Title
The Congressional Black Caucus and a Theory of Concordance

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The political battle for equal citizenship and an effective franchise has occupied a long part of American history for minority groups (Davidson and Grofman 1994; Parker 1990; Stewart and McClain 2010; Valelly 2004). Thus, the movement of Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and American Indians into the electoral arena and their political empowerment, especially at the local level, is a central theme in minority politics. Since their entrance into electoral politics, scholarship on minority politics has demonstrated that as their numbers in elective office increase, minorities become more effective policy makers.

Defined as minorities having membership in the dominant governing coalition—chiefly as liberal minority officeholders in councils or legislatures having Democratic majorities, minority incorporation was shown to be strongly linked to policy responsiveness over measures of numerical minority representation in an award-winning study of ten cities (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984). Cities that had elected minorities who were part of the Democratic establishment had adopted citizen police review board, hired more minority municipal employees, and placed more minority residents on community boards.

Other studies also show empirically that descriptive representation and incorporation promote minority policy responsiveness (Haynie 2001; Meier and Stewart 1991; Meier et al. 2005; Ochs 2011; Preuhs 2006, 2007; see also Eisinger 1982; Karnig and Welch 1980). Incorporation, it is theorized, leads to minority empowerment, the latter defined as the translation of political power into a greater share of economic and social power for minority groups. Chiefly empowerment is realized through gains for minorities in reducing racial and ethnic disparities in health, housing, crime, education, wealth, and poverty.

A new group of scholars have established how African Americans are making a difference in legislatures as elected lawmakers (e.g., Canon 1999; Gamble 2007; Grose 2010; Haynie 2001; Minta 2009; Tate 2003; Whitby 2007, 1997; but see also Singh 1998; Swain 1993). However, political incorporation is a two-sided process. Not only do minorities struggle for representation in the political system, fighting established groups in the system and racism, but there is a second struggle over how these newly-incorporated groups will lead. Incorporation favors political moderation. Combining roll-call statistical data with an historical review, I attempt to establish how racial politics is received and moderated in American political institutions (see also Hawkesworth 2003). The statistical analysis is based on Poole and

Rosenthal's NOMINATE scores and other data from the *CQ Almanacs*. Major newspaper coverage of the Congressional Black Caucus during this period is also assessed. The historical review covers the thirty-three years of the Carter to Obama administrations.

Political Incorporation: A Two-Sided Process

Institutions shape the behavior of political elites (e.g., Shepsle 1989; Weingast and Marshall 1988; see Hall and Taylor 1996 for a review). Thus, there is a dialectic between new elites and established institutions. Martin Shefter (1994) describes the two-sided process in the history of political incorporation in American cities. He finds that the most radical Black leaders in New York City were those lacking ties to the regular party organizations, and there were attempts to purge radical leaders from the party. One such New York leader was Black Congressman Adam Clayton Powell. Powell was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1944. Powell's attempts to attach antidiscrimination measures to routine legislation making its way out of the House were so frequent that they were listed in congressional records as the "Powell Amendments" (Singh 1998: 47; Hamilton 1991). Charging that the Democratic Party's record on civil rights was too weak, Powell endorsed Republican President Dwight Eisenhower for a second term in 1956 (Shefter 1994: 229). The Democrats, Shefter argues, sought to limit Powell's radicalism through challenges in primary elections. Ultimately the U.S. Congress in 1967 investigating charges of Powell's corruption voted to expel him. Two years later, Powell won a Supreme Court ruling that his expulsion was unconstitutional. He returned to Congress in 1969, though stripped of his seniority and two years of congressional pay. In 1970, Powell was defeated by Charles B. Rangel.

Extending Shefter's arguments, incorporation theories fail to acknowledge the arsenal of rules and procedures that are used by those in power to overcome conflict. Parties are institutions having mechanisms of political control. Furthermore, the U.S. Congress has complex rules, procedures, and norms. Through reform, the influence of parties increased in the House (Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1983). The story here is actually complicated. In spite of changes as part and parcel of the new partisan warfare that has emerged in Congress, senators have continued to engage in obstructive tactics, more so since the 1970s (Schickler 2001; Sinclair 2006). Nevertheless, the structure and dynamics of legislative politics are powerful influences and constraints on individual legislative behavior.

Parties provide committee assignments for members and select leaders, such as committee chairs, who support these goals. They also compel cooperation from the rank-and-file through the provision of opportunities, goods, and exchanges like logrolls, that otherwise are not available (Smith 2007). Presidents, as heads of the national party, have also used their authority to influence members of Congress. They enter into legislative politics prior to the introduction of policies that they care about as bills on the floor (Beckmann 2010). While the exercise of power by parties and the president is generally positive, it can be negative as well.

Thus, in time, incorporation in the political system is expected to produce political moderation as minorities politically advance. Operating under a winner-take-all election system, the policy agendas of dominant American parties are not often radical except under remarkable conditions such as the Civil War, the Great Depression, and the Civil Rights era. New groups find that they need to accommodate the policy interests of parties in order to advance and

become more effective legislators. They enter into centralized leadership where the collective fate of the party is as important as Blacks' efforts to increase their share of seats.

Writing in the aftermath of the Socialist Party's decisive support of German imperialism, Robert Michels (1999) insists that political parties have oligarchical and conservative tendencies. Political parties generally sacrifice their radicalism to advance political objectives. Their leaders also seek stronger leadership roles and professionalize in order to improve the direction of their organization's affairs. They will show less radicalism in order to advance.

Thus, incorporation is a dynamic, contested process between radicals and moderates. First, minorities use their newly-acquired power and authority to implement policies in ways that radically challenge leadership. These new minorities are outsiders seeking inclusion to win a more supportive policy environment. Then incorporation involves a second area of contestation as newcomers are influenced by the political process as much as they seek to influence outcomes.

As theorized by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984), Black policy effectiveness should increase as their numbers and leaders expand in Democratic-led administrations. However, Black lawmakers may not able to win radical outcomes without the backing of extra-electoral forces, such as protest, legal rulings, and seismic world events. Furthermore, unlike the theory of Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, because incorporation is a two-sided process, Black lawmakers inevitably change under incorporation yielding less radical challenges to institutionally-based leadership as they win new positions under the existing political structure. However, policy winning, measured in this study as the percentage of time that members vote with the House majority on key bills, should increase for African American legislators as they accommodate better their party's and president's policy agendas. While party polarization during this time frame has clearly impacted and changed Black legislative behavior, the thesis is that so has incorporation, yielding new concordance between Black members and their party.

An Expansion in the CBC's Numbers and Influence

The Congressional Black Caucus was formed as an effort to increase Black legislative influence in the U.S. Congress. Organized originally in 1969, it was renamed the Congressional Black Caucus in 1971. The 13 founding members of the CBC are Shirley Chisholm, George Collins, William Clay, John Conyers, Charles Diggs, Ron Dellums, Walter Fauntroy, Gus Hawkins, Ralph Metcalfe, Parren Mitchell, Robert Nix, Charles Rangel, and Louis Stokes. Conyers and Rangel, original CBC founders, continue to serve in the 112th Congress. Both have amassed a lot of seniority. Under House Democratic control, Conyers served as chair of the House's Judiciary Committee, while Rangel chaired of the powerful Ways & Means Committee until a charge of ethics allegations forced him out. The number of Blacks serving in the House of Representatives (including D.C.'s nonvoting delegate) has increased from 13 in 1971 to 18 in 1981 to 39 in 1993 to 43 in 2011. The size of the CBC increased dramatically as a result of the new-majority Black/minority districts that were created in the South. Also, two Black Republicans, both from the South, were elected to the 112th Congress.

Caucuses are formed as an effort to influence the legislative process beyond what regular participation in Congress offers (Hammond 1998; Miler 2011). The CBC was organized to strengthen the policy efforts of Black legislators. Former representative William L. Clay (1992) describes the early years of the CBC as one of its founding members. The old CBC began with

direct policy challenges to President Nixon, boycotting his State of the Union address because he had refused to meet with the group. Some radical members of the CBC challenged President Carter over his budgets, specifically Dellums and Conyers. In 1980, the CBC called a press conference to object to, among other things, the large defense component of President Carter's budget plan. Thirteen Black lawmakers voted against its adoption, losing the vote to the majority in favor of it. The *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1980* reported that the (Carter-backed) House budget resolution represented "the largest annual increase in military spending during peacetime" (1980: 108).

In contrast to the 1970s and early 1980s when the Congressional Black Caucus took strident ideological stands, its will to contest Democratic presidents appears less. There are several reasons why. First, party leaders began to integrate Blacks better. Bill Gray's elevation to chair the Budget Committee in 1985 was momentous in the transformation of the CBC's political style (Singh 1998). It is not easy to determine how many Blacks have served in party leadership positions since the Nixon administration. *Congressional Quarterly Almanacs* began reporting party leadership positions in its 1985 volume. The number of Blacks in party leadership positions, including as regional or assistant whips or on policy committee posts, however, steadily rise. Beginning in 1985, 7 Blacks held party leadership posits with Charles B. Rangel serving at the top as a Deputy Whip. Among the old guard, Parren Mitchell was an at-large whip (with William Gray), Harold Ford was a regional whip, Cardiss Collins was on policy, and William L. Clay was on the party's campaign committee in 1985. In 1986, that number increased to 9. In 1993, 11 Blacks served in party leadership positions with John Lewis as one of four Chief Deputy Whips. In 1995, 17 Blacks served in party leadership positions.

In the 111th Congress, Jim Clyburn held House's third ranking leadership position as majority whip, responsible for the formulation of policy for the Democratic Party and its passage. Along with Clyburn, in the 111th, G.K. Butterfield, John Lewis, and Maxine Waters are three of the nine Chief Deputy Whips. Chief Deputy Whips were selected by Speaker Nancy Pelosi in consultation with Majority Whip Jim Clyburn, both of whom are elected by the Democratic Caucus. Lewis has been a whip since 1991, as a means to maintain CBC representation in response to Bill Gray's resignation from the House to head the United Negro College Fund.

The road to having more influence in the House was not easy for Black legislators. As federal law in 1964 firmly ended segregation in public facilities, a contestation over the racially biased distribution of policymaking authority in Congress emerged. The political histories of Black lawmakers indicate that there were earnest conflicts over their committee assignments. Singh tells the account of Shirley Chisholm (D-CA) being assigned initially to the Department of Agriculture over her protest that there were "no trees in Brooklyn" (1997: 79-80). She was then placed on Veterans Affairs. Ron Dellums (D-CA) tangled with conservative White leadership to win a place on the Armed Services Committee in 1974, which he later chaired (Dellums and Halterman 2000). While Rangel and Ford were placed on the House's powerful Ways and Means Committee in the mid-1970s, two other Blacks were denied places on the House Budget Committee in the 1980s. Another study established that as late as 1996, Black Democratic members of House generally held fewer seats on prestigious committees than White Democrats. Even Black freshmen received fewer prestigious assignments than newly-elected White Democrats (Tate 2003: 75-79; see also Canon 1999).

Thus, having greater access to power and influence finally, Black members have more reasons to support the party's policy agenda in the legislative process. With the expansion of

Black political power, Black legislators may find themselves unable to oppose Black party and legislative leaders. In 1995, Champagne and Rieselbach wrote the following: "Some, perhaps most, black legislators may find it difficult to oppose legislation written in committees that blacks chair or on which blacks have exerted substantial influence" (1995: 151).

Congressional scholars find that members of the U.S. Congress are generally loyal to committees, and rarely challenge their policy making authority. Thus, Black advancement brings in competing loyalties. When made chair of the House Budget Committee, Gray voted "present" on the CBC alternative budget amendments. Robert C. Smith points out that John Conyers (D-MI) was also forced to abandon a pledge to investigate whether there were grounds to impeach President Bush before the Speaker could agree to his serving as chair of the Judiciary Committee (Smith 2009: 18).

In addition to integration and advancement, the expansion in numbers is a second reason for why the CBC is less radical. Several scholars contend that as their numbers increased, we should see differences in the legislative behavior by Black members of Congress based on region, district, and ambition. Brought in large number to the House in 1992, southern Black lawmakers are more moderate than northern ones. For example, Black southern legislators were more supportive of President Clinton's bipartisan policy efforts, including his deficit-reduction budget resolutions than Black northern House members. Furthermore, six Black members of Congress, all from the South twice voted for President Bush's constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage in 2004 and 2006.[i] Political ambition is important, as some Black have voted conservatively as part their courtship of the moderate White vote, which is essential to winning in majority-White jurisdictions. Artur Davis (D-AL) twice voted against President Obama's health care legislation, and the only Black member of Congress to do so, as part of his campaign to win a statewide race in his politically conservative state of Alabama in 2010.

While Black political advancement and expansion reduce the political radicalism of the CBC, the new, more partisan atmosphere in the U.S. Congress has also tamped down Black dissent from the party. Divided government (e.g. Fiorina 1992; Mayhew 1991) and Republican dominance in Congress especially have increased the Democratic President's leadership authority among African American lawmakers. They are more likely to vote for the President's policy initiatives, compromising their ideological stands to vote with the President to win some Democratic victories. Movement in the liberal policy direction is difficult in a system requiring a supermajority in the Senate.

Blacks did not have to contend with Republican control in the House during the Carter administration, and they were inclined to threaten gridlock as liberal pivot points in the U.S. House. Gridlock is based on the ideological preferences of legislators for policy (Brady and Volden 2006). In the Reagan era, conservative and moderate Democrats were favored as important players in budgetary politics, and Black lawmakers were isolated. Tension among Blacks with the Democratic Party peaked during the 1980s with Jackson's presidential bids. The party responded by elevating more Black legislators into party leadership positions and granting them chairmanships. This quieted their rebellion. Furthermore, pivot politics has changed since the 1980s. The party in control today has a more substantial effect on the legislative agenda (Stiglitz and Weingast 2010). Thus, to be effective in Washington requires high levels of party discipline from House legislators. The current context has given ambitious Black legislators more reasons to support their party and their party's president.

In addition to divided government, party polarization has also greatly affected the CBC's legislative strategy. In the tense competition and widening policy gap between the two parties,

there is also greater deference to parties in Congress. Parties work harder to offer inducements to middle-range legislators (Rohde 1991). The CBC as a minority caucus is less likely to win policies as an oppositional group because policy victories today require broad, unquestioned support from all Democratic House members.

Why did partisanship increase in Congress? The sources are party polarization are debated. One account is as the Republican Party strengthened with the demise of the one-party South, the two parties sorted themselves better along party lines (Lowry and Shipan 2002). Some contend that legislative rule changes have made the parties more important in the policymaking process, giving them more authority over the individual votes of their members (Sinclair 2006). Others argue that the electorate has polarized, making members more partisan as well (McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Still others suggest that the policies of the major parties have polarized, making it more difficult to reach agreement on legislation both can support (Brunell, Grofman, and Merrill 2010). The federal deficit has widened the policy rift between Republicans and Democrats. The growing size of the federal deficit became a national problem in the 1980s. Republicans, however, refused to whittle back defense spending programs and Democrats bristled at domestic programs being blamed for the size of the federal deficit. Thus, with the large deficits the country is running, it is unlikely that the party differences will lessen any time soon. Finally, party discipline is dynamic, with the unity of the opposing party and the differences in party strength emerging as strong predictors of party unity (Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger 2007).

Whatever the source, polarization has reduced political tensions between Blacks and the Democratic Party. As liberals, Blacks feel no longer left out as the party counts on their support and can no longer realistically formulates an agenda that depends on cross-over Republican votes. In the spirit of this new solidarity with the party, the CBC is less motivated to challenge it as ideologues. Ironically, any new source of Black party dissent is poised to come from Black moderates, not progressives, who seek votes from more conservative Whites through the championing of bipartisan legislation.

The literature on the U.S. Congress asserts that legislators are competitive, rational actors (e.g., Shepsle and Weingast 1995). In the U.S. Congress, Blacks' support of the Democratic Party and Democratic presidential leadership will yield their greater participation in legislative victories. The incorporation of African Americans in Congress has also led to more legislative victories. While race-specific policies continue to be rejected, such as a racial justice provision for Clinton's large crime bill, Blacks are more likely to win broad policies that they also want, such as higher minimum wages, government spending to stimulate the economy, and children's health care programs, and reject those they don't want. However, polarization and incorporation are also associated with a marked decline in the Black radicalism of Black legislative behavior that was witnessed during the 1970s and early 1980s.

Thus, it is theorized that incorporation, namely the participation of Blacks in the dominant governing coalition, should lead to ideological moderation even as it should also help liberalize their party. The Democratic Party has clearly liberalized for reasons other than the new elections of liberal minorities. But the rise of liberal minorities in Congress should be considered a factor in the liberalization of the House Democrats. Thus, if the theory holds, data should show that Black House legislators are less liberal than they were in the 1970s as a new legislative group in Washington. Secondly, Black legislators as stronger members of their party in government should show the increasing deference to presidential leadership. Finally, as a consequence of incorporation, Black legislators should be greater participants in legislative

victories when their party in control of the House. The leverage politics of the past is still apparent on the floor of Congress. It represents a tradition. However, it is less apparent for Blacks because of increasing party discipline as well. No longer issuing defiant press releases, the CBC has split its votes on defense and tax cuts and finds it difficult to achieve solidarity on these matters. Reflecting on his observation of these types of changes in the CBC, Rangel expressed surprise that some CBC members had shown support for the Iraq War (Rangel and Wynter 2007).

Thus, the CBC has changed. Liberal Black legislators are not as able to command CBC solidarity for their liberal agenda as in the past. And while Black legislators are clearly working in a new highly partisan environment in Washington, their legislative behavior has changed because of minority political incorporation as well. Black members have become less radical to please their party and as new party leaders. Having plowed some ground for African Americans politically, they are also seeking new votes and recognition as national leaders in Washington.

Analytic Approach and Findings

In addition to the historical review, three statistical measures are examined here to shed light on how the CBC has changed over time. The first are ideological scores averaged for Black (Democratic) House members from the 95th Congress to the 111th and average scores for House Democrats.   The ideological scores are from Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal's important mathematical coding of legislative behavior from the 1st to the 111th Congresses (1789-2010). Based on an analysis of nearly 100,000 roll call votes, they found two dimensions can strongly predict specific floor votes in Congress; the first dimension represents left-right voting on bread-and-butter issues, while the second dimension reflects voting patterns on civil rights issues (Poole and Rosenthal 2007; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). The second dimension since 1980 has become less predictive and is not reported here.   Congressional behavior, they argue, has become increasingly unidimensional (Poole and Rosenthal 2007).

A second measure is the percentage of time that the Democratic members of the CBC voted for their presidents' policy agendas using statistics available in the *CQ Almanacs*.   The *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* series provides a detailed portrait of each session of Congress beginning in 1946. Because of incorporation and party polarization, the CBC now supports better their presidents' agendas. The percentage of time that House Democrats support their presidents is also analyzed here for comparative purposes.

Finally, a third statistical measure from 1977 to 2010 called policy winning or effectiveness is also analyzed here. Effectiveness is a new measure that shows how often members vote with the House majority on key bills each year. Key bills as defined by the annual Congressional Quarterly Almanac pertain to legislation involving a national controversy, or presidential politics, or having a great impact on the lives of Americans. CQ Almanac identifies about a dozen key bills each year. Voting with the House majority indicates how successful the CBC is getting its policy agenda adopted or having policies, the group staunchly opposes, rejected by the House majority.

The evidence for concordance is provided in Figures 1, 2, and 3. Figure 1 shows the ideological scores of the CBC and the Democratic Party from 1977 to 2008. There is a clear trend toward convergence. The first dimension scores for the CBC are strongly liberal. In 1977, the average CBC score was -.56, while for the Democratic Party, it was -.29. Over time, the

CBC average score diminished some to -.46 in 2008, while for the Democratic Party, the first dimension score increased some to -.34 (see Figure 1). The ideological gap between the CBC and the Democratic Party narrowed, therefore, from .27 to .11. The Black Caucus and the Democratic Party today are less far apart than they were in the 1970s and 1980s. The average NOMINATE scores are also shown in Table A.1 of the Appendix.

Figure 1. Ideological Scores for the CBC and the House Democratic Caucus from 1977 to 2009

Source: Poole-Rosenthal Nominate Scores, 1st Dimension and as calculated for Black House Legislators, see Voteview.Com

Figure 2 shows that Black House Democrats and the Democratic House Caucus also are closer in votes on legislation backed by the president as measured by the gap in their support levels (the numbers are available in Table A.2 of the paper's appendix). Black presidential support scores for Obama roughly entered the high 80s, for Clinton, the high 70s, while for Carter, the high 60s. While I theorized that the CBC is less rebellious today, both the CBC and the House Democratic Caucus are now less rebellious, mostly likely rooted in the new party discipline that has emerged. What has been especially noteworthy is the new concordance for Black Democrats and their party is found in getting House Democrats to resist Republican presidential agendas. Thus, while the historical data clearly shows less trouble for Democratic presidents in the policy arena from the CBC, higher levels of support for Democratic presidents most likely reflect the influence of new party discipline more than incorporation on the behavior of Black Democrats.

Figure 2 shows that Black Democrats were about 14 percent less than House Democrats to support President Reagan, but that gap has become less under President Bush. The gap since

Reagan has approached zero. Party unity has reduced Democratic support for the policy agendas of Republican presidents (see Fleisher and Bond 2000), which never earned high support from Black legislators in any event. The data also show that toward the end of the Clinton administration, Black legislators were his stronger backers than the party as whole. Thus, the large increases in party unity have reduced political friction between Blacks and Democrats under Republican presidents since the Reagan era. This is concordance, but it may not be from minority incorporation, but from new party discipline.

Figure 2. The Gap Between Black House Democrats and the Democratic House Caucus in Legislative Support for the President, 1977-2010


Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanacs and calculated by author. See Table B.3 for the calculation of these scores.
Note: Individual data in 1990 to calculate scores for Blacks were not available.

To see if Black legislators participate more in voting with the House majority, a new measure was constructed. This measure represents their legislative success, since obviously voting with the majority is how one wins in the legislative process in the House. Legislative winning scores show how often members vote with the House majority on "key bills" each year. Key bills as defined by the *annual Congressional Quarterly Almanac* pertain to legislation involving a national controversy, or presidential politics, or having a great impact on the lives of Americans. *CQ Almanac* identifies about a dozen key bills each year. Voting with the House majority indicates how successful the CBC is getting its policy agenda adopted or rejected by the House majority. Figure 3 shows policy winning scores for the CBC and the Democratic House Caucus from 1977 to 2010.

Figure 3. Legislative Winning Measure: Percent of Time CBC (Democrats only) and House Democrats vote with the House majority to pass/reject key bills, 1977-2010

Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanacs Key Votes Data, as calculated by author.
Note: CQ Almanacs lists about a dozen key bills annually that the House voted on that represent "a matter of major controversy," "a matter of presidential or political power," and "a matter of potentially great impact on the nation and lives of Americans."

Three points can be made from analyzing these data. First, as Figure 3 shows the CBC scores mirror those of the Democratic Party, indicating that there has always been a strong overlap between the policy winning or effectiveness obtained by Black Democrats and the House Democrats. Black House legislators were never so radical as to opt out of the majoritarian system in Washington. When the Democratic agenda does well, so does the policy agenda of the CBC. Secondly, policy effectiveness scores for the CBC and the two parties have increased over time, presumably because of increasing party discipline. When Blacks challenged President Carter, they were less effective. However, the CBC scores increased from an average of .53, indicating that 53 percent of the time, they vote with the House majority on key bills, to a significant 69 percent of the time or .69 under Clinton when the Democrats still had their House majority (see Appendix Table A.3 for the numbers).

A third point is that at the same time, the partisan dynamic has greatly affected the policy character of major House legislation. House parties have become more aggressive in controlling the policy agendas of the House more of the time. Democrats under Clinton pass legislation in 1993 and 1994 that largely reflects their policy agenda, and then after capturing the House majority, Republicans vote for legislation that passes or is rejected 70 percent of the time. Before, under Carter, both parties (and the CBC) passed or rejected legislation a little more than 50 percent of the time. Now it is more a winner-take-all scenario with partisan control of the House more critical than which party controls the presidency.

The data shown in Figures 2 and 3 complicate the account of how political incorporation has transformed the legislative behavior of Blacks in Congress. The general trend of party polarization and the politics emanating from divided government leading to a winner-take-all policy dynamic may be the ultimate causes of these changes in the CBC. Nevertheless, incorporation as a concurrent trend, I believe is still there. Ideological changes through

incorporation, shown in Figure 1's Poole and Rosenthal scores, have taken place among Black legislators that make it easier for them to support policy leadership by their political party and their presidents.

Conclusion: Bringing New Ideological Groups into the Center of Power

The 33-year period shows significant change for Black legislators and for parties has taken place. The theory presented here is that these developments are rooted in concordance, a process in political incorporation where new minority groups become less ideologically oriented in government and move closer to the mainstream. Black House members through greater acceptance by the party and seniority have become important party and legislative leaders during this time. Black House legislators are less liberal and more likely to follow the leadership of Democratic presidents and the party today than in group's early years. They also have dramatically improved their rates of participation with the House majority in making or blocking policy and laws when their party is in control.

Other data, not shown here, are that under Reagan, Black Democrats, in time, began to show some support to two very Republican policy matters, tax cuts and big defense budgets.   A majority of CBC members (63 percent) voted for further tax cuts in 1986 under Reagan, but not the old guard members such as Mitchell, Conyers, and Clay. Later, only 41 percent of Black Democratic House members opposed cutting defense spending in 1994 under President Clinton—a matter that had united them under President Carter. Those Blacks unwilling to cut defense were generally new lawmakers, generally from the South, and included Clyburn, Meek, Hilliard, and Thompson. The ideological purity of hardened liberals who believe in a progressive tax system and lean defense budgets has softened. Thus the implications of this study is that as the Democratic Party presses sometimes to the right on issues to win votes, the CBC today is more inclined to lean right too. Black lawmakers today are pragmatic politicians who will support an anti-tax agenda if that is where their party wants or needs to go.

The picture is muddied by the loyalty that the CBC commands regarding its annual budget resolutions, as shown in Table 1. No Black Democrat has opposed it from 1981 to 2009, and only a few have voted "present," notably Gray, when he headed the House Budget Committee in the mid-1980s, Sanford Bishop for some years in the 1990s, and Artur Davis in 2009. There still is radical dissent from CBC members, but it is less likely to be presented as a unified front. Barbara Lee from California issued a resolution (HR 4899) opposing the war in Afghanistan in 2010, for example. It won only 100 House votes, and 65 percent of the vote from the CBC. Those opposed were almost all from the South, but there were some northern Blacks opposed to Lee's resolution as well.   Although support in the House has increased some over time, the vote on the CBC budget amendment is now symbolic, attesting to the group's legislative authority in Washington more than its ideological will.

Table 1. Total Floor Votes for the CBC Alternative Budget, 1981-2009

	Floor Vote	Black Division
1981	69-356	
1982	86-322	
1983	None submitted	
1984	76-333	
1985	54-361	Gray voted "present"
1986	61-359	Gray voted "present"
1987	56-362	Gray voted "present"
1988		
1989	81-343	
1990	90-334	
1991		
1992	77-342	
1993	87-335	
1994	81-326	
1995	56-367	Bishop voted "present"
1996		
1997	72-358	Bishop voted "present"
1998		
1999		
2000	70-348	
2001		
2002		
2003	85-340	
2004	119-302	
2005		
2006	131-294	
2007	115-312	
2008	126-292	
2009	113-318	Davis voted "present"

Source: Based on CQ Almanacs.   Data are shown for years when there was coverage of this issue.

Thus, while the CBC members remain surprisingly united around the CBC alternative budget amendments, some CBC members support pieces of the Republican Party's social agenda, prominently its hostility to gun control measures and gay rights. Some Black members also began presenting themselves as fiscal moderates, voting for the Blue Dog's budget proposals as well as their own caucus's amendment and the party's. The Blue Dogs represent a group of fiscally conservative Democrats. In 2001, in fact, the vast majority (89 percent) of Black House Democrats backed the moderate Blue Dogs' plan. Although only two Black House members were members of the Blue Dog Coalition in the 109th Congress, pragmatism has replaced ideological purity for many Black legislators. These votes represent moderate steps by members of the CBC to support their political ambitions to win in larger, majority-White

jurisdictions as well.   While many more Black House Democrats belonged to the Progressive Caucus than the Blue Dog group , in 2009, the CBC did not unanimously support the Progressive Caucus's budget amendment in 2001 either. In fact, 26 percent of the CBC voted against the Progressive Caucus's proposed budget amendment. However, in 2008, when Barbara Lee brought to the floor a budget amendment proposed for the Progressive Caucus, 86 percent of the CBC voted for it.

The trend favoring less radicalism among liberal Black legislators began about 1993, at the start of the Clinton presidency. Urban, northern Blacks were unwilling to back a moderate Democrat in the 1970s, as Conyers indicated his plan was to "dump" President Carter before his reelection bid in 1980 (see Clay 1992). Now that Black legislators had moved up in the party's ranks and in numbers, Clinton was more persuasive than Carter. Moreover, electoral pressures on the party increased, in the aftermath of the Republican Party's seizing control of the House after the 1994 elections. There has also been generational replacement, as based on data from the 101st to 108th Congresses, Rocca, Sanchez and Nikora (2009) show that older Blacks are more liberal than younger Blacks in the House.   In addition to ideological moderation and greater party and presidential support, political disputes between the CBC and the Democratic Party or president are less public.

The integration and advancement of Blacks in American government represents an important historical moment. The doors have opened wider for today's new Black leaders. African American legislators still introduce and vote on more bills speaking to the racial concerns of Blacks than Whites (e.g., Canon 1999; Haynie 2001; Whitby and Krause 2001), and also speak up in hearings on matters pertaining to race (Minta 2009; Gamble 2007). Still, young, ambitious Black lawmakers are building records that are new. Members of the CBC are less able to unite to defend a policy agenda specific to Blacks. Black lawmakers in Washington are more pragmatic in giving greater deference to the party and Democratic presidents.   In the last-minute compromise with the Republicans extending the tax cuts to wealthy Americans in 2010, something he had campaigned against, Obama still won 34 percent of the CBC vote for his bipartisan agreement.

In the end, this emerging pattern of concordance between Black House Democrats and their party constitutes an important discovery. It speaks to the power of the institution in shaping elite behavior and structuring stability, a point that rational choice institutionalists have made, but is now amplified by other key statistical and historical data on African American legislative and political leadership. The genuine political incorporation of new groups can lead to concordance and to governing collectively. Yet the costs versus the benefits of political incorporation for U.S. political minorities are issues that will be debated among scholars and political groups for some time to come.

Appendix Table A.1. Average Poole-Rosenthal Scores for CBC and House Democrats, 95th-111th Congresses (Std. Deviation In Parentheses)

	CBC	House Democrats
95th	-0.56 (.07)	-0.29 (.20)
96th	-0.55 (.07)	-0.29 (.20)
97th	-0.55 (.07)	-0.29 (.20)
98th	-0.56 (.07)	-0.295 (.19)
99th	-0.56 (.07)	-0.31 (.17)
100th	-0.55 (.10)	-0.31 (.17)
101st	-0.55 (.10)	-0.32 (.17)
102nd	-0.56 (.11)	-0.32 (.17)
103rd	-0.53 (.09)	-0.34 (.17)
104th	-0.51 (.08)	-0.37 (.16)
105th	-0.51 (.09)	-0.38 (.15)
106th	-0.5 (.09)	-0.38 (.15)
107th	-0.49 (.09)	-0.39 (.14)
108th	-0.46 (.11)	-0.39 (.14)
109th	-0.46 (.11)	-0.40 (.13)
110th	-0.46 (.10)	-0.38 (.15)
111th	-0.48 (.11)	-0.36 (.16)

Source: Poole-Rosenthal Nominate Scores, 1st Dimension and as calculated for Black House Legislators and House Democrats, see Voteview.Com.

Appendix Table A.2. Average CQ Almanacs' Presidential Support Scores for Black House Democrats and House Democrats, 1977-2010 (Std. deviation In parentheses)

	Black House Democrats	House Democrats	Gap
1977	66 (8.7)	62	4
1978	65 (12.2)	62	3
1979	70 (12.8)	64	6
1980	62 (4.6)	61	1
1981	28 (5.8)	42	-14
1982	23 (5.9)	36	-13
1983	11 (4.1)	28	-17
1984	20 (3.6)	34	-14
1985	15.5 (2.1)	30	-14.5
1986	13 (2.6)	25	-12
1987	12 (2.9)	24	-12
1988	15 (2.8)	25	-10
1989	25 (5.2)	36	-11
1990	n/a	25	n/a
1991	24 (2.8)	34	-10
1992	11 (2.8)	25	-14
1993	78 (7.9)	77	1
1994	72 (12.0)	75	0
1995	80 (9.3)	75	1
1996	77 (6.8)	74	1
1997	74 (5.8)	71	2
1998	79 (6.4)	74	5
1999	83 (4.8)	73	10
2000	83.5 (7.6)	73	10.5
2001	22 (9.3)	31	-9
2002	26 (7.6)	32	-6
2003	20 (8.6)	26	-6
2004	26 (11.2)	30	-4
2005	20.5 (9.9)	24	-3.5
2006	28 (13.4)	31	-3
2007	5 (2.6)	7	-2
2008	15 (3.9)	16	-1
2009	96 (2.4)	90	6
2010	86 (5.3)	84	2

Source: Calculated for Black House Democrats by author and as reported in CQ Almanacs for House Democrats.

Appendix Table A.3. Average Legislative Winning Scores for the CBC (Democrats only), House Democrats, and House Republicans, 1977-2010

	CBC	House Democrats	House Republicans
1977	0.61	0.51	0.47
1978	0.55	0.57	0.46
1979	0.6	0.64	0.55
1980	0.45	0.57	0.73
1981	0.45	0.56	0.67
1982	0.79	0.67	0.45
1983	0.6	0.62	0.46
1984	0.5	0.6	0.49
1985	0.54	0.52	0.62
1986	0.56	0.64	0.54
1987	0.76	0.77	0.34
1988	0.64	0.73	0.52
1989	0.57	0.66	0.62
1990	0.78	0.71	0.42
1991	0.55	0.63	0.6
1992	0.74	0.7	0.54
1993	0.71	0.7	0.37
1994	0.68	0.65	0.54
1995	0.32	0.41	0.8
1996	0.53	0.63	0.75
1997	0.46	0.54	0.7
1998	0.56	0.61	0.69
1999	0.51	0.55	0.68
2000	0.71	0.73	0.74
2001	0.32	0.39	0.78
2002	0.37	0.41	0.75
2003	0.32	0.36	0.8
2004	0.7	0.73	0.61
2005	0.56	0.56	0.72
2006	0.26	0.3	0.87
2007	0.77	0.71	0.49
2008	0.89	0.88	0.48
2009	0.9	0.86	0.23
2010	0.71	0.77	0.36

Source: Average legislative effectiveness scores were based on the percentage of time that caucus members voted with the majority on CQ Almanacs' list of "key votes" bills. These scores for caucuses were calculated by the author. House party scores were calculated using aggregate reported votes by parties on key bills as reported in the CQ Almanacs.

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Endnotes

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[i] These Black House members were: Davis (D-AL), Bishop (D-GA), Scott (D-GA), Ford (D-TN), Jefferson (D-LA), and Thompson (D-MS).