completely be absent.

Stressing the implicitness of pragmatics does not, however, mean that the pragmatic forces are to be seen as completely indeterminate. It is precisely the task of the pragmaticist to work out the implicit conversational principles by means of linguistic reasoning. As Grice (1975:50) argued in discussing similar issues, "the presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out." But we need to account for such implicatures in general terms. Grice's general Cooperative Principle is as valuable as ever, and his discussion of the maxims shows that conversational principles have to be taken into account, but the maxims do not circumscribe a coherent general framework of how conversation should be described. (Cf. e.g. Levinson's 1983 discussion of the Manner maxims as being different from the others, in that they are detachable (p.116-7) and refer to surface structure (p.122) rather than to the semantic representation.)

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The explicit-implicit distinction is not the same as that between intentional and unintentional. Both of these distinctions are, however, scalar. For instance,

it is difficult to say off hand whether Freudian slips are to be regarded as intentionally communicated messages, or not. Similarly, as regards implicitness, it is most probable that things (messages, behavioral patterns, etc.) that are implicit today may be explicit tomorrow. (Cf. the discussion of question particles in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.) Thus, the non-verbal, implicit gesture that I discussed above may become conventional. Or, certain pragmatic particles might for instance get the status of honorifics. Or implicit means of addressing people (e.g. address avoidance) might become conventionalized.

But whereas intention has more to do with the **source** (i.e. the emitter) of a message, explicit and implicit have to do with responsibility **between** human beings.

When Levinson (1983:11) argues that "... for a feature of the context to be linguistically encoded, (a) it must be intentionally communicated, ..." this does not mean that the feature has to be explicitly encoded. Levinson, I think, confuses intentionality and explicitness when he says (1983:11,fn.8):

> Consider e.g. the French _Je suis malheureuse_, which encodes that the speaker is female: in what sense would this be _intentionally_ communicated?

My answer would be: in the sense of it being intentionally, but implicitly communicated. It can be seen as to (at least) **some extent** intentional, because the alternative

choice, the possibility for women to use the masculine ending (<u>malheureux</u>) is also available, and, what is more, used. But since this latter choice actually results in an 'ungrammatical' sentence, it is likely that it is produced more consciously, and intentionally - perhaps precisely in order not to keep up the implied sex distinction.

I do not here want to go into a detailed discussion of the extent to which a communicative act has to be intentional in order to warrant linguistic analysis. In general, I hold that intentionality is a gradient concept, and that there are bridge-like - be they Freudian or whatever - phenomena that cannot be regarded as clearly intentional or unintentional. When we come to investigate ordinary language, and language usage, it is less clear than in semantics at what level of consciousness a particular choice is made.[5] Especially within what I have here characterized as implicit pragmatics, intentionality is a moot point. Not only in the sense that the speakers themselves do not always know what their intentions are, but also because they would probably not be ready to accept that their intentions shine through as often as a pragmatist would have it. For instance, if a speaker uses <u>you know</u> or <u>anyway</u> in an utterance, s/he is usually not him/herself aware of this. And thus cannot either be aware that s/he is transmitting some information by uttering the particles.

As always, however, if somebody (say, a non-native speaker or a child) does not know how to use pragmatic particles like <u>you know</u> and <u>anyway</u> appropriately, it is the extent to which s/he otherwise sounds native-like that will be taken as basis for judgements as regards his/her conformity with the pragmatics of the language. Thus, in such cases, the **effect** of using a construction or element - rather than the speaker's intentions - might well be decisive both for the linguist-pragmatist as analyst, and also for the speaker's addressee and audience. This also applies to a speaker whose intentions are blurred (from him/herself) by too much vodka. We still treat his/her speech as mirroring his/her intentions until we realize that s/he is drunk (in the same way as we take a foreigner's speech at face value, as being in accordance with the norm, until we realize that s/he is a foreigner). In general, then, we have to work on the assumption that what the speaker said, or what we can infer from it, was intended - at some level of consciousness. And I see it as the goal of linguistics to explicate meaning at all levels. (For further discussions of related issues, see Chapter 4.)

*

This, then, is the IMPLICITNESS of pragmatics.[6] An implicit choice is defined as a linguistic choice that the speaker in principle can deny that s/he has made. The speaker is not (or does not think that s/he is) to be held

responsible for his/her choice in, say, a court of law. An utterance can be given a truth-conditional meaning only with respect to the explicit choices it manifests.[7] Implicitness goes beyond literal meaning, and accounts for non-truth conditional aspects in language. Implicitness covers what is generally known as presuppositions and implicatures, but it goes beyond the field that these concepts denote, and it does not start from a formal definition of these concepts. In particular, implicitness also covers aspects of speakers' attitudes and emotions, as well as the (even non-intentional) effect an utterance has on the addressee.

Finally, I can see Levinson's (1983:281,fn.25) anxiety that "there is a significant danger" if appeal is "made to implicit aspects of context before the full significance of explicit aspects of context ... have been taken properly into account." It seems to me, however, that since explicit aspects might be argued to be (at least very close to) semantic in nature - especially in non-truth-conditional theories of semantics - we should precisely because of this try to develop implicit pragmatics, in order to get a clearer picture of where to draw the optimal line between semantics and pragmatics.

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In Chapter 4 I will deal with the parameters that I regard as constitutive of the implicit aspect of pragmatics. Before I do that, however, I will - starting with

Chapter 2 - undertake an analysis of a restricted area in one language - question formation in Solf - in order to show the kinds of problems that pragmatic research has to be able to handle. At the end of Chapter 4 I will then show how the parameters of implicit pragmatics give an adequate description of the phenomena encountered in my analysis of question formation in Solf.

Footnotes to Chapter 1.

[1] In subsequent chapters I use the more general term **struc-
ture** instead of 'syntax' to refer to form in language.

[2] Morris's qualification 'some languages' is probably
defendable if we not only think of natural languages like
English and Swedish, but also of artificial, mathematic-
ally-based languages. I assume that there are 'pragmatical
rules' in all **natural** languages.

[3] In fact, I am not sure that we need to make a distinction
between explicit pragmatics and semantics. That is, if
an element (for instance, a linguistic sign) is used (in-
tentionally and) explicitly (in the sense discussed here),
it automatically (providing other speakers understand
it) gets the status of a cognitive abstraction, a con-
ventional element in the language. Hence, it gets a place
in the cognitive pattern of speakers; hence, it is part
of semantics. (In this connection, cf. also Fillmore
1985.)

Notice that this view is in direct opposition to
Carnap's suggestion that an investigation is to be as-
signed to the field of pragmatics if it makes explicit
reference to the language user (cf. Levinson 1983:2-3).
Grice's (1957) concept of communication in terms of
meaning-nn also relies on explicitness: S intends to cause
H to do X, by getting H to recognize that S tries to cause

that action.

[4]Compare in this connection Levinson's (1983:163-5) discussion of redundancy constraints in language, and his discussion of the historical development of address terms, from conveying particularized, to conveying generalized, and in the last instance, to conveying conventional implicatures.

[5]In terms of the distinction between explicit and implicit, we might argue that explicitness has to do with aspects of language that a speaker can have in focus in his/her consciousness (cf. Chafe 1980), and that implicitness has to do with aspects of language that are consciously peripheral. Even though both the structural rules and the pragmatic principles in language are unconscious, both are conventional to some extent - otherwise communication would not work (as it does not always do, due precisely to one speaker's lack of knowledge of the relevant principles). But whereas the former have been taught at school, and have thereby been made conscious, the pragmatic principles are implicitly conventional.

[6]To a large extent what I have called 'implicit' in this section is what Nichols 1984 calls 'indexical.' However, whereas indexical in her trichotomy is non-volitional, I see implicitness as a more dynamic notion.

[7]This does not mean that it is impossible to state one's understanding of an utterance in truth-conditional terms,

even though (part of) this understanding might derive from implicit aspects of the utterance. This, however, is a process one step removed from what is generally talked about in truth-functional semantics.

CHAPTER 2: QUESTION PARTICLES IN SOLF - PRELIMINARY ANALYSES

2.1. Introduction

The typical way to think of the use or function of language in relation to its structure and meaning is to take the structure and meaning for granted as communicative means, and then investigate how these means are used in a context. Up to a certain point this is also no doubt a feasible way to approach language and language usage. However, language is, of course, not made up of components (like structure, meaning, and function) that interact, language simply is. The components are abstractions that the linguist investigates, they are parts of a whole that do not necessarily make up that whole when they - as abstractions - are put together again to depict language. The linguist knows this, but he also knows that to be able to make any progress in the field, abstractions have to be made.

The use or function of language is not merely an application to a situational context of a ready-made system. This process of application in itself creates meanings, and even structures. (A sentence with a truth-functional meaning A in one context might get a different meaning in context B; a context may require, say, a marked word order of a sentence, instead of the neutral order, for the sentence to be effective.) But context does not only

have the power to change the meaning or structure of a sentence. The very process of using a sentence in a context typically requires the speaker to use certain accompanying communication features that have no propositional or truth-functional meaning. Such features are felt to be needed for pragmatic reasons. The speaker might want to specify his/her feelings, or how s/he wants the addressee to take the message, and so on. Typical examples of this category of communicative means are to be found in the area of non-verbal communication: gestures, proxemics, tone of voice, etc. But there are also verbal elements that have the same function. The prime examples of these are the **pragmatic particles.**

Pragmatic particles like <u>well</u> and <u>you know</u> are usually argued not to have any semantic content, but only a pragmatic function. (Cf. for instance R. Lakoff 1972, Östman 1981a, 1982a, Levinson 1983.) Pragmatic particles are usually distinguished from clearly grammatical, or semantic, particles, for instance question particles, or focus particles (like <u>only</u> and <u>also</u>). However, this distinction into semantic particles and pragmatic particles has to be seen as what it is: a linguistic abstraction.

In the following I want to show how the distinction between semantics and pragmatics gets blurred in the area of question formation in Solf. (For similar arguments with respect to the area of deixis in Finnish, see Östman forthcoming b.) The exposition begins with an analysis of

the syntactic and semantic conditions under which a number
of particles are used in Solf, and goes on to investigate
the sociolinguistic and psychological/psycholinguistic con-
straints on their usage. This variety of analyses and
discussions results in a number of important implica-
tions. On the basis of these implications I then suggest a
format for dealing with pragmatics in general, in Chapter
4.

2.2. Preliminaries and the data

Solf is a dialect of Finland Swedish that is spoken
in the village of Solf, near the west coast of central
Finland (south of the town of Vasa).

Data for the present analysis consist of tape
recordings (4 hrs, 10 min.) of dinner-table conversations
in Solf. The conversations were taped around Christmas
1979, and in the summer of 1980. Since I am myself a native
speaker of Solf, I have naturally also used introspection -
especially when I have wanted to present minimal pairs of
utterances.

The linguistic area that I want to investigate in
Solf is that of directives in the sense of Searle 1976. In
particular, I will focus on requests and questions. In
general terms, directives are attempts by the speaker to
get the addressee to do something. But such attempts can be
dressed in a variety of linguistic forms. For the present

purpose it is useful to think of requests and questions not only in terms of requesting information (or action), but also in terms of different degrees (explicit and implicit) of requesting confirmation. A scale of information requesting can be seen as having as one of its end poles a category of 'Explicit Request for New Information.' The speaker wants to know something s/he does not already have knowledge of. WH-questions are closer to this Request-for-new-information pole than 'yes-no' (y/n) questions, since by using a WH-question the speaker does not give ready made options (as is the case in y/n questions).

The other end pole of this abstracted, gradient scale of requests can be seen as being close to an ordinary statement, and Request-for-Confirmation can be seen as a fairly discrete point somewhere in the middle of the scale. This set-up can be represented as in Figure 2.1., with tags exemplifying the Request-for Confirmation point, and you know being an example of a more delicate (i.e. implicit) way of requesting information without actually requesting it (cf. Östman 1981a).

```
Implicit              Request for              Explicit
request for           confirmation             request
acceptance of                                  for new
utterance    X————————————X————————————X       information
             you know      tags      y/n  WH
```

Figure 2.1. The relation of explicit and implicit requests as displayed on a gradient scale.

By viewing all types of questions and requests from this more functional, or pragmatic, perspective, we do not have to make either-or decisions a priori of what is a question and what is not. Consequently, in this study, the term 'question formation' is interpreted interactionally. This is, of course, also the basis for languages needing a question category in the first place.

In this and the following chapter I will discuss a number of pragmatic particles in Solf whose functions can be related to each other as points on the scale of Figure 2.1.. I will even show that some of these particles are almost grammatical question particles.

Question formation in standard Swedish is similar to that in English, except that it is simpler in not needing anything comparable to the English do-support. Y/n questions are formed by inversion of Subject (NP_1) and tense-carrying verb. WH-questions are formed by fronting the questioned constituent as a WH-word, and inversion of the Subject (NP_1) and the tense-carrying verb. (For details on structural aspects of question formation in standard Swedish, see Andersson 1977, Platzack 1982, and Engdahl 1985.) Furthermore, Swedish can use variations in pitch alone, to indicate that an utterance is a question rather than a statement. The general characteristic of question intonation in Swedish is higher pitch somewhere in the latter part of the sentence. (For details on intonation in standard Swedish, see Hadding-Koch 1961, Johansson 1978,

and Gårding 1979.)

The present data included 643 instances of what I refer to as requests on the scale of Figure 2.1.. Of these requests, 122 were pure y/n questions, and 85 were pure WH-questions. 'Pure' here means that inversion, and WH-word plus inversion, respectively, indicated that the utterance was a question (cf., however, below). Together these 207 instances make up 32.1% of the total number of questions. Furthermore, there were 25 questions in the data which were questions by virtue of their prosody alone. Added to the 207, all these together make up 232 instances, or 36%, of the total number of questions and requests in the data. Thus, to oversimplify slightly, we can say that about one third of the questions in the data from Solf are wholly within the domain of the grammatical system of standard Swedish. In the following, I will pay little attention to the questions in my data that were formed by these 'normal' means.

2.3. Linguistic analyses and observations

The syntactic rules for the formation of y/n and WH-questions in Solf are similar to those of standard Swedish. Y/n questions are formed by inversion of subject (NP_1) and tense-carrying verb, as exemplified in (1) and (2). (The most important specific notations used in the transcriptions of the examples are given in the Appendix.)

(1) Liisa mååχa   in taavχo ---> Mååχa   Liisa in taavχo?
    Lisa painted a picture   painted Lisa a picture
    'Lisa painted a picture ---> Did Lisa paint a picture?'

(2) Kalle a   lejkt me   possle sett
    Kalle has played with puzzle his
    'Kalle has played with his jigsaw puzzle'
    ---> A   Kalle lejkt me   possle sett?
         has kalle played with puzzle his
         'Has Kalle played with his puzzle?'

Non-Subject WH-questions are formed by fronting the

questioned constituent, and inversion of subject (NP$_1$) and

tense-carrying verb:

(3) Dö boor najnstans ---> Vann boor dö?
    you live somewhere   where live you
    'You live somewhere ---> Where do you live?'

(4) Kalle a   gaaji hejm (för   an va ₰yyk)
    Kalle has gone home because he was ill
    'Kalle has gone home (because he was ill)'
    ---> Vaför <or: Fövaa> a   Kalle gaaji hejm?
         why   why   has Kalle gone home
         'Why has Kalle gone home?'

Subject WH-questions simply put <u>vem</u> in the place of NP$_1$.

(5) Najn   a   riita i böökren miin
    someone has drawn in books   mine
    'Someone has written in my books'
    ---> Vem a   riita i böökren miin?
         who has drawn in books   mine
         'Who has written in my books?'

Further syntactic and semantic characteristics of

question formation in Solf will be dealt with in sections

to come. Note in particular the discussion of <u>åm</u>-construc-

tions in 3.2., and the discussion of different kinds of

clefts and topicalizations in section 3.3.1..

2.3.1. The question particles

There are four particles which together seem to be covering a large area of the scale of requests and questions in Figure 2.1.. These are tå, då, elå, and na. But each of these particles has its particular characteristics, and thus they cannot be used interchangeably in all contexts. For convenience, I will henceforth refer to these particles as question particles.

Since there are hardly any published linguistic discussions relating to Solf, the pragmatic particles in Solf have, of course, not been studied either. But there are some studies on particles in standard Swedish. However, in contrast to the epistemic probability particles (in Solf: no, vel and fol), the relevance particle (jo in Solf), and the emphatic particle (noo in Solf), many of the question particles have not been widely recognized as particles, especially not as question particles. One reason for this is probably that three of the question particles have homonyms with clear lexico-semantic meanings.[1] The particle elå is - for the native speaker - definitely 'the same word' as the lexical conjunction elå, 'or,' na will no doubt be connected with na, 'something,' and tå with tå, 'when, then.'

In the following I will mention each of the question particles in turn, and discuss their syntactic and semantic peculiarities. I will also be concerned with a number of pragmatic issues when I discuss contextual restrictions

for each particle. At this stage, however, the pragmatic analysis will not be systematic as such, but rather indicative of the direction the discussion will be moving in, in subsequent chapters.

2.3.2. Tå and då.

The particle då in Solf is cognate to the homophonous temporal conjunction då 'when, then,' the temporal adverb då 'then,' and the pragmatic particle då in standard Swedish. The temporal conjunction and adverb are realized as tå in Solf, but Solf also has a pragmatic particle tå.

Andersson (1976:34-5) notes that the particle då in standard Swedish has a 'very unclear meaning' in examples like (1).

(1) Hade du några pengar kvar, då?
    had you any money left då
    'So, did you have any money left?'

In his paper, Andersson briefly discusses what he regards as two particles: då and då då. My analysis of these, however, suggests that the first då of då då should be regarded as a temporal adverb. In standard Swedish, the first då of då då has a long vowel. Since vowel length and stress tend to go together in Swedish, and since pragmatic particles tend not to be stressed, the vowel length of då at least suggests the possibility that då is a lexically specifiable word. The main argument in favor of treating the first då of då då as a temporal adverb is, however,

that it can be substituted for by nu, 'now.' Thus, for past and future situations you can say (2) and (3), but for a situation in the present you would say (4), with nu då, instead of då då.

(2) Skulle du   ha   köpt   en ny bil då då?
    should you have bought a new car då då
    'So, would you have bought a new car then?'

(3) Skall du köpa en ny bil då då?
    shall you buy a new car då då
    'So, are you going to buy a new car then?'

(4) Skall du köpa en ny bil nu då?
    shall you buy a new car nu då
    'So, are you going to buy a new car now (then)?'

The distribution of tå and då in Solf and standard Swedish is given below. (Note that there is no phonological rule of the form t --> d/V_V in Solf.)

	Standard Swedish	Solf
particle	då	då, tå
temporal	då	tå
conj/adv		
combination	då då	tå då

Table 2.1. The distribution of the particles tå and då in Solf and the corresponding forms in standard Swedish.

Thus, we note that in Solf the stressed (or stressable) form has been lexicalized as the t-form. (A similar difference between the use of t- and d- forms can be found in the personal pronouns: we find the form tö (or even töög) for stressed, and dö for unstressed occurrences in the second person singular.) The lexicalization of the tå-form - rather than of the då-form - is in accordance

with what has been argued to be a universal rule: pragmatic particles tend to be prosodically cliticized to some other, lexical word in a sentence. (Cf. for instance Arndt 1960, Kriwonossow 1977, Weydt 1969, Zwicky 1977.) Since it is fairly obviuos that historically tå and då originate in the same form (cf. standard Swedish då, and the old Swedish (and old English) particle(s) þa and þa þa), this argument would, however, force us to conclude that tå is to be used when it itself receives some stress (i.e. when it has a clear semantic meaning), and då when the word (or words) preceding it (the word to which it is prosodically clit- icized) is stressed. As we see from the situation in Solf, however, the relation between stress and particles is not one of bi-directional implication: we also find tå as a pragmatic particle. This is a clear indication that the universal rule is only a tendency. Not all prosodically cliticized elements in language are pragmatic particles, nor are all pragmatic particles necessarily subordinated to some other word prosodically. (This is even more obvious in English, where particles like well and you know can make up tone units by themselves, and carry nuclear tones.)

In the present data there were 124 request utterances which contained one or both of the particles tå and då. This figure is greater than the number of 'pure' instances of WH-questions and it is also greater than the number of 'pure' instances of y/n questions. This in itself hints at the importance of tå and då for question formation in Solf.

2.3.2.1. Tå

In very general terms, the particle tå can be compared to the use of then in English in utterances like This, then, is my suggestion.

In the preceding sub-section I implied that the particle tå (as opposed to då), can receive stress. This state of affairs actually makes it extremely difficult in many cases to know whether tå is used as a pragmatic particle, or as a temporal adverb or temporal conjunction.

The temporal adverb tå specifies the time referred to as non-present. It can be used both for past and future time, and stands in opposition to nö 'now.' (Cf. the discussion of examples (2 - 4) in standard Swedish above.) In some of its occurrences, the particle tå retains some of these temporal (i.e. non-present) characteristics. In utterances (5) and (6) tå can be interpreted as having this dual function of being a particle, but still retaining some of its temporal meaning.

(5) Faar di   bara neer ije tå å   dää   me   jemt
    go   they only down here tå and there with equal
                                        (+M SOL80-J08-1)
    'Do they just go down here, then, and that's it?'

(6) Ska   vi let dom   va ti in aaron gaang tå å   gaa
    shall we let them be to an other time tå and go
                                        (+F SOL80-J08-1)
    'Shall we then just leave them for another time, and
    go?'

When tå is used utterance finally it functions as a question particle. In examples (7) and (8) tå is used utterance finally together with subject-verb inversion, and

in examples (9 - 11), again utterance finally, we find tå as a question indicator without any accompanying subject-predicate inversion. That is, in these latter cases it is only the particle tå itself that indicates that the utterance is a question, or a request for confirmation. (As regards the use of the particle visst, cf. example (10), see 2.3.5.c.)

(7) Jer ede vyy yvi ede hejla altihoopa tå
    is that view over that whole everything tå
                                        (+F SOL80-J08-2)
    'Is that a view of all of it (then)?'

(8) Jaanå je int e tiide ååt he tå
    yes-nå is not it there to it tå   (+M ORI79-J03-2)
    'So, isn't it in that direction?'

(9) E i fråån fↄyyje   tå
    it is from aeroplane tå   (+F SOL80-J08-1)
    'It's from the plane (then)?'

(10) Ni va täär fↄejra dagar tå visst
     you were there several days tå visst
                                    (+F SOL80-J08-2)
     'You were there several days, weren't you?'

(11) Men sedan tå
     but later tå   (+F ORI79-J03-2)
     'But what then?'

The request made in an utterance with tå is a request for further information about the topic that is being talked about. Tå cannot easily be used in a question that introduces a new topic. (Notice that in all the examples given above pronouns (di, dom), or deictic elements (ede, tiide, täär, sedan) are used to refer to something given.) This characteristic of tå is best illustrated by reference to its behavior with WH-words. A simple WH-word like va(a) 'what,' vann 'where,' vart 'where-to,' vadan 'where from,'

vem 'who,' etc. would be used in situations where you ask for a repetition of what the other speaker has just said (or some part of his/her utterance). If you want more information than what the speaker has already given, or if you want him/her to spell out some of the things that s/he has presupposed, you add the particle tå after the WH-word: vaa tå, vem tå, etc. Thus, in an interaction like the following, a simple Vaa? would not be enough – in fact, it would most likely result in a mere repetition of the question.

(12) A: Fösöök jiss va   ja a   tχööft idaa
        try   guess what I have bought today
        'Try to guess what I have bought today'
     B: Vaa tå?
        what tå
        '(No,) what?'

2.3.2.2. Då

Då cannot easily be related to the temporal adverb and conjunction tå, nor can it directly be related to the particle tå, except in the sense that both can be used utterance finally to indicate that an utterance is a question or a request.

In one sense, tå and då are opposites, since då can be used in an utterance that introduces a new topic. The possibility of introducing a new topic is not, however, the major function of då, but a consequence of its more general function of suggesting that what is said is in some sense in opposition to, contrary to, or simply in contrast to,

the preceding verbal cotext or non-verbal situational context. This is a particularly prominent feature of då when it is used in y/n questions. The examples below are given short specifications about the relevant situational context. Example (13) also shows that då does not necessarily introduce a new topic.

(13) A: Laa int ja na ja
      put not I any I
      'Didn't I put any?'
      Laa ja såkre ja
      put I sugar I
      'Did I put sugar?'
   B: Legg mejr   (-M)
      put more
      'Put more'
   A: A ja lakt då
      have I put då   (+M SOL80-J09-1)
      'Have I already put, then?'
   B: £jyy   (-M)
      yes
      'Yes'
/the speaker cannot remember whether he had put sugar in his coffee or not; his interlocutor suggests that he has/

(14) Jaa -- saa int vi he då
    yes   said not we it då   (-M SOL80-J09-1)
    'Oh yes, didn't we say that?'
    /surprised comment in response to what the previous speaker had just said/

(15) A   dö leest tejde Agaata Kristi   böökren na enn
    have you read those Agatha Christie books   na yet
   då
   då   (-M SOL80-J09-2)
   'So, have you read those Agatha Christie books yet?'
   /an ironic comment; S (the speaker) has lent some books to A (the addressee), and S feels that A has kept them too long/

(16) Nee -- syns   ni å tåår då
    no   are-seen you too there då (+F SOL80-J08-2)
    'No, can you be seen there, too?'
    /a remark contrary to expectation/

(17) Språåt∅e då
     language då   (-M SOL80-JO11-1)
     'Do you mean the language?'
     /the speaker is not sure that he understood what was
     said. Different people were discussed; the speaker of
     (17) thought that he was asked about what differences
     there are between Americans and Englishmen, but
     finding that this was an irrelevant question in the
     particular context, he suggests - rightly - another
     interpretation by asking (17)/

In a y/n question, tå tends to expect a positive

answer, whereas då - faithful to its implication that what

is said is contrary to the context at hand - tends to be a

rhetorical question that expects a negative answer. In

example (18) the speaker introduces the topic of lutfisk

with this question. By using då he indicates that he takes

for granted that you cannot get this kind of fish in

California. That is, the context that the speaker opposes

by using då can even be a particular belief or view of the

world that the speaker holds.

(18) Haa di   lyytfiskan jeer då
     have they lutfisk   here då   (+M ORI79-JO2-2)
     'So do they have lutfisk here?'

If he had said

(19) Haa di lyytfiskan jeer tå.

with tå instead of då, the preceding context would have had

to strongly suggest that this kind of fish is in fact

available in California, and by uttering (19) as a request

for confirmation, the speaker would be acknowledging his

surprise at this. By using då (in (18)), the speaker makes

his utterance close to a rhetorical question: he certainly

does not expect 'yes' for an answer. The answer to an

utterance like (19), on the other hand, is very likely to

be 'yes.'

In WH-questions the contrary-to-context function of då does not stand out so clearly. However, if B adds då instead of tå after a WH-word - cf. the discussion at the end of 2.3.2.1., example (12) - the implication is that B does not agree with what A said. For instance, Vem då? 'WHO?' indicates 'You can't seriously mean that you are talking about HIM/HER!' The implication of contrast or of 'being in opposition' is, however, fairly weak in most WH-questions with då. The implication of using då might in some contexts simply be something like 'Now that X is handled, what about Y?'. An example of this is (20).

```
(20) Ho  je e me    Oola a    papp då
     how is it with Ola  and dad  då   (+F ORI79-JO3-2)
     'What about Ola and dad?'
     /what about you two, are you going to join us or not?/
```

Då also implies more involvement on the part of the speaker than does tå. Utterance (21) says something like 'I want to know, because I have some personal interest in your answer: I might come with you although I probably won't,' where the last part of this specification supplies då's implication - however weak - of 'being in opposition.'

```
(21) Vart     ska   dö faar då
     to-where shall you go  då         (+F ORI79-JO3-2)
     'Where are you going?'
```

If tå is used instead of då in (21), the utterance gets a more distanced feeling: 'I am just asking you for general information; I don't want to imply that what you answer will affect me.' This distinction might be related to the aspect of introducing new topics (då can introduce new

topics, <u>tå</u> can not). A question about an on-going topic is part of the relevant verbal cohesion of the discourse, and therefore does not a priori stand out in any way. A question that introduces a new topic, on the other hand, can be a question about a non-verbal act or situation at hand, and thus shows your concern - whether sincere or not - and would tend to be interpreted as being polite and involved.

The contrary-to-context meaning of <u>då</u> can also be simultaneously signalled by prosodic means, as in the following examples.

(22) Finns e TÄÄR då
     is   it there <u>då</u>   (+F SOL80-J09-2)
     'So, it IS there, then?'

(23) Va je eje$_r$ då
     what is this <u>då</u>   (+M ORI79-J03-1)
     'So, what is THIS?'

One of the conversations included a situation where the interactants were looking at photographs. Almost every new photograph that was brought on the scene, was commented on by some utterance like the following (all examples are from (+F SOL80-J08-1).

(24) Vadan   va ede då
     from-where was that <u>då</u>
     'And where is this one from?'

(25) Vann jer e då
     where is it <u>då</u>
     'And where is this?'

(26) Vann je eje teiji då
     where is this taken <u>då</u>
     'And where is this taken?'

What goes on here is in accordance with the weak version of

the 'being in contrast' meaning: each new photograph is 'in opposition' to the preceding one. (Cf. the discussion of (20).) If tå had been used in (26) instead of då, the meaning would be that the photograph had been talked about for some time, and the speaker cannot figure out, say, where the photographer had been standing. In this sense, then, tå and då indicate that something is situationally established, or not established, respectively.

As a further extension of indicating that something is not situationally established, då thus gets used very often in questions that function to introduce new topics into a conversation. The examples in (27 - 29) all introduce brand new topics, but there are other cases where something has been talked about earlier in the conversation and is reintroduced with a då construction. Examples of this are (30 - 32) below.

(27) Nåå   ska   ni   böri   kⱡipp   hettⱷin   då
     when shall you begin cut   hedge   då
                                        (+M SOL80-J09-1)
     'Now, when are you going to start cutting the hedge?'

(28) Haa   dö   na $lessamt $eftär   Laila   då
     have you any   sorry   after   Laila   då
                                        (+F SOL80-J08-1)
     'So, are you (at all) longing (to see) Laila (now)?'

(29) Å   Stondas   då
     and Stundars   då   (-M ORI79-J03-1)
     'And what's (happening with) Stundars (nowadays)?'

(30) Va   taⱡa   dö   åm   na   vattnas   då
     what talked you about any watering   då
                                        (-M SOL80-J08-1)
     'So what did you say about (something needing) watering?'

(31) Sirkko va   ska   vi jäär me -- båårdin   då
     Sirkku what shall we do   with   tablecloth? då
                                    (-M ORI79-JO3-2)
     'So, Sirkku, what shall we do with the table-cloth?'

(32) Nåår saa ni vi sko   ga ti tejde tantona då
     when said you we should go to those aunties då
                                    (+M ORI79-JO2-2)
     'So when did you say we were supposed to go and see
     those ladies?'

2.3.2.3. Tå, då, tå då, and nö

As we have seen in the preceding sections, both the
particles tå and då occur utterance finally to indicate
that the particular idea unit (cf. Chafe 1980) is to be
taken as a question or a request for confirmation. We also
saw that although the particles have a common origin, they
have each developed specific presuppositions, which in turn
introduce restrictions on the contexts in which the
particles can be used appropriately.

Syntactically speaking, the two particles cannot be
distinguished, nor is it feasible to try to distinguish
between them propositionally: both turn a statement into an
interrogative. In fact, in grammatical terms, we could
even argue that tå and då are the same, tå being the
stressable form, and då the non-stressable form. Notice
for instance that in Vem då? the WH-word gets stressed,
whereas in Vem tå? the particle would tend to get
stressed. We could then argue that grammatically the
stressable form tå is used for questioning whole sentences,
and då is used for questioning constituents of sentences.

According to this suggestion, the particle då, prosodically cliticized to another word, would be a focus marker which makes the element it is cliticized to the questioned element. Tå, on the other hand, can receive stress, since its function is more explicitly that of indicating that the whole of the preceding utterance is questioned. It has a status close to the major punctuation mark in writing. (This is of course an oversimplification. On punctuation in relation to the explicit - implicit distinction, see Östman in print.)

However, since both particles occur utterance finally, and the scope of då can be a constituent phrase of any size (counting from the right; thus also that of a whole sentence) the potential meaning difference in terms of scope has been overshadowed by more pragmatically determined differences.

What makes this grammatical analysis even more questionable as a sufficient analysis is the fact that the particles tå and då very often occur together as the sequence tå då. Some combinations of tå and då clearly do not make up a single pragmatic expression, but constitute a temporal adverb plus the particle då, as in (33). The sentence is in the past tense; when it is changed into the present, the particle tå also has to be changed into nö 'now.'

(33) Va   ni   inn tå då så ni   hinda
     were you in   tå då so you had-time (+F SOL80-J09-1)
     'Were you inside then, so that you had the time?'

Other examples, however, have t̲å̲ somewhere in between a temporal adverb and a particle, as in (34). Here a change of t̲å̲ into n̲ö̲ does not necessarily have to accompany a change into the present tense, but such a change is possible. In this case the utterance is truly ambiguous, since even though we were to decide that one version (the one with n̲ö̲, or the one with t̲å̲) is more acceptable than the other, we also have to take into account that n̲ö̲ can be used as a pragmatic particle, too (cf. below).

(34) Vila   int on taaχ me   on na tå då
     wanted not she talk with her n̲a̲ t̲å̲ d̲å̲
                                   (+F SOL80-J08-1)
     'So, she didn't want to talk to her (then at all)?'

And in other examples, still, there is hardly any temporal meaning retained in t̲å̲. Example (35) is in the present tense, but still has t̲å̲.

(35) Vem je anje tå då
     who is this t̲å̲ d̲å̲   (+M SOL80-J08-1)
     'So who is this (then)?'

Another clear case where t̲å̲ d̲å̲ is used pragmatically is (36). Here the second t̲å̲ is the temporal conjunction that initiates the following subordinate clause which specifies the time of the utterance. The phrase t̲å̲ d̲å̲ in (36) does not add any propositional meaning to the utterance.

(36) Faar dö sama veeg tå då tå   dö faar då
     go   you same road t̲å̲ d̲å̲ when you go   d̲å̲
                                   (+M ORI79-J03-2)
     'Do you go the same way, then, when you go?'

The particle n̲ö̲ (which is homophonous with the temporal adverb n̲ö̲, 'now') can also potentially be used as

a request particle in Solf. There were also a number of occurrences of the combination nö då in my data, but no occurrences of nö tå. This is understandable, since both nö and tå retain some of their temporal-adverb characteristics ('now' and 'then'), and combined they would thus seem to create an inconsistency. However, since då is not homophonous with the temporal adverb or the temporal conjunction tå, the combination nö då does not carry any inherent (lexical) inconsistency. As can be seen from the tense in the verb form in (37), nö here lacks its temporal specification in the combination nö då.

(37) Je e teiji me   tenn kamera eje nö då
     is it taken with your camera this nö då
                                      (+F SOL80-J08-1)
     'Now, is this taken with your camera (then)?'

We can also note that many of the pragmatic occurrences of tå då are in fact preceded by nö, where nö does not have its temporal meaning. Cf. example (38).

(38) Vann va e la - vann va hedennan nö tå då
     where was it   where was this   nö tå då
                                          (+F SOL80-J08-1)
     'So, where was - where was this?'

(39) Vann saa dö   eje va nö tå då
     where said you this was nö tå då
                                (+F SOL80-J08-2)
     'Where did you say this was?'

In both (38) and (39) any of the particles nö, tå, då, or any combination of them, can be deleted, with no change in the propositional meaning of the sentences.

It seems that tå då has to be regarded as a single pragmatic particle, rather than as a combination of tå and då, since in examples (38) and (39) the particle nö can

occur together with tå då, but it cannot occur together
with the particle tå only. Cf. (40) and (41).

(40) Joor dö he i gåår   nö tå
     did you it in yesterday nö tå
     'Did you do that yesterday then?'

(41) Jäär dö he i daag nö tå
     do   you it in day nö tå
     'Do you do that today now?'

In example (40), nö occurs together with the past tense
of the verb, and if tå is added, it is tå that gets inter-
preted as being a temporal adverb. In (41), on the other
hand, nö gets interpreted as the temporal adverb 'now,' and
tå as the question particle. If (40) and (41) are said with
Subject-Verb word order, as (42) and (43), respectively,
the interpretation would be the same as for (40) and (41).

(42) Dö joor he i gåår nö tå

(43) Dö jäär he i daag nö tå

Also, with this word order, in (42) nö alone is a more
ambiguous question marker than tå alone, and vice versa for
example (43).

      It is not obvious what particular function should be
ascribed to the pragmatic particle tå då. As often in
language, the meaning of a combination of two elements is
not equivalent to an amalgamation of their individual
meanings. But tå då does nevertheless to a large extent
combine the meanings of tå and då, and in particular, it
seems to retain the meaning of contrast of då. The combin-
ation tå då also seems to have even more of a request-for-
further-information meaning than what either of tå or då

has separately. All the sentences in (44) below request
confirmation, but if they are put on the scale in Figure
2.1., då would occur rightmost of the three (since it can
be used to introduce a completely new topic, especially in
a WH-question), tå would come in the middle, and tå då
would be leftmost on the scale.

(44) a. Nåår a   Kalle tşööft ande nyy biilin siin då?
        When has Kalle bought that new car   his då
        'When has Kalle bought that new car of his, then?'

     b. A   Kalle tşööft in nyy biil då?
        has Kalle bought a   new car då
        'Has Kalle bought a new car? I don't believe you!'

     c. A Kalle tşööft in nyy biil tå
        'Is that it? Is that what you've been talking
        about?'

     d. A Kalle tşööft in nyy biil tå då?
        'Oh, so that's what you mean?!'

With reference to my discussion of examples (40 - 43)
above, we can further note that in a remark about the non-
past, using nö då is a more neutral way of asking a
question (cf. (45a)) than using tå då, whereas in a remark
about the past, it would be the other way round: using tå
då is more neutral (cf. (46a)) than using nö då.

(45) a. Va   ska   vi jäär nö då
        what shall we do   nö då
        'What shall we do (now then)?'

     b. Va ska vi jäär tå då

(46) a. Va   sko   vi a   joort tå då
        what should we have done tå då
        'What should we have done?'

     b. Va sko vi a joort nö då

The (b)-alternatives in both examples suggest that the
situation is (or was) somewhat hopeless. And if nö tå då

is used in (45) and (46), it would indicate an even greater degree of lack of suggestions for what to do.

Notice finally that nö, tå, and då have to occur in the particular order they have in the examples above: as nö tå då. No other combinations are possible. You cannot say *då nö, *då tå, *tå nö då, or *tå då nö.

2.3.3. Elå and elå va

Elå (va) resembles the standard-Swedish tag eller hur (literally: 'or how'). The lexical meaning of the morphemes of elå (va) is 'or (what).' Like tag-questions in English, standard Swedish eller hur and Solf elå (va) are also added at the end of a sentence. However, these tags in Swedish and in Solf are more like set phrases or particles than like the varying tags in English. An English tag-question can profitably be analyzed as consisting of two clauses: what I have elsewhere called the Basic clause (cf. Östman 1981b), which contains the main propositional content in the idea unit at hand; and the tag itself, which requires tense, auxiliary, and pronoun specification on the basis of characteristics in the Basic clause. These two parts often form tone units of their own in English. In standard Swedish eller hur also typically forms a tone unit of its own. In Solf the tag elå va can - but need not - be said as a separate tone unit, whereas the abbreviated form elå typically occurs as an utterance-final particle. The particle can be stressed, and

the more it is stressed, the more it resembles the separate tone unit tags of English and standard Swedish.

Used as utterance-final particles, elå and elå va show little difference in meaning between them. Elå va is perhaps more addressee oriented, in the sense that it more explicitly yields the floor; the use of elå by itself - precisely because it retains some of the features of the conjunction elå 'or' - more explicitly indicates that the speaker leaves him/herself the option to give the 'or' alternative him/herself. Thus, in example (1), the speaker uses elå alone (suggesting that she might herself supply an alternative[2]). But even though she makes a pause after elå, the addressee does not take the floor. So, the speaker of (1) has to continue where she left off, and supply her own alternative. Example (2), on the other hand, is a clear case where the speaker appeals to the addressee, using elå va.

```
(1) Jer e  na        tå såm   man ska   bööv teŋk  yvi
    is  it something tå which one shall need think over
      elå -- elå gaar e  bara ti svaar  så je?
      elå    elå goes it only to answer so this
                                        (+F SOL80-JO11-1)
      'Is it something one needs to think about, or is it
      just (a matter of) answering like this (= spon-
      taneously)?'

(2) Int hadd an vel bodd   na -- leeŋgär -- elå va --
    not had  he vel lived any   longer       elå va
                                        (-M SOL80-JO11-1)
    'I don't presume he had stayed there for a longer
    (period of time), had he?'
```

It is thus very typical that the word elå is followed by another syntactically complete question, as in examples (3 - 5).

(3) Finns e na braa stell ije i Arinda elå ska   vi
    is   it any good place here in Orinda elå shall we
      faar tide ti --
      go   there to   (+F ORI79-J02-2)
    'Is there any good place here in Orinda, or shall we
    go to ... ?

(4) Fåår man taaX dialekt i skooX elå ho - ho   haar
    may one speak dialect in school elå how how have
      di e nö - nöfötiidin me   dialekt
      they it now nowadays   with dialect
                                   (-M SOL80-J011-2)
    'Are you allowed to speak the dialect in school, or
    how is it nowadays with the dialect?'

(5) Va un faktist Xyyk elå elå va hadd un na fejl
    was she really sick elå elå va had she any faults
      elå bara vila   int
      elå only wanted not   (-M SOL80-J09-1)
    'Was she really ill or, or what, was there anything
    wrong with her, or just did (she) just not want to
    ...'

These examples form a gradient scale with respect
to the function of elå. Elå in (3) is hardly more than
a sentential conjunction. In (4) it is less of a conjunc-
tion. In English the formation of tag questions is a
productive process: given a Basic clause, any native
speaker of English is able to add a tag to it, or several
alternative tags, which all conform to the syntactic
requirements of a syntactic tag-question in English. How-
ever, as we saw, in Solf the elå (va) tag is more like a
set phrase, which does not change even if the form of the
Basic clause changes. Example (4) nevertheless indicates
that tag-question formation as a syntactic process is not
completely non-productive in Solf either. Rather, it can be
called a semiproductive process. (Cf. Bolinger 1961, Dik
1967.) The speaker of (4) does not use elå va, but the
frame 'elå + WH-word,' and substitutes va with ho 'how.'

Example (1) can be seen as the next point on this function-al scale: here we find two occurrences of elå, one at the end of the first sentence, and the other elå introducing the second clause, which contains the alternative. In (5), finally, the form used is elå va: the first elå suggests that the speaker has an alternative at hand; but this is directly followed by elå va, indicating that he appeals to the addressee; still, he also supplies his own alternative, and even an alternative to that (the last two clauses being coordinated with the conjunction elå).

Elå can also be used more or less like the con-junction 'or' by the same (or another) speaker to introduce an afterthought (which is usually contrary) to what has just been said (as in (6) and (7)), or by (the same or) another speaker to give the addressee the possibility to have a different opinion (as in (8)).

```
(6) Kastar di    tiit   dom   tå appelsiindren tå
    throw  they there them  tå oranges          tå
       bara -- skaÍar dom å -- elå skaÍar int di    dom
       only     peel  them and  elå peel   not they them
          heldär
          either                            (+M ORI79-J03-1)
       'Do they then just throw in the oranges, peel them
       and - or don't they even peel them?'
```

```
(7) Dö gaav vel 350 kanɡi (  ) -- Elå va e 300
    you gave vel 350 maybe         elå was it 300
                                   (+F SOL80-J09-1)
    'You probably gave 350. ( ) Or was it 300?'
```

```
(8) Elå sko      int ni   vill he ni
    elå should not you want it you   (+F SOL80-J09-2)
    'Or wouldn't you like that?'
```

But elå can also be used in a more pragmatic fashion - corresponding to English 'I mean' - to introduce a phrase

or clause as a matter of self correction, as in (9).

(9) A   an stodeera - elå ondäviisa - han tää   tå å
        has he studied   elå taught   he   there tå å
        'Has he studied, I mean taught, there too, then?'

When elå is used more like a conjunction, as in (6
- 8), it is followed by V-S word order - cf. (10a). If
elå is to be understood as a pragmatic correcting device,
in the sense of 'I mean,' the word order is not inverted
- cf. (10b).3

(10) a. Elå stigär int ni opp --
        elå step   not you up   (+M SOL80-J09-2)
        'Or don't you get up?'

(10) b. Elå ni stigär int opp
        'I mean, you don't get up'

Elå can also be used to introduce lexical and sen-
tential dummies as extended tags, either to show that the
speaker is unsure about the form or term s/he has just
used (as in (11 - 13)), or to show that the content of
what s/he has said is not all that clear, as in (14 - 16).

(11) Komyynär elå va   ska   ja sej
     parishes elå what shall I say   (+F SOL80-J011-1)
     'Parishes, or whatever (they are called)'

(12) Teŋkt   ni böri jeet elå na   tåχide nö
     thought you begin eat elå some such now
                                (-M SOL80-J011-1)
     'Did you think of starting to eat or something like
     that?'

(13) Int a   an fχytta na tå   elå na   tåχdennan
     not has he moved any then elå some such
                                (-M SOL80-J011-1)
     'They haven't moved then, or anything?'

(14) --- elå ja veijt int ---
         elå I know not   (+F ORI79-J02-1)
     'Or I don't know'

(15) Kanʃi dö sko   vill ha   na $kaaka nö elå va
     maybe you should want have some cake   now elå what
        jer e fråågan åm
        is it question about   (+F SOL80-JO9-1)
     'Maybe you would like some cake now, or what's this
     all about?'

(16) Men vem eegd onje stögon tå   on voor dejla
     but who owned this house when she was divided
        elå vem voor on dejla   me   elå ho va e
        elå who was she divided with elå how was it
                                    (-M SOL80-JO9-2)
     'But who owned this house when it was divided (in
     two), or who was it divided between, or how did it
     happen?'

This kind of hedging is very frequent in the com-
municative strategies that speakers of Solf use in their
everyday interactions. It is a virtue not to sound too sure
of yourself. This is because one of the cardinal sins in
the community is to boast about yourself, your knowledge,
and your character. (It is acceptable to boast about your
achievements, especially if they relate to aspects of life
like the amount of alcohol you can drink, the taxes you
have not paid, or a bargain you have made.)

Notice that in most of the examples given above,
the Basic clause in an elå-tagged sentence is in the form
of a question. This is also the typical way to use elå
(va) in Solf. There are, however, cases that come closer
to the English tag-questions, where the Basic clause is
not in question form. An example would be (17).

(17) Kanʃi vodka i best elå ja fåå no sii nö
     maybe vodka is best elå I may now see now
                              (+M ORI79-JO2-1)
        'Maybe vodka is best, or, (well,) we'll see (how
        things work out)'

As an utterance-final question particle elå cannot

generally be added to a WH-question. This is intuitively understandable, since elå (like tag-questions in general) tends to be interpreted as giving alternatives, whereas WH-questions are requests for unknown information. However, if elå were to be added to a WH-question, the only way that sentence could be interpreted is that the speaker is not clear about the relevance of his question, whether it is rightly put, for instance. The particle elå alone would in this case thus function as an abbreviation of elå introducing what I characterized as lexical and sentential dummies, in connection with my discussion of examples (11 - 16) above.

As a question particle in y/n questions, elå suggests that there are alternative routes ('yes' or 'no') that the addressee can take. But at the same time the use of elå suggests that what is expressed in the Basic clause is actually the speaker's own view. Thus, elå merely asks for confirmation. This is especially the case where the Basic clause does not have S-V inversion, as in (18), and in åm 'if' questions like (19) and (20). (Åm-questions are further discussed in section 3.2..)

(18) Panda e j jo finskt$_r$ - elå -- nee - je ---
     Panda is - jo Finnish elå   no   is
                                  (+F ORI79-J03-1)
     'Panda is Finnish, isn't it, or, no, is --?'

(19) Åm ni sko   vill faar å   skååd på na tåχi --
     if you should want go and look at some such
       nöög elå
       now elå   (-M ORI79-J03-1)
     'Maybe you would like to go and look at some of those
     now, or (something)'

(20) Am an a   jivi na   ooret nombro tå   elå
     if he has given some wrong number then elå
                                    (-M SOL80-JO11-1)
     'Maybe he's given (you) the wrong number then, or
     (something)'

In Östman (1981b) I argued that elå va has developed

a slight resistance towards occurring after a positive

Basic clause. Instead, int sant (lexically: 'not true')

would be used. Thus, (21) and (23) would be better than

(22) and (24), respectively.

(21) Kalle a   tÿÿöft in biil, int sant?
     Kalle has bought a   car   not true

(22) ?Kalle a tÿÿöft in biil, elå va?

(23) Kalle a int tÿÿöft najn biil, elå va?

(24) ?Kalle a int tÿÿöft najn biil, int sant?

However, this seems to hold only for cases where the Basic

clause has the declarative form. If the Basic clause has

an inverted (as here, question) structure, the restriction

no longer holds. Cf., for instance, (25).

(25) Hödö   papp fåå ja ta   dom åå   de elå va
     hear-you dad may I take them from you elå va
                                    (-F SOL80-JO9-2)
     'Hey, dad, can I get these from you?'

We can also note that elå (va) is a more implicit particle

than int sant. The latter almost forces the addressee to

comply with the speaker's suggestion, or, what is worse

from the point of view of politeness, not to comply.

In general, then, the particle elå is not as such

a grammaticized question particle, but there are cases

where the only thing that marks the clause as a question

is the particle elå. Example (26) consists of three

clauses, preceded by the attention-getter hödö.

(26) Hödö   va   je e ǥäχan elå va je e ǥöleijonen
     hear-you what is it seals elå what is it sea-lions
       elå
       elå   (+F SOL80-J09-2)
     'Hey, what is it; seals or what; what is it; sea-lions
     or what?'

The first clause is va je e 'what is it?,' the second is
ǥäχan elå 'seals?,' and the third is the rest of the
utterance. The second clause is the one of interest
here. (An alternative analysis would be that we have the
particle elå va in the second clause, rather than elå. In
that case, the last clause could be translated as 'are they
sea-lions or what?.' The middle clause, ǥäχan elå (va), is
still marked as a question only by virtue of the particle.)

     Another example, where elå va indicates that the
utterance is a question, is (27).

(27) Kanǥi e va anje boldärpoijtǥin såm brååka memme
     maybe it was this wild-boy   who teased with-me
       elå va
       elå va   (+M SOL80-J09-1)
     'So, was it this wild boy who teased me?'

If you leave out elå va from this utterance, it is no
longer a question.

     Elå thus mitigates the force of a straight y/n ques-
tion by (seemingly) giving an option to the addressee not
to comply with the propositional content of the Basic
clause. By using elå at the end of a y/n question you can
keep both alternatives ('yes' and 'no') plausible. A y/n
question without elå forces you to formulate your question
so that one alternative is presented as more likely. In
English, if you want to know whether Charles has eaten or

not, and you want to express this request for information in a polite manner by using a tag-question (cf. R. Lakoff 1974a), you have a number of choices, but in each of them you indicate your own view in the Basic clause. Thus, in <u>Charles has eaten, hasn't he?</u> the basic reason for using the tag is to get the addressee to confirm your view as expressed in the Basic clause, whereas in <u>Charles hasn't eaten, has he?</u> you take the opposite stand. (Cf. also Hudson 1975.) <u>Elå,</u> on the other hand, gives both the 'yes' and the 'no' answer equal expectancy. Notice also that <u>elå</u> is not an abbreviation of an alternative question. <u>Do you want coffe, elå</u> is not a question of whether you want coffee, or, say, tea, but a question of whether you want coffee or not.

2.3.4. <u>Na</u>

<u>Na</u> is propositionally to be translated as 'any-(thing)' or 'some(thing).' As a particle indicating that the utterance it occurs in is a request, <u>na</u> also prototypically occurs last (or towards the end) in the utterance. As a question particle <u>na</u> cannot be stressed. It can occur as a question particle both in y/n questions and in WH-questions, and it prototypically occurs as a question particle in **negative** utterances. Some examples follow.

```
(1) Böövär int e sliipas    na nö tå då --
    needs   not it make-even na nö tå då  (-M SOL80-JO9-1)
    'So we don't need to make it (=the surface) even,
    then?'
```

(2) Övåsetär   int di   na då
    translate not they na då   (-M ORI79-J03-1)
    'And they don't translate?'

(3) Int faa vi -- na -- mejr nö vet∮a na i biilin nö då
    not go we   na   more nö vet∮a na in car   nö då
    elå
    elå   (+F ORI79-J03-2)
    'I don't presume we're going to go in the car any more,
    then?'

(4) Nikkes vila   int ha   sett   na heldär
    Nicke's wanted not have theirs na either
                                               (-M SOL80-J09-2)
    'So, the Nicke's didn't want to have theirs either?'

As we see from these examples, na tends to occur
together with other question particles. But example (4)
indicates that this is not a necessary requirement. If
na is left out of (4), the utterance is an ordinary de-
clarative statement.

If the utterance is positive, na can still be used,
but it then tends to be interpreted as a 'some/any' de-
terminer to the following word. Thus, we can say both (5)
and (6), but not (7).

(5) Jer anje nyy prestin na braa
    is this new priest na good
    'Is the new priest any good?'

(6) Jer int anje nyy prestin braa na
        not   na
    'Isn't the new priest good?'
(7) ?Jer anje nyy prestin braa na.

In my discussion of elå in 2.3.3. I pointed out that
elå can be used to introduce lexical and sentential dummies
as extended tags. A 'dummy' in this sense is a lexically
vague expression that adds little or no propositionally
content to the utterance in which it occurs, and it is used
by the speaker to indicate his/her uncertainty or hesitancy

as regards what s/he is saying. Such dummies are of course not unimportant from a communicative point of view. In fact, functionally they are speech act qualifiers (cf. Peters et al. forthcoming) on a par with pragmatic part-icles. The question particle <u>na</u> is often to be found as part of a lexical dummy, manifested as <u>na tåli(dennan)</u>, 'some such.' When this combination is not an obligatory constituent in the clause, then the dummy as a whole – usually preceded by <u>elå</u> – functions as a kind of question particle (cf. (8a)). This construction with a lexically empty or unspecified word can also occur in positive sentences (cf. (8b)).

(8) a. A   dö int vari ti Aåbo elå na tåχi
        have you not been to Åbo <u>elå na tåχi</u>
        'Haven't you been to Åbo, then?'

    b. A dö vari ti Aåbo elå na tåχi
        'Have you been to Åbo, then?'

Actually, what I have just described might be a re-flection of a more general principle that if an interrogat-ive utterance contains optional material finally, usually optional adverbials, and if it is also marked as a question with some ordinary means, for instance with inverted word order, or with a WH-word, then the necessity of using <u>na</u> (or for that matter any other particle) diminishes. Cf. the examples under (9 - 11). In (9) we find the form <u>najn</u>, which is the form of <u>na</u> in attributive position before countable nouns, or when it occurs as an independent word meaning 'somebody' or 'anybody.'

(9) a. ?A   dö (int) vari ti Ååbo?
       have you not been to Åbo

   b. A   dö int vari ti Ååbo najn gaaŋg?
      have you not been to Åbo any time
      'Haven't you ever been to Åbo?'

   c. A dö vari ti Ååbo najn gaaŋg?
      'Have you ever been to Åbo?'

(10) a. ?Hitta Kalle biilin?
        found Kalle the-car
        'Did Kalle find the car?'

    b. Hitta Kalle biilin na?

    c. Hitta Kalle biilin (na) igåår?
                                yesterday

(11) a. ?A   biilin gaaji braa?
        has the-car gone well
        'Has the car been going well?'

    b. A biilin gaaji na braa?

    c. A biilin gaaji (na) braa i hööst?
                                  this fall

(Notice that I am not claiming that by adding an adverbial like 'yesterday' or 'this fall' you can make a sentence a question. The sentence has to be marked as a question irrespective of the adverbial. The important thing is that question particles do not seem to be as necessary parts of questions when these have other material finally. I will come back to this issue in section 2.3.6.)

Finally, we can notice that na can override the need for inversion in y/n questions, especially if the negative morpheme int comes first in the utterance. (In Solf, the negative int can occur either initially, or after the tense-carrying verb, or finally, or in combinations of initially-and-finally and medially-and-finally.)

```
(12) a. Kalle a   int sleiji de   na
        Kalle has not hit    you na
        'So, Kalle hasn't hit you?'
```

```
     b. Int a Kalle sleiji de na?
```

Example (12b) does, however, have inverted word order. But this is necessitated by the fronting of the negative adverb. (**Any** adverb in Swedish would have the same effect on word order, if it was fronted.) Notice, then, that if na is left out of (12b), the sentence would no longer be a question.

The status of na as a question particle is even clearer if me 'me' is used as the object in utterance (12b). Example (12d) would mean that the speaker is asking him/herself whether Kalle has hit him/her, and is thus rather unacceptable because of the presuppositions it creates.

```
(12) c. Int a Kalle sleiji me
        'Kalle hasn't hit me'
```

```
     d. ?Int a Kalle sleiji me na?
```

The characterization of na as a question particle in negative utterances is adequate when minimal-pair utterances are considered: na has a marked tendency to be appended to negative requests. If na is appended to positive requests, it functions merely as an addendum to y/n inversion. Cf. examples (13) and (14), which have y/n inversion and where na could be substituted for by tå.

```
(13) Kåmbär dö   hiit opp na fören  dö   faar ti   Amerika
     come    you here up  na before you  go      to America
                                       (-F SOL80-J09-2)
     'Are you gonna come up here before you go to America?'
```

(14) A   on   kona ha   onde kₓeninjen na Sirkko
     has she could have that dress   na Sirkku
                                           (+F SOL80-J08-2)
     'Has Sirkku been able to have (=wear) that dress (at
     all)?'

In the same way as tå and elå retain (or take on)
some of the meanings of their lexical homonyms, na also
has some of the 'some, any' meaning when it is used as a
question particle. Thus, in the two preceding examples na
adds a meaning close to that of '(not) at all,' to the
sentences.

All examples of the use of the question particle na
have so far been y/n questions. Precisely because of its
implication of '(not) at all' it is also understandable
that na typically refers to a whole proposition and is not
often to be found in WH-questions, most of which question
particular constitutents. But since 'why'-questions do not
question any particular constituent, but rather request a
(propositionally expressible) reason or cause, na can be
used in these, as example (15) shows.

(15) Ho kååm int Kalle hejm na (igåår)
     how came not Kalle home na yesterday
     'Why didn't Kalle come home yesterday?'

This example also shows that negative WH-questions retain
their syntactic characteristics even though na is added to
the utterance. This is so because WH-questions do not take
the negative particle int initially.

2.3.5. Other particles

As we have seen in many of the examples above, there is a marked tendency for the pragmatic particles to cluster together at the end of an utterance. And we also saw that there is a fairly strict internal order among the question particles. To what was said earlier, we can add that na usually occurs before (nö) tå då, and elå always comes last.

We have also seen that a number of other particles have occasionally occurred towards the end of some of the examples I have discussed. Other particles almost seem to come in and help the potential question particles to carry out their duty properly. In more theoretical terms, what we really seem to be faced with in Solf is not so much that one pragmatic particle functions as a grammatical question particle, but that the general strategy for forming a question is to have one or more particles at the end of an interrogative or directive utterance.

There are a number of other particles in Solf besides those I have dealt with which also frequently occur in questions. I am not claiming that these are question particles, too, but they do - in one way or another - take part in question formation in Solf. These are particles that tend to occur in questions, and especially if several of them occur together in an utterance, the utterance will be understood as a question. I will here just briefly mention some of these other particles, and give some examples where

the particular particle comes close to being a question particle.

a. The pragmatic particle **å** propositionally means 'and,' or 'also.' Examples:

(1) Haa ni na   ti bĺaand me   å
    have you anything to mix   with **å**   (+F ORI79-JO2-1)
    'Do you have anything to mix with, then/(also)?'

(2) Sko   e va najn ŝillna   å
    should it be any difference **å**   (-M SOL80-JO11-1)
    'What difference does that make?'

Especially in (2), **å** cannot be interpreted as 'too.' The context for (2) was that the addressee first excused herself for the fact that things were not the way they should be, and then the speaker said 'So what ...' by means of (2).

b. The particle **heldär** means 'either, neither,' and is almost exclusively used in negative clauses, as a complement to **int**. Typically, **heldär** occurs last in an utterance, occasionally (if the negation is emphatic) followed by an 'extra' instance of **int**. As in the case of **å**, **heldär** does not either itself carry an implication of request, but it helps to enforce that interpretation.

(3) Böövär int di   skaaĺ heldär
    needs not they peel **heldär**   (+M ORI79-JO3-1)
    'Don't they (even) need to peel?'

(4) Ja tykkär int kan di   no fol foodär at   var å
    I think not can they **no fol** demand that each and
    een ska   böri riŝg tiid heldär int
    one shall begin phone there **heldär not**
                                   (+F ORI79-JO3-2)
    'I don't think they can demand that each and every
    one should start to call them, can they?'

(5) Dö fee int najn kåntakt me   an   sedan   tå heldär
    you got not any   contact with him afterwards tå heldär
       int
       <u>int</u>   (+F SOL80-J011-1)
    'So, you didn't get any contact with him afterwards
    (even)?'

c. The pragmatic particle <u>visst</u> propositionally means
'true,' and functions almost like a tag, but can occur
both utterance initially and utterance finally. (For an
example of the use of <u>visst</u>, see 2.3.2.1., example (10),
where it is used together with <u>tå</u>.) Other tag-like ex-
pressions in Solf include <u>vetdö</u> ('know you'), <u>föstaar dö</u>
('understand you'), <u>mins dö</u> ('remember you'), and <u>je int e
(he)</u> ('isn't it').

d. The pragmatic particle <u>nö</u> was discussed in section
2.3.2.3..

e. The probability particles <u>vel</u>, <u>kanøi</u>, and <u>vetøa</u> also
often occur in request sentences. For examples, cf. 2.3.3.
(7) <u>vel</u>; 2.3.3. (7), (15), (17) <u>kanøi</u>; 2.3.4. (3) <u>vetøa</u>.

f. The negative particle <u>int</u> is often inserted sentence
finally to give extra emphasis to a question, as we saw
above in (4) and (5). In these occurrences it also func-
tions somewhat like a tag, by which the speaker expects the
addressee to agree with the negative statement made. Thus,
by inserting <u>int</u> into an utterance, you move the utterance
leftward on the scale in Figure 2.1., and ask for con-
firmation rather than for information. In the following
example the speaker first starts out with a straight y/n

question, but then changes it into a negative question, presumably because she is fairly certain that her propositional content is, after all, true. (I think one can feel confident in interpreting the s̲ as the beginning of sama.)

(6) Va   e   s   - Va   int e   sama såm   anje a   leest
    was   it   was not it same which this has read
                                              (+F SOL80-JO11-2)
    'Was it - Wasn't it the same that he had read?'

That is, 'Is this X?' implies that the speaker does not know, whereas 'Isn't this X?' says 'This is X, isn't it?' (cf. Hudson 1975), and reveals the speaker's own view. Utterance initially, too, the function of int̲ is to give the negation extra emphasis. If int̲ occurs both initially and finally in the same utterance, as in (7), the utterance has to be interpreted as an emphatic negation of its propositional content.

(7) Int a   Kalle joort najntig int
    not has Kalle done anything not
    'Kalle hasn't done anything!'

However, if int̲ is used only utterance initially, it does not so much negate the rest of the utterance, but it is rather an indication that the speaker is not certain about the propositional content of his/her utterance. In other words, the speaker is asking for confirmation.

In addition to these particles, certain auxiliary verbs and verb forms like sko̲ 'should,' måst̲ 'must,' böri̲ 'begin,' and vaar̲ 'had better to,' especially in combination with one of the probability or relevance particles no̲, jo̲, vel̲, and fol̲ also give a feeling of uncertainty and

request for information or confirmation. Even certain utterance-initial locutions like <u>nå men</u> ('well but'), <u>höni</u> 'hear you,' <u>ja håksa på</u> 'I suddenly remembered,' <u>int vejt ja</u> 'I don't know (but),' and <u>int mejna dö</u> 'you didn't mean' suggest that what is to follow is directed to the addressee, and thus often asks for his/her view, or confirmation, of what follows after the initial locution. This, in fact, links up to a grammatical tendency in Solf of using performative sentences like <u>mejna dö ...</u> 'did you mean' and <u>va saa dö ...</u> 'what did you say' to introduce a question. After such an initial phrase, inversion of subject and predicate in the following utterance is not obligatory.

To summarize, we can say that any request for information will tend to contain one or more particles, and also, more often than not, these will be utterance-final particles. Question particles in Solf thus differ distributionally from probability particles, which tend to occur after the tense-carrying verb, and emphatic particles, which tend to occur utterance initially.

2.3.6. Pronouns as particles?

In this section I want to show the feasibility of the remark I made in section 2.3.4., that it does not so much seem to matter which particle you use to give the impression that an utterance is to be taken as a request or a question. The main thing is that there is some

material utterance finally that is not necessary from the point of view of the propositional meaning of the utterance. Thus, there is not even any requirement that the 'unnecessary' material has to be a particle. A vocative phrase at the end of an utterance often has this function, since it explicitly directs the speaker's attention to a particular addressee; also, I mentioned earlier that other phrases, especially if they contain some indefinite pronoun like naijn or najntiŋg, make the utterance sound more like a question or a request. Here I will deal in some detail with the behavior of personal pronouns from this point of view, since these, too, can be in final position in an utterance and - as I will show - thereby partake in question formation in Solf.

The first set of examples does not require any extra-ordinary analysis, but is an instantiation of the typical situation in Solf that 'unnecessary' pronouns occur finally in questions. All these examples involve the third person singular neuter object pronoun he.

(1) Hadd int di   he
    had not they it   (-F SOL80-J09-1)
    'So they hadn't? or: Hadn't they done it?

(2) Fåå man he
    may man it   (-F SOL80-J09-1)
    'Can one do that?'

(3) A   ni he
    have you it   (-F SOL80-J09-1)
    'Have you? or: Have you done that?'

(4) A   ja he
    have I it   (-M SOL80-J011-1)
    'Have I?'

(5) Jer e he
    is it it   (+M ORI79-JO3-2)
    'Is it?'

The fact that all the examples of this construction
in my material have a pronoun as subject is a coincidence,
and not a criterion for the possibility of using the con-
struction. Anything can be the subject - cf. example (6).

(6) Hadd int presidentins jeneraalsekreteerar he
    had not president's general-secretery   it
    'Hadn't the President's General Secretary (done that)?
    or: The P's G S hadn't?'

In all the examples we find an auxiliary verb only,
and examples (1 - 4) and (6) could syntactically be an-
alyzed as having omitted the (dummy) main verb jäär 'do.'

Semantically, he does not add any propositional con-
tent to the respective utterances, and the questions could
be asked without the final pronoun he. The construction can
also be used in assertions (for instance, corresponding to
(3) we can say Ni a he 'You have'). Both in directives and
in assertions he gives the utterance somewhat extra
force. In assertions, this implies that the speaker is
convinced of what he is saying, whereas in questions,
except for supporting the final-particle tendency for
questions, he indicates a certain amount of surprise on the
part of the speaker. Notice that it is the stressed form
(cf. Table 2.2.) of the pronoun that is used finally. (Cf.
example (5).) If he is left out, the utterances would have
to be heavily marked with prosodic means. But, as the
discussion in this chapter in general should have made
clear, intonation and prosody is not something that

speakers of Solf easily rely on for forming questions and requests.

The other type of construction in Solf where an 'unnecessary' pronoun occurs utterance finally can syntactically be described as a variation of right dislocation[4], since it is always the pronoun corresponding in gender and number to the subject of the utterance that is repeated. Thus, a third-person subject (pronoun or not) is repeated as <u>han</u>, <u>hon</u>, <u>he</u>. Some examples follow.

(7) Laa ja såkre ja
    put I sugar I
    'Did I put sugar?'

(Cf. the discussion of example (13) in 2.3.2.2.)

(8) Kan dö draa in å blåås tö
    can you draw in and blow you   (+F SOL80-J09-1)
    'Can you (really) inhale and blow?'

(9) Int va e sireendren he
    not was it syrens   it   (-F SOL80-J09-1)
    'That wasn't the syrens, was it?'

(10) Nå int a   ni sitt ede ni
     <u>nå</u> not have you seen that you   (+F SOL80-J08-1)
     'But you haven't seen that, have you?'

(11) Hadd Kalle tj'ööft na   han
     had Kalle bought anything he
     'So, had Kalle bought anything?'

Table 2.2. shows the three types of pronouns used in Solf. As can be seen from examples (8) and (9), it is the strong forms of the pronouns that get repeated utterance finally. But the 'overstrong' or emphatic forms of the personal pronouns in Solf can also be used in the dislocated position. Thus, instead of <u>ja</u>, (7) could have had <u>jaag</u> finally.

	WEAK	STRONG	EMPHATIC
1.p.sg.	ja	ja(a)	jaag
2.p.sg.	dö	tö	töög
3.p.sg.m.	an	han	anje(nnan)
			ande(nnan)
f.	on	hon	onje(nnan)
			onde(nnan)
n.	e	he	eje(nnan)
			ede(nnan)
1.p.pl.	vi	vi(i)	veeg
2.p.pl.	ni	ni(i)	(nii)
3.p.pl.	di	ti	teije(nnan)
			tejde(nnan)

Table 2.2. The personal-pronoun system in Solf.

The emphatic forms in the third person are demonstrative pronouns; the j-forms in Table 2.2. are proximal forms, the d-forms distal. Examples of demonstratives as dislocations for third person pronouns are (12 - 15).

(12) Va e för stoort ede
     was it too large it   (-F SOL80-J09-1)
     'Was that too large (then)?'

(13) Aåt an ande
     ate he that-one   (+F SOL80-J09-1)
     'Did he (really) eat?'

(14) Je e åå våran kamera eje
     is it of our   camera this-one   (+M SOL80-J08-1)
     'Is it taken with our camera (then)?'

(15) Jer e fråån onde ∅öön edennan
     is it from that lake that-one   (+F SOL80-J08-1)
     'Is that one from that lake (then)?'

Using weak forms of the pronouns (where these differ from the strong forms) in the final, dislocated position makes the utterance unacceptable. We cannot say, corresponding to (8):

(16) *Kann dö draa in å bℓåås dö.

Also, the sentence-internal subject cannot have a strong or emphatic form, if it is to be followed by a dislocated pronoun. In that case, the final position will be occupied by some other particle:

(17) *Kann tö/töög draa in å bɹåås dö/tö/töög?

(18) Kann tö/töög draa in å bɹåås då/tå/elå?

The repeated pronoun can easily be followed by other question particles, as in (19) and (20).

(19) Je dö Såɹvboo   tö då
     are you Solf-villager you då   (-M SOL80-J011-1)
     'Do you regard yourself as a native from Solf?'

(20) Jaanå je int e tiide ååt he tå
     jaanå is not it there to it tå   (+M SOL80-J08-1)
     'Well, isn't it in that direction (then)?'

There are also a couple of examples in my material where the repeated pronoun is followed by some propositional element. Cf. examples (21) and (22).

(21) Va e ti   bååda he såm a   bygd on
     was it they both it who had built it
                                        (-F SOL80-J09-2)
     'Was it these two, then, who built it?'

(22) Va int an tvåå gaaŋgor han täär
     was not he two times he there   (+F SOL80-J011-1)
     'Wasn't he there twice?'

In example (21) we notice that the repetition of the pronoun comes directly after the matrix clause. It would not, however, be unacceptable to make the repetition after the relative clause, either.

Example (22) might give us some insight into how these constructions are produced. As I said above, in a generative approach, the construction could be treated as a variation of right dislocation. But a close look at (22)

reveals two things. First, the two last elements in the utterance can easily change position with little difference in meaning:

(23) Va int an tvåå gaaŋgor täär han?

Secondly, sentence (22) is also near-synonymous with (24),

(24) Va int e tvåå gaaŋgor han va täär?
     was not it two times   he was there

from which (22) could be generated through cleft-movement. However, if (24) is the source of (22), then the second han of (22) remains unexplained. It should have been deleted, if there was an intermediate structure like (25)

(25) ?Va int an tvåå gaaŋgor täär?

to which the principle of end-weight - or some other principle that affects the relative order of adverbials in Solf - would apply[5], giving the acceptable (26).

(26) Va int an täär tvåå gaaŋgor?

Thus, I find it difficult to derive (22) if all its elements (and in particular the second occurrence of the third person pronoun) are assumed to be part of its propositional content. Instead, I want to suggest that there is a principle in Solf that allows you to repeat a pronominalized form of the subject noun utterance finally (excepting potential final question particles), for the pragmatic reasons discussed in this section. That is, the han of (22) is not to be seen as part of the propositional content, as a third person singular masculine pronoun, but as a marker that enforces (and adds an attitudinal element

to) the question. There are also, however, other principles at work at the same time - especially in spoken inter- action. Solf, like so many other languages, also adheres to the general principle of end-focus, and tends to place new information last in a sentence. Thus, if the element tÄÄr of the proposition that is expressed in a neutral manner in sentence (26) needs to be focused upon, (25) is not a valid alternative, nor is (23), since it does not place tÄÄr finally. So, not only does (22) allow tÄÄr to come in the unmarked focus position, the 'particle' han effectively separates out tÄÄr from the rest of the sentence, and thus gives it an even clearer status of being focused upon.[6]

I mentioned above that the function of the pronoun- final construction is that it helps to make the utterance sound more like a question than if the repeated pronoun was lacking. This is indeed the case, but the final pronoun is not easily used as the sole question marker. In other words, the construction can also be used with other sentence types, especially with declaratives. Seen in this light, we can perhaps say that the construction reinforces the modality that is already expressed in an utterance, or that it adds the speaker's attitude to what s/he is saying. If the utterance is a question, it makes it an even clearer question, with overtones of surprise. If it is a statement, it makes the statement more forceful. And when the construction is used in combination with probability particles, it makes the force of the probability expressed

by the probability particles stronger, and thus, in effect, it makes the probability of the proposition itself weaker. And in this way the combination 'final pronoun + probability particle' will communicate that a request for information or confirmation is intended by the speaker. The probability particles in (27) and (28) are <u>vel</u> and <u>vetøa</u>, respectively.

(27) E   va   vel vaanlit yvi hejla Amerika he
     it was <u>vel</u> usual   over whole America it
                                    (+M SOL80-JO11-1)
     'Wasn't that usual all over America?'

(28) ... så fåår ja ta   anje ja vetøa
          so may I take this I <u>vetøa</u> (-M SOL80-JO8-1)
     '... then I can take this one, can't I?'

Because it is, after all, a pronominalization of the subject noun phrase that is repeated, it is clear that the repetition also gives some extra focus to the subject itself in a y/n question. Let me illustrate this with the minimal pair in (29) and (30).

(29) A   dö sitt Kalle na
     have you seen Kalle <u>na</u>
     'Have you seen Kalle?'

(30) A dö sitt Kalle tö
     'Have YOU seen Kalle?'

<u>Na</u> in (29) focuses on the whole of the preceding sentence, and in particular - since <u>dö</u> can be taken as given from the context of situation - on the verb phrase <u>sitt Kalle</u>, and thus questions that constituent. <u>Tö</u> in (30), on the other hand, places the focus on <u>dö</u>, and asks more specifically whether the addressee in particular has seen Kalle. These examples also indicate why the final-pronoun construction

is not easily used in WH-questions. WH-questions presuppose everything except the particular WH-element, and thus make it difficult to focus on or question a particular part or element in them.7

2.4. Summary and conclusions

The discussion of the basic linguistic behavior of the particles tå, då, tå då, na, and elå in the preceding sections suggests the following conclusions thus far.

Question particles in Solf tend to co-occur with other means of question formation, for instance, with inverted word order. But there are clear cases where each of the particles is the only means whereby a sentence is marked as being a question. This, of course, is the basis on which I regard these as question particles in Solf.

In their function as question particles, they all occur at the end (or very close to the end) of utterances. It might therefore not be an overstatement to say that if a particle that occurs last in an utterance can have the force of changing a statement into a question, then the last position in an utterance must be of special importance for Solf speakers. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that there also exists a number of other particles and softening devices in Solf which occur finally, and reinforce the interpretation of utterances as requesting information or confirmation. Indeed, we even found that

utterance-final personal pronouns can have this force. This tendency can be expressed as a general principle: there is an **utterance-final place-holder constraint** for questions in Solf.

For semantic reasons and reasons of frequency of occurrence, it is particularly då and elå of these particles that have a clear function of being question forming. Tå and nö need certain restrictions on tense to be unambiguously interpreted as question particles. Na is fairly infrequent as the sole marker indicating that a sentence is a question. Also, na occurs mostly in y/n questions, and even there it tends to favor the company of other particles. Of elå and då it is perhaps even possible to say that då is the particle that has come closest to being a grammaticized question particle in Solf. This is so primarily because då, unlike the other particles, does not have any lexical homonym. The fact that we can add the particle elå to a sentence that ends in då, but not vice versa, might also be taken as an indication of a relatively higher grammaticization of då. That is, whereas då is more integrated with the rest of the sentence, elå can be added on as a tag-question - especially if it has the form elå va. However, elå cannot be discarded as being only a tag of the same type as English tags. Except for what has already been discussed in section 2.3.3., we also have to remember that English-type tags are to be found in Solf. These characteristically have more structure than the

particle elå. A typical tag question in Solf would consist of a phrase with the meaning 'don't you think,' as in the following example. (Cf. also the phrases mentioned under 2.3.5.c.)

```
(1) Sko     no Oola vill lees na bɫaad,     troor dö?
    should  no Ola  want read na newspaper  think you
    'Would Ola want to read the newspaper, do you think?'
```

Indeed, on the basis of the discussion so far, elå seems to be semantically more neutral than då, which carries with it certain implications of contrast, and which can be used to introduce a new topic.

*

Finally, we have to ask whether the question particles in Solf make up a syntactico-semantic system. There does not seem to be any straightforward answer to this problem. It is possible, of course, to neglect all the pragmatic implications that the question particles carry, and focus on their propositional content. But this would not only distort the data, it would also overlook the very basic fact that none of these particles is completely grammaticized.

The preceding analysis did, however, show some interesting syntactico-semantic characteristics of the question particles. We found that då in principle can have in its scope a constitutent that is smaller than the whole of an utterance, whereas the other particles tend to have an utterance as a whole, or at least a predication, in their scope.

We also found certain differences in the behavior of the particles in different types of questions. Thus, na tends not to occur in WH-questions. Also, we found that då and na cannot be stressed, whereas tå and elå can occur stressed or unstressed.

If we compare the meanings of the question particles with each other in a set of minimal pairs like that in (2), we can try to relate their meanings to points on the scale of Figure 2.1..

(2) a. A   Kalle sleiji Ville då?
        has Kalle hit   Ville då
        'Has Kalle hit Ville?'
    b. A Kalle sleiji Ville tå?
    c. A Kalle sleiji Ville elå?
    d. A Kalle sleiji Ville na?

Notice first of all that the scale of Figure 2.1. is a gradient scale, and that the question particles span everything from the far left up to the point of WH-questions. In fact, it is even possible to use the particle då cliticized to a questioned constituent, as in (3) or even as in (4), instead of a WH-word. (Finnish uses the focus particle -kin in a similar fashion; cf. Östman 1977.)

(3) A   dö vari jeer leeŋg då?
     have you been here long då
     'How long have you been here?'

(4) A dö vari leeŋg då, jeer?

Instead of då, we could also use tå in (3) and (4), but whereas the preferred answer to these two questions would be something along the lines of 'Just twenty minutes,' the most likely answer to (5) - with tå instead of då - would be a simple 'yes' or 'no.' This again brings out the

scope differences of tå and då.

(5) A dö vari jeer leeŋg tå?

I already discussed the relation between tå and då in 2.3.2.3.: utterances with då can be placed further to the right on the scale, since då can introduce a new topic. Tå cannot be used in a question that introduces a new topic, and can thus only be used in order to request confirmation.

The particle na will also have to be placed towards the request-for-new-information pole of the scale, primarily because of its possible implication of '(not) at all.' In fact, since då implies a contrast with the preceding or situational context, na should even be placed to the right of då.

An utterance with elå is close to a tag-question, and should probably therefore be placed somewhere in the middle on the scale of Figure 2.1., at the point of 'request-for-confirmation.' This also tallies with my general impression that elå is semantically the most neutral of the particles. Elå would probably best be placed in between tå and då: it cannot as readily be used to introduce a new topic as can då, although if a sentence like (6) is said in the appropriate situation, it can introduce a sub-topic.

(6) Vill dö ha   kaffe elå?
    want you have coffee elå
    'Would you like some coffee?'

I will not further pursue this enterprise of attempting to relate the question particles to one another without

seemingly referring to their pragmatic characteristics. The discussion above shows, however, that such an approach is not impossible, and that it does give the analyst insights about the function of each particle. Nevertheless, since there is no syntactico-semantic basis on which to build such a description in detail - since none of the particles is a grammaticized question particle in Solf - I will leave this discussion as it now stands, and deal with the pragmatic behavior of the question particles in the next two chapters.

Footnotes to Chapter 2

[1]Even though the emphatic particle <u>noo</u> has a lexico-semantic near-homonym <u>noog</u> 'enough,' and even though attempts have been made for standard Swedish (cf. Borgstam 1977; in standard Swedish they are complete homonyms, <u>nog)</u> to argue that the basic meaning of the particle is still the same as that of the adverb, namely that of 'sufficient,' this connection is not intuitive, nor readily made by native speakers.

[2]Compare in this connection discussions of suspending presuppositions by adding on an adverbial clause after an otherwise completed utterance. (Levinson 1983:195; Horn 1972.) In the present case, what is hinted at as potentially being added on to the Basic clause is not only a further specification in the form of an adverbial clause, but even a completely opposite alternative to the one suggested in the Basic clause.

[3]As an indication of the frequency with which speakers of Solf start their utterances with <u>elä</u>, I can mention that my son (age seven, with Finnish as his mother tongue), when speaking Solf, has internalized a rule of question formation according to which he always starts questions in Solf with this particle. And although he gets corrected a lot about other aspects of his Solf, I have not heard native speakers correct him in this respect. (In

3.2. I discuss the potential influence of Finnish on the use of question particles in Solf.)

[4]These constructions are not proper instances of right dislocation in the generative sense of this term. Actually, the process in Solf is the reverse of right dislocation, since it is the pronoun and not the full noun phrase that is placed outside the sentence. Notice also that an utterance with a repeated pronoun utterance finally can also have a right-dislocated noun phrase (in the proper sense of this term).

(i) Jer di   fråån SåXv ti, Mamm å   Papp diin?
    are they from Solf they Mom   and Dad your
    'Are they from Solf, your Mom and Dad?'

[5]Whatever the principle, it seems not to be obligatory when a repeated pronoun follows the sentence - as we see from the acceptability of (23). I use the term 'end-weight' in the sense of Quirk & Greenbaum (1973: 410), referring to "the tendency to reserve the final position for the more complex parts of a clause or sentence."

[6]An alternative analysis, which - from the point of view of the speaker - does not necessarily have to be in opposition to the one I have just given, simply says that tåår is added as an afterthought. Notice, however, that such an analysis would imply that (i) is a fully acceptable utterance.

(i) Va   int an tvåå gaaŋgor han?
    was not he two times   he
    'Wasn't he twice? or: Wasn't he twice he?'

I cannot argue that (i) is unacceptable in a conversation as an elliptical statement, but at least it is a clearly ambiguous utterance: it either means that he was something twice, where that something has to be specified in the preceding context; or it means that he was himself (or somebody else referred to as <u>han</u>) twice. In the latter case <u>han</u> would be an ordinary Subject Complement.

[7]In Solf, if you simply want to ask the question 'Why?' in response to what somebody has just said, you do not normally say <u>Vaför?</u>, even though this word propositionally corresponds to <u>Why</u>, and is used as the WH-word in a why-question like (i).

(i) Vaför joor dö e?
     why   did you it
    'Why did you do it?')

Rather, you would say <u>Vaför he?</u>, adding on the strong form of the third person singular neuter pronoun. Obviously, this can also be regarded as an instance of the final-place-holder constraint for questions in Solf. We can also note that instead of <u>Vaför he?</u>, it is possible to say <u>Vaför tå?</u>, with the question particle <u>tå.</u>

CHAPTER 3: QUESTION PARTICLES IN SOLF - PRAGMATIC ISSUES

In this chapter I will have a closer look at the behavior of question particles in Solf in relation to a number of pragmatic aspects. Although I ended the discussion in Chapter 2 with a list of both syntactically and semantically revealing characteristics of the question particles in Solf, the discussion also showed quite clearly that as it stands the syntactico-semantic analysis is not sufficient to explain all aspects of the behavior of the question particles. Not only did we find that each of the question particles has pragmatic overtones, we in fact discovered that it is primarily these overtones that make it possible for speakers to choose among the particles in a communicative situation.

Although the question particles on the one hand do have a near-grammaticized function of indicating the interrogative mood of a sentence, they also form a subgroup of the general category of pragmatic particles. This dual function is discussed briefly in the first section of this chapter. The question is raised again in section 3.5., from a more general point of view.

Section 3.2. takes up a very different aspect: we enter into diachrony, and try to find a reason for the fact that Solf has near-grammaticized question particles, although question particles are not found in standard Swedish. What starts out as a question in diachrony turns

out to be also a question relevant for linguistic typology.

In sections 3.3. and 3.4. I discuss the behavior of the question particles in relation to a number of sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic issues. Section 3.4. gives the results of a number of elicitation experiments.

The chapter ends with a section on what I see as the theoretical implications of the discussion of question formation in Solf for the study of pragmatic particles in general, and for the study of questions in general.

3.1. Particles and propositional content

So far we have discussed the question particles in Solf in terms of them being question particles. We did find, however, that such a syntactico-semantic analysis does not take us very far in this case. There is another perspective that needs to be gone through in detail: we need to look at these particles from a functional point of view. In particular, we need to look at them from the point of view of the demands that conversation itself places on language. We need to look at the particles not only as a class of near-grammaticized question particles, but also as a particular subclass of the class of **pragmatic** particles.

Even though requests for information and confirmation in Solf tend to contain particles, no particle has the status of being a grammaticized question particle, and

probably any question or request could be made without particles or other softening devices. We can then hypothesize that particles would be left out of utterances that do not so much have interaction itself in focus, but rather need to focus on the propositional content of the utterance. In such a communicative situation the particles would in fact hinder the transfer of information from one person to another.

Support for this hypothesis can be found in situations where a question which contains one or more particles gets repeated by the same speaker. This usually happens when the addressee is not attending properly the first time the question is asked, or in situations where the addressee is not a Solf speaker, and thus might have language problems. I will here give some examples of these phenomena.

The following excerpt is a case in point.

(1) a. Nåår a   dö fått   ejennan då -
       when have you received this   då
       'When have you received this?'
    b. Elå a   dö t∮ööft e -
       elå have you bought it
       'Or have you bought it?'
    c. A   dö t∮ööft e
       have you bought it
       'Have you bought it?'
    d. Elå fee   dö e åå   Bev
       elå received you it from Bev   (+F SOL80-J08-1)
       'Or did you get it from Bev?'

The particle då is used in the first idea unit. It introduces the topic, and foregrounds it. In the example, the speaker of (1a) does not get any answer to her question. She now wants to repeat her question. But in her repetition

she cannot use då. She could, however, very well have said (1b[1]), simply leaving out the particle då.

(1b[1]) Nåår a dö fått ejennan?

If she instead of (1b) had repeated utterance (1a) as her follow-up turn, the most likely interpretation would be that she is now saying something in contrast to, or in opposition to what she said in (1a). The situational context does not, however, warrant such an interpretation, and the addressee would be rightly confused if she had repeated (1a) as is. A repetition of (1a) would also have indicate that she is introducing a new topic. But that is not the case either, since she already introduced the topic the first time she said (1a). The speaker of (1a) cannot be sure why she did not get an answer. In particular, she cannot be sure that the addressee did not hear her question. The addressee may well have simply ignored her question.

The particle då does not only introduce a topic in an abstract sense of creating coherence in the discourse, it also indicates the speaker's involvement in the issue, suggesting that the speaker has just thought of something. Therefore, because of the uncertainty as to what the addressee's lack of response to (1a) really meant, the speaker cannot again indicate (and thereby repeat) that she has just thought of something, using då. The speaker cannot imply that she has suddenly thought of the same thing twice. If a speaker wants to say a second time that s/he

has just thought of something, this cannot be done im-
plicitly. The second time around the implication would have
to be spelled out and communicated in the form of an
explicit performative, for instance as <u>Hey, I just thought</u>
<u>of something!</u>

The method of introducing a topic with a particle or
speech act qualifier that indicates that the speaker 'just
thought of something' is very commonly used in Solf.
Other particles that are used with the same force include
the initial <u>Vaa</u> and <u>Va sko ja sej</u>. These are implicit
attention getters that can usually be used only once per
topic (or subtopic) - although a combination of them in
the same utterance, in the order given, is also accept-
able. Example (2) is not an authentic one, but it illus-
trates a typical way of leaving out particles as the
speaker gets more and more annoyed for not getting an
answer. (Utterances a1 and a2 are alternative topic
introducers.)

```
(2) a1. Va    sko    ja sej, va    dö ti Aåbo na
        what should I  say   were you to Åbo  na
        'By the way, did you go to Åbo?'
    a2. Va dö ti Aåbo na då
    b. Hödö - va   dö  ti Aåbo na igåår
       hey-you were you to Aåbo na yesterday
    c. VA    dö  ti Aåbo
       were you to Åbo
       'DID you go to Åbo?'
```

When the speaker of (1a) gets no answer, an <u>elå</u>
question is added, as an afterthought. The speaker does
not, of course, want to lose face, and she does stand to
lose face if she is not acknowledged as a worth-while

communicative partner by the other conversationalists. By making her original question (1a) into an alternative question - by adding (1b) on to it - she has saved her face for a moment longer. It would have been possible also to place elå last in her utterance: A dö tşööft e elå, but in that case the particle elå would not have been ambiguous (between conjunction and question particle), as it is in (1b), and thus not effective as part of her communicative strategy. Also, in an utterance with elå at the beginning, the speaker him/herself provides the completion, but if the particle is at the end of the utterance, the addressee is placed under greater demands to perform a completion. With no response to (1a) and without knowing why no such response was given, the speaker does not dare to place such demands.

In (1c) and (1d) the speaker again repeats the two alternatives, with a slight variation (with the altern-atives in the opposite order), making it clear that she is making an alternative question, and suggesting that maybe the reason the addressee did not respond the first time was that there was too short a pause in between (1a) and (1b). (Also, since (1a) was not responded to, it was probably not correct to suggest that the addressee had been given the thing talked about - maybe the whole suggestion was ridiculous. So, by repeating the two alternatives in the opposite order in (1c) and (1d), the speaker manages to at least put them forth as alternatives of the same degree

of probability.)

Some further examples in my material include the following.

(3) a. Nåmen va ejennan å vi lokaalin elå
well-but was this å at apartment elå
'But was this also close to the apartment?'
   b. Je e -- vi Bråkkvodd eje å
is it   at Brookwood this å   (+F SOL80-J08-1)
'Is it at Brookwood?'

The particle å is here retained in b., but elå is dropped.

(4) a. Ska   Liinos haa   å
shall Linus   have å
'Does Linus want some (too)?'
   b. Ska   dö int haa
shall you not have
'Don't you want any?'   (+F SOL80-J09-1)

Both utterances in example (4) are directed to the same child. The second utterance does not contain any particle. Instead it puts forth the opposite alternative to that presented in the first utterance.

Consider next example (5).

(5) a. Hadd an bodd   na han tå tää̈r å   då elå
had he lived na he   tå there å(too) då elå
'Had he (also) been living there?'
   b. Hadd an
had he
   c. Int hadd an vel bodd   na -- leengär -- elå va --
not had he vel lived na   longer   elå va
'He hadn't lived there any longer, had he?'
                                   (-M SOL80-J011-1)

Notice here that instead of the question particles tå and då the probability particle vel, and the elå va form of the tag are used in the repetition. As we saw in the discussion in 2.3.3., elå va is more explicit than elå: elå va is a tag rather than a question marker.

The following two sequences (6 - 7) are directed
toward speakers that do not have Solf as their mother
tongue. Again, pragmatic particles are left out in the
repetitions, and the propositional content is thus made
more prominent and more easy to understand for a non-
native speaker.

(6) a. A   on   kona ha   onde k/eninjen na Sirko
        has she can have that dress   na Sirkku
        'Has Sirkku been able to have (=wear) that dress
        (at all)?'
    b. A   un   haft $den $däär $kleninjen
        has she had   it   there dress
        'Has she worn that dress?'   (+F SOL80-JO8-2)

The particle na is dropped, and /X in k/eninjen becomes 1 in

the repetition. (Cf. the Appendix.)

In example (7), utterance a. is spoken by +F, and the
repetition-clarification in b. is uttered by -M.

(7) a. Ho jer e me   smöre ije va   kåstar he då
        how is it with butter here what costs it då
        'What about the butter here, how much is it?'
    b. Va   kåstar smöre jeer
        what costs butter here
        'How much is the butter here?'

Both utterances are directed to the same addressee. (Ho jer
e me X is a frequent topic introducer in Solf, correspond-
ing roughly to English as for X.)

In this connection we can note that when utterances
with final pronouns are repeated, we find the same tendency
as with the 'other' question particles: they all tend to be
dropped. One example will have to suffice.

(8) a. A   ni t$øøft na   åt Råbban ni
       have you bought anything to Robban you
       'Have you bought anything for Robban?'
    b. Ska   ni jäär e
       shall you do   it
       'Are you going to do it?'
    c. A   ni t$øøft na   åt an   (-F SOL80-J09-2)
       have you bought anything to him
       'Have you bought anything for him?'

From the few examples discussed here, it seems clear
that the question particles in Solf have very specific
functions. This should be particularly obvious from my
detailed discussion of the behavior of då in repetitions
(cf. especially example (1), but also (5) and (7)). And the
last two examples - (6) and (7) - show that speakers of
Solf are at some level aware of these particles as belong-
ing to the dialect, and that it is felt that the particles
should be avoided when speaking to somebody who does not
know Solf perfectly.

We have already seen in fairly general terms that the
question particles have very specific functions in addition
to their syntactico-semantic meaning of requesting inform-
ation or confirmation. But it is not enough to say that
pragmatic aspects need to be taken into account in order to
explain their behavior fully. It is also obvious, partic-
ularly from my discussion of examples (6 - 7), that the
question particles in discourse obey pragmatic rules that
are not totally unconscious, and therefore not a priori
different from syntactic and semantic rules.

In section 3.5. I will further discuss the implica-
tions the analysis of question particles in Solf has for

the study of pragmatic particles in general.

3.2. Areal influence?

Finland-Swedish dialects are of major interest in attempts to gain insight into the cultural, social, and linguistic interaction that has taken place over the centuries between the Swedish speaking population in Finland and the Finns. There is still disagreement as regards the extent to which Finnish has influenced the dialects spoken in the Finland-Swedish rural villages. The typical statement found in the literature is that except for prosody, very few influences can be observed. Within prosody, it is noted that most Finland-Swedish dialects lack the acute-gravis accent distinction of Sweden Swedish, and that they have a much more monotonous intonation pattern than Sweden Swedish. Finnish, of course, is well-known for not making extensive use of intonation contours - particularly not for grammatical purposes.

In previous studies I have pointed to the functional similarities between aspects of prosody, and pragmatic particles - both within a language, and across languages. (Cf. Östman 1979b, 1979c, 1982a; cf. also Schubiger 1965, Kriwonossow 1977, and Halliday 1979.) In Östman fortcoming a. I have made a set of experiments in Solf, in order to get more information about the intralinguistic aspect of the interaction between pragmatic particles and prosody. In

this section I will raise some cross-linguistic issues in connection with the functional relation between prosody and pragmatic particles. For both historical and areal reasons, the situation in Solf invites such an investigation.

Applied to the field of question particles in Solf, the cross-linguistic issue can be stated in the following terms. Swedish, as we saw, forms y/n questions without particles, and can make grammatical use of intonation alone. Finnish, on the other hand, uses two clitical particles for expressing questions or requests for con-firmation: the grammaticized question particle -kO (man-ifested as -ko or -kö, depending on the requirements of vowel harmony in the particular word; henceforth the particle will be referred to as -kO), and the relevance particle -hAn (manifested as -han or -hän). (For the use of -hAn in order to request information, see Hakulinen 1976.) And Finnish makes very little use of intonation for grammatical purposes (cf. below). The particular issue to be raised, then, is whether the development of question particles in Solf can be seen as an influence from Finnish, and more generally, whether the pragmatic particles in Solf are functionally more similar to those in Swedish, or to Finnish particles.

In the present section I want to challenge the traditional view that it is primarily within the area of prosody that Finnish has had a marked influence on Finland Swedish. Obviously, I will mostly be dealing with question

particles, but towards the end of this section I will also show how another type of question formation in Solf has been influenced by Finnish. (The influence of Finnish on Finland Swedish in the area of deixis is dealt with in Östman forthcoming b.)

First, a couple of words about question formation in Finnish. Finnish WH-questions are formed in a similar manner to the way Swedish WH-questions are formed, except that no inversion takes place in Finnish.

(1) Kalle tuli kotiin kello viisi.
    Kalle came home   clock five
    'Kalle came home at five o'clock'
    ---> Koska Kalle tuli kotiin?
         when Kalle came home
         'When did Kalle come home?'

(2) Kalle oli juonut mehua.
    Kalle was drunk juice
    'Kalle had drunk juice'
    ---> Mitä Kalle oli juonut?
         what Kalle was drunk
         'What had Kalle drunk?'

For y/n questions, Finnish uses the question particle -kO together with fronting of the questioned constituent. That is, -kO is always attached to a word of the first constituent of the clause, marking (part of) that constituent as being the questioned element. If -kO is attached to the fronted tense-carrying verb, the whole sentence is questioned, without particular focus on any element.

```
(3) Virtasen    Liisa oli juossut kotiin
    Virtanen's Liisa was run        home
    'Virtanen's Liisa had run home'
    ---> Virtasen Liisako oli juossut kotiin?
         'Was it V's LIISA, who had run home?'
    ---> Virtasenko Liisa oli juossut kotiin?
         'Was it VIRTANEN's Liisa who had run home?'
    ---> Kotiinko Virtasen Liisa oli juossut?
         'Was it (to her) HOME that V's Liisa had run?'
    ---> Oliko Virtasen Liisa juossut kotiin?
         'Had Virtanen's Liisa run home?'
```

As I mentioned, Finnish does not use variation in pitch for grammatical purposes. Finnish intonation is usually described as being very monotonous, usually starting slightly higher than it ends in a clause. (For details, see Hirvonen 1970, Wiik 1981.) Expressive question intonation can be communicated either by making one of the first elements of the sentence somewhat higher in pitch, or by moving the overall pitch contour some tens of hertz higher in the speaker's pitch range. Kalevi Wiik (personal communication) also argues that it might be possible to use a declarative sentence with an 'over-high' pitch range all through the utterance, together with some non-verbal feature like raised eye-brows, to indicate the interrogative (and surprised) mode of an utterance. (In conncetion with this, cf. Bolinger 1981.)

The first thing to note in comparing Finnish and Solf, is of course that whereas the question particle is attached to the initial element in a sentence in Finnish, in Solf the particle is a sentence-final particle. Furthermore, there are no phonetic similarities between the question particles in Finnish and those in Solf. Thus, we

can immediately exclude the possibility of a simple word-for-word borrowing of the Finnish question particles. In the case of elå, however, we do have a phonetic and semantic similarity with the Finnish eli 'or.' But Finnish eli is borrowed from Swedish eller 'or,' rather than the other way around. (Cf. Toivonen 1955.)[1]

There are also other similarities between question formation in the two languages. First of all, we can note that it is not only the grammaticized particle -kO that can be used to form requests in Finnish. The relevance particle -hAn can also be so used, particularly in generic and indefinite person constructions. The following example (including the translation of it) is from Hakulinen 1976:55.

(4) Poimitaanhan   syksyllä marjoja?
    pick-taan-hAn fall-on   berries
    'Berries are picked in the autumn, aren't they?'

Secondly, we can note that the grammaticized question particle in Finnish does not always behave according to the strict formal rules I gave above. Cf. the examples in (5).

(5) a. Haaveissa vainko oot   mun
       in-dreams only-kO you-are mine
       'Are you mine only in (my) dreams?'
    b. Se onko hän?
       it is-kO him
       'Is it him?'
    c. Nyt se onko hän?
       now it is-kO he
       'Is it him now?'

Example (5a) is from a song, and is strictly speaking not against the rule, since haaveissa vain can be regarded as one constituent. The ordinary way to express the pro-

positional content of (5a) would, however, be <u>Haaveissako</u> <u>vain...</u> . Example (5b) is a fairly ordinary type of question in Finnish, even though <u>se on</u> 'it is' is not a constituent. Since Finnish does not ordinarily make use of formal subjects, we could, however, here argue that <u>se</u> is a semantic dummy that is not part of standard Finnish, and therefore does not really count. But (5c) - again from a song - is a clear example where the element to which <u>-kO</u> is added has not been fronted. The rule-governed formation of a question with this word order is <u>Nytkö se on hän?</u>, or <u>Onko se nyt hän?</u>. Although these examples might not be counted as part of standard Finnish, they nevertheless show that the general rule of adding <u>-kO</u> to the first con- stituent in a y/n question can be broken.

The next type of example is very common. Here we have a WH-word which takes the clitic question particle <u>-kO</u>, although this particle syntactico-semantically speaking is to be reserved for y/n questions.

(6) Missäkö   se   Kalle nyt taas on?
    where-<u>kO</u> it/the Kalle now again is
    'Where is that Kalle now again?'

Example (7) is from a newspaper advertisement, and adds the relevance particle <u>-hAn</u> to <u>-kO</u>.

(7) Mitäköhän   mummi   pitäisi pienistä Micki-
    what-<u>kO</u>-<u>hAn</u> grandma like   small   Micki-
      kangaspuista, joilla   voi kutoa nukkekodin mattoja
      loom   with-which can weave doll-house mats
    'What would Grandma say about the small Micki-loom,
    with which one can weave mats for the doll-house?'

Briefly, I would say that the use of the construction with a WH-word plus the particle <u>-kO</u> does the following. It

makes the question somewhat rhetorical: a propositional answer is not expected, although an answer would certainly be acceptable. Typical responses to (6) and (7) would be in the form of 'Well, boys will be boys,' and 'Yes, that's a good idea,' respectively. At the same time, the construction also makes the question exclamatory. In example (7) the exclamation is toned down by the use of the clitic -hAn, but in (6) it is more directly communicated: 'I don't know what to do with that boy!' In other words, the particle -kO in these examples has a pragmatic function. Thus, although -kO seems to have a strict grammatical function in Finnish, it can in certain cases (as far as I know, the situations exemplified in (6) and (7) are the only cases) function more or less in the same way as other pragmatic particles in Finnish - in particular in the same way as -hAn. (Examples (6) and (7) could also be introduced with -hAn only, as Missähän ... and Mitähän ..., respectively, where -hAn would communicate closeness, intimacy, and indirectness.)

The situation in Solf can be seen as similar to that in Finnish, but Solf has not grammaticized its particles to the same extent as Finnish has. That is, the use of the clitic -hAn in Finnish question formation is more or less at the same stage of grammaticization as the use of då or elå in Solf. In Finnish, the grammatically conditioned -kO can be used pragmatically, too; in Solf, the pragmatically conditioned particles of request can

perform a grammatical function.

The present data do not exclude the possibility that there is, or has been, influence from Finnish in the area of information requesting, but they do not directly speak in favor of this interpretation either. Note that WH-questions in Finnish do not contain question particles (examples like (6) and (7) are still non-prototypical exceptions), whereas Solf accepts question particles in WH-questions. And, as I already mentioned, the positions of the question particles in the two languages are very distinct. These points would in fact be arguments against the hypothesis of Finnish influence on Solf.

If this is the case, we have to look in another direction for an explanation to the development of question particles in Solf. First, we can note that there is a definite quantitative similarity between the number of pragmatic particles used (even within one and the same sentence) in Solf and in Finnish. In standard Swedish, the tendency is to allow just one particle per sentence, which has the effect that the particles are closer to being modal particles, or particles with semantically definable conventional implicatures. Finnish and Solf, on the other hand, can have an abundance of particles in an utterance. Secondly, whereas Swedish makes grammatical use of prosody, Finnish does not, and Solf does so only to a limited extent. I would like to suggest, then, that there does exist some inherent similarity in function between prag-

matic particles and aspects of prosody, and that languages tend to make use of these, either so that one language uses predominantly prosody (Swedish and English), and another language predominantly particles (Finnish because of a general lack of use of prosody in the language, Chinese - which also has an abundance of particles - because prosody is used for other, notably lexical, purposes)[2], or so that a particular language uses both of these means in balance. The purpose of Östman forthcoming a. is to show how this balance is achieved in Solf. In general, then, this would suggest that the two linguistic means compensate for each other in several respects, and we get a situation of pragmatic complementary distribution, where this term is used not in the structural either-or sense, but in the pragmatic sense of **preferred** usage (cf. Levinson 1983).

At this point of the discussion there are two alternatives that suggest themselves. We can either keep to the initial hypothesis and argue that, despite the comments in the preceding paragraph, the reason for the development of question particles in Solf is in fact to be sought in a fairly direct influence from Finnish. This argument would run as follows. Finnish is directly responsible for the loss of semantically usable prosody from Solf, and hence indirectly - but uniquely - responsible for the rise of various particles. This alternative sounds plausible, except for two things: first, we do not know which came first, the particles, or the loss of semantically relevant

prosody; and secondly, not all dialects of Sweden Swedish make as much use of prosody as standard Sweden Swedish. For instance, the acute - gravis distinction is not upheld in all dialects in Sweden.

It is thus safer to make a somewhat weaker claim, but a claim that at the same time has more general implications. It may be, as has been argued in a number of studies (cf. for instance Ahlbäck 1956), that at least part of the reason why Solf and most other Finland-Swedish dialects do not utilize prosody to the same extent as standard Swedish does, has to do with influence from Finnish. But this influence has only been indirect on the development of question particles in Solf. The direct reason for this development is a more general linguistic principle that a language has to make use of particles in an inverse proportion to the degree to which it relies on intonation. (Notice that the two alternative explanations are not necessarily in opposition. Even though we might find evidence in support of the first alternative, the second is not automatically made invalid.)

Following Halliday (1979) we could state the present issue in a rather controversial fashion. Halliday has argued that pragmatic particles and modal elements are dispersed in a sentence in a manner similar to the peaks and troughs of intonation contours displayed on an oscillogram. If we were to accept such a functional equation between verbal and non-verbal material in language, the

traditional claim about the special status of prosody as regards the areal influence between Finnish and Finland Swedish could be saved – for the moment. But this claim could only be salvaged by the suggested equation.

*

In the rest of this section I want to discuss yet another area of question formation in Solf. With this discussion I also want to show the tenability of my original hypothesis that Finnish influence on Finland Swedish is much more wide-spread than what is traditionally recognized.

The construction to be discussed is the åm-construction. Instead of uttering a straightforward y/n question, a Solf speaker can use an indirect locution, manifested as an if/whether clause.

(8) Am   e no ska   ga ti set yyt na   neet idaa
    if/whether it no shall go to put out any nets today
                                              (+M SOL80-JO9-1)
    'Might it be possible to throw out some nets today?'

(9) Am dö sko   ha   tiid --
    if you should have time   (+F SOL80-JO9-2)
    'Do you think you have the time? or simply: Do you
    have time (to do something)?'

Some speakers almost exclusively use this construction when they form y/n questions. Examples (8) and (9) are pure y/n questions, but some of the åm-constructions in my data take up a position in between questions and suggestions, and thus indicate a possible way in which this construction might have come about.

Some of these examples could be translated into

English as 'What if'-clauses. The combination of the words WHAT plus IF (<u>Va åm</u>) is not permissible in Solf. Thus, instead of uttering the more elaborate <u>Va sko dö sej åm</u> 'What would you say if,' <u>åm</u> is felt to be enough. That is, the cognitive source for some of the <u>åm</u> questions can be seen from the following examples.

(10) Ho jer e   me   tee Oola nö då såm haar såde   mytⱢi
     how is it with you Ola <u>nö då</u> who has so-that much
        peⱤgar -- Åm vi sko   lå̊å̊n   å̊å̊ tee å̊ Ⱡikk frå̊å̊n
        money   if we should borrow of you and send from
        Finlands bank -- (   )? Ska   e no gaa he
        Finland's bank   shall it <u>no</u> go it
           troo?
           believe   (+F ORI79-JO3-1)
     'What about you Ola, who has such a lot of money.
     (What) if we were to borrow money from you, and send
     from the Bank of Finland? Is that possible, do you
     think?'

(11) Jer e laⱤgt frå̊å̊n San San Fransis sisko - Åm vi
     is it far   from San   Francisco   if we
        sko   faar han daajin vi faar tiit   då
        should go   the day   we go   there-to <u>då</u>
                                       (+F ORI79-JO3-2)
        'Is it far away from San Francisco? What if we were
        to go the same day as we go there?'

Both of these are preceded by an introductory, more general question, and the <u>åm</u> sentence is added as a reason for asking the more general question, and it is put forth as a suggestion for the direction in which the topic of the conversation could continue.

Example (12) is almost like an 'if - then' clause, although a 'what if' translation would still be the most appropriate. In examples (13) and (14) we have clear repetitions by the same speaker.

…

(12) Åm dö sko   a   proova an å   skååd åm an a
     if you should have tried it and see   if it have
     passa --
     suited   (+F ORI79-JO2-2)
     'What if you try it and see whether it fits?' (cf.
     'If you try it, then you'll see whether it will fit
     you.')

(13) A: Jer e - laŋgt $ifråån ede
        is it far   from   that   (+F SOL80-JO8-1)
        'Is that far away?'
     B: Va
        what   (-M)
        'What?'
     A: Åm e i laŋgt bårtifråån
        if it is far   awayfrom
        'Is it far away?'

(14) Nåmen dehäär dehäär $smaakar int di   såm $kaakår
     nåmen dehäär dehäär taste   not they like cookies
        $häär
        here
     'Well, I mean, don't they taste like cookies here?'
     Åm i Åm int di $smaakar såm $kaakona $häär --
     if   if not they taste   like cookies here
        $häär i Finland
        here in Finland
        here in Finland   (+F SOL80-JO8-2)
     'Don't they taste like cookies here, here in Finland?'

There are four alternative explanations to the use
of this construction in Solf. The first alternative is
to analyze them as due to speakers' ellipses of fully
grammatical sentences, coupled with a performative analys-
is. The examples in (13) and (14) would be evidence for a
performative analysis, where questions have an underlying
performative sentence of the form 'I ask you (whether)
(S)'[3], since åm 'whether/if' could not be inserted unless
we presume that questions have an underlying performative
sentence, which would typically get manifested before (to
the left of) the propositional question.

Figure 3.1. Schematic representation of a performative analysis.

(Thus, the <u>åm</u>-construction in Solf is similar to a situation where ordinary declarative clauses were to be preceded by <u>at</u> 'that,' from the underlying 'I say (that) (S).' This construction was not instantiated in the present data, but it is not an unacceptable locution in Solf.) The principle of ellipsis simply says that you delete most of the performative sentence in a repetition. Thus, the underlying structure of the <u>åm</u>-construction in Solf would be '(I ask you) whether <propositional content>.'[4]

The second explanation - which is not necessarily in opposition to the first - would be that this is due to Finnish influence. In Finnish, the question particle <u>-kO</u> is used both for direct questions and for subordinate, 'whether'-questions. Standard Swedish should theoretically (i.e. prescriptively) use <u>huruvida</u> as its indirect-question marker, but in everyday language <u>om</u> 'if' has almost completely taken over the function of <u>huruvida</u>. In this perspective, a possible explanation would be that <u>åm</u> in Solf has the same field of application as <u>-kO</u> in Finnish, and

therefore its use in Solf has been extended to direct questions.

The third explanation, or potential source, for the åm-construction also comes from Finnish. Consider the following example.

(15) Ja bara frååga åm   ni ska -- Åm ni sko   vill
     I just asked whether you shall if you should want
     faar å skååd på na tåɣi --
     go and look on some such   (-M ORI79-JO3-2)
     'I just asked whether you would like to go and see
     any such ...?'

This could be analyzed as a straight repetition of åm, where even the performative sentence is explicitly used the first time. However, in the transcript above, I wrote the second åm with a capital letter (indicating that I have analyzed the sequence as two sentences, or functionally, as two idea units) because the tense changes in the repetitions of the modal, from ska to sko. Notice also that other non-repetitious uses of åm-requests - in particular, cf. examples (8) and (9) - have either ska or sko as their tense-carrying verb. Since conditional if-clauses in Solf are formed with the modal sko, the change in (15) from ska to sko implies that the speaker sees the repetition as being close to a conditional if-clause. The same can perhaps be said about example (9), whereas example (8), which has ska, would be a clear example of an ordinary direct question using the åm-construction. Finnish has a particular mood form in conditional if-clauses, the conjunctive, which is marked with the affix -isi-. In Solf, as I said, conditional if-clauses contain the modal sko. This third

explanation involves homonymy. Finnish <u>jos</u> 'if' (conditional) has <u>åm</u> as its translation equivalent in Solf. Also, Finnish -<u>kO</u> in indirect questions (cf. above) is translated as <u>åm</u>. If there is Finnish influence on Solf, it is theoretically possible that the <u>åm</u> of questions could be confused with the conditional <u>åm</u>, and that the specific tense form associated with conditional <u>åm</u> could be transferred to utterances with the <u>åm</u> of questions. On this account, Finnish influence would thus have produced a surface structure that is not found in Finnish.

The fourth explanation is a general pragmatic one, and relates to the tendency in Solf for using indirect ways of speaking. We do not only have <u>åm</u>-clauses as main clauses in Solf, we also have constructions where it seems as if main clauses are embedded, but they still remain main clauses structurally. Thus, in addition to sentences like (16) and (17), we also find sentences like (18) in Solf.

(16) Dö saa vi sko   ga hejm
     you said we should go home
     'You said we should go home'

(17) Saa dö vi sko ga hejm
     said you
     'Did you say we should go home?'

(18) Dö saadö   vi sko ga hejm
     you said-you
     'You said we should go home, did(n't) you?'

That is, (18) is a sentence with declarative form, but it has the pronoun <u>dö</u> in two places, which allows the addressee to interpret (18) either like (16) or like (17). But since (18) is both ambiguous and indeterminate between the

two, the sentence will take on a value in between (16) and (17): it could be placed near the 'request-for-confirmation' point on the scale in Figure 2.1. (I have written saadö in (18) as one word to indicate the enclitic nature of -dö. We thus see that the similarity in function between pragmatic particles and pronouns in Solf is not restricted to the case of final pronouns discussed in 2.3.6. In (18) the pronoun -dö in effect indicates the speaker's uncertainty.)

As should be clear from the way I presented the four explanations above, these are not really alternatives, but complementary sources for the development of åm-constructions in Solf. If this analysis is accepted, it is also clear that the influence of Finnish on Solf - and on Finland Swedish in general - goes far beyond the area of prosody, however broadly conceived. And mutual influence is of course a natural thing to assume as having taken place between two people that for centuries have lived side by side in friendship.

3.3. Sociolinguistic issues

3.3.1. Age

The village of Solf is presently in a state of flux. The last couple of decades have seen a marked change in the community: the younger generation sees emigration from the village as a much stronger alternative than used to

be the case. The traditional means of survival (in partic-
ular, farming) are not felt to be that appealing any more.
On the other hand, since the village is relatively close
(about twelve miles) to the town of Vasa, a number of
people who work in Vasa and grew up there, have recently
moved into the village, commute into town daily, and have
more than ever before introduced both standard Finland
Swedish and Finnish into the community. Some 25 years ago
the village was still completely unilingual in the Solf
dialect - not even standard Finland Swedish was properly
mastered by many villagers.

It is obvious that this relatively sudden change
in the community has influenced its language. But what
is more interesting from the present point of view is the
extent to which implicit means might have changed from
one generation to another. An adequate discussion of this
question would also shed some light on the diachronic de-
velopment of pragmatic particles in general.

In the following I will make some tentative observ-
ations about the use of question particles by younger
speakers, as opposed to speakers of the older generation.
The younger generation is represented by one male and one
female speaker, about the age of thirty.

Of all the requests for information or confirmation
in my material, 68.3% (439) were made by older speakers,
and 31.7% (204) by the younger speakers. Table 3.1. gives
the distribution of the different kinds of requests for

the two groups of speakers, and Table 3.2. gives the percentages of the request types within each age group.

	YOUNGER – SPEAKERS – OLDER				TOTAL
	no.	%	no.	%	no.
All requests in the present material	204	31.7	439	68.3	643
Y/n inversion (only)[5]	38	31.1	84	68.9	122
WH fronting (only)[6]	38	44.7	47	55.3	85
Prosody only	5	20	20	80	25
Åm-constructions	3	30	7	70	10
Topicalizations, etc.[7]	3	30	7	70	10
Na	36	43.9	46	56.1	82
Tå, då	32	25.8	92	74.2	124
Elå	15	32.6	31	67.4	46
Other particles	22	22.7	75	77.3	97
Pronoun repetitions	6	17.1	29	82.9	35
(Not classified[8]	6		1		7)

χ^2 (p < .001)

Table 3.1. The number and percentages of request types across age groups.

	YOUNGER – SPEAKERS – OLDER	
Y/n inversion	18.6	19.1
WH fronting	18.6	10.7
Prosody	2.5	4.6
Åm-constructions	1.5	1.6
Topicalizations, etc.	1.5	1.6
Na	17.7	10.5
Tå, då	15.7	21.0
Elå	7.4	7.1
Other particles	10.8	17.1
Pronoun repetitions	2.9	6.6
Not classified	2.9	.2
	100 %	100 %

Table 3.2. The percentages of request types within each age group.

Notice first of all the highly significant χ^2-value, indicating the possibility that there are real, significant

differences between the younger and the older speakers'
use of question forming devices.

Perhaps the most surprising figures that appear in
Tables 3.1. and 3.2. are those for the category 'Prosody
only.' If it is true that - over the centuries - Solf has
been influenced by Finnish in the area of prosody in
particular, then one would have expected the older speakers
to rely less on intonation than the younger generation,
which has, after all, studied other languages and been
travelling (in Sweden for instance) much more than the
older generation, and thus knows the importance of in-
tonation for question formation in other languages. But it
could in fact be argued that the younger speakers are
hypercorrecting themselves: the distinctive aspect of Solf
(and Finland Swedish in general) is that it does not make
use of prosody to the same extent as Sweden Swedish;
therefore, the younger speakers - in attempts to explicitly
distinguish their Solf from other languages, and at the
same time show their solidarity and identity with the
community (cf. also Wiik & Östman 1982) - might be tempted
to adopt an extreme version of monotonousness. On the other
hand, it might of course also be argued that since the
younger generation nowadays has a more explicit contact
with the Finnish speaking population than what the older
speakers have had[9], not using prosodic means in Solf might
be a 'renewed' influence from Finnish. At any rate, it is
clear that intonation is definitely not one of the means of

question formation that the younger generation is bringing into the dialect.

One reason why older speakers would tend to rely on intonation for question formation is no doubt hypercorrection in the opposite direction. This can be seen from an analysis of questions made by older speakers to non-native speakers of Solf. Thus, the only WH-questions in the data which had a marked stress pattern were used by older (female) speakers to non-native speakers of Solf. Examples of this are (1) and (2).

(1) $Vaar $e Jån$_r$
     where is Jon   'Where is Jon?'   (+F SOL80-J09-1)

(2) Vann i Sanna$_r$ såm int kåmbär$_r$
     where is Sanna who not comes   (+F ORI79-J03-2)
     'Where is Sanna, who doesn't come?'

(Also, as was pointed out earlier, question particles tend to be dropped from questions directed to non-native speakers of Solf.) Even though prosody is not often used alone as a question indicator, a rise in pitch very often accompanies questions - y/n questions in particular. Such utterances have been counted in the category of 'y/n inversion' in Tables 3.1. and 3.2.. I have done this because the questions would be questions also without the marked intonation patterns, and because intonation in Solf very often has an expressive, rather than a grammatical, function. Some examples follow.

(3) Mååƚa di altihoopa$_r$ gyyƚt$_f$
     painted they everything yellow   (-M ORI79-J03-1)
     'Did they paint everything yellow?'

(4) (Je e) sant$_r$
is it true   'Is it true?'   (+F SOL80-J08-2)

(5) Mejna dö vi sko   faar idaa$_r$
meant you we should go   today   (+M ORI79-J03-2)
'Did you mean we should go today?'

    Of the twenty-five pure intonation questions in the data, only four were complete sentences with subject and predicate:

(6) Aj dö joor he
<u>aj</u> you did it   (+F SOL80-J09-2)
'Oh, you did that?'

(7) (A för<<u>or:</u> på>) sentraalbutiitøen gaar e braa
and for   on   Central-shop   goes it well
                             (-M ORI79-J03-1)
'And everything is well at the Central shop?'

(8) Dö hitta int an
you found not it   (+M SOL80-JO11-1)
'You didn't find it?'

(9) Dö vila int taax
you wanted not speak   (-M SOL80-JO11-2)
'So you didn't (<u>or:</u> don't) want to talk?'

None of these are real questions, although they do seem to expect some kind of response. (In some cases, the reason I have considered them questions is not primarily their prosody, which is not at all marked, but the situation in which they were uttered. Thus, gestures or facial expressions might in these cases have been more determinant than variations in pitch itself. (Cf. Bolinger 1981.) The category 'Prosody only' might thus rather be seen as comprising those examples that cannot be explained with reference to any of the other categories.) Example (6) is basically a repetition, with a bit of surprised feeling attached to it, and can only receive one answer,

viz. 'Yes.' Example (7) is a method for introducing a new topic: the final stressed syllable has a level pitch. Example (8) could be prefaced with Så 'So,' and is a recapitulation or summary of what another person has just said, or implied. Example (9) is also a summary, and perhaps a request for confirmation: 'Did I get you right?, or: So that's your final word, is it?'. Notice also the particle aj and the final pronoun he in (6), the negative particle int in (7) and (8), the final pronoun an in (8), and the peculiar word order in (7), introduced with å 'and, too.' (Also, notice that (7) and (9) were spoken by one of the younger speakers.)

The rest of the 'Prosody only' questions consists of one phrase each; one example is simply hm$_r$. These are almost exclusively echo questions, which are either inserted for reasons of politeness, or as requests for confirmation, and most typically only expect an affirmative nod, or a 'Yes' as answer (or, in the case of a question in the negative form: a 'No'), to indicate that what the addressee heard or deduced was what the speaker had in mind. In some examples the phrase is a proper name or a pronoun, which has the same function as 'Who?,' and gives a suggestion as to the identity of what is referred to. Cf. example (10).

```
(10) A: Ho  leeng va  an täär
         how long  was he  there        (-M SOL80-J011-1)
         'For how long was he there?'
     B: Papp menn
         dad  mine        'Do you mean my dad?'    (+M)
```

Some of the examples are suggestions by the same speaker to an immediately preceding WH-question asked by him/herself (as in (11)), or a request for confirmation to a y/n question (as in (12)), also by the speaker him/herself.

(11) Ho   ska   e   va
     how shall it be   'How should it be?'
        Såde
        so-it   'Like that?'   (+F SOL80-J08-2)

(12) Va   va   he
     what was it   'What was that?'
        Ande gyyX̸   vaasin
        that yellow vase   'The yellow vase?'
                                (-F SOL80-J09-2)

Finally, consider examples (13) and (14) of the category 'Prosody only.' These are more complex, and have a syntactic structure.

(13) Å he vaa   jo
     å it becomes jo   (+M ORI79-J03-1)
     'And that makes?'

(14) Tå ukki   lagar
     tå ukki(=grandpa) mends   (+F ORI79-J03-1)
     'When Ukki makes (it)?'

Notice, however, that they are not full sentences. Utterance (13) lacks a Complement, but instead has the relevance particle <u>jo</u> finally. It is also a paratactic addendum (indicated by the conjunction - or particle - <u>å</u>) to what the previous speaker has just said. (Compare here the use of the relevance particle -<u>hAn</u> in Finnish used as a question particle: -<u>hAn</u> and <u>jo</u> are usually regarded as translation equivalents.) Example (14) can either be regarded as a subordination (syntactically marked by the temporal subordinator <u>tå</u> 'when') to a higher (performative) sentence of the form 'Do you mean (S)?,' which is left implicit in the

same way as the performative sentence preceding an <u>åm</u>-construction can be seen as having been left out; or <u>tå</u> can be seen as something in between a subordinator and a particle.

The latter suggestion might give us some insight into the diachrony of the use of <u>tå</u> as a question particle as discussed in section 2.3.2. One hypothesis could run as follows. <u>Tå</u> as a temporal conjunction is expected to have a clause following it that will specify the time at which the activity in the matrix clause obtains. Any specification of a propositional content will make its application (i.e. its reference, cf. Lyons 1963) narrower. Thus, in a face-to-face interaction, by uttering the matrix clause first, you can add on specifications to it if you realize (on the basis of facial expressions or grunts) that the addressee is not approving the (more general) contents of the matrix clause. <u>Tå</u> at the end of an utterance will imply that there are specifications and limitations to what has just been said, which have not been spelled out explicitly, but which could be spelled out, say, in a temporal clause. By inserting <u>tå</u> at the end of all statements that the speaker is not sure about, s/he leaves him/herself a way out, in case the addressee has counterarguments to his/her general point. (Cf. footnote 2 to Chapter 2.) The addressee will take this as a request for confirmation, and even for information. Also, the addressee should interpret the statement as a deferential (i.e. 'polite') way of stating something. And

at that point the conjunction has acquired a pragmatic function. It is pragmatic because it can no longer be tied down to explicit semantic rules.

My discussion of the 'Prosody only' category has been somewhat lengthy. However, as I suggested earlier, prosody is of special importance in discussions of pragmatic particles. For Solf, I have shown that the examples in the category 'Prosody only' are not clear cases, and that, in fact, intonation very seldom is used as a grammatical question marker. (Still, it is obvious that Solf does not rely on intonation as little as Finnish does.) We can add to this the fact that only about one-sixth of the requests for information in my data were formed by standard Swedish means, viz. by WH fronting only, y/n inversion only, and prosody only. Most requests thus contained particles or particle-like elements. It is now time to look at some of the age differences in Tables 3.1. and 3.2. with respect to the use of different particles.

First of all, the figure for 'WH fronting' is slightly higher for the younger speakers (44.7 as opposed to the default of 31.7 in Table 3.1.; 18.6 for the younger, 10.7 for older speakers in Table 3.2.). The category stands for cases where the speaker makes a WH-question in the standard Swedish manner, by fronting the relevant WH-word, possibly accompanied by pitch variation. In other words, these are the cases of WH-questions that do not have any particles or final pronouns. On the basis of these figures,

then, it seems that the younger speakers tend to feel that the WH-marker itself is enough to mark an utterance as a WH-question, and consequently do not feel the need to add on any other particles. Older speakers, however, tend more to treat all questions the same, and for them questions need final particles.

Older speakers seem to use instances of the categories 'Tå, då' and 'Other particles' more than younger speakers. A simple explanation for this is of course that the younger speakers have been influenced by languages like standard Swedish and English, which do not make use of particles to the same extent as Solf does. But then, one could argue, they could just as well have been influenced by Finnish, which **does** make extensive use of particles. (And to counterargue that claim, we would have to go into a detailed discussion of Solf speakers' attitudes to different languages; it is clear that the Finnish language creates more negative than positive attitudes among Solf speakers; for details, see Östman forthcoming c.) We can also note that the distribution of the instances of the category 'Elå' is more or less in accordance with the default expectations. And English in particular, of course, makes extensive use of tag-questions. The figure for the category 'Other particles,' might also be explainable as indicating recent language interference from closely related languages (like English and Swedish); however, a study of each of the particles in this category might give

a more detailed picture of the issue. The figure for 'Tå, då' does suggest the importance of these particles as question particles in Solf - especially for the older speakers. And here it may be that explicit 'mother-tongue' teaching of standard Swedish at school has made the younger speakers less sensitive to the old people's use of the important question particles.

The figure for the category 'Na' is rather surprising, and I have no immediate explanation for why younger speakers use this particle so often. It may be, however, that the question-forming function of na is a secondary attribute of the particle. As we saw in section 2.3.4., na is very seldom used alone to mark an utterance as interrogative. I have not made any detailed study of non-interrogative uses of na, but it is not inconceivable that the particle is a marker of social relation, or politeness, and that it is only because of its tendency to occur in sentences that express a request of some form (a situation which presupposes a particular relation between the interactants) that it has become closely associated with questions - and maybe even reinterpreted by the younger speakers to be a question particle. If this is the case, it is a further indication that na is not a question particle to the same extent as tå, då, and elå are.

The figure for pronoun repetition (2.9 for younger speakers as against 6.6 for older speakers) fits in nicely with our expectations that older speakers would tend to

rely on sentence-final elements in general to indicate that an utterance is intended as a question (cf. the discussion of the figure for the category 'WH fronting' above). This would represent what villagers call 'real' Solf, uninfluenced by changes in the modern society. The younger speakers, on the other hand, might treat the use of final pronouns as a particular instance of right dislocation - on a par with the use of other types of right dislocations in Solf - and thus not as readily associate them with question formatio... We can also note that the object-dummy construction, which was briefly mentioned in the beginning of 2.3.6., is hardly used at all by older speakers (I found one potential instance in my data). The six instances recorded for the younger speakers might indicate that the construction is borrowed from standard Swedish (where it is frequently used). From that point of view, it is possible that pronoun repetition in Solf is regarded as a special case of the standard Swedish construction (or vice versa), and younger speakers would tend to use the latter, too, as part of the stock-and-trade of Solf.

In general, then, where there are differences in the language of older and younger speakers as regards question formation, constructions with particles tend to be used more frequently by older speakers, and - for obvious reasons - the area where the younger speakers do not pay enough attention to the use of question particles is WH-formation.

The differences reported here have taken place during one generation. In effect, then, what we have found is evidence that pragmatic (and prosodic) phenomena do change rather rapidly, and are fairly easily influnced by the systems of other languages. Taken one step further, this also means that the whole idea that Finnish intonation (or lack of it) has influenced that of Solf (and Finland Swedish in general) gets some support from the present findings. However, on the one hand, the influence of Finnish is a historical issue, and its manifestations have become fairly conventionalized for native speakers of Solf. On the other hand, what seems to be happening at present is that the language of the younger speakers of Solf gets influenced (through cultural influence) by languages (like Swedish and English) that are genetically close to Solf, and this results in a different kind of interference: an interference that goes in the opposite direction, if we relate this to my earlier discussion of intonation and particles as pragmatic alternatives.

3.3.2. Sex

In this section I want briefly to mention the distribution of different means for asking questions and requesting information in relation to the speaker's sex. The most important figures are given in Table 3.3. and Table 3.4..

	FEMALE	– SPEAKERS	– MALE		TOTAL
	no.	%	no.	%	no.
All requests in the present material	356	55.4	287	44.6	643
Y/n inversion (only)	69	56.6	53	43.4	122
WH fronting (only)	39	45.9	46	54.1	85
Prosody only	14	56	11	44	25
Åm-constructions	7	70	3	30	10
Topicalizations, etc.	6	60	4	40	10
Na	40	48.8	42	51.2	82
Tå, då	67	54	57	46	124
Elå	23	50	23	50	46
Other particles	63	64.9	34	35.1	97
Pronoun repetitions	24	68.6	11	31.4	35
(Not classified	4		3		7)

χ^2 (p > .2)

__Table 3.3.__ The number and percentages of request types across sex groups.

	FEMALE	– SPEAKERS –	MALE
Y/n inversion	19.4		18.5
WH fronting	11.0		16.0
Prosody	3.9		3.8
Åm-constructions	2.0		1.1
Topicalizations, etc.	1.7		1.4
Na	11.2		14.6
Tå, då	18.8		19.9
Elå	6.5		8.0
Other particles	17.7		11.9
Pronoun repetitons	6.7		3.8
Not classified	1.1		1.1
	100 %		100 %

__Table 3.4.__ Percentages of request types within each sex groups.

The χ^2-value is not significant. That is, whatever differences we find (in these data) in men's and women's use of question particles and other means for asking questions in Solf, these are not statistically significant

differences. The following discussion of differences might therefore be taken as rather speculative. However, as the figures in Tables 3.3. and 3.4. indicate, there are nevertheless differences. Instead of the statistical null hypothesis we might therefore want to make a more precise hypothesis, namely that women will often use just those particles and constructions whose meanings are consistent with what is generally said about women's language.

Again, 'y/n inversion (only)' is not indicative here, as it was not either when correlated with age. What is perhaps somewhat surprising in the tables is that the category 'Prosody only' is not correlatable with the speaker's sex. In fact, before analyzing the last of my tapes, I thought I had a clear case for women using more instances of this category than men. The last tape, however, contained six occurrences of this category, five of which were by men not present in any of the other conversations. In experiments to be reported on more in detail in Östman forthcoming a. I found that women tend to use rising intonation at the end of questions more often than men. The results from those experiment are, however, based on sentences in isolation, said in a laboratory, and it may be that in such a situation, in an attempt to distinguish questions and statements clearly, the speakers added rising intonation at the end of questions.

The figure for the category 'Tå, då' is not significant - perhaps exactly because tå and då are the major

particles of request in Solf. Note, however, that in combination with the results for the 'WH fronting (only)' category, we can perhaps deduce that women tend to treat particles as being necessary in all kinds of questions (since the figure for WH-questions without any particles is 45.9 as opposed to the default 55.4), whereas men would tend to feel that the WH-word itself is enough as question marker. This interpretation would of course tally with stereotypical differences between men's and women's language: adding extra - in particular, non-propositional - material to an utterance has the effect of focusing attention on other aspects of conversation (interaction itself, or expression of attitudes, for instance) than the propositional content of the message. This would be typical of so called women's language - especially as seen through the eyes of representatives of the speakers of male language. (Cf. R. Lakoff 1975, 1979, Östman 1981a.) The fact that women tend to use more indirect, subordinate åm-constructions than men ('indirect' is the crucial word) can also be taken as an instance of a realization of typical linguistic difference between male and female language (although the occurrences here are extremely low).

The figures for the other particles and question indicators in Tables 3.3. and 3.4. prove to be very interesting from the point of view of establishing a set of particles as the question particles in Solf. Whereas the figures for the categories 'Other particles' and 'Pronoun

repetitons' indicate that women tend to use instances of these categories more often, the figures for the categories 'Na' and 'Elå' actually go in the opposite direction. Thus, if it is true as I have hypothesized in this study, that the particles tå, då, elå, and na are more conventionally associated with requesting information or confirmation than any other particles, we can presume that other particles would then be used for less grammaticized and conventionalized purposes - like expressing attitudes, emotions, and establishing rapport. If that is the case, the figures in Tables 3.3. and 3.4. would simply indicate that - in accordance with what is generally said about typical women's language - women (also in Solf) tend to use such markers more often than men (cf. the categories 'Other particles' and 'Pronoun repetitions').

As I pointed out above, the overall differences between male and female usage in relation to the present data are not statistically reliable, and there are issues that I have not gone into detail about: why, for instance, would men use elå and na more often than women? Still, most of the figures do go in the direction students of 'language and sex' would predict, and there thus seems to be evidence in favor of the more precise hypothesis put forth at the beginning of this section.

3.4. Psycholinguistic aspects - results of an experiment

In an experiment to be reported more in detail in Östman forthcoming a. I asked twenty-four native speakers of Solf to give responses to different versions - containing a variety of pragmatic particles - of one and the same sentence. Since the major goal of that study is to discuss the interaction of particles and prosody in one and the same language (i.e. in Solf), I accordingly synthesized (a) sentences with and without particles, (b) sentences (with and without particles) with 'appropriate' intonation, and the same sentences with a neutral (slightly falling) intonation, and (c) different types of intonation contours without verbal material. For each prompt sentence, the subjects were asked to check off ready-made alternatives on a set of questionnaires.

Since the experiment also included prompts with the question particles elå, då, and na, I will here briefly survey some of the findings relating to these. The prompts I want to discuss are those that have a neutral, slightly falling intonation all through, and the versions of the sentence I will concentrate on are given in Table 3.5.. (Bulla means '(coffee-)bread,' billit means 'cheap,' and i and je are different - in free variation if unstressed - forms of the copula 'to be'.)

I take categories 5-7 to indicate different degrees of uncertainty, and the categorization by a subject of a prompt as a 5, 6, or 7 as indicating that in that subject's opinion a potential speaker of such a sentence is requesting confirmation or information from his addressee. The results of how the subjects judged prompts A-E with respect to the degree these sentences ask for confirmation or information is presented in Table 3.7.. (The percentages indicate the per cent of subjects who categorized the prompts as 5-7.)

E.	Je bulla na billit	87.5%
B.	Je bulla billit	79.2%
D.	Bulla i billit elå	70.8%
C.	Bulla i billit då	37.5%
A.	Bulla i billit	0.0%

Table 3.7. Sentences judged for the degree of uncertainty they express. (The percentages indicate the per cent of subjects who categorized prompts A-E as 5, 6, or 7. Cf. Table 3.6..)

The figures are very much as one would expect. Nobody regarded A as expressing uncertainty. B is the ordinary y/n inverted question form, and eight out of ten subjects felt that inversion alone is enough to mark a sentence as some sort of request. But two out of ten obviously felt that something is missing: a particular kind of prosody, a particle, or a gesture, we can assume. Even adding the particle na - which we saw has a dubious status of being a question particle (by itself) - almost makes one more out of the ten classify the prompt as a request. (One

subject, i.e. 4.2% did not respond to the prompt.) D is close to a tag question, and would be expected to receive uncertainty responses. The distribution between categories 5, 6, and 7 as regards elå is as follows (here, too, one subject's response was unclear).

```
_____
5.  'somewhat uncertain'      20.8%
6.  'uncertain'               29.2%
7.  'question'                20.8%
_____
```

<u>Table 3.8.</u> Responses to prompt D, with elå.

Category C in Table 3.7. does not seem to live up to our hopes, but we have to remember that the prompt has a very neutral (almost level) intonation and statement form. And despite this, almost four out of ten subjects would be ready to classify the prompt as indicating uncertainty. This is a clear indication that då is not by itself a grammaticized question particle. But the figures also indicate that many native speakers have conventionalized it as a request indicator to some extent. Also, as can be seen from the distribution of the responses to C in Table 3.9., the major clustering of responses is for category 5, 'somewhat uncertain.'

```
-  no answer              4.2%
-  multiple answers       4.2%
1. 'extremely certain'   12.5%
2. 'certain'              8.3%
3. 'fairly certain'      20.8%
4. 'neutral'             12.5%
5. 'somewhat uncertain'  33.3%
6. 'uncertain'            0.0%
7. 'question'             4.2%
```

Table 3.9. Responses to prompt C, with då.

*

Another response sheet consisted of alternatives of a different kind: I wanted to find out to what extent particles express certain typical attitudes or feelings. In this test the subjects were allowed, and even encouraged, to check off more than one alternative for each prompt. The set-up for the experiment was the same as for the modality experiment, except that only six alternatives were given. The alternatives were those in Table 3.10.

```
I.    The speaker ('s statement) sounds neutral, without any
      extra feelings or emotions (No grammatical subject was
      given in the characterizing statement for each slot.)
II.   The speaker sounds polite
III.  The speaker sounds friendly and understanding
IV.   The speaker sounds angry, agressive, critical, and
      impertinent
V.    The speaker sounds calm and relaxed
VI.   The speaker sounds impatient, irritated, uninterested,
      and stressed.
```

Table 3.10. Six alternative responses, indicating different attitudes and feelings.

Let us first have a look at the extent to which prompts A-E were characterized as 'neutral.' Cf. Table

3.11..

```
A. Bulla i billit        62.5%
C. Bulla i billit då     20.8%
D. Bulla i billit elå    16.7%
E. Je bulla na billit    12.5%
B. Je bulla billit        8.3%
```

Table 3.11. Response I, 'neutral,' to prompts A-E.

What is striking here is of course that it is only the straightforward statement A that a significant number of subjects feel is neutral (or at least do not place in any of the categories II-VI). The figures for the rest of the categories thus indicate that particles do indicate some kind of speaker's involvement in what s/he is saying (again, remember that the pitch contour of each prompt was constant). Even though the differences are small, it is interesting to note again that då is the particle that is 'less involved,' i.e. most grammaticized. The figure for category B, the ordinary question, is somewhat sur- prising, though. It actually suggests that an utterance with question form, but without the appropriate intonation, and without any supporting particles, will be taken to have a stronger affective meaning than - presumably - a question with particles (cf. E), and/or intonation. And this, if anything, shows the difference between question formation in Solf and in standard Swedish.

The next task is to see whether any (or any combina- tion) of the choices II-VI can be associated with a partic-

ular question particle. Since these particles are, after all, particles that indicate request for information or confirmation, we should not expect any of them to be uniquely associated with communicating a particular feeling or attitude. Rather, we should look for tendencies, and see the results on a par with what we talk about as the affective meaning of words - except that in the case of pragmatic particles there is very often no defi>ite propositional content that the affective meaning is added to.

Category II, 'polite,' is somewhat different from categories III-VI, in that it more explicitly refers to interactive characteristics, whereas the other categories have to do more with the speaker's feelings and attitudes. A speaker can be calm, friendly, angry or impatient without necessarily having these feelings towards his/her addressee. But being polite by definition means that you are polite to the addressee, or your audience. If the responses are placed on a scale according to the extent A-E prompted the subjects to check the 'polite' box, we find that no one thought A was polite, and the sentence with då in it was considered to be the most polite alternative. However, since the percentage figure for då was only 25%, it might not at first sight seem significant. Still, we should be content with getting figures in this percentage range, taking into account the level of conventionality we are working at: these are not propositional, semantic meanings

of the particles, but rather 'accessory meanings.' But since a certain percentage of subjects agree to assign the ‧same 'accessory meaning' to a particle (or a sentence containing a particular particle), in effect, **to that extent,** the particle is conventionalized. Since this part of the experiment did not contain sentences with the particle tå, we cannot, of course, be sure that tå does not have similar, polite functions. On the contrary, it seems that we do use tå to soften down commands, as in the following utterance.

```
(1) Ta    hiit an tå
       take here it tå            (+M ORI79-JO3-1)
       'Give it to me, then!'
```

If we put together all the categories that indicate a positive response, namely 'polite' (II), 'friendly' (III), and 'calm' (V), we find that the two highest scoring prompts were sentences C (elå; 62.5%) and D (då; 45.8%). Since the high score for då might be due to its high score for the category 'polite,' we can exclude category II, and then find that it is in fact the sentence with elå that gives by far the most positive scores, as Table 3.12. shows.

D. Bulla i billit elå	41.6%
C. Bulla i billit då	20.8%
E. Je bulla na billit	20.8%
B. Je bulla billit	8.4%
A. Bulla i billit	8.4%

Table 3.12. Responses indicating the degree to which the prompts were felt to express a positive feeling (categories III and V).

If we do the opposite maneuvre and put together the categories that express negative feelings, we get the result in Table 3.13..

B.	Je bulla billit	58.3%
E.	Je bulla na billit	45.8%
C.	Bulla i billit då	33.3%
A.	Bulla i billit	29.2%
D.	Bulla i billit elå	20.8%

Table 3.13. Responses indicating the degree to which the prompts were felt to express a negative feeling (categories IV and VI).

Not only is category D the most positive, it is also the prompt that gets least negative responses. On the other hand, we again see that questions without intonation are taken to express rather negative attitudes, and even a sentence like E, with question form and the particle na, is felt to be rather negative.

If we disregard the category 'polite,' and put together all the responses to categories III-VI, we end up with figures for the extent to which speakers express their attitudes, feelings, in general, their involvement, by using A-E.

B.	Je bulla billit	66.7%
E.	Je bulla na billit	66.7%
D.	Bulla i billit elå	62.5%
C.	Bulla i billit då	54.1%
A.	Bulla i billit	37.6%

Table 3.14. Subjects' judgments of the general involvement the prompts express (categories III - VI).

The high figures here no doubt to a large extent have to do with the nature of the test. But it is interesting to note that the sentence with då is lowest on the hierarchy (excepting the neutral A). On the other hand, då was the prompt that was classified as being the most 'polite.' It thus seems that particles tend to choose to be most effective either in the area of 'involvement' - with the speaker him/herself in focus - or in the area of interaction, where the addressee (or the speaker and the addressee together) are in focus. On the basis of the results given above, we can then say that då is more of an interactive particle, whereas elå is a particle that expresses positive involvement, and na seems to be a particle that expresses more of a negative involvement. Except for the neutral prompt A, na has the lowest score for politeness; except for B, it receives the least number of 'neutral' responses; it is low on the 'positive' hierarchy, and high on the 'negative' hierarchy, although here, of course, other factors - question form in particular - might be decisive. Note, however, that B and E receive the same overall figure for expression of involvement.

Finally, I will have a brief look at the extent to which A-E were classified as either of III-VI more than the others. The percentages in the grid below indicate the same as in the other tables: the extent to which subjects have indicated that a sentence is of a particular category.

	III friendly	IV angry	V calm	VI impatient
A. Bulla i billit	4.2	16.7	4.2	12.5
B. Je bulla billit	4.2	25	4.2	33.3
C. Bulla i billit då	12.5	12.5	8.3	20.8
D. Bulla i billit elå	20.8	4.2	20.8	16.7
E. Je bulla na billit	20.8	16.7	0.0	29.2

Table 3.15. Percentages of responses to prompts A-E with respect to the different categories III-VI of involvement.

I chose the categories III-VI on the basis, first of all, that I thought I could myself distinguish these four without too much difficulty, secondly, on the basis of research within psycholinguistics (cf. e.g. Silverman, Scherer & Ladd 1983; Ladd, Scherer & Silverman forthcoming), and thirdly, because they made up two pairs with opposite poles, and this would make it easier for the subjects to decide among the six alternatives they were given. (I also spent much time with each subject before each test situation to make sure the subjects knew what the alternatives were.) On the basis of the results in Table 3.15. it also seems fair to say that the categories 'friendly' and 'angry,' on the one hand, and 'calm' and 'impatient,' on the other hand, are opposites also with respect to the responses they got in this test: D and E were friendly, A and B (and also E!) were angry, while C was 'both'; D was calm and B and E and C were impatient.

More in detail, A was felt to sound angry more than anything else, B was felt to sound impatient by one third of the subjects, and one fourth of the subjects felt that

it also sounds angry. And note that these are the ordinary, neutral ways of forming statements and questions in standard Swedish. But in this test they had a monotonous intonation, and no particles. Sentence E (with question form and <u>na</u>) does not fare much better. Almost one third of the subjects classified it as impatient, and 16.7% as angry, but there was still one fifth of the subjects who felt that it has some amount of friendliness in it - a friendliness that <u>na</u> itself adds, since B did not sound too friendly, and the sentences are otherwise the same.

Sentence D (with <u>elå</u>) seems to be the most friendly and calm prompt, although it also seems to have an element of impatience in it. The friendliness and calmness go well together with the general positive attitudes that <u>elå</u> seem to express (see above). Sentence C (with <u>då</u>) is hard to define with respect to the four categories. And this is of course what we can expect of a prompt that seems to be more effective on the interactive plane in language (cf. the discussion of 'polite' above). The relatively high figure for <u>då</u> for the category 'impatient' might be explained by what I earlier characterized as its meaning of 'being in opposition' (cf. sections 2.3.2.2. and 2.3.2.3.).

The results of the experiment discussed in this section clearly show that each of the particles are associated with particular discourse functions in addition to their use as near-grammaticized question particles. The results of this analysis will be further discussed in

Chapter 4.

3.5. Implications

My analysis of question particles in Solf has gone along a number of very different avenues. In Chapter 4 I will pull the different results together and indicate the direction in ᵾich this manifold analysis takes us. In this section I will iiscuss some implications for the analysis of questions and the analysis of pragmatic particles in general. The first section of Chapter 4 will take up for discussion the theoretical implications about the field of pragmatics that we can draw from the analyses in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3.

<div align="center">*</div>

In order to be able to talk about question particles in the terms I have used in this study, I started out from a cognitive-semantic perspective. Instead of making an either-or distinction in terms of syntactic characterizations, I approached questions and requests from a scalar point of view: a construction that is used in utterances whose function is to (seemingly) give the addressee more power in an interaction of information transference manifests some part of this (interactively defined) conceptual field, and can be regarded as more or less of a question. In section 2.2. I set up a tentative gradience (Figure 2.1.) to cover the conceptual field of

directives, and in my analysis of question formation in Solf I have shown not only the plausibility of such a gradience, but its necessity - especially if we see language as a dynamic process (both synchronically and diachronically), and not only as a stative product.

The fact that I have talked about a set of particles in Solf as question particles - with reference to a scale of requests for information and confirmation - does not, however, mean that I see the meaning and function of such particles as wholly determined by this conceptual field. In the analyses, it has become clear that the relevant particles have a number of 'accessory' meanings in addition to their question-forming function. I place the word 'accessory' within quotes, because it is only from the point of view of question formation that these meanings or functions are secondary. The 'accessory' meanings can themselves be defined in terms of similar conceptual fields, or gradient scales.

In fact, it has become clear from recent research in lexicology that the meaning of most lexical items should be seen in scalar terms. Even when we agree on the meaning (the 'correct' application) of a word, say, 'table,' we still have to accept that different speakers might think of different kinds of tables when confronted with the lexeme TABLE: does a table have a round or square surface; is it one-legged or four-legged; how high does a table have to be for it to be called 'a table'? In lexicology we over-

look idiolectal connotations of lexemes, simply because these connotations do not seem to be easily predictable, nor essential for getting at an overall understanding of a particular lexeme. For lexicological reasons we abstract out its PROTOTYPE (Rosch 1973, 1977, Fillmore 1975b, 1978), CORE (Putnam 1970), or PEAK (Östman 1979c, 1979d, 1981b) meaning on the basis of the frequency with which one or several meanings are ascribed to a lexeme by native speakers.

In addition to the core meaning of a lexical item, dictionaries also tend to give an inventory of a set of features over which the meanings of lexemes can range. This set can be referred to as its DOMAIN, or RANGE. (Cf. also Wittgenstein's (1967) concept of family resemblance.)

In traditional terms, the core meaning of a lexeme would be the necessary and sufficient ingredients that make up the lexicon meaning of the lexeme, and the domain would constitute the sufficient, but not necessary ingredients. Strictly idiolectal connotations would be neither necessary nor sufficient ingredients for the meaning of a particular lexeme. The distinction between the core and the range of applicability of a lexeme can also be seen in TYPE-TOKEN terms. The core meaning of a lexeme refers to the lexeme as a part of a linguistic and abstract system, whereas tokens of this type can range in their meaning and application depending on the verbal cotext and situational context.

In a number of articles (Östman 1979a, 1979c, 1979d, 1981b) I have shown that abstracting out conceptual frames (in terms of a multidimensionality of conceptual scales) over which a linguistic element can range, and within which it can be given a core meaning is useful not only for describing the meanings of nouns, but also for describing the behavior of pragmatic particles. Since the success of this approach rests on the efficiency and workability of the stipulated (or simply detected, on the basis of perceived human behavior) abstract arsenal of conceptual fields, it is obvious that the greatest problem here is to 'find' the empirically adequate conceptual categories (i.e. scales).

In Östman (1979c, 1981b) I illustrated how the core-domain approach could be used to characterize the semantic meaning of pragmatic particles in terms of a scale of modality. At one end this scale was Certainty (the speaker expresses certainty about the propositional content of his/her message) and the other pole was Uncertainty. Note, however, that this scale is only one of a set of similar scales, and that looking at pragmatic particles in the light of only one such scale would naturally give only one aspect of the meaning of the particles.

As an example, compare the following characterizations of (standard) Swedish ju, Finnish -kin, and English polarity tag-questions (from Östman 1979c:180).

```
        ---------------------------------------------------------------------
                             ⬆
                            $
                         %%%%%%%%%%%
        Swe ju        C   x----------x-----------x   U
                                      N


                                                  ⬆
                                                 $
                         %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
        Eng. tags     C   x----------x-----------x   U


                             ⬆
                            $
                         %%%%%
        Fi. -kin      C   x----------x-----------x   U

        ---------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Figure 3.2. Examples of core-domain analyses with respect to a scale of modality.

<Key to Figure 3.2.

    C = speaker expressing certainty as to what his pro position says

    U = speaker expressing uncertainty ...

    N = speaker being neutral with regard to the truth of his proposition

    x---x an abstracted conceptual scale

    %%%% domain; the range of applicability of an ele ment of language with respect to a particular scale

    $ core meaning within a domain; the term 'peak mean ing' that I have used in earlier discussions has its basis in the representation above>

The representation of the relevance particle ju in Swedish in Figure 3.2. means that, on this scale, it can range in meaning from expressing that the speaker is convinced of what s/he is saying, as in (1), to expressing that s/he is neutral (or even somewhat uncertain) with respect to the propositional content of his/her message, as in (2). (These examples are from Allén et al. 1976.)

(1) Tyskarna anföll   ju inte Sverige
    Germans attacked ju not Sweden
    'The Germans didn't attack Sweden (as you should know)'

(2) Och ni använde ju inte de 6000 kronorna genast
and you used ju not the 6000 crowns at-once
'And (I presume) you didn't use the 6,000 crowns at once'

The peak for ju (its core meaning) in this domain will lie quite close to the Certainty pole. This peak would stand for the meaning most frequently associated with ju on this scale. The domains and peaks for -kin and tag-questions in English could be explained in similar terms. An example of a tag expressing certainty would be (3) (cf. Östman 1981b) as opposed to the typical case of tag-questions expressing uncertainty, as in (4).

(3) You didn't know that, did you!

(4) It's raining outside, isn't it?

(For a detailed discussion of -kin, see Östman 1977.)

In Östman (1979c) I also suggested that intonation contours could be given semantic meanings with the peak-domain approach. In this way we can show the similarities of intonation contours and pragmatic particles, as well as account for what I earlier talked about as their complementary distribution. The meaning of a particle in one language and a frozen intonation contour (cf. Liberman & Sag 1974, Sag & Liberman 1975, Ladd 1978, 1980, 1983) in another language can thus be compared with respect to different scales. (Cf. Östman 1979c:188 for a suggestion of an analysis of intonation contours in these terms.)

If we see questions and requests as lying on a scale which represents a conceptual field, the next question is whether this scale is a different scale from the

modality scale.

The basic criterion for treating some pragmatic particles as question particles in Solf is not that one or two of them could be singled out as being fully grammaticized particles as such. Rather, as we saw, there is a general tendency in Solf to have (especially sentence-final) particles in an utterance which expresses a request of some sort. I also pointed out that a number of the particles that take part in this general tendency were, in fact, what I call probability particles. These can, of course, most directly be described in terms of the modality scale.

In fact, the only workable criterion for separating the probability and question particles in Solf would have to be a positional one. Probability particles tend to occur sentence internally, after the tense-carrying verb; question particles tend to occur sentence finally. On a functional basis, the two categories of particles can only be separated in very gradient terms. Probability particles express the attitudes of the speaker, whereas the question particles are more explicitly interactive and addressee-oriented. However, if X communicates to Y a statement that expresses less than complete certainty, then Y can regard this as a request for confirmation (and still be said to follow normal principles of co-operation). Conversely, of course, a request for information also shows that the speaker is to some degree uncertain about the tenability of

his utterance. This might suggest that we should see these two scales (the modality scale and the question scale) as one notional schema, going from Statement towards lesser degrees of certainty, ending up in Question.

Nevertheless, because of the positional differences in the manifestations of these scales as regards the use of particles, and because of the basic difference between probability particles as being more speaker-oriented, while particles of request are more addressee-oriented, my view is that the two scales should be kept apart. Notice also that while probability particles could possibly be seen as functioning on both of these scales, the question particles that I have discussed in this study do not have a modal function. Still, the two scales do have quite specific relationships. Schematically, the following picture emerges.[10]

Figure 3.3. Hypothesized interaction between a scale of modality and a scale of questioning.

I think of the broken lines as necessary projections from one scale to the other, so that a choice on one scale usually entails a (more or less specific) choice on the

Solf would not be complete. Especially for a language like Solf with few written records, it is not enough to say, for instance, that a reanalysis is taking place, with the effect that the sentence-final particles are taking over the functions of inversion and prosody for forming questions in Solf. We need to be able to describe this state of affairs as a system in itself, not as something in between one system and the next. At present, the standard Swedish system with inversion and prosody, and the Finnish system with particles might be working together in Solf - but what we have is **one** system, the Solf system, where the particles do not have the same functions as inversion and prosody in standard Swedish, but they offer a vast amount of facilitating support to the addressee when s/he needs to decide whether something is a question or not.

<p align="center">*</p>

Although the discussion of particles in this chapter has mainly been concerned with one small area (particles asking for information or confirmation) of the whole field of pragmatic particles, it has nevertheless proved very informative for getting more general information about how pragmatic particles function in language.

I have already discussed a number of hypotheses and implications in this and the preceding chapter. For instance, I suggested the possibility of a close functional similarity between the use of particles and certain aspects of prosody in languages in general, such that, where - for

whatever reason - one device cannot be used, the other will be used. I have also indicated the importance of taking into account socioloinguistic and, in particular, psycholinguistic aspects when describing the functions of pragmatic particles. Since pragmatic particles tend not to have any propositional meaning, an adequate description of their functions should naturally be sought in the realm where pragmatic particles do have an impact.

The function the members of the class of pragmatic particles perform is implicit, and they primarily have a function within what we could call the pragmatic perspective on language. Much of what has been done in the published research on particles is, however, to a large extent part of semantics. For instance, discussions of the focus and scope of particles come under this characterization, and we can also see the stress on semantic issues in the frequent use of terms like 'modal' or 'focus' particles. But we need to go on from where semantics leaves us, and try to say something general about the pragmatic particles in their natural habitat: the pragmatic component of language.

If we characterize pragmatic particles on a structural basis we can form a prototype concept of what a pragmatic particle looks like. Drawing on recent research in the field, we could come up with the following relevant parameters in such a structural word class. (Cf. for instance discussions in Arndt 1960, Weydt 1969, Kriwonossow

1977, Östman 1982a.)

a. item length: pragmatic particles are typically very short;

b. prosody: pragmatic particles are typically subordinated prosodically to another word or phrase;

c. lexicality: a pragmatic particle typically resists clear lexical specifications; it is propositionally empty; and,

d. sentential structure: a pragmatic particle typically modifies the whole of a sentence.

There are obvious problems with having this word-class characterization as a starting point for a universal characterization of pragmatic particles. Some of these (especially a) are very idiosyncratic in comparison to existing word-class criteria. There are also problems of delimitation: a formally defined class of pragmatic particles will overlap with other classes; and there are elements in language (for instance, expressions like generally speaking; cf. Östman 1982b) that function in the same way as pragmatic particles, but do not conform to the structural criteria given above. So, if pragmatic particles are seen as a word class on a par with other word classes, their status will become that of an ill-defined and non-intuitive category, similar to the Stoics' class of Particles (containing any word that cannot be declined). This kind of classification of pragmatic particles involves relating them to the textual PRODUCT.

The other way to get a handle on the class of pragmatic particles is to approach them from a more dynamic point of view, and see how they function in discourses seen as PROCESSES. Both of these approaches, as well as semantic characterizations of pragmatic particles, are necessary. And there is, of course, nothing strange with such a double classification and characterization of a class of elements. This is the way we always have to work: we have to take all existing perspectives on language into account simultaneously.

If we approach the issue from the point of view of how these particles function in discourse, we can distinguish two separate avenues. First there is the aspect of discourse cohesion. This lies very close to the structural way of looking at language, especially if we think of the cohesion of a product text. Pragmatic particles not only take part in the architecture of the individual sentence (cf. Östman 1979d), they also partake in building up larger textual architectures, by tying one text (or sentence) to another in some way. (Cf. Östman 1982a.) In conversational analyses, pragmatic particles are often classified on positional grounds, and thus we find subclasses like post-completers and prestarters (Sacks et al. 1974). Similarly, in structural approaches to narratology, pragmatic particles are classified as episode markers, organizers, or simply as connectives.

The second avenue we can take is to note the similar-

ities there are between the function of pragmatic part-
icles, and the function of certain aspects of prosody
(e.g. voice quality), paralinguistic features, and non-
verbal behavior. What the pragmatic particles have in
common with these is implicitness. Both anchor utterances
to the speaker's attitudes about the situational context,
and to his/her interactive behavior.

Notice incidentally that the different aspects of
the pragmatic particles that I have talked about here do
not constitute subclasses of pragmatic particles. All
pragmatic particles potentially rely on these aspects in
discourse. But even if we should not talk about clausal,
textual, attitudinal, or interactional particles as
separate subclasses, it is true that the pragmatic part-
icles both can have, and do have, any one (or several) of
these aspects in **focus**. For instance, I guess has the
clausal aspect in focus (cf. its close relation to the
epistemic particles <u>I suppose,</u> and <u>I believe</u>). <u>You know,</u>
again, has the interactional aspect in focus, but it also
has an important textual usage. (Cf. Östman 1981a.)

It should be obvious that both the structural and
the functional information are necessary for an overall
characterization of pragmatic particles. Without the func-
tional characterization pragmatic particles would be
reduced to little more than an extremely-hard-to-define
word class; without the structural delimitation pragmatic
particles could not be distinguished from implicit anchor-

ing performed by gestural or prosodic means, nor from any verbal element that on a particular occasion happens to have, say, an expressive function.

*

In my discussion of the question particles in Solf I found that none of the particles could be described as completely grammaticized question particles. I also found that most of them had close connections to the propositional meanings that their respective homonymous forms have in Solf. Thus, there were cases where <u>elå</u> was used as the only question indicator in an utterance, there were other cases where <u>elå</u> functioned like a tag, and there were cases where <u>elå</u> simply meant 'or,' but there were also cases where <u>elå</u> had a function somewhere in-between these meanings. It was not clear from the context, say, whether <u>elå</u> was more like a tag, or more like a conjunction. And finally, there were instances in the data like <u>A an stodeera – elå ondäviisa – han tään tå å</u> 'Has he studied – I mean taught – there too?,' where <u>elå</u> had a clear pragmatic function, somewhat like the English <u>I mean</u>.

It is clear from examples like these that delimiting a class of pragmatic particles will be very difficult if every particle turns out to have this kind of shading-off and variable meaning whenever it is used. Notice also that there is no easy way to talk about different homonymous items in a case like that of <u>elå.</u> The problem with the particle is that it seems to retain some aspect of each

of its potential meanings/functions whenever it occurs, and thus, with respect to this particle at least, no strict dividing line can be drawn between 'conjunction,' 'tag,' and 'pragmatic particle.' The more general problem is that the same kind of argument could be made, mutatis mutandis, for tå, då, and na.

As a first attempt at tackling this problem I have made a distinction between the CENTRAL pragmatic particles in a language, and the PERIPHERAL particles of that language. (Cf. Östman 1982a, 1982b, where I use the term 'core' particles instead of 'central' particles.)

In Östman (1982a:153) I argued that the ultimate delimiting criteria for calling a linguistic unit a proto-typical (i.e. a central) pragmatic particle is that

(a) this unit does not directly partake in the proposition-al content of an utterance; and that

(b) it has as its **sole** function to implicitly anchor the (propositional content of the) utterance to the emotions and attitudes of the speaker, and/or to a particular level of politeness, and/or to some coherence aspect of the discourse. (For a detailed account of the sense in which I use these terms, see Chapter 4.)

'Sole function' here means that for an item to be called a central pragmatic particle, it should never be able to have any other than a pragmatic-particle function. It is always an instance of the class of pragmatic particles

independent of where it occurs.

This definition of pragmatic particles will exclude from the class of central pragmatic particles such expressions as can (but need not always) have a pragmatic-particle function (for instance, aspectual particles like just, and too in English, and most of the question particles in Solf that I have discussed in this study), and whose pragmatic-particle function is not clearly delimited from its propositional meaning. These are then the peripheral members of the class of pragmatic particles.

Note, however, that the core pragmatic particles can still have homonyms which have a clear propositional content. But in these cases the pragmatic and propositional functions are clearly separate in nature, with no scalar relation between the two. This status of homonymity is what is being made use of in a joke like the following:

(5) A: You know, yesterday I really enjoyed myself!
     B: No I don't, actually.

In Östman 1982b I suggested that English has, at least, the following set of central pragmatic particles:

I-mean	you-know	why	oh	man
I-guess	you-see	well	uh	blood
I-say		like	ah	
		say		

Table 3.16. Central pragmatic particles in English.

and I also suggested a sub-classification of the peripheral pragmatic particles in English, using terms like 'aspect-

uals' (e.g. <u>too</u>, <u>also</u>, <u>now</u>, <u>just</u>), 'hedges' (e.g. <u>kinda</u>, <u>sorta</u>), 'epistemics' (e.g. <u>I-suppose</u>, <u>I-think</u>), 'supports' (e.g. <u>yeah</u>, <u>uhuh</u>), and 'turn-takers' (e.g. <u>anyway</u>, <u>okay</u>). For this tentative list and classification of pragmatic particles in English, I refer the reader to Östman 1982b.

Applying this classificatory system to the question particles in Solf would result in a classification of them as a subclass of peripheral pragmatic particles, which could be called 'information requesters' (cf. in English particles like <u>huh?</u>, <u>ok?</u>, and other tags). Thus, while in Solf the modality particles <u>no</u>, <u>vel</u>, <u>fol</u>, the relevance particle <u>jo</u>, and the emphatic particle <u>noo</u> would probably be classified as central pragmatic particles that are never obligatory from the point of view of truth-functionality, propositionality, or spatio-temporality (cf. 1.3.), the request particles <u>elå</u>, <u>tå</u>, and <u>na</u> are peripheral particles, and thus only potential implicit anchorers. Other particles extensively discussed in this chapter which would also be classified as peripheral include <u>int</u> and <u>nö</u>, whereas the particle <u>då</u> (and probably also <u>tå då</u>) would be central particles – although not necessarily with the aspect of request-making as their basic function. (Further studies are in need here.)

*

Finally, the question particles in Solf also give information about how pragmatic particles develop diachronically in language.

The class of pragmatic particles is a pseudo-open class. The central members are relatively few, but pragmatic-particleness is peripherally dispersed in various directions (in terms of the center-periphery distinction). I would claim that there are basically two historical sources for pragmatic particles. One source is that they are related to homonymous adverbs, phrases, or other constructions. These are expressions that are most often explicit attitude anchorers, but which can in certain situations be used in a more implicit manner. And consequently, their prototypical meaning/function might also gradually change.

For instance, the propositional meaning of Swedish säkert (Solf seekärt) is 'for sure.' But if I say (6)

(6) Han kommer säkert
    he comes for-sure

this can **either** mean that he is sure to come, or the opposite, viz. that I am not at all so sure that he will come. (The same can be said about varmasti in Finnish.)[11]

Thus, in this case, an attitudinal adverbial might get additional, interactive or attitudinal, meanings that eventually overthrow their propositional meanings (or, as in most cases, we get clear homonyms).

The other source of pragmatic particles is the actual function of language itself, and can be illustrated with expressions like English wow, uhuh, and oh. It is interesting that expressions like these should get so conventionalized as to be peripheral, rather than central,

pragmatic particles. But <u>oh</u>, for instance, is a con-
ventionalized representations of a kind of hesitation, and
moreover, it follows fairly precise rules. (Cf. James 1972,
1973.) It is, in fact, conventionalized in the same way as
any other sounds or forms mean specific things.

In this case, then, it is the context of situation
itself (and the interactants within it) which supply the
language with elements for expressing attitudes (usually
accompanied by specific prosodies or gestures).[12]

*

In Chapter 1 I dicussed the problems that this study
set out to solve and in the beginning of this section I
discussed some general implications for the study of
questions that could be drawn on the basis of the analyses
in Chapters 2 and 3.

More in particular, the analysis of question part-
icles in Solf has shown that it might sometimes be worth
while not to make one's analyses in terms of traditional
lingustic abstractions, even at the abstraction level where
we find concepts like syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.
The analyst has to relate particular sentences to the
situations in which they occur, in order to be able to
decide whether speakers are making questions or not.

The question particles in Solf have to be treated as
a subclass of the general class of pragmatic particles,
which do not have a clearly specifiable propositional
content in an utterance, but relate to aspects in the

situational context. But the question particles are not central pragmatic particles. They play a double role in language in that they are manifestations both of language seen as a structural system, and of language seen as goal-oriented action. And because neither a syntactico-semantic nor a pragmatic characterization of the question particles is necessary nor sufficient, the question particles have to be defined in prototype terms over syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic features of language. The question particles in Solf are manifestations of language as a communicative system, where language is seen as a Gestalt concept, rather than as a conglomerate of interacting abstractions.

3.6. Summary

In this chapter I have looked at the question particles in Solf in two related perspectives: from the point of view of discourse, and from the point of view of the community of Solf itself.

In section 3.1. I showed that the question particles behave in a manner similar to pragmatic particles in general in that the speaker can leave them out of his/her utterance for the purpose of making the propositional content more prominent. Support for this hypothesis was found in situations where a question which contains one or more particles get repeated by the same speaker. In Chapter

4 of this study I will come back to discourse aspects of the question particles, and deal with the particles more systematically in relation to the theoretical framework to be discussed in that chapter.

In the other sections of this chapter I discuss the question particles from the point of view of the Solf speaker in his/her communicative situations - both diachronically and synchronically. In section 3.2. I found a potential source for the occurrence of question particles in Solf: Finnish uses a grammaticized question particle. I was not, however, able to show that there was an unambiguous direct influence from Finnish in this area. But in the further discussion of åm-constructions as questions I did find clear indications of Finnish influence. I concluded that the influence of Finnish on Solf - and on Finland Swedish in general - goes far beyond the area of prosody. As a further indication of the close relationship between the two cultures, we can note that there is a number of everyday words in Swedish, like those for 'boy,' and 'shoe' which have been borrowed from Finnish.

In the sections on sociolinguistic issues, I found that there are differences in the language of older and younger speakers as regards question formation; generally speaking, constructions with particles tend to be used more frequently by older speakers. I also found evidence of a difference in the use of question particles when correlated with the sex of the speaker.

Finally, the results of the psycholinguistic experiment discussed in section 3.4. clearly indicate that each of the question particles has particular pragmatic functions in the manner of pragmatic particles in general.

Footnotes to Chapter 3

[1]Furthermore, Swedish _eller_ is of Common Germanic origin, and is also found in Gothic (cf. Hellquist 1922).

Finnish has three words for 'or': _tai_, _vai_, and _eli_. Whereas _tai_ and _vai_ are used between alternatives, _eli_ is used when the elements (words, phrases, sentences) surrounding it are synonyms. It may be, then, that the phonetic similarity between _eli_ and _elä_ has had an influence in the development of their meanings at some stage. And what is more, _eli_ can also be used in a manner similar to the use of _elä_ in Solf. Thus, we can imagine a situation where speaker A says _I've been abroad for two weeks_, and speaker B replies with (i).

```
(i) Eli et    siis olisi       pystynyt ryöstämään pankkiani
    or  not thus should-be managed  to-rob      my-bank
    viime viikolla
    last  week
    'In other words, you would not have been able to rob my
    bank last week'
```

In the same manner as _elä_ retains some of its sense of 'or,' even when it is used sentence finally, so also _eli_ can be used to introduce an alternative - giving the (sometimes unjustified) implication that the alternatives are synonyms. For instance,

```
(ii) Onko   sinulla jano,  eli haluatko     teetä?
     be-kO you        thirst or  want-you-kO tea
     'Are you thirsty, that is, would you like some tea?'
```

But note that _eli_ cannot be used as a tag in the same way as _elä (va)_ . In Finnish, _vai_ is used in tags:

(iii) Oletko   ostanut uuden auton, vai?
      be-you-<u>kO</u> bought new   car   or
      'You've bought a new car, have you?'

Taking an even broader areal perspective, we can note finally that <u>ili</u>, 'or' in Russian is even more similar in function to <u>elå</u> than to <u>eli</u>. <u>Ili</u> can be used in all the senses of <u>tai</u>, <u>vai</u>, and <u>eli</u>, and also in tags: <u>ili kak</u>.

[2]It could then, of course, be argued that Swedish, too, since it uses the acute-gravis distinction for lexical purposes, should have an abundance of particles. However, recent studies of these issues indicate that it is primarily when they are said in isolation that words like <u>anden</u> 'the duck,' and <u>anden</u> 'the spirit' can be separated on the basis of their respective stress patterns. (Cf. Bruce 1977.)

[3]In Solf, the performative verb does not have to be <u>frååga</u> 'ask,' but can also be <u>sej</u> 'say.' Cf. the following utterance, where the say-verb is used explicitly.

(i) Ja segär vann vadan   jer eje elå vann --
    I say   where from-where is this <u>elå</u> where
                                 (+F SOL80-J09-2)
    'I asked where, from where is this, then, or where..?'

[4]This analysis, or rather, the fact that you can have a matrix question starting with <u>åm</u>, is evidence against Bresnan's (1972) analysis of WH-words as belonging to the class of complementizers. One of her main arguments is precisely that <u>whether</u> and <u>that</u> do not show up in matrix clauses, and would thus be in complementary dis-

tribution with <u>when</u>, <u>where</u>, etc.

[5]The category includes combinations of prosody plus y/n inversion. It is not perhaps quite correct to say that it is inversion **only** that makes these y/n questions interrogative. The constructions often contain, for instance, vocatives and other sentence-initial expressions, which help to indicate that what follows is a question. Also, several instances of y/n questions in the material are reflex-like repetitions of what another person has just said, as in the following exchange:

```
(i) A: Di    haar ...
       they have      'They have ...'    (-M ORI79-JO2-1)
    B: Haar di
       have they      'Have they?'        (+F)
```

In Solf, such a repetition is a way of being polite and show one's interlocutor that one is attending.

[6]The category includes combinations of prosody plus WH-fronting. A number of the constructions that have here been classified as WH-questions are one-word utterances of the form <u>Va?</u> 'what,' <u>Vem?</u> 'who,' and <u>Vann?</u> 'where-at?.' Some of these should no doubt be analyzed not as WH-questions, but as conventionalized markers meaning 'I'm sorry, I didn't hear that.' What makes the classification even more problematic is that <u>va</u> is also homophonous with the past form of the verb 'to be,' and with the weak form of the topic-introducing particle <u>vaa</u>.

[7]This category refers to a set of constructions that all involve some kind of marked frontings, which are basically modifications of cleft formation. Some examples follow. Example (i) is an ordinary cleft sentence in question form.

(i) Va   ede ede hyyse såm   ni bodd ii
    was that that house which you lived in
                                        (+F SOL80-J08-2)
    'Was that the house you lived in?'

As for the more marked cases, consider first (ii), which is not a question.

(ii) Men ho di   talar he vejt ja jo int men --
     but how they speak it know I jo not but
                                        (+F SOL80-J011-1)
     'But how they speak, that, of course, I don't know.'

This is not two tone units, and therefore I would not be inclined to treat <u>Men ho di talar</u> as a left dislocation, with <u>he</u> taking its place in the matrix sentence. The underlying structure is rather something like this:

$$(_{S_1} \text{ I don't know } (_{Comp} \text{ it/that } (_{S_2} \text{ they speak Manner-Q})))$$

WH-formation in S_2 gives 'How they speak'; this is fronted, to give 'How they speak I don't know it'; and, since this does not correspond to an acceptable sentence in Solf, the <u>he</u> 'it' is obligatorily fronted in the underlying S_1, giving 'How they speak it I don't know.'

   Some examples involving question-formation follow.

(iii) Vann va e ni   saa ande låppmarknan va
      where was it you said that flea-market was
                                        (+F ORI79-J03-1)
      'Where did you say that flea-market was?'

From 'You said that flea-market was Place-Q' WH-fronting

would give <u>Vann saa ni ande låppmarknan va?</u>. But from this, <u>vann</u> 'where' is clefted into 'Where was it that ...'. In principle, the same thing happens in (iv).

(iv) Ho mytşi va e e sko   va ååv eje
     how much was it it should be of this
                               (+M SOL80-J09-1)
     'How much should it be of this?'

In (v) sentence chopping has really gone as far as it can,

(v) Teije koorten mejna dö mamm fråån Årinda
    these cards   meant you mummy from Orinda
                         (-M SOL80-J08-1)
    'Did you mean these cards from Orinda, Mummy?'

and in (vi) something we can call 'back-inversion' has taken place.

(vi) Va   saa dö je e millan
     what said you is it between (+M ORI79-J03-2)
     'What did you say it was between?'

The sentence should have come out as <u>Va saa dö e je millan?</u>, but for some reason the Subject and the Verb have changed places. (We cannot treat <u>Va saa dö</u> as a prestarter, and the rest of the question as a direct question, because that would mean something very different, viz. 'Is it between?.' But maybe <u>Va saa dö</u> as a whole could be regarded as a WH-word, or maybe <u>Va</u> simply has two functions in the sentence: it is the Object both of <u>Va saa dö?</u> and of <u>Va je e millan?</u>.)

I am not claiming that these constructions are peculiar to the syntax of Solf, but rather that question formation in Solf is not straightforward in other areas either, and that constructions like these are frequently

used in the dialect. (For further details on the syntax of Solf, cf. Östman forthcoming c.)

[8]The category includes requests in other languages than Solf and requests that were not easily classified, for instance, because of poor tape-recording quality.

[9]The interactions between the Swedish- and Finnish-speaking population in Finland is a widely debated issue. It is clear that for a long time the two people lived side by side in all friendliness, the Finns being hunters and fishers, while the Swedes were mostly farmers. However, when Finland was part of Sweden (up till 1808) aristocratic Swedes immigrated from Sweden and were put to rule the land. This, of course, was bound to create dissatisfaction among both farmers, fishers, and hunters, and since the 'old,' farming Swedes were also Swedish speaking, problems between the two language groups must have ensued. During the latter part of the Russian period (1808-1917) the two language groups again became very close, which no doubt made the step toward independence (in 1917) much easier. However, up till (and somewhat beyond) the middle of this century, the two language groups have - mostly for political reasons - not been optimally intimate and friendly toward each other. But especially during the last twenty years, the attitudes toward the other group have become more positive in both quarters.

CHAPTER 4: QUESTION PARTICLES AND THE LEVEL ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction

In Chapter 1 I talked in very general terms about pragmatics as the study of language usage. I also indicated that I do not see any opposition between pragmatics on the one hand, and fields like sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and anthropological linguistics on the other hand. Rather, I see aspects of these latter areas of linguistic research as pertaining directly to how language is used, and they are therefore part of the general subject of pragmatics.

In my discussion of question particles in Solf I have had fairly little to say about their syntax and semantics. Syntax has come up only insofar as the data on particles have had some more general implications for syntactic research, and semantics I have tried to keep constant - in terms of a general scale of requesting information. (Cf., however, section 2.4..) What I have tried to do, then, is to specify the situations under which it is acceptable to use one question particle, but not another. In other words, I have mostly dealt with the ways context influences the appropriate use of elements of language, and to that extent the discussion has also taken into account pragmatic aspects of language.

But what the discussion of the question particles and of pragmatic particles in general has lacked is a general

format. The characterizations have seemingly been done at random, where the analyst grabs anything that comes his/her way. Despite more than a decade's work on conversational implicatures, speech acts, presuppositions, and conversational analysis, there is still no general framework where all aspects of language use can be set in relation to each other.

On the basis of my discussion both of the particles as they appear in everyday conversations, and of the native speakers' responses in various experiments, it seems feasible to regard the pragmatic particles in Solf as drawing on, and relating to **three** basic areas of human behavior.

One of these areas emerges as a result of my finding that speakers' use of the various question particles can be related to their age and sex. A speaker has a particular role in his/her society, and s/he tends to follow the norms, or practices that other individuals with the same role behave in accordance with. This is determined by the culture of the society, where by 'culture' I do not necessarily mean large-scale cultures, but also, for instance, particular age groups. With respect to this area of human behavior, the individual speaker will tend to conform to, and be **coherent** with, what is expected of him/her in the community.

Another such area of human behavior has interaction in focus. At any particular point in his/her communicative

behavior, the speaker has to take his/her addressee, or audience into account. The communicative acts are most often directed to some other person(s). That being the case, the speaker has to adapt his/her acts to - among other things - the status and level of intelligence of his/her interlocutor, and to their degree of acquaintance. In the discussion of questions in Solf, I found that an ordinary question or statement without particles would tend to sound blunt and impolite, and, in general in Solf, the way to express any kind of request is in an implicit and indirect manner. With a general term, what the inter- locutors in a conversation have to take into account is the aspect of **politeness**. The interactive aspects of language are, of course, those that in most detail have been dealt with in the pragmatic literature, in such terms as the co-operative principle, and conversational implicatures.

The third area of human behavior that has to be taken into account when we discuss aspects of the context that influence the use of language is the speaker him/herself. Depending on his/her particular attitudes and feelings, even prejudices, his/her communicative behavior will vary. We saw this in the results from my psycholinguistic experiment, when subjects were able to classify sentences as communicating friendliness, calmness, aggressiveness, or impatience, depending on what particles the sentences contained. In general, we can talk about this aspect as the extent to which the speaker communicates his/her in-

volvement in aspects of the context of situation in which s/he is when being an interlocutor.

The notion of coherence is most directly related to culture, and is structurally manifested for instance in textual cohesion. It also deals with geographical phenomena, and influences the characteristics of different discourse types: lies, word-plays, irony. The aspect of politeness is concerned with socio-interactive information and has a supermaxim of 'Avoid Confrontation!' as its most noticeable manifestation in our everyday lives. It deals not only with politeness, but also with violations of the Gricean maxims, and with the functions of social varieties of language, and to some extent also with geographical varieties. Involvement deals with emotional and attitudinal aspects of language and focuses on a speaker's psychological make up, and the speaker's preoccupation with him/herself. Together with politeness, this aspect is directly manifested for instance in planning and slips of the tongue. It is also concerned with psychological varieties of language, for instance, how, whether, and when to use a bureaucratic variant of English in a specific situation.

These three areas of human behavior are connected in three different ways. First, they are interrelated and interdependent: a certain type of involvement can show up as politeness, or vice versa, and aspects of politeness might be part of the coherence of a subculture, and coher-

ence with respect to, say, an age group may predetermine certain aspects of politeness, or involvement. Secondly, the communication of aspects of all three of them takes place in an **implicit** manner. In fact, if you try to communicate aspects of them explicitly, you are either talking about them by mentioning them, on a meta-level (in which case you would be using semantic propositions), or you are using manifestations of these areas (like honorifics), which have become conventionalized, and are therefore also part of semantics, in that they can be given semantic-content specifications. And thirdly, a speaker's utterances are hardly ever communicated in vacuo, but will be **anchored** to each of these three areas of human behavior simultaneously. Some aspect might stand out and be in focus in a particular situation, but these areas are all potentially present, for instance, in order to allow the addressee to draw necessary inferences.

I would like to suggest that these three areas of human behavior are also the primary parameters that influence language usage, and the basic categories according to which pragmatic phenomena should be classified, and through which they can be explained. In effect, in this view, (especially implicit) pragmatics as a whole can be talked about as the field of Implicit Anchoring. These three areas I regard as the most important (macro-) parameters that govern the interactive rules of communication. All of them together give reasons for **how, when,** and

whether to speak, and thus specify the interactive possibilities of language (cf. R. Lakoff 1981; Östman 1981a).

4.2. Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement

In this section I want to give some examples of the linguistic manifestations of the three pragmatic parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. The examples will largely be taken from areas that are closely connected with my discussion of question particles in Chapters 2 and 3. I will not in this study dwell on the theoretical aspects of the parameters. For a detailed account of these, see Östman forthcoming d.

A linguistic choice can anchor the communicative act explicitly or implicitly or both. At word level, explicit anchoring is done by means of propositional content words. A word can explicitly anchor a communicative act not only to objects, activities, qualities, but also to situations (with deictic terms), to persons (with pronouns), to points or spans of time (with tense and temporal adverbials), and to attitudes (with attitudinal adverbials). An implicitly anchored choice, on the other hand, cannot be given an explanation in propositional terms, but is to be related to (either or some of) the three parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. From the point of view of implicit pragmatics, a speaker anchors his/her utterance to a coherent context

(and co-text), to his/her social relations to his/her addressee(s), and to his/her internal attitudes and emotions. There is always some context present beforehand for every utterance, but elements and constructions themselves also bring in new contexts. Pragmatics, then, is concerned with the anchoring of utterances along the three axes of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement.

The linguistic choices that speakers make in order to communicate (or avoid communicating) their discourse intentions can fruitfully be related to and analyzed with reference to the three parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. Linguistic choices can be made simultaneously with respect to (all or some of) the three interdependent parameters. A particular linguistic choice can highlight one (aspect of a) parameter more than the others.

4.2.1. Coherence

Coherence is defined as that principle of pragmatics which deals with how the choice of a linguistic element contributes to establishing (or maintaining, or changing) the function (in the sense of function/text of Nichols 1984) of a discourse, or part of a discourse, as a whole. Coherence is the dynamic principle, and what we see on the surface as the product is held together by cohesive manifestations of that principle.

Whereas text linguists and conversational analysts

tend to see coherence and cohesion as different sides of the same coin of textuality (cf. Östman 1978b, Enkvist 1978). Coherence in the present approach is a more general notion, of which cohesion (in the sense of Halliday & Hasan 1976) is just a particular manifestation. Utterances do not occur in vacuo, but are part of (larger-scale) discourses and contexts. The pragmatic parameter of Coherence not only gives the causes for the surface relations between utterances, but also, and in particular, it deals with the relation of an utterance to its context.

The pragmatic parameter of Coherence can be seen as accounting for the implicit, common-sensical rules in accordance with which human beings (intuitively) adjust themselves to this world - in short, according to which they live. (Cf. Margolis 1984, Ziff 1984.) In the final instance, this means that Coherence stands for what we generally refer to as **culture**. Note, however, that culture is not an undifferentiated whole. The large-scale concept culture that denotes a speech community with shared norms and evaluations includes a hierarchy of norms on a smaller scale: social class constraints, etiquette and tact constraints, restraints on how to tell a story, on how to partake in a conversation, and even on how to form an utterance. Speakers can invoke and implicitly refer to the pragmatic parameter of Coherence at different levels on this hierarchy. (Cf. Östman forthcoming d, and Chapter 5 below.)

As an illustration, we can have a brief look at pragmatic particles in different languages, and see how they can signal and establish the Coherence of a discourse. With respect to the pragmatic parameter of Coherence, a pragmatic particle can perform at least the following six different functions.

1. Turn-signalling. A pragmatic particle can function as a means for getting the floor, for keeping the floor, or as an indication that the speaker wants to give the floor to somebody else. In Östman 1981a I suggested that in addition to its other functions, <u>you know</u> also has this as one of its more prominent functions. (The turn-signalling function of pragmatic particles has been dealt with extensively by ethnomethodologists, conversational analysts, and students of narrative structure.) Applied to my discussion of question particles in Chapters 2 and 3, we see that all the particles have a floor-yielding function by virtue of them being question particles, and that the use of <u>elä</u> in particular has this pragmatic function.

2. Preparedness. A pragmatic particle can function as a hesitation phenomenon. Hardly any particle, however, has as its only function to be hesitational. Rather, what a speaker does by using a hesitational device is to create redundancy, and hedge, at the same time as s/he is planning his/her idea units, and thus indicating the amount of preparation s/he has made for the inter-

action. In my data on question particles in Solf, I found that elå can be used with a force similar to the English I mean, and utterance-final pronouns - when they are repetitions in the sense discussed in section 2.3.6. - can be relied on to indicate the subject of an utterance unambiguously. The particles Vaa and Va sko ja sej which I briefly mentioned, signal both an attempt to get the floor, and at the same time indicate that the speaker has not planned his/her utterance in detail yet.

3. Discourse or story markers. Longacre 1979 has shown that in certain languages a coherent paragraph would have certain verbal, particle-like markers - either at the beginning or at the end, or both. Particles can also be used to indicate the beginning or end of a story or discourse as a whole, in the openings and closings of the discourse. And also, particles can be used to foreground certain aspects of a text, to indicate that one part is more important than surrounding parts, which are backgrounded, or non-foregrounded, or simply digressions. (Cf. also Labov 1972, Tannen 1979, Chafe 1980, Hopper 1979, Enkvist 1972, Wårvik 1984, Östman 1982b.) With regard to my discussion of question particles, we saw that tå and då behaved differently with respect to introducing new topics into a discourse.

4. Dialect and identity markers. Pragmatic particles can also function to identify speakers. This function of pragmatic particles is the only one that with some

justification can be described as an 'unnecessary' use of particles. But since they are identity or dialect markers, they are not really unnecessary, after all. (Cf. Even-Zohar's 1978 discussion of the use of this strategy in one of Dostoyevsky's novels.)

5. Sociolinguistic and style markers. In my discussion of the question particles in Solf, it was obvious that the use, or kind of use, of a particular particle was - at least to some extent - indicative of the speakers age, and possibly also his/her sex[1]. In Östman 1982b I showed how pragmatic particles could be relied on for author identification.

6. Relevance marking. The maxim of relevance is perhaps the most important of Grice's maxims. Relevance links up with foregrounding, and a particle can indicate the relative relevance of an utterance. (Cf. discussions of the relevance particle -han in Finnish by Hakulinen 1976.) In a sense the 'focus particle' -kin (propositionally 'too, also') in Finnish also pragmatically says that something (i.e. what is inside its scope) is relevant to the on-going discussion. But sometimes this pragmatic function is highlighted, and there is no 'focus' meaning associated with -kin (cf. Östman 1977). (On relevance in discourse, cf. also Holdcroft forthcoming.) As an example of this function in my data, notice that I said that the particle då questions the appropriate identification of a phrase, and thus the

relevance of the referent of that phrase. I also mentioned the relevance particle _jo_ briefly, which indicates that what the speaker says is obvious, and its obviousness is relevant to the issue at hand.

The importance of Coherence is best seen when it is not adhered to, or perhaps rather, when its manifestations are not the ones we would expect. Thus, in the area of foreign-language teaching and learning, a neglect of Coherence results in difficulties for non-native speakers in everyday situations, and indicate the importance not only of communicative, but also of cultural competence. Coherence is something you grow up in, something that an outsider can only learn indirectly - through cohesion. To have complete communicative, or cultural competence in more than one language is rare. But - paradoxically perhaps - to have cultural competence in any L2 just to a certain degree is even more difficult. You can sound and be as if you knew how to behave in a different culture, but very often such behavior is - in the last instance - mimicry of the behavior displayed on the surface (i.e. cohesively) in that L2 culture.

4.2.2. Politeness

Politeness is defined as that principle of pragmatics which deals with how the choice of a linguistic element contributes to establishing (changing, maintaining) the

social relation between speaker and addressee/audience. The function of an element along this parameter is that of function/event (cf. Nichols 1984): it concerns the status and roles of interactants. 'Politeness,' then, is the term I use to refer specifically to human interaction and interactional relations.

In a conversation the speaker and the addressee (constantly interchanging roles) always have to take each other into account. They both have to keep constant track of the other. Human interaction and co-operation is governed by the two principles of **face-saving** and **solidarity** (cf. Östman 1981a, 1982a): the two counterbalancing forces that tend to restrict the behavior of a speaker to what is socially and situationally acceptable, while at the same time allowing him/her to save face in the presence of his/her interlocutor(s). The speakers have to find the appropriate balance between expressing their own needs, and taking those of the addressee into account. And they have to control their speech and communicative behavior in accordance with this.

A speaker's management of his/her interactional relations is realized as strategies of Politeness. In any situation, and at any point in that situation, a speaker has to choose what s/he considers to be the most appropriate strategy of interaction.

Dissatisfied with the Gricean Cooperative principle and its maxims as a description of actually occurring

interactional behavior, Robin Lakoff (1975) formulated the following three Rules of politeness.

```
_____
1. Keep aloof!    (Formality)
2. Give options!  (Deference)
3. Show sympathy! (Camaraderie)
_____
```

Table 4.1. Robin Lakoff's Rules of politeness.

These are conceived of as alternative strategies of interaction (although Rule 2 can be combined with either of the other two). In later writings, Lakoff talks about these rules as 'stylistic strategies.' A speaker can choose to use any one of these at a particular point in a conversational interaction.

In Lakoff 1979 four stylistic strategies are distinguished. These strategies (with brief specifications) are given in Table 4.2..

```
_____
Clarity       (Impersonal)
Distance      (Formal politeness, designed to impute
                authority)
Deference     (Don't impose; give options!)
Camaraderie   (Show sympathy!)
_____
```

Table 4.2. Robin Lakoff's stylistic strategies.

These strategies make up a frame of reference for Politeness. Whenever you want to talk or write to somebody, you start by choosing the strategy of Politeness you find most appropriate. The strategy of Politeness you have chosen initially for a conversation can be changed during

the interaction, but such a change almost inevitably has to be made in an explicit manner. For instance, a change from Distance to Deference Politeness can be made through a mutual agreement to switch from surnames to first names. In British English this would typically be accomplished by saying, for instance, 'By the way, I'm Bill,' or 'Do you mind if I call you Bill?,' or even 'Let's use first names!.'

The strategy of Clarity is not really part of interaction, since if a speaker chooses to follow this strategy s/he also chooses not to take the addressee into account at all. (Thus, the term Clarity itself is a misnomer from the point of view of the addressee. The clarity expressed is not a communicative clarity, but a clarity that is achieved through following the rule-governed, prescriptive norms of the language.) A speaker following the strategy of Clarity focuses on his/her message itself, with little interest as to whether that message gets rightly understood by an addressee or not. This is basically the strategy defined by H. P. Grice's (1975) maxims and co-operative principle. The co-operative principle of course has the advantage of forming a frame of reference for communication, but it is a frame of reference from which any ordinary conversation will depart - to varying degrees.[2] (That is, the co-operative principle is set up to have the same value for interaction as logical formulae have for the structural description of language.)

The remaining three strategies (cf. the Rules in Table 4.1.) are then **the** strategies of Politeness in communicative interaction. The Distance (or Formality) and the Camaraderie strategies constitute extreme end-points on this hierarchy of Politeness. Although people may often strive towards attaining relationships with other people in which they could use these strategies, such relationships are in fact very rare. In present-day Western society (which is what my discussion mostly is concerned with; cf., however, Östman forthcoming d, Silverstein 1979) any (especially unconditional and absolute) reference to power (which is what the strategy of Distance is based on) is more and more seldom met with in interpersonal relations. Similarly, to gain a complete Camaraderie relationship with another human being, you need to be psychological twins. Thus, if we want to be precise, we should rather see the strategies of Politeness as forming the following hierarchy.

```
CLARITY
DISTANCE
DISTANCE/DEFERENCE    (i.e., Distance in practice)
FORMAL DEFERENCE
INFORMAL DEFERENCE
CAMARADERIE/DEFERENCE  (i.e. conventional Camaraderie)
CAMARADERIE
```

Table 4.3. Strategies of Politeness.

In Table 4.3. I have also included a distinction between Formal and Informal Deference. (For discussions,

cf. Östman forthcoming d.) What we end up with, then, as choices of interactive Politeness are different kinds of Deference. Code switching takes place in interpersonal communication as it does with respect to dialects and sociolects. Thus, when a speaker needs to use two Politeness strategies simultaneously, with different people in the audience, or for specific purposes, s/he can switch between using one Politeness variant (e.g. Formal Deference) for his/her public, out-group relations, and another variant (e.g. Informal Deference or Camaraderie/Deference) for his/her home and peer-group relations. (Cf. also Gumperz 1982:84, and 5.2. below.)

What, then, are the cues that we as interlocutors rely on for our understanding of other speakers' attempts to convey interactional information to us? Again, as in the case of manifestations of the parameter of Coherence, there is no one set of devices from which we can pick out a 'Clarity-marker' or a 'Camaraderie-marker.' The markers are different in different types of discourse: sometimes the strategy of Politeness can be communicated through prosodic features (cf. Silverman, Scherer & Ladd 1983), sometimes through the use of certain particles, and sometimes through changes in word order or through other syntactic rearrangements. This is what makes Politeness and strategy-marking implicit.

With reference to the functions of pragmatic particles we can simply say that a pragmatic particle can

indicate the strategy a speaker uses in a conversation; or, as in the case of <u>you know</u> (cf. Östman 1981a), the speaker signifies that although s/he realizes that at present the communication is carried on within Informal Deference, s/he would not mind using a Camaraderie/Deference strategy - if this is acceptable to the interlocutor.

Within a particular strategy of Politeness a particle can also indicate what aspect it highlights from the following tentative list. (This list is simultaneously a list of what I see as an inventory of the universal - as opposed to language-specific - aspects of interaction, cf. Östman forthcoming d.)

1. Formality vs. informality

When you choose to be 'polite' (in the traditional sense) and show deference to your interlocutor(s), you have a further (scalar) choice of either being neutrally deferent, that is, being **informally** deferent and simply see to it that you do not create any offence; or, you can choose to follow the society's rules of etiquette more precisely, and be **formally** deferent. Formality is what the society sanctions to be the deference **norm**. But this norm will of course vary from one culture to another - and even within a culture. That is, the members of a society might conceive of the norm of politeness in different ways. For some groups or individuals, informality is taken to be the deference norm.

2. Impoliteness (rudeness)

This aspect is related to the first parameter in the sense that if you do not follow the norms that prevail in the society, the other members of the society will characterize you as impolite or rude. In general, speaker X will tend to characterize as 'polite' or 'impolite' the utterances of speaker Y on the basis of the extent to which speaker Y communicates in accordance with what speaker X thinks is appropriate.

3. ME-first and YOU-importance

A person's view of him/herself in this world starts out from his/her own point of view. S/he regards the surroundings from where s/he stands in terms of certain conventionalized characteristics of his/her being. Our prototypical ways of being situated and behaving in this world determines an a priori orientation, or perspective, with respect to which we view everything around us. This is the I-here-now perspective, or our zero-point (cf. Lyons 1977).

In their discussion of freezes (binomial expressions) like here and there, now and then, Cooper & Ross (1975) found that this conventional view that speakers have of themselves in the world is reflected in such freezes. The first element (noun, adjective, verb, preposition) in binomial expressions very commonly refers to EGO, here, now, upright position (cf. up and down), forward looking, etc. This state of affairs Cooper & Ross labelled the ME-

FIRST PRINCIPLE. We can relate this to the face-saving aspect of communicative interaction that I mentioned earlier.

There are, however, a number of very commonly used freezes that go against this principle, for instance <u>you and me</u> and <u>ladies and gentlemen</u> (cf. <u>man and woman</u>, <u>boy and girl</u>). To account for these I argued in Östman 1981a that there is another principle in our way of looking at the world that pulls in the opposite direction. This principle I have called the **YOU-IMPORTANCE PRINCIPLE**. The YOU-importance principle comes into play when we interact with other people, and take them into account.

4. Power and Solidarity

This aspect is similar to the previous one, but it relates more directly to social status on the **power** end of the scale, and at the other end of the scale, **solidarity** relates to 'you and me,' rather than to 'you' - as in the YOU-importance principle.

5. Intimacy

This aspect has to do with showing (mutual) feelings and emotions in a particular interaction - and thus connects up with the pragmatic parameter of Involvement. Intimacy forms a gradient scale of more - less, and is to some extent complementary to the power-solidarity scale.

6. Directness and indirectness

Conversational **directness** has to do with expressing oneself directly and to the point, more or less in accord-

ance with the Gricean maxims. In normal interactional situations, however, we tend to employ a certain degree of indirectness. Conversational indirectness is employed as a strategy to mitigate the effect of an utterance, and thus to avoid confrontation. Linguistically, such confrontation avoidance is typically realized as discourse-regulating hedges. (Cf. R. Lakoff 1980; Östman 1982a.)

Semantically speaking, a pragmatic particle like _I guess_ looks very much like an epistemic adverb, comparable to _probably_, or a modal, superordinate sentence like _I suppose._ But to be able to use _I guess_, the relation between the participants has to be of a certain kind. You cannot use _I guess_ in any odd situation. (It would not, for instance, be good policy to use _I guess_ in an exam answer.) Thus, it seems that whereas the function of _you know_ can primarily be related to a scale of Indirectness, _I guess_ is an expression that primarily functions on, and highlights aspects of, a scale of Intimacy.

Now, if we want to find the meaning and functions of a pragmatic particle like _you know_, we can start by setting up a prototypical, of necessity rather abstract semantic characterization. In Östman 1981a (p.17) I suggested the following general meaning of _you know:_

a. The speaker strives towards getting the addressee to cooperate and/or to accept the propositional content of his utterance as mutual background knowledge.

Such an 'and/or' characterization is perhaps not wholly

satisfactory (cf. Schourup 1984), so we can perhaps say that semantically

b. The speaker wants to imply that the propositional content is mutual knowledge.

and that as a pragmatic consequence on a very general level, this can be interpreted as

c. An attempt by the speaker to get cooperation from the addressee.

The basic point here is that you know does not primarily relate to any utterance, or utterance sequence. It relates to the relationship between the speaker and the hearer. It functions as an implicit indicator of the relationship among speaker and addressee, rather than as an indicator of the speaker's relationship to his utterance.

In Östman 1981a I also pointed out that you know has a number of sub-functions. The basic idea here is that if we find an occurrence of you know that we would like to describe as having a turn-taking function, this as such is not the meaning of you know: any other item could probably have been used as a turn-taker, but the fact that you know in particular is used indicates not only turn-taking but also the more general relationship between the speaker and his/her addressee, as suggested in a - c above.

Turning now to the question particles in Solf, we can note that elå is a typical Informal-Deference particle, in that it can be interpreted as giving the addressee the right to disconfirm, or even oppose, the propositional

content (or even form) of a speaker's elå-utterance. Also, we saw that då was the particle that was judged as being 'most polite' in the experiments discussed in 3.4.. This, I suggest, can most naturally be interpreted as an indicator that the strategy of Formal Deference is used in the conversation. Informal, rather than Formal, Deference would be the norm - and neutral strategy - in Solf. Thus, if speakers indicate that an utterance containing då is 'polite,' to use that particle would seem to indicate a movement in the direction of Distance/Deference. Notice also that då was typically associated with indications of 'opposition' or 'contrariness' (cf. 2.3.2.2. and 2.3.2.3.).

4.2.3. Involvement

Whereas Coherence and Politeness have been dealt with from several points of view in the linguistic literature, not much attention has so far been paid to what I regard as the third parameter of pragmatics, that of Involvement.

In general terms, I define Involvement as that principle of pragmatics which deals with how the choice of a linguistic element contributes to expressing the speaker's feelings, attitudes, and prejudices toward the topic of discourse, the situation, and/or the addressee.

Involvement, attitudes, and emotions include all those uses of language that in some sense or other are governed by the speaker's feelings, towards the addressee,

towards the situation, or towards some other aspect of the world outside - for whatever purpose: to manipulate or persuade somebody of something, to express prejudices, or just to create togetherness (or antipathy). Such expressions of feelings, attitudes, and prejudices are - for obvious reasons - usually expressed in an implicit manner.

Involvement is perhaps the most implicit parameter of pragmatics. This is so, because whereas aspects of Coherence and Politeness have to some extent become ritualized - and are easily recognized as rituals, the ways to express emotions and attitudes implicitly seem idiosyncratic and difficult to pin down. In fact, some linguists would even hold that the Involvement that a speaker indicates in his message is not part of the meaning of that message, but ancillary to it: Involvement aspects can be left out of an utterance without change of meaning. But this is true only if we accept as language nothing but explicitly transmitted information. What such an approach misses is the implicit information about **how** the speaker intends a particular message to be understood and interpreted.

Below is a tentative list of the contextual aspects that are bound to influence the speaker's relative Involvement in his communicative act.

1. The context of situation. Are the interactants alone? What are their respective roles? Do they have a consider-

able amount of shared background knowledge? What is the status of their verbal (and non-verbal) interaction? Are there relevant extra-linguistic objects that have to be taken into consideration? Does the particular cultural context set constraints on the amount of Involvement that is allowed?

2. **The topic of the discourse.** What issues are at stake? Is the settlement of the topic relevant outside the present discussion (see 'consequence' below)?

3. **The medium.** Written language requires more planning (which is one important manifestation of Involvement) in order to exclude potential ambiguities. Thus, as neutral (or non-neutral, if that is your purpose) words and phrases as possible tend to be chosen in written texts. (Cf. Östman in print.)

4. **The time lapse.** This links up with medium. The longer time lapse that is possible between a speaker's message and an addressee's response, the more planning the speaker needs to undertake, and - most likely - the more uninvolved the message will become.

5. **Concern for interlocutor(s).** Within this aspect we can distinguish at least the following factors (cf. Robin Lakoff MS):

a. **visibility:** can the interlocutors see one another, and thus rely on, and make reference to non-verbal means of communication?

b. **reciprocity:** is the relationship between the inter-

locutors of the solidarity- and camaraderie-type: can the speakers interchange roles at will, without creating offense?

c. **formality**: do the speakers have a (conscious) need to follow the society's rules of etiquette (Formal Deference), or is adherence to our sense of tact (Informal Deference) enough?

d. **spontaneity**: can the speakers be spontaneous, and know that they can rely on instant feedback to set things straight in case either participant breaks an unwritten rule of interaction?

e. **empathy**: can the speakers fully rely on each other? Do they see communication as what Robin Lakoff (MS) calls "a joint endeavor," or do they employ the Conduit metaphor (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980) of sending messages to one another, even struggling to get messages sent in a way to impress the interlocutor?

f. **consequence**: does the interaction have any potential effect beyond the immediate situation? Are there witnesses, or tape-recorders present during the conversation? Can you at a later stage be held responsible for what you have said?

6. The speaker's state of mind. The extent to which the speaker has a bad day can make him/her uninterested in expressing his/her emotions and attitudes implicitly.

Involvement as such is not affected by these factors: either you are involved with your topic, situation, inter-

locutor, or yourself, or you are not. But these factors influence the **expression** of Involvement.

With reference to the discussion of question particles in Solf, we saw that reference to feelings is made when we indicate whether a particle indicates calmness, aggressiveness, positive or negative attitude, etc. In the discussion in 3.4. we saw, for instance, that då came out as the 'least involved' of the particles, and that elå proved to be the one that communicates the clearest positive feeelings.

On a modality scale of Certain --- Uncertain we can also indicate the pragmatic Involvement of a speaker. As we saw in the case of säkert in 3.5., the pragmatic specification does not have to be the same as the semantic specification. Cf. also the discussion in 3.4. as regards the behavior of the question particles in Solf with reference to the modality scale.

Involvement can also be expressed by prosodic means. A general finding in this area is that the more pitch variation there is in an utterance, and the wider the pitch range is, the more expressive the utterance is.

The parameter of Involvement is also needed as a reference point when, say, a speaker uses devices to imply that something is foregrounded information where there are no real Coherence reasons for this. That is, when the speaker emits his/her message as if it was worth foregrounded status.

We also see the need for having a parameter of Involvement to account for the grammaticality and acceptability of a sentence like

(1) If she says that again, I'll hit the bitch.

where she is naturally interpreted as being coreferential with the bitch. Notice that the coreferential interpretation is more natural in (1) than it is in (2).

(2) If she says that again, I'll hit the girl.

Although this is in need of further study, one reasonable hypothesis would be that it is the attitudinal feature of the word bitch that makes the coreferential interpretation the preferred one in example (1). (However, it is not clear that it is only Involvement that is at stake here. Certain words - like bitch and bastard - have this property, but other similar words - like criminal - do not.)

We also find statements in the literature to the effect that the difference in meaning between near-synonyms like (3) and (4) will be accounted for in terms of them having different implicatures.

(3) John kissed the girl.

(4) It was John who kissed the girl.

This is true as far as it goes, but the theory of implicatures does not say how to account for the difference in meaning. The reason, again, has to do with the degree to which the speaker is involved in what s/he is saying, and Involvement is not accounted for in the theory of implicatures.

We see the interrelation of Involvement with the other two parameters in the choices speakers make with respect to whether the audience is part of one's peer group or not. Thus, Gumperz (1982:83) has shown that the 'we' code is used to reflect involvement, whereas the 'they' code is used to indicate the speaker's objectification and distance in code switching among bilinguals. But such switches are not restricted to bilingual speakers. Similarly, we have to draw on Coherence together with Involvement in explaining the fact that a sentence like (5) can either be a positive statement (by an admirer), or a negative statement (by a detractor). (From Levinson 1983:110.)

(5) Queen Victoria was made of iron.

*

In his discussion of the differences between spoken and written discourse, Chafe (1979, 1982) sets up a scale that focuses on the 'involvement' and 'detachment' of the speaker/writer in his text. (Cf. also Kay 1977, Tannen 1980.)

----

involvement ------------------------------------ detachment

Figure 4.1. Chafe's scale of involvement and detachment.

(Notice that my use of the term Involvement includes reference to Chafe's scale as a whole, i.e. both to aspects of his 'involvement,' and aspects of 'detachment,' in the

same manner as my use of the term Politeness also includes reference to aspects of rudeness.)

Chafe (1981, 1982) has suggested that involvement and detachment have more or less direct, prototypical manifestations in the linguistic expression. The grammatical constructions that can be argued to be typically indicative of detachment are given in Table 4.4..

```
----------------------------------
DETACHMENT
----------------------------------
passives
nominalizations
non-Agent type Subjects
precision
past perfects
indirect quotations
literary vocabulary
indirect questions
conservative language
lack of contractions
----------------------------------
```

Table 4.4. Features of detachment.

These devices "serve to distance the language from specific concrete states and events." (Chafe 1982:45).

Whereas detachment from the audience is typical for a writer, involvement with the audience is typical for a speaker. The list in Table 4.5. includes the main constructions that are typical instantiations of involvement.

```
------------------------------------------------------------
INVOLVEMENT
------------------------------------------------------------
first-person references
reference to speaker's mental processes
  - processes while talking (e.g. I can recall)
  - processes in the past (e.g. I had no idea; I thought)
fuzziness (due to fuzzy knowledge or difficulty in finding
    appropriate words), manifested as hedges and vagueness
    (and so on; something like; sort of)
monitoring of information flow
  - you know, I mean, well, oh, so, anyway
  - evidentials
  - speech-act substitution
emphasis: emphatic particles (really, just)
direct quotations
second-person reference
first name
negations
colloquial vocabulary and pronunciation
tense: historical present in narrative
empty pronouns
precision: illustration
concreteness and imageability
actions and Agents emphasized
------------------------------------------------------------
```

Table 4.5. Features of involvement.

Most of these devices are implicit[3] in the sense that the feelings of detachment and involvement that they express are transmitted as 'extra' information, as information about how the speaker relates to his audience, and how the addressee is supposed to understand his content message. These devices are also implicit in the sense that it would be unlikely (I do not say impossible) that somebody would be convicted of a crime simply on the basis of having used a passive construction or a nominalization instead of an active transitive clause to show his/her detachment in a situation, or from a particular person.

Labov 1972 has touched on similar issues in dis-

cussions of evaluative elements in (Black English) narratives. Whereas Labov's definition of evaluation is highly restricted to his interest in narratives ('evaluation' stands for the means used by the narrator to indicate the point of the narrative), Tannen 1980 defines evaluation more broadly, as the speaker's indication of his/her attitudes towards his/her material.

Both Labov and Tannen make a distinction between external and internal evaluation (although the concept 'internal evaluation' is not as such used by Labov). External evaluation involves an explicit metacommunication of the speaker's feelings towards his/her text, for instance, an utterance like **This was terrible!**. Internal evaluation is expressed by paralinguistic features; pauses; intonation, pitch, speech rate, and loudness variations; laughter; lexical choice; etc. (Cf. my distinction between explicitness and implicitness in language use.)

No meanings are probably wholly objective, but associations and connotations, we feel, are even more subjective than lexical meanings, which can be indicated for instance as conglomerates of semantic features. It is important to note, however, that the connotative, evaluative, or **affective** meaning is not something that can easily (if at all) be spliced off from the objective propositional-content meaning of a word. What, for instance, would be the propositional content of words like **good** and **bad**, that could be distinguished from their

affective, evaluative meanings? Affective meaning, then, does not lie outside language proper - it is always present in some form.

Still, it is a rather typical tendency even in much of present-day linguistics to regard the emotions, attitudes, connotations, and evaluations that can be found embedded in phrases and words as idiosyncratic and constantly changing aspects of language. Consequently, it is argued that these aspects are not to be treated as part of meaning, if indeed as part of the subject matter of linguistics. Thus, Palmer (1976:64) argues as follows.

It is sometimes suggested that words become associated with certain characteristics of the items to which they refer. Thus woman has the connotation 'weak' and pig the connotation 'dirty'. ... Strictly, however, this is not a matter of the meaning of words or even of meaning in general. It rather indicates that people (or some people) believe that women are weak and pigs dirty.

And still, a couple of sentences earlier (p. 63) Palmer argues that connotation "is not usefully distinguished from cognitive meaning." In my view, if a particular feature of a word - be it connotative or denotative - is associated with that word in the minds of native speakers, then this should suffice to make that feature count as part of the meaning of the word. (Thus, I would say that when people believed that the earth was flat, then flatness was a part of the meaning of The earth). Cf. also 6.2.)

The research that Charles Osgood and his collaborators (cf. Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum 1957, Osgood, May & Miron 1975) have done over the years should be ample evidence to indicate that affective meanings are not only idiolectal and idiosyncratic. I will not here go into any details about Osgood's SD-technique, but its usefulness for the Involvement parameter of pragmatics cannot be overlooked. (In Östman in print I show how reference to the Evaluation, Potency, and Activity values of words can help us find the locus of implicit Involvement in language.)

4.3. The Level Analysis

I see it as the task of pragmatics to specify the constraints there are on human interpretation not only of linguistic systems, but also of language as an instance of human behavior. It is also, of course, interesting if the analyst's devices can be made to predict certain aspects of language use. But this does not mean that prediction of what is (or will be) used (and how what is used will be evaluated, and what effect it will have) should be seen as the ultimate goal of pragmatics. (Cf. also Gumperz 1982:30.) The most we can, and should, hope for in this area is to come up with what conversational analysts call 'preference organization' of linguistic behavior.

Out of the extra-linguistic factors that influence

our use of language I have in this Chapter abstracted out three pragmatic parameters, those of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. As I have pointed out repeatedly, these are interdependent parameters, to which we implicitly anchor the utterances we produce.

Coherence is drawn on when the choice of a word or structure is evaluated in relation to the extent to which that word or structure fits the text or discourse at hand. A choice made with respect to the parameter of Coherence contributes to establishing the coherence, or function, of the discourse, or part of a discourse, as a whole.

Choices made with respect to the parameter of Politeness contributes to establishing the social relation between speaker and addressee and/or the speaker's audience. Politeness is the notion I use to talk about what goes on **between** people as individuals, in specific situations. There is a number of interactively relevant aspects that can be thought of as universally operative (although to different degrees in different cultures) due simple to the (physical) confrontation of two or more individuals: power, solidarity, intimacy, formality, and so on. (Cf. 4.2.2..) A particular culture would tend to interpret these aspects as forming a hierarchy of more or less 'politeness.' And it is with reference to our particular interpretation of Politeness as a hierarchy with Clarity and Camaraderie as end-points that linguistic manifestations of

Politeness should be seen. Politeness is closely connected
to Coherence in many ways, most directly through the
concept of a society's Politeness norm.

Choices made with respect to the parameter of
Involvement contributes to expressing the speaker's
attitudes toward the topic, the situation, or the addres-
see. Whereas Coherence and Politeness theoretically can
be experienced more directly as being 'outside' the in-
dividual, Involvement is to be sought within people. A
speaker's Involvement in his/her topic, or in the situation
at hand, is also closely related to that speaker's sense
of his/her Coherence and Politeness behavior. In 4.2.3. I
gave a list of factors that influence whether or not you
are involved: topic, situation, state of mind, and so on.
In addition to the list in 4.2.3. I here want to suggest a
tentative list of aspects of Involvement that specify the
constraints on the direction and type of Involvement of a
linguistic choice.

1. **Degree** of Involvement, in terms of a scale of Emotions
- Attitudes - Prejudices.

2. **Involvement - detachment**, as discussed in 4.2.3..

3. **Positive - Negative** feelings, with at least the follow-
ing two sub-classes: (a) Friendliness; and (b) Calmness
(cf. 3.4.).

4. **Affective** meaning, in terms of Osgood's universal cate-
gories of Evaluation, Potency, and Activity, together with
his concept of Polarity force.

5. **Certainty**, seen as a scale of modality, but manifested in an implicit manner.

6. **Expressive** meaning, with the sub-classes (a) focus; (b) contrast; and (c) emphasis. (Cf. Östman in print.)

7. **Planning** indicates the psychological problems the speaker has with linguistic organization, of both content and form. It is related to preparedness under Coherence, and has at least the following two sub-classes: (a) topic break; and (b) specification. (Cf. Östman in print.) Typical manifestations of planning include (filled or empty) pauses, false (or 'true') starts, anacoloutha, repetitions, slips of the tongue, (verbal, or even non-verbal) gestures, and/or pragmatic particles.

8. **Sincerity.** Is the speaker sincere or not in his/her expression of Involvement?

The impetus for the preceding theoretical discussion came from a desire to circumscribe functional issues in language from the 'outside,' from human behavior in general, rather than extending the apparatus of theories based on the structure of language. The three parameters I have set up are intuitive[4] if language is seen as an aspect of human behavior in general, and the obvious claim I am making is that our linguistic choices are constrained by the workings of these parameters. These parameters I thus conceive of as jointly constituting what I have called Implicit Pragmatics.

*

In Chapters 2 and 3 I discussed the varied properties of question formation in Solf from a number of different points of view, and came to the conclusion that there is no existing framework in terms of which these properties can coherently (and in an intuitively satisfying manner) be described. In this chapter I have set up the kind of framework that a description of pragmatic phenomena require. The discussions in the three chapters now need to be brought together. We need a way to represent the pragmatic information of utterances and texts, and we need to show how the system can be applied to the description of the functions of question particles in Solf. In this section I will deal with the former of these tasks.

In section 4.2.2. I gave what I see as the basic function and sub-functions of the pragmatic particle <u>you know</u> (based on Östman 1981a). In that discussion I stated that the basic problem for semantic analyses is that <u>you know</u> does not primarily relate to any utterance, or utterance sequence, but to the relationship between the speaker and the hearer. I also argued that with respect to the sub-functions of <u>you know</u>, it is not just a matter of categorizing a particular occurrence of <u>you know</u> as having one function rather than another. Rather, the particle retains aspects of several functions wherever it occurs.

To be able to indicate all such intricacies simultaneously for each particular occurrence of a pragmatic particle, I have devised (cf. Östman 1981a) what I call the

Level Analysis method. The idea here is simply that you indicate on different levels what a pragmatic particle is doing: any pragmatic particle potentially has a function on all (pragmatic) levels, and any (usually one) of these particular functions can be highlighted in a specific situation.

The levels that I recognize are, of course, the parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. At a fourth level one **could** indicate the basic semantic function (cf. the specification under a for <u>you know</u> in 4.2.2.) of each and every particle. But this type of semantic characterization should be used with care. In the case of central pragmatic particles, for instance, a semantic characerization is little more than a trick to bring pragmatics into semantics. Such fourth-level specifications could still be used as mnemonic indications, for instance, for pragmatic particles in the form of characterizations like 'central,' 'aspectual,' and 'epistemic.' Especially for the peripheral particles, this would be informative.

In principle, any element or construction can have a pragmatic function in addition to its semantic meaning. The analyst can indicate such potential functions at the levels of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. But it is not enough just to say that, for instance, the Politeness aspect of a particular element is highlighted in a particular situation, and that the Involvement aspect is highlighted in another situation where the particle is

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used. We also need to say what form such highlighting takes, what features of Politeness, or of Involvement, are in focus. It is for the sake of this more detailed information that I have given tentative lists of the various aspects that partake in circumscribing the areas of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement in 4.2..

Thus, with reference to the preceding discussions, and to the findings of Östman 1981a, we can say that <u>you know</u> can have turn-signalling as one of its functions at the Coherence level. Within Politeness, a pragmatic particle can for instance specify the strategy of Politeness that a speaker is using in a conversation; or, as in the case of <u>you know</u>: a speaker's use of the particle indicates that although the interlocutors are presently using strategies of Informal Deference, s/he would not mind changing the situation in the direction of Camaraderie/ Deference. (Cf. Östman 1981a for details.) At the Politeness level one can also indicate whatever potential aspects are highlighted of the more universal phenomena of rudeness, power, intimacy, which I discussed in 4.2.2.. For instance, I argued that whereas the function of <u>you know</u> can primarily be related to the scale of Indirectness, <u>I guess</u> is primarily an expression on the scale of Intimacy. Information like 'Cooperation requested' (cf. the discussion of the semantics of <u>you know</u>) also belongs to the level of Politeness, and could be indicated if this aspect in particular is focused on.

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A detailed analysis of the Involvement factor of <u>you know</u> might show the prevalence of aspects like 'certainty,' 'positive attitude,' 'planning,' and 'involvement.' At the level of Involvement, the Level Analysis can indicate information like plus-or-minus E, P, and A; it can indicate the point on a scale of feelings (prejudice -- attitude -- emotion) at which a speaker carries on his/her part in a conversation; or we can simply indicate whether a particle indicates, say, calmness or aggressiveness. On a modality scale of Certain --- Uncertain we can also indicate the pragmatic Involvement of a speaker. As we saw in the discussion of <u>säkert</u> in 3.5., this pragmatic specification does not have to be the same as the semantic specification. Furthermore, aspects of sincerity can be indicated, and, as a further specification of turn-taking we can also specify more detailed information in our Level Analysis, for instance that a pragmatic particle is an attention getter, or that the use of a particular particle implies foregrounded information where there are no real Coherence-reasons for this.

In a concrete analysis of specific pragmatic particles in particular situations we furthermore have to pay special attention not only to the fact that a pragmatic particle is used, but also to how that particle is used. In Östman 1981a, for instance, I have shown that the important distinction between male and female uses of <u>you know</u> is not that one group uses the particle more than the other, but that one group uses the particle more than the other, but

that it is used in very different ways. In particular, I found that women tend to use <u>you know</u> in order to qualify whole utterances, whereas men tend to use it to qualify shorter phrases. (For further details, see Östman 1981a.)

The Level Analysis that I have given a short presentation of above, is not, of course, restricted in its use to clarifying the pragmatics of pragmatic particles. What is more important is that it can function as a general method for indicating pragmatic information of any element in a discourse.

The particular formal representation of a Level Analysis is of course of secondary importance. In Östman 1981a I suggested that the different levels simply be put underneath the utterance or piece of text to be analyzed; in the following manner (where '+' indicates highlighting; the example is a modification of a similar representation in Östman 1981:40).

UTTERANCE:	-- You know -- a -- oh, I don't ...
COHERENCE	+ Turn-taking
POLITENESS	Inf-Def ⟶ Ca/Def
INVOLVEMENT	attention-getting
(SEMANTICS	imply shared knowledge)

<u>Figure 4.2.</u> An example of a Level Analysis.

*

At this point we need to ask why this particular model is to be favored to other models that deal with more or less the same aspects of linguistic behavior. Why, for instance, is this solution to be preferred to Halliday's systemics, which also recognizes different levels of analysis (and from whom the format of my 'level'-represent-ation clearly is a borrowing).

The first point is not in major contrast with Halli-day's systemics, although it is in opposition to the dis-course approach taken in Halliday & Hasan 1976. The present approach seeks to make a synthesis of what Levinson (1983: 286ff.) labels Discourse Analysis (DA) and Conversation Analysis (CA). In particular, I have followed CA method-ology in avoiding analyses based on a single text, in relying as much as possible on empirical data (cf. Chapters 2 and 3), and thus avoiding premature theory construction, and I have also emphasized the interactional and infer-ential consequences of the choice between alternative utterances. On the other hand, I have not based my dis-cussions on attested observations only, but I have also relied on introspection and intuition (a linguistic technique related more to DA than to CA), and I have also at times committed the CA sin of 'guessing' what would be odd, instead of solely relying on the data. In summary, then, I have started with conversation analysis, built a theory on the basis of the findings of this analysis, and then taken a more discourse-analytic approach in predicting

beyond the data.

The second point of difference is this. The three levels that Halliday recognizes are the ideational, interpersonal, and textual levels. (Cf. for instance Halliday 1967-68, 1970, 1978, 1979.) The interpersonal and textual levels do come close to the area that my Politeness and Coherence parameters cover, respectively, although Halliday's levels are more semantically oriented. This is not, however, a major divergence between the two approaches, since for Firth and Halliday, meaning in their sense of the term also includes function. The ideational level is, however, closely connected with what we generally understand by semantics (my potential fourth level), and thus, Halliday's approach has little room for indicating aspects of Involvement.

Thirdly, systemics is a very rigid structural format for representing the linguistic choices that speakers make. That is, a choice at one level, say, within the transitivity or theme systems, automatically excludes all the potential alternatives of a route not chosen. This is clearly in opposition to what we find in natural-language interactions.[5] We saw this in the case of the question particles in Solf, too. The use of elå, for instance, cannot always be clearly asssigned as due to one choice rather than another. Instead, what we find is that all the potential functions, or forces, of elå are potentially there and can be drawn on - ambiguously. The same phenom-

enon is pointed out by Levinson (1983:354), in connection
with his example (105) - given below as (1);

(1) Mom: Do you know who's going to that meeting?
    Kid: Who.
    Mom: I don't know!

where Mom's first turn is taken by the Kid as a pre-
announcement, whereas Mom intended it as a real question.
(Cf. also Levinson's (1983:330) discussion of his example
(49).) Levinson convincingly shows that the ambiguity in
such examples is present not only for the analyst but also
for the participants themselves. In other words, a prag-
matic analysis needs simultaneous access to several
potential meanings, in order to be able to accurately
mirror the behavior of conversationalists. (Note also in
this connection my previous discussion of Va as used
simultaneously as Object and as Subject in a sentence, in
fn. 7, Chapter 3; and my discussion in 3.2. of construc-
tions like Dŏ saadŏ V as syntactically indeterminate
between interrogative and declarative.)

Fourthly, and in close connection to my third point,
whereas in Halliday's 'level analysis' (cf. Halliday
1979:72 for an example) an element gets picked out and
characterized as indicating property X, Y, or Z on one of
his three levels, my Level Analysis operates simultaneously
on all levels for, in principle, all words or construc-
tions. As I pointed out earlier, any of the relevent
aspects on any one level might be highlighted, but they are
all potentially there, and can be drawn on, both for the

analyst, and in particular for the native speaker and his/her understanding of the utterance and the situation at hand.

Fifthly, whereas Halliday's approach is an explicit approach in the sense that the features that are indicated on his three levels are largeley syntactico-semantic, my approach is a pragmatically-oriented one that seeks to investigate the implicitly communicated aspects of language use. And, as far as language use is concerned, I refer to Austin (1962), who, in his discussion of performatives, argued that it is the implicit performatives that are the primary ones. In terms of speech act theory, we could say that the three parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement are the devices that on a larger scale of language use can be referrred to by the analyst in making the implicit features of language explicit. (Cf. in this connection Searle's (1969) Principle of Expressibility. Cf. also in this discussion Levinson's 1983:360 note that embedded, implicit, corrections in conversations are preferred to expressed corrections. In Solf, in particular, but perhaps also more generally, there seems to be a preference for avoiding making a directive altogether.)

Finally, as a summary of these points, the present approach looks at language from the point of view of the participants themselves (cf. the ethnomethodology of speaking), and thereby attempts to relate directly to human behavior in general.

*

I will give two further examples of the general applicability of the Level Analysis. First, consider indirect speech acts. It has often been pointed out that what a speaker means by an utterance like (1) may to some extent be **indeterminate**. (Cf. e.g. Leech 1983:35,39.)

(1) Cold in here, isn't it?

But if indirect speech acts are potentially indeterminate, then it would surely be wrong to characterize the force of a particular indirect speech act as unambiguously X or Y. Indeterminacy means that there is no one heuristic that will specify the force of that utterance unambiguously. The speaker him/herself does not want to make such a choice, but keeps several potential forces available. By indicating different potential forces on different levels in a Level Analysis, we can thus simulate the psychological reality behind a particular linguistic choice, and indirect speech acts turn out not to need as much special treatment as some linguists argue. As for (1), its force on the level of Politeness might be specified as an attempt to get the addressee to close the window, at the same time as it is an instance of phatic communication at the level of Coherence.

The other example is from Old English. Recently, the particles þa and þonne have been extensively discussed in the literature (cf. Enkvist 1972, forthcoming, Wårvik 1984, Östman 1982b). In a thorough discussion of the problems with these particles, and especailly with successive

clauses introduced by þa or þonne, Mitchell (1985:para2546) argues as follows in reference to passage i.22.10 from Ælfric's <u>Catholic Homilies</u>, "the second þonne clause is used <u>apo koinou</u>; it is in a sense a principal clause to the first and a subordinate clause to the third clause introduced by þonne." The relevant passage is given in (2), followed by Thorpe's (1844-6) translation.

(2) Ic wylle settan min wedd betwux me and eow to þisum
     behate; þæt is, þonne ic oferteo heofenas mid
     wolcnum, þonne bið æteowod min renboga betwux þam
     wolcnum, þonne beo ic gemyndig mines weddes, þæt ic
     nelle heonon-ford mancynn mid wætere adrencan.
     'I will set my covenant betwixt me and you for this
     promise: that is, when I overspread the heavens with
     clouds, then shall be shown my rainbow betwixt the
     clouds, then will I be mindful of my covenant, that I
     will not henceforth drown mankind with water.'

What Mitchell implies is not that the three þonne clauses are hierarchically ordered, the first þonne clause subordinated to the second, and this in turn subordinated to the third. What he wants to say is that the second clause is marked as being both a main clause and a subordinate clause simultaneously. What this boils down to is that þonne, when it is used the second time, can be interpreted as a superordinating conjunction or particle in reference to the preceding clause, but that the following (the third) þonne clause forces a reinterpretation of the second þonne as being a subordinating particle. But both these forces of the second þonne have to be kept available to the reader of passage (2). þonne is indeterminate in this passage much the same way as indirect speech acts are potentially indeterminate. Again, an adequate account of

the functions of þonne has to be able to specify this indeterminacy; in terms of the Level Analysis: þonne is simultaneously a grounding marker at the level of Coherence, and a conjunction at the semantic level. A similar conclusion is reached with respect to the related particle þa by Wårvik (1984:30-1):

> The division of þa into a foreground-marking, sequence-marking, and consequence-marking adverbial is, of course, artificial, as all the nuances are naturally present in each occurrence of þa. If such a classification is valid, the place that þa occupies in a clause would then reinforce one of the nuances, and thus the variations in word-order would enable one particle to carry several nuances of meaning.

*

In the discussion above I hinted at a distinction between the actual and the potential pragmatic function of the choice of a linguistic element. This needs some elaboration. We often encounter statements to the effect that the actual context of situation is indeterminate, and that we can never achieve a full explanation of any particular context. This is true from the point of view of the analyst, but for the interlocutors in a particular situation, context – or at least some context – is always present in a quite unambiguous manner, and can be added to, through the particular linguistic choices that the

interlocutors make in the ensuing conversation. It is thus obvious that when we encounter a potential ambiguity in a situation or in an utterance, or when the interlocutors experience a difficulty in interpreting a particular utterance, then the analyst has to start from the utterance itself, its place in the discourse, and its parts, and look for the potential functions that an element or a combination of elements can have.

In the present approach, this does not, however, mean that we for a particular situation choose one of a set of alternative functions (in the way we would choose one of the meanings of an ambiguous word like <u>bachelor</u>). Instead, for the actual function of a linguistic element the analyst - as well as, implicitly, the participants themselves - needs to retain all the potential meanings available, and can call forth and draw on these if difficulties of interpretation occur. The Level Analysis thus purports to mirror this aspect of the linguistic behavior of conversationalists. The Level Analysis is a method for analyzing the actual function of utterances, while at the same time retaining the analyst's/interlocutor's access to other potential functions of the same utterances.

<p align="center">*</p>

In my discussion of intention in section 1.3. I argued that the linguistic effect of a message has to be considered on a par with the speaker's intention. But if this is the case, then we also need to scrutinize certain

other theoretical concepts. In particular, the distinction between symptom and symbol cannot be upheld as rigorously when doing implicit pragmatics, as is usually taken for granted in linguistic research. Let us look at four situations.

A. If speaker X blushes, that means that X is embarrassed, but speaker X does not use blushing in order to communicate that s/he is embarrassed.

B. Speaker Y speaks geographical dialect y.

C. Speaker Z speaks in accordance with his/her age and sex group.

D. Speaker W speaks English with a Finnish accent.

It is true that the manifestations of situations A, B, and C should strictly speaking be regarded as non-linguistic manifestations if the speakers do not have a choice. But in situations B and C the addressee might not know that what s/he hears is automatic. Where this is the case, the potential function of the dialect has to be kept within reach if we want to give an adequate explanation of what happens in a discourse. The same, I think, can also be argued for situations A and D. Again, then, the Level Analysis does not make an a priori choice between what is a symptom and what is a symbol, nor do speakers in ordinary conversations.

4.4. Question particles in Solf revisited

We have already seen that the question particles in Solf cannot be used interchangeably, although they tend to co-occur. In this section I want to return to the question particles, and look at them from the point of view of the system of implicit pragmatics that I have devised in this Chapter. Based on the rather informal discussion of Chapters 2 and 3, I will give what I see as the potential pragmatic functions of the basic question particles in Solf, in terms of the parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement.

A semantic characterization of the question particles in Solf would simply say that they are peripheral particles of the sub-class 'information requesters' (cf. Östman 1982b), where, in English, we also find tags, and particles like huh? and ok?. The exception to this general statement is the particle då, which should rather be characterized as a central pragmatic particle. But its semantic meaning, as an abstraction (cf. the discussion in the preceding section), is still the same as for the other particles.

4.4.1. Tå and då

A comparison with English would say that tå is close to the use of the English particle then, and the functions of då are most closely conveyed by the use of interrogative intonation.

Coherence

With regard to the different aspects of Coherence dealt with in 4.2.1., we can note the following features of tå and då. As question particles they are the (socio-linguistic) markers of 'real' Solf in the sense that they tend to be used more frequently as question particles by older speakers than by younger speakers.

On the textual level of Coherence, we can first note that tå and då - like all question particles - have a floor-yielding function. And we can note that the particle tå då has this function much more strongly than either of the other two, since it requests further information more eagerly than tå or då taken separately. Tå and då also function as discourse markers in another sense - and here their respective functions are in opposition. Tå implies that what is talked about is already situationally es-tablished, and requests further information about the topic. Whereas tå is therefore not happily used in order to introduce a new topic, då particularly indicates that what is talked about is not situationally established (in fact, då often explicitly opposes this), and it can thus happily be used in an utterance that introduces a new topic. Furthermore, as to relevance marking, we can note that since då can also question the appropriate identification of a phrase, it thereby marks that phrase as being irrele-vant to the discussion.

Politeness

As in other cultures, the use of pragmatic particles makes the interaction more indirect in Solf, too. But in Solf a lack of pragmatic particles is apt to be a clear indicator of impoliteness.

Although då was judged as 'most polite' in the psycholinguistic experiment referred to in 3.4., and can be regarded as a typical interactive particle, this should not be taken as an indicator that the use of då is to be recommended in Solf. The situation can rather be described as the opposite. The fact that då is judged as 'polite' should most likely be considered as an indication that då marks the conversation as being at the level of Formal Deference, and even indicating movement in the direction of Distance/Deference. This is in particular suggested by the typical feature of då as indicating that what is said is in some sense in opposition to the preceding. (Cf. the disuccion in Chapter 2.) Of the parameters of Politeness discussed in the present chapter, då most clearly focuses on the Power end of the Power-Solidarity scale. Whereas då thus expects a negative answer (indicating that the 'contrary' interpretation suggested by the speaker of the då utterance is not feasible), the use of tå expects a positive answer, and can be characterized as coming closer to the Solidarity end of the Power-Solidarity scale.

in particular elå va - is a stronger, and more unambiguous floor-yielding device than any of the other particles.

Politeness

Elå is a typical Informal Deference particle, which gives the right to the addressee to disconfirm, or even oppose, what the speaker has just said. Its function as an 'I mean'-hesitator can introduce an afterthought either by the speaker him/herself or by his/her interlocutor. And since elå has an equal expectancy potential for a positive and a negative answer, the response from the interlocutor can happily be one contrary to the opinion of the speaker. With respect to the Politeness aspects dealt with in 4.4.2., elå highlights the YOU-importance aspect.

Involvement

Elå is the question particle in Solf that expresses the most positive feelings and attitudes. It scored high both for the category 'friendly,' and for the category 'calm.' In general terms, we can characterize elå as an 'involvement particle.' This aspect is futher underlined by the function of elå as a planning device (cf. the use of I mean in English).

4.4.3. Na

It is difficult to give an appropriate characterization of na in contrastive terms. Perhaps the closest we can get is to say that it functions like a lexical hedge

in English (cf. kinda, sorta).

Coherence

Some of my findings suggest that na is more often used by younger speakers than by older speakers, but my material is not representative enough to completely warrant this conclusion. Na also has the same general hedging function that we found for elå.

Politeness and Involvement

The responses to na in the psycholinguistic experiment are somewhat difficult to explain. On the one hand, na seemed to suggest 'friendliness,' but at the same time it received high scores for the categories 'angry' and 'impatient.' I also noted that na frequently occurs in negative utterances. These findings seem to suggest the following Politeness and Involvement interpetation. Na is primarily a Politeness marker, in the sense that it presupposes a particular relation between speaker and addressee. The kind of relationship that admits both negative attitudes and positive attitudes together is that of Camaraderie - as seen from the point of view of the society's norm for Politeness. Thus, the fact that we find na in negative utterances is not because na has anything intrinsically negative about it, but that it is used in negative utterances to mitigate the negation. The aspect of Politeness that na sets in focus would then be Intimacy.

4.5. Conclusion

The analysis of the pragmatics of question particles
in Solf is an analysis of their respective potential func-
tions on the three parameters of implicit pragmatics. In
addition to their syntactic and semantic characteristics,
the question particles carry with them this kind of prag-
matic information whenever they are used. In effect, this
means that pragmatic particles cannot simply be brushed
aside as merely carrying conventional implicatures, as
Leech (1983:11) suggests. The purpose of the Level Analysis
described in this chapter is to assign to each word,
element, or construction - from an inventory of potential
functions - the features on each level (of Coherence,
Politeness, and Involvement) that can be thought to be in
focus on the basis of what the interlocutors and/or the
analyst know about the particular discourse. And out of
these features, it is furthermore possible to indicate
whether any one or more of the features on one (or several)
levels are particularly highlighted. (Cf. the plus sign in
Figure 4.2.)

It has often been pointed out that the regularities
in pragmatics are more of constraints, restraints, or
principles, as opposed to the rules of grammar. This has
precisely to do with what I earlier (4.3.) referred to as
the potential indeterminacy of the force of conversational
utterances. Leech (1983:23-4) discusses this issue in terms
of the negotiability of pragmatic factors, whereby part of

the responsibility of the meaning is left to the addressee. I claim, then, that the functions of question particles in Solf is indeterminate in the same way as I discussed the indeterminacy of indirect speech acts and OE bonne in 4.3.. And one way to account for this indeterminacy of actual function in a conversation is to perform a Level Analysis of the particular question particle.

*

The analysis of question formation in Chapter 3 resulted in a variety of statements about the contextual restrictions that influence the final output of a request for confirmation or information in Solf. In this chapter I have suggested a general framework within which the issues raised in previous chapters could conveniently be addressed together. I also suggested that not only is this a feasible way of looking at the use of requests in Solf, but that it is the kind of system that not only systematically handles the facts, but also is required, in order for us to be able to adequately represent or simulate the native speakers' language use.

Footnotes to Chapter 4

[1]But we not only have to pay special attention to the fact that a pragmatic particle is used, but also to how that particle is used (cf. Östman 1981a, and 4.3. below).

[2]Thus, Grice's maxims do not account for the fact that people tend to read into messages much more than what that message actually says. In connection with this, cf. Levinson's (1983:3.2.4.) discussion of the necessity of having a principle of informativeness.

[3]The speaker's reference to his own mental processes might be an exception, and thus more of an explicit anchoring device. However, even under this category, the expressions are more or less implicit, and it is sometimes difficult to draw a sharp line in terms of explicit-implicit between, say, I guess, and I thought.

[4]In a sense, Searle's sincerity conditions also contain these three parameters, since they state the requisite beliefs (cf. Coherence), feelings (cf. Involvement), and intentions (cf. Politeness, especially if intention is interpreted in a goal-oriented manner, as the interactive intentions) of the speaker, as appropriate to each kind of action.

[5]In fact, in earlier versions of systemics (cf. Halliday 1967-8) it was possible to have 'lines' (corresponding

to choices by route) crossing one another. According
to Ventola 1984 this is no longer allowed. But even
in that earlier version, each choice was an explicit
either-or choice, where the indeterminate aspects of
language were overlooked.

CHAPTER 5: FURTHER APPLICATIONS - PASSIVE AND PERSUASION

Chapter 4 contained a theoretical discussion of the three parameters that make up what I call Pragmatics as Implicitness. In Chapter 4 I also applied the Level Analysis to the function of question particles in Solf. In this chapter I will illustrate how these parameters can be made use of on a larger scale. I will look very briefly at two areas: persuasive language and passive constructions.

The analysis of persuasive language starts out from a 'type' of language, and investigates how this type of language manifests itself. I want to show what markers of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement there are in persuasive language. In my discussion of passive constructions I take the opposite avenue of reasoning, and start with a category ('passive') that is defined structural-semantically, and I then show how passives are made use of for pragmatic purposes: to express Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement.

In this chapter I will not so much argue for the necessity of the Coherence-Politeness-Involvement framework in order to point to some new facts that only this framework can handle. Rather, I will merely show how what we know about the functions of passive clauses and about the language of persuasion can be given a coherent frame of reference if we utilize the insights that recourse to the

pragmatic parameters can offer. The expositions in this Chapter will consequently be very brief.

5.1. Passive constructions

5.1.1. Introduction

In this section I will show very briefly how the parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement can be used as a framework for explicating the pragmatic function of passive constructions in Swedish. (For an extensive discussion of this topic, see Östman forthcoming e.) In Leinonen & Östman 1983 we showed that languages tend to have not only one passive construction, but a set of passive constructions. The passive constructions in a language all semantically suppress the Agent. I will here show how a linguistic choice between the use of particular passive constructions in a situation is not only semantically governed, but that it is also governed by the speaker's implicit adherence to the pragmatic parameters.

In Leinonen & Östman 1983 we distinguished between three basic passive constructions in Swedish: the Patient-oriented periphrastic passive with bli 'become' plus past participle exemplified in (2), the Activity-oriented morphological passive with the verbal suffix -s exemplified in (3), and the Agent-oriented indefinite-person passive marked with man as Subject. This construction is ex-emplified in (4) below.

(1) Pojken   kysste flickan.
    boy-the kissed girl-the
    'The boy kissed the girl.'

(2) Flickan blev   kysst av pojken.
    girl-the became kissed of boy-the
    'The girl was kissed by the boy.'

(3) Flickan kysstes (av pojken).
    girl-the kissed-s̲ of boy-the
    'The girl was kissed (by the boy).'

(4) Man kysste flickan.
    man̲ kissed girl-the
    'The girl was kissed.'

       The findings of Leinonen & Östman 1983 can be summarized in the following terms. First, if we want to take into account the semantic correlates of syntactic constructions, we should not see passives as secondary constructions, as results of optional transformations. Passives have to be generated as such, based on an underlying semantic feature of Agent demotion, or Agent suppression. However, although the Agent is semantically suppressed – and syntactically often not realized at all – it is still part of the meaning of passive constructions. As Keenan (1981) argues, it is the **implication** of the existence of an Agent that is definitional of passives. Secondly, and closely related to the non-dependence of passives on actives, syntactic constructions are to be seen not only in terms of the parts that they contain, in terms of them being generated anew on each specific occasion. They are also to be viewed from a holistic point of view, as set (though expandable) surface configurations, as constructional types. And thirdly, most often a partic-

ular language does not simply have a passive constructional type; it has several.

When we talk about active constructions, we usually refer to a set, or even a system, of constructional types. For active constructions we can set up a constructional hierarchy, or scale, which consists of typical transitive sentences at one end point, and typical Subject + Complement constructions, or 'ascriptions' (cf. Halliday 1967-8) at the other end point. In between these we can distinguish a fairly discrete point where we find typical intransitive clauses (including different types of middle constructions, like This wine drinks well). (Halliday talks about this 'mid-point' as 'Non-directed action,' and of transitive clauses as indicating 'Directed action.') Schematically, this can be presented as in Figure 5.1. or Figure 5.2..

Subject + Complement --- Intransitive --- Transitive

Figure 5.1. A scale of constructional types in the active.

Subject-Noun + Copula + NP/Adj sentences

Intransitive & Middle sentences (Subject-Noun + Predicate)

Transitive sentences (Subject-Noun + Predicate + Object)

Figure 5.2. Active constructional types displayed as a hierarchy.

(We might, of course, want to single out other construc-
tional types, too, but I think these are the major ones
that will be accepted as constructional types by most
linguists.)

All of these constructional types single out a topic,
which in unmarked situations often is akin to a semantic
Agent, Actor, or Controller. And in all the constructional
types, some activity, process, or quality is predicated
of that topic. We can refer to this scale, or the cor-
responding hierarchy, of constructional types as the **Active
Pattern**.

Passive constructions can also be seen as a set, or a
system of constructional types. In a sense, this system
parallels the active hierarchy of Figure 5.2.. This is the
Passive Pattern, and it has the following main construc-
tional types.

Periphrastic passives   (Subject-Noun + AUX + V)
Morphological passives   (Subject-Noun + V-affix)
Indefinite-person passives ((Subject-dummy) + V(-affix))[1]

Figure 5.3. The constructional types in the Passive
Pattern.

As I am well aware, indefinite-person passives are
not usually regarded as passive constructions, since
syntactically they have active verbal morphology. It is
clear, however, that if passive is looked at from a

semantic point of view, these constructions fill a gap in the Passive Pattern. For instance, and in particular, we usually distinguish between three kinds of verbs: those that express a state, those that characterize a process that leads to a result, and those verbs that express some on-going activity. Purely syntactically defined passive constructions in many languages have to be restricted to the latter two of these types of verbs (or a subset of these). That is, stative verbs like <u>have</u> do not usually passivize: *<u>A bicycle is had (by the landlady)</u>. Semantically, however, there seems to be no a priori reason why an Agent should not potentially be suppressable with stative verbs. Thus, if indefinite person constructions are regarded as part of the passive pattern, we can indicate suppressed-Agent meaning also with stative verbs, as in (5). (For detailed discussions of the status of indefinite-person constructions, see Leinonen & Östman 1983 and Östman forthcoming e.)

(5) Åtminstone har man en fin bil
    at-least   has <u>man</u> a   fine car
    'At least one has a fine car'

    In this view of passives the relationship between active and passive is not overlooked. There is a relationship, but what are called typical active and typical passive sentences are parts of different constructional patterns (that is, sets of constructional types). It is the patterns that show relationships. In the same way as we can compare the phonemic inventory of two languages, we

can also compare constructional patterns in different languages. But if we pick out one constructional type, say, the morphological passive, from one language, and compare it to a morphological passive in another language, we are making the same mistake as if we were to pick out the phoneme /a/ from one language, and compare it to the phoneme /a/ in another language. In both cases we neglect to take into account the other members of the respective systems of which these members (the morphological passive, and the phoneme /a/) are necessary parts. (Cf. also Langacker 1982:65.)

My arguments above do not, however, mean that I want to overlook the obvious semantic similarities between prototypical active and passive sentences. Before choosing between different active and passive constructions for the verbal manifestation of his/her idea unit, a speaker has to choose whether to suppress the Agent or not. Syntactically, this choice involves, among other things, the choice of which NP to make the syntactic Subject of his/her utterance. That is, even though actives and passives are seen as belonging to separate patterns, it is still possible to acknowledge a relationship between, for instance, the syntactic Object of an active clause and the syntactic Subject of a passive clause.

The constructional types of a language form an integral part of the syntactic make-up of that language. And the reason one constructional type is used instead of an-

other in a particular text is governed by semantic factors. As Charles Fillmore, John Anderson, and others have shown, the choice of Subject-of-a-sentence, and the choice of preposition in a prepositional phrase are governed by underlying semantic factors, i.e. semantic role relations. (Cf. e.g. Fillmore 1968, 1977, Anderson 1978, 1980.) For instance, the (or at least one) difference between The house was filled with children, and The house was filled by children is that in the former sentence the children are seen as Instruments, whereas in the latter sentence they are seen as Agents.

I would like to argue that the choice of using one constructional type rather than another is in a similar way semantically governed. That is, the different passives (=Agent-suppressing constructions) in a language, say, in Swedish, do not occur in free variation. There is a semantic pattern that lies behind the choice of both active and passive constructional types. This semantic pattern may be universal, much in the same way as semantic roles may be universal. Different constructional types in the patterns of different languages are related to the factors that make up this semantic pattern, even though the syntactic, language-specific patterns may vary extensively. That is, in the same way as a particular semantic role might play a more decisive role in one language than in another, so too will different constructional-type semantic factors be highlighted in different languages. In other words, the

inventory of semantic factors may be universal.[2]

In Leinonen & Östman 1983 we also suggested a format for how these semantic factors relate to the semantic roles, and how syntax can make use of them. The suggestion was simply that the verb and the predicate be indexed in the same manner as role specifications: both in the lexicon, and in specific sentence derivations. As we pointed out in that article, such indices will be useful in order to explain why, for instance, a periphrastic passive is used instead of a morphological passive in Russian; viz. through aspect restrictions in the predicate. With such a device we can also easily make available the fact that the Swedish periphrastic passive usually has its Patient fronted, and that Russian morphological passives require extra semantic restrictions on the Patient, in terms of Animacy. (A refinement of this format is suggested in Östman forthcoming e.)

5.1.2. Pragmatic potentialites of passive constructions

In this section I want to discuss a speaker's choice of a passive construction in terms of the pragmatic parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement. The question is not only under what pragmatic conditions the speaker would choose to use a passive construction instead of an active one, but also under what conditions s/he would tend to use a particular type of passive - in the sense this was discussed in the previous section. The discussion

in this section will be rather abstract in the sense that I will mostly look at what I consider to be the potential communicative functions of passives. I have thus not investigated any particular style in depth, using the methods of conversation or discourse analysis, to show how passives interact with other linguistic aspects in actual use.

In the following I will mostly be dealing with passive constructions in Swedish. However, I will not necessarily argue that the Swedish passives have the pragmatic functions X, Y, and Z. Instead I will discuss how passive constructions can be seen as markers of certain social and psychological, i.e. pragmatic phenomena, and what inferences we can draw from the occurrence of a passive construction in a discourse. The issues that I raise are implicitly present in discourse in the sense that the pragmatic functions that I associate with the use of a passive construction are potential pragmatic functions: every situation and utterance will choose to highlight, or focus on, one (or more) functions, at the expense of the others.

From the point of view of Coherence I will discuss some textual aspects of passives; within Politeness I will deal with interactive strategies; and under Involvement I will briefly touch on how attitudes are expressed with passives.

5.1.2.1. Coherence

The question that the Coherence parameter of pragmatics has to deal with in relation to passives can be stated as follows. How do speakers make use of passives to (implicitly) create (or even destroy) Coherence in a culture, in a situation, or, what is more relevant in this discussion, in a discourse or text? From the point of view of the analyst investigating a product text, the same question can be stated in the following terms. Why is a (particular kind of) passive construction used at this particular point in the text?

The textual product is a manifestation of certain communicative strategies that speakers use. The speaker gives the information s/he wants to communicate particular linguistic structures in accordance with the particular goals s/he wants to achieve. Thus, a text is a manifestation of a number of simultaneous choices by a speaker or speakers. The speakers not only choose what to say, but also how they want to express themselves: what presuppositions, and foci of interest they should choose. Interactively, a speaker has to have such a grasp of his/her utterance that a listener can unambiguously deduct what the speaker is talking about, and what his/her intentions are. The information structure of an utterance thus has directly to do with how a particular utterance macro-syntactically fits the surrounding verbal context. To the extent that 'purely' textual structuring in this sense

partake (even if indirectly) in the implicit establishment of Coherence, it is part of the pragmatic perspective on language at the sentential level of Coherence.

To realize that there do exist purely co-textual reasons for using a passive construction, and that such co-textual structuring also, in a sense, create Coherence, we can think of the situation where we have a painting hanging on the wall, and underneath it we have a text in the form of either (1) or (2).

(1) Owned by James Smith.

(2) Donated by James Smith.

In other words, the painting is one element in the clause structure (with auxiliaries left out as being low in semantic information). That is, we have a situation where we simply can not imagine **not** to prepose the painting. (It would be strange to have a sign saying 'James Smith owns,' or 'James Smith (has) donated,' and underneath that sign a painting.) The position of the painting is given, as a **theme**, and after the painting (here: underneath it) follows the predication, the **rheme**. (I am here using the terms 'theme' and 'rheme' only in the sense of the structural opposition between the beginning and the end of a clause (cf. Halliday 1967-8).)

We can note in passing that in a language like Finnish, which has what is usually referred to as a much 'freer' word order, you do not need to use a passive construction in a case like this.

```
(3) Lahjoittanut        James.
    donate-perf.part.   James(nom.)
    Donated by James.
```

or:

```
(4) Omistaa James.
    owns    James.
    Owned by James.
```

Figure 5.4. An example of obligatory fronting of a constituent for Coherence reasons.

Notice that (3) and (4) have the form and word order they have in spite of the fact that the ordinary syntax of Finnish does not permit such sequences. First, there are no purely syntactic reasons for the possibility of leaving out objects in Finnish. (A possible counterexample is the use of the predicate as 'yes' or 'no' in answer to a y/n question; cf. (5).

```
(5) A: Löitkö      Kallea?
       hit-you-kO kalle(part.)
       'Did you hit Kalle?'
    B: Löin.
       hit-I
       'Yes' or: 'Yes, I did')
```

Secondly, there is a word order constraint in Finnish (cf. Hakulinen 1976), which says that verb-initial sentences tend to be avoided - despite the fact that Finnish is a synthetic language that grammatically allows quite a free word order. Thirdly, the word orders of (3) and (4) are

given, and have the status of being set expressions. It would be very odd to have a plate under the painting with the inscription <u>James lahjoittanut</u> or <u>James omistaa.</u>

We find a similar phenomenon in newspaper announcements, where the place of the painting is taken up by a headline in large boldface letter type.

(6)   **ENGLISH TEACHER**
            wanted at St Mary's College.
                ...

(7)   **EUROPEAN STAMPS**
            sold at incredible discount prices
                ...

In examples (6) and (7) it is of course also the pragmatic salience (cf. Van Valin 1980) of the NP that decides its initial position, and therefore information structuring for interactive reasons. So, here we are perhaps no longer within the realms of really 'pure' textual reasons for fronting.

We can see the same process at work in sentence (8), where in the place of a painting or a boldface headline we have a left-dislocated element.

(8) Bill, he was shot.

One of the pragmatic reasons why <u>Bill</u> has been thematized here is again (as was the case in (6) and (7)) no doubt interactive, but there is also what we can call a purely textual reason why <u>Bill</u> comes first. A sentence like (8) would typically be used in a situation where another person has mentioned Bill's name, or (indirectly) referred to him - perhaps by presenting a picture of Bill. The speaker of

(8) can then relate his utterance to this previous mentioning.

In unmarked, neutral texts (if such objects exist), sentences tend to follow each other according to a theme-rheme pattern:

(9) Theme 1 -- Rheme 1. Theme 2 -- Rheme 2. ...

where Rheme 1 and Theme 2 have the same, or partly the same referent.

(10) Bill threw the ball. The ball flew through the air.
     T1   R1 = T2

In such cases T2 would ordinarily be replaced by a pronoun:

(11) Bill threw the ball, and it flew through the air.

In situations like these, the passive can thus give us an alternative structural possibility, if we for cohesive reasons necessarily want to follow a theme-rheme pattern, as in (12), instead of using (13).

(12) Bill threw the ball, and it was well received by Peter.

(13) Bill threw the ball, and Peter received it.

In English, as well as in Swedish, we have a principle of **end-weight** (which is of course related to that of end-focus, and the topic-comment distinction). (For a discussion of the relation of this principle to coherence, see Leech 1983.) Thus, (14) is better than (15).

(14) When they finally started to talk, they were enthusiastically listened to by the Finnish army, which had gathered on the scene of the crime.

(15) When they finally started to talk, the Finnish army, which had gathered on the scene of the crime, enthusiastically listened to them.

In this case, the <u>by</u>-phrase of (14) might be new (and thus has directly to do with speaker-hearer interaction) at the same time as it is a heavy element (and thus one reason for its final position in the sentence is textual). But we can also imagine the sentences in a context where the element of new-ness is all but lacking, but the passive version is still to be preferred.

(16) The robbery of the golden watch that took place in a barrack in Helsinki yesterday is rapidly being solved. Two official spokesmen for the Parliament visited the barrack where the army in its entirety had stayed for the last two weeks. Mr Virtanen's and Ms Järvinen's statements to the soldiers was some what delayed. But when they finally started to talk, they were enthusiastically listened to by the Finnish army, which had gathered on the scene of the crime.

Thus, in (16), the use of the passive form is for reasons of Coherence.

In a language like Swedish, which has to use inverted Subject-Verb word order in the main clause when a <u>when</u> clause precedes, the equivalent to (15) - given below as (18) - is definitely not as good as the Swedish equivalent to (14) - given below as (17). (And this is so even without the interfering non-restrictive relative clause.)

(17) När   de   äntligen började tala   blev   de
     when they finally   began   speak became they
        entusiastiskt   avlyssnade av hela   den finska
        enthusiastically listened   by whole the Finnish
           armén(, som hade samlats   på brottsplatsen).
           army   who had gathered on crime-scene

(18) När de äntligen började tala, avlyssnade hela den
        finska armén(, som hade samlats på brottsplatsen,)
        dem entusiastiskt.

This is of course a typical situation when the subject of

the corresponding active clause is a long and heavy phrase. The passive thus gives us a possibility of placing such heavy phrases last in a sentence.

In terms of Coherence as manifested in theme-rheme ditribution the passive can thus help to create cohesion between sentences and between clauses, and by so doing also of course create a more easily noticeable and processable Coherence in the discourse as a whole.

(For other aspects of Coherence in relation to the use of passive constructions, see Östman forthcoming e.)

5.1.2.2. Politeness

I will start my discussion of the behavior of passives in relation to interactive strategies with a short application of Grice's maxims (cf. Grice 1975) to the choice of passives in Swedish.

As I have already pointed out, Grice's maxims make up a negative frame of reference for conversational inter-action. The kinds of questions that can be asked within this frame are of the form, 'What maxim(s) does this utter-ance violate, or deviate from?.' Thus we can for instance say that an Agentless passive violates Grice's maxim of Quantity, if, say, the context of situation demands the Agent to be identified, since by using an Agentless passive in that situation, the speaker has not been as informative as s/he should have been. All passives also seem to violate Grice's maxim of Manner: passive constructions seldom make

things clear and more obvious. Instead, they create ambiguities and unclarities.

In addition to this, passives also violate Grice's maxim of interactional relevance. The speaker might indeed him/herself feel that it is relevant to use an indefinite-person (man) passive in reference to him/herself (cf. below for this use of indefinite-person passives in Swedish), and utter (1). But from the point of view of co-operation, (1) is not co-operatively relevant; rather, in its subtlety it sets up an hindrance for efficient cooperation in the situation.

(1) Man skulle nog inte ha   gjort det där.
    one should nog not have done it there
    'One shouldn't really have done that.'

On the surface, sentence (1) consists of an indefinite pronoun followed by a predication. And thus it can be interpreted as 'Somebody (or: 'You,' 'People') should not have done that.' This is the literal meaning of the utterance. However, if the speaker intended man to refer to him/herself, and wanted to say 'I should not have done that' with (1), then the utterance can be said to violate Grice's second maxim of Quality, which says that one should not say what one does not have enough evidence for. The speaker might have 'internal' evidence for saying that s/he should not have done so-and-so, but the addressee might interpret the sentence in a more general sense (corresponding to its literal meaning), and in that interpretation (which is an interactive possibility), the speaker violates

the maxim.

Saying that passives violate Gricean maxims does not seem to offer much insight beyond that very general statement itself. It seems to me that if we start the pragmatic investigation of a construction from the point of view of its structure and propositional content, we can in principle find instances of how any construction violates all Grice's maxims - by relating it to a variety of situational contexts. By taking a positive view of cooperation in terms of the strategies of Politeness that I discussed in Chapter 4, we can instead see the use of passives as a means to **avoid violating**, that is, to adher to, what Robin Lakoff (1975) calls Rules of politeness.

When speakers use the strategy of Camaraderie, the interaction itself is in focus. The speaker and the addressee have the same status, neither one has any possibility or desire to influence the other. The conversation might seem indirect, since the speakers do not explicitly need to express everything they want to say. The interlocutors understand one another with a minimum of effort. If passives are used as manifestations of this strategy of Politeness, it is definitely not in order to conceal any important points. Either one uses a passive because one honestly does not know who or what the Agent (or Controller of an activity) is, or because it simply does not matter who the Agent is, or else it is simply obvious to both speaker and addressee who the Agent is.

A speaker who wants to communicate in accordance with the Distance strategy wants to keep the addressee at a certain distance. Adherence to aspects of social status, like address terminology, are important in Distance Politeness, whereas emotionally loaded words and expressions clearly do not fit in. This strategy is most clearly exemplified by Bureaucratese and (until a decade or two ago) Academese. It is precisely as a manifestation of speakers' use of Distance strategies that we will find an abundant use of passives, both of morphological passives (like the Swedish s-passive) and of periphrastic passives (the English be and the Swedish bli passive). Both the morphological and the periphrastic passives can keep the Agent in the background, and especially for politicians or other officials using a variety of Bureaucratese, it is often very important to give an illusion that things just happen in society (especially if things go wrong), without anyone (including those who are in charge themselves) seemingly being responsible for what has happened. A very typical instance of the use of the Distance-strategy marking s-passive can be seen in the customary phrase by which a waiter/waitress can approach his/her customers in Swedish:

(2) Vad önskas?
    what wish-s
    'What is wished?' (= What can I do for you?)

Newspaper headlines are very often in the passsive form. This is, however, usually not because the writer

does not know who is behind what has happened. The difference between an s-passive and a periphrastic passive in Swedish headlines can almost always be related to the semantic difference there is between them: the s-passive focuses on activity, and the use of the periphrastic passive concentrates the readers attention to the Patient, and the stativity or perfectivity of the result. Man constructions are less usual in political reports. This no doubt has to do with the inherent focus on the Agent in man-passives. (Cf. Leinonen & Östman 1983, Östman forthcoming e, and 5.1.1. above.) To use an indefinite-person passive would not be consistent with the basic goals of journalism: it would imply that the writer knows who or what is the causal factor behind an activity, while at the same time refusing to tell the reader this explicitly.

Within the area of Deference, where interlocutors show (conventional) respect for one another and subordinate themselves in relation to others, most propositional information is qualified with expressions like probably, isn't that so, don't you think, strictly speaking, and other pragmatic particles. The type of indirectness that we find in Deference Politeness often carries with it negative connotations. (Cf. R. Lakoff 1980.) This is understandable, since the speakers do seem to try to push the responsibility for what is said onto their interlocutors, and each speaker works on the assumption that s/he him/herself is not part of the dominant group. I think it is within this

strategy of Politeness that man-passives in Swedish are used the most.

Andersson (1972) argues that there are two basic uses of man in Swedish.

1. A **general** use, where man has all individuals as its discourse universe. For instance,

(3) Man skall inte tro   på allt   som sägs
    one shall not believe on everything that say-s
    på TV
    on TV
    'One/You/People shouldn't believe everything that is said on TV.'

2. The other use is what Andersson calls **anaphoric**. The discourse universe is here a particular group of people, as in the following example, where the discourse universe that man refers to includes all those who work for the TV company.

(4) På TV har man fått   en ny chef.
    on TV have one gotten a new boss
    'They've gotten a new boss on TV.'

(In example (4) the corresponding English word would be they, in example (3) one, you, and people are possible.)

But what is of more direct relevance to my discussion of the Deference strategy are the cases that Andersson takes up as special cases of man in its general function:

a. man in the sense 'you'

(5) Man kan bara inte uppföra sig   så.
    one can just not behave -self so
    'One/You/People simply can/should not behave like that.'

(It seems to me that the use of one in the English version would here sound Distance-like.) According to

Andersson, man is here milder than du 'you,' it does not irritate the listener, and the use of du would exclude 'I,' which it should not do.

b. man in the sense 'I'

(6) Man har ju i alla fall bott i Berkeley.
    one has ju in every case lived in Berkeley
    'At least one (= 'I') has lived in Berkeley.'

where, according to Andersson, jag 'I' would be too direct, and man has a more emphatic character.

c. man in an overgeneralized sense, "the misuse of man," where man includes some of the people we are talking about, but not all:

(7) När man läst   ett stycke i N.N.'s nya
    when one read(perf) a   section in N.N.'s new
        diktsamling,   känner man sig   sömnig.
        poetry-collection feels   one -self sleepy
    'When one/you/we have read <or: Having read> a sec-
    tion of N.N.'s new collection of poems, you/we/one
    feel(s) tired.'

According to Andersson, man is here identical to the (critic-)'I,' together with other educated readers. Using man gives the utterance a more objective feeling, especially, as in this case, when what is at issue is something that people tend to disagree on.

All these three uses of man can be explained in terms of strategies of Politeness in the following way. The speaker uses the strategy of Deference to take away his/her own responsibility from what s/he is actually saying. The speaker follows certain principles of social interaction, and it is really these principles that dictate his/her

utterance, and the form it eventually takes. Example (5) is an instance of 'pure' Formal Deference: one should avoid telling the addressee straight to his/her face what one thinks of him/her. The other two examples are rather alike, but especially example (6) follows the principle of not boasting about oneself: a speaker should avoid indicating that it is s/he who is the active (i.e. responsible) person behind an activity that can be boasted about. Similarly, in example (7) the object is to keep the 'I' in the background, and not unnecessarily take responsibility for attitudinally loaded utterances. (And if one has to take responsibility, one should not do so alone, but instead use _we_.)

All this, of course, has to do with keeping up the balance between what I called solidarity and face-saving in 4.2.2.: on the one hand one should not be impolite to one's interlocutor, but on the other hand one does not either want to come out of an argument looking awfully stupid. The co-operative goal is to find the golden mean.

5.1.2.3. Involvement

The two examples below (cf. also Bolinger 1980:86) clearly show how passive constructions - and especially the ommission of the Agent - can be used to encourage, maintain, and even create general untruths and prejudices.

(1) Woman was meant for breeding.

(2) This piece of information was not meant for the public.

By leaving out the Agent in (1) the speaker tries to implicitly communicate that this is a God-sent truth, that it was in fact God who meant woman for breeding; whereas in actual fact, **the** appropriate Agent here would probably be 'by men.' In example (2) the speaker tries to imply that there are certain documents or information that by definition are not meant for the ordinary man in the street; whereas the real state of affairs is simply that the speaker did not want anybody to see what crooked plans s/he was making before it would have been too late to change them. If the public were to get to know about them (as it presumably did), it would not like them. The speaker knows this, and thus tries to blame it all on some abstract societal machinery, where things have to be done in a certain way.

It could be argued that examples (1) and (2) have the form they have conventionally, since the verb <u>mean</u> cannot happily be used in active clauses 'with the same meaning.' Cf. (3).

(3) *God meant woman for breeding.

Compare also the following pairs of examples.

(4) a. I was meant for you.
    b. *God meant me for you.

(5) a. I meant for Harry to be our new chairman.
    b. Harry was meant to be our mew chairman.

In example (5), version (a) does not mean the same thing as version (b) does. Examples (1) and (2) would thus have been more to the point if I had used the verb <u>intend</u> instead of

mean. Cf.

(6) a. God intended woman for breeding.
 b. Woman was intended for breeding.

(7) a. This piece of information was not intended for the
 public.
 b. I did not intend this piece of information for the
 public.

The argument would be that in the case of mean, the speaker does not have a choice: the passive form is given beforehand as the only possibility. But in the case of intend, the speaker is free to choose whether s/he will use a passive or an active construction. However, this is only part of the truth. Choices can be made on different levels. By choosing the phrasings of (1) and (2), the speaker also chooses to leave the Agent unspecified. And, I would argue, by choosing mean instead of intend the speaker implicitly implies that the utterances in (1) and (2) can only be said in one way: in the passive. If the speaker of (2) is a sophisticated linguist, he can even before a court of law state that he has not been trying to mislead journalists at all, it simply is a fact of English grammar that one does not express the content of (2) in the form of (8).

(8) *I did not mean this piece of information for the pub-
 lic.

Yet, by choosing (2) — instead of either (7a) or (7b) — the speaker is communicating his/her own attitudes and feelings about the said piece of information and his/her relation to the ordinary man in the street.

 The choice of mean as opposed to intend in (1) and

(2) can be compared to a speaker's choice of the pronouns he, she, or it in reference to a baby. It is the conventionalized pronoun, and the one that the grammar of English dictates in unmarked situations. By using he or she the speaker indicates that s/he regards the baby as an individual with a sex. By using it the speaker might well want to indicate his/her feelings towards babies in general, but since it is accepted by the grammar of English, s/he can not be accused of disliking babies. In this sense, the attitude the speaker communicates is implicit in the sense this word is used in this study.

From the point of view of the potentialities of pragmatics, we can remain neutral with respect to the alternatives (a) that there exist (unambiguous) restrictions on when and where a passive construction can be used, and (b) that whenever a passive construction is used, it carries with it certain pragmatic connotations, associations, or implications. That is, it is of course true that the use of a passsive construction might have become conventionalized in certain areas of grammar. And in a restrictive sense we might then want to say that the use of such a passive construction is therefore not due to a choice by the speaker. But any meaning implies a choice by the speaker. And the communication of pragmatic meanings implies making implicit choices.

5.1.3. Conclusion

This section has focused on the pragmatics of passive constructions in Swedish. At the same time I have given the reader some idea of where I draw the line between semantics and pragmatics in my view of language. In section 5.1.1. I argued on the basis of previous research that - from a semantic point of view - the feature of Agent suppression is definitional of all passives. This led to a situation which might seem uncomfortable to some linguists, namely that indefinite-person constructions (which in English and in Swedish have active morphology) also have to be regarded as passives semantically.

There are two further points I want to stress in connection with this discussion. First, the fact that indefinite-person passives in English might have the same verbal morphology as active sentences (since they, you, and one can be used ambiguously) is a particular feature of English. In Finnish, for instance, the indefinite-person passive has a verbal morphology of its own (called 'the fourth person' in Hakulinen & Karlsson 1979). (Cf. also Östman 1981c.) Also, in English, there used to be a passive construction with the prefix a-, as in (1),

(1) The house was a-building.

which I would be inclined to characterize as an indefinite-person passive.[3] When the prefix a- was eventually dropped from the construction, it is easy to understand that the verbal marker that remained (i.e. -ing) would also fall

out of use as a passive marker (because of the obvious homonymy with the progressive tense marker). In that situation, some other construction had to fill the slot of the passive pattern in English. And what we have is a construction that is marked as semantically passive by other means than through verbal morphology.[4]

Secondly, there is a theoretical question involved here, too. Lyons 1963 argued that any term that is used in linguistics also has to be **materially adequate**: terms, like 'passive' should also capture the 'ordinary,' every-day meanings that such terms have. Both the man-construction in Swedish, and the indefinite-person construction with the -tAAn/tiin suffix in Finnish are generally referred to as passive constructions.

With my discussion of the pragmatic potentialities of passives in section 5.1.2., I have wanted to show how the use of syntactically active and passive constructions can be used in situations to communicate implicit pragmatic information in addition to their semantic content. Also, I have wanted to show how the different types of semantically defined passives have different pragmatic implications. Since in all situations I have encountered, the three passive constructions in Swedish can be kept distinct on the basis of their different inherent Orientation, I have regarded Orientation as a semantic feature of Swedish grammar. However, it could be argued that Orientation is a pragmatic aspect because of its implicit nature. I do

not want to take a definite stand on this issue, except
for what I just said, since - as I have repeatedly pointed
out - I see the concepts of structure, semantics, and prag-
matics as useful abstractions for the analyst, which should
not force him/her to necessarily classify a borderline
linguistic feature as belonging to one rather than to
another of the three components of language. (Cf. the
discussions in Chapter 1 and in Chapter 6 below.)

5.2. The language of persuasion

5.2.1. Introduction

The purpose of this section is to have a brief look
at one type of discourse, and see how an analysis of this
discourse type not only can, but needs to, refer to the
pragmatic parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involve-
ment, and how the analytic use of these parameters in turn
can help to define that discourse. (For a more extensive
analysis of the material dealt with in this section, see
Östman to appear.)

I have chosen to deal with persuasive discourse for
a number of reasons. First, persuasion has not been dealt
with extensively in the linguistic literature, although
it is probably fair to say that all interactions - except
perhaps pure small-talk conversations - have some element
of persuasion in them. (We can also note that pragmatics
has recently been connected with aspects of rhetoric

(cf. e.g. Leech 1983), and rhetoric of course is tradition-
ally understood as the use of language for persuasive
purposes. Even though pragmaticists today do not stress the
persuasive aspect of rhetoric, the connection is still
there.)

Secondly, persuasion is not a speech act on a par
with, say, promising or requesting. For one thing, a
persuasive sentence can not be analyzed in terms of a
performative statement of the form (1).

(1) I persuade you that S

I will argue below that this is precisely due to the
inherent implicitness of prototypical persuasion and
persuasive discourse.

Thirdly, one common view of persuasion is that any
discourse or element of discourse can have a persuasive
effect, but that there are no specific features of persua-
sion in language, and therefore no persuasive discourse to
be treated as a separate type of discourse. There are at
least two issues involved here. First, even though it is
customary to think of persuasion only in terms of whether a
piece of discourse has a persuasive effect or not, I will
not here restrict myself to this view. Rather, I see
persuasive language in the first instance as a manifesta-
-tion of a speaker's persuasive intention. And secondly, as
I will show below, it is true that there is no one lin-
guistic feature that can be talked about as a particular
marker of persuasion, say, in English. But the reason for

this is the implicit way a speaker's persuasive intent has to manifest itself in persuasive language. However, if we do not view the concept 'persuasive discourse' in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but instead give it a prototype characterization, then we will also be able to find prototypical markers of persuasive discourse. I will argue that persuasive discourse does exist as a discourse type, and that an adherence to the three pragmatic parameters can help define and characterize this discourse type. In general, persuasion is not like metaphors and ironies that "can acquire conventional indicators and structural correlates" (Levinson 1983:165; Brown & Levinson 1978:267ff), but it is more like the implicitness of allusions, where the communication of an allusion rests solely on hints. (On allusions, cf. Schaar 1975, 1978, Östman 1979a.)

Aspects of persuasion have been dealt with extensively both in rhetoric and in social psychology. Although research within these areas should also be of interest to the linguist, I have not considered it necessary to give an overview of their century-long debates within the limited scope of this study. (For basic overviews, see Brown 1963, Bettinghaus 1973, Smith 1982.)

5.2.2. The data

When a speaker wants to persuade another person open-
ly, s/he can do this explicitly, and the analysis of such
overt persuasion is consequently to be done in straightfor-
ward semantic terms. Explicit persuasion needs no markers,
since both participants are aware of what is going on. But
for a discourse to be an instance of explicit persuasion,
both interlocutors have to agree on the persuasive means to
be used. If speaker$_i$ relies solely on means of logical
deduction in his/her argumentation, and speaker$_j$ uses a
combination of logical and religious argumentation, then to
the extent that the religious means that speaker$_j$ uses are
effective (especially if speaker$_i$ is not aware that any but
logical means are used), to that extent the persuasion by
speaker$_j$ of speaker$_i$ is simultaneously carried out on an
implicit level.

The kind of persuasive discourse that I will be con-
cerned with in this study is implicit persuasion. The
hypothesis is that there exist linguistic means (e.g. words
and structures) that can be regarded as markers of implicit
persuasion. As I will argue more in detail below, we cannot
expect to find any particular marker, or set of markers
that would always and unambiguously indicate that the
speaker wants to persuade his/her addressee or audience.
Such a marker - if it existed - would effectively destroy
the whole enterprise of attempting to carry out implicit

persuasion. We can, however, discover bundles of markers, or combinations of words and structures that together indicate (at least to the analyst) that a piece of discourse is persuasive in nature.

Since a thorough analysis of all the potential words and constructions that might serve a persuasive purpose is probably an impossible task - and certainly outside the scope of this study - I will here illustrate implicit persuasion with an analysis of some of the linguistic aspects of a persuasive text, namely of James Clavell's The Children's Story (Coronet 1983; 1963/1981). In particular, I will show how the aspects of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement are drawn on for implicit persuasion in this text.

The Children's Story might not be considered a good representative of ordinary persuasive discourse. And, strictly speaking, my analysis is of an 'ideology' of persuasive discourse, rather than of a 'reality.' But ideologies, like prejudices, are based on some - albeit stereotypical - connection with reality. From this, there are two possible lines of argumentation. We can either say that Clavell's perception of persuasion represents people's stereotypical attitudes about what persuasive discourse looks like, and we can thus treat Clavell's perception of it as a framework in the same way as Grice's Co-operative Principle forms a frame of reference, as something that is not normally adhered to in everyday face-to-face inter-

action, but which is a norm for such behavior. The second alternative, and the one that I am inclined to follow, takes the opposite line of argumentation, and says that this story depicts the basic principles, and **because** it is a story about the persuasion of children (a summary of the plot is given below), the manifestations of persuasive strategies and methods are shown, and can be seen much more clearly here, than in, say, <u>Mein Kampf</u>, or Nixon's Checkers Speech and Watergate Speech. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that a strict separation of ideology and reality is in practice possible when doing pragmatics. (I showed in Chapter 1, however, that such a separation is important, and in principle possible.)

Another reason why a literary text like Clavell's story is to be preferred to a piece of ordinary con-versation - at least at this stage of preliminary lin-guistic research in the field of persuasion - is that the analyst does not have to rely solely on his/her own interpretation of the text. The author - by being omni-scient - not only gives the reader/analyst an insight into what the persuader intended, but also into how this intention was perceived, whether it was effective or not. The story - as a story - is a coherent piece of persuasive discourse, which ties together manifestations of persuasion from different levels. The characters of the story not only have their own ideas and attitudes, and attempt to exert their power when possible, they are also

part of a larger whole - the story - which is controlled by Clavell himself. Thus, the effects of all the three parameters can be seen clearer here than in an ordinary conversation, where the analyst him/herself might be one of the interlocutors, and might thus not have all perspectives so clearly at hand.

5.2.3. The analysis

5.2.3.1. The plot of the story

James Clavell's The Children's Story is a story about the 25 minutes during which a classroom of seven-year-olds is politically converted into accepting an enemy force.

A foreign power has invaded the U.S., and all over the country representatives of this power have been given the task to show how good and friendly, in fact, how much better, the state of affairs is now that the foreign power is in charge, in comparison to the situation people had been living in before.

In the school class of the story there are two main forces, on the one hand there is the New Teacher, and on the other hand there is Johnny, whose father has been very active in the resistance movement, and who is the only pupil who overtly objects to being converted. The story is ultimately about how the New Teacher manages to per-suade Johnny into accepting the enemy.

At the discourse level, the story is an instance

of persuasive discourse in its most simple and straight-
forward fashion: the New Teacher's persuasive discourse
is directed toward children of the age of seven. Although
Clavell is the omniscient writer, the story is often told,
and the situation experienced, from the point of view of
the children.

The analysis will partly follow the temporal order of
the story, but it will also move from Coherence through
Politness into Involvement. In section 5.2.4. I will take
up some of the most striking aspects of the story anew, and
relate them more explicitly to the pragmatic parameters.

5.2.3.2. Manifestations of Coherence-establishing
strategies

Persuasion does not take place only at the verbal
level. When attempting to influence somebody, it is of
great help if you also look influential - where your
particular looks and behavior, of course, have to be
synchronized with the purpose at hand, and the group or
individual toward which persuasion is directed.

When the New Teacher enters the classroom for the
first time, she immediately succeeds in making a positive
impression on the children. And that is the first prerequi-
site of effective persuasion:[5]

(1) The children gasped. They had expected an ogre or giant
    or beast or witch or monster ... But instead of a mon-
    ster, a beautiful young girl stood in the doorway. Her
    clothes were neat and clean, all olive green - even
    her shoes. But most important, she wore a lovely smile,
    and when she spoke, she spoke without the trace of
    an accent.

In the next couple of pages, the New Teacher is given even more positive attributes: her perfume was clean, fresh and young, she smelled youth and cleanness; she spoke gently, and radiantly; she sat down on the floor "as gracefully as an angel."

In fact, not only did everything in her behavior say that she took good care of herself (clean, fresh), but also that she cared about her audience. If a person has an established authority, his/her way of dressing might not make a difference with respect to his/her credibility and power, but if - as in this case - the New Teacher had all reason to believe that her authority would be questioned, her way of dressing would at least not make them question that authority even more. We have to remember also that to a seven-year-old sparkling clothes are apt to arouse more positive feelings than what they would for adults. But in the adult world, too, dress and behavior are important for creating a positive first impression. If you come to a meeting in a shabby dress, you not only give a bad impression of yourself, your behavior is also most likely interpreted by your interlocutor as being negatively directed against him/her, i.e. as being offensive. (In this case the impression that the New Teacher's appearance

communicates of caring for her audience is not sincere. We learn that from the omniscient writer. But potential ambiguity is enough at the level of implicit pragmatics.)

In addition to her dress, cleanliness, and youth, the New Teacher had also learned everybody's names, and she had found out that it was Mary's birthday today. In other words, she (succeeds in giving the impression that she) regards the children as people and as individuals.

The New Teacher's non-verbal behavior is most effective in the initial stage of her persuasive task. It creates the important first impression. (This is also parallelled in Clavell's treatment of the subject. There is much less stress on the New Teacher's non-verbal actions in the latter part of the book.) The non-verbal dimension is also a very implicit one. You may notice that somebody is clean, but you might not directly associate your positive evaluation of that person with his/her cleanliness. This association takes place on an implicit, unconscious level.

Except for the non-verbal cues, the New Teacher also uses a number of other devices to make the children see not only the Coherence of the enemy's framework, but also its positive sides. In particular, she uses metaphorical expressions, and draws parallels between the new and the old systems.

A further efficient Coherence strategy that the New Teacher uses is to compare the new situation (manifested in herself) with the previous situation (manifested in

(2) c. You can always ask me anything. That's the fair
        way. The new way. Try me.

'Fairness' and 'newness' are presented together, to
implicitly indicate that they equal one another. It is
also implicitly directed toward Mary's statement. This
is the 'now,' and the New Teacher is their real teacher.

5.2.3.3. Manifestations of the use of different interactive strategies

The New Teacher is in an extremely dominant position.
Not only is she the teacher, she is also a respesentative
of the invaders. Thus, she could use a very power-ridden
Distance strategy to convert the children. She could
threaten them, she could even use physical force to make
them do as she wants. To a certain extent she also uses her
status as a teacher and therefore a power-ridden strategy
when she makes the kind of comparisons exemplified in the
previous section. However, overtly these comparisons do not
appeal to feelings, but are in the format that a teacher as
teacher would be expected to use to inform her pupils.

But it is not enough to make the children obey. She
also wants to make them think the way she does. If they (=
the invaders) manage to convert the children, then at
least they will not have any problems with the next adult
generation. And in order to reach this goal, she knows that
she will be much more effective if she uses a strategy that
is closer to Camaraderie than to Distance Politeness.

In this particular case, the use of Deference strategies would be difficult, since the children know they do not have the power. Thus, they do not have to act as if they did not have power; and for the New Teacher to pretend that they do have power would be paradoxical in the light of her status. But as we shall see below, she occasionally – and very effectively – reverts to Deference strategies, too.

However, what the New Teacher does, is not to choose to follow either the Distance or the Camaraderie/Deference strategy. Instead, she chooses to keep both these strategies within reach. In fact, part of the reason why her persuasion becomes so efficient is that she knows how to alternate between the two strategies.

Again, one example will have to suffice.

The New Teacher cannot use a Distance strategy even when she talks to Miss Worden at the beginning of the story (and Miss Worden surely knows her situation and status in relation to that of the New Teacher):

(1) a. Hello, Miss Worden.
    b. I'm taking over your class now.
    c. You are to go to the principal's office.

Miss Worden asks why, and is very upset and afraid.

(1) d. He just wants to talk to you, Miss Worden.

"The New Teacher said gently."

(1) e. You really must take better care of yourself.
    f. You shouldn't be so upset.

Here the New Teacher obviously could have used a Distance strategy. And she also does so to a certain extent: (1b)

is a direct statement, instead of something like 'Please don't feel bad, but I have to take over your class now,' or some form of 'I'm sorry, but I have to ... .' Utterance (1c) is also quite direct, but she could have said, 'Go to the principal's office straight away!' Instead she mitigates her statement and her use of the BE + _to_ INF construction suggests that this has been decided on by somebody else: some 'unknown' entity.[6] She, the New Teacher, is not herself responsible. It is simply something that has to happen.

A similar implicit reference to something decided on beforehand is made by using a form of <u>shall</u> in (1f). Palmer (1974) has suggested that one semantico-pragmatic aspect of the English modals is that <u>will</u>, <u>can</u>, <u>must</u>, and <u>dare</u> are subject-oriented: <u>John will come</u> means that the subject, John, has the power to decide about his comings and goings; whereas <u>shall</u>, <u>may</u>, <u>ought</u>, and <u>need</u> are discourse-oriented: <u>John shall come</u> implies that somebody else has decided for him, that it is predecided, and that he himself cannot influence his coming. In (1f) the New Teacher could have said 'You must not be so upset.' By using <u>should</u>, she does not appeal to Miss Worden, but to something like general rules of etiquette. On the other hand, the New Teacher uses the subject-oriented <u>must</u> in (1e), implicitly indicating that it is her own fault: Miss Worden herself has the power to take care of herself - but she has not done so.

Why, then, does the New Teacher not use a straight Distance strategy toward Miss Worden? The answer is obvious: because of the children. She cannot give them an impression of her being 'bad' or 'cruel' to anyone. Note also Clavell's masterly indication of this two-edged situation in the phrase "The New Teacher said gently."

In (1a) <u>Hello</u> is for the children - she does not say 'How do you do.' In (1d) she uses the pragmatic particle <u>just</u> to indicate to the children the unimportance of going to see the principal, but at the same time <u>just</u> is an indication to Miss Worden that the situation could be extremely serious for her: she knows, or should know, that the expression <u>X just wants to ...</u> is a standerd way of indicating the seriousness of a situation. In (1e) she uses the pragmatic particle <u>really</u> to show Involvement. But combined with <u>must</u>, her way of expressing this is almost as if she spoke to a child: <u>You really must.</u> And in (1f) she uses the same strategy: <u>You shouldn't be.</u> We can imagine her raised finger, the slight horizontal back-and-forth movement of her head, and the smacking sound from her mouth.

Thus, at the same time as she talks to Miss Worden, her addressee, she simultaneously chooses her words and expressions to make an impact on the children, her audience. And this, of course, is something that we frequently see in political speeches: the person who asks an impertinent question can not easily be persuaded, so the best

strategy for the politician is to concentrate his/her efforts on persuading the other people in the audience, for instance by belittling or reinterpreting the questioner's point.

In general, then, we note that persuasive discourse is very different from ordinary discourse: whereas in ordinary interactions you start out at with Formal Deference strategies (cf. Scollon & Scollon 1981), and work your way toward Informal Deference, or even Camaraderie/Deference, in persuasive discourse you start out on either side — or on both sides simultaneously — of (Formal and Informal) Deference in the Politeness hierarchy (cf. Table 4.3.), and work your way towards the middle. (This principle is shown more in detail in Östman forthcoming e.)

5.2.3.4. Markers of Involvement

One very striking feature of indicating Involvement all through the story is the New Teacher's use of an abundance of pragmatic particles in her persuasive discourse. With these she mitigates and qualifies her speech acts, and indicates her (insincere?) Involvement in the situation, and in the welfare of the children. She uses just to belittle a fact, tags to appeal to her audience and create a feeling of Deference, and really to express her intense feelings. Other particles she often reverts to are well, of course, just because and after all.[7]

But except for the use of different pragmatic

particles, there are also other kinds of markers of Involvement in persuasive language. Here I will just deal with a small selection from Clavell's story. Clavell uses both explicit and implicit markers of Involvement.

The three examples below contain clear instances of explicit indications of attitudes:

(1) That's very good, Mary. Very, very good.

(2) Yes it is a pretty [flag].

(3) Yes, Johnny, you're quite right. You're a very, very wise boy.

The interesting thing is that all three of these are used in situations where the New Teacher simply cannot be too pleased.

Utterance (1) is a response to the fact that Mary does know what <u>pledge</u> means. The New Teacher wants to argue that they should not say things they do not understand. Fortunately for the New Teacher, no one knows what <u>allegiance</u> means. Example (2) is said in reference to the stars-and-stripes, and her statement can - at best - be taken as ironical: the flag, after all, is the sign that stands for the conquered nation. Example (3), finally, is said in a situation where the children are supposed to keep their eyes closed while they pray to Our Leader for candy, but Johnny peaks, and sees that it is not Our Leader that puts candy on everyone's desk, but the New Teacher herself.

These examples suggest quite strongly that the use of **explicit** expressions of (especially positive) attitudes in

persuasive discourse is a mark of **insincerity**. For children at age seven, however, the New Teacher's explicit expression of positive attitudes in this manner is taken as a sign of her appreciation. The explicitly expressed positive appreciation is, however, a conventional aspect of school-teaching. That is, as **pupils** the children need appreciation when they are right. However, for the New Teacher, the children have a dual role of being pupils and persuadees, and in their latter role, the children do not fare well when they behave in a manner that produces the New Teacher's responses in (1-3). Adults would be more alert and suspicious than children when hearing too much explicit expressions of positive Involvement from somebody they do not know very well.

Above, I mentioned the use of different pragmatic particles as implicitly marking also Involvement in persuasive discourse. I will here give some further examples of implicit markers of Involvement in the New Teacher's speeches in Clavell's story.

The use of children's vocabulary helps to enforce her 'we' relationship with the children. She communicates that even though she is a teacher, she is willing to use small kids' words like <u>tummy</u>. Other words with the same effect include <u>daddy</u>, <u>fine</u> (in the expression "a fine man riding a fine horse"), and <u>fair</u>.

Another construction typical of children's discourse is <u>I wish</u> as used by the New Teacher in the following ex-

ample.

(4) I wish I could have a piece of it [=the flag]. If it's so important, I think we should all have a piece of it. Don't you.

Notice again the concretization: if something is important, then one should want it. And she manages to get the children to accept cutting up their flag into little pieces. Notice also that the appeal here (the tag don't you) is not a question. In other words, she is not prosodically giving the children the option to disagree, even if verbally she seems to be doing just that.

A final example involves strengthening a phrase with words like lovely, which are part both of typical women's language and of children's discourse. And thus, since she uses it as a woman, the subtleness with which it can be interpreted as coming closer to children's language is very unconscious and implicit.

(5) Oh yes, I have a lovely surprise for you. You're all going to stay overnight with us. We have a lovely room and beds and lots of food, and we'll all tell stories and have such a lovely time.

Notice the expressions I have a ... surprise for you, We have lots of food, and We'll all tell stories, which all appeal to the kinds of things children like.

All these cases of indicating implicit Involvement are closely connected to the Politeness strategy of Camaraderie/Deference. The New Teacher uses the register of the group she wants to convert in order to show her solidarity with that group. But it is not a matter of first establishing rapport, and then trying to persuade the

victim(s). You have to do both at the same time: the more effort you need to put down in being persuasive, the more frequently you have to use indicators of rapport in your discourse.

5.2.3.5. The goal achieved

As I said in the beginning of this analysis, The Children's Story is not really about how the New Teacher persuades a whole class; it is rather the story of persuading Johnny. We do not know much about Johnny, so maybe it is too much to interpret his position as that of a leader. But it is with him the New Teacher has problems, and she also knows that when and if she manages to persuade him, that is the end of her ordeal.

The first step for Johnny toward getting persuaded comes after the New Teacher has talked about fear. Her argumentation here is in many respects similar to the argumentation that Johnny's father has previously used to him. Johnny's father had said:

(1) Don't be afraid, Johnny. If you fear too much, you'll be dead even though you're alive.

The New Teacher says:

(2) Fear is something that comes from the inside, from your tummies, and good strong children like you have to put food in your tummies. Not fear.

Clavell writes:

(3) Johnny hated her even though he knew she was right about fear.

Thus, Johnny's journey towards getting persuaded starts

with the New Teacher showing him what she has in common with his father (perhaps unconsciously; but as a Coherence strategy Clavell uses it effectively).

But Johnny is not easily persuaded, and when nothing else seems to work on him, the New Teacher resorts to the traditional method of 'if you can't beat them, join them.' Or, in this case: 'have them join you.' Johnny gets special treatment, he gets a better position than his friends - he gets promoted in society (i.e. in the classroom). The New Teacher says:

(4) And because Johnny was especially clever, I think we should make him monitor for the whole week, don't you?

"Johnny decided that he liked his teacher very much. Because she told the truth. Because she was right about fear. Because she was right about God." But we all know what the real reason was: because she made him monitor for the whole week.

In general, then, on the basis of the analysis offered in this section, we can see that there are two ways to deal with obstinate people: either - as in Johnny's case - give them special favors, and they will let themselves be persuaded; or - as in the case of Johnny's father - put them to 'school' and use more direct and explicit means of persuasion.

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5.2.4. Conclusion

My analysis of Clavell's <u>The Children's Story</u> is, of course, only a partial analysis. (A more extensive analysis is given in Östman to appear.) Because of the medium in which the text is transmitted, I have been forced to leave prosody out of my account; there are also, of course, grammatical constructions and turns of phrases that should have been dealt with more in detail. As an example, note the implication of the use of <u>allow</u> in the following sentence: "the New Teacher opened the window and allowed them to throw it [=the flagpole] into the playground."

In 5.2.1. I justified using this kind of story as it is a prime example of how persuasion works in a simplified context. Relatively speaking (and I have indicate in my analysis what this means), however, the strategies used in the story by the New Teacher to the children are the same as those that would be used in ordinary persuasive discourse, and the type of linguistic manifestations of persuasive discourse directed toward adults will also turn out to be very similar to those we have found in this story.

Persuasive language can to a certain extent be characterized as a psychological dialect.[8] It is a register of speaking that the speaker is in command of; and by using the persuasive register, s/he associates him/herself with a particular role in society. However, persuasive discourse differs from a psychological dialect in that everyone has

access to it, and everyone uses it only under certain conditions, and not necessarily in particular, recurring contexts of situation, like at work, or at home.

What, then, are the markers of this psychological dialect? What are the verbal devices we use in persuasion, and what are the cues that the addressee should be aware of in order to realize that s/he is the target of an effort at persuasion? As I argued in 5.2.1., in more explicit instances of persuasion this is not a problem. As a manifestation of a Distance strategy, even the use of direct commands by the persuader is permissible – not to mention physical power.

In general, as we saw, there is no **one** marker of persuasion, nor does there exist a predetermined set of markers that are by definition persuasive. In fact, such a situation would be counter to the whole essence of persuasion. If, as I have argued, persuasion – especially Deference persuasion – is implicit, then the unmarked situation would be an **avoidance** of markers – especially explicit markers – that might indicate that you are in the process of persuading somebody.

Markers of psychological dialects tend in general to be implicit, since by choosing to communicate in accordance with a particular psychological dialect, you do so for a purpose. And if you make your purpose **too** obvious and explicit, your actions and yourself might well get inter- preted as being pretentious, which might easily lead to an

interpretation of you as somebody not to be taken serious-
ly.

But, as this analysis has shown, even though we might
not be able to separate out any specific markers of persua-
sion, there are still verbal features in persuasive dis-
course that implicitly indicate the persuasive purpose
of a persuader. And **because** no such persuasive marker can
be extracted, the analysis I have presented, and the
framework within which the analysis is presented, is
crucial for an understanding of how persuasive discourse
works.

5.2.4.1. Coherence

Coherence shows up in the general purpose of persua-
sive discourse. Persuasion involves an attempt by Speaker A
to alter the coherent framework$_i$ in which Speaker B lives
and acts, into becoming more like the coherent framework$_j$
that Speaker A lives in. Naturally, as in all communica-
tion, Speaker A might not be sincere about his/her frame-
work$_j$, or s/he might be able to persuade B that framework$_j$
would be good for **him/her**, although A does not live in
accordance with it him/herself. (For instance, A and B
might be smokers, but A is older, and can try to persuade B
that s/he should stop before s/he completely destroys
his/her lungs; for Speaker A him/herself this might already
be too late.)

Political, moral, and religious persuasion is often

directed not to one person at a time, but to the whole of a society, a particular group in the society, or a culture as a whole, against a prevailing tradition. The goal is to introduce new, or simply different, values as being more rewarding than those that the people in that culture live by today. In this very broad sense, persuasion draws on the implicit aspect of Coherence. As we saw in the analysis in 5.2.3., a very effective way to persuade someone is to (insincerely) adopt the persuadee's frame of reference in a number of important respects, search for a(n insincere) common ground, and on that basis, little by little, change that framework - using (pseudo-)logical arguments.

In this connection we can note Gumperz's (1982:49) argument that conventions of code switching are especially frequent in appeals, arguments, and any discussions where the speaker wants to persuade others. But code switching does not necessarily have to involve two or more clearly distinct languages: it is even more implicit (and perhaps even more effective) if dialects, or even registers of the same language are used for this purpose.

5.2.4.2. Politeness

The use of different Politeness strategies turned out to be very significant. Persuasive discourse seems to use the whole scale of interactive strategies, and what is particularly significant for persuasion is the shift

of strategies in one and the same persuasion. R. Lakoff's (1975) argument that Distance and Camaraderie strategies can never be adhered to simultaneously, will not hold for persuasive discourse. In persuasive discourse these strategies not only can be used simultaneously, they **have to** be used in that manner: the switch from one to the other is typical of this type of discourse. (The reason being, of course, that as persuader you do not always have to be sincere on all levels: the end justifies the means.)

In general, persuasive discourse draws a lot on aspects of Politeness. Persuasion functions in an interaction, and as we have seen, Politeness is always involved when people interact. But who is allowed to persuade whom, who is able to persuade whom, and what happens in persuasive discourse in relation to the use of different strategies of Politeness?

Intuitively, having power seems to be an important factor for the persuader. But again, we can distinguish between, on the one hand, more explicit attempts at persuasion, which usually are successful either if the persuader is the more powerful - i.e. if s/he uses Distance or Distance/Deference strategies - or, if the relationship between persuader and persuadee is one of Camaraderie. In the latter case, too, power seems to be important, since communication is here ideally supposed to be direct. However, the interactants in a Camaraderie relationship would not accept that persuasion is taking place, or that

persuasion even exists as a potential strategy between them: if the relationship is **really** a Camaraderie relationship, then the interactants **do** in fact live according to the same frame of Coherence.

Within Deference Politeness, on the other hand, persuasion takes place in a more implicit manner. If, in accordance with how I characterized Deference earlier, the interactants (both !) act as if the other person was in charge, persuasion cannot use power, but must use 'anti-power.'

Indirectness is acceptable in society as a manifestation of a Distance or Distance/Deference strategy (cf. political speeches, for instance), but indirectness is not highly valued as a Deference strategy (cf. women's language). (Cf. R. Lakoff 1980.) If persuasive discourse is used in Distance or Distance/Deference Politeness, it will be more explicit (though potentially indirect) – and **that** seems to be fairly acceptable, since – in principle, at least – one can always decide not to be persuaded. However, indirectness in the persuasive discourse of Deference Politeness might easily give the potential persuadee a sense of insecurity. Not only is the persuasion indirect, it is also implicit. And **that** may be the reason why speakers of women's language are not taken to sound trustworthy. The conclusion that especially male-language speakers draw, then, is that women (as prototypical speakers of women's language) are not only irresponsible

(cf. the quasi-transitive hierarchy discussed in Östman 1981a), they are also constantly making up schemes to get others (usually men) to do as they want. Again, all this is of course an interpretation by the speakers of male language, who use a different norm of Politeness than speakers of the female register. That is, the Coherence of their respective cultures is not identical. (And this state of affairs contributes to creating and maintaining negative connotations for women's language.)

5.2.4.3. Involvement

Within the realms of the parameter of Involvement you show sympathy, and that you care for the persuadee. Attitudes are typically communicated via pragmatic markers: pragmatic particles, the use of particular words and phrases, and the appeal to what the persuader implies is common sense. One interesting result here is that the explicit use of attitudinal expressions in persuasive discourse tends to be a sign of insincerity.

Thus, persuasion also draws on the parameter of Involvement. If you attempt to change somebody's beliefs and values, you best succeed by appealing to that person's feelings: his/her emotions, attitudes, even prejudices. Or, if that person has no prejudices (!), you can attempt to create prejudices for him/her, in order to persuade him/her of the opposite.

Not only do we refer to feelings and Involvement

when we appeal to stereotypical qualities, say, of a people: "Jews are X," "Italians are Y," "Americans are Z," and "Scandinavians are ö";[9] we also use similar methods in ordinary conversation, in a more implicit manner. One well-known way that has often been discussed within lexical semantics of how to create a positive or negative attitude toward something - and thereby to persuade somebody into liking or disliking that something - is to use a synonym with the suitable connotation. We all know how we can make use of 'synonyms' like <u>statesman</u> vs. <u>politician</u>, or <u>thrifty</u> vs. <u>economical</u> vs. <u>stingy</u>, for persuasive purposes, and, in general, how we can use 'referent honorifics' (Levinson 1983:92) like <u>lady</u>, <u>steed</u> (for 'horse'), <u>residence</u> (for 'home') and <u>dine</u> (for 'eat') to show our appreciation of, or our relation to, the referents of these words.

Footnotes to Chapter 5.

[1]These specifications (as well as those given in the Active Pattern in Figure 5.2.) of the elements that a constructional type consists of are very rough specifications. The order of the elements, for instance, vary typologically, and some languages can incorporate Subjects into Predicates, whereas others can not. The characterizations within parentheses are only given in order to bring forth the intended associations in the reader.

[2]But, of course, saying that, really means that there is very little universality at all in the factors, and perhaps in semantics in general. Thus, if, as I think, semantics should be directly correlated with cognition and thinking, the alleged universality of these factors, of course, depends on how one thinks cognition works.

There are at least three reasons why I personally feel that semantics is not something that should be talked about in universal terms, but rather as a language-specific phenomenon:

- linguistic relativity (cf. Whorf 1941, Silverstein 1979),

- thinking can take place in terms of (conventionalized) images, and semantic structure is partly at least based on conventional imagery, rather than on universal logic (cf. G. Lakoff 1981, Lakoff & Johnson 1980),

- the relation between semantics (meaning) and knowledge

structure: semantic structure is partly at least characterized relative to one's knowledge structure (cf. Langacker 1983). This suggests that semantics is even to some extent speaker-specific.

In this way of seeing language, the constructional types are (largely conventional) symbolizations of human cognitive structures.

[3]I am grateful to Jeanne van Oosten for reminding me of this construction.

[4]Compare the development of the T/V address system in English. The fact that _thou_ fell out of use did not have the result that another pronoun was created to take its place. The whole system of address terminology had to be changed, so that, for instance, avoidance of address term became a prominent alternative.

[5]The Coronet edition has no page numbers. In fact, the graphic channel is very dominant, and well done, in the sense that it parallels the development of, and activities in, the story. It has blank pages, and half-filled pages, where this is called for - to give the appropriate effect.

[6]Cf. e.g. Quirk et al. 1973. Levinson 1983:72-3 also notes that the expression _You are to X_ encodes that the source of the instruction is not equivalent to the speaker, and it gives the speaker authority.

[7]Some other important particles for persuasive discourse include

- why to suggest something obvious (cf. R. Lakoff 1973);

- anyway to suggest that what has just preceded is of little importance, a digression: let us now get on to the important issues (or back to the main line of the story; cf. Östman 1981a);

- you know to imply that something is settled and accepted although it is not (cf. Östman 1981a).

- introductory so and then to indicate that the speaker is allowed to draw the inference that follows: so because of what s/he hears or perceives, then because of what the interlocutor has just said. (cf. Levinson 1983).

Some further important devices include

- the switch from this to that to indicate emotional distance, and from that to this to show empathy (cf. Levinson 1983:81, R. Lakoff 1974, Fillmore 1975a, Lyons 1977); and

- the use of nominalized constituents to introduce an (unwarranted) presupposition (cf. 4.2.3.).

[8]My definition of a psychological dialect follows Robin Lakoff 1981. Briefly, a social dialect is something that you learn as a child and that has a solidarity function, but generally, you tend to have to give it up if you want to get somewhere in this world. A psychological dialect, on the other hand, shows a certain personality and does not have to be given up. An example of a psychological

dialect would be the language of politicians. It is a dialect that is consciously learnt for a particular purpose, as a second dialect, and it is fairly easy to code-switch between this dialect, and, say, the language a politician speaks at home to his/her spouse and children. By using a particular psychological dialect you want to present yourself as a certain kind of person.

[9]Cf. in this connection Allen 1983.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS

6.1. Summary of results

6.1.1. Theoretical issues

6.1.1.1. General

I started the investigations in this study by looking at a set of pragmatic particles in Solf. It is common knowledge in linguistics that for an element of language to receive the characterization 'pragmatic particle,' it should lack semantic meaning, and only have a pragmatic function in language. (Cf. e.g. Levinson 1983; Östman 1982a.) Usually, also, what we potentially find in languages is, on the one hand, a set of grammaticized particles with a clear function (like the question particle -kO in Finnish), and, on the other hand, there are particles that cannot be given semantic specifications (like sitä in Finnish; cf. Hakulinen 1975). However, in my analysis of question particles in Solf, I found that there is a number of particles that are indeterminate with respect to having a semantic meaning and a pragmatic function. These particles potentially have both - simultaneously. On the basis of this state of affairs, a number of theoretical issues have to be seen in a new light, both in the area of pragmatics, and in language in general (cf. below, 6.2.).

My analysis of question particles in Solf showed that

it is not possible to give them a definition in terms of necessity and sufficiency. For instance, I showed in 4.4. that in pragmatic terms none of the functions ascribed to a particular question particle can be seen as a necessary functional characteristic of that particle. Instead, I suggested that a particle has a number of potential functions that a speaker can draw on in a particular situation. In this sense, the Level Analysis gives each particle a prototype definition in functional terms. I also showed that the very concept 'question particle' itself has to be seen as a prototype, and that the prototype definition of question particles even has to be given over the traditional components Syntax, Semantics, and Pragmatics. Not even the semantic meaning of a particular question particle is a necessary characteristic of that particle.

The further implication of this result is even more serious in that it questions the traditional attempts to delimit linguistic features as being primarily either structural, semantic, or pragmatic. In fact, my analysis of question formation in Solf even suggests that such theoretical delimitations may turn out to be a hindrance for an appropriate description of a linguistic phenomenon.

I have also stressed the importance of the effect of a linguistic message in this study. And I would like to conclude this part of the discussion with what I think can be seen as a general result from my investigation, namely that it is in practice hardly possible (nor desirable) to

draw up any stringent borderline between (i) linguistic phenomena proper, (ii) linguistically relevant extra-linguistic factors, and (iii) linguistically irrelevant factors.

6.1.1.2. Parameters and levels

From the point of view of linguistic theory, I have in this study worked on the assumption that it is feasible to discuss language with reference to the three 'components' of Structure (or, Syntax), Semantics, and Pragmatics. (Cf. further 6.2..) On this basis I have argued for a view of pragmatics that is very general in that it also deals with issues that are generally regarded as belonging to the spheres of areas like sociolinguistics and psycho-linguistics. In taking such a view, I have attempted to remain close to Morris's original definition of pragmatics.

From the point of view of the meaning and function of a linguistic message, the speaker of that message performs an act of anchoring. An act of anchoring can either be performed explicitly or implicitly. Instances of explicit anchoring are dealt with in semantics terms, those of implicit anchoring are to be dealt with in pragmatics. In this study I have only dealt with the pragmatic (i.e. implicit) aspects of anchoring.

In Chapters 2 and 3 I analyzed question formation in Solf in many different perspectives. In this analysis, and especially in my attempt to deal with the particles that

partake in question formation, I did not only look at the syntax and semantics of questions. I also wanted to show in general under what conditions one type of question, for instance with one particle rather than with another, could be used. To be able to give such a varied analysis I found that the only reasonable way of approaching the issue is to look at pragmatics from its own point of view. I looked at language use from the point of view of how people use language, rather than from the point of view of how ready-made structures fit situations. (Naturally, these two perspectives cannot be separated, and such a separation is the last thing I would be in favor of.)

The three parameters that I deal with in detail in Chapter 4 are set up on a prima facie basis. The parameter of Involvement has its seat within each and every speaker: everyone has attitudes, feelings, even prejudices, and these are either communicated, or suppressed. In either case, the analyst can find their manifestations. The parameter of Politeness has interaction in focus: the relationship between a speaker and his/her addressee or audience gets expressed implicitly in the communicative acts that the speakers use. The parameter of Coherence has its seat in the society and culture in which we live and that we have been brought up in. The society has rules and constraints that have to be followed, if one is to be regarded as a full party of that society.

These three parameters are interdependent, but all

have prototypical manifestations in language. Since the manifestations of Coherence and Politeness have been dealt with extensively in the literature of pragmatics during the last decade or so, I focus on the parameter of Involvement in Chapter 4. I argue that this parameter is as important as the other two. In Chapter 4 I also suggest a method for analyzing linguistic aspects pragmatically in a way that the speakers' intuitive competence can be accounted for. This method I call the Level Analysis.

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The final question that is always lurking in the background is of course whether this approach, or theory, is falsifiable. One way of falsifying it would be to argue that there is no way to keep the three parameters separate, and therefore there are no three parameters. This is in fact what Leech (1983) and Halliday (1978) argue as regards the attitudinal aspect of language. They both subsume it under the interpersonal aspect. (Note that this decision not to give the attitudinal aspect of language a parameter of its own is in direct opposition to the linguistic theories of, say, Bühler and Jakobson.) This decision is based on the assumption that there is no need to make a distinction between the speaker's and the hearer's meaning (cf. Leech 1983:56-7). Since I have in this study stressed the importance of the lingusitic effect of a message, I cannot agree with this assumption.

6.1.1.3. Principles and maxims

It is commonplace in pragmatics to express rules and constraints in the form of principles and maxims. Grice's (1975) Co-operative Principle and its set of Maxims are of course the prime example of this tradition, but there have of course been many extensions - in different directions - of this idea of seeing language use as governed by principles. Leech (1983) devotes a whole book to searching for principles in addition to those discussed by Grice himself and those developed in the Gricean tradition.

Drawing on Halliday's distinction between the textual and interpersonal level of communication, Leech organizes his principles and maxims in these terms, as Principles of the Interpersonal Rhetoric, and Principles of the Textual Rhetoric. The principles and maxims that Leech sets up as corresponding to the textual and interpersonal levels could well be taken over by the machinery that I have set up in the theoretical discussion of this study. In fact, my three parameters themselves could be expressed as a superprinciple of the following form:

General pragmatic principle

In relation to the situation in which you are, be appropriately Coherent, Polite, and Involved!

In the Interpersonal Rhetoric, Leech has Principles like the Cooperative Principle (taken over from Grice), the

Politeness Principle (with Maxims of Tact, Generosity, Approbation, and Modesty), and the Irony Principle. And in the Textual Rhetoric we find the Processibility Principle (with an End-focus Maxim and an End-weight Maxim), the Clarity Principle, the Economy Principle, and the Expressivity Principle. Leech does not, however, have any principles or maxims for what I have called the Involvement parameter. In an attempt to translate the results of my discussion of Involvement in this study into a principle, I suggest the following.

General Involvement Principle

Know the attitudinal values that the particular (i.e. your) culture ascribes to various concepts, and express (or suppress the expression of) your feelings, attitudes, and prejudices in those terms!

We all follow this principle in our daily routines, but the foreign language learner will also need to learn how to apply it as part of gaining communicative competence in a foreign language. Below are five Maxims under this general principle. The three first come under a supermaxim that could be stated bluntly as: **Do not be honest!**

Maxims

1. Do not be too certain!

Avoid expressing your certainty about the content of a proposition too overtly if you know (or have reason to believe) that your interlocutor is of a

different opinion. Not only will you by so doing
be more polite, you will also be more successful
in getting your addressee to accept your view. (Cf.
the results in 3.4. and in 5.2.)

2. Do not be negative!

Avoid expressing negative feelings overtly and ex-
plicitly (unless you know for a fact that your ad-
dressee shares these negative feelings). In particul-
ar, avoid expressing your possible negative feelings
about your interlocutor (unless specifically asked
to do so). (Cf. 3.4.)

3. Do not be too positive!

Avoid expressing positive feelings too overtly, since
this might be taken as an indication of insincerity.
(Cf. 5.2.3.4.)

Maxims 4 and 5 can together be expressed as a supermaxim
with the force: **Plan your Involvement!**

4. Evaluate the purpose of your utterance!

Plan (or refrain from planning) your utterance in
accordance with your purpose of the interaction. De-
cide whether to manifest an attitude, emotion, or
prejudice or not in your discourse. For instance, use
pragmatic particles in certain situations, and avoid
using them in others. (Cf. also 5.1.2.3..)

5. Use appropriate linguistic means!

This is a further specification of the General

Involvement Principle, and it says that you should use the pragmatic particles, vocabulary, and syntax whose implicit values correspond to the feelings you want to communicate (implicitly). Plan the verbal manifestation of the emotions, attitudes, and prejudices you want to communicate to your addressee!

6.1.2. Empirical findings

Apart from a number of shorter discussions of various linguistic features in different languages, I have in this study primarily dealt with three areas of language: the behavior of question particles in Solf, the structure and behavior of passive constructions in Swedish, and the manifestations of persuasive discourse in the light of an analysis of a literary text. I shall here repeat the major findings in each of these areas.

6.1.2.1. Question particles

In my analysis of questions and requests for confirmation in Solf I found that one third of the examples I had gathered from spontaneous conversations did not utilize the same means for requesting information or confirmation that standard Swedish uses. Furthermore, I found that only one sixth of the cases were such that they did not contain any particles. This quantitative fact in itself suggests

the importance of certain pragmatic particles for the formation of questions and requests in Solf.

In my analysis of the syntax and semantics of question formation in Solf I found that it was in particular the particles tå, då, tå då, elå, and na that occurred in such questions. Even more interesting was the finding that each of these could be used as the only means for indicating that an utterance is interrogative rather than declarative. In my further analyses of the behavior of these particles I came to the conclusion that the particles då and elå have indeed become partly grammaticized in the language.

Seen from a pragmatic point of view, it is important to approach question formation in Solf in relation to the general pragmatics of the society. In particular, I noted, and showed, that interpersonal relations are carried on in a very indirect manner in the village. Linguistically this is manifested not only in an abundant use of pragmatic particles to hedge whatever is communicated, but also in a number of other syntactic constructions, like the åm-construction, which structurally is an indirect question used by itself, and the dö saa dö construction, which syntactically is a combination of a a statement and a question. Because none of the question particles are completely grammaticized in Solf, I also found it useful to give a pragmatic account of their meanings and functions in terms of the three parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and

Involvement. In fact, I argue that such an analysis is needed in order to be able to give a realistic account of the indeterminate functions of question particles in Solf.

Further important findings in my discussion of question particles in Solf include the result that age was an important factor in the use of different kinds of question particles, and that psychological states like friendliness and aggressiveness can be communicated by the use (or non-use) of these particles. I also argued that a certain influence from Finnish can be noticed, but that it is more likely to be an indirect influence, in part due to a universal restriction of languages tending to grammaticize either particles or prosody for question formation.

6.1.2.2. Passive and persuasion

In Chapter 5 I illustrated the workings of the parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement on two other linguistic areas. The purpose of these analyses was not primarily to give some new information about how passives and persuasive discourse function, but rather to show how already well-established findings can be given a clear framework with reference to the pragmatic parameters discussed in Chapter 4, which - as we saw in the discussion of question particles - are needed anyway to give an intuitive account of pragmatic matters in language.

In my brief discussion of the semantics of passive

constructions in Swedish I argued that the semantic feature of Agent suppression is definitional of all passives. This forced me to regard also indefinite-person constructions as passives - although they have active morphology in languages like English.

With my discussion of the pragmatic potentialities of passives I showed how the use of syntactically active and passive constructions can be used in situations to communicate implicit pragmatic information in addition to their semantic content. Also, I showed how the different types of semantically defined passives have different pragmatic implications. Since in all situations I have encountered, the three passive constructions in Swedish (the morphological, the periphrastic, and the indefinite-person construction) can be kept distinct on the basis of their different inherent Orientation, I have come to regard Orientation as a semantic feature of Swedish grammar.

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In my analysis of persuasion I based my discussion on a text that was by definition persuasive. The question I asked was whether there are particular means in language by which a speaker achieves a persuasive effect in verbal (or even non-verbal) interactions. I argued that persuasive discourse cannot be fully understood unless persuasion is seen as an implicit communicative act.

More in particular, I argued that one of the main features of persuasion is the avoidance of conventionalized

markers that would mark a piece of discourse as persuasive. In my analysis of James Clavell's <u>The Children's Story</u> I pointed to a number of uses of particular linguistic manifestations of choices that the writer/character had made, and by which they communicated more on an implicit level than what the surface structure of the story might at first indicate. I also analyzed the implicit markers of persuasion in terms of the three parameters of pragmatics, and showed how reference to them creates a neat framework for the understanding of the story as a whole.

6.2. The overall picture

In this study I have mainly been concerned with giving an overview of the aspect of pragmatics in linguistics. I have, however, indicated that I accept the customary three-way division of labor in linguistics in terms of Structure (or Syntax), Semantics, and Pragmatics. In this final section I will elaborate a little on how my component of pragmatics fits into a general theory of language. In particular, I want to say something about where to draw the line between semantics and pragmatics, in addition to the line between explicitness and implicitness that I have discussed earlier. Of necessity, the exposition will be very brief and preliminary.

6.2.1. Background

In Chapter 1 I briefly mentioned that the predominant way in which linguistic theory has been discussed in the twentieth century is in terms of boxes. Good examples of language interpreted as the interaction between a number of various boxes or components are the structuralist view and the transformational-generative view. What these views have in common is that you start from the inside, almost literally, and work yourself outwards. In principle, both structuralism and transformational grammar furthermore tried to use the same kinds of rules for explaining different kinds of linguistic phenomena.

Recently, a number of functionalist theories and analyses have been suggested, where another avenue of reasoning is taken: it is argued that one should start with the functions of language, and show how different functions get manifested in linguistic form. Whereas functionalists working in the structural tradition take a form-to-function approach to language, recent functionalist work attempts to take a function-to-form approach. (For an excellent overview, and a long list of references, see Nichols 1984.)

It seems to be tacitly assumed, however, that you have to choose either of these strategies, and consequently show that the alternative strategy is untenable.

Now, if you operate with only these two points of view of, or perspectives on, language – as, again, most functionalists seem to do, you also have to divide up the

labor of accounting-for-language between these two. But there seems to be a tacit assumption that language is a product, something that exists 'out there,' and has both form and function as intrinsic characteristics. In this view it is fairly easy to see form in terms of phenomena that can be tied down to one kind of 'rules,' and function as being tied down by some other kind of rules, or 'tendencies.' In effect, the approaches become deterministic.

No matter how we see the diachronic development of form and function in a language, no one would argue that we can do without either of these two components of language. Linguistic form has a function, otherwise it would not be communicative, nor language; linguistic function needs to be manifested in some way - verbally or non-verbally. If it is not manifested, it will not communicate anything.

In such a bipartite view of language, meaning is generally in some sense taken for granted: either as being embedded in form from the outset (cf. the base component in transformational-generative grammar), or as being function, or as being part of function (cf. the Firthian and neo-Firthian views), or as being partly form (as lexicology) and partly function (as semantics)[1]. And this is a reasonable way of viewing things as long as you restrict yourself to treating language as a product.

But once we bring in individual, flexible human beings into linguistics, we are looking at language from

the point of view of its function. And if we also want to
see language as a **dynamic process**, we have to see language
users not only as concrete individuals, but also as
constructors of an abstract **langue**.

In the rest of this section, I want to suggest a
particular division of labor, a view of language that is
dynamic and that takes the individual into account.

6.2.2. The Perspectives - Filter View of language

The form-function theories are no doubt an improve-
ment over the box view of language in the sense that a
form-function view explicitly indicates that there is a
qualitative distinction to be made. The 'form' takes care
of the structural aspects of language, and the 'function'
takes care of the use of language in context. But even
though we here take into account the individual in relation
to his/her society and to other individuals, we do not find
the individual him/herself there at all, at least not
directly. That is, the COGNITIVE component is missing: the
individual's MIND has not been taken enough into account
explicitly. Or rather, it has been taken into account, but
only in relation to other minds.

In the present theory I therefore keep to a tri-
partition of the conglomerate called 'language.' The three
parts are STRUCTURE, SEMANTICS, and PRAGMATICS. Roughly,
structure is language specific and refers to the form, the
means, the tool; semantics is (in the last resort) in-

dividual specific, and refers to the cognitive, psychological make up of a speaker; and pragmatics is culture specific, and refers to the social and the cultural.

I talk about the **Syntactic perspective** and the **Pragmatic perspective** on language: you enter language from two different perspectives, simultaneously; and the **Semantic filter**, through which you abstract and conceptualize both the information from the two perspectives, and from the world around you. Thus, the theory of linguistic behavior that I am here advancing I call **The Perspectives - Filter View of Language**.

When you describe a linguistic phenomenon, you have to approach that phenomenon simultaneously from two points of view:

1) from the internal, structural perspective, which accounts for the existing linguistic means (phonemes, morphemes, clauses) that we can use in a given situation - that we even **have to** use if we want to communicate verbally. In this perspective, we see language as a formal, autonomous system.

2) The other perspective starts out from language as part of human behavior, with special stress on social interaction and culture. This is what I call the pragmatic perspective.

A linguistic theory constantly needs to keep these two perspectives within reach - as does every speaker of that language. This is little more than stating that syntax

is influenced by pragmatic aspects, and vice versa.

What is a mistake in structural theories is to try to explain pragmatic aspects with structural means. The pragmatic perspective needs its own tools. (Cf. also Levinson 1983:294.) To add a new box with the label 'Pragmatics' on it, or put all the 'smaller' boxes into a larger pragmatics box, is doing pragmatics from within the structure of language. The pragmatics of this study is a perspective from the outside. (The structural perspective on language deals with and explicates the more-or-less autonomous means - usually verbal means - that we have to use in speaking and communicating.)

'Meaning' in this view is perhaps diachronically a secondary phenomenon (cf. below), but for each speaker-hearer in each given situation, meaning is the primary aspect of language. Meaning is a particularization, an abstraction of the 'inputs' from the structural and pragmatic perspectives. Semantics can be seen as a buffer zone between the structural and the pragmatic perspectives, between language structure, and the process that the use of language implies. It has its direct correlates in psycho-linguistic aspects: perception, cognition, understanding, and memory. Semantics is, in short, the cognitive aspect on language, which tries to satisfy the demands of both the other perspectives.

As an illustration, let me take an example from frame semantics and case grammar, and the distinction between

semantic roles like Agent, Patient, and Instrument on the one hand, and situational roles on the other. The situational make up of a commercial transaction includes - in our culture - the potential reference to the Buyer, the Seller, the Money (the means), and the Goods (the object, or more abstract phenomena that will move from one person to another as a result of a commercial transaction). This situational make up I regard as part of the pragmatic perspective on language: the socio-cultural definition of a prototypically coherent situation. When we want to say something about this state of affairs, we assign semantic roles to the participants (or, participating parts) of the prototypical situation. This is what happens in the semantic filter. For instance, we assign the semantic role of Agent to the Buyer, and the semantic role of Instrument to the Money.

Despite my terminology, the semantic filter is not to be seen as a filter between pragmatics and structure. The semantic filter is in another dimension: it takes input from the pragmatic and structural perspectives, but at any given point in time it has an essence of its own, which is the cognitive make up of the speaker.

A schematic representation of the Perspectives - Filter View of language is given in Figure 6.1.

SE

ST

PR

Figure 6.1. A schematic representation of the Perspectives - Filter View of language.

The ST circle contains the linguistic choices that are structurally constrained; the PR circle contains the linguistic choices that are pragmatically motivated. And both of these types of choices are called upon in a specific situation, and made use of in constructing meaning. The PR circle, as I have shown in this study, contains the three parameters of Coherence, Politeness, and Involvement.

The circles contain different linguistic skills,[2] and input from both perspectives is seen as entering the semantic filter. The filter gets its input both during an individual's specific act of communication, and in the act of the individual learning a language.

The arrows in Figure 6.1. capture the fact that it is through specific use that language in general may change, and that a language exists as a constantly changing process. It only exists as a product at any given time, for any given human being, and at that given point in time the

human being possesses a particular cognitive make up. At a subsequent point in time, s/he might - and no doubt will - change that make up.

A linguistic skill or entity in one circle usually remains in the same perspective, and backloops to its own circle. But a linguistic entity can also 'jump over' into the other circle (through its loop). For instance, the fact that a third person singular verb requires an -s suffix is an aspect of language that normally remains in ST. However, if the head noun of the Subject is abstract, and it has a long postmodifier with a more concrete noun, the verb can - especially in everyday speech - agree with the number of the postmodifying, more concrete noun, as in (1a). In example (1b) the finite verb has to stand in the plural form, although formally the Subject is in the third person singular. Here, the Subject-Predicate concord is not determined by syntactic factors.

(1a) A large number of elks running around in the woods of Finland, which <u>do</u> not seem to mind the cold winters, <u>have</u> been spotted by certain long-tailed trolls.

(1b) A great number of elk running around in the woods of Finland, which <u>do</u> not seem to mind the cold winters, <u>have</u> been spotted by certain long-tailed trolls.

In both examples, the pragmatic influence on the verb is stronger than the structural requirement. We see the same thing in the Subject-Predicate concord of (2) and (3).

(2) The faculty were not unanimous.

(3) The faculty was unanimous.

Similarly, there are elements of language that are, and usually remain in PR, like pragmatic particles. But a pragmatic particle can also become so conventionally associated with a way of expressing something structurally that it eventually gets grammaticized. This is what seems to have happened in Solf with respect to question formation.

The discussion in this section has been very hypothetical and contentious. It is not my intention to suggest this view of language as a necessarily better view than other theories. It is, however, an attempt to show how pragmatics as I see it fit in with syntax and semantics, and also, how these latter have to be reinterpreted if the idea of Pragmatics as Implicitness is taken seriously, and its implications are worked out in detail.

Footnotes to Chapter 6

[1]For an explicit suggestion of how this last kind of form-function theory could look like, see Östman 1978a, 1979a.

[2]All the three components in the Perspectives-Filter View are in the mind of the speaker-hearer. But the structural and pragmatic perspectives are more unconscious than the more consciously existing semantico-cognitive filter. However, as I discussed earlier, we have to accept some degree of conventionalization of pragmatic information, too, otherwise implicitly communicated information would never have its (intended) purpose. If we compare the situation in PR to that of ST, we notice that although we can assume that at a fairly early stage (but cf. Östman 1981a) of our language development we know, or have access to both - in Hockett's (1968) sense of 'know how.' But we have been taught about language structures at school, and have thus been made consciously aware of them. We can speculate that if schools also decided to start teaching the appropriate use of pragmatic particles like you know, these would also become more (explicitly) conventional.

APPENDIX

Notations for transcribing Solf

In Wiik & Östman 1982 we drew up guidelines for how to represent the Finland Swedish dialects in writing. These guidelines have also been followed here: for a more detailed account of the phonology, grammar, and the writing system of Solf, I refer the reader to my forthcoming grammar of Solf (Östman forthcoming c).

Below are some of the most important features to note in reading the transcription I have used in examples from Solf.

- The writing system is based on the phonological system of Solf. The default value of a symbol is close to its IPA value. Thus, ⟨y⟩ stands for a close front rounded vowel, and ⟨j⟩ stands for a palatal approximant. Some important exceptions to this general rule are given below.

- Long vowels and consonants are represented as ⟨oo⟩, ⟨ll⟩, ⟨ss⟩, etc. Although most long vowels get diphthongized this has not been indicated in the transcription, since the diphthongization is not phonologically significant.

- ⟨ɤ⟩ stands for $[\underset{\cup}{l}]$. /ɤ/ is a separate phoneme in Solf. The sound is not part of standard Swedish.

- ⟨ö⟩ stands for a vowel in between $[\emptyset]$ and $[\text{œ}]$, with more lip-rounding than either of these.

- ⟨o⟩ stands for $[u]$.

- ⟨u⟩ stands for $[ʉ]$, which is only used in loan-pronuncia-

tions, for instance when a Solf speaker uses (or tries to use) standard Finland Swedish to somebody who is not a native speaker of Solf.

- <ʃ> stands for $[ʃ]$, <tʃ> stands for $[tʃ]$.

- <ŋ> stands for $[ŋ]$.

- <ä> stands for $[æ]$, <å> stands for $[o]$.

- <a> stands for a vowel neutral with respect to back and front. (The vowel diagram for Swedish is usually not depicted as a quadrilateral, but as a triangle, with the corners i, u, and a.)

- Direction of pitch movement is given as a subscript after the word on which the nuclear stress falls. Thus, 'table$_r$' means rising, 'table$_l$' means level, and 'table$_f$' falling pitch on the word table.

- A dash (-) indicates a short pause, two dashes (--) indicate a longer pause. (msec. have not been indicated.)

- Parentheses inside authentic example sentences indicate that the tape-recording at this point is unclear. If something is put inside such parentheses, that something is to be taken as a guess or an approximation. Sometimes alternative suggestions have been given within pointed brackets, in the following manner:

... word X (word1 <or: word2> word3) word Y ...
(Material given within parentheses in constructed sentences is optional.)

- Hesitational sounds, false starts, and other verbal material that lack propositional content are retained in

the transcriptions as they occurred, but they are not translated. Pragmatic particles and other speech act qualifiers that cannot be given a satisfactory word-for-word translation are underlined and given in their Solf form.

- $ preceding a word indicates that the pronunciation of the word is non-Solf, i.e. usually that it is (somewhat closer to) standard Finland Swedish.

- £ preceding a word indicates that the word was pronounced with ingressive airstream.

- Numbers and letters in parentheses after an example refer to the code number of the tape, preceded by 'M' for male, and 'F' for female speaker, again preceded by '-' for relatively young speakers (in these data, under 30), and '+' for relatively older speakers (over 50). The sequence (+M SOL81-JO11-2) thus means 'Male speaker over 50; recorded in Solf in 1981; own recording (JO), tape number 11, side 2.'

The transcription is thus fairly broad. The writing system I have created for Solf is phonological, and thus does not rely on any established writing system. However, for reasons discussed in Wiik & Östman 1982, the symbols å, ä, ö, and the values of o and u have been taken over from the writing system of standard Swedish.

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