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Cultivating Good Citizens:

The State, Textbooks, and Agency in Contemporary China

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

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in Education

by

Jia Jiang

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Cultivating Good Citizens:

The State, Textbooks, and Agency in Contemporary China

by

Jia Jiang

Doctor of Philosophy in Education

University of California, Los Angeles, 2019

Professor Carlos A. Torres, Chair

This dissertation investigates how the state, teachers, and students negotiate citizenship education in the high school politics curriculum in China to explore the functions and outcomes of Chinese citizenship education. Inspired by Gidden's and Sewell's statements of structure and Emirbayer and Mische's agency theory, this study focuses on how social structures and agency shape the practices of Chinese citizenship education. In addition, this research explores the influences of the Chinese individualization on the practices of citizenship education.

Data were collected from a fieldwork lasting five months in two high schools in the same city in Zhejiang Province, China. This fieldwork included observing 58 classes of the politics curriculum, interviewing 25 students and seven teachers, and analyzing textbooks and documents relating to citizenship education. Findings reveal that the state desires responsible socialist

citizens who know their rights, participate in public life with order, have a strong national identity, and support the current political system and official ideology; students demonstrate their understanding of citizens as being individualized, passive, yet patriotic; while politics curriculum teachers interpret good citizens as citizens who obey the law and behave well in their daily life. The major tension between the state and the teachers and students is that the state wants to promote its official ideology, but students and teachers are not terribly attracted to this theme; as such, teachers selectively teach citizenship and students selectively learn citizenship. Their selective strategy is shaped by social structures (e.g., the schema of ideal responsible socialist citizen proposed by the Party-state, the reality of China's politics, exam-oriented educational system, the individualistic culture, textbooks, teachers' teaching, students' preferences, time, space, etc.) and the agency of teachers and students (including teachers' and students' knowledge and experience, teachers' imagination of meaningful teaching, students' aspiration of personal freedom and self-expression, etc.).

Due to teachers' and students' selective strategy, the Party-state's goal of cultivating responsible socialist citizens succeeds in terms of promoting students' awareness of their responsibilities to their communities and the state. It is not as successful in promoting students' identification with the CCP and socialist ideology. In addition, it has the unintended result of facilitating students' knowledge of their rights and their political participation. However, this research concludes that students' increasing awareness of rights and political participation, which is facilitated by the rise of the individual, will not directly contribute to political change in China. Political control, the underdevelopment of cultural democratization, and the insufficient welfare system block their further political participation and limit their sufficient understanding of citizenship.

The dissertation of Jia Jiang is approved.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

This research investigates the interactions between the state, teachers, and students in citizenship education, aiming to show the functions of Chinese citizenship education and its real impacts on students. It focuses on the subject of *Sixiang Zhengzhi* (literally, Thought and Politics) in senior secondary education, a subject highly related to citizenship education in China. By exploring goals and contents of citizenship education designed by the Party-state, how teachers teach citizenship, and how students understand and practice citizenship in the context of the individualization of Chinese society, this research shows the complexity of citizenship education in China.

Research Problem

Since the 1990s, citizenship education has emerged as a critical topic for many educators, researchers, and policymakers around the world. This increased interest in citizenship education highly relates to social issues happening in different societies over the past three decades, including the declining participation in elections and civic activities in well-established Western democracies, the demise of welfare states, the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the turn to Western democracy by these former Communist countries, the increasing social inequality and decreasing social solidarity in many countries, and the challenges from globalization (Brooks & Holford, 2009; Cogan, Morris, & Print, 2002a; Naval, Print, & Veldhuis, 2002; Osler & Starkey, 2006; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001). To respond to these issues, many governments, policymakers, and NGOs have proposed and implemented citizenship education in schools or in informal learning settings as a way to prepare a democratic citizenship for the work of democracy or to promote responsible citizens for social cohesion (Brooks & Holford, 2009; Osler & Starkey, 2006). For example, the United States has included preparing students for

responsible citizenship in its national education goals with the legislation of Goals 2000: Educate America Act (1994) and developed national standards for classes in Civics and Governments which aim to promote informed, effective, and responsible citizens (Center for Civic Education, 1994). In the same year, the Australian government began to promote citizenship education with the establishment of its Civics Expert Group (1994). In 1998, England published the Crick Report, which mandated the teaching of a course in citizenship at the secondary school level, starting in 2002 (Advisory Group on Citizenship, 1998). Citizenship education is also promoted by supra-national organizations, such as the UNESCO (1995), which has advocated actions on education for human rights and democracy, and the European Commission (1998), which has called for the education of an active and democratic citizenship.

In parallel with the growing policy interest in citizenship education, the last three decades have seen a remarkable growth in research regarding citizenship and citizenship education in different disciplines, including education, political science, sociology, and psychology. Such studies have mainly centered on three major questions. The first concerns what kind of citizenship education should be promoted, from theoretical and philosophical standpoints (for example, Banks, 1997; Biesta, 2011; Callan, 1997; Johnson & Morris, 2010; McLaughlin, 1992; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). The second question relates to how citizenship education is implemented in reality, as has been addressed in studies of policy, curriculum implementation, and country-based studies on the practice and challenges of citizenship (Cogan & Derricott, 2012; Cogan, Morris, & Print, 2002b; Faulks, 2006; Kennedy, 1997; Torney-Purta, Schwille, & Amadeo, 1999). The third question focuses on the outcomes of citizenship education, including evaluations of the impacts and effects of policies, curricula, and educational process on students' learning of knowledge, skills, values, and dispositions of citizenship. This question is largely

explored using quantitative surveys, such as the influential International Association for the

Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) civic education study program in 1999, 2009,

2016 (Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010; Schulz et al., 2018; Torney-Purta et al.,

2001). A large body of literature in the field of political socialization also addresses the outcomes

of citizenship education by investigating how family, media, peers, schools, etc. influence the

learning of political knowledge, political participation, civic engagement, and identity formation

(Keating, Benton, & Kerr, 2011; Renshon, 1977; Sherrod, Torney-Purta, & Flanagan, 2010).

Nevertheless, more research still needs to be done in terms of using multiple research methods

(quantitative, qualitative, and mixed) to explore the process of citizenship education and focus on

the unique citizenship education experiences and meanings of students and teachers from

different demographic groups (Arthur, Davies, & Hahn, 2008).

Some scholars pointed out two shortcomings in the field of citizenship education: the

dominant Western liberal democracy discourse (Hedtke, Zimenkova, & Hippe, 2007; Levinson,

2005) and the dominant enlightenment discourse (Dimitrov & Boyadjieva, 2009). On the one

hand, many discussions about citizenship education situated in democratic societies take for

granted a liberal (representative) democratic version of citizenship education (Levinson, 2005).

Countries that have experienced political transformation, such as the former communist countries

in Eastern Europe, are relatively few and superficially studied (Hedtke et al., 2007). Unbalanced

case studies of citizenship education have led the field uncritically perceiving citizenship

education as a conduit to political liberation and democracy. However, a few scholars have stated

the possibility that citizenship education is a way of social control. Lawson and Scott (2002)

have pointed out that, in the past, citizenship education has chiefly encouraged patriotism and

loyalty to the nation; Sears and Hughes (2006) have shown how indoctrination is imbedded in

citizenship education's commitment to slogans and dogmas, the rush to reform, and the tradition of didactic teaching in Canada. Citizenship education also can be a way for governing elites to maintain their power, status, and positions (Cogan et al., 2002a). On the other hand, the enlightenment discourse of citizenship has always assumed that the teaching of knowledge and civic attitudes will directly translate into civil behavior, and that youth with blank slates will passively accept the idea of citizenship education (Dimitrov & Boyadjieva, 2009). This position overlooks students' existing knowledge about citizenship and their agency in the process (Olson, Fejes, Dahlstedt, & Nicoll, 2015). Indeed, an increasing number of studies have shifted their research paradigm to view individuals as actively constructers of citizenship (Haste, 2004) and focus on understanding the experiences and interpretations of different agents (including policymakers, stakeholders, teachers, and students) involved in citizenship education (for example, Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011; Marri, 2005; Staeheli & Hammett, 2010).

Focusing on the case of China, a former communist state which has experienced huge social transformation since its economic reforms in 1978, this research enriches current studies and discussions of citizenship education by showing a different framework for thinking about and practicing of citizenship education in an authoritarian state. This dissertation shows a complex picture of the functions of citizenship education, combined with social control, social integration, and some positive elements of democracy at the same time.

China is an authoritarian state where the control of the state institutions is limited to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Against this background, citizenship education in China is usually perceived as a system for supporting socialist nation-building. It has an ideological link with the CCP, aims to support a socialist world view, and tries to "mold" citizens along predetermined lines (Kennedy, 2014). However, since the turn of the 21st century, the Party-state

has begun to integrate Western discourse into the Chinese framework of citizenship education. In his 2007 report to the 17th National Congress of the Chinese CCP, erstwhile President Hu Jintao (2007a) emphasized the need to set up education about citizenship (*jiaqiang gongmin yishi jiaoyu*) to raise citizens' awareness of socialist democracy, the rule of law, liberty, equality, and justice. Although the discourse of citizenship was not often mentioned in the Xi era, the components of citizenship, such as political identity, public participation, and awareness of the rule of law are defined as key competencies for political education (Ministry of Education, 2017). Indeed, some studies have indicated significant changes in Chinese citizenship and citizenship education in response to social transitions since the country's 1978 economic reform. Influenced by the marketization, liberalization, and globalization, China has increased the course contents to include political rights and systems, the rule of law, socialist democracy, Chinese traditional culture, and global citizenship in its official curricula relating to citizenship education (K. W. Cheung & Pan, 2006; Law, 2016; Lee & Ho, 2005; P. Li, Zhong, Lin, & Zhang, 2004; Tse, 2011). Nevertheless, there is a political bottom line: "Citizenship education must uphold the socialist system, the CCP as the only ruling power, and China's territorial integrity" (Law, 2011, p. 128). Thus, in China, citizenship education endeavors to follow its communist legacy, while blending elements of traditional Chinese culture with Western ideas of rights, the rule of law, and democracy.

Although existing research has traced changes in citizenship education in China, more research is needed to further explore why and how the Party-state will integrate three quite distinct discourses: socialist/communist, traditional, and democratic, into its citizenship education framework. Particularly, it is still unclear whether such efforts will succeed or fail and what kind of challenges will be confronted by the Party-state led citizenship education in the

process. To answer these questions, this research first investigates the historical progress of the CCP's political ideology and the official politics curriculum since the CCP took power in 1949, showing the contexts and goals for the Party-state to promote socialist ideology, Chinese traditional culture, nationalism, and socialist democracy in citizenship education. In doing so, it explores the social functions of citizenship education designed by the Party-state. This research then examines whether the Party-state has realized its goals for, or designed functions, of citizenship education. It uses interviews and classroom observation to investigate how students understand and practice citizenship and how teachers teach it, unfolding the complexity of citizenship education in reality.

In terms of the context of Chinese citizenship education, this research pays particular attention to the individualization of Chinese society, a theme which has been explored in the field of anthropology (Hansen, 2015; Hansen & Svarverud, 2010; Yan, 2009, 2010b) but noticed by few scholars in citizenship education. Individualization theories were first proposed by Western scholars to describe particular changes in the nature of social relations in Western European societies, in which individuals uprooted from their cultural traditions and previous social categories (such as family, kinship, gender, and class), have been and are compelled by the social structure to increasingly desire individuality, choice, and freedom, and at the same time must rely on social institutions to realize "a life of their own" (U. Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 1991; Howard, 2007). Inspired by works on the Western individualization process, some scholars have also explored the individualization of Chinese society. Indeed, China has witnessed the rise of the individual in private life and public life over the past four decades. In private life, more and more people, especially youth, have increasingly pursued their individual freedom, independence, personal happiness, and individual realization (Gold, 1993;

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Hansen & Pang, 2010; Yan, 2003). In public life, there has been a rise in people's awareness of their individual rights, as attested to by various rights movements and protests and the emergence of Internet individualism and activism (Yan, 2010a).

Nevertheless, scholars pointed out the uniqueness of Chinese individualization, comprising: (1) the state-managed liberation of the individual as a private and economic unit, on the one hand, and the strengthening of direct political control on the other; (2) the lack of culturally embedded democracy; (3) the lack of a universalized welfare system; and, (4) the absence of shared liberal notion of autonomous individual and political liberalism, which value individual rights as something with which one is born (Hansen, 2015; Yan, 2009, 2010b). This study reveals how Chinese individualization influences the official framework of citizenship education as well as teachers' and students' thinking and practicing of citizenship. It also pays attention to the contested individual vs. state relationship facilitated by the rise of individualism in the Chinese high school setting.

This research examines the outcomes and functions of the state-led citizenship education from the perspectives of students and teachers. Following the increasing research paradigm, which perceives the individual as an active being constructing citizenship, this research assumes that teachers and students will negotiate citizenship education with the Party-state. Inspired by Giddens' (1979) suggestion of combining human agency and social structure to analyze the social world, this research particularly looks into the agency of teachers and students in the classes of citizenship education and the social structures that enable or constrain their practices of citizenship education. It adopts Emirbayer and Mische's (1998) three dimensions of agency framework: 1) the *iterative dimension* which refers to past patterns of thought and actions; 2) the *projective dimension* which refers to the capacity of imaginative engagement of the future in

social actions, and 3) the *present dimension* which refers to the practical evaluation of social actions; to analyze how agency contributes to the social actions of teachers and students of citizenship education. In addition, this research employs Sewell's (1992) statement about the structure and structural change to show how the agency of both teachers and students is either constrained or empowered by social structures. By showing the complex interactions of structures and agency in the teaching and learning of Chinese citizenship education, this research reveals how the state-led citizenship education is shaped by the social structures and agency involved in the process.

In sum, this research investigates the functions of Chinese citizenship education desired by the Party-state and its real impacts on students. On the one hand, it explores the goals and contents of citizenship education desired by the Party-state. On the other hand, it uses structure and agency perspectives to study the teaching and learning of citizenship, demonstrating how teachers and students negotiate citizenship education with the Party-state and social structures, thus shaping the outcomes of citizenship education. It pays particular attention to the role of the individualization of Chinese society in the whole process. Although citizenship education can be implemented in multiple subjects and in informal learning settings, this research mainly focuses on the politics curriculum (*Sixiang Zhengzhi*) due to its direct relation to state-led citizenship education.

Research Questions

This research concerns how the dynamic interactions between the state, teachers, and students in the high school politics curriculum in China shape the outcomes of Chinese citizenship education. There are several questions to be addressed in this research: (1) What kind of citizen is promoted by the state? What comprises the state's interests in citizenship education?

(2) How do students think about and practice citizenship? (3) How do teachers perceive and teach citizenship? (4) what are the tensions or gaps between the state, teachers, and students in their perceptions of citizenship and citizenship education? How do teachers and students negotiate with these tensions in the classroom? What factors, from the perspective of agency and structure, contribute to their negotiation?

Significance of the Study

This research contributes new perspectives and insights to existing studies on Chinese citizenship education. First, by adding the perspectives of individualization, this research reveals how Chinese individualization influences the Party-state's construction of citizenship and shapes both the teaching and the learning of citizenship. This theme, while seldom studied in current research on Chinese citizenship education, plays an important role in reality. It implies a contested relationship between the state and its populace that needs to be further explored.

Second, this research examines the dynamic interactions between the state, teachers, and students in citizenship education. International studies of citizenship education have led to growing interest in citizenship education in mainland China. These studies have explored the contents and changes of Chinese citizenship education, the influential pedagogies advocated by Chinese scholars, and young people's civic values, understanding, and attitudes (Fairbrother, 2003; Kennedy, Fairbrother, & Zhao, 2013; Law, 2011; J. Li, 2009; X. Zhao, Haste, Selman, & Luan, 2014; Z. Z. Zhao, 2013; Z. Z. Zhao & Fairbrother, 2010; Zhong & Lee, 2008). However, it is unclear how teachers teach, what their classroom practice looks like, how teachers and students interact with state led citizenship education, what the outcomes of citizenship education are, and what factors influence its outcomes. Through conducting fieldwork in two high schools, this research shows rich details of the implementation of citizenship education in China,

demonstrating the complexity of Chinese citizenship education and some of the factors influencing its outcomes.

Moreover, this research also contributes to current studies of citizenship education worldwide. By using China as a case study, this research helps to examine the political complexity of an authoritarian state in a globalized world, as well as the multiple assumptions and functions of citizenship education. By showing a different framework with which to think about citizenship, it adds insight to current studies of citizenship education, which predominantly focus on Western countries and assume citizenship education for democracy.

Organization of Chapters

This dissertation includes eight chapters. The first chapter provides a general overview of the study, including the background of the research problem, the major research questions, the significance of this research, and the organization of the chapters. Chapter two reviews the literature in three parts: the first part reviews the notions of citizenship to identify key elements and issues in the field of citizen studies, suggesting a basic investigative framework for citizenship and citizenship education in this study; the second part discusses the analytical framework, the functions of citizenship education and "structure and agency" to best interpret the data; and the third part reviews the history, issues, and challenges of citizenship and citizenship education in China. Chapter Three explains the methodology utilized in this study, introducing the school sites, participants, research methods, and ways of collecting and analyzing the data.

Chapters Four through Seven present the analysis of the data. Chapter Four reviews the historical change in China's ideology and how it affected the politics curriculum. Chapter Five details the discourse of citizenship in the high school politics curriculum, demonstrating how and why textbooks construct "ideal responsible socialist citizens" who know their rights, are

willingness to participate in public life within order, form a strong, patriotic national identity, appreciate the Chinese traditional culture, and support the current political system.

Chapters Six and Seven investigate students' and teachers' subjective understanding of citizenship and their daily practice. Chapter Six shows students' daily life, their understanding of their rights and responsibilities, their dilemmas inherent in their participation in organized civic engagement, their primordial sense of national identity, and their struggles when their national identity conflicts with their global identity. It outlines how the individualization and globalization of young people, together with the media and problematic political systems, shape students' perceptions and practices of citizenship. It also reveals the slightness of Chinese students' resistance to official ideology. Chapter Seven focuses its attention on politics curriculum teachers. It details three teachers' autobiographies, their teaching of politics, their thoughts on citizenship education, and their strategies for dealing with students' challenges. This chapter shows how the teaching of citizenship education is shaped by China's exam-oriented educational system, students' resistance, and teachers' agency.

Chapter Eight is the conclusions chapter in which all major themes are brought together to shed light on how interactions between individual and social structures shape China's young citizens. It first concludes the epistemic gaps in the understandings of citizenship between the state, students, and teachers. Then it reveals the strategies of selective teaching and learning adopted by teachers and students and analyzes how existing social structures and teachers' and students' agency contributes to these strategies. Finally, this chapter discusses the influence of Chinese individualization on understandings and practices of citizenship, revealing how young citizens are constrained by their insufficient understanding of citizenship and by the lack of external conditions for practicing meaningful citizenship.

Chapter 2 Overview of the Literature and Theoretical Framework

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework that guides this research. It first defines and reviews extant studies on citizenship, identifying four key elements of citizenship, including rights, obligations, political participation, and citizenship identity. These elements also offer a basic conceptual framework for understanding Chinese citizenship education. It then reviews current studies on the definitions, functions, and outcomes of citizenship education. Further, this chapter adds theories on social structures and agency to the framework investigating the functions of citizenship education and its real outcomes. The final part of this chapter reviews the history of citizenship in China, current studies on Chinese citizenship education, and the individualization of Chinese society.

Notions and Elements of Citizenship

Although citizen as a classic concept can be traced back to ancient Greek, the expansion of citizenship is a phenomenon paralleling the emergence of modern nation states. Isin and Turner (2002a) pointed out that "modern citizenship itself was born of the nation-state in which certain rights and obligations were allocated to individuals under its authority" (p. 3). From this perspective, citizenship is widely understood as a legal status by which an individual is recognized as a member of a state or political community, and as having certain rights and obligations, although the interpretation of these rights and obligations vary from one state to another. Citizenship is also understood as a desirable activity, which relates to citizens' participation in the political community (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). Indeed, political participation by the citizenry is considered key to democracy and to deal with increasing voter apathy and declining of civic engagement (Putnam, 2000). In addition, citizenship identity—the feeling that one belongs to a political community—becomes a key theme in discussions of social

unity, given the increasing prevalence of nationalism, immigration, and minority groups

(Brubaker, 1992; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Tilly, 1995).

Therefore, this study adopts rights, obligations, political participation, and identity as four

main elements to investigate the nature of citizenship. They are certain key elements for

understanding citizenship and citizenship education (Cogan & Derricott, 2012; Schulz et al.,

2010).[1] Underlying these four themes are ideas about what kinds of rights and obligations

citizens should have, what kind of democracy is preferred, what kind of political participation is

needed, and what kinds of relations exist between citizens, between citizens and the state, and

between insiders and outsiders. Political theorists writing from the perspectives of liberalism,

republicanism, communitarianism, and multiculturalism provide different answers to these

issues, indicating there is no stable, normative model of modern citizens (Isin & Turner, 2002b;

Kymlicka, 1995). The next section reviews key issues in and debates about rights,

obligations/responsibilities, political participation, and national identity to show the complexity

of citizenship and citizenship in the Western democratic contexts.

Rights and obligations/responsibilities

The discourse about the rights of citizenship regards citizens as the recipients of certain

benefits offered by the state (Walzer, 1970). It has a long liberal tradition that has developed

from the sixteenth century to today in the West. There are many branches of liberalism, varying

from "'negative liberty' ideals that emphasize individuals' right to be let alone and to pursue

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[1] The IEA civic education study program includes four content domains for the investigation of students'
understanding of citizenship: 1) civic society and systems, which includes rights and responsibilities; 2) civic
principles, which relates to equality, freedom, and social cohesion; 3) civic participation; and, 4) civic identity
(Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010). Whereas Cogan and Derricott (2012) used five categories to
investigate citizenship: 1) a sense of identity; 2) the enjoyment of certain rights; 3) the fulfillment of corresponding
obligations; 4) a degree of interest and involvement in public affairs; and 5) an acceptance of basic societal values.
This study does not include value elements or principle elements in its framework of citizenship because it assumes
that different political systems have different understandings of values.

their own projects free of state compulsion, all the way to 'positive liberty' notions" (Schuck, 2002, p. 132).

According to Held (2006), the modern liberal idea of human beings as individuals with rights to be citizens of their state emerged from crises in religious tradition, the monarchical powers, and the feudal system of property rights at the late sixteenth century (p. 58). The agendas of the earliest liberal thinkers, such as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and John Locke (1632–1704), were to restrict the power of church and state and to free individuals from political interference. They reasoned that the legitimate source of the state's power was the people's consent; therefore, the state had responsibilities to protect individuals' lives, security, and property, and to mediate their conflicting interests.[2] Underlying this assumption is the belief that individuals are born free and equal and should have the right to pursue their own preferences in daily life, although the individuals referred to were mainly white, male property owners. Gradually, these rights expanded to include liberty of thoughts, publishing, and association, in order to limit the authority of society over individuals, as was clearly articulated in John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* (1859). These discussions about liberty set the foundations for the rights guaranteed by modern democratic governments.

The history of citizens claiming their rights in reality is much more complicated. It is not only a quest for liberty and freedom, but also a quest for equality and inclusion, as the cases of France and United States show. The French Revolution played a significant role in the development of the modern institution of national citizenship. It was a revolution by the "Third Estate"[3] combined with the bourgeoisie to claim common rights and obligations, oppose

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[2] See Hobbes' The Leviathan and Locke's Two Treatises of Government.

[3] Before the French Revolution, French society was divided into three estates: The First Estate (clergy), Second Estate (nobility) and Third Estate (commoners). The Third Estate was combined by many different classes, ranging

privileges, and establish equality before the law; civil equality and political rights were the main concerns of the revolution (Brubaker, 1992). In terms of American citizenship, its history is a struggle for recognition and inclusion, as shown in the expanding rights to slaves and women, and of voting rights from propertied white men to slaves, native-born Americans, and, finally, women (Shklar, 1991).

Today, the rights a citizen possesses can be divided into three categories suggested by T. H. Marshall (1950):[4] (1) civil rights, including those necessary for individual freedom, such as freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice; (2) political rights, including those necessary to participate in the exercise of political power, such as the rights to vote or be elected; and, (3) social rights, including those necessary for social security and welfare and to ensure a basic material safety net for survival, such as the rights to education and social services. For Marshall, social rights are important to guarantee the justice a person (especially a person from a disadvantaged group) can acquire and the extent to which a person can participate in society. These are key elements of citizenship needed to overcome social inequality among social classes.

Multiculturalism brings the perspectives of minority groups into the debate about rights. Recognizing the differences among many groups—people of color, women, LGBT people, aboriginal people, and ethnic and religious minorities—cultural pluralists believe that the rights of citizenship should consider the special needs and cultures of minority groups, such as special representation in the political institutions for women or blacks, the right of self-government rights for national minorities or aboriginal peoples, and special rights to religious practice for

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from peasants, labors, middle classes, to capitalists (Brubaker, 1992).

[4] T. H. Marshall offered an historical perspective on the development of modern citizenship in Britain. Although his three categories have been disputed, they still offer the basic typology for citizenship rights.

some immigrant groups (Kymlicka, 1995). However, the claim of cultural rights, which emphasizes the unique culture of certain groups has been questioned for its potential to spur self-separation and threaten social unity (Spinner-Halev, 1999). Moreover, there is a worry that collective rights (like minority groups' self-determination) will harm individual rights. Underlying this concern is a huge debate concerning the universality of human rights and cultural relativism (An-Na'im, 1995).

While rights have been the subject of wide-ranging debate and discussion, obligations and responsibilities have been comparatively ignored by many citizens and by political and social theorists. Basic citizenship obligations may include obeying the law, taxation, obligatory conscription in the military. However, the past four decades have witnessed an increasing requirement for citizen obligations and responsibilities due to the problems confronting welfare systems and declines in political community (Janoski, 1998). The welfare system has been the target of criticism since the 1980s as leading to the "free-rider" phenomenon and the dependency on government among the unemployed and marginalized. Therefore, the neo-conservatives have proposed that citizens should not only be the passive receivers of welfare benefits and that, in addition to such basic obligations such as taxation, military service, and obeying the law, citizens should have other social obligations, including working, contributing to their family's support, learning employable labor skills (Mead, 1986). On the other hand, communitarians worry about the effective and just functioning of society, and thus propose citizenship obligations of participation and civic virtues (Etzioni, 1993; MacIntyre, 1981; Putnam, 2000). Janoski (1998), summarizing various discussions about obligations, divided them into four types: legal obligations, political obligations, social obligations, and participation obligations (p.55). Nevertheless, there is no consensus about what kind of obligations citizens should have, nor

why. In addition, there are other issues bearing on the questions of citizenship obligations, including investigating the relationship between rights and obligations, the issue of whether and how to enforce obligations, and the issue of limiting obligations .

Therefore, it is important to ask what kinds of rights citizens believe they have, how they claim their rights, and how they understand freedom and equality. It is also important to look at what kinds of obligations citizens think they have, how they balance rights and obligations, and what they do to fulfill those obligations.

Political participation and civic engagement

Citizenship is not only a legal status relating to rights and obligations, it also concerns the actions and activities of individuals involved in public and community affairs—that is, political participation and civic engagement. Political participation includes voting, campaigning, monitoring the performance of representatives, or waging protests to influence government policies. In a broader sense, participating in public affairs is suggested as civic engagement, including joining activities such as reading or watching news broadcasts, discussing politics and social issues, giving money to charity or volunteering for community service (Ekman & Amna, 2012). However, there is a dispute between liberalism and republican republicanism about the meaning and extent of citizens' participation in community affairs.

For liberalism, citizenship is a "passive" or "private citizenship" without any requirements for citizens' participation in public life, because of its emphasis on freedom and passive entitlements (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Walzer, 1970). Although liberal theorists advocate the right of political participation, they believe that exercising this right is up to each citizen. As Walzer (1970) pointed out, "the usual expectation of liberal theorists is that only men dissatisfied with the security they receive will choose to participate in any very active fashion"

(p. 208). Political participation is perceived as an instrument for assisting the pursuit of personal life and protecting citizens' liberty (Oldfield, 1990). Moreover, liberal theorists think that political participation is a burden for individuals, compared with the enrichment and enjoyment of private life. They prefer to place their trust in elected authorities or representatives. On the one hand, they are concerned about the tyranny of the majority; on the other, they worry about the corruption of representatives and the despotic power of the state. Therefore, they propose a representative government and a separation of powers (Held, 2006). As liberal theorists assume it is "nature" for individuals to pursue their own good and preferences, they suggest using the democratic system to solve conflicts of interest in the public sphere.

Different from the liberal idea of "passive citizens," republicanism, inspired by Machiavelli and Rousseau, advocates "active citizens" who participate in political life. Rather than assuming that the state and community will intervene in individuals' lives and freedom, republicanism believes individuals will fulfill themselves by participating in the life of the republic (Aristotie, 1998; Oldfield, 1990). Therefore, in addition to its instrumental value, political participation has intrinsic value for the development of citizens as human beings. Republicanism addresses the public good or common good of community. As Held (2006) summarized, "citizenship is the means to involvement in a shared enterprise orientated towards the realization of the common good; and political participation is the necessary vehicle for the attainment of the good" (p. 39). Thus, republicanism claims that citizens have the duty to participate in politics for the "common good" by overseeing officials, protecting liberty, and maintaining the health of society and democracy. Protecting the common good requires a high degree of vigilance. Civic mindfulness requires concern for the public and cooperation with others (Galston, 1991; Macedo, 1990; Oldfield, 1990). In addition, political participation and

civic engagement in church, community, and voluntary associations can generate social capital and make democracy work (Putnam, 2000; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994).

Why people should participate in politics or what factors facilitate their participation is another matter. Increasing voter apathy and indifference to political participation has become a global phenomenon, particularly among youth. Liberal theorists attribute the decline in political participation to the enrichment of private life, while republican theorists attribute it to the impoverishment of public engagement, disinterest in political debate, and people's lack of access to effective participation (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). Putnam (2000) concluded that the pressures of time and money, suburbanization, the privatization of leisure time through electronic entertainment, and generational change since the 1970s have led to a decrease in social capital and civic engagement. Skocpol (1999) analyzed changing organizational patterns, positing that the multiplicity of advocacy groups run by managers has encompassed citizen involvement. Other studies offer insights into how social change, social structure, and discourse (or culture) influence people's involvement in politics (D. X. Zhao, 2006). In recent years, some scholars have questioned the assumed decline of young people's political participation, arguing that young people in the digital age have changed their forms of public engagement from the dutiful citizen model to a new actualized citizen model centering on self-expression and actualization (Bennett, Wells, & Rank, 2009).

Others have suggested increasing civic engagement by promoting civic virtues through education or strengthening social ties through reviving neighborhoods and civil society (Barber, 2003; Oldfield, 1990; Putnam, 2000). While "rational-choice" scholars focus on analyzing the ways in which institutions and organizations can create incentives for meaningful engagement (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999).

Inspired by the above discussions about political participation and civic engagement, this study pays attention to how students understand political participation and civic engagement, what kinds of activities they want to be involved in and why, and what factors influence their participation in politics and public affairs.

Citizenship as an identity

Citizenship celebrates identity, an expression of one's membership in a political community (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). The majority of citizens in a nation-state recognize themselves as a member of the larger community to which they feel a sense of attachment. This sense of identity is formed through the sharing of common interests, territory, and pride, including both cultural forms (tradition, ethnicity, lifestyle) and political forms (systems of beliefs, ceremonies, symbols) (Heater, 1999). Identity breeds loyalty to the extent that citizens are willing to sacrifice their personal gain for the advancement of community interest (Habermas, 1992).

One strong expression of citizenship identity is patriotism, referring to one's love of country and nation (Kelman, 1997). Huddy and Khatib (2007) have summarized three forms of patriotism proposed by scholars: 1) *symbolic patriotism,* referring to a sense of pride in one's country or nation; 2) *blind patriotism*, also called uncritical patriotism, characterized by an unwillingness to criticize or accept criticism of one's country or nation; and, 3) *constructive patriotism*, characterized by questioning and criticism driven by a desire for positive change. Scholars have studied the impacts of different forms of patriotism on political involvement. Schatz, Staub, and Lavin (1999) concluded that "blind patriotism" is positively associated with political disengagement, nationalism, perceptions of foreign threat, and the perceived importance

of symbolic behaviors while "constructive patriotism" is positively associated with political involvement (such as political efficacy, interest, knowledge, and behavior).

National identity is another issue widely discussed in connection with citizenship identity. While patriotism relates both to countries and nations, "national identity" refers strictly to the concept of nation.[5] A nation is "a community of people of the same descent, who are integrated geographically, in the forms of settlements or neighborhoods, and culturally by their common language, customs, and traditions" (Habermas, 1992, p. 199). With the emergence of the modern nation-state, the nation has become the source of state sovereignty, and some states have developed a new sense of nationhood based on the boundaries of the political system, despite their initial ethnic and cultural differences (Kelman, 1997). National identity conflates two sets of dimensions, one civic and territorial, the other ethnic and genealogical (Smith, 1991). It facilitates individuals' adoption of beliefs, values, assumptions, and expectations that help them define and locate themselves in the world (Kelman, 1997; Smith, 1991).

Nationalism is "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity, and identity for a population that some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential nation" (Smith, 1991, p. 73). Nations that seek self-determination, autonomy, and unity may launch aggressive actions and bring conflicts, war, and suffering. Witness the tide of nationalism and separatism happening in Western Europe, Soviet Union, Canada, etc. since the 1960s, and conflicts that have plagued Eastern Europe since the 1990s (Habermas, 1992; Janoski, 1998; Kelman, 1997; Smith, 1991).

Other issues in the discussion of citizenship identity include the internal and external challenges to group identity. Internally, despite sharing a citizenship identity, individuals in a

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[5] Country and nation are not necessarily the same. According to Kelman (1997), "some members of the nation may live outside the country, and some inhabitants of the country may be part of a different nation" (p. 166).

state also have different group identities based on class, gender, religion, ethnicity, race, age, etc. These group identities direct individuals to claim the rights of their own group, which challenges the universal attachments and rights in state-based citizenship (Isin, Wood, & Wood, 1999). Externally, on the one hand, the current issues of immigration and refugees in Europe and the United States have challenged the exclusionary nature of citizenship identity based on a closure political community. On the other hand, cosmopolitan (or world) citizenship has been advocated since the Second World War. It emphasizes that national citizens should have a sense of collective and individual responsibility for the world as a whole to solve global issues, such as global inequality and poverty, environmental degradation, and the violation of human rights (Linklater, 2002). The global identity inherent in the concept of cosmopolitan citizenship challenges the assumption that citizenship identity is based on nation-states.

Rights, obligations, political participation, civic engagement, and citizenship identity are the core components of citizenship. However, there is no universal agreement about the normative meanings and contents of each component. Different definitions of citizenship relate to distinct perspectives on power, equality, inclusion, democracy, diversity, common good, and social solidarity. They are situated within particular political, social, and cultural contexts. Therefore, the aims and objectives of citizenship education are influenced by understandings of citizenship and are also contested within and amongst countries.

Citizenship Education: Definitions, Functions, and Outcomes

As the key question for this study is what the social functions of citizenship education in a particular society are, this section reviews several theories exploring the functions of education and applies them to explain three different functions of citizenship education. It also reviews

current studies on the outcomes of citizenship education to explore what factors shape its functions.

Definitions and typologies

Citizenship education is commonly perceived as education for the preparation of young people as citizens and includes the promotion of certain knowledge, skills, attitudes, values, and dispositions (Advisory Group on Citizenship, 1998; Cogan et al., 2002a; Kerr, 1999b).[6] In Western contexts, citizenship education is widely associated with democracy, active citizen participation, informed citizens, active citizens, effective citizens, or responsible citizens (Advisory Group on Citizenship, 1998; Center for Civic Education, 1994; UNESCO, 1995). These associations are largely based on the concept of democratic citizenship in Western countries. Yet, there still exists great varieties in citizenship education in these countries, in terms of its aims, contents, and approaches.

This study defines citizenship education in a more values-neutral way. It perceives citizenship as a term describing the membership of an individual in a state that includes rights, obligations, political participation, and identity without assuming a normative content of these elements. Therefore, citizenship education here is a kind of education relating to these elements. Citizenship education occurs, not only in schools and universities, but also in families, religions, communities, associations, and other informal learning settings. In the school setting, it has various forms, too. It is delivered in social studies and history classes and, to a lesser degree, in

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[6] A similar term to citizenship education is civic education, which is also broadly used in the literature. Traditionally, civic education refers to the study of governments, constitutions, institutions, the rule of law, and the rights and responsibilities of citizens, and is largely content- and knowledge-led; currently, it also refers to the educational process by which young people become informed and active citizens in their society (Cogan, Morris, & Print, 2002a; Kerr, 1999b).

literature, geography, and science. It also relates to hidden curricula and students' participation in classroom life and student associations.

Scholars have distinguished different types of citizenship education. Mclaughlin (1992) pointed out that citizenship education ranges from a minimal level to a maximal level. A minimal citizenship education conceptualizes citizenship as a legal status and emphasizes the provision of information (such as the legal and constitutional system and the processes of government and suffrage) and the development of basic social morality (such as loyalties and responsibilities). In contrast, a maximal citizenship education assumes good citizens are people who concern with the common good of the community, and therefore emphasizes students' social involvement, critical reflection, and understanding of politics and controversial issues (Kerr, 1999b; McLaughlin, 1992). Kerr (1999b) has proposed distinguishing types of citizenship education into three strands based on their intended aims or goals: education about citizenship, which focuses on providing students with knowledge and understanding of national history and the government; education through citizenship, which emphasizes preparing students' learning through active participation in the school or local communities; and education for citizenship, which involves the presentation of knowledge, skills, values, and dispositions needed by active citizens.

Another influential classification of citizenship education was proposed by Westheimer and Kahne (2004). They distinguished three kinds of good citizen promoted by education, including: the personally responsible citizen, who acts responsibly in his or her community; the participatory citizen, who actively participates in community organizations to improve society or solve social problems; and the justice-oriented citizen, who critically analyzes social issues and injustice and pursues social justice (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004, pp. 241–242).

Although above classifications of citizenship education have different names, they share certain traits: minimal citizenship education emphasizes knowledge and basic citizenship requirements, more active one stresses active participation, and critical one, addressing areas of injustice and pursing systematic change.

Multiple functions of citizenship education

As pointed out Levinson (2005) , many discussions about citizenship education are situated in democratic societies and they take for granted a liberal (representative) democratic version of citizenship education. The types of citizenship education identified above are exactly drawn from cases of UK (Kerr, 1999a; McLaughlin, 1992) and US (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). By including the case of Asian countries and post-communist countries, my study of the literature distinguishes multiple functions of citizenship education: citizenship education for democracy; citizenship education for social cohesion; citizenship education for social change; citizenship education for social order or social control.

Citizenship education for democracy and social cohesion is the most widely recognized and desired function of citizenship education. Educating a democratic citizenship is a popular goal among Western democratic countries, countries that experience democratization, and transnational organizations—the United States (Goals 2000: Educate America Act, 1994), England (Advisory Group on Citizenship, 1998), Australia (Civics Expert Group, 1994), United Nations (UNESCO, 1995), European Commission (1998), etc.—who have proposed to prepare citizens who are informed with knowledge about their rights, duties, and government, have the willingness and skills needed for civic participation, and display public spirit, such as reasonableness, respect for others, and caring for the common good. Yet, these various entities have different emphases. Minimal citizenship education, education for personal responsible

citizens, and education for participatory citizens well describe the various types of citizenship education in the category of democratic citizenship education.

The social cohesion function of citizenship education is more associated with the national identity issue embedded in the concept of citizens. Indeed, constructing national identity and promoting national belonging through a history course and a civic course is a widely-observed phenomenon in citizenship education in different countries, including Australia, the United States, Singapore, England, and others. For example, in Singapore, the aim of national education is to foster a sense of national pride, to teach the Singapore story, and to instill the core values of harmony and good governance (Baildon & Sim, 2010). National identity education assumes that social cohesion and unity is promoted by emphasizing students' common identity and culture. However, according to current demographics, the existence of homogeneous national culture and identity is rare. Thus, multicultural citizenship education and democratic citizenship education have been proposed in some countries to deal with social cohesion crises by building consensus on respecting diversity and a democratic political system (Banks, 1997; Habermas, 1992; Kymlicka, 1995).

There are some programs in citizenship education are more critical, aiming at fostering social change. These programs emphasize students' critical thinking, addressing controversial issues, and taking action for social change: the goals of maximal citizenship education (McLaughlin, 1992) and justice-oriented citizenship education (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). Rather than obeying the law or participating in established institution systems, the citizens advocated by this education prefer to question unequal social structures, learn about democratic social movements, and challenge established systems. Nevertheless, this kind of education is not terribly widespread. As such, justice-oriented citizenship education is more often practiced at the

small program level than at the national level (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). As it challenges existing state power and social structures, justice-oriented citizenship education is not very visible or favored in state and national education systems.

Few studies have claimed that citizenship education can be instrument for social order or social control. Yet, this kind of citizenship education exists. Dimitrov and Boyadjieva (2009) pointed out that, in post-communist countries marked with a collectivistic worldview and egalitarian morality, schools teaching citizenship education are used by the state as tools for maintaining order and cultivating obedient citizens. Piattoeva (2010) showed that Russia promoted a brand of citizenship education that might be called "patriotism education," emphasizing students' loyalty and responsibility to the state. Differing from the civic-republican citizenship model's call for responsibility based on the protection of individual freedom, the Russian model prioritizes the state's affairs over individual interests and   reproduces its power and authority. Even in Western countries, there is a possibility that citizenship education functions with elements of social control , as showed by Sears and Hughes (2006)'s study on the indoctrination nature of the teaching of citizenship education in Canada embedded in the commitment to slogans, rush to reforms, and didactic teaching.

To conclude, there are many functions of citizenship education for the society and the state. These functions vary among countries, depending on the kind of citizenship that is taught and how it is implemented. Piattoeva (2010) claimed, "it is important to understand that rights, duties, participation, and identity can be articulated in very different terms, largely depending on the political ideology they are rooted in. Thus, citizenship is a profoundly historical and embedded concept inseparable from the meaning of the polity itself" (p. 131).

The effects of citizenship education and the factors shaping its outcomes

The functions of citizenship education should not be measured only by its goals and content. Outcomes also matter. Many empirical studies have investigated the effects of citizenship education on students, particularly in school settings, and explained what factors contribute to those effects. However, their conclusions have been disputed. Although peer-pressure, family beliefs, and mass media undoubtedly influence the way students approach citizenship education in the West (Renshon, 1977), this study mainly reviews the effects of schooling on students' learning outcomes of citizenship.

Many studies hold a positive view of the effects of schooling on students' learning outcomes of citizenship, particularly in the field of political socialization. Through conducting quantitative studies, research shows that schools have increased students' political knowledge and skills (Hahn, 1998; Niemi & Junn, 1998; Schulz et al., 2010, 2018; Torney-Purta, 2002). Schools' positive impact on students' citizenship learning outcomes relates to the teaching of civic content and skills, teacher-student dialogue concerning controversial issues, relationships between students and between teachers and students, and students being able to participate in school affairs and local community (Schulz et al., 2010; Torney-Purta, 2002).

However, other researchers question the positive outcomes of citizenship education for students, focusing on American social studies courses and civics courses. With the steady decline in young people's political participation, many scholars, particularly political scientists, claimed that civics classes had little effect on the vast majority of students in the 1960s and 1970s (P. A. Beck, 1977; Langton & Jennings, 1968). Recently, reviewing studies on the impact of civic education on adolescent's political participation, Manning and Edwards (2014) concluded there is little evidence of civics classes having a discernible or direct effect on voting or voter

enrollment. Other researchers have explained the ineffectiveness of citizenship education as a product of the subject's low status, the inadequate training and support for teachers, the lack of teaching competence, the didactic instruction, and students' being bored by or disconnected from the knowledge (Brooks & Holford, 2009; Faulks, 2006; Kerr, Ireland, Lopes, Craig, & Cleaver, 2004; Niemi & Junn, 1998; Zemelman, Daniels, Hyde, & Varner, 1998).

Although the effects of citizenship education vary from school to school and from country to country, it is clear that its effects are determined by certain factors. The influential IEA civic education study program offers a framework for systematically considering the factors that influence the development of young people's roles as citizens. These factors relate to their wider community, their schools and classrooms, their home and peer environment, and their individual characteristics (Schulz et al., 2018, p. 12). Therefore, it is also important to understand how the desired function of citizenship education is shaped by these factors in the process of implementation. Rather than using quantitative research methods, this study uses qualitative methods to richly depict how these factors shape the outcomes of citizenship education.

Structure, Agency, and Citizenship Education

Some scholars of citizenship education have called for a shift of research paradigm to perceive individuals as active constructers of their own citizenship (Bennett et al., 2011; Biesta, 2011; Haste, 2004). Following this research paradigm, this study adds insight by paying particular attention to agency in the process of citizenship teaching and learning. It perceives individual as purposive and knowledgeable actors (Giddens, 1984). It also looks into social structure, one classical term in social science associated with discussions of agency (Sewell, 1992).

The structure and agency perspectives adopted herein are influenced by Giddens' (1984) and Sewell's (1992) structuration theory and by Emirbayer and Mische's (1998) agency theory. Those theories provide insightful perspectives to think structures and agency. Combining structure and agency perspectives in the study of Chinese citizenship education, it systematically reveals how social structures both constrain and enable teachers' and students' practice, and how both teachers and students express their agency in the process. Ultimately, this study offers a new framework to investigate the outcomes and processes of citizenship education led by the Party-state.

Structuration theory from Giddens and Sewell

In 1984, Anthony Giddens systematically expressed his theory of structuration, in his book *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Giddens (1984) explains the production and reproduction of social systems and social relations by focusing on the understanding of human agency and of social institutions. He perceived human agency as the capacity and intention to do things, and human agents as being knowledgeable about the conditions and consequences of their actions in their daily life (Giddens, 1984). Rather than defining structure as patterns of social relations or social phenomena, Giddens (1984) defined structure as "rules and resources recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems" (p. 337). In this definition, he claimed the duality of structure "as the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes" (Giddens, 1984, p. 374). The duality of structure is the basis of social reproduction and is expressed in people's routine actions. It means that rules and resources, as structural properties of social systems, offer human agents tools to practice and thus shape their practices, and that these practices constitute and reproduce structures. In the process, human agents are knowledgeable about the rules and resources through day-to-day practices and

their actions are enabled, based on their knowledgeability. Giddens further stated that structure should not be equated with constraint, as it is always both constraining and enabling human agency. However, he admitted that the knowledgeability of human agency is always bounded by the unconscious, on the one hand, and by the unacknowledged conditions/unintended consequences of action, on the other (Giddens, 1984).

William Sewell (1992) reformulated Giddens' definition of structure to explain how structural transformation was possible. He replaced the ambiguous notion of rules with the notion of cultural schemas, encompassing rules of etiquette, aesthetic norms, recipes for groups, various conventions, principles of action, etc. Sewell also redefined resources by dividing the term into non-human resources and human resources.[7] After reformulating Giddens' original concepts, Sewell (1992) defined structure as "composed simultaneously of schemas, which are virtual, and of resources, which are actual" (p. 13).

Another contribution of Sewell's work is to explain structural change through five axioms: the multiplicity of structures; the transposability of schemas; the unpredictability of resources accumulation; the polysemy of resources; and the intersection of structures (Sewell, 1992). The multiplicity of structures posits that structures exist at different levels, operate in different modalities, and are based on different types and quantities of resources; the transposability of schemas means that the schemas accessed by actors can be applied to different social contexts; the unpredictable of resources accumulation implies the modifications of schemas; the polysemy of resources indicates that human agents can reinterpret resources in different ways; and the intersection of structures means that structures intersect and overlap (Sewell, 1992). Therefore, structures not only constrain social actions, they also empower human

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[7] For Sewell (1992), non-human resources included objects that can be used to enhance power; human resources included physical strength, knowledge, and emotional commitments that can be used to enhance or maintain power

agents to exercise their agency through applying different schemas, accessing various arrays of resources, reinterpreting these resources, and acting creatively (Sewell, 1992).

Both Giddens and Sewell recognized the human agency involved in social actions. Giddens (1984) stated that human actors are knowledgeable and can reflexively monitor their actions, while Sewell (1992) pointed out individuals' agency arises from their knowledge of schemas and their control of resources, and argued that a capacity for agency (for desiring, for forming intentions, and for acting creatively) is inherent in all humans. In addition, Sewell (1992) also admitted the varieties of agency in terms of kind and extent. However, neither Giddens nor Sewell further explore what agency is and where it comes from. Giddens' idea of the duality of structure has been particularly criticized for its over-simplification of agency (Archer, 1995; Mouzelis, 1989). Mouzelis (1989) pointed out that human actors not only accept rules and resources, they also distance themselves from rules and resources, question them, or use diverse strategies to maintain or transform them, showing that the "duality of structure" concept does not apply to all agency-structure relationships.

Agency theory from Emirbayer and Mische

Many social theories have discussed the concept of agency, including action theory, theory of practices (Bourdieu and Giddens), rational choice theory, phenomenology, communication, and feminist theory, among others (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Nevertheless, Emirbayer and Mische (1998) criticized that existing discussions of agency are limited because they focus on just one dimension of this concept, such routine, or on its purpose or judgement. Instead, they disaggregated agency into three component elements and reconceptualized it as

> a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to contextualize

past habits and future within the contingencies of the moment). (Emirbayer &
Mische, 1998, p. 963)

One of the main characteristics of Emirbayer and Mische's (1998) concept of agency is

their use of temporal orientation, echoing Mead's statement that human actors will reconstruct

their orientations toward the past and future in response to emergent events. They suggested that

human agency should be understood in a three-dimensional way—that is, in relation to the

iterative dimension (referring to the past), the projective dimension (referring to the future), and

the practical-evaluative dimension (referring to the present). They pointed out that these three

dimensions all play a role in any concrete action, although their contributions vary (Emirbayer &

Mische, 1998, p. 972).

The iterative dimension of agency was defined by Emirbayer and Mische (1998) as past

patterns of thought and action. It is developed from the schematization of past social experience,

relating to concepts of routines, dispositions, schemas, competences, patterns, traditions, etc.

Emirbayer and Mische pointed out that the iterative dimension of agency plays an important role

in reproducing past patterns of action and sustaining people's identity, meanings, and

interactions over time. The projective dimension of agency refers to social actors' ability to

imaginatively engage the future in their social actions, relating to words like goals, plans,

objectives, plans, dreams, wishes, desires, fears, aspirations, etc. The practical-evaluative

dimension of agency refers to the capacity of social actors to make practical judgments among

alternative possible actions in response to emergent situations, and is linked to such terms as

practical wisdom, practical consciousness, prudence, application, judgement, critical

deliberation, etc. The projective dimension and practical-evaluative dimension of agency involve

the potentiality for change, as Emirbayer and Mische (1998) stated that, "by subjecting their own

agentic orientations to imaginative recomposition and critical judgement, actors can loosen themselves from past patterns of interaction and reframe their relationships to existing constraints" (p. 1010). This kind of change or reconstructive or transformative potentialities of human agency are trigged when social actors confront contradictory or otherwise problematic situations; therefore, social situations or contexts matter (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998).

Structure, agency, and citizenship education

Inspired by structuration theory from Giddens and Sewell and agency theory from Emirbayer and Mische, this research assumes that the functions and outcomes of citizenship education are shaped by the social structures and agency involved in its implementation and practices.

Following Sewell's definition of social structures and the IEA framework of factors influencing citizenship education, this research perceives the structures relating to citizenship education as schemas and resources located at the wider community level, at the school and classroom level, and at the home and environment levels. The official framework of citizenship education, the school culture, the norms in the relationship between teachers and students, and youth culture can be taken as schemas located at different levels. While resources include resources for community participation and school participation.

Sewell's five axioms embedded in structures also offer an important framework for investigating how citizenship education in China is shaped by the multiplicity and intersection nature of structures, the transposability of schemas, and the polysemy and unpredictability of resources in the process of citizenship teaching and learning.

In addition, following Emirbayer and Mische's conceptualization of three dimensions of agency, this research investigates how the iterative, projective, and practical evaluative

dimensions of teacher' and students' agency contribute to their teaching and learning of citizenship.

Citizenship, Citizenship Education, and Individualization in China

China is considered as an authoritarian state. With the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) firmly in charge, the state influences all aspects of life. Through reviewing the emergence, development, and issues of citizenship in China, the next section demonstrates the historical changes and issues in the relationship between individuals and the state, revealing the tensions surrounding citizenship in contemporary China. It also reviews current studies on the changes, pedagogies, and outcomes of Chinese citizenship education, showing the research gap that this study fills. In addition, it examines the individualization of Chinese society and its effects on Chinese citizenship education.

The emergence, development, and issues of citizenship in China

The idea of citizenship in China did not evolve naturally from Chinese society and thought. Instead, it has Western roots and was introduced into China to solve a sociopolitical crisis and mounting imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century. Before that, China was a traditional society marked by an imperial bureaucracy and Confucianism. Ordinary Chinese people were submissive to the emperor and the ruling class. However, this relationship began to change as China was increasingly threatened by Western countries. After Britain defeated China in the 1840s, other foreign countries began to encroach on or oppress China, leading Chinese intellectuals, officials, and politicians to develop a strong sense of national backwardness.[8]

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[8] Between the 1840s and the 1890s, China experienced a series of military defeats by Western powers and Japan. As a result, some parts of China became semi-colonies of foreign powers. Many Chinese people felt humiliated by these wars as before these wars, they had thought of China as "the middle kingdom"—placed below heaven, but above the rest of the world. Now they felt China was so weak to survive in the world.

Learning from the West, building a modern state, and promoting modern citizens were proposed as ways to save the nation and revitalize China.

During the late Qing dynasty and the early Republican era (roughly from the 1890s to the late 1920s), the term "citizen" was translated in three ways: *guomin* (nation state people), *gongmin* (public people), and *shimin* (city people). As Glodman and Perry (2002) summarized, "these terms, along with a number of others, highlight distinct aspects of state-society relations: nationalism in the case of *guomin*, public spirit in the case of *gongmin*, and urban rights and responsibilities in the case of *shimin*" (p. 5). Although political rights were proposed, they were viewed as a means of promoting the interests of the state. The Western tradition of citizenship, which emphasized protecting individual freedoms and restricting the power of the state, was ignored in the discourse about Chinese citizenship at that time. The New Cultural Movement (1914–1919) advocated individuality and utilitarianism, which are core elements in the liberal ideal of citizenship; however, this liberal discourse was gradually replaced by the discourse of Party, obligations, and nationalism under the leadership of Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese nationalist Party), in the context of the second Sino-Japanese War (1931-1945) (Z. H. Guo, 2015).

In 1949, after three years of civil war, the Chinese Communist Party took power from the KMT and turned China into a socialist country, the People's Republic of China. China became a Party-state, with the Party controlling all aspects of life. During the Mao Zedong era (1949–1976), the preferred term in the official press to define a socialist person was *renmin* (people)—a concept based on class—rather than citizen. The term "citizen" described the legal status of those with PRC nationality. Thus, citizens were classified into the people and their enemies, with the former including the workers and peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and

some patriotic democratic elements, and the latter referring to the bureaucratic class and the landlord class, who were "bad" members of society and thus did not enjoy the rights of the people (Yu, 2002). The civil and political rights of the people were very weak. Their social rights were substantial but unequally distributed. During the Mao period, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) provided workers in urban areas with pensions, health care, education, and housing due to the priority of national industrial development; while people living in the countryside and people who were not employed shared few welfare benefits, having limited healthcare coverage and no pension system (Vortherms, 2015; Xu, Guan, & Yao, 2011). In terms of political participation, although there were many political activities, they were carried out under the direction of Mao and the CCP, and demanded total compliance to the Party (Goldman, 2002).

After the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the CCP under Deng Xiaoping implemented a policy of reform and opening to the world. Although this mainly focused on economic reform, including de-collectivizing agriculture and opening markets, it also had far-reaching effects on society, politics, and culture, influencing the life of every Chinese citizen and redefining China's position in the international community (Perry & Selden, 2003). Different from the elite-oriented and nation-state-oriented discourse of citizenship that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, China's current discourse on citizenship has been practiced by ordinary people as a weapon to struggle for and protect their rights. The changes, statuses, and issues of Chinese citizenship in terms of rights, political participation, and identity today relate to the empowerment of the National People's Congress (NPC), the opening of village elections, the rise of civil society and rights consciousness, the distinctions between rural citizens and urban citizens, issues for migrant workers, and the growth of nationalism.

In the post-Mao era, political, civil, and social rights have been developed to some extent, but with limitations and inequalities. Regarding political rights, China has not implemented universal suffrage and the opportunities to participate in the exercise of political power are closely held in the hands of the CCP. The National People's Congress, which is the country's highest lawmaking institution and the main institution for people to practice their sovereignty, is highly influenced by the CCP, and employs indirect and secretive election. However, at the county and township level, citizens have had the right to directly elect deputies to their local congress[9] since the mid-1980s; although the influence of local congresses on policy- and decision-making are limited, there is an increasing eagerness among deputies to criticize the performance of town officials (O'Brien, 2002). More significant is village residents' right to elect a villagers' committee, which began in 1988. Unlike a people's congress, a villagers' committee is not part of the state apparatus and has more power, resources, and autonomy to do things relating to villagers' life; it is the main organization through which villagers manage their own affairs, educate themselves, and meet their needs (O'Brien, 2002). In terms of social rights, there is no doubt that, owing to the success of its economic development agenda, the state offers increased benefits to more of its citizens.[10] Nevertheless, the Party-state's offer of social welfare faces many challenges. City-dwellers receive much better welfare than rural citizens; and there is also a regional imbalance, with coastal provinces offering better welfare programs than inland

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[9] China has five levels of people's congress: the NPC at the national level and other people's congresses at the provincial-level, prefecture-level, country-level, and township-level. For people's congresses at the provincial-level and prefecture-level, they use indirect election (S. J. Guo, 2013, pp. 141–142).

[10] Nevertheless, in the early years of the economic reform, the Party-state withdrew its socialist welfare system from the SOEs and urban work units to ease its financial burdens; the best-known examples are the housing, medical, and education reform reforms of the 1990s (Yan, 2010b). Since the late 1990s, concerned with maintaining the country's economic development, social stability, and political authority, the Party-state has initiated a new welfare system reform, adopting a public-private hybrid approach and extending pension, healthcare, and employment benefits from SOEs and work units to workers in the private sector, migrant workers, and rural residences (Croll, 1999).

provinces, due to their superior economic development (Croll, 1999; Gao, Yang, & Zhai, 2019;

Y. Guo, 2014; Xu et al., 2011). In addition to the unequal distribution of welfare, another major

issue underlying social rights is the exclusion of migrant workers[11] from local welfare systems.[12]

Even though the Party-state began to support migrant workers' well-being and welfare service

rights in 2006, migrant workers continue to have low welfare program participation rates due to

the localization of welfare programs, systemic difficulties, and their own lack of knowledge and

willingness (Xu et al., 2011). As to civil rights, China's Constitution guarantees the freedoms of

speech, thought, association, and religion; however, in reality, these freedoms are censored and

controlled by the government and the CCP to some extent. The lack of protection for civil rights

diminishes the practice of political rights, too.

There is now much more space for Chinese citizens to participate in politics and

influence the decision-making of local governments. In addition to electing representatives to

county-level people's congresses and villagers' committees, citizens can express their opinions

publicly using television and newspapers, and particularly online media platforms like WeChat

and Weibo. They can also use the petition system to convey suggestions, complaints, or requests

to relevant government departments (Goldman, 2005; Xiong, 2015). In addition to this increased

space for political participation, China also has witnessed increasing popular awareness and

practice of claiming rights, as evidenced by the widespread demonstrations by different groups

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[11] Since the 1980s, many peasants, who had been restricted to the countryside during the Mao era, began to move to cities in search of a more comfortable standard of living, due to the permissive policy on movement into urban eras. According to the 2018 *Report on China's Migrant Population Development*, the migrant population (including rural migrant workers and urban migrant workers) reached 244 million in 2017.

[12] In China, access to welfare benefits is based on *hukou* (household registration) status, which is mainly hereditary and includes information regarding status (urban/rural) and location (country/township). Migrant workers cannot easily enjoy the benefits of government welfare programs—particularly education, health services, and social security—because they have no local urban *hukou* status, even though they may have worked in the city for ten or more years. Although migrant workers can apply for urban *hukou*, the admission standards are too demanding for most migrants, due to their generally low education levels and lack of human capital (Vortherms, 2015).

that exploded all over China in the 1990s and 2000s, including farmers calling for reduced taxes, laid-off workers demanding back wages and benefits, migrant workers demanding better working conditions, and urban and rural residents protesting the confiscation of their homes and land (Goldman, 2005). These protests clearly show a rise in citizens' consciousness and ability to protect their interests, although their interests mainly emphasized economic rather than political issues (Goldman, 2005). Some demonstrations and social protests targeted corruption in the Party and government, abusive officials, and the conflicts between the power of the Party-state and citizens. To maintain the social stability and the authority of the Party, the CCP suppressed those who tried to draw attention to these issues and sought to restrict the public space for political discourse (Goldman, 2005). To some extent, citizens and the state were negotiating their relationship. In spite of this, political participation in China faces the issue of general political apathy (Y. Xia, 2011), a worldwide phenomenon. Although citizens have election rights, many of them have little interest in electing local officials (O'Brien, 2002). Moreover, citizens have criticized the low value of elections, due to incidences of corruption.

Nationalism is another big issue in the current citizenship discourse in China. At the beginning of twentieth century, nationalism was inherently associated with citizenship because of Western imperialism and a popular willingness to save China as a nation. In the 1990s, nationalism reentered the public discourses and was widely expressed at the state, intellectual, and popular levels, as witnessed by the growing emphasis on Chinese tradition and culture, protests against America's bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the reemergence of anti-Japanese popular nationalism, and the strengthening of China's territorial integrity and national unity (Gries, 2004; Y. J. Guo, 2004; He, 2007; S. S. Zhao, 2004). This new nationalism is a way for the state to maintain its political authority by showcasing itself as the

representative of national interests. It is also a response to challenges from the West, a bid for world dominance, and an emotional means for the populace to express national esteem and national pride (Gries, 2004; S. S. Zhao, 2004).

Citizenship education in China: Changes, pedagogies, and outcomes

Associated with the social changes since 1978, citizenship education in China has altered its aims, contents, and pedagogy. In grades K-12, citizenship education is associated with the moral curriculum and the politics curriculum (P. Li et al., 2004). Moral curriculum and politics curriculum include content relating to politics, morality, and the relationship between individuals and the Party-state. The moral curriculum is taught in primary education and junior secondary education, while the politics curriculum is taught in senior secondary education, with two class hours per week.

During the Mao era, education was perceived by the Party-state as an important instrument for creating socialist citizens (Law, 2011), which was consistent with the objective of socialist country construction at that time. An ideal socialist citizen was absolutely selfless, obeyed the CCP, was committed to building a new socialist China, was against class enemies, and learned Marxism-Leninism and Mao's speeches and writings (T. H. Chen, 1969; Y. G. Chen & Reid, 2002). Since 1951, the Party-state had required secondary schools to provide political courses on communist moral values, socialist China's state structure, historical materialism, etc.; however, these courses were stopped during the Cultural Revolution, which closed the schools (Law, 2011).

Since the 1978 economic reform, education has been seen by the CCP more as a means for nation-building and economic development, rather than an ideological tool. The politics curriculum and citizenship education are still emphasized, but with several changes, including

the integration of individual rights and democracy, Chinese tradition and culture, socialism, nationalism, and globalization into the curriculum. Lee and Ho (2005, 2008) found that, with the process of modernization and marketization, the curriculum of moral and political education has increasingly advocated for education for democracy and legal education, including political rights, China's election system, and China's political system of negotiated democracy. Comparing the textbooks in Grades 7–9 from 1997 to 2005, Tse (2011) noticed a gradual shift from ideological-political indoctrination to a growing emphasis on individual rights and global elements. Other study have pointed out that, under the influence of the patriotic education campaign begun in the 1990s, schools and textbooks have integrated contents to promote people's pride over China's ancient civilization, their collective memory about the one hundred years of humiliation, and their understanding about international relations (Lee & Ho, 2005; Wang, 2008). These contents are used by the CCP as a new ideological tool to enhance its political legitimacy (Wang, 2008). Additionally, globalization has been discussed in textbooks. Law (2006) showed how globalization influences citizenship education curriculum to integrate global citizen perspectives. However, despite the inclusion of individual rights, democracy, and globalization in its curriculum, Law (2011) stated there is a political bottom line for change in citizenship education, which holds that "citizenship education must uphold the socialist system, the CCP as the only ruling power, and China's territorial integrity" (p.128).

Z. Z. Zhao and Fairbrother (2010) reviewed several influential pedagogies of citizenship education suggested by Chinese scholars, such as the aesthetic approach, the dialogic approach, the life-practice and activity-oriented approach, and the affective approach. They concluded that these pedagogies move away from indoctrination and teacher-centered instruction toward more democratic and student-based learning (Z. Z. Zhao & Fairbrother, 2010). Learning-centered

education is part of the focus of the most recent educational reform, which began in 2001. However, it is unclear whether these pedagogies are widely used by teachers, due to the challenges they represent to the exam-oriented educational system in China (Schweisfurth, 2013).

Few studies have investigated teachers' and students' reactions to the Party-state-led citizenship education. A survey of 2000 students at Peking University showed that students under the new politics curriculum in high school have positive opinions regarding political participation and democracy in China, increased trust in government officials, and a more skeptical view of free markets, which realizes the aims of the Party-state (Cantoni, Chen, Yang, Yuchtman, & Zhang, 2017). However, a few studies have showed students' resistance to citizenship education and the failure of state-led nationalism. Fairbrother (2003, 2008) found some students in Hong Kong and mainland China resisted what they saw as a dominant discourse and exercised agency through critical thinking dispositions. A study of history education in Chinese high schools found that history courses have failed to promote nationalist attitudes in students, due to the reduced contents on the anti-Japanese war, students' pragmatic use of textbooks for the college entrance exams, students' using their cognitive and emotional agency to critically receive the textbook's history knowledge, students' tendency to consider ideological elements as official clichés, and the availability of alternative information from mass media, the Internet, popular culture, and family memory (Qian, Xu, & Chen, 2016). Although their research mainly focused on history education rather than political education, it indicated the possibility for students to exercise agency in the politics curriculum. In addition, one misconception about Chinese youth's citizenship learning is that they have shown a strong awareness of voting, democracy, and equality in the classroom, but lack a willingness for civic

engagement in reality (J. Li, 2009; Tu, 2011). In terms of teachers' actions and perceptions, Lee and Leung (2006) found that Shanghai teachers have strong awareness about global citizenship. Chinese traditions and values have also been perceived as important for educating good citizens among teachers in other cities (Lee, 2005).

In addition to studying the official curriculum, some researchers have also investigated school environments. Tse and Lee (2003) revealed that the way in which schools were organized, the role of the Chinese Communist Party in schools, and, in particular, the ways in which moral, civic, and ideological education are intertwined with life in mainland China schools, and the roles they play in shaping Chinese citizenship education.

The individualization of Chinese society and its effects on citizenship education

Current studies on Chinese citizenship education have paid attention to how the goals and contents of citizenship education have been influenced by the marketization, modernization, and globalization of China during economic reform. This study adds insights on current discussions about Chinese citizenship education by including another social context, the individualization of Chinese society, which is considered a key social transition in contemporary China (Yan, 2009).

The individualization theme is developed to describe one characteristic of the late modernity or second modernity of Western countries. Given the social modernization in the twentieth century, individuals have been liberated from the bonds of family, tradition, kinship, religion, and other social groups, and have increased their freedom of choice and self-determination (U. Beck, 1992; U. Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 1991). However, they have had to rely on social institutions, such as the welfare state, education systems, and labor market to realize their choice, freedom, and individuality; with the challenges of globalization to the welfare state, the individualization process has been accelerated and

intensified, and individuals face more uncertainty and risk due to the retreat of the welfare state (U. Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002).

China is also undergoing an individualization process along with its modernization. This process partially started in the Mao era, as collectivist programs of social engineering, such as rural collectives and urban work units, resulted in individuals' becoming dis-embedded from traditional networks of social ties, and re-embedded in the Party-state (Yan, 2010b, pp. 491–495). In the post-Mao era, with the market reform, Chinese individuals are further dis-embedded from the Party-state and their traditional social ties. Yan (2010b) pointed out with the de-collectivization of agriculture, the development of a private economy, and the reform of state-owned enterprises associated with market reform, millions of people, particularly peasants, have become migrant workers or self-employed (pp. 495–499). In addition, due to the retreat of the state from private life, individuals have more choice and freedom to choose a life of their own, with more and more people valuing, expressing, and pursuing their desires, happiness, individual freedom, and individual realization (Hansen & Svarverud, 2010, p. xi). At the same time, people's rights awareness is increasing, as manifested by various rights movements and protests, Internet individualism, and activism (Yan, 2010a, pp. 2–15). The rise of the individual is a prominent characteristic that links Chinese and Western individualization.

However, there are some differences in China's individualization compared with that of the West. First, China's individualization process is largely managed by the Party-state, which directs individualization in its citizens' private and economic lives to promote their freely choosing their life trajectory, consumption, self-control, and self-management, with the aim of developing the economy while simultaneously preventing individuals from claiming political rights (Hansen, 2015; Yan, 2009). As Hansen (2015) concluded, the liberation of the individual

as a private and economic unit and the strengthening of direct political control can exist at the same time. Second, Chinese individualization lacks the cultural democratization that backs up individualization in Western countries (Yan, 2009, p. 288). U. Beck defined cultural democratization in Western culture as "the principles of democracy are being picked up and at least believed in, as principles for the organization of everyday life and relationships" (U. Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, p. 205). It includes "the belief in equality in relationships, in dialogue rather than violence, or imposing authority to achieve agreement" (U. Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, p. 205). These kinds of cultural democratic principles have not been widely accepted and internalized in the Chinese context. Third, China's welfare system is not sufficient to support individuals' self-development to the degree found in Western welfare states (Yan, 2009, p. 288). Although the Party-state has, since the late 1990s, increased its provision of social welfares to migrant workers, people working in the private sector, and people living in rural residences in order to maintain economic development, social stability, and political authority, this improvement still is not sufficient to satisfy people's needs (Xu et al., 2011, p. 12) This insufficient social welfare increases the individuals' risks, forcing them to search for help from their families and personal networks. Finally, the core elements of individualization—classic individualism and political liberalism—are also underdeveloped in China (Yan, 2009, p. 289). Classic individualism perceives the individual as a naturally autonomous, self-determining agent with a set of natural rights; however, for a long time, individualism in China was understood as selfish and egotistic (Yan, 2010b, p. 508) and marked by the Party-state as spiritual pollution. Political liberalism, which is dedicating to limiting the state's power in order to protect individuals' rights, is not sincerely accepted by the Party-state; although the Party-state has developed strategies to protect individual rights, this improvement is based on its perception of

the individual as the means of political life, rather than on the Western liberal perception of the individual as the end of political life (Yan, 2010b, p. 508). Indeed, Yan (2010b) pointed out Chinese individualization perceives that "individual must take more responsibility and proactive actions for the sake of achieving the wealth and power of the nation-state, namely, the modernization of country" (p. 509).

One contradiction in Chinese individualization concerns the rise of the individual versus the Party-state's political control and its emphasis on individuals' responsibility to the nation. This contested individual-state relationship is also reflected in the practices of schooling. Based on ethnographical research conducted in a rural boarding school, Hansen (2015) stated that the state, schools, and teachers are cultivating self-reliant and responsible individuals who willingly contribute to the neoliberal economy and take responsibility for their failures, while at the same time requiring students' unquestioning loyalty to the Party-state (p. 180). Hansen observed teachers' and students' critiques of educational policies and practices. But she pointed out these critiques were limited in the private sphere, without any collective consequence (Hansen, 2015, p. 184).

Following Hansen's work on schooling, this research examines how the individualization of the Chinese society shapes the practices of citizenship education. It pays attention to how the rise of the individual, political control, the lack of cultural democracy, the insufficient welfare system, and the lack of classic individualism and political liberalism, as schemas, influence the state's, teachers', and students' understandings and practices of citizenship.

Research Framework

At first glance, based on its aims and contents in the official discourse, it seems that citizenship education in China functions as a means of social control. However, this research

argues that the functions of citizenship education only come clear when its outcomes are examined. By studying the structures and agency involved in the process, this research assumes that Chinese citizenship education is shaped both by social structures and the agency of teachers and students within the social context of the individualization of Chinese society.

Citizenship is examined herein by four dimensions: 1) rights; 2) obligations and responsibilities; 3) political participation and civic engagement; and 4) citizenship identity. For the first, this study pays attention to what kind of rights (civil rights, political rights, and social rights) and obligations and responsibilities are valued by the state, teachers, and students, and why, and how they balance rights and obligations. As for political participation, it examines how the state talks about political participation and civic engagement, how teachers teach these concepts, how students understand and practice these concepts, and what factors influence their participation. For citizenship identity, this study examines national and political identity, including the discourse of nationalism, patriotism, and identification with the CCP and the Party-state.

Inspired by Giddens' and Sewell's ideas about structures and the IEA's framework for factors influencing citizenship education, this research perceives social structures as schemas and resources located at the wider community level, at the school and classroom level, and at the home and environment levels. The agency perspective mainly adopts Emirbayer and Mische's framework for studying the iterative, projective, and practical evaluative dimensions of teachers' and students' agency in citizenship education. By including social structures and agency in the analysis, this research systematically demonstrates the complexity of citizenship education in China.

Chapter 3 Research Methods

The purpose of this study is to investigate how the functions of Chinese citizenship education and its real impacts on students are shaped by social structures and agency involved in the process. The major focus of this research is the subjective understanding of citizenship and the process of interactions. Accordingly, it adopts qualitative methodology, which aims to "understand how people interpret their experiences, how they construct their world, and what meaning they attribute to their experiences" (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015, p. 6).

Fieldwork was conducted from March 2017 to July 2017 in two high schools in the same city[1] in Zhejiang Province, which is located on the eastern coast China and is among the wealthiest provinces in China. This research chose China because it offers a different framework to think about citizenship and citizenship education. During the fieldwork, I reviewed documents relating to citizenship education, observed classroom teaching and people's daily life in schools, and interviewed teachers and students. This fieldwork offered me a wholistic understanding of the life of students and teachers and provided me with rich opportunities to capture unexpected events in schools.

The School Sites: No.1 School and No. 6 School

The choice of school sites in this study was done through a combination of purposive sampling and personal connections. My initially plan was to choose one key urban high school and one regular urban high school in a developed province in China, for two reasons. First, research has indicated that provinces with higher per capita disposable incomes, more urban

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[1] Due to the confidential nature of this study, I did not include any information about this city. Considering all high schools in Zhejiang Province use the same textbooks and the schedules of teaching are shaped by schools and teachers, the influences of city on the practices of citizenship education in the politics curriculum might play a less important role than curriculum and teachers. Nevertheless, the civic culture and civic engagement programs in the city did matter a little bit, as No.6 school's teacher would like to use one government policy in the city to explain concepts, and one civic engagement program in No.6 School was a part of a civic engagement program initated by the government.

residents, and more trade openness tend to have more liberal political preferences in China, favoring constitutional democracy, individual liberty, market reform, and modern science and values (J. Pan & Xu, 2018). Therefore, by choosing a more developed province, this study can maximum the possibility for gaps in understanding citizenship understanding between students, teachers, on one side, and the state, on the other, as teachers and students may have more liberal preferences than the state, which holds a more conservative view. Second, China's high school system is stratified, with key schools at the top, regular schools in the middle, and vocational schools at the bottom. Key schools are those relatively few schools that have more state funding, better teacher quality and teaching facilities, and higher college admission rates (Wu, 2012). Regular schools are the majority schools that didn't have extra state funding and didn't have good academic performance. Therefore, by choosing a key high school and a regular high school, this study can show how citizenship education is shaped by the hierarchical school system, teachers of varying quality, different pedagogical resources, and most important, through differentiating students' aspirations in the educational process.

Zhejiang Province is a suitable province for this study due to its liberal tendencies, its developed economy, its ongoing educational reform, and my familiarity with it. According to a study of China's ideological spectrum, Zhejiang Province ranked as the third most liberal province among the 29 provinces investigated, following Shanghai and Guangdong.[2] Additionally, it is one of several provinces that joined in China's economic reform very early. It started its reform in 1978 when the economic reform began. It is one of China's four richest provinces and among the provinces with the most foreign exports and highest disposable income

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[2] This data came from the first draft of Pan and Xu's 2015 article, *China's Ideological Spectrum*. The paper was published in 2018 without including concrete province data. However, in its first draft, province data were included.

per capita. In 2017, the yearly per capita disposable income in Zhejiang was ￥42,046 (around US$6,468), the highest among other provinces and well above the national average of ￥22,408. Indeed, Zhejiang is famous for its prosperous private economy, which accounted for 65.4 per cent of the province's gross domestic product (GDP) and 55.6 per cent of its total tax revenue in 2017. In terms of educational reform, Zhejiang Province began to reform its national college entrance examination (NCEE) system in 2015, changing the division between the humanities and science tracks in senior secondary education. This reform has allowed students more autonomy to choose,[3] but at the same time has challenged the original school system. Finally, I was born, raised, and received my undergraduate degree in Zhejiang; this life experience helped me to build close and trusting relationships with teachers more easily.

The choice of high schools was based more on personal connections. Doing fieldwork by observing high school classrooms is not easy in China, largely because high schools are busy teaching for exams. In addition, although citizenship contents are taught in all high schools, research on citizenship education is a somewhat sensitive issue for some people in China. In 2013, the teaching of Western liberal ideas—including universal values, press freedom, civil society, citizen rights—was unofficially restricted to higher education, in accordance with the "seven no's"[4] (Economy, 2018, p. 38). In addition, my role as a Ph.D. student studying in a university in the United States would make high schools more skeptical about my research.[5]

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[3] Before this reform, in addition to the required courses of Chinese language, math, and foreign language, students at the Grade 11 level needed to choose whether they would pursue the humanity track (including politics, history, and geography) or the science track (including physics, chemistry, and biology) for the NCEE. With the new reform, students can now choose whichever three courses they wish to take for the exam, although all must still take exams in Chinese language, math, and foreign language.

[4] The "seven no's" included no talk of universal values, press freedom, civil society, citizen rights, the party's historical aberrations, the privileged capitalistic class, and the independence of the judiciary.

[5] This was verified by the principle of No.6 school reminded me to not touch sensitive issues and told me how another research team from abroad in the science field caused troubles for their participants in Zhejiang province.

Therefore, I had to rely on good personal connections and individuals' willingness to grant me access to school sites. Fortunately, a professor in Zhejiang Province with whom I was familiar introduced me to two schools—No.1 School, a *key urban high school* and No.6 School, a *regular one*—through his good personal relationships with a leader in No.1 School and the principal in No. 6 school.

Fieldwork in No.1 School

Like many No.1 Schools in China's various cities, the No.1 School I observed was a top school in the city. More than 90% of its students would be admitted by first-tier academic universities, with a few outstanding students getting offers from such prestigious Western universities as Harvard, Yale, Oxford, etc. The No. 1 school presented itself as a high school for future leaders who were responsible, professional, collaborative, and innovative. Indeed, the alumni of this school were businessmen, scientists, managers, and leaders in their fields, and were definitely among the city's elites.

No.1 School had fewer than 1,800 students, grouped into 37 classes with three grades. In each grade, there were around 550 to 580 students, a student number similar to that of other key schools in Zhejiang Province. The faculty comprised more than 150 teachers and staff. Many teachers had advanced high professional titles,[6] confirming the school's prestige. The school itself was famous for its intensive pace of study and strict discipline. Additionally, it had more than 50 student clubs, with focuses such as poetry, singing, sports, and psychology, among other topics. Every week, students would spend one lesson period attending club activities.

There were seven teachers teaching politics in this school. Three were women in their 40s and 50s, two of whom were school leaders; the other four were men, including two in their 40s–

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[6] In China, teachers' professional titles are broadly divided into three levels, including senior level, middle level, and junior level. Many teachers in No.1 school hold the title of senior level.

50s and two in their late 20s. From my observation, only four teachers were responsible for the teaching of politics in the semester I conducted fieldwork.[7] Although there were more than 500 students in each grade, only 70–80 students chose politics as the test subject, which reduced teachers' teaching workload after grade 10, when students made their test subject decision. However, the workload for politics curriculum teachers was still very heavy.

My fieldwork in No.1 School did not go as smoothly as I had anticipated. My original plan was to follow two politics curriculum teachers in each school and participate in school activities as much as possible. However, when I got access to No.1 School, I soon realized that my participation would be limited due to the complexity of the field. I was introduced to Mr. Wen by a friend of the professor in No.1 School.[8] Mr. Wen was a politics curriculum teacher, the head teacher for Grade 10, and at the same time the leader of the politics curriculum teachers in No.1 School. After a short talk with me about my research, Mr. Wen agreed to allow me to follow him through classroom observation. Although I mentioned that I wanted to follow another teacher in grade 10, I received no further response to this issue; the most Mr. Wen could do was to allow me to audit his class and to interview him. I soon realized it was inconvenient for Mr. Wen to arrange for me to attend a homeroom class, or to place me in an office, or assign me any role in the school.[9] Due to the difficulties of accessing other teachers, I accepted this reality and

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[7] The two school leaders didn't have politics classes in the semester that I conducted fieldwork, while another young teacher had worked for a department of the government in the city before I conducted my fieldwork and din't show up in No.1 School very often.

[8] The friend of my professor was the head teacher for the Grade 12. This teacher reported my research to the school principal and got approval from the principal. Although I said I preferred to follow two teachers, he introduced me to Mr. Wen, only.

[9] Although politics curriculum teachers shared an office in the administration building, Mr. Wen had another office in the classroom building—a subject-combination office based on his homeroom teacher status. Mr. Wen spent most of his time in the latter office because he was a homeroom teacher, but the office had no room for me.

changed my original plan to just follow Mr. Wen's class, albeit with the hope of reaching out to more politics curriculum teachers as time went on.

When I entered the field, Mr. Wen was teaching 12 lessons per week—three lessons for each homeroom. I chose one homeroom that best fit my schedule. However, after one month the schedule changed in No.6 School, and I changed my classroom observation to another homeroom. As my focus was on the teaching of politics and interactions in the classroom, this change did not cause too many issues in my research, although I had to introduce myself and my research to new students.

Due to the lack of an office spot in No.1 School, I went to No.1 School only when Mr. Wen had class. Usually, I audited three of Mr. Wen's classes each week. I would come to school before the class began, chat briefly with Mr. Wen, follow him to the class, sit at the back of the classroom, and audit the whole 40-minute class. At the beginning of my research, I introduced myself and my research to the students, hoping they would become interested in me and the research. However, due to the brevity of my classroom stays, only a very few students reached out to me to talk about something after class. Most exhibited aloofness, treating me as a teacher who audited their class and sat behind them. My presence in the classroom seemed to have no influence on them, as they remained focused on their study.

Sometimes, Mr. Wen invited me to attend school activities, such as teaching research activities for politics curriculum teachers, student activities, and a civic engagement program for students. The latter required students to identify social issues and to propose solutions. I did not have the chance to see how students prepared these proposals, but got the opportunity to observe how they presented their final projects. At the end of my fieldwork, Mr. Wen also invited me to help organize the civic engagement program, which lasted five days in July. Mr. Wen's

invitation to me to join school activities showed his kindness and support for my research. Through these activities, I had many informal opportunities to interact with politics curriculum teachers and Mr. Wen. When I interviewed Mr. Wen, he sincerely shared his opinions and experience.

In the middle of May, after two months of classroom observation, I began to recruit students for interviews during their short classroom breaks. Seven students were recruited based on their engagement in class[10] and their own willingness to be interviewed. I gave them each a consent form to bring home and texted their parents about this research. As most students were boarding at the school, interviews were conducted one week later, after they returned the completed consent from their parents. The interviews were done with no other people present.

Fieldwork in No.6 School

Unlike No.1 School, No.6 School was a small, regular school, with only around 200 students in each grade, roughly one-third the number of students in No.1 School. Moreover, students' academic performance in No.6 School was far behind that of their peers in No.1 School. While 90% of students in No.1 School would get into first-tier academic schools, fewer than 10 (6%) students in No.6 School would do so; instead, most students went to second-tier universities or joined the vocational higher education track. If No.1 School was preparing the city's future leaders, No.6 School was preparing its future workers and ordinary citizens. The huge gap in students' academic performance between No.1 School and No.6 School was initially shaped by the fact that No.1 School admitted the best students in town, but increased due to No.1 School's better teacher quality and resources; for example, No.1 School offered classes that

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[10] Three of them were chosen because they had interacted with Mr. Wen by asking questions or answering questions during my observations. One of them was particularly active in some classes to question Mr. Wen.

prepared students for math or science competitions, and that would give them an advantage when applying for college admission.

There were six politics curriculum teachers in No.6 School—two females and four males. Five were grouped in two adjacent offices, while the other, one of the school's vice principals, had an independent office. Two were responsible for teaching politics in Grade 10, and four for teaching Grades 11 and 12. The average teaching workload was 10 lessons per week.

Different from accessing the field through my personal network, as I had done in No.1 School, my access to No. 6 school was more official. I was introduced by my professor to the school principal, who then arranged for me to directly approach the school's politics curriculum teachers. Before that, however, the school principal carefully discussed my research with me due to my status as a Ph.D. student studying abroad. He instructed me to not to touch on sensitive issues without explaining what the issues were. I agreed, with the hope that I would not make trouble for my participants. However, I soon realized there was no clearly official definition of sensitive issues and that everyone had a different understanding about them. For teachers who taught politics, citizenship education was not a sensitive issue, so I did not meet with any problems when I introduced my research to them; some even felt it was an important topic. Additionally, teachers who were not in positions of power felt very free to talk about whatever they wanted, in private.

There were only two teachers taught grade 10, Ms. Yang and Ms. Qu. I first met Ms. Yang in the principal's office. Ms. Yang was a very young teacher who had just begun to teach politics the previous year. She was responsible for teaching five classes in Grade 10. Before meeting with me, she had already been informed by another vice principal about my research. However, I still introduced her to my research to get her official approval. What surprised me

was that she was familiar with citizenship education when I mentioned to her; it turned out she had taken a course about citizenship education in her undergraduate degree, which relieved my worries about the sensitivities of my topic. Ms. Yang also introduced me to another teacher, Ms. Qu, who also taught politics in Grade 10. As there was an available desk for me, I was placed in Ms. Qu's office, which was located at the corner of the first floor of the classroom building. There were two teachers in this office—Ms. Qu and Mr. Li, who taught politics in Grades 11 and 12. Due to the good relationship these two teachers had with other teachers in the school, the office was a very popular place. Other teachers often visited the office to socialize with their colleagues, chat about life issues, and share the latest school news and rumors. Some students also came into the office to ask questions, report classroom issues, or share personal feelings and issues with teachers.

Having a desk in an office was a huge advantage for my fieldwork, and offered me many opportunities to interact with teachers and talk with students. During my fieldwork at No.6 School, I spent either the whole day or at least the afternoon or morning at the school, an average of three days per week. When I did not have other things to do, I usually stayed at the office. Teachers included me in their daily communications, invited me to lunch or exercise, or asked me about my experiences in America. A few students who often visited the office also wanted to know more about my experience of studying abroad and to share their personal stories with me. Sometimes, I would accompany Ms. Qu on her visits to her friends in other offices, where they discussed such topics as how to do physical exercise, how to use Chinese medicine, and the tasty food around the city. I also visited Ms. Yang's office and attended school activities as much as I could.

I chose to observe one class from Ms. Yang and one from Ms. Qu. Each class had two lessons per week. Usually, I went to the classroom before the class began and tried to socialize with students; however, this socialization was not as successful as I had hoped, as students seemed too shy to talk with me. In late April, due to the influence of the NCEE in Zhejiang Province, No.6 School requested that students in Grade 10 choose the subjects on which they would be tested, after which the school rescheduled the students' homeroom periods. As such, I had to change classes based on my schedule. This time, I chose to observe one class from Ms. Yang and one from Ms. Qu. Students in Ms. Yang's class had chosen politics as their tested subject, unlike those Ms. Qu's class.

I conducted student interviews in No. 6 school in mid-May, with students recruited from Ms. Yang's and Ms. Qu's classes. Similar to No.1 School, many students in No.6 School were boarding at school. And I interviewed students after their and their parents' consents. Most student interviews were done in a school classroom or office, with no others present. A few students were interviewed in the summer over the phone, due scheduling issues. All interviews were done with the permission of the students' parents. I also tried to interview all politics curriculum teachers in No. 6 school and got five of the six teachers to participate.

To conclude, my fieldwork in No.1 School and No. 6 school differed somewhat. In No.1 School, my role was more like that of an outsider and my fieldwork was limited to classroom observation and interviews. However, this does not mean students and teachers were cautious or skeptical about me. From their interviews and daily life, I understood their aloofness was largely shaped by their busy schedules, heavy study pressure, and my not having an office in the school. However, through classroom observation and interviews, I still gathered a great deal of

information from them. In No. 6 school, my relationships with teachers and students were much closer than in No.1 School, due to the greater amount of time I spent in the school.

Data Collection

Several methods were used in this research to collect data, including documents collection, interviews with teachers and students, and classroom observations.

Documents Collection

Documents and artifacts in the research setting usually offer investigators a source of natural data that is not altered by the presence of the investigator (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). This study collected three kinds of documents—official documents relating to Chinese citizenship education, documents and artifacts presented in the field, and researcher-generated documents relating to information about student participants.

In terms of official documents, I collected curriculum standards and textbooks for the senior secondary education politics curriculum, *Sixiang Zhengzhi,* with the aim of better understanding official representations and interpretations of citizenship and citizenship education. The textbooks used in No.1 School and No.6 School were nationally-used versions published by People's Education Press, in 2004.[11] Additionally, I collected historical documents dating back to when the CCP took power in China (1949–present) from government websites and published official documents collections. These historical documents included the CCP's statements about its ideology, government documents relating to moral education and citizenship education, and curriculum standards for morality and politics—a subject taught from primary to

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[11] Another politics textbook version was available from Shanghai Education Press, but was only used in Shanghai.

senior secondary education.[12] These documents helped to explain changes in the CCP's ideology and Chinese citizenship education over time.

In terms of documents and artifacts presented in the field, I included the teaching guidelines teachers used, the homework they assigned their students, and the pen-and-paper tests in the politics curriculum to understand what citizenship education contents teachers and students covered in their daily life. I also collected materials relating to informal citizenship education in the school setting, such as a poster in No.6 School that advised students how to choose test subjects for the NCEE, and posters in both No.1 School and No.6 School calling on students to participate in school affairs. Collectively, these documents provided me with rich information about the real practices of citizenship education.

In addition, researcher-generated documents revealed more about the situation, person, or event being investigated were used in this study (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). I produced a work sheet for students who were going to be interviewed (see Appendix 1). This sheet combined two tasks: one was to have students draw about things they deemed important in their life; the other was to have students to draw a picture showing their understandings of the relationships among themselves, their local community, the governments, the people's congress, and the CCP. The first task helped me to understand students' life and to begin the interviews; the second helped me to appreciates students' real understandings of relationships in citizenship. In total, I received

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[12] The documents on CCP ideology were mainly from the CCP's official website: http://cpc.people.com.cn/. The government documents relating to moral education and citizenship education were mainly from the website of the Ministry of Education and the series of collections *Important documents in education for the People's Republic of China* [*Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhongyao jiaoyu wenxian*] edited by He, Dongchang. The curriculum standards were mainly come from the book *Collections of curriculum standards and teaching guidelines of primary and secondary schools in the twentieth century: thought and political education* [20 shiji Zhongguo zhongxiaoxue kecheng biaozhun jiaoxue dagang huibian] published by People's Education Press.

14 responses from 25 students. It turned out students' responses to the first task offered me rich

pictures about their individualistic culture, which was coded in later data analysis.

Classroom Observations

As one of my research foci is the teaching of citizenship education in the formal politics

curriculum, I chose to follow three teachers who taught politics in Grade 10 in the two schools, a

grade in which a wide range of contents relating to citizenship were covered: Teacher Wen in

No.1 School, and Teachers Qu and Yang in No.6 School. Over the fourteen weeks I spent at the

two schools, I observed fifty-eight politics classes—twenty-two from Teacher Wen, seventeen

from Teacher Yang, fourteen classes from Teacher Qu, and five classes from other politics

curriculum teachers. I observed how teachers interpreted the textbooks and interacted with

students in the classroom and how students acted in class. I also talked with students and

teachers during their short classroom breaks. The classroom observations revealed that the

teachers used an exam-oriented pedagogy to teach politics, taught politics differently when the

class was open to the public,[13] and that students are occasionally challenged their teachers and

the textbook.

Due to the change in the NCEE, both schools changed their original politics curriculum

schedule, as shown in Table 3-1. My original plan was to observe the Political Life course for the

spring semester, as it covered a great many issues relating to citizenship education, as presented

in Chapter 5. However, by the time I entered the field, Teacher Wen in No.1 School had

completed teaching the Political Life courses, had begun to teach Life and Philosophy, and later

returned to teaching Cultural Life. Teachers Qu and Yang had completed half the contents of

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[13] In China, teachers will have public lesson (*gongkai ke*) ocassionaly based on the requirement of schools. For
public lesson, it means that the lesson is open to other teachers and school leaders, allowing them to sit in the
classroom to evaluate the lesson.

Political Life. During my fieldwork, they also taught three-fourths of the contents of Cultural Life. Therefore, I mainly observed how teachers taught Political Life, Cultural Life, and Life and Philosophy. These courses still offered rich information about the teaching and learning of Chinese citizenship.

In addition to classroom observations, I also carried out participant observations by following, observing, and taking part in school activities as much as possible. In No.1 School, I joined politics curriculum teachers in their teaching-research work to see how they reflected on their classes, and a youth civic engagement program that encouraged students to identify social problems and propose solutions. In No. 6 school, as I had a seat in one of the offices for politics curriculum teachers, I often observed and participated in teachers' daily talk about students' performance, school politics, their daily concerns, etc. I also lunched and exercised with teachers in No.6 School, and visited other offices occasionally. Additionally, I observed how students interacted with teachers after classes and how they behaved in student market activity, organized by the students' association to help students sell their things. All of this gave me insights into the daily life of teachers and students, and the daily practice of citizenship education in schools, particularly in terms of students volunteer work and civic engagement.

Table 3-1 Schedule of Thought and Politics

Grade	The Schedule of Thought and Politics
Grade 10	Economic Life (Fall Semester)
	Political Life (Spring Semester)
Grade 11	Cultural Life (Fall Semester)
	Life and Philosophy (Spring Semester)

Grade 12	(1) Scientific Socialism; (2) Economy;
	(3) The State and International Organization;
	(4) Scientific Thinking; (5) Law in Life; (6) Civic Ethics

Notes: Grade 10 and Grade 11 were requirement courses for students which meant that every high school student needed to take them. For elective courses, students who chose politics as their NCEE subject should choose two courses.

Semi-Structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews played a significant role in this research and helped to explain teachers and students' views on Chinese citizenship. I conducted formal interviews with twenty-five students and seven teachers teaching politics (see Table 3-2). Student interviewees were recruited based on their and their parents' consent. These students were drawn from the three homeroom classes in which I conducted classroom observations. Seven were from Teacher Wen's class, eight from Teacher Qu's class, and ten from Teacher Yang's. Most interviews were conducted at school and lasted from twenty to thirty minutes, due to the limited break time students had. A few interviews were done via telephone during the summer.

Table 3-2 Profiles of informants and classroom observations

School	Student			Teachers			Classroom Observations
	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total	
No.1 School	3	4	7	N/A	2	2	22 lessons from Mr. Wen

No.6 School	8	10	18	2	3	5	17 lessons from Ms. Yang; 14 lessons from Ms. Qu
Total	11	14	25	2	5	7	53+5 lessons from other teachers

I asked students about their life expectations and their perceptions of their rights, responsibilities, civic engagement, patriotism, and political identity (see Appendix 2). In terms of teacher interviews, the three teachers I had followed were interviewed two to three times each, with each interview lasting one hour; the other four teachers were interviewed within one hour. Interview questions addressed their biographies, with a focus on their educational experiences, how they became teachers, and how they viewed citizenship and citizenship education in China (see Appendix 3 for teachers' interview questions). These interviews provided me a great deal of information about students' and teachers' thoughts on citizenship and citizenship education.

Data Analysis

I conducted data analysis both during and after data collection. During data collection, I wrote fieldnotes and memos about my observations and interviews, to develop possible themes or ideas relating to the research questions and the studied phenomenon. I systematically used the software MAXQDA to code the data, to understand how the state, teachers, and students understood citizenship and practiced citizenship education. All conversations in this study were conducted in Mandarin, the official language in schools, and transcribed by me after data collection.

The first round of analysis involved coding the data, based on the conceptual framework developed from literature review. I designed initial code categories that included aspects of citizenship (rights, obligations/responsibilities, political participation, civic engagement, and national identity/patriotism and political identity) and citizenship education at three levels: the Party-state, teachers, and students. Current textbooks, curriculum standards, interviews transcripts, and fieldnotes were analyzed. I chose two textbooks—*Political Life for* Grade 10 and *Cultural Life for* Grade 11— for detailed coding, due to their use during the fieldwork and their strong connection to citizenship education. The units of coding for textbooks were every paragraph relating to citizenship education. During the first round of coding, I used structural coding to identify large segments of text in designed coding categories, setting the basis for an in-depth analysis within categories (Saldaña, 2009). Textbooks, teachers' and students' interview transcripts, classroom observations, fieldnotes, and curriculum standards were coded. Then, I coded and sub-coded these segments further to extract data that detailed each category, using inductive coding. For example, for national identity and political identity at the Party-state level, I developed sub-codes that included rejuvenating the Chinese nation, national spirit/patriotism, Chinese culture, China in a global world, national unity and minority ethnic issues, and the leadership of the CCP. Additionally, I reviewed the whole texts, added code categories, and revised coding schemes in the process (see Appendix 4 for the revised final coding categories).

In the second round of data analysis, I compared the commonalities and differences among the discourse of the state, teachers, and students regarding citizenship and citizenship education. Based on the analysis of the gaps between the discourse of the state, teachers, and students, I further concluded the selective strategies teachers used to teach citizenship and

students used to learn citizenship. In addition, I drafted diagrams to explain Chinese citizenship education from the perspective of social structures and agency.

Positionality

My role as a person growing up in Zhejiang Province and a Ph.D. student studying abroad influenced this research in several ways. As I grew up in Zhejiang Province, I could easily talk things in Zhejiang Province with my participants, which made our relationships more closed. After knowing the city where I was born, one teacher was very glad to share his experiences in that city with me. However, my role as a Ph.D. student played a double-edged role in this study. On the one hand, as mentioned in the above section, the principle of No.1 school reminded me to not touch sensitive issues in the fieldwork due to my oversea background. Although I figured out teachers and students were much freer to talk about things with me, I was still very cautious to talk about the issues of democracy. I didn't ask very critical questions to teachers and students in the field, limiting my exploration of teachers' and students' understandings of democracy. On the other hand, as some teachers and students were curious about learning experiences in America, I gained their respect and trust with sharing my experiences.

Ethical Issues

Citizenship and citizenship education are sensitive topics in China, as indicated by the worry shown by the principal of No.6 School and the "seven no's" discourse mentioned earlier. Therefore, the foremost ethical issue of this study was to guarantee the privacy and confidentiality of the participants' information. First, the research was conducted with the consent of the research subjects. Informed consent forms were gathered from each school's principals, teachers, and students, as well as students' parents. I imparted the aim and contents of

this study to them and informed all participants that they could freely stop their participation at any point during the process without consequence, and could freely access and revise their responses. Second, participants were guaranteed that any information obtained in connection with this study and that could identify research subjects would remain confidential. Teachers' and students' names were coded or replaced with pseudonyms; the raw data and documents, including the coding information, were either locked up or stored in a password protected digital format by the researcher. Thus, this study aimed to provide teachers and students a safe space in which to share their perspectives freely and with a minimum of concerns and doubts, secure in the knowledge that they could not be identified, to the best of my ability.

Chapter 4 The Official Ideology and Politics Curriculum in China

This study focuses on the practices of citizenship education in *Sixiang Zhengzhi* (literally, Thought and Politics)*,* the politics curriculum in Chinese senior secondary education. This curriculum not only relates to the teaching of politics but is also associated with China's political ideology, moral education, and ideological education. This connection is clearly verified in its national curriculum standard, which states that one aim of the politics curriculum is to ensure students "know the CCP is the core leader of the Chinese socialist enterprise and its guiding ideology is Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, and Three Represents" (Ministry of Education, 2004). The senior secondary curriculum of *Sixiang Zhengzhi* is a part of the politics curriculum covering from primary education to higher education. It is also included in a wider thought and political work of the CCP and the Party-state.

To understand the discourse of citizenship education in China, this chapter mainly examines the wider system in which the politics curriculum is embedded. It investigates the ideological changes in the CCP, the evolving landscapes of its ideological work, and the changes in the politics curriculum.

Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, and Nationalism: The Official Ideology of the CCP

In October 2017, the CCP held its 19th National Congress and revised its Party constitution. One of the big revisions was to include President Xi's thoughts among its guiding principles. The current CCP's official ideology includes Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the theory of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. In addition, the CCP has another important ideology—nationalism—that, despite not being

officially listed as a CCP guiding principle, is widely mentioned in government documents and practiced in daily life (Gries, 2004; Y. J. Guo, 2004; S. S. Zhao, 1997).

The following sections review the origins of and revisions to the CCP's ideology. In general, the CCP has experienced three phases of ideological change: during the first phase (1921–1949), the CCP adopted Marxism-Leninism[1] and modified it with Maoism to have a proletarian revolution; the second phase (1949–1976) is dominated by Maoism, with the radical and utopian aim of building a socialist China; the third phase (1978–present) is much more pragmatic, emphasizing economic development and renaming the Party's core ideology as "socialism with Chinese characteristics."

Bringing Marxism-Leninism to China and the rise of Maoism

The rise of Marxism-Leninism and the CCP can be dated to the late Qing dynasty (around 1840 to 1911) and the Republic of China era (1912–1949). The CCP refers to this period as China's "one-hundred-year humiliation," a historical period in which China suffered due to Western imperialism and wars and experienced huge social and political transformation, setting the stage for the creation of the CCP as a revolutionary party. Indeed, the one-hundred-year humiliation was a bridge to Chinese nationalism and the CCP's current legitimacy, as shown in Chapter 5.

Nationalism and anti-traditionalism

Beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Chinese empire experienced a series of humiliations in the form of repeated unsuccessful wars and unequal treaties forced on them by Western governments. This contributed to the disintegration of China's traditional political structure and gave rise to a national identity crisis (Gries, 2004; Y. J. Guo, 2004; S. S.

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[1] Marxism and Leninism came to China before the official founding of the CCP at its Firs Congress in 1921. Around 1919 to 1920, there were already other groups in China studying Marxism.

Zhao, 1997). Between the 1840s and the 1890s, the Qing state endured a series of military defeats at the hands of Western powers and Japan, including wars with Britain in the 1840s and 1860s, war with France from 1883 to 1885, and war with Japan in 1895. These defeats, together with the imperialist expansion at the turn of 20th century, resulted in some parts of China's territory becoming semi-colonies of foreign powers (Spence, 1990, p. 231).[2] China, which had thought of itself as "the middle kingdom"—placed below heaven, but above the rest of the world—was forced to recognize its backwardness. At the time, Chinese intellectuals, officials, and politicians worried that their country would be "carved up like a melon" by the foreign powers.

Against this background and in response to the threats posed by Western countries, nationalist sentiment began to rise in China, seeking China's survival in a brutal Social Darwinian world system (S. S. Zhao, 2004). From this strong motivation to save China emerged three different approaches, all centered on nationalism: a Western-learning approach based on learning Western technologies and political systems (advocated by officials and the Qing court, in hopes of preserving the Qing court); anti-foreign sentiment, especially hatred for Western imperialism, believing it to be the cause of China's suffering; and ethnic nationalism, which called for the Manchus[3] to be overthrown in favor of a republican China. The latter strategy laid the foundation for the Republic of China, and was promoted by Western-trained Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925). Dr. Sun argued for a revolution "to expel the Manchus, to revive China, to establish a republic, and to distribute land equally among the people."

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[2] Such as, Shandong was occupied by Germany; Hong Kong was leased to Britain; France had special rights in Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hainan; Russia occupied Lushun; and Japan occupied Taiwan and continued to expand its economic penetration to central China (Spence, 1990, p. 231).

[3] Manchus was the ruling ethnicity in China at the time.

When the Republic of China was founded, in 1912, progressive politicians dreamed that the provisional republican government would lead to national elections and constitutional democracy that would revitalize China and transform it into a modern state. However, the warlords and monarchist movement, plus intensified foreign imperialism and moral degradation in the early years of the Republic of China made many Western-trained or Western-influenced intellectuals realize the importance of awakening the Chinese people, rather than just adopting republican institutions (Hsu, 2000). Together with the new elite, they launched a New Cultural Movement from 1915 to1923, rejecting Chinese traditional culture, Confucianism, and the classical Chinese language, while at the same time advocating the adoption of Western technology and science, as well as Western values, institutions, and cultures.[4] Lin (1979) pointed out the iconoclastic attitude toward Chinese traditional society and culture, particularly the attack on Confucianism, was based on the assumption that Chinese society and culture was so organically based on Confucianism that it would be impossible to change only parts of it.

Anti-imperialism and the coming of Marxism-Leninism

With the goal of renewing Chinese culture, the New Cultural Movement introduced many Western ideologies, including liberalism, anarchism, and socialism. At first, liberalism won many intellectuals hearts, as it promised a democratic state with new, autonomous, and conscientious citizens (S. S. Zhao, 2004, p. 58). However, the English and American model of liberalism was quickly replaced by the Russian branch of socialism following the May Fourth Movement in 1919.[5] As Meisner (1999) commented, "the old image of a Western world

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[4] For instance, Chen Duxiu, a famous intellectual leader who founded the influential journal, Xin Qingnian (New Youth), attacked conservatism and called for the destruction of unworthy traditions. He said, "I would rather see the ruin of our traditional 'national quintessence' (guo cui) than have our race of the present and future extinguished because of its unfitness of survival" (Chow, 1960, p. 46).

[5] The movement was triggered by a decision made at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 to transfer the former

providing progressive models for the regeneration of China was replaced by a new image of a west made up of cynical and aggressive imperialist states, threatening the very survival of China" 17).

Frustrated by Western imperialism, many intellectuals and young students turned to the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the Marxist promise of worldwide revolution. Marxism had the benefit of being both different from Chinese tradition and critical of Western capitalism and imperialism, while the Russian Revolution offered a concrete way of political action for transforming China (Meisner, 1999, p. 18). In 1921, the CCP was founded with the assistance of the Moscow-controlled Third International (also called the Comintern). The newly formed CCP adopted standard Leninist methods of organization and proclaimed the Marxist-Leninist goal of organizing the Chinese proletariat for a socialist revolution.

Following Marxist theory, the CCP initially dedicated itself to organizing working-class movements, and succeeded in mobilizing industrial workers in large cities and miners and railroad workers in remote areas to demonstrate their nationalist sentiments and demand better working and living conditions. However, the CCP soon realized it would be difficult for a socialist revolution to succeed in China due to the weakness of the country's working-class and the rule of warlords (Schwartz, 1951). Under the guidance of the Soviet Union, the CCP decided to ally itself with the Kuomintang (KMT, meaning Chinese Nationalist Party), which had been established by Dr. Sun in 1919 and later became the ruling party of the Republic of China, from

German concession in the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan. The movement, which was anti-imperialist in nature, began with student demonstrations in Peking and quickly spread to other major cities, with students, shopkeepers, industrial workers, and employees joining together in strikes that were later followed by a boycott of Japanese goods.

1928–1949. However, after short period of cooperation (1924–1927), the CCP was suppressed and almost destroyed by KMT from 1927 to 1930 (Meisner, 1999; Schwartz, 1951). [6]

The rise of Maoism: Rural-based revolution, nationalism, and the mass line principle

Under the leadership of Mao Zedong (1893–1976), the CCP survived the KMT's aggression—setting up a Soviet-style government in Jiangxi in 1931, experiencing a Long March (1934–1935) to escape from KMT's military encirclements, building a new base area in Yanan, expanding during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), defeating the KMT after a three-year civil war (1946–1949), and finally achieving the unification of China. This period witnessed the rise of Maoism, which was marked by a rural-based revolution strategy, nationalism, and the mass line principle (*qunzhong luxian*).[7]

During 1928 and 1931, the CCP gradually changed its revolution strategy from an urban-centered revolution suggested by the Russian Revolution and the Comintern to a rural-based revolution,[8] eventually developing its own revolution under the leadership of Mao Zedong. Indeed, in 1927, Mao systematically expressed his idea that the peasantry would take the leading role in the Chinese revolution, after seeing peasant uprisings in 1925 and organizing a peasant movement in 1926. He described the peasantry as the vanguard of the revolution, put villages at

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[6] Despite their initial cooperation, the KMT and CCP had conflicts about the forms of that cooperation. Moreover, the radical workers' and peasants' revolutionary movements promoted by the CCP harmed the interests of the Chinese bourgeoisie, landlords, and rural elites who formed the social basis of the KMT. In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, one of the KMT leaders, gained control of Shanghai. He chose to join the bourgeoisie and foreign businessmen interests to attack labor organizations, creating a schism between the two parties. From 1927 to 1930, Chiang Kai-shek purged CCP members from the KMT and ordered five military encirclements to destroy the CCP. The wars between the KMT and CCP lasted from 1927 to 1937.

[7] The mass line principle refers to that the Communist cadres should intimately involve with the peasant masses and treat the masses as their teachers (Meisner, 1999, p. 44).

[8] As Schwartz (1951) pointed out, this strategy differed from Marxism-Leninism, as Marx himself criticized the peasantry's negative role in revolution, while Lenin recognized the role of peasants but insisted they should be led by the working class (p. 76).

the center of revolutionary action, and called for the CCP to lead them (Mao, 1927). In 1935, Mao assumed CCP leadership in the midst of the Long March and his rural-based revolution theory were officially recognized, marking the triumph of indigenous communism (S. S. Zhao, 2004, p. 99).

After the CCP settled at Yanan, the mass line principle and revolutionary nationalism in the countryside were developed as the twin pillars of Maoism, against the backdrop of the Sino-Japanese war, which lasted from 1937 to 1945 (Harrison, 1972, p. 514). To foster revolutionary nationalism during the Sino-Japanese war, Mao and his CCP fellows called for a united front with the KMT to resist the Japanese invaders, and capitalized on the rise in mass nationalism due to the brutality of value Japanese invasion. By doing so, the CCP gained mass support, particularly among students, peasants, and urban elites. At the same time, Mao and his fellows continued to implement Mao's rural-based revolutionary strategy and perfected the principles of the mass line in its base in Yanan. In accordance with the principles of the mass line, the CCP conducted moderate land reform to address peasants' needs, involved peasants in political, economic, and military organizations, launched a "to the village" *(xiafang)* campaign that required intellectuals and Party cadres to work with workers and peasants, and reduced the size of the army and government bureaucracy, allowing the CCP to forge a close link between its leaders and the people (Hsu, 2000, pp. 591–593). Moreover, the CCP developed some social visions and practices that matched original Marxist theory and influenced their practices after they took over power.[9] In addition, Mao and the CCP also emphasized ascetic and egalitarian

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[9] Such as, the CCP combined industrial with agricultural production, and education with productive labor, which from a Marxist perspective were essential steps in realizing the elimination of the distinctions between town and countryside, between workers and peasants, and between mental and manual labor. For the CCP and Maoism, these strategies were also useful for resolving the harsh conditions caused by the Sino-Japanese war (Meisner, 1999, p. 49).

values, including hard work, diligence, self-discipline, and altruism, values that were "not only responsible for the revolutionary success in the past but remained essential to bring about the socialist society of the future" (Meisner, 1999, p. 49).

To sum up, the rise of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism in China was highly associated with nationalist sentiment characterized by strong anti-imperial and anti-Japanese feelings, a product of Western imperialism and Sino-Japanese war. Mao and his fellows creatively modified Marxist and Leninist orthodoxy by emphasizing the key role of the peasantry in a Chinese socialist revolution. In addition, they developed the principles of the mass line to organize the Party and used nationalism to mobilize the Chinese people. Different from the Marxist view that ideology was determined by economic structure, Mao and the CCP emphasized the importance of value systems, which played a significant role in its development during the Yanan period. However, Mao also inherited Marxist socialist visions about equality and Leninist ways of organization. The CCP (1945) described Maoism as the result of applying Marxist universalism to Chinese conditions and listed Maoism as one of its guiding principles, at the CCP's Seventh National Congress, in 1945.

Building a socialist China: Mao era's ideology (1949–1976)

When the CCP assumed ruling power over China in 1949, its major task was no longer to realize national independence, but rather to build a new China. However, it faced a huge challenge—that is, how to develop a socialist state within a very backward society, which contradicted Marx's statement that the socialist state would develop after capitalism. As a party following Marxism and Leninism, the CCP continued to choose to follow the Soviet model to construct a socialist China; however, this strategy was soon replaced by Mao's radical development strategy.

From 1949 to 1952, the CCP mainly dedicated itself to stabilizing the country's politics

and economy and adopted Mao's "new democracy society"[10] strategy to unity the bourgeoisie. In

addition, Mao promoted "the people's democratic dictatorship," an idea developed from Lenin's

vision of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat. Mao (1949) defined the working class, the

peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie as people who possessed voting

rights and the freedoms of speech, assembly, and association; while the landlord class and the

bureaucratic bourgeoisie were enemies who should be dictated to and deprived of democratic

right. With the creation of voting laws in 1953, the people's democratic dictatorship seemed to

come into practice. All citizens above the age of 18 had the right to elect Deputies to the people's

congress, while landlords and counter-revolutionaries were denied suffrage.

At the end of 1952, with the rapid recovery of China's economy and the stabilization of

its politics, Mao and the CCP decided to move to a new stage, which they called "the transition

to socialism." The CCP quickly stepped up their ambition to develop a socialist China by

following the Soviet model of state industrialization and eliminating all forms of capitalism and

the ownership of private property. In this process, development priority was given to the rapid

growth of heavy industry, and a centralized administrative system was established in which

central planners determined all significant resource allocation and production targets.

Although the socialist transformation from 1953–1956 seemed successful, it did not work

well for the development of agriculture; more important, it facilitated a bureaucratic system,

social conflicts, and social inequality, with which Mao was unsatisfied (Meisner, 1999, p. 191).

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[10] The "new democracy society" proposed by Mao differed from the old bourgeoisie democratic society ruled by the bourgeoisie; rather, it was a society under the leadership of the working class and the CCP, based on an alliance of workers and peasants, and rested on a broader social base that included the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, a society also known as the "People's Republic." Implying this strategy, the government carried out land reform to provide poor peasants with land; at the same time, it encouraged the bourgeoisie to have their own businesses and used their managerial, commercial, and technical expertise to speed China's economic recovery.

In response, Mao launched the Hundred Flowers campaign (1956–1957) and the Anti-rightist

Campaign (1957) to criticize bureaucratism and resistance to China's socialist transformation.[11]

Dissatisfied with the Soviet model of industrialization, Mao promoted more radical economical

strategies—the Great Leap Forward Campaign and the people's communes—aimed at fostering

rural industrialization and urban industrialization at the same time.[12] In the Great Leap Forward

Campaign, the CCP used ethics and ideology to motivate workers and peasants to work harder

and longer.

However, the Great Leap Forward turned out to be a disaster, as it led to great famine

from 1959 to 1961. The people's commune also showed its shortfalls, including food shortages,

organizational chaos, conflicts between richer and poorer collectives, inefficiencies in the

production and distribution of goods and materials, etc. (Meisner, 1999). With the dramatic

failure of the Great Leap Forward and the people's communes, Mao had to admit his mistakes

and the setback to his leadership. He was replaced by Liu Shaoqi as the Chairman of China

(1959–1968), but still wielded great influence within the Party. From 1961 to 1965, the CCP

under the leadership of Liu mainly adopted a more moderate Leninist model of economic

development strategy in pursuit of political order and economic efficiency.[13] However, social

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[11] The Hundred Flowers campaign encouraged people to criticize bureaucratism in the Party and the state. However, students and intellectuals not only criticized bureaucratism but also questioned Mao, socialism, and the CCP. In June 1957, these people were labeled right-wingers, marking the beginning of anti-rightist campaign, a one-year heresy hunt targeting dissents both within and outside of the Party (Meisner, 1999).

[12] The Great Leap Forward Campaign was officially announced at the second session of the Eighth Party Congress (May 1958) with a slogan of "To produce more, faster, better, and cheaper in agriculture and industry" and the ambition to catch or exceed the UK and US in the production of steel and other industrial products. The people's communes were huge rural units in which thousands of households were combined to increase agricultural production and local industrial production; they also provided education and practiced communist forms of social life, work organization, and distribution.

[13] Under the leadership of Liu, the people's communes were turned back into lower-level agricultural producer cooperatives, individual farming was revived, small and inefficient industries were closed, managers in industries were given more power, and workers' efforts were more closely related to their rewards.

inequalities increased as the numbers of rich farmers and workers benefiting from the new economic policy increased. A new bureaucratic class, which Mao equated with capitalism, expanded in both the Party and the state.

In the mid-1960s, with the help of the military, Mao initiated and led the disastrous Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), aiming "to crush those people in power who took a capitalist road; to criticize the reactionary bourgeois academic authorities; to condemn the ideology of the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes; and to transform education, literature, art and other parts of the superstructure that did not conform to socialist ideas" (CCP Central Committee, 1966). The Cultural Revolution was based on Mao's theory that class struggle could be persistent in a socialist society and his assumption that capitalists dominated the CCP leadership (Mao, 1962). Mao mobilized units of Red Guards, mainly composed of young students, to destroy The Four Old Things[14] and to target cultural and political authorities, referring to teachers, professors, intellectuals, and cadres. Workers and soldiers were also mobilized during this period to take away the power of those who chose the "capitalist road." As a result, many Chinese historical sites, artifacts, and archives were damaged; many intellectuals, scholars, cadres, and people were marked as capitalists or reactionary revolutionaries, suffered various abuses[15], and were sent to the countryside for re-education at the hands of peasants. Alongside them, the young Red Guards and other secondary education graduates were also forced to the countryside, losing their opportunities for more education. In addition, the Party itself was decimated and many of its leaders purged or dismissed, including Chairman Liu Shaoqi (Hsu, 2000, p. 703). Although Mao took back his power and cleaned out the "capitalist roaders," he inflicted the most serious

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[14] The four old things referred to old customs, old cultures, old habits, and old ideas, which were perceived to be promoted by capitalists and the old exploiting class.

[15] The various abuse included public humiliation, imprisonment, hard labor, or seizure of property.

damage that the Party, the state, and the people had experienced since 1949, as the CCP admitted years later (CCP, 1981).

The Cultural Revolution ended in 1976 with the death of Mao and the arrest of the so-called Gang of Four, four key Mao allies who had played leading roles in the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, when Deng Xiaoping became the CCP's most powerful leader. The CCP abandoned "class struggle" as its guiding force and adopted a new development path emphasizing economic development. However, the CCP still upholds Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thought, appreciating Mao's efforts to apply universal Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese condition. Although the CCP admitted Mao's mistakes in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Mao's thought is still part of the official discourse.

Pursuing economic development and socialism with Chinese characteristics in the economic reform era (1978–present)

When Deng Xiaoping assumed power in 1978, he and the CCP announced that the major focus of the Party was to realize Chinese socialist modernization in four areas—agricultural development, technical training, industrial development, and national defense—rather than class struggle. Since then, China has entered into an era of economic reform, allowing markets and capitalism to develop in a socialist country. This period has witnessed the CCP creatively promoting China's economy without effecting deep political reform, developing a Chinese way of "socialist building." Another important element of the CCP's ideology is nationalism, which has been systematically promoted since the early 1990s.

Deng Xiaoping theory on building socialism with Chinese characteristics

To develop China's economy, Deng encouraged economic reform and an "open door policy." The new economic reform included the dismantling the commune system instituted by

Mao, abolishing collectivization, introducing privately owned enterprise, and invigorating state-owned factories by reforming the management system (Chai, 2003). At the same time, Deng encouraged learning from Western technologies and welcomed the foreign investments. Different from Mao's era perceiving the market as a typical form of capitalism, the CCP under the leadership of Deng valued the positive functions of the market in developing Chinese economy.

Deng and his followers used Marx's idea of productive forces and productive relations to back up their reform. In 1984, they claimed that the major contradictions in China's society were between productive forces and productive relations, and between the economic base and the superstructure; therefore, the major task was to reform aspects of productive relations that were blocked or didn't match the rate of productivity: the blurring of the responsibilities between governments and enterprises, the lack of enterprise autonomy, and equality of distribution (CCP Central Committee, 1984). In 1987, Deng's successor, Zhao Ziyang, invented the theory of the primary stage of socialism, which claimed China was already a socialist country but still needed to make great efforts to develop a market economy (Z. Y. Zhao, 1987). However, Deng and his followers had to approach China's relationship to the market and capitalism carefully, as it could be easily construed by Party conservatives as a betrayal of the socialist revolution. Indeed, from 1990 to 1992, triggered by the Tiananmen Movement in 1989 and the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, there was fierce debate over whether China's current reform was a capitalist reform or a socialist one. Conservatives claimed that to introduce the market to China was to introduce capitalism.

In the political realm, Deng was much more conservative. In 1979, he announced the Four Cardinal Principles which were deemed indisputable by the CCP—upholding the socialist

path, the people's democratic dictatorship, the CCP's leadership, and Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (Deng, 1979). The Four Cardinal Principles was a response to the 1978–79 Democracy Wall Movement, which sought the comprehensive liberalization of the Chinese political system (W. W. Zhang, 1996, p. 29). Although Deng emphasized political stability, he agreed with and advocated a limited degree of political reform to improve the Party's efficiency and facilitate economic reform, rather than to improve the democratization of the political system. In 1980, Deng proposed to reform the system of Party and state leadership, targeting bureaucratism in the Party, over-centralized power, life-long employment for the leading cadres, etc. (Deng, 1980). One of the major results of his calling for political reform was the 1982 revision of China's Constitution, which included placing a two-term limit on the presidency. In 1986, to aid China's further economic reform, Deng called for another round of political reform to eliminate political obstacles to decentralization. Deng (1986) stated that the main goals of political reform were to strengthen socialism, develop productive forces, and encourage individual initiatives in the economy; his strategies were to separate the Party from the state, to decentralize power, and to downsize institutions.

Although Deng and the CCP held conservative attitudes toward political reform and insisted on socialism and the leadership of the CCP, intellectuals were much more liberalized by the process of economic reform since 1978. In spite of the Democracy Wall Movement, some intellectuals called for democracy, criticized corruption within the Party, discussed humanizing Marxism, and tried to limit the power of the Party through political reform. In 1986, many college students demonstrated on the streets, demanding a real election in the local people's congress in response to the new election law initiated the same year. However, the CCP repressed the demonstrations and launched a new campaign against "bourgeoise liberation." In

1989, larger-scale democracy movement broke out, known as the Tiananmen Movement.[16] Many college students in Beijing demonstrated in the Tiananmen Square, demanding freedom of organization and freedom of the press, and condemning bureaucratic corruption. Later, unemployed youths, workers, and citizens joined the demonstration to express their dissatisfaction with the inflation, unemployment, and suffering associated with economic reform. In the following two months, the demonstrations spread across China, but were ended through military repression approved by Deng Xiaoping. After that, Deng chose Jiang Zemin (1989–2002) as his successor and surrendered his last official titles.

However, Deng was still very influential in the Party. From late 1989 to 1992, when the conservatives in the Party questioned the capitalist path to economic reform and tried to make the policy more conservative, Deng ended this trend and promoted a further market reform, one that would influence development in China for decades. In the Fourteenth Party Congress, held in 1992, Deng's idea and policies were summarized as a theory (Lilun) on building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Deng Xiaoping theory was further elaborated on and written into the Party Constitution as one of the principles of the CCP in 1997, after Deng's death. Deng had first vaguely talked about building socialism with Chinese characteristics in the 12th Party Congress, in 1982. Now he had developed this theory, which emphasized that China was in the primary stage of socialism and should follow its own road toward socialism. This theory upheld Deng's market-oriented economic reforms, open-door policy, and Four Cardinal Principles. The theory also included Deng's independent "one country, two system" foreign policy (which dealt with the re-unification of China with Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan), a political reform agenda

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[16] The movement was triggered by the death of Hu Yaobang, one of the CCP leaders who supported more liberal political reform, in April.

to perfect the people's congress system and the People's Consultative Conference system, and a cultural agenda to cultivate citizens who were idealistic, moral, educated, and disciplined.

Deng Xiaoping theory on building socialism with Chinese characteristics was valued by the CCP as a second great theoretical contribution to finding the right path for China by combining the universal truth of Marxism with the actual conditions of China, the first contribution being Mao Zedong Thought. The CCP appreciated this theory for explaining what socialism was and how to build socialism. However, unlike Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, Deng had broken with the orthodox of the communist convention, which defined socialism as the reverse of capitalist market economy and abolished class inequality by nationalizing the means of production; indeed, Deng regarded market regulation as a permanent feature of China (W. W. Zhang, 1996).

Jiang's Three Represents and Hu's Scientific Outlook on Development

Since the CCP's 1992 announcement of socialist market reforms, China has witnessed a massive and rapid economic development and change. In the Jiang era, the average GDP growth rate remained between eight and nine percent for a decade. Many state-controlled and collective-owned enterprises were privatized, while the number of individual and private entities increased,[17] a phenomenon referred to as "the state retreats and the private sectors move forward" (Garnaut, Song, & Yao, 2006).

During this process, the greatest contradiction China faced in the 1990s was how the CCP could redefine itself but still maintain its privileged position, given the increasing importance of the non-state sector (Brown, 2012). Due to China's market-oriented economic reform, the

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[17] According to a survey of the private sector, by 2002, individual and private entities numbered two million and employed more than 27 million workers and staff, up significantly from 1989, when 0.09 million private sector enterprises employed 1.43 million workers and staff (Dickson, 2007).

relationship between the CCP and the country's industrial workers was deteriorating quickly and violations of workers' rights in the private sector was becoming a serious problem (B. G. Guo, 2003). In response, in early 2000, Jiang Zemin advanced the concept of three representations and systematically proposed a "Three Represents" (*san ge daibiao*) theory in his speech on the 80th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, in July 2001. This theory tried to adjust the role of the CCP and broaden the Party's social support; that is, it asserted that the CCP should always represent the development trend of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the majority of the Chinese people. By emphasizing that the CCP should represent China's advanced productive forces, this theory shifted attention away from relationships to the means of production, thereby positioning class struggle as less important or even irrelevant when compared to economic development (Holbig, 2009). This theory also justified the reality that many Party members had become private entrepreneurs; it also allowed the integration of more private entrepreneurs into the political system, throwing off the Party's old class-based dogma (Zheng, 2002). In 2002, when Jiang retired, the 16th CCP Congress officially adopted his Three Represents theory as a one of the Party's guiding principles, giving it equal status with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought, and Deng Xiaoping theory. The CCP appreciated Jiang's theory for creatively answering the questions of what kind of Party to build and how.

Although by the time Hu Jintao took power over from Jiang, in 2002, China had become the world's sixth largest economy, it was also confronted by huge social disparities, including widening regional disparity, a tattered social and welfare system, massive unemployment, structural poverty, and rising environmental concerns (Zheng & Tok, 2007). In addition, popular protests had increased dramatically. President Hu proposed the ideas of a Scientific Outlook on

Development and a Harmonious Socialist Society to frame his administration. For the former, Hu (2007b) emphasized prioritizing development that put people first; promoting development and that was comprehensive, balanced, and sustainable; and striking a balance between urban and rural development, different regions, economy and society, domestic and international forces, man and nature, central and local governments, etc., to solve the serious social problems arising from the process of economic reform.[18] Hu (2005) borrowed the Confucian idea of harmony and defined a Harmonious Socialist Society as one that was "democratic and ruled by law, fair and just, trustworthy and fraternal, full of vitality, stable and orderly, and maintained harmony between man and nature" (para. 2).[19] Together with the Scientific Outlook on Development, the goal of building a Harmonious Socialist Society was written into the Party constitution in 2007, although afforded less importance. In 2012, when Hu retired, his idea of Scientific Outlook on Development was listed as a guiding Party principle, similar to Deng Xiaoping theory and Jiang's Three Represents.

Comparing with Deng's and Jiang's focus on rapid economic development and encouragement of "letting some people get rich first," Hu's political agenda of Scientific Outlook on Development and Harmonious Socialist Society emphasized sustainable long-term economic development, paid considerable attention to social development and "common prosperity," and tried to reduce widening social inequalities by prioritizing the welfare of disadvantaged social groups and underdeveloped regions. Indeed, during Hu's decade in power, social policies, including abolishing agricultural taxes, extending insurance, pensions, and

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[18] Hu first proposed the idea of "comprehensive, balanced, and sustainable development" in a speech in 2003, and developed this idea into scientific outlook on development in 2004.

[19] With the goal of building a Harmonious Socialist Society, in 2006, the CCP Central Committee (2006) proposed future policies regarding rural development, regional development, employment, education, medicine, public health, environmental protection, the legal system, taxation, fiscal matters, social security, community management, Party leadership, and cultural enterprises.

income support to rural as well as urban residents, and building a civic welfare infrastructure to support migrants were implemented with multiple aims[20] but with limited success in reducing inequality (Howell & Duckett, 2019). In terms of political reform, although Hu seemed open to a more democratic society, his political reform agenda mainly followed Deng's political strategy of improving government and party efficiency and perfecting the people's congress system (S. J. Guo, 2013). However, he did try to improve intra-Party democracy and democracy at the local level.

Xi Jinping Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era

When Xi Jinping took over power from Hu Jintao in 2012, China had already been the world's second-largest economy for two years. However, China and the CCP still faced many challenges in the economic, political, social, and cultural arenas. Its GDP growth rate began to slow down after 2012, and its economic structure heavily relied on low-cost manufacturing, rather than innovation or the development of service sectors, and had been influenced by the 2008 global recession. Moreover, the number of popular protests exceeded 180,000 by 2010, with people requesting more public goods, such as environmental protection, education, and health care. In addition, corruption and ideological retreat also bothered the CCP, becoming the issues Xi Jinping placed front and center after he took over the leadership (Economy, 2014, 2018).

Since taking office, Xi has launched many policies to deal with economic, political, social, cultural, and ecological issues. In terms of the economy, he emphasized deepening the market-oriented reform, proposed the "one belt, one road" initiative to develop the Western parts

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[20] These aims included to reduce inequalities, to stimulate domestic consumption and sustain economic growth, to offset the effects of China's entry to the WTO and the global recession of 2008, and to maintain social stability (Howell & Duckett, 2019).

of China and expand foreign markets, and encouraged innovation. For politics, Xi launched an anti-corruption campaign within the Party, one which was much more profound than those initiated by any of his predecessors. He strengthened the role of the CCP and Party values throughout Chinese polity, and implemented a top-down legal reform to emphasize the rule of law, although the state arrested public-interest lawyers (Economy, 2018; Minzner, 2015). In the cultural arena, Xi has focused on promoting ideological unity by emphasizing the role of the Party in leading in the ideological sphere, promoting the Chinese dream, core socialist values, and traditional culture, and strengthening Internet regulations. Together with emphasizing Chinese characteristics, Xi has also tried to limit the influence of Western ideas, through such methods as the "seven no's" in higher education, which restrict the teaching of the Western and liberal ideas, including such concepts as universal values, press freedom, civil society, citizen rights, the Party's historical aberrations, the privileged capitalistic class, and the independence of the judiciary (Economy, 2018, p. 38). For social issues, Xi's most significant policy is the poverty alleviation campaign. While in terms of ecological issues, Xi has mainly followed Hu's sustainable development strategy and emphasized environment protection. In terms of foreign policy, with its slogan of realizing the Chinese dream to rejuvenate the Chinese nation and its "one belt, one road" policy, China's foreign policy was much more focused on China reclaiming its rightful place in the world (Ferdinand, 2016).

In 2017, at the end of his first term as General Secretary of the CCP, Xi's policies and thought were summarized as "Xi Jinping Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a New Era" and listed as guiding political ideology for the CCP at the 19th Party Congress. A more important change after 19th Party Congress was that Xi revised the state Constitution to remove the two-term limits on the presidency, set by Deng Xiaoping. Xi's thought consists of a

14-point basic policy covering the economy, politics, the role of the Party, people-centered

government, national security, and so on. While many of his thoughts were inherited from his

predecessors, what made Xi different was that he proposed the idea of the Chinese dream and

rejuvenating Chinese nation to replace Hu's idea of a harmonious socialist society, reinjected the

Party into the state and society, and emphasized increased political control, including

emphasizing the role of the Party, the strengthening of Chinese socialist ideology, the

centralization of his leadership, and limitations on Western liberal ideas.

Promoting nationalism through the patriotic education campaign

In the first half of the twentieth century, nationalism played an important role in China's

revolution and its resistance to imperialism and Japanese invaders. In the Mao era, nationalism

was less prominent. However, in the post-Mao era, nationalism marked with strong patriotism,

also called state nationalism, became popular again (S. S. Zhao, 2004). In particular, the CCP

intentionally promoted state nationalism to deal with its legitimacy crisis in the 1980s and to

support its political legitimacy.

The Tiananmen Movement provoked a belief crisis for the CCP, as the Party had

repressed the student movement. Indeed, since the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976),

China has witnessed a number of "belief crises" (crisis of faith in socialism, crisis of belief in

Marxism, and crisis of trust in the Party) among different social groups, such as young people,

the peasantry, and local government officials (Wang, 2008; Zheng, 1999). To strengthen the

legitimacy of the CCP and socialism, in 1983, the CCP had launched a campaign against

spiritual pollution—referring to the influence of foreign liberal ideas and lifestyles (Gold, 1984);

in 1986, it launched another campaign against bourgeoise liberalization to reverse liberal trends

among intellectuals and reaffirm the Four Cardinal Principles. After the repression of the

Tiananmen Movement, the CCP launched a large-scale campaign against peaceful evolution, trying to re-emphasize its ideological work. This new campaign also aimed to check pro-Western liberalism by condemning Western countries for allegedly plotting to undermine China's socialist system.[21] However, the campaign also tried to reaffirm the leading role of the Party in all areas and to blame market-oriented reforms for the chaos in China's social and political systems.

After the CCP ended the campaign against peaceful evolution in mid-1991, it launched the patriotic education campaign, which reflected a significant change in the CCP's strategy for strengthening its legitimacy. Although still emphasized the learning of Marxism and socialism, the new campaign highlighted nationalism more. The campaign started with a March 1991 letter from Jiang Zemin, then the new leader of the CCP, to the Education Minister and his deputy. In the letter, later published in the People's Daily, Jiang (1991) stated that, "there is a need to conduct Chinese modern and contemporary history and national conditions to pupils, middle school students, and university students to improve their national esteem and national confidence and to avoid their worship of foreign things" (p. 3126).

Jiang's strategy was to use China's one-hundred-year humiliation history to promote youths' nationalism, to make them realize the evil of Western capitalism in the early 20th century, and to cultivate their identification with the CCP by showing that it was the CCP that saved China. Jiang's letter soon got responses from the CCP, in the form of two official documents marking the launch of the patriotic education campaign. The two documents stressed that their aim was to prepare builders and descenders of socialism and to defend against the

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[21] The worry of peaceful evolution was even more exaggerated by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, exemplified by the fall of the Berlin wall. In particular, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc facilitated the CCP's more conservative ideologues to regard Western countries as enemies wanting the overthrow of the CCP regime, just the former Soviet Union had been overthrown (S. S. Zhao, 2004).

"peaceful evolution" plot of internal and international hostile powers (Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Central Committee of the Youth League, & National Cultural Heritage Administration, 1991; State Education Commission, 1991).

The patriotic education campaign was carried out at full scale until the August 1994 release of the *Outline on Implementing Patriotic Education* by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP (1994). This outline extended the scope of patriotic education, the agencies responsible for it, and the ways in which to do it. Although mainly targeting youth, it also included the populace, peasants, cadres, soldiers, and Chinese residing abroad. Regarding the agencies responsible for this program, this outline urged all levels of the Party and the government, the Departments of Propaganda, Education, Culture, Civil Affairs, and Tourism, labor unions, the Communist Youth League, and women's unions to create detailed plan for implementing patriotic education in their work. Additionally, this outline suggested various means of patriotic education, including integrating patriotism into official curricula in primary, secondary, and college education, using news media (such as newspapers, TVs, books, movies, music, etc.), building patriotic education bases for people to visit, practicing such rituals as raising flags and singing the national anthem in schools and at large public ceremonies, and celebrating traditional festivals and revolutionary festivals. According to Wang (2008), the estimated number of memory sites in China is over 10,000. To some extent, this outline institutionalized the patriotic education campaign within the Chinese education system and the Party-state systems, embedded it in popular culture and public media, and allowed it to penetrate into people's daily lives.

Started in 1991, patriotism continued to be considered an indispensable element of supporting of the CCP's political legitimacy in the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras. Table 4-1 shows the documents issued by official departments relating to patriotism. In the Xi era, the Chinese dream and Chinese traditional culture were particularly emphasized as integral parts of patriotism. After twenty-six years, patriotism is still widely present in the official curriculum, public media, and people's daily life, without any sign of decline.

Table 4-1 Documents relating to patriotism campaign in the Hu and Xi eras

Year	Document relating to Patriotism Campaign	Characteristics
2004 (Hu)	Ministry of Education: *Outline on Implementing Education for Developing and Cultivating the National Spirit in Primary Education and Secondary Education*	This document basically followed the education strategies in patriotic education campaign and claimed patriotism as the core of the national spirit.
2013 (Xi)	CCP Central Committee: *Suggestions on Cultivating and Practicing Core Socialist Values*	This document listed patriotic as one of twelve core values.
2016 (Xi)	Ministry of Education: *Suggestions on Deeply Implementing Patriotism Education in Educational System*	This document stated a strong willingness of rejuvenating the Chinese nation with the discourse of "Chinese Dream."
2017 (Xi)	the CCP Central Committee and the State Council: *Suggestions on Implementing Projects for Inheriting and Developing Excellent Traditional Chinese Culture*	In this document, Chinese traditional culture was particularly emphasized.

Summary: The continuities and changes of ideology

Since the CCP's foundation in 1921, the Party itself has experienced three big changes in its ideology. It first followed Marxism-Leninism to promote a proletarian revolution through a standard Leninist Party organization under Soviet guidance. However, this political agenda failed

to fit China's conditions in the early 1900s. It was Mao who creatively modified the revolutionary strategy by emphasizing the role of the peasantry, which is why Maoism is credited with applying Marxist universalism to Chinese conditions. After the CCP came to power in 1949, its ideology oscillated between the Soviet Union's socialist industrial development model, which prioritized heavy industry and facilitated professionalism and bureaucratism, and a more aggressive Maoist model that emphasized the equal development between rural and urban, the mass line principle, and class struggle.

When the Cultural Revolution ended, the CCP, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, gave up its orthodox socialist idea of a planned economy and adopted a more capitalist, market-driven economy, while still upholding the rule of the CCP and socialism in the political arena. After the Tiananmen Movement and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CCP prioritized nationalism, characterized as "strong patriotism," as its official ideology to gain popular support. Later, Jiang's Three Represents, Hu's Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi's thoughts on socialism with Chinese characteristics, were added into the Party constitution together with Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, and Deng Xiaoping theory. These three ideologies basically followed Deng Xiaoping's economic reform agenda but added some points for dealing with social issues that arose after Deng died.

Therefore, ideology is not only a slogan for the CCP. It has a social background and functions. The current prevalent ideology in the CCP and China is Deng's pragmatic economic reform, his successors' thoughts on socialism with Chinese characteristics, and nationalism, all of which back up the CCP's political legitimacy and its leaders' authority.

The Landscape of Thought and Political Work

Paralleling the update of its official ideology, the CCP systematically implemented ideological education in shaping people's mind or thoughts (*Sixiang)* through its ideology. Therefore, ideological education is also named by the CCP as thought and political work (*Sixiang Zhengzhi Gongzuo)*, referring to the Party's work of changing people's thoughts, minds, and political consciousness. This belief in changing people's minds has roots not only in the CCP's orthodoxy of Marxism and Leninism, but also in Chinese traditional culture. As a revolutionary party, raising people's political consciousness is an indispensable agenda item in Marxism and Leninism; for example, the Soviet communist party valued the training of politically conscious and activist agitators and established basic propaganda systems in its earlier stage (Chang, 1997). In terms of Chinese culture, Confucianism, the dominant official ideology of Imperial China, always asserted the malleability of human nature, the power of model emulation to create a good society, and the effects of the study of classical texts on people's spiritual and moral transformation (Cheng, 2009).

Indeed, in the construction of the Chinese Party-state, thought and political work were seen as a key tool for mobilizing the masses' political consciousness for the revolution; after the CCP found the new China, it still played an important role in its governance during the Mao era by educating Party members in its ideology and policy and training non-Party members to accept that ideology. After the Cultural Revolution, thought and political work was resisted and weaken by the leaders at that time. However, the CCP reinforced its thought and political work after the Tiananmen Movement, which continues to deeply influence the politics of present-day China.

The origins and foundations of the CCP's thought and political work

Learning from the Soviets, the CCP has valued thought and political work since its foundation. In its first meeting, the CCP (1921) clearly stated the need to establish trade unions and to indoctrinate the spirit of class struggle in the unions. The CCP gained mobilization skills in the process of radical workers' and peasants' revolutionary movements in the 1920s, including discussion groups, night schools, and political publications, etc.; learned to offer Party members an adequate education and indoctrination during the Jiangxi period; and developed a more systematic methods of thought reform in the Yanan period.

The thought reform was developed in the Rectification Movement, which lasted from 1942 to 1945 and aimed to combat subjectivism, sectarianism within the Party, and formalism (Mao, 1942), all thoughts Mao believed were incorrect and targeted at his political dissents. During this movement, Party members, students, and intellectuals were required to learn Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, and were forced to experience criticism, self-criticism, and confession relating to their individualism, liberalism, petti bourgeois sentiments, and non-proletarian ideologies in study groups (Cheng, 2009, p. 65). Through this movement, Mao successfully strengthened his position in the Party, eliminated the remnant influence of Soviet-oriented communists, and remodeled people's minds to be ideologically and politically loyal to the Party. Mao (1945) commented that the rectification campaign was effective in correcting the unhealthy thoughts in the Party, and that ideological education should be the central political task to unite the Party.

Radical ideological campaigns and intense propaganda work in the Mao era

After the CCP took power, thought and political work played a more significant role in remolding Chinese people to realize China's socialist transformation. This was achieved through

multiple political and ideological campaigns, through the propaganda system established in the later 1940s and early 1950s, and through the formal educational system.

Regarding the ideological campaigns, from 1950 to 1952 the CCP launched a thought reform aimed at the non-communist elite, mainly targeting to young students and intellectuals to eliminate their petti bourgeoise origins and implant revolutionary ideology and collectivism. Based on its experiences with thought reform in the Yanan period, the CCP required young students and intellectuals to participate in political schools and training programs, undergo intensive ideological study, attend mass meetings and study sections, expose their personal and family histories, and be publicly criticized and self-criticized (Cheng, 2009). In addition, many political campaigns launched in the Mao era included efforts to mobilize Party members and non-Party members to follow Maoist ideology and policies, such as the Great Leap Forward campaign, the anti-rightist campaign, the 1960s campaign of learning Lei Feng, and the Cultural Revolution.

In terms of the propaganda system, in the 1950s the CCP established a propaganda system under the guidance of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, with four main branches: the Propaganda Departments of the Regional Party Committees, the central government's Ministry of Culture, mass organizations, and the mass media (A. P. L. Liu, 1971).[22] In addition, as citizens were collectivized in factories, schools, the Party, and mass organizations, they were easily organized into small groups to read news and learn new policies, a great mechanism for the Party-state to realize the transmission of its messages to the mass line

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[22] The Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP dealt with a great many issues, ranging from Party education, Marxism-Leninism research, and the regulation of media and publication to public health and sports; propaganda departments at the regional levels transmitted and adapted centrally-defined propaganda policies to regional situations (A. P. L. Liu, 1971, pp. 35–47). The Ministry of Culture was a state apparatus that regulated education, film, publications, and dramas.

and affirm its political control (Chang, 1997). The whole propaganda system was integrated with not only the Party and the state, but also with society, as mass organization and mass media showed.

The educational system, which was run by the state, was also an integral part of the thought and political work of the Party-state. On the one hand, the teaching of general subjects, such as geography, language, science, and politics, was charged by the Party-state and influenced by the state's educational policy, particularly the politics subject, as will be described in later sections. On the other hand, the Young Pioneers—an organization regulated by the China Communist Youth League on behalf of the CCP—was established in schools to cultivate 9- to 15-year-old students' identification with the CCP. The China Communist Youth League was responsible for the CCP's ideological work for high school and college students. However, in the Cultural Revolution, the propaganda system and the educational system were destroyed.

The retreating and reinforcing of thought and political work in the Post-Mao era

In the 1980s, after the Cultural Revolution, the focus shifted to economic reform and thought and political work were not emphasized as much as in the Mao era. Although the conservatives in the Party launched several campaigns targeting individualism and the influence of Western liberal ideas in the 1980s, such as the campaign against spiritual pollution in 1983 and the campaign against bourgeoise liberalization in 1986, these campaigns were resisted and restricted by then leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, respectively. However, after the Tiananmen Movement, the CCP reemphasized thought and political work, as Deng Xiaoping blamed Tiananmen on the lack of thought and political work in the 1980. He said, "the biggest mistakes in the past ten years was education. Here I refer to the political and thought education,

it was not only for schools and young students, but also for the whole population" (Deng, 1989, p. 306).

Learning from Tiananmen and following Deng's emphasis on thought and political work, the CCP continued to strengthen its propaganda work and ideological education throughout the Jiang, Hu, and Xi eras. In the Jiang era, the CCP issued a series of documents and campaigns to strengthen political education and thought work among Party members, the masses, and youths, emphasizing that thought work was equally important to China as economic development, and was the Party's life line.[23] In response to Jiang's 2000 concept of "governing the nation with virtue," the CCP issued the *Outline for Improving Civic Virtues*, dedicated to educating all citizens with socialist virtues through the channels of family, schools, work units, and other organizations, as well as through the pedagogy of role models, activities, ceremonies, etc., similar to the patriotic education campaign (CCP Central Committee, 2001). The socialist virtues mainly emphasized collectivism, patriotism, and socialism, but also included such working ethics as hard work, such civic virtues as caring for the community, and such family ethics respecting the old.

In The Hu era, thought and political work was still emphasized to improve the Party, to uphold CCP and socialist ideology, and to improve social morality. For the whole society, using Jiang's idea of "governing the nation with virtues" to deal with the declining moral standards in society, Hu (2006) proposed a new moral code for all Chinese citizens and Party officials, called

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[23] For example, the 1994 document *Resolution on Several Problems Regarding Strengthening Party Construction* emphasized that thought construction was the first priority of Party construction; the 1996 document *Resolution on Several Problems Regarding Strengthening Construction of a Socialist Spiritual Civilization* dealt with issues of thought, morality, and culture in the 1990s and emphasized the equal role of thought work and economic development; the 1999 document *Resolution on Strengthening and Improving Political Thought Work*, a response to the crackdown on Falun Gong, described thought work was the Party's lifeline, re-emphasizing Mao's statement that ideological education was the central task to unite the Party.

the "eight honors and eight shames" (*barong bachi*)[24], which later became a national campaign. The specific honors promoted in the moral code were not new, and were similar to the socialist civic virtues promoted in the Jiang era. However, the concepts of honor and shame were part of traditional Chinese moral norms (Law, 2011). This trend of integrating Chinese traditional culture into the CCP's socialist agenda was not a surprise. Jiang's era already emphasized the learning of Chinese traditional culture as part of its agenda of patriotism; however, the CCP in The Hu era made much more use of the discourse of Chinese traditional culture, as the Harmonious Socialist Society initiative clearly shows.

In the Xi era, which continued the trend of emphasizing the role of the Party and tightening political control, thought and political work continued to play an important role, but placed more emphasis on Chinese characteristics. In August 2013, Xi emphasized the extreme importance of ideological work and stated that the major tasks of thought work were to uphold the leading role of Marxism in the ideological sphere and to propagate socialism with Chinese characteristics. "The unique cultural tradition, the unique historical fortunate, and the unique national condition determined that we must have a unique development road," Xi (2013, p. 156) claimed, echoing Xi's Four Self-confidences discourse—that is, self-confidence in the theory, paths, institutions, and cultures of Chinese-style socialism.

Xi initiated a campaign of cultivating core socialist values, which was similar to the patriotic education campaign and Improving Civic Virtues campaign in the Jiang era, as well as the "eight honors, eight shames" campaign in The Hu era. Hu Jintao, in his report on the 18th

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[24] Eight honors and eight shames referred to: (1) regarding the love of the motherland as an honor, regard damaging the motherland as a shame; (2) regarding serving the people as an honor, regarding deviation from the people as a shame; (3) regarding the advocation of science as an honor, regarding fatuity and ignorance as a shame; (4) regarding diligence as an honor, regarding indulgence as a shame; (5) regarding unity as an honor, regarding selfishness as a shame; (6) regarding honesty and sincerity as an honor, regarding dishonesty at the sight of profits as a shame; (7) regarding discipline and law-abidance as an honor, regarding disorder and lawlessness as a shame; (8) regarding plain living and hard working as an honor, regarding living in luxury as a shame.

Party congress in 2012, when he retired, proposed 12 core socialist values, including prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony for national values; freedom, equality, justice, and the rule of law for social values; and patriotism, dedication, integrity, and friendship for individual values. The CCP stated these values were an inheritance of China's excellent traditional culture and the achievements of human civilization.[25] In 2013, the CCP launched a campaign aimed at cultivating core socialist beliefs among the whole society, emphasizing the need to integrate these values into the educational system, to propagate them through the mass media and over the Internet, and to organize activities to promote them, similar to the approaches used in the patriotic education campaign.

The Politics Curriculum: The Thought and Political Work behind the Official Curriculum

The educational system, including K-12 education, higher education, and vocational education, is always considered by the CCP an important medium for its thought and political work. This was clearly shown in the campaigns for patriotic education, improving civic virtues, eight honors and eight shames, and core socialist values, all of which emphasized the work done by schools. In addition to school activities and student organizations (China Young Pioneers and Chinese Communist Youth League), many school subjects, such as literature, history, and arts are also used by the Party-state as media to implement its ideological education. Among these, the politics curriculum[26] is the most important official curriculum for thought and political work for the CCP.

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[25] Although the values of democracy and freedom, a Western discourse, were integrated into the socialist value system, the CCP forbade talk of the seven no's—universal values, press freedom, civil society, citizen rights, the party's historical aberrations, the privileged capitalistic class, and the independence of the judiciary.

[26] The politics curriculum has different names at different educational stages, such as *Deyu* (Moral Education) and *Sixiang Zhengzhi* (Thought and Politics). Very often, people will also use the *Zhengzhi* (politics) curriculum to describe the subject of *Deyu* and *Sixiang Zhengzhi*. Therefore, this study uses the term "politics curriculum" to referring to the courses of *Deyu* and *Sixiang Zhengzhi* from primary to higher education, as it shows the political nature of this subject.

Chinese students are required by the state to take the subject of politics from primary school to university, as shown in Table 4-2, following. Basically, in the primary education stage, this subject mainly relates to cultivating students' character and social skills; in the junior education stage, it pays attention to students' morality, law awareness, and mental health; in the high school stage, it teaches basic knowledge about politics, economics, and (to some extent) socialist theories; finally, in the higher education stage, the curriculum directly covers many contents relating to Chinese socialist ideology. However, the structure and contents of this subject have experienced several changes. This subject was first developed in the Mao era, destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, restarted in the Deng era, and became more systematic and coherent in the Jiang and Hu eras. In the Xi era, the subject has continued to evolve, placing more emphasis on Xi's ideology.

Table 4-2 The courses of politics through primary education to higher education

Education stage	Grade	The Courses' names of politics
Compulsory education	Grade 1–3	Character and Life
	Grade 4–6	Character and Society
	Grade 7–9	Thought and Character
High School level	Grade 10–11	Including four required courses: Economic Life, Political Life, Cultural Life, and Life and Philosophy;
	Grade 12	Including two elective courses from six courses, covering from scientific socialism, economy, state and international organization, scientific thinking, law, and civic ethics and morality

Higher education	Undergraduate	Including four required courses: (1) Principles of Marxist Theory; (2) Mao Zedong Thought and theories of Socialism with Chinese Characteristic; (3) The Outline of Chinese Modern History; (4) Ideological and Moral Cultivation and Basics of Law.

Note: The table here covered the courses of thought and politics in the academic educational track without including the courses of the vocational education track in high school education and higher education. The courses' names presented here were based on the last versions in Jiang and Hu eras before the revisions in Xi era.

Cultivating new socialist man with unstable and weak curriculum infrastructure in the Mao Era

In 1950, shortly after coming to power, the CCP began to implement the subject of politics, in parallel with its reconstruction of the socialist educational system. The whole goal of the new socialist educational system was to cultivate new socialist men who were red and expert to support China's modernization, corresponding to the socialist building goal of the Mao era. Being "red" referred to fully accepting Communist ideology; being "expert" referred to having specific knowledge and skills that could contribute to the nation's industrial modernization (T. H. Chen, 1969). The subject of politics related more to the "red" line of education, aiming to promote students' communist morality, their dedication to serving the Chinese people and socialism, and their basic knowledge of socialism and Marxism (Government Administration Council, 1954; Ministry of Education, 1957, 1959). The communist morality included having "five loves" (loving the country, loving the people, loving working, loving science, and loving to protect public property), being collectivist, disciplined, honest, absolutely selfless, and obedient to the CCP, having a proletariat class consciousness, raising ideological understanding of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, and integrating labor and production; all of these

characteristics were summarized by Chen (1969) as describing the new socialist man, and as reflecting the image of the "red" youth the CCP-led state wanted to create.

However, although the goal of the subject of politics was very clear for the CCP in the early 1950s, there were no common curriculum standards or textbooks until 1959. The structure of the curriculum also changed frequently, in terms of content, time, and course names. Although the state required the upper levels of primary education to offer politics courses in 1950, it canceled this requirement from 1952 to 1968. At the secondary educational level, in 1951, the state required schools to offer politics courses for two class hours per week from Grade 9 to Grade 12 (Ministry of Education, 1951).[27] However, starting from 1954, the teaching of politics courses was reduced; by 1956, it was limited to teaching about the constitution in the second semester of Grade 12, for one class hour per week (Curriculum and Teaching Materials Research Institute, 1999). Although the state tried, in 1957, to reinstalled politics courses in secondary education and listed the content for the courses, these courses were soon replaced by socialist education, which focused on the anti-rightist campaign. It was not until 1959 that the CCP-led state issued a detailed teaching outline for politics courses from Grade 7 to Grade 12.[28] In addition, the teaching hours increased to three to four class hours per week for students on the academic track (Ministry of Education, 1959). This version of politics courses set the basic framework for those in the 1960s and even the 1980s. It should be mentioned that it was not until 1961 that secondary students began to have textbooks, such as *Chinese Revolution and the CCP*,

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[27] These courses focused on the history of China's revolution in Grade 9, knowledge of social sciences in Grades 10 and 11, and a "common program" in Grade 12. In addition, schools should have a "news and policies" course from Grade 7 to Grade 12, with one class hour per week (Ministry of Education, 1951).

[28] In junior secondary education, schools taught communist morality, a brief history of society development, socialist revolution, and socialist building, and methodology of thinking; in senior secondary education, schools taught political knowledge, economic knowledge, and dialectical materialism.

Education in Moral Quality, and *Dialectical Materialism* (Ministry of Education, 1961).[29] At the higher educational level, in1950, the state instructed all universities and colleges to offer two required one-year courses—The New Democracy, relating to China's modern and revolutionary history, and Political Economy—for all students; another course, Basics of Marxism, was added as an additional required course in 1953.

In 1964, the politics courses in secondary and higher education were criticized by Maoists, who believed (based on Mao's 1962 emphasis of class struggle) that the courses had been negatively influenced by people with a capitalist ideology and that the teaching placed too much emphasis on rote memorization (Ministry of Education, 1964). As a result, the CCP-led state tried to reform these courses radically by increasing their teaching of Mao's work (Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, Party Committee of the Department of Higher Education, & Contemporary Party Committee of the Ministry of Education, 1964). When Cultural Revolution began, in 1966, politics courses, together with courses on literature and history, were replaced by the teaching of Mao's work and radical political struggle (CCP Central Committee & State Council, 1966).

To sum up, in the Mao era, it was a clear goal of the CCP-led state to use the subject of politics to cultivate new socialist men who were "red" (i.e., armed with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought, and proletarian class consciousness). However, the effects of this curriculum were limited through secondary education and higher education. This reality was clearly summarized by the Ministry of Education, whose evaluation of the politics curriculum in the Mao era stated "the curriculum was not stable, textbooks were not good, leaders did not pay

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[29] Before that, students mainly studied selected editorials and articles in state newspapers, works by and about Mao Zedong, and important CCP and state documents (Rosen, 1983).

attention to, teachers did not want to teach, and students did not want to learn" (Ministry of Education, 1979).

Promoting Four-have citizens with the building of curriculum infrastructure in the beginning of market reform

After the Cultural Revolution ended, the shift from class struggle to economic reform signaled a change in the goal of formal education, from cultivating "read and expert" socialist men to producing professionals, sub-professionals, and skilled workers who were able to contribute to China's economic development and modernization (CCP Central Committee, 1985; Law, 2013). However, the red line of education was still stressed by the Party-state, as indicated by the new educational slogans, *Siyou Xinren* (Four-have persons, referring to well-educated socialist men who had socialist ideals, morality, knowledge, and disciplines) and *Five Loves* (love motherland, people, labor, science, and socialism). The biggest change was the abandonment of Mao's orthodoxy of class struggle.

As in the past, politics courses are still valued by the CCP in the post-Mao era as major channels for transmitting new socialist ideology, policies, and moralities. After the Cultural Revolution ended, the CCP worried about Chinese youths' loss of belief in socialism, the CCP, Marxism, and Maoism; one of their solutions was to emphasize thought and political education (Ministry of Education, 1979). In 1978, shortly after the Cultural Revolution ended, the Ministry of Education (1978) required primary and secondary schools to provide politics courses that taught students Marxism, Maoism, basic political knowledge, communism, a brief history of society development, dialectical materialism, etc., very similar to the 1959 framework, but with the addition of politics courses into primary education.

With the stabilization of the political and educational systems, the politics curriculum became more systematical, stable, and unified in the 1980s than in the Mao era. The Ministry of Education issued curriculum guidelines for primary and secondary students in 1982. The politics curriculum in primary education was named Thought and Character, and mainly emphasizing cultivating students' new socialist characters and behaviors, including "Five Loves", being collectivist, supporting the CCP, having civilized social manners, and being humble, honest, and brave; the politics curriculum in secondary education, named Thought and Politics, targeted students' socialist characters, basic knowledge of the history of society development, Marxist political economy (which integrated the new idea of economic reform), and dialectic materialism (Ministry of Education, 1982e, 1982a, 1982b, 1982c, 1982d). At the same time, the Party-state encouraged different publishers to make textbooks, but continued to censor all textbook contents.

In the second half of the 1980s, the Party-state continued to revise the guidelines for primary education (in 1986) and secondary education (in 1986 and 1988) by adding the elements of socialist democracy, law awareness, and open-door policy into the curriculum, corresponding to economic reform and political reform in Deng's era (State Education Commission, 1986a, 1986b, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c).[30] Socialist democracy was similar in meaning to Mao's democratic centralization principle, encouraging students to negotiate things within the group, but to follow the principle of the minority being obedient to the majority and the individual obedient to the collective. The law awareness element referred to knowing the rights guaranteed by the law and obeying the law, while the open-door policy element encouraged students to learn advanced technologies and experiences from Western countries. However, following the CCP's

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[30] Together with the content change, the politics curriculum in the secondary education readjusted its structure. In junior secondary education, courses included Citizens, A Brief History of Society Development, and Basic Knowledge of China's Socialist Construction; in senior secondary education, courses included Scientific Perspective on Life, Economic Knowledge, and Political Knowledge.

traditional view, the teaching outline still claimed that individuals should put the collective first and serve society.

After the Tiananmen movement, political and ideological education became more conservative in response to Deng's statement blaming the 1989 protests on the weakness of China's political and ideological education. The State Education Commission (1989) pointed out that schools pursued academic performance too much and valued scientific learning rather than humanity learning, contributing to students' ignorance of political and ideological matters. With an emphasis on strengthening ideological education, promoting students' identification with socialism and the CCP, and resisting Westernization and Western liberal ideas (State Education Commission, 1989, 1990), the State Education Commission amended the politics curriculum guidelines for primary education in 1990 and 1992, and those for junior and senior secondary education in 1993. These versions of the guidelines kept many contents from previous versions, added elements of Mao's thought, class perspective, critiques of capitalism, and Deng Xiaoping's theory, as well as emphasizing patriotism, collectivism, and socialism (State Education Commission, 1992, 1993a, 1993b).

Toward responsible socialist citizens with regulated individualism in Jiang's and Hu's era

Since the mid-1990s, with the deepening of market reform, the Party-state began to reform its educational system from exam-oriented to quality-oriented (*Suzhi*) to cultivate well-rounded persons who were good at intelligence, morality, physics, and aesthetics (CCP Central Committee & State Council, 1993, 1999). Students' creativity and problem-solving skills were particularly highlighted, because the Party-state perceived them as the key to helping China compete in the global economy and the emerging knowledge-based economy (CCP Central Committee & State Council, 1999). Following the educational reform started in 1993 and the

new curriculum reform started in 2001, the politics curriculums for primary and junior secondary education were revised three times, while the curriculum for senior secondary education was revised twice.[31] Among these revisions, the curriculum standards revisions in the early 2000s and 2011 differed significantly from past versions in terms of curriculum structure, content, and pedagogy. The major changes were the adjustment of curriculum aims toward cultivating responsible socialist citizens with regulated individualism and the movement toward more student-centered pedagogy.

The curriculum in primary education was divided into two courses in 2002, with one named Character and Life for lower-grade-level students and another (Character and Society) for higher-grade-level students. The curriculum in junior secondary education was renamed Thought and Character in 2003, and paid more attention to students' moral development, psychological health, and learning of law and national conditions. One significant change in the junior secondary politics curriculum was the elimination of learning the history of society development, a topic aimed at criticizing the capitalist system and verifying the advantages of the socialist system.[32] Finally, the curriculum structure in senior secondary education was adjusted from teaching economy, Marxist philosophy, and politics to teaching four required courses (Economic Life, Political Life, Cultural Life, and Life and Philosophy) and two elective courses.

In 2002, the new curriculum standards resulted in primary education and junior secondary education adopting a new framework, one that scholars described as multileveled and multidimensional (Law, 2006), to organize curriculum contents. This framework included

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[31] The politics curriculum of primary education was revised in 1997, 2002, and 2011; of junior secondary education in 1997, 2003, and 2011; and of senior secondary education in 1996 and 2004.

[32] The topic of brief history of society development was taught as a course for Grade 8 in the 1988 and 1993 version, and was reduced to a part of contents in the Grade 9 in the 1997 version. In the 2003 version of curriculum standard, this content disappeared.

students' different life spheres—i.e., the individual sphere, communities (including family and school), local community (hometown or village), the national level, and the global level. At the same time, the framework addressed three elements at each level of primary education: social contexts, social activities, and social relationships. For junior secondary education, the framework also emphasized morality, psychological health, law, and nation conditions.

Through investigating students' life at different levels, the individual level was stressed more than before. In both primary and junior secondary education, the politics curriculum often talked about knowing one's self, being confident, self-protection, being positive and brave when facing challenges, doing things in which one was interested, and enjoying life (Ministry of Education, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). All these elements showed that the curriculum encouraged a certain degree of self-identity, a key element of individualism.

At the same time, however, the curriculum also emphasized students being responsible citizens in their public life—i.e., respecting others and obeying social norms and laws. Indeed, the elements relating to citizenship increased. Although the politics curriculum had talked about law awareness and socialist democracy since the mid-1980s, it was not until the mid-1990s that citizen rights, democratic participation, and civic virtues were largely present in the standards (Ministry of Education, 2003, 2004, 2011a, 2011b; State Education Commission, 1997). Much as the 1997 junior secondary education politics curriculum required teachers to teach citizen's personal rights (including rights of privacy, name, portrait, and marriage), educational rights, property and consumer rights, and voting rights, these rights were also taught in the renewed 2011 version. The 2004 politics curriculum standard for senior secondary education included democratic participation in the Political Life course, reflecting the advocacy of intra-Party and local-level democracy during the Hu era. However, the curriculum still upheld socialist

orthodoxy by emphasizing the learning of Marxist historical materialism and dialectical materialism, Mao's thought, and updated theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics, as well as emphasizing Four Haves and Five Loves, patriotism, and collectivism.

As the new curriculum reform encouraged a student-centered pedagogy, the politics curriculum also tried to integrate this in its standard, requiring teachers to offer more activities that encouraged students' critical thinking, questioning, creativity, and problem-solving skills.

Therefore, this thesis uses responsible socialist citizen to describe the kind of person the Party-state wanted to create in the Jiang and Hu eras—i.e., responsible citizens who upheld socialist systems and the leadership of the CCP. At the same time, the Party-state encouraged a certain degree of individualism with regulation. Indeed, regulated individualism was a term proposed by some scholars to describe the fact that students in China were encouraged to develop their own interests, thinking, goals, and life skills for their personal welfare and economic development, but were also regulated by the Party-state to adopt its socialist worldview (K. W. Cheung & Pan, 2006). A similar phenomenon was observed by Hansen (2015) in her ethnographic work.

Emphasizing law awareness, political identity, and socialism with Chinese characteristics in the Xi era

Starting in 2016, the primary and junior secondary education thought and politics curricula experienced another round of revision, and were renamed as Morality and Law. Adding Law to the curriculum name highlights the new revision's emphasis on the importance of law education from primary to secondary education, responding to calls for better understanding of the rule of law in the Xi era. Indeed, the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Justice, and the National Office of Law Popularization (2016) released the *Guideline of Law Education for*

Youths in 2016, which aimed to increase youths' knowledge about law, as well as their awareness of that need to protect their rights through law, use law to participate into public life and state affairs, and obey the law. This document influenced the design of the new Thought and Politics curriculum and textbooks.

In 2017, the Thought and Politics curriculum standard for senior secondary education was revised, along with other subjects. Following the new concept of "key competencies" dominating the design of curriculum standards in all subjects, the politics curriculum defined four key competencies for students: political identity, scientific perspectives (i.e., Marxist perspectives), awareness of the rule of law, and public participation. Indeed, all these elements were already included in the old curriculum. The biggest changes in the new curriculum were readjusting the curriculum structure by adding a new course named "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," reducing the contents on economy, and combining Cultural Life and Life and Philosophy into one course.

Another big change in primary and junior secondary education was the unification of textbooks for literature, history, and politics courses. While Jiang and Hu eras featured unified curriculum standards, the Party-state encouraged different publishers to publish different versions of textbooks. Now, however, textbooks for literature, history, and politics subjects would have one national textbook version. This new policy reflected Xi's emphasis on unifying ideology.

Renaming the Thoughts and Politics curriculum as Morality and Law, the four key competencies of the politics curriculum, the adding of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics as a course, and the unification of textbooks in nine-year compulsory education, all reflected the

ideological change in the Xi era, in which the Party-state emphasized the rule of law while at the same time tightening its ideological and political control.

Conclusion: Transmitting Socialist Ideology through Politics Curriculum

Political ideology plays a significant role in the politics of all communist regimes. Derived from Marxism-Leninism, ideology in communist regimes "guides the actions of the political elite in the hegemonic Communist Party, justifies the Party's monopoly on power, and legitimizes its proclaimed historical mission to 'build socialism'" (White, 1999, pp. 23–24). This statement well describes the functions of the CCP's ideology. Whether in the revolutionary era, the Mao era or the post-Mao era, the CCP has used ideology to guide its goals and directions, justify its policies, support its political legitimacy, show its leaders' authority, unify people's minds, and mobilize people.

Accordingly, the CCP uses its propaganda system, political campaigns, mass organizations, and formal education to educate or indoctrinate Party members and the whole population with its ideology. In the Mao era, which featured intense thought and political work, the CCP mobilized millions of peasants, workers, intellectuals, students, and other social groups to support its rule and its policies on socialist building. In the post-Mao era, thought and political work has still been emphasized, but with less intensity than in the Mao era. It has focused more on improving Party members' morality and performance, and on educating the populace about patriotism, collectivism, socialism, socialist virtues, and updated socialist ideology. It aims to gain people's support for the leadership of the CCP and to deal with the degradation of morality arising from China's economic development. It thus serves the needs of both economic development and political legitimacy, which are key themes for the CCP in the post-Mao era.

The politics curriculum, from primary to higher education, has been an important integral part of the CCP's thought and political work for transmitting its ideology to youth. In the Mao era, this curriculum aimed to promote "red" socialist men who were armed with Marxism-Leninism, believed socialist ideology, supported the leadership of the CCP, had class consciousness, and worked hard for socialist rebuilding. However, the impacts of this curriculum on students were limited by its weak curriculum infrastructure. In the post-Mao era, economic reform has required the politics curriculum to adjust its aim to prepare Four Haves persons with socialist ideals, morality, knowledge, and disciplines in the Deng era, and to cultivate responsible socialist citizens with regulated individualism in the Jiang and Hu eras for the purpose of personal welfare and economic development. Rights discourse, democratic participation, and the rule of law have been added to the curriculum, corresponding to the CCP's limited political reforms provoked by reflections on the Cultural Revolution and the needs of economic development. However, the bottom line of the thought and politics curriculum is still to uphold Deng's Four Cardinal Principles—that is, to uphold the socialist path, the people's democratic dictatorship, the CCP's leadership, and Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

The CCP has achieved its desired ideological education in the curriculum through making curriculum standards, censoring textbooks, and unifying textbooks. However, based on official documents, the impacts of the politics curriculum on students have been questioned, with the CCP mentioning students' lack of willingness to learn politics and schools' reduced focus on humanity learning, compared with scientific learning. Therefore, whether the CCP's ideology can win students' hearts needs to be further explored. The following chapters will show a more complex practice of teaching politics curriculum in the schools. The next chapter examines how the politics curriculum talks about citizenship, the theme on which this study focuses.

Chapter 5 Desiring Responsible Socialist Citizens: The Representations of Citizenship in the Official Textbooks of the Politics Curriculum

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the politics curriculum, *Sixiang Zhengzhi (Thought and Politics),* is a part of the broader thought and political work for the CCP. It is dominantly influenced by the Party-state and reflects the official ideology. This chapter investigates the discourse of citizenship in the politics curriculum in senior secondary education in China. It first introduces the structure and contents of the politics curriculum and the making of textbooks, showing that the nature of this curriculum is to cultivate Chinese socialist citizens and to support the rule of the Party-state. Then it examines the discourse of citizenship represented in textbooks in terms of national identity and political identity, rights, responsibilities, political participation, and socialist democracy.

The Thought and Politics Curriculum: Structure, Topics, and Textbooks Making

The Thought and Politics curriculum studied in this research is based on the 2004 curriculum standard version. Although the curriculum has been undergoing reform since 2017, when I conducted my fieldwork, Zhejiang Province and the schools in my fieldwork used the curriculum and textbooks framed by the 2004 curriculum standard version. In 2004, the Ministry of Education published the *Curriculum standard for Thought and Politics in senior secondary education*, responding to the state-led basic curriculum reform launched in 2001.[1] High school curriculum reform started in 2004 in four provinces as an experiment, then was gradually implemented nationwide by 2010.

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[1] The curriculum standard for other 15 subjects in high school had been published in 2003. The curriculum standard for Thought and Politics was the latest released.

The Thought and Politics curriculum in high school: Structure and contents

The 2004 curriculum standard version for Thought and Politics was adopted from 2004 to 2017 in China, until the new curriculum standard was released in 2017. It played an important role in shaping the structure and contents of this subject in every high school in China.

This standard readjusted the course for Though and Politics by dividing it into two sections: a requirement section and a selective section. All high school students[2] in China must take four courses in the requirement section—Economic Life, Political Life, Cultural Life, and Life and Philosophy, covering the economy, politics, and culture in citizens' daily life, using Marxist philosophy as a basic interpretation framework. The selective section is designed for students who will take Thought and Politics as their tested subject in the NCEE, including six courses. Each course is designed for one semester and students need to choose two. Although the curriculum standard states that students can choose courses in selective sections based on their interests, the reality is that students' choices are limited because the opening of these courses in high schools depends on whether the courses are tested in the NCEE. Different provinces in China have different requirement and policy for the NCEE. It turns out in Zhejiang Province, students who choose to take politics as one of their exam subjects need to take Law in Life and State and International Organization because these two courses have been tested in the NCEE in Zhejiang Province since 2014.[3]

The curriculum standard gives specific curriculum content guidelines for these courses. Table 5-1 details the contents covered in these courses.

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[2] This refers to high school students in academic senior secondary education. High school students in vocational education have another curriculum for Thought and Politics.

[3] Before 2014, the college entrance exam policy in Zhejiang Province was different. Students did not need to take the exam in politics separately. The content of politics was integrated into an exam subject named Humanity Synthesis, which included history, politics, and geography.

Table 5-1 The structure and contents of Thought and Politics in high school

Course categories	Course name	Content
Requirement courses	Economic Life	Goods exchange; Marxist price theory; consumption; companies and labors; investment; income; distribution; and socialist market economy.
	Political Life	Civic rights and responsibilities; civic engagement; government; socialist political system (including people's congress, the leadership of the CCP, ethnicity policies and religion policies); and international cooperation and competition.
	Cultural Life	Cultural diversity; the influence of culture to people and society; the heredity and innovation of culture; Chinese culture and the spirit of Chinese nation; and the constructing of advanced socialist culture in China.
	Life and Philosophy	Marxism's dialectical materialism and historical materialism; CCP's ideology like "seeking truth from facts"; correct values which perceives that the real valuable life is to make contributions to society, a value proposed by the CCP.
Elective courses	State and International Organization	Different democratic political systems in the world; international organizations.

Law in Life	Civil rights and obligations; law relating to the contract, employment, and marriage; law reparation without talking about political rights.

Note: Each course lasts for one semester (20weeks).

Starting from economy in one's personal life to macro-economic policy, Economic Life emphasizes the importance of the market in the economy and the necessity of state regulation, following the economic reform since 1978. The aim of Economic Life is to let students understand economic phenomena in daily life and develop certain skills to live in a modern economy; more importantly, is to let them know that the basic and core task of a socialist society is to develop the economy. Political Life aims to let students know that China's socialist democratic political system is characterized by the leadership of the CCP, people's power, and the rule of law. Cultural Life relates to students' cultural identity and national identity, while Life and Philosophy links to the CCP's fundamental ideology; that is, Chinese Marxism. Although introducing different democratic political systems around the world, the real aim of State and International Organizations is to argue that the National People's Congress System is the most appropriate system for China's national condition; additionally, the content of international organizations mainly aims to develop students' global view from the perspective of the nation state. Law in Life responds to the CCP's claim of the rule of law. To sum up, all these courses seek to introduce students to the CCP's official views about economy, politics, and culture, and to persuade them to support China's modernization within the current political system. However, they also add students' daily life to the curriculum, following the student-oriented principle in the curriculum standard.

Different from the former Thought and Politics curriculum, the present curriculum has several changes. First, it makes Political Life a required course for all students, including science track students who had previously stopped learning politics curriculum contents before Grade 12, when the Political Life course was taught. As such, these science track students did not receive any knowledge about China's political system, including the people's congress system, various levels of government, the party system, and civic engagement. This change is a response to the declared goal of building a society with Chinese socialist democracy and the rule of law. Second, the curriculum recommends replacing the traditional teacher-centered pedagogy with student-center pedagogy, emphasizing the contents of the curriculum should relate to students' lives. This corresponds to the aims of educational reform.

The making and revision of textbooks

Although the new curriculum reform encourages the diversity of textbooks, the Thought and Politics curriculum has only two textbook versions. One is published by People's Education Press and are used nationwide; the other is published by Shanghai Education Press, and used only in Shanghai.[4] Zhejiang Province adopted the version by People's Education Press in 2006.

The making and revision of the Thought and Politics textbooks published by People's Education Press show the importance of this curriculum to the Party-state's ideology. According to Zhang (2005), around 10 publishers made their own Thought and Politics textbook versions, but only the People's Education Press version was approved by the Censorship Committee for Textbooks of Primary and Secondary Education. The published textbooks were edited by the

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[4] Shanghai has a different curriculum standard for Thought and Politics but still follows the guideline of curriculum reform. The curriculum of Thought and Politics in Shanghai includes three courses: Economic Life for Grade 10, Political Life for Grade 11, and Life and Philosophy for Grade 12. This version of textbooks has been used since 2006 fall in Shanghai. However, the new revision of curriculum standard in 2017 replaced Shanghai's version of the curriculum and textbooks with national ones.

Guiding Editing Committee for the Experimental Textbooks Based on the High School Political

Curriculum Standard, a part of the Ministry of Education; this is a unique arrangement, as no

other national curriculum subjects have such a committee. The committee is comprised of four

professors of Marxism from two top universities, two officials of the CCP central propaganda

department, three professors (of law, history, and political science), and one editor from People's

Education Press. Each textbook was written by a group composed of university professors and

high school teachers. The textbook for Political Life was censored by the CCP's propaganda

department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Administration for Religious Affairs, and

the State Ethnic Affairs Commission.

Since they were first published, the Thought and Politics textbooks have experienced

several major revisions. All Thought and Politics textbooks are revised after every CCP National

Congress, which are held every five years, to ensure the books propagate the themes express at

the Congress meeting. The CCP sees this propaganda as a means of letting the spirit of the CCP

National Congress "go into textbooks, into the curriculum, and into students' brains" (*Jing

Jiaocai, Jing Kecheng, and Jing Tounao*). As such, the textbooks for the four required courses

were revised in 2008 after the 17th CCP National Congress, and again in 2013 after the 18th CCP

National Congress, based on official documents. The textbooks were also revised in 2014, after

the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CCP Central Committee. Political Life experienced an extra

revision in 2015 to reflect the themes of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CCP Central

Committee and a series of speeches by President Xi Jinping.

Although each textbook has its own logic, the remainder of this chapter mainly examines

three dimensions of the official course: how the Party-state promotes political identity and

national identity, how it represents issues of civic rights and responsibilities, and how it talks

about civic engagement and democracy. These dimensions reveal how the Party-state constructs the desired relationship between it and individual Chinese. The related contents are mainly distributed in Political Life and Cultural Life, and scattered in Economic Life, Life and Philosophy, Law in Life, and State and International Organizations.

The Construction of National Identity and Political Identity

Citizenship identity refers to individuals' identification with their political community. It is important for a political system to maintain its legitimacy and authority to govern, and to strengthen social solidarity. This study examines citizenship identity in terms of national identity and political identity. National identity here refers to one's identification with a constructed Chinese nation, while political identity refers to one's identification with the CCP and the political system. Cultivating youth's national identity and political identity are main aims for the Thought and Politics curriculum; as stated in the curriculum standard, one of the course's specific aims is to teach students to love the CCP, love the country, strengthen national esteem, national confidence, and national pride, promote the spirit of the Chinese nation, and have the ambition to work hard for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (Ministry of Education, 2004).

Rejuvenating the Chinese nation

Rejuvenating the Chinese nation is a slogan expressed a great many official documents. Wang (2014) pointed out this discourse has been used by many Chinese leaders—from Sun Yat-sen to Chiang Kai-shek and from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao—as a way to mobilize the Chinese populace to support their revolution or reform. However, during the Xi era, it has become a more important and more often mentioned slogan, in connection with the Chinese dream.

This discourse of rejuvenation references China's glorious past and long history. Before the first opium war (1839–1842), in which China was defeated by Britain, many Chinese

considered China to be the center of the world and had a strong sense of China's cultural and moral superiority. However, since then, China experienced a series of national traumas relating to Western threatens and Japanese incursions lasting from 1840 to the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945, which has been named China's "century of national humiliation." This humiliation narrative was not used in the early period of the PRC; instead, during that time the CCP used class struggle theory to explain this century of history within the framework of the Chinese revolution, foreign imperialism, and the recently-ended civil war. It adopted "victor" narratives to mobilize popular support. It was not until the early 1990s that the phrase "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" was mentioned by the CCP and became the Party's new mission, replacing the old mission of socialist future and communist future. This rejuvenation discourse was more emphasized and characterized as the Chinese dream in the era of President Xi, who first mentioned the Chinese dream during his visit to "The Road of Rejuvenation" exhibition at the National Museum of China on November 29 2012. In the speech, he asked, "What is the Chinese dream? I think rejuvenating the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history. It is the dream for several Chinese generations. It represents the whole interests of the Chinese nation and Chinese people. It is the shared expectations for every Chinese" (Xi, 2012, p. 36).

Thereafter, rejuvenating the Chinese nation, the glorious past, the waning of China in modern history, and traditional culture were presented in Thought and Politics textbooks—mainly in Cultural Life and to a lesser extent in Political Life. The Cultural Life textbook includes a specific unit on the culture and spirit of the Chinese nation (People's Education Press, 2014b, pp. 61–84). The unit first introduces the long history of Chinese civilization by comparing with the disappearance or collapse of such earlier civilizations as Mesopotamia, India,

Greece, and Rome. Through this comparison, it marks the uniqueness and vitality of Chinese culture, aiming to evoke youths' pride in their culture. Next, the textbook uses a paragraph to briefly review the development of Chinese culture from the Shang dynasty (1600–1046 BC) to the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), showing the shaping, the gold age, and the waning of Chinese culture. The textbook explains the waning of Chinese culture as a process featuring the decline in feudalism governance and the huge impacts of Western industrial culture. The juxtaposition of the glorious past and the waning of China tries to inspire youths to be willing to and passionate about rejuvenating China.

How then to restore the glory of China? The textbook claims, "the practice has testified that only under the leadership of the CCP and the guideline of Marxism, can China create its new flourishment of culture and realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" (People's Education Press, 2014b, p. 65), but does not directly explain what the practice is. However, the narrative in other sections indicates that this practice relates to the failure of many intellectuals in modern China trying to find a way to save China, and the success of the CCP in leading the Chinese people to build a new socialist China (People's Education Press, 2014b, pp. 75, 95–97). In the section named "Developing socialist culture with Chinese characteristics" (People's Education Press, 2014b, pp. 95–99), the textbook says that the way of total Westernization and the way of cultural renaissance proposed by intellectuals in the early 20th century both failed; however, the widespread emergence of Marxism in China after the May Fourth Movement was a turning point for Chinese culture, taking it from waning to reviving. Therefore, the claim of rejuvenating the Chinese nation becomes a strong argument for the legitimacy of the CCP.

As the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation indicates a rejuvenation of Chinese culture, how to perceive and talk about Chinese culture, particularly traditional Chinese culture, becomes

a key issue. In the early stage of the CCP, Confucianism, as a dominant element of Chinese traditional culture, was criticized by the Party's founders, such as Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, during the New Cultural movement. After the founding of the PRC, Confucianism and Chinese traditional culture experienced more assaults, particularly during the Cultural Revolution and the Criticizing Lin Biao and Criticizing Confucius Campaign; now, however, the CCP promotes Chinese traditional culture, perceiving Chinese traditional culture as a means to maintain social order, strengthen national identity, and offer spaces for people's spiritual life.

How does the textbook deal with the CCP's *volte face* on traditional culture? It simply states that we should take what is good and discard what is bad (*Quqi Jinghua, Quqi Zaopo*).

> How to inherit traditional culture, and let it play active roles? The correct attitude is 'take what is good and discard what is bad'. We should critically inherit traditional culture to make the old to be used for today…We should keep and develop the part which is healthy and matches the requirement of society, and delete or transformed the part which is backward, decadent, and does not satisfy the development of society. (People's Education Press, 2014b, p. 43)

However, the textbook does not explain too much about what is good and what is bad. When talking about excellent traditional culture, it mainly refers to achievements in Chinese traditional architecture, arts (including literacy, drama, and painting), scientific technologies, and philosophy, without offering many details. The bad part of traditional culture relates to bad social customs or behaviors, such as physiognomy, Geomancy, and Feudalist thought like *Sangang Wuchang* (the three-cardinal guides and five-constant virtues), and an ethics requirement for women called *Sancong Side* (the three obedience and the four virtues).[5] Loving to make social networks (*La Guanxi*) and to expand one's kinship network are also considered backward

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[5] Sangang (the three-cardinal guides) were that ruler guides subject, father guides son and husband guides wife; Wuchang (the five constant virtues) were benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity. The three obedience meant that a woman needed to obey her father before marriage, her husband during married life, and her sons in widowhood; the four virtues referred to morality, proper speech, modest manner, and diligent work.

traditional behaviors (People's Education Press, 2014b, p. 90). The textbook also criticizes filial love by stating that the feudal society emphasized children's filial devotion to their parents to the point of stupidity. It claims filial love is still important in modern families, but should be based on the equality of children and parents. The new interpretation of filial love is called transformation and innovation of traditional culture in the textbooks.

In addition to Chinese traditional culture, another core element in Chinese culture is socialist culture with Chinese characteristics. In Cultural Life, there is a whole unit relating to this topic. The textbook states that developing socialist culture with Chinese characteristics is the only correct way for realizing the rejuvenation of Chinese culture and for building a powerful socialist culture in China (People's Education Press, 2014b, p. 98). It defines Chinese socialist culture as a national, scientific, and people-oriented socialist culture that embraces modernization, the world, and the future (People's Education Press, 2014b, p. 96). The textbook also calls for people to have a cultural confidence toward Chinese culture and to use Chinese socialist theories, including Deng Xiaoping theory, the Three Represents, and Scientific Outlook on Development to arm their brain and guide their practices. Therefore, by evoking the Chinese nation, the CCP tries to make the nation's youth believe in the Chinese socialist path and accept Chinese socialist ideology, particularly theories on socialism with Chinese characteristics.

In addition to the renewal of Chinese culture, the textbook advocates cultivating national spirit, which the CCP considers a national pillar. Patriotism is identified as the core of Chinese national spirit, and the textbook states it should be expressed in practical actions, such as working hard and building the motherland, objecting to invasion and protecting the motherland, rejecting ethnic separatism, and safeguarding the unity of the motherland. More importantly, the textbook claims that, in contemporary China, "Patriotism is the same as loving socialism.

Developing socialism with Chinese characteristics and safeguarding the unity of China are the themes of patriotism today" (People's Education Press, 2014b, p. 75). It also cites a quote from Deng Xiaoping equating patriotism with loving socialism: "Is the concept of the country abstract? If we did not love the new socialist China under the leadership of the CCP, then what should we love? We could not require all Chinese people in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and overseas to support socialism. However, at least, they should not object to a new socialist China. Otherwise, how can we say they are patriotic?" (People's Education Press, 2014b, p. 75).

Contrary attitudes toward the Western

Another the topic often mentioned in the discourse of rejuvenating the Chinese nation is how to perceive and deal with the West, which has often challenged China in modern history. China has experienced two waves of learning from the West, as indicated in Chapter 4. The first happened from the 1840s to the early 1900s, in which intellectuals first tried to learn Western science and technologies, and then turned to learning its political system and culture to solve the waning of China under imperialism. The second wave happened in the 1980s, during which intellectuals advocated liberal ideals and democracy, which were suppressed by the government as challenging the governance of the CCP. Since then, however, China has become integrated into the global economy more deeply, due to the economic reform and opening up policy that started in 1979 and expanded in 1992.

The textbook shows very contradictory attitudes toward the West. On the one hand, it states China needs to be open to the world to learn advanced technologies and make excellent achievements. This attitude exactly reflects China's economic policy in the post-Mao era. The textbook encourages students to respect cultural diversity in the world because every nation, including China, has its own culture. Moreover, it calls on students to welcome the spread of the

world's excellent culture in China and to learn from others' cultural achievements to enrich

Chinese culture. As China gains more power in the global world, the textbook also suggests that

students introduce Chinese culture to the world and improve the influence of Chinese culture.

Basically, the textbook encourages cultural cooperation and communication in an equal sense.

On the other hand, the textbook reminds youth to be cautious about hostile Western

forces and their intention of Westernizing China, a severe worry for the CCP in the 1990s.

Although benefiting from economic globalization, the CCP holds a skeptical attitude toward it;

as the textbook states,

> The development of technology and economic globalization promote a better
> distribution of capital, technology, and knowledge in a global level. They offer
> new opportunities. However, the current economic globalization is led by the
> Western developed countries. They define the game of the world economy. It
> brings a lot of pressure to developing countries. After the cold war, the hostile
> foreign forces treat China as the opponent of ideology. They try to penetrate
> Western culture into Chinese culture to Westernize China and to separate China.
> So, it is important to protect our culture. (People's Education Press, 2014b, p. 22)

The Cultural Life textbook does not explain what the hostile Western forces are and what

it means to Westernize China; however, the Political Life textbook talks about hegemonism and

notes that the great powers use the excuse of "freedom, democracy, and human rights" to

infringe on other countries' sovereign and interfere in their governance, indirectly indicating

America's hegemony toward China. This is not only view held by the CCP, it is also one

accepted by many Chinese, including liberals and dissident intellectuals (S. S. Zhao, 2004, p.

33).

Ethnic minorities in the shadow of the Chinese nation

In the process of constructing the national identity, a thorny problem is the issue of

minority ethnicities. China is an imagined nation based on political territory, rather than one

bound together by kinship, common language, customs, or shared myths. This refers to all ethnicities residing in the PRC's territory, including the majority Han and 55 other minority ethnicities; the latter are mainly scattered in the north, west, and southwest of China, and are a result of an ethnic identification project launched by the CCP in the 1950s.[6]

The textbooks' basic stance on ethnic minorities is to emphasize the unity of all ethnicities, following the ethnic policies of the Party-state. The content relating to ethnic minorities is mainly presented in a section named "Our ethnic regional autonomy system and religion policy" (People's Education Press, 2015b, pp. 71–82), and another named "The culture of the Chinese nation" (People's Education Press, 2014b, pp. 62–66). The aims of these contents are to let students know the basic principle by which the government deals with ethnic issues, understand the ethnic regional autonomy system, have a consciousness of national unity, and respect ethnic cultural diversities, as stated in the curriculum standard (Ministry of Education, 2004).

The textbooks describe all ethnicities as living in harmony together in contemporary China. The Political Life textbook describes the current relations between Chinese ethnic groups as marked with equity, unity, mutual help, and harmony (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 72). Every minority ethnicity has its own delegates to the National People's Congress; the proportion of minorities in the NPC is higher than the proportion of minorities in the whole population. In addition, the state implements more preferential policies to ethnic minority regions

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[6] At first, with the CCP's encouragement of applying for official recognition of ethnic identities, more than 400 non-Han ethnic groups applied. The large number of self-identified ethnic groups made the government send scholars, officials, and college students into the field to re-identify ethnic minority groups. As a result, thirty-eight ethnic minority groups were officially recognized in 1953, another fifteen were identified in 1964, and two more were recognized in 1982.

through the Development of the Western China Program, started in 2000. [7] The textbook also presents a picture of a Tibetan woman expressing thanks to workers from Jiangsu Province for the aid they provided Tibet. Ethnic regional autonomy system is also introduced, showing that ethnic groups in regional autonomy areas govern themselves—making policies, administering local public finance, planning for economic development, and maintaining their own cultures.

Without talking about ethnic identification history, the textbook makes an illusion that all ethnicities have existed for a long time, belong to the Chinese nation, and have strong identities with the Chinese nation. The Cultural Life textbook states that all these ethnicities make great contributions to the development of Chinese national culture; "In the long historical development, the cultures of the various ethnic groups blend with each other and facilitate with each other, contributing to the glory of Chinese culture. Every people in each ethnicity has a strong identity and strong belonging to the shared Chinese culture, showing the profound cultural foundation of the Chinese nation and the powerful solidarity of the Chinese nation" (People's Education Press, 2014b, p. 70). This statement shows a unity of minority ethnic groups in the Chinese nation, presenting a strong Chinese national identity that extends beyond ethnic identity.

However, the modern history of China is one of ethnic conflicts, rather than of ethnic harmony. In the late Qing, the Manchu, the ethnic minority rulers of the Qing dynasty, were criticized by Han nationalists. In the early 20th century, Sun Yat-sen claimed, "Foreign imperialist powers as lesser evils compared to the Manchu government" (S. S. Zhao, 2004, p. 64). The revolutionary slogans *Geming Paiman* (A revolution to expel the Manchus) and *Quchu Dalu, Huifu Zhonghua* (Throw out the Tartar caitiffs and revive China) were very popular at that

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[7] In this program, the central government invests heavily in these areas, through such projects as the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and the "transmitting natural gas from West China to East China" and "transmitting the electricity from West China to East China," projects, as well as through the rebuilding of infrastructures such as airports, highways, and communication facilities.

time. Later this slogan was modified with another of Sun Yat-sen's concepts, "China as a republic of five nationalities" (*wuzu gonghe*), that is, Manchus, Han, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetan. In the Mao era and post-Mao era, separatism, as a strain of ethnic nationalism, existed among some minorities, particularly Tibetans and Xinjiang Muslims. Independence demonstrations and riots took place in Tibet in 1959, 1987, 1989, and 2008; Xinjiang witnessed riots in 1990, 1993, 1997, and 2009 (S. S. Zhao, 2004, p. 199). The ethnic conflicts between ethnic minority groups and the majority Han persist in contemporary China.

Mention of these conflicts was avoided in the textbooks. When talking about Tibet, the textbook demonstrates that the old Tibet was a backward feudal serf system, and that Tibetan people's standards of living have greatly improved since the democratic reform in 1959. It doesn't show the fact that the "democratic reform," which was a land reform guided by class struggle, led to riots in Tibet and the establishment of a Tibetan government, headed by the Dalai Lama.

Supporting the leadership of the CCP

From the discourse of rejuvenating Chinese nation, it is very clear that the promotion of Chinese nationalism is designed to support the leadership of the CCP. Through this nationalist approach, the textbooks try to promote youths' political identity with the CCP by stating that the CCP's leadership comes from China's historical path and its people's choice, benefits China's development, and is required by the socialist rule of law. In addition, the textbook emphasizes that the CCP represents people's interests, mainly in the Political Life textbook section named Our Political Party System, which dedicates two lessons to this topic.

The textbook claims "the leading and governing status of the CCP is not proclaimed by CCP itself but is an inevitable result of historical development of Chinese society and a correct

choice of Chinese people" (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 63). It shows three approaches to nation building for China in the first half of 20th century: an approach represented by the Northern Warlords (1912–1927) and the KMT that protected capitalists' interests; an approach presented by moderate groups that advocated a capitalist republic; and an approach represented by the CCP that suggested a people's republic based on the leadership of the working class and an alliance of workers and peasants. The textbook briefly states that the third approach won the support of the majority of people, including nationalist capitalists, while the other two approaches failed. This history is very important for the CCP's legitimacy.

The textbook also introduces three major achievements by the CCP in the 90 years since it was founded. The first is the independence of China, which is also emphasized in the discourse of rejuvenating the Chinese nation; the second is the socialist revolution, which laid the foundations of the socialist system; the third is its development of socialism and modernization. The textbook particularly highlights the miracle of Chinese development since the 1979 economic reform, including the significant improvement in its economic power, the progress of socialist democracy, the development of socialist culture, and the improvement of people's life. The textbooks attribute these developments to the CCP's ability for state administration. However, the textbook does not mention the corruption that occurred after the economic reform nor any of the disasters that occurred in socialist revolution period, including land reform, the anti-rightist campaign, and the Cultural Revolution. The CCP's achievements are shown without mention of its failures and mistakes.

The textbook uses the important role the CCP has played in China's modern history and contemporary society to predict its importance to China's future. The textbook firmly asserts that the "Chinese socialist enterprise must follow the leadership of the CCP. Only under the

leadership of the CCP, China can develop Chinese socialism, safeguard the unity of the motherland and the unity of all ethnicities to provide a stable and harmonious social environment for modernization, and motivate all positive elements to realize the goal of building a moderately prosperous society" (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 63). These statements mainly emphasize the CCP's contribution to Chinese society, particularly to its economic performance.

In addition to using China's history and economic performance to validate the CCP's authority, the textbook also notes that the CCP administration's status is authorized by law. However, it does not introduce how that process works; it just says that law is of great value for the governance of a country, and that one aim for China is to build a socialist rule of law country. It stresses there is no conflict between the leadership of the CCP and socialist rule of law, as socialist rule of law must uphold the leadership of the CCP and the leadership of the CCP must rely on socialist rule of law. However, what does socialist rule of law mean? The textbook does not explain. It mentions that the key to the rule of law is running the state in accordance with the Constitution. It also introduces the four revisions to the constitution since 1982, which were made by National Peoples' Congress after being proposed by the CCP. In addition, the textbook notes, as an example of the CCP's law-based exercise of state power, that the CCP makes proposals to National People's Congress, which must approve them through legal procedures. The concept of the rule of law and the emphasis on the constitution indicates Western democratic discourse, but have a very different meaning under the leadership of the CCP.

The textbook shows a very positive image of the CCP by depicting it as a party of and for the people. It says the majority CCP members have no aspirations for fame or gain, work very hard, and serve people wholeheartedly. It lists three model Party members: a manager who devotes himself to China's aircraft carrier enterprise, a cadre who works hard for people in his

village, and a provincial vice-secretary who cares about ethnic minorities. The textbook describes the CCP's nature and purpose and verifies its leadership as follows:

> The Chinese Communist Party is the vanguard of the working class. It is also the vanguard of Chinese people and Chinese nation. The nature of the CCP determines that it does not have its own special interests apart from representing the fundamental interests of the majority of the people. Serving the people wholeheartedly is the Party's purpose. All the Party's work is for the benefit of the people.(People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 67)

From above sections, it is clear the textbooks construct an imagined Chinese nation to unify all citizens of different ethnicities. By introducing China's glorious past, the waning of China in modern history, and Chinese traditional culture, the textbooks try to motivate youths' passion for rejuvenating the Chinese nation. By linking the CCP's leadership with that rejuvenation, the textbooks use national identity to promote youths' political identification with the CCP and the socialist system. Political identity is also promoted through showing the national independence and economic performance achieved under the leadership of the CCP, and a positive image of the CCP. In the construction of national identity, the CCP also carefully deals with Western values and systems.

Rights, Responsibilities, and Civic Virtues

Rights and responsibilities are key issues in the discussion of citizenship. What kinds of rights and responsibilities citizens share and why mark the differences in citizenship theories? This part mainly reveals how the textbooks talk about rights and responsibilities. It also includes civic virtues, as they have a close relationship with citizen responsibilities. Rights and responsibilities are mentioned in a small section named "Political rights and responsibilities: The foundation for participating political life" in the Political Life textbook. This section is designed just for one lesson (about 40 minutes). In addition, the textbooks of Economic Life and Law in

Life introduces a little bit about workers' social welfare without pointing out it as social rights.[8]

Civic virtues are covered in Cultural Life, and are allotted three lessons.

Political rights as rights authorized by the Constitution

In earlier versions of citizenship education, rights referred mainly to individual freedoms and constraints to state power; now equality is added to the rights discourse, influencing today's politics in the world (Isin & Turner, 2002a). However, the textbook does not talk much about freedom and equality beyond introducing three political rights stated in the Constitution: the right to vote and be elected, the right of political freedom, and the right of supervision. These rights are perceived as the rights of citizens to participate in state affairs and social affairs, rather than individuals' rights of freedom and equality.

The textbook explains voting rights by citing a relevant sentence in the Constitution: "All citizens of the People's Republic of China who have reached the age of 18 have the right to vote and to be elected, regardless of ethnic status, race, gender, occupation, family background, religious belief, education, property status or length of residence, except persons who are deprived of political rights according to law" (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 8). The textbook then states that citizens can vote for or be elected as deputies of the state's authority apparatus, i.e. the people's congress. It claims the right to vote and to be elected is the basic democratic right of citizens, and that using this right is the foundation of citizens' participation in the management of the state and society (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 8).

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[8] The textbook of Economic Life just mentions that workers have the rights of social security and social welfare without detailed explanation (People's Education Press, 2014a, p. 44). While the textbook of Law in Life distributes a paragraph to introduce the contents of workers' social rights, including elders' pensions, healthcare, occupational injure insurance, unemployment insurance, and maternity benefits without detailed explanation (People's Education Press, 2015a, p. 61). The textbooks introduce social welfare as labor rights rather than clearly naming it as social rights. Therefore, the introduction of social rights is simple and ambiguous, and does not have a significant role in the discourse of citizen rights. In addition, it should be pointed out that the Law in Daily Life is a course for students who will select politics as their NCEE subject. Therefore, many high students who don't choose politics as their NCEE subject also do not learn the contents of social welfare from textbooks.

Political freedom refers to the freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration, which are also described in the Constitution. Rather than considering political freedom as an end in itself, the textbook perceives political freedom as a means for people to practice their right to be masters of their state by fully expressing their opinions. Moreover, it emphasizes that the state has tried to protect citizens to practice their political freedom through making relevant laws and creating various conditions. However, in reality, the Party-state censors the press and speech and limits assembly and demonstration, as they challenge the leadership of the CCP and its administration of the state. Worrying about the challenges political freedom presents to the state, the textbook reminds students of the harms of unlimited political freedom; "Someone says that political freedom means people should be unrestrained, they can say whatever they want to say and do whatever they want to do. How do you think about this opinion?" The textbook does not show any answer to this question, but apparently hopes students will notice the boundaries of political freedom.

The right of supervision mainly targets state apparatuses and people working in these apparatuses. It includes the rights of criticisms, suggestions, complaints, charges, and exposures of corruption or wrongdoing in any state apparatus or by officials. However, the textbook reminds students that citizens should not distort facts or make false accusations, which is also stated in the Constitution.

In a later section introducing the three principles[9] of political participation, the textbook emphasizes the equality of rights with a very short statement taken from the constitution: "All citizens of the People's Republic of China are equal before the law" (People's Education Press,

[9] These three principles are: principle of equality, principle of unifying rights and obligations, and principle of unifying individual interests and state interests. The latter two principles will be introduced in the state-oriented responsibilities section. The principle of equality concerns only about equality of rights but also equality of obligations.

2015b, p. 10). The textbook goes on to explain that, "Although citizens have differences in nationality, ethnicity, gender, career, family background, religion, education, property, and length of residence, they are all equal in terms of enjoying rights and performing obligations" (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 10). However, this explanation just describes an ideal world to citizens. It does not mention the inequality issues in China's society, including gender, ethnicity, gender, education, and residency issues.

State-oriented responsibilities

After introducing political rights, the textbook immediately talks about citizens' political obligations to the state and society, which are listed in the Constitution. The first mentioned obligation is the duty to safeguard the unity of the country and all its nationalities. The textbook explains that citizens should have this duty because, "The unification of the country and the unity of all nationalities is the fundamental guarantee to the socialist modernization and the important guarantee to citizens' rights. Therefore, every citizen should connect their fortunate with the prosperity of the country and the rise and fall of a nation, and will meet this duty" (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 9). Basically, it uses the discourse of state interests to verify citizens' duties, a discourse that also verifies the leadership of the CCP. Using the same logic, the textbook introduces citizens' duty to safeguard the security, honor, and interests of the motherland, and the duty to perform military service and join the militia, in accordance with the law. It also details citizens duties to the state, such as keeping state secrets, defending the motherland and resisting aggression, protecting the state's sovereignty, rejecting any behavior that subverts the political regime, and safeguarding the stability of the state and society. In addition, the textbook reminds students that citizens should abide by the Constitution and laws, because the Constitution and laws reflect both the Party's claims and the people's opinions.

Concerned that citizens might care only about their rights without performing their

responsibilities, the textbook emphasizes citizens' obligation to participate in politics—that is,

the principle of unifying rights and obligations—to create a balance between citizens' rights and

responsibilities. It says, "The realization of rights needs the practice of obligations; while the

practice of obligations can guarantee the realization of rights" (People's Education Press, 2015b,

p. 9). It also reminds students to cherish their citizenship rights, to respect others' rights, and at

the same time to have the awareness of their citizenship obligations.

Another principle mentioned in the textbook is the principle of unifying individual

interests and state interests, the conflict between which is a classical issue in politics. How does

the textbook deal with the conflicts? It proposed that state interests should come first: "When

practicing rights and obligations, citizens should unify individual interests and state interests.

When individual interests conflict with state interests, individual interests should be subject to

state interests" (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 11). With this simple and affirmative

statement, the textbook skips over the complexity of this topic. The prioritization of state

interests over individual interests in China is similar to the situation in Russia (Piattoeva, 2010),

showing a trend in post-communist countries.

Socialist and collectivist-oriented civic virtues

Rights and responsibilities refer to the knowledge and behaviors citizen should have,

while civic virtues relate more to their dispositions and morality. The Cultural Life textbook

dedicates three lessons to civic virtues—Building Socialist Spiritual Civilization, Promoting

Ideological and Ethical Progress, and Moral Cultivation and Scientific Culture Cultivation.

These lessons are presented from a policy standpoint to promote the kinds of morality preferred

by the state and to realize these moral construction goals, rather than from a student and citizen standpoint to explain the complexity of morality in the sense of moral philosophy.

The civic virtues promoted in the textbook mainly follow the CCP's official discourse on morality and values, from *Siyou Gongmin* (Four-have citizens) and socialist concepts of honors and shames, to core socialist values. As introduced in chapter 4, the socialist concept of honors and values and the core socialist values are a combination of excellent cultural beliefs drawn from Chinese tradition and human civilization, as stated in the textbook. They are perceived by the Party-state as a tool for improving the attractiveness of socialist ideology to Chinese people. However, the textbook does not explain these values in detail, and instead talks about the importance of integrity in market with a small discussion section. In addition, the textbook mentions Chinese traditional virtues, such as selflessness, public dedication, patriotism, inspiring righteousness, etc., which basically reflect the thoughts of famous intellectuals and heroes from Chinese history and mainly encourage China's youth to contribute to the community and to the people.

Whether discussing core socialist values, *Siyou Gongmin,* or Chinese traditional virtues, it is very clear the textbook is proposing values or virtues that prioritize the needs of the state, society, and community, rather than individuals' fulfillment or happiness. In terms of pedagogical influence, by simply listing the values, morality, or virtues preferred by society or the state, the textbook does not help students understand what these values, morality, or virtues mean, nor why they are important.

The textbooks' representation of rights, obligations/responsibilities, and civic virtues shows that the Party-state values the obligations/responsibilities dimension of citizenship more than its rights dimension, a stance determined by the Party-state's view that state and community

interests precede individual interests. This view is consistent with Chinese tradition culture, the CCP's revolutionary past, socialist building in the Mao era, and the economic development and social stability goals of the post-Mao era. In terms of the discourse on rights, the textbooks limit its introduction of political rights and does not deeply discuss the nature of liberty and equality embedded in traditional ideas of rights.

Political Participation and Socialist Democracy

Although the textbook pays very limited attention to citizen rights, it talks a lot about political participation and socialist democracy, assigning twelve lessons to these issues, far more than the one lesson allotted for political rights and responsibilities. The textbook encourages youth to care about politics, including practicing rights and performing obligations, engaging in public affairs and the building of socialist democracy, and caring about international affairs. On the one hand, the Thought and Politics curriculum values people's political participation in the name of people's common interests. As it says, "The contents of Political Life more relate to public management and public interests, such as whether the government exercises its power according to regulations, whether the distributions of social welfares are fair, or whether citizens' rights are well protected and so on. All these issues will influence the realization of people's democracy and relate to everybody's interests" (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 13). On the other hand, advocating political participation also aims to let youth stand with the state's interests and support the leadership of the CCP, following the CCP's major agenda for political education.

The textbook suggests students' learning and practicing a political knowledge enables them to participate in politics. It lists practices relating to youth's life, such as reading news, learning current political issues, and engaging in the Communist Youth League. Then, what kind

of political knowledge can students learn from the Thought and Politics curriculum? The

following section mainly shows how the textbook introduces ways of political participation

(including democratic voting, decision-making, management, and supervision) and the idea of

socialist democracy (including the functions of government and the people's congress).

Democratic voting: Voting with rationality

China is a state combining indirect and direct election. Citizens have election rights

relating to two organizations. The first is the election of deputies to the people's congress (PC),

an official legislative institution generally considered a "rubber stamp," but showing increasing

influence in Chinese politics (M. Xia, 2007). The PC system includes people's congresses at the

nation, province, prefecture, county, and township level. Citizens can directly vote for people's

deputies of people's congress at the county and township levels. Deputies at the city, province

and national level are usually elected through indirect election. Another election is the direct

election for village committees and resident committees in cities, which are considered people's

self-governing organizations. While they are non-governmental organizations, they do have the

power to manage public affairs in village or neighborhood communities.

The textbook first introduces what direct and indirect election are and discusses their

advantages and disadvantages. It states that direct election offers every voter a chance to vote

his/her own preferred leaders; if many voters are scattered, indirect election might be adopted.

The textbook also introduces the concepts of competitive and single candidate elections,

particularly mentioning that in a competitive election, candidates need to introduce themselves to

voters through speeches and debates; in the election, candidates should not conduct a fake or

misleading campaign or bribe voters. After providing a limited amount of knowledge about

elections, the textbook verifies the PRC's election system by saying, "To choose what kind of

election is determined by the social-economic system, living standard, the quality of voters, etc. in different historical time and different areas" (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 16).

It was in 1953 that PRC first had universal suffrage; deputies at the township level were elected through direct election, while people's congress deputies at the county, city, province, and national levels were elected through indirect election. The textbook attributes this to the undeveloped economy and culture, poor transportation, and poor quality of people in the early stages of the PRC: "Now, with the development of society and economy, the scope of the direct election has been expanded to the people's congresses at the county level; and all levels of people's congresses adopt competitive elections for people's deputies" (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 17). The textbook further states that, due to its national conditions, huge population, vast territory, and unbalanced development, China adopted a combination of direct and indirect election.

Students are encouraged to value their voting rights in the future. The textbook criticizes some negative attitudes toward voting, such as "voting has nothing to do with me" and "choosing any candidate is fine." These attitudes are considered evidence of a weak awareness of being citizens and a weak sense of being the master of the country; "When a citizen vote, he/she should vote for the public interests, consider people's interests, learn the candidates' virtues and ability, then vote based on rational thinking," the textbook claims (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 18). To improve students' awareness about voting with rationality, the textbook uses village election as a case. It shows different reasons to vote, such as the candidate enthusiastically serves everyone and the issues that he/she promises are the issues a voter cares about; or the candidate is well favored, or honest, or fair and selflessness, or has a strong social network and good ability, or promises voters good opportunities, adding that the voter could opt to choose no one if

he/she did not have a preferred candidate. The textbook asks students which reason they would identify with if they were voters, trying to facilitate students' thinking.

Democratic public decision-making, management, and supervision

Together with the concept of democratic voting, the textbook introduces the concepts of democratic public decision-making, democratic management, and democratic supervision, called the "four democracies," a discourse on which first emerged in the 15th CCP's National Congress in 1997 and has continued to be used in official documents (S. J. Guo, 2013).

Democratic public decision-making mainly means that citizens participate in public policy decision making can make the decision more scientific and democratic, ensuring the fundamental interests of the majority are represented. The textbook (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 22) states that democratic decision making can improve citizens' understanding of policy so that the policy can be implemented more easily; moreover, it will improve citizens' passion to become involved in public affairs, which has a pedagogical function at the same time. The textbook introduces four systems through which citizens can participate in government's decision making: the system of reporting social conditions and public opinion; the expert consultation system; the system of keeping the public informed; and the system of hearings.[10] It uses a case of a hearing relating to a provincial electricity pricing to familiarize students with the hearing system. The textbook shows the different opinions of different agents in the case, including a relevant government department, consumers, experts, and people's deputies. It asks students to compare the differences in their opinions and to think as a decision-maker and

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[10] The system of reporting social conditions and public opinion refers citizens reporting their opinions and suggestions to the decision-making institution through phone calls, letters, emails, and news media; the expert consultation system refers to experts or scholars engaging in the process of decision-making with their professional knowledge and techniques; the system of keeping the public informed indicates that citizens have the right to be informed about big policy relating to public interests; the system of hearings means that citizens can go to a hearing to express their opinions.

consumer. Additionally, the textbook encourages students to have a moot hearing to discuss the issue of school fees, trying to promote students' political participation abilities.

Democratic management refers to the grassroots democratic self-governing organizations in China—village committees in rural areas and resident committees in cities. The textbook briefly introduces these organizations' history (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 23).[11] It does not give students any details about the conflicts and complexity in the Party-state's relationship with these organizations (O'Brien & Li, 2000), [12] but instead shows it as a symbol of democratic progress in China. More important content in the textbook is to introduce the ways in which residents can participate in committees to manage community affairs.[13] In addition, the textbook shows cases of youth participation in their communities, such as by volunteering to work in a resident committee, proposing a recreation center to a resident committee, or participating in a committee meeting. It encourages youths to identify issues (such as transportation, public facilities, or environment issue) in their communities, and then make suggestions to improve their communities.

Democratic supervision is also introduced in the textbook as a good way to improve officials' work(People's Education Press, 2015b, pp. 27–30). The textbook shows several ways for citizens to do supervision, such as using the petitioning system by writing a letter, making a

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[11] The grassroots democratic self-governing organizations were born in a small village in Guangxi in 1981, developed with their authorization in the Constitution in 1982, were institutionalized in 1987 through the Village Committee Organization Law, and expanded to include resident committees in cities with the implementation of the Village Committee Organization Law in 1998.

[12] O'Brian and Li (2000) traced the debates about and challenges of the village committee, including worries about it weakening the power of the Party in villages, the questioning of people's democratic consciousness, the role of rural cadres, the continuing bureaucratic resistance, dishonest elections, etc.

[13] The textbook introduces that, for village committees, villagers can vote for the committee member, attend village meeting to express their opinions, make self-governing regulations, make village affairs more transparent, evaluate leaders and ask for periodic performance report; for resident committees in the cities, residents also can participate committee meeting and supervise their daily work (People's Education Press, 2015b, pp. 24–25) .

phone call, or having a face-to-face meeting with relevant officials; expressing opinions and suggestions through people deputies; using news media (such as TVs, broadcasts, newspaper, and online media); or attending a hearing, democratic appraisal, or online appraisal. The textbook reminds students that when citizens practice their supervision right, they should have the courage to fight evil forces to defend the interests of the state and the people; however, they should use a legal approach, pay attention to facts, and not disturb official activities.

To sum up, the textbook encourages youths to engage in political participation, but only to the degree and in the way the Party-state allows. The textbook promotes orderly political participation but rejects unordered actions contrary to the Constitution, laws, regulations, or legal procedures.

Socialist democratic system

The Political Life textbook takes many sections to talk about China's political system, including its government, people's congress system, political party system, ethnic regional autonomy system, and religion policy. On the one hand, these introductions help students to know these systems, which is important for their political participation; on the other, these introductions also aim to improve students' identity with Chinese socialist democracy.

However, what does Chinese socialist democracy mean? The first lesson of Political Life explains that China's democracy is people's democracy, because people are the masters of the state who have rights of managing state affairs, economy, culture, and social affairs; it is dictatorship because the state will dictate to its enemies. The discourse of a people's democratic dictatorship was first proposed by Mao Zedong in 1940 (Steiner, 1950) and has been continually used by the CCP since. Following Marxist and Leninist ideas of democracy, the textbook defines democracy as a system in which the ruling class manages the affairs of state in accordance with

the principle of equality and the principle of majority rule. This definition emphasizes the class nature of democracy: "Democracy has a very apparent class nature. The world never has an abstract and classless democracy" (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 5). In addition, the textbook praises the universality and authenticity of people's democracy in China, saying it is universal because all people except enemies share democratic rights and are the masters of the state and society, and it is authentic because people's rights are protected by its systems and laws, and because China's current vitality testifies that people have real freedom, democracy, and human rights (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 5).

The textbook introduces what the government does and how to constrain and supervise the government, hoping citizens can "know the nature and duties of the government, trust that the government works for people, support the work of the government, seek help from the government, and supervise government's behavior" (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 38). It points out that the government is the executive apparatus of state power, and that its job mainly includes protecting people's rights and the state's stability, organizing economic development (such as macroeconomic control and market regulations), organizing cultural development (such as broadcasting Marxist theory and scientific knowledge and developing education, culture, science and technology, public health, etc.), offering social welfare (such as education, employment, health, pension, and residence), and protecting the environment and improve resource efficiency to have an ecologically sound system. In addition, the textbook mentions the government's working principle; that is, be responsible to the people. It shows the government in a good light and tries to promote youth's identification with the government. It encourages citizens to seek help from the government through the petitioning system to protect their rights and improve the government's work. Moreover, to make students more familiar with their local

government, the textbook set activities asking students to identify relevant government departments for certain issues, list departments in their local government, and evaluate their local government's performance.

Another major textbook theme concerns how to use government power and how to supervise the government. The textbook reiterates that the power of the government is derived from the people and the government needs to administer the country on their behalf according to laws and relying on democratic, scientific decision-making and procedural justice. The textbook also explains the importance of power supervision, calling power "a double-edged sword. If the government used its power appropriately, it can govern well, execute its policies well, thus benefit people; but if it used its power abusively and exceeded the law's limit, it will trigger corruptions and have harmful results" (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 46). Then, how are citizens to constrain and supervise the government's power? The textbook says the key is to rely on democracy and the rule of law. Particular, it introduces the supervision system outside the government (the people's congress, the CCP, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the legal system, and citizens) and inside the government (upper-level government, supervision department, legal department and audit department). The textbook also talks government's efforts of making government affairs public.

Ideally, a PC is the apparatus for people to execute their state power, and the PC system is considered the fundamental political system for China. The textbook briefly introduces the structure of PCs, the work of people's deputies, the relationship of PCs with other state apparatus, and the advantages of the PC system. The most important content on the PC system regards its power of legislation, power of decision, power to appoint and fire officials, and power of supervision. The textbook explains these powers in detail, and talks about people's deputies'

rights, including discussing bills, voting, making proposals, and inquiring. The textbook shows the democratic nature of the PC system, calling it "a system where all power of the state belongs to people, people elect their deputies through democratic voting to combine people's congresses at different levels, people's congress produces other state apparatuses, and its principle is democratic centralism[14]" (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 61). It claims PCs are the most powerful apparatus in China, without mentioning that they are in reality less important than the government and the Party.[15] Finally, the textbook attempts to verify China's political system by comparing it with the Western parliamentary system:

> Practice has improved that the people's democratic dictatorship and people's congress system are the achievements of Chinese peoples' fighting and the choice of history. They are good systems adapting to China's national condition. If we wanted to develop Chinese socialist democratic politics, we must insist and improve people's congress system. And we must not only copy Western political system. (People's Education Press, 2015b, p. 61)

The practice mainly refers to the failure of copying Western parliamentary system in the early 1900s. How then to improve people's congress system? The textbook says we need to support the leadership of CCP to protect peoples' democracy, to implement the rule of law, and to insist on democratic centralism. However, the democratic function of the people's congress is limited by its large numbers of deputies, the part-time nature of their work, the brevity of their meetings, the influence of the Party, etc. (Cai, 1992).

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[14] It is democratic because people can vote deputies, deputies can democratically discuss the important decision and the making of laws, and deputies can be fired according to legal procedure; it is centralist because it is people's congress that produces administration apparatus and legal apparatus and monitors them, and it is the central state apparatus that leads local state apparatus.

[15] In some places, people's congress is leaded by the government and treated as a tool for the government to skirt the legal procedure; in fact, the importance of the people's congress is determined by the importance of its leaders in the party, and unfortunately, the leader of the government in China always has higher position in the CCP than that of the people's congress (Cai, 1992, p. 34).

China's political party system is defined as multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CCP. When talking about the CCP, the textbook mainly verifies the authority of the CCP without showing what the leadership of the CCP really means and how it works with state apparatuses (see the previous section "supporting the leadership of the CCP"). Multi-party cooperation is introduced in the textbook as the CCP being the ruling party while the other eight democratic parties[16] are participating parties that consult with and supervise the CCP. The textbook mentions little about the apparatus for multi-party cooperation, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), other than to mention its membership, which includes the CCP, eight democratic parties, non-partisans, people's groups, minorities, patriots from different arenas, and compatriots in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. However, the textbook does not introduce how the CPPCC works nor how it chooses its members. In addition, the textbook says the system is different from both the two-party or multi-party competition systems found in Western countries, and the one-party systems found elsewhere.

The textbooks do promote students' knowledge about the meanings and ways of political participation, emphasizing the value of political participation for the common good of community and society and for the restriction of power, but do not much emphasize the importance of political participation for citizens' own interests. On the one hand, they do reflect the achievements of China's political system and the efforts of the Party-state toward ensuring good governance and reducing corruption; on the other, these contents have a symbolic meaning of showing that China is democratic and can have its own unique political system—i.e., a socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics.

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[16] The eight democratic parties were founded before the PRC.

Summary

The making, censorship, and revision of the Thought and Politics textbooks show that the textbooks are well controlled by the Party-state and reflect official interpretations of the desired relationship between the individual and the state. By examining how citizenship is represented in the textbooks in detail, this chapter clearly shows the type of responsible socialist citizen the Party-state wants to create—people who love the country, identify with Chinese traditional culture, resist "Western hegemony," support the leadership of the CCP, put the state's interests first, perform their state-oriented responsibilities, and our dedicated to building socialist modernization through hard work and collectivist civic virtues. They also know their political rights, have basic knowledge about how China's political system ideally works, and are able to participate in voting, public decision-making, management, and supervision. However, their participation is more for the good of the community and society rather than for their own interests and rights. In addition, they must limit their participation to the space the Party-state allows. They are socialist citizens who support socialist political systems and socialist ideology. They are responsible citizens who are patriotic, put the state's interests front and center, and will sacrifice their own interests when they contradict with those of the state. This kind of citizenship is very different from the liberal citizenship or republican citizenship common in the Western discourse. While liberal citizenship and republican citizenship are based on the protection of individual freedoms, the responsible socialist citizen in China is based on loyalty to the state and to the Party.

As the CCP celebrates the legacy of Marxism and its socialist system symbolically in the post-Mao era, it is no surprise that it emphasizes the promotion of students' knowledge about Marxism, their socialist virtues, and their identification with socialist ideology, including

socialism with Chinese characteristics to verify the legitimacy and leadership of the CCP. However, comparing with the emphasis on "red and expert" in the Mao era, the current emphasis on socialist identity is much weaker, due to the crisis in socialist ideology during the 1980s (S. S. Zhao, 2004) and its continued weakening in the 1990s, facilitated by economic reform. Realizing the unattractiveness of socialist ideology among youths, the CCP purposively integrated patriotism into its ideology, as shown in Chapter 4. Through showing China's glorious past and the waning of China, the textbooks aim to foster students' passion for rejuvenating the constructed Chinese nation, and to promote youths' political identification with the CCP by linking the CCP's leadership to the rejuvenation enterprise.

The devotion of so many textbook sections to discussing socialist democracy and introducing the Chinese political system—particularly political rights, ways of political participation, and the people's congress system—and make them available to every high school student is a large departure from past practice. These changes reflect the progress in citizen rights, the rule of law, socialist democracy, and political participation in the post-Mao era, such as placing the rights content before the content on the state in the 1982 Constitution,[17] allowing citizens to sue the government, internalizing international human rights norms to some degree in the constitution in 2004, improving socialist democracy to allow grassroots self-governance (such as, village committee), and developing the "four democracies" (S. J. Guo, 2013; Yu, 2002). These progresses have been achieved through reflection on the impact of the Cultural Revolution and the necessities of economic reform (D. D. Chen, 2005; S. J. Guo, 2013).

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[17] In the context of the Chinese narrative, sequence and ordering are important. In the previous constitutions such as the 1954, 1975, and 1978 Constitutions, citizen rights were placed after the chapter on state organization or near the end of the document (Yu, 2002).

However, there are many problems facing citizens' rights, political participation, and socialist democracy in China. The practice of citizen rights is limited by the condition of that doing so not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society, and of the collective, and by the lack of a constitutional enforcement apparatus to ensure it. The equal enjoyment of rights, particularly social rights, is hindered by the household registration system, and political rights in China are consistently regarded as a grant given by the state to the citizens, rather than as a natural or inalienable prerogative, as in the Western liberal tradition (Nathan, 1986; Perry, 2008; Yu, 2002). Political participation and socialist democracy are shaped by Party-state preferences, and place few restrictions on government power due to a lack of constitutional democracy, and understanding of the rule of law that perceives law as an end rather as a tool, and a system of checks and balances (S. J. Guo, 2013). The major problem with the textbooks is that they depict an ideal world, without much talk about reality.

Therefore, the representation of rights and political participation in the textbooks have several limitations. The textbooks do not touch on the topic of social rights (although mentioning social welfares a little bit), the problems confronting rights in China, or the nature of rights for individual freedom and equality. The textbooks also present only the ways of participation the Party-state allows and that do not allow people to challenge the regime.

Do the textbooks successfully cultivate responsible socialist citizens? Do they make youth support the CCP, form strong patriotism, and acquire collectivist civic virtues? Do they improve youths' trust in the government and their willingness for and skills of voting and political participation? The following chapters will answer these questions by investigating students' and teachers' responses to the official Thought and Politics curriculum.

Chapter 6 Individualized, Passive, yet Patriotic Young Citizens

Since the economic reform started in 1978, Chinese society has witnessed the rise of the individual. Due to the retreat of the Party-state from personal lives and the influence of globalization and Western values, more and more Chinese individuals have been freed from the constraints of family, kinship, community, and the Party-state; they have more rights, choices, and freedom in their personal lives (Yan, 2009). Particularly, people born after 1978 are marked as China's me-generation, a generation whose members are self-centered, pursue their self-realization, and have a strong awareness of their rights (F. S. Liu, 2011; Yan, 2009).

With the rise of the individual, will Chinese youths become active citizens who claim their rights, request democracy, call for social justice, and reject the Party-state's socialist ideology? Some research shows that Chinese youths are politically indifferent to official ideology and the prospect of political reforms, much like politically apathetic Western youths (F. S. Liu, 2011; Yan, 2006); however, Chinese youths can, at the same time, express strong nationalism. Scholars have linked this phenomenon to the youths' pragmatism, their being beneficiaries of China's reform, the Party-state's discouragement of true political participation, and youths' pursuit of collective identity (F. S. Liu, 2011; Yan, 2006).

This chapter focuses on Chinese youths' understanding and daily practice of citizenship. It aims to reveal the characteristics of these Chinese young citizens and to explain why they share these characteristics. The first section of this chapter outlines current high school students' life picture, including their life aspirations, relations with their family, struggle in school, and their globalization, all elements that relate to their political views. The following sections address these students' perspectives of Chinese citizenship, their experiences in daily civic engagement, and their identification with the nation-state and the CCP. Data presented here are drawn mainly

from student interviews and classroom observations.

The Individualistic and Global Youth under Pressure

Chinese urban youths have been described as "simultaneously materialistic and idealistic, instrumental and expressive, internationalist and nationalist, global and local, apolitical but nationalistic, modern and traditional, blessed with material prosperity and yet under great pressure to strive for greater material wealth…" (F. S. Liu, 2011, p. 182). Similar features can be observed among these studies informants, who were born after 2000. The youths encountered in the fieldwork were very individualistic, had an equal and close relationship with their family, but experienced heavy pressures in their study. At the same time, they had many opportunities to access global culture, despite living in a walled-Internet world.

"Doing things that I like" and "Being myself"

When talking about their life aspirations, the students that I interviewed offered a wide diversity of responses. They wanted to be entrepreneurs who ran their own business, engineers who designed machines, doctors who could cure diseases, actors who performed their own talent, teachers who loved to interact with students, historians, writers, financiers, psychologists, and so on. Most said they would like a job they had a strong interest in or just liked. They saw work as not only a means of making a living but, more important, as a way for them to express themselves and to realize themselves; one boy, whose idol was Steve Jobs and who dreamed of being an entrepreneur, claimed,

> Actually, I want to create a company. Although I did not know what major I will do well now, I want to have a company very much. Because I feel it is really cool to have one, and I can try my best to do the things that I want to do. Maybe, I can make a difference. (Student No.5, male, No.1 School, interview)

Being myself, freedom, and happiness were themes emphasized by some students; as one boy who wanted to build his own building stated, "I hope I can try my best to be myself. Personally, I do not like to be regulated, but sometimes for the rule, you know, you have to follow it. Anyway, I just wish I can live for myself and be myself." This individualistic style made another student want to create his own studio, because if he ran his own studio then he would enjoy the freedom to work whenever he wanted and take vacations whenever he wanted. There was no doubt that doing interesting things, independence, and freedom contributed to the students' happiness, but for some students, happiness also meant having a stable job, a great relationship with their family and friends, or traveling around China or even the world to satisfy their curiosity.

The individualistic-oriented culture was also reflected in students' idols and choice of exam subjects. They liked Steve Jobs, Aamir Khan (an Indian actor who increased his weight by 27 kg to fit the character in his movie), Karlie Kloss (a Victoria's Secret model who also learned computer programming), Lu Han (a Chinese popular entertainment star), Gloria Tang Tsz-Kei (a creative singer from Hong Kong), and so on. A willingness to work hard, uniqueness, independence, talent, and a good personality were the shared characteristics of these students' idols. In terms of exam subject choice, students have the freedom to choose three subjects from physics, chemistry, biology, geography, history, politics, and information technology for college entrance exam. For the interviewed students, their choice of exam subjects resulted from a combination of reasons, such as their interest in the subject, whether they were good at the subject, whether the subject was required for their preferred university major, the competitions in the subject, and whether the school or teachers had advantages in teaching the subject. Among the 25 students interviewed, 16 (64%) stated that liking or having a strong interest in a subject

was a major reason for choosing it, while 10 identified being good at the subject or having learned it well.

Support and tensions from family

The students' pursuit of "self" and "happiness" was supported by their parents. Most students' family seemed harmonious, warm, and relaxed. Their parents respected their choice and encouraged them to live a life of their own and do the things they liked. As a student put it,

> My dad and mom hope I will be healthy and happy. They said, 'no matter what you do in the future, you actually do not need to take care of us. However, our biggest hope is that you can be happy.' Do the things that will make me happy, have a relaxed time, do the things I like. They just wish these things. (Student No.5, male, No.1 School, interview)

The child-parent relationship was quite close in most interviewed students' families. One boy said he would play online games with his dad and mom, while a girl stated she liked to discuss school events with and get suggestions from her mother. When choosing an exam subject, parents would participate in the process by offering suggestions, but leave it to the students to make the final decision. Some students would take their parents' advice if they felt it was good, while those who disagreed with their parents might negotiate with and persuade them.

Of course, there were tensions in some students' families, mainly related to the conflict between students' poor academic performance and parents' high academic expectations. The girl who mentioned frequently discussing school events with her mother also mentioned her parents' disappointment with her when she did not fare very well on her high school entrance exam. Another boy was less lucky; his parents did not even want to care for him when they were angry due to his failure of academic performance. Both the boy's and girl's family tensions were mainly caused by their parents' high academic expectations. Indeed, academic performance played a great role in all students' daily life, creating much pressure in their lives.

Heavy study pressure and competition

Students' study pressures could be seen very clearly in both their school life and their conversations. A typical daily schedule for a student in this city was to rise at 6:30 am; arrive at school around 7:20 am; begin classes at 8:00 am; complete eight, 40-minute lessons a day; have an extracurricular activity; and leave school around 5:00 pm. Students boarding at school had to take extra self-study lessons from 6:20 pm to 9:30 pm (or later) to complete their homework. Some student not boarding at school might voluntarily attend the self-study lessons to push themselves to study, while others might attend out-of-school tutoring to learn more, then go to bed around 10:00 pm. During the 14 hours from 7:30 am to 9:30 pm, students' lives revolved around studying (see Table 6-1). In addition, some students would have extra tutoring classes at the weekend. According to the recent PISA survey, 15-year-old students in China (B-S-J-G area) spent an average of 57.1 hours per week studying, much higher than 44.0 hours per week OECD average.[1]

These pressures the students felt were not only due to their heavy academic schedule and their parents' high expectations, but also the school management and current educational reform. School- or grade-level tests were very frequent, and students in both schools usually had to take a mid-term exam, a final exam, and monthly tests in each of their classes. When a student performed badly in his or her exams, he or she would have a strong motivation to work harder to gain a better score. Some would compare their and their peers' academic performance, pushing themselves to work harder. The large number of tests was associated with students' heavy homework load, which some students claimed was too much for them to complete. In addition,

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[1] This survey coverages 72 countries around the world. The survey in China mainly included Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu province, and Guangdong Province. Although Zhejiang Province was not included in the data, considering its advanced economic development and the similar time schedule of studying in China, the situation for students spending time on study might be very close to the one in the B-S-J-G (China).

the current educational reform exaggerated students' pressure, while at the same time offering

them more choices and opportunities to take exams. Students in the two schools began to take

important exams relating to their college application in Grade 10, and may take 10–22 such tests

in their high school journey.

Table 6-1 Official time schedule for students in the No.6 School

Morning Routine		Afternoon Routine	
Getting Up	6:30	5_{th} Lesson	1:10—1:50
Breakfast	7:10	6_{th} Lesson	2:00—2:40
Pre-lesson	7:25—7:50	Eye Exercise	2:50—2:55
1_{st} Lesson	8:00—8:40	7_{th} Lesson	2:55—3:35
2_{nd} Lesson	8:50—9:30	8_{th} Lesson	3:45—4:25
Big Break	9:30—10:00	9_{th} Lesson	4:30—5:00
3_{rd} Lesson	10:05—10:45	Dinner	5:05
4_{th} Lesson	10:55—11:35	Self-study Sessions	6:20——9:30
Lunch	11:40		

Some students in No.1 School had another pressure source, the Olympiad in STEM

subjects, including math, physics, chemistry, biology, and information technology. One student

who won a medal in these Olympiad competitions would be many advantages in their college

application, such as being assigned a bonus score or being admitted by a top university earlier.

Therefore, No.1 School ran extra classes to prepare its students for the Olympiads. Students in

these classes spent most of their time studying contents at the college level, but the classes were

popular among students who felt they might help their college application. Competition was very fierce.

Some students dealt very well with these pressures and competitions—navigating them to maximize their advantages or learning according to their interests—while others who did not perform well struggled, often wavering between working harder and giving up. A boy in No. 6 School complained that he didn't want to learn at all sometimes but try to persuade himself to learn. Finally, a few students lost their interest in learning and just killed time in school.

Living in a global but walled world

Another feature these youths shared was their interest in global culture. Their favorite stars or idols not only came from China, but also came from Japan, South Korea, India, America, Britain, and Australia. They read Russian literature and the New Yorker, listened English pop-songs, and watched Japanese manga and anime, South Korean dramas, and Hollywood movies. Some even read books written in English. Thanks to the development of the Internet and groups of people dedicated to translation, youths in China had significant access to global cultural commodities. The requirement of learning English in China's education system afforded them the ability to interact with Western English-speaking culture, especially those whose schools encouraged students to have international communications. During the fieldwork, No.1 School hosted a group of students from German for two weeks, while No.6 School hosted students from Australia for one week. These international students lived in Chinese students' homes, had classes with them, and communicated with them, offering both groups great opportunities for intercultural communication. No.1 School also offered programs for its students to visit abroad, including in America, Britain, Germany, France, Canada, Australia, Italy, and so on.

However, from my observations, the most popular and influential global cultural commodities enjoyed by these youths were not from the Western world, but from Japan and South Korea. Japanese anime and manga are very popular among today's Chinese youth. Seven interviewed students listed reading manga or watching anime as one of their hobbies, and some students sold manga in the annual students' market at No.6 School. During No.1 School's student cultural festival, anime- and manga-style figures appeared frequently on students' posters; the school even had an anime club that attracted the anime-lovers among students. When asked why they loved Japanese anime, students mentioned it was *Rexue* (hot-blooded) and idealistic, unlike their own mundane daily life. A boy in No.6 School stated, "You know, it is very close to the daily life, but a little bit more ideal than mundane life……The Japanese anime is much closer to the reality. For example, the main character may not find a job sometimes. It just likes the reality." Whether *Rexue* or idealistic, anime reflected students' individualistic characters, their dreams to be different, and their self-realization that daily life for them might be very boring. The most popular South Korean cultural commodities to these Chinese students were its idol groups, TV shows, and TV dramas, which also had huge audiences in the broader Chinese society. A few students were more drawn to European and American cultural circles.

Although Chinese youths had a great deal of access to global culture, this did not mean they could interact with global culture freely. Due to Internet censorship, Facebook, Google, YouTube, Twitter, and some Western news websites were blocked in China, based on their politically sensitivity contents, while some sensitive political words were censored in Chinese local websites. However, youths knew of the censorship as they often surfed online, and a few of them would use a Virtual Portable Network (VPN) to cross the Great Firewall to get reach the websites they wanted to surf, a process called *Fanqiang*. At first, *Fanqiang* was used to access

entertainment; later, netizens began to touch things they could not see in China. One boy in No.6

School described his experience of *Fanqiang*:

> Well, at first, I do it just for some stars…Because I like to watch American
> dramas, I have watched a lot in the summer. I like some stars, then Instagram
> offers me the opportunity to follow them. And sometimes you can see the things
> you cannot see in China. You can see them on foreign websites. I feel this is the
> reason why the government wants to repress VPN because foreign websites have
> lots of things that the government does not want you to see. (Student No.25, male,
> No.6 School, interview)

The boy explained that the things the government did not want people to know were

some historical issues in China. When asked how he felt about the blocking of VPN, he replied

that he felt it unnecessary, because the government really cannot block all things: "After all, if

people wanted to know, they will know." However, not all students could learn the skills of

Fanqiang. One girl said she would not get across the Great Firewall because it was too difficult

to learn how; instead, she relied on other netizen's translations to get the information she wanted.

To sum up, these high school students, all born after 2000, were very individualistic,

focusing on self-realization and pursuing their own happiness. Different from the generations in

the Mao era, their family relationship was more closed and democratic, which contributed to

their individualism. However, these students experienced heavy study pressures and fierce

academic competition, which pushed them to be realistic and pragmatic in their choice of exam

subjects and in their daily lives, including their participation in politics, as will be shown later. In

addition, they lived in a global but walled world. Many students noticed the censorship of the

Internet, some could escape it, but others had to live with it with due to technological difficulties.

Imagining Good Citizens

In the state discourse, a good Chinese citizen is a person who loves the country, supports

the leadership of the CCP, obeys the law, has the rights listed in the constitution, and participates

in public life to the degree and in the manner the state allows. Based on my interviews with students and fieldwork observations, I found there were similarities in and differences between the state's discourse and the students' discourse. Following the state discourse, students thought obeying the law and loving the country was important to a good citizen; however, different from the state discourse, socialist values and collective values were less emphasized by students. In their imagination of good citizens, students never talked about anything relating to socialism and the CCP. I asked students what kinds of people they would consider good citizens. Among students' narratives, obeying the law, loving the country, performing *Suzhi* (quality), having rights, and practicing obligations were the behaviors most frequently mentioned. Based on these narratives, students' conceptions of what made a good citizen range from being passive to be patriotic, showing the divergence among students.

Being Law-abiding

Being law-abiding was the most popular characteristics students attributed to good citizens, with many consider yet a basic and important qualification for being an ideal citizen. In students' eyes, being law-abiding meant not breaking the law, not doing bad things, and not doing the things the law did not allow. A few students considered that, as long as a person obeyed the law, he/she was a good citizen. Their conception of good citizens located at a minimum level, fitting the term "minimal citizenship" or "personal responsible citizenship" proposed by scholars (McLaughlin, 1992; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004).

Loving the country

Loving the country was also mentioned by one-third of students as an element of good citizenship; however, among these students, the meaning of loving the country varied, ranging from being a good person, to doing things a person should do, not harming the country's

interests, considering the country's interests, proposing suggestions to the state, maintaining the good image of China, or making some contributions to the country. Some students considered behaving well in their daily lives—that is, doing what they should and obeying the law—to be more important than using words to express their patriotism. Different from the students who limited patriotism to individual behavior level, some students talked about how to deal with the bad or dark side of the country and make suggestions. Slandering or cursing China was definitely not preferred by these students: "I think a good citizen was a person who should not curse or spurn his/her country when his/her country or hometown emerged problems. He or she should propose some suggestive suggestions," one boy stated. Another girl distinguished between critiquing events in China inside the country and doing so out of the country, saying a good citizen can criticize the country, but only inside of the country; if he/she were out of the country, he/she should maintain its good image.

Based on students' narratives about loving the country, their patriotism was dominated by the discourse of uncritical patriotism, which is characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism (Schatz et al., 1999). Although one student pointed out that need to make constructive suggestions to address critical social problems, he set the bottom line of critique, not cursing China or being cynic.

Performing *Suzhi* (Quality)

Some students mentioned that performing or improving *Suzhi* was also a way to show patriotism. *Suzhi*, usually translated as "quality," has a unique political and social context in China. Kipnis (2006) pointed out this word gained popularity in the era of economic reform, relating to the state's desire to create a strong nation by raising the quality of its citizens, the justification of the birth control policy with the terms of "population quality" (*renkou suzhi*), and

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people's anxiety of falling behind under the increasing competition in the education system and job market. Following the state's claim of improving the quality of citizens, some students agreed to improve their *Suzhi* or perform *Suzhi*, particularly when abroad. The students seem to have been impressed by depictions, in the Chinese media, of Chinese tourists behaving uncivility while abroad, such as by throwing rubbish, spitting, or speaking loudly in the public sphere. One girl stated that Chinese citizens abroad should behave with civility, as they were representatives of China. Another mentioned that improving *Suzhi* was good for the country. By linking individual behavior to representing China and affecting its fortunes, performing *Suzhi* gained a patriotic meaning. However, not all students associated *Suzhi* with patriotism. Some merely considered it a basic requirement for citizens, one that targeted individual behavior in the public sphere, such as being polite, speaking and behaving in a civil way, paying attention to hygiene, parking in certain places, and so on. These behaviors more related to the wellness of the community, public life, or society around individuals, than the country's overseas reputation.

Caring for the community

Some students used the term citizenship to describe the relationship between the individual and the community or the society, as the *Suzhi* discourse already indicated. In this sense, these students considered a good citizen to be a person who showed empathy for other people, pursued justice, participated in policies, or made contributions to society. One student mentioned the importance of empathy for building a good society with humanity; another stated that a good citizen should have a sense of justice and stand up when he/she encounters unfair or immoral things. However, this sense of justice is more related to concrete events than to social-structural inequality issues in China. Three students talked about voting, proposing suggestions to the neighborhood committee, and reporting social issues to the governmental department;

however, from their narrative, participation in politics was more for the good of the community and the society than for their own interests or rights.

From passive personal-oriented citizen to patriotic citizen

Based on students' narratives, six types of citizenship can be identified, in two dimensions (see Table 6-2). One dimension concerned whether citizens' interests were at the personal, community, or state level; the second concerned whether the behavior was passive or active. Basically, the passive behavior was one that did not require much effort by the individual to implement.

Personal-oriented citizenship refers to a kind of citizenship in which citizens care more about their personal good. At the passive level, personal-oriented citizens just obeyed the law, exercised the rights that the law guaranteed them and performed the responsibilities that the law required of them. Their reasons for doing so was not to avoid punishment but to protect their personal interests. A more active personal-oriented citizen might claim some rights not guaranteed in the law for his/her own good.

In community/society-oriented citizenship, citizens care more about the well-being of the community/society. At a passive level, such citizens obey the law to avoid harming the community, and perform civility in the public sphere; at the active level, citizens take actions for the good of other people and of the community, such as helping others experiencing unfairness or injustice, participating in the community for the good of the community, proposing suggestions to the government, and even making contributions to society.

In state-oriented citizenship, citizens are concerned mainly with the state's interests. A passive state-oriented citizen would deliberately avoid harming state interests; a more active state-oriented citizen would actively protect the state/country's interests, maintain its good

image, or even sacrifice his/own interests for the good of the state and country. In the students' minds, the concepts of state and country were blurred, as the state apparatus always represented the country's interest.

Table 6-2 Six types of citizenship in students' narratives

	The Personal-oriented Citizen	The Community/society-oriented Citizen	The State-oriented Citizen
Passive	Obeying the law for self-protection; practicing rights in the law; performing responsibilities.	Obeying the law for the good of the community; performing civility.	Doing one's duty; not harming the state interests.
Active	Claiming rights; participating in politics for self-interests.	Showing empathy to other people and helping others; engaging civic affairs for the good of the community; caring for social justice and challenging social structure.	Performing civility to maintain the good image of the state; protecting the country's interests; sacrificing individual's interests for the state interests.

These six types of citizenship are not mutually exclusive; different students might understand citizenship by using different combinations of the six. However, active personal-oriented citizenship and active community/society-oriented citizenship were less often mentioned by students than other types. For the most part, the students understood good citizens

to be passive personal-oriented citizens, passive community-oriented citizens, passive state-oriented citizens, and active state-oriented citizens (or patriotic citizens). Although a few mentioned active participations in communities, they did not really favor challenging the current social structure; in their minds, therefore, good citizens were passive yet patriotic. This is unsurprising, because being politically active is not an easy thing, and requires many individual efforts and environment supports. This is particularly true in China, where there are many systemic barriers to participation into politics, such as censorship, the difficulty of reporting public issues, the politics of critique, and so on. The fieldwork showed that students had a sense of difficulties due to both the time they spent online and their personal experiences. As for conceptualizing good citizens as patriotic citizens, this perspective was much influenced by students' growing up in China, the Party-state, and the popular discourse in the official media, which will be explained in later sections.

Rights and Responsibilities: Freedom, Individual Interests, and the Good of the Community

The previous chapter showed that China's secondary school politics textbooks don't not talk much about rights. The Political Life textbook only allocates one lesson to this issue and introduces citizen rights as simply comprising voting rights, the freedoms of publishing and speech, and the rights of supervision. The rights discourse was not mentioned in most students' conceptualizations of good citizens. Does this mean that Chinese students do not care much about citizen rights? When asked what kinds of rights citizens had, students' answers provided a far richer picture of their understandings of citizen rights, varying from emphasizing individual freedoms to the rights of political participation. However, the rights mentioned by students were

mainly civil and political rights. Social rights, a key element in Marshall's concept and Western countries, was missing from students' discourse.

Cherishing civil rights

More than half of students acclaimed civil rights, cherishing them for ensuring individuals' physical and mental freedom, life, and safety. Most particularly listed personal freedom or freedom of speech as important citizen rights. One girl in No.1 School said, "if a person did not have freedom, there will be no meaning for life." Although students showed a strong willingness to pursue individual freedom, they were aware of the preconditions for freedom—that is, not harming other people. Rights of privacy, portrait, reputation, life, and safety also were mentioned by some students. Students' cherishing of civil rights shows their strong concern about their own individual freedom and interests, reflecting the individualistic characteristics of current Chinese youth.

Political rights as rights for self and for the community

Students also recognized the importance of political rights, including voting rights, the right to supervise the government, right of engagement, and right to be informed. More than two-thirds of students considered the rights to vote and to be elected to be important citizen rights. Around half also talked about the right to supervise the government, including the rights of engagement and to be informed. For these students, voting rights were important because they wanted to choose the representatives who represented their interests and welfare or who were responsible and trustworthy. Voting rights were also considered by some students as an important way to engage in public affairs, thereby showing citizens were the real masters of the country. In particular, some students mentioned voting rights as important as to preventing the corruption made possible by internal nomination.

Some students valued the right to supervise the government, right of engagement, and right to be informed because they enabled citizens to report problems of public policy, avoid corruption, increase government transparency, and propose suggestions to improve public policy. Some also cared about the protection of personal interests; as a boy in No.6 School stated, "I think the right of supervision is important. Because, because that some government departments have been reported corruptions. It is the people who finally suffered. We must report corruption." Another boy talked about the inconvenience caused by a lack of information. Aside from their concerns about personal interests, some students also cared about how the good of the community and society could be protected through political rights. One girl in No.6 School explained the importance of the right of supervision, saying "sometimes the policy made by the government is not right. It needs people to make suggestions to improve." Another boy in No.1 School claimed that only by having information about public policy, could citizens work with the government and make the country better.

Their cherishing of political rights shows students' awareness of the need to protect citizens' interests, their willingness to be recognized as a member of the political community through engagement, and their consciousness of the good of the political community.

The seeds of social rights awareness

Equality and social rights did not really emerge in students' thinking about important citizen rights. However, I did ask students a specific question relating to social rights and equality issues. In China, migrant workers receive fewer social welfare benefits than urban citizens; for example, their children could not take college entrance exams in the cities to which they have migrated unless they got an urban *Hukou*. Four of the interviews had migration experiences. One boy at No.1 School described the difficulties he encountered the education

process. Because he did not have local *Hukou*, he was rejected by local schools, and his family had to ask others for help (*Zhao Guanxi*) and to pay some money before he finally got the chance to enter a primary school. I posed two ideas to the students: the first was that everybody should equally share the same rights; the second was that, as urban citizens had lived in the city longer and made more contributions than migrant workers, they should have more rights.

Of the twenty-three students who responded to this question, only two agreed (partially) with the second statement, which claimed urban citizens' privilege. They mentioned the urban citizens' feeling of unfairness and inequality was, in reality, caused by a lack of resources. Three students held a neutral attitude. One girl expressed her empathy for migrant workers, because she knew a little bit about their situation, but she accepted the reality. "I felt so empathic to them. However, there was no way to solve it. They might be born not well; their family might be poor…However, not everyone is born with equality." (*Student No. 13, female, No.6 School, interview*), the girl commented in a helpless tone. Two other students admitted each side had good reasons.

However, most students claimed that migrant workers should share in the same rights as urban citizens, for various reasons. Ten of these students stated that having the same rights was based on the equality principle and rural migrant workers should be guaranteed basic rights. One boy specifically mentioned that the socialist nature of China determined everybody's equal status: "China is a socialist country; everybody should have equal rights. It should not be determined by how many contributions a person made," he said. Seven students used the contribution argument to opposed unbalanced rights; some students stated that migrant workers had made as many or more contributions to the city as urban citizens. Some argued that, as long as a person made contributions, he/she should enjoy basic rights, no matter how many

contributions he/she has made. One student mentioned that contribution to the country mattered more than the contribution to the city. Another student particularly mentioned rural migrant workers' disadvantages in education and proposed that the government should offer cheaper schools for migrant workers' children.

Therefore, students' understandings of civil rights, political rights, and social rights varied. Although civil rights were not emphasized by the textbooks, more than half of the interviewed students cared about their personal freedom, safety, privacy, and life, showing their concern for individual interests and freedom. In terms of political rights, most students apparently accepted what the textbooks had taught them, valuing voting rights, the right to supervise the government, and the right of engagement. For them, these rights were a way for them to protect their interests, to show their recognized status in the political community, and to make the society or state better. As for the social rights that not clearly demonstrated in the textbooks, students didn't have a clear understanding of them. From their attitudes toward rural migrant workers' inequality issues, many of them appeared to believe everybody should be equal, a key theme in social rights; however, some accepted the reality of inequality and very few of them claimed the government should do more to reduce inequality. This lack of interest in requesting that the government to do more is consistent with their tendency to view passive citizenship as good citizenship.

Agreeing state-oriented obligations

When it came to their understandings of citizens' obligations, students' narratives were very similar to what was represented in the textbooks. More than two-thirds of students mentioned state-oriented obligations, such as protecting the state's interests, maintaining the state's honor and safety, and making contributions to the country when needed. Obeying the law,

performing military performances, or paying taxes were also referenced by some students. One student claimed that paying tax was for the good of the state: "If you did not pay tax, then the state cannot run." However, citizens' obligation to respect other citizens was only mentioned by three students. State-oriented obligations were more popular than social- and individual-oriented ones among these students.

The textbooks' influence on students' understanding of citizen obligation can be seen in the students' narratives. However, the picture was complicated. When asked what comprised citizen obligations, students tried to recall what the textbooks said, while others admitted they could not remember what had been sent in the books. One girl in No.6 School confessed, "in terms of obligations, I think, protecting the state's thing… this is definitely important. Others?... Well, I can't remember very clearly." It should be mentioned the question was "What kinds of obligations do you think a citizen has," rather than "What kinds of obligations are mentioned in the textbooks." Students' inclination to recall contents from textbooks showed that some were inclined to think of citizen obligations as objective knowledge rather than a true belief held in one's heart. Therefore, for these students, there was a gap between knowing obligations and performing obligations. However, some students seemed to legitimately agreed with what the textbooks said. One boy in No.1 School stated, "Our obligations, (they include) loving the country, protecting (the country) and the four basic citizen responsibilities. For obligations, we must perform it, there is no reason to not do it."

Therefore, students' perspectives on rights and obligations show that the knowledge of political rights and obligations presented in the textbooks did have impacts on them. They actively took away what the textbooks introduced about rights and valued rights issues for personal freedom, interest's protection, and the common good of community. However, their

learning of obligations was less active; they knew they had obligations, but did not really take

that knowledge to heart, as shown by some students' memorization of this knowledge.

The Dilemma of Participation in Organized Civic Engagement

The textbooks encouraged students to actively participate in politics in an orderly

fashion. This part investigates students' attitudes toward voting and volunteer work. In addition,

it examines students' school engagement to identify their real actions. From their attitudes

toward voting and behaviors in school activities, a very remarkable characteristic of their

participation was that they showed a strong willingness to vote but took a passive approach to

school engagement.

Positive attitudes toward problematic voting

Although the textbooks introduced democratic voting in China and encouraged students

to vote based on the performance of the representatives, the reality was a different story. During

my fieldwork, I witnessed village voting in my hometown and neighborhood committee voting

in the city in which I did my fieldwork. Both showed people's distrust surrounding the functions

of voting, as well as the problems typical in Chinese voting, including corruptions, voting based

on one's relative network, bribery, the lack of information about candidates, and the lack of real

campaigns.[2] Both village and neighborhood committee elections are overseen by the Party-state,

which determines the candidates, distributes posters introducing the candidates, and organizes

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[2] In April, I went back to my hometown, a small village in China. When my whole family, including my aunt's family and uncles' family, gathered together, my relatives talked about the on-going voting in my village. One mentioned that he would vote based on who gave more money, another relative said he would vote for another remote relative. However, one of my brothers, of the younger generation, complained about the useless of voting as it could not stop corruption. Their response represented the current issues for village election in China, bribery, voting based on relative network, distrust, and corruptions. While in the city, I observed an election for the neighborhood where I lived, and found out that the neighbor residences were not familiar with the candidates due to the lack of information and lack of real campaigns. In addition, a political teacher in No.1 School pointed out that people in the city had little interest in voting due to the weak power of the neighborhood committee.

the voting, beating the people to question whether voting made a difference. Not knowing the candidate with their policies is very common in the election of people's deputies, too. However, this reality was not presented in the textbooks, which simply encouraged students to vote without showing the real results of voting in China. How then will students treat voting? Do they realize the reality?

When asked whether they would vote when they turned 18 and were enfranchised, most students assertively stated they would, reflecting their strong awareness of voting rights. However, one student said he did not believe the voting system would make a difference and did not know where to vote, while another student said his decision to vote or not would depend on whether he had time. The reasons for students wanting to vote varied. Some were curious about voting experience, some considered it a citizen obligation, and some wanted to be involved in state affairs or choose the representatives they liked. One girl's active attitude toward voting is representative of these students' strong interests: "I have not voted before, so I am very curious about this. Second, I feel voting will let me feel involved in civic engagement. My positive energy would be facilitated" *(Student No. 10, female, No.6 School, interview)*. When pointed out to her, the issue of the lack of candidate information seemed not to bother her, as she stated that she could explore how the candidates could protect her related interests by herself. Other students had a similar attitude, saying they could learn enough about the candidates through the media and online searching to be responsible in their voting. Two hoped the voting system itself would improve, such as by introducing the candidate to people more or having campaign speeches. However, a few said they would still vote, even without knowing the candidate. One boy stated that the candidate should not be bad and that it would be better to give his support.

However, around one-third of the students who positively wanted to vote said they would not vote under the condition of not knowing the candidate, as voting for an unfamiliar candidate was meaningless and irresponsible. When one student was reminded that she could search for candidate information online, she replied that she did not trust online information.

These students' responses show that most were very interested in voting, perceiving it as a valuable experience, a way to gain a sense of involvement in the country, or a way to protect their interests. Only of a few did not treat voting seriously. Many valued voting and wanted to be responsible, and would therefore like to know more information about candidates. However, students' participation was influenced by systemic obstructions to voting, including the efficacy of voting, the inconvenience of voting, the lack of detail information about candidates, and the lack of campaign; one-third of the students said they were likely not to vote after learning the reality of voting. Very few considered requesting that the system itself be improved.

Distrusting School engagement and civic engagement

Students' real engagement in school affairs was investigated through two school engagement programs in No.1 School and No.6 School, revealing the dynamics of students' political participation. Both schools showed they cared about students' opinions and tried to involve students in school affairs—No.1 School through an activity named "Having lunch with the principal" and No.6 School by setting up a suggestion box for students.

In No.1 School, two opportunities to lunch with the principal were allocated to each homeroom class each year. It was a good opportunity for students to report issues to the principle. In the homeroom class in which I conducted classroom observations this opportunity was allocated based on need. The class president announced it to his fellows openly and gave the

opportunity to students who showed interest.[3] When asked whether they would like to report

issues to the school and to make suggestions, two students said they were so far satisfied with the

school schools, so they did not need to. One girl said she had already proposed an issue about

accommodation to the housing staff; another said she noticed the issue of smoking on campus

and would definitely raise the issue if she had the chance to have lunch with the principal.

However, one boy distinguished between public discussion and private discussion:

> I feel the communication with teachers and school leaders about school affairs is
> very few. However, there are lots of discussions among students. Yes, when there
> were no teachers in the classroom, we will discuss a lot. However, we do not have
> much suggestions for the school, because we do not have so many critiques about
> the school leaders. We do not have any connection with them too. (Student No. 6,
> male, No.1 School, interview)

Complaining about something to a peer and reporting it to the school were two different

things. Although the boy said they did not have many critiques about the school or its leadership,

I heard students complain about the heavy study pressure and strict administration (having a

mandated running exercise during a break time in the morning, too many tests) in the school. In

this boy's narratives, his lack of connection with school leaders blocked him from making

suggestions. If he had a connection with the school leaders, he might feel it easier to express his

opinions.

In No.6 School, a Student Suggestion Mailbox was set in the hallway of the first floor in

the middle of the semester. Along with this mailbox was a poster encouraging students to share

the problems they sought in school affairs: "Class, do you want a better restaurant and housing?

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[3] It was not clear whether more than two students applied nor how the class president dealt with the competition. But
from the class president's narrative about this event, it was very clear that he wanted to do it publicly, showing
fairness. He said, "at that time, I asked them whether they wanted to have lunch with the principle, some of them
showed interests. Then, I think as I am the person who is passing the message, I should give other people more
opportunities and let others take that."

Do you want a good rest? Do you want your high school life more colorful? If you had thought about these, please write them down and tell us." This activity was organized by the Youth League Committee at the school. When asked whether they made any proposals to the school, thirteen students responded. A few said that they had suggested something, such as checking an old machine, having hot water all the time in the accommodations, or having better food. Others did not participate—most because they were satisfied with the school, one because he was not interested in the activity, and another because the issue might already have been reported. However, five students who had suggestions for the school did not report them due to their distrust of the school; as one student put it, "Well, we have many suggestions. Damn, it is just too much…However, I did not report these things. Because it will not make any difference. The school will not set the hot water machine. It is just impossible." The students just discussed these matters privately, as they believed their suggestions would not matter.

The narratives in No.1 School and No.6 School show that students' reporting issues to the school was subject to several conditions; specifically, the students had to know their suggestions or complaints were reasonable, that they would be considered and taken seriously, and how to and where to express them. There was no doubt that the schools tried to accommodate the third condition by creating the "Lunch with the principal program" and the student suggestion box. Although these programs were very limited, they provided a way for students to express their opinions about school life. However, students' participation in school affairs was largely influenced by the second condition, believing the suggestions would have an effect. This condition relied students trust in the system, which was partly determined by systematic efforts to show that students' suggestions would work. In the fields of political science and psychology, the belief that one's suggestion would work is called political efficacy. Research shows that

political efficacy contributes to democratic actions and is related to socioeconomic status, civic resources, and political socialization (Beaumont, 2010). This study shows that political efficacy is also influenced by one's trust in the system and system performance.

Students' response to making suggestions to the school is a mirror of civic engagement in China. While there is no doubt that people are dissatisfied with some aspects of life or public policies, they preferred to discuss such issues privately, rather than report them officially, as other studies have observed (Hansen, 2015). One thing blocking civic participation is citizens' lack of belief that the political system takes their suggestions seriously and really tries to solve them. When I asked students about civic engagement, many already knew how to make approaches using the Internet and official channels, but that did not mean that they would take actions. Indeed, some students described their frustration with using official approaches. One student said she witnessed her mother reported a transportation issue in her community to the police, but the police said they were not responsible for this issue. Her mother then made a call to the government and other departments, but no one came out to deal with the issue. This experience destroyed her the image of China as a responsible society. Given the difficulties of the official approach, many students claimed that if they needed to protect their rights or report issues, they would ask for help on the Internet.

Pragmatic and performative participation in institutionalized volunteer work

In addition to voting, civic engagement also refers to volunteer works, which connect individuals with the society. Indeed, the Party-state encourages students to have some social experiences and to learn things from society. It institutionalizes volunteer work and social practice into the high school curriculum, requiring all high school students in China to take courses in these areas. This comprehensive practice activities curriculum includes three sections:

Inquiry Learning, Society Practice, and Community Service.[4] If students did not complete these

courses, they will not get a high school degree. For those who to complete the requirements, their

experiences of inquiry learning, social practice, and community service will be recorded in their

academic performance archives and counted as important indicators of their competences, which

has an influence of their college application. Following the national curriculum requirement,

Zhejiang Province began to institutionalize these courses and activities into high schools in 2007,

training teachers, offering funds, and encouraging communities, Youth league Committee,

entrepreneurs, and youth educational bases to support this curriculum by offering youths practice

opportunities.

Both No.1 School and No.6 School implemented practice activities—No.1 School

through programs such as visiting Shanghai Scientific Museums, protecting the environment,

protecting the cultural heritage, and volunteer works, and No.6 School through a program

relating to water issues that was an integral part of the Water Issues Program (including water

pollution and water waste) advocated by the city Youth League Committee. In addition, both

schools required students to provide community service.

The institutionalized of social practice into curricula explains why most students had

volunteer experiences, volunteering at hospitals, libraries, museums, neighborhood committees,

nursing homes, transportation centers, and so on. Around one-third of students had interest in

doing these things because they felt it was meaningful to do volunteer work. This meaning came

from the happiness they gained by helping others and their empathy towards others. As one girl

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[4] These courses and activities are developed by each school. There is no national curriculum for these courses. In general, students need to complete 15 credits of Inquiry Learning Courses covering social issues in society, economy, science, and life in their three years of high school; in addition, they need to have Society Practice one week per academic year and more than 10 days of community service in the whole three years (Ministry of Education, 2004).

in No.6 School said, "I feel doing volunteer work is very fun, and it is very meaningful. It is worth to do because everybody feels very happy. People who receive help will feel happy, while people who offer help will also be happy." Another girl, who attended the Caring for Autistic Children program, claimed she began to realize the meaning of this program after attending it, although her first motivation for participation was to have fun: "You can help people who might not be the same as. Some people who might have physical issues or mental issues, they need us more attentions."

However, not all students joined in activities based purely on their selfless and humanitarian concern. A few students claimed that their main reason for participating was to gain skills and knowledge, following the goal of these curriculums. This response from a boy in No.1 School is representative of these students' self-improvement concerns.

> I have been to the science museum to be a volunteer. I also helped the aged people in my communities. For the museum, I go because I do not know many things there, I can learn more knowledge through that volunteer work. Second, through volunteer work, I need to communicate with others. It will improve your social skills and improve your way of speaking. (Student No.5, male, No.1 School, interview)

More than half the students based their participation on pragmatic reasons, such as completing school requirements, earning extra scores, or making their CV more attractive to universities and employers. One boy in No.1 School, who donated books by selling things, mentioned he did these things for two reasons: "one reason is based on heart. The second reason is a little bit utilitarian, you know, if you applied for college, it looks good when you have these experiences." Other students complained about the meaninglessness of volunteer work, saying that if the school did not require them to do these things, they would definitely not do them: "Well, I have no interests about it. I have already had lots of study pressure. I even cannot

complete homework." Another boy in No.6 School described his experience in the summer water

issue program, saying he and his team members went to a lake in the city, took a picture to verify

they had already done something for the program, then left: "It is just too performative and

formalized," the boy complained. His complaint was a common one made about many

volunteering works in China. As these volunteering works were top-down things, implemented

as a task from the Party-state, there was a high possibility that people would treat it as a task,

something to be completed at a minimal level or to get reward and recognition; actual volunteer

work did not matter, pictures of volunteer work did.

Volunteer work or social practice activities were good ways to connect people and

strengthen communal bonds. When the Party-state implemented these activities as a required

element of student evaluation, it guaranteed everyone's participation but at the same time

facilitated students' pragmatic and performative participation in these activities—that is, joining

for credits or doing things at a minimal level. As these activities lasted a very short time, they did

not promote students' sense of belonging to the community.

The common characteristic of voting programs, school engagement programs, and

institutionalized volunteer works was that they were implemented in a top-down manner.

Officials decided how the program would work, with the aim of involving citizens and youths.

However, if the officials did not prove that they really cared about citizens' opinions and reports,

students would not feel a real passion to engage in civic affairs, as students' distrust of school

leaders indicated. On the other side, students' participation in civic affairs was largely driven by

pragmatic reasons, as shown above, which related to students' study pressures and the serious

competition in the Chinese educational system.

Strong National Identity with Blurred Political Identity

When the textbooks talked about patriotism, one main intention was to facilitate students'

support for the leadership of the CCP and to put state interests first. However, this study shows

that while students have a strong national identity, they have a blurred political identity.

Moreover, collectivist ideology is not as appealing to them as it was to past generations.

"The priority of state interests over idols"!?

In the students' conceptualizations of good citizens, patriotism was an important theme.

This patriotism aspect can be seen clearly in the Boycotting South Korea Protest that arose

during the fieldwork, caused by the THAAD issue. The THAAD issue related to South Korea's

deployment of a US-built missile defense system known as the Terminal High Altitude Area

Defense (THAAD) to defend against North Korean Missile threats. The Chinese government

strongly opposed this deployment because it was concerned the radar system in THAAD would

help the US military detect military activities in China and threat China's national security

interests (China Daily, 2016a, 2016b).

South Korea announced the deployment of THAAD on July 8th 2016, triggering tense

relations between China and South Korea and influencing the economic and cultural arena in

these two countries for months. Alongside the official actions,[5] state media encouraged Chinese

consumers to boycott Lotte company and South Korean goods, but discouraged overt anti-South

Korean protest.[6] Supporting the stance of the Chinese government, the discourses of boycotting

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[5] Chinese government unofficially restricted the performance of South Korean celebrities and banned the broadcasting of South Korean TV shows, drama, and pop music on TV and internet in China since July. At the same time, group tours from China to South Korea were also banned unofficially by Chinese government in March ("South Korea tourism hit by China ban," 2017).

[6] Lotte Group was a company in South Korea which agreed to exchange one of its golf courses to the government for the deployment of THAAD in February 2017. Chinese official later closed the majority of its stores in China on pretexts such as fire-safety issue. On February 27, The *Global Times*, an official newspaper in Beijing, advocated that Lotte should get out of the Chinese market, Chinese society should cooperate to restrict the import of South

THAAD, Lotte, and South Korean goods, and stopping travelling to South Korean were very popular on social media. Although South Korean pop culture, including TV dramas, shows, and pop music had been very popular in China since the late 1990s and many Chinese youths had South Korean idols, many supported the ban on South Korean entertainment. The sentence "*Guojia Mianqian Wu Ouxiang*" (State interests have priority over idols) spread on the Internet.

When I began to conduct my fieldwork, the wave of anti-South Korean sentiment had already begun to calm, but was still mentioned by students and teachers. In No.6 School, I saw a news comment from a student related to THAAD posted on News Column[7], at the front wall of the politics curriculum teachers' office. The news concerned how local people in South Korea protested the deployment of THAAD, but the comment addressed boycotting South Korean celebrities:

> "China is the biggest market for South Korean entertainment industry. If South Korean superstars lost supports from their Chinese fans, they were nobody. Implementing the ban on South Korean entertainment was a way to protect Chinese culture. Many people online were very unhappy about this ban. However, as it was said on Weibo, "State interests have absolutely priority over supporting idols."

This comment showed strong confidence in China's powerful influence on the South Korean economy, concern about the influence of South Korean culture on Chinese culture, and unconditional support for and loyalty to the nation-state. However, when I interviewed students

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Korean cultural goods, people could stop buying South Korean cars and phones, and tourists who planned to go to South Korea should change their plans to protect state interests (Global Times, 2017). Nevertheless, the newspaper emphasized that there was no need to have large anti-South Korea protests. Anti-foreign protest was not a new phenomenon in China. Since the 1990s, China has witnessed several waves of nationalist protests, such as anti-American demonstrations after US planes bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, anti-French protests in 2008 after France boycotted the 2008 Beijing Olympics over the riots in Tibet, and anti-Japanese protests following Japan's bid for a permanent UN security council seat in 2005, a maritime collision in 2010, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue in 2012 (Weiss, 2014).

[7] News Column was a column for students to post their comment about news on bulletin boards. The political teachers in Grade 10 required their students to submit a comment on one piece of news they read every two weeks.

about their real stance on the South Korea ban, the picture seemed much more complex and not as assertive as the comment suggested. Among the 17 students who responded my questions on the South Korea Ban,[8] around two-fifths clearly supported ban, thinking it was a way to protect the state's interests. One boy said,

> I had a very strong identity with our country…Although our country had many problems and had a lot of space to improve, although we criticize it a lot, when it came to the fundamental issues relating to stability and international conflicts, we will firmly stand with our country. (Student No.6, male, No.1 School, interview)

His narrative showed unconditional support for and loyalty to state policy addressing stability and international conflicts. However, he also mentioned that people should boycott rationally, rather than using violence to burn or to break South Korean goods.

Around three-fifths of these students struggled with the conflict between safeguarding state interests, and their affection for their idols and consumption of South Korean culture. Some students supported the ban passively, admitting they could not ignore the state's interests totally but would still support their idols in their heart and still watch South Korean shows and TV dramas over the Internet if they wished. Others clearly objected to this ban because they thought the conflict between states should not extend to intercultural communications. One student mentioned that the policy was not reasonable, because Chinese people used lots of South Korean goods; another said China still needed to learn from South Korea and the ban would make people wonder why the Chinese government would do things like this. One girl who had a South Korean idol described her awkward reaction to the ban. She opposed the ban at first, but later wavered due, influenced by the dominant media discourse.

> I became a little bit irrational at first. Then I thought, we could do nothing to this ban… The online groups then disputed fiercely about this ban. One line insisted

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[8] There were another two students were asked this question, but they did not show their stance. One student was not very clear about this event, another was unwilling to talk about this.

that we should support China; another line questioned why a conflict between two countries should extend to celebrities. Many netizens quarreled online…The online discourse was so fiercely. I became a little bit strange. I did not stand up with South Korean stars and thought China should insist on its own stance. (Student No.15, female, No.6 School, interview)

In recent years, state nationalism has been widely expressed in China's official media and social media. As the THAAD issue showed, this state nationalism was exclusive and defensive, considering state interests first and doling out economic punishment to other countries when their actions challenge China. In addition, the Party-state mobilized people to support it and won some people's support, as the phrase "state interests have priority over idols" showed. However, its efforts were less successful among people who were connected to a global world and shared the benefits of globalization, such as consumption of South Korean culture.

Loving the country based on primordial emotion and state performance

Students' state nationalism in the THAAD issue was largely mobilized by the official media. However, when tracing their patriotic reactions, it appeared they were very much based on primordial emotion and state performance. Despite the disagreements over the THAAD issue among students, when asked whether they loved China, many students expressed they felt happy to live here, felt proud when saw the rising of the national flag, or felt angry when they read news about territorial issues. Some students claimed they preferred to stand with the country, and neither curse China nor harm state interests.

Being born and raised in China counted was seen as sufficient reason to love China by some students. Their feelings were primordial, based on blood, culture, and history. One boy in No. 6 school student stated that he loved China "Because this is the place where I was born and grow up. My family and friends are here." Another used Chinese blood as a metaphor, saying "I love our country. After all, you are a Chinese, your body flows Chinese blood." For some

students, being Chinese itself indicated the need to love China; as one girl put it, "I like to tease our country. However, after all, I'm Chinese, I have to love my own country and love my own culture." However, this student also attributed her love for China to her appreciation of Chinese history and culture, as did several other students.

Only a few students based their love for China in Chinese traditional culture, its long history, the spirit of its historical heroes, or its fine arts (including literacy and some artifacts). Many students showed their detachment from traditional culture; when traditional culture was mentioned, the first and main thing they thought of were festivals, such as the Spring Festival, the Lantern Festival, the Dragon Boat Festival, and so on. The festivalization of Chinese traditional culture reflects that Chinese traditional culture, having been officially scorned and marginalized for generations, had lost its life roots and became a remote thing in people's life. To overcome this, many traditional festivals were reintroduced and emphasized. Some students complained about this, thinking it too superficial:

> Chinese culture? I think… it should not only be expressed superficially in
> festivals, such as celebrating the Spring Festive and the Lantern Festival. I think
> as a Chinese, you must have a deep understanding of Chinese culture. It should be
> a reference to your behavior. (Student No.4, male, No.1 School, interview)

Indeed, learning Chinese traditional culture in a modern society was not an easy thing. Due to the waning of traditional ways of living, it was hard for students to have deep knowledge and appreciation of the core of Chinese culture. Even textbooks did not attempt a deep introduction of the subject. Moreover, Chinese traditional culture was challenged by modern Western culture. One student criticized the aesthetic of Chinese architecture and the profusion of gaudy colors on traditional clothing, noting she preferred Western styles and fashions. Another boy treated traditional culture as too old and not fashionable; he liked Euro-American culture

because it was more modern. Therefore, although the textbooks wanted to promote students' pride in and understanding of Chinese traditional culture, the disappearance of traditional cultural infrastructure and the challenge of Western culture made this difficult.

Another important element in students' narrative about their satisfaction and identity with China was the state's good performance on security protection and economic development. Four students mentioned they were satisfied because they felt secure living in China, particularly when compared with the insecurity seen in such other countries as the United States, South Africa, or Syria. One student mentioned that even though the United States was the most advanced country in the world, it had gun issues, racial discrimination, and gang issues. Through comparison with the dangers seen in the most advanced country on earth, China's security seemed outstanding to him. Another student was moved by the state when he saw the news that China had rescued its oversea citizens in an earthquake. He commented, "As long as the state treats us well, we would like to make a contribution to the state spontaneously."

Economic development was only mentioned as a source of patriotic feelings by one student. Considering the importance of economic performance in the official discourse of legitimacy, the lack of mentions of economic development might be a surprise. However, as these students were born in an era when they already shared great material wealth and had not experienced poverty like the generations in the 1960s and 1970s, it is reasonable that economic development was not as appealing to them as to previous generations. Moreover, unlike security issues, which were a personal material issue, good state economic performance was an abstract impression of state performance; it did not really register as an improvement to people's life. Additionally, as these students were too young to need to make a living, economic issues were remote to them.

To promote students' patriotic feelings for China, the textbooks showed the country's long history, rich culture, and rapid economic development, all of which did influence students' patriotic feeling, but not to be extent the textbooks desired. Students' love for the country mainly came from their primordial emotions, cultivated by their living in China and the state's good performance on security.

Blurred Identification with the CCP

The Party-state and the textbooks both wanted students to support the leadership of the CCP based on both its past achievements and its key role in the future rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Although many students showed a patriotic feeling, loving the country and loving the Party were different things. Indeed, their understanding of the CCP was very limited and their identification with the CCP was not very clear.

Students had a very simple impression about the CCP, largely limited to knowing it was the ruling party of China and had governing leadership. However, they did not know how the Party exactly worked and had an ambiguous understanding that many officials in the government were Party members. One student said he just felt the Party was too far from his life. Students' responses were not surprise, because the textbooks did not introduce how the CCP worked, despite offering a great deal of content of its achievements and ideology. In addition, although many students were China Youth League members, they did not interact with the Party system as they were still outsiders of the Party.

Around half of the students had a willingness to become a CCP member; however, their main reasons for joining the CCP were quite pragmatic, largely related to how they could benefit from Party membership. Students stated that being a CCP member was an indication of excellence, because not everyone could be a Party member, and could be helpful for their future

employment. A few students claimed that it was an honor to have a Party member status, and distinguished them from the rest of the populace. Only two students mentioned the CCP's good performance as a reason for joining. Other students did not think too much about whether they would like to join the Party; however, as some were already China Young League members, they would likely follow the path to becoming a Party member. A few students who were not CYL members felt it would be very hard to apply to become a CCP member. None of them cited a belief in socialist ideology as a reason for them to join the Party; on the contrary, many of them treated socialist ideology as a cliché from another age.

Perceiving socialist slogan as a cliché

The textbook encouraged students to put the state's interest first and to work for the good of the country. Although students agreed to protect state interests, they considered the CCP's socialist ideology—sacrificing themselves for the good of the country—a dated, unappealing cliché. This crisis of socialist ideology can be seen in a lesson relating to core socialist values in Mr. Wen's class in No.1 School.

The whole lesson was about the values of life, a lesson from the Life and Philosophy textbook. Core socialist values were not in the content of this textbook, but Mr. Wen tried to use an example to explain the meaning of values. He asked students what the core socialist values included, but nobody answered. It seemed they did not know the answer. However, in the back of the classroom was a poster that stating the twelve core socialist values. After a short silence, Mr. Wen pointed out the poster; a few students immediately turned around, read the sentences, smiled with relief, and nodded. Mr. Wen continued to question his students, asking, "Class, what's your first impression when you saw these words?" "Well, they're the content that we

need to memory and recite," a boy answered frankly. Immediately, the left class began to laugh. I guess because the boy gave an answer that was true for them, but not expecting by the teacher.

However, Mr. Wen just waited for the laughter to stop, then recognized the students' teasing words: "Well, maybe many of you will not take these words seriously and not agree with these values. And you may think they're very hard to recite. This morning, when a student responsible for the Monday Speech mentioned the word Capitalism before the whole school, the whole school burst into laughers. However, personally, I think the political system is not necessarily good or bad." Another boy responded, agreeing with Mr. Wen: "Yeah, every state has different national conditions."

This moment was intriguing. Mr. Wen was frustrated by his students' lack of belief in core socialist values. He continued reminding students of what he said in his first class: "What did I say in my first class with you guys? Many years ago, when a student talking about studying for the rise of China before the whole school, many students also laughed. I felt very sorry at that moment. I think if you guys did not want to lead this society, it will be very terrible for this country." "Studying for the rise of China" is a quotation from former Premier Zhou Enlai; the primary school literature curriculum talked about how Zhou, as a teenager suffering under the effects of Western imperialism, decided to studying for the rise of China after seeing a Chinese person being bullied by foreigners. The article itself was a typical piece to promote students' patriotic feeling of China using humiliation history and to inspire them working hard for China. However, in Mr. Wen's narrative, this sentence seemed a bit little ridiculous to the students.

Apparently, Mr. Wen noticed that his students perceived socialist ideology as a cliché. He pointed out that students might see socialist ideology as something that was being imposed on them and therefore be unwilling to accept content associated with the word "socialism." From

laughter over the reciting of core socialist values and their response to the word capitalism and

Zhou's studying for the rise of China statement, students' detachment from the official socialist

ideology was very clear. The discourse of hating capitalism and adopting socialism, though

common and effective years ago, seemed ridiculous and funny to them now. Indeed, when I

asked them about the difference between capitalism and socialism, some students thought

capitalism was more advanced and developed, according to their observations.

From the students' above responses, it is very clear the textbooks failed to promote their

belief in and attachment to socialism and the CCP. The textbooks' efforts to promote young

citizens' patriotism through emphasizing Chinese traditional culture and the miracle of the

economic development since 1978 were similarly unsuccessful, as few students had a deep

understanding of Chinese traditional culture and few counted economic development as an

important reason to love China. While these young citizens were patriotic, their patriotic feelings

were based on primordial emotions and mobilized by the official media.

Conclusion: The Individualized, Passive, yet Patriotic Young Citizens in China

From the above students' discourse relating to citizenship and their performances in daily

life, three characteristics can be seen in how they think of citizenship—that is, perceiving it as

individualized, passive, yet patriotic.

These students are individualized citizens, which is consistent with the individualistic

character of their generation. Different from the Mao era generations, the generations since the

economic reform are more self-centered, mainly interested in pursuing a life of their own,

independence, freedom, and self-realization. Due to their strong sense of self-awareness, these

students value their civil rights, including their personal freedom and the freedoms of speech,

privacy, property, and security. Moreover, they recognize the importance of political rights for

protecting their own interests, such as choosing people's deputies who will represent their

interests or supervising the government to prevent corruption and avoid people's suffering. Their

self-centered orientation does not mean that they are selfish, just that they care about themselves

before considering other citizens and the public good. Students' awareness of performing *Suzhi*

in the public sphere and their support for rural migrant workers' equal rights show they know the

boundaries of their freedom, are concerned about the wellness of their communities, and are

emphatic about disadvantaged groups. One meaning of "individualized citizens" refers to those

who cherish individual freedoms and individual interests; however, a second meaning of refers to

atomized citizens, those who lack the awareness of uniting others to take collection action or to

push the government to change. This theme relates to the passive characteristic of these citizens.

The passive aspect of students' citizenship is reflected in several ways. First, although

many students feel empathic toward rural migrant workers and support their equal rights, few

have the awareness to request the government address the issue. In addition, in their

conceptualizations of good citizens, they list more behaviors relating to passive citizens, such as

obeying the law, performing their responsibilities, and performing *Suzhi*. Although they care

about their civil and political rights, they are content to simply to enjoy the rights guaranteed by

law without requesting any unincluded rights. Students' performance in school engagement

programs also shows their passive characteristics. Although schools set up programs enabling

them to make suggestions, some students do not participate even when they have something to

report. Comparing with the participatory citizens and justice-oriented citizens proposed by

Westheimer and Kahne (2004), i.e., citizens who actively join volunteer works and challenge

social injustice, the young citizens studied in this thesis are clearly passive. This is not surprising,

because it is not an easy thing to be an active citizen, as it requires significant individual efforts

and environment supports. The lack of the latter makes it harder for Chinese citizens to be active citizens. In China, there are many systemic barriers to participating in politics, such as censorship, the difficulty of reporting public issues, the politics of critique, distrust of government officials, and so on. Although the textbooks encourage students to engage in politics, students already sense the difficulty in doing so, as they do not live in a vacuum. In addition, students' twisted attitude toward voting and their passive engagement with the "Having Lunch with the Principle" and "Suggestion Box" programs reflect their level of discouragement were problematic systems. Many students have a strong awareness of voting, but after learning the reality thereof, such as the lack of detailed information about candidates and the absence of real campaigns, some announced they will give up on voting. In terms of school engagement programs, some students claimed they do not participate because they do not believe their suggestions will be taken seriously.

Many students are passive about claiming their rights, participating in politics, and challenging social inequality, but active in terms of protecting the state's interests, which is why they are considered patriotic citizens. There are many ways for students to show their patriotism, including acting with civility, proposing suggestions to the government, not slandering China, and supporting the official political stance of the country without condition, as the THAAD case indicated. Students claim their love of the country is based on primordial emotion and state performance, but some of their more aggressive patriotic behaviors are prompted by the official media and the textbooks. However, as students live in a global world, some struggle to balance their patriotism with their consumption of global culture.

What then is the difference between students' perspectives on citizenship and the state's desired citizens, as presented in the textbooks? The state wants citizens who obey the law,

engage in politics through officially condoned approaches, love the country, and, more important, support the leadership of the CCP. However, students conceptualize citizens as individualized, passive, yet patriotic. The textbooks' introduction of civic engagement approaches and rights is actively accepted by students, while the content on patriotism is only partly accepted, as the textbooks' promotion Chinese traditional culture does not reach students' hearts. The biggest failure of the textbook is its inability to persuade students to believe in socialist ideology, which students reject as a dated cliché. In the following chapter, I will show how teachers teach the Thought and Politics curriculum and how they deal with the tensions between students and the state.

Chapter 7 Teaching Citizenship: Exams, ideology, and Autonomy

The previous chapters have shown the tension between the Party-state and its young citizens—that is, between the socialist citizens who support the CCP and the socialist ideology promoted through official textbooks desired by the CCP, and the individualized and passive citizens conceptualized in the young generation's mindset. In particular, students' teasing about the socialist slogan "studying for the rise of the country" and cynicism surrounding the juxtaposition of capitalism and socialism makes their detachment from socialist ideology very clear. However, how teachers respond to this tension and how they teach citizenship in such challenge are unknown.

This chapter mainly investigates how teachers understand citizenship and teach the Thought and Politics curriculum in two Chinese high schools. It pays attention to teachers' responses to socialist ideology and other social structures influencing their pedagogical practice, particularly the exam-oriented educational system, one of the major characteristics of Chinese education. The data here is mainly drawn from teacher interviews and classroom observations. The three teachers whom I followed in the fieldwork, including Mr. Wen in No.1 School and Ms. Qu and Ms. Yang in No.6 School, are presented here case-by-case by showing their educational backgrounds, their thoughts on and practices of curriculum, and their perspectives on citizenship education. By presenting these three teachers' practices in detail, this chapter shows how the social structure shapes teachers' teaching and how teachers find a space to go beyond the constraints of examination and ideology. In addition, this chapter compares the differences and similarities between No.1 School and No. 6 School, showing a differentiated citizenship education in Chinese high schools.

Mr. Wen: Lecturing and Educating a Moral Person

As pointed out in the methods chapter, No. 1 school, the school employing Mr. Wen, was an elite school in the city. Most of its students would get into first-tier universities in China, but its humanities track was not as popular as its science track. Its students preferred to choose science, chemistry, and biology for their NCEE test subjects, rather than history, politics, and geography, because subjects in science track are more valued by universities and job markets. Among the roughly 550 students in Grade 10, only 70–80 would choose politics as a test subject for the NCEE. Therefore, the subject of politics did not have a very high status compared with the subjects in science track.

Mr. Wen was a gentle and personable teacher who was thin, not very tall, and had short hair. He was the head of Grade 10, the leader of the school's politics curriculum teachers, and a homeroom teacher for the best class in Grade 10. He also taught three politics classes. Mr. Wen was composed and introverted, was always in a good temper, and spoke in a peaceful tone.

Suffering from the bureaucratic system

Mr. Wen was in his middle 40s. He was born in 1972 in a small village in Zhejiang Province and grew up in the 1980s. When the Tiananmen movement happened, Mr. Wen was in Grade 12 and about to take the NCEE. With the reduction in admission places following Tiananmen, he failed to be admitted to a college. He took the exam again the following year and entered a normal training school in his city in 1992, majoring in history and politics. However, being a teacher was never his first choice; indeed, the normal training school was at the bottom of his application list. Two years later, he graduated from the training school and was allocated to a middle school teaching job in a nearby small town. Although the job was not a very good one, Mr. Wen learned to accept it by persuading himself that at least he had not had to go to a

more remote and poorer village. After working as a middle school teacher for 10 years, Mr. Wen transferred to a high school in the same town. Five years later, around 2007, he came to No.1 School, which was located in a much better city. Mr. Wen explained that a major reason for his coming to the current high school was that he could not find a good position in his previous city due to the bureaucracy of the local system and his lack of *Guanxi* (connection). He said,

> If I could go to the local county, I will not be here. However, there was no possibility for me to get a job there. To be honest, the bureaucracy in that small county is very serious even now. Not mention I did not have any *Guanxi* (connection) there. (Mr. Wen, interview)

Luckily, Mr. Wen learned No.1 School was recruiting a politics curriculum teacher from a friend. He applied for the job despite sensing the school had already chosen its preferred candidate and was only continuing the job recruitment process to show that the recruitment was open and fair. Somehow, the chosen candidate was not employed and Mr. Wen got this job. However, his transfer to the new school was full of difficulties. The department of education in the former city did not want him to go; although they did not offer him a good job before, they now realized Mr. Wen was an excellent teacher. Meanwhile, the education department in the new city did not want to recognize his previous 15 years' working experience, which directly influenced Mr. Wen's social welfare. When Mr. Wen told this story, it was the first time and only time I saw a little bit of emotion cross his face.

The reason that I have presented Mr. Wen's life course is that his experience is typical of that of a teacher born in the early 1970s, as can be seen in three other teachers I encountered in my field work who were also born in the early 1970s. All had been influenced by the Tiananmen event in different ways: some had participated in the demonstration and others had lost the opportunity to get into a good university, like Mr. Wen. After graduation, they were allocated

mandatory jobs and experienced difficulties in changing jobs. Particularly, a teacher who had a rural background, like Mr. Wen, would experience even more difficulties because of their lack of connections in the city. To some extent, these teachers were the harmers of the Chinese political system; but, at the same time, they benefited from the economic reform. They enjoyed some degree of upward mobility based on their merits, which apparently was more difficult in the Mao era. If No.1 School had not followed an open and fair recruitment procedure, Mr. Wen would probably still be in his original small-town school.

The bureaucracy and *Guanxi*, which influenced Mr. Wen's job opportunities and job change possibilities, are two typical characteristics of the Chinese political system. Mr. Wen's response to this bureaucratic political system was also typical. Although he suffered from and complained about the bureaucratic system and *Guanxi* culture, he did not and could not do anything about it. Complaining about it, accepting it, finding a way to survive, and paying the cost were the only things he could do. He did not follow the rules being played out in society, yet did not want to and could not challenge or change anything.

To improve citizens quality, to change society

Although Mr. Wen did not show any willingness to change the social system, he appreciated citizenship education. I was impressed by his thoughts on citizenship education in a comment section for a public lesson activity that happened on the first day I met Mr. Wen. Four young politics curriculum teachers, including one from No.1 School and three from another school, gave public lessons relating to international organization. After their lessons, other politics curriculum teachers gathered together to share ideas about lesson design and offer some comments. When Mr. Wen commented, he said that the politics curriculum should not only teach students' knowledge, but also cultivate their thinking skills, their political identity, their

rationality, their awareness of the rule of law, and their civic engagement. His comments were very similar to the key competencies outlined in the new politics curriculum standard. This was not a surprise; as the leader of the school's politics curriculum teachers, Mr. Wen had to be very familiar with the new politics curriculum standard. However, in his comment, Mr. Wen did not talk too much about political identity, instead emphasizing rationality and civic engagement, indicating that although he adopted and used the official discourse, he interpreted it based on his own needs.

Indeed, during my classroom observations and interviews with him, he did not show any passion to promote students' political identification with the CCP, even though he himself was a Party member. However, Mr. Wen did care about students' rational patriotism, which is why he showed frustration at his students' teasing comments about the "study for the rise of China" quotation. In response to his students' laughter, Mr. Wen reminded them of what he had said about patriotism in their first class: if they did not love their country, if students like them who were its top talents were not loving the country, society would be over. Additionally, he clarified to the students that loving China did not mean looking down on the United States and other Western countries; in fact, he admitted to the students that these Western countries were great countries. What he hoped students would do was to do their own jobs well, which is the best way to show one's patriotism. Compared to the Party-state's interpretation of patriotism and mobilization of people against Western countries for the interests of the state, Mr. Wen's interpretation was both milder and much more practical.

Mr. Wen believed citizenship education was necessary to confront backwardness in society:

> If our society wanted to be modernized, the economy is one element. And there is
> no doubt that it finally needs the modernization of people. The change in people

is the most important thing. People need to improve. For the change of people, I
think the most important is the quality as a citizen. (Mr. Wen, interview)

Although he did not clearly indicate what the backwardness in society was, based on his own experiences and the discourse around society, it might refer to the *Guanxi* culture and the bureaucracy of the system, from which Mr. Wen himself had suffered, and other issues exposed in recent years. Here, Mr. Wen noted that society itself should improve; however, his approach was not to directly challenge the social structure or to ask the system itself to change, but to challenge and require people to change. To some extent this is reasonable, as the social structure and social system are comprised of people; on the other hand, it followed the official discourse and logic, which blamed people for the bad side of society, and adopted the official solution of correcting people's morals in response. He thus relieved the social structure of the burden of having to make a change.

When asked how he defined citizen quality, Mr. Wen listed justice and fairness, followed by the core socialist values. However, he added, "For these words, I think, our ancients also said these. I always tell my students that there are many kinds of people in the world, sages, good guys, ordinary guys, bad guys, and evil guys. I hope my students can be at least ordinary guys and try to be good guys. A good guy is a person who respects rules and follows rules, this is the basic requirement." Mr. Wen's description of a good citizen matched the image of a personally responsible citizen who is good, but passive (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004).

When speaking about rights and responsibilities, Mr. Wen complained that the current issue facing students was not their lack of rights, but their lack of responsibilities. This complaint was echoed by other teachers whom I interviewed. They realized that current students had much more and much stronger awareness of their rights and were mainly self-centered, as they were

the only child in their family. This self-centered attitude extended to their school life, with students treating the school as a place designed to serve them, which placed more requirements on teachers and challenged their authority more than ever before. Mr. Wen explained that he did not object to students' rights—in fact, he thought rights and responsibilities were equally important—but was worried about students' limited awareness of others' feelings and ignorance of their responsibilities to their classroom and their communities.

When Mr. Wen mentioned students' strong awareness of their rights, he was mainly referring to personal rights; however, the textbooks mainly talked about political rights. How then did Mr. Wen treat political rights? Mr. Wen explained that his teaching mainly followed what the textbooks wanted students to know, such as voting rights, political freedoms, and the rights of supervision. Regarding voting rights, as they have experienced the election of people's deputies the previous year, he described what happened at the election scene to his students and frankly pointed out the issues with and disadvantages of the election—particularly that he did not know about either of the candidates but had to choose one as a people's congress deputy. When his students showed curiosity about how he had made his choice, he carefully explained that he had compared the two candidates' CVs to choose a better candidate, while noting that some other people chose randomly, based on the candidates' name; Mr. Wen hoped his students could be more responsible in exercising their voting rights in the future. In addition, Mr. Wen explained to students that the people who chose randomly and irresponsible did so because they felt no connection to the election. One the one hand, this disconnection was caused by the lack of a real election campaign; on the other, it was related to people's lack of political quality, including the candidates' awareness of how to campaign and give an election speech, the voters' awareness of serious voting, and the voters' awareness of the fairness of having to guess which candidate was

more appropriate, rather than choosing a candidate with which he/she was familiar. Mr. Wen particularly pointed out the unfairness of the election was influenced by the *Danwei* (work unit)[1] system. As his school had fewer eligible voters than another *Danwei* in the district, the candidate nominated by his school had no possibility of getting more votes than the candidate nominated by the other, because people preferred to vote for the candidate from their own place. Rather than blaming systemic problems, Mr. Wen attributed the major reason to people's protective awareness of their own people, similar with his narrative that to change the society, the most important thing was to change people. However, it was still a surprise to me that Mr. Wen could speak of election issues so frankly to his students, and that he did not try to avoid the backwardness of the election at all. However, to prevent students' frustrations about the election, he also told them things would change over time, saying things were already much better than before, and that in 20 or 50 years, things would be much better than today.

Pinning his hopes on the future was also the attitude with which Mr. Wen approached democracy. He told students that he thought China did not have democracy, as democracy was a modernized Western concept that had never existed in China's traditional society, and needed to be localized and practiced according to reality: "It needs time, it needs not only one day or two days, one year or two years, it might need several decades or even more than one hundred years. However, one thing is pretty sure, democracy is a progressive thing…… You should not give up, not lose hopes. We are part of the people who make their efforts to pursue democracy." When asked what the obstacles to realizing democracy in China were, he listed three reasons: systemic

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[1] *Danwei* or work unit was a place of employment where workers were bound to their work unit for life during the period of planning-economy, which still had an influence on current China's social structure. Previously, *Danwei* created their own housing, child care, schools, clinics, shops, services, post office, etc.

problems, people's awareness, and a lack of material wealth. Mr. Wen believed that if China was rich enough, things would change at the political level.

To summarize, Mr. Wen perceived a good citizen as one who followed the law, was responsible, had good quality, cared about others, treated their voting rights seriously, and would not stop pursuing democracy. He cherished citizenship education as he thought it was a way to improve citizens' quality and to change society. In terms of the many problems facing Chinese society, Mr. Wen's approach was to improve people's awareness rather than challenge the current social structure, even though he did mention that the system itself should be changed.

Two reasons may explain Mr. Wen's focus on people's awareness: first, he did believe people's quality and awareness were the most important things to change, and did not realize the importance of changing the social structure, which is quite consistent with the official discourse; second, as challenging the social structure was a sensitive topic, despite its importance, he chose to avoid discussing it with me and with his students. Whatever the reason, the result of his tendency was clear—his students would not gain an awareness of how the social structure influenced their life, nor of how they could challenge and change the current social structure. Although Mr. Wen never avoided talking about current issues in Chinese society, his explanation of these issues as a result of people's lack of awareness oversimplified matters, such as in the case of the election. While it is true that people's quality influenced the fairness of the election, the most fundamental issue was the structure of the election itself, including the lack of a real campaign, transparent procedures, etc.(Cai, 1992; O'Brien, 1990). Mr. Wen mentioned the lack of campaign but did not go deeply into this issue with his students.

Therefore, following the citizenship education presented in the Thought and Politics textbooks, Mr. Wen taught students basic knowledge of their political rights and approaches to

civic engagement, promoted their patriotism, and cultivated them to be good and responsible citizens. Differing from the textbooks, he advocated a more introverted patriotism, talked about issues in the political system, and did not talk much about socialist identity. However, his emphasis on the improvement of people's awareness and on pinning one's hopes on the future reduced the power of citizenship education to challenge the current social system.

Test-oriented pedagogy, lecturing, yet opening space for students' questioning

Although Mr. Wen cherished citizenship education and interpreted the politics curriculum's aim as to promote students' thinking skills, political identity, rationality, awareness of following law, and civic engagement by adopting the official discourse, citizenship education was not central to his teaching of the politics curriculum. One the one hand, Mr. Wen focused on teaching for tests; on the other hand, citizenship contents, particularly the knowledge of rights and civic engagement, were not important in the NCEE. Taking the 2017 NCEE test of Thought and Politics as an example, the Political Life and Cultural Life course, which directly relate to citizenship education, accounted for 33 of the total of 100 scores (see Table 7-1).[2] However, the tested contents of Political Life and Cultural Life mainly related to the positive or ideal functions of the CCP, government, people's congress, CPPCC, and Chinese traditional culture, contents more related to political identity and national identity than to students' knowledge of rights and political participation. There was a single question relating to students' knowledge of labor rights, which was content from the Economic Life course. Rights issues and political participation were not addressed in the test.

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[2] The test combined NCEE and Academic Proficiency Test together. Students who did not choose politics as their NCEE subject only needed to complete the part for Academic Proficiency Test, which was a requirement for their high school degree and accounted for 70% of the test's score. Students who chose politics as their NCEE subject needed to complete an additional part, worth 30% of the total test score. The Academic Proficiency Test part reflected the basic required knowledge of Thought and Politics to high school students.

Table 7-1 The score distribution of each course in the NCEE test of Thought and Politics (2017)

Course Type	Economic Life	Political Life	Cultural Life	Life and Philosophy	State and International Organizations	Law in Life	Total
Required track	21	18	15	16	N/A	N/A	70
Selective track	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	15	15	30
Total	21	18	15	16	15	15	100

Mr. Wen himself perceived the major function of the politics curriculum as being to prepare students' thinking and skills directly relating to their examination, and to teach them to be a human (*zuo ren*), which was also considered by him to be moral education.

> Examination, this is the thing should not be dropped. Then in the process, I will pay attention to teach students to be a human (zuo ren). This is one principle in my teaching. Why? It is just not right if you did not reach these two things. These two aspects are all what I pursue. I once had an opinion: the values and the functions of this subject are the unique way of thinking and moral education. (Mr. Wen, interview)

When asked what the unique way of thinking for the politics curriculum was, he explained that "The way of thinking in the politics curriculum is very different from other subjects. Such as, when we think an issue, we will think what's going on there? why do people do that? And how should you do to make a change?" He added that this mode of thinking was mainly used in political and economic analyses; in addition, people in the politics subject would use macro, mid-level, and micro perspectives. Mr. Wen pointed out that these thinking skills not

only influenced students' daily life, they were directly relating to their testing skills to answer open questions on the examinations relating to economy and politics.

Indeed, teaching students the knowledge on which they would be tested in the examination and the thinking skills they would need for the examination were the most important things for Mr. Wen's class. Through observing Mr. Wen's class, I discovered that for him a typical lesson included an opening in which he talked about small issues relating to students or introduced the lesson's topic (2–3 minutes), followed by requiring the students to read the contents of the textbook that would be taught in the lesson (7–10 minutes), after which he would lecture (20–25 minutes); if there were still some time left, he preferred to leave the time for students to do their homework. His lecturing mainly focused on the key points on which they would be tested, the logic of the textbooks, and contents that might be hard for students to understand.

Mr. Wen explained the reason he let students pre-read books first was that the textbook itself was very easy to understand and students in No.1 School had a very good capability to understand its contents. Mr. Wen also pointed out that some students might be more knowledgeable than him, as they read a lot of books. This was verified in my observations; in a lesson about the materialism of the world, a typical Marxism statement adopted by the communist regime, Mr. Wen stated that the theory of Creationism made no sense, and was a theory rejected by Marxism, as Marxism was atheist in its outlook. Surprisingly, the students, who generally kept quiet, burst into small discussions without Mr. Wen's permission. One student sitting in front of me stated loudly to the class that he thought Creationism did make sense because it explained everything. Later, another student added that there was no consensus about the origins of the world, and that many theories were just assumptions. "Theories only can

be falsified," a third student commented. These comments indicated the students agreed with

neither creationism nor materialism. It was very clear their statements were not from textbooks,

at least not from the Thought and Politics textbooks. After the class, I said to Mr. Wen that these

students were really good and hard to deal with; he agreed, saying, "Yeah. I am a little bit afraid

of these students. You know, they will read extra books. There is just a student saying that he is

reading a philosophy book published by the Oxford University and he asks me a question from

that book!"

In terms of lecturing, Mr. Wen admitted that his pedagogy was mainly lecturing and

knowledge based. He claimed that, although the new Thought and Politics textbooks encouraged

employing more activities and problem-based learning, teachers would not adopt these

pedagogies in reality because of testing demands.

> I do not say we have no activities. However, there are very few. Why? Because of
> the pressure of the examination. There is no way to change it……If you did not
> make students get A, you must have problems. First and foremost, the evaluation
> of us are based on how many of our students get A and have scores beyond 90
> scores. (Mr. Wen, interview)

The new examination reform also reinforced testing-oriented pedagogy. Although it

offered students more opportunities to take the NCEE, the reform pushed teachers to teach

textbooks more quickly so as to have more time to prepare for the first test, which started in the

spring semester of Grade 11. Mr. Wen said the study period for the Thought and Politics

curriculum had changed from two years to one-and-a-half years, or even just one. Therefore,

before the examination reform, he had more time to say things unrelated to textbooks; now he

had to cut things out to stay on schedule. If he could not finish lessons on time, students would

blame him. The speedup of teaching was easily observed; when I came to No.1 School, Mr. Wen

had almost completed the Political Life textbook, which was usually taught over an entire spring

semester. During the spring semester, he finished the Life and Philosophy textbook and covered three-fourths of the contents of Cultural Life, which should be taught the next year. In addition, to save even more time, he would skip lessons on which students would not be tested.

Although Mr. Wen's classes were full of lecturing and test-based pedagogy, they were certainly not boring. Many students were strongly interested in listening to him, interacting with him, and questioning him, partly because he liked to use vivid examples and events from students' daily life to explain things and to help students deal with their daily issues, including how to deal with competitions and anxiety, treat other students, be positive about life, and so on. Mr. Wen treated these as elements of moral education, and valued them as meaningful for his teaching. To influence students and to lead them to be good persons was the whole aim of Mr. Wen's moral education agenda; in this sense, Mr. Wen's cherishing of citizenship education was a part of that agenda. Another factor explaining students' interest in Mr. Wen's class might be that Mr. Wen encouraged students to question, discuss, and comment on what they have learned (as the Creationism episode showed), which gave students space to express their ideas. Some students also said they had strong interests in philosophy, which was a course Mr. Wen taught during my observation.

Confronting students' challenges of socialist ideology

Chapter Six touched on students' challenges of socialist ideology, specifically that they thought socialist ideology was a cliché and mocked socialist slogans such as "study for the rise of China." Earlier in this chapter, students' objections to China's official atheism revealed that they questioned the doctrine of Marxism. However, students' challenges toward the curriculum and socialist ideology went beyond its these. Some thought the textbooks were very bad and

socialist ideology was a brainwashing tool; others appreciated narratives countering official discourses.

One day, following his class on Marxist philosophy, I waited for Mr. Wen in the back of the classroom, as he was surrounded by students asking questions. During my wait, a boy sitting in the back of the classroom came to me and complained about the textbooks in a very frustrated tone: "I think the textbook of Thought and Politics s are very awful. What should I do?" This was not a question I had expected[3] but was not an isolated case. When I sought other students' opinions about the Thought and Politics textbooks, while some thought the textbooks were interesting, other students in both schools considered the textbooks and the politics curriculum to be brainwashing and boring. A few days later, I told Mr. Wen this and asked how he would have replied to this student. Mr. Wen laughed and said, "Well, it is easy. Telling this student that the textbook will change in the future. To be honest, these textbooks, sometimes, when I read, I feel disgusting." I was shocked once again. I noticed Mr. Wen sometimes criticized the textbooks for their lack of logic in front of the class, which partly explained students' questioning them, but I never thought he would feel disguised by the textbooks.

Sometimes, students would publicly express their dislike of the textbooks and socialist ideology. In another lesson, relating to the topic "people as the subject of social history," Mr. Wen mentioned to students that President Xi had called for the members of the Politburo to learn

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[3] I was shocked by this student's question and wondered that he might think the opinions in the philosophy textbook had some problems. Instead of asking why he thought the textbooks awful, I suggested to him that the textbooks only demonstrated one way of philosophical thinking, he could reach out other philosophical books. "If you didn't agree with Mr. Wen, you can debate with him." I smiled. "Well, you know." The boy shrugged his shoulder and glanced at Mr. Wen, indicating there was no way he would win the debate. "But what if I read other books and found their opinions were different from the textbooks? I would be lost." He said. "Well, testing is testing, you might need to treat them differently." I replied without thinking too much. After we finished our conversation, I immediately realized my way of replying to this students' question was problematic. Rather than digging out his worries, I assumed his thoughts on the textbooks matched mine. Also, I was telling students not to treat textbooks seriously. Nevertheless, students' worry about the textbooks was real.

things and had promoted some cadres after becoming president. Mr. Wen then asked the students, "If you were a member of the politburo, what class you would take?" One student responded, "Well, it probably will be the politics class to keep the thinking of members pure and advanced." Mr. Wen echoed this answer, "Yeah, to keep its purity and advanced nature, and to let the Party members put people in their heart. However, why?" Another student replied, "For brainwashing." The whole class burst out laughing. Mr. Wen also laughed without showing any anger or embarrassment at this unexpected answer. "Brainwashing? Hmmm. Indeed, you guys did not understand deeply. Why we should learn historical materialism, why the Party members should put people in the heart? Indeed, every political opinion has a deep principle." Mr. Wen said without responding to the issue of brainwashing too directly. By asking students why they should learn Marxism, Mr. Wen tried to legitimate the need for learning Marxism through emphasizing its insights. He then introduced the main topic of the lesson; that is, that people were the creators of history. That is why he reframed the first student's answer by adding the point about helping Party members keep the people in their hearts.

Another episode showed students' resistance to the official discourse and to official serious representations of the president. During my fieldwork, a funny video about President Jiang Zemin[4] was very popular among students. Two students in the class even demonstrated a behavior art in the school by posting a sentence from President Jiang on their bodies: "If one should uphold his country's interest, he should lay down his life; he should not do things just to pursue his personal gains and he should not be evaded responsibilities for fear of personal loss"

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[4] The video gathered some funny behaviors from President Jiang, including his angry reply to a journalist in Hong Kong, which criticized the journalist as too young and naïve to ask questions about the CCP's intervention on the nomination of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong in 2000; his interview with an famous American journalist in which he spoke English; and an occasion in which he talked about his attitude when he got to know his presidential nomination during the Tiananmen event in 1989 by using a poem in Imperial China..

(*Gou li guojia shengsi yi, qi yin huofu qubi zhi*). This sentence showed strong patriotism, but somehow was lampooned by the students.

There were several strategies by which Mr. Wen dealt with students' disbelief of socialist ideology. First, Mr. Wen frankly admitted students' dislike of Marxism. He once mentioned in the front of the class that students might not like what they heard about Marxism and might think of Marxism as an old thing; however, he emphasized that Marxism was changing and progressing. By emphasizing Marxism's legacy of change, Mr. Wen passed students the message that Marxism was not an absolute truth, thereby deconstructing the absolute authority of Marxism to make students feel closer to the theory. Moreover, he told students that the development of Western capitalism should give thanks to Marx, because it is was Marx's theories that helped the West, particularly the Nordic countries, to adjust and resolve their inner conflicts. Through showing Marxism's impact on the Western countries, Mr. Wen tried to prove Marxism's power in society. However, without showing the real power of Marxism, which focuses on the analysis of social structure and the concept of class, students' understanding of Marxism was limited to abstract concepts of historical and material dialectics. However, students' dislike of Marxism was reduced a bit by Mr. Wen's deconstruction.

Second, Mr. Wen could not avoid talking about the mistakes in China's socialist rebuilding, and in doing so won his students' hearts. One day, in a lesson relating to Marxist philosophy, Mr. Wen mentioned that the Great Leap Forward movement did not obey the laws of human society: "It is just not possible for us to surpass Britain in three years and catch up with the United States in five," Mr. Wen said. After he stopped, the whole class students immediately clapped their hands to show their appreciation for Mr. Wen's speaking the truth. Mr. Wen also criticized the mistakes of Mao Zedong and the worship of Mao after the Cultural Revolution. In

addition, he admitted to students that Deng's "Cat" theory was outdated. Although the mistakes of the past were readily spoken of, Mr. Wen rarely criticized current issues and confirmed the reasonability of current sayings, such as Scientific Outlook on Development and anti-corruption.

When it came to current China, teachers needed to be very cautious about their narratives, particularly in public spaces. In one public lesson, a young teacher used a popular TV drama, *In the Name of People*, to explain a Marxist principle. The drama itself was about the anti-corruption movement advocated by the CCP and was popular because it showed the serious corruption in the government and the Party, which was very seldom seen in TV shows. The young teacher used one corruption case from the drama to introduce the concepts of social existence and social awareness, which was both impressive and interesting. However, after her class, another politics curriculum teacher who also had a position in the administration department pointed out that the young teacher needed to pass a correct Party image to students:

> As you just demonstrated small corruptions in low level officials and big corruptions in high level officials, I worry it will leave a bad Party image to students. However, if you could emphasize that other positive figures in the drama to show that our Party is good in general, I think it will be better. And the extent of anti-corruption in this drama is very large, you could emphasize it and say it shows the Party's determination. (classroom observation, public lesson)

This politics curriculum teacher's words well represented the official stance towards talking about politics in public. It was allowable to talk about corruption and mistakes in the past, but teachers needed to emphasize and maintain students believe in the goodness of the Party. In addition, when talking about past mistakes, these must be officially approved mistakes and teachers needed to follow the official version of these events.

A third strategy Mr. Wen used was to urge students to pin their hopes on the future, as his reaction in the textbook episode showed. By telling students that the textbooks would change in

the future and that the future for trial was bright and promising, Mr. Wen tried to give them hope, while at the same time tempering their demands for immediate change. Despite Mr. Wen's assurances, the future might not be good, as the new curriculum emphasizes more socialist ideology.

Ms. Qu: Humanitarian Caring and Memorizing

Ms. Qu was the politics curriculum teacher in No. 6 school, which was much smaller than No.1 School, and whose students' academic performance was far behind that of their peers in No.1 School. Very few of the school's students could get into first-tier universities in China.

In this school, the humanities track was much more popular than the science track, and most students chose at least two subjects in the humanities for their NCEE. The politics curriculum was quite popular, with around half of all students choosing politics as an exam subject. Teachers explained that the school encouraged students to choose this subject, as they thought doing so might improve their chances of getting a better academic score. This was verified by a poster, hanging in a classroom hallway on the second floor, then offered "guidance for choosing examination subjects" and discussed the relative difficulty of learning different subjects and their relevance to universities. It also introduced the competitiveness of choosing different subjects. When it came to politics, the poster said:

> Politics: degree of difficulty 2/5; demand to universities 2/5
> There are many testing questions in politics based on memories. However, these questions are simple yet very boring, such as materialism and metaphysics, which are really boring knowledge. Many students in the second-tier high schools would like to choose this subject. This subject is good for students who are not good at computing but write cleanly.

The poster presented politics as the easiest subject to learn but the least demanded by universities. It pointed out memory and clean writing as the two most important elements to learn this subject well. Although it claimed the subject's contents were very boring, it encouraged students to choose it because, compared with other subjects, such as physics, requiring competences of computation, imagination, and mathematics, politics was much easier for students in No. 6 school to learn.

Ms. Qu was in her late 40s. She had long hair and always smiled. She was an interesting woman with a broad range of hobbies, and who was very nice to her students. She took Yoga classes, drew Chinese pictures, had a podcast in which she read articles and essays to her audience, practiced Chinese physical exercises in the office, and used Chinese medicine to help students deal with their health issues. Her office was quite popular, and students sometimes would come by just to say hello to her. In addition, Ms. Qu was a volunteer in her community, giving lectures relating to healthy living to her neighbors on weekends.

In 1989, Ms. Qu was a normal college student and demonstrated alongside her classmates on the streets of her city with her classmates in response to the Tiananmen Square Movement, which she saw as an anti-corruption demonstration. After Tiananmen, many of her classmates were distributed into jobs at the local level as a punishment. Ms. Qu was allocated a teaching job in a rural area, although she had been born in the city. Two years later, in 1991, she started to study for an undergraduate diploma in the College of Politics and Economy in a Normal University in her province. She spent a quite interesting and free four years, writing poems, engaging in literature, and reading many books based on her own interests, such as history, ethics, philosophy (including Schopenhauer and Nietzsche), and Western economy. After her graduation, Ms. Qu was again required to work in a middle school in a rural county. Five years

later, she transferred to Zhejiang Province and became a teacher in No. 6 school. She once taught history, politics, and geography at both the middle school and high school levels, when No.6 School had a middle school. However, now, with the removal of No.6 School's middle school, Ms. Qu focuses on teaching politics at the high school level. During her early stage in No.6 School, she earned a law school degree from a university in the city, through informal education.

What impressed me most about Ms. Qu were her enthusiasm for learning and her attitude toward life-long learning, when she attributed to her desire not to be bored or burned out by her job. For those reasons, Ms. Qu also thought the frequent changing of textbooks was a good thing for her, as she could adjust her class and learn new things through lesson planning.

"Only politics curriculum teachers can save the politics curriculum"

"Only politics curriculum teachers can save the politics curriculum" is a sentence that came up whenever Ms. Qu talked about the changes in students, who were increasingly self-aware and more willing to challenge teachers' traditional pedagogy. Ms. Qu explained that this sentence was very popular online many years ago.

Why did the politics curriculum need to be saved? Ms. Qu pointed out it had credibility issues stemming from two factors. First, teachers used lecturing and indoctrinating to teach, which was so boring that students would not buy into whatever was being caught. Second, public opinion was very different from the textbooks, and teachers had to tread the gap between reality and the textbooks carefully: "You could not only tell students how good the CCP was and how good the government was, you must use your own life examples to verify those and use students' life experience to testify those. Because, you know, now the public opinions do not match the political textbooks very much," Ms. Qu said.

Ms. Qu was bothered by the same issues that confronted Mr. Wen in No.1 School; that is, students' resistance toward socialist ideology and the good image of the CCP. However, different from Mr. Wen's case, I never saw students in Ms. Qu's class openly and publicly express dissatisfaction with the textbooks nor disbelief in socialist ideology, although a few students said, in the interviews, that they thought the textbooks were a form of brainwashing.

Ms. Qu dealt with the credibility crisis in the politics curriculum by adopting four strategies: recognizing the gap, emphasizing subject knowledge in teaching, caring for students' humanitarian competence rather than ideological indoctrination, and cultivating her students' trust in her through her own personality. Similar to Mr. Wen, Ms. Qu did not avoid talking about the gap between reality and the textbooks. She often shared realities with her students and guided them to analyze them reasonably. Second, although the textbooks had a very clear ideological function, Ms. Qu placed more emphasis on their professional knowledge content, partly due to the test-oriented nature of high school education. She less talked about ideological issues, thus somewhat diminishing the potential for ideological indoctrination. Third, when it came to promoting students' thinking, rather than caring about their identification with the CCP, Ms. Qu focused on cultivating their humanity, which was one of the two goals of her teaching, the second being knowledge. Ms. Qu thought humanity as the key for students' future happiness, and so focused on helping students to become a noble in spirit, respect others and history, behaves in a civil manner, and have good taste. This goal fit well with her own interest in literature. While the scant attention she paid to her students' identification with the CCP reflected her thought about the Party. Ms. Qu was not a CCP member, and once explained that she knew too much about the CCP to have any interest in joining it, which made sense, given her participation in the Tiananmen Square Movement. The fourth strategy Ms. Qu used was to

increase the credibility of the textbooks was to make herself trustworthy: "If you would like to make the textbooks trustworthy, you need to let students trust you first, then she/he will trust the words that you say."

Dancing with shackles on: Identifying and memorizing the key points of the textbooks

Ms. Qu made examinations her teaching priority, which she saw as being shackled. When I told Ms. Qu that I had found many teachers would follow the textbooks' framework when teaching, she responded, in a resigned tone, "Yes, because those contents were all the tests would test. We had nothing to do with it. To speak frankly, we are dancing with shackles on."

The shackles of examination and the textbooks shaped Ms. Qu's teaching. Her typical teaching routine was to let students prepare five questions relating to the textbooks' contents for three minutes, and then ask a few students to answer their own questions publicly for one minute. After that, she began to introduce the key questions for that lesson, which usually related to the key points in the textbooks. Then, she would require students to take a few minutes to read the textbooks, keeping the questions she proposed in mind. After that, she began to lecture, with little space for students to discuss and to question, before ending with a summary to remind students the key points covered in the class.

Ms. Qu's major task in the class was to let students understand the logic, key points, and tested contents of the textbooks. All her classroom activities served this aim. The section featuring students' self-questioning and self-answering aimed to familiarize students with the contents and memorize them for future testing. Usually, students would ask each other questions on such topics as the nature and function of the government, citizens' rights, approaches to political participation, CCP principles, the responsibilities of the people's deputies, and so on.

However, memorizing was a painful experience for students, many of whom complained, in the interviews, that memorizing textbooks was just too hard, with some even saying they hated it.

Considering the importance of memorization for getting a good subject test score, Ms. Qu introduced memory training to the class, encouraging students to use associative memory to strengthen their impression of the contents. For example, she suggested using an imagined letter to link the four approaches (using the petitioning system, expressing opinions through people deputies, using news media, and attending hearings) by thinking of to whom they were going to send the letter and where to send it. However, it was doubtful whether this technique would help students' civic engagement in their daily life.

Ms. Qu also provided students with a framework for the textbooks through the questions she posed to students before lecturing. However, these questions mainly referred to nature, role, and principles of whatever was being addressed in that lecture. Rather than facilitating students' critical thinking about the topics, Ms. Qu's questions scaffolded them to identify the important textbooks information on which they would be tested. Therefore, students' reading of the textbooks and their answering of Ms. Qu's questions in the class was utility based and largely depended on their reading skills rather than other skills.

Although Ms. Qu's teaching was constrained by examinations and textbooks, she still had some space to do things differently. One space came from the examples she used in the classroom. As Ms. Qu cared about students' humanity and was herself interested in literature, she used many examples not taken from the textbooks, such Qing dynasty poetry and cultural combinations by Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. The most impressive example of this during my classroom observations was her referencing, in a lesson on International Relations, the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamyan in Afghanistan in 2001, as example of the impact of

international conflicts. I was impressed because this case was quite old but exactly showed Ms. Qu's interests in history and humanitarian caring. Moreover, while the case was not directly related to the textbooks, Ms. Qu mentioned it in an appropriate manner and at an appropriate time to remind students to cherish their cultural heritage. When I asked Ms. Qu why she would add many extra contents in class, she responded that part of the reason was to promote students' other skills, and part was to kill time. Another space Ms. Qu created was to encourage students to read the news during their spare time and to write comments for the news column posted on the politics curriculum teachers' office wall. Ms. Qu explained that, as many students were boarding at school, this strategy would encourage them to read the news and give them confidence when they saw their comments posted. More importantly, however, this strategy was useful for helping students to prepare for questions related to the news in the subject tests.

Citizenship education: To reach the bottom line

As the main aims for Ms. Qu's teaching were teaching knowledge and cultivating students' humanity; citizenship education was not very important on her teaching agenda. Indeed, she conceptualized citizenship at a minimal and passive level, limited to hoping students would obey the law and have empathy for others.

> Well, I think every people who has a Chinese nationality is a Chinese citizen. As a citizen, the basic requirement she/he needing to reach is to obey the Constitution and laws. I think this is the bottom line. If she/he could reach this, then we can have an appropriate requirement on morality…Morality is uncertain, and everybody has a different understanding about morality. (Ms. Qu, interview)

Ms. Qu did not give morality a very important place in citizenship education. When asked what kind of morality she wanted students to have as citizens, she referred to empathy, saying, "Well, having empathy and being a living human. If you could be tolerance and feel

empathy to others, this is a much higher level," Ms. Qu said. Her considering of empathy matched her caring for students' humanity.

Therefore, Ms. Qu did not have a strong commitment to implementing citizenship education to raise students' rights awareness, encourage their political engagement, or promote their patriotism and political identification with the CCP. She just followed what the textbooks presented and introduced students to citizen rights and responsibilities, approaches to democratic political participation, voting, and basic knowledge of the Chinese government and party system. She called her pedagogy on these things "empty talk" without practice. Regarding democratic political participation, she admitted she honestly did not think democratic supervision could make any difference to governance, because it just could not work in China. However, she did emphasize a little bit with democratic public-decision making and management, hoping it would help students to understand some societal phenomena. However, she encouraged students to participate in community service by using her own volunteer experience as an example.

In terms of voting, Ms. Qu herself did not think the voting of people's deputies would make any difference. She described it as pro forma behavior, something that followed procedure but had no real function. However, she allowed that following procedure was progress, compared with the past. Ms. Qu also frankly pointed out the deficiencies of people's deputies system, including that it was a part-time job, limiting deputies' time and passion to investigate issues in their community and propose suggestions. When asked whether she would talk about those issues to students, she said she would, and would also mention how deputies (or their equivalent) worked in Western countries.

Consistent with her passive attitude toward citizenship education and voting, Ms. Qu had a very limited commitment to democracy. She thought democracy did not matter in China and that any political regime a country adopted was shaped by that country's politics and history:

> To be honest, I think, democracy is not necessary must be a very good thing. If a political regime works appropriate for the country, it is acceptable. Such as China, we have 1.4 billion population, how to rule? It is already very uneasy for us to reach current progress. We get rid of hungry and cold now. It is very difficult to make it. (Ms. Qu, interview)

Therefore, based on the reality that China was heavily populated and difficult to rule, and the achievements China had realized under the leadership of the CCP, Ms. Qu accepted the legitimacy of the current political regime, following the logic of the textbooks. However, Ms. Qu said she hoped the government could improve its awareness of serving people and that people's awareness of democracy could be improved in the future.

Ms. Qu's mistrust of democracy was also reflected in her thoughts on democracy in schools and her experiences in the teachers' union. She pointed out that the democracy in schools only belonged to the inner circle of leaders who would decide things, including middle-level leaders and high-level leaders, commenting "An ordinary teacher indeed has no say in those things." Although the school did have a teachers' union which ideally was a place for teachers to express their needs and suggestions, Ms. Qu questioned its real function: "Even though you said something in the teachers' union, the leaders would just listen and did not take any actions. It wouldn't make any difference."

When it came to patriotic education, Ms. Qu's attitude was very similar to that of Mr. Wen, in that she was not dedicated to promoting students' political identification with the Party and strong patriotic feelings. Instead, she understood patriotism as "simple patriotism," that is, loving one's self and one's family first, then loving one's country. Ms. Qu said, "The patriotism

in the past was too abstract. Now I feel it needs to come down to earth. Telling students to love their classmates and teachers, That is patriotic. As long as you got along with others, society will be in harmony, then the country will be stable."

The failure of teaching ethnic issues

The failure of teaching ethnic issues revealed the difficulty of meaningful citizenship education. In the politics textbooks, how to deal with ethnic issues was an integral part of the construction of citizenship awareness about the political community, which was highly related to multicultural citizenship education. The textbooks emphasized a united Chinese nation and the equity between different ethnicities. However, the teaching of ethnic issues was not easy for teachers, partly due to the teachers' lack of knowledge of minority ethnicities and partly due to students' lack of interaction with minority ethnicities.

In the lesson about China's ethnic policy, Ms. Qu mainly wanted students to understand the ethnic equality policy in China. After introducing China's principles for dealing with ethnic issues, Ms. Qu pointed out to students that, although the textbook said there was no ethnic discrimination now, discrimination still exists; however, she did not explain what that discrimination was. This was not surprising, since Ms. Qu said she would talk about reality to deal with the textbooks' credibility crisis. For example, when mentioning the unity of minority ethnicities, Ms. Qu also frankly pointed out the independence movements of Tibet and Uygur, which were never presented in the textbooks. However, Ms. Qu did not go deeply into these issues. For her, merely mentioning the Tibet and Uygur issues was sufficient to show that only through the unity of different ethnicities could China develop well. With lots of time left in the class, Ms. Qu switched her emphasis to introducing the excellent people in different minority ethnicities and some minority groups' traditional festivals, albeit on a very simple level. At the

end of this class, she reminded students to treat minority ethnicity equally and to avoid nationalist Chauvinism. It was hard to tell what students would learn from this class; they might learn something of the ethnic equality policy, become aware of Tibet and Uygur issues without knowing why and how they emerged, or gather a very little knowledge about some minority ethnicities. However, they would not understand what the sufferings of minority ethnicities were.

Apparently, Ms. Qu preferred to enrich students' understanding of minority ethnicities, which was consistent with her interests in humanities education. One day, she proudly mentioned to me that, in another homeroom class, she had encouraged a student from a minority ethnicity to research his own ethnicity but was rejected by that student; however, another student said that he wanted to study the Khui nationality—the third-largest minority ethnicity in China, which was comprised of Muslims. Ms. Qu was so happy that she asked this student to find other cohorts to do the project together. She explained to me that, now that the cultures of minority ethnicities were being destroyed by the dominant Han culture, she wanted students to know something about their culture. However, the project was not going well. Although Ms. Qu encouraged students to do some research on the Khui, she did not give them any further guidance, she just let them do things on their own. When the student who came up the idea came to the office to report his group's progress, Ms. Qu asked how they did the research and how they communicated with Khui people. It turned out their research was a failure. The students went to a popular noodle restaurant that was supposedly run by Khui in hopes of meeting members of that ethnicity. However, when they learned the boss of the restaurant was not a Khui, just someone who had lived in a Khui area many years ago, they felt frustrated and stopped their questions. For me, the migration experience of the boss might have been an interesting story to look into—why he left the Khui area, what his experiences with Khui people were, why he ran a Khui restaurant even

though he/himself was not Khui, whether he could introduce other Khui people in the city, etc. However, as these students were quite young and had no experience in doing research, they missed an opportunity to learn.

Ms. Qu also did not realize the potential in the boss' stories. She just accepted the students' failure and did not give any further guidance. When the student submitted his group's report, I had a chance to look it over, and quickly discovered everything they wrote came from the Internet, including the history of the Khui, the origin of the name, and the group's traditional festivals; it did introduce the Khui, but in a very superficial way. However, Ms. Qu was very satisfied with students' report and planned to make a poster of it to set before the wall of the office, hoping other students would learn something about the Khui from this poster. In the interview, she explained that she was easily satisfied by the students' project because she thought there were too few supports and too little time for students to do such things:

> Our system is different from the Western system. In the Western country, you need to do research if you wanted to study something. However, in China, there are not so many supports. Students stay in the classroom for a whole day. How can I ask them to do research? If students spent their spare time a little bit on politics, it is already very good. (Ms. Qu, interview）

Ms. Qu's statement was quite true. On the one hand, doing research as a learning strategy was not very popular in China and the public services relating to these activities were quite limited. On the other hand, students had to spend a lot of time on their study; therefore, the time they could commit to doing projects was limited. More importantly, this activity was proposed by Ms. Qu unofficially, meaning students could not get support from the school. Another factor influencing the effectiveness of this activity was the lack of professional knowledge supporting it, such as knowledge about doing research and knowledge about ethnic minorities.

Ms. Yang: Dedicated to Teaching Subject-knowledge

Ms. Yang was around 24 years old, and had just graduated from a normal university in China the year before I met her. She had short hair and was always in a good mood, in addition to being very smart and efficient in her teaching and daily work. Ms. Yang described herself as a person with no dreams who nonetheless hoped to be an interesting person in her life and in her work. She enjoyed tasty food and often went to the gym to maintain a good physical and mental state.

To be a politics curriculum teacher was never Ms. Yang's dream. It was more a result of her carefully calculating her possibility of getting into a good university. Ms. Yang said her academic performance in the high school was not good enough to get into a good university; as such, she applied for the teacher training program in the normal university, which received applications and interviewed students before the NCEE.[5] However, there were only a few majors opened to humanities-track students like Ms. Yang. She chose to major in Literature and Politics but was only admitted to the Politics major, because her score did not reach the threshold for the Literature major. In her four years of college life, she took classes the departments of political science and education for three years and interned as a politics curriculum teacher in another good high school in her current city for one year. While in the normal university, in addition to taking courses, she also volunteered in a migrant-children school.

To my surprise, Ms. Yang said her university learning contributed nothing to her teaching. Instead, it was her high school politics curriculum teacher who influenced her teaching practice most. She explained,

> Because there is a huge gap between the knowledge learning from the university
> and that learning from the high school. There are not so many

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[5] If a student passed the interview, she/he would get extra scores to add on her/his national college examination scores to apply for the university.

interconnections…The things I learned at university cannot be used in the classroom because these things were at much higher level whereas the contents in the high school are just basic requirements. To be honest, I use my own learning strategies in high school and what my politics curriculum teachers taught me to teach these students. I feel I am influenced by my high school politics curriculum teachers most. (Ms. Yang, interview)

Ms. Yang said that although some concepts in the philosophy course she taught at high school related to the Marxist philosophy she learned in the university, and some concepts in Economic Life were included in the introductory courses in economics and Marxist economy that she learned at university, she still could not directly integrate what she learned at the university into her teaching at the high school. The gap between the knowledge taught in university and the knowledge taught in high school reveals the challenges facing teacher training programs in China.

As a novice teacher, Ms. Yang admitted she was not as good as more experienced teachers, and faced several challenges. First, she found it difficult to attract students to learn the subject, mainly due to tests and the boringness of the textbooks: "The textbooks are boring, but you have to teach the things that will be tested…Some contents, as you know, such as the Cultural Life, there is not so many things to teach, but you have to teach," Ms. Yang complained to me. I completely understood her critique of Cultural Life, which talked about the impacts of culture on people in a very superficial way. I expressed this to politics curriculum teachers in both schools, and most agreed with me.

The second challenge Ms. Yang experienced was lesson planning. As a novice teacher, she took a long time to prepare a lesson, as she was not yet familiar with the textbooks. The most difficult thing, she found, was to make a smooth connection between different knowledge contents in the textbooks. I responded that I sometimes thought the disconnection was caused by

the textbooks; however, Ms. Yang stated that experienced teachers could make the connections much better, and moreover made better connections between knowledge and real life. She also pointed out that experienced teachers better knew what knowledge was important, what was not, and at what point students would feel confused. All these were things she felt she needed to improve.

The third challenge to Ms. Yang was the test-oriented evaluation system, which was also mentioned by Mr. Wen and Ms. Qu. Ms. Yang thought it was unfair to evaluate a teacher based solely on his or her students' academic performance, because students themselves should be at least somewhat responsible for their testing scores and there were academic performances gaps between classes. However, she had to accept the reality, and so convinced herself to care less about the evaluation system and not to compare herself with others. Instead, she paid more attention to her students' real growth. Still, as test scores would determine her students' college application, Ms. Yang dedicated a lot to of her teaching to preparing students for examinations.

Subject-knowledge oriented pedagogy: To prepare testing and basic political competence

Like Mr. Wen and Ms. Qu, Ms. Yang's teaching of the politics curriculum mainly focused on the knowledge on which students would be tested. She described this as an unchangeable theme. She used lecturing to introduce the key points of the textbooks, required students to memorize these key points by checking a few students' memorizations in each lesson, and asked students to do mind-maps to summarize the textbooks, which helped them strengthen their memory of the contents. Different from Mr. Wen and Ms. Qu, Ms. Yang spent a lot of time clarifying students' misconceptions about some knowledge, to improve their accuracy in the tests. Although some misconceptions seemed trivial, they were still important to making the correct answers. For example, students must use **administrating** (*xing zheng*) in relation to the

government, but **governing** (*zhi zheng*) in relation to the CCP. Similarly, they need to distinguish between the **fundamental** political system (referring to the people's congress system) and the **basic** political system (referring to the ethnic regional autonomy system), and needed to specify the four power of the people's congress, including the power of legislation, the power of decision, the power of appointment and firing, and the power of supervision. Inspired by her high school teacher, Ms. Yang tried to teach students strategies for answering test questions effectively. She thought the key to making correct answers on politics curriculum tests was developed students' competence in two areas: reading skills for understanding what the test questions were really asking, and their thinking skills, which can be trained through question-answering strategies. Memorizing was still a basic requirement, which is why she checked students' memorization in class.

However, the most valuable things she wanted students to develop were a corrective way of seeing the world and a corrective value system. When asked how she defined "corrective," Ms. Yang clarified, "Well, it may cannot be named as corrective. Or we can say, scientific. Such as, when we talk about the attitude toward consumption, we are educating students to be rational consumers. And students need to have a basic sense about society, politics, and philosophy." Ms. Yang categorized being rational and having basic knowledge about what was happening in society as basic political competence. She perceived the politics curriculum as a unique platform for helping students to know what was happening in the world, unlike other curricula, which did not often speak about those things. She hoped students would pay attention to changes in public policy and international affairs, as she thought these changes influenced people's lives and were necessary for students to understand. Compared with Mr. Wen's emphasis on morality and Ms.

Qu's emphasis on humanity, Ms. Yang's caring for students' political competence was much more closely related to the politics subject.

Indeed, the element of political competence was well integrated into Ms. Yang's class. She talked about political news relating to the contents of the textbooks with purpose and encouraged students to think more about political news. In the lessons relating to international relations, she mentioned the THAAD issue, including a detailed explanation on what THAAD was, what its impacts were, and why China objected to it, offering much more information, rather than parroting the official media and encouraging students to support the state's stance unconditionally. By analyzing political news and public policy, Ms. Yang guided students to think rationally.

Sometimes, Ms. Yang would introduce extra knowledge not included in the textbooks in the class. Students would not be tested on these pieces of knowledge, but she thought they were important to help students to understand the politics subject. In a class about the political party system in China, Ms. Yang explained that a political party was an organization that aimed to form or maintain a political regime or influence politics, and that represented the interests of a certain class, social status, or group. She also introduced the concepts of ruling and opposition parties, which was not the case of China but offered a rich basis for thinking about political parties. She also used videos to vividly introduce the people's congress system to students, offering much more information than the textbooks.

In terms of the political ideology, different from Ms. Qu and Mr. Wen's concern about the crisis of political ideology, Ms. Yang never expressed worries about this issue, either in the interview or in the classroom. To some point, she treated political ideology as objective knowledge that needed to be taught, rather than something students needed believe in. In the

lesson on the CCP, Ms. Yang skipped the part about model members of the Party in favor of a very short introduction to theories on socialism, partly because the planned contents were not important and students would not be tested on them.

To some extent, the teaching of subject knowledge would deconstruct official ideology. In the lesson on the determining factors in international relations, Ms. Yang tried to use the THAAD issue once again to demonstrate how conflicts of interests changed international relations. She showed the historical relationships between South Korea and China, including those between corporations since 1992, and outlined the conflicts caused by the THAAD. She asked students to consider what South Korea's and China's respective interests were in the THAAD issue. Through analyzing international relations from the perspective of interests and history, Ms. Yang demonstrated a complex picture of the international world, showing students that the current conflicts between China and South Korea were temporary. Therefore, her teaching had the potentiality to diminish the official attitude of hostility toward South Korea and to enable students to think about international relations more objectively.

Citizenship education: To introduce basic political knowledge

Ms. Yang saw herself as a responsible citizen, who was neither very passive nor very active. She voted for the people's deputy in her community, participated in volunteer programs in her college, and would propose suggestions to No.6 School when given an opportunity. In terms of voting, although she felt the information provided about the candidates was too limited, she still voted for the candidate she thought might best represent teachers' interests. She did not have any other experience in political participation, because she did not have any issue over which she needed to interact with the government. Regarding civic engagement, Ms. Yang once volunteered for a year to read books to rural migrant children, which she found very meaningful.

In terms of her attitude toward democracy, different from Ms. Qu's frustration with democracy in the school, Ms. Yang held a positive attitude, saying the school had democratic meetings for the evaluation of school leaders and teachers could propose suggestions to the teachers' union. While Ms. Qu thought suggestions offered to the teachers' union would make no difference, Ms. Yang seemed to believe they would, even though she had no firsthand knowledge.

It is hard to tell why Ms. Qu and Ms. Yang held different attitudes toward the school's democracy. One possible explanation is that, as Ms. Yang had only been at the school for a short time, she did not understand the reality of "performing democracy" in the school. Or, it may be because Ms. Yang was expected to do more school work by the school leaders, and was therefore more involved in the community, which might have contributed to her trust in the democracy in the community. A third explanation relates to the generation gap between the two teachers. Compared with Ms. Qu, Ms. Yang was much more active to encourage students to propose suggestions via the school's "suggestion box" and cared whether the school would really adopt students' suggestions. She once asked the teacher responsible for the suggestion box to ensure students' suggestions would be taken seriously.

Regarding citizenship education, Ms. Yang was not strange to the concept. To my surprise, she had taken a course in citizenship education in her college; however, she said she had forgotten what she had been taught in the class and her only memory was that she needed to be tested. However, Ms. Yang thought real citizenship education involved encouraging students to be good citizens and cultivating students' competences, which she found hard to achieve in the current educational system due to the influence of the tests. For her, real citizenship education was not only about knowledge, but also about skills of civic engagement; however, due to the tests, teachers did not have very much time to teach extra knowledge or offer extra activities. In

addition, she thought citizenship education set too-high requirements for teachers, because good

citizenship education needed teachers to know exactly what to teach and how to teach students

about citizenship.

Similar to Ms. Qu, Ms. Yang did not show too much commitment to citizenship

education; instead, she just followed what the textbooks showed to students, and taught students

the concepts of political rights, approaches to civic engagement, and basic knowledge about

China's political system and the CCP. Ms. Yang said she just hoped students would gain a basic

knowledge about politics, their political rights, and how the people's congress worked, which

were required knowledge for the tests and important for students' future lives. However, unlike

Ms. Qu, Ms. Yang would integrate extra political knowledge into her teaching, as her previously

mentioned explanation of political parties showed. She also used many daily cases in her

teaching to make politics more understandable to her students. When she taught democratic

decision making, she used a case of a hearing about highway charges in the city to help students

know what a hearing was and how public policy was made. She learned of this case while

watching a video on the bus.

In terms of patriotic education, different from Ms. Qu's emphasis on a simple patriotism,

Ms. Yang hoped her students would become rational patriots. She had a concern about radical

patriotism online and hoped students would be patriotic based on their understanding about real

China and to do reasonable things. She explained,

> There are many radical speeches online. Indeed, students would see many things
> online. They were unavoidable to see these speeches. However, they should not
> be guided by those opinions. They should not only follow what others say. I think
> people need to make a judgment based on the truth. This is what I called rational
> patriotism. (Ms. Yang, interview)

Ms. Yang used the THAAD issue as a case to explain what a rational patriotism was. She thought students should not support the state's stance unconditionally without knowing why China objected and why their support was needed. Her introduction of the historical relationship between China and South Korea and the impacts of THAAD on China served her rational patriotic education purpose. By emphasizing rationality, Ms. Yang tried to promote students to think more critically, rather than just following radical patriotism online.

Differentiating teaching strategies in different schools

One interesting theme that emerged from Ms. Yang's interview was her use of different teaching strategies in different schools. She once had an internship at a good high school in the city that was similar to No.1 School. She said her teaching at that school was much easier and more interesting. She could offer much more extra knowledge to students at that school and did not need to exactly follow what the textbooks said. Indeed, she let students read the textbooks for themselves and just supplied explanations to provide context, similar to Mr. Wen's strategy. Ms. Yang explained that she did so because students in that school were quite good, had a strong motivation to learn, did not repeatedly make the same mistakes on tests, and read political news. More important, the students she taught in that school would not choose politics for their NCEE, allowing her to face less pressure to follow the textbooks slavishly. However, when she came to No.6 School, she had to adjust her teaching strategies, as students in No.6 School were much less motivated to learn and had much less knowledge about political news. She had to require her students in No.6 School to memorize the textbook points on which they were going to be tested.

This was an interesting phenomenon. Both Ms. Qu and Ms. Yang in No.6 School emphasized memorizing, while Mr. Wen in No.1 School never asked his students to memorize textbooks. Mr. Wen's teaching seemed much more relaxed and easygoing, as he only spent

around 20 minutes per lesson lecturing, while Ms. Qu and Ms. Yang usually spent at least 30–35 minutes lecturing. Combining Mr. Wen's teaching with Ms. Yang's prior experience in a good high school, it seemed that teachers in good school place less emphasis on memorizing. As Ms. Yang explained, these different teaching strategies might be caused by the inter-school gap in students' academic capacity, and by the different role of the politics curriculum in the NCEE in these different schools, with the regular school treating the politics curriculum more seriously as it thought its students would choose this subject more often, and encouraged them to do so.

In addition, students in the two school were treated differently. In No.1 School, students were expected to be leaders in the city or even in the country, while it was expected that students in No.6 School would seldom even enter a first-tier university. Moreover, whereas No.1 School students were encouraged to attend civic engagement programs, such as civic engagement programs and service learning, students in No.6 School had far fewer resources. When asked what caused this phenomenon, some teachers attributed it to differences in students' competencies, noting it would be very easy for No.1 School students to do well in many activities, and very hard for No. 6 school students to do so. Underlying the gaps in students' competencies was the difference in available resources at the two schools, which related to the schools' students' families' social-economic status. Students in No.1 School had more access to some civic engagement programs because their parents could contribute more resources through their social networks.

Conclusion: Teaching Citizenship with Shackles on

There are many similarities between Mr. Wen, Ms. Qu, and Ms. Yang. All three taught the politics curriculum in a test-driven way, teaching knowledge on which students would be tested, skipping topics on which they would not, using lecturing to introduce key points of the

textbooks, and explaining misconceptions to improve students' performance in the tests. Ms. Qu and Ms. Yang both emphasized memorization, and their teaching was mainly shaped by the *Gao Kao* (NCEE), which teachers refer to as the Baton of *Gao Kao*. Indeed, four other teachers whom I interviewed during my fieldwork also pointed to the NCEE as the biggest challenge to and difficulty in their teaching.

The Baton of the NCEE

China restored the NCEE in 1977, shortly after the end of the Cultural Revolution, to select talented people to enter colleges. At first, the admission rate was very low, around 4.8% in 1977. It increased gradually, reaching 37% in 1995, growing to 56% in 1999 due to the massification of higher education in 1998, and reached 74.5% in 2017. However, competition for university places was still very fierce, with less than half of admitted students going to the academic higher education track, which offered much more value in the job market than the vocational track; moreover, only around 11% of students who took the NCEE could be admitted into first-tier academic universities. In terms of Zhejiang Province, around 14.0% of students who took the college entrance examination went to first-tier academic universities in 2017.

Since the restoration of the NCEE, students' examination score has been the only standard by which most students are admitted to college.[6] Therefore, the exam contributed to the test-driven nature of Chinese schools. There have been many critiques about this kind of education failure to promote students' other skills, such as collaboration, communication skills, leadership, and so forth. That is why the quality education reform, launched in 2001, aimed at enriching students' multiple skills rather than just their test-taking skills. In 2014, the Ministry of Education began to reform the NCEE, increasing the number of times students could take the

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[6] Students could earn extra scores if they were minorities, winners of the national mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology or information competitions, or athletes. But this policy was restricted since 2014.

exam and reducing the importance of the examination score by increasing the importance of students' other qualities on college applications.

However, these policies barely influenced teachers' test-driven pedagogy. As showed in this chapter, politics curriculum teachers in both schools still mainly focused on teaching the exact textbook content and knowledge on which students would be tested in the NCEE. The new educational reform in fact strengthened the test-driven nature of teaching in high schools, as it reduced the time available to teachers for teaching and sped up their teaching schedule.

The influence of the NCEE on teaching mainly functioned in several ways. First, schools used students' examination scores to evaluate teachers and to determine teachers' salary and promotion, so teachers had to pay attention to students' test scores. Second, students themselves cared about their test scores, as these scores highly influenced their opportunities to get into a good university and their future career opportunities; accordingly, they wanted their teachers to focus on test-related knowledge; "If you introduced too many things unrelated to tests, students will complain," a teacher in No.6 School said. Third, if politics curriculum teachers cared about students' future, they had to try their best to improve students' test performance, which was determined by their reading skills, answering strategies, and memories, as mentioned by Mr. Wen and Ms. Yang. Finally, with the implementation of the new educational reform, the number of students who chose the politics curriculum as an NCEE subject increased, particularly in No. 6 school, which increased politics curriculum teachers' workloads.

Accordingly, all three teachers continue to use test-driven pedagogy to teach the politics curriculum, focusing on knowledge-based education. All three teachers followed what the textbooks presented, introducing basic political rights, approaches to civic engagement, and basic knowledge about the Chinese political system and the CCP. They offered students very basic

knowledge about politics but did not really train their civic engagement skills. Ms. Qu described this education as empty talk, which exactly reflected the nature of limited citizenship education.

The space for citizenship education

However, teachers still had some space to do things differently, based on their teaching autonomy, which allowed them some latitude in deciding how they spent their time in the classroom, where they taught in the classroom, and how they valued the politics curriculum.

Although teachers were pushed to speed up their teaching, there was still some time left in every lesson, as the full 40 minutes of class time was not needed to teach the contents in the textbooks. Teachers had the autonomy to decide how they spent that time. For Mr. Wen, he let students do their homework; Ms. Qu set a self-questioning and -answering section to check students' memorization and to "kill time," as she put it; Ms. Yang also used the time to check students' memorization, or to share political news and extra knowledge.

The teachers also shared a content space to teach things they wanted to teach. This space was shaped by the external condition that teachers still had significant teaching freedom in the classroom, and by the internal condition that teachers decided how to value the politics curriculum and citizenship education. As long as they completed teaching the contents in the textbooks and covered the key points, teachers had the autonomy to decide what to say in the classroom and no one could intervene except the students—such as when Mr. Wen frankly pointed out the mistakes made by the CCP, or when Ms. Yang enumerated the gaps between what the textbook said about voting and the reality of voting. However, there was a bottom line, such that they could not criticize the current CCP too much and had to maintain the good image of the CCP, particularly when the class was open to the public, as the case of a young teacher in No.1 School showed.

The internal condition of teachers' perspectives on the real value of the politics curriculum, which is a form of the projective dimension of teachers' agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998), shaped the extent to which teachers could go beyond the textbooks. Although all teachers made testing their teaching priority, they did not really think it as the most valuable thing. They still cared about the other values of the politics curriculum, which made their teaching more meaningful and helped them to feel valued. Different teachers would value different things: Mr. Wen cared about students' morality and hoped students would be good citizens with good quality, which was important for driving change in society; Ms. Qu emphasized cultivating students' humanity, hoping her students would be happy in their life; and Ms. Yang valued basic political competencies, hoping her students could understand how politics would influence their lives in the future. These different foci influenced how they used examples to explain textbooks. Mr. Wen preferred to use students' daily lives to explain key contents in the textbooks; Ms. Qu drew case examples from literature or chicken-soup essays to facilitate students' humanitarian caring; while Ms. Yang used political news to facilitate students' thinking. While it is hard to say why different teachers had different values about the politics curriculum, teachers' personal experiences and teaching training background, which are forms of the iterative dimension of teachers' agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998), explain some of the variances. Mr. Wen's suffering at the hands of the bureaucratic system gave him a greater made desire to change society, even though his approach was to do so by changing people's morality; similarly, Ms. Qu's college experiences in the late 1980s shaped her concern about her students' humanity.

Although teachers shared some time space and content space for the politics curriculum, they still had a very limited commitment toward citizenship education, focusing on promoting

personally responsible citizens and offering students basic knowledge about politics, at a minimal level. This limitation was not only caused by the test-driven pedagogy, but also by the teachers' own understanding of what made good citizens and their lack of professional knowledge of citizenship topics. All three teachers conceptualized good citizens as essentially passive. They emphasized good citizens would obey the law, be of good quality, have a basic knowledge about politics, and not challenge the current social structure. This mindset was consistent with the Party-state' emphasis on morality when dealing with morality social issues. On the one hand, because citizenship, particularly civic engagement, was a new concept emerging in China in the first decade of the 21th century, it was understandable that teachers might not realize the critical aspects thereof; on the other hand, as China's current political system did not encourage, and sometimes even suppressed critical civic engagement, it was also necessary for teachers to avoid challenging the Party-state purposely, as doing so might cause troubles and risks for themselves and their students. Moreover, based on the failure of Ms. Qu's teaching of ethnic issues, it is also clear the teachers lacked professional knowledge about citizenship topics, which made it difficult for them to teach citizenship education more deeply.

Diminishing the influences of socialist ideology

For the Party-state, the major function of the politics curriculum was to cultivate socialist citizens and gain students' political identification with the CCP and the socialist system. However, students' detachment from socialist ideology was clear. Some thought the political textbooks were brainwashing and did not believe socialist ideology at all. Teachers sensed students' dislike of the ideological part of the textbooks, particularly in No.1 School, where students' resistance toward socialist ideology was clearly presented in the classroom. On the one hand, teachers needed to teach what was in the textbooks; on the other, they needed to win

students' trust to attract students to learn this subject. In the event, teachers did not exactly teach socialist ideology to students, and the influence of socialist ideology was limited in several ways.

First, teachers treated socialist ideology as object knowledge to memorize, rather than a belief that needed to be internalized. They did not treat it as an absolute truth as the textbooks intended and passed this information to students. Mr. Wen publicly said to students that Marxism was evolving and the old sayings of Mao or Deng might not match the realities of modern society. He also did not insist that Marxist atheism was absolutely correct when challenged on this point by students. This flexibility might diminish the orthodoxy of Marxism and socialism to students, offering them more flexible space to think about socialist ideology.

Second, teachers talked about the gaps between what was presented in the textbooks, and reality. They did not avoid talking about current problems with the CCP, the voting system, or some social issues. Indeed, by talking about the corruptions and mistakes made by the CCP, teachers could win students' hearts, as Mr. Wen's case showed. However, they also needed to show the contributions of the CCP to China's society. As one politics curriculum teacher in No. 6 school said, "We did not shut up about problems of China and the CCP. However, at the same time, we would emphasize to students that we were progressing immediately." A similar phenomenon was observed in the case of the young teacher in No.1 School; when she talked about corruption in the CCP, she was reminded by another teacher to emphasize the Party's anti-corruption campaign to ensure students had a good image of the CCP.

Finally, the subject knowledge in political science could also diminish socialist ideology somewhat. As Ms. Yang's case showed, she explained international relations from the perspective of individual countries' interests and showed how it influenced the relationship

between China and South Korea in the THAAD issue, offering students a different perspective from that of the official discourse of exclusive patriotism.

Differentiating youth citizens in high schools

Another shackle on teaching citizenship was the different treatment afforded students in different schools. The resources available for the students in No.6 School were largely limited to textbooks for memorization purposes; students had few opportunities to learn extra knowledge or to have extra out-class activities. There was less expectations they would become excellent citizens, as their teachers did not believe they really could do a good job in civic engagement. In stark contrast, students in No.1 School were expected to be the leaders of the future. They read extra books, more publicly expressed their dissatisfaction towards socialist ideology and had more opportunities and resources to join civic engagement programs, such as service learning programs and a civic engagement program encouraging them to propose policy suggestions. Moreover, teachers in No.1 School appreciated their students' competences. Through their different attitudes toward students' potential to become good citizens, teachers actually differentiated these youth citizens at a very early stage. There is no doubt that there were gaps in students' academic performance and in some competencies, as students in No.1 School were almost the best students in the town. However, teachers need to realize that these gaps were partly caused by family background and school environments.

To sum up, teaching citizenship is not an easy thing for politics curriculum teachers in China. Indeed, it is a marginal agenda item in politics curriculum teachers' teaching, resulting from an intersection of social structure and agency. The biggest influencing factor or shackle is the examination-oriented educational system, which shapes teachers' test-driven pedagogy and limits their efforts to pay attention to citizenship education. Teachers still have some control over

time space and content space, allowing them to teach what they really want to teach. However, with a limited understand about citizenship education and citizenship topics, and considering the current situation in China, teachers thought about citizenship in a passive way, aiming at producing passive citizens who obeyed the law and had basic knowledge about their rights, civic engagement, and politics. Moreover, they differentiated young citizens at the high school level by having different expectations of them. In addition, teachers did not exactly follow the Party-state mode of socialist citizenship, a variation shaped by their own experience, students' dislike of socialist ideology, test-driven pedagogy, and subject knowledge of the politics curriculum.

Chapter 8 Conclusion and Discussion: Structure and Agency in Chinese Citizenship Education

This study has explored the dynamics and complexity of the interactions between the state, textbooks, students, and teachers in Chinese citizenship education, using the high school politics curriculum as a lens. It has traced the changes in China's official ideology and politics curriculum and examined how citizenship is represented in high school politics textbooks. Moreover, it also examined how students and teachers understood and practiced citizenship and how teachers implemented citizenship education in the politics curriculum classroom by conducting fieldwork in two high schools.

This chapter begins by reviewing the gaps in the understandings of citizenship between the Party-state, students, and teachers, and shows the tensions in Chinese citizenship education that are facilitated by these gaps. Next, it concludes the selective teaching and learning strategies adopted by teachers and students and explains how these strategies are shaped by social structures and agency. Finally, this chapter discusses the influence of individualization of Chinese society on citizenship education, showing the positive yet constrained outcomes of citizenship education.

It should be mentioned that the study does not aim to generalize its findings to the whole of China, as the events in these two schools and the views of their students and teachers cannot be assumed to represent those of other schools and individuals in other regions. Rather, through showing the tensions and interactions between the state, students, and teachers in two high schools, this study aims to offer the opportunity to understand their patterns of practice and interactions.

The Gaps in the Understanding of Good Citizen between the State, Students, and Teachers

Previous chapters have shown the understandings of citizenship between the state, students, and teachers. This part further discusses the similarities and differences in their understandings.

Responsible socialist citizens desired by the state

By examining official documents, curriculum standards, and how citizenship is represented in high school politics textbooks in detail, this study clearly shows the kind of responsible socialist citizens that the Party-state wants to cultivate—i.e., people who know their rights and obligations, have sufficient knowledge and ability to participate in voting and public affairs, and, more important, have formed a strong national identity embracing the reconstructed Chinese nation and a political identity that supports the leadership of the CCP. Ideally, citizens are dedicated to contributing to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, while at the same time being autonomous, independent, and focused on self-improvement. As many scholars have indicated, the state's construction of these ideal citizens is a product of the Party-state's response to China's political, social, and cultural changes, such as the establishment of socialist democracy and legality, the widening of civil society and public space, and efforts at maintaining social order and reducing social instability (K. W. Cheung & Pan, 2006; Law, 2011; Zhong & Lee, 2008). In summary, cultivating responsible socialist citizens is important for the political legitimation of the CCP, the political and social stability of China, and China's economic development.

The integration of citizen rights and political participation into the education of Chinese socialist citizens in the post-Mao era is a huge change for the Party-state, compared with what was practiced in the Mao era. These elements started to emerge in the politics curriculum in the

late 1980s, increased their presence in the 1990s, and combined to take on an indispensable role in the definition of Chinese citizenship, as shown in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

The changes in these elements in the curriculum well reflect the progress of citizen rights and political participation in the post-Mao era, facilitated by reflections on the Cultural Revolution and the push of economic reform. The chaos of the Cultural Revolution forced the CCP to undergo self-reflection and self-criticism and to value the protection of citizen rights (D. D. Chen, 2005). The process of economic reform compelled the Party-state to undergo a measure of political reform to counter the many social and political problems caused by the reform, including serious government corruption, social injustice, a widening of income gaps and regional disparities, the collapse of the old social, health and income safety network, and increased public unrest (S. J. Guo & Guo, 2007). The political reform dedicated to facilitating economic development and to easing domestic conflicts and serious political tensions, such as separating the functions of Party and state, decentralizing decision making, regularizing the legal system, and improving socialist democracy by introducing grassroots self-governance, intra-Party democratization, and the "four democracies" (S. J. Guo, 2013). However, this political reform always held a political bottom line; that is, it followed the "Four Cardinal Principles," which insist on maintaining the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system. It did not aim to pursue systemic change toward constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and a system of checks and balances (S. J. Guo, 2013).

Against the background of the limited political reform, the high school politics curriculum introduces Chinese youths to their citizen rights, the four ways of democratic participation in public affairs, the rule of law, and knowledge of the government and people's congress. Through preparing students with these knowledges, the Party-state on the one hand

wants to cultivate citizens who are able to protect their rights and to participate into politics within the space its allowed, benefiting national unity and political stability (Law, 2016; Perry, 2008); on the other hand, it seeks to gain youths' trust in Chinese democracy, which can contribute to the CCP's legitimacy.

Nevertheless, due to the limited degree of political reform of the Party-state, the representations of citizen rights and political participation are limited in content and depth. In terms of citizen rights, the textbooks simply introduce youths' civil rights and political rights, even though civil rights and political rights are problematic in China. Although the textbooks talk about workers' rights of social welfare, they do not clearly link social welfare to citizens' social rights, a category of rights that indeed has huge inequalities in the post-Mao era (Fong & Murphy, 2006). In addition, perceiving rights as a bestow from the Party-state is a significant characteristic of Chinese rights discourse (Nathan, 1986; Perry, 2008; Yu, 2002), differentiating it from the Western liberal tradition, which views rights as natural or inalienable prerogatives. The textbooks stress that political participation is for the good of the community, rather than emphasizing political participation as a means of protecting individual rights. Neither do the textbooks discuss the problems of Chinese democracy, such as a lack of checks and balances, the limitations of the people's congress, and the challenges facing the government.

Although citizen rights and political participation are introduced to youths, Chinese citizenship construction far from liberal traditions thereof (Janoski & Gran, 2002; Schuck, 2002), which emphasize individual rights and freedoms. In contrast, China's Party-state prioritizes state interests and reminds youths of their obligations to other citizens and to the state, such as respecting others' rights, paying taxes, keeping state secrets, and protecting the state's sovereignty. Although the state claims to balance its citizen's rights and responsibilities, it is

clear that it prefers responsible citizens who care about the common good of the community and the state, obey the law, work hard, love the country, and contribute to China's modernization. Emphasizing citizens' responsibilities over their rights has long been a Chinese phenomenon, from Imperial China to the present (Culp, 2007; Janoski, 2014; Z. Z. Zhao, 2010); thus, this thesis uses "responsible" to describe the type of citizens desired by the state.

The promotion of patriotism and national identity in youths is intended to cultivate responsible citizens, while at the same time supporting the CCP's political legitimacy. Although China is home to many ethnicities, the state tries to construct an imagined Chinese nation that is shaped and defined by the state. Through reviewing China's glorious past, tracing the waning of China in modern history, and demonstrating China's current achievements, the textbooks try to unite youths of different ethnicities and promote their pride in, patriotic feelings towards, and passion to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. More important, by positioning the CCP as the core leadership of Chinese rejuvenation and the best representation of the nation's interests, the Party-state attempts to persuade Chinese youths to support the leadership of the CCP in the name of the nation. It blurs the differences between the nation and the Party-state in an effort to equate loving the country with loving the Party-state (Fairbrother, 2003).

The CCP's end of the government's performance, along with the orthodoxy of the CCP's socialist ideology and system, are the cornerstones of the CCP's political legitimacy (Shambaugh, 2008; D. X. Zhao, 2001). As such, textbooks include many contents that introduce the Party, the exemplary nature of Party members, the service-oriented nature of the government, the huge economic achievements gained under the CCP's leadership, and the modernization of socialist ideology toward youths. The meaning of socialism changed with the passing of the Mao era, which emphasized class struggle, equality, and a centrally planned economy, and the CCP

has updated socialism's legacy by introducing the term, "socialism with Chinese characteristics" to verify the CCP's leadership and unique way of modernization. The Party-state seeks to use education to gain youths' support for its leadership and their faith in China's socialist path. In addition, the Party-state wishes to cultivate youths' socialist virtues, such as contributing to the country, serving the people, and discipling themselves; from the Party-state's perspective, to be a "socialist citizen" is to be a good citizen.

Individualized, passive, and responsible citizen: Interpretations of good citizens from teachers and students

Although the Party-state desires citizens who put responsibilities over rights, would like to actively participate into politics, love the country, and support the leadership of the CCP and the current socialist system, there is a variety of political attitudes and citizenship understanding among Chinese people. A study showed that the citizenship discourse in Chinese society is likely to be articulated in terms of rights, while the state highlights the responsibilities and participation aspects of citizenship (S. C. Chen, 2013). Based on large online survey, Pan and Xu (2018) found that people's preferences in the political dimension diverge between liberal views and conservative views. The liberal views favor protecting individual rights from state intervention and such inclusive political institutions as a multi-party system and universal suffrage; while the conservative views support the current one-Party system and the state's intervention in the private domain. They also pointed out the increase in political liberalism among citizens aged between 18 and 35 (Pan & Xu, 2018).

Through interviewing students and observing their interactions in the classroom and school daily life, this research showed the similarities in and differences between the state discourse and student discourse on citizenship. Following the state's discourse on

responsibilities, many students perceived obeying laws, loving the country, and performing *Suzhi* (quality) or self-improvement as important elements of good citizens. Similar trends in youths' thinking about good citizens, particularly in terms of patriotic feelings, have also been widely observed among secondary students and college students in other studies (Fairbrother, 2008; H. Li, 2018; J. Li, 2009; S. Y. Pan, 2011; Tu, 2011; Xiang et al., 2018; Ye, 2018; X. Zhao et al., 2014). For students in this study, the meaning of loving the country varied from being a good person, performing *Suzhi*, proposing suggestive suggestions to the government, to supporting the political stance of the country. Students claim their loving of the country is based on blood, culture, history, or the state's performance on security protection and economic development, although economic development was a relatively small consideration. To some extent, the promotion of patriotism by the Party-state also plays a role. In addition, many students in this study also think civic engagement is their obligation, verifying another study showing that around 87.8% of investigated college students thought they had an obligation to actively participate in activities that benefit the community and society (Tu, 2011).

Many students in this study stated their willingness to vote for people's deputies in local congress. For many of them, this political participation is both an obligation and a way to engage state affairs. However, their political engagement and participation at school was passive. While some students proposed suggestions to the school, many students in this study did not, either because they did not have issues to report, had already discussed their issues privately, or did not report issues officially because they did not believe their suggestion would be taken seriously or acted upon. Hansen (2015) observed a similar phenomenon in her study, in that teachers' and students' critique of educational practices were limited to the private sphere, without any collective consequences. This study supplements Hansen's finding by showing that, in addition

to the lack of awareness of taking actions, the system itself also matters. Students did not believe their suggestion would be acted on, showing their distrust toward schools, which is also influenced by whether school takes students' suggestion seriously. Students' school engagement shed light on their broader political participation and civic engagement. After learning the problems with voting in China, such as the lack of candidate information and the lack of real campaigns, around one-third of the students who said they wanted to vote changed their minds. In addition, some students had already noticed the difficulties of civic engagement in reality, such as the irresponsiveness of officials and the bureaucracy, based on their life experiences and news reading, which led to their disappointment with the current political system. In addition to systemic difficulties, many students also lacked awareness of claiming their rights, requesting that the government do more, and challenging current social structures, as shown in their imagining of a good citizen. Therefore, their passive characteristic interacts with their awareness and the social structure.

In addition to their passive characteristic, students also show another three differences from the state's discourse of citizenship, in terms of their positive attitudes toward rights, their indifference toward socialist ideology and the CCP, and their detachment from Chinese traditional culture. Although the textbooks assign only half of a lesson to discuss them, many students express the value they attach to civil rights (such as individual freedom, freedom of speech, right of privacy) and political rights (voting rights, right to supervise the government, right to be informed). For them, these are not only rights guaranteed by the constitution but also rights intended to protect their individual interests and freedoms, to help them engage in politics, and to make governance better. In addition, they are aware of the condition on their rights, that is, to not harm other people's rights. However, the students in these studies did not show strong

awareness of social rights, consistent with the fact that textbooks paid little attention to social rights.

Students' valuing of political rights and civil rights was also revealed in a mixed-methods study investigating 1,631 Chinese secondary students' attitudes toward democracy, in two cities. The study reported that students positively agreed that all people should have their social and political rights respected and should be free to criticize the government publicly (C. H. W. Cheung, Chong, Kennedy, & Chow, 2018). It also reported that students value democracy and equality, which is verified in this study's finding that students care about democratic participation and the equality of migrant workers. Students' valuing of political and civil rights in a more liberal way is different from the state's discourse of rights as a bestow from the state. It is a result of the individualistic tendencies of the "me" generation born after 1978 (F. S. Liu, 2011; Yan, 2009). The secondary students in this study showed a strong desire to do the things they liked and for self-realization, contributing to the value they placed on freedom, privacy, and happiness. Therefore, this thesis uses "individualized" to describe their cherishing of personal freedom and strong self-awareness in the concept of citizenship. This "individualized" characteristic does not necessarily conflict with their responsibilities to the community and society. For some students, their responsibilities toward the community and society, such as volunteer work and voting, are a way to construct their life meaning, to satisfy their curiosity, or to be recognized, thus serving their self-identity needs.

The biggest gap between the state and students is students' detachment from socialist ideology and their weak political identification with the CCP, as shown by students' mocking the socialist slogan "studying for the rise of China," laughing about criticisms of capitalism, doubting textbook contents associated with socialism, treating politics courses and textbooks as

brainwashing, and having a limited understanding of the CCP. Although textbooks introduce the

CCP's achievements and ideology, students do not show strong political identification with the

party, although neither do they oppose its leadership. In terms of its intention of using patriotism

to gain people's political identification with the CCP and socialism, the Party-state has failed to

influence the students in this research, who express their love of China but say little about their

love of the Party and their identification with socialism. Other studies have also shown the

separation between love for the country and loyalty to the Party among youths and Chinese

people (Chan & Nesbitt-Larking, 1995; H. Li, 2018).

Students' detachment from socialist ideology is not a surprise. Since the 1980s, the CCP

has experienced belief crises caused by the lingering effects of the Cultural Revolution (Wang,

2008; Zheng, 1999). Although the CCP uses economic development, patriotism, and education to

gain popular support, it cannot make the socialist idea itself attractive to the majority of Chinese,

especially given the fact that the CCP modifies its socialist ideology frequently and that the

meaning of socialist ideology is far away from its original version, which valued egalitarianism

and the elimination of class disparities, etc., as shown in Chapter 4. In addition, the prevalent

individualistic culture among youths makes socialist ideology, which emphasizes self-sacrifice

and altruism, unacceptable. Kwong (1994) pointed out this ideological crisis happened to youths

in the 1980s as a result of the dislocations between the utopian socialist views of youths and the

real culture in society, which advocated individualism, materialism, and consumerism. Although

the current "me" generation is not as radical as the youth in the 1980s, its members have

experienced the huge gap between the idealized socialist worldview in the textbooks and cultural

reality. Following their precedents, they have chosen the individualistic culture, which affords

them more space for self-expression. Against this background, intensive propaganda about

socialist ideology will not persuade these youths, but rather arouse some students' dislike, as shown by some students in this study referring to politics teaching as brainwashing. In addition to the gap between idealized socialist views and cultural realities of youths, there is also a gap between the idealized socialist view of the CCP and government and popular dissatisfaction with corruption, local governance, increasing inequality, food insecurity, environmental issues, etc. As Ms. Qu pointed out, the gaps between reality and textbooks make textbooks lose their credibility.

Many students also show their detachment from Chinese traditional culture,[1] although a few students expressed pride in China's long history, were moved by the patriotic spirit of historical heroes, and were impressed by its fined arts. Although the state tries to promote Chinese traditional culture to foster youths' cultural identity and maintain social harmony or social order, many students experience traditional culture in a festivalized way and have limited understanding of it. On the one hand, the politics textbooks do not deeply examine the philosophy and meaning of Chinese traditional culture; on the other, the country's long history of denying Confucianism since the early 1900s and throughout the Mao era, together with the modernization of China and the individualization of Chinese society, have undermined the life roots of traditional culture, making it less prevalent in society.[2]

The teachers in this research perceived "good citizens" as people who obey the law, respect rules, behave well in their daily life, care about the community, and love the country with

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[1] However, this study cannot claim that Chinese traditional culture does not influence youths' minds because while culture may not be sensed or named by youths, it may still play an implicit but important role in shaping their behavior and attitudes. Indeed, students' thoughts on improving *Suzhi* and their awareness of their responsibilities toward community, society, and the state are consistent with the idea of self-cultivation and the inseparability of the self and the collective in Confucianism (Lee, 2004; Tu, 2011).

[2] For example, values such as filial piety, which is a typical characteristic of Chinese traditional culture, have already eroded in current society, despite still functioning in several ways (C. K. Cheung & Kwan, 2009; Zhan & Montgomery, 2003).

rationality. On the one hand, teachers valued responsible citizens; on the other, they did not emphasize the ideological elements of citizens. Therefore, both teachers and students understood citizenship in a non-ideological way. However, different from students' valuing of rights, teachers complained about students' strong rights awareness, as it made their teaching and education more challenging.

To sum up, this study reveals the similarities in and differences between the state, teachers, and students in terms of their understandings of good citizens. The state, teachers, and students shared a consensus on the elements of responsibility in citizenship, including obeying laws, participating in public affairs and voting, caring about the common good of communities and the state, and loving the country, although the meaning of loving the country varied among them. However, they had discrepant understandings of good citizens in terms of socialist identity, rights, and traditional culture. Due to the individualization of Chinese society, students show strong rights awareness. At the same time, they hold an indifferent attitude toward socialist values and detach themselves from socialist slogans. This is a result of the interplay between the individualistic culture of youths, the decline in belief in socialism in society, the changing meaning of socialism, and the huge gaps between utopian socialist views and reality. Students also show detachment from Chinese traditional culture, which is not consistent with their modernized culture.

Selective Teaching and Learning: The Complexity of Cultivating Good Citizens in China

For the Party-state, citizenship education is an important project for developing the economy, maintaining social stability, improving social cohesion, and strengthening the CCP's political legitimacy. However, the influences of formal citizenship education on students do not exactly follow the Party-state's wishes. Teachers selectively teach citizenship, while students

selectively learn it. This selective teaching and learning are shaped by the social structures and agency involved in the process of teaching and learning.

Selective Teaching

By following three politics curriculum teachers in two high schools through classroom observation and semi-structured interviews, this study found that the teachers neither showed a strong commitment to teaching citizenship, nor exactly followed the Party-state's schema of responsible socialist citizenship in their teaching. Indeed, they mainly offered a limited citizenship education that focused on the teaching of basic political knowledge presented in the textbooks. Teachers selectively adopted the elements of a responsible citizen, but did not show any passion for promoting students' political identity. In contrast, they strategically dealt with socialist ideology in their teaching, exercising their agency to make things different.

Teachers' lack of commitment to teaching citizenship may have been a product of the rigid, exam-oriented educational system and their compliance with test-oriented pedagogy. Due to the importance of students' academic performance to schools, students, and parents of the highly-competitive NCEE, schools used students' academic performance to evaluate teachers and determine their salaries and promotion. Faced with these top-down and bottom-up pressures and in consideration of students' future and their own careers, teachers adopted an exam-centered pedagogy. They emphasized the key points of textbooks, skipped contents on which students would not be tested, taught students strategies for memorizing and answering questions, and reminded students of misconceptions surrounding terminology in the tests. Although the current NCEE reform aims to give students more chances to take exams, it speeded up the teaching schedule, thus strengthening the test-driven nature of teaching. As a result, in terms of citizenship education, teachers in both two schools focused on "official" epistemology about

political rights, approaches to civic engagement, China's political systems, and the CCP. In short, they offered students a knowledge-based citizenship education.

Ye (2018) observed a similar phenomenon in her study, pointing out that the dominant pedagogy in the politics curriculum in her studied junior and secondary schools was lecturing and knowledge transmission; she also found that, although questioning and group-discussion were implemented in the classroom, the questions were short, simple, and closed. However, using mixed-methods to investigate the teaching and learning of citizenship education in junior secondary schools in two Chinese cities, Law and Xu (2019) found that teachers used diverse pedagogies, including lecturing, inquiry-based approaches, facilitating discussions, and creating open and free class climates. These different conclusions might be caused by the different sampling techniques used and the different educational stages investigated. Although this study cannot generalize that all high school politics curriculum teachers in China use test-driven pedagogy to teach citizenship education, it clearly shows how the exam-oriented educational system restricts their teaching.

However, this study also shows teachers' negotiation with the test-driven culture. Although all three teachers prioritized teaching for tests, they still added elements not relating to tests in their teaching. Mr. Wen paid attention to students' morality and used examples not in the textbooks to inform students how to deal with issues in daily life; Ms. Qu used some cases from literature or essays to facilitate students' humanitarian caring; and Ms. Yang made efforts to integrate political news so that her students understood how policies influence their life.

Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p. 963) stated that agency is a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past but also orient toward the future and the present. Similarly, teacher's agency to negotiate with the test-driven culture is motivated by

teachers' desire for meaningful teaching (the projective or future element of agency) and supported by their prior experiences and knowledge (the iterative or past element of agency). Indeed, the teachers in the study were not satisfied to be technicians for teaching or to just prepare students for good exam scores. They desired to conduct meaningful teaching and to be valued. As pointed out by other researchers, teachers' desire for educational rather than instrumental teaching, their goals of teaching, and their views on students' learning are important projective resources for their agency (Buchanan, 2015; Priestley, Edwards, Priestley, & Miller, 2012; Vähäsantanen, 2015). This research also showed that teachers' past experience and prior knowledge play important roles in shaping their imagination and influence their capacity to take actions. Mr. Wen's morality approach and his subtly expressed desire to change society were partly influenced by his past experience with the bureaucratic system; Ms. Qu's humanity approach was largely influenced by her own experience in the 1980s and her knowledge in this field. In addition to of the projective and iterative resources of agency, the success of teachers' negotiations with the test-driven culture depends on the time and space available in the schooling structure. Although teaching is oriented toward tests, teachers still have an independent space to teach, because other people do not intervene; and teachers can always arrange to have plenty of time left in the class. This available space and time offer teachers opportunities to teach things differently, as long as they keep the focus on improving students' test scores and do not violate the political bottom line.

Teachers' negotiation with the test-driven culture indicates their ability to implement meaningful citizenship education under the constraints of the examination-oriented system. However, the reality is that the teachers in this study adopted knowledge-based citizenship education and did not extend the content of citizenship beyond the textbooks. The teachers'

limitation in citizenship education may have to do with their projective and iterative dimensions of agency regarding their citizenship education. In terms of the projective dimension of agency, citizenship education was not among these teachers' definitions of meaningful teaching, although they had already implemented some elements relating to citizenship education in their teaching. This ignorance of the importance of citizenship education also relates to the teachers' limited understanding of citizenship. The teachers in this study mainly understand good citizens as people who obey the law, are of good quality, and have basic knowledge about politics. Ms. Qu's failure in teaching ethnic issues indicates how the teachers' lack of knowledge of citizenship topics limited their teaching. In addition, social contexts also matter. Although the Party-state encourages democratic participation in public policies and emphasizes Chinese democracy in its textbooks, critical civic engagement is not encouraged and democracy is not working well in reality, as pointed out by Ms. Qu. Therefore, knowing the risks of critical civic engagement, the teachers in the study taught about the approaches of political participation but did not go further, following the Party-state's political bottom line of the Four Cardinal Principles.

However, when it came to the elements of political identity and socialist ideology in the teaching of citizenship, the three teachers showed their negotiation ability by not teaching or modifying certain content. Although political identity and socialist ideology are the most important elements of citizenship education for the Party-state, these teachers treated socialist ideology as objective knowledge to be learned, rather a belief to be internalized. They talked about the corruptions, historical mistakes, and current problems of the CCP, diminished the orthodoxy of Marxism by acknowledging its evolution, and mentioned the gaps between reality and the textbooks in terms of voting systems and other social issues. They showed no passion for promoting students' identification with the CCP and socialist system. Regarding patriotism, the

teachers emphasized a rational patriotic feeling that emphasized doing one's job in daily life, rather than the strong patriotism with a call to work for the modernization of China proposed by the Party-state.

Teachers' passive teaching of socialist ideology is much shaped by the gaps between textbooks and reality and students' detachment from socialist ideology. In addition, the teachers had their own views of Chinese society, such as their distrust of democracy and their critique of the bureaucratic system. Dealing with challenges arising from students' resistance to brainwashing, together with their own understandings of China, the teachers used their practical-evaluative capacity to lessen the doctrinal content of socialist ideology. Sewell (1992) pointed out the change of social structure is embedded in the multiplicity of structures, the transposability of schemas, the unpredictability of resources accumulation, the polysemy of resources, and the intersection of structures. This study shows how conflicts in the multiple structures—that is, the conflicts between an ideal world in textbooks and the problematic reality—allowed students and teachers to respond differently than the Party-state desired.

Therefore, teachers adopted a selective strategy to teach citizenship. Following the textbooks, they taught students about their rights and responsibilities, approaches to political participation, and basic knowledge of China's political system. However, they discarded actively promoting students' political identification with the CCP and the socialist system. Their selective strategy was an interplayed process between the social structures (examination-oriented system, textbooks, the reality of China, students' preferences, and time and space in teaching) and their own iterative, projective, and practical-evaluative dimensions of agency.

Both social structures and their different dimensions of agency offer constraints to and resources for teachers' teaching. The examination-oriented system, textbooks, and teachers' lack

of knowledge of certain citizenship dimensions limit their commitment to deeper citizenship education. The reality of Chinese politics, students' preferences, time and space in teaching, their valuing of meaningful teaching, and their judgement about the appropriation of pedagogy offer them resources to de-ideologize citizenship teaching. Although textbooks constrain the teachers from meaningful citizenship teaching, the textbooks' content also offer teachers tools to learn new things, as pointed out by Ms. Qu. Additionally, the current official discourse of four core citizenship competencies (political identity, scientific thinking, law awareness, and public participation) is also a resource that could be selectively used by the teachers.

Selective Learning

Similar to teachers' selective teaching of citizenship, students in this study learned citizenship in a selective way rather than passively accepting what is transmitted to them. This was demonstrated by their acceptance of the idea of responsible and patriotic citizens, their active cherishing of citizen rights and democratic participation, their passive engagement in school life, and their indifference toward or even rejection of socialist ideology. Their different attitudes toward different content in textbooks well revealed students' capacity to accommodate, reinterpret, and resist the knowledge transmitted from textbooks and by teachers.

Students' strategy of selective learning is an interplay of students' agency and the social structures surrounding their lives. When textbooks' contents are coherent with students' identity and knowledge (the iterative elements of their agency), students were highly likely to accept them, as shown by students' accommodation of responsible citizens and patriotic citizens. When the contents offered by textbooks match students' projective elements of agency, students more actively used these contents as resources for their actions and even reinterpreted them. This was verified by students' valuing of citizen rights and democratic participation, as well as their

reinterpreting of them in terms of their individual freedom and interests. As a generation that was born after the economic reform and grew up in an individualistic culture, the students in this research well internalized the values of self-expression and self-realization, desiring a life of their own and valuing individual freedom. Against this background, they more actively learned rights discourses, particularly on civil rights. However, when the textbooks' contents conflicted with students' life experience, knowledge, or imagination, there was a high possibility they would resist the influence of these contents, as shown by students' detachment from socialist ideology and traditional culture. Everyday reality provided grounds for their distaste: disbelief in socialism, corruptions within the government and the Party, the bureaucratic working style of the government, and the censorship of the Internet and speech. Students got these pieces of information from their parents, peers, and teachers, as well as by reading the news and through their life experiences. These pieces of information became important resources for their knowledge of society and offered them capacity to think differently from textbooks. In addition, as socialist values, which emphasize self-sacrifice for the good of the collective and the state, no longer fit with students' individualistic values and imagined life, they were resisted by some students.

Commenting on students' resistance to political education in China, Fairbrother (2003) pointed out that students assert their power over the political socialization process by "recognizing and evaluating the state's efforts to control this process through schooling, taking advantage of those aspects of socialization which help to enhance their own power, and bringing into paly their dispositions to think critically to form their own critical and constructive national attitudes" (p.180). Extending Fairbrother's agency statement to patriotism, this study reveals students' agency toward other forms of political socialization, specifically the learning of

citizenship, through their accommodation of responsible citizens and patriotic citizens, their active absorbing of citizen rights and participation, and their resistance to socialist ideology.

More important, this study also shows how social structures (the match of textbooks' contents to students' experience, the individualistic culture, and the gaps between textbooks and reality) influenced students' selective learning. Particularly in terms of the match between textbooks and students' experience, knowledge, and beliefs, this study echoes Patnode's (2017) suggestion that political classes succeed when their discourse matches students beliefs and fail when their discourse conflicts with students' perspectives.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the test-driven educational system also played a limited role in students' learning of citizenship in this study. First, compared with students who did not choose politics as a subject for the NCEE, those who did faced greater demands from teachers like Ms. Yang, who required such students to memorize more contents and to take homework more seriously. Second, although the test-driven culture facilitated students' memorizing of textbooks, the real influence of memorization on students' learning was limited. One student clearly pointed out that, although they needed to memorize and recite textbooks for the exams, they quickly forgot these contents after being tested, revealing that rote memorization of textbooks will not help to indoctrinate students.

Therefore, due to teachers' selective teaching of citizenship and students' selective learning of citizenship, the Party-state realized its goal of cultivating responsible citizens; however, it was less successful in promoting students' identification with the CCP and socialist ideology. In addition, it had the unintended result of facilitating students' knowledge of their rights and political participation. Although the function of citizenship education, according to the Party-state, is to reproduce its ideology, its real outcomes include reproduction, irrelevant, and

democratic elements. This is a result of the interplay between the social structures and the agency of teachers and students. Social structures include the schema of the ideal responsible socialist citizenship proposed by the Party-state, the reality of China's politics, the exam-oriented educational system, the individualistic culture at the state and society levels; schools' performance, textbooks, teachers' teaching, students' preferences, time, and space at the school and classroom levels; and students' peer culture and media use at the individual level. Teachers' agency is drawn from their past knowledge and experience, their imagination of meaningful teaching, and their practical evaluative capacity of their teaching; students' agency is drawn from their knowledge and experience of citizen reality, their individualistic culture, their aspiration of self-expression and self-realization, and their evaluation of textbooks and knowledge. Following Sewell's (1992) statement about the multiplicity of structures to effect structural change, this research shows how conflicts between the idealized socialist system view and the problematic reality, and between the ideal socialist citizen and the individualistic culture of youth contributed to students' agency.

The Individualization of Chinese Society and the Constrained Citizens

One sub-theme of this research was to investigate how the individualization of Chinese society influenced citizenship education. Scholars have noted that Chinese individualization involves the rise of the individual, direct political control, the lack of cultural democracy, the insufficient welfare system, and the absence of classic individualism and political liberalism (Hansen, 2015; Yan, 2009, 2010b). This study shows that these elements have influenced understandings of citizenship in China.

At the Party-state level, the Party-state applies a regulated-individualism strategy in politics textbooks that encourages individuals' creativity, self-confidence, positive attitudes to

challenges, doing things they like, and enjoying life for the purpose of personal welfare and economic development, while at the same time regulating them to follow the socialist worldview (K. W. Cheung & Pan, 2006; Hansen, 2015). This strategy follows the Party-state's promotion of individualization in the economic realm and its caution regarding Western liberal ideas, as shown in the Party-state's campaigns against liberalization in the 1980s and in the resistance of western ideas in the "seven no's" in Xi era. Although the Party-state currently educates youths regarding citizen rights and political participation, this education is largely aimed at promoting political legitimacy and social stability.

At the individual level, with the rise of the individual, youths have developed strong self-awareness and have come to value personal freedom, happiness, self-realization, and self-expression. This influences them to positively take away of the knowledge of rights, political participation, and civic engagement presented in textbooks, and at the same time resist socialist ideology and collectivist values, which are not attractive to nor suitable for their individualistic youth culture. Moreover, many of them value rights more as a tool to protect their own interests than as a bestow from the Party-state.

Does students' increasing awareness and knowledge of rights and political participation indicate a positive political change toward China's democracy? This study indicates the answer may be "No," due to China's political system and the limitations on students' awareness of rights and citizenship. As shown in Chapter 6 and mentioned in the earlier section, most students had a strong awareness of voting; however, many of them were passive in school engagement programs. The gap between awareness and practices relating to civic engagement was caused by students' lack of need, their distrust of school systems, and the performance of the school. This indicates that people's political participation is largely influenced by their needs of participation,

whether the political system performs democratically, and whether the system can gain their trust. Therefore, given the situation of China' current political system, e.g., political control and the avoidance of rights claiming, there is a high possibility that many students will continue to show political apathy in the future, due to the difficulty of effecting meaningful political participation and their distrust of the system. Although many students have gained a strong awareness about their rights and political participation, that awareness is far from sufficiently strong to seek drastic changes. On the one hand, students learn rights discourses but lack the awareness of social rights, rights of claiming rights, and taking collective actions, not mentioning that collective actions in China are discouraged by the Party-state. On the other hand, the lack of discussions of democracy in the textbooks also limit students' imagination of democratic systems, which make it harder for them to imagine other possibilities for China's political system. In addition, although many students are indifferent to the socialist system, they are not agitating to change it.

Therefore, these young citizens are constrained by their inner insufficient understanding of citizenship and by external hard conditions for practicing meaningful citizenship. Given the underdeveloped cultural democratization in current Chinese society, students do not show a strong awareness of their right to claim their rights, nor of the possibility of taking collective actions. With the insufficient welfare system and the limited introduction of social rights in textbooks, students know a little about workers' social welfare without naming it as social rights. Due to the Party-state's political control and avoidance of rights claiming and collective actions, youths do not trust the system and seek drastic changes. Nevertheless, the increasing awareness of rights and political participation are seeds for future change.

Limitations and Future Research

By using the perspective of structure and agency, this study shows the complexity of Chinese citizenship education, opening the black box of how citizenship education is implemented in classrooms. However, this study has limitations coming from its focus and methodology.

This study mainly focuses on the classroom practice of citizenship education, without paying much attention to the learning and practice of citizenship in informal settings. Investigating the practices of citizenship in students' organization and other inform settings would provide a tremendous amount of information about how students practice citizenship in reality, contributing to our knowledge of students' deep understandings about rights, equality, and democracy, and their negotiation ability in the process. Although this research has paid some attention to the school engagement program, the dynamics of citizen practices require further investigation. In addition, students' interviews in this study revealed that their talking about politics in family settings, their parents' political attitudes and experiences, and their family's cultural and social capital influenced students' understandings and practices of citizenship to a certain degree. More exploration of this is needed. Future qualitative research may find ways to discretely and effectively explore how families influence students' understanding of citizenship.

Another interesting phenomenon emerging from the fieldwork is the differentiating of citizenship education in the two schools, as raised in Chapter 7. However, absent detailed quantitative data, this research cannot tell the extent of the differences of understandings between the students at the two schools. Further analysis is needed to reveal the social results of the differentiating of citizenship and how the differentiation relates to current Chinese politics.

Gender issues also emerged in my fieldwork but are not presented in this study. I heard teachers in the field talking about the differences between boys and girls in the learning of politics, claiming boys could more easily learn abstract political system while girls had little interest in politics but were good at memorization. Are these judgments true? To what extent does a gender gap exist, and why? These questions require further attention.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Work Sheet for Students

Dear student,

Thank you for participating this research. The following questions are based on volunteer.

Please answer with your own understandings. Thanks.

1. Please draw a picture to describe the things important for you in your daily life, including your family, interests, your future plan, study, etc.

2. Please draw a picture to describe your understandings about the relationships among you, your community, government, people's congress, and the CCP

Appendix 2: Interview Questions for Students

Basic Background Information

-Age; Family background (born place, parents' education background and vocation; migration experience); Position in school; whether participating in any association.

-Do you have any idol? Why you like it?

-Your hobby and the meaning of your hobby to you?

-How do you use media?

-When you grow up, what kind of person you want to be?

Perceptions about Citizenship and Citizenship Education

(1) Citizenship

-How do you understand citizen? What do you think as a good citizen?

-What kind of citizen do you want to be?

-What's kind of rights do you think citizens should have? Where do these rights come from? Is it important? Why?

-Now in China, there is a huge issue about migrant workers' rights. Some people believe that migrant workers should have the access to social welfare benefits in the city; others believe that these migrant workers shouldn't belong the city because they make few contributions to the city? How do you think about this issue?

-What kinds of obligations and responsibilities do you think citizens should have? Why?

-Have you joined any community service? Please describe the experience and the meaning of these experiences to you.

-Have you joined any student association? Why you join or not?

-How do you think about NPC election in China? Have you experienced NPC election? Please describe your experience.

-What words will you use when it comes to China?

-To what extent, you love China? How do you think about South Korean Ban?

-How do think about Chinese tradition and culture?

-Have you ever considered to join the CCP?

-How do you understand socialist system with Chinese characteristics?

(2) Citizenship Education

-What is your understanding about citizenship education? What is the meaning of citizenship education to you, to your school and to your community?

-How do you think about the politics textbooks you used? Do you see any advantages and disadvantages? What other contents of citizenship education do you think should be included in textbook?

-How do you like the politics curriculum? What have you learned from the politic courses?

-What are your challenges in learning citizenship education?

- How do you learn to be a citizen? Besides school, where do you get other information about citizenship?

Appendix 3: Interview Questions for Teachers

Social Background and Teaching Experience

-Could you tell me about your background (age, degree, position in school)? How long have you been teachers in this school?

-How do you become a politics curriculum teacher? The meaning of teaching?

-What kind of training (including pre-service training and in-service training) do you have received with your field?

-What challenges and concerns do you have met in your teaching career?

-How do you think about politic curriculum? Including its positions in schools, relations to national entrance exam, and the aims of politic curriculum.

-How the new educational reform influences your teaching in politic courses?

Perceptions about Citizenship and Citizenship education

(1) Citizenship

-How do you understand citizen? What do you think as a good citizen?

-What's kind of rights do you think citizens should have? Where do these rights come from? Is it important? Why?

-Now in China, there is a huge issue about migrant workers' rights. Some people believe that migrant works should have the access to social welfare benefits in the city; others believe that these migrant workers shouldn't belong the city because they make few contributions to the city? How do you think about this issue?

-What kind of obligations and responsibilities do you think citizenship should have and why?

-Have you joined any community service? Please describe the experience and the meaning of these experiences to you.

-How do you think about NPC election in China? Will you vote for NPC election? Why?

-How do you think about patriotism?

-How do think about Chinese tradition and culture?

-How do you understand socialist system with Chinese characteristics?

(2) Citizenship Education

-What kind of citizens do you want your students to be?

-What is your understanding about citizenship education? What is the meaning of citizenship education to you, to your students, to your school and to your community?

-How do you think about the textbooks you used? Do you see any advantages and disadvantages? What other contents of citizenship education do you think should be included in textbook?

-In your teaching, how do you teach citizenship issues? How do you teach your students to become citizens?

-What are your challenges in teaching citizenship education?

Appendix 4: Final Coding Categories

Level	Codes
The Party-state (textbooks and curriculum standard)	Citizenship • Rights; • Responsibilities/obligations; • Political participation/civic engagement; • National identity and political identity; • Socialist system and the CCP Citizenship education
Teachers	Teacher career School life Citizenship education • Aims • Teaching/pedagogy • Dilemma in teaching Citizenship • Images of good citizens • Rights; • Responsibilities/obligations; • Political participation/civic engagement; • National identity and political identity;

	• Socialist system and the CCP
Students	The life of urban youth
	Citizenship
	• Images of good citizens
	• Rights;
	• Responsibilities/obligations;
	• Political participation/civic engagement;
	• National identity and political identity;
	• Socialist system and the CCP
	Citizenship education
	• Why or why not choose politics curriculum
	• Comments on politics curriculum
	• Learning
	• Evaluation of textbooks
	• Homework
	• School administration
Structure and Agency	Structure
	Agency
	• Teachers
	• Students

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