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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE

The Three-In-One Mode Derailed: Multilateral Interaction in Guangdong's Deworm Campaign
Against Snail Fever

THESIS

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

In History

by

Yanlin Lu

Thesis Committee:
Associate Professor Emily Baum, Chair
Associate Professor Renee Raphael
Assistant Professor Chelsea Schields

2020

Dedication

To

My grandfather, Prof. Chi-yung Lu

And all those who dedicated themselves to the deworm campaign

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List of Abbreviations

GPA: Guangdong Provincial Archive 廣東省檔案館

SMA: Sihui Municipal Archive 四會縣檔案館

RMA: Renhua Municipal Archive 仁化縣檔案館

QMA: Qujiang Municipal Archive 曲江縣檔案館

CCP: Chinese Communist Party 中國共產黨

PRC: People's Republic of China 中華人民共和國

MPH: Ministry of Public Health 衛生部

GHD: Guangdong Health Department 廣東省衛生廳

GSRI: Guangdong Schistosomiasis Research Institution 廣東省血吸蟲病防治研究所

NDNPLSG: National Deworm Nine-Person Leadership Small Group 全國血防九人領導小組

NSRC: National Schistosomiasis Research Committee 全國血吸蟲病研究委員會

GDSPLSG: Guangdong Deworm Seven-Person Leadership Small Group 廣東省委血防七人小組

GSRC: Guangdong Schistosomiasis Research Committee 廣東省血吸蟲病科學研究委員會

PCSGP: Huang Fei ed., *Guangdongsheng xuexichongbing liuxing yu kongzhi* 廣東省血吸蟲病流行與控制 [*Prevention and Control of Schistosomiasis in Guangdong Province*]

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I thank my wonderful cohorts, especially my peer partner Haleigh. As a patient and professional writing tutor, she pointed out my numerous grammatical mistakes and some awkward usages, and offered me invaluable suggestions. Frank Chen and Brian Spivey, two of my friends here, have been tremendously supportive and helpful in providing new insights and recommending relevant scholarship. I learned a lot from my conversations with them.

I thank my parents and other family members for their care and love. I dedicate this thesis to my grandfather, a professor who graduated from the University of Michigan and participated in the campaign as a deworm expert. I hope he knew that the goal of eliminating snail fever has been achieved.

Abstract of the Thesis

The Three-In-One Mode Derailed: Multilateral Interaction in Guangdong's Deworm Campaign

Against Snail Fever

by

Yanlin Lu

Master of Arts in History

University of California, Irvine, 2020

Professor Emily Baum, Chair

After founding the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reluctantly realized that its traditional way of governing – relying on revolutionary cadres to directly mobilize the masses – was no longer sufficient for its new identity as the ruling party of China. As a result, the Party made a compromise between its Marxist ideology and the actual need to utilize technocrats. It did so by forming the “three-in-one mode” (三結合模式). This mode comprised of the CCP, the technocrats, and the masses, and was applied to various fields, including industry, agricultural production, literature, and education. The mode's success in practice was also credited by Chairman Mao as the key to eliminating snail fever, a symbolic health campaign in Maoist China. Utilizing newly available primary sources from Guangdong, one of the endemic provinces, this thesis provides a critical reexamination of the mode's actual practice in the deworm campaign. It argues that practicing the three-in-one mode was a crucial part for the Party to construct the socialist state, but it encountered dilemmas when it tried to simultaneously utilize and control various insubordinate agents, and failed to keep compromise between upholding its political agenda while not intervening in scientific pursuits. As this thesis shows, facing these challenges, the Party consolidated its leadership position and overcame inertia in local society by politicizing the campaign, thus derailed the mode from its initial design and brought notably high costs to the campaign starting in late 1958.

Introduction

In 1958, when hearing the news that Yujiang County, one of the endemic areas located in the lower reach of the Yangtze River, had completely eliminated snail fever, Chairman Mao's mind was "churned with so many thoughts" that he could not sleep. "A gentle breeze blew warmly as the rising sun overlooked my window," Chairman Mao wrote. "Looking afar at the southern sky, I was inspired to write." The outcome was one of his most well known poems among his literature, *Farewell to the God of Plague*.¹ Feeling that he had not fully expressed his emotion, he wrote another short postscript:

In the past few years, most physicians in China lost their confidence when facing the disease. In the past two years or so, however, they have become more active in dealing with snail fever, bringing us hope. It is because that the Party is taking a lead in the deworm campaign, and our people have actively participated in it. With the joint efforts of the Party, the masses and our scientists, the God of Plague has nowhere to hide but runaway.²

In this significant but often ignored postscript, Chairman Mao explicitly credited the successful elimination of snail fever in Yujiang County to the cooperation of "the Party, the masses and our scientists," otherwise known as the widely practiced "three-in-one" mode.³ Using newly available primary sources, including provincial and county archives, work reports from deworm institutions, local newspapers, and other publications, this thesis charts how this nationwide deworm campaign was carried out in one of the endemic areas, Guangdong province. The cam-

¹ Mao Zedong 毛澤東, Song wenshen ershou 送瘟神二首 [Two Poems of *Farewell to the God of Plague*], *Renmin ribao* 人民日報 [People's Daily], October 3, 1958, 1. Mao's quote was translated by Miriam Gross and Bo Kong. See Miriam Gross, *Farewell to the God of Plague: Chairman Mao's Campaign to Deworm China* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016), preface.

² Wang Xiaodong 王曉東, *Mao Zedong shici jiedu* 毛澤東詩詞解讀 [Interpretation of Mao Zedong's Poetries] (Xi'an: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 2016), 215-217.

³ The term "three-in-one" (三結合) was frequently used in various official sources in Maoist China (newspapers, government reports and other publications). It can be used to describe other forms of combination, such as the combination between three kinds of farming techniques, the combination of work, study and relax, and so on. But it was most widely used to refer to the combination between the Party, the technocrats, and the masses. The subsequent thesis follows this usage.

paigned started in 1951, when the first provincial deworm institution was established; and achieved the goal of preliminary elimination in 1974, when the endemic areas dropped 99.93% compared to its peak.⁴

Specifically, this thesis provides a critical examination of the formation, operation, and evolution of the aforementioned three-in-one mode in this campaign. It illustrates how the Party, the masses and the technocrats cooperated and interacted with each other, and discusses the profound impact of the three-in-one mode on the campaign.⁵ It argues that the three-in-one mode was one of the most crucial prerequisites for the ultimate success of the campaign, but the campaign's unpopularity among local society and its highly technically-demanding nature forced the Party to politicize it, in order to consolidate the Party's control of the campaign and provide continuous political impetus. Such politicization derailed the three-in-one mode from its intended trajectory, and brought notable high-cost and volatility to the campaign. The derailment of the three-in-one mode in the deworm campaign reveals the dilemma that the Party encountered in building the socialist state, when it struggled to simultaneously rely on and control various insubordinate agents.

The Three-In-One Mode and State-Building in Maoist China

State-building can be generally described as a process through which various state institutions were created and gradually consolidated, enhancing the state's capacity to utilize resources and pursue core agendas. In Maoist China, the relation between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the newly born socialist state was so intimate that these two terms was often com-

⁴ Huang Fei 黃飛, *Guangdongsheng xuexichongbing liuxing yu kongzhi* 廣東省血吸蟲病流行與控制 [Prevalence of Schistosomiasis Control in Guangdong Province] (Guangzhou: Guangdong keji chubanshe, 2005), 2-3. Hereafter referred to as *PSCGP*.

⁵ By "technocrat" and "professionals", I refer to experts who had the necessary expertise in various fields, such as art, industry, and hygiene. These two words are interchangeable in this thesis. I will discuss their consistent and formation in the subsequent thesis.

bined as a new term “party-state.”⁶ Although the Party was the primary protagonist in constructing the socialist state, its struggle and arguably unsuccessful process of transforming itself from a revolutionary party to a ruling party made it “a major obstacle to state-building in post-1949 China.”⁷

The three-in-one mode is a valuable entry point to examine the Party’s uncomfortable transition and the dilemma it encountered in the process of state-building. Comprised of the Party, the technocrats, and the masses, the mode was essentially a compromise between the Party’s Marxist ideology of relying on the masses and the actual need of utilizing technocrats to construct the socialist state. Julia Strauss argues that relevant scholarship on state-building tends to focus on its broader trends and profound outcomes, while the “messy and complex processes” of *how* the state generated sufficient capacity to “implement core or new state projects” remain either assumed or obscured.⁸ The three-in-one mode sheds light on this sophisticated and evolving process as it connects two intertwined relations - state-society and state-elites - that were fundamentally crucial for constructing the socialist state. Accordingly, the mode’s derailment was a manifestation of how the party-state was unable to simultaneously utilize and control external agents that were crucial to pursuing its agendas.

In Maoist China, a primary way for the state to effectively interacted with and transformed the society according to its wills and agendas was through launching various campaigns, including the Land Reform, the Agricultural Collectivization Movement, the Socialist Education Movement, and so on. Julia Strauss defines the campaign in China as “the state’s extraordinary mobilization of people and resources to implement a specific program to accomplish particular

⁶ Scholars like Shiping Zheng provide critical examination on this term, arguing that state and the Party were two different political organizations with contrast logics of governance in post-1949 China. I believe, however, that a clear line between the Party and the socialist state it endeavored to build is both unable and unnecessary to draw in my case study. Therefore, I see party-state as an entity in contrast with society and cultural elites.

⁷ Shiping Zheng, *Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma*, (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 15.

⁸ Julia Strauss, *State Formation in China and Taiwan: Bureaucracy, Campaign, and Performance*. (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 4-5.

goals in a defined period of time.”⁹ The degree to which the state has the capacity to concentrate various resources within a short period is a crucial criteria to evaluate the effort of state-building, while launching campaigns further facilitated such a processes. Although Maoist China witnessed a gradual consolidation of the party-state’s effective control over the society, the process was far from one-way and smooth. The core agendas of the state were, in Strauss’s word, “often in the teeth of indifference or resistance from other human agents in society.”¹⁰ Accordingly, society resiliently negotiated and maneuvered with the state through various tactics, and such trends became notable when a specific agenda was proved especially unpopular.

Although sharing a similar natures, the targets of campaigns were varied. Such diversity determined the campaign’s scale and the range of agents involved. In addition to campaigns that were limited within the bureaucratic system or involved broader population to tackle a short-term goal such as the Land Reform, many campaigns simultaneously required public participation and technical expertise in specific fields - for example, the campaign against snail fever. “In Maoist China, the three-in-one mode was widely practiced in industry, agriculture, education, art, and literature,” scholar Xu Dawei argues. “The contents of the three-in-one mode were diversified, but it mainly referred to the combination of the Party, experts and the masses.”¹¹

The evolving state-society interaction became more dynamic when it overlapped with another long-lasting tension between the state and the cultural elites. As Joel Andreas illustrates, such tension came into existence when the new political elites - communist peasant revolutionaries - encountered old educated elites with bourgeois backgrounds in 1949.¹² “What we used to be familiar with - revolution - is no longer essential,” Chairman Mao complained. “What we do

⁹ Ibid, 22.

¹⁰ Ibid, 5.

¹¹ Xu Dawei 徐大慰, *Shanghai nulaomo yanjiu* 上海女劳模研究 [The Study of Model Female Workers in Shanghai] (Wuhu: Anhui shifan daxue chubanshe, 2012), 126.

¹² Joel Andreas, *Rise of the Red Engineers: the Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China’s New Class*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 3.

not know, however, is forcing us to deal with it.”¹³ In dealing with new hassles, these cultural elites were indispensable to the consolidation and operation of the state. Although the CCP sought to utilize their scant expertise in the state-building process, it simultaneously upheld the radical Marxist ideology of relying on masses and eradicating differences between classes. The balance was proved hard to maintain as the technocratic notion of governing was essentially contradictory to the grand enterprise of eliminating class differences. As a result, the socialist state has been constantly oscillating between these two notions of governing throughout Maoist China, and the state’s complex interaction with the cultural elites also simultaneously facilitated and undermined the process of state formation.

Compromising the technocratic and revolutionary notion of governance, the three-in-one mode lies in the critical junction of state-society and state-elite interaction within the enterprise of state-building. The mode’s practice reveals how the party-state endeavored to utilize scant resources to achieve core goals on its agenda, and how the inertia in the society and the resistance from cultural elites effectively undermined the party-state’s capacity to achieve these goals. Different from many relevant scholarship which emphasizes the state apparatus and discusses issues such as factionalism and rectification, a discussion on the three-in-one mode enables us to see how the party-state engaged with external - often insubordinate - agents that were indispensable to the state-building, and struggled to rely on and control them simultaneously.

The relevant scholarship regarding the three-in-one mode, however, is largely disproportionate with its critical role in the formation of the socialist state. No scholarly work in English, at least to my knowledge, is devoted to the study of the mode explicitly.¹⁴ Some Chinese lan-

¹³ Genghaode yunyong sanjiede de lingdao fangfa 更好地運用“三結合”的領導方法 [Better utilize the three-in-one mode], *Renmin ribao* 人民日報 [People’s Daily], February 11, 1963, 1.

¹⁴ Sigrid Schmalzer spends a chapter in her *Red Revolution, Green Revolution* discussing how the three-in-one mode, namely the combination of experienced old farmers, rural cadres and educated youth/agricultural technicians, was practiced in the National Agricultural Scientific Experiment Movements, in which more than 8000 of such combination groups were formed. See Sigrid Schmalzer, *Red Revolution, Green Revolution: Scientific Farming in Socialist China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 32-33.

guage literatures mention the operation of the mode in different fields, but most of the analysis remains fragile and unsystematic.¹⁵ In addition to solely discussing the mode's operation in one specific case like most of the existing scholarship did, this thesis also aims at illuminating what were the factors that determined the different outcomes of practicing the three-in-one mode. In other words, it endeavors to shed light on the commonality of the mode as well as how divergent social and political context could bring notable peculiarity to the mode's actual practice.

The Deworm Campaign : A Case Study

Among various campaigns that practiced the three-in-one mode, the campaign against snail fever distinguishes itself because of its wide spatial and temporal span, along with its notable dynamic.

Eliminating snail fever has always been one of the goals on the Party's agenda. As one of the most widely spread tropical diseases in the world, snail fever, or schistosomiasis, is described by Centers for Disease Control (CDC) as "second only to malaria as the most devastating parasitic disease." People are infected when exposed to fresh waters, in which the larval forms of the parasite – released by freshwater snails – penetrate the skin, causing gradual disability and

¹⁵ For representative study, see Qu Shuang 渠爽, *Lingdao zhuanjia he qunzhong sanjiehe shehuizhuyi shengchan guanxi de yizhong tansuo* 領導、專家和群眾三結合：社會主義生產關係的一種探索 [Three-in-one Combination of Leaders, Experts and the Masses: An Exploration of Socialist Production Relations], master thesis, Renmin University of China, 2013. Focusing on industrial production, this is the hitherto the most comprehensive work that devotes specifically to the three-in-one mode. Examining it from a Marxist perspective, Qu argues that the mode should be deemed as the Party's effort to explore a new relation of production. For discussion of the mode on literature production, see Deng Yuzhen 鄧玉真, *Sanjiehe chuanguo xianxiang yanjiu* “三結合”創作現象研究 [On “Three-Combination”: A Creating Form in Literature], master thesis, Henan University, 2008; and Shou Zuodi 首作帝, *Zhongguo xinwenxue jiti chuanguo yanjiu(1928-1976)* 中國新文學集體創作研究(1928-1976) [A Study about Collective Writing in Modern Chinese Literature (1928-1976)], doctoral dissertation, Central China Normal University, 2010. For film production, see Xu Dawei 徐大慰, *The Study of Model Female Workers in Shanghai*. As to the practice of the mode in education, see Li Qinggang 李慶剛, *Dayuejin shiqi jiaoyugeming yanjiu* 大躍進時期教育革命研究 [The Study on the “Education Revolution” During the Great Leap Forward] (Beijing: Zhonggongzhongyong dangxiao chubanshe, 2006), 90-112.

eventual death.¹⁶ Before effective measures were taken, situation was far more devastating in the 1950s China, with around 10.5 million persons had snail fever and another 100 million constantly exposed to infection in 1956.¹⁷ Exhausted by continuous wars with warlords, communists, and the later invaded Japanese, the Republican Government, as scholar Wang Xiaojun argues, has taken “limited measures to deal with the epidemic only in specific areas, resulting in almost nothing,” and left this daunting task to its communist successor in 1949.¹⁸ In contrast with the Republican government, however, the deworm work was soon initiated by the communists and escalated to a nationwide, Party-mandated health campaign following Mao’s order in 1955. The campaign brought the epidemic under control by the end of the Maoist era despite the constant turmoil and stagnations.¹⁹ The unprecedented achievement of the campaign and its deep intertwinement with politics all symbolized its significant status in Maoist China.

Initiated soon after the establishment of the socialist state and achieving its primary goal at the end of the Maoist Era, the wide temporal span of the deworm campaign makes it an ideal case to examine the chronological evolution of the three-in-one mode. In addition, the wide but uneven spacial distribution of the disease proved valuable to reveal the dynamic between various levels of hierarchy within the state apparatus, on which the three-in-one mode was formed. Few if any other campaigns that practiced the three-in-one mode has these temporal and spatial advantages to make in-depth analysis.

The unique spacial distribution of the disease also makes Guangdong an ideal region to examine the three-in-one mode. As a political-orientated campaign initiated and motivated by

¹⁶ “Parasites - Schistosomiasis”, <https://www.cdc.gov/parasites/schistosomiasis/>, acquired in April 4th, 2020.

¹⁷ Cheng Tien-Hsi. “Schistosomiasis in Mainland China: A Review of Research and Control Programs Since 1949.” *The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene* 20, no. 1 (January 1, 1971): 26–53.

¹⁸ Wang Xiaojun 王小軍, *Jibing shehui yu guojia ershi shiji changjiang zhongyou diqu de xuexichongbing zaihai yu yingdui* 疾病、社會與國家：二十世紀長江中游地區的血吸蟲病災害與應對 [Disease, Society and the State: The Disaster and Response of Schistosomiasis in the Middle Reach of Yangtze River in 20th Century] (Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 2011), 2, 188.

¹⁹ For detailed description on the campaign as a whole, see Miriam Gross, *Farewell to the God of Plague*, 15-43.

Chairman Mao, the center of the epidemic - the lower reach of Yangtze River - also attracted most of his attention. Such attention brought more resources to the local deworm campaign, along with intense political pressure for the local party cadres to participate. Accordingly, most of the literature devoted to the deworm campaign tend to lay their stresses on the lower reach of the Yangtze River, while little if any works examining the operation of the deworm campaign in other provinces.^{20 21}

In addition to filling up the gap in historiography, the value of Guangdong's case lies in its lower degree of prevalence compare to the center of the epidemic.²² As a result, Guangdong's deworm campaign attracted less attention from the state, enjoyed less available resources, has lower priority on the local authority's agenda, and was more unpopular among the society because of the lack of notable imperativeness. All these disadvantages and challenges in turn pro-

²⁰ Chinese literatures concerning this topic are represented by Wang, Xiaojun, *Disease, Society and the State*; Shi Yali 施亞利, *Jiangsusheng xuexichongbing fangzhi yundong yanjiu(1949-1966)* 江蘇省血吸蟲病防治研究(1949-1966) [Study on the Prevention of Schistosomiasis in Jiangsu Province(1949-4966)] (Hefei: Hefei gongye daxue chubanshe, 2014); and Lai Jingping 賴靜萍, *Dangdai zhongguo lingdao xiaozu bianqian yu xiandaiguojia chengzhang* 當代中國領導小組變遷與現代國家成長 [The Evolution of Leader Groups in Contemporary China and the Growth of Modern State] (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2015). Focusing on different historical periods, Shi and Wang together provide a relatively comprehensive historical review on the deworm works in the middle and the lower reach of Yangtze River throughout the 20th century. Lai uses the deworm campaign small leader group to examine how this unique political invention was put into practice. She argues that the Party used these leader groups to manifest its will in various levels, and consolidated its control over the whole campaign.

²¹ In English literature, the most significant work is *Farewell to the God of Plague* by Miriam Gross, which is hitherto the only book-length work devoted to PRC's snail fever control campaign in anglophone literatures. Focusing on the lower reach of the Yangtze River as Wang did, she illustrates the human, technical, and organizational challenges faced by grassroots health campaigns during the Maoist era. She also argues that it was the prevention effort rather than the treatment effort that led to the ultimate success of the campaign, and creates the term "scientific consolidation" to illuminate how the state was able to manifest its will and control the campaign at the grassroots level by relying on grassroots science. Other scholarly works include "Bilharzia: Victory in China", in John Farley, *Bilharzia: A History of Imperial Tropical Medicine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 201-215; and Joshua Horn, *Away with All Pests: An English Surgeon in People's China* (London: The Hamlyn Publishing Group Limited, 1969).

²² Among the twelve epidemic areas in China (province as unit), Guangdong ranked the last in the numbers of communes, towns and farms that were infected with schistosomiasis. In other rankings, Guangdong was ranked last in the whole country. These include the number of infected people (ranked last but one), the number of infected production brigades (ranked the last one), and the number of accumulated patients (ranked third from the last). See Qian Xinzhong 錢信忠, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xuexichongbing dituji* 中華人民共和國血吸蟲病地圖集 [Atlas of Schistosomiasis Transmission in China] (Beijing: Zhonghua ditu xueshe chubanshe, 1985), 17-21.

vide a valuable chance to test the state's capacity to pursue its goal and manifest its will, especially in those areas that were relatively out of the state's direct focus.²³

The dynamic of the deworm campaign case lies in the fact that the participation of the masses and technocrats were all indispensable to the campaign, while both of them posted considerable challenges to the state in pursuing the goal of deworming China. In other words, the tension between state-society and state-elites simultaneously manifested and intensified in one campaign. Such dynamic was also rare in other cases in which the three-in-one mode was applied, and the peculiarity of the deworm campaign was the determining factor.

Given the poor material conditions in Maoist China, human labor was one of the very few resources that could be utilized with low cost, and relying on the masses also corresponded to the Party's Marxist ideology. The campaign was, however, notably unpopular among the local society because it was an abrupt intrusion from whichever perspective. Local party cadres were assigned additional tasks that impeded them from finishing the production quota, and faced the risk of being criticized and even dismissed if the deworm work was not properly handled. As to the peasants, symptoms of snail fever among those who were infected were negligible, while accepting testing and treatment brought considerable financial burden and impeded them from carrying out agricultural work. For those not infected, the campaign required cumbersome, unpaid but mandated labor that greatly alter their daily routine.

In the enterprise of eliminating snail fever, technocrats - especially those technical experts - was proved to be a greater hassle for the Party who nominally led the campaign. Different from other campaigns such as the Land Reform, when the deworm campaign was initiated, it was totally alien to everyone involved except for a very small group of experts. Accordingly, the degree to which the campaign relied on technocrats and their expertise was notably higher than in other arenas such as literature writing and education. To make things worse, the the technical ex-

²³ The only scholarly work that focuses on the deworm campaign in Guangdong is He Yuanyuan 何媛媛, *Guangdong xuexichongbing liuxing yu fangzhi yanjiu (1949-1985)* 廣東血吸蟲病流行與防治(1949-4985) [Study of the Prevalence and Control of Snail Fever in Guangdong (1949-1985)], master thesis, South China Agricultural University, 2011. This research is basically a chronology of the campaign.

perts constantly held opinions that were opposite to the Party's will, while these opinions had inborn authority because of their expertise and cultural capital, which posed direct and powerful threat to the Party's leadership.

The three-in-one mode lies in the middle of a precarious balance between two contrasting notions of governing - technocratic and revolutionary - while the dispute from the technical elites had proved that the conflicts between these two notions of governance were irreconcilable. Facing challenges from technical elites, the Party responded by politicizing the campaign, claiming it as a political issue rather than a technical issue. In so doing, the Party subordinated deworm expertise to its political agenda and derailed the three-in-one mode from its designed trajectory, in which technocrats and the Party were supposed to be equal and shoulder different responsibilities. In other words, the Party gave up maintaining the balance of the three-in-one mode and fully adopted a revolutionary notion of deworm campaign, characterized by extensively relying on the masses. The notable unpopularity of the campaign in the local society, however, determined that the masses would not consciously and actively participate in the campaign, but could only be motivated by external impetus. Meanwhile, the politicization of the deworm campaign also made the attention from the state become the only impetus to drive the campaign forward. Such attention was proved strong but unstable, as it was determined by the campaign's priority on the state's agenda. Compared with other more imperative issues such as the dealing with the military pressures from the Soviet Union, however, it was impossible for the deworm campaign to remain on the state's core agendas and enjoy constant attention.²⁴ As a result, the unstable political impetus brought periodical stagnation and notable high-cost to the deworm campaign.

²⁴ Lai Jinping convincingly reveals how the priority of the deworm campaign changed on the Party's agenda by calculating the frequency that deworm-related reports appeared on *Renmin ribao* (People's daily), the largest state-sponsored newspaper representing the Party's position. Her chart shows that relevant reports started to drastically increase since 1955, when Mao called for the elimination of snail fever. The amount of reports reached its peak in 1958, and dropped dramatically to almost negligible in 1962. Lai Jinping, *The Evolution of Leader Groups in Contemporary China and the Growth of Modern State*, 79.

The derailment of the three-in-one mode echoes with Shiping Zheng's argument that the Party, still upholding its revolutionary ideology after the end of the revolutionary era, has become one of the major obstacles to state-building in post-1949 China.²⁵ Such persistence on revolutionary ideology that was increasingly irrelevant to governing the country largely impeded the Party from fully embracing its new identity as the ruling party. It was because of such failed transition that the Party altered the state from building a routinized, stabilized bureaucratic system to provide mild but constant impetus to handle various issues such as eliminating snail fever, while replaced with a campaign-style of governance. The instability and volatility of such governance has been clearly shown in the deworm campaign.

The first chapter charts how Guangdong's environment facilitated the spread of the parasitic disease, and how, before the formation of the three-in-one mode, technocrats shouldered the daunting responsibility of deworming Guangdong with scant support from the state and the local society.

Chapter two illustrates the Party's intervention to the campaign in 1956. It charts the formation and early operation of the three-in-one mode, discusses how the masses were incorporated in to the campaign, until the tension between the Party and the technical elites regarding the deworm plan intensified in mid-1957.

The following chapter traces the origin of such tension to the debate between cultural capital and political capital, and between political agenda and the objectivity of science. It analyzes how the Party dealt with such challenges by politicizing the campaign, downplaying the subordinate elites while relying on the Red and Expert lower technicians, thereby subordinating the objectivity of science to its political agenda, and derailing the three-in-one mode.

Chapter four discusses the profound impact that such a transformation had on the campaign. It illustrates how extensively relying on the masses could bring notable high-speed to the campaign in a short period, but the blindness for pursuing high-speed and the unsustainability

²⁵ Shiping Zheng, *Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma*, 15.

of mass movements brought disastrous outcome especially during the Great Leap Forward. By examining the chronological evolution of the deworm rhetoric, it reveals how attention from the state gradually became the only impetus of the campaign, and how the instability of such impetus brought periodical stagnation to the campaign and drastically slowed it down in a long-term.

CHAPTER ONE

Science-Oriented: The Early-Stage Deworm Campaign

Snail Fever and Guangdong

Located in southern China, Guangdong's natural environment and human factors facilitated the prevalence of snail fever. The prevalence of the parasitic disease strictly overlaps with the distribution of its host, the freshwater snail, or *Oncomelania hupensis*. In terms of natural factors, Guangdong's subtropical monsoon climate brings warm temperature and abundant precipitation, which makes it the ideal place for snails to grow and rapidly reproduce. Additionally, Guangdong's ubiquitous rivers and periodical floods of the rivers also help to migrate the snail to peripheral regions. A flood in 1915, for example, brought more serious consequences apart from the loss of houses and crops in Sanshui, one of the endemic counties. Villagers observed that more people were infected by the "big belly disease(大肚病)" - the common name for snail fever because of the notable symptom of fluid intention in the stomach - after the devastating flow.²⁶

As for human factors, similar to many other Asian regions, rice played a dominant role in Guangdong's grain production, which made farmers more likely to touch water. Similarly, farmers' daily activities, such as fishing and grazing, were also inevitably water-related. Once exposed to water, the matured larvae, or cercariae, penetrate the skin of a mammalian host and then

²⁶ Xu Guohuang, 許國煌, Huang Shilong 黃仕龍, and Pan linabo 潘聯波, *Sanshui Xuefang Shiliao* 三水血防史料 [Historical materials on Sanshui's deworm campaign], in *Sanshui Wenshi* 三水文史, vol 3-4, 1982, 105.

move to the host's intestines, causing infection.²⁷ The host's feces can contain thousands of larval eggs, starting a new cycle of transmission if the feces are discarded into the water, which is common: due to the lack of sanitary infrastructure, farmers often defecate around the farmland they work in, while livestock could spread the disease further through their feces because of their wide range of motion. To make things worse, many farmers collect human and livestock's feces as fertilizer, which pollutes the lands they plant crops. Together, these natural and social factors made the transmission of snail fever a vicious circle in Guangdong.²⁸

Different from other notorious pandemics such as the Black Plague and cholera, snail fever generally does not kill the patient shortly after infection. Among all the three stages of snail fever infection - acute, chronic and late stage - only a few patients were on the first stage, which causes serious symptoms and rapid death due to the immune system's reaction. The majority of the infected people belong to the chronic stage, who were largely asymptomatic or showed relatively mild reactions, including fever and diarrhea. This stage could last for decades, making the prevention and treatment effort seemingly unnecessary and unpopular among patients. If no treatment or prevention measures are taken, however, some of the patients may deteriorate to the late stage. Typical symptoms include massive fluid retention in the stomach - the so-called "big belly" - dwarfism, diminished cognitive function among children, infertility, and eventual death.²⁹

It was almost impossible to trace how the snail fever prevailed in Guangdong before the early 20th century, since people simply did not know about its existence. It was not until 1911

²⁷ In 1959, when the deworm campaign was at its peak, many farmers ignored the government's instructions and entered the polluted water for fishing and other agricultural activities, resulting in 318 infections and 22 deaths. It is not hard to imagine how was it like when people did not even know the existence of the disease. See Huang Benkun 黃本坤, *Songzou wenshen weimin chuhai sihuixian xiaomie xuexichongbing jishi* 送走瘟神，為民除害——四會縣消滅血吸蟲病紀實 [Send the god of plague away: How the Sihui County eliminated the snail fever], in Sihuishu zhengxie wenshiweiyuanhui 四會縣政協文史委員會 ed., *Sihui wenshi* 四會文史, vol. 16, 1999:78.

²⁸ Huang Fei 黃飛, *Guangdongsheng xuexichongbing liuxing yu kongzhi* 廣東省血吸蟲病流行與控制 [Prevalence of Schistosomiasis Control in Guangdong Province] (Guangdong keji chubanshe, 2005), 2-3. Hereafter referred to as *PSCGP*.

²⁹ Huang Fei, *PSCGP*, 3-4.



Illustration 1: Late stage snail fever patients in Guangdong, 1956. Many of them were adult, showing typical symptoms of dwarfism and fluid retention. Huang Fei, PCSGP, 187.

that a missionary surgeon detected the first case of snail fever infection in Guangdong.³⁰ Ignorance, of course, did not protect them from the contagious disease. People generally blamed the symptoms and the death caused by snail fever on the misapplication of *Fengshui*, a series of traditional practices that claimed to use energy forces to harmonize individuals with their surrounding environment.³¹ Such misapplication of *Fengshui* included inappropriate location of the houses and ancestors' graves, or disrespect to the rural deities. When burying deceased patients, people found it hard to close the coffin because of the patient's big belly. They stabbed at the belly to let the fluid come out before burial, and broke some cups and plates in front of the

³⁰ Guangdongsheng difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 廣東省地方志編纂委員會 ed., *Guangdong shengzhi weishengzhi* 廣東省志·衛生志 [Guangdong Provincial Chronology · Hygiene] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2003), 207. I can't find the detail information about the missionary. The only relevant record is his translated Chinese name, Wo Naide (沃乃德).

³¹ Miriam Gross, *Farewell to the God of Plague*, 115.

tomb, in order to rearrange the *Fengshui*, so that hopefully, good luck would be brought back to the community.³²

Although the degree of disease prevalence was relatively lower than the center of epidemic statistically, the sheer numbers of Guangdong's patients and endemic areas were quite massive. Before the deworm work was carried out in 1951, around 200 villages had been abandoned due to the prevalence of snail fever, and more than 10000 hectares of farm land were left uncultivated.³³ Moreover, 11 counties, 39 towns, and 176 production groups were listed as endemic areas; around 5.7 million people - 10% of Guangdong's population - were threaten directly by the disease, according to an investigation carried out in 1955.³⁴

Details were similarly horrifying. Luohu village, part of the Sihui county, had "around 3500 villagers three decades ago, while only 1163 remain," according to a deworm work summary by the Guangdong Health Department (GHD) in 1956.³⁵ Once snail fever entered a community, those who survived with serious after-effects found it difficult to continue agricultural production. A village in Renhua county was described by nearby residences as "half-life village" as 90% of villagers were patients. A local newspaper somewhat exaggeratedly described these patients as "skinny as monkey, and can hardly do any heavy labor."³⁶ In another nearby endemic

³² Xu Guohuang, 許國煌, Huang Shilong 黃仕龍, and Pan lianbo 潘聯波, *Sanshui Xuefang Shiliao* 三水血防史料 [Historical materials on Sanshui's deworm campaign], in Zhengxie sanshui xianweiyuanhui wenshizu 政協三水縣委員會文史組 ed., *Sanshui Wenshi* 三水文史, vol 3-4, 1982,107.

³³ Guangdong Parasite Disease Prevent Institution 廣東省寄生蟲病防治研究所 ed., *Guangdongsheng xuexichongbing fangzhi ziliao huibian* 廣東省血吸蟲病防治資料彙編 [Collection of Guangdong Deworm Campaign Materials], unpublished internal sources, 84-85. Hereafter referred to as *CGDCM*.

³⁴ GSRI, yijiuwuwu nian shangbanniandu gongzuobaogao 一九五五年上半年度工作報告 [Work report of the first half of 1955], *Xuexichong Ziliao shang* 血吸蟲資料 (上) [Schistosomiasis Materials (First volume)], 1955, 11.

³⁵ Guangdong Provincial Archives (hereafter GPA) 317-1- 45-15~22, GHD, *Guangdongsheng sannianlai fangzhi xuexichongbing gongzuobaogao* 广东省三年来防治血吸虫病工作总结报告 [Recent three years of Guangdong deworm work report], May 14, 1956.

³⁶ Hong Lijiu 洪理就, *Song wenshen ji renhua xuefangzhanxian dajie* 送瘟神——記仁化血防大捷 [Farewell to the God of Plague: recording the victory of the deworm campaign], *Shaoguan ribao* 韶關日報 [Shaoguan daily], September 22th, 1959, 2.

area, Danxia, a 20 years old man was reported to “has the height of around 3.5 *Chi* (4.6 feet)”, and “can barely do any farming work,” as a local newspaper described.³⁷

Written as a propaganda report proclaiming the seemingly “victory” of the deworm campaign during the Great Leap Forward period, it was necessary for the reporter to portray the scene before the deworm campaign with horrifying details. Despite these potential exaggerations, the prevalence of the parasitic disease nevertheless impeded the local agricultural production as it forced peasants to leave water-lands polluted by feces uncultivated, and disenable patients with serious symptoms to carry out agricultural production work. When agricultural production became unsustainable, the local economy collapsed, forcing the remaining residents to migrate to other areas, which simultaneously transmitted the disease. The result, as Chairman Mao wrote in his poems, was that “thousands of homes are deserted, with ghosts singing there(萬戶蕭疏鬼唱歌).” Facing this dreadful scene, the CCP managed to initiate the daunting deworm task soon after it came to power in 1949, but it largely left this seemingly technical work to a small group of professionals.

Techocrat-Dominated: The GSRI and the Early-Stage Deworm Campaign

Although the deworm work had been carried out in the lower reach of the Yangtze river, the center of the endemic area, other provinces’ reactions were relatively slow due to the lack of sufficient attention. In 1951, two years after the regime was established, two local surgeons - Zhang Xinghui and Xu Jinzhi - reported their detection of the “big belly disease” to the GHD. Experts were soon sent to further investigate, later confirming that the “big bellies” were a typical symptom of snail fever infection. Later in the same year, the Guangdong Schistosomiasis Research Institute (廣東省血吸蟲病防治研究所, hereafter referred to as GSRI) was founded in the

³⁷ Liuxing bainian de xuexichongbing jiben xiaomie le danxia dongtang renren jiankang shengchan peng-bo 流行百年的血吸蟲病基本消滅了 丹霞董塘人人健康生產蓬勃發展 [The snail fever has been eliminated after hundred years of prevalence, everyone in Danxia and Dongtang is healthy and work hard to increase productivity], *Shaoguan ribao* 韶關日報 [Shaoguan daily], May 23, 1960, 4.

medical school of Lingnan University, one of the most prominent missionary universities in Guangdong.³⁸

The founding of the GSRI marked the initiation of Guangdong's deworm campaign. Since then, the GSRI independently carried out various deworm works until 1956, when the Party and the masses also joined in the campaign and formed the three-in-one mode. I refer to the time period from 1951 to 1956 as the early stage of Guangdong's deworm campaign. What distinguishes it from the later campaign is that the later widely-practiced three-in-one mode had not been used, and the technocrats shouldered most of the responsibility. The dominant role that the technocrats played in the early part of the campaign made it highly science-oriented, in sharp contrast with the later campaign's politically-oriented nature. It in turn provides us an opportunity to compare the early stage with the later campaign, and to see how the practice of the three-in-one mode changed the way that the campaign operated.

As its name indicates, the GSRI largely comprised of professionals. Chen Xintao, a Harvard trained parasitologist, then the dean of the medical school at Lingnan University, served as the first director of the institute. Xu Bingkun, a prominent epidemiologist and also Chen's colleague, worked as a researcher. Along with other lower technicians and medical personnel, these professionals dominated the institute and profoundly impacted the trajectory of the early-stage deworm campaign.³⁹

In the early 1950s, the state's reliance on Chen and his fellow colleagues in Guangdong's deworm campaign was part of the broader trend of utilizing the technocrats and professionals to construct the newly-born socialist state. The vast majority of the technocrats received higher education in the so called "old society," a general description of all the historical periods before 1949. Some of them, like Chen, even held a diploma from prominent Western institutions. For a newly established regime, the professional knowledge that these technocrats possessed was in-

³⁸ *CGDCM*, 5.

³⁹ GSRI: *1952 nian gongzuo zongjie baogao* 1952年工作總結報告 [Work report of 1952], *Xuexichong ziliao shang* 血吸蟲資料 (上) [Schistosomiasis Materials (First volume)], 1952, 25-27.

valuable for consolidating governance and carrying out works in various fields. Additionally, during this period, the Party was also proclaiming its New Democracy policy, underscoring the cooperation with technocrats and intellectuals despite their ideology and political stance. By virtue of their expertise, they dominated leadership positions, such as the director of GSRI.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, the Party's agendas was occupied by more imperative issues: stabilizing the price of goods, reestablishing social and political order, suppressing the counterrevolutionaries, and carrying out the Land Reform. For those less-imperative issues, such as eliminating a local epidemic, the Party was happy to leave the problem completely to the professionals.

The distinction between the Party and government within the state apparatus also explained why GSRI was the dominated force to carry out deworm work at this stage. During the 1950s, when the Party had not consolidated its governance, it tried to distinguish itself from the government.⁴¹ The Party tended to see itself as the political leader determining the grand direction of China's development - for example, between socialism and capitalism - and left the routine matters to the government system. As a result, although the Party was still the decisive political power, the Party organization system and the government bureaucratic system were largely parallel and relatively independent from each other. This relative independence explains the autonomy that the GSRI enjoyed: it was affiliated with the GHD, a part of the government bureaucratic system rather than the Party system. As a result, among all of the work reports from 1951 to 1956, no evidence shows that any form of party branches existed within the institute.⁴² Although we cannot simply conclude that no party branch existed in the institute during these five years, its influence was likely to be highly limited and negligible.

⁴⁰ For a detailed account of this period, see Jeremy Brown and Paul Pickowicz ed., *Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People's Republic of China* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007). For the crucial role of old intellectual, see Hong Yung Lee, *From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 115.

⁴¹ For detailed illustration on the separation of the Party and the government in the early 1950s, see Lai Jingping, *The Evolution of Leader Groups in Contemporary China and the Growth of Modern State*, 141-143.

⁴² GSRI: *Xuexichong ziliao shang* 血吸蟲資料（上） [Schistosomiasis Materials (First volume)]. This is the collection of all the work reports of the institute from 1951-1956.

GSRI's autonomy enabled the early deworm campaign to be science-oriented, which was clearly shown in their work reports. The contents of all the work reports can generally be classified into five main categories: 1. General summary of the work; 2. Treatment work; 3. Education and propaganda among the masses; 4. Training technicians; and 5. Research. All of the contents in the work reports were driven by a purely scientific, technical concerns. In other words, Chen and his colleagues had the full capacity to determine the trajectory of the campaign based on their own knowledge and expertise, with no external factors - most commonly, politics - interfering with their determination. Although some parts of the work reports included the elements of "political learning", this was generally aimed at enhancing the professionals' understanding of the ongoing political events and the Party's policies, so that they can "more actively participate in the deworm works."⁴³

With Chen and his colleague's hard work, the institute gradually enlarged itself from 10 personnel in 1951 to 47 in 1953, and most of the new members were lower technicians trained by the earlier members of the institute.⁴⁴ Despite the gradual expansion, the science-oriented nature of the campaign and main works of the institute remained unchanged. Under Chen's guidance, the GSRI had gained notable achievements: they successfully identified the endemic areas in Guangdong, provided treatment to some patients, compounded applicable synthetic drugs, and discovered a practical way to eliminate the snail, the host of the parasitic disease. All these earlier efforts laid the basis for the subsequent full-scale deworm campaign.

The autonomy that the institute enjoyed, however, came at the cost of scant support - both politically, organizationally and financially - from the bureaucratic system. The GSRI was, by its

⁴³ GSRI: Yijiuwusinian diyiji gongzuobaogao 一九五四年第一季工作報告 [Work report of the first quarter of 1954], *Xuexichong ziliao* 血吸蟲資料 [Schistosomiasis Materials], 1954, 14.

⁴⁴ For a detailed description of short-term training of lower technicians, see: GSRI: Yijiuwuernian gongzuo zongjie baogao 一九五二年工作總結報告 [Work report of 1952], *Xuexichong ziliao shang* 血吸蟲資料 (上) [Schistosomiasis Materials (First volume)], 1952, 25-27. In this thesis, "lower technicians" refers to laypersons who received short term training from the experts. They knew basic techniques and were able to carry out simple deworm work in actual practice. What distinguished them from the experts was that they generally did not have the capacity to create new knowledge or technique (for example, invent a new medicine), but can only utilize these knowledge in actual deworm work (for example, provide injections and testing to potential patients).

nature, a research institution, and most of its achievements were research-related. In the actual deworm practice, however, it was forced to shoulder many other responsibilities - conveying propaganda to the masses, providing treatment, and eliminating the snail - that were out of its capacity. Most of these works were highly labor-consuming rather than technique-demanding, and it was unimaginable to count on 50-60 personnel to provide testing for 5.6 million people who faced the direct threat of the disease, let alone the even more cumbersome treatment works. To make things worse, these absurd ideas were commonly held by the local authorities, who believed that all the "professional" tasks should be done by professionals. "Different levels of the local Ministry of Hygiene did not shoulder their responsibility (on the deworm task), but rather passed their buck to the GSRI," A later work summary by the GHD concluded. "They highly relied on the professionals to carry out the deworm tasks, and believed that the deworm campaign was the technocrats' job, while the Ministry of Hygiene did not have the ability or responsibility to participate."⁴⁵

The GSRI's complaints on the non-cooperation of the local authority were also ubiquitous in their work reports. Some of them were concerned about the cumbersome treatment work. "The higher-up assigned the task of providing treatment to 1000 patients in one year. It does not look like a large number, but it is unbelievably difficult for the institute to undertake the treatment task if it is simultaneously required to spend time on prevention," the professionals complained in their report to the GHD, their superior. "Even if we managed to finish the task, the deworm work cannot be routinized without the participation of local hygiene departments."⁴⁶ Chen and his fellow colleagues clearly understood their role as technical guides rather than direct participants in the campaign, and were especially upset about the dislocation of their role. "We can never achieve the goal of eliminating snail fever in Guangdong if the GSRI is the only

⁴⁵ GPA 317-1- 45-15~22, GHD, *Guangdongsheng sannianlai fangzhi xuexichongbing gongzuobaogao* 广东省三年来防治血吸虫病工作总结报告 [Recent three years of Guangdong deworm work reports], May 14, 1956.

⁴⁶ GSRI: *Yijiuwusi niandu shangbannian gongzuo baogao* 一九五四年度上半年工作報告 [Work report of the first half of 1954], *Xuexichong ziliao shang* 血吸蟲資料 (上) [Schistosomiasis Materials (First volume)], 1954, 31.

participant in the campaign,” another report wrote dispiritedly. It then demanded local hygiene departments to shoulder their own responsibility, and demonstrated that the GSRI “can only function as technical guider.” “Governments must pay sufficient attention on this fatal local epidemic,” the report summarized, “to make sure that the agricultural production will not be impeded.”⁴⁷

The professionals’ effort of underscoring the connection between the deworm work and the agricultural production deserves special attention, as it clearly reflected the campaign’s awkward position on the local government’s agenda. Eliminating the parasitic disease was a daunting task which demanded various massive resources and constant efforts and participation. No one, however, could predict when the snail fever *would* be eliminated - or whether it *could* be eliminated. On the other hand, this hassle had existed for hundreds or even thousands of years, and therefore some thought that it did not make a difference if it existed for a bit longer. As a result, although the deworm work was on the local government’s agenda, it unsurprisingly had a lower priority compared with other tasks such as enhancing agricultural production. In order to heighten the deworm campaign's priority and highlight its imperativeness, so that it could receive more resources and attention, Chen and his colleagues struggled to embed the campaign into other enterprise such as agricultural production. The result, however, was disappointing.

In addition to the lack of support from the authorities, professionals also found it challenging to mobilize the masses into the deworm work - or did not realize the importance of doing so. Conveying deworm propaganda to and educating the masses were among the main tasks of the GSRI, but the shorthanded institute did not carry out these cumbersome works until 1953. Even as they did so, their purpose was to persuade the masses to cooperate with testing or to accept necessary treatment, while the professionals remained the main body of the campaign. In addition to giving public speeches, showing slides and displaying big-character posters in one or two

⁴⁷ GSRI: Yijiuwusan niandu gongzuo zongjie 一九五三年度工作總結 [Work report of 1953], *Xuexichong ziliao* 血吸蟲資料 (上) [Schistosomiasis Materials (First volume)], 1953, 17-18.

villages, the so called “sickroom education” was one of the major forms of deworm propaganda, which was aimed specifically at educating snail fever patients. The results were inspiring, since while these patients were those who suffered the most from the disease, they enthusiastically participated in the campaign. Their numbers, however, were highly limited or even negligible.⁴⁸

Facing all these challenges, the professionals gradually realized the necessity of having the Party lead the campaign and the masses participate. “We did not have sufficient contact with the Party cadres and masses in the endemic areas, and failed to gain their understanding and support to the deworm campaign,” a work report summarized. “The deworm campaign is, in essence, a mass campaign. It has to be led by the Party cadres and mobilize the masses, to achieve the campaign’s ultimate victory.”⁴⁹ Written in 1953 when the whole country started to adopt a mobilization mode of governance notably in the dissemination of the Marriage Law, it was reasonable to speculate that underscoring the role of the masses in the report was a way to follow the Party’s general spirit. The complains about the lack of support from the masses, however, appeared quite frequently in deworm reports before and after 1953, and such statement could be seen as simultaneously echoing the Party’s policy while reflecting the real dilemma that the professionals encountered in daily deworm practices.

Enjoying full autonomy until 1956, Chen and his colleagues dominated the early deworm campaign in Guangdong. The relatively less interference from the Party enabled technocrats to carry out the deworm works purely based on their knowledge and expertise, which also brought notable achievements and laid the groundwork for the subsequent campaign. The lack of supports from the inactive bureaucratic system and unconscious masses, however, greatly impeded the professionals from eliminating the parasitic disease. The dilemma that the technocrats faced

⁴⁸ The largest mass movement that the GSRI launched was in 1955, when they did an experiment of burying the snails in Maba county. Only 438 peasants participated in the testing, which was less than 1% of the subsequent, large-scale mass movement. GSRI: *Yijiu wuwunian shangbannian gongzuo baogao 一九五五年上半年工作報告* [Deworm work report of the first half of 1955], *Xuexichong ziliao shang 血吸蟲資料* (上) [Schistosomiasis Materials (First volume)], 1955, 6.

⁴⁹ GSRI: *Yijiuwusan niandu gongzuo zongjie 一九五三年度工作總結* [Work report of 1953], *Xuexichong ziliao shang 血吸蟲資料* (上) [Schistosomiasis Materials (First volume)], 1953, 17.

in turn provided the possibility for the full intervention of the Party and the masses and the practice of the three-in-one mode after 1956.

The Party's intervention, however, largely restrained the autonomy that the professionals enjoyed earlier, gradually transforming science from the *principle* of the campaign to its *method*. In contrast with Chen and his colleagues who deemed science as the highest principle to judge every step of the deworm work, the intervention of the Party gradually deprived of science's role as the principle of the campaign especially when the objectivity of science was contrast with the Party's agenda. In other words, the Party equated science with specific techniques, and saw these techniques as indispensable to the campaign, but they can only be passively utilized and controlled by the Party rather than the opposite. In this sense, after the Party's intervention, the *principle* or highest criteria of the campaign became the Party's will, while science or techniques served as the *method* of achieving the Party's goal. Since the Party interfered, tensions between science and politics existed throughout the rest of the deworm campaign.

CHAPTER TWO

Forming the Three-In-One Mode: The Deworm Campaign in Full Swing

The Party's Intervention and the Formation of the Three-In-One Mode

As the technocrats expected earlier, following Mao's call to eliminate snail fever, the Party started to directly interfere in the deworm campaign beginning in 1956. Mobilizing the masses and organizing the technocrats who fought the battle alone earlier, the Party soon formed the three-in-one mode in national, provincial, county and even production team levels, putting the campaign in full swing. Similar to other provinces, the three-in-one mode was also formed in Guangdong's endemic areas, and greatly accelerated the campaign.

In the only English-language book-length study of snail fever in China, Gross convincingly speculates that the combination of imperative need for Mao to continue and speed up the ongoing agricultural collectivization, Mao's long-lasting distrust of the Ministry of Public Health(MPH), and his response to the visit of the Japanese snail fever delegation contributed to his full intervention in late 1955.⁵⁰ Among these reasons, the first one seems to be the most fundamental. The profound negative impact that snail fever brought to agricultural productivity has been discussed earlier. Mao saw the disease as one of the greatest obstacles for continuing and speeding up the agricultural collectivization, and he also realized that the earlier efforts of collectivization had effectively organized the masses, which in turn made it possible to mobilize them into the deworm campaign. In one of his most frequently quoted articles, the preface of the *Upsurge of Socialism in China's Countryside*, Mao predicted that after the success of agricultural collectivization, "some diseases that brought the most disastrous impact to our people - snail fever, for example - that people see no hope of elimination earlier, now is possible to be con-

⁵⁰ Miriam Gross, *Farewell to the God of Plague*, 25-34.

trolled.” “In sum,” Mao optimistically summarized, “our people have foreseen their splendid future.”⁵¹

In addition to the three reasons that Gross speculates, it was obvious that launching the campaign was also aiming at consolidating the newly established regime’s legitimacy. As scholar Yang Nianqun argues in his *Remaking Patients*, in modern Chinese history, Chinese people’s sick body - the so-called “Sick Man of Asia” - had become a metaphor for the deterioration of the country.⁵² Base on this premise, Ruth Rogaski illustrates how Chinese elites “accepted a medicalized view of their country’s problem, and embraced a medicalized solution for the deficiencies of both the Chinese state and the Chinese body.”⁵³ Such politicization of medical issues was also adopted by the Party. Many scholars have pointed out that in the Party’s narrative, the term “snail fever” has far exceeded its biomedical or epidemiological meaning, and became the metaphor of the so-called “Old Society”(舊社會), a general description of all the societies before the communists took power. It is crucial to notice that, in Chinese language, the literal translation of snail fever is “Blood Sucking Worm Disease”(血吸蟲病), which makes it easy to link this term with the exploiting class - landlord and bourgeoisie - who sucks the people’s blood for centuries, causing disastrous outcome, and should be eliminated by the Party through revolution.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Mao Zedong 毛澤東, *Zhongguo nongcun de shehuizhuyi gaochao xuyan* 中國農村的社會主義高潮(序言) [Upsurge of Socialism in China’s Countryside (preface)], *Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting* 中共中央辦公廳 ed., *Zhongguo nongcun de shehuizhuyi gaochao* 中國農村的社會主義高潮 [Upsurge of Socialism in China’s Countryside] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1956), 2.

⁵² Yang Nianqun 楊念群, *Zaizao bingren zhongxiyi chongtu xia de kongjian zhengzhi* 再造病人：中西醫衝突下的空間政治（1832-1985） [Remaking Patients: Spatial Politic Under the Struggle between Chinese and Western Medicine] (Beijing: Zhongguorenmin daxue chubanshe, 2006), 21.

⁵³ Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 2-3.

⁵⁴ For relevant discussions, see Li Xiangdong 李向東, *Jianguo chuqi zhengzhi yinyu xia de xuexichongbing fangzhi* 建國初期政治隱喻下的血吸蟲病防治 [The campaign against snail fever in the early years of the People’s Republic of China and the political metaphor], *Xuchang xueyuan yuanbao* 許昌學院院報, 2012, vol.6, 99; Wan Zhenfan 萬振凡, Yang Wen 楊文, *Jibing fangzhi yu xinzhengquan de hefaxing jiangou* 疾病防治與新政權的合法性建構 [Controlling the disease and the consolidation of the new regime’s legitimacy], *Jiangxi shehui kexue* 江西社會科學, 2017, vol.4, 21.

Therefore, the victory against the “Blood Sucking Worm” was, in essence, equated to the victory of a new social system against the old one. This narrative perfectly fitted into the Party’s ideology, and was constantly deployed in subsequent deworm propaganda.

Driven by all these factors, Mao showed his determination toward eliminating snail fever to Xu Yunbei, then the Deputy Minister of MPH, in a public health meeting held in Hangzhou in late 1955. Mao’s order was more explicitly articulated in the later promulgated *Outline of National Agricultural Production From 1956 to 1957*, in which snail fever was listed as one of the “epidemics that caused the greatest impact to the people”, and should be eliminated in “every possible places” within twelve years.⁵⁵ Scholars often regard this as the symbol of the escalation of the campaign, from being partly carrying out to full mobilization. Also in 1956, Mao reaffirmed his determination, and called for “mobilizing the whole Party, mobilizing the masses, and eliminating the snail fever” in the highest secretary meeting, which further pushed the already accelerating campaign forward.⁵⁶

Forming the various levels of the three-in-one mode was one of the earliest measures that the Party took after fully carrying out the campaign. “What are the prerequisites that can assure the elimination of snail fever?” A commentary article published in the *Renmin Ribao* (People’s Daily) in early 1956 asked. The leadership of the Party was raised first, as the deworm campaign has become the top priority of both central and local Party Committees’ agenda. The organized peasants also played a crucial role, who “are going to fight bravely and creatively against the snail fever for their own health and benefits.” Last but not least, the article states, that scientists “have been researching the snail fever for more than three decades,” and will contribute signifi-

⁵⁵ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 中共中央文獻研究室 ed., *Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian* 建國以來重要文獻選編 [Selected important documents in the People’s Republic of China] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2011), 575.

⁵⁶ Xu Yunbei 徐運北, Maozhuxi zhihui songwenshen 毛主席指揮送瘟神 [Farewell to the God of Plague under the command of Chairman Mao], *Mianhuai Mao Zedong* 緬懷毛澤東 [In memory of Chairman Mao] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2013), 266.

cantly to the campaign.⁵⁷ These three prerequisites corresponded exactly to the three groups in the three-in-one mode.

In order to ensure the Party's leadership while simultaneously utilizing the technocrats' expertise, the Party created two sets of hierarchical, parallel but interconnected structures to ensure that both the Party and the technocrats can contribute to the campaign in different positions. Within the Party apparatus, the so-called "National Deworm Nine-Person Leadership Small Group" (全國九人血防領導小組, NDNPLSG) was formed under Mao's command and followed the direct command of the Central Committee of the Party. The NDNPLSG was comprised of figures who were among the leading sector of the Party system, such as Ke Qingshi, then the First Secretary of the Party Committee in Shanghai; Wei Wenbo, then the Deputy Minister of the MPH and the Secretary of the East China Military District. Secretaries of the Provincial Party Committees in the most seriously impacted endemic areas, mostly the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, also joined the NDNPLSG. Directly led by the Party Central Committee, the NDNPLSG became the highest authority that organized the nationwide deworm campaign.⁵⁸

Parallel to the NDNPLSG, the Party organized the technocrats and established the so-called National Schistosomiasis Research Committee (全國血吸蟲病研究委員會, NSRC). Consisting of the experts and professionals from various disciplines and different endemic provinces, the NSRC served as the technical guide of the whole campaign. Chen Xintao, the director of the GSRI who led the early stage of Guangdong's deworm campaign, joined the NSRC soon after it was formed, where he met many colleagues with similar background.⁵⁹ The leader of the NSRC, Dr. Su Delong, was an epidemiologist trained at John Hopkins University who earned his

⁵⁷ Yiding yao xiaomie xuexichongbing 一定要消滅血吸蟲病 [Have to eliminate the snail fever], *Renmin ribao* 人民日報 [People's daily], January 27, 1956, 1.

⁵⁸ Xu Yunbei 徐運北, Maozhuxi zhihui songwenshen 毛主席指揮送瘟神 [Farewell to the God of Plague under the leadership of Chairman Mao], *Mianhuai Mao Zedong* 緬懷毛澤東 [In memory of Chairman Mao] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2013), 266.

⁵⁹ *Dangdai zhongguo de weishengshiye* 當代中國的衛生事業 [Hygiene enterprise in modern China] (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 2009), 203-204.




Illustration 2: Chi-yung Lu 陸啟榮, Yu-seou Lou 老如簫, *Research on compounding drugs for the prevention and treatment of snail fever*, Department of Chemistry, Jinan University, 1957.2. They are my grandfather and grandmother. A pharmaceutical chemist who earned his doctoral degree at the University of Michigan in 1952, Chi-yung Lu was a committee member of the NSRC.

Ph.D. at Cambridge University, under the guidance of Nobel Prize Laureate Sir Howard Florey.⁶⁰ Respectively representing the Party and the technocrats, the NDNPLSG and NSRC became the two parallel organizations that led the deworm campaign in the national level.

Beneath organizations like the NDNPLSG and NSRC in the endemic areas, provincial party leadership followed this basic model by creating small groups of party and technocrat-led research committees. Due to its relatively lower degree of disease prevalence, delegates from Guangdong were not incorporated in the first meeting of the NDNPLSG held in late 1955, but the Guangdong Deworm Seven-Person Leadership Small Group (廣東血防七人領導小組, GDSPLSG) was soon formed by the Party in mid-1956. Similar to the relationship between the NDNPLSG and the Central Committee of the CCP, the GDSPLSG was comprised of the top lead-

⁶⁰ *Su Delong jiaoshou lunwen xuanji* 苏德隆教授论文选集 [Collection of Prof. Su's papers] (Tianjin: Tianjin kexue jishu chubanshe, 1995), 1-5.

ers in Guangdong's Party apparatus. Zhao Ziyang, then the Secretary of Guangdong's Party Committee who later became the top leader of the CCP, served as the first group leader of the GDSPLSG. Accordingly, Guangdong Schistosomiasis Research Committee (廣東省血吸蟲病科學研究委員會, GSRC) was also formed, led by epidemiologist Chen Xintao and comprised of other technocrats.⁶¹

Similar organizations were established below the provincial level, though the process was notably slower. Some levels of the Party committees, such as the municipal and county levels, formed their deworm leadership small groups in 1956; but district, town and production team levels of leadership small groups were not formed until 1957.⁶² Similarly, the so-called deworm institutions (防治站) were also established in each endemic counties, providing technical guidance to the deworm campaign in the grassroots level.⁶³




Illustration 3: the structure of the three-in-one mode in the deworm campaign.

⁶¹ GPA 317-1-45-31~37, GHD, *Guangdongsheng yijiu wuliu niandu fangzhi xuexichongbing gongzuo-zongjie* 廣東省1956年度防治血吸蟲病工作總結[Work summary of Guangdong deworm work in 1956].

⁶² GDSPLSG, *Guangdongsheng yijiuwunian xuefang gongzuo jihua de jidian chubu yijian* 廣東省1957年血防工作計劃的幾點初步意見[Some opinions about Guangdong's deworm plan in 1957], *Xuexichong ziliao xia* 血吸蟲資料(下) [Schistosomiasis materials(Second volume)], 1956, 1.

⁶³ Huang Fei, *PCSGP*, 21-22.

The structure of the aforementioned hierarchical, parallel system of the Party and technocrats in the deworm campaign is more clearly shown in illustration 3. From national to provincial, municipal, county, and even lower levels, each levels has its leadership small groups representing the Party, and the research committees and local institutions representing the technocrats and professionals. Meanwhile, different levels of the Party leadership small groups also shouldered the responsibility of mobilizing the masses in the district they governed, therefore theoretically incorporating the masses into the three-in-one mode. The actual efforts of mobilizing the masses, as this thesis will discussed below, was largely shoulder by the grassroots Party branches.

As illustration 3 shows, the two sets of hierarchical but parallel systems comprised of two overlapping pyramids, with the masses at the bottom. It reveals two significant characteristics of the mode: First, in the higher hierarchy, there were notably less personnel involved - both from the Party and the technocrat group. However, as the chapter below will show, although small in number, the interactions and conflicts within the leading sector could have profound impact on the three-in-one mode as a whole. The debate between technocrats and Party concerning the deworm plan happened mostly within the leading sector, but it ultimately changed the structure of the three-in-one mode and the trajectory of the campaign. Second, as the overlapping area reveals, the distinction between different groups was much more clearer in the higher hierarchy. When it comes to the grassroots level, however, it became difficult to draw a strict line between different groups. In the national level, there was no overlapping between the NDNPLSG and the NSRC in terms of personnel. The NDNPLSG was purely comprised of higher-level Party leaders, while every members in the NSRC were scientists. Although the NDNPLSG namely had the duty of mobilizing all the masses in every endemic areas, they did not do so directly but rather assigned this work to lower levels of leadership small groups. As the yellow color shows, however, at the grassroots level - such as a village or a production team - the distinction between the three groups became especially ambiguous. A personnel could simultaneously be a local Party cadre, know basic deworm technique such as how to locate and bury snails, and conducting agricultur-

al production to earn a living, which makes it difficult to judge which group should he or she belongs to.

The hierarchical but parallel structure of the three-in-one mode also reveals that in the original design of the mode, the relationship between the Party and the technocrats were equal but with different responsibilities. Although the Party was the nominal leader of the mode, its duty was largely coordinating and organizing different forces into the campaign. Meanwhile, deworm experts were still given considerable autonomy to make technical suggestions based on their expertise. Such labor division was proved unrealistic as the degree to which the campaign relied on technocrats and their expertise was so high, that technocrats' opinions inevitably impeded the Party from fully shouldering its responsibility as the leader of the campaign, which buried the seeds for their later schism.

The Initial Practice of the Three-In-One Mode

The formation of various levels of the three-in-one mode laid the organizational basis for the escalation of the campaign, and the mode's initial practice also brought notable achievements to the campaign from 1956 to 1958. Compared to the subsequent campaign, the early practice of the three-in-one mode was generally correspondent to its original design - the Party served as organizer and coordinator, technocrats as technical guider, and the masses as participant. Although the cooperation between the three groups was also relatively smooth in the initial practice of the mode, the seeds of conflict and split had taken their roots between technocrats and the Party.

Despite the later conflict, the initial practice of the three-in-one mode gained notable achievements in only one year. "Hygiene Ministries in different endemic provinces have established and consolidated more than 1400 deworm institutions, and trained more than 13000 Party cadres who were directly responsible for the deworm work," A report from the Council of State described its accomplishment enthusiastically. "Together, they comprised a deworm

team.” It continued to state that more than 400000 patients received treatment from 1956-1957, which is approximately 266% of all the patients that were treated from 1949 to 1956.⁶⁴

The deworm campaign also achieved notable success in Guangdong. In addition to forming various levels of the three-in-one mode as illustrated earlier, Guangdong also held the first provincial deworm work conference, and identified the endemic areas and the distribution of patients and snails.⁶⁵ Meanwhile, Guangdong started training lower technicians who knew basic deworm techniques such as providing testing and burying snails, so that they could become technocrats. After holding two deworm short-term training programs which respectively trained 256 and 287 lower technicians, the amount of deworm technocrats - both experts and lower technicians - had enlarged to more than 868 in 1956, in sharp contrast with 11 in 1951, and 57 in 1955. This was also the highest number of technocrats throughout the campaign.⁶⁶ The expansion of the technician group laid the basis for providing large-scale testing, treatment, and killing of snails in the subsequent campaign.⁶⁷

In general, in the initial practice of the three-in-one mode, the Party kept a good relationship with the technocrats who earlier dominated the campaign. On the one hand, different from other political-orientated campaigns such as the Land Reform or Suppressing Counterrevolutionaries that the Party was familiar with, eliminating the snail fever was a daunting, highly technical-orientated task which was alien to the Party and required expertise in various fields. On the other hand, given the fact that the year 1956 has long been deemed an “ephemeral spring” for Chinese intellectuals, the emphasis of Chen and other technocrats’ dual identities as

⁶⁴ Guowuyuan guanyu xiaomie xuexichongbing de zhishi 國務院關於消滅血吸蟲病的指示 [Instruction from the Council of State concerning eliminating snail fever], *Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi* 中共中央文獻研究室 ed., *Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian* 建國以來重要文獻選編 [Selected important documents in the People’s Republic of China] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2011), 185.

⁶⁵ GPA 317-1-45-31~37, GHD, *Guangdongsheng yijiu wuliu niandu fangzhi xuexichongbing gongzuo zongjie chugao* 廣東省1956年度防治血吸蟲病工作總結（初稿） [Report of Guangdong’s deworm work in 1956 (first draft)].

⁶⁶ Huang Fei, *PCSGP*, 24.

⁶⁷ *CGDCM*, 19.

intellectual and diligent working class was not a coincidence. The communists reevaluated the role that intellectuals played in building the socialist state, ⁶⁸marked by a famous speech given by Premier Zhou Enlai in early 1956, in which he explicitly stated that the intellectuals were now “a part of the working class”, in contrast with earlier ambiguous judgement.⁶⁹ After experiencing various movements such as the Thought Reform since the socialist state established in 1949, most of the intellectuals were grateful to the Party’s new policy, and felt that they were trusted and had a stake in the country for the first time. All these factors contributed to the smooth relationship between the Party and the technocrats in the early practice of the three-in-one mode.

As mentioned above, facing a lack of support from the bureaucratic system and the masses, technocrats welcomed the intervention of the Party to the deworm campaign. Many of the technocrats had joined the Party and believed that the Party “brought hope and strength to the campaign.” ⁷⁰ “We have confidence to eliminate the snail fever within seven years,” a scientist wrote enthusiastically in a newspaper in 1957, “because the Chinese Communist Party has taken over the campaign.” He continued to praise how the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao care a lot about the campaign, who “gave us policies, direction, and even detailed deworm procedures.” “Scientists!” He inspiringly called at the end of the article, “the Party and our people are waiting for us to open the intellectual gate for the construction of the socialist state, and expecting us to eliminate the snail fever and our people’s pain. Let us accomplish unprecedented achievements!” ⁷¹

⁶⁸ For discussion concerning how intellectual as a class was constructed and consolidated by the Party, see Eddy U, *Creating Intellectual: Chinese Communism and the Rise of a Classification* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2019).

⁶⁹ Zhou Enlai 周恩來, Guanyu zhishifenzi wenti de baogao 關於知識分子問題的報告 [Report concerning the intellectual issues], in Zhou, Enlai, *Zhou Enlai jiaoyu wenxuan* 周恩來教育文選 [Collection of Zhou Enlai’s articles concerning education] (Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1984), 102.

⁷⁰ Renhua Municipal Archives (hereafter RMA) S1.1-02-01, Renhua Deworm Institution 仁化縣血防站, *Gongzuo huibao* 工作匯報 [Work report], 4.

⁷¹ Jiaqiang kexue yanjiu xiaomie xuexichongbing 加強科學研究，消滅血吸蟲病 [Enhance the scientific research and eliminate snail fever], *Jiangxi zhongyiyao* 江西中醫藥 [Jiangxi Traditional Chinese Medicine], January 31, 1956, 1.

Meanwhile, the Party also regarded the technocrats as one of the most crucial contributors to the campaign, which was clearly shown in the rapid establishment of various levels of research committees and deworm institutions from 1956 to 1957. Similarly, through chronologically examining the evolution of deworm plans, scholar Lai Jingpin argues that opinions from the experts can largely determine the Party's decision.⁷² Within various work reports in Guangdong and among higher levels, appeals for "enhancing scientific research" and "letting the scientists play their role" were ubiquitous. For those local Party branches and cadres who did not pay sufficient attention to the technocrat group, they surprisingly found that critics appeared on *People's Daily*, the largest state-sponsored newspaper representing the Central Committee's position. These cadres were accused of "downplaying the significance of technical guiders, and wrongly believed that the snail fever can be eliminated solely by mobilizing the masses without solving the technical problems." And as a result, "both the prevention and treatment works failed to meet criteria." Here, we see the Party was consciously playing its role as leader and coordinator of the three-in-one mode, trying to find the balance between relying on the masses and utilizing the technocrats in the deworm campaign. "Forming a strong deworm team and enhancing our technical guidance is one of our most crucial work," the article continues. "We should soon establish and enhance various levels of deworm research committees and institutions, send our best medical personnel to the institutions, and let them become the core of technical guiders." ⁷³

If the Party's call on "relying on technocrats" also appeared in the subsequent deworm campaign propaganda, the positive description explicitly regarding the higher-level experts - in contrast with the subsequent, large scale of stigmatization - was unique to this period. Chen Xintao, the leading deworm scientist in Guangdong who met with Mao in the earlier national deworm meeting, became the main figure in a detailed deworm report written in 1956 in *Nanfang*

⁷² Lai Jingping, *The Evolution of Leader Groups in Contemporary China and the Growth of Modern State*, 149.

⁷³ Jixu nuli fangzhi xuexichongbing 繼續努力防治血吸蟲病 [Keep working hard to eliminate snail fever], *Renmin ribao* 人民日報 [People's daily], May 28, 1956, 2.



Illustration 4: Chairman Mao and Prof. Chen Xintao in a national deworm meeting, 1956.3. Huang Fei, *PCSGP*, preface.

ribao, a newspaper run by the Party committee of Guangdong. In the report, Chen was depicted as a diligent intellectual who “endeavored to figure out a practical way for the farmers to achieve this goal(of eliminating snail fever),” a description underscoring his identities simultaneously as an expert and a part of the working class. “One county after another, one town after another,” the article vividly illustrates, “he has been to every single one of the endemic areas, identified the distribution of the disease, and made a lot of important suggestions to the superior.”⁷⁴

In addition to the Party and the technocrats, the masses were also a crucial part of the three-in-one mode since it was established in 1956, but mobilizing them was far more difficult than establishing various levels of research committees and leadership small groups. As illustrated earlier, in the early stage of the deworm campaign, technocrats had tried to conduct de-

⁷⁴ Ping Jian 平建, Yang Shu 楊淑, *Women yiding neng chedi xiaomie xuexichongbing ji jishengchongxue zhuanjia chenxintao fangzhi xuexichongbing de yanjiu gongzuo* 我們一定能夠徹底消滅血吸蟲病——記寄生蟲學專家陳心陶防治血吸蟲病的研究工作 [We definitely can eliminate snail fever: a report on epidemiologist Chen Xintao and his deworm research work], *Nanfang ribao* 南方日報 [Southern daily], June 4, 1956, 3.

worm education and propaganda among the masses in the endemic areas. Despite the achievements, however, their work “can hardly meet with the urgent need of mobilizing our masses.”⁷⁵

In 1956, when the Party interfered and escalated the deworm campaign, mobilizing the masses once again became the top priority on the deworm agenda. The challenges, however, were notable, given the fact that the transmission routine of the snail fever among the rural masses was a “seamless vicious circle.”⁷⁶ First, the matured larvae that cause the infection can only be observed in a laboratory with microscope. In other words, the danger was invisible for the peasants, and their negligible scientific knowledge made it difficult for them to understand why they could not go to their lands to continue farming as usual because of something that they thought “does not exist.” Second, as illustrated earlier, most of the patients belonged to the chronic stage after infection (stage two), which meant that they were largely asymptomatic or showed mild reactions. Many of the peasants did not know about their infection until they were forced to accept testing. Once they tested positive, however, peasants’ daily life would be greatly altered. Imagine if a “healthy” strong young man, also the only laborer in a household, tested positive for snail fever. He would be forced to pay for treatment and would be unable to continue farming, creating a significant financial burden for his family - meanwhile the patient would not even feel any symptoms at all.⁷⁷ “Every aspects of the deworm work - investigation, testing, treatment, and prevention - were essentially contradictory to the agricultural production,” a work report from the GHD illustrated in 1956. “Some farmers resolutely rejected any testing,

⁷⁵ GPA 317-1- 45-15~22, GHD, *Guangdongsheng sannianlai fangzhi xuexichongbing gongzuo zongjie baogao* 廣東省三年來防治血吸蟲病工作總結報告[Deworm work report of the past three years in Guangdong], May 14, 1956.

⁷⁶ GPA 317-1-45-9~14, GHD, *Chuanda zhonggong zhongyang fangzhi xuexichongbing jiurenxiaozu dierci kuodahuiyi jingshen tigang* 傳達中共中央防治血吸蟲病九人小組第二次擴大會議精神(提綱) [Conveying the principles of the second meeting of the NDNPLSG (outline)], 1956.

⁷⁷ In Maoist China, especially after the agricultural collectivization, farmers worked in production team and earned “labour voucher(工分).” If a household cannot finish the works assigned by the production team, their income would be impacted.

worrying about unable to pay for treatment and cannot do farming work once tested positive.”⁷⁸ In addition to the treatment work, the cumbersome prevention works - locating and eliminating the almost invincible snails, collecting feces, building hygiene and water infrastructures - were even more disfavored. Accepting treatment was cumbersome enough because of the financial burden and inability to work that came with it, but at least farmers did not need to do any physical labor. Prevention work, however, was equally time-consuming, impede agricultural production, and additionally, required massive physical labor. To make things worse, in contrast to treatment, prevention efforts can only be seen after a long period, which further contributed to the peasants' lack of participation. Together, all these factors made the deworm work especially unpopular in rural Guangdong.

Before the masses could be mobilized in the deworm campaign, they had to be given the answers to two questions: first, what is snail fever; second, how and why should it be eliminated? In order to provide satisfactory answers to these questions, each newly established local deworm institution formed their propaganda team (宣教組), comprised of 4-7 personnel, often with various backgrounds. For example, a propaganda team in Qingyuan county was comprised of five people, “including party members, earlier recovered patients, and local practitioners of Traditional Chinese Medicine,” according to a report of a local newspaper. This team shouldered various responsibilities, such as training other propaganda personnel, acting in deworm-related dramas, and drawing big-character posters and other propaganda publications. “We should admit that in this deworm campaign, propaganda plays a crucial part in the campaign,” the report summarized, “and their achievements are not quantifiable compare to other deworm works such as treatment.”⁷⁹

⁷⁸ GPA 317-1-45-31~37, GHD, *Guangdongsheng yijiu wuliu niandu fangzhi xuexichongbing gongzuo zongjie chugao* 廣東省1956年度防治血吸蟲病工作總結（初稿）[Guangdong deworm work report of 1956 (first draft)].

⁷⁹ Chuse de xuanjiao gongzuo 出色的宣教工作[Excellent work of deworm propaganda and education], GDSPLSG ed., *Guangdong xuefang jianbao* 廣東血防簡報 [Guangdong deworm brief report], March 3, 1957, 3.



Illustration 5: Local propaganda teams illustrating the transmission routine of snail fever. Huang Fei, *PCSGP*, 191.

The report also mentioned another interesting detail about the propaganda team. Before the Spring Festival, the most important traditional festival in China, Rongsheng production team, one of the production teams in Qingyuan county, did not finish their work of killing snails, and needed help from other production teams. It was raining heavily and families were preparing for the celebration of the Spring Festival, but the propaganda team still visited every single nearby production team, knocked on the door of every household, and successfully mobilized enough labor to finish the deworm work. Despite the potential exaggeration in propaganda materials, this case was a clear reflection of the crucial and diversified role that the propaganda group played at the grassroots level. The various backgrounds of the team members was a clear reflection of the aforementioned ambiguity and overlap within the three-in-one mode when it came to the grassroots level. Thanks to this intimate relationship, the team members were able

to get close to the rural masses, and became the backbone for the Party to carry out deworm education and propaganda work at the grassroots level.

As the report revealed, propaganda teams carried out their work through various methods. In addition to regular forms of propaganda such as holding meetings and drawing posters, deworm exhibition and deworm-related art performance remained notable. As Denise Ho argues in her *Curating Revolution*, in Maoist China, making an exhibition “was both mass education and mass mobilization.”⁸⁰ Deworm exhibitions were carried out by propaganda teams on tour, showing pictures, specimens, and models of snails and larvae to the masses. Occasionally, recovered patients were invited to give speeches. This was exactly what Ho describes as materializing and localizing the revolution, and making it intelligible at the grassroots level.⁸¹ As a part of the revolution enterprise, the seemingly abstract deworm campaign, along with the political metaphor and narrative behind it, were clearly manifested to the rural masses. The achievement of such exhibition was notable. “Using artifacts for education, especially by showing the larval with the microscope and presenting pictures of the late-stage patients, we successfully provided in-depth deworm education to our people,” a member of propaganda team wrote. “The exhibition provoked peasants’ anger and hatred to the disease, and motivated them to participate in the deworm work more consciously.”⁸² In addition, the deworm-related art performances - movies, folk songs, dramas - were also popular among the peasants, especially for those illiterate. When a propaganda team finished their drama performance in Hua county, Guangdong, a 60 years old woman commented, “people kept talking about snail fever, snail fever - what is

⁸⁰ Denise Y. Ho, *Curating Revolution: Politics on Display in Mao’s China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, 4-5.

⁸² Li Jinglian 李景廉, Yunyong xiaoxing zhanlanhui jinxing xuanchuan de tihui 運用小型展覽會進行宣傳的體會[Experiences of using small deworm exhibition for propaganda], GDSPLSG ed., *Guangdong xuefang jianbao* 廣東血防簡報[Guangdong deworm brief report], October 15, 1957, 2.

snail fever? I do not know. I found those meetings boring, and cannot read posters and slogans,” she complained. “After this drama, I finally understand what is snail fever.”⁸³

The hard works of the propaganda teams, however, could at best answer the questions of what snail fever was and how to eliminate it. For the troublesome “why” question, the team faced more challenges, and needed to provide stronger justifications to the masses. In earlier propaganda, enthusiastic team members tended to solely emphasize the imperativeness of deworm work, as if the campaign was the top priority, while all the other work - most importantly, agricultural production - could be ignore or left behind. Such propaganda was unrealistic and even somewhat disturbing, since participating in deworm works did not provide any income or food to the peasants, but rather cost time, labor, and money. In addition, when trying to stress the urgency of carrying out deworm work, team members often exaggerated the horror of snail fever, which brought pessimism among the peasants and further undermined the already weak confidence of eliminating the parasitic disease.⁸⁴

To overcome these problems, a new approach called *Suanzhang* (算賬) was gradually adopted by local propaganda teams. It can be roughly translated as “settling the account,” that is, clearly illustrating the advantages and disadvantages of participating in the deworm campaign to the peasants, usually by means of conversations. It was proved to be practical at the grassroots level, especially in persuading the peasants who were concerned about the potential cost of receiving treatment. As one of the propaganda team member Li Rongbin recalled, in order to persuade patients to go to the hospital, they “went to every single patients’ home to persuade them, using the *Suanzhang* method to illustrate why it was necessary to receive treatment.” The examples they used included patient Luo Huojiu, who was weak and thin before go-

⁸³ Zhou Guoying 周國盈, Huaxian xuefangzhan dali kaizhan xuanjiao gongzuo 花縣血防站大力開展宣教工作[Hua county deworm institution endeavored to carry out deworm propaganda and education], GDSPLSG ed., *Guangdong xuefang jianbao* 廣東血防簡報[Guangdong deworm brief report], September 1, 1957, 3.

⁸⁴ Bixu zuohao xuanjiao gongzuo 必須做好宣教工作 [Must work well on propaganda and education work], GDSPLSG ed., *Guangdong xuefang jianbao* 廣東血防簡報[Guangdong deworm brief report], October 15, 1957, 1.

ing to the hospital, and can at best earn 70 labor vouchers each month, which can barely sustain his living. After being cured, he was able to earn at least 120 labor vouchers each month, almost twice as much as earlier. “Using these examples to persuade the masses,” he summarized, “our comrades have gained notable achievements.”⁸⁵

Compare to the earlier propaganda, *Suanzhang* was more attractive to the rural masses because it contained less rhetoric and directly responded to peasants’ concern about their interests.⁸⁶ Meanwhile, a series of policies were gradually implemented to further ease peasants’ concerns. These policies included waiving the assigned farming works for peasants who tested positive for snail fever, and using low-interest loans to subsidize the financial burden of the masses because of the treatment. In addition, killing snails was also listed a part of agricultural work that counted toward the labor voucher.⁸⁷ Together, these policies largely eased the conflicts between deworm work and agricultural production, and successfully mobilized the rural masses into the operation of the three-in-one mode.

The initial practice of the three-in-one mode gained notable achievements; its internal conflicts, however, would gradually manifested in the subsequent practice. The propaganda efforts did mobilizing the masses into the deworm work, but such efforts were far from once and for all. The inertia in the local society still existed, while the propaganda work could, at best, persuaded the peasants to sacrifice their interests in a short period. Meanwhile, the equal but

⁸⁵ Li Rongbin 李榮彬, Xiangbanfa zhao qiaomen jiejué bingren ruyuan zhiliao de kunnan 想辦法找竅門 解決病人入院治療的困難 [Figure out ways to solve the problems that patients have for receiving treatment in hospital], GDSPLSG ed., *Guangdong xuefang jianbao* 廣東血防簡報 [Guangdong deworm brief report], November 22, 1957, 1.

⁸⁶ Similar cases of *Suanzhang* were ubiquitous in the mobilization at the grassroots level. For more examples, see Li Ziguang 李子光, Renhuazhan zenyang dongyuan bingren jinyuan 仁化站如何動員病人進院 [How did Renhua deworm institution mobilized the masses to the hospital], GDSPLSG ed., *Guangdong xuefang jianbao* 廣東血防簡報 [Guangdong deworm brief report], January 1, 1958, 2.

⁸⁷ Yang Bixia 楊碧霞, Mabaxiang zai kaizhan fangzhi gongzuozhong de jige wenti shi zenyang jiejuede 馬壩鄉在開展防治工作中的幾個問題是怎樣解決的 [How did Maba town deal with several problems in the deworm campaign], GDSPLSG ed., *Guangdong xuefang jianbao* 廣東血防簡報 [Guangdong deworm brief report], December 25, 1956, 4.

separate labor division between the Party and the technocrats was proved hard to maintain, and their conflicts inevitably outburst.

CHAPTER THREE

“Struggle Between Expert and Layperson”: The Transmutation of the Mode

Compiling Deworm Plan and the “Struggle Between Expert and Layperson”

The early practice of the three-in-one mode in the deworm campaign was largely successful. Inevitably, however, “things are changing (事情正在起變化).” Using this phrase as topic, Mao Zedong wrote a famous - or infamous - article that explicitly targeted the daring intellectuals who earlier expressed their criticism of the Party. The article symbolized the outburst of the Anti-Rightist Movement, and also marked the end of the aforementioned “ephemeral spring” for intellectuals, along with their intimate relation with the Party.⁸⁸ Although the Anti-Rightist Movement inevitably had negative impacts on the relationship between the Party and the technocrats - especially the experts - in the practice of the three-in-one mode, the conflicts between them had long existed, and the movement was, at best, a trigger for the outburst of struggle.

Although the struggle was intensive, it was limited within the leading sectors of the Party and the technocrats who had the capacity to determine the trajectory of the deworm campaign. Here, the hierarchical structure of the three-in-one mode started to manifest its impact on the mode’s operation: although the scale of the debate was limited, it still had a profound impact on the lower hierarchies, and profoundly changed the subsequent campaign. It was for this reason that this chapter largely jumps out of Guangdong, and tries to illuminate the origin and escalation of the debate, along with its consequences. Only in this way can we make sense of why Guangdong’s deworm campaign changed so profoundly after 1958.

⁸⁸ Mao Zedong 毛澤東, *Shiqing zhengzai qi bianhua* 事情正在起變化 [Things are changing], Zhonggong zhongyang wenzhan yanjiushi 中共中央文獻研究室 ed., *Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenzhan xuanbian* 建國以來重要文獻選編 [Selected important documents in the People’s Republic of China] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenzhan chubanshe, 2011), vol. 10, 233-240.

The Anti-Rightist Movement was a part of the broader transformation happening in the communist world in the mid-1950s. The Secret Speech that Nikita Khrushchev delivered in the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union shook people's belief in the communist enterprise. It led to a series of political turmoil in Eastern Europe, and also raised a heated debate among Chinese society. With great confidence of the Party's achievements in reestablishing order and consolidating legitimacy, however, Mao decided to launch a Rectification Movement, aiming at cultivating a speech-friendly environment for the Party to listen to critics from various aspects of the society. Mao's initial goal was to ease the social conflicts brought by a series of movements since the regime established, and provide a chance for those who lost interests and privileges in these movements to mediate their anger. But when intellectuals articulated their grievance to the Party without scruples and exceeded Mao and the Party's range of tolerance, Mao realized that these critics were directly targeting the Party's leadership and undermining its legitimacy. As a response to these critics, Mao launched the Anti-Rightist Movement to reconsolidate the Party's absolute authority, which characterized these daring intellectuals as "Rightist" and meted out punishments accordingly.⁸⁹

Among the grievances that the intellectuals articulated, their critique of "layperson leading experts" remained notable. Finding themselves under the surveillance of the illiterate or semi-illiterate Party cadres, intellectuals were upset about the ubiquitous Party control and the newly-established Red-over-Expert hierarchy. Once enthusiastically advocated of cooperating with the Communist Party, Qian Weichang, a prominent rocket scientist trained at California Institute of Technology, first articulated that "non-experts cannot lead the experts" in 1957. This famous

⁸⁹ Relevant discussions are more than extensive. For detailed illustration, see Daniel Leese, *Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in the Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), first and second chapter; Shen Zhihua 沈志華, *Chuzai shizi lukou de xuanze 處在十字路口的選擇: 1956-1957年的中國* [Choices in the Crossroad: China in 1956-1957] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2013)

quote widely represented many intellectuals' dissatisfaction, but it also made Qian one of the main targets of the Anti-Rightist Movement.⁹⁰

The conflicts between experts and layperson also existed in the deworm campaign. This conflict, however, largely happened within the leading sector of the Party and the experts, represented by Mao, the top leader of the Party; and Prof. Su Delong, the highest authority of deworm experts. Yu Shunzhang, Su's student, recorded his teacher's conversation with Mao at a conference:

Chairman Mao knew that Prof. Su Delong was a deworm expert, so he went to Su and asked: "Can we prevent and eliminate snail fever in three years?" Prof. Su said, "no." "How about five years?" Mao continued to ask. "No," answered Prof. Su. Mao was a bit angry, and kept asking, "how about seven to eight years?" The comrade who sat next to them noticed Mao's frustration, and poked Prof. Su. Prof. Su changed to a milder tone and answered, "let's try."⁹¹

The unpleasant conversation between Su and Mao represented the broader conflicts between experts and the Party concerning the leadership of the deworm campaign, or more specifically, concerning the deworm plan. Experts like Su did not show notable intention to directly challenge the Party's leadership of the campaign. They played the role as technical guiders as the Party wanted, but insisted on preserving their autonomy within the arena of science. The technical-demanding nature of the deworm campaign, however, meant that most of the problems in

⁹⁰ *Jianjue weihu dang dui kexugongzuo de lingdaoquan kexuejia zhiding zeng zhaolun qianweichang zhiding fandong kexue gangling de yinmou* 堅決維護黨對科學工作的領導權 科學家揭發曾昭抡錢偉長制定反動科學綱領的陰謀 [Firmly defend the Party's leadership over scientific works: Scientists revealing Zeng Zhaolun and Qian Weichang's conspiracy of compiling reactionary scientific outline], Xin Qinghua bianji weiyuanhui 新清華編輯委員會 ed., 捍衛高等教育和科學事業的社會主義方向 批判右派分子錢偉長的反黨反社會主義言行 [Defending the socialist direction of higher education and scientific enterprise, criticizing the anti-Party, anti-socialism speeches and actions of Rightist Qian Weichang] (Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe, 1957), 185-187.

⁹¹ Yu Shunzhang 俞順章, Qianli Danqi 千里單騎 [Riding the horse along for thousands of li], in *Sudelong jiaoshou danchen yibaizhounian jinian wenji* 蘇德隆教授誕辰一百週年紀念文集 [Collection in memorial of Prof. Su's 100 years old birthday] (Beijing: Dier junyi daxue chubanshe, 2006), 92. Similar record also appeared in Su's daughter's memoir.

the campaign - such as the necessary time for elimination - were essentially technical problems, while the campaign's political-motivated nature added more dynamics and complexities. For Su Delong, "how long does it take to eliminate snail fever" was purely a scientific problem, and he answered it solely based on his estimation as a professional. For Mao, however, this was a crucial political problem that was fundamentally important to his revolutionary blueprint, and he did not have much patience. Although Mao enjoyed a supreme statue in the socialist state, as a layperson, he frustratedly found himself in an absolute disadvantage position in his quarrel with Su. "We are afraid of professors, we are so afraid of them since we came into cities," Mao later complained in 1958. "We realized that they had so much knowledge, while we knew nothing at all. As Marxists, we are not afraid of imperialists, but we fear bourgeois professors so much...this is peculiar, and I cannot tolerant anymore."⁹² By virtue of their expertise, experts' opinions were naturally more authoritative than the Party's, which in turn unconsciously but notably undermined the Party's leadership to the campaign. This was essentially what Joel Andreas describes as the "competition between political capital and cultural capital."⁹³

The conflicts between experts and layperson had existed since the formation of the three-in-one mode, but they were hidden under the seemingly intimate cooperation between the Party and the experts. The Party was totally alien to the deworm works at the very beginning of the campaign, and needed to rely on the experts to make deworm plans. Meanwhile, the earlier friendly intellectual policies also helped to ease the potential conflicts. But when it came to the middle of 1957, after leading the campaign for more than one year and gaining notable achievements, the Party believed that it had accumulated enough experiences and confidence to independently carry out the deworm works. Encouraged by the success of the First Five Year Plan and motivated by the emerging idea of the Great Leap Forward in mid-1957, the Party wanted to speed up the deworm campaign, but this appeal faced pressures from the experts. Meanwhile,

⁹² Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao lilun yanjiushi 中共中央黨校理論研究室 ed., *Lishi de fengbei zhonghuarenmin gongheguo guoshi quanjian zhengzhijuan* 歷史的豐碑 中華人民共和國國史全鑒 1 政治卷 (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2005), 466.

⁹³ Joel Andreas, *Rise of the Red Engineers*, 34-36.

the outburst of the Anti-Rightist Movement also greatly undermined their relationship.⁹⁴ Driven by all these factors, when it came to the middle of 1957, the struggle between expert and layperson has inevitably erupted.

The timeline of the evolution of Party-expert relation in 1957 was more clearly revealed in a series of commentary articles that appeared in *People's Daily*. On January 22, a commentary article entitled “thoroughly prevent and cure snail fever” was published on the first page. It continued the Party’s earlier narrative, praising the achievements of the deworm campaign while simultaneously underscoring its current insufficiencies, and asserted that these problems could only be solved by “combining the masses and our scientific technique,” in order to achieve the ultimate victory.⁹⁵ When it came to May, however, a new commentary article has changed its title to “Using the force of masses to prevent the disease.” It laid most of the stresses on the labor-consuming prevention work, which relied mostly on launching large scale mass movements, while mentioning little if any about technocrats or scientific-related contents.⁹⁶

Things became even more dramatic in July 1957, when the speech of Li Dequan, then the Ministry of MPH, appeared in *People's Daily* in full text entitled “the Party’s leadership is indispensable to hygiene work.” In addition to summarizing the achievements and insufficiencies of the hygiene work, the end of the article deserves our special attention. “Lastly, we have to clearly understand that similar to other enterprises, our great achievements in hygiene arena are the result of relying on the Party’s leadership, and enforcing the Party’s policies,” Li asserted. “The Party can lead scientific work, can lead hygiene work, is absolutely true.” He then shifted his criticism to “some people” - mostly experts - who “wrongly believe that the Party knew nothing

⁹⁴ For detailed illustration on how the Anti-Rightist Movement was carried out within the science arena, see Cui Luchun 崔祿春, *Jianguo yilai zhongguo gongchandang keji zhengce yanjiu* 建國以來中國共產黨科技政策研究 [Study of the scientific policies] (Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 2002), 36-40.

⁹⁵ Chedi de fangzhi xuexichongbing 徹底地防治血吸蟲病 [Thoroughly prevent and cure snail fever], *Renmin ribao* 人民日報 [People’s daily], January 22, 1957, 1.

⁹⁶ Yong qunzhong liliang yufang jibing 用群眾力量預防疾病 [Using the force of masses to prevent the disease], *Renmin ribao* 人民日報 [People’s daily], May 5, 1957, 3.

about science and hygiene, therefore has no right to play its role as leadership...we must resolutely support the Party's leadership, and firmly fight back against various Rightists.”⁹⁷ One month before the article was published, the Anti-Rightist Movement had started, and Li's speech was largely a response to those “bourgeoisie experts,” especially within the hygiene arena, who articulated their grievance during the Rectification Movement.

In October 1957, conflicts between the Party and the hygiene field experts were brought to public and, not surprisingly, greatly escalated. Still in the *People's Daily*, the subject of attack shifted from implicitly “some people” to explicitly “Rightists in the hygiene field,” who used to be “rampant for a while, united with Rightists in other arenas, attacked and stigmatized the Party's policies and the achievements in hygiene works...They claimed that the Party knows nothing about science and hygiene, and therefore has no right to lead these works,” the article stated.⁹⁸ It was obvious that the debate and struggle between expert and layperson - specifically, the Party - had greatly intensified and become irreconcilable. In order to respond to critics from the grudging experts, the Party endeavored to legitimize its leadership by making comparison with the earlier regime. “Under the governance of the Nationalists, there was only one Central Hygiene Institute, with very few medical personnel and journals,” the article asserted. “After the liberation, we build up our own parasitic diseases research institute, epidemiology research institute, labor hygiene research institute and so on...with more than 3000 medical personnel shouldering their responsibility. How could our hygiene enterprise develop so rapidly without the socialist system and the Party's leadership?”⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Li Dequan 李德全, Weisheng gongzuo libukai dangdelingdao zaidiyijie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui disisici huiyi shang de fayan 衛生工作離不開黨的領導——在第一節全國人民代表大會第四次會議上的發言 [The Party's leadership is indispensable to hygiene work: a speech on the first National People's Congress, fourth conference], *Renmin ribao* 人民日報 [People's daily], July 12, 1957, 4.

⁹⁸ Kexue jishu de fazhan buneng tuoli zhengzhi cong weishengjie de fanyoupai douzheng shuoqi 科學技術的發展不能脫離政治——從衛生界的反右派鬥爭談起 [Politics are indispensable to the development of science and technology: starting from the Anti-Rightist Movement in the hygiene arena], *Renmin ribao* 人民日報 [People's daily], October 3, 1957, 3.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, 3.

The seemingly eloquent response from the Party was, in essence, weak and somewhat meaningless. Although the Party could use its powerful propaganda machine to harshly criticize the insubordinate Rightists, these experts still exclusively processed the necessary expertise for hygiene works, including the deworm campaign. In the Party's original design of the three-in-one mode, its role as leader and coordinator was not contradictory to the technocrats' role as technical guider, and the Party also did not have the intention to acquire the technologies directly. The Party wanted the technologies to function according to its will, but the objectivity of science made this assumption largely unrealistic, as the quarrel between Su and Mao revealed. And the Party also realized the irreconcilable tension between its leadership of the campaign and the experts who exclusively possessed expertise. Finding itself in the precarious position of layperson while simultaneously attempting to lead the campaign, the Party started to look for solutions to solve this "struggle between expert and layperson."

"Replace the White Flags with Red Flags": Readjusting the Power Structure of the Mode

The struggle between experts and the Party greatly challenged the legitimacy for the Party to lead the deworm campaign as layperson. As response, in addition to fully utilizing the propaganda machine to attack the insubordinate Rightist experts and reclaim its right to lead the campaign, the Party endeavored to control the necessary deworm expertise by differentiating the technocrat group into "experts" and "lower technicians." Launching a movement called "Replace the White Flags with Red Flags"(拔白旗插紅旗)," the Party instigated these lower technicians to struggle with the insubordinate experts, who used to be their teachers. By doing so, the Party successfully deprived the authority that these experts had by virtue of their expertise, took over the control of necessary deworm technologies, and consolidated its absolute leadership over the whole deworm campaign. As a result, the Party fundamentally changed the power structure of the three-in-one mode, which brought profound impact to the trajectory of the subsequent campaign.

As illustrated in the earlier chapter, the relationship between deworm experts and the Party has greatly deteriorated after the Anti-Rightist Movement in the middle of 1957. Meanwhile, the Party's intention of accelerating the deworm campaign also became notable. "Our estimated time for eliminating snail fever has greatly shorten, and all the concrete facts have resolutely refuted all the pessimistic and conservative thoughts. It is beyond doubt that we can accelerate the eliminating of snail fever," a commentary article in *People's Daily* stated in the February of 1958.¹⁰⁰ The deworm experts who insisted on rational and gradual approach of elimination, such as Su Delong, became the greatest obstacle for the acceleration of the campaign, which led to their ultimate split with the Party.

Raised by the NDNPLSG in a national deworm conference in February 1958, the principle of "leap forward greatly, work hard for three years, speed up the elimination of snail fever" was quickly conveyed to the provincial level.¹⁰¹ In March, the GDSPLSG convened a deworm conference, urging for the Great Leap Forward of Guangdong's deworm campaign to coincided with the ongoing national Great Leap Forward.¹⁰² The relatively lower degree of disease prevalence gave Guangdong's Party leaders great confidence, who later called for "eliminating snail fever in 1958."¹⁰³ Such a daunting and even unrealistic goal could only be achieved through launching large scale mass movements, but Guangdong's cadres also realized that the participation of technocrats were indispensable. "In order to achieve the goal of eliminating snail fever in Guangdong within one year," a newspaper ran by the GDSPLSG wrote, "in addition to the Party's leadership and relying on the masses, our technical personnel should also function as the

¹⁰⁰ Jiasu xiaomie xuexichongbing 加速消滅血吸蟲病 [Speed up the elimination of snail fever], *Renmin ribao* 人民日報 [People's daily], February 27, 1.

¹⁰¹ Shi Yali, *The campaign against snail fever in Jiangsu Province(1949-1966)*, 174.

¹⁰² *Guangdong xuefang tongxun* 廣東血防通訊 [Guangdong deworm communication], April 1, 1958, 6.

¹⁰³ Sihui Municipal Archive (hereafter SMA)111-1-29, GDSPLSG, *Zhuajin shijian buzhi guanche xiaomie xuexichongbing gongzuo* 抓緊時間佈置貫徹消滅血吸蟲病工作 [Quickly layout deworm works], 1958.

staff of deworm campaign, solving urgent technical problems.”¹⁰⁴ To achieve the goal of eliminating snail fever, it was not enough to only rely on a few elite scientists like Su Delong and Chen Xintao. For provincial and especially grassroots level, it was crucial to have a large group of lower technicians, who knew basic deworm skills and could put them into grassroots deworm practice. To satisfy the urgent demand, as a part of the Great Leap Forward in Guangdong’s hygiene arena, the GHD compiled an ambitious plan of “training 4000 high-level medical personnel within five years, and enlarge the total number to 6000,” which was twice as much as the current amount.¹⁰⁵

Training lower technicians has always been on the deworm agenda since the campaign was initiated by technocrats in 1951. From the earlier technocrat-dominated stage to the initial practice of three-in-one mode in 1956, this task was constantly underscored.¹⁰⁶ But it was only after the split between the Party and experts and the initiation of the Great Leap Forward that these lower technicians became the Party’s primary technical support in the campaign. As Joel Andreas illustrates, although communists who were “attempting to supervise non-Communist experts” could “formally impose their authority,” their ability to exercise leadership “was compromised by their lack of technical understanding.” And the long-term solution, Andreas asserts, was to train a new generation of technicians who “had expertise and were also committed Communists, that is, both Red and expert.”¹⁰⁷ Mostly trained by the deworm experts after the establishment of the socialist state, these lower technicians were grateful for the educational opportunities that the Party provided, and were generally more loyal to the communist regime com-

¹⁰⁴ Pinglun juezhan de yinian 評論：決戰的一年[Commentary article: A year of decisive battle], *Guangdong xuefang tongxun* 廣東血防通訊 [Guangdong deworm communication], April 1, 1958, 4.

¹⁰⁵ GPA 317-1-63-8~12, GHD, *Guangdongsheng 1958-1962 nian weisheng gongzuo dayuejin de chubuguihua* 廣東省1958-1962年衛生工作大躍進的初步規劃[The preliminary plan for the Great Leap Forward in Guangdong’s hygiene works], March 24, 1958.

¹⁰⁶ “We must train a large amount of experienced deworm personnel, and put them into the campaign.” GPA 317-1-47-117~121, GHD, *Guangdongsheng 1956 zhi 1960 nian xiaomie xuexichongbing guihua caoan* 廣東省1956年至1960年消滅血吸蟲規劃(草案) [Guangdong deworm plan (1956-1960)(draft)], March 1956.

¹⁰⁷ Joel Andreas, *Rise of the Red Engineers*, 49-50.

pared to their “bourgeois” teachers. They might not have the capacity to invent new technologies - compounding a new drug - as their teachers did, but their “red and expert” background ensured them to be simultaneously loyal to the Party and able to utilize existing deworm skills into grassroots deworm practice, which made them the perfect substitution for the disgruntled and insubordinate experts.

In the earlier deworm practice, although in different positions, the distinction between elite experts and lower technicians within technocrat group remain ambiguous. Shouldering different responsibilities, both experts and lower technicians diligently participated in the campaign. When the campaign progressed, however, friction appeared as the lower technicians demanded more power, which generated conflicts with their expert teachers. The Party astutely noticed this schism, and regarded it as a perfect chance to further differentiate the elite experts and the lower technicians.

As the top leader of the Party, Mao had constantly and publicly shown his predilection to the revolutionary youths compare to those well-educated elite intellectuals. In the Eighth Party Congress held in Chengdu in 1958, after illustrating the stories of Karl Marx who wrote the Communist Manifesto at the age of 29, Sakyamuni who found the Buddhism when he was young, and Lenin who created Bolshevism at the age of 31, Mao concluded that “many of the scholars and inventors created their paradigm and made contributions when they were young, ” when they were repressed and looked down upon by those prominent figures. “Listing so many examples,” Mao stated, “I am making the argument that young people can surpass the old people, and those with less knowledge and expertise can also surpass those with more.”¹⁰⁸

Mao’s intention of demoting these insubordinate experts was clearly shown in the deworm campaign. When the Great Leap Forward in the deworm campaign was launched in early 1958, the NDNPLSG had explicitly stated that “the bourgeoisie experts did not have much real knowl-

¹⁰⁸ Mao Zedong 毛澤東, *Zai bada erci huiyi shang de jianghua* 在八大二次會議上的講話 [Speech on the eighth Party congress, second conference], *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* 毛澤東思想萬歲 [Long live the Mao Zedong thought], 1967, 156-157.

edge, and some of our cadres were perplexed by their rhetoric. Regions that blindly believed in experts were regions that fell behind in the deworm campaign.” When it came to mid-1958, after the deworm forward enterprise gained notable but also dubious “achievements,” the NDNPLSG credited them with “breaking away with the superstition to the bourgeoisie experts, and cultivating a dare to think, dare to say, dare to do (敢想、敢說、敢做) style of communism.”¹⁰⁹ Stigmatized as “less in amount, slow in speed, low in quality, high in cost (少慢差費),” the gradual and rational approach of eliminating snail fever that the experts favored was stigmatized as the opposite of the Great Leap Forward principle.

In addition to further accelerating the process of replacing and downplaying the experts, echoing Mao’s speech, the Party launched the “Replace the White Flags with Red Flags” movement in mid-1958 that was aimed at “pulling out the bourgeoisie White Flags, and planting the proletarian Red Flags,” in other words, to let the young revolutionaries to surpass the old, “bourgeois” experts.¹¹⁰ As the director of NSRC, the highest deworm technical institution, Prof. Su Delong unfortunately became one of the four major “White Flags” within the hygiene arena. After the brave quarrel with Mao, still driven by his strong conviction in scientific principles, the ingenuous and honest scientist wrote a brief comment - “crazily exaggerate”(誇大狂) - on one of the reports by the NDNPLSG which unrealistically urged for the “leap forward” of the campaign.¹¹¹

The revolutionary youth who came up and resolutely “pulled up” this “Bourgeois White Flag” was Su’s student, Yu Shunzhang. At a hygiene conference held in May 1958 that specifically aimed at replacing the White Flags with Red Flags, Yu gave a speech entitled “Su Delong: The

¹⁰⁹ Shi Yali, *The campaign against snail fever in Jiangsu Province(1949-1966)*, 178.

¹¹⁰ Mao Zedong 毛澤東, Zai bada erci huiyi shang de jianghua 在八大二次會議上的講話 [Speech on the eighth Party congress, second conference], Mao Zedong sixiang wansui 毛澤東思想萬歲 [Long live the Mao Zedong thought], 1967, 80.

¹¹¹ Zhongguo kexue jishu xiehui 中國科學技術協會 ed., *Zhongguo kexue jishu zhuanjia zhuanlue yixue-bian yufangyixue Juan* 中國科學技術專家傳略 醫學編 預防醫學卷 [The biographies of Chinese scientists and experts (medical part)] (Beijing: Zhongguo kexuejishu chubanshe, 1993), 176.

Typical Figure of Bourgeoisie Medical Authority.” Similar to other revolutionary youth who harshly criticized the prominent figures in their fields, Yu blamed his teacher for claiming “the MPH was a bunch of layperson who know nothing about specific technologies.” Yu also seemed to consciously lay stress on criticizing Su for “monopolizing all the available resources.” In Yu’s account, in order to “exclusively claim the achievements of research and underscore his significance,” his teacher “never cooperate with other lower technicians, and exclude them from the research process” of compounding deworm-related drugs. Under the radical political atmosphere, Yu’s narrative was clearly exaggerated and with notable intention of political speculation, but the grievances regarding the lack of promoting chances revealed in his rhetoric was real and intriguing. Although received training from Prof. Su after 1949, Yu and his fellow revolutionary youth clearly realized that it was the Party that gave them the chance to be educated in New China. Instigated by the Party while simultaneously having their own agency and appeals, these lower technicians also consciously utilized their Red and Expert background as political capital to challenge their teacher, in return for greater resources and power.¹¹²

In sharp contrast with the precarious position of these experts, Yu and other revolutionary lower technicians began to replace their teachers and occupy significant positions as technical guiders in the further accelerated deworm campaign. This progressing transformation gave Xu Yunbei, then the Vice Minister of the MPH and also one of the nine members in the NDNPLSG, great confidence. Xu later gave a speech at the aforementioned hygiene conference. “Although these experts had some technical knowledges, they were on the wrong way and using wrong method, and therefore undermining our enterprise,” Xu criticized. “Then, why would it be a problem for us to leave this small group of ‘authorities’?” In addition, Xu enthusiastically illustrated, new medical forces are rapidly emerging, including a large amount of indigenous experts

¹¹² Yu Shunzhang 俞順章, *Zichan jieji yiyao quanwei de daibiao renwu sudelong* 資產階級醫藥權威的典型人物——蘇德隆 [Su Delong: The Typical Figure of Bourgeoisie Medical Authority], *Quanguo yiyao weisheng jishu geming jingyan jiaoliu dahui huikan* 全國醫藥衛生技術革命經驗交流大會匯刊 [Collection of the Conference for the National Hygiene Technological Revolution Communication] (Beijing: Renmin weisheng chubanshe, 1958), 73.

(土專家) and hygiene activists, which has grown into a technical team that was “both Red and Expert.” Relying on these politically loyal lower technicians as technical support, for the first time, the Party was able to take advantages in their debate with experts, and Xu was finally able to confidently assert that “our medical enterprise is totally fine without expert, and will absolutely fail without the leadership of the Party.”¹¹³

The hygiene conference in September largely determined the result of debate between layperson and expert, and Xu wrote another more significant commentary article in November 1958. It was published in *People's Daily*, and marked the end of this struggle and the Party's ultimate victory:

There were some bourgeoisie experts in hygiene arena, who believed that the snail fever could never be eliminated but at best be controlled. They asserted that eliminating snail fever was, in essence, a technical problem, and could only be solved by scientific methods. They claimed that they were the “expert,” and the Party was “layperson,” and the masses were even ignorant; therefore, they rejected the Party's leadership and did not believe in the power of the masses. Under the Party's leadership, the way to eliminate the parasitic disease is in sharp contrast with the experts'. Eliminating snail fever is a crucial political problem, and what determine its outcome are the Party's leadership and the power of the masses, rather than the "technical problems" as experts assert. Guided by this thought, the Party correctly raised the principle of active prevention and treatment, and aiming at eliminating snail fever with high speed, high quality, and low cost by launching various mass movements.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Xu Yunbei 徐運北, Po zichan jieji yiyao quanwei li wuchan jieji weisheng zhiqi quanguo yiyao jishu geming jingyan jiaoliu dahui zongjie baogao 破資產階級醫藥權威 立無產階級衛生志氣——全國醫藥衛生技術革命經驗交流大會總結報告 [Break the bourgeois medical authority and establish the proletarian medical spirit: the summary report of the Conference for the National Hygiene Technological Revolution Communication], *Quanguo yiyao weisheng jishu geming jingyan jiaoliu dahui huikan*, 385-386.

¹¹⁴ Xu Yunbei 徐運北, Zou xiaomie xuexichongbing de lu 走消滅血吸蟲病的路 [On the road of eliminating snail fever], *Renmin ribao* 人民日報 [People's daily], November 24, 1958, 6.

Here, by claiming that eliminating snail fever was essentially a political problem rather than a technical problem, Xu was making a fundamentally crucial point that successfully transformed the Party from the precarious position of “layperson” - who knows nothing about deworm technologies - to the advantage position of experts, who not just knowing politics but social problems and social solutions. This rhetoric also simultaneously deprived the technical experts’ authority and demoted them to the position of “layperson” where the Party frustratedly situated earlier.

For the first time since the onset of Party involvement in 1956, politics not only “motivated” the deworm campaign, it also controlled it. Through such a transformation, the Party successfully legitimized itself as the “expert” of the deworm campaign, who now had the absolute right to lead the campaign and determine its trajectory. Meanwhile, by differentiating the technocrat group, downplaying the experts and relying on the revolutionary lower technicians, the Party broke the power balance and restriction between the Party as leader and the technocrats as technical guider, successfully depriving the right for technocrats to raise any dissents and objections to the deworm plan. This fundamentally changed the power structure and the original design of the three-in-one mode. By doing so, the Party largely gave up the earlier attempt to compromise between its Marxist ideology and the practical need of relying on technocrats, transformed the technocrat group into its loyal vassal rather than allowed to have disputes, and consolidated its absolute and exclusive control over the whole campaign. Since 1958, the deworm campaign was carried out solely according to the Party’s revolutionary ideology, that was, as Xu stated, through “launching various mass movements.” Accordingly, in sharp contrast with the early-stage deworm campaign dominated by the professionals, science was deprived of role as the ultimate *Principle* to determine the trajectory of the campaign, and was equated with the relatively simple deworm technologies processed by lower technicians who were loyal to the Party’s leadership - in other words, science became the *method* to achieve the Party’s will.

As the last chapter shows, the transformation of the power structure of the three-in-one mode and the Party’s absolute control over the campaign brought profound impact to Guang-

dong's deworm practice. From late 1958 to the basic elimination of snail fever within the province in 1974, Guangdong's deworm campaign showed two notable characteristics: high-speed and volatility. These were the result of large-scale mass movements and the unstable, volatile politics that motivated the campaign.

CHAPTER FOUR

Politically-Oriented: The Mode Under the Party's Absolute Control

Pursuing High-Speed: The Deworm Mass Movement and Its Consequences

The end of struggle between experts and the Party did not mean the thorough abandonment of the three-in-one mode; rather, it went through a transformation of power structure and still functioned in the deworm campaign, but with notable differences compared to earlier practice. Claiming itself as an expert to lead the campaign and driven by its Marxist ideology, the Party relied on political methods - launching large-scale mass movements - to achieve the goal of eliminating snail fever. Such approach brought notable but unstable high-speed, while the periodical stagnation because of such instability was proved to be a greater obstacle for the campaign to be reactivated.

Throughout the deworm campaign, the significance of the masses in the three-in-one mode was steadily increasing. In contrast with the early-stage campaign in which the technocrats failed to mobilize the masses, the Party succeeded in doing so by relying on propaganda groups at the grassroots level. As illustrated earlier, during the initial practice of the three-in-one mode the Party endeavored to maintain a balance between mobilizing the masses and utilizing technocrats. "Last year, our deworm work gained notable achievements, by organizing the scientific forces and launching large scale mass movements," a document from the Council of State illustrated in 1957.¹¹⁵ When the debate between layperson and experts intensified a few months later, however, the Party started to emphasize the importance of mobilizing the masses

¹¹⁵ Guowuyuan guanyu xiaomie xuexichongbing de zhishi 國務院關於消滅血吸蟲病的指示 [The instruction of eliminating snail fever from the Council of State], Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi 中共中央文獻研究室 ed., Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian 建國以來重要文獻選編 [Selected important documents in the People's Republic of China] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2011), vol. 10, 185.

in order to reaffirm its ideology and to combat the insubordinate experts. The emphasis on relying on the masses reached to its first peak during the Great Leap Forward, when the Party deemed mass movements as the key to accelerating the campaign.

The significance of mass movements lies in the fact that it was the major way to eliminate snails, the only infection source of the parasitic disease. Eliminating snails was related to three aspects of works: locate the snails, kill snails through burning, burying or using drugs, and transforming the natural environment that was suitable for the snails to grow. Given the wide spreading and large amount of snails in Guangdong, launching mass movements became the only practical way to eliminate snails throughout the province.

According to different environmental factors, areas with snails in Guangdong can be classified as mountainous areas (5.25%) and water-grass areas (94.75%).¹¹⁶ For water-grass areas(草塘型地區), Liubo and Jingkou area remained significant. Together, they occupied more than 87% of the total areas with snail in Guangdong. Water-grass areas were largely uncultivated land. The periodical summer floods brought snails from other endemic areas, and when the flood ebbed in winter, snails remained, and the fertilized and damp soil became the paradise for them to grow and reproduce. In long-term, transforming the natural environment like Liubo and Jingkou was the most crucial prerequisite for the elimination of snails. It was driven by such consideration that in 1958, the GDSPLSG initiated its ambitious plan of building a series of water infrastructures to halt the periodical floods, and cultivated Liubo and Jingkou into arable land. As a part of the ongoing Great Leap Forward movement, ten of thousands of peasants were mobilized by the Party into the construction of dams and reservoirs, and gained notable achievements after a few years of hard works.¹¹⁷ “All the water-grass areas have been cultivated

¹¹⁶ Huang Fei, *PCSGP*, 38.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, 56.

into flat and arable lands,” a report on *People’s Daily* described the transformation of Jingkou enthusiastically in 1973, “and peasants started to plant rice, peanuts and sugarcanes on it.”¹¹⁸



Illustration 6: Peasants building water infrastructures. Huang Fei, *PCSGP*, 192.

In addition to the enterprise of transforming Liubo and Jingkou, mass movements were also carried out in other endemic areas. Due to the lack of oral interviews with local peasants, the degree to which the local propaganda teams changed their attitude regarding the deworm campaign remained unclear. Most of the accessible sources during the Great Leap Forward period is considerably dubious, either propaganda sources, newspaper reports, or internal work reports from local deworm institutions. Although these sources all rhetorically and dubiously pro-

¹¹⁸ Caokuang piao daoxiang feixu bian xincun guangdongsheng sihuixian jingkou dadui xiaomie xuexi-chongbing hou de xinbianhua 草壙飄稻香，廢圩變新村——廣東省四會縣逕口大隊消滅血吸蟲病後的新變化 [Water-grass areas have planted rice, and abandoned land have become new villages: the new change happened in Jingkou, Guangdong after the elimination of snail fever], *Renmin ribao* 人民日報 [People’s daily], October 21, 1973, 3.

claiming how the masses enthusiastically and wholeheartedly participated in the deworm campaign, it would be equally biased to state that the propaganda team's effort was totally in vain. What deserves more attention, however, is how the deworm rhetoric started to emphasize the crucial role of the mass movement. Thanks to the efforts of carrying out deworm education in schools, students became one of the main participant in addition to peasants.¹¹⁹ In Zhang city, for example, a mass movement of eliminating snails was comprised of around 600 students and 1000 peasants, who “worked day and night for 40 days, from 5am in the morning to 12pm at night,” as a local newspaper reported.¹²⁰ In another endemic area, Maba county, 600 students from middle and primary schools “started a labor competition of killing snails in high spirit,” and “gained great achievements in the deworm campaign.”¹²¹ In addition to newspapers, similar accounts appeared in various local archives. “Thanks to our deworm education, students knew that killing snails was a glory task and had great motivation to participate,” a cadre in Renhua county wrote in report.¹²²

Although mass movements became the main approach for carrying out deworm works, the indispensable role that technocrats played was still constantly highlighted during the deworm Great Leap Forward. But after the struggle between the Party and experts, the latter almost disappeared in the deworm propaganda. The aforementioned dispute largely happened at the national level and among a limited number of personnel, but it still inevitably influenced the de-

¹¹⁹ Zhonggong guangdong shengwei fangzhi xuexichongbing qirenxiaozu guanyu xuexichongbing yiqu zhongxiaoxuexiao kaizhan xuanchuan jiaoyu gongzuo de tongzhi 中共廣東省委防治血吸蟲病七人小組關於血吸蟲病疫區中小學校開展宣傳教育工作的通知 [Notification by the GDSPLSG regarding carrying out propaganda and education works among schools in endemic areas], GDSPLSG ed., *Guangdong xuefang jianbao* 廣東血防簡報 [Guangdong deworm brief report], December 25, 1956, 1.

¹²⁰ Quanjian zhongxuesheng kuzhan sishitian xiaomie 63.1% zhangshi renminggongshe erqianduoming dajun touru dierci mieluojuedou 全縣中學生苦戰40天消滅釘螺63.1% 樟市人民公社二千多名大軍投入第二次滅螺決鬥 [Students in the county fought hard for 40 days and eliminated 63.1% of snails, two thousand members in the People's Commune in Zhang city participated in the second battle against the snails], *Qujiang ribao* 曲江日報 [Qujiang daily], November 24, 1958, 3.

¹²¹ Maba 600 duo shisheng weijian dingluo 馬壩600多師生圍殲釘螺 [600 students and teachers sieged snails in Maba], *Qujiang ribao* 曲江日報 [Qujiang daily], November 24, 1958, 3.

¹²² RMA S1.1-05-07, Renhua deworm institution 仁化縣血吸蟲病防治站, *Shiyuefen gongzuo huibao* 十月份工作匯報 [Work reports of October], 3.

worm work at provincial and below levels, which was another vivid example of how the hierarchical structure of the three-in-one mode impacted its operation. Although the tension between the Party and the deworm experts was relatively less severe in Guangdong, the operation of the GSRC was still notably impacted.¹²³ In contrast, lower technicians at the grassroots level became the new representative of technocrat group. In Renhua county, for example, when doing testings, lower technicians “worked from 9am to 3 am...have less than 6 hours of sleep each day, and did not even have time to take a bath.”¹²⁴ Another nurse, Yang Bixia, being mocked by the masses as “shit collector” because of collecting feces for testing, successfully finished her works by patiently educating peasants and building a good relationship with them.¹²⁵ All these reports underscored the intimate relationship between lower technicians and the masses, and emphasized how these technicians helped to better carry out mass movement.

Statistics also corresponded with the aforementioned narratives. In 1958-1959, Guangdong spent close to 8.9 million work days on deworm campaign, in sharp contrast with around 70000 work days from 1956-1957. And the achievements were also notable: in 1960, the areas with snails in Guangdong dropped 75% compare to 1958.¹²⁶ Despite the exaggeration of rhetoric regarding the masses’ attitude and the actual amount of working days, we can assert that the peasants and students, wholeheartedly or somewhat reluctantly, did participated in the mass movements, at least during 1958-1959, when the earlier efforts of local propaganda teams started to show. These accounts and statistics clearly revealed the high-speed of the campaign when it was under the Party’s absolute leadership.

¹²³ Founded in 1956, the GSRC normally elects its own committee members every years. But after the first election in 1957, it did not elect new committee members until 1962, and the earlier director, epidemiologist Chen Xintao was also replaced by the minister of GHD. Meanwhile, the amount of researches that the GSRC conducted also reduced notably in 1958-1962. Huang Fei, *PCSGP*, 19-20 about the structure of the GSRC; and 163-164, about the researches.

¹²⁴ RMA S1.1-05-07, Renhua deworm institution 仁化縣血吸蟲病防治站, Shiyuefen gongzuo huibao 十月份工作匯報 [Work reports of October], 6.

¹²⁵ Yiguan anxin reai yufang gongzuo de yangbixia tongzhi 一貫關心、熱愛預防工作的楊碧霞同志 [Comrade Yang Bixia who always care about and keen on prevention works], GDSPLSG ed., *Guangdong xuefang jianbao* 廣東血防簡報 [Guangdong deworm brief report], September 1, 1957, 3.

¹²⁶ Huang Fei, *PCSGP*, 48-49.

Large scale mass movement and the high-speed it brought, however, were at cost of altering the daily routine and social order. Sociologist Zhou Xueguang defines “movement-style of governance(運動式治理)” in China as “temporary halts to the routinized operation of bureaucratic system, replacing it with top-down, political mobilization to utilize every possible resources, in order to finish a specific task at a specific moment.” He also points out, however, that such governance was “periodical and unsustainable,” and was likely to lead to “the danger of derauling the whole movement.”¹²⁷ What Zhou describes was exactly what happened in Guangdong’s deworm campaign. In Qingyuan county, for example, after the mobilization of local propaganda team, masses were “high in spirit,” who “halted fishing and other production works for a week” and “carried out deworm work from 4am in the morning to 11pm at night.”¹²⁸ The report was intended to show the active participation of the masses, but it also revealed how such deworm mass movement impacted the operation of the local society. Partly because of realizing the unsustainability of mass movements and partly because of the political pressure brought by the Great Leap Forward, local cadres wanted to achieve the goal of eliminating snail fever as soon as possible. Such a blind pursuit of high-speed, however, derailed the campaign to a large extent, and led to disastrous results.

The most notable example of pursuing high-speed was in compiling the deworm plan. Without the “impediment” of the insubordinate experts, when it came to 1959, the earlier seven year deworm plan compiled in 1957 was dramatically shortened to “basically eliminate snail fever before the national holiday (October 1).”¹²⁹ Accordingly, in order to pursue higher speed of treatment, Guangdong adopted the notorious “20 Ways of Antimonial Treatment Technologies

¹²⁷ Zhou Xueguang 周雪光. *Zhongguo guojia zhili de zhidu luoji yige zuzhixue yanjiu* 中國國家治理的制度邏輯：一個制度學研究 [The logic of China’s state govern: an institutional research] (Shanghai: Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian shudian, 2017), 125.

¹²⁸ Zhu Qigui 朱其桂, *Qingyuan xuefangzhan zai mieluo yundong zhong xuanchuan gongzuo de zuofa* 清遠血防站在滅螺運動中宣傳工作的做法 [How Qingyuan deworm institution carried out deworm propaganda], GDSPLSG ed., *Guangdong xuefang jianbao* 廣東血防簡報 [Guangdong deworm brief report], January 1, 1958, 2.

¹²⁹ Huang Fei, *PCSGP*, 169.

Reform(錫劑治療技術革新二十條)” raised by leap forward “activists” in Hunan, another endemic province.¹³⁰ Replacing the earlier treatment handbook compiled by deworm experts, the so-called treatment reform was essentially a dangerous attempt by ill-informed but ambitious lower technicians to shorten those seemingly unnecessary but crucial procedures of treatment, such as physical examination, checking patients’ medical history, and providing disinfection after injection.¹³¹ Enforcing this treatment reform list, the treatment routine in Guangdong was drastically - even somewhat horrifyingly - shortened, from the earlier 19 days (now referred as long-term treatment) to 4 days, 2 days, and even 4 hours. Guangxi county, an endemic county in Guangdong, explicitly called for “mainly using 4 days and 2 days treatment, audaciously using 4 hours treatment, while avoid using long-term treatment.” Not surprisingly, it gained notable “achievement” of “treating 9306 patients” within one year, with only 1508 patients receiving the relatively safer 19 days long-term treatment.¹³² The short-term treatments, however, were proved to have extreme side-effects and notably raised the death rate. Given the large amount of personnel - more than 56000 - who received short-term treatment, the actual number of dead may never be known.¹³³

The seemingly miraculous but essentially dubious achievements blindfolded many local cadres. At the end of 1958, Hua county, Yingde county, and Zengcheng county had declared the total elimination of snail fever. Accordingly, they ended the campaign and dissolved their deworm institutions. None of these three counties, however, ultimately eliminated the parasitic

¹³⁰ Antimony is the major element in the deworm drug. It can effectively kill larval within the human body, but with notable side-affects.

¹³¹ Shi Yali, *The campaign against snail fever in Jiangsu Province(1949-1966)*, 179-181. In addition, it also speeded up the necessary time for injecting antimonial drugs, which made it more likely to bring notable side-affects; and lower the criteria for receiving treatment, incorporating those earlier excluded people such as elders or people with specific diseases, who suffered from notable higher risks.

¹³² SMA 1-1, Guangxi Deworm Institution: *Guangsixian fangzhi xuexichongbing gongzuo ziliao* 广四县防治血吸虫病工作资料 [Deworm materials of Guangxi county], March 4, 1959.

¹³³ Huang Fei, *PCSGP*, 76.

disease until 1985.¹³⁴ Similar to these three counties, the whole deworm campaign in Guangdong was largely terminated in 1960, which brought a profoundly negative impact. The aforementioned days spending on deworm work drastically dropped to 60000 during 1960-1963, in sharp contrast with 8.9 million in 1958-1959; in addition, in 1962, the areas with snails in Guangdong also notably increased to twice as much as 1960.¹³⁵ As a result, when the campaign reappeared on the local Party's agenda in 1963 because of the growing deworm pressure, cadres and masses frustratedly found that the earlier termination of the campaign brought an even greater degree of disease prevalence compare to pre-1958.¹³⁶ "Facing new difficulties, many cadres and masses were notably pessimistic and did not have enough confidence for the ultimate victory of the campaign," a report from the GSRC wrote in 1963.

When Xu Yunbei rhetorically claimed victory against the "less in amount, slow in speed, low in quality and high in cost" experts in 1958, he listed mass movements as the Party's "magic weapon" to win the victory of the deworm campaign. Mass movement was, nevertheless, one of the crucial factors for the ultimate success of the deworm campaign, as the dilemma that the GSRI faced from 1951-1956 clearly showed. But when the deworm experts were deprived the right to raise any dissents, solely relying on mass movement and blindly pursuing high-speed brought great cost to the campaign, as the radical reform of treatment revealed. In addition, the unsustainability of mass movement also led to periodical stagnation of the campaign, and remobilizing the masses after the first failure proved to be even harder. Facing such a dilemma, deworm propaganda once again became the main approach for mass mobilization, but showing distinct characteristics of combining the notable, ongoing political events.

¹³⁴ For detailed illustration, see *Huaxianzhi* 花縣志[Hua county gazetteer] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1999), 805-806; *Yingde xianzhi* 英德縣志[Yingde county gazetteer] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1995), 777; and *Zengcheng xianzhi* 增城縣志[Zengcheng county gazetteer] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1995), 839.

¹³⁵ Huang Fei, *PCSGP*, 48-49, 54.

¹³⁶ GPA 317-1-128-44~53, GSRC: *Guanyu dangqian xuexichongbing fangzhi gongzuo de jiancha baogao* 關於當前血吸蟲病防治工作的檢查報告[Report of the current deworm work], June 30, 1964.

Volatility: Political Events and the Evolving Deworm Rhetoric

In addition to relying on mass movements, the Party's victory against a small group of in-subordinate experts in 1958 brought another notable consequence: the campaign had become a "political problem," and accordingly, politics became the only driving force of the campaign. Such a driving force was essentially Mao's attention, and his attention could bring massive impetus and resources to the campaign, as the escalation of the campaign in 1956 showed. But Mao's attention could easily shifted as his agenda was filled up with other issues - dealing with the split with the Soviet Union, recovering the country from the Great Famine - that were far more imperative and had a higher priority than the deworm campaign. Additionally, Mao had also taken a step back from the direct leading position partly because of the disastrous outcome of the Great Leap Forward, which further undermine the deworm campaign's priority on the state's agenda.

Facing such a competition, when the campaign was stagnated and faced the urgent need to be reactivated, it tended to seek impetus from ongoing, notable political events to legitimize its existence, in return for more resources. These political events, however, were also constantly evolving as Mao's attention shifted, adding more volatility to the deworm campaign. Such effort of legitimization was most clearly shown in the rhetoric surrounding the deworm campaign, which appeared in various official documents, newspapers and other propaganda sources. Examining its chronological evolution since late 1958 sheds lights on the volatility of the deworm campaign when it was under the Party's absolute leadership.

Deworm propaganda during the early-stage campaign was carried out by technocrats at the GSRI. What distinguishes the earlier deworm propaganda with the later practice was its apolitical nature. A work report from GSRI in 1953, for example, listed several components of deworm propaganda, including the basic transmission routine of snail fever, the meaning of accepting testing, the negative effects that snail fever had on human, and the major ways of pre-

vention.¹³⁷ Before the Party intervened and politicized the campaign in 1956, the deworm propaganda carried out by technocrats purely served the purpose of eliminating snail fever - or, occasionally, for “agricultural production” and “the health of our people” - with very little affiliated political meaning or metaphor. Similarly, deworm rhetoric in work reports and other documents during this period was also largely dispassionate.

When the Party interfered in the campaign in 1956, mobilizing the masses became one of the top priorities. Accordingly, deworm propaganda started to lie in the middle of the interaction between the Party and masses at the grassroots level. From various work reports and newspapers, it was obvious that deworm rhetoric started to incorporate the principles and policies regarding the campaign from the central committee of the Party. “Can we eliminate snail fever? Of course we can,” a published deworm work report asserted. “Eliminating snail fever is a political task raised by the central committee of CCP, and it has to be finished.”¹³⁸ From 1956 to mid-1957, most of the deworm rhetorics highlighted Mao and the Party’s firm determination of eliminating the parasitic disease in order to underscored the urgency of the campaign and to provide confidence to the audience. This could be deemed as the initiation of the combination of deworm rhetoric and the ongoing, notable political events.

Such a combination became pronounced when the Great Leap Forward of the deworm campaign was initiated in early 1958. After Liu Tianfu, then a member of the Party committee of Guangdong, gave a speech entitled “relying on the masses, enhance our spirit, fighting for the basic elimination of snail fever this year and the thorough elimination next year” on a deworm conference in March 1958, the “leap forward’ enthusiasm of the delegates was sparked. “We assure that we will uphold the revolutionary spirit of leaping forward,” a delegate from Renhua

¹³⁷ GSRI: *Gongzuo zongjie yijiu wusan nian shangbannian* 工作總結（一九五三年上半年）[Work summary: the first half of 1953], *Xuexichong ziliao shang* 血吸蟲資料（上）[Schistosomiasis Materials (First volume)], 1953, 12.

¹³⁸ Shaoguan diwei pizhuan fangzhi xuexichongbing wurenxiaozu guanyu zhuanqu diyici xuefang gongzuo huiyi de baogao 韶關地委批轉防治血吸蟲病五人小組關於專區第一次血防工作會議的報告 [Shaoguan Party committee approve and forward the report of first deworm conference in Shaoguan district issued by the deworm five-person small group], GDSPLSG ed., *Guangdong xuefang jianbao* 廣東血防簡報 [Guangdong deworm brief report], July 20, 1957, 1.

county demonstrated, “and resolutely implement the deworm instruction from the center committee, in order to completely eliminate snail fever in Renhua before 1958.”¹³⁹ Similar rhetoric soon became even more ubiquitous after the Party won its struggle with the experts in late 1958. After treating 1460 patients in 10 days, Renhua county became the new model for the Great Leap Forward. “With the courage of breaking waves and a thunder-like power,” a local newspaper rhetorically illustrated, “people in the county march forward again and again, and aim at resolutely, thoroughly eliminate snail fever with the shortest time.”¹⁴⁰

The disastrous result of such an unrealistic Great Leap Forward has been illustrated earlier, and the wide-spread pessimism at the grassroots level became the greatest challenge that the Party ever faced since it interfered in the campaign in 1956. “Compared with 1958 and 1959, most of our deworm cadres and technicians lagged notably behind, in terms of discipline, work quality and thoughts,” a deworm work report from Renhua county wrote in 1962, “specifically, they were frustrated by the fact that they have been working so hard for three years, but still cannot eliminate the disease. They lost confidence, and doubted when and whether the deworm campaign would end.”¹⁴¹ The earlier deworm propaganda and mobilization was nevertheless effective, but not once and for all. Eliminating snail fever was a time-consuming and labor-demanding enterprise that required constant efforts and attention, while the periodical stagnation brought by the unsustainability of mass movements could easily negate all the earlier achievements, which further deepened the long-existed pessimism.

¹³⁹ Meng Shilin 孟世林, Kuaima jiabian juezhan yinian chedi jianmie xuexichongbing 快馬加鞭，決戰一年，徹底殲滅血吸蟲病 [Speed up and fight the decisive battle in one year, to completely eliminate snail fever], GDSPSLG ed., *Guangdong xuefang tongxun* 廣東血防通訊 [Guangdong deworm communication], April 1, 1958.

¹⁴⁰ Renhua xiaomie xuexichongbing gongzuo dayuejin shitian zhiliao bingren 1460 ming 仁化消滅血吸蟲病工作大躍進 十天治療病人1460名 [The treatment work in Renhua experienced a Great Leap Forward, with 1460 patients received treatment], *Shaoguan ribao* 韶關日報 [Shaoguan daily], December 12, 1958, 2.

¹⁴¹ RMA S1.1-07-02, *Sanyuefen fangbing zhibing qingkuang huibao* 三月份防病治病情況匯報 [The report of preventing and curing snail fever in March], 7.

When it came to 1963, facing the imperative need to reactivate the campaign, Ke Qingshi, then the leader of the NDNPLSG, called for “reestablishing various levels of deworm leadership small groups and technical institutions” in the ninth national deworm conference, or in other words, reestablished the three-in-one mode. In his speech, Ke consciously combined the deworm campaign with the ongoing Socialist Education Movement, a movement launched by Mao aiming at reestablish faith in socialism after the disastrous Great Famine, in which 30 million people died.¹⁴² Similarly, such an effort of rebuilding people’s faith in the deworm campaign also appeared in Guangdong’s deworm propaganda, and successfully “converted the pessimism among the cadres and the masses.”¹⁴³ Only few years after the reactivation of the campaign, however, the turmoil brought by the outburst of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 once again halted the campaign, with Sihui and other local deworm institution dissolved.¹⁴⁴

When the initial chaos ceased, Guangdong’s deworm campaign gradually rehabilitated in 1967, with the deworm rhetoric consciously linking the campaign with the ongoing Cultural Revolution. “Through creatively learning and practicing Mao Zedong Thought,” wrote a work report, “our cadres and deworm technicians revolutionized their thoughts and the deworm campaign. With the impetus of the great Cultural Revolution, our deworm work gained notable achievements.”¹⁴⁵ This was another example of how deworm rhetoric consciously sought impetus from the current political events in order to legitimize its existence.

When it came to 1968, Liu Shaoqi, then the president of the People’s Republic of China, was stigmatized by Mao as “the Capitalist Roader” and excluded from the Party. This new political event was soon adopted in the deworm propaganda, while Liu and the earlier insubordinate

¹⁴² GPA 317-1-128-44~53, NDNPLSG, *Guanyu dijiuci quanguo fangzhi xuexichongbing gongzuo huiyi de baogao* 關於第九次全國防治血吸蟲病工作會議的報告 [Report on the ninth national deworm conference], 1963.

¹⁴³ RMA S1.1-09-03, *Yijiu liusannian shangbannian gongzuo zongjie* 一九六三年上半年工作總結 [Work summary of the first half of 1963], 7

¹⁴⁴ Huang Fei, *PCSGP*, 23.

¹⁴⁵ GPA 317-1-146-15~19, *Guangdongsheng 1966 nian fangzhi xuexichongbing gongzuo zongjie* 廣東省1966年防治血吸蟲病工作總結 [Guangdong deworm work summary of 1966], April 17, 1967.

experts became the scapegoat for the earlier setback of the deworm campaign during the radical Great Leap Forward. “During the Great Leap Forward, Guangdong’s revolutionary people highly raised the red banner of the Mao Zedong thought, actively participated in the deworm campaign, and gained notable achievements,” an official document wrote in 1968. “But Liu Shaoqi boasted his revisionism deworm policies, relying on the ‘foreign experts’(洋專家) and halting the mass movement. As a result, snail fever was not eliminated in our province, and even spread to Nanhai and Shunde county.”¹⁴⁶ Representing the bureaucratic system, Liu was known for his preference on the technocratic notion of governance. Such notion was in sharp contrast with Mao’s revolutionary ideology, which led to their ultimate split during the early years of the Cultural Revolution. Ironically, it was largely because of the blindness of mass movement that led to the stagnation of deworm campaign, while such “revisionist deworm policies” could have mediated the radical approach and saved the campaign from being derailed.

Wei Wenbo, the ex-director of the NDNPLSG, became another scapegoat after his political career ended during the Cultural Revolution. Similar to his superior Liu Shaoqi, Wei was accused of downplaying the significance of mass movements, and highlighting science and technology.¹⁴⁷ “From 1956 to 1957, when bourgeois academic authorities Su Delong and Chen Fangzhi fiercely attacked the Party’s leadership and rejected mass movements,” a document summarizing Wei’s accusations wrote, “Wei even dared to say ‘professors, do not be afraid, you may raise your dissents.’”¹⁴⁸ By blaming Liu, Wei, and other deworm experts, the Party was able

¹⁴⁶ GPA 317-1-152-79, The Production Team of the Revolutionary Committee in Guangdong 廣東省革命委員會生產組, *Guanyu sanniannei xiaomie xuexichongbing de tongzhi* 關於三年內消滅血吸蟲病的通知 [Notification on eliminating snail fever in three years], November 14, 1968.

¹⁴⁷ Here, Wei used an intriguing term *Da hulong* (大呼隆), or “swarm,” to describe mass movement. As a dialect term, it is really difficult to find an appropriate translation in English. What Wei was trying to describe was how the masses disorderedly crowded in the deworm campaign, randomly worked for a while with no clear labor division or object, and soon disorganized with at best very little achievement. To pursue high-speed and satisfied the need of propaganda, such approach was ubiquitous at the grassroots level.

¹⁴⁸ RMA S1.1-12-06, *Da pantu Wei Wenbo pohuai xuefang gognzuo zuixing zhailu gong dapipan cankao* 大叛徒魏文伯破壞血防工作罪行摘錄（供大批判參考） [The great traitor Wei Wenbo’s accusation for undermining the deworm campaign (for reference of criticizing)], December 1969.




Illustration 7: The notification for reactivating the deworm campaign. Similar format was adopted in other provincial and grassroots level documents.

to clean up the stains on its leadership brought by the earlier failure of the campaign, and provided a new justification for it. This was a smart tactic through which the Party was able to re-consolidate its authority by claiming that it “never made a mistake,” therefore re-legitimizing its leadership, and remobilizing the masses into the deworm campaign.

Similar combinations of deworm propaganda and the ongoing political events became more obvious when Mao’s personality cult played a part in it. In 1969, in order to reactivate the deworm campaign, the central committee of the CCP issued a notification convening all the endemic provinces to have a national deworm conference, and Mao wrote two characters - do it (照办) - on this documents. Ironically, by virtue of Mao’s personality cult which reached its peak during the early years of the Cultural Revolution, these two characters became the most significant impetus of the deworm campaign in this period. Daniel Leese illustrates how the emphasis of the Mao cult shifted from his rhetoric to his icons, including statues, badges, and images,

from mid-1967 onward.¹⁴⁹ In the case of the deworm campaign, Mao's rhetoric - the two characters - seemed to be iconized, appearing on every deworm report and document with large size and notable color, as a symbol of legitimizing the deworm campaign.¹⁵⁰ In addition, this reductive form of "do it" instruction was constantly underscored at the grassroots propaganda. "The county revolutionary committee seriously implemented our great leader Chairman's Mao's 'do it' instruction, mobilized the masses and carried out 11 deworm mass movements," wrote another deworm work report.¹⁵¹ In 1974, when the decade-long Cultural Revolution came close to its end, deworm rhetoric again combined itself with the ongoing Criticizing Lin Biao and Criticizing Confucius Movement and the Learn From Dazhai Movement.¹⁵²

Although the notable political events throughout the Cultural Revolution was volatile and hard to follow, what remained stable in the deworm rhetoric was the constant emphasis on Mao's earlier poetry of *Farewell to the God of Plague* and the stresses on relying on mass movements. Through constant effort to kill snails and to provide treatments, when it came to 1974, the areas with snail in Guangdong dropped 99.33% compared to 1958, and achieved the goal of basic elimination of snail fever.¹⁵³

Despite the unrealistic goal of eliminating snail fever in 1959 during the Great Leap Forward, the mildest deworm plan compiled in 1956 predicted the elimination within seven years, with "one year of preparation, four years of hard work, and two years of consolidation," in other

¹⁴⁹ Daniel Leese, *Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in the Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 149.

¹⁵⁰ RMA S1.1-12-08, Zhonggong zhongyang zhuanfa guanyu nanfang shisan shengshiqu xuexichongbing fangzhi gognzuo huiyi de qingkuang baogao de tongzhi 中共中央轉發<關於南方十三省市區血吸蟲病防治工作會議的情況報告>的通知 [The central committee of the CCP forward the report of the conference comprised of thirteen provinces, cities and districts in southern China regarding deworm work], 1969.

¹⁵¹ GPA 317-1- 176-59, *Qudong jinchun xuefang gongzuo jinzhan de qingkuang* 去冬今春血防工作進展的情況 [The progress of deworm work in last winter and this spring], April 7, 1972.

¹⁵² GPA 317-1-214-92, *Wosheng chunji xuefang gongzuo qingkuang* 我省春季血防工作情況 [The situation of our province's deworm work in spring], April 18, 1974.

¹⁵³ Huang Fei, *PCSGP*, 53. It was not until 1985 that the snail fever was completely eliminated in Guangdong.

words, before 1963.¹⁵⁴ While in reality, since the campaign was politicized by the Party in 1958, the periodical stagnation brought by the unsustainability of mass movement and the volatility of politics in Maoist China even outweighed the high-speed that the mass movements brought, and significantly slowed the campaign down for more than a decade, let alone the high cost of various resources. The repetition of the campaign reveals the internal flaws of relying on politics as its impetus. As Lai Jingping argues, “such political mechanism - relying on the attention of the Party as impetus - is internally problematic, which means that once the Party’s attention shifts, the campaign loses its motivation.”¹⁵⁵ It was after the end of the Maoist era, when a routinized, stabilized bureaucratic system gradually established and incorporated the deworm work into its agenda, that the goal of *Farewell to the God of Plague* was finally achieved.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 165.

¹⁵⁵ Lai Jingping, *The Evolution of Leader Groups in Contemporary China and the Growth of Modern State*, 68.

Epilogue: Science and Politics

Even after half a century, readers can still easily link the ongoing pandemic in 2020 with the deworm campaign I illustrated in the article: the uncertainty for when and even whether the disease can be eliminated; the tension between the normal operation of the society and the necessary restrictions; the difficulties for convincing people to accept testing and protect themselves; the high financial burden for common people in terms of accepting testing, treatment and being unable to work. And most importantly, the deep intertwinement of science and politics.

At the time of writing this thesis, a similar struggle between technical experts and political leaders unfolded in a different part of the world. Similar to the quarrel between Dr. Su Delong - the “chief scientist” of the deworm campaign - and Mao Zedong, concerning how long does it take to eliminate snail fever, President Trump of the United States was simultaneously having a quarrel with his chief scientist, Dr. Fauci, regarding how long does it take to have a useable vaccine against COVID-19. Respectively in 1957 and 2020, in two different countries with dramatically contrast social systems, these two quarrels shared astonishing similarities. In both cases, politicians who had no expertise tried to set foot on the arena of science, and interfered in its operation according to their political and economic agendas. President Trump was eager to be re-elected in the forthcoming election, while Mao wanted to fulfill his ambitious blueprint of leap forward and build a prosperous socialist state. Without the restriction of power, however, Mao and his Party politicized the deworm campaign, thereby subordinating the objectivity of science to their political agenda. Consequently, the campaign was eventually succeeded, but with notable, unnecessarily high costs - both living and material

Was all the effort of practicing the three-in-one mode ended with a derailment? In contrast, the mode was practiced in various fields, and with drastically different outcome. Historian Schmalzer discusses the operation of the three-in-one mode in the Agricultural Scientific Experiment Movement - a movement aiming at enhancing agricultural production to rehabilitate the

country from famine - with an enthusiastic tone. In the agricultural case, experienced old peasants, educated youths who learned novel agricultural technologies from elite scientists, and the local Party cadres comprised the three-in-one mode, in which “people contribute differently to the production of knowledge based on their social position.”¹⁵⁶ In other words, old peasants could share their empirical experiences, educated youth shouldered the responsibility of practicing laboratory technologies disseminated by higher-level scientists, while Party cadres - who also had rich experiences of leading agricultural works - organized them together and assured that three groups cooperated smoothly. And in reality, they did.

What, then, made the outcomes of these campaigns so different? Why there was at best very little disobedience from the peasants in the agricultural movement and no discernible “struggle between expert and layperson?” It is obvious that the agricultural movement had a greater popularity among the local society compared to the daunting, cumbersome, and seemingly endless deworm campaign. A more crucial factor, however, was the different relationship between science and politics.

First, in the agricultural movement, the degree to which the campaign rely on exclusively owned expertise was notably lower than the deworm campaign. Old peasants, educated youth, and local Party cadres all had the ability to contribute to the movement intellectually. In the deworm campaign, however, such task could only be done by the technical elites who exclusively owned expertise, thus impeded other agents from “contributing knowledge based on their social position.” As illustrated earlier, such monopoly of expertise greatly challenged the Party’s capacity to effectively implement its leadership, and that planted the seeds of disputes between the Party and the deworm experts.

Second, the compromise between the Party’s Marxist ideology and the practical need of utilizing technocrats was successful in the agricultural movement, or in Schmalzer’s words, “scientific knowledge could benefit from multiple forms of expertise and so be properly revolution-

¹⁵⁶ Schmalzer, *Green Revolution, Red Revolution*, 42-43.

ary.”¹⁵⁷ That was because in this case, scientific knowledge or expertise was essentially complementary to the Party’s political agenda of enhancing agricultural production and disseminating agricultural technologies at the grassroots level. If, however, the objectivity of scientific knowledge was contradictory to the Party’s agenda - in the deworm case, the Great Leap Forward - and undermined the Party’s leadership, then this expertise, along with the people who exclusively possessed it, became the antithesis of the Party and the campaign it led, as the struggle between expert and layperson showed. Science was therefore politicized, and became the method of the deworm campaign rather than its principle. Although revolutionary lower technicians played the indispensable role of providing preliminary technical guidance, their lack of capacity to make fundamental decision - such as compiling a national deworm plan - made them the subordinates of the Party, and unable to uphold the objectivity of science. And those who disobeyed the objectivity of science were in turn punished, as the failure of the Great Leap Forward showed.

If the three-in-one was so problematic in the deworm campaign, would it be better if the mode was not adopted at all, and leave this work solely to the professionals? The irony lies in the fact that both science and politics were indispensable to the deworm campaign, but their balance was proved extremely hard to maintain. The dilemma that the GSRI encountered - lack of support from the bureaucratic system and the local society - has clearly demonstrated that it was impossible for the technocrats to finish the work of deworming Guangdong alone. A routinized bureaucratic system will reasonably leave this work solely to the professionals. But given its low efficiency nature and the scant material condition in the early years of the PRC, solely relying on technocrats was nevertheless unrealistic. Only a strong, external impetus could effectively overcome the inertia within the bureaucratic system and among the local society to rapidly push the campaign forward, and such impetus must be political and could only come from the Party. The impetus was so strong that it demand absolute control over the whole enterprise, subordinating all the insubordinate agents to its command, and launching mass movements to pursue the goal

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

of eliminating snail fever. The impetus was simultaneously so unstable that once it became weak, a temporal stagnation could easily negate all the earlier efforts. An ideal way for the campaign to be carried out was to combine the technical guidances from technocrats and mass movements, but the acute and largely irreconcilable conflicts between the objectivity of science and political agenda made such historical “if” largely meaningless.

Although shaped by divergent context, the three-in-one mode still shares many similarities that sheds light on how the Party simultaneously interacted with various agents in constructing the socialist state, and how its revolutionary ideology simultaneously facilitated and impeded such process. There are rich potential room for further theorizing the mechanism of the mode from sociological or political perspective, illuminating different variables - temporal and spacial span, the degree to which the expertise was exclusively owned, the popularity among society - and further evaluate how they affect the operation of the mode. By doing so, we may jump out of the state apparatus itself to better illuminate what does state-building mean to various external agents involved.

The first draft of this thesis was written from 2017 to 2019, and revised during the greatest pandemic in human history in 2020. Back in 2019, I had a chance to know the greatest cellist in the world, Yo-Yo Ma, who shared the same enthusiasm for this topic with me. “History makes the past come to life, and like life, it is never ending,” he wrote to me before he left, “you are embarking in a great profession.” I could never imagine the first sentence would come true in such an unexpected if also tragic way. The intimate relation between science and politics existed in the past, the present, and our foreseeable future, not only in Maoist China but all around the world, while hygiene provides a perfect contested field for them to manifest their intertwine-ment. Although the only thing that human being can learn from history is that they never learn from history, I still naively keep my finger crossed that people may seek insights from the Maoist deworm campaign to help them prepare for the critical crisis they are currently experiencing.

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