Creating Partisans:
The Organizational Roots of New Parties in Latin America

by

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Abstract

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The frequent emergence of new parties is a feature of democracies almost everywhere. While most of these new parties remain ephemeral, some manage to establish stable ties with voters and win substantial electoral support over repeated elections. This divergence raises the question why some new parties are able to take root in society, establish stable ties with voters, and successfully compete in elections over time, while others fail to do so.

Despite a vibrant literature on both the stability of party identification and de-alignment away from traditional parties, we do not have a good understanding yet of why some new parties succeed in taking root in society, while others fail to do so. This dissertation attempts to fill this gap. It explores different paths that new parties take to build mass support, i.e. to secure electoral support and build partisan attachments in the electorate, in the context of the recent wave of party formation in Latin America. It seeks to explain how new parties come to choose different mobilization strategies and how voters in turn respond to these different party strategies.

With the decline of unions, which played a central role in the historic founding of mass parties, much of the recent literature has concentrated on parties' *direct* appeals to voters and explained variation in success to secure support in terms of the type of direct appeals, e.g. based on class vs. ethnic interests or identities or charismatic appeals. In this study, I consider different types of direct appeals and also explore *organizationally mediated* strategies, i.e. appeals that engage voters through societal organizations. I find that organizationally mediated strategies can secure electoral support very effectively and yield durable voter ties by socializing organization members into identifying with the party. Even though the mediating role that civil society organizations can play has been

largely overlooked with the decline of labor unions, new types of organizations—particularly indigenous organizations, peasant unions, and informal sector unions—play similarly important roles in democratic societies today. While the existing scholarship has examined the formation of these organizations and their role in politicizing ethnic or class cleavages, little attention has been paid to the various ways in which different forms of party-organization linkages might influence vote choice and the emergence of partisanship.

The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I explain the adoption of different party mobilization strategies by focusing on the intra-elite dynamics during parties' founding moments, the period before the party contests its first major election. Two features of the founding moments—one internal to the new party, the other one external to it—are key: (1) the cohesion of the coalition of party leaders and organizational allies and (2) the credibility of other attractive parties in the party system. These factors shape early-on whether a party-organization tie becomes institutionalized by adopting routinized rules and mechanisms that govern how candidates will be selected and factional disagreements will be settled. Whether party-organization ties become institutionalized, in turn, establishes whether a new party can rely on organizationally mediated strategies or is restricted to employing direct appeals only. Furthermore, I argue that the institutionalization of a linkage can provide the basis for different types of organizationally mediated strategies and resulting party structures, depending on the structure and resources of the organizational allies.

In order to explain new parties' ability to create mass support, I then focus on voters' responses to the different party strategies, in a second step. I show that organizationally mediated appeals can help parties obtain electoral support more effectively than most types of direct appeals. Furthermore, if the underlying party-organization linkages are institutionalized, mediated appeals also yield durable voter-party ties by socializing organization members into identifying with the party itself. Drawing on social identity and self-categorization theory, I contend that societal organizations, which serve as highly relevant and immediate reference groups to their members, provide social spaces in which socialization into new parties can occur, if the organization is organically linked to a party.

This argument is tested in the context of the recent wave of party formation in Latin America. My dissertation compares three major new parties, Bolivia's MAS, Ecuador's Alianza PAIS, and Mexico's MORENA, with each other and with other new parties. Using a multi-method research strategy based on 24 months of fieldwork in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico, this research combines insights from over 230 in-depth interviews with representatives of parties and societal organizations with analyses of original and existing surveys, census data, and election returns, archival research, ethnographic work, and a series of novel experiments conducted in the field.

To my parents

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Chapter 1

Introduction: The Organizational Roots of New Parties

Across the world, we see new political parties emerging over and over again. In particular in recent decades, the regular emergence of new parties—both from the left and the right—appears to be a feature of democracies almost everywhere. While new parties arise frequently even in well-established, historic democracies with allegedly 'frozen party systems' in Western Europe,[1] this happens even more frequently in young democracies. In fact, many new democracies have been characterized by unstable party systems and frequent entry of new parties, often displacing prior parties. While most of these new parties remain ephemeral and fall into oblivion after one or two elections, some actually manage to establish stable ties with voters and win substantial electoral support over repeated elections.

This raises the question how some new parties are able to take root in society, establish stable ties with voters, and successfully compete in elections over time, while others fail to do so. What explains the variation in success to create stable mass support across new parties, i.e. to secure electoral support and build partisan attachments in the electorate? In asking these questions, this analysis seeks

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[1] In recent years alone, new parties such as Podemos and Ciudadanos-Partido de la Ciudadanía (Ciudadanos; Citizens-Party of the Citizenry) in Spain, Syriza in Greece, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom, the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S; Five Star Movement) in Italy, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD; Alternative for Germany) in Germany, the Dansk Folkeparti (DF; Danish People's Party) in Denmark, the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV; Party for Freedom) in the Netherlands have made the headlines and, in many cases, significant inroads in popular elections. This is not a new phenomenon either. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens) in Germany, the Front National (National Front) in France, and the Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party) in Norway are just a few examples of parties founded in the 1970s/1980s that have had a lasting influence on politics in their respective countries and still enjoy substantial support today.

to explain mass support for new parties. In doing so, it distinguishes two closely related but conceptually separate dimensions to this outcome: new parties' ability to (1) secure electoral support and (2) build partisan attachments in the electorate.

While the stability of party identification,[2] the de-alignment away from traditional parties,[3] and to a lesser extent the causes behind the emergence of new parties have received a lot of attention,[4] we do not have a good understanding yet of why some new parties succeed in taking root in society, securing stable electoral support, and building a partisan base, while others fail to do so. This study attempts to fill this gap. It explores the different paths that new parties can take to build mass support, which ultimately determines their long-term success or failure. Thereby, I aim to explain both how new parties come to choose different mobilization strategies in the first place as well as how voters then respond to these different party strategies.

I study these issues in the context of the recent wave of party formation in Latin America. Following the neoliberal reforms in the 1980s/1990s, many traditional parties in countries across the region were discredited, quickly lost electoral support, and, in many cases, virtually disappeared.[5] In the most extreme cases, this crisis of representation culminated in the complete collapse of the party systems, as, for example, in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. In other cases, some of the established parties have survived but the disruption in the party system led to the collapse of one or multiple major parties, as for example in Argentina, or caused longstanding dominant parties, such as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico, to lose their hold on power.[6] Along with this rupture in party systems across the region, which left many voters without attachments to any political party, we have witnessed a major wave of party formation.

The parties that are part of this recent episode of party formation vary greatly in terms of their capacity to secure stable electoral support, their ability to establish stable ties with voters, the strength of their party organizations, and their potential to effectively link society and the state. Some of these new parties, such as Bolivia's Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) or Brazil's Partido dos

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[2] For example, see Campbell et al. (1960), Green and Palmquist (1994), Green et al. (2002), Miller and Shanks (1996), and Schickler and Green (1997).

[3] For example, see Lupu (2014, 2016b), Mair et al. (2004), Roberts (2014), and Seawright (2012).

[4] For example, see Arriola (2013), Bruhn (2012), Hale (2006), Hicken (2009), Kalyvas (1996), Kitschelt (1989), LeBas (2011), Levitsky et al. (2016), and Riedl (2014).

[5] For explanations of the demise of the traditional parties, see Dietz and Myers (2007), Lupu (2014), Roberts (2014), and Seawright (2012).

[6] For explanations of the decline of the PRI as a dominant party, see Greene (2007) and Magaloni (2006).

Trabalhadores (PT), resemble traditional "mass integration" parties (Kirchheimer 1966, 184) with enduring ties to voters, as indicated by stable rates of voter identification and lowered electoral volatility. Other parties with a similar platform, such as Ecuador's Alianza Patria Altiva i Soberana (Alianza PAIS), failed to establish stable ties with voters.

I investigate the trajectories of major new parties in this episode of party formation by comparing the types of linkages new parties forge to voters through different mobilization strategies. Much of the recent literature has concentrated on parties' direct appeals to voters and explained variation in success to secure support based on the type of direct appeals, e.g. based on ethnic or class interests or identities or personalistic appeals. In this study, I consider different types of direct appeals and also explore *organizationally mediated* strategies, i.e. appeals that engage voters through societal organizations. More specifically, I argue that organizationally mediated strategies can secure electoral support more effectively than most direct appeals and yield durable voter ties by socializing organization members into identifying with the party. Even though the mediating role that civil society organizations can play has been largely overlooked with the decline of labor unions, I contend that more recent types of organizations—such as indigenous organizations, neighborhood associations, and informal sector unions—play similarly important roles in democratic societies today. Such organizations, formed around fundamental political group identities or interests, play crucial roles in the everyday lives of large segments of the population in Latin America. Members usually have very immediate, regular face-to-face contact with these organizations (usually at the local level). While the existing scholarship has examined the formation of these organizations and their role in politicizing class and ethnic identities, little attention has been paid to the various ways in which different forms of party-organization linkages might influence vote choice and the emergence of partisanship.

The argument proceeds in two steps. In a first step, which is elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3, I focus on parties' founding moments, the period before the party contests its first major election. The intra-elite dynamics during those founding moments explain the adoption of different party mobilization strategies: the primary use of direct appeals to voters versus the additional use of organizationally mediated strategies. Any contemporary party will, at least to some extent, try to appeal directly to voters. More specifically, it will directly communicate substantive/programmatic and/or descriptive appeals through, for example, speeches or advertisements spread through mass media. However, while some parties rely primarily or exclusively on such *direct appeals*, other new parties also heavily invest in organizational structures, i.e. develop linkages with societal organizations or build proper party branches, and use *organizationally mediated strategies*, i.e. appeals that build ties to voters through societal organizations.

As I will show, two features of the founding moments—one internal to the new party, the other one external to it—are key: (1) the cohesion of the coalition of party leaders and organizational allies and (2) the credibility of other attractive parties in the party system. These factors have long-lasting consequences for party-organization relationships. They shape early on whether a party-organization tie becomes institutionalized by adopting routinized rules and mechanisms that govern how candidates will be selected and factional disagreements will be settled. Whether party-organization ties become institutionalized, in turn, establishes whether a new party can rely on organizationally mediated strategies or is restricted to employing direct appeals only. Furthermore, I argue that the institutionalization of a linkage can provide the basis for different types of organizationally mediated strategies and resulting party structures, depending on the structure and resources of the organizational allies.

In order to explain new parties' ability to create mass support, I then focus on voters' responses to the different party strategies, in a second step, in Chapters 4 and 5. I show that organizationally mediated appeals can help parties obtain electoral support more effectively than most types of direct appeals. Furthermore, if the underlying party-organization linkages are institutionalized, mediated appeals also yield durable voter-party ties by socializing organization members into identifying with the party itself. Drawing on social identity and self-categorization theory, I contend that societal organizations, which serve as highly relevant and immediate reference groups to their members, provide social spaces in which socialization into new parties can occur, if the organization is organically linked to a party.

This argument is based on an analysis of the recent wave of party formation in Latin America. The study compares three major new parties, Bolivia's MAS, Ecuador's Alianza PAIS, and Mexico's Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (MORENA),[7] with each other and with other new parties. Using a multi-method research strategy based on 24 months of fieldwork in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico, this research combines insights from over 230 in-depth interviews with representatives of parties and societal organizations with analyses of original and existing surveys, census data, and election returns, archival research, ethnographic work, and a series of novel experiments conducted in the field.

The three principal parties studied here can be characterized as leftist. This ideological similarity allows for a certain level of comparability in terms of programmatic appeals. However, there is good reason to believe that the argument is not limited to leftist parties. In fact, there are numerous examples in Latin

[7] MORENA might be considered a late-developer in the context of this episode of party formation. However, the underlying social dynamics that brought about its formation are very similar to the other instances of new party formation during this period.

America and beyond of new societal organizations that have become linked to centrist or conservative parties.

The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. The first section discusses defines and conceptualizes new political parties and mass support. The second section discusses the existing research on the overall outcome, mass support for new parties. The third section presents the study's main argument and theoretical contributions. The fourth section reviews the selection of the new parties studied in-depth and their divergent trajectories. Last, the fifth section outlines the methods and research design employed.

1.1. Mass Support for New Parties

This study asks why some new parties are able to take root in society, establish stable ties with voters, and successfully compete in elections over time, while others fail to do so. In doing so, it explores different paths that new parties can take to build mass support, which ultimately determines their long-term success or failure. Therefore, the overall explanandum of this study is mass support for new parties. We can distinguish two closely related but conceptually separate dimensions to this outcome: new parties' ability to (1) secure electoral support and (2) build partisan attachments in the electorate.

Political parties have been long acknowledged as some of "the most significant organizations in society" for democratic politics (Schattschneider 1942, 36). They serve several functions central to any democratic system: they aggregate and represent societal interests, to mobilize voters, to select candidates for political office, and to form governments (for example, see Downs 1957, 97; Katz and Mair 1995, 6; Kirchheimer 1966; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976, 58). Different parties might emphasize one function over another, e.g. focusing on winning office more than representing particular interests. However, in order for any party to fulfill any of these functions it needs to take root in society and endure electorally and in the minds of voters over time. Yet many new parties seem unable to accomplish this goal. This inability of new parties to take root seems to be particularly prevalent in in the context of democratic consolidation in new democracies, which have been especially characterized by unstable parties and frequent entry of new parties (Mainwaring 1999, 3; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, 204; Tavits 2008a).

Definitions

New Political Parties

It is important to clearly define what constitutes a new party. Building on Sartori's canonical definition (1976, 63), I define a party as a political group identified by an official label that presents candidates for election to public office.[8]

Even though parties often also serve many other functions crucial to democratic representation (Downs 1957, 97; Katz and Mair 1995, 6; Kirchheimer 1966; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976, 58), this minimal definition seems most appropriate because it does not impose normative notions about what parties ought to do. Instead, it only assumes that parties have electoral ambitions. This criterion seems appropriate given that, in democratic regimes, parties ultimately always have to attempt to place candidates in public office in order to pursue any other goals.[9] Furthermore, this definition is helpful because it looks past the (usually self-chosen) label 'party' and instead considers the functional role of such groups within the political system. In fact, most parties that have been founded in Latin America in recent years have eschewed the label 'party' and instead labeled themselves 'movements' in order to distinguish themselves from 'traditional parties.' While some of these grew out of social movements, many of them actually resemble elite or cadre parties and do not exhibit ties to mass movements of any kind. While the relationship between a new party and movements is in fact highly important, it should be empirically investigated rather than determined based on a group's self-chosen label.

Based on this definition of parties, defining what constitutes a *new* party appears straightforward at first sight; yet given the various different forms in which parties can come to be, it is not immediately obvious what should be considered new. I propose a definition of new parties that combines characteristics of a party-in-the-electorate and of a party-in-government (Key 1942).

First, building on Barnea and Rahat's threshold-based definition, I consider a new label or name to be a necessary criterion. As they point out, "(i)f the main activity of the party is to seek office by competing in elections, then its identity in the competition, the banner that makes the office-seekers a 'team', that is, the party label, must be 'new'" (2010, 311). While they "consider a party label to be new if it was not used in the election preceding the one in question" (Barnea and Rahat

[8] Satori defines parties as "any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office" (1976, 63).

[9] Even a niche party that might only aim to raise a certain issue (rather than attain elected office) would still need to put forward candidates and campaign in elections in order to be successful.

2010, 311), I propose a slightly more restrictive definition that accounts for the fact that, especially in developing countries, parties might occasionally 'boycott' an election. Therefore, I understand a party label to be new if it was not used in either of last two national elections preceding the one in question.

Second, I also consider "the newness of the candidates competing under the label" in order to ensure that merely relabeled parties are not considered new under this definition (Barnea and Rahat 2010, 311). However, I relax Barnea and Rahat's threshold for this criterion. They require that "at least a majority" of "the candidates and representatives of the office-seeking/office-holding team … must be new …, i.e. must not originate from one party" (2010, 311). While this threshold might be adequate in many party systems, it appears too high in post-transition contexts, where many, if not most, members of the political elite might have been associated with the same dominant party previously. Therefore, I deem a party to satisfy the 'newness of candidates' criterion if at least some of its national-level candidates and representatives are new, i.e. originated from different parties or from no party at all. Therefore, 'pure' splinter parties, i.e. parties that *only* consist of candidates and representatives that split off from an established party and simply rename themselves, do not meet this criterion. However, parties that include both a splinter from an established party and other outside candidates and representatives that had not been part of the same party before would satisfy this criterion.

Building on these two criteria, I consider a party to be new (a) if it exhibits a new party label, i.e. a label not used in either of the last two national elections preceding the one in question, and (b) if some of its national-level candidates and representatives originated from different parties or from no party at all.

Mass Support

As stated above, we can distinguish two closely related but conceptually separate dimensions of mass support: parties' ability to (1) secure electoral support and (2) build partisan attachments in the electorate. The first dimension, electoral support, is fairly straightforward. I use the term to refer to voters' behavior during elections, i.e. for which party (or parties) voters' vote in a given election. Within this dimension, I will consider both voters' past vote choice, whether they voted for the party and its candidates, and vote intention, whether they would vote for them.[10]

The second dimension, partisan attachments, might need a little more explanation.[11] Drawing on the canonical definition presented by Campbell,

[10] I consider primarily elections at the national and the regional level. I exclude local elections since, in many systems, independent candidates are more common at the local level and often primarily local issues and idiosyncrasies determine vote choice.

[11] I use the terms 'partisan attachment,' 'party identity,' and 'partisanship' interchangeably

Converse, Miller, and Stokes, I use the term party identification to "characterize the individual's affective orientation to … [a party] in his environment" (Campbell et al. 1960, 121). As they point out, "[o]nly in the exceptional case does the sense of individual attachment to party reflect a formal membership or an active connection with a party apparatus. Nor does it simply denote a voting record … Generally this tie is *a psychological identification*" (Campbell et al. 1960, 121; italics added by author for emphasis). Building on this understanding of party identification, Green et al. maintain that "party identification is a genuine form of social identification … [and that] [c]itizens have an enduring sense of what sorts of people belong to various parties and whether they identify with these social groups" (2002, ix). Thereby, party identification can be viewed as a genuine social identity that can become independent and disconnected from other social identities. Whereas, for example, a voter's class or ethnic identities might—years ago—have shaped with which party she identifies, this party identification can persist even if the other identities change over time. In fact, for decades, scholars have pointed out that party identification "raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation" (Campbell et al. 1960, 133).

1.2. Explaining Mass Support: Existing Research

1.2.1. Explanations of Electoral Support

Most of the recent literature has explained success in securing electoral support in terms of different types of direct appeals, although there is rich, older literature on the role of organizational mediation in creating electoral support. In this context, parties and candidates are understood to appeal directly to voters (e.g., through speeches or advertisements spread through mass media) and attract them through issue or identity-based platforms or by making selective material promises. In this understanding, success in securing electoral support primarily hinges on the types of direct appeals made and their credibility.

First, a significant strand of the literature puts a strong emphasis on the importance of direct programmatic or issue-based appeals in explaining vote choice. In this context, parties are viewed as appealing directly to the electorate through programmatic or issue-based platforms, and voters make their vote decisions by evaluating the different issue proposals relative to their policy preferences. Spatial voting models in the tradition of Anthony Downs assume voters make their vote choice by choosing the party or candidate with a platform closest to their ideological ideal point (Downs 1957). As Achen and Bartels point out, "(s)ubsequent work has elaborated the canonical spatial model in a variety of

important ways—for example, by allowing for probabilistic voting behavior, nonspatial 'valence' factors such as charisma and incumbency, parties motivated … [not only by] office seeking, constraints on parties' platforms (for example, due to historical legacies), and uncertainty in voters' perceptions of parties' platforms" (2016, 25).

Notwithstanding the continued prominence of spatial voting models in political science, a mounting body of evidence, from developed and developing countries alike, raise serious doubts about the effectiveness of issue-based appeals and the adequacy of such accounts of vote choice. As Achen and Bartels succinctly summarize, "voters, even the most informed voters, typically make choices not on the basis of policy preferences or ideology" (2016, 4).

Second, another important strand of the literature emphasizes the importance of personalistic or charismatic appeals. Going back at least to Max Weber's ideal type of charismatic authority (Weber 1922, 124ff.), the discipline has recognized the importance of strong leadership and the influence that personalistic appeals might have over voters. More recently, the importance of charismatic appeals has been emphasized by the vast literature on neopopulism (for example, see Barr 2003; Ellner 2003; Roberts 2015; Torre 1999; Weyland 1996).

When considering electorally successful new parties—not just in Latin America but also in well-established Western European democracies—we often encounter a charismatic figure looming large at the head of the party, e.g. as the party's president or candidate for president or prime minister. Therefore, when considering any given electorally successful new party, it is easy to attribute much of its appeal to this figure. However, such a conclusion might be problematic: in fact, it seems that, while most electorally successful new parties indeed exhibit strong charismatic leadership, so do many new parties that fail to gather substantial electoral support or lose it again after short periods of time. It is not that charismatic appeals do not influence voters; but rather that such explanations are severely underspecified. While we might have come to think of longstanding parties, such as Argentina's Peronists or the German social democrats, as quintessential mass parties, it is important to remember that many of their founders, such Perón, Lassalle, and Bebel, were also characterized by strong personalist and charismatic leadership styles at the time (Collier and Collier 1991; Guttsman 1981). At the same time, most of them also invested in organization building, i.e. strategies of mobilizing societal organizations and building a party. Therefore, it appears necessary to look beyond the role of personalist and charismatic leadership and systematically compare various cases of new parties with strong charismatic leaders.

Third, identity based, descriptive appeals constitute another important way parties can try to mobilize voters. Voters might prefer candidates that "embody" a certain social identity (*descriptive representation*). For example, voters might

prefer candidates that share their ethnic or class background. This would allow parties to directly appeal to voters by choosing certain types of candidates (e.g., of a certain ethnic background) and/or selectively signaling candidate background characteristics (see, e.g. Chandra 2004).

In this context, prior research has paid particular attention to ethnic appeals. Across new democracies, and even in Latin America, where ethnic voting was not viewed as an important factor during earlier democratic episodes, appeals based on ethnic identities and interests are viewed as highly salient and have been linked to the stability of electoral support (Chandra 2004; Ferree 2004, 3, 2006; Horowitz 1985; Madrid 2005, 1, 2012; Van Cott 2000, 156). According to these accounts, direct ethnic appeals can bring about electoral stability in new democracies because ethnicity can serve as a salient cue for voters (Birnir 2001, 219). These approaches share the assumption that vote preferences are primarily determined by an individual's ethnic identity. Building on this, we might expect parties that consistently appeal to voters based on individuals' ethnic identities to enjoy more stable support over time.

Yet there are numerous open questions about this seemingly plausible argument that raise doubt whether the existing literature is too quick to assume that indigenous voters make their vote choice primarily based on their ethnic identity. Beyond the severe measurement issues from which many of these studies suffer, the debate on how social identities influence party system stability in Latin America exhibits multiple significant flaws. First, it is simply being assumed or asserted that indigenous voters make their vote choice based on their ethnic identity without actually convincingly testing this claim. On the one hand, the Bolivian case might seem to provide some support for this claim, given that the MAS has made extensive indigenous appeals and, at the same time, it has received very stable support. On the other hand, this assumption becomes problematic considering that census and survey data indicate a steep decline in voter self-identification as indigenous during the same time period.

Furthermore, there is large overlap between ethnic and class cleavages in many parts of Latin America, and many parties such as the MAS that make ethnic appeals also routinely employ class appeals. Therefore, a convincing analysis of ethnic voting must take into account the class background of voters and the role of class appeals. Ideally, research should aim to isolate the individual effects of ethnic and class appeals on vote preferences. Third, the existing work does not theoretically appreciate the varied roles of interest organization representing these social identities. Fourth, while many parties in Latin America have tried to appeal based on ethnic and class-based identities, the tremendous variation in success of such strategies has been understudied.

Class-based appeals constitute another type of direct appeal that has received particular attention in the literature (Evans 2000, 401; Korpi 1983; Lipset

1960, 220–24). Whereas in many Latin American countries a class cleavage is thought to be reproduced in elite opinions and attitudes (Rosas 2010, 70), many scholars hold that most “Latin American party systems have not been frozen by the political organization of class cleavages as in post-1920s Europe” (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, 576; see also Rosas 2010, 70). Recently, however, several studies have suggested an advent of class voting in multiple Latin countries (Handlin 2012, 2013, 142; Hellinger 2005). However, as discussed in the previous section, there is tremendous overlap between ethnic and class cleavages in many parts of Latin America and many parties employ appeals based on both ethnicity and class. Therefore, it is analytically crucial to try to isolate the individual effects of ethnic and class appeals on vote preferences.

Beyond these different types of direct appeals, clientelist linkages constitute another means of securing electoral support that has received a lot of scholarly attention (for example, see Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013). Clientelist appeals rely on the promise of “direct, personal, and typically material side payments” in exchange for voters’ support of a specific party or candidate (Kitschelt 2000, 849). While clientelist mobilization certainly plays an important role in securing turnout and swaying voters in many elections in many developing countries (Nichter 2008), this strategy is much less important for new parties, unless they are founded from within the state. In fact, unlike in the past, the most recent episode of party formation in Latin America has been much less state-driven, as the creation of new parties pre-dates the election of their leaders to major political office (the PSUV in Venezuela constitutes a major exception to this trend). Actually, most of these parties could be characterized as externally mobilized parties, i.e. “parties founded by outsiders” (Shefter 1977, 411). Such parties do not “enjoy access to a pool of resources out of which patronage can be generated if it is to distribute patronage to its supporters” (Shefter 1977, 411) and are, hence, “compelled to rely upon other means to acquire a following” (Shefter 1977, 415). It is not to say that new parties never employ clientelist mobilization but that such a strategy is less viable for them than for parties in office and that it would be cross-cutting to other strategies.

1.2.2. Explanations of Partisan Attachments

Despite longstanding research on partisan attachments, the theoretical micro-foundations behind the establishment of attachments to new parties is still little understood. Even though scholars have long studied the “origins and the 'freezing' of different types of party systems” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 3; see also, Bartolini and Mair 1990; Collier and Collier 1991), we still know surprisingly little about how voters actually come to identify with new parties and the emergence of

such parties. This issue is especially relevant for younger or less institutionalized democracies where the appearance of new parties is particularly common. Therefore, new party systems, in new democracies or after dramatic party system changes, present a unique opportunity to study “the Big Bang of party birth … when it happens, not decades afterward” (Holmberg 2007, 565).

The traditional view expressed in *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960) is that “party identification in essence is a non-political attitude formed mainly by socialization during childhood and adolescence (and that) … (t)hereafter party identification is supposed to be immune to politics and economic change, except under really rare circumstances when a realignment can occur” (Holmberg 2007, 562–63). While socialization during childhood and adolescence might explain the stability of party identification once established due to inter-generational transmission, it cannot explain the creation of new attachments for "the first generation" of voters to new parties. Also, while the literature on voter realignment in the US has convincingly established the long-term effects of generational replacements (Miller and Shanks 1996, 161–3), the debate on more short-term realignments appears under-theorized, pointing to vague “conditions of pervasive change in the social or political context” and focusing on the role of individual leaders (Miller and Shanks 1996, 184). While changes in “the larger political environment” and party leaders are certainly of importance in order to explain voter realignment, these factors are theoretically underspecified.

Recently, some innovative research has begun investigating these issues. Examining the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil, along with Argentina’s Frente por un País Solidario (FREPASO), Lupu (2016a, 77) emphasizes the importance of parties’ “ability to develop a strong and broad-based *party brand.*” He contends that “(w)hen parties offer a demonstrably consistent brand that appeals to a substantial swath of the electorate, voters attracted to that brand are more likely to form lasting attachments” (2016a, 78).

Another important contribution on the emergence of new parties, or rather the scarcity of successful new parties, is presented in the recent volume edited by Levitsky, Loxton, Van Dyck, and Domíguez (2016). They also emphasize that new parties must “cultivate strong partisan identities” (Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck 2016, 10). Elaborating on the development of strong partisan identities (Lupu 2014, 2016b), Lupu argues that “one important determinant of whether new parties succeed in building a partisan base is their ability to develop a strong and broad-based *party brand*” (2016a, 77). He goes on to explain that “(w)hen parties offer a demonstrably consistent brand that appeals to a substantial swath of the electorate, voters attracted to that brand are more likely to form lasting attachments” (2016a, 78). While stable, consistent programmatic party brand might be a necessary condition for the development of partisan attachment, they are certainly not sufficient. Furthermore, in light of the mounting evidence that voters rarely pay

close attention to programmatic appeals, other potential venues through which voters can develop partisan attachments need to be further explored.

Analyzing the emergence of mass partisanship in Russia, Brader and Tucker emphasize the importance of political experience and argue “in favor of thinking about partisanship as something that forms and strengthens over a period of years, rather than as something that springs fully formed from nothing” (2001, 70). While it certainly makes sense that partisanship, just like any deep-seated social identity, would take some time to develop, it remains unclear why some parties are better and quicker than others at creating partisan attachments.

Further exploring this issue, Samuels analyzes differences in partisanship across Brazilian parties and attributes those differences to “the connections between party recruitment activity, individual motivation to acquire political knowledge, and individual engagement in highly politicized social networks” (2006, 2). In a similar vein, Samuels and Zucco explore the 'crafting' of partisan attachments to the PT in Brazil and show that local party presence and civil society density are associated with vote support and partisan attachments.

In examining the link between civil society mobilization and partisanship, this study builds on this work that has begun exploring this link. It goes beyond existing work by demonstrating how civil society support actually translates into partisan attachments and explaining why see observe a lot of variation across cases with similar levels of civil society density. Furthermore, this analysis considers also other types of strategy often used by new parties, considers other important cases beyond the particular case of the PT, and explores its microfoundations for a theory of mass support.

1.3. The Mediating Role of Societal Organizations

As discussed above, much of the recent literature has explained success in securing electoral support in terms of different types of direct appeals. Many of these accounts treat voters as atomized citizens and consider social identities and groups only relevant as so far as they shape voters’ individual preferences over policies or types of candidates. In political science, as recently recognized by others, “[g]roups were implicitly moved offstage; the structure of civil society disappeared from view” (Achen and Bartels 2016, 225).

The theoretical framework advanced in this analysis goes beyond direct appeals and re-examines the mediating role that societal organizations can play in securing electoral support and creating partisan attachments. Locally organized, participant based civic associations organized around a broad range of political identities and interests can play a crucial role in mediating parties’ appeals to voters. Unlike professionalized, primarily nationally focused interest groups or

international NGOs, societal organizations are characterized by regular personal interactions between local leaders and their members. Through this local embeddedness, societal organizations, such as indigenous organizations, neighborhood associations, and informal sector unions, can play a crucial role in connecting new parties to voters within the organizations' distinct social milieus.

While societal organizations, in the form of labor unions, are usually thought of as having played a crucial in role in mobilizing votes and in creating lasting identities among voters in earlier episodes of party formation (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Collier and Collier 1991; Przeworski and Sprague 1986), it is unclear what societal organizations can play in the founding of new parties today. Given a decline of labor unions' ability to represent and mobilize large parts of the electorate in many countries and a rise of new types of societal organizations, it appears that the mediating role that civil society organizations can play has been largely forgotten.

By revisiting the longstanding puzzle of how organized, politicized interests and identities actually get translated into mass support for political parties, this project builds on earlier social cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). However, while much of this earlier work portrays the translation of politicized interests and identities into partisan support as a reflexive response, this study explicitly focuses on the different ways in which organized interests can be linked to parties and how this, in turn, shapes support for those parties. This approach also allows us to specify and test the microfoundations through which this translation of interests and identities into partisan support can occur.

In the following section, I will develop the idea that new types of organizations that were previously largely excluded from corporatist ties with traditional parties, play similarly important roles in democratic societies today. While the existing scholarship has examined the formation of these organizations and their role in politicizing ethnic or class cleavages, little attention has been paid to the various ways in which different forms of party-organization linkages might influence vote choice and the emergence of partisanship.

1.3.1. Societal Organizations

Societal organizations formed around fundamental political group identities and interests are ubiquitous in democratic societies (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Whether understood as interest groups or social movements, such organizations rooted in, for example, ethnic, class, or religious identities, are immediately relevant for their members and often define where "one's fate and fortune lies" (Berger 1981, 12). In fact, for the purposes of this study, societal organizations are

understood to include all participant based civic associations, interest groups, and social movement organizations formed around fundamental political group identities or interests that are organized at least locally (potentially also regionally or nationally) and hold regular "in-person" meetings. Depending on a specific society's salient cleavages and other political identities, these societal organizations can take various forms: while some of these organizations might be characterized as primarily classist (such as labor unions, employer associations, and informal sector unions), others are primarily ethnic (such as some purely indigenous organizations). Yet others span across these divides (such as the *cocaleros* in Bolivia) or take the form of "local programmatic associations" (such as neighborhood associations) (Davies Escobar and Falleti 2016, 7). Regardless of the identities and/or interests at their core, such organizations can "provide a mechanism through which citizens who have a *shared attitude* or a *shared interest* can come together and channel their collective resources into political action" (Thomas 2001: 7).

Through the late nineteenth and twentieth century, labor unions have arguably been the most widespread and politically relevant type of societal organizations. As Collier and Handlin point out, "(t)hey were not the only popular-sector organizations, but they were politically privileged both by their own resources and capacity to undertake collective action and typically by their affiliation to political parties" (Collier and Handlin 2009a, 4).

Labor unions were crucial not only in politicizing class identities and organizing workers as a central part of the electorate; they also played a decisive role in mobilizing votes and in creating lasting partisan identities among voters that would last for generations (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Collier and Collier 1991; Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Labor unions and related ancillary organizations played a crucial role in creating and mediating the social identity at the heart of the socialist mass parties (Guttsman 1981; Lidtke 1985; Mann 1973; Ritter 1963; Wehler 1986). In these early mass parties, strong, shared group identities, often referred to as class consciousness but in fact strongly associated with specific parties,[12] were "formed … in a number of independent and often competitive organizations, most frequently as trade-unions …, but also as cooperatives, neighborhood associations, clubs, etc." (Przeworski 1985, 13).

This type of organizationally mediated identity formation, however, was not limited to leftist parties. For example, Catholic mass organizations in 19th century Europe offered a similar social space for party identity formation and the mobilization of electoral support (Kalyvas 1996).

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[12] On the social construction of this identity that later came to endorse labor-based parties and thereby turned into party identification, see Thompson (1966) and Katznelson and Zolberg (1986).

Since these earlier episodes of mass party formation, the importance of labor unions, as societal organizations representing and mobilizing large parts of the electorate, has declined in most parts of the world. The shift from state-centric, Keynesian or import-substituting, economic models to market-oriented economic models weakened labor unions and made them less viable as a base of labor-based parties (Collier and Handlin 2009a; Levitsky 2003; Murillo 2001). While labor-based parties pursued different strategies in response to this crisis (Kitschelt 1994; Levitsky 2003; Murillo 2001; Roberts 2014), the importance of ties to labor unions declined in most cases. Nevertheless, despite their decline in power, these weakened unions still continue to play a role as societal organizations representing workers in many countries.

1.3.2. Contemporary Societal Organizations

Given this decline of labor unions' ability to represent and mobilize large parts of the electorate in many countries and the rise in importance of different kinds of societal organization, it is not obvious what role societal organizations can play in the founding of new parties today. At first sight, the new generation of societal organizations looks quite different from the traditional labor union model. In fact, most of these 'new' societal organization either did not exist during earlier episodes of party formation, such as informal sector unions, neighborhood associations, environmental organizations, and the landless movement, or were only partially incorporated into the political arena, such as indigenous or peasant organizations. What is more, these organizations exhibit a broader range of organizational forms and represented issues and identities. While some of these organizations focus on classic materialist, class-based issues, other are formed around newer political identities.

These purported organizational and structural differences between traditional and contemporary societal organization have led many scholars to be rather pessimistic about the mobilizational and representational capacity of such organizations today. Collier and Handlin, for example, emphasize that "(p)arties play a much less central role [today]…, as associations typically have more distant, intermittent, instrumental relations to parties, if they have any at all" (2009a, 5).

However, the recent episode of party-building in Latin America raises some doubts about whether this picture of exclusively distant, ad-hoc, and instrumental relations between contemporary societal organizations and parties is justified. While for decades scholars have pointed to the demise of close voter-party ties and the waning of mass parties (such as labor-based parties) (Katz and Mair 1995; Kirchheimer 1966; Panebianco 1988), cases such as the MAS in Bolivia or the PT in Brazil raise the question of whether these ties are really passé. These new parties

exhibit close, organic ties to a variety of new (and to some extent old) societal organizations and resemble traditional "mass integration" parties (Kirchheimer 1966, 184) with enduring ties to voters. Beyond those cases, in which the ties between the party and societal organizations have remained quite close over time, there are also cases in which extensive, early coordination between new parties and societal organizations failed to turn into lasting, organic linkages (e.g. Ecuador's *Alianza PAIS*). Furthermore, while some organizations have developed close, organic linkages with new parties, others have relied primarily on instrumental, short-term agreements with different parties. Yet others extensively supported new parties logistically and electorally initially but did not institutionalize those ties and, in some cases, came to oppose those some parties later on. These divergent trends raise the question of the conditions under which we might expect party-organization ties to become organic or institutionalized and under which circumstances party-organization ties might remain instrumental and based on 'short-term agreements' between the two actors. I will revisit this question and the implications of different types of party-organization linkages in the theory section below and explore it more fully in Chapter Two.

1.3.3. Societal Organizations in Latin America

Across Latin America, the new generation of societal organizations proliferated at extraordinary rates and gained increased prominence as a result of their organizing efforts against the neoliberal reforms during the 1980/90s (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Collier and Handlin 2009b, 53; Dietz 1998; Garay 2007; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005, 2006). These organizations play crucial roles in the everyday lives of large segments of the population. Unlike primarily nationally focused interest groups in the US, members of these organizations in Latin American usually have very immediate, regular face-to-face contact with these organizations (usually through local branches) and strong organizational identities. Furthermore, unlike in some older democracies such as the United States,[13] in most Latin American countries, about one third to one half of citizens at least occasionally attend meetings of such organizations (LAPOP 2016). During the period of party system turmoil in the early 2000s, about 20-40 percent of the population in most Latin American countries reported attending such organization meeting at least "once or twice a month" (LAPOP 2016).

Even in the face of massive disruptions of the party system these societal organizations have stable and large bases of support and membership, exhibit close

[13] For a discussion of why such organizations rarely exist in the United States anymore, see Skocpol (2003).

ties between local leaders and their base, and are often relatively long lived. Furthermore, it is important to highlight that parties, even uninterrupted ones, are usually organized with much more of a national focus, without the same level of regular, personal interactions, and with less cohesion of identities, by virtue of having to build a broader coalition of groups in order to be electorally viable.

1.3.4. The Role of Organizations for Participation

Despite the literature's focus on direct appeals in explaining mass support and the prevalent skepticism about the representational relevance of societal organizations today, the argument advanced in this study—on its most abstract level—claims that these new types of societal organizations play pivotal roles in democratic representation today and are comparable to labor unions in earlier episodes of party formation. In order to understand the new episodes of party building that we have witnessed in recent years (Levitsky et al. 2016; Levitsky and Roberts 2013; Roberts 2014; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010),[14] we also need to examine the role of these new forms of organizations more fully (Collier and Handlin 2009b; Thachil 2014). While much of the existing scholarship has focused on the formation of these organizations and on their role in politicizing ethnic or class cleavages (e.g., Garay 2007; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005, 2006), little attention has been paid to the direct ways in which different forms of party-organization linkages might influence vote choice and the emergence of partisanship.

In the existing literature, the role of societal organizations is often directly or indirectly limited to mobilizing and politicizing identities or interests to which parties can appeal (Madrid 2008, 2012; Van Cott 2005). This focus overlooks important variation in party-organization linkages and assumes that voters make their vote decision primarily in response to such direct appeals. Madrid, for example, argues that ethnic parties in Latin America have been successful in mobilizing voters when they "have eschewed exclusionary *rhetoric*, developed broad-based *platforms*, and *recruited leaders and candidates* from a range of different ethnic groups" (Madrid 2008, 481; italics added by author for emphasis). In his analysis of the electoral success of the MAS, "the MAS's ethnopopulist rhetoric and platform" has been key because it allows the party to mobilize the "large proportion of the Bolivian population [that] is of indigenous ancestry" and also appeal to non-indigenous voters through programmatic and personalistic populist appeals (Madrid 2008, 484). Such direct appeals to voters—based on party

[14] For a discussion of the new episodes of party building in other regions, see also, for example, Hino (2012), Sikk (2005), and Tavits (2008b).

issue platforms, descriptive appeals through the nomination of co-ethnic candidates, and personalism—might be effective to mobilize voters. However, an analysis that only focuses such direct appeals overlooks the ways in which organizations (organized around similar underlying identities and interests) might influence the vote choice and identities of their members.

Understanding the variation in party-organization linkages and the specific role that organizations play in influencing the vote choice and identities of its members is relevant not only for the new generation of societal organizations but also for older organizations in the context of the early labor movement. Even though the importance of organizations and associations has been emphasized repeatedly in this earlier context (Guttsman 1981; Lidtke 1985; Mann 1973; Ritter 1963; Wehler 1986), the specific mechanism through which they advanced the success of early labor-based parties remains unclear. It is not directly obvious whether these early parties succeeded because these organizations politicized their members and created a rather diffuse sense of class conscience that could then be appealed to by different parties based on the parties' policy proposals (for example, by any given socialist, social democratic, or communist party) or because these organizations actually mobilized their members for a particular party and got them to vote for and identify with that party.

Prominent historical accounts seem to be in line with the latter idea, suggesting that these organizations actually went beyond just politicizing a class identity and in fact endorsed specific parties and created strong attachments to individual parties (Guttsman 1981, 3). Nevertheless, given the absence of good public opinion data for that time, we might never be able to establish conclusively whether the majority of these voters would have thought of themselves first and foremost as proletarians or, for example, as Social Democrats or Communists. Therefore, it remains unclear to what extent the mass support of early labor-based parties was due to parties' successful mobilization of class identities and interests versus the creation of attachments to specific parties through labor unions and other related associations.

This same puzzle arises again with this more recent episode of party formation. To what extent and how do societal organizations influence mass support for new parties? Can they shape the vote preferences of their members? What about other people in their social circle, such as family members, neighbors, or close friends? Can these new types of societal organizations that are more organizationally diverse than 'first generation' societal organizations attach voters to new parties and create partisan identities in a similar fashion as we hypothesized labor unions and Catholic mass organizations did in 19th century Europe?

1.4. Founding Moments, Party Strategies, and Mass Support: The Argument

The argument proceeds in the two steps: first, I analyze the 'top-down perspective' of how different types of party-organization linkages develop and how they shape the ways in which new parties appeal to voters. Second, I examine the 'bottom-up perspective' of how voters, in turn, respond to these different appeals by parties. More specifically, I show how those different mobilization strategies influence vote preferences and partisan identities, and, thereby, account for the creation of mass support. Thereby, the focus of this study on the different ways in which organized interests can be linked to parties and how this, in turn, shapes support for those parties allows us to specify and test the actual mechanism through which this translation of interests and identities into partisan support can occur.

Part I

In a first step, which is elaborated in Chapter 2, I explain the adoption of different party mobilization strategies by focusing on parties' founding moments, the period before the party contests its first major election.[15] The key question is whether a party only relies only *direct appeals* to voters or whether also gets to use *organizationally mediated strategies*, i.e. appeals that build ties to voters through societal organizations. Any contemporary party will, at least to some extent, try to appeal directly to voters—communicating substantive/programmatic and/or descriptive appeals (often based on class or ethnic identities and interests, and/or clientelistic promises), e.g. through mass media. However, while some parties rely primarily or exclusively on such direct appeals, other new parties also heavily invest in organizational structures, i.e. develop organic linkages with societal organizations, and use organizationally mediated strategies.

Two features of the founding moments—one internal to the new party, the other one external to it—are key: (1) the cohesion of the coalition of party leaders and organizational allies and (2) the credibility of other attractive parties in the party system. These factors shape early on whether a party-organization tie becomes

[15] A party's "first major election" refers to the first *major* national election a party contests. In order to account for the fact that many new parties will first run only a few candidates in a 'test' election before actually contesting a full election, the definition considers the first *major* rather than just the first election per se. More specifically, I will only consider the very first national election to be major if the party already wins major national office (such as the presidency or more than 25% of the vote for legislative elections). Otherwise, the very first electoral contest will be considered a test election and the subsequent national election will be considered the first major election.

organic, i.e. whether an initially instrumental organization-party tie becomes institutionalized. First, higher coalition cohesion—attained through *moments of solidarity*, i.e. costly acts of public support for each other and the joint goals, for example, through joint participation in high-stake protests—can lower the expected costs of institutionalizing such ties by increasing mutual trust and shared sense of identity between proto-leaders and organizational allies. Second, the availability of other credible, attractive parties in the party system shifts the distribution of power between party leaders and organizational allies and makes instrumental, short-term linkages, instead of institutionalized ties, more likely. Furthermore, I argue that the dynamic of how party leaders' and organizational allies' incentive structures change over time, from a party's founding moments to later stages in its life, leads parties to be more likely to institutionalize ties with organizations early on. Later on, parties are more likely to pursue instrumental linkages when establishing ties to other organizations. Whether party-organization ties become institutionalized through the adoption of routinized rules and mechanisms that govern how candidates will be selected and factional disagreements will be settled, in turn, establishes whether a new party can employ organizationally mediated strategies or is restricted to relying on direct appeals only.

Furthermore, we can distinguish two different types of organizational allies based on their structure and the organizational resources they can offer to a party. On the one hand, an organizational ally could take the form of a major societal organization, i.e. a peak association of membership-based interest groups or social movements organized at the national or regional level, such as a labor union confederation. Such an organization, by definition, exhibits a multi-level organizational structure that connects individual members to a national or regional level of organization, potentially involving additional levels of organization such as local and sub-regional chapters. On the other hand, we could imagine a primarily locally based organization or group, such as a local social or political movement. Compared to the former type, such an organization is characterized by a less complex organizational structure since it is only organized at the local level.

This difference in degree of organization—national/regional, aggregated organization vs. only local organization—has important implications for the resulting party structures and the types of organizationally mediated strategies available to the new party. On the one hand, a major societal organization already has an organizational structure in place that makes it rather easy for a new party to 'borrow' the organization's infrastructure in order to connect to a large number of local level organization members at once and mobilize them for the party. Therefore, if a linkage with a major societal organization is institutionalized, this leads to an incorporation of the organization with its internal hierarchy and structure into the new party. The resulting party takes the form of what Duverger might have described as an "indirect party" (Duverger 1954, 6), i.e. a party that "is made up of

the union of the component social groups" (Duverger 1954, 6). Historically, this type of party structure might have been best exemplified by the British labor party of around 1900, which "was made up of Trade Unions, Co-operative Societies, Friendly Societies, and groups of intellectuals who had united to establish a common organization: there were no party supporters or members, only members of the component groups" (Duverger 1954, 5).

On the other hand, locally based organizations or groups, by definition, lack an organizational structure that connects the local organization to the national level. Therefore, if linkages with them are institutionalized, they can only be incorporated into the party at the local level. Furthermore, we might also expect such a local organization to have less organizational autonomy vis-à-vis the party due to the organization's smaller membership and coverage (compared to major societal organizations that have national or at least regional coverage). In fact, given these groups' localized nature and their relatively low degree of organizational autonomy, they might effectively serve as local branches for the party, once stably incorporated into the party. The resulting party becomes more resembling of a "direct party" (Duverger 1954, 5), in which, eventually, the local organizational structures become subsumed and "the members themselves form the party community without the help of other social groupings" (Duverger 1954, 5).

Part II

In a second step, which is elaborated in Chapter 4, I focus on the behavioral dynamics behind voters' responses to the different party strategies: I argue that appeals through linkages with societal organizations can help parties obtain electoral support and, if linkages are institutionalized, also yield durable voter-party ties by socializing organization members into identifying with the party itself.

First, I contend that appeals mediated through either instrumentally or organically linked organizations, e.g. in the form of organizational endorsements of a party during electoral campaigns, are very effective in swaying organization members and people in their social circle (e.g., other family members and neighbors) to vote for new parties. Second, drawing on social identity and self-categorization theory, I contend that societal organizations, which serve as highly relevant and immediate reference groups to their members, provide social spaces in which socialization into new parties can occur if the organization is organically linked to a party.

As discussed above, new societal organizations exhibit extensive membership and play crucial roles in the everyday lives of large segments of the population. Members usually have very immediate, regular face-to-face contact with these organizations and strong organizational identities. Even in the face of massive disruptions of the party system these societal organizations have stable and

large bases of support and membership, exhibit close ties between (local/regional) leaders and their base, and are often relatively long-lived.

Given this high salience of societal organizations, I argue that their members and potentially also other people in their social circle (e.g., other family members, neighbors, and close friends) should be very likely to follow endorsements made by the organization. Such endorsement effects are well documented in the American politics literature (e.g., Arceneaux and Kolodny 2009; Kuklinski and Hurley 1994; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Lupia 1994). However, compared to the locally organized, 'embedded' societal organizations in many developing countries, the "interest groups" considered in the context of contemporary U.S. politics usually exhibit much less regular face-to-face interactions among group members and with local group leaders, have much lower local membership, and might arguably hold less affective value to their members. Therefore, societal organizations are even more effective in swaying their members' vote preferences outside the US.

Moving beyond voters' attachments to these organizations, I furthermore argue that voters can also become attached or loyal to parties themselves through their association with these organizations, if they are exposed to repeated endorsements consistently for the same party, including in between election campaigns. Therefore, I contend that organic ties between societal organizations and a party may attach organization members to that party and socialize them into identifying with the party. After dramatic party system changes, these societal organizations provide social spaces in which socialization into new parties can occur. According to social identity and self-categorization theory (Bettencourt and Hume 1999; Cohen 2003; Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987), in organizations that bring together people who share key attributes that are important to members, such as a shared ethnic or socio-economic background, the prototypic group member's and group leaderships' personal values and doctrinal positions, e.g. support for a particular party, often become absorbed by other group members. Put differently, if I perceive "people like me," with whom I interact regularly, to support a particular party or candidate, I might just start doing the same.[16] For this mechanism to work, it is secondary what the specific shared characteristics within each organization are, as long as the characteristics are important or defining enough to make members perceive themselves as "one of them." Whereas a book club might not provide an important enough shared

[16] While people might think of themselves as part of various groups – organized or not – I expect that the very immediate, usually locally organized, socio-economically homogenous, and highly socially salient character of these societal organizations provides a more fundamental and important reference group to create partisan attachment. I will test this assumption of high group identity saliency through survey questions contained in the survey experiment.

characteristic, we would expect organizations expressing fundamental political group identities and interests to pass this threshold.

Societal organizations, by definition, bring together people that share key attributes that are important to members. If then, in turn, the figurative 'prototypic group member' or the 'organization *per se*,'[17] which organization leaders (correctly or not) often claim to embody, is perceived as being oriented to a particular party, this doctrinal position becomes absorbed by other group members. This support for a particular party could find its expression in, for example, the regular endorsement of a party by the organization leaders, the endorsement by other 'prototypical' peers, the representation of the organization in the party leadership, or extensive historic ties.

While one-off expressions of support for a particular candidate or party, for example, through an organization's one-time endorsement, might lead members to support this candidate or party, repeated endorsements for the same party, potentially even in-between electoral campaigns, could create more long-term attachments. Even though people that are not members of an organization but feel represented by that organization and view it as a prototypical exemplar of an identity that is defining to them might also follow some cues from that organization (Weßels and Klingemann 2009),[18] this socialization mechanism should be particularly relevant for actual organization members. They, unlike non-members that only feel represented by an organization, typically experience regular, face-to-face interactions with other group members and organization leaders and who, on average, probably exhibit stronger attachments to the organization.

1.5. Methods & Research Design

This research compares the major new parties in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico with each other and with other new parties that were founded during the same time period. Using a multi-method research strategy based on 24 months of fieldwork in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico, my study combines insights from in-depth interviews with representatives of parties and societal organizations with analyses of original and existing surveys, and election returns, archival research,

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[17] In this context, "(a) prototype can either be the most typical group member—an actual person—or a fictional member who embodies the most common or most frequent attributes shared among group members" (Huddy 2001, 133–34; see also Rosch 1978). For a more extensive discussion of "prototype theory," see Lakoff (1987).

[18] The question of whether the use of organizational endorsements as heuristics by voters is "rational" and/or "serve(s) the interest of the electorate" is not the focus here (Kuklinski and Hurley 1994, 729–30).

ethnographic work, and a series of novel experiments conducted in the field.

Comparative Case Studies of Political Parties

My analysis compares major new parties that emerged during the recent episode of party-building in Latin America (Levitsky et al. 2016; Levitsky and Roberts 2013; Roberts 2014; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010), Bolivia's MAS, Ecuador's Alianza PAIS, and Mexico's MORENA,[19] with each other. In addition to the cross-national comparison between the three parties, I also leverage within-case analysis of the parties' relationships with different societal organizations. Furthermore, I draw on comparisons to other new parties in these countries that serve as insightful shadow cases.

The three contemporary parties, which were formed during a crisis of representation and gained prominence in recent years, exhibit many similarities. First, they were founded during a moment of popular mass mobilization. Second, they developed in response to a previous experience of widespread corruption among established parties' elites. Third, they were built on a broad coalition of societal organizations, which had been strengthened by the previous mass protests, and, at least initially, claimed to represent them politically. These initial coalitions were particularly similar for the MAS and Alianza PAIS in terms of the sectors represented by these organizations. Fourth, these parties initially exhibited very similar political platforms and agendas. Fifth, all three parties, maybe akin to new parties more generally, showed similarly strong elements of charismatic leadership.

Notwithstanding all these outward similarities, these new parties exhibit remarkable variation in their strategies to mobilize voters and the extent of mass support for them. In fact, while the MAS exhibits stable, organic linkages with various major societal organizations and stable rates of vote support and voter identification, Alianza PAIS initially pursued extensive linkages with major societal organizations but failed to institutionalize these and has later relied almost exclusively on direct appeals to voters. The recently founded MORENA also displays organic organizational linkage but the organizations are only locally organized. Furthermore, MORENA presents an important case that allows me to examine processes of party building in the context of a party system that underwent dramatic changes during the democratic transition process but never fully collapsed. Due to the persistence of some parties that have traditionally been stably

[19] MORENA might be considered a late-developer in the context of this episode of party formation. However, the underlying social dynamics that brought about its formation are very similar to the other instances of new party formation during this period.

linked to major societal organizations, the range of organizations available for linkages with this new party was severely limited.[20]

These comparative case studies are based on information collected through over 150 original extensive, semi-structured interviews with national, regional, and local leaders of parties and societal organizations as well as some political analysts and journalists in different parts of all three countries. These original interviews conducted during 24 months of field research in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico between January 2014 and August 2017 are further complemented by the analysis of transcripts of interviews conducted with 85 MAS parliamentarians during the early years of the MAS administration in 2007 and 2008 (Zuazo 2009). Furthermore, I gathered relevant newspaper articles from newspaper archives and internal party and organization documents. These sources allow me to assess the extent of endorsements by organization leaders, support by societal organizations' leaders and activists during political rallies, representation of organizations in the party (e.g., in party leadership positions or as candidates for public office), the historic development of linkages, and the campaign strategies of parties (e.g., the extent of direct appeals). These primary sources are further complemented by some existing accounts of critical moments in party and organization relationships provided by historians and anthropologists. The newspaper sources and historical accounts in the interviews permit me to engage in process tracing to detect the effects of changes in linkages over time (Brady and Collier 2004). Furthermore, in order to get a "thicker" understanding of the mechanisms through which organizationally mediated strategies might actually influence mass support, I also studied local branches of Coca farmer unions (*cocaleros*) in the Chapare (Bolivia) and different labor union locales in different parts of Bolivia and Ecuador by conducting additional interviews with rank-and-file members and through participant observation at meetings of these organizations.

Experiments on Microfoundations of Mass Support

In order to test how voters respond to different types of appeals and how new partisan attachments lead voters to behave, I conducted two discrete choice experiments in which I presented voters with campaign posters that closely resemble real-world posters in Bolivia and Ecuador. In these experiment, which were fielded in La Paz and El Alto (Bolivia) in February/March 2016 and in Quito

[20] This context posed critical constraints on new party strategies, principally leaving only locally organized groups 'available' for new parties to engage with. In fact, many major societal organizations in Mexico were historically affiliated with the PRI through national-level corporatist arrangements. Notable examples are large-scale labor union confederations, such as the *Confederación de Trabajadores de México* (CTM) and peasant unions affiliated with the *Confederación Nacional Campesina* (CNC).

(Ecuador) in October/November 2016, I presented representative samples of voting eligible citizens with profiles of (fictitious) candidates for national legislature. The use of fictitious candidates instead of real politicians allows me to more effectively manipulate the dimensions of key theoretical interest and even include a new (fictitious) party towards which voters by definition do not have any previous affective or positional dispositions. Unlike in prior conjoint experiments (e.g., Carnes and Lupu 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014), which presented survey respondents (often online) with tables presenting the specific values of profile attributes, I used campaign posters and short, two-sentence vignettes presenting the candidates (through door-to-door canvasing) in order to improve realism of the treatment and overcome potential concerns raised by illiteracy. The discrete choice outcome, i.e. having to choose between two candidates, closely "resembles real-world voter decision making, in which respondents must cast a single ballot between competing candidates who vary on multiple dimensions" (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 4).

The design builds and expands on recent experimental attempts to test class and ethnicity effects on vote preferences in other developing countries (for example, see Dunning 2010; Dunning and Harrison 2010) and experiments exploring social peer effects on voting behavior (for example, see Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008). Unlike these prior experiments, however, I used randomized conjoint analysis as part of the design in order to "identify the causal effects of various components of a treatment … (and) nonparametrically identify and estimate the causal effect of many treatment components simultaneously" (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 2). Unlike most of the longstanding applications of conjoint analysis in marketing research, where estimates are often heavily dependent on modeling assumptions, this variant of conjoint analysis can nonparametrically identify the average marginal component effect (AMCE) and its interactions "under assumptions that are either guaranteed to hold by the experimental design or else at least partially empirically testable" (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 3).

Analysis of Survey Data

The analysis of patterns and determinants of vote choice and partisan attachments, in the second part of the analysis, also draws extensively on original and existing survey data. First, I conducted extensive original surveys on representative samples of the voting eligible populations in La Paz and El Alto (Bolivia) and Quito (Ecuador) along with the experiments described above as well as on some nationally representative sample in Bolivia in 2014. Second, I take advantage of numerous existing, nationally representative surveys: multiple waves of the AmericasBarometro/Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) for all

three countries and other countries in the region; the Mexico Election Panel Studies from 2000, 2006, 2012; and, in some instances, Latinobarómetro surveys conducted in the three countries.

1.6. Organization of the Study

The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, *Founding Moments: Founding Coalitions and Party Strategies*, I present a theoretical model that focuses on the intra-elite dynamics during parties' founding moments to explain the adoption of different party mobilization strategies. In Chapter 3, *Evidence: Development of Party Strategies in Three New Parties*, I test the implications of the theoretical model developed in the previous chapter in the context of three specific cases of new political parties in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico, drawing on in-depth interviews with representatives of parties and societal organizations, internal party and organization documents, and newspaper articles.

I then focus on voters' responses to the different party strategies. In Chapter 4, *Capturing Votes and Creating Partisans: Vote Choice and Party ID*, I present a theoretical framework about the behavioral dynamics behind voters' responses to these strategies and their different effects on party identification and vote preferences. In Chapter 5, *Evidence: Voter Responses to New Parties' Strategies*, I put this theory about the microfoundations of support for new parties to an empirical test, analyzing experimental, survey, and electoral data as well as extensive field interviews from Bolivia and Ecuador.

Finally, in Chapter 6, *Conclusion: New Political Parties and Societal Linkages in Comparative Perspective*, I discuss the main findings of the study and reflect on their broader theoretical implications. Moving beyond the specific cases examined throughout the study, this chapter demonstrates the relevance and plausibility of the theory in the context of other new democracies as well as for new parties in more established democracies.

Chapter 2

Founding Moments: Founding Coalitions and Party Strategies

2.1. Introduction

2.1.1. Party Strategies

New parties exhibit immense variation in their strategies to mobilize voters. Any contemporary party will—at least to some extent—appeal to voters directly—communicating substantive/programmatic and/or descriptive appeals (often based on class or ethnic identities and interests, and/or personalistic appeals), e.g. through mass media. However, while some parties rely primarily or exclusively on such *direct appeals*, other new parties also heavily invest in organizational structures, i.e. develop instrumental or more sustained, organic linkages with societal organizations, and use *organizationally mediated strategies*, i.e. appeals that build ties to voters through societal organizations.



FIGURE 2.1. Mobilization Strategies Available to New Parties

While an early literature analyzing the formation of mass parties, such as socialist or Catholic parties in 19th century Europe, focused on the role of labor unions or church organizations for voter mobilization (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Kalyvas 1996; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Przeworski 1985), the more recent literature has almost exclusively focused on parties' *direct* appeals to voters and has explained success in securing electoral support in terms of different types of direct appeals (e.g., direct ethnic vs. class appeals) (Birnir 2001, 219, 2007; Centellas 2015, 238; Chandra 2004; Evans 2000, 401; Ferree 2004, 3, 2006; Horowitz 1985; Kitschelt 2000; Korpi 1983; Lipset 1960, 220–24; Madrid 2005, 2012). Yet despite the fact that the mediating role that civil society organizations can play has been largely forgotten with the decline of labor unions, new types of organizations might play similarly important roles in democratic societies today. Therefore, in order to understand the new episodes of party building that we have witnessed in recent years (Hino 2012; Levitsky et al. 2016; Levitsky and Roberts 2013; Roberts 2014; Sikk 2005; Tavits 2008; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010), we also need to examine the role of these new forms of organizations more fully (Collier and Handlin 2009; Thachil 2014). Groups such as indigenous movements, peasant unions, and informal sector unions can provide an alternate way of "connecting" to voters and a source of political support, as for example when organizations endorse parties and candidates.

Therefore, the question arises why some parties pursue organizationally mediated strategies in addition to direct appeals, while others rely exclusively on

direct appeals. Or, to be more precise: why do some new parties invest in and maintain organizational structures, i.e. develop linkages with such societal organizations or build proper party branches, while others rely primarily on direct appeals to voters and fail to build and maintain organizational linkages?

2.1.2. Overview of the Chapter

In answering this question, I focus on the intra-elite dynamics during parties' founding moments. After identifying the actors involved, I discuss the strategic options available to them. Then, I turn to the period that is critical to all of this: parties' founding moments, the time period before the party contests its first major election.[1] I contend that the relationship that the members of the founding coalition have with each other during this critical period, and the nature of competition with other outside parties shape whether a party-organization linkage becomes organic, i.e. whether an instrumental organization-party tie—based on overlapping policy goals—becomes institutionalized. This, in turns, establishes whether a new party can employ organizationally mediated strategies or is restricted to relying on direct appeals only.

In a first step, I focus on how parties reconcile conflicts of interests within their broader coalition, i.e. whether they adopt institutionalized rules and mechanisms to manage the relationship with organizational allies (e.g., by instituting rules about candidate selection that secure organizational representation within the party and about how to settle factional disagreements within the founding coalition) initially. I argue that whether parties adopt such institutionalized rules and mechanisms to manage the relationship with organizational allies is a function of the composition of the founding coalition, the relationship that the members of that coalition have with each other before the party contests its first major election, and characteristics of other outside parties.

Furthermore, I argue that the dynamic of how party leaders' and organizational allies' incentive structures change over time—from a party's

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[1] As discussed in Chapter 1, a party's "first major election" refers to the first *major* national election a party contests. In order to account for the fact that many new parties will first run only a few candidates in a 'test' election before actually contesting a full election, the definition considers the first *major* rather than just the first election per se. More specifically, I will only consider the very first national election to be major if the party already wins major national office (such as the presidency or more than 25% of the vote for legislative elections). Otherwise, the very first electoral contest will be considered a test election and the subsequent national election will be considered the first major election.

founding moment to later stages in its life—should lead us to expect that (a) parties are much more likely to institutionalize ties with organizations early on than later and that (b) parties are much more likely to pursue instrumental linkages when establishing ties to other organizations later on. Furthermore, we would expect that (c) the fear of potential desertions down the road and uncertainty about the effectiveness of support by different organizations would strongly incentivize party proto-leaders to institutionalize linkages with more organizations than might be necessary for a simple minimum winning coalition. Moreover, I will show that we should expect such institutionalized party-organization ties to be quite sticky over time, even if an organizational ally is 'courted' by a more appealing alternative party later.

In a second step, I argue that the institutionalized rules and mechanisms to manage the relationship with organizational allies can take different forms, depending on the composition of the founding coalition, and provide the basis for different types of organizationally mediated strategies.



FIGURE 2.2. General Argument to Explain Mobilization Strategies Available to New Parties

2.2. Founding Coalitions: Proto-leaders and Organizational Allies

The founding coalition, i.e. the group of actors involved in the founding of a new political party, could consist of two different types of actors—proto-leaders and organizational allies. First, there must be proto-leaders, i.e. a group of individuals with electoral ambitions. These proto-leaders are—by definition—a rather small elite group that might have no or only weak formal institutional rules and structures and pursue more or less broad programmatic objectives. These

individuals could come out of societal organizations, could have been part of previously existing parties' elites, or could be 'true' outsiders to the political elite of a country. Many—but not necessarily all—of them will eventually take prominent leadership roles in the party once it has actually been formed and contests elections.

Second, in addition to proto-leaders that any new party will need, some founding coalitions will also include one or multiple participant-based organizational allies, i.e. pre-existing groups that endorse and support the founding of the party (Panebianco 1988, 51–52). These organizational allies could be major national or regional societal organizations, such as labor union confederations, or local social or political organizations.

The state could constitute another type of organizational ally for new political parties that are founded "out of office." However, unlike in the past, the most recent episode of party formation in Latin America has been much less state-driven, in that the creation of new parties pre-dates the election of their leaders to major political office (the PSUV in Venezuela constitutes a major exception to this trend). In fact, most of these parties could be characterized as externally mobilized parties, i.e. "parties founded by outsiders" (Shefter 1977, 411). This is important because such parties do not "enjoy access to a pool of resources out of which patronage can be generated" (Shefter 1977, 411) and are, hence, "compelled to rely upon other means to acquire a following" (Shefter 1977, 415), such as "ideological and solidary incentives" (Shefter 1977, 411). In fact, we might expect such new parties, unlike parties founded from within the state, to be more prone to rely on organizationally mediated strategies (Shefter 1977, 414).[2]

The composition of the founding coalition is determined by various factors such as the existence and politicization of national societal organizations and local or regional movements, their availability for a coalition, i.e. whether they are already linked to other parties, and the political goals of these organizational allies and the new parties. Unlike the proto-leaders, they usually exhibit rather narrow

[2] However, it is unclear what our expectations about later use of clientelistic voter mobilization should be: on the one hand, if elected to major political office, any new party might gain access to other resources that could be used to further invest in party apparatuses and/or to mobilize voters clientelistically. On the other hand, "[i]f … the party was not in a position to distribute particularistic benefits when it first undertook to mobilize mass support, its leaders will have been compelled to rely upon or to establish a network of mass organizations—labor unions, peasant leagues, churches, party sections—that did not need to be fueled by patronage. A party linked to a mass constituency through such an organizational structure will not, once it comes to power, be compelled to raid the public treasury in order to maintain its hold upon its supporters" (Shefter 1977, 414). Either way, the focus here is on organizational allies that support new political parties before this party assumes any major political office.

sectoral interests and can count on an established, wider membership base as well as on stable institutional rules and structures (e.g., for candidate selection).

These two types of actors can be highly complementary in their organizational structure and goals, explaining why they might come together and form the founding coalition of a new party: on the one hand, organizational allies can provide legitimacy, endorse the new party among its members, and—in some case—offer additional organizational resources such as a stable membership base and "ready-made" networks capable of organizing campaigns and other outreach events to the proto-leaders. On the other hand, proto-leaders can advance the rather narrow sectoral interests of the organizational allies in the broader political arena by furthering organizations' substantive demands and getting organization members elected or appointed to public office.

Whereas in earlier episodes of party formation, for example in the context of late 19th century European parties or early 20th century Latin American parties, such an organizational linkage was a *sine qua non* for any mass-based party, the rise of mass media and modern campaigning might allow contemporary proto-leaders to eschew such ties if the costs of pursuing the support from organizations appear too high because they might instead be able to rely more on direct appeals. However, if prominent organizations are "available" and the costs of obtaining support from them—either instrumentally or in a more sustained fashion—are not too exorbitant, we might expect most proto-leaders to be interested in securing organizations' electoral and logistical support.[3] Even if the proto-leaders are not primarily interested in building a broader movement but instead focus on the candidacy of prominent individuals—as might be the case in devotee or cadre parties (Duverger 1954, 62–64)—we might still assume that they would want to secure at least instrumental endorsement from important organizations for the elections.

Furthermore, even though today mass media are of central importance in democracies everywhere, access to them—and mobilization through them—is not equally feasible for all parties. In many countries, the most important mass media outlets are heavily dominated by existing parties. Especially in those cases, organizationally mediated strategies—as a substitute for less viable direct appeals—would be even more relevant for new parties.

Therefore, we will assume that most proto-leaders have at least a weak preference for securing at least some instrumental support, e.g. in the form of candidate endorsements, from some prominent organizations if the expected costs of securing this support are not too high.

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[3] Whether prominent organizations are "available" to support new parties depends on whether there are at least some existing organizations that are issue and reputation compatible with the new party and open towards supporting any particular party at all and, if so, whether they are not already firmly committed to other parties.

2.3. Strategic Options: Instrumental vs. Institutionalized Party-Organization Ties

Once proto-leaders and an organizational ally begin to support each other in some fashion due to the complementarity of their goals, they could do so either (a) on an instrumental, ad-hoc basis—constantly reevaluating their connection and potentially deserting each other at any given point—or (b) they could institutionalize their connection by adopting routinized rules and mechanisms to manage their relationship. These rules and mechanisms could be formally codified or more informal in nature (North 1990, 3–4); what is more important is that they are internally routinized within the founding coalition, i.e. that "the rules and procedures … are widely known, accepted, and complied with (Levitsky 2003, 18; see also, North 1990; O'Donnell 1994, 57). Therefore, institutionalization—understood as behavioral routinization—"constrain[s] actors … [and through the] entrenchment of 'rules of the game' tends to narrow actors' behavioral options by raising the social, psychic, or material costs of breaking those rules" (Levitsky 1998, 80).

While the specific form that the routinized rules and mechanisms governing the relationship between a nascent party and an organizational ally take could vary widely, they—at a minimum—need to establish rules and procedures ensuring a representation of organizational interests in party organs and among a party's candidates for political office. Rules and mechanisms, such as quotas for delegates in party congresses, nomination quotas for party candidate lists, automatic representation of organization leaders in party executive committees, or the creation of permanent coordination body, effectively constitute partial power-sharing agreements with organizational allies: they not only secure a certain level of organizational representation within the party but also establish procedures through which later disagreements can be channeled.

There are strong incentives for both proto-leaders and organizational allies to institutionalize party-organization ties but also non-trivial risks and costs associated with such a strategy. For the proto-leaders, the institutionalization of ties with an organizational ally offers large potential pay-offs in later elections by tying the organization to the party and securing continuous electoral and organizational support (including access to a stable member base and "ready-made" networks for outreach events) from it. At the same time, institutionalizing linkages also comes at a significant cost to proto-leaders because it requires them to give up some autonomy and decision authority (e.g., about candidate selection and policy platform) to an "outsider" group. Thereby, this institutionalization brings with it the risk that the organizational ally could seize significant control of the party itself, hijack its goals, and/or not deliver its promised support.

For organizational allies, the institutionalization of ties with a party offers the prospect of a 'loyalty bonus,' i.e. more protected and potentially increased political representation through the party by securing more influence on the party's policies and candidate selection, compared to discretionary, ad-hoc concessions that proto-leaders might make to instrumental organizational allies. Also, by gaining influence during the early stages of party formation, organizational allies should have much more influence on a party's long-term trajectory and 'anchor' it programmatically, compared to an organization that begins supporting a more established party—already set in its ways—later on. At the same time, institutionalizing ties with a party also poses a non-trivial risk of losing autonomy and being perceived as "corrupted" by politics, if the party deviates from their "joint" goals, if they party coopts the organization, and/or if the proto-leaders turn out to become corrupt once in office.[4] Even if an organization were to respond to such "betrayals" by leaving the party coalition later, these reputational or legitimacy costs would already have been incurred and could negatively impact an organization's ability to serve as a legitimate authority (in the context of their narrow sectoral interests) and cause them to loss their membership.

2.4. Founding Moments

I argue that the experiences that proto-leaders and organizational allies have together before the party contests its first major election shape their long-term relationship and strongly shape whether instrumental ties develop into institutionalized ties by influencing the expected costs/risks of institutionalizing such linkages. More specifically, *proto-leaders' individual backgrounds*, i.e. whether they "came out" of an organizational ally, and the experience of *moments of solidarity* before the party contests its first major election can create mutual trust and decrease the costs of institutionalizing a linkage.

First, a proto-leader's individual background—whether he or she "came out" of an organizational ally—could account for heightened trust between this organization and the proto-leaders. However, this dynamic could account for heightened trust between a proto-leader and only that *particular* organization. Since most founding coalitions encompass multiple organizational allies, it would not be relevant for the relationship with other organizational allies. Second, even

[4] This obviously assumes that the organization is open to develop any kind of linkage with a party in the first place, unlike for example anarchist groups (Collier and Collier 1991, 97). Otherwise, such an organization could—by definition—never become an organizational ally within a founding coalition.

if proto-leaders do not have any prior individual connections to an organization—as would be the case if either the proto-leaders had not progressed through (or "come out" of) an organization's ranks or if the coalition contains multiple organizations and proto-leaders were previously only involved with one of these organizations—other critical experiences before the party founding could similarly build mutual trust between proto-leaders and organizational allies.

More specifically, the experience of *moments of solidarity*, i.e. costly acts of public support for each other and the joint goals, during a *party's founding moments*, i.e. before the party contests its first major election, can lower the perceived costs of institutionalizing linkages with each other by increasing mutual trust. Especially during moments of crisis, for example when policy changes endanger the interests of members of the founding coalition or when a member is subject to state repression, organizational allies and proto-leaders can show their loyalty to each other and reveal their commitment to joint goals, for example by showing public support during high stake protests. Such moments of solidarity both a) send costly signals to the other side about the seriousness of commitment to the stated goals and provide both sides with critical insights into each other's' trustworthiness, and b) promote a sense of shared political fate between the proto-leaders and these organizations and across organizations (by having confronted and overcome a joint challenge). Thereby, the experience of moments of solidarity builds trust and decreases the costs and risks associated with institutionalizing party-organization ties.[5]

2.5. Resulting Dynamics

As discussed in the previous section, there are strong incentives for both proto-leaders and organizational allies to institutionalize party-organization ties but also non-trivial risks and costs associated with such a strategy. Even though the outcome of this cost-benefit analysis in any particular case will depend on the specific expected payoffs and costs of institutionalization, we can nevertheless discern some conditions under which we might expect the ties between a party and an organization to be much more likely to become institutionalized and conditions under which might expect ties to remain instrumental.

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[5] While the likelihood of having experienced such moments of solidarity obviously increases the longer the founding coalition 'spends together' (before the party actually assumes major elected office), a long foundation time period is neither sufficient nor necessary.

2.5.1. From the Perspective of Proto-leaders

From the perspective of proto-leaders, the best strategy depends first and foremost on the expected benefits and risks/costs associated with institutionalizing their tie to an organization. More specifically, we should expect them to build a coalition that ensures their electoral success without giving up too much power. In this section, I will contend that the dynamic of how proto-leaders'/leaders' incentive structures change over time—from a party's founding moments to later stages in its life—should lead us to expect that (a) parties are more likely to institutionalize ties with organizations early on rather than later and that (b) parties are more likely to pursue instrumental linkages when establishing ties to other organizations later on. Furthermore, we should expect that (c) the fear of potential desertions down the road and uncertainty about the effectiveness of support by different organizations would incentivize proto-leaders to institutionalize linkages with more organizations than might be necessary for a simple minimum winning coalition.

Given how devastating a potential desertion by major organizational allies could be for a new party we might expect that proto-leaders have a strong incentive to tie important organizational allies tightly to them. As stated in the previous section, it seems warranted to assume that most proto-leaders have at least a weak preference for securing at least some instrumental support, e.g. in the form of candidate endorsements, from some prominent organizations if the expected costs of securing this support are not too high. Yet without institutionalizing this relationship, a party's ability to rely on organizations will be severely limited due to the fear of potential desertions, leaving party leaders only with instrumental ties or direct appeals at their disposal. While party leaders might still try to maintain instrumental ties with such groups, there is little preventing either side—the party or the group—from deserting the other when their short-term goals no longer align or disagreements arise. Especially for a new party that, unlike more established parties, has only a very limited support base of its own, such desertions could bring with them potentially high electoral costs in the next election and—if they cannot find another suitable source of electoral support—might even pose a threat to the very "survival" of the party.

Of course, the ability to find another organization to support your party depends directly on the availability of other potentially viable organizational substitutes for such an arrangement. However, I would contend that, in most cases, there is good reason to be skeptical about a new party's prospects of quickly finding other organizational allies, if deserted. Especially in highly fragmented party systems or party systems that experience a lot of new party entries, such as in most younger party systems, we would expect the number of parties eyeing for organizational support to be much larger than the number of

big, established organizations with high mobilization potential. In fact, we might expect this assumption to hold even in older party systems, which might be less fragmented and experience fewer new party entries: in this case, many of the relevant organizations interested in pursuing their representational goals through parties could already be stably linked to an existing party.

Furthermore, we should expect that this fear of some potential desertions down the road would incentivize proto-leaders to institutionalize linkages with more organizations than might be necessary for a simple minimum winning coalition. This tendency should be further heightened by the lack of information about the effectiveness of support by different organizations—due to the novelty of the party and their limited electoral experience. The resulting high uncertainty about how big your organizational coalition needs to be in order to be electorally successful should lead new parties to overshoot rather than undershoot and institutionalize linkages with a rather large number of organizations.

We would expect this dynamic to be very different for an established party: while such a party could still establish new linkages with other organizations, there is good reason to expect that such ties would be more likely to remain instrumental and not become institutionalized. First, organizational endorsements and logistical support should be much more effective and crucial for new parties, which—unlike more established ones—usually have little or no reputation and more limited mobilization networks of their own. Therefore, we might expect proto-leaders to be willing to pay a higher cost—in the form of power concessions to their organizational allies—than the leaders of more established parties. Second, the more elections the party has contested, the less uncertain the party leadership should be about what (or rather whom) else it takes to achieve their electoral needs. This should bring about a shift in balance of power between party leaders and organizational allies: established parties should face less need to concede extensive power to such organizations (by institutionalizing linkages) and should be in stronger position to just selectively "buy" the additionally necessary support from smaller organizations. Therefore, we might expect them to have less need to concede power to organization and instead be able to rely on individual organizations instrumentally more easily (e.g., by securing their support through selective incentives).

2.5.2. From the Perspective of Organizations

From the perspective of the organization, however, the best strategy does not depend only on the expected benefits and risks/costs associated with institutionalizing its tie to a party—as outlined above—but also on the availability of credible, attractive alternative options in the party system. In this section, I will contend that, if there is only one credible, attractive party option available for an organization, the cost-benefit calculation discussed before should determine whether the organization is open to institutionalize the tie or whether it would remain only instrumental. If, however, there are multiple similarly attractive and credible party options available for an organization, we should expect the organization to be more likely to pursue only instrumental linkages.

When considering which existing or nascent parties in the party system might be able to represent them politically, i.e. further their substantive demands and also to get organization members into positions of public power, we might expect organizations to consider both the attractiveness and credibility of the different party options. In this context, how attractive a party appears crucially depends on its stance on the core issue(s) of the organization and the other members of the party coalition. For example, if a party has traditionally held a strong stance opposed to an organization's core demands or is closely aligned with other organizations that the organization views as incompatible with its goals, the organization should view it as less attractive. Beyond the attractiveness of a party, an organization probably also considers a party's credibility, i.e. how trustworthy the party and its leaders/proto-leader appear and whether you believe that it can obtain enough power to achieve your goals. For example, if you do not trust the leaders or you highly doubtful about the party's ability to obtain enough power eventually to actually represent you politically, you should view it as less credible.

If there is only one credible, attractive party option, the organization is left with only two options: it can either choose this party or remain without direct representation through a party. If it chooses this party, the cost-benefit calculation discussed in the previous section should determine whether the organization is open to institutionalize the tie or whether it would remain only instrumental. I will return to this case later.

If there are multiple similarly attractive and credible party options, the organization is in a powerful position and should be able to obtain more concessions—in the sense of more extensive policy influence, nominations/appointments or other selective benefits by not tying itself to one party. Therefore, we might expect the organization in such a scenario to be more likely to only pursue instrumental linkages, which allow it to engage in short term

'contracts' that can be re-negotiated later, for example, in the lead up to the next election.

2.5.3. Stability of Institutionalized Party-Organization Ties

In order to explain the stability of institutionalized party-organization ties over time, we need to consider how both actors' incentive structures and power positions change over time. More specifically, I will contend that we should expect institutionalized party-organization ties to be quite sticky over time due to the high cost of defecting from the institutionalized ties and expected, increasing returns to earlier investments for both sides as well as organizations' resulting position as veto players within the party, party's limited ability to pinpoint the effectiveness of organizations' performance, and a decrease in organizational autonomy. Furthermore, I will argue that, even if an organizational ally is 'courted' by a more appealing alternative party later, we might expect the existing institutionalized tie to last.

First, there are high costs for defecting from institutionalized party-organization ties for both sides involved. For party leaders, defecting an organizational ally with which they have an institutionalized linkage would bring with it non-trivial reputational costs. Party leaders would have to fear that other organizational allies still connected to the party and other organizations that could potentially become allies would lose trust in the leaders' fidelity and the dependability of the tie. Furthermore, the loss of an important organizational ally, which might have previously publicly signaled the commitment of the party to certain issues (e.g., labor rights), could lead to a dilution of the 'party brand,' potentially undermining the stability of the party's wider support base (Lupu 2016).

Similarly, the organization would also have to fear high costs if it decided to defect from an institutionalized tie with a party. Internally, if an organization defects from a party, for example by backing another party, it seems unlikely that such a major decision about organizational strategy would be uncontroversial. Therefore, even if the organization might formally separate from the party, some parts of the leadership and many rank-and-file members might not follow suit, causing splits of the organizations and a loss of organization members. Externally, if an organization defects a party, it might suffer a reputational cost vis-à-vis other parties. Such other parties, with whom the organization might prefer to engage might become wary of the trustworthiness of the organization.

Second, the routinized rules and mechanisms put in place in the process of institutionalizing the party-organization tie might have caused organizations to have become veto players within the party. While the specific rules and

mechanisms governing the power sharing agreements between a party and its organizational allies could vary widely, they usually secure a significant standing for organizations within the party (e.g., through formal quotas securing a certain representation in party organs) and are typically hard to change. This should make it quite hard for party leaders to defect on an organizational ally later on.

Third, deserting an institutionalized tie would entail the loss of expected, increasing returns to earlier investments for both sides, especially for the organizational ally. For an organizational ally, investments in the party—in the form of electoral and organizational support—during the early phases of a new party, only bear fruit much later once the party has gained a measure of power that enables it to further the organization's substantive demands and get organization members into public office. Deserting the party after already made substantial investments means foregoing most of these payoffs.

Similarly, proto-leaders have given up some autonomy and decision authority over the party's positions and candidates early on in anticipation of continued electoral and organizational support down the road. While payoffs might be somewhat more proximate for proto-leaders than for the organizational ally, they still forego substantial future payoffs if they desert the organizational ally later.

Fourth, we should expect the institutionalization of party-organization ties to have led to some cooptation of organizations' leadership, leading to a decrease in organizational autonomy, which would make a desertion by organizations less likely. Close, organic ties between a party and an organization pose a substantial risk of cooptation of the organization's leadership by the party. This could happen either through intentional, 'top-down' replacement of organization leaders (in the vein of *charrismo*) or due to individual organization leaders' career incentives, leading them to move on to political or party leadership positions. In either case, this cooptation dynamic would result in a loss of organizational autonomy. It is important to emphasize that it is not necessarily clear beforehand whether the latter form of cooptation might not actually be a successful strategy for an organization to achieve its goals.

Fifth, even though electoral experiences might decrease party leaders' uncertainty about what (or rather whom) else it takes to achieve their electoral needs, it still remains very hard for them to pinpoint the effectiveness of specific organizations' contributions to, for example, an election campaign. This remaining uncertainty about individual organizations' performance vis-à-vis their promised support of the party makes it hard for the party leaders to even identify an organizational tie that is no longer beneficial.

Beyond these—largely internal—factors that lead us to expect institutionalized party-organization ties to be quite sticky over time, the stability of such ties could also be influenced by whether other alternative 'outside'

options are available for the organizations.[6] There are no attractive and credible outside alternatives to the party that an organization is currently linked to, the organization is left with only two possible options: it can either stick with the current party or choose to have no partisan representation at all. Therefore, even if the organization is not completely content with its current arrangement, it is still probably better off with it, given the high barriers to exiting the existing institutionalized tie discussed above. If, however, an organization faces at least one attractive and credible outside alternative, the picture becomes slightly more complicated. In this case, the organization needs to assess the attractiveness and credibility of the offers made by the rival party. However, given the high barriers to exiting the existing arrangement, the rival offer would need to be considerably more attractive—compensating for the expected costs of defection, lost increased returns to earlier investments. What is more, even such an attractive offer might not be sufficient to overcome the problems raised by the cooptation of organizations' leadership. Furthermore, even with such an attractive offer from a rival party, the organization would need to consider the rival party's credibility, i.e. how trustworthy the party and its leaders/proto-leader appear and whether you believe that it can obtain enough power to achieve your goals. Here it stands to reason that the organization faces significantly more uncertainty and risk about the alternative option compared to their current party ally about which they already have a lot of inside information due to their extensive previous interactions. This might make even a significantly more appealing rival option to the existing institutionalized tie less desirable for the organization.

2.5.4. Resulting Party Mobilization Strategies

If a founding coalition contains organizational allies, the commitment mechanisms institutionalizing the organization-party tie can take different forms, depending on the types of organizational allies, and provide the basis for different types of organizationally mediated strategies and resulting party structures.

We can distinguish two different types of organizational allies based on their structure and the organizational resources they can provide to the party. On the one hand, an organizational ally could take the form of a major societal organization, i.e. a peak association of membership-based interest groups or social movements organized at the national or regional level, such as a labor union

[6] Given that the number of parties eyeing for organizational support is typically much larger than the number of big, established organizations with high mobilization potential—as discussed above—this type of consideration should be much more relevant for organizations than for party leaders.

confederation. Such an organization—by definition—exhibits a multi-level organizational structure that connects individual members to a national or regional level of organization—potentially involving additional levels of organization such as local and sub-regional chapters. On the other hand, we could imagine a primarily locally based organization or group, such as a local social or political movement. Compared to the former type, such an organization would be characterized by an organizational structure that does not aggregate up as far since it is only organized at the local level.

While a major societal organization already has an organizational structure in place that would make it rather easy for a new party to 'borrow' the organization's infrastructure in order to connect to a rather large number of local level organization members at once and mobilize them for the party, local movements lack such an organizational structure that connects the local organization to the national level.

This difference in degree or level of organizational aggregation—aggregated organization vs. only local organization—has important implications for the resulting party structures and the types of organizationally mediated strategies available to the new party. If a linkage with a major societal organization is institutionalized—through the adoption of routinized rules and mechanisms to select candidates and to settle factional disagreements between the party and the organization—this leads to an incorporation of the organization with its internal hierarchy and structure into the new party. The resulting party takes the form of an "indirect party" (Duverger 1954, 6), i.e. a party that "is made up of the union of the component social groups" (Duverger 1954, 6). Historically, this type of party structure might have been best exemplified by the British labor party of around 1900, which "was made up of Trade Unions, Co-operative Societies, Friendly Societies, and groups of intellectuals who had united to establish a common organization: there were no party supporters or members, only members of the component groups" (Duverger 1954, 5).

If, however, linkages with local organizations are institutionalized, these organizations can be incorporated into the party only at the local level. Furthermore, we might also expect such a local organization to have less organizational autonomy vis-à-vis the party and less power within the party due to the organization's smaller membership and coverage (compared to major societal organizations that have national or at least regional coverage). In fact, given these groups' localized nature and their relatively low degree of organizational autonomy, they might effectively serve as local branches for the party, once stably incorporated into the party. The resulting party would be more resembling of a "direct party" (Duverger 1954, 5), in which—eventually—the weaker organizational structures become subsumed and "the members themselves form

the party community without the help of other social groupings" (Duverger 1954, 5).

Last, if a founding coalition does not contain any organizational allies, the new party is—by definition—unable to pursue organizationally mediated appeals and can only rely on direct appeals to voters. Therefore, the resulting party could probably not be characterized as a mass party—neither direct nor indirect—but could take the form of a caucus, cadre, or devotee party (Duverger 1954, 62–64).

Chapter 3

Evidence: Development of Party Strategies in Three New Parties

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I test the implications of the theoretical model developed in the previous chapter in the context of three specific cases of new political parties in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico. I analyze the development of these parties, drawing on in-depth interviews with representatives of parties and societal organizations, internal party and organization documents, and newspaper articles. In doing so, I trace their development and relationship to organizations from their founding moments, through the institution of a party structure, to explain the adoption of different mobilization strategies.

The new parties that emerged during the recent episode of party-building in Latin America, such as Bolivia's MAS, Ecuador's Alianza PAIS, and Mexico's MORENA,[1] exhibit many outward similarities. First, they were founded during a moment of popular mass mobilization. Second, they developed in response to a previous experience of widespread corruption among established parties' elites. Third, they were built on a broad coalition of societal organizations, which had been strengthened by the previous mass protests, and—at least initially—claimed to represent them politically. These initial coalitions were particularly similar for the MAS and Alianza PAIS in terms of the sectors represented by these organizations. Fourth, these parties initially exhibited very similar political platforms and agendas. Fifth, all three parties—maybe akin to new parties more generally—showed similarly strong elements of charismatic leadership.

Despite all these similarities, the subsequent relationships that these parties developed with societal organizational allies and the mobilization

[1] MORENA might be considered a late-developer in the context of this episode of party formation. However, the underlying social dynamics that brought about its formation are very similar to the other instances of new party formation during this period.

strategies used by the parties vary a lot. While the MAS came to institutionalize its linkages with a large number of societal organizations and could consistently rely on them in subsequent elections as a result, Alianza PAIS initially pursued extensive linkages with similar organizations but failed to institutionalize these and has later relied almost exclusively on direct appeals to voters. MORENA presents an important case that allows me to examine processes of party building in the context of a party system that underwent dramatic changes during the democratic transition process but never fully collapsed. Due to the persistence of some parties that have traditionally been stably linked to major societal organizations, the range of organizations available for linkages with this new party was severely limited.

In comparing these three cases, this chapter addresses the question why party-organization ties become institutionalized in some cases and not in others and how such institutionalized linkages determine the mobilization strategies available to the parties later on. After giving a brief overview over the key findings of this chapter in the following three subsections, I will present the full analysis of the three cases: MAS in Bolivia (3.2), Alianza PAIS in Ecuador (3.3), and MORENA in Mexico (3.4).

3.1.1. Founding Moments

In a first step, I show how the shared experience of moments of solidarity before or during a party's founding moments can create a shared sense of identity within the founding coalition and create mutual trust between proto-leaders and organizational allies involved in the moments of solidarity. While in all three cases, the parties' proto-leaders were closely ideologically aligned with their organizational allies and came to rely extensively on them to secure electoral support, the extent to which different organizational allies and the groups of party leaders trusted each other and shared an identity with each other (and with other allies) varies a lot between the MAS, Alianza PAIS, and MORENA and even across different organizational allies of these parties. Tracing the interactions that the proto-leaders and leaders of different organizations had with each other initially, I show how the involvement in costly acts of public support for each other and the joint goals could bring together a cohesive coalition.

Through a series of large-scale popular protests in Bolivia and Mexico that at times even faced repressive state responses, leaders of different organizations and the proto-leaders of the parties that would emerge later came together over sustained periods of time to march side-by-side. I show how, through these shared experiences, the different actors involved came to trust each other and develop a

shared sense of identity. While some proto-leaders in the case of the MAS and, to a lesser extent, in the case of MORENA had also come out of specific member organizations, these moments of solidarity brought together leaders and rank-and-file members from *across* different organizations and proto-leaders. Thereby, trust and a shared identity developed not just between the proto-leaders and individual organization leaders but also between different organizations that had little history of working together before.

However, not all organizational allies and proto-leader experienced such moments of solidarity. Besides some important organizations in Bolivia and Mexico that did not participate in the protests, the vast majority of proto-leaders of Alianza PAIS were not actively involved in similar protests that took place in Ecuador at a similar moment as the ones in Bolivia. As a result, despite their close ideological alignment, the early party leadership, most prominently Correa in Ecuador, did not have much trust in their organizational allies.

3.1.2. Institutional Consequences

Building on the insight that the shared experience of moments of solidarity can create a shared identity and mutual trust between proto-leaders and organizational allies, I then show how such cohesion within the founding coalition shapes early on whether a party-organization tie becomes organic, i.e. whether an initially instrumental organization-party tie becomes institutionalized. More specifically, higher coalition cohesion—attained through, most importantly, moments of solidarity—makes parties and the organizational allies involved in the moments of solidarity more likely to adopt institutions that will tie them together. These institutions—at a minimum—consist of rules and mechanisms that guarantee organizational representation and influence within the party (to influence leadership selection and the party's policy positions), firm rules about candidate selection securing organizational inclusion on the ballot, and the institutionalization of forums to settle factional disagreements within the founding coalition. Furthermore, I point out that the availability of other very credible, attractive parties in the party system can—in extreme cases—shift the distribution of power between party leaders and organizational allies and makes instrumental, short-term linkages, instead of institutionalized ties, more likely. In the case of such instrumental ties, either due to the lack of moments of solidarity or because other attractive parties in the party system make an organization prefer not to tie themselves to one party, the coordination between the party and its organizational allies occurs in an ad-hoc fashion. In such case, no institutionalized spaces for

organizational representation within the party are created and organizational inclusion on the ballot remains at the sole discretion of the party.

These institutional consequences of the founding moments—whether rules and mechanisms to manage party-organization ties are instituted or whether the linkage remains instrumental—be seen both *across* and *within* the three parties studied. While the ties with organizational allies of the MAS and MORENA that had marched side-by-side with the other organizations and the parties' proto-leaders before the parties assumed national office became fully institutionalized, the relationships with the other organizational allies that came to support the parties later but had not been part of such *moments of solidarity* have remained instrumental. In the case of both parties, such organizations have stayed at the periphery of the coalitions and enjoy less influence within the parties than the organizations that institutionalized their ties to the parties early on. In the case of Alianza PAIS, the party leaders were hesitant to adopt internal rules and mechanisms that would tie them to *any* organizations as result of the lack of trust that they placed in their organizational allies and the absence of a shared identity with them. As a result, instead of guaranteeing them a seat at table through the creation of coordination institutions or secured representation in candidate nomination procedures, the Alianza PAIS leadership continued to coordinate with them only on an ad-hoc basis.

Subsequently, I show that the specific design of the institutions adopted to manage party-organization ties depends on the structure of the organizational allies. More specifically, differences in the structure of the organizational allies—the degree or level of organizational aggregation—make other mechanisms for coordination with allies and for organizational representation within the party necessary.

Resulting Party Structure

Relatedly, I show that whether and how party-organization ties become institutionalized has important implications for the resulting larger party structure. In fact, the three new parties studied end up following very different trajectories.

Having institutionalized ties with large number of peak associations organized at the national or regional level, the MAS can credibly rely on the internal structure within these organizations to provide a local base foundation for it and it does not have to build a separate party infrastructure. The resulting party takes the form of what could be characterized as an indirect party, i.e. a party that "is made up of the union of the component social groups" (Duverger 1954, 6). In fact, the party structure of the MAS in its relationship to the societal organizations, with which linkages have become institutionalized, resembles the party structures of the British labor party of around 1900, which "was made up of

Trade Unions, Co-operative Societies, Friendly Societies, and groups of intellectuals who had united to establish a common organization: there were no party supporters or members, only members of the component groups" (Duverger 1954, 5).

In the case of MORENA, the institutionalization of ties at the local level leads the organizations to become incorporated through (and in some cases, as) local branches for the party. Thereby, the resulting party becomes more resembling of a direct party, in which the weaker organizational structures become subsumed and the membership is direct.

Not being able to credibly rely on organizational allies to provide stable ties to voters and local communities, Alianza PAIS follows yet a different path. While the *formal* party structure at first sight appears to follow the model of a direct mass party, the party is more accurately characterized as a nationally focused elite party that relies on local notables in a largely discretionary fashion. Since party leaders did not have to adopt institutions that would credibly secure the representation and influence of organizational allies within the party, the resulting party structures leaves most power with the party leadership, specifically the party's national directorate. While the party statutes provide structures for internal representation and accountability, the overwhelming power of the national directorate—both by design and in practice—raises serious doubts arise about how effectively internal accountability can be ensured by the party's structure.

Stability of Linkages: Institutionalized vs. Instrumental Ties

Analyzing the long-term stability of party-organization ties, I find that institutionalized ties are indeed much more stable and durable than instrumental ones. On the one hand, I show that once a tie between a party and an organizational ally becomes institutionalized through the adoption of coordination and control mechanisms, it becomes very hard to serve this linkage. Even when the interests of party leaders and organizations diverge down the road and conflict arises between, institutionalized party-organization ties have proven to be quite sticky.

On the other hand, instrumental ties can unravel easily when disagreements arise with organizations allies. The case of Alianza PAIS illustrates this point well: initially, the party received crucial support from its organizational allies and, in exchange, key demands of the organizations were implemented, and some organization leaders were nominated to run on the party's lists in the early elections. Yet once tensions arose with organizations after the passing of the constitution, there was no mechanism in place to work out the issues within the party coalition and there were no institutional barriers that would keep either side

from deserting the other. Eventually, the organizations that had initially helped Correa and Alianza PAIS come into office ended up organizing large scale protests that brought the Alianza PAIS government to the brink of collapse.

Here, the comparison to the Bolivian case is particularly interesting: whereas disagreements about very similar issues also arose within the MAS and caused some popular protests, the ties between the MAS and the organizational allies in question had become so deeply institutionalized that it largely endured these challenges. Moreover, the 'brain drain' away from organizational allies into the party and elected office that has resulted from the secured representation of organizations within the MAS, had weakened the organizations themselves to such an extent that they could no longer pose a serious threat to the party.

3.1.3. Mobilization Strategies Available to New Parties

Given the stability of institutionalized party-organization ties, their adoption during parties' founding moments establishes whether a new party can steadily rely on them for voter mobilization down the road. Without institutionalized linkages, new parties might still be able to use instrumentally linked organizations to mobilize voters—however, such ties are less reliable and more unstable down the road—or they might be left unable to use any organizationally mediated appeals at all.

As I show across the different cases, both institutionalized and instrumental linkages allow parties to rely on organizationally mediated appeals and receive endorsements that are usually issued organization leaders and handed down through the organizations. However, whether the underlying party-organization linkages is institutionalized or instrumental determines how frequently endorsements occur and how reliable they are across elections.

On the one hand, in organically linked organizations, i.e. organizations with institutionalized linkages, endorsements for the party and expressions of support would occur very regularly—not just during electoral campaigns—and, given the stability of the underlying ties, reliably and consistently over time. On the other hand, in instrumentally linked organizations, endorsements would happen less frequently, only during electoral campaigns, are less reliable to the party, and could potentially be different and inconsistent across elections.

Without (or only very limited) organizational linkages, a new party is restricted to employing direct appeals only. In addition, once in office, it might also rely on clientelist mobilization. Alianza PAIS illustrates this scenario well. First, the party has extensively relied on direct appeals—often communicated by Correa himself through radio addresses or when visiting local communities with his 'traveling cabinets.' Second, since its rupture of most of its instrumental

linkages, the party has also greatly relied on very extensive, highly targeted public spending—some of it clientelistic in nature—to secure support bases and mobilize voters outside the party's strongholds, relying on a network of local notables, often mayors, to mobilize voters.

3.2. MAS in Bolivia

3.2.1. Founding Moments: Joint Participating in High-stake Protests as Moments of Solidarity

Bolivia constitutes a particularly interesting case to study the rise and success of new parties. As in many young democracies (Mainwaring 1999, 3; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, 204; Tavits 2008), parties in Bolivia have traditionally been characterized as weakly institutionalized and hardly rooted in society (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 20). Furthermore, as in many other countries in Latin America and beyond (Dietz and Myers 2007; Lupu 2014; Roberts 2014; Seawright 2012), beginning in the early 1990s, traditional parties were discredited, quickly lost electoral support, and virtually disappeared from the electoral landscape. The new parties that have emerged since this party system collapse vary greatly in terms of the stability of their ties with voters and of their electoral support.

While most of the newly emerged parties have been characterized by high electoral volatility and an inability to create stable attachments to voters, the MAS could be characterized as a new "mass" party (Duverger 1954: 63) with enduring ties to voters, as indicated by stable rates of voter identification and lower electoral volatility. First organized in 1995 and registered as a party in 2000,[2] the MAS contested its first national election in 2002 and immediately came in a close second for the presidential and legislative election (with 20.9 percent of the votes, after the electoral alliance of the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (MNR)

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[2] The party was first instituted as Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP) in March 1995 and elected Alejandro Veliz as its president and then split into the ASP and the Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (IPSP) in 1999. After a series of failed attempts to register the party, it was first officially registered in 2000, as an alliance between the IPSP and a defunct but still registered party by the name of Movimiento al Socialismo-Unzaguista (MAS-U), and finally registered under its final name Movimiento al Socialismo-Instrumento Político pr la Soberanía de los Pueblos (MAS-IPSP) in 2002. For a detailed account of this process, see García Yapur et al. (García Yapur, García Orellana, and Soliz Romero 2014, 86–113).

and the leftist *Movimiento Bolivia Libre* (MBL) with 22.5 percent). In the general election three years later, the party received the strongest electoral support enjoyed by any party since the country's return to democracy in 1982. In the historic 2005 election, the MAS managed to gain the majority of the votes (for the legislature and president) and has received similar, stable electoral support in the following elections and other popular votes. While also clearly evident in legislative election results, this stabilization of electoral support stood out particularly when examining presidential elections: whereas Bolivia had seen five different presidents during the tumultuous five years before the 2005 election, the office has been held by the same person since 2005 (re-elected in 2009 and 2014). At the same time, rates of voter identification with the MAS have been much more stable than for other parties.

Similar in levels of organizational participation and mobilization to Ecuador and Mexico, Bolivia exhibits a multitude of societal organizations that represent fundamental political group identities and interests. While some of these organizations in Bolivia might be characterized as primarily classist (such as labor unions, informal sector unions, and peasant unions), others are primarily ethnic (such as indigenous organizations), and yet others span across these divides and are organized around other deep-seated group interests and/or identities (such as neighborhood associations or the *cocaleros*, the coca grower unions, in the Chapare region).

These organizations are relatively long-lived and have stable bases of support and membership. In this context, it is also important to point out that their existence predates the electoral success of the MAS and that the extent of membership/participation in them and the socioeconomic composition of their membership appears to have been unaffected by the country's left turn (Davies Escobar and Falleti 2016, 27–28).

The founding coalition of the MAS consisted of a group of proto-leaders, some of whom came out of societal organizations, some who were leftist intellectuals, and a series of organizational allies. Most of the societal organizations that eventually came to support the party as organizational allies were already part of its founding coalition and became involved in the party before it assumed major national office in 2006. However, a few other, major organizations that came to support the party later as organizational allies had not been part of its founding coalition.

Within the founding coalition we distinguish two separate groups of organizations based the extent of prior experiences together. Some organizations and their leaders started supporting each other in regular, large-scale protests (in particular, highly visible national marches) in the early 1990s, marching side-by-side with the other organizations and the proto-party leaders. Among these peasant and indigenous organizations were the CSUTCB (Unified Syndical

Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivial; Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia), the CIDOB (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia; Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia), the CSCB (Syndical Confederation of Bolivian Colonists; Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia; which later became the CSCIB), and the FNMCB Bartolina Sisa (National Federation of Peasant Women of Bolivia Bartolina Sisa; Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Bartolina Sisa; which later becomes the CNMCIOB-BS).

Other organizations within the party's founding coalition became involved in these popular protests only in the early 2000s. Most prominently, these organizations include the national informal sector union confederation CGB (Confederación de Gremiales de Bolivia), FEJUVE (Federation of Neighborhood Councils of El Alto; Federación de Juntas Vecinales de El Alto), and the CONAMAQ (National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu; Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas de Qullasuyu).

A third group of organizations did not participate in the joint protests in a sustained fashion at all but nevertheless also came to support the party as organizational allies. These organizations, in particular, many formal sector unions and the historic Bolivian Worker Central (COB; Central Obrera Bolivia), only entered into an 'alliance' with the MAS after the MAS had already won the presidency and legislature.

Moments of Solidarity: First Wave of Protests

Through a series of popular protests that took place in Bolivia throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, leaders of different organizations and the proto-leaders of the MAS came together over sustained periods of time to march side-by-side. The first wave of protests during the 1990s is notable because it brought together a series of diverse indigenous organizations and peasant unions and party proto-leaders for the first time, forming the core of what become the MAS.

These protest activities included a series of long protest marches, mass demonstrations, and acts of civil disobedience. The shared experience of working together in these protests, which at times even faced repressive state responses, to express public support for each other and the joint goals served as *moments of solidarity*: they allowed a highly diverse group of participants that had little history of collaboration to get to know and trust each and develop a shared identity. The demands expressed during these large, national marches centered on a broad range of popular issues related to land rights, coca production, indigenous rights, income inequality, and gender inequality.

The first wave of these protests began in 1990, when 800 lowland indigenous protesters walked 640 kilometers from Bolivia's northeastern Beni to La Paz in the so-called March for Territory and Dignity, demanding recognition and political participation. This initial protest mobilization was followed by a series of large marches and intense popular protests took place throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s (García Yapur, García Orellana, and Soliz Romero 2014, 79–86). While the initial march in 1990 was led and composed by indigenous low organizations associated with the CIDOB, the following protests saw the participation of representatives of a much wider range of organizations, marching side-by-side.

In fact, the following marches and protests brought together a wide range of representatives and rank-and-file members of different peasant unions, indigenous organizations, and individual labor unions. In doing so, the marches connect different types of organizations and leaders from organizations representing similar issues from very different parts of the country that had little history of working together. For example, in the 1996 March for Territory, Land, Political Participation, and Development, leaders and rank-and-file members of the CIDOB, that has traditionally represented the indigenous peoples of the low land, had started the long march to Santa Cruz to La Paz alone but were joined by other organizations along the way. The CSUTCB and the CSCB, for example, sent contingents from other parts of the country the following day to express their solidarity (Cott 2000, 1998; Fabricant 2012, 207).

While some of the earlier marches were still associated with particular organizations,[3] the major marches and large-scale protests in the late 1990s/early 2000s as well as the highly visible March for 500 Years of Resistance in 1992 were organized and attended by a broader range of organizations. These organizations include all major peasant and indigenous confederations at the time—the CSUTCB, the CSCB, the CIDOB, and the FNMCB Bartolina Sisa (García Yapur, García Orellana, and Soliz Romero 2014, 79–86). Another important indigenous organization, the CONAMAQ that was founded in 1997 to represent indigenous communities (of the Aymaras, Quechuas, and Urus) in the highlands, also became involved in the protests, starting in 2002 (Schavelzon 2012, 4). Even though some small elements of the historic Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) had participated in the 1992 March for 500 Years of Resistance

[3] Among the earlier marches the March for Life, Coca, and National Sovereignty (also known as the March of the Century) in 1994, the March for Life, National Sovereignty, and Women of the Trópico in 1995 deserve special mention. They were organized by the newly formed federating body of coca grower unions of Bolivia's Chapare region, the Coordinator of the Five Federations of Tropics of Cochabamba [la Coordinadora de las Cinco Federaciones del Trópico de Cochabamba].

(García Yapur, García Orellana, and Soliz Romero 2014, 85), the COB leadership had not been involved in the further protest activities in a sustained fashion.

According to a high-level level CSUTCB leader, who participated in many of these protests, the early marches were crucial in order to build trust across organizations and "overcome the strong competition of leaderships," especially across the CSUTCB, the CIDOB, the CSCB, and the FNMCB Bartolina Sisa (interview by author, 10/22/2014).

Moments of Solidarity: Second Wave of Protests

This first series of popular protests throughout the 1990s was followed by additional, arguably even more intense, popular protests in the earlier 2000s in response to neoliberal economic reforms. The protests brought together an even wider coalition of participants. The established group of peasant unions, indigenous organizations, and early party leaders that had already formed during the earlier protest episodes were joined by other societal organizations with a primarily urban base.

The demands expressed during these protests included many of the same popular issues at the heart of the protests during the 1990s related to land rights, coca production, indigenous rights, income inequality, and gender inequality. However, following the privatization of water systems in 1999, water access and public service provision, more generally, as well as the nationalization of the country's natural gas reserves become important additional demands. Beginning in the early 2000s, these demands were also joined by calls for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution for Bolivia.

The first major episode of popular protest occurred during the so-called Water Wars of Cochabamba in 2000 and La Paz/El Alto in 2005 that had erupted over the privatization of public water services. The second major episode of protests over the exploitation of Bolivia's large natural gas reserves took place during the so-called Gas Wars in 2003.

This second wave of protest brought about a widening of the founding coalition. The earlier group of peasant unions, indigenous organizations, and early party leaders was joined by other organizations with a primarily urban base. Most prominently, neighborhood associations, organized under the FEJUVE and organized informal sector workers' unions, associated with the national informal sector union confederation CGB played a major role throughout these protests (Spronk 2007, 2013; Webber 2011; Farthing and Kohl 2014, 11). Furthermore, they were joined by the Union Federation of Mine Workers of Bolivia (FSTMB, Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia) during the Gas Wars, and by a newly formed "rural-urban, multiclass alliance called the Coordinadora

de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida (Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life …) during the Water Wars" (Spronk 2007, 8).

Arguably, the state's repressive response to the popular protest activities further amalgamated the different organizations and individuals who would later become leaders of the party. All the way back to the Massacre of Villa Tunari in 1988, where anti-narcotics forces of the Bolivian National Police killed 12 people and injured over a hundred peasants and coca growers, state repression seems to have propelled solidarity across organizations. According to a prominent national leader of the CSCB at the time, "the massacre [of Villa Tunari] was the beginning of the political reflection of the leaders" of the organizations that later became allies of the MAS. He explains that it was in further protests in response to such repression that "leaders of different organizations, including young Evo Morales, came together in this fight" (interview by author, 10/22/2014).

During some of the earlier marches, and even more strongly during the Water Wars and the Gas Wars, the Bolivian state repeatedly tried to violently repress the protest activities with its security forces (El Diario 2003b, 2003c, 2003a, 2002; Finnegan 2002; International Comission of Jurists 2007). During the height of the Gas Wars in October 2003, for example, the Bolivian state deployed heavily armed police and military units to suppress the protest, causing the death of at least 64 people and injuring over 400 other (New York Times 2018a, 2018b; Greenwald 2012).

3.2.2. Institutional Consequences

During the founding moments and in the first few years immediately afterwards, the MAS adopted a variety of institutional arrangements that govern the party's relationship with different organizational allies. These arrangements have shaped how the party would come to reconcile conflicts of interests within their broader coalition in the years to come. While the ties with the organizational allies that had marched side-by-side with the other organizations and the proto-party leaders before the party assumed national office became fully institutionalized, the relationship with the other organizational allies that had not been part of such *moments of solidarity* has remained rather instrumental.

Even though organizations, such as the COB, that were not part of the early *moments of solidarity*, have also come to support the MAS (for the time being), their relationship with the party remains instrumental. Unlike the organizational leaders that had been actively involved in the above discussed protests during the 1990s and early 2000s and had marched side-by-side with the proto-leaders of the party and with representatives of the other organizations,

these organizations, such as the COB, continued to mistrust the proto-party leaders and did not develop as shared sense of identity with the other actors, of being part of the 'process of change.' While these organizations eventually came to support the MAS in exchange for some political concessions and limited representation within the party and government, they stay at the periphery of the coalition and enjoy less influence within the party and the government than the organizations that institutionalized their ties to the party early on.

These other organizations that had marched side-by-side with the party's proto-leaders and the representatives of the other organizations during the 1990s and early 2000s came to firmly institutionalize their ties to the party quickly and extensively. In the case of these organizations, a series of national and subnational corporatist institutions have secured privileged representation of the organizations within the party and in government. Furthermore, a set of codified rules has guaranteed the extensive representation of these organization in party leadership and among the party's candidates for elected office and create institutional spaces in which disagreements between party and organizations and across organizations can get resolved. At the same time, these institutions fuse together the party and these organizational allies and make it very hard for fully linked organizations to desert the party.

Among these organizations with institutionalized ties, we can distinguish two separate groups that—while both were part of the party's founding coalition—differ in their extent of involvement in the above-mentioned *moments of solidarity*. Some organizations, in particular, the CSUTCB, the CIDOB, the CSCB, and the FNMCB Bartolina Sisa, and their leaders started supporting each other in regular, large-scale protests (in particular, highly visible national marches) in the early 1990s, marching side-by-side with the other organizations and the proto-party leaders. Other organizations within the party's founding coalition, in particular, the CGB, the FEJUVE, and the CONAMAQ, became involved in these popular protests only in the early 2000s. While both groups of organizations came to institutionalize their ties to the party through the above-mentioned coordination and control mechanisms, the earlier supporters came to become particularly deeply fused to the party, losing more organizational autonomy but also enjoying more extensive and privileged representation.

Furthermore, the institutionalized, organic ties with a large number of organizations across the country have resulted in a very particular party structure. Since the party can credibly rely on the organizations to provide a local base foundation for it, it does not have to build a separate party infrastructure. In fact, the local branches of the organizational allies act actually become part of the party itself.

Last, the organizations that have organic linkages with the party have served a key function in transmitting or distributing endorsements for the MAS

among its members and the local communities within they operate. While instrumentally linked organizations would mobilize voters during electoral campaigns, the leaders of organically linked organizations would regularly—not just during elections—issue endorsements for the party. Usually these are issued by national leaders and handed down through the organizations. Across interviews with local level organization members—across different organizations and across different parts of the country—it became clear that such endorsements are not only widespread but also understood to be highly effective, especially in rural settings.

The Pact of Unity and the National Coordination for Change

In the lead-up to the 2005 election, in which the MAS—to the surprise of many—won both the presidency and the majority of the legislature, a new coordination body of the organizational coalition had evolved, the Pact of Unity (*Pacto de Unidad*). This Pact of Unity was a council of societal organizations created to help its members coordinate and prepare a draft version of a new constitution for the Constituent Assembly that had been one of the core demands of the protests discussed above. Once the Constituent Assembly had been convocated in August 2006, the Pact of Unity also served as a platform to help the MAS supporting group within the Constituent Assembly coordinate and find a consensus with the different organizational actors (Filho 2014, 140; Schavelzon 2012).

While the membership in its early years was still a bit in flux and at times also included smaller organizations and subnational groups of larger organizations, the Pact of Unity generally had a core membership of five national organizations: the CSUTCB, the CSCB, the FNMCB Bartolina Sisa, the CIDOB, and the CONAMAQ (García Yapur, García Orellana, and Soliz Romero 2014, 82). While there was no formal representation of the party within the body, many of the organizations' representatives also held office within the party and members of the party leaders regularly attended meetings of the Pact of Unity.

In an effort to strengthen ties with the organizations that were already part of the Pact of Unity and incorporate other organizations that had not formally been part of it but had become important organizational allies during the Water Wars and gas conflict, a new institution, the National Coordination for Change (CONALCAM; la Coordinadora Nacional por el Cambio), largely replaced the Pact of Unity. Formally announced in January 2007 and actually fully established in early 2008, CONALCAM took over many of the coordinating functions from the Pact of Unity. While the Pact of Unity continued to play an important role in the Constituent Assembly throughout 2007, it became much less important and

visible once the Constituency Assembly approved the new constitution in December 2007 (Viaña 2011, 37).

Beyond the members of the original Pact of Unity, CONALCAM also came to include a number of other important organizations. Two of them, the FEJUVE de El Alto and the Confederation of Rural Teachers in Bolivia had already been coordinating extensively with the Pact of Unity. While not formal members of the Unity Pact, they had signed the Pact for Sovereignty and National Dignity with the organizations of the Pact of Unity in 2005, along with the Coordinara del Gas y de la Vida that had played a crucial role in coordinating protests during the water wars but had since lost most of its importance (Zuazo 2009, 43; Spronk 2007). Other new additions included the influential informal sector unions and student unions.[4] In addition to organizational representatives, the new CONALCAM also includes representatives of the MAS led executive (the President and, depending on the agenda, different ministers), the leaders of the MAS parliamentary groups in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and the President and Vice President of the Constituent Assembly (Escárzaga 2012, 152–53; Harnecker and Fuentes 2008, 200–201).

Going far beyond the coordinating functions served by the Pact of Unity, CONALCAM has a broader membership and enjoys a wider and more robust mandate to advance the 'process of change' (*proceso de cambio*) that the MAS had set out to pursue. President Evo Morales, when announcing the institutional reform during a speech looking back at the first year in office, explains that CONALCAM "will be the highest level of political decisions, which is above the cabinet" (quote according to Viaña 2011, 37).

Beyond the regular meetings of the CONALCAM at the national level, Departmental Coordinators of Change (CODECAM; Coordinadoras Departamentales del Cambio), replicate the national CONALCAM at the state-level (or rather *departamento*-level). These state-level institutions that were implemented in 2010 are composed of the state leaders of the member organizations that exist in that state, the state leadership of the party, representatives of municipal governments (held by the MAS), state assembly members of the MAS, and the state governor in states where the MAS holds that office, such as La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, and Pando (*La Razón* 2010).

As an "organization of organizations" (Mollinedo 2015), this body has a clear corporatist character and serves at least three important functions with regards to the relationship between the party and its organizational allies. First,

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[4] A few more organizations were added later (mostly in January 2008 and August 2010), bringing the number to almost 30 organizations (Escárzaga 2012, 153; *La Razón* 2010).

this body allows the MAS leadership to exercise direct control over the organizational allies.

Second, nevertheless, CONALCAM also presents a new formal venue for organizational allies to influence policies more directly and have direct access to the President's 'ear,' he or sometimes other member of the executive would preside over the meetings of this body (Escárzaga 2012, 153). Beyond the mere symbolic importance of this direct line of communication between the organizations, the party leadership, and the President, CONALCAM has at times been quite critical and served as a 'loyal opposition' to the government. For example, CONALCAM has publicly criticized specific policies proposed by the MAS and at times even demanded wide-reaching changes in the President's cabinet of ministers (El Diario 2018; Urgentebo 2016).

Third and maybe most importantly, the body presents a formal forum in which factional disagreements within the party coalition could be settled. As one high-level organization leader, who has represented an indigenous organization in the CONALCAM, put it during an interview, CONALCAM "manages to glue together" (interview by author, November 19, 2014).[5] It provides an institutional mechanism through which disagreements about policies as well as candidate selection get managed and "decisions [are] made in coordination between the social organizations" (interview by author with Hilarion Mamani, Secretary General of CONAMAQ, March 2, 2016).

While many new leftist parties in Latin America at one point or other established forums in which organizational allies could voice their views, CONALCAM appears particularly institutionalized and endowed with distinctively far-reaching decision powers. This point is also emphasized by Santos Ramirez, one of the key architects behind the CONALCAM within the MAS, when asked about the goal of CONALCAM in an interview in August 2007:

> In this entity, you participate, not only to make suggestions, [or] to ask, but to decide what we are going to do from then on. … I'm [just] returning from Ecuador, I was in Lima, I was in Buenos Aires, and I have seen that there is no decision-making body like this, where the leaders, who are the leaders of the popular movements, are present for decision making.
>
> (quoted according to Harnecker and Fuentes 2008, 201)

[5] The verb used in Spanish is "aglutinar."

In fact, representatives of different organizations—both national-level leadership and regional activists—kept on emphasizing in interviews conducted by the author that the national CONALCAM and state-level CODECAM play an important role in candidate selection. Hilarion Mamani, Secretrary General of the CONAMAQ, for example, pointed out that

> Through meetings of the CONALCAM—and in every department there is also a committee—through these, the social organizations get together and define [candidates]. They determine organically: 'it's this sector's turn or that sector's turn.' And organically, they are fights; there are many candidates but we have to reach a consensus and choose one or few.
>
> (interview by author, 03/02/2016)

Party Congress, National Board, and Candidate Selection

Beyond the national-level CONALCAM and the department-level CODECAM, which serves as forums in which disagreements among the leaderships of the different actors within the party coalition over day-to-day policy issues get resolved, the MAS has also developed a system of party institutions that incorporate a larger number of delegates from all the different organizational allies and focuses on more long-term matters. Through party congresses, a representative national board, and subnational councils of delegates of the organizational allies with a presence in any given territory, the party has institutionalized a number of mechanism through which to manage its relationship with organizational allies. A set of codified rules guarantee the extensive representation of organizational allies in party leadership and among the party's candidates for elected office. Through these formal rules, early organizational allies enjoy a particularly privileged position. The organic or corporatist mechanisms employed to nominate the party's candidates for elected office fuse together the party and the organizational allies.

The Ordinary National Congress

According to the party's statutes, the party's highest authority is the Ordinary National Congress (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 18), which meets every two years (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 11). The party congress is composed of large number delegates from the allied base organizations and the department-level party organizations (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 12, 14). Beyond the delegates, office holders of the party, such as members of the executive, senators, deputies,

governors, state assembly members, mayors, and councilors, are also invited as participants—but not as delegates (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 12).

The delegates are sent from all the different confederations (and some federations as well as the MAS youth organization) that are affiliated with the MAS, according to set quotas for each organization. While the exact number of overall delegates has varied a bit from congress to congress, as result of new organizations being admitted to the congress over time, the most recent congress in 2016 counted on a total of 3620 delegates (see formal announcement in the appendix). 2870 of these were delegates sent by organizational allies and 750 were delegates sent by the department-level party organizations. Among the organizational allies, the largest delegations (consisting of 200 delegates each) are reserved for three of organizations that were allied since the early marches discussed above, the CSUTCB, CSIB, and CNMCIOB-BS. Most other organizations are represented with 50-100 delegates each.[6]

The party congress has a number of central functions: most importantly, it elects members of the national board of the party (in a direct and secret vote, requiring an absolute majority) (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 18a); it decides on changes to the party statutes (with support from the Organic Congress (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 19e)) and the government's program (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 18c); it is the highest authority in disciplinary matters against party leaders and members (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 18d-f); it decides on the addition of new organizational allies (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 19f).

The National Board

Furthermore, the party statutes enshrine extensive organizational representation in the party's powerful national board, similar to the other institutions already discussed. First, to be eligible to be elected to be member of the national board you "have been a base member or active and consistent militant of a social organization for 10 years" (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 31). Second, the three positions at the head of the board are reserved for the three organizations that were allied since the early marches, the CSUTCB, CSIB, and CNMCIOB-BS. This privileged representation of early organizational allies, similar to larger delegate quotas to the congress for these organizations, is founded in Article 18b where it require congress to "respect(s) the historic trajectory of the three parent organizations at the head of the National Board of the MAS-IPSP: CSUTCB, CSCIB, and CNMCIOB-'B.S.'" (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 18b). Since the board is

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[6] The COB that only recently began formally supporting the party and remains at the periphery of the party's institutions (see more detailed discussion below) gets to send only 20 delegates.

composed of a president, vice president, and 12 additional party secretaries responsible for different thematic portfolios (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 33), this leaves 9 positions to be divided between the other organizational allies.

The role that the organizations play in the election of the national board and the privileged representation of some organizations is described very illustratively by Senator Santos Ramírez from Potosí:

> Well, the structure of the Movement towards Socialism is consolidated exclusively under the mandate, leadership, call, and management of these national organizations: peasants, *colonizadores*, Federation of Women, *gremiales*, and until now the presence of the rural teachers still continues. What is it that they do? Every two years, they follow the call to the congress. A year ago, we had the 6th National Congress of the Movement towards Socialism. How do they select [the party leadership]? The President, Vice President, and International Affairs are selected first; that is the first decision, that one is made by consensus; and who proposes those ministries? The founding organizations, the ones that built the political instrument of the Movement towards Socialism, put them forward. From then on, a list without specifying the ministries is being nominated; it is the congress that begins to nominate by national and departmental organizations.
>
> (quoted according to Zuazo 2009, 332–33)

He then goes on to explain further:

> I believe that at this point, in the 6th Congress, we have already had a diverse presence, for example, of artisanal workers, of microentrepreneurs, of retirees, of miners. It has become more diversified; that is why we have the representation of the three organizations in our national executive board: the comrade Evo Morales, who is nominated by the Confederation of Peasants; the comrade Gerardo Garcia, who is nominated by the Confederation of *Colonizadores*, and the comrade Leonilda, who is nominated by the Federation of Peasant Women. From there on down [the list], there is a diversity of organizations.
>
> (quoted according to Zuazo 2009, 333)

This point is further elaborated by Antonio Peredo, one of the prominent early proto-leaders of the party,[7] in a 2007 interview:

> There is a structure determined by the [party] statutes that recognizes the original organizations of the MAS: the cocaleros of the Chapare and Yungas; the *colonizadores*, peasants who in their time went to colonize uninhabited lands; the Federation of Peasant Women; and other organizations that have incorporated themselves, such as the rural teachers, the market vendors, the *gremiales* [informal sector unions]. The president of the MAS, Evo Morales, is a representative of the Chapare; the vicepresident is a representative of the *colonizadores*, the secretary of international affairs is a representative of the Federation of Peasant Women.
> …
> [Question:] And those posts are set for those organizations?
>
> Yes, they are set in accordance with the [party] statutes. Each organization knows that they will fill that post and has in mind what person they will bring every two years because every two years a MAS congress takes place where the executive board is elected.
>
> (quoted according to Harnecker and Fuentes 2008, 141–42)

Candidate Selection: National Board & Ampliados

The nomination procedures for the party's candidates for any elected public office extensively involve the party's organizational allies—in an organic or corporatist manner. The mechanism employed to nominate the party's candidates for elected office fuse together the party and the organizational allies.

On the one hand, party candidates must have been affiliated and active with the party for a substantial period of time. The party statutes specify that, for example, candidates for deputy positions need to have had at least 10 years of affiliation and militancy for the MAS-IPSP and that "invited, independent or neutral" candidates are not allowed to run on MAS party tickets (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 59b, d).

[7] Antonio Paredo was a prominent leftist public intellectual in Bolivia who came from what could be described as a longstanding 'revolutionary family': his brothers, Coco and Inti Paredo, were members of the guerilla movement led by Che Guevara and were killed by the Bolivian military. In 2002, Peredo ran as the party's candidate for Vice President (on a ticket with Evo Morales); he served as one of the few MAS deputies elected before 2005 (2002-2005) and then as senator (2006-2009).

On the other hand, candidates need to get nominated by organizational allies. The party statutes specify that "all candidates shall be elected organically by the social organizations in accordance with their own norms and procedures(,) [and] the statutes and regulations of the MAS-IPSP" (2012, Art. 59d). More specifically, candidates are nominated bottom-up—potentially through multiple organizational levels *within* each organization—through internal rules determined by each organization. Article 59a specifies that "the candidates for national, departmental, and municipal deputies shall be elected through the own norms and procedures and the most democratically possible forms that *each sector* considers appropriate in compliance with the Law of the Electoral Organ and the statutes considering gender equality."[8]

While the specific procedures vary somewhat across different organizations largely as a function of different internal structures within different confederations and federations, most of them begin with a large number of locally nominated pre-candidates—usually nominated at the lowest level of organizational hierarchy, such as the union local, local community, or local branches of a specific organization. Depending on the specific organizations' rules, this first round of nominations occurs through decision-rules such as voting (open or secret), acclamation, consensus, or rotation. These pre-candidates are then 'send up' to the next hierarchical level *within* the organization, where one person is chosen among all the pre-candidate. For most organizations, this process of aggregation repeats multiple times—once for each level of organizational hierarchy—until they get up to the administrative level at which the final nomination has to occur. Depending on the position, this could be anywhere between the municipal level (for municipal councilors) and the departmental or national level for national deputies.

Leonilda Zurita, who has held a number of leadership positions within the peasant women movement and the party (including as national board member) and has served as departmental assembly member in Cochabamba, describes the process as follows:

> We choose candidates first in the neighborhood, after than in the central, which is composed for six or seven neighborhoods, then in the districts; in my district, for example, are five centrals. From there it is taken to an open town hall, meetings, it does not matter if there are 10 candidates. From there it is take to the federation, and there once again a vote … The candidates are not chosen by the President, but by their communities; it is not the finger

[8] Italics were added by the author for emphasis.

> (quoted according to Harnecker and Fuentes 2008, 153)

A similar account is presented by Isabel Ortega, who has been a leader within the indigenous and peasant women movements and served as national deputy, senator, and vice minister of indigenous justice:

> First, they chose me in the community, then in the central. If the central has 4 or 12 communities, they choose 4 or 12 people there; and out of those 12 people, only one has to come forth. The regional [level] has 52 or 70 communities. From there, only one person has to come forth. So thereby we elected our parliamentarians.
>
> (quoted according to Harnecker and Fuentes 2008, 153)

These procedures, which occur *within* each organization, thereby yield at least one (but if necessary also multiple) candidate(s) to be put forward by *each* organization. However, these *within-organization* selection procedures cannot solve the potential coordination or aggregation problem *across organizations* that arise if multiple organizations exist within a given geographic territory. While in some cases, in particular for municipal candidacies in rural areas, there might indeed only be one organization that is affiliated with the MAS, for most positions there are multiple organizations potentially competing for the same position (or set of positions, in the case of the party list candidates).

To solve this coordination problem across organizations, a set of additional institutionalized mechanisms have been adopted by the party. On the hand, a system of national, department level, regional, provincial, and municipal *ampliados*, councils of delegates of the organizational allies with a presence in any given territory, have been put in place. On the other hand, the final responsibility to ensure coordination on the party's candidates is conferred to the national board of the party.

Mirroring the different administrative levels of the state, the MAS has instituted a system of councils of delegates of the organizational allies with a presence in that territory. The subnational *ampliados*—at the departmental, regional, provincial, and municipal level—are particularly relevant for nomination purposes since only limited other formal, cross-organizational forums exist within the party.[9] These councils meet at least twice a year, but haves clear rules through which organizations can force additional meetings (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 71), and consist of "all the base delegates of the social organizations of a given jurisdiction" (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 70). A series of interviewees, mainly

[9] At the national level, the CONALCAM fulfils this nomination function.

departmental and local organization leaders, emphasized that these *ampliados*, in addition to allowing the organizations in a jurisdiction to come together on other issues, were crucial because it provide a mechanism through which they could coordinate on the joint party candidates.

One of the founding leaders of the CSUTCB and president of the party's Tribunal of Discipline and Ethics, Teodoro Barrientos Céspedes, explains that the

> The *ampliados* … assemble all the leaders and the bases to participate and they bring a list of names for all the posts. And that is where they are chosen in a secret vote or also by consensus.
>
> (interview by author, 11/05/2014)

The work of the different *ampliados* is ultimately overseen by the national board of the party. The party statutes charge the national board with the responsibility "to coordinate and respect the own selection forms, mechanisms, and procedures of the social base organizations for the candidates for national, departmental, regional and/or provincial, municipal, district-level, and sectoral deputy/assemblymen that the MAS-IPSP will put forward in the electoral competitions" (2012, Art. 37f). Thereby, the national board provides another institutionalized space in which coordination among the different organizations about candidate selection can occur, if disagreements between organizations arise that are not solved by the *ampliados*.

Resulting Party Structure and Mobilization Strategies

The institutionalized, organic ties with a large number of organizations across the country have brought about a very particular party structure. Since the party can credibly rely on the organizations to provide a local base foundation for it, it does not have to build a separate party infrastructure. In fact, the local branches of the organizational allies act actually become part of the party itself. In the words of Evo Morales at the MAS party congress in 2003, "where the union organizations [that form part of the MAS-IPSP] work well, the political instrument does not exist separately" (as quoted in Alto 2007, 76). In fact, even membership in the party is indirect and occurs "through their natural social organizations" (MAS-IPSP 2012, Art. 8).

The resulting party takes the form of what could be characterized as an "indirect party" (Duverger 1954, 6), i.e. a party that "is made up of the union of the component social groups" (Duverger 1954, 6). In fact, the party structure of

the MAS in its relationship to the societal organizations, with which linkages have become institutionalized, resembles the party structures of the British labor party of around 1900, which "was made up of Trade Unions, Co-operative Societies, Friendly Societies, and groups of intellectuals who had united to establish a common organization: there were no party supporters or members, only members of the component groups" (Duverger 1954, 5).

Across interviews, national and regional leaders of various organizational allies were quite clear and—maybe surprisingly—very open about what they understood their organizations' role in creating and securing mass support for the MAS to be. Especially for the organizations that have had organic linkages with the party, organizations' leadership would regularly—not just during electoral campaigns—issue endorsements for the party. Often these would be issued by national leaders and handed down through the organizations. As one prominent leader of the CSUTCB points out during an interview,

> within the confederation, we have a chain: the confederation, the departmental [organizations], the regional [organizations], the *centrales*, the provincial level [organizations], the *sub-centrales*, and the community. So that way the information is sent down.
>
> (interview by author, 11/05/2014).

It seems often higher-level leadership would actually attend local organization meetings in order to express their endorsements.[10] As Natalio Rodolfo Mancilla Castro, National Executive Secretary of the national informal sector union confederation (Confederación de Gremiales de Bolivia) and Secretary General of the powerful Federation of the Gremiales of El Alto (Federación de Gremiales de El Alto), explains, when asked about the activities of his organization during election times, that

> we have to go and visit the meetings of the assemblies and unions to make it known to the people who our candidates are. … We, as *gremiales* have our people go [to those meetings] and we as leaders direct people [in the meetings] how our vote in the polls should be for the MAS.
>
> (interview by author, 03/02/2016)

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[10] During many interviews, organization leaders would actually use the term un *instructivo* to refer to an endorsement that they would issue; the term endorsement might not convey the full intensity of the Spanish term.

At least for the organically linked organizational allies, these endorsements are not limited to electoral campaigns though. As the leader of a coca grower union federation in the Chapare region states, when asked about how his organization ensures that members support the MAS, this happens

> through meetings. In OTBs [*organización territorial de base*; territorial base organizations], there always meetings that take place. That's where the leaders need to become involved. Someone from higher up [within the organization] comes to these meetings and hands down the information. This what we would refer to as 'socializing' the members and informing the local leadership. … Every month, there are meetings. That's when it's important that some authority, for example, we as leaders or some minister or someone, goes to these meetings to inform.
>
> (interview with Severo Delgado Veliz, General Secretary, *Federación Única Centrales Unidades*, by author, 10/20/2014)

He goes on to explain that this happens in a similar way "across sectors and all over the country… not just of peasant organizations but also for gremiales, FEJUVE, transportistas etc." (interview with Severo Delgado Veliz, General Secretary, Federación Única Centrales Unidades, by author, 10/20/2014).

Across interviews with local level organization members—across different organizations and across different parts of the country—it became clear that such endorsements are not only widespread but also understood to be highly effective, especially in rural settings. What is more, it seems that organization leaders seem to be well aware of their ability to influence members' preferences. One national peasant union leader, for example, when asked about the role of his organization in securing stable electoral support for the MAS in the area, explained:

> In the rural area, the MAS has an organic relationship due to … its affiliation with an organized structure, such as the CSUTCB, the *Interculturales* … These organizations are the ones that convey the messages, channel, guide, disseminate, and inform.
>
> For a peasant, what the press says must be heard, but it must not be believed. … Not even the official radio messages are heard. I believe that the presence of the official radio stations, [such as] Channel 7, are less credible for peasants than a leader. The word of a leader is more credible; it is very strong.
>
> (interview by author, November 19, 2014)

Stability of Ties

Once a tie between the party and an organizational ally has become institutionalized through the above-mentioned coordination and control mechanisms, it becomes very hard to sever this linkage. Even when put a lot of stress, the institutionalized party-organization ties have proven quite sticky.

From the perspective of the party leadership, there might be very little incentive to do so in the first place since it would loss the support of the organization and would risk losing control over the organization. Even if the party leadership wanted to expel an organizational ally from its coalition and, for example, revoke the organization's right to send delegates to the party bodies, they would still need the approval of the party congress, which presents a high institutional barrier.

From the perspective of the organization, the barriers to deserting the party are probably even higher. First of all, if organization deserted the MAS, it would entail the loss of power not only within the party but also within the government, given the MAS' hegemonic position within the Bolivian party system.

Second, even if an organization wants to sever its institutionalized tie to the MAS, it becomes very hard to actually accomplish it due to potential splits within the organization and the cooptation of the organization's leadership that has resulted from the institutionalized tie. The temporary withdrawal of CONAMAQ and CIDOB from the Unity Pact and CONALCAM between 2011 and 2013 illustrates the first point. In June 2010, high tensions had risen between the MAS led government and CIDOB over new laws that, in the view of the indigenous lowland protesters, were "falling short of historic demands for designated seats in congress for indigenous self-representation … not sufficiently encompass[ing] respect for consultation with indigenous communities before any development projects" (Webber 2017, 698). The tensions with the CIDOB and CONAMAQ rose further during the TIPNIS crisis in 2011, which Farthing and Kohl summarize succinctly:

> The issue was the construction of a road to connect the Beni with Cochabama, 32 miles of which would cut through the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS), the 5.5-million-acre lowland forest that straddles the Cochabamba and Beni Departments northeast of La Paz. The government sought the road to better integrate the inaccessible Amazon departments of Beni and Pando as well as to facilitate hydrocarbons exploration, which Vice President García Linera calls essential to balance the country's lopsided dependence on natural gas in the Chaco. The proposed thoroughfare has been a long-standing Beni demand and in the works decades before the 1990 founding of the

> TIPNIS. … Improved roads, however, also open tropical areas to logging and expansion of the agricultural frontier by highlanders[.] …
> Some 800 of the approximately 12,000 indigenous Moxeños, Yucarés, and Tsimanés (also known as Chimanés) who call the TIPNIS home set off in August 2011 to march 375 miles up steep mountainsides to La Paz to protest the lack of prior consultation on road consultation as required by the 2009 Constitution and the 2007 UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In Yacuma, the project's supporters blocked their route, and, on September 25, five hundred police forcibly removed the protesters, wounding seventy and, according the independent Human Rights ombudsman, violating their human rights. Feelings ran so high that two government ministers and other top officials resigned in protest. Morales apologized for the use of force, begged for forgiveness, and the march resume. He promised to negotiate a settlement, while accusing the right wing and the United States of subsidizing the marchers in an effort to destabilize the government.
>
> (Farthing and Kohl 2014, 52–53)

The CIDOB had played a crucial organizing the protests and had received support from CONAMAQ. While tensions between peasant unions and indigenous organizations had also arisen before in the Pact of Unity over questions related to the draft constitution in 2006 and 2007, they did not rise to the level that any of the coalition's core organizations tried to leave the coordination body (Schavelzon 2012, 98). Prominent leaders within both organizations were now advocating to break with the government and sever ties with the MAS. After leaders of both organizations declared their withdrawal from the Unity Pact and CONALCAM in 2011, the fierce struggle between factions within both organizations that were in favor of the withdrawal and those that were opposed to it arose. These factional infights continued and culminated in the split of both organizations into MAS aligned and government opposed splinters. In late 2013, the MAS aligned factions reclaim their ties to the party and reinstate their membership in the Unity Pact and CONALCAM. Therefore, the attempts to sever the institutionalized ties with the party failed in the end, causing splits of the organizations and a loss of organization members.

Beyond those instances of extreme tensions between some organizational allies and the party, in which the withdrawal attempt (or temporary withdrawal) led to splits within the organizations, it also becomes very hard for organizations to sever institutionalized ties due to the cooptation of the organizations' leadership. In fact, in most organizations, the institutionalization of party-organization ties has also brought about widespread cooptation of organizations'

leadership, leading to a decrease in organizational autonomy vis-à-vis the party, arguably making a desertion by organizational allies less feasible or likely. This happened in two different ways: due to individual organization leaders' career incentives, leading them to move on to political or party leadership positions; and through intentional, 'top-down' replacement of organization leaders by the party leaders.

First, the above-described system, in which party leadership and public office holders are recruited primarily from the organizational allies, creates strong career incentives for organization leaders to move on to higher positions with the party or in government. As a large number of interviewees, especially at the local and departmental level of organizational allies, admitted, their special relationship with the party has been a double-sided sword: on the hand, they have been able to place their own people in positions of power within the party and government and have been able to significantly influence policy outcomes. On the other hand, many of their most capable and respected leaders are no longer focused on running the organization. Therefore, while this form of cooptation might have yielded unprecedented levels of representation for organizations, the resulting 'brain drain' away from the organizations has also weakened the organizations themselves and brought about a loss in organizational autonomy and capacity.

Second, in this context where the party and organizations have become deeply fused and institutions such as CONALCAM and CODECAM exert a fair amount of influence over organizations (or at least over factions within organizations), the party also gains increased power over organizations and can support MAS friendly individuals and factions within the organization (in the vein of *charrismo*).

Instrumental Ties: Organizational Allies at the Periphery

Many of the organizations, such as the large and historic labor central COB, that extensively coordinated with the MAS proto-leaders early on but were not part of the early *moments of solidarity*, have also, for the time being come to support the MAS. However, their relationship with the party remains instrumental (Mayorga 2012, 68). Unlike the organizational leaders that had been actively involved in the above discussed protests during the 1990s and early 2000s and had marched side-by-side with the proto-leaders of the party and with representatives of the other organizations, these organizations, such as the COB, have continued to mistrust the proto-party leaders and did not develop as shared sense of identity with the other actors, of being part of the 'process of change.' While these organizations eventually came to support the MAS in exchange for some political concessions and limited representation within the party and

government, they stay at the periphery of the coalition and enjoy less influence within the party and the government than the organizations that institutionalized their ties to the party early on.

Following the Media Luna crisis in 2008, the COD began a cautious dialog with the government and signed a formal agreement of mutual support with the CONALCAM (Escárzaga 2012, 154). Nevertheless, the COD continued to be very critical of the government. After heated internal fights, in 2013 the national leadership of the COB began a process of 'rapprochement' with the government: in late 2013, the COB formally announces to relinquish plans to form their own party and instead formally support MAS and join CONALCAM and the coalition of organizational allies of the MAS (Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Previsión Social 2015, 4).

However, as extensive interviews with members of the national COB leadership and leaders of various departmental CODes reveal, this joining of the coalition is motivated by a clear *quid-pro-quo*: the COD would receive a set number of slots to nominate their candidates for the 2014 legislative elections, in exchange for mobilizing the vote of formal workers. What is more, there appears to be little expectation on the side of COB and CODes that this alliance would be lasting in the long-term.

The reasoning of the COB's national leaderships decision to enter into a strategic alliance with the party (or rather the government) is outlined very clearly by José Luis Delgado Ramirez, a national board member of the COB and one of the key architects behind the 'rapprochement' with the MAS:

> As workers we have been 'throwing stones,' as they say, from outside the palace for six years, saying 'they're doing it wrong; they're doing it wrong. This does not seem right to us'—and the government responding 'no, no, no,' when this process is ours, too.
>
> It has now been decided that we enter; not to stay on the outside but to get involved in the process. As result of that meeting, the COB [now] has representatives in the legislature, after the elections that took place recently in the country. We have senators elected through the labor movement through the MAS. There has been a rapprochement with the government, through the party in office. Of the 17 candidates we put forward as workers for representation, 12 were elected. We have senators, as well as uninominal, multinominal, and also supra-state representatives.
>
> We cannot say either that we are going to refuse to have legislative representation. … Now we have a workers' caucus inside the legislative body. …

> This is important because it guarantees that through legislation we can guarantee the application of labor laws and defend the workers' grievances and also because it used to be that, suddenly, decisions would made because this reason was not present within the government.
>
> We are in full effort of socialization because it is not easy for the worker to understand what is happening, especially in politics. We are in a process of socializing as well as of explaining the reasons for this decision.
>
> In practice, from the point of view of the worker, after the party of comrade Evo Morales took over office, the COB had been face-to-face with the government for six years. It did not partake, it made life impossible, there were conflicts, and there was everything.
>
> How is it that the good and the best are now in a meeting; are we friends? Therefore, the worker is not understanding this for historical reasons. What the leadership is doing at this time with this decision … [to ally with the MAS] is to pass down this information to the bases so that they understand the reasons behind this decision and also what comes from here on forward.
>
> (interview by author with José Luis Delgado Ramirez, National Secretary of Regional Integration and Development, COB, 12/04/2014)

However, as interviews with other members of the national executive and leaders of various departmental CODes reveal, there appears to be no shared identity with the broader coalition and its goals, little trust in the party and its leaders, and no intentions to maintain this alliance if the government stopped delivering on its promises.

A leader of one of the CODes, for example, after expressing his reservations about the new "strategic alliance" with the MAS, explained that if their organization is not content with the "fruits of the alignment with the party of the government", "we are sure that the Workers' Party will be reactivated" (interview by author, October 2014).

A leader of another one of the CODes clarifies that "there is no type of relationship with the party of the MAS; it is with the government. …. We are very separate from the MAS party" (interview by author, 10/25/2014). Yet another leader of another one of the CODes goes even further and states

> The *Central Obrera* has to be anti-partisan; what is, we can participate directly in politics. There is currently a rapprochement of the workers with the current administration—it is not with the MAS party. So what we are looking for is that—through this agreement that we have—the government can pay attention to the needs and prioritize all that the workers need to be able to live, as it says in the constitution, 'comfortably and freely'
>
> (interview by author, 10/27/2014).

This type of instrumental relationship is not limited to the COB though. Other organizations, which had not participated in the early *moments of solidarity* and came to support the MAS in a similar fashion to the COB later, maintain exclusively instrumental linkages with the party. While they support the MAS in exchange for some political concessions and limited representation within the party and government, they stay at the periphery of the coalition. Even once in office as a national deputy, they still remain focused on this quid-pro-quo:

> I have never been of any political parties; my only politics have always been the work in the base [organizations]. The Federation of Cooperatives through their leaders made political alliances with the MAS to have a representation in the National Parliament; as a result, I am here, my colleague Hilarión Bustos, my colleague Victor Mena and three substitute deputies, the result of this political agreement.
>
> (interview with Alex Cerrogrande Acarapi, deputy from Oruro, quoted according to Zuazo 2009, 200–201)

3.3. Alianza PAIS in Ecuador

3.3.1. Founding Moments: Protests without Proto-party Leaders

The founding of Alianza PAIS occurred during a moment of mass mobilization similar to the one we saw in Bolivia. The platform of the party that goes back to a civic association working to resolve Ecuador's foreign debt (Jubileo 2000 Red Guayaquil) founded in 1999 was closely aligned with the demands of the protesters in the street.[11] As Roberts points out, "[f]ollowing the examples of Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia, Correa had campaigned on a pledge to convoke a constituent assembly, write a new constitution, sweep aside the corrupt political establishment, and unleash a 'citizens' revolution' with new forms of popular participation" (2014, 268).

Building on the close ideological alignment between the party's proto-leaders, most prominently the presidential candidate Rafael Correa,[12] and the demands of the popular protests organized by a broad coalition of societal organizations, the early party came to be seen as representing these protesters politically. In return, the party could rely on their support.

A broad collation of powerful societal organizations—representing sectors similar to ones in the founding coalition of the MAS—came to support the party. This support proved to be particularly crucial when the party contests its first elections in 2006, holds a national referendum about instituting a Constituent Assembly, elects its members in 2007, and puts the new constitution to a popular vote in 2008.

Alberto Acosta, one of the founding fathers of the party and cabinet members in the first Alianza PAIS administration until becoming president of the Constituent Assembly,[13] highlights the influence of a broad coalition of societal organizations on the party platform and emphasizes their crucial importance in winning the 2006 election:

> In this setting [of economic, social, and institutional crisis], the proposals formulated specifically by the indigenous movement and also by other social movements, such as the labor union movement …, become consolidated. It is in this context that electoral force appears that brings the current president, Rafael Correa, to the presidency. …

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[11] The party was formally registered (as party) in early 2006.

[12] Alianza PAIS did not run any legislative candidates in the 2006 general election.

[13] Acosta later became an outspoken critique of the administration and ran against Correa in the 2013 presidential elections for a multi-party coalition.

> Many of the proposals that are there [in the 2006 campaign platform of Alianza PAIS] do not arise from the minds of us intellectuals who wrote this up. These were the proposals of the popular sectors. We wrote it up, but who proposed it? It was the popular sectors. Proposals in the economic area, education, health, the democratic revolution, the constitution, etc. were subjects that motivated the popular struggles. Therefore, this is very important. These movements were decisive actors for the victory of Rafael Correa in 2006, to convene the Constituent Assembly and for the referendum in April 2007, to form the National Constituent Assembly in September 2007, and for the approval of the constitution in 2008. And then, some social movements still supported the election of Correa in 2009. …
>
> The triumph of Rafael Correa in 2006 would have been unthinkable without the struggle of the social movements. Without the support of the social movements—the social movements support[ed] Rafael Correa, especially in the second round, [but] in the first round as well—Correa would not have won, the Constituent Assembly would not have happened because you would not have won. We could not have had such an important result let a lot the approval of the constitution without the support of the social movements. The social movements were fundamental—vital—for this government. …
>
> In the second round of November 2006, the contributions of these groups were decisive. There was a large alliance—a large front—formed by the social movements …. In the process of convening a Constituent Assembly, there was an enormous support and several groups participated. Then, in the Constituent Assembly they were constant strategic allies. The CONAIE, the FENOCIN, the labor unions, the teachers[‘ unions], and the students[‘ organizations] were strategic partners and played preeminent role in the approval of the constitution and the referendum in September 2008.
>
> (Interview by author, 12/08/2015)

This characterization of very close ties between the early party and its extensive group of organizational allies and extensive coordination between them is very consisted with the understanding held by the organizations themselves. Numerous interviews with leaders of different organizations further document this early support and coordination within the founding coalition. The president of the

Confederation of Indigenous and Peasant Peoples and Organizations (FEI; Confederación de Pueblos, Organizaciones Indígenas y Campesinas del Ecuador), for example, emphasized the coordinated support by different indigenous and peasant organizations:

> The FEI with the FENOCIN and the FENACLE signed an agreement with … Correa in 2006. … In the second round [the run-off election] in 2006, we all supported him.[14]
>
> (Interview by author with José Agualsaca, president of the FEI, 11/23/2015)

Within this broad coalition of organizational allies—encompassing individual labor unions and union confederations, especially the ones associated with the United Workers' Front (FUT, Frente Unitario de los Trabajadores), student organizations, urban social movement organizations, and a number of peasant and indigenous organizations—the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE, Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador) was particularly important. While we might have come to think of Bolivia of a case of particularly extensive and successful indigenous and peasant mobilization in recent years, the strength and degree of mobilization was at least as high in Ecuador when Alianza PAIS contested its first election. Yashar even goes as far as characterizing Ecuador as having "Latin America's strongest, oldest, and most consequential indigenous movement" (2005, 85). In fact, as discussed in more detail below, the CONAIE, through its involvement in sustained, high-intensity protest activities, had played a key role in bringing down three earlier presidents in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Abdalá Bucaram in 1997; Jamil Mahuad in 2000; Lucio Gutiérrez in 2005) (Peña y Lillo E. 2012, 73–74).

What is more, the CONAIE had a proven track-record of working extensively and closely with other organizations:

> CONAIE's leadership was open to collaboration with nonmember and nonindigenous popular sector social movement organizations. …
> Its member organizations and local authorities had worked closely with a wide range of allies in their struggle to organize; these included …

[14] FENOCIN: National Confederation of Peasant, Indigenous, and Black Organizations (Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras)
FENACLE: National Federation of Agro-industral Farm Workers and Free Indigenous of Ecuador (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Agroindustriales de Campesinos e Indígenas Libres del Ecuador)

> nongovernmental organizations, and labor unions (especially the peasant affiliate of the Confederación Ecuatoriana de Trabajadores and the Catholic Workers' Union). Class and ethnic-based roots commingled … . This experience created lasting, expanding dense networks of activists, NGOS, and leaders from unions and center-left political parties. As these organizations (and their descendants) struggled against neoliberal reforms in the cities, CONAIE drew on those networks to lead the popular sectors' challenges to neoliberalism.
>
> (Silva 2009, 159–60)

Characteristics of outside parties

While many of the organizations that would come to help Alianza PAIS win the 2006 elections were earlier closely aligned with another party, the Movimiento de Unidad Plurinational Pachakutik – Nuevo Pais (MUPP; also often just referred to as Pachakutik), they had largely turned away from this party by 2006 (Roberts 2014, 267). Furthermore, given their specific demands, the other options in the party systems arguably did not constitute attractive alternatives to Alianza PAIS with its closely aligned anti-neoliberal discourse. What is more, Pachakutik even joined the coalition around Alianza PAIS during the second round of the 1996 and formally endorsed their candidate Correa.

In 1996, CONAIE, along with the CMS, played a crucial role in the formation of a new party, Pachakutik (Van Cott 2005, 121–24; Silva 2009, 168; Yashar 2005, 149). The party initially relied extensively on organizationally mediated appeals through the CONAIE and CMS and fared well in the 1996 and 1998 general elections.

These linkages, however, became largely severed when the CONAIE, together with 400 dissident military officers under the leadership of Colonel Gutiérrez, mounted a coup d'état against the government of President Mahuad and Congress, which included several Pachakutik leaders (Yashar 2005, 151; Mijeski and Beck 2011, 65; Becker 2011, 68–74), over the proposed dollarization of the country's economy. The putschists instituted a short-lived 'Government of National Salvation' that was led by Colonel Lucio Guitérrez, CONAIE president Antonio Vargas, and the former Supreme Court president Carlos Solórzano, that lasted (Becker 2011, 68–74).

(Missed) Moments of Solidarity: Organizations and Protests

Notwithstanding the overlap in policy goals between the early party and its group of organizational allies, their close ties, and coordination, the early party leadership around Correa did not have much trust in their organizational allies due to a lack of prior experiences together. In fact, while the party's proto-leaders were closely ideologically aligned with the demands of their organizational allies, leading up to the passage of the new constitution, they had not actively participated in the extensive popular protests that had taken place in the 1990s and early 2000s.

The country had experienced a series of large-scale nation-wide popular protests, beginning with the first National Indigenous Uprising in 1990, organized by the CONAIE with support by other peasant and indigenous organizations (Yashar 2005, 144–47; Ramírez Gallegos 2010, 89). This first uprising was followed by a "more intense, wave of anti-neoliberal contention" spurred by President Durán's extensive economic reform program (Silva 2009, 162). Through a series of marches, acts of civil disobedience, and general strikes, that brought together a broader coalition of organizations, most importantly the FUT, CONAIE, and the Social Movements Coordinator (CMS, Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales), which encompassed a wide range of non-indigenous social movement organizations and individual unions (Silva 2009, 155–67). The massive protests continued throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s (Ramírez Gallegos 2010, 89). During this time, the protests peaked several times: first, during the massive mobilizations against a neoliberal agrarian reform bill and efforts to privatize the oil sector under President Durán in 1994; then again, during the staggering strikes and massive protests against the neoliberal reforms proposed by President Bucaram in 1996/1997 and President Mahuad between 1998 and 2000, culminating in the ouster of both presidents (Silva 2009, 155–88; Ramírez Gallegos 2010, 89; Yashar 2005, 148); and then again in 2004-2005 against President Gutíerrez, culminating in his removal from office in 2005 (Ramírez Gallegos 2010, 89).

(Missed) Moments of Solidarity: Proto-party Leaders

While the party's proto-leaders were closely ideologically aligned with the demands of their organizational allies, leading up to the passage of the new constitution, they had not actively participated in the extensive popular protests that had taken place in the 1990s and early 2000s. In fact, most of the proto-leaders had very limited or no personal experiences with the organizations that came to support them. Except for maybe Ricardo Patiño and Alberto Acosta, who

had had some limited prior personal involvement in the indigenous and labor movements respectively,[15] most of the proto-leaders could not look back on any prior personal involvement in any of the allied organizations. In fact, just like Correa, who had earned a Ph.D. in Economics in the US and taught Quito's Universidad San Francisco before briefly serving as finance minister in 2005, many of the other proto-leaders, such as Alberto Acosta, Patricia Dávila, and Fander Falconí, had also been academics or public intellectuals.

Correa, whose leadership within the group was uncontested even though he had not been part of initial circle of founders that had formed in 1999 when Correa was still studying in the US (Pérez-Rolo González 2016), was particularly mistrusting of the organizations. According to multiple sources who were close to him during his early years in office, he had never come to put much faith in them. Acosta elaborates on this point:

> He [Correa] did not come from the social movements. … He did not believe in the social movements … because never had an experience with the social movements. He is a young, intelligent, hardworking person, with a lot of charisma but he has no prior social experience. He did not fight in the streets. He was not in the unions, in the indigenous movements. He had a discourse in favor of that while it was useful, and then he distanced himself.
>
> (Interview by author, 12/08/2015)

3.3.2. Institutional Consequences

As result of the lack of trust that the party leadership placed in their organizational allies and the absence of a shared identity with them, it is not surprising that the party leaders were hesitant to adopt internal rules and mechanisms that would tie them to the organizations. Instead of guaranteeing them a seat at table through the creation of coordination institutions or secured representation in candidate nomination procedures, the party leadership continued to coordinate with them only on an ad-hoc basis. No institutionalized spaces for organizational representation within the party were created and organizational representatives ran on the party's lists as 'invited candidates,' the number and selection of which is completely discretionary.

[15] Patiño had worked for the CEDOC (Ecuadorian Central of Class-based Organizations; Central Ecuatoriana Organizaciones Clasistas) in the 1980s. Acosta had been involved in founding the indigenous Pachakutik party in 1995.

The National Convention

According to the party's statutes, the party's highest authority is the National Convention, which meets at least every two years (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 16). The party convention is composed of the members of the National Directorate, the party's elected public office holders "to the level that the National Directorate decides," and "the territorial delegates designated by the Provincial Directorates and special districts abroad in accordance with the democratic mechanism established by the National Directorate" (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 16).[16]

The national convention has a number of central functions: most importantly, it elects the president, two vice presidents, and executive secretary of the party; it elects the party's candidates for President and Vice President; and it approves the party statutes and the government's program (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 16, 20).

The National Directorate

The powerful national directorate of the party is "the highest body of political leadership of Alianza PAIS, when the National Convention is not in session" (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 17). It is composed of the party's president, two vice presidents, the executive secretary, the 24 provincial directors, the former executive secretaries, and representatives of the special districts abroad (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 17). Compared to the already powerful national board of the MAS in Bolivia, Alianza PAIS's national directorate has even far-reaching competencies. Among a broad range of competencies, it gets "to define the selection mechanism for the delegates to the National Convention, their number and form of participation and decision-making;" "convene the National Convention;" and "decide on the matters to be submitted to attention of the National Convention" (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 18). Furthermore, the national directorate gets "to define the strategy on how to relate to other political and social organizations" (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 18). Last, the national directorate is tasked "to establish the maximum percentage of invited candidates that Alianza

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[16] In Ecuador, provinces [provincias] constitute the first political and administrative level below the national level. Ecuador currently has 24 provinces, each one with a popularly elected prefect and a provincial government that is composed of the mayors of the province and has legislative and executive competencies. Below the provincial level follow the cantons [cantones]. Each canton is headed by a popularly elected mayor and municipal government. The third and lowest subnational level consists of parishes [parroquias].

PAIS will put forward in each district for electoral processes" (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 18).

These 'invited candidates' present an important way in which the party allows local notables and organizational representatives to run on the party ticket. These 'invited candidates' provide a highly discretionary way in which the party leadership can promise access to the spoils of office and limited representation in government (mainly to the legislative) in exchange for electoral support during a specific election. Furthermore, this mechanism allows the party to target individuals, such as individual organizational leaders or local notables, rather than organizations themselves.

Unlike for the MAS, where invited candidates are not permitted and even nominations that results from temporary alliances have to go through the corporatist structures, the mechanism of 'invited candidates' leaves the representation of organizational allies at the discretion of the national directorate, which in turn does not have any guaranteed representation of organizations either. Therefore, even if an organizational ally were to support the party consistently over multiple elections, Alianza PAIS's institutional structure would offer neither any formal venues of representation within the party nor any credible guarantees of sustained representation among the party's candidates for elected office.

The only party organ that is formally tasked "to connect to the social organizations and incentivize them to form part of the movement … [and] to promote the participation of the social organizations in the electoral processes," the Permanent Commission of Social Organizations,[17] does not institute any rules that would guaranteed organization's access either: its members are designated by the national directorate (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 29). Therefore, the decision about whom it include—just as with 'invited candidates'—is left at the complete discretion of the party leadership.

Candidate Selection

The institutional rules through which Alianza PAIS chooses its candidates—especially its legislative candidates—are fairly vague and underspecified, opening creating opportunities for the party leadership to influence the process in a discretionary fashion. The party statutes give some limited authority to the national convention: as discussed above, the national convention is tasked with nominating the party's candidates for President and Vice President. Moreover, the national convention chooses the members of the

[17] This commission can be replicated at the various subnational level, at the discretion of the national directorate (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 43, 52, 60, 71)

National Electoral Commission (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 16, 26), which is responsible "to organize the electoral processes for the members of territorial directorates and national and territorial candidates of the Alianza PAIS" (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 26). Furthermore, the party statutes establish that the provincial convention chooses the candidates for elected officials that are chosen in the provinces (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 45).

Beyond that, no specific rules or mechanisms for the selection of party nominations, for example, for national legislators are enumerated. Instead the statutes establish that the national directorate (in collaboration with the party's national electoral commission) gets to choose the mechanism through which candidates are chosen:

> For the election of authorities and candidates the criteria of gender equity and parity will be applied; as well as, the norms and provisions the Constitution, the Law, and internal regulation of Alianza PAIS establish.
>
> The National Directorate will approve the mechanisms of internal democracy proposed by the National Electoral Commission of the movement.
>
> (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 81)

This discretionary power delegated to the party's national directorate has led to discontent within the party (NOTIMUNDO 2016; Telégrafo 2016), with some prominent people within the party, such as Alberto Acosta, early member of the party's early leadership circle and then president of the Constituent Assembly, demanding regular primaries (La Hora 2008).

Over the years, the party's national directorate has considered different nomination mechanisms, including open and closed primaries, party conventions, and "'a type of primaries' in which the provincial directorates would propose names of possible candidates to the national directorate" (El Comercio 2014; NOTIMUNDO 2016; El Comercio 2016; El Telégrafo 2016).

Resulting Party Structure

While the *formal* party structure—at first sight—appears to follow the model of a direct mass party, it might be more accurately characterized as a nationally focused elite party that relies on local notables in a largely discretionary fashion. Furthermore, unlike the MAS, which has to be

characterized as an indirect party, Alianza PAIS has a system of individual membership of "permanent adherents or militants" (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 5-7).

On the one hand, the party statutes have provisions that establish an internal structure resembling of traditional direct mass parties: in addition to the central national level organs discussed above and additional national commissions, the statutes outline a multi-layered framework that replicates those organs at the various levels of the country's political and administrative hierarchy (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 43-73). At the base of the party, it provides for Committees of the Citizen Revolution composed of the local party members (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 74), resembling of party branches.

On the other hand, extensive interviews by the author with elected officials and party activists in 2015 and 2016 have shown that many of the subnational party organs have not actually been instituted and that party branches exist only in very few parts of the country. What is more, unlike in traditional democratic mass parties where barriers to changing party structures are high and usually require the consent of lower level units, the subnational structure of Alianza PAIS is completely discretionary and can be sidestepped by the party leadership without the approval of any other actors. In fact, while the party statutes outline an extensive subnational party structure, it also delegates far-reaching power to the national directorate to re-organize the subnational at their will:

> For its representation and operation, the movement may be organized at the provincial, district, cantonal, [and] parish level, and in special districts abroad, as well as in other forms if the National Directorate determines it so.
>
> (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 43)

In a narrow sense, the internal structures of the party are certainly democratic: they provide structures for internal representation and accountability and stipulate that decisions are to be made by consensus or majority votes (Alianza PAIS 2014, Art. 80). However, given the overwhelmingly powerful national directorate—both by design and in practice—serious doubts arise about how effectively internal accountability can be ensured by the party's structure. Furthermore, given the discretionary nature of the *subnational* organs of the party and their limited existence, the party does not seem to fit traditional definitions of democratic *mass* based parties (Duverger 1954). Instead one might characterize Alianza PAIS as a nationally focused elite party that relies on local notables in a largely discretionary fashion.

Stability of Ties

As discussed above, Alianza PAIS enjoyed crucial support from a variety of organizational allies in the early elections and referendums between 2006 and 2009. At the same time, key demands of the organizations were implemented, especially in the new constitution, and some organization leaders were nominated to run on the party's lists in the 2008 and 2009 elections (Ramírez Gallegos 2010, 86). Yet these ties remained instrumental and were not institutionalized through internal rules and mechanisms that would guarantee organizations' representation within the party. Instead the coordination with organizations remained on ad-hoc basis and organizational representatives ran on the party's lists as 'invited candidates.'

These instrumental ties with organizational allies seemed to work well initially but started to unravel when disagreements arose with organizations allies. As the former Prefect of the capital's province of Pichincha, Ramiro González, who served as Minister of Industry and Productivity under Correa from 2013 to 2015, emphasizes "in fact, Correa arrived with the support of Pachakutik" (interview by author, 11/23/2015), an indigenous party traditionally linked closely to the CONAIE. Yet this relationship did not last; he points out that "[t]here were indigenous ministers at the beginning, but that marriage did not last" (interview by author, 11/23/2015).

Once tensions arose with organizations about the next policy steps after the successful passing of the constitution, there was no mechanism in place to work out the issues within the party coalition and there were no institutional barriers that would keep either side from deserting the other. Invigorated by their sweeping electoral successes in the 2009 and 2013 general elections, the party leadership came to believe they could continue to be electorally successful without having to make large concession to organizations allies for their continued support. Therefore, beginning in 2009, the party leadership began distancing itself from key organizational allies. In particular, the ties with large and powerful organizations, such as the CONAIE and most of the labor movement, that had begun making demands for more extensive concessions, came undone.

This point is also emphasized the leader of one of the few smaller organizations that remained instrumentally linked to the party. In an interview, the the president of the Confederation of Indigenous and Peasant Peoples and Organizations of Ecuador (FEI; Confederación de Pueblos, Organizaciones Indígenas y Campesinas del Ecuador), states:

> It seems that the difference is that the comrades of the CONAIE proposed the tactics to Correa's government as they had proposed to the government

> of Lucio Guitérrez: to share power. That is when the Correa government said 'no,' and there they turned back. That is where the gap started.
>
> (Interview by author with José Agualsaca, 11/23/2015)

Somewhat ironically, the organizations that had initially helped Correa and Alianza PAIS come into office ended up organizing large scale protests that brought the Alianza PAIS government to the brink of collapse. When tensions over the extraction of natural resources in indigenous regions, labor law reforms, and fiscal reforms heightened in 2014 and 2015, organizations, such as the CONAIE and FUT, organized massive demonstrations, marches, and roadblocks that presented the biggest threat to the government since the attempted coup in 2010.

Here, the comparison to the Bolivian case is particularly interesting: whereas disagreements about very similar issues also arose in Bolivia and caused some popular protests as discussed above, the ties between the MAS and its organizational allies had become so deeply institutionalized that it largely endured these challenges. Arguably, the 'brain drain' away from organizational allies into the party and elected office that has resulted from the guaranteed representation of organizations within the MAS, had also weakened the organizations themselves to such an extent that they could no longer pose a serious threat to the party.

This gradual decline in the party's ties with the organizations over time that ultimately culminated in the complete collapse of linkages with many organizations is documented similarly by both proto-leaders of the party and leaders of the organizations themselves. Alberto Acosta, for example, describes the change in the party's ties with the organizations over time as follows:

> Correa later denies the role of social movements. … Gradually, it [the party] was distancing itself from the social movements. As he [Correa] was gaining more power, he was distancing himself from the social movements. To him, they were no longer necessary. Once the constitution was approved, he already distanced himself from the social movements. And then, he tries to control the social movements, to dominate them, to subordinate them and, when that does not suffice, he tries to divide them to make them disappear. I would say this is the big problem. Correa not only ignores his origins, but he tries to destroy the bases. … He came to the presidency because of the social movements and then he kicks away the ladder. … He no longer needed those ladders anymore.
>
> (Interview by author with Alberto Acosta, 12/08/2015)

Describing the change in ties and the ultimate rupture, Jorge Herrera, the president of the CONAIE states the following:

> The government is a government that at the time picked up the discourse of the social struggles in the country. It is a government that—for us—as we look at it today, is a 'wolf dressed in sheep skin.' … It is practically a government that took the proposals from the social movements and the indigenous movements of the CONAIE and assumed Ecuador's presidency with those discourses. As it had a discourse of change for the benefit of the large majority of the country, people actually trusted them and for a while they polled very high in credibility and popularity in the country. But … at some point we determined that it was not a government that was responding to our political approach.
>
> (interview by author, 11/20/2015)

Remaining and New Instrumental Ties

While most of the linkages with organizational allies came undone between 2009 and 2013, Alianza PAIS has maintained some limited instrumental linkages and tried to create some parallel organizations to existing, critical ones. These efforts often focus smaller organizations that receive very small concessions, in the form of 'invited candidate' posts for leaders rather than in sustained representation, in exchange for their support during election times. Even when entire national confederations pledge their support, these concessions can be rather limited as the president of the FEI explains: "I was a candidate for the Alianza PAIS movement as an alternate for the National Assembly, but we did not get in because only eight got in and I was in the ninth place." However, he goes on to say that they "were able to put a few comrades in different positions in parochial boards and for [municipal] councils through Alianza PAIS" (Interview by author with José Agualsaca, president of the FEI, 11/23/2015)

It appears most remaining instrumental linkages focus on subnational units of larger organizations. For example, Alianza PAIS has tried to secure the indigenous vote in some districts by "signing pacts with base level organizations, giving posts to the leaders" (Interview by author with Severino Sharupi, CONAIE, national board member, 10/23/2015).

In fact, it seems like some national organizations are quite content with having different territorial parts of the organizations support different parties during electoral campaigns. The president of the FENOCIN, for example, pointed out that

> some names, for example, have been proposed … to both parties. Some comrades have appeared with the Socialist Party and other with the Alianza PAIS party. … In Alianza PAIS, we had an assembly member [deputy], we have had the comrade Pedro de la Cruz … he was constituent assembly member, assembly member, and now he is a member of the Andean Parliament. And through this, we have advanced in that sense.

However, he goes on to say, "we have not had any leader inside the directorate of the party" (Interview by author with Santos Villamar, President of FENOCIN, 10/29/2015).

Similar to the organizations with instrumental linkages to the MAS in Bolivia, these organizations focus on issuing endorsements during electoral campaigns. What is more, these endorsements also seem to happen locally, usually in meetings of the base organizations. The president of the FENOCIN explains, "We go to the events. We go to the assemblies. For example, when they hold general meetings, they invite us—there we are" (Interview by author with Santos Villamar, President of FENOCIN, 10/29/2015).

Furthermore, it seems that Alianza PAIS leaders seem to be well aware of the effectiveness that organizational endorsements can have over organization members. The deputy director of Alianza PAIS in the province of Chimborazo, for example, makes this point very clear:

> I believe that base organizations play a very important role. For example, with the people at the base—the peasants, the indigenous, those that live in marginal urban neighborhoods—what their leader conveys is fundamental. It is the voice of what they have to do. So, if you have many leaders of social organizations as followers, first, you can easily enter the social organizations, and second, you already have the ground prepared for you because they become the spokespersons for the implementation of public policy.
>
> (Interview by author with Lucy del Carmen Montalvo Pazmiño, Provincial Deputy Director of Alianza PAIS Chimborazo, 12/5/2015)

However, while such endorsements through instrumentally linked organizations might be highly effective, these instrumental ties remain fundamentally unstable. As one prominent former mayor and co-founder of the indigenous Pachakutik party explains:

> They move! These leaders that used to be with Alianza PAIS are now with AVANZA. It is dangerous because there is no real political consciousness of participation.
>
> (interview by author with Auki Tituaña, former mayor of Cotacachi and co-founder of Pachakutik; 10/21/2015)

Furthermore, this instability of ties is also reflected in the frequent changes in positions of power conceded to instrumental allies. Most visibly, this has yielded instability and constant turnover in the cabinet (Freidenberg 2012, 140).

Parallel Organizations

Beyond the reliance on uneven instrumental linkages with existing organizations in order to secure electoral endorsements, Alianza PAIS has begun creating parallel organizations to the large critical ones. These efforts have been most extensive with regards to labor movement. Here the party, largely relying on targeted spending of public funds according to a variety of different sources within the labor movement, has created the United Workers' Central (CUT, Central Unitaria de los Trabajadores). While organization only has a very limited organizational reach thus far, it still serves an important symbolic function and helps the government discredit other labor confederations critical to them.

These points are underlined by Ramiro González, who served as Minister of Industry and Productivity under Correa from 2013 to 2015 but then became a critique of the government:

> President Correa since he arrived tried to have his own teacher unions, for example. … He did the same with the CUT, the United Workers' Central, instead of the FUT. At the same time, it was a strategy of weakening the traditional ones
>
> (Interview by author with Ramiro González, 11/23/2015)

The symbolic importance of the creation of the CUT is also emphasized by the Alianza PAIS director of the province of Chimborazo:

> In labor issues, the FUT has always been a historic—but delegitimized—[connecting] line. Now we have built the CUT. Therefore, we have that force and the CUT is a worker line that supports Alianza PAIS.

> (Interview by author with Pepe Tenesaca Mendoza, Provincial Director of Alianza PAIS Chimborazo, 12/5/2015)

Non-organizational Mobilization Strategies

Beyond those limited, instrumental linkages and attempts to create parallel organizations, Alianza PAIS has used two other strategies that aim at side-stepping societal organizations all together. First, Alianza PAIS has extensively relied on direct appeals—often communicated by the president himself through radio addresses or when visiting local communities with his 'traveling cabinets.' Second, Alianza PAIS, once in office, has greatly relied on very extensive, highly targeted public spending to secure support bases and mobilize voters outside the party's strongholds.

First, to an extent that surpasses most other personalist presidents in the region, Correa has tried to appeal to voters *directly*. As Conaghan puts it, Correa and his party have been in a "permanent campaign," in which they try to connect "directly to voters, with minimal interference or 'filtering' by parties, civil society groups, or the media" through regular and widely disseminated radio addresses and traveling cabinet meetings, "during which the president and various ministers visit different locales to meet with local authorities, greet members of the general public, and appear at concerts or cultural events" (2008, 52–53). Conaghan points out that "[T]he festive atmosphere surrounding Correa's visits provides fertile ground for politicking; the government made good use of the events to raise support" (2008, 53).

Second, since assuming office, Alianza PAIS has greatly relied on very extensive, highly targeted public spending to secure support bases and mobilize voters outside the party's strongholds. On the one hand, the government has invested heavily in highly visible infrastructure projects that have well received by voters. As Freddy Ehlers, cabinet minister from 2010 to 2013 and State Secretary for the Presidential Initiative for the Construction of a Society of Good Life from 2013 to 2017, points out,

> [the Alianza PAIS government] has been a government mostly dedicated to public works. The government has dedicated itself all the efforts—all the ministers have been ants—building hospitals, building schools, building roads. There was no ideological base work"
>
> (interview by author with Freddy Ehlers, cabinet minister from 2010 to 2013 and State Secretary for the Presidential Initiative for the Construction

> of a Society of Good Life from 2013 to 2017, former presidential candidate of Pachakutik, 11/26/2015)

On the other hand, a lot of the public spending appears to be highly targeted towards certain districts and, according to some accounts, distributed in a clientelist manner. The targeted distribution of funds is closely connected to the party's reliance on local notables, often mayors, to mobilize voters, especially in rural areas and after losing power in many cities in the 2014 elections. Especially in areas outside the party's early strongholds, Alianza PAIS has relied strongly on mayors that serve as local notables to mobilize voters in their communities.

Based on extensive interviews with mayors in the coastal province of Manabí and the northeastern provinces of Napo and Imbabura, it appears that while some mayors and mayoral candidate were actually actively targeted by the party, many switched allegiances strategically themselves in order to gain better access to public funds. Ideological alignment and prior contact with the party does not appear to be necessary at all in those cases. When asked about the type of connection to the party before (successfully) running for mayor with Alianza PAIS in 2009, one interviewee, who had a widely respected community leader who had been allied with other parties before, quite illustratively explains that he had had

> no relationship. When I was a candidate, I met him [Correa] personally. I was no friend of Correa before. When I was a candidate, they told us that all Alianza PAIS candidates have to take photos. He had a tremendously positive image and therefore we decided to have our picture taken. [*He points to his picture with Correa.*] This is not a montage; it is real. Many candidates from all over the country took that picture.
>
> (interview by author with Alberto Anrango, former mayor of Cotacachi, 10/25/2015)

Both strategies of targeted public spending, however, are highly dependent on full state coffers. When public funds became less abundant with the massive drop in oil prices the in late 2014 and early 2015, the party's ability to rely on clientelistic forms of mobilizations became severely limited. As Ramiro González, who served as Minister of Industry and Productivity under Correa from 2013 to 2015, points out, Alianza PAIS "was always more clientelist, with public officials and people from the *bono* [cash transfer program]. … [But] there are no resources left keep giving them and then it becomes harder and more expensive to get people out into the streets." (Interview by author, 11/23/2015).

3.4. MORENA in Mexico

3.4.1. Founding Moments: Joint Participation in High-stake Protests as Moments of Solidarity

The founding of MORENA occurred against a somewhat different background than the scenario faced by the MAS in Bolivia and Alianza PAIS in Ecuador. Whereas the party systems in Bolivia and Ecuador had practically completely collapse by the time these new parties began contesting elections, MORENA faced a different scenario. Even though the party system in Mexico had also experienced a serious crisis of representation that caused the longstanding dominant party PRI to lose their hold onto power, it never fully collapsed. In fact, the traditional parties managed to survive the crisis and continue to exist to this day.

Especially the survival of the PRI has posed critical constraints on the types of potential organizational allies and mobilization strategies available to new parties. Historically, most major societal organizations in Mexico were affiliated with the PRI through national-level corporatist arrangements. For example, going back to Lázaro Cárdanas's presidency in the 1930s, the largest labor union confederation, the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM, Confederación de Trabajadores de México), and the largest peasant union confederation, the National Peasant Confederación (CNC, Confederación Nacional Campesina) have been formally linked to the PRI (Collier and Collier 1991, 200, 202).

The PRI's continued hegemony over most nationally organized societal organization has seriously limited the range of societal organizations that could become allies for any party. While a few other major confederations without longstanding ties to the PRI emerged, such the Cardenist Peasant Central (CCC, Central Campesina Cardenista) that were allied with the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD, Partido de la Revolución Democrática), most other societal organizations were primarily locally organized or only represented a specific sector of the workforce, in the case of labor organizations. In addition to the few independent labor unions,[18] these, for example, include neighborhood

[18] Important examples of such independent unions include the Mexican Union of Electricians (SME, Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas), the Independent Workers' Union of the Autonomous Metropolitan University (SITUAM, Sindicato Independiente de Trabajadores de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana), and some factions of the National Coordinador of Education Workers (CNTE, Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación) and of the National Social Securiry Workers' Union (SNTSS, Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores del Seguro Social).

associations, such as the influential Asamblea de Barrios and the Unión de Colonias Populares (UCP) in Mexico City (Bruhn 1997, 211).

Such subnational societal organizations constitute the most important organizational allies of the MORENA. Unlike for the MAS or Alianza PAIS whose organizational allies take the form of peak associations usually organized at the national level, MORENA has to rely on primarily locally based organizations and groups. Some of these are the above mentioned independent organizations that had previous ties to the PRD, such as many of the neighborhood associations in Mexico City, individual labor unions, and the peasant central CCC. These organizations follow the members of the PRD leadership and base that had broken with their party to form MORENA.

However, MORENA has also built linkages to a wide range of primarily locally organized groups that were never affiliated with the PRD or any other party. These include a number of student unions, local unions, and locally or regionally organized independent peasant unions and indigenous organizations.[19]

The composition of the party leadership also reflects the two different heritages. On the one hand, a large part of the proto-leaders of the party were former PRD politicians, most prominently the former head of the Mexico City government and former PRD presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). They decided to split from the PRD when the PRD entered an alliance the Pact for Mexico (*Pacto por México*) with the President Enrique Peña Nieto's PRI and the right-wing National Action Party (PAN, Partido Acción Nacional) in late 2012. MORENA, which had been registered as a civic association in late 2011 to prepare the 2012 presidential campaign of AMLO, was formally registered as a party on July 9, 2014 (Bolívar Meza 2014). On the other hand, the leadership of the new party also included some outsiders that had not been part of the PRD beforehand. As Ackerman notes such outsiders are also well represented among the party's early candidates:

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[19] Between formerly PRD affiliated and un-affiliated organizations, a total of 40 peasant and indigenous organizations have expressed their support for MORENA thus far. These include the Movimiento Social por la Tierra (MST), the Central de Organizaciones Campesinas y Populares (COCYP), the Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala (CNPA), the Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autónomas (UNORCA), the Unión Popular Revolucionaria Emiliano Zapata (UPREZ), the Unión General Obrero, Campesina y Popular (UGOCP), the Unidad de la Fuerza Indígena y Campesina (UFIC), the Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos "José Dolores López Domínguez" (CIOAC- JDL), Unión Nacional de Trabajadores Agrícolas (UNTA), and the Central Campesina Cardenista (CCC) (Maya 2018).

> the vast majority of the MORENA candidates for the Mexico City Constituent Assembly, also in 2016, were leading intellectuals, actors, and leaders of civil society.
>
> (Ackerman 2016, 400)

Characteristics of Outside Parties

For most of the smaller organizations at the core of MORENA's founding coalition, the other established parties did not present credible, attractive options to link with. First, the internal structure of most of the established parties that have a realistic chance at winning national offices, such as the PRI, PAN, and PRD, would not offered a way to gain privileged access and sustained representation within the party. To the extent that corporatist structures within those parties directly connect to organizations, as do within the PRI, these structures are focused on peak organizations and would be hard-pressed to incorporate independent organizations. Second, and arguably more importantly, many of these organizations have developed against (or at least in clear demarcation from) the established parties and their organizational structures. The independent unions and peasant organizations in MORENA's founding coalition, for example, are defined by not being part of the PRI-affiliated labor and peasant confederations. Third, closely to the second point, many of the activists that form part of the local organizations come to strongly despise even the PRD after it enters into an alliance with the PRI and PAN through the Pact for Mexico.

For the few national or regional peak associations, such as the peasant central CCC, that came to support MORENA later, the party system still offered other credible, attractive alternative options, when MORENA contested its first (limited) legislative election in 2015. These organizations that had previously been allied with the PRD continued to view the PRD as a credible, attractive alternative to MORENA. As my interviews document, these organizations' leaders were still very much considering alliances with both party options initially. In fact, they only began openly supporting MORENA in late January 2018 (Maya 2018).

Moments of Solidarity

The large-scale protests in the aftermath of the 2006 Presidential Elections presented a crucial series of moments of solidarity, during which AMLO, his supporters from within his former party, and members of many organizational allies came together to publicly express their discontent with what they

understood to be a 'stolen election.' This experience was critical in creating a shared identity within MORENA's later founding coalition. Furthermore, it led AMLO and other proto-leaders around him to realize that they could trust and rely on the broad set of local organizations that came to their support during these moments of crisis.

According to the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE, Institute Federal Electoral; now the National Electoral Institute, INE), AMLO, who had run as the candidate of a left-wing coalition of the PRD, the Labor Party (PT, Partido del Trabajo), and the Convergence party (Convergencia), narrowly lost to the Felipe Calderón, the candidate of the PAN. The initial, official count of the vote released by IFE on July 6 reported a narrow margin of victory of about 243,000 votes of 41 million cast (or 0.58%) (McKinley Jr. 2006a). However, there existed widespread allegations of irregularities and fraud and public demands for recount of the ballots. According to an opinion poll conducted by the newspaper *El* Universal in early August, 59% of Mexico City residents believed that electoral fraud had taken place and 63% believed there should be a full recount of all ballots (El Universal 2006).

These allegations of a 'stolen election' prompted large-scale protests and civil unrest that began shortly after the announcement of the official election results lasted for months. These prolonged mass protests included the "occupation of the capital's great Zócalo Plaza and some six miles of the central Reforma Avenue" by protesters, acts of civil disobedience, and a series of marches that "culminated in the biggest demonstration in modern Mexican history" on July 30 with an estimated number of participants ranging "from 350,000 to more than 2 million," as reported by The Guardian (Tuckman 2006).

As part of a series of popular assemblies that were held on the Zócalo during the protests, AMLO also called for a National Democratic Convention (CND, Convención Nacional Democrática) to coordinate the opposition against the outcome of the election. A broad range of societal organizations from all over the country, most of them not national confederations but rather sectorially or locally organized groups, answered the call and sent large delegations to the CND that took place on September 16. These included large delegations from various indigenous organizations and peasant unions (Gomez et al. 2006; La Jornada 2006; Gomez Mena 2006); independent labor unions, such as the Mexican Union of Electricians (SME, Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas), the Independent Workers' Union of the Autonomous Metropolitan University (SITUAM, Sindicato Independiente de Trabajadores de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana), the Tram Alliance of Mexico (ATM, Alianza de Tranviarios de México), and some factions of the powerful National Social Securiry Workers' Union (SNTSS, Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores del Seguro Social) (Gomez et al. 2006; Gomez Mena 2006); and various student movement organizations, such

as the National Youth Movement (Movimiento Nacional de la Juventud), Students in Civil and Peaceful Resistance (Estudiantes en Resistencia Civil y Pacífica), and the University Front (Frente University) within the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) that had voted to send 3,000 delegates alone (Gomez et al. 2006). However, other prominent national organizations, such as National Workers' Union (UNT) that had previously supported the party, decided not to send a delegation to the CND (Gomez et al. 2006).

Notwithstanding the widespread allegations of irregularities and fraud, some of which were substantiated in the partial recount of 9% of the ballots order by the Federal Electoral Tribunal on August 5, the courts ultimately did not order a full recount or overturn the official victory of Calderón (McKinley Jr. 2006a, 2006c, 2006b).

However, despite the fact that the protests were unable to overturn the electoral defeat of AMLO, they had brought together the proto-leaders and many organizational allies of what would become MORENA in these moments of solidarity. The shared experience of lengthy, large-scale protests was critical in creating a shared identity among the different actors involved, many of whom would later become part of MORENA's founding coalition. Furthermore, the immense and steadfast support provided by organizational allies from all over the country over weeks on end, often at high personal costs to themselves led AMLO and other proto-leaders around him to realize that they could deeply trust and rely on this broad coalition of local organizations.

3.4.2. Institutional Consequences

During its founding moments, MORENA adopted a variety of institutional arrangements that govern the party's relationship with organizational allies. These arrangements have shaped how the party has come to reconcile conflicts of interests within their broader coalition. While the ties with the organizational allies that had marched side-by-side with the other organizations and the proto-party leaders before the party became national office became fully institutionalized, the relationship with the other organizational allies that had not been part of such *moments of solidarity* has remained rather instrumental.

Yet the mechanisms and rules through which the ties to organizational allies become institutionalized for MORENA are very different from the ways developed by the MAS. More specifically, differences in the structure of the organizational allies—the degree or level of organizational aggregation—make

other mechanisms for coordination with allies and for organizational representation within the party necessary.

The structure of the organizational allies is very different from the ones linked to the MAS. In the case of the MAS most organizational allies take the form of peak association of membership-based interest groups or social movements organized at the national or regional level. Such organizations—by definition—exhibits a multi-level organizational structure that connects individual members to a national or regional level of organization as well as additional levels of organization such as local and sub-regional chapters. Such organizations already have an organizational structure in place that make it rather easy for a new party, such as the MAS, to 'borrow' the organizations' infrastructure in order to connect to a rather large number of local level organization members at once and mobilize them for the party.

In contrast, the organizational allies of MORENA are primarily locally based organizations and groups, characterized by a less complex organizational structure. Therefore, if linkages with local organizations are to be institutionalized, these organizations can only be incorporated into the party at the local level. Furthermore, local organizations tend to have less organizational autonomy vis-à-vis the party due to the organization's smaller membership and coverage (compared to major societal organizations that have national or at least regional coverage). In fact, given these groups' localized nature and their relatively low degree of organizational autonomy, I find that they become incorporated through (and in some cases, as) local branches for the party.

Thereby, the structure of the organizational allies with whom linkages are institutionalized has important implications for the resulting party structures and the stability of the linkages. Through the institutionalization of ties at the local level, the organizations become incorporated through (and in some cases, as) local branches for the party. Thereby, the resulting party becomes more resembling of a "direct party" (Duverger 1954, 5), in which the weaker organizational structures become subsumed and "the members themselves form the party community without the help of other social groupings" (Duverger 1954, 5).

The Committees of Protagonists

At the base of the party's organizational structure are the "committees of protagonists" (MORENA 2014, Art. 14).[20] These base committees can take the form of both geographically defined branches and identity or sector-based cells.

[20] Membership in MORENA is individual and the individual members are referred to as "protagonists of true change" (MORENA 2014, Art. 4).

On the one hand, there are base committees that are geographically defined and organized at the level of the neighborhood or town (MORENA 2014, Art. 14).[21] On the other, base committees can also be established to represent specific "identities (gender, cultural, social, ethnic, etc.) or participation in sectoral activities (factories, schools, *ejidos*, agragrian communities, workplaces, cultural, sports, socio-environmental, youth, etc.)" (MORENA 2014, Art. 14).

According to interviews with leaders of numerous base committees, local organizations and groups use these base committees to connect to the party. In some cases, just organizational leaders would join base committees, but most of the time, the whole organization would simply reconstitute itself as a base committee. Especially the second form of base committee that is organized around a specific identity or sectors maps on very well to the structure of the organizational allies. Thereby, it allows a wide range of organizations—ranging from women's groups over indigenous groups to workers in a particular workplace—to easily incorporate their existing groups into the party.

Through this incorporation into the party through base committees, the organizational allies gain extensive, guaranteed representation within the party and influence over candidate nomination. In fact, the particular mechanisms used for candidate selection, especially for the party's lists of proportional representation (PR) candidates at any level, side-steps much of the higher-level party apparatus and offers base committees a direct shot at securing nominations. I will first briefly outline the role of these base committee within the party and how they can influence the party's positions and selection of higher party leadership. Then I will return to the specific mechanisms used for candidate selection and how they secure privileged representation for organically linked local organizations and offer ad-hoc representation for instrumentally linked national organizations.

The Broader Party Structure

As discussed in the previous section, the "committees of protagonists" serve as the base of the party's organizational structure and through its participation in the District Congress elects the delegates for the State and National Congresses (MORENA 2014, Art. 14). Each of these base committee consists of at least 5 and up to 60 members and is supposed to meet at least once every 30 days (Art. 16).

[21] The party statutes also allow for base committees abroad and regulate their representation within the party. Given their small number and relative insignificance within the party, I will not explicitly discuss them in this section.

All the base committees in a given municipality form a Municipal Assembly and come together as a Municipal Congress—a meeting of the full membership of all base committees within the municipality—at least every three years to elect their leadership, the Municipal Committee (MORENA 2014, Art. 14, 16).[22] In a similar fashion, the District Congress—also a meeting of the full membership of all base committees within the district—also meets at least every three years (MORENA 2014, Art. 24). Each District Congress elects the influential District Coordinators, who also automatically serve as delegates to the State Congress, State Council, and National Congress (MORENA 2014, Art. 26). All District Coordinators together in a state also form the State Congress and State Council (MORENA 2014, Art. 26-29)

Moving to national level, the party's highest authority is the National Congress (MORENA 2014, Art. 34). It is composed of all the districts coordinators and the outgoing National Executive Committee and can have between 1,500 and 3,600 delegates, depending on the size of the district delegations (MORENA 2014, Art. 35). The National Congress, which regularly only meets every three years,[23] elects the National Executive Committee as well as 200 members for the National Council, which acts between congresses and meets at least every three months (Art. 36, 38, 41). Besides the 200 delegates elected by the National Council, the National Council also contains 100 representatives of the states' party leadership (the 96 Presidents, Secretaries-General, and Organizational Secretaries from the different states and Mexico City as well as 4 representatives from the committees abroad) (MORENA 2014, Art. 36).

Last, the National Executive Committee, elected by the National Congress for three-year terms, consists of 21 members (Art. 38). Besides a President and a Secretary-General, it consists of 19 Secretaries with specific portfolios, many tasked explicitly with coordinating with organizational allies. These include the Secretary of Education, Training, and Political Training, who "will be MORENA's link with the teacher unions;" the Secretary of Women, who "will be in charge of the relationship with related organizations in the country;" the Secretary of Sexual Diversity, who is responsible "to spread the fight of MORENA in the organizations of the LGBT movement;" the Secretary of Indigenous and Peasants, who is in charge of the "link with the indigenous and

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[22] Each attendee has equal voting rights (MORENA 2014, Art. 20).
In Mexico City, the *delegaciones* are treated as municipal equivalents (MORENA 2014, Art. 14).

[23] The party's statutes also establishes provisions through which 'extraordinary' National Congresses can be invoked by "the majority of the members of the National Council, the National Executive Committee or a third of the state councils" (MORENA 2014, Art. 34).

peasant organizations and peoples of the country;" the Secretary of Labor, who is "responsible for establishing the link with organizations of unionized workers, the informal economy, migrants, day laborers, and workers' organizations in the countryside and the city;" and the Secretary of Cooperativism, Solidary Economy, and Civil and Social Movements, "who will be in charge of carrying out activities in promotion and defense of the rights of associations and their economic, social, political, and cultural participation" (MORENA 2014, Art. 38). Similar designated positions to coordinate with organizational allies also exist within the lower-level party leadership bodies, e.g., within the State Executive Committees (MORENA 2014, Art. 32).

Candidate Selection

In accordance with Mexico's electoral system, the party has to nominate candidates for three types of elected public office: elected executive positions (the President of the Republic, Governors, and Municipal Presidents), legislative positions elected through PR party lists, and legislative positions elected through a plurality vote in single-member (for part of the Senate, multi-member) districts. The selection of all three types of candidates is overseen by the National Elections Commission that is designated the National Executive Committee from among the members of Consulting Council for three-year terms (MORENA 2014, Art. 45).

The candidates for elected executive positions (the President of the Republic, Governors, and Municipal Presidents) are nominated by the respective national, state, and municipal electoral assemblies.[24] These electoral assembly are closely connected to the structure of the congresses, described above: the municipal (and district) electoral assemblies are meetings of the full membership of all base committees within the territory. The state and national electoral assemblies are composed of delegates elected by the Municipal and District Assemblies respectively. Therefore, all candidates for elected executive positions candidates are nominated either directly by the base organizations or indirectly by the base organizations' delegates.

The second type of nominations to be made is for legislative positions elected through PR party lists. These are nominated through two different mechanisms: two-thirds are nominated through a lottery system that side-steps much of the higher-level party apparatus and offers base committees a direct shot at securing nominations. The remaining third of the party PR lists (occupying each third position on the list) are set aside for 'external personalities.' These

[24] Unless specified otherwise in the citations, the candidate selection procedures discussed here are regulated in Art. 44 of the party statutes (MORENA 2014).

positions are used to include well-known public figures and provide ad-hoc representation for instrumentally linked national and regional organizations.

The party's internal candidates for the party PR list, i.e. the two-thirds that are not external candidates, are selected through a publicly conducted lottery from among local level activists. For federal elections, a separate lottery is conducted for each multi-state constituency. For lower level elections (e.g., state elections), two separate lotteries are conducted for each electoral entity, one for female candidates, the other one for male candidates—their position on the actual party list alternates. For lotteries at any level, each District Assembly, i.e. the meeting of the full membership of all base committees within the district, gets to propose 10 candidates (5 men and 5 women; through a direct and secret vote). These assembly meetings are supposed to occur simultaneously, which thus far has indeed been largely the case.

These lotteries create a direct way through which the base organizations—and through them the local organizational allies—are credibly guaranteed two-thirds of the party list nominations. This selection rule by-passes all of the higher-level party apparatus and leadership. In fact, the national party leadership does not have any say in who gets nominated through this procedure.

In fact, as my interviews with many of the national deputies that came into office through the lottery document, most of them had been activists in local level societal organizations without any prior involvement in party politics. As one Mexican newspaper writes the day after first lottery that took place for the 2015 legislative elections about one of the lottery entrants, who had only recently entered party politics:

> Seven months ago, the adventure began for *doña* Olivia and for the rest of the aspirants, who, for the most part, are leaders of [for example] neighborhood associations, taxi driver unions, in short, people who in some way hold influence over the neighbors in the environment.
>
> (Gutérrez 2015)

Furthermore, while no individual organizational ally is guaranteed an actual nomination, each one has a similar chance at being represented. This avoids potential contention among different organizational allies since the only factor that determines their chances of winning a nomination is the number of their active members.

The external candidates for the remaining third of the party PR lists (occupying each third position on the list) are selected by the National Council. These positions are used to include well-known public figures and provide ad-hoc representation for instrumentally linked national and regional organizations.

The third and last type of nominations to be made is for legislative positions elected through a plurality vote in single-member, or for part of the Senate, multi-member districts. Here, the party statutes also establish set quotas for "external personalities" that get to run under the MORENA label and specifies that up to 50% of the candidates for single-member districts can be external. The specific districts in which the external candidates are also chosen at random a year before the election.[25]

Within both types of districts—those with internal and those external candidates—the specific candidates are chosen through surveys. For each internal candidate district, a survey is used to select the best positioned candidate among the pre-candidates selected by the district electoral assembly, i.e. the meeting of the full membership of all base committees within the district. For each external candidate district, a survey is used to choose among four pre-candidates selected by the National Election Commission.

Similar to the PR party list nomination procedures, the mechanisms used here provide privileged representation for the institutionalized, local organizational allies and a venue for ad-hoc representation for instrumentally linked national and regional organizations. On the one hand, institutionalized, local organizational allies are guaranteed, direct influence through the selection of the direct candidates. On the other hand, candidates of instrumentally linked organizations, along with well-known public figures, can be nominated, at the discretion of the Party Council.

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[25] There is some limited room for switching of districts, overseen by the National Electoral Commission.

Chapter 4

Capturing Votes and Creating Partisans: Vote Choice and Party ID

4.1. Introduction

This chapter and the following one explore how voters respond to appeals based on these different strategies. In doing so, this second part of the study aims to explain the mechanisms of mass support for new parties, i.e. their ability both to (a) secure electoral support and (b) create partisan attachments in the electorate.

Focusing on voters' responses to different types of party mobilization strategies, I compare the effectiveness of linkages new parties forge through *direct* appeals to voters (based, for example, on class and ethnic identities) versus through *organizationally mediated* strategies, i.e. appeals that build ties to voters through societal organizations, in order to explain their ability to create mass support.[1] Thereby, this chapter speaks to a serious of closely related questions: How effective are organizationally mediated appeals in securing electoral support? How do they compare to direct appeals? How effective are different types of direct appeals compared to each other (e.g., ethnic vs. class-based appeals)? What explains the successful creation of partisan identification for some new parties within relatively short period of time? How do these partisan attachments structure voters' responses to different types of mobilization appeals?

As discussed in the first chapter, the recent literature has largely focused on parties' *direct* appeals to voters and has explained success in securing support in terms of different types of direct appeals (e.g., ethnic vs. personalistic appeals). This chapter instead argues that organizationally mediated strategies can secure electoral support more effectively than most types of direct appeals and also yield

[1] While some of these organizations are also organized around class or ethnic identities, the main distinction between direct appeals and organizationally mediated strategies consists in how a party activates those identities. In the results section, I also analyze the effectiveness of organizational endorsements by type of underlying identity.

durable voter-party ties by socializing organization members into identifying with the party itself.[2] Though traditional civil society organizations whose mediating role has been asserted before, like labor unions, have seen their influence decline, new types of organizations, such as indigenous organizations, peasant unions, and informal sector unions, can play similarly important mediating roles in democratic societies today.

In developing this argument, this chapter addresses two theoretically related but conceptually different dimensions or components of mass support: vote support and partisan attachments. First, I contend that appeals mediated through either instrumentally or organically linked organizations, in the form of organizational endorsements of a party (e.g., during electoral campaigns), are very effective in influencing vote choice. It will be argued that organizationally mediated appeals are not only effective in swaying the vote choice of organization members, but they also affect people in their immediate social network (e.g., other family members and neighbors) to vote for new parties. Second, drawing on social identity and self-categorization theory, I contend that societal organizations serve as highly relevant and immediate reference groups to their members and provide social spaces in which socialization into new parties can occur if the organization is organically linked to a party. Thereby, this approach can account for the creation of new attachments for "the first generation" of voters for new parties.

In doing so, this chapter makes three major theoretical contributions. First, it offers a new explanation of how voters become partisans by coming to identify with new parties in a post-transition framework, e.g., in new democracies or after a major disruption in a party system.[3] While both the stability of party identification and the de-alignment away from traditional parties have received a lot of attention (e.g., Lupu 2014, 2016b; Roberts 2014; Seawright 2012), the theoretical micro-foundations behind the creation of attachments to new parties—both in young democracies today and historically in established democracies—are

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[2] When using the term 'socialization,' I am not using it in a narrow sense that only refers to socialization during childhood and adolescence, the time during which partisan attachments are often developed in stable party systems (Campbell et al. 1960), but to refer to its broader use as the process of internalizing norms, values, and identities of a group.

[3] Drawing on the canonical definition presented by Campbell et al. (1960, 121), I use the term party identification to "characterize the individual's affective orientation to an important group-object [- a party -] in his environment". As they point out, "[o]nly in the exceptional case does the sense of individual attachment to party reflect a formal membership or an active connection with a party apparatus. Nor does it simply denote a voting record … Generally this tie is a psychological identification" (1960, 121).

still little understood.[4] Building on both earlier sociological research on party formation as well as more recent work on the creation of mass partisanship (Lupu 2016a; Samuels and Zucco 2015), this chapter provides clear microfoundations for a theory of mass partisanship and elucidates the role that societal organizations play in 'translating' social cleavages into partisan support. In doing so, it contributes to broader debates about the role of social groups and group loyalties in democratic politics (Achen and Bartels 2016; Weßels and Klingemann 2009).

Second, by exploring the relationship between parties and voters, the chapter addresses a key role of civil society organizations in political representation and helps understand the persistence of mass parties. While for decades scholars have pointed to the demise of close voter-party ties and the waning of mass parties (such as labor-based parties) (Katz and Mair 1995; Kirchheimer 1966; Panebianco 1988), cases such as the MAS in Bolivia raise the question of whether these ties are really passé. Thereby, this research contributes to the debate about the different functions served by parties and the changing relationship between parties, civil society, and voters (Chandra 2004; Collier and Handlin 2009; Kitschelt 2000; Levitsky 2003; Stokes et al. 2013; Thachil 2014b, 2014a).

Third, it provides important insights into the politicization of social structures and the representation of social identities such as ethnicity and class. Ever since the period of decolonization, analysts have tried to disentangle class and ethnicity as important political identities in the Global South. Juxtaposing different categories of marginality, this research provides important insights into the role of race/ethnicity and class in developing countries. In order to understand the broader political implications of such identities, we need to explain not just why groups organize around them (e.g., Garay 2007; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005, 2006), but also how these organizations are then incorporated into the electoral arena through parties. The linkages that parties form with these societal organizations constitute an urgent topic of study because they fundamentally structure the political participation of traditionally marginalized groups such as indigenous populations or informal workers, which—for historical reasons—often have strong ties to societal organizations but not to traditional, typically rather elite-focused parties.

This chapter proceeds as follows. After briefly outlining how my theory builds on existing literature to account for the creation of mass support, I will discuss the importance of societal organizations and introduce my argument about their role in shaping vote choice and creating partisan attachments. Last, I will present a number of hypotheses to test the argument.

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[4] For some recent, innovative work on the creation of mass partisanship, see Lupu (2016a) and Samuels and Zucco (2015).

4.2. Creating Mass Support

The traditional view expressed in *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960) is that "party identification in essence is a non-political attitude formed mainly by socialization during childhood and adolescence (and that) … (t)hereafter party identification is supposed to be immune to politics and economic change, except under really rare circumstances when a realignment can occur" (Holmberg 2007, 562–63). While socialization during childhood and adolescence might explain the stability of party identification once established due to inter-generational transmission, it cannot explain the creation of new attachments for "the first generation" of voters to new parties. Also, while the literature on voter realignment in the US has convincingly established the long-term effects of generational replacements on party identification (Miller and Shanks 1996, 161–3), the debate on more short-term realignments appears under-theorized, pointing to vague "conditions of pervasive change in the social or political context" and focusing on the role of individual leaders (Miller and Shanks 1996, 184). While changes in "the larger political environment" and party leaders are certainly of importance in order to explain voter realignment, these factors are theoretically underspecified.

In fact, while the stability of party identification and the de-alignment away from parties have received a lot of attention, the theoretical micro-foundations behind the establishment of attachments to new parties is still little understood. Even though scholars have studied the "origins and the 'freezing' of different types of party systems" for decades now (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 3; see also, Bartolini and Mair 1990; Collier and Collier 1991), we still know surprisingly little about how voters actually come to identify with new parties, especially in younger or less institutionalized democracies where the appearance of new parties is highly commonplace. Therefore, new party systems—in new democracies or after dramatic party system changes—present a unique opportunity to study "the Big Bang of party birth … when it happens, not decades afterward" (Holmberg 2007, 565).

Recently, some innovative research has begun investigating these issues. Samuels, for example, analyzes differences in partisanship across Brazilian parties and attributes those differences to "the connections between party recruitment activity, individual motivation to acquire political knowledge, and individual engagement in highly politicized social networks" (2006, 2). In a similar vein, Samuels and Zucco explore the 'crafting' of partisan attachments to the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil and show that local party presence and civil society density are associated with vote support and partisan attachments. Also examining the PT, along with Argentina's Frente por un País Solidario (FREPASO), Lupu (2016a, 77) emphasizes the importance of parties'

"ability to develop a strong and broad-based *party brand.*" He contends that "[w]hen parties offer a demonstrably consistent brand that appeals to a substantial swath of the electorate, voters attracted to that brand are more likely to form lasting attachments" (2016a, 78).

In examining the link between civil society mobilization, vote choice, and partisanship, this study builds on this work that has begun exploring this link. It goes beyond existing work by demonstrating how civil society support actually translates into vote support and partisan attachments and explaining why we observe a lot of variation across cases with similar levels of civil society density. Moreover, this study considers other important cases beyond the particular case of the PT. Furthermore, I consider another type of strategy often used by new parties and explore its microfoundations for a theory of mass support: instead of, or in addition to, building their own local party structures and branches or mobilizing voters through *direct appeals* (based on, for example, class and ethnic identities or personalistic appeals), parties can also connect to voters through existing *societal organizations* (at the local, regional, and/or national level).[5] More specifically, I contend that the linkages that new parties forge through such *organizationally mediated strategies*, i.e. appeals that invoke ties to voters through existing societal organizations that organize around fundamental political group identities and interests (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Lipset and Rokkan 1967), such as indigenous movements, peasant unions, informal sector unions, and labor unions, can yield stable parties, i.e. stable voter-party ties and stable electoral support bases.

4.2.1. Societal Organizations

Participant-based, locally organized societal organizations formed around fundamental political group identities and interests have been and continue to be ubiquitous in democratic societies (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Whether understood as interest groups or social movements, such organizations rooted in, for example, ethnic, class, or religious identities, are immediately relevant for their members and often define where "one's fate and fortune lies" (Berger 1981, 12). Depending on a specific society's salient cleavages and other political identities, these societal organizations can take various forms: while some of these organizations might be characterized as primarily classist (such as labor unions, employer associations, and informal sector unions), others are primarily ethnic (such as some purely indigenous organizations), and yet others span across these divides (such as the *cocaleros* in Bolivia) or take the form of "local programmatic

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[5] Furthermore, parties could also build their own parallel societal organizations (e.g., parallel labor unions).

associations" (such as neighborhood associations) (Davies Escobar and Falleti 2016, 7). Across Latin America, such societal organizations gained increased prominence as a result of their organizing efforts against the neoliberal reforms during the 1980/90s (Collier and Handlin 2009, 54; Garay 2007; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005, 2006) and play crucial roles in the everyday lives of large segments of the population. Members usually have very immediate, regular face-to-face contact with these organizations (usually through local branches) and strong organizational identities.[6] Even in the face of massive disruptions of the party system—which is usually organized with much more of a national focus, without the same level of regular, personal interactions, and with less cohesion of identities (by virtue of having to build a broader coalition of groups in order to be electorally viable)—these societal organizations have stable and large bases of support and membership, exhibit close ties between (local/regional) leaders and their base, and are often relatively long-lived. Unlike in some older democracies such as the United States, in most Latin American countries, about one third to one half of citizens at least occasionally attend meetings of such organizations (LAPOP 2016). During the period of party system turmoil in the early 2000s, about 20 - 40 percent of the population in most Latin American countries reported attending such organization meeting at least "once or twice a month" (LAPOP 2016).

4.2.2. Mass Support through Organizationally Mediated Appeals

These locally organized, participant-based organizations can play a crucial role shaping vote choice and partisan attachments. First, I contend that their members and other people in their immediate social network (e.g., other family members, neighbors, and close friends) should be very likely to follow endorsements made by the organization. Second, if an organization repeatedly and intensively (i.e., not just during election campaigns every couple of years) expresses its support for the same party, as would be the case if the organization is organically linked to a party, organization members and their immediate social circle can also become attached or loyal to parties themselves through their association with the organization. I will discuss these two arguments in turn.

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[6] Based on the psychological mechanism outlined below, membership' in these organizations should be conceptualized in a broad, encompassing way (rather than only considering small, formal membership) and be defined as 'belonging to' an organization and participating in its meetings (through face-to-face meetings).

First, given the high salience of societal organizations discussed above, their members and other people in their immediate social network (e.g., other family members, neighbors, and close friends) should be very likely to follow endorsements made by the organization. Such endorsement effects are well documented in the American politics literature (e.g., Arceneaux and Kolodny 2009; Kuklinski and Hurley 1994; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Lupia 1994). While organizational endorsements in the Americanist literature are usually understood to serve as information shortcuts that allow badly informed voters "to emulate the voting behavior they would have exhibited if they were relatively well informed" (Lupia 1994, 67), they might also serve a potentially less rational, primarily affective logic. In fact, compared to the locally organized, 'embedded' societal organizations in many developing countries, the "interest groups" considered in the context of contemporary U.S. politics usually exhibit much less regular face-to-face interactions among group members and with local group leaders, have much lower local membership, weaker organizational identities, and might arguably hold less affective value to their members. Therefore, societal organizations should hold even more sway over their members—badly informed ones as well as highly informed ones—and be even more effective in swaying their vote preferences.[7]

Second, beyond the effect on vote choice, there is good reason to believe that voters can also become attached or loyal to parties themselves through their association with these organizations. More specifically, organic ties between societal organizations and a party may attach organization members to that party and socialize them into identifying with the party. After dramatic party system changes, these societal organizations provide social spaces in which socialization into new parties can occur. According to social identity and self-categorization theory (Bettencourt and Hume 1999; Cohen 2003; Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987), in organizations that bring together people who share key attributes that are important to members, such as a shared ethnic or socio-economic background, the prototypic group member's and group leaderships' personal values and doctrinal positions, e.g. support for a particular party, often become absorbed by other group members. Put differently, if I perceive "people like me," with whom I interact regularly, to stand with a particular party or candidate, I might just start doing the same.

For this mechanism to work, it is secondary what the specific shared characteristics within each organization are, as long as the characteristics are important or defining enough to make members perceive themselves as "one of

[7] The question of whether the use of organizational endorsements as heuristics by voters is in fact "rational" and/or "serve(s) the interest of the electorate" is not the focus here (Kuklinski and Hurley 1994, 729–30).

them." Whereas a book club might not provide an important enough shared characteristic, we would expect organizations expressing fundamental political group identities and interests to pass this threshold. In fact, while people might think of themselves as part of various broader, usually unorganized groups, I expect that the very immediate, locally organized, socio-economically homogenous, and highly socially salient character of these societal organizations provides a more fundamental and important reference group to create partisan attachment.[8]

Societal organizations, by definition, bring together people that share key attributes that are important to members and serve as important reference groups for their members. If then, in turn, the figurative 'prototypic group member' or the 'organization *per se*,'[9] which organization leaders (correctly or not) often claim to embody, is perceived as being oriented to a particular party, this doctrinal position becomes absorbed by other group members. This support for a particular party could find its expression in, for example, the endorsement of a party by the organization leaders, the endorsement by other 'prototypical' peers, the representation of the organization in the party leadership, or extensive historic ties.

While one-off expressions of support for a particular candidate or party—for example, through an organization's one-time endorsement—might lead members to support this candidate or party, repeated endorsements for the same party could create more long-term attachments.

Even though people that are not members of an organization but sympathize with it and feel represented by it might also follow some cues from that organization (Weßels and Klingemann 2009), this socialization mechanism should be particularly relevant for actual organization members. They—unlike non-members that only sympathize with an organization—typically experience regular, face-to-face interactions with other group members and organization leaders. To them, the societal organization serves as very immediate, local, and often socio-economically homogenous reference group. If the organization expresses support for a particular candidate or party, members should follow such endorsements (*peer mechanism*).

Furthermore, we might even expect some 'spillovers' of organizational membership to other people in their immediate social network. For example, if your spouse, neighbor, and close friends are active members of an organization,

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[8] I test this assumption of high group identity saliency through survey questions that were asked along with the poster experiments.

[9] In this context, a "prototype can either be the most typical group member—an actual person—or a fictional member who embodies the most common or most frequent attributes shared among group members" (Huddy 2001, 133–34; see also Rosch 1978). For a more extensive discussion of "prototype theory," see Lakoff (1987).

you might (a) also view other organization members as your peers and (b) hear from them about how the organization supports a particular party (*spillover mechanism*). Especially in cases where multiple people in your close social circle belong to the same organization (or similar organizations supporting the same party), such indirect endorsement would seem quite powerful. Given that membership in many of these organizations is determined by fixed criteria, such occupation in a particular sector or property ownership in a particular neighborhood, this spillover mechanism could be crucial in reaching a broader group of people beyond direct members.

These 'spillovers' of membership could take place informally through everyday conversations between organization members and the people in their close social circle. Furthermore, they could even affect other people in their wider community: since new parties usually lack base organizations capable of organizing campaigns and other outreach events, organizational linkages provide new parties with "ready-made" networks capable of organizing such events to reach not only organization members but also the broader communities within which they are embedded.

These mechanisms, which could account for the rather rapid establishment of robust attachments to new parties, build on the literature on the formation of class and mass integration parties such as socialist or Catholic parties in 19th century Europe.[10] Studying class formation in late-18th and 19th century Europe, a number of social historians have emphasized the importance of the shared experiences, associational life, and social milieu that result from the underlying productive relations in the development of a class conscience or identity. This post-structural understanding of class, and class conscience, goes back to E.P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*, where he defines class as follows:

> The class experience is largely determined by the productive relations in which men are born—or enter involuntary. Class-consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms. If the experience appears as determined, class-consciousness does not.
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> (1966, 9–10)

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[10] This type of organizationally mediated identity formation was not limited to leftist identities. For example, Catholic mass organizations in 19th century Europe offered a similar social space for identity formation (Kalyvas 1996).

Yet in Thompson's work a crucial step in the formation of class consciousness, going from classes as groups with shared dispositions to organized groups taking collective action, remains underdeveloped. As Katznelson points out in his critical discussion of Thompson's analysis, "[g]roups of people sharing motivational constructs ('dispositions to behave') may or may not act collectively to transform dispositions to behavior" (1986, 19). This leads him to conclude that "it is useful to distinguish between class at the third level and the fourth, which refers to classes that are organized and that act through movements and organizations to affect society and the position of the class within it" (1986, 20).

Addressing this critical step in political identity formation, a series of subsequent studies on the formation of the labor movement in different parts of Europe emphasize the key role played by voluntary associations that formed part of the broader social-cultural milieu and labor movement culture (Lidtke 1986, 42–44; Wehler 1986, 21–23). This work explains that class identity was "formed … in a number of independent and often competitive organizations, most frequently as trade-unions …, but also as cooperatives, neighborhood associations, clubs, etc." (Przeworski 1985, 13). By the first decade of the 20th century, a dense network of organizations covering almost every aspect of workers' life had developed in many European countries, as Lidtke describes in detail, for Imperial Germany:

> There was a striking variety, including not only recreational, educational, and entertainment clubs but numerous service organizations as well. The two oldest and largest organizations were the workers' singing societies (*Arbeiter-Gesangvereine*) and the workers' gymnastic clubs (*Arbeiter-Turnvereine*). Workers' singing societies were started, sometimes as branches of political workers' educational organizations, during the founding years of the socialist labor movement in the 1860s. … Cycling clubs (*Arbeiter-Radfahrervereine*) became popular toward the end of the century and soon competed very successfully with the gymnastics clubs for followers. After the turn of the century other sports were organized; workers' swimming clubs (*Arbeiter-Schwimmvereine*), workers' athletic clubs (*Arbeiter-Athletenvereine*) for wrestling, boxing, and weight lifting, workers' rowing clubs (*Arbeiter-Rudersportvereine*), and workers' sailing clubs (*Arbeiter-Segelvereine*) … . …. Soccer (*Fussball*) was already widespread in Europe and, though no national organization of workers' soccer clubs had yet been formed, they were flourishing on the local level … . Chess was not left out either, though the workers' chess societies could boast of large memberships. A desire to be close to nature could be satisfied by joining the Friends of Nature (Naturfreunde), and if one wished to encourage one's thespian ambition there were workers'

> dramatic societies (*Arbeiter-Theatervereine*). … The educational tradition in the labor movement was continued through workers' educational societies (*Arbeiter-Bildungsvereine*) and workers' stenographic associations (*Arbeiter-Stenographenvereine*). A number of societies were service oriented, notably the workers' Samaritan associations (*Arbeiter-Samaritervereine*), the associations for popular health (*Verband Volksgesundheit*), and the workers' consumer societies (*Arbeiter-Konsumvereine*). Those committed to the fight against alcohol could join the workers' temperance associations (*Arbeiter-Abstinentenvereine*) and opponents of theism could enter the societies of proletarian freethinkers (*Arbeiter-Freidenker*).
>
> (Lidtke 1985, 22–23)

Despite their crucial importance in building and reinforce class identities, the specific mechanism, however, through which these organizations advanced the success of early labor-based parties remains unclear. It is not obvious whether these early parties succeeded because these organizations politicized their members and created a rather diffuse sense of class conscience that could then be appealed to by different parties based on the parties' policy proposals (for example, by any given socialist, social democratic, or communist party) or because these organizations actually mobilized their members for a particular party and got them to vote for and identify with that party. Prominent historical accounts seem to be in line with the latter idea, suggesting that these organizations actually went beyond just politicizing a class identity and in fact endorsed specific parties and created strong attachments to individual parties (Guttsman 1981, 3). Nevertheless, given the absence of good public opinion data for that time, we might never be able to establish conclusively whether the majority of these voters would have thought of themselves first and foremost as proletarians or, for example, as Social Democrats or a Communists. Therefore, it remains unclear to what extent the mass support of early labor-based parties was due to parties' successful mobilization of class identities and interests versus the creation of attachments to specific parties through labor unions and other related associations. Therefore, understanding the variation in party-organization linkages and the specific role that organizations play in influencing the vote choice and identities of its members is not only relevant for the new generation of societal organizations but also for older organizations in the context of the early labor movement.

4.3. Hypotheses

While it might be hard to put a theory that tries to account for changes in deep-seated social identities to a rigorous and conclusive empirical test, one can certainly derive some decisive testable implications.[11] At the outset, if the claim that societal organizations are very effective in swaying their members to support a particular party or candidate and, if repeated consistently over time, attach them to that party lastingly, is correct, one would expect to see evidence that manipulating organizational endorsements has significant effects on vote preferences. More specifically, we would anticipate that

> ***H1 (Co-organizational endorsements):*** *Voters are more likely to support a candidate who has been endorsed by a societal organization that they are connected to than a candidate that has been endorsed by a societal organization that they are not connected to or a candidate without organizational endorsement.*

Furthermore, one can distinguish two different ways in which such organizational endorsements could operate based on how a voter is connected to a societal organization. First, an individual voter could be a direct member of a societal organization (*peer mechanism*):

> ***H1a (Co-organizational endorsements for individual members):*** *Voters are more likely to support a candidate who has been endorsed by a societal organization that they belong to than a candidate who has been endorsed by a societal organization that they do not belong to or a candidate without organizational endorsement.*

Second, even if not a direct member themselves, other people in a voter's immediate social network, such as family members, close friends, and neighbors, could be members of a societal organization. As discussed above, we might still expect these people in the immediate social circle of active members to (a) also view other organization members as their peers and (b) hear from them about how the organization supports a particular. Therefore, we would expect organizationally mediated strategies to be more effective in securing electoral support than just direct appeals not only for direct organization members but also for their family members, close friends, and neighbors (*spillover mechanism*).

[11] The following hypotheses for the experiments (along with secondary hypotheses) were pre-registered with EGAP and the AEA RCT Registry prior to data collection. For presentational reasons, they have been renumbered here.

However, we might expect such spillover effects to be smaller than the effect of 'direct' co-organizational endorsements, i.e. endorsements on direct organization members.

> ***H1b (Co-organizational endorsements for social network members):*** *Voters are more likely to support a candidate who has been endorsed by a societal organization that family members, close friends, or neighbors belong to than a candidate who has been endorsed by a societal organization that none of these belong to or a candidate without organizational endorsement.*

While organizational endorsements should be able to sway their members to support any given party, we would expect such endorsements to be particularly effective when voters face a genuinely new party, i.e. a party towards which they do not have any previous affective or positional dispositions.

Also, in an effort to parse out to what extent organizational endorsements serve primarily as rational information shortcuts for voters or whether they tap into more affective ties between members and their locally organized groups, I propose to compare organizational members to non-members who strongly sympathize with the organization. If organizational endorsements only act as information shortcuts, we would expect these sympathizing non-members to also follow the endorsements. If organizational endorsements, however, tap into some more affective (and potentially irrational) ties to an organization, as emphasized by the peer mechanism, actual organization members should be more likely to follow endorsements because they—unlike sympathizing non-members—regularly experience, face-to-face interactions with other group members and organization leaders.

Furthermore, if voters are not just loyal to societal organizations but have also been socialized into identifying with a party through frequent exposure to endorsement for the same party, we would expect to be able to observe that (a) members of organizations organically linked to a party are more likely to identify with that party, controlling for other factors that might predispose people to join an organization (*peer mechanism*), that (b) people in the immediate social network of such organizations are also more likely to identify with the party than non-members without such network connections (*spillover mechanism*), and that (c) these partisan attachments are actually deep-seated or robust and lead voters to discount information that is not consistent with their partisan identities. Scholars have pointed out that party identification "raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation" (Campbell et al. 1960, 133). Or, put slightly differently, "party identification organizes and structures the voter's perception of political objects. As a result,

party identification reduces the impact of new and disturbing elements on the political scene" that are not in line with a voter's party identification (Helm 1979, 111). Therefore, we would expect stronger, more robust and resilient party identification to lead voters to be less responsive to concerning information when evaluating policy platforms, i.e. voters with a stronger, more resilient attachment to a party should be more willing to support a candidate or policy that deviates from their own ideological ideal points, if it is "their party's" candidate or policy. Following this logic, we can indirectly test the resilience or robustness of party identification (across the whole sample as well as for specific parties and types of voters such as those that attend organization meetings regularly):

> ***H2 (Resilience of party identification):*** *When faced with a candidate whose policy platform deviates from their own, voters that are co-partisans are more likely to support the candidate than voters that are not co-partisans.*

The habitual use of organizationally mediated appeals by some parties in recent years should have brought about rather robust and resilient partisan attachments (for those parties), in particular for voters who have been more exposed to consistent and repeated appeals. Therefore, voters who attend meetings of relevant societal organizations frequently should exhibit much more robust, resilient partisan attachments than those that attend organization meetings only infrequently.

Other Explanations

Given the existing literature's extensive focus on new parties' *direct appeals* to voters, it is important to also evaluate the impact of such appeals on vote preferences. By considering both direct and mediated appeals, I can then also assess their effectiveness of one relative to the other. Therefore, I will briefly sketch out different types of direct appeals that, if invoked consistently, might also account for stable electoral support.

Within the literature on direct appeals, prior research has paid particular attention to ethnic appeals. Across new democracies, and even in Latin America, where ethnic voting was not viewed as an important factor during earlier democratic episodes, appeals based on ethnic identities and interests are viewed as highly salient and have been linked to the stability of electoral support (Chandra 2004; Ferree 2004, 3, 2006; Horowitz 1985; Madrid 2005, 1, 2012b; Van Cott 2000, 156). According to these accounts, direct ethnic appeals can quickly and consistently mobilize electoral support in new democracies because ethnicity can serve as a salient cue for voters (Birnir 2001, 219). These approaches share the

assumption that vote preferences are primarily determined by an individual's ethnic identity. Building on this, we might expect parties that consistently appeal to voters based on individuals' ethnic identities to enjoy more stable support over time.

> ***H3a (Descriptive ethnic representation):*** *Voters are more likely to support candidates that are co-ethnics.*
> ***H3b (Programmatic ethnic representation):*** *Voters are more likely to support candidates that promote a policy platform that is concordant with their ethnic identity and interests.*

In parallel fashion, direct appeals might be found in voters' class identities. Whereas in many Latin American countries a class cleavage is thought to be reproduced in elite opinions and attitudes (Rosas 2010, 70), many scholars hold that most "Latin American party systems have not been frozen by the political organization of class cleavages as in post-1920s Europe" (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, 576; see also Rosas 2010, 70). Recently, however, multiple studies have suggested an advent of class voting in multiple Latin countries (Handlin 2012, 2013, 142; Hellinger 2005). This explanation assumes that vote preferences are primarily determined by a voter's class background (Evans 2000, 401; Korpi 1983; Lipset 1960, 220–24).

> ***H4a (Descriptive class representation):*** *Voters are more likely to support candidates that share their class background.*
> ***H4b (Programmatic class representation):*** *Voters are more likely to support candidates that promote a policy platform that is concordant with their class background and interests.*

Chapter 5

Evidence: Voter Responses to New Parties' Strategies

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I test the theory about the microfoundations of support for new parties empirically, drawing on a series of novel experiments and analyzing original and existing survey data from Bolivia and Ecuador. More specifically, in order to test how voters respond to appeals based on different types of party mobilization strategies and how new partisan attachments lead voters to behave, I conducted two discrete choice experiments in which I presented voters with campaign posters that closely resemble real-world posters in Bolivia and Ecuador.

The analysis of the data reveals interesting patterns for both dimensions of mass support—vote choice and partisan attachments. First, the results of the poster experiments suggest that organizationally mediated appeals are very effective in obtaining electoral support, especially when voters face a new party. In fact, the results show that organizational endorsements can even overcome other cross-cutting divides. For example, voters follow organizational endorsements even for candidates whose policy preferences are not congruent with their own and when facing candidates that are no co-ethnic with them. What is more, the effectiveness of organizationally mediated appeals does not seem to be limited to one specific organization or type of organization (e.g., ethnic or class-based organization).

Beyond organizationally mediated appeals' ability to influence vote choice, I illustrate that regular endorsements—not just during electoral campaigns—for the same party that occur in organically linked organizations could lead organization members and people in their immediate social network to develop durable attachments to the party itself. Drawing on social identity and self-categorization theory, I contend that societal organizations, which serve as highly relevant and immediate reference groups to their members, can provide

social spaces in which socialization into new parties takes place if the organizations' ties to the party is institutionalized. Analyzing survey data from Bolivia and Ecuador, I show that membership in an organization that consistently endorses a party is strongly associated with whether a voter develops an attachment to that party and that frequency of organization meeting attendance is connected to the robustness of that partisan attachment.

I then compare and contrast this organizationally mediated path to partisanship, which can account for the development of robust partisan attachments to the MAS, to an alternative path to partisanship that can yield PID even for parties without organically linked organizational allies. I show that in the case of Alianza PAIS, a party that could not rely on regular endorsements from organically linked organizations, partisan attachments have developed in direct response to voters' evaluation of the party's performance.

Whereas organizationally mediated appeals appear to be capable of creating partisan attachments that take the form of robust, deep-seated social identities, partisanship that develops in response to voters' evaluations of a party's performance seems to be an expression of a less crystalized and potentially rather temporary affinity for a party that could be abandoned rather quickly in response to negative information about the party's performance. The first type of partisanship resembles the characterization of party ID, in the tradition of the Michigan school of party ID, as a genuine, stable social identity that raises 'perceptual screens' that filter out information inconsistent with the identity (Campbell et al. 1960; Green and Palmquist 1994; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). In the latter case, PID seems to operate in a way more consistent with running-tally models, in which PID largely tracks voters' evaluations of performance (Fiorina 1981).

In fact, across different measures of performance, voters' identification with Alianza PAIS follows both individual and general retrospective evaluations of performance (over the previous year) quite closely. This holds particularly true for high information voters, who—unlike low information voters—regularly follow the news and can monitor the party's performance more closely. More specifically, high information voters appear to be more responsive to changes in performance evaluations.

Even though both paths can leader voters to start identifying with new parties, the resulting attachments vary in their crystallization and durability. Whereas organizationally mediated appeals are capable of creating partisan attachments that take the form of robust, deep-seated social identities, partisanship that develops in response to voters' evaluations of a party's performance seems to be an expression of a less crystalized and potentially rather temporary affinity for a party that could be abandoned rather quickly in response to negative information about the party's performance.

Furthermore, these types of partisanship have important consequences for the stability of vote preferences. In fact, the more stable partisan identities developed by parties that use organizationally mediated appeals consistently are significantly more predictive of vote intentions than the less stable, evaluation-based form of partisanship.

After briefly presenting the research design for the poster experiments and original voter surveys conducted in Bolivia and Ecuador, I turn to the empirical findings. Drawing on the analysis of the experimental evidence along with original and existing survey data, I first discuss the insights gained related to the first dimension of mass support for new parties—vote choice—and then turn to the findings related to the second dimension—partisan attachments.

5.2. Research Design: Poster Experiments & Voter Surveys

In order to test how voters respond to appeals based on different types of party mobilization strategies and how new partisan attachments lead voters to behave, I conducted two discrete choice experiments in which I presented voters with campaign posters that closely resemble real-world posters in Bolivia and Ecuador. The first experiment was fielded in La Paz and El Alto (Bolivia) in February/March 2016 and then replicated in Quito (Ecuador) in October/November 2016.[1] In addition to collecting participants' experimental responses, I also applied survey instruments on a host of different social and political topics.

In the experiments, I presented representative samples of voting eligible citizens with profiles of (fictitious) candidates for national legislature. The use of fictitious candidates instead of real politicians allows me to more effectively manipulate the dimensions of key theoretical interest and even include a new (fictitious) party towards which voters by definition do not have any previous affective or positional dispositions. Unlike in prior conjoint experiments (e.g., Carnes and Lupu 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014), which presented survey respondents (often online) with tables presenting the specific values of profile attributes, I used campaign posters and short, two-sentence vignettes presenting the candidates (through door-to-door canvasing) in order to improve realism of the treatment and overcome potential

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[1] The research was reviewed and approved by UC Berkeley's Committee for Protection of Human Subjects (IRB Protocol #2015-12-8202). Pre-analysis plans were registered with EGAP (#20160224AB for the Bolivia study; #20161103AB for the Ecuador study) and the AEA RCT Registry (#AEARCTR-0001079 for the Bolivia study; #AEARCTR-0001766 for the Ecuador study) prior to data collection.

concerns raised by illiteracy. The discrete choice outcome, i.e. having to choose between two candidates, closely "resembles real-world voter decision making, in which respondents must cast a single ballot between competing candidates who vary on multiple dimensions" (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 4).

The design builds and expands on recent experimental attempts to test class and ethnicity effects on vote preferences in other developing countries (for example, see Dunning 2010; Dunning and Harrison 2010) and experiments exploring social peer effects on voting behavior (for example, see Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008). Unlike these prior experiments, however, I used randomized conjoint analysis as part of the design in order to "identify the causal effects of various components of a treatment … (and) nonparametrically identify and estimate the causal effect of many treatment components simultaneously" (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 2). Unlike most of the longstanding applications of conjoint analysis in marketing research, where estimates are often heavily dependent on modeling assumptions, this variant of conjoint analysis can nonparametrically identify the average marginal component effect (AMCE) and its interactions "under assumptions that are either guaranteed to hold by the experimental design or else at least partially empirically testable" (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 3).

5.2.1 Attributes & Presentation

In order to manipulate the perception of a candidate's ethnic background and gender, I used photos of female and male individuals of different ethnic backgrounds (indigenous/mestizo(a)/white)[2] and repeated the candidate's ethnic background (directly stated) and gender (through the gendered article and noun for candidate: "esta candidata"/"este candidato") as part of the vignette. The candidate's class background (popular class/middle class/upper class) was also be briefly stated as part of the vignette (e.g., "Este candidato *de clase media*…"). Furthermore, the experiment manipulated whether a cue about the candidate's

[2] Since ethnicity in the Bolivian and Ecuadorian context is arguably socially constructed in a such a way that it cannot be reduced to physical characteristics, such as skin color, but is also routinely expressed through attire, the ethnic cues presented in the pictures rely on both skin color and attire, i.e. actors that self-identified as indigenous were photographed wearing elements of traditional indigenous attire, while actors that self-identified as white or mestizo(a) were photographed wearing a white shirt/blouse. While I am concerned that thereby the ethnic cues provided by the profiles are stronger than the cues about a candidate's class background, which is only expressed as part of the vignette, this seems to be the only culturally appropriate way to manipulate perceptions of ethnicity.

party was given and, if so, which party, by including the party logo/name in the poster and by repeating the party name in the vignette.[3] Similarly, for profiles, which contain an organizational endorsement, the poster includes the organization logo/name and the vignette will restate it (e.g., "This indigenous candidate of the MAS *has the strong support of the [respective organization]*"). Analogously, the policy platform advocated by the candidate, which varies along two dimensions (class and ethnicity), included in the poster as a policy slogan (e.g., "To strengthen indigenous rights") and restated in the vignette (e.g., "He wants to strengthen indigenous rights"). Last, some profiles contained a clientelist appeal as part of the vignette (e.g. "If you vote for him, you will receive a kilo of sugar and two packages of noodles").[4]

In order to mitigate race- and gender-independent actor "fixed effects" such as attractiveness and perceived competence, I took various pictures of numerous similarly aged actors from each ethnic group (based on actors' self-identification as indigenous, mestizo, or white) and gender (a total of about 700 pictures across 76 actors in Bolivia and about 800 pictures across 75 actors in Ecuador) and pretested these pictures through focus groups and pretest surveys in La Paz and Quito respectively. Only pictures that were scored very similarly with regards to perceived attractiveness and competence and that were consistently scored as belonging to the same ethnic category by most respondents in the pretest (mean: 76.9% for Bolivia, 71.3% for Ecuador) (in virtually all cases, this modal ethnicity rating was also consistent with the actor's ethnic self-identification), were included in the actual poster experiments. Furthermore, in order to further mitigate other unobserved actor "fixed effects" and ensure that participants in the poster experiment would not see the same actor with different additional attributes (e.g., running for different parties) across different evaluation

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[3] In addition to the parties that had contested the most recent general elections in Bolivia and Ecuador respectively, I also include a fictitious new party in each experiment ("Movimiento Boliviano Social"/"Movimiento Ecuatoriano Social"). The name and logo of these fictitious, new parties were chosen in such a way that it should have a realistic appearance and not convey any information about the policy positions of the parties. Like most new parties in Bolivia and Ecuador, across the political spectrum, they were called "Movimiento." The adjective "social" contained in the name, unlike perhaps in other countries, does not signal a left leaning of the party; in fact, conservative parties as well as leftist parties have used the adjective "social" as part of their name.

[4] Based on extensive prior ethnographic research, it appears that "a kilo of sugar" or "a kilo of noodles" has traditionally often served as the "standard currency" to buy a vote. While the mere mentioning of this as part of the vignette might raise concerns about the credibility of the promise, the pretest and pilot suggested that respondents saw this kind of appeal as natural and did not raise questions about its credibility.

rounds/candidate pairs, I included pictures of 6-7 actors for each gender-ethnicity combination and randomly drew (without replacement "within" each respondent) which one(s) of these picture(s) were included in any given respondent's posters for that gender-ethnicity combination.

FIGURE 5.1. Example of a Poster.
Note: The corresponding vignette would translate to: "This mestizo, middle-class candidate belongs to the Movimiento Boliviano Social and has the strong support of the CSUTCB La Paz, the Departmental Peasant Federation of La Paz. He wants to increase social spending, reduce income inequality, and strengthen indigenous rights."

While at first this might appear like a rather large number of components that are being varied, this is in fact a feature of conjoint analysis: it enhances "realism relative to the direct elicitation of preferences on a single dimension(,)" it "allows researchers to test a large number of causal hypotheses in a single

study, making it a cost-effective alternative to traditional survey experiments" and it permits "researchers to evaluate the relative explanatory power of different theories" (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 3). Last, especially when dealing with sensitive issues and identities, "conjoint experiments have the potential to limit concerns about social desirability (Wallander 2009), as they provide respondents with multiple reasons to justify any particular choice or rating" (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 3).

Following common practice in conjoint analysis, each respondent was presented with multiple pairs of profiles that were generated following a completely independent randomization (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 16).[5] All levels within the ethnicity, class, gender, organizational endorsement, and policy platform attributes were assigned with equal probability (within each respective attribute). Since I intended to pool across the various opposition parties for most of the analysis, the "main levels" for the party attribute (for Bolivia: not stated/new fictitious party/MAS-IPSP/opposition parties; for Ecuador: not stated/new fictitious party/Alianza PAIS/ opposition parties) were assigned with equal probability. Within the "main level" of opposition parties, one out of the six (Bolivia) or five (Ecuador) "secondary" levels, i.e. specific opposition parties, were then randomly chosen (from a uniform distribution). Last, in order to improve the external validity of the clientelist appeal attribute, I assigned the levels associated with this attribute approximating their real-world distribution. According to prior national surveys conducted in both countries, on average about one quarter of Bolivians and Ecuadorians observed such vote-buying activities. Therefore, I assigned the "clientelist promise" level with 25 percent probability.

The two profiles in each pair were presented side-by-side on a large tablet device. After each profile pair, respondents were asked to choose between the two candidates.[6] Furthermore, respondents were asked some pre-treatment questions

[5] Even though in some settings one might want to restrict some of the attributes to take on particular values depending on the values of the other attributes, this was not warranted in this case because none of the potential attribute combinations were "deemed so unrealistic that a counterfactual would essentially be meaningless" (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 26). For example, even though the academic literature might have focused on indigenous candidates in one particular party in Bolivia (Madrid 2005, 2012a), all parties included indigenous candidates in their party lists during the most recent general elections.
The randomization and the creation of the corresponding campaign posters/vignettes were done in R and the resulting profile pairs were then inserted into Qualtrics surveys.

[6] As Hainmueller et al. point out, this forced-choice "question closely resembles real-world voter decision making, in which respondents must cast a single ballot between competing candidates who vary on multiple dimensions" (2014, 4). As secondary

in order to be able to test for the heterogeneous treatment effects implied by some of the hypotheses and proposed mechanisms (e.g., by partisanship) as well as several post-treatment questions to allow me to (observationally) analyze the determinants of party identification and to assess the extent of racial, social desirability bias.[7]

5.2.2. Samples

Bolivia – Primary Study

The first experiment was conducted on a representative, probability sample of voting-age Bolivians in the cities of La Paz and El Alto (Bolivia). These two cities, which are the country's third and second largest cities respectively, arguably constitute particularly hard cases within Bolivia for the theory presented here. First of all, the share of indigenous population in both cities (and in particular in El Alto) is larger than in other big Bolivian cities. Therefore, we would expect direct appeals based on ethnicity, which in Bolivia primarily take to form of indigenous appeals, to be more effective in these cities than in other electorally relevant parts of the country. Second, similarly to many other developing countries, in which participation in civil society organization is often higher in rural areas (Cleary and Stokes 2006, 130–38), in Bolivia societal organizations, such as peasant unions and indigenous organizations, have much lower membership rates and hold less sway over their members in urban settings than in rural parts of the country. Therefore, if it can be shown that organizationally mediated appeals affect vote preferences here, they should have an even larger effect in rural areas.

The sample includes a total of 599 respondents across the two cities (300 in La Paz; 299 in El Alto). Each respondent was presented with six profiles pairs (yielding a total of 7,188 of profiles across 3,594 pairs evaluated). The

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outcomes, they were also asked to rate each candidate (on a scale from 1 to 7) and whether the candidate would represent the respondent's interests, if elected. Furthermore, at the very end of the post-treatment questionnaire, respondents were presented with another secondary, behavioral outcome measure about the candidate they chose in the first round of candidate profiles. They were asked whether they would be interested in attending future campaign events with this candidate and, if so, they would be asked to provide their phone number so that they can be informed about such events.

[7] In order to try to avoid that pre-treatment questions might prime respondents to pay particular attention to some candidate profile characteristics, I included numerous pre-treatment questions covering a broad range of social and political topics.

experimental participants were recruited through door-to-door canvassing and the survey (including the presentation of the campaign posters) was administered on large tablet devices. Since internet connectivity is often unreliable this context, I used an offline survey application and pre-loaded a certain number of previously prepared surveys per enumerator and day on each tablet (with unique combinations of six profiles pairs that were previously created following the randomization procedure outlined above). In order to ensure that respondents of different ethnic and socio-economic background were well represented in the sample, the randomization was stratified by census districts/zones/blocks. In the absence of a sampling frame with information on ethnicity and class on an individual-level, this stratification can serve as a proxy for these factors as there is a fair amount of geographic clustering based on these characteristics. Within each cluster, a random sample of households was selected using an interval sampling method.

Ecuador – Replication Study

Following the initial study in Bolivia, the experiment was replicated on a representative, probability sample of voting-age Ecuadorians in Quito, Ecuador's capital and second largest city.[8] The sampling procedure closely followed the one used in Bolivia, outlined in the previous section.

The sample includes a total of 700 respondents and each respondent was also presented with six profiles pairs. Just as in the initial study, the experimental participants were recruited through door-to-door canvassing and the survey (including the presentation of the campaign posters) was administered on large tablet devices.

5.3. Electoral Support

Despite the nearly exclusive attention in the literature to direct appeals, the results of the poster experiments suggest that organizationally mediated appeals are very effective in obtaining electoral support, especially when voters face a new party. Furthermore, while direct descriptive ethnic appeals have an effect on vote choice (in the Bolivian case; not in Ecuador), other forms of direct appeals—especially direct programmatic appeals—appear to be very ineffective. At the same time, the effectiveness of organizationally mediated appeals does not seem

[8] The only inclusion criteria were age and citizenship, i.e. only adults (18 years of age and older) who hold Ecuadorian citizenship were eligible to participate.

to be limited to one specific organization or type of organization (e.g., ethnic or class-based organization).

Most of the point estimates from the replication of the experiment in Ecuador are very similar. However, membership in societal organizations was somewhat lower in the Ecuadorian sample (of Quito) than expected based on country-wide samples, leading to bigger standard errors for the co-organizational endorsement hypotheses. Nationally representative surveys consulted during the design of the experiments indicate that 29.2% of Ecuadorians and 35.5% attend meetings of societal organizations at least once or twice a month (LAPOP 2012). Yet while levels of participation in societal organizations are similar at the national level for Bolivia and Ecuador, organization members were underrepresented in the Ecuadorian sample: only 11.7% of respondents in the Ecuadorian sample of Quito indicated that they were members of at least one societal organization, as compared to about 28.9 % of respondents in the Bolivian sample of La Paz and El Alto. A plausible explanation for this low share organization members in the Quito sample might be that organizational membership in Ecuador could to be even more skewed towards rural areas and smaller cities than in Bolivia.[9]

Therefore, I will first present the key findings from the more decisive Bolivia study that test the effectiveness of organizationally and then compare and contrast these to the findings of the replication study that took place in Ecuador. After I will use the better powered Bolivia data to explore the underlying mechanisms in more detail. At the end of this section, I will present the findings on direct appeals to present a point of reference for the effectiveness of organizationally mediated appeals.

5.3.1. Organizationally Mediated Appeals

First of all, the experimental evidence provides strong support for the claim that organizationally mediated appeals can have an additional effect on vote preferences: voters are significantly more likely to support candidates that have been endorsed by a societal organization that they are connected to than candidates that have been endorsed by a societal organization that they are not connected to or candidates without organizational endorsements (H1) (henceforth, I will refer to such an endorsement by an organization that a voter also belongs to as a *co-organizational endorsement*). In the Bolivian context, where the

[9] Unfortunately, more reliable survey data on organizational membership that is *representative at the local level* to test this claim directly is not available at this point.

importance of co-ethnic appeals has been emphasized extensively in prior research (Madrid 2008, 2012b; Van Cott 2005b), the size of this co-organizational endorsement effect on voters' propensity to vote for a candidate is—depending on the specification—at least as big as the co-ethnicity effect.

What is more, organizational endorsements are particularly effective when respondents face a new party. When focusing on the scenario in which voters are presented with a new party, i.e. a party towards which they do not have any previous affective or positional dispositions, which arguably constitutes the most direct test to assess the effectiveness of organizational endorsements in getting voters to support new parties, the effect of co-organizational endorsements is strongly heightened. In the Bolivia study, voters are about 19.3 percentage points more likely to support candidates that have been endorsed by a societal organization that they belong to than candidates that have been endorsed by a societal organization that they do not belong to or candidates without organizational endorsements (see Figure 5.2).[10]



FIGURE 5.2. Average Marginal Effect of Co-organizational Endorsements (H1a) for New Party (Bolivia)
Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

These effects do not appear to be limited to one specific organization or type of organization (e.g., ethnic or class-based organization). For example, when analyzing the average marginal effect of co-organizational endorsements for new party profiles in the Bolivian context—the most direct test of the theory—the

[10] Since I preregistered to evaluate the interaction between co-organizational endorsements and the fictitious party label for individual membership (H1a), I am only presenting this estimate for individual members here. Similar, albeit somewhat smaller, yet still highly significant effects can be observed for co-organizational endorsements for social network members (H1b) and pooling across membership types (H1).

effect of endorsements by indigenous organizations, informal sector unions, and employer associations on their members is similar and statistically indistinguishable from endorsements by a formal labor union.[11] Only endorsements by neighborhood associations and peasant unions seem to have an even larger effect on their members.[12]

Second, in order to disentangle the two different ways in which a voter could be connected to a societal organization, I had formulated two distinct hypotheses about co-organizational endorsements: by organizational membership of the voter or of someone in the voter's immediate social network (H1a, H1b). Here, the data also provides support for the hypotheses (see Figure 5.3).[13]



FIGURE 5.3. Average Marginal Effects of Co-organizational Endorsements by Type of Membership (H1a & H1b) for New Party (Bolivia)
Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

[11] The findings are similar when analyzing profiles with existing parties' cues.
[12] The difference is statistically significant at the 0.0001 level for neighborhood associations and the 0.05 level for peasant unions.
[13] Given that individual members are rarer than social network members, the confidence intervals for the effect of co-organizational endorsements for individual members (H1a) are larger and the effect is only significant at the 0.1 level (p: 0.0695).

Even when going beyond new parties and looking at all parties, i.e. including all the established parties that voters have strong priors about, a similar picture emerges. Voters are significantly more likely to support candidates that have been endorsed by an organization that are connected to (H1).



FIGURE 5.4. Average Marginal Effects of Co-organizational Endorsements by Type of Membership (H1, H1a, H1b) across All Parties (Bolivia)
Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Most of the point estimates for these hypotheses tests from the replication of the experiment in Ecuador are very similar. However, as discussed above, membership in societal organizations was somewhat lower in the Ecuadorian sample (of Quito) than expected based on country-wide samples, leading to bigger standard errors for the co-organizational endorsement hypotheses. As result, some of the hypothesis tests are not conclusive at conventional levels of statistical significance. For example, the estimate of the average marginal effect of a co-organizational endorsement (when looking at all parties) (H1) is a 4 percent point increase (p: 0.17).



FIGURE 5.5. Average Marginal Effects of Co-organizational Endorsements by Type of Membership (H1, H1a, H1b) across All Parties (Ecuador)
Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.



FIGURE 5.6. Average Marginal Effect of Co-organizational Endorsements (H1a) for New Party (Ecuador)
Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Please note the different scaling on of the x-axis.

That being said, when analyzing the average marginal effect of co-organizational endorsements for organizations that are relatively better represented in the sample such as the CONAIE, arguably the most influential and relevant societal organization in Ecuador, highly significant, large effect sizes can be documented. For example, when voters face new party profiles, CONAIE members are about 30.8 percentage points more likely to support candidates that have been endorsed by their organization (p: 0.01).



FIGURE 5.7. Average Marginal Effect of Co-organizational Endorsements (H1a) by CONAIE for New Party (Ecuador)

Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Please note the different scaling on of the x-axis.

Even though the design can obviously only identify the effect of co-organizational endorsements for organization members and cannot randomly assign organizational membership to voters, the experiment and the observational survey data suggest that the effectiveness of organizational endorsements is driven by organizational membership rather than some other correlated but theoretically separate moderator.[14] These organizations, which have existed much longer than the current parties in Bolivia and Ecuador, exhibit stable membership in composition and size over time and do not seem to recruit new members on a partisan basis. Instead selection of new members into the organizations occurs primarily based on other criteria, such as occupation or place of living.

[14] Comparisons within subgroups, such as among organization members, however, are fully identified by the design, given that the randomization within the different attributes occurred orthogonally to the subgroups.

Mechanisms

Having established that organizationally mediated appeals can be very effective in obtaining electoral support, especially when voters face a new party, I will now explore the underlying mechanisms in more detail. Given the above-mentioned power limitations of the Ecuador replication study, I will primarily focus on the Bolivia study here.

First, in an effort to parse out to what extent organizational endorsements serve primarily as rational information shortcuts for voters or whether they tap into more affective ties between members and their locally organized groups, I compare organizational members to non-members who strongly sympathize with the organization. If organizational endorsements only act as information shortcuts, we would expect these sympathizing non-members to also follow the endorsements. If organizational endorsements, however, tap into some more affective (and potentially irrational) ties to an organization, as emphasized by the peer mechanism, actual organization members should be more likely to follow endorsements because they—unlike sympathizing non-members—regularly experience, face-to-face interactions with other group members and organization leaders.

The latter prediction is supported by the experimental findings: when looking at respondents that are not members of an organization but feel represented by that organization and sympathize with it, the estimate for the average marginal effect of an endorsement by that organization is rather small and not significantly different from 0 (see Figure 5.8).[15] This finding suggest that organization endorsements do more than serving as rational information shortcuts.

[15] This additional test was conceived after filling the pre-analysis plan.



FIGURE 5.8. Average Marginal Effects of Co-organizational Endorsements on Non-members that Feel Represented by Organization (Bolivia)
Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Second, I explore how organizational endorsements interact with cross-cutting divides (such as policy platforms and ethnic cleavages. As it turns out, organizational endorsements are very effective in overcoming other cross-cutting divides. For example, even when focusing on cases where voters strongly disagreed with candidates' policy platform—for both redistributive or ethnic policies—organizational endorsements are highly effective. In fact, voters follow organizational endorsements even for candidates whose policy preferences are not congruent with their own.



FIGURE 5.9. Average Marginal Effects of Co-organizational Endorsements for Discordant Policy Platforms (Bolivia)
Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

In a similar fashion, organizational endorsements are very effective in overcoming ethnic cleavages. For example, organizational endorsements proved to be able to get voters to support even candidates that are not their co-ethnics.



FIGURE 5.10. Average Marginal Effects of Co-organizational Endorsements for Non-co-ethnic Candidates (for New Party Profiles) (Bolivia)
Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

It is important to point out that the effectiveness of this type of cross-ethnic organizational endorsement is not limited to ethnic organizations. In fact, endorsements by non-ethnic organizations, such as informal sector unions or neighborhood associations, are also highly effective in getting voters to support candidates that are not co-ethnics of theirs.



FIGURE 5.11. Average Marginal Effects of Co-organizational Endorsements by Non-ethnic Organizations for Non-co-ethnic Candidates (for New Party Profiles) (Bolivia)
Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

What is more, organizational endorsements are highly effective in swaying vote preferences, irrespective of voters' level of information. In fact, low and high information voters respond similarly to organizational endorsements.



FIGURE 5.12. Average Marginal Effects of Co-organizational Endorsements (for New Party Profiles) by Voter Information Level (Bolivia)
Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Last, the observational survey data from Bolivia and Ecuador suggest that such organizational appeals are not just highly effective but are also in fact fairly common. For example, about 25.0 percent of individual organization members (in the Bolivian survey population) reported having received 'electoral campaign information' from societal organizations.[16] Also, this process appears to occur locally through personally known organization representatives. According to the survey data, in over two-thirds of the cases organization members received this campaign information from an organization representative they knew personally.

Furthermore, the original survey data shows that members of societal organizations tend to exhibit strong organizational identities, linking their own fate to the organization's fate, as well as clear expectations about what constitutes typical electoral behavior among their peer members. For example, about of 62.6 percent of organization members (in the Bolivian survey population) agreed that "what happens to this organization affects what happens in your life."[17] Out of

[16] Compared to 15.9% among voters that are not individual members of an organization (the difference is significant at the 0.01 level).

[17] This "linked fate" seemed even more common among members of peasant unions (78.6%) and indigenous organizations (73.5%). For respondents that were members of

these, more than half (55.2 percent) reported that it affects them "a lot." Besides, members seem to have clear expectations about what constitutes typical electoral behavior among their peer members: about 39.1 percent of societal organization members expressed their belief that most or almost all of "the other people that also belong to [their primary organization] generally vote for the same party" as they do.

Given the large number of hypotheses tested, I expected that some of these tests would yield false positives by chance. Even when adjusting for the multiple comparisons using the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) False Discovery Rate correction at an alpha level of 0.05, the findings described here remain virtually unchanged.[18]

Following best practices for conjoint experiments (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, 22), I also examined the stability and no carryover effects assumption by estimating the effects for each of the six rounds of tasks separately and found that the estimates are similar across tasks.

Direct Appeals

While the existing literature has repeatedly emphasized the importance of direct appeals to voters in order to explain success in obtaining electoral support and establishing partisan attachments, the results of the experiments suggest a very limited effectiveness of direct appeals—especially of direct programmatic appeals—in securing electoral support. Neither direct programmatic appeals based on ethnicity nor class that were in line with voters' ethnic and class identities and interests had a significant effect on voters' propensity to choose those candidates in neither study, i.e. voters were not more likely to support candidates that promoted a policy platform that was concordant with their ethnic or class background and interests (H3b, H4b).[19]

Moving beyond direct appeals based on a policy platform, one could also imagine that voters might prefer candidates that "embody" a certain shared social

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multiple organizations, this question referred to the organization that was most important to them.

[18] The p value for H1a (pooling across all parties) for the experiment in Bolivia obviously increases further and the finding can no longer be considered statistically significant.

[19] These findings hold regardless of whether voters' ethnic and class interests are coded based on voters' direct policy preferences on economic and ethnic issues, their self-placement on e.g. a left-right spectrum or as reflective of their ethnic and class background (for further detail, see the Bolivia Pre-Analysis Plan, 4). Furthermore, they are robust to different operationalizations of class and ethnicity.

identity (*descriptive representation*). Here the findings are mixed: while there is evidence from the experiment in Bolivia that voters favor co-ethnic candidates (H3a), a shared class background does not seem to have a significant effect (H4a).[20] More specifically, when faced with co-ethnic candidates in Bolivia, voters are on average about 5.5 percent more likely to support them (see Figures 5.13 and 5.14).[21] In the replication of the experiment in Ecuador, direct appeals—neither programmatic ones nor descriptive ones—did not sway vote preferences at all (see Figures 5.15 and 5.16).



FIGURE 5.13. Average Marginal Effects of Direct Appeals (H3a-H4b) (across All Parties) (Bolivia)

Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

[20] The findings for H4a are robust to different operationalizations of class.

[21] Here, a respondent's ethnicity is coded based on a commonly used ethnic self-identification question, asking respondents whether they consider themselves to be white, indigenous, afro-Bolivian, mestizo or other. When using information from another question employing the Bolivian census categories, the results remain virtually unchanged (AMCE: 0.0579 SE: 0.0129).



FIGURE 5.14. Average Marginal Effects of Direct Appeals (H3a-H4b) (for New Party Profiles) (Bolivia)

Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.



FIGURE 5.15. Average Marginal Effects of Direct Appeals (H3a-H4b) (across All Parties) (Ecuador)

Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.



FIGURE 5.16. Average Marginal Effects of Direct Appeals (H3a-H4b) (for New Party Profiles) (Ecuador)
Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

5.4. Party Identification

Beyond organizationally mediated appeals' ability to influence vote choice, there is good reason to believe that voters can also become attached to parties themselves through their association with these organizations, if the organization consistently endorsed the party. Additional analysis of the survey and experimental data suggests that membership in an organization that consistently endorses a party is strongly associated with whether a voter develops an attachment to that party and that frequency of organization meeting attendance is connected to the robustness of that partisan attachment.

Even though at first sight survey respondents in Ecuador appear to identify with Alianza PAIS at comparable rates as voters do in Bolivia for the MAS, this trend captures different types of partisan attachments: deep-seated, genuine social identities vs. running-tallies that only crystalize slowly over time. These two types of partisan attachments appear to develop through two different paths to partisanship—through organizationally mediated appeals vs. through voters'

evaluation of the party's performance. Whereas organizationally mediated appeals appear to be capable of creating partisan attachments that take the form of robust, deep-seated social identities, partisanship that develops in response to voters' evaluations of a party's performance seems to be an expression of a less crystalized and potentially rather temporary affinity for a party that could be abandoned rather quickly in response to negative information about the party's performance. The first type of partisanship resembles the characterization of party ID, in the tradition of the Michigan school of party ID, as a genuine, stable social identity that raises 'perceptual screens' that filter out information inconsistent with the identity (Campbell et al. 1960; Green and Palmquist 1994; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). In the latter case, PID seems to operate in a way more consistent with running-tally models, in which PID largely tracks voters' evaluations of performance (Fiorina 1981).

Furthermore, these types of partisanship have important consequences for the stability of vote preferences. In fact, the more stable partisan identities developed by MAS identifiers are significantly more predictive of vote intentions than the less stable, evaluation-based form of partisanship exhibited by Alianza PAIS identifiers.

This section goes beyond the data collected as part of the two experiments. It also draws on original survey data collected in both settings and makes extensive use of multi-wave cross-sectional survey data for representative population surveys for Bolivia and Ecuador from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

The section proceeds as follows: I first discuss the ability of new parties to build partisanship in the electorate through the repeated use of organizationally mediated appeals. Then I turn to a scenario in which a new party could not rely on such repeated organizationally mediated appeals and explore how less stable partisan attachments developed through voters' evaluation of the party's performance. In the third section, I directly compare the stability of the two resulting types of party identification. Last, I outline some implications of the two different types of partisan attachments for the stability of vote choice.

5.4.1. Robust PID through Organizationally Mediated Appeals

Beyond organizationally mediated appeals' ability to influence vote choice, the results suggest that voters can become attached to the party themselves through their association with these organizations. Organizational membership is strongly associated with whether a voter has developed a partisan attachment to

the MAS and frequency of organization meeting attendance is connected to the robustness of the partisan attachment.[22]

Analyzing the original survey data, I show that membership in organizations that have consistently endorsed the MAS stands out as one of the strongest and most robust predictors for whether a voter exhibit an attachment to the party. Even after controlling for respondents' class, ethnicity, ideology, income, age, gender, level of education, and level of political information, organization members (across individual and social network membership in organizations with ties to the MAS) are 11.21 times more likely to identify with the party than non-members (see Model 1, Table 5.1). In fact, while other variables are also associated with party identification in some of the regression models, membership in a societal organization is one of the strongest and most robust predictors for partisanship across model specifications. This positive, statistically significant association holds for both individual and social network members (see Model 2, Table 5.1).

This picture is very different for Alianza PAIS that—unlike the MAS—has not relied on consistent organizationally mediated appeals. When replicating the analysis of predictors of PID for Alianza PAIS based on the original survey data gathered in Ecuador using the same question phrasings, membership in the same types of organizations is not associated with whether a voter exhibit an attachment to the party (see Table 5.2).

[22] The results presented here focus on identification with the MAS. The results are virtually identical when extending the analysis to include identification with any party.

TABLE 5.1. Determinants of MAS Party Identification (Population Estimates) - Logit Models

	Model 1 (Base Model)	**Model 2** (By type of membership)
Societal organizations		
Member (Indiv. and social network members)	2.4168*** (0.8862) [11.2100]	
Individual member		1.5325** (0.7561) [4.6299]
Social network member		2.0303** (0.8253) [7.6163]
Class		
Upper middle class	2.8214 (1.7534) [16.7999]	3.3426* (1.8751) [28.2925]
Middle class	-0.2173 (1.0649) [0.8047]	-0.4829 (1.0539) [0.6170]
Lower middle class	0.4584 (1.0165) [1.5815]	0.3926 (1.0035) [1.4808]
Income		
Household income (Q2)	-1.0590 (0.8987) [0.3468]	-0.9241 (0.8981) [0.3969]
Household income (Q3)	-0.3275 (0.9073) [0.7207]	-0.2384 (0.9168) [0.7879]
Household income (Q4)	3.0474* (1.5865) [21.0611]	2.8851* (1.6877) [17.9061]
Ethnicity		
White	0.6789 (1.8526) [1.9717]	1.6406* (0.8783) [5.1585]
Indigenous	0.3404 (0.6607) [1.4055]	0.1958 (0.4346) [1.2163]
Ideology		
Self-placement: strong leftist (1)	1.2906 (3.2147) [3.6350]	3.2177 (3.8792) [24.9707]
Self-placement: leftist (2)	2.1411 (3.0318) [8.5084]	3.8617 (3.6969) [47.5479]
Self-placement: weak leftist (3)	3.4281 (3.0796) [30.8178]	5.1620 (3.7360) [174.5112]
Self-placement: centrist (4)	-0.5505 (2.9924) [0.5767]	1.2965 (3.6292) [3.6566]
Self-placement: weak rightist (5)	-14.3628 (1414.0336) [0.000]	-11.7609 (1477.0451) [0.0000]
Self-placement: rightist (6)	1.5405 (2.947) [4.6671]	3.3114 (3.6127) [27.4222]
left-right positions score (1: far right - 7: far left)	1.3286*** (0.4123) [3.7757]	1.3295*** (0.4277) [3.7793]
indigenous positions score (1: against more ind. rights - 7: for more ind. rights)	0.0820 (0.3893) [1.0854]	0.1135 (0.4039) [1.1202]
Background controls		
Age (in years)	-0.0396* (0.0222) [0.9611]	-0.0456* (0.0238) [0.9554]
Female	-0.4452 (0.6925) [0.6407]	-0.5975 (0.7198) [0.5502]
Level of information (1-5)	0.7957* (0.4691) [2.2160]	0.8469* (0.4995) [2.3323]
Education (secondary education completed)	-1.4522 (0.9374) [0.2341]	-0.9927 (0.9125) [0.3706]
Education (post-secondary education)	-0.2044 (0.9016) [0.8151]	-0.4905 (0.9619) [0.6123]
Constant	-9.7515** (4.1234)	-11.5701** (4.8052)
N	117	115
Nagelkerke Pseudo R^2	0.6651	0.6735

Notes: Cell entries are the unstandarized logisitic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and log odds in square brackets. Significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; The reference categories (dropped from all models) are for ethicity, class, household income, ideology are "mestizo," "lower class," Household income (Q1)," and "Self-placement: strong rightist (7)" respectively.

TABLE 5.2. Determinants of Alianza PAIS Party Identification (Population Estimates) - Logit Models

	Model 1 (Base Model)	**Model 2** (By type of membership)
Societal organizations		
Member (Indiv. and social network members)	0.0475 (0.4038)	
	[1.0487]	
Individual member		-0.2635 (0.5489)
		[0.7684]
Social network member		-0.0996 (0.4694)
		[0.9052]
Class		
Upper middle class	0.3262 (1.0305)	0.2349 (1.0279)
	[1.3857]	[1.2648]
Middle class	0.8393 (0.6079)	0.8205 (0.6091)
	[2.3148]	[2.2717]
Lower middle class	1.196* (0.696)	1.1588* (0.6935)
	[3.307]	[3.1862]
Income		
Household income (Q2)	-0.296 (0.5381)	-0.2586 (0.5377)
	[0.7438]	[0.7721]
Household income (Q3)	0.0977 (0.6312)	0.1759 (0.6384)
	[1.1026]	[1.1923]
Household income (Q4)	0.9404* (0.5095)	0.9127* (0.5164)
	[2.561]	[2.4911]
Ethnicity		
White	0.915 (0.8962)	0.9597 (0.9053)
	[2.4968]	[2.6108]
Indigenous	2.159*** (0.8215)	2.1846*** (0.8353)
	[8.6623]	[8.8873]
Ideology		
Self-placement: strong leftist (1)	35.3804 (2498.7816)	35.3502 (2503.5918)
	[2320148211157364]	[2251143239380505]
Self-placement: leftist (2)	17.8058 (1934.7186)	17.8502 (1937.0101)
	[54070405.3793]	[56523453.3104]
Self-placement: weak leftist (3)	18.3297 (1934.7187)	18.329 (1937.0102)
	[91307752.1581]	[91240259.5657]
Self-placement: centrist (4)	16.2829 (1934.7186)	16.2853 (1937.0101)
	[11791938.0541]	[11819524.2466]
Self-placement: weak rightist (5)	16.1198 (1934.719)	16.1507 (1937.0105)
	[10017552.107]	[10330976.4241]
Self-placement: rightist (6)	16.5447 (1934.7186)	16.5505 (1937.0101)
	[15319768.6738]	[15410138.6955]
left-right positions score (1: far right - 7: far left)	0.3933*** (0.1226)	0.3851*** (0.1236)
	[1.4818]	[1.4698]
indigenous positions score (1: against more ind. rights - 7: for more ind. rights)	-0.3131** (0.1521)	-0.2971* (0.1522)
	[0.7312]	[0.7429]
Background controls		
Age (in years)	0.0044 (0.0135)	0.0043 (0.0135)
	[1.0044]	[1.0043]
Female	0.62 (0.3977)	0.592 (0.3981)
	[1.859]	[1.8076]
Level of information (1-5)	1.0156*** (0.4691)	1.041*** (0.2424)
	[2.761]	[2.8322]
Education (secondary education completed)	-0.3236 (0.4856)	-0.3502 (0.488)
	[0.7235]	[0.7046]
Education (post-secondary education)	-0.6865 (0.4675)	-0.6277 (0.4742)
	[0.5033]	[0.5338]
Constant	-23.4759 (1934.7192)	-23.4989 (1937.0107)
N	239	237
Nagelkerke Pseudo R^2	0.4528	0.4531

Notes: Cell entries are the unstandarized logisitic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and log odds in square brackets. Significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; The reference categories (dropped from all models) are for ethicity, class, household income, ideology are "mestizo," "lower class," Household income (Q1)," and "Self-placement: strong rightist (7)" respectively.

To assess the plausibility of the development of partisan attachments through organizationally mediated appeals in the Ecuadorian context further, I replicated the analysis of predictors of party identification with Pachakutik, a smaller party that has relied on organizationally mediated appeals from indigenous organizations since its inception, using the same original survey data. Similar to what we observe in the case of the MAS in Bolivia, membership in organizations that have consistently endorsed the Pachakutik stands out a significant, positive predictor for whether a voter exhibit an attachment to the party (p: 0.0292). This finding suggests that organizationally mediated appeals can indeed be used to develop partisan attachments in Ecuador in a similar way to the MAS.

Beyond the question of who develops a partisan attachment, the theory also has testable implications about the robustness of the resulting partisan attachments: the habitual use of organizationally mediated appeals by the MAS in recent years—whose partisans are the largest group in the sample—should have brought about rather robust and resilient partisan attachments, in particular for voters who have been more exposed to consistent and repeated appeals.

First, the results provide strong evidence of robust and resilient partisan attachments: voters tend to be willing to support candidates that deviate from their own policy ideal points, if it is "their party's" candidate. When faced with a candidate whose policy platform deviates from their own, voters that are co-partisans are about 20 percentage points more likely to support the candidate than voters that are not co-partisan (see Figure 5.17).[23] When restricting the sample to MAS partisans, the effect of co-partisanship (as tested in H2) becomes even more pronounced: they are 25.2 percentage points more likely to support "their party's" candidates.

[23] This finding holds for different kinds of policy preferences on which candidates and voters could disagree: the effect sizes and significant levels are very similar for ethnic and economic issues.



FIGURE 5.17. Average Marginal Effects of Co-partisan Appeals for Discordant Policy Platforms (H2) (Bolivia)
Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Second, voters that attend meetings of relevant societal organizations frequently exhibit much more robust, resilient partisan attachments than those that do not attend organization meetings frequently.[24] When faced with a MAS candidate whose policy platform deviates from their own, the effect of facing "their party's" candidate for frequent organization meeting attendees is an astounding 70.8 percentage point increase in propensity to support the candidate. This effect is almost three times as large as for those that do not attend frequently (see Figure 5.18).

[24] I define "frequently" as "once a week or more" or "once or twice a month" and "infrequently" as anything less than that.



FIGURE 5.18. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Average Marginal Effects of Co-partisan Appeals for Discordant Policy Platforms for MAS Profiles by Attendance of Organization Meetings (Bolivia)

Notes: Fully non-parametric linear regression estimates (without covariates) with clustered SE (at the respondent level); bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

5.4.2. Volatile PID through Performance Evaluations

The development of party attachments to Alianza PAIS presents an interesting comparison to the organizationally mediated path pursued by the MAS. Whereas the analysis in the previous section suggests that repeated organizationally mediated appeals could account for the development of attachments to the MAS, Alianza PAIS could not rely on frequent and consistent organizationally mediated appeals due to its failure to institutionalize its linkages with organizational allies. With this path to robust, deep-seated partisanship closed, party identification with Alianza PAIS could only develop in response to the party's direct appeals and performance in office. As the analysis of original and existing survey data reveals, less crystalized and rather temporary partisan attachments to Alianza PAIS appear to have indeed developed in response to voters' evaluation of the party's performance. This holds particularly true for high information voters, who—unlike low information voters—regularly follow the news and can monitor the party's performance more closely. More specifically, high information voters appear to be more responsive to changes in performance evaluations.

Across different measures of performance, voters' identification with Alianza PAIS follows both individual and general retrospective evaluations of performance quite closely. First of all, when analyzing predictors of partisan

attachment to Alianza PAIS, voters' individual evaluation of (a) the change in the country's general economic situation over the last year, (b) the change in their individual economic situation over the last year, and (c) the performance of the current Alianza PAIS administration are all significantly,[25] strongly positively associated with whether a voter identifies with the party (see Table 5.3).

TABLE 5.3. Determinants of Alianza PAIS Party Identification (Population Estimates) - Logit Models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Measures of perception of performance (ind. level)			
Country's general economic situation	0.9480*** (0.0668) [2.5108]		
Individual economic situation		0.5740*** (0.0671) [1.7598]	
Performance of party in office			1.7883 0.0821 [5.5985]
Constant	0.9868*** (0.0502)	0.9463*** (0.0477)	-0.3653*** (0.0787)
N	2268	2274	2287
Nagelkerke Pseudo R^2	0.1346	0.0470	0.4395

Notes: Cell entries are the unstandarized logisitic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and log odds in square brackets. Significance levels: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

However, this analysis of individual level measures of performance evaluations and partisan attachments collected at the same point in time raises potential concerns of reverse causality. For example, a partisan might evaluate the government's performance over the last year more positively *because* she identifies with the party.

In order to overcome such concerns of reverse causality to the extent possible without panel data, I also construct more independent, general measures of performance perceptions, by aggregating the individual-level performance evaluations to national average measures. Here, a similar picture emerges: when looking at general perceptions of how the economic situation of the country and general perceptions of how the situation of individual citizens has changed over the previous year, identification with the party also closely maps on those changes over time.

Furthermore, in line with the theoretical model discussed in the previous chapter, we might expect that high information voters, who—unlike low information voters—regularly follow the news, should be able to monitor the party's performance more closely. Therefore, high information voters should also be more responsive to changes in performance and their identification with the party should trail performance evaluations more closely than party identification among low information voters.

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[25] Using LAPOP data for all available years (2008-2016/17), these measures draw on questions IDIO2, SOCT2, and M1.

To examine this implication of the theory, I test for interaction effects between performance evaluations and voters' information level on identification with the party.[26] The analysis reveals statistically significant interaction effects between, on the one hand, voters' information levels and, on the other hand, both the individual-level and aggregate measures of change in the country's economic situation over the last year as well as the aggregate, general evaluation of performance of the current Alianza PAIS administration (see Table 5.4). The direction of the interaction effect is consistent across these measures and shows that the relationship between performance evaluations and partisan attachments is significantly stronger for high information voters than for low information voters. This finding indicates that partisan attachments among high information voters follow performance evaluations more closely than among low information voters.

TABLE 5.4. Determinants of Alianza PAIS Party Identification (Population Estimates) - Logit Models

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Performance measure * Information level	0.35625** (0.1640) [1.4345]	0.8598* (0.4591) [2.3408]	1.9594** (0.9675) [7.0948]
Measure of perception of performance			
Country's general economic situation (ind. level)	0.7908*** (0.1343) [2.1116]		
Country's general economic situation (aggregate)		-0.1576 (0.3910) [0.8691]	
Performance of party in office (aggregate)			-0.6642 0.8111 [0.5147]
Information level (high information voter)	0.0248 (0.1221) [1.0883]	0.0196 (0.1158) [1.0656]	-1.3082* (0.7352) [0.2703]
Constant	0.9067*** (0.0997)	0.9154*** (0.0949)	1.3573** (0.6255)
N	1713	1736	1284
Nagelkerke Pseudo R^2	0.1639	0.0071	0.0086

Notes: Cell entries are the unstandarized logisitic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and log odds in square brackets. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

The figure below illustrates this point graphically: partisan attachments among high information voters trail performance evaluations (even at the aggregate, general societal level) much more closely than for low information voters.

[26] Using LAPOP data for all available years (2010-2016/17), voters' information level is measured using question GI0 ("¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet?" [How often do you follow the news, whether on television, radio, newspapers, or the internet?]). I coded respondents that followed news most closely ("Diariamente" [Daily]) as high information and respondents that followed news less frequently ("Algunas veces a la semana" [A few times a week], "Algunas veces al mes" [A few times a month], "Rara vez" [Rarely], and "Nunca" [Never]) as low information.



FIGURE 5.19. General Performance Evaluation (during Previous Year) and Partisan Attachments to Alianza PAIS by Voter Information Level (Ecuador)
Data: LAPOP.

To further test this information transmission mechanism for the development of volatile partisan attachments in response to performance evaluations, I replicate the same analysis in the context of the case of the MAS in Bolivia. This case should provide a placebo test of sorts since performance evaluations here—to the extent that they matter for the development of party identification in this case—should be similarly relevant for both high and low information voters. Both high and low information voters are similarly exposed to organizationally mediated appeals that also provide crucial information cues about the party performance. Therefore, we should expect high and low information voters to be similarly responsive to changes in performance.

This prediction is clearly supported by the replication of the analysis for the MAS in Bolivia, drawing on LAPOP data for the same time period and focusing on same survey questions. Testing for interactions effects between voters' level of information and the same performance evaluation measures considered above on identification with the MAS, the estimates for the interaction effects are consistently small and never statistically significant.

TABLE 5.5. Determinants of MAS Party Identification (Population Estimates) - Logit Models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Performance measure * Information level	-0.0787 (0.1682) [1.0976]	1.2425 (1.1078) [2.2216]	1.4979 (1.8074) [2.6198]
Measure of perception of performance			
Country's general economic situation (ind. level)	1.0886*** (0.1393) [2.8059]		
Country's general economic situation (aggregate)		-0.3315 (0.9083) [0.7303]	
Performance of party in office (aggregate)			-0.5042 0.5136 [0.9265]
Information level (high information voter)	-0.2785** (0.1211) [0.7135]	-0.0615 (0.1242) [0.8201]	-0.4636* (0.2593) [0.6009]
Constant	1.5151*** (0.1005)	1.3899*** (0.1006)	1.3850** (0.2030)
N	2202	2241	1402
Nagelkerke Pseudo R^2	0.1324	0.0025	0.0075

Notes: Cell entries are the unstandarized logisitic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and log odds in square brackets. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

The graph below further illustrates this point: partisan attachments among high information voters and low information voters are virtually indistinguishable.



FIGURE 5.20. General Performance Evaluation (during Previous Year) and Partisan Attachments to MAS by Voter Information Level (Bolivia)
Data: LAPOP.

5.4.3. Stability of PID

The evidence presented in the previous two sections suggests that the two different paths to partisanship—through organizationally mediated appeals vs. through performance evaluations—yield two different types of partisanship. Whereas organizationally mediated appeals appear to be capable of creating partisan attachments that take the form of robust, deep-seated social identities, partisanship that develops in response to voters' evaluations of a party's performance seems to be an expression of a less crystalized and potentially rather temporary affinity for a party that could be abandoned rather quickly in response to negative information about the party's performance. The first type of partisanship resembles the characterization of party ID, in the tradition of the Michigan school of party ID, as a genuine, stable social identity that raises 'perceptual screens' that filter out information inconsistent with the identity (Campbell et al. 1960; Green and Palmquist 1994; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). In the latter case, PID seems to operate in a way more consistent with running-tally models, in which PID largely tracks voters' evaluations of performance (Fiorina 1981).

If these characterizations of partisanship are correct, we might expect that, at least in a context where there is variation in party performance over time, the first type of partisanship, PID as an affective, social identity, should be more stable over time and less volatile than the rational, performance based PID. The analysis of changes in the rates of partisan identification with both Alianza PAIS and the MAS between 2008 and 2016/17 supports this prediction: aggregate identification with Alianza PAIS exhibits a lot more variability over time aggregate identification with the MAS. At the national level, on average 52.2% of the average share of Alianza PAIS identifiers changes their identity every two years. This is about 27% more than the average change in PID for the MAS (average share of PID that changes every two years: 41.1%). While the available multi-wave, cross-sectional survey data does not allow us to trace stability of identification at the individual level the way panel data would, this aggregate level of instability for Alianza PAIS identifiers is quite noteworthy.

TABLE 5.6. Rates of Identification with Alianza PAIS and MAS

Party	2008		2010		2012		2014		2016	MEAN	VOLATILITY
Alianza PAIS	0.135		0.107		0.175		0.292		0.148	0.171	0.522
		0.028		*0.069*		*0.117*		*0.144*		0.089	
MAS	0.198		0.226		0.108		0.184		0.129	0.169	0.411
		0.028		*0.118*		*0.076*		*0.055*		0.069	

Notes: *Notes*: Rates of identification with party (in population) for different survey waves with absolute change in identification between survey waves in italics. Volatility indicates the average share of PID that changes between survey waves.

In order to address this problem of ecological inference, which might lead us underestimate the actual rate of change at the individual level, I disaggregated the survey data by strata, the lowest level of aggregation for which the samples are representative and comparable over time. While this effort obviously does not completely solve the ecological inference problem that we face due to the aggregation of individual-level data, it nevertheless gets us a little 'closer' to the individual respondents and allows us to observe potentially diverging trends in identification across different regions of the country that might offset each other in the national averages.[27]

For Alianza PAIS, the instability in PID observed at the national level does not seem to be driven by one particular region. In fact, the analysis reveals very similar instability across all regions of the country.

TABLE 5.7. Disaggregated Rates of Identification with Alianza PAIS

Strata	2008		2010		2012		2014		2016	MEAN	VOLATILITY
Costa	0.142		0.136		0.233		0.351		0.156	0.204	0.511
		0.006		*0.097*		*0.118*		*0.195*		0.104	
Sierra	0.121		0.080		0.114		0.236		0.139	0.138	0.534
		0.041		*0.034*		*0.122*		*0.097*		0.074	
Oriente	0.201		0.059		0.143		0.208		0.155	0.153	0.563
		0.142		*0.084*		*0.065*		*0.053*		0.086	
national	0.135		0.107		0.175		0.292		0.148	0.171	0.522
		0.028		*0.069*		*0.117*		*0.144*		0.089	

Notes: Rates of identification with Alianza PAIS (in population) for different survey waves with absolute change in identification between survey waves in italics. Volatility indicates the average share of PID that changes between survey waves.

For the MAS, most strata exhibit similar levels of stability over time; with only La Paz exhibiting a somewhat higher average share of PID changing between survey waves.[28] It is interesting to note that the *departamentos* in which consistent organizationally mediated strategies have been used extensively by the

[27] For the Bolivia data, I collapsed some of the strata in the earlier years to reconstruct the same strata used in later years in order to ensure comparability over time. Since the earlier samples were constructed to be representative at the more fine-grained level, the new, collapsed strata are also representative.

[28] This higher share seems largely drive by the significantly lower share of MAS identifiers in 2012, compared to both 2010 and 2014.

MAS, such as Cochabamba, Potosi/Oruro, and La Paz, are also the regions with the highest rates of identification with the party. In these *departamentos* an average 20.4% of the population identifies with the population; compared to an average of 11.9% across the rest of the country. What is more, the late adoption of organizationally mediated strategies by the MAS in Santa Cruz, following the *media luna* crisis in late 2008, is followed by a large increase in identification with the MAS in the 2010 survey wave: whereas only 4.7% of the population in the *departamento* of Santa Cruz identified with the MAS when surveyed in February/March 2008, this number had more than doubled by 2010 (11.5%) and has remained very stable since then (on average 11.1% since 2010 with very little variation over time).

TABLE 5.8. Disaggregated Rates of Identification with MAS

Strata	2008		2010		2012		2014		2016	MEAN	VOLATILITY
La Paz	0.345		0.335		0.083		0.218		0.119	0.220	0.562
		0.010		*0.252*		*0.135*		*0.099*		0.124	
Santa Cruz	0.047		0.115		0.104		0.132		0.093	0.098	0.367
		0.067		*0.010*		*0.028*		*0.039*		0.036	
Cochabamba	0.249		0.287		0.160		0.249		0.151	0.219	0.402
		0.038		*0.127*		*0.089*		*0.098*		0.088	
Beni/Pando	0.099		0.139		0.091		0.137		0.174	0.128	0.335
		0.040		*0.048*		*0.047*		*0.036*		0.043	
Potosi/Oruro	0.228		0.286		0.101		0.135		0.114	0.173	0.430
		0.058		*0.184*		*0.034*		*0.021*		0.074	
Chuquisaca/Tarija	0.085		0.107		0.109		0.207		0.152	0.132	0.335
		0.022		*0.002*		*0.098*		*0.055*		0.044	
national	0.198		0.226		0.108		0.184		0.129	0.169	0.411
		0.028		*0.118*		*0.076*		*0.055*		0.069	

Notes: Rates of identification with the MAS (in population) for different survey waves with absolute change in identification between survey waves in italics. Volatility indicates the average share of PID that changes between survey waves.

Notes: Rates of identification with the MAS (in population) for different survey waves with absolute change in identification between survey waves in italics. Volatility indicates the average share of PID that changes between survey waves.

5.4.4. Implications for Vote Choice

There is evidence that these types of partisanship have important consequences for vote choice. First, consistent with the theory developed in the previous chapter, overall, the more stable partisan identities developed by MAS

identifiers are more predictive of vote intentions than the less stable, evaluation-based form of partisanship exhibited by Alianza PAIS identifiers. The correlation coefficient between vote intention, supporting the party you are attached to, and partisan identity is 0.514 for MAS identifiers; compared to 0.419 for Alianza PAIS identifiers, when analyzing LAPOP data for all available years.

Second, while the correlation coefficient between PID and vote intention is fairly similar over time for MAS identifiers, it has gradually increased over time for Alianza PAIS identifiers. This increasing correlation of PID and vote intention is very much consistent with a running-tally understanding of PID and seems to be indicative of a partisan identity that crystalizes only slowly over time, consistent with rational, running-tally notions of partisanship. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that this increasing correlation for Alianza PAIS identifiers is particularly pronounced among high information voters for whom their attachment becomes nearly twice as predictive for their vote choice between the 2010 and the 2016 surveys waves. This finding seems consistent with the theoretical model of performance-based partisanship discussed above that emphasizes the key importance of high information voters in the development of partisanship.

TABLE 5.9. Correlation Coefficients between PID and Vote Intention for Alianza PAIS and MAS—Overall and by Voter Information Level

		2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	MEAN
MAS	*overall:*	0.534	0.534	0.480	0.516	0.417	0.514
	low info. voters:		0.493	0.479	0.502	0.352	0.506
	high info. voters:		0.563	0.481	0.524	0.442	0.522
Alianza PAIS	*overall:*	0.342	0.349	0.428	0.505	0.560	0.419
	low info. voters:		0.326	0.451	0.519	0.460	0.390
	high info. voters:		0.357	0.404	0.488	0.604	0.449

Chapter 6

Conclusion: New Political Parties and Societal Linkages in Comparative Perspective

6.1. Introduction

This study has raised the question how some new parties are able to take root in society, establish stable ties with voters, and successfully compete in elections over time, while others fail to do so. What explains the variation in new parties' success to create stable mass support across new parties, i.e. to secure electoral support and build partisan attachments in the electorate?

In answering these questions, I develop a theory about how mass support for new parties and their institutionalization can be shaped by societal organizations. While scholarship has examined the formation of these organizations and their *direct* role in politicizing ethnic or class cleavages that can then be appealed to by parties, I show that they can play a—potentially much more important—*indirect* or *mediating* role in shaping mass support.

The genetic argument made here goes back to parties' founding moments and lays out how these early interactions between proto-leaders of new parties and societal organizations shape the way in which they relate to each other for many years to come. These early experiences shape whether ties with organizations become institutionalized and locked in through rules and mechanisms that govern how candidates will be selected and factional disagreements will be settled, determine what kinds of mobilization strategies parties can use during elections later on, and elucidate parties' ability to mobilize electoral support and build robust partisan attachments.

After recapitulating the main findings of the study in the next section, I reflect on their broader theoretical and normative implications for democratic representation and accountability, in the following section. Finally, I will conclude by discussing the relevance and plausibility of the theory in the context

of other new democracies as well as for new parties in more established democracies.

6.2. Summary of Findings

The analysis follows the development of three new parties and their relationship to societal organizations from the parties' founding moments, through the institution of a party structure and adoption of different mobilization strategies, to explain their ability to create mass support. In a first step, I show how the shared experience of moments of solidarity before or during a party's founding moments can create a shared sense of identity within the founding coalition and create mutual trust between proto-leaders and organizational allies. Building on this insight, I then show how such cohesion within the founding coalition shapes early on whether party-organization ties become institutionalized or remain instrumental. I then demonstrate that once a tie between a party and an organizational ally becomes institutionalized through the adoption of coordination and control mechanisms, it becomes very hard to serve this linkage. Given the stability of institutionalized party-organization ties, their adoption during parties' founding moments establishes whether a new party can steadily rely on them for voter mobilization down the road. Without institutionalized linkages, new parties might still be able to use instrumentally linked organizations to mobilize voters—however, such ties are less reliable and more unstable down the road—or they might be left unable to use any organizationally mediated appeals and restricted to employing direct appeals only.

Last, I then focus on how voters respond to appeals based on the different types of party mobilization strategies in order to explain variation in new parties' abilities to create mass support, i.e. their ability to (a) secure electoral support and (b) build partisan attachments in the electorate. I show that appeals mediated through linkages with societal organizations can help parties obtain electoral support particularly effectively and, if linkages are institutionalized, also yield particularly durable voter-party ties by socializing organization members into identifying with the party itself. The partisan attachments that result from such organizationally mediated appeals appear to be particularly stable, deep-seated social identities, especially when compared to partisanship that develops—without organizationally mediated appeals—just in response to voters' evaluations of a party's performance.

6.2.1. Founding Moments

In a first step, I show how the shared experience of moments of solidarity before or during a party's founding moments can create a shared sense of identity within the founding coalition and create mutual trust between proto-leaders and organizational allies involved in the moments of solidarity. While in all three cases, the parties' proto-leaders were closely ideologically aligned with their organizational allies and came to rely extensively on them to secure electoral support, the extent to which different organizational allies and the groups of party leaders trusted each other and shared an identity with each other (and with other allies) varies a lot between the MAS, Alianza PAIS, and MORENA and even across different organizational allies of these parties. In the cases where leaders of organizations and proto-leaders of the party were involved in costly acts of public support for each other and the joint goals, for example in the case of the MAS and MORENA, cohesive coalitions emerged.

Through series of large-scale popular protests in Bolivia and Mexico that at times even faced repressive state responses, leaders of different organizations and the proto-leaders of the parties that would emerge later came together over sustained periods of time to march side-by-side. Through these shared experiences, the actors came to trust each other and develop a shared sense of identity. While some proto-leaders in the case of the MAS and, to a lesser extent, in the case of MORENA had also come out of specific member organizations, these moments of solidarity brought together leaders and rank-and-file members from *across* different organizations and proto-leaders. Thereby, trust and a shared identity developed not just between the proto-leaders and individual organization leaders but also between different organizations that had little history of working together before.

However, not all organizational allies and proto-leader experienced such moments of solidarity. Besides some important organizations in Bolivia and Mexico that did not participate in the protests, the vast majority of proto-leaders of Alianza PAIS were not actively involved in similar protests that took place in Ecuador at a similar moment as the ones in Bolivia. As a result, despite their close ideological alignment, the early party leadership, most prominently Correa, did not have much trust in their organizational allies.

6.2.2. Institutional Consequences

The shared identity and mutual trust within the founding coalition that result from the shared experiences of moments of solidarity shape early on

whether a party-organization tie becomes organic, i.e. whether an initially instrumental organization-party tie becomes institutionalized. More specifically, higher coalition cohesion—attained through, most importantly, moments of solidarity—makes parties and those organizational allies that were involved in the moments of solidarity more likely to adopt institutions that will tie them together. These institutions—at a minimum—consist of rules and mechanisms that guarantee organizational representation and influence within the party (to influence leadership selection and the party's policy positions), firm rules about candidate selection securing organizational inclusion on the ballot, and the institutionalization of forums to settle factional disagreements within the founding coalition. Furthermore, the availability of other credible, attractive parties in the party system can shift the distribution of power between party leaders and organizational allies and makes instrumental, short-term linkages, instead of institutionalized ties, more likely. In the case of such instrumental ties, either due to the lack of moments of solidarity or because other attractive parties in the party system make an organization prefer not to tie themselves to one party, the coordination between the party and its organizational allies occurs in an ad-hoc fashion. In such case, no institutionalized spaces for organizational representation within the party are created and organizational inclusion on the ballot remains at the sole discretion of the party.

These institutional consequences of the founding moments—whether rules and mechanisms to manage party-organization ties are instituted or whether the linkage remains instrumental—be seen both *across* and *within* the three parties studied. While the ties with organizational allies of the MAS and MORENA that had marched side-by-side with the other organizations and the parties' proto-leaders before the parties assumed national office became fully institutionalized, the relationships with the other organizational allies that came to support the parties later but had not been part of such *moments of solidarity* have remained instrumental. In the case of both parties, such organizations have stayed at the periphery of the coalitions and enjoy less influence within the parties than the organizations that institutionalized their ties to the parties early on. In the case of Alianza PAIS, the party leaders were hesitant to adopt internal rules and mechanisms that would tie them to *any* organizations as result of the lack of trust that they placed in their organizational allies and the absence of a shared identity with them. As a result, instead of guaranteeing them a seat at table through the creation of coordination institutions or secured representation in candidate nomination procedures, the Alianza PAIS leadership continued to coordinate with them only on an ad-hoc basis.

Subsequently, the specific design of the institutions adopted to manage party-organization ties depends on the structure of the organizational allies. More specifically, differences in the structure of the organizational allies—the degree or

level of organizational aggregation—make other mechanisms for coordination with allies and for organizational representation within the party necessary.

In the case of the MAS most organizational allies take the form of peak associations organized at the national or regional level. Such peak organizations exhibit a multi-level organizational structure that connects individual members to a national or regional level of organization as well as additional levels of organization such as local and sub-regional chapters. This internal structure within the organization that aggregates the organization up to the national or regional level means that the party can easily coordinate with the organization at the national or regional level and rely on the organization's internal structure to connect all the way down to local level organizations and their members.

In contrast, the non-instrumental organizational allies of MORENA are primarily locally based organizations and groups, characterized by a less complex organizational structure. In order to institutionalize linkages with such organizations, the organizations can only be incorporated into the party at the local level. Furthermore, local organizations tend have less organizational autonomy vis-à-vis the party due to the organization's smaller membership and coverage (compared to major societal organizations that have national or at least regional coverage). In fact, given these organizations' localized nature and their relatively low degree of organizational autonomy, I find that they become incorporated through (and in some cases, as) local branches for the party.

Resulting Party Structure

Furthermore, whether and how party-organization ties become institutionalized has important implications for the resulting larger party structure. In fact, the three new parties studied end up following very different trajectories.

Having institutionalized ties with large number of peak associations organized at the national or regional level, the MAS can credibly rely on the internal structure within these organizations to provide a local base foundation for it and it does not have to build a separate party infrastructure. The resulting party takes the form of what could be characterized as an indirect party, i.e. a party that "is made up of the union of the component social groups" (Duverger 1954, 6). In fact, the party structure of the MAS in its relationship to the societal organizations, with which linkages have become institutionalized, resembles the party structures of the British labor party of around 1900, which "was made up of Trade Unions, Co-operative Societies, Friendly Societies, and groups of intellectuals who had united to establish a common organization: there were no party supporters or members, only members of the component groups" (Duverger 1954, 5).

In the case of MORENA, the institutionalization of ties at the local level leads the organizations become incorporated through (and in some cases, as) local branches for the party. Thereby, the resulting party becomes more resembling of a "direct party" (Duverger 1954, 5), in which the weaker organizational structures become subsumed and "the members themselves form the party community without the help of other social groupings" (Duverger 1954, 5).

Not being able to credibly rely on organizational allies to provide stable ties to voters and local communities, Alianza PAIS follows yet a different path. While the *formal* party structure at first sight appears to follow the model of a direct mass party, the party is more accurately characterized as a nationally focused elite party that relies on local notables in a largely discretionary fashion. Since party leaders did not have to adopt institutions that would credibly secure the representation and influence of organizational allies within the party, the resulting party structures leaves most power with the party leadership, specifically the party's national directorate. While the party statutes provide structures for internal representation and accountability, the overwhelming power of the national directorate—both by design and in practice—raises serious doubts arise about how effectively internal accountability can be ensured by the party's structure.

Stability of Linkages: Institutionalized vs. Instrumental Ties

Institutionalized ties are indeed much more stable and durable than instrumental ones. On the one hand, I show that once a tie between a party and an organizational ally becomes institutionalized through the adoption of coordination and control mechanisms, it becomes very hard to serve this linkage. Even when the interests of party leaders and organizations diverge down the road and conflict arises between, institutionalized party-organization ties have proven to be quite sticky.

On the other hand, instrumental ties can unravel easily when disagreements arise with organizations allies. The case of Alianza PAIS illustrates this point well: initially, the party received crucial support from its organizational allies and, in exchange, key demands of the organizations were implemented, and some organization leaders were nominated to run on the party's lists in the early elections. Yet once tensions arose with organizations after the passing of the constitution, there was no mechanism in place to work out the issues within the party coalition and there were no institutional barriers that would keep either side from deserting the other. Eventually, the organizations that had initially helped Correa and Alianza PAIS come into office ended up organizing large scale protests that brought the Alianza PAIS government to the brink of collapse.

Here, the comparison to the Bolivian case is particularly interesting: whereas disagreements about very similar issues also arose within the MAS and caused some popular protests, the ties between the MAS and the organizational allies in question had become so deeply institutionalized that it largely endured these challenges. Moreover, the 'brain drain' away from organizational allies into the party and elected office that has resulted from the secured representation of organizations within the MAS, had weakened the organizations themselves to such an extent that they could no longer pose a serious threat to the party.

6.2.3. Mobilization Strategies Available to New Parties

Given the stability of institutionalized party-organization ties, their adoption during parties' founding moments establishes whether a new party can steadily rely on them for voter mobilization down the road. Without institutionalized linkages, new parties might still be able to use instrumentally linked organizations to mobilize voters—however, such ties are less reliable and more unstable down the road—or they might be left unable to use any organizationally mediated appeals at all.

Both institutionalized and instrumental linkages allow parties to rely on organizationally mediated appeals and receive endorsements that are usually issued organization leaders and handed down through the organizations. However, whether the underlying party-organization linkages is institutionalized or instrumental determines how frequently endorsements occur and how reliable they are across elections.

On the one hand, in organically linked organizations, i.e. organizations with institutionalized linkages, endorsements for the party and expressions of support would occur very regularly—not just during electoral campaigns—and, given the stability of the underlying ties, reliably and consistently over time. On the other hand, in instrumentally linked organizations, endorsements would happen less frequently, only during electoral campaigns, are less reliable to the party, and could potentially be different and inconsistent across elections.

Without (or only very limited) organizational linkages, a new party is restricted to employing direct appeals only. In addition, once in office, it might also rely on clientelist mobilization. Alianza PAIS illustrates this scenario well. First, the party has extensively relied on direct appeals—often communicated by Correa himself through radio addresses or when visiting local communities with his 'traveling cabinets.' Second, since its rupture of most of its instrumental linkages, the party has also greatly relied on very extensive, highly targeted public spending—some of it clientelistic in nature—to secure support bases and mobilize

voters outside the party's strongholds, relying on a network of local notables, often mayors, to mobilize voters.

6.2.4. Mass Support for New Parties

In the next step, I then focus on how voters respond to appeals based on the different types of party mobilization strategies in order to explain variation in new parties' abilities to create mass support, i.e. their ability to (a) secure electoral support and (b) build partisan attachments in the electorate. Appeals mediated through linkages with societal organizations can help parties obtain electoral support particularly effectively and, if linkages are institutionalized, also yield particularly durable voter-party ties by socializing organization members into identifying with the party itself. The partisan attachments that result from such organizationally mediated appeals appear to be particularly stable, deep-seated social identities, especially when compared to partisanship that develops—without organizationally mediated appeals—just in response to voters' evaluations of a party's performance.

First, appeals mediated through either instrumentally or organically linked organizations, in the form of organizational endorsements of a party during electoral campaigns, are very effective in swaying organization members and people in their immediate social network (e.g., other family members and neighbors) to vote for new parties. As the experimental evidence from Bolivia and Ecuador demonstrates, organizationally mediated appeals are very effective in obtaining electoral support, especially when voters face a new party. In fact, the results show that organizational endorsements can even overcome other cross-cutting divides. For example, voters follow organizational endorsements even for candidates whose policy preferences are not congruent with their own and when facing candidates that are no co-ethnic with them. What is more, the effectiveness of organizationally mediated appeals does not seem to be limited to one specific organization or type of organization (e.g., ethnic or class-based organization).

The effectiveness of organizationally mediated appeals is particularly noteworthy, when compared to direct appeals. While the existing literature has repeatedly emphasized the importance of direct appeals to voters in order to explain mass support for new parties, the results of the experiments suggest a very limited effectiveness of direct appeals—especially of direct programmatic appeals—in securing electoral support. Voters do not appear very responsive to direct programmatic appeals (neither based on ethnicity nor class). The only type of direct appeal that was at least somewhat effective in shaping vote preferences was a co-ethnicity appeal, i.e. being presented with a co-ethnic candidate.

Second, regular endorsements—not just during electoral campaigns—for the same party that occur in organically linked organizations could lead organization members and people in their immediate social network to develop durable attachments to the party itself. Drawing on social identity and self-categorization theory, I contend that societal organizations, which serve as highly relevant and immediate reference groups to their members, can provide social spaces in which socialization into new parties takes place if the organizations' ties to the party is institutionalized. Analyzing survey data from Bolivia and Ecuador, I show that membership in an organization that consistently endorses a party is strongly associated with whether a voter develops an attachment to that party and that frequency of organization meeting attendance is connected to the robustness of that partisan attachment.

I then compare and contrast this organizationally mediated path to partisanship, which can account for the development of robust partisan attachments to the MAS, to an alternative path to partisanship that can yield PID even for parties without organically linked organizational allies. I show that in the case of Alianza PAIS, a party that could not rely on regular endorsements from organically linked organizations, partisan attachments have developed in direct response to voters' evaluation of the party's performance.

Across different measures of performance, voters' identification with Alianza PAIS follows both individual and general retrospective evaluations of performance (over the previous year) quite closely. This holds particularly true for high information voters, who—unlike low information voters—regularly follow the news and can monitor the party's performance more closely. More specifically, high information voters appear to be more responsive to changes in performance evaluations.

Even though both paths to partisanship—through organizationally mediated appeals and through voters' evaluation of the party's performance—can leader voters to start identifying with new parties, the resulting attachments vary in their crystallization and durability. Whereas organizationally mediated appeals are capable of creating partisan attachments that take the form of robust, deep-seated social identities, partisanship that develops in response to voters' evaluations of a party's performance seems to be an expression of a less crystalized and potentially rather temporary affinity for a party that could be abandoned rather quickly in response to negative information about the party's performance.

Furthermore, these types of partisanship have important consequences for the stability of vote preferences. In fact, the more stable partisan identities developed by parties that use organizationally mediated appeals consistently are significantly more predictive of vote intentions than the less stable, evaluation-based form of partisanship.

6.3. Democratic Accountability and Representation

In democratic regimes, political parties are typically thought of as playing a central role in democratic representation, acting as intermediaries linking society and the state (Sartori 1976, 57; Schattschneider 1942, 36). Yet many parties fail to serve these representative functions. By analyzing why some parties are able take root in society and establish stable ties with voters, while others fail to do so, this study contributes to the ongoing debate about the different functions served by parties and the changing relationship between political parties and voters. While for decades scholars have pointed to the demise of close ties between voters and parties and the waning of mass parties in favor of catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966, 184), electoral-professional parties (Panebianco 1988, 264) or cartel parties (Katz and Mair 1995, 6), recent developments in Latin America raise the question of whether these ties are really passé.

This study has far-reaching implications for how we understand the role of parties in democratic accountability and representation. Whether parties can serve as stable transmission belts between citizens and the states crucially depends on their ability to secure mass support and how they relate to societal organizations.

Even if we focus on parties' role in holding elected officials accountable to the electorate, their capacity to fulfill this crucial task depends on their ability to attain at least some minimal degree of organizational and electoral stability. If (new) parties fail and disappear regularly, party labels become uninformative and it becomes hard for voters to hold representatives accountable.

This necessity to attain at least some minimal degree of stability in support becomes particularly important in the context of democratic consolidation in new democracies. As Innes points out with reference to Eastern European party systems after the return to democracy, "(w)here parties fail, it will hardly matter how efficient other institutions of (the) state may have become. The new system will lack legitimacy and be vulnerable to instability and takeover" (2002, 85). While different parties might emphasize one function over another, e.g. focusing on winning office more than representing particular interests, in order for any party to fulfill most of these functions it must to endure electorally and organizationally over time and thereby, considering all the parties in the system, the party system needs to exhibit a fair amount of stability over time. In fact, many new democracies in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, and beyond have been characterized by unstable parties and experienced problems in democratic consolidation as a result.

Beyond such considerations of electoral accountability, parties ability to enable "the citizens to communicate to the state" (Sartori 1976, 57) in a more meaningful way and advance representation requires more than just reasonably stable parties. To understand parties' role in substantive and descriptive

representation and their ability to live up these normative expectations, we must understand how parties connect with society. More specifically, it becomes central to understand how parties recruit their members, choose their leadership, and select their candidates for public office.

The findings outlined above elucidate how parties represent political interests and identities and how those interests and identities get translated into party positions and candidates. In order to understand the broader political implications of politicized interests and identities, such ethnicity or class, we must explain not just why groups organize around them, which has been the focus of much of the recent literature, and what public demands these organizations make—as interest groups in a pluralist sense. In addition, we also should pay close attention to what role these organizations can play inside political parties—as corporate or constituent groups.

In fact, this transformation from politicized identities into organized parties that mobilize the electorate to vote in the interests of these identities has been quite underexplored. This study seeks to understand how this transformation takes place and in doing so, help us fill some important voids in the state-society relations literature by "explaining variation in forms and patterns of partisan representation, both spatially … and temporally" (Roberts 2012, 48) and thereby provide some answers to the "formidable questions (that) remain unanswered, especially regarding the dynamics properties of parties and party systems and their sources of change over time" (Roberts 2012, 49). Thereby, this research project directly builds on the recent literature that analyzes the politicization of shared ethnic and other social identities and the mobilization and organization of 'new social movements' around them (Van Cott 2005; Garay 2007; Yashar 2005, 2006) as well as the literature on changes in representation of the popular sectors (Collier and Handlin 2009; Eaton 2013; Rossi 2014; Spronk and León 2014).

Last, beyond the roles that societal organizations can play—as interest groups—making public demands, and—as corporate or constituent groups—inside political parties, this study also points to the importance that societal organizations can play around or surrounding parties—as locally embedded associations. In fact, the study suggests that participation in societal organizations, or even just in indirect association with them through others in their social network, might actually be more important than direct policy preference or ideology for many citizens. The finding that appeals that tap into such organizational identities are actually more effective in influencing vote choice than most forms of direct appeals—especially direct programmatic appeals—speaks to a growing body of new literature on representation. It is consistent with other recent work that has highlighted that "voters, even the most informed voters, typically make choices not on the basis of policy preferences or ideology" (Achen and Bartels 2016, 4).

In doing so, the theoretical framework advanced in this analysis goes beyond direct appeals and re-examines the role that societal organizations can play in securing electoral support and creating partisan attachments. It brings back and deepens ideas about the mediating role that societal organizations can play that people might have forgotten about. Societal organizations, in the form of labor unions, played a crucial in role in mobilizing votes and in creating lasting partisan identities among voters in earlier episodes of party formation (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Collier and Collier 1991; Przeworski and Sprague 1986). However, much of this earlier work lacks microfoundations and portrays the translation of politicized interests and identities into partisan support as reflexive: mass support for socialist parties, for example, tends to be portrayed as a 'natural outgrowth' of the politicization of class interests by labor unions. Yet it remains unclear why, for example, 'class consciousness' sometimes translated into support for a particular party and sometimes not.

This study, however, explicitly focuses on the different ways in which organized interests can be linked to parties and how this, in turn, shapes support for those parties. This approach also allows us to specify and test the microfoundations through which this translation of interests and identities into partisan support can occur.

Furthermore, given this decline of labor unions' ability to represent and mobilize large parts of the electorate in many countries and the rise in importance of different kinds of societal organization, it is not obvious what role societal organizations can play in the founding of new parties *today*. At first sight, the new generation of societal organizations looks quite different from the traditional labor union model. In fact, most of these 'new' societal organization either did not exist during earlier episodes of party formation, such as informal sector unions, neighborhood associations, environmental organizations, and the landless movement, or were only partially incorporated into the political arena, such as indigenous or peasant organizations. What is more, these organizations exhibit a broader range of organizational forms and of represented issues and identities. In fact, these purported organizational and structural differences between traditional and contemporary societal organization have led many scholars to be rather pessimistic about the mobilizational and representational capacity of such organizations today.

By analyzing the relationship between such new organizations and parties in the context of the recent wave of party formation in Latin America, this study helps us understand the key role that such new organizations—despite their organizational and structures differences—can play in 'translating' social cleavages into political parties and their key role in political representation.

Furthermore, the study yields new insights into the creation of partisan attachments and their consequences. While the stability of party identification and

the de-alignment away from parties have received much scholarly attention, the theoretical micro-foundations behind the establishment of attachments to new parties is still little understood. The study traces two separate paths through which attachments to new parties can develop: through consistent and repeated organizationally mediated appeals and through voters' evaluation of the party's performance. Even though both paths can leader voters to start identifying with new parties, the resulting attachments vary in their crystallization and durability.

Notwithstanding their novelty, especially the new partisan attachments that have been created in Bolivia since the recent party system collapse seem to work much like older partisan attachments in more established democracies. In fact, they raise similar "perceptual screens" through which voters evaluate policy platforms. In addition, the findings suggest that the attachments to new political parties constitute genuine social identities in their own right.

6.4. New Political Parties and Societal Linkages Elsewhere

The emergence of new political parties is a feature of democracies almost everywhere. While new parties emerge particularly frequently in young democracies, their emergence is certainly not limited to young democracies. In fact, new parties arise frequently even in well-established, historic democracies with allegedly 'frozen party systems' in Western Europe. In recent years alone, new parties such as Podemos and Ciudadanos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, UKIP in the United Kingdom, the Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy, the AfD in Germany, the Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, and the PVV in the Netherlands have made the headlines and, in many cases, significant inroads in popular elections. This is not a new phenomenon. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in Germany, the Front National in France, and the Fremskrittspartiet in Norway are just a few examples of parties founded in the 1970s/1980s that have had a lasting influence on politics in their respective countries and still enjoy substantial support today.

This frequent emergence of new parties in democracies almost everywhere begs the question to what extent the theory put forward in this study can help us understand the prospects of new parties elsewhere. Beyond the context of the specific cases analyzed in this study, there is good reason to believe that mediation through new types of societal organizations could also account for the mobilization of electoral support and the establishment of partisan attachments in other regions and during other episodes of party formation. In fact, given how ubiquitous societal organizations are in many democratic societies, mediated strategies appear highly viable for new parties in many different settings, particularly after party system disruptions and to mobilize traditionally unincorporated voters (e.g., indigenous voters or informal sector workers).

The three principal parties studied here can be characterized as leftist. This similarity of platforms allows for a certain level of comparability in terms of programmatic appeals. However, there is no inherent reason why that the argument should be limited to leftist parties. In fact, there are numerous examples in Latin America and beyond of new societal organizations that have become linked to centrist or conservative parties.

However, there are at least two important scope conditions that would have to be met for this theory to be plausibly applicable: (a) there must be a sizeable number of voters that are not already attached to existing parties and (b) there must be societal organizations that are not yet organically linked to established parties and count at least some of these unattached voters among their members.

The first condition that there must be a sizeable number of voters that are not already attached to existing parties is crucial because it determines whether a new party could become electorally viable (or successful) at all, assuming it can successfully mobilize these voters. While there would need to be at least enough unattached voters to make a new party electorally viable (and gain some elected offices), the exact number or rather their share of the electorate (and depending on the electoral system potentially also their distribution across constituencies) only matters in so far as it puts an upper bound on the potential mass support that a new party can achieve.

At least four different factors could yield such unattached voters. First, voters could (still) be unattached because they got exposed to democratic parties only recently. This scenario would, for example, be the case in a country that recently transitioned to democracy. Second, voters could be unattached because they never developed attachments to any existing party. This category would, for example, include independents and swing voters, esp. those that have not been successfully catered to well by any of the established parties; new voters that could not participate in elections before and only recently received the right to vote (e.g., after the extension of suffrage to formerly disenfranchised people); traditionally unincorporated voters (e.g., indigenous voters or informal sector workers in Latin America), who might have had the right to vote (and might well have exercised it) but were largely ignored by the established parties. Third, voters who might have had attachments to a party before could become unattached because the party they were attached has disappeared. In the most extreme case, the entire party system might have collapsed, for example, due to widespread corruption scandals and discontent with the established parties, as did many parts of Latin America in the late 1990s (Lupu 2016; Seawright 2012). Alternatively, only individual parties might have disappeared (e.g., because they lost their registration for reasons possibly even unrelated to their electoral performance). Fourth, voters might become unattached because they simply

turned away from other established parties. In this case, the voter turns away from her former party, even though the party continues to exist (individual disgruntled voters).

Any one or a combination of multiple of these factors could yield unattached voters that new parties could try to mobilize. Future research will have to investigate empirically how these different ways of becoming an 'unattached voter' might shape voters' different predispositions to develop new attachments. However, at least some of these unattached voters will develop new attachments and it seems plausible that this occur through organizational mediation.

The second condition that must be met for this theory to have any plausible relevance is that there must be participant-based, locally organized societal organizations that are not yet organically linked to established parties and that these have at least some of the unattached voters among their members. Furthermore, these organization needs to be at least potentially open to engage with a party, even if it is just instrumentally. As discussed in Chapter 4, the specific nature underlying the organization is secondary, as long as it meets the definition discussed in Chapter 1. Depending on a specific society's salient cleavages and other political identities, these societal organizations could take very different forms. They could, for example, be organized around ethnic, class, religious, regional, or environmental identities or interests. More importantly, the societal organizations must be participant-based and locally organized. Unlike professionalized, primarily nationally focused interest groups or international NGOs, organizations must be characterized by regular personal interactions between local leaders and their members for the theoretical mechanism to be plausibly applicable.

Furthermore, these organizations should have at least some unattached voters among their members. However, the spillover mechanism illustrates that the influence of societal organizations is not limited to just its direct members. Therefore, as long as at least some of the unattached voters are part of an organization, other unattached voters in their social networks could also be affected by the organization.

It seems that these two assumptions are more likely to be satisfied in some countries than in others. While the first assumption should hold in many contexts, it might be particularly likely to be met in nascent democracies and developing countries. Beyond the obvious reasons why new democracies would have more unattached voters, widespread elite corruption seems particularly widespread in developing countries (even those that are not nascent democracies), making frequent crises of legitimacy and discontent with established parties more likely.

It is not to say, however, that assumption cannot also be met in well-established, highly industrialized countries. In fact, beyond the longstanding existence of groups of independents and swing voters, the large growth in

disgruntled voters, for example, in Western Europe in recent years, who have turned away from 'their' previous parties, even though the parties have not disappeared, has lessened the restraints on potential support for new parties.

The second assumption, that there must be participant-based, locally organized societal organizations that are not already organically linked to established parties and have at least some of these unattached voters among their members, also appears to hold in many different settings. As discussed in the first chapter, for example, in most Latin American countries, about one third to one half of citizens at least occasionally attend meetings of such organizations (LAPOP 2016). But even beyond Latin America, we encounter such organizations in many different contexts, in nascent and well-established democracies alike.[1] In fact, especially since the 1960/1970s, we have seen a plethora of new organizations motivated by a range of postmaterial issues and identities develop across developing and highly industrialized countries that have the potential to reach voters that have been out of the reach of traditional societal organizations before. Some of these new organizations, especially in the US, take the form of professionalized, primarily nationally focused interest groups, unable to serve the same social functions discussed above. However, many new organizations, such as, for example, organizations that grew out of the environmental, peace, and LGBTQ movements as well as new religious organizations in many different countries, are participant-based and locally organized in a way that would allow them to play a crucial mediating role in creating mass support for new parties.

[1] The contemporary US presents an important exception. For a detailed discussion of why such organizations rarely exist in the United States anymore, see Skocpol (2003).

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Appendices

APPENDIX A. Overview over the Attributes and their Presentation in the Posters and Vignettes for the Poster Experiment in Bolivia (Spanish Original Text)

Attributes	Levels	Presentation: Poster	Presentation: Profile
Ethnicity	indigenous	candidate skin color	"indígena"
	mestizo(a)		"mestizo"/"mestiza"
	white		"blanco"/"blanca"
Class background	upper class	---	"de clase alta"
	middle class		"de clase media"
	popular class		"de clase popular"
Gender	male	candidate gender	"este candidato"
	female		"esta candidata"
Party	not stated	party logo/name	---
	new fictitious party (MBS)		"Movimiento Boliviano Social"
	MAS-IPSP		"Movimiento al Socialismo-Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos"
	UN		"Unidad Nacional"
	MSM		"Movimiento Sin Miedo"
	MDS		"Movimiento Demócrata Social"
	PDC		"Partido Demócrata Cristiano"
	PVB-IEP		"Partido Verde-Instrumento de la Ecología Política"
	"the opposition"		"la oposición"
Organizational endorsement	not stated	party logo/name	---
	placebo control		"una organización social"
	formal labor unions		"COD La Paz, la Central Obrera Departamental"
	informal labor unions		"Federación Departamental de Gremialistas, Artesanos y Comerciantes Minoristas de La Paz"
	indigenous movement		"CONAMAQ, el Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas de Qullasuyu"
	peasant union		"CSUTCB La Paz, la Federación Departamental de Campesinos de La Paz"
	neighborhood association		"FEDJUVE, la Federación Departamental de Juntas Vecinales"
	comité cívico		"Comité Cívico de La Paz"
	employer/business association		"FEPLP, la Federación de Empresarios Privados de La Paz"
Policy plaform	left	"Para más bonos sociales y menos desigualdad de ingresos"	"El quiere aumentar los bonos sociales y reducir la desigualdad de ingresos." OR "Ella quiere aumentar los bonos sociales y reducir la desigualdad de ingresos."
	left-indigenous	"Para más bonos sociales y menos desigualdad de ingresos / Para fortalecer derechos indígenas"	"El quiere aumentar los bonos sociales, reducir la desigualdad de ingresos y fortalecer derechos indígenas."OR "Ella quiere aumentar los bonos sociales, reducir la desigualdad de ingresos y fortalecer derechos indígenas."
	right	"Para más iniciativa privada y menos intervención estatal"	"El quiere promover iniciativa privada y reducir intervención estatal." OR "Ella quiere promover iniciativa privada y reducir intervención estatal."
	right-indigenous	"Para más iniciativa privada y menos intervención estatal / Para fortalecer derechos indígenas"	"El quiere promover iniciativa privada, reducir intervención estatal y fortalecer derechos indígenas." OR "Ella quiere promover iniciativa privada y reducir intervención estatal"
Clientelist appeal	not stated	---	---
	clientelist promise		"Si votas por el, vas a recibir un kilo de azucar y dos paquetes de fideos." OR "Si votas por ella, vas a recibir un kilo de azucar y dos paquetes de fideos."

APPENDIX B. Overview over the Attributes and their Presentation in the Posters and Vignettes for the Poster Experiment in Bolivia (English Translation)

Attributes	Levels	Presentation: Poster	Presentation: Profile
Ethnicity	indigenous	candidate skin color	"indígena"
	mestizo(a)		"mestizo"/"mestiza"
	white		"white"
Class background	upper class	---	"of upper class background"
	middle class		"of middle class background"
	popular class		"of popular class background"
Gender	male	candidate gender	"candidato" (ending signals gender)
	female		"candidata" (ending signals gender)
Party	not stated	party logo/name	---
	new fictitious party (MBS)		"Movimiento Boliviano Social"
	MAS-IPSP		"Movimiento al Socialismo-Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos"
	UN		"Unidad Nacional"
	MSM		"Movimiento Sin Miedo"
	MDS		"Movimiento Demócrata Social"
	PDC		"Partido Demócrata Cristiano"
	PVB-IEP		"Partido Verde-Instrumento de la Ecología Política"
	"the opposition"		"the opposition"
Organizational endorsement	not stated	party logo/name	---
	placebo control		"a social organization"
	formal labor unions		"COD La Paz, la Central Obrera Departamental"
	informal labor unions		"Federación Departamental de Gremialistas, Artesanos y Comerciantes Minoristas de La Paz"
	indigenous movement		"CONAMAQ, el Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas de Qullasuyu"
	peasant union		"CSUTCB La Paz, la Federación Departamental de Campesinos de La Paz"
	neighborhood association		"FEDJUVE, la Federación Departamental de Juntas Vecinales"
	comité cívico		"Comité Cívico de La Paz"
	employer/business association		"FEPLP, la Federación de Empresarios Privados de La Paz"
Policy plaform	left	"For more social spending and less income inequality"	"He wants to increase social spending and reduce income inequality." OR "She wants to increase social spending and reduce income inequality."
	left-indigenous	"For more social spending and less income inequality / To strengthen indigenous rights"	"He wants to increase social spending, reduce income inequality, and strengthen indigenous rights." OR "She wants to increase social spending, reduce income inequality, and strengthen indigenous rights."
	right	"For more private initiative and less state intervention"	"He wants to promote private initiative and reduce state intervention." OR "She wants to promote private initiative and reduce state intervention."
	right-indigenous	"For more private initiative and less state intervention / To strengthen indigenous rights"	"He wants to promote private initiative, reduce state intervention, and strengthen indigenous rights." OR "She wants to promote private initiative, reduce state intervention, and strengthen indigenous rights."
Clientelist appeal	not stated	---	---
	clientelist promise		"If you vote for him, you will receive a kilo of sugar and two packages of noodles." OR "If you vote for her, you will receive a kilo of sugar and two packages of noodles."

APPENDIX C. Overview over the Attributes and their Presentation in the Posters and Vignettes for the Poster Experiment in Ecuador (Spanish Original Text)

Attributes	Levels	Presentation: Poster	Presentation: Profile
Ethnicity	indigenous	candidate skin color	"indígena"
	mestizo(a)		"mestizo"/"mestiza"
	white		"blanco"/"blanca"
Class background	upper class	---	"de clase alta"
	middle class		"de clase media"
	popular class		"de clase popular"
Gender	male	candidate gender	"este candidato"
	female		"esta candidata"
Party	not stated	party logo/name	---
	new fictitious party (MES)		"Movimiento Ecuatoriano Social"
	Alianza PAIS		Alianza PAIS
	CREO		Creando Oportunidades
	PSC		Partido Social Cristiano
	PSP		Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero
	MUPP		Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik
	AVANZA		Partido Avanza
Organizational endorsement	not stated	party logo/name	---
	placebo control		"una organización social"
	formal labor unions 1		"FUT – Frente Unitario de Trabajadores"
	formal labor unions 2		"PLE – Parlamento Laboral Ecuatoriano"
	formal labor unions 3		"CUT – Central Unitaria de Trabajadores"
	indigenous/peasant organization 1		"CONAIE - Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador"
	indigenous/peasant organization 2		"FENOCIN - Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras"
	indigenous/peasant organization 3		"FEI - Confederación de Pueblos, Organizaciones Indígenas y Campesinas del Ecuador"
	employer/business association		"ANDE – Asociación Nacional de Empresarios"
Policy plaform	left	"Para más bonos sociales y menos desigualdad de ingresos"	"El quiere aumentar los bonos sociales y reducir la desigualdad de ingresos."/"Ella quiere aumentar los bonos sociales y reducir la desigualdad de ingresos."
	left-indigenous	"Para más bonos sociales y menos desigualdad de ingresos" / "Para fortalecer derechos indígenas"	"El quiere aumentar los bonos sociales, reducir la desigualdad de ingresos y fortalecer derechos indígenas."/"Ella quiere aumentar los bonos sociales, reducir la desigualdad de ingresos y fortalecer derechos indígenas."
	right	"Para más iniciativa privada y menos intervención estatal"	"El quiere promover iniciativa privada y reducir intervención estatal."/"Ella quiere promover iniciativa privada y reducir intervención estatal."
	right-indigenous	"Para más iniciativa privada y menos intervención estata" / "Para fortalecer derechos indígenas"	"El quiere promover iniciativa privada, reducir intervención estatal y fortalecer derechos indígenas."/"Ella quiere promover iniciativa privada y reducir intervención estatal"
Clientelist appeal	not stated	---	---
	clientelist promise		"Si votas por el, vas a recibir un kilo de azucar y dos paquetes de fideos."/"Si votas por ella, vas a recibir un kilo de azucar y dos paquetes de fideos."

APPENDIX D. Announcement for the 9th Ordinary National Congress of the MAS (2016) Including List of Quotas for Delegations by Different Organizations

MAS IPSP

MOVIMIENTO AL SOCIALISMO
INSTRUMENTO POLÍTICO POR LA SOBERANIA DE LOS PUEBLOS
DIRECCIÓN NACIONAL MAS - IPSP

Que, como establece la resolución 002/2016 de la Comisión Política del XVI Congreso Ordinario de la Central Obrera Boliviana, "la COB es parte fundamental del PROCESO REVOLUCIONARIO DE CAMBIO, juega un rol protagónico, al aglutinar y movilizar a los trabajadores por sus reivindicaciones, en torno a la defensa del PROCESO REVOLUCIONARIO DE CAMBIO, porque cualquier dubitación, retroceso o apertura de las puertas para el retorno del neoliberalismo, será considerado como un golpe en contra de los trabajadores y el pueblo boliviano." Resolución en la que además se decidió apoyar la modificación de la CPE el pasado 21 de febrero para garantizar la repostulación de nuestro hermano Evo Morales. Mostrando la unidad inquebrantable del pueblo boliviano para seguir construyendo la Patria.

Que, La restauración del neoliberalismo que sufren los pueblos de países vecinos y hermanos como Argentina y Brasil, deben ser enfrentados a través de una acción internacional conjunta de los movimientos sociales de Bolivia con sus pares de Sudamérica.

POR TANTO:

La Dirección Nacional del Movimiento al Socialismo - Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos MAS–IPSP, en estricto cumplimiento a la ley de partidos políticos y el estatuto orgánico en su Art. 15 convocan:

AL 9no CONGRESO NACIONAL ORDINARIO DEL MOVIMIENTO AL SOCIALISMO-INSTRUMENTO POLÍTICO POR LA SOBERANÍA DE LOS PUEBLOS MAS – IPSP

LUGAR Y FECHA:

EL Congreso Nacional Ordinario se realizará los días 15, 16 y 17 de diciembre de 2016 en el Departamento de Santa Cruz, en instalaciones del Coliseo Plurinacional de la ciudad de Montero a partir de horas 08:00 a.m.

TEMARIO:

1.- Inauguración del magno congreso ordinario, sujeto al programa especial. (10:00AM)
2.- Control de asistencia.
3.- Conformación de la Policía Congresal
4.- Conformación de comisión de poderes
5.- Elección y posesión del presídium
6.- Informe de la Dirección Nacional cesante.
7.- Conformación de Comisiones.

- Comisión Orgánica
- Comisión Política

"Por una Bolivia Digna, Soberana y Productiva"

Calle Luis Fernando Jemio N° 1549 esq. Casimiro Corrales - Zona Miraflores
Teléfono/fax (591)2152279 - (591-2)2119051
Sitio Web: www.masbolivia.bo • e-mail: masipsp.bo@gmail.com • La Paz - Bolivia



MOVIMIENTO AL SOCIALISMO
INSTRUMENTO POLÍTICO POR LA SOBERANIA DE LOS PUEBLOS
DIRECCIÓN NACIONAL MAS - IPSP

- Comisión Económica
- Comisión Política Internacional
- Comisión Agenda Patriótica 2025- Bicentenario

8.- Informe de comisiones al pleno
9.- Elección y Posesión del Tribunal de Honor
10.- Elección y Posesión del nuevo directorio de la Dirección Nacional del MAS-IPSP.
11. Clausura

PARTICIPANTES:

- Presidente del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia Evo Morales Ayma
- Vicepresidentes del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia Álvaro García Linera
- Ministras y Ministros
- Viceministros y Viceministras
- Senadoras, Senadores, Diputadas y Diputados
- Gobernadores
- Asambleistas Departamentales
- Alcaldesas, Alcaldes, Concejales y concejalas.

DELEGADOS TITULARES:

Central Obrera Boliviana COB	20 delegados
Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB)	200 delegados
Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Indigenas Originarias Campesinas Bartolina Sisa	200 delegados
Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia (CSIB)	200 delgados
Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Mujeres de Bolivia (CSCIMB)	50 delegados
Concejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas de Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ)	100 delegados
Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB)	100 delegados
Confederación de Jubilados Rentistas de Bolivia	100 delegados
Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores Luz-Fuerza Telecomunicaciones, Agua Gas de Bolivia	100 delegados
Confederación Nacional de Maestros Rurales de Bolivia CONMERB	100 delegados

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INSTRUMENTO POLÍTICO POR LA SOBERANIA DE LOS PUEBLOS

DIRECCIÓN NACIONAL MAS - IPSP

Confederación de trabajadores de Educación Urbana de Bolivia CTEUB	100 delegados
Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores en Construcción de Bolivia	100 delegados
Federación Nacional de Cooperativas Mineras FENCOMIN	100 delegados
Confederación transporte Federado de Bolivia	100 delegados
Confederación de Transporte libre	100 delegados
Confederación de Trabajadores Fabriles de Bolivia	100 delegados
Coordinadora Nacional de Gremiales de Bolivia	100 delegados
Confederación de Panificadores de Bolivia	100 delegados
Confederación Nacional de la Micro y Pequeña Empresa (CONAMyPE)	100 delegados
PLANE	100 delegados
Federación de Trabajadores Petroleros	100 delegados
Confederación Nacional Vendedores de Periódicos	100 delegados
Confederación Nacional de Constructores	100 delegados
Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FSTMB)	100 delegados
Federación Nacional de Estibadores de Bolivia	100 delegados
Confederación de Trabajadores Artesanos	100 delegados
Juventudes MAS-IPSP	100 delegados

Direcciones Departamentales del MAS-IPSP:

La Paz, Cochabamba y Santa Cruz	300 delegados
Chuquisaca, Potosí, Oruro y Tarija	250 delegados
Beni y Pando	200 delegados

"Por una Bolivia Digna, Soberana y Productiva"

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MAS IPSP

MOVIMIENTO AL SOCIALISMO

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INVITADOS ESPECIALES:

- Embajada de la República de Cuba
- Embajada de la República Popular de China
- Embajada Bolivariana de Venezuela
- Embajada de la República de Nicaragua
- Embajada de la República de Ecuador
- Embajada de la República de El Salvador
- Embajada de la República Islámica de Irán
- Embajada de la República de Rusia
- Embajada de la República del Perú
- Embajada de la República de Panamá

NOTA. - Todos los asistentes al Magno Congreso deberán traer sus respectivos estandartes, wiphalas y banderas, conjuntos musicales y danza autóctonas.

Los gastos de pasajes y alimentación correrán por cuenta de cada delegado al Magno Congreso.

Es dado en la ciudad de La Paz, a los catorce días del mes de octubre de dos mil dieciséis años.

Leónida Zurita Vargas
STRIA. DE REL. INTERNACIONALES
DIRECCIÓN NACIONAL
MAS - IPSP

Víctor Morales Ruiz
DIRECCIÓN NACIONAL
MAS - IPSP
COMISIÓN POLÍTICA

Julio Huaraya C.
COMISIÓN POLÍTICA
MAS - IPSP

Herminia Choquetarqui Coronel
SECRETARÍA GENERO Y GENERACIONAL
COMISIÓN ECONÓMICA
Dirección Nacional del MAS - IPSP

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