Title

Levels of Political Mobilization and Racial Bloc Voting among Latinos, Anglos, and African Americans in New York City

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LEVELS OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND RACIAL BLOC VOTING AMONG LATINOS, ANGLOS, AND AFRICAN AMERICANS IN NEW YORK CITY

JAMES W. LOEWEN†

INTRODUCTION

In the spring and early summer of 1991, New York City redrew its City Council district lines in response to a revised charter increasing the number of City Council seats from 35 to 51. In 1992, New York State redrew the lines for its State Assembly, State Senate, and U.S. Congressional districts, in response to the 1990 Census. Before 1991, Latinos in particular had not been elected to these bodies in numbers commensurate with their share in the population. Table 1 shows that before the redistricting of the City Council and the elections that followed, only three Latinos were members of the Council out of 35 (just under 9%), while Latinos were 24.4% of the total population of the city. Only six African Americans sat on the Council, or 17%, in a city where African Americans made up almost 29% of the total population. No Asian American had ever been elected to the Council, while Asian Americans were about 7% of the total population of the city.

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TABLE 1. PERCENTAGES OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS
BEFORE REDISTRICTING IN TOTAL POPULATION, VOTING AGE
POPULATION (VAP), CITY COUNCIL, STATE ASSEMBLY, STATE
SENATE, AND CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION
(Compare to Table 24.)[1]

GROUP	POP.	VAP	CITY COUNCIL	STATE ASSEMBLY	STATE SENATE	U.S. CONGRESS
White*	43.2%	47.4%	74%	65%	72%	64%
Black*	25.2	23.4	17	28	‚20	29
Latino	24.4	22.0	9	7	8	7
Asian*	6.7	6.7	0	0	0	0
All minorities**	56.3	52.1	26	35	28	36
Total***	99.5%	99.5%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Non-Latino
** Non-Latino Blacks, Latinos, and non-Latino Asians.
*** Excludes non-Latino Native Americans and non-Latino "others."

Among New York City's 61 representatives to the State Assembly, only four were Latino and seventeen were African American before redistricting. Among New York City's 25 state senators, only two were Latino and five were African American. In the city's congressional delegation, only one of fourteen representatives was Latino and four were African American. No Assembly Representative, State Senator, or Representative to Congress from New York City was Asian American. Non-Latino African Americans had reached approximate proportional representation, except in the City Council. Non-Latino whites were overrepresented for each office, compared to their proportion of the population.

Due to the Voting Rights Act, a crucial issue was whether these redistrictings would provide Latinos, African Americans, and Asian Americans the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. While neither the Voting Rights Act nor constitutional jurisprudence guarantee racial/ethnic (hereafter "racial") minorities proportional representation, courts have held that substantial under-representation coupled with a showing of intraracial voting ("racial bloc voting" or "RBV") among the white electorate (also called "white bloc voting"), provide strong evidence of minority vote dilution.[2] In many mixed districts, political leaders know that

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1. The research underlying this article is summarized in James Loewen, Preliminary Report on Racial Bloc Voting, Political Mobilization, and Redistricting Plans in New York City (July 1991) (filed with submission on New York City redistricting at U.S. Department of Justice by Community Services Society) [hereafter NYC Report), and Preliminary Report on Racial Bloc Voting and Political Mobilization in New York City, As It Affects Proposed Congressional Districts (May 1992) (prepared for New York State Senate).

2. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). An interpretation of *Gingles* holds that the key question is whether the choices of minority voters are usually defeated by the choices of majority voters. Thus RBV among whites ("white bloc voting") is the

if whites bloc vote, minority candidates often have little chance at the polls. On the other hand, community leaders know that if whites bloc vote white, minorities have a good chance in voting rights litigation. When whites frequently vote for minority candidates ("crossover voting"), then the racial composition of a district makes little difference to the election outcome. Accordingly, as a prelude to determining whether various redistricting plans met the challenge of providing minorities better opportunities to elect candidates of their choice, planners, attorneys, and interest groups needed to know the extent of political mobilization[3] and racially polarized voting among each group in each borough.

This article examines previous empirical studies that bear on this issue. Then it presents analyses of several New York City elections in the 1980s, offering conclusions about the political mobilization and racial bloc voting rates of each racial group. These analyses rely on methods now standard in voting rights litigation: correlation, ecological regression, and complementary overlapping percentages analysis.[4] Analysis will show that African Americans are now more registered than Anglos, while Latinos and Asian Americans still lag behind. Latinos and African Americans continue to show less voting for lower offices than Anglos do. For the top of the ticket, such as Mayor in 1989, when important Black candidates run, African Americans turn out and vote at higher rates than whites in most boroughs. Latinos also vote more when Latino candidates run. Asian American voting is minimal. Anglos, Blacks, and Latinos show racial bloc voting except in a few locations, notably Manhattan's Lower East Side. These conclusions as to levels of political mobilization and racial bloc voting among each group are then used to predict the proportion of the population that

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key factor. RBV among minority voters ("minority cohesiveness") is an important second factor, to show that minority choices differ from white choices. In some cases, however, it can be shown that a "chilling effect" on minority voters, resulting from their submersion in a larger bloc-voting majority population, has reduced their political mobilization on behalf of minority candidates. A third question is whether the minority group is sufficiently compact geographically so that one or more districts can be drawn which provide the minority a reasonable opportunity to elect candidates of its choice. In some cases, however, other kinds of relief have been granted, including limited or cumulative voting, that do not require geographic compactness. Additional issues to be examined in each case include, whether different minorities (in New York City, Latinos, African Americans, and Asian Americans) vote together and can be considered a unified minority; whether minority proportions too low to provide probable electoral control are appropriate in areas where "majority-minority" districts cannot be drawn; what proportion of minority voters provides the minority a reasonable opportunity to elect; and whether districts "waste" minority votes disproportionately by packing them into super-majorities or fragmenting them among several majority-majority districts.

    3. Political mobilization as used in this paper refers to levels of voter registration, turnout at the polls, and votes for the office in question (rollon).

    4. These methods are explained in James Loewen & Bernard Grofman, *Recent Developments in Methods Used in Vote Dilution Litigation*, 21 THE URB. LAW. 589 (1989) [hereafter *Recent Developments*].

each race must constitute in a specific area to have an equal chance to win elections for city council and state and federal legislature.

Summary of Previous Research

Partly because of past difficulties in getting data by precinct in New York City, few analyses existed that relied on up-to-date statistical methods and provided empirical information on political behavior by race until now. Roman Hedges and Jeffrey Getis presented conclusions based on their analysis of the 1977 Democratic primary for Mayor (Herman Badillo, Latino, Percy Sutton, African American, and Bella Abzug, Abraham Beame, Mario Cuomo, Joel Harnett, and Ed Koch, white).[5] I do not fully agree with their methodology nor understand how they derive estimates for the percentage of Latinos required for secure districts that are lower than the percentage of African Americans required for secure districts.

Richard Engstrom used single-equation multivariate regression to analyze the 1977 Democratic primary for Mayor, the 1982 Democratic primary for Lieutenant Governor (H. Carl McCall, African American, and white candidates), and the 1984 Democratic presidential primary (Jesse Jackson, African American, and Walter Mondale, white, and others).[6] He found that African American voters gave 72% of their vote to Sutton, 88% to McCall, and 100% to Jackson. Latino voters gave 79% to Badillo, 64% to McCall, and just 34% to Jackson, while giving about 50% to Mondale. White voters (including Asians) gave 24% to McCall but negligible support to Badillo and Sutton, and just 5% to Jackson. Double-equation ecological regression, explained in the next section, would provide more accurate estimates and allow calculation of the proportion of each group that did not vote for the offices in question. Nonetheless, Engstrom's results showed the same pattern among Latino and African American voters that marked their voting behavior in later elections, as will be seen.

In *Butts v. City of New York*,[7] William O'Hare found that in 1982 only 44% of the Latino VAP was registered, compared to 56% of African Americans and 64% of Anglos (computed by unweighted averaging of income categories, which understates the differences somewhat).[8]

5. Roman Hedges & Jeffrey Getis, A Standard for Constructing Minority Legislative Districts: The Issue of Effective Voting Equality (n.d.) (unpublished typescript, on file with author).

6. Richard Engstrom, Polarized Voting in Citywide Elections in New York: 1977-1984 (n.d.) (unpublished typescript at 18-19, on file with author).

7. 614 F. Supp. 1527 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

8. Memorandum from S.A. Ifill and S. Soni, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund 22-23 and Appendix C (1989) (summarizing the work of William O'Hare,

In 1984, Angelo Falcon found much lower registration rates in 1982: 35% for Latinos, 39% for African Americans, and 49% for whites.[9] By 1984, registration among Latinos had jumped to 52%, among African Americans to 56%, and for whites to 60%. Although various registration drives, including those during the Jesse Jackson presidential campaign, did increase registration among all three of these groups, such a jump suggests some problem with the 1982 figures. Falcon also reports increased voter turnout as a fraction of registration: 70% among Latinos, 70% among African Americans, and 82% among whites.

Like Falcon, the Institute for Puerto Rican Policy found that once registered, Latinos voted as much as African Americans and 10% less than whites in the 1988 presidential election.[10] However, only about 33% of Latinos and Blacks who voted for president bothered to vote for New York City charter revision proposals, farther down on the ballot, while about 60% of whites did so. Findings presented below from the 1988 Democratic presidential primary show more political mobilization among African Americans than Anglos when a popular Black candidate, in this case Jesse Jackson, is on the ballot. Therefore results from the Bush-Dukakis contest may not be useful to predict outcomes in interracial contests in New York City districts.

In 1989, John Mollenkopf showed that in the elections for president in 1984 and 1988, Blacks and Hispanics voted overwhelmingly for Mondale and Dukakis while Anglos split.[11] Mollenkopf also reported analyses of ethnic groups within the white VAP (Jews, Greeks, Italians, etc.) and changes in registration rates. However, his conclusions are based solely on extreme case analysis and would benefit from multivariate ecological regression, explained in the next section.

Except for Hedges and Getis, no one used any of these earlier analyses to develop estimates of the percentage of each race required for tossup elections. The estimates of Hedges and Getis derive from questionable statistical methods applied to a single 1977 election and were not used by courts or redistricting bodies to my knowledge. Some groups relied upon sophisticated opinions offered by various political leaders and candidates about the degree to which each group turned out and bloc voted. Unfortunately, these

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Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8, in Butts v. City of New York, 614 F. Supp. 1527, 1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)) (on file with author).

9. *Id.* at 24 and Appendix D (summarizing Angelo Falcon, Black and Latino Politics in New York City (1988)).

10. *Id.* at Appendix E (summarizing INSTITUTE FOR PUERTO RICAN POLICY, CHARTER REVISION AND RACIAL EXCLUSION (1989)).

11. JOHN MOLLENKOPF, THE WAGNER ATLAS: NEW YORK CITY POLITICS 24-27 (1989).

opinions varied widely. The New York State Assembly resurrected the notorious old 65% rule, which states that a "safe" minority district is one whose total population is at least 65% minority. This rule begins with the 50% required for a tossup, adds 5% to compensate for lower turnout among minority registered voters, another 5% to compensate for lower registration rates, and 5% because minority voters are a smaller proportion of the VAP than of the total population. This rule originated, the Assembly claimed, in earlier New York redistricting efforts. Actually, it neither originated in nor is it an appropriate rule to use in New York City.[12]

What constitutes a district winnable by Latinos, African Americans, Asian Americans, or a combination of two or three of these groups is an empirical question. The answer varies for different groups and for different parts of New York City. The rest of this article presents the results of analyses of several recent citywide elections and contests for offices in districts within the city, by borough and sometimes by smaller areas, to provide provisional answers to that question.

Methodology

To determine the extent of racial bloc voting and political mobilization, three statistical methods have evolved in voting rights litigation and have been accepted by the courts, including the Supreme Court in *Thornburg*: correlation, extreme case analysis, and ecological regression. These analyses require two kinds of data: a measure of the dependent variable (votes cast for each candidate), and a measure of the independent variable (race of voter). Results from extreme case analyses confirmed ecological regression results and will only be reported where used to determine levels of voting by groups that could not be analyzed effectively by ecological regression. Because three and even four racial groups compete in New York City, multivariate ecological regression was used.

Data on turnout or registration by race in New York City are not available. Analysts must rely on voting age population (VAP) data by race from the 1990 Census. The Census, state legislature, and city redistricting commission reported VAP by "voter tabulation districts" or VTDs, which often consist of a single precinct ("election district" or "ED"), but sometimes combine two or more

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12. Letter from C. Daniel Chill on behalf of the Assembly to judges in PRLDEF v. Gant, No. 92-521, slip op. at 3-4 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 27, 1992). Actually, 65% was the appropriate figure for Hinds County, Mississippi, as presented in testimony by James Loewen in Kirksey v. Bd. of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977). The United States Department of Justice then applied it in United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), a case involving the Brooklyn borough of New York—a social setting about as different from Mississippi as could be imagined.

EDs. To make the analysis by VAP data feasible, election returns were likewise combined by VTDs. To determine levels of political mobilization by race, registration by race was estimated by regressing overall 1990 registration data against VAP by race. Instead of turnout data by race, also unavailable, a related figure—rollon or votes for the office as a proportion of people at the polls or, here, of VAP—was estimated by regressing votes cast against VAP by race.

I analyzed five major elections in which racial polarization might reasonably be expected to have taken place. Because minority-majority contests provide the most probative settings for determining the extent of RBV, in all of the analyzed elections minority candidates—African American, Latino, and/or Asian American—ran against whites. Table 2 shows the candidates and vote totals for the contests analyzed in this research. Contests in which the front-running candidate of a given racial group received less than 10% of the overall vote were defined as minor and discarded.[13]

TABLE 2. ELECTIONS ANALYZED, CANDIDATES,
          VICTORS (*), AND VOTES

YEAR, CONTEST	CANDIDATES (RACE)	VOTE TOTAL	VOTE %
1985 Mayor	Koch (W)*	425,459	64.0%
	Bellamy (W)	125,481	18.9
	Farrell (B)	88,162	13.3
	Newman (W)	8,980	1.4
	Rubenstein (W)	8,563	1.3
	DeLucia (W)	7,820	1.2
1985 Council Pres.	Stein (W)*	287,403	49.7
	Lipper (W)	140,217	24.2
	Ruiz (L)	45,347	7.8
	DelToro (L)	38,346	6.6
	Erazo (L)	34,083	5.9
	Stevens (B)	33,109	5.7
1988 Dem. Pres.	Jackson (B)	408,838	44.8
	Dukakis (W)	412,015	45.1
	Minor candidates (W)	92,521	10.1
1989 Mayor	Dinkins (B)*	543,357	51.1
	Koch (W)	444,043	41.8
	Ravitch (W)	46,956	4.4
	Gold (W)	28,480	2.7

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13. Election returns and VAP data from the 1990 U.S. Census by VTD were provided by Community Service Society, an umbrella social work agency in New York City. The 1990 registration data originally came from the city election commission. Data for the 1989 mayoral election returns originally came from John Mollenkopf, consultant to the election commission. The 1989 council president returns came from the New York City Board of Elections and the 1985 election returns came from John Flateau, then consultant to the Community Service Society. Data on the 1988 returns were provided by the New York State Senate.

1989 Council Pres.	Stein (W)*	607,786	75.5
	Mendez (L)	197,573	24.5
1986	Chin-Brandt (A)	NA	NA
	York (A)*	NA	NA
1987 Judge of Civil Court, Manhattan			
	Chin (A)*	NA	NA
	Thom (A)	NA	NA
	Two white candidates	NA	NA

CORRELATION ANALYSIS SHOWS POLARIZED VOTING

Visual inspection of the returns in these elections shows a pattern of racial bloc voting. For instance, as the proportion of Latinos in the VAP increased, the proportion of the votes won by Latino candidates likewise increased. Figure 1 shows the proportion of votes cast for Latino, Rafael Mendez, who ran for City Council President against Anglo incumbent, Andrew Stein, in the 1989 Democratic primary, graphed against the proportion of Latinos in the VAP. For clearer presentation, the geographic unit is the New York City Council District (CD), rather than the VTD. Note that the proportion of votes won by Mendez rose steadily as the proportion of Latinos in the VAP increased.

FIGURE 1. SCATTERGRAM SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF VOTES CAST FOR LATINO CANDIDATES BY PROPORTION OF LATINOS IN THE CD VAP, 1989 CITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT[14]

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
14. 51 CDs generate 55 data points because several CDs reach across two boroughs. Each part was treated as a data point.

The correlation coefficient, r, confirms this visual impression: r equals +0.79. The higher the percentage of Latinos in the VAP, the higher the percentage of votes cast for Mendez, the Latino candidate. Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients for each major racial group and votes for major candidates and candidate groups in 1985 and 1989.[15]

The square of the correlation coefficient indicates the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that is associated with the independent variable. Here r^2 equals 0.62 or 62%. CDs varied widely, from about 7% to 56%, in the proportion of votes they cast for Latino candidates. The r^2 tells us that the racial composition of the CD accounts for 62% of that variance. Again, the more Latino the CD, the more votes it gave to the Latino candidate.

TABLE 3. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN RACIAL GROUPS AND PERCENTAGES OF VOTES FOR CANDIDATES IN CITYWIDE ELECTIONS[16]

YEAR	CONTEST	RACE OF VOTERS	CANDIDATES	CORR. COEFF.
1985	Mayor	White	All white candidates	+0.85
		Black	All white candidates	−0.94
		Latino	All white candidates	−0.25
1985	Council	White	All white candidates	+0.76
	President	Black	All white candidates	−0.46
		Latino	All white candidates	−0.79
		White	All Latino candidates	−0.69
		Black	All Latino candidates	+0.34
		Latino	All Latino candidates	+0.83
1988	President	White	Jackson (Black)	−0.84
		Black	Jackson	+0.88
		Latino	Jackson	+0.40
1989	Mayor	White	Dinkins (Black)	−0.87
		Black	Dinkins	+0.89
		Latino	Dinkins	+0.32
		Asian	Dinkins	−0.33

15. The table reports the r for Stein, which is of course opposite in sign from the r for Mendez. Correlation coefficients can vary in magnitude from 0 to 1. (The r would be negative if Latino precincts had voted disproportionately *against* Mendez.) An r of 0 or 0.1 means no consistent relationship obtains between the racial/ethnic composition of the precinct and the outcome of the election. An r of 1.0 indicates a perfect relationship between these two variables. To predict perfectly how a precinct voted, all that is needed is its racial composition. To interpret a correlation coefficient of 0.79, note that rs of 0.5 are considered strong in most areas of social science research. In voting research, rs of 0.8 and even 0.9 are common because the racial composition of a precinct closely predicts its vote.

This scattergram and correlation coefficients are shown for heuristic purposes; multivariate ecological regression offers more accurate estimation of Latino voting behavior.

16. 1985 and 1989 analysis done by CD citywide; 1988 done by VTD by borough and averaged (unweighted).

1989	Council	White	Stein (white)	+0.83
	President	Black	Stein	−0.48
		Latino	Stein	−0.79
		Asian	Stein	+0.19

* In 1985 and 1989, Latinos who identified as white or Black in the 1990 VAP were included in the white or Black as well as Latino VAPs. No important differences result from this double-counting; in few VTDs were Black Latinos more than 10% of the VAP. Analyzing Black Latinos separately showed that their voting behavior was between that of Blacks and Latinos but closer to that of Blacks.

In all five major elections analyzed between 1985 and 1989, bivariate correlation coefficients showed consistent relationships between racial composition and electoral outcome. Like the 1989 Stein-Mendez contest, the 1985 contest for Council President was primarily a Latino-white contest. Ruiz, Del Toro, and Erazo were all Latino candidates. Stein and Lipper were Anglo candidates. Stevens, the lone African American candidate, came in last, receiving only 5.7% of the votes cast. The correlation coefficient for the three Latino candidates together was +0.83, showing that CDs with high Latino VAPs gave more support to Latino candidates. Conversely, the correlation coefficient for the Anglo candidate was +0.76, showing that CDs with high Anglo VAPs supported the white candidates. African American voters showed a negative correlation coefficient for white candidates and a positive correlation coefficient for Latino candidates.[17]

Three of the elections can be analyzed as Black-white contests. In the 1985 race for Mayor, the correlation coefficient was 0.85 between the percentage of Anglo voters and percentage of votes cast for Koch, Bellamy, and other Anglo candidates. Meanwhile, the *r* between the percentage of African Americans in the VAP and votes for Anglo candidates was −0.94; the larger the population of Blacks in the CD, the *fewer* votes for whites. In this Black/white contest, the correlation coefficient between the percentage of Latinos in the VAP and the percentage of votes cast for white candidates was −0.25. The negative sign and modest size of the correlation coefficient indicates that CDs with more Latinos returned somewhat *fewer* votes for white candidates than did CDs without Latinos.[18]

In the 1989 race for Mayor, Black-white racial polarization remained high; the correlation coefficient between the percentage of Anglos in the VAP and votes for Anglo candidates was +0.87. The correlation coefficient for African Americans and votes for Dinkins,

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17. Correlation coefficients do not tell how a group actually voted, but only indicate a similarity of pattern between the population and its voting behavior. Thus ecological regression will reveal later that 70% of African Americans supported an Anglo against a Latino for City Council President in 1989, compared to 90% of whites.

18. Since non-Latinos can be either Black or white, bivariate correlation coefficients are only a first step in sorting out how each group voted.

the African American candidate, was also a high +0.89. Latino CDs again showed a modest negative correlation coefficient of −0.35 between the percentage of Latinos in the VAP and the percentage of votes cast for Anglos.

The 1988 presidential primary can be seen as a contest between Michael Dukakis, Al Gore, and other whites, on the one hand, and African American Jesse Jackson on the other. White CDs showed much stronger support for the Anglo candidates; the correlation coefficient was +0.84 with votes for white candidates. For Blacks, the same coefficient was highly negative at −0.89. Latinos were in between with a coefficient of +0.40.

Table 3 indicates that Anglos were generally the most polarized group. In 1985, for example, when Stein's main opposition for Council President was Latino, the proportion of CDs that was white correlated with votes for the three white candidates at the +0.76 level. The correlation between proportion Anglo and votes for Anglo candidates for Mayor, where the nonwhite candidate was African American, was even higher at +0.85.

Although I did not always calculate r for the smaller Asian VAP, Asian Americans tended to vote for white candidates but were less polarized than white voters. Latino voters aligned more with African Americans, supporting African American candidates with mildly positive correlation coefficients when no major Latino candidate was in the race. Conversely, African Americans supported Latino candidates with mildly positive correlation coefficients when Latino candidates opposed white candidates and no major Black candidate was in the race. Correlation coefficients do not tell how each racial group voted, however. For that we use ecological regression, which projects the regression line in a scattergram like Figure 1 to 0% and 100% Latino. The resulting percentages of votes provide estimates for all non-Latinos and Latinos in the jurisdiction.[19]

However, in New York City African Americans are more likely to live near Latinos than near Anglos. In Brooklyn, for instance, Blacks and whites live in very different neighborhoods. The correlation coefficient between percentage white and percentage Black in the 1990 VAP using VTDs as the unit of analysis is −0.83, while between Blacks and Latinos it is +0.21. Similar coefficients characterize other boroughs. Therefore ecological regression and correlation can be misleading when done bivariately (*e.g.*, Latinos vs. non-Latinos) in a multivariate situation (Latinos, African Americans, Anglos, Asians). Better estimates of voting behavior derive

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19. This description of ecological regression was limited to the "single-equation method" for simpler exposition. Ecological regression uses a slightly more complicated double-equation method; *see* Loewen & Grofman, *Recent Developments, supra* note 4.

from multivariate ecological regression, which simultaneously regresses outcome—proportion of the VAP voting for white candidate(s), for instance—against percentages of Anglos, African Americans, Latinos, and sometimes Asian Americans in the VAP. Although technically multivariate, such regression does not amount to the kind of multivariate regression that courts have appropriately struck down as going to *motive* for bloc voting.[20] This multivariate regression amounts to a more accurate specification of the values of the independent variable, race of voter (by VTD), rather than a new independent variable. Most of the following analyses relies upon multivariate ecological regression analysis.[21]

Patterns of Political Mobilization and RBV in the 1989 Election for Mayor

The 1989 Democratic primary for Mayor is a good place to begin an examination of voting patterns by race in New York City. African American David Dinkins challenged white incumbent Ed Koch; two other white candidates joined the fray. Table 4 groups the three white candidates and shows results from multivariate ecological regression by CD for the entire city.

Table 4 shows more rollon (votes for the office in question, as a proportion of VAP) in the African American community compared to other groups. No part of the electorate voted at a high rate compared to most other jurisdictions in the United States, however. To understand rollon, note that 100 voters at a polling place do not usually cast 100 votes for every office. A few may spoil their entire ballots. Others may overlook an office or choose not to vote for any candidate for that office. This failure to vote is rolloff. Conversely, rollon tells the percentage of voters at the polls (or here, of VAP) whose votes were counted for the office in question.

TABLE 4. VOTES FOR MAYOR (AND ROLLOFF) BY RACE, 1989

RACE OF VOTER	PERCENTAGE OF VAP VOTING FOR		NOT VOTING (ROLLOFF)
	WHITE CANDIDATES	DINKINS	
White	15.4%	4.5%	80.1%
Black	1.9	25.6	72.5
Latino	6.3	8.1	85.6
Asian[22]	11.6	—	88.4

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20. *See, e.g.*, Bernard Grofman, *An Expert Witness Perspective on Continuing and Emerging Voting Rights Controversies*, 21 STETSON L. REV. 799 (1992) (discussing Jones v. Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1984)).

21. Findings from multivariate ecological regression were confirmed with extreme case analysis not reported here.

22. The Asian American figures were generated by multivariate ecological regression, which requires reasonable variation in the independent variable, the percentage of each race in the VAP. When data points are constricted in range, even slight curvilinearity, projected to 100%, can result in erroneous estimates. The

Table 4 also shows RBV. The easiest way to show the amount of bloc voting, however, is by a simpler table showing choices made by voters who actually cast valid votes for this office (rollon). Table 5 shows that white and probably Asian American voters voted for white candidates. African Americans were very cohesive and supported Dinkins, the African American candidate. Latinos split but leaned toward Dinkins by a margin of 56% to 44%.

TABLE 5. RACIAL BLOC VOTING AMONG ROLLON,
MAYOR, 1989

| | PERCENTAGE OF ROLLON VOTING FOR | |
RACE OF VOTER	WHITE CANDIDATES	DINKINS
White	77.4%	22.6%
Black	6.9	93.1
Latino	43.7	56.3
Asian[23]	99+	—

Voting behavior within each racial group differs in different parts of New York City depending on country of origin, rate of political mobilization, and political orientation. Therefore citywide analysis, while an important first step, cannot suffice to predict how various parts of the city will vote in contests among African American, Anglo, Latino, and Asian candidates. Table 6 shows patterns of political mobilization and RBV across all five boroughs in the 1989 mayoral election. The right-hand column shows rolloff, the percentage of VAP not voting for this office. African Americans showed lower rolloff than whites, indicating more political mobilization—more votes for the office. Voting among all groups in New York City was low compared to other jurisdictions in the United States, however. Black rollon was not significantly higher than white rollon in Brooklyn, perhaps because some Blacks in Brooklyn are recent immigrants from Haiti and cannot register to vote.

Latinos varied dramatically in rollon, largely because some are

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percentage of Asian Americans in the VAP ranges from 0% to only about 30% in this data set. Therefore, multivariate ecological regression often cannot provide reliable estimates for Asian Americans, and the percentage of Asian Americans who voted for Dinkins is not calculable by this method. Complementary overlapping percentages analysis was used to provide more accurate estimates of Asian American voting patterns, as explained in a later section. Therefore, here we usually report results for three groups: African Americans, whites, and Latinos.

Curvilinearity occurs when the data points do not form a straight line. Often they form a "power curve" or S-curve. Figure 1 shows a hint of curvilinearity at the lower left. Several CDs that are less than 10% Latino fall below the regression line, showing even fewer votes for Mendez than would be predicted from their racial composition. At the upper right, several CDs that are more than 50% Latino fall above the regression line, showing more votes for Mendez than would be predicted from their racial composition. Mendez may have campaigned more in these heavily Latino CDs and ignored overwhelmingly non-Latino CDs.

23. *See supra* note 22.

United States citizens from Puerto Rico while others are new arrivals from Central and South America. Latinos also varied in political orientation, probably depending upon their class status as well as whether they were refugees from a right-wing government in El Salvador, for example, or a left-wing government in Cuba. Table 6 shows some of these differences. Throughout the city, Latinos showed higher rolloff—less voting—than whites or African Americans. In Queens, Latino VTDs showed hardly any voting at all; their rolloff was so high that calculating the rollon is difficult.

TABLE 6. VOTES FOR MAYOR AND ROLLOFF BY BOROUGH AND RACE IN 1989

	PERCENTAGE OF VAP VOTING FOR		
RACE OF VOTER	WHITE CANDIDATES	DINKINS	NOT VOTING
BRONX			
White	14.8%	3.4%	81.8%
Black	2.5	31.9	65.6
Latino	9.0	4.1	86.9
BROOKLYN			
White	19.7	3.8	76.5
Black	1.8	22.4	75.8
Latino	5.9	8.1	86.0
MANHATTAN			
White	14.1	8.2	77.7
Black	3.6	35.7	60.7
Latino	6.1	5.0	88.9
QUEENS			
White	18.3	3.2	78.5
Black	2.4	32.9	64.7
Latino	—*	—*	—*
STATEN ISLAND			
White	11.4	2.4	86.2
Black	4.9	31.4	63.7
Latino	—*	—*	—*

* Curvilinearity and/or lack of variation in the independent variable (% minority in VAP) makes these estimates tentative.[24]

Table 7, which includes only the choices made by voters who cast valid votes for this office, shows extremely polarized voting. Whites supported white candidates overwhelmingly, particularly Koch, except in Manhattan where they did so by almost two to one. African Americans supported Dinkins by more than 90% except on Staten Island, where a still-massive 86.5% voted for him. Latinos in Brooklyn supported Dinkins over the white candidates, but in

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24. In Staten Island, Latinos did not make up a high enough proportion of VTDs to supply reliable statistics. Curvilinearity showed up in several areas. In Manhattan, whites in interracial VTDs were more likely to vote for Dinkins than whites in overwhelmingly white VTDs. Also in Manhattan, Blacks were somewhat more mobilized in overwhelmingly Black VTDs than in interracial VTDs.

Manhattan and the Bronx, Latinos supported white candidates. The small Latino population on Staten Island made analysis of their voting behavior unreliable. Low Latino voting in Queens also precluded assessment by ecological regression. Asians supported the Anglo candidates, although curvilinearity and limited dispersion in the Asian percentage in the VAP make it difficult to assess the precise extent of their support.

TABLE 7.   RACIAL BLOC VOTING AMONG ROLLON IN THE 1989 ELECTION FOR MAYOR

	PERCENTAGE OF ROLLON VOTING FOR	
RACE OF VOTER	WHITE CANDIDATES	DINKINS
BRONX		
White	81.3%	18.7%
Black	7.3	92.7
Latino	68.7	31.3
BROOKLYN		
White	83.8	16.2
Black	7.4	92.6
Latino	42.1	57.9
Asian	99+*	0*
MANHATTAN		
White	63.2	36.8
Black	4.5	95.5
Latino	55.0	45.0
Asian	99+*	0*
QUEENS		
White	87.8	12.1
Black	6.8	93.2
Latino	—*	—*
STATEN ISLAND		
White	82.6	17.4
Black	13.5	86.5
Latino	—*	—*

* See Table 6 note.

More analysis should be done to determine precise levels of RBV and political mobilization within each borough. Within Manhattan, for example, such analysis could shed light on the voting behavior of such groups as Dominicans in northwest Manhattan, Puerto Ricans in Spanish Harlem, whites in the Upper West Side, and whites in the affluent East Side. Table 7 shows that whites and probably Asians bloc voted for Anglo candidates, while African Americans did so for Dinkins and Latinos varied by borough. These conclusions are useful general findings. Also important are the estimates of voting levels for each group by borough.

Patterns of Political Mobilization and RBV in the 1989 Election for City Council President

Table 8 shows voting patterns for the Mendez-Stein contest for Council President in 1989. Andrew Stein won handily against his Latino opponent, Rafael Mendez. Table 8 shows much more rolloff in the Council President contest than in the mayoral election in the same year throughout the five boroughs. This difference in rolloff is particularly evident among minority voters.

TABLE 8. VOTES FOR CITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT
(AND ROLLOFF), 1989

| | % OF VAP VOTING FOR | | |
RACE OF VOTER	STEIN	MENDEZ	NOT VOTING
CITYWIDE			
White	15.2%	1.8%	83.0%
Black	12.8	5.6	81.6
Latino	2.3	6.8	90.9
BRONX			
White	14.6	1.0	84.4
Black	13.9	6.7	79.4
Latino	0.9	7.5	91.6
BROOKLYN			
White	17.3	1.9	80.8
Black	9.7	4.4	85.9
Latino	—*	6.2	93.8*
MANHATTAN			
White	9.1	3.2	87.7
Black	7.5	5.8	86.7
Latino	1.5	5.8	92.7
QUEENS			
White	17.8	1.6	80.6
Black	19.2	7.8	73.0
Latino	—*	—*	99+*
STATEN ISLAND			
White	10.0	1.0	89.0
Black	10.6	9.2	80.2
Latino	5.0*	5.6*	89.4

* See Table 6 note.

Table 9 shows RBV among those who cast ballots for City Council President in 1989. About 90% of all Anglos in the city and more than 90% in each borough outside Manhattan voted for Stein, the Anglo candidate. Manhattan whites supported Stein almost three to one. Latinos everywhere voted heavily for Mendez, the Latino candidate.[25] African American voters favored Stein by about seven to three.

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25. On Staten Island, constricted variance in the percentage of Latinos in VTDs precluded accurate estimates.

TABLE 9.   RACIAL BLOC VOTING AMONG ROLLON, COUNCIL PRESIDENT, 1989

	PERCENTAGE OF ROLLON VOTING FOR	
RACE OF VOTER	STEIN	MENDEZ
CITYWIDE		
White	89.4%	10.6%
Black	69.6	30.4
Latino	25.3	74.7
BRONX		
White	93.6	6.4
Black	67.5	32.5
Latino	10.7	89.3
BROOKLYN		
White	90.1	9.9
Black	68.8	31.2
Latino	0*	99+*
MANHATTAN		
White	74.0	26.0
Black	56.4	43.6
Latino	20.5	79.5
QUEENS		
White	91.8	8.2
Black	71.1	28.9
Latino	—*	99+*
STATEN ISLAND		
White	90.9	9.1
Black	53.5	46.5
Latino	47.2*	52.8*

* See Table 6 note.

Thus Table 9 shows RBV particularly among whites and Latinos in this white-Latino contest: Anglos voted overwhelmingly for the white candidate while Latinos voted for the Latino candidate. African Americans were split but generally supported the Anglo candidate.

Patterns of Political Mobilization and RBV in the 1988 Democratic Primary Election for President

In the 1988 presidential primary, African American and white New Yorkers again voted along racial lines. African Americans were highly mobilized (at least by New York City standards), showing more rollon than whites. Latinos showed low rollon, varying by borough. In Queens, Latino voting was so low as to be undiscernible.

TABLE 10.   VOTES FOR JACKSON (BLACK CANDIDATE),
DUKAKIS (WHITE CANDIDATE), OTHER WHITE CANDIDATES,
AND ROLLOFF, 1988 DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY

	PERCENTAGE OF VAP VOTING FOR			
RACE OF VOTER	JACKSON	DUKAKIS	OTHER WHITES	NOT VOTING
CITYWIDE				
White	1.6%	13.4%	3.2%	81.7%
Black	28.1	1.7	0.8	69.4
Latino	2.2	2.0	0.2	95.7
BRONX				
White	1.6	14.3	3.9	80.2
Black	28.9	3.1	1.2	66.8
Latino	2.1	3.5	0.2	94.2
BROOKLYN				
White	1.4	15.0	4.0	79.6
Black	20.0	0.6	0.3	79.1
Latino	6.0	3.0	0.1	90.9
MANHATTAN				
White	3.5	14.2	3.2	79.1
Black	31.2	0.2	0.2	68.5
Latino	3.5	3.5	0.7	92.3
QUEENS				
White	0.8	14.9	3.0	81.3
Black	30.6	1.2	0.3	67.9
Latino	0*	0*	0*	100.0*
STATEN ISLAND				
White	0.8	8.8	1.9	88.5
Black	29.9	3.3	2.0	64.8
Latino	0*	0*	0*	100.0*

Citywide averages are by borough, unweighted.
* See Table 6 note.

Table 11 shows RBV in this primary. African Americans and whites were polarized in every borough. Latinos split evenly between Jackson and the white candidates. In the Bronx, Latinos preferred white candidates but in Brooklyn they preferred Jackson.

TABLE 11.   RACIAL BLOC VOTING AMONG ROLLON,
1988 DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY

	PERCENTAGE OF ROLLON VOTING FOR	
RACE OF VOTER	JACKSON	WHITE CANDIDATES
CITYWIDE		
White	8.7%	91.3%
Black	91.9	8.2
Latino	49.2	50.8
BRONX		
White	8.1	91.9
Black	84.8	15.2
Latino	36.2	63.8
BROOKLYN		
White	6.9	93.1

Black	95.7	4.3
Latino	65.9	34.1
MANHATTAN		
White	16.7	83.3
Black	98.7	1.3
Latino	45.5	54.5
QUEENS		
White	4.3	95.7
Black	95.3	4.7
Latino	—*	—*
STATEN ISLAND		
White	7.0	93.0
Black	84.9	15.1
Latino	—*	—*

* See Table 6 note.

Patterns of Political Mobilization and RBV in the 1985 Election for Mayor

Table 12 shows analysis of voting patterns for Koch's election against Bellamy (white), Farrell (African American) and minor candidates for Mayor in 1985. Koch won handily, receiving most of the votes among Anglos, African Americans, and Latinos. Although legally meaningful RBV was not present, Table 13 nonetheless shows considerable differences between African American and white voting patterns, with Latinos split in between as in the 1989 Mayoral election. Even though runner-up Carol Bellamy was well-known, the election generated little excitement. Levels of voting were very low, particularly among people of color. Only 6% of the Latino VAP in Brooklyn voted, and even fewer voted in Queens. African Americans in Manhattan and Staten Island voted slightly more than whites; elsewhere African Americans voted slightly less than whites. In all, political mobilization among all three major groups was roughly equal and quite low, with Latino mobilization in Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Queens still lower.

TABLE 12. VOTES FOR WHITE CANDIDATES, BLACK CANDIDATE, AND ROLLOFF IN 1985 MAYORAL RACE

RACE OF VOTER	PERCENTAGE OF VAP VOTING FOR		NOT VOTING
	WHITE CANDIDATES	FARRELL	
CITYWIDE			
White	13.9%	0.4%	85.7%
Black	6.8	4.2	89.0
Latino	9.0	1.4	88.6
BRONX			
White	12.8	0.2	87.0
Black	6.8	4.4	88.8
Latino	11.5	1.2	87.3
BROOKLYN			
White	15.7	0.7	85.6

Black	6.1	3.4	90.5
Latino	5.9	0.4	93.7
MANHATTAN			
White	15.3	0.5	84.2
Black	9.3	8.5	82.2
Latino	9.2	—	90.8
QUEENS			
White	15.3	0.4	84.3
Black	7.6	4.9	87.5
Latino	—*	—*	—*
STATEN ISLAND			
White	7.9	0.1	92.0
Black	7.6	3.0	89.4
Latino	10.2*	—*	89.8

* See Table 6 note.

Table 13 shows racial bloc voting. Anglos bloc voted over-whelmingly. Farrell was not a major candidate. He placed third and received less than 40% of the African American votes, virtually no white votes, and perhaps one Latino vote in seven. As in 1989, Latino voting behavior was midway between that of Anglos and African Americans.

TABLE 13.   RACIAL BLOC VOTING AMONG ROLLON,
1985 MAYORAL RACE

	PERCENTAGE OF ROLLON VOTING FOR	
RACE OF VOTER	WHITE CANDIDATES	FARRELL
CITYWIDE		
White	97.2%	2.8%
Black	61.8	38.2
Latino	86.5	13.5
BRONX		
White	98.5	1.5
Black	60.7	39.3
Latino	90.6	9.4
BROOKLYN		
White	95.7	4.3
Black	64.2	35.8
Latino	93.7	6.3
MANHATTAN		
White	96.8	3.2
Black	52.2	47.8
Latino	99+	—
QUEENS		
White	97.5	2.5
Black	60.8	39.2
Latino	—*	—*
STATEN ISLAND		
White	98.8	1.2
Black	71.7	28.3
Latino	99+*	—*

* See Table 6 note.

Patterns of Political Mobilization and RBV in the 1985 Election for City Council President

The last citywide election analyzed was the 1985 contest for City Council President involving front-runner Stein, white; Lipper, the runnerup, also white; three Latinos who came in third, fourth, and fifth; and Stevens, an African American candidate. Table 14 shows the results. Again, it shows low rollon. Twelve percent of the white VAP and less than 10% of the African American and Latino VAPs voted in this contest. On Staten Island, a different pattern occurred: White rollon was only 6.6%, lower than African American and Latino voting rates.

TABLE 14.   VOTES FOR CITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT
(AND ROLLOFF), 1985

| | PERCENTAGE OF VAP VOTING FOR | | | |
RACE OF VOTER	WHITE CANDIDATES	LATINO CANDIDATES	BLACK CANDIDATES	NOT VOTING
CITYWIDE				
White .	11.6%	1.1%	0.5%	86.8%
Black	6.4	1.6	1.0	91.0
Latino	1.6	5.3	0.5	92.6
BRONX				
White	11.5	0.6	0.3	87.6
Black	6.8	2.2	1.0	90.0
Latino	2.0	7.2	0.6	91.2
BROOKLYN				
White	12.4	1.3	0.5	85.8
Black	5.5	1.4	1.3	92.2
Latino	—*	3.4	0.5	96.1*
MANHATTAN				
White	12.5	1.7	0.7	85.1
Black	8.6	3.2	1.3	86.9
Latino	1.0	6.5	0.7	91.8*
QUEENS				
White	12.9	1.1	0.4	85.6
Black	8.4	1.8	1.2	88.6
Latino	—*	1.0*	—*	99.0*
STATEN ISLAND				
White	6.2	0.5	0.3	93.0
Black	7.8	1.3	0.8	90.1
Latino	5.5*	4.6	0.6	89.3*

* See Table 6 note.

Table 15 shows RBV in this election. The pattern resembles the 1989 election for the same office. Anglos voted overwhelmingly for the white candidates, while Latinos voted overwhelmingly for the Latino candidates, except on Staten Island, where lack of variance in the independent variable makes results questionable. African American voting behavior fell in between those two groups,

though a bare majority (53%) voted for white candidates. African Americans gave the three Latino candidates more support than they gave the Black candidate, who was not a major candidate.

TABLE 15. RACIAL BLOC VOTING AMONG ROLLON, 1985 CITY COUNCIL PRESIDENTIAL RACE

| | PERCENTAGE OF ROLLON VOTING FOR | | |
RACE OF VOTER	WHITE CANDIDATES	LATINO CANDIDATES	BLACK CANDIDATES
CITYWIDE			
White	87.9%	8.3%	3.8%
Black	71.1	17.8	11.1
Latino	21.6	71.6	6.8
BRONX			
White	92.7	4.8	2.4
Black	68.0	22.0	10.0
Latino	20.4	73.5	6.1
BROOKLYN			
White	87.3	9.2	3.5
Black	70.5	17.9	11.5
Latino	0*	87.2	12.8
MANHATTAN			
White	83.9	11.4	4.7
Black	65.6	24.4	9.9
Latino	12.2	79.3	8.5
QUEENS			
White	89.6	7.1	4.3
Black	73.7	15.8	10.5
Latino	—*	99+*	—*
STATEN ISLAND			
White	88.6	7.1	4.3
Black	79.6	13.3	8.2
Latino	51.4	43.0	5.6

* See Table 6 note.

CONCLUSIONS REGARDING CITYWIDE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION BY RACE

Table 16 shows levels of political mobilization by race for 1985, 1988, and 1989 across the city. The first column shows that the African American and Latino total populations included more children. Thus VAP as a proportion of total population was smaller among people of color. (The table does not include Asian Americans because of problems estimating their political behavior given their small proportions in the population.

TABLE 16.   POLITICAL MOBILIZATION BY RACE, VAP AS
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION, REGISTRATION AS
PERCENTAGE OF VAP, AND ROLLON AS PERCENTAGE OF VAP

YEAR, RACE, CONTEST	VAP AS % OF TOTAL POP.	REGISTRATION AS % OF VAP*	ROLLON AS % OF VAP**
1985, White	82.5%	62.5%	
Mayor			14.3%
Council Pres.			13.2
1985, Black	71.2	57.5	
Mayor			11.0
Council Pres.			9.0
1985, Latino	69.5	50.5	
Mayor			10.4
Council Pres.			7.4
1988, Democratic Presidential Primary			
White	82.5	62.5	18.3
Black	71.2	57.5	30.6
Latino	69.5	50.5	4.9
1989, White	82.5	62.5	
Mayor			19.9
Council Pres.			17.0
1989, Black	71.2	57.5	
Mayor			27.5
Council Pres.			18.4
1989, White	69.5	50.5	
Mayor			14.4
Council Pres.			9.1
Average White	82.5	62.5	Top of Ticket 17.5
			Council Pres. 15.1
Black	71.2	57.5	Top of Ticket 23.0
			Council Pres. 13.7
Latino	69.5	50.5	Top of Ticket 9.9
			Council Pres. 8.2

* From multivariate ecological regression of overall registration on CD level, 1990.
** From multivariate ecological regression on CD level except 1988, from multivariate
ecological regression on VTD level by borough, averaged (unweighted) for the city.

Table 16 has other important implications. The first compo-
nent of political mobilization is voter registration. Even after two
"Jesse Jackson for President" primaries (1984 and 1988) and the
political mobilization efforts associated with David Dinkins's suc-
cessful mayoral campaign of 1989, African Americans were slightly
under-registered compared to whites. Latinos, not benefitting from
the mobilization associated with a major national candidate or a
successful citywide candidate, remained under-registered compared
to African Americans and Anglos. The second column shows that
62.5% of the white VAP was registered to vote in 1990, compared
to 57.5% of African Americans and 50.5% of Latinos. Asian
Americans, as analysis presented below will show, were even more
under-registered.

Moreover, all groups were under-registered compared to rates
in many other parts of the United States. Of course, recent immi-

gration causes many Latinos and Asians and some African Americans and Anglos to be non-citizens, hence not registered. However, New York City is also said to suffer under laws and policies that make it difficult for voters to know exactly in which precinct they live and this can cause long delays on election day, and in other ways depress registration, campaigning, turnout, and rollon.[26]

Note that rollon was higher among African American voters in 1988 and 1989 than among Anglos. This shows increased political mobilization among African Americans, perhaps attributable to the aforementioned campaigns. Paradoxically, this increased mobilization did not result in higher registration. Perhaps the Jackson and Dinkins campaigns emphasized mobilizing relatively high proportions of their registered supporters to turn out and vote on election day, while slighting registration drives. This is not my memory of the campaigns, however, particularly of the Jackson campaign. Perhaps registration data in New York City is not reliable. Another possible inference would be that purging is done with more thoroughness in African American and Latino VTDs than in white VTDs. Purging is a necessary part of the registration process but can be *overdone*. If New York City purges registrants who have not voted in the previous two or four years or who do not respond to forms mailed to their homes, such purging policies would affect minority VTDs more than white VTDs. Latino registrants voted at lower rates than whites, so they would be more likely to be purged; before 1988, the same was true of African American registrants. Census officials report that mailed forms provoke lower return rates in New York City than in most other places and lower rates in minority areas than in white areas. Thus African American and Latino registrants would probably return any mailed registration confirmation forms at lower rates. By whatever method, uneven purging may be interfering with voting by some minority group members who might be purged by overzealous officials or policies. These claims were issues in a lawsuit by Community Service Society that halted the 1989 purge.[27]

For all these reasons, registration data must be considered with caution. In any event, rollon and RBV, not registration, ultimately decide elections. Problems in registration affect rollon, however, since the would-be voter whose name cannot be found on the registration rolls cannot cast a valid ballot.

Here rollon is the proportion of African American, Latino, and white VAP that cast valid votes for the offices in question. In 1989, compared with 1985, African American voters showed a marked

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26. *See* Ashe v. Bd. of Elections, 124 F.R.D. 45 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (discussing the difficulties of voting procedures under the New York system).

27. *See* MOLLENKOPF, *supra* note 11, at 20.

increase in rollon, approximately doubling for each office. This shows a considerable reservoir of political interest in the African American community. In 1989 the Black VAP rolled on at a higher rate than the white VAP, even in the election for Council President.[28] In other places I have studied, some Anglo voters have shown "support" for African American candidates not by voting for them but by neglecting to turn out or vote at all. Results in Table 16 suggest that this took place in 1989 in New York City. The white VAP did increase its political mobilization between 1985 and 1989, but not by much, considering the closeness of the mayoral contest, its historic nature, and the amount of media attention it generated.

Latinos, too, increased their political mobilization between 1985 and 1989, but the increase was modest. Nationally, Latino political mobilization has lagged far behind white political mobilization, due to a combination of factors including more recent immigration, lower citizenship rates, younger VAP (younger adults vote less in all groups), lower socioeconomic status (SES) than whites, and more recent arrival in the city or the precinct (often requiring re-registration).

High rollon as one moves down the ballot also shows political mobilization. Mobilized voters know to make choices not only for the top of the ticket but also for lower offices. Table 17 shows that people of color, particularly Latinos, are less likely to rollon than Anglo voters as we move down the ticket from mayor to council president. Eighty-two percent of Anglo voters who voted for mayor also voted for council president. Only two-thirds of all African American voters who cast valid votes for mayor in 1989 bothered to vote for council president. Among Latinos the proportion was even lower (63.2%), even though Latino candidates were on the ballot for council president. To be sure, Table 16 is a reminder that although Black voting showed a larger decrease from mayor to council president than did white voting, a higher proportion of the Black VAP still voted for council president than that of the white VAP in 1989. Nonetheless, the heavier rolloff among people of color holds negative implications for their chances of winning council district seats and New York Assembly seats, which, like the placement of council president candidates, do not appear first on the ballot. African Americans were slightly ahead in overall average in Table 16, but their greater rolloff for lower offices, shown in Table 17, suggests the conclusion that political mobilization varies but is generally about the same in the Anglo and African American

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28. Some Latinos were included in the white and Black groups, but more among whites, which slightly increased the gap between Black and white political mobilization. Yet, the Black advantage in 1989 was nonetheless real.

communities. Latinos lag behind with about two-thirds of the political mobilization of whites and African Americans. Later analyses will show that Asian Americans lag still further.

Assuming that 96% of those at the polls voted for mayor—not an unreasonably high estimate, since this historic Black-white contest was highly publicized and led the ballot—allows us to estimate the percentage of people at the polls who did not bother to rollon for the office of council president. Table 17, based on Tables 4, 6, and 8, shows the rolloff by borough based on this estimation of turnout.

TABLE 17.   PERCENTAGE OF ESTIMATED TURNOUT NOT VOTING FOR 1989 CITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT (ROLLOFF)

RACE OF VOTER	ROLLOFF
CITYWIDE	
White	18%
Black	36
Latino	39
BRONX	
White	10
Black	49
Latino	33
BROOKLYN	
White	22
Black	41
Latino	57
MANHATTAN	
White	47
Black	67
Latino	37
QUEENS	
White	13
Black	26
Latino	—*
STATEN ISLAND	
White	23
Black	48
Latino	—*

* See Table 6 note.

In Brooklyn, for example, 23.5% of the white VAP voted for mayor. Assuming 96% rollon, about 24.5% of the white VAP turned out at the polls. Only 19.2% voted for council president. Therefore about 22% of the white turnout did not vote for council president. Black rolloff was about twice as large. In the African American VAP in Brooklyn, 24.2% voted for mayor but only 14.1% voted for council president. Similar calculations show that about 41% of the African American turnout did not vote for council president. Latino rolloff was higher still. In the Latino VAP,

14.0% voted for mayor but only 6.2% voted for council president, even though the runnerup was Latino. Thus a whopping 57% of the Latino turnout did not vote for council president. This pattern is not unusual. Minority voters often show lower political mobilization by voting for the top of the ballot but not for all offices. Table 17 should be read with care, however, because turnout levels varied. Thus in Manhattan, Table 17 seems to imply that Latinos voted more for City Council President than did Anglos or African Americans, but Table 8 shows that only 7.3% of the Latino VAP voted for this office, compared to about 13% among the white and Black VAP respectively.[29]

Table 18 summarizes rolloff citywide, again showing that Latinos in particular are not highly politically mobilized. Even though Latino candidates ran for city council president in both years, about one-third of Latinos who voted for mayor did not cast a vote for city council president.

TABLE 18. ROLLOFF FOR LOWER OFFICES, VOTES FOR CITY
COUNCIL PRESIDENT AS PERCENTAGE OF VOTES FOR MAYOR IN
1985 AND 1989, BY RACE

YEAR	RACE	VOTES FOR COUNCIL PRESIDENT DIVIDED BY VOTES FOR MAYOR
1985	White	92.3%
	Black	81.8
	Latino*	71.2
1989	White	85.4
	Black	66.9
	Latino*	63.2

* Latino totals here include Latino whites and Latino Blacks.

I conclude that, given a situation in which African Americans believed their votes might make a difference in city council contests, their political mobilization would be strong. More effort would be required in the Latino community, including a major registration drive, perhaps a citizenship drive and mobilization to get Latinos to turn out and vote for a given office on election day.

Specific Analysis of Latino Political Mobilization and Racial Bloc Voting in Queens

Prior tables have shown that Latinos in Queens were not voting to a degree that was measurable by ecological regression. Complementary overlapping percentages analysis, a form of extreme case analysis, was applied to all VTDs in Queens whose 1990 VAP

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29. This apparent paradox occurred because a much smaller percentage of the Latino VAP voted for mayor than among Anglos and African Americans. Within this much smaller group, a higher percentage voted for City Council President.

was 70% or more Latino. This method allows further examination of the political mobilization of Latinos in Queens. There were eleven such VTDs with a total population of 23,459. They were 76% Latino in VAP, 68% Latino when counting Black Latinos as African American. Just 4.4% of their VAP voted, fewer than one person in twenty.[30] According to complementary overlapping percentages analysis, however, 1.6% of the VAP in the Latino VTDs was Anglo and voted in this election. Another 3.5% of the VAP was African American and voted. Combined, we have "located" 5.1% of the VAP that voted for mayor—but in reality only 4.4% of the *total* VAP in these VTDs voted! Thus the rate of voting in the Latino VTDs was so low that the relatively tiny numbers of Anglos and African Americans in them accounted for all of it. These numbers force the conclusion that less than 2% of the Latinos in Queens voted for mayor in 1989. Examination of the other elections reveals the same pattern.

Without a massive campaign to increase registration, turnout, and rollon among Latino residents in Queens, Latino residents there will remain a negligible factor in electing candidates to the City Council, State Assembly, or Congress. No district can be drawn that might be won by the candidate of choice of Latino voters without considerable crossover voting by Anglo or African American voters. Creating a single-member district in Queens drawn with the intent of maximizing the proportion of Latino voters might prompt the kind of political mobilization campaign just mentioned. However, because citizenship, registration, turnout and rollon all play a part, and because rollon is so very low, increases in political mobilization will probably be gradual.

Specific Analysis of Asian American Political Mobilization and Racial Bloc Voting in Lower Manhattan

Complementary overlapping percentages analysis on Asian, Latino, Anglo, and Black VTDs allows assessment of political mobilization and racial bloc voting in lower Manhattan, including Chinatown. Four VTDs were more than 90% Asian-American in total population and contained 95% Asian, 3.4% non-Latino white, 1.4% Latino, and 0.4% non-Latino Black VAP.[31] Only 3.5% of the

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30. Complementary overlapping percentages analysis begins with the assumption that non-Latino whites in Latino VTDs vote much like non-Latino whites in the overwhelmingly white VTDs, while African Americans vote much like African Americans in overwhelmingly African American VTDs. *See* Loewen & Grofman, *Recent Developments, supra* note 4, for an introduction. In Queens, complementary overlapping percentages analysis compared the political behavior of the Latino VTDs with 124 white VTDs and 84 Black VTDs. The white VTDs had a total population of 164,270, 93.7% non-Latino white in VAP. The Black VTDs had a total population of 149,760, 95.5% Black in VAP.

31. Complementary overlapping percentages analysis compared the political be-

VAP in the overwhelmingly Asian VTDs voted for mayor in the 1989 primary, less than one in 25. Complementary overlapping percentages reveals that just 2.3% of Asian Americans voted for this office, after accounting for voting by other racial groups in the Asian precincts. Two-thirds of Asian Americans who did vote chose white candidates, while about 82% of Anglo voters chose Dinkins. For Manhattan as a whole, Table 7 showed that Anglos chose Anglo candidates by a 63/37 margin, but on the lower east side of Manhattan, where these four white VTDs were located, whites did not show white bloc voting. There 82% of white voters chose Dinkins. Fifty-four percent of Latinos in this area voted for white candidates.

To investigate whether Asian American voters were not interested in the Koch-Dinkins contest, in which no Asian candidate ran, complementary overlapping percentages analysis was performed on two judgeship contests where Asian candidates ran in lower Manhattan. In 1987, Asian Americans Dorothy Chin and Peter Thom ran against white candidates Harvey Glasser and Richard Braun for Judge of Civil Court in Manhattan. Chin won. In 1986 Asian American Dorothy Chin-Brandt opposed Lewis York, who won. Asian Americans did cast almost all of their votes for Chin-Brandt in 1986. However, they did not vote very much. In 1986 these four VTDs cast just 100 votes for this office—only about one percent of their VAP voted! In 1987, they gave Asian candidates 89% of their votes, but only 4.3% of the VAP voted. Chin won only because the other three groups—Anglos, African Americans, and Latinos—did not show RBV but supported her.

These analyses show that less than five percent of the Asian-American VAP in Chinatown is likely to vote. Citizenship, younger median age, and recency of residence are undoubtedly factors. As with Latinos in Queens, steps need to be taken to increase political mobilization among Asian Americans.

Analysis of four heavily white VTDs on the lower side shows that 54.4% voted for Anglo candidates and 45.6% voted for Dinkins. This was lower crossover than among Anglos on the Lower East Side, but more than elsewhere in Manhattan. For judge in 1986, lower west side Anglos supported the Asian candidate with 64% of their vote. In 1987, Anglos gave 49% of their vote to the

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havior of these VTDs with nearby Anglo, Black, and Latino VTDs. Four nearby VTDs were more than 75% Latino and contained 2.2% Asian, 3.0% Anglo, 78.2% Latino, and 16.7% Black VAPs. Four nearby VTDs were more than 63% Anglo and contained 8.7% Asian, 64.9% Anglo, 18.6% Latino, and 7.8% Black VAPs. No nearby VTDs were overwhelmingly Black, so four Black VTDs were taken from Harlem. They provide a good indication of the voting behavior of Blacks because this election was marked by uniform Black RBV and high Black political mobilization throughout the city. The four VTDs were more than 90% Black and contained 0.2% Asian, 0.7% Anglo, 6.6% Latino, and 92.5% Black VAPs.

Asian candidates. This willingness to support Asian candidates does not show RBV and does not differ much from Anglos on the Lower East Side.

CONCLUSIONS AS TO WINNABLE DISTRICTS IN NEW YORK CITY

The analyses and results presented thus far allow conclusions as to what is required to create districts in which African Americans and Latinos, as well as Anglos, have a chance to elect candidates of their choice.[32] Tossup districts are districts in which Anglos and Blacks, Anglos and Latinos, Latinos and Blacks, or all three have an equal chance to elect based on past political behavior. To predict tossup districts the analyst must answer two questions: First, will voters behave as they have in citywide contests where Latinos, in particular, know they have had little chance of winning? Or will districts with higher proportions of Latino voters prompt more registration and turnout? Second, will voters rolloff for these lower offices as they have for city council president, voting more for the top of the ticket? Or will new districts prompt more interest in the rest of the ticket?

These issues amount to predicting whether there will be a warming effect. Citywide contests probably have had a chilling effect, particularly on Latino and Asian political mobilization. Minority candidates may respond to newly created majority African American or Latino districts by increasing their campaigning. Anglo would-be candidates may respond by running half-heartedly, especially if they are not incumbents. The African American VAP and Latino VAP may respond by registering, turning out, and voting for minority candidates at higher rates than when these candidates run in districts where they had little chance of winning. Thus drawing districts with higher proportions of Latino voters may prompt political mobilization. The tables that follow allow readers to make their own predictions as to warming effects because they offer averages based on mayoral elections showing high political mobilization and city council president elections showing low mobilization.

Because different groups, especially Latinos, show such different rates of political mobilization in different boroughs, analysis will be by borough, beginning with Queens. From Tables 6 through 15, which show voting patterns by borough, and Table 16 which shows political mobilization, it is possible to calculate how many votes for candidates of each race will be generated by equal populations of Anglos, African Americans, and Latinos. Table 19 shows the results for Queens. The table reveals that if rollon for city council,

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32. Given their current level of political mobilization, no district can be drawn in which Asians have an equal chance, if whites bloc vote.

state legislative, and congressional districts resembles that in the races for city council president, a Black/white district would be a tossup when its total population is 50% white and 50% Black. If mobilization were higher, however, African Americans would win in such a district, because African Americans in Queens show more ability than Anglos to increase their political mobilization in high-profile contests. Latino voting was so low that a biracial (white/Latino or Black/Latino) district must be 92% Latino in total population for Latinos to have an equal chance of victory.[33]

TABLE 19.   VAP, REGISTERED VOTERS, AND ROLLON (VOTES FOR MAYOR AND PRESIDENT OF CITY COUNCIL) GENERATED BY 100 RESIDENTS OF QUEENS, BY RACE

	WHITES	BLACKS	LATINOS
Total Population	100.0	100.0	100.0
VAP	83.1	73.2	74.3
Registered Voters	51.9	42.1	37.5*
Ave. Votes for Mayor	14.5	17.5	1.5
Ave. Votes for Council President	14.0	14.0	1.2

* Obtained by multiplying citywide registration rates (from multivariate ecological regression) by Queens VAP. Overstates Latino registration in Queens.

Applying these guidelines to the proposed Queens districts revealed that no district was Latino-winnable. A massive Latino political mobilization campaign would be required for any Latino success in Queens. For Asian Americans to have a chance to elect Asian candidates or even to have much influence in electing candidates of other groups would require a similar campaign.

In lower Manhattan, since analysis has shown that Anglos do not consistently bloc vote, no percentages are appropriate. Depending upon qualifications and appeals, Anglo, Latino, African American, or Asian candidates have a chance to win. Elsewhere in Manhattan, Table 20 tells what is required for tossup districts. Again, the analysis was done twice, assuming low and high rollon. Using the lower rate, a Black/white district would be a tossup when its total population is 45% white and 55% African American. A white/Latino district would be a tossup when its total population is

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33. In *A Standard for Constructing Minority Legislative Districts*, Hedges and Getis develop much higher population requirements for tossup districts: In Queens, for example, Hedges and Getis concluded that Black/white districts must be 70% Black, while "no combination of Hispanics and/or Blacks can insure a Latino candidate effective voting equality in Queens." Hedges and Getis, *supra* note 5, at 9. I disagree. Some of our differences may result from increased minority political mobilization since the 1977 election upon which their conclusions rest. However, I do not fully understand or agree with their methodology. Citywide, for example, they find that Blacks must comprise 76% of Black/white districts, while Latinos must comprise 75% of Latino/white districts. I do not believe that estimates for Latino districts can be lower than for Black districts.

32% white and 68% Latino. A Black/Latino district would be a
tossup when its total population is 36% Black and 64% Latino. A
white/Black/Latino district would be a tossup when its total popu-
lation is 23% white, 28% Black, and 49% Latino.

TABLE 20. VAP, REGISTERED VOTERS, AND ROLLON (VOTES
FOR MAYOR AND PRESIDENT OF CITY COUNCIL) GENERATED
BY 100 RESIDENTS OF MANHATTAN, BY RACE

	WHITES	BLACKS	LATINOS
Total Population	100.0	100.0	100.0
VAP	89.3	75.9	72.4
Registered Voters*	55.8	43.6	36.6
Ave. Votes for Mayor	17.0	21.7	7.3
Ave. Votes for Council President	12.1	10.0	5.6

* Obtained by multiplying citywide registration rates (from multivariate ecological
regression) by Manhattan VAP. Understates Latino registration in Manhattan.

Borough-wide analyses for Staten Island yielded the data in
Table 21, which shows the proportions needed for tossup districts.
Assuming low rollon, a Black/white district would be a tossup
when its total population is 58% white and 42% African American.
This is because African Americans showed more political mobiliza-
tion, especially rollon, than whites in Staten Island. A white/
Black/Latino district would be a tossup when its total population is
33% white, 24% African American, and 44% Latino. All districts
in Staten Island were white-winnable.

TABLE 21. VAP, REGISTERED VOTERS, AND ROLLON (VOTES
FOR MAYOR AND PRESIDENT OF CITY COUNCIL) GENERATED
BY 100 RESIDENTS OF STATEN ISLAND, BY RACE

	WHITES	BLACKS	LATINOS*
Total Population	100.0	100.0	100.0
VAP	76.8	64.2	67.0
Ave. Votes for Mayor	8.4	15.0	6.8
Ave. Votes for Council President	6.9	9.5	5.2

* Because there are too few Latinos for stable analysis in Staten Island, Latino ratios
are taken from nearby Manhattan.

Table 22 shows what is required for tossup districts in Brook-
lyn. Using the lower rate, a Black/white district would be a tossup
when its total population is 42% white and 58% African American.
A white/Latino district would be a tossup when its total population
is 21% white and 79% Latino. A Black/Latino district would be a
tossup when its total population is 26% African American and
74% Latino. A white/Black/Latino district would be a tossup
when its total population is 16% white, 22% African American,
and 62% Latino.

TABLE 22. VAP, REGISTERED VOTERS, AND ROLLON (VOTES FOR MAYOR AND PRESIDENT OF CITY COUNCIL) GENERATED BY 100 RESIDENTS OF BROOKLYN, BY RACE

	WHITES	BLACKS	LATINOS
Total Population	100.0	100.0	100.0
VAP	78.9	69.5	66.8
Registration*	49.3	40.0	33.7
Ave. Votes for Mayor	15.0	11.7	6.8
Ave. Votes for Council President	13.2	9.5	3.4

* Obtained by multiplying citywide registration rates (from multivariate ecological regression) by Brooklyn VAP.

Table 23 shows what is required for tossup districts in the Bronx. Using the lower rate, a Black/white district would be a tossup when its total population is 48.5% white and 51.5% African American. A white/Latino district would be a tossup when its total population is 34% white and 66% Latino. A Black/Latino district would be a tossup when its total population is 35% African American and 65% Latino. A white/Black/Latino district would be a tossup when its total population is 25% white, 26% African American, and 49% Latino.

TABLE 23. VAP, REGISTERED VOTERS, AND ROLLON (VOTES FOR MAYOR AND PRESIDENT OF CITY COUNCIL) GENERATED BY 100 RESIDENTS OF THE BRONX, BY RACE

	WHITES	BLACKS	LATINOS
Total Population	100.0	100.0	100.0
VAP	80.2	69.5	66.1
Registered Voters*	49.3	46.6	35.2
Ave. Votes for Mayor	12.5	15.8	8.5
Ave. Votes for Council President	11.2	10.6	5.7

* Obtained from multivariate ecological regression of registration data for the Bronx, on the VTD level.

These five major elections in New York City showed low but increasing political mobilization from 1985 to 1989 among all groups. All five elections were highly polarized, with Anglos voting for Anglo candidates, African Americans generally voting for African American candidates, and Latinos voting for Latino candidates. Whites in particular showed overwhelming white bloc voting. Citywide, Anglos never voted for people of color. Anglos did not vote for Black candidates for mayor in 1989 (77.4% voted intraracially), for president in 1988 (91.3% voted intraracially), or for mayor in 1985 (97.2% voted intraracially). Anglos also did not vote for Latino candidates for Council President in 1989 (89.4% voted intraracially) or 1985 (87.9% voted intraracially). African Americans voted more diversely, although they favored African American candidates when they had any hope of winning. They

voted for Black candidates for mayor in 1989 (93.1%) and president in 1988 (91.9%). African Americans also voted for Anglo candidates for Council President in 1989 (69.6%), mayor in 1985 (61.8%), and Council President in 1985 (71.1%). Although African Americans never gave a majority of their votes to Latino candidates in these five contests, in the contest for Council President in 1985 they gave considerably more votes to Latino candidates than to the sole African American candidate.

Latinos also voted diversely, although they favored Latino candidates even when they had faint hope of winning. Latinos voted for Latino candidates for Council President in 1989 (74.7%) and 1985 (71.1%). Latinos voted for white candidates for mayor in 1985 (86.5%). Latinos also split between African American and white candidates in 1989 for mayor (56.3% for white candidates) and 1988 for president (50.8% for white candidates).

Citywide, no district is Asian-winnable except in the absence of RBV by non-Asians. For example, Asian candidates can win in lower Manhattan, where voters do not bloc vote. Voters elsewhere in New York City may not bloc vote against Asian Americans; more Asian-American candidacies are required to test this possibility.

OUTCOMES

Table 24 shows the proportion of each governmental body—city council, state assembly, state senate, and congressional delegation—composed of members of each racial group in New York City after redistricting. Recall that before redistricting, Latinos in particular had not been elected to these bodies in numbers commensurate with their share in the population. Table 24 shows that after the redistricting of the City Council and the elections that followed, Latinos increased from three members on a 35-person Council to nine out of 51. African Americans increased from six of 35 to twelve of 51.

TABLE 24.   PERCENTAGES OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS
AFTER REDISTRICTING IN TOTAL POPULATION, VAP, CITY
COUNCIL, STATE ASSEMBLY, STATE SENATE, AND
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION (Compare to Table 1.)

GROUP	POP.	VAP	CITY COUNCIL	STATE ASSEMBLY	STATE SENATE	U.S. CONGRESS
White*	43.2%	47.4%	58%	62%	64%	54%
Black*	25.2	23.4	24	28	20	31
Latino	24.4	22.0	18	10	16	15
Asian*	6.7	6.7	0	0	0	0
All groups**	56.3	52.1	42	38	36	46
Total***	99.5	99.5	100	100	100	100
Total Number of Officials			51	61	25	13

  * Non-Latino
 ** Non-Latino Blacks, Latinos, and non-Latino Asians.
***Excludes non-Latino Native Americans and non-Latino "others."

After redistricting in the New York City delegation to the State Assembly, Latino representation rose from four to six. African American representatives remained unchanged at 17. In the State Senate, Latino elected officials doubled from two to four. African Americans remained unchanged at five. Of the city's 13 Congressional representatives, one fewer than before redistricting, Latinos increased from one to two while African Americans held steady at four. Again, no Assembly Representative, State Senator, or Representative to Congress from New York City was Asian American. Non-Latino whites continued to be overrepresented for each office, compared to their proportion of the population, but the overrepresentation was reduced. Latinos, in particular, made small but meaningful gains in all elected bodies.

Most predictions based on the analysis presented here were confirmed: Districts that were expected to elect minority candidates did so. Two predominantly Black Senate districts in central Brooklyn re-elected white incumbents, who probably won a majority of Black voters in their districts. These senators thus may be considered candidates of choice of the African American community; it will be interesting to compare their voting record with that of African American state senators from elsewhere in New York City.

Levels of political mobilization and racial bloc voting in New York City change constantly, due to registration drives, new candidacies, and changes in the underlying age structure and citizenship rate in the city's various ethnic and racial groups. These new elections provide fertile ground for further research. It will be important to look for evidence of any increases in political mobilization accompanying the creation of majority-Latino or majority-Black districts. Also, it will be important to compare rollon by race for

City Council, State Assembly, and State Senate with that at the top of the ticket for mayor. Such research can determine if minority voters rolled off more than Anglo voters, even in contested elections in districts drawn so that they might have the ability to elect candidates of their choice. Thus these new analyses will allow considerable refinement of the calculations of political mobilization and racial bloc voting presented in this article for Latinos, African Americans, Anglos, and Asian Americans in New York City.