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WOMEN AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN INDIA

Karen Leonard

The most important analyses of women in Indian society have explored women's position in several ways. Indian women have been analyzed as symbols of status and prestige, whose seclusion and supervision are basic to the maintenance of family purity and reputation.¹ They have been analyzed as objects of exchange—the giving of a daughter in marriage is “the crucial ranked transaction”—in which girls lower in status were given to men higher in status.² They have been analyzed as economic goods, as productive capital assets, or as luxury goods, and this analysis has helped to explain different female mortality rates at various ages by the economic value of women at those ages.³ Central to these analyses is the fact that the control of women at all stages of their life cycle was essential to the continuation of traditional family and caste patterns.

The Hindu caste system depended upon the maintenance of relationships between hierarchically ranked castes. Caste endogamy, or marriage within one's own caste, was enforced through the control of marriages by families and particularly through the control of women. Thus, while women in India have been shown to be highly idealized, they have been systematically subordinated. In the past, the reasons for their subordination were very explicit, strongly enforced by religious and secular authorities, and most strongly enforced by the social units of caste and family.

The changing position of women in India can best be measured by utilizing quantitative methods in the context of family and caste history. While some of the quantifiable measures I discuss here do not relate directly to the personal liberation of women, they concern changes which, in conflict or in combination with traditional Indian cultural concepts about women, promise to lead to further changes in the position of women.

Changes in the social order in modern India, particularly with respect to women, are far more complex than nationalist historians suggest. Studies of women in the classical texts, or surveys of contemporary attitudes and behavior, have given no reliable guides to change over time. Most scholars have treated the changing position of Indian women as a matter of intellectual or political history. It is true that social reform debate in late nineteenth-century India centered upon improvements in the position of women. Accepting the contemporary British administrative and missionary evaluations of the progress of civilizations according to the position of women, Indian men confronted their dilemma, put thus by a Bengali social reformer: “Indian women are the fishbone sticking in our throat; we cannot swallow them and we cannot get them out.”⁴ Many reforms were instituted to benefit women: the eradication of

the practice of *sati* (burning a widow with her husband's body); the raising of the legal age for marriage and sexual intercourse; the sanctioning of widow remarriage; the education of women. Western-educated social reformers helped develop the vernacular languages, using the spoken rather than the classical dialects, at least partly in an effort to reach female readers. Special vernacular literatures for women were developed in this way. But such literary and reform activities were led by men, and men principally engaged in them until the twentieth century. Nonetheless, though more radical reforms like widow remarriage made little headway, the growth of education for women, coupled with a rising age at marriage, had major and irreversible effects upon women and upon Indian social institutions.⁵

Social and political reforms also brought women into new spheres of public life. The nationalist movement included political reforms such as the vote for women and involved women as participants, especially under Gandhi's leadership.⁶ Women gained equal rights in the constitution of independent India. Thus the legal system and the political and social goals of the new nation provided a context in which some women could take advantage of new opportunities, and Indian women have achieved higher rates of participation in several public and professional areas than women in the United States.⁷

Sometimes the values sanctioning the increased participation of women in public life were traditional ones, as in the professions of medicine and higher education. In the first case, the treatment of Indian women by male physicians posed cultural problems, and female physicians filled a real need. Most women specialized in midwifery and gynaecology, and patients preferred married female physicians to unmarried ones. There was also family pressure for daughters to become doctors rather than nurses, for nursing was initially associated with polluting tasks and with Christian or Anglo-Indian practitioners, and, of course, a doctor's career was both prestigious and lucrative. Missionaries and the Indian government not only encouraged female medical students through the creation of separate schools and the provision of financial support, they also provided secure employment,⁸ so that Indian female doctors avoided the entrepreneurial activities associated with private medical practice.⁹ In the case of higher education, emphasis on the seclusion and purity of women necessitated the development of separate educational institutions and female faculties for female students and thus contributed to the high proportion of female academics in India today.¹⁰

Despite an improvement in the position of women in modern Indian society, evidenced by general patterns such as those above, it is hard to measure the extent to which women actually control their lives. That is the goal, however distant, against which any progress toward women's liberation must be measured, and that kind of change, in India, must be measured at the levels of family and caste. Social relations institutionalized at these levels most directly affect individual women. Whether one should analyze women in India by caste or class may become as crucial as the question of ethnicity or race versus class for the analysis and mobilization of women in the United States. But although the present state of knowledge of women in either category in India is very superficial, the caste unit appears to be the most promising

focus of investigation.¹¹ Uniform patterns of values and behavior have been imposed by caste ascription upon women, as upon men, although economic resources may determine the ability of caste members to carry out the prescribed normative patterns for their caste. Class within a caste is a very significant variable, and structural differences within the caste I have studied correlate with differences in control of economic resources.

Caste has been variously defined, sometimes quite broadly as a hierarchy of groups within a society, with group membership determined by birth. Even when defined this simply, caste contrasts with such social categories as class, kinship, and territorial community in the mode of recruitment of members (by birth ascription or acquired membership) and in its hierarchical aspects (castes ranked in necessary relation to others in a system).¹² Many scholars of India prefer more detailed definitions, adding structural and cultural characteristics such as endogamy, regulations governing inter-dining and other social interaction, hereditary occupation, concepts of purity and pollution, and such caste-specific attributes as life cycle ceremonies, dress, and diet.¹³ Scholars of India generally stress the corporate nature of each caste and also the caste system as a whole, and many focus upon problems of group or individual mobility within such a system. All of these more specific and unique definitions provide useful and significant measures by which changes in family and caste can be linked to wider societal change in the subcontinent.

Despite the work that has been done on family and caste in India, historical work on both institutions is far behind contemporary social science research. In addition, few scholars have focused on women. Work on the family and modernization in India has concentrated upon a possible transition from joint to nuclear family, household composition, and the life cycle of the family.¹⁴ The Indian family's strongly instrumental role in determining the marriages and occupations of children has led to studies of change in male occupational patterns. Studies of the transmission of property are few, and because until 1947 daughters could not inherit under most systems of Indian personal law, these studies, too, have chiefly concerned men.¹⁵ Village studies suffer the same limitations and have usually been conducted by men without access to female informants; they focus on public and therefore male activities. In North India, there is the added difficulty that the kinship system features village exogamy combined with patrilocal residence, so that the anthropologist's village has a population of families continuing in the male line. All married women in the village come from outside and their families are not included in the study. Even though cultural relationships between families allied by marriage have been delineated, few studies have actually documented marriage alliances in a given marriage network or caste over several generations.

Scholars working on caste and modernization have dealt with efforts to reform caste customs, with the organization of modern caste associations, with caste in politics, and with caste mobility through occupational change or rising income levels. These studies also focus upon men, and judging from these measures a number of castes display similar characteristics of modernity. But it is likely that a comparison of the characteristics of the women in those apparently similar castes would reveal sharp

differences in such variables as female age at marriage, extent and nature of education, and extent and mode of seclusion or movement outside the home. The merchant castes of Hyderabad city are a good example: the women of the Goswami, Komati, Jain, and Parsi communities contrast sharply in these and other variables, though the men share a similar class ranking and cluster of occupations.¹⁶ For comparative purposes, and for more accurate evaluation of a given caste's "modernity," consideration of the position of women will contribute a further and very significant set of measures.

Why family and caste history in India have remained relatively unexplored, when their potential contribution to an understanding of social change appears so obvious, is partly due to a problem of sources. It is true that the collection of basic genealogical materials is difficult. The lack of central civil or religious registration of Hindu births, marriages, and deaths does preclude family reconstitution and statistical analysis of the accuracy and on the scale of that by scholars working on family history in England, Europe, or the United States. But data can be collected on manageable caste populations from oral information and family records, and marriage networks can be reconstructed which go back to the eighteenth century. My own research data on the Kayasth caste of Hyderabad city in India includes almost four thousand individuals from the late eighteenth century to the present, divided into seven subcastes and belonging to some three hundred patrilineages or extended families. Analyzing this mass of data, first by hand and then by computer,¹⁷ the most striking changes concerned the position of women from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. The rapidly changing roles for women within the Kayasth caste have obvious implications with respect to social change for the caste as a whole and for the larger society.

In fact, the Kayasth caste has distinctive traditions and characteristics which make it a useful indicator of political and social change in India. An urban, literate, clerical caste, it became prominent with the establishment of the Mughal Empire in sixteenth-century India. Kayasth men learned Persian and worked for the Muslim rulers, contributing numerous political, military, and literary figures to the historical record. They have been portrayed as a mediating group between Muslim rulers and Hindu subjects,¹⁸ and they served the Mughals in Delhi and throughout the empire. When the Mughal provincial governor of the Deccan in the early eighteenth century, Nizam ul-Mulk, established his own independent dynasty there, some Kayasths were already in his service and more continued to migrate to the capital city of Hyderabad.¹⁹ Some became members of the Hyderabad nobility but most worked as record-keepers and administrators at lower levels of the bureaucracy.

These immigrant Kayasths from North India shared certain structural and cultural characteristics. Their hereditary occupation was government service and their mother tongue was Hindustani, then written in the Urdu script. In many ways, they were a typical high-ranking Hindu caste, following regulations governing marriages and social interaction patterned upon Brahminical models.²⁰ Those who settled in Hyderabad belonged to seven of the twelve subcastes of North Indian Kayasths, and these subcastes were themselves endogamous, with marriages traditionally arranged only within each subcaste.

Yet the Kayasths' tradition of service with Muslim rulers earned them a reputation for adaptability and cultural eclecticism. The strong occupational and cultural identification with Muslims left its mark in both public and private etiquette and dress, even in such domestic matters as personal names and diet. And the Kayasths in Hyderabad state under the Nizam remained part of a Mughlai culture and bureaucracy well into the twentieth century, while British rule elsewhere in India changed the language and traditions of administration. Thus the rapid political changes in twentieth-century India—*independence in 1947, the military takeover of Hyderabad state by India in 1948, and the reorganization of states in 1956 which made Hyderabad city the capital of a new Telugu-speaking state, Andhra Pradesh*—had an unusually strong impact upon such a caste. The changes within the Kayasth caste will be of comparative interest to others working on change in Indian society and should help to pinpoint where and why significant breakdowns of social control within family and caste units occur.

The variables that I found most useful in measuring change experienced and expressed by women of this caste were the following: (1) naming patterns; (2) age at marriage; (3) amount and kind of education; (4) employment outside the home, both before and after marriage and motherhood; (5) the ratio of never-married women to all women; (6) marriage across subcaste and caste lines; and (7) marriage in or out of birth order. While most of these variables were also significant for measuring changes experienced by men of the caste, they usually proved far more significant when applied to the women.

Naming patterns for women showed rapidly changing concepts of the place of women in the community from the late nineteenth century to the present. While men's names were recalled from the beginnings of the genealogies and were appropriate to the political context of their time, women's names could be recalled only as far back as the late-nineteenth century and then they proved to be rather limited in number. Women's names were short, almost like nicknames, characteristic of the caste and often used in combination with the appropriate kinship term.²¹ In the early twentieth century, names for girls began to draw on a wider frame of reference and there were fewer duplications; many girls were, like boys, named for popular nationalist figures and widely known literary and mythological characters. Parental expectations were reflected here, as parents increasingly viewed their daughters as people whose names might be known and used outside the family, potential participants in public life.

A second variable is the age at marriage. All castes had normative ages for the marriages of both girls and boys, but that for girls was more uniformly enforced since family purity was threatened by delay. A boy's marriage could be delayed without such consequences, and he could also be remarried at a later age. Among the Hyderabad Kayasths, the average age of girls at marriage in the late nineteenth century was six, and it has moved steadily upward. The average is now about twenty and marriages of women as late as age thirty are not uncommon.²²

The next variable, amount and kind of education, is related to age at marriage, and shows a similarly dramatic rise. As the age at marriage rose, girls remained in their parental homes longer (though they had seldom joined their husbands before puberty in any case) and received more training there. Girls in this caste were very rarely lit-

erate in the late nineteenth century. The first to be educated were tutored at home by relatives, in their mother tongue or in the language of religious texts. The first girls' school for caste members was founded in 1931 and did not offer an academic curriculum until the 1940s; the second caste school for girls, a domestic science school, was founded in the late 1940s. By the 1950s, Hyderabad state had become part of India and the languages and system of education had changed considerably.²³ By the end of that decade, half of the Kayasth female children were in schools with regular academic curriculums, learning English and other languages useful for higher education and employment. (In contrast, Kayasth boys had been studying English in increasing numbers since the 1860s.) Since the 1970s, even the poorest families have sent their daughters through elementary school, while middle- and upper-class families send their daughters to college. And a significant percentage of the current generation of women is attaining higher academic and professional degrees.²⁴

Employment is also closely aligned with the educational trends.²⁵ No Kayasth women worked outside the home in 1900. A very few vernacular-educated women taught in the caste schools for girls in the 1930s and 1940s. Now, of 102 teachers in the Mathur subcaste, 70 are women. In the same subcaste, there are now 6 female physicians, representing some 8 percent of all doctors in the caste.²⁶ While Kayasth women work predominantly as teachers and as doctors or scientific researchers, some are employed as radio technicians and in other miscellaneous jobs. Marriage and motherhood do not have a negative effect upon employment. In fact, the preference is for women to work after rather than before marriage, so that parental arrangement of marriages is not endangered by the association of single women with men in an occupational setting.

While the data shows rapid and striking changes in the life experience of Kayasth women over three or four generations, to interpret it as direct evidence of women's liberation would not be justified. These developments can be related more directly to the family as such, for family welfare rather than personal autonomy appears to be the major consideration behind these changes.²⁷ Decisions concerning an Indian girl's education and employment are still made primarily by others, as both my data and the more general literature suggest. And these decisions and the support system they require—the socialization process for adolescent girls, the system of arranged marriages, and the structure and function of the extended family and/or household—must be related to traditional family and caste values and structures.

The socialization process for girls in India, particularly at middle and upper levels of society, has interesting implications for their career prospects. An Indian adolescence emphasizes continued stability and personal development within the context of the family, rather than disruption and crisis. Girls at middle and upper levels of Indian society are encouraged to concentrate on their education, whether for cultural, practical, or diversionary reasons. While they are socialized into a feminine role, they are not subjected to those conditions of female adolescence found in most Western countries that generate emotional tensions and deflect attention from educational and career goals. Girls in the United States, for example, are responsible for arranging their own

marriages, and for most of them it is still the case that matrimony is considered more important than, and usually in direct conflict with, a career. During the more sheltered and less competitive Indian adolescence, girls do not fully develop as individuals, but rather their self-concepts are closely tied to their families and they derive considerable security from that tie.²⁸

The adolescent stage of life ends with the arranged marriage, the institution largely responsible for the relative absence of role conflict during adolescence in India.²⁹ Arranged marriages provide major support for career women in several significant ways. The system is still utilized by most families even at “Westernized” levels of Indian society and ensures nearly universal marriage for Indian girls. Before the 1950s, marriage or career did sometimes seem to be exclusive of one another—educated girls did not expect to have careers after marriage, and professional women often remained single.³⁰ But this appears to have been a transitional stage.³¹ Secondary sources indicate that before about 1950, education for girls was sought chiefly for its cultural value and for its use in the home; more recent sources indicate that degrees for girls are now sought for the purpose of pursuing a career.³²

Why is the educated bride now permitted to pursue a career? Here we are on familiar ground, for in both the United States and India living comfortably is important, and if a woman works for the economic benefit of the family it is readily justified. Marriage arrangements for daughters with good career prospects have apparently ceased to present special difficulties, and such daughters have an acknowledged market value. Marriage advertisements are as likely to state the degrees and salaries of the girls as of the boys. The profitable employment of an educated bride can be a welcome asset and win support and security for her in her new home. Just as a girl’s cultural and domestic accomplishments formerly weighed more heavily in the marriage choice than the details of her appearance, now her earning power can be judged as a contribution to the household and family.

An arranged marriage offers other advantages. The issue of whether or not a girl will work after marriage will normally be settled as an alliance is arranged. Should both husband and wife pursue careers, the possibility of widely disparate ranking in their respective careers can be avoided.³³ If a potential bride’s career prospects clearly outrank the groom’s, that particular match will be avoided. In most Western marriages, such decisions and possibilities usually arise after marriage as new and separate issues and prove to be sources of conflict; in the Indian case, a bride’s role in the economy of her future home is determined and understood beforehand by all concerned.

Other features of Indian family and social structure support the career woman even after the birth of children, for care of the household and of children are customarily diffused among members of the extended family and servants whenever possible. Even though family units may now be smaller in urban areas, it is still common to have relatives in the home or nearby,³⁴ and servants are still available, though they may be new ones hired on a cash basis rather than old family retainers.³⁵ Furthermore, an Indian mother is not subjected to the pattern of child-centered duties and activities enjoined upon most mothers in American society. Publicly-demonstrated conformity to such a

public pattern has not yet impinged upon the more heterogeneous and private patterns of Indian family life. Nor does Indian society emphasize woman's role as consumer, the commercial exploitation of which can be blamed for much of the retrogressive development of "femininity" in recent decades in the United States. Rather the men and servants of a family carry out most of the purchasing duties in India. Finally, a more recent factor is that maternity leaves and child-care facilities are accepted and in many cases required practices in India.³⁶

Although the changes outlined above demonstrate that quantifiable changes in the position of women are not necessarily related to the personal liberation of women, these and other functional and structural changes nevertheless conflict with traditional cultural concepts about women and are bringing about further changes in the position of women. Some of these changes are more directly concerned with such personal values as autonomy.

Such a variable is represented in the percentage of single or never-married women—a factor that helps establish a transition period for changing concepts about women which differs according to caste. Earlier surveys found that the first generation of highly educated women in particular castes tended to remain unmarried, and it has been argued that education and its relationship to marriage arrangements is best understood in the context of each separate caste.³⁷ Since the percentage of single women was close to zero among most castes, and certainly among the Kayasths, even small variations become significant. In my Kayasth data, this transition period featuring very late marriages or no marriages for highly educated women pursuing careers ends in the 1960s.³⁸ As more research is done, this transition period should be found to be a recurring theme in patterns of caste modernization, and should indicate the lag between a caste group's production of educated career women and full acceptance of them as family members through their inclusion by marriage.

The remaining variables indicate a weakening of parental control and increasing possibilities for women to choose their marriage partners or plan their own futures. These variables, too, center upon the institution of marriage, and they measure more radical structural changes in family and caste patterns. The variable of marriage across subcaste and caste or community lines proved significant. Here I found two distinct patterns in my data, and a breakdown by class proved essential to differentiate between them. The first wave of such (then) deviant or prohibited marriages began in the 1880 but these marriages were correlated with poverty in the caste. They were motivated by an inability to make more orthodox arrangements and they usually occurred between members of two Kayasth subcastes in a common residential area. There was no pattern of preference for the taking or giving of daughters between participating families or subcastes, indicating that the families were equally impoverished and unable to enforce any system of ranking.³⁹ But the second significant incidence of such marriages across subcaste lines began in the 1930s and involved families at higher income levels. These marriages were often initiated by men in the modern administration or new professions, particularly those who engaged in social reform activities. These more recent marriages across subcaste lines were correlated with wealth and high occupational

status. Since the 1940s the direction in which daughters moved has indicated the relative status of families and subcastes within the Kayasth caste.⁴⁰

Still a third pattern, of “love marriages” across subcaste, caste, or community lines, can be discerned and analyzed over time. In these cases, parental control was and is defied, and such marriages have steadily increased since the nineteenth century. While a small percentage of Kayasth men always kept or married women from subcastes other than their own, such liaisons or marriages were extremely rare for Kayasth women before the 1940s. But such marriages by Kayasth women now occur, and genealogies record husbands from Muslim, Sikh, and merchant castes. (The range of non-Kayasth wives is still wider, including also Brahmans, Australians, and Americans.)⁴¹

Marriage out of birth order, a variable Daniel Smith found significant in documenting declining parental control in late eighteenth century Massachusetts,⁴² is probably an even more significant measure in Indian society. In my Kayasth data, daughters rarely married out of birth order prior to the 1930s, and when it occurs now, as it does at an increasing rate, it appears to mean that a younger daughter has successfully imposed her choice of a husband upon the family. It may just as legitimately indicate greater autonomy on the part of prospective husbands. Even so, it is statistically more significant in the case of women because of their “ceiling” marriageable age and the provision of at least a minimal dowry by parents,⁴³ factors that require more preparation and planning for the marriages of daughters than for sons. In the case of sons, educational and occupational training has caused more fluctuation in the age at and order of marriage in both the past and present.

Fertility in marriage is a potentially useful variable concerning the growth of female autonomy.⁴⁴ My data is of doubtful validity until the last two generations, because until then the records did not note children who did not survive to marriageable age, and because of inconsistent recording of children by sequential wives. More accurate data, correlated with measures of improved health conditions and medical services in Hyderabad city, could be used to show family limitation, and this trend might be more strongly correlated with the attributes and achievements of married women than with those of their husbands.

There are other variables that can be used to discover and date stages in the breakdown of parental and caste control of women. One is the decline in the arrangement of multiple marriages between two families, such as the “exchange” marriage of a brother and sister to a sister and brother, perhaps even upon the same occasion.⁴⁵ Not only were dowries saved, but a joint marriage ceremony cut the expenses considerably. Multiple marriages also occurred between distant branches of the participating families and over several generations, and they were arranged for reasons of mutual convenience and proven congeniality between families as well as for economy. While such family-oriented reasons still hold today, such patterns have almost disappeared because of the consultation with prospective individual brides and grooms concerning their marriage arrangements now.

There have also been changes in the correlation between wealth and age at marriage.⁴⁶ This is an interesting variable for Indian society, because it seems to show

changing values regarding age at marriage and subcaste endogamy. Earlier, the poorer Kayasth families chose to continue pre-puberty marriages for their daughters at the expense of maintaining subcaste endogamy,⁴⁷ while families with more resources married off their daughters at a later age and were more concerned with subcaste or caste endogamy. Now, a daughter's increasing age is a less important consideration than a "proper" alliance at all income levels, but a "proper" alliance is defined less often by subcaste and caste affiliation and more often by occupational and income level.⁴⁸

Very recently, scattered instances of divorce, remarriage, and inheritance by daughters within the caste indicate that these matters will be important measures of personal autonomy for women. These cases show women obtaining legal and economic support to assert their independence, in marked contrast to earlier cases of degradation or forced religious conversion that followed upon women's total dependence upon husbands and families.⁴⁹

The data on the Hyderabad Kayasths demonstrates the usefulness of specific, largely structural, variables to measure change in the position of women within the caste and changes affecting the caste as a whole. Some of the conflicts produced can not be resolved in traditional ways, and thus cultural assumptions concerning women in India are changing and will continue to change.⁵⁰ For example, the extension of kinship ties to individuals from outside one's own subcaste or caste does violence to the cultural model underlying the Bengali kinship system, which is probably the model for North Indian (and therefore Kayasth) kinship as well.⁵¹ The concepts of shared and exchanged physical and moral (substance and code) relationships which integrate kinsmen in that system obviously cannot persist when marriage partners are drawn from outside the circle of blood relationship or caste, and the key position of the woman in that system, as "half-body" of her husband and the link between her family and his, must be conceived of differently. But cultural or cognitive analysis of changing family and caste patterns must build upon careful studies of structural change in these units. The variables concerning women appear to give the most promising index for the measurement of such change; they certainly enhance our understanding of the changing opportunities for women in modern India.

NOTES

¹Excellent articles are those by Hanna Papanek, "Purdah: Separate Worlds and Symbolic Shelter," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15, no. 3 (June 1973): 289-325 and Shirley Lindenbaum, "Women and the Left Hand: Social Status and Symbolism in East Pakistan," *Mankind* 6, no. 11 (June 1968): 537-44. For a more general discussion, see David Mandelbaum, *Society in India* 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), vol. I, parts 2 and 3.

²The quotation is from R. S. Khara, "Hierarchy and Hypergamy: Some Interrelated Aspects Among the Kanya-Kubja Brahmans," *American Anthropologist* 74, no. 3 (June 1972): 621. See also Mandelbaum, *Society in India*, I:99, for this analysis.

³Shirley Lindenbaum, "The Value of Women," paper presented at the Ninth Annual Bengal Conference, 1973.

⁴Sivanath Sastri in a speech at the Rajahmundry Town Hall in 1890, as reported in a letter of Reverend H. C. Schmidt in *The Foreign Missionary* 12, no. 2 (February 1891): 14.

⁵See John G. Leonard, "Viresalingam and the Making of Modern Andhra," unpublished ms, 1968, chapters 4 and 5, and his "Kandukuri Viresalingam, 1848-1919," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970), chapters 5, 6, and 7. A forthcoming book by John G. and Karen Leonard, *Education and Progress: Social Reform Movements in Nineteenth Century South India*, will focus more explicitly on women's issues.

⁶A typical account is that of Manmohan Kaur, *Role of Women in the Freedom Movement, 1857-1947* (New Delhi: Sterling, 1968). For Gandhi's view of the complementarity of the sexes, see Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, *Woman's Role in Society* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1959).

⁷Muriel Wasi, ed., *The Educated Woman in India* (Bombay: Tata-McGraw-Hill, 1971) contains excellent studies and further references. For comparison, see Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, *Woman's Place, Options and Limits on Professional Careers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

⁸Margaret I. Balfour and Ruth Young, *The Work of Medical Women in India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1929). See also the accounts by Dr. Hilda Lazarus in *Women in Modern India: Fifteen Papers by Indian Women Writers*, ed., Evelyn C. Gedge (Bombay: D. B. Taraporewala, 1929) and Dr. Sushilla Nayer in *Women in the New Asia*, ed., Barbara F. Ward (Paris: UNESCO, 1965). Margaret L. Cormack noted family preferences in *The Hindu Woman* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), pp. 159-60.

⁹There has been an observed preference for government or other bureaucratic medical service by female doctors in the United States too: Epstein, *Woman's Place*, pp. 151-66 and 171. Female lawyers might fit this pattern as well, for they often specialized as government advisors to Court of Wards cases involving women in purdah, as Tata indicates in her article in Gedge, *Women in Modern India*.

¹⁰See Lakshmi Misra, *Education of Women in India, 1921-1966* (New York: MacMillan & Co., 1966) and the articles by Dr. Sushila Mehta and Santokh Singh Anant in *Crises in Indian Universities*, ed., G. S. Manusukhani (Bombay: Oxford and IBH Publishing Company, 1972).

¹¹Some have looked at urban units to partially explain improved conditions for women: Gerald D. Berreman, "Women's Roles and Politics: India and the United States," reprinted by the Berkeley South Asia Series from *Readings in General Sociology*, eds., R. W. O'Brien et al. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969) and, implicitly, McKim Marriott, "Multiple Reference in Indian Caste Systems," in *Social Mobility in the Caste System in India*, ed., J. Silverberg (The Hague: Mouton, 1968). Scholars of other countries often explain the prominence of women in India by class. See, for example, David Reisman, intro. to Jessie Bernard, *Academic Women* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1964); Epstein, *Woman's Place*, pp. 145-46; William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (New York: Free Press, 1963). But scholars of India find this insufficient: Berreman, "Women's Roles and Politics," p. 70, and Papanek, "Purdah," p. 292. The significance of the caste unit for the study of women is pointed to by Papanek, "Purdah," pp. 293 and 298-99, and by Doranne Jacobson, "Purdah in Central India," unpublished paper presented at the American Anthropological Association Meetings, New Orleans, 1969, and cited by Papanek, "Purdah," p. 304.

¹²I am following Berreman here, who discusses the structure, function, and psychology of caste and other systems of social organization at length in De Vos and Wagatsuma, *Japan's Invisible Race* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

¹³The excellent discussion by McKim Marriott and Ronald Inden, "Caste Systems," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia* (Chicago: Helen H. Benton, 1974) 3:982-91, includes further references.

¹⁴The most recent such publication, which conveniently includes an annotated bibliography, is A.M. Shah, *The Household Dimension of the Family in India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974). He omits, however, Sylvia Vatuk *Kinship and Urbanization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

¹⁵For example, a work on Ceylon such as G. Obeyesekere, *Land Tenure in Village Ceylon* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967) has material on daughters' marriages and transmission of property, while a comparable study on India such as that by Thomas G. Kessinger, *Vilyatpur 1848-1968* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) does not have such material. His study of peasant families in a North Indian village is based entirely on male property groups. Although recent changes in Hindu inheritance law are gradually being implemented, the marriage and inheritance records maintained by Islamic authorities might enable one to study women and the transmission of property in Muslim communities for earlier periods in India.

¹⁶The Goswamis, for example, were only a male "caste" composed of gurus and their students who inherited the business through adoption, and legitimate marriages to women from other castes began only two generations ago. The Komatis only just produced their first female B.A., while the Parsi women have been highly educated for several generations.

¹⁷A preliminary version of this "caste history" up to the twentieth century is part of my dissertation, "The Kayasths of Hyderabad City," (University of Wisconsin, 1969). Unfortunately, I have not completed the computer analysis for the variables to be discussed, and thus cannot give specific figures.

¹⁸Yusuf Husain, "Les Kayasthas, ou 'scribes,' caste Hindoue Iranisee, et la culture musulmane dans l'Inde," *Revue des Etudies Islamiques* 1 (1927): 455-58; Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 105-106.

¹⁹Karen Leonard, "The Hyderabad Political System and Its Participants," *Journal of Asian Studies* 30, no. 3 (May 1971): 569-82.

²⁰Most sources for these North Indian, or Chitragupta, Kayasths are in Urdu. Some English sources include Gopi Nath Sinha Varma, *A Peep into the Origin, Status, and History of the Kayasthas*, 2 vols. (Bareilly, 1929 and 1935); William L. Rowe, "Mobility in the Nineteenth-Century Caste System," in *Structure and Change in Indian Society*, eds., Milton Singer and Bernard S. Cohn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 201-207; and Pandit Raghuvara Mitthulal Shastri, "A Comprehensive Study into the Origin and Status of the Kayasthas," *Man in India* 11, no. 2 (1931): 116-59.

²¹Examples: Gajra bibi, Silu bibi, Devi Rani, Lalta bibi, Jugna bibi, Choti bibi, Lal Devi, and so forth. Bibi means wife.

²²Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns*, pp. 232-36. A more successful general discussion of the importance of this and related variables is that by D. C. Dubey and Amita Bardhan, *Status of Women and Fertility in India* (New Delhi: National Institute of Family Planning, 1972).

²³Persian, Urdu, and English had been the languages of the administration and professions, while women tended to learn Hindi. Now Telugu, Hindi, and English are most useful for government and professional service. Most of the Kayasth schools have been taken over by the government or by the Hindi Pracher Sabha.

²⁴The medical profession is preferred by both young women and men of this caste today.

²⁵Papanek, "Purdah," p. 299 remarks on the correlation between higher education for women and lower levels of observance of purdah or seclusion, and many other sources support the correlation between education and employment for Indian women today. I will list them here: Rhoda Goldstein, *Indian Women in Transition* (New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1972); Aileen D. Ross, *The Hindu Family in its Urban Setting* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967); Promila Kapur, *Marriage and the Working Woman in India* (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1970); P. Kapur, *Love, Marriage and Sex* (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1973); P. Sengupta, *Women Workers of India* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1960); Rama Mehta, *The Western Educated Hindu Woman* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1970); and Vatuk, *Kinship and Urbanization*.

²⁶This subcaste was led by the most prominent Kayasth noble family in Hyderabad State, and family and caste controls are still strong within it. Doctors are concentrated in only a few of the families and preferential marriage patterns now ally them with families of doctors in the other subcastes. Thus there are several cases where both spouses are doctors.

²⁷The sources cited in footnote 25 support this interpretation.

²⁸Cormack, *The Hindu Woman*, pp. 173-93.

²⁹The best discussion of adolescence, which makes comparisons over two generations, is Mehta, *The Western Educated Hindu Woman*, Cormack, *The Hindu Woman*, and Ross, *The Hindu Family in its Urban Setting*, also discuss this and base their work, too, upon upper and middle-class informants.

³⁰Thus Cormack stated in *The Hindu Woman* (published first in 1953), p. 157: "It is impossible to discuss the single woman except in relation to education and the professions, as it is virtually only through them that the single woman exists in India today."

³¹Compare Cormack's concern, *ibid.*, and pp. 159-60 of *The Hindu Woman* with her perception on her 1959 visit to India that education, marriage, and career were no longer in conflict (*She Who Rides a Peacock* [New York: Praeger, 1961]), p. 3. See also Mehta, *The Western Educated Hindu Woman*, where both generations interviewed thought it possible to have both marriage and career; marriage was taken for granted, having a career still depended upon certain factors being present.

³²Mehta, *The Western Educated Hindu Woman*, pp. 33-48 and 164-69; Ross, *The Hindu Family*, pp. 64, 206, 210-14; Dube in Ward, *Women in the New Asia*, p. 195.

³³Epstein, *Woman's Place*, pp. 121-22, discusses this problem with respect to Western society.

³⁴Ross, *The Hindu Family*, chap. 2; K. M. Kapadia, *Marriage and Family in India* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1966), chap. 12; and Mehta, *The Western Educated Hindu Woman*, particularly chap. 9.

³⁵This is actually preferable from the point of view of the working woman, for it will require less in the way of her supervision, participation, and reciprocal obligations.

³⁶"Maternity Protection and Benefits in 92 Countries," *Women in the World Today*, International Report no. 6, June 1963, reprinted by the Women's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor. Some of the relevant legislation is summarized in Dubey and Bardhan, *Status of Women and Fertility in India*, pp. 41-42. Indian concepts of sex and occupational roles evidently differ considerably from concepts in the United States. Discussions of masculinity and femininity in India such as that by Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 162-66, and of compartmentalization between the spheres of work and home such as that by Milton Singer, *When a Great Tradition Modernizes* (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 320-35, serve as brief introductions to this whole complex area.

³⁷Mandelbaum, *Society in India*, I:108, and Papanek, "Purdah," p. 299.

³⁸I have a few cases of single professional women who should have married in the 1960s, and, among the Mathurs, some young women married in their late twenties and then only with the aid of a generous dowry.

³⁹Certain Bhatnagar, Srivastava, Saksena, and Gaur families could be said to form a pool for such marriages, and this pool included a few families of non-Kayasth or mixed ancestry from the same sections of the city.

⁴⁰Thus the Asthanas would both take girls from and give girls to some of the Saksenas, but they would only take girls from the Mathurs. At the same time, they gave girls to Srivastava families of wealth and status of North India but avoided alliances with local Srivastava families.

⁴¹While the instances are still statistically few, there seems to be a correlation between such marriages for women and movement away from Hyderabad, when all marriages concluded overseas are excluded from the analysis.

⁴²My general debt to the work of Daniel Scott Smith is quite evident. His dissertation, "Population, Family and Society in Hingham, Massachusetts, 1635-1880," (University of California, Berkeley, 1972), proposes most of the measures I have found valuable for my Indian data. One of his favorite variables, the rate of premarital pregnancy, cannot be used in studying India because of the lack of precise recorded dates for marriages and births.

⁴³Although the Hyderabad Kayasths did not follow the more formal and expensive dowry system of North Indian Kayasths, they did furnish household and personal items to a daughter upon her marriage. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns*, conveys the confusing results when unrelated surveys and units of analysis are used to generalize about these factors; clearly we need

more information on dowry and bride price for caste and community units in India.

⁴⁴Daniel Smith examined fertility as an index of “domestic feminism” in nineteenth-century America, in *Feminist Studies* 1, no. 3/4 (Winter-Spring 1973): 40-57, reprinted in *Clio’s Consciousness Raised*, eds., Mary Hartman and Lois Banner (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). The Indian government’s efforts to limit fertility will complicate contemporary use of this variable, particularly when the signature of one’s mother-in-law, required to obtain a loop in some distribution centers, is taken into consideration.

⁴⁵Among the Kayasths, such marriages were termed “leen-deen” or “aatha-saatha” (give-take or come-with) in Urdu.

⁴⁶Wealth was closely correlated with uniform early marriage of daughters in eighteenth century Massachusetts, but this correlation ceased in the nineteenth century as marriage became more individually determined: Daniel Smith, “Parental Power and Marriage Patterns,” *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 35, no. 3 (August 1973): 419-28.

⁴⁷This explanation was offered by informants, at any rate, although other correlations may prove as important.

⁴⁸Again, the complexity and volume of my twentieth century materials makes these statements far more general than I would like and than use of a computer will allow.

⁴⁹In one case, when a husband converted to Islam in order to take as his second wife the Muslim woman with whom he had fallen in love, the Kayasth wife’s family was too poor to take her back. She also converted and remained with her husband, but she sent her son to her parents to be brought up as a Hindu while her daughters became part of the Muslim family.

⁵⁰Some beautiful examples can be found in contemporary literature and the arts in India. Raja Rao’s novel, *Kanthapura* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974) shows the effect of the nationalist movement on women in a village. The films of Satyajit Ray are particularly sensitive portrayals of the changing position of women in India—*Devi*, *Charulata*, and *Mahanagar* shown in sequence, for example.

⁵¹Ronald Inden and Ralph Nicholas, “A Cultural Analysis of Bengali Kinship,” in *Prelude to Crisis: Bengal and Bengal Studies in 1970*, ed., Peter Bertocci (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1972), and more recent unpublished manuscripts.