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Title

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Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5dw2d12b>

Journal

American Indian Culture and Research Journal , 20(4)

ISSN

0161-6463

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Publication Date

1996-09-01

DOI

10.17953

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“The Crossroads of Destiny”: The NCAI’s Landmark Struggle to Thwart Coercive Termination

THOMAS W. COWGER

Today we—America’s half million Indians—stand at a fork in the trail. The time has come for all of us to choose the way we will travel. In one direction is the downhill trail we have followed since our lands were invaded more than a century ago. This way, marked by the laws of an often-blind government, leads to ignorance, poverty, disease, and wasted resources. The new trail—the way of selfhelp—leads toward a better life, toward adequate education, decent income, good health, and wise use of our precious natural wealth.

—Clarence Wesley, former president of the NCAI,
undated¹

In November 1944, nearly eighty delegates from twenty-seven states, representing fifty tribes, met at the Cosmopolitan Hotel in Denver, Colorado. Out of the Denver deliberations came the first successful national organization controlled by Indians, the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI). Although it was established by Native Americans, the NCAI’s founders patterned it largely after the Indian reorganization constitutions and by-laws of the Indian New Deal. Many of the founders had gained important political experience from IRA tribal governments. Re-

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cent wartime experiences also led a new generation of Indian leaders to demand equal voting rights, adjudication of land claims, increased veterans' benefits, and the full benefits of American citizenship.²

Nearly five hundred years after Columbus set foot in the Americas, Native Americans had become prime movers in determining their fate. The formation of the NCAI in 1944 provided Indians with a national instrument to make their voices heard in legislation and implementation of federal Indian policy. In the mid-1950s the newly founded NCAI faced its most difficult challenge as the compulsory termination movement of the period touched a nerve in the Indian community because of its obvious threat to legal and cultural rights. Although the termination threat caused internal divisions within the organization, the NCAI withstood the strain. Rejecting the forced nature of the policy and asserting the right of Indian communities to control their own destinies, the NCAI launched an unprecedented drive in the postwar years to defeat or modify the coercive termination program.

Despite continued federal efforts since the 1880s to assimilate Indians forcibly into American society, approximately 250 reservations remained in the United States at the end of World War II. In the 1950s the United States government embarked on an ill-fated effort to terminate the federal trust status of Indian reservations. Between 1945 and the mid-1960s the government termination policy affected 1,365,801 acres of Indian land and an estimated 13,263 Indians.³ In its broadest sense, termination signified a drive to assimilate the Indians once and for all into the dominant society. In its narrowest sense, termination represented a legal means to abrogate the federal government's trust obligations to the tribes.

Most scholars who have studied the termination period have reached a consensus on the origins of the movement: Nearly all trace the roots of termination to the Truman administration.⁴ Although implementation of the termination policy is widely associated with the 1950s, the idea for a withdrawal of federal services was nothing new at that time.⁵ Conservative reform groups and federal policymakers had long advocated the forced assimilation of Native Americans into mainstream American society. Historian Kenneth R. Philp argues that postwar policy shifts were linked to the failures of the Indian New Deal. In particular, the movement for termination was fed by the reform

opponents of John Collier and his philosophy during the 1930s and the immediate postwar years.⁶ Postwar changes in liberalism also affected Indian policy. Although John Collier's administration had promoted cultural pluralism, postwar liberalism favored the assimilation of minorities and, in the case of Indians, a reduced federal role and decreased government spending.⁷ In a period of rapid economic growth, proponents of termination wanted to remove restrictions on Indian lands and make them fully taxable and alienable. In 1945, O.K. Armstrong voiced many of these sentiments in his widely read *Reader's Digest* article "Set the American Indian Free!"⁸ Practically all the calls to dismantle the tribal edifice, abolish the BIA, and force the Indians into assimilation came from westerners. Termination offered easy access to Indian trust lands and untapped natural resources. It also promised to stimulate population growth in the region.⁹

This new liberal outlook placed a premium on national unity and conformity. The decade after the Second World War demanded that all Americans possess the same societal values. For the dominant population, individualism, competition, capitalism, and private property served as the cornerstones of the American ideal. Numerous Indians in the postwar period, however, held strikingly different values and mores. According to many tribal traditions and cultures, the Native American framework was built around spiritualism, communalism, and community participation. In the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union, the communal lifestyle fostered by reservations smacked of communism and socialism and ran contrary to the American model of individualism. Anthropologist Nancy Lurie has argued that it was not until the termination movement that many Indians became fully conscious of "the diametrical opposition between Indian and white objectives."¹⁰ Thus, termination produced an ideological showdown. Ultimately, the NCAI's campaign to defeat coercive termination centered on two factors: education of mainstream society about the needs and rights of Native Americans, and America's ethical and legal commitment to protect those rights.

Most well-aculturated leaders of the NCAI did not oppose the goals of termination, that of assimilation and equal opportunities, but they wanted to insure that tribes were prepared for any new changes.¹¹ N.B. Johnson, President of the NCAI and Oklahoma Supreme Court Justice, for example, favored termination and a full integration of Indians into the mainstream society. "We look

forward to the day when the Indian will have passed out of our national life as the painted, romantic, feather-crowned hero of fiction," Johnson stated in a 1948 conference address, "and will have added the current of his free, original American blood to the heart of the this great nation."¹² Johnson and others pursued assimilation through voluntary termination as a means to an end of Indian separateness and economic and cultural dislocation.¹³ Other NCAI leaders like Helen Peterson, NCAI executive director, accepted noncompulsory termination but wanted improved education, health care, job training as well as full consultation before tribes were terminated.¹⁴ In essence, Johnson and Peterson sought integration before termination. Experience had also taught, however, that the stated goals of a policy were often different from the consequences of a proposal.

Whether to accept or reject termination legislation was not a cut and dry decision. Termination was a multi-faceted, complex issue that contained both beneficial and harmful elements. As a result, a diverse range of opinions trickled up from the tribes to the organization as to acceptable termination terms. There were many termination provisions under discussion that the tribes welcomed. Most members of the NCAI agreed that federal regulations regarding Indians should be lessened and some removed and that the Bureau should be gradually eliminated. For example, most tribal leaders wanted an end to the Indian liquor law that they felt discriminated against them.¹⁵ In reality, an end to some federal control was necessary before tribes could achieve some measure of self-determination. These members disliked the federal paternalism which they felt hindered Indian progress. They felt that the BIA had curtailed land sales, economic opportunities, and Indian self-determination. Speaking to the delegates in 1948, Will Rogers, Jr., Cherokee and son of the noted humorist, encouraged federal withdrawal to give Indians greater control over their own affairs.¹⁶

Meeting in Santa Fe in 1947, representatives passed a resolution that recommended the gradual liquidation of the BIA. It called for a carefully planned the dissolution to proceed in phases and a release of many programs to the states or other federal agencies. For example, almost all supported the transfer of Indian Health Services from the BIA to the Public Health Service. Most members also wanted assurances that the federal government would continue to provide and administer special services such as education, housing, and welfare programs.¹⁷ Reservation leaders like

Frank George, Nez Perce from the Colville Reservation, however, opposed the dissolution of the BIA. George and other reservation leaders worried that the transfer of federal Indian interests to the states would jeopardize Indian interests. If federal ties were severed, untold stress and substantial economic setbacks would occur.¹⁸ The question of state jurisdiction over criminal and civil Indian affairs produced much discussion. While some tribes welcomed state control of civil matters, others worried that it would leave them vulnerable to states that lacked experience in Indian affairs or were unwilling to assume Indian services.¹⁹ On the other hand, some tribes welcomed state criminal jurisdiction on their reservations.²⁰ Yet, several tribes worried that the extension of state criminal jurisdiction over reservations would threaten Indian sovereignty and violate treaty agreements. In order to allay these concerns, some tribal leaders wanted states to be required to consult with the tribes before assuming authority over them.²¹

Congressional initiatives aimed at termination also brought other concerns. The majority of the members were anxious over the criterion and regulations for defining tribal rolls. In the event of a liquidation of tribal assets, the tribes wanted to regulate tribal rolls and set blood quantum requirements.²²

Many delegates also opposed the wording of early congressional termination initiatives because of their negative and uncomplimentary tone. Bill language such as "emancipation" carried connotations of slavery and created a false impression that Indians were not already full citizens.²³ Others feared that termination was a step backwards because it negated the advances of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). The new measure threatened to abolish tribal organizations, constitutions, and corporations formed under the IRA, and to nullify treaties.²⁴

Some Indians worried that, on the one hand, the federal government was reducing federal responsibility, while, on the other hand, it was expanding federal control. Opponents of termination were concerned that the federal assistance required to prepare tribes for termination would increase, instead of decrease, paternalism. Delegates in 1949 passed a resolution resisting a plan to create area offices between the commissioner's post and the local superintendents. Opposition to the new level of administration came largely from the tribes in the Northwest. The NCAI garnered support to defeat the proposed area offices from Congressman Compton White of Idaho. However, White's bill to prohibit the offices failed to reach the House floor for a vote. In 1949,

Commissioner Dillon Myer created eleven area offices, seemingly to decentralize administration but also to shield him from tribal consultation.²⁵

Land and property remained at the heart of most concerns over termination measures. Some Native Americans saw the potential advantages of the new legislation; certainly urban Indians understood the likely benefits from the dissolution and disbursement of tribal assets. Small numbers of Native Americans desired a removal, or at least a modification, of trust restrictions over tribal properties and resources. Tribal leaders such as Wade Crawford of the Klamath supported termination as a means to gain control over the tribe's timber resources.

The great majority of members, however, feared a loss of federal custody over Indian land and property. If the tribes were terminated, their land and properties would be subject to state and local taxation and regulation and no longer under the protection of the BIA. Experience had shown that most Indians who came into possession of title to their lands lost it. Some worried that forcing trust patents on Indians would lead to wholesale loss of lands through tax sales. The majority of the members of the NCAI felt that the "emancipation bills" with regard to property represented ill-disguised attempts to swindle Indians out of real estate and tax Indian land.²⁶

Obviously it was impossible to create a workable Indian policy that incorporated all Indian views. What remained for the NCAI was to help design or maintain policy that best suited the needs of the individual tribes. How to accomplish this objective was a different matter. Congress often carried out termination legislation that was contrary to tribal views. Differences persisted between tribally supported legislation and congressionally directed termination action. In practice, the Eighty-third Congress passed a blanket measure that was prepared in haste and took little account of individual tribes' needs. By acting unilaterally, Congress denied Indians their rights. Once aware of the sweeping nature of the legislation and its disastrous consequences, the tribes fought back.

The termination movement gathered speed in 1947, when the Senate Civil Service Committee directed the acting commissioner of Indian affairs, William Zimmerman, to identify and classify tribes on the basis of their readiness for termination. Zimmerman's lists inadvertently provided westerners and conservatives with a clear blueprint for termination.²⁷ Unfortunately, Zimmerman

had prepared the lists without the knowledge and consent of the Indians involved. The acting commissioner later realized his mistake and tried to rectify his error, but it was too late. The "Zimmerman plan" became the cornerstone for the termination policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.²⁸

The relocation policy of the period complemented the termination program. In the wake of large-scale Indian migrations during World War II, the BIA decided to launch a program to relocate Native Americans to urban areas. Relocation and termination shared a common logic: both fostered assimilation and the reduction of government services.²⁹

Several termination-minded individuals played key roles in promoting withdrawal of federal recognition in the early phases of the movement. President Truman's commissioner of Indian affairs, Dillon Myer, was the first to push vigorously for termination. Myer had previously directed the War Relocation Authority (WRA). After he was appointed commissioner, he purged the BIA of Collier loyalists, replacing them with former WRA colleagues,³⁰ and then set the nation on a new course in Indian policy. Albert Grorud, a special assistant to the Senate Indian Affairs Subcommittee, also performed a significant, but less visible, role in the crusade for withdrawal. Grorud, longtime friend of Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, despised the BIA and was an outspoken critic of the Indian New Deal. He used his influence in Congress, particularly the Senate, to push the termination movement.³¹ In 1952 President Dwight Eisenhower appointed a terminationist from New Mexico, Glenn Emmons, as his commissioner of Indian affairs. Republican congressional majorities in 1952 also brought more conservatives into positions of power in Indian affairs.³²

Senator Arthur V. Watkins of Utah, however, became the congressional architect of the new federal program. A devout conservative and Mormon, Watkins relished the opportunity to participate in the overhaul of Indian policy. O. Hatfield Chilson, an Eisenhower official, noted in an interview that Watkins "thought he was paying off a debt which the Mormons owed the Indians."³³ In a 1957 article, Watkins defended termination with assimilationist arguments dating back to the 1880s. Indians would advance, he argued, only through assimilation and an end to special federal restrictions. Termination, to Watkins, provided a means of equal opportunity and freedom to all Native Americans.³⁴

Leaders of the NCAI quickly learned to take advantage of the Utah senator's fervent religious beliefs. On one occasion in the

mid-1950s, John Rainer, former executive director of the NCAI, on the advice of Robert Bennett, future Indian commissioner and founding member of the NCAI, sat outside of Watkins's office reading a *Book of Mormon*. Rainer hoped for a favorable reaction from the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs on a bill before the Senate. Bennett's strategy and Rainer's savvy paid dividends. Watkins was so pleased that Rainer was reading the Mormon scriptures that he invited the NCAI leader into his office and responded positively to his request.³⁵

Once the coercive implication of the new policy became clear, the NCAI united in a concerted effort to oppose forced withdrawal and instead promoted alternatives to the shift in policy. Demonstrating near consensus, the delegates at the 1948 convention in Denver recommended that any withdrawal of federal services to Indians proceed locally on a case-by-case basis instead of as a national policy. The 1948 convention also met the termination threat with proposals to strengthen tribal control over Indian affairs.³⁶ Instead of accepting cuts in federal services, D'Arcy McNickle, charter member and chairman of the Indian tribal relations committee of the NCAI, outlined a ten-point program in 1951 to attack Indian poverty. McNickle's self-help proposal called for a domestic Point IV program with greater federal appropriations for Indian reservations.³⁷ President N.B. Johnson called McNickle's plan the Indian equivalent of the successful "Marshall Plan" that provided aid in the economic reconstruction of Western Europe following World War II.³⁸

As the termination tide slowly developed momentum in 1950, Johnson requested that Oscar L. Chapman, secretary of the interior, assign a permanent federal liaison to work with the NCAI in shaping new policy. Chapman turned down the request.³⁹ Through a joint effort with the Association on American Indians Affairs (AIAA), the NCAI in January 1952 arranged for tribal representatives from across the country to come to the nation's capital to confront Chapman and Myer over the new policies.⁴⁰ The meeting had little effect on the course of the new policy.

The crisis over termination had profound effects on the NCAI. Having successfully survived earlier criticisms that the organization was created as a tool of the Collier administration and the bureau, the NCAI delegates voted at the 1948 Denver conference to rescind a 1945 resolution prohibiting bureau employees from holding office in the NCAI.⁴¹ As the uncertainties and dangers of withdrawal in the late postwar years became more apparent, the

NCAI needed to draw from the talents and political expertise of all its members.

The termination threat also changed the political structure of the NCAI in several important ways. The concern over termination prompted the NCAI to make itself more tribally oriented; less emphasis was placed on small groups, organizations, and individuals within the tribes. In the struggling infant years of the NCAI, the organization had extended voting membership to urban groups, bands, and chapter affiliates within tribes. By the mid-1950s some urban Indians were attempting to undermine tribal governments. Delegates in 1955 changed the original constitution to limit group membership only to federally recognized tribes. Tribes were also accorded more voting power than individuals. The amended constitution allowed tribes to elect more than one voting delegate based on the size of the tribe. Participation in the executive council was also changed to encompass all member tribes with their representatives selected by the tribal councils. As with the original constitution, other Indians were still encouraged to join as individuals.⁴²

Serious factional disputes within the NCAI over termination also led to an important change in leadership. Attorney Dan Madrano, charter member of the NCAI; Oklahoma politician Frank George, Nez Perce from the Colville Reservation and executive director of the NCAI in 1952; and Sioux attorney Ramon Roubideaux supported termination. Opposition to forced withdrawal by the majority of the NCAI membership and a lack of NCAI funds to pay his salary led George to resign his position before his term was finished.⁴³ The NCAI leaders at first worried that George's departure would damage the organization's reputation and alienate the Indians of the Northwest from the NCAI at a critical time. Some of the NCAI officers even worried that Madrano, George, and Roubideaux might try to disrupt the 1953 convention. Neither concern came to pass. In order to protect the integrity of the organization from the possible internal divisions, President W.W. Short, founder of the Choctaw-Chickasaw Confederation of Oklahoma and NCAI charter member, considered expelling the former officers.⁴⁴ The executive council helped calm George by scraping up enough money to pay part of his back salary.⁴⁵

Helen Louise (White) Peterson, an enrolled Oglala Sioux with the Indian name of Wa-Cinn-Ya-Win-Pi-Mi ("a woman to trust and depend on"), replaced George as executive director in 1953.

Coached at an early age by her grandmother to value Indian land and to be a role model for the Indian community, Peterson proved to be the right leader in a time of crisis. Active in the NCAI since 1948, she was also an advisor to the United States delegation to the second American Indian conference in Cuzco, Peru, in 1949. Her experience assisting city planners with minority programs in Denver, Colorado, and Rapid City, South Dakota, in the immediate postwar period paid important dividends for the NCAI. Peterson was to use her expertise to assert Indian rights, equality, and ethnic identity to slow the assimilationist movement.⁴⁶

By 1954, as the perils of forced termination became apparent to Native Americans on the reservation, the new policy marked a power shift in Indian leadership within the NCAI away from the Plains and the Southwest, particularly the Oklahoma tribes, and toward the tribes of the Northwest.⁴⁷ Tribal delegations often worried about the influence of off-reservation Indians looking to benefit from per capita payouts. Reservation Indians were concerned about losing land, water, hunting, and fishing rights. President N.B. Johnson, who helped lead the NCAI from its inception, was replaced in 1953 at the Phoenix conference by W.W. Short. Although Short served as president of the NCAI for only one year, he fulfilled an important transitional role. A successful Oklahoma businessman, he not only provided the NCAI with financial assistance but, more importantly, he reached out to the reservation community at a critical time.⁴⁸

The more significant change in presidential leadership came in 1954 with the election of Joseph Garry, a forty-four-year-old, full-blooded Coeur d'Alene from Idaho. The great-great grandson of the noted Chief Spokane, Garry was a veteran of both World War II and the Korean War. Prior to his election to the presidency of the NCAI, he had served four years on the organization's executive council. Having earlier served as president of the Affiliated Tribes of the Northwest, Garry was elected to the Idaho state legislature in 1956 and 1958. He brought a strong dedication to the special relationship between the federal government and the tribes, Indian ethnicity and sovereignty, Indian civil rights, and the reservation community. Perhaps most importantly, he was committed to protecting Indians' land bases and other resources and Indian self-determination. In the end, Peterson's and Garry's noncompulsory view of termination won out over the ideas expressed by Roubideaux and Madrano.⁴⁹

House Concurrent Resolution 108 (HCR 108) committed the federal government to coercive termination. Approved on 1 August 1953, it stated that Indians "should be subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges, rights, and responsibilities" as all American citizens. The resolution further recommended the immediate removal of federal guardianship and supervision over the tribes. To this end, Congress proposed the speedy termination of federal services and supervision for the individual tribes of California, Florida, and Texas. Tribes specified for termination included the Flathead of Montana, the Klamath of Oregon, the Menominee of Wisconsin, the Potawatomi of Kansas and Nebraska, and the Chippewa of North Dakota. The resolution directed the secretary of the interior to recommend specific legislation to end federal responsibility within the next year.⁵⁰ Shortly afterwards, on 15 August 1953, Public Law 280 (PL 280), a companion act, passed, extending state jurisdiction over Indian reservations.⁵¹ The new legislation represented an extremely dangerous situation to the tribes that did not desire it. For the tribes targeted for termination, "it would end federal services without insuring they would be provided by the states; cut off tribal funds, liquidate tribal property; abolish federal protection of Indian land and potentially lead to loss of Indian trust property."⁵²

On the heels of HCR 108 and PL 280, the NCAI annual convention at Phoenix in December 1953 took on particular significance. The theme of the three-day meeting that year was, appropriately, the "Crisis in Indian Affairs." "We [Indians] are at the crossroads of destiny," proclaimed Clarence Wesley, chairman of the San Carlos Apache Reservation. "The path we choose today," he continued, "is the road of tomorrow from which there is no turning."⁵³ The NCAI's stand against the coercive termination policy generated widespread support from the tribal representatives. In a distinctive, symbolic gesture Allie Reynolds, a member of the Creek tribe and noted pitcher of the New York Yankees, demonstrated his support for the NCAI during this critical time. Reynolds had been scheduled to address the Phoenix conference. At the last minute he was unable to attend, but he sent two hundred autographed baseballs to be handed out to the delegates to help promote good attendance at the meetings.⁵⁴

During the conference the NCAI stood firm in its opposition to forced termination. Commissioner Emmons, who was unable to attend the conference, addressed the delegates in a speech read to them, asking them to put aside past differences between the BIA

and the NCAI and unite in creating new policy.⁵⁵ To Emmons, cooperation meant unconditional, passive acceptance of the new shift in policy. Opposed to forced and coercive termination, the NCAI urged consultation and Indian consent about future policy changes.⁵⁶ In essence, the NCAI appealed to a fundamental democratic principle, securing the consent of the governed. As the sweeping nature of termination became apparent, the NCAI braced for the long legal and legislative battle ahead. Fearing that Indians could be legislated out of existence, D'Arcy McNickle warned in 1952 that the "battle for civil rights may not yet be won, but the battle for the right to be culturally different has not even started."⁵⁷

Congressional deliberations on the termination bills for individual tribes began on 15 February 1954 when the Senate and House Subcommittees on Indian Affairs opened joint hearings. Pressured by a ridiculous deadline of 1 January 1954, Watkins pushed for draft termination bills before Congress, state officials, and Indian tribes had enough time to evaluate properly the benefits and consequences of the measures.⁵⁸ The twelve bills under discussion included Utah, Texas, Western Oregon, Klamath, California, Menominee, Flathead, Seminole of Florida, Makah, Nevada, Sac and Fox, Kickapoo, Potawatomi of Kansas, and Turtle Mountain. Although Watkins usually presided over the hastily organized hearings, E.Y. Berry, chairman of the house subcommittee, helped. Like Watkins, Representative Berry of South Dakota was a conservative Republican. The pro-assimilationist Berry had denounced the Indian New Deal as retrogressive.⁵⁹ Other terminationists such as representatives Wesley D'Ewart of Montana and William Harrison of Wyoming and A.L. Miller of Nebraska occasionally attended the hearings but did not participate regularly.

Dominating the proceedings, Watkins usually bullied the witnesses by eliciting only the assimilationist responses he was interested in hearing. On several occasions he interrupted testimony to assert his own beliefs. Watkins denounced the validity of treaties and trust responsibilities and condemned the failures of the reservation system. As the hearing advanced, it became evident that Watkins and Berry were not following Zimmerman's model for phased termination. The basis for their selection process remains unclear. After the hearings, Congress approved six termination acts during the 1954 session. These included the Menominee, the Klamath, the numerous bands and tribes of

western Oregon, the Alabama-Coushatta, and the Mixed Blood Ute and Southern Paiute of Utah.⁶⁰

In response to the termination acts, the NCAI immediately went on the offensive to prevent other tribes from being terminated without their consent. The NCAI directed their assault with care, trying to wield influence without bringing the roof down on BIA programs. On 25–28 February 1954, in the midst of the joint hearings, the NCAI called an emergency conference at the Raleigh Hotel in Washington, D.C. The organization obviously selected the dates and location of the conference to coincide with a break in the hearings. The intermission ensured the NCAI that large numbers of Native Americans would be available to attend the conference.⁶¹ Representing more than one-third of the nation's Indian population, delegates came from forty-three tribes, twenty-one states, and the territory of Alaska. Congressional representatives, lawyers, and employees of the federal government also attended the conference as nonvoting delegates. Planning the conference on less than three weeks' notice, the NCAI received the generous support of numerous reform organizations.⁶² Commissioner Emmons not only attended the conference but approved the use of tribal funds for delegates to attend.⁶³ A generous grant from an anonymous donor also helped the NCAI meet its expenses, which totaled nearly \$1,400.⁶⁴ Noted attorney Theodore Haas also donated his time and legal talents to the conference.⁶⁵

The prime objectives of the conference were to unify Indian support against termination and to provide a forum for public relations. The NCAI admirably accomplished both goals, using information as a means of political persuasion. In order to meet its objectives, the Indian organization hired Annabelle Price, a professional public relations specialist, to organize the media campaign. Price, together with Jim Hayes, a member of the American Friends Service Committee, ensured that the event was covered by more than four thousand newspapers and numerous local, regional, and national radio and television stations in the United States and Alaska. Coverage even included the British Broadcasting Corporation.⁶⁶ By most accounts and standards, the conference was an enormous public relations victory. Joined by numerous U.S. reform organizations in its opposition to termination, the NCAI also received moral support from groups in Europe.⁶⁷

The emergency conference served as more than simply a means to educate the general public and elected officials about the

Indians' position on changes in federal policy. Perhaps more importantly it functioned to unify the NCAI. When the conference first started, some members still had questions about termination. Proponents of termination had attempted to rush the new policy through Congress before many Native Americans understood its implications. The delegates at the conference listened to legal specialists and tribal and federal officials discuss the ramifications of the pending termination bills.⁶⁸ By the time the deliberations concluded, the membership was "100%" opposed to the new measures.⁶⁹

Insisting that forced termination laws violated treaty privileges, the conference delegates adopted a "Declaration of Indian Rights," calling for a continuation of federal guardianship and the rights and benefits of citizenship. Reservations, the representatives proclaimed, "do not imprison us. They are ancestral homelands, retained by us for our personal use and enjoyment. We feel we must assert our right to maintain ownership in our own way, and to terminate it only by our consent."⁷⁰ On the other hand, the NCAI agreed to help tribes that consented to the new policy, such as the Menominee, prepare for immediate termination.⁷¹

Immediately following the conclusion of the conference, one hundred Indian delegates who remained in Washington overwhelmed Senator Watkins by attempting to attend the subcommittee termination hearings for the Salish and Kootenai tribes of the Flathead Reservation in Montana. The senator halted the hearings in the Insular Affairs Committee room and moved the proceedings to the Senate caucus room.⁷²

The 1954 termination bills were only one of the legislative problems the officers of the NCAI faced. Heirship and competency bills also demanded immediate attention. During the year the NCAI also strongly supported the transfer of health services from the BIA to the Public Health Service, because the organization rightly thought the shift would improve health care.⁷³

Early in 1954, the NCAI scored several important victories in the battle against forced termination. When representative Wesley D'Ewart of Montana introduced a "competency" bill in 1953-54, intended to loosen Indian land title restrictions and to force assimilation, the NCAI stopped the measure. The bill called for the automatic fee patenting of allotments when tribal members reached adulthood. Aside from giving private interests easier access to Indian lands, the proposal represented a form of termination by decree. As the bill neared passage in early 1954, heavy

lobbying by the NCAI forced it to be withdrawn.⁷⁴ "Hard work and \$425 worth of telephone calls to tribal chairmen to get them to send wires to their Congressmen," Peterson recalled excitedly, "did the trick and it happened right before our eyes!"⁷⁵

The NCAI also modified the first termination bill. Watkins began the hearings with six small bands of Paiute and Shoshone in his home state of Utah. Since the bands had been too poor to send delegates to the emergency conference, the NCAI in early 1954 sent a representative to meet with them to determine their wishes regarding termination. Although four of the bands showed little resistance to termination, the Skull Valley and Washakie strongly opposed it. Following the meeting with the Indian communities, the NCAI asked Watkins's subcommittee to leave the two bands out of the Utah bill. Before favorably reporting the proposal to the full Congress, the subcommittee dropped the two bands from the bill. Not only did Congress exclude the two bands from the final measure, but they also canceled past debts they owed the federal government. The legislation passed just as the NCAI had requested.⁷⁶

After the two successes, the NCAI in November 1954, at Omaha, Nebraska, proposed a "Point Nine" program as an alternative to the forced termination legislation. It was introduced to Congress as the Point IV program, modeled after technical assistance programs of the same name for underdeveloped countries. The plan, similar to the one proposed by McNickle in 1951, aimed at restoring lands to tribal ownership, protecting and developing reservation resources, rendering occupational training, and providing a revolving credit fund to help Indian communities and businesses become more self-sufficient.⁷⁷ The long-term program was intended to provide Native Americans with a gradual transition into the mainstream society and ultimately make federal responsibility unnecessary. The NCAI's suggestion represented a well-articulated counterproposal to federal Indian policy. The Department of the Interior opposed the proposal, because it implied that the government had previously failed to provide such services, and it limited technical and economic assistance to Indians to that accorded foreign governments.⁷⁸

The persistent efforts of the NCAI, however, continued to bear important fruit. The unified stand of the NCAI in 1954, with assistance from other reform groups, had generated adequate political pressure to slow, or in some cases even stop, the termination movement until more important shifts occurred in Congress.

The NCAI halted termination of the Turtle Mountain Chippewa, the Florida Seminole, the Flathead, and the Colville tribes. Even Helen Peterson expressed surprise at the success of the NCAI movement in slowing and altering federal policy.⁷⁹ Several members of the Senate and House Committees on Indian Affairs changed their positions on the termination bills after the NCAI emergency conference.⁸⁰ The NCAI campaign had also served to alert many state officials to the high cost of turning federal services for Indians over to the states. In 1955 the Democrats gained control of Congress, and in 1957 they increased their majority. Liberal western Democrats took control of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committees. Representative Lee Metcalf and senators James Murray and Mike Mansfield of Montana and Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming lent valuable assistance to the NCAI and Indian groups opposed to termination.⁸¹

The anxiety of termination and the legal battle against it increased the participation of Indians voting in elections. The NCAI was largely responsible for the increased political awareness. In 1956, it sponsored a program entitled "Register, Inform Yourself and Vote," which interpreted issues, provided candidate information, and explained the mechanics of voting to its members. Politicians from western states recognized the effectiveness of the elevated Indian political activity on legislation in their states. Regional legislators quickly learned that the best way to secure Indian votes was to oppose federal action that did not have Indian consent. The respected American Heritage Foundation in 1957 acknowledged the NCAI for its voting awareness efforts by presenting the organization with a painting for "outstanding public service."⁸²

Changes in the Eisenhower administration also slowed termination. Secretary Douglas McKay resigned in 1956 to run for the Senate. Eisenhower named Fred S. Seaton, former Nebraska senator and White House staff member, to the position. Seaton, a moderate conservative Republican, departed from the strong commitment to termination legislation. Seaton's position reflected the influence of the NCAI. With respect to withdrawal legislation, Secretary Seaton announced that termination would proceed cautiously and only with the consent of the tribes involved.⁸³ The NCAI officers hailed the new position and offered their cooperation with the new shift policy.⁸⁴ The forced termination of the previous generation was now dead. In the early 1960s the policy of the federal government shifted from termination to self-deter-

mination and direct assistance to the reservations. After the acts in 1954, Congress in 1956 terminated the Wyandotte, Peoria, and California rancherias, and in 1959 federal responsibility for the Catawba of South Carolina ended. Termination ended with the Northern Ponca of Nebraska in 1962.

The termination policy failed to deliver its promises and was not implemented with the care its promoters envisioned, but was applied with haste and confusion. Termination did not end the vast outlays of federal funds. Nationally, the policy failed to simplify the administration of Indian affairs or reduce federal responsibilities toward Indians; instead, many tribes were left burdened with inadequate local services and perplexed by new state regulations. In most cases termination produced land losses, poverty, unemployment, and resentment. In the end, only about 3 percent of the Indian population was terminated, and the same percentage of Indian lands was withdrawn from federal trust status.⁸⁵ Although the coercive termination policies of Watkins and his allies were relatively short-lived, the fear of termination threatened all Indians. "Termination," as historian Donald Fixico aptly wrote, threatened to be "an all-inclusive destroyer of Indian life-styles."⁸⁶ In light of the recent conservative backlash in Congress and federal cutbacks in spending, the spectre of termination has reappeared.

Flexing its newfound political muscles, the NCAI, in the mid-1950s, made an important stand in the nation's capital. Native Americans for the first time in their history expressed themselves on a national level in a unified voice that echoed throughout the chambers of Congress and elsewhere. Competing with the McCarthy hearings in 1954 and the nation's obsession with communism, Indian leaders successfully made their wishes known. From then on, Indians demanded a larger role in the formulation of Indian policy.

In the process, Native Americans learned two valuable lessons that would serve them well in the decades to come: the power of the vote and the influence of the media. During the termination era, the NCAI used the classic political weapon of the citizenry in a democracy: the ballot. The vote became an important resource for pursuing Indian goals. The NCAI also showed themselves quite adept at using the media to communicate broad appeals for support. In the turbulent 1960s and 1970s and beyond, Indians took advantage of these resources to force their concerns into the larger public arena.

Perhaps the Indian protests in the mid to late 1950s were not as dramatic as the Black confrontations over civil rights during the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Although most African-Americans preferred complete assimilation, many Native Americans did not. Passage of the coercive termination bills threatened to complete the Indian assimilation that had started hundreds of years earlier. At stake was not only an end to special federal protection negotiated in past treaty agreements, but the right to a separate ethnic identity. In the end, that persistent desire to preserve culture and identity proved to be the NCAI's most powerful weapon.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to thank Donald L. Parman and Donald J. Berthrong for their crucial suggestions and critical support.

NOTES

1. "Indians—and the New Trail," National Anthropological Archives (hereafter cited as NAA) (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, NCAI Records, box 18, Hayes, Jim [American Friends Service Committee]).

2. N.B. Johnson, "The National Congress of American Indians," *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 30 (Summer 1952): 140–43; Alison R. Bernstein, *American Indians and World War II* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 116–21.

3. Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great Father 2* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 1058–59.

4. The standard works on the termination policy are Donald L. Fixico, *Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945–1960* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986); Larry W. Burt, *Tribalism, Federal Indian Policy, 1953–61* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982); and Larry J. Hase, "Termination and Assimilation: Federal Indian Policy, 1943–1961" (Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State University, 1974). Historical scholarship on the period, however, has tended to focus on the federal government and its formulation and implementation of policy. Little attention has been given to the Indians' response to changes in federal Indian policy.

5. Although some writers associate the term *withdrawal* with Myer's administration and *termination* with Eisenhower's administration, I am using the two terms interchangeably.

6. Kenneth R. Philp, "Termination: A Legacy of the Indian New Deal," *Western Historical Quarterly* 14 (April 1983): 165–80.

7. Clayton R. Koppes, "From New Deal to Termination: Liberalism and Indian Policy, 1933–1953," *Pacific Historical Review* 46 (November 1977): 543–66. Following the 1946 elections, Republicans controlled both houses.
8. O.K. Armstrong, "Set the American Indian Free!" *Readers Digest* 47 (August 1945): 47–52.
9. Hasse, "Termination and Assimilation," 73–74, 77–79, 96–97.
10. Nancy O. Lurie, "The Contemporary American Indian Scene," in *The American Indian Today*, ed. Stuart Levine and Nancy O. Lurie (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968), 456.
11. Delegates at the 1953 convention accepted the inevitable goal of assimilation. 1953 Proceedings, Resolution #4, NCAI Records, box 5, Resolutions Adopted, 1953, 4.
12. Address by N. B. Johnson, 1948 Proceedings, NCAI Records, Proceedings, 1948, box 3: 12; Address by Johnson, 1950 Proceedings, NCAI Records, box 4, Proceedings, 1950, 48.
13. For other examples see the address of Robert Yellowtail, Proceedings of 1948.
14. Joint Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Termination of Federal Supervision over Certain Tribes of Indians, Joint Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs*, 83d Congress, 2d sess., parts 1–12, 76, 78.
15. 1949 Proceedings, NCAI Records, box 3, Proceedings, 1949, 53–55.
16. 1948 Proceedings, 45–46.
17. *Ibid.*, 12.
18. *Ibid.*, 16, 17.
19. NCAI Records, box 68, Bronson, Ruth M., "Outreach," 4; 1948 Proceedings, 75.
20. Release of 3 April 1948, NCAI Records, box 67, Releases 1947–52, 1955, 1959, & 1960.
21. 1948 Proceedings, 18, 75.
22. 1948 Proceedings, Resolution # 21, 76.
23. 1949 Proceedings, Resolution #20, 77.
24. Bronson, "Outreach," 3–4.
25. Opposition regarding the area offices can be found in NCAI Records, box 72, Memoranda and Correspondence Concerning Area Office Organization, 1948–51.
26. 1948 Proceedings: 16; Frank George to Sam Ahkeah, 12 May 1953, box 41, Navajo Tribe, 1951–53. On several occasions in the immediate postwar years, the NCAI passed resolutions opposing any "emancipation" bills. See, for example, Resolution no. 20, 1949 proceedings, NCAI Records, box 3, Proceedings, 1949; Resolution no. 18, 1950 Proceedings, NCAI Records, box 4, Resolutions, 1950.
27. "Officer and Employees of the Federal Government," *Hearings before the Committee on Civil Service, United States Senate 80th Cong., 1st sess., on Senate Resolution (1947)*, 544–47; S. Lyman Tyler, *A History of Indian Policy* (Washington, DC: Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1973), 163–64.

28. Zimmermann later called his misinterpreted plan a policy of "extermination" not "staged termination." Address of William Zimmermann, Jr. to the NCAI, Omaha, Nebraska, November 19, 1954, NCAI Records, box 7, Speeches, 1954.

29. Kenneth R. Philp, "Stride Toward Freedom: The Relocation of Indians to the Cities, 1952-1960," *Western Historical Quarterly* 16 (April 1985): 175-90.

30. Hasse, "Termination and Relocation," 108-64; Richard Drinnon, *Keeper of Concentration Camps* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 167-71.

31. Account of Helen L. Peterson and Robert L. Bennett, Albuquerque Conference, 21 May 1993. The conference held in Albuquerque on 20-21 May 1993 featured oral interviews with the founding members of the NCAI. Present at the conference were Helen L. Peterson, Erma Hicks Walz, John Rainer, Art Manning, Robert Bennett, and the author. The project was sponsored by the Smithsonian Institution. Written transcripts, tape recordings, and photographs from the two-day conference have been deposited at the National Anthropological Archives of the Smithsonian Institution, Washington D.C. (hereafter cited as the Albuquerque conference).

32. Emmons's appointment meant a change in Interior Department leadership, but not a basic shift in Indian policy. Address by commissioner of Indian affairs Glenn L. Emmons before the Indian Rights Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 21 January 1954, NCAI Records, box 68, Emmons, Glenn; address by Emmons before the NCAI, Omaha, Nebraska, 19 November 1954, NCAI Records, box 7, Speeches, 1954. See also Debra R. Boedner, "Termination and the Administration of Glenn L. Emmons as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1952-1961," *New Mexico Historical Review* 54 (October 1979): 287-304.

33. "Oral History interview with O. Hatfield Chilson," by Thomas F. Scopes, 1 March 1976, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; account of Robert L. Bennett, Albuquerque conference, 21 May 1993. Watkins's personal papers have been deposited at the Redd Center at Brigham Young University. His papers dealing with his involvement in Indian affairs, however, are missing from the collection. Mormons believe that Lamanites (Indians) and Nephites (whites), both remnants of the house of Israel, share a royal heritage. Although once a chosen people, Indians (Lamanites), according to the Mormons, have suffered injustice and persecution because of their unrighteous ways. The Lamanites will advance when they accept full integration into mainstream society and are converted to the true faith. The *Book of Mormon* is full of references to the relationship between Lamanites and Nephites. Joseph Smith's prophecies concerning the Lamanites can be found in *Doctrine and Covenants*, particularly sections 49 and 57 (Salt Lake City, UT: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 1989), 88-90, 102-103. See also Edward L. Kimball, ed., *The Teachings of Spencer W. Kimball* (Salt Lake City, UT: Bookcraft, 1982), 59-620.

34. Arthur V. Watkins, "Termination of Federal Supervision: The Removal of Restrictions over Indian Property and Person," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 311 (May 1957): 42-47.

35. Account of John Rainer, Albuquerque conference, 21 May 1993.
36. 1948 Proceedings, 60–66.
37. Address by D'Arcy McNickle to the NCAI, 24–27 July 1951, NCAI Records, box 5, Speeches, 1951.
38. Undated newspaper clipping in NCAI Records, box 5, Newspaper Clippings.
39. Oscar L. Chapman to N.B. Johnson, 20 January 1950, National Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 48, CCF 1937–1953, File No. 5-11, General 5-11, Indian Chartered Corp Gen (Pt. 4), box 3529.
40. Oliver La Farge to Helen L. Peterson, 4 December 1953, NCAI Records, box 5, General Correspondence, 1953.
41. 1948 Proceedings, 57–58.
42. Account of Peterson, Albuquerque conference, 21 May 1993; copy of the Draft Substitute of the Constitution and By-laws of the NCAI Presented by Paschal Sherman to the Members of the Executive Council, 30 October 1952, NAA, James Curry Papers, box 125, 1952 (Sept.–Dec.); memo for N.B. Johnson from James E. Curry, August 1952, Curry Papers, box 125, 1952 (May–Aug); John W. Cragun to Peterson, 24 May 1954, NCAI Records, box 1, NCAI Constitution & By-Laws #1.
43. Interview with Peterson, Albuquerque conference, 21 May 1993; and author interview with Peterson in Washington D.C., 16, 19, 20, and 21 October 1992.
44. W.W. Short to Peterson, 20 October 1953, NCAI Records, box 5, General Correspondence, 1953.
45. W.W. Short to Ramon Roubideaux, 8 September 1953; Short to Ruth Bronson, 3 November 1953; Bronson to Short, 17 September 1953; Peterson to Short, all in NCAI Records, box 21, Short, W.W.; and Short to Bronson, 3 November 1953; Short to Peterson, 10 October 1953; Short to Peterson, 15 October 1953; all in NCAI Records, box 5, General Correspondence, 1953.
46. Author interview with Peterson; *News Bulletin of the NCAI* (November 1953), NCAI Records, box 67, Washington Bulletin (selected copies) 1947–61, 2; NCAI Press Release of 18 August 1955, NCAI Records, box 27, Miscellaneous Mail, 1968–49. An interesting letter from Peterson to Susan H. La Motte, 8 February 1954, not only reveals Peterson's strong commitment to the NCAI but also demonstrates the frenzied daily schedule of the organization's executive director and her limited staff. The letter can be found in NCAI Records, box 19, La Motte (Indian Affairs Women's Club).
47. Account of Peterson, Albuquerque conference, 21 May 1993.
48. *Ibid.*; *NCAI Bulletin* (November–February 1953), NCAI Records, box 67, Washington Bulletin (selected copies) 1947–51, 1, 3.
49. Account of Peterson, Albuquerque conference, 21 May 1993; biographical sketch of Joseph Garry, 25 July 1959, in NCAI Records, box 75, "Pendleton Round-Up" (Indian encampment). The city of Spokane, Washington, is named after Garry's great-great grandfather.
50. 76 *United States Statutes* B132.
51. 67 *United States Statutes* 588–90.

52. NCAI Records, Emergency Conference, box 56, Conference Call (February 1954), 2.

53. Keynote Address by Clarence Wesley to the NCAI, 7 December 1953, NCAI Records, box 5, Speeches, 1953.

54. *The Phoenix Gazette*, 4 December 1953; and 7 December 1953 clippings in NCAI Records, box 5, Newspaper Clippings.

55. Statement by Commissioner of Indian Affairs Glenn L. Emmons to Be Read on his Behalf at the Annual Conference of the NCAI, 7 December, 1953; NCAI Records, box 5, Speeches, 1953.

56. Resolutions Adopted by the NCAI at the 10th Annual Convention, 4-7; statement by Glen A. Wilkinson, 8 July 1954, NCAI Records, box 28, Correspondence and Memoranda (1954-55).

57. D'Arcy McNickle, "A Battle Yet to Wage" (Paper presented to the Institute on American Indian Assimilation, 8, 9, 10 May 1952), NCAI Records, box 19, McNickle, D'Arcy (1943-54).

58. Even some westerners, like John B. Hart, executive director of the North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission, had reservations about the speed with which the policy was being administered. Hart preferred to delay termination until the federal government worked out the logistics with state, county, and local agencies and, more importantly, supplied funds to such agencies. John B. Hart to Orme Lewis, 11 January 1954, NCAI Records, box 32, Turtle Mountain, N.D., 1953-54.

59. Steven C. Schulte, "Removing the Yoke of Government: E.Y. Berry and the Origins of the Termination Policy," *South Dakota History* 14 (Spring 1984): 48-55.

60. For transcripts of the hearings, see U.S. Congress, Joint Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Termination of Federal Supervision over Certain Tribes of Indians, Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs*, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 1954, parts 1-12.

61. Bronson and Peterson to Jay Nash, 12 February 1954, box 54, Emergency Conference: General Correspondence.

62. Report on the Emergency Conference of American Indians, 25-28 February; NCAI Memo, 12 February 1954, NCAI Records, box 56, Emergency Conference. Nineteen reform organizations attended the conference. These included the ACLU, American Friends Service Committee, American Legion, American Missionary Society, the AIAA, Boy Scouts of America, Daughters of the American Revolution, Friends Committee on National Legislation, General Federation of Women's Clubs, Indian Rights Association, Institute on Ethnic Affairs, Japanese-American Citizens' League, Marquette League for Catholic Indian Missions, Montana Farmers Union, National Association of Intergroup Relations, National Council of Churches, New York Yearly Meeting of Friends, North Dakota Indian Affairs Commission, and the United Church Women.

63. NCAI Press Release, 21 February 1954, included in Report of the Emergency Conference of American Indians on Legislation, NCAI Records, box 56, Emergency Conference. The lengthy report provides a nice summary of the conference proceedings.

64. Bronson and Peterson to Nash, 12 February 1954, Peterson to Joseph Garry, 6 November 1954, NCAI Records, box 6, General Correspondence (Outgoing), 1954.

65. Peterson to Theodore Haas, 8 April 1954, NCAI Records, box 54, Emergency Conference; Annabelle Price to Peterson, 14 March 1954, NCAI Records, box 56, Emergency Conference: General Correspondence.

66. Jim Hayes to Lawrence Lindley, 29 March 1954, box 54, NCAI Records, Emergency Conference.

67. M. Muller-Fricklen to the NCAI, 12 December 1957, NCAI Records, box 71, Subversive Organizations: Attorney General List 1957, 1958.

68. Proceedings of the Emergency Conference of American Indians on Legislation, NCAI Records, box 56, Emergency Conference Bulletin, 1954.

69. W.H.H. Pilcher to Lorena M. Burgess, 20 March 1954, NCAI Records, box 6, General Correspondence (Incoming) 1954.

70. Joseph R. Garry to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 10 March 1954 with attached Declaration of Indian Rights, NCAI Records, box 28, Correspondence (1954-59). The declaration is also included in the Report on the Emergency Conference.

71. Peterson to Arthur LeBlanc, 5 November 1954, NCAI Records, box 30, Bay Mills Community (Mich.) 1949-55.

72. *Washington Star*, 28 February 1954, clipping in NCAI Records, box 54, Emergency Conference, General Material.

73. Resolutions of the NCAI, NCAI Records, box 7, Resolutions and Policy Statements, 1954.

74. Statement of Joseph Garry Regarding the Competency Bill, 3 May 1953, NCAI Records, box 58, Competency Bill, 1953-54; NCAI Records, box 66, Legislative Reports, 22-23; Resolutions of 1953, Resolution #4: 10-11; Statement of Helen Peterson, NCAI Records, box 6, "Dictabelt" Transcripts of Proceedings November 1954: 10-F, 3-6.

75. Peterson to Susan H. La Motte, 7 August 1954, NCAI Records, box 19, Susan La Motte.

76. Statement of Peterson, NCAI Records, box 6, "Dictabelt" Transcripts of Proceedings, 18-20 November 1954, 10-F, 2; Peterson to La Motte, 7 August 1954.

77. McNickle had originally proposed a "10-Point Plan." By 1953, however, Congress had fulfilled one of the suggestions, so the NCAI submitted a "Nine Point Program." Point Four Program, NCAI Records, box 58, Point Four Program (83d-85th Cong.), 1954-57.

78. Hatfield Chilson to James E. Murray, 1 July 1957, Truman Library, Papers of Sidney R. Yates, Correspondence Files (1958), box 13, file marked "Indians-American" (1958).

79. Peterson to La Motte, 7 August 1954; Peterson to Jonathan M. Steere, 6 April 1954, NCAI Records, box 56, Emergency Conference: Hayes Correspondence, 1954.

80. Peterson to Jonathan M. Steele, 6 April, 1954; Peterson Testimony, "Dictabelt" Transcripts of Proceedings 1954, 9-F, 4-5; *ibid.*, 10-F, 1.

81. Account of Rainer and Peterson, Albuquerque conference, 20 May 1993.

82. Helen L. Peterson, "American Indian Political Participation," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 311 (May 1957): 116–26; John G. Cornelius to Peterson, 4 April 1957 and John G. Cornelius to Peterson, 21 August, 1957, both in NCAI Records, box 76, American Heritage Foundation, 1956–61; Vine Deloria, Jr., and Clifford Lytle, *The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 195.

83. Radio Broadcast of Fred A. Seaton, secretary of the interior, at Window Rock, Arizona, 13 September 1958, NCAI Records, box 72, Seaton, Fred: Statement, Radio Broadcast, Correspondence 1956, 1958, 1959.

84. NCAI Bulletin, 1 November 1958, NCAI Records, box 67, Washington Bulletins (Selected Copies 1947–61), 1.

85. Figures quoted in Prucha, *The Great Father*, 2: 1058–59.

86. Fixico, *Termination and Relocation*, 184.