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The Ideological Dominance of Market Logic: Adapting U.S.-based Education Reforms into Rio de Janeiro's Poorest Schools

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The Ideological Dominance of Market Logic:

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Rio de Janeiro's Poorest Schools

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Education

by

Rolf Straubhaar

2014

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Ideological Dominance of Market Logic:

Adapting U.S.-based Education Reforms into

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by

Rolf Straubhaar

Doctor of Philosophy in Education

University of California, Los Angeles, 2014

Professor Val Rust, Chair

The extant literature on 20th and 21st century public policy in Brazil makes clear that the private sector and social elite have long had an interest and influence in government across all sectors, that they have at many times brought in reforms from outside of Brazil, and that for the last several decades that international influence has been neoliberal in both policy and ideology. More to the point, the current literature argues that neoliberal ideology is commonly reflected in contemporary Brazilian policymaking—however, no research as of yet explores *how* that thinking is enacted, particularly within Brazilian education policy. This dissertation addresses this gap by exploring how what I call *market logic*, or the belief that ideas and services that come from private companies and nonprofits are inherently superior to those provided by the public sector, permeates current education policy in Rio de Janeiro, and how that ideology is both accepted and resisted by various stakeholders within Rio's

education circles. Drawing on interviews with Secretariat administrators, teachers and nonprofit workers, I argue that the current administration of Rio's Secretariat is run by people who subscribe heavily to *market logic* in their thinking and policymaking, in large part because of the ideological role of *market logic* in supporting the business-oriented *currently dominant educational project*. However, I also use participant observations of a public school teacher strike and interviews with nonprofit workers within Teach For Brazil (an educational nonprofit that has adapted the education reform model popularized by the U.S. nonprofit Teach for America) to show how many stakeholders in Rio's public schools are resisting that project and rejecting the notion that private educational models and ideas are inherently more efficacious than public options.

The dissertation of Rolf Straubhaar is approved.

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2014

DEDICATION

I dedicate this study to my wife, Kristy, for the love and support she has given me throughout my career and my studies. Kristy is the one who helped me realize that research is my passion, and pushed me to do what would make me happy. None of this would have been possible without her.

For my girls, Evie and Rosie, who I hope will always have the courage to do what gives their life purpose and makes them feel alive.

For my parents, Joe and Sandy, for encouraging me since I was small to do what I love.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

VITA

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Market Logic in Rio de Janeiro

Introduction

On a quiet afternoon in the industrial North Zone of Rio de Janeiro, in a middle school right off *Avenida Brasil*, the main trucking thoroughfare bringing goods in and out of Rio, classes had just ended and I was sitting in the back of a brightly decorated math classroom. This particular school was included in Rio's "Schools of Tomorrow" program, a recent effort to improve curriculum, lengthen the school day and increase afterschool opportunities through public-private partnerships in schools in the most dangerous neighborhoods with the lowest standardized test scores. I was waiting for Patricia, who was dropping off her class in a variety of her campus' afterschool programs, which had included a tutoring program run by a nonprofit I will here refer to as Teach For Brazil.[1]

When Patricia came back, she fell back in her chair and rolled her eyes. "Some days, you just want to give up," she sighed. She explained that one of the girls in her class, one of her best students, had been complaining that she was now confused by how to do some basic algebra. "We covered this months ago, and she understood perfectly, she was doing great. Then last semester her Teach For Brazil tutor taught her some different trick, and she got all confused. The trick she'd learned in Teach For Brazil didn't work for the higher level stuff I had to teach later." She sighed again and asked, "Isn't private tutoring supposed to help students do better, not confuse them and make things worse?"

The way Patricia framed her frustration gets to the heart of the issues that arise in policy decisions based in what I will here call *market logic*, or the belief that ideas and services that come from private companies and nonprofits (such as the tutoring referred to by Patricia) are inherently superior to those provided by the public sector. I will argue that administrators within the current Secretariat of Education in Rio subscribe heavily to *market logic*, and have brought private partners

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[1] Throughout this dissertation, I have used pseudonyms for all individuals and organizations, with the exception of two public figures: Eduardo Paes (Rio's mayor at the time of this study) and Claudia Costin (Paes' education secretary).

with similar ideological leanings (such as educational nonprofits, foundations and management companies) to assist in the delivery of educational services in Rio's lowest-performing public schools, the Schools of Tomorrow.

In particular, I will focus attention on Teach For Brazil, an educational nonprofit that has adapted the education reform model popularized by the U.S. nonprofit Teach for America (or TFA) in which high-achieving graduates from prominent national colleges are recruited to be tutors in low-performing schools for two years. This type of educational borrowing is particularly of interest because, as will be shown later, it is encouraged at the municipal level by Rio's current Secretariat of Education, and reflects a disposition towards policy initiatives developed in the United States oriented around *market logic*: increased standardized testing, the use of incentive pay to increase test scores, a lengthened school day, and the use of private sector partners (like Teach For Brazil) as service providers in public schools.

Statement of Problem

As I will show hereafter, the extant literature on 20th and 21st century public policy in Brazil makes clear that the private sector and social elite have long had an interest and influence in government across all sectors, that they have at many times brought in reforms from outside of Brazil, and that for the last several decades that international influence has been neoliberal in both policy and ideology. More to the point, the current literature argues that neoliberal ideology is commonly reflected in contemporary Brazilian policymaking—however, no research as of yet explores *how* that thinking is enacted, particularly within Brazilian education policy. This dissertation addresses this gap by exploring how what I call *market logic* permeates current education policy in Rio, and how that ideology is both accepted and resisted by various stakeholders within Rio education circles.

The roots of what I here call *market logic* run deep in Brazilian history: since the first years of Brazil's republic in the late 1800s, private interests have held significant sway in Brazilian politics.

Elite landholders controlled the vast majority of Brazilian territory, and both locally and nationally exercised significant influence in politics and the rule of law (Leal, 1948). This oligarchical structure continued through the early 20th century, as descendants of these prominent families populated most national political offices (Schwartzman, 1975).

The economic crisis of 1929 created public demand for a stronger federal government, reflected in the centralized populist regime of Getúlio Vargas and his industrial national development project commonly known as the *Estado Novo* (Hilton, 1975a). Vargas pushed a political platform of domestic development, both in terms of industry and the social services (like a national public education system) commonly associated with the modern welfare state (Hilton, 1975b). While such a bureaucratic system is designed to lessen the influence of private industry and the elite, the Brazilian private sector (particularly industrialists) ingratiated themselves within Vargas' regime and national project and maintained a strong presence in public policy (Diniz, 1978).

Along with the *Estado Novo*, this period also saw one of the first significant importations and adaptations of U.S. educational theory and thought. During Vargas' regime and even more prominently during the following Kubitschek administration, a number of elites and intellectuals affiliated with or working in government pushed for a new scholastic model (called the *Escola Nova*, or New School) that was in large part modeled in the thought of John Dewey (Cunha, 1999). Just as the administrations of this period focused on building a strong, government-supported economy, they also embraced the Deweyian notion of seeing public education as a means of socializing new generations to fill the roles needed in this new national vision (Cunha, 2001).

This focus on national development continued under Vargas' and Kubitschek's successor João Goulart. Though fears surrounding Goulart's populism led Brazil's elite to support a military coup in 1964, the domestic industrialization (and subsequent prominence of the private sector and the industrial elite) that continued under these democratic regimes only deepened under military rule in the 1960s

and 70s (Skidmore, 1988). As stated by Boschi (1979), "the main [political] purpose of industrialists was to conquer political space and direct the process of economic development of advanced capitalism....[and maintain] whatever [political] space they were able to claim" (p. 225).

Under the military regime, Brazil experienced such significant growth that it was commonly referred to as an "economic miracle," though that prosperity began to slow with the oil crises of the late 1970s (Barros & Graham, 1978). The country entered into economic stagnation in the 1980s, experiencing alongside much of Latin America what was commonly called the "lost decade" (Grinberg, 2008). This floundering led the Brazilian private sector's support for the military regime to erode, a phenomenon some argue was instrumental to the eventual end of military rule (Diniz, 2002).

When Brazil transitioned to democracy in the late 1980s, President Collor (1989-1991) attempted to correct the economy with explicitly neoliberal reforms (Boito & Randall, 1998), including the privatization of both state industry and public services (Valença, 1998). This turn towards neoliberalism was a purposeful reaction against the central state begun by Vargas during the *Estado Novo* and continued throughout the military dictatorship (Boito & Randall, 1998), as the centrist policies of those previous eras were faulted by Collor and his contemporaries as causing the "lost decade."

While Collor and his successors were prominent supporters of neoliberal reform, Brazil during this period also experienced significant pressure from the World Bank (Barreto & Leher, 2008) and domestic business elites to adapt more market-friendly policies. It was in large part as a result of this international influence (which will be described in further detail in the discussion of policy borrowing in Chapter 2) that the Brazilian educational sector began to be increasingly privatized and governed with business-like managerial sensibilities (Bueno, 2004).

Perhaps the most prominent politician associated with neoliberal policy reform in Brazil is President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002), who was elected in a landslide on an explicitly

neoliberal political platform that to many observers (Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006; Power, 1998) marked a significant paradigm shift from previous administrations. Though Cardoso was unseated in 2002 by a prominent leftist and union leader, president Lula (2002-2011), whose chosen successor Dilma is still in power, scholars have noted that the neoliberal trend in public policy begun under Cardoso has largely continued through the early 21st century (Boito, 2007; Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006).

With regards to the role of the private sector in Brazilian public policy since this neoliberal turn in the 1990s, the market-oriented reforms of this era increased both the profits (Boito, 2005) and political role of private industry, particularly finance (Dias, 2005). While this short history has shown that the social elite running the Brazilian sector has played a significant role in public policy throughout the 20th century, the financial sector has been especially associated with both international financial institutions (like the World Bank) and the Brazilian regimes of the 1990s and 2000s, allowing this industry to exercise a significant amount of political influence (Boito, 2007). This influence is increasingly manifest not only through personal and professional associations between the political and financial spheres, but also through pressure to adapt the neoliberal reforms associated with the World Bank and its structural adjustment policies (Bueno, 2004). Over time, private sector elites also pushed their agenda through the contributions of business-led philanthropic endeavors in the public sector, including privately financed nonprofits and other social service providers (Fernandes, 1994).

This prominence of private equity and business in the public sector, and their encouragement to adapt ideological models and policies from outside Brazil (particularly from the U.S.), has over time become reflected in general public understandings of governance and policy. Most pointedly, Boito (1998) has used Gramsci's theorization of hegemony to argue that since the Cardoso regime in the 1990s the ideology underpinning neoliberal public policy has been broadly accepted by both the elite and the Brazilian masses. That is, the association of the state with inefficiency and private enterprise with productivity and innovation, the seeds of what I here call *market logic*, have been commonly

accepted by much of the broader Brazilian populace. Within the education sector specifically, a rapidly growing literature in comparative education argues that—in Global South countries like Brazil—much of the current market-driven educational "common sense" that guides the everyday decisions made by teachers, administrators and policymakers is influenced heavily by similarly market-influenced professional discourse in educational circles in the Global North (Ramirez & Boli, 1987; Ramirez, 2006). However, little research as of yet has explored *how* this influence is enacted.

This is the problem which this study has been designed to address. As has been shown in this section, elite private business interests have long held powerful sway in Brazilian public policy, and in the current policy environment the market-based ideological foundations of neoliberal thought have become widely accepted by both policymakers and the general population. In education in particular, the currently dominant business-oriented policies of the Global North have considerable influence in Brazil and similar contexts. However, within the current literature a significant question remains unanswered: how is that influence enacted? It is this process of enactment and the reaction to such that I will explore and document through this dissertation.

Modifications to Original Study Plan

In my original dissertation proposal, this study focused much more on Teach For Brazil organizationally, with plans to observe in Teach For Brazil classrooms and its organizational headquarters in addition to conducting interviews with its participants. However, several circumstances led me to expand the reach of this study to include the study of Rio's public school teachers and administrators within Rio's municipal Secretariat: first, Teach For Brazil suspended its operations shortly after my arrival in Rio (as will be more fully documented in Chapter 7), and while I was still able to conduct interviews with the majority of Teach For Brazil's former teachers, I found myself with much more research time than this activity required. Second, in the interviews I had with Teach For Brazil teachers these individuals regularly emphasized the significant role of the Secretariat in both

encouraging the formation of Teach For Brazil itself and creating a policy environment that welcomed organizations like Teach For Brazil. Teach For Brazil teachers also discussed at length the often negative reception they had at the school level from public school teachers, and the skeptical feelings of such teachers towards market-based reforms in general. From these interviews, I became interested in hearing from Secretariat administrators and public school teachers themselves, so that I could compare their sentiments with Teach For Brazil participants' perceptions of those sentiments. As I pursued these lines of inquiry and conducted interviews with Secretariat administrators and public school teachers, I found in analyzing this data that there was a clear and extensive impact of what I later theorized as *market logic* at the municipal, school and nonprofit levels. In my analysis, I also began to see a sizable critical reaction to *market logic* rhetoric among teachers working in public schools and Teach For Brazil, especially during the period documented in Chapter 5 when public school teacher went on strike. The scope of the study in general was thus extended to include data from all three of these populations: Secretariat administrators, public school teachers and Teach for Brazil teachers.

Theoretical Foundations

This inductive, empirically-based research project contributes to the continuing anthropological debate on the meaning of culture and the impact of various global cultural flows on the commonly accepted ideas and regular cultural practices of individuals in localized spaces, in this case the Schools of Tomorrow in Rio de Janeiro. The meaning of culture has been debated since the formation of anthropology as a discipline. Previously, anthropologists commonly referred to culture as being the proprietary beliefs and patterns of behavior of any given societal group (Baldwin et al., 2006). As time has passed, however, that relatively simplistic definition has been problematized—while essentialized definitions of culture are commonly used in public discourse, some anthropologists (see Abu-Lughod,

1991; González, 1999) feel the entire construct of "culture" should be jettisoned due to its baggage and potential for misinterpretation.

More commonly, many anthropologists have re-defined culture as the "making of meaning" (Anderson-Levitt, 2012, p. 442), with meaning retaining a very broad definition that can include behavioral norms, common understandings, or any other type of shared knowledge or belief (see Strauss & Quinn, 1998; Anderson-Levitt, 2002; Fischer, 2007). Previously, behaviors themselves have factored heavily in definitions of culture (Erickson, 2011), but many anthropological thinkers today define the term more broadly to include the thinking processes that lead to and inform behavior. As Spradley (1979) states, culture is "acquired knowledge people use to interpret experience and generate behavior" (p. 5). As García Canclini (2006) broadly writes, culture includes "the whole of the social processes of signification" (p. 121), those that are manifested in social action and those that inform or direct such action.

Such meaning-making is typically situated in the current anthropological literature in discrete local contexts (Anderson-Levitt, 2002; Bartlett, 2009). However, given the increasingly global flows (Appadurai, 1990) of cultural elements that are reflected in localized spaces, it seems equally important to recognize the potential for national, regional and global influence on localized beliefs and cultural practices. Given the individualized, "multicultural" nature of meaning-making, some anthropologists have gone so far as to propose a global view of culture, in which cultural notions and ideals are shared and spread across contexts throughout the world (Foster, 1991; Wax, 1993; Hannerz, 2008).

While the definition of culture can occur at the individual level, and individual beliefs and actions can be influenced by multitudinous factors, some actors hold a greater level of power and influence in the "construction and diffusion of ideas around the globe" (Anderson-Levitt, 2012, p. 442). In the case of Rio de Janeiro's Schools of Tomorrow, city level administrators, private partners brought in to provide educational materials and services, and teachers all hold varying degrees of power to

determine, both in their professional responsibilities and in their contributions to public discourse, what "good" educational policy and practice are. Previous research has shown that these actors' views of "good educational practice" are to some extent influenced by the cultural ideals and beliefs expressed by the multilateral institutions and global actors that determine international education policy (Beech, 2006; Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2006; Steiner-Khamsi & Quist, 2000). As documented in the previous section "Statement of Problem," in Brazil specifically there has been an extensive literature documenting the role of neoliberal thought in influencing public policy, and in particular educational policy. The purpose of this study is to investigate how that neoliberal influence of what I here theorize as *market logic* is enacted within the education sector in Rio de Janeiro, a city which many Brazilian educational practitioners have begun to view as "ground zero" for experimentation with and spread of global market-based ideals of education reform.

This study also utilizes methodological approaches for the study of policy borrowing in comparative education that have been developed by David Phillips and Kimberly Ochs (2003, 2004; see also Rappleye, 2006). Phillips and Ochs (2003, 2004) identify four phases typical in documented incidents of policy borrowing: a pull or incentive that promotes the idea, which Phillips and Ochs (2004) call "cross-national attraction," the moment of decision when an organization or government decides to borrow a given idea or policy, the implementation of that borrowed idea and then the "indigenization" (Phillips & Ochs, 2004), or what Hannerz (1987) would call the "creolisation" of that idea. By focusing on how Rio's administrators, teachers and nonprofit workers perceive and feel about the U.S.-originated policy reforms they have borrowed and adapted, through the present study I explore how local stakeholders have responded to each of the phases identified in this borrowing model. That is, this study effectively documents the motives that drove initial "cross-national attraction" at the Secretariat level, the opinions that led Secretariat members to decide to borrow these particular policies, and the perceptions of social actors at both the municipal and school levels regarding the

9

implementation and "îndigenization" of those policies.

Research Questions

This study aims to answer the following research question:

1) How does *market logic* discourse factor into policy-making and social mobilization in Rio de
    Janeiro's education sector?

In order to answer this question, I oriented my interviews and participant observations to answer
the following sub-questions:

1a) How is the business-like orientation of Rio's current Secretariat perceived by Rio public
school teachers and nonprofit workers?

1b) How is the inclusion of the private sector in Rio's public schools perceived by Rio public
school teachers and nonprofit workers?

1c) How is *market logic* reflected in the interactions between Rio's Secretariat and public school
teachers as an organized labor force, particularly during their recent strike?

1d) How is *market logic* reflected in Teach For Brazil's adaptation of the Teach For America
organizational model to Rio?

The Significance of This Study

The purpose of this study is to produce a detailed depiction of how a number of *market logic-*
driven education reforms begun in the United States, most prominent among them the organizational
model of Teach For America, have been enacted in a Brazilian sociocultural context, along with the
reaction of local education actors to that enactment. In so doing, this study explores the applicability
and viability of educational policies and models that are already being adapted and borrowed in many
other international contexts, and the findings presented here will provide important insight that could
prove useful to those working in similar circumstances. Not only will this study provide Brazilian
policymakers and teachers with an understanding of the difficulties and issues that have accompanied

such policy borrowing, but it will also provide key insights applicable to multilateral funding agencies and governments (like the United States) whose policies encourage similar borrowing in other contexts.

The Organization of This Dissertation

These research questions will be answered in turn throughout the rest of this dissertation, following an exploration of the extant literature on this subject (covered in Chapter 2) and the methods used to conduct this study (explained in Chapter 3). In Chapter 4, I answer part of Research Question 1a by exploring the perceptions of Secretariat administrators and teachers regarding the business-minded orientation of the current administration of the Secretariat of Education. In Chapter 5, I answer Research Question 1c, by documenting how the *market logic* ideals guiding the current administration play out in the interactions between the Secretariat and its teachers as an organized labor force. Specifically, I do this through participant observations of a three-month strike held by Rio teachers in part to protest recent business-oriented U.S.-style reforms.

In Chapter 6, I explore Research Question 1b, by documenting the thoughts and feelings of members of Rio's public education sector regarding public-private partnerships and the perceived privatization of education. In Chapter 7 I then answer Research Question 1d by documenting one case study example of such perceived privatization: the case of Teach For Brazil, which attempted to adopt the organizational model of Teach For America to the Schools of Tomorrow, and ended up closing its doors after only two years.

Chapter 2

Review of the Literature

In this chapter, I situate this study within the relevant literatures within comparative and international education. Specifically, I will first explore the research that has been done thus far on the general trend of educational transfer, or the spread of particular policies or ideas from one context to another (primarily from the Global North to the Global South, as in the present case of Rio).

Following this, I will provide an introduction to several prominent recent theories in comparative and international education that could be used to make sense of the data in this study, especially world culture theory (Meyer et al., 1977; Ramirez & Boli, 1987), the vertical case study (Vavrus & Bartlett, 2006, 2009) and the notion of the educational project (Bartlett, 2003, 2010). Building on these, I will theorize my own notion of the *currently dominant educational project*, and make particular note of the ideological aspect of that project which I call *market logic*. I will also theorize the resistance to this *market logic* on the part of teachers and nonprofit workers using Bartlett's (2003) discussion of competing educational projects.

Policy Borrowing: A Review

The question of policy or knowledge borrowing (or educational transfer) has been fundamental to the field of comparative education (Beech, 2006; Phillips, 2006), which contains a rich and lengthy literature on the applicability of Western models to developing world contexts (for a general introduction to this area of inquiry, see Phillips & Ochs, 2004; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004; for some of the most prominent empirical studies in this area, see Phillips, 2000; Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2006; Steiner-Khamsi & Quist,

2000). Knowledge and policy transfer in education, particularly from the Global North to the Global South, has been occurring since the beginning of colonialism (See Titmus & Steele, 1995; Steele & Taylor, 1995; Fordham et al., 1998), continuing through the efforts of prominent multilateral development institutions in the 20th century and into our current era of globalization (Phillips & Ochs, 2004). There is a long history in the literature on how cultural elements (such as pedagogical methods, school structures, and so forth) can be transferred through transnational educational endeavors (Mortenson, 1977; Harris, 1980; Toiviainen, 1995).

Much of this literature tries to explore the ways in which systems, policies and practices in education are transferred from one world region to another (Ochs, 2005; Phillips, 2000; Sprigade, 2005; Tanaka, 2003). At the national level, such borrowing has historically been based in politics rather than in viability or cultural relevance. Halpin and Troyna (1995) argue that policy borrowing across national boundaries is primarily driven by the political need to legitimize policy relations between countries, rather than the prospective feasibility of the borrowed policy in question. Other scholars have noted similarly that certain policies tend to gain political traction due to their political symbolism rather than the details of their proposed implementation (Green, 1993; Robertson & Waltman, 1992).

Especially during the latter half of the twentieth century, the primary actors directing the process of international policy and knowledge transfer were multilateral development organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (or OECD), the World Bank and so forth. These organizations, in their discourse and in the stipulations attached to the loan programs they commonly offered to developing countries

in the 1980s and 90s, established a neoliberal free market approach as the "common sense" norm in education policy, and convinced dozens of countries to adopt such an approach (Gwynne & Kay 2000, p. 142). As a result, federal funding for education dropped in many developing economies, and educational systems were decentralized to conform to the international standards set by the World Bank and similar multilateral organizations (Homedes & Ugalde, 2005). The World Bank held an especially powerful role in forcing this form of policy transfer, as it was the single largest source of development capital in international education throughout the late twentieth century (Heyneman, 2003)—as a result, developing countries in need of development capital were forced to accept the privatizing terms of World Bank loans, given their outsized status as the primary source of financial assistance.

Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, perhaps the majority of the policy and knowledge transfer that occurred was this obligatory sort, the adoption of particular educational policies and ideals as stipulations of multilateral funding. Due to the large number of countries begrudgingly accepting this assistance and adopting policies based in privatization and decentralization, and the extended period in which such policies were prioritized by prominent multilateral organizations, over time certain ideological underpinnings of these policies paradoxically became commonly accepted as "good" practice: decentralization, privatization, and the use of market forces to regulate social services all became part of a "normal," accepted ideological package (Carnoy & Rhoten, 2002). Multilateral organizations and foundations seemed to happily embrace this role, seeing themselves as the purveyors of "modernity" and "progress" in the Global South (Arnove, 1983).

In the context of increasing globalization, this form of obligatory policy and knowledge transfer has been theorized in multiple ways that have been clearly outlined by Tikly (2001): first, there is literature that points to a perceived "hyperglobalist" tendency that is seen to promote, to an extent, an increasingly integrated global culture (we will see this idea again shortly in my discussion of world culture theory). There is also another body of work by scholars who look at this global transfer of policy more critically, arguing that globalization has promoted polarization between world cores and peripheries and exacerbated inequality—much of the literature just discussed on the role of the World Bank and other multilaterals takes this approach (Carnoy & Rhoten, 2002; Arnove, 1983).

However, a newer trend in globalization theory merges these perspectives in a "transformationalist" approach to globalization (Tikly, 2001) that recognizes the power of increasing interconnectiveness alongside empirically demonstrable contradictory processes of global integration and fragmentation which vary according to local contexts and historical relationships. This transformationalist approach seems to resonate with the existing literature, which recognizes the exacerbation of inequality caused by some forms of global educational transfer (Gwynne & Kay, 2000; Carnoy & Rhoten, 2002; Arnove, 1983) while also recognizing the ways in which an increasingly globalized world has promoted the exchange of ideas in ways that are not so explicitly coercive.

With regard to this second point, NGOs have played a particular role in the process of soliciting or bringing policies and educational ideals across borders for application in new contexts. With the welfare state's decline near the end of the 20th century (Filgueira & Filgueira, 2002; Brady, Beckfield & Selebi-Kaiser, 2005), and the accompanying rise

in popularity of privatization and civil society alternatives to state educational intervention (Centeño, 1994; Gwynne & Kay, 2000), the creation of private organizations in response to public educational inequities has quickened as part of a general political trend away from state involvement in social policy. These nonprofit actors, who exercise a greater degree of autonomy than their governmental counterparts, also import foreign policies and cultural ideas about teaching into their programming, but often for less coercive reasons than those driving policy transfer at the state level (due to the aforementioned financial influence of multilateral institutions like the OECD, World Bank and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [commonly known as UNESCO]). As will be seen hereafter, two such nonprofits that are of interest to the present case are Teach For America, the prominent U.S. organization that brings competitive college graduates into low-income classrooms for two years, and Teach For All, the multilateral umbrella organization that supports organizations like Teach For Brazil that seek to adapt the Teach For America organizational framework to countries other than the United States.

Finding A Framework to Explain the Spread of Neoliberal Education Policy

World Culture: A Framework That Falls Short

Whether driven by multilateral institutions like the World Bank or nonprofit organizations like Teach For America and Teach For All, there has been extensive debate regarding the forces behind policy and knowledge transfer. Some academics argue that policy and knowledge transfer is primarily attributable to elements of what comparative sociologists have called *world culture*. World culture theory first emerged in the 1970s as a theoretical framework meant to explain the spread of mass schooling throughout the

world. Early pieces in this literature (particularly Meyer et al. 1977) assert that such spread is a result of social change in education becoming driven more by an increasingly global "world society" than by the individual characteristics of regions or nations. According to world culture theorists, this increasingly "world culture" is based in Western liberal myths and ideals (of the individual, of the role of the state, of human rights, and so forth), which have over time become a global "norm" through their isomorphic influence (Ramirez & Boli, 1987)—for example, the right of every child to have access to formal education.

While world culture theory has been critiqued for its assumption of universality (Anderson-Levitt, 2003; Bartlett, 2003), there are some theoretical claims or assumptions within world culture theory with which I agree. First, the assertion by Ramirez (2012) that it is crucial to consider "the context or situation in which individuals find themselves" (p. 426), as "actors and activities are profoundly constructed and influenced by their environments" (Ramirez, 2006, p. 367). While Ramirez and other world culture theorists may define "environment" differently than anthropologists of education like myself, as they admittedly use this assumption to make claims at the "macro level of analysis" regarding the manner in which the educational systems of nation states mirror their larger global context (Ramirez, 2012, p. 427-428), interestingly it is this same assumption that drives the micro level work of myself and other anthropologists of education (particularly Anderson-Levitt, 2002, 2003; Bartlett, 2003) as we seek to explore the ways in which local contexts (be they at the community, school, or in this case the organizational level) diverge from or respond to the social structures within which they are embedded. Though ironically it is from this particular conclusion

regarding the embeddedness of context that world culture theorists and their oftentime

critics draw their starkly different conclusions, this similarity of starting points makes

clear that our philosophical underpinnings can be more closely related than we are willing

to recognize.

Second, there is the recognition by world culture theorists that world culture is not

always a determinant of how schooling looks "on the ground" in particular contexts. For

this world culture theorists turn to a construct theorized by Karl Weick (1976) as "loose-

coupling," which asserts that while increasingly homogenizing global educational trends

exist, they are not always directly reflected in micro level structures (Ramirez, 2012). As

Carney et al. (2012) state, this to a certain degree neutralizes the arguments of critics of

world culture theory and brings much of the discussion to an impasse, as the theory's

"willingness to acknowledge local processes of enactment...means that it is too easily

able to accommodate its critics ...[as] what was once a lively debate has thus fallen into a

comfortable set of complementarities about educational convergence" (p. 367).

Recognizing the Global-Local Nexus

However, there is small yet growing literature (see Anderson-Levitt, 2012a; Vavrus

& Bartlett, 2006, 2009) that seeks to address this global-local dialectic between world

culture scholars (who tend to be macro level-oriented sociologists using quantitative

methodologies, like Meyer and Ramirez) and their critics (who tend to be micro level-

oriented anthropologists using ethnographic methodologies, like Anderson-Levitt and

Bartlett) through innovative methodological approaches that address world culture as one

socially constructed reality among many. While world culture sociologists like Ramirez

(2012) have long self-identified as "[operating] at the macro level of analysis" (p. 427)

and anthropologists like Anderson-Levitt and Bartlett have tended to conduct micro-level ethnographies of educational practices in particular times and spaces (e.g., Anderson-Levitt, 2002; Bartlett, 2009; Schriewer, 2012), new developments in the anthropology of education have focused greater attention on the degree to which this is a false dichotomy, inasmuch as culture is produced on all levels by localized communities which in turn influences other communities, whether macro or micro.

Vavrus and Bartlett (2006) make this point through their methodological model of the "vertical case study," in which the culture and knowledge enacted by particular groups in particular social locations is "[situated] ... within a broader cultural, historical, and political investigation" that addresses cultural flows and facets traditionally categorizable as both micro and macro, quantitative and qualitative (p. 95). Anderson-Levitt (2012a) builds upon this by noting that "world culture" as defined by Ramirez and other world culture theorists is a social reality that does affect teaching and learning in many social locations, albeit a socially constructed reality. That is, rather than seeing this "world culture" as a reified entity unto itself that exerts social influence on its own (a critique also levied by Carney et al., 2012), Anderson-Levitt (2012a) asserts that "world culture" is instead created just as any other degree or form of "culture" is formed, through processes of meaning-making undergone by particular communities at particular times and in particular spaces. In the case of "world culture," these communities and spaces are simply more elevated and powerful than those that are traditionally researched, including settings like the offices of the World Bank or other prominent multilaterals and the conferences and academic journal settings in which world culture theorist scholars put forth and defend their claims (Anderson-Levitt, 2012a, pp. 442-443).

This social situatedness of world culture does not in any way challenge its validity as a cultural form that is worthy of study—rather, such situatedness forces us as scholars to open our research to a wider landscape of cultural flows that influence localized teaching and learning, of which world culture is only one (though arguably a powerful one, as those actors involved in its production and spread tend to hold more social, cultural and economic capital than those that promote more localized cultural forms and flows).

Replacing World Culture with the Educational Project

Elsewhere (Straubhaar, 2014) I have initially theorized an alternative to world culture theory that recognizes the social situatedness of "world culture" as well as the role of power in its spread, in the construct of the *currently dominant educational project*. This builds upon Barlett's (2003, 2010) notion of *educational projects*, which she defines as "durable (but not permanent) constellations of institutions, financial resources, social actors, ideologies, discourses, pedagogies, and theories of knowledge and learning that shape the way people think about schooling and its purpose" (2010, p. 52). My construct of the *currently dominant educational project* builds upon Bartlett's (2003, 2010) theory in two primary directions: a heavier emphasis on the role of power in the spread of particular educational projects, and a recognition of such projects' temporal dimension.

First, building upon Bartlett's (2003, 2010) theorization, I argue that the role of power plays a significant role in the development and spread of what might be called "world culture." As explained previously, the opinions of particular individuals and institutions (e.g., the World Bank, academics working in institutions in the Global North, etc.) have an outsized impact on what is considered "good" educational practice that is

worthy of replication, in that it is such actors that are primarily responsible for both the initial development of the ideas behind an *educational project* and the spread of those ideas through the exercise of their power and influence. These *educational projects* can then be reflected in the opinions regarding "good" educational practice held by administrators, teachers and organizational leaders in particular, localized spaces. As some *educational projects* enjoy the support of powerful institutions and actors and others don't, I differentiate those that are spread in this manner by referring to them as *dominant educational projects*.

Second, as accepted notions of "best practice"—as well as the institutions that support such notions—change over time, with today's "bad practices" being yesterday's "best practices" (Anderson-Levitt, 2002), I have added a temporal dimension to this construct. The *currently dominant educational project* is represented by the "constellation of...ideologies, discourses, pedagogies, and theories of knowledge and learning" (Bartlett, 2010, p. 52) that are supported by currently dominant global educational institutions, actors and financial resources. Generally speaking, in today's global educational climate the supporters of the *currently dominant educational project* include prominent multilateral institutions like the World Bank, UNESCO, and most bilateral funding agencies (particularly prominent funders like USAID, DFID, and the like).

Neoliberal Ideology and Market Logic

The project currently pushed by such actors includes a number of different ideas and discourses: for example, elsewhere I have discussed the rise of learner-centered pedagogy (Straubhaar, 2014) as one aspect of the *currently dominant educational project*. However, in this study I focus on one of the primary ideological discourses undergirding

this project, which is powerfully reflected in the voices of Rio Secretariat administrators, teachers and nonprofit workers interviewed herein: that is, what I call *market logic*, or the presumption that private industry is inherently more effective, efficient and innovative in the provision of educational services and ideas than the public sector, due in large part to the competition that is assumed to be inherent to the free market. Innovation and efficiency are commonly associated with the free market and the private sector, but *market logic* goes beyond association—it is more akin to what is referred to as "common sense," or the instinctive assumptions one relies on in everyday decision-making. To an individual or group of individuals whose ideological worldview is based in *market logic*, the idea that private is superior to public is a truism that can accurately and reliably apply to any program or policy.

Those that subscribe to *market logic* thus commonly express the belief that teaching done by the private sector will be superior to that done by public school teachers, that curricula developed privately will be of higher quality than those produced publicly, and that more innovative ideas will arise from educational think tanks, foundations and nonprofits than might come forward from public school districts and administrators. Further, as will be seen later, this belief in the superiority of the private sector extends to administrative questions: namely, that people with strong backgrounds in business, management and related industries are seen as more qualified to run school systems (like Rio's Secretariat) than educators, whose classroom experience and training are thus implicitly discounted.

As will be noted hereafter, the belief and trust that is at the basis of *market logic* is not necessarily created *ex nihilo*: there are points of reference to which *market logic*

adherents appeal to support the validity of their belief in the superiority of particular models and policies: namely, quantifiable results. As Fischman and Tefera (2014) have pointed out, for the last several decades, in the United States, the United Kingdom (Auld & Morris, 2014) and throughout the world, education policy has come to be driven by a "what works" research narrative in which "evidence-based" and "scientifically-based" policy has come to be seen as a gold standard. In this paradigm, large-scale quantitative studies that can demonstrate empirical impact on student achievement become the desirable norm, and proponents of particular programs or models cite such studies as evidence of their rigor and wide-ranging applicability. In the present case, I will show that Secretariat officials and leaders of Teach For Brazil both engaged in this type of discourse, citing evaluative studies of their programs or ideas in the U.S. and elsewhere as evidence of why it should be applicable to public schools in Rio de Janeiro. In the framework developed by Phillips and Ochs (2004) described earlier, it is these types of evaluative studies that often first promoted the "cross-national attraction" that began the process of bringing such policies to Rio.

Such studies are often referred to by proponents of *market logic* when the validity of their policy proscriptions is questioned. This is perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of *market logic* as documented in the present study: that is, the faithful and trusting way in which its adherents common fall back on *market logic* even when their day-to-day lived reality contradicts it. In the present case, I will present accounts of Secretariat officials and nonprofit leaders who are confronted by teachers and nonprofit workers who challenge the particulars of adapted market-oriented policies from the U.S., noting ways in which their lived classroom experiences show that such policies do not

seem to fit or work well in the context of Rio public schools. In response, Secretariat and nonprofit leaders fall back on *market logic* and appeals to the "proven" nature of their reforms and models, trusting and believing their core assumptions about the viability of such models more than the lived experience of those enacting them at the ground level.

The global trend towards *market logic* is hardly new—in the United States, it represents a broader arc in which education policy, and public policy generally, has been influenced by neoliberalism[2] over the last 30 years (Burch, 2009). Ever since the introduction of a discourse of American under-performance during the Reagan administration, most prominently visible in the publication of the report *A Nation at Risk* (National Commission on Excellence and Education, 1983), a neoliberal reform movement supporting school choice (Giroux, 2004), private supervision of public education through charter schools (Saltman & Gabard, 2003), private curriculum development (Apple, 2000), private and for-profit teacher education (Sleeter, 2008; Weiner, 2011) and accountability-heavy education management systems (Apple, 2006; Weiner, 2007) has continued to gain prominence in U.S. education policy circles (Ellison, 2012; Hursh, 2011).

This neoliberal educational project has gained support of prominent actors within educational policy circles, such as the Walton, Gates and Broad foundations (Saltman, 2010). Scholars have noted its influence in prominent recent policy shifts like the *No Child Left Behind* act (Ravitch, 2010) and President Obama's Race to the Top initiative (Giroux, 2009).

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[2] I define neoliberalism as a political ideology with origins in the late 20th century that has prioritized private, market-based policy solutions and encouraged the weakening of the welfare state.

More recently, scholars have begun to note the role of networks of reformers in promoting and spreading particular ideas regarding what education reform "should" look like (Ball, 2012; Scott, 2008). As neoliberal reforms have formed the basis of a great deal of global social policy (including educational policy) over the last several decades, a generation or more of policymakers have grown up and become professionals in policy environments in which the neoliberal approach to social policy, and the *market logic* undergirding it, have simply become generally accepted common sense. That is, in such an environment (like Rio de Janeiro in the last several years), most policymakers have come to share a common notion of "good" education reform, and organizations (like Teach For America and Teach For Brazil) that promote those notions are thus able to effectively market themselves as solutions to educational inequality (Anderson, 2013). It is this shared notion that I am referring to when I speak of *market logic*.

As will be seen hereafter, however, *market logic* and the *currently dominant educational project* it supports are not uncontested. As Bartlett (2003) has stated, "there is rarely a single, coherent educational project...instead, projects intersect with subordinate...ideas....[and] multiple projects compete for hegemonic control of the public's imagination" (p. 187). In the present case, a number of actors with lived experience in Rio public school classrooms, particularly public school teachers and nonprofit workers, express their distrust of and disagreement with particular policies based in *market logic*. While these actors do not necessarily agree sufficiently in their general educational ideologies or notions of pedagogy to constitute a viable *counterproject* (Bartlett, 2003), they do represent a call for context-driven reform that

requests that higher priority be given to the voices of those implementing policy at the ground level.

Teach For America's Model as a Contested Manifestation of *Market Logic*

While Chapters 4 through 6 document different education actors' perspectives on a number of different reform ideas, the most specific model examined in this study is that of Teach For America, adapted by the Brazilian nonprofit Teach For Brazil. This study forges a crucial relationship to the extant literature because there is scant international contribution (Friedrich, 2014) as of yet to the U.S.-based literature debating the role and perceived effectiveness of the Teach For America teacher-training model. Within the larger debate on "what works" in education reform and the many evaluative studies that have been conducted on different policies, a number of different studies have attempted to evaluate the Teach For America model's effectiveness in the U.S., with different studies putting forth contrasting results. A number of prominent studies have published relatively positive results, showing Teach For America teachers to have a positive impact on their students' performance.[3] Primarily, two studies (Decker et al., 2004; Glazerman et al., 2006) found that TFA elementary school teachers were just as effective as their peers in reading, and were even superior to their peers in math. However, other studies have found that TFA teachers (as well as other teachers who enter the classroom before receiving certification) produced lower test scores than students studying under certified teachers (Darling-Hammond et al., 2005). The lack of agreement among these studies (conducted within the national context in which the TFA model was formed) leads to questions as to

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[3] The most prominent of these studies include Decker, P. et al. (2004). *The Effects of Teach For America on students: Findings from a national evaluation*. Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. Raymond, M.E. et al. (2001). *Teach For America: An evaluation of teacher differences and student outcomes in Houston, Texas*. Stanford, CA: Credo. Tatel, E.S. (1999). Teaching in under-resourced schools: The Teach For America example. *Theory into Practice,* Winter 1999, 38(1): 37-45.

why the Teach For America model has spread so widely throughout the globe, and it is precisely that question which this study aims to answer: why does a model like Teach For America's spread internationally despite the contested nature of its effectiveness? Again, I here will argue that the spread of the Teach For America model to Brazil can be explained in large part by the dominance of *market logic* in Brazilian policy-making circles, specifically in this case within Rio's Municipal Secretariat of Education.

Contributions of the Study

Specifically, this study begins to fill the aforementioned gap in the literature on the motives for the international spread of the Teach For America teacher training model. More generally, this study contributes to the small but growing literature (see Anderson-Levitt, 2003) on global flows in education within the field of educational anthropology. On one hand, anthropology of education is a thriving subfield, sponsored by the Council on Anthropology and Education section within the American Anthropological Association, with numerous scholars exploring the limits and boundaries of the subdiscipline (Anderson-Levitt, 2012b; Levinson & Pollock, 2011). However, the literature on global flows in education and their influence on educational practice has heretofore been dominated by quantitatively-oriented sociologists (Meyer et al., 1977; Ramirez & Boli, 1987; Ramirez, 2006).

While there is anthropological literature exploring how localized educational communities respond to external policy pressures (Anderson-Levitt, 2003), and Lesley Bartlett's (2010) aforementioned theoretical construct of the *educational project* which attempts to explain how networks of particular actors promote particular pedagogies, ideals and structures, there has not yet been any exploration within anthropology of the

particular spread of educational reform ideals from the Global North to the Global South, an area of research that has not gone unnoticed in comparative sociology (Meyer et al., 1977; Ramirez & Boli, 1987) and comparative education (Beech, 2006; Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2006; Steiner-Khamsi & Quist, 2000).

This project is also innovative within Brazilian studies, as little previous research has been done in Brazil on the enactment of *market logic* in public policy, and even less exists on the sociocultural effects of translating the Teach For America model (or other *market logic*-based policies) these models to non-U.S. contexts[4]. Several large-scale quantitative impact evaluations have been conducted regarding the effectiveness of the Teach For America model in raising student achievement in Latin America and Europe (Hutchings et al., 2006; Ofsted, 2008; Alfonso et al., 2010; Muijs et al., 2010; Scott et al., 2010), but no extant studies anthropologically engage the translation of these models from the perspective of those enacting it on the ground. As a result, this study was the first in a potentially fruitful field of studies of similar Brazilian programs using "borrowed" models across implementation sites and national contexts.

The present study will begin to address an urgent need for ethnographic inquiry into the spread of the Teach For America model and its undergirding *market logic* within the anthropology literature. By exploring the contested role of *market logic* at both the municipal and school levels, this study opens up a very fruitful area for further work on how *market logic* as a paradigm can influence not only policy-making, but the "common sense" thinking of educators and laypeople who are on the receiving end of *market logic*-based policy proposals. While the present study explores the prominence of *market logic*

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[4] Though the various programs in Latin America modeled after Teach For America are discussed briefly in Bruns, B., Evans, D., & Luque, J. (2011). *Achieving world-class education in Brazil: The next agenda*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

in Rio de Janeiro, this phenomenon is not limited to Rio as a city, Brazil as a country, or Latin America as a region. Rather, the spread of *market logic*-based educational reform ideals from the Global North to the Global South is truly occurring worldwide. For example, the Teach For America model of teacher training alone has been adopted by over 30 different organizations in Europe, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Oceania, yet the incorporation and adaptation of international cultural flows by such organizations has only begun to be studied empirically (Friedrich, 2014), and not yet from an anthropological perspective. As a result, the present study represents a initial solid step forward into a potential area of fruitful inquiry for many years to come within both comparative education and the anthropology of education.

Chapter 3

Research Methods

Description of Research Methods

For this study's methods I have drawn on my disciplinary training in anthropology and conducted an ethnography, specifically 66 qualitative interviews (with teachers, Secretariat officials and nonprofit workers) and 26 participant observations (of teachers, particularly as they participated in strike meetings and marches). While the formation of this study was informed by the relevant literature on global flows of educational models and ideas (as was discussed at length in the previous chapters' review of the literature), the methods used were primarily inductive, grounded in the collection and analysis of interviews and fieldnotes that were then be analyzed to find trends and themes that were then generalized into a working hypothesis on how Rio's Secretariat of Education adapted and implemented North American educational ideas, and why they do so.

Participant Recruitment

I located administrators, teachers and nonprofit staff primarily through the use of social networks. That is, I had initial contacts upon arriving in Brazil with the Secretariat of Education, with various public school teachers and with Teach For Brazil. I then reached out to other individuals that knew these initial contacts, and continued this "snowball" pattern with each new contact I met. In total, I interviewed 5 Secretariat administrators[5], 37 teachers and 26 nonprofit workers (though some of these were interviewed multiple times).

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[5] While the nature of the positions held by these administrators and the programs they supervised varied widely, I do not go further into detail so as not to threaten their anonymity. All interviewees were in managerial positions, however.

Table 1. Interview Subjects.

Municipal Secretariat Administrators	
1. Robson	4. Alessandra
2. Vinicius	5. Sarah
3. Caio	
Teachers	
1. Terezinha	20. Anna
2. Antonio	21. Monique
3. Marcela	22. Erika
4. Beatriz	23. Laura
5. Fabiano	24. Luciana
6. Pedro	25. Renata
7. Kelly	26. Diogo
8. Marcos	27. Fabiana
9. Afonso	28. Tatiane
10. Aline	29. Jeferson
11. Amanda	30. Emanuele
12. Livia	31. Paulo
13. Bruna	32. Renan
14. Luiza	33. Raul
15. Gabrielle	34. Fabricio
16. Patricia	35. Camila
17. Andressa	36. Raquel
18. Brenda	37. Marina
19. Larissa	
Nonprofit Workers	
1. Leandro	14. Marcio
2. Mariana	15. Samuel
3. Ana Clara	16. Aléxia
4. Sabrina	17. Bianca
5. Julia	18. Nina
6. Raíssa	19. Tainara
7. Marcia	20. Danilo

8. Gustavo	21. Alexandre
9. Jorge	22. Rafaela
10. Claudia	23. Viviane
11. Andréia	24. Jessica
12. Lorena	25. Natália
13. Carmen	26. Guilherme

Data Collection

My participant observations (Spradley, 1980) of teacher protests were my primary means of answering Research Question 1c, regarding how Secretariat administrators responded to the concerns of Rio teachers during their strike. Through my personal observations of teacher protests and administrative public responses to such, I particularly looked for how these interactions reflected (or not) administrators' belief in *market logic*.

My ethnographic interviews with staff and teachers (Spradley, 1979; Rubin & Rubin, 1995) were used to answer Research Questions 1a and 1b, regarding administrator and teacher perceptions of the Secretariat's business-minded policies and use of privatization (effectively documenting Secretariat administrators' motives driving the "cross-national attraction" [Phillips & Ochs, 2003, 2004] phase of policy borrowing, or the motives which led such leaders to borrow particular ideas or models in the first place). I also used these interviews to answer Research Question 1d, regarding nonprofit workers' perceptions of Teach For Brazil's adaptation of the Teach For America organizational model.

With each interview subject, I began with open-ended, semi-structured interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). On average, these interviews lasted two and a half to three hours, with several lasting up to five hours. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. Most subjects were only interviewed once—however, all five Secretariat administrators

were interviewed twice, and three teachers were also interviewed twice. When subsequent interviews occurred they were unstructured, driven by the themes that arose from the coding and analysis of initial interviews and observations (Spradley, 1979). Having four years of previous experience living in Portuguese-speaking contexts, as well as two years of university-level Portuguese coursework, I had sufficient Portuguese language ability to conduct and translate all interviews myself.

My own experience as an educator with Teach For America, one of the leaders in the school reform movement in the U.S. (Darling-Hammond, 2000), and as a researcher involved with documenting and analyzing prominent school reform models like charter schools, magnet schools and Teach For America (Straubhaar & Gottfried, in press), played a crucial role in helping me to identify elements of influence in the educational context of Rio de Janeiro. This previous experience provided me with something of an insider's perspective, particularly with Teach For Brazil (due to my participation in TFA, and my similar experience as a novice teacher in urban classrooms), though as a North American researcher I recognize that I was also viewed as an outsider by the administrators, teachers and nonprofit workers with whom I worked. That said, I believe my positionality worked in my favor as I collected data, as I had sufficient commonality with the teachers and nonprofit staff I interviewed so as to establish the trust and common ground necessary for thorough ethnography, while still maintaining enough of an outsider status to keep myself from becoming involved in the local politics and loyalties of any particular organization.

Justification for Research Methods

An ethnographic methodology based in qualitative interviews and participant

observation was absolutely imperative to answer my research questions. Qualitative interviews are one of the primary means by which one can glean how people feel and think about the cultural environment around them. Qualitative interviewing encourages participants to describe their worlds in their own terms so that I could more fully understand how and why the particular organizational cultures of the Secretariat, of Rio's Schools of Tomorrow and of Teach For Brazil were created, evolve, and maintained (Spradley, 1979; Rubin & Rubin, 1995). This allowed me to answer my research questions regarding administrator, teacher and nonprofit worker perceptions of what educational ideals frame their organizations and why. Perception-based questions such as these necessitate the level of qualitative detail inherent in ethnographic interviews.

I complemented these qualitative interviews with participant observation. Participant observation denotes self-inclusion into one's realm of study, interaction with subjects and the capturing of an authentic "picture" of how a given sociocultural context functions (Spradley, 1980). Through my participant observations of the protests, marches and meetings associated with the Rio teachers' strike, I answered Research Question 1c regarding how teachers were treated by their city-level administrators, effectively capturing an ethnographic "snapshot" of the dynamic between these two levels of authority within the Secretariat.

Preliminary Research

In preparation for working on the work of organizations like Teach For Brazil for my dissertation, previous to my data gathering I studied *Enseña Chile* (Straubhaar, 2010), one of Teach For Brazil's sister programs that has also copied Teach For America's organizational model. It was this evaluation that interested me in the international

applicability and feasibility of the TFA teacher training model and the notion of educational transfer in general, as *Enseña Chile* seemed to be relatively successful in promoting concrete positive change in student achievement, despite the contextual differences between the educational sectors in the USA and Chile. Having documented the quantitative influence of *Enseña Chile*, I became very interested in examining how teachers who were effectively implementing this model felt about its implementation. It was upon the basis of this previous study that I framed my current research plan.

For the present study, I first outlined my plans to collect ethnographic data through scheduled interviews and classroom observations. I then gathered data firsthand in Brazil and processed it as it was collected. My proximity to my subjects allowed me to fill in any gaps I encountered while transcribing and coding my interviews and fieldnotes.

Research Schedule

I carried out my research over an 11-month period starting in April 2013. This time frame allowed me to make observations and conduct interviews in at least 3 different settings, including Rio's Secretariat, among teachers (particularly those that participated in a three-month general strike), and among Teach For Brazil tutors. I planned to split my time relatively evenly between these three groups over the research period, to allow myself time to build trust and gather a sufficient amount of data among each group. In total, I conducted 10 interviews with Secretariat administrators (two interviews each with five different administrators), 40 with public school teachers (34 teachers were interviewed once, and three were interviewed twice) and 26 with nonprofit workers (all of whom were only interviewed once). I also conducted 26 participant observations during the teacher strike outlined in Chapter 5**.**

The following table outlines my general timeline for data collection[6]:

Table 2. Research Timetable.

April 2013 – May 2013	Make initial in-person contact with all three organizations, set up preliminary interviews
June 2013 – August 2013	Finish initial semi-structured interviews with all interview subjects; begin strike observations
September 2013	Finish coding of initial interviews and observations, develop further interview questions based on recurring themes; continue strike observations
October 2013 – February 2014	Conduct further interviews based on themes arising out of initial coded fieldnotes; finish strike observations
March 2014	Conduct final interviews with all research subjects

This time frame provided sufficient time to collect the data required to answer my research questions.

Proposed Location of Research and Justification

I conducted my research in Rio de Janeiro, necessarily so because it is the only city in which Teach For Brazil operated, but also due to the particular politics of Rio's current mayoral administration. As previously mentioned, Rio has to a large degree become "ground zero" for experimentation with new education reform models and ideas within Brazil, making it an ideal location for this study. This locality was imperative to my study shedding light on the academic experiences of poor students in one of Brazil's most dynamic and economically unequal cities.

Within this context, the culture and politics of Brazil impacted my work deeply. 20th century Brazilian history is a story of political unrest, despotic dictatorships, and stark inequality (Fausto, 1999; Thorp, 1998). Although democratically governed since 1985, Brazil has struggled to transition to a just society. For the last 60 years, expanded

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[6] The school year in Rio de Janeiro begins in January and ends in December.

opportunities in education have been a significant factor in social mobility (Bruns, Evans, & Luque, 2011). However, much of this expanded opportunity sprang from privatized channels denied to marginalized groups, so educational inequality still persists among racial minorities and low-income Brazilians (Vegas & Petrow, 2008). As previous private efforts in Brazil have not achieved change on a broad scale, there is an urgent need to investigate how organizations like Teach For Brazil, and private-friendly public sector administrations like the current Secretariat borrow North American models while this trend is still somewhat young and potentially open to necessary change.

Traveling abroad was crucial to execute my project responsibly, from an anthropological perspective. Subjective observation and face-to-face interaction remains the optimal way to encourage participants to describe their worlds in their own terms, so I could fully understand how and why their culture was created, evolved, and was maintained.

The study was conducted with 10 Secretariat administrators, 40 teachers and 25 nonprofit staff, across various areas and schools within Rio de Janeiro. To prepare for my research, I was in contact with the administrative staff of Teach For Brazil and several members of Rio's Secretariat who were familiar with my study plan. Based on my own prior research experience in formal school settings, I anticipated accommodation as I would not disturb regular instructional activities.

Getting to Rio: The Road to My Methods

The road to this dissertation began in 1990, when I first went to Brazil as an elementary school-aged child tagging along with my parents as they taught for a time at the University of São Paulo. I remember playing in the streets and learning Portuguese

from Brazilian *Turma da Mônica* comic books. Later on, in college, I chose to take two years off to serve as a volunteer educator in the Amazon region of Brazil, developing a love for the people of both Manaus and several smaller towns in *Amazonás*, like the fishing town of Itacoatiara.

When I returned to the U.S., I remember feeling a stronger sense of culture shock than I ever had upon leaving and felt like I left home in Brazil. I first began to realize this during my time in Manaus, when a friend and I met an Englishman desperate for some English conversation. I remember feeling caught off guard, as I hadn't spoken English in months—but English slowly came naturally again. After he left, my friend looked at me strangely and said, "You know, you're a different person when you're speaking English." I considered this and realized he was right—latent parts of my personality came stronger and more naturally when in Brazil, others in the U.S. I realized that I liked and felt at home in both—and upon returning to the U.S., I found myself missing my adopted Brazilian self and looking for chances to go back.

I studied abroad in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil through UT-Austin and found that I loved urban Afro-Brazil just as I had loved indigenous Amazonian Brazil. I returned to Salvador to do an ethnographic senior project studying a female-led urban community organization in the *bairro* of Candeal. All in all, I had lived around 4 years in Brazil prior to this study. In college I studied international development and led my university's organization for development-minded students, *Students for International Development*. Within the broader field of development, international education strongly appealed to me, and when I graduated I was offered a position in Mozambique for one year developing a Portuguese language health education curriculum for an American-based NGO called

Care For Life. I worked as their ethnographer, studying local culture as it applied to nutrition, sanitation, income generation and hygiene, and then using that data to generate culturally-appropriate lessons. I fell in love with education, and started looking for my next step.

By now this was 2007, and I came back to the U.S. and began teaching elementary school in New York City through Teach For America. During the two years I committed to teaching as a Teach For America corps member, I taught 4th grade in Washington Heights and then 3rd grade on the Navajo Reservation in New Mexico, putting in extra hours and working my hardest to help my students, in both cases the lowest-achieving students in their grades, to make drastic gains in their reading and math abilities and catch up to their peers. While in both cases my students did make significant gains in their abilities, results which gave me some of the greatest professional satisfaction I've felt in my adult life, the time and effort required by my school principals and my Teach For America supervisors to reach that point were extremely stressful. At the end of my two-year commitment, part of me was more than happy to move on to graduate school, leaving behind the anxiety dreams and early mornings that had typified my TFA experience. I left TFA very satisfied at what I had been accomplish in the classroom and very thankful to TFA for the role they played in making that experience possible, but also very interested in exploring how some of the lowest points of my own two years might be more easily avoided at the organizational level.

After Teach For America, I returned to academic study, pursuing a Master's degree in Latin American Studies at the University of Texas at Austin. While there, I first heard about Teach For Brazil and was fascinated—given my own time as an educator in Brazil

and as a teacher in the U.S. through TFA, I found myself wondering, what would a Brazilian version of TFA look like? How would the TFA model be adapted to function in a Brazilian context? Would participants in Teach For Brazil experience the same paradoxical feelings and issues I had while teaching through Teach For America? I found myself, at the same time, wishing Teach For Brazil all the best and worried about how it might play out, both in terms of how effective it would be in combating the inequalities I had come to know in the Brazilian educational system and the difficult personal issues its recruits might experience in the classroom.

As I began to look further into the case of Teach For Brazil, I saw that its adoption and adaptation of a U.S.-based organizational model was hardly an isolated phenomenon in Rio de Janeiro. I soon heard more concerning the current mayoral administration and Education Secretary Claudia Costin, and I then began to hear education policy people based in Rio engaged in similar education reform efforts. As time progressed, I began to note a trend that seemed worthy of documentation. U.S. organizational models and policy ideas seemed to have gained a certain cachet among innovative Brazilian policy officials and some nonprofit workers, and I wanted to understand why.

I include these elements of personal history because I feel they are essential to understanding the impetus for and drive behind this study. I take seriously the idea that my positionality and personal experiences are key in shaping the research agenda I pursue and the questions I ask. Through my personal experiences with the inequalities of the Brazilian educational system and the educational reform efforts of groups like TFA, I found myself asking significant questions about the efficacy of education reform, the motives behind policy transfer, and the feasibility of nonprofit efforts to address

educational inequities, in Brazil and the U.S. It is those questions which brought me to this work, and which will continue to direct my research agenda throughout my academic career.

Limitations of the Study

While this study addresses questions that have potentially global implications (namely, why do particular educational ideas travel?), it is necessarily limited in its geographic and organizational scope. Within an 11 month time frame, it would be quite difficult to explore the work of more than the three groups I have identified (Secretariat administrators, teachers and Teach For Brazil tutors) with the depth and breadth necessary for ethnographic work. With more time, the qualitative exploration of other similar efforts in Rio could further document the extent to which this trend of ideological borrowing is common throughout the city's education sector. However, lack of funds makes the extension of the time frame of this project difficult.

Also, by restricting the study geographically to Rio de Janeiro, a relatively unique cultural environment with a particularly friendly policy climate for education reform, the findings of this research are understandably not directly generalizable to a larger Brazilian or international context. However, I argue that the strengths of this study, particularly the rich and deep analysis it facilitates of pedagogical and policy thinking at various administrative levels within Rio de Janeiro, far outweigh these limitations.

Chapter 4

Teacher and Secretariat Views on Market Logic-Driven Reforms

The Rise of Neoliberal Education Reform in Brazil

In order to effectively explore this study's primary research question (that is, how *market logic* discourse factors into educational policymaking in Rio), it is first necessary to more fully document the history of neoliberalism within Brazilian education policy. The current mayoral administration of Rio is not the first to bring market-based reforms associated with neoliberalism to Brazilian education. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, president of Brazil from 1995 to 2002, is the politician most strongly associated with bringing neoliberal policies to Brazil (Mollo & Saad-Filho, 2006), whether in education or otherwise. However, many of Cardoso's most neoliberal educational policies, such as performance pay for teachers, went into effect well into the 2000s after the end of his tenure (Evangelista & Leher, 2012).

Other neoliberal policies, particular those that encourage market-like competition and accountability based on standardized tests (Afonso, 2009), were also encouraged at a national level by a number of prominent politicians throughout the 2000s. In 2005, under new education minister Fernando Haddad, the Brazilian Ministry of Education developed a national standardized test measuring student proficiency on basic competencies, referred to colloquially as the *Prova Brasil*, or "Brazil Test." That same year, the Ministry developed the Basic Education Development Index (*Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica*, or IDEB), a metric used to measure school-level progress for public schools throughout the country based on results of the *Prova Brasil* and grade-level passing rates, despite many municipalities expressing concerns that the IDEB at best

provides a simplistic look at educational quality (Franklin, 2011).

In 2006, a number of prominent politicians, management companies, banks, industrial groups and members of Brazilian civil society, including Haddad, founded the think tank *Todos Pela Educação* ("Everyone for Education"), an advocacy group calling for further implementation of accountability-based reforms modeled after the United States' No Child Left Behind Act (Martins, 2009). Many scholars have criticized *Todos Pela Educação* for its direct ties to corporate industry, and questioned the fact that calls for accountability-based reform in Brazil have consistently been supported by capitalist interests (Leme, 2011). Interestingly, a number of prominent Brazilian education policymakers have been affiliated with *Todos Pela Educação*, and a number of business and management professionals have begun their careers in education through the organization, including the last two national-level Secretaries of Basic Education and, most pertinent to the present case, the Secretary of Education for Rio de Janeiro during the time of this study, Claudia Costin (Evangelista & Leher, 2012).

Claudia Costin and the Paes Administration

Contrary to the national trend towards neoliberal education reform in Brazil through the 2000s, the mayoral administrations of Rio de Janeiro during this same period trended in a more populist direction, supporting traditional union interests in education rather than accountability-based reforms (Schwartzman, 2011). In 2009, this pattern ended with the election of Eduardo Paes, a center-right politician known for prioritizing accountability and business-like efficiency in government (Fajard, 2012). As his education secretary, Paes brought in Claudia Costin, a technocrat with a background in public administration and economics who had previously worked for the World Bank and

several private Brazilian foundations, been a management consultant for a number of former Portuguese colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa, and acted as Administration and Reform Minister under neoliberal Brazilian president Henrique Cardoso and Secretary of Culture in the southern state of São Paulo (Evangelista & Leher, 2012).

Costin was brought in due to her technocratic reputation for prioritizing data in her administrative decision-making and not being afraid to challenge traditional notions of public worker tenure in the name of efficiency and accountability (Schwartzman, 2011). In the first year of her term, several significant policy changes were put into place, such as the administration of an additional municipal standardized test, the creation of bonus pay incentives for schools that reach growth goals relative to this test, and the creation of the "Schools of Tomorrow" program. In the Schools of Tomorrow program, 155 schools with low IDEB scores in low-income, violent areas (Lucas, 2011; Lucas & Canen, 2011) were selected to implement an elongated school day, receive additional private afterschool programs and implement innovative curricula, in an effort to improve their test score performance (Pessoa & Vieira, 2013).

This Schools of Tomorrow program was based on the premise that in order to address the needs of the neediest schools, it is necessary to have more services and higher quality materials than are typically found in Rio public schools, and that such additions are only possible through external support and public-private partnerships (Gawryszewski, 2012). These additional services, including tutoring, cultural activities like dance and music, and sports teams were brought in to both maximize instructional time and keep children in vulnerable areas excited about school, thus reducing drop-out rates (Nolasco-Silva & Faria, 2013).

The Purpose of This Chapter

On the basis of this history, the focus of this chapter is to share the contrasting

perspectives of 5 Secretariat officials and 37 Rio public school teachers[7] on the policies

and perspectives of the current administration of Rio's Secretariat of Education. More

specifically, this chapter will explore these social actors perspectives' on the Secretariat

leadership's ties to accountability-based reform and the perceived *market logic* of the

current Secretariat, or its preference for private, market-based ideas and solutions for

educational inequality. The data presented from these interviews provide a fascinating

look at not only how neoliberal thinking and *market logic* have been enacted in Rio

education policy, but also at how public school teachers both support and resist that

thinking.

Rio's Secretariat Seen as Business-Led and Business-Minded

In the eyes of many of Rio's public school teachers, particularly those working in

the Schools of Tomorrow, their issues with the Paes and Costin administration can be

traced to one root issue: that Costin and other municipality-level education leaders are not

educators.

> Our Education Secretary, sadly, isn't an educator. She is an
> economist concerned with numbers, with statistical analyses.
> And it's not just her—at the state level, in other states like
> São Paulo as well, this is increasingly becoming the norm.
> (Raquel, 7/17)

The teachers I interviewed found this to be problematic because not being

educators, these managers of educational programs and departments weren't able to fully

understand how schools work, what successful teaching looks like, and other forms of

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[7] As noted in Chapter 3, these 5 Secretariat officials were each interviewed twice (resulting in a total of 10
administrator interviews) and three of the 37 teachers interviewed were also interviewed twice (resulting in
a total of 40 teacher interviews).

knowledge which teachers see as essential to managing education. One teacher put this quite simply: "Claudia Costin isn't an educator, she's a manager, an administrator. So why is she the head of education, when she doesn't know what life in schools is like, what the needs are?" (Renata, 8/30). Another teacher extended this logic to all those who are brought into the Secretariat from non-education backgrounds:

> There are a lot of people today working in curriculum writing, in educational projects, even at the government level that were never teachers and have never worked in education previously. We want to avoid this, to curb this tendency, which you see in city government, at the state level, even at the national level. I've worked on lots of committees and teams at the Secretariat, and there is an incredible difference when the team is made up of schools and principals, people with experience, and when all the other people besides me have backgrounds in management, economics and so forth. These folks are very smart, they're very analytical, but they simply don't know what it is like. They don't know how to design something that will reflect the reality on the ground and work in that context, in an actual school, because they've never been there. (Paulo, 7/2)

To many teachers I interviewed, this not only makes work difficult (as Paulo [7/2] pointed out), it feels like a personal slight. After all, with so many public employees with rich and extensive backgrounds in schools on the ground, why are people brought in from other sectors to manage them when they don't understand how schools work, and push agendas that don't seem likely to work to those with experience? In the words of Fabiana (1/8),

> I'm very critical of the fact that the main education leader in Rio, Claudia Costin, is an economist rather than an educator. As an economist, her focus is on statistics, measurable quantitative goals, pushing actions that will meet those goals. And education doesn't work that way, we who work on the ground know that it doesn't work that way. And this is incredibly frustrating, to be an educator, to know from decades of experience how our schools work, and to then

have economists and management experts who don't think pedagogically, who don't have any sense of history and what we've been doing for years, who just came in with the current administration and have never worked in education before, telling us to do this that and the other and to do it now, now, now, wanting results that prove that this administration is doing it right. They want it all yesterday, all these tests, tests, tests. And if we don't do well on their tests, designed by them, then we're pointed out and shamed into doing better. Is it any wonder that teachers and school staff feel unmotivated and unappreciated in this climate?

When I brought this up with Robson (7/2), a former school teacher and current mid-level manager within Rio's Secretariat, he was quick to remind me that he was still a licensed teacher, identified himself as such, and thought Rio's teachers were amazing, "the backbone" of all the Secretariat's work. However, he also was quick to defend the influx of management professionals as a necessary counterbalance:

Truthfully, I think the ideal is to have equilibrium between these two strengths, those with management backgrounds and those with educational backgrounds. We really can't, and try hard not to, look down on the experience of those who really understand and know schools on the ground. After all, if we bring in someone who is wholly a manager, who has a lot of experience in the private sector but none in public schools, and don't bring in any educators to help him, he'll only be able to skate on the surface, as well say, he won't know what to do. He might have huge, wonderful ideas, but he won't know how to put them into practice. At the same time, though, we need people with management experience because we need to lead and manage this huge public school system we have. Rio's Secretariat is the biggest school district in Latin America, and it needs to be managed. Look at me as an example: I was in public schools for years as a teacher, then I came to the Secretariat, and now to combine these two worlds I'm getting an MBA in project management. I sought this training because I understand the need for this equilibrium, that it isn't enough just to understand schools, that I need to understand management techniques, that I need theoretical and academic knowledge to improve my practice as a manager. (Robson, 7/2)

This rhetoric of the necessity of managers is reflected in the reality that all of the

current administration's leaders within Rio Secretariat, all of those in the highest

positions, came from management backgrounds and were not educators:

> The Secretariat in large part is made up of people that are
> teachers. That is, they were teachers and now they are in
> bureaucratic "desk jobs." That said, all of those in leadership
> positions are people with degrees in management,
> economics, marketing. All of them have degrees outside of
> education, and the sense you get is that people with these
> backgrounds are thought to be more capable, more able to
> think big. (Andréia, 9/26)

> Specifically, if you look at Secretary Costin's background,
> and that of her main sub-secretaries, those that are
> responsible for the big projects and such, they have degrees
> in communication, administration, management, economics.
> So the secretary is surrounded by people at the closest level
> that think a certain way, that think like managers. You see
> this at lower levels, too, those that are brought in to run new
> projects, like the Schools of Tomorrow a few years ago and
> similar projects these days, all of these new people are
> economists, marketing specialists and so forth. When all of
> the top positions are given to people with these backgrounds,
> people with particular training, and for that matter a
> complete lack of understanding of school routines, of what it
> is like to run a classroom—it sends a clear message. Those
> that really understand schools aren't invited to make the big
> decisions on how to run schools. (Lorena, 10/12)

A number of teachers I interviewed expressed frustration with this state of things,

feeling to a certain degree that there was a glass ceiling for them in terms of career

advancement unless they (like Robson [7/2]) sought out management training. In

Tatiane's (6/2) words,

> Teachers don't really have a career path in the system right
> now. There is no career track to move from classroom
> teacher to management, even at the school level. There's a
> lack of long-distance planning for teachers, in part because I
> simply think the Secretariat doesn't think much about

teachers, and doesn't think much of them. Their actions speak quite clearly that they don't think teachers and educators are capable of bringing new ideas into their planning meetings, of contributing anything to the education of our children at the city level. Economists and managers aren't the only ones with thoughts: teachers are capable of being a real part of this process, too.

As can be seen in Tatiane's words, many teachers feel that their experience or expertise isn't respected. This, unfortunately, is not seen as something new that arose with the current Secretariat administration, but rather as a deep-set societal reality of the low status given in Brazil to the education profession:

The mentality has to change. Unfortunately, most Brazilians think that teachers don't do anything, that they just have their daily routine, sit at their desk drinking coffee. And we know that isn't our reality. (Amanda, 9/25)

I understand that people simply don't know much about our work, but I feel bad for the people that don't know and still judge us as lesser for choosing to be teachers. (Patrícia, 9/19)

The reality is that people don't think much of education as a profession. That bothers me, that people think of teachers as being little more than babysitters. That says a lot about what the public really thinks of public schools. (Livia, 10/2)

I hate when I hear people talk about teachers as lazy, as teaching being an easy job that doesn't take work. When I hear this, I tell people, "I'm at X school, classroom number Y, go there tomorrow morning and see how you do. I want to see if you'll last a day. After that, you can tell me whether teachers are lazy or not." It drives me crazy. People look at, say, a businessman with an MBA or a doctor with their degree and think that that person studied a lot and deserves respect. Well, I also studied a lot, and I also deserve respect. (Larissa, 5/25)

While the teachers I interviewed had to an extent become accustomed to these attitudes among the general population, it particularly bothered them to see the same

attitudes come from their superiors within the Secretariat of Education. Several

administrators, for example, implied a similar value judgment about the relative value of

management knowledge vis-a-vis pedagogical knowledge when they said:

> If you ask me, what's really lacking in schools is
> management. A bit more management among the educators.
> If you are an educator, but have a manager's background,
> then your school will function much better. When we have
> principals that have management training, that manage well
> their student organizations, their teachers, their parent
> committees, then that school gets along just fine. There is a
> clear difference, one you can see, when you compare a
> school with a principal that has a background in education,
> no matter how good they are at that, and one with a principal
> that has a background in management. The difference is
> night and day. (Vinicius, 7/10)

> This is, in my experience, a universal truth: good
> management makes all the difference. Good management
> lets you solve your problems in a reasonable time frame with
> reasonable costs. It makes it possible to reduce your costs.
> This is completely different from an administration mindset
> where you focus on other priorities, where you neglect
> planning, you neglect indicators and other measures, and
> you really don't have any idea whether your work is helping
> or not. (Robson, 7/2)

Such statements sent a clear message: that management knowledge was more

necessary for good school functioning than pedagogical knowledge or classroom

experience, and that management knowledge was more highly prized and valued than that

associated with education. They also sent a secondary message: that in order to function

as the Secretariat desired, current teachers and principals should seek out opportunities to

learn to become managers, to transition in their professional identity from educator to

manager. Caio (8/5), a former teacher, embodied this transition: he was a former teacher,

and yet the language he used to refer to teaching seemed very economic and market-

based. For example, at one point he referred to the knowledge students must gain in the

classroom as a "good" to be acquired, and then described students as "consumers" rather than learners (Caio, 8/5).

This line of thinking reflects another facet of *market logic*: that is, not only are ideas and services provided by the private sector assumed to be better than those provided by public institutions, but individuals with backgrounds in the private sector are assumed to be superior to those with backgrounds in public service in their ability to manage the public sector itself. According to *market logic*, then, the best way to improve the efficacy and efficiency of the public sector is to make it more like private enterprise, a task best suited to those with business backgrounds.

When I asked Caio what he thought of teachers that did not agree with the entrance of market-based rhetoric and practices into public education, and that felt their input as experienced educators was not being taken into account, his tone became quite firm, insisting that the Secretariat does listen to teachers, while at the same time making it clear that the Secretariat would continue to do what it thought best even if teachers disagreed:

> Yes, there are management-types working here at the Secretariat, but they are always connecting with people on the ground to hear what the district wants. It's a complicated situation in several aspects, because there is the political side. I'm not talking about party politics, but the relational politics of helping people, like teachers, understand what the district really needs. Sometimes we need to take positions that teachers won't like, that won't be very pleasing to them, but honestly we need to think first about students and our responsibility to our students, their parents, and the population as a whole. No-one here is trying to make teachers' lives harder, on the contrary we're here to support them as much as possible to make their work easier. But we also can't please everyone, and there will always be some teachers that aren't satisfied, even when all the measures we take are for the bettering of our schools and the benefit of

our students. (Caio, 8/5)

He then went on to cite the specific example of standardized testing, which has

significantly increased under Costin's administration, along with bonus programs that

reward schools with large test score gains:

> We understand that some of these measures might put more
> pressure on teachers, like the case of the tests. In past
> administrations we didn't have a clear vision of what
> students were learning across the district, so Claudia
> [Costin] put together this new standardized test system, and
> she applied it to the whole district, so that with those test
> results we could have some sense of where we were having
> problems. But some teachers don't agree with these tests,
> they think it's an imposition, a means of control. But it is an
> imposition that facilitates management and good resource
> distribution. If you can see in the test scores that in a certain
> subject, one school is having trouble, then we can approach
> that school and try to understand what the problem is. Not to
> over-manage them, but to help the school meet their goal.
> And lots of times, teachers don't understand that this helps
> students, that this helps us improve educational quality.
> (Caio, 8/5)

In truth, most of the teachers I interviewed did oppose these standardized test

reforms, in large part because they did not agree that such tests helped students or

improved educational quality. To many of the teachers I interviewed, this focus on

numbers and statistics as a means of measuring quality was the root of the problem:

> Public education today is obsessed with test results. They
> focus so much on testing students, and say it is for their
> benefit, but all they focus on then is test results. We don't
> talk about quality, about how to teach a good lesson, how to
> help students actually learn. Better test results don't lead to
> improvement in quality, as much as they might need these
> results to defend their practices politically. (Raquel, 7/17)

The crux of this difference of opinion between Secretariat managers and teachers

was a different understanding of what "quality" meant, and how to measure it. In the eyes

of Secretariat managers like Robson, the metrics available from standardized test results,

and the ability to follow those to measure improvements, are a crucial measure of

improved "quality:"

> The Secretariat's priority is to improve student learning. This
> is all we work towards, all the time, making sure students
> learn what they really need for their lives. All of our actions,
> all of these tests, all of the measures to monitor results and
> use those results to determine what we need to work on, all
> of them are focused on improving educational quality so that
> we can improve student learning. All of our metrics, the new
> tests, all of it has been put in place to improve the quality of
> the product we offer to our clients, our students. (Robson,
> 7/2)

In this quote, Robson made it quite clear that he perceived standardized test results to be

an accurate and efficient measure of student learning. As outlined in the current literature

(Auld & Morris, 2014; Fischman & Terefa, 2014), this is a common sentiment among

education policymakers in the U.S., Europe and throughout the world. Robson's

articulation of this claim is particularly rich with *market logic*, as his language (e.g.

references to the work done by the Secretariat as a "product" and students being referred

to as "clients") also implied a very market-oriented way of understanding education and

the educational work done by the Secretariat.

It is precisely this market-oriented way of looking at education, what I earlier

referred to as market-based logic, that many teachers I interviewed felt was at fault.

Several teachers expressed feeling that a market or business-oriented approach did not fit

in public education:

> This business system—I don't think it fits very well in
> education. I have issues with the current administration on
> this point. I don't see education in this way. I'll still work
> with them, I'll do what is possible that I can do, but I think
> that in this type of reform you end up doing a disservice to

and leaving behind the children that most need it, because when you are measured by your numbers it's easier to find a way to leave out those children rather than help them. (Amanda, 9/25)

I agree with other teachers that criticize this focus on test results. You see clearly, here in Rio, at the state level, the national level, that the public common sense is getting closer and closer to what is considered common sense by the private sector, especially in this focus on using statistics and metrics to measure results. In education, statistics will never measure true results, they can't. Each child is singular, each person is different. There are structural differences between the contexts in which students learn, students begin at different points, they don't all start on an equal playing field. And they don't account for that in their metrics. Education for me is a process that permeates your entire life, and if you just focus on test results, what are you really measuring? Just what someone memorized in preparation for that testing moment? It doesn't work. For me we would be better served by teaching students how to address the different situations they will encounter in life, rather than just reducing them to numbers. (Jeferson, 4/21)

As Jeferson mentioned, one of the primary concerns of teachers is that the Secretariat's current focus on test results has gone so far as to leave concerns relative to pedagogy and learning left unaddressed. While agreeing that management in general is helpful in school settings, several teachers felt that the focus on management and metrics had become myopic, leaving out any other considerations:

This seems like a general trend, this focus on management, this idea that principals and teachers should all be managers. My current principal is a manager more than a principal— his degree is in management, and he forgets about pedagogy almost entirely. He just focuses on test results, sitting in his office worried about getting our numbers up as a school. He doesn't say things like, "Look everyone, let's do some interesting work that will help our students learn," he doesn't seem worried about that at all. He's focused on what is demanded of him by his superiors, which means he's focused entirely on numbers. (Marina, 5/8)

54

The Secretariat of Rio de Janeiro, in this quest for higher
numbers, keeps harping on this idea that principals, and
administrators in general, should all be managers. I agree to
this to an extent, I think good administrators are good
managers. But they can't *just* be managers, you know?
(Renan, 9/3)

In addition to their concern about the current Secretariat's focus on management

and test results, another reform policy implemented under Costin that troubled teachers

was a bonus program in which schools that reach certain growth goals in their test results

received salary bonuses for that year. This policy was generally referred to as the

"meritocracy policy:" rather than have one general growth goal for the all schools in the

district, individual schools' growth goals were based on that school's previous

performance, thus supporting the Secretariat's assertion that all schools meritocratically

had an equal chance to earn the bonus. A number of teachers found the presumption that

this system was truly meritocratic to be false and misleading, particularly Jeferson (4/21):

This logic of meritocracy, man, meritocracy doesn't exist.
Meritocracy for who? No-one begins in the same place—
even if you use previous test scores as the basis for schools'
goals, how can you take someone raised in Leblon [one of
Rio's richest neighborhoods], who had parents who read to
them at night every night, who heard high vocabulary from a
young age, and who studied at Santo Inacio [a well-known
private school], and say that the same test will equally
measure their performance alongside someone who was
born in a nearby *favela*, had parents that had to work all the
time and were hardly ever able to be home, and studied at
the local public school that didn't have running water and
sent their students home half the time? I don't care what
algorithm you use to try to even out those inequalities, the
same test will never equally judge the knowledge of kids
separated by that much social inequality. (Jeferson, 4/21)

Jeferson here exposes one of the flaws with *market logic*-based policies in Rio: their

failure to take context into account. That is, while it theoretically makes sense for the

school district to use a single test to evaluate all students, such a model fails to recognize how socially privileged students may have access to score-improving resources that poor students do not. As a result, even hard-working students may not be able to reach district goals due to circumstances beyond their control.

As another part of the meritocracy platform, the current Secretariat had begun publishing schools' test results in local newspapers. While defended as a transparency measure, teachers also took issue with the competition and stigma that this created for low-performing schools in poor neighborhoods:

> This kind of policy has horrible consequences. Rio has never had such an intense ranking policy before. Today they make the message very clear, "Just look at the rankings, School A is marvelous, School B is okay, School C is mediocre." And all on the basis of test results, test results are held supreme in this ranking, they are the basis for everything, for the school bonuses, for everything. That may sound like a good policy in a board room downtown, but at the school level, it means you have teachers who feel that one measure determines their value to society. It creates a lot of pressure to perform, and understandably, though unfortunately, teachers pass that on to students. You have teachers discriminating against students, telling parents that their kids are no good and should go elsewhere because they're worried about looking good, about the effects on their ranking. (Fabiana, 1/8)

Some teachers worried about the effect such policies had on instruction, as school leaders felt pressure to push test preparation in the classroom as a priority over the regular curriculum, resulting in classrooms where students memorize facts for tests, but don't seem to really learn. As Renan (9/3) stated, "the problem with this focus on tests is that it leads students to memorize instead of learn. They just memorize, memorize, blurt out that information on the test, and then don't remember anything afterwards." Marina (5/8) similarly noted, "Students don't remember anything of what they memorize for these

tests. If you do your job well and raise scores, sure, you get a higher ranking—but

students don't really learn." One young man who tutored in the Schools of Tomorrow

through the NGO Teach For Brazil saw himself in his students as he pushed test

preparation skills, remembering his own experience of studying for a college entrance

exam:

> I look at my students while I'm leading through old practice
> tests and I see myself. I was also turned into a number, when
> I was finishing high school and I was preparing for the
> *vestibular*[8], I took an expensive private study course. They
> did this whole thing, almost like brainwashing, where you
> stay there all day memorizing what you need for the test,
> and then after the test you forget it all, because you don't
> need or use any of that information in your actual life. That's
> what I see happening in the low-income schools we work in,
> kids who are in most need of education are just being trained
> to answer standardized tests! What they really need is to
> learn to reason, to think critically, to see things from
> different perspectives, to understand differing arguments.
> The current test prep emphasis gives them none of that.
> (Jeferson, 4/21)

Several teachers worried about their students and the effect of high-stakes testing on

them. For one teacher, her concern was with students that don't test well, feeling that they

are left behind and unaccounted for in the current political climate. Another teacher felt

that high-stakes testing hurts all children, leaving behind a focus on learning. In their

words,

> I know I have complete autonomy over my grades, but the
> thing is, if a kid in my class gets a grade that is significantly
> different than what they got on the test, I'm asked to come in
> and explain myself. They assume that either I made up the
> grade, or I'm crazy, or I'm incompetent because I didn't teach
> the material well enough for them to do well on the test. But
> it's not like that—there are simply children that don't do well
> on tests, despite being brilliant, ones that get nervous, that
> even throw up on test days because they're so nervous.

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[8] A general term for Brazilian college entrance exams.

Others whose parents get on their case when they learn there will be a test, and so the child shows up terrified about doing badly. We're terrifying our children with this pressure, when in reality some people just don't do well on tests—I've had friends that have tried to get public sector jobs time after time, and were really smart, but didn't get them because the public sector jobs always include a test, and they get nervous. Yet I passed and got this teaching job—does that inherently mean I'm smarter than them? No, it means I'm better at test-taking. There are so many people out there that are so much smarter than what they show on tests, yet all we're measuring, all that seems to matter, are the test results. It's scary, when you sit in your classroom and wonder: Am I wasting all this time on something that, with it comes to actual learning, what I came here wanting to help child do: doesn't even really matter? (Livia, 10/2)

I realize that given current circumstances, I need to prepare students for these tests, I have to respond to these pressures to perform on the test, or I lose my job. I have to establish quantitative goals and work to reach them, I have to do whatever's necessary, whatever it takes. My question is, really, is this helping our students? Is it really helping *anyone*? With all this pressure we stop thinking of students as students, as people with individual needs and concerns. They become metrics to be increased. (Amanda, 9/25)

What several teachers found most tragic and ironic was that the current

Secretariat's focus on standardized test results, and the ranking and bonus policies that

have come from that focus, do not even necessarily succeed in producing real gains in

test scores. Rather, the high stakes associated with those tests have primarily produced a

huge incentive to cheat:

These reforms feel like impositions. Things didn't need to be like this, so extremely business-oriented, crammed into this business framework that doesn't really produce success in education. To be more specific, I'm talking about the business-based benefit system they use: that who produces results gets rewarded, and who doesn't receives no reward. Education doesn't work like that. Like I've told you, the teachers at our school, or any school, get an extra 14% annual bonus if the school reaches its growth goal. Is it nice

to get a 14% bonus? Sure, it's great getting a 14% bonus. Who doesn't like extra money? The problem is that this confounds things, it's based on some pretty big assumptions about our motives. This whole idea is based on the idea that teachers aren't already doing their best for kids to raise their scores and reach their growth goals. And ironically, with these bonuses, you create your own problem, giving teachers a motive to make up scores, to make up grades. You see schools whose scores come out in the paper and they're incredible, the growth looks staggering, but it's all made up for show, it's as we say here, "for the Englishmen to see." When if you visit that school and really look at the quality of education in that building, you'll see it's nothing like what you would expect from their reported growth margin. (Bruna, 11/13)

Other teachers reported how they had seen individual teachers and school officials cheat

so as to improve their test scores:

You see this in classrooms, teachers giving students the answers, teachers changing students' answers before turning in the tests. Anything so that at the end of the day your school looks good when the results come out, and you're up on top. (Amanda, 9/25)

You really do see this at the school level, schools that don't fail anyone. And you see the Secretariat applauding for them, because according to the logic of the business world, the way they think and work, this looks great, it looks like success, when in reality it doesn't mean you did anything. (Andressa, 12/10)

I'm not naïve enough to think that everyone is honest with their test results. If your school earned its 14% bonus, that means nothing—it doesn't mean you really made a difference for your students. What it usually means is you cheated, you told the kids with difficulties to stay home and only invited the best students to come on test day, or you sent your slowest kids to another class at the beginning of the year so you wouldn't have to account for their test results. (Livia, 10/2)

It's simple how it's done: kids that should be held back aren't, kids that didn't learn anything are passed along to the next grade, kids that won't do well on the test aren't allowed to

take the test. This way, a school looks beautiful, 0% of
students are held back, test results look good, at least for
those that were allowed to take it. It all looks beautiful for
the Secretariat. And everyone thinks that school is good. But
nothing really happened, nothing really was taught, and next
year no-one will know anything. But in the end, who cares?
We got our 14%. (Luiza, 2/15)

These teachers here articulate a clear critique of market-based monetary incentives for

improving test scores: rather than promote real improvement, they provide a powerful

motive to cheat. While the policy aligns with *market logic* (i.e. if bonuses work as an

incentive to increase productivity in private business settings, they will similarly work in

public schools), these teachers' personal experiences clearly show that *market logic*-based

policy in this case does not necessarily result in genuinely improved test scores, much

less increased learning.

For some teachers, with time the process of trying to still provide quality

instruction when all they feel is pressure to raise test scores becomes exhausting. Livia

(10/2) worried about burning out, because she felt like she wasn't able to really teach and

practice her craft, and her kids weren't able to learn, because that learning wasn't what her

higher-ups wanted:

At the end of the day, the Secretariat wants to see you meet
your growth goal. You add the monetary incentive, and it
gets worse, people think, "Okay, well, we'll do what need to
do," even if that isn't legal, even if it hurts kids. I feel this
every time these tests come around: I feel like I've spent
years trying to help parents recognize the value of my work,
and then the Secretariat comes in and says all that matters is
test scores, and not only that but you'll get a financial reward
for good test scores. So even if you've got years of training
and experience in how to teach a quality lesson, here comes
the Secretariat saying "No, you're wrong, teach to the test,
please." It makes you want to give up—and I'm not even
against tests, I understand the role of tests, I'm not all that
radical. But the weight they have in the current

administration—it makes you want to throw up your hands. This isn't why I became a teacher, to teach test prep. (Livia, 10/2)

For a number of teachers I interviewed, it was precisely this burn-out and feeling of pressure to teach contrary to one's experience and training that made them wish their supervisors, especially at the Secretariat level, were educators that could understand their concerns:

This is precisely why I think the Education Secretary should be an educator, should be trained in education, should have had a long career in education and really understand it. I know Claudia Costin has a great CV for her area and discipline, that she has a lot of experience in her area, but to be an administrator in education you need to be an educator. You need to have known what it's like to work in a school, to spent sleepless nights on piles of student work in your classroom, to have experienced the frustrations and joys of leading students to knowledge. People who have done that, people who understand what we do, they understand that education isn't a matter of numbers, it is a matter of *people, of children*. If you quantify children as test scores, you stop thinking of them as students, as people. They become just numbers, and their humanity disappears. A child is no longer Tiago from your third period, a real child you've known and accompanied and helped along through their development, a child with a family, with a name, with quirks and problems. Tiago becomes Student number one thousand two hundred and whatever, a number with no humanity. That is not how education works. I wish we had a Secretary that understood that. (Patrícia, 9/19)

As it stood, during the time of data collection nearly all of the teachers I interviewed expressed not feeling heard by the current administration (to the point, as will be shown in Chapter 5, that the teacher's union went on strike). In the eyes of interviewed teachers, all of these reforms that have been discussed were handed down from the Secretariat in a very authoritarian manner, without opportunities for teachers to provide input or give their opinions. In their words,

All of us, being human, try things and err. And we need to
recognize those moments and do our best to make up for
them. The difference with the current Secretariat is there is
no effort to recognize or make up for errors: things that don't
work continue in force, even when teachers expressed
frustration with them and showed that they aren't working.
All of these reforms that have come in with Paes and Costin,
they've all been completely top-down. We didn't participate
at all. As a general rule, this administration only checks in
with teachers *after* implementing their ideas. I think it
should be the opposite: they should check in with us before
starting to get our feedback, rather than have this attitude of
"Do what you're told." (Erika, 4/25)

The current Education Secretary doesn't engage in dialogue
with teachers or with the teachers' union. There is no bridge
or means of communication between the Secretariat and
teachers. It's almost funny, Claudia Costin got a Twitter
account, and announced it as if it would be the solution to
this, the way anyone should interact with her. Instead, it's
mainly been a way for her to blow off those that approach
her in person: she just says, "Send me a tweet." Really?
You're only willing to listen to 140 characters? (Fabiana,
1/8)

I get the feeling that the city almost comes up with ways to
avoid listening to us. Like they engage just enough to keep
us working, you know? [Laughs] If anyone brings up an
issue with them, they come back offering something else:
"This isn't what you wanted, but here it is, get back to work
please." (Emanuele, 4/29)

One teacher resented that Secretariat officials seemed to use test data as a form of

evidence, a way of saying that their reforms were good because the data support them. In

short, he resented that the Secretariat seemed to trust data more than its own teachers'

experiences and voices:

The current Secretariat is not at all democratic. Almost
authoritarian, really. Instead of leaders coming up from the
ranks of teachers, or even at least listening to teachers, they
keep bringing in these business outsiders with technocratic
ideas that have never seen the inside of a classroom. And
those ideas keep getting funded and implemented, even

when teachers protest, because they claim the data back
them up. (Diogo, 6/15)

While Diogo's resentment is understandable, the Secretariat's view of test scores as being

a more reliable metric than teachers' personal experiences aligns perfectly with *market*

logic: in business, the most important measure of success is an increased profit. In the

present case, the Secretariat sees increased profits (in the form of increasing test scores):

while teachers may not like the means to that end, it is the end, the bottom line, that truly

matters.

"Proven" Outside Models

According to the officials I had the chance to interview within the Secretariat,

they did not see themselves as unwilling to listen. Rather, they had a more technocratic

sensibility and seemed to trust "best practices," or models that had a "proven" success

record elsewhere, even if they triggered some teacher resistance:

> I understand that some teachers do not like some of the ideas
> we have implemented. But the thing is, these are not just our
> ideas—we didn't just pick them out of the air. All of these
> reforms, the testing, the bonuses, the growth goals, all of
> these are ideas that have already been tried and tested
> elsewhere, and they worked. These are proven best
> practices, they work, which is why we chose them. And
> they're working here, we see our numbers improving. I can
> understand some teachers feeling growing pains as they get
> used to these reforms, but the data show they're working,
> and we're not going to stop just because some people have to
> learn something new. (Vinicius, 7/10)

Reflecting similar comments from other Secretariat officials mentioned earlier, Vinicius

makes clear here precisely what metrics matter to the Secretariat: evaluative studies that

show a policy or model as producing results in other contexts, and similar quantitative

results in Rio schools. Though Rio school teachers (as illustrated in this chapter) question

those metrics, Secretariat officials put more trust in evaluative studies and improved test

scores than teachers' opinions or personal experiences.

Interestingly, several officials specifically mentioned Claudia Costin and Eduardo

Paes' experiences abroad as their inspiration for looking outside of Rio for "proven"

reform models:

> Claudia Costin has visited China, she's visited the United
> States, she's seen some [reform models and ideas] in these
> areas that are working and that looked like they could work
> here. In truth, Claudia knows a lot of educational models
> from all over the world, and why wouldn't anyone with that
> kind of knowledge not want to bring it here, so it can help
> us? (Robson, 7/2)

> I really think it's Costin's experiences abroad, her
> experiences especially in Canada, where she lived, but also
> in the United States, other countries with strong reform
> movements right now. The mayor even, he's also had a lot of
> international experience, and with that comes experience,
> comes knowledge of projects that have been tried and
> proven the world over, and if those models have best
> practices that could help us here, we bring them, we apply
> them to our local reality. (Caio, 8/5)

Here Robson and Caio outline what Phillips and Ochs (2003, 2004) refer to as the period

of "cross-national attraction:" Paes and Costin saw reform models during their

international travels that appealed to them, and upon returning to Rio they sought ways to

adapt those policies to their local context.

A number of non-formal teachers working in the Schools of Tomorrow have noted

the same trend. Interestingly, they both work for an NGO called Teach For Brazil which,

as will be outlined further in Chapter 7 adapted Teach For America's organizational

model from the United States with the Secretariat's support:

> Truthfully, this administration really prides itself on bringing
> in models from elsewhere, they don't hide it, they make it

very clear that they are transplanting something from somewhere else. To them this is a feature, because it already worked someplace, and there are ostensibly studies that support this. They use this, honestly, to sell the new reform the same way a company sells a product, and people "buy" it when they are shown what seems to be proof that the product will work. It's a business model of reform, really. (Marcio, 6/28)

They bring models in from everywhere—lots from the United States, but not only, sometimes they even bring models from other states in Brazil. What's important to them is that there is proof that the model already worked. (Andréia, 9/26)

As Robson and Caio stated, several teachers also noted that these models often come from outside Brazil, and most especially tend to be based on education reform models first popularized in the United States:

Lots of these recent reforms have been influenced by foreign ideas. The economists working at the Secretariat especially love to cite the reforms that happened in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, American cities like that. When the new tests came in, they cited these examples. When the bonuses started, and the published rankings started, they also cited American examples that supposedly proved that meritocracy works. (Diogo, 6/5)

It's pretty clear that they are trying to reproduce external models. Whenever a new idea is proposed, examples of foreign cities are brought up to show that these new ideas aren't untested, that they have worked before. (Lorena, 10/12)

One reason teachers thought this type of policy borrowing occurred is because of the rhetoric of global competition that has arisen alongside international tests like the PISA. That is, some teachers felt that the Secretariat adopted international models as an attempt to better compete with the countries that produced those models:

What ends up happening is, you have these global rankings, you have the PISA, you have all these things. So when you

look, Brazil's education rankings are down at the bottom of the list when these rankings and test results come out. So our officials feel like we have to do something, and the national Minister of Education comes out saying, "We scored badly in Subjects A, B, and C, so we need to focus on those." And then that comes down to the local government here, they get the mandate to do something and they plan these reforms as a way of improving our results on these tests. The problem is that the reforms we've gotten aren't improving our teaching. They improve our rankings, and our test results, which is fine I guess, improving test scores and rankings isn't nothing, it'll contribute somehow to improving education. But improving test results doesn't necessarily mean our teaching has gotten any better. That's what's frustrating. (Camila, 8/26)

In all of my interviews with teachers, I was surprised by how consistently such interviews would begin with their efforts to understand and empathize with the Secretariat's leadership and their potential motivations for their reforms. Phrasing like "I can see where the Secretariat is coming from," or "I can understand why this policy would look appealing" were quite common. Especially given those efforts, however, several teachers saw it as quite frustrating that these efforts at empathy did not seem to be reciprocated. In the words of Renata (8/30), "All of these reforms have been imposed, and what hurts most is the Secretariat doesn't even try to understand our side. We have experience, but they don't seem to see it as legitimate. Which makes it hard to see them as legitimate leaders of ours."

Conclusion

The primary purpose of this chapter has been to examine the enactment of *market logic*-based reforms in Rio de Janeiro through the eyes of public school teachers. As has been shown throughout this chapter, Rio teachers generally recognized that recent reforms put forward under Costin's administration of the Secretariat of Education have

been based primarily in *market logic*, or the perceived superiority of notions of management that come from business and the private sector. More specifically, teachers recognized that current Secretariat officials see business experience as superior to classroom experience, improved test scores as an ideal measure of student learning and monetary incentives as an effective way to improve test scores.

Further, teachers felt that their experience and knowledge were not recognized by the current administration, as current positions in administration, curriculum-writing and so forth tend to be occupied by individuals with backgrounds in business and management rather than education. While interviewed teachers understood these tendencies given the background of the current Secretary and her top deputies, the tendency of the Secretariat to consistently prioritize business experience and *market logic* over the voices and input of career educators was difficult for Rio's teachers to accept.

When it came to specific *market logic*-based policies, interviewed Rio teachers were openly resistant: in their lived experience, administrators with business backgrounds did not understand classroom and school dynamics, standardized testing did not effectively measure student learning, and monetary incentives for improved test scores only resulted in falsified gains. In short, teachers felt that the reforms put forward by the current administration did not produce genuine improvements in school management or student learning.

In interviews with Secretariat officials, it was clear that they had already heard these criticisms. In response, Secretariat administrators defended their reforms on the basis of documented increases in test performance and studies that had technocratically "proven" such models' efficacy in other contexts, particularly the United States. In other

words, it was not that teacher criticisms were not heard: Secretariat officials simply gave more weight in their decision-making to evaluative studies and test scores than they gave to first-person experiences. The Secretariat, in this case, is clearly basing their policy decisions in *market logic*, enacting policies that emphasize quantifiable gains and that utilize monetary incentives. While teachers understandably felt frustrated that their day-to-day experiences with these reforms were dismissed as anecdotal and subjective, that dismissal made perfect sense within a *market logic* framework that prioritizes objectivity and measurable improvement.

As will be shown in the following chapter, these struggles with reforms based in *market logic* eventually reached a breaking point: in this case, a 77 day-long strike protesting Costin's policies and the lack of teacher voice in their implementation.

Chapter 5

On Strike: Teachers Rejecting Market Logic

"Unfortunately in Brazil the only
way to change things is to mobilize.
Mobilization, protest, we don't have
any other mechanism for social
change. If it weren't for protests like
this, it would take 4 or 5 more years
just to get where we are now. You
either protest, or you put up with
it." (Luciana, 10/4)

Partially in response to increasing frustration with *market logic*-derived reforms

such as those described in Chapter 4, on August 8, 2013, teachers in Rio de Janeiro's

municipal-run schools decided to strike.[9] The immediate reason for the strike was the

recently proposed and city-administration-designed *Plano de Cargos e Salários dos*

Professores (hereafter referred to as PCSP), a new salary and promotion plan for the

city's teachers. While this proposed plan offered ostensible salary increases, teachers and

the teachers union objected to the proposal because it only applied to teachers already

working in a teaching position that requires them to put in 40 hours a week in the same

school, which only describes 10% of the current teacher corps.[10] While the city

simultaneously is working to transition all city teachers to 40-hour schedules, and claims

it will have done so by 2018 (thus making the salary increases available to all teachers by

that point), teachers claimed that the change unfairly made salaries unequal during the

five-year transition period, and also forced teachers to accept a schedule change that

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[9] Traditionally, in the city of Rio de Janeiro the state runs secondary schools while the municipality, whose
Secretariat is that run by Claudia Costin, is responsible for primary schools (which cover up through the
equivalent of 8th grade).

[10] The majority of Rio de Janeiro's schools still only teach on a scaled schedule; that is, students only attend
classes during the morning, afternoon or evening, rather than for a full seven-hour block. The city, however,
is currently slowly transitioning schools to a full seven-hour block, and made this salary change in part to
encourage teachers to make the switch to a 40-hour position.

would drastically alter their current workloads,[11] and open themselves up to the possibility of losing their job.[12]

However, while the deliberations held during the strike primarily addressed the particular points of the PCSP, teachers used the strike as an opportunity to air other grievances held against the current administration: insufficient pay, increased standardized testing, out-of-reach incentive pay for improved test results, overly taxing demands in terms of work hours and responsibilities (including an elongated school day in the Schools of Tomorrow), and the perceived privatization of public education through the use of NGOs and private foundations to provide curricular materials, evaluations and tutoring in public schools.

As outlined in Chapter 1, I addressed teachers' perceptions of the current administration of the Secretariat of Education in greater detail in Chapter 4. In this chapter, I use my fieldnotes from 26 of my participant observations of the strike as well as interviews with 10 Rio public school teachers as a case study that illustrates how *market logic* is reflected in interactions between the current administration of the Secretariat of Education and the city's teachers, thus answering Research Question 1c. On the basis of these participant observations (described in fuller detail in Chapter 3), I argue that the current Secretariat of Education interacted with striking public school teachers in a rather authoritarian manner, with little or tokenistic participation of teachers in the decision-making processes that led to the PCSP and the other policies targeted by the

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[11] For example, a number of teachers are simultaneously studying to receive their Master's or Ph.D., and would be unable to do so on a 40-hour schedule; also, teachers currently working several jobs during different shifts would have to sacrifice that additional experience and income.

[12] That is, those teachers not currently in a 40-hour position would have to leave their jobs and re-apply for such, leaving them open to the possibility of unemployment. Also, the proposed plan allows teachers to apply to teaching positions outside of their licensure area (e.g. a licensed history teacher can apply for jobs teaching Portuguese), causing additional competition that could lead current teachers to be displaced.

strike. As outlined in the previous chapter, I argue that this discounting of teacher voice is primarily due to the Secretariat's reliance on the quantitative outputs that routinely guide *market logic*; in this case, measurable improvements in efficiency and productivity (like the aforementioned increase in weekly work hours) were seen as higher priorities than the opinions and experiences of the teachers who would be affected by those policies. As will be seen in this chapter, dissenting teacher opinions, no matter how popularly supported or passionately expressed, were primarily seen by the Secretariat as impediments to the productivity and effectiveness of previously determined plans.

The Strike's Early Days

While the strike began on August 8, the first public demonstrations began several days later. On August 14 (8/14), I participated in the first large-scale demonstration, a march with thousands of teachers[13] that started in *Largo do Machado* ("Machado Square," named after a well-known local 18th century oil merchant), a well-known square in Rio's wealthier *Zona Sul* (or "Southern Zone"), and continued to the mayor's offices in a building known as the *Palácio da Cidade* (or "Palace of the City"), where union leaders would request an audience with the mayor, Eduardo Paes. Before we left Largo do Machado, union leaders reminded participants of the union's current demands, set during a union meeting the day before: that the PCSP be renegotiated to include a salary increase for all teachers immediately (as opposed to the current city proposal that only immediately benefits employees working a 40-hour week), along with improved work conditions. Union representatives also discussed a meeting they had had the day before with the mayor's Chief of Staff, Pedro Paulo Carvalho. The meeting had ended

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[13] According to *O Globo*, Brazil's primary news network, the police estimated the crowd at 6,000, while the union claimed 10,000 participants (http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2013/08/reuniao-da-prefeitura-do-rio-e-com-professores-termina-sem-acordo.html).

without any agreement, and in part the purpose of the march was to incentivize the mayor to meet with the union directly.

As we marched, I asked the teachers near me how they personally felt about the strike. One 20-year veteran teacher who I will call Terezinha said that the proposed PCSP was simply the last straw: "In the school I work in, so much has been handed down without even asking us: curriculum changes, schedule changes, projects we didn't ask for, and now changes in how we're paid, all without so much as asking us what we thought. It's just too much. We need to be heard" (8/14). A young teacher I will call Antonio nodded, and added, "We claim to have a democratic government, but the changes that have occurred under Eduardo Paes are anything but democratic. In policy-making we are told what to do, and are never heard. We have no voice" (8/14).

At the end of the march, little would happen that would lead such teachers to change their minds: upon arriving at the mayor's office, union representatives were told that the mayor already had other scheduled appointments and that, lacking an appointment, the union would not be able to meet with him.

Two days later, on a Friday (8/16), I participated in a very similar march, starting again at Largo do Machado, but this time headed towards the *Palácio Guanabara* (or "Guanabara Palace," the headquarters of Rio's state government). This time, though, the crowd was much, much smaller, no more than a few hundred people. When a union leader spoke before the march, the reason for the reduction became more clear: the city was threatening to give "*corte de ponto*," or negative marks on the permanent professional record of any teacher that had been absent for more than 10 days, an act that could easily lead to a teacher's dismissal. While the union leaders were trying to

encourage everyone, those around me were obviously afraid. "I know it's a pressure tactic, I understand the motives for it, and they're despicable," said a teacher I will call Marcela (8/16). "That said, as much as it infuriates me that the city is doing this to silence us, it infuriates me even more to know it is working. People are afraid. I may be here, but I am still afraid. I have a daughter, and who will support us if I am fired?"

One teacher I met during this particular march, a woman I will call Aline, became a close friend and my main contact for updates about upcoming marches and meetings. She was active in union leadership, and was particularly incensed about the *corte de ponto*: "This came out of nowhere, absolutely nowhere. We were not advised that this was even on the table. This is completely unacceptable: Paes and his government cannot be allowed to act in this completely authoritarian manner" (8/16).

Using social media (particularly Facebook), the union organized another protest for several days later. This time, to maximize visibility, the protest would be held on the popular Copacabana beach on a Sunday (8/18), a day on which the beach is typically crowded to the point that the city closes down the neighboring beach road. I attended the protest, which despite rain had a much larger showing than the last one at Largo do Machado.[14]

While many teachers were still expressing worry about the possibility of being fired, a union representative announced that they would not be intimidated: if Mayor Paes pushed forward with the *corte de ponto*, teachers would not make up for lost instructional days after the eventual end of the strike. When I asked several teachers what they thought about this measure, one woman I will call Beatriz said that,

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[14] The Military Police estimated that around 1,000 participants marched in this particular protest (http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2013/08/professores-em-greve-fazem-ato-na-praia-de-copacabana.html).

> We have no interest in hurting our students academically,
> but the threat of *corte de ponto* is unfair and going too far.
> We are protected by law in our right to protest, and we will
> not be intimidated. I have heard friends tell me teachers are
> being selfish in pushing so hard for our salaries, but really I
> feel that says more about what our society thinks of
> teachers than anything else. If a doctor were being offered
> our salary, would they think it unjust of him to mobilize? I
> don't think so. And our Secretariat obviously feels the same
> way—we are being offered the pay that people like Paes
> and Costin, who are not educators and do not understand
> our reality, think we are worth. That makes this not just
> about salary. This is about an administration that does not
> respect education, that acts dictatorially towards its teachers
> and does not think their voices worth listening to. (8/18)

On August 20, I joined several thousand teachers in a demonstration outside Rio's city hall in the neighborhood of *Cidade Nova* ("New City"). Teachers protested outside while union leaders held another meeting with the mayor's chief of staff, Pedro Paulo Carvalho. Several chants echoed through the crowd, but the most repeated and enthusiastic was, "*A educação parou!*" or "Education has stopped!"

When the meeting ended, a union representative told the crowd that no agreement had been reached: the city representative had agreed to protect current teachers' employment status if they gave up on the salary increase, but union leaders refused to do so. As the union representative relayed these results, one woman near me visibly balked and yelled: "No salary increase whatsoever? Do they have absolutely no respect for us or what we do?" (8/20).

The union representative tried to pacify the crowd by highlighting that dialogue was still open, and that talks had not ended. Another meeting had been set for that Friday, August 23. However, few were talking around me and spirits seemed low as the crowd disbanded.

Aline, who had been busy with union business, met me as the crowd dissipated. She was livid: "We as a constituency are being quite clear, and our strike is not demanding anything beyond the pale. Our demands are just, and this threat of *corte de ponto* is simply authoritarian. It reminds me of responses to social movements under the dictatorship. And above all, it simply doesn't help this negotiation go anywhere productive" (8/20).

I returned to city hall along with a sizable crowd of teachers that Friday (8/23). Several people around me seemed excited, and when I asked why, one person mentioned that the mayor himself was finally sitting down to talk to union leaders. Another person nearby was less impressed, simply saying "I refuse to let myself get excited until I hear what he says. Whenever he's met with teachers, he just nods and pretends to listen, and then does the opposite. He has never respected our opinions before, and this could be just more of the same" (8/23).

After the meeting, a union representative came out to tell the crowd the result: Paes had agreed to forgive the days of school missed if the union agreed to a lower salary increase than they had requested (8% instead of 19%). The crowd's reaction seemed mixed: some nodded, some shook their head, and a lot of low-volume conversation could be heard. I met up with Aline, and she was trying to be positive: "It's a big step that the mayor met with us. That at least somewhat recognizes that we are legitimate in doing what we are doing. He hasn't done that before. It might still not go anywhere, but we simply have to see what the union decides" (8/23). Before disbanding, union representatives announced a union vote on the proposal to be held the following Monday, August 26.

I had not tried to attend previous union meetings, as I had been told I would be unable to observe due to my non-member status. However, when I asked Aline during the August 23rd demonstration, I was told that I could attend upcoming meetings if I mentioned her name and was willing to sit with the press. Happy to agree to those conditions, I came to observe the August 26 meeting in which Paes' proposal would be debated.

There was enough debate on the measure that the meeting took all morning, with around 20 individual members being given time to speak to the large crowd. As an attempt to ensure balance, equal numbers of teachers that both supported continuing and ending the strike were allowed to speak, and applause and cheers seemed to follow the comments of both sides in relatively equal measure.

Those that supported ending the strike voiced that the mayor should, at least for now, be given the benefit of the doubt; that is, the PCSP still had to be voted on by the city council, and so the strike should be ended until the mayor presents his finalized version of the PCSP to that council for a vote. If the finalized version reflected his stated concessions, then the strike would have been successful, and if it didn't, the strike could always be restarted at that time.

A significant plurality of voting members, however, did not want to put that much trust in the mayor or his administration. As one man near me stated, "He hasn't respected us enough to keep his word or really listen to our wishes up to this point, why do we think he will start now?" In addition to this distrust, for many teachers the strike was not just about the PCSP: it was an opportunity to point out many perceived inequities perpetuated by the current administration. I talked for a while with two teachers outside

after the meeting, and one I will call Fabiano made clear that there is much more in his eyes beyond the PCSP that needs reform: "When Mayor Paes, first came into office, he and his appointed secretary, Claudia Costin, didn't just disrespect us with regards to salary: they reorganized the schools entirely, they added more tests, they grade us based on our students' tests, they bring in private companies for projects we could do ourselves. All of this remains unchallenged, and this strike gives us a chance to bring it to light."

At the end of the meeting, the majority of members voted to uphold the strike.

This decision would receive some pushback on September 2, when a state-level judicial tribunal mandated that the strike be suspended immediately. According to the decision[15], union-member teachers that continued to strike would be fined $200,000 *reais* (around $80,000 dollars) per day missed.

On September 3, I attended a union meeting at the historic cable car overpass in Rio's downtown district of *Lapa* in which a majority of teachers voted to uphold the strike. Following the vote, participating teachers began marching towards the city council building. Those around me were incensed. "We have the right to strike, it is an integral part of the Brazilian constitution," said one man near me that I will call Pedro. "Even here in Rio, teachers have gone on strike many times since I began my career in 1990. We have a right to strike and have our grievances heard. This decision, obviously influenced by Paes and Costin, and this fine—it is all a slap in the face. It is telling teachers they should be grateful for what they get, that they don't deserve more. It's a slap in our face, and a slap in the face of democracy" (9/3).

When the march arrived at the city council building, it was drizzling and some

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[15] http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2013/09/justica-determina-suspensao-imediata-da-greve-dos-professores-no-rio.html

participants began to leave. Before leaving, though, a union representative speaking to the crowd made the union's position clear: "The union has never taken marching orders from the justice department, and constitutionally we do not have to until our grievances are heard. Our assembly is the only body that will decide if this strike continues or not" (9/3).

On Friday, September 6, I attended another union meeting that preceded a scheduled discussion between union representatives and the mayor's chief of staff, Pedro Paulo Carvalho. That day was supposed to be the last day that teachers could return to work without a fine, and several teachers expressed pride that the vote to maintain the strike felt like a symbolic rejection of the validity of that ruling. I also learned from one of the speakers that the union had officially disputed the judicial decision suspending the strike.

After the meeting with Carvalho, a participating union representative reported that the union had been promised membership in a working group that would revise the PCSP, effectively giving them a seat at the table during final editing of the PCSP before it would be presented to the city council for a vote. This was met with applause, and lots of positive comments murmured by those near me. While suspension of the strike was still put off to be decided by a later meeting, several teachers around me seemed hopeful that the fight was almost over.

Feelings of Betrayal

On September 10, I observed a follow-up meeting in which, on the basis of Mayor Paes' previous promises, union members voted to end the strike. While several speakers were positive, emphasizing the in-roads that had been made, one speaker especially emphasized that the union cannot let its guard down, in case promises made by the

administration were not kept. Also, as one woman near me noted, "They still haven't resolved the *corte de ponto*. I won't be convinced until I see the court keep Paes and Costin in line about that." In part to appease those who still held misgivings, a decision was made that, despite ending the strike, union members would hold a demonstration on September 17, the day the PCSP would be presented to the city council for debate.

After the meeting, I went out for a drink with several teachers that had participated in the meeting. We were caught by surprise when the nightly news anchor announced on the bar's TV that Costin had sent out a missive that evening (after the strike had already been ended) announcing that municipal teachers would have to hold Saturday classes to make up for all days missed due to the strike.

One man, Ronaldo, was furious, striking the table for emphasis while he said, "This is *exactly* why we were striking! This kind of shit! The mayor and Costin knew we were voting, and before announcing this they knew the strike was over. And after, *after* we had time to debate as a union, they just announce this kind of shit? This city has no democracy. We pretend it does, but it can all be undone if King Paes and Queen Costin decide to wave their scepter."

When the union next met on September 17, the day the PCSP went for debate to the city council, the tone was much less celebratory. In addition to the aforementioned announcement of Saturday classes, the version of the PCSP presented that day reflected no input from the union, despite earlier promises of a working group that would include union members. Members of the union read the bill aloud to the group, noting significant changes that elicited boos from the larger union body. For example, when it was read that the salary increase would only be 4% (in contrast to the government's previously

promised 8%, and the union's request of 19%), there was a general uproar. Another point that triggered a strong audience reaction was a proposition that most of the salary increases would go to those with graduate education, a suggestion intended to promote meritocracy that would nonetheless leave most municipal school teachers with their salary unchanged.

Beyond the lack of promised inclusion of the union in a working group drafting the PCSP, several teachers felt it was a gesture of disrespect that the mayor had sent the PCSP to the city council with a "note of urgency," meaning that debate should be cut short and kept to a minimum to get the bill passed as soon as possible. One woman near me muttered under her breath, "A slap in the face, a slap in the face." When I asked her what she meant, she said, "It would have been bad enough to hear this on its own. But the Mayor and Costin promised to include us, and they simply didn't. They didn't just act autocratically, they promised they wouldn't and then did anyway. They give us no reason to trust anything they say, because the next day it might be completely different. We receive no respect."

Going Back on Strike

On September 20, I observed a follow-up union meeting in which union members voted to go back on strike. Another item discussed was whether the removal of Claudia Costin, the city's education secretary, should be a stipulation of the strike. After the vote and subsequent discussion, we marched to city hall, with so many teachers participating that the march closed down *Avenida Presidente Vargas*, one of the widest through-ways in downtown Rio.

Every teacher I spoke to was expressed feelings of anger and betrayal. "We will

not be ignored, we will not be silenced," said one young male teacher. A short middle-aged woman said, "They obviously didn't get the message last time, which is that we as teachers should have a voice in these kinds of decisions. If they won't respect us enough to give us a voice, we will take it."

At the end of the march, we arrived outside city hall, where union representatives were whipping up the crowd atop a truck covered in loudspeakers. While I was far back enough in the crowd not to see it myself, I was told that a group of around 50 teachers entered city hall and occupied a floor, refusing to leave until they could speak again to the mayor's chief of staff, Pedro Paulo Carvalho. We heard secondhand that Carvalho refused to meet with them under such conditions, and in response they refused to leave. This announcement led those around me to cheer. "We can wait, we can wait, we will wait until you hear us," yelled one elderly man near me.

Throughout the afternoon and evening, little updates trickled back through the crowd regarding the current status of the occupiers: they were currently talking to a leader of the Military Police regarding the terms on which they would leave. The Military Police were threatening to remove them forcibly. They insisted on being able to stay and exercise their right to peaceful protest, and would do so until they got an audience with the chief of staff, the mayor or Costin. The chief of staff refused to come down, and the mayor and Costin were in meetings. The protestors said they were willing to wait.

Though the wait lasted more than five hours, the protesting teachers around me showed no signs of leaving. One woman near me who I will call Kelly stated clearly, "We were promised that, when the city government sat down to finalize the PCSP, that there would be a working group created to discuss it. But the city government never

approached us. Never even gave the union the dignity of a phone call. We found out about the current proposed plan when it came out in the newspaper" (9/20).

This removal of teachers from the decision-making process, especially after having promised such, is a clear example of a tenet of *market logic* discussed at length in Chapter 4—the implicit assumption that teacher knowledge and experience is less valuable in decision-making than the knowledge and experience of administrators with business and private industry backgrounds. Teachers were not involved in the original talks that formulated the PCSP—after all, that was what originally triggered the strike. Then later, even after promising teacher involvement in the formulation of the PCSP, such involvement was never facilitated, because it was seen as unnecessary. The experience, knowledge and opinions of teachers were not seen as valuable contributions to the formulation of the salary plan that would affect those very teachers.

During the five-hour wait outside city hall, I met up with Aline, who expressed similar sentiments: "Paes and Costin are playing with us. They're playing with the union, with us as teachers, with all school employees and students. They aren't taking us seriously, and they think they can push us around. Well, let's see how they feel after a few more hours of this [building occupation], huh? We'll see if they feel they can keep ignoring us" (9/20).

Despite continued petitions that they will only disband after meeting personally with Pedro Paulo Carvalho, Claudia Costin or Mayor Paes, after five hours no-one had come to meet the group. Between eight and nine PM, the group came back downstairs and met up with the crowd. One of the occupiers took a megaphone and, in what seems like an attempt to keep the crowd's energy up after their inability to get a meeting, yelled

out, "We didn't get a meeting, but we brought attention to our cause and showed what we are capable of. Especially when we keep being pressured, we are not afraid to provide pressure in return!"

City Council Takes Over the Debate

At this point, the PCSP began to be debated by the city council, and so teachers and the union began to focus at least part of their efforts on city council members. On September 23, union representatives met with the city council president in an effort to begin talks on a new salary and career plan that took some of the union's requests into account. However, the meeting ended without any agreement, and with the city council announcing it would proceed with its previous plan of limited debate on the PCSP given its "urgent" status.

I watched the evening news coverage of the meeting in a juice bar with Aline and some of her union friends (9/23). The education secretary, Claudia Costin, was quoted as saying there simply wasn't sufficient money in the budget for what the union demanded, and that the union needed to be willing to compromise. The desk anchor read a statement from the city government lamenting the "partisan and uncompromising" attitude of the union and its members. One of Aline's friends, a man I'll call Marcos, got red in the face and shouted, "*We* are uncompromising? *We* are the problem? That is ridiculous, pure craziness! We have come to the table every time Paes and Costin have deigned to receive us. This is a large part of why many of us wish we had someone else to deal with as education secretary. They refuse to even listen, and *we* are the ones that are uncompromising" (9/23)?

As if to prove Marcos' point regarding a refusal to engage with the union or

teachers, Mayor Paes held a meeting the following day with city council members to discuss how to progress with the bill, but no teachers were invited to the meeting. Councilman Guaraná, a member of the city council's leadership, had met with the union and was scheduled to do so again, but refused, complaining of "pressure from all sides:" as he stated to *O Globo*, a prominent national periodical, "My priority right now is to resolve this problem, not talk with them. I've already heard what they had to say, and what we need now is a solution."[16]

Again, Councilman Guaraná's comments re-emphasize the primary complaint of teachers during this strike: that in the *market logic*-driven circles of Rio's Secretariat, in which most administrators had business backgrounds and were focused on the bottom line, teachers' voices were seen as unnecessary at best, and an impediment at worst. The administrators in Rio's Secretariat and city council members saw no reason to meet with teachers, as they already were familiar with their grievances: they simply did not give those grievances much priority and saw discussions built around irreconcilable impasses as a distraction. They would, in Councilman Guaraná's words, much rather focus on using their (implicitly superior) business experience and technocratic skillset to "resolve this problem."

When I talked to Aline over the phone about the news coverage to get her opinion, she said she had heard it was even worse: debate on the bill would still be limited and the "urgent" status would be maintained. "They never really listened to us, they just scheduled meetings so they could say they did: but at this point they are not even bothering to put on appearances, they are just moving forward by themselves" (Aline,

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[16] http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2013/09/paes-se-reune-com-vereadores-para-discutir-demanda-de-professores.html

9/24).

The following day (9/25), I received an email from another union friend reporting that the bill had been debated, received 27 amendments from councilmen affiliated with Paes' political coalition, and had been signed by Paes himself. The email quoted a missive written by union leadership that expressed disappointment that the city had not even notified them of these events: they learned via the popular press. According to the press, the PCSP was going back to the city council the next day, September 26, for a final vote. At the end of the email, my friend invited me to a union-organized protest to be held at the same time outside the city council building.

That Thursday (9/26) the city council session was scheduled to begin at 2:30 in the afternoon, but I arrived early to meet up with Aline and some other friends outside. Several dozen teachers had been given passes to attend the session inside, but Aline told me that no passes had been given to the union. A group of protesting teachers even formed a barrier outside the entrance to try to check passes of those entering, but that was soon broken up by military police.

While we waited, a number of protesting teachers did manage to get access inside. We heard later that the city councilmen, claiming that the protesting teachers were too much of a disruption, suspended the session and scheduled to re-meet the following week on October 1. The teachers who had gained access inside the building, however, were refusing to leave until the PCSP was taken off the docket for further discussion. When a union leader announced this outside, the crowd cheered (9/26). Smiling, the union representative then yelled, "We aren't leaving until Paes' plan is taken out of consideration! We aren't leaving this building until we are heard!" (9/26) The crowd

roared its approval.

As the evening progressed, many protesters left, but a number remained committed to stay overnight in vigil so long as the occupying teachers remained inside. As I left around 8 PM, remaining teachers were taping protest banners stating "Education on strike" and "Occupy City Council" to the sides of the city council building.

The following morning, I came back and saw the union, in solidarity with protesters still inside, hold a public vote to uphold the strike (9/27). One union speaker stated, "We started this strike to fight for quality in public education. We had suggestions for how this could be done. None of those suggestions were heard or discussed. Now we will be heard" (9/27)!

A following speaker announced that, in response to the protest, the city had stated that all teachers not in the classroom during the protest held September 26 would receive *corte de ponto*. Upon hearing this, those around me in the crowd were infuriated. The speaker promised that union lawyers were working to fight the move, and that no effort would be spared to protect union members (9/27).

Despite a constant military presence inside and outside of the city council building, the protesters occupying inside had not been removed as of mid-day Friday (9/27). However, I heard from Aline that weekend that the military police that forcibly removed the teachers, and that many of them had been injured (9/29). In a Facebook message to me, Aline again compared the current atmosphere to the military dictatorship of the 1960s and 70s: "We are not being treated like professionals, or even like citizens, but rather like enemy combatants. The military, under orders from the city, is still treating us like they think this is their dictatorship and they can do whatever they want" (9/29).

As Aline's commentary shows, in her eyes the use of military force only further emphasized the low regard given to teachers' voices by the Secretariat. If before this teacher strike was seen as a distraction, now that teachers had shown they were not relenting the city government had taken measures to the next level, classifying strike participants as hostile enemy combatants.

That next Monday (9/30), I arrived mid-day at the city council building amid several hundred protesting teachers as the city council debated the bill inside. A group of teachers had made a line near the door to the building, and were trying to keep council members from entering the session as a means of delaying the process. Military police in turn were trying to move those in line out of the way to allow access to the building. I was told by several teachers around me that another meeting had been set with councilman Guaraná, but that this time the salary plan wasn't even on the docket: the union simply hoped to ask for the military police to be called off to avoid future injury.

Ironically, soon after I arrived I heard screaming from another part of the crowd, and I could see some kind of mist going up into the air. Someone screamed, "Pepper spray, they're using pepper spray!" and people began to run, holding their jackets and shirts over their mouths. I began to run, too, but slowed down around a block away. When it looked like the spraying had stopped, I walked back along with a number of other protestors. As I walked back I saw shop owners locking their doors and looking through windows with worried expressions.

Soon after the spraying, a union leader got on top of a soundtruck and by megaphone demanded that councilman Guaraná order the military police to back off. When that had no response, the speaker insisted on speaking with the officer in charge of

the military police. No officer came forward.

Someone in the union leadership got on the megaphone and asked all protesting teachers to call on their colleagues to come down and participate in the protest. "We need everyone to come here now! The mayor just gave an interview in which he lied about the reality of what is happening here, and we need more to know the truth!" Following this, a chant began to go through the crowd: "*Não adianta me reprimir, esse governo vai cair,*" or "it doesn't matter if you repress me, this administration will fall."

Around six, I was able to meet up with Aline. I asked her if she knew any details of the Paes interview that was referenced over the megaphone: she didn't, but said she'd let me know. I asked if she knew anything more about the police removal of the protestors over the weekend, and a man next to her said he had been one of the occupiers. "It was ridiculous—we were cornered. They used shock weapons to get us out of there, and dragged some of those that refused to leave even after being shocked, saying they were going to get us out of there however they needed to. It was ridiculously violent," he said. Aline shook her head and said, "To justify this, they try to paint us as violent. It is pretty clear who the real perpetrators of violence are."

Around seven that night, I heard several small-sounding explosions. After each, masked youth could be seen running with the police behind them. Soon after, the council session was ended, again cut short citing the protests as an imposition and distraction. As soon as this was announced, teachers began to head home, not wanting their protest to be confused with possible violence. A small group stayed behind, insisting on staying the night in front of the building in protest.

When I got home, Aline had included me on a group Facebook message in which

she linked to coverage of two interviews Mayor Paes had given. In the first link, an audio

clip, he responded to the union's occupation of the city council building that weekend:

"It's very sad to see teachers invading a plenary session of the city council and see those

people occupying the building in the midst of the democratic process. There are certain

premises of democracy that must be maintained, and as a consequence we had to remove

the occupying teachers from the building [this last weekend]. It is much better when we

sit and negotiate."

The second link was the interview that had been referred to in the protest that day,

an interview on the *Globo* TV news network. In it[17], Paes defended his stance, refusing to

entertain the union's demand to withdraw the PCSP from the council: "The union

demanded I send the PCSP within 30 days, and they demanded I do so with 'urgent'

status. It's now up to the city council. We have to understand that what is asked in this

process must be rational. There is no point in asking for a salary that the city can't pay."

In response to that day's protest, he continued saying that "we can't live by threats. We

are doing the best we can for the people, the city and teachers as a constituency. The plan

is with the city council ready to be voted on. We've met numerous times [with the union],

and we have three signed agreements."

Aline wrote the following as a commentary on the interviews: "Here are the lies

several of you asked about today during the protest. By claiming that he is doing as we

asked (which is not true), and referring to agreements that did not occur, the mayor is

trying to convince the broader public that he is the reasonable one and we are the ones

refusing to negotiate. In contrast, Paes is the one who has only met with us when forced

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[17] http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2013/09/paes-diz-que-nao-vai-ceder-pressao-de-professores-em-greve-no-rio.html

to do so, and who has broken his promises to give us a seat at the table. As such, he has forced our hand, and those that are hurt by this are teachers and students. We will continue to demand that the PCSP be removed from the city council agenda for now. We will not put up with a government that acts in an authoritarian and truculent manner, that disrespects its employees and doesn't treat them like professionals. We will not live under a dictatorship" (9/30).

Paes' interview comments seem to crystallize the perspective of the city and the Secretariat with regards to the city's teachers: by saying that teachers must learn to be "rational" in their demands, he implies that their current stance is irrational and emotional. This framing of teachers as immaturely pushing for what is unattainable creates a striking counterpoint for the city and the Secretariat, who implicitly are then framed as responsible, rational and objective in their decision-making. This framing fits in perfectly with the assumptions of *market logic*, in which business-trained technocrats prioritize order and efficiency while public-sector workers are lazy, inefficient and wasteful with resources.

I returned to the city council building the next morning (10/1), on the day on which the council was scheduled to vote on the PCSP. The street was full of hundreds of teachers and closed to traffic, and even the police seemed to have several hundred in their ranks. A number of protesting teachers were doing a piece of performance art in front of the council building, sweeping with brooms and explaining that they were there to "clean house."

A bit later, as more and more police arrived, several chants started up in the crowd: alternating using the names of various council members that were part of Paes'

and Costin's political coalition, the crowd chanted, "Councilman _____, councilman

_____, the police are here to arrest you!"

Around four PM, a union leader announced that the session had begun. The details

of the meeting only trickled out bit by bit through allies in the news media, as this time

the council had closed its chambers to the public citing safety concerns. Soon after it was

announced that the session has begun, I saw several altercations between the police and

protesters. One man walked up to a policeman and yelled, and in response was hit in the

face with a baton. On one side of the city council building, teachers tried to enter and

police tried to disperse them with stink and smoke bombs. This only increased the

conflict, as teachers cried out that they were being repressed and pushed back against

police. I left out of concern for my own safety as soon as I heard the first shout of tear

gas.

When I got home, I followed updates online and watched the nightly *Globo* news:

though a number of council members left in protest, the vote was held and the PCSP was

approved. Claudia Costin, the education secretary, argued the validity of the plan: "The

city pays, now with the PCSP even more so, the most generous salary among Brazilian

cities." A notice released by the city hailed the measure as "a victory for all employees"

and asked teachers to return to the classroom as soon as possible "so that students are not

further disadvantaged"[18]. Over Facebook, Aline forwarded me a video taken by a

protester that showed the police using tear gas and rubber bullets. She sardonically added

in a message, "I don't see a 'victory for all employees,' do you? I see a war. Downtown is

a war zone, and teachers are the enemy" (10/1).

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[18] http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2013/10/plano-de-salarios-dos-professores-e-aprovado-e-vai-para-sancao-de-paes.html

After that violent night, several days pass without much incident. Three days later, I attend a union meeting in which a majority vote to maintain the strike. When supporters were asked to raise their hand to vote for a renewal of the strike, an older woman near me said, "Not just yes: *hell* yes" (10/4). Several people around me smiled and nodded.

The following day (10/5), I got a mass email from a union leader I will call Afonso with a notice that Mayor Paes and Secretary Costin had met that day with school principals and parents to discuss how to end the strike. I reached out to Afonso and asked for his thoughts. He wrote, "I understand having all stakeholders at the table to solve this impasse—but wouldn't that necessarily include us as teachers as well? The fact that we were not invited seems like a glaring indicator of how little Paes and Costin value our input. They only meet with us when we demand it, and even then not always. Is it any wonder that we resort to protests to be heard?" (10/5).

The next large protest occurred on Monday, October 7. I arrived around 5 in the afternoon, and *Avenida Presidente Vargas* was completely shut down with the crowd. I couldn't begin to count the numbers of people--the military police estimated 10,000, while the union estimated 50,000[19]. This time, protesting teachers were supported by numerous groups marching with banners supporting the strike: "The *Favela* [Slum] Supports Teachers;" "Public Servants Stand Together;" "Firefighters Support Rio Teachers." Women dressed as traditional Brazilian healers waved incense and pronounced blessings. Indigenous people dressed up in traditional regalia drummed and danced. A number of signs protested police violence in previous protests: "More Books Less Bombs," "Power to the People, Not the Police." I also saw several groups of students

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[19] http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2013/10/apos-ato-pacifico-de-professores-no-rio-grupo-tenta-incendiar-camara.html

wearing school uniforms and marching in solidarity.

After a few hours, most of the crowd had arrived at the city council building. One of the trucks with speakers announced that a lower court had just thrown out the union's case contesting the *corte de ponto*, and the crowd jeered. In a number of areas in the square controlled firepits were started in metal barrels, often with musicians and dancers around them. A chant worked its way through the crowd several times: "*A greve continua, prefeito, a culpa é sua*," or "The strike is still on, and mayor, it's your fault."

While waiting outside the city council building, I talked to several teachers about how they felt about the current state of the strike. One man I'll call Rafael said, "This protest shows where the public's sympathy really lies. The mayor keeps saying he's only trying to defend the interests of students, but look how many students are here tonight! Two of my students said they were coming, that they think it is a crime how teachers have been treated during this process. I think that is beautiful, that support. It gives me hope that perhaps teachers may finally get the respect they deserve, from the public if not from the government" (10/7).

Around 8 PM, a union representative congratulated the crowd on showing so much solidarity to the city's teachers. She then advised teachers and their supporters to go home, so as to avoid any violence that may be brought on by vigilantes later in the evening. I said goodnight to those around me and headed towards the subway.

The next day (10/8), Mayor Paes agreed to meet with union leaders. In televised remarks, he confirmed that he would stand by the *corte de ponto* for protesting teachers, and that teachers should learn to live with the reality of the new PCSP: "The PCSP has been approved, the salary increases will already go through in November, and...the city

already has judicial support for the *corte de ponto* for all teachers still on strike since September 3….The purpose of today's meeting isn't to decide anything, but to talk. The way to end this strike is for union leaders to not radicalize so much. Anyone who comes to the table wanting me to fire my education secretary and undo a law already on the books is not looking to compromise."[20]

The following day (10/9), I attended a union meeting where members again voted to uphold the strike. They also voted to take the request for Costin's dismissal off the table as a strike demand, though they voted to keep it as a political position of the union. Several attendees directly challenged Paes' remarks from the day before. For instance, one woman I will call Isabel told me that "Paes' statement to the press put all the responsibility for the strike on us, when he has consistently not kept his word to include us and has not listened to anything we've said. The only power we hold at this point is the strike: if we give that up, too, then we have no choice but to bend over and take what he decides to give us" (10/9). Another woman I will call Ciete said that "we are more than willing to negotiate, but negotiation means both parties get a voice and get to put forward stipulations for an agreement. In every meeting we've had with Paes, he has been the only one talking, or when he's pretended to listen he's then contradicted that later to the public. We want to talk, but really *talk*—not just listen" (10/9).

On October 11, Aline forwarded me an email she had received from the Secretariat, along with a note saying that all protesting teachers she knew had received the same: the email mandated that all teachers that had missed school in September come to the Secretariat within three days to defend those absences. "This is a pressure tactic,

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[20] http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2013/10/paes-pede-que-professores-nao-radicalizem-tanto-para-greve-terminar.html

nothing more," Aline wrote. "We haven't given up, and they are trying to scare us into doing so. Pressure from above pushing conformity to the party line: more of the same, this is more of the same" (10/11). Several hours later on the same day, she sent me another more celebratory email with the news that a judge had provisionally annulled the city council session in which the PCSP had passed[21]. "Finally some justice! I find it telling that the judiciary had to force the administration's hand—it is seemingly the only way they will listen, which is why we strike" (10/11).

I saw that sentiment reflected in many teachers the following Tuesday, Brazil's national Day of the Teacher (10/15). I went downtown that afternoon and saw what felt like an even larger crowd than the previous march, a veritable sea of people[22]: there were flags from other unions, political parties, LGBT groups, and many other organizations and movements that had turned out in solidarity with the city's teachers. Around five PM the crowd began marching towards the city council building, filling two of downtown Rio's largest through-ways, *Avenida Presidente Vargas* and *Avenida Rio Branco*. Many military police lined the streets, and as we passed a number of protesters near me yelled at them: "Try to keep your hands to yourselves this time!" "End to the Military Police!"

I arrived at the city council building around 7:30 PM. Several speakers using loudspeakers led the crowd in chants. A woman near me hugged me and the man next to me, asking "Are you teachers?" When I said I was a researcher, she said, "Wonderful, the world needs to hear about this! My mother is a teacher, and I am here for her. You need to tell everyone in the U.S. how teachers are treated here" (10/15).

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[21] This decision was later contested by the mayor: http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2013/10/camara-do-rio-recorre-da-suspensao-de-votacao-do-plano-de-professores.html
[22] The crowd was estimated as being between 7,000 (police estimate) and 100,000 (union estimate) [http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2013/10/apos-ato-pacifico-de-professoresrio-tem-confronto-entre-pms-e-vandalos.html]

Soon after, I heard several explosions, and a man near me said we should all head home before the police got violent again. One woman with a megaphone yelled, "Don't let them intimidate you! Show them they don't scare us!" Soon after I saw smoke in the distance from police smoke and gas bombs, and headed quickly towards the newest open subway stop. All nearby subway stops were closed, so I grabbed the first bus I saw headed towards my general neighborhood.

On the bus home, several people on their smartphones were following coverage of the protest: one said that the police had gotten out their riot shields and were charging the crowd. Another reported that the police had begun using rubber bullets as well as smoke bombs and tear gas. One woman, hearing the reports, shook her head and said, "We use rubber bullets on teachers? *Teachers*?" (10/15)

In the days following this protest, human rights groups protested the state's treatment of protesters.[23] Even the Organization of American States received a complaint about the abuse of protesters' human rights[24]. When I asked Aline over Facebook, she hoped an end was finally in sight: "With this kind of abuse on the part of the city government, hopefully there will be pressure to listen to us" (10/20).

Several days later (10/22), news arose that a deal had been struck to end the strike, brokered by the Brazilian Supreme Court in Brasilia: Paes agreed to give up the *corte de ponto*, the PCSP would be brought up for public debate again in four months, and teachers would have to do make-up days for time missed.[25] Three days later, the union

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[23] http://ddh.org.br/nota-de-repudio-as-arbitrariedades-cometidas-pelo-estado-no-ato-em-apoio-aos-profissionais-da-educacao/
[24] http://global.org.br/programas/prisoes-arbitrarias-realizadas-nas-manifestacoes-no-rio-de-janeiro-sao-denunciadas-a-oea/
[25] http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2013/10/acordo-deve-encerrar-greve-de-professores-no-rio-anuncia-governo.html

met to vote on whether to accept the agreement.

I was at the meeting, and the atmosphere was tense. Some called to continue the strike because the concessions were not good enough, and because opposition to the PCSP would likely wane by the time it came back up for discussion. Some called for an end to the strike, not because the agreement was good enough, but because support for the movement was weakening in the wake of the violent response to protests. I asked the man next to me what he thought, and he shrugged: "It is a loss either way. We have fought long and hard, and yet the PCSP is still law. The struggle has been long, and we are losing supporters. People see the way we've been repressed in our marches, and they see us losing. I want to keep pushing, but will it get us anything? I am doubtful. They have won. Paes has won" (10/25). After eight hours of heated debate and three tie-breaking votes, a majority voted to end the strike. After 77 days, the strike was over.

Conclusion

This ethnographic depiction of the 2013 Rio teachers' strike vividly displays how *market logic* informed the interactions between Rio's Secretariat and the city's teachers: throughout the strike, the city government consistently framed striking teachers as ill-informed, irrational and overly demanding, fitting the stereotypes commonly associated with the public sector under *market logic*. In making decisions regarding the PCSP, city officials typically acted without the input of teachers as a constituency, and only met with those teachers when pressured to do so. In the few meetings teachers had with city officials, promises were made (such as the promise of union inclusion in a working group that would draft the PCSP) that were later rescinded. When such actions were protested, the city first tried to cut resistance short by using market incentives (like the *corte de*

ponto) to encourage teachers to back down. When that did not end the strike, city officials responded by expediting the law-making process and using a heavy police presence that teachers saw as an effort to stifle opposition.

As seen in Chapter 4, this perception of a relatively authoritarian approach to governing on the part of the Paes and Costin administration extended beyond the particular case of this strike: teachers, government officials and private sector organizations brought in to do project work in city schools also shared this perception that Rio's Secretariat did not value teachers' voices in their day-to-day work of running the city's schools. This relationship is understandable when seen through the lens of *market logic*: teachers may feel they deserve to be heard, but to business-minded managers the primary concern was the bottom line. In this case, when Secretariat officials felt that teachers' demands could not be accommodated by the budget and felt the salaries being offered are consistent with market rates throughout the country, meetings with teachers to discuss decisions that cannot be changed seemed unnecessary. Officials with the business experience prized by *market logic* had already looked at the numbers and made the decisions they felt had to be made—if teachers then did not agree, that was unfortunate but, in the eyes of Secretariat officials, irrelevant. This perception of teacher knowledge and experience as irrelevant to policymaking is at the heart of *market logic*.

In the following chapter, I will discuss how this *market logic* extends beyond the use of business-minded thinking in governing Rio's educational system to the hiring of private firms and nonprofits to provide services in public schools.

Chapter 6

Teacher and Secretariat Views on Privatization

In addition to employing *market logic* in their administration of Rio's public schools, Secretariat administrators also demonstrated their preference for private industry by contracting with a number of foundations, think tanks and nonprofits to provide services and materials to be used in public classrooms, particularly in the Schools of Tomorrow. As I became acquainted with a number of people working in the educational nonprofit sector in Rio, I began to realize how much private education initiatives and public-private partnerships had grown in the city and Brazil as a whole. In particular, this was highlighted for me one day while having lunch with an educational entrepreneur who had studied in the United States.

We met in the food court of a shopping mall near his office, and after we had ordered our food and found a table he began talking about a trend he had noticed among Brazilians studying in the United States: their admiration for and desire to emulate many of the private education reform models they had seen taking off in U.S. school systems that were already being emulated elsewhere.

> There were lots of Brazilians studying abroad, and this was right in the middle of the huge boom of charter schools, Teach For America, KIPP, that kind of thing. If you were studying abroad in the mid-2000s in Ivy League education schools, every case study you read was coming from the charter world. And lots of us, when we looked at Brazil, it seemed clear that something was wrong with education and the educational system. So those of us who were in a position to do something about it, we started to say among ourselves, "Hey, let's do something about it." Let's take these American models, this American energy that's already spreading to other places, with Teach First in the UK, adoption of U.S. reforms and models in China, India, South Africa. This is already hitting everywhere, and there was this

feeling like, "We need to get on board at some point!" And not only that, but it was easy to also see a potential economic gain from this. Like, we can really make some money doing some work in schools, on the private side. (Leandro, 9/2)

I asked what kind of work he meant, and he went into more detail:

You know, starting schools, starting teacher training centers, starting venture capital funds, education projects. I think what we started to see is that the U.S. really opened up that door to private industry in education. You always see the articles that so-and-so CEO of Success Schools makes $300,00 a year, that kind of thing. That kind of word got around, and people began to see we can make a lot of money. Schools have big budgets, so if we've got a $5 million dollar budget, I can do the math, the CEO of that would make something like a quarter million dollars. (Leandro, 9/2)

While Leandro stated that most of those he knew planned on working in the private sector this way, as he was at the time, they saw spending some time in the public school system as an entry point into education:

I think Brazilians started to see this trend and were like, "Okay, here's my way in: I'll do something in the public sector for a little while, get paid pretty decent, and make some good connections for when I start my NGO, or my education business, or whatever." There were some among us who were quite open about the fact that they saw this as a way to make some money. I know a few people who told me to my face, "I'm gonna get *rich* doing this back in Brazil." People saw this and thought this was a big window, a big opportunity. For a lot of us, I think, the motivation wasn't really "Let's educate our children." Which is unfortunate, that's a big problem. (Leandro, 9/2)

As will be seen throughout this chapter, in which I address Research Question 1b regarding teacher perceptions of private initiatives in public schools, I cite interviews with 37 Rio teachers, 5 Secretariat employees and 26 NGO workers who all noted this

same pattern of adoption of U.S. models of private education reform[26]. Opinions on this varied, with Secretariat employees and some teachers seeing benefits to public-private partnerships, while other teachers and many NGO employees saw flaws in such work. As in previous chapters, I refer to the arguments supporting such work as *market logic*, or the belief that the private sector is inherently superior to the public sector in the efficacy and quality of its ideas and services. While Secretariat employees and several teachers subscribed to this *market logic*, other teachers and NGO workers pushed back against it, arguing that the public sector was just as capable even if not commonly perceived as such.

I close this chapter focusing on the tight-knit social network of business-trained people working in Rio's Secretariat and educational NGOs (and often moving between the two sectors) noted by Leandro, NGO workers and teachers. Nearly universally, those interviewed saw this closed social network as problematic, leading to the use of public money to support private educational projects that benefited friends and colleagues but didn't seem to lead to significantly changed educational outcomes.

A Secretariat Run by Market Logic

In the eyes of interviewed teachers and NGO workers, the administration of Rio's Secretariat was particularly business-oriented, with leaders that subscribed heavily to *market logic*, or the belief that free markets and private enterprise are more functional and efficacious than government. According to Sabrina (9/13), a current public sector employee and former tutor through the nonprofit Teach For Brazil,

> We have a mayor and Secretariat that are very management-

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[26] As noted in previous chapters, three of these teachers were interviewed twice (resulting in a total of 40 teacher interviews), and the five Secretariat officials were also each interviewed twice (resulting in a total of 10 Secretariat interviews). Each of the nonprofit workers were only interviewed once.

focused. They care a lot about goals, about quantitative, measurable results. This is relatively new, as Rio de Janeiro hasn't had a mayor like this for a long time, in the last 10, 20 years. He believes strongly in the power of private initiative. He holds this belief in all sectors, not just education. I see this in my own work with the city. The problem with this is that the kind of rhetoric he uses, and which Education Secretary Claudia Costin uses, gives the impression that the public sector is a slow, old machine, full of bureaucracy, addicted to corruption. In order to "fix" this, he has proposed all kinds of public-private partnerships, and seems to hold them up as the ideal: partnerships with businesses, partnerships with NGOs, and the like.

When I spoke with Secretariat employees, they proudly professed the same reasoning, arguing that Rio's school district was simply too large, with problems too entrenched for the public sector to handle them on its own:

> We in Rio are the vanguard for what happens in every other city in Brazil. We are the largest school district, not just in Brazil, but in Latin America. Unfortunately, before the current administration we were very isolated, with the public sector only working with itself, pure and simple. When Claudia Costin came in with the Paes administration, she brought a very different perspective, one which I believe in very strongly: that is, that a quality education can't be done solely through the public sector. We need private initiative and involvement, we need NGOs, people that aren't trained in education giving their contribution so that education can be what we need it to be. We have a lot of private partners who also believe in what we're doing, who believe they have something to contribute. They believe, as we do, that there are many things we can only achieve with the support of NGOs and the private sector. We can't do it all with the Secretariat working by itself. This is a mindset I plan to take with me for the rest of my career, that it is important to involve civil society in education, that the Secretariat or the government can't transform education by itself, that true education involves not only students' parents, but companies, NGOs, foundations, institutes. We believe very strongly in the collective construction of quality education. (Robson,

7/2)

As a partial rationale for this belief, Robson (7/2) mentioned the issue of changes in

educational policy between political administrations. In Rio politics, policies can change

drastically between administrations, and so the Paes administration in part felt the

involvement of the private sector ensures a longer-term legacy for their policies and

ideals: "This type of private-public planning goes well beyond the current administration,

which is uncommon, as the next administration could change a lot—but the current

secretary believes these policies should be priorities for a long time coming" (Robson,

7/2).

Some people felt that those NGOs chosen to participate in the Secretariat's public-

private partnerships were chosen particularly for their business-oriented models and

structures. In particular, several people who had worked in business-structured

educational NGOs brought into the Schools of Tomorrow by the current administration

expressed these feelings:

> The current Secretariat prefers people trained in
> management, economics, marketing and so forth to those
> trained in education, feeling they are more capable and better
> thinkers. One option for them is to bring people like that
> into the Secretariat as employees, which it has done a fair
> amount, but that has a political cost. Another option which
> they have employed is to bring in NGOs, which have already
> attracted this type of person, to manage projects and bring in
> new ideas with a lower political cost, since it isn't as
> transparent. (Andréia, 9/26)

> There are many types of NGOs. One type which is
> increasingly common is very influenced by the private
> sector. They look and act more like companies than NGOs.
> The Secretariat and the mayor's office identify more with
> this type of NGO that have this business style, and identify
> less with more grassroots NGOs that just focus on providing

services. You see this clearly in the choice of NGOs that work in the Schools of Tomorrow, they are the type of NGO whose vision lines up closely with the vision of the current administration. In part, because they were created by people that are close to the current administration, people with the same vision of management, efficiency, results, leadership, all that. (Marcio, 6/28)

Interviewed Secretariat employees recognized this same tendency. One reason why one Secretariat employee felt this occurred is because, following *market logic*, businesses and business-minded NGOs were better than the public sector at running projects and providing quality products. That is, many Secretariat employees feel the private sector can do certain things that the public sector simply can't:

Truthfully, the private sector helps us do a lot of things that are hard for us to do. We have a number of consultancies that are focused specifically on that which we aren't very good at, like research. In some projects, we also have support in terms of school management, principal and school staff training in certain management models. These are all things we couldn't do by ourselves as a Secretariat. We don't have the people to do this. In some projects, we've built them together with partners, but truthfully who runs them are the private partners. I think all of this is something important that the private sector contributes. With their support, their knowledge of innovative methodologies, teaching teachers new and innovative methodologies—if I'm not mistaken, we've had technicians from American NGOs that trained us in teaching skills, how they organize classroom learning time, when they call attendance, how long they take doing exercises vis-a-vis direct instruction, all of that. I found it very interesting, because we don't have any of this information. (Caio, 8/5)

What I found particularly interesting in Caio's comments is that many of the things he mentioned as areas in which NGOs are needed are areas in which traditionally one would think trained educators would be the "experts:" teaching methodologies, classroom

organization and management, and so forth. This is another clear illustration of *market logic*, as Caio (and those who brought in such consultants) felt that private companies and partners would be better than public school teachers even in those areas of technical specialty which teachers are specifically trained to do.

The training mentioned by Caio near the end of his comments, run by an "American NGO," was actually a training offered by Teach For Brazil, the NGO that will be profiled in depth in Chapter 7. Teach For Brazil was an organization that had adapted the alternative teacher training model of Teach For America, including their Teaching As Leadership instructional model. Mariana (8/2), a former employee of Teach For Brazil, confirmed this offered training when I spoke to her, nothing that "Teach For Brazil offered to do a training for the Secretariat using Teach For America's teaching and assessment model. Which is singular, very effective, clearly effective." The Secretariat, having accepted the training, felt it was similarly effective; in Caio's (8/5) words, "I think NGOs can support the public sector by doing things that aren't our focus, things we don't have the strength or ability to do."

In the following section, I will address teachers' and NGO workers' perceptions of these two assertions: first, that NGOs provide better quality services than the public sector, and second, that the private sector is better at bringing in innovative ideas and methodologies than the public sector.

Perspectives on NGOs as Service Providers and Idea Generators

NGOs as Service Providers

Some teachers in Schools of Tomorrow also hinted at this *market logic* in their descriptions of what they saw as the benefits of private partnerships that provided goods

and services. In particular, the teachers at one school had received an expensive science

curriculum developed by a private firm, which included materials and experiments which

their school had not had access to previously. In one teacher's words,

> These private projects make things easier. If you wanted to
> do something similar yourself, you'd have to pay for it
> yourself, buying the materials, or you'd have to have the
> creativity and energy to design it all yourself. On the other
> hand, here you have an already ready project offered to us,
> already made, and well made by a well-regarded private
> firm. It makes it all so easy, you get the material, and all you
> have to do is work with your students. (Brenda, 3/2)

I asked several teachers at this school if they thought a similar project of the same quality

could be done by the Secretariat. One teacher was doubtful:

> Frankly, I find it hard to believe that the city could do this.
> I'm thinking of the old grandparent's saying: "How am I
> going to do this? If I don't know how, I buy it ready-made." I
> have trouble believing that the city could do the same thing
> with the same quality as the science materials we received
> from this company. Even the paper quality, it was amazing—
> I have trouble believing the city could do it, or if they tried,
> it would be much more expensive. (Laura, 2/17)

I interviewed four different teachers at this school, and all shared various reasons why

they felt private endeavors such as this science project were better than those that could

be offered by the public sector. One said that one benefit is that private projects cost less:

"This is cheaper than if the city hired new teachers to do this same work" (Brenda, 3/2).

Another felt that private contracted employees were more reliable than public sector

ones: "The private sector works like this, if a person worked for this company and got

sick, they'd send someone else. Public sector teachers, they can be harder to rely on"

(Anna, 3/5). A third expressed feeling comfort in the fact that, if they do turn out to be

inefficient, private partners can be fired easily: "With private endeavors, if it doesn't

work, you take it out. It's easier to do this with consultants than public employees, who are hired for life, have retirement plans, and all that" (Monique, 3/6).

All of these rationales reflected *market logic*: that is, private consultancies were better than working through the public sector because private industry was seen as cheaper, more efficient, more effective, more reliable, and easier to cut off in case of a mismatch. One teacher expressed the market logic clearly underlying these rationales with the following comment: "Instead of dealing with the bother of public sector hiring, why not just buy what is already made and ready to go? Because after all, we know that private industry already works. So why not bring into the public sector what already works on the private side?" (Brenda, 3/2). The *market logic* here is clear: there is an underlying assumption that ideas and models developed in the private sector work better than those from the public sector. Another teacher at this school expressed a similar sentiment: "Companies are used to being efficient, cheap and giving you what you want. They have a good feel for the market, they've done this other places and it worked. You have a cost-benefit that you don't get with public works" (Monique, 3/6). Again, these sentiments are based in *market logic*: private companies are efficient, cheap and address demand, while the public sector does not. The teachers at this school seemed to subscribe to such logic just as strongly as the Secretariat employees mentioned earlier.

After vising this school with this private science project, I was introduced to two former administrators at this school that had since moved into positions within the Secretariat. When asked what they felt about the Secretariat's use of private projects in the Schools of Tomorrow, they both said that they felt the current administration should be trusted to make wise financial decisions. That is, if they chose these projects, then

those projects must be an efficient use of the city's money:

> Some teachers I know don't want to accept projects like these science materials simply because they are privately developed. I don't understand this. Why not use what the Secretariat provides, if those working there have examined the project and feel it is good for us? (Alessandra, 1/23)

> I think this is a basic question of cost-benefit analysis. No city government would spend more money on a private project if they could do it cheaper themselves. So if this is the choice they made, it must also be the cheapest option available. (Sarah, 1/26)

Many teachers I interviewed were less trusting. For two teachers I met, they recognized that at least during the current administration, private-public partnerships were an inevitable reality. Therefore, even if they didn't like such projects and felt the money could be used more effectively, they felt they might as well make use of the private projects provided while they lasted:

> For a lot of us, the issue is that these private companies and NGOs are being paid with public money. This is why we're critical of bringing NGOs and private companies into schools. We're thinking about the economic factors, and this is something that really deserves looking into, to make sure that public money isn't being funneled out through projects like this. We know this is an issue, a common issue here in Brazil. We know how things work. That said, I've received expensive private curricular materials at my school that, while I wish they weren't bought in the first place, were really nice. So I used them. I was thinking practically: the public money has already been spent in this case, so if the material is good, I might as well use it. (Andressa, 12/10)

> I know of some folks who refuse to use anything that comes from a private project on principle. I can understand that on one level, but on another, it seems like a waste. The money is already spent—and it was a *lot* of money—but it was already paid, you know? Protesting won't bring it back. A

friend of mine said that they thought this project absurd, that they should have given us a raise instead. And I agree, completely—I'd much rather they'd used that money to pay us instead of some company. The thing is, they *didn't* give it to me. They gave it to that company. So it seems like a double waste to not even use these materials that already came at such a high cost. (Anna, 3/5)

Other teachers I interviewed also saw such projects as a waste, but were angrier and less pragmatic in their responses. One teacher in particular worked at a school that had received a private tutoring service, and she expressed anger that such work, which could easily be done by teachers like her, was being hired out:

I think that, in this case, they should hire us instead of these random college students and others that come in to do this tutoring. Tutoring, catch-up literacy classes, these are exactly the kinds of things we do all day, just not one-on-one. And these are our students, we already know them, work well with them, and all that. The tutors they bring in often teach them in ways that are different from what we do, and kids get confused. So why not hire us to do their tutoring? I'd happily take the extra money. It's really annoying to see public money wasted on a program that often complicates things as much, if not more, than it really helps kids. (Gabrielle, 2/20)

It was interesting to note how broadly this sentiment was shared. Not only did Patricia share similar frustration in the opening vignette shared in Chapter 1, but as will be seen shortly some tutors also felt out of place doing tutoring work that could be more easily (and more effectively) done by students' more experienced classroom teachers.

Teach For Brazil, the NGO profiled in Chapter 7, offered precisely this kind of tutoring. One former Teach For Brazil employee, who I'll call Marcio (6/28), agreed that it would have been much more efficient for teachers to be hired to do the work he had done: "The work Teach For Brazil did, that I did, was totally irrelevant. The Secretariat

could easily do afterschool tutoring itself, using public school teachers. Why does the Secretariat need services like ours to do what they could easily do themselves?"

Several teachers and former NGO workers felt that private projects like Teach For Brazil were often brought in as "stop-gap" measures, or short-term attempts to improve grades and test scores. While they understood the political reasons for the current administration to want to see short-term improvements, they still wished that more long-term measures were taken:

> In previous administrations there weren't so many private projects. When this administration came in, they saw a whole bunch of areas where test scores were low, and they thought a quick and easy way to try to get those scores up would be to bring in NGOs and companies to focus on that. I can understand that, though I wish they'd actually commit to doing something more long-term, beyond trying to make the test scores this year look better than last year. (Patrícia, 9/19)

> Lots of us teachers are against NGOs in public schools. Everyone knows teachers are paid badly, that we could use a salary increase and better work conditions. Everyone knows this. And these projects that are brought in, they aren't helping anyone out five years from now, the way a teacher would who decides to stay in the classroom because they're finally recognized with a salary increase. These projects, they're all band-aid solutions, trying to improve this indicator, raise test scores in this area, but even those goals don't get reached. The indicator is the same, the test scores weren't raised. So how well was that money spent, really? (Luciana, 10/4)

NGOs as Idea Generators

Just as many teachers were critical of the *market logic* argument that NGOs and other private partners were better at providing certain academic services than the public sector, other teachers and NGO workers interviewed were similarly critical of the notion

that the private sector was a better source of innovative ideas and models than the Secretariat. One former Teach For Brazil tutor was particularly critical of this idea, which (as will be explained further in Chapter 7) was part of Teach For Brazil's appeal: that it brought in Teach For America's innovative and "proven" instructional and training model from the United States:

> In terms of bringing in new ideas, the city could hire people just for this, hire people to think of new ideas, of how to use afterschool time, of how to do tutoring, or whatever else. They could have brought in Teach For America's methodology themselves if they really liked it, they didn't need a nonprofit like Teach For Brazil to do it for them. I ask myself a lot why the Secretariat feels like it needs these organizations to bring in new ideas from outside, this seems problematic to me. Especially when what all these third party organizations do isn't that well-organized, there's no coordination between them, and no real dialogue or transparency with the schools they work in about what they're supposed to do. (Marcio, 6/28)

Public-Private Network: Suspicions of Favors and Corruption

The lack of dialogue mentioned by Marcio was very important to a number of teachers and nonprofit workers I interviewed, who felt that this lack of transparency and dialogue about public-private partnerships revealed the true motive for why many of them were brought in: as a form of back-door favor between Secretariat employees and their private sector colleagues. As Raul (11/6), a classroom teacher who also works part-time with several nonprofits, said, "If you propose a project to the Secretariat, you'll rarely get the greenlight, unless you know someone inside. If you do, you're home free." Amanda (9/25), another classroom teacher, felt similarly: "I think there's really something to the idea you hear some people say, that people in the Secretariat are taking advantange, that there are NGOs that don't do good work but are overpaid out of favors or

connections." One seventh grade teacher expressed his concerns with this pattern:

> When you're talking about improvement projects that are
> privately sponsored, whether it's a curriculum project,
> teacher training, whatever it is, there's a private partner there
> who is earning good money off of teachers and principals
> that just want to improve their practice. These days, it seems
> like the Secretariat itself rarely does this work: they bring in
> private partners, foundations, NGOs, that do all of this work
> that you'd think the Secretariat could do itself. And why
> would they bring these organizations in? Well, they get this
> work because they know someone inside. It's all favors.
> (Fabricio, 10/28)

For Paulo (7/2), the level of money put into these projects makes this pattern of private

sector involvement in public schools especially worrisome:

> It worries me to see the amount of money poured into some
> of these projects. In my school, there was this tutoring
> project, run by an NGO I've never heard of, and it made a
> *lot* of money. We had no idea where that money went, or
> where all this will stop. If you try to find out more, you
> better be ready to really work, because they keep this kind of
> information locked down tight, they don't let the reports or
> budgets for this type of thing get out easily. But some of us
> from my school really looked into this, asked for
> information releases from the Secretariat, and almost a year
> later, when the project was almost finished, we got one.
> Man, it was a *lot* of money. You wonder, if they have that
> much money around, why it's so hard to get a raise in this
> system. (Paulo, 7/2)

Many of the classroom teachers and NGO workers I interviewed were worried by

the social connections between the Secretariat's current administration and the private

sector. To them, these connections made the rise in public-private partnerships seem like

a way to reward one's friends and political allies, which in this Secretariat, seemed to

include many of the people running business-like NGOs:

> For better or worse, the people that run the kinds of NGOs

working in the Schools of Tomorrow have the same kinds of
backgrounds and run in the same circles as the people who
are currently running the Secretariat and the mayor's office.
They all have the same profile: they come from business,
from management, from marketing. (Samuel, 5/5)

Not only do these individuals share a similar profile and background, but in a number of instances mentioned by those I interviewed individual people who had begun in educational NGOs later took jobs in the Secretariat. As Guilherme (11/27), a former Teach For Brazil teacher mentioned,

It's funny, the person at the Secretariat that's currently
responsible for the Schools of Tomorrow is a familiar face—
it's our old CEO from Teach For Brazil. It's incredible how
people who work for an NGO, even one that is forced to
shut its doors, see a door open for them within the leadership
of the Secretariat.

For many of those I interviewed, this pattern disappointed but did not surprise them, as Brazil has long been notorious for political corruption. As former Teach For Brazil teacher Mariana (8/2) put it, "You know that Brazil is famous for corruption, right? It's a serious problem, one as old as our country. What happens is you have NGOs and companies that are little more than a front, almost money-laundering schemes. This makes people suspicious of all NGOs." Here Mariana refers to Brazil's history of private interests influencing the public sector (documented at length in Chapter 1) as a potential explanation for the current public-private dynamic: since private enterprise has long been involved with government, and has thus built an extensive network of contacts within the public sector, it makes sense that socially-minded business and finance workers with ties to nonprofits and foundations would use those contacts to their advantage.

Another former Teach For Brazil teacher who had tutored in several of the

Schools of Tomorrow felt that organizations like hers had little to no supervision, and

could effectively do what they wanted. To this teacher, who I'll call Bianca (9/23), NGOs

were able to maintain a culture of relative impunity so long as they maintained the public

sector connections that got them their contracts:

> All of this is a really convenient scheme for people looking
> to make money. You have these standardized tests which
> show that schools are supposedly horrible. And you have a
> relatively common public perception that the public sector
> can't fix it, and doesn't know what to do, so it's easier to put
> an NGO in to fix the problem. This makes it very easy,
> because those that are in the government and those that are
> in the NGOs are all friends, they're all business people,
> management people, they went to the same schools and are
> in the same social circles. So when the Secretariat puts out a
> call for proposals for a public-private partnership in the
> Schools of Tomorrow, you can bet that whoever gets it
> worked one of their inside connections. And they aren't
> really expected to do much, they're a band-aid, a stop-gap
> measure, and they don't even cover the gap they're put in
> there to fix! This whole pattern is a way of giving the
> impression that you're reforming education when in truth
> nothing changes, the reality of kids in poor schools remains
> the same. It's all done "for the Englishman to see," as we
> say. This whole self-interested pattern is quite common,
> NGOs with public partnerships that don't really do anything,
> they are just a way of giving money to the private sector.
> Public policy is effectively written behind closed doors,
> without any supervision, by a close group of buddies from
> both private and public sectors.

Bianca wasn't the only former NGO worker whose experiences working in public-

private partnerships colored her views of such work. Several other former NGO workers I

interviewed similarly felt that their experiences taught them that most private projects in

public schools were unnecessary and likely corrupt:

> Whenever I hear anyone argue that civil society is the
> solution for education, given the experiences I've had, it
> feels to me like what they're really saying is "Let's give some
> money to the private sector." This won't push forward any

real change, it will just make things go even slower. Look at
how many NGOs are already working with the Secretariat,
there are at least 10 or so. Then consider there are another 10
or more with projects through the State of Rio de Janeiro.
Then think about how many, who knows how many likely
have contracts at the federal level. Each one of those is
taking public money that could be used in the public sector.
Each one of those is taking money away from public
schools, and if they're anything like the NGO in which I
worked, not really doing much in return. (Danilo, 12/5)

The logic of the private sector is that you work for profit.
Everything you do is for profit. So why do we want people
coming into public schools that are looking for a profit?
Don't just look at education, look at public health, the gas
and oil industries, look anywhere: when you see the entrance
of the private sector, they are there to make money. They are
there to see what they can get out of public education, not to
contribute to it. (Alexandre, 2/4)

Here several Teach For Brazil teachers echo the same sentiments shared by Leandro (9/2)

at the beginning of this chapter: that there are those in the private education sector who

are primarily interested in monetary rather than academic gains, even among nonprofits.

As explained earlier, this aligns perfectly with *market logic*, which asserts that business

principles are seen as the best way to manage any industry, public or private. One such

business principle is the focus on the bottom line: here Alexandre (2/4) made the point

that even if those in the private education industry have good intentions, those intentions

are more or less irrelevant when one's organization is structured in such a way as to

require profit to survive. Profit, this line of thinking implies, will always have the final

say, good intentions notwithstanding.

One former Teach For Brazil teacher discussed with me how naïve he felt

regarding the workings of the private education sector when he first joined Teach For

Brazil. His recruiters told him that the project was privately funded, and that it wouldn't

receive any public money, which remained true through his first year of teaching. When

the Secretariat began paying part of his salary during the second year, however, he felt

somewhat betrayed:

> When I first joined Teach For Brazil we were told we
> wouldn't be publicly funded at all. They said this in our early
> interviews, that there were various commercial investors,
> banks and so forth. They even asked me, because my
> undergraduate degree was in a discipline that is known to be
> a bit more critical in its theoretical orientation, whether I
> would have problems working for a project that was
> financed by big banks and successful companies. I said no,
> depending on what we're going to do with that money, if
> we're going to use it to do good work, sounds fine to me,
> keep sending more [laughs]. I think I was pretty naïve back
> then—first to believe that the financing would continue to be
> private, as over time we needed other funding and, despite
> what they'd said, they eventually turned to the Secretariat to
> ask for money. That didn't sit right with me, but I probably
> should have expected it to happen eventually. We were
> working in public schools, after all. Still, though, when we
> heard we would begin getting public funding, that made me
> very angry. It felt like a bait and switch. (Gustavo, 9/3)

Gustavo further noted that he thought he was naïve to approve of Teach For Brazil's

corporate funding. As he got older and more experienced, he began to realize that

companies likely had their own motives for investing in such a project, which wouldn't

necessarily be benign:

> Also, though, I think I was a bit too innocent to think that
> banks would fund us to do the kind of work I was interested
> in doing, really revolutionary work. When of course, if
> banks and companies are investing in our work, they're
> going to expect some sort of return on that investment.
> They're going to expect some influence, some benefit to
> come to them. That's just the way the world works.
> (Gustavo, 9/3)

Another former NGO employee who had worked in the Schools of Tomorrow

expressed similar sentiments: after several years of working in nonprofit projects, she

began to question the efficacy of such work in really addressing the root causes of

poverty. She also began to question the motives of such work, when it was primarily

funded by bankers and other financial players who would likely be somewhat invested in

the social status quo:

> I think one thing that really left me disillusioned was when I
> realized that all these private projects, which are supposed to
> be temporary, to just last long enough to do the work they
> need to do, had become permanent. Think of *Rocinha*, or
> another of these giant *favelas* in Rio—there are almost more
> NGOs than houses in those neighborhoods today! If they
> worked, if they were really effective, then we shouldn't have
> any poverty anymore, right? So something must be wrong
> with this whole set-up, the NGOs, the foundations, the
> institutes, civil society in general—something isn't working.
> This sector is becoming huge, and is losing any real
> meaning. I also find myself questioning the financiers of
> these NGOs that are bankers, that are CEOs of who-knows-
> what. What interest do they have in these investments, you
> know? Why are they investing half a million, a million *reais*
> in a project? The current inequality of society seems to be
> working for them, so when they invest in a project that
> supposedly promotes the least of society, what result are
> they expecting, what return do they want on that
> investment? I don't know, but I've definitely learned that I
> shouldn't just accept boilerplate responses—these are
> questions that need answers. (Rafaela, 11/28)

For several of the people I interviewed, they shared these suspicions regarding the

motives of private enterprise desiring to work in education. These same suspicions were

extended to the Secretariat and the business-minded NGOs with which the Secretariat

currently had partnerships, as they all shared a market-oriented, results-minded business

approach to their work.

To Nina (12/12), the suspicion she felt towards each of these parties was the same

because she saw them as all connected. To her, they collectively represented a social

network in which technocratic rhetoric was used as a smokescreen that allowed higher-

ups in the Secretariat to offer money and projects to their private sector friends as favors:

> There's a whole social network between the NGOs, the corporations and the Secretariat. There are many people who were CEOs of NGOs that now have positions in the Secretariat, because they knew the other higher-ups there already and they were friends with them. I recently worked for a second educational nonprofit that also works in the Schools of Tomorrow, and why? Because the CEO is friends with everyone at the Secretariat, and they got her the contract. We're talking about a tight-knit network of relatively few people, and they all help each other out. One works for a company that makes a product, and through connections they sell that product to the Secretariat. Another works in an NGO, and through connections gets a contract to do a project in the Schools of Tomorrow. It's a lot of favor-trading between friends, we'll put it that way. And everyone in this little group benefits from this, you understand? Everyone is benefiting. And why does this happen? Because all these people know each other for a reason. The people in the public sector now aren't educators —a few years ago they were working for the same companies and NGOs as their buddies, and they came into education with Costin. Now that they have access to projects and public investment, they're helping their old buddies out, because later down the road they'll have the favor returned to them when they eventually leave public service. (Nina, 12/12)

It was already surprising to hear this level of disillusionment regarding the

potential benefit of NGO projects from former NGO workers. It was even more

surprising to hear the same sentiments from Claudia, a woman who had also formerly

worked for Teach For Brazil and who had, after that experience, gotten a job at the

Secretariat based in part on her work and connections from that nonprofit. Going into this

interview, I thought that if anyone had personal reasons to argue for the validity of

private-public partnerships and defend the status quo, it would be her—which is why I

found it all the more surprising when she questioned the role of NGOs in public

education, and openly admitted that she felt nonprofit work helped nonprofit employees

much more than the communities in which NGOs operated:

> I find the NGO-ification of education very problematic,
> because the only people who really benefit from nonprofit
> work are those who work for nonprofits, the supposed
> changemakers, not the marginalized people they are
> supposedly working for. The NGO I worked for, Teach For
> Brazil, they were supposedly going to come into public
> schools and completely change things around. Several years
> later we can see that Teach For Brazil didn't change hardly
> anything. Whose life did that NGO change? It changed my
> life. It changed the life of our former CEO, whose now
> working for an education company selling her products to
> school districts around the country. She benefited. I
> benefited. And to a certain degree, I came into the
> experience knowing that, knowing that it would be like that.
> That this was my "in," a way to get to know how public
> schools work so that I could work further up the ladder one
> day. When we first met I told you some beautiful stories
> about a few students of mine that went on to have success in
> high school. What I *didn't* tell you was the story of my other
> dozens of students that didn't stay in the program, or didn't
> get much out of it. Even my "success stories," I don't tell the
> whole story, because not all of them are really being
> successful now. One girl, I helped her learn a few important
> things, but she's not in a very good high school now. Her life
> isn't really any different than it was when I met her. Her life
> wasn't revolutionized and changed, mine was. And this is
> exactly what's wrong with NGOs: those who benefit aren't
> the communities we target, but us, the employees who gain
> experience that helps their careers. (Claudia, 9/17)

Conclusion

The interviews analyzed in this chapter illustrate clearly how teachers and NGO

workers see *market logic* as a significant influence on the thinking of many

administrators within Rio's Secretariat. Interviewed Secretariat officials confirmed this

sentiment, as their statements belied the view that private industry is inherently more

efficient and effective than the public sector, able to do things which the public sector cannot by itself. In general, this *market logic* view of government assumes an agility on the part of the free market which the public sector is too entrenched in bureaucratic norms to match. In parallel fashion, this worldview assumes that individuals with management experience in the private sector are more capable of managing efficiently and effectively than those with backgrounds in education, and private providers of educational services have higher quality products and are more innovative in their thinking. Perhaps the most illustrative example from this chapter of *market logic* in Secretariat officials' thinking is the fact that when pressed to cite examples of services that private industry can provide better than the public sector, Secretariat administrators cited curriculum writing, pedagogical training, and other educational skills that are exactly what teachers and education workers are trained to perform. That is, according to *market logic*, business-trained managers and those with private sector experience are superior to public sector employees even in those employees' particular area of expertise.

As illustrated here, some teachers subscribe to *market logic*, too, believing that private sector education providers are more reliable and do higher quality work than their fellow teachers. Other teachers do not subscribe to this thinking, but pragmatically accept the private services and products offered them, seeing private-public partnerships as inevitable under the current administration. However, the majority of interviewed teachers expressed a stronger sense of frustration with this trend, feeling that many of the services (particularly tutoring) that are currently being offered in the Schools of Tomorrow by private entities are doing lower quality work than teachers themselves could provide, and that the money spent for such services could be better spent within the

Secretariat.

Perhaps most interestingly, nearly all interviewed former NGO workers, including tutors, agreed with this assessment, feeling that their work was no better than that which could be done by public school teachers, and that the ideas or models brought in by nonprofits like Teach For Brazil could just as easily be utilized within the Secretariat rather than through a private contract. When asked why they felt then that such private-public partnerships continued, many NGO workers said that they were suspicious of such partnerships as being a front for corruption or favor-trading between friends. As many of those currently holding positions within Rio's Secretariat share the same business and management backgrounds as those leading the educational think tanks, foundations and nonprofits that hold partnerships with the Secretariat, many of those interviewed suspected that these partnerships were then at least partially motivated by personal gain rather than the public interest. This also is an unfortunate side effect of *market logic*: when business ethics and management techniques are seen as universally superior, they can be applied to public sector management in ways that do not serve the needs the public sector is intended to serve. In this case, most interviewed nonprofit workers saw a business-minded preoccupation with the bottom line and profit as inherently at odds with serving the needs of all students. Within such *market logic*-driven programs, those that were seen as benefiting most were nonprofit workers themselves, rather than the students and communities in which they worked.

In the next chapter, I present the specific example of Teach For Brazil, one of the NGOs brought into the Schools of Tomorrow. In this case study, I will use interviews with men and women who were recruited into Teach For Brazil as recent college

graduates excited about the chance to really make a difference in the world and contribute to the end of educational inequality. Through their words and their memories[27], I will show how their perspectives changed though the course of their two years in Teach For Brazil's program, with most of them leaving that experience feeling that they contributed very little and, in some cases, feeling that their experience taught them to consciously work against nonprofit endeavors like Teach For Brazil that they saw as a misuse of public funds.

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[27] These interviews took place primarily after participants had finished their two years (or less, as a number of participants left before their commitment was finished) of teaching through Teach For Brazil. A s result, though I here try to tell the full story of their experiences with Teach For Brazil, these are primarily recollections after the fact rather than the thoughts and feelings Teach For Brazil teachers had while still in the classroom.

Chapter 7

Privatization in Action: The Case of Teach For Brazil

Having now explored the perspectives of Secretariat officials, teachers and nonprofit workers regarding the phenomenon of private entities providing services within Rio's Schools of Tomorrow, this chapter will use the shared experiences and opinions of 25 workers within one such nonprofit, Teach For Brazil, as a case study of how such organizations form, function and (in some cases, like that of Teach For Brazil) choose to disassemble themselves and start anew. By so doing, I here will answer Research Question 1d, regarding how *market logic* is reflected in the adaptation of the Teach For America model to Rio de Janeiro.

Teach For Brazil provides a fascinating case study of how Rio's current Secretariat of Education has utilized the nonprofit sector to further its importation of business-oriented reforms developed in the United States, in this case the organizational model of Teach For America. Within the Teach For America model, nonprofits aspire to reduce educational inequality in a given country by recruiting high-achieving graduates from prominent national colleges to teach in needy schools for two years. Undergirding this model is the theory that high-performing college graduates with strong work ethics have the personal qualities necessary to be high-quality classroom teachers, and can thus drastically improve their students' performance and reduce the achievement gap between rich and poor. Through Teach For All, an umbrella network that provides strategic support to social entrepreneurs throughout the world that work to implement the Teach For America education reform model in their own national contexts, this model has been adapted in over 30 countries around the globe. In this chapter, I document how the

Secretariat of Education saw Teach For America and Teach For All as a "proven" business model that could be used to help the Schools of Tomorrow reach several of the district's goals, such as increasing the school day and increasing standardized test scores.

Through interviews with 25 young recent college graduates[28][29] that were brought in by Teach For Brazil to teach in Rio's Schools of Tomorrow[30], in this chapter I will show how this particular "proven" organizational model of business-oriented reform proved difficult to adapt to a Brazilian context, with Teach For Brazil eventually closing its doors after two years. On the basis of interviews with former Teach For Brazil teachers, this chapter will illustrate the process of how prominent employees of Rio's Secretariat brought the Teach For All model to Rio, how Teach For Brazil adapted to fit the legal constraints and contextual needs of Rio's public schools, how the experience of working in Teach For Brazil classrooms was "on the ground," and how that experience interestingly led most former Teach For Brazil teachers to conclude that such private sector, that *market logic*-driven reform endeavors are problematic and that education provision is best left to the public sector.

Deciding to Bring Teach For America to Brazil

In January of 2009, Eduardo Paes took office as the new mayor of Rio de Janeiro. As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, he brought in a very business-minded approach to public policy, including education policy, as shown by his choice of economist and well-

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[28] Teach For Brazil recruited 32 teachers into its first (and only) cohort, so those I interviewed could be seen as representing a clear majority of the group. As described in Chapter 3, these teachers were contacted through "snowball" sampling, meaning I had the contact information of two teachers at first and then networked from there to meet and interview the rest of my population.

[29] As will be seen in the next section, this chapter relies on one extended interview with a non-Teach For Brazil teacher, namely a nonprofit consultant I call Leandro. Leandro's interview is cited due to his personal involvement in the process of deciding to bring the Teach For America model to Brazil.

[30] Each of these former Teach For Brazil teachers was interviewed once. An interview with a nonprofit consultant referred to as Leandro is also cited, resulting in a total of 26 nonprofit worker interviews.

regarded public sector manager Claudia Costin. As has been shown in Chapter 4, one of Costin's largest initiatives was the "Schools of Tomorrow" program, in which schools in the poorest sections of Rio, particularly areas with violent drug-related crime, would receive additional afternoon programming intended to lengthen the school day and provide students with additional academic and extracurricular resources. In doing so, Costin's Secretariat was partnering with a number of nonprofit organizations to provide these services.

Several officials within the Secretariat of Education, particularly a woman I will refer to as Daiane, had heard of Teach For America (hereafter referred to as TFA) and were very interested in bringing its model to Brazil, and saw the Schools of Tomorrow program and its private partnerships as an opportunity to do so, given the current administration's openness to private-public partnerships and adaptation of models (like the TFA model) that seemed built on proven "best practices."

The adaptation of the Teach For America model had already occurred by this point in a number of different countries. As referenced earlier, a separate organization known as Teach For All had been founded by Teach For America's founder Wendy Kopp to function as a source of materials, training and technical support to social entrepreneurs around the world that might be interested in bringing this organization model to their country. Daiane and several other interested parties traveled to New York City to speak to Wendy Kopp, and reached an agreement to begin a Teach For All-affiliated organization in Rio de Janeiro, For its part, Teach For All supplied curricular materials for training new teachers[31], a rubric for measuring effective teaching known as Teaching As

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[31] More specifically,, Teach For Brazil was sent an over 400-page long training packet used to train new Teach For America teachers during their summer training, known as the Teaching as Leadership packet. This collection of readings was then translated into Portuguese by Teach For Brazil staff.

Leadership model, and a liaison officer who had previously taught as a Teach For

America teacher to serve as a bridge person and local trainer to teachers in Rio.

I had spoken with Leandro (9/2), an educational entrepreneur in Rio who had been

closely involved with the process of bringing the TFA model to Brazil. In his words,

> People had been talking about bringing TFA here since
> around 2007. And you have likely seen how it is by now,
> that in Brazilian education there are certain circles in which
> these types of decisions tend to be made. There's a
> relatively small group of people who are reform-minded
> here in Rio and all tend to know each other, whether from
> studying together in U.S. colleges, or other experiences,
> and so we were all supportive of the idea, but the idea had
> no champion until Daiane stepped in. She thought it was
> best to move forward during the first Paes administration,
> because they were supportive and we were unsure that we
> could get the same level of support from later
> administrations. (Leandro, 9/2)

Leandro here highlighted the importance of the political climate under Paes' new

management-focused administration in allowing for the establishment of organizations

like Teach For Brazil. However, he also made note that the network of reform-minded

individuals in Rio's education policy circles mentioned in Chapter 6 already existed prior

to this time. This is an important point that reinforces the role of multiple factors in

establishing and promoting any given *educational project* like market-based reform, with

networks of supportive social actors and a friendly political climate playing related, but

different roles.

Once the decision had been made to move forward, this group of reform-minded

individuals began looking for people that could lead the Teach For Brazil team. They

eventually found an individual that had been successful in other local socially-minded

business ventures, who became Teach For Brazil's first CEO. This individual recruited

several others with similar backgrounds, and the process of building Teach For Brazil's team began.

Some Necessary Changes to the Model

Once the leadership of Teach For Brazil had been recruited, they felt comfortable moving forward knowing that they had supporters like Daiane within Rio's public education sector. However, as they began the process of starting up Teach For Brazil, they had to decide how implement organizationally the training materials that Teach For All had provided to them. They knew that they wanted to train high-performing graduates of Brazil's top universities to teach in low-income Rio schools, but other than that they did not yet know what their organization would "look like." Inevitably, some adaptations were necessary in order to work in accordance with Brazilian law and the stipulations of Rio's Secretariat.

First, contrary to the experience of Teach For America teachers, Teach For Brazil recruits would not be able to be full-time classroom teachers, as according to Brazilian law those positions were only available to teachers with licensure granted from accredited institutions. As Ana Clara (7/1) stated,

> Unlike the United States, the system here is a bit more bureaucratic. I don't know the American system really well, or how it works, but from what we studied the main problem is that we didn't have licensure, and according to the law I couldn't teach in elementary or secondary settings without it....Unlike the United States, there is no form of alternative certification here. While some of us Teach For Brazil teachers had degrees that gave them licensure, to get a public school job they'd have to go through the formal application process, and as NGO workers we couldn't do that. So that is how we ended up doing afterschool.

Given their inability to be formal classroom teachers, the proposal arose that

Teach For Brazil teachers could work in an afterschool capacity, focused on tutoring struggling students in core subjects so as to improve their grades and test scores in core subjects. In short, the plan was for Teach For Brazil teachers to function as tutors to low-performing students in math, Portuguese language and science (though science was later excluded to focus more attention on math), the primary subjects assessed by both the Brazilian national standardized exams and the Program for International Student Assessment, or PISA[32]. Teach For Brazil was also asked to focus its efforts on grades six through nine, as these grades were tested most heavily at both the national and international level. In the eyes of former Teach For Brazil teachers, Rio's Secretariat saw in them a "quick fix:"

> So the Secretariat has to show that they are getting results, and the way they show that are through standardized test scores. And I think Teach For Brazil, as a partner of the Schools of Tomorrow, was brought in for that, to increase test scores, or to help struggling students academically so that they would have higher test scores. The Secretariat is very, very concerned with test scores, and I think when they heard about Teach For Brazil, bringing in a model that had good academic results in the U.S., they thought it would be a convenient way to boost those results. (Viviane, 11/26)

This proposal, however, implied adaptations to the Teach For America model that had not been done anywhere else. As Rafaela (11/28) stated,

> Doing afterschool work was something that hadn't happened in any Teach For All partner outside of Brazil. This idea of not being teachers, of instead being tutors, it was new, it was a structural change that was necessary or we weren't going to get into the schools. But it also meant that we were using Teach For All's methods and methodologies in a setting other than that for which they were designed.

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[32] The PISA has become quite well-known in recent years due to its popular use as a means of rating the relative quality of national school systems, which has led to many national-level policy measures in Brazil intended to improve PISA scores (and by so doing, improve Brazil's international image) (Almeida, Dalben and Freitas, 2013).

Despite this rather radical change, former Teach For Brazil teachers stated that the staff were comfortable moving forward because they were promised government support for the project. "We were promised by the government that, from the moment we were chosen and entered Rio schools, we would have the government's support for the work we were doing" (Julia, 8/8).

So planning moved forward: the Secretariat gave Teach For Brazil a list of schools in which they wanted them to work, all of which were Schools of Tomorrow[33]. From this list, Teach For Brazil chose 14 schools in which to place its teachers[34]. The schools were spread across the city, typically in poor areas with histories of crime and drug trafficking, but also predominantly in areas where a city police presence had been established to limit drug violence (Mariana, 8/2).

Recruiting Teach For Brazil Participants

The next step was marketing the idea of Teach For Brazil and attracting potential applicants. In this respect, Teach For Brazil staff were very clear that they tried to stick to the Teach For All model as much as possible:

> Basically it was just like in the United States, they recruited recent college graduates that they considered to be of excellent quality through a rigorous application process, with a lot of competition. There were 32 openings and over 2,000 people applied, 2,300, 2,500, I don't remember the exact figure anymore, but it was a lot of people. And after all that, several steps with interviews, they chose us to be the 32 corps members that would work in district schools. (Raíssa, 8/20)

When I asked Raíssa why only 32 recruits were chosen, she noted that Teach For Brazil's

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[33] When originally designated as such, around 150 (or 15%) of Rio's 1,004 municipal schools were included in the "Schools of Tomorrow" program.

[34] Teach For Brazil preferred to concentrate its teachers in a small group in schools so that each teacher could have several colleagues working in the same school as a support network (Raíssa, 8/20).

staff very consciously wanted to start small, given the adaptations they had made to the

Teach For America model and their own relative inexperience with it. In short, the cohort

was kept purposefully small so as to function as a trial group whose experience could

then be used to bring the organization to scale.

Former Teach For Brazil teachers commonly cited the strength of the marketing

campaign, focused on promoting the idea of each Teach For Brazil recruit as a potential

change agent and force for good[35], as being a crucial factor in leading them to apply and

join the program. Danilo (12/5) said,

> Their marketing campaign was beautiful—colorful, eye-
> catching ads that were posted all over the top college
> campuses, emails sent out to every listserve you could
> imagine, beautiful booths at job fairs. And the slogans were
> really appealing. They sold the idea this way: What change
> do you want to be in the world? What change do you want
> to make happen? It was all based on that idea, be the
> change you want to see in the world, and especially for
> people like me, coming out of college and wanting to make
> a difference, that was incredibly appealing.

Almost all of the Teach For Brazil teachers I interviewed noted having the same

positive reaction to the ad campaign. Andréia (9/26) stated, "I fell in love with the idea

that I could have an impact, that I could make a difference in a new way." Marcio (6/28)

added, "I always had a strong desire to do some work with social meaning, something

that would make a difference in society. When I heard about Teach For Brazil, it seemed

like an excellent way to do just that."

The Appeal of the Model

One of the motives behind the adoption of the Teach For All model was a

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[35] Anderson (2013) has noted and analyzed extensively the way in which Teach For America uses this same rhetoric in their marketing materials and on their website. Veltri (2010) has documented that this rhetoric is one of the main reasons many recruits decide to join Teach For America.

commonly held understanding among Teach For Brazil's staff and supporters that the

Teach For All model had already been proven successful and was easily replicated. When

those who later became Teach For Brazil teachers learned about the organized as potential

recruits, they were told that part of what made this organization so promising was the

strength of the model it was adapting:

> When I learned about Teach For Brazil and that it was
> taking applicants, I thought the proposal was different in a
> very appealing way...the advertising cited the success that
> this model had seen elsewhere, and this was a chance to
> bring it to Brazil. They "sold" this idea very well, with
> beautiful marketing, and at each step of the application
> process I was more and more interested and invested in the
> project. (Jessica, 1/5)

Other Teach For Brazil recruits were similarly encouraged by the idea that Teach

For Brazil's model was already proven elsewhere. Jorge (2/14) thought at the time that "it

was a very cool idea, that we would have this really thorough training...that we would be

part of an international network that had already been doing this work for a long time."

Ana Clara (7/1) similarly stated that "Teach For Brazil was using a model that had

already been shown to be effective and was adapting it here."

Here these interviewees illustrate the degree to which the same *market logic-*

oriented ideology that drove Secretariat decisions to adapt and implement particular

policies also motivated Teach For Brazil's leadership. To these NGO leaders, the

existence of rigor, quantitative studies illustrating the effectiveness of the Teach For

America organizational model and pedagogical method in the U.S. was sufficient proof of

its applicability and viability in Brazil. However, as will be seen hereafter, the experience

of Teach For Brazil will raise questions regarding that applicability and viability,

questions which led most of the interviewed Teach For Brazil teachers to question *market*

logic itself.

Several former Teach For Brazil teachers made note of the language used by Teach For Brazil staff to describe the Teach For America model and its underlying methodologies: "Teach For Brazil talked about having Teach For America's methodology, their evaluation methods, their teaching methods, which they described as singularly strong, powerful and effective" (Mariana, 8/2). As Guilherme (11/27) similarly stated, "In Teach For Brazil they talked a lot about Teach For All's methods, which to them were the most brilliant, perfect, unquestionable, and unmatched method, and that all the educational studies proved this."

For some teachers, the perceived strength of the Teach For America model was most strongly illustrated by the existence of the Teach For All network, which showed that the Teach For America model was effective enough to be worth adapting around the world. As one Teach For Brazil teacher succinctly put it, "After all, Teach For America has been around for more than 20 years[36], and it must have had good results in the United States, because after all it was been replicated, right? They wouldn't replicate something that was ineffective or hadn't been proven already" (Julia, 8/8).

Implementing the Teach For America Model: Rubber Meeting the Road

As occurs commonly in Teach For America and other Teach For All programs, Teach For Brazil teachers began with an intense, closely monitored five-week summer training program during summer vacation. Former Teach For Brazil teachers referred to this period as "exhilarating" (Raíssa, 8/20), "intense" (Danilo, 12/5) and "cloistered" (Jorge, 2/14), as they spent day and night together studying Teach For All's training

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[36] Teach For America was founded in 1989 (Kopp, 2001).

materials, preparing lesson plans and teaching classes.[37] Almost all interviewed Teach For

Brazil teachers reported feeling excited during this period about the chance to be a force

for positive change, and feeling that excitement grow knowing they were part of a group

all dedicated to the same goal. As Gustavo (9/3) stated, "I saw us as this very dedicated

group, passionate about our ability to do something, to transform the status quo."

Guilherme (11/27) similarly asserted, "It was really exciting, the prospect of working in

at-risk areas alongside such dedicated, passionate people."

As the first cohort of Teach For Brazil teachers entered the classroom for their

first year, careful attention was paid to making sure that teachers followed the Teach For

All teaching strategies and models they had been taught during their training. As Aléxia

(9/24) reported,

> We had staff whose job was to monitor us, we would write
> our lesson plans and send them to them....That first year,
> every lesson plan had to be sent to them. And it had to be
> perfect and completely filled out: I had to put in the exact
> wording of the questions I would ask, and the timing within
> the class of when I would ask them. I even had to put in the
> name of which student I planned on calling on to answer
> each question. That level of detail, it left me a bit nervous
> and uncomfortable at first, but I got used to it.

When I asked another former Teach For Brazil teacher why she felt her

supervisors were so exacting, she stated that "in that first year I think they just wanted to

replicate the model of success put forward by Teach For America. I think that since they

were learning something new, something they weren't too familiar with yet, they felt

more comfortable sticking to the book and pushing us to do things the way they had been

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[37] While Rio de Janeiro's schools typically do not have summer school, the Secretariat organized a summer school program with Teach For Brazil in several struggling schools for students that were academically behind their grade-level peers. As an incentive to participate, Teach For Brazil and several of its corporate sponsors would bring in athletes, musicians and celebrities for activities after each day of classes (Raíssa, 8/20).

done elsewhere" (Rafaela, 11/28). This dynamic is interesting, as it illustrates some of the tensions inherent in making organizational decisions based in *market logic*: after all, it was the demonstrated positive results of the Teach For America model, based in market-oriented quantitative metrics, that led many Teach For Brazil leaders to believe in its viability. At the same time, that trust and reliance in the existent value of the Teach For America model led those same leaders to ignore values like adaptation and innovation, also associated with private industry and thus prized by *market logic*. This illustrates how *market logic* is not necessarily internally consistent in the way it is enacted by those who subscribe to it—rather, elements of it are used (whether consciously or unconsciously) to support pre-existing agendas that might not be ideologically consistent with the underlying principles of *market logic* itself.

While first-year Teach For Brazil teachers tried to stay positive in their classroom experiences, some said the position they were in, trying to be like Teach For America teachers but doing so in a context that was very different from Teach For America, could be difficult. Since Teach For Brazil was set up as an afterschool program, teachers did not have their own classrooms and had to negotiate for space. As Samuel (5/5) related, "It was a bit complicated, because it wasn't really the Teach For America model, with our own classroom, our own students. That said, we didn't worry too much, because we thought we were making a difference, and that's what mattered."

Learning as They Went Along

Several former Teach For Brazil teachers described feeling increasingly insecure and nervous about their work and their ability to deliver positive results as their first year in the classroom progressed. In part this was due to the loosely organized nature of their

task: Teach For Brazil teachers had been trained in Teach For America's pedagogical and behavior management techniques, but when it came to determining the content of their lessons they were simply given the municipal curriculum for their subject and grade level, told to teach for two hours a day and left to plan from there. As Viviane (11/26) related,

> During our training and on through the first year, especially as we separated and each went to our assigned schools, we increasingly felt that we weren't prepared to be there. It was all so fast: the training had been so fast, and before we knew it our students were in front of us and they didn't seem to be doing as well as they should be, given what we'd heard about this model and these methods.

Several former Teach For Brazil teachers shared that, in retrospect, they felt that part of the reason they felt ill-prepared is because Teach For Brazil's staff were just as inexperienced with the model as recruited teachers were. In Rafaela's (11/28) words,

> The staff really weren't prepared enough to train us, that's just a fact....They didn't know the model, or at least they knew it very little. Think about it: Teach For Brazil was organized formally by the original CEO and her later replacement in August, they were already recruiting and processing applications in the fall and our training was in January. Not only that, they were recruiting other support staff at the same time they were recruiting us….In truth, we were all learning and becoming familiar with the model together, which made the whole process more difficult in my mind….I think the staff should have been much more prepared and secure in their knowledge in order to effectively teach us what we needed to learn.

Rafaela here provides a fascinating example of how *market logic* can fail to reflect reality: after all, Teach For Brazil's leadership team and CEO had strong backgrounds in business and business-led social programs. According to *market logic*, these backgrounds would prepare them quite effectively with the management skills and business savvy

necessary for the task of managing an organization like Teach For Brazil. However, as will be illustrated by further interviews, the inexperience of Teach For Brazil's leadership in the education sector was quite broadly seen by former Teach For Brazil teachers as being a significant contributing factor to Teach For Brazil's failure.

School-Level Difficulties

In addition to feeling insecure in their training, many former Teach For Brazil teachers reported encountering difficulties at their assigned school sites, including low attendance, resistance from teachers and other school-level staff, and a low level of quantitative impact of the program.

Low Attendance

All 25 interviewed former Teach For Brazil teachers reported having problems with low attendance in their classrooms. "One of our biggest challenges was maintaining decent attendance in an afterschool setting….We were supposed to have at least 20 students, and sometimes we'd have four or five" (Jorge, 2/14). "We simply didn't have students," Guilherme (11/27) noted.

Originally, part of the reason Teach For Brazil had agreed to an afterschool setting was because the Secretariat had promised to make attendance in Teach For Brazil's classes mandatory for those students that needed it (Julia, 8/8). Not only were the classes not mandatory, but Teach For Brazil teachers were often not given rolls or lists of any kind indicating which students should participate (Marcio, 6/28).

As a result, when they first entered their school sites most Teach For Brazil teachers found that their first job was recruitment. As Samuel (5/5) noted,

> We had to do our own recruitment, we had to go find
> students, go from class to class describing our project,

trying to convince them to come. Which was rather odd, for our students' first contact with us to be us pleading for them to come. It's surreal that you should have to try to persuade students that are behind academically, kids you don't know that are 10, 12 years old, that they should stay after school for tutoring, when of course most students that are struggling are the ones that least like school.

As a result, most Teach For Brazil teachers had trouble with attendance. Not only was afterschool tutoring not appealing, but most Schools of Tomorrow had a number of other afterschool activities that students found more appealing:

In the Schools of Tomorrow you have afterschool sports, dance, this kind of thing. And between sports, dance, music, and tutoring, what do you think they're going to pick? We were always competing with three or four afterschool options at the same time. It was horrible. In truth this was the part of our work that most bothered me, because to come to afterschool, you have to want it. And the first week you'd have 15, the second week 10, the third week three sometimes. And not only was this discouraging, but your attendance was part of what Teach For Brazil tracked to measure your success in the classroom. So you found yourself begging students to keep coming, for the love of God to not quit. (Aléxia, 9/24)

To keep one's attendance numbers up, trying to win over students became a large part of the job. "We had to try to keep classes interesting, to make them want to come back" (Raíssa, 8/20). Several former Teach For Brazil teachers stated that their biggest challenge during their first year was "winning over the kids" (Danilo, 12/5; Mariana, 8/2; Aléxia, 9/24) through the use of incentives like food, parties and field trips, and that problematically those that were easiest to win over were those that least needed their tutoring. As Mariana (8/2) put it,

Most students were in our classes because they wanted to be, which meant we had a lot of good students, those that were already invested in learning, and had a sense that school was important and was a potential way out for them.

> But this meant that our work wasn't reaching a lot of those
> who most needed it.

Resistance from School Staff

While some Teach For Brazil teachers were able to develop positive relationships with the teachers and staff at their school sites (Claudia, 9/17; Rafaela, 11/28; Danilo, 12/5), others encountered a great deal more resistance. "My principal, I think, had something out for me from the beginning—she didn't even grant me classroom space, I had to find something nearby," shared Julia (8/8). Others shared similar experiences, particularly of first impressions in which teachers were resistant to the project (Gustavo, 9/3; Sabrina, 9/13; Aléxia, 9/24; Marcio, 6/28; Andréia, 9/26; Guilherme, 11/27). Marcio (6/28) felt that this was likely related to the manner in which Teach For Brazil entered those schools:

> One reason they didn't understand our role was because it
> was never really explained to them. At the beginning of the
> year, they learned that they would be receiving some new
> project, that two or three people from it would be coming,
> that it would be done after school, and that's that. Essential
> things like "I would appreciate you indicating to them
> which students to work with," or "Please grant them class
> space," this kind of thing didn't happen. And that was
> Teach For Brazil's fault, the Secretariat's fault, for just
> putting us in there without telling them beforehand, much
> less asking.

As illustrated in Chapters 4 and 5, this type of unilateral decision to insert programs without teacher input was something that irritated teachers about Rio's Secretariat in general, not just in the case of Teach For Brazil. Dozens of other projects had already been inserted in the Schools of Tomorrow, and Teach For Brazil was only the most recent example of a larger trend of civil society projects being mandated without consulting school-level staff.

As mentioned previously, this vignette also provides another example of how the business backgrounds of Teach For Brazil's leadership were not sufficient for them to effectively lead an educational organization like Teach For Brazil, though that would make sense according to *market logic*. Teach For Brazil teachers like Marcio faulted Teach For Brazil's leadership for not better understanding how Rio's public schools worked and helping them gain support in their placement sites, a problem that might not have existed had individuals with education backgrounds been chosen to lead Teach For Brazil.

Lack of Quantitative Impact

As mentioned previously, one of the primary reasons the Secretariat had approved Teach For Brazil's work in the Schools of Tomorrow was because it was hoped that Teach For Brazil teachers would improve standardized test scores. In Alexandre's (2/4) words, "we went into the schools with the primary responsibility of improving grades and test scores." It was for this very reason that Teach For Brazil teachers worked in upper primary grades, primarily seventh to ninth grade, because those were the grades whose standardized test scores made up the IDEB[38], the main indicator used by the federal government to determine public school effectiveness (Mariana, 8/2).

It was also based on this reasoning that all Teach For Brazil teachers were placed teaching a core test subject: Portuguese, Mathematics or Science[39]. In Gustavo's (9/3) opinion, this was all done in response to the Secretariat's need to respond to political demands:

This all has to do with goals, with results, with these

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[38] IDEB stands for "Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica," or "Indicator of Basic Education Development."

[39] Though science was phased out in the second year and science teachers were relocated as math teachers.

standardized tests. Portuguese and math are the core subjects in these tests, and so we offered tutoring in these key areas to respond to the political demand to improve scores. Depending on the year, we taught different grades, each time teaching the grade whose test scores would be factored into that year's IDEB. The first year it was ninth grade, the second year it was sixth grade, because these were the grades that were going to be tested those years. So we worked in response to these political demands, under the understanding that if we were having the impact we expected on our students, their scores would go up, and our IDEB would go up, making the city look good.

As a result, seeking the forms of evidence typically used to support *market logic-*based programming, Teach For Brazil staff demanded a lot of data from Teach For Brazil teachers: not only did Teach For Brazil teachers prepare their own assignments and grade their own tests (Carmen, 11/30), but Teach For Brazil asked them to report numbers on how many students spoke up in class, how many raised their hands, and many other smaller potential indicators of effectiveness (Aléxia, 9/24).

This became discouraging when Teach For Brazil teachers did not see the significant results they were led to expect. Jessica (1/5) noted that "the day-to-day work was incredibly intense, and I don't feel I was as successful as I expected to be, as only a handful of students experienced much academic impact." Similarly, Viviane (11/26) said that "the first year was frustrating for me because I didn't see quantitative results, the results that Teach For Brazil's method was supposed to provide....In Teach For Brazil the focus was numbers, and I had to deliver."

Several Teach For Brazil teachers also found that the teaching methods in which they were trained were different enough from those of students' primary classroom teachers to cause students trouble. "The teaching methodologies we used were different, very different, and this cause some comparison by students: 'Oh, the Teach For Brazil

teacher does this differently'" (Mariana, 8/2). As noted by Patricia in the opening vignette of Chapter 1 and Teach For Brazil teacher Marcio in Chapter 6, this was a commonly recognized problem with private groups like Teach For Brazil providing tutoring meant to supplement instruction given by public school teachers.

Not only did this cause comparison, but it made it very difficult for Teach For Brazil teachers to try to support students in the material being covered in their regular classes. As Jorge (2/14) stated,

> The idea was for us to do our work on the basis of the official curriculum, but in practice that didn't work. It was very hard for us to stay in contact with the teacher teaching our subject and know what he or she was teaching at any given time….They weren't required to work with us, and few teachers actually follow the curriculum as it is set out, each teacher follows their own schedule. So when you add a new element to the mix, a tutor from an outside project, we were usually not on the same page as the regular classroom teacher.

This made planning difficult, and also occasionally had negative effects on students' academic outcomes. Danilo (12/5) sheepishly told me the story of one girl whose grades were negatively affected by working with him:

> There was one girl who came up to me once she was one of my best students, she never got less than a perfect score. But then one time I taught something very differently from her regular teacher, and when she used my strategy on her test she got a 7 [out of 10]. She then came to see me and explained why she wouldn't be coming anymore, because my strategies were different from those she needed to do well in class. And I could understand where she was coming from, I'd do the same thing. That experience made me think a lot about how much I was really helping, versus how much I might actually be hurting my students.

"Some Things Began to Break Down"

As Teach For Brazil teachers' first year in the classroom progressed, they tried to

stay positive, but often found themselves concerned at their lack of impact, and what felt

like a lack of answers from Teach For Brazil staff. In Viviane's (11/26) words,

> The first year was very hard. It was an interesting
> combination: we were very motivated, as we were in a
> program we had worked hard to get into, and which we
> believed in, which we were super-motivated to see succeed,
> but we didn't have the tools to make that happen. That
> threw me off a bit. I didn't know much, but I had an Teach
> For Brazil trainer who was there to help me, and I was
> really motivated to learn, but things still only were going
> so-so, we weren't really *succeeding*. By the second half of
> the year, we began to get really frustrated, because we
> could see that the staff wasn't prepared to know how to
> help us. Some people began to leave early. Some things
> began to break down.

Several others similarly began to feel that the staff, despite having the business

backgrounds prized by *market logic*, was not adequately prepared to respond to their

problems. "We weren't well-trained, and staff weren't prepared to know how to help us"

(Rafaela, 11/28). "Some of us had questions, serious questions, not just complaints. But

when we'd ask, we were told not to worry. If we asked again, we were told we were

wasting time and being inefficient" (Guilherme, 11/27).

A number of Teach For Brazil teachers felt that the staff began to take these

questions personally, resulting in further tension. In Alexandre's (2/4) words,

> Teach For Brazil was administered in a complicated, very
> personal way. If you had a question or criticism, even if it
> was constructive, an attempt to make the work go better,
> they would see it as a personal attack. I think they felt
> pressure. It was all new, new to us, new to the staff. Just as
> for a lot of us, this was our first job after college, for a lot
> of the staff this was their first time in management, and
> they were still learning. We were all learning at the same
> time, and this resulted in some problems.

Some of the Teach For Brazil teachers began to question the efficacy of their

methods, especially those who had education backgrounds and had already gained

licensure. Guilherme (11/27), who had an undergraduate degree in education, said that

> I could see how the Teach For Brazil folks that weren't
> from education accepted the rhetoric around the methods
> we were trained in. We were told it was inarguably the most
> efficient method, though we were never shown serious
> studies showing this. As time passed and we had trouble
> seeing results in the classroom, more people began to
> wonder if we shouldn't try something else.

Here Guilherme notes that he and other pedagogically-trained Teach For Brazil teachers

were the first that began to notice and question the *market logic*-based management of

Teach for Brazil—though management had the business backgrounds prized by *market*

logic, and though the Teach For America model had the support of large-scale empirical

studies that often formed the basis of support for *market logic*-based policies, Teach For

Brazil teachers were not feeling successful on the ground. As will be seen hereafter, this

led them to turn to other (typically education-based) sources for guidance and curricular

ideas, and eventually led most of them to question or challenge *market logic*.

Moving Into the Second Year

In response to Teach For Brazil teachers' frustrations, as well as a lack of

demonstrated impact in the first year, Teach For Brazil staff became more flexible as the

first year ended and the second year began. Gustavo (9/3) said that "the second year was

much more open, as we were already in crisis mode. We weren't having the results we

expected, and grades needed to go up."

Many Teach For Brazil teachers, given this newfound flexibility, began trying new

things to find their voice in the classroom. For some teachers time and practice was

enough, as they began to feel "more confident in the classroom as time went on" (Aléxia,

9/24). Others began to research more traditional teaching methodologies that "made more sense for [them]" (Rafaela, 11/28).

That said, the work was still wearisome and tiring, and many said they still didn't see quantitative results. Some found limited solace in turning to one another, as Danilo (12/5) stated:

> It was a very hard process, and we felt burned out. We found support from each other, trying to help each other get better, but even that understandably lessened with time, as we lost our energy, lost our excitement, and so forth....We had meetings every Friday, and we depended a lot on each other....We tried to share experiences, to learn how to do better, because we could see we were running out of steam, and we weren't getting the job done. That our original objective was already out of reach.

While many Teach For Brazil teachers found support in each other, the relationship between Teach For Brazil teachers and Teach For Brazil staff became increasingly frayed. Some felt this was because of the staff's inexperience with educational principles or programs, as Carmen (11/30) put it:

> I think the way the staff related to us was in part because they were confused. To an extent, we didn't know if we were a company, which all of them were used to working in, they had corporate backgrounds, or a nonprofit. Ironically, this meant that these people, who were professional and respected in the corporate sphere, were rather unprofessional in how they tried to run Teach For Brazil, not knowing the nonprofit sphere.

Carmen here highlights one of the main ideas that Teach For Brazil teachers challenged relative to *market logic*: in their experience, it turned out that accomplished and experienced business professionals did not, in their experience, manage and lead educational programs better than educators would have done. To the Teach For Brazil

teachers I interviewed, the educational inexperience of their supervisors was keenly felt.

Some felt that the staff's behavior was attributable to their inexperience with Teach For All, which led them to try to go "by the book[40]," trusting in the "proven" nature of the Teach For All model more than their own feelings or intuition. Rafaela (11/28) described one training meeting that she felt illustrated this perfectly, when Teach For All's regional representative for Latin America came to visit. During that visit, this person "said that we don't need to stick to their model, as the staff had told us...I think it was liberating for the staff to be told that, that they can stray from the model so long as results come. They were afraid of not knowing enough and doing it wrong" (Rafaela, 11/28).

Others felt that Teach For Brazil staff had been caught off guard by Rio's Secretariat, trusting in promises of support and then feeling frustrated when those promises didn't come through as planned. As Gustavo (9/3) said,

> Teach For Brazil was taken for a ride by the city. Our bosses had a lot of contact with the public sector. Most of them had never worked in education or the nonprofit sector, they were from other areas, especially the corporate world. And they had done well there. So I think they were a bit too confident, they believed in things they were told, and then when those things didn't happened, they learned the hard way what working with the public sector is like.

Again, these experiences shared by Teach For Brazil teachers paint a picture of business-led educational endeavors that goes against *market logic*: while Teach For Brazil's leadership had personal records of success in the private sector, the Teach For Brazil teachers I interviewed saw their leaders' inexperience with pedagogy, with the Secretariat of Education and with Teach For All as being direct causes of Teach For Brazil's eventual undoing.

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[40] The "book" in question being the Teach For All summer training packet, based in Teach For America's pedagogical model Teaching As Leadership, mentioned earlier in this chapter.

While these former Teach For Brazil teachers felt they could see these motives for the staff's behavior during our interviews, after time had passed since they had been in the classroom, many talked about feeling very frustrated at the time when it felt like the staff led with a heavy hand. Guilherme (11/27) said that "as problems arose, the staff responded in exaggerated and unthoughtful ways, which put distance between them and us, until we had serious issues."

Aléxia (9/24) told me about several instances in which she was taken aside for being perceived as "too critical:"

> Within Teach For Brazil, I didn't feel free to express myself. At the beginning, I talked a lot, I liked to engage in discussions about our work. When I wasn't happy, I wanted to be up front about it. And I was called aside, for a private discussion, where they told me to start watching myself because I was being a negative influence. After that, I was a different person. And it wasn't just me, other people were called aside for similar conversations, and had the same reaction. One of these people left early, two of them actually. Called "negative influences" for trying to bring attention to serious problems. This didn't make sense to me.

As the end of the second year neared, it became clear to Teach For Brazil teachers that the program was ending. Plans for a second generation of Teach For Brazil teachers were abandoned, even after already holding an application process and having selected the new cohort (Julia, 8/8). Many left as soon as they found other jobs, knowing their contracts with Teach For Brazil were about to end (Mariana, 8/2; Gustavo, 9/3; Marcia, 8/22). Those that remained hoped that they would be rewarded with contacts and job prospects for their loyalty, and while some found jobs that way (Andréia, 9/26; Claudia, 9/17), others were disappointed. Samuel (5/5) said, "it was sad, the way Teach For Brazil ended, with such conflict and so many problems between us and the staff. It left us a bit

distant, and they understandably didn't try to help us much."

Perceived Successes

While Teach For Brazil as an organization ended up closing its doors, many former Teach For Brazil teachers still felt proud of the classroom-level successes they felt they had achieved. As Samuel (5/5) noted, "We didn't see clear quantitative results, but we saw impressive qualitative results, like students coming that didn't used to like school, undisciplined kids behaving better, students that were still below grade level but learned to add and subtract."

The majority of the Teach For Brazil teachers I interviewed expressed satisfaction in the way they had been able to connect with their students personally and be a positive role model and confidant. Mariana (8/2) stated that "when I showed interest in their lives outside of school, when I visited their families and got to know them, we built some really strong bonds." Guilherme (11/27) stated that he also "had very warm memories of my students and the relationships we built," and Jessica (1/5) felt that she "developed a strong affection for my students and felt personally for their problems." Viviane (11/26) and Julia (8/8) talked with fondness about students they were still in contact with through Facebook and other forms of social media.

Alexandre (2/4) talked at length about the role he felt he played in his students' lives:

> I think that, for a lot of students that didn't have many
> people that cared about them and paid attention to them, we
> did a good thing. We gave them the chance to have an adult
> in their lives that was interested in them and cared about
> them. I think that was something really good and
> worthwhile, even if academically speaking we didn't
> achieve what we'd hoped.

It is important to note that none of these perceived successes fit the criteria of *market logic*: test scores did not significantly increase, and neither did student grades in the subjects in which they received Teach For Brazil tutoring. In a market framework, Teach For Brazil did not produce any added value—they did not increase the bottom line. The successes Teach For Brazil teachers saw in their own classrooms were much more personal, emotional and interpersonal in nature.

Benefits of Being a Teach For Brazil Teacher

However, even those former Teach For Brazil teachers who were critical of the program and felt it relatively ineffective were quite open in recognizing the benefits that being a teacher through Teach For Brazil had granted them personally.

Paramount among those benefits was the chance to experience what life was like "on the ground" for students and teachers in poor communities. The vast majority of the Teach For Brazil teachers I interviewed admitted to coming from wealthy and privileged backgrounds, and having little to no experience either in poor communities or outside the elite private school system. For these Teach For Brazil teachers, young and just finished with college, their time with Teach For Brazil was their first chance to really become acquainted with Brazilian public schools and the daily lived reality of the Brazilian poor:

> This was a singular experience in my life, I matured a lot. I began to see how my country really is, because before I didn't have the least idea, just like those I live with still don't get it...Now this is an area of interest for me, I want to improve peoples' lives somehow. I didn't know and I saw how it was to live without money….And this was certainly good for me in this sense, I matured professionally, emotionally, personally. (Raíssa, 8/20)

> I think that it opens your mind and your head when you participate in a project like this, it's something that people that haven't done it can't understand. Working in situations

like the ones we worked in opens you up to new ways of thinking. While you're working to transform the lives of others, this work transforms you, too. (Marcio, 6/28)

I liked that I would be working in the worst schools in Rio. I thought, good, this will be hard….I'll really see what it's like day to day….I knew that there was a lot of inequality between the private and public school systems in Rio, but I didn't know it was *so* big. I didn't understand the dimensions of it. And I thought this work was important, I was there in the thick of it, that was important to me. And I matured a lot through that experience. (Bianca, 9/23)

I loved it. It was really good to get to know the public school system, as I studied in private schools my entire life. You enter a public school and it's very different, another world….For me it was a singular experience. Rio is a completely divided city. As a child, as an adolescent, I stayed away from poverty, I walked on by. I always lived near a *favela*, you can see one from the window of my mother's house. But I never went there, I never had friends there, you know. I never had much contact. And really this was a singular opportunity to see that, because it's not the same watching a TV program, listening on the radio, watching movies. It's not the same as being there yourself. (Ana Clara, 7/1)

Above and beyond the personal satisfaction that came from seeing their time with Teach For Brazil as an opportunity for personal growth, others saw professional benefits from their time in Teach For Brazil. Teachers felt their experience had helped them develop needed professional skills, like the ability to work in groups, deal with adversity, and speak publicly. Alexandre (2/4) summarized these benefits thusly:

Teach For Brazil was a huge growth experience, professionally speaking. You learn to relate professionally, to work with your boss, your school, you create a different, professional persona. And because for most of us this was our first job, those two years were a great time to learn to do these things….Teaching, I learned to speak better, more clearly. I learned to have more patience, to be more perceptive of the interactions in a room during a meeting, to know when to speak up. I learned to be more proactive. I

tend to be a listener, taking it all in first before taking
action, but in Teach For Brazil I had to learn to be more
proactive. This professional development was a huge gain
for me, and all of us in Teach For Brazil.

Generally speaking, most of the former Teach For Brazil teachers I spoke to, no matter how positively or negatively they felt about the organization itself, felt that their experiences with Teach For Brazil were personally and professionally enriching, giving them opportunities they would not have experienced otherwise. As will be noted later on, for a small number of former Teach For Brazil teachers this sense of personal benefit was quite literal in a professional sense, as their connections with Teach For Brazil gave them advantages in finding their current jobs.

Perceived Reasons for Not Being Successful

The former Teach For Brazil teachers I interviewed had strong opinions on why they feel Teach For Brazil struggled to gain a foothold in Brazil, the way other Teach For All organizations have done in other countries around the world. Specifically, they felt that the Teach For All model (and teaching methodology) was not well-matched with the Brazilian educational policy environment, that once brought in it was not sufficiently adapted to that environment, that it was brought in too fast, that they were too focused on quantitative impact, and that Teach For Brazil leaders were too beholden to Rio's Secretariat.

Teach For All Model Not Applicable

Former Teach For Brazil teachers felt that the Teach For All model was not applicable to Rio de Janeiro in two primary respects: first, that the after school model did not work, and second that Teach For All's teaching methods were focused on technique at the expense of theory.

Several former Teach For Brazil teachers still subscribed somewhat to *market logic*, in that they believed that Teach For America was a successful implementation of the Teach For All model and was worthy of emulation, but that it simply hadn't worked because Brazil had no legal provision for alternatively certified full-time teachers. As Ana Clara (7/1) said, "Teach For Brazil's model worked in the way it was implemented in the United States, but it didn't work here the same way...Teach For Brazil would either have to find some way to fit or our legislation would have to change to make accommodations."

Rafaela (11/28) mentioned several times that she wanted to give the Teach For All model the benefit of the doubt, and believe that it was as effective in other settings as they had been told: it simply didn't work in the after school setting in which it was implemented in Rio's schools. As she put it,

> Doing afterschool tutoring wasn't the way the program, the model, was designed. It was meant for regular teachers, not teachers giving supplemental classes. So I think that this set-up messed up the project, because the model and the setting didn't fit, they weren't lined up. I know I've criticized the model, but it could just be because I worked in an adaptation that wasn't like other countries, that isn't found in any other Teach For All program, so of course you can't expect the same results. (Rafaela, 11/28)

Julia (8/8) expressed the same sentiment: she admired the Teach For America model, and Teach For Brazil's association with it was one of the primary reasons she initially applied. She wished it could have worked as it does in other countries. As she said, "Teach For America wasn't meant to be an afterschool program. The way it's supposed to work, you really have an impact in the life of each child. But unfortunately for us it didn't work like that" (Julia, 8/8).

Interestingly, Viviane (11/26) told a story of an interaction with Teach For Brazil staff that showed how they tried very hard not to think of themselves as a traditional after school program, typically associated with "fun" activities like sports and field trips. Rather, maintaining the *market logic* focus on the bottom line (in this case, test scores), they tried to maintain their focus on academic achievement: "I thought of taking kids to the theater, of doing sports, things like that, but man, if that interfered with your teaching, staff would say, 'What is your focus? This program isn't meant to be fun, to be some entertaining add-on—our work is academic.' They wanted to be taken very seriously, to live up to the Teach For All name" (Viviane, 11/26).

Interestingly, for the majority of those I interviewed it was precisely the techniques and teaching methods associated with Teach For All that they most resented and felt fell short. They felt that their summer training was too short, and only provided them with some basic lesson planning techniques that were not sufficient to see success in the classroom. In their words,

> The training was horrible, really bad. We were trained in this American methodology from Teach For All that was very technique-oriented, that had lots of techniques, but you weren't trained to have any capacity for critical thinking at all. You were trained to do what they told you, to follow it strictly, but in a way that didn't seem to really apply to real students in real classrooms (Tainara, 9/28)

> The methodology we used is one that today I consider very limited. I don't know if it's because they are American ideas that don't fit in Brazil, or if it's something else, but I thought it was very boxed in, very closed, very limiting. Today I think of some of my students that didn't get what I was teaching, but the truth isn't that they didn't get it, but that the method didn't work for them....The method had lesson plans, you had to have a lesson objective, the goal you wanted to reach, the steps to get there. That is, you had

> your opening, introduction of content, guided practice,
> independent practice, ending exercises. It was all in that
> mold, very linear, very closed. It was very organized, but
> you also felt trapped, that you couldn't do anything that
> didn't follow that fossilized model. (Rafaela, 11/28)

> The content of our training was basically an overdose of the
> Teach For All model, its standards, the step-by-step of their
> lesson outline. It was all that, how to arrive in the
> classroom and teach a good class, from the outline of the
> teaching steps to the lesson plan outline. It was all lined
> out, point by point, and this didn't really fit the Brazilian
> model of pedagogy which I, as one of those with an
> education background, was familiar with. (Jorge, 2/14)

These interview quotes from Teach For Brazil teachers begin to illustrate their concerns

with a model (in this case, the pedagogical model of Teach For America) that is primarily

concerned with discipline and quantitative outputs: to these teachers, even those not

previously acquainted with more common or traditional pedagogical methods, the Teach

For America pedagogical model felt closed, narrow and insufficient.

What many felt was missing was a lack of pedagogical theory in which they could

situate the techniques they were trained to use. Without this deeper background, they

didn't feel they knew what to do when the basic techniques in which they were trained

didn't work. As Danilo (12/5) said,

> We felt a lack in terms of preparation, in terms of knowing
> how to teach. We had that short training in the summer, but
> over the course of the year you would encounter situations,
> problems, and we didn't know what to do and didn't feel
> like the support staff that was there to help us knew how to
> answer our questions. We hadn't learned any pedagogy or
> pedagogical theory, these kinds of discussions were wholly
> lacking. They taught us a method of how to teach a class,
> which helps of course, you had a way to plan, to put your
> lesson together. But we felt the lack of pedagogical
> training, of knowing different kinds of pedagogy and how

to use them. We got a bit of this near the end of the second year because we'd asked for it so much, but by then we had all kind of figured out our own thing, and it didn't do much to help.

Those Teach For Brazil teachers who had a background in education noted this the earliest, wondering why their training didn't include any content knowledge from the areas they were expected to teach. As Gustavo (9/3) said, "There was no content training, no math, no Portuguese, no science, even though those were the subjects we were teaching." Mariana (8/2) added, "I taught Portuguese, but we didn't have any training on how to teach reading, or literacy. We were taught how to teach a class, that's all."

These same Teach For Brazil teachers also noted that their training lacked any of the writings of the great Brazilian educational thinkers they had been exposed to during their undergraduate training. This was especially troubling because it had been promised during the application process. As several Teach For Brazil teachers noted,

> This is only one example, but I feel an illustrative one: one night during summer training we were sitting down to dinner and I was sitting next to one of the other Teach For Brazil teachers that had an education background, who also had a pedagogical background, and we both noted that we hadn't heard a single thing about Paulo Freire. Obviously we weren't expecting to hear only about Paulo Freire, but anyone that works in education in Brazil learns about Paulo Freire, so we thought it odd, and we were very curious why he hadn't been addressed at all. But then, we had only just finished our initial training, and we were told that we would have speakers and discussions with great educators and all that, so we trusted it would. But then it never did, you know? (Gustavo, 9/3)

> The training was interesting, a time to meet people and new ideas. It worried me, though, that a deeper exploration of

educational issues, in psychology, sociology, educational policy, all of which was promised during the admissions process, just wasn't there. The teachings we did get were very technical, and we didn't engage in any discussions that were outside of the "Teach For All box." In the admissions process, we were promised a chance to study the great Brazilian educators, and were told that we would have a chance to question everything and create our own way of doing things. But during our actual training, it became clear that we had to apply the Teach For All network's methodology, without questions. We could ask questions about how best to apply those techniques, but we couldn't question the actual techniques without being called 'unproductive'. (Guilherme, 11/27)

The critique articulated here is that the issue with Teach For Brazil's training was insufficient grounding in pedagogy, theory, and content knowledge: in short, it lacked a grounding in all of the traditional forms of expertise taught by educators. In a sense this is still a critique of *market logic*, as these teachers' issues with the Teach For America pedagogical model and their training in it was that it wasn't sufficiently grounded in education as a discipline: it simply wasn't "educational" enough.

That said, not all Teach For Brazil teachers felt the same way regarding their training. Several former Teach For Brazil teachers noted that, over the course of the two years, a slight divide developed between those who enjoyed the Teach For All methods and felt they were sufficient, and those that wanted more training. Ana Clara (7/1), Julia (8/8) and Marcia (8/22) in particular, while a small minority among 32 teachers, really felt comfortable and successful using Teach For All's methods. Marcia (8/22) felt that "the teaching methods are the best thing I took away from my time with Teach For Brazil. I now work in adult education, in teacher training, and I still use my Teach For All

materials all the time in those trainings." Julia (8/8) talked abut feeling successful using

Teach For All's methods: "I feel I was good, in general. I read everything they gave me,

all the teaching materials, as well as this book, *Teach Like a Champion*. And it worked, I

think I did pretty well."

While the other 23 Teach For Brazil teachers I interviewed tended to be more

critical of the model, those that questioned it the most tended to be those with an

education background, like Natália (11/26). In her words,

> It's funny, because especially us who had some training as
> teachers, the methodology we were taught seemed very
> basic, overly simple. It worked for some people, like Julia,
> but honestly I thought she seemed kind of robotic in how
> she taught, following everything TFA to the letter. I guess it
> worked for her, but she seemed sometimes almost like a
> robot, no personality in her work.

Jorge (2/14), who also had an education background, also felt that the Teach For All

method was overly technical and somewhat limiting:

> A "good" Teach For Brazil class was a very standardized
> class, following particular procedures. You had to make
> students sit in their chairs properly, you had to do it just so.
> There was a big focus on discipline, it was a large part of
> our training, what we most focused on, getting a well-
> functioning class through the use of discipline, through the
> way we set up the chairs, through the way we made sure
> students only spoke up when they were supposed to, the
> way we made sure they raised their hands. We had time to
> write our classroom organizational criteria, our class rules,
> what you could and couldn't do. For Teach For Brazil this
> was our focus, it was the base of our training, what was
> supposed to help us teach. To have a good class, you first
> needed to be organized, clean, with everything functioning.
> They repeated this a lot in the trainings, that this kind of
> thing should be our focus as educators.

These pedagogical priorities of classroom management and efficiency make sense within

a *market logic* framework that is focused on the bottom line—however, as can be seen

here it felt insufficient to many of the Teach For Brazil teachers charged with

implementing it.

Lack of Adaptation

Several former Teach For Brazil teachers, while dissatisfied with how Teach For

All's methods worked for them, felt that the methods themselves weren't necessarily at

fault. Rather, they expressed feeling a lack of adaptation of those methods to a Brazilian

context. As Mariana (8/2) said, "What we were taught was the Teach For America

method, how to teach a class. It[41] was translated into Portuguese, but it was basically the

same." Gustavo (9/3) felt that many resented this, saying that "With time, we saw that the

model, it was from an international program, there were clear directions for how to

implement it, but it didn't always fit our lived reality. So we began to resent the emphasis

put on the model."

Alexandre (2/4) addressed this point in further detail, noting that a lack of

adaptation was understandable given the short timeline in which Teach For Brazil was

organized:

> We had trainings, and we had readings, but we got the
> impression that when they started the program they did so
> really fast. So they hadn't really had time to learn what
> Teach For All was all about, what this methodology was,
> and how it most appropriately be used in Rio de Janeiro.
> You know, what parts of the model could be adapted here,
> and which should be left aside. Instead of this adaptation
> process, it was more like they just grabbed some material,
> translated it, and handed it off to us. Over and over.
> Translate some more material, and hand it off to us.
> Translate some more material, and hand it off to us. Just to
> give you an example, the person who basically trained us in

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[41] "It" referring to the Teaching As Leadership summer training packet.

the Teach For All methodology, her only training to do that was being an English teacher. So she basically translated the materials and handed them off to us. I mean, c'mon— there are other situations here, other ways of thinking, other ways of dealing with situations. So understandably there were some difficulties, because the United States has their own societal particularities, just like we do. I mean, there were some things we read and all we could do was laugh. There was one part in the reading especially, where a student that was put up as a model seemed like a little robot! We didn't want robot students, students that just sit there repeating everything. So there are some cultural differences there, I think.

While it is understandable that the business-trained people leading Teach For Brazil would feel pride in how quickly they were able to bring the model to scale, these interview quotes show that the speed with which it was implemented definitely had costs as well as benefits: especially given their lack of background in education and their lack of familiarity with Teach For America, Teach For Brazil administrators had difficulty in engaging in much adaptation beyond the translation of curricular materials.

Brought In Too Fast

As reflected in Alexandre's (2/4) thoughts, many Teach For Brazil members felt that a lot of what went wrong with Teach For Brazil could be attributed to the speed with which the program was begun. As Jorge (2/14) stated, "the Teach For Brazil staff were proud of having implemented the program in such a short time, but the problem is that lots of little problems arose afterwards, building to the point where some more planning beforehand would likely have been wiser."

Aléxia (9/24) was a bit plainer in her criticism:

It feels like they unwrapped the whole project too quickly, almost with an attitude of 'Well, let's see what happens.' Like that, you know? There was no study, they didn't seem

158

to have much of a plan, it was all this attitude of 'Let's see
if it works, let's see if we see the numbers go up.' And
guess what? It didn't work.

Too Focused on Quantitative Impact

Aléxia's criticism gets to the heart of another common critique among Teach For Brazil teachers: the *market logic*-oriented focus of the organization was on its own quantitative impact, which (as Aléxia notes) turned out to not be very strong. Bianca (9/23) understood why there was this focus, while still feeling it was overdone: "The leaders of Teach For Brazil, they wanted quick results to show the model worked. The problem is that a new program, adapted quickly by someone who doesn't know it well, won't have an immediate impact." Ironically, Bianca argued that Teach For Brazil's *market logic* focus on quantitative results was undone by their attempt to prove their business-like efficiency in unfolding the program quickly.

In Teach For Brazil's first years, the quantitative focus was two-fold: trying to improve student's grades and test scores. As Gustavo (9/3) stated, "my goal as a Portuguese teacher was to see my students' Portuguese grades go up, simple as that." Mariana (8/2) added, "the priority was also tests, improve test scores. This was all tied up to the IDEB, which determined educational funding, so the stakes were high for all of us."

As much as this quantitative focus was understandable given a *market logic*-driven policy context that increasingly was based in high-stakes test accountability, former Teach For Brazil teachers still felt frustrated by the focus on using quantitative indicators for their work when their successes seemed more qualitative. As Danilo (12/5) stated,

Student achievement can be measured in so many ways.
But the only way we used, chosen by Teach For Brazil, by
the city, by the state, by the government as a whole, is
based in standardized test results. I know Teach For Brazil
didn't invent this, but it still felt unfortunate to be a part of
this. Putting all that on kids: that for them to be successful,
they have to demonstrate their content knowledge, take
tests, be evaluated and judged. Putting so much emphasis
on this makes it almost like a doctrine, a common sense
that doesn't make sense at all. And children spend so much
time memorizing things they will never use in their lives.

As Danilo (12/5) pointed out, this *market logic* emphasis on testing and numeric results

was not started by Teach For Brazil: rather, it was a response of Teach For Brazil to its

larger accountability-heavy policy context, particularly the demands of Rio's Secretariat.

This reflects the argument made on the basis of interviews with teachers and Secretariat

officials in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, that the larger policy context of Rio schools is

increasingly guided by *market logic*. Teach For Brazil, in this sense, was only one of

many programs focusing on improving the test score bottom line.

Being Beholden to the Secretariat

Teach For Brazil's dependence on Rio's Secretariat was critiqued by several

former Teach For Brazil teachers, as it seemed to them to undercut Teach For Brazil's

ability to push for change within the educational system. Rather, to these teachers, it

seemed like Teach For Brazil most often did what it was told, pursuing the city's *market*

logic agenda focused on improving test results:

Improving test results has always been this administration's
priority. Sometimes their interests matched up with ours,
but even when they didn't their interests took priority. For
Teach For Brazil to have its program, it would have to line
up with their political priorities. So Teach For Brazil did
this: they danced to the administration's tune. (Gustavo,
9/3)

Teach For Brazil called itself an NGO working for the transformation of education. But how are you transforming anything if you work through the city and literally dance to their tune? I didn't understand this, I wanted to change the music, not dance to their tune. We had an idea of what we wanted to be, but the city instead basically turned us into an IDEB test prep course. Teach For Brazil danced to the city's tune, and I didn't like that. (Aléxia, 9/24)

Interestingly, even though Teach For Brazil organizationally was run on the same *market logic* principles as the Secretariat at the time, Teach For Brazil teachers felt frustrated that this program, framed to them in its initial marketing as a idealistic means to change Brazil's educational reality, ended up pursuing largely the same market-oriented goals and interests as the Secretariat: improved test scores and a higher IDEB.

Teach For Brazil Teachers' Career Paths and Education Opinions Post-Classroom

Thinking again upon the research question addressed in this chapter (i.e. "how is *market logic* reflected in Teach For Brazil's adaptation of Teach For America's organizational model?"), and the emphasis in Teach For America's model on producing alumni that influence education policy, it was interesting to see the effect of participation in Teach For Brazil on its teachers' career paths. Participation in Teach For Brazil most definitely had an impact on their career paths and opinions regarding the nonprofit and public sectors. Notably, after the experience most Teach For Brazil teachers wanted to remain in the education sector. That said, the vast majority had developed quite critical opinions regarding the significant role of nonprofits in a public education system run by *market logic*, and felt strongly that the money used to support such efforts would be better invested in the public sector.

As Marcio (6/28) noted, "most of us wanted to stay in education somehow, which was part of the purpose of Teach For Brazil, to bring more people from other sectors into

education." A small number, even including some of those that had been critical of Teach

For Brazil, were committed to working within similar organizations as a force for good:

> If Teach For Brazil had continued, I would have been
> willing to stay in some capacity...After all, they saw that
> some changes were needed, and they saw that the
> innovations I brought to the classroom worked. So if I had
> the chance to help them reform, to do more of what
> worked, I would have happily taken the chance. I couldn't
> do Teach For Brazil again the way we were taught—but if I
> had a chance to try to help make it better, I would jump at
> it. (Rafaela, 11/28)

Others had enjoyed their time with Teach For Brazil, and shared an interest in staying in

education, but didn't feel sufficiently prepared for such work. Alexandre (2/4) stated that

"Teach For Brazil showed me that my place isn't 'in the field,' as that's too demanding

for the type of introverted person I am." Julia (8/8), one of those who most fully believed

in the Teach For All model, nonetheless doubted her ability to contribute much to

education after her two years in the classroom:

> I was invited to work in city government, in education, but
> I felt that my Teach For Brazil experience wasn't sufficient
> for me to be able to contribute to education in Brazil, not
> even a bit. It's a bit sad, as even though I enjoyed the
> program and thought the model wonderful, when I thought
> about it I don't feel like I contributed anything to education
> during my time in Teach For Brazil. I wanted so badly to
> contribute something, but I don't feel that I did, that I
> contributed anything. I only got a sense for how horrible
> the system is, which is something I didn't know before.

Interestingly, this sentiment was shared by the majority of those I interviewed: that their

time in Teach For Brazil had taught them how little the nonprofit sector contributes to

change in education. Within the framework of this study, their classroom experience had

led them to doubt the validity of *market logic*. "I learned a lot from my experience and it

was very rich, and I'd like to work more in education, but I don't think anything I do will be as transformational as I might have hoped" (Jessica, 1/5). "I plan to continue in education, but in other forms, different from what we did in Teach For Brazil. I want to do something that will really change things, something truly revolutionary, unlike Teach For Brazil" (Guilherme, 11/27). Others had even stronger feelings: Nina (12/12) stated that "I'm now one year into a Master's in education, and I would do everything differently than what I did in Teach For Brazil." Gustavo (9/3) felt that the strongest message he took from his time in Teach For Brazil was the need to oppose efforts like Teach For Brazil's: "my time in Teach For Brazil was a powerful motivation to oppose myself to the types of ideas I saw defend in Teach For Brazil, the waves of reform that it represented."

Others' experience in Teach For Brazil led them to question specific aspects of business-oriented reform: for example, the use of the private sector in public schools, or bringing people from the business sector to work in education. As Bianca (9/23) stated, "it bothered me that the people in front of our organization as directors had no experience in education, and assumed their experience in business could inform education." Sabrina (9/13) resented the idea represented in Teach For Brazil that the private sector should be a source of innovation for public schools, an idea she saw as borrowed from the United States:

> I don't know if I agree with this whole idea, of an
> international network [like Teach For All], liberal in the
> sense of believing that it is the private sector's job to drive
> public education, bringing innovation, bringing people
> from other disciplines to solve its problems. I think any real
> solution will need to be more profound than that.

Though former Teach For Brazil teachers varied in the degree to which they felt

opposed to the Teach For Brazil model, nearly all of them had concluded after their two

years with Teach For Brazil that education would be most fully improved by working

through the public sector. In their own words:

> It's cool to help kids like we did, it's important to do
> something, but at the same time, if we're going to change
> the lives of all the millions of kids in Rio de Janeiro, that
> change will have to come from the government. (Julia, 8/8)

> Teach For Brazil had its good points, but I think the real
> effort needs to come from the system, from the public
> sector. (Aléxia, 9/24)

> The only way to really change things, to really change
> people's daily reality, is through the public sector. It's too
> much for the NGOs. I'll give an example: the public sector
> is like a huge transatlantic freighter, moving slowly, but
> carrying a ton of people. An NGO is like a schooner, faster,
> but it only carries a few people or sinks. We need to carry
> more than just a few people, and we can't afford to sink.
> (Claudia, 9/17)

As mentioned earlier, for several Teach For Brazil teachers what changed their mind was

when they learned that in its second year, Teach For Brazil would be supported by public

funds (rather than the private donations that had supported it previously). To these Teach

For Brazil teachers, they felt like they were weakening the public system when that

money could have been used to do the same work internally:

> The original set-up when we started was that we would be
> paid by private money, by corporate donations. And almost
> one year in, that changed, they said no, we are going to sign
> a contract with the Secretariat to receive public money, and
> I thought, I don't like that. Because the second you put
> public money in an NGO, you're taking money away from
> the public. Instead of investing in teachers, training,
> professional development, you're paying for people that
> don't understand education to come in and try to solve

164

educational problems, often earning more than public teachers are earning. That bothers me. (Tainara, 9/28)

You often hear the argument that civil society efforts like Teach For Brazil cost less, that's it's cheaper to buy a service from an outside contractor that already has its own organization and methodology as a complete package, rather than develop those things from within the state. But at the same time, for us that we were working in these kinds of organizations, it's easy to think, "What is the public sector doing? Why do we have to think up new ideas, why not the Secretariat?" I also question whether it is cheaper to contract this kind of work, because in the long-term the city pays anyway, and what they paid us wasn't small change. You already have this huge human capital in the public sector, you have tons of teachers, more than 70% of the public budget is for human resources, and yet with the 30% left over you bring in new private parties hiring more people to work inside schools? This seems contradictory. Why not train teachers to do this work, teachers you already have? Or instead of contracting private parties, contract more staff? (Samuel, 5/5)

Instead of bringing in private enterprise, why not increase the number of public positions, invest better in people, invest in higher salaries, in better career opportunities? This will be bring in more people, better qualified people. Look at the salary we earned: R$1,400.00 a month for 40 hours a week of work. Why couldn't they use this money on public employees? If you offered a salary that competitive, you could get the same candidates Teach For Brazil got: people already with a Master's, with doctorates, even. You could get candidates that are just as competitive in the public sector. And ironically, by investing in Teach For Brazil instead, you just reinforce the idea that private is better than public. (Danilo, 12/5)

The reason I left Teach For Brazil was because of their use of public money for private benefit. I don't think it was necessarily embezzlement, but you had public money spent on us that could have been more effectively spent through the public sector. In my mind, the public sector can be

effective, efficient, it can be all of these things we associate with private industry, and the only reason it isn't is because we keep funding private efforts out of this mistaken belief that the private sector is inherently better. (Alexandre, 2/4)

Today I feel this way, I used to be very immature, when I came into Teach For Brazil I was very immature, I knew nothing about education, about public education, about privatization, about anything. After these two years, learning from my experience and from some great colleagues I met, I think the city was right to end projects like Teach For Brazil. I don't think schools should be without projects, but why not do those projects within the Secretariat, within schools, through the public sector? I agree with that. Teachers didn't like when we came in the way we did, and today I agree with them, man—seeing public money invested in an outside program, using money that could have been spent through the public sector. Today I'd rather fortify the public sector than bring in outside people. I'm against privatization. (Viviane, 11/26)

This section clearly illustrates the largest (and most ironic) impact of participation in Teach For Brazil on these teachers: that is, their experience taught them to distrust the main principles of *market logic*. These teachers did not see business experience as superior to education experience for managers of educational programs, and they did not see private organizations like Teach For Brazil as superior to the public sector in its ability to provide quality educational services and ideas.

Career Benefits for Teach For Brazil Teachers

As mentioned earlier, many Teach For Brazil teachers felt that their time in the classroom with Teach For Brazil had benefited them personally. For some, that benefit came in the form of future job opportunities: several former Teach For Brazil teachers and staff were offered jobs in Rio's Secretariat (Claudia, 9/17; Aléxia, 9/24; Julia, 8/8), and others got jobs at educational organizations and foundations with ties to Teach For

Brazil (Gustavo, 9/3; Sabrina, 9/19; Andréia, 9/26). As Aléxia (9/24) said, "I feel like Teach For Brazil was a bridge, a career bridge, for so many. So many Teach For Brazil folks are in city government now."

For Claudia (9/17), one of those who had achieved a competitive position through her Teach For Brazil ties, the reality that her time in Teach For Brazil had benefited her more than her students made her feel very guilty:

> I think this NGO-ification of education is very problematic, because who benefits from NGO work are the NGO workers, the "change makers," not the people they're supposed to be serving. Look at the example of Teach For Brazil which came in supposedly to trigger big changes: what changed? Whose life was changed? Mine was, my boss' life was. Who's making money from this is us.

Conclusion

This case study of Teach For Brazil is a fascinating example of an attempt made by supporters of business-minded reform in Rio de Janeiro to adapt one of the more prominent organizational models associated with such reform in the United States to a Brazilian context. Above and beyond the lessons learned by former Teach For Brazil teachers regarding why they felt that adaptation was unsuccessful, it is interesting to note the ideology that undergirded the adaptation in the first place.

That is, Teach For Brazil supporters and staff brought the model to Rio in large part because, subscribing to *market logic*, they saw it as a proven business model from elsewhere (a trend explored more fully in Chapters 4 and 6), and sought to prove its applicability to Rio's schools by producing measurable improvements in metrics like grades and test scores. This is an interesting perception, given the contested nature of the Teach For All model in the United States (Darling-Hammond et al., 2005; Heilig & Jez,

2010, 2014), and the fact that when adapted to Rio under the pretext of its "proven" nature, the model was unable to produce the expected results.

Perhaps the most interesting legacy of Teach For Brazil is the effect it has had on the career plans and ideological perspectives of its participants: that is, the vast majority of interviewed Teach For Brazil teachers had come to distrust the various tenets of *market logic*. Like Teach For America and other Teach For All partners, Teach For Brazil's mission was to promote reform in Brazilian public education by providing dynamic, ambitious young people with a hands-on experience in the classroom, thus giving them the motivation to work for more equitable education policies throughout their later careers. In the United States, there is a growing critical literature on this network of former Teach For America teachers that, from their experiences in Teach For America, subscribe to neoliberal ideals of school reform and prominently push for the expansion of charter schools and other market-based education reform (Kavanagh & Dunn, 2013; Kretchmar, Sondel & Ferrare, 2014; Maloney, 2013).

Interestingly, the trend thus far among Teach For Brazil participants seems to be the opposite: that is, their participation in Teach For Brazil has led them to doubt the validity of private solutions for the problems of public schools. During their two-year commitment a number of Teach For Brazil teachers (Sabrina, 9/13; Gustavo, 9/3; Guilherme, 11/27) began to become acquainted with the critical literature on Teach For America and other market-based U.S. education reforms through their own independent study. These Teach For Brazil teachers then began to push back from within the organization, garnering sympathy among others who were having similarly frustrating experiences in their own classrooms. As documented in this chapter, the majority of

Teach For Brazil's recruits left their experience doubtful of their impact, doubtful of the applicability of business experience to management of programs like Teach For Brazil, and doubtful of the potential impact of similar private initiatives in Rio's schools. For some former Teach For Brazil teachers, the legacy of their time in Teach For Brazil is even more extreme, having led them to become activists against privatization and *market logic*-based education reform.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

The primary purpose of this dissertation has been to document how *market logic*, or a belief in the inherent superiority of private programs and ideals as the solutions to public education's problems, has been enacted in Rio de Janeiro's public schools. In response to Research Questions 1a and 1b, through interviews with Secretariat administrators, teachers and nonprofit workers, I argue on the basis of the data presented here that the current administration of Rio's Secretariat is run by people who subscribe heavily to *market logic* in their thinking and policymaking, even when the lived reality of policy implementation seems to challenge the validity of *market logic*.

To draw back on Phillips and Ochs' (2003, 2004) policy borrowing framework outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that it was the predisposition of those in Rio's education policy circles towards *market logic* that led to the original "cross-national attraction" of the U.S.-based policies they imported and adapted. That is, a number of business-oriented Rio policymakers, including some who studied abroad in the U.S. and read case studies of U.S. market-based reforms in their coursework (Leandro, 9/2), saw the spread of market-based and accountability-driven reform policies in the U.S., and they found them appealing. One of those policy models was Teach For America, the Brazilian adaptation of which is the focus of Chapter 7. A number of mid-level policymakers within Rio's Secretariat were among those who admired such policies, and when the 2009 Paes election brought in an administration that was friendly to business-oriented technocratic ideas, the Secretariat's newly established leaders seized the moment

to implement and adapt those policies, taking the next several steps in Phillip and Ochs' (2003, 2004) model.

These findings highlight the importance of ideology in the theorization of the *currently dominant educational project*. In Chapter 2, I define that term as referring to the "constellation of...ideologies, discourses, pedagogies, and theories of knowledge and learning" (Bartlett, 2010, p. 52) that are supported by currently dominant global educational institutions, actors and financial resources. In the present case, prominent international institutions and actors did play a role in promoting neoliberal, business-minded discourses of privatization and decentralization, as outlined in Chapter 2. The present study makes clear that part of what made the policy ground fertile for receiving accountability-based reforms and models like Teach For America in recent years is the dominance of such neoliberal reforms for the last several decades, leading to an environment in which current actors at all levels of policy development (teachers, nonprofit workers, mid-level pubic and private sector managers, and top managers) had grown up surrounded by policies based in *market logic*. This social environment in which *market logic* has over time become common sense makes the documented acceptance of *market logic* among ground-level teachers and nonprofit workers in this study understandable in a way that might otherwise have remained hidden. After all, the 2009 Paes election brought significant policy changes to Rio's schools in the short course of a few years—at first glance, it might seem like all it took was an election (or at a higher level, a new UN leadership or a new World Bank president) to disrupt the balance of power and bring in a new *currently dominant educational project*.

However, such a simplistic explanation does not take into account the historically entrenched role of powerful multilateral funding organizations like the World Bank. As outlined in the history of policy borrowing in Chapter 2, it is the dominance of neoliberal public policy in Brazil (and throughout the world) since the structural adjustment period of the 1980s that has led to the current context in which the ideological assumption of the superior efficiency, innovation and quality of private ideas and services over public ones has become commonplace, not only among policy-making elites but at all social levels. Due to the extended employment of power over time by multinational actors in obliging national governments to accept neoliberal policy proscriptions, policies based in *market logic* have been the norm for so long that *market logic* has truly become common sense.

However, the strength of the foothold gained by *market logic* and the *currently dominant educational project* does not mean that these ideas and structures remain uncontested. Indeed, as documented here, Rio's new policies and the *market logic* ideology upon which they were built received significant pushback and promoted wide-scale social mobilization. In response to Research Question 1c, the strike documented in Chapter 5 displays the extent to which Rio's public school teachers, and to an extent the public at large, disagreed with and pushed back against Rio's new reforms and the *market logic* behind them.

In response to Research Question 1d, I further document the resistance to privatization and other elements of *market logic* among nonprofit workers in Chapters 6 and 7. Despite being brought in by a program, Teach For Brazil, whose organizational model was based in the *market logic* notion that private organizations can effect a significant change in public education policy, most former Teach For Brazil teachers

interviewed in this study had come to doubt the efficacy of private educational models and ideas, with some becoming activists working against such policies.

Drawing on Barlett (2003), I argue that this resistance to the *currently dominant educational project* on the part of teachers and nonprofit workers is not ideologically cohesive enough to constitute a viable *counterproject*, as interviewed teachers and nonprofit workers disagreed to varying degrees with particular policies. However, the fact that such diverse social actors can band together around resistance to current market-based policies leads to the question: what are the future prospects for the market-based *currently dominant educational project* in Rio's schools? Will this project continue to hold its current dominance over educational policy and educators' thinking? As explored more fully in Chapter 2, educational projects include "institutions, financial resources, social actors, ideologies, discourses, pedagogies, and theories of knowledge and learning that shape the way people think about schooling and its purpose" (Bartlett, 2010, 52). In the present case, *market logic* is clearly the primary ideology underlying the market-based *currently dominant educational project*, and that ideology has begun to be challenged by teachers, nonprofit workers and the public at large. However, the local institutions and social actors supporting the market-based project remain largely the same: the Paes administration is still in power, and the same business-minded professionals are in charge of Rio's Secretariat. Even further, in part due to the influence of this current administration and the funding it has opened up to the private sector, the number of educational nonprofits, foundations and think tanks in Rio continues to grow, fueling the network of reform-minded professionals mentioned by many of those interviewed in this study.

At the national level throughout Brazil, *market logic* continues to be reflected in educational discourse, and the reform network represented by *Todos Pela Educação* remains influential. At the international level, market-based reforms are still supported by prominent nation-states (particularly the United States under the current Obama administration) and multilaterals such as the World Bank. In fact, Claudia Costin recently left Rio's Secretariat under the care of her deputy so that she could take a position over the Bank's educational funding throughout Latin America (Bertolucci, 2014).

Given these circumstances, both globally and locally within Rio, the market-based *currently dominant educational project* is likely not going to dissipate any time in the near future. That said, opposition to it is not going away, either. As just discussed, many of teachers and former nonprofit workers in this study have only recently embraced anti-*market logic* activism, and it is unknown what impact they might have on Rio's education sector over the next few years. Will their numbers grow? Will more teachers and former nonprofit workers become disillusioned with the current *status quo*? Will they form a viable alternative educational *counterproject* (Bartlett, 2003)? Will this group have more success in future endeavors than they did during the teacher strike documented in Chapter 5? The present study provides some initial insight into these questions, but they could only fully be answered through more longitudinal work in this area, and through the expansion of this research to include more schools, more teachers and more nonprofits. Case studies of other nonprofits and foundations operating in Rio's Schools of Tomorrow (and public schools more generally) could shed light on the degree to which the case of Teach For Brazil is representative of Rio's private education sector more generally. Do other nonprofit workers experience similar disenchantment with *market logic* and

privatization through their work experiences? Or do participants in those programs come to subscribe more fully to the ideology underpinning the *currently dominant educational project*?

Speaking generally, this study makes clear that the market-based educational project and the *market logic* undergirding it play a significant role in contemporary public schools in Rio de Janeiro, independent of that project's ability to actually effect positive change in low-performing schools. The varied reactions of Secretariat administrators, teachers and nonprofit workers to current market-based policies illustrates the potential for complexity, difference of opinion and resistance at the varying levels of Rio's public education bureaucracy. At the same time, the failure of many attempts at resistance (most notably the strike outlined in Chapter 5) makes clear the resilience of educational projects which are supported and defended by those local and global institutions and social actors that hold the most social power.

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