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The Yanks are Coming Over There:
The Role of Anglo-Saxonism and American Involvement
in the First World War

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

Dino Ejercito Buenviaje

August 2014

Dissertation Committee:

Dr. Brian Lloyd, Chairperson

Dr. Roger Ransom

Dr. Thomas Cogswell

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The Dissertation of Dino Ejercito Buenviaje is approved:

Committee Chairperson

University of California, Riverside

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IN MEMORIAM

Howard G. Bryden

Who embodied the best qualities of an educator and a human being

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Yanks are Coming Over There:
Anglo-Saxonism and American Involvement in the First World War

by

Dino Ejercito Buenviaje

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in History
University of California, Riverside, August 2014
Dr. Brian Lloyd, Chairperson

At first glance, the United States had little reason to be involved in the First World War. Its isolationism and its significant Irish- and German-American immigrant populations, who were unfriendly to Great Britain, should have kept the United States from involvement. How the United States government cast its lot with the Allies by 1917 will be the focus of this study.

Anglo-Saxonism is crucial to understanding the reason for the entry of the United States in the First World War. Anglo-Saxonism is the belief that the peoples of the British Isles and their descendants in the United States and the British Empire are inherently “superior” because of their qualities of courage, thrift, and most importantly, “self-government.” Anglo-Saxonism originally revolved around the founding myths of the British people. Over the centuries, these narratives were appropriated by various interests to suit the needs of the time. The founders of the United States adapted the Anglo-Saxon myths by linking the ideals of American liberty to the ancient Anglo-

Saxons who fought against their Norman oppressors. By the turn of the twentieth century, Anglo-Saxonism culminated with the injection of racial and pseudoscientific explanations for the supremacy of the United States and the British Empire.

By the outbreak of the First World War, the United States foreign policy establishment appropriated Anglo-Saxonism to suit Allied war aims. By endowing the United States and Great Britain with the qualities of “self-government” and liberty, the war became a struggle between “civilization”, as represented by the Allied powers, and the forces of “autocracy” and “militarism”, as represented by Germany. Even though the German people had previously been considered to be close relatives of the Anglo-Saxons, the militarism and reactionary ideology espoused by the Hohenzollern dynasty and Prussian aristocracy, disqualified them from the Anglo-Saxon family. Thus, the foreign policy establishment swayed American public opinion and convinced them of the need to go to war.

Primary sources such as correspondences, government documents, and periodical articles from the time will be utilized to understand the role of Anglo-Saxonism. Understanding Anglo-Saxonism can help us understand the role of culture in foreign policy.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The entry of the United States on the side of the Allied powers in 1917 was a turning point in the First World War. For three years, there had been a stalemate on both sides, particularly along the Western Front. Britain, France, and Germany, which had counted on a swift victory in 1914, instead witnessed the carnage that drained both in blood and treasure. The unprecedented nature of the war, which saw the introduction of new technology, prevented neither side from gaining an advantage, while at home, the pressures of the war significantly altered social relationships in terms of politics, class, and gender, sweeping away pre-war assumptions. Once the United States had cast its lot with Britain and France, the balance had tipped in the favor of the Allies, through the injection of fresh recruits, American industrial power, and American credit. The addition of the United States into the ranks of the Allies, did not only pave the way for victory. Its involvement in the First World War introduced the “crusading” theme of American foreign policy when President Woodrow Wilson declared that the world be “made safe for democracy,” which continues to have relevance in the early years of the twenty-first century.

The First World War was a significant moment in the history of American foreign policy as well as a cataclysmic baptism by fire for much of humanity. While at first glance, it may appear that “The War to End All Wars” may have little else to yield to historians, there are still some areas that call for historical inquiry. The following questions reflect the nature of this dissertation proposal: What induced the United States

to join the side of the Allies during the First World War? How could the United States have entered on the side of Great Britain in 1917 when Irish-Americans and German-Americans, who formed significant portions of the population, were hostile to the British? By what means did the United States government convince the American public that joining the side of the Allies was a just and noble cause?

Anglo-Saxonism could be one key to explaining American involvement in the First World War. Briefly, Anglo-Saxonism is the belief that those of Anglo-Saxon origin, particularly the peoples of the British Isles and their descendants in the United States and the “White Dominions” (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) of the British Empire, contained virtues and qualities that made them naturally “superior” to other ethnic groups. Among the virtues highly prized by Anglo-Saxonists include courage, thrift, independence, and self-control, culminating into “self-government,” unique to these peoples. These qualities, therefore, explained the economic success of the United States and the British Empire and justified imperial expansion during the late nineteenth century.

Anglo-Saxonism has undergone an evolution throughout its long history, and over the centuries, people in both Great Britain and the United States used Anglo-Saxonism to suit the needs of the time. In its original sense, Anglo-Saxonism refers to the founding myths that defined the English people during the early Middle Ages, as migrations of Germanic peoples settled what would become England after the collapse of Roman rule, which would be written down in documents, by chroniclers such as Geoffrey of Monmouth and Bede the Venerable. Such myths included the founding of the ancient

Britons by survivors of the Trojan War and the stories of King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table. These early myths created a sense of national identity for an island populated by Angles, Saxons, and Jutes.

However, by the time of the Reformation, these myths no longer sufficed, and Anglo-Saxonism was recast as part of the banner of Protestantism, in the struggle against the Roman Catholic Church, most notably illustrated by the defeat of the Spanish Armada by the English navy and its subsequent destruction by the “Protestant Wind,” claiming divine favor. Puritans and other groups reinterpreted the Anglo-Saxon stories to denounce the deviation of Rome from the original scriptures, as well as the corrupt Stuart monarchy and Anglican hierarchy that was still heavily influenced by the Catholic Church. Because of the influence of the Calvinism espoused by English Puritans, the idea of the English-speaking peoples as the “Chosen People” became part of the narrative of Anglo-Saxonism, especially as they began to settle North America to create a “city on a hill” amidst the “heathen” native Americans.

Anglo-Saxonism would be reinterpreted by the leaders of the United States, both to provide a sense of continuity from the English tradition, as well as to emphasize the ideals of liberty that the ancient Anglo-Saxons represented to the Founders, which would later on evolve into “American exceptionalism”. The leaders of the American Revolution looked to the Anglo-Saxon myths as containing the kernels of American democracy, particularly the ideals of limited government and popular sovereignty, before the Norman Conquest in 1066, which introduced the bondage of feudalism. This also coincided with

the Enlightenment principles of natural rights, and served to contrast the fledgling United States from the corrupt British monarchy.

Starting in the middle of the nineteenth century Anglo-Saxonism shifted from its emphasis on liberty to racial ideology. The application of Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection added a pseudoscientific component to Anglo-Saxonism, which had originally been a combination of literary and religious myths. Darwin's theory of natural selection lent an aura of scientific credence to Anglo-Saxonism, as his ideas were appropriated and adapted to classifying ethnic groups into a hierarchy, with the Anglo-Saxon peoples at the top of the human evolutionary chain because under this paradigm, the world had become a battleground of limited resources with each of the races competing for survival, with the Anglo-Saxons as the most successful in utilizing those resources. Anglo-Saxonism served to promote Manifest Destiny, which decreed that the American descendants of the Anglo-Saxons were ordained to expand from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and that the Native Americans and Mexicans who stood in their way would either be subjugated or exterminated. Additionally, Anglo-Saxonism was also reinterpreted to justify southern slavery by reinterpreting the story of Noah's children to sanction the bondage of African-Americans, both before and after the Civil War. As the United States engaged in large-scale industrialization, Anglo-Saxonism also reflected the fears of "old-stock" Americans, particularly the patrician Boston elite, who feared of being overrun by the "new immigrants" from southern and eastern Europe, as well as east Asia. These fears, coupled with the geopolitical realities of the 1880s and 1890s, would

prompt a further redefinition of Anglo-Saxonism that would fit with the new international role of the United States in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the *rapprochement* that developed between the United States and Great Britain allowed both countries to set aside old disputes and embark upon a new century with the possibility of future cooperation. That *rapprochement* was possible through the belief in Anglo-Saxonism shared between the ruling classes of both countries. Anglo-Saxonism provided a pseudoscientific justification for late nineteenth century imperialism that neatly explained how one quarter of the globe fell under the dominion of the British Empire, as well as the rise of the United States. It is this shared affinity held by the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) establishment that gradually pushed the United States and Great Britain closer together by resolving their final outstanding disputes in the Western Hemisphere and that allowed the Britain to relinquish dominance over Latin America to the United States. The goodwill provided by the British government toward the United States in the Spanish-American War, was an example of Anglo-Saxon solidarity against the “Latins” represented by Spain and presented the possibility of a geopolitical partnership.

During the late nineteenth century, Anglo-Saxonism included not only the peoples of Great Britain and the United States, but also Germany, due to linguistic similarities and a seemingly shared culture. The Teutonic theory held that the seeds of Anglo-Saxon culture and its qualities, particularly that of self-government, lay in the distant past in the forests of Germany and northern Europe that over the ages would later spread to the

British Isles, and eventually the United States, making the German people “close relatives” of the Anglo-Saxon family. Since the colonial period, there had been a stream of German immigration, most notably in the mid-nineteenth century, as the result of revolution and nationalist struggles in Europe. German culture was held in high esteem and many German-Americans contributed greatly in the political, economic, and intellectual spheres of American life. By the turn of the twentieth century, American progressives looked to Wilhelmine Germany as the model for social legislation and as an alternative to British *laissez-faire* capitalism. It would appear to Anglo-Saxonists that it would be a matter of time for the peoples of Great Britain, Germany, and the United States to forge their solidarity as a larger Anglo-Saxon family.

However, in the decade or so before the First World War, there were tensions within the Anglo-Saxon community, which would later prompt another redefinition of Anglo-Saxonism. The twentieth century began with the Boer War between the British and the descendants of Dutch settlers in what is now South Africa. Proponents of Anglo-Saxonism in Great Britain and the United States were at a loss to explain how the British army could be fighting the Boers, who were fellow Anglo-Saxons, who exhibited the qualities of independence of self-government in the Veldt of Africa. Additionally, in the years before the outbreak of the First World War, Germany became a source of ambivalence to American visitors. While many Americans were impressed with the progress achieved in areas like medical insurance and housing for workers, they were uneasy with the increasing militarism, hypernationalism, and preponderance of the state

in the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II, which was competing against the British for global dominance, one of the long-term causes of the First World War.

The outbreak of the First World War created a break in the Anglo-Saxon family, creating a narrower definition of Anglo-Saxonism, not on race, but by culture. Even though the German people had been originally included due to racial and linguistic affinities, by World War I, it was culture that disqualified the Germans from membership in the Anglo-Saxon family. Political culture also became important as a characteristic of Anglo-Saxonism. Proponents of Anglo-Saxonism claimed that it was the ancient Anglo-Saxons who sowed the seeds that would grow into the traditions of self-government and individual liberty that were clearly evident in Great Britain, the dominions, and the United States by the turn of the twentieth century. Thus, Germany could not be included because it had developed into a conservative monarchy dominated by the descendants of Germanic warlords. It then fell to the WASP foreign policy establishment to use Anglo-Saxonism to sway American public opinion to support the Allied cause despite the significant influence of German culture in the United States. Propaganda was crucial in the redefinition of Anglo-Saxonism. The atrocity stories regarding the German occupation in Belgium and France, as well as the sinking of the *Lusitania*, circulated by the British, and later American propaganda machines, excluded the German people from the family of Anglo-Saxons by highlighting the barbarity of German soldiers against civilians. Anglo-Saxonism, then, was defined by the war as representing “civilization” and democracy in the form of the Allies, versus the militarism and “savagery” represented by Germany. By couching the war in these terms, the foreign policy

establishment of the United States gained the support of a diverse public whose backgrounds would otherwise not have had a natural affinity with the aims of the WASP elite and the Entente. The most tangible result, therefore, would be the entrance of the United States in the war as one of the Allied powers.

Anglo-Saxonism is crucial to understanding the foreign policy of the United States during the early twentieth century. Anglo-Saxonism fulfilled various functions. First, Anglo-Saxonism gave a sense of origin. As the United States became a haven for the “new immigrants” from Southern and Eastern Europe during the closing years of the nineteenth century, both the mythic and pseudoscientific components of Anglo-Saxonism gave solace to the “old stock Americans” who wished to preserve their predominance in an increasingly urbanized and industrialized society. Secondly, Anglo-Saxonism provided a new purpose. The old admonitions of the founders for the United States to stay aloof from international affairs became inadequate in an age of industrialization, global markets, and colonial expansion. By declaring a crusade for “civilization,” Anglo-Saxonism served to cloak the new foreign policy establishment’s rush to imperial adventures in the Philippines and Latin America, which resembled the *realpolitik* and old diplomacy of the European powers. Anglo-Saxonism allowed the United States and Great Britain to extinguish ancient grievances. The resulting *rapprochement* that occurred during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries between the two great English-speaking powers served as a foundation for a new relationship that made it possible for the United States to enter as an ally of Britain by 1917.

Understanding the history of Anglo-American relations is crucial before analyzing the reasons behind the entry of the United States as an ally of Britain during the First World War. Anglo-American diplomacy is a topic that has been of great interest to historians, particularly, since the postwar period, due to the "Special Relationship" forged during World War II between the leaders of the United States and Great Britain. In this study, the relationship that developed between the United States and Great Britain in the 1890s, culminating into the entry of the United States in 1917, will be examined in three steps: through the realm of foreign policy of both countries; through cultural and intellectual exchanges, particularly in the development of Anglo-Saxonism throughout American culture as a whole, and within the WASP elite; and the propaganda employed by the WASP elite in the foreign policy establishment

Bradford Perkins's, *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914* (Athenaeum, 1968) is an example of the diplomatic approach in examining the Anglo-American *rapprochement*. In this work, Perkins traces the beginnings of the "special relationship" between the United States and Britain to the late nineteenth century. Like many historians, Perkins follows the narrative approach of analyzing causes and effects, decision-makers, and policies. He argues that the *rapprochement* between Britain and the United States began around 1895, after the Venezuela boundary dispute. By the end of the nineteenth century, explains Perkins, America's power and capabilities had grown to such an extent that war between both countries was considered unthinkable. Perkins traces the foundation for the *rapprochement* through the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 and the resolution of the Alaska Boundary Dispute in 1903,

both of which assured American supremacy in the Western Hemisphere. Another basis for the origins of Anglo-American cooperation, Perkins argues, can be found in the growing similarities in the outlooks of both British and American elites and political similarities through the democratization of the British political system. Lastly, Perkins argues that America's taking up of imperialism through the Spanish-American War at the end of the nineteenth century further eased tensions between both countries and further abated traditional anti-British hostilities because of growing American tolerance for the burdens of British imperialism.

Another example in the diplomatic analysis of the special relationship is D. Cameron Watt's work, *Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place 1900-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975), which looks at the changes in the Anglo-American relationship through the perspective of what he calls, "international history." Watt notes the problems contemporary historians have with traditional "diplomatic history" who find it lacking in intellectual content and attracts only those more interested in details rather than broad theoretical concepts. Watt makes an extensive study of the foreign policy-making bodies in both Washington and Whitehall, the demographic make-ups of the respective bodies, and how decisions are made and crafted into each country's foreign policy.

There are many historical works that analyze the Anglo-American *rapprochement* as a broad cultural movement in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. Particularly, the concept of transnational culture, the study of the interactions between cultures, will be a dominant theme in this study. In the collection of essays edited by

Thomas Bender in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), the authors transcend national boundaries to find, for example the influence of other cultures and global events in the formation of the United States. Frank Thistlethwaite studies the origins of the WASP community in his work *The Anglo-American Connection in the Early Nineteenth Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959) arguing that despite formal separation, the elites of Britain and America shared a common culture, which was interconnected and overlapped in the realms of business and culture. Additionally, Robert Kelley's *The Transatlantic Persuasion: The Liberal-Democratic Mind in the Age of Gladstone* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969) explores the intellectual continuity that existed in the United States and in Britain during the early nineteenth century. Kelley argues that liberalism served as a common frame of reference between both peoples and would have a major influence in major movements such as the abolitionist and feminist movements.

There has been a great deal of work devoted to the study of various sections American culture and the role in which class plays in their perceptions of their place in society. Charles A. Beard's seminal work *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1913, 1949 ed.) argues that the Constitution was created to secure the interests of the economic elite that had arisen after the American Revolution. David R. Roediger's *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (London: Verso, 1991) examines the evolution of the American working class, which had classified associated the status of the American worker with race.

Accordingly, this study will examine the culture shared by the WASP elite, particularly, their education, their perceived roles in society, and their aspirations.

Sociologist E. Digby Baltzell's *The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964) makes a groundbreaking study of the rise of the WASP community, which combines themes of social darwinism and anti-Semitism from the first half of the twentieth century through the Kennedy administration. For example, he examines the attempts of the Gilded Age millionaires to emulate the British aristocracy by sending their children to boarding school and by establishing exclusive clubs to give a sense of permanence to their newfound wealth. Similarly, Eric P. Kaufman in his work *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004) examines the rise and decline of the WASP community from the eighteenth century through 2000, and argues that the rise of multiculturalism, not only has eroded the influence of the WASP community in the political, economic, and social life of the country, but has also deconstructed notions of ethnicity. Thomas and Kathleen Schaeper in *Cowboys and Gentlemen: Rhodes Scholars, Oxford, and the Creation of an American Elite* (New York: Berghen Books, 1998) analyze how the Rhodes Scholarship influenced the lives of American social and academic elites from its inception in 1904 through the 1990s. The authors of this work stress that the connections formed among the American scholars, and with their British counterparts created bonds that would last throughout their careers. Steve Fraser's and Gary Gerstle edited work *Ruling America: A History of Wealth and Power in a Democracy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005) contain a diverse array of essays, which

analyze the many facets of the WASP elite, from the antebellum period to the foreign policy establishment that arose during the twentieth century.

An important component in understanding the WASP community is the role of Anglo-Saxonism in the belief in the superiority of the “Anglo-American race.” This study will provide an explanation of what constitutes an “Anglo-Saxon” and the influence of Anglo-Saxonism in the development of the Anglo-American rapprochement. Kevin Phillips in *The Cousins’ Wars: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), provides an interesting discussion on the seventeenth-century antecedents of Anglo-Saxonism in which he maintains that the Puritans had differentiated themselves as a “Chosen People” from a decadent court under Catholic influences. Stuart Anderson’s *Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904* (London: Associated University Press, 1981), gives a comprehensive view on the rise and fall of Anglo-Saxonism in American foreign policy and its role in the Anglo-American *rapprochement*, which guided the WASP elite. He analyzes “the cult of Anglo-Saxonism,” which served as a useful tool to achieve various means from explaining the origins of the English-speaking peoples to charting their destiny. John Higham’s work *Strangers in the Land* closely examines the use of Anglo-Saxonism by nativist groups to forge an American identity in the economic, social, and political tumult of the United States, with the influx of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe during the late nineteenth century, and during the First World War, as Germany was excluded from the Anglo-Saxon family because of its “militarism” and “barbarism”.

John T. McNay examines the Anglophilia prevalent among the WASP elite through the eyes of Cold War Secretary of State Dean Acheson in *Acheson and Empire: The British Accent in American Foreign Policy* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2001). Using Acheson's education as an example, McNay considers the pervading influence of British elite culture in the education of the WASP elite, which plays a role in how they later see the world, long after their prep school days. WASP influence in foreign policy is analyzed in Robert Dean's *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001), which examines how gender and class shaped foreign policy makers at the turn of the twentieth century, which then shaped American foreign policy throughout the first half of the twentieth century and into the beginnings of the Cold War. Dean further examines how institutions that segregated by gender, such as elite boarding schools, Ivy League fraternities, secret societies, and gentlemen's clubs helped shape twentieth-century policymakers, who were forged into a special brotherhood, with access to the corridors of power.

Additionally, theories of gender will also be discussed in this study, which is also linked to the belief in Anglo-Saxonism. Gail Bederman's *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), analyzes both the impact of race and gender in the formation of late nineteenth century. By the turn of the twentieth century, Anglo-Saxonism defined the need for the United States and Great Britain to reach out not just for diplomatic reasons, but because of the need for the "Anglo-Saxon races" to unite in a

world of racial and gender conflict, as a way for men to respond to perceived “threats” of emasculation due to industrialization and the rise of feminism. Allen J. Frantzen and John D. Niles in their edited work *Anglo-Saxonism and the Construction of Social Identity* (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1997) examine the role of English national myths in establishing the national identity of the United States. To these authors, Anglo-Saxonism provided a sense of continuity between Britain and America and a national consciousness for the fledgling American society of the nineteenth century. Clifford Putney’s *Muscular Christianity: Manhood and Sports in Protestant America 1880-1920* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001) examines the gender expectations in the early twentieth century and definitions of masculinity in response to perceived femininity in American Protestantism during the Victorian era. As a result, Putney argues that the definition of masculinity changed from Victorian perceptions of “gentility, stoicism, and self-denial” to that of “action and aggression.”

Historians have also looked at how Anglo-Saxonism was manifested at the individual level. David Burton’s work *Theodore Roosevelt and His English Correspondents: A Special Relationship of Friends* (Transaction of the American Philosophical Society, v.. 63, 1973) explores the role of correspondence in the Anglo-American *rapprochement*. Burton studies letters between Roosevelt and his five most consistent English correspondents. He argues that in these letters, the friendship between Roosevelt and his friends expressed their hope for a closer partnership between Britain and the United States based on a common heritage, language, and institutions. It is also

important to note that there was a strong cultural affinity in the United States for German culture, due to the history of German immigration, dating back to the seventeenth century. Daniel T. Rodgers's work *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* examines the inspiration that American progressives found in German social legislation devised by the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck during the late nineteenth century.

There is extensive literature on the study of epistolary writing. For example, in *Letter Writing as a Social Practice* (John Benjamins Publishing Co., Philadelphia, 2000), editors Nigel Hall and David Barton argue that letter writing is one of societies most prolific human activity because it crosses both formal and informal situations. They further argue that the most effective way to examine letter writing is to view it as a social practice, examining the texts, the participants, and the artefacts in their social contexts, with the goal of understanding the role of literate activity in society. Unlike official documents, which customarily parrot the government's position on any given topic, personal correspondence contains a person's, candid and unfiltered thoughts.

The role of propaganda will also be important in understanding how the WASP elite set the United States on the course of war on the side of the British. In *Propaganda for War: How the United States was Conditioned to Fight the Great War of 1914-1918* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company Inc., 1996) Stewart Halsey Ross examines the role newspapers and other media played in influencing American public opinion during the First World War. He writes that British and American propaganda was successful in galvanizing the American public against the Germans. He shatters the

myth shared by many Americans that the United States had been completely neutral during the first three years of the war. Rather, he counters that influential members of society such as politicians, diplomats, bankers, and businessmen had already decided that the United States would be solidly in the camp of the Entente.

Troy E. Paddock in his edited work *A Call to Arms, Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Newspapers in the Great War* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Press, 2004) delves into the role of newspapers during the First World War in the major belligerent countries. The contributors of this work evaluate the effectiveness of each major country's propaganda efforts, particularly the efforts of the British, who were most successful in shaping American public opinion well before the entry of the United States. He examines the motifs employed by newspapers in every camp, particularly the language they use to mold their public's opinions, with the help of government censorship, whether it was for "civilization" or for the "battle of good against evil."

This work will be a continuation of a previous study undertaken at the California State University, Fullerton titled *Correspondence and Community: Elite Friendships and the Anglo-American Rapprochement, 1895-1910*. The main argument of this work is that unlike other alliances of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the relationship between the United States and Great Britain transcended mere diplomacy or geopolitics. Rather, the "Special Relationship" was made possible through shared cultural values and interconnected relationships, whether in the literary, legal, or business fields, particularly among the ruling classes, who were in a position to influence the foreign policies of their respective countries.

Where this work differs however, is that it will examine the conditions in the United States in the early twentieth century, particularly in understanding the role which Anglo-Saxonism played in influencing the United States to join the Allies during the First World War. This dissertation will study the intellectual evolution of Anglo-Saxonism, particularly, how it was influenced by the pseudoscientific theories of the late nineteenth century, particularly the misappropriation of Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection, which served as the justification for late nineteenth century imperialism. This study will examine the rise of the WASP elite, which dominated the foreign policy making bodies of the United States government during the early twentieth century. The study of this subgroup is crucial because it was this elite group to that was most susceptible to the siren song of Anglo-Saxonism, which influenced their decision to side with the Allies, despite the fact that large segments of Americans were not sympathetic to the British. To that end, various methodologies will be employed toward further understanding of this study.

Employed in this study will be various sources. One traditional source of primary source information can be found in the official diplomatic correspondence from the State Department and the British Foreign Office during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. An equally valuable primary resource can be found in the newspapers and periodicals of the period such as *The Times of London*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Spectator*, *The Nation*, *Living Age*, and *The Economist*. These periodicals provide a mirror into the elite culture of the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, by looking into their insights on international events and shared cultural

assumptions and a first hand account of the improvement of relations between the United States and Great Britain and its ramifications in international politics. These sources are accessible. Claremont University in Pomona, California, has volumes of nineteenth and early twentieth century periodicals, particularly the period that I wish to cover.

Primary sources from various sources will be employed in this study. Crucial to understanding this particular period in history will be the official diplomatic papers during the years leading to the involvement of the United States in the First World War. Toward that end, documents from the British Foreign Office and the State Department will be necessary to understand Anglo-American relations during the First World War. However, diplomatic correspondence alone cannot fully explain the reasons that the United States joined Great Britain during the First World War. Personal correspondence among British and American elites of the period provide important information on, not only personal attitudes, but because they provide a certain candor on various topics that cannot be expressed in official correspondence. The periodicals of the time are also key to this study because they provide the cultural context upon which one can place both the diplomatic and personal correspondence. These sources are accessible. The University of California, Los Angeles has copies of diplomatic correspondence from the British Foreign Office. The National Archives in Washington, D.C. has diplomatic papers from the period.

Personal correspondence is an important primary source that will be utilized for this study. Rebecca Earle, editor of *Epistolary Selves: Letters and Letter-Writers 1600-1945* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1999), argues that letters serve

the needs of the most powerful and circulate among the less elevated. In William Decker's *Epistolary Practices: Letter Writing in America before Telecommunications* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), William Merrill Decker attempts to answer the questions about the role of letter writing in the literate and literary culture of pre-twentieth century America and how it has changed in the past hundred years; the relationship between letter writing and speech as well as composition in other genres; and the role of distance in letter writing. Decker argues that letters provide immediacy and intimacy normally unavailable in face-to-face conversation and that the assumption of confidentiality that allows such intimacy.

Among the correspondences that will be provided in this study will be those by Theodore Roosevelt, which are bound in six volumes in *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, edited by Elting E. Morison. His correspondence, for example, with British diplomat Sir Cecil Spring Rice from the 1880s through the First World War, for example lends an insight into the shared goals of the Anglo-American elite who believed in a common destiny for both the United States and the British Empire. The correspondences of Henry Adams will provide the intellectual underpinnings of the Anglo-Saxonism of the turn of the twentieth century. The letters of Carl Schurz, the prominent German-American of the nineteenth century, will lend some insight on the contributions of German-Americans, particularly, the "forty-eighters" who escaped the failed revolution in Europe to start a new life in the United States. The letters of Woodrow Wilson will shed some light in the official decision making process in the events leading to the involvement of the United States on the side of the Allies in 1917, as will those of his

advisor, Colonel Edward House. These correspondences should provide an insight into the influence of Anglo-Saxonism on the individual level. The correspondences needed for this study are quite accessible. For example, Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, has all of Theodore Roosevelt's papers and correspondences, while Princeton University in Princeton, New Jersey has all of Woodrow Wilson's papers and correspondences.

The second chapter, "Anglo-Saxonism and American Culture, 1895–1914" will analyze the role of Anglo-Saxonism from the 1890s to the eve of the First World War. This chapter will examine how Anglo-Saxonism was an evolving phenomenon, from its roots as the national myths of the British Isles to an ideology using pseudo-scientific principles, which not only justified late nineteenth century imperialism, but also mapped out the destinies of the English-speaking peoples. This chapter will also show that Anglo-Saxonism filtered down from the elite to ordinary Americans, who used Anglo-Saxonism to define themselves against the "New Immigrants" from southern and eastern Europe.

The third chapter, "The German-American Connection, 1850-1914", will examine the history of German immigration to the United States. German-Americans played a major role in the settling of the United States, and were part of the American social fabric generations before the First World War. This chapter will show the depth that German culture influenced in many areas of American society, such as education, and that alignment with Britain was not a foregone conclusion at the outbreak of the First World

War. Thus, it would take a concerted effort by the WASP elite to convince American society that to be German was to be an enemy to progress and civilization.

Chapter 4, “The Rise of Anglo-Saxonism in the Foreign Policy Establishment,” will analyze the basis of its power as well as its cultural world view, which is crucial in understanding the foreign policy of the United States in its early years as a rising power. This chapter will illustrate how Anglo-Saxonism became a dominant doctrine in the foreign policy establishment. By the 1890s, the WASP elite in the State Department and other branches of the federal government saw the world increasingly falling under European imperialism and realized that the United States could no longer heed the advice of its founders. Anglo-Saxonism neatly coincided with diplomatic reality by adding a racial and cultural justification of American global expansion.

This chapter will highlight some of the prominent leaders of the foreign policy establishment of the early twentieth century such as Henry Cabot Lodge, Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, Henry White, Woodrow Wilson, and Alfred Thayer Mahan and their contributions to the shift in American foreign policy from an inward looking republic to a major industrial power with an assertive foreign policy that would portend major consequences in the dawn of the twentieth century.

The fifth chapter, “Anglo-Saxonism in the First World War,” will analyze the propaganda used by the WASP elite to convince the American public to side with the British. This chapter will highlight the role of Anglo-Saxonism in the attitudes of the WASP elite, which not only directed their sympathies to the British cause but it influenced the decision-making process leading America to war. This chapter will chart

evolution of Anglo-Saxonism and explain how the German people were banished from the Anglo-Saxon family by the First World War, using cultural development as part of its criteria.

This chapter will also examine the correspondences of major figures of the WASP elite from the beginning of the twentieth century to the eve of America's entry into the First World War, not limited to this proposal. The correspondence between Theodore Roosevelt and British diplomat Cecil Spring Rice not only provide personal details, for they also serve as a living example of Anglo-American relations during their *rapprochement* of the early twentieth century. Their correspondence continues during the First World War, by which time Spring Rice served as Britain's ambassador to the United States. The correspondences and papers of Woodrow Wilson are crucial in understanding his motivations in leading the United States into the First World War, despite the fact that he campaigned on preserving American neutrality. The letters and papers of Colonel Edward House will be important to this chapter because of his capacity as Wilson's unofficial advisor.

The final chapter, "Conclusion" will recapitulate the argument of this dissertation, while suggesting possible avenues for further study. It is to be hoped that this study will make further inroads in the fields of Anglo-American relations by examining the social dynamics that would influence the course of diplomacy.

CHAPTER 2
ANGLO-SAXONISM AND
AMERICAN CULTURE 1895—1914

This chapter will analyze the role of Anglo-Saxonism from the late nineteenth century to the eve of the First World War. Originally, Anglo-Saxonism refers to the mythic and literary origins of the English-speaking peoples that came out of the waves of migration from of Angles, Saxons, and Scandinavians from Northern Europe to the British Isles during the fifth century, following the collapse of Roman rule. Anglo-Saxonism evolved over the centuries, first in England and later in the United States, to suit the needs of the time. Despite the changes that have occurred in the long history of England, among the chief qualities that remained constant and unique to the Anglo-Saxon peoples were courage, independence, thrift, self-control, and “self-government” that would be transferred to the cultural, legal, social, religious, and political traditions of the United States. For the United States, Anglo-Saxonism provided a template upon which to establish a new identity for a young nation that had just gained its independence. Because of the relative youth of the United States, an emphasis was placed on the vigor of the descendants of the ancient Anglo-Saxons who settled the North American and their ability to triumph over non-Anglo-Saxon peoples deemed “inferior.” Likewise, in the early years of the republic, Anglo-Saxonists emphasized ancient Anglo-Saxon liberty to contrast it with Great Britain, which they considered corrupted by Norman feudalism and continental absolutism.

By the late nineteenth century, Anglo-Saxonism continued to evolve into an ideology, combining the traditional qualities of courage, independence and self-government with elements of Social Darwinism, justifying imperial expansion. At this juncture, a *rapprochement* between Great Britain and the United States became possible. After 1890, the foreign policy establishment became more convinced that remaining aloof from geopolitical affairs would be detrimental to the long-term economic and diplomatic interests of the United States. As the United States ventured overseas, the principles of Anglo-Saxonism became the justification for acquiring territorial possessions in the Caribbean the Pacific, and the economic domination of Latin America. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Anglo-Saxonism mapped out the destinies of the English-speaking peoples by providing a common future for the United States and Britain, which would facilitate cooperation by the outbreak of the First World War.

The Roots of Anglo-Saxonism:

Anglo-Saxonism began as the mythic and literary origins of the English people who settled in the British Isles following the end of Roman rule in the fifth century. After the withdrawal of Rome's legions came waves of Germanic migrations Angles, Saxons, and Scandinavians from northern Europe. In order to integrate a diverse island, the narrative of the Anglo-Saxon people began to be written down, explaining their mythic origins.¹ The main message from these myths were that the English-speaking peoples inherited from their ancestors the legacy of a free people, which make them better than anyone else because they inherited the qualities that are conducive to self-

¹Hugh A. MacDougal, *Racial Myth in English History: Trojans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons*, (Hannover: University Press of New England, 1982), 7.

government, such as courage, independence, thrift, and self-control. These qualities would guide the English-speaking peoples throughout England's history, culminating into the rise of the British Empire.²

The beginnings of "England" could be traced to the end of Roman rule. When Emperor Honorius withdrew the Roman legions in 410 AD, four hundred years of Roman civilization came to an end. In *The Ruin of Britain*, written about 540 AD, Gildas blamed the iniquities of the Britons, for the collapse of civil order in Britain, precipitating the Anglo-Saxon invasions. He cited the letter of Honorius admonishing the Roman citizens of Britain to look after their own defenses, for they would expect no more help from Rome's legions.³ The collapse of Roman authority in Britain in the fifth century AD brought about the end of Roman culture. The language of the Britons gradually replaced Latin. Bureaucratic institutions, such as the civil service had no need to exist with the withdrawal of the legions. As a result, the withdrawal of the legions meant that Roman money no longer held any value. The roads, villas, and other monuments to Roman rule decayed. The industries that had supported a Roman infrastructure fell idle. The urbanized market economy that had flourished in Roman Britain for almost four centuries reverted to the conditions that Julius Caesar found in 55 BC, i.e., a warrior agrarian society.⁴

The years following the collapse of Roman rule become more a matter of speculation than that of historical record. Gildas's work remains one of the few accounts

² Ibid, 2-3.

³ Gildas, *The Ruin of Britain and other Works*, Michael Winterbottom, tr., (London: Phillimore & Co., 1978), 22.

⁴ Nicholas Brooks, *Anglo-Saxon Myths: State and Church 400-1066*, (London: Hambledon Press, 2000), 22.

of Britain at the advent of the Anglo-Saxon invasions. This passage by Gildas gives a vivid description of the collapse of Roman civilization:

...Our citizens abandoned the towns and the high wall. Once again they had to flee; once again they were scattered, more irretrievably than usual; once again there were enemy assaults and massacres more cruel. The pitiable citizens were torn apart by their foe like lambs by the butcher; their life became like that of beasts of the field. For they resorted to looting each other, there being only a tiny amount of food to give brief sustenance to the wretched people; and the disasters from abroad were increased by internal disorders, for as a result of constant devastations of this kind the whole region came to lack the staff of any food, apart from such comfort as the art of the huntsman could procure them.⁵

With the withdrawal of the Romans, Britain was subject to Germanic invasions. Various tribes such as the Alemanni, Angles, Frisians, Saxons, and Swabians settled throughout the southern portion of the island of Britain.⁶ The Anglo-Saxon tribes overran Britain and established their stronghold, thus filling the void left by the Romans. Rather than an elaborate bureaucracy and infrastructure, a warrior aristocracy predominated, in which authority was based on military prowess. In place of the Latin language and literature, the Germanic languages of the Anglo-Saxons dotted the island, whose influence can still be placed in modern England. Norse and Germanic gods replaced the Christianity brought by the Romans, who still reign over the days of the week throughout the English-speaking world.⁷ It is this period, however, that provided the conditions where myth could flourish that would gradually unite this island and create the concept of “England.”

⁵ Gildas, 23.

⁶ Don Henson, *The Origins of the Anglo-Saxons*, (Norfolk, England: Anglo-Saxon Books, 2006), 58.

⁷ Brooks, 23-4.

The Anglo-Saxon Myths:

The collapse of Roman rule in Britain meant a lack of reliable sources describing the years since 410 when the last Roman legions withdrew from the island. In place of official record keeping, myths served to fill the void left by the Romans. These myths were stories brought over by various Germanic peoples who encroached upon the Western Roman Empire and the island of Britain. A few examples of the myths that have been preserved have Germanic origins, from the tales of *Sigmund* and *Weland and Beaduhild*, which originated from Norse mythology, to the incorporation of *Aetla* (Attila) the Hun, whose exploits caused the Germanic incursions into the Roman Empire.⁸

The Anglo-Saxon myths that prevailed during the Early Middle Ages fall into two categories. The first category of myth is the myth of migration. In the myth of migration, the story is structured around the need for more space for a people to thrive, which is often patterned after the Jewish narratives of the Old Testament.⁹ The second category is known as “conquest mythology”. These myths revolve around the establishment of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms in Britain. Their stories are similarly structured, revolving around an exodus from an ancestral birthplace; a series of trials to be overcome in their new homeland; a sign of divine sanction; the conversion from paganism to Christianity; and the defeat of a traditional enemy.¹⁰

⁸ Henson, 96-8

⁹ Ibid, 106.

¹⁰ Ibid, 102.

The latter category of mythology gives an insight into the formation of Anglo-Saxon identity. For example, the tale of Hengest exemplifies military prowess as one of the chief qualities of the Anglo-Saxons. Likewise, the epic of *Beowulf* emphasizes the role of the hero. *Beowulf* epitomizes the ideal relationship between lord and warrior, as shown in the expectations of generosity by a lord to his retainer upon a successful campaign.¹¹ In the narrative translated by Kevin Crossley-Holland, Hengest is the hero who leads the Danes after the death of their leader Hnaef to victory over their enemies.¹² Also central to the Anglo-Saxon myths is the idea of the Anglo-Saxons as a “chosen people”. Gildas took a disparaging view of what he saw as Britons’ the lack of moral fortitude, which explained their conquest by the Romans and their subsequent degradation upon the collapse of Roman rule.¹³ The narratives of the Anglo-Saxon myths, such as that of Hengest describe the ancient Britons as unworthy, which would justify their conquest. The story of Hengest would suggest that because of his victory, the Anglo-Saxons had a right to establish their dominion in what would become the kingdom of Kent, from whom its royal line was derived, serving as the nucleus for the English state.¹⁴

Bede, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, and the Making of England:

Bede’s *Ecclesiastical History of the English People* is one of the earliest attempts write down the common history of what would become “England.” Rather than simply describe the history of the “Saxons”, or “Jutes”, Bede’s original title, *Historia*

¹¹ *Beowulf*, Seamus Heaney, tr., (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 69.

¹² Levom Crossley-Holland, *The Anglo-Saxon World*, (Suffolk, Great Britain: The Boydell Press, 1982), 6-7

¹³ Gildas, 17-8.

¹⁴ Henson, 103-5.

Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum implies a common people that transcends the various Anglo-Saxon kingdoms that existed in by the seventh century.¹⁵ Bede writes his *Ecclesiastical History* from a particular standpoint. As a member of the Church, his work reflects the unity of the Roman Catholic Church, rather than the political loyalties of each particular kingdom.¹⁶ For example, Bede does this by beginning his work with a description of the island of Britain. He gives the geographical features, as well as a description some of the local flora and fauna of the island, and a description of the climate of the island, rather than dwelling on the particularities of any of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms.¹⁷ Secondly, Bede takes note of the languages that were in use in England. Yet, he emphasizes the fact that what unites the speakers of the speakers of English, British (or Welsh), Irish, and Pictish, is the Latin language of the Roman Catholic Church, suggesting that it is the spiritual unity that makes up the English people.¹⁸

Bede's description of Britain under Roman rule differs vastly from Gildas's *Ruin of Britain*. Though not intended to be a history of Britain, Gildas's work is often treated thus because of its eyewitness account of Britain immediately following the end of Roman rule. Gildas prefaced his history by declaring his intention to "deplore with mournful complaint...a general loss of good, a heaping up of bad." That is, his goal was to serve as a warning against spiritual laxity, not unlike the epistles of St. Paul in the New

¹⁵ Henson, 104.

¹⁶ C. Warren Hollister, *The Making of England, 55 BC-1399*, 3rd ed. (Lexington, Massachusetts, D.C. Heath: 1976), 39-40.

¹⁷ Bede, *The Ecclesiastical History of the English People*, Judith McClure and Roger Collins, tr., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 9-10.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Testament.¹⁹ Bede's *Ecclesiastical History* however was intended as a history, written using the documents of his day with corroborating evidence. He consulted historians such as Pliny, Solinus, Eutropius, Sain Germanus, and Gildas. He consulted archives in Canterbury, Kent, and gained access to papers from Rome.²⁰

Bede's *Ecclesiastical History* delves into more detail the political and social developments of England during and after Roman rule, without as much admonishment as Gildas's work. For example, for the years surrounding Rome's fateful decision to withdraw its legions from Britain, Bede described the historical context that led to Rome's withdrawal from Britain by citing the invasions of the Germanic tribes that swept into Gaul, the rampant political instability in Rome, and the sacking of Rome by the Goths.²¹ Again, Gildas describes the same period with more commentary on the shortcomings of the Britons without much the same attention to detail and historical analysis as illustrated in *Ecclesiastical History*.²²

Perhaps where Bede and Gildas coincide is their treatment of the Anglo-Saxon invasions. Both scholars heap condemnation on the Britons' sins as the reasons for the Anglo-Saxon invasions. Gildas refers to the invasions as God's way "to purge his family, and to cleanse it from such an infection of evil..."²³ Bede also gives a Biblical analogy to the Anglo-Saxon invasions by likening them to the destruction of Jerusalem by the

¹⁹ Gildas, 13.

²⁰ George Hardin Brown, *Bede the Venerable*, (Boston, Massachusetts: Twayne Publishers, 1987), 88-9.

²¹ Bede, 21-2.

²² Gildas, 22-3.

²³ *Ibid*, 25.

Babylonians, as a means of divine punishment.²⁴ However, where he differs from Gildas is his treatment of the myth of Hengest. Gildas only refers to the raiding party of Hengest as “three keels”, referring to their ships. Bede, however, describes the arrival of the Saxons, Angles, and Jutes. He traces the royal lines of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms to Hengest and Horsa, describing them as “sons of Woden”, from Norse mythology.²⁵ Like Gildas, Bede considers the Anglo-Saxons justifiable. He believed that because of their sinfulness, the Britons deserved their punishment and were not fit to rule Britain. Thus, Bede traces the beginnings of the English people to the Anglo-Saxon invasions, rather than with the ancient Britons, themselves.²⁶

Likewise, the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* takes its cue from Bede’s *Ecclesiastical History*. The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* begins with a description of the island. It also emphasizes that among the languages spoken on Britain, Latin is a uniting factor in the island.²⁷ Perhaps even more explicitly than Bede’s *Ecclesiastical History*, the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* makes more of an effort to include Britain in the larger Christian community by including the events in the New Testament as part of the history of Britain before any mention of the Anglo-Saxon rulers²⁸

Unlike Gildas’s *On the Ruin of Britain* and Bede’s *Ecclesiastical History*, The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* was written specifically to praise the Anglo-Saxon kings. While both Gildas and Bede condemn the moral torpor of the ancient Britons, the *Anglo-Saxon chronicle* makes no mention of them, and credits the Anglo-Saxons with the

²⁴ Bede, 28.

²⁵ Ibid, 27.

²⁶ Brown, 90.

²⁷ The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, M.J. Swanton, tr., (New York: Routledge, 1996), 3.

²⁸ Ibid, 5–9.

establishment of the English nation.²⁹ Of the three works, the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* gives the most historical credence to the myth of Hengest. The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* lists the exploits of Hengest in detail, from his arrival at the request of Vortigern to the establishing of the kingdom of Kent.³⁰ As its title suggests, the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* traces the beginnings of the English nation to the creation of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms, rather than the ancient Britons. The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* creates what Benedict Anderson calls an “imagined community”, by using language to construct a larger Anglo-Saxon, hence “English” community out of an island of various kingdoms, often in conflict with one another.³¹ By its nature, the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* establishes the primacy of the Anglo-Saxons through its celebration of the military conquests of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms, and gives a sense of purpose to the Anglo-Saxons who settled into Britain above mere conquest and booty.³²

Geoffrey of Monmouth’s History of British Kings and the Arthurian Legend:

Geoffrey of Monmouth’s work *Historia Regnum Britanniae* was written in 1136, far beyond the era of the Anglo-Saxon invasions. Geoffrey’s purpose then, was to include the Normans, who were the last of the wave of invaders to overtake England, into the English community. Rather than to condemn the Britons, Gildas and Bede had done, Geoffrey sought to include the early Britons by connecting the Norman to the Arthurian legend. By connecting the Normans to the ancient Britons, particularly King Arthur,

²⁹ Janet Thormann, “The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle Poems and the Making of the English Nation,” *Anglo-Saxonism and the Construction of Social Identity*, Allen J. Frantzen and John D. Niles, eds., (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1997), 64.

³⁰ The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, 13–17.

³¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1983), 6–7.

³² Thormann, 65.

Geoffrey's work would establish a line of continuity, thus providing the Normans a sense of legitimacy.³³

Geoffrey's history of England delves more into myth than Gildas, Bede, or the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicles*. Like Bede and the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, Geoffrey gives a geographical preface as an introduction, perhaps consciously imitating their style, so as to lend legitimacy to his history of Britain.³⁴ While Gildas and Bede write from an ecclesiastical perspective, Geoffrey writes from a lay secular point of view. Geoffrey delves into Roman mythology to explain the origin of the Britons. According to Geoffrey, Britain was founded by Brutus, a grandson of Aeneas, who escaped the fall of Troy. Like the origin myths of other peoples, Brutus was given a divine commission by the goddess Diana to establish a kingdom in "an empty land" beyond Gaul and be the father of a line of kings.³⁵ After years of wandering, came upon the island of Albion, which he renamed "Britain" and established his capital at Troia Nova, where he established a people, from which the Britons were derived by the time of the Roman conquest.³⁶

Geoffrey's approach to the ancient Britons differ markedly from that of Gildas, Bede, or the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*. Rather than condemning them or ignoring them altogether, Geoffrey puts the Britons in a more positive light. Rather than blaming the sins of the Britons for the Anglo-Saxon invasions, Geoffrey instead blames the political

³³ Robert Rouse and Cory Rushton, *The Medieval Quest for Arthur* (Gloucestershire, Great Britain: Tempus Publishing Ltd, 2005), 11.

³⁴ Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, Lewis Thorpe, tr., (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1966), 53.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 65.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 74–5.

instability of the Roman Empire for the demise of Roman rule in Britain and its indefensibility against the invaders.³⁷ Like Bede and the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, Geoffrey weaves the myth of Hengist into the narrative of the founding of the English nation through their defeat of Vortigern.³⁸

Geoffrey wrote his *History* during the civil war between Stephen and Matilda in 1138. He goes beyond the earlier works mentioned in this paper provides the narrative of Arthur, a Welsh chieftain. The Arthurian legend served various purposes. One of them was to cast Arthur as the ideal model for the feudalism that was established since the Norman conquest. The Arthurian legends, aside from regaling its audiences with deeds of knightly valor, served to teach the morals of chivalry and the importance of maintaining the bond between lord and vassal.³⁹ While Gildas, Bede, and the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* ignore the Arthurian narrative altogether, Geoffrey takes great pains to connect Arthur to the recently established Norman rulers. Geoffrey was one of the first medieval scholars to cast Arthur in a heroic light. He does this, not only for the sake of literary flair, but rather for the purpose of establishing legitimacy for his patrons, the Normans, who came over with William the Conqueror in 1066. Firstly, Geoffrey's narrative of the Arthurian legend establishes a sense of continuity by linking the Normans to the ancient Britons. Secondly, Geoffrey bypasses the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms, the last of which the Normans overthrew because of their fractured nature. By tracing royal

³⁷ Ibid, 147.

³⁸ Ibid, 165.

³⁹ Laurie A. Finke and Martin B. Schichtman, *King Arthur and the Myth of History*, (Gainesville: University of Florida, 2004), 112.

genealogy back to the British, the Normans would be able to justify the centralization of England with the creation of a strong bureaucracy.⁴⁰

In the centuries since the Norman conquest, Anglo-Saxonism continued to play a role in the shaping of the British people. The theme of the English people as a “chosen people” gained new meaning during the English Reformation of the sixteenth century, when Henry VIII broke England away from the Roman Catholic Church. For example, John Bale, a former Carmelite priest who joined the Church of England, re-cast the Anglo-Saxon story, *The Actes of the English Votaryes* as an allegory for the struggle between the English church and a corrupt Roman Catholic hierarchy by emphasizing the sexual appetites of Roman Catholic priests, who did not spare even young English boys. In doing so, Bale gave credibility to Henry’s decision to declare himself the Supreme Head of the Church of England as a holy cause, rather than a political expedience. Therefore, since the Roman Catholic Church had been divided between the Bishop of Rome and the Patriarch of Constantinople, the Anglican church was the “true church.” This decision would be further vindicated under the leadership of Elizabeth I, as England escaped the clutches of the Catholic by the failed invasion attempt of the Spanish Armada.⁴¹

Just as Anglo-Saxonism was used to justify the English Reformation, the British people drew upon their Anglo-Saxon narrative in the struggle between absolute and constitutional monarchy throughout the seventeenth century, with the emphasis on

⁴⁰ Ibid, 37–8.

⁴¹ Allen J. Frantzen, “Bede and Bawdy Bale: Gregory the Great, Angles, and the ‘Angli’”, *Anglo-Saxonism and the Construction of Social Identity*, Allen J. Frantzen and John D. Niles, eds., (Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1997), 25-6.

liberty, as interpreted by the Whig faction that overthrew James II. In their triumph against the Stuart dynasty's pretense at divine right, the Whigs drew back on England's Anglo-Saxon past as an example of the ideal society. Sir William Temple, who wrote *An Introduction to the History of England*, idealized the Goths as "civil, orderly, and virtuous," in contrast to the absolutist tendencies of the Romans whom they vanquished. Therefore, it was in the spirit of the Goths that the Whigs overthrew James II during the Glorious Revolution in 1689 because he was imposing Catholic absolutism upon the English people.⁴² The accession of the German Hannoverians to the British throne in the early eighteenth century, as a result of the 1701 Act of Settlement, was celebrated by Whig leaders as a reunion of the English people to their Saxon relatives, and drew upon their common ancestry and the Protestant cause.⁴³ As the Whig version of history emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, historians, such as John Oldmixon supporting the Whig cause connected their revolution against absolutism and the constitutional monarchy to Anglo-Saxon institutions such as the *witenagemot* from which Parliament was derived, whose goal was to prevent monarchical tyranny, which would be carried on to Britain's North American colonies.⁴⁴

The Roots of American Anglo-Saxonism

The roots of American Anglo-Saxonism must be understood with the construction of American white identity. The United States was created in the eighteenth century out of a melting pot of peoples from all over Europe, with diverse creeds and traditions. As

⁴²MacDougal, 73-4.

⁴³Ibid, 77-8.

⁴⁴Ibid, 80.

the early Republic was established its founders appropriated Anglo-Saxonism to establish a national identity, which Americans would use to further differentiate themselves among the various European ethnic groups settling in the country, thus creating a hierarchy distinguishing “civilized” from “savage”. During the first decades of the Republic, a narrative had developed which defined who was an “American” and the ultimate destiny of the American people. First, they, were descended from ancient Anglo-Saxons with a tradition of liberty before the Norman Conquest. This included a Protestant identity, which drew heavily on Calvinism declaring the Americans to be an “elect” who shared a covenant with God to spread Christianity. Founding Fathers, such as John Winthrop, George Washington, and Thomas Jefferson were part of this Anglo-Saxon pantheon, from which the American nation would spring. The American people, were therefore, the heirs to the ancient Anglo-Saxons who would continue the legacy of liberty and Protestant Christianity upon the North American continent.⁴⁵ Thus, Anglo-Saxonism provided a common narrative for the fledgling republic during the nineteenth century, as the United States endured the growing pains of nationhood as it expanded westward in the decades before the Civil War.⁴⁶

American imperial expansion can be more clearly illuminated by using the template of Anglo-Saxonism. The peoples of Great Britain and their descendants in the white dominions and in the United States shared a common sense of origin and destiny by the end of the nineteenth century. Referring to themselves as the “English-speaking

⁴⁵Eric P. Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004), 24.

⁴⁶David R. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class*, (London: Verso, 1991), 21.

race,” Anglo-Saxonists believed that inherent in their character were self-government, liberty, and rule of law. In addition, Anglo-Saxonists claimed for their own the virtues of intelligence, temperance, efficiency, and moral consciousness.

Anglo-Saxonists drew upon the cultural and literary heritage connecting Britain and America. They claimed for their own the ancient myths of the founding of the British people and the heroic epic of King Arthur.⁴⁷ Anglo-Saxonism added a religious component during the Protestant Reformation and the Commonwealth, by believing they were “God’s Chosen People,” which was likewise transplanted in Massachusetts by the Puritans.⁴⁸ During the founding of the United States, the Anglo-Saxonists of the early nineteenth century took liberty as an inherent characteristic, and at the time, brooked no *rapprochement* with the British, whom they saw as hopelessly corrupted by monarchy. It was this interpretation of Anglo-Saxonism that fueled the idea of “Manifest Destiny” and justifies the expansion of the United States across the North American continent at the expense of Mexico and Native Americans.⁴⁹ During the 1840s when famine in Ireland drove an unprecedented horde of Catholic Irish immigrants to American shores. Nativists feared for the future of the United States, whether Catholicism would undermine American democratic institutions. Anglo-Saxonism thus provided an American identity by stressing its Protestantism.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Hugh A. MacDougall, *Racial Myth in English History: Trojans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons*, (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1982), 1-3.

⁴⁸ Richard Van Alstein, *Genesis of American Nationalism*, (Waltham, Massachusetts: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1970), 5.

⁴⁹ Anderson, 27-8.

⁵⁰ Kaufman, 47.

The leaders of the revolution drew upon Anglo-Saxon themes as part of their cause for liberty against despotic monarchical rule, based upon the belief that ancient England under the Anglo-Saxons was free until the Norman invasion of 1066. During the early years of the republic, the leaders of the new nation equated Anglo-Saxonism with freedom.⁵¹ Likewise, Jefferson, who saw the independent yeoman farmer as the backbone for the new American society, also believed that the North American continent belonged to the United States.⁵² By the 1830s and 1840s, as Manifest Destiny became synonymous with Anglo-Saxonism and served as the justification for American expansionism. Many Americans believe that it was the destiny of the young republic to expand from the Atlantic to the Pacific because of their Anglo-Saxon heritage, which had divine sanction. Americans began to see non-Anglo-Saxons, i.e., African-Americans, Mexicans, and Native Americans, as incapable of governing themselves responsibly. Thus, by 1850 Manifest Destiny provided the justification for the acquisition of Texas, the Oregon Country, and California because under the wise tutelage of American Anglo-Saxons, those areas would progress much farther than if they had been left to their own devices. Once the United States had reached the Pacific, Asia and the Caribbean lay next in the sights of Anglo-Saxonists with the same goals.⁵³

Late-Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Anglo-Saxonism

The intellectual discourse over Anglo-Saxonism continued into the late nineteenth century. Proponents of Anglo-Saxonism defined what it means to be an American

⁵¹ Kaufman, 61.

⁵² Ibid, 84.

⁵³ Reginald Horsman, "Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism", *Critical White Studies: Looking Behind the Mirror*, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, eds., (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 141-2.

through the prism of Anglo-Saxonism, which developed political, cultural, and religious dimensions, including the Teutonic theory, scientific racism, and social darwinism, which had something for different kinds of Anglo-Saxonists. American historians and ethnologists of the 1890s such as Herbert Baxter Adams, John Fiske, John W. Bergess, and James K. Hosmer continued to draw from the forests of northern Europe as the origins of American “self-government” and bolstering the identity of an Anglo-Protestant America.⁵⁴

Frederick Jackson Turner, most prominent for his Frontier Thesis, on first glance would appear to refute Anglo-Saxonism’s role in shaping American culture by stressing westward expansion’s role in creating an egalitarian and democratic society. In actuality, Turner’s intellectual pedigree included the Anglo-Saxonist Herbert Baxter Adams as his mentor. Turner assumed that Americans of Anglo-Saxon descent comprised the “native stock” of the United States, and it was this Anglo-Saxon stock’s sense of liberty and agrarian impulse that conquered the western half of North America.⁵⁵

By the end of the nineteenth century, the concepts of liberty and self-government as unique to Anglo-Saxonism continued to be part of the intellectual discourse, going back, at least, to medieval England. In the 1891 edition of the Harvard Law Review the legal tradition of the Magna Charta was a major influence in the federal and state constitutions, which inculcated the sense of “liberty” as part of the American identity. The author Charles Shattuck argues that the concepts of private property, religious

⁵⁴ Eric P. Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004), 51.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 51-2.

liberty, freedom of speech, and trial by jury, etc., as protected by the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, are a continuation of the Anglo-Saxon traditions enshrined in the Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act, and the English Bill of Rights.⁵⁶ Shattuck traces the protection of the rights to “life, liberty, and property” to Teutonic origins that were gradually transmitted to England by the time of the Norman Conquest in 1066.⁵⁷ Shattuck refers particularly the thirty-ninth article of the Magna Charta which declares that “No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or banished, or any ways destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor send upon him, unless by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.”⁵⁸ This has been interpreted as the origins of due process, the foundation of American jurisprudence that protects a citizen’s right against imprisonment or having his property seized by an arbitrary and tyrannical government. Shattuck considers this article of the Magna Charta especially important because it serves as a foundation upon which traditional English liberties would be built, which he ascribes as one of the chief qualities of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. He best articulates this saying:

Personal liberty was a common-law right in England in 1215, and long before; it was one of the great rights declared in the thirty-ninth article of the Great Charter; it was insisted upon in all the confirmations of that article, and is there always found in connection with the rights of life and property; its infringement was the chief complaint in the Petition of Right of 1627, and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 was passed solely to secure it against usurpation. Altogether, it may be said that the history of the growth and development of the right of personal liberty is the main element in the history of early English constitutional law, that the idea of

⁵⁶ Charles Shattuck, “The True Meaning of the Term ‘Liberty’ in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect “Life, Liberty, and Property,” *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 4. No. 8, 15 Mar 1891, 366.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 369.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 372.

personal liberty pervades the history of the Anglo-Saxon race, and that it is, therefore, not surprising to find it classified with the rights of life and property as one of the three greatest civil "liberties."⁵⁹

The rights to life, liberty, and property guaranteed in the Magna Charta, according to Shattuck, are thus enshrined in the federal and state constitutions, culminating in the Bill of Rights, particularly the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against the seizure of life, liberty, and property without the due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment would be tested in the "Slaughterhouse Cases", which decided whether butchers in New Orleans were being deprived of their livelihood when the state government of Louisiana created a monopoly and restricted the area in which butchers may ply their trade in the name of public health.⁶⁰ Shattuck noted that the dissenting justices cited the Anglo-Saxon legal heritage enshrined in the Magna Charta that depriving one's ability to earn a livelihood was the same as depriving one's property, which was an infringement of liberty, as stated in the Fourteenth Amendment.⁶¹ He therefore, uses development of liberty to differentiate the English-speaking countries from non-English-speaking countries.⁶²

Because of the inherent love for liberty held in the hearts of the English-speaking peoples, the case for Anglo-Saxonism, as inherent in the political blueprint of the United States, continued to be a topic of intellectual discourse in the late nineteenth century. Anglo-Saxonists tied American political institutions to the primeval forests of the

⁵⁹Ibid, 376.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 383-4.

⁶¹ Ibid, 385.

⁶² Ibid, 368.

Germanic peoples, who held the kernels of representative government.⁶³ In the September 1895 issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* traced the American federal system that emerged in the late eighteenth century was not a new system, but rather, had its roots in the ancient Germanic tribes. While he noted that similar movements had occurred in the ancient Greek and Roman city-states, the Germans were successful because they did not fall to anarchy, and eventually, autocracy, as had occurred with the ancient Greeks and Romans.⁶⁴

Morey examines further the development of Anglo-Saxon institutions transplanted from Germany, which held the seeds of the future American government, which would blossom centuries later. Like many Anglo-Saxonists, Morey looked at the village structure as the basis for American representative government. At the lowest level was the town meeting or *tun-gemote*, which elected its own chief magistrate, known as the *tun-reeve*. At the next level was the hundred, which was made up of a collection of towns, which elected the *hundred-reeve*, which had an assembly, known as the *hundred-gemote*. A group of “hundreds”, composed the shire, which had an assembly called the *shire-mote* made up of the freeholders of the shire, who elected their “earldorman”, the chief executive, and the *shire-reeve*, from which the title of “sheriff” is derived. He argued that the organization of the “town meetings”, “hundreds”, culminating into the shire, served as the template for the American federal system because it provided the conditions necessary for self-government, which would later distinguish the English-

⁶³ Anderson, 38.

⁶⁴ William C. Morey, “The Sources of American Federalism,” *Annals of the Academy of American Political Science*, Vol. 6, September 1895, 207.

speaking peoples from all others.⁶⁵ Consistent with other Anglo-Saxonists, Morey argued that the free institutions established by the early Anglo-Saxon tribes were brought to an end after the Norman Conquest of 1066, which introduced feudalism and centralized government. For example, the shire had become reduced to an administrative unit, rather than a self-ruling entity. The sheriff was no longer an elected position, and the earldorman was appointed by the Crown. According to Morey, in the centuries after 1066, England had copied its continental neighbors, culminating in the Tudor and Stuart dynasties, with the centralization of government.⁶⁶

By the 1890s, Americans took a great interest in the Anglo-Saxon language, which was available at more than three dozen schools, making the United States the country with the most abundant Anglo-Saxon courses in the world, compared to the 1840s, when there were only four schools that taught Anglo-Saxon. Proponents of Anglo-Saxonism believed that the American people were the heirs to the Anglo-Saxons by linking American political institutions with their own decentralized tribal systems.⁶⁷ In the article by Morey, he argued that the Pilgrim fathers and the Puritans who settled in Massachusetts were part of an “Anglo-Saxon revival” because they escaped the centralized “tyranny” they had known in England and re-established the institutions that existed before the Norman Conquest. He considered the New England townships in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut as models of Anglo-Saxon “self-government” that had no parallels in the world of the seventeenth century. From the New

⁶⁵ Ibid, 208.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 209.

⁶⁷ J. R. Hall, “Mid-Nineteenth Century American Anglo-Saxonism,” *Anglo-Saxonism and the Construction of Social Identity*, Allen J. Frantzen and John D. Niles, eds., (Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1997), 133-4.

England town, therefore, sprang forth the seeds of American federalism, which could be seen in the Albany Plan of Union proposed in 1754, culminating into the federal Constitution that was ratified in 1787.⁶⁸ Likewise, in an address to Syracuse University in 1875, attorney Dexter Hawkins attributed the love of liberty as unique in the Anglo-Saxon people, particularly in its influence behind the creation of American institutions. As the descendants of the ancient Anglo-Saxons settled into North America, they would transplant Anglo-Saxon institutions. In the aftermath of the American Revolution, the leaders of the new American polity could further fulfill the ancient liberties of their Anglo-Saxon forebears because they would be free of the trapping of hereditary monarchy, landed aristocracy, and an established church, which had so corrupted England, the ancient homeland. He considered the American Civil War as the last battle for Anglo-Saxon freedom, which eliminated slavery, which he considered a remnant of “barbarity”.⁶⁹

After the Civil War, white southerners turned to Anglo-Saxonism to establish a new narrative to replace the paradigm of slavery that was destroyed. This was a change in attitude from the antebellum period when white southerners identified more with the Normans, as the planter class desired to link themselves to the English aristocracy who traced their ancestry to the Norman Conquest in 1066. When the Civil War broke out, white southerners identified with the “Cavaliers” of the English Civil War of the

⁶⁸ Morey, 213.

⁶⁹ Dexter A. Hawkins, *The Anglo-Saxon Race: Its History Character and Destiny*, (New York: Nelson & Philips, 1875), 25-6.

seventeenth century, compared to the “Puritan” northerners.⁷⁰ Throughout the antebellum period southerners held to a code of honor that was reinforced by slavery. When the American Civil War broke out, white southerners counted on that sense of chivalry in order to prevail against the commercial barbarians of the North.⁷¹

With the defeat of the Confederacy in 1865 and the Reconstruction that followed, white southerners would have to refashion a new narrative. During the 1890s, Anglo-Saxon studies became part of the southern curriculum, in light of increasing demand for university courses by white southerners, who used Anglo-Saxon linguistics and ideals to define themselves, in light of the disruptions caused by the Civil War and Reconstruction.⁷² White southerners saw themselves in the stories of the Anglo-Saxon people who fought against oppression, whether it be the Romans or the Normans. Therefore, the Civil War fought between 1861 and 1865, was not so much over the subjugation of African-Americans, as it was a struggle against the oppression of the federal government, their contemporary version of the Norman invaders.⁷³ An article by W. P. Trent in the *Sewanee Review* in 1901 justified the South’s secession on the grounds that the states had the right to govern themselves as they saw fit, including the issue of slavery. States’ rights, then became the mid-nineteenth century equivalent of the Anglo-

⁷⁰ Ritchie Devon Watson, Jr., *Normans and Saxons: Southern Race Mythology and the Intellectual History of the American Civil War*, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 2008), 21.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, 169-70.

⁷² Gregory A. Van Hoosier-Carey, “Byrhtnoth in Dixie: The Emergence of Anglo-Saxon Studies in the Postbellum South,” *Anglo-Saxonism and the Construction of Social Identity*, Allen J. Frantzen and John D. Niles, eds., (Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1997), 157.

⁷³ *Ibid*, 161.

Saxon virtue of self-government, which southern intellectuals appropriated, as they began to give their accounts of the Civil War after 1865.⁷⁴

The aftermath of General Robert E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox Courthouse, would usher, for many southerners, an era of humiliation and degradation, as they would have to endure the abolition of slavery, military occupation, disfranchisement, and the onslaught of Northern carpetbaggers, which they felt akin to the defeat of the Anglo-Saxons after the Battle of Hastings in 1066, as well as the military dictatorship established by Oliver Cromwell in the aftermath of the English Civil War in the seventeenth century.⁷⁵ In the article by Trent, he argued that Reconstruction was even more excessive than the military government imposed by Cromwell after the establishment of the Commonwealth of England after 1649. He blamed the Radical Republican faction led by Thaddeus Stevens for suppressing the South's inclination to Anglo-Saxon self-government by imposing military occupation upon the former Confederacy and using African-American suffrage as a cudgel to keep southern whites in a "vanquished" state.⁷⁶ He also thought it was a "delusion" to give freed African-Americans the same rights of citizenship by giving them the vote because of their "inherently" inferior nature, and that universal suffrage would require countless generations of Anglo-Saxons tutelage, which to him was among the chief reasons that Reconstruction failed.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ W. P. Trent, "A New South View of Reconstruction," *The Sewanee Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1901, 13.

⁷⁵ Gregory A. Van Hoosier-Carey, "Byrhtnoth in Dixie: The Emergence of Anglo-Saxon Studies in the Postbellum South," 162.

⁷⁶ W. P. Trent, "A New South View of Reconstruction," 16.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 19.

With the abolition of slavery, white southerners used Anglo-Saxonism to refashion a new identity for themselves. They found themselves in the Anglo-Saxon tribes, thus occupied by the Norman invaders, and sought to create similar institutions that would recreate the liberty lost to the Norman Conquest. They identified with the qualities of temperance, duty, and endurance, which facilitated self-government.⁷⁸ As a result, white southerners believed that even though they were unsuccessful in the military struggle during the Civil War, they could preserve their heritage by using the Anglo-Saxon language and its institutions against northern carpetbaggers. The southern appropriation of Anglo-Saxonism, therefore, would save American culture, as a whole, from the forces unleashed by the Civil War, most notably the emancipation of African-Americans.⁷⁹ Southern white proponents of Anglo-Saxonism used the literary and linguistic traditions of the ancient Anglo-Saxons as another tool in the disfranchisement of African-Americans by condemning African-Americans' use of language to the periphery, declaring that it was inferior compared to the language of Beowulf. Therefore, southern Anglo-Saxonists argued against what they called the "linguistic miscegenation" between African-American English with the "pure" English, which descended from Anglo-Saxon language, and used it as another justification for racial segregation.⁸⁰

It is therefore no surprise that southern whites used Anglo-Saxonism as part of their arsenal in the subjugation of African-Americans in the late nineteenth century. Southerners used Anglo-Saxonism to further differentiate themselves from African-

⁷⁸ Gregory A. Van Hoosier-Carey, "Byrhtnoth in Dixie: The Emergence of Anglo-Saxon Studies in the Postbellum South," 164.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 165.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 169.

Americans, and that despite the abolition of slavery, they believed that African-Americans could therefore never rise to the levels of southern whites. An article in the June 1900 issue of the *North American Review* addressed the question of whether African-Americans could ever be integrated in the wider American society. The author, Professor John Roach Straton of Mercer University in Macon, Georgia, argued that the education of African-Americans in the decades after the Civil War has done little good, and to the contrary, had only encouraged “their tendency to immorality and crime”, compared to the antebellum period when they were a more docile people in their ignorance.⁸¹ He cited a direct relationship between the rise of spending on education of African-Americans with the increase in the crime rate. For example, he listed that between 1870 and 1880, the crime rate among African-Americans increased 25 percent and that between 1880 and 1890, it had increased to 33 percent, while between 1865 and 1890, spending on the education of African-Americans totaled to \$100 million. Like many southerners of his time, Straton linked African-Americans with the crime of rape, particularly against white women, which he believed to be intrinsic to their nature.⁸²

While one does not have to be an Anglo-Saxonist to espouse racist ideology, Straton saw civilization as inherent in the Anglo-Saxon peoples. Though one might be wont to share the fruits of civilization to “savages”, they would not be able to digest them, and on the contrary, such fruits would be harmful to them by their sudden introduction. He expressed it best by stating

⁸¹ John Roach Straton, “Will Education Solve the Negro Problem?” *The North American Review*, Vol. 170, No. 523 (Jun., 1900), 785.

⁸² *Ibid*, 786-7.

The true civilizing process is not a sudden and artificial development from without, but a gradual and harmonious growth from within. Plato's dwellers in the cave could not be suddenly transferred from their accustomed darkness to the dazzling light on the out side. The African cannot be lifted to the plane of the Anglo-Saxon by the use of either logarithms and Greek roots or formulae for cultivating a field or constructing a pair of shoes. The Anglo-Saxon has reached his present high civilization after a long and laborious struggle upward. Through a series of well defined steps, he has risen from barbarism to his present plane. The system in which he now dwells is the logical outcome of all that has gone before, and consequently the white man of to-day is thoroughly suited to his environment. Now, it is reasonable to think that, since Anglo-Saxon civilization is thus the culmination of a series of steps, all the steps must be taken before it can safely be reached.⁸³

Furthermore, Straton argued that exposure of non-Anglo-Saxon peoples to the Anglo-Saxons has generally led to their extinction. He cited historical examples like the contact between the British and the indigenous peoples of Tasmania, the contact between the British and the Maoris in New Zealand, the contact between Europeans and the native Hawaiians, and the contact between Europeans and native Americans, which led to drastic declines in numbers because of the attempts of well-meaning Europeans to “civilize” them.⁸⁴ In the case of African-Americans, Straton concluded that while there may be remarkable individuals like Booker T. Washington, whose emphasis on “industrial education” he supported wholeheartedly, he believed that as a whole, “lifting them up” by education would have disastrous consequences because while the Anglo-Saxon peoples took millennia to developed into a “civilized” race, the sudden introduction of education and technology wrought by emancipation would lead to the

⁸³ Ibid, 793-4.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 795-7.

ultimate destruction of the African-American people, releasing their propensities toward “degeneracy”.⁸⁵

The transformation of Anglo-Saxonism from the optimism of liberty to its message of racial struggle occurred in the mid-nineteenth century with Darwin’s *Origin of the Species: The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*, published in 1859. Anglo-Saxonists utilized Darwin’s theory of natural selection from its biological application to the human world. For example, even though the term “races” in the subtitle of the work referred to animal species, Anglo-Saxonists of the period extended the definition to include humans. Darwin’s subsequent work, *The Descent of Man* in 1871, argued that the laws of evolution and natural selection also applied to human beings, particularly those of the Anglo-Saxon race. As a result, Darwin’s works provided a scientific explanation for the “superiority” of some races and the “inferiority” of others. Adding science to the Anglo-Saxonists’ arguments provided an intellectual foundation from which to draw and a means in which to gain credibility.⁸⁶ These ideas would then be applied to American foreign policy at the beginning of the twentieth century, as the United States embarked upon an expansionist foreign policy by projecting its power beyond its shores. Anglo-Saxonism and whiteness complemented each other perfectly by declaring that the white race had the obligation to “civilize” and “Christianize” the “savages” of the world.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Ibid, 798-800.

⁸⁶ Horsman, 129.

⁸⁷ Philip C. Wander, et al, “The Roots of Racial Classification”, *White Privilege: Essential Readings on the Other Side of Racism*, Rothenberg, ed., 31.

Darwin's theories of evolution and natural selection became a source from which Anglo-Saxonists from both sides of the Atlantic, could expand upon their theories of racial superiority. Increasingly, intellectuals from the United States and Great Britain looked to Anglo-Saxonism as a reason for the incredible success of their respective countries, and that with the United States and Great Britain working together in concert, they would be a force for greater good. In the years following the publication of *Origin of the Species*, various writers used the themes of racial struggle to justify the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. Benjamin Kidd, a British civil servant, published *Social Evolution* in 1894. Therein, he contended that human societies are subject to the same biological laws that governed other organisms.⁸⁸ A similar Anglo-Saxonist, Karl Pearson, wrote in 1900 *National Life from the Standpoint of Science* wrote that nations were engaged in perpetual struggle, particularly in economic and technological competition. As a result of the struggle between nations, the "suffering" of individual members of society i.e., workers was a price for progress, whose ultimate goal was civilization.⁸⁹

By the late nineteenth century, Anglo-Saxonists used history to justify the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon civilization of Britain and the United States. Anglo-Saxonist historians argued that the ancient Anglo-Saxon race developed the free institutions Britain and America by the nineteenth century. James Hosmeer, a contemporary historian of the 1890s remarked that

⁸⁸ Ibid, 30-31.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 31-32.

Representation, the principle that pervades the whole apparatus for law-making and administration in the higher ranges of politics, is distinctly an Anglo-Saxon idea, proceeding probably from the earliest times. If America resembles the ancient mother, in no less degree does England resemble her... The blood and fibre of the whole great English-speaking race, in fact, is derived from those Elbe and Weser plains; government of the people, by the people, for the people, which is as the breath of its life wherever that race may be scattered, is the ancient Anglo-Saxon freedom.⁹⁰

Similarly, in the August 1898 issue of *Living Age*, the director of the American Archaeological School in Athens, Dr. Charles Waldstein, opined that the peoples of the United States and Great Britain shared a common history. He claimed that before 1776, the year of the American Revolution, the history of America lay *not* with the Native Americans, but with England. He also made the claim that the history of Great Britain, therefore, would not be complete *without* including the histories of the United States and its settler colonies of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.⁹¹ In regards to the American Revolution, Waldstein did not interpret it as a schism between the two English-speaking peoples. Rather, the revolution and the founding of the United States complemented England's enterprise of self-government in America. Thus, the peoples of Great Britain and the United States, deduced Waldstein, are far more united because they share the same institutions of self-government.⁹²

Another method of manipulating history to justify the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon peoples was the "Teutonic" theory which held that the ancestors of the British and American people hailed from Germany, and over the centuries, established themselves in

⁹⁰James Hosmer, *A Short History of Anglo-Saxon Freedom: The Polity of the English-Speaking Race* (Boston: Berwick & Smith Printers, 1890), 9-10

⁹¹ Charles Waldstein, "The English-Speaking Brotherhood", *The Living Age*, August 1898, v. 167, 232.

⁹² *Ibid*, 231.

England and America, taking their ideas of self-rule with them. Among the scholars who supported the “Teutonic” theory, were John Mitchell Kemble who, in his work, *The Saxons in England*, traced the development of English institutions of representation and self-government to ancient Anglo-Saxon assemblies. Edward Freeman, Regius Professor of history at Oxford University, promoted the idea of race in English history. In his lectures between 1881 and 1882 titled, *The English People in its Three Homes*, Freeman wrote that there were three points of origin of the English-speaking peoples. “Old England” was in northern Germany, whose people migrated to “Middle England” which was Britain, whose people then migrated to “New England”, the United States. He toured the United States giving lectures on the origins of the English-speaking peoples and was enormously popular. Freeman’s contributed to the field of Anglo-Saxonism by emphasizing the unity of the peoples of Britain and America based on race and language.⁹³

Sir Walter Besant best expressed the “Teutonic” school of Anglo-Saxonism in the August 1896 issue of the *North American Review* when he summarized the history of the Anglo-Saxon peoples as coming from

... a cold, sterile and ungenial tract of country in the midst of which now stands the very noble city of Hamburg. They came over in hordes; they settled down on the English coasts; whole districts of their native land were deserted; they came in tribes and in families; wherever they sat down, they brought with them, as part of themselves, not to be changed, their laws and their customs and their language. These survived, and remain to this day in essentials the language, the laws, and the customs of their countries.⁹⁴

⁹³ Anderson, 37-39.

⁹⁴Sir Walter Besant, “The Future of the Anglo-Saxon Race”, *North American Review*, August 1896, v. 376, 129.

Besant further argued that throughout the centuries, the Anglo-Saxons who settled England rooted out the indigenous peoples of Britain. Instead, the Anglo-Saxons absorbed other peoples who crossed their path in succeeding migration waves. He viewed Americans as having the same trait as their Anglo-Saxon forebears as they settled the frontier, displacing, not only indigenous populations, but previous colonizers writing

The United States of America in the same way cover ground which has been Spanish, French, Dutch, and Swedish. What trace do you find Spanish occupation?—an ancient town. What trace do you find of the Dutch?—a few houses here and there which remind one of Amsterdam. Anglo-Saxon America is constantly engaged in absorbing.⁹⁵

Besant concluded that the Anglo-Saxon people are a “stiff-necked race... which cannot change its mind—as regards laws and manners—for the mind of any other race... a people, which if it settles down anywhere, means to go on living as before and to make other people live in the same way.”⁹⁶ The author concluded that this restless spirit and the ability to absorb foreign elements allowed the Anglo-Saxon races to expand their dominion throughout the globe.

This then is the present position of our race; we possess the finest and most desirable parts of the earth; we are more wealthy than the rest of the world put together; we are connected by a common ancestry; by a common history up to a certain point; by the same laws which we have inherited from our common ancestors, by the same speech; by the same religion; by the same literature... It would be difficult to find stronger bonds: they are such as nothing in the world can cut asunder.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Ibid, 130.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 130-1.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 136.

Culture also provided another dimension of being Anglo-Saxonism. An editorial in the 30 April 1898 issue of *The Spectator* argued for the inclusion of the United States, despite its immigrant population, among the Anglo-Saxon peoples. According to the editorial, the American people were predominantly Anglo-Saxon based upon its leaders in government, religion, legal system, and literature.⁹⁸ With the exception of Martin Van Buren, all of America's presidents were of English descent. Additionally, McKinley's cabinet consisted of men of British descent. English common law also served as one of the hallmarks of Anglo-Saxondom, according to the editorial, which cited the Supreme Court's ruling that the common law of England was also part of the United States. As for literature, because Anglo-Saxons claim English as a mother tongue, all English-speakers from both sides of the Atlantic share the same appreciation for the great literary works of, such as Shakespeare or Coleridge. Having common cultural affinities, regardless of ethnicity, also illustrated that Anglo-Saxonism had the potential for inclusion.⁹⁹

Anglo-Saxonists used contemporary statistics to justify their belief in the superiority of the English-speaking peoples. In the 14 March 1896 issue of *Outlook*, the editorialist Reverend George Payson echoed the social Darwinist belief in race as the basis for future conflict. He dismissed the French and Germans as viable contenders to Britain and the United States, because of their lower birth rates and their "lack of pluck and grit."¹⁰⁰ He quotes that as of 1895, the Great Britain and the United States combined

⁹⁸ "Are Americans Anglo-Saxon?" *The Spectator*, 30 April 1898, 615.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Reverend George S. Payson, "Anglo-Saxon Supremacy", *Outlook*, 14 March 1896, 11.

controlled 30 percent of the earth's surface; 25 percent of the world's population; raised more than 66 percent of the world's wheat; and accounted for 66 percent of the world's tonnage. To Payson, these facts give uncontestable proof that "the history of this race, its genius for government, its enterprise, and its devotion to civil and religious liberty, fit it for the noblest destiny."¹⁰¹ An editorial in the *Christian Observer*, as early as 1850, predicted that the Anglo-Saxon race would expand to as much as 800 million in the distant future because of its inherent superiority in fertility, language, and literature.¹⁰²

Anglo-Saxonism became a lens through which to interpret the historical development of the United States. Anglo-Saxonists saw demography as crucial to the cultural and economic development of the United States by the nineteenth century. In an article for the *New York Times* a writer named Edward E. Cornwall, MD, took pains to refute an argument that Americans had no close connection to Britain or Germany. He concluded that out of a population of about 55 million white Americans in the 1890 census, 33 million, or 60 percent were considered to be of Anglo-Saxon heritage, meaning those descended from settlers from the British Isles. All other groups such as Native Americans or African-Americans, according to Cornwall, "have no part in the destiny of the American people."¹⁰³ It is not surprising, then, that the racial component of Anglo-Saxonism flourished as American society faced a new wave of "new immigrants" from southern and eastern Europe, which terrified old stock Americans.¹⁰⁴ Rather than celebrate the cultural diversity of the United States, through immigration, Anglo-

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² "The Anglo-Saxon Race," *Christian Observer*, 6 July 1850, 27.

¹⁰³ Edward E. Cornwall, M.D. "Are the Americans an Anglo-Saxon People?" *The New York Times*, 14 January 1900, 21.

¹⁰⁴ Anderson, 54.

Saxonists argue for what they saw as the racial “purity” of the Anglo-Saxon heritage of the American people.

The Anglo-American Community:

Despite the acrimony that resulted from the political separation between the United States and Great Britain, both English-speaking countries continued to be enmeshed economically, intellectually, and culturally. The cities of Boston, New York, Liverpool, and London were integrated into the Atlantic economy, which had its roots in colonial period. British capital helped finance American industrialization during the early nineteenth century until the Civil War.¹⁰⁵ British political radicals and intellectuals looked to the United States as a model for liberty, while American abolitionists worked with their British counterparts.¹⁰⁶ As a result of these intertwined networks, an Anglo-American community emerged that would provide the foundation for the *rapprochement* between both countries at the turn of the twentieth century, which would later become the “Special Relationship.”

Britain’s economic ties with the United States can be traced to the seventeenth century with the creation of the Virginia Company in 1606. Envious of the wealth pouring into Spain from its Latin American colonies, the English government hoped to repeat Spain’s success. However, even though the United States had achieved political independence, it remained economically dependent on European manufactured goods, European markets, and European capital, particularly British capital.¹⁰⁷ Between 1820

¹⁰⁵ Frank Thistlethwaite, *The Anglo-American Connection in the Early Nineteenth Century*, (New York: Russel & Russel, 1959), 8.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 76.

¹⁰⁷ Wilkinson, 28.

and 1860, half of American products went toward British markets, and by 1860, Great Britain accounted for 80 percent of foreign tonnage arriving in American ports.¹⁰⁸

Cotton, however, proved to be the most valuable economic link between Great Britain and the United States. American cotton fed the British mills of Lancashire between 1820 and 1860, which in turn, provided American consumers with cheap clothing and other manufactured goods.

In addition to economic ties, the United States and Britain maintained an intellectual community. During the early decades of the nineteenth century, the United States was a model for liberty, particularly to British intellectuals. The Jacksonian Democracy of the 1820s and the 1830s fired the imaginations of British liberals and religious non-conformists who chafed under a political system dominated by the landed nobility and a society groaning under the overwhelming influence of the Church of England.¹⁰⁹ American society was a favorite topic for British authors such as Frances Trollope, Charles Dickens, and Harriet Martineau who wrote about their travels to a hungry British audience, which would continue to inspire generations of British immigration.¹¹⁰

British immigration to the United States was crucial to the formation of the Anglo-American community. It is important to note that for the purposes of this chapter, “British immigration” refers to the countries of Great Britain, i.e., England, Scotland, and Wales. British emigration to the North American colonies had been a fact of life since

¹⁰⁸ Graeme M. Holmes, *Britain and America: A Comparative Economic History, 1850-1939*, (London: David & Charles Publishers Limited, 1976), 9.

¹⁰⁹ Thistlethwaite, 40.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, 44-5.

the seventeenth century. By the mid eighteenth century, an average of 125,000 people left Britain for North America, mostly to escape its caste ridden society.¹¹¹ An emigrant named Alexander Thomson best expressed such sentiment writing that unlike in Scotland “...we have no tithes of general taxes, or... We have the privilege of choosing our ministers, schoolmasters, constables, and other parish officers for laying and collecting the necessary assessments...”¹¹²

During the first census in 1790, approximately 60 percent of the white population of the United States was of English and Welsh descent. British immigration to the United States continued after independence. After a long lull because of the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812, immigration from England totaled 15,837 between 1820 and 1830.¹¹³ Between 1851 and 1860, immigration from England alone totaled 247,125, a significant jump from a decade before at 32,092. Immigration from England peaked between 1881 and 1890 at 644,680.¹¹⁴

The impetus to immigration was the Industrial Revolution, which dislocated traditional trades in Britain, through mechanization.¹¹⁵ As power looms priced out traditional weavers by the late eighteenth century the United States became a beacon of economic opportunity. Between 1826 and 1827, Parliament made an inquiry on the

¹¹¹ Barbara De Wolfe “Introduction” *Discoveries of America: Personal Accounts of British Emigrants to North America during the Revolutionary Era*, Barbara De Wolfe, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3-4.

¹¹² Alexander Thomson, 16 August 1773, “News from America,” *Discoveries of America: Personal Accounts of British Emigrants to North America during the Revolutionary Era*, Barbara De Wolfe, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 119.

¹¹³ Rowland Tappan Berthoff, *British Immigrants in Industrial America*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 1953), 5.

¹¹⁴ Berthoff, 5.

¹¹⁵ William E. Van Vugt, *Britain to America: Mid-Nineteenth Century Immigrants to the United States*, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press: 1999), 9.

economic effects of industrialization and its relationship to British emigration to the United States, concluding the destructive effects of mechanization in the textile industry.¹¹⁶

In addition to economic necessity, it was personal ambition that induced many Britons to come to America. The prospect of owning land lured many emigrants to cross the Atlantic, without even the scantest information of where they were settling or the costs involved. Many British immigrants were inspired by the Jeffersonian ideal of the independent yeoman farmer. What coincided with mid-nineteenth century British immigration was the availability of land in the United States. With the availability of land, all that was needed was capital, prompting relatively well-off Britons to contemplate migration across the Atlantic.¹¹⁷

For the great majority of British immigrants, their experiences in settling in the United States was atypical to that experienced by their Irish brethren and counterparts from southern and eastern Europe. With English as their primary language, they had none of the usual impediments facing other immigrants, which allowed them to bypass the typical adjustment period of entry-level work and upward mobility through the next generation.¹¹⁸ As a sign of true acceptance, British workers eventually adopted the same racial prejudices as their American counterparts. They equally shared the same disdain for southern and eastern European immigrants and adopted the same anti-immigrant

¹¹⁶ First Second and Third Reports from the Select Committee on Emigration from the United Kingdom with Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index, *Irish University Press of British Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. 5, 29 March 1827, 209.

¹¹⁷ Van Vugt, 11-2.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, 125.

attitudes that the “new immigrants” were taking away good jobs and debasing the American way of life, thus perpetuating Anglo-Saxonism.¹¹⁹

The White Anglo-Saxon Protestant:

To understand American Anglo-Saxonism is to examine the phenomenon in American culture known as the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant, or WASP. In a 1991 essay by Richard Brookhiser, to be a WASP required subscribing to a set of ideals: conscience, anti-sensuality, usefulness, civic-mindedness, industry, and success. These ideals regulated the actions, beliefs, and motivations of the WASP elite, which in some ways, filtered down to the white working classes throughout the history of the United States. According to Brookhiser, these qualities not only explained the rise of the WASPs but that the Puritan work ethic espoused by the WASP elite contributed to the rise of the United States as an economic superpower.¹²⁰

The proponents of Anglo-Saxonism in the United States were the Anglo-American community, whose members could trace their lineage to British colonists who settled in the original thirteen colonies. The colonial experience of these early English settlers influenced the formulation of what would become WASP culture. Of the original 105 settlers in Jamestown, 36 were listed as “gentlemen” and expected to live the life to which they had been accustomed. Thus, even in a new world, class assumptions began to be planted, as manual labor was not fitting for the ancestors of the WASP elite.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Berthoff, 133.

¹²⁰ Richard Brookhiser, “The Way of the WASP”, *Critical White Studies: Looking Behind the Mirror*, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, eds., (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 16-7

¹²¹ Capt. John Smith, “The Proceedings of the English Colony in Virginia,” 1612, *The Complete Works of Captain John Smith (1580-1631) in Three Volumes*, Vol. 1, Philip L. Barbour, ed., (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 208-10

In contrast to Jamestown, as the Puritans settled New England in the 1630s, religion rather than commerce, was their motivation to leave Europe. John Winthrop wrote that one of the justifications for settling in New England was to spread the gospel into hitherto unknown regions of the world and to check the influence of the Catholic Church in the New World.¹²²

As the thirteen colonies grew from isolated outposts of England's fledgling colonial empire of the seventeenth century to part of an emerging global Atlantic economy of the eighteenth, the concept of "whiteness" further evolved out of the growing tensions between an increasingly powerful planter class and the dispossessed indentured servants and that between the colonies and the home country.¹²³ Indentured servitude was gradually phased out with the introduction of Africans as a new source of labor to be exploited. As African slavery became a more common part of colonial life, especially in the southern colonies, English settlers defined their whiteness even further by distinguishing themselves from "Negro labor". By the eighteenth century, there arose a gradation of occupations that were deemed suitable for white workers and those reserved for African slaves. Slavery provided a means for working class whites to share the same dignity as the planter class because they could use skin color for solidarity.¹²⁴

While the institution of slavery created social cohesion within the colonies, a widening gulf existed between the colonies and the British motherland. Despite the commonalities between the settlers and their British brethren in culture and language, the

¹²² John Winthrop, "Reasons to be Considered for Justifying the Undertakers of the Intended Plantation in New England for Encouraging Such Whose Hearts God Shall Move to Join with them in it," *The English in America 1578—1970*, Howard B. Furer, ed. (New York: Oceana Publications, 1972), 93.

¹²³ Roedigger, 27.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.

tensions simmering between the colonies and Great Britain during the 1760s and early 1770s exploded into the American Revolution. At the heart of the matter was the resentment by the colonists of not having the same rights as British subjects. The rhetoric of “slavery vs. liberty” was commonly in use in the political tracts of the day, particularly regarding the arbitrary rule of Parliament over the colonies on matters such as taxation and settlement on Indian lands west of the Appalachians, culminating into Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence.¹²⁵

Like his contemporary Jefferson, James Iredell, the future Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, made his own personal declaration of independence. A patriot from a distinguished family in North Carolina, and a descendant of Oliver Cromwell, Iredell renounced his allegiance to George III on March 1777 after considerable deliberation:

Severe and painful, indeed was this Duty. I loved my Country; I once loved my Prince. Would have been the greatest blessing in life to me had it been in my power to continue my attachment to both. This would have been the Case, Sir, if your Majesty had not adopted measures of the most fatal tendency; measures insupportable to freemen, and which perhaps in the end may prove personally ruinous to yourself. I cannot yet, Sir, without emotion, think of the complicated miseries yourself, as much as your Subjects may endure, from your haughty and precipitate conduct.¹²⁶

Iredell accuses George III of ruling arbitrarily, depending on ministers who give false information about the thirteen colonies, who were mostly depended on the good graces of the Crown, rather than on the citizens of the colonies. As a result, Iredell concluded that the king of Great Britain endangered the liberty of the colonies, which he was expected to

¹²⁵ Roedigger, 30.

¹²⁶ James Iredell March 1777, Letter Renouncing Allegiance to King George III, from the Rare Book, Manuscript and Special Collections Library, Duke University, 1.

protect, as part of his royal duties.¹²⁷ This infringement on their liberties was what impelled the political separation from Great Britain.¹²⁸

“Whiteness” as an identity came further into focus during the first years of the Republic in the political and economic spheres, which further evolved into the conventions of the WASP elite. In 1790, Congress that “all white persons” would be given the full rights of citizenship.¹²⁹ The motivation behind this piece of legislation was to associate the rights, privileges, and responsibilities with a free white citizenry. Thus it would be inconceivable to ascribe American citizenship to African-Americans or Native Americans.¹³⁰

The ideal of republicanism was not purely a political ideology. Rather republicanism was also applied to the workshop, as it filtered down to the working classes, eager to establish their identities as distinct from the degradation of Black slavery. For example, Thomas Jefferson believed that the cornerstone of the early Republic lay in the yeoman farmer.¹³¹ To be white was to be accorded all the privileges of citizenship, which would establish who would have political participation, as well as clarify people’s positions in the socio economic ladder.¹³² Whether they were yeoman farmers, or shop apprentices, labor republicans sought to eliminate inequality among

¹²⁷ Ibid, 7.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 11.

¹²⁹ Ibid, 25.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Roediger, 45.

¹³² Philip C. Wander, Judith N. Martin, Thomas K. Nakayama, “The Roots of Racial Classification,” *White Privilege: Essential Readings on the Other Side of Racism*, Paula S. Rothenberg, ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 2005), 30.

white workers. On the shop floor, there was to be no distinction of who was the “master” or who was the “servant.”¹³³

With the Jacksonian democracy of the 1830s, the ruling class widened to include white male, Anglo-Saxon Protestants who had a perceived stake in the socioeconomic structure.¹³⁴ To be a “freeman” was the highest honor coveted by the white working class because it rejected the dichotomy of *master* and *slave*. The connotation of the term “freeman” was that of independence and control over one’s destiny.¹³⁵ However, as white males were granted access to political participation, there was an equally strong movement to ensure the political and economic marginalization of African-Americans. During the 1830s, constitutions across the North sharply restricted the rights of free Blacks, so that by 1860, only one African-American in fourteen would have the right to vote.¹³⁶ The result was what sociologist Pierre L. van der Berghe called “*herrenvolk* democracy” because in his studies of South African society during *apartheid* and the United States under segregation, the dominant racial group enjoyed democracy, while minorities lived under oppression.¹³⁷

In addition to liberty and citizenship, religion was another pillar in American white identity, namely Protestantism, which played an important role in the founding of the thirteen colonies. It is important to note that contrary to what is generally believed,

¹³³ Roediger, 43.

¹³⁴ Alexander Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America*, (London: Verso, 1990), 23-4.

¹³⁵ Roediger, 55-6.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, 56.

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, 59-60.

people settled in the colonies, not for the sake of their religious liberty, but rather to practice their faiths to the exclusion of all else.¹³⁸

Even though the Constitution enshrines the separation of church and state in the Bill of Rights, Protestantism remained the default religion for the overwhelming majority of Americans in the early decades of the republic. Yet, there remained a tension over the identity of the United States, whether it was a “Christian” nation meaning Protestant, or a secular “republic,” which had gained a negative connotation during the French Revolution.¹³⁹ The consensus followed, then that the Founders of the early republic shed the new nation of all trappings of monarchy and state-sanctioned religion, they still believed in the idea that the United States was analogous to the Biblical covenant between God and the children of Israel.¹⁴⁰

Out of this milieu of political, economic, and social assumptions came the dominance of the WASP elite that lasted until the latter half of the twentieth century. The term “White Anglo-Saxon Protestant” was introduced by the sociologist E. Digby Baltzell in *The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America* in the 1960s. Baltzell defined the WASP elite as being traced to the East Coast establishment, bearing a resemblance to the British aristocracy in mannerisms and upbringing that had

¹³⁸ John M. Murrin, “A Protestant Era: Colonial Era to the Civil War”, *Religion and American Politics: From the Colonial Era to the Present*, Mark A. Noll and Luke E. Harlow, eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 24-6.

¹³⁹ Harry S. Stout, “Rhetoric and Reality in the Early Republic: The Case of the Federalist Clergy,” *Religion and American Politics: From the Colonial Era to the Present*, Mark A. Noll and Luke E. Harlow, eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 66.

¹⁴⁰ Stout, “Rhetoric and Reality in the Early Republic: The Case of the Federalist Clergy,” 72-3.

emerged by the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁴¹ The origins of the WASP elite could be traced to the founding of the thirteen colonies, which occurred in different circumstances, from the backwoods of Virginia to the rocky soil of New England.

Throughout the seventeenth century, a clique of wealthy planters often dubbed the “First Families,” emerged in Virginia society. Land was the foundation of wealth in Virginia, and a prerequisite for any kind of social pretension. Tobacco, then, became the engine for economic stability in Virginia. As long as there was a demand in Europe and the prices were high, tobacco proved to be a source of the fortunes of the First Families.¹⁴²

Because the terrain and the climate of the southern colonies provided for the rise of a planter elite, New England was different in terms of its settlement and the eventual rise of its elite class. As Virginia was settled by adventurers from the Virginia Company, Massachusetts was founded on religion.¹⁴³ Over time, Massachusetts and the rest of New England evolved from a spiritual community to an economic center in the Atlantic trade.¹⁴⁴ Starting with the Navigation Acts of 1660 and 1673 and the Staple Act of 1673, Parliament regulated colonial trade, by restricting the transport of colonial goods through British merchants and shippers. All goods going to the colonies had to go through the British Isles. From this wealth, a handful of families, clustered in Boston, emerged, such

¹⁴¹ E. Digby Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 9-10.

¹⁴² Louis B. Wright, *The First Gentlemen of Virginia: Intellectual Qualities of the Early Colonial Ruling Class*, (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1949), 44.

¹⁴³ Peter Dobkin Hall, “*The Organization of American Culture 1700—1900: Private Institutions, Elites, and the Origins of American Nationality* (New York: New York University Press, 1982), 22.

¹⁴⁴ John Murrin, *Anglicizing an American Colony: The Transformation of Provincial Massachusetts*, (dissertation, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms Inc., 1966), 24-5.

as the Adamses, Cabots, Lodges, Tyngs, and Ushers. Though they may have had different origins, these families shared the same economic interests. By the eighteenth century, the “First Families” of Boston used marriage to protect their assets, even among first cousins, which had originally been forbidden by the Puritans.¹⁴⁵

After the Civil War, a new industrialist class emerged. To add legitimacy to their new-found wealth, these Gilded Age millionaires formed genealogical societies such as the Sons of the American Revolution and the Society of Mayflower Descendants. In doing so, not only did they appear respectable, but they also provided a sense of continuity in a society undergoing large-scale industrialization, urbanization, and immigration.¹⁴⁶ Among this WASP elite were men of letters such as Henry Adams who reflected the apprehensions of the late nineteenth century. With the “new immigrants” from Eastern Europe streaming into Ellis Island year by year, Anglo-Saxonists like Adams felt increasingly out of touch with the accelerating changes overcoming American society.¹⁴⁷

It was primarily this WASP elite that was most in favor of American imperial expansion. Using Darwin as a guide, they saw a world of limited resources, with nations, like organisms, fighting for survival. As they saw it, the world of the turn of the century was divided among the “Latin race” represented by France, the “Teutonic” race as represented by Germany, the “Slavic race” represented by Russia, and the “Anglo-Saxon race” in the forms of the British Empire and the United States. To them, it was a natural

¹⁴⁵ Hall, 58-9.

¹⁴⁶ E. Digby Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 110.

¹⁴⁷ Joanne Jacobson, *Authority and Alliance in the Letters of Henry Adams*, (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 50.

conclusion, therefore, that Britain and the United States would join forces against such antagonistic rivals and spread the benefits of civilization.¹⁴⁸

Anglo-Saxonists translated their numbers as justification for the expansion of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century. An article in *The Maine Farmer* connected the American victory in the Spanish-American War, Britain's victory in the Boer War, and the eventual domination of Russia by Germany as proof of Anglo-Saxon superiority.¹⁴⁹ He argued that since the Anglo-Saxon races have contributed to the technological progress of the nineteenth century, as well as the bulk of global trade and to culture and literature, it stood to reason that Anglo-Saxons were best suited to manage humanity.¹⁵⁰ To the contrary, the author compares the low birthrate of France with the high fertility of Britain and the United States, as well as the slow economic development of Latin America and colonies administered by Latin countries in Africa. Anglo-Saxonism, then, was clearly the preferred model for colonization, which would then be undertaken by the United States.¹⁵¹

Anglo-Saxonism was an integral component of American colonial rule in the Philippines. The victory of the United States in the Spanish-American War and the acquisition of the last remnants of Spain's colonial empire marked the debut of the United States as a major world power. Having at last realized the responsibilities of colonial rule by American foreign policy makers could the United States embark its

¹⁴⁸ Anderson, 63.

¹⁴⁹ Rev. J.H. Cone, "Anglo-Saxon Superiority", *The Maine Farmer*, 15 March 1900, vol. 68, no. 20, p. 2.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 488.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

rapprochement with its old adversary Great Britain.¹⁵² American control of the Philippines was Anglo-Saxonism in action. While it was one thing to extol the past glories of the Anglo-Saxon race, it was another thing to apply the credos of Anglo-Saxonism in the Philippines. Politicians could no longer talk about the *potential* benefits of American rule, but of how to bring “civilization” to the Philippines.¹⁵³

For some American Anglo-Saxonists, colonial rule over the Philippines was more than a strategic or economic necessity. Rather, it was part of a missionary impulse of spreading Christianity and civilization to a “benighted” part of the world. In an article in *The Arena* George F. Pentecost best summarizes the American Anglo-Saxon as a lover of liberty, an individual, and a Protestant.¹⁵⁴ To him, the rise of the United States as an industrial power, culminating in the annexation of the Philippines, was part of a divine will, and that the American people had a destiny to fulfill.¹⁵⁵ Pentecost believed that the purpose of American colonization was to bring “universal education, political freedom...the modern mechanical arts and sciences...and Christian civilization at the front door of Asia.”¹⁵⁶

The realities of colonial rule gave a rude awakening to Anglo-Saxonists. The “bully little war” in which Theodore Roosevelt charged to battle gave way to a protracted guerrilla war in the Philippines led by Emilio Aguinaldo, who believed that the

¹⁵² Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States 1895—1914*, (London: Victor Gollanz Ltd.), 51

¹⁵³ Hazel McFerson, *The Racial Dimension of American Overseas Colonial Policy*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1997), 2.

¹⁵⁴ George F. Pentecost, DD, “America in the Philippines,” *The Arena*, May 1905, vol. 103, no. 186, p. 490.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 487

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 488.

Philippines would be given independence after the war with Spain. This forced Americans to confront which the direction the United States was headed, whether to serve as a beacon for liberty, or to be just another colonial empire. In an address on 7 October 1899, Secretary of War Root justified America's role in the insurrection and the actions of the military. He argued that the United States was the only civilizing force in the Philippines, that would fall into the anarchy of tribal warfare, should the Filipino people be left to their own devices. He described Aguinaldo's forces as "men who prefer a life of brigandage to a life of industry" and Aguinaldo as a "military dictator...who has attained supreme power by the assassination of his rival, and who maintains it by the arrest and punishment of every one who favors the United States, and the murder of every one whom he can reach who aids her."¹⁵⁷ In the same breath, Root extolled the Anglo-Saxon virtues of the American soldiers in the Philippines, even though he did not mention Anglo-Saxonism by name. To him, the American soldier

...carries with him not the traditions of a military empire, but the traditions of a self-governing people. He comes from a land where public discussion has educated every citizen in the art of self-overnment...where the affairs of city and county and town and village, have made the art of government the alphabet of life for every citizen, where every citizen has learned that obedience to law, and respect for the results of popular elections is a part of the order of nature.¹⁵⁸

The guerrilla war ended with the capture of Aguinaldo, thus allowing the United States to begin its "civilizing mission" in the Philippines. Despite the goals of bringing

¹⁵⁷ Elihu Root, "Address by the Secretary of War at the Marquette Club in Chicago, October 7, 1899, in Response to the Toast, 'The American Soldier,' *The Military and Colonial Policies of the United States: Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root*, Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, eds. (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1970, reprinted from the edition of 1916, Cambridge, Massachusetts), 10.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 11.

self-government to the Filipino people, American policy makers enabled the landowning elite to dominate the political and economic systems. The United States ensured the primacy of the elite through the creation of the Philippine Civil Service. The members of the Taft Commission had hoped that the creation of a civil service in 1901 would eliminate corruption and establish an efficient colonial structure.¹⁵⁹ Through the *pensionado* system starting in 1903, children from elite families would spend some time in the United States to study and become acculturated to American values and then return to the Philippines to take up their posts in the Philippine Civil Service.¹⁶⁰ The opposite proved to be true. Corruption became rampant in all areas of government as networks of patrons and clients emerged, whereby political bosses handed out offices to their supporters. The vicissitudes of American politics also accelerated the pace at which corruption developed as autonomy was gradually handed over to Manila. In a twist of irony, in its colonial experience, the United States failed in its all-important mission, which was to teach the values of self-government and democracy.¹⁶¹

Anglo-Saxonism in American culture evolved over a long period of time, with its roots stretching back to the founding myths of the English people. As English settlers established the thirteen colonies, they adapted their myths to their new surroundings and created a new narrative that established the identity of “whiteness,” that distinguished them from the indigenous peoples of North America and the African slaves who were first imported into the thirteen colonies in the seventeenth century. By the eighteenth

¹⁵⁹ Taft, 95-6.

¹⁶⁰ Cruz, 86.

¹⁶¹ Abinales, 153.

century, as the thirteen colonies became integrated into the Atlantic economy, Anglo-Saxonism took another turn when attempts at centralization by the British government clashed with the ideals of liberty and self-rule resulted in the American Revolution, establishing the United States. Yet, despite the political separation between Great Britain and the United States, the economic, social, and cultural connections between both English-speaking peoples continued throughout the nineteenth century. As the United States emerged to become an industrial giant by the 1890s, Anglo-Saxonism became an expression of this new self-confidence and the willingness of the American people to take a more forceful role in world affairs with the British people as their partner.

CHAPTER 3

THE GERMAN-AMERICAN CONNECTION 1850-1914

This chapter will examine the German heritage in American culture. Though not always recognized today, German-Americans played a major role in the settling of the United States, and were part of the American social fabric generations before the First World War. German culture influenced many areas in American cultural and intellectual life, which was just as deep as English culture, which has been more thoroughly explored. In the late nineteenth century, the German people were closely affiliated to, if not part of, the Anglo-Saxon family through the “Teutonic Theory” of Anglo-Saxonism by establishing the forests of Germany as the primordial homeland of the Anglo-Saxon peoples who eventually migrated to the British Isles, and later, the United States. Thus, by 1914, alignment with Britain was not a foregone conclusion at the outbreak of the First World War, with a large German-American population that, at best, was indifferent to the British cause, and at worst, utterly hostile.

Nevertheless, Anglo-Saxonists still felt an ambivalence about adding contemporary Germany, which was also a rival to the rising power of the United States, to the Anglo-Saxon family because of the Prussian military and political apparatus that was put in place by Otto von Bismarck after 1871, that contradicted with the ideals of self-government and liberty that were cherished by British and American Anglo-Saxonism. Tensions between the United States and Great Britain on the one hand, and Germany, on the other, were exacerbated after Bismarck’s fall from power in 1890, when

Kaiser Wilhelm II advocated a more aggressive foreign policy. By the turn of the twentieth century, American foreign policy makers regarded Germany as a threat, as both countries competed for influence in Asia and the Pacific, and when Germany began its encroachment in Latin America, which the United States regarded to be part of its informal empire. Thus, the rivalry between both countries would become a source of tensions leading to the beginning of the First World War.

The contributions of the German people in the United States stretch far back long before the creation of the United States. In 1507, Martin Waldseemüller, a German cartographer, was the first to refer to the New World as “America.” In 1626, Peter Minuit, another German, negotiated the purchase of the island of Manhattan from its indigenous inhabitants.¹⁶² German immigration to what would become the United States, began during the seventeenth century with the establishment of Jamestown, when some German settlers formed part of John Smith’s party. The first German permanent settlement in the colonies consisted of thirteen Mennonite families from Krefeld in western Germany, who settled in the future community of Germantown, outside Philadelphia in 1683. William Penn encouraged German immigration to the newly established colony of Pennsylvania. The Mennonites shared many similarities with Penn’s church, the Society of Friends, more commonly known as the Quakers, particularly their inward spirituality, as opposed to the ritualism of other denominations. After some meetings with Penn’s associates, a group of German Mennonite leaders formed the Frankfurt Company and purchased 25,000 acres in the wilderness of

¹⁶² Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany and the United States: “A Special Relationship?”*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980), 28

Pennsylvania. On 20 August 1683, the first German immigrants arrived in Philadelphia, who would form the community at Germantown.¹⁶³

The first German settlers generally settled in the mid-Atlantic colonies of Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. In addition to religious freedom, another reason for immigration to the colonies was to escape war. During the first half of the seventeenth century, the German people in the Rhineland Palatinate suffered tremendously during the Thirty Years' War.¹⁶⁴ In 1688, Louis XIV of France again invaded the Rhineland Palatinate in order to expand French influence, resulting in the expulsion of nearly half a million Germans.¹⁶⁵ By the mid-eighteenth century colonists of German descent comprised 250,000, or 8 to 9 percent of the population. Many Germans contributed to colonial society, including John Peter Zenger, who established the foundations of freedom of the press. Germans fought on both sides of the American Revolution such as the Hessian mercenaries who supported the British, the American heroine Molly Pitcher, born Maria Ludwig, and Baron Frederick von Steuben who transformed the Continental Army from a mob of farmers to a professional fighting force, contributing to eventual victory over the British.¹⁶⁶

After independence, the United States established its initial diplomatic contacts with the German states, notably, Prussia. On 10 September 1785, the United States and Prussia entered into a commerce treaty that called for "trade reciprocity and freedom of the seas for neutral vessels, even in time of war." The treaty was renewed thirty years

¹⁶³Albert Bernhardt Faust, *The German Element in the United States*, vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), 34.

¹⁶⁴Ibid, 55.

¹⁶⁵Ibid, 57.

¹⁶⁶Gatzke, 28.

later and reinforced with the Treaty of 1828. Despite such friendly beginnings, trade between the United States and Prussia did not blossom to any significant extent for much of the nineteenth century because Prussia had neither overseas possessions and did not invest in international trade, and the United States did not wish to become involved in European affairs. Neither country even considered it necessary to maintain diplomatic representation in each other's capitals until the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Thus, relations were cordial because there were few common political interests between the United States and Prussia.¹⁶⁷

While prospects for diplomatic cooperation between the United States and German states were miniscule, there was room for cultural exchange. For the Germans who immigrated in the nineteenth century, America represented a utopia, the perception of which originated from the American Revolution. German immigrants perceived America as a “*tabula rasa*”, an empty space upon which they could build a new life, that held little to none of the cultural baggage of the old world—established religion, class structures, princes, and an overwhelming state. Germans immigrating to American believed that America was an abundant land that would reward hard work.¹⁶⁸

The events of the American Revolution influenced German perceptions of the United States. The writings of Benjamin Franklin and the accounts of the Marquis de Lafayette reinforced the picture of America as a land of religious freedom. In fact, to many of the Pietist clergy, America represented a “city on a hill” where Protestant

¹⁶⁷ Manfred Jonas, *The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), 16-7.

¹⁶⁸ Kathleen Neils Conzen, “Phantom Landscapes of Colonization: Germans in the Making of a Pluralist America, *The German-American Encounter: Conflict and Cooperation between Two Cultures, 1800-2000*, Frank Trommler and Elliott Shore, eds., (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 11.

religion flourished, unmolested by the religious skepticism unleashed in Europe by the Enlightenment. Fueled by positive reports of American life, immigration by Germans into the United States held at a steady rate between 1783 and 1800 of 510 per year, totaling to 8,700 immigrants.¹⁶⁹ During the first half of the nineteenth century, Germans established “colonies” all over the United States, not in the traditional imperialistic sense, but in the sense of establishing a community whereupon one may lay down roots. Because of their belief in America as a new and as an “empty” land, in exchange for the riches they were extracting, German settlers believed they were contributing by infusing their own culture. The Germans who settled in the United States resisted temptations to assimilate into the larger Anglo-American society, believing in the superiority of their own culture.¹⁷⁰

Americans formed differing perceptions of Germans when traveling abroad, both complimentary and uncomplimentary. These perceptions were often based on the purpose of their journeys. During the nineteenth century, there emerged three groups of American travelers to Germany. The first group of Americans traveled to Germany, chiefly to study in German universities. The second traveled to Germany as part of a larger education in European and classical culture. The third group were tourists and

¹⁶⁹ A Greg Roeber, “Through A Glass Darkly: Changing Ideas of American Freedom,” *Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and America Since 1776*, David Barclay and Elizabeth Glaser-Schmidt, eds. (Washington, DC: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 20-1.

¹⁷⁰ Kathleen Neils Conzen, “Phantom Landscapes of Colonization: Germans in the Making of a Pluralist America,” *The German-American Encounter: Conflict and Cooperation between Two Cultures, 1800-2000*, 13.

those seeking novelty.¹⁷¹ Between 1800 and 1839, fifty-one American citizens traveled to Germany, of which the majority came from New England. Of those fifty-one, two-thirds came from the educated classes, such as clergymen, students, and scholars.¹⁷²

Among the most common comments traveling Americans had was that the Germans they encountered were cordial and hospitable. However, many of the travel journals of the period reflected cultural differences between Germans and Americans. Among such observations were that Germans enjoyed eating and drinking too much; wasted time in celebrations; were in less of a hurry than Americans; and subjected their women to hard labor.¹⁷³ It is not surprising therefore, that these comments were from New Englanders who grew up with a Puritan background, as the United States was in the midst of the religious revival of the Second Great Awakening and the reform movements of the 1830s.¹⁷⁴ However, disenchantment did not lie solely with Americans. Some German visitors to the United States found themselves repulsed by American democracy in the form of universal manhood suffrage. Others complained about the lack of culture and the American obsession with commerce, totally at odds with traditional German connections to agriculture. However, such sentiments did not abate the emigration of Germans to the United States.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ Herman Wellenreuter, "Germans Make Cows and Women Work," *Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and America Since 1776*, David Barclay and Elizabeth Glaser-Schmidt, eds. (Washington, DC: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 47-8.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 50.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 52-6.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 57-9.

¹⁷⁵ Hans-Jurgen Grabbe, "Weary of Germany—Weary of America: Perceptions of the United States in Nineteenth-Century Germany," *Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and America Since 1776*, David Barclay and Elizabeth Glaser-Schmidt, eds. (Washington, DC: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 71-2

The Revolution of 1848 was a turning point in the history of the German people, which would also have repercussions in the United States. The influence of the French Revolution hung over Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century, as liberals clashed with conservatives and nationalists clashed with ancient dynasties of central Europe. Dissatisfaction with the settlement of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which ended the Napoleonic Wars, caused Germans to rebel against the old order. German liberals and nationalists aspired to break free from the domination of the Austrian Empire and the petty princes of the German Confederation and forge a united Germany based on democratic principles. The economic effects of the Industrial Revolution made their way to Germany, as cheap mass-produced British goods ruined the livelihoods of traditional artisans. These conditions made Germany ripe for revolution.¹⁷⁶ Following the same pattern as the French Revolution, the Frankfurt Assembly drafted a Declaration of the Rights of the German People, which was based on liberal principles, such as civil liberties and constitutional government, taken from the Declaration of Independence and the Declaration of the Rights of Man. In 1849, the Frankfurt Assembly drafted its constitution, much along the same lines as the French and American models.¹⁷⁷

American public opinion was sympathetic to the cause of revolution in Europe. To many Americans who paid attention to foreign affairs, Europe, with the exception of Great Britain, stood for tyranny, especially in the form of the Holy Alliance, whose goal was to stamp out democracy. American publications such as the *American Quarterly*

¹⁷⁶ A.J.P. Taylor, *The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany Since 1815*, (New York: Capricorn Books, 1962), 68-70.

¹⁷⁷ R.R. Palmer, et al., *A History of the Modern World*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 10th, ed., 2007), 500-01.

Register, *Brownson's Quarterly Review*, and the *New York Tribune* speculated on the course of events in Germany and predicted that a unified German state would emerge with a federal system based on the United States.¹⁷⁸ It is important to note, however, that American interest in European affairs depended largely upon the region. While the Northeast paid rapt attention to the events of 1848, the newspapers in the South and the West were mute on the subject matter and focused primarily on domestic issues. This was due to a range of reasons. The western states were absorbed with internal development. The South's main focus was on slavery and its extension to the West, as well as small numbers of immigration, which remained concentrated on the Northeast.¹⁷⁹

The United States government expressed its support to the goals of the Frankfurt Assembly and extended the good wishes of the American people to the German people. President James K. Polk quickly promoted Andrew J. Donelson, the minister to Prussia, to "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Federal Government of Germany," based upon the optimistic assumption of success upon the part of the revolutionaries.¹⁸⁰ Donelson was instructed to go to Frankfurt and observe the proceedings there. Meanwhile, the Frankfurt Assembly prevailed upon the United States to give material support by lending experienced men and particularly, requested that an American officer serve as an admiral in the fledgling German navy. Polk, however was reluctant to go to that extent, since it would be an unprecedented break from traditional American foreign policy. Commodore Foxhall Parker was also instructed to go to

¹⁷⁸ John Gerow Gazley, *American Opinion of German Unification, 1848-1871*, (New York: Longmans, Green, & Co, 1926), 17-19.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 20.

¹⁸⁰ Jonas, 19.

Frankfurt and discern what aid the United States could give. When he arrived, he learned that the Frankfurt Assembly was interested in purchasing a frigate from the United States Navy in anticipation of a war with Denmark over the disputed province of Schleswig-Holstein. Parker concluded in a report that civil war in Germany was imminent and advised against any American officers serving in Germany. The accession of Zachary Taylor rendered moot any future assistance to the Frankfurt Assembly because he saw that German unification was not realistic.¹⁸¹

Despite its lofty goals, the Frankfurt Assembly failed for a number of reasons. The main contributing factor to its failure was its inability to enforce the plans set forth. The Frankfurt Assembly had no army, and therefore had no credibility among the German states. Secondly, the princes of the German states were jealous of their individual sovereignty, and were loathed to lose themselves in a greater German state. The Declaration of the Right of German People offended non-Germans within the German states, such as the Poles, because it specifically applied to the German people, unlike the universal premises of the French and American models. The role of Austria in the new Germany was especially troublesome for the Frankfurt Assembly because of the traditional leadership of the Habsburgs. By excluding Austria, more than a millennium of tradition would be terminated. However, including the Austrian Empire with its non-German peoples would have been problematic for the Frankfurt Assembly. These setbacks caused the prominent German-American politician Carl Schurz to doubt the success of the Assembly. In another letter to Petrasch, he declared, "If the German nation

¹⁸¹ Gazley, 23-6.

makes itself ridiculous now, it will be ridiculous for a long, long time.”¹⁸² Thus, the Frankfurt Assembly disbanded in late 1849, having lost the opportunity to bring democracy to the German people. Many of the German liberals who supported or sympathized with the Frankfurt Assembly left for the United States and became known as the “Forty-Eighters.”¹⁸³

In the aftermath of the failure of the Revolution of 1848, and particularly, the Frankfurt Assembly, there followed an exodus of German immigrants to the United States. Between 1850 and 1870, the number of German immigrants in the United States had swollen from 600,000 to 1.7 million. Between 1852 and 1854, there were as much as 500,000 immigrants entering the country alone.¹⁸⁴ As with other waves of immigration, nativist sentiment existed against German immigrants, by the way they kept to themselves, and their fondness for beer. Nevertheless, on the whole, the American public welcomed German immigrants wholeheartedly, which eased their assimilation into the larger culture. American newspapers praised German immigrants for their education, their thrift, their work ethic, and particularly, the money that they brought with them. Thus, to the eyes of many Americans, Germans were prime candidates for citizenship.¹⁸⁵

German-Americans and Politics:

No sooner had they left their homelands than many of the forty-eighters began to adopt American culture and participate in antebellum politics. While previous German immigrants praised American culture for its adherence to Protestantism, the forty-eighters

¹⁸² Carl Schurz to Theodore Petrasch, 18 September 1848, *Intimate Letters of Carl Schurz*, vol. 30, Joseph Schafer, ed., and translator (Madison, Wisconsin: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1928), 50.

¹⁸³ Taylor, 77-87.

¹⁸⁴ Jonas, 20.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

saw American democracy as political model to emulate. As a whole, the generation of the forty-eighters had abandoned their former allegiances and took up the banner of republicanism.¹⁸⁶ Carl Berthold, a middle class immigrant from Waldeck in western Germany, gave an account of the 1852 elections with great interest:

The [Whigs], or “aristocrats”...wanted to treat the Germans unfairly, they were supposed to have to wait to become citizens until they’d been in the country for 21 years, that’s almost like it is in Germany with the princes, they want to rule over the Germans like that, but they got their necks broken. Democracy won out by a great majority, and in a few weeks a true Democrat [Franklin Pierce] will ascend the presidential chair. The [Whigs] are now trying all sorts of tricks to get back in, like the big wheels tried to do with the people in [the Revolution of 1848] but flattery doesn’t get you anywhere here.¹⁸⁷

Until the early 1850s, the majority of forty-eighters sided with the Democratic Party because of their belief in the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian principles of popular sovereignty. However, as sectionalist tensions flared, the forty-eighters eventually switched to the newly-formed Republican Party after 1854 because of their abhorrence for slavery.¹⁸⁸

Within the emerging German-American community that was being forged by the forty-eighters, slavery was as much a controversial topic as it was for the larger community. Many German-American publications took the position of “free soil” and “free labor”. Periodicals, such as the *New Yorker Demokrat* and the *Anzeiger des Westens*, frequently questioned the position of the Democratic Party on the issue of

¹⁸⁶ James M. Bergquist, “The Forty-Eighters: Catalysts of German-American Politics,” *The German-American Encounter: Conflict and Cooperation between Two Cultures, 1800-2000*, 23.

¹⁸⁷ Carl Berthold, 23 February 1853, *News from the Land of Freedom: German Immigrants Write Home*, Walter D. Kaphoefner, Wolfgang Helbich, Ulrike Sommer, eds. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press: 1991), 325.

¹⁸⁸ Jonas, 20-1.

slavery.¹⁸⁹ The election of 1854 was a turning point in the political allegiance of German-Americans over the issue of Stephen Douglas's Kansas-Nebraska Act. Because of Douglas's pro-slavery position, German-Americans defected from the Democratic Party and sought out a party that was more in tune with their interests.¹⁹⁰

Schurz, among the more prominent German-Americans of his generation, escaped Germany in the aftermath of the failed Revolution of 1848 because of his activities, sought refuge in the United States. He joined the Republican Party because it shared his opposition to slavery. In 1855 he denounced the Kansas-Nebraska Act because it did not really resolve the controversy of slavery and was nothing more than a cover for Douglas's political ambitions.¹⁹¹ By the mid-1850s, Schurz had not only settled successfully in Wisconsin; he even began to venture into American politics with great relish. He ran for the Wisconsin legislature as a Republican in 1856. Even though he was defeated, Schurz made his mark as a rising star in the Republican Party. Of his first experience in American politics, Schurz wrote to his friend Henry Meyer

You over there in your decrepit Europe can hardly understand any more how a great idea can stir the masses to their depths and how an enthusiastic fight for principles can displace all other interests; even, for a time, materialistic ones. It is the first time in seven years that I have taken part in politics—in a time which arouses even the sleepest and in a cause which is second to none in the world in reach and greatness.¹⁹²

Of the prospects of the Republican Party, Schurz continued

¹⁸⁹ Bergquist, "The Forty-Eighters: Catalysts of German-American Politics," 26.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, 27.

¹⁹¹ Hans L. Trefousse, *Carl Schurz: A Biography*, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 59-60.

¹⁹² Carl Schurz to Henry Meyer, 20 November 1856, *Intimate Letters of Carl Schurz*, vol. 30, Joseph Schafer, ed., and translator (Madison, Wisconsin: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1928), 173-4.

At last a regular, intense struggle against slavery has arisen in the United States; and the party of freedom, while defeated in the first election contest, despite its youth and deficient organization, has shown so much strength and won so much territory that it can look to the future with the confidence of victory.¹⁹³

While German-Americans gradually abandoned the Democratic Party, the Republican Party was not entirely welcoming to them. There was still a nativist force that prevented German-Americans from taking leadership positions in the Republican Party. Secondly, the Republicans ran on issues that were culturally insensitive to German-Americans. In 1855, the temperance movement dominated state elections in New York, Wisconsin, and Illinois, which alienated German-American support and crippled the chances of German-American candidates.¹⁹⁴

This experience showed the Republican Party leadership, that if it wanted German-American votes, then it would have to change its campaigning strategies. That meant denouncing nativist rhetoric, while emphasizing its support for free-soil in its platform. However, state republican platforms maintained its support for temperance, which left German-Americans dissatisfied.¹⁹⁵ During the presidential election of 1856, these lessons were learned as the Republican Party nominated John C. Fremont as its first presidential candidate. The Republican platform endorsed a more inclusive position, which pushed for equality for all citizens. By denouncing nativism, more forty-eighters fled from the Democratic Party and swelled the numbers of the Republican Party, which stood for “free soil, free labor, free men and Fremont.”¹⁹⁶ Though many German-

¹⁹³ Ibid, 174.

¹⁹⁴ Bergquist, 27.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, 28.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

Americans remained within the Democratic Party, they no longer voted as a single bloc. By the eve of the Civil War, most of the forty-eighters who joined the Republican Party supported Lincoln's policy of preserving the Union.¹⁹⁷

Throughout the wars that the United States had fought during the nineteenth century, from the War of 1812 to the Spanish-American War, German-Americans served their country with distinction from the rank and file to the officers' corps. The Civil War was a conflict that showed a large proportion of German-Americans. In the Union army alone, German-born soldiers totaled over 176,000 out of a total of 2 million mobilized troops.¹⁹⁸ Most German-Americans volunteered for service for either ideological reasons or out of financial necessity. About one out of six German-Americans was conscripted. German-Americans accounted for five to fifteen percent of most regiments in the Union army and were often placed into "German companies" in order to accommodate the language barrier. More than 30,000 German-Americans served in around thirty "German Regiments", which consisted of German soldiers and officers at the beginning of the war, but in the latter phases of the conflict, German soldiers were placed randomly throughout the ranks.¹⁹⁹

German Americans and German Unification:

During the 1850s and 1860s, much of the American public was preoccupied with sectional rivalries, and ultimately, the Civil War. Thus, the events unfolding in Germany, particularly, the process of unification undertaken by Prussian Chancellor Otto

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, 29.

¹⁹⁸ Walter D. Kamphoefner and Wolfgang Helbich, *Germans in the Civil War*, Susan Carter Vogel, tr. (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2006), 9.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, 20.

von Bismarck had less priority in American newspapers. However, of what was reported on Germany, American public opinion weighed in on the side of the Prussians because of their Protestant affiliations, although with some reservations because of the martial mentality within Prussian society.²⁰⁰ Diplomatic relations between the United States and Prussia had generally been amiable. The one thorny issue between both countries between 1848 and 1871, however, revolved around Prussia's compulsive military system during the 1850s, whether a Prussian soldier who came to the United States without completing his military service was considered a United States citizen. Ultimately, the case was not considered worth fighting over, and was resolved by the Bancroft Treaties of 1868. Bismarck had greater matters to attend to.²⁰¹

As Bismarck executed his machinations during the 1860s, American public opinion rallied around the cause of German unification. The experiences of the Civil War caused many Americans to sympathize with the issues of "national unity" vs. "states' rights", which were thrown around in Germany, albeit under different contexts.²⁰² American public opinion was divided over the rivalry between Prussia and Austria for leadership among the German states. The *New York Times*, a pro-Austrian newspaper, saw Bismarck as an unprincipled and calculating politician who used German unification as a pretext for Prussia's aggrandizement at the expense of Austria and smaller German states.²⁰³ However, the *New York Herald* favored Prussia as an agent for change and

²⁰⁰ Gazley, 124-5.

²⁰¹ Ibid, 127-8.

²⁰² Ibid, 170.

²⁰³ Ibid, 183.

progress against Austria's feudalism.²⁰⁴ Nowhere was division more evident than in the German-American community. The victories of the Prussian army over the Austrians aroused celebrations in many German-American communities in New York and Chicago. German-American organizations raised \$600,000 for German charities. The forty-eighters who left German despotism praised Bismarck. In a letter to his wife, Schurz gave his appraisal of Bismarck and the possibility of unification:

The development of affairs in Europe is surprising...And since the attainment of these results depends wholly upon the energy and the success of Prussia, my sympathies are naturally with the Prussian side. At present, it is all off with the revolution; and the attempts at revolutionary organization which are still underway here and there are supremely absurd. Bismarck can now be more useful to Germany than any other man if he can only be forced into the right track.²⁰⁵

Schurz's high opinion of Bismarck originated in a meeting with him on 28 January 1868 during a visit to Berlin. He had some misgivings that German unification might simply be a mask for Prussian expansionism. In their conversation, Bismarck became pleased when Schurz relayed the support of the German-American community for his policies.²⁰⁶ In a letter to his friend, Adolf Meyer, Schurz described Bismarck as a man of strong will and character, which he believed to be necessary for the monumental task of uniting the German people.²⁰⁷ A few German-Americans, however, such as Karl Heinzen, a forty-eighter and radical journalist, could not celebrate the reactionary Prussian government

²⁰⁴ Ibid, 194.

²⁰⁵ Carl Schurz to Margarethe Meyer Schurz, 24 July 1866, *Intimate Letters of Carl Schurz*, vol. 30, Joseph Schafer, ed., and translator (Madison, Wisconsin: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1928), 364.

²⁰⁶ Trefouse, 165.

²⁰⁷ Carl Schurz to Adolf Meyer 3 February 1868, *Intimate Letters of Carl Schurz*, vol. 30, Joseph Schafer, ed., and translator (Madison, Wisconsin: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1928), 421.

that was still steeped in absolutism and militarism, which was poised to bring all of Germany under its control.²⁰⁸

The issue of German unification culminated with the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. Bismarck used a succession crisis in Spain as a pretext of eliminating France as the last obstacle to a Prussian-dominated Germany.²⁰⁹ Despite the historic ties between France and the United States, American public opinion had turned against the French government by 1870, particularly of Napoleon III. Americans distrusted him because they believed he betrayed the Second Republic in 1851. They saw the conversion of the Second Republic into the Second Empire as a move toward reactionary despotism, rather than democracy.²¹⁰ Americans not only had philosophical disagreements with Napoleon III, but could point toward instances of French meddling, particularly during the 1860s, when the events of the Civil War had shown France to be sympathetic toward the Confederacy. Particularly unforgivable to many Americans was Napoleon III's ambition to restore a French colonial empire in the Western Hemisphere by installing the puppet government of Archduke Maximilian in Mexico between 1862 and 1867, which was a direct attack on the Monroe Doctrine. These memories were still fresh in the minds of the American public as war broke out in 1870.²¹¹

Although it declared its neutrality, United States was clearly sympathetic to Prussia. Elihu Root, the minister to Paris, intervened on the behalf of Prussians trapped in France on the outbreak of war. The United States rebuffed offers by the European

²⁰⁸ Gatzke, 36.

²⁰⁹ Jonas, 26.

²¹⁰ Gazley, 289.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 290-2.

powers to mediating an end to the conflict, which was in line with the policy of the Prussian government. The United States closed its ports to belligerent vessels of both sides. In the aftermath of France's defeat, the United States was wary of the Paris Commune that emerged after the abdication of Napoleon III. During negotiations, the United States did not press Bismarck to abandon his demand for Alsace-Lorraine, much to the dismay of the French minister in Washington. Bismarck never forgot the goodwill expressed by the United States in his hour of need, and would therefore make it a policy to accommodate the United States.²¹²

German unification in 1871 was greeted with enthusiasm in the United States. American historian and diplomat George Bancroft expressed high hopes for the Second Reich. In his reports, Bancroft stated that the new German Empire closely mirrored the United States in many ways, particularly its federal structure, and universal manhood suffrage for the Reichstag. Bancroft, thus declared that there would this "United States of Germany" would be the most liberal government in all of Europe, and it would be in the best interests of the United States to cultivate the friendship of the most rapidly growing power in Europe.²¹³ Schurz, despite his liberal credentials, greeted Germany's victory over France in 1870 with great joy. In a speech he gave in St. Louis, Missouri commemorating the end of the Franco-Prussian War, he referred to German unification as "a portentous event which shifts the political center of gravity on the continent of Europe, and annihilates the empty and hollow phrase of the European balance of power which had aimed at defrauding Germany of her achievements, independence, and

²¹² Jonas, 27-8.

²¹³ Ibid, 29.

power...”²¹⁴ He credited the victory over France to the “physical courage, impetuous attack, skillful handling of arms, and intellectual education of the German soldier.”²¹⁵

He gloried in the rise of Germany, so much so, that he raised the flag of the new German Empire from the building of the *Westliche Post*, where he worked in St. Louis. He shared in the jingoistic rhetoric of his fellow German-Americans declaring that Germany was the greatest nation in Europe and had fulfilled the goals of the Frankfurt Assembly in 1848.²¹⁶

During the 1870s, diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany were especially amiable. Even though the United States did not factor greatly in international events, Bismarck was careful to prevent antagonizing American public opinion, especially in Latin America, where he would most likely run afoul of the Monroe Doctrine. Bismarck’s government consulted the State Department over how best to resolve differences between German citizens and Latin American governments. In turn, the United States government requested Kaiser Wilhelm I to arbitrate in the long-running border disputes with Great Britain over Canada.²¹⁷ As chancellor, Bismarck made security his priority for the newly-unified Germany, by establishing alliances to isolate a vengeful France, by eschewing colonial expansion, and by not constructing a large deep-water navy, which would antagonize Great Britain. These policies assured

²¹⁴ Carl Schurz, “Address delivered at the Peace Celebration in St. Louis,” 1871 from the Western Historical manuscript Collection, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 3.

²¹⁵ Ibid, 7.

²¹⁶Trefouse, 178.

²¹⁷Jonas, 32.

Germany's neighbors, as well as the United States, of a peaceful and contented Germany.²¹⁸

Bismarck's domestic policies met high American approval. In the late 1870s, suspicious of the loyalties of the German Catholics, Bismarck embarked upon his *Kulturkampf* policy. Under this policy, the Jesuits were expelled from Germany, bishops lost power, German education fell under secular, rather than religious control, and civil marriage was instituted. Bancroft reported the *Kulturkampf* as a sign that Germany was freeing itself from feudalism and was emulating the separation of church and state.²¹⁹ When Bismarck turned his attention to the socialists, he too garnered high praise in the esteem of many Americans. Bismarck's outlawing of the Social Democratic Party assured the United States that Germany was committed to *laissez-faire* capitalism.²²⁰ As the United States celebrated its centennial anniversary, both Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm I expressed their congratulations to the American people and their hope that the peaceful relationship, which had existed since the days of Frederick the Great, would continue.²²¹

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, cultural exchanges between the United States and Germany accelerated. The most significant impact German culture made on American intellectual life had its roots in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century with Wilhelm von Humboldt's essay "The Limits of State Action," written in

²¹⁸ Ibid, 30.

²¹⁹ Ibid, 31.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid, 32.

1792, supporting academic freedom. In 1810, he founded the University of Berlin.²²² Humboldt's counterpart in the United States was Thomas Jefferson, who devoted forty years of his life to establishing a public university in Virginia, where he believed that it would be possible to pursue truth based on reason. Due to the influences of the Enlightenment, the American and French Revolutions, and the Romanticism on both sides of the Atlantic, many Americans developed an affinity for the German people, who appeared to be on the same road toward liberty and progress.²²³

Nowhere was this affinity more evident than in the realm of education. The Revolution of 1848 caused a massive exodus of German liberals to the United States who wanted to reform education from the exclusive place of the elite to an arena where democratic principles would be taught to new generations. This was the beginning of the *kindergarten* movement, first began by Friedrich Froebel in Germany in 1837, and later transplanted in Watertown, Wisconsin in 1856 by Margarethe Schurz, wife of the prominent German-American politician, Carl Schurz. The establishment of the first kindergartens coincided with the public education movement in the United States. The kindergarten was based on the assumption that the child was inherently good and should be taught the principles of democracy at an early age and thus make a positive contribution to society.²²⁴ Kindergartens thereafter opened throughout New England in 1867, through the influence of Henry Barnard and Elizabeth Peabody, through their connections with the Schurzes. In 1873, the future of the kindergarten was secured as the

²²² Daniel Fallon, "German Influences on American Education," *German-American Encounter: Conflict and Cooperation between Two Cultures, 1800-2000*, Frank Trommler and Elliott Shore, eds., (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 77-8.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 79.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 79-80.

foundation for the modern American public education system, when William Harris, the superintendent of schools in St. Louis, Missouri, established the first kindergarten in a major metropolitan area. The kindergarten was especially useful in helping immigrants assimilate into American society by fostering a sense of citizenship.²²⁵

American adoption of German pedagogy did not stop with the kindergarten. During the nineteenth century, American educational established the elementary and secondary educational system based on the Prussian system of education. Because of the perception of Prussian society as hierarchical and militaristic, Calvin Stowe, an education reformer, believed that the Prussian system could not simply be transplanted, but rather it should be modified to fit the democratic aims of the American public school system. Based on his observations in Prussia, Stowe wrote a report to the Ohio legislature outlining what would become the foundations of the American educational system: the need for trained teachers; the credentialing of teachers; compulsory education for all children; a school system based on discipline and the authority of the teacher, which parents must respect; and the advancement of students through the educational system based on comprehension of the learning material. The revolution in American primary and secondary education that resulted from Germany's influence neatly coincided with the intense industrialization and the rise of the United States as an economic power in the years following the civil war.²²⁶

The crowning touch to this educational revolution in the United States was in the creation of the research university, established as a result of German-American cultural

²²⁵ Ibid, 80.

²²⁶ Ibid, 82.

exchange. Studying at German universities was a profound experience for many Americans. It may have appeared that Oxford or Cambridge would have been the choice to study because of the linguistic and cultural heritage between the United States and Great Britain. However, Americans were eager to establish their own identities during the first decades of independence. Additionally, the British erected obstacles to American students by establishing quotas.²²⁷

The German universities at Berlin and Göttingen offered a different paradigm of learning. While many American and European universities of the early nineteenth century were still based on classical studies and liberal arts since the Middle Ages, German universities, under the vision of Humboldt, focused on expanding knowledge and directly applying that knowledge to society, again, coinciding with the vision of the Founders such as Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison. Unlike their British counterparts who would have snubbed their American cousins, German universities went through great lengths to welcome American scholars. During the first half of the nineteenth century, around 200 American students matriculated at German universities. However, by 1900, it had mushroomed to 9,000, due to advances in travel and the growing popularity of German education. Many prominent Americans such as George Bancroft and John Lothrop Motley had a German education, and a new generation of Americans who grew up in the Midwest used their experiences in Germany to reform American universities.²²⁸ What arose from those reforms was the modern research university that stressed teaching and research; the ideal

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid, 83.

of academic freedom; and emphasis on the sciences. Crucial to this vision was the concept of the graduate education, which stressed specialization and the addition of new knowledge to a discipline, culminating into the doctoral degree, paving the way for American leadership in research in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.²²⁹

The application of these American Progressives' educational experiences in Germany was first expressed in economics and social legislation. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the ideal of *laissez-faire* and free trade, as espoused by Britain, began to be challenged for its inattentiveness to the resulting inequities of wealth in society.²³⁰ After unification, Germany's rapid industrialization was from the result of government protection. Also, it was Germany that pioneered the first pieces of social welfare legislation, such as unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and old-age pensions.²³¹ These were important lessons to be learned by a new generation of German-trained American economists. American universities forged connections with German economic departments. For instance, the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Finance and Economy sent ten to fifteen graduate students to Halle, by the 1890s.²³²

The exposure to German economic theories showed American scholars a wider world of possibilities and alternatives to the British economic model. Bismarck's social welfare legislation of the 1880s, originally, a compromise between conservative and socialist factions in the Reichstag, caught the interests of American labor leaders, who

²²⁹ Ibid, 84.

²³⁰ Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 1998), 82-3

²³¹ Ibid, 222-3.

²³² Ibid, 84.

were dismayed at the lack of progress in the United States.²³³ In 1905, the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL), an offshoot of the International Association for Labor Legislation, was founded to advance the interests of American workers. The AALL was founded by Henry Farnam from Yale University and Adna F. Weber from the New York Bureau of Labor Statistics, both of whom were students of German economist Gustav Schmoller. It was originally an “educational” association which published an English language version of its European counterpart, *The Bulletin*, which advanced progressive legislation. Eventually, the AALL transitioned into lobbying for more stringent regulations in the match industry.²³⁴

By the Progressive era, factory legislation, minimum wage laws, and pensions had been integrated into state laws. The next obstacle was social insurance. Carroll D. Wright, the US commissioner of labor, commissioned John Graham Brooks in 1891 to compile a report on German compulsory insurance. Brooks, in his investigations into the effects of social legislation, was less than enthusiastic and made no recommendations. The Socialists then took up the mantle for social insurance. The Socialist Party included social insurance in its plank when it first organized in 1900. Eugene Debs had recommended the German model to the chair of the Minnesota Employees’ Compensation Commission, as a source of information during a fact-finding mission in 1908. Because of the Socialist Party’s strong advocacy for social welfare legislation,

²³³ Ibid, 235-6.

²³⁴ Ibid, 236.

social insurance became associated with radicalism in the perceptions of American voters, despite its conservative roots under Bismarck.²³⁵

In tandem with social insurance, workers' compensation was a German innovation that caught the interest of American reformers. Industrialization put a heavy toll on American families who were financially ruined when the sole breadwinner became unable to work due to a workplace injury. In the first decade of the twentieth century, a small portion of workers or the families received any kind of compensation. In Pittsburgh steel mills, alone between 1906 and 1907, a quarter of families went uncompensated. Less than a third received \$100 for burial expenses. Even if a case was brought to litigation, the courts often ruled in favor of the employer.²³⁶

The German accident insurance law, enacted in 1884 was considered a model for American progressive reformers. Under Bismarck's plan employers were organized into networks of compulsory quasi-public employers' mutual associations, called the *Kassen*. Employees would be compensated according to a fixed scale. By 1903, funding for accident insurance came from a variety of sources: 7 percent from the government; 47 percent through employer taxes; and 46 percent from employees.²³⁷ Americans of all stripes supported compensation for workplace injuries. Theodore Roosevelt championed it as part of his overall policy of establishing the government as the protector of the people against exploitation by powerful companies. Even employers supported workmen's compensation to escape litigation and as an opportunity to steal the thunder

²³⁵ Ibid, 242.

²³⁶ Ibid, 246.

²³⁷ Ibid, 223.

from labor unions. By the eve of the First World War, twenty-one states enacted legislation establishing workmen's compensation, and Germany was seen as being at the vanguard of social legislation and a beacon for American progressives. It would appear to many Americans that Germany and the United States would grow closer together.²³⁸

Germans and Anglo-Saxonism: Common Origins and Anxieties

By the late nineteenth century, proponents of Anglo-Saxonism extended the Anglo-Saxon family beyond the British Isles and into Germany with the "Teutonic origins theory." The idea sprouted from early nineteenth century Romanticism and nationalism, when scholars began to construct narratives based on common linguistic and national origins. The Teutonic origins theory held that the Germany was the home of the Anglo-Saxon tribes, from which they were scattered to the British Isles, and ultimately, the United States. Thus, the kernels of Anglo-Saxon virtues such as self-control, independence, and self-government were also held within the German people, making them part of the Anglo-Saxon family.²³⁹ As a result, compared to other European immigrants, most notably the Irish and Italians, German immigrants were greeted far more warmly and were integrated relatively seamlessly into American society, because, in no small part, of the racial affinities between Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic stocks.²⁴⁰ Quite similarly, in the early twentieth century, the German scholar Albert Bernhardt Faust, who devoted his career to the fostering of friendship between Germany and the United States, attributed characteristics to German-Americans, which were consistent

²³⁸ Ibid, 247.

²³⁹ Anderson, 37-8.

²⁴⁰ Leroy G. Dorsey, *We Are All Americans, Pure and Simple: Theodore Roosevelt and the Myth of Americanism*, (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 2007), 119.

with the larger Anglo-Saxon family, such as duty, honesty, loyalty, industry, and respect for law. To Faust, these characteristics helped form American society, which suggested that German-Americans were part of the Anglo-Saxon family.²⁴¹ An article in *The New York Times* by Medill McCormick, the publisher of *The Chicago Tribune*, acknowledges that far more substantive ties existed between the German and American peoples and suggested that the *rapprochement* between Great Britain and the United States was not as solid as it appeared claiming that any sentiment regarding Shakespeare, the Bible, and the Magna Charta was “perfunctory” and could not make up for the years of “condescension” on the part of the British government. This was clearly articulated when he says

We not only exchange professors with German universities...we import historians, psychologists, and chemists for our best chairs. Whereas a generation ago we looked to Oxford and Cambridge for inspiration, now we turn to Heidelberg and Leipzig. We have Germans on the bench, in business, in the law, in office, and seeking it. English with a German accent is more familiar to our ears than English with an English accent.²⁴²

Perhaps the closest that these hopes were ever close to being attained was in a speech in commemorating Kaiser Wilhelm II’s visit to Britain, when British foreign minister Joseph Chamberlain, a fervent Anglo-Saxonist, himself, in his tireless efforts to secure an alliance between Great Britain and Germany, suggested an alliance among the “Germanic empires”, meaning Germany, Great Britain, and the United States.²⁴³

The British historian Edward A. Freeman in his 1872 work *Outlines of History* traced the Anglo-Saxon peoples to the Teutonic peoples of Germany, who in turn, were

²⁴¹ Albert Bernhardt Faust, *The German Element in the United States*, Vol. 2, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), 465.

²⁴² “Americans Prefer Germans,” 9 August 1909, *The New York Times*, 1.

²⁴³ Imanuel Geiss, *German Foreign Policy, 1871—1914*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 92.

descended from the Aryan migrations into Europe in the distant past, from whom all Germanic peoples are descended.²⁴⁴ The Angles, Saxons, and Jutes then settled the British Isles in the fifth century A.D. and displaced the Celts. Freeman attributed to them characteristics of independence, by describing them as unwilling to assimilate Roman culture by keeping their language and by stubbornly clinging to their religion. These peoples, according to Freeman, established the ethnic and cultural foundations of the English people.²⁴⁵

Likewise, an article by J. W. Jackson in *The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* argued that the Teutonic peoples, who became the modern Germans, have been a force for racial and cultural invigoration in Europe for millennia, from the Middle Ages, when the Franks mixed with the Celtic population of Gaul after the collapse of the Roman Empire, through the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871.²⁴⁶ He described the Teutons as

Tall of stature and large of limb, fair-haired, and blue-eyed, they present us, more especially in the Scandinavian variety with the beau ideal of robust, vigorous, and large-hearted humanity, dwelling in a temperate clime. They are framed on a large scale, and are obviously intended as providential instruments for the effectuation of vast deeds and the utterance of profound thoughts... They are the reserve force of the West, which always comes into play when the more nervous races have been exhausted by the morbid excitement of their corrupt civilization. They are the osseous and muscular pole of European humanity... Modern Europe is their making. It is impossible to over-estimate our obligations to such a race. They made medieval Italy differ from Greece, and it is their larger presence in Britain which differentiates her from ethnically exhausted France.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁴ Edward A. Freeman, *Outlines of History*, (New York: Holt & Williams, 1872), 14-5.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 108.

²⁴⁶ J. W. Jackson, "The Racial Aspects of the Franco-Prussian War," *The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, Vol. 1, 1872, 33-4.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 38-9.

Jackson listed the accomplishments of the Germanic peoples throughout the centuries. For example, in the field of music, he listed Handel, Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven; in philosophy and literature, Immanuel Kant, Georg Hegel, Johann von Goethe, and Johann von Schiller; Martin Luther for the Reformation; Alexander Humboldt and Carolus Linnaeus in the science; and Helmut von Moltke in military strategy.²⁴⁸ He argued that the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, was the latest chapter of the continuing struggle between the Celts and the Teutons. However, even though the Germans had achieved the goal of unification, they still are not yet poised for European leadership because it still has not shaken off feudalism.²⁴⁹ However, Jackson had more confidence in another branch of the Teutonic family, the Anglo-Saxons in Great Britain, which has grown into a worldwide empire and the center of civilization and commerce, and by extension, the United States. The main difference, according to Jackson, between the Germans and the Anglo-Saxons, was that the latter had developed constitutional government, placing emphasis on liberty.²⁵⁰

James K. Hosmer further elaborated on the Teutonic theory of Anglo-Saxonism. In his work *A Short History of Anglo-Saxon Freedom*, Hosmer traced the ancestors of the Anglo-Saxon peoples to the region between the Weser and Elbe rivers in Germany. He argued that in these villages across the North Sea, the kernels of Anglo-Saxon institutions were already present.²⁵¹ Hosmer credited their warrior culture as the basis of Anglo-

²⁴⁸ Ibid, 39.

²⁴⁹ Ibid, 41.

²⁵⁰ Ibid, 43.

²⁵¹ James K. Hosmer, *A Short History of Anglo-Saxon Freedom*, (New York: Scribners and Sons, 1890), 3

Saxon freedom that has been ingrained in the English-speaking peoples of the late nineteenth century, particularly, in its organization. For example, the origins of the New England township, according to Hosmer, were based on freemen who could bear arms, upon which the *tun-scipe* was formed, which was organized into the hundred, and the shire. The *aethling*, *ceorl*, *lathe*, and *slave* formed the social hierarchy of the Germanic tribes that settled England.²⁵² The *Cyningas*, or king, was a military leader who was chosen by the local communities, made up of landowning freemen, and as such, did not hold absolute power. The *tun-moots* became the foundation of representative governments that checked the power of the king. Thus, when the first English settlers arrived in Jamestown, It is from these humble Germanic beginnings, Hosmer concluded, from which American constitutional government of checks and balances, was established.²⁵³

In the realm of religion, the prominent American Anglo-Saxonist, Josiah Strong, credited the rise of the “true faith” of Protestantism with the German reformers of the sixteenth century, which freed Western Christianity from papal absolutism, which he attributed to the Celts and “Latins.” He considered Protestantism to be another sign of what it meant to be Anglo-Saxon and consistent with the Anglo-Saxon ideals of liberty and self-government. Strong believed that Anglo-Saxonism was divinely ordained to spread the ideals of liberty and self-government, considered unique to the Anglo-Saxon peoples, to the rest of the world.²⁵⁴

²⁵² Ibid, 16-7.

²⁵³ Ibid, 20.

²⁵⁴ Josiah Strong, *The United States and the Future of the Anglo-Saxon Race*, (London: Alfred Boot and Sons, 1889), 34

While Hosmer and other Anglo-Saxonists established the Teutonic theory as part of the origins of the Anglo-Saxon people, they were also sure to distance contemporary Germany from the United States and Great Britain, the contemporary Anglo-Saxon nations, because the unified German state established by Bismarck did not adhere to Anglo-Saxon principles of self-government and liberty, which the British and American peoples espoused in the late nineteenth century. Instead, Hosmer described Wilhelmine Germany as based on the Prussian military state dominated by its Kaiser and court, covered over with a veneer of parliamentary government.²⁵⁵ He reflected that

Under able leaders she has shown herself marvelously powerful. As regards the people, however, what the world has had occasion to notice particularly is the docility with which they have suffered themselves to be led. The initiative has been from the ruling [Hohenzollern] dynasty and its great servants. The Court has supplied the plan of action, the brains, and the energy for carrying it out, using the resources and mighty strength of an unresisting people to secure objects undoubtedly adapted to promote the well-being of the people...It has been said that the Germans of to-day are cheated by a mere counterfeit of representative institutions, while real freedom is far away from them. To some extent, the remark is true. Though the German Parliament debates and votes, the power of the [Hohenzollern] dynasty is very great and not diminishing.²⁵⁶

The tendency toward absolutism was literally written into the person of Germany's first emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm I, who in his earlier capacity as King of Prussia, ruled, as well as reigned, without concerning himself with the consent of his subjects and was fiercely opposed to the notion of democracy. After his death in 1888, the *North American Review* gave a retrospective of his tenure as king and Kaiser in these words:

In both his functions, as King and as Emperor, William repeatedly found himself in a sea of trouble. He persistently refused any interpretation of

²⁵⁵ Hosmer, 271.

²⁵⁶ Ibid, 330-1.

either constitution, royal or imperial, which conferred on the ministry, as in England, the power to govern with its related responsibility to the Legislature. He often protested that he had not given up, and would never abandon the hereditary right to rule, as well as to reign. The legislative bodies had their functions, but they did not include in any form the executive power. They would censure his ministry and could refuse proposed laws, and budgets; but they could not overthrow his ministers. His Cabinet was responsible to himself, and not to the law-making power.²⁵⁷

Likewise, Strong noted that while self-government and the love of liberty were part of the early Teutonic ancestors of the Anglo-Saxons, that flame had burnt out, to be replaced by militaristic regimentation. Spiritually, Strong condemned German Protestantism for falling into the same regimentation, and lapsing into “formalism,” meaning that German Protestants were more concerned with ritualism than having a full spiritual experience. He judged its fruits by the fact that German missionary societies were supported with a fraction of donations that were normally given to British and American missionary societies, implying that German Protestants lack the spiritual zeal held by their British and American counterparts.²⁵⁸

In addition to misgivings in issues of religion, Anglo-Saxonists also shared reservations about Germans in the realm of foreign policy during the late nineteenth century. Theodore Roosevelt best expressed the ambivalence toward Germany’s inclusion into the Anglo-Saxon family of the late nineteenth century. His capacities, both as a private citizen and as president, lend a unique insight into the attitudes of late nineteenth century WASP elites and their world views. Like the Anglo-Saxonists of the

²⁵⁷ John A. Kasson, “The Hohenzollern Kaiser,” *The North American Review*, April 1888, Vol. 146, No. 377, 376.

²⁵⁸ Strong, 35.

late nineteenth century, Roosevelt was a follower of the Teutonic theory, which included Germany as the primordial cradle of the Anglo-Saxon people and praised the warrior spirit of Norse mythology.²⁵⁹ He also acknowledged, in a speech given to a German-American association, the “increasing importance” of the German identity that had been felt throughout the history of the United States from early colonization and credited their defense of the Union during the Civil War, and particularly in preventing Missouri from joining the Confederacy.²⁶⁰ In a similar speech that he gave in Baltimore, Roosevelt evoked the Teutonic spirit of adventure and perseverance, as he described the hardships of the German colonists who settled in the Thirteen Colonies, whose blood flows into the American people.²⁶¹

Roosevelt, on several occasions, expressed his admiration for the accomplishments of the German people, particularly, their unification into one nation-state and hoped for a closer relationship between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon powers. During his presidency, Roosevelt and Kaiser Wilhelm II made overtures toward cementing friendship between their respective countries. In some ways, both men shared similarities in their childhoods. Both Roosevelt and Wilhelm II overcame physical challenges in their childhood through a strict physical regimen. They came to power at a relatively young age. They saw the potential greatness of their respective countries supported the expansion of their respective countries’ naval power. Wilhelm II hoped

²⁵⁹ Dorsey, 121.

²⁶⁰ Theodore Roosevelt, “Remarks to the Delegates of the German Societies Received at the White House, 19 November 1903,” *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt: Presidential Addresses and State Papers*, Part 2, (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1901), 507.

²⁶¹ Theodore Roosevelt, 15 June 1903, *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, 450.

that he could court Roosevelt and persuade him into forming a German-American alliance.²⁶²

Toward that end, in 1902, Wilhelm II sent his brother, Prince Henry, to promote German-American friendship, which included presenting a statue of Frederick the Great in Washington, D.C., as well as donating models of German sculpture and architecture to Harvard University. In 1905, the tradition of exchanging German and American professors was inaugurated to promote their respective countries' cultures.²⁶³ Schurz gave his perspective on the royal visit and did not ascribe any ulterior motive beyond the promotion of friendship between both countries.²⁶⁴ He remained skeptical to concerns of German ambitions that threaten the strategic and economic interests of the United States, declaring that it would not be in the interests of Germany to violate the Monroe Doctrine. Schurz refused to consider the prospect of a conflict between the United States and Germany beyond a tariff war and concluded that the visit of Prince Henry was a reflection of the naturally warm friendship that existed between the German and American peoples.²⁶⁵

In his letter to the German diplomat Hermann Speck von Sternberg, Roosevelt described Wilhelm II as “a fit successor to the [Holy Roman Emperors] Ottos, Henrys and Fredericks of the past.”²⁶⁶ In a letter he wrote to American newspaper editor and

²⁶² Jonas, 67.

²⁶³ William Harbutt Dawson, *The German Empire 1867—1914* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1966), 392-3.

²⁶⁴ Carl Schurz, “The United States and Germany,” *The Independent*, 20 March 1902, 665.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 666-7.

²⁶⁶ Theodore Roosevelt to Hermann Speck von Sternberg, 27 November 1899, *Theodore Roosevelt: Letters and Speeches*, Louis Auchincloss, ed., (New York: The Library of America, 2004) , 182.

politician Whitelaw Reid, Roosevelt expressed his gratitude for Kaiser Wilhelm II's support in his mediation ending the Russo-Japanese War, for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize.²⁶⁷ His letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge detailing Kaiser Wilhelm's efforts in persuading Czar Nicholas II to make concessions to Japan showed that Germany had the potential to become a strategic ally in American foreign policy.²⁶⁸

However, like other nativist Americans, he had misgivings over the influence of German-Americans in American society at the beginning of the twentieth century. The large waves of German immigrants arriving on American shores at the close of the twentieth century made Roosevelt and others concerned that rather than assimilating into the larger Anglo-American society, German immigrants would instead transform the United States into what they had left behind in Europe. Roosevelt and other nativists could point to German-American associations, such as the National German-American Alliance, as an example of the "Germanization" of America, when its main goal was simply to promote German culture.²⁶⁹

Nativists at the turn of the twentieth century, like Roosevelt, expressed a distaste for what they called the "hyphenated American", meaning, an immigrant who retained elements of his or her cultural heritage, rather than assimilating wholly into the larger American and Anglo-Saxon culture. Roosevelt considered the maintenance of one's German heritage by living in German-American neighborhoods, continuing to speak German, and going to German schools to be almost akin to treason and therefore,

²⁶⁷ Theodore Roosevelt to Whitelaw Reid 11 September 1905, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Elting Morsion, ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), 18.

²⁶⁸ Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 2 September 1905, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Elting Morsion, ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), 9.

²⁶⁹ Dorsey, 123.

anathema to the American ideal of the “melting pot.”²⁷⁰ His views are best articulated in his essay called “The True American,” where he expressed what it means to be an American, which is simply to obliterate any signs of the country he or she has left behind. Of European, particularly, German, immigrants, Roosevelt exhorted

We must Americanize them in every way, in speech, in political ideas, and principles, and in their way of looking at the relations between Church and State. We welcome the German or the Irishman who becomes an American. We have no use for the German or Irishman who remains such. We do not wish German-Americans and Irish-Americans who figure as such in our social and political life; we want only Americans, and provided they are such, we do not care whether they are of native or of Irish or of German ancestry.²⁷¹

For Roosevelt, anyone who wishes to be an American cannot have any cultural connection to the land he or she left behind. Though he originally intended that immigrants should leave behind their ancient quarrels, such as those between the Irish and the English, or those between the French and Germans, to become a true American meant that, “He must learn to celebrate Washington’s birthday rather than that of the Queen [Victoria of England] or Kaiser [Wilhelm II], and the Fourth of July instead of St. Patrick’s Day.”²⁷²

In the realm of foreign policy, despite his personal admiration for the German people, Roosevelt saw Germany as a rival for interests in Latin America and the Pacific, which were a source of tensions for both countries. By the late nineteenth century, the United States and Germany were emerging powers in international affairs. The decades

²⁷⁰ Ibid, 125.

²⁷¹Theodore Roosevelt, “True Americanism,” *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt: American Ideals*, Vol. 2 (New York: P.F. Colliers, 1897), 42.

²⁷² Ibid, 46.

after the Civil War witnessed the rise of American industrial power led by an Anglo-Saxonist elite that was willing to extend American influence beyond its shores, most notably by the extensive modernization of the US Navy starting in the 1880s. By 1898, the United States made its entrance as a world power with the defeat of Spain and the acquisition of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.²⁷³ At the same time, after Bismarck had unified the German people, he was later rewarded by his forced dismissal in 1890 by Wilhelm II, who wanted a more aggressive Germany, through his policy of *Weltpolitik*, or “geopolitics”. By the late 1890s, a clique of politicians, aristocrats, and industrialists formed a lobby that supported Wilhelm II’s desire a powerful navy and a colonial empire in order to aggrandize the newly-formed Reich.²⁷⁴

As early as 1889, diplomatic relations between Germany and the United States began to worsen. The Samoa Crisis in 1889 became a nexus which brought Germany, Great Britain, and the United States together, and had the potential to unleash a war involving those three countries. A few decades earlier, the South Pacific was given little attention by the great powers, which were more focused on the Atlantic trade. By the late nineteenth century, however, the islands of the South Pacific were a source of colonial rivalries among the European powers and later, the United States. Starting in the 1850s with the discoveries of gold in California, Australia, and New Zealand, more investment was placed in infrastructure and communication to the Pacific, such as telegraph lines and

²⁷³ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Samoan Triangle: A Study of Anglo-German-American Relations*, (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1974), 134.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 123.

the Transcontinental Railroad. Over the decades, commerce in the Pacific grew, which made the Pacific Ocean and the countries bordering it, potential centers of trade.²⁷⁵

In an article written in 1895 by Lorrin Thurston, the Hawaiian minister in Washington, D.C., he declared that the Pacific region should be given as much attention as the Atlantic, if not more so, because of the growing trade. He painted stark contrasts between the lack of telephones, telegraphs, and railroads in the countries bordering the Pacific in the 1850s, and of the islands of the South Pacific, he described them as being “inhabited by savages and cannibals whose absolute sway was interrupted by an enterprising trader or self-sacrificing missionary.”²⁷⁶ He stated that since the 1850s, the exports of countries bordering the Pacific Ocean had grown exponentially, particularly those under “dominated by the Anglo-Saxons” and predicted that one day commerce in the Pacific region would rival or even surpass that of the Atlantic.²⁷⁷ Thurston described the South Pacific as an area of competition among the major powers such as Spain, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, each claiming various territories from Australia to Fiji, for political and economic interests, emphasizing the social Darwinism of the late nineteenth century, as each nation battled each other for limited resources. Nevertheless, he pointed out that the bulk of economic development in the Pacific was under the initiative of the Anglo-Saxon powers, by either Great Britain or its self-governing dominions, such as Australia or Canada, which emphasizes support for Anglo-

²⁷⁵ Ibid, 7

²⁷⁶ Lorrin A. Thurston, “The Growing Greatness of the Pacific,” *The North American Review*, Vol. 160, No. 461, April 1895,448.

²⁷⁷ Ibid, 456.

Saxonism as a source for good, at least for the global economy of the late nineteenth century.²⁷⁸

In a similar vein, Commodore George Melville, the chief engineer of the US Navy stressed the importance of the Pacific for the economic growth of the United States. He underscored the fact that the Pacific Ocean covers 800,000 square miles, which would be an excellent outlet for trade, whose potential would grow with the completion of the Transcontinental Railroad and a future canal across Central America. According to Melville, the Pacific region would absorb much of the domestic exports from manufacturing, valued at \$79.5 million in 1896.²⁷⁹ He also noted the untapped potential of the markets in Asia and Pacific region. For example, while China imported \$130 million per year and Japan at 138 million yen, the United States only sent about \$25 million to Asia in 1896, and about 5.69 percent of its total foreign trade passes through its Pacific ports.²⁸⁰ Additionally, he also pointed out that the Pacific coast was a weak spot in the nation's defenses, which had only fourteen vessels, or less than a total 50,000 tons of displacement. This is compared to Japan, with forty-eight vessels, or 173,000 tons, and Great Britain at forty-one vessels at 91,000 tons. It would take about ninety days to send reinforcements from New York to California or longer because the United States did not have many coaling stations in between.²⁸¹ Melville, thus chided American foreign policy makers for staying aloof while Germany had annexed the Marshall Islands, and

²⁷⁸ Ibid, 457-8.

²⁷⁹ George Melville, "Our Future on the Pacific: What We have There to Hold and Win," *The North American Review*, Vol. 166, No. 496, March 1898, 293.

²⁸⁰ Ibid, 294.

²⁸¹ Ibid, 291.

Great Britain and France annexed other islands in the South Pacific in the latter part of the nineteenth century.²⁸²

During the late nineteenth century, however, there was instability in the Samoan political system, which was in the form of rivalry among competing chiefs for the Samoan crown.²⁸³ The continuing conflict among these chiefs coincided with the increasing influence of Great Britain, Germany, and the United States in the region. During the 1870s, the British government made attempts to establish a protectorate over Samoa, but was unsuccessful.²⁸⁴ During the 1880s, Germany began in earnest, its acquisition of colonial territory in Africa and the Pacific. In the Pacific, Germany gained control of part of New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago between 1884 and 1885. Samoa, however was the real prize sought by Chancellor Bismarck.²⁸⁵

When civil war broke out in Samoa in 1887, the three powers each supported a candidate for the Samoan throne, which escalated into an international crisis. In 1889, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States sent warships to Samoa, with the German and American warships confronting each other at the Samoan harbor at Apia. On the prospect of a war with Germany, Roosevelt wrote to his close friend, the British diplomat Cecil Spring Rice

Frankly, I [don't] know that I should be sorry to see a bit of a spar with Germany, the burning of New York and a few seacoast cities would be a good object lesson on the need of an adequate system of coast defences; and I think it would have a good effect on our large German population to force them to an ostentatiously patriotic display of anger against Germany;

²⁸² Ibid, 287.

²⁸³ Kennedy, 3.

²⁸⁴ Ibid, 13.

²⁸⁵ Ibid, 25.

besides, while we would have to take some awful blows at first, I think in the end, we would worry the Kaiser [Wilhelm II] a little.²⁸⁶

Despite the bellicose rhetoric of Roosevelt, however, the prospects of a war between Germany and the United States over Samoa disappeared when a massive hurricane destroyed the warships on 15 March 1889. The three powers agreed to joint control over Samoa.²⁸⁷ By 1898, however, conflict once again embroiled the island. British and American newspapers claimed that the German government was behind the outbreak of the Samoan Civil War, as a plot to establish a puppet government, since Germany had the largest economic stake in Samoa.²⁸⁸ The Samoa Crisis was resolved in 1899, when the British withdrew their claims in Samoa due to the outbreak of the Boer War in South Africa, and Germany and the United States split the Samoa islands between them, and in addition, Germany purchased the Caroline and Mariana islands from Spain. However, as a result of the Samoa Crisis, the diplomatic tensions between Germany, Great Britain, and the United States were heightened, rather than abated.²⁸⁹

The United States had interests at stake in Samoa. According to Henry Ide, who served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Samoa, the United States, since 1872, had established a naval coaling station, which had been granted by the High Chief of Pago Pago, which was finalized in a treaty between the governments of the United States and Samoa in 1878.²⁹⁰ According to Ide, Samoa was part of a larger geopolitical

²⁸⁶ Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice, 14 April 1889, , *Theodore Roosevelt: Letters and Speeches*, Louis Auchincloss, ed., (New York: The Library of America, 2004) , 28.

²⁸⁷ Kennedy, 86.

²⁸⁸ Ibid, 147.

²⁸⁹ Ibid, 238-9.

²⁹⁰ Henry C. Ide, "Our Interest in Samoa," *The North American Review*, Vol. 165, No. 489, August 1897, 156.

consideration in the South Pacific. As various European powers were claiming islands in the South Pacific, most notably Germany and Great Britain, the United States was becoming increasingly isolated and could be left out of the potential strategic and economic opportunities in the region. He stated:

In the South Pacific, European nations have been swift to seize upon the vantage points. With the French in Tahiti and New Caledonia, the Spanish in the Carolines and Philippines, the Germans in the Marshall Islands, New Guinea, New Britain, and other groups, and the British in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, the Solomons, and many other groups, and exercising a practical protectorate over Tonga, there is no independent group left except Samoa. But these islands, lying south 10 degrees and west 173 degrees, are in the very path of commerce... If it is appropriated by any foreign power, we have no foothold left south of the equator, no place to which we can go as a matter of right. When we once relax our grasp, we do so forever. Immediate annexation by England or Germany would follow, and those hands never open to release what they have closed upon.²⁹¹

Taking a leaf from Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose works would influence practitioners of late-nineteenth-century geopolitics, Ide stressed the importance of Pago Pago as a naval station because of its harbor. Other nations like the United States were in search of coaling and stations to supply their navies, in order to establish a presence in the Pacific. Ide noted that in 1872 German representatives attempted to secure the harbor at Pago Pago, but were beaten out by the United States.²⁹² Ide stated that in 1888, Germany had attempted to take Samoa by force, resulting in a bloody conflict, which divided the indigenous population of Samoa into factions supported by German, British, and American forces and the imposition of martial law by German officials even upon Americans, which raised tensions between the governments of Germany and the United

²⁹¹ Ibid, 160-1.

²⁹² Ibid, 161.

States, which could have resulted into war. Ide quoted Secretary of State James G.

Blaine's objection:

To subject the citizens of the United States to the inspection of the German navy; to require reports from each household as to arms kept for its necessary protection; to make permission from the German authorities a needed prerequisite to the natural right of American citizens to guard themselves from danger; to inquire into the character of even their rumored conversations and hold them answerable therefore to the summary proceedings of a German court-martial. All these were trials and indignities to which they ought never to have been subjected.²⁹³

Ide argued that the presence of the United States in Samoa has benefited both the Samoans on the one hand, as well as the Germans and Americans on the other.

The establishment of a supreme court in Samoa under his tenure as chief justice, meant that English Common Law was established for Americans or Englishmen, who otherwise, would have had to go to a German consulate to redress their grievances. Previous confusion over validity of land titles were also resolved, as well as the finances of the Samoan government, which hitherto, was constantly in debt. Such actions recalled the ideals of "The White Man's Burden", with which Anglo-Saxonism was becoming associated by the late nineteenth century.²⁹⁴

The United States and Germany had periods of confrontation in other areas of Asia and the Pacific. A year before the crisis in Samoa had abated, the United States fought its "bully little war" with Spain in 1898. Though, it was ostensibly for the liberation of Cuba, the Spanish-American War became a war over the remains of Spain's decaying empire, as well as a European crisis. The Spanish government appealed to

²⁹³ Ibid, 167.

²⁹⁴ Ibid, 169-70.

Austria-Hungary, France, and Germany for diplomatic intervention on its behalf. However, any intervention, let alone, military aid from the continental powers would have been impossible because of Britain's moral and material support to the United States, despite its official neutrality.²⁹⁵

Throughout the war, the British government also stoked American suspicions of German designs on American interests in the Philippines and Latin America. Germany, however, also contributed to American suspicions. Since 1897, Wilhelm II had grown suspicious of the growing *rapprochement* between the United States and Great Britain and had grown convinced that there was an "Anglo-Saxon conspiracy" to dominate Europe economically and called for a continental tariff against the United States.²⁹⁶ As tensions between Spain and the United States escalated, Wilhelm II called for a pan-European alliance to rally around Spain's cause, which he believed was legitimate. The United States was already designated as a potential opponent in German secret naval documents, and had Germany's navy been sufficiently expanded, the Spanish-American War could have become a war between the United States and Germany. With the collapse of Spanish rule imminent, Wilhelm II expressed an interest in acquiring the Philippines.²⁹⁷ The German government appeared to express an interest in aiding Filipino insurgents in establishing an independent state. Tensions rose particularly through the actions of Vice Admiral Otto von Diderichs in Manila Bay. With the destruction of the Spanish fleet by Commodore George Dewey on 1 May 1898, Manila

²⁹⁵ Jonas, 55-6.

²⁹⁶ Holger H. Herwig, *The Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889—1941*, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1976), 21.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 25-6.

became an object of interest, not just to the United States, but other countries, including Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, which sent naval observers to protect their respective interests in Manila. The German squadron under the command of von Diderichs was larger than those of the other foreign powers present. Von Diderichs appeared to make aggressive moves, giving rise to a legend that a British squadron intervened to prevent a clash between the German and American warships. The incident in Manila Bay would spark the *rapprochement* between the United States and Great Britain.²⁹⁸

Germany's actions in Latin America would continue to fuel American suspicions. For decades, there were large numbers of Germans emigrating to South America for better economic opportunities. According to an article in *The Journal of Race Development* by F.E. Chadwick, Rear Admiral of the United States Navy, there were 110,000 Germans who emigrated to Brazil between 1820 and 1911 and at a rate of 4,000 a year. Unlike others in the foreign policy establishment, he did not consider Germany to be a threat to American interests in the Western Hemisphere.²⁹⁹ On the contrary, he believed that larger numbers of German immigrants in Brazil would be a benefit to the country and argued that if Germans made up the majority of the population, Brazil would be "of a higher type economically and intellectually," to offset the mixed European, African, and indigenous population.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁸ Jonas, 57.

²⁹⁹ F.E. Chadwick, "Present-day Phase of the Monroe Doctrine," 310, *The Journal of Race Development*, Vol. 4, No. 3, January 1914, 310.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 311.

Others, however, were not as optimistic. Attempts to purchase property in Baja California in 1901 for Wilhelm II touched off speculation in the media of a German incursion. In 1902, as Prince Henry was making his goodwill tour, the Danish government rebuffed a proposal for the United States to purchase the Danish West Indies, now known as the Virgin Islands, Senator John Hay and the American press believed that Germany was planning on acquiring them, thus putting pressure on Denmark.³⁰¹ In 1897, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt shared with naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan on the importance of the Caribbean to the United States and his concerns about Germany

We should acquire the Danish [Virgin] Islands, and by turning Spain out should serve notice that no strong European power, and especially not Germany, should be allowed to gain a foothold by supplanting some weak European power. I do not fear England; Canada is a hostage for her good behavior; but I do fear some of the other powers.³⁰²

Roosevelt expressed similar anxieties in a letter to Spring Rice

As an American I should advocate—and as a matter of fact do advocate—keeping our Navy at a pitch that will enable us to interfere promptly if Germany ventures to touch a foot of American soil...I would simply say that we did not intend to have Germans on this continent, excepting as immigrants whose children would become Americans of one sort or another, and if Germany intended to extend her empire here, she would have to whip us first.³⁰³

As Roosevelt continued in his letter to Spring Rice, his analysis on Germany became more nuanced. He objected to the Prussian militarism and authoritarian government of

³⁰¹ Jonas, 68.

³⁰² Theodore Roosevelt to Alfred Thayer Mahan, 3 May 1897, *Theodore Roosevelt: Letters and Speeches*, Louis Auchincloss, ed., (New York: The Library of America, 2004) , 95.

³⁰³ Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice, 13 August 1897, , *Theodore Roosevelt: Letters and Speeches*, Louis Auchincloss, ed., (New York: The Library of America, 2004) ,108-9.

Wilhelmine Germany, referring to the “imprisoning of private citizens of all ages who do not speak of ‘Majesty’ with bated breath” as contrary to Anglo-Saxon ideals of liberalism. Of the American public opinion on Germans, Roosevelt finds that “Americans don’t dislike the Germans, but so far as they think of them at all they look upon them with humorous contempt,” and predicted that in one hundred years, will be of little consequence.³⁰⁴

For the time being, however, Germany and the United States would once again confront each other over a crisis in Venezuela. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Venezuelan government fell behind its debt payments to Germany and other European powers. When Venezuela did not comply to Germany’s demands to arbitration, the German government declared its intentions of imposing a blockade and seizing some customs houses. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hay had no objections, as long as no territory was occupied. Such an act would have been in gross violation of the Monroe Doctrine.³⁰⁵ In his letter to Spring Rice on 3 July 1901 detailing a conversation with German Ambassador Speck von Sternberg, Roosevelt framed Venezuela Crisis in the context of the significance of the Monroe Doctrine

...the Monroe Doctrine does not touch England in any shape or way, and that the only power that needs to be reminded of its existence is Germany. I explained to the German Ambassador that I did not want to see America get a foot of territory at the expense of any one of the South American states, and that I did not want her to get a single commercial advantage over Germany or any European power save as it was obtained by fair competition by the merchants or by the ordinary form of treaty; but that I most emphatically protested against either Germany or any other power getting new territory in America—just as I am certain England would

³⁰⁴ Ibid, 110

³⁰⁵ Jonas, 69.

object to seeing Delagoa Bay [in Mozambique] becoming German or French instead of Portuguese.³⁰⁶

In December 1902, a combined German, British, and Italian fleet blockaded Venezuela, which was interpreted by the American public as a challenge to the Monroe Doctrine.³⁰⁷ Congress and American public opinion continued to suspect Germany of harboring territorial ambitions in the Western Hemisphere, while ignoring the British who also took part in the blockade. Roosevelt ordered a fleet to conduct naval maneuvers in the Caribbean as a show of strength. This decision persuaded all the parties to enter into arbitration. The Venezuelan Crisis showed Roosevelt that the United States had to maintain a strong presence in the Caribbean in order to prevent German encroachment.³⁰⁸

Roosevelt's ambivalence over Germany remained prevalent throughout his presidency. Roosevelt's letter on 3 July 1901 to Cecil Spring Rice expressed that "it would be most unfortunate if Germany could not continue to get along well with both the United States and England."³⁰⁹ In his estimation of Kaiser Wilhelm II on 13 May 1905, he stated that the German nation was dominated by the Prussian military state, implying a lack of self-government, associated with Anglo-Saxonism, and more specifically, subject to the whims of Wilhelm II, himself.³¹⁰ Again, in his letter, Roosevelt expressed a desire for friendly relations between the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, but at the same

³⁰⁶ Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice, 3 July 1901, *Theodore Roosevelt: Letters and Speeches*, Louis Auchincloss, ed., (New York: The Library of America, 2004) , 233.

³⁰⁷ Dawson, 393.

³⁰⁸ Jonas, 70-3.

³⁰⁹ Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice, 3 July 1901, *Theodore Roosevelt: Letters and Speeches*, Louis Auchincloss, ed., (New York: The Library of America, 2004) , 233.

³¹⁰ Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice, 13 May 1905 *Theodore Roosevelt: Letters and Speeches*, Louis Auchincloss, ed., (New York: The Library of America, 2004) , 386.

time, he considered Germany an unreliable ally due to the policies of Wilhelm II, which he described as “too jumpy and too erratic.”³¹¹

The Moroccan Crisis of the early twentieth century was an example of Wilhelm’s increasingly aggressive and meddlesome foreign policy. In his letter to William Howard Taft, Roosevelt expressed the balance he had to maintain in relations between Great Britain and Germany during the Moroccan Crisis in 1905. He described Wilhelm II’s interference in France’s annexation of Morocco as a “pipe dream”, which had the potential of starting a war with France’s ally, Britain, surmising that “The Kaiser is dead sure that England intends to attack him. The English Government and a large segment of public was sure that Germany intends to attack England.”³¹² His letter expressed the growing tensions between the British and German governments in the decade before the First World War, as Britain was trying to maintain its global dominance in light of Germany’s rising power. Roosevelt saw the United States as being caught in their competition for global hegemony and had to tread lightly.³¹³ As he mediated between France and Germany in arranging the Algeiras Conference to defuse the crisis in Morocco, Roosevelt had to go so far as to give a speech to German war veterans placate the German government, emphasizing the close ties between the United States and Germany, and the magnanimity of Wilhelm II in consenting to negotiate with France.³¹⁴

³¹¹ Ibid, 387.

³¹² Theodore Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, 20 April 1905, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Elting Morison, ed., (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), 233.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Theodore Roosevelt to Whitelaw Reid, 28 April 1905, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Elting Morison, ed., (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), 250.

In the last decade before the outbreak of the First World War, the attempts by the German Foreign Office to cement an alliance with the United States began to wind down. Germany was becoming more involved in other areas of the world, such as the Middle East and the Balkans, where the United States had not the slightest strategic interest. Roosevelt's second term as president drew to a close by 1909, and his successors, William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson were not as interested in foreign adventures, as the United States was in the midst of domestic reform during the Progressive Era.³¹⁵ As he was ending his presidency, Roosevelt wrote Wilhelm II a farewell letter, rich in sentimentality, and when he stopped in Berlin in 1909 as part of his world tour, Wilhelm II publicly declared him his friend. Roosevelt was awarded an honorary degree from the University of Berlin and established a Roosevelt Professorship to promote German-American friendship.³¹⁶ Despite, however, the exchanges of platitudes between Roosevelt and Wilhelm II, any hope for a formal alliance between the United States and Germany would not be forthcoming. Roosevelt never fully trusted Wilhelm II's intentions, nor could he truly believe that Germany had no territorial ambitions in the Western Hemisphere. German-American relations remained much as they were during the 1890s, as Europe and the world were set on the road toward the Great War.³¹⁷

The doubts expressed by Roosevelt and other policy makers both in the United States and Great Britain at the turn of the twentieth century centered on the anxieties caused by the economic rise of Germany after its unification in 1871, and particularly, the

³¹⁵ Jonas 93-4.

³¹⁶ Ibid, 92.

³¹⁷ Ibid, 94.

uncertainty created in the wake of Bismarck's dismissal in 1890, and the more aggressive and bellicose foreign policy of Wilhelm II that followed.³¹⁸ The historian J. Barker Ellis expressed these tensions between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon powers in his article *The Future of Anglo-German Relations*, published in *The Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature*. Ellis's article was a rebuttal to the British industrialist Lord Avebury, who gave an optimistic view of the global economy. Ellis, instead, pointed out the challenges posed by Germany to Britain's leadership at the turn of the twentieth century. Ellis subscribed to the social Darwinism of the late nineteenth century, which became injected into Anglo-Saxonism, pitting nations and peoples against one another in the never-ending struggle for survival, including the Anglo-Saxons, whom he described as "a little tribe of Northmen" and the Hohenzollerns of Prussia as "a poor Swabian family", who came to power "by right of the stronger."³¹⁹ Ellis, in no uncertain terms, considered Germany's foreign policy under Wilhelm II as a challenge to Britain's naval and economic supremacy. He considered the Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic peoples to be two completely different peoples, rather than close cousins under a large family tree. He repudiated the utopian visions held by previous generations of economists that free trade was the catalyst toward world peace, and that international arbitration would abolish war. Rather, he fell back on Niccolo Machiavelli's dictum that force was a necessary means for a state

³¹⁸ J. Alden Nichols, *Germany After Bismarck: The Caprivi Era*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), 55.

³¹⁹ J. Ellis Barker, "The Future of Anglo-German Relations," *Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature*, June 1906, 533.

or a ruler to survive.³²⁰ He best articulates the Prussian philosophy of using force to achieve political ends by saying:

The cause of Prussia's marvelous growth can be summed up in one single word, which is worth noting, exists only in the German language. It can be summed up in the word "Machtpolitik," which translated into English, means "the policy of force." "Machtpolitik" is a word which is consequently on the lips of every German who discusses foreign policy, and has no wonder, for Prusso-Germany has put all her trust in the policy of force, which is her traditional policy and which has stood the test of ages. If we read the history of Prusso-Germany we find that by the constant use of force Prussia has become great and powerful, and has welded into a homogeneous mass the numerous nationalities and races which originally inhabited modern Germany.³²¹

Ellis's article raised the warning flag that Germany seeks to challenge the supremacy of the Royal Navy, and by extension, Britain's colonial empire, which he considered to be the most serious challenge since the Napoleonic Wars. He cited the expanding naval budget, in which the German electorate voted to spend £200 million to be spent over several years, more than the British government spent on the Boer War, alone.³²² Ellis concludes with this warning:

At present Germany dominates the Continent, but if her frontiers should become further extended she would rule it, and Germany's military, naval, and industrial power might become irresistible. She might then become able to vanquish not only Great Britain, but the United States, as well. Anglo-Saxon civilization might eventually be replaced by German civilization the world over. For these reasons it may be expected that Great Britain would feel impelled to assist the weaker European Powers in opposing any further extension of Germany. Germany seems to be standing at the parting of the ways, and a few years may decide the fate of Europe and perhaps that of the world.³²³

³²⁰ Ibid, 534.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Ibid, 538.

³²³ Ibid, 543.

The British writer, Sydney Brooks, gave his assessment of American suspicions of Germany's strategic ambitions. In his essay in the periodical *The Living Age*, Brooks outlined the reasons that American foreign policy makers considered Germany to be a rival in the geopolitics of the early twentieth century. Brooks's article foreshadowed the coming confrontation between the Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic peoples, which would also include the United States, despite the traditional aloofness held by American public opinion in matters regarding European diplomacy.³²⁴ He surmised that Americans were far more hostile to German institutions than to British institutions, explaining that unlike Great Britain, which has a fundamentally democratic system of government within its constitutional monarchy, Germany was at heart, an autocracy, thinly veiled by a parliamentary system, resting on a "military, aristocratic, and bureaucratic caste." Thus, such a political system was incompatible with American democracy and the "free institutions" of other Anglo-Saxon peoples.³²⁵

It was not simply a matter of political differences between the two countries that Brooks noted the antipathy of the United States toward Germany. He also stated that Germany's policies in Latin America and Asia have been considered to be a threat to the economic and strategic interests of the United States. For example, he noted Secretary of State John Hay's suspicions that German influence might have been involved in the cancellation of the sale of the Danish West Indies, now the Virgin Islands, to the United States in 1899. Brooks concluded that Wilhelm II and his foreign policy makers were

³²⁴ Sydney Brooks, "Great Britain, Germany, and the United States," 31 July 1909, *The Living Age*, 259.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 261.

plotting to undermine the Monroe Doctrine by expanding German influence in the Western Hemisphere through emigration to relieve social pressures at home, gaining economic influence in Brazil, culminating in the installation of a naval base in the Caribbean by attempts to lease land from Venezuela.³²⁶ The Spanish-American War was also an example of Germany's meddling and obstruction of American efforts to establish the position of the United States as a newly-emergent power, thus raising warning flags for American foreign policy makers, arguing that

The futile rudeness of the German squadron in Manila Bay, the Kaiser's swoop down the *disjecta membra* of the Spanish Empire in the Pacific, the clash over Samoa, and many smaller but not less irritating incidents expanded the distrust of German policy of national prepossession. Within a year of the signing of the Peace of Paris, the Kaiser and the [German foreign office in] Wilhelmstrasse had between them contrived to oust Great Britain from her old position as the supreme object of American suspicion. All the doubts and apprehensions, the willful misunderstandings, and irrational animosities that Americans used to project in their dealings with [Great Britain], they have, since 1908, brought to bear against Germany.³²⁷

Brooks considered attempts of Wilhelm II at gaining the friendship of the United States, through the visit of Prince Henry of Prussia, educational exchanges, and overly complimentary articles by Ambassador Baron von Sternberg to be facile, at best, and have done little to remove American doubts about German intentions, but rather, merely to cover German ambitions in Latin America, the Pacific, and elsewhere. On the contrary, he argued that American foreign policy makers were far more comfortable with Great Britain's global dominance because Britain, with its naval supremacy, has seen fit

³²⁶ Ibid, 262.

³²⁷ Ibid.

to recognize the Monroe Doctrine, and therefore accepted American hegemony over Latin America. Additionally, he expressed the belief that in a future conflict, the United States would provide more than moral support for Great Britain and the survival of its empire because German supremacy would be an obstacle to the rise of the United States as a world power, citing Mahan's analysis as an example showing that if Germany gained command of the sea, the U.S. Navy would be no match in a naval battle, and American commerce would be strangled by blockade.³²⁸ Brooks concluded his article expressing his confidence that, though the United States is still new to the uncharted waters of being a world power, that its foreign policy would ultimately mature and accept the fact that alliances are necessary. When that time comes, he predicted that the friendship between the United States and Great Britain would be more cemented and less dependent on mere sentimentality.³²⁹

The rise of Germany as a naval power was also a concern for American foreign policy makers at the beginning of the twentieth century. An article by W. G. Fitzgerald in the *North American Review* declared that Germany, under the direction of Wilhelm II and his ministers, was on its way toward building an offensive navy. The expansion of the navy was part of Wilhelm II's *Weltpolitik*, which aimed at German supremacy in international diplomacy, at the expense of the Anglo-Saxon powers, notably, Great Britain. According to the Navy Act of 1900, "Germany must have a fleet of such strength that a war, even against the mightiest naval power, would involve risks

³²⁸ Ibid, 263-4.

³²⁹ Ibid, 266.

threatening the Supremacy of that Power.”³³⁰ Toward that end, Fitzgerald detailed the increased military spending by the Reichstag, of about \$4 billion in the previous decades. With the unveiling of the British dreadnoughts, the German government, according to Fitzgerald, planned on constructing its own versions of the dreadnought in order to keep pace with the Royal Navy, which will be far more powerful than any ship of the German navy’s existing fleet.³³¹ The implications of the naval expansion were evident to American foreign policy makers. By threatening Great Britain’s naval supremacy, Germany would also be threatening American interests, as well. Fitzgerald noted that Germany’s foray into colonization in Africa was a disappointment. The costs of maintaining its colony in German Southwest Africa (present-day Namibia) at \$175,000,000 far outweighed any benefits, particularly, in light of a brutal colonial war to pacify the colony.³³² Thus, Latin America would be a more lucrative target for German ambitions, particularly, Brazil, and the Monroe Doctrine was the only obstacle toward achieving that end. Not surprisingly, Fitzgerald made the observation that the German government refused to entertain any proposal of limiting its armaments at the Hague Peace Conference.³³³

The suspicions of American foreign policy makers regarding Germany’s ambitions toward Latin America remained in the first few months of the First World War, foreshadowing the tensions that would emerge in the years leading to American involvement. An article in the periodical *Outlook*, dated in November 1914, announced

³³⁰ W. G. Fitz-Gerald, “Does Germany Menace the World’s Peace? The Truth about the Only ‘Offensive’ Navy,” *The North American Review*, 19 April 1907, Vol. 184, No. 613, 853.

³³¹ *Ibid*, 856.

³³² *Ibid*, 854-5.

³³³ 859-60.

that the German government announced on 3 September 1914, that it would respect the Monroe Doctrine and not establish colonies in Latin America. Ironically meant to assuage American concerns, the statement only heightened concerns that Germany might actually have designs somewhere in the Western Hemisphere. Adding to those concerns was a following statement that a German invasion and occupation of Canada would not be in violation of the Monroe Doctrine, since Canada had given military and economic assistance to Great Britain and was therefore “beyond the pale of American protection.”³³⁴ Adding weight to these suspicions, the *Outlook* article argued that based on a school of thought among German professors, the fact that the United States maintains colonies such as the Philippines, invalidated the Monroe Doctrine, and thus Germany would be justified in expanding its influence in the Western Hemisphere. Since Germany had a population growth of 800,000 a year, Latin America was the perfect place where its surplus population could immigrate. This view was also supported by General Friedrich von Bernhardi, who argued that it was hypocritical for the United States to use the Monroe Doctrine to keep out European powers from colonizing Latin America, while it was, at the same time, maintaining colonial possessions in the Pacific. He stated:

While, on the one side she insists on the Monroe Doctrine, on the other she stretches out her own arms towards Asia and Africa in order to find bases for her fleets. The United States aim at the economic, and where possible, the political command of the American continent, and at naval supremacy in the Pacific. Their interests both economic and political, notwithstanding all commercial and other treaties, clash emphatically with those of Japan and England.³³⁵

³³⁴ “Germany and the Monroe Doctrine,” *Outlook*, 4 November 1914, 521.

³³⁵ *Ibid*, 523.

The *Outlook* article raised concerns whether American citizens who were born in Germany could be counted upon to support the United States, should war break out with Germany, since as of the 1910 Census, there were more than two and a half million people of German descent. The article concluded that the great majority of German-Americans would ultimately side with the United States because the Prussian militarism, from which they had emigrated, was incompatible with Anglo-Saxon, and therefore, American views of liberty and self-government. This is contrasted with the fact that even though the United States and the British Empire share a three-thousand-mile border with Canada, neither side holds any fortifications because both people share the same world view. It explains:

The reason for this history of peace is to be found in the fact that, whatever the failings of the British Empire and the United States may be, both of these great countries are in principle devoted to a common ideal—that the people should control their own government, and not the government its people.³³⁶

The article concluded that the war between the Allies and Germany was a war between the ideals of self-government exemplified by the Allies, and the autocracy, embodied by Germany. Even though, at this point, the United States has the luxury of neutrality, the encroachment of Germany, whose values are inherently incompatible with the Anglo-Saxon ideals, upon the Western Hemisphere means that at some point the American people would have to fight to protect those ideals, and that would mean joining forces

³³⁶ Ibid, 524.

with its fellow Anglo-Saxons, the British, in order to defeat the forces of autocracy and militarism.³³⁷

The cultural connection between Germany and the United States was just as deep and long-running as that between Britain and the United States. At various times in their histories, both Germans and Americans looked to each other as models, whether it was the American political model of the late eighteenth century or German social legislation of the early twentieth century. German immigrants contributed to the political and cultural life throughout the history of the United States from colonial times to the eve of the First World War. Thus, it would become a challenge for the foreign policy establishment to ask millions of Americans to set these bonds aside during the First World War.

However, despite the cultural connections between Germany and the United States, framing the German people in the context of Anglo-Saxonism was more of a challenge. During the late nineteenth century, it appeared that the Teutonic theory of Anglo-Saxonism might have provided a way to include Germans into the Anglo-Saxon family by tracing the ancient origins of the Anglo-Saxon peoples in the forest of Europe, wherein the kernels of self-government and other qualities such as adventurousness, resourcefulness, and self-discipline had lain, that would spread later to the British Isles and eventually, to the United States. However, the contemporaries of late nineteenth century economics and diplomacy prevented a fusion of Teuton and Anglo-Saxon, as Germany and the United States were rising powers, both with leaders that wanted their

³³⁷ Ibid.

respective countries to play a much larger role in international affairs, resulting in tension that escalated into confrontation between both countries. Despite overtures of friendship from both governments, both the foreign policy establishments of Wilhelmine Germany and the United States retained their mutual suspicions of one another, which would continue into the outbreak of the First World War.

CHAPTER 4
THE RISE OF ANGLO-SAXONISM
IN THE FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT

This chapter will discuss the role of Anglo-Saxonism in the decision-making process within the foreign policy establishment of the United States from the late nineteenth century to the beginning of the First World War. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States had not only grown into an industrial power. It had also entered the ranks of the major world powers with a colonial empire in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The last decade of the nineteenth century witnessed a shift in the American world view. Rather than staying aloof from world affairs, as it had done since the founding of the republic, the United States began to take a more active role in the world stage, as much of the globe was increasingly partitioned among the European powers and Japan.

The foreign policy elite in Washington, DC of the 1890s had a far different outlook from that of the Founders a century earlier. Behind this fundamental shift in foreign policy was a foreign policy elite that used Anglo-Saxonism as the new rallying cry for a more boisterous and aggressive nation, seeking to take its place in the world. Anglo-Saxonism was redefined to suit the new foreign policy of the United States, which was heavily influenced by Social Darwinism and other pseudo-scientific ideas, justifying the “inherent superiority” of the British and American peoples. Anglo-Saxonists of the late nineteenth century emphasized the idea that qualities such as self-government, resourcefulness, and intelligence were qualities held by Great Britain and the United States that justified global domination. Anglo-Saxonism provided a variety of purposes

for the foreign policy elite. It gave a purpose to the foreign policy establishment that sought to break from the tradition of disengagement dictated by George Washington's Farewell Address of the late eighteenth century. By this time, Anglo-Saxonism had gone beyond parlor room discussions among WASP elites and became part of foreign policy. Because the United States and Great Britain were deemed by Anglo-Saxonists to be "blessed" with the aforementioned qualities of good government, self-control, resourcefulness, and intelligence attributed to Anglo-Saxonism, they had the responsibility of establishing good government and "civilization" to the benighted parts of the world. Anglo-Saxonism, thus, justified colonial expansion in the Pacific and Caribbean, by calling it the "white man's burden", rather than naked imperialistic aggression, as had been charged by its critics. Anglo-Saxonism provided an outlet for a society whom the foreign establishment feared was being "softened" by urbanization and industrialization with the closing of the frontier, as well as being "diluted" with the arrival of the "new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. This chapter will focus on the conditions allowing Anglo-Saxonism to flourish in the foreign policy establishment, the extent to which Anglo-Saxonism as an ideology influenced foreign policy decision making, as well as the major figures of the foreign policy establishment.

The history of the United States, from the colonial period, through the nineteenth century, was that of a nation whose people were in constant movement from the Atlantic to the Pacific, in search of free land and economic opportunities. Attempts by the British government to hinder that movement, for example, through the Proclamation of 1763, which excluded the Ohio Valley from settlement, were met with outrage and marked was

the first step toward the American Revolution. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provided the mechanisms for integrating new territories into self-governing states, in which such residents would be provided the full protection of the Constitution.³³⁸ Anglo-Saxon ideology had become an ingrained influence when Congress passed the Naturalization Act of 1790, which made free white men eligible for citizenship. It is worth remembering that as the United States developed throughout its history, so too did Anglo-Saxonism evolve to suit the exigency of the time. At the founding of the republic, the Anglo-Saxon myths and icons were appropriated by its Founders to reinforce the ideals of liberty and self-government.³³⁹

As the United States continued its expansion, the federal government's relationship with Native Americans was a precursor to colonialism after the Spanish-American War. The proclamation of "Manifest Destiny," was really a call for the propagation of Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the guise of "liberty" across North America, regardless of who stood in the way.³⁴⁰ Thus, even though Native Americans and Mexico had inhabited those lands, they used the land inefficiently and perpetuated "savagery" and "backwardness". The proponents of the Mexican-American War of the 1840s justified the conflict by arguing that only the Anglo-Saxon peoples could truly rule the vast expanses of North America because they would establish the principles of self-government in the untamed lands of the West, from Texas to California because it was a

³³⁸ Hazel McFerson, *The Racial Dimension of American Overseas Colonial Policy*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1997), 80.

³³⁹J. R. Hall, "Mid-Nineteenth-Century American Anglo-Saxonism: The Question of Language," *Anglo-Saxonism and the Construction of Social Identity*, Allen J. Frantzen and John D. Niles, eds. (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1997), 134.

³⁴⁰MacFerson, 83-4.

part of their history and bloodlines from their ancient past. By spreading the ideals of liberty and self-government, inherent to Anglo-Saxonism, the West, and even the world would be formed in the image of an Anglo-Saxon America.³⁴¹

The redefinition of Anglo-Saxonism in the late-nineteenth century would have ramifications for American foreign policy. By 1890, American expansion, however, was not restricted to the spread of liberty and the addition of self-governing states to the Union. The United States government supported expansionist policies for more mundane reasons, such as conquest and access to new markets. Annexing Canada had been an old dream, which failed twice after ill-planned invasions during the American Revolution and the War of 1812, and instead led to the creation of the Canadian confederation. By 1850, the acquisition of the Pacific Coast, from Great Britain in the Oregon Country and from Mexico through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, completed Manifest Destiny. Policymakers began to look at the Pacific and the Western Hemisphere as a new outlet for exports in a new American “empire,” as the United States was embarking on the course of becoming a major industrial power.³⁴²

William H. Seward: The Architect of Empire

The architect of American imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was William H. Seward. As Abraham Lincoln’s secretary of state, Seward’s diplomacy prevented European intervention during the Civil War. He did so by marginalizing the Confederacy by discouraging Great Britain and other European powers

³⁴¹ Paul A. Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910,” *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 88, No. 4, March 2002, 1322-3.

³⁴² Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963, with 1998 preface), 3-4.

from granting it recognition as a sovereign nation. Secondly, he used Canada's vulnerable geographic location as a leverage to ensure British neutrality, and during the *Trent* affair, he did not allow the heat of the Civil War to result in an international war between the United States and Great Britain. In doing so, he ensured the victory of the Union over the Confederacy, setting the foundation for American expansion in the coming decades.³⁴³

With the Civil War over, the creation of an American empire would dominate the last third of the nineteenth century. American foreign policy was in transition by the end of the Civil War. On the one hand, American presidents and secretaries of state were bound by the tradition of non-engagement in "entangling alliances" going back to the founding of the republic. The Monroe Doctrine served as a bulwark against European meddling into the Western Hemisphere. The American people saw themselves as a "city on a hill" embarking upon an experiment of creating a nation, not based on blood or ethnicity, but upon the ideals of liberty, that would attract the downtrodden peoples of Europe and elsewhere.³⁴⁴ Seward was the first major policymaker to break away from the traditional paradigm of American foreign policy. As secretary of state, Seward sought to use the economic potential of the United States as the launching pad of a new American empire, plus the magnet of immigration to contribute to American economic power.³⁴⁵

³⁴³ John M. Taylor, *William Henry Seward: Lincoln's Right Hand Man*, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), 179-81.

³⁴⁴ Beisner, 10-2.

³⁴⁵ Glyndon G. Van Deusen, *William Henry Seward*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 511-2.

Seward saw the domination of Latin America as crucial for the rise of the United States as an imperialist power. His goal was to acquire for the United States a series of naval bases in the Caribbean, particularly Santo Domingo and the Danish Virgin Islands, and the Pacific. The acquisition of Alaska, though known at the time as “Seward’s Folly”, in 1867 was part of a grander plan to annex Canada, the old expansionist dream of throwing out the British from their last North American colony, going back to the American War of Independence.³⁴⁶ Seward did not wish for the United States to acquire new territory for its own sake. In fact, aside from Alaska, the only mainland territory Seward desired was the Isthmus of Panama, the rest being island acquisitions.³⁴⁷ Economics was the impetus for late nineteenth-century American expansion. He saw the geopolitical position of the United States as the basis of economic supremacy, located between Europe and Asia. Rather than a traditional land-based empire, Seward sought to have the Pacific become part of an American commercial empire.³⁴⁸

The acquisition of Alaska was part of a larger strategy of establishing an American presence in Asia. A canal through Panama would open markets on the West Coast to the Atlantic. As early as 1863, Seward raised the profile of the American representative in Hawaii and negotiated a trade reciprocity treaty with the Hawaiian government in order to draw it into an American sphere of influence, culminating in its annexation by 1898. In 1867, Seward laid claim on the Midway Islands, as part of a

³⁴⁶ Sidney Lens, *The Forging of the American Empire*, (New York: Thomas E. Crowell, Co, 1971), 157.

³⁴⁷ Ernest N. Paolino, *The Foundations of the American Empire: William Henry Seward and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1973), 23.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 30.

chain coaling stations leading to Asia.³⁴⁹ Once in Asia, Seward vigorously advocated for free American access to its markets. In 1868, he negotiated the Burlingame Treaty, which provided cheap Chinese labor to help complete the Transcontinental Railroad. At the same time, Seward had ambitions to open the markets of Japan and Korea to American trade, the latter which would be fulfilled by the 1880s.³⁵⁰

Seward's quest for empire was not due purely to geopolitical considerations. His ideology was based on an extension of Manifest Destiny. However, instead of creating self-governing states across the North American continent, Seward believed that "Divine Providence" mandated an American empire dominating Latin America and the Pacific.³⁵¹ In his speech at Madison Wisconsin on 12 September 1860, he declared that "empire for the last three thousand years...made its way constantly westward...until the tides of the renewed and decaying civilizations of the world meet on the shores of the Pacific Ocean."³⁵² Anglo-Saxonism was clearly the guiding light for his expansionist policy, even when most Americans before and after the Civil War, did not care for more territory.³⁵³ Seward adopted the attitude of paternalism as he laid out American foreign policy. He saw China as having been "under the spells of superstition and caste," only to be roused by the blessings of American trade.³⁵⁴ The United States would serve as a

³⁴⁹ LaFeber, 29.

³⁵⁰ Ibid, 30-1.

³⁵¹ Ibid, 26.

³⁵² William Henry Seward, "Democracy, the Chief Element of Government," 12 September 1860, *The Works of William Henry Seward*, Vol. 4, George Baker, ed., (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1888), 319.

³⁵³ La Feber, 31.

³⁵⁴ William Henry Seward, "The Destiny of America" 14 September 1853, , *The Works of William Henry Seward*, Vol. 4, George Baker, ed., (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1888), 325.

“tutor” to China in the arts of Western civilization, which presaged the idea of the “White Man’s Burden.”³⁵⁵

For all his goals, Seward’s contemporaries dismissed his vision for the United States, particularly the purchase of Alaska from Russia. The lack of a navy, or rather, the unwillingness to expand that navy after the Civil War, was a stumbling block for him, which would be rectified long after he had left office in 1869. In retrospect, however, Seward could be seen as a transition from the pre-Civil War ideology of non-interference to imperial expansion. The generation of policymakers in the State Department and the Navy would fulfill his plans in the years between 1890 and the First World War, with the Open Door Policy in China and the acquisition of the Virgin Islands in the Caribbean. Seward anticipated the rise of the United States as a global economic power, and the Anglo-Saxonists would be the ones standing on his shoulders.³⁵⁶

The potential that Seward saw in the ascendancy of the United States lay in its economic expansion following the Civil War. The United States had many advantages from which to draw: rich agricultural land; vast raw material; modern technology (e.g., railways, steam engines, mining equipment, etc.); geographic isolation; absence of foreign enemies; a steady labor force brought in by immigration; and a steady flow of foreign and domestic investment capital.³⁵⁷ Between 1865 and 1898, the United States devoted its energies to internal economic development. During the thirty-three years between the end of the Civil War and the outbreak of the Spanish-American War,

³⁵⁵ Paolino, 147.

³⁵⁶ Ibid, 210-2.

³⁵⁷ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), 242.

productivity in agriculture and industry jumped to astronomical levels. Wheat increased 256 percent, while corn and sugar increased 222 percent and 460 percent, respectively. Coal production increased 800 percent, while the production of crude petroleum rose from 3 million barrels to 55 million barrels. What especially aided American economic growth were the millions of immigrants who joined the labor force.³⁵⁸ The United States truly had an economy of scale. American firms such as Singer, Du Pont, Bell, and Standard Oil were leaders in technology and enjoyed a gigantic domestic market.³⁵⁹ American foreign trade proved to be more competitive than either Britain or Germany as exports increased sevenfold between 1860 and 1914.³⁶⁰ Between 1874 and 1900, American exports grew from around \$600 million to \$1.4 billion. Exports to Canada and Europe grew from about \$500 million to \$1.1 billion between 1875 and 1900, while exports to Asia and Latin America in those same years grew from \$72 million to \$200 million. This was not the whole picture, however.³⁶¹

While the United States was indeed an economic power, it was not a military power. In 1900, the United States had only 96,000 military and naval personnel compared to Germany's 524,000 and Britain's 624,000. In warship tonnage, the United States ranked only fourth behind France and Russia.³⁶² American foreign policy held to the tradition of isolationism, thus steering away from any formal alliance. Geographic isolation had rendered alliances unnecessary for most of its history. This isolation

³⁵⁸Ibid, 243.

³⁵⁹Ibid, 243-44.

³⁶⁰Ibid, 245.

³⁶¹ Robert L. Beisner, *From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865—1900*, (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1986), 22-3.

³⁶²Kennedy, 203.

allowed the United States to achieve dominance of the Western Hemisphere. American economic dynamism was thus coupled with the willingness of its policy makers to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy.³⁶³

Changes in American Society:

In the years after Seward's departure from the State Department, the United States began to break away from its traditional disengagement from international affairs. There were a number of factors that were behind the shift to a more aggressive foreign policy. One reason was a changing population. Between 1870 and 1890, the population grew from 39 million to 63 million.³⁶⁴ Immigration was a significant contributor to population growth. Between 1880 and 1920, the "New Immigrants" from southern and eastern Europe were outnumbering the "old stock" immigrants from northern and western Europe. By 1910, one-third of Americans were either foreign-born or had at least one parent who was. Immigrants constituted significant proportions of major metropolitan areas and provided the labor for factories in a booming economy.³⁶⁵ Arriving at a rate of at least 65,000 a year in the decades leading to World War I, these immigrants from southern and eastern Europe were outnumbering older sources of immigration from northern Europe.³⁶⁶ Nativists feared that the arrivals of immigrants, who were so

³⁶³Ibid, 248.

³⁶⁴ Beisner, 74.

³⁶⁵³⁶⁵ Nell Irvin Painter, *Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877—1919*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987), xxxiii-iv.

³⁶⁶ John Higham, *Strangers in the Land, Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925*, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1955), 159.

fundamentally different from the previous generations of immigrants, could undermine the Anglo-Saxon values of self-government, as well as white racial purity.³⁶⁷

The major shifts in population caused some to think about the direction of American society. The closing of the frontier marked a turning point in the social history of the United States. The historian Frederick Jackson Turner postulated in his “frontier thesis” in 1893 that the expansion and settlement of the frontier played a role in shaping American character and molded American democracy, which distinguished the United States from the cramped nations of Europe.³⁶⁸ Other intellectuals of the time grabbed onto Turner’s frontier thesis by arguing that the closing of the frontier, with no outlet, would be detrimental for American manhood. Without the free air of the West, they feared that industrialization and urbanization would weaken American men and lose the taste for war, unlike the previous generation who fought in the Civil War. The United States would then be torn into class conflicts and revolutions that had so plagued Europe throughout the nineteenth century. Jingoists of the 1890s proposed a new frontier of colonies and markets beyond America’s shores where American masculinity could flower through the crucible of war.³⁶⁹

The changing landscape of international relations of the late nineteenth century also influenced the development of a more aggressive American foreign policy. Starting in the 1880s, the European powers, particularly Britain and France, had been partitioning the continent of Africa into colonies and protectorates. Asia was also divided into

³⁶⁷ Ibid, 169.

³⁶⁸ Beisner, 75.

³⁶⁹ Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars*, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1998), 15-6.

colonies, and China, the biggest prize in Asia, was carved into spheres of influence, also by Britain and France. Additionally, there were new contenders, which altered the geopolitical balance of power. For the first time, a unified Germany arose, which unsettled the traditional Concert of Europe, which had maintained the peace since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. In Asia, Japan escaped the fate of European domination through extensive reform and industrialization, and became an imperialist power in its own right, having subdued China in the Sino-Japanese War 1895.³⁷⁰ To many Americans of the period, the United States could no longer afford to cling to the sentimentality of George Washington's Farewell Address. As a rising industrial power, the United States had to join the European powers in dominating the non-industrial world for markets and resources, or risk falling behind the European powers in gaining access to markets in Asia and not fulfilling its own destiny of dominion over the Western Hemisphere.³⁷¹

By the end of the 1880s, a new generation of elite policymakers had emerged in Washington. Unlike their predecessors, they were well-connected through their travels to Europe and their connections with the European aristocracy. While previous generations may have eschewed any admiration of European, particularly British, culture, these White Anglo-Saxon Protestant elites were ready to proclaim their affinity with the Anglo-Saxon community.³⁷² In their paradigm, the pinnacle of humanity was the Anglo-Saxon race, to which the United States belonged through its connections with Great Britain, Germany, and Scandinavia. The rise of this new WASP elite coincided with the

³⁷⁰ Painter, 148.

³⁷¹ Lens, 161.

³⁷² Painter, 142.

emergence of late nineteenth century Anglo-Saxonism, based on the application of Darwin's theory of natural selection on human society. Social Darwinists saw the world in terms of limited resources, and that the race that made the most effective use of those resources were destined to rule, while "inferior" races should accept "benign" subjugation. It was therefore incumbent upon them that the Anglo-Saxon nations, particularly, the United States and Great Britain, should work in concert, if not enter into a full-fledged alliance.³⁷³ Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Alfred Thayer Mahan were the most prominent among the many individuals most associated with Anglo-Saxonism and their application of its principles into American foreign policy. Their policies would lead the United States to chart upon a new course in its world outlook and take its place among the industrialized powers in shouldering the "White Man's Burden."³⁷⁴

The Anglo-American Rapprochement of the 1890s and its Impact on US Foreign Policy:

The rise of the United States as a major power in the 1890s coincided with its diplomatic *rapprochement* with Great Britain. The ideology of Anglo-Saxonism provided the final piece to the Anglo-American *rapprochement*, upon which American and British foreign policy elites could establish a common purpose. The addition of the United States as a possible partner in imperial affairs partially offset Britain's relative decline, as it dealt with new challenges in European diplomacy.³⁷⁵

³⁷³ Stuart Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895—1904*, (London: Associated University Presses, 1981), 73.

³⁷⁴ Lens, 166.

³⁷⁵ Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895—1914*, (London: Victor Gollanz, Ltd., 1969), 52.

In the late nineteenth century, Britain grew increasingly isolated by the new diplomatic realities taking shape in Europe. After experiencing several decades of unquestioned leadership, the British faced foreign policy challenges from different areas of the globe, such as Russia's encroachment towards India and its presence in China and colonial disputes with France in Asia and Africa. Also in 1894, France and Russia signed the *Entente Cordial*, which caused much alarm in London. Meanwhile, Germany rose as the leading military power, becoming home to the largest army in Europe.³⁷⁶ Then in 1890, Kaiser Wilhelm dismissed Bismarck as chancellor and introduced a new foreign policy based on direct competition with Britain in the acquisition of colonies and the enlargement of Germany's navy.³⁷⁷

The overwhelming lead Britain enjoyed in industrial capacity and naval size steadily eroded in the century's closing years. A chief reason for this development was the spread of industrialization throughout Europe and the United States.³⁷⁸ One of the stark realities challenging Britain was a united Germany whose population and industrial capacity was growing steadily after 1870. For example, German coal production grew from under 90 million tons in 1890 to just under 280 million tons in 1914 as opposed to Britain's at over 290 million tons.³⁷⁹ In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Britain's industrial and commercial pre-eminence shrank. In 1880, Britain commanded about 23 percent of world manufacturing and world trade. By 1913, it had dropped to 14 percent. Between 1820 and 1840, annual productivity was 4 percent, which shrank to 3

³⁷⁶Ibid.

³⁷⁷Ibid, 6.

³⁷⁸Kennedy, 226.

³⁷⁹Ibid, 210. In coal production, Germany produced 89 million tons in 1890 to 277 million tons in 1914 compared to Britain at 292 million tons.

percent between 1840 and 1870 and decreased even further to about 2 percent between 1875 and 1894. While its traditional industries of coal, textiles, and ironware continued to increase production, Britain lost its lead to newer industries of the late nineteenth century such as steel, chemicals, machine tools, and electrical products. These industrial statistics alarmed the British government because of their diplomatic ramifications.³⁸⁰

This trend of decline did not go unnoticed by the British leadership. Prime Minister Lord Salisbury saw the need for Britain to end its traditional isolationist policy. In 1898 Lord Salisbury addressed the House of Lords on the dire situation in British foreign policy. By the late nineteenth century, Britain had acquired extensive colonial holdings in Africa and Asia, raising the envy of various European powers, notably Germany. Salisbury argued that the acquisitive policy of the late nineteenth century left Britain in a vulnerable position as it might incite the hostility of other nations, as well as leaving Britain spread out too thinly, thereby putting a burden upon its resources.³⁸¹ By 1898, various sectors of the British leadership called for an alliance between Great Britain and the United States. Joseph Chamberlain, the colonial secretary, was the most ardent supporters for closer ties between Britain and the United States. Chamberlain succinctly analyzed Britain's isolation:

Since the Crimean War nearly 50 years ago, the policy of this country has been a policy of strict isolation. We have had no allies--I am afraid we have had no friends...As long as the other Great Powers of Europe were also working for their own hand were separately engaged, I think

³⁸⁰Ibid, 228. Britain produced 22.9 percent of world manufacturing and 23 percent of world trade. By 1913, it was only at 13.6 and 14 percent respectively. Between 1820 and 1840, annual productivity was 4 percent which shrank to 3 percent between 1840 and 1870 and decreased even further to 1.5% between 1875 and 1894.

³⁸¹"Two Foreign Policies" *The Economist*, 12 February 1898, 231.

the policy [of isolationism] we have pursued...was undoubtedly right for this country...But now in recent years, a different complexion has been placed upon the matter...All the powerful states of Europe have made alliances, and as long as we keep outside these alliances, we are envied by all and suspected by all.³⁸²

Chamberlain was one of the growing number of voices clamoring for a *rapprochement* and a formal alliance between the United States and Great Britain. Realizing Britain's isolation, Chamberlain reached out to the United States as the best place to look for an alliance due to its cultural similarities and compatible world views.³⁸³

In light of Britain's imperial overstretch, the foreign policy establishment in Washington sought to establish the hegemony of the United States over Latin America, ending Britain's economic supremacy over the Western Hemisphere. Crucial to this aim was the renegotiation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, signed in 1850 in which both countries would originally share custody over an isthmian canal.³⁸⁴ Imperialists in the foreign policy establishment wanted the United States to have sole control over a future isthmian canal. During the Spanish-American War, Commodore Dewey's fleet had to make the months-long journey around the Straits of Magellan to reach the Spanish fleet in Manila, which could have been dramatically shortened by an isthmian canal. Negotiations with the British government began in 1898, with the State Department calling for changes in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. McKinley argued before Congress that

³⁸²Joseph Chamberlain, "Speech by Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain at the Birmingham Town Hall Advocating Closer Ties with the United States, 13 May 1898," *Great Britain, Foreign Policy and Span of Empire 1689-1971*, Joel H. Wiener, ed. (New York: Chelsea, 1972), v1, 509.

³⁸³*Ibid*, 509.

³⁸⁴David H. Burton, *British-American Diplomacy 1895—1917 Early Years of the Special Relationship*, (Malabar, Florida: Krieger Publishing Company, 1999), 27.

an American-controlled canal was crucial to the economic interests of the United States, especially since Hawaii had been annexed that year.³⁸⁵

An obstacle to the renegotiation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was the controversy surrounding the border between Alaska and Canada, due to vague wording in a treaty between Britain and Russia, Alaska's former occupier. The British government wanted to link the fate of an isthmian canal with the settling of Alaska's boundary with Canada, which had been a bane in Anglo-American relations throughout the nineteenth century.³⁸⁶ Secretary of State John Hay, in his letter to US Ambassador Henry White, found it "deplorable" that the British insisted on linking the issue of the canal with the issue of Canada. He claimed that British public opinion supported an American-controlled canal and would be a benefit to the global community. Nevertheless, he remained confident that the United States and Britain would come to an equitable agreement.³⁸⁷ Ultimately, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty lapsed and was replaced by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty signed in 1901, assuring American hegemony over the Western Hemisphere, assuring the British government that the United States would not become a problem. As a result of the treaty, the Anglo-American *rapprochement* that had begun in the 1890s became the foundation for the Special Relationship of the twentieth century.³⁸⁸

The continuing evolution of Anglo-Saxonism was crucial in the flowering of the Anglo-American *rapprochement* of the 1890s. The foreign policy elites of the United States and Great Britain saw Anglo-Saxonism as a common world view that provided a

³⁸⁵ Ibid, 28.

³⁸⁶ Ibid, 33.

³⁸⁷ John Hay to Henry White 14 February, 1899, *The Life and Letters of John Hay, Vol. 2*, William Roscoe Thayer, ed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1915), 218.

³⁸⁸ Burton, 32.

purpose for their respective countries. As the United States took on the responsibilities of empire, Great Britain saw a potential partner acting in concert to hold back more hostile world powers, such as Germany or Russia. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, British Anglo-Saxonists welcomed the debut of the United States as a world power. British commentators like Geoffrey Seed, and Professor Edward Dicey saw the victory of the United States over Spain as proof of Anglo-Saxon “superiority” in the perpetual struggle among the races for survival and dominance.³⁸⁹ In an article in the *North American Review*, the American professor of Archaeologist and a strong supporter of the Anglo-American *rapprochement*, Charles Waldstein praised the potential benefits of Anglo-American partnership. In his article, he does not point to ethnic school of Anglo-Saxonism as the basis for the *rapprochement* between the growing friendship between the United States and Great Britain, simply because of the ethnic diversity of the United States, as well as the diversity of peoples that formed Great Britain, which he found problematic. Rather, he saw the English language that ties both countries together.³⁹⁰ To the contrary, in his article, Waldstein objected to the racial and ethnic chauvinism that pervaded Continental powers, particularly, Germany, which he traced to a reaction to Napoleon Bonaparte’s armies in the early nineteenth century, later to be channeled by Otto von Bismarck in his unification of the German states in 1871. Thus, to reduce the *rapprochement* between the United States and Great Britain to mere ethnic solidarity cheapened its potential.³⁹¹

³⁸⁹ Perkins, 52.

³⁹⁰ Charles Waldstein, “The English-Speaking Brotherhood,” *The North American Review*, vol. 167, no. 501, August 1898, 225.

³⁹¹ *Ibid*, 227.

Waldstein pointed to the shared culture of the American and British peoples that binds them together, regardless of their ethnic make-up. As examples, he uses British monuments like Westminster Abbey, which memorializes statesmen and poets, which inspire and provide a sense of familiarity to Americans, regardless of their ethnicity. Secondly, Waldstein uses English literature, citing authors like William Shakespeare, and Sir Walter Scott as a common source of unity for both countries on either side of the Atlantic.³⁹² He best explains the role of language in how British and American travelers understand the world:

At every step while the Englishman or American travels abroad, even in the most civilized countries, he meets with administrative enactments, privileges, restrictions, injunctions and directions, sent from the summits of government into the busy plains of ordinary daily life, which are foreign to him and which evoke a sense of criticism, if not of irritation and revolt. The same feeling of strangeness and of foreignness constantly comes over him, if he attempts to follow their political life, whether the American consider the legislative and administrative proceedings of a European republic, or the Englishman study the laws and enactments of some other constitutional monarchy. On the other hand, every Englishman becomes readily familiar with the political system of the United States and feels at home under its rule, as the American lives happily under the laws of Great Britain and can follow with interest the work of the House of Commons.³⁹³

Overall, Waldstein believes that the *rapprochement* between the United States and Great Britain, which he considers “an English-speaking brotherhood,” possesses inherent qualities not found in any other European power. He declares that by working together, the United States and Great Britain can be the leaders of human civilization because of their commitments to constitutional and representative government. He does

³⁹² Ibid, 230.

³⁹³ Ibid, 232.

not consider the American War of Independence of 1776 to be a disaster, but rather, an affirmation of the Thirteen Colonies' commitment to self-government, continuing the arc of early English history, starting with the Magna Charta and the English Civil War.³⁹⁴ Waldstein also reminds his readers that the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 originated as a joint statement by both the American and British governments, in their commitment to protect the newly independent nations of Latin America against an invasion by the Continental powers, foreshadowing the *rapprochement* of the 1890s. He ends his article with a plea for both governments to remember that it is the deep cultural bonds, rather than ethnic chauvinism that should tie the American and British peoples together through which they can improve humanity.³⁹⁵

Alfred Thayer Mahan and the New Navy:

One of the most significant contributors to the change in American foreign policy at the beginning of the twentieth century was Alfred Thayer Mahan. He understood that in order for the United States to fulfill its potential, it had to look outward, and in order to look outward, the United States needed the necessary tools, in this case, being a modern navy that would project American power overseas. Mahan's entire life revolved around the service of his country, for he was born on 27 September 1840 on the grounds of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and died on 1 December 1914 at the Naval Hospital in Washington, D.C. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis in 1859 and devoted the rest of his life to the Navy. To him, the Navy would be the means upon which the United States could take its place among the European powers that

³⁹⁴ Ibid, 234.

³⁹⁵ Ibid, 236.

were carving out much of the world in the late nineteenth century.³⁹⁶ Mahan's southern upbringing would have an impact on his later philosophy that the Anglo-Saxon peoples, by their virtues of self-government, would establish their dominion over "uncivilized peoples" and spread "the blessings of civilization." Because of Mahan's extensive and comprehensive work on the role of naval power in history, Mahan became the authority for foreign policy makers who wanted to make the argument for a more assertive role for the United States in international affairs.³⁹⁷

Mahan combined both the ideology of Anglo-Saxonism and the practical means of applying it through the use of the Navy as a tool of foreign policy. In particular, Mahan, emphasized the social-darwinistic dimension of Anglo-Saxonism, which rested on the assumption that the world was a battleground, in which the races of humanity competed for limited resources. Thus, the nation, or people, that can best utilize those resources, to him, was the nation that was "the fittest" and best suited to survive in such an environment. In this world view, he sees a natural partnership between the United States and Great Britain because of their shared values, particularly the love of liberty and the rule of law, which are considered to be the foundations of self-government, the cornerstone of Anglo-Saxonism. He saw the history of the United States unfold in which the Anglo-Saxon ideals of the United States spread across the North American continent, assimilating everyone its path, in a manner similar to that of ancient Rome. He therefore sees overseas expansion to the Pacific as a natural and necessary outlet for the United

³⁹⁶ Robert Seager II, *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters*, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press: 1977), 2.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 37.

States, since toward the south, referring to Latin America, consists of an “alien people” with strange values, and the north, meaning Canada, as sharing similar Anglo-Saxon values which would not tolerate foreign occupation.³⁹⁸

Mahan would be most known for his seminal book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. Originally part of his lectures on naval history, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* covered the rise of the British navy between 1660 and 1783. Mahan begins with the statement, “The History of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war.”³⁹⁹ Mahan listed the conditions under which determined whether a country became a sea power: geographical location; physical area; population; and political institutions.⁴⁰⁰ He therefore, concluded that Britain satisfied these conditions, which allowed it to become a global empire by the eighteenth century. In his work, Mahan analyzed Britain’s wars against France, Holland and Spain and concluded that Britain’s success as a commercial and world empire lay in the fact that it used sea power more effectively than its neighbors. Mahan explained that the command of the sea was predicated on the following criteria: destroying the enemy’s navy in pitched battles; acquiring its colonies; blockading its ports; and blocking its access to strategic trade routes.⁴⁰¹ By holding Britain as a model for national greatness, he also implied that the

³⁹⁸ Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power,” *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*, (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1898), 35.

³⁹⁹ Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660—1783*, (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1890), 1.

⁴⁰⁰ Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660—1783*, 36-7.

⁴⁰¹ Seager, 204.

United States, too, could become a great power by following the British example of building a great navy to protect its commercial interests.

Mahan's work was widely read among the foreign policy establishment of the 1890s and beyond, and influenced the course of American foreign policy. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* was a textbook for American foreign policy makers who desired to see the United States take its place among the major powers of the late nineteenth century. Mahan's ideas coincided with the desire to have access to markets in the late nineteenth century, declaring that

“Foreign necessities or luxuries must be brought to [a nation's] ports, either in its own or in foreign ships, which will return, bearing in exchange the products of the country, whether they be fruits of the earth or the works of men's hands, and it is the wish of every nation that this shipping business be done by its own vessels. The ships that thus sail to and fro must have secure ports to which to return, and must, as far as possible, be followed by the protection of their country throughout the voyage.”⁴⁰²

On the necessity of a navy, Mahan argued,

“springs from the existence of peaceful shipping and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation, which has aggressive tendencies and keeps up a navy merely as a branch of the military department. As the United States has at present no aggressive purposes, and as its merchant service has disappeared, the dwindling of the armed fleet and general lack of interest in it are strictly logical consequences.”⁴⁰³

The Influence of Sea Power in History regenerated an interest in the navy, which had been allowed to deteriorate in the decades after the Civil War. Mahan's work injected a sense of purpose to a new generation of naval officers, who tied the nation's well-being to trade. Therefore, in order to protect trade, a large navy was necessary. Thus, the

⁴⁰² Mahan, 34-5.

⁴⁰³ Ibid, 35.

United States would need to establish its naval presence in the Caribbean, Hawaii, and other strategic locations to protect its trade.⁴⁰⁴ As a result, the curriculum at the Naval Academy in Annapolis began to reflect the teachings of Mahan, albeit slowly, to include “modern” subjects such as economics and political science.⁴⁰⁵

Mahan was part of a new generation of “navalists” who pleaded the case for a “large policy”, and therefore, a powerful navy to enforce it. He was considered a “prophet” of a new age, one in which the United States was a major player in the geopolitical maneuverings of the great powers of the late nineteenth century, and his reading public went beyond the naval establishment, waiting for his pronouncements on the military and diplomatic questions of the day.⁴⁰⁶ Theodore Roosevelt was among the “navalists” who identified very closely to Mahan’s vision. To him, simply having a defensive military was clearly insufficient to the global diplomatic realities of the late nineteenth century. His review of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* reiterated the necessity for a navy that would be able to stand against that of a major European power. He stated most explicitly

Forts alone could not prevent the occupation of any town or territory outside the ranging of their guns or the general wasting of the seaboard... We need a large navy, composed not merely of cruisers, but containing also a full proportion of powerful battleships, able to meet those of any nation. It is not economy—it is niggardly and foolish shortsightedness—to cramp our naval expenditures, while squandering money right and left on everything else, from pensions to public buildings.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁴ Richard D. Challener, *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press: 1973), 13.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 14.

⁴⁰⁶ Seager, 224.

⁴⁰⁷ Theodore Roosevelt, “Review of The Influence of Sea Power Upon History,” *The Writings of Theodore Roosevelt*, William H. Harbaugh, ed., (Indianapolis: Bobs-Merrill Co., 1967), 41.

In his article “The United States Looking Outward,” Mahan reiterated the importance of markets and highlighted the fact that the United States in the late nineteenth century was in a unique position of being both an Atlantic and a Pacific power.⁴⁰⁸ He saw the rise of another newcomer, Germany, as a threat to the long-term interests of the United States in the Pacific, which he believed to be a future battleground of the great naval powers, stating that

All over the world German commercial and colonial push is coming into collision with other nations: witness the affair of the Caroline Islands with Spain; the partition of New Guinea with England;...the Samoa affair; the conflict between German control and American interests in the islands of the western Pacific; and the alleged progress of German influence in Central and South America. It is noteworthy that while these various contentions are sustained with the aggressive military spirit characteristic of the German Empire, they are credibly said to arise from the national temper more than from the deliberate policy of the government...a condition much more formidable.⁴⁰⁹

Mahan in his article further makes the connection that economic rivalry will inevitably lead to political and military conflict. It was in the best interests of the United States to build up its navy in order to embark upon the new policy of, what Foster Rhea Dulles called, “mercantile imperialism,” that a nation must have overseas bases beyond its home shores in order protect its commerce abroad.⁴¹⁰

It was not surprising then, that Mahan considered himself an anglophile, having written about the rise of the Royal Navy, as an example for the United States to emulate. Amid the Anglo-American *rapprochement* of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, he supported a “cordial understanding” with Great Britain, rather than a formal

⁴⁰⁸ Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The United States Looking Outward,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, August 1898, *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*, (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1898), 6.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 7-8.

⁴¹⁰ Foster Rhea Dulles, *America’s Rise to World Power*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), 32-3.

alliance. This new relationship would be based on the shared national interests of both countries in a world, in which continents were being partitioned for their markets and resources.⁴¹¹ Mahan anticipated the eventuality that war would erupt between Great Britain and Germany. In such a war, he believed that the United States would side with Britain. He argued, therefore, that the United States should not adhere to a strict definition of neutrality, dating back to the War of 1812 and adopt the British maritime practice of seizing contraband during wartime.⁴¹²

In pushing the United States to take a more strident position in world affairs, Mahan continued to press for greater cooperation between Great Britain and the United States. In his article, “An Anglo-American Reunion”, Mahan called upon the shared kinship of the American and British peoples. He believed that the fundamental similarities in language and heritage were breaking down the traditional enmity between both countries that had existed since the American Revolution.⁴¹³ This article was part of a compilation of his writings under his work *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*, which he began in 1897. The timing for this work could not have been more striking. During this time, the crisis in Cuba was compelling leaders in the United States to intervene on behalf of the Cuban people’s struggle against Spain. Additionally, there were mounting pressures for the United States to annex Hawaii. Mahan persuaded the publishers Little, Brown, & Co. to market the book to a military audience in order to influence policy makers in Washington to advance a “broader

⁴¹¹ Seager, 225.

⁴¹² Challenger, 26.

⁴¹³ Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Possibility of an Anglo-American Reunion,” *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*, (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1898), 108.

policy” for the United States and working in concert with Great Britain, against Germany, which he perceived to be their common threat.⁴¹⁴

In order for the United States to achieve its destiny of domination, it needed to have the tools necessary, most particularly a navy that ranked among that of the major European powers. After the Civil War, the navy had greatly deteriorated. By 1880, the navy, which had helped secured Union victory less than twenty years earlier, was mostly derelict and obsolete. Out of 1,942 vessels, only 48 were in fighting condition. The same insular attitude that disdained any interest beyond America’s shores contributed to the decline of the United States Navy during the 1870s.⁴¹⁵ However, by the 1880s, the growing realization of access to markets in Asia and dominance of the Western Hemisphere made both political and military leaders to reconsider the importance of a modern world-class navy. In 1881, Secretary of the Navy William Hunt established a naval board that would be up to date on the latest naval developments, culminating into the creation of the Naval War College of 1884, setting the stage for a modern navy.⁴¹⁶

Congressman William McAdoo of New Jersey and diplomat John Kasson pled the case for the modernization of the United States Navy. They argued that American citizens and economic interests in areas as far flung as the Samoas had the right to be protected by an adequate navy. In 1883, Congress authorized spending for four steel vessels, laying the foundation for the “New Navy”. Between 1885 and 1889, Congress authorized the construction of thirty more vessels. However, the ships to be constructed

⁴¹⁴ Seager, 348-9.

⁴¹⁵ LaFeber, 58.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid, 59.

were only lightly-armored cruisers that targeted commerce ships and not offensive battleships for domination of the seas. Nevertheless, the creation of the “New Navy” during the 1880s became a starting point upon which Anglo-Saxonists could formulate a new aggressive foreign policy for the 1890s.⁴¹⁷

Mahan’s influence on foreign policy had become extensive among the policy makers in the State and War Departments by the beginning of the twentieth century. Mahan, himself encouraged the growing *rapprochement* between the United States and Great Britain in the early years of the twentieth century, by drawing upon Anglo-Saxonism as the basis of global cooperation against common threats like Germany. He noted that despite waves of immigration, the United States still remained “English” in its political traditions and ethnic makeup, and thus, despite the growth of the United States into a major world power, the similarities between both countries in Anglo-Saxon values, such as the ideals of self-government and the rule of law meant that Great Britain did not see the United States as a threat to its strategic interests.⁴¹⁸ In 1906, he persuaded President Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of War Elihu Root to abandon traditional American neutrality rights, which was one of the causes of the War of 1812.⁴¹⁹ Mahan’s flock of “navalists” had grown within the policy making organs of Washington, which the importance of continued Anglo-American cooperation, and sought to adapt his teachings to the new foreign policy of the United States.⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁷ Ibid, 60.

⁴¹⁸ Mahan, “Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power,” 34.

⁴¹⁹ Challenger, 26.

⁴²⁰ Ibid, 27.

A direct application of Mahan's writings could be found in the policy of acquiring bases in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. The necessity for bases was compatible with Seward's social darwinistic world view that structured the world as a battleground where the fittest nations survived. He expresses this sentiment in his article on Asia in *Harper's Weekly*:

The first law of states, as of men, is self-preservation—a term which cannot be narrowed to the bare tenure of a stationary round of existence. Growth is a property of healthful life, which does not, it is true, necessarily imply increase of size for nations, any more than it does for individuals, with whom bodily, and still more mental, development progresses long after stature has reached its limit; but it does involve the right to insure by just means whatsoever contributes to national progress, and correlatively to combat injurious action taken by an outside agency, if the latter overpass its own lawful sphere.⁴²¹

Using history as a guide, Mahan referred to the decision made by the Roman Republic to occupy Messina in Sicily, which was the first instance in which Rome extended its influence beyond the Italian peninsula, ultimately changing its destiny by transforming from a landlocked republic into a Mediterranean empire.⁴²² Likewise, Great Britain provided the template for the United States to chart its course into the unknown waters of being a global power. He cited the extensive networks of naval bases stretching from Gibraltar to India, as well as British possessions in the North Atlantic and the Caribbean, which lay at the basis for its global empire.⁴²³ According to Mahan, it was not by sheer seamanship, alone, that established Britain's global pre-eminence by the late nineteenth century. Rather, it was the qualities of self-government and the love of liberty throughout

⁴²¹ Mahan, "The Problem of Asia," *Harpers New Monthly Magazine*, March 1900, 543.

⁴²² Mahan, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power," 33.

⁴²³ *Ibid*, 36-7.

England's history within Anglo-Saxonism that allowed Britain to rise from an insignificant island among the nations of Europe. During the age of exploration under Elizabeth I, Mahan credited the initiative of "buccaneers" like Sir Francis Drake and Sir Walter Raleigh, who added to England's wealth by plundering Spain's treasures, since they were not hindered by unnecessary regulations of a bloated bureaucracy.⁴²⁴ Thus, in staking out its claim in the New World, which he described as "the brawl of nations," what seemed to be a disadvantage in not conquering "half-civilized" peoples like the Aztecs and Incas, the British people planted the seeds of self-government, where it could grow unhindered and ultimately become the United States. These were the lessons that Mahan hoped to impart upon his readers.⁴²⁵

Though considered laughable during Seward's time, the need to establish an American military and economic presence overseas gave the navy a sense of urgency. In 1900, the General Board of the Navy was created to list the priorities of the navy, particularly, the locations for potential naval bases. There were two areas of interest to the United States Navy: the Caribbean and Asia. The General Board desired to make the Caribbean Sea an "American lake" with its crown jewel, an isthmian canal. The Spanish-American War had given Puerto Rico and Cuba to the United States. The Board considered additional sites such as Almirante Bay and Chiriqui Lagoon in Panama; Port Elena in Nicaragua; the Galapagos Islands off the coast of Ecuador; and even as far as Bahia Hondo in Brazil.⁴²⁶ By the first decade of the twentieth century, the navy became

⁴²⁴ Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The Isthmus and Sea Power," *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 1893, reprinted in *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*, (Boston: Doubleday, 1918), 69.

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁴²⁶ Challener, 37.

the foundation for American imperialism in the Caribbean and in Latin America. It was instrumental in the transformation of Cuba into an American protectorate, through the numerous interventions into its domestic affairs. The importance of the Panama Canal, as well as American economic interests required interventions into the governments of Central America, as well, by maintaining dictatorships in Guatemala, Nicaragua that were friendly with the United States.⁴²⁷

The increasing importance of Chinese markets necessitated an American presence in East Asia by the end of the nineteenth century. As in Latin America, there were strong recommendations from both the army and the navy to establish coaling bases either on or near the Chinese mainland. This would complete the “insular empire” of the United States, which extended from Hawaii and the Philippines.⁴²⁸ The accessibility to China’s markets led the United States government to follow the Open Door Policy, to ensure that it would not be left out as China was increasingly at the mercy of European spheres of influence, made even more evident with the crushing of the Boxer Rebellion by a multinational force of Europeans, Americans, and Japanese.⁴²⁹ In the event that the Open Door Policy had failed and China was open for partition, the Navy was willing to consider gaining a concession at Tianjin and bases at the Chusan Islands, which were part of Mahan’s recommendations made in August 1898. Ultimately, such plans never materialized because they would contradict the ideals of the Open Door Policy and the potential risk of the major powers intervening against the United States.⁴³⁰

⁴²⁷ Ibid, 165-6.

⁴²⁸ Ibid, 179-80.

⁴²⁹ Seager, 460.

⁴³⁰ Challenger, 186-7.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Mahan, who had become the acknowledged authority on foreign policy, was called upon to give his analysis on the role of the United States in Asia in *Harper's Monthly*. In his three-part article "The Problem of Asia", Mahan acknowledged the fact that the acquisition of the Philippines after the Spanish-American War had placed the United States into the position of an "Asiatic Power," and as such, could no longer afford to remain aloof from international affairs.⁴³¹ Mahan concluded that Asia would be the focus of international events in the twentieth century. He states it most succinctly

For the problem of Asia is a world problem, which has come upon the world in an age when, through the rapidity of communication, it is wide awake and sensible as never before, and by electrical touch, to every stirring in its members, and to the tendency thereof.⁴³²

Likewise, Theodore Roosevelt was in complete agreement with Mahan's analysis of conditions in Asia, requiring the attention of the United States and Great Britain. In his letter, in response to Mahan's article, he stated:

I feel that the United States and England should so far as possible work together in China, and that their cooperation and the effective use of sea power on behalf of civilization and progress which this cooperation would mean in the valley of the Yangtze [River], is of the utmost importance for the future of Asia, and therefore of the whole world.⁴³³

In his further study of Asia, Mahan acknowledged Japan as an emerging power as a result of the modernization efforts undertaken during the Meiji Restoration, while joining the ranks of those who consider it to be the "Yellow Peril." However, rather than

⁴³¹ Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The Problem of Asia," *Harpers New Monthly Magazine*, March 1900, 538.

⁴³² *Ibid*, 540.

⁴³³ Theodore Roosevelt to Alfred Thayer Mahan, 18 March 1901, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Elting E. Morison, ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), 19.

focusing on the coastlines, Mahan saw Central Asia, between the thirtieth and fortieth parallels, from Asia Minor to the Korean Peninsula as a future battleground among the major powers, with the “Slavic peoples,” i.e., Russia, as the chief rival to the Anglo-Saxon race.⁴³⁴ Because of its geographic limitations, Russia would have no choice but to expand southward toward the goal of obtaining a warm water port. Mahan concluded that Russia would then collide with maritime powers, such as Great Britain. The concern over Russia, as a potential rival in Asia would also be shared by other elites in the foreign policy establishments in both the United States and Great Britain. Anglo-Saxonists would thus have a sense of purpose.⁴³⁵

The Experience of the Philippines and Anglo-Saxonism:

The one arena where policy makers could apply the ideals of Anglo-Saxonism was the Philippines, which the United States acquired by the Treaty of Paris, ending the Spanish-American War. One of the arguments in the debate for acquiring the last of Spain’s colonies, most notably the Philippines, was so that the United States would assume its responsibility like the other European powers and bring “civilization,” (Protestant) Christianity, and “progress.” Having taken on the task of governing the Philippines, American policy makers sought to apply the ideals of Anglo-Saxonism, particularly, imparting “self-government” to the Filipino people. While it was one thing for Boston patricians to boast of the past glories of the Anglo-Saxon race, it was another thing to apply the credos of Anglo-Saxonism in the new situation that was unfolding in the Philippines. Politicians could no longer talk about the *potential* benefits of American

⁴³⁴Seager, 465.

⁴³⁵Mahan, 542.

rule, but of how to bring “civilization” to the Philippines. As the United States began to establish the foundations of colonial rule in the Philippines, race, particularly Anglo-Saxonism, based on precedents established well before the Spanish-American War, played a significant role in determining the relationships between American administrators and the Filipino people, whether through the grueling realities of the guerrilla war against the insurgents or of the actual business of colonial government.⁴³⁶

For future American colonial administrators, there was no question that Great Britain would be the model for governing the Philippines. At an annual meeting of the American Academy of Social and Political Science in May 1899, the question on the best way for the United States to establish colonial control over the Philippines was discussed by academics and politicians, alike. In the opening remarks given by Theodore S. Woolsey, a professor of international law at Yale University, he compared the Dutch colonial system to the British colonial system. He concluded that the British colonial system was worth emulating because of its Anglo-Saxon ideals of self-government, as evidenced by the dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, while he referred to the East Indies as little more than “a sort of huge farm by the government of the Netherlands.”⁴³⁷

Woolsey cites British rule over India as a model for how the United States should rule the Philippines. He bases his entire assumption that the Philippines is incapable of

⁴³⁶ Hazel McFerson, *The Racial Dimension of American Overseas Colonial Policy*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1997), 2.

⁴³⁷ Theodore S. Woolsey, “The Government of Dependences,” *The Foreign Policy of the United States: Political and Commercial*, Theodore S. Woolsey, E. W. Huffcut, A. Lawrence Lowell, et al., *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 13, Supplement 12 (May, 1899), 3-4.

self-government, and must therefore, rely on the tutelage of the United States government. With regard to India, Woolsey professed his admiration for the British civil service, because of its use of young British men, “the flower of the race,” to take upon the White Man’s Burden. He commended the British for having made a study in the governance of “dependent races.” The result, therefore, according to Woolsey is the British in India have kept the peace, preserved order, built roads, railroads and irrigation works, brought justice to the humblest, lessened famine and pestilence, introduced state education, sanitation and dispensaries, freed trade from many burdens, simplified taxation, and has begun to introduce local self-government.⁴³⁸

Taking the cue from the British model, Woolsey, summarized the goals of the United States in its management of the Philippines: to exercise religious toleration among the Christian and Muslim populations; to “educate” the “civilized” half of the Philippines in the arts of self-government; to expand communication and public works; and to raise revenue.⁴³⁹ The challenge in establishing self-government in the Philippines was reflected in the accounts of Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., who served governor-general of the Philippines. He blamed the “backwardness” of the Philippines on Spanish colonial rule, which, he argued, introduced feudalism to the Philippines and reinforced by the Roman Catholic Church.⁴⁴⁰ However, Woolsey introduces a paradox that would hang over the United States in grappling the reality of colonial rule over the Philippines. In establishing “order” and “civilization” in the Philippines, he believed that it would be

⁴³⁸ Ibid, 10.

⁴³⁹ Ibid, 11.

⁴⁴⁰ Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., *Colonial Policies of the United States*, (New York: Doubleday, 1937), 145.

unthinkable for the United States to grant self-government to a “half-civilized” nation as the Philippines. Doing so, he argued, would lead to chaos. Thus, he likened the relationship between the United States and the Philippines as that between a guardian and his ward that must be kept on the tight leash of military rule.⁴⁴¹

Regardless of the academic debates, the American experience of governing the Philippines was born in the crucible of the Filipino insurrection that followed almost immediately after the conclusion of the Spanish-American War. Much to the surprise of the Americans, the “insurgents” had the utter temerity and audacity to demand the independence that Dewey had promised Aguinaldo in Singapore. On 4 February 1899, barely two months from the Treaty of Paris, troops under Aguinaldo fired on an American unit in Manila, thus inaugurating the Philippine-American War, which cost \$170 million (plus hundreds of millions more in pensions), 4,000 American casualties, and hundreds of thousands in Filipino lives.⁴⁴²

In an address on 7 October 1899, Secretary of War Root justified America’s role in the insurrection and the actions of the military. He argued that the United States was the only civilizing force in the Philippines that would fall into the anarchy of tribal warfare, should the Filipino people be left to their own devices. He described Aguinaldo’s forces as “men who prefer a life of brigandage to a life of industry” and Aguinaldo as a “military dictator...who has attained supreme power by the assassination of his rival, and who maintains it by the arrest and punishment of every one who favors

⁴⁴¹ Theodore S. Woolsey, “The Government of Dependences,” *The Foreign Policy of the United States: Political and Commercial*, 16-7.

⁴⁴² Sidney Lens, *The Forging of an American Empire*, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1971), 186-7.

the United States, and the murder of every one whom he can reach who aids her.”⁴⁴³ In the same breath, Root extolled the Anglo-Saxon virtues of the American soldiers in the Philippines, even though he did not mention Anglo-Saxonism by name. To him, the American soldier

...carries with him not the traditions of a military empire, but the traditions of a self-governing people. He comes from a land where public discussion has educated every citizen in the art of self-government...where the affairs of city and county and town and village, have made the art of government the alphabet of life for every citizen, where every citizen has learned that obedience to law, and respect for the results of popular elections is a part of the order of nature.⁴⁴⁴

In imposing another brand of colonialism upon the Philippines, the first duty of the United States was to impose order by suppressing the “insurrection”. Unlike the war against the Spanish, which utilized conventional military tactics, the Philippine-American War was a guerrilla war, which blurred the line between soldier and civilian as American troops moved outside Manila.⁴⁴⁵ Brute force, however, was not the only means the United States employed in suppressing the guerrilla war. As the occupation of Manila began, McKinley gave expressed orders that the army would treat the Filipinos as humanely as possible in order to match American actions with American desires for the well being of the Philippines, as an example of providing Anglo-Saxon “civilization” and win over the Filipino people to the cause of American colonialism. The military

⁴⁴³ Elihu Root, “Address by the Secretary of War at the Marquette Club in Chicago, October 7, 1899, in Response to the Toast, ‘The American Soldier,’ *The Military and Colonial Policies of the United States: Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root*, Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, eds. (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1970, reprinted from the edition of 1916, Cambridge, Massachusetts), 10.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴⁴⁵ Stuart Creighton Miller, “The American Soldier and the Conquest of the Philippines,” *Reappraising an Empire: New Perspectives on Philippine-American History*, Peter W. Stanley, ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1984),13-4.

government would continue to allow Spanish law to remain in force, with justice administered by officials already in place, provided that they accept American authority. Private property would also be respected.⁴⁴⁶ One of the army's first duties during the occupation of Manila was to provide health and sanitation facilities that were woefully inadequate under the Spanish and that had been destroyed by war. The Board of Health was created under the direction of Chief Surgeon Major Frank S. Bourns. The Board of Health instituted health regulations, inspected homes, markets, and other establishments that could affect public health, ran the leper hospital, and provided smallpox vaccinations.⁴⁴⁷ It should be noted, however, that such services became unevenly distributed outside Manila and into the countryside.⁴⁴⁸

As the guerrilla war continued, the question over whether to keep the Philippines intensified among Americans. In Congress, there was an intense debate between Senator Albert Beveridge of Indiana and Senator George Hoar of Massachusetts. Beveridge had introduced a resolution calling for the United States to retain the Philippines and to stay the course in putting down the insurgency. Hoar denounced this measure. In defending his resolution, Beveridge questioned the ability of the Filipino people to govern themselves:

The great majority of the natives of the islands...were incapable of understanding even the simplest form of self-government. Decades would be necessary to instruct them in the rudiments of administration as it was understood in America...As a rule they were indolent, and their methods

⁴⁴⁶ Gates, 55-6.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid, 57-8.

⁴⁴⁸ James A. Le Roy, *The Americans in the Philippines: A History of the Conquest and First Years of Occupation with an Introductory Account of the Spanish Rule*, (New York: AMS Press, Inc., reprint from edition of 1914, Boston), vol. 2, 287-8.

of the most primitive nature. They must be dealt with as children by a strong and simple government.⁴⁴⁹

Hoar, however, responded from the constitutional perspective by asking, “Where did the United States get the right to buy and sell people like sheep?” He countered Beveridge’s claims by arguing that the Philippines already had an established government with courts, schools, governments, and churches. Thus, to Hoar, in maintaining its grip on the Philippines, the United States would be responsible for smothering the sovereign entity of the Philippine Republic that had been proclaimed in the struggle against the Spanish.⁴⁵⁰

With the capture of Aguinaldo in 1901 and other revolutionary leaders subsequently, the United States proceeded to follow McKinley’s mandate of “uplifting,” “civilizing,” and “Christianizing” the Philippines. On In the midst of the guerrilla war, there had been debates over what form a civil government in the Philippines would be established. The question of the relationship the Philippines would have with the United States—whether as a state, territory, or colony—hung over Congress. The Insular Cases of May 1901 resolved the question by granting limited rights to Filipinos and other subject peoples taken from Spain, under the premise that the Constitution does not fully follow the flag. While the Filipino people were granted the “fundamental rights” of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, they were not necessarily granted “procedural rights,” such as trial by jury.⁴⁵¹ American colonial rule in the Philippines was an experiment because for the first time the United States had acquired territory with no intention of incorporating it as state with uniform institutions as could be found on the mainland. Using Anglo-

⁴⁴⁹ “Senator Beveridge on the Philippines,” *The New York Times*, 10 January 1900, 5.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵¹ Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century’s Turn*, (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961), 339.

Saxonism as a guide, American administrators, in subsequent years, would be traversing uncharted waters.⁴⁵²

In order to determine what kind of arrangements could be made for the Philippines, McKinley organized a committee, consisting of future president William Howard Taft, Dean C. Worcester, Luke E. Wright, Henry C. Ide, and Bernard Moses and led by Jacob Schurman, the president of Cornell University in March 1899, as the guerrilla war was commencing. After a tour of the islands, the Philippine Commission, also known as the Schurman Commission concluded that the Philippines was unprepared for self-rule despite the government established under Aguinaldo. In an article in the *Times of London*, a Filipino committee protested that the Schurman Commission did not make any efforts to cooperate with Aguinaldo's government, arguing that "it is impossible for a commission sitting only at Manila and unaided by friendly cooperation on the part of the national Government, to arrive at a proper understanding of the actual condition of affairs in the Philippines, the unanimity and aspirations of the people, and their capability of self-government."⁴⁵³ The Schurman Commission operated on cultural biases and had contact only with members of the elite that was seeking to maintain its class prerogatives with the new American order. As expected, the Schurman Commission recommended that only American colonial rule was the best safeguard for protecting the welfare of the Philippines, out of concern that the islands would descend into tribal warfare.⁴⁵⁴

⁴⁵² Julian Go, "Introduction: Global Perspectives on the U.S. Colonial State in the Philippines," *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives*, Julian Go, and Anne L. Forster, eds., (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2003), 4-5.

⁴⁵³ Untitled, *The Times of London*, 1 February 1899, 5.

⁴⁵⁴ Morrell Heald and Lawrence S. Kaplan, *Culture and Diplomacy: The American Experience*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977), 143.

In 1900, McKinley ordered a second commission headed by Taft with the purpose of establishing a civil government. Roosevelt wrote Taft commending him for having been chosen and had every confidence in his abilities in heading the commission.⁴⁵⁵ The report by the Taft Commission began by generalizing the majority of the Filipino people as “ignorant, credulous, and childlike, and that under any government, the electoral franchise must be much limited, because the large majority will not, for a long time, be capable of intelligently exercising it.”⁴⁵⁶ However, unlike other Americans who had visited the Philippines, Taft made the effort to become acquainted with the Filipino people beyond two-dimensional caricatures and sought to base civil government upon indigenous traditions.⁴⁵⁷ However, at the same time, Taft, after studying other colonial experiences by the British, concluded that the United States would serve the Philippines better by transplanting American values of freedom and self-rule.⁴⁵⁸ The Taft Commission, thus established the founding principles for civil government:

That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial...that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense...that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime...that no law shall be passed abridging freedom of speech or of the press, or the rights of people to peaceably

⁴⁵⁵ Theodore Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, 7 February 1900, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Elting E. Morison (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1951), 1175.

⁴⁵⁶ Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Reports of the Philippine Commission, the Civil Governor, and the Heads of the Executive Departments of the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands (1900-1903)*, Washington D.C.: War Department), 31.

⁴⁵⁷ Morrell Heald and Lawrence S. Kaplan, *Culture and Diplomacy: The American Experience*, 145-6.

⁴⁵⁸ Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines*, (New York: Random House, 1989), 169-70.

assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting free exercise thereof, and that free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed.⁴⁵⁹

The Taft Commission began its work on 1 September 1900, establishing civil rule by creating local governments in municipalities and provinces, organized courts among American lines, and created the creation of the Philippine Civil Service. In his recollections, Worcester, one of the commissioners, encountered initial skepticism from military governor General Arthur MacArthur (father of General Douglas MacArthur), who saw military rule as the only solution and regarded the Taft Commission as an intrusion to that end.⁴⁶⁰

The United States established the Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA) in 1898 to administer the Philippines, along with the other territories acquired from Spain. Because of the insurgency, the BIA was placed under the jurisdiction of the War Department under Secretary Elihu Root. The operations of the BIA were left to George De Rue Meiklejohn, assistant secretary of war on 23 August 1898, whose position roughly corresponded to that of the British colonial secretary.⁴⁶¹ Upon its founding, the BIA faced two major problems regarding the Philippines. The first problem was over how to establish a civil government in the Philippines in the midst of a guerrilla war and whether the military could provide the infrastructure necessary while fighting a war. The second

⁴⁵⁹ Bureau of Insular Affairs, 9.

⁴⁶⁰ Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present*, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1930), 273-5.

⁴⁶¹ Romeo V. Cruz, *America's Colonial Desk and the Philippines, 1898-1934*, (Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 1974), 24.

problem was over which agencies would claim jurisdiction over the Philippines upon the conclusion of the guerrilla war.⁴⁶²

On 4 July 1901, Root ended the military government and appointed Taft as the first civil governor of the Philippines. The administration of the Philippines was divided into four departments headed by the members of the Schurman and Taft Commissions: the department of the interior under Worcester; the department of commerce and police under Wright; and the department of public instruction under Moses. In his inaugural address as civil governor to the Philippine Assembly in 1901, Taft reiterated the goal of the United States, which was to educate “a people untutored in the methods of free and honest government...”⁴⁶³ In his reflections as civil governor during a lecture at Yale University in 1906, Taft reiterated that the Filipinos were not ready for independence because they had not been fully trained in the Anglo-Saxon ideals of self-government, heavily underscoring the difference between American and Philippine citizenship due to the fact that the Filipino people were not ready to exercise the same constitutional privileges granted to American citizenship.⁴⁶⁴

While grand rhetoric on the “white man’s burden” was one thing, delivering on the promises of American government and Anglo-Saxon civilization was another. In implementing its colonial policy, the United States sought to provide the Philippines law and order, as well as the material benefits of American rule, in the form of infrastructure

⁴⁶² Ibid, 26.

⁴⁶³ William Howard Taft, “Inaugural Address as Civil Governor of the Philippines,” *The Collected Works of William Howard Taft*, David H. Burton, ed., (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2001), vol. 1, 79.

⁴⁶⁴ William Howard Taft, “The Duties of Citizenship Viewed from the Standpoint of Colonial Administration,” *The Collected Works of William Howard Taft*, David H. Burton, ed., (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2001), vol. 1, 41.

such as roads, sewers, water supply, hospitals, parks, and schools.⁴⁶⁵ Nowhere was inculcation of American Anglo-Saxon values more crucial than in the schools. The goal of the Taft Commission was to provide a public and secular educational system that would teach the arts of civilization to the great majority of the population.⁴⁶⁶ In his report to the Taft Commission, David P. Barrows, Superintendent of Education, expressed his concern that limiting education to the children of the elite at the expense of the children of the peasants would result in their exploitation because they would not learn the values of self-government and democracy.⁴⁶⁷ His aim was to destroy the hold of the landed elite upon the peasantry, and through education, create a new class of independent yeoman farmers that would own its own land, setting the foundation for a society based on Anglo-Saxon ideals of liberty and self-government.⁴⁶⁸ The Taft Commission recommended that Filipino teachers who were cooperative with the American authorities and who showed an inclination for learning English be trained in the United States where, they could be taught the arts of civilization by example.⁴⁶⁹ To that end, the Taft Commission ordered that English would be the language of instruction in the schools, rather than the local dialects, with the reasoning that “There is no great advantage in learning to read in a language which offers nothing worth reading to those who have acquired the art... The limits of the province remain their horizon. They are shut out from the advantages

⁴⁶⁵ McFerson , 109.

⁴⁶⁶ Bureau of Insular Affairs, 399.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid, 712.

⁴⁶⁸ David P. Barrows, “Education and Social Progress in the Philippines,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1907, vol. 30, no. 1, 73

⁴⁶⁹ Bureau of Insular Affairs, 412.

enjoyed by their fellow-countrymen who have had the means to enable them to acquire a language through which may be derived a knowledge of civilized society.⁴⁷⁰

With the establishment of the civil government, the United States commenced its cooperation with the Filipino elite. The elite class that existed in the Philippines owes its origins to Spanish colonialism. When the Spanish first colonized what would become the Philippines, they worked with the existing *datus*, or chieftains. By the nineteenth century, this class expanded into the *ilustrado* elite of *mestizos* who had a mixture of either Spanish or Chinese origin. Under Spanish colonial rule, this class of landowners and professionals, many of whom were educated in Europe, gained experience in local politics, but their ambitions for a greater role in governing the Philippines were thwarted by Spain. During the 1890s, a movement for reforms within the colonial government grew among the *ilustrados*, most notably by José Rizal, but they were reluctant to advocate violent revolution for fear of unleashing a popular uprising with unpredictable consequences. Nevertheless, as the Philippines became embroiled in the Spanish-American War, the *ilustrados* stood as a natural ruling class that claimed to speak for the Filipino people.⁴⁷¹

The United States ensured the primacy of the elite through the creation of the Philippine Civil Service. The members of the Taft Commission had hoped that the creation of a civil service in 1901 would eliminate corruption and establish an efficient

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁷¹ Norman G. Owen, "Introduction: Philippine Society and American Colonialism," *Compadre Colonialism: Studies on the Philippines under American Rule*, Norman G. Owen, ed. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan, 1971), 1-3.

colonial structure.⁴⁷² Through the *pensionado* system starting in 1903, children from elite families would spend some time in the United States to study and become acculturated to American values and then return to the Philippines to take up their posts in the Philippine Civil Service.⁴⁷³ The opposite proved to be true. Corruption became rampant in all areas of government as networks of patrons and clients emerged, whereby political bosses handed out offices to their supporters. The vicissitudes of American politics also accelerated the pace at which corruption developed as autonomy was gradually handed over to Manila. In a twist of irony, in its colonial experience, the United States failed in its all-important mission, which was to teach the values of self-government and democracy.⁴⁷⁴

After the Spanish-American War: Crises in Anglo-Saxonism

The *rapprochement* between the United States and the British Empire during the 1890s was interrupted by unraveling events in South Africa, namely, the Boer War, which created a crisis among the adherents of Anglo-Saxonism in both countries. Unlike other colonial wars in Africa and Asia, the Boer War was not between European and non-European, but between two groups of Europeans, the British and the Boers, largely descendants of Dutch settlers who migrated to what is now South Africa during the seventeenth century. The war became a crisis that could have undone the Anglo-American *rapprochement*, because the Boers were culturally, and linguistically related to

⁴⁷² Taft, 95-6.

⁴⁷³ Cruz, 86.

⁴⁷⁴ Patricio N. Abinales, "Progressive-Machine Conflict in Early Twentieth Century U.S. Politics and Colonial State Building in the Philippines," *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives*, Julian Go, and Anne L. Forster, eds., (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2003), 153.

the British and Americans. American public opinion empathized with the Boers who traveled across the seas and were fighting for their independence against the British, just as in the American Revolution. For Anglo-Saxonists, the Boers epitomized the ideals of Anglo-Saxonism by having conquered a wilderness and “inferior peoples” and for establishing a community based on self-government and were fighting to preserve their liberties. These inconsistencies in the narrative of late nineteenth-century Anglo-Saxonism became difficult to reconcile.⁴⁷⁵

The causes of the Boer War originated in 1795 when Britain gained control of Cape Colony (present-day South Africa) from the Dutch Republic during the Napoleonic Wars. The “Boers,” however, did not wish to live under British rule. In addition to differences in language and culture, it was the issue of slavery that became the last straw for the Boers, who depended on African slave labor, as the British government abolished the slave trade in 1807 and slavery in the British Empire in 1833.⁴⁷⁶ During the 1830s, a few thousand of Boers made the “Great Trek” and left Cape Colony and settled in lands along the Vaal and Orange rivers beyond British jurisdiction in order to escape further meddling. In 1852, the Sand River Convention established the Transvaal, or the South African Republic, which was recognized by Great Britain. In 1854, Britain recognized the independence of the Orange Free State.⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷⁵ Paul A. Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880—1910, *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 88, No. 4, March 2002, 1342.

⁴⁷⁶ ⁴⁷⁶ Thomas J. Noer, *Briton, Boer, and Yankee: The United States and South Africa 1870—1914*, (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1978), 6.

⁴⁷⁷ Richard B. Mulanax, *The Boer War in American Politics and Diplomacy*, (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1994), 9.

It was not until the 1860s that the British government paid any attention to the Boer republics. Starting with the discovery of diamonds in the 1860s, and gold in the 1890s, the Boer republics suddenly became an issue for concern. Overnight, the once thinly-settled Transvaal and Orange Free State were overrun by prospectors, mainly British, seeking to make their fortunes. The Boer governments, however, resented the presence of the *Uitlanders* (foreigners) that they were part of a plot by the British to conquer them, while the miners believed they were not given their rights, such as citizenship and voting, and that the government was not responsive to their needs, including sanitation, police, and infrastructure.⁴⁷⁸ Tensions exploded in December 1895 during the Jameson Raid, when *Uitlanders* led by Dr. Leander Starr Jameson, an administrator of the British colony of Southern Rhodesia, staged an uprising to overthrow the government of Transvaal under the guise of “liberty.” The raid was suppressed by January 1896 by the Transvaal President Paul Kruger. The Jameson Raid confirmed Boer suspicions that Britain would add Transvaal and the Orange Free State to its empire, despite protests by the British government condemning the raid. Intransigence on both sides ultimately led to the outbreak of hostilities between Britain and the Boer republics.⁴⁷⁹

The Boer War broke out in 1899, a year after the Spanish-American War and the same year as the Samoa Crisis. The conflict was no longer limited to the British and the Boer republics, for it also had international ramifications. Germany also became drawn to the colonial conflict between Great Britain and the Boer republics. Despite Bismarck’s

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid, 14.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid, 15.

reluctance, powerful lobbying groups pressed for German colonial expansion in Africa in the years following unification in 1871 in order to enhance Germany's standing among the European powers. Ernst von Weber, a proponent of German colonial expansion, argued for intervention in the Boer conflict as part of a strategy allowing Germany to expand into southern Africa, using the Boer republics as an agricultural base. He also argued that the Boer and the German peoples were part of a larger Teutonic people, who had a mutual interest in repelling the English invaders.⁴⁸⁰ After Bismarck's retirement in 1890, Kaiser Wilhelm II adopted a more active foreign policy, with the goal of aggrandizing Germany's international position. In the aftermath of the Jameson raid, he sent a telegram to President Paul Kruger of Transvaal, congratulating him for resisting foreign encroachment of his territory, which aroused the anger of the British government, which saw Wilhelm II interfering in a purely colonial affair.⁴⁸¹ For the British government, the Boer conflict had the potential to expand into an international conflict and symptomatic of the reality that the "splendid isolation" enjoyed by Britain for much of the nineteenth century could no longer be sustainable, with the rise of Germany, Russia, Japan, and the United States as challengers to its supremacy.⁴⁸²

The Boer War had direct consequences for the United States. South Africa had great economic potential by the late nineteenth century. The discovery of gold showed Americans that South Africa was a potential market for American products for both white and black consumers. It was in the interest, then, of American policy makers that Great

⁴⁸⁰ Martin Kröger, "Imperial Germany and the Boer War" *The International Impact of the Boer War*, Keith Wilson, ed., (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 25-6.

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁴⁸² Keith Wilson, "The Boer War in the Context of Britain's Imperial Problems," *The International Impact of the Boer War*, Keith Wilson, ed., (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 160.

Britain was successful in establishing its dominance over the Boers. South Africa under direct British rule would be profitable for many reasons. The British government would open South Africa to American trade and investment, which the agrarian Boer governments strongly opposed. Anglo-Saxonists in the American foreign policy establishment naturally expected direct British rule over South Africa to be more efficient than that of the Boers. More importantly, since the British would impose English as the primary language of South Africa, American companies would have a far greater advantage than that of other European continental powers, especially Germany.⁴⁸³

Reaction to the conflict between the Boers and the British government was divided in all levels of American society. A significant proportion of the US Senate was sympathetic to the Boer struggle. Senator A. O. Bacon of Georgia, a Democrat, compared the Boer conflict to previous nationalist movements of the nineteenth century, of peoples struggling for liberty against powerful empires. He used examples such as the Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire during the 1820s and the Hungarian Uprising against the Austrian Empire in 1848, and cited precedent of the United States stating its moral support in those struggles. Thus, he argued, that expressing support for nationalist movements was not the same as a “foreign entanglement” in those struggles, themselves.⁴⁸⁴ Significant sectors of the American public were also sympathetic to the Boers, most notably, Americans of Irish, German, and Dutch descent. Theodore Roosevelt, due to his Dutch ancestry, saw much to be admired in the Boers, who were an embodiment of Anglo-Saxonism:

⁴⁸³ Noer, xi.

⁴⁸⁴ Mulanax, 132.

The Boers are belated Cromwellians with many fine traits. They deeply and earnestly believe in their cause, and they attract the sympathy which always goes to the small nation... The Boers are marvelous fighters, and the change in the conditions of warfare during the past forty years has been such as to give peculiar play to their qualities... In our congested city life of today the military qualities cannot flourish as in a mounted pastoral population, where every male is accustomed to bearing arms, and, what is quite as important, is accustomed from his youth to act under a rough but effective military organization.⁴⁸⁵

The “yellow journalists” Hearst and Pulitzer, printed articles that were favorable to the Boers. It was no stretch of the imagination for average Americans to equate the Boer conflict with the American Revolution. Prominent Americans, including former President Benjamin Harrison, industrialist Andrew Carnegie, the German-American politician Carl Schurz, philosopher Henry Adams, and the lawyer Clarence Darrow voiced their support for the Boers.⁴⁸⁶ The Boer republican governments, who were familiar with the sympathies of American public opinion toward their plight, sought to court American foreign policy makers to transfer their support from the British. In 1900, a Boer delegation came to the United States to rally Boer support in Washington. However, division among the pro-Boer organizations and the entrenched anglophilia, brought upon by the Anglo-American *rapprochement* rendered this mission a failure.⁴⁸⁷

The foreign policy makers in the United States were placed in a delicate position, however. The Boer War broke out amidst the *rapprochement* between the United States and Great Britain, as both powers were in the midst of negotiating their final outstanding

⁴⁸⁵ Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice, 2 December 1899, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Elting E. Morison (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1951), 1103-4.

⁴⁸⁶ William N. Tilchin, “The United States and the Boer War,” *The International Impact of the Boer War*, Keith Wilson, ed., (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 113.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 114.

disputes in the Western Hemisphere, namely, the Alaska Boundary Dispute and the renegotiation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and the British government had gone to great lengths to ensure American neutrality by making significant concessions and essentially handing control of the Western Hemisphere to the United States.⁴⁸⁸ Despite the sentimental rhetoric, the foreign policy establishment, particularly John Hay and Theodore Roosevelt sided with Great Britain, since a British victory would be more beneficial to American long-term economic interests in South Africa. During the conflict, American trade with South Africa and Great Britain, as exports increased from \$16 million in 1899 to \$20 million in 1900, which included sales of boots, gunpowder, and firearms.⁴⁸⁹ The response of the United States to the Boer conflict resembled that of Great Britain during the Spanish-American War. During the Spanish-American War, the continental powers, particularly, Germany, showed sympathy with Spain, yet Great Britain, in spite of its official neutrality, gave much moral and material support to the United States. In the Boer War, it was the United States that sided with Great Britain, despite opposition from the other European powers.⁴⁹⁰

The Boer War was a challenge for the proponents of Anglo-Saxonism. Unlike other previous colonial conflicts, the Boer war did not involve Africans, but rather a people of European descent, particularly Dutch descent, who were ethnically and linguistically akin to the English-speaking peoples. Theodore Roosevelt expressed his ambivalence in a letter to an Australian on 9 March 1900. He expressed his affinity with

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid, 118.

⁴⁸⁹ Noer, 73.

⁴⁹⁰ Tilchin, "The United States and the Boer War," 109.

the Boers because of his Dutch descent. He considered it a tragedy that there should be conflict between the British and the Boers. However, he cast his loyalty with the English-speaking peoples. Roosevelt concluded, therefore, that the ultimate destiny with the Boers lies with Great Britain, and that the greatest benefit for Africa would be a union of the British and Boer peoples, just as the mixture of Dutch and English in the United States, or of the Irish and English in Australia.⁴⁹¹

Anglo-Saxonists who opposed Britain's actions saw the Boers as another branch of Anglo-Saxons in South Africa. In this narrative, like their cousins in Great Britain and the United States, the Boers left their ancestral homeland in the Netherlands for Africa, where they tamed the wilderness and carved out their farms and homes, and later on established their own free societies that became the Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.⁴⁹² In an article of the *North American Review*, Dr. F. V. Engelenburg, the editor of the *Pretoria Volkstem* delivered the case of the Boer peoples. His article reads like an Anglo-Saxon narrative, of a people who travel across the seas to settle in a wilderness and create a thriving society. He describes South Africa, when the first Europeans arrived in the seventeenth century, as "a poor country," where there is scant rainfall, subject to periodic plagues of locusts and other insects, and devoid of natural amenities, such as navigable rivers and harbors. However, despite such

⁴⁹¹ Theodore Roosevelt to A. J. Sage, 9 March 1900, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Elting E. Morison (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1951), 1214-5.

⁴⁹² Paul A. Kramer, "Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910," *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 88, No. 4 (Mar., 2002), 1341.

disadvantages, the Boer has been able to survive, and will continue to survive, long after the gold and diamond mines have been exhausted.⁴⁹³

Engelenburg describes the relationship between the British and the Boer peoples to be one of continual encroachment by the British, and the Boers desperately clinging to their way of life. He also turns the narrative of Anglo-Saxonism against the British, by painting them as an effete people who thrive on luxury and give up on the first sign of hardship, and instead casting the Boers as a hardy people, capable of self-government and fortitude, which he vividly illustrates:

This population is dependent on the outside world, not merely for the products of technical industry, but also for those of agriculture... Every week sees numerous steamers arriving from all parts of the world, laden with every conceivable kind of goods, to supply the limited South African community with many necessaries of life. Should this means of supply ever be cut off, a large portion of our white and other population would simply starve, or at any rate be deprived of the comforts of life. Only the Boers, who eke out a frugal existence on their secluded farms, and have not yet become dependent on frozen meat, European butter, American meal and Australian potatoes? Only the Boers, who, with rare endurance, the heritage of their hardy race, boldly face years of drought, rinder pest, locusts and fever, could survive such a collapse of the economic machinery of a country so severely dealt with by nature. The remaining Europeans would gradually disappear, just as the Phoenicians and the Arabs disappeared in the days long past.⁴⁹⁴

Another way Engelenburg contrasted his people to the *Uitlander* was to cast the Boers as farmers, to the British miners and capitalists who had no other desire than to plunder and enrich themselves. He uses biblical analogy to describe the Boers of the inland areas as agriculturalists who “work by the sweat of his brow” to water his fields against all odds

⁴⁹³ F. V. Engelenburg, “A Transvaal View of the South African Question,” *The North American Review*, Vol. 169, No. 515 (Oct., 1899), 473-4.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 475-6.

from locusts to Hottentots and who will ultimately save civilization. On the other hand he describes those who live along the Cape of Good Hope as those who amassed their fortunes through trade with India and lived in luxurious ease.⁴⁹⁵ Ultimately, Engelenburg blamed the interference of the British administrators in the Cape Colony for the cause of the conflict. He stated that the gradual infringement of the rights of the Boers through “negrophilistic” policies, regarding the treatment of African slave labor, the imposition of English, rather than Dutch in the courts and bureaucracy, British attempts to annex the Boer republics, and the dominance of British speculators, whom he regarded as alien to the Boer agricultural way of life and “unworthy of the Anglo-Saxon nation.”⁴⁹⁶

The Boer War, thus, exposed a vulnerability to relations between Great Britain and the United States that the *rapprochement* of the 1890s had not completely eradicated, namely, American anglophobia. The memories from the American Revolution and the War of 1812 continued to be evoked every Fourth of July, and were thus exploited by politicians who did not support the growing closeness between Great Britain and the United States. The Anti-Imperialist movement conflated both the Boer War and the Philippine Insurrection, exposing the inconsistencies of Anglo-Saxonism, by showing that it was unethical for a free people to impose their will on alien peoples, which was supposed to be the very antithesis of the principles of Anglo-Saxonism.⁴⁹⁷ Senator Augustus Bacon from Georgia, who was not among those caught up in the fever of

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid, 476-7.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid, 478.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid, 1339.

Anglophilia surmised British colonialism thus, when he wrote, "...only with the sword and the gun can millions of the semi-civilized be kept in subjection," as a lesson for the United States, which was contemplating following Britain's example.⁴⁹⁸

An example that expresses the ambivalence of many Americans regarding the Boer War was a work called *Between Briton and Boer* by Edward Stratemeyer, who would later be known for *The Hardy Boys*' mysteries under the pseudonym Franklin Dixon. *Between Briton and Boer* was written as a boys' adventure, which was a popular genre in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The construction of the story is a reflection of Anglo-Saxonism, itself, as well as an allegory of the Boer War. The story begins with two English brothers, Martin and Ralph Nelson, who parted ways. Martin settled in a ranch in Texas, while Ralph established his ranch in South Africa.⁴⁹⁹ Their two sons, Dave, the American, and Will, the Briton finally meet, as circumstances force Martin to leave Texas for South Africa, and much of the story shows Dave and Will's instant friendship bloom, and their adventures that follow, due to their common English forebears.⁵⁰⁰ When the war breaks out in South Africa, Will, despite having been born in South Africa, automatically declares his loyalty to Britain and is confident of the outcome, while Dave shows some skepticism.⁵⁰¹ The conversation between Will and Dave encapsulates the American ambivalence toward the Boer War:

"Pooh, Dave, you don't imagine [the Boers] can whip us?," demanded his cousin.

⁴⁹⁸ Senator Augustus Bacon, "Independence for the Philippines," *Republic or Empire? The Philippine Question*, William Jennings Bryan, ed., (Chicago: W.B. Conkey, 1900), 545.

⁴⁹⁹ Edward Stratemeyer, *Between Briton and Boer or Two Boys' Adventures in South Africa*, (Boston: Lothrop, Lee & Shepard, 1900), 6-7

⁵⁰⁰ Kramer, 1344.

⁵⁰¹ Stratemeyer, 225-6.

“Certainly not—if England sends out a big enough army; but [the Boers] must be fighting with a lot of pluck.”

“I dare say they are—since their homes are here; but this war won’t last—take my word for it.”

“I think it will last a good bit longer than many suppose. Unless I am mistaken,, the Boers will fight to the last ditch. They are sure that they are in the right and that God is with them.”

“And we are sure they are wrong—and there you are.”

“Yes there you are, Will; but that doesn’t settle the matter.”

“No, that must settle itself, if you are going to put it that way.” The English lad looked at his American cousin questioningly. “Dave Nelson, I believe you about half side with the Boers.”

“I don’t deny it Will, for they are fighting for what they consider their natural right—Liberty. You must remember that we Americans fought for the same thing during the Revolution. For myself, I am sorry this matter wasn’t patched up without an appeal to arms.”⁵⁰²

The story expresses the tensions of the meaning of the war. For the British, as expressed by Will, the war is clearly about establishing the authority of the British Empire in the African Veldt, regardless of the intransigence of the Boers. The Boers were cast as the villains in the story, for not having the foresight to understand the benefits of British rule, and they viewed the Americans with suspicion, due to their closeness with England. In a conversation with Boer soldiers, for instance, Dave was astounded at their insistence on defending their lands and their conviction that God was on their side. For Dave, however, he was able to empathize with the Boers because of the similar struggles of the Thirteen Colonies who fought against British oppression.⁵⁰³ In a sense, the Boer War

⁵⁰²Ibid, 292-3.

⁵⁰³ Ibid, 189.

was not so much a colonial war, but rather, it was a civil war within the Anglo-Saxon family because the issues of Anglo-Saxonism were at stake, the desire to rule one's self and to defend one's home from tyranny and despotism.⁵⁰⁴

Theodore Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War:

Among the foreign policy makers of the early twentieth century, none would be as influential as Theodore Roosevelt. His ascendance into power coincided with the rise of the United States as a world power and embodied the vigor of an emerging industrial power that was willing to play a more aggressive role in international politics. Roosevelt's personal transformation from a sickly child to a larger-than-life figure was a personal statement of the kind of masculinity that the United States required as it began to chart the unknown waters of the twentieth century. His aristocratic background and his sense of purpose was a testament to the Anglo-Saxonism of the early twentieth century, showing that the United States, by virtue of its Anglo-Saxon heritage, had a responsibility to spread the light of civilization.⁵⁰⁵ Like Frederick Jackson Turner, Roosevelt saw the Frontier as crucial to the values of Anglo-Saxonism, for through the taming of the wilderness by the establishment of agriculture, the Anglo-Saxon virtues of self-government were being planted, as the wilderness of the forests and prairies, were being reorganized into territories, and then into self-governing states.⁵⁰⁶ Turner referred to the West as a "safety valve," which alleviated the pressures of urban life. Likewise, to Roosevelt, the wilderness was a place where American men, especially could cultivate

⁵⁰⁴ Kramer, 1344.

⁵⁰⁵ Bruce Miroff, *Icons of Democracy: American Leaders as Heroes, Aristocrats, dissenters, and Democrats*, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 160-1.

⁵⁰⁶ Richard Slotkin, *Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth Century America*, (New York: Atheneum, 1992), 29

the virtues of self-reliance, and what he later called, “the strenuous life.” His ranching stint in North Dakota became his inspiration for his book *The Winning of the West*, among other works that emphasized the role of the white hunter, which conformed to the American Anglo-Saxon narrative. The West encouraged the cultivation of the “manly” values of resolution and self-reliance, which served as a rebuke to the urban decadence of the eastern United States. Roosevelt saw the West as a place to re-energize Americans who were feeling stifled by the confining industrial world of city life, which he saw as a threat to the American national character.⁵⁰⁷ The cowboy, therefore, according to Roosevelt, was the direct descendant of the Anglo-Saxon warriors of old. Unlike the east-coast aristocrats, who had been dulled by urban decadence, the cowboy was closer to nature, which honed his senses and allowed him to sharpen his hunting skills that were necessary for survival. Additionally, Anglo-Saxonism, was interpreted by Roosevelt along gender norms, as well. The cowboy was the protector and the provider, while women served to maintain the home and bear children. The family, was not only to be a source of emotional comfort. Rather, it had a larger responsibility to replenish the Anglo-Saxon stock.⁵⁰⁸ Cowboys were far removed from the negative effects of the big city, which included “alien” influences from large scale immigration and labor unions. The West served as a breeding ground for social Darwinism, as different ethnic groups surpassed each other for survival, from Native Americans, culminating into Anglo-Saxon Americans.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid, 37.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid, 49.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid, 39.

For Theodore Roosevelt, Anglo-Saxonism and foreign policy were one and the same. When the Census Bureau declared the frontier closed in 1890, it became an existential crisis for Anglo-Saxonists, for the West was where Americans could learn the virtues of self-government. Roosevelt and other Anglo-Saxonists were concerned that as the United States became an urban and industrialized society, the Anglo-Saxon values would be lost, and the American people would lose its “virility” and be unable to compete in the larger international arena and compete with other nations and peoples for limited resources.⁵¹⁰ Much of his writings reflected the ideas of Francis A Walker’s theory that Anglo-Saxons in the United States were in danger of “race suicide,” i.e., the inability to reproduce more offspring in order to compete with other races. Roosevelt often chided his fellow WASPs for devoting too much of their energies to decadence and leisure, and not enough on having more children.⁵¹¹ Such anxieties about the decline in fertility also coincided with unchecked immigration from non-Anglo-Saxon peoples, whether from southern and eastern Europe, or from Asia, which threatened to overwhelm the population and irrevocably transform the Anglo-Saxon nature of the United States, thus depriving the American people of their rightful destiny. It was then, necessary for the United States to expand beyond the Western Hemisphere to search for new frontiers in order for the Anglo-Saxons to continue to flourish.⁵¹²

Like other Anglo-Saxonists of the early twentieth century, Roosevelt was a firm believer in “The White Man’s Burden.” Like the European powers, the United States, to

⁵¹⁰ Ibid, 52.

⁵¹¹ Higham, 147.

⁵¹² Slotkin, 52.

him, must take charge in civilizing its new conquests in the tropics, particularly the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Roosevelt believed that only the United States and other Anglo-Saxon peoples could teach “inferior” peoples about good government. To place such people in charge over their own fate, to him would be irresponsible.⁵¹³ As the United States took on the responsibilities of colonial rule at the beginning of the twentieth century, Anglo-Saxonists like Roosevelt could look to the British Empire as a template. The self-governing dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa were peopled mainly by Anglo-Saxons, mainly from the British Isles and were located in temperate zones. However, in the tropical zones, such as Africa and Asia, the British government maintained direct rule. This example taught American Anglo-Saxonists that the United States must maintain dominance over its tropical possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacific.⁵¹⁴

The application of Roosevelt’s Anglo-Saxonism into policy can be seen in his letter to Secretary of State John Hay supporting President William McKinley’s nomination of Major General Leonard Wood for command in Cuba and Major General Francis V. Greene for command in the Philippines. His letter stated concern for the challenges the United States was facing as it inaugurated its governance of the former Spanish colonies, the failure of which, “might mean the definite abandonment of the course upon which we have embarked—the only course I think fit for a really great

⁵¹³ Rubin Francis Weston, “Racism and the Imperialist Campaign,” *Race and US Foreign Policy in the Ages of Territorial and Market Expansion, 1840 to 1900* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998), 190.

⁵¹⁴ Philip W. Kennedy, “Racial Overtones of Imperialism, 1900,” *Race and US Foreign Policy in the Ages of Territorial and Market Expansion, 1840 to 1900* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998), 199.

nation.”⁵¹⁵ The Philippines, became for Roosevelt, a new “frontier,” where American men can tame a new wilderness and subdue another people, as Daniel Boone and Sam Houston had done in previous generations.⁵¹⁶ Hay also shared the view that the United States had an “obligation” to annex the Philippines, which trumped the objections raised by the Anti-Imperialists who opposed the acquisition of Spain’s last colonies. Of the opposition, Hay recounted to Whitelaw Reid, one of the American commissioners to the Philippines:

There is a wild and frantic attack now going on in the press against the whole Philippine transaction. Andrew Carnegie really seems to be off his head...He says the [McKinley] Administration will fall in irretrievable ruin the moment it shoots down one insurgent Filipino. He does not seem to reflect that the Government is in a somewhat robust condition even after shooting down American citizens in his interest at Homestead. But all this confusion of tongues will go its way. The country will applaud the resolution that has been reached, and you will return in the role of conquering heroes, with your “brows bound with oak.”⁵¹⁷

Roosevelt’s letter to Hay expressed the need for the United States to have able administrators for its newly acquired colonies stating that

In Cuba we may lay up for ourselves infinite trouble if we do not handle the people with a proper mixture of firmness, courtesy, and tact. In the Philippines we are certain to invite disaster unless we send ample forces, and what is even more important, unless we put these forces under some first-class man. Both in Cuba and in the Philippines what we obviously need, and need at once, is to have some man put in supreme command in whom we can absolutely trust and to whom we give the widest liberty of action.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹⁵ Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay 1 July 1899, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Vol. 2, Elting E. Morison, ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), 1024.

⁵¹⁶ Slotkin, 53.

⁵¹⁷ John Hay to Whitelaw Reid, 29 November 1898, *The Life and Letters of John Hay*, Vol. 2, William Roscoe Thayer, ed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1915), 198-9.

⁵¹⁸ Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay 1 July 1899, 1024-5.

At no point did he even discuss the wishes of either the Cuban or Filipino people. Roosevelt's letter clearly indicated that the United States knew exactly what was in the interests of the peoples it had acquired from Spain, and that what they required were strong-minded men who had the will to bring forth civilization, particularly in his recommendation of Greene to stop the growing guerrilla war, who would "smash the insurgents in every way until they are literally beaten into peace; entertaining no proposition whatever from them save that of unconditional surrender."⁵¹⁹ Roosevelt, in his praise of Wood, compared him to British colonial officials, serving as models for the United States in undertaking the "White Man's Burden."⁵²⁰

Roosevelt's impact on American foreign policy of the early twentieth century had significant consequences. When he assumed the presidency in 1901, Roosevelt applied Mahan's policy of modernizing the navy in the era of the *Dreadnought*. Between 1901 and 1909, Roosevelt allocated funding for a modern navy that would place the United States on par with major naval powers, such as Great Britain and Germany. During his first term, ten battleships were constructed, each at a cost between \$6.6 million and \$7.5 million. Unlike the smaller warships that saw action at the Battle of Manila Bay in 1898, these battleships were 16,000 tons, traveled at 18 knots and boasted 12-inch guns as their main batteries and 8-inch guns as secondary batteries.⁵²¹ In 1906, the Royal Navy unveiled the *Dreadnought*, which had a single battery of 12-inch guns, displaced 18,000 tons and could travel at 21 knots on oil-fueled turbines, rendering the rest of the world's

⁵¹⁹ Ibid, 1025.

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ Seager, 520.

navies obsolete. The United States Navy followed suit in 1908 by producing the *Florida* and *Utah*, which each displaced 22,000 tons and had 10 12-inch guns; in 1909 with the *Wyoming* and *Arkansas*; at 26,000 tons and 12 12-inch guns; and by 1910, the *New York*, *Nevada*, *Pennsylvania*, and *California* at between 27,000 and 32,000 with 10 to 12 14-inch guns. Despite Mahan's objections at the increasing size and expense of the new battleships, the General Board recommended the naval build up as early as 1902 and 1903, which gained a sense of urgency in the aftermath of the Japanese victory in the Battle of Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War, which was decided by *Dreadnought*-type battleships that were larger and more powerful than its predecessors.⁵²²

Roosevelt had justification for the expansion of the US Navy. The Spanish-American War had shown that naval power was crucial in implementing foreign policy, when he remarked, rather casually, to his friend William Wingate Sewall on the destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay by Commodore George Dewey.⁵²³ As Secretary of the Navy, he emphasized accuracy in naval gunnery, readiness for combat, and modernization of the fleet.⁵²⁴ Roosevelt's interest in the navy continued to be a major priority in his administration. In his letter to Secretary of the Navy Paul Morton, Roosevelt declared that the Navy should be a major national priority. Roosevelt's close watch over the Navy can be reflected in this letter in which he pointed out the

⁵²² Ibid, 520-1.

⁵²³⁵²³ Theodore Roosevelt to William Wingate Sewall, 4 May 1898, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* Vol. 2,, Elting E. Morison, ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951),823.

⁵²⁴ Henry J. Hendrix, *Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy: The US Navy and the Birth of the American Century*, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 20-1.

improvements under Morton's predecessor, William Henry Moody. Roosevelt appraised Moody's tenure as Secretary of the Navy by saying

He has understood clearly that there are two sides to the work of the Department. There is, in the first place, the industrial efficiency of the navy; that is, the building of ships, engines and ordnance, the provision of equipment and stores, the purchase and inspection of material, the employment of laborers and mechanics, the care of dockyards, and many similar details. All of this is of the utmost importance, but to do it implies in the Secretary simply such qualities as are shown in the administration of a great private manufacturing establishment.⁵²⁵

Roosevelt continued to reiterate the importance of the navy in the larger realm of international relations that it should be in "a state of constant preparedness for war." He dismissed opponents of his naval policy as "unprogressive inert men" whom he considered a threat to national security. As Roosevelt wrote this letter, he was especially concerned about the clash between Russia and Japan over control of Korea in the Russo-Japanese War and the aftermath of the Battle of Tsushima in which the Japanese navy dealt a surprising blow to the Russian navy, which could potentially change the balance of power in the Pacific, challenging the notions of Anglo-Saxonism.⁵²⁶

At the beginning of the twentieth century, it appeared that Russia was a potential rival to the Anglo-Saxon powers in East Asia. Between 1898 and 1904, the Russian government had designs on dominating northern China and to use it as a springboard to the Pacific, as part of its long-range goal of securing a warm-water port. In 1898, St. Petersburg wrested a concession at Port Arthur from the Chinese government and first preference at a railroad through Manchuria. In 1900, 50,000 Russian troops occupied

⁵²⁵ Theodore Roosevelt to Paul Morton 25 June 1904, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* Vol. 4,, Elting E. Morison, ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), 847.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid*, 848.

Manchuria in order to demand further concessions from Beijing, with the goal of possibly directly annexing Manchuria.⁵²⁷ In 1899, Roosevelt appraised the threat of Russian domination over Asia to his friend, British diplomat Cecil Spring Rice. As in his other correspondences, Roosevelt's world view based on racial conflict was evident, in which he saw the United States and Great Britain as part of an Anglo-Saxon family struggling against the Slav. He considered a Russian domination of Asia to be a calamity for Anglo-Saxondom, and believes that an American presence in Asia would be a benefit to the British in India.⁵²⁸ While assuaging Spring Rice's fears of the Russian threat, that was not Roosevelt's chief concern:

The diminishing birth rate among the old native American stock, especially in the north east, with all that that implies, I should consider the worst. But we have also tremendous problems in the way of the relations of labor and capital to solve. My own belief is that we shall have to pay far more attention to this than to any question of expansion for the next fifty years, and this although I am an expansionist and believe that we can go on and take our place among the nations of the world, by dealing with the outside problems without in any way neglecting those of our internal administration.⁵²⁹

Roosevelt's fear over the shrinking birthrates of the "old stock" Americans was shared by other Anglo-Saxonists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which was part of the greater fear of the decline of American "manliness," due to the increasing industrialization and urbanization of American society and the growing rift between the capitalist and working classes. Anglo-Saxonists like Roosevelt worried that the decline of the traditional elites and the dilution of American stock by immigration from eastern

⁵²⁷ Anderson, 148-9.

⁵²⁸ Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice 11 August 1899, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* Vol. 2, Elting E. Morison, ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), 1051-2.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid*, 1053.

and southern Europe and the growing “feminization” of politics would render the United States unfit to assume its destined leadership in the international arena.⁵³⁰

Just as the United States was a newcomer in international politics, Japan, too, was an emerging power in Asia, presenting a dilemma for Anglo-Saxonists. The fast-paced modernization that followed the Meiji Restoration in 1868 spared Japan from the fate of European domination that occurred throughout Asia during the late nineteenth century, most notably, China, to the extent that it was competing with Russia over China.⁵³¹ The Russo-Japanese War provided an opportunity for Roosevelt to mediate as a peacemaker between the belligerent parties, while at the same time protecting the interests of the United States in Asia. On the one hand, Roosevelt was impressed with the Japanese people for having modernized fairly quickly. In his letter to Spring Rice, he was a “firm believer in the Japanese people...and believed that Japan would simply take her place from now on, among the great civilized nations.” However, he was also concerned that if Japan were to defeat Russia and continued to rise in power, a future conflict with the United States lay on the horizon.⁵³² Thus, in a subsequent letter to Hay, Roosevelt realized the necessity of balancing the interests of the United States versus that of Japan’s and Russia’s as they competed for control of East Asia.⁵³³ Because Japan was one of the small handful of countries in Asia to escape European colonial control and could deal with European powers as an equal, Japan became the “Yellow Peril,” especially as

⁵³⁰ Hoganson, 29.

⁵³¹ Hendrix, 104.

⁵³² Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice 13 June 1904, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* Vol. 4, Elting E. Morison, ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), 830-2.

⁵³³ Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay 26 July 1904, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* Vol. 4, Elting E. Morison, ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), 865.

Japanese immigrants arrived in West Coast states like California. The Japanese threatened Anglo-Saxon America, which feared a “horde of Asiatic peoples” who could overrun American society.⁵³⁴

Roosevelt took the opportunity to mediate the peace between Japan and Russia at Portsmouth, New Hampshire in 1905, four months after Japan’s victory at the Battle of Tsushima. The naval yard at Portsmouth was chosen as the site for the talks between the two belligerents because Washington, DC would be too hot for the summer, when the talks would be scheduled and so both the Russians and the Japanese would be mindful of American military might in their negotiations.⁵³⁵ The upset resulting from Japan’s victory at Tsushima caused a great deal of excitement from Roosevelt, as he wrote Spring Rice, treating the Japanese people as “honorary” Anglo-Saxons with his praise for the results of their modernization:

“What wonderful people the Japanese are! They are quite as remarkable industrially as in warfare...The industrial growth of the nation is as marvelous as its military growth. It is now a great power and will be a greater power...I believe that Japan will take its place as a great civilized power of a formidable type, and with motives and ways of thought which are not quite those of the powers of our race.”⁵³⁶

Nevertheless, despite Roosevelt’s enthusiasm, the fear of Japan as the “Yellow Peril” prompted western states to restrict the rights of Japanese immigrants, prompting the “Gentleman’s Agreement.” Unlike other Asian immigrants like the Chinese, the Japanese represented a threat to Anglo-Saxonism because they were competing against American economic interests, not only in Asia, but within the United States, itself, through the

⁵³⁴ Higham, 168.

⁵³⁵ Hendrix, 105.

⁵³⁶ Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice 16 June 1905, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* Vol. 4, Elting E. Morison, ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), 1233.

growth of Japanese-owned farms and businesses in states like California.⁵³⁷ The Japanese, were seen as inassimilable and threatened to endanger American institutions and could not be trusted to be “patriotic Americans.” Such racial antagonism toward the Japanese would have dire implications decades later in the Second World War.⁵³⁸

Anglo-Saxonism and Central America

One tangible result of the Anglo-American *rapprochement* is the unchallenged dominance of the United States in the Western Hemisphere in the decade before the First World War. The diplomatic realities of the late nineteenth century convinced the British government to relinquish control of the Western Hemisphere to the United States, in order to deal with the rise of Germany as a competitor, instead of having to fight against both.⁵³⁹ Seeing that American hegemony over Latin America was far more preferable to German dominance, the British Foreign Office and press encouraged the United States to assert its “moral superiority” over Central and South America, which Theodore Roosevelt happily did, through his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, becoming another vehicle to apply the ideology of Anglo-Saxonism at the beginning of the twentieth century.⁵⁴⁰

In an article to the American Political Science Association, Phillip Brown, the former minister to Honduras analyzed in a 1912 article of the *American Political Science Review*, the role of the United States in Central America, and how the Monroe Doctrine can best be applied to achieving the objectives of American foreign policy, giving the

⁵³⁷ Rubin Francis Weston, *Racism in U.S. Imperialism: The Influence of Racial Assumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1893-1946*, (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1972), 33.

⁵³⁸ *Ibid*, 34.

⁵³⁹ Perkins, 158.

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 161.

reader an insight into an American diplomat's challenges in dealing with the governments of Central America, namely Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. It is very clear from the beginning that Brown approaches the relationship between the United States and the nations of Central America from an Anglo-Saxonist perspective. First, he describes the cultures of the peoples of Central America as anathema to the values of Anglo-Saxonism, represented by the United States. For example, besides making the comparison between the federal system of the United States and the unitary systems of the nations of Central America, the virtue of self-government, as the cornerstone of an Anglo-Saxon society like the United States, according to Brown, is "a concept dimly comprehended" in Central America, as well as American values of forthrightness. He notes that respect for the rule of law, while highly regarded in Anglo-Saxon countries like the United States, is completely reversed in Central America, which tends to be defined by whoever is in power.⁵⁴¹

Secondly, the way Brown describes the role of the American diplomat follows the script of Rudyard Kipling's "The White Man's Burden." He notes the natural apprehension of Central Americans to the motives of the United States, citing the taking of California during Mexican War, the imposition of the Platt Amendment on Cuba after the Spanish-American War, the occupation of Puerto Rico, the wresting of Panama from Colombia in 1903, and the handling of the foreign debts of the Dominican Republic. However, he justifies such actions by the United States as ultimately out of benevolent

⁵⁴¹ Philip Brown, "American Diplomacy in Central America," *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 6, no. 1, February 1912, 154.

intentions.⁵⁴² Thus, he uses words like “ungrateful” and “onerous” in his dealings with the governments of Central America, which he has likened to that of a petulant student who resents his wise old tutor. Brown best illustrates the dilemma of the American diplomat thus:

If he is what is popularly termed a "sidestepper," in trying to avoid unpleasant diplomatic issues with the local government and at the same time satisfy his aggrieved compatriots, not to mention his own government, he usually falls between the two stools. If, on the other hand, he is normally conscientious, he finds he must either incur the hatred of the complainants who may be able to cause him serious annoyance, or he must in cases deserving diplomatic action, make unpleasant representations without the certainty of receiving the approval and support of Washington.⁵⁴³

Brown also pointed out why it was important for the United States to have such a strong hand in Central America and the Caribbean: the short distance between Central America and the United States; the Panama Canal; and the necessity to prevent Central America from falling under European influence due to the “enforced feebleness” of the peoples of the region.⁵⁴⁴

Brown interprets the Monroe Doctrine as a means to advance Anglo-Saxon concepts of civilization into Central America. He portrayed the role of the United States as that of an “older brother” caring for his younger siblings and even cited a line from the Gilbert & Sullivan operetta *HMS Pinafore*, to reiterate the job of the United States as the policeman of the Western Hemisphere, “whose lot is not a happy one.” He cited instances in which the United States has had to intervene in conflicts between the various

⁵⁴² Ibid, 155.

⁵⁴³ Ibid, 156.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid, 160.

Central American states. For example in 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt and President Porfirio Diaz of Mexico mediated in a conflict involving Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, which was resolved on the gunboat *Marblehead*. Again in 1907, when war again threatened to break out between Guatemala and Honduras, did Roosevelt mediate by inviting delegates from the Central American republics to a peace conference.⁵⁴⁵ However, such overtures of peace, Brown argued, needed to be balanced by the use of force, and he cited instances in 1909 and 1911, when American and British forces landed in Nicaragua to restore order and to prevent a wider conflict from breaking out.⁵⁴⁶ He concluded his article by restating the importance of the Monroe Doctrine, which was to help the people of Latin America to attain civilization and self-government, the true foundation on which Anglo-Saxon nations, like the United States, are based.⁵⁴⁷

Conclusion:

The foreign policy of the United States underwent significant changes in the decades following the Civil War. Immediately upon the aftermath of the surrender of General Robert E. Lee at Appomattox Courthouse, the transition from an inward-looking republic to an American empire was underway. Secretary of State William Henry Seward established the foundations for American dominance in the Western Hemisphere with plans for strategic acquisitions in the Caribbean and the Pacific. However, he died before fulfilling his vision, and would hence be known for his “folly” of purchasing Alaska. The economic expansion of the last third of the nineteenth century would impel

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid, 161.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid, 163.

foreign policy makers to re-evaluate foreign policy. The WASP elite of the late nineteenth century, who were more well-connected and well-travelled than previous generations, saw that the old admonition to stay away from permanent alliances was becoming obsolete in the wake of European colonial expansions in Africa and Asia, and that the United States, must therefore, adopt a more outward-looking approach in international relations.

Anglo-Saxonism had once again been transformed to suit the needs of the time. Rather than a banner for liberty and justification for white settlement in North America, as had been the case in previous generations, the injection of pseudoscientific ideas based on Darwin's theories of natural selection established the culmination of Anglo-Saxonism by adding racial superiority as justification for imperialism and colonial expansion. Proponents of Anglo-Saxonism were convinced that the United States had to fulfill its destiny and take its place among the European powers. Because of the social Darwinist element of Anglo-Saxonism, the United States had to compete for markets and resources among the other powers in order to survive. Additionally, the foreign policy makers in Washington justified the surge of American imperialism with the argument of spreading the ideals of self-government, inherent in Anglo-Saxonism. These can be seen in the guidelines for naval power, as outlined by Alfred Thayer Mahan, and the examples of American dominance in Latin America and colonial rule in the Philippines. The Anglo-American *rapprochement* of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century showed a way in which the United States and Great Britain could merge their own respective interests.

There were however, limitations to Anglo-Saxonism as a guide in foreign policy. The realities of maintaining both the formal and informal American empire in the years after the Spanish-American War were far more challenging than the rhetoric suggested. Once reviled, the British served as guides for colonial rule as American foreign policy makers began to establish order in the newly-acquired territories from Spain. Despite the theoretical models of colonial administration, the guerrilla war in the Philippines, however, showed both foreign policy makers and public alike that bringing “civilization” was often a bloody and messy affair as part of the “White Man’s Burden.” In Latin America, as the United States practiced indirect domination through economic hegemony, there were no expensive campaigns of empire, as had been the case in the Philippines. However, from the Anglo-Saxonist perspective, maintaining American dominion over Central America, for example, was likened to making children behave, which was considered to be an onerous and mind-numbing task.

The Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War presented a unique challenge to Anglo-Saxonism. The belligerents, the British and the Boers, are similar, not simply because of their ethnic and linguistic makeup. Like the British people, the Boers also believe in self-rule, which they accomplished in trekking across the veldt to establish their own societies, rather than living under what they perceived to be an oppressive government. When their rights were infringed by a distant government, the Boers fought back to preserve their own way of life against an increasing horde of *Uitlanders*. American foreign policy makers found themselves in a dilemma because they were torn between their growing friendship with Great Britain, which justified its actions by

arguing it was spreading “civilization,” but sympathized with the struggles with the Boers which were similar to the ideals of the American Revolution. Ultimately, economic and geopolitical interests would prevail over sentiment. On the surface, it would appear that the Russo-Japanese War had nothing to do with Anglo-Saxonism. However, to Anglo-Saxonists like Theodore Roosevelt and Cecil Spring Rice, Russia was considered a threat to the Anglo-Saxon people because of their rapidly growing population and expanding economy in a social darwinist world of limited resources. However, the rise of Japan as a modern industrial power presented a conundrum to Anglo-Saxonists, especially as Anglo-Saxonism acquired its element of racial supremacy by the end of the nineteenth century. How could an obviously non-Anglo-Saxon people achieve modernization at the same level as Europe and the United States, while having defeated Russia, a European power in the Battle of Tsushima? Thus, the reaction to Japan ranged from calling it the “Yellow Peril” to “honorary Anglo-Saxons.” At the dawn of the twentieth century, Anglo-Saxonism had arrived in its recognizable form and would for the decade before the First World War, coast on the self-satisfaction of the peoples of the British Empire and the United States.

CHAPTER 5
ANGLO-SAXONISM
IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

This chapter will analyze how Anglo-Saxonism evolved and reached its culmination at the beginning of the First World War and how it was used to justify the involvement of the United States, despite its official neutrality, and its eventual declaration of war against Germany by 1917. At the outbreak of hostilities between the Entente and Central Powers in August 1914, the United States automatically declared its neutrality. However, President Woodrow Wilson and his cabinet, with the exception of Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, were on the side of the Allies, most notably, the British government, due to the close ties that had been cultivated twenty years earlier in the *rapprochement* between both countries. Even in a private capacity, the United States provided significant financial and material assistance to the Allied powers throughout the war, much to the consternation of the German government. Any further involvement by the United States would not have been realistic at the beginning of the war, due to the high proportions of Americans of German and Irish descent, who, in many cases, still retained close ties with their respective homelands, neither of which were particularly friendly to Great Britain, as well as the traditional aversion to European wars over the balance of power.

In order to sway public opinion effectively to the Allied cause, Anglo-Saxonism was once again reinterpreted to suit the *zeitgeist* of the First World War. As had been shown in previous chapters, Anglo-Saxonism had been slowly evolving to suit the needs of the time, which served as a source of identity for the English-speaking peoples, by

appropriating certain values such as virtue, self-reliance, and “self-government.” By the turn of the century, Anglo-Saxonism was further cemented with a racial component due to the pseudo-scientific and social Darwinist assumptions of the time. The First World War, however, presented a new dilemma for proponents of Anglo-Saxonism, both in the United States and Great Britain. Similar to the conundrum posed by the Boer War over how to place the Dutch settlers in the narrative of Anglo-Saxonism, the issue now was Germany. In the decades before the Great War, Anglo-Saxonists considered the German people, racially, to be close relatives to the Anglo-Saxon peoples and even declared Germany to be the primordial birthplace of all Anglo-Saxon peoples, though with some reservations, especially with the unification of Germany under Prussian hegemony in 1871. Thus, it would become difficult to reconcile the affinity between the German and Anglo-Saxon peoples, which still held in the United States at the beginning of hostilities, with the idea of a fratricidal war that broke out in 1914.

With the progression of the war, a growing divergence took place within Anglo-Saxonism. As the war became more entrenched, the idea of “Teutonism” developed in the presses of Great Britain and the United States. This idea held that the Germans simply could not be part of the Anglo-Saxon peoples because they had developed into a warlike state and did not adopt the self-governing institutions, such as the representative governments of the Anglo-Saxon peoples of the United States and the British Empire. This was evidenced by the conservative government under the Hohenzollern monarchy, which claimed to rule by divine right, that extolled the ideology of Prussian militarism and “*Kultur*.” Meanwhile, the ideals of self-government and “civilization” had become

ingrained foundations of Anglo-Saxonism in the United States and Great Britain, and had become exclusively claimed by both English-speaking nations upon the outbreak of the First World War. To push the argument for war among significant Irish- and German-American populations, a steady stream of atrocity stories persuaded the American public to turn against the German government and people. By the time Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war against Germany, all pretense of the German people's membership in the Anglo-Saxon family were removed, due to a propaganda machine which determined that Germany's development into a warrior state, and its inherent barbarity made it unsuitable to be among the ranks of the "real" Anglo-Saxons who developed democracy and "civilization." Thus, the ideals of "civilization" and "self-government" that had been earlier monopolized by proponents of Anglo-Saxonism, had become universal values extolled by Wilson, as he made the case for war. Once those values became identified with a wider segment of the American people, it then became acceptable to raise up arms against Germany.

American Neutrality:

When the guns of August roared in 1914, following the July Crisis between Austria and Serbia that flared in the aftermath of Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination, dragging all the major European powers to war, the United States reflexively declared its neutrality. On 27 July, as Austria mobilized against Serbia and British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey proposed a conference to defuse the crisis, Wilson replied that the United States did not take part in events beyond the Western

Hemisphere.⁵⁴⁸ In his speech on 19 August 1914, Wilson warned the American people against following their passions and taking sides in the European conflict and that those who incite such passions “will assume a heavy responsibility” for causing divisiveness within American society. He furthermore pleaded that

The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men’s souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.⁵⁴⁹

To the American people, the outbreak of the Great War was yet another of the constant quarrels among the peoples of Europe, which they and their forebears had sought to escape. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan reflected his contempt at the actions of the European powers that led to the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914, and his synopsis to Wilson of the July Crisis gave a rather comical tone to the opening of the most devastating war in human history, to that point:

...Each one declares he is opposed to war and anxious to avoid it and then lays the blame upon someone else. The German Ambassador this morning blamed Russia and congratulates his country that the [German] Emperor did what he could to avoid war. He also commends the efforts of France and Great Britain to avoid war, but the Czar is charged with being the cause, his offense being the mobilization of his army after Austria had assured him that the integrity of [Serbia] would not be disturbed.⁵⁵⁰

⁵⁴⁸ Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914—15*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), 3.

⁵⁴⁹ Woodrow Wilson, “Statement of the President, August 19, 1914, in the Early Days of the Great War,” *President Wilson’s Great Speeches and Other History Making Documents*, (Chicago: Stanton and Van Vliet, 1917), 43-4

⁵⁵⁰ William Jennings Bryan to Woodrow Wilson, 28 August 1914, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914—1920: Volume 1*, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), 7.

Bryan's synopsis appeared to justify the long-standing American policy of staying aloof from the international power politics of European diplomacy. The decades between the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 and August 1914 showed simmering nationalist tensions and the arming of Europe through the growth of alliances, which made difficult any understanding of the causes of the outbreak of war. The "domino effect" of the aftermath of Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination exposed the inherent weakness of the European alliance system, one of which that Bryan appears to be glad that the United States was not a part.⁵⁵¹

In the early stages of the war, American opinion was still even-handed toward the German government and people, owing to the accommodation made to them as close relations to the Anglo-Saxon peoples in the late nineteenth century. In an article in *The Independent*, its editorial compared the justifications used by both Great Britain and Germany in waging war. The article made references to America's cultural debt to Germany, as it weighed the German government's appeal for the sympathy of the American people, as it drew on shared Teutonic affinities, in justifying its war against Russia, described by German Chancellor Bethman-Hollweg as "a half-Asiatic and semi-civilized barbarism." Though, the editorial ultimately sided with Great Britain, it still considered Germany a "good and powerful friend."⁵⁵² Theodore Roosevelt's book *America and the World War*, a critique on the Wilson administration's policy of neutrality, published in 1915 is another such example. Rather than blaming Germany for starting the Great War, as the Treaty of Versailles will have done in 1919, Roosevelt

⁵⁵¹ Link, 11.

⁵⁵² "Germany's Appeal to America," *The Independent*, 24 August 1914, 260.

placed the blame squarely on the Serbian government for allowing secret societies to carry out the assassination of Franz Ferdinand on the basis of nationalist irredentism, setting off the cataclysm that would engulf the major European powers.⁵⁵³ Of the German people, and particularly Kaiser Wilhelm II, Roosevelt considered them just and honorable, and condemned the notion that Germany was inherently evil.⁵⁵⁴ Quite the contrary, he saw calls for the destruction of Germany as a grave mistake, in which he drew upon the similarities between the American and German peoples, alluding to the Teutonic school of Anglo-Saxonism from the late nineteenth century:

The Germans are not merely brothers; they are largely ourselves. The debt we owe to German blood is great; the debt we owe to German thought and to German example, not only in governmental administration but in all the practical work of life is even greater. Every generous heart and every far-seeing mind throughout the world should rejoice in the existence of a stable, united, and powerful Germany, too strong to fear aggression and too just to be a source of fear to its neighbors.⁵⁵⁵

He reiterated his regard for Germany in a letter to Edmund Robert Otto von Mach, a German-born Harvard graduate and art historian, who wrote a series of books defending Germany's reasons for war, by declaring that it is from Germany that "the United States has most to learn." He reassured von Mach that even though he condemned Germany's actions against Belgium, he does not have any personal animosities toward the German people. He indirectly reaffirmed Germany's ties to the Anglo-Saxon peoples by saying that "if Mexico governed herself as well as Canada, she would not have any more to fear from us than has Canada," referring to the political instability in Mexico due to its

⁵⁵³ Theodore Roosevelt, *America and the Great War*, (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1915), 16-7.

⁵⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 66-7.

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 72.

revolution sparked in 1910. He believed that the German people, through their ties with the Anglo-Saxon peoples, also represented civilization and good government, which he hoped that countries like Cuba and the Philippines would attain under American tutelage. He concluded his letter by saying that would be “a world calamity if the German Empire were shattered or dismembered.”⁵⁵⁶

Nevertheless, Roosevelt faulted the German government in its violation of Belgium’s neutrality, insofar as it was a part of policy, and not out of pure malice, again stressing his Germanic ancestry and his affinity with the German people.⁵⁵⁷ In his letter to British historian Arthur Hamilton Lee two weeks after the outbreak of the Great War, Roosevelt reiterated his respect for Germany and acknowledged the German people’s contribution to American society, as well as his Germanic ancestry. However, in the letter, Roosevelt already began to distance himself from the government of Kaiser Wilhelm II, portending the ultimate separation between the Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic peoples, which he believed contributed to the igniting of the conflict stating:

...the Government of Prussianized Germany for the last forty-three years has behaved in such fashion as inevitably to make almost every nation with which it came in to act its foe, because it has convinced everybody except Austria that it has no regard for anything except its own interest, and that it will enter instantly on any career of aggression with cynical brutality and bad faith if it thinks its interest requires such action.⁵⁵⁸

However, of the conduct of the British, Roosevelt praised the government’s decision to come to the aid of the Belgian people, which he held up in order to shame the Wilson

⁵⁵⁶ Theodore Roosevelt to Edmond Robert Otto von Mach, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Vol. 7, Elting E. Morison, ed., (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), 832.

⁵⁵⁷ Roosevelt, 24.

⁵⁵⁸ Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur Hamilton Lee 22 August 1914, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Vol. 7, Elting E. Morison, ed., (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), 810.

administration, for what he saw as a lack of action.⁵⁵⁹ His letter to Lee condemned the violation of Belgian neutrality and squarely placed the blame on Germany and wrote, “...I do not know whether I would be acting right if I were president or not, but it seems to me that if I were President, I should register a very emphatic protest, a protest that would mean something, against the levy of the huge war contributions on Belgium.”⁵⁶⁰

Roosevelt made note of the motives of the British people’s involvement, including the dominions, such as Australia, Canada, and South Africa, which was to protect civilization and liberty, which have been appropriated as the hallmarks of Anglo-Saxonism, foreshadowing the anti-German sentiment that would emerge in the later years of the war.⁵⁶¹

Additionally, Americans in 1914 generally had a parochial view of the world, adding to their contempt of European power politics. The British journalist Sydney Brooks, in his analysis of American public opinion during the first year of the war, criticized the lack of interest by Americans in the cataclysm unfolding across the Atlantic, despite the direct effects it had on American trade, such as the loss of trade revenue, unemployment, and contraction of the economy.⁵⁶² Because of the unique position of the United States in the international stage, due to its long-standing aversion to European conflicts, Brooks believed that made the United States an “impartial” observer to whom the Allies and the Central Powers could present their case, based on the assumptions that American public opinion would not support a war that was not just

⁵⁵⁹ Roosevelt, *America and the Great War*, 64-5.

⁵⁶⁰ Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur Hamilton Lee, 810.

⁵⁶¹ Roosevelt, *America and the Great War*, 67-8.

⁵⁶² Sydney Brooks, “The United States and the War,” *The North American Review*, Vol. 201, No. 711 (February 1915), 231.

and that American economic assistance in the event of war would tilt the balance.⁵⁶³ His observation of the results of the 1914 midterm election, which was generally a Republican victory, reinforced the belief that Americans were far more interested in domestic affairs such as the reduction of the tariff, with none of the candidates discussing the European war at length.⁵⁶⁴ Brooks best explains American attitudes by reminding his British audience that

American foreign policy, therefore, so far as it is concerned with the affairs of Europe and Asia, proceeds without any reasoned and consistent backing of popular knowledge or interest, and very largely, in consequence, turns on the personality and opinions of particular Presidents or particular Secretaries of State. It is altogether natural that this should be so. The United States is remote, unconquerable, huge, without hostile neighbors or any neighbors at all of anything like her own strength, and lives exempt in an almost untroubled tranquility from the contentions and animosities and the ceaseless pressure and counter-pressure that distract the close-packed older world. Inevitably, therefore, a sober, sustained, and well-informed interest in foreign affairs is a luxury with which the ordinary American citizen feels he can dispense.⁵⁶⁵

Despite his lament over American insularity, Brooks concluded his article, highlighting the fact that the majority of the American public remained sympathetic to the Allied cause, associating it with “civilization” and democracy. He noted that Prussian militarism was a long-term threat from which not even American neutrality could tolerate.⁵⁶⁶

As Ambassador to the United States throughout the First World War, Cecil Spring Rice reported on American public opinion to his superiors at Whitehall, notably Foreign

⁵⁶³ Ibid, 232.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid, 235.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid, 238.

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid, 240.

Secretary Sir Edward Grey, as well as friends and family. In his letter to his nephew, Spring Rice gave his appraisal of American society, reporting that

The US has ceased to be a whole—that is, a uniform population moved by feelings of patriotism...while Germany was gradually getting all the elements in the nation to think alike in national terms [Britain] and the US were encouraging our people to think only in terms of *personal* not national advantage; we care for the honey, not the hive.⁵⁶⁷

Spring Rice further added in his observations on the regional mindset of Americans:

For instance, in California there is a complete contempt for the affairs not only of Europe, but of the middle and eastern States. The middle States think in terms of wheat and the southern States in terms of cotton, just as the Welsh miners think in terms of wages. What is a government to do under these circumstances? Just to act as the majority desire, and the majority desire is to make money and not to make war.⁵⁶⁸

Spring Rice was especially concerned about the German government's influence on American public opinion, encouraging Americans to stay out of the European conflict and that the Wilson administration would ultimately be swayed by it. He wrote to his colleague, the British journalist and diplomat Sir Valentine Chirol that “”Everyone who has had the slightest connection with Germany either in business, science, or literature...receives special copies of pamphlets and personal appeals signed by distinguished men of letters and scientists.”⁵⁶⁹ He noted that German sympathy was

⁵⁶⁷ Cecil Spring Rice to Dominick Spring Rice 17 September 1915, *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice*, Vol. 2, Stephen Gwinn, ed. (London: Constable, 1929, reprinted Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972), 285.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 286.

⁵⁶⁹ Cecil Spring Rice to Sir Valentine Chirol 27 November 1914, *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice: A Record*, Vol. II Stephen Gwynn, ed. (London: Constable, 1929, reprinted Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972), 247.

strong in the Midwest, along with anti-British sentiment. He also observed that the German government seemed to have strong connections with Jewish bankers in New York and accused them of collaborating with them before the outbreak of the war. He also surmised that even though the Wilson administration was strongly pro-British, it had to tread very carefully to make sure that neutrality was maintained and would not have the appearance of siding with the Allies.⁵⁷⁰ In the aftermath of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, Spring Rice expressed his frustration to his former colleague, Lord Onslow, over the neutrality of the United States and used Anglo-Saxonism, praising the British dominions which rushed to the aid of the mother country, thus criticizing the inaction of Wilson's administration:

The U.S. was regarded as the eldest child of liberty, the principal incarnation of the Anglo-Saxon idea of independence and self-sufficiency, and of the hostility to outside control. In Australia and Canada, for instance, it was taken for granted that the occupation of Belgium and the triumph of German militarism in Europe would arouse the unanimous condemnation of the American government and people. But the government was silent and inculcated in the people 'neutrality in thought as well as deed'—that is, an absolute complete and systematic indifference to what most people regard as one of the greatest crimes in history...England now, and not the U.S., is fighting for the cause of liberty and the U.S. and not England is holding aloof. The result is that the natural hegemony of the free English-speaking world falls to England and the free colonies are fighting on her side as bound together in the common cause of freedom.⁵⁷¹

For many Americans, the First World War was just another “family squabble” among the monarchs of Europe, and it was in the national interest of the United States to distance

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid, 248.

⁵⁷¹ Cecil Spring Rice to Lord Onslow, 23 September 1915, *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice: A Record*, Vol. II Stephen Gwynn, ed. (London: Constable, 1929, reprinted Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972), 306-7.

itself as much as possible, just as it had sought to do during the Napoleonic Wars a century earlier, and to be able to conduct trade with belligerents on both sides.⁵⁷² Wilson best expressed that hope in a speech he gave in the first weeks of the war. He noted the diversity of the American people, many of whom originated from the nations involved in the Great War, yet believed that “the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans all...” and that he foresaw such a nation in the best position to mediate peace in Europe, with his exhortation to the American people to “be neutral in fact as well as in name...”⁵⁷³ Nevertheless, Wilson’s neutrality policy was criticized for its inconsistency. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, from the outbreak of the war, clearly supported the Allies, and believed that it was in the interest of the United States for the Allies to defeat Germany, which contrasted Wilson’s position that the United States should not have a stake in either side, so that he could appear as a more impartial mediator.⁵⁷⁴ Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, found it ironic that Wilson should protest British violation of neutrality rights, while being silent on other issues regarding the war, such as Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality, encroachment of Chinese sovereignty by Great Britain and Japan, and

⁵⁷² Robert W. Tucker, *Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America’s Neutrality 1914–1917*, (Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 2007), 17.

⁵⁷³ Woodrow Wilson, “An Appeal to the Citizens of the Republic, Requesting their Assistance in Maintaining a State of Neutrality during the Present European War,” 18 August 1914, *President Wilson’s Foreign Policy: Messages, Addresses, Papers*, James Brown Scott, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), 67-8

⁵⁷⁴ William C. Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy*, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1980), 188-9.

the violation of the Hague Conventions, which seemed to undermine his role as the mediator between the Allies and the Central Powers.⁵⁷⁵

During his brief tenure as secretary of state, Bryan's main priority was to maintain the neutrality of the United States. If the United States was to have a role at all in the Great War, it was to play the role of mediator to stop the carnage. Wilson offered to be the mediator to the Allies and Central Powers at the inception of hostilities, based on the argument that the United States, as a major neutral power, would have the credibility to broker a settlement that would be equitable to the belligerent powers.⁵⁷⁶ In the first months of the war, Bryan strenuously advocated a mediator's role for the United States. In his letter to Wilson on 1 December 1914, he laid out the arguments for mediation. First of all, he argued that the war was having a negative impact on the economy through the disruption of trade with Europe. Secondly, he believed that the United States could take a leadership role among the neutral powers that are also suffering from the effects of the conflict between the Allies and the Central Powers. He stated succinctly that, "other neutral nations are complaining of the act of belligerents in interfering with neutral commerce—the friction and irritation are increasing. These neutral nations look to us to represent the third party—the bystanders' who, though innocent, suffer while the combatants fight."⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷⁵ Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, 15 January 1915, *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge*, (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York: 1925), 451

⁵⁷⁶ Charles Seymour, *American Diplomacy During the World War*, (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1964), 130-1.

⁵⁷⁷ William Jennings Bryan to Woodrow Wilson 1 December 1914, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914—1920*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 10-1 .

William Jennings Bryan vs. Robert Lansing:

During the first year of the war, there were two men who competed for Wilson's attention regarding the war in Europe: Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan and State Department Counselor Robert Lansing, who would succeed Bryan as secretary of state on 8 June 1915. The competition between Bryan and Lansing reflected the evolving policy of the United States throughout the war, and the changing nature of Anglo-Saxonism that would lead to the entry of the United States into the conflict in 1917. While Bryan wanted to remain strictly wedded to the principles of neutrality, Lansing believed that an armed confrontation with Germany was inevitable because a German victory would be against the interests of the Anglo-Saxon powers and that it was Anglo-Saxonism, itself, the belief that the principles of "civilization" and "self-government," which he believed, were associated with the Anglo-Saxon peoples, that behooved the United States to side with Great Britain.

These two men's differing backgrounds and philosophies influenced the direction of the United States from strict neutrality declared in 1914 culminating in its declaration of war against Germany in 1917. Bryan, best known for his "Cross of Gold" speech as the Populist Party candidate, was chosen by Wilson as secretary of state for his large following among ordinary Americans. Unlike many secretaries of state before or since, Bryan took pride in his simplicity, compared to the refined Washington establishment.⁵⁷⁸ His Christian beliefs were adamantly manifested in how he conducted American foreign policy between 1913 and 1915. Bryan saw war as an abomination upon Christian

⁵⁷⁸ Daniel M. Smith, *The Great Departure: The United States and World War I, 1914—1920*, (New York: John M. Wiley and Sons, 1965), 15.

civilization and sought to prevent it as much as possible, through arbitration. As early as 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War, he proposed a treaty in which all international disputes would be settled by an international tribunal. It gained support by the Inter-parliamentary Union in London in 1906 and the International Peace Conference in New York in 1908, including President William Howard Taft and British Prime Minister Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. He continued to push his proposal after his appointment as secretary of State in 1913 by gaining international support, and by September 1914, only Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy were not signatories.⁵⁷⁹

Lansing, however, was the complete opposite of Bryan. While Bryan was known as the “Great Commoner,” Lansing came from a distinguished New York family and had training in international law. He had traveled abroad in his youth and had practical experience in settling international agreements. Among those agreements were the Bering Sea Claims Commission in 1896, the 1903 Alaska Boundary Tribunal, the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration from 1908-1910, and the North Atlantic Fisheries and Fur Seals Conference in 1911.⁵⁸⁰ On 27 March 1914, Lansing was appointed as counselor to the State Department, making him second only to the secretary of state. This position gave him an opportunity to take part in the decision making process. Lansing’s extensive experience in international law complemented Bryan’s inexperience and at times would fill in when Bryan was away on his lecture circuits.⁵⁸¹ Unlike Bryan, Lansing was a realist in international affairs. Even though he believed in the principles of democracy

⁵⁷⁹ Lawrence W. Levine, *Defender of the Faith: William Jennings Bryan: The Last Decade, 1915—1925*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 6-7.

⁵⁸⁰ Daniel M. Smith, *Robert Lansing and American Neutrality*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), 1.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid*, 5.

and was devout in his Presbyterian faith, he held no illusions about the perfectibility of humanity and understood that conflict was part of the interactions among nations, and to rely on this naiveté' was detrimental in conducting foreign policy. He wanted to temper the innate idealism of the American world view with pragmatism in foreign policy.⁵⁸²

Unlike Bryan, Lansing was sympathetic to the Allied cause, particularly the British, from the outset of hostilities in 1914. As part of the WASP elite, Lansing's support was echoed by others in the foreign policy establishment. He reflected in his memoirs that despite the *rapprochement* between Britain and the United States in the previous two decades before the war, public opinion, buttressed by teachings in the public school system held the British to be a "hereditary foe" to the American people, and such "prejudice" against the British Empire prevented earlier interventions in the war. Additionally, he noted that a significant proportion of Americans opposed to the entry of the United States were naturalized citizens of German and Austrian descent, as well as Americans of Irish descent, who despaired of British oppression of Ireland. He was especially suspicious of German-language newspapers that supported Germany's cause and criticized Allied war policy, particularly the British blockade of Germany, but expressed his indignation when these newspapers were also under the employ of the German government, with the purpose of disseminating propaganda for the Central Powers.⁵⁸³ For example, in his memorandum to Wilson on 9 December 1914, Lansing denounced a letter written by the German psychologist, Hugo Münsterberg which

⁵⁸² Smith, *The Great Departure*, 18.

⁵⁸³ Robert Lansing, *War Memoirs of Robert Lansing* (Indianapolis, Indiana; Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1935), 75.

objected to the preferential treatment given by the Wilson administration to the Allies, while German-Americans faced discrimination. Lansing concluded that because Münsterberg was German, he was naturally an agent of the Kaiser on the mission to spread German propaganda throughout the United States and that their goal was to “separate American citizens of German nativity or descent from the general body of the American people, to impress upon them that they are a distinct group of society...and to make them feel that they are first of all Germans,” and to “use this great body of German origin as a political machine with which to threaten the Administration into showing special favors to Germany and Austria in the performance of the neutral duties of this government.”⁵⁸⁴ He furthermore dismissed British violations of neutrality as part of the realities of the war, simply because the British navy had command of the seas, and Germany did not. Thus, were Germany to have naval superiority, Britain and France would be cut off from world trade.⁵⁸⁵

Lansing often complained that the long-standing animosity against Great Britain from the American Revolution and the War of 1812, which was reinforced in history textbooks continued to engender antagonism among many Americans, which was confirmed by British violations of neutrality rights, notably American shipping. Thus, it became incumbent upon Lansing to persuade American public opinion by stressing the dangers of German hegemony, should Germany win the war.⁵⁸⁶

⁵⁸⁴Robert Lansing, 19 November 1914, “Memorandum by the Counselor for the Department of State on Professor Hugo Münsterberg’s Letter to President Wilson,” *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914—1920*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 167.

⁵⁸⁵Ibid, 174.

⁵⁸⁶Lansing, *War Memoirs*, 22-3.

The sinking of the *Lusitania* was an example of the divide between Bryan and Lansing. Bryan, in a letter to Wilson, was careful to maintain neutrality by condemning British violations of neutrality, as well as German submarine warfare. He was also quick to remind Wilson that the *Lusitania* was flagged by the German government as an enemy vessel, and that the Americans on board were traveling at their own risk. He continued to exhort Wilson to play the role of the mediator, pleading

As the well-wisher of all we should act; as the leader in the peace propaganda we should act; as the greatest Christian nation we should act—we cannot avoid the responsibility. The loss of one American, who might have avoided death, is as nothing compared with the tens of thousands who are dying daily in this ‘causeless war.’ Is it not better to try to bring peace for the benefit of the whole world than to risk the provoking of war on account of one man?⁵⁸⁷

Lansing, however, in his letter to Bryan, was quick to condemn the German government for the sinking of the *Lusitania*. He considered the warnings posted by the German government not to travel on British vessels to be insufficient. Rather, he argued that “it is a more flagrant violation of neutral rights on the high seas, and indicates that the German naval policy is one of wanton and indiscriminate destruction of vessels regardless of nationality.”⁵⁸⁸ Lansing believed that war with Germany was inevitable, if not immediately, then soon after.⁵⁸⁹ Lansing’s memorandum to Wilson dated 11 July 1915 regarding the sinking of the *Lusitania* declared that

⁵⁸⁷ William Jennings Bryan to Woodrow Wilson, 23 April 1915, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914—1920*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 379.

⁵⁸⁸ Robert Lansing to William Jennings Bryan, 1 May 1915, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914—1920*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 381.

⁵⁸⁹ Tucker, 109.

...the German Government is utterly hostile to all nations with democratic institutions because those who compose it see in democracy a menace to absolutism and the defeat of the German ambition for world domination. Everywhere, German agents are plotting and intriguing to accomplish the supreme purpose of their government.⁵⁹⁰

Furthermore, Lansing wanted the United States to take a stronger stance toward Germany in light of the sinking of the *Lusitania*. He demanded that Bryan declare that the sinking of the *Lusitania* by Germany was an “indefensible action,” which called for “strict accountability” on part of the German government, and that the United States would take “steps necessary” to safeguard American lives and property.⁵⁹¹ However, Bryan maintained in his letter to Wilson that the *Lusitania* was carrying ammunition valued at \$152,400 and argued that “Germany has a right to prevent contraband going to the allies and a ship carrying contraband should not rely upon passengers to protect her from attack—it would be like putting women and children in front of an army.”⁵⁹²

Whereas Bryan saw the war on moralistic terms, Lansing saw the conflict in terms of the traditional European balance of power and a redefinition of the ideals of Anglo-Saxonism, by placing Germany on the wrong side of history. For Lansing, a German victory would be a threat to the interests of the United States. As events in the late nineteenth century had shown, imperial Germany had expressed a desire to expand its influence in the Pacific and in the Caribbean, areas, where the United States had economic and political interests. His memorandum cited “plots and intrigues” by

⁵⁹⁰Lansing, *War Memoirs*, 19.

⁵⁹¹ Robert Lansing to William Jennings Bryan, 5 May 1915, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914—1920*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 384.

⁵⁹² William Jennings Bryan to Woodrow Wilson 9 May 1915, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914—1920*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 386.

German agents to undermine American influence in Latin America, such as fomenting anti-Americanism in Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.⁵⁹³ Therefore, to him, Great Britain represented the forces of liberal democracy, while Germany was the incarnation of militarism and autocracy. As the carnage of the Western Front was proof of the stalemate between the Allied and Central Powers, Lansing believed that it was just a matter of time before the United States would have to intervene.⁵⁹⁴

Bryan did not share the same view. Unlike Lansing who wanted to give full support to the Allies, Bryan held to the belief in strict neutrality. On the issue of private banks loaning money to either side, Bryan argued that it would drag the United States into the war, violating its neutrality. As the conflict began, Bryan and Lansing held opposite viewpoints. In a letter to Wilson on 10 August 1914, Bryan noted that Lansing had no problems with the Morgan Company of New York loaning money to the French Government. He stated that

If we approved of a loan to France, we could not, of course, object to a loan to Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Austria, or to any other country, and if loans were made to these countries our citizens would be divided into groups, each group loaning money to the country it favors...All of this influence would make it all the more difficult for us to main neutrality, as our action on various questions that would arise would affect one side or another and powerful interest would be thrown into the balance.⁵⁹⁵

Lansing had a more pragmatic approach. In a memorandum dated 23 October 1914, he reminded Wilson that the United States owed money to various European countries. He

⁵⁹³ Ibid, 19-20.

⁵⁹⁴ Smith, *Robert Lansing and American Neutrality*, 18.

⁵⁹⁵ William Jennings Bryan to President Wilson, 10 August 1914, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914—1920*, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 131-2.

informed Wilson that there has been European demand for American products. He then warned Wilson that not doing business with the belligerent countries would have a disastrous effect on American foreign trade.⁵⁹⁶ The issue of Britain's violation of neutral rights was a clear difference between Bryan and Lansing. While Bryan objected strenuously to British violations of neutrality by interfering with the rights of neutral nations to engage in trade during times of war, Lansing, in essence, chose not to pursue the issue with the British government, based on his assumption that it would be a matter of time before the United States would side with Great Britain and declare war against Germany, which was, to him, the greater threat to international security. He frankly stated that to condemn the British government would have tied the hands of the United States in the eventuality it entered the war, as other neutral nations would accuse the American government of hypocrisy, should the United States also engage in the practice of intercepting neutral shipping. Ultimately, the increasingly pro-Entente stance by Wilson and his cabinet would compel Bryan to resign as secretary of state.⁵⁹⁷

The Role of the American Clergy in the First World War:

Aside from the State Department, other institutions came out to support the Britain and the Entente nation and marginalize Germany and the Central Powers well before 1917. The Protestant clergy played a significant role in molding public opinion against Germany by anticipating the arguments of Anglo-Saxonists who declared the war

⁵⁹⁶ Robert Lansing, 23 October 1914 "Summary of Information in Regard to Credits of Foreign Governments in this Country and the Relation to Trade," *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914—1920*, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 138-9.

⁵⁹⁷ Lansing, 128.

to be a “just war” for the causes of “civilization” and “self-government.” Since the days of the American Revolution, Protestant churches have galvanized Americans using patriotism and nationalism from the pulpit.⁵⁹⁸ In their sermons, New England clergymen from varied denominations such as the Congregationalist, Baptist, and Lutheran churches were the most vocal in their support of independence. Thus, the American Revolution was transcended, from a dispute over the taxation to that of a holy struggle between the forces of liberty and tyranny.⁵⁹⁹ During the Civil War, both the Union and the Confederacy claimed to have God on their side, as clergy in the North and the South presented arguments for and against secession and the morality of slavery.⁶⁰⁰ In the war against Spain in 1898, Protestant clergymen again claimed to have God on their side because the United States was fighting for Cuba’s liberty against a Catholic tyrannical Spain.⁶⁰¹ By the early years of the twentieth century, there was a growing peace movement that had ecumenical support among Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish organizations, which sought to persuade nations to abolish the art of war. This movement had the support of prominent people such as William Jennings Bryan and Andrew Carnegie. However, such calls for peace fell on deaf ears in August 1914, when Europe once again marched to war.⁶⁰²

American preachers sounded the call for war one again. This time, Germany was cast as a demonic monster that threatened to destroy civilization. This coincided with the

⁵⁹⁸ Ray H. Abrams, *Preachers Present Arms: The Role of the American Churches and Clergy in World Wars I and II, with Some Observations on the War in Vietnam* (Scottsdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1933; revised 1969), 3.

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 6-7.

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁶⁰² *Ibid.*, 9-11.

“Teutonism” belief that Germany could not be part of the Anglo-Saxon peoples because of their conservatism and militarism. Therefore, the cause of the Entente was a just war because of Germany’s invasion of Belgium and the “atrocities stories” that reinforced the alleged barbarities committed by the Germans in the territories that they occupied.⁶⁰³ In the early years of the war, the peace movement, which had been in vogue in the early twentieth century, was lamented as having been futile in preventing war. The focus, then, was to prepare the United States against a German invasion, out of fear of the repetition of the abuses that were carried out against the Belgians.⁶⁰⁴ One such clergyman was Rev. Dr. Charles Henry Parkhurst, pastor of the Madison Square Church in New York City. He was no ordinary preacher, for his flock consisted of the Manhattan elite, which served as his power base in his forays into politics.⁶⁰⁵ As early as 23 August 1914, he placed the sole blame of the war upon Germany, likening Kaiser Wilhelm II to a “rabid dog” and called upon the Entente to

...deal with him exactly as Germany dealt with Poland at the time of the partition (even though there was no united Germany during the eighteenth century partitions of Poland)...deal with him as Germany meant to deal with France in the [Franco-Prussian] war of [1870] when she intended to impose a war indemnity so heavy, and so to cripple her military means of offense and defense s to crush her as a military power and render Germany invulnerable from the aide of France.⁶⁰⁶

As soon as the United States declared war on Germany, almost every Protestant denomination, the Catholic Church, and the Jews preached on the themes of patriotism and that of a “holy war”. The United States, in their eyes, was undoubtedly in the right

⁶⁰³ Ross, 189.

⁶⁰⁴ Abrams, 22-3.

⁶⁰⁵ Ross, 189-90.

⁶⁰⁶ Charles Henry Parkhurst, “Kaiser is Blamed: Dr. Parkhurst Would Blot Him Out as Public Menace”, *The New York Times*, 23 August 1914, wp 6.

and had God's approval. Those who had previously been pacifists, such as William Jennings Bryan and attorney Clarence Darrow, had been converted to the cause of war.⁶⁰⁷ Clergymen, such as Newell Dwight Hillis of the Plymouth Congregational Church organized drives for war bonds and preached that the United States had an obligation to support Britain, "the motherland" and France because of its support during the Revolutionary War against "German invaders".⁶⁰⁸

As the United States became more heavily involved in the war effort, preachers went beyond instilling patriotism, but rather helped fuel a climate of war hysteria. German atrocity stories, depicting German soldiers raping French and Belgian women were repeated in every sermon. The nature of the war changed from a war against Prussian autocracy and absolutism, but to a war against the German people, itself. The Kaiser was not merely a warmonger, but the devil, himself.⁶⁰⁹ The result, then, was a virulent strain of hatred and antagonism to the German people and culture, which had hitherto been admired by many Americans. The teaching of the German language in schools was forbidden in fourteen states. States such as Iowa prohibited any public meeting to be conducted in languages other than English. German operas were banned from concert halls.⁶¹⁰ More substantively, clergymen encouraged the formation of vigilante groups that hunted for spies, purportedly to be lurking behind every corner, with the support of government agencies, such as the Bureau of Investigation (the predecessor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation) and the Justice Department, which threatened the

⁶⁰⁷ Abrams, 53-5.

⁶⁰⁸ Ross, 191.

⁶⁰⁹ Abrams, 101-3.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid, 116-7.

very democracy that Wilson promoting when he asked Congress for a declaration of war.⁶¹¹

The British and American Propaganda Machines:

One cannot discount the impact of newspapers and government propaganda machines in molding American public opinion during the First World War. Before war was declared on 4 April 1917, British propagandists vigorously courted the United States with the purpose of turning the American public against Germany. The British government used censorship to provide American readers the British perspective of the war. Under the Defense of the Realm Act, the British government had control over “all statements intended or likely to prejudice His Majesty’s relations with foreign powers.”⁶¹² The British propaganda machine, Wellington House, circulated reports of German atrocities in Belgium. The Central Committee for National Patriotic Organizations published a series of pamphlets written by members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History titled, *Why We are at War: Great Britain’s Case*.⁶¹³ While the British and French aimed for American involvement. The Germans aimed for preserving American neutrality. The German government made attempts to refute the charges of barbarism. German propaganda showed pictures of German soldiers feeding Belgian and French children. In the final analysis however, the Germans proved to be less adept at

⁶¹¹ Ibid, 119-20.

⁶¹² Peterson, 13.

⁶¹³ Charles Roetter, *The Art of Psychological Warfare, 1914-1945*, (New York: Stein and Day, 1974), 32-3.

swaying the American public to support its cause because the British and French were much more effective in provoking American outrage.⁶¹⁴

The British government succeeded in portraying Germany as a savage nation, whose army paid no regard to the rules of warfare. In doing so, it had secured America's sympathies. British newspapers had warned the American public in the early stages of the war that the collapse of the British Empire would be detrimental to American interests.⁶¹⁵ Put it simply, the British propaganda machine portrayed the war as simply a crusade, a war of civilization against the forces of darkness. Therefore, the Allies were on the side of good. The British propagandists had the fortune on calling upon the cultural similarities between the American and British peoples, and marginalizing the Germans as the "other". The German people were often portrayed as "power hungry", "impatient", and unfit for the duties of being a great nation.⁶¹⁶ In 1915, the British government published the *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages*, more popularly known as the "Bryce Report" because the prominent scholar Lord James Bryce headed it. The report was a collection of German atrocities in Belgium. Upon its publication, the Bryce report incensed the British and American public with horrific tales of German brutality.⁶¹⁷ Brutality committed against children was common throughout the Bryce report. One such account by a Belgian soldier read

I was at Hofstade, the Germans were retreating, we were advancing near the headquarters of the Gendarmerie. I saw a woman about 45 years old and a boy of about 9 who had been struck with a bayonet several times,

⁶¹⁴ Ibid, 55-7.

⁶¹⁵ Armin Rappaport, *The British Press and Wilsonian Neutrality* (Stanford, California; Stanford University Press, 1951), 11.

⁶¹⁶ Peterson, 35.

⁶¹⁷ Peterson, 53.

both in the face and in the body, both the boy's hands were cut off at the wrist, he was kneeling on the ground, one hand cut off was on the ground, the other hanging by a bit of skin.⁶¹⁸

A recurring theme in the Bryce Report was the destruction of property by German soldiers. A Belgian professor testified

...All the civilians had fled and the Germans were in possession of the town. I saw some of the soldiers breaking open private houses in the principal square. The whole town was looted...[The German officer] and his men were lighting matches and setting them to the curtains. The excuse given for this and the burning of the houses was that a German officer of high rank had been killed in the house of the mayor...[A German soldier] stated that he regretted the kind of warfare that the Germans were carrying on, but said that they had been fired on by civilians and that what they had done was done by orders.⁶¹⁹

Sexual violence was also prevalent throughout the Bryce report. A Belgian soldier testified to witnessing the corpse of a man with his genitals slashed off and a woman with "clear marks of violation." Such stories titillated, as well as outraged the British and American public.⁶²⁰

The testimonies gathered by the Bryce Report were merely accumulated and not analyzed. Much of the testimonies were incomplete and were based on second and third hand information. The stories that were printed were based upon the assumption that they were true until proven otherwise.⁶²¹ Despite these gaps of credibility, the Bryce Report bore a great deal of credence among the American public. Bryce was an eminent scholar whose work, *The American Commonwealth*, laid the foundations for Anglo-American friendship in the late nineteenth century. As ambassador to the United States,

⁶¹⁸ *Committee on Alleged German Outrages*, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1915), 87.

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid*, 55-6.

⁶²⁰ *Ibid*, 113.

⁶²¹ Peterson, 53-4.

Bryce had a reputation as a great friend to the United States. It was therefore, not difficult to suspend disbelief and skepticism over atrocities committed by the Germans.⁶²²

American newspapers were all too eager to print German atrocities. The sinking of the *Lusitania* was grist for anti-German propaganda mills. Despite claims by the German government that the ocean liner was carrying arms bound for Britain, the sinking of the *Lusitania* coincided with the publication of the Bryce Report.⁶²³ The New York Times reported that the *Lusitania* was unarmed and “defenseless as a ferryboat” and flatly denied carrying any arms.⁶²⁴ The deaths of more than 1,000 people, of which 128 were American, earned Germany a new level of infamy because of its use of submarine warfare. In a compilation of editorials by newspapers from all over New York City published on 8 May 1915, The New York Times called the sinking of the *Lusitania* “murder” and piracy and posed the question, “What advantage will it be to [Germany] to be left without a friend or a well-wisher in the world?” Therefore, the article showed that the verdict clearly cast the German government as guilty of such an infamous outrage.⁶²⁵ Major American newspapers concluded that the German people were an inherently savage people, based on Allied atrocity propaganda. From the beginning of the war, the German people had been stricken from the Anglo-Saxon family, and were relegated to the “Teutonic” race, at best and Huns at worst, using Kaiser Wilhelm’s speech during the Boxer Rebellion, exhorting his soldiers to imitate the actions of Attila the Hun.⁶²⁶ Allied

⁶²² Ibid, 58.

⁶²³ James Morgan Read, *Atrocity Propaganda, 1914–1919*, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1941), 201.

⁶²⁴ “Lusitania was Unarmed,” *The New York Times*, 10 May 1915, p. 1.

⁶²⁵ “Press Calls Sinking of Lusitania Murder,” *The New York Times*, 8 May 1915, p. 6 .

⁶²⁶ Read, 17.

newspapers cited “scientific” findings that showed that Germans were predisposed to psychopathic behavior due to the size of the German brain, using nineteenth century phrenology.⁶²⁷ The sinking of the *Lusitania* added fodder as the *St. Louis Republic* in its opinion section accused the German government of not only reversing the progress of international law, but the very tenets of Christianity, itself.⁶²⁸

Prominent Americans, including William Skaggs, a southern progressive, added to the anti-German hysteria. His book *German Conspiracies in America*, traced the history of German treachery from Hessian mercenaries during the American Revolution to the destruction of the *Lusitania*, describing Germany as “a nation of ruthless destroyers,” which clearly was intended to incite his reading public.⁶²⁹ His book reinterpreted history by describing the American Revolution as a struggle between a free Anglo-Saxon people and a despotic German king in the form of George III, who was also the elector of the German state of Hannover. He argued that it was only the influence of three generations of English liberalism that reformed the British royal family by the beginning of the reign of Queen Victoria.⁶³⁰

A few months after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, an even greater outrage was the arrest and subsequent execution of the English nurse, Edith Cavell. She was charged with having aided English and French prisoners of war by hiding them and helping them escape to France. As with the *Lusitania*, the German government justified her execution by claiming that she was a spy, not a nurse. Brand Whitlock, the Minister in Belgium

⁶²⁷ Ibid, 18-9.

⁶²⁸ “The Law Still Stands,” *The St. Louis Republic*, 10 May 1915 6.

⁶²⁹ William Skaggs, *German Conspiracies in America*, (London: T. Fisher, Ltd, 1915), 11.

⁶³⁰ Ibid, 14-6.

wrote to General ...Moritz von Bissing, the German Governor General in Belgium, imploring him to spare her from death by describing her as having “spent her life in tending the sufferings of others” and having “lavished her care upon German soldiers” as well as Allied prisoners of war.⁶³¹ Her execution stirred the American public on a level that equaled the sinking of the Lusitania because of her gender and her profession, which should have spared her from the brutality of war.⁶³² Whitlock reported in his letter to Bryan that coverage of the case of Cavell’s execution was extremely upsetting to the German government. He wrote that he had to meet several times with German officials “to prevent serious complications,” which referred to their objection to having a Belgian citizen on the staff of the Legation.⁶³³ After having been informed of Cavell’s execution, Whitlock wrote Walter Page, the Ambassador to Great Britain that he considered the failure to save her life a blow on the part of the American Legation in Belgium. He added:

Although the German Authorities did not inform me when the sentence had actually been passed I learned through an unofficial source that judgment had been delivered and that Miss Cavell was to be executed during the night. I immediately sent Mr. Gibson, the Secretary of Legation, to present to [German civil governor] Baron von der Lancken my appeal that execution of the sentence should be deferred until the Governor should consider my plea for clemency.⁶³⁴

⁶³¹ Brand Whitlock to General Moritz von Bissing 11 October 1915, ,” *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914—1920*, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 131

⁶³² Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1927; reprinted 1972), 34.

⁶³³ Brandon Whitlock to William Jennings Bryan, 30 October 1915, , *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914—1920*, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 62.

⁶³⁴ Brand Whitlock to Walter Page, 13 October 1915, ,” *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914—1920*, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 61.

In an article by James M. Beck, the former Assistant Attorney General of the United States, he protested Cavell's execution claiming that she was not given a fair trial. He differentiated German from American and English concepts of "justice", emphasizing that the German form of justice consisted only in the following of procedure, rather than the concept of "inalienable rights" and the presumption of innocence under English common law.⁶³⁵ He argued that

Miss Cavell's fate only differs from that of hundreds of Belgian women and children in that she had the pretense of a trial and presumably had trespassed against military law, while other victims of the rape of Belgium were ruthlessly killed in order to effect a speedy subjugation of the territory. The question of the guilt or innocence of each individual was a matter of no importance. Hostages were taken and shot for the alleged wrongs of others.⁶³⁶

The execution of Edith Cavell and its coverage by British and American newspapers continued to resonate throughout the war and convinced the American public to sympathize with the Entente and that Germany was capable of any gross violation of human decency.⁶³⁷

The final straw that eliminated any shred of sympathy for Germany was the publication of the Zimmerman Note in 1917 in which Germany promised Mexico the states of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona in exchange for an alliance against the United States after Germany should war be declared between both countries. To the American public, however, the publication of the Zimmerman Note was a culmination of German

⁶³⁵ James M. Beck, "The Case of Edith Cavell: A Reply to Dr. Albert Zimmermann, Germany's Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs," *The New York Times*, 31 October 1915, p. sm 1.

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁶³⁷ Roetter, 11-2.

villainy from the atrocity stories in the Bryce Report to the execution of Edith Cavell.⁶³⁸ The New York Times connected the Zimmerman Note to suspected German movements in Mexico and Mexico's supposed attempt to cause friction in relations between the United States and Japan.⁶³⁹ Despite the fact that Zimmerman was within his duties as foreign minister to secure Germany's interests, he was still roundly condemned as a villain by the American public. The course was thus set for war between Germany and the United States.⁶⁴⁰

After three years of neutrality and propaganda by the British, the groundwork had been laid for an American propaganda machine. Wilson established the Committee of Public Information (CPI) through an executive order eight days after the declaration of war. The Committee consisted of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and chaired by George Creel, a civilian journalist.⁶⁴¹ In his report given to Wilson on 1 June 1919, Creel described that the purpose of the CPI "was to drive home the absolute justice of America's cause, the absolute selflessness of America's aims."⁶⁴² In his book surrounding his work in the CPI, Creel describes the function of the CPI as a vehicle to project American ideals and to maintain Allied morale by using all forms of media—telegraph cable, motion pictures, radios, and print.⁶⁴³ Between 1917 and 1919, the CPI received more than \$6.8 million in funding from Wilson's office and Congress. During

⁶³⁸ Rappaport, 133-4.

⁶³⁹ "Washington Exposes Plot," *The New York Times*, 1 March 1917, p. 1.

⁶⁴⁰ Peterson, 315.

⁶⁴¹ George Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire*, (Stanford University Press: 1938; reprinted in 1972 by Arno Press), 31-2.

⁶⁴² George Creel, *Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information, 1917, 1918, 1919*, (Washington DC.: Government Printing Office, 1920; reprinted 1972 by Da Capo Press, New York, 1972), 1.

⁶⁴³ George Creel, *How We Advertised America*, (New York: Harper, 1920; reprinted by Arno Press, New York, 1972), 4-5.

those two years, the CPI received more than \$2.8 million in receipts from the sale of publications and movie tickets for its films. Between 1917 and 1919, the CPI spent more than \$7.9 million.⁶⁴⁴ In his own words, Creel defended his declaring that

In no degree was the Committee an agency of censorship, a machinery of concealment or repression. Its emphasis throughout was on the open and the positive. At no point did it seek or exercise authorities under those war laws that limited the freedom of speech and press.⁶⁴⁵

Despite his assertions, the CPI waged an extensive campaign to maintain war morale and to remind the American public of the righteousness of their cause. One such example was the Four Minute Men, which was an organization of speakers who toured the country making speeches. About 75,000 people gave speeches of no more than four minutes specific topics such as the arguing for the selective service, selling Liberty Loans, and the reasons for fighting Germany.⁶⁴⁶ As with the Protestant clergy previously mentioned, the CPI contributed to the war hysteria and censorship that resulted after the declaration of war with Germany.⁶⁴⁷

As a result of the constant barrage of propaganda, the effects of anti-German sentiment would be manifested in various ways. Though originating before the declaration of war, the “Americanism movement” gained full force by stressing enthusiastic and uniform support for the war. German-Americans, who had lived with their neighbors in peace, were considered the enemy within American society, which must be stamped out. Since German-Americans had maintained strong cultural connections to the Fatherland in the decades before the war, Americanists sought to

⁶⁴⁴ Creel, *Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information*, 8.

⁶⁴⁵ Creel, *How We Advertised America*, 4.

⁶⁴⁶ Creel, *Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information*, 24.

⁶⁴⁷ Ross, 268.

eradicate any vestige of German culture. Some examples included dropping the German language from public school curricula, the closing of German language newspapers, the Anglicization of German names, the banning of German opera and music, and the renaming of sauerkraut to “liberty cabbage.”⁶⁴⁸

The Anglo-American Connection:

Despite Wilson’s admonition, it would be all but impossible for the United States to be completely impartial over the events in Europe. In the two decades preceding the outbreak of the Great War, Great Britain had been cultivating friendship with the United States by eliminating the last remaining controversies between both countries in the Western Hemisphere. The Washington foreign policy establishment, for the most part, was unabashedly Anglophile. Lodge, despite being an Anglophobe, early in his political career, was more of an Anglophile, due to his Boston origins, which was reflected in his constant travel to Britain, his fashions, and in his admiration for the British Empire, and his support for the *rapprochement* between the United States and Great Britain during the 1890s.⁶⁴⁹ Wilson, himself, depended upon a small circle of advisors on foreign policy: Robert Lansing, the counselor to the State Department; Walter Page, the Ambassador to Great Britain; and William Jennings Bryan, the Secretary of State. Only Bryan was adamant in maintaining the strictest American neutrality.⁶⁵⁰

⁶⁴⁸ Higham, 208.

⁶⁴⁹ Widenor, 38.

⁶⁵⁰ Tucker, 25.

Secondly, the intricate economic connections between the United States and Great Britain made neutrality and complete impartiality practically impossible. British banks and investment had financed the development of the American economy throughout the nineteenth century, particularly its railroad expansion. Britain had been a market for American agricultural products, particularly southern cotton. Even though the United States had become an industrial giant at the beginning of the twentieth century, it still depended on the British to navigate the complex waters of global finance.⁶⁵¹ As war in Europe progressed, the American and British economies would become more inextricably linked. As early as September 1914, the British government sent agents on behalf of the War Office to the United States to fill orders for munitions in anticipation of a more protracted conflict with Germany. Despite protests from the Irish-American community, the State Department declared that belligerents from both sides had the right to purchase munitions from neutral countries like the United States.⁶⁵² By late 1914, the War Office sent Lieutenant B. C. Smyth-Pigott to make arrangements with American firms such as Remington and Winchester for the purchase of rifles to meet the demands of Britain's growing army, which was projected to be at nearly 1.2 million by July 1915.⁶⁵³ It was not just for munitions that the British were turning to the United States, but rather, any industry, material, or commodity that could be of use to the Allied war machine. As a result a mad dash of agents from private firms came to the United States

⁶⁵¹ Kathleen Burk, *Britain, America, and the Sinews of War, 1914—1918*, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1985), 4.

⁶⁵² *Ibid*, 14.

⁶⁵³ *Ibid*, 15.

claiming to act on the authority of the British government to secure deals that they would then sell to the War Office, plus a 10 percent commission.⁶⁵⁴

On January 1915, the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co. became the British government's sole purchasing agent, upon the suggestion of Cecil Spring Rice, the British ambassador. Spring Rice believed that Morgan would be the best person with whom to do business since the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co. was the largest and most powerful bank in the United States. Additionally, Morgan owned a substantial portion of the shipping industry, which would deliver goods to the Allies easily.⁶⁵⁵ In Spring Rice's letter to Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, he had the utmost confidence in Morgan's abilities as the chief purchaser for the British government in the United States and alluded to the earlier confusion that pre-dated Morgan's appointment, of which he believed a marked improvement.⁶⁵⁶ J. P. Morgan, himself had strong personal ties to Britain. He spent half the year in England and was well connected with high society. His niece, Mary Burns, was married to the first Viscount Harourt. As a strong believer in the Allied cause, Morgan donated his country house to be used as a hospital up on the outbreak of hostilities. With Morgan as the chief purchaser, the British government could be assured that the most powerful bank in the United States would not have any dealings with Germany.⁶⁵⁷

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid, 16.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid, 18.

⁶⁵⁶ Sir Cecil Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey 20 May 1915, *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice*, Stephen Gwinn, ed. (London: Constable, 1929, reprinted Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972), Vol. 2, 270-1.

⁶⁵⁷ Burk, 20 -1.

The British government was especially eager to garner American support. In the twenty years preceding the Great War, it had cultivated a *rapprochement* with the United States, to the point of relinquishing control of the Western Hemisphere. With the outbreak of the First World War, the Foreign Office hoped its efforts yielded a return, in the form of American cooperation, while keeping in mind the sensitivities of American public opinion against intervention in Europe. As his experience with Americans, through his friendship with Theodore Roosevelt had shown, Spring Rice gave his insight on the nuances on American public opinion:

Roosevelt writes (and I agree with him that that everyone must be impressed by the very friendly feeling of [the United States] towards England and its anti-German sentiment...but there are other elements and the influence of the Germans and especially the German Jews is very great, and in parts of the country is supreme. We must not count on American sympathy as assured to us. A little incident might change it, and there are the cleverest people in the world at work with large sums at their back who will let no opportunity pass to do [Britain] mischief.⁶⁵⁸

Likewise, Spring Rice, in his communications with Grey, emphasized the fact that Germany's actions regarding the invasion and occupation of Belgium showed that it was beyond the pale as a civilized nation, which necessitated action.

I venture to enclose for your information the paraphrase of a telegram from [Foreign Secretary] Sir Edward Grey in answer to a telegram of mine reporting an accusation circulated in the press to the effect that England was opposed to peace and demanding exorbitant terms. I enclose this telegram not, of course, with any idea of influencing your policy but merely as the statement of a point of view which I am sure you will be interested to know.⁶⁵⁹

⁶⁵⁸ Cecil Spring Rice to Sir Edward Grey 25 August 1914, *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice*, Vol 2, Stephen Gwinn, ed. (London: Constable, 1929, reprinted Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972),218

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid.

Grey replied to Spring Rice:

...Germany planned this war and chose her own time for forcing it on Europe. No one was in the same state of military preparation as Germany was when war began...A series of able writers, instructors of Germany, from [German nationalist historian] Heinrich von Treitschke, has openly taught under the sanction of the Government that the main object of German policy must be to crush Great Britain and to destroy the British Empire...A cruel wrong has been done to Belgium; wanton destruction has been inflicted on her and her resistance has been punished by wholesale acts of cruelty and vandalism. Is Germany prepared to make reparation for these acts?⁶⁶⁰

Theodore Roosevelt, throughout his correspondences to his British friends, trumpeted his support for the British cause, which was to come to the aid of the Belgian people, which he used to express his dissatisfaction with the Wilson administration's policy of neutrality. In his letter to Spring Rice on 5 February 1915, Roosevelt expressed the belief that a war between Great Britain and the United States over the violation of neutrality rights would have been a disaster, and thus, would work to Germany's advantage, using the Civil War as an analogy, in which Lincoln wisely prevented a war with either Britain or France, while preserving the Union at the same time.⁶⁶¹ In another to John St. Loe Strachey, British journalist and editor of *The Spectator*, Roosevelt reiterated his pro-British views when in an article of *The Spectator*, Strachey insinuated that Roosevelt did not appear to be strongly behind Britain. His defense was that regardless of his affections for Britain, he was an American first. Nevertheless, he reiterated that

I emphatically stated that England was right; and that England had made all peace lovers her debtors by her action toward Belgium;

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid, 224.

⁶⁶¹ Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice 5 February 1915, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Vol. 8, Elting E. Morison, ed., (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), 888-9.

but I thought it very unwise to indulge in hysterics in the matter...Next to my own country I put England first; I am in closest sympathy with her.⁶⁶²

He argued further:

Surely you must realize, if only from the bitterness expressed toward me by the Germans, that I have unequivocally expressed my sympathies with the Allies and my denunciation of Germany and my abhorrence of a neutrality which is neutral between right and wrong...I have distinctly stated that in what England did for Belgium she has set the right example for the United States. I have spoken in the highest terms of your Army and Navy of the attitude of the upper classes and of large sections of your people. I have explicitly stated that you have done better than we would have done. I have held you up as being better compared to us.⁶⁶³

Anglo-Saxonism and the First World War:

The outbreak of the First World War unleashed the next step in the evolution of Anglo-Saxonism with the exclusion of the German people from the Anglo-Saxon family, particularly, from the midst of the English-speaking peoples from both sides of the Atlantic. In the decades before the war, even though British intellectuals, such as James Bryce, were not closely aligned to their German counterparts, they were, in some ways, considered German universities superior to British higher education. British academics routinely visited German universities to learn the latest ideas.⁶⁶⁴ After the war began, however, British academics made great effort to divorce themselves intellectually and

⁶⁶² Theodore Roosevelt to John St. Loe Strachey 22 February 1915, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Vol. 8, Elting E. Morison, ed., (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), 897.

⁶⁶³ *Ibid*, 898.

⁶⁶⁴ Stuart Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany: British Academics 1914—1918*, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1988), 6.

philosophically from Germany. For examples, three weeks after the war began, historians at Oxford University such as L. G. Wickham Legg, H.W.C. Davis, C.R.L Fletcher, Arthur Hassall, and F. Morgan wrote published *Why We Are At War: Great Britain's Case*, to justify the British position. *Why We Are At War* was the first of a series of “Oxford pamphlets” that reiterated the reasons Britain went to war. These historians highlighted the plight of Belgium, as its neutrality was violated by Germany, thus giving Britain the moral high ground of protecting an innocent and weaker nation from a stronger aggressor.⁶⁶⁵ Without mentioning Anglo-Saxonism directly, the Oxford historians ascribed to the British cause the qualities of humanity and civilization, while defining Germany as the “enemy of humanity”. However, most damning to the Germans was the argument that in coming to the aid of the Belgian people, Great Britain, as the Anglo-Saxon power, disregarded any ties to Teutonic militarism, and that “the call to right” was far higher than “the call of blood.”⁶⁶⁶

The racial and Social Darwinist element had been part of the ideology of Anglo-Saxonism in the two decades before the First World War, which held that the Anglo-Saxons and their descendants in Britain and the United States were destined to rule. This coincided neatly with the WASP elite, justifying their dominance in the social, economic, and political spheres of American society.⁶⁶⁷ In the decades before the war, Anglo-Saxonists like Theodore Roosevelt railed against “hyphenism”, or the remaining bonds that immigrants continued to hold for their countries of origin, and called for a purer

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid, 60-1.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid, 63-4.

⁶⁶⁷ Alexander Deconde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston: Northeastern University Press: 1992), 55.

definition of being an American, in reaction to the waves of immigrants from eastern and southern Europe, as well as the Irish- and German-Americans.⁶⁶⁸ When the Great War began, Anglo-Saxonists embarked upon the policy of “Americanism”, in order to instill loyalty among immigrant populations for the American way of life, by diluting “hyphenism”, which was a source of discomfort for the WASP elite in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. In doing so, the WASP elite established that the Anglo-Saxon was the American ideal. This was best exemplified in a speech Wilson gave to the Daughters of the American Revolution in October 1915, which reflected the evolution of Anglo-Saxonism, in which he declared,

The American Revolution was the birth of a nation; it was the creation of a great free republic based upon traditions of personal liberty, which theretofore had been confined to a single little island, but which it was purposed should spread to all mankind.⁶⁶⁹

Critics of “Americanization” pointed out that the WASPs were the most blatant hyphenated Americans, by emphasizing their English origins, and was manifested in the Wilson Administration’s condoning of Britain’s violations of neutral nations on the high seas.⁶⁷⁰

Despite generations of assimilation and their contributions to American society, German-Americans became suspect to charges of “disloyalty” and being “un-American,” thus more devoted to the Kaiser than to the principles of liberty. Propaganda stories of German atrocities in Belgium, Germany’s submarine campaign, and sabotage attempts at

⁶⁶⁸ Stephen J. Gross, “The Perils of Prussianism: Main Street America, Local Autonomy, and the Great War,” *Agricultural History*, Vol. 78, No. 1, Winter 2004, 79.

⁶⁶⁹ Woodrow Wilson, “Address to the Daughters of the American Revolution,” 11 October 1915, *President Wilson’s Great Speeches and Other History Making Documents*, (Chicago: Stanton and Van Vliet, 1917), 73.

⁶⁷⁰ Deconde, 82.

factories fueled anti-German sentiment across the United States, convincing many that their German-American neighbors could be agents of the Reich, itself.⁶⁷¹ Spring Rice reported to his colleague Sir Valentine Chirol on the sentiment toward German-Americans saying:

It is curious to see the violent tone adopted by the German press [in the United States] against the American public, on the ground that they are Anglo-maniac. Their tone is almost friendly to France and Russia, but nothing is too bad for England, and they are almost inarticulate with hate. A great danger here is racial feeling, and if this were to break out the task of the government would be difficult. I think the Government is really afraid of it. There is a distinct feeling of fear that if the Allies are beaten the turn of America would come next and come soon. Twelve million Germans in one's belly is rather a severe weight for a nation which has to fight seventy millions outside. And that is the situation here.⁶⁷²

Wilson was concerned that since German-Americans were among the most organized white minorities in the country, that they could somehow foment social or political disturbances across the country, and German-American leaders hoped to use the numbers of German-Americans to influence Wilson to maintain a policy of neutrality.⁶⁷³

From the beginning of the war, the Allied propagandists sought to define the aims of the conflict, and most importantly, to define the “enemy”, particularly, Germany. The British, and later, American governments appropriated the values of self-government, liberty, and “civilization,” and associated them with Anglo-Saxonism, while on the other hand conflating Germany’s “*Kultur*” with Prussian militarism, the preponderance of the state over the individual, and “barbarism”, resulting in the atrocities committed by the

⁶⁷¹John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism*, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1955), 197.

⁶⁷²Sir Cecil Spring Rice to Sir Valentine Chirol, 13 November 1914, *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice*, Stephen Gwinn, ed. (London: Constable, 1929, reprinted Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972), Vol. 2, 244.

⁶⁷³Deconde, 84.

German army in its occupation of Belgium, for example. After the sinking of the *Lusitania*, public opinion clearly condemned Germany, and leaders like Lodge were convinced that the Anglo-Saxon powers, such as Britain and the United States, as well as France, represented democracy and liberty against “Prussian militarism”.⁶⁷⁴ Indeed, for German intellectuals the outbreak of the war was seen as a seminal moment for German national consciousness. By eschewing French and British ideals of democracy and capitalism, they held up the warrior ethos, which contrasted the materialism of British capitalism, and saw themselves as “defenders” of Europe and Western Civilization from “Slavic barbarism,” which came to be known as *Kultur*.⁶⁷⁵ Ironically, in the June 1915 issue of the *Irish Quarterly Review*, which presented a more neutral perspective on the war, Germany’s political and economic philosophy was summed up in the abject worship of the state, dominated by a military elite, which is not subject to any external authority, and thus the more its power grows, the more it becomes a threat to the liberties of other peoples.⁶⁷⁶

While nativism did not sprout during the First World War, the anti-German hysteria of the First World War was unprecedented in its magnitude, which reflected the evolution of Anglo-Saxonism, as one of the factors behind the increasing sympathy in the United States for the British cause. The most tangible result of the *rapprochement* between Great Britain and the United States during the 1890s was the pro-British element in the foreign policy establishment. Despite the stated official neutrality, Wilson and

⁶⁷⁴ Widenor, 217.

⁶⁷⁵ John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial*, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2001), 278-9.

⁶⁷⁶ M.F. Egan, “Kultur and Our Need of It,” *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review*, Vol. 4, No. 14, (June 1915), 211-2.

almost all of his cabinet were unabashed Anglophiles and made every accommodation to the British government, especially in the trading of contraband.⁶⁷⁷ For the foreign policy establishment, however, having drunk from the same well of Anglo-Saxonism before the war, had to separate Germany from the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Only English-speaking peoples of Great Britain and the United States could be considered true Anglo-Saxons because of their devotion to liberty and civilization. Therefore, only the Anglo-Saxons, which held elements of British influence, could be considered true Americans. The “Teutonic” peoples, then, of whom the Germans were a part, were clearly inherently different from the Anglo-Saxons and therefore, not American. In the eyes of the policy makers in Washington, DC, this was the most effective way to sway public opinion toward the side of the Allies in a war, which otherwise, the great majority of Americans would have opposed.⁶⁷⁸ After the entry of the United States in 1917, this new definition of Anglo-Saxonism would be applied, then to the “100 percent Americanism” campaign to root out “hyphenism” to differentiate the “true Americans” from the Teutonic elements in the form of German-Americans, from banning the teaching of the German language in the curriculum of schools and universities to the lynching of German-Americans. The federal government, in the name of “Americanism,” would enact measures to limit free speech through the Sedition Act and as far as denaturalization for American citizens of German descent.⁶⁷⁹ Wilson’s attack on “hyphenism” can best be exemplified in his address to Congress on 7 December 1915, in which he warned of citizens of other nations

⁶⁷⁷ Paul L. Atwood, *War and Empire: The American Way of Life*, (New York: Pluto Press, 2010), 111.

⁶⁷⁸ Higham, 201.

⁶⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 209.

who, despite being welcomed by the United States, have either spread dissension, sabotage, or have conspired against that government, which gave them the privilege of citizenship. It was, of course, a thinly-disguised reference to German-Americans, whose loyalty was becoming increasingly in doubt, and were becoming more closely associated with the German government.⁶⁸⁰ Thus, he called on Congress

To enact such laws at the earliest possible moment and feel that in doing so I am urging you to do nothing less than save the honor and self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out. They are not many, but they are infinitely malignant, and the hand of our power should close over them at once. They have formed plots to destroy property, they have entered into conspiracies against the neutrality of the Government, they have sought to pry into every confidential transaction of the Government in order to serve interests alien to our own.⁶⁸¹

Lodge had a similar reaction to those he called “hyphenates”, people who did not conform fully to the American ideal. He saw, even naturalized German-Americans as a potential fifth column that could subvert the political system of the United States, which he had long believed to be part of Anglo-Saxon civilization, which he associated with republican self-government and individual liberty. Additionally, he believed all of the English-speaking peoples, including Great Britain and its dominions, shared the same genius for establishing self-governing societies out in the wilderness.⁶⁸² As the war began, Lodge’s Anglo-Saxonism crystallized and saw it as a conflict between Anglo-Saxon civilization and “Teutonism”, and thus identified the interests of Great Britain as similar to

⁶⁸⁰ Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress, 7 December 1915, *President Wilson’s Great Speeches and Other History Making Documents*, (Chicago: Stanton and Van Vliet, 1917), 94.

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid*, 95.

⁶⁸² Widenor, 70-1.

those of the United States.⁶⁸³ Lodge's hostility toward "hyphenism" was evident in a letter he wrote to Roosevelt describing a Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting, in which he resented being lectured by a German-American immigrant about patriotism and Americanism. He described the account thus:

The German-American propaganda has become pretty bad. We had them before the Foreign Relations Committee the other day on the question of prohibiting the export of munitions of war, when a man from the Lutheran Theological Seminary in St. Louis named Bente, addressed us...He had an accent so strong that you could stumble over it, and he proceeded to lecture us on Americanism, patriotism, what true Americanism was and what the opinions of George Washington were. Some of us are not hyphenates—we are just plain Americans...They are now engaged in telling us how loyal they are to the United States.⁶⁸⁴

Both Lodge and Roosevelt were of the same mind, that the Wilson administration was incompetent and playing into German hands through its policy of neutrality, which they believed to be far too passive, and likened Wilson to Thomas Jefferson, a century earlier, when the United States was at the mercy of Britain and France during the Napoleonic Wars.⁶⁸⁵ Roosevelt described Wilson and Bryan as the worst men in their positions, for allowing the United States to be a state of "unpreparedness" like the Jefferson and Madison administrations on the eve of the War of 1812.⁶⁸⁶ In his letter to the British scholar James Bryce, Roosevelt reiterated his belief that Wilson was intimidated by the German-American vote, as well as accused American pacifists like Henry Ford and

⁶⁸³ Ibid, 167.

⁶⁸⁴ Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, 22 February 1915, *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge*, (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York: 1925), 457.

⁶⁸⁵ Widenor, 198.

⁶⁸⁶ Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge 8 December 1914, *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge*, (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York: 1925), 450.

Andrew Carnegie of playing into the hands of the German government by opposing military preparedness for the United States and by encouraging the Wilson administration to maintain its strict neutrality, despite the atrocities committed by the Germans in Belgium.⁶⁸⁷

If the American public had to be convinced of supporting the Allied cause, the media was the means in which to do it. The first step would be to alienate the American public against the German cause. In the decades leading up to the First World War, there had been a great affinity between the American and German peoples. Germans made up a significant proportion of American immigrants during the mid-nineteenth century, as they escaped the chaos of revolution and saw the United States as a beacon of democracy. Americans, in turn looked to Germany as a model of social progress. American progressives of the early twentieth century, such as Randolph Bourne, marveled at German innovations in social legislation.⁶⁸⁸ However, as the war progressed, even American intellectuals, who were once solid supporters of Germany joined the rhetoric of cutting off Germany from the Anglo-Saxon family. The economist Thorsten Veblen, most known for his *Theory of the Leisure Class* stressed the incompatibility of the German imperial system with capitalism and liberal democracy.⁶⁸⁹

For generations, Americans held perceptions of their government's disinterest and impartiality during the first three years of the First World War, which changed only when Germany declared unrestricted submarine warfare. Such myths, however contradicted

⁶⁸⁷ Theodore Roosevelt to James Bryce, 30 November 1915, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Vol. 7, Elting E. Morison, ed., (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), 994.

⁶⁸⁸ Brian Lloyd, *Left Out: Pragmatism, Exceptionalism, and the poverty of American Marxism, 1890—1922*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 274.

⁶⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 289.

the reality that American political and business elites deemed it in their best interests to support the forces of the Entente and gradually alienate the larger public from the Central Powers.⁶⁹⁰ Prominent members of American society devoted much of their time and talents toward persuading the American public to support the cause of the Entente, by exploiting atrocity stories revolving the German occupation of northern France and Belgium. Additionally, official German policies, such as the use of submarine warfare, played into the hands of British and American propagandists, who were more adroit in the demonization of Germany.⁶⁹¹

One of the methods of persuading the American public to side with the Entente powers was to emphasize the fundamental difference between the Anglo-Saxon and “Teutonic” peoples, which was the inherent militarism in German culture. Even less than a decade before the outbreak of the war, when Germany and the United States were rising powers in competition with one another, the abhorrence to standing armies was considered to be one of the virtues of the original Anglo-Saxon peoples, who mobilized for battle only reluctantly, and for self-defense, and not to glory in war for its own sake, compared to other continental powers, most notably the Germans from Prussia.⁶⁹² The British journalist, Arnold White, saw Germany as a threat to world peace a decade before the war. Particularly, he saw Prussian militarism as a cause of the next world war for several reasons. For example, in his article “Germany’s Aim in Foreign Politics,” Arnold analyzed Germany’s increasing desire for continental hegemony, such as conquering the

⁶⁹⁰ Stewart Halsey Ross, *Propaganda for War: How the United States was Conditioned to Fight the Great War of 1914–1918* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Co., 1996), 146.

⁶⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 147.

⁶⁹² Frederic Louis Huidekoper, “Is America Prepared for War?” *The North American Review*, Vol. 182, No. 591 (Feb., 1906), 162.

Netherlands because it would greatly enhance its colonial empire, with the addition of Dutch colonies in the East Indies and the Caribbean.⁶⁹³ Secondly, the inherent militarism of German society, in Arnold's view, would make prolonged peace impossible because of the fear of falling into "decadence", even so far as to describe a proposal to erect a military-style barracks for the poor in major towns and cities. Because of this slavish devotion to the Kaiser and the military, Arnold concluded that Germany was no longer a nation of deep intellectual thought, and therefore, on the way to "barbarism".⁶⁹⁴

Likewise, the American intellectual Carlton Hayes cited German militarism as one of the main causes of the outbreak of the First World War. He demonizes Germany in his analysis of German history from the mid-nineteenth century to the onset of the war in 1914, through the works of prominent Germans like the politician Prince Bernard von Bülow, General Friederich von Bernhardi, and the German-American psychologist Hugo Muensterburg, Hayes argued that Prussian militarism was incompatible with the rise of liberalism in the aftermath of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. For example, he cited the failure of the Frankfurt Assembly in 1849 to unify the German people under a democratic government to the rigid conservatism of the Hohenzollern monarchy, reinforced by the reactionary East Prussian Junker aristocracy, that would not "pick up a crown from the gutter," when offered a chance at German leadership.⁶⁹⁵ Rather, it was Bismarck's "blood and iron" through three wars in the 1860s that united the German states into the German Reich. Thus, to Hayes, what made the unified

⁶⁹³ Arnold White, "Germany's Aim in Foreign Politics," *The North American Review*, Vol. 180, No. 581, (April 1905), 560.

⁶⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 561.

⁶⁹⁵ Carlton Hayes, "The War of the Nations," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 1914, 689.

Germany of 1871 unique was that the army was its core, and that the apparatus of the state was simply grafted on to it in which he described

In the new Germany a huge national army was superimposed upon a hierarchical civil service, and ballot-boxes were rendered ornamental rather than useful... With such a state, liberal government after a British or French model would be clearly incompatible; under liberal institutions neither the civil bureaucracy nor the military machine could be maintained at the proper pitch of efficiency. Nor would liberalism suit the German genius. "In the German view," says Professor Münsterberg, "the state is not for the individuals, but the individuals for the state."⁶⁹⁶

In Hayes's article, in the years following unification, he paints a picture of Germany that appears to be the antithesis of the Anglo-Saxon powers that value self-government and democracy. For example, He described Chancellor von Bülow as "a good conservative, a landowner and a bureaucrat, he evinces much impatience with the Reichstag, its opposing parties and its dilatory actions. He has no comprehension of the operation of parliamentary government. He indicts the whole party-system, and his judgments on political parties turn largely upon their several attitudes toward armaments."⁶⁹⁷ This explained his automatic revulsion to the British party system, especially in his unwillingness to work with the Social Democratic Party, saying that, "the more English the tendency of a party, the more he assails it." Hayes argued further that the German electorate shares a similar view.⁶⁹⁸ Hayes also attributed the dominance of militarism to the influences on German intellectual thought of the late nineteenth century, particularly the chauvinist and jingoistic influence of the German philosopher Heinrich von

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid, 693.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid, 694.

Treitschke. Hayes described Treitschke's sole purpose was to "unite national history and Darwinism." He summarized Treitschke's writings as an attempt to show the evolution and the inevitable triumph of the German state; thus, Treitschke became known as "the national historian" for the German people. Hayes connected Treitschke's ideas with the development of German foreign policy of the late nineteenth century, going so far as to count how many times politicians like von Bülow cited Treitschke in their writings and give credit to him for their policies in the two decades leading to the First World War.⁶⁹⁹ Thus, to Hayes, Treitschke's ideas become the framework for Germany's foreign policy after Bismarck's dismissal in 1890, which inaugurated the "world policy" of Kaiser Wilhelm II and his chancellors, which emphasized the enlargement of the German navy, the acquisition of colonies, and Germany's overall aggressive posturing in international diplomacy, contributing to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.⁷⁰⁰

Hayes appraised Chancellor von Bülow using von Bülow's own words:

Billow sounds the keynote of his policy, both domestic and foreign, in the ringing words: " It is not the duty of the government in the present time to concede new rights to Parliament, but to rouse the political interest of all classes of the nation by means of a vigorous and determined national policy, great in its aims and energetic in the means it employs " (page 341). He denies his willingness or ability to utilize the Fashoda incident or the Russo-Japanese War in order to bring France and Russia into alliance with Germany. He glories in the Agadir incident and claims that it was he himself who inspired the Kaiser to make that melodramatic entry into the Moroccan Question. He exults in the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and boasts that German threats of war sufficed to secure Russian acquiescence in that high-handed violation of the Treaty of Berlin. But while he takes pride in the German "world policy" of recent

⁶⁹⁹Ibid, 704.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid, 701-2

times, he remains remarkably oblivious to the danger of Germany's international isolation.⁷⁰¹

Despite Haynes's condemnation of German militarism and its contribution to the First World War, he also left some room to single out Anglo-Saxonism, as well, for its contributions to the war, in all its forms such as "Anglo-Saxon institutions," "the manifest destiny of the Anglo-Saxon race," and "the White Man's Burden," as examples of British hypernationalism, and imperialism, as extolled by British writers like Henry Spencer and Rudyard Kipling, which was but another means to gain public, and most notably American support for the war.⁷⁰² Hayes concluded his essay by arguing that Great Britain and Germany were equally to blame for their actions or inactions that led to the outbreak of the First World War. Thus, to Hayes, not only was Anglo-Saxonism another banner for the war, it was also used as an indictment against the belligerents for the unprecedented death and suffering that came out of the Great war.⁷⁰³

To differentiate themselves from the Germans, when hostilities commenced, the reasons for war had been crystallized for the Allies into a war for "civilization" and "liberty", which had been appropriated into the realm of Anglo-Saxonism and thus a rallying banner, particularly, for the Anglo-Saxon peoples of the British Empire, and later, the United States. The Scottish statesman Archibald Colquhoun outlined the reasons Britain and its dominions were fighting the war. He underscored the fact that despite previous doubts, the British dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and

⁷⁰¹ Ibid, 700.

⁷⁰² Ibid, 706.

⁷⁰³ Ibid, 707.

South Africa enthusiastically joined the war with the mother country without reservation. He noted the Anglo-Saxon bonds that tie Britain and its dominions, which were based on common values and traditions that transcended ethnicity, compared to the German Empire, which was forged by Prussian militarism in 1870.⁷⁰⁴ To him, the foremost reason for Britain's involvement is to protect Belgian neutrality, which Germany had violated. Though not purely, for altruistic reasons, since the conquest of Belgium would leave Britain vulnerable for invasion, Colquhoun used the defense of Belgium to distinguish Anglo-Saxon values of liberty, and self-government to Teutonic militarism and the atrocities that issued from it.⁷⁰⁵ To reinforce the stark difference between the Anglo-Saxons who love liberty and the "barbarous" Teutons, Colquhoun reinforced the atrocities committed in Belgium, which he directed to an American audience, such as the burning of the medieval library at Louvain, the bombardment of unfortified towns, such as Malines, and individual acts of cruelty committed on civilians. He compares them to being more savage than the Huns because he argued that unlike Attila's armies who knew no better, to the German army, it was a deliberate act and part of military policy.⁷⁰⁶ While not mentioning Anglo-Saxonism by name, Colquhoun attributes to the British Empire the values at stake in the war associated with Anglo-Saxonism arguing

Our partners in this fight have been our foes of old; they may be our rivals in the future, but for the present their cause is ours because Prussian hegemony in Europe would mean the triumph of a crude and brutal militarism. The British Empire is not afraid of nationalism; it views with sympathy the revival of national aspirations in the smaller Slav peoples, and its heart warms to Belgium; but above all we, as a free democracy, are

⁷⁰⁴ Archibald R. Colquhoun, "Why the British Empire is at War," *The North American Review*, Vol. 200, No. 708 (November 1914), 680.

⁷⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 688.

⁷⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 690.

opposed to Teutonism, which is enshrined in a military autocracy and knows no law save its own.⁷⁰⁷

Colquhoun concluded by reiterating that in its fight for liberty that the British Empire was in a struggle against German militarism. He believed that a German victory would set humanity back to a social darwinian world in which “nature is red in tooth and claw,” in which any sort of barbarity was encouraged, especially in wartime, contrasting of course, to how Britain and its dominions observe the rule of law, even in wartime. Thus, he considered to be far worse than previous enemies, including Napoleon Bonaparte.⁷⁰⁸

The dichotomy between the values of self-government and liberty, represented by Anglo-Saxonism and the Teutonic militarism represented by Germany can be best described in an article of the *Journal of International Ethics* by the anarchist Victor S. Yarros. His comparisons between the Anglo-Saxon Allies and Germany are based on the role of the state. Unlike his contemporaries who condemned Germany purely out of jingoism, Yarros’s analysis of the conflicting values of Anglo-Saxonism and Teutonism was more subtle and nuanced. He is consistent with other critics in their assessment of the German government, which, is dominated by a militarist elite, ruled by a Kaiser who bases his authority on divine right. Because of the way Bismarck formed the German Empire in 1870, any hopes of liberalism taking root were dashed by the preponderance of Prussian militarism. However, he diverges from other critics in pointing out that the German constitution still checks the power of the Kaiser through the budget, and thus,

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid, 691.

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid, 692.

cannot be a true “absolute monarchy.”⁷⁰⁹ In the continuum of the political spectrum, however, Yarros considers the juggernaut of the German state to be a greater threat to civilization because, unlike the Anglo-Saxon democracies of Great Britain and the United States, the individual accounts for nothing and can be disposed of at will. Yarros’s critique of the compromise between the supremacy of the state and elements of democracy, in fact makes Germany even more unstable as he states

Of course, a half divine dynastic state cannot consent to submit its decisions to any parliament or referendum. Of course, in a political sense a half divine state is "irresponsible" -that is, responsible to God alone. Such a state is, in truth, of infinitely more value than all its subjects taken together. It may order them to fight foreigners or one another, and it may keep up the fighting indefinitely, without condescending to give reasons. But the question is whether, rhetoric and loose writing aside, any educated German can seriously maintain that the constitution of the Teutonic empire expressly or by necessary implication recognizes the sacrosanct and divine nature of the state, or the insignificance of the individual.⁷¹⁰

On the other hand, Yarros analyzes in detail the political systems of the United States and Great Britain and how they differ from the government of the Hohenzollerns in Germany. He explains how the British parliamentary system as a balance between the sovereign and Parliament, particularly, the House of Commons, which speaks for the majority of the people. Yarros, however, criticizes the British political system, which has historically been dominated by the landowning elite for the interests of the landowning elite. Nevertheless, he still believed that compared to Germany, Great Britain still stood for the Anglo-Saxon ideals of democracy and self-government, arguing that “Democracy is assuredly better and safer than any of the superseded forms of government, and

⁷⁰⁹ Victor S. Yarros, “The German and Anglo-American View of the State,” *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 28, No. 1, October 1917,46.

⁷¹⁰Ibid, 45.

democracy has long meant, and still means, the rule of the majority-at least within certain constitutional bounds.”⁷¹¹ He noted the trends in British politics toward democratization in the decades before the outbreak of the Great War, with the enfranchisement of the working classes, the diminishment of the powers of the House of Lords, from holding veto power to merely a suspension of legislation, and the inevitable suffrage of women voters.⁷¹² Of the United States, Yarros emphasized the system of checks and balances in the Constitution, as well as constitutional protections of civil liberties, thus protecting both majorities and minorities from a tyrannical government. He also alluded to trends from the political reforms of the Progressive Era, such as the initiative, referendum, and recall that lead toward direct democracy giving political power to the people, themselves, rather than lawmakers in either the state and federal governments.⁷¹³

As an anarchist, Yarros’s bias would paint both the Allies and Germany with the same brush in which the state is supreme over the individual. However, he makes a distinction from his fellow contemporary anarchists who believe that all governments are tyrannical. Despite his anarchist leanings, he believed in the Allied cause. To Yarros, what was at stake in the war against Germany, was autocracy, the embodiment of the state in either the form of the Kaiser or the Prussian military elite, versus democracy through majority rule. He believed that the days of autocratic government embodied by Germany were numbered, and the democratic governments epitomized by the Anglo-

⁷¹¹ Ibid,48.

⁷¹² Ibid, 47.

⁷¹³ Ibid, 48-9.

Saxon countries, such as Great Britain and the United States, were the wave of the future.⁷¹⁴ He most eloquently criticizes his fellow anarchists when he states that

The fight for democracy is a fight for the very conditions of growth-for free discussion, local autonomy, individual and group rights under the law. The anarchist who says that all governments are alike, that tyranny is tyranny, and that the war does not concern him-and, alas, there are not a few who say this--simply reveals his ignorance of the course and conditions of human evolution. Progress there has been, and progress there will continue to be--if societies and states preserve their freedom and society is not rebarbarized by the Prussian type of government. The anarchist who assumes that institutions can be suddenly changed, and that whole nations can lift themselves by their boot-straps, needs an elementary course in political science and political history. But such a course, coupled perhaps with a few advanced lectures, would also greatly benefit those who write and talk superficially about the difference in kind between the German view of the sovereign state and the Anglo-Saxon view.⁷¹⁵

Among Anglo-Saxonists, Theodore Roosevelt was among the most outspoken public figures of his day. As president, he guided a more aggressive foreign policy and was instrumental in making Americans more comfortable in their country's new role as a world power, while garnering the Nobel Peace Prize for mediating the end of the Russo-Japanese War.⁷¹⁶ Roosevelt had mildly supported Wilson's declaration of neutrality upon the outbreak of hostilities. However the end of 1914 convinced Roosevelt convinced that Germany should be confronted for its atrocities in Belgium, and that the United States should ultimately join the Entente to that end.⁷¹⁷ In another letter to Lee, Roosevelt's criticism of the Wilson administration's strict neutrality was much sharper by 1915. He practically accused Wilson, himself, of cowardice, describing him as "an entirely cold-

⁷¹⁴ Ibid, 49-50.

⁷¹⁵ Ibid, 51.

⁷¹⁶ Ross, 172.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid, 173.

blooded seeking man...anxious at all hazards to keep the German-American vote and the pacifist vote,” He believed that by not criticizing German atrocities in Belgium as sharply as attacking British violations of neutrality rights, Wilson was giving refuge to the German government, and saw German-Americans and pacifist groups as foot soldiers for the German cause, and thus, considered any attack on Britain almost as an attack on the United States, itself. His opinion of Wilson cannot be any blunter when he said

Wilson has permitted the German Embassy to be a center of not only anti-English but of anti-American agitation, which has included the forging of passports, the purchase of newspapers, and even more sinister deeds still, for there can be little doubt that the explosions in American arms and munitions factories and on certain ships have been due to a German propaganda instigated by or connived at and encouraged by the German officials. Of course, if Wilson had any kind of self-respect...he would have summarily dismissed the German Ambassador and called the German Government to account for this long ago. It has been only the successive brutalities of the Germans which have prevented him from throwing his weight on their side and against the Allies.⁷¹⁸

Like many Americans, Roosevelt was outraged at the German invasion of Belgium, as stated earlier in his book, *America and the World War*. He spoke of the violation of the sovereignty of Belgium and Luxembourg, the destruction of the medieval town of Louvain, the destruction wrought by airships, and the torment of the Belgian royal family.⁷¹⁹ Despite his protestations for peace, however, Roosevelt denounced the pacifist movements and the movement toward international law of the early twentieth century. He saw the world Court at The Hague as impotent in preventing war, and that the myriad of arbitration treaties as useless in protecting Belgium.⁷²⁰

⁷¹⁸ Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur Hamilton Lee, 2 September 1915, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Elting E. Morison, ed., (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), Vol.8, 967.

⁷¹⁹ Roosevelt, 23-4.

⁷²⁰ Ibid, 50-1.

Ultimately, Roosevelt's book was a thinly veiled criticism of Wilson's policy of neutrality. Like many others, Roosevelt preached for "self-defense." He considered the navy to be the only safeguard for peace, which he believed that the Wilson administration was allowing to deteriorate. He ended his book by calling upon the nation to intervene on Belgium's behalf.⁷²¹ Lodge was in full accord in his appraisal of Roosevelt's critique of the Wilson administration's policy of neutrality, particularly Bryan's execution of it as secretary of state, as well as disarmament treaties like the Hague Conventions, which he considered, "folly, if not wickedness of making treaties which have no force and no intent of enforcement behind them."⁷²²

Wilson had no doubt of his sympathies to Britain and the Entente powers, even when he played the role of an honest broker trying to mediate a peace between the belligerents.⁷²³ Additionally, Britain was far more successful in employing methods of persuasion than Germany in winning the sympathies of the American public through its ability to control the flow of news from Europe, thus shaping public opinion.⁷²⁴ Pro-Entente sentiments abounded in the foreign policy establishment in the opening months of the war. In September 1914, three American ambassadors to France, Myron T. Herrick, the outgoing minister appointed by Taft, Robert Bacon, Herrick's predecessor, and William Graves Sharp, Wilson's appointee, in a special mission to France, declared their sympathies to the French cause and promised persuade American public opinion. In

⁷²¹ Roosevelt, 276-7.

⁷²² Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, 20 January 1915, *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt of Henry Cabot Lodge 1884—1918, Vol. II*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), 452-3.

⁷²³ Ross, 146.

⁷²⁴ H.C. Peterson, *Propaganda for War: The Campaign against American Neutrality, 1914—1917*, (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), 12-3.

the same month, Henry van Dyke, the ambassador to the Netherlands and Luxembourg, presented Wilson a clear bias toward the Entente in a letter, declaring that the war to be a struggle between democracy and militarism, and that a German victory would be detrimental to the long-term interests of the United States.⁷²⁵

Of the senior diplomats in the Wilson administration, Walter Hines Page, the ambassador to Great Britain, devoted his career toward strengthening Anglo-American relations. He not only supported the British on a political basis; he believed that the war was between the English-speaking peoples and German autocracy.⁷²⁶ While Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan was insistent upon stressing America's freedom of the seas by adhering to the Declaration of London, Page saw the issue as a remnant of the War of 1812 that missed the forest for the trees. He stressed that

It is a world-clash of systems of government, a struggle to the extermination of English civilization or of Prussian military autocracy. Let us suppose that we press for a few rights to which the shippers have a theoretical claim. The American people gain nothing and the result is friction with [Great Britain]...If Germany win, will it make any difference what position Great Britain took on the Declaration of London? But suppose England win. We shall then have an ugly academic dispute with her because of this controversy...As we see the issue here, it is a matter of life and death for English-speaking civilization.⁷²⁷

That is, a German victory was to him, a larger threat than British violations of international law. Page stressed to Wilson the value of America's friendship with Britain, which had been blossoming since the *rapprochement* of the 1890s, and that continuing to harass the British would damage long-term Anglo-American relations.

⁷²⁵ Ibid, 167-7.

⁷²⁶ Ross Gregory, *Walter Hines Page: Ambassador to the Court of St. James's* (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1971), 62.

⁷²⁷ Walter H. Page to Woodrow Wilson, 15 October 1914, *The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*, Burton J. Hendrick, ed., (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1923), 371-2.

Because Paged had linked America's destiny so closely to Britain's cause, the Germans could no longer rely upon the United States as a neutral power, but rather as a belligerent in all but name.⁷²⁸

On April of 1917, Wilson gave his historic speech to Congress asking for a declaration of war against Germany, which was the culmination of Anglo-Saxonism, though it was not expressly mentioned by name. Wilson's arguments for declaring war had universalized the values of liberty and self-government, which had been inherent in Anglo-Saxonism. Events had changed, which finally induced Wilson to break off relations with Germany. The announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare meant that even American ships would not be spared, even though the German government had promised in 1915 in the *Sussex* Pledge not to engage in indiscriminate sinking of vessels bound for Allied countries.⁷²⁹ The declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare bore direct economic consequences because the German government had marked the seas around Great Britain, France, and Italy as areas where any ship could be sunk, regardless of whether it was neutral. American merchants, as a result, refused to go to sea, unless their ships were armed or escorted by a convoy.⁷³⁰ Spring Rice reported the effects of unrestricted submarine warfare to Balfour that "The result is a stoppage of trade, a congestion in the ports, widespread discomfort and even misery on the coast and inland,

⁷²⁸ Ibid.

⁷²⁹ Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters: Facing War, 1915—1917*, (New York: Doubleday, Doran, & Company, 1937), 447-8.

⁷³⁰ Tucker, 189.

even bread riots and a coal famine.”⁷³¹ Even still, Wilson remained reluctant to give up on peace entirely. In the subsequent weeks, German submarines began sinking American ships, which brought the Wilson administration no other alternative but to end American neutrality. Spring Rice wrote

Enough has been said and hinted in official circles and in the press to justify the assertion that the die has been cast and that this country has drifted into war. It is not that the United States wanted it but their hand has been forced by Germany. The President, according to all indications, will not declare war on Germany on April 2 but merely assert that a state of war has existed between the United States and Germany since March 17, or even perhaps March 14, the date of the sinking of the *Algonquin*. Great hopes are entertained that Germany will herself in the interval declare war, consequent upon a probable encounter between the submarines and an armed American ship, two of which should, by now, be entering the area prescribed by Germany.⁷³²

Germany by 1917 had become associated with the very antithesis of Anglo-Saxonism, through its militarism, expressed by the barbarity in how it waged war, and the fact that “self-governing” nations like the United States would take up the struggle. In his speech on 6 April 1917, Wilson outlined the reasons for declaring war against Germany, particularly, the repeated violations of American neutrality by the submarine warfare waged by Germany, which, he argued had violated international law, using the example of the sinking of hospital ships and other vessels transporting relief to Belgium being

⁷³¹ Cecil Spring Rice to Arthur Balfour 23 February 1917, *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice*, Vol. 2, Stephen Gwinn, ed. (London: Constable, 1929, reprinted Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972), 381.

⁷³² Cecil Spring Rice to Arthur Balfour, 23 March 1917. *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice*, Vol. 2, Stephen Gwinn, ed. (London: Constable, 1929, reprinted Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972), 387-8.

sunk by German submarines.⁷³³ Thus, Wilson declared that Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare

...a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There is no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it...Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.⁷³⁴

While Wilson's speech to Congress is most well known for its line of "making the world safe for democracy," Wilson also conflated Germany with autocracy and militarism, which were inherently incompatible with the ideals of self-government, the ideals espoused in Anglo-Saxonism, embodied by the United States and other free countries. Nevertheless, he declared that the United States was not at war with the German people, nor did the United States harbor any hatred toward the German people, but rather against the government of Kaiser Wilhelm II that pushed the German people into war without their consent.⁷³⁵ On the other hand, Wilson declared that "Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbor states with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will given them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be successfully worked out only under cover where no one has the right to ask questions."⁷³⁶ Where, perhaps, the speech most highlighted the ideals of Anglo-Saxonism, was when Wilson spoke of the incompatibility between

⁷³³ Woodrow Wilson, "Why We Went to War," 2 April 1917, *President Wilson's Great Speeches and Other History Making Documents*, (Chicago: Stanton and Van Vliet, 1917), 12.

⁷³⁴ *Ibid*, 13.

⁷³⁵ *Ibid*, 17.

⁷³⁶ *Ibid*, 17-8

Prussian autocracy to the ideals of liberty and self-government embodied in the United States, which despite his earlier attempts at peace-making, he now saw was a hopeless cause from the beginning. At the same time he ascribed negative qualities of underhanded behavior, such as sabotage to the Germans, including the attempt to draw in Mexico into a war against the United States through the Zimmerman Telegram. At the same time, though, because Russia was part of the Triple Entente, Wilson disregarded the autocracy of the Romanovs because of the “democratic” nature of the Russian people, which had manifested itself during the February Revolution. Thus, the American people would not have any qualms serving with the Russians.⁷³⁷ Through the context of Anglo-Saxon ideals, Wilson therefore described the goals in these terms:

The world must be made save for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.⁷³⁸

The entrance of the United States into the war meant that there would now be a bloc of Anglo-Saxon powers united against German militarism. Spring Rice believed that his role as Ambassador to the United States had been fulfilled, in navigating Britain through the mercurial waters of American public opinion. However, he understood that only the United States government should make the decision to declare war on Germany, but only

⁷³⁷ Ibid, 18-9.

⁷³⁸ Ibid, 20.

when its interests were endangered. Nevertheless, he was content that the United States and the British Empire were engaged in the same undertaking.⁷³⁹

Anglo-Saxonists rejoiced when Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war against Germany. No longer under the pretense of “neutrality,” strict or otherwise, Anglo-Saxonists could openly declare Germany as an enemy of liberty, and therefore, not part of the Anglo-Saxon family. Madison Grant, for instance, in his revised edition of *The Passing of the Great Race*, retracted any references to the “Germanic” or “Teutonic” origins of early American settlers. Instead, other Anglo-Saxonists like Henry Fairfield Osborn declared that the German people were actually descended from “Asiatic” peoples, and therefore, had no connection to the early Anglo-Saxons who settled in England.⁷⁴⁰ George Louis Beer, a history professor at Columbia University, saw the entry of the United States as an opportunity for the Anglo-Saxon peoples to take up the fight for civilization and self-government. It was clear to him that the danger to world peace was the Prussian militarism and autocracy represented by Germany. The goal, then, for the Allies, was to ensure that Germany would never have the ability to threaten world peace, again. He saw the German state as little changed from its primordial beginnings, when the “Teutonic” warlords had a personal tie to their warriors, compared to democratic countries with civilian control over the military.⁷⁴¹ He argued that the Prussian military state was incompatible with the values of self-government represented by the Anglo-Saxon Peoples. He argued

⁷³⁹ Gwynn, 389.

⁷⁴⁰ Higham, 218.

⁷⁴¹ George Louis Beer, *The English-Speaking Peoples: Their Future Relations and Joint International Obligations*, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1917), 127.

The German people have for generations been so impregnated with the creed of Teutonic racial superiority, they are in large part so thoroughly permeated with the over-weening ambitions of an aggressive *Kulturpolitik* and *Weltpolitik* based upon the doctrines of ascendancy, and they have so widely accepted a materialistic code that rejects all moral considerations in interstate relations, that even the overthrow of an autocracy supported by the army and a subservient bureaucracy would by no means guarantee the liberties of the world and make it safe for peace-loving democracies. The systematic educational drill of two generations cannot be nullified and discredited in a day. But the overthrow of militarism and the establishment of democracy would at least allow the entrance of the light.⁷⁴²

To the contrary, Beer argued that with the entrance of the United States in the war, the unity of the Anglo-Saxon peoples was complete. As Germany represented the values of Teutonic militarism, the United States, Great Britain, and the dominions of the British Empire represented the ideals of self-government, for the dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, are not “colonies” to be subordinated by a mother country, but self-governing polities with democratic institutions.⁷⁴³ He also ascribed the pioneering qualities of “individual enterprise” to the settlers of the English-speaking dominions, which have allowed them to flourish, compared to the militarism of the German Empire and its “contempt” for non-militaristic societies.⁷⁴⁴ Additionally, Beer reinterpreted the early leaders of the United States, such as George Washington and Alexander Hamilton, not as rebels to the British crown, but, really as part of the larger Anglo-Saxon family, for the ideals for which they fought during the American Revolution were really part of ideals of Anglo-Saxonism, the right to self-government

⁷⁴² Ibid, 129.

⁷⁴³ Ibid, 170-1.

⁷⁴⁴ Ibid, 100.

and liberty.⁷⁴⁵ Thus, in Beer's eyes, the British Empire was not a despotism, unlike the German *Reich* of Kaiser Wilhelm II, but rather, as a "commonwealth of nations," where loyalty to the British crown, common institutions like the parliamentary system, the English language, and not brute force, are the ties that bind the dominions to Great Britain, not as subordinates, but as equals.⁷⁴⁶

The role of the United States throughout the First World War has been complex, to say the least. On the one hand, when the conflict began, Wilson officially declared neutrality and hoped to play a role as a mediator, since the United States would be the strongest of all the neutral powers involved. However, that neutrality was far harder to keep because of the pro-Entente sentiment in the foreign policy establishment in Washington. Politicians like Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge castigated the Wilson administration for taking too strict a stance on neutrality, especially in light of German atrocities in Belgium and submarine warfare on the high seas. American financiers and companies openly supplied much needed war materiel, and loaned significant amounts of money the Allies. While openly condemning Germany's submarine warfare, the Wilson administration, especially after the resignation of William Jennings Bryan as secretary of state, was not as strenuous in its objections to British violations of neutrality on the high seas.

Despite the pro-Allied sympathies among the foreign policy elite, it would have required a great deal of effort to convince American public opinion to enter the war with Great Britain and France. The traditional isolationism in American society would have

⁷⁴⁵ Ibid, 172

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid, 177.

already made many Americans loathed to take part in yet another one of Europe's endless wars, which many of its immigrants had sought to escape since the early years of the United States. Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine had been the cornerstone of American foreign policy since the early days of the republic, which precluded any foreign adventures and had taught Americans to be averse to European affairs. Additionally, through immigration, especially in the mid nineteenth century, significant proportions of the population consisted of Americans of Irish or German descent, who contributed to the political, economic, social, and intellectual life of the United States. Neither of those groups would have been friendly toward Great Britain, even under normal circumstances, and both groups, especially German-Americans still maintained strong cultural ties to their countries of origin. When the war broke out, German-American groups took great strides to ensure that the United States government maintain the policy of strict neutrality, as the German government would have preferred. Making a case for war would have been difficult for foreign policy makers.

In order to sway a diverse American populace, Anglo-Saxonism would undergo another redefinition. Whereas twenty years earlier Anglo-Saxonism provided the justification for American overseas expansion, Anglo-Saxonism in the First World War became associated with the seemingly "universal" cause of liberty and self-government. Through the joint efforts of American and British propaganda machines, the American public was exposed to a barrage of atrocity stories committed by German occupation forces in Belgium, especially the shooting of the English nurse, Edith Cavell. The sinking of the *Lusitania* also provided the perfect ammunition for the British and

American governments to persuade the American public to support action, and eventually, war against Germany, for it showed that the German government would go so far as to sink unarmed vessels filled with civilians. Such stories would show average Americans that Germany represented the forces of autocracy and barbarism, which therefore, could not be reconciled with the Anglo-Saxon values of civilization, liberty, and self-government, which were associated with the Allied cause. While, just a two decades earlier when Anglo-Saxonists would have acknowledged the German people as “Teutonic” cousins of the Anglo-Saxon family, they had completely severed all ties with Germany because Prussian militarism could not possibly bear any resemblance to the ideals of self-government and liberty so espoused by the Anglo-Saxon nations of Great Britain, its dominions, and the United States. Thus, by the time President Wilson argued that the world be made safe for democracy in April of 1917, it was no longer necessary to trumpet the ideals of Anglo-Saxonism, for to the American people, the values of Anglo-Saxonism and democracy were one and the same.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Since the end of the Second World War, the “Special Relationship” shared by the United States and Great Britain has been a fact in international diplomacy, that has carried both countries in almost every conflict since, including Iraq and Afghanistan in the early twenty-first century. In the shifting sands of international diplomacy, that has been considered almost a certainty, with the benefits taken for granted by both English-speaking peoples. No other two countries of such major geopolitical consequence have shared such closeness politically, militarily, economically, and culturally. Additionally, it is the similar world view shared by both countries that has significantly shaped events of the past century, since the *rapprochement* between Britain and the United States has allowed both countries to move beyond old grievances and established the foundation for the Special Relationship. That first instance was during the First World War, when the United States abandoned its traditional reluctance to wage in European wars and entered on the side of the Allies at a very crucial moment. With the availability of American capital, material, and men, the United States turned the balance of the war heavily in favor of the Allies, which broke the three-year long stalemate of the Western Front. This study has been to answer the question of what allowed the United States to break its long tradition of isolationism in global affairs to side with the Allies in the First World War.

Anglo-Saxonism has provided both English-speaking powers that world view. It served as the rallying cry for the United States to send its soldiers “over there.” In the

millennium before the Great War, Anglo-Saxonism had undergone various transformations. In its strictest sense, Anglo-Saxonism was the term for the body of literature in the Anglo-Saxon language surrounding founding myths of the Germanic peoples who invaded England in the centuries following the end of Roman rule. These myths served to coalesce these disparate groups of Angles, Saxons, Frisians and Jutes, into the English people, who would later distinguish themselves from the Norman conquerors who vanquished King Harold in 1066 at the Battle of Hastings, ushering the introduction of feudalism and centralized government. In these myths, which form the core of English literature today, such as the legends of King Arthur and the Round Table, the Anglo-Saxons held the virtues of courage, independence, self-control, and liberty which would later be translated as “self-government.” Over the centuries, English leaders adapted these myths to suit the needs of the time. During the Reformation in the sixteenth century, the Puritans reinterpreted the Anglo-Saxon myths to distinguish Protestant England from the corrupt papacy by including the Calvinist doctrine of predestination. By the seventeenth century, the Anglo-Saxon myths were mobilized in the struggle between constitutional parliamentary government and an absolute monarchy, with the Whigs casting themselves as the Anglo-Saxons protecting their free institutions against the Normans of their time, the Stuarts, who claimed rule by divine right.

As English settlers crossed the Atlantic toward the New World to establish the thirteen British colonies in North America, the Anglo-Saxon myths went with them, which would form the basis of the new American republic. The early leaders commonly referred to as the Founding Fathers, such as John Winthrop, George Washington and

Thomas Jefferson, appropriated Anglo-Saxon myths to establish the identity of the United States. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, it was the Americans who carried on the traditional liberties of the Anglo-Saxons against the feudalistic and tyrannical despotism of the British monarchy. Thomas Jefferson believed that the yeoman farmer was the direct descendant of the Anglo-Saxon citizen warrior, who was ready to defend his liberty at a moment's notice, and the New England town hall meeting was also a nineteenth-century incarnation of the "*witanagemot*", or the Anglo-Saxon council of elected leaders. Protestantism became part of the American identity, as the Puritan settlers believed themselves to be God's "Elect", when they were establishing their "city upon a hill." Thus, the ideals enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights were not so much new ideas, but rather, a continuation of Anglo-Saxon traditions of liberty. Thus, Americans of the early years of the republic appropriated the Anglo-Saxon values of independence, self-reliance, liberty, rule of law, and self-government.

In the following decades since the founding of the republic, the United States expanded westward. As Americans moved west, Anglo-Saxonism also adapted to westward expansion of the antebellum period. With the withdrawal of Spanish influence in the Western Hemisphere, Manifest Destiny provided the justification for the settlement of North America, since it was based on the assumption that it was open for settlement by people of Anglo-Saxon descent. Because only Anglo-Saxons were inherently capable of self-government, other peoples who stood in the way of westward expansion, such as Native Americans and Mexicans could be swept aside, having been deemed "inferior."

At the same time, in the 1840s and 1850s, the Protestant identity of Anglo-Saxonism also distinguished nativists from the waves of Irish Catholics arriving in the port cities of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia escaping from the Potato Famine. In the years following the Civil War, white southerners adapted the Anglo-Saxon narrative to explain their plight. Even though during the antebellum era, they identified with the Norman aristocracy, in the new paradigm of Reconstruction, white southerners saw themselves as the oppressed Anglo-Saxons living under the occupation of the Norman invaders in the aftermath of the Battle of Hastings. They could empathize with the Anglo-Saxons through the loss of self-government as they lived under military occupation and the humiliation of “carpetbagger and Negro rule.” Southern intellectuals of the late nineteenth century promoted the study of Anglo-Saxon language and literature as part of their heritage and saw freedmen as inherently incapable of the virtues of self-government, which made Reconstruction an exercise in futility in the most epic of proportions.

As the United States moved beyond the scars of the Civil War and Reconstruction by the end of the nineteenth century, Anglo-Saxonism had reached its culmination. The introduction of Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection added a pseudoscientific explanation for the “superiority” of the English-speaking peoples as well as the “inferiority” of other ethnic groups and nationalities. This coincided with the rise of the United States as an industrial power, leading to a change in American foreign policy by an elite that was more willing to shed the traditional aversion to engagement in global affairs. The White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) elite was at the top of the political, economic, social, and cultural hierarchy, which closely identified with the ruling class in

Great Britain. Confident, and assured of their place in society, the WASP elite projected the values of Anglo-Saxonism, such as self-control, civic mindedness, and diligence. Whereas Anglo-Saxonism in the United States was associated with liberty in the early nineteenth century, by the beginning of the twentieth, it became a justification for colonial rule by the British, and later, American empires, and served as the basis for the Anglo-American *rapprochement* of the 1890s. The WASP elite, who dominated the foreign policy establishment, began to empathize with the challenges of upholding the “White Man’s Burden” carried by the British, as the United States began to administer newly-acquired possessions, such as the Philippines.

The WASP elite vigorously supported the social Darwinist element of Anglo-Saxonism to explain their dominance of American society at home and called for a concert among all of the Anglo-Saxon peoples abroad, particularly Great Britain and Germany. Anglo-Saxonists of the late nineteenth century made efforts to include the German people in the Anglo-Saxon family through the “Teutonic School”, positing that Germany was the primordial birthplace of all Anglo-Saxons who later migrated to England and later, the United States. German immigration to the United States went back to the late seventeenth century and also came in waves in the mid-nineteenth century, as Germans sought to escape the upheavals of the Revolutions of 1848. German immigrants and German-Americans made as significant contributions to American political, economic, social, and intellectual life as the British, and comprised a significant proportion of the population. After the unification of Germany in 1871 and its subsequent rise as an industrial power, Anglo-Saxonists of the Teutonic School tried to

place Germany in the Anglo-Saxon world and wished for some kind of concert consisting of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. However, diplomatic realities, namely, the rivalry between Britain and Germany, the controversy between Germany and the United States over Samoa, the appearance of German encroachment in the Western Hemisphere, as well as American ambivalence toward the ideologically conservative and militaristic nature of the Prussian Hohenzollern monarchy, were formidable obstacles in the decade before the First World War.

As the First World War began, despite Woodrow Wilson's profession of strict neutrality, the Wilson administration was far friendlier to the Entente powers than to the Central Powers. American banks loaned billions of dollars to the Allied governments, while American companies supplied munitions and other materiel to the Allies. However, the bloc of German-American interests, who maintained strong cultural links to the Fatherland, prevented full involvement for the first three years of the conflict. Additionally, American public opinion at the beginning of the war was vehemently opposed to participation in the war because of the traditional distaste for European wars. Nevertheless, the foreign policy establishment dominated by the WASP elite, once again adapted Anglo-Saxonism, by appropriating the values of "civilization," decency, and self-government, and associating them with the Anglo-Saxons, and therefore the Allies, relegating "militarism" and "barbarism" to Germany.

Due to the British blockade and command of the seas, the United States provided a captive audience for British propaganda, which constantly disseminated stories of German atrocities in Belgium. Stories of the brutality of German occupying forces in

Belgium in the Bryce Report, the execution of the English nurse, Edith Cavell, and the sinking of the *Lusitania* outraged the American public who increasingly saw all Germans, including German-Americans, as barbarians with no sense of human decency. Over time, Anglo-Saxonists disqualified Germany from the Anglo-Saxon family because the true Anglo-Saxon peoples of Great Britain and the United States developed systems of representative government and human rights, while Germany, remained under warlord rule, through the Prussian military state. It is the cultural and political institutions, therefore, of the German Junker elite, particularly, militarism and reactionary ideology that made the German people ineligible to be included among the ranks of the Anglo-Saxons. This was evident in the writings of the Anglo-Saxonists of the period who sought to remove any suggestion that the Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon peoples could bear any kind of similarity.

Thus, by the time Wilson delivered his address to Congress asking for war, a significant portion of the American population was prepared for war. His argument “to make the world safe for democracy” included the virtues of Anglo-Saxonism, particularly the virtue of “self-government.” His address to Congress carefully distinguished the values of the “self-governing” peoples from the militarism of Germany, which was deemed to be a threat to world peace, particularly in the form of the German government’s declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917, which led Wilson to no other course than to ask Congress for a declaration of war after three years of the role as mediator between the Allies and the Central Powers. At this point, there could be no mistaking the Germans for being part of the Anglo-Saxon family, because by their very

nature, they do not share the values of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. When the United States declared war on Germany, Anglo-Saxonists cheered, for now there was a grand coalition of English-speaking powers consisting of the United States, Great Britain, and its dominions, united toward the noble goal of fighting for the Anglo-Saxon values of liberty and self-government.

This year marks the centennial of the outbreak of the “War to end all War.” It is now more important than ever to examine the causes of the First World War, which, as Earl Grey described, was when “the lights were going out all over Europe,” and brought Europeans toward the brink of destruction twice in the first half of the twentieth century. The century since the guns of August has left unresolved issues that continue to plague foreign policy decision makers. This study has shown the influence of culture on foreign policy by examining the role of Anglo-Saxonism on the American foreign policy establishment during the First World War. Anglo-Saxonism’s continuing role in American society in the 1920s is also another venue that bears consideration, especially its role in the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan and its agenda of “Americanism,” which originated during the First World War, as it expanded its mandate, from terrorizing African-Americans and prevent them from exercising their rights of citizenship, to an anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic platform, especially in light of the Russian Revolution in 1917, which gained a wider audience, thus bring the Ku Klux Klan to its highest numbers of membership in its entire history.

The writings of Madison Grant would continue to echo the themes of Anglo-Saxonism and by portraying the United States as under siege from the perils of

immigration from southern and eastern Europe and “miscegenation,” which would influence policymakers to pass immigration laws in 1921 and 1924, heavily favoring immigrants from northern Europe, while severely restricting immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, which would bear significant consequences during the Second World War and the Holocaust. The current debate over immigration reform bears witness to the influence of Anglo-Saxonism, as many Americans continue to be uneasy over the changing definition of being an “American,” in light of the Immigration Act of 1965, which removed the previous restrictions of the 1920s, as the current demographics suggest a shrinking white majority in the coming decades of the twenty-first century.

Future avenues can explore the continuing role of Anglo-Saxonism in American and British foreign policy in the interwar period, the Second World War, and the establishment of the Special Relationship during the Cold War and beyond. The universalist and crusading nature of Wilson’s speech to Congress in 1917, also reflect the continuing influence of Anglo-Saxonism in American foreign policy of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Almost every president in the past century has repeated Wilson’s desire “to make the world safe for democracy” as a justification for the intervention of the United States in subsequent conflicts. The Atlantic Charter, drafted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill reflected Wilson’s ideals, and would thus outline the goals of the United States and Great Britain, with regard to Europe during the Second World War. The Special Relationship can be seen as the fulfillment of the Anglo-Saxonists of the turn of the twentieth century, as the United States and Great Britain would face the challenges of the Cold War, with the Soviet

Union and communism as the enemy to civilization that must be either contained or eliminated. In the post-Cold War era, the theme of “American exceptionalism” can be seen as another manifestation of Anglo-Saxonism, serving as a justification for neoconservatives to support American intervention in the Middle East and the War on Terror.

As the global economy becomes further integrated throughout the twenty-first century, the United States and other countries can no longer afford to take refuge in ethnic jingoism, such as Anglo-Saxonism, and use it to justify aggression, whether in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, or Asia. The world must find a new narrative that will foster a common humanity and a fundamental respect for the destinies of all peoples. Only then, can Europeans, Americans, and other peoples of the world escape the fate that befell their counterparts in August of 1914.

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