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An Army for the People:
The Self-Defense Forces and Society in Postwar Japan

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

Tomoyuki Sasaki

Committee in Charge

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2009

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2009

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

An Army for the People:
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by

Tomoyuki Sasaki

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, San Diego, 2009

Professor Takashi Fujitani, Co-Chair

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This dissertation concerns the relations between the military and civil society in postwar Japan in the period between 1950 and the late 1980s. I examine the processes by which the military, namely the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), established close ideological and socio-economic ties with civil society and normalized itself in a constitutional order that renounced war and banned the possession of war potential. I first focus on how the US occupation forces and Japanese government leaders presented the event of rearmament at the discursive level, and then shift my attention to how the SDF and other state institutions interacted with civilians at the local and material level and how civilians responded. My main argument is that not only the state but also civil society itself contributed to consolidating civil-military interdependency.

The significance of this study is that it concerns the militarization of society as a structural problem immanent to the capitalist economy that operates with the nation-

state as its basic unit. The military takes advantage of such problems as class difference and uneven development between the city and the countryside, and appeals to those who do not benefit from this economic system. By investigating this process, I demonstrate that the governance of civil society in the modern liberal state works not necessarily through suppression or prohibition but by encouraging the active participation and engagement of those governed.

Introduction

Militarization in Liberal Governance

The military of any nation-state requires popular support. When status worked as a principle of organizing society (e.g., in absolutist Europe or feudal Japan), joining a military was a privilege allowed only to people of a particular status. Many people could and did spend their entire lives having no contact with the military. But with the advent of the modern nation-state, the nature of the military drastically changed. The nation-state does not allow people to remain passive subjects. It expects people to take responsibility for national defense in exchange for the protection it offers them. The military, whether conscripted or voluntary, comprises service members from all social classes, who identify themselves as “the people” of the nation-state (at least in theory). Even those who do not join the military are supposed to identify themselves as members of the nation-state, endorse the state’s security policies actively, and collaborate in national defense in a time of emergency. Thus the military of a nation-state, unlike that in the era of the status system, must cultivate a firm base of support in civil society and convince them of the need for an army. This dissertation is a case study of the building of a closely intertwined relation between a military and civil society in modernity. My focus is the Self Defense Forces and Japanese society in the post WWII period.

The Peace Constitution and Rearmament: A Background

Imperial Japan surrendered to the United States and the other Allied Nations by accepting the Potsdam Declaration. Based on this declaration, the occupation forces set as their initial goals the demilitarization of the defeated country. Immediately after arriving in Japan in September 1945, SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers)—Douglas MacArthur himself and his occupational organs—began to pursue a number of reforms. They dissolved the Imperial Army and Navy, and the Special Higher Police, and terminated military conscription. They directed the release of political prisoners and the abolition of the Peace Preservation Law, while purging war collaborators from public and private sector jobs, including officers from the army and navy, politicians and bureaucrats who had supported the aggressive war, and executives in ammunition companies. SCAP also granted women universal suffrage, and guaranteed the people's freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, as well as the right of labor to organize.

The establishment of a new constitution was probably one of the most fundamental and influential reforms for demilitarization brought about by SCAP. The new constitution was promulgated in November 1946 and enacted in May 1947. The preamble expressed the Japanese desire for peace, and recognized the “right to live in peace” of “all people of the world.” Moreover, Article 9 read as follows:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

2) In order to accomplish the aim of preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

With these stipulations in the Preamble and Article 9, SCAP sought to prevent Japan from ever again posing a military threat to its hegemony in Asia.

The tension of the Cold War, however, intensified from the late 1940s. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union was helping establish communist regimes. In China, after a three-year civil war, the Chinese Communist Party gained a victory and declared the founding of a people's republic in 1949. Within Japan, the communist party had been organizing a number of demonstrations demanding better wages and food rationing, and demonstrators often ended up seizing control of production at factories. In this strained political atmosphere, SCAP's main goal for the occupation gradually shifted from demilitarization to security reinforcement, and here, the so-called "reverse course" began. SCAP banned strikes by public employees, and encouraged the Japanese government to outlaw the Communist Party. In June 1950, the Korean War broke out, and this further accelerated the shift in occupation policy. SCAP promoted a Red Purge, expelling about thirteen thousand people who were allegedly communists from their public and private positions. This Red Purge was accompanied by the de-purge of some of those war collaborators who had been removed from their positions.

It was during the reverse course that rearmament started. In July 1950, just a month after the outbreak of the Korean War, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to create a new armed force of 75,000 personnel, and this army was named the National Police Reserve (*keisatsu yobitai*, hereafter the NPR). The United States envisaged converting Japan into a bulwark against communism by reinforcing its security system. But even after the launch of rearmament, the constitution remained

intact. According to this constitution, Japan was supposed to aspire to build a peaceful country with no recourse to a military organization. Here there was an obvious contradiction between the constitutional ideal and the reality of rearmament.

Despite this contradiction, the army survived and continued to grow. After Japan recovered its sovereignty and independence in 1952, the United States kept demanding the further reinforcement of the Japanese army. In October 1952, the Japanese government increased the quota of the army to 110,000, and renamed it the Safety Forces (*hoantai*). Two years after, the government reorganized the Safety Forces into the Self Defense Forces (*jieitai*, and hereafter the SDF), equipped with an army, a navy, and air force. The government also founded the Defense Agency for the administration of the SDF. By 1958, the total quota for the three forces had increased to about 222,000.

In present-day Japan, the SDF has grown to an organization with a significant military might by world standards. As of 2007, roughly 240,000 service members were serving in the SDF, including the Ground SDF, Maritime SDF, and Air SDF. This number is by no means comparable to the number of service members in the militaries of such countries as the United States, the People's Republic of China, and Russia. But it is more or less the same as the number of service members in the militaries in major European countries, such as Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.¹ In 2008, Japan had the seventh-largest military expenditure, after the United States, China, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Germany. Its military budget was

¹ Bōeishō, ed., *Nihon no bōei: bōei hakusho, Heisei 19-nenban* (Kabushiki-gaisha Gyōsei, 2007), 380.

\$46.3 billion, and accounted for 3.2 percent of the world share.² From the early 1990s, the Japanese government has been dispatching the SDF overseas to collaborate with the United Nations' Peace-Keeping Operations. Although constitutional restrictions still prevent service members from going to combat areas to fight with weapons, the SDF is increasingly acting as a "normal" military organization in the international arena.

The major political parties now accept the SDF as constitutional. Up to the early 1990s, the Socialist Party used to be the severest critic of the SDF and the Liberal Democratic Party, which fully endorsed the SDF. But when the party took power for the first time in 1994, Murayama Tomiichi, the party leader and prime minister, abandoned the party's most fundamental policy on unarmed neutrality, and recognized the SDF's constitutionality. The Democratic Party, the rival party for the Liberal Democratic Party in contemporary Japanese politics, supports the maintenance of the SDF, and in this aspect, its policy does not differ much from that of the LDP. Although the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party oppose the SDF, they maintain only a small number of seats in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors, and their political power is limited.

The popular approval rate of the SDF is also high. According to a survey conducted by the Cabinet Office in 2008, more than 80% of the respondents responded that they had a good impression on the SDF. This rate has been quite stable over the last twenty years. In the same survey, those who agreed with military

² The research conducted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Available at <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/05/05A>.

reinforcement and those who preferred the maintenance of the status quo together accounted for 80 percent. Again, this rate has been stable over the last twenty years.³ It appears that in contemporary Japan, there is a general consensus on the need for the SDF. Those who observe the contradiction between the constitutional ideal and the SDF, and those who insist on the scaling down or abolition of the SDF constitute a small minority.

My main question in this dissertation is how people in postwar Japan came to terms with the presence of a military organization while preserving a peace constitution. I want to know what enabled the SDF to continue to grow despite a constitution that banned the nation from possessing war potential. To answer these questions, I will examine various ideas and practices the SDF and the government employed in order to enlist support from civil society, and civilians' responses to these ideas and practices.

I cover the four decades between 1950 and the end of the 1980s. While until the 1970s a number of peace and anti-military movements developed, during the 1980s anti-military sentiment withered away. Communities with military bases increasingly chose to co-exist with the SDF. Japanese society rapidly formed a consensus on the need for an army. This permitted the government to undertake the first overseas dispatch of the SDF. In 1991, it dispatched the Maritime SDF's minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the Gulf War ended, and a number of overseas dispatches have been following until now. The cooperative relation between the

³ The survey conducted by the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. The results of the surveys conducted after 1947 are available at <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/>.

military and society in present-day Japan had been consolidated by the end of 1980s. I will investigate what happened to the SDF and society during these four decades.

Militarization in the Postwar State

In his *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan*, the political scientist Glenn Hook has traced changes in postwar Japan's security policy. He identifies the period up to the 1980s as the period of "demilitarization." While maintaining the SDF, the Japanese government was extremely reluctant to employ it as a military force to resolve international disputes, and severely restricted military expenditure to the minimum level. Hook looks for the main reason for this pacifist policy in the popular and intellectual anti-war sentiment cultivated through the experience of war (that of the atomic bombs in particular) and the peace constitution. But he also argues that from the 1980s, the government gradually altered its pacifist policy and began to strengthen the military under pressure from the United States, which expected Japan to take more responsibility for the collective defense of Asia. Thus, the period of demilitarization ended, and "(re) militarization" started. In this book, Hook sees militarization mainly as a process by which the state becomes willing to resort to military forces for the settlement of international disputes.⁴

⁴ Glenn D. Hook, *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan* (London: Routledge, 1996). Hook is not alone insisting on this point. For example, Peter Katzenstein, another political scientist, agrees that compared to those countries that have advanced military strengthening as essential national agendas (e.g., the United States), postwar Japan endeavored to build a relatively peaceful and non-violent state, and therefore the degree of its militarization was low. Katzenstein,

I agree with Hook's overall discussion of Japan's security policies, and recognize the usefulness of the concept of militarization. But I propose to use this term in a different manner. I want to think about it in relation to not only the extent of the state's armament, but also the military's influence on civil society more broadly.

Cynthia Enloe defines the term in the following manner:

Militarization is a step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas. The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal.⁵

By defining the term in this way, Enloe is urging us to shift our attention toward the militarization of everyday life. Even when a country does not pursue overt military buildup or wage war against another, as long as the military exists, civilians' lives are transformed by the military in a number of ways even in peacetime. Enloe explains this with a variety of examples from a feminist standpoint. Militaries in some countries recognize prostitution as a necessary evil for its male service members. The same militaries may spread the image of the supportive model wife among service members' wives, and guarantee them comfortable material lives in order to enlist their loyalty to their husbands and the nation. Militaries in other countries may mobilize the notion of motherhood in order to encourage women to have more children to contribute to national security. In Enloe's argument, when these women rely on the

Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

⁵ Cynthia Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 3.

military to maintain their livelihood, and when they cease to question the legitimacy of the military, then, their lives are “militarized.”

While Enloe’s focus is on the militarization of women’s lives, the anthropologist Catherine Lutz examines the militarization of a community. In her *Homefront*, she demonstrates how the socio-economic lives of people in the city of Fayetteville, located next to Fort Bragg in North Carolina, have been closely intertwined with the military. Fayetteville’s history with the US army started before World War I, when civic boosters invited the army to build a training ground near the city, expecting it to bring economic benefits. From then on, the US army became one of the largest employers in the city. Businesses that targeted military personnel also flourished. Before conducting research in Fayetteville, Lutz emphasizes, she was expecting to study “civilians living alongside soldiers.” She realized that this distinction between things civil and things military was “an illusion, artificially maintained.” She does not believe that this is unique to Fayetteville, but constantly reminds the reader that there are many similar cities in California, Texas, and Virginia, to name a few states. The civil-military relation in Fayetteville thus symbolizes that of the twentieth-century United States.⁶

These arguments made by Enloe and Lutz are useful when we consider the case of postwar Japan. They indicate that the militarization of the state cannot be

⁶ Catherine Lutz, *Homefront: A Military City and the American Twentieth Century* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001). Another important reading on militarization is Michael Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s* (New Haven: Yale University, 1995). Like Enloe and Lutz, he focuses on the militarization of society. He argues that since the 1930s, security and defense have become Americans’ national anxieties, and shaped civilians’ socio-economic and cultural lives.

separated from that of civil society. In order to accomplish the arming of the state smoothly, the state has to prepare civil society both ideologically and socio-economically. In my study, therefore, while accepting that the Japanese state accelerated military buildup from the 1980s (as Glenn Hook argues), I do not suppose that this event took place all of sudden. Instead, I believe that the government and the SDF had been working to normalize the presence of a military in postwar society for many years, and this gradually and consequently led to building a consensus on the need for the military in society. I will explore this as the militarization process of Japanese society—the process by which civilians’ lives became controlled by the military, and they came no longer to feel that it is something to be corrected.

In the Japanese context, historical studies on prewar and wartime Japan often emphasize the Imperial Army’s impact on, and management of, civil society. Although these studies do not deal with the army exclusively, they at least suggest that the army maintained close interactions with civil society by helping to establish policies concerning labor (Garon), social welfare (Kasza), rural relief (Smith), health and hygiene (Frühstück), and so on.⁷ In contrast, the SDF has not received the same type of scholarly attention. While in his book on the military-industrial complex of modern Japan, Richard Samuels has pointed out a tight link between the state’s defense policies and industrial community’s economic activities, his focus is not the

⁷ Sheldon Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Gregory Kasza, “War and Welfare Policy in Japan” in *The Journal of Asian Studies* 61, no.2 (May 2002); Kerry Smith, *A Time of Crisis: Japan, the Great Depression, and Rural Revitalization* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); and Sabine Frühstück, *Colonizing Sex: Sexology and Social Control in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

SDF's interaction with individual civilians.⁸ The lack of scholarly interest in this topic is probably due to a tendency to minimize the scale of the SDF under the postwar constitutional order, and to view it as a rather secluded organization that does not have much significance in civilians' everyday lives. But as I have pointed out, the SDF is comparable at least to militaries in European countries in size. It is impossible that the SDF has had little interaction with civilians.

Sabine Frühstück's recent work *Uneasy Warriors* is probably the first book to address the relation between the SDF and civilians. Inspired by Enloe's argument, she seeks to show the reader the process of the militarization of postwar society. She discusses the SDF's mobilization of particular gender images, pop culture, and communal memory, and maintains that these efforts contributed to minimizing the image of the military as an aggressive and violent organization, and fostering popular acceptance of the SDF.

I share a fundamental research question with Frühstück. Like her, I want to know how the SDF normalized its presence in postwar society. Her argument, however, is by no means sufficient. The problem is that she does not consider the significance of militarization within the larger political and economic context of postwar Japan. Her book indicates that more than half a century after the SDF was founded, many Japanese regard this military organization as a natural part of their everyday lives, which is a clear consequence of a long-term militarization process. But her analysis stops there. She simply points out that the SDF has been increasingly

⁸ Richard J. Samuels, *"Rich Nation, Strong Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

normalized in society. From her book, we cannot determine what political and economic factors enabled and advanced the militarization process, and what this process meant in relation to the broader dynamics of postwar Japanese history.⁹

On the contrary, I find it crucial to place militarization within the larger political and economic context of postwar Japan. My basic presumption is that the relation between the SDF and society did not grow in isolation. In the postwar period, Japan underwent US occupation, recovered from the damage of the war, put itself on the path to high-speed economic growth, experienced large-scale social movements, and grew into a global power. The military-society relation developed in close connection with these events. I will ask how SCAP and government and military leaders defined the significance of possessing a military organization, what activities the SDF carried out, and how civilians responded, in the midst of this transformation of the nation. This will allow us not only to better understand why militarization took place, but also to recognize that militarization is not a problem caused by the SDF alone, but rather a structural problem immanent to the postwar political economic system.

Liberal Governance of Society

Throughout this study, I emphasize that the militarization of postwar society developed in large part by relying on the voluntarism of the people themselves. The Japanese government and the SDF did not necessarily force the people to accept the

⁹ Sabine Frühstück, *Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

presence of a military through suppression or prohibition. Instead, they sought to create an environment in which the people could actively support the SDF of their own will. In a broader sense, this has to do with the question of the state's governance of civil society. In this section, I provide an overview of how the relation between the modern state and civil society has been conceptualized, and make clear what theoretical basis I employ in my study in order to understand the people's support for the SDF.

I begin from Jürgen Habermas's influential discussion on the state and civil society. Using the case of Western Europe, he has demonstrated that civil society emerged as a new bourgeois class acquired economic power under capitalist development. Civil society first functioned as an arena where the bourgeoisie engaged in free economic production and exchange. But it gradually took up the role of making critical, autonomous citizens, as liberalism guaranteed individual freedom. Citizens came to discuss actively not only economic issues but also a broad range of issues related to the management of their own state. From this activity in civil society, Habermas argues, what he calls a public sphere was born. In the public sphere, citizens articulated and refined individual opinions as public opinions—those representing a collective will of civil society—to influence the state's decision making and limit its arbitrary use of power. In sum, Habermas conceptualizes civil society as a discrete

category essentially distinguished from the state, and believes that its most ideal relation to the state is the one that guarantees its independence.¹⁰

The Habermasian notion of the state and civil society has had considerable influence on the ways that historiography was produced. The field of Japanese history was not exceptional. Such scholars as Andrew Barshay, Andrew Gordon, and Timothy George have written books on the relations between the state and particular groups of people within civil society, such as intellectuals (Barshay), workers (Gordon), and pollution victims and their support organizations (George). They share the presumption that the state and society are two separate spheres; society's responsibility is to resist the state's intervention; and any society should eventually obtain autonomy from the state. Because of this presumption, they also share the idea that modern Japan is somehow unique. By measuring the state-society relation in modern Japan against their ideal, they characterize the former with a more authoritarian state and more passive citizens, both of which indicate the lower degree of Japanese society's autonomy. Whether explicitly or not, they generally agree that Japanese society has yet to achieve the ideal relation with the state.¹¹

I do not necessarily disagree with these scholars' characterization of state-society relations in modern Japan. It may be true that the Japanese state has been more

¹⁰ Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991).

¹¹ Andrew Barshay, *State and Intellectual in Imperial Japan: The Public Man in Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Andrew Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); and Timothy George, *Minamata: Pollution and Struggle for Democracy in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002).

authoritarian, and citizens have demonstrated less resistance, compared to the cases of Western Europe or North America. The problem with their arguments, however, is that they do not question the legitimacy of the dichotomy of the state and society. They believe that society enjoys extensive, if not full, autonomy elsewhere (the West, more precisely), and that Japan somehow lags in this aspect. But we must question whether this type of ideal relation between the state and civil society has ever existed in the history of modernity. As long as we look at the relation between the military (an institution belonging to the state) and society in particular, the answer is without doubt negative. Civil society's autonomy has never existed. As I have mentioned in the previous section, scholars have shown that it is the nature of a military to control civil society through various means for its perpetuation. This is also true of the so-called advanced democratic countries. In fact, in the United States, we can see the military's intervention in civil society more clearly than in any other countries. It is evident that an approach that presupposes the rigid dichotomy of the state and society does not allow us to understand the militarization process properly.

Therefore, I choose another approach. Here, Michel Foucault's argument is useful. He presents an argument on the state-society relation totally different from the one presented by Habermas. He maintains that beginning in the eighteenth century, the modern state began to view inhabitants within its national borders as a "population," that is, a group of people upon whom the economic wellbeing of the state depended. For the modern state, optimizing the population's potential—augmenting their productivity and improving their health—became one of its main concerns. When the population emerged as the object of intervention, Foucault says, what he names

“governmentality” also arose. Employing this term, he draws attention to multiple forms of regulating the population’s conduct that are established in such a way as not to conflict with a liberal ideology of freedom. These forms do not always involve direct and coercive control by the state, but encourage the population’s active engagement, participation, and contribution. In this argument, therefore, the types of activities that we tend to associate with the enhancement of the quality of citizens’ lives (school education, management of household economy, advancement in medicine, etc.) can be understood as techniques of governance. Foucault does not see much analytical value in drawing a boundary between the state and society. The boundary is rather illusive because the modern nation-state has never abandoned its interest in controlling society, and also because in a liberal state, society often works as a site where individuals learn to think and behave voluntarily in accordance with the state’s political and economic interests.¹²

Foucault’s argument has been advanced to a great extent. Jacques Donzelot has shown the processes by which families in modern France monitored their own conduct and took domesticity and industriousness upon themselves, with the help of such professions as social agencies and juvenile courts. Nikolas Rose has theoretically elaborated on the idea of “freedom,” not as a notion that enables individuals to resist ruling authorities, but as a politically invented notion for the effective operation of

¹² Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

governance.¹³ These studies suggest to us the following tenet. At the most fundamental level, liberalism allows people to believe that they are free individuals. In theory, they are allowed to make decisions autonomously and to act according to those decisions. For the state, support from those who believe they are free is much more desirable than that from those who feel they are under coercion. The latter may cease to support the state or even rebel against it once its power is weakened, while the former's support is much more fervent, stable, and long-lasting. Therefore, the modern state introduces a number of techniques to make people believe that they are not forced to do anything but chose freely. This does not mean at all that the state grants them the freedom to do anything. Instead, the most important thing is to instill in people the idea that they are acting autonomously. In short, liberalism is a form of governance of people that aims to create the illusion that they are not being governed.

In his *Molding Japanese Minds*, Sheldon Garon describes the history of modern Japan by incorporating Foucault's notion of governmentality. He focuses on various private organizations, and examines how they willingly internalized certain civic norms, subjected themselves to the state's power, and helped the state enforce policies, including those aimed at dealing with poverty, religion, and prostitution and illicit sexuality. But it is questionable whether his argument is wholly convincing. One of Garon's main points is to illuminate the ways that the modern Japanese state tried to manage its society and intervene in people's everyday lives directly and continually

¹³ Jacques Donzelot, *The Policing of Families* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1997); and Nikolas Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

even in peacetime. He contends that this was unique because Western democracies—what he identifies as the three most liberal democratic polities in the world: the United States, Britain, and France—did so only at the time of such emergencies as war. While using the notion of governmentality, Garon hangs on to the belief that society should be independent from the state, and implies that autonomous society exists in the West. As a result, he ends up underlining the argument that Japan lags in its relation between the state and society, the argument that many scholars of Japanese studies have long advanced.¹⁴

In my study, I accept the basic thesis stressed by Foucault (and his successors): where liberalism functions as a central ideology of rule, not only the state but also society itself participates in its governance. I use this thesis as an analytical tool with which to explore the relation between the SDF and society. I am particularly interested in demonstrating that SCAP and the Japanese government found it crucial to enlist spontaneous popular support, and that military leaders also agreed with them. To enlist popular support, the SDF endeavored to become “an SDF for the people” (*kokumin no tame no jieitai*). It carried out a number of activities that offered socio-economic assistance for civilians, particularly working-class men and people in rural communities, and thereby consolidated a base of popular support. As they became beneficiaries of military assistance, civilians increasingly believed that the SDF was indispensable to their lives, and equated their own welfare with the state’s security reinforcement, while eschewing criticism of the SDF. Postwar militarization was not

¹⁴ Sheldon Garon, *Molding the Japanese Mind: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

something imposed on society by the state. I demonstrate that society itself became self-regulating and contributed to building a structure that would sustain the interdependence of the military and society.

But unlike Garon (and the other historians of Japan mentioned above), I do not intend to understand the military governance of society in postwar Japan on a developmental scale. Japan was integrated into the world capitalist system in the late nineteenth century. It adopted liberalism as a basic ideology for regulating people's conduct, and based on this ideology, sought to make industrious and disciplined citizens. The postwar state, during and after US occupation, continued to value society's active engagement in self-governance. Its experience was (and is) as modern as those of Europe and the United States. I do not believe, therefore, that there was a qualitative difference between the Japanese mode of governance and the Western one. Nor do I presuppose that there is one ideal mode of governance toward which all societies must obtain eventually. Instead, I stress the contemporaneity of the mode of governance in liberal capitalist states in general, presenting my work as one case study of civil-military relations in modernity.

Chapter Organization

This dissertation contains four chapters. In Chapter One, I examine the efforts made by SCAP and the Japanese government to present rearmament within the framework of liberalism. While rearmament was an order given by the occupier to the occupied, SCAP intended to demonstrate that they were not depriving the Japanese government of its political autonomy. Japanese leaders involved in the founding of the

new military—Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and Maki Tomoo, the first president of the Defense Academy—tried to persuade the Japanese to support rearmament of their free will. This chapter investigates what language SCAP and the Japanese leaders employed to attain their goals, and illuminates the political atmosphere in which governing authorities, to carry out rearmament smoothly, stressed the voluntarism of those governed.

Chapter Two concerns how the SDF intended to achieve a cooperative relation between the military and society at the material level. I focus on the SDF's interaction with civilians during high-speed economic growth, which began in the mid-1950s. I argue that the SDF worked as a welfare institution for those who did not benefit from high-speed growth. The SDF recruited into military employment a pool of surplus labor, including unemployed working-class men in the city and farmers in the countryside. Then it relocated recruited members to work on civil engineering and disaster relief in rural communities, particularly in Hokkaido, which suffered from low population and labor shortages during high-speed growth. Through these activities, the SDF cultivated a stratum of people who would support the SDF for the maintenance of their livelihoods. This chapter explores the interdependence of the military and society as deeply rooted in the political economy of postwar Japan.

Liberalism, however, does not always work to harness people's conduct. When liberalism values the voluntarism of the people, the possibility opens up that individuals may turn into severe critics of state policies. In Chapter Three, by examining the anti-SDF movements in 1960s and 1970s Hokkaido, I show that the language of the postwar constitution guaranteeing individual rights and freedoms

helped local residents conceptualize and vocalize their criticism of the SDF. But at the same time, liberalism is an ever-growing system that tries to eliminate any outside by incorporating even criticism. I demonstrate that the government and the Defense Agency attempted to integrate even residents who were critical of the SDF into its welfare system by offering compensation and subsidies to those communities hosting bases.

Chapter Four concerns a culmination of the militarization process. From the late 1970s, the Japanese government explicitly insisted on the need for military buildup and transformed the SDF into a world military power. This chapter focuses on the campaign on the “northern threat,” in which former SDF officers energetically appeared in the popular media and emphasized the menace of Soviet military aggression as well as Hokkaido’s vulnerability. Fear-mongering is an effective form of liberal governance. People who have internalized fear as a dominant framework for interpreting their outer world willingly subject themselves to a greater control over how they should live. I examine the ways that promoters of the campaign and the government, which took full advantage of the campaign, used fear to prevent any more criticism of the SDF from developing in Hokkaido and converted this community into a land that could be easily employed for military purposes.

Chapter One

The Launch of Rearmament: Placing It in the Liberal Context

Those who govern society and try to shape its members' conduct must establish a language with which to rationalize their governance in such a way that it is acceptable to its members. People are able to perceive and comprehend what is happening in the outer world through language. This means that people's experience of a single event can differ greatly depending on what language is available to them and what language enjoys political dominance at a certain moment of history. Nikolas Rose calls this technique for governance "intelligibility," underlining the importance of language as that which makes governance work.¹

In this chapter, I examine the intelligibility of rearmament. When rearmament was launched in 1950, SCAP and Japanese government leaders were deeply concerned about how to describe this event within the framework of postwar liberalism. As of 1950, the reverse course was well underway. SCAP had already abandoned its original agenda of democratizing Japan, and had shifted its goal in occupation to security reinforcement. But this did not mean that SCAP had abandoned its liberal principles for governing the people. SCAP continued to regard the making of the citizens who would cooperate with occupation policies, whether democratic or not, as indispensable to smooth governance. Japanese government leaders were also conscious that they

¹ Rose, *Powers of Freedom*, 28-31.

could not simply force the people to support rearmament, but had to persuade them to do so.

This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first two sections, I discuss SCAP's efforts to present rearmament, which was an unrefusable order from the occupier to the occupied, in a way that it would not conflict with the principle of respecting Japanese ability for self-governance. Then, I will move on to examining the notion of patriotism articulated by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and Maki Tomoo, the first president of the Defense Academy. They expected patriotism to work as a disciplinary category that would guide the people on the significance of national unity and the need for rearmament in postwar Japan. In the final section, I will place Yoshida's and Maki's arguments within their contemporary intellectual context.

In this chapter, I do not necessarily intend to argue that SCAP's and Japanese government leaders' effort directly led to nurturing spontaneous popular support for the new army. Instead, my aims are to highlight the political atmosphere of the early postwar period, in which the idea of liberal governance became extremely important, and to show that even the pursuit of rearmament was not supposed to contradict this ideal.

“Authorizing” Rearmament

The mounting Cold War forced the United States to reconsider its policy of keeping Japan disarmed. From early 1950, the United States increasingly expected the Japanese government to contribute to the maintenance of its own security. It demanded that the Japanese government not only provide land for US military bases

and re-develop munitions industries, but also rearm the country. While agreeing to the first two demands, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru was reluctant to re-establish full-scale armed forces. When John Foster Dulles met Yoshida on June 22, 1950 to urge that rearmament be hastened, Yoshida replied that Japan's political and economic situation would not allow for rearmament. Politically, occupied Japan had enacted in 1946 a new constitution. This constitution renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation and banned the possession of armed forces. Economically, the devastated nation, which had not recovered from the wartime, could not afford to build a new army. His stress on economic recovery and his skepticism of rearmament had led Yoshida to develop the thesis of "self-defense without resort to arms," and to repeat this position to the Japanese public.²

The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, limited the extent to which the Japanese government could autonomously settle the question of rearmament. As many of the US troops stationed in Japan were mobilized for the war, MacArthur took the issue of rearmament out of the hands of the Japanese government. On July 8, 1950, MacArthur sent Yoshida a letter in which he ordered the founding of a new armed force, the "National Police Reserve" (NPR).

In this letter, MacArthur made maximum effort to avoid sounding as if he were giving the Japanese government an order it could not refuse. He began his letter by emphasizing how his occupation policies were designed to enhance Japanese autonomy, not to restrict it:

² John Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and The Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1988), 384.

In keeping with my established policy to re-invest autonomous authority in the Japanese Government as rapidly as the situations permits, I have visualized the progressive development of law enforcing agencies adequate to the maintenance of internal security and order...

Then, MacArthur expressed his appraisal of postwar Japan's "modern" and "democratic" police system, which he himself had created in the early years of the occupation. He said that the Japanese police had been "faithfully" assuming "autonomous responsibility" and forging a "proper relationship" with the citizenry. The Japanese people could "take justifiable pride in this agency." The "calmness" and "serenity" that the Japanese police ensured citizens made a sharp contrast to the "violence," "confusion," and "disorder" that existed in neighboring countries. The Supreme Commander then moved on to insisting on improving the police force, because he did not want to see the "favorable conditions" challenged by "lawless minorities." In his view, the police system could be augmented to safeguard "the public welfare in a democratic society." At the end of the letter, he finally discussed concrete ways of pursuing this police reform. He said: "I authorize your government to take necessary measures to establish a national police reserve of 75,000 men." Then he promised SCAP's support for the government in this matter. "The appropriate sections of this Headquarter will be available, as heretofore, to advise and assist in the technical aspects of these measures."³

³ "Letter from MacArthur to Yoshida," in Masuda Hiroshi ed., *Rearmament of Japan, Part I* (Congressional Information Service, Inc. and Maruzen Co., 1998), 1-B-126 (Microfiches).

The Japanese government could not figure out MacArthur's intent, particularly the type of relationship he was envisaging between the new "National Police Reserve" and the existing police force.⁴ The police system had been completely reformed by SCAP shortly after the occupation started. In order to democratize the system and to promote the autonomy of local governments, SCAP dismantled Japan's highly centralized police system, and allowed the local governments of communities with a population of 5,000 or more to found their own police forces. The central government did maintain a police system, namely the "National Local Police" (*kokka chihō keisatsu*). But the government's purpose here was not to control local police forces (the National Rural Police did not hold the right to command), but to assist small communities that did not have a budget large enough to establish their own police forces. This new system did not work smoothly by any means. The absence of central authority and a lack of communication among local governments made the new system ineffectual in dealing with crimes that affected multiple communities. Also, those communities that were allowed to have their own police forces often faced financial difficulty in maintaining the system. Prior to receiving MacArthur's letter, the Japanese government had repeatedly asked SCAP to improve this police system so that it could function more effectively. But SCAP had refused this request each time out of the fear that any change in the system might lead to revival of an oppressive, centralized police system. Upon receiving MacArthur's letter, some government

⁴ Yoshida Shigeru, *Kaisō jūnen 2* (Tokyo: Tokyo Shirakawa Shoin, 1957), 142-143.

leaders thought that the Supreme Commander had finally given permission to reform this inefficient police system.⁵

Ōhashi Takeo, then the Minister of Justice, recalls that he was asked by Chief Cabinet Secretary Okazaki Katsuo to come to the prime minister's residence soon after the Japanese government received MacArthur's letter. Okazaki wanted to discuss MacArthur's intentions with Ōhashi. Judging by its name, they expected the NPR to serve as "a strong force that backed up the police, equipped with fairly high-quality weapons."⁶ They did not associate the NPR with a military organization at this point. Ōhashi and Okazaki appointed Katō Yōzō, an executive from the National Rural Police, to take charge of recruiting officers and service members. Katō also supposed that the NPR would become "a complementary force to the police force" and "part of the police system institutionally." But as he held meetings with SCAP, he gradually realized that MacArthur intended to establish a new armed force aimed at protecting Japan's security and order—an organization under the direct control of the cabinet and completely independent of the existing police system.⁷ Colonel Frank Kowalski, who would later be sent by SCAP to the NPR to train its service members, remembers that very few Japanese government officials were informed of the legal status of the NPR even among those involved in the founding of this force.⁸

⁵ Bōeichō, *Jieitai jūnenshi* (Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsukyoku, 1961), 10-14. Katō Yōzō, *Shiroku jieitaiishi: Keisatsu yobitai kara konnichi made* (Tokyo: Bōei Kōsaikai, 1976), 16-18.

⁶ "Ōhashi Takeo intabyū kiroku," in Ōtake Hideo ed, *Sengo Nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū I* (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobō, 1991), 450.

⁷ Katō, *Shiroku jieitaiishi*, 19.

⁸ Frank Kowalski, *Nihon saigunbi* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 1999), 64.

But MacArthur and SCAP did not suddenly come up with the idea of rearming Japan with outbreak of the Korean War. US officials in Washington had been discussing this question for some time. In a memorandum sent to the Secretary of Defense in May 1948, the Department of the Army stated that “limited military armament for Japan” was “desirable” so that Japan could share the burden of its own defense against the Soviet threat.⁹ MacArthur initially expressed skepticism about rearmament in consideration of the country’s weak economy and the constitutional restriction (just as Prime Minister Yoshida would later do, in his effort to slow rearmament).¹⁰ While acknowledging MacArthur’s opinion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed the Department of the Army’s proposal, saying that the rearmament of Japan should not be postponed in “view of the unsatisfactory world situation and the likelihood of its worsening.”¹¹ Although MacArthur continued to oppose Japan’s rearmament, the pressure from Washington officials became too great for MacArthur to simply ignore it. As the Cold War mounted, MacArthur himself began to recognize the need for rearmament, too. On New Year’s Day in 1950, he sent a message to the Japanese people. In this message, he no longer denied the Japanese the right to self-defense. This could be interpreted as a sign of the loosening of his hard stance

⁹ “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Secretary of the Army on May 18, 1948,” in Masuda, ed., *Rearmament of Japan 1*, 1-A-46 (Microfiches).

¹⁰ “Memorandum of Interviews between General MacArthur under Secretary of the Army Draper, and Mr. Kennan,” in Masuda, ed., *Rearmament of Japan 1*, 1-A-46 (Microfiches).

¹¹ “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 1, 1949,” in Masuda, ed., *Rearmament of Japan 1*, 1-A-85 (Microfiches).

concerning Japan's rearmament.¹² By the time the Korean War broke out, SCAP had fairly concrete plans for a prospective Japanese army. SCAP wanted to build four divisions, which would replace the US Army divisions stationed in Japan. It also planned to train recruits and officers under the supervision of the Public Safety Division of SCAP.¹³

It was obvious to anyone, however, that rearmament would seriously contradict the spirit of the Potsdam Declaration and the vision of the society MacArthur had guided the Japanese to strive for over the past five years. He had taught the Japanese that the Imperial Army and Navy had misled them, and that they should defend themselves without depending on a military in order not to repeat the mistake they had committed. So he would have to explain to the Japanese what had happened to the demilitarization policy, unarmed neutrality, and Article 9. Facing this situation, he presented the establishment of the NPR as an autonomous choice made by the Japanese government: the Japanese government had been asking SCAP for permission to build an armed force; the Supreme Commander, out of concern for the peace and security of the Japanese people, finally "authorized" the government's proposal. By presenting the rearmament in this way, MacArthur intended to demonstrate to the Japanese people his commitment to the fundamental principle of guaranteeing the nation's autonomy.

¹² MacArthur, "Nentō seimei" in Ōtake ed., *Sengo Nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū 1*, 233-236.

¹³ "Memorandum for Chief of Staff from A. P. Fox," in Masuda, ed., *Rearmament of Japan 1*, 1-B-125 (Microfiches).

It is obvious that the Japanese government had no right to make a decision concerning whether to approve rearmament or not. But MacArthur knew that to induce the Japanese government to actively pursue rearmament, he could simply “authorize” it instead of ordering such an action. Given the unequal relationship established between the occupier and the occupied, Japanese government leaders did not believe that they were entitled to challenge MacArthur’s authorization of the NPR. During the last five years of occupation, they had learned this sufficiently. Yoshida Shigeru remembers that he understood MacArthur’s letter as “an *order* concerning the security of the country.”¹⁴ Ōhashi Takeo recall that upon receiving MacArthur’s letter, he and Okazaki Katsuo immediately agreed that “that was not the kind of issue they could refuse.” Then, they visited Major General Courtney Whitney at the Government Section to introduce themselves as those in charge of establishing the NPR. There, Ōhashi and Okazaki quickly accepted Whitney’s offer to send a military advisory group from SCAP and to provide the NPR with weapons and equipments. They also initiated the selection of important personnel for the future army the same day.¹⁵ Twelve days after the letter, they appointed Masuhara Keikichi as the director of the new organization, and he resigned as the Governor of Kagawa Prefecture to go to Tokyo.

In this way, the compliance of the Japanese government was quite striking. No one dared ask MacArthur or SCAP directly why he resorted to such ambiguous

¹⁴ Yoshida Shigeru, *Kaisō jūnen* 2, 142.

¹⁵ “Ōhashi Takeo intabyū kiroku,” in Ōtake ed, *Sengo Nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū* 1, 450.

expressions as “authorize the government to take the necessary measures to establish a national police reserve,” or to point out the simple fact that the Japanese government had never asked for rearmament. In occupied Japan, associating “authorization” with “unrefusable order” did not require much work. In the last five years of occupation, Yoshida’s government had become highly self-regulating. It had learned that autonomy was insured only if it was willing to conform to the basic guidelines set by the occupier.

The Law and the NPR

After authorizing the founding of the NPR, SCAP worried about how to establish a legal basis for this new armed force. Again, SCAP had to found the NPR in such a legal manner that would not contradict political liberalism. As I have said, rearmament was an unrefusable order from the occupier, but it was crucial for SCAP to present it as a project legitimated by the Japanese Diet.

SCAP advised the Japanese government to found the NPR through a cabinet order, rather than a law enacted by the Diet. As of July 1950, Yoshida Shigeru’s conservative Liberal Party, to which SCAP gave its full endorsement, possessed an absolute majority in the House of Representatives, holding 264 out of 466 seats, while the Socialist Party held 48 and the Communist Party, 35. But the Liberal Party constituted a small minority in the House of Councilors. It held only 76 out of 250 seats, while the Socialist Party held 61 seats and Ryokufūkai (a group of independent Diet members who tried to stay away from the conflict between the right and the left) held 50 seats. SCAP feared that these other parties would prolong Diet proceedings. It

was not even clear that the Diet would approve the proposal. Courtney Whitney from the Government Section expressed his worry in the following way:

This procedure [telling the government to issue a cabinet order] was necessary and desirable because...the freedom of discussion and debate enjoyed by that body [the Diet] would undoubtedly have been seized upon by the Communists and other leftist members to criticize not only the Government's proposal but actually to attack by inference or by thinly veiled reference the motives of the Supreme Commander and of the United States for propaganda purposes both in Japan and abroad.¹⁶

Naturally, the Yoshida Cabinet followed SCAP's direction. The Cabinet waited to issue the order until the Diet adjourned on August 3, 1950, as a precautionary measure to keep the opposition from enjoying the opportunity to interrogate the government. The Cabinet finally issued the "National Police Reserve Order" on August 10. The order recognized the founding of the NPR as an organization directly administrated by the Cabinet. It set a quota of 75,000 personnel, and defined the NPR's mission as "maintaining peace and order within the country," and stipulated that it could take actions for public safety under the direction of the Prime Minister.

SCAP's rejection of Diet proceedings seems to be incongruous with the policy of granting autonomy to the Japanese people. One might think that SCAP should have allowed the proposal to be brought to the Diet for free discussion if it had truly wished to present rearmament as the choice of the Japanese government. But if we examine carefully the legal ground on which the National Police Reserve Order was issued, we

¹⁶ "Memorandum Concerning Legal Aspects of the Implementation of the Supreme Commander's Letter of 8 of July 1950," in Masuda, ed., *Rearmament of Japan 1*, 1-B-126 (Microfiches).

will notice that the issuance of a cabinet order did not necessarily conflict with SCAP's broadly publicized liberal principles.

As is well known, the United States did not establish a military government in occupied Japan, but opted to enforce occupation rather indirectly: it preserved prewar governing institutions such as the Diet, cabinet, and bureaucracy, and ruled the occupied country through them.¹⁷ Even after defeat and the arrival of SCAP, the Meiji Constitution continued to be effective (until May 3, 1947, when the new constitution was enforced). The government was supposed to rule the nation based on this constitution. SCAP controlled the Japanese government through directives. The Japanese government translated these directives into Japanese, and proclaimed them as "Potsdam Orders"—orders whose purpose was to put into practice the principles of the Potsdam Declaration. The orders established through this procedure did not require the Diet's approval, and yet possessed the same validity as Diet-approved legislation. By the end of the occupation, the government had issued some 520 orders. The National Police Reserve Order was one such order.

The Meiji Constitution gave legitimacy to the Potsdam Orders. Article Eight of the Constitution was a provision concerning imperial ordinances. The article stated:

The Emperor, in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities, issues, when the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial ordinances in the place of law.

¹⁷ Okinawa was an exception. The United States ruled Okinawa through a military government from 1945 to 1950.

The government of Imperial Japan used this article mainly to declare martial law in areas affected by a large-scale riots or natural disasters. Between the enactment of the Meiji Constitution and the end of the war, there were three cases of the declaration of martial law based on this article: the riot against the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth for the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the Great Kantō Earthquake in 1923, and the unsuccessful coup d'état by army officers on February 26, 1936. In these cases, the government promulgated “emergency ordinances” (*kinkyū chokurei*) in the name of the Emperor in order to enforce martial law provisions necessary to contain disorder. These provisions included the transfer of administrative and judicial authority to the commander, the suspension of the freedom of the press, and the authorization of the requisition of private properties for munitions purposes.¹⁸

Furthermore, governing through ordinances was a common practice adopted in Japanese colonies such as Taiwan and Korea. As Edward I-te Chen has detailed, the central government of Japan had been concerned about what legal relations to establish with the colonies since it obtained Taiwan in 1894. The central government viewed its colonies as integral parts of the empire, and therefore hoped to apply the constitution and other Diet-enacted laws to them. But at the same time it realized that differences in customs and culture might impede this. The solution was to issue ordinances whose authority derived from the Meiji Constitution and the Diet. Besides Article Eight, the constitution contained provisions concerning imperial ordinances. Articles Nine and Ten recognized the Emperor’s right to issue imperial ordinances

¹⁸ For the full texts of these emergency ordinances, see the following database: <http://www.geocities.jp/nakanolib/>.

“necessary for the maintenance of public peace and order and for the promotion of the welfare of his subjects” even in peacetime, and ordinances to “determine the organization of the different branches of the administration,” respectively. Also, the Imperial Diet created a law that allowed the governors-general of Taiwan and Korea to issue ordinances at their own will. These ordinances had the same effect as laws enforced in Japan. Until 1945, nineteen governors-general in Taiwan issued 275 ordinances, and nine governors-general in Korea, 676 ordinances.¹⁹

It is not clear whether SCAP personnel were aware that the Japanese government had used ordinances extensively for the management of the colonies. But they at least knew that the Japanese government had used Article Eight to issue emergency ordinances, and that they could rule Japan quite arbitrarily by this method. So they pressured the Diet to pass an ordinance pursuant to this article. Thus, the Eighty-ninth Imperial Diet ratified the “Imperial Ordinance Concerning Orders to Be Issued Following the Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration” on September 20, 1945. The ordinance stated:

In case it is necessary for the enforcement of such matters as are required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in consequence of our acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the Government may by Order make such provisions as may be required and provide for necessary punishments.

Legally speaking, this ordinance shifted the authority to determine what constituted “an urgent necessity” and what orders were to be issued from the Emperor to the

¹⁹ Edward I-te Chen, “The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives,” in Ramon H. Myers and Mark Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Supreme Commander. Upon accepting the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese government had already admitted that the authority of the Emperor and the government would be subject to the Supreme Commander. This ordinance reconfirmed from the standpoint of law that the Supreme Commander possessed the prerogative to declare orders independent of parliamentary proceedings. Courtney Whitney, in his memorandum concerning the legal foundation for establishing the NPR, pointed to the Potsdam Orders and argued that the founding of the NPR could be pursued legally through the issuance of an order, without Diet proceedings.²⁰

To put it simply, through the Potsdam Orders SCAP created a state of exception within the Meiji constitutional system. Under this circumstance, the law-making authority held by the Diet—one of the most basic aspects of modern states—was suspended, and the cabinet became accountable to the Supreme Commander, rather than to the Diet. Since an abundance of orders were issued in which the Diet technically exercised no control, one can say that the Diet during the occupation was rather powerless and that the Meiji constitution was not in actuality functioning. Instead, power was concentrated in MacArthur, who designed directives, and the Japanese government, which faithfully worked as a mediator between MacArthur and the people by translating the directives into Japanese. Eventually, the Imperial Diet approved the revision of the Meiji Constitution under strong pressure from SCAP and brought an end to itself in March 1947.

²⁰ “Memorandum Concerning Legal Aspects of the Implementation of the Supreme Commander’s Letter of 8 of July 1950” in Masuda, ed., *Rearmament of Japan I*, 1-B-126 (Microfiches).

Giorgio Agamben argues that since World War One, the acquiescence of the legislative power to the executive power through the declaration of a state of exception has become a common practice of constitutional states, whether democratic or authoritarian. The most obvious example is the Nazi state, which, as soon as Hitler was given power by the people, proclaimed the Decree for the Protection of the People and the State in order to suspend the articles of the Weimar Constitution concerning individual freedoms. Since the decree was never repealed, Agamben points out, it is possible to consider the Third Reich as a state of exception that lasted twelve years inside the Weimar Republic.

Besides the Third Reich, Agamben offers a number of examples of a state of exception pursued by other European nations. France, the country that is often perceived as the opposite of the authoritarian Nazi regime, also has a long and intense history of employing the state of exception as a technique for governing the population. During World War I, President Poincaré issued a decree in August 1914 placing the entire country under a state of siege. The parliament converted this decree into a law soon after. In the first six months, the parliament suspended its activities, and even after it re-opened, the parliament passed laws that granted legislative power to the executive. Although the wartime state of siege ended in October 1919, the government repeatedly asked the parliament for full powers to cope with political and economic problems more effectively, on such occasions as the crisis of the French franc in the 1920s and the Nazi expansion in the 1930s. Once war broke out in Europe in 1939, the

Daladier government assumed the power to take all necessary measures to defend the country.²¹

Through these examples, Agamben demonstrates the paradox that the declaration of a state of exception opens up a space external to the law within the body of the law. Because a state of exception is based on the suspension of the law, not its abolition, and because this suspension of the law is enforced legally, it must be distinguished from mere political disorder, where one power attempts to overthrow the other and institute a new rule from scratch. Yet, by extending the period of the state of exception permanently, the executive power can substantially abolish the existing law system, just as the Nazis did to the Weimar Republic. Agamben writes:

...from a technical standpoint the specific contribution of the state of exception is less the confusion of powers...than it is the separation of “force of law” from the law. It defines “state of the law” in which, on the one hand, the norm is in force but is not applied and, on the other, acts that do not have the value of law acquire its “force.”²²

This argument by Agamben provides insight into the US occupation of Japan. MacArthur was aware that indirect occupation through the existing governing institutions could be as effective as direct occupation by a military administration. By obtaining the authority to issue directives that could be converted into orders, the Supreme Commander could give “force of law” to his own words. There was no need to implement a military administration. That would have required a far greater number

²¹ Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 12-13.

²² *Ibid.*, 38.

of personnel and a higher budget, and triggered more popular resentment against the occupier.

Moreover, the enforcement of the state of exception was convenient for SCAP because it was compatible with the principle of liberalism. As I have said, the state of exception is the suspension of the law. The basic idea is that waiting for the Diet to make laws is not an efficient way to protect people during an emergency. So an individual or group with higher authority must temporarily take up the role of administering a whole state. But once the emergency is over, the law is supposed to be applied again. To put it another way, the state of exception is a mode of governance that the liberal state invented in order to enable dictatorship while maintaining the general framework of the liberal state. In SCAP's views, it was not negating the authority of the Japanese Diet, but was merely suspending it until circumstances improved. SCAP was supposed to return law-making power to the Japanese Diet when the day came that the Diet could make laws by itself. SCAP issued the Potsdam Orders as temporary measures until then. The National Police Reserve Order was one of the Potsdam Orders. So SCAP would not have agreed that it unilaterally imposed the order on the Japanese. According to SCAP, MacArthur was legally granted the right to determine what constituted a threat to Japanese security. He decided that the intensifying Cold War was actually threatening Japanese security and that creating an army was the best measure to protect it. He has thus ordered rearmament in place of the Japanese Diet.

Here, we should recall once again that Imperial Japan extensively used ordinances in its colonies. When we consider this fact together with Potsdam Orders in

US-occupied Japan, we can easily argue that the use of the state of exception is a form of governance common to colonies and semi-colonies. But we must not forget that colonialism and liberalism were not contradictory. Instead, the latter theoretically complemented the former. In liberalism, only those who can exercise reason can enjoy freedom. When liberalism emerged as the bourgeoisie gained power, only middle-class adult men could enjoy freedom. Women, children, and working-class people were denied freedom because they were considered irrational and incapable of making consent. People in colonies were the same. Colonial powers judged them immature, and refrained from applying the principle of freedom to them. Liberalism justified colonialism as a mode of tutelage that aimed to help immature people internalize reason and make their own decisions autonomously.²³ The state of exception contributed to colonialism from the legal perspective. Because people in colonies were not mature enough to make laws by themselves, authorities in metropolises were helping them.

Patriotism

Once the NPR was established, government leaders had to explain to the people why rearmament was necessary and why the people had to support the National Police Reserve. The language they used to this end was that of *aikokushin* or patriotism. They believed that patriotism was compatible with postwar liberalism, and

²³ For the intimate relation between liberalism and colonialism, see Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

expected with this notion to teach the people how to respect the well-being of the national community while admonishing them against pursuing selfish interests.

Yoshida Shigeru was one of the most enthusiastic proponents of patriotism. While serving as the prime minister five times between 1946 and 1954, Yoshida expressed his desire to spread patriotism on a number of occasions, such as administrative speeches and debates in the Diet. Most fundamentally, he viewed patriotism as the driving force that could unite the people for the reconstruction of the nation's political economy. He believed that amid the hardships of defeat, occupation, and economic devastation, the people had to consider the nation's reconstruction and entry into the liberal capitalist bloc to be the most important, immediate goals.

But in Yoshida's opinion, the opposition parties were spending too much energy attacking the government's policies; workers were protesting in the street against the government and the US occupation forces. Yoshida attributed this political chaos to the people's lack of patriotism. Because the people had lost their love of country upon defeat in war, he thought, they had come to value individual freedom and rights over the good of the nation-state. Regaining a Japanese collective identity therefore became one of Yoshida's most urgent political priorities. In his speeches at the Imperial Diet (until March 1947) and the postwar Diet (after May 1947), he continually emphasized the need for the people to endure economic and political hardships in the name of patriotism, and collaborate for the betterment of "the people's lives" (*kokumin seikatsu*).

We can observe Yoshida's emphasis on patriotism from the early stage of the occupation. Immediately after arriving in Japan, SCAP had recognized laborers' right

to organize, and since then, the labor movement had grown rapidly. During 1946, the scale of strikes enlarged so much that it became difficult for SCAP and the Japanese government to control the working masses. Labor unions planned to hold a general strike on September 1, 1947. Under this strike, trains were to be stopped, schools were to be closed, and phone and postal services were to be suspended. This would be the largest strike of the postwar period. Afraid that this strike would undermine the authority of the occupation forces stationed all over Japan, MacArthur banned the strike. Yoshida had been long criticizing the working masses and telling them to regulate themselves more in the name of patriotism. After the strike was banned, Yoshida lamented that the people could not avoid SCAP's intervention. In his view, at a time when the people should have been demonstrating their commitment to the reconstruction of the economy, they were only pursuing their own interests.

It is truly lamentable that since the end of the war, the people are losing day by day the spirit to work hard and strive for national reconstruction. The people of this nation used to be respected as patriotic by the Great Powers. I feel so sorry that as a result of the defeat in the war, their spirits are lost, morals are decaying, and conflicts are increasing.²⁴

There is another example. Early in 1949, the government accepted the austerity budget that had been proposed by the American financial advisor Joseph Dodge to end the nation's persistent inflation. Since the government planned to reduce drastically its subsidies for industries, large-scale rationalization, including extensive layoffs, seemed unavoidable. Yoshida maintained that, while some people might temporarily

²⁴ Administration policy speech given at the Ninety-second Imperial Diet on February 14, 1947. Minutes of the Diet are available at the following database made by the National Diet Library: <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/>.

suffer from the Dodge Plan, the nation needed to undergo this “surgery” to secure the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This surgery could not be carried out in the absence of the people’s patriotism:

In order to achieve a bright future, the surgery must be carried out soon, and to enable the nation to endure the surgery, we need, above all, the people’s firm faith and passionate patriotism... I sincerely hope that the people of eighty million will confirm their determination to reconstruct the nation through their strong independent spirit and efforts to endure a frugal life.²⁵

The 1950 rearmament convinced Yoshida even more deeply of the need to promote patriotism. The members of the Diet were not pleased that the government planned to strengthen the police system without the Diet’s approval. The leftist parties associated this event with a return to wartime militarism. On July 12, just four days after MacArthur’s letter, a member of the Communist Party charged at a plenary session of the House of Representatives that the founding of the NPR would increase Japan’s chances of being drawn into a third world war.²⁶ On July 15, Suzuki Mosaburō, who would later become the chairman of the Socialist Party, asked why the defeated nation had to deliberately involve itself again in international conflicts. He contended that the government should pay more attention not to rearming the country, but to improving Japanese laborers’ rights and interests.²⁷

Yoshida, however, criticized those who insisted on “permanent neutrality” and a “complete peace treaty” (a peace treaty with both capitalist and communist states),

²⁵ Administrative policy speech given at the Fifth Diet on April 4, 1949.

²⁶ Statement by Hayashi Hyakurō at a plenary session of the House of Representatives at the Eighth Diet on July 12.

²⁷ At the plenary session of the House of Representatives at the Eighth Diet on July 15.

saying that they were being unrealistic. He constantly reminded Diet members that the Korean War was raging, and insisted that “red invaders” were extending their “evil hands” to disturb peace and to hinder national reconstruction. According to him, MacArthur was deeply worried about Japanese people’s security, and had decided to increase the police force to the level of other democratic states. Yoshida argued that those with true patriotism should ignore small differences in political visions.²⁸

From 1950 Yoshida began to show interest in introducing patriotism into school education as well. At the behest of SCAP, the Japanese government had promulgated the Fundamental Law of Education in 1947. Reflecting SCAP’s demilitarization and democratization policy, this law rejected authoritarian education and endorsed individualism. The preamble stated that the realization of the establishment of a democratic and cultural state depended fundamentally on “the power of education”; and that “we” the Japanese had to “esteem individual dignity” and foster education aimed at “the creation of culture, general and rich in individuality.”

In Yoshida’s view, however, this new educational philosophy generated serious crises in the classroom. Teachers became radicalized and spent more of their energy on union activism than education; students lost their national pride and grew spoiled and egoistic. For him, education in any country must begin by teaching students its “national language, history, and geography,” and by “cultivating national characteristics.” But this type of educational philosophy was discarded in the name of

²⁸ Administrative policy speech at the Eighth Diet on July 14.

democratization and progressivism. Yoshida thought that there were too many people who “misunderstood freedoms, insisted only on their own rights, and did not try to understand other people’s positions.” He called these people “modern barbarians” (*kindaiteki yabanjin*) who did not comprehend the “true meaning of democracy.”²⁹

Facing this situation, Yoshida asked the Minister of Education, Amano Teiyū, a former Kyoto Imperial University professor of German Philosophy, to prepare moral guidelines for the reference of the Japanese people. While criticizing prewar militarism, Amano agreed with Yoshida that postwar democracy had been robbing the people of patriotism. He felt compelled to redefine the relationship between the state and the people. In his “Outline of Ethical Practice for the Japanese People” (*Kokumin jissen yōryō*), Amano stressed that the state and the people depended on each other for their existence. In so doing, he tried to remind the Japanese of the “spirit of fairness and justice,” which was not manipulated solely by individuals’ self-interests. He wrote:

The life of the state exists where individuals work for the state and the state works for individuals. The state, therefore, should not neglect individuals’ personalities and happinesses, and individuals should not lose love of the state. The state is not an entity created for individuals’ interests, so the state should not be considered to be the means of achieving individuals’ interests. But the state is not an entity that neglects individuals either. Individuals should not be considered as the means of achieving the interests of the state. Here lies the ethics of the state and the people.

²⁹ For Yoshida’s discontent with SCAP’s educational reform, see Chapter Ten of *Kaisō jūnen 2* “Bunkyō kaikaku o megutte,” 95-125.

Critics usually regard the series of patriotic policies promoted by Yoshida and Amano as reactionary. When discussing Yoshida's discontent with SCAP's educational reforms, John Dower points to his patriotism education as a return to tradition. He argues that Yoshida's policy "ransacked the past for an ethical code that could be adapted to present circumstances."³⁰ Dower's criticism may be right. Yoshida's promotion of patriotism was reactionary in that state leaders in prewar and wartime Japan were all eager to inculcate patriotism in the people, and Yoshida's policies evoked this past.

But at the same time, we should not forget that when promoting patriotism, both Yoshida and Amano were pointing to the fundamental tenet of liberalism. In a liberal state, the people are free. They are not forced to believe in, or act according to, one particular thought. They are free to embrace any thought, and criticize anything. But there is one thing no one can negate: that is, the nation-state. The nation-state is the very institution that guarantees the people various freedoms, and protects them from those who try to violate their freedoms. In other words, the people's freedom cannot exist without the state. Therefore, in a liberal state, negating the basic framework of the nation-state cannot be tolerated. Those who do so will be severely punished. This is true of any liberal state: whether the United States, France, Imperial Japan, or Nazi Germany. Although the extent to which criticism of the nation-state is tolerated may differ from one state to another, no state will tolerate those who intend to overthrow it by exercising their freedom. In any nation-state, the people must show

³⁰ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, 353.

certain respect to it. This is what Yoshida and Amano tried to remind the people of. They believed that the people must not conflate freedom with uncontrolled license, but should always think of how to balance individual freedom and the good of the nation-state.

Yoshida's desire to reinvigorate patriotism in postwar liberalism can be observed most clearly in the founding of the National Safety Academy (*Hoan daigakkō*). The academy was founded in August 1952, just after Japan obtained independence and when the National Police Reserve developed into the Safety Forces, equipped with both ground and maritime forces. Two years later, the government founded the Defense Agency and reorganized the Safety Forces into the Self Defense Forces, a full-fledged military with ground, maritime, and air forces. Then the National Safety Academy was renamed the National Defense Academy (*Bōei daigakkō*). Since its founding, the aim of the Safety/Defense Academy has been to provide professional training for future military officers. Yoshida was afraid that rearmament would become a financial burden for the nation's economy. Even after the NPR was founded, he tried to keep the scale of the armed forces rather small, resisting pressure from the United States, which expected Japan to pursue a military buildup as quickly as possible. On the other hand, he expressed his strong support for a new military academy. Those involved in founding the academy recall that Yoshida had a plan for an officer development curriculum as early as 1950, the year rearmament

started. And in fact, he was intimately involved in selecting educators for the academy.³¹

Why? When Japan's gradual rearmament seemed unavoidable due to the United States' pressure, Yoshida saw an urgent need to train officers who could supervise the new military in the new Japan. Imperial Japan had maintained two military academies, namely the Imperial Army Academy in Tokyo and the Imperial Naval Academy in Hiroshima. But Yoshida did not want anyone related to these academies to influence the new academy's educational policies or curriculum. His hatred of the Imperial Army and Navy was well known. To him, the officer education in Imperial Japan had been a complete failure. It inculcated military spirit (*gunjin seishin*) in future officers, but with its elitist attitude, it failed to cultivate national spirit (*kokumin seishin*). As a result, the gulf between the military and civil society widened. Military officers, Yoshida thought, must be specialists of not only military affairs but also general politics and international relations. They must be well connected with civil society, and internalize a sense of obligation to work for the people. Otherwise, they would lead the country in the wrong direction by imposing policies without the consensus of the people.³² Moreover, in Imperial Japan, the Army and Navy often clashed over the distribution of military spending, operations, and leadership in occupied areas. In Yoshida's mind, this factionalism took place precisely because officers identified themselves only with the Army or Navy, not with the

³¹ "Zadankai, Hoan daigakkō no omoide," in Bōei Daigakkō Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai ed, *Bōei daigakkō jūnenshi* (Yokosuka: Bōei Daigakkō, 1965). 38.

³² "Dai ikkai sotsugyōshiki shukuji," in *Ibid.*, 43. Yoshida, *Kaisō jūnen 2*, 156-158.

nation-state.³³ Therefore, Yoshida hoped to appoint a civilian educator as the academy's president, and to educate future officers for the three branches of armed forces at one academy so students would identify themselves as members of the nation-state.

Yoshida asked his friend Koizumi Shinzō to suggest a well-qualified person. Koizumi was a graduate of Keiō University. He specialized in economics, particularly the British economy, and held the position of the president at Keiō between 1933 and 1947. He was an advocate of liberal economy, and extremely critical of Marxism as well as command economies (such as wartime Japan's and Germany's). One of his most famous and best-selling books, published in 1949, was titled *Kyōsan shugi hihan no jōshiki* (General knowledge for the critique of communism). Yoshida and Koizumi had become close friends, and they shared a hatred of communism and militarism. They also shared a belief in the importance of maintaining close friendships with liberal democratic states in Western Europe and North America.

Koizumi entrusted the presidency of the academy to his friend Maki Tomoo. Like Koizumi, Maki was a graduate of Keiō. Maki also had a bachelor's degree from Oxford University in England. After coming back to Japan, he taught politics and the British Constitution in the Department of Law at Keiō. While Koizumi was the president of Keiō, Maki worked as a trustee of the same school. Like Koizumi, he was famous for his belief in European liberalism.

³³ “Zadankai, Hoan daigakkō no omoide” in Bōei Daigakkō Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai ed, *Bōei daigakkō jūnenshi*, 39.

Responding to Yoshida's expectations, Maki vigorously promoted patriotism, and the need to defend the country, in a much more articulate manner than had Yoshida. For Maki, just as for Amano Teiyū, the state was the very framework that enabled humans to gather as "the people." It guaranteed them rights and freedoms. If the independence of the state were undermined by the force of other countries, the life of the people would become that of slaves, and their autonomy would be lost. Under such a condition, the people would have to live in constant fear of domination and repression. The state, he thought, needed to secure the means to self-defense in order to defend its freedom and democracy. The people should not simply expect the state to protect them, but should themselves engage actively in national defense. Naturally, Maki rejected unarmed neutrality as an armchair theory. In his mind, whoever associated peace with nonresistance was simply promoting defeatism. Could we say, Maki asked, that such people possessed the "dignity and spirit of civilized humans"?³⁴

Like Yoshida, Maki repeated that freedom did not refer simply to human conduct unleashed from restrictions. To be sure, Maki never forgot to insist that the aim of the academy's education was to raise autonomous individuals. He maintained that the esteem of individuality was the foundation of modern civilization, and would work as a driving force for advancing society. So students at the academy were supposed to learn how to make important decisions by themselves. But he also believed that individuals must bear responsibility for their own words and actions by

³⁴ Maki Tomoo, *Bōei no tsutome* (Tokyo: Kōyō Shobō, 1965), 47-50.

taking into account that society determines by consensus what one can and cannot do.

He wrote:

If I say democracy and the spirit of obedience, most of you will probably find these two expressions oxymoronic and strange. In reality, however, there will be no true freedom where there is no discipline. It is impossible to found a true democracy if people have no intention to follow the law and to obey justice.³⁵

Here, although Maki is referring to “democracy,” we can speculate that what he really meant was liberalism. Although we often use the term “liberal democracy” as if both liberalism and democracy help to accomplish the same goal, this is by no means true. Historically, liberalism emerged with the rise of capitalism in Europe. It enabled the bourgeoisie to claim their own freedom in economic activities and to establish people of the lower social stratum as free laborers. On the other hand, democracy developed as a notion with which to challenge bourgeois liberalism. It helped the working class insist on their own political rights, which had been neglected by the bourgeoisie. So liberalism and democracy originally were two separate ideas that were not compatible with each other. With the advent of the twentieth century, however, capitalist states could no longer ignore the growing power of the working class. The Russian Revolution and the Great Depression made capitalist states realize the importance of integrating working class people into the capitalist system. In the first half of the twentieth century, many states came to recognize universal suffrage as well as other political and social rights. Liberalism thus became liberal democracy. In Japan’s case, as Andrew Gordon has detailed, the working class movement toward

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

democracy started as early as the 1900s (after the Russo-Japanese War). After long-term, sometimes violent, contestations, the working masses obtained male universal suffrage in 1925, and female universal suffrage and the right to organize and bargain collectively during US occupation.³⁶

Because of this historical context, Maki presented liberalism and democracy almost interchangeably. We can say the same thing about Yoshida and other promoters of patriotism. But from their writings and speeches, one can see that they thought little about democracy. They seldom talked about how to enhance the people's rights or how to create an environment in which they could better exercise their rights. They were rather concerned about how to educate those who they believed were ignorant masses so that they would feel like subjecting themselves to the state's authority. This was exactly the agenda of liberalism. But when they tried to accomplish this agenda, "democracy" was a very convenient notion. By resorting to this term, they could present themselves as if they were defending the people's rights, and urge them to harness their conduct more strictly and become more disciplined if they wished to maintain the rights they were already enjoying.

On another occasion, Maki went further on the importance of harnessing one's conduct. He defined "discipline" as "obedience with reason" (*risei aru fukujū*). "Reason" referred to one's intelligence—the ability to judge what was right and what was wrong by envisaging the long-term consequences of one's conduct. When one obeys any type of authority, Maki argued, if one correctly understands the ultimate

³⁶ Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan*.

goal of this obedience and agrees with this goal, this is not mere blind obedience, but discipline. When a superior gives commands to subordinates, if he can convince them of the true meaning of these commands, he will not offend their human dignity. In a society founded on the accumulated practices of this type of obedience, people would enjoy freedom within discipline and engage in self-regulated and self-responsible behavior. From this society, “public spirit” (*kōkyō seishin*) would emerge naturally. Maki insisted that one should discard the idea that obedience referred to the passivity of the feudal status system, and realize that it could be transformed into a source of confidence and pride.³⁷ In addition to “obedience with reason,” Maki frequently used such expressions as “obedience with pride” (*hokori aru fukujū*) and “obedience without hesitation” (*tamerai naki fukujū*).

Behind the invocation of disciplined freedom, Maki maintained a deep admiration for Western Europe and the United States, which had successfully developed highly disciplined societies under liberalism. One of Maki’s favorite philosophers was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Maki often cited this philosopher before the academy’s students to demonstrate his idea of disciplined freedom. He was particularly fond of this epigram of Rousseau: “In giving himself to all, each person gives himself to no one.”³⁸ Rousseau pointed this out in his famous *On the Social Contract*. He maintained that in the state of nature, humans enjoyed freedom from any type of coercion. But eighteenth-century Europe before the French Revolution was a world in which the King and a small number of aristocrats dominated other humans by

³⁷ Maki, *Bōei no tsutome*, 31-32.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 112.

force. To confront this situation, Rousseau charged, it was not sufficient to insist on the return to a state of nature, since each human was weak and lacked the power to resist the strong. The solution he proposed was to build a community that could protect its members' freedom against attacks from outside—what he called a “republic.” Humans were supposed to enter this community through a contract based on each individual's free will. In this community, each would naturally feel obliged to work under the direction of “the general will” of the members, who now became the “people.” It was in this context that Rousseau wrote that “In giving himself to all, each person gives himself to no one.” What he meant was that working for the republic would not lead to the surrender of individual freedoms, but was a means of securing greater individual freedoms for all members of the republic.³⁹

We all know that Rousseau's concept of popular sovereignty played a crucial role in the overthrowing of the monarchy during the French Revolution. But at the same time we should not forget that such dictators as Robespierre admired Rousseau, and used his ideas to justify their abuse of power in the name of the people. When Maki repeatedly mentioned “obedience with pride,” he was probably aware that Rousseau's liberalism could be suitably used to legitimate the state's power over the people while creating an illusion that the former represented the interests of the latter.

Zeal for the Liberal Subject

³⁹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract* (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub Co., 1987).

In the larger context of postwar Japanese intellectual history, Maki was by no means alone. Many intellectuals lamented that the Japanese were passive subjects who needed training to exercise their rights and freedoms. In December 1950, a couple of months after the founding of the NPR, Iizuka Kōji, the professor of Geography at Tokyo University, published a book called *Nihon no guntai* [The military of Japan]. The purpose of this book was to investigate the nature of the power structure generated by the Imperial Army and Navy in pre-surrender Japan. It was one of the earliest attempts to study the Imperial Army and Navy academically. Since the majority of government and military documents were not available to researchers during the occupation, Iizuka chose to rely instead on the testimonies of those who had served in the Army and Navy. He organized several roundtable discussions. The discussants included the political scientist Maruyama Masao, who had been enlisted in the Army, two more men from the Army, one man from the Navy, and the psychologist Minami Hiroshi, who had been working toward his PhD at Cornell University when the war broke out and had been detained in the United States during the war.

The discussants more or less agreed that the Imperial Army and Navy had failed to modernize hierarchical relations. In their view, the concept of law and rights—a set of objective values unaffected by the arbitrary judgments of authorities—had never penetrated into these armed forces. Instead, human interaction within the military was ruled by a feudal status system. Under these conditions, the lower ranks had no choice but to demonstrate total submission to their superiors, since there was no legal code to which they had recourse. What accounted for Japanese soldiers’

loyalty to authority was not their spontaneous identification with the nation-state, but internalized fear. Minami Hiroshi pointed out that this made a sharp contrast with the case of the United States. Since the foundation of their country, Minami observed, Americans had engaged in wars in order to defend their values. They fought against the British to obtain independence. In the Civil War, northerners and the southerners fought against each other to maintain their respective politico-economic systems. The Americans had a revolutionary tradition. According to Minami, the Americans could die for an ideology they believed in, but the Japanese and the Germans would never dare to do so, because in an autocratic regime, people would fight for their bosses (*oyabun*), not for their ideology.⁴⁰

Iizuka concluded the discussions above by characterizing the Japanese military as “a miniature of the Emperor state.” At the top of the hierarchy of the military reigned the Emperor. Officers presented their commands as those of the Emperor. Once they legitimized their conduct by claiming the Emperor’s authority, they were able to control not only the public but also the private lives of their subordinates, since the Emperor’s authority derived from the merciful paternalism he offered. In contrast, Iizuka maintained that in Western societies, even maids could enjoy their free time when they were not working. Their status as maids was based on a professional contract, so once they were off work, they were free humans. But in Imperial Japan, those in lower ranks could find their private realm only in the bathroom. Even after the Imperial Army and Navy were abolished, this social relation persisted, he charged. In

⁴⁰ Iizuka Kōji, *Nihon no guntai*, (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), 219. This book was originally published by Tokyo University Cooperatives in December 1950.

private corporations and government institutions, people still took for granted that subordinates should serve their bosses even in private matters. Modern social relations had yet to develop in Japan.⁴¹

Maruyama Masao, one of the discussants in the roundtables, widely popularized this masochistic idea of the Japanese military and society in various writings, too. The intellectual community received his 1946 essay “Theory and Psychology of Ultrationalism” with enthusiasm. This essay brought him fame as one of the severest critics of Imperial Japan. Borrowing from Carl Schmidt, Maruyama defined the modern state as *ein neutraler Staat*. This type of state adopted “a neutral position on internal values, such as the problem of what truth and justice were,” and found a basis for its rule “in the external function of preserving public order.” While European states reached this form of statehood through religious reforms and the abolition of absolutism, the Meiji state failed to recognize the separation of the public and the private. Subjects who were not guaranteed a private realm could never develop “free, subjective awareness.” According to Maruyama, this was exactly why Imperial Japan ended up imposing oppressive policies at home and waging wars of aggression abroad. Subjects who were not free could be irresponsible in their own actions.⁴² They were “pushed into the vortex by men who were

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 256.

⁴² Of course, this argument by Maruyama reminds us of E.H. Norman’s famous discussion of the soldiers of Imperial Japan in 1943. He argued that Japanese soldiers were not free, but slaves of the state’s power. He said: “It is impossible to employ genuinely free men for enslaving others; and conversely, the most brutalized and shameless slaves make the most pitiless and effective despoilers of the liberties of

themselves driven by some force that they did not really understand.” For Maruyama, even Nazi Germany represented a variation of modern subjectivity in that the people actively granted power to Hitler and that Hitler was capable of making decisions of his own will.⁴³

For Maruyama, therefore, raising the free subject became the major agenda in the postwar period. In his study of the debates on subjectivity, Victor Koshmann elaborates on Maruyama’s notion of freedom. According to him, Maruyama aspired to the construction of two types of freedoms as essential parts of a postwar revolution. First was “a private, inner realm of ‘negative freedom,’” which would enable the Japanese to realize that they were autonomous individuals with their own personalities. Next would come a “freedom *for*”—active freedom with which to demand political rights. Once an individual acquired these two freedoms, he would be “now obliged to discipline his hedonistic impulses and to assume responsibility for affairs of state in the public realm.”⁴⁴

To be sure, the people discussed above did not share a single political view concerning Japan’s rearmament. For example, Iizuka was ready to accept the rearmament as an accomplished fact. Just as he was finishing his book *Nihon no guntai*, the Japanese government announced the founding of the NPR. He added a short chapter called “Nokosareta gunjintachi” [The servicemen who remain behind],

others.” See E.H. Norman, *Peasant and Soldier in Japan: The Origins of Conscripted* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1965).

⁴³ Maruyama Masao, “Theory of Psychology of Ultrationalism” in *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

⁴⁴ Victor Koschmann, *Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 175.

suggesting the path the new military should take. Unlike Yoshida Shigeru, Maki Tomoo and others involved in the founding of the NPR, Iizuka did not fully support the rearmament. According to him, “It would be better if we could forgo the NPR.” But Iizuka believed that if rearmament was necessary, the NPR should become a popular army. He was afraid that because young men of twenty to thirty-five years old had been brought up during the height of militaristic education, the new military might reproduce the sort of “blindly obedient soldiers” who wore “uniforms in their minds.” He expected the NPR to set up new educational policies so that citizens would feel compelled to defend new democratic Japan voluntarily.⁴⁵

On the other hand, Maruyama Masao and Minami Hiroshi were expressly critical of the rearmament. They were members of Heiwa Mondai Danwakai [Peace issues discussion group], a group of more than fifty intellectuals and scientists in Kyoto and Tokyo who called for Japan’s neutrality in the Cold War. The group was formed in 1949, when the nation was beginning to learn that the Japanese government was seeking to reenter the international community by concluding a peace only with the capitalist bloc. The group published manifestos in January 1949 and January 1950, insisting on overall peace with both the capitalist and socialist blocs. In October 1950, a couple of months after the founding of the NPR, the group released its third manifesto.

In that manifesto, the scholars argued that it would not serve “the happiness of the Japanese people” to collaborate with either the United States or the Soviet Union.

⁴⁵ Iizuka, *Nihon no guntai*, 304-307.

The forms of government of these two states were not as different as one might think, they wrote. They strikingly resembled each other in that both were making enormous efforts to build a “total mobilization system” to prepare for a forthcoming total war by militarizing all aspects of people’s lives. If Japan joined either regime, that would bring about “horrible consequences” because it was obvious that a total war would devastate all participants and there would be no clear victor. Japan should reconfirm the principles of the peace constitution, they insisted. Article 9 must be interpreted as renouncing not only war as a means of settling international disputes but also wars of self-defense. The Japanese right to self-defense should be protected in “spiritual, cultural, political, and legal manners.” For this purpose, Maruyama and Minami wrote, the Japanese should make an effort to join the United Nations as soon as possible. The United Nations could work as “the most rational and effective organization for solving international conflict.”⁴⁶ Although the members of the group did not speak explicitly of their affiliation with particular political parties, their three fundamental strategies—overall peace, neutrality, and an unarmed state—matched exactly the Socialist Party’s security policy. In the same period, Yamakawa Hitoshi, one of the major ideologues of the Socialist Party, developed an argument similar to that of the Danwakai’s regarding Japan’s security policy.⁴⁷

Despite their various political beliefs, Iizuka, Minami, and Maruyama all shared the idea that new Japan required its people to internalize certain norms, that is,

⁴⁶ Heiwa Mondai Danwakai, “Mitabi heiwa ni tsuite” in Ōtake ed, *Sengo Nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū 1*, 558-582.

⁴⁷ Yamakawa Hitoshi, *Nihon no saigunbi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1952).

strong individualism, voluntary national identification, and consideration for the nation's good. They thought that ordinary Japanese people were still far from this stage of consciousness. They were all zealous about inculcating the norms of liberalism into a people presumed to be unenlightened. We have to wonder, however, whether we can argue that the wartime Japanese state simply forced its people to endorse the war against their will, and that the people lacked any kind of voluntarism. Recent studies show that this is a misconception of wartime Japan. We know that workers, both men and women, fervently supported the war, identifying it as an opportunity to win recognition as legitimate members of the nation-state, and that many intellectuals articulated theories to rationalize this trend. For the state, too, voluntary support from the people was crucial when it had to boost production to win the total war. We can definitely say that wartime Japan's governance was already based in large part on the principle of popular voluntarism.⁴⁸

But postwar intellectuals refused to recognize wartime people's voluntarism. In their minds, people were simply brainwashed by the militarist state, without a clear consciousness of what they were doing. As we know, this view of history was introduced by the US occupation forces, which claimed to liberate the Japanese from wartime oppression and to advance democracy. And the allure of democracy is its universalizing tendency: it permits those living under this form of government to believe that they are enjoying the highest level of political rule in human history. Europeans and Americans achieved (or claimed to have achieved) democracy by

⁴⁸ Yasushi Yamanouchi et al., eds., *Total War and 'Modernization'* (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asian Program, 1998).

overcoming the shortcomings of the older political systems, such as absolutism and bourgeois liberalism. Under a democratic regime, all people with the nationality of a given state, regardless of class, gender, and race, are supposed to be able to enjoy political participation in the nation-state. From a Euro-American standpoint, therefore, democracy represents the culmination of their political development, and all people in the world naturally aspire for this system.

Postwar Japanese intellectuals accepted this view of history. Once they accepted it, then their mission was to make the people realize that they had blindly followed the militarist state, and re-direct their energy to the consolidation of a new democratic state. What they were doing might have been very similar to what wartime leaders had done, in that both encouraged active popular support for their political agendas. But in a democratic regime, encouraging active popular support no longer had negative connotations. Those intellectuals were convinced that they were helping the people acquire democratic consciousness. But it is questionable whether these intellectuals were truly concerned about the people's, or working-class people's, rights in the name of democracy. Rather, the notion of democracy mainly served them to admonish the people against pursuing their selfish interests and to insist on the importance of the building of a new nation consisting of actively engaging subjects.

When the entire intellectual community was immersed in this enthusiasm for a new Japan, whether to support rearmament or not was not as large a political question as we may believe. Both supporters and opponents operated under the same ideology—the ideology that presupposed the unity of the nation and expected everyone to behave as such. As Masao Miyoshi has succinctly pointed out, “Japan as

the frame of reference for the Japanese never disappeared,” and “this ideology of the unitary Japan was in fact reinforced, during the six years of the US occupation.”⁴⁹ In this circumstance, supporters of rearmament could easily appropriate opponents’ love of country, by asking how a country could shield its democracy without possessing at least minimal armed forces.

⁴⁹ Masao Miyoshi, “Japan Is Not Interesting,” in *Re-Mapping Japanese Culture: Papers of the 10th Biennial Conference of the Japanese Studies Association of Australia* (Monash Asia Institute, 2000), 11-25.

Chapter Two

Military as a Welfare Institution: Recruitment and Other Activities during High-Speed Economic Growth

In the last chapter, I argued that for those involved in the founding of the NPR, including SCAP, Yoshida Shigeru, and Maki Tomoo, presenting this event within the context of liberalism was important. They believed that the Japanese should endorse the rearmament spontaneously without feeling forced to do so. In this chapter, I consider how the SDF put into practice this agenda, and intended to create a system with which to enlist popular support not only at the ideological, but also at the material level.

I place the SDF's interactions with civilians in the socio-economic context of 1950s and 1960s Japan. During these years, the nation enjoyed unprecedented high-speed economic growth. But not all people benefited equally from it. Uneven development between the city and the countryside was exacerbated by the high-speed growth. Unemployment and marginal employment continued to be a serious problem for many workers. Communities in rural areas suffered from depopulation and labor shortage.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that the SDF worked as a welfare institution in this economic situation. By "welfare institution," I refer to an institution that offers socio-economic assistance to people who have difficulty in maintaining their livelihood in the free competition of the capitalist economy. In its recruitment, the SDF targeted unemployed and marginally employed men in the city and farmers in the countryside, and offered them employment opportunities. Then the SDF moved the

people thus recruited to communities that were suffering from financial difficulties and labor shortages, particularly those in Hokkaido. The SDF used their labor to build and improve the communities' infrastructures.

The SDF did not promote itself as a welfare institution. But when we consider the SDF's activities in relation to postwar Japan's economy, we realize that working class men and people in rural communities came to rely on the SDF as an institution indispensable to their livelihoods. One aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate that militarization—that is, civil society's dependence on the military—is a structural problem with the postwar Japanese political economy. This chapter intends to demonstrate one aspect of that dependence.

Creating Employment

The Defense Agency kept a detailed record of applicants, including their ages, former occupations, and prefectures of origin, in the first ten years of its history (1950-1959).¹ An examination of this record will enable us to see the ways in which the SDF's recruitment, particularly the recruitment of second-class privates, seamen, and airmen,² was heavily influenced by the economic trends of the time. When the economy was expanding, the SDF had difficulty recruiting prospective military members, whereas when the economy found itself in a repression, the SDF could secure sufficient applicants more easily. Although the record ends in 1959, and the

¹ Bōeichō Jinjikyoku Jinji Dainika, ed., *Boshū jūnenshi, jō, chū, ge* (Tokyo: Bōeichō Jinjikyoku Jinji Dainika, 1961).

² In Japanese, they are *nitō rikushi, kaishi, and kūshi*. Unless applying for an executive position, anyone who hoped to join the SDF first applied for one of these positions.

Defense Agency has not published a similar record since then, it definitely suggests the general trend of recruitment in postwar society.

The correlation between the SDF and the nation's economy was already clear in the first recruitment effort. SCAP ordered the establishment of the NPR in July 1950. SCAP entrusted public relations for the new organization to the National Police.³ It began recruiting members in August of the same year. The quota was 75,000. Once the National Police began accepting applications, almost half of the quota applied in just the first day, and eventually about 380,000 people applied for 75,000 positions in just the first month.⁴ Of the applicants, 35.6 per cent were farmers, 13.5 per cent were unemployed, and 13.1 per cent were industrial workers.⁵ Although there were only ten days between the launch of PR activities (e.g., the distribution of posters to police stations and municipal halls, and the broadcasting of radio advertisements) and the actual acceptance of applications, the first recruitment ended much more successfully than government leaders had predicted.

This success is understandable when we consider the economic condition in which Japan found itself at that time. In the immediate postwar period, the Japanese economy was completely devastated, and was suffering from severe inflation. As the United States hoped to transform Japan into a bulwark against communism in cold-war Asia, how to re-build the Japanese economy became a major concern for the United States. In December 1948, the US government sent Joseph Dodge, the

³ As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, the National Police Reserve and the National Police were two different organizations. While the National Police was a police force, the National Police Reserve was a euphemism for a military.

⁴ Bōeichō Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., *Jieitai jūnenshi, jō*, 23.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 116-118.

president of Detroit Bank, to Japan as a financial advisor for SCAP. He had previously enforced financial reforms in occupied Western Germany. The United States expected him to end Japan's persistent inflation and stabilize the economy. Dodge's basic belief was that to gain international competitiveness, Japan had to accumulate capital through its own efforts without relying on foreign, particularly US, aid. Under his guidance, SCAP had enforced an austere budget and suspended governmental loan subsidies. As Dodge expected, these policies did successfully end the inflation. But the Japanese economy was stuck in a severe depression. Because of the suspension of governmental loans and subsidies, companies had to enforce rationalization. As a result, a number of small- and medium-sized companies were forced into bankruptcy, and many workers lost their jobs.⁶

The first recruitment of the NPR was launched in this economic condition. For unemployed men, the sudden establishment of the new military presented an unexpected and welcome employment opportunity. The NPR offered a monthly salary of 5,000 yen (later reduced to 4,500 yen) and a retirement benefit of 60,000 yen.⁷ This salary was much higher than the average starting monthly salary for university graduates (4,000 yen), although as years passed, the SDF's salary would be adjusted to the average amount for government employees. For unemployed men and those fearful of losing their jobs in the midst of rationalization, this salary and the retirement benefits were certainly attractive.

⁶ For Dodge's economic policy, see Takafusa Nakamura, *The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure, 1937-1994* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1995), 37-43.

⁷ Bōeichō Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., *Jieitai jūneshi, jō*, 23.

We also have to realize that many of those who lost their jobs in the cities during the Dodge recession left the cities and returned to their hometowns. So the number of people engaged in agriculture sharply increased immediately after the Dodge Plan was enforced. In August 1949, that number grew to 19,150,000, an increase of about 12 per cent over the previous year.⁸ We also have to remember that the population of rural villages had already increased sharply in last four years because of a number of returnees from the former colonies. Naturally, not all these people could make a living by farming. Most of them were just staying with their families, expecting to get employment in the cities. Also, agrarian villages were concerned about the populations that had increased so drastically in a short period. In this situation, some farmers, or more precisely returnees from the city, saw the SDF as the opportunity to make a living for themselves once again.

The nation's economy unmistakably continued to influence the SDF's later recruitment. While Japan was in a recession during 1949 and early 1950, the outbreak of the Korean War prepared a path to economic recovery. The war triggered an armaments boom, and provided companies with opportunities for investment and technical innovation. The year 1955 witnessed an economic boom called *Jinmu keiki*,⁹ which would become the prelude to the high-speed economic growth that would last until the early 1970s. Production increased, prices stabilized, and international balance of payments improved. The 1956 Economic White Paper declared that the nation was

⁸ Ōhara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūsho, *Nihon rōdō nenkan 23* (Ohara Shakai Mondai Kenkyūsho Shuppanbu, 1951), “Nōson ni okeru sōtaiteki kajō jinkō no zōdai.” Also available on line at <http://oohara.mt.tama.hosei.ac.jp/rn/23/rn1951-132.html>.

⁹ Jinmu was the name of the first emperor in Japanese mythology. The economic boom was named after him to stress its unprecedented scale in Japanese history.

no longer in “the postwar period” (*mohaya “sengo” dewa nai*), citing various indices in which the economy had exceeded the prewar era’s highest production level. The increase in employment opportunities enabled many young men to find jobs more easily in the civilian sector than had been possible in the immediate postwar period.

Reflecting this economic trend, the SDF quickly began to lose its popularity among prospective recruits. From 1956, the SDF often had difficulty meeting the target number for recruits. In each recruitment term, the target number was set at five times the number of projected personnel positions. Ideally, the SDF wanted to select the most talented applicants from a rather large pool through written and physical exams. In the first recruitment term of 1957, however, the SDF could recruit only 16.2% of the targeted number of applicants by ten days before the application deadline.¹⁰ In the third recruitment term of the same year, one-third of the applicants applied after the deadline had passed.¹¹ One can easily imagine that the SDF staff in charge of recruitment became desperate to reach the quota and rushed to convince unenthusiastic potential recruits to apply at the last moment.

Facing this decrease in the number of applicants, the SDF was most worried about prospective service members’ academic ability. Because of the small number of applicants, the SDF had to lower the minimum passing grade on the written exam to three points (in the first recruitment term of 1957) or five points (in the second and third terms of the same year) out of a total 30 points.¹² It turned out that some of the members thus admitted were illiterate. They could not read basic textbooks

¹⁰ Bōeichō Jinjikyoku Jinji Dainika, ed., *Boshū jūneshi, ge*, 23.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹² Bōeichō Jinjikyoku Jinji Dainika, ed., *Boshū jūneshi, jō*, 48.

satisfactorily. Preoccupied with the decline in the quality of its members, the SDF had to admonish its recruitment staff against forceful recruitment, and make it clear to the public that the SDF would not admit illiterate men.¹³

Despite its unpopularity during the period of high-speed economic growth, a significant number of men continued to apply to the SDF. While the NPR started with 75,000 personnel, by 1958 the SDF had increased its quota to 222,066 (Ground: 170,000, Marine: 25,441, and Air Force: 26,625).¹⁴ Though with difficulty, the SDF managed to maintain about eighty to ninety per cent of its personnel quota at any time. The question is who continued to join the SDF even after the economy recovered.

The pools of farmers and unemployed men continued to serve as the major sources of applicants. These two groups together accounted for about 50 percent of applicants in almost all recruitments.¹⁵ To know why these people applied to the SDF at the time when one could supposedly find employment in the civilian sector easily, we have to understand how the labor market developed in the history of the modern Japanese economy and what positions farmers and unemployed men occupied in the postwar labor market.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 48. Bōeichō Jinjikyoku Jinji Dainika, ed., *Boshū jūneshi, ge*, 20.

¹⁴ Asagumo Shinbun Hneshūkyoku, ed., *Bōei handobukku, Shōwa 50-nenban* (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1975), 46-47.

¹⁵ Calculated from the data provided in *Boshū jūneshi, jō, chū, ge*. In the records for the years 1953 to 1956, the category of “unemployed” disappeared. But during these years, the ratio of applicants from “other” drastically increased. In 1957, the SDF re-established the category of “unemployed,” and the ratio of “other” decreased. From this, I conclude that unemployed men were included in the category “other” between 1953 and 1956. It suggests that the SDF did not want to promote the idea that it was recruiting a large number of unemployed men.

First of all, capitalist economy in the modern nation-state inevitably generates uneven development between the city and the countryside. The nation-state integrates regions that maintained autonomous economies into one single market, and tries to mobilize all natural and human resources for the sake of the national economy. But not all regions enjoy development in an equal manner. As industries mature and factories are built in certain areas, the migration of people takes place to these areas. This leads to the formation of cities and then metropolitan areas. On the contrary, the countryside suffers from a continuous decrease in population. The central government often sees the countryside mainly as a reservoir of young and cheap labor, which will eventually move to the city. The countryside is often left behind in the development of infrastructures. The difference between the quality of living in the city and that in the countryside deepens with the acceleration of urban industrialization. This in turn stimulates people's desire to move to the city even more strongly, and creates the idea that the countryside is backward. As long as capitalism works with the nation-state as its basic unit, uneven development between the city and the countryside happens anywhere (though its intensity may differ). As Harry Harootunian has pointed out, "permanent unevenness and unequal development" are required conditions for "continuing expansion of capital industries."¹⁶

In Japan's case, people's migration to the city was rather slow in the early and mid Meiji Era. Despite the government's hope to advance modern industries, Meiji Japan had yet to accumulate sufficient capital for investments. The economy still

¹⁶ Harry Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 4.

relied heavily on the traditional sector, agriculture and the textile industry. World War I, however, contributed greatly to the growth of modern industries. Japan enjoyed being a supplier of weapons for the allied powers, and could dominate the Asian market while the allied powers were preoccupied with the war in Europe. Heavy and financial industries prospered in the city, and here, a large-scale migration of laborers began. In the interwar years, the population of cities drastically increased, and such metropolitan areas as Tokyo/Yokohama and Osaka/Kobe developed.¹⁷

While air raids during the Pacific War and food shortages in the immediate postwar years temporarily halted people's migration to the city, it soon resumed with the launch of high-speed economic growth. Or more precisely, the migration this time proceeded on a much larger scale than ever. Between 1950 and 1960, about 2.9 million people left agriculture and forestry, and the number of those in non-primary industries increased by 11 million. The speed of the flow of people to the city accelerated even more in the next decade (4.3 million would leave agriculture and forestry).¹⁸ Japan's economic growth was precisely the process by which the agrarian population was removed from their hometowns for the sake of urban industrialization.

But not all people could obtain jobs the way they hoped in the city. As the economist Takafusa Nakamura, as well as other economists of Japan in general, emphasize, a large pool of surplus labor was a serious problem. The pace at which urban industrialization took place could not match the pace at which farmers left agrarian villages. For the category of middle school graduates only, the number of jobs

¹⁷ Chapter One of Harootunian's *Overcome by Modernity* is an excellent description of the uneven development that advanced in the interwar years.

¹⁸ Nakamura, *The Postwar Japanese Economy*, 147-149.

available exceeded the number of people looking for jobs already in 1953 (since they were valued as the cheapest labor force by industries). But for other laborers, the number of people looking for jobs was larger than the number of jobs available until the early 1960s. It was only after this period that the labor market became a “seller’s market.”¹⁹ In other words, during the 1950s, people’s desire to move to the city was much greater than the city’s capacity to accommodate them. In the cities, there were quite a number of unemployed men: some were urban dwellers who had lost jobs, and others were migrants unable to find employment.

The SDF secured its service members by absorbing surplus labor into military employment. In the time of recruitment, the SDF targeted the unemployed men who were wandering around train terminal stations and entertainment districts, and persuaded them to join the SDF by ensuring them meals, lodging, and clothing. This method of recruitment—what they called “street recruitment” or *gaitō boshū*—became quite famous in the media due to recruiters’ frequent appearance on the street. For example, in February 1962, the police arrested an SDF sergeant at Ueno Station in Tokyo. This station was the terminal for long-distance trains arriving from the northern part of Japan. Many day labor recruiters came to this station to find those seeking jobs. Among these day labor recruiters, this SDF sergeant was recruiting homeless men and men who had run away from home. But the sergeant did not have permission to work inside the station, and therefore the police had to stop him. The

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 150.

SDF sergeant confessed that he had already recruited more than 1,000 men in this way.²⁰

Other accounts also back up the argument that the SDF was chosen by unemployed men. The novelist Asada Jirō, who himself used to work for the SDF, has written a number of stories that contain descriptions of the SDF's recruitment methods.²¹ In these stories, people are also recruited in such places as Ueno Station and Kabuki-chō, one of the biggest entertainment districts in Shinjuku, Tokyo. The men are often jobless and hungry. SDF recruiters approach these men saying that they will buy them a good meal (such as *tonkatsu* or steak). One story describes SDF recruiters even carrying the menu of the SDF's cafeteria with them, and showing hungry men how well they can eat in the SDF. To be sure, these stories take place in the early 1970s, about one decade later than the periods we are discussing. But they surely suggest that even in the 1970s, after the oversupply of labor in the cities had supposedly been solved, certain districts of the cities were famous as hangouts for unemployed men, and that SDF recruiters frequented these places. It is not hard to imagine that SDF staff carried out much more intense recruitment in the 1950s and 1960s.

If unemployed men were the main pool of applicants to the SDF in the cities, then farmers were their counterparts in rural areas. As I have pointed out, the speed at which agrarian villages shrank from the 1950s on was striking. The decrease in

²⁰ Hoshino Yasusabrō and Hayashi Shigeo, *Jieitai: sono futatsu no kao* (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobō, 1963), 31-32.

²¹ Asada Jirō, *Hohei no honryō* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2004). This book contains nine short stories concerning the lives of SDF service members in the 1970s.

population resulted in the decline of productivity, and this further resulted in a decrease in income. The ratio of the average wage for farmers to that of industrial workers was 101 in 1947: there was a severe food shortage all over Japan in the immediate postwar years, so the prices of agricultural crops increased, and therefore agrarian villages enjoyed prosperity. But, as the economy became centered increasingly in cities and on heavy industry, this ratio dropped to 67 in 1950 and to 39 in 1955.²² Once farmers realized that they could not make a sufficient income by farming, they left their villages, which resulted in a further decrease in population. Agrarian villages were trapped in this vicious circle throughout the period of high-speed economic growth.

As the population of agrarian villages was absorbed by industrial cities, some of this population looked to the SDF as a means of escaping unstable economic conditions. Autobiographies written by SDF service members and former members clearly support this point. Konishi Makoto, who would later become an aggressive critic of the SDF's inhuman treatments of its members, was born the third son in a farming family and admitted to the SDF in 1964. His family was so poor that he could not pay for school-provided lunches. He had to bring his own lunch box containing only rice, and sometimes he could not even bring that. To support his family, he delivered newspapers before school, and sometimes worked as a day laborer with his father. He says that the reason that he chose to work for the SDF was to get away from

²² Sengo Nihon no Shokuryō, Nōgyō, Nōson Henshū Iinkai, ed., *Nōson shakaishi 11* (Tokyo: Zaidan Hōjin Nōrin Tōkei Kyōkai, 2005), 78.

this poverty and the resulting discrimination.²³ Konishi's case might be extreme, but his experiences at least suggest why so many farmers joined the SDF.

The high ratio of farmers among applicants is key to understanding the geographical variance among applicants. The prefectures of Kyushu sent far more applicants than the prefectures in other regions. For example, in the four recruitments of 1957, applicants from the seven Kyushu prefectures accounted for 31.2 percent of the total applicants from the forty-six prefectures (Okinawa was still under US occupation). In 1958, the ratio was 27.7 percent. One can observe similar results in other years, too.²⁴

The Kyushu prefectures contained a large agrarian population. As of 1950, those engaged in agriculture accounted for 48.4 per cent of total workers nationally. In all the Kyushu prefectures except Fukuoka, the ratio was much higher than the average: 62.8 percent in Kumamoto, 64.9 percent in Miyazaki, and 72.7 percent in Kagoshima. Moreover, high population density, the lack of arable land, and the land reform during the occupation era resulted in creating a large number of small-sized family farms. As of 1954, almost 40 percent of farming families in Kyushu owned land of only 1.2 acres or less.²⁵ Once high-speed economic growth got underway, many farmers gave up farming, and began to move to the city looking for better-paid jobs. This explains why so many Kyushu men applied to the SDF.

²³ Konishi Makoto, *Hansen jieikan* (Tokyo: Gōdō Shuppan, 1970), 47-50.

²⁴ Calculated from the data provided in *Boshū jūneshi, jō, chū, ge*.

²⁵ Kyushu Keizai Chōsa Kyōkai, ed., *Zusetsu Kyushu no keizai* (Tokyo: Bunkakudō, 1959), 45-46.

In fact, Konishi Makoto, who was mentioned above, was from Miyazaki Prefecture in Kyushu. Also, when reading service members' biographical essays, we realize how many of them came from Kyushu. Sudō Junji was originally from Oita Prefecture in Kyushu, and worked for the SDF's Second Division in Hokkaido. Influenced by his hard-working parents, he had once decided to devote himself to agriculture. But when he considered the "trend of society" (*yononaka no ugoki*), he began to have doubts about the growth potential of this industry, and eventually joined the SDF.²⁶

As for geographical variance, we must not forget about miners from Kyushu. Unfortunately, the SDF almost always organized the record of applicants' former occupations and the record of their home prefectures separately, but a couple of times they published applicants' former occupations according to the region. These records show that more than half of the miners who applied to the SDF came from Kyushu: 299 out of 503 in the first recruitment of 1957, and 312 out of 503 in the second recruitment of the same year. Although miners constituted a fairly small part of the total applicants (usually one to three per cent), we should not overlook this geographical variance when we consider Kyushu's position vis-à-vis the national economy.

²⁶ Daini Shidan, *Shōwa gojūendo daiikkai shidan iken happyōkai: Iken happyō bunshū* (Daini Shidan, 1975). Page numbers are not available, since this is a collection of members' handwritten essays. These essays were written by members who joined the SDF in the early 1970s, not exactly the period I am discussing. But in the early 1970s, the flow of people from the countryside to the city was continuing. Therefore, these sources help us examine the relationship between recruits' socio-economic conditions and the nation's economy during the high-speed growth.

The large number of miners came from Kyushu because Fukuoka Prefecture was the home of the famous Chikuhō coalfield. There, famous *zaibatsu* companies, including Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, were running a number of mines. As already noted, Fukuoka was the only Kyushu prefecture where the ratio of farmers to the total number of workers was smaller than the national average. This prefecture was highly industrialized because of this coalfield. But in postwar Japan, just as in any industrial country, the demand for coal decreased drastically, and instead, industries began to depend on electricity and petroleum. This phenomenon became obvious from the 1950s. Many companies enforced rationalization and fired workers. During the 1960s, all those large companies would close their mines. It is not hard to imagine that the miners who were fired or feared being fired looked to the SDF as their next employer.

SDF officers often attribute the SDF's popularity in Kyushu to the tradition of military culture. Saigō Takamori, one of the most famous leaders of the Meiji Restoration, was from Kagoshima. Until the end of the war, Kyushu prefectures sent a number of Army generals to the center. SDF people like to believe that Kyushu's military culture continued to encourage young men to work for the nation even in the postwar era.²⁷ There might be some truth to this statement. Konishi Makoto says that people in Kyushu respected soldiers so much that when someone entered the SDF, his family celebrated by making *sekihan*—a special celebratory rice dish. From his childhood, his mother sang military songs for him and told him a number of heroic

²⁷ During my research in Japan in 2006 and 2007, I had the opportunity to talk to several people from the SDF. Some of them referred to this particular atmosphere of Kyushu as one factor that explained the popularity of the SDF in that region.

stories about Japanese soldiers. On the contrary, his father was a socialist and did not like the SDF. But Konishi admits that his father was an unusual figure in his town.²⁸

Shimauchi Eiji grew up in Fukuoka with two brothers. He and his brothers all admired the military from childhood, and often played soldiers. He writes that joining the SDF was a rather natural choice.²⁹

However, an examination of the recruitment record in the context of the nation's economy has allowed us to identify the unmistakable connection between recruitment and the uneven development between the city and the countryside. People from Kyushu joined the SDF because postwar industrialization devastated rural villages (and coal mines) and because they realized that they could not make a living staying in Kyushu. It is possible that the high number of military personnel from Kyushu in the prewar era can likewise be explained by the region's impoverished economy. If military culture was widespread, that was not simply because of Kyushu's timeless tradition, but because that was one way of coming to terms with the fact that so many economically disadvantaged people were applying to the SDF (and the Imperial Army and Navy). Accepting uncritically the discourse on Kyushu's military culture may divert our attention from analysis of its socio-economic factors.

The Volunteer Military in Liberalism

In this way, the SDF tried to secure a pool of applicants by absorbing surplus labor in civil society. The SDF did not force farmers and unemployed men to join the

²⁸ Konishi, *Hansen jieikan*, 44.

²⁹ Daini Shidan, *Shōwa gojūnen do daiikkai shidan iken happyōkai: Iken happyō bunshū*.

military (though some recruiting staff might have been aggressive). The SDF's recruitment operated completely on a voluntary basis, and applicants could decide of their own will whether joining the SDF was desirable for them or not. In this sense, the SDF's recruiting system was suitable to liberal governance. Supposedly, people applied to the SDF because they wanted to do so. But as I have shown in the previous section, one's socio-economic conditions undoubtedly influenced one's decision. In this section, I articulate the meaning of joining the military in a liberal state, and consider whether we can truly argue that people applied to the SDF voluntarily.

On the one hand, we must note that the military in the modern nation-state identifies protecting the people's rights and freedom as its foremost mission. The French Revolutionary Army was the first example of a military of this type. The French Army consisted of male conscripts from all social classes, not aristocrats or foreign mercenaries, and its purpose was no longer to serve the interests of the king, but to provide for the defense of the rights and freedom that the people had acquired through the revolution.³⁰ As the locus of sovereignty shifted from the monarch to the people throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, militaries in other nation-states, too, increasingly saw the aim of the military as securing the people from external threats. Modern Japan was not exceptional. While the Imperial Army and Navy were first established as a military for the Emperor, as the people gained

³⁰ For the founding of the French Revolutionary Army, see Alan Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during the Revolution and Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). For another example of the founding of a national military with conscripted men (Germany), see Ute Frefert, *A Nation in Barracks: A Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society* (Oxford: Berg, 2004).

political power from the interwar period, they began to promote their care for the people's welfare. The postwar military advanced this trend. The Safety Forces Law, enacted in 1952, defined the SDF's mission as protecting the people's lives and property. Similarly, the Self-Defense Forces Law, enacted in 1954, declared its goals to be the defense of the nation's peace, independence, and security.

On the other hand, the military contradicts individual rights and freedom. To accomplish the goal of defending the people's rights and freedom, the military must always be ready to go into action in the case of unexpected contingencies. The military therefore gives priority to the maximum functioning of the organization as a whole. Efforts to reach agreement through discussion and persuasion are often seen as inefficient and inadequate. Within the military, rights and freedom—the very ideas modern nation-states place the greatest value on, and the very ideas that the national military claims to protect—can be suspended. The rank system is rigid. Those in a lower rank are expected to obey unquestioningly the commands of their superiors. Corporal punishment is often administered to promote discipline.

To be sure, the SDF did admonish its members against corporal punishment and other types of physical violence. Since all members were volunteers and therefore had the freedom to quit if they wanted, the SDF could not treat them as badly as conscripts (the Imperial Army, for example) would have. But when we read SDF men's memoirs, we realize that the use of physical violence and humiliation through verbal insult was widespread. In his autobiography, Akamatsu Fuminosuke, who joined the SDF in 1964, writes at length about abusive treatment at the hands of his superiors and the regimented everyday life in which members incessantly had to worry

about officers' surveillance. Fights and bullying among service members were also common, and it was not unusual for bullied members to try to run away from the base.³¹

Thus, while many people may agree that the nation-state needs a military at the abstract level in order to protect their lives, it is another question whether they actively identify themselves with the national military and whether they are willing to work for it at the practical level. Military labor tends to be seen as a burden that one would like to avoid. For many, it is something that should be taken care of by someone else, something one would like to forgo. When conscription is enforced, this rift between civil society and the military might be kept at a minimum, since this system requires any young men after a certain age to participate equally in national defense. But still, conscripts in any country find myriad ways of evading service. Abundant data prove this. For example, Alan Forrest has shown that men in Revolutionary France tried to avoid serving the military by employing both legal and illegal means: running away, riots, purchase of a replacement, marriage to become household heads, etc.³² Men in Imperial Japan resorted to more or less similar means.³³ But in these regimes, the state at least could punish conscription evaders and forced men to serve the military while condemning conscription evasion as an unpatriotic behavior. In a country that relies on volunteers, on the contrary, no one is forced to fight for the nation, and therefore, the rift between civil society and the military deepens even more sharply.

³¹ Akamatsu Fuminosuke, *Hirakare nakatta mado: aru jieitain no shiki* (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1972).

³² Forrest, *Conscripts and Deserters*.

³³ For conscription evasion in Imperial Japan, see Kikuchi Kunisaku, *Chōhei kihi no kenkyū*, (Tokyo: Rippū Shobō, 1977).

It is clear that people in postwar Japan at the beginning of rearmament were caught between these two feelings. On the one hand, people's desire for a national military was unmistakable. In an opinion survey conducted by the *Yomiuri Shinbun* in February 1952, more than half answered that Japan needed to possess a military: 32 percent said that Japan needed to do so unconditionally, while 24 percent said that it should do so depending on the situation. 35 percent of respondents said that they would put up with a tax increase or a shortage of goods if necessary to increase military expenditures. 45 percent agreed with an increase in the number of NPR personnel. Nevertheless, many of them opposed the revival of a conscription system. 64 percent of respondents favored a volunteer military, while only 17 per cent favored a conscription military.³⁴ Most Japanese people seemed satisfied that they were given the freedom to choose whether or not to join the military. These results eloquently convey that people's longing for a national military at the abstract level did not necessarily imply a willingness to work for the military at the practical level. But we must ask who had freedom of choice. Who had the choice of not joining the SDF when they did not want to do so, and of entrusting the mission of national defense to others?

Let us consider the case of the middle class. If workers were lucky enough to find employment at a large corporation and get on the track to lifetime employment (which was the guarantee of a middle-class life), their life would be quite stable. Their salaries increased almost automatically as years passed. Besides monthly salaries, they

³⁴ Kaigo Toshiomi and Shimizu Ikutarō, eds., *Shiryō sengo nijūnenshi 5* (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1966), 109-110.

also received annual bonus and housing allowance. They were protected by company-funded health insurance plans and pensions. For these middle-class workers, working conditions at the SDF were surely undesirable. First of all, salaries were not high. Although SDF service members enjoyed relatively high salaries and generous benefit plans in the early 1950s, as the economy grew from the mid-1950s, employees in large corporations came to enjoy better work conditions than those of the SDF. Also, freedom was severely restricted in the SDF. New service members were required to live within a station. Leave was granted only a couple of times a month. To leave, service members had to get permission from their seniors, who often rejected such petitions. A short story by Asada Jirō tells us that newly hired members could take their first leave only three months after enlisting. Prior to leave, they had to prepare itineraries, which had to be approved by their supervisors. On the day of leave, two service members had to travel in a team to watch each other, and they had to return to their base by curfew.³⁵

But only a limited number of people could enter the middle-class world, at least in the first couple of postwar decades. As economists often point out, the postwar Japanese economy has been characterized by its “dual structure,” that is, the interdependence of a small number of large-sized companies and a large number of small- and medium-sized companies. Under this structure, large companies often used the cheap labor of small companies indirectly through a subcontracting system. For large companies, this was much more profitable than producing goods by themselves. While they could increase subcontracting during an economic boom, they could easily

³⁵ Asada, “Shinderera sutōrī” in *Hohei no honryō*.

drop their subcontractors during a recession. Large companies also hired a number of temporary workers, who were mainly women. In a recession, companies easily cut their salaries or even fired them. The work conditions of workers in small- and medium-sized companies and temporary workers in large companies were significantly worse than those of full-time workers in large companies. Even if they could complete the same portion of work in the same amount of time as full-time workers in large companies, they received smaller salaries. They were not entitled to various types of benefits enjoyed by full-time workers in large companies, either. This discriminatory employment system has been a salient feature of the Japanese economy until now.³⁶

The postwar state did not intend to solve this problem actively. Although the postwar constitution granted the people “the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultural living,” and recognized the state’s responsibility for “the promotion and extension of social welfare and security” (Article 25), neither the Liberal Democratic Party nor the Socialist Party found it urgent to systematize welfare provisions under the state’s leadership. Unlike socialists (or social democrats) in Western Europe, the socialists in postwar Japan were extremely skeptical about the welfare state. They believed that by helping to build a welfare state, they would end up perpetuating capitalism and distancing themselves from the opportunity to build a socialist state.

In contrast, the LDP, the party in power since 1955, was aware of the importance of the welfare state to mobilize the working class for economic growth.

³⁶ Nakamura, *The Postwar Japanese Economy*, 162-168.

But the LDP depended largely on corporations to achieve this aim. Bureaucrats from the LDP, in collaboration with the industrial community, established a series of welfare provisions in which corporations were the major providers and the state assisted those who were not covered by corporations (e.g., health insurance and old age pensions). Corporation-based provisions were inexpensive and generous, and these were privileges only workers in large-sized companies could enjoy. On the other hand, state-based provisions were expensive, which left many workers in small- and medium-sized companies without social security.³⁷ This hierarchical welfare system was convenient for the LDP and the government. Those full time workers with corporate benefits increasingly divorced themselves from radical activism and pledged their loyalty to their corporations. The LDP and the government could domesticate the labor movement while spending relatively little for social welfare. Instead of solving the dual structure of the Japanese economy, they ended up reinforcing it.³⁸

Throughout the postwar period, half of the population was located in the lower part of the dual structure. During the 1950s, about 50 percent of wage laborers worked for companies of fewer than 30 employees. This proportion did not change much in the next four decades.³⁹ They were in a constant fear of losing jobs. It was not unusual for an entire company to go out of business if its parent firm enforced rationalization.

³⁷ For the history of the postwar welfare state, see Mutsuko Takahashi, *The Emergence of Welfare Society in Japan*, (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997).

³⁸ For the process that workers divorced from radicalism in postwar Japan, see Andrew Gordon, *The Wages of Affluence: Labor and Management in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).

³⁹ Nakamura, *The Postwar Japanese Economy*, 163-164.

As a result, the labor fluidity in small and medium companies was much higher than in large companies.

A survey of the ten-year employment history of 35 people (16 men and 19 women), conducted by the journalist Iwamoto Jun, provides us with some interesting details.⁴⁰ The subjects graduated from one middle school in Miyagi Prefecture (in northern Japan) in 1963 and moved to Tokyo for their jobs. They were among those students who got jobs through the so-called “mass employment” system or *shūdan shūshoku*. Under this system, urban recruitment companies recruited students in such rural regions as Tohoku, Kyushu, and Shikoku. Upon graduation, the recruitment companies brought them to companies (often small- and medium-sized companies) in such metropolitan areas as Tokyo/Yokohama, Osaka/Kobe, and Nagoya. This mass employment was beneficial for employers because they could save money and time on recruitment advertisement, and could recruit cheaper and more docile labor than in the cities. It was beneficial for schools in the countryside because they could find jobs for a number of students at once. It was a nationwide phenomenon. The national railway company *Kokutetsu* ran special trains for these students (Kyushu/Chugoku to Osaka/Kobe, and Tohoku to Tokyo/Yokohama) every spring until 1975.

It was rare for these students to be able to find employers that offered stable work conditions. The value of their labor was their disposability. They were the first to be laid off in the time of a recession. Of the 35 in Iwamoto’s study, only 4 stayed at their first employer for more than five years. Many of them changed jobs every two to

⁴⁰ First published in *Shūkan shinchō* (June 21, 1973). Reprinted in Yoshikawa Hiroshi, *Kōdo keizai seichō: Nippon o kaeta rokusen’ichi*, (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1997), 114-115.

three years. They took a variety of jobs in a confectionery company, an electronic company, a restaurant, a rice shop, a gas station, a construction company, a bar, a liquor shop, a department store, etc.

I am citing this list because the SDF was one choice for men in the group. Three out of the sixteen men worked for the SDF at some point in the ten-year period. This might be too small a sample from which to draw precise generalizations, but their experience at least suggests that for the type of men who were in the bottom part of the dual structure of the Japanese economy, becoming an SDF service member was a realistic option. Other personal accounts support this point. Konishi Makoto had three older brothers and one sister, all of whom left Kyushu through the “mass employment” system after graduating from middle school. In his hometown in Miyazaki Prefecture in Kyushu, it was not common for middle school graduates to advance to high school. One of his brothers joined the SDF after working at a woolen mill near Nagoya for a few years. Once he joined the SDF, his best friend at the factory also joined the SDF.⁴¹ Sano Eiji, a member of the Second Division in Hokkaido, says that prior to coming to the SDF, he worked at a lathe factory, a bowling center, and a dam construction site, and finally became a day laborer.⁴²

For the men like Konishi’s brother or Sano Eiji, the SDF offered a relatively decent workplace, compared to other jobs available in the civilian sector. As for salary, those who joined the SDF as of 1961 as second-class privates, seamen, or

⁴¹ Konishi, *Hansen jieikan*, 45-47.

⁴² Daini Shidan, ed., *Shōwa gojūichinendo shidan iken happyōkai bunshū* (1976), 3.

airmen at the age of eighteen received a monthly salary of 6,800 yen.⁴³ At around the same time (1960), the average starting monthly salary was 6,020 yen for middle school graduates (fifteen years old), 8,220 yen for high school graduates (eighteen years old), and 13,330 yen for college graduates (twenty two years old).⁴⁴ Contrary to the common notion that postwar Japanese society comprised a large middle class, the salary system in the postwar period continued to be extremely class-oriented. Given that they had finished only junior high school, and changed jobs so frequently, the men who moved to the cities under mass employment could not expect a steady increase in their salaries, and therefore the salary the SDF offered was attractive. In addition to the monthly salary of 6,880 yen, the SDF gave bonuses twice a year as well as a special allowance to those sent to remote or cold regions (such as Hokkaido), plus health insurance and the promise of a retirement allowance after completing even one term (two years for the Ground SDF, three for the Marine and Air Force). Moreover, since members were supposed to reside at an SDF station, they did not have to spend money on meals and lodging.

In terms of daily life, too, the SDF compared favorably with the opportunities available to working class people in civil society. Just as SDF members had to live inside an SDF base, many laborers who came from the countryside to work for small-sized stores or factories lived at their employers' houses or dorms, either because their employers required them to do so, or because they could not afford to rent an apartment. In this circumstance, working hours tended to be long. Even after finishing

⁴³ Bōeichō Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., *Jieitai jūnenshi*, 290.

⁴⁴ Rōdōshō, *Shōwa sanjūgonen rōdō keizai no kenkyū* (1961), “Kōdo seichōka no chingin jōshō.” Available on line: <http://www.hakusyo.mhlw.go.jp/wp/index.htm>.

work for the day, employees could not relax and were frequently treated like house servants by employers' families. In contrast, at the SDF working hours were strictly observed. There was no overtime work. Once they finished their work, they could use their time as they wished. They did not face discriminatory treatment based on social class (though they did face treatment based on military rank). They were surrounded by members who wore the same uniform, ate the same meals, and lived in the same-sized room. In fact, during recruitment SDF staff emphasized not only the stability of employment at the SDF (e.g., the SDF would not go bankrupt), but also the type of equality that is hard to obtain in civil society. As one SDF recruitment manual notes, "in regular society (= civil society), one's salary depends on one's academic background, but at the SDF, junior high school graduates and university graduates are treated equally, and the rest depends on one's merits."⁴⁵

To be sure, the military's appeal to working-class people was not unique to Japan. It is a phenomenon common to liberal capitalist regimes. The Japanese historian Yoshida Yutaka has pointed out a similar trend in the prewar Japanese context. According to him, sons in agrarian villages in poor prefectures regarded volunteering for the military (instead of being conscripted) and becoming noncommissioned officers as one of the few means of escaping poverty⁴⁶ In the US context, David Segal has emphasized the nature of the US military as a welfare institution. He argues that the US military traditionally provided jobs to a population

⁴⁵ Kinen Jigyō Kyōsan Jikkō Iinkai, *Nanakamado: Asahikawa chiren sōsetsu nijusshūnen kinenshi* (Asahikawa: Kinen Jigyō Kyōsan Jikkō Iinkai, 1976), 400.

⁴⁶ Yoshida Yutaka, *Nihon no guntai: heishi-tachi no kindai-shi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002), 87-91.

that could not find a means of making a living in the civilian sector. For example, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara initiated the so-called Project 100,000 in 1966. He tried to recruit young people with physical and mental difficulties and give them technical training. By doing so, McNamara argued, the military could contribute to reducing unemployment and alleviate poverty in the civilian sector.⁴⁷ Christian Appy has made a similar argument. He has focused on the Vietnam War and pointed out that 80 per cent of soldiers were from the working class or the lower middle class.⁴⁸ In this sense, there was no difference between the SDF and other militaries.

But there was also a particularity to the SDF. That is, SDF service members did not have to worry about being sent to battlefields abroad. No matter how many similarities we can point out between the SDF and most other militaries, this characteristic of the SDF should not be overlooked. As Segal reminds us, those American youths recruited through Project 100,000 were eventually sent to Vietnam. Contrary to the advertised aim, the US military had not given them proper technical training due to a lack of funds. It had only given them regular combat training together with more apt recruits. The death rate among those recruited through Project 100,000 was disproportionately high. To put it another way, applicants to militaries in other countries had to consider the possibility of death on the battlefield. But applicants to the SDF did not think about this. Neither the main opponents of the SDF, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, nor the Liberal Democratic Party ever imagined

⁴⁷ David Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy*, (University Press of Kansas, 1989), Chapter Four.

⁴⁸ Christian Appy, *Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993).

sending the SDF abroad until the 1990s. Both sides basically agreed that sending troops abroad would conflict with the section of Article Nine that renounced “the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”⁴⁹ This absence of the possibility of death made the choice of working for the SDF even more realistic for working-class people. They could almost equate service in the SDF with other forms of government employment. In fact, joining the SDF was a lot less competitive than getting a government job, and yet it guaranteed the same salary and benefits.

The concept of a volunteer military suggests that anyone could decide of their own free will whether or not to work for the SDF. This was probably true for middle-class Japanese. If they thought that working for the SDF was tough and restricting, they could find a more suitable employer. Working-class Japanese, however, by no means enjoyed the same degree of freedom. They might have thought that working for the SDF was tough and restricting, but it was also true that the SDF guaranteed a certain level of salary and a decent working environment that would otherwise be hard for them to attain in the civilian sector. Freedom to join the military was unequally distributed to people of different social classes.

Building Hokkaido

My next question concerns the SDF’s use of recruited men, in other words, what activities service members undertake once they joined the SDF. The ways in which the SDF recruited its members had to be considered within the larger context of

⁴⁹ It was not until 1991 that the government sent SDF troops abroad. After the Gulf War, the Marine SDF was sent to the Persian Gulf for minesweeping. The next year, the Ground SDF was sent to Cambodia to join UN peacekeeping efforts.

the nation's economy. The SDF worked as a welfare institution by offering employment for men who did not benefit from the high-speed growth that exacerbated uneven development. One can point out the same thing when we examine the SDF's use of recruits.

Hayashi Kiezo established basic policies for service members' activities in the early days of the postwar military's history. He was appointed as the NPR's superintendent (the highest-ranked uniform officer) in December 1950. He had not commanded any military organization. He was a graduate of the Department of Law of Tokyo Imperial University (like many other bureaucrats). He served as the Governor of Tottori Prefecture, and then as a bureaucrat of the Home Ministry and the Imperial Household Agency. The government asked him to assume the position of Superintendent because Yoshida Shigeru desired to keep officers of the Imperial Army and Navy from interfering in the building of a new army, just as he wanted to prevent former military officers from teaching at the Defense Academy. Hayashi continued in power even after the NPR was reorganized into the Safety Forces (1952) and then the SDF (1954): he served as Chief of Staff of the Ground SDF and Chief of the Joint Staff Office (the chief of the Ground, Maritime, and Air SDF) until 1964.

As I have shown in the previous chapter, such people as Yoshida Shigeru and Maki Tomoo believed that the Imperial Army and Navy's elitist attitude exacerbated the gulf between the military and civil society. Hayashi agreed with them. He strongly believed that the NPR should conform to popular opinion at any cost. He repeated the slogan "an NPR for the people" (*kokumin no tame no yobitai*) and "an SDF for the people" (*kokumin no tame no jieitai*). In his view, service members had to be highly

disciplined and had to refrain from abusing their power vis-à-vis civilians. They had to act so that “the eighty million Japanese” spontaneously desired to say: “NPR, please work hard for us!” (*shikkari yattekure*) The NPR had to be at “the vanguard of defending the people’s peaceful life” (*kokumin no heiwa na seikatsu o mamoru zen’ei*).⁵⁰

When we consider Hayashi’s belief in an army for the people, we cannot forget about his career at the Home Ministry. On the one hand, the Home Ministry represented the prewar state’s authoritarian governing institutions. It suppressed political dissent by establishing such notorious laws as the Peace Preservation Law in 1925. But As Sheldon Garon has demonstrated, the Home Ministry also dedicated itself to pursuing progressive social policies. Just as in any other industrial states, Japan after WWI faced serious labor unrest, and the Home Ministry founded the Social Bureau in 1920 within the ministry to deal with issues of labor and welfare more efficiently. Bureaucrats from this bureau, often called social bureaucrats, included many graduates from the Department of Law at Tokyo Imperial University with a strong sense of a mission to reform society. They also possessed a deep knowledge of militant class conflict in Europe and the United States through their study abroad, which made them aware that the mere suppression of labor movements would not bring about social peace. The social bureaucrats proposed to shift old repressive policies toward more inclusive ones. They, for example, made great contribution to the revision of the Factory Law, which reduced the maximum hours of

⁵⁰ Hayashi Keizō, “Kokumin no yobitai taran,” in Rikujō Bakuryō Kanbu Sōmuka Bunshohan Taishi Hensan-gakari, ed., *Keisatsu yobitai sōshi* (Tokyo: Bōeichō, 1958), 397.

work for women, and banned night work for women and children. They also worked to recognize labor unions despite overwhelming critic from other ministries and the military.⁵¹

Although Hayashi was not directly involved in making social policies in prewar and wartime Japan, the Home Ministry's principle of inclusion for social governance strongly influenced Hayashi's policies at the SDF. He knew that to enlist popular support for the SDF, the SDF had to build a system in which the people could benefit from the SDF in some way. Within the SDF, Hayashi was not alone, but had a number of colleagues who held the same belief. During the 1950s, former bureaucrats from the Home Ministry occupied important positions in the military. These included Masuhara Keikichi as the first director of the NPR (the highest-ranked civilian officer), Eguchi Mitoru as the first vice-director of the NPR, and Katō Yōzō as the chief of the personnel bureau. The influence of former Home Ministry bureaucrats was especially strong in the Ground SDF. They formed a faction called "Home Ministry Warlords" (*naimu gunbatsu*).

Hokkaido is an ideal place to examine how the SDF used its service members to become an army for the people. Many service members who were recruited on the other three islands were sent to this northernmost island. By 1956, a couple of years after the SDF was founded, 22 military bases had been built in Hokkaido. No other

⁵¹ Garon, *Labor and the State in Modern Japan*.

region saw such a concentration of military facilities.⁵² In 1960, 35,400 Ground SDF personnel were stationed in Hokkaido, and in 1961, 42,500 personnel. This number amounted to one third of all Ground SDF personnel. By 1962, the SDF had built thirteen divisions in Japan, and four were stationed in Hokkaido. Prior to other divisions, these four divisions gained a semi-independent status as the Northern Army (*Hokubu hōmentai*) in 1952. Of course, service members carried out their activities in other regions, too. But the concentration of SDF personnel and facilities in Hokkaido will permit us to see most clearly the significance of service members' activities.

The most common explanation for the SDF's high profile in Hokkaido is that this prefecture was the most strategically critical site for the SDF and the government during the Cold War. This vast island is located just south of the Soviet Union. The small islands to its north, the so-called Northern Territories or *hoppō ryōdo*, had been occupied by the Soviet Union since August 1945. Therefore, the government and the SDF expected Hokkaido to serve as the breakwater of communism. Yet, there were a relatively small number of US military bases on this island. SCAP's focus was on Honshu (with such metropolitan areas as Tokyo and Osaka) and Okinawa (as a main base for military activities in the Pacific theater). The government had to defend Hokkaido without relying on the US military.

This explanation is by no means wrong. But when we look at the political and economic position attributed to Hokkaido within the nation-state throughout its history, another explanation may be possible. Most importantly, since the beginning of

⁵² Except Okinawa. Just as SDF facilities were concentrated in Hokkaido, US military facilities were concentrated in Okinawa during and after its occupation of the islands.

the Meiji Era, Hokkaido has been the target of the central government's opportunistic developmental policies. The central government saw this vast island, with its rather small population, as a supplier of food and natural resources for the nation's industrial development as well as an outlet for the rapidly growing population on the other three islands. Encouraged by the government, waves of immigrants—mainly poor farmers and urban workers—moved to Hokkaido from the early Meiji Era whenever economic recessions took place. Agriculture, fishery, and mining prospered from the Meiji Era, and Hokkaido was integrated into the nation-state's economy. Yet, the central government's developmental policies did not pay much attention to improving the quality of residents' everyday lives. Communities with small populations were scattered across the island, and local governments were constantly plagued by a lack of financial resources to organize their infrastructure.

This situation had not improved when the SDF began to station forces there in the 1950s. As part of postwar democratization and promotion of local autonomy, Hokkaido, which had been administered directly by the central government and given special financial treatment, obtained prefectural status 1946. Independence as a prefecture meant that Hokkaido now had to secure its own economic stability. This was extremely demanding for the prefecture, since the shortage of labor was a chronic problem, the income from agriculture and fishery was limited, and the mining industry was declining. Although Hokkaido contained several industrial cities, including Muroran, famous for its steel industry, the level of industrialization remained low compared to that of other prefectures. The central government founded the Hokkaido Development Agency (*Hokkaido kaihatsuchō*) in 1949. The aim of the agency was to

support developmental projects on this island and improve the living standard of residents. The agency compiled a special budget for this purpose every year, and treated Hokkaido's development as a national mission. Throughout the next fifty years, the budget from the Development Agency would continue to be an important part of Hokkaido's income until the agency was abolished in 2001. In other words, all Hokkaido has been placed within the state's welfare system until very recently.⁵³

SDF service members worked to compensate for Hokkaido's chronic labor shortage and financial difficulties, thereby complementing the state's project for Hokkaido's development. Their main activity was what the SDF termed "people's livelihood support," or *minsei kyōryoku*. As the name suggests, under *minsei kyōryoku*, members conducted the kinds of projects that would enhance the quality of life in the area, such as civil engineering and disaster relief. The SDF started this activity to demonstrate its compatibility with the peace constitution. The SDF was quite hesitant to present itself solely as a military that conducted regular military activities, such as maneuvers. Through people's livelihood support, the SDF intended to nurture a peaceful image, and to become "an SDF worthy of love and trust" (*aisare and shinrai sareru jieitai*).⁵⁴ In Hokkaido, people's livelihood support did not work

⁵³ Another example is Okinawa. When the United States returned Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1972, the Japanese government founded the Okinawa Development Agency. Its aim was the same as that of the Hokkaido Development Agency. The agency was abolished in 2001, together with the Hokkaido Development Agency. For the history of the Hokkaido Development Agency, see Hokkaido Kaihatsuchō, ed., *Hokkaido kaihatsuchō sanjūnenshi* (Tokyo: Hokkaido Kaihatsuchō, 1981).

⁵⁴ *Asagumo* (December 6, 1956). *Asagumo* is a weekly newspaper published by the Mutual Aid Association of the Defense Agency (1954-1961), and then *Asagumo*

simply to help residents accept the SDF at the ideological level. Instead, backed by communities' desire to improve their infrastructures, people's livelihood support became a crucial part of the welfare support that they relied on.

Article 100 of the Self Defense Forces Law prepared a legal basis for civil engineering. This article stipulated that ministries and local governments were entitled to entrust civil works to the SDF. If the SDF judged that the entrusted work was related to the purpose of SDF men's training—for instance, training in the use of equipment that require high skill to operate—the SDF accepted all or part of the work. This work usually included the building of roads and bridges as well as their repair, land clearing, snow clearing, and so on. The SDF regarded civil work as part of military training, so the salaries of SDF personnel were paid by the SDF itself, not by the communities. Therefore the fees that the SDF asked were much more reasonable than those private companies would have asked.⁵⁵ While communities throughout the nation took advantage of this service, Hokkaido communities' heavy reliance on it was obvious. In 1956, for example, SDF divisions all over Japan accepted a total of 124 orders for civil engineering projects, and 61, nearly half of these orders, were received by the four Hokkaido divisions.⁵⁶

But what is most striking about service members' civil engineering projects in Hokkaido is not simply the number of orders, but the nature of their service, which reached remote communities that had previously had few provisions for public

Shinbunsha (1962-). The purpose is to deepen the understanding of the SDF among the populace.

⁵⁵ Bōeichō Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., *Jieitai jūnenshi*, 361.

⁵⁶ *Asagumo* (December 6, 1956).

assistance. Service members, for example, built or repaired roads for villages that did not have roads leading to nearby communities, and for villages whose roads were so narrow that they were impassable in winter. Residents from one village said that road expansion completed by service members enabled them to transport their dairy products even in winter.⁵⁷ Service members also engaged in snow clearing: it was rare for small communities to be equipped with their own snowplows and bulldozers. The mayor of one village expressed his gratitude, saying that the SDF's work allowed buses, the only means of transportation for village dwellers, to run even on snowy days. One resident said that he was glad that his village would no longer be a "remote island on the land."⁵⁸ Members also worked to extend phone lines and installed public phones for some villages.⁵⁹ While engaging in these civil works, members sometimes visited communities where people still lived without electricity. To these communities, they brought an electric generator and amused the residents by showing them a movie or TV program.⁶⁰

During the 1950s, several Hokkaido communities, including the towns of Nayoro, Engaru, and Bihoro, and the city of Asahikawa, conducted extensive campaigns to bring SDF bases to their communities. In these campaigns, town or city assemblies and the chambers of commerce strongly insisted on the merits of having an

⁵⁷ *Asagumo* (November 5, 1964).

⁵⁸ *Akashiya* (February 1, 1958). *Akashiya* is a weekly newspaper published by the Northern Army.

⁵⁹ *Asagumo* (January 17, 1963).

⁶⁰ *Asagumo* (January 17, 1963), *Asagumo* (January 16, 1964).

SDF base.⁶¹ The main consideration behind these campaigns was that proponents saw the stationing of the SDF as an opportunity to build their community. If a community was designated as a location for an SDF base, the SDF offered generous financial support to build or improve roads between the community and the base. Once the base opened, a large number of service members moved in. The number depended on the size of each base, but at least about 1,000 service members worked even at a small-sized base. Officers brought their families as well. Many communities that promoted the SDF's stationing only had a population of 20,000 to 30,000 (except Asahikawa). The SDF significantly boosted these communities' populations.

Furthermore, once settled in a community, service members would then contribute to the community's economy through people's livelihood support. The City of Asahikawa and its nearby communities, for example, began to entrust a number of civil engineering works to the SDF as soon as the SDF settled in Asahikawa in 1953. The record of the SDF's civil engineering in this city indicates that service members offered to handle all sorts of projects, ranging from such large-scale projects as building inter-town roads and an electric generator for agriculture to such minor projects as building ditches for streets and clearing land for elementary-school playgrounds.⁶²

To be sure, the Hokkaido Development Agency was also concerned about the low living standard of Hokkaido communities. But the agency's assistance by no

⁶¹ Engaruchō, ed., *Engaruchōshi* (Engaruchō, 1977), 586-593; Bihorochōshi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Bihorochōshi* (Mihoroshi, 1972), 1297-1303; Nayoro Shiyakusho, ed., *Nayoroshishi* (Nayoro Shiyakusho, 1971), 47-52; and Asahikawashishi Henshū Iinkai, ed., *Asahikawashishi daiinikan* (Asahikawa Shiyakusho, 1959), 855-869.

⁶² Asahikawashishi Henshū Iinkai, ed., *Asahikawashishi daiinikan*, 868-869.

means reached all small communities. For example, if we look at the road-building projects supported by the Agency, we notice that the Agency focused only on the improvement of the major inter-city roads (e.g., Sapporo, Chitose, and Otaru).⁶³ Obviously, the Agency's road organizing project was intended to facilitate the transportation of goods and food among major Hokkaido cities as well as between Hokkaido and other urban areas, thereby integrating the prefecture into the nation's economic system. Satisfying local residents' everyday needs was the Agency's secondary purpose; doing so would not bring any economic benefits to the central government. When we examine the SDF's civil engineering projects in this context, we realize that it operated in such a way as to address this deficiency.

People's livelihood support also included disaster relief. Under Article 83 of the Self Defense Forces Law, prefectural governors were (and are) entitled to ask the SDF to dispatch its troops in times of natural disaster, such as earthquakes, fires, typhoons, and heavy snow, in order to "protect human life and property." Again, Hokkaido used this service quite frequently. In the ten years after the foundation of the National Police Reserve in 1950, the SDF offered disaster relief to Hokkaido 207 times, one fifth of the total instances of disaster relief conducted in Japan.⁶⁴ In this decade, Hokkaido experienced a couple of historic disasters: the Tokachi-oki Earthquake in 1952, the sinking of the passenger ferry Tōyamaru due to a typhoon in 1954, the great fire in Iwanai Town in 1954 (33 casualties), and the catastrophic tsunami caused by the Great Chilean Earthquake in 1960. In each case, the SDF (the

⁶³ Hokkaido Kaihatsuchō, ed., *Hokkaido kaihatsuchō sanjūneshi*, 146-147.

⁶⁴ Bōeichō Jieitai Jūnenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., *Jieitai jūnenshi*, 357.

National Police Reserve and the Safety Forces) dispatched its troops to evacuate residents, search for casualties, provide first aid, transport foods to affected areas, repair broken roads and levees, and so on.

But again, directing our attention to more minor cases will be a good way to examine how communities valued service members as personnel who could provide the swiftest support in case of emergency. Whereas in law the dispatch of SDF personnel had to be requested officially by a prefectural governor and then approved by the Defense Agency, this procedure was often omitted in Hokkaido. It was not unusual for local governments (city, town, village) to contact nearby SDF stations directly to ask for assistance. The records of the SDF's disaster relief documented by the City of Asahikawa and the Town of Engaru indicate that members were constantly called up throughout the year to deal with mountain fires as well as fires in town, floods, avalanches, and so on.⁶⁵

Also, the SDF's newsletters are full of accounts that demonstrate that its members were also asked to handle personal emergencies, such as the transportation of sick or injured people to hospitals in wintertime. In small villages, when heavy snow buried all roads, civilians' only means of transportation was sleighs, and so the SDF's snowmobiles and tanks were particularly appreciated. For example, *Akashiya* in February 1, 1959, reported news of a forestry worker saved by the SDF. This forestry worker caught acute pneumonia while working in the village of Shikaoi. But the village hospital was located nineteen miles away, and sixty inches of snow made

⁶⁵ Asahikawashishi Henshū Iinkai, ed., *Asahikawashishi daikan*, 866-867; and Engaruchō, ed., *Engaruchōshi*, 379.

transport extremely difficult. Though the hospital first tried to send a doctor in a horse-drawn sleigh, the snow was too deep. Then the nearby police station asked the SDF Shikaoi Base for help. Upon this request, the SDF dispatched a tank (their snowmobile was being used for other purposes at that time) and transported the forestry worker to the hospital.⁶⁶

To understand the Hokkaido communities' dependence on the SDF's disaster relief, we must note that in the first couple of postwar decades, very few communities were prepared to offer their residents provisions for disasters due to financial difficulties and labor shortage. The number of local governments that could maintain fire stations at their own expenses was extremely limited: 28 communities as of 1955, and 42 as of 1960. It was not until 1975 that all 212 cities, towns, villages in Hokkaido became equipped with fire stations.⁶⁷ Small communities with no fire stations depended on semi-volunteer, part-time firemen, who served only in emergencies. These were usually members of community youth associations, and they had their own jobs in ordinary times. But after the high-speed economic growth started and young adults began leaving rural areas, it became increasingly difficult to maintain even these part-time fire brigades.

Moreover, for a local government, the lack of a fire station meant that it could not offer medical emergency transport service. While such big cities as Sapporo or Otaru offered this service from the late 1950s, in many communities, families and neighbors handled the transportation of the sick and the injured to medical facilities. It

⁶⁶ *Akashiya* (February 1, 1959). For another example, see *Akashiya* (March 15, 1961).

⁶⁷ Hokkaido, ed., *Shin Hokkaidoshi dairokkan* (Hokkaido, 1977), 180.

was only in 1976 that all communities were finally required to offer the service by law.⁶⁸ In this way, compared to the slow speed at which local governments systematized public services concerning disasters and emergencies, the SDF organized its disaster relief from very early. Residents had learned to rely on the SDF when faced with a natural disaster or personal emergency before becoming familiar with local government-offered services.

While civil engineering and disaster relief were the two main activities under people's livelihood support, service members also offered important physical assistance for Hokkaido farmers every spring and fall. In the 1950s and 1960s, there were many farming families who had lost young male workforce in the Asia-Pacific War. The SDF sent several service members to each such family so that they could help plant and harvest rice. There was no legal basis for this. Each SDF unit in a community could determine whether to engage in this activity at its own discretion. But it widely spread to all parts of Hokkaido. Many service members came from farming families and had experience working in rice fields, so helping farming families did not require any special training or preparation. Service members were supposed to help the same farming family every year, and nurture close personal ties with civilians in communities. There are no official data that indicate exactly how many service members participated in this activity, but SDF's newsletters published a number of articles on the subject. According to these, the four divisions in Hokkaido

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 181-184.

dispatched a total of 51,180 service members to communities on this island between May 22 and June 25 in 1965, and 42,479 between May 23 and June 18 in 1966.⁶⁹

Finally, I want to point out that offering support to Hokkaido communities was also a rewarding experience for service members as well. As I have pointed out in the previous chapter, many men who joined the SDF had been in the lower part of the dual structure of the nation's economy. Employers easily fired them in times of a recession, and once the economy recovered, they hired other laborers with similar ability. Their labor was replaceable and disposable. Those who applied to the SDF were deeply concerned about the disposability of their work. Ichikasa Takeo, for example, said that when he was about to graduate from high school, his teacher strongly encouraged him to apply to a big company. But he felt that "in big capital, he could not even become a cog" (to constitute that capital) and wondered "if there were any chance that the value of his existence would be recognized."⁷⁰ Others were not as explicit as Ichikasa, but they express similar feelings. Sasaki Ken wrote that his repetitive everyday life bored him out of his mind, and that he desired to encounter a job that would give him a "purpose in life" (*ikigai*).⁷¹ Uematsu Kazunori worked at a gas station without any skills or special licenses. All he did was to assist his seniors. He wrote that he began to fear that his way of life would ruin him.⁷²

⁶⁹ *Akashiya* (July 30, 1965) and *Akashiya* (June 30, 1966). If one member worked for two days, he was counted twice. Since one member usually worked for several days, the actual number of those who participated in this activity was probably smaller.

⁷⁰ *Shōwa gojūninendo shidan iken happyōkai bunshū*, 41-43.

⁷¹ *Shōwa gojūninendo shidan iken happyōkai bunshū*.

⁷² *Ibid.*

By joining the SDF, service members not only secured a means of stable income but also gained the opportunity to be recognized as workers indispensable to others' lives. Although we tend to reduce the labor question to the redistribution of material wealth, it is also true that workers have long struggled to gain recognition as indispensable humans, not mere disposable commodities. In their biographical essays, service members often described their becoming service members as a process by which they transformed from unimportant, anonymous workers into useful components of society.

Kawajiri Takashi was a third son in a farming family in Kagoshima. He studied at a night school while working during the day, and then moved to a vocational school to become a mechanic. But he never had a feeling of fulfillment, and always wondered about such questions as: "What is life?" and "What will my lifelong occupation be?" In the SDF, he could finally feel proud of his own duties in an engineer brigade that specialized in disaster relief and civil engineering. He concluded his essay by emphasizing that he would like to become a service member that the people of Hokkaido would respect.⁷³ Sudō Sadayuki said that he joined the SDF because he was convinced that he could find "a purpose in life" and live "fruitful days" (*jūjitsu shita hibi*) as a service member. According to him, he was most pleased about his decision, when local residents showed gratitude for the SDF's activities in disaster relief. While engaging in these activities, he sometimes did not have enough

⁷³ *Shōwa gojūichinendo shidan iken happyōkai bunshū*, 32-34.

time to eat or sleep. But when local residents said thank you, his exhaustion immediately dissipated.⁷⁴

In this way, the SDF offered crucial socio-economic support for both the working-class men and farmers who did not have jobs and the communities in Hokkaido that were facing a labor shortage and financial difficulty. In short, the SDF contributed to relocating a labor force so that it would be used in the most appreciated and effective manner. When the NPR was founded, the Superintendent Hayashi Keizō expected the new army to become an army for the people, to which the Japanese would spontaneously lend their support. The SDF realized this by working as a welfare institution. The SDF took advantage of such problems as uneven development between the city and the countryside and the dual structure of the Japanese economy. By doing so, the SDF secured its firm position within the Japanese economic system. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, working class people and rural communities increasingly became the SDF's support base.

⁷⁴ *Shōwa gojūninendo shidan iken happyōkai bunshū*, 21-23.

Chapter Three

Containing Protest: Anti-SDF Litigation and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency

While the SDF presented itself as “an SDF for the people” (*kokumin no jieitai*) and offered assistance for under-developed communities, it remained, after all, a military organization, building military bases and conducting military maneuvers. The SDF considered its civil engineering and disaster relief to be military concerns, essential parts of the training of its service members. From the SDF’s standpoint, the line between its “people’s livelihood support” (*minsei kyōryoku*) and military maneuvers was very thin. Therefore, although the people living in military communities could expect to enjoy the SDF’s support, they also had to worry about incessant loud noise, environmental destruction, and even danger to their lives caused by maneuvers.

The two most famous litigations brought against the SDF in postwar Japanese history took place in Hokkaido in the 1960s. While people and communities in this northern island nurtured intimate socio-economic relationship with the SDF, some increasingly questioned whether the SDF was truly contributing to the good of residents and communities. In the midst of the antiwar social atmosphere triggered by the 1960 revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty, two brothers in Eniwa and 173 residents in Naganuma contested the SDF’s maneuvers and the construction of a military base.

The 1960s witnessed the intensification of social movements worldwide. Students, workers, and ordinary citizens not only in Japan but also in the United States,

France, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere, protested against their governments over such issues as war, the democratization of the university, and workers' rights. Immanuel Wallerstein suggests viewing the movements that took place throughout the 1960s as a single movement, calling it "the revolution of 1968," a revolution in and of the world-system. He argues that the movements were essentially protests against US hegemony as well as its antithesis, Soviet hegemony, in the world. Although countries on both ideological sides enjoyed a certain economic stability during the two decades after the end of World War II, people had become aware of the rigidity of this system by the end of the 1960s. They began to doubt that the economic stability of nation-states could be the only criterion by which to measure individual happiness.¹

We need to understand the two litigations in Eniwa and Naganuma in this context. They were manifestations of a broad skepticism about the political and economic system that the postwar Japanese state had established under the supervision of the United States in the previous two decades. This chapter examines Eniwa and Naganuma residents' efforts to conceptualize their criticism of the SDF and the Japanese state within the postwar constitutional order. The postwar constitution, which renounced war and guaranteed the people's "right to live in peace," served them as a valuable tool for insisting that individual rights should not be sacrificed for national collective security.

¹ Immanuel Wallerstein, "1968, Revolution in the World-System," in *Geopolitics and Geoculture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

In last two chapters, I have examined liberalism as a mode of governance that aimed to promote the people's spontaneous support for rearmament. In this chapter, I argue that liberalism structurally and inevitably generates the emergence of political dissent. Because the liberal state gives individuals a certain freedom to discuss and determine what type of political regime to adopt, there is always a possibility that they will not necessarily endorse the state, but call for its reform and reorganization. The Eniwa and Naganuma cases will help us understand how individuals contested the liberal state by employing the liberal notion of freedom.

Liberal governance, however, always operates with the presumption that objections are inevitable. It incessantly tries to reinvigorate itself by overcoming such objection. After detailing the Eniwa and Naganuma Incidents, I will shift my attention to the SDF's and the government's attempts to re-integrate critical residents into the military welfare system. Here, I analyze the role of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, which assumed a mission to mediate between the SDF and those communities with military facilities from the 1960s. I demonstrate that the military welfare system grew even more comprehensive after this new agency settled the Eniwa and Naganuma cases.

The Eniwa Incident

The first litigation took place in the town of Eniwa, an agricultural community located near the prefecture's capital Sapporo. On December 24, 1962, the Northern Army, headquartered in Sapporo, submitted to the Chitose Police Department a letter of accusation against Nozaki Takemi and his brother Miharuru. Two weeks earlier, the

two brothers had cut telephone cables in the Shimamatsu maneuver field located just next to their house and ranch. The brothers had long opposed the SDF's maneuvers. By cutting the telephone cables, they had attempted to disconnect communications within the maneuver field. The Northern Army claimed that they had violated Article 121 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. This article stated: "those who break or damage the weapons, ammunition, aircrafts, and other defense equipment owned by the SDF shall be subject to an imprisonment of five years or less, or a fine of 50,000 yen or less." Based on the Northern Army's accusation, the Police Department indicted the Nozaki brothers at the Sapporo District Court on March 7, 1963.

This incident, which would be later known as the "Eniwa Incident," did not at first receive much public attention. Many believed that the court would treat it as a minor criminal offense and quickly close the case by fining the Nozaki brothers. The Nozaki brothers and their defense lawyers, however, insisted on the brothers' innocence in the first hearing, held in September 1963. They claimed that the SDF constituted "war capability" (*senryoku*), which Article 9 of the constitution banned the nation from maintaining.² If the SDF was unconstitutional, then the SDF Law would also be legally invalid. The defendants claimed that the prosecutors could not accuse anyone of having violated a law that had no legal validity.³ Thus this small criminal

² Although the English version of the Japanese constitution uses the term "war potential" to refer to *senryoku*, I use "war capability" to illuminate more clearly the military power the state possesses.

³ Eniwa Jiken Taisaku Iinkai, ed., *Eniwa jiken: Jieitaihō ihan: kōhan kiroku 1 and 2* (Sapporo: Eniwa Jiken Taisaku Iinkai, 1964), 4-5.

case in a Hokkaido town became the first court case in which the constitutionality of the SDF would be contested.⁴

To the defendants' identification of the SDF as war capability, the prosecutors responded that the SDF constituted "defense capability" (*bōeiryoku*). Conservative cabinets led by the LDP had been pursuing this distinction between war capability and defense capability since the 1950s. In 1954, Ōmura Seiichi, the Director of the Defense Agency under Hatoyama Ichirō's cabinet, maintained that the constitution renounced "war" and "the threat or use of force" only if the purpose was to settle "international disputes."⁵ Ōmura argued that resorting to armed forces for the purpose of preventing foreign attacks was genuinely "self-defense" (*jiko bōei*), and that the constitution did not ban the use of armed forces for this purpose. Therefore, in his view, Japan's possession of the Self-Defense Forces was constitutional.⁶ In the same year, Satō Tatsuo, the Director of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, maintained that Japan had given up only belligerency, not the right to self-defense, because the right to

⁴ Before the Eniwa Incident, there was an attempt to bring a lawsuit against the armed forces in postwar Japan. In 1951, Suzuki Mosaburō filed a lawsuit at the Supreme Court on behalf of the Socialist Party asking the court to recognize the unconstitutionality of the National Police Reserve. Prior to the lawsuit, however, Suzuki had not suffered any damages by the NPR. He simply wanted to contest the constitutionality of the SDF. The Supreme Court judged that the court could not deal with lawsuits concerning the interpretation of the constitution at the abstract level, and dismissed the case. Therefore, the constitutionality of the SDF was never discussed in this case.

⁵ The first part of Article 9 reads as follows: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes."

⁶ At a budget committee of the Lower House on December 22, 1954. Asagumo *Shimbun Henshūkyoku*, *Bōei hando bukku: Shōwa 54 nen-ban* (Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1979), 321.

self-defense was indispensable for “maintaining the existence of the state” (*kokka no seizon iji*).⁷ Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, who assumed his position in 1957, followed this interpretation of the SDF. He argued that the nation had not renounced the right to self-defense, and that “a minimum level of armed forces”—the level of armed forces that Japan possessed—constituted only “defense capability.”⁸ The cabinets that followed hewed to the interpretation advanced by the Hatoyama and Kishi Cabinets as the government’s “unified view” (*tōitsu kenkai*). The prosecutors in the Eniwa case repeated this interpretation of the SDF at court.⁹

The prosecutors cited Article 3 of the SDF Law in order to back up the SDF’s status as defense capability. This article defined the SDF’s mission as “defending our nation’s peace and independence,” “defending the country from direct or indirect invasion,” and “maintaining public order.” According to them, the SDF had been conducting their activities in accordance with this mission, and therefore its presence did not contradict Article 9. This meant that the indictment of the Nozaki brothers under the SDF law was legally valid.

Furthermore, the prosecutors contended that the constitution not only allowed for the possession of defense capability but also obliged the Japanese to exercise the right to self-defense actively. The third paragraph of the preamble of the constitution stated:

⁷ At a cabinet committee of the House of Councilors on May 25, 1954. *Ibid*, 326.

⁸ At a cabinet committee on April 24 in 1957. *Ibid*, 323.

⁹ At the third hearing on December 7, 1963. Eniwa Jiken Taisaku Iinkai, ed., *Eniwa jiken 1 and 2*, 28-42.

We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations.

From this, the prosecutors concluded that the Japanese could not be content with a policy of nonresistance and unarmed neutrality. They argued that because the political crisis of one country inevitably affected other countries' security in the contemporary international community, giving up one's right to self-defense was equivalent to neglecting the importance of world peace.¹⁰

To be sure, the government's and the prosecutors' argument based on "defense capability" and "self-defense" was not at all novel within the international context. No nation-state in the modern era has justified wars of aggression. Any nation-state has claimed that it would engage only in wars of self-defense. The French Constitution of 1791 renounced "war with a view to making conquests," and promised not to "use its forces against the liberty of any people." But France involved itself vigorously in imperialist competition with other Western powers throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 renounced war "for solution of international controversies" and "as an instrument of national policy." The great powers, including most European nations, the United States, and Imperial Japan, signed this pact. But soon after that, Japan invaded Manchuria and waged war with China in the name of self-defense. When Japan declared war on the United States and Great Britain in 1941, the declaration stated that the Empire must stand up for the

¹⁰ Eniwa Jiken Taisaku Inkai, ed., *Eniwa jiken: Jieitaihō ihan: kōhan kiroku 9* (Sapporo: Eniwa Jiken Taisaku Inkai, 1967), 4-9.

purpose of “self-existence and self-defense” (*jison jieii*). In the case of the United States, prior to approving the pact, the Senate did not forget to add a statement confirming that the pact would not infringe upon the US’s right to self-defense. Subsequently, the United States conducted a number of military interventions in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East throughout the twentieth century. History clearly shows that the border between war of self-defense and war of aggression has been always vague.

The Japanese government and the prosecutors in the Eniwa, however, seemed to be unaware of this. They conveniently ignored the simple fact that many nation-states in the modern era had engaged in invasions and atrocities in the name of self-defense. Their argument operated only at the ideological level, as if noble purposes would unmistakably lead to noble practices. They strongly believed that once they defined armed forces as defense capability, they could justify whatever these armed forces would do as self-defense.

At the trial, the Nozaki brothers and their defense lawyers pointed out the discrepancy between the ideal of self-defense and its practice. They did so by arguing that one nation-state’s defense capability could inflict serious damage not only on people in other nation-states but also on its own people. To demonstrate this, they demonstrated how the SDF’s incessant maneuvers had destroyed their dairy business and livelihood and how the brothers and their family had struggled against the SDF to stop maneuvers.

The Shimamatsu maneuver field, which was located just next to the Nozaki family’s house, occupied 8,821 acres. It was one of the SDF’s largest maneuver fields.

Eniwa's close relation with military organizations had begun in 1901, when the Seventh Division of the Imperial Army confiscated part of the town's land for its training. But in the prewar era, the scale of training remained rather small. The Seventh Division used the field mainly for training in the use of rifles and machine guns. The training took place only several times a year. When there were no military activities, town residents were allowed to enter the field to harvest wild flowers and vegetables. At the end of the Asia-Pacific war, US occupation forces took over the field and used it for much larger-scale maneuvers. Particularly after the Korean War broke out, the US occupation forces began to mobilize tanks and bombers. This situation did not change even after Japan obtained independence in 1952.¹¹

The Nozaki family's struggle against military maneuvers started around 1955. From this time, the US forces set up targets for ground-attack aircraft only 0.6 miles from the Nozaki family's house. They repeated practice bombardments once every two weeks. Aircraft flew only 100 feet above the family's house and ranch during practice bombardments. The total number of aircraft flying above the family's house reached 1,000 to 1,500 a day. This inflicted serious damage on their dairy business and their health. Because of the loud noise, some cows went mad, some produced notably less milk, and some repeatedly delivered calves prematurely or miscarried. The father, the mother, and one of the brothers experienced grave hearing problems. The mother's condition was especially bad. Her ear condition and extreme fatigue forced her to be hospitalized in Sapporo. Upon the mother's hospitalization in the spring of 1957, the

¹¹ Watanabe Minoru, ed., *Eniwashi-shi* (Hokkaido Eniwa Shiyakusho, 1979), 515-16.

family had its first face-to-face talk with the US Air Force through the mediation of the US Consul in Sapporo. After repeated protests, the US Air Force agreed to suspend its maneuvers near the family's house, and eventually decided to withdraw its troops permanently in 1957.

Upon its withdrawal, the US Air Force handed the maneuver field over to the Air SDF. Soon after, the Air SDF began practice bombardments—exactly what the US Air Force had done—under the supervision of the US troops at the Misawa Base in Aomori Prefecture. The SDF also conducted artillery live-fire training. Exhausted by the loud noise and his continuing protest, the father was hospitalized in Sapporo in 1958. The two brothers and the sister continued to protest against maneuvers through various means. They published a letter in a local newspaper, petitioning for the cancellation of maneuvers; collected signatures from neighbors; and met with important personnel at the Northern Eniwa Unit. Despite these efforts by the Nozaki family, the SDF did not take any measures to reduce the number of maneuvers or to cut down on noise. The brothers sometimes tried to stop maneuvers by standing in front of the artillery, but service members removed them by force and resumed maneuvers each time. Meanwhile, the parents continued to stay in Sapporo to escape noise and receive treatment (and the mother would die during the trial). As the value of the cows and their milk continued to decrease, the family's debts steadily increased.

The incident took place on December 11, 1962. In the morning of that day, the SDF conducted practice bombardments without prior notice to the family. The SDF had earlier promised to give the family notice before maneuvers. The two brothers went to the Northern Eniwa Unit to ask them to postpone the afternoon maneuvers

until they could talk to the headquarters of the Northern Army. Takemi, the older brother, told the supervisors at the unit that if the SDF did not postpone the maneuvers, the brothers would resort to force. At one o'clock in the afternoon, the SDF resumed the maneuvers despite the brothers' petition. Takemi called the Northern Army to ask for the cancellation of maneuvers. The other brother Miharū and sister Kazuko went to the field to protest directly. The SDF ignored their protest. Miharū cut telephone cables in front of service members in order to prevent communication. Several angry service members hit and choked him. The SDF resumed their exercises next day. On that day, on the way to the maneuver field, Takemi and Miharū cut other telephone cables.¹²

During the trial, the prosecutors attempted to present the Nozaki brothers' act of cutting telephone cables as irrational and absurd. In their argument, the Nozaki family had been benefiting from the SDF on a daily basis. The SDF allowed the family to use the water reservoir located inside the maneuver field for drinking water and to generate electricity, and provided the family with land, rent-free, to build the water pipes connecting the water reservoir to their house.¹³ For the prosecutors, the Nozaki brothers were simply insolent residents who did not sufficiently appreciate the benefits they were receiving from the SDF. But the Nozaki brothers' own account provided a sharp contrast with this view. The brothers had had a long history with the

¹² Statement by the Nozaki brothers at the fourth hearing on March 16, 1964. Eniwa Jiken Taisaku Iinkai, ed., *Eniwa jiken 1 and 2*, 49-57.

¹³ At the fifth hearing on March 18, 1964. *Ibid.*, 105-107.

SDF prior to the incident. They chose to cut the telephone cables only as a last resort, to defend their business and livelihood from the SDF's maneuvers.

Up to the early 1960s, many people in Hokkaido had been considering their relationship with the SDF in fairly positive terms. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, the SDF made enormous efforts to appeal to people in this region, particularly those in under-developed communities, by providing them with generous socio-economic support. The Nozaki's brothers' hometown, Eniwa, was not exceptional. Service members there engaged in civil engineering and disaster relief. Also, Eniwa was one of those communities service members annually visited to help poor farmers plant and harvest rice. Residents in Hokkaido saw the SDF as one of the few available sources of public assistance. Under this condition, it was not hard for people in Hokkaido to believe that the defense of a nation-state as a whole was identical with the defense of individual lives. For the SDF, too, its two missions—"protecting national peace and independence, and maintaining national security" and "protecting the people's lives and properties"—complemented each other. The Nozaki brothers and their defense lawyers, however, urged people in Hokkaido and the rest of the nation to reconsider this conflation of the defense of the nation-state and that of individuals. They tried to demonstrate that what the government identified as "defense capability" could destroy individuals' lives in the name of the defense of the nation-state.

The Right to Live in Peace

When pointing out the incompatibility between the defense of the nation-state and that of individual lives, the Nozaki brothers and their defense lawyers struggled to

explain the centrality of individual rights within the postwar constitutional order. For this purpose, as the trial proceeded, they gradually adopted the notion of the right to live in peace (*heiwateki seizonken* or *heiwa ni ikiru kenri*).

Law scholars had long agreed that the postwar constitution recognized the “right to live” (*seizonken*). Article 25 stipulated that all people had “the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultural living,” and that the state was responsible for “the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and public health.” Among the American officials in SCAP who designed the constitution were a fair number of so-called New Dealers, who believed that the people’s rights should be extended to the social realm. Article 25 prepared a legal basis on which the government enacted the Livelihood Protection Law in 1950, guaranteeing the people the right to petition for public assistance in case they had difficulty in maintaining a minimum standard of living by themselves.

Upon renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty and the intensification of the Vietnam War, some scholars began to claim that the constitution guaranteed not only the people’s right to live but also their right to live *in peace*. Hoshino Yasusaburō was the first to make such efforts. In 1962, he contributed a chapter to an anthology of articles on the constitution, theorizing in it the right to live in peace. He focused on the second paragraph of the preamble to the constitution. This paragraph declared the Japanese people’s commitment to international peace and the renunciation of tyranny. The end of this paragraph read: “We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.” While the body of the constitution did not include any article that explained the right to live in peace in concrete terms,

Hoshino suggested understanding that Article 9 and the right to live in peace as mutually reinforcing.

In a literal interpretation, Article 9 might seem to concern exclusively the state's diplomatic policy. It renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation, and banned the nation from maintaining war capability. At first glance, it could appear to have little to do with citizens' rights. In Hoshino's view, however, the diplomatic policy determined by Article 9 actually ensured the people a peaceful living environment, although this was not explicitly expressed in the constitution. Article 9 liberated the Japanese from the anxiety of war. It liberated them from military service and other obligations to participate in national defense. Article 9, Hoshino pointed out, enabled the people to "employ all available manpower and wealth to build a free and peaceful society." According to Hoshino, the right to live in peace stipulated in the preamble meant protecting this type of living environment. By construing the right to live in peace in this way, he demonstrated that pacifism in the constitution must be the principle for determining not only the state's diplomacy but also the extent of individual rights.¹⁴

During the Eniwa trial, the right to live in peace was not yet well recognized in the public and even among law scholars. While the defense lawyers constantly used the expression "the invasion of life" (*seikatsu shingai*), they did not explicitly state that the SDF violated the Nozaki family's "right to live in peace." Toward the end of

¹⁴ Hoshino Yasusaburō, "Heiwateki seizonken joron" in Kobayashi Takasuke and Hoshino Yasusaburō, eds., *Nihonkoku kenpōshi-kō: sengo no kenpō seiji* (Kyoto: Hōritsu bunkasha, 1962), 3-25.

the trial, however, they gradually recognized that Hoshino's combined interpretation of the preamble and Article 9 would help them effectively denounce the SDF's maneuvers and underline that the brothers' wellbeing should not be conflated with that of a national collectivity.

In the final defense plea made in January 1967, Fukase Tadakazu, one of the Nozaki brothers' defense lawyers and a law scholar at Hokkaido University, explained the concept of the right to live in peace, just as Hoshino had done in his 1962 paper. He also added new interpretation to this concept. He argued that Article 13 of the constitution also reinforced the notion of the right to live in peace. This article stipulates that the people's "right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" was the "supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs." Although this article added the condition that the quest for this right should not interfere with "public welfare" (*kōkyō no fukushi*), Fukase insisted that Article 9 did not allow military affairs to be interpreted as "public welfare." Instead, he proposed to include the right to live free from military interference in the definition of the right guaranteed by Article 13. At the end of the trial, Fukase retrospectively defined the Nozaki brothers' struggle against the SDF as a fight for the right to live in peace, and claimed that for the Nozaki brothers, to aspire to life free from military maneuvers was to exercise a constitutional right.¹⁵

The Sapporo District Court handed down its verdict on March 29, 1967. While finding the Nozaki brothers not guilty, Judge Tsuji Mitsuo avoided making a judgment

¹⁵ Fukase Tadakazu, "Kenpō no heiwa shugi no haikai to igi," in *Eniwa jiken shiryō* 36 (Sapporo: Hokkaido-ritsu Toshokan).

on the SDF's constitutionality in relation to Article 9 and the right to live in peace. Relying on the Self-Defense Forces Law, the prosecutors had accused the Nozaki brothers of having damaged "SDF-owned equipment used for the purpose of defense." Judge Fukushima, however, stated that the telephone cables cut by the brothers could not be considered as parts of "SDF-owned equipment." Typical examples of SDF-owned equipment included weapons, ammunitions, and airplanes. The judge argued that compared to these, telephone cables obviously paled in significance. Therefore, the SDF Law could not provide a legal ground on which to try the Nozaki brothers. The judge concluded that since the brothers had not violated the SDF Law and therefore were not guilty, he had no reason to mention the constitutionality of the SDF.¹⁶

Although it found them not guilty, the verdict greatly disappointed the brothers, since they had sought to link the case to the legitimacy of the SDF within the constitutional order. On the other side, the Northern Army and the prosecutors were quite satisfied that the court focused on the criminality of the Nozaki brothers' actions. Of course, the ideal verdict for them would have been to find the brothers guilty and the SDF constitutional. But after the defense team repeatedly pointed out the harmful consequences of defense capability on the Nozaki brothers' life, many outside the court—law scholars and the media—anticipated that the court would refer to a contradiction between the SDF and the constitution in some way. The Northern Army

¹⁶ Fukase Tadakazu, *Eniwa saiban ni okeru heiwa kenpō no benshō* (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1967), 441-446.

and the prosecutors felt that they should be grateful that the court did not do so. They chose not to appeal to a higher court.

The Naganuma Incident

The Nozaki brothers' hope to establish the right to live in peace as a constitutional right, however, did not vanish with the conclusion of their court case. Their efforts significantly influenced the way the plaintiffs of the next anti-SDF litigation constructed their argument.

The next anti-SDF litigation took place in Naganuma—a small farming town not far from Eniwa—in 1968, about a year after the Eniwa case verdict. On May 30 of that year, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and the Hokkaido Prefectural Government notified the Mayor of the town that the Defense Agency was planning to build a new Nike missile base in the town. Nike missiles were surface-to-air missiles, which could be launched from the ground against aircraft. The US company Western Electronic had first developed technology for Nike missiles, responding to the US federal government's demand for a new air-defense system to combat Soviet jet aircraft. Since the early 1950s, the US Army had deployed more than 200 Nike missiles all over the United States. The United States exported Nike technology to Japan in 1958, and offered interest-free subsidies through the Mutual Security Assistance Program. Among the firms that showed interest in indigenizing Nike

missiles, Mitsubishi obtained the prime contract.¹⁷ By 1968, the Defense Agency had already built two Japanese Nike missile bases: one in the Tokyo metropolitan area and another in southern Kyushu. The Defense Agency explained that a third Nike missile would be deployed in order to defend the security of northern Japan.

When announcing the building of the Nike missile base in Naganuma, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Hokkaido Government also called on the mayor to agree to a plan to cut down a part of Mount Maoi to provide space for the missile base. The Japanese government had listed this mountain as a forest preserve in 1897. Residents of Naganuma had been relying on it for the protection of the watershed since then. Upon receiving notification from the Minister and the Hokkaido Government, Mayor Nakagawa Kiyoshi immediately declared his support for the project. On June 10, he summoned a town assembly. Out of the 26 assembly members, 17 supported the plan with conditions. The conditions were: that the central government would compensate the town for any damages that the felling of trees in the forest preserve might cause; that the central government would not turn the base into a nuclear base; and that the central government would use the base in such a way as to advance the “culture and economy” of the “garden town” character of Naganuma. On June 13, Mayor Nakagawa visited the Defense Agency in Tokyo to notify them that the town had approved the plan for the Nike missile base.¹⁸

¹⁷ For the information on Japanese firms’ efforts to indigenize armament productions, see Samuels, *“Rich Nation, Strong Army.”*

¹⁸ Hayashi Takeshi, *Naganuma Saiban: Jieitai iken ronsō no kiroku* (Tokyo: Gakuyō Shobō, 1974), 15-16.

The Forestry Agency, an extra-ministerial bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, held two public hearings to explain the procedure for the building of the Nike missile base to town residents. The first hearing was held over three days in September 1968. The Forestry Agency explained that the government was planning to build alternative facilities for watershed protection after the felling of the forest preserve. The residents who opposed the Nike missile base maintained that the Agency only distributed “simple numbers and maps,” and demanded that the Agency provide them with more detailed plans for the alternative facilities. On the final day of the first hearing, the opponents, frustrated with the lack of sufficient explanation, called for the cancellation of the project. They got into a loud altercation with those who supported the project. The chairman finally had to prorogue the hearing in utter turmoil near midnight.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry judged the hearing legally effective, and tried to delist Mount Maoi from the forest preserves list. Socialist and Communist Party members, however, brought this issue to the Diet and questioned the validity of the hearing. Pressured by them, the Forestry Agency held another hearing in May 1969, but this hearing similarly fell apart from the beginning. Opponents of the plan contended that the Forestry Agency had purposely set up the hearing during the busiest part of the farming season, and had given Naganuma residents only six days’ notice. They thought that the agency was intentionally depriving them of the opportunity to state their opinions. Supporters of the project claimed that the opponents only wanted to disrupt the hearing, while offering no constructive opinions. The two sides also confronted each other outside the building where the hearing was

held. Supporters and LDP members insisted that the Nike missile base was crucial for national defense and community development. Opponents, Socialist and Communist Party members, and student protesters insisted that Nike missiles would drag Japan into war.¹⁹

On July 7, 1969, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry finally removed an 86.7 acre-area of Mount Maoi from the forest preserves list, thereby permitting the Defense Agency to cut down trees and build the Nike base in that area. The same day, 173 residents who opposed the Nike base project filed lawsuit in the Sapporo District Court against the Japanese government, petitioning for cancelation of the delisting. The plaintiffs anticipated that it would take a long time for this case to be settled in court. So besides petitioning for cancelation, they also asked the court to issue an injunction against the government's tree felling until the case was settled. Article 25 of the Administrative Case Procedure Law stipulated that the court could order an injunction against a government action in order to prevent the damage that action might cause.

The Sapporo District Court responded promptly. It issued an injunction on August 2 to prevent tree felling and the building of the base. Judge Fukushima Shigeo argued that tree felling might cause serious "irreparable damage" to the community and that the SDF's constitutionality needed to be discussed in relation to the "spirit of the constitution" prior to the building of the base. The Japanese government appealed to the Sapporo High Court the following week. After two hearings, the high court

¹⁹ Hayashi, *Naganuma Saiban*, 17-24.

reversed the district court's decision on January 23, 1970, and permitted tree felling and the building of the base. The high court stated that the government's plan for alternative facilities such as dams were satisfactory for watershed protection.²⁰ The plaintiffs decided not to appeal. They thought it unlikely that the Supreme Court would rule in their favor. Following this decision, in June of the same year, the government began to clear the forest preserve and construct the base. Although they had failed to prevent the government from building the base, the plaintiffs chose to contest the constitutionality of the SDF in the district court and to challenge the constitutional validity of delisting the mount preserve for the purpose of constructing an SDF base.

The plaintiffs consciously used the Nozaki brothers' argument as a model for critiquing the government's Nike base project. In fact, many of the lawyers who defended the Nozaki brothers helped the Naganuma residents bring their lawsuit. From the beginning of the trial, the plaintiffs and their lawyers argued that the Nike missile base would violate local residents' right to live in peace.

First, the plaintiffs pointed out the anticipated consequences of the tree felling of the forest preserve. The forest preserve in Mt. Maoi had been securing water resources for drinking and irrigation purposes, preventing floods, avalanches, and mudslides, and protecting the town from snowstorms and windstorms. Naganuma's residents were overwhelmingly farmers. As of 1965, 2,000 households—two thirds of the total households—engaged in farming. Reflecting this demography, most of the

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 28-33.

173 plaintiffs were farmers. For them, the functions that the forest preserve bore were closely related to their agricultural business. The town was located at a low altitude and had suffered a number of floods since its establishment in 1892. The plaintiffs feared that tree felling in the forest preserve would further increase the incidence of floods and dry up rice fields, thereby destroying the foundation of their livelihood.²¹

The plaintiffs also discussed the anticipated consequences of the presence of the Nike missile base. They first insisted on the high risk of an accidental explosion of missiles. An accident that had taken place in New Jersey in 1968 engendered their fear. In this accident, several Nike missiles had exploded, killing fifteen soldiers. The missiles' boosters fell to earth three miles away, and their warheads, two miles away. According to the plaintiffs, if a Nike missile exploded, its fourteen-foot-long, two-ton booster could fly up to three miles away while remaining extremely hot, and its drop position was unpredictable. Even if the SDF launched a missile intentionally, the missile would not simply obliterate an enemy aircraft. The wreckage from the exploded missile and the aircraft would fall to the ground. The plaintiffs maintained that the Nike base would make the entire area within three miles in radius uninhabitable.²²

The plaintiffs also feared that the government would eventually turn the Nike missile base into a nuclear base. The government strongly and repeatedly denied that possibility. But the American Nike-Hercules, from which the Japanese Nike was developed, had optional nuclear warheads. Indeed, almost all Nike-Hercules missiles

²¹ *Naganuma saiban kankei shiryō*, 12, 64-65.

²² *Ibid.*, 51-52.

deployed in the United States were equipped with nuclear warheads. With Japan's scientific technology, it would not have been difficult to manufacture nuclear warheads for Japanese Nike missiles.²³

The top SDF officers who gave testimony at court confirmed the plaintiffs' fears. Responding to the plaintiffs' petition, the court had summoned these officers so that they could clarify the purpose of the Nike missile base. Naturally, they all insisted that the government and the Defense Agency were not planning to install nuclear warheads onto Nike missiles. They basically reconfirmed the Japanese government's "Three Non-Nuclear Principles," which Prime Minister Satō Eisaku had enunciated in 1967.²⁴ But one of the officers Genda Minoru, the former Chief of Staff of the Air SDF, maintained that if Japan were to receive a nuclear attack, it would have to consider arming itself with nuclear weapons with the help of the United States. Ogata Kagetoshi, the Chief of Staff of the Air SDF, contended that while Japan's security policy was "exclusively defense-oriented," the United States could go on an offensive on behalf of Japan if the situation required.²⁵ Their testimony demonstrated that SDF top officers were not necessarily committed to following the Japanese government's official nonnuclear policy, and that the definition of self-defense could be extended as

²³ *Ibid.*, 52-54.

²⁴ At a budget committee meeting in the Lower House in December 1967, a member of the Socialist Party asked about the possibility that nuclear weapons would be placed on the Ogasawara Islands, which the United States had promised to return to Japan the next year. Satō responded that the Japanese government would not allow any territory under Japanese administration to be armed with nuclear weapons, stating that: "Japan shall neither possess nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor shall it permit their introduction into Japanese territory." The prime ministers since then have accepted this as the government's official principle concerning nuclear weapons.

²⁵ Hayashi, *Naganuma saiban*, 51-56.

far as offensive use of nuclear weapons. In this context, the plaintiffs' fear of the conversion of the Nike base into a nuclear base was not irrational.

Moreover, the plaintiffs argued that such an advanced military base could serve to attract an enemy's attack, rather than repelling it. They cited the bombing of Northern Vietnam by the US troops in 1965, in which they attacked the enemy's radar and missile bases exclusively in the first several days of the bombing. In modern warfare, attacking radar and missile bases was one of the most efficient forms of destroying the enemy's counter-attack capability. According to the plaintiffs, the Japanese government and the Defense Agency were intending to defend the nation at the cost of Naganuma's residents—a relatively small number of people living far from the metropolitan areas. At the same time, the plaintiffs drew an analogy between Naganuma's position in national defense and Japan's position in the United States' cold-war geopolitics in Asia. Yamada Akira, one of the military researchers who gave testimony at the request of the plaintiffs, indicated that the United States encouraged Japan to deploy Nike missiles in order to integrate it under its nuclear umbrella and direct the enemy's—that is, the Soviet Union's—attention to Japan. Under this condition, the plaintiffs argued, not only Naganuma residents but also the entire Japanese population would have to live in a fear of a nuclear war.²⁶

In this way, the plaintiffs listed various anticipated consequences of the deforestation of the preserve and the building of the Nike base, and pointed out that these actions would seriously conflict with Naganuma residents' constitutional right to

²⁶ *Naganuma saiban kankei shiryō*, 55.

live in peace. In so doing, they attempted to establish the unconstitutionality of the SDF and the Nike base. They expected that if they could establish this argument, the court would retrospectively invalidate the building of the base and order its closure.

In an Era of Protest

The Sapporo District Court handed down its verdict on September 7, 1973, about four years after the 173 Naganuma residents filed their lawsuit. Judge Fukushima Shigeo, the same judge who issued the injunction against the government's deforestation of the preserve, recognized the right to live in peace as a constitutional right. He fully accepted the plaintiffs' argument concerning the relationship between the preamble and Article 9 of the constitution—the argument that the individual right to a peaceful life and the state's security policy must complement each other. According to Fukushima, the three principles of the constitution—popular sovereignty, respect of fundamental human rights, and pacifism—had to be interpreted not individually but in an integrative manner. Then the judge pointed out that the Nike base would increase Naganuma's chance of becoming a target for attack in case of war, and that Naganuma's residents' right to live in peace could not be maintained under this condition.

The recognition of the right to live in peace likewise influenced the judge's interpretation of the notion of "defense." While the prosecutors had been insisting that Article 9 had not renounced wars of self-defense nor banned the possession of defense capability, Judge Fukushima deemed that it was unlikely that the constitution that guaranteed the right to live in peace would at the same time justify war depending on

its purpose. Wars of self-defense conducted with defense capabilities, no less than wars of aggression conducted with war capability, would have to mobilize human and material resources from civil society. In other words, both types of wars and both types of armed forces equally risked violating the people's right to live in peace. The judge rejected the prosecutors' (that is, the government's) interpretation of Article 9 as incompatible with the pacifist spirit manifested in the preamble. He defined "war capability" as "an organization constituted by human and material means that could be employed for the purpose of war," and within this definition, there was no clear difference between war capability and defense capability. Naturally, the judge regarded the SDF as war capability, and therefore as unconstitutional.

Judge Fukushima did not necessarily deny Japan's right to self-defense, but he contended that as a sovereign and independent state, Japan could exercise such a right. But he warned that associating the notion of self-defense automatically with the possession of a military was too simplistic. In his opinion, a state could avoid war and maintain peace through diplomatic means, and the Japanese were supposed to find other methods for this purpose through their own wisdom and effort. Finally, he concluded that the delisting of Mount Maoi from the forest preserves list to construct a base for an unconstitutional institution could not assume legal validity and suggested removal of the Nike base and restoration of the forest preserve.²⁷

Here, it is important to note that prior to filing their lawsuit, the 173 Naganuma residents had not yet experienced any damage caused by the SDF. And they had not

²⁷ Hayahsi, *Naganuma saiban*, 82-90.

been required to leave their houses and lands. They decided to file the lawsuit because they feared that tree felling and base construction *could* bring damage to their life in the future. This contrasted with the Eniwa Case. The Nozaki brothers had been suffering from military maneuvers for a long period of time. At the trial, the brothers could demonstrate the damage caused by the SDF by providing a great amount of empirical evidence and data. But in the Naganuma case, all the damage the plaintiffs referred to were hypothetical, and thus much harder for the plaintiffs to establish. The plaintiffs, however, developed an argument convincing enough that the judge eventually ruled in their favor. It is clear that the conceptualization of the right to live in peace helped the plaintiffs enormously in organizing and verbalizing the anticipated damage in a coherent manner.

Until the early 1960s, the Japanese were not conscious that they possessed the right to live in peace. It was clearly written into the constitution, but they did not know that they could actually use this right to denounce the state's actions and to demand better treatment. When faced with the SDF's destruction (or potential destruction) of local residents' daily lives, however, law scholars, the Nozaki brothers, the Naganuma residents, and their lawyers "discovered" this right and defined its content through an imaginative interpretation of the preamble and articles of the constitution.

Once the right to live in peace was established, the Naganuma residents were able to present many different anticipated consequences of the building of the Nike base coherently as violations of this right. Of course, even without recourse to the right to live in peace, the Naganuma residents could have pointed to the damage caused by the SDF. Regardless, they could have raised concern that the deforestation

of the preserve might destroy their agricultural business and that the building of the base might place them in constant danger of nuclear war. But in such cases, they would not have had the language with which to correlate the various damages. Only by establishing the concept of the right to live in peace were the plaintiffs able to demonstrate the significance of their objection to the Nike base within the framework of postwar democracy.

Since the end of World War II, Japan had not lacked institutional arrangements for democracy. The people enjoyed universal suffrage. The constitution recognized popular sovereignty and guaranteed fundamental human rights. This did not mean, however, that the state had actively encouraged the people's participation in political decision-making. This was especially true for decision-making concerning the state's security policies. The government launched rearmament secretly without popular consensus in 1950. It conveniently interpreted Article 9 as allowing for the possession of armed forces for self-defense during the 1950s. It did not intend to encourage public discussion on the relationship between the SDF and the constitution. For the state, the people were rather compliant subjects who did not raise much of a critical voice against its security policies and its interpretation of Article 9. If we define democracy as a system designed to incorporate the voices of the people into the state's decision-making to the maximum extent possible, then there had been no democracy in postwar Japan, at least in the field of national security, until the 1960s. In this context, the Eniwa and Naganuma Incidents helped establish important turning points for postwar democracy. The Nozaki brothers, the Naganuma residents, and their lawyers offered a

new understanding of the constitution. They proved that not only the government but also the people themselves could interpret the constitution.

This was certainly a product of postwar liberalism. The state had been promoting the people's active support for rearmament and the SDF. By offering socio-economic assistance for rural communities, the SDF envisaged consolidating an environment in which local residents could spontaneously recognize the need for an army. To put it another way, under this system, criticism of the state and the SDF was not necessarily prohibited nor suppressed. Local residents were never encouraged to engage in such criticism. But, they were guaranteed basic civil liberty under the constitution: they had freedom of thought and speech. Employing these freedoms, they could express their anti-military sentiments and consider what true democracy meant. This is one distinctive feature of liberalism. When the people realize that they are autonomous individuals who can make their own decisions, they do not always support the liberal state but may call for the restructuring of a system founded by such a state.

In the 1960s, not only the Nozaki brothers and the Naganuma residents but many other Japanese as well shared an eagerness to define for themselves the meaning of democracy. In 1960, the Kishi administration suppressed the massive and unprecedented protests against the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty or *Anpo*, and railroaded the bill approving the revision through the House of Representatives despite the strong opposition of the Socialist and Communist Parties. With this event, the people became increasingly skeptical of the system the Japanese government and the US occupation forces had established over the past fifteen years. They doubted

that national politics had truly reflected popular opinion, and began to confront the state that prioritized security reinforcement and economic growth over the improvement of individuals' livelihood.

Although the renewal of the Anpo could not be prevented, the decade after the 1960 protest witnessed a variety of citizen movements. University students all over Japan, discontent with tuition increases and an authoritarian education system, carried out a number of strikes and boycotts demanding self-governance of universities by students. In 1967, farmers in Sanrizuka began to fight against the government's forcible confiscation of their land for the building of a new international airport. In 1968, supporters of the victims of Minamata disease founded the Citizens' Council for Minamata Disease Countermeasures to raise people's awareness of pollution problems and to pressure the government and Chisso to take more genuine responsibility.²⁸

But most major studies of the protest movement of the 1960s did not take seriously enough the people's growing skepticism of the existing system. When George Packard examined the Anpo protest in his famous *Protest in Tokyo*, he reduced this movement to a conspiracy set up by radical leftists. In his argument, ordinary citizens were simply being manipulated, and did not realize that alliance with the United States would be beneficial for Japan.²⁹ Thomas Havens discussed the anti-Vietnam War protest in his *Fire across the Sea*, arguing that the Japanese could engage in mass-scale protest precisely because the Vietnam War was "a fire across the

²⁸ For civic movements concerning the Minamata disease, see George, *Minamata*.

²⁹ George Packard, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

sea,” and because “no Japanese blood was shed.” For him, it was selfish of the Japanese to satisfy their conscience while economically benefiting from the war. Just like Packard, Havens had certain expectations of how the Japanese should have acted as an ally of the United States in Cold-War Asia, and lamented that the Japanese had not conformed to that expectation.³⁰ Ellis Kraus characterized the young people who participated in the Anpo era protests as self-indulgent. For him, they were prompted not by a clear political vision but by libertarian and individualistic values. In his argument, the Anpo era protests contributed little to transforming postwar society.³¹ These scholars all tended to trivialize the significance of the Anpo era protests.

Wesley Sasaki-Uemura presents a quite different view. Responding to Packard’s argument in particular, he challenges the view that the 1960s protests were a monolithic, unitary movement agitated by radical leftists, and suggests shifting scholarly attention from political leaders’ discourse and party rivalries to ordinary citizens’ aspirations to political participation. By examining the activities of four civic groups that developed during the Anpo era, he maintains that many participants in protest movements were concerned not about partisan battle but about issues directly related to their everyday lives. These issues included ordinary people’s war responsibility, democratization in the workplace, women’s political engagement, and a

³⁰ Thomas Havens, *Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan 1965-1975* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

³¹ Ellis Kraus, “The 1960s’ Japanese Student Movement in Retrospect” in Gail Lee Bernstein and Haruhiro Fukui, eds., *Japan and the World: Essays on Japanese History and Politics in Honour of Ishida Takeshi* (London: Macmillan Press, 1988).

more egalitarian democracy vis-à-vis the dogmatic democracy led by a proletarian party.³²

Sasaki-Uemura's reassessment is useful for understanding the importance of the arguments developed by the Nozaki brothers and the Naganuma residents. Those cases reinforce his point that one of the critical legacies of the Anpo era protest was the consolidation of "the idea of the citizen as the key social actor in public spheres."³³ In residents' movements that flourished in the aftermath of the Anpo protest, participants emphasized that the state's developmental policies and individual happiness were not always in accord, as they objected to petrochemical plants, bullet train lines, the Narita International Airport, and nuclear power plants. We can add military bases to this list. Participants in protest movements against these facilities demonstrated that citizens in a democratic regime had the right to object to the state and that the state could not pursue projects that might transform local residents' lives without their consent.

The Defense Facilities Administration Agency

While the 173 Naganuma residents successfully won recognition from the Sapporo District Court of their right to live in peace, the government immediately appealed to the Sapporo High Court. In 1976 the high court reversed the district court's decision, arguing that because alternative facilities would work to prevent such

³² Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, *Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001). The civic groups he examined are the Mountain Range, the Poets of Ōi, the Grass Seeds, and the Voiceless Voice.

³³ *Ibid.*, 211.

natural disasters as floods, the Nike base would not endanger the plaintiffs' lives. Moreover, the Sapporo High Court, unlike the Sapporo District Court, chose to stay away from discussion of the constitutionality of the SDF. According to the high court, questions concerning the state's security were highly "political" and directly related to fundamental national governance. Therefore, the government needed to maintain a certain coherence in its security policies without being influenced by other organs. For this reason, the Sapporo High Court concluded that it was desirable for the judiciary not to be involved in security issues, implicitly criticizing Judge Fukushima's judgment of the SDF as unconstitutional. The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, but it supported the Sapporo High Court's decision and dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal in 1982.

The government and the Defense Agency had already begun constructing the Nike base in 1969, after the Sapporo High Court gave the government permission to begin deforestation. They finished installing radars, launchers, and missiles on the site by 1972. The Nike base had been operating since then. Since the plaintiffs lost at both the Sapporo High Court and the Supreme Court, they no longer had any means of stopping the operation of the base.

The SDF and the government, however, were not simply content with the judicial system that tended to favor national defense over individuals' lives. They had been promoting the SDF as "an SDF for the people" (*kokumin no jieitai*), endorsing the idea that their efforts at national defense would also defend the people's livelihood. In this sense, they had to take seriously the criticisms the Nozaki brothers and the Naganuma residents had presented. Those criticisms could have destroyed the belief in

reciprocity between the SDF and people in Hokkaido that the SDF had intended to establish. From the 1960s, the government and the SDF began to envisage building a system that could integrate even critics of the SDF into its welfare structure. The founding of the Defense Facilities Agency was a major attempt by the government and the SDF to accomplish this.

The Japanese government founded the Defense Facilities Administration Agency in 1962. This agency had its origin in two institutions that the government had founded during and after the US occupation: the Procurement Agency (*Chōtatsu-chō*) and the Construction Headquarters (*Kensetsu honbu*). The former was founded under the direction of SCAP in September 1947. Its central mission was to obtain land, facilities, and supplies for the use of the US occupation forces. This agency built bases and offices for SCAP, and also provided housing to SCAP's officers and soldiers and their families. Even after Japan's independence, the agency continued to operate under the US-Japan Administration Agreement, which legally confirmed the US troops' tenancy of Japanese land and facilities in order to accomplish the goals established in the US-Japan Security Treaty. The Construction Headquarters was founded in 1952. This institution assumed the same mission as that of the Procurement Agency, not for the US troops but for the Safety Forces (and later the SDF). When the government founded the Defense Agency in 1954, the Construction Headquarters was incorporated as one division of the agency.³⁴

³⁴ Bōei Shisetsuchō-shi Hensan Inkaï, ed., *Bōei shisetsuchō-shi: Kichi mondai to tomo ni ayunda 45nen no kiseki* (Tokyo: Bōei Shisetsuchō, 2007) 36-41.

While the Procurement Agency and the Construction Headquarters operated independently from each other, the government increasingly recognized the importance of their collaboration. In June 1957, Prime Minister Kishi had a talk with US President Eisenhower. They reconfirmed amity between the two countries, and agreed that the United States would reduce its troops in Japan to establish a more equal relationship, and that Japan would in turn engage more actively in its own defense. At the end of 1956, the US troops owned 458 facilities, occupying an area of 248,488 acres. By the end of 1959, the number of the facilities owned by the US troops decreased to 243, and an area of 83,027 acres³⁵ As the US troops withdrew from Japanese soil, they often ceded their lands and facilities to the SDF. There were also many cases in which the SDF and the US troops jointly used lands and facilities. In this situation, there was little reason for the government to run these two institutions separately, and in 1961, they agreed to merge. The next year, the Diet passed a proposal for the merger, and at this point the Defense Facilities Administration Agency was launched.

Soon after the merger, the nature of the new agency was transformed. Encouraged by the Anpo protest and the Eniwa Case, from the early 1960s many people living by military facilities joined in strong protest movements. Although the Procurement Agency and the Defense Agency occasionally offered compensation for damage caused by the US troops and the SDF, there was no legal system that formally specified the procedure for providing such compensation. Governors and mayors of

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 37.

communities with military facilities petitioned the government to take measures to solve this problem and restore social calm. LDP members also began to prepare a bill to offer public assistance to these communities. Communities with military facilities were overwhelmingly located in rural areas (with some exceptions such as Yokosuka City in Kanagawa Prefecture). Since 1955, the LDP had been enjoying fervent support from people in rural areas. Because of their support, the LDP could uninterruptedly maintain a majority in both houses of the Diet. The party feared that anti-base sentiments might affect the popularity of the LDP in rural areas. The government thus founded the Cabinet Council on Base Questions (*Kichi mondai nado kakuryō kyōgikai*) in 1965, and finalized a bill concerning the Improvement of the Environs of Defense Facilities in March of the following year. The Diet approved this bill in June, and the law was promulgated and enforced in July.

This law, which became known as the Environs Improvement Law (*Shūhen seibi hō*), promised subsidies to build facilities to prevent damage caused by the SDF's maneuvers and other activities, as well as compensation for any such damages. The Defense Facilities Administration Agency took up the role of investigating communities with military bases and administering these subsidies and compensation. For example, the agency conducted noise insulation work for schools, provided financial assistance to help those living near air bases to relocate, and paid compensation to those farmers and fishers whose businesses were affected by military maneuvers.³⁶

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 56-58.

Just three years after the establishment of the Environs Improvement Law, the Naganuma Incident took place. The law prepared the legal basis upon which the Defense Facilities Administration Agency offered financial assistance to the Town of Naganuma to prevent the damage the Nike base might cause. As I have discussed, Naganuma residents most feared that the deforestation of the preserve might increase the chance of flood and mudslide. Responding to this fear, the agency built seven mudslide-control dams and 0.6 miles of levees along the rivers that went through the mountain. The residents were also afraid that the mountain might lose its water-retaining function, so the agency improved a number of irrigation ditches for farmers in the town. Some residents had been using water obtained from mountain streams as drinking water. As an alternative to this, the agency built a reservoir and waterworks facilities. The agency undertook these projects from 1969, together with the building of the Nike base.³⁷

The Town of Naganuma received assistance from the Defense Facilities Administration Agency in domains that were not directly affected by the construction of the Nike missile base. This was a condition on which the town accepted the Nike base project. Prior to submitting an agreement to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the town assembly expressed its desire to receive governmental subsidies by adding the statement that “the building of the base should promote the plan to build a ‘prosperous garden city’ and contribute to the development of the culture and economy of local society.” Expecting that the building of the base would increase

³⁷ Naganumachō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Naganumachō 90nen-shi* (Naganumachō, 1977), 577.

traffic within and near the town, the town government asked for subsidies to improve or build roads. Of a proposed budget of 320 million yen submitted by the town, the agency granted 277 million yen.

The town government also asked for subsidies to build various facilities for “people’s livelihood stabilization (*minsei antei*).” This was a new notion introduced by the Environs Improvement Law. While the SDF carried out many activities in the name of “people’s livelihood support” (*minsei kyōryoku*), various anti-military movements forced the government to admit that the SDF did damage some people’s livelihood. So “stabilizing” it and raising it to the level of other people’s livelihood became important tasks. It was also a vague notion, however. The law did not define what facilities for “people’s livelihood stabilization” meant. In the case of Naganuma, of a requested budget of 552 million yen, the agency approved 330 million yen. With these subsidies, the town built a swimming pool, a community center, and an assembly hall in the name of educational facilities, and an agricultural training center, a greenhouse, and so on in the name of agricultural facilities.³⁸

Soon after the enactment of the Environs Improvement Law, the government became aware of its shortcomings. First, while the original intention of this law was to provide compensation for damages caused by the SDF and the US troops, the definition of “damage” and its “victims” became increasingly unclear. Rapid urbanization and suburbanization took place in many areas during the 1960s. The number of people living near military facilities grew steadily as well. Accordingly, the

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 576.

areas affected by military activities (e.g., loud noise caused by jet planes) increased. Also, the level of damage varied according to the individual and neighborhood. The Defense Facilities Administration Agency often had difficulty in determining which individuals and which communities were entitled to compensation and subsidies, and how much they were entitled to.

Second, many Japanese became conscious of the exacerbation of industrial pollution. The so-called four big pollution diseases—Minamata Disease, Niigata Minamata Disease, Yokkaichi Asthma, and Itai Itai Disease—received a great deal of public attention from the late 1960s. The Sixty-Fourth Diet in 1970 was called the “Pollution Diet” because of its active discussion of the issue. The Diet made it clear that the state was responsible for resolving the problem, and passed a series of progressive laws to prevent pollution. Local governments from communities with military facilities saw an analogy between the problem of industrial pollution and that of military bases. They began to demand not simply compensation for the damage they received, but also more comprehensive measures of support—the type of support that would allow communities to enhance their residents’ socio-economic lives in exchange for hosting military bases. The Environment Agency, founded in 1971 to deal with issues of industrial pollution, also supported such claims by communities with military facilities.³⁹

The government submitted a bill concerning the Improvement of Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities to the Seventy-second Diet in 1973.

³⁹ Bōei Shisetsuchō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Bōei shisetsuchō-shi*, 126-127.

The bill was approved by the Diet soon after, and promulgated and enacted as a law in June 1974. Following the principle of the Environs Improvement Law, the new law (the Environment Improvement Law hereafter) continued to guarantee compensation for victims. But it also introduced a new type of subsidy to local governments. Article 9 of this law granted the Director of the Defense Agency the right to designate certain communities as those “related to defense facilities” (*bōei shisetsu kanren shichōson*). Communities could receive this designation if they hosted air bases, maneuver fields, and/or naval ports that occupied large areas within the communities. Once designated as “communities related to defense facilities,” they were entitled to receive subsidies from the government. The government determined the amount of subsidies depending on the size of the area owned by military facilities within each community, the community’s population, population density, and the scale of military activities (the frequency of maneuvers, the number of landings and takeoffs of planes, etc.). In other words, if a community had a large population and high population density, and hosted large military facilities with a high frequency of military activities, that community could be given large subsidies.⁴⁰

This government-granted subsidy, namely the “Article-9 Subsidy,” was attractive for many communities because the government and the Defense Facilities Agency did not specify how the subsidies should be spent. The agency defined the purpose of the subsidy vaguely as assisting communities to build “public facilities” for the improvement of their living environment. Public facilities included facilities for

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 128-131.

“transportation and communication,” “sport and recreation,” “environment and hygiene,” “education and culture,” “medicine,” “social welfare,” “fire fighting,” and “industry promotion.” Almost any facility could fall under one of these categories. It could be a city hall, a road, a sewer system, a fire station, a park, or a gym.

To be sure, local governments could have build public facilities for “people’s livelihood stabilization” under the Environs Improvement Law, just as the town of Naganuma did. But in that case, local governments had to submit a budget and wait for the Defense Facilities Administration Agency’s approval. Besides, as I have pointed out, the aim of this subsidy was to guarantee people in communities with military facilities the same basic standards of living that people in other communities were enjoying (at least in theory). On the other hand, the Article 9 subsidy was designed to guarantee communities with military facilities a living environment better than other communities. It made it clear that hosting military facilities would bring extra income to communities. Local governments looked forward to money they could spend fairly freely. Instead of demanding a subsidy for a specific facility and waiting for the agency’s approval, they could decide on their own how to use a subsidy.

Just after the establishment of the Environment Improvement Law, the Defense Facilities Agency surveyed the conditions of communities with military facilities all over the nation, and designated ninety-four communities as those entitled to subsidies in 1974. The agency included in this list the town of Eniwa and other nearby

communities such as the town of Hiroshima⁴¹ and the city of Chitose as communities related to the Shimamatsu Maneuver Field and the Chitose Airfield. From Hokkaido, six more communities were listed. Other listed communities were mostly from Okinawa, Kyushu, and Tohoku. In that year alone, the agency granted a total of 500 million yen to these communities. The next year, the agency added eleven more communities to the list. The number of designated communities did not change much after that. But the amount of subsidies increased steadily: three billion yen in 1975, eight billion in 1978, and ten billion, one hundred million in 1980.⁴²

This Environment Improvement Law contributed greatly to taming anti-SDF movements. After the enforcement of this law, no major litigation against the SDF took place in Hokkaido. This law transformed the hosting of military bases into one means of economic improvement for small communities with no major industry. It became increasingly difficult for residents of military communities to organize protest movements. When the Defense Facilities Administration Agency insulated their houses, schools, and offices against noise, and when their communities built recreation centers, roads, and parks with subsidies from the government, they had to wonder about the merit of removing military bases from their communities through long-term litigations that would require an enormous amount of money and time. Moreover, those who opposed military bases had to fight against not only the SDF but also other

⁴¹ This is a town near Eniwa in Hokkaido. The town does not have any official relation with famous Hiroshima City in Hiroshima Prefecture. But those who founded the town in the Meiji Era were from Hiroshima Prefecture and named the town after their home prefecture.

⁴² Bōei Shisetsuchō-shi Hensan Inkaikai, ed., *Bōei shisetsuchō-shi*, 133-135.

community members who insisted on the benefits the SDF could bring. Within any community, a conflict had long existed between those who opposed military facilities and those who supported them. In fact, not all Eniwa or Naganuma resident had agreed with the Nozaki brothers or the 173 plaintiffs. The Environment Improvement, however, drastically reduced the number of opponents of the SDF within a community and made them a minority. In this situation, many chose to coexist with military bases while taking advantage of them.

The Eniwa and Naganuma Incidents and the subsequent establishment of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency indicates how the liberal state can extend its scope of governance almost ceaselessly by overcoming, or even taking advantage of, crisis. Here, Antonio Negri's discussion of the transformation of the nature of the state during the twentieth century helps us understand this. He argues that the Great Depression of 1929 fundamentally changed the ways in which the liberal capitalist states dealt with labor questions. Facing the impoverished working class and the intensifying labor movement, the state began to act as a main organ that mediated the conflict between capital and labor. As we see in the New Deal in the United States, the state created employment and enforced a number of labor-protective regulations, thereby stabilizing the economy and detaching the working masses from radicalism. Negri sees this as a process by which the state became the "social state," a type of state that promised to guarantee the interests of the working masses.

He further argues that the concept of the social state was systematized as a fundamental principle of state management after World War II. The state did so through the constitutionalization of labor power. For example, the Italian Constitution

of 1948 defined Italy as “a democratic republic founded on labor,” locating the sovereignty of the bourgeois capitalist state in the working masses. This constitution symbolized the heightening of the state’s attempt to integrate the masses into the capitalist system. In Negri’s view, by becoming the social state, the liberal capitalist state has acquired the power to co-opt class struggle. In this state form, workers’ antagonism against capitalism no longer undermines nor threatens the rule of the state. The state designs and renews various policies aimed to accommodate such antagonism. Popular objection is rather a crucial factor that enables the state to revitalize and reinforce itself.⁴³

The expansion of the military’s welfare system can be placed within this context. Just like the postwar Italian state, the postwar Japanese state sought to build a cooperative relation between the state and the working masses, recognizing them as legitimate members of the state, “the people.” From the founding of the NPR, military leaders had to conform to this principle. During the 1950s, the SDF engaged in civil engineering and disaster relief and transformed residents in rural communities into beneficiaries of the SDF’s assistance. When it turned out that the SDF could not win local residents’ loyalty with these activities alone, the government founded the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and tried to transform those who objected to the SDF into beneficiaries of the agency’s assistance. If any mass-scale protests against the SDF take place in the future, the government, the SDF, the Defense

⁴³ Antonio Negri, “Labor in the Constitution,” in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State Form* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).

Agency, and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency will undoubtedly devise countermeasures to cope with this new crisis, and try to integrate the new critics into its welfare system as well. As a result, the military's welfare system will continue to grow. Although the notion of the people's rights in the constitution certainly helped individuals articulate criticism of the SDF, it is also true that this notion was already built into the structure of the military governance of society, and this made it extremely difficult for critics of the SDF to maintain their criticism while resisting the improvement of livelihoods the state promises.

Chapter Four

The Campaign on the “Northern Threat”: The Making of Military Base Hokkaido

Faced with the Eniwa and Naganuma Incidents, the government and the Defense Agency urgently wanted to reaffirm the SDF's status as an institution that would defend local residents' livelihood. The government founded the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, and that agency actively worked to turn those residents critical of the SDF into beneficiaries of its assistance. Thus, after the Naganuma Incident, people who had previously objected to the SDF increasingly questioned the benefits of protest, and instead sought to benefit from the Defense Facilities Administration Agency. Taking advantage of the withering-away of protest movements, the Japanese government and the Defense Agency began to strengthen the SDF much more intensely than in the previous three decades.

In this chapter, I examine the campaign on “the northern threat” (*hoppō kyōiron*), a widespread campaign to promote the idea of Japan's—and especially Hokkaido's—vulnerability to attack by the Soviet Union. Former top SDF officers launched this campaign in the late 1970s. They appeared in popular magazines and produced books, both fictional and non-fictional works, energetically analyzing the Soviet Union's military potential and the plausibility of an attack on Japan. Backed up by the jingoistic atmosphere that suffused Japanese society, the government and the Defense Agency pointed to the Soviet Union as Japan's potential enemy, and pursued its military buildup without facing major resistance. In this process, they came to view Hokkaido as a community that could be easily employed and manipulated for military

purposes. Thus, this chapter discusses the culmination of a militarization of Hokkaido that had been proceeding since the 1950s.

In liberal governance, fear-mongering is an important tool for the management of society. When people internalize a sense of fear of a particular object, they feel urged to become self-regulating in order to avoid the unpleasant consequences that object might generate, and willingly impose restrictions and controls upon themselves. Fear-mongering therefore functions as an effective way to inculcate social norms in citizens without recourse to overt coercion. This is exactly what happened in Hokkaido from the late 1970s. Hokkaido communities had long been depending on the SDF to maintain their economies. When the fear of Soviet aggression intensified and when promoters of the campaign called for a military buildup, the people of Hokkaido found it extremely difficult to question the legitimacy of the campaign and eventually allowed for extensive military use of their communities.

Formation of the Northern Threat

The campaign on the northern threat started with one article published in *Shūkan posuto*, a weekly magazine targeting mainly conservative businessmen, in July 1978. The purpose of this article was to enlighten the reader about the importance of national defense in the uncertain Cold-War international condition. For this purpose, Kurisu Hiroomi from the SDF was interviewed. He was a graduate of Tokyo Imperial University. After graduation, he worked briefly for the Home Ministry, and then volunteered for the Imperial Navy. When World War II ended, he had been promoted to lieutenant. In 1951, he joined the National Police Reserve and subsequently

assumed various important positions, including Commander of the Thirteenth Division (headquartered in Hiroshima City); Chief of the Headquarters of the Eastern Army, which consisted of one division, one brigade, and several units in the Kantō area; and Chief of Staff of the Ground Staff Office. In 1977, he was finally appointed the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office, the highest officer rank within the SDF.

In the interview, Kurisu first warned that as long as the government stuck to a policy that maintained the defense budget below one percent of the GNP, it would be impossible for the SDF to maintain a thorough defense of the country. He also pointed out the people's indifference toward national defense and the SDF, and lamented that there was no longer a conscription system in postwar Japan. Then, the interviewer asked about the relation between the SDF and Article 9. Kurisu responded that instead of worrying about the constitutionality of the SDF, most service members were thinking about how to work most efficiently within the Japanese legal system. The topic shifted to an emergency situation and the SDF's belligerency. Under the existing legal system, and the Self Defense Forces Law in particular, the SDF could resort to the use of force only with the prime minister's permission when an external attack occurred. The interviewer asked whether the SDF would respect the law and wait for the prime minister's order even in the case of an emergency. Kurisu's answered no to this question. Under the SDF Law, a lengthy bureaucratic procedure would be required before the prime minister could authorize the SDF's use of force. Kurisu maintained that in an emergency, service members were ready to act at SDF officers' discretion, or using Kurisu's own expression, in an "extralegal" (*chōhōki-teki*) manner.

Next to this interview, the *Shūkan posuto* placed an article describing a potential emergency scenario. In this scenario, the North-South conflict in the Korean Peninsula finally develops into an armed battle in 198X. While the United States is reluctant to intervene in the battle, the Soviet Union quickly makes a decision to back North Korea. North Korean naval ships and Soviet fighter MIGs invade the continental shelf co-managed by South Korea and Japan, and begin to attack their oil-drilling facilities. The MIGs also target the SDF fighters that have been patrolling the ocean. Judging this situation an emergency, the Air SDF decides not to wait for directions from the Prime Minister, and orders its fighters to fight back immediately. According to the article, this scenario was prepared by a military affairs research group familiar with international relations. By presenting it together with Kurisu's comment, the article obviously intended to give the reader the impression that a foreign attack was not unrealistic and that the SDF was already on an increased level of alert.¹

This article caused a great controversy. The mass media spread Kurisu's statement, identifying it as an "‘extralegal’ statement" (*chōhōki hatsugen*). At a press conference held after the article was published, Kurisu confirmed that he did not intend to retract his statement. Kanemaru Shin, then the Director of the Defense Agency, immediately discharged Kurisu as the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office. According to Kanemaru, the SDF was supposed to operate under the principle of

¹ "Moshi Jieitai ga kenpō kyūjō o mushi shitara do naru," *Shūkan posuto*, July 28-August 4, 1978 (Shōgakukan), 203-210.

civilian control, and therefore Kurisu, as a military officer, should have not presented his opinion as if it represented the SDF's collective opinion.

Discharge, however, did not impede Kurisu's activities. On the contrary, his position as a civilian commentator enabled him to declare his opinions on national defense more freely, without any institutional restrictions. He continued to appear in such journals as *Shūkan posuto* and *Gendai*, a monthly magazine published by Kōdansha dealing with political, economic, and social issues broadly. In 1980, Kurisu published a book entitled *Kasō tekikoku Soren: Warera kō mukae utsu* [The potential enemy Soviet Union: This is how we will strike back]. In this book, he treated Soviet invasion of Japan as a highly plausible event in the near future, and then harshly criticized the LDP and the government, maintaining that they had worried too much about opposition from the leftist parties and had failed to present concrete policies for defense against the Soviet Union.²

Kurisu's activities had enormous influence on other SDF officers. Until then, they had been reserved about making any statement on political issues. Because of the imperial past, during which the army and the navy frequently interfered in politics, the Japanese government strictly admonished uniform officers against discussing defense policies in public, and uniform officers themselves generally conformed to this. Although former SDF officers had sometimes written their memoirs, they had never used the mass media to reveal their own opinions concerning the SDF and the

² Kurisu Hiroomi, *Kasō tekikoku Soren: warera kō mukae utsu* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1980).

constitution. But Kurisu broke this taboo, which encouraged other officers discontent with this depoliticized status to speak out in public.

In February 1981, Takeda Gorō, then the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office, repeated almost exactly what Kurisu had done a few years earlier. In an article published in *Hōseki*, another weekly magazine targeting businessmen (just like *Shūkan posuto*), he objected to the government's policy of restricting the defense budget to less than one percent of GNP, as well as its refusal to introduce a conscription system.³ The Socialist Party and other parties reproached Takeda for his statement at the Diet. The director of the Defense Agency also warned him that his statement was inappropriate, thereby forcing him to retire from his position at the SDF. But just like Kurisu, Takeda did not cease his activities as a military affairs commentator. The same year, when Kaihara Osamu—a military commentator and former SDF officer—edited a book entitled *Tōron Jieitai wa yaku ni tatsu no ka* [Debate: does the SDF serve a useful purpose?], Takeda contributed one chapter, entitled “Soredemo Soren no shinryaku wa soshi dekiru” [Even so, we can prevent Soviet invasion]. He repeated what he had said in the *Hōseki* article. He continued to criticize the government, and called for the elevation of popular awareness of national defense.⁴

Takeda was not the only person who was inspired by Kurisu's “‘extralegal’ statement” and his succeeding activities in the media. From the late 1970s, former SDF officers collaborated with military affairs experts to fuel the fear of Soviet

³ The LDP governments had been denying the possibility of implementing conscription. They argued that that would violate Article 18 of the constitution, which prohibited “bondage in any kind” and “involuntary servitude.”

⁴ Kaihara Osamu, ed., *Jieitai wa yaku ni tatsu no ka* (Tokyo: Bijinesusha, 1981).

aggression. Mitsuoka Kenjirō, a former commander of the Ninth Division of the SDF (headquartered in Aomori) and an army officer in Imperial Japan, together with Ozawa Kazuo, a military affairs expert, edited a book entitled *Jieitai no mita Soren-gun* [The Soviet Army the SDF saw] in 1981. In this book, they discussed such topics as the danger of a third world war; Russians/Soviets' national characteristics and their military strategies; lessons the Japanese should learn from the Finns' resistance against the Soviets; and Japan's defense system against the Soviet Union.⁵

Hirose Eiichi, a former commander of the Twelfth Division (headquartered in Gunma), superintendent of the Northern Army, and principal of the Ground SDF Fuji School (a school offering training in armored warfare and field battle), edited a book entitled *Jieitai kanbu OB hyakunin no bōei chokugen* [Frank talk on defense by one hundred former SDF officers] (hereafter *Frank Talk on Defense*) in 1983. As this title suggests, Hirose produced the book in collaboration with a hundred former SDF officers, most of whom had held the rank of division commander or higher.⁶ These books contained similar opinions. They insisted on the danger of a third world war and called for the immediate improvement of national defense. As the subtitle of Hirose's book, *Inoru dakedewa heiwa wa konai* [Peace won't come through prayer alone] suggests, they were extremely critical of Article 9, and emphasized that there were times when people had to fight in order to protect their country.

⁵ Ozawa Kazuo and Mitsuoka Kentarō, eds., *Jieitai no mita Soren-gun: rikukaikū no taiso bōei senryaku* (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1981).

⁶ Hirose Eiichi, ed., *Jieitai kanbu OB hyakunin no bōei chokugen: inoru dake de wa heiwa wa konai* (Tokyo: Nihon Kōgyō Shinbunsha, 1983).

These are only a few examples. The period between the late 1970s and mid-1980s witnessed a proliferation of publications—both books and magazine articles—on the northern threat. The targets of these publications were not pundits of politics and international relations, but ordinary readers. Articles on the northern threat usually appeared in popular magazines. The books on this topic were written in such a way that even those without special knowledge of politics and international relations could understand. Not only famously conservative publishers, such as Shōgakukan and Bungei Shunjūsha, but also those regarded as middle-of-the-road, such as Shinchōsha and Kōdansha, actively published on this northern threat. The media gradually adopted the term *hoppō kyōiron* [discourse on the northern threat] to refer to arguments related to Soviet aggression broadly.

Did the northern threat campaign truly reflect a sense of fear shared by the Japanese? On the one hand, it is true that bilateral relation between the Soviet Union and Japan had remained strained since the end of World War II. As a US ally in the cold-war international system, Japan had maintained a rather hostile position toward the Soviet Union. The relation between the two countries deteriorated even further from the late 1970s. As one specialist in the Russo-Japanese relations has pointed out, the period from the late 1970s to the early 1980s was probably “the coldest and most difficult” in the history of diplomacy between the two countries.⁷

⁷ Hiroshi Kimura, “Japan-Soviet Political Relations from 1976-1983,” in Gilbert Rozman, ed., *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 87. Other scholars tend to agree that the late 1970s was one of the most difficult times for the Soviet-Japan relation, too. See, for

The MIG-25 Incident symbolized the beginning of this “coldest and most difficult” time. On September 6, 1976, Lieutenant Belenko of the Soviet Air Force entered Japanese airspace in a MIG-25 fighter plane and landed at the Hakodate Airport in Hokkaido. The Air SDF had initially detected the fighter plane approaching Hokkaido on radar, but lost track of it just as it descended to land. The lieutenant, however, had no intention of attacking Japan. His only purpose was to ask for political asylum in the United States through the Japanese government’s mediation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted the US government, confirmed its willingness to accept Belenko’s request for political asylum, and sent him to the United States on September 9. After this, despite Soviet demands for the plane’s prompt return, the Defense Agency moved it for inspection to the Hyakuri Air SDF Base in Ibaraki Prefecture with the assistance of the US Air Force. In early October, the Defense Agency finished its inspection, whereupon the Japanese government informed the Soviet government that the plane was ready for return and, on November 14, finally shipped it to the Soviet Union.⁸ Although this incident did not cause any military confrontation nor harm any human lives, it made the Japanese government officials highly conscious of the vulnerability of Japan’s air defense system.

In 1977, another event took place that exacerbated relations between the two countries. One year earlier, the United States had declared the sea extending out to 200 nautical miles from its coasts as its exclusive economic zone, in order to settle disputes

example, William Nimmo, *Japan and Russia: A Reevaluation in the Post-Soviet Era* (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1994).

⁸ For the detailed description of the incident, see Bōeichō, ed., *Bōei hakusho, Shōwa 52-nenban* (Ōkurashō Insatsukyoku, 1977), 135-149..

over fishing rights with other countries. The next year, the Soviet Union followed the United States' lead and enforced a 200-mile fishing zone policy. From the government's perspective, however, the problem was that when calculating 200 nautical miles, the Soviet Union included the Northern Territories as its own territories. The Japanese government had been insisting on its sovereign right to these territories by arguing that the Soviets had illegally occupied them at the end of World War II. The Soviet enforcement of the 200-mile fishing zone policy was therefore humiliating for the Japanese government. Furthermore, the Soviet armed forces began to reinforce army and air force units in the Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands in the Northern Territories in 1979. Although the Japanese government repeatedly protested against this military buildup, the Soviet Union did not withdraw its troops.⁹

In addition, US-Soviet relation also deteriorated seriously in the late 1970s. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, claiming to protect the communist regime established the previous year. On the other hand, the United States financially supported the Islamic fundamentalists there. This grew into a proxy war between the two superpowers. This event completely terminated *détente*, that is, the relaxation of the East-West conflict that had been pursued after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. After this, the two superpowers adopted more confrontational stances toward each other, which would last until Gorbachev emerged as the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985.

⁹ For the Soviet-Japan relations in this period, I have referred to Kimura's article and Nimmo, *Japan and Russia*, 59-88.

While the northern threat campaign emerged from this strained political atmosphere, we must remember that the late 1970s was definitely not the only cold and difficult time for Japan and the Soviet Union. For example, the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 upset the Soviet Union, and Soviet officials repeatedly protested against the Japanese government. They warned Tokyo that the presence of US troops in Japan was encouraging communist military attack. Moscow Radio transmitted Japanese-language programs attacking the Japanese government throughout the 1960s. The Soviet government informed the Japanese government that as long as US troops were stationed in Japan, it would not return Shikotan Island and the Habomai Group—the parts of the Northern Territories that Moscow had agreed to return after signing a peace treaty.¹⁰ But Japanese society did not immerse itself in the fear of Soviet invasion then. To be sure, government officials worried about the growing possibility of Soviet aggression and a nuclear war, but this did not develop into a chain reaction of panic about the Soviet Union nor a large campaign insisting on security reinforcement. This suggests that the deteriorating relation between Japan and the Soviet Union alone does not explain the emergence of the northern threat campaign. There have to be other factors that explain this event.

Policing the Crisis, written by Stuart Hall and his colleagues, provides a useful framework for considering this issue. This now-classic book researches the moral panic over “mugging” in 1970s British society. This term was introduced to Britain in 1972 to refer to robbery and violence on the street. The police warned that the safety

¹⁰ Nimmo, *Japan and Russia*, Chapter 2; Alexei V. Zagorosky, “Reconciliation in the Fifties: The Logic of Soviet Decision Making” in Rozman, ed., *Japan and Russia*.

of British society was in danger, pointing out the growing incidence of mugging. The newspapers gave a great deal of coverage to this issue, prompting fear of muggers with sensational headlines. Responding to social unrest concerning mugging, the judiciary meted out punishments that seemed unnecessarily harsh compared with those for similar crimes in previous decades.

The authors' aim, however, was not to examine why individuals mugged, but why British society developed such an intense fear of mugging—which, according to them, was not particularly a new phenomenon—at a specific moment in history. To answer this question, the authors consider the “invention” of mugging within the contemporary British political and economic context, and maintained that the early 1970s was a time of crisis in the nation's capitalist development. While Britain had been seeking to resolve labor problems by establishing a welfare state since the end of World War II, this approach was at stalemate. The loss of the colonies was gradually placing a financial burden on the state economy. The unemployment rate increased. Stagflation did not cease. Facing this situation, Edward Heath's Conservative government chose to take confrontational measures against labor activism, which had so far been treated with tolerance. But Heath's approach only fueled the intensification of militant activism.

At the same time, the authors pointed out that urban black communities were particularly sensitive to the economic recession. Black workers were often the first to be laid off when companies enforced restructuring, and therefore unemployment and the poor quality of available housing affected them more seriously than others. The police were keeping a close watch on black communities, considering them hotbeds of

crime, and this often led to physical confrontations between the police and black youth. In this social atmosphere, the police began to label street violence that occurred in black neighborhoods “mugging,” as if it were a completely new type of crime, and launched an anti-mugging campaign together with the media and the government. The authors argued that this campaign consequently helped divert discontented workers’ attention from more fundamental economic problems and justify the police’s oppressive treatment of the racial minority community.¹¹

This argument by Hall et al. is insightful. They indicate that fear is by no means a sentiment spontaneously developed and shared by members of a society. It is something that can be manufactured for particular political purposes. When analyzing a fear-mongering campaign, therefore, one cannot simply focus on the contents of the campaign. Instead, it is necessary to position it within a broader political and economic context and identify what problems, concerns, and anxieties a given society experienced in the midst of that campaign. I apply this tenet to the case of the northern threat campaign and examine why the campaign intensified at that particular moment of postwar history and what consequences it brought about for Japanese society.

Reinforcing Defense Autonomy

Most of all, I wish to emphasize that Japan’s economic system, which the United States and Japan had established in collaboration during and after the occupation period, went through a critical transformation in the second half of the

¹¹ Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order* (London: Macmillan, 1978).

1970s: namely Japan's emergence as a global economic power. It is well known that Japanese postwar economic prosperity originated in the United States' cold-war geopolitics in Asia. When the Cold War intensified from the late 1940s, the United States hastened Japan's economic recovery, thereby transforming it into a strong capitalist ally in the Pacific. It facilitated Japan's efforts to import cheap raw materials from Southeast Asia, with which Japan was supposed to manufacture goods for export to Southeast Asia and the United States. By establishing close trade relations between Japan and Southeast Asia, the United States sought to keep Japan from developing ties with communist China, stabilize its economy (as well as its politics), and contain the revolutionary waves surging in Asia.

This arrangement worked smoothly for both Japan and the United States during the 1950s. Japan's economy quickly recovered, and the United States could import cheap cotton textiles and consumer electronics such as radios from Japan. But from the 1960s, such Japanese companies as Toyota, Honda, and Yamaha introduced motorcycles and automobiles to the US market. By exporting these high-value-added products, Japan increased its GNP by 10 percent annually between 1960 and 1965. Imported motorcycles and automobiles gradually gained a competitive edge over domestic products in the US market. In 1965, Japan for the first time ran a trade surplus with the United States, and its trade surplus continued to grow throughout the 1960s.

In the 1970s, Japanese dominance in the US market developed into a serious diplomatic problem for the United States and Japan. Japan's economy had grown far more than the United States had expected. Washington constantly criticized Tokyo for

not buying enough US products to resolve the trade friction, and asked Tokyo to open up markets and expand domestic demand. Neither Nixon's devaluation of the dollar against the yen nor the Oil Crisis of 1973 prevented Japanese car companies from increasing their sales.¹² Anti-Japanese sentiment spread among Americans, particularly workers in the automobile industry. As John Dower has pointed out in his study on racism on both sides of the Pacific War, many Americans viewed Japanese aspirations to economic growth in this period as a manifestation of their desire to dominate the world once again, and accused the Japanese in racialized terms similar to those used during the previous war.¹³ Consequently, so-called "Japan bashing" from the late 1970s made the Japanese realize that the United States was willing to support Japan's economic growth only as long as it remained a docile client state.

When the northern threat campaign is placed within this context, we realize that it was not simply about the Soviet menace, but also the rising tension between the United States and Japan. On a number of occasions, promoters of the campaign expressed their distrust of the United States and anxiety about Japan's loss of US support.

Kurisu Hiroomi, the first to start the northern threat campaign, insisted on this point most actively. He repeatedly maintained that the United States would not mobilize its troops to help the SDF even if Japan's tension with the Soviet Union

¹² For the US-Japan relations from 1945 to the 1970s, I referred to Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)

¹³ John Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1987).

developed into armed confrontation. He pointed to an “ethnic factor.” In his view, while the Americans saw NATO nations—mostly Caucasian, though Kurisu did not say so explicitly—as their “relatives” and NATO as a “community of fate” (*unemi kyōdōtai*), they did not see relations with Japan in the same way. The United States and Japan were at most a “community of interest” (*rieki kyōdōtai*), by which he implied that the alliance of the two countries was based not on true mutual trust but simply on common interests that were temporary and fragile. Therefore, Americans would ultimately prioritize their own interests ahead of Japan’s. There was a possibility that the Americans would give up Japan to the Soviets, depending on the conditions in which a conflict developed.¹⁴ Although Kurisu was not completely explicit, he probably had in mind the mounting anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States when he mentioned the “ethnic factor,” and implied that the community of (economic) interest might collapse in the not-too-distant future.

While Kurisu’s utter distrust of the United States may have been extreme, his ideas more or less represented those of former SDF officers. In *Frank Talk on Defense*, Hirose Eiichi, the editor of the book and a former commander of the Northern Army, admonished the Japanese against considering the US-Japan Security Treaty a panacea for national defense. Just like Kurisu, he stated that the Americans would help Japan only when they regarded this act as serving their national interests.¹⁵ In Chapter One of *The Soviet Army the SDF Saw*, Fujii Haruo, a military affairs expert, interviewed the former commander of the Ninth Division, Mitsuoka Kenjirō. They agreed that

¹⁴ Kurisu, *Kasō tekikoku Soren*, 173-183 (“Beigun ga tasuke ni kuru to wa kagiranai”).

¹⁵ Hirose, *Jieitai kanbu OB hyakunin no bōei chokugen*, 199.

when international conditions did not work in their favor, the Americans could turn “extremely selfish and isolationist,” and therefore, the Japanese had to bear this in mind when they built a long-term defense plan. Mitsuoka further argued that, depending on changes in international relations, not only the Soviet Union but any other foreign country as well, including the United States, could become Japan’s enemy, and that the Japanese needed to resolve to protect the country independently, without counting on foreign troops.¹⁶

During the northern threat campaign, a number of fictional works that depicted Soviet aggression were also published. Iwano Masataka was one of the leading writers on this topic. He was a graduate of the Imperial Army Academy (1934) and the Army War College (1940). When the Asia-Pacific War ended, he was serving as an officer at the Imperial General Headquarters. In 1951, he joined the National Police Reserve. Until he retired in 1966, he assumed important positions at the SDF, including vice-principal of the Joint Staff College and major general. After retiring from the SDF, he worked as a fiction writer and military commentator. Once the campaign on the threat from the north gained popularity, he took advantage of it and published novels that focused on a Soviet invasion of Japan, such as *Hi-zairagata sensō: Nihonjin wa tsugi no sensō ni ikinokoreru ka* [An unconventional war: Can the Japanese survive in the next war?] (1978), *Beiso gekitotsu su! Kunashiri-tō o dakkai seyo!* [The US and USSR clash: Recapture Kunashiri Island] (hereafter *Recapture Kunashiri Island*) (1979), and *Hokkaido senryō saru* [Hokkaido Occupied] (1983).

¹⁶ Ozawa and Mitsuoka, eds., *Jieitai no mita Soren-gun*, 14-17.

US abandonment of Japan was also a recurring theme in these fictional works. Iwano depicted the United States as a nominal and impractical ally of Japan. In *Hokkaido Occupied*, the United States does not send any troops to keep the Soviets from landing on Japanese soil despite the Japanese government's repeated requests. In *Recapture Kunashiri Island*, the United States is too occupied with its own war with the Soviet Union, and also has to assist Western European countries as the leader of NATO. In both novels, Japanese guerrilla forces, not American soldiers, must take charge of driving the Soviets out of Hokkaido.¹⁷

Similarly, in fictional works by other authors, the US-Japan Security Treaty does not work at the time the Japanese most need it. In one novel, the US government declares that it will maintain neutrality in the Soviet-Japanese War as long as the Soviet Union does not attack US military facilities within Japan. Aware of the United States' enormous military might, the Soviet Union agrees to this condition. Because of this gentleman's agreement, the US forces prevent the SDF from using joint bases for the two militaries in Japan. The Japanese-US joint bases included some of the most advanced air stations, such as Misawa in Aomori Prefecture, and the prohibition of their use seriously dampens the SDF's counterattack ability.¹⁸ In another novel, the commander of the Northern Army criticizes the US-Japan Security Treaty as

¹⁷ Iwano Masataka, *Hokkaido senryō saru* (Tokyo: Futami Shobō, 1983), and *Beiso gekitotsu su!: Kunashiritō dakkai seyo* (Tokyo: Futami Shobō, 1979).

¹⁸ Sase Minoru, *Hokkaido no jūichinichi sensō* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1978), 53-56.

“practically non-existent,” and expresses his frustration at the Americans, who choose to remain an “outside observer” in the Soviet invasion of Japan.¹⁹

In this way, promoters of the campaign on the threat from the north feared that the economic friction between the United States and Japan would undermine the United States’ commitment to defending Japanese security in the event of an emergency. Therefore they called for autonomy in national defense, the strengthening of the SDF, and the unity of the nation. A series of Soviet acts of aggression in the late 1970s, including the MIG 25 Incident and the Afghan War, provided them with a perfect excuse to publicize the importance of their goals without condemning too harshly the United States, which they knew Japan would in reality have to continue depending on in defense matters.

Silencing Hokkaido

When promoters of the northern threat campaign tried to advocate for national defense, Hokkaido was a major nuisance. Hokkaido was the center of the anti-SDF movement throughout the 1960s and 1970s. As discussed in the previous chapter, two major litigation cases that questioned the legitimacy of the SDF took place in Hokkaido: the Eniwa Incident in 1962 and the Naganuma Incident in 1969. Participants in both cases imaginatively interpreted the peace constitution to critique the SDF’s maneuvers and military bases in their communities. In the latter case, the judge at the Sapporo District Court concluded in 1973 that the SDF was

¹⁹ Izaki Hitoshi, *Hokkaido ga jinmin kyōwakoku ni naru hi: Sorengun ga shinchū suru sankagetsu* (Tokyo: Gakushū Kenkyūsha, 1980), 113-114.

unconstitutional. Both cases attracted many supporters and sympathizers from all over Japan, as well as great attention from the mass media. It is safe to say that during this period, the idea that peace could be pursued without recourse to military forces dominated public opinion. But in 1976, the Sapporo High Court overturned the decision previously handed down by the District Court. The plaintiffs immediately appealed to the Supreme Court.

The northern threat campaign emerged precisely as the plaintiffs were waiting for the Supreme Court's judgment. One aim of the campaign was to silence critics of the SDF, and to warn that the neglect of national defense would lead to Soviet invasion of Japan. Books and articles on the northern threat—whether fictional or non-fictional works—frequently presented Hokkaido as the defenseless and vulnerable object of Soviet attack, and in these works, Hokkaido's defense was always destined to fail and Hokkaido people had to endure humiliating occupation by foreigners.

For example, in his 1980 article entitled “Soren-gun koko e jōriku!” [The Soviet military lands here!], Kurisu Hiroomi discussed four potential routes of Soviet invasion, three of which were in Hokkaido. He argued that no matter which route the Soviets took, the SDF would not have sufficient power to fight back, and the Soviet occupation of the island would be inevitable. He claimed that he based this prediction on a survey of the landscape of Hokkaido he had conducted in an SDF-owned helicopter.²⁰ In another article, entitled “Kinkyū shirei, Hokkaido o hōki seyo!” [Emergency command: Abandon Hokkaido!], Kurisu discussed a potential military

²⁰ Kurisu, “Soren-gun koko e jōriku! Warera kō mukae utsu,” *Gendai*, January 1980 (Tokyo: Kōdansha), 54-86.

clash between the US and Soviet blocs in Europe. He maintained that if a war broke out in Europe, the Soviet Union would attack Hokkaido and nullify Japan's military power in the region. Geographically, Hokkaido prevented the Soviet Union from mobilizing fleets from such cities as Vladivostok to the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, control of Hokkaido would become an important agenda for the Soviet Union upon the outbreak of war, and the Soviet troops would either destroy Japan's sea lane near Hokkaido or ambush coastal cities of Hokkaido.²¹

Hokkaido ga jinmin kyōwakoku ni naru hi [The day Hokkaido becomes a people's republic] focused on everyday life in Hokkaido after a Soviet invasion. In this fictional work, the Soviet Union occupies the entire island, establishes a puppet regime, namely the People's Republic of Hokkaido, and allows the Revolutionary Party—a pro-Soviet communist party—to rule the republic. Under the direction of the Soviet Union, the new government nationalizes industries and collectivizes agriculture and fisheries. It confiscates wealthy residents' properties, and purges those who held high-rank positions within the old government. It also announces the founding of a militia organization and conscription. The Soviet prohibition of trade with mainland Japan places Hokkaido under a severe shortage of food and goods. Waiting in line for rationed food and goods soon becomes part of the landscape of Hokkaido's everyday life just as in contemporary Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Moreover, the masses are banned from traveling abroad, or even enjoying Japanese and Western movies, TV programs, and other sources of information and entertainment. Popular resentment of

²¹ Kurisu Hiroomi, "Kinkyū shirei 'Hokkaido o hōki seyo': 'Soren shinkō' Nichibei gokuhi sakusen no shinsō" in *Gendai*, October 1982 (Tokyo: Kōdansha), 56-70.

the communist regime and the Soviet Union gradually mount. The novel ends with former SDF members and other Japanese patriots preparing for a guerrilla war against the Soviet troops.²²

Furthermore, the campaign's promoters often attributed the hypothetical failure of the defense of Hokkaido to peace movements. In *Hokkaido Occupied*, when the Soviets take control of Sapporo, they quickly arrest wealthy business owners and anti-communist intellectuals, and send them to concentration camps built in a suburb of the city in order to reeducate them. Takimoto Ichirō, a professor of economics at Hokkaido University, escapes arrest because of his specialty in Marxist economics. But the Red Army searches his house to confiscate valuables. Several soldiers try to sexually molest his wife, though they are stopped by a Soviet officer, who is concerned about the reputation of the Red Army in the occupied area. That night, Takimoto cannot sleep because of the humiliation he and his wife have suffered. He finds his wife crying next to him, but has no words to console her. He can only ask her to endure the hardship together with him. He is filled with anger against the SDF, which easily surrendered to the Soviets. Then, his anger shifts to the peace movement that has been emasculating the SDF. Takimoto thinks:

We lacked military strength. If we had had more military strength, the enemy might not have invaded Hokkaido. In the 1970s, we used to hear that we could prevent a war only by observing the peace constitution, and I agreed with it and supported [the constitution]. But what a figment it was. Come to think about it, if a country could maintain its security only with a constitution, no country would spend a fortune for armament. I am powerless, and don't know how to use a weapon. But I wonder if I should join the resistance force ...²³

²² Izaki, *Hokkaido ga jinmin kyōwakoku ni naru hi*.

²³ Iwano, *Hokkaido senryō saru*, 262.

In another scene, the Hokkaido governor and Mr. Matsumura, a former governor and a current diet member, are having a meeting to discuss how Hokkaido should respond to a Soviet attack. They predict that the Soviets will carry out air raids on major cities in Hokkaido, and therefore agree on the need to built public shelters. But at the same time, the governor confesses that there is strong opposition to shelter construction within Hokkaido. According to him, the members of the prefectural assembly have taken a strong antiwar stance. They react “hysterically” whenever the topic of defense or security comes up, and associate it with preparation for war. Matsumuara responds to this, calling Hokkaido a “rural backwater” (*inaka*). He argues that Tokyo people would better understand the difference between “defense” and “offense,” and be more supportive of the building of defense facilities.²⁴ Here, the author is clearly referring to the peace movement that gained popularity in 1960s and 1970s Japan, and implying that the rejection of participation in national defense would result in foreign invasion and the partition of the nation.

In *Hokkaido no jūichinichi sensō* [An eleven-day war in Hokkaido], Lieutenant Colonel Tamura is talking with his subordinate, Fujisaki, a young private, in a break in combat against the Soviet Union in Wakkanai. As a senior service member, Tamura is telling Fujisaki about his experiences with anti-SDF activists. Before coming to Hokkaido, he worked for the Thirteenth Division, headquartered in Hiroshima. Once, when members of the division visited Nihongahara in Okayama Prefecture (one of the

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 101-102.

maneuver fields owned by the Ground SDF) for a shooting training, anti-SDF student activists threw stones at them. At another time, members of the Socialist Party and labor unions carried out protest in the same place, and tried to prevent SDF service members from entering the field. Many passionate service members were furious at the protesters, who did not try to appreciate the SDF's mission. Tamura, however, admonished other service members against becoming angry at the protesters. He reminded them that they were working to defend Japan not because other people asked them to do so, but because they spontaneously wanted to do so. So they must not take the condescending attitude that they are bringing benefits to society. Instead, they should note that some Japanese do not want to be protected by the SDF, and just accomplish their missions as faithful servants of society.²⁵

Unlike *Hokkaido Occupied, An Eleven-Day War* does not condemn the peace movement directly. Lieutenant Tamura is tolerant about criticism of the SDF, and exhorts his subordinates to be the same. But the audience for the book is clearly aware that Tamura and Fujisaki are having their conversation in the middle of the war with the Soviet Union, and that they are fighting against the Soviets. This proves more strongly than anything else that the anti-military peace movement, to which Tamura showed great tolerance, did not contribute to building peace in Hokkaido. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has taken advantage of the vulnerability of Hokkaido and invaded it. SDF service members are risking their lives to protect civilians while knowing that many of these same civilians have heavily criticized the rearmament of

²⁵ Sase, *Hokkaido no jūichinichi sensō*, 144-146.

the nation. Here, the contrast is obvious between broad-minded, earnest service members and irrational protesters.

Promoters of the campaign also commonly tried to silence dissent by representing Hokkaido residents as Soviet spies. In *Hokkaido Occupied*, Hokkaido appears as the forefront of a Soviet spy operation. To guarantee the right to fish in the fertile seas near the Northern Territories and Sakhalin, Hokkaido fishermen collaborate with Soviet officials and provide them with the information on the SDF. They collect information on the quality of SDF-owned tanks and aircrafts, the frequency and details of maneuvers, and so on. They also give the Soviets high-quality Japanese tape-recorders, cameras, watches, whisky, and cigarettes. They agree that they must keep one another's spying activities confidential, and if some violate this agreement, they are severely punished by others.²⁶ Similarly, the authors of *Frank Talk on Defense* warn against the Soviet conversion of Hokkaido residents into obedient spies. According to them, Hokkaido fishermen give Soviet officials information not only on the SDF but also on the individual residents of the entire region, and the Soviets are analyzing the information thus obtained in order to enforce its occupation effectively.²⁷

It is true that some Hokkaido fishermen bribed Soviet officials in order to fish freely near the Soviet territories. This practice became common after the Soviet Union enforced its 200-mile fishing zone policy. The mass media called their fishing boats “repo-sen” [reporting boats], meaning that they “reported” their information to the

²⁶ Iwano, *Hokkaido senryō saru*, 93-95, 138-139.

²⁷ Hirose, ed., *Jieitai kanbu OB hyakunin no bōei chokugen*, 83-85.

Soviets. While in reality, those “repo-sen” constituted a small minority of fishing boats in Hokkaido, Iwano and the authors of *Frank Talk on Defense* wrote as if most Hokkaido fishermen were Soviet collaborators. Furthermore, Iwano called these boats “rosuke-sen.” “Rosuke” was a derogative term for the Soviets—equivalent to such well-known epithets as “shina-jin” or “chankoro” for Chinese. The term was frequently used by the Imperial Army during World War II and the early post-war period. Now, Iwano applied this term to refer to Hokkaido fishing boats to condemn them as Soviet collaborators. Other promoters of the campaign also used this term in various places. Their distrust and hatred of Hokkaido residents were evident.

Promoters of the campaign also severely attacked Hokkaido’s grass-roots efforts at international exchange with the Soviet Union. They particularly criticized the Hokkaido Japan-Soviet Friendship Center (*Hokkaido nisso yūkō kaikan*). The Hokkaido businessman and peace activist Hoshino Yasusaburō founded the center in Sapporo in 1976. He believed that advancing civic interactions with the Soviets was crucial for the peace of Hokkaido, and expected the center to support cultural, academic, and athletic exchange programs, and host Soviet delegations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognized the center as one of its extra-ministerial foundations. By the 1980s, Hoshino and his supporters had built two more friendship centers in Wakkanai and Kushiro. The authors of *Frank Talk* accused these friendship centers of being controlled by the Soviets. They argued that this was part of Soviet psychological operations that aimed to turn Hokkaido residents into docile supporters in time of

occupation.²⁸ In Iwano's *Hokkaido Occupied*, Hokkaido residents have built the friendship centers to flatter the Soviets and to minimize harsh treatment at their hands.²⁹ Later in this novel, a patriotic Japanese resistance group dynamites the center in Wakkanai and the home of the center's director. They believe that the center is facilitating the Soviet invasion of Japan.³⁰

Military Base Hokkaido

The government did not officially endorse the northern threat campaign. The Defense Agency removed Kurisu Hiroomi from the position the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office immediately after he made the "extralegal" statement. When Takeda Gorō, another Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office, called for an increase in military expenditure and the introduction of a conscription system, the agency forced him into retirement. The government maintained that the SDF must be under strict civilian control, and therefore those in uniform should not make any statement concerning national security policies. But it is also true that it took full advantage of the fear created by the formers SDF officers to fulfill its desire to enhance the nation's defense system. In the previous two decades, when anti-military sentiment persisted under intensifying peace movements, the government had been extremely hesitant to insist publicly on strengthening the military. The northern threat campaign, however, enabled the government to target the Soviet Union as a potential enemy, thereby

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 83-85.

²⁹ Iwano, *Hokkaido senryō saru*, 99.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 197

highlighting the role of the SDF in emergency situations without facing strong opposition.

Public opinion also helped the government pursue the reinforcement of the SDF. The surveys on defense issues, conducted by the Cabinet Office every three years, clearly indicate that an increasing number of people became sensitive about national security in the 1980s. In the 1975 and 1978 surveys, about 40 per cent of the respondents believed that there was a danger that the Japanese might be dragged into war. In the 1981 and 1984 surveys, more than 60 per cent of the respondents had come to believe so. In all the surveys, the main reason cited by respondents for their fear of war was “international tension and conflict” (56 per cent in 1976 and 62 per cent in 1978), followed by “the US-Japan Security Treaty” and “lack of defense capability.” But during the 1970s, about 15 per cent of those afraid of war had no particular reason. They “somehow” (*nantonaku*) feared war. In the surveys in the 1980s, however, those who somehow feared war had decreased to 7 per cent, and 71.5 per cent identified their reason as “international tension and conflict.” The two issues they were particularly concerned about were US-Soviet conflict and Soviet military buildup in the Northern Territories.³¹

In April 1980, the House of Representatives established the Security Special Committee (*anzen hoshō tokubetsu iinkai*). All diet members except those from the Communist Party supported the founding of the committee. In a groundbreaking move, the Socialist Party, which had been criticizing the SDF as unconstitutional, agreed to

³¹ The survey conducted by the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. Available at <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/>.

the establishment of a committee that would most likely end up recommending the enhancement of the SDF's power. Bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency, and Lower House members concerned about security issues attended the committee. The aim of the committee was to “investigate various issues concerning the US-Japan Security Treaty and the SDF, and devise measures for them.”³² Although the stated aim was fairly vague, the committee clearly meant to focus on the threat of the Soviet Union.

In his opening speech at the second committee meeting, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ōkita Saburō criticized the Soviet Union's military ambitions in the Middle East and Africa, and maintained that Japan must halt Soviet expansion in the Far East. Arima Motoji, a Diet member from the LDP, cited an article written by Kurisu Motoomi—the article on four potential routes of a Soviet invasion of Japan—and charged that the defense of Hokkaido from the Soviet Union inevitably required the strengthening of the Maritime and Air SDF. The Director of the Defense Agency, Hosoda Kichiō, showed his appreciation of Arima's opinion, and stated that the agency would consider better distribution of the defense budget.³³ Although Kurisu had been discharged from his position, his bold opinions clearly had a considerable impact on Diet members and bureaucrats.

Fear of the Soviet Union was also a heated topic outside the Security Special Committee. From the late 1970s, Diet members and ministers often discussed this

³² At the first committee meeting on April 1, 1980. Available at the website of the National Diet Library: <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/>.

³³ At the second committee meeting on April 26, 1980.

topic in various committee meetings. In the opening meeting for the plenary session at the Ninety-third Diet, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō criticized a series of Soviet military actions abroad as “extremely regrettable” (*kiwamete ikan*), and promised to “continue strongly demanding the improvement of these situations.”³⁴ On another occasion, Iwatare Sukio, a Socialist Party member, asked Suzuki if the Soviet Union was posing a “threat” (*kyōi*) to Japan, a term he defined as a country possessing “technical ability” and actual “intention” to invade another country. Responding to this question, Suzuki admitted that the Soviet Union constituted a “potential threat” (*senzaiteki kyōi*), meaning that it might develop a desire to invade Japan if the relations between the two countries worsened.³⁵

The Defense Agency also used the fear-mongering campaign to boost its presence in national politics. This is clear from the publication process of annual white papers on defense. Because of its controversial status vis-à-vis Article 9, the Defense Agency for a long time was not allowed publish its own white papers, as other ministries and agencies do. In white papers, each ministry or agency is supposed to analyze the present situation in its own field and make policy recommendations. For the Defense Agency, to do this was too risky. The Socialist and Communist Parties as well as leftist and liberal citizens believed that an unconstitutional organization should not be involved in policy making. The Defense Agency did not want to stir up popular anti-SDF sentiment, either. The agency, however, finally published its first white paper in 1970 when Nakasone Yasuhiro (whom I will discuss below) occupied the

³⁴ At a plenary session for the Lower House on October 3, 1980.

³⁵ At a Cabinet committee for the House of Representatives on November 4, 1980.

agency's directorship. It had been twenty-six years since the foundation of the agency, and Nakasone judged that the people were ready to listen to the agency's policy recommendations without an allergic reaction to defense issues. After that, Nakasone resigned as the director of the agency to take another ministerial position, and without Nakasone's leadership, the agency failed to publish its second white paper the next year. The agency published its second white paper in 1976 under the new strong leadership of the LDP bureaucrat Sakata Michita. The agency has been publishing white papers annually since then. Just after publication of the second white paper, the former SDF officers' campaign against the Soviet Union intensified. This provided the agency with a perfect justification for policy recommendations on an annual basis.

The contents of the white papers were clearly meant to arouse the public's fear of the Soviet Union. Almost all white papers published before the end of the Cold War began with independent sections on the Soviet Union as a military threat. In these sections, in line with former SDF officers, the Defense Agency repeatedly denounced the Soviet Union's military ambitions. The 1980 White Paper charged that Japan's military situation was "growing increasingly severe" (*sara ni kibishisa o mashite iru*). It expressed doubt that the Soviet Union was developing nuclear weapons only as deterrence against nuclear war. Instead, the white paper warned of the possibility that this neighboring country was actually trying to use nuclear weapons. The Defense Agency was particularly critical of Soviet military buildup in the Northern Territories. It strongly condemned the Soviet Union's action, charging it with the political intention to "make Japan recognize its unlawful occupation of the islands," and stated

that Japan would by no means tolerate this action.³⁶ White papers in other years took a similar line of argument.

The birth of the cabinet of Nakasone Yasuhiro represented the height of the shift to more aggressive security policy. Nakasone had been famous as one of the most hawkish LDP members since the 1950s, and his hatred of the Soviet Union and communism had long been well known. He had been the director of the Defense Agency from 1970 to 1971. He had vigorously promoted the establishment of a new constitution that would give the SDF the status of a national army. When he assumed his premiership in 1982, he envisaged breaking with the postwar political order that had severely restricted the SDF's activities. The campaign on the northern threat provided him with an ideal opportunity to pursue his pro-SDF policy and reinforce national defense. In his five years in power, which is quite long for a prime minister in Japan, he abolished the policy that had limited military expenditure to under one percent of the national budget. Although he did not mention the revision of Article 9 during his term (the Socialist Party was the second largest party in the Diet), he frequently toured SDF bases to boost service members' morale. This performance was quite noteworthy since many previous prime ministers, afraid of criticism from the leftist parties, eschewed direct interaction with service members. He clearly helped raise the public visibility of the SDF.

Nakasone also sought to advance the military alliance with the United States. As pointed out above, Japan's trade friction with the United States had worsened

³⁶ Bōeichō, *Bōei Hakusho, Shōwa 55-nenban* (Ōkurashō Insatsukyoku, 1980), 3-5.

during the 1970s. LDP members expected him to cope with this problem and improve Japan's relation with the United States. Nakasone himself had been a proponent of autonomous defense before becoming prime minister, but knew that that such policy could not gain sufficient support even within the LDP, which contained a fair number of members who believed that defense expenditure should be limited to the minimum level. He also knew that in cold-war Asia, breaking away from the US-Japan Security system would not be a realistic option. Therefore, unlike former SDF officers, who used the northern threat campaign to call for autonomous national defense, Nakasone used it to insist on the need for Japan's further integration into the regional security system supervised by the United States. Nakasone nurtured his friendship with Ronald Reagan, and demonstrated his willingness to fight against communism with the United States, proclaiming that security was "indivisible," and that Japan was an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for the defense of the "free world" against the Soviet Union.

When we consider Japan's military cooperation with the United States, it is important to know how the military-industrial complex developed in this period. Japanese munitions industry had revived in the postwar period with the full support of the United States. The Japanese government used the United States' Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) funds to help munitions manufacturers. By relying on US support, the industrial community and the government endeavored to build up high technologies for munitions production and to indigenize as many arms systems as possible. But as Richard Samuels has pointed out, the increasing indigenization of arms did not necessarily mean that Japan had secured autonomy from the United States in munitions production. Instead, Japanese firms actively purchased licenses for

new technologies from US firms, thereby consolidated the Japanese munitions industry's dependence on the United States. When trade friction became a serious political problem between Japan and the United States in the 1970s, both the Japanese government and the Japan Business Federation or Keidanren promoted the co-development of arms with the United States. By doing so, they intended to both fend off US criticism of trade imbalance between the two countries and show Japan's willingness to share the burden for regional security. During the 1980s, Japanese firms launched various co-development projects, including those for antitank warfare, submarines, and missile homing devices.³⁷

From the late 1970s, Japanese ammunition companies turned to practical-use high-quality new weapons developed through licensing, and the government and the Defense Agency treated Hokkaido as a testing laboratory for these weapons. For example, in 1977, the government decided to indigenize the F-15 tactical fighter. Unlike fighters previously produced, the F-15 was capable of shooting long-distance missiles, and therefore was highly priced. Although the United States tried to sell this fighter to its allies to acquire foreign currency, Japan was one of only a few countries willing to purchase the license. The Mitsubishi Heavy Industry obtained the license and produced a domestic version. The Defense Agency first deployed F-15 fighters at the Chitose Air Base in Hokkaido.³⁸ After this, when munitions manufacturers produced new aircraft, the Defense Agency often introduced them at this base. This air base had also been used as a civilian airport since 1951, and Tokyo-Chitose had grown

³⁷ Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army*, particularly Chapters Five and Six.

³⁸ Bōeichō, ed., *Bōei hakusho 53-nenban*, 124-134.

into one of the busiest airline routes in the world. But from the late 1970s, the frequency with which the fighters were scrambled increased drastically, placing the security of civilian passengers at risk. This condition would last until 1988, when Shin-Chitose Airport, a purely civilian airport, opened just next to the airbase.

Purely domestic weapons were also turned to practical use at the same time. The Mitsubishi Heavy Industry invented a new world-class tank, the Model 74, which was equipped with a laser rangefinder and a computerized fire control system. These tanks were first deployed in the Seventh Division, headquartered in Higashi-Chitose in central Hokkaido. The Defense Agency built three tank regiments within this division, and completed converting it into an armored division in 1981. The Defense Agency regarded this as one of its most strategically important divisions, and introduced cutting-edge weapons within it. Even now, it is the only armored division within the SDF, and its destructive capability far surpasses that of other divisions. In present-day Chitose, SDF tanks often run on public roads together with regular automobiles. This has become a common part of the landscape of Chitose.

Another form of Japan's collaboration with the US military was the realization of joint training, and the two militaries extensively used maneuver fields in Hokkaido for this purpose. In 1978, the Japanese government signed the Guideline for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. This guideline complemented the US-Japan Security Treaty by specifying forms of military cooperation between the two countries. Concretely, the

United States and Japan agreed to conduct joint military training on Japanese soil.³⁹ In 1981, the Ground SDF and the US Marine and Army held their first joint training on the Higashi-Fuji Maneuver Field, located in Toyama Prefecture. Nakasone, who became prime minister the following year, made it an annual routine. While from the following year, the militaries of the two countries chose different venues all over Japan for joint training that were held several times annually, they tended to favor those in Hokkaido. Hokkaido hosted the two largest maneuver fields in Japan: Yausubetsu Maneuver Field in eastern Hokkaido, with an area of 4.1 million acres, and Hokkaido Maneuver Field near Sapporo, with an area of 2.2 million acres.⁴⁰ In other regions, there were four more large-scale maneuver fields. But excepting the one in Higashi-Fuji, none of them were comparable in size to those in Hokkaido. Therefore Hokkaido remained most attractive to the two militaries every year.

Accordingly, the SDF and the US military further advanced the joint use of SDF facilities—not only maneuver fields, but also airbases, radar bases, and military stations. The combat training on the Hokkaido Maneuver Field in 1986 involved for the first time top officers from the two militaries, including those from Ground, Maritime, and Air Staff Offices of the SDF, and the headquarters of the United States Forces Japan. This combat training was attended by 6,000 Japanese and 7,000

³⁹ The Maritime SDF had been conducting joint training with the US Navy in the seas off Japan since the 1955. Through the guideline, the two governments decided to realize joint training for the armies.

⁴⁰ Hokkaido Maneuver Field consisted of several smaller maneuver fields located next to one another. One of them was Shimamatsu Maneuver Field, where the Eniwa Incident took place in 1962.

American military personnel.⁴¹ Joint training has continued to the present day. The number of training exercises on two maneuver fields in Hokkaido, including those for local divisions, other divisions, and the US military, reaches three hundred annually.

This military use of Hokkaido would have met with serious protest during the 1960 and early 1970s. But in the 1980s, the state could pursue the further militarization of the island rather smoothly. The campaign on the vulnerability of Hokkaido, the condemnation of peace movements, and the representation of Hokkaido as a hotbed of Soviet spies had created an atmosphere in which local residents could no longer raise objection to the SDF.

The Hokkaido businessman Murai Yukio stressed this point in his book published in 1980. In this book, he heavily criticized the northern threat campaign, accurately identifying it as originating in the Tokyo-based media and among former SDF officers. According to Murai, the media's constant representation of Hokkaido as a defenseless object of Soviet attack caused its residents considerable distress, and they increasingly felt that they had to demonstrate their patriotism to the rest of Japan. He called this campaign a Hokkaido "witch hunt." As he himself admits, he was not an expert of international relations or politics, but in the midst of the intensifying jingoistic campaign, he thought it urgent to reveal the constructed nature of the campaign as a resident of Hokkaido.⁴²

⁴¹ For the records of joint trainings between 1981 and 1986, see *Bōei hakusho*. Each *Hakusho* contains the record of the joint training held in the previous year.

⁴² Murai Yukio, *Tokyo hatsu hoppō kyōiron: Hokkaido kara no teigen* (Gendai no Rironsha, 1980).

Here, we also have to note that there was a material basis for Hokkaido residents' urgent longing to demonstrate their patriotism: that is the growing gap between the national economy and the Hokkaido economy. Even after the two oil crises, the Japanese economy continued to grow. The main reason was its structural transformation. During high-speed growth in the 1960s and 1970s, the manufacturing industries, such as steel, non-ferrous metals, and shipbuilding, worked as the driving force for growth (though the production of automobiles was already increasing). The oil crises in 1973 and 1978 inflated the prices of imported raw materials, and this placed these sectors in a long-term depression. After 1978, the Japanese government designated "structurally depressed industries," including these sectors above, and advanced rationalization, which required the closure of plants and the firing of employees. Within the manufacturing industry, the machinery sector was exceptionally profitable. Automobiles, VCRs, word-processors, personal computers, and microelectronics had a high rate of value added, and required less energy and import of raw materials compared to the steel and shipbuilding sectors. The increasing production and technological development in this sector enabled the Japanese economy to continue growing after the 1970s.⁴³

Hokkaido was left behind by this structural transformation. Hokkaido had depended heavily on agriculture and fishery, lumbering, mining, and the steel industry. The mining industry had already been shrinking rapidly since the 1960s. The oil crises devastated Hokkaido's steel industry, whose production scale was relatively small to

⁴³ Nakamura, *The Postwar Japanese Economy*, 229-235.

begin with, compared to that of the metropolitan areas in other parts of Japan. Hokkaido did not have any industry that could compete in the new era. Moreover, the oil crises forced the Japanese government to cut investment in public projects as part of its fiscal restraint policy. As I have pointed out, Hokkaido (together with Okinawa) had received financial support from the Hokkaido Development Agency. Public projects undertaken by this agency had greatly stimulated the prefecture's economy. In its 1984 White Paper, the Hokkaido government lamented that in contrast to the national economy, which was growing steadily, the prefecture's economy had been in depression since the late 1970s and showed no sign of recovery.⁴⁴

Under this condition, the fear-mongering campaign had an enormous influence on the ways that people in Hokkaido perceived the SDF. When the economy stagnated and when the central government was retreating from public projects, the SDF was one of few remaining organizations that could guarantee a considerable number of populations and economic benefits for Hokkaido communities. But now, the possibility was emerging that even the SDF might abandon the island and give it up to the Soviet Union. This constant fear led Hokkaido residents to refrain from criticizing the SDF and to demonstrate their willingness to collaborate with it.

Here it is important to note that, while former SDF officers started the campaign on the northern threat for their political agendas, and the state capitalized on it, Hokkaido people themselves also shared a ground on which to perceive a series of events predicted by the campaign as "fear." Hokkaido's long dependency on the SDF

⁴⁴ Hokkaido Kaihatsu Chōseibu, ed., *Kiezai hakusho: Shōwa 58-nenban* (Hokkaido, 1984).

made its residents extremely sensitive to the idea of losing the SDF. In this sense, it is wrong to regard Hokkaido residents simply as victims of the northern threat campaign. They helped impose fear on themselves and amplify it, assuring themselves that efforts for advancing national defense would enable them to continue benefiting from the SDF in their communities.

It is questionable, however, whether the advancement of national defense brought Hokkaido residents better lives. The government and the Defense Agency often justified the military buildup in Hokkaido by resorting to such notions as “the people’s safety and life” (*kokumin no anzen to seizon*). They had been repeating this since the 1950s, when the SDF began to station personnel in this region. The SDF carried out such activities as civil engineering and disaster relief in the name of the enhancement of “the people’s safety and life.” After the anti-SDF protests in the 1960s, the government founded the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and tried to demonstrate that the SDF could still serve the interests of local residents and communities. The intense dissemination of fear from the late 1970s, however, worked to prevent Hokkaido residents from any longer questioning the SDF’s presence. It became difficult for them to discuss and determine in their own terms the meaning of protecting the people’s safety and life. Instead, such institutions as the government and the Defense Agency interpreted these notions for them, and determined what needs to fulfill for them. The result was a greater military presence than at any other time in the history of Hokkaido. The government and the Defense Agency began to see Hokkaido primarily as a community that could not survive without military’s protection and that could be manipulated for military purposes. Here, “the people’s safety and life” were

increasingly abstracted and dissociated from the concrete, local context. The discrepancy between the people the government and the Defense Agency claimed to protect, and the people who actually experienced military maneuvers on the daily basis grew larger and larger.

Conclusion

During the 1980s, Japan's military buildup accelerated in the midst of the campaign on the northern threat. While the Cold War officially ended soon after with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the SDF's military activities continued to expand, and do still, to the present day.

In August 1990, Iraqi troops invaded and occupied Kuwait. The Security Council of the United Nations immediately responded to this by issuing a resolution denouncing Iraq and enforcing economic sanction against Iraq. The United States initiated the formation of a coalition, and 34 countries announced their participation, including its US major cold-war allies: Great Britain, France, Canada. In January 1991, coalition forces launched offensives against the Iraqi troops and expelled them from Kuwait. In March, the Iraqis surrendered, and the war ended. The SDF did not join the coalition forces. Both the LDP and leftist parties, such as the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, had long argued that the overseas dispatch of SDF forces would violate Article 9 of the Constitution. The Japanese government offered only financial support. Although that offer amounted to \$13 billion, the United States responded rather coolly, and asked Japan to contribute not only money but also troops to the international effort.

The Japanese government reacted quickly. In April 1991, the Director of the Defense Agency ordered the Chief of Staff at the Maritime SDF to dispatch minesweepers to the Persian Gulf to clear the seas in the aftermath of the war. SDF minesweepers were supposed to work only in the high seas. The government argued,

therefore, that this should be regarded not as an overseas dispatch of the SDF but as part of the usual mission of the Maritime SDF. Obviously, there was a considerable difference between patrol in the high seas near Japan and minesweeping in the high seas near the Persian Gulf. But the government evaded criticism from the leftist parties by denying the unusual nature of the SDF's minesweeping mission.

Then, the government intended to prepare a legal ground for overseas dispatch within the constitutional order. The United States had been pressuring Japan to allow the SDF to join the United Nations' Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), and it was becoming more and more difficult to resist this pressure. The LDP government submitted a bill concerning Japan's collaboration with the PKO in 1991. The government argued that the SDF's participation in the PKO would not violate Article 9 because the SDF would only go to areas where wars and conflicts were already settled, and because service members would not fight against enemies but engage in such activities as disaster relief, the construction of infrastructures, and patrolling in noncombat areas. Although the Socialist and Communist Parties strongly opposed the bill, the LDP managed to win support from the other two parties—the Kōmei Party and the Social Democratic Party—and passed the bill in both houses. Now Japan became able to legally dispatch the SDF abroad under the authorization of the United Nations. Soon after the establishment of the PKO law, the government dispatched the SDF to Cambodia, where the United Nations were supervising national reconstruction after the damage of the long civil war. Since then, the SDF have undertaken peace-

keeping and relief activities in a number of countries and areas, including Rwanda, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq.¹

The overseas dispatch of the SDF did not win much popular support at first. A number of civic organizations protested, pointing out the incompatibility with the constitution. But one event changed this popular sentiment: the earthquake that struck Kobe and environs in January 1995. At a magnitude of 6.8, it was the most catastrophic earthquake since the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923. At the request of Hyōgo Prefecture, the Defense Agency dispatched troops to the affected area to rescue victims, put out fires, deliver emergency supplies, and remove collapsed houses and buildings. For about a hundred days until the area was normalized, a total of 2.2 million service members devoted themselves to disaster relief, mobilizing 340,000 vehicles, 13,000 airplanes, and 680 ships.² This was by far the largest-scale disaster relief in the history of the SDF. Every day on TV, the people watched service members selflessly assisting earthquake victims and rebuilding communities. While the SDF had been consolidating its ties mainly with rural communities, this disaster relief in Kobe and the Hanshin area definitely contributed to raising the SDF's visibility in that metropole and nationwide.

A survey conducted six months after the 1995 earthquake clearly shows that the SDF's disaster relief helped many people accept the overseas dispatch of troops as part of the SDF's routine. Compared to a year prior, the proportion of those who

¹ For the process by which the PKO Law was made, see the Bōeichō. ed., *Bōei hakusho, Heisei 4-nenban* (Tokyo: Ōkurashō Insatsukyoku, 1992), 149-163.

² Bōeichō, *Bōei hakusho, Heisei 7-nenban* (Tokyo: Ōkurashō Insatsukyoku, 1995), 166-167.

supported the SDF's participation in the Peace-Keeping Operations increased by 26.7 per cent (48.4 in 1994 to 75.1 in 1995), while the proportion of those who opposed dropped by 16.3 per cent (30.6 to 14.3). Similarly, the percentage of those who supported the SDF's relief activity abroad increased by 18.4 per cent (61.6 to 80), while opposition dropped by 11.2 per cent (21.9 to 10.7).³ From these results, we can speculate that the respondents found a certain continuity between the SDF's disaster relief at home and peace-keeping and relief activities abroad. They justified the latter by interpreting it as an extension of the former. In their view, while the arena of the SDF's activities shifted to foreign soil, its foremost mission did not change fundamentally: it continued to be rescuing victims from various kinds of disasters.

In present-day Japan, it is almost impossible to find any qualitative difference between the SDF and other countries' militaries. The only difference is that the SDF is allowed to engage in its activities only in noncombat areas because going to combat areas and bearing arms to fight against enemies would infringe upon the section of Article 9 that banned "the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." Service members are only allowed to bear a minimum level of arms for self-defense. But given the LDP government's history of conveniently interpreting the notion of self-defense to expand the field of the SDF's activities, it is likely that they may alter the definition of a minimum level of arms so that service members can arm themselves fully enough to fight against enemies in combat areas. Besides, in recent wars, terrorism and guerrilla operations play important roles, and the border between

³ A survey conducted by the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. Available at <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/>.

combat and non-combat areas is increasingly blurring. Even if the government tries to limit service members' armament to a minimum level, the conflation of combat and noncombat areas may force service members to bear more elaborate arms.

In recent years, those who object to the SDF's overseas activities constitute a small minority. It appears that most Japanese do not find a contradiction between Article 9 and the SDF's extending missions to foreign soil, and agree that the SDF makes important contributions to their lives. This consensus has not been established in a short period. In this dissertation, I have defined "militarization" as a process by which people gradually ceased to question the presence of a military in their everyday lives, and argued that this process got underway from 1950, when the new postwar military was founded. Since then, the SDF has made efforts to appeal to civilians, particularly working class people in the city and people in rural communities, by offering various types of socio-economic help. This prepared a ground on which the state could pursue overt military buildup from the 1980s without encountering major resistance. We can understand the SDF's expansion abroad as the consequence of this postwar militarization process.

In this dissertation, I have paid a great deal of attention to Hokkaido. It is an ideal place for studying militarization. The entire region has suffered from underpopulation and labor shortage from the early Meiji Era. The region was far from metropolitan areas and lacked major industries other than agriculture and mining, both of which began to decline sharply in the postwar period. Although the steel industry did develop in such cities as Muroran, it remained relatively small in scale. Under this condition, the central government founded the Hokkaido Development Agency in the

immediate postwar period, thereby compiling a special budget to help Hokkaido's economy. These economic factors contributed to nurturing Hokkaido communities' dependence on the SDF. Hokkaido communities saw in the stationing of the SDF an opportunity to revitalize their economies.

In recent years, the Defense Agency has been proposing to downsize or close several bases in Hokkaido because of financial difficulty. This proposal, however, has faced strong resistance from local residents, particularly in such cities as Chitose and Eniwa, which host large military facilities. In current Hokkaido, those civilians who opposed this proposal have formed an association called Hokkaido no jietai sonzoku o motomeru kai (Association calling for the maintenance of the SDF in Hokkaido) to demand that the Defense Agency reconsider the closure and downsizing of bases. This development eloquently attests to the SDF's success in securing its position in Hokkaido people's lives.

But I have not meant simply to stress the uniqueness of Hokkaido. While Hokkaido certainly established the closest ties with the SDF, there were (and are) many similar communities in other parts of Japan. In the postwar period, rural communities in general experienced under-population and were left behind by industrial development in the metropolitan areas. We can find these communities not only in Hokkaido, but also in Tohoku, Hokuriku, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu. Many of the communities that became famous for the notable presence of the SDF were in these regions. These communities include Kōriyama in Fukushima, Misawa in Aomori, Hachinohe in Iwate, Tsuyama in Okayama, and Sasebo in Nagasaki. In these communities, the SDF contributed to boosting population and carried out civil

engineering and disaster relief, and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency granted generous subsidies for “people’s livelihood stabilization.” People in these communities have been sincere supporters of the SDF up to the present day, just as people in many Hokkaido communities have been.

Here, I want to introduce an interesting event that took place recently. An election for mayor was held in the town of Yonaguni, the westernmost island of Japan, in August 2009. The election in this small town received a fair amount of media attention because the two candidates clashed over whether to promote the SDF’s stationing on the island. The result was the victory of Hokama Shukichi, who was endorsed by the LDP and insisted on the SDF’s stationing. Hokama had been arguing that the SDF could offer a remedy for the problem of decreasing population and that the town’s economy would prosper with state subsidies. To be sure, Hokama won the election by a narrow margin. A significant number of residents supported the other candidate, who contended that the island should be military free in order not to cause anxiety for China and Taiwan. But at least this election indicates that many people in rural communities continue to associate the SDF with the improvement of their everyday lives.⁴ And in fact, Yonaguni is by no mean alone. It is not rare to hear of small rural communities debating whether to invite the SDF to station personnel there.

When we consider communities with a disproportionate military presence, we cannot forget Okinawa. Okinawa’s postwar history has been quite distinct from the rest of Japan. The US occupation lasted there until 1972, while the rest of Japan

⁴ The election was held on August 2. All the major newspapers (Asahi, Mainichi, and Yomiuri) had been reporting this election since July.

recovered sovereignty in 1952. But when we consider its experience with the US military, there are striking similarities with rural communities' experiences with the SDF in mainland Japan. Although the US military does not engage in anything equivalent to "people's livelihood support," it has been contributing to the prefecture's economy by creating employment for civilian Japanese. Together with tourism, US military facilities are a crucial source of income for the prefecture.

Furthermore, after Okinawa's reversion to Japanese sovereignty, communities with US military facilities became entitled to state subsidies under the Environment Improvement Law. Just like those in Hokkaido, a number of Okinawa communities receive subsidies to build roads, parks, and public facilities. In fact, together with Hokkaido, Okinawa had the highest number of communities designated as those "related to defense facilities" under the Environment Improvement Law.⁵ We can probably argue that in Okinawa the US military plays a role similar to the role the SDF plays in Hokkaido and other rural communities in mainland Japan. We often associate Okinawa with anti-military protests. This association is not wrong: there are without doubt a number of residents who resent the US military. We should not forget, however, that it is not unusual for Okinawans to elect mayors or governors who support the maintenance or even strengthening of US military bases. For example, in the past ten years, people in Nago City have elected mayors who back the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to the city.

⁵ Bōei Shisetsuchō-shi Hensan Inkai, ed., *Bōei shisetsuchō-shi*, 132-135.

Critics of the SDF have taken little note of the form of governance thus established by both the postwar state and society. Until the early 1990s, the Socialist Party was the severest and most influential critic of rearmament and the SDF. Since 1955, the party had presented the defense of the peace constitution as its most fundamental political agenda. The socialists were most afraid of Japan's return to prewar militarism, and insisted on the abolition of the US-Japan Security Treaty, the dissolution of the SDF, and neutrality in international politics. They repeated these slogans in elections, and backed a number of peace and anti-military movements. In both the Eniwa and Naganuma incidents, the socialists actively worked to support the Nozaki brothers and the 173 plaintiffs and to raise nationwide awareness of the incidents in the Diet and the media. While they undoubtedly contributed to slowing down the conservative government's military buildup, it is also true that their extreme antagonism to the SDF prevented them from taking seriously the fact that the military's governance of society operated in large part based on the principle of voluntarism and inclusion. For them, the SDF was an oppressive institution that was trying to revive prewar militarism in postwar society. They did not admit that the SDF was providing some Japanese with vital socio-economic assistance. Therefore, while calling for a society without a military, the socialists failed to propose concrete plans to maintain the livelihood of those who relied on the SDF after its abolition.

Ishibashi Masashi most clearly represented this attitude in the Socialist Party. He was one of the most famous socialists in postwar Japan. He was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1955. He also assumed the positions of general secretary and chairman, thereby exercising his leadership until his retirement in 1990. He

energetically worked to build a theory on “unarmed neutrality,” and the party adopted it as its official view when he was elected as the chairman in 1983. At the Diet, in the media, and on many other occasions, he advocated this policy and insisted on the eventual abolition of the SDF. Ishibashi, however, never discussed the role of the SDF in rural communities. In his famous *Hibusō chūritsu-ron* [On unarmed neutrality], he did identify poverty as a crucial factor that explained the rise of prewar militarism. He contended that the military had gained power by appealing to people of the lower social stratum, and pointed out that “class difference” (*kakusa*) and “inequality” (*fubyōdō*) had not disappeared in postwar Japan.⁶ But Ishibashi’s analysis did not go further. He did not articulate the mechanism that continued to encourage working-class men to join the SDF and Hokkaido communities to depend on it. His discussion on the abolition of the SDF and unarmed neutrality proceeded rather at the abstract level.

Here I am not trying to criticize the Socialist Party or Ishibashi in particular. I am pointing out that in postwar Japan, critics of the SDF in general—not only the socialist party but also leftist and liberal citizens more broadly—associated the SDF (or military organizations in general) overwhelmingly with direct oppression and domination, and had difficulty in understanding that some Japanese voluntarily and enthusiastically supported the SDF. But as this dissertation has stressed, militarization happened in large part by stimulating people’s aspiration for the improvement of their living conditions, thereby convincing them of the need for a military. Those who

⁶ Ishibashi Masashi, *Hibusō chūritsu-ron*, (Tokyo: Nihon Shakaitō Chūō Honbu Kikanshikyoku, 1980), 166-168.

supported the SDF did not view their relations with the SDF as that of oppressor and oppressed, or dominator and dominated. They believed that they supported the SDF of their free will.

By claiming this, however, I have not meant to trivialize the large presence of the SDF in society nor to argue that we should simply accept the SDF as a legitimate national army. Instead, I wanted to demonstrate that free popular will was a tool for governance, just as oppression and prohibition were. In other words, governance based on free popular will can produce a severe control of society, as severe as that produced by governance based on relentless oppression and prohibition. The government, the SDF, the Defense Agency, and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency were all eager to rally popular support and incessantly tried to help local residents in Hokkaido improve the quality of their lives. Local residents responded positively, and even those who were initially critical of the SDF also learned the benefits the military could bring to their communities. As they became beneficiaries of the military's welfare system, local residents gradually came to rely on the military when determining what the improvement of the quality of their lives meant, and equated the advancement of national defense with their own welfare. The consequence was the intense military buildup from the late 1970s. The state began to see Hokkaido as a land easily employed for military purposes, converting it into a laboratory for newly development weapons and a maneuver field for joint training for the SDF and the US military.

Moreover, I have also wanted to emphasize that free popular will was by no means a feeling individuals could enjoy independent from the socio-economic context of the time. Such factors as unemployment, marginal employment, uneven

development between the city and the countryside, and labor shortage and the lack of public support in rural communities contributed to consolidating the conditions under which people of certain regions and economic statuses had little choice but to look to the SDF. When unemployed men joined the SDF and when people in Hokkaido encouraged the SDF to station personnel in their community, there was no coercion in a formal sense. No one forced them to do so. They could have made different decisions if they wanted. But they clearly knew that their socio-economic circumstances limited the scope of their choice, and they therefore found it crucial to maintain their livelihood with the SDF's assistance. Therefore, the line between freedom and coercion is much more vague than we may believe. In the modern liberal state, we are free in the legal system, but there are a number of settings that lead us to one single choice (that is, civil society's dependence on the military) even if direct external force does not exist.

The militarization that began in the 1950 is an ongoing process. Would it be possible to stop it? In the mid-1990s, Gavan McCormack addressed this theme. At that time, overseas activities through the PKO Law were quickly becoming an essential part of the SDF's missions, and politicians, intellectuals, and citizens were feeling urged to re-define the relation between the SDF and the constitution. In this atmosphere, those who insisted on constitutional revision began to speak out openly. These included Ozawa Ichirō, the founder of the Japan Renewal Party (and currently an executive of the Democratic Party), as well as the *Yomiuri Shimbun*. While Ozawa's and the *Yomiuri's* proposals for revision differed in details, they both argued that by revising Article 9, the Japanese should give the SDF the status of a national

army, strive to establish an “ordinary” country, and boost that country’s influence in the international community.

On the other hand, those who continued to see significant values in Article 9 actively discussed how to come to terms with the SDF within the constitutional order. These included the *Asahi Shimbun* and the Iwanami group. Again, their proposals for revision differ in details, but both argued for the Japanese to maintain Article 9. Although they did not call for the abolition of the SDF, they emphasized that the SDF should scale down its armament level, engage mainly in territorial defense of Japanese soil, and contribute to the international community through non-military means. McCormack contrasted these two proposals for the SDF and Article 9, and called the Ozawa-Yomiuri forces “realist” and “pragmatist,” and the Iwanami-Asahi forces “idealist” and “pacifist.” McCormack himself showed great sympathy for the latter’s idealist pacifism, contending that instead of aiming to become an ordinary country, Japan should articulate and embrace the sense of being “different” and reaffirm its identity as a “peace state” for the twentieth-first century.⁷

More than a decade has passed since McCormack wrote this piece. The constitution still remains intact, but arrangements for constitutional revision have gradually been made. In 2000, the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors each established a committee in order to accelerate discussions on how to revise the constitution. In 2007, the Diet passed a law that stipulated detailed procedures for constitutional revision (until then there was no such a law;

⁷ Gavan McCormack, “The Peace State: Dilemmas of Power,” in *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence* (Armonk: New York, 1996), 185-221.

constitutional revision was technically impossible). The two major parties—the LDP and the Democratic Party—are both enthusiastic about revising the constitution (though in different manners). It will not be surprising if revision takes place in the near future.

I agree that the discrepancy between the constitutional ideal of peace and the reality of a military presence has grown so large that something must be done to this situation. And personally, I agree with McCormack that the Japanese should embrace the country's difference, re-affirm the value of Article 9, and strive to become a pacifist state. The problems the Nozaki brothers and the Naganuma residents faced in the 1960s are not completely solved. Some people still endure loud noise and others are afraid of environmental destruction (though the number of these people may have dropped drastically after the founding of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency). Converting Japan into an “ordinary country” with a national army would only exacerbate these problems. The scaling down and disarmament of the SDF certainly sounds like an attractive idea. But at the same time, it is obvious that the closure of military facilities and reduction of the number of service members would generate enormous concern among those people whose socio-economic lives were already inextricably intertwined with the SDF in Hokkaido and elsewhere. When capitalism operates as a principle for managing the nation-state's economy, class difference and uneven development inevitably emerge, and the SDF has grown by taking full advantage of these. So if Japan is to aspire to a peace state as McCormack suggests, we need to consider not only how to scale down and disarm the SDF, but

also how to cope with problems with capitalism and how to build a society where its members would not need a military's assistance to maintain their livelihood.

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