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The Shaping of Empire: History Writing and Imperial Identity in Early Modern Spain

By

Michael Andrew Gonzales

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Committee in charge:

Professor Thomas Dandeleit, Chair

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Abstract

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Previous studies on politics and history writing in early modern Europe have focused on how early modern monarchs commissioned official royal histories that served to glorify the crown and its achievements. These works discuss the careers of royal historians and their importance at court, and examine how the early modern crown controlled history writing. In the case of Spain, scholars have argued that Spanish monarchs, particularly Philip II, strictly controlled the production of history writing by censoring texts, destroying and seizing manuscripts, and at times restricting history writing to authorized historians. Modern scholars have largely avoided analyzing the historical studies themselves, and have ignored histories written by non-royal historians.

My dissertation broadens the discussion by examining a variety of histories written by royal historians and authors from outside of the court, including clerics, bureaucrats, and military officers, motivated to write histories by their concern over Spain's recent imperial policies and campaigns. Their discussion of important events in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Americas uncovers the historical significance of empire as a concept, legacy, and burden during the rise and decline of Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. My analysis of these works explores the uses of history writing as political commentary and as a platform for the expression of national, regional, and imperial identities.

The historians covered in this dissertation weigh in on the crown's past and present policies, and their texts reveal insights into the political culture of early modern Spain. Many of the authors covered in this study glorify the might of the Spanish monarchy and its status as the protector of the Catholic Church, and they celebrate Spain's wars against Protestants in Europe and the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, some Spanish historians rejected this imperial triumphalism, contrary to the view commonly expressed in modern scholarship. Non-royal histories of Philip II's controversial intervention in the French intervention, for example, reveal an important evolution in thinking about Spain's imperial legacy, demonstrating a shift from glorification of empire characteristic of royal histories penned during Philip II's reign, to a more sober assessment in the early seventeenth century, that includes recommendations for fewer military interventions abroad in favor of protecting Spain and its empire. This critical slant was also found in colonial Latin American history writing during the reign of Philip III. The famous mestizo historian Garcilaso de la Vega El Inca used his work to criticize colonial

policies enacted under Philip II and advocate for reforms in the imperial administration of the New World.

My findings alter conventional wisdom about the thrust of history writing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which has emphasized contemporary historians' universal praise of Philip II and his campaigns. Moreover, the multiple print runs of these histories, which passed through royal and Inquisitorial censors, reveals that readers took a keen interest in the discussion and suggests wider concern over Spain's imperial policies. By analyzing royal and non-royal histories, we discover a critical discourse among historians on Spain's past, present, and future, and find evidence that the crown and the Church permitted a freer expression of political views than previously argued.

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Introduction

Since ancient times, scribes, chroniclers, prophets and historians have written texts meant to shape our understanding of the past and to influence politics, society, religion, philosophy, and culture, frequently by celebrating the actions and thinking of rulers. These texts include iconic histories such as those by Herodotus and Tacitus, and the Old and New Testaments which have shaped our understanding of history, culture and religion. The Renaissance brought about a renewed appreciation for Greek and Roman cultural achievement, and the invention of the printing press enhanced the ability of religious reformers, philosophers, monarchs and their spokesmen to convey information and analysis to a wider audience. The Reformation, the discovery of the New World, Christendom's clash with the Ottomans in the Mediterranean, rivalries among Catholic and Protestant princes, among other things, were urgent issues that were contested on the battlefield as well as in books, pamphlets, and broadsides.

During the sixteenth century, Spain was at the center of these developments. The exploitation of New World silver made Spain the richest empire in the world, and gave the Spanish monarchy the resources to defend dynastic interests and to expand its political influence in Europe and beyond. The reign of Philip II (1555-1598) is commonly seen as the highpoint of the Spanish imperial enterprise. During his long rule the Prudent King definitively put an end to French pretensions over Italy, repelled the Ottoman Empire from the western Mediterranean, solidified Spanish control in Italy, and combated Protestantism both inside and outside of his domains. Beyond the confines of Europe Philip II reformed the colonial administration of the Americas and oversaw the expansion of Spanish power into the Philippines. Philip II's acquisition of the kingdom of Portugal and his far-flung colonial holdings in Asia and Africa in 1580 gave birth to an empire of unprecedented size that stretched across the globe.

Nevertheless, signs of the Spanish empire's vulnerability began to appear in the final decades of Philip II's reign. The war against the Dutch rebels, which had begun in 1566, had turned into a quagmire with no end in sight by the late sixteenth century. The famous defeat of the Armada in 1588 was a costly and embarrassing loss for the Spanish crown that emboldened the English Queen Elizabeth I to encourage Francis Drake and others to undertake daring attacks against Spain and her colonies. Philip II's decision to intervene in the longstanding French Wars of Religion to prevent the Protestant Henry of Navarre from inheriting the throne proved to be another expensive and largely fruitless campaign. In spite of the lucre flowing from the Americas the Spanish crown often had great difficulty funding these multiple wars, and on several occasions Philip II was forced to declare bankruptcy to his bankers.

Broadly speaking, this project attempts to uncover the various ways that early modern Spanish historians treated Philip II and his monumental imperial enterprise in their texts. The focus will be on histories of the crown's recent wars written by Spaniards in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. These historians ventured into controversial territory as they covered still smoldering conflicts that did not always end well for the Spanish crown. Their works were political commentaries on the state of the Spanish empire that threw into relief the pressing political, military, and economic issues of the day. The shifting depictions of Philip II found in these works reflected broad issues of empire in the early modern world. An analysis of these histories reveals the connection between politics, history writing, and imperial identity in early modern Spain.

In recent years the topic of history writing in the early modern period has generated considerable scholarly interest. For example, Anthony Grafton's *What Was History?: The Art of History in Early Modern Europe*, traces the development and evolution of the historical arts. He

defines the *ars historica* as a new set of rules for the critical writing and reading of history that emphasized the importance of a primary source's credibility and internal consistency. Grafton also notes that historians in the sixteenth and seventeenth century stressed the pedagogical function of history as a tool for teaching prudence and morals to its readers.¹

Historians of early modern Spain have recognized the importance of history writing as a platform to advance religious, political, and imperial goals. Spanish chroniclers in the sixteenth century drew upon ancient and early medieval sources of dubious authenticity to establish the canonical narrative that Catholicism in Spain was established in the first century with the arrival of Santiago (St. James). The Santiago legend not only allowed these historians to celebrate Spain's Christian Roman past, but also to emphasize their kingdom's special confessional status in Christendom during the height of the Counter-Reformation.²

History writing also formed a key component of the Imperial Renaissance which flourished in Spain. Spanish historians of the discovery and conquest of the Americas frequently invoked Greco-Roman cultural models to elucidate the New World encounter, a process that led to a reevaluation of the classical interpretive framework itself.³ In Europe the works of Livy, Tacitus, and Suetonius served as models for Spanish humanists, who translated these ancient authors and emphasized the importance of their lessons of imperial rule. Spanish historians also advocated Constantine and other great emperors as models for the Spanish crown, and wrote works that portrayed the kings of Spain as the true heirs of the Roman Empire and its imperial grandeur.⁴

The intersection of politics and history writing sheds light on the political culture of the early modern state. A landmark study is Orest Ranum's *Artisans of Glory: Writers and Historical Thought in Seventeenth-Century France*. Ranum discusses the careers of French historians who obtained the appointment of royal historiographers in the courts of Henry IV, Louis XIII, and Louis XIV. The book describes how these historians exalted the *gloire* of the French monarchy while fashioning their own reputations, careers at the court, and identities as scholars. While Ranum concedes that their histories likely had little influence on royal policy, he argues that these writers played an important role in influencing and shaping the concept of the state and the role of the prince in French political culture.⁵

More recently, Richard L. Kagan's *Clio and the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain* analyzes the importance of the office of royal historian under the Spanish Hapsburgs, and the ways in which monarchs used history writing to glorify the crown. Tracing the origins of Spanish history writing to the Christian kings of Asturias in the ninth century, Kagan writes that a turning point came during the 13th century when the Castilian monarch Alfonso X commissioned vernacular histories of his reign that legitimized his rule

¹ Anthony Grafton, *What was History?: The Art of History in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 60-68.

² Katherine Van Liere, "Renaissance Chroniclers and the Apostolic Origins of Spanish Christianity," in *Sacred History: Uses of the Christian Past in the Renaissance World*, ed. by Katherine Van Liere, Simon Dutchfield, and Howard Louthan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 121, 124, 136.

³ David Lupher, *Romans in a New World: Classical Models in Sixteenth-Century Spanish America* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 321.

⁴ Dandeleet, "An Imperial Renaissance," in *The Renaissance World*, ed. by John Jeffries Martin (New York: Routledge, 2007), 318, 322. *Spanish Rome, 1500-1700* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 80-2.

⁵ Orest Ranum, *Artisans of Glory: Writers and Historical Thought in Seventeenth-Century France* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 336.

amidst a noble rebellion.⁶ Official histories reached a new significance during the Renaissance. Monarchs placed stronger emphasis on their temporal achievements and the value of dynastic reputation within an international context, while the advent of the printing press facilitated the dissemination of the histories. By the reign of the Catholic Monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella (1479-1512), history writing had become an essential part of the crown's propaganda machine.⁷

Kagan's narrative largely focuses on Philip II's sponsorship of histories and the career of the royal historian Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas. In stark contrast to his father Charles V, who commissioned a relative multitude of histories of his reign, Philip II was initially reluctant to sanction histories on his rule for fear of revealing potentially damaging information to Spain's enemies. However, as the state of the Spanish empire became threatened during the later years of his reign, Philip II commissioned Herrera to write histories that defended his policies and reputation as a historical actor.⁸ As both the *cronista del rey* (chronicler of the king) and the *cronista mayor de las Indias* (chronicler of the Indies) Herrera produced histories of recent events that glorified the Spanish monarchy's campaigns in Europe and celebrated its achievements in the New World.⁹ Herrera's career as royal historian would extend into the reign of Philip IV. Kagan argues that the Spanish crown exercised a heavy hand in the production of history writing by censoring texts, intimidating historians, destroying and seizing manuscripts, and restricting history writing to authorized scholars.

Ranum and Kagan provide revealing insights into the political uses of history writing by monarchs during the early modern period. Both authors focus on official royal histories and historians, and they concede that non-royal histories lay outside the scope of their analysis. Moreover, these monographs focus mostly on the careers of royal historians as important intellectuals at court, instead of the content, argument and significance of the histories themselves. Ranum argues that the French royal histories, although written by authors from different social and intellectual backgrounds, largely conformed to the same interpretive framework and described the French monarchs in similar ways.¹⁰ For his part, Kagan limits his discussion of royal histories to Herrera's monumental *Historia general del mundo* and *Historia general de los hechos de los castellanos en las islas I tierra firme del mar oceano*, which were his most famous works.

This project broadens the scope of the study of history writing by analyzing a variety of histories written by both royal historians and by historians from outside the court, including clerics, bureaucrats, and military officers. The histories themselves are an important yet largely neglected source for understanding the evolution and debate of Spanish imperial thought. An examination of this diverse group of histories of Spain's imperial entanglements reveals the role of history writing in the construction and negotiation of empire. This study also illuminates the historical significance of empire as a concept, legacy, and burden during the rise and decline of Spain. A dynamic, evolving portrait of empire emerges. In contrast to the royal historiographers discussed by Ranum and Kagan, whose works were bound by static sets of *topoi* and *sententiae* (opinions and commonplaces), the Spanish historians analyzed here wrote from a variety of

⁶ Kagan, 24-5.

⁷ Kagan, 9-10, 46.

⁸ Kagan, 123.

⁹ Kagan, 176.

¹⁰ Ranum, 15.

perspectives and had different agendas.¹¹ These histories reveal fundamental policy debates and intellectual shifts in Spain, its empire, and in Europe.

It is particularly important to examine the works of non-royal historians, who have received little to no attention in modern scholarship. In the first place, these scholars did not operate under the same constraints as their counterparts at court. For example, Pedro de Valencia, Philip III's *cronista general de estos reinos y de las Indias*, hesitated to write a history of Spain's prolonged conflict with the defiant Araucanian Indians for fear that Spain's enemies would exploit it as evidence of the crown's weakness and advance their own claims of superiority.¹² By contrast, Spanish historians not affiliated with the court often wrote critical histories of the monarchy's recent defeats and the implications for Spain's future.

Moreover, early modern Spanish printing records indicate that non-royal histories often sold more books than those penned by royal historians. For example, most of Herrera's histories were only printed once in Madrid.¹³ Royal histories were important as an instrument of royal policy, but they probably did not reach a wide reading public. In contrast, many of the non-royal histories analyzed in this dissertation went through multiple printings in both the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon during the seventeenth century, suggesting that they reached a comparatively wider reading audience.

In addition to analyzing history writing's uses as a tool to glorify the early modern state, this project explores other lines of inquiry related to politics and the practice of history. The penning of historical works played a significant role in the formation of national identity in early modern Spain. Histories served as an important platform for the articulation of an emerging Spanish national identity as well as discourses of regional patriotism that challenged a national or collective framework. Spanish historians also used their texts to frame, analyze, and demonize the religious and cultural other, who were the adversaries of the crown in the construction and maintenance of national and imperial projects. Perhaps most importantly, history writing was not a static form and did not always glorify the Spanish monarchy, imperial policy, or suggest royal infallibility. Rather it tended to reflect the course of historical events in which Spain served as a key historical actor, and to discuss key turning points that reflected Spanish reverses and poor policy decisions. In particular, during the reign of Philip III (1598-1621) non-royal historians used their analysis of historical events to explain what went wrong and to suggest shifts in policy that would benefit the monarchy and its empire.

Thus, a close reading of historical texts from the period identifies the emergence of history writing as critique of royal policy and, a fortiori, reveals the type of criticism that the crown and its censors were willing to accept. Moreover, these histories also provide insight into the evolution of political discourse among royal and non-royal historians about Spain's imperial legacy and demonstrate an important shift from the glorification of the empire characteristic of royal historians in the late sixteenth century, to a more sober assessment of the imperium by non-royal historians in the early seventeenth century.

The Spanish crown's intervention in the French Wars of Religion looms particularly large in this inquiry. Philip II's war against Henry of Navarre was one of the most controversial and aggressive campaigns of his reign. The Prudent King's order to send the Army of Flanders into France and his campaign to make his daughter the queen of France shocked Europe and led Spain's enemies to conclude that the Spanish crown had territorial designs on the entire continent.

¹¹ Ranum, 20. Kagan, 174-5, 178, 184.

¹² Kagan, 197.

¹³ Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano*, vol. 5 (Barcelona: Libreria Palau, 1951), 582.

The event proved to be a polarizing event in Spain itself. Histories of the intervention reveal that the conflict threw into relief contrasting attitudes towards empire in the Spanish kingdoms, including detailed discussion of how the intervention weakened Spain's hold on Flanders and fed the imperial ambitions of the Protestant Dutch. These works are ripe territory for uncovering changes in Spain's imperial identity at the start of the seventeenth century.

Chapter 1 "History Writing, Spanish Triumphalism, and the French Wars of Religion" sets the stage by discussing Spanish histories written during the height of the intervention in the French Civil Wars, namely Pedro Cornejo de la Pedrosa's *Compendio y breve relación de la Liga y confederación Francesa* and Gregorio López Madera's *Excelencias de la monarchia y reyno de España*. These texts reflect the controversial nature of the conflict, offer intense criticism of the French, express severe doubt over the sincerity of Henry IV's conversion to Catholicism, and advance interesting views of imperial triumphalism and anti-French rhetoric. While not written by royal historians, these histories nonetheless defend the Spanish crown's controversial involvement in France and assert Spain's unrivaled imperial superiority on the world stage.

Chapter 2 "History Writing in the Service of the Crown" discusses official history writing in the context of the French Wars of Religion and royal historians' response to its failed policies in France. It examines Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas's *Historia de los sucesos de Francia desde el año 1585, que comenzó la liga católica, hasta el fin de 1594*, which he published the same year that Philip II was forced to reach a peace with Henry IV. Herrera's work is a prime example of history writing in the service of the crown, as the royal historian labors to repair the monarchy's tarnished international image at a time when it needed this damage control the most.

Chapter 3 "The Two-Faced King" explores questions of alterity and identity in non-royal histories of the French Wars of Religion written in the aftermath of the conflict. These works are Luis de Bavia's *Tercera y quarta parte de la historia pontifical y general*, Diego de Villalobos y Benavides's *Comentarios de las cosas sucedidas en los Países Baxos de Flandes desde el año de 1594 hasta el de 1598*, and Fray Marcos de Guadalajara y Javier's *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica*. In a marked departure from both Herrera and sixteenth-century Spanish historians, these early seventeenth-century authors do not demonize Henry IV and the French but offer critiques of reason of state politics and the complex political relationship between France and Spain. This chapter explores the political implications of these changing depictions.

Chapter 4 "A New Vision of Empire" continues to examine the political themes found in the histories of Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier. These two historians cast a critical eye towards Philip II's failed enterprise in France and its impact on Spain and its empire. These authors use their works to advance a striking political message that warned of Spain's growing political and military vulnerability and advocated for a change in imperial policy.

Chapter 5 "Victory in Defeat" covers how history writing reflected questions of national identity in early modern Spain. The growing criticism in Europe of Spanish military actions sparked a prideful articulation of Spanish national identity in the histories of Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides. However, this understanding of national identity was far from uniform, as the Castilian historians Bavia and Villalobos y Benavides advanced a very different understanding of the Spanish nation than the Aragonese historian Guadalajara y Javier.

Chapter 6 "History Writing and Imperial Rivalry in the Mediterranean" discusses the relation between history writing and imperial identity within the context of the long-standing conflict with the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean in the sixteenth and early seventeenth

centuries. Using early modern Orientalism as a starting theoretical framework, this chapter examines how Pedro de Salazar's *Hispania Victrix* and Luis Cabrera de Córdoba's *Historia de Felipe II, Rey de España* dehumanized the Ottoman Turks and their Berber allies as a religious and cultural "other." These distorted depictions in turn provide a revealing look into notions of Spanish triumphalism and imperial supremacy in the early modern period.

Chapter 7 "Peru and the Paths of Empire" turns to history writing in colonial Latin America and provides a new reading of Garcilaso de la Vega El Inca's *Royal Commentaries and General History of Peru*. While past studies have cast the mestizo historian as an anti-colonialist or an early creole patriot, this chapter places Garcilaso and his history within the reformist climate of early seventeenth-century Spain. Like many other historians covered in this dissertation, Garcilaso uses his history as a platform to call for a reassessment of empire during the reign of Philip III.

Through this analysis of the above nine histories this dissertation offers insights into the intellectual and political purposes of history writing, thus revealing important shifts in thinking on fundamental political, intellectual, and military questions of the period, including Spain's imperial legacy. It demonstrates that the end of the reign of Philip II was an important juncture in the use of history writing as critique of royal policies, particularly concerning the empire and its future. The dissertation also uncovers the emergence of non-royal historians as articulate voices of criticism within an arena of political discourse of imperial policy. These histories and their authors reflected important views of national identity, regional interests, cultural and religious assessments of Spain's imperial rivals, and patriotic appeals for the necessity of administrative reform. Historians from a variety of backgrounds emerged as important agents of empire, contributing to debates central to Spain's place in European and imperial history.

Chapter 1 Spanish Triumphalism and the French Wars of Religion

Introduction

This chapter examines how Spanish historians in the late sixteenth century wrote about and interpreted the Spanish crown's intervention in the French Wars of Religion. Philip II's decision to send the Army of Flanders into the kingdom of France in order to help the Catholic League was one of the most controversial and costly acts of the Prudent King's reign. An analysis of the histories of the intervention written while the conflict was still raging provides a revealing glimpse into the Spanish imperial *mentalité* at the close of the sixteenth century. By looking at how these historians treated the ongoing war in France one can shed light on the ideological underpinnings and consequences of imperium, and help uncover what possession of a global empire meant to early modern Spaniards.

Specifically, this chapter analyzes Pedro Cornejo de la Pedrosa's *Compendio y breve relación de la Liga y confederación Francesa* from 1592, and Gregorio López Madera's 1596 work *Excelencias de la monarchia y reyno de España*. Cornejo and López Madera champion Philip II's contentious war against Henry of Navarre and advance a triumphalist vision of Spanish imperial power. Both historians share a polemical and anti-French viewpoint characterized by hostility not only toward the former Huguenot Henry IV and his supporters, but also a critical view of the Catholic League allies of the Spanish crown as well. Cornejo and López Madera argue that Spain had a noble duty to intervene in France, and they frame Philip II's controversial involvement in French affairs along providentialist and universalist lines. Their works are unabashed celebrations of Spanish hegemonic supremacy that reveal the charged and aggressive nature of imperial triumphalism in Spain during the final decade of Philip II's reign.

Broadly defined, Spanish triumphalism is an exalted and mystical view of Spain's imperial power which imbues the Spanish monarchy with a providentially guided mission to spread and protect the Catholic faith. R. Po-Chia Hsia writes that Spain was emblematic of the triumphant Catholicism of the Counter-Reformation, and the Spanish crown considered itself favored by God with religious orthodoxy at a time when Protestantism was sweeping Europe. According to Hsia, Spanish Catholicism reflected the immense authority and elevated self-image of the Spanish monarchy, which assumed the role of the staunchest defender of the Church.¹⁴ Catholicism also comprised the core of early modern "Spanish" identity, as most Spaniards exemplified *Hispanidad* as the "most perfect form of Catholicism," and viewed Spain's empire as God's will on earth.¹⁵

The providential mission of the Spanish monarchy was rooted in the *Reconquista* and became more clearly defined in history writing beginning with fifteenth-century chroniclers, who hailed the kings of Castile as divinely chosen to lead the fight against Islam.¹⁶ This rhetoric of Spanish messianism came to be particularly pronounced during the reigns of Catholic Monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella, who oversaw such dramatic exploits as the conquest of Granada and the discovery and colonization of the New World. In turn, Charles V's election as Holy Roman

¹⁴ R. Po-chia Hsia, *The World of Catholic Renewal, 1540-1770* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 47-8.

¹⁵ Hsia, 53.

¹⁶ D.A. Brading, *Mexican Phoenix: Our Lady of Guadalupe, Image and Tradition across Five Centuries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 34.

Emperor in 1519 affirmed the power and authority of the Hapsburgs, with the Spanish kingdoms occupying an increasingly central place in the imperial orbit.¹⁷ Indeed, the reign of Charles V inspired a wave of universalist imperial writing, reflective of the emperor's vast empire and the vision of an united Christendom under his rule. Intellectuals and statesmen such as Gattinara and Vitoria sought to make this ideal of universal empire a tangible reality.¹⁸ The ideal of a universal empire faltered politically, however, and Charles had to divide his titles between his son Philip, who became King of Spain, and his brother Ferdinand, who became Holy Roman Emperor. While Charles V did muster the rhetoric of universal empire in his failed attempt to elect his son Philip as king of the Romans, the division of his empire is commonly seen as shattering the geographic and political possibility of the establishment of a universal monarchy.¹⁹

Although the rhetoric of explicit imperial universalism became less pronounced in Spain, Spanish triumphalism arguably became more pronounced and forceful during the reign of the Catholic King Philip II. In other words, as the dream of a universal Hapsburg imperium appeared to die away, many Spanish statesmen and intellectuals expounded upon the unrivaled superiority of the Spanish monarchy and its providential destiny as the champion and guardian of the Catholic faith. Indeed, with Philip II's rule the Spanish monarchs came to be the "de facto military protector of the Papal State and Rome's most powerful foreign financial patron."²⁰ In the Papal court Philip II's diplomats successfully lobbied for the recognition of the Spanish crown's supreme place of precedence over the French crown during the Council of Trent.²¹ Similarly, Spanish humanists argued that Spain was the true heir to the Roman Empire, thus exalting the Spanish empire's imperial grandeur and cementing the Spanish monarchy's role as "the contemporary protector and reformer of the city."²²

Some historians have argued that Philip II himself fully believed in the messianic vision of the Spanish monarchy. For example, Geoffrey Parker asserts that Philip II believed that he had been chosen by God to do His work, and that God would intervene to help him succeed.²³ Parker also believes that Spaniards shared their monarch's messianic vision, as statesmen, artists and writers frequently attributed Philip II's achievements to divine favor, and portrayed a trinity of Philip II, God, and Spain as sharing the same goals.²⁴ While other historians, such as Henry Kamen, have disagreed with Parker's assessment that a sense of messianism dominated Philip II's outlook, an aggressive foreign policy and a triumphalist rhetoric of Spanish Catholic militancy did characterize much of the Prudent King's rule.²⁵

The final decade of Philip II's reign in particular is an interesting moment in Spanish imperial thought. While the Spanish crown came under increasing economic and military strain at this time, it was also the apogee of Philip II's aggressive attempts to defend the Catholic Church beyond the confine of his domains. Although the Great Armada of 1588 stands out as

¹⁷ Stanley G. Payne, *Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984) 45.

¹⁸ Carina Johnson, "Some Peculiarities of Empire in the Early Modern Era," in *Politics and Reformations: Histories and Reformations. Essays in Honor of Thomas A. Brady, Jr.* ed. by Christopher Ocker (Boston: Brill, 2007). 493.

¹⁹ Johnson, 510.

²⁰ Thomas James Dandeleit, *Spanish Rome* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 57.

²¹ Dandeleit, 62.

²² Dandeleit, 81.

²³ Geoffrey Parker, *The World Is Not Enough: The Imperial Vision of Philip II of Spain* (Waco, Texas: Markham Press Fund, 2001), 29-30.

²⁴ Parker, 47-9.

²⁵ See Henry Kamen's *Philip of Spain*, especially Chapter 8.

the most well known example of this militant intervention, Philip II had actively supported Catholic resistance in Ireland and Japan. He also continued his efforts to support the English Catholics after the destruction of the Armada.²⁶ The campaign to support the Catholic League is another vivid example of aggressive Spanish intervention during the final years of Philip II's reign, as the prolonged war against Henry of Navarre was arguably just as spectacular, and, in fact, more costly than the infamous Great Armada.²⁷

In the midst of this constant warfare, history writing was frequently used as a medium to evaluate and debate the meaning of empire in the early modern Spanish world. Given the controversial and aggressive nature of Philip II's intervention in the French Wars of Religion, Spanish histories of the civil war are particularly ripe territory for exploring the contours of imperial triumphalism. In addition to looking at how Spanish historians from the late-sixteenth century depicted the French Wars of Religion and justified Philip II's entry into the conflict, this chapter examines how these figures portrayed the Spanish empire's overall power and mission. Pedro Cornejo's *Compendio y breve relación de la Liga y confederación Francesa* views the Spanish monarchy in messianic terms and depicts the Spanish crown as the savior of Catholicism, thus strongly resembling the Spanish Catholic triumphalism described by such scholars as R. Po-Chia Hsia and Geoffrey Parker. Similarly, the *Excelencias de la monarchia y reyno de España* of Gregorio López Madera offers an expansive and lavish vision of the unrestrained scope and grandeur of the Spanish empire. There are noticeable undertones of universalism in Madera's belief that that Spain had the unquestioned place of supreme precedence in the world. In essence both historians believe that Spanish imperial power was unrivaled, and they argue that the Spanish crown possessed an unmistakable mandate to become involved in the French Wars of Religion.

Given the complexity of the French Civil Wars, an overview of Spain's involvement in France is useful. As long-time rivals the French and Spanish crowns had been engaged in a series of dynastic wars over holdings in Italy since the late fifteenth-century. Termed the Italian Wars, the French never made any effective territorial gains in these costly conflicts. Philip II himself came to the Spanish throne in 1556 while Henry II was attempting to once again reassert French control over the Italian Peninsula.

One particularly stunning example of the still smoldering enmity between the kingdoms of Spain and France in the mid-sixteenth century is a treatise addressed to Philip II by the priest Frex de Torres. An unpublished manuscript written while the young Philip was also serving as king of England in 1557, Torres urges his king to conquer France. The cleric writes that for many years France has waged war on Spain, and argues that the rival kingdom represented a major obstacle for peace in Europe, a prospect that in turn would strike fear into the Ottoman Empire.²⁸ In his view the French could simply not be trusted, since the French crown was in a good position to attack at any time Philip II's domains in England, Milan, and Burgundy.²⁹ As

²⁶ Javier Ruiz Ibáñez and Gaetano Sabatini, "Monarchy as Conquest: Violence, Social Opportunity, and Political Stability in the Establishment of the Hispanic Monarchy," in *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 81, no. 3 (September 2009), 502. Ruiz Ibáñez and Sabatini claim that Philip actively tried to expand the Spanish monarchy through these endeavors.

²⁷ Philip II estimated that the total cost of the Armada was 10 million ducats, while the upkeep of the Army of Flanders in the 1590s cost 3 million ducats annually. Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 87, 269.

²⁸ Frex de Torres, *Discurso de Frex de Torres, Canonigo de Palencia, sobre la conquista de Francia al rey nuestro señor*, (Manuscript Section of the Escorial Library: III-20), 5.

²⁹ Frex de Torres, 9.

such, Torres calls for the Spanish crown to eliminate the French threat entirely and conquer the kingdom. Indeed, he goes as far as to say that if Philip II followed his advice then a large part of France would easily be subjected to the king, and that eventually Spain could conquer France just as Greece had conquered Troy.³⁰

While Philip II himself never acted upon this grandiose plan to vanquish France at the beginning of his reign, Frex de Torres writing is indicative of a striking and polemical anti-French sentiment in Spain in the mid-sixteenth century. According to the priest's assessment, France was a rogue kingdom that posed a great danger to both Spain and Christendom as a whole. Such a peril could only be stopped through dramatic military action. Interestingly, similar alarming assertions will once again emerge in the 1590s writings of Cornejo and Madera during the intervention in the French Wars of Religion.

France had long held a central place in Philip II's strategic outlook, and he had attempted to restrain France throughout his rule. He considered the kingdom a more direct threat than England.³¹ Although the dynastic contest over Italy would come to an end early into Philip II's reign with the signing of the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559 with Henry II, France would still pose a danger to the Spanish empire.³² Henry II's death in a freak jousting accident later that same year during a celebration of the marriage between his daughter Elizabeth of Valois and Philip II marked the effective beginning of a period of political and religious chaos in the kingdom. With the Valois monarchy weakened, French Protestants, or Huguenots, jockeyed for power with Catholic nobles, who organized themselves into the Catholic League.

On the one hand, the weakened condition of France in the second half of the sixteenth century further secured the pre-eminence of the Spanish crown in European affairs during Philip II's reign.³³ While the unrest in France arguably benefited the international balance of power in favor of Spain, Philip II still regarded the instability in the rival kingdom with grave concern, as he worried that the chaos in France could affect the Netherlands or even Spain.³⁴ Particularly troubling was the growing power of the Calvinist Huguenots. Even some Protestant nobles had obtained high positions of power at this time, with the Admiral of France Gaspard de Coligny perhaps being the most notable example. With this rise in Huguenot power in turn came the perennial fear of a Huguenot takeover and the eventual emergence of a united Protestant front consisting of France, England, and the rebellious Dutch.³⁵ The infamous St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre, orchestrated by the Queen Mother Catherine de Medici, failed to wipe out the Huguenots and further fanned the flames of the religious and factional conflict in France.³⁶

In terms of the Spanish responses to the conflict, Philip II attempted to contain the crisis in France through diplomatic channels, and he and his ambassadors repeatedly urged the weakened French crown to stamp out the Huguenots. As the Wars of Religion intensified in the mid-1580s the Spanish crown also began sending large sums of money to the Catholic League. Matters came to a head with the chaotic rule of Henry III, who struck out against the Leaguers and assassinated their leaders, the duke and cardinal of Guise. In response to this controversial act a Catholic fanatic assassinated Henry III. This situation was especially alarming for Philip II

³⁰ Frex de Torres, 30.

³¹ Kamen, 279.

³² Cateau-Cambrésis effectively guaranteed the Spanish crown's dynastic grip in Italy. Patrick Williams, *Philip II*, 30-31.

³³ Williams, 32.

³⁴ Kamen, 92.

³⁵ Kamen, 140.

³⁶ Williams, 131.

due to the fallen king's inability to produce an heir, leaving the Huguenot leader Henry of Navarre, the Prince of Bearne, next in line to the throne under Salic Law.³⁷

After Henry III's death Philip II stepped up his financial support for the Catholic League, which staunchly opposed Henry of Navarre's claim to the throne. The situation became critical in 1590 when Henry's army laid siege to Paris. At that juncture, Philip II ordered the Army of Flanders, commanded by Duke of Parma, to invade France, lift the siege, and defeat Henry of Navarre. This intervention proved controversial in Europe. Spain's enemies feared Philip II's dynastic ambitions, particularly after he made the case that his daughter Isabella Clara Eugenia, the granddaughter of Henry II of France, deserved the throne. This inventive argument ran counter to Salic Law and fed fears of Philip's imperial ambitions.³⁸

While the Duke of Parma successfully lifted the siege of Paris, Spain became bogged down in France. Henry of Navarre proved to be a gifted military commander, and the Catholic League's strongholds were systematically conquered. Then, in a celebrated maneuver, Henry IV converted to Catholicism in 1593, drawing many Catholic nobles to his side. After the Vatican recognized Henry's conversion, Philip's religious justification for intervention evaporated. Henry was crowned Henry IV, and he quickly declared war against Spain. Henry used anti-Spanish sentiment to consolidate his hold on power, and the conflict finally ended in 1598 with all Spanish forces expelled from France. Philip II spent huge sums of money and exhausted his forces in a failed attempt to prevent Henry of Navarre from becoming king of France.³⁹

The Greatness of the Spanish empire

Turning to the Spanish histories of this long and brutal conflict, it is important to note that Philip II explicitly forbade any histories of his life to be written while he was still alive, and it was only during the last years of his reign that he granted permission to write a general history of the world that encompassed the time of his rule. During Philip's rule the publishing of histories of contemporary international events came under restriction.⁴⁰ Beyond royally sponsored history, however, there were a handful of non-royal histories from the late sixteenth-century that dealt with Spain and the French Wars of Religion.

These works written during Philip II's active intervention in France vividly reflect the triumphalist Catholic militancy that characterized the Spanish crown's war with Henry of Navarre. Such is the case with Pedro Cornejo's *Compendio y breve relación de la Liga y confederación Francesa*. Cornejo was a member of the Carmelite order and a historian, and he had previously written on the war against the Dutch rebels in Flanders in the 1570s. Cornejo traveled to France following the renewed outbreak of war after the death of Henry III, where he served the Catholic League and wrote tracts in its defense. Cornejo himself was in Paris during Henry of Navarre's siege, and his history provides a gripping account of the battle.⁴¹ The *Compendio y breve relación* was first published in Paris in 1590, and later reprinted in Madrid in 1592.⁴² Predictably, he takes a celebratory view of Philip II's decision to militarily intervene in

³⁷ Williams, 179-80, 213-14.

³⁸ Joseph Perez, *L'Espagne de Philippe II* (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 335. Manuel Fernández Álvarez, *Felipe II y su tiempo* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1998), 587.

³⁹ Perez, 337.

⁴⁰ Richard L. Kagan, *Clio and the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 95, 130.

⁴¹ *Indice biográfico de España, Portugal e Iberoamérica*, ed. by Victor Herrero Mediavilla, (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1986), text-fiche, 232A106, 232B107.

⁴² Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano*, vol. 5 (Barcelona: Antonio Palau, 1950), 108.

the kingdom, and his work a vivid example of Spanish messianic triumphalism and anti-French sentiment of the time.

Cornejo justifies Philip II's intervention in the French Wars of Religion by depicting France as being in an incredibly desperate position in the late 1580s and early 1590s. According to the Carmelite historian, France was once a flourishing kingdom that held a place of precedence in Christendom, but throughout the last decades of the sixteenth century it had been reduced to a state of abject ruin worthy of sadness and pity. He writes that "This change and loss of its [France's] luster was caused by two things: the first and principal was the division of faith and heresies that had arisen in the kingdom, and secondly it was governed by women and youths."⁴³

Cornejo accordingly has an extremely harsh opinion of Henry III. In the opening of his work the Carmelite claims that the last of the Valois monarchs led a miserable and sinful life driven by the pursuit of pleasure, and that the domestic war that engulfed France was in part God's punishment for the king's many moral transgressions.⁴⁴ During the king's troubled reign not only were abbeys and other sacred places profaned by bands of unchecked heretics, but the poor people of France were also administered with little justice and burdened with insufferable royal tributes.⁴⁵ Similarly, Cornejo relates the widely held view amongst Catholics at the time that Henry III's most reprehensible deed was his assassination of the Cardinal de Bourbon, the Duke of Guise.⁴⁶ This act was monstrous not only because it involved the killing of an "anointed pillar of the Church," but also because Henry carried out the murder in such a craven manner. Moreover the monarch was too foolish to foresee the intense anger that the assassination would cause amongst good French Catholics.⁴⁷

This work portrays Henry III as an incompetent and amoral tyrant, and Cornejo does not despair when Henry himself falls victim to assassination. Rather, the monk notes that the king's death occurs on the eve of a victory against the Catholic League in Paris, writing

this King was at the height of his power and with the greatest prosperity and forces of war that he ever thought of bringing together, [and] the most terrible and audacious event (measuring and weighing the matters) that the world has ever seen happened to him. And this was that it got into the head of a poor monk, of the Order of Saint Dominic, named Friar Diego Clemente, of poor and low birth, known to be the son of a vegetable gardener, and so deformed that he was a second Aesop, and one of the least learned and most humble of his convent, to kill the king.⁴⁸

⁴³ "Han causado esta mutación y perdida de su lustre dos cosas: la primera y principal la diuision de fee y heregias que en el se leuantaron, y segunda auer sido gournado por mujeres, y mancebos." Pedro Cornejo de la Pedrosa, *Compendio y breve relación de la Liga y confederación Francesa* (Madrid, 1592), 3.

⁴⁴ Cornejo, 4-5.

⁴⁵ Cornejo, 8.

⁴⁶ Vincent J. Pitts, *Henri IV of France: His Reign and Age* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 136. Williams, 213.

⁴⁷ Cornejo, 32.

⁴⁸ "estando este Rey en el colmo de su desseo, y con la mayor prosperidad y fuerças de guerra que jamás pensó juntar, le aconteció el mas terrible y denodado caso que (medidas y pesadas las cosas) en el mundo jamás se ha visto. Y este fue, q se le metió en cabeza a un pobre religioso, de la orden de santo Domingo, llamado Fray Diego Clemente, de generación pobre y baxa, es a saber hijo de un hortolano, y el de persona tan diforme, q era un segundo Esopo, y de los menos doctos y mas abatidos q en el conuento auia, de matar al Rey." Cornejo, 50.

Later Spanish historians in the seventeenth century writing of the French Wars of Religion deplore Henry's assassination as an act of regicide, despite their largely poor opinion of him. Cornejo, however, notes the poetic justice and irony of the murder. In a sense the king is receiving his just reward, as his life is brought to end by the same craven method used to kill the Cardinal de Bourbon. Moreover, for Cornejo the ignominy of Henry's death is amplified by the fact that his killer Friar Jacques Clemente was a humble and semi-deformed monk. The assassination is almost portrayed as a David and Goliath struggle, as the tyrant at the height of his power is struck down by the meek. Indeed, Cornejo writes that Friar Clemente had the moral backing of his confessors, and that he had firmly believed that he was justly killing a tyrant.⁴⁹

Significantly, the *Compendio y breve relación* offers no eulogies or *encomias* for Henry III and his life. Rather, Cornejo simply mentions that on his deathbed Henry "confessed, took communion, and received the extreme unction, and said words and showing signs of repentance of his past life."⁵⁰ Such treatment of the death of the last of the Valois kings is a stunning indication of the Carmelite's religious and political radicalism. In his view regicide could be justified if the king posed a threat to the Church. This assessment ran counter the Spanish court's own stance on regicide; nor did any Spanish theologians at the time write in favor of murdering monarchs.⁵¹

The *Compendio y breve relación* presents French society torn asunder during the height of the Wars of Religion. Due to the protracted fighting both rich and poor were dying of hunger, and a pestilence had spread throughout nearly the entire land. So many people had perished that the bodies of the dead remained unburied and littered the roads of France.⁵² Cornejo writes that the civil war divided families into warring camps, and the kingdom was burned by "such a dangerous fire of war that we saw brothers against brothers, fathers against children, mothers against husbands: and finally that nobody dared to talk on account of not knowing the allegiance of whom they were speaking with."⁵³ The very social order was unraveling due to a weak king and the contagion of heresy.

Cornejo unsurprisingly is sympathetic towards the Catholic League. He believed that the nobles of the House of Lorraine (the heads of the Catholic League) were far from rebels and traitors; rather they legitimately loved their kingdom and sought to defend the Church and exterminate heresy.⁵⁴ As such, the Leaguers were bulwarks of Catholicism against the insidious attacks of the Huguenots and their *realista* (royalist) allies. Nevertheless, a strong anti-French attitude still pervades this text. For instance, Cornejo writes that while the Leaguer nobles' initial motivations were just, their military campaigns brought about significant destruction due to the natural greed and insolence of French soldiers. As a result of these defects the League's troops often ransacked the countryside and stole money, livestock, and other provisions from unfortunate civilians.⁵⁵ Elsewhere in his history Cornejo calls the French impatient and

⁴⁹ Cornejo, 50.

⁵⁰ "confessado, comulgado, y recebido la extrema Unción, y dicho palabras y mostrando señales de arrepentimiento de su vida pasada." Cornejo, 52.

⁵¹ Kamen, 279.

⁵² Cornejo, 20-21.

⁵³ "un tan peligroso fuego de guerra q veíamos los hermanos contra hermanos, padres contra hijos, mujeres contra sus maridos: y finalmente que nadie osaua hablar por no conocer el pecho y coracon de aquel con quien hablaua." Cornejo, 45.

⁵⁴ Cornejo, 7.

⁵⁵ Cornejo, 43.

choleric.⁵⁶ The French soldiers natural rapaciousness and audacity contributed to their undisciplined behavior, which in turn undermined the efforts of the Catholic League. This negative assessment implies that outside intervention was required to achieve stability in France.

For Cornejo, the growing power of the Prince of Bearne, Henry of Navarre, also served as proof that the kingdom of France needed international help. Cornejo composed his history before Henry of Navarre formally declared his intention to convert to Catholicism, and his history accordingly is reflective of the widespread Catholic hostility felt towards the Huguenot leader and the anxiety over his potential ascension to the throne in the early 1590s. This work characterizes Henry of Navarre as an arch-heretic, a universal enemy of the Church.⁵⁷ Cornejo writes that after it became apparent that Henry of Navarre likely stood to inherit the crown, the Catholic nobles of France repeatedly implored the Prince of Bearne to convert to Catholicism for the good of the kingdom. Henry, however, remained obstinate in his heretical beliefs and refused these requests.⁵⁸ According to Cornejo, “neither the advice of friends, the reprimands of confessors, or the reprimands and excommunication of the Pope himself” were enough to persuade the Huguenot prince from leaving the path of heresy.⁵⁹ The Carmelite historian never considers Henry to be a proper heir to the French crown, and instead writes that after Henry III’s death the good Catholics of the *Parlement* of Paris declared the Cardinal de Bourbon to be the true successor to the throne, dubbing the elderly clergyman Charles X.⁶⁰

Cornejo dehumanizes Henry of Navarre’s army as a marauding force that “executed all manner of cruelties,” and committed an assortment of atrocities against the Church, including the sacking of monasteries and the murder of priests. Significantly, Cornejo writes that the Prince of Bearne’s forces consisted of both heretical French and Protestants from other parts of Europe, most notably the “barbarous” English and Scottish.⁶¹ Indeed, when Henry began fighting for the throne he and the Huguenots implored foreign heretics for aid, which, according to Cornejo arrived from Germany and Britain within a year.⁶² Henry of Navarre’s army symbolized the devious internationalist forces of Protestantism at work. For Cornejo and many of his contemporaries, the struggle for the French crown was more than just a domestic confined to France. Rather, the war was essentially a representation of the battle between orthodoxy and heresy, and at the time that this history was published there was still the danger that France could follow the route of England and be lost to the Church.

In Cornejo’s view Henry of Navarre posed a threat to Europe as a whole. Writing of a convocation of the Catholic League, the Carmelite states “Here was discussed the great harm that would come to Christendom, if any heretical King came to reign in France: because joining his forces with England and the heretics of Germany, not only would the Catholics of France be left insecure, but the surrounding provinces would suffer: such as Flanders Lorraine, Burgundy, and even Spain itself...”⁶³ This provocative statement puts forth a sort of domino theory for

⁵⁶ Cornejo, 68.

⁵⁷ Cornejo, 61.

⁵⁸ Cornejo, 10.

⁵⁹ “ni consejos de amigos, ni reprehensión de confesores, ni la admonición y excomunicacion del mismo Papa” Cornejo, 46.

⁶⁰ Cornejo, 54. Cornejo makes no mention of the possibility of having Philip II’s daughter Isabella Clara Eugenia be made queen of France.

⁶¹ Cornejo, 62-3.

⁶² Cornejo, 14.

⁶³ “Aquí se trato del gran daño que vendría a la Christiandad, si venia a reynar en Francia algún Rey herege: porque juntando sus fuerzas con Inglaterra y hereges de Alemania, no solamente no quedarían seguros los Católicos de

confessional international politics in the sixteenth-century – the fall of France to a Protestant king would endanger surrounding areas, most notably the domains of the Spanish Hapsburgs. Indeed, this view of international relations reflects Philip II's own fears regarding the emergence of a united Protestant front that would spread heresy and gravely threaten his empire.⁶⁴

As such, the *Compendio y breve relación* makes clear that only intervention from Spain could effectively put a stop to the religious and political turmoil that was ravaging France at the end of the sixteenth century. Thus, much like Frex de Torres from the start of Philip II's reign, Cornejo frames the "French problem" as a threat that could only be solved through dramatic and aggressive military action. Importantly, the Carmelite spins the decision to intervene in a manner that highlights Philip II's prudence and restraint, as he writes that the Spanish king was initially reluctant to intervene in France because of an earlier peace agreement he had made with the Valois monarchy. The Carmelite remarks that the Duke of Mayenne and the Duke of Savoy had sent their forces to fight Henry of Navarre, and that Pope Sixtus V himself "worked to achieve this venture, and begged the king of Spain to become involved; but the Catholic King because of the peace treaties that he had sworn with France put off [acting] without publicly interfering in anything."⁶⁵ In this account it is interesting to compare Philip II's deliberativeness with the Protestant princes' quick, affirmative response to Henry of Navarre's request for aid. Indeed, Cornejo believed that Philip had enough reasons to break this peace due to Henry III's behavior.⁶⁶ Yet, rather than serving as an implicit criticism of Philip II's delayed response to the Prince of Bearne's rise in power, the account is a defense of the Prudent King's historical image.

Philip II's ultimate decision to intervene in the French Wars of Religion was one of the most controversial actions of his reign, and the enemies of the Spanish crown interpreted this campaign as an act of wonton aggression.⁶⁷ By portraying Philip as conflicted because of the peace agreement with Henry III, Cornejo is attempting to dispel his king's image as an expansionist warmonger. Indeed, the reader is drawn to compare the integrity of Philip II to the craven and sinful Henry III and the heretical Henry of Navarre.

This of course is not to say that the *Compendio y breve relación* portrays Philip II as being content with his peace agreement and the situation in France. According to Cornejo, the Spanish king secretly held "*mala amistad*" for both the peace treaty and Henry III, and was moved by the pleas of the Papacy and the Catholic League. As such, soon after Henry III's death the Prudent King decided to spring into action, "seeing the matters of the Catholics more entangled than ever before."⁶⁸ In this discussion over Philip II's decision to intervene in France Cornejo reinforces the campaign's religious and political importance. The Carmelite writes that the Prince of Bearne's victory would not only result in the loss of the Catholic Faith in France, but

Francia, pero las prouincias circunuezinias se resentirian: como Flandes, Lorena, Borgoña, y aun la misma España...." Cornejo, 11.

⁶⁴ R.A. Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain: A Study of the Spanish System, 1580-1720* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 27.

⁶⁵ "trabajaua de acordar esta partida, y rogaua a la magestad de España metiesse también la mano en ello: pero el Rey Católico a causa de las pazes q tenía juradas con el de Francia se entretenía sin meterse públicamente en nada." Cornejo, 46-7.

⁶⁶ Cornejo, 61.

⁶⁷ Kamen, 241.

⁶⁸ "viendo las cosas de los Católicos mas enredadas q jamás." Cornejo, 61.

the others [other kingdoms] would be in danger, because this province [France] was like a heart and a military crossroads of Europe: and that in him [Henry of Navarre] it [France] would be lost, left clearly to understand not only by the examples that we have of England, Denmark, Sweden, and other states, where by the nobles had turned their backs on the Church, the Faith had been completely lost in their domains: but also in that the men of today are so inclined to pleasing those that they serve, that not only the knights and courtiers accommodate themselves to the customs of their kings, but even the servants measure their heart according to the will of the master whose aid they hope for: taking advantage of the saying that states, that when the father is a drummer, it is necessary that the children are dancers.⁶⁹

Cornejo espouses his domino theory for the spread of Protestantism in Europe, as he notes the centralized location of France in the continent. Moreover, the Carmelite monk emphasizes that France at the end of the sixteenth-century was on the verge of being lost to the Church, as he views the presence of heresy within a kingdom as a contagion that expands quickly and inexorably from the head, i.e. the king. Following this framework, if the Calvinist Henry of Navarre were to claim the throne, then France would effectively be doomed.

As such, the *Compendio y breve relación* effectively presents the Spanish crown as the savior of Catholicism in France. According to Cornejo, the Prudent king ordered the Duke of Parma and the Army of Flanders to hurry into France not for territorial gain or the expansion of Hapsburg influence, but for the explicit purpose of “preventing the harmful danger and dangerous harm that threatened all of Christendom.”⁷⁰ The Carmelite makes clear that the fate of the Church in France and beyond rested on the shoulders of Philip II. This point is especially apparent in his account of the siege of Paris.

Cornejo himself was present at Henry of Navarre’s attack on the French capital. Given this firsthand experience, his account of the siege is appropriately detailed and polemically charged. The Carmelite writes that Paris was in a precarious situation when the Prince of Bearne set his sights on the city, as its walls were in very poor repair and the reserves of food, water, wine, and other necessities were dangerously low.⁷¹ Yet in spite of these setbacks the defenders of Paris as a whole acted bravely during Henry’s assault.

According to Cornejo, the city could have become “a second Babylon, wherein each one without law, king, nor justice, did what he wanted,” but in spite of this potential chaos the good Catholics of Paris remained steadfast in their resistance against the Prince of Bearne.⁷² The history presents the siege as an incredibly charged moment, as the Carmelite historian writes that Henry of Navarre’s sympathizers in Paris conspired to bring down the city from the inside.⁷³

⁶⁹ “los otros corrian peligro, por ser esta prouincia como un riñón y plaça de armas de la Europa: y que en el se perdería, dexase claramente entender no solo por los exemplos q tenemos de Inglaterra, Dinamarca, Suecia, y otros Estados, donde por auer buuelto los señores las espaldas a la Yglesia, se ha perdido la Fe enteramente en sus señoríos: pero también en que son los hombres el dia de oy tan amigos de complacer juste vel iniuste a los q siruen, q no solo los Caualleros y cortesanos se acomodan a la costumbre de sus Reyes, pero aun hasta los mocos miden su corazón a la medida de la voluntad del amo de quien algún bien esperan: aprovechándose del refrán que dize, que quando el padre es tamborilero, es menester q los hijos sean dançadores.” Cornejo, 61.

⁷⁰ “Por euitar pues este dañoso peligro, y peligroso daño q a la Christiandad uniuersalmente amenacaua.” Cornejo, 61.

⁷¹ Cornejo, 77.

⁷² “una segunda Babylonia, en donde cada uno sin ley, Rey, ni justicia tiraba por donde quería,” Cornejo, 79.

⁷³ Cornejo, 82.

During this time of desperation, reverence for the Catholic faith motivated and sustained the city and its defenders, and Cornejo portrays the Parisian clergy in an especially favorable light. For instance, he writes admirably of the bishop of St. Louis (*San Lis*) who was committed to the defense of the city with his force of armed monks, and he lauds the various preachers who gave hope to the beleaguered populace.⁷⁴

In spite of the efforts of these devout defenders, however, Henry of Navarre's noose around the city tightened as the siege wore on. Cornejo particularly notes the growing starvation of the inhabitants, and as an eyewitness of the siege he relates in graphic detail the city's suffering. He writes that the residents were so starved that they ate the meat and hides of dogs, horses, horses, and other "dirty animals," and were forced to drink contaminated water. "The music that was heard was the shrieks of the poor elderly, women, maidens, and children that called for bread, without anyone to give it to them, nor could anyone help or aid them."⁷⁵ The lack of food had gotten so acute that the Papal legate and the Spanish ambassador Bernardino de Mendoza had to subsist off of morsels. With shock Cornejo relates how he even heard credible reports of 22 children being eaten throughout various parts of the city, stating that he had not read of such a horrible incident occurring since the destruction of Jerusalem.⁷⁶ As such, the siege of Paris was a time of widespread and horrible tribulation for the city. This use of the image of Jerusalem reinforces Cornejo's point that the fight for the city was a holy struggle of monumental importance. His charged account makes no mention of Henry of Navarre's promise of goodwill towards the Parisians and vow to not suppress the Catholic faith if the city surrendered. Nor does he mention how Henry allowed women, children, and clergy to leave the city at one point during the siege.⁷⁷

As it stands, Cornejo's detailed description of the Parisians' intense suffering further justifies his argument concerning the necessity of the Spanish crown's intervention. While in the Carmelite's eyes the conviction of the city's inhabitants and defenders was certainly admirable, the overall message of this work is that the city would have inevitably fallen if the siege had not been lifted through outside help. As such, he portrays the timely arrival of the Duke of Parma as a godsend, and he marvels at Philip II's decision to send his "*lugarteniente*" to relieve Paris, writing that the governor of Flanders "sent men in order to aid Paris, and although Parma abandoned and put his government in danger, he came in person with the forces necessary [to save the city]."⁷⁸ Thus, while he recognizes that Parma put Flanders at risk by coming into France, the Carmelite historian does not see this decision as a liability or an unwise gambit. Rather, he interprets the move as a sign of the Spanish crown's pious commitment to protect the Catholic faith. This dedication is cemented by the quality of the troops sent in the expedition, as Cornejo marvels at the large number of prominent Italian and Spanish soldiers that Parma had in his camp. He writes "all at hand [were] the most valorous and shining soldiers that ever served the king, with other infinite Captains, and valorous soldiers."⁷⁹

⁷⁴ Cornejo, 84, 98.

⁷⁵ "Las músicas que se oían, eran alaridos de pobres viejos, mujeres, doncellas, y niños que pedían pan, sin que nadie se lo diese, ni les pudiese remediar ni socorrer." Cornejo, 96-7.

⁷⁶ Cornejo, 97.

⁷⁷ N.M. Sutherland, *Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion* (Bristol: Elm Bank, 2002), 349.

⁷⁸ "embiasse gente para socorrer a Paris, mas que el mismo abaldonado y metiendo en peligro su gouierno, viniessen en persona con las fuerças neccsarias para ello." Cornejo, 98.

⁷⁹ "todos a una mano los mas valerosos y luzidos soldados que jamas a Rey siruieron, con otros infinitos Capitanes, y valerosos soldados." Cornejo, 100.

Cornejo stresses that Parma's entry with this impressive force into France was of a wholly benevolent character and motivation. He writes that the Catholic League joyously welcomed the Duke into their kingdom:

Immediately those in Paris learned of the arrival of this Prince, and the solemn reception that was given to him [by the Catholic League], and the love that his Highness in turn had shown to them [the Catholic League], assuring them that the will of the Catholic King, his seigneur, was nothing other than freely favoring the just enterprise and praiseworthy business of the Holy Union, and to help to eradicate the heresies of that kingdom, without having the crown passed to any heretical person nor one separated from the holy Faith which the entire Roman Church guards. And that consequently his intention was to do the same until death, and to not seize any town, castle, or fortress of France, as some thought, and the enemies [of the Spanish crown] publically said.⁸⁰

This passage makes clear the Spanish crown's purely munificent and devout intentions in France. Spain's intervention against Henry of Navarre was a mission to save the Catholic faith, not an aggressive campaign of conquest. According to Cornejo, as the Army of Flanders approached Paris, Henry of Navarre quickly lifted the siege and departed with his substantial force of over twenty-thousand men. The Carmelite in fact believed this relief to be quite timely, as he thought that Paris could have endured for only two more days before being forced to surrender out of starvation. While Henry's heretical troops had profaned the churches and other holy sites on the outskirts of the capital, Parma and Philip II had saved the city.⁸¹

The *Compendio y breve relación* portrays the arrival of the Duke of Parma as an incredible and momentous act; predictably, the people of Paris are shown as being overjoyed after the lifting of the siege. Cornejo writes that after Henry departed from the city walls nearly all of the residents of Paris gathered at the Cathedral to give thanks and participate in a solemn procession.⁸² He concludes the history by writing that due to Parma the tide of war had turned against Henry of Navarre,

and to this day the city of Paris remains so provided [for], that we can say, it is no less of a miracle than what God showed in Samaria, because without the passes of the roads being open, the wheat which just fifteen days ago cost between one-hundred and fifty and two-hundred ducats, today is given for three [ducats]. What follows ahead in the Epitome of these wars which we started, (if God will give us life, and forces for it) we will finish.⁸³

⁸⁰ "Luego se supo en Paris la llegada deste Principe, y el solemne recibimiento que se le auia hecho, y el amor que su Alteza recíprocamente les auia mostrado, asegurandoles que la voluntad del Rey Católico su señor, no era otra sino de libremente fauorecer la justa empresa y loable assumpto de la santa Union, y ayudar a extirpar las heregias de aquel Reyno, sin que en la corona del sucediese persona herege ni apartada de la Fe sagrada que toda la Yglesia Romana guarda. Y que su intención por el consiguiente era hazer lo mismo hasta perder la vida, y no de apoderarse de villa, castillo, ni fortaleza de Francia, como algunos pensauan, y los enemigos públicamente dezian." Cornejo, 98.

⁸¹ Cornejo, 100.

⁸² Cornejo, 100-1.

⁸³ "y quedando la villa de Paris el día de oy tan abastecida, que podemos dezir, ser no menor milagro que le que Dios mostro en Samaria, por q sin estar aun abiertos los passos de los vios, el trigo que ahora quinze días costaua ciento y cinquenta, y dozientos ducados, oy se da por tres. Lo que adelante se seguirá en el Epitome destas guerras que hemos comencado (si Dios nos diere vida, y fuerças para ello) lo acabaremos." Cornejo, 103.

Cornejo's comparison between the end of the siege of Paris and the miraculous liberation of the Israelites in Samaria underscores the tremendous importance of the Spanish crown's intervention against Henry of Navarre. As with Samaria, Paris had been renewed and freed from the depredations of non-believers thanks to God's favor. Through this assessment the Carmelite not only conveys a lesson on the importance of faith and resilience, but he also infuses Parma's campaign with a sense of providential mission. Indeed, the Samaria reference grants the Spanish monarchy a sacral quality, as it shows that Philip II and his forces were chosen by God to carry out his will through the military campaign in France. The history imparts the reader with the message that with Spain's divinely guided help France could be brought back securely into the flock of the Church.

Cornejo's 1590 work is a vivid expression of Spanish triumphalism and anti-French sentiment, which acutely encapsulates the providentialist *mentalité* regarding Spain's imperial power during the final decade of Philip II's reign. The history portrays the intervention of the Prudent King in France in a wholly reverential light, and the work serves as a laudatory celebration of the Duke of Parma's campaign. Cornejo's polemical depictions of the perfidious Henry III, the rising power of the heretical Henry of Navarre, and the intense suffering experienced during the siege of Paris all amply justify Philip II's decision to send the Army of Flanders in France. While it is true that the Carmelite historian certainly holds a certain amount of admiration for the Catholic League and the defenders of Paris, the *Compendio y breve relación* demonstrates that France was on the verge of being completely overtaken by heresy, including a wave of foreign heretics brought in by the Prince of Bearne. Cornejo thus creates the impression that the French Catholics were largely incapable of protecting their kingdom. Indeed, while he notes the piety and commitment of the French Catholic defenders during the siege of Paris, Cornejo nonetheless demonstrates that the city had to be rescued by the Spanish. The French are either portrayed as victims, or dehumanized as heretics.

In Cornejo's patronizing depiction of France there is an implied sense of *translatio imperii*. As noted earlier in this chapter, Cornejo remarks that over the long course of the Wars of Religion France had fallen from its position as the jewel of Christendom and had descended into ruin, and only the Spanish crown could save the kingdom from heresy. Through this framing of the French Wars of Religion the Carmelite implies that by the end of the sixteenth-century Spain had surpassed France and assumed the place of precedence amongst the kingdoms of Christendom. Philip II's benevolent support of the French Catholics proves this position of superiority. Cornejo presents a powerfully optimistic assessment of the future of the Spanish monarchy, as he shows that Spanish power had been cemented amongst the fall of France.

The *Compendio y breve relación* advocates an unrestrained and aggressive use of Spanish imperial power, a foreign policy approach that largely characterized the final years of Philip II's reign.⁸⁴ For Cornejo the defense of the Catholic faith was the ultimate justification for military intervention, a goal made all the more important given his "domino theory" concerning the spread of Protestantism. Importantly, the Carmelite historian gives an entirely positive account of Spain's intervention in the French Wars of Religion; there are no mentions of the extensive costs or the difficulties of Philip II's campaign against Henry of Navarre. While Cornejo shies away from advocating an actual Spanish occupation of France, his staunch support of the intervention reveals a paternalistic and triumphalist vision of Spanish imperial power. The

⁸⁴ Ruiz Ibañez and Sabatini, 502. Aside from the intervention in France, other bellicose ventures during this period included Philip II's support of Catholics in England, Ireland, and Japan.

work's overriding message is that the Spanish monarchy serves as the stalwart champion and savior of the Catholic Church, thus imbuing Spain with a sacred duty to stamp out heresy and combat the infidel. The framing of this history's narrative, with the account concluding with the joyous and miraculous liberation of Paris, strongly implies that the Catholic cause in both France and throughout the world will prevail with the Spanish crown's aid.

According to the Carmelite historian, only the Spanish monarchy was capable of saving France, and there was no possibility that Spain could fail in this holy mission. The *Compendio y breve relación* is a powerful expression of militant Catholic triumphalism and messianic fervor that exalts Spanish imperial power and presents the Spanish monarchy as an embodiment of God's will on earth.⁸⁵ Cornejo in turn envisions the Spanish crown as being divinely favored and protected by God.⁸⁶ Indeed, this history's unwavering triumphalist outlook towards the Spanish empire and its mission is indicative of a providentialist *mentalité* at a time when Philip II was undertaking the most controversial and aggressive campaigns of his reign.

Another work written during Philip II's intervention in the French Wars of Religion that exhibits a powerful message of Spanish imperial triumphalism is Gregorio López Madera's *Excelencias de la monarchia y reyno de España* from 1596. This work was first published in Valladolid in 1597, and later reprinted in Madrid in 1625.⁸⁷ While not a narrative history, it can still be considered an example of historical writing, as López Madera talks extensively about Spain's ancient, medieval, and near recent past (i.e. the fifteenth and sixteenth century). Originally from Madrid, López Madera was a jurist and career bureaucrat for the crown, and he spent most of his professional life working as an attorney for the Chancery of Granada. While in Granada he was a central figure in the discovery and discussion over the *Plomos del Sacromonte*, forged artifacts and relics that supposedly established Granada's status as an ancient Christian city. López Madera argued for the *Plomos'* authenticity.⁸⁸

As the title suggests, *Excelencias de la monarchia y reyno de Espana* details the various facets of Spain's grandeur, including its superiority in the realms of religion, economy, culture, and military strength. It offers an unrestrained and expansive vision of Spanish imperial power. Importantly, for the purpose of this chapter, López Madera's treatise is a vivid *mélange* of Spanish triumphalist thought and anti-French attitude, and the larger context of Spain's war with Henry of Navarre pervades the text.

López Madera devotes a significant portion of his work to arguing for Spain's place of precedence in Christendom over France, and he litters the history with barbs aimed against historical and political claims made by French scholars. For instance, López Madera mocks the assertion of the French historian Cassaneo that his "*patria*" deserves the place of "*primer lugar*" (precedence) in the world, writing that France only ruled over around twelve major cities within its provinces, while the domains of the Spanish crown stretched out all over the world and consisted of "so many nations and kingdoms, in which there are an infinity of provinces and

⁸⁵ This aligns with Hsia's definition of Catholic Triumphalism. Hsia, 48-9.

⁸⁶ This assessment in turn mirrors Parker's view of Spanish messianism during the reign of Philip II. Parker, 30, 48.

⁸⁷ Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano*, vol. 7 (Barcelona, Libreria Palau, 1954), 646-7.

⁸⁸ Enrique Garcia Ballesteros and Jose Antonio Martinez Torres, "Una historiografía en tiempos de Felipe II: *Las excelencias de la monarchia y reyno de España*," in *Felipe II (1527-1598) Europa y la monarquía católica*, 150-151. For more on the *Plomos* see Katie A. Harris, *From Muslim to Christian Granada: Inventing a City's Past in Early Modern Spain* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2009).

cities.”⁸⁹ In López Madera’s view, the French claims of grandeur are provincial and absurd when compared to the scope of the Spanish *Monarquía*.

The Spanish crown’s global empire is a central component of López Madera’s argument regarding Spain’s superiority over France. In particular, the jurist writes that due to the conquest and settlement of the Americas (as well as Asia), the Spanish have brought about the conversion of countless heathen souls. He states that under Spain’s rule in the Indies

so many thousands of people had been converted, whom for so long the demon had possessed, and there being expected every day new fruit [conversions] and the ascension of these idolatrous peoples into the Catholic Church, thus Spain should hold first place in the eyes of the Church, because Spain has truly given the Church the hundredth [bountiful fruit], and is so excessively superior to the kingdom of France, which its inhabitants without having great reason and cause extol.⁹⁰

According to López Madera, the French could not possibly hope to compete with this monumental achievement of spreading Christianity throughout the globe. Another example of his triumphalist rhetoric, this passage further illustrates what the jurist believed to be Spain’s crucial place of unrivaled importance in the Catholic world, as the heroism and piety of the Spanish was responsible for bringing an unprecedented number of idolaters into the flock of the Church.

Related to this vision of Spain’s prime place within the Catholic world, López Madera argues that the Spanish monarchy’s title of “Catholic” is older than the French monarchy’s sobriquet “Most Christian” (*Cristianissimo*). The jurist writes that the Spanish kings were first christened “Catholic” with Alfonso I, who received this title in the eighth century before the Frankish Charlemagne was called *Cristianissimo*.⁹¹ While these two titles were granted within a few years of each other, nonetheless for López Madera this episode further demonstrates Spain’s rightful place of primacy over France in the world. The title of “Catholic” is made more meaningful than that of “Most Christian” because it was granted first; likewise, the sobriquet is evidence of Spanish crown’s long-standing commitment to the Church.

The *Excelencias de la monarchia y reyno de España* also frequently delves into the semi-mythical realm of ancient history to prove Spain’s superiority over France. For instance, citing Seneca, López Madera claims that the ancient Spanish were some of the very first people to settle in France, as they traveled there with Hercules, commonly believed by early modern Spanish historians to be one of the first kings of Spain, in his journey from Spain to Italy. According to López Madera, while in ancient France Hercules and the Spanish founded the city of Alexia.⁹² Similarly, López Madera makes the somewhat fantastical assertion that the Frankish kings had originally descended from ancient Spanish kings. Arguing against French claims that the Franks were descendants of the Trojans and had never mixed their blood with foreign

⁸⁹ “tantas naciones y reynos, en que ay infinidad de prouincias y ciudades.” Gregorio López Madera, *Excelencias de la monarchia y reyno de España* (Valladolid, 1596), 70.

⁹⁰ “se han conuertido tantos millares de gentes, en quien tan antigua possesion tenia el demonio, esperándose cada día nueuo fructo, y accession de aquellas gentes Idolatras en la Iglesia Catholica, por lo qual deuria tener en ella el primer lugar, como el que verdaderamente le ha dado el fructo centésimo, y excessiuamente aventajada al Reyno de Francia, en el qual sin tener tan grande razón, y causa lo encarecen muchos sus naturales.” López Madera, 45.

⁹¹ López Madera, 83.

⁹² López Madera, 67.

peoples, he writes that the Frankish monarchs were in fact the descendants of the ancient Spanish monarch Hercules.⁹³

These claims, while based on arguably dubious mythical evidence, serve to subordinate France to Spain on a historical level and reinforce the illustrious heritage of the Spanish monarchy at the expense of the French crown. By placing the Spaniards and their king Hercules within the foundational narrative of the Franks, and by extension France, López Madera strips the rival kingdom of a sense of majesty and importance, as it is essentially painted as a satellite of ancient Spain. In other words, the French owe their kingdom and their royal line to the Spanish. This claim that the Spanish in fact founded France bears a striking resemblance to the arguments made by Spanish humanists regarding Spain's prominent place in Roman history. The royal historians Florian de Ocampo and Ambrosio de Morales, for example, argued that the ancient Spanish soldiers were centrally involved with the founding of Rome itself.⁹⁴ These Spanish humanists undertook a "literary conquest" of Rome, and they "created a version of history that subjugated Rome to Spanish designs."⁹⁵ As such, much like Ocampo and Morales, López Madera attempts a literary conquest of France by inserting Spain within the foundational narrative of the Franks, thus depriving the rival kingdom of its mythical heritage and subjugating it to the superior Spanish crown.

The assertion that the Spanish founded France also gives credence to the possible notion of the *Infanta* Isabella Clara Eugenia inheriting the French throne during the Wars of Religion. After all, if the origins of the French monarchy could ultimately be traced back to the Spanish king Hercules, then the crowning of Philip II's daughter as queen of France would be a reasonable and just solution to the succession crisis of the French Wars of Religion. According to López Madera's assessment, the ancient histories of the two kingdoms were intertwined, albeit in a way that gave primacy to Spain; accordingly it stands as a logical outcome that a member of the Spanish Hapsburg royal family could rule France.

Indeed, the *Excelencias de la monarchia y reyno de España* is explicitly critical of France's observation of Salic Law, which was a major roadblock in Philip II's attempts to place his daughter on the French throne.⁹⁶ According to López Madera, thanks to the Spanish practice of allowing women to inherit the throne, his kingdom has enjoyed an excellent, venerable, and unbroken line of rulers. Indeed, the jurist cites a number of kingdoms from antiquity that, to their benefit, did not prohibit passing on the crown to women.⁹⁷ In contrast to this peaceful dynastic continuity in Spain, France

(in order to preserve) the male succession which [France's] writers extol so much) the Royal House has changed three times, and left unresolved the issue of succession in the kingdom, which would continue much better with the daughters of the last possessors [of the crown], rather than going to other different houses of the ancient family of the Franks, which [the ruling house] has changed three times as its own inhabitants confess.⁹⁸

⁹³ López Madera, 34-5.

⁹⁴ Dandeleit, 44-5.

⁹⁵ Dandeleit, 81.

⁹⁶ Salic Law only allows men to inherit the throne.

⁹⁷ López Madera, 29.

⁹⁸ "(por guardar la succession de varones que tanto sus escriptores encarescen) ha salido tres vezes de la casa Real, y faltado la succession del Reyno, que se continuara mucho mejor en las hijas de los últimos possessores, que no en otras casas differentissimas de la antigua familia de los Francos, en que se ha mudado estas tres vezes como sus mismos naturales confessan..." López Madera, 29.

López Madera presents Spain as the very model of dynastic stability, while he shows that the French model of succession is comparatively in shambles. From this perspective, the French practice of only allowing the crown to pass on to men is needlessly restrictive and causes lamentable disorder, since the kingdom has sacrificed dynastic stability and peace through their observation of the Frankish custom.

This critique is a powerful commentary on France's then on-going succession crisis during the period of Spain's intervention in the French Wars of Religion, as the kingdom's stringent observation of Salic Law led to Henry of Navarre being made the primary candidate for the throne after the death of Henry III. It follows from López Madera's biting commentary that this lamentable situation could have been avoided if the French had not been insistent on having a male inherit the crown. These remarks serve as implicit support for Philip II's controversial attempt to place his daughter Isabella Clara Eugenia on the French throne. By demonstrating the rigidity and potential danger of the legal institution, López Madera attempts to delegitimize the foundation of the legal arguments of Henry of Navarre's camp. Due to her direct relation to the Valois line through her mother, Isabella Clara Eugenia's ascension to the throne would prevent the breaking of dynastic continuity in France. The French refusal to recognize the *Infanta's* rights to the throne serves as a prime example of the folly of Salic Law in López Madera's eyes, as she would have likely made an ideal candidate given her close relation to Henry III, devotion to the Catholic faith, and attachment to Spain. While the jurist never explicitly mentions the *Infanta* by name in his text, his criticisms of France's Salic Law and his laudations of Spain's own system of royal inheritance are a call to allow the French throne to pass on to Isabella Clara Eugenia. Incidentally, by the time that López Madera's work was published, the campaign to make the *Infanta* queen of France had begun to fail, as the Papacy had effectively recognized Henry IV's conversion in 1596.

Much like Pedro Cornejo's history, Gregorio López Madera's treatise is a powerful expression of a militant and paternalistic Spanish imperial *mentalité*. Both López Madera and Cornejo share a strong and polemical Francophobic sentiment, as the two present France in a very negative light. For Cornejo, the French were largely unable to deal with the spread of heresy that was tearing their kingdom apart. According to López Madera's assessment, France was a pitiful yet arrogant kingdom that could not hope to compete with the grandeur of Spain.

This derogatory representation serves as justification for the Spanish monarchy's controversial involvement in the French Wars of Religion. The overriding message of López Madera's work is that Spain has an undeniable place of precedence as the preeminent Catholic kingdom of the world. Given this grandeur, it stands that the Spanish monarchy has a responsibility to spread and protect the Catholic faith throughout the globe. It should logically follow that Spain would have an obligation to help the beleaguered French Catholics during the Wars of Religion since they were unable to deal with their Huguenot and succession problems. Through this assessment of the stark differences between the power of Spain and France, López Madera justifies and glorifies Philip II's decision to help the Catholic League. Likewise, his position on Salic Law further vindicates and valorizes Spain's intervention in the French Wars of Religion. By strongly implying that Isabella Clara Eugenia should be allowed to inherit the French throne, López Madera strengthens the case for the war against Henry of Navarre.

Conclusion

While they are two different types of historical works, both the *Compendio y breve relación de la Liga y confederación Francesa* and the *Excelencias de la monarchia y reyno de*

España argue for extensive and aggressive Spanish involvement in France at the close of the sixteenth century. Pedro Cornejo presents the Duke of Parma's timely defense of Paris as a miraculous godsend that provided crucial help to the Catholic cause in France. According to his assessment, Henry of Navarre would have likely defeated the Catholic League and placed France under his heretical rule if it was not for Spain's aid.

López Madera's case for Spanish intervention is subtler, but in many ways more bellicose. By showing that France was in a subordinate position to Spain in such matters as religion, culture, and government, López Madera demonstrates that a dynastic link between the two kingdoms by way of the *Infanta* would undoubtedly benefit the French. The connection to Spain through Philip II's daughter would be an honor, and France would share in the superior customs and grandeur of the Spanish monarchy. In other words, Cornejo jubilantly commemorates a dramatic military intervention, while López Madera argues for substantial dynastic and cultural intervention, and indirectly calls for the Spanish crown's takeover of France. In contrast, Cornejo explicitly notes that Philip II had no designs for the kingdom. Regardless, both writers triumphantly believe that the Spanish crown had an unquestionable prerogative to be involved in French affairs as the champion of the Catholic faith.

These two works encapsulate an aggressive and expansive vision of Spanish imperial power. Importantly, unlike many historians in the seventeenth century, neither Cornejo nor López Madera write about any of the negative aspects of Philip II's intervention in France, such as its immense costs, the questionable loyalty of the Catholic League, or the negative impact that the conflict had on the security and stability of the Spanish empire. Rather, they portray Spanish involvement in France entirely as a glorious enterprise that is done for the good of the Catholic faith and the French, and their works commemorate the Spanish crown's piety, might, and benevolence.

Cornejo effectively characterizes Philip II's intervention in the French Wars of Religion as miraculous, and he provides a quasi-messianic portrayal of the Spanish monarchy and its mission. While perhaps not as explicit as Cornejo's messianism, López Madera similarly holds that the Spanish crown was divinely chosen to defend and help spread the Catholic faith throughout the globe.

In addition, López Madera paints a portrait of the expansive scope and power of the Spanish empire, and his claims of Spanish supremacy vis-à-vis France represent a sort of literary conquest and subjugation of the rival kingdom. Moreover, there is an undercurrent of universalism in the jurist's argument that the Spanish monarchy had an unrivaled place of precedence in the world. By stating that Spain was first among all Christian kingdoms, López Madera goes as to imply that the authority of the Spanish crown was greater than even that of the Holy Roman Emperor. While López Madera does not call for the establishment of a universal Hapsburg imperium in the manner of Gattinara, he does put forth an unrestrained vision of Spanish imperial power. Indeed, López Madera emphasizes the global nature of Spain's imperium, and he strongly implies that the Spanish crown had an imperative to change the dynastic workings of another Catholic kingdom, namely France. This case for Spanish precedence was more than just a matter of prestige. Political power was also at stake.

Both Cornejo and López Madera authors present a radical framework of Spanish power that reveals the vibrancy and force of imperial triumphalism during the final decade of Philip II's reign. These works thus offer a sort of window into the Spanish imperial *mentalité* of the 1590s. In their respective visions of empire, the two historians believe that the Spanish crown had a sacred responsibility to combat heresy and defend the Catholic faith well beyond the confines of

the Hapsburg domains. This aggressive and expansive approach towards imperium not only justifies, but also valorizes the controversial acts by Philip II during the French Wars of Religion. While both Cornejo and López Madera shy away from explicitly advocating that Spain conquer and occupy France, the two sixteenth-century historians nonetheless call for the Spanish crown to aggressively involve itself in the dynastic struggles of a foreign kingdom. Simply put, both the *Excelencias de la monarchia y reyno de España* and the *Compendio y breve relación de la Liga y confederación Francesa* celebrate the unsurpassed glory, strength, and righteousness of the Spanish empire. Indeed, these works are a striking example of how history writing could be used for political purposes in early modern Spain. These works are tools of empire. Cornejo and López Madera use their histories as a platform to support one of the Spanish crown's most bellicose military ventures and articulate Spain's imperial greatness.

The grandiose image of Spanish imperial power that Cornejo and López Madera present failed to live up to the political realities of the final years of the French Wars of Religion. Philip II's campaign to prevent Henry of Navarre from becoming king began to seriously unravel when the Bourbon prince converted to Catholicism. The Papacy's eventual recognition of both Henry's conversion and claim to the French throne deprived the Spanish crown of its primary justification for going to war; Spain's mission to protect the Church in France had lost legitimacy and had become a quagmire. In the last year of his reign Philip II had little other recourse than to settle for a bitter peace with Henry IV. Spanish historians writing of the intervention after the war's end faced the sensitive task of chronicling the ultimately failed venture of Philip II. The following chapters will explore how these authors portrayed the French intervention and its role in shaping Spanish imperial power.

Chapter 2 History Writing in the Service of the Crown

Introduction

Philip II's intervention in the French Wars of Religion proved to be a disaster for the Spanish empire. The Spanish crown had spent its limited resources and jeopardized its hold on the Netherlands in an unsuccessful effort to prevent Henry of Navarre from obtaining the French throne. Philip II's campaign to prevent Henry of Navarre from becoming king began to seriously unravel when the Bourbon prince converted to Catholicism. The Papacy's eventual recognition of both Henry's conversion and claim to the French throne deprived the Spanish crown of its primary justification for going to war; Spain's mission to protect the Church in France had lost legitimacy and become a quagmire. In the last year of his reign Philip II had little other recourse than to settle for a bitter peace with Henry IV, and signed the Peace of Vervins in 1598 in order to insure the relative peace and security of his son's transition to the throne.

While during the course of the conflict in the late sixteenth century Pedro Cornejo de la Pedrosa and Gregorio López Madera wrote polemical histories that championed the war against Henry of Navarre, Spanish historians writing of the intervention after 1598 faced the thorny task of essentially writing a history of defeat for Spain. This chapter examines how the royal historian Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas depicted the failed conflict in his 1598 work *Historia de los sucesos de Francia desde el año 1585, que comenzó la liga católica, hasta el fin de 1594*, and what this portrayal reveals about Spanish imperial identity at the turn of the seventeenth century.

Herrera completed the *Historia de los sucesos de Francia* the same year of the Peace of Vervins in 1598; as such, this history offers a vivid account of the costly conflict and its importance for the Spanish empire. Moreover, the work reveals the linkage between history writing and politics in early modern Spain, as Herrera labors to vindicate the Spanish crown's tarnished historical image in the wake of the controversial intervention in the French Wars of Religion. Importantly, the royal historian advances a triumphal and at times bellicose vision of Spanish imperial power that asserted both Spain's superiority and painted Philip II's war against Henry IV as a fully justified enterprise. Like earlier Spanish historians, Herrera demonizes Henry IV as a dangerous heretic who threatened the Catholic faith. In Herrera's analysis Philip II escapes blame for the defeats and setbacks of the conflict. Rather, he argues that the Spanish crown's unreliable Catholic League allies and even the Papacy were responsible for Henry IV's eventual ascension to the French throne. Herrera's history stresses the Spanish crown's continued place as the preeminent defender of the Catholic faith at a moment when the Spanish empire had begun to show signs of vulnerability.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the final decade of Philip II's reign marked the apogee of the Spanish crown's campaign to defend the Catholic Church against perceived Protestant threats. The Great Armada of 1588 and the war against Henry of Navarre were perhaps the most striking examples of this aggressive foreign policy.⁹⁹ Yet during this period of military intervention in the name of the Catholic faith a sense of a disillusionment and doubt began to emerge within Spain concerning the Spanish empire's triumphal destiny. The failure of the Great Armada is commonly seen as the first major blow to Spanish imperial confidence and a

⁹⁹ Javier Ruiz Ibáñez and Gaetano Sabatini, "Monarchy as Conquest: Violence, Social Opportunity, and Political Stability in the Establishment of the Hispanic Monarchy," in *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 81, no. 3 (September 2009), 502.

critical moment for this spirit of imperial *disengaño*, or disenchantment, that would come to characterize certain aspects of Spanish political thought and cultural discourse in the seventeenth century.

Towards the end of his reign Philip II's imperium for the first time came under pressure on all its fronts simultaneously.¹⁰⁰ In turn, some Spaniards came to lose patience over the costly burdens of empire at this time.¹⁰¹ Particular dissatisfaction was felt over the military reversals in the Low Countries, the failing war in France, and the audacious attacks of the English, such as Sir Francis Drake's brief yet humiliating capture of the city of Cádiz. Moreover, Spain's increasingly moribund economy was exacerbated by years of population loss due to declining birthrates and plague. The Spanish empire had become overwhelmed. R.A. Stradling writes that the dramatic increase of royal tax demands upon Castile in the years after the defeat of the Great Armada sparked an outburst of public criticism of the Spanish crown's defense commitments; dissent was voiced in the *Cortes* of 1591, and grew in volume and frequency as living conditions worsened in Castile in the middle of the decade.¹⁰² According to Stradling, the overall message of these dissatisfied commentators was that "Castile should attend to her own affairs and abandon her disastrous dabbling in those of northern Europe."¹⁰³ From these criticisms there emerged a "fatalistic" vision of Spain's empire centered on the likelihood of the Spanish empire's decline and ruin. J.H. Elliott writes that given that Philip II had been faltering in the super-human undertaking of preserving a worldwide empire, Spanish commentators at the end of the sixteenth century began to doubt that their imperium could avoid the cyclical process of rise and decline characteristic of all past empires.¹⁰⁴

The failed campaign against Henry IV proved to be an especially costly and embarrassing episode for Philip II. The Spanish king's decision to intervene in France was arguably one of the most monumental and consequential actions of his reign.¹⁰⁵ While the Army of Flanders's fortunes grew worse the Spanish court attempted to repress news of any reverses whenever possible. In turn, the Peace of Vervins was a flat-out embarrassment for the Spanish crown, as Philip II was forced to give up all the French territory it had acquired during the war, and had very little to show for the vast expenses he made during the campaign.¹⁰⁶ The Prudent King thus purposefully delayed publishing the treaty until four days before his death.¹⁰⁷

It is crucial to analyze Herrera's *Historia de los sucesos de Francia* within this context of imperial embarrassment and crisis. His text represents another attempt by the Spanish crown to shape the narrative of the intervention in France. The work can be seen as a counter against the observations from both within and outside of Spain regarding the weakening state of the Spanish crown. Herrera uses his narrative of the controversial and ultimately unsuccessful campaign in France to exalt the Spanish crown and reaffirm its mission to protect the Catholic faith during this troubling moment.

¹⁰⁰ R.A. Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain: A Study of the Spanish System, 1580-1720* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 30.

¹⁰¹ Henry Kamen, *Philip of Spain* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 317-320.

¹⁰² Stradling, 32.

¹⁰³ Stradling, 32.

¹⁰⁴ J.H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1986), 48.

¹⁰⁵ Joseph Perez, *L'Espagne de Philippe II* (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 336-7. Patrick Williams, *Philip II* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 180-1.

¹⁰⁶ Kamen, 300, 312-3.

¹⁰⁷ Williams, 249.

This goal of defending Philip II's historical image in turn is closely tied with Herrera's own ambitions. Descended from an Old Christian family from Castile, Herrera traveled to Italy at a young age to further his university education. There he entered the employ of the lettered *condottiere* Vespasiano Gonzaga Colonna, who had served as Philip II's viceroy in Navarre and Valencia. Herrera worked as Gonzaga's secretary and historian, and he developed a particular interest in writing about current events.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, Herrera was very anxious for royal patronage, and he quickly gained the court's attention with his early pro-Spanish histories of the annexation of Portugal and the life of Mary, Queen of Scots. The *Historia de los sucesos de Francia* in particular helped to cement his status at court. Herrera himself writes that Philip II ordered him to produce this history, and the text played a large part in his successful campaign to obtain the post of *Cronista Mayor de las Indias*.¹⁰⁹ Herrera would go on to be one of the most prolific and famous royal chroniclers of Philip III's reign.

Although this work was only printed once in Madrid in 1598, it nevertheless carries a great deal of political importance.¹¹⁰ Given his agenda the historian unsurprisingly advances a glowing account of Philip II's actions during the French Wars of Religion. The *Historia de los sucesos de Francia* is thus a prime example of how the Spanish crown used history writing as a political tool to defend its reputation and advance its own image as the benevolent defender of the Catholic faith.

A Just War

One major way that Herrera justifies the Spanish crown's intervention in the French Wars of Religion is by detailing France's descent into chaos during the prolonged conflict. For instance, although his assessment of Henry III is perhaps not as radical as the views of earlier Spanish historians such as Cornejo, it is nonetheless quite negative. Herrera describes the last of the Valois line as being an extremely weak monarch who was despised in his kingdom and allowed heretics to ravage France and greedy governors to usurp control of the provinces and cities.¹¹¹ Moreover, he writes that Henry III frequently had complicit dealings with the Huguenots, such as taking the heretical city of Geneva under his protection, and allying with Henry of Navarre.¹¹² In spite of this negative portrait, however, Herrera still presents Henry III's assassination as a shocking crime, a view in keeping with the general attitude of the Spanish court. Few Spanish theologians wrote in favor of regicide, and Henry III's murder in fact terrified the royal council. This stance contrasts markedly with the assessment of Cornejo and radical Catholic French writers, who depicted the assassination as just retribution against a cruel and hedonistic tyrant.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Richard L. Kagan, *Clio and the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 135-6.

¹⁰⁹ Kagan, 129-30, 138.

¹¹⁰ Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano*, vol. 5 (Barcelona: Libreria Palau, 1951), 581.

¹¹¹ Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Historia de Antonio de Herrera, criado de Su Magestad, y su coronista mayor de las Indias, de los sucesos de Francia, desde el año de 1585 que comenzó la Liga Católica, hasta en fin del año 1594...* (Madrid, 1598), 2.

¹¹² Herrera, 4.

¹¹³ Kamen, 279, Herrera, 96. The two authors' backgrounds and their intended audiences can possibly explain their differing portrayals of Henry III. As covered in Chapter 1, Cornejo served with the Spanish ambassador Bernardino de Mendoza during the critical period surrounding the siege of Paris, and his history is a call to action to save the Catholic faith in France. This close connection with the Catholic League could have likely influenced the Carmelite's radical portrayal of Henry III, since the Valois monarch became an avowed enemy of the Legeurs and their clerical allies.

Although he shies away from reveling in Henry III's assassination, Herrera devotes a large section of his work to delegitimizing the Valois dynasty and painting France as a kingdom in ruin at the end of the sixteenth century. He observes that the French and their monarchs were responsible for this state of affairs because they rejected the virtues and good practices that had once made the kingdom great, writing

The crown of France went from being the greatest of Christendom, from protecting the Church, [waging] wars against the infidels, and with the zeal of the Catholic religion adorning the kingdom with magnificent temples and the clergy with incomes, to usurping the benefices of the clergy in order to give them to the laity, giving bishoprics and abbeys to soldiers, courtiers and the worst people, to making alliances with Turks and peace with Heretics, waging wars against Christians and [causing] enmity with Catholics, and taking into protection the enemies of the Church because of reason of state, close friend to the misfortunes and troubles that will be described ahead.¹¹⁴

In essence, the French crown had turned its back on the Church and its Christian duties during the sixteenth century; as a result France had become in many ways a "rogue" heretical state.

This critical assessment is very much in keeping with the prevailing view in late sixteenth-century Spain regarding the rival kingdom. Many Spaniards considered France to be a hotbed of heresy; the Inquisition paid particular attention to French immigrants, as they believed that members of the French nation were naturally prone to following the religion of Calvin.¹¹⁵ In turn, Spanish writers contrasted the state of discord in France with the relative internal peace of Spain in the sixteenth century.¹¹⁶ Herrera takes up this juxtaposing depiction of the two kingdoms to advance the political message of his history. By presenting the French as impious, craven, and self-serving, the royal historian reaffirms Spain's own identity as the benevolent protector of Christendom, and justifies Philip II's war against Henry of Navarre.

According to Herrera's assessment, conspiracies, sedition, and *novedades* spread throughout the kingdom, and virtue itself was disregarded and scorned. "Thought-out consideration, they said was fear. And modesty they interpreted as vileness. And prudence as sloth. And hasty cholera they held for courage."¹¹⁷ He describes France as being infested by opportunistic scoundrels who had no regard for the common good of the republic, and those few who wished to remain neutral were forced to flee the kingdom.¹¹⁸ Herrera thus presents a bleak view of the French in crisis and the moral character of the French people as a whole. He remarks that "if any word was still kept, it was not out of a fear of God, but to have more companions in whatever was undertaken, as following one's ends was estimated more than empathizing with

¹¹⁴ "Llego la corona de Francia, a mayor grandeza que otra ninguna de la Christiandad, con la proteccion de la Iglesia, con las guerras contra Infieles, con el celo de la religion Católica, con ennoblecer el Reyno con magnificos templos, el clero con rentas, y con hazer poco caso del Pontifice, con usurpar las rentas al Clero, para dallas a legos, con proueer los Obispados, y las abadías a los soldados, y cortesanos, y gente peor, con hazer ligas con turcos, y guerras a Christianos, y paz con Herges, y enemistad con Católicos, y tomar en proteccion a Iso enemigos de la Iglesia, por razón de estado, allegado a las desuenturas, y trabajos que a delante se dirán." Herrera, 4.

¹¹⁵ Mateo Ballester Rodríguez, *La identidad española en la Edad Moderna (1556-1665): discursos, símbolos y mitos* (Madrid: Tecnos, 2010), 370.

¹¹⁶ Ballester Rodríguez, 373.

¹¹⁷ "La madura consideración, dezian que era miedo. Y la modestia la interpretauán a vileza. Y la prudencia, a pereza. Y la súpita cólera tenían por esfuerzo." Herrera, 76.

¹¹⁸ Herrera, 77.

anyone's small suffering."¹¹⁹ This depiction of France as a discordant and fallen kingdom serves to further demonstrate that Philip II's decision to intervene was just, laudable, and necessary.

Herrera's demonization of Henry IV is infused with similar political meaning. Importantly, when Herrera wrote this history, Henry IV's power and fame were on the ascent. During the course of the later years of the French Wars of Religion the majority of the Catholic population of France had grown increasingly weary of the decades of civil war and the machinations and interventions of foreigners that had bedeviled their kingdom.¹²⁰ Henry fruitfully capitalized upon these sentiments, and by 1598 the vigorous French monarch had successfully cast himself as the savior of France.¹²¹ The many damning remarks regarding Henry found in Herrera's text thus tarnish the former Huguenot's lustrous image, cast doubt over his famous conversion to Catholicism and his right to rule, and justify Philip II's intervention in the conflict.

Herrera writes that the Prince of Bearne was a well-known adulterer and natural liar, and as a Huguenot he hated Catholics and was obsessed with avenging the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre.¹²² To this end Henry of Navarre was responsible for a great number of atrocities against the Church and his Catholic enemies. After Henry captured the city of Vendôme his English and Scottish troops "sacked the town performing very barbaric cruelties and disrespects, especially with sacred objects..."¹²³ The Spanish historian adds that during this sack, Henry, in cold blood, ordered that the Catholic noble the Monsieur Du Benchard be beheaded with his own sword. The Huguenot also cruelly put to death the chief Provincial of the Franciscans, and the remaining monks were killed by the Prince of Bearne's soldiers as they tried to flee.¹²⁴

Similarly, in line with his fierce hatred of the Church, Herrera observes that Henry of Navarre frequently colluded with the English and other heretics during his campaign for the throne. The Spanish historian is keen to bring up the two-faced behavior of the Prince of Bearne, such as when he swore to Henry III that he would forsake heresy while simultaneously raising an army of Huguenots and foreign Protestants in order to invade France.¹²⁵ According to Herrera, not only did Protestants make up the bulk of Henry of Navarre's forces, but he also conspired with heretical rulers, most notably Elizabeth I of England.¹²⁶

Perhaps the most sinister example of the collaboration between Henry of Navarre and the English was the campaign to capture Rouen. The threat of the city's capture was in fact the primary driving force behind Philip II's order to send the Duke of Parma into France a second time after he lifted the siege of Paris.¹²⁷ Located in Upper Normandy, Rouen was of vital strategic importance for the Spanish crown. Not only would the city's capture give Henry

¹¹⁹ "si toda via se guardaua alguna fe, no era por el temor de Dios, sino por tener mas compañeros en lo que se emprendía, estimando en mas conseguir sus fines, que compadecerse con nadie con algún poco de sufrimiento." Herrera, 77.

¹²⁰ Perez, 335.

¹²¹ Geoffrey Parker, *Philip II* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 228. Perez, 335. Williams 118.

¹²² Herrera, 88-9.

¹²³ "saquearon la villa haciendo muy barbaras crueldades y desacatos, y en especial en las cosas sagradas...." Herrera, 115.

¹²⁴ Herrera, 115.

¹²⁵ "jurara de desamparar la heregia", "embió a Inglaterra, y a Alemania, a persuadir a los Principes protestantes, que hiziessen liga para la conseruacion de su seta." Herrera, 8.

¹²⁶ Herrera, 115.

¹²⁷ Perez, 333.

command of the Seine River and grant easy access to Leaguer controlled Paris, but perhaps more importantly, it would allow him to easily attack the Spanish-controlled Low Countries.¹²⁸

Interestingly, Herrera does not note any of these strategic factors in his account of the need to defend the city. Rather, he emphasizes the confessional implications behind Rouen's potential loss, as he observes that Henry IV planned to give the city to the English. He writes that the Prince of Bearne had intended to take Rouen

in order to hand over that city to the queen of England (according to what was then disclosed) in exchange for promised payment for the help she [Elizabeth I] had done for him [Henry of Navarre], and for that which she newly sent him five thousand English, a thousand scouts, and many munitions that were unloaded in Dieppe, with seven companies of veterans (experienced soldiers) that the queen ordered to be taken from the garrison of the town of Dordrecht which was in Flanders.¹²⁹

English rule of Rouen would have clearly spelt doom for the practice of Catholicism in the city. This troubling allegation not only revealed the extent of the partnership between Henry of Navarre and Elizabeth I, but it also exposed the disturbing lengths that the Huguenot leader was willing to pursue in order to obtain the French throne.

Moreover, in a further indication of Henry of Navarre's Machiavellian character, Herrera notes that the Prince of Bearne repeatedly asked the Ottoman Empire to intervene in the conflict by attacking the domains of Philip II.¹³⁰ For the Spanish historian, Henry's readiness to court with the infidel reveals a lack of scruples and a troubling willingness to disregard religion and jeopardize the safety of all of Christendom in order to further his political goals.

Indeed, in Herrera's eyes, one of Henry of Navarre's most disturbing qualities was his embrace of reason of state politics. Spanish political theorists saw the philosophy of reason of state as calling for a government to trample over the boundaries of Christian morality for the "good" of the state. According to this political rubric, all the resources and instruments available to society, including religion, should be subordinated to the state and its conservation.¹³¹ In the view of Spanish and other Catholic commentators, under reason of state religion loses its independence and becomes an instrument of the state, ultimately resulting in an atheistic polity devoid of conscience.¹³² Herrera clearly demonstrates that Henry IV followed this disturbing political platform. Writing of Henry and his *politique* supporters, Herrera observes

it was notorious the way with which they behaved without any religious zeal, conforming to a maxim that Henry held for a long time, which was that the kings won however they could, and governed however they wanted, being enough [proof] for him [Henry of Navarre] the examples of what Henry VIII and Elizabeth had done in England, and that

¹²⁸ Williams, 223.

¹²⁹ "para entregar aquella ciudad a la reyna de Inglaterra (según entonces se publico) por tenérsela prometida en pago de los socorros q le auia hecho, y por el q nueuamente le enuiaua de cinco mil Ingleses, mil gastadores y muchas municiones q se descargaron en Diepa, con siete compañías de soldados viejos q la reyna mando sacar del presidio de la villa de Dordre q en Flandes." Herrera, 180.

¹³⁰ Herrera, 119, 127.

¹³¹ J.A. Fernández-Santamaría, *Natural Law, Constitutionalism, Reason of State, and War: Counter-Reformation Spanish Political Thought* (New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 2:43.

¹³² Fernández-Santamaría, 2:44.

without doubt this would be the greatest persecution that could come against the holy mother Church.¹³³

Thus, according to the royal historian's troubling assessment, for the Prince of Bearne and his followers the pursuit of political power was paramount, while moral and spiritual matters held little importance.

Especially disturbing is Henry of Navarre's supposed invocation of the Tudor monarchs of England as models for this warped style of rule. For Herrera and many other Spaniards in the late sixteenth century, Henry VIII and Elizabeth I were arch-heretics and the unquestioned enemies of the Church and Spain. The English monarchs proved the dangers of allowing a heretic to ascend to the throne, as they effectively wiped out the practice of the Catholic faith in their domains through royal fiat. While Philip II's policy towards England was guided largely by economic and political considerations during his reign, many of the king's agents saw the English as abominable and dangerous heretics.¹³⁴ The Spanish ambassador in Paris during the early 1580s remarked that all evil emanated from England, and Bernardino de Mendoza, who served as Philip II's ambassador in London, displayed an unwavering religious hostility towards the island kingdom during his career.¹³⁵ In turn, many in Spain viewed with horror the sad fate of the English Catholics, and the religious hostility ran deep between England and the Spanish kingdoms.¹³⁶

In keeping with this wide scale demonization of the English, Herrera remarks that many of the good Catholics in France who opposed Henry of Navarre frequently cited Elizabeth I's brutal reign and the sad fate of the English Catholics as examples of the likely consequences of Protestant rule.¹³⁷ By noting Henry's identification with the Tudor monarchs Herrera casts serious doubt over the future of the Catholic Church in France. Indeed, in large part due to Henry IV's rise to power Philip II was convinced during the final years of his reign that Catholicism was losing ground in France.¹³⁸

Herrera's remarks concerning Henry IV's adherence to reason of state politics call into question the sincerity of his conversion to Catholicism, and demonstrate that the former Huguenot still potentially posed a danger to the Church. The absolution did nothing to ease the hostilities between Spain and France, and the Spanish crown and its supporters expressed skepticism over Henry's conversion during the remaining course of the war.¹³⁹ Henry's conversion and absolution by the Papacy was never fully accepted by Philip II. Indeed, the Peace of Vervins did not explicitly recognize that Henry IV was the legitimate and Catholic king of France.¹⁴⁰ Herrera's text reflects this lasting skepticism.

¹³³ "era notoria la mana con que procedían sin ningún zelo de religión, conforme a una máxima que mucho tiempo atrás tenia Enrique, que los Reynos le ganauan como se podía, y se gouernauan como se quería, bastando para ello los exemplos de lo que auian hecho en Inglaterra, Enrique VIII y Isabel, y q sin duda esta sería la mayor persecución que podría venir contra la Santa madre Iglesia." Herrera, 278.

¹³⁴ John Lynch, *Spain under the Hapsburgs* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 1:280.

¹³⁵ Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 165. Kamen, *Philip of Spain*, 256-7.

¹³⁶ Lynch, 1:280, 1:314.

¹³⁷ Herrera, 83.

¹³⁸ Williams, 181.

¹³⁹ Ballester Rodríguez, 375.

¹⁴⁰ Williams, 248-9.

In the first place, Herrera relates that on a number of occasions Henry rejected pleas to rejoin the Church. Perhaps the most glaring incident occurred on the eve of renewed fighting in 1588 between Henry III, Henry of Navarre, and the Catholic League, when Henry III and the Queen Mother Catherine de Medici summoned the Prince of Bearne and implored him to convert to Catholicism in order to head off a succession crisis for the throne. Henry of Navarre not only refused these entreaties “because he was always obstinate in not wanting to leave his sect,” but he also supposedly schemed to kidnap Catherine de Medici and take her to the Huguenot stronghold La Rochelle; Henry apparently was only dissuaded from this outrageous scheme by his more level-headed advisors who claimed that kidnapping the Queen Mother would ruin his chances of ever becoming king.¹⁴¹

Accordingly, Herrera calls into question Henry’s sincerity when he finally decides to convert during the final years of the French Wars of Religion. This much- delayed request to convert

was suspected of fabrication and dissimulation, and a move of the state, more than that of religion, plotted out before hand without sincerity or devotion, especially not having seen any signs by which one could judge that this conversion was the work of God; and since [these signs] did not emerge, it appeared that the conversion did not originate from a proper spiritual inspiration, but instead from human persuasions....¹⁴²

In sum, Henry of Navarre only asked to re-enter the Church to further his bid for power. His spiritually bankrupt conversion accordingly encapsulated the cornerstone of reason of state thought: the subordination of religion to political ends.¹⁴³

Henry of Navarre’s behavior during the ceremony similarly reveals his insincere commitment to the Catholic faith. Herrera remarks that Henry’s confession was shockingly brief, which was surprising given the large number of sins Henry had committed, and that after the Mass Henry talked at length in private with the English ambassador.¹⁴⁴ The royal historian views the event not as a triumph for the Catholic faith, but as an ominous and lamentable episode. The fact that the French king’s first act after the conversion was to speak with the English served as shocking proof that Henry’s scandalous association with heretics would continue after his “conversion.” Indeed, the former Huguenot successfully convinced Clement VIII that he be allowed to maintain his alliance with the English as a condition of the absolution in exchange for allowing the implementation of the reforms of the Council of Trent.¹⁴⁵

Herrera thus presents Henry IV as a dangerous fraud who will likely still threaten the Church in spite of his conversion and absolution. The *Historia de los sucesos de Francia* keeps alive the memory of the controversial monarch’s many transgressions during the French Wars of Religion. It is important to consider that the Spanish crown sanctioned Herrera’s charged and controversial argument. As noted earlier, Philip II directed Herrera to write this history of the French Wars of Religion, and the work ultimately played a large part in Herrera being granted

¹⁴¹ “porque estuu siempre duro en no querer dexar su seta,” Herrera, 32.

¹⁴² “era sospechoso de ficción y disimulación, y un golpe de estado, mas q de religión, hecho antes con designo q con sinceridad ni deuocion, especialmente no se auiedo visto algunas señales, por las quales se pudiesse juzgar q esta conuersion era obra de Dios, y mas no pareciendo, como no parecía que procedía de propio mouimiento, sino de persuaciones humanas...” Herrera, 278.

¹⁴³ Fernández-Santamaría, 2:43-4.

¹⁴⁴ Herrera, 295-6.

¹⁴⁵ Williams, 226.

the post of Royal Chronicler of the Indies.¹⁴⁶ This work is a vivid example of how the Spanish crown made use of history writing as a political mechanism to protect and enhance its reputation and image. While Philip II was forced to reach a peace with Henry IV, through his history Herrera fires one last salvo against the French king in an effort to darken his historical image.

Spain Vindicated

Herrera's work not only defends Philip II by attacking the recently triumphant Henry IV, but also by valorizing the Spanish crown and its campaign in France. He portrays Philip II as the model Catholic monarch, and attempts to dispel the image of Spain's intervention in France as an act of expansionist aggression. Similarly, he argues that Philip II intervened at a critical moment in the French Wars of Religion, and that the French Catholics readily and gratefully accepted Spanish aid. This attempt to redeem the Spanish crown's image was no easy task for Herrera. Philip II's military intervention on behalf of the Catholic League was an extreme push for power; at no other time since the rule of Charles V had the French accusations of the Hapsburgs' pretensions of universal empire been more justified.¹⁴⁷

In the first place, Herrera writes that Philip II acted deliberately and carefully when war once again broke out between Henry of Navarre, the Catholic League, and Henry III in 1588, and that in spite of the Pope's direct urgings, the Spanish king refused to directly intervene in the escalating conflict due to his peace treaty with the Valois monarchs.¹⁴⁸ Philip II only took action after Henry III's assassination due to his pious commitment to protecting the Church. Herrera writes

It appeared to the Catholic King that his agreement to honor his peace with the kings of France no longer impeded him [due to the death of Henry III], and [since] it no longer was about the conservation of the Catholic religion, he accepted the call to protect the Catholics and started to employ his forces along different parts of France.¹⁴⁹

According to Herrera, this first round of aid that Philip II directed into France after the death of Henry III was substantial, affirming the monarch's desire the help the Catholic cause in the embattled kingdom. He writes that the secretary of the Spanish embassy in France Diego Maldodano was sent to Brittany with twenty thousand ducats and two hundred quintals of gunpowder for the purpose of aiding the Leaguer Duke of Mercoeur, whose forces were inferior to those of Henry of Navarre's in the region.¹⁵⁰ The arrival of Maldodano "greatly strengthened the Duke, and his situation was at all times improved;" soon after the *Maestro del Campo* Juan del Aguila was sent to Brittany with three thousand Spanish infantry, "with which the Duke of Mercoeur won land and reputation."¹⁵¹ Herrera frames this aid as being of great benefit to the

¹⁴⁶ Kagan, 138.

¹⁴⁷ Perez, 337.

¹⁴⁸ "apretaua al Rey Católico para que socorriesse a los Católicos, y los fauoreciesse de veras: poniéndole por delante el daño que se auia de seguir a sus Reynos, si la Corona caya en un hombre herege, especialmente en el Principe de Bearne.... Mas como el Rey Católico anduuo siempre muy mirado en no dar ocasión a Franceses de poder decir, que rompía la paz que con ellos tenia (por muchas que ellos le diesen) yua despacio en esto, aunque con desseo de no faltar a la religión." Herrera, 91.

¹⁴⁹ "El Rey Católico pareciendo q no le impedía mas el respeto de la paz q tenia con los Reyes de Francia, y q ya no se trataba sino de la conservación de la Religión Católica, acepto la proteccion de los Católicos, y comenci a emplear sus fuerças por diuersas partes de Francia." Herrera, 99.

¹⁵⁰ Herrera, 99-100.

¹⁵¹ "se esforcó mucho el Duque, y fue siempre mejorando;" "con que el Duque de Mercurio use ganando tierra y reputación." Herrera, 100.

Leaguers, while in fact modern scholars have argued that Philip II had territorial designs on Brittany.¹⁵²

Similarly, Herrera observes that Philip II's ambassador went to great lengths to help the Catholic League and the Church in France during the beginning days of the Spanish intervention. In a comment aimed at proving that Philip II had absolutely no designs on the French throne, he writes that Mendoza strove to raise funds for the ransom of the Cardinal de Bourbon (who was a potential heir to the throne and imprisoned by Henry of Navarre), "because he [the Cardinal] was the only remedy for the conservation of the religion and entire exclusion of Henry [of Navarre], from which would happen to soon follow a general peace in France."¹⁵³ He likewise writes that Mendoza labored for the well being of Paris and the Catholic cause during Henry of Navarre's brutal siege of the capital. "The ambassador don Bernardino de Mendoza in this time walked about the city, animating the people, and helping those that governed, advising that it [the government] come together, and his advice and authority were of much benefit, because in that city he had great standing..."¹⁵⁴ This praise is especially significant given that Mendoza was a controversial figure, and many of Spain's enemies saw the ambassador as a scheming agent whose primary concern was advancing the interests of the Spanish crown.¹⁵⁵

Unsurprisingly, Herrera writes that the French Catholics saw the Duke of Parma's lifting of the siege of Paris as a Godsend. He notes that the starving people of the French capital were sustained by the hope of Philip II's intervention, and that letters promising Spanish aid were read aloud to the populace.¹⁵⁶ According to the royal historian's assessment, the Parisians viewed the Spanish expeditionary force as their best hope of delivering them from Henry of Navarre's heretical rule.¹⁵⁷ As noted in the previous chapter, the residents of Paris endured horrible conditions during the siege, as Henry conducted his attack on the city with brutal effectiveness, resulting in the deaths of roughly 30,000 inhabitants out of a total population of 200,000.¹⁵⁸

As such, after Parma lifted the siege the Spanish forces "Were well received and admitted, and with much care they responded to the defense and guard of the city and, provided all that they could bring together with great care and cost on the part of the king..."¹⁵⁹ and that "They

¹⁵² Perez, 333.

¹⁵³ "pues era el único remedio para la conseruacion de la religión y entera exclusión de Enrique, de que se había de seguir luego una general quietud en Francia." Herrera, 108. The Cardinal de Bourbon died soon after the beginning of the Spanish crown's intervention.

¹⁵⁴ "El Embaxador don Bernardino de Mendoza andaua en este tiempo por la ciudad animando la gente, y ayudando a los que gouernauan aconsejándolo que convenía, y fue de mucho prouecho su consejo y autoridad porque en aquella ciudad tenia mucho crédito..." Herrera, 112.

¹⁵⁵ For instance, many of Spain's French enemies believed that Mendoza had a large hand in plotting the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre. Robert J. Knecht, *The French Civil Wars* (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), 165.

¹⁵⁶ Herrera, 144.

¹⁵⁷ Compared to the *Compendio y breve relación de la Liga y confederación Francesa* the siege of Paris does not factor as heavily into Herrera's narrative. While Herrera does mention the starvation and suffering of the Parisians during the siege, he does not go into the same level of vivid detail that Cornejo uses in his account of the ordeal. Likewise, Herrera appears to ascribe less importance to the event than Cornejo. This difference between the two authors can possibly be explained by when they wrote their respective works. Cornejo wrote his history shortly after the siege was lifted, and from his view the arrival of the Duke of Parma was a decisive turning point in the Wars of Religion. In contrast, Herrera was writing from the perspective of the war's end, and given Henry of Navarre's eventual victory the lifting of the siege of Paris might have been less momentous for the Spanish historian.

¹⁵⁸ Williams, 222.

¹⁵⁹ "Fueron bien recibidos y admitidos y con mucho cuydado acudían a la defensa y guarda de la ciudad y proueyan a quanto convenía con gran cuydado y gasto del Rey....," Herrera, 215-6.

found in the citizens of Paris much recognition and gratitude for past and present favors...¹⁶⁰ Herrera thus makes clear that the Parisians initially received the Spanish as saviors, not foreign occupiers. Indeed, he also writes that many other French cities came to rely on the military assistance of the Spanish empire, such as Rouen, in which “all hope was founded in the help of the Catholic King.”¹⁶¹

Herrera goes to considerable lengths to demonstrate that the French Catholics, at least initially, welcomed the Spanish forces with open arms. Herrera’s reproduction of a letter from Cardinal de Sens to Philip detailing the religious importance of the Spanish campaign in France highlights the politicized nature and mission of this history. In the letter the cardinal states that France has been infected by the impiety and fury (*rabia*) of heretics, yet a merciful God moved the pious Philip II, who chose to help the French “in this such great necessity, and thus certainly by his means we have been liberated from many and grave eminent dangers.”¹⁶² The Cardinal de Sens in turn offers a “thousand thanks” to the Catholic King for sending great sums of money and his armies to help the French Catholics, writing that his thanks are

neither as great nor as many as they should be, nonetheless [they are] the best and most affectionate that we can [give], offering and promising in every occasion to never forget this very distinguished favor, heretofore with much trust we again insistently supplicate you [Philip II] to continue to aid us and to remedy in good time our needs...¹⁶³

The Cardinal de Sens’ letter stands as a glowing testament to Spanish benevolence, and Herrera’s inclusion of the translated letter in its entirety serves an important rhetorical purpose. By presenting such a gushing description of the intervention and its importance for France in the cardinal’s own words, Herrera explicitly shows that French Catholics desired and appreciated Spain’s help. The letter serves as proof that the Spanish crown only strove to help France and combat heresy in the troubled kingdom.¹⁶⁴ In direct contrast to the demonized image of Henry IV found in this history, Herrera depicts Philip II as subordinating all other matters to the protection of the Catholic faith. Through this letter the royal historian thus draws attention to Philip II’s piety while obfuscating the monarch’s actual political goals behind the intervention. Many modern historians have in fact argued that Philip II pursued a foreign policy that was profoundly secular, and his military involvement in the French Wars of Religion was no different.¹⁶⁵ The Spanish king chose to aid the Catholic League largely because of dynastic considerations, as he sought to either place his daughter on the throne or to secure a stable

¹⁶⁰ “Hallaron en los ciudadanos de Paris mucho reconocimiento y agradecimiento por los beneficios pasados y presentes...” Herrera, 216.

¹⁶¹ “toda la esperanca se fundaua en las ayudas del Rey Católico.” Herrera, 315.

¹⁶² “en esta necesidad tan grande, y assi por cierto por su medio hemos sido librados de muchos y graues peligros eminentes.” Herrera, 254.

¹⁶³ “y si no tales, ni tantas como merecen, alomenos las mayores y mas afectuosas que podemos, ofreciéndonos en toda ocasión, y prometiendo, de no echar jamás en oluido este beneficio tan señalado, antes con mucha confianza de nuevo os suplicamos instantemente, por la continuación de ayudarnos, y remediar con tiempo nuestra necesidades...” Herrera, 254-5.

¹⁶⁴ See Anthony Grafton, *What was History?*, and D.A. Brading, *The First America* for rhetorical uses of using reproduced letters and quotations in early modern history writing.

¹⁶⁵ See Kamen, Perez, Williams. Manuel Fernández Álvarez, *Felipe II y su tiempo* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1998). In contrast, Geoffrey Parker asserts that religious messianism informed Philip II’s foreign policy. See *Philip II and Grand Strategy of Philip II*.

political situation for his only son through the war.¹⁶⁶ Herrera says nothing about these political aspirations, and instead asserts that religious ends were Philip II's sole concern.

Herrera further valorizes Philip II as the model Catholic monarch by comparing his selfless commitment to aiding the Catholic faith with the mercenary and opportunistic Italian princes who aided Henry of Navarre during the French Wars of Religion. Herrera alleges that the Venetian Senate, the Duke of Tuscany, and other unnamed Italian potentates sought to counter the potency of Spain by favoring Henry of Navarre and sending him large sums of money.¹⁶⁷ These Italian princes were only concerned with their political goals and followed "the reason of state as the shadow [follows] the body..."¹⁶⁸ In line with this thinking, Herrera claims that the Italians were convinced that Philip II likely would have demanded extensive financial and territorial restitution from France in exchange for his aid, as they cynically did not truly understand how a king could spend so much with only the service of God in mind. The Spanish historian unsurprisingly dismisses these claims as utterly ridiculous, as he stresses that Philip II "had no end other than that of the religion [Catholicism]" in his campaign against Henry of Navarre.¹⁶⁹

For Herrera, the Italian rulers embody the dangerous traits of reason of state politics: self-interested, impious, and conspiratorial. This assessment reflects the lukewarm relationship between Spain and Italy at the end of the sixteenth century. On the one hand, the reign of Philip II and Spanish hegemony over much of Italy brought peace and stability to the Peninsula after the tumultuous Italian Wars of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Nevertheless, in spite of its benefits Spanish rule in Italy came to be resented, as sixteenth-century Italians made Spaniards the scapegoats for their failures.¹⁷⁰ Distrust similarly marked the Spanish perception of the Italians in the late sixteenth century. The political theorist Alamos de Barrientos wrote that the larger independent Italian states resented Spanish dominance of the peninsula and longed to see it end.¹⁷¹ At the end of Philip II's reign the governor of Milan warned the Spanish court that there was a general desire in Italy to expand the Spaniards.¹⁷² Moreover, Italy was commonly viewed as the birthplace of reason of state, with the dangerous philosophy originating from the pen of Machiavelli.¹⁷³

Thus, like many of his contemporaries, Herrera viewed Italy with a good degree of trepidation and suspicion. In the royal historian's eyes, it was unsurprising that the Italian potentates would follow the heretical Henry of Navarre due to their subscription to reason of state politics. These rulers were willing to trample over religion in order to obtain any sort of political advantage. In contrast, Herrera asserts that Philip II selflessly devoted his resources to protecting the Catholic faith with no ulterior motive of political or territorial gain.

Indeed, the question of Philip II's supposed territorial aspirations was a very sensitive issue that was a blot on Spain's international image. Herrera writes that when the Spanish crown commenced its intervention, the supporters of the Prince of Bearn were quick to accuse Philip II of seeking to divide up the kingdom of France. In response to these accusations, "Don Bernardino de Mendoza, Ambassador of Spain, who viewed this cause with only the end of his

¹⁶⁶ Williams, 181. Perez, 337.

¹⁶⁷ Herrera, 118.

¹⁶⁸ "la razón destado como la sombra al cuerpo..." Herrera, 118.

¹⁶⁹ "no tenia mas fin que el de la religión" Herrera, 118.

¹⁷⁰ Eric Cochrane, *Italy, 1530-1630* (New York: Longman, 1988), 167-9.

¹⁷¹ Parker, *Grand Strategy*, 109.

¹⁷² Kamen, *Philip*, 309.

¹⁷³ Fernández-Santamaría, 1:21.

Prince, which was the service of God, not any other human [end], countered with many lively reasons the slander of his enemies, which was a difficult task.”¹⁷⁴ In truth Philip II did actually seek the partial dismantling of French territory, and he was not opposed to placing French provinces under the rule of the Spanish crown or its allies. In entering the war the Prudent King likely had designs on Languedoc and Brittany.¹⁷⁵ Moreover, he also sought to annex Provence and hand it over to the duke and duchess of Savoy.¹⁷⁶ The leaders of the Catholic League likewise used French territory as a bargaining chip in their negotiations with the Spanish crown over the marriage of the *Infanta* Isabella Clara Eugenia. In exchange for his daughter’s hand in marriage and the French throne the Leaguer Duke of Mayenne offered to give Philip II Provence and Picardy.¹⁷⁷

As a condition of the Peace of Vervins Philip II was forced to give up the French territory the Spanish had occupied during the course of the war, which included parts of Brittany, Languedoc, and the France-Comte, as well as the cities of Calais and Blavet.¹⁷⁸ With the exception of the marquisate of Saluzzo, which was conquered by Savoy, France’s territorial integrity remained intact.¹⁷⁹ As such, Herrera goes to significant lengths to obfuscate Philip II’s territorial aspirations, and to accordingly depict the Spanish crown as staunchly refusing to break apart the kingdom of France. According to the royal historian, on the eve of the intervention unnamed figures in the Spanish court urged the king to dismantle France on the basis that

there was no doubt that France united is such a powerful kingdom that could threaten the rest of Christendom, and that the French are naturally so troublesome that when seeing themselves and without war between them, they look for it with others, as has been seen, as the peace with Spain did not restrain [them]....¹⁸⁰

To support this view, the proponents of disunion cited the many times that the French crown had initiated war with Spain and the long history of rivalry between the two kingdoms.¹⁸¹

Responding to the argument that the Spanish crown could not in good conscience dismantle the kingdom, they state

that France was thusly like an infected and dangerous body to Christendom, because it was in league with all the enemies of the Church, with Turks, with Protestants, with England, and all the rebellious states of Flanders; it sought to excite the Turks and Moors against Christendom, it armed the Lutherans, urged the Calvinists [to act] against the

¹⁷⁴ ”Don Bernardino de Mendoza, Embaxador de España como quien miraua esta causa con solo el fin de su Principe q era el seruicio de Dios, sin otro humano, con muy viuas razones, por su parte deshazia las calumnias de sus enemigos, en que no tenia pequeño trauajo.” Herrera, 105.

¹⁷⁵ Perez, 333.

¹⁷⁶ Williams, 214.

¹⁷⁷ Perez, 334.

¹⁷⁸ Parker, *Philip II*, 182. Williams, 248-9.

¹⁷⁹ Williams, 248-9. Saluzzo lies near the Piedmont region in Italy.

¹⁸⁰ “no auia duda sino q Francia unido es tan poderoso Reyno q puede molestar todo lo demás de la Cristiandad, y q los Franceses son de naturaleza tan inquieta q viéndose unidos y sin guerra entre ellos las buscaran con otros, como se ha visto, q no embargante la paz con España...” Herrera, 129.

¹⁸¹ Herrera, 129

Church of God, had nests of heretics, as in Sedan, La Rochelle, Saint-Jean-d'Angély, Montauban, and Nimes, and others.¹⁸²

Furthermore, they allege that the Catholic League's campaign was a lost cause, as they felt that the majority of the kingdom supported Henry of Navarre, and that France was "a Babylon of *Politiques*, [with] men who neither valued religion nor God."¹⁸³ These figures felt that the base nature of France fully justified going to all-out war and breaking up the kingdom.¹⁸⁴

According to Herrera, these councilors argued that Philip II was well within his rights as sovereign of the Spanish empire to invade and break apart France. He in turn notes that many objected to this measure on the grounds that the maintenance of the good of all Christendom was not the responsibility of Spain, but instead was the domain of the Papacy (for spiritual matters) and the Holy Roman Emperor (for temporal matters). Nevertheless, those in favor of dismantling France had shocking answers for these concerns. They responded to this matter by stating,

although the king of Spain is neither Pope nor Emperor, he had as great a presence in Christendom because of the grandeur in his states, and he should consider the consequences of their good for the universal well-being of the Church, so the care of the universal good of Christendom pertains to him because his own states cover nearly all of Christendom and their trouble stirs up nearly all of the Christian Republic, and if any care for the good of the Church of God pertains to the Emperor, it matters much more to the [Spanish] king, who has greater states and greater jurisdictions.¹⁸⁵

These counselors thus advocated a radical interpretation of Spanish imperial power, in which the sheer grandeur and supremacy of Philip II's domains could justify the monarch's unilateral dissolution of another Catholic kingdom. In their eyes the Prudent King was an "emperor" in all but name, and he could act accordingly. They advance a truly radical vision of Spanish imperial might in which Philip II's political power was far greater than the Emperor's; as such the Spanish crown could act for the good of Christendom without paying heed to territorial boundaries. The imperial polemicists are calling for Philip II to move well beyond the standard confines of sovereignty held by a king.

These entreaties are a brazen call for Spain's imperial supremacy on the world stage. Interestingly, this platform seems to follow a reason of state line of argument. In the polemical counselors' schema, the might of the Spanish empire would justify circumventing the Catholic international political system of early modern Europe, and the Spanish crown could unilaterally

¹⁸² "q Francia era entonces como cuerpo infecto peligroso a la Christiandad, porque estaua en confederación con todos los enemigos de la Iglesia, con Turcos, con Protestantes, con Inglaterra, y con los estados de Flandes rebeldes, procuraua concitar los Turcos y Moros contra la Christiandad, armaua los Luteranos, solicitaua los Caluinistas contra la Iglesia de Dios, tenia nidos de hereges, como eran Sedan, la Rochela, san Juan de Anglei, Montaluan y Nimes, y otros." Herrera, 129.

¹⁸³ "una Babilonia de Politicos, hombres que no estiman ni a la religión, ni al proprio Dios." Herrera, 129.

¹⁸⁴ As previously noted, these views mirror the prevailing opinion of the French in sixteenth-century Spain. See Chapter 7 of Ballester Rodríguez.

¹⁸⁵ "aunque el Rey de España no es Papa ni Emperador, tenia tanta parte en la Christiandad, que el bien de sus estados por su grandeza, y porque la consecuencia se deue considerar bien uniuersal de la Iglesia, le tocaua el cuydado del bien uniuersal de la Christiandad porque sus estados particulares abraçan casi el uniuersal de la cristiandad y su trauajo disturba y inquieta toda la república Cristiana, y si toca al Emperador algún cuydado del bien de la Iglesia de Dios, tanto mas toca al Rey quanto tiene mayores estados y mayor jurisdicción." Herrera, 129.

dissolve the kingdom of France without any sort of Papal approval. This accordingly would be a subordination of religion to political ends, the hallmark of atheistic reason of state.¹⁸⁶ While these councilors claimed to be acting for well being of the Catholic faith, in reality they would be undermining the authority of the Church.

Herrera reveals that Philip II nevertheless flatly rejected these arguments of imperial domination, writing “With all this reasoning the Catholic King could never be induced to think about or seek any matter other than the conservation of the Catholic faith, although many French advised him of the goal this war had to have, and he knew of the intention carried by the Duke of Mena and others.”¹⁸⁷ With these councilors, Herrera in essence constructs a “straw-man” argument that closely resembles how Spain’s enemies commonly viewed Philip II and his supposed ambitions. These adversaries, most especially the French, Dutch, and English, believed that Philip II and the Hapsburgs had aspirations towards universal empire.¹⁸⁸ The intervention in France in particular served to further heighten these fears of Spanish imperial domination.¹⁸⁹ By relating that the Spanish king flatly rejected the above imperialist entreaties, he confirms that Philip II in fact had no expansive territorial or political goals behind his decision to intervene in France. This entire exchange serves to mend the Prudent King’s image as Herrera shows that he stood above the political dealings of the French and his own court, and remained steadfast in his commitment to defending the Catholic Church.

Moreover, this discussion provides fascinating insights into the world of Spanish imperial thought at the close of the sixteenth century. Herrera, and by extension his patron the Spanish court, take pains to broadcast that Philip II explicitly rejected an expansive and aggressive framing of the Spanish crown’s imperial power. As such, Herrera walks a fine line between depicting Philip II as the steadfast champion of the Catholic faith and making sure to note that he did possess any inklings of imperial expansion. The Spanish crown wanted to portray itself as being both superior and benign. This signals an important shift from the triumphalist depictions of Spanish imperial power found in the earlier sixteenth-century histories discussed in Chapter 1.

For instance, the vision of Spanish superiority that the councilors purportedly advance is reminiscent of Gregorio López Madera’s views. López Madera argues that Spain held the undeniable honor of being the preeminent Catholic kingdom in the world due to its unrivaled supremacy in a variety of political, cultural, and religious matters. He believes that Spain’s imperial grandeur could justify the Spanish crown’s involvement in the affairs of Catholic France. While López Madera does not explicitly advocate the disunion of France, he does essentially call for a Spanish dynastic take-over of the kingdom through his patronizing criticisms of Salic Law and support of the *Infanta*’s rights to the French throne. As such, López Madera and the counselors converge in their support of a radical intervention in France that fundamentally alters the political structure of the kingdom. These figures advance a radical interpretation of imperial power that allows for Spain to interfere in the inner workings of another Christian polity. Their respective frameworks elevate the Spanish crown above all of Christendom.

¹⁸⁶ Fernández-Santamaría, 44.

¹⁸⁷ “Con todas estas razones jamás se pudo induzir al Rey católico a que pensasse ni procurasse otra cosa sino la conseruacion de la Fe católica, aunque muchso Franceses le aduertian del fin que auia de tener esta guerra, y sabia la intención que lleuaua el duque de Mena y otros.” Herrera, 129.

¹⁸⁸ See Marie Tanner, *Last Descendant of Aeneas* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), and Peer Schmidt, “Felipe II y el mundo germánico,” in *Imágenes históricas de Felipe II*, ed. by Alfredo Alvar Ezquerro (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Cervantinos, 2000), 70-1.

¹⁸⁹ Perez, 337.

Herrera clearly attempts to distance Philip II from this aggressive vision of imperium, which had become a troubling liability at the end of the sixteenth century. Instead of emphasizing the unquestioned superiority of Spain through historical argument, the royal historian seeks to portray Philip II as a benevolent monarch who safeguarded the Church and bridled the calls for conquest emanating from his court.

In this vein Herrera repeatedly notes that Philip II made good on his pledge not to occupy and seize any French territory during his war with Henry of Navarre. He writes that after the siege of Paris Philip II sent a large cavalry regiment into France “with orders to not occupy (as was previously told) an inch of land, only to help the Catholic cause, and thus [to help] the Duke of Joyeuse.”¹⁹⁰ Similarly, Herrera states that even after the war had largely turned against Philip II and members of the Catholic League had begun defecting to Henry of Navarre’s camp at an increasing rate, the Spanish king still refused to allow his forces to seize any French territory. After the Spanish army had captured La Chapelle-du-Mont-de-France after losing a substantial number of men in the fighting, Philip II refused to seize the city, and installed a son of the Marshal of Rouen (a prominent Leaguer) as a sign of the Spanish crown’s continuing good will to the Catholic League and commitment to defending the Church in France.¹⁹¹ In Herrera’s eyes the Spanish army’s presence in France was wholly benign and munificent. Indeed, the Spanish crown is portrayed as making noteworthy sacrifices for the benefit of the French Catholics, thus further proving Philip II’s heroic and selfless commitment to the Catholic cause.

In spite of these noble intentions, Herrera argues that one of the main reasons that the intervention in France failed was because Henry of Navarre fooled the French into following him by exploiting their sense of patriotism. Henry’s ability to tap into the kingdom’s patriotic sentiment was indeed a major foundation of his success; the machinations of the Catholic League and Philip II’s intervention shocked the majority of French Catholics and pushed them into Henry’s camp.¹⁹² According to Herrera’s interpretation of Henry of Navarre’s rising popularity, the former Huguenot unjustly vilified Philip II and the Spanish in order to consolidate his own hold on power. He writes that Henry’s agents claimed that the governor of Flanders Archduke Ernesto was planning to invade France with a powerful army and occupy part of the kingdom. This news proved to be nothing more than a rumor that

was invented by the Royalists in order to put the Spanish in a bad light, and to persuade the Leaguers to reconcile with them [the royalists], for the common defense of the state. And other similar inventions were used at every step, in order to sew suspicion and division between those of the union [Catholic League].¹⁹³

Henry of Navarre falsely portrayed the Spanish as foreign invaders and exploited French proto-national sentiment for his own political ends.

Indeed, in a telling statement concerning Henry IV’s reason of state ethos, Herrera writes that he decided to wage war against the Spanish domains not only to seek revenge against Philip

¹⁹⁰ “con orden de no ocupar (como atrás queda referido) un palmo de tierra, sino asistir la causa Católica, y por ella al Duque de Joyosa.” Herrera, 153.

¹⁹¹ Herrera, 319.

¹⁹² Perez, 335.

¹⁹³ “fue inuentada de los Realistas para constituir en mala opinión a los Españoles, y persuadir a los confederados, que se reconciasen con ellos, para la común defensa del estado. Y de otras semejantes inuenciones se usaua a cada passo, para poner sospechas y diuision entre los de la parte de la unión.” Herrera, 305.

II, but to also “clean France of the humors that the civil war had generated.”¹⁹⁴ This declaration of war was nothing more than a calculated maneuver designed to solidify the former Huguenot’s hold on power. According to Herrera, Henry falsely claimed that Philip II, under pretenses of piety, was responsible for the discord that had been infecting France, and that the monarch sought to divide the kingdom. In response to these imagined injuries he sought to “wage open war on the King of Spain by sea and by land and on all of his subjects, vassals, and lands in order to avenge himself of the injuries that he had received, as the kings [of France] his predecessors had done.”¹⁹⁵ Henry of Navarre thus purposefully distorted Spain’s image in order to substantiate his unjust declaration of war.

Herrera accordingly argues that Henry IV’s success in rallying French support through these dubious means was a major affront to the Spanish crown.¹⁹⁶ In his opening dedication to prince Philip, the future Philip III, he writes

Here one will see the inventions, and the deceits with which the enemies sought to seduce the poor Catholics of that miserable kingdom, afflicted with so many disorders to separate them from their sacred purpose, and of the belief that they had, that the king our seigneur, and father of your highness, moved by his substantial and pure piety, and generosity in the help that he gave them, they were persuaded that he did that in order to usurp, or divide that state. The liberality of Your Highness, composed of a sincere spirit and zeal for the protection of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman faith was so enduring that it revealed the ingratitude of those who had the least right to use it with him, that which will make this monarch eternally glorious, for he has saved the Catholic religion in [France], and given with his arms a Christian king to that kingdom.¹⁹⁷

As such, through their slanderous lies Spain’s enemies warped Philip II’s genuine and heartfelt commitment to protecting the Catholic faith in France to further their own power. The monarch had nothing put pure and pious intentions, but Henry of Navarre and his supporters unjustly accused him of being a tyrant with sinister imperial ambitions. Ingratitude and a blackened reputation were the Spanish crown’s rewards for the benevolent sacrifices it made on behalf of France. This opening dedication thus reveals *Historia de los sucesos de Francia’s* central theme: to set the historical record straight and present a “true” history of the French Wars of Religion that corrects the blatantly false claims made about the Spanish monarchy.

For Herrera, arguably one of the major affronts suffered by the Spanish monarchy during the French Wars of Religion was the rejection of Isabella Clara Eugenia as the proper candidate for the French throne. This matter, in turn, was one of the more controversial aspects of Philip

¹⁹⁴ “por limpiar a Francia de los humores que tenia que auia engendrado la guerra ciuil.” Herrera, 316.

¹⁹⁵ “hazer guerra abierta al Rey de España por mar y por tierra y a todos sus súbditos, vassallos, y tierras para vengarse de las injurias que auia recebido, como lo auian hecho los Reyes sus predecesores.” Herrera, 349.

¹⁹⁶ Herrera, 350.

¹⁹⁷ “Aquí se verán las inuenciones, y los engaños con q los contrarios procurauan de seducir a los pobres Católicos de aquel miserable reyno, afligido con tantas turbulencias para apartallos de su santo propósito, y de la creencia q tenían, de q mouido el Rey nuestro señor, y Padre de VA de su mucha y pura piedad, y benignidad en las ayudas q los daua, se persuadiesen q lo hazia por usurpar, o diuidir aquel estado. Esta a liberalidad de su M hecha con animo sincero y zeloso de la conseruacion de la religión Católica, Apostólica Romana, fue la q al cabo permaneciendo hizo conocer la ingritud de los q menos obligación tenían de usalla con el, y la q hará eternamente glorioso a este monarca, pues ha conseruado en ella la religión Católica, y ha dado con sus armas Rey Christiansissimo a aquel reino.” Herrera, fol.1.

II's intervention, and many of Spain's enemies saw the campaign to make the *Infanta* the queen of France as proof of the Spanish monarch's imperialist intentions. Indeed, Philip sought to govern France, either indirectly or directly, through his daughter.¹⁹⁸ Herrera accordingly deals at length with this controversial matter, working to justify Isabella's claim to the throne and argue that Philip II had no designs over France.

Herrera writes that Isabella Clara Eugenia had substantial right to the French crown through her blood relation to the Valois monarchy, and due to this connection she should have enjoyed a good amount of support in France. In a detailed account of the convening of the Estates General in France that covered the succession crisis, he relates how the Spanish representative Don Íñigo de Mendoza eloquently demonstrated to the Estates General that the crown should pass to Isabella Clara Eugenia, as she was the "*hija primogénita*" of Elizabeth of Valois, the elder sister of Henry III.¹⁹⁹ In turn, many of the French representatives at the meeting approved of the measure to support electing Isabella Clara Eugenia as queen, "judging, that it was very appropriate for that Kingdom, to have a prize that secure...."²⁰⁰

Herrera writes, however, that some French, as well as unnamed foreign Princes, opposed and sabotaged this nomination of Isabella

out of particular passions, and with artifices, (as in effect happened) not having respect to the cause of God, nor all that the Catholic King had done for that kingdom, until then, without attending to matters so justified, the Catholic ministers valuing everything ahead [at the expense] of the general good, and considering as well, that it is a natural matter of the French to hold foreigners in poor esteem, and that they would unwillingly receive a foreign king.²⁰¹

In light of these objections concerning the likely French antipathy towards electing a foreign monarch, the French Catholic ministers, after a good deal of debate, agreed that the *Infanta* should marry the Duke of Guise.²⁰²

Philip II's lawyers assured him throughout the proceedings that his daughter had a solid right to the throne, and the monarch accordingly did not consider Salic Law to be an insurmountable obstacle.²⁰³ In truth this campaign was a pipedream, not only due to Salic Law, but also because the *Infanta's* ascension to the throne would have meant that the French would have had to recognize the supremacy of the Spanish.²⁰⁴ Herrera in turn attempts to delegitimize this substantial opposition to the *Infanta* by noting that these objections were rooted in baseless anti-Spanish sentiment or crass political biases. For example, the Duke of Mayenne of the Catholic League opposed this plan because of his own aspirations to be crowned king.²⁰⁵ Other

¹⁹⁸ Perez, 337. Williams, 221.

¹⁹⁹ Herrera, 270.

²⁰⁰ "juzgando, que era muy a propósito para cual Reyno, tener prenda tan segura...." Herrera, 270.

²⁰¹ por particulares pasiones, y con artificios, (como en efecto succedio) no teniendo respeto a la causa de Dios, ni a cuanto el Rey Católico por aquel Reyno auia hecho, hasta entonces, sin atender a cosas tan justificadas, los ministros Católicos posponiendo lo todo al bien general, y considerando también, que es natural cosa de los Franceses estimar en poco a los estrangeros, y que de mala gana reciben Rey estrangero." Herrera, 270-1.

²⁰² Herrera, 271.

²⁰³ Kamen, *Philip of Spain*, 297. Perez, 334.

²⁰⁴ Manuel Fernández Álvarez, *Felipe II y su tiempo* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1998), 587.

²⁰⁵ Herrera, 271-2.

naysayers believed that the Duke of Guise was comparatively too low of status to marry the *Infanta*; in turn

others who looked at these matters with malice, said that the Catholic King desired the disunion of the State [France]: at the least [wanting] to occupy Brittany and Provence, because [with] the *Infanta* being elected as Queen of France, in time he would not lack means to pursue his intentions: but those who knew the sincerity of the will of the Catholic King, and that his principal aim was the good of the Catholic Religion.²⁰⁶

Likewise, while Herrera writes that some French parties opposed the *Infanta*'s bid because they thought it would scrap (*deséchala*) Salic Law, he notes that Isabella herself had a substantial legal claim to the throne. The royal historian argues that Isabella Clara Eugenia's blood ties to the Valois dynasty not only entitled her to the French throne, but also the inheritance of a substantial swath of French territory. Herrera writes that the *Infanta*, as the daughter of the deceased Henry III's eldest sister, should legally inherit the Counties of Provence, Clermont, Flers, Champagne, and Toulouse, and the Dukedoms of Burgundy, Normandy, Gascony, Brittany, Albania, and Bourbon.²⁰⁷

In spite of the strength of Isabella Clara Eugenia's case, the opponents of Spain were gradually able to turn the Estates General to their side, and the body eventually dismissed the *Infanta*'s claim to the throne.²⁰⁸ According to Herrera, this flagrant disregard of the *Infanta*'s rights was rightly considered to be a notable injustice by her Spanish and remaining French supporters, yet Philip II decided not to press the matter due to his wish to maintain good relations with the Catholic League and to not interfere in the internal affairs of France.²⁰⁹ Framing this turn of events as a grievous mistake on the part of the French, he writes that having Isabella Clara Eugenia as queen would have been a sure way to decisively end the dangerous ambitions of Henry of Navarre and insure the safety of the Catholic faith in the kingdom.²¹⁰ Herrera writes that the matter definitively came to an end at the "junta" (council) of Suresnes, when the Leaguer leader the Duke of Mayenne out of personal spite for the Duke of Guise and his own desire for the throne, sabotaged the proceedings and persuaded the *Parlement* of Paris to issue a decree that forbade any foreigner from becoming ruler of France, thus definitively excluding the *Infanta* from taking the throne and paving the way for Henry of Navarre's ascension.²¹¹

The campaign to make the *Infanta* the queen was a disaster both for the Spanish crown's international image and for the war effort in France, as it convinced many Frenchmen that they needed to support Henry of Navarre in order to preserve their kingdom's national independence.²¹² In contrast to the prevailing view in France, Herrera portrays the Spanish crown as the victim during these proceedings, and his framing of the *Infanta*'s bid for the French throne completely absolves Philip II of having any ulterior political motives. He demonstrates

²⁰⁶ "otros que mirauan estas cosas con malicia, dezian que el Rey Católico desseaua la diuision del Estado: a lo menos ocupar a Bretaña, y a Prouenca, porque siendo la Infanta elegida por Reyna de Francia, no le faltarian con el tiempo medios para seguir su intento: pero los que sabían la sinceridad de la voluntad del Rey Católico, y que su principal mira, era el bien de la religión Católica." Herrera, 274.

²⁰⁷ Herrera, 276.

²⁰⁸ Kamen, 299.

²⁰⁹ Herrera, 159.

²¹⁰ Herrera, 275-6.

²¹¹ Herrera, 289-90.

²¹² Williams, 221.

that the Spanish king acted entirely with restraint and benevolence as he sought to benefit the French Catholics in his campaign to make his daughter queen. By revealing that Philip II insisted on allowing the Estates General to decide the matter, Herrera asserts that the Spanish king was hardly an aggressive imperialist intent on expanding his own domains through his daughter.

Spain Betrayed

Given Herrera's frustration over the fate of the *Infanta's* claims in France, it should come as little surprise that he presents a less than rosy account of the relations between Spain and the Catholic League. Indeed, he argues that the intervention in the French Wars of Religion failed largely because of the incompetence, greed, and disloyalty of the majority of the Leaguers. In his view the Catholic League made for toxic allies.

Philip II gave an immense amount of aid to the Leaguers. Shortly after the death of Henry III Philip agreed to provide the leaders of the Catholic League a generous monthly stipend while they fought Henry of Navarre.²¹³ All told the Spanish crown paid these Catholic nobles roughly three million ducats over the course of this conflict.²¹⁴ At first Philip II never intended to provide direct military aid to the League, and his order for the Army of Flanders to lift the siege of Paris was only meant to be a one-off intervention. Rather, he hoped that the military task would largely remain in the hands of the Leaguers.²¹⁵ Nevertheless, this did not prove to be the case, as the Catholic nobles repeatedly met defeat at the hands of Henry of Navarre.²¹⁶

Herrera himself makes clear his contempt for the shoddy military performance of the Spanish crown's French allies. For instance, he writes that the Leaguer leader the Duke of Joyeuse received a great deal of disgust from the Spanish commander Juan de Anaya over his cowardly behavior during a battle with Henry of Navarre's forces near Carcassonne. Anaya believed that the Catholic forces could have taken the city if they had pressed the fight against the Prince of Bearne's general the Duke of Montmorency, yet the Duke of Joyeuse instead ordered his forces to retreat. Indeed, Herrera writes that the French Catholics were being overly cautious with the deployment of their forces at the battle.²¹⁷ The Leaguer's cowardice was likely to blame for the failure to capture Carcassonne.

Herrera writes that the Catholic League continued to fight very poorly when aided by the Spanish forces. He notes that at the battle of Caudebec-en-Caux the French captains acted with little prudence and patience, and that they badly executed the order given to them by the Duke of Parma. Herrera claims that many of these troops ended up deserting, and that the Duke of Mayenne's entire cavalry openly stated that they wished to leave the battle; these disorders resulted in the eventual retreat of the Catholic forces.²¹⁸ The cowardly squabbles of the Leaguers were a significant drain on the war effort against the Prince of Bearne.

Herrera writes that the members of the Catholic League were not only unreliable fighters, but they also defected to Henry of Navarre's camp in droves as the conflict progressed. One of the first major Leaguers to abandon the Catholic cause was the Seigneur of Vitry. Herrera bitterly observes that in spite of the substantial assistance given to him by the Spanish crown, this noble joined the Prince of Bearne's camp at the beginning of 1594 and handed over the city

²¹³ Williams, 180-1.

²¹⁴ Parker, *Philip II*, 182.

²¹⁵ Kamen, 297.

²¹⁶ Vincent J. Pitts, *Henri IV of France: His Reign and Age* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 194-5.

²¹⁷ Herrera, 178.

²¹⁸ Herrera, 205.

of Meaux, of which he was governor. As payment for this betrayal the Seigneur received thirty thousand ducats and the office of captain of Henry of Navarre's personal guard.²¹⁹ Soon after, a number of other Catholic League Captains and cities sided with Henry of Navarre, and the *Parlement* of Paris even issued a decree backing him as king.²²⁰ Paris' change of allegiance was especially significant, since the city had long opposed the Prince of Bearne and supported the Catholic League.²²¹ Importantly, in a jab at the mercenary character of Henry of Navarre's supporters, Herrera portrays these changes in allegiance as being motivated by greed and political opportunism. The former Huguenot expanded his camp not by appealing to religion or noble ideals, but through base temptations of wealth and power.

For Herrera, the Duke and the Duchess of Guise perhaps perpetrated the most egregious betrayal. The Guise family, the House of Lorraine, was the head of the Catholic League, and Philip II maintained a longstanding alliance with them that dated back to 1584.²²² As such, their defection was a major blow to the Spanish crown's campaign in France. Herrera writes that shortly after the Seigneur of Vitry switched sides the Duchess of Guise (the Duke of Guise's mother) decided to negotiate a peace with Henry of Navarre. The ministers of Philip II offered the Guise family money and soldiers in order to continue to fight against Henry of Navarre, yet the Duchess "deceiving the common sense of men" rejected these supplications and sided with the former enemy of her house. Her young son the Duke of Guise followed suit with these plans.²²³

Predictably, Herrera considers this change in allegiance to be a horrid act of treachery. He states that the scheme of the Guise family

took away much authority from the union [Catholic League], and from the part of the Catholics for whom mattered that the Catholic League endured, but as for the rest of the [fortified] towns that the Duke had, they were so heavily in the interior of France that it would be a very hard enterprise for the Catholic King to maintain and garrison them, and [at] infinite spending...so that it would not end up being good for the Catholic King to return to scatter in France so much money, sustaining ones and the others with danger of being deserted, conforming to the custom of the French who govern only for the present.²²⁴

The royal historian thus presents the treachery of the Duke and Duchess of Guise as a major setback and an affront against the Spanish crown. Philip II displayed an unwavering commitment to helping the Catholic League and its nominal leaders the House of Lorraine, even pushing for the marriage of his daughter and the Duke of Guise. Yet this blatant act of political opportunism undid the Spanish crown's substantial labors and sacrifices.

²¹⁹ Herrera, 313.

²²⁰ Herrera, 326-7.

²²¹ Parker, *Philip II*, 182. N.M. Sutherland, *Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion* (Bristol: Elm Bank, 2002), 8-9.

²²² Kamen, 256-7.

²²³ "defraudando el común juyzio de los hombres" Herrera, 336.

²²⁴ "quito mucha autoridad a la unión, y a la parte de los Católicos por lo que importaua q se conserbara, pero quanto a lo demás las placas que tenia el Duque, estauan tan dentro de Francia q fuera empresa muy dura para el Rey Católico mantenerlas y presidialas, y gasto infinito...tanto mas q no tornaua bienal Rey Católico boluer a esparcir en Francia tanto dinero, sustentando a unos y a otros con peligro de ser desamparado, conforme al uso de los Franceses q se gouiernan solamente por lo presente." Herrera, 336-7.

Indeed, in an indication of his anti-French sentiment, Herrera uses this episode to issue a broader claim about the capricious and selfish nature of the French political character, as he notes that political expediency was more convenient for the French nobility than any religious cause. In essence, he portrays Henry's growing support, which was largely based on French patriotic sentiment, as an abandonment of religion. There emerges an understanding in the text that the Spanish crown was far more concerned with the security of the Catholic Church in France than the majority of the French themselves.

The war against Henry of Navarre grew increasingly difficult as the Spanish crown saw itself abandoned by its allies in France. Over time Philip II had to send in more and more of his forces into France, to the effect that the Catholic King "greatly regretted that with so many forces as he had put into France better progresses were not made...." and the monarch had to deploy the Duke of Parma and the Army of Flanders into French territory on three separate occasions in order to attempt to turn the tide of war in favor of the Catholics.²²⁵ In direct contrast to his initial goal of only maintaining a minimal military presence in the kingdom, Philip II ended up maintaining at great expense Spanish garrisons in Brittany, Languedoc, the Franche-Comte, Savoy, and Paris.²²⁶ The war in France became a quagmire, and Herrera laments that Philip II "had spent much in France without achieving effects proportionate to these costs."²²⁷

The royal historian notes that the costs of this intervention were indeed great. He writes that the Spanish army's supplies became so meager that most of the troops' rations consisted of twelve ounces of black bread and two *reales*, and in order to find food many soldiers were forced to abandon their posts and go out into the countryside and forage. In contrast, "The Army of Henry, as it every day increased in number by the many people that it had added, abounded with provisions that came from the nearby villages..."²²⁸ Given these poor conditions Parma feared that a mutiny would break out among his troops, and he ordered his forces to quietly retreat in the night.²²⁹ Writing of this retreat, the Spanish historian says "This retreat of an army that was badly paid, hungry, and afflicted with bad sites on account of continuous rain and bad weather, was judged to be prudent and well ordered."²³⁰ This outcome is a vivid example of the difficult conditions that the Army of Flanders in France endured while the French came to unjustly treat the Spanish as foreign invaders.

Herrera notes these conditions not to reveal the weakness of the Spanish empire at the end of Philip II's reign, but to chronicle the immense sacrifices that the Spanish crown made for the good of France and the Catholic faith. In the royal historian's view, the intervention in France was certainly a costly endeavor, but Spain still remained strong. He writes that as the war against Henry of Navarre wore on,

one considered that Alexander [the Great], and the Romans, as well as the Turk enjoyed fortune because they never waged two large wars as the same time, while the Catholic King had upon himself four very large [wars], one with his rebels in the Low Countries,

²²⁵ "sentía mucho q con tantas fuerças como auia metido en Francia no se hiziessen mayores progresos...." Herrera, 208.

²²⁶ Parker, *Philip II*, 182.

²²⁷ "auia gastado mucho en Francia sin seguirse efeto y igual a los gastos." Herrera, 341.

²²⁸ "El Exercito de Enrique así como cada día acrecentaua de numero por la mucha gente q audia, abundaua de vitualla que le yua de los lugares cercanos...." Herrera, 204.

²²⁹ Herrera, 205.

²³⁰ "Esta retirada de un exercito mal pagado, hambriento y aflixido con los malos sitios por las continuas lluuias y malos tiempos, fue juzgada por prudente y bien ordenada." Herrera, 206.

one with France, one with England, and one with the Turk: all apart from the secret enemies, who are much worse than the public ones, it was desirable to consider in what way to wage war, so that they could hope for better outcomes than before.²³¹

Importantly, in laying out this Herculean task facing Philip II at the end of his reign, Herrera imparts a triumphalist message regarding Spanish imperial power. The Spanish crown was fighting four separate wars concurrently, while the great empires of Alexander the Great, the Romans, and the Ottomans only undertook one war at a time. This comparison certainly is a testament to Spain's might.

Nonetheless, Herrera's statement also reveals his outrage over the outcome of the French Wars of Religion and the resulting vulnerability of the Spanish empire at the close of the sixteenth century. Although Spain remained powerful, many enemies still threatened the kingdom and its domains. In reality Philip II had avoided the wise advice of his father to avoid a multi-front war;²³² thanks to his decision to intervene in the civil war the Spanish crown had to contend with France, the Dutch, and the English.²³³ Importantly, for the first time in his reign Philip II had to face the full power of France in open war.²³⁴ Nevertheless Herrera asserts that Philip II's policies were not to blame for this strategic predicament; rather the fault lay on Spain's "secret enemies." His remarks about these hidden enemies reveals Herrera's belief that craven adversaries stabbed Spain in the back while hiding under the false guise of neutrality or even friendship. In other words, at the end of Philip II's reign a conspiracy was afoot to bring down the Spanish empire. In spite of the Spanish crown's commitment to protecting the Church, even other Catholic powers could not be fully trusted in this toxic climate of subterfuge.

Herrera's anger at these unseen enemies becomes particularly evident in his discussion of Henry of Navarre's absolution by the Papacy. Having already once abjured the Catholic faith, Henry again requested that he be allowed to re-enter the Church after the death of Henry III. In the final years of his pontificate Sixtus V was amenable to this appeal, but Philip II's stern objections prevented any further action. Indeed, Philip exercised a sort of informal imperialism over the Vatican during much of his reign, as the Spanish crown strongly influenced Papal policy through a combination of military coercion and benevolent patronage. Although the Spanish presence in Rome proved resilient throughout the seventeenth century, this influence did begin to chip away during the final years of Philip II's reign.²³⁵ Chance played a notable role in Henry IV's eventual absolution, as the sudden deaths of the pro-Spanish Gregory XIV and his successor Innocent IX led to the election of the strong-willed Clement VIII.²³⁶ During the early years of his pontificate Spanish-Papal cooperation remained quite strong, and Spanish patronage and pensions continued to flow to Rome.²³⁷ Nevertheless, this relation chilled when Clement VIII

²³¹ "se consideraua, que la fortuna de Alexandre y de los Romanos, y también la de los Turcos, fue porque nunca tuuieron dos guerras grandes en un mismo tiempo, y que teniendo el Rey Caótico sobre sí quatro grandissimas, la de sus rebeldes en los países baxos, la de Francia, la de Inglaterra, y la del Turco: allende de los enemigos secretos, que son mucho peores que los públicos, conuenía erar en que forma se auia de guerrear, demanera que se pudiesen esperar mejores sucesos que hasta entonces." Herrera, 341.

²³² Fernández Álvarez, 610.

²³³ Parker, *Philip II*, 183.

²³⁴ Williams, 228.

²³⁵ Thomas James Dandeleet, *Spanish Rome, 1500-1700* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 94.

²³⁶ Williams, 224.

²³⁷ Dandeleet, 93-4.

went against the wishes of the Spanish crown and chose to absolve Henry of Navarre in 1595. Predictably, Herrera believed this controversial decision to be a grievous mistake.

Clement VIII absolved Henry IV in large part because of the growing French support for their king, and because the Pope believed that the former Huguenot's repeated and humble requests for absolution were sincere.²³⁸ Herrera unsurprisingly presents a different view of these proceedings. He asserts that Henry's supporters in Rome used a combination of fear mongering and bribery to push Clement VIII into allowing the former Huguenot back into the Church. He writes that this pro-French faction had a very strong presence in Rome, and whenever arguments were made against the absolution in the Papal court Henry's agents caused a great commotion in order to derail the proceedings. Henry's supporters threatened the Papacy, as they

proposed many difficulties that could follow, and especially the division in France of the Church, where the nomination of a Patriarch would take away obedience from the Holy See, and that in this many cities would come together, and that many desired that the Papacy absolve him [Henry of Navarre], and such was true, that the good desired this [the absolution] not because they took Henry for a Catholic, but because they hoped that from that path they could escape from so many troubles.²³⁹

As such, Henry's party used the unity of the Church as a bargaining chip as they threatened the Papacy with the possibility of religious schism and the establishment of a separate French Church. The belief that Henry's absolution would prevent the apostasy of France was in fact a major factor behind Clement VIII's decision.²⁴⁰

Herrera singles out the Cardinal Filippo Sega as Henry of Navarre's strongest adherent amongst the clergy. Like the rest of Henry's supporters, the cardinal largely framed his argument for the absolution in political terms, threatening the Papacy with the possibility of schism, and stating that it would have been impossible to deny the Prince of Bearne the crown due to his popularity in France.²⁴¹ In response to these claims

The Pope proceeded with care, as it appeared to him that the arms of the Catholic King that had forced Henry to undertake the conversion that he did, and that would make him persist in being Catholic, and to give at the least apparent signs of that [the conversion], did not have the success that was aspired to, nor achieve the progress that was hoped for.²⁴²

This mention that Philip II's intervention was responsible for pushing Henry of Navarre to convert to Catholicism is a paltry acknowledgement of the Spanish crown's sacrifices during the

²³⁸ Dandeleit, 94.

²³⁹ "proponiendo muchos inconuenientes que se podían seguir, y en especial una diuision en Francia de la Iglesia, adonde con el nombramiento de un Patriarcha quitarían la obediencia a la santa Sede, y que en esto concurrían muchas ciudades, y que muchos desseauan que el Papa le absoluiesse, y así era verdad, que los buenos lo desseauan, no porque tuiessen a Enrique por Católico, sino porque esperauan poder por aquel camino salir de tantos trabajos." Herrera, 303.

²⁴⁰ Dandeleit, 94.

²⁴¹ Herrera, 339.

²⁴² "El Papa andauan en cuydado, pareciéndole que las armas del Rey Católico que auian forçado a Enrique a hazer la conuersion que hizo, y auian de ser las que le auian de hacer perseuerar en ser caotlico, y dar alomenos aparentes muestras dello, no tenían la fecilidad que se pretendía, ni hazina los progresos que se auia esperado." Herrera, 339.

French intervention. According to Herrera's argument, the war against the Prince of Bearne failed because Philip II's supposed allies in France and Rome turned their backs on Spain; indeed, as Herrera notes elsewhere in this history, the Papacy initially strongly lobbied the Spanish crown to intervene in France.²⁴³

While the Pope believes that Spain's role in the conflict drove the Prince of Bearne to convert, Herrera clearly views the conversion as a spiritually bankrupt deception. The former Huguenot did not deserve Papal absolution, and certainly was not to be trusted or fit to be king of France. The royal historian notes

it was certain that Henry, since he was a baby, had been raised in the heresy, and it is difficult to leave that which is sucked from the milk of the mother, and more so being his ailment of relapse, thus that having once abjured the heresy, he returned to it, and had with much force looked for means to expand it, in France as well in other parts, necessitating him to favor heretics and infidels, as was seen in the bull of Pope Sixtus V.²⁴⁴

Nonetheless, Herrera shows that Clement VIII came to be taken in by the calls to absolve Henry of Navarre. He writes that the Prince of Bearne's supporters led the Pope to believe the ridiculous claims that Henry's absolution would bring about a lasting peace between Spain and France, thus allowing the two kingdoms to join forces and fight "the common enemies of the faith."²⁴⁵ In truth, while Clement VIII would later take great pride in brokering the Peace of Vervins in 1598, the absolution itself did nothing to immediately end the hostilities between Henry IV and Philip II.²⁴⁶

Importantly, according to Herrera, Henry's supporters continued to couch their case in political terms, as they argued that the tide of war had turned against Philip II and the Spanish crown had lost *reputación*, while in contrast Henry of Navarre had continued to experience gains every day.²⁴⁷ Perhaps the most insidious claim that Clement VIII had listened to was the accusation that Spain had come to dominate the Papal court. He writes

to the people who were closest to his Holiness understand that this absolution was conducive to the liberty of the Roman Court, where the Catholic King was absolute, and that it was necessary to keep in equilibrium the bands of France and of Spain, and there was no-one that did not remember the munificence of the kings of France, in giving to that court prelacies, abbeys, and pensions with which they [Papal courtiers] were made rich, all of which the couriers were deprived of, were the absolution not made.²⁴⁸

²⁴³ See above, pgs. 14-5.

²⁴⁴ "era cierto q Enrique desde niño se auia criado en la heregia, y es dificultoso dexarlo que se mama en la lecha, y mas siendo su dolencia de recayda, pues que auiendo una vez abjurado la heregia, boluio a ella, y auia con mucha fuerca buscado medios para estendella, assi en Francia, como en otras partes, pidiendo para ello fauor a hereges e infieles, como se veía en la bula del Pontifice Sixto V." Herrera, 352.

²⁴⁵ Herrera, 351.

²⁴⁶ Dandeleit, 95.

²⁴⁷ Herrera, 351.

²⁴⁸ "a las personas que mas cerca andauan de su Santidad, dauan a entender que esta absolución conuenia por la libertad de la Corte de Roma, a donde era absoluto el Rey Católico, y que era necesario mantener los bandos de Francia y de España, allende de q no auia nadie que no se acordase de la liberalidad de los Reyes de Francia, en dar en aquella Corte prelacías, abadías, y pensiones con que la enriquecían, de todo lo qual estaun los cortesanos priuados, mientras que no se hiziesse la absolución." Herrera, 351.

There in fact was an element of truth to the above accusations of Spanish domination. Philip II and his supporters exercised a heavy hand in Papal affairs; Henry IV's absolution in turn allowed the French to fully compete for clients amongst the clergy and jockey for influence in the Vatican after decades of civil war. This new state of affairs not only benefited Rome financially thanks to the normalization of benefices coming from France, but it also freed the Papacy from relying solely on Spain for military and economic aid. French support allowed Clement VIII to play a more active and forceful role in Italian affairs, such as his annexation of Ferrera in 1598.²⁴⁹

Unsurprisingly, Herrera considers the allegations of Spanish domination and manipulation in Rome to be false, as he labors to show throughout his history that Spain was a devoted servant and protector of the Catholic faith. This absurd notion that the Papacy needed to be liberated from Spanish influence was a particularly egregious instance of Spain's enemies demonizing Philip II for their own political ends. The royal historian thus reveals that the inner circle of Clement VIII was not only hostile to the Spanish crown, but also leaves open the possibility that the Pope had been influenced by these sinister reason of state views. According to these unnamed courtiers and clergy, absolving the Prince of Bearne, regardless of the sincerity of his conversion, would serve as a way to counteract Spain's influence and insure that the kingdom did not become too powerful. Religion gives way to political and financial considerations in this "equalizing" balance of power framework.

While Herrera stops short of being explicitly critical of the Pope himself, his account of the absolution is nonetheless disquieting. The *Historia de los sucesos de Francia* at best portrays Clement VIII as a naïve and weak-willed Pontiff who refused to continue the fight against Henry of Navarre and was amendable to the demands and lies of the Prince of Bearne's supporters. Importantly, while Herrera does not explicitly state if Clement VIII believed the accusations regarding Spain's supposed domination of the Papal Court, the fact that the pope ultimately approved the absolution suggests that he was at least influenced by the slanderous lies of Henry of Navarre's camp. In Herrera's view, by absolving Henry Clement VIII betrayed the trust and pious devotion of the Spanish crown.

According to the royal historian's account of the proceedings, Spanish legates and other representatives made forceful and cogent arguments against Henry of Navarre's absolution. He writes that while the supporters of the absolution claimed that the Prince of Bearne would respect the Papacy, treat Catholics well, and prohibit the preaching of heresy, the opposition tore these claims apart. These legates referenced in detail Henry's previous relapse into heresy, the feigned nature of his conversion, as well as his general lack of credibility and trustworthiness amongst Catholics.²⁵⁰ Regarding the claim that the acceptance of Henry's conversion would allow France to avoid a greater tragedy (namely the continuation of the Wars of Religion) Herrera writes

This was responded to [by the opposition], that the absolution being such a bad deed, it should not be done, even to avoid a greater ill, and this was a bad deed, for the conversion of Henry was feigned and without security of perseverance, and unworthy,

²⁴⁹ Dandelelet, 94-5.

²⁵⁰ Herrera, 352-3.

with a lack of the disposition necessary for the absolution, as he had deeply involved himself with deformity and disorder.²⁵¹

Finally, concerning the argument that Henry's ascension to the throne was all but assured given his secure position of power in France, Herrera states

To this was said that since without the absolution it was in doubt that he [Henry of Navarre] would collect the crown, and with the absolution it [the coronation] would be without doubt, it was not good to make certain [the coronation] with the absolution which otherwise was doubtful without it: even more that he would be absolved out of reason of state, and not out of the good Faith that he admitted that he had (that was agreed that he had), in order to merit the absolution.²⁵²

Herrera thus demonstrates that the opponents of the absolution presented well-reasoned arguments that proved that allowing the former Huguenot back into the Church would represent a blow to the Catholic faith and a victory for reason of state politics. Divisions amongst the cardinals were indeed fierce, and Philip II himself made concerted efforts to influence the Papal conclave in his favor, but in the end the pro-French faction won out.²⁵³ Herrera accordingly presents these proceedings as a travesty given Henry IV's clear impiety. The *Historia de los sucesos de Francia* concludes with Herrera noting that the Pope chose to absolve Henry because he had already been chosen as king of France. Regarding this decision, the royal historian writes

all the Christian kings and princes had the obligation to see that Henry be denied the absolution, because he was unrepentant and faked his conversion, and it was clear that he lacked constancy, and these faults could result in great harm to the Catholics of France, which is a large part of Christendom; thus [the French Catholics] implored help from the Catholic King, because he was concerned with helping all of the faithful, and because of the vicinity that his states had with that kingdom; and they [the French Catholics] were not silent about this point, that since Sixtus V's past offer of absolution did nothing to dissuade Henry from heresy, why should he now taken in by arguments of law and Theology as his supporters proved?²⁵⁴

²⁵¹ "Respondiase a esto, que siendo la tal absolución obra mala, no se podía hazer, aunque fuesse para euitar mayor mal, y que esta era obra mala, por ser la conuersion de Enrique fingida y sin seguridad de perseuerancia, y ser indigno, con falta de disposición necessaria para la absolución, por lo qual tenía en sí muy entrañada la disformidad y desorden." Herrera, 352.

²⁵² "A esto se dezia q pues sin la absolución estaba en duda el allegar a la corona, y con la absolución seria sin duda, no era bien hacer cierto con la absolución lo que era dudoso sin ella: quanto mas que ya seria absoluele por razón de estado, y no por la buena Fe que en el conuenia que huuiesse, para merecer el absolución." Herrera, 353.

²⁵³ Williams, 224.

²⁵⁴ "tenían obligación todos los Reyes y Principes Christianos de procurar q se negasse a Enrique el absolución y habilitación, por ser impenitente y fingido conuertido, y constar que el no podía auer perseuerancia (perseverancia), de que se podía seguir mucho daño a los Católicos de Francia, que es una gran parte de la Christiandad, y implorauan el fauor del Rey Católico, como primer Principe de la Christiandad, a quien toca la protección de todos los files, y por la vecindad de sus estados con aquel reyno, y no callauan a este propósito, que auiendo Sixto V ofrecido la absolución a Enrique, y no auiendo hehco caso dela, por no apartarse de la heregia, no se le deuia de dar ahora por muchos fundamentos de derecho y Teología con que lo probaban. Anadiase lo que nueuamente se auia delcarado en Paris por un arresto del Parlamento que en Castilla dizen auto, que los hereges tuuiesse un supremo tribunal en todos los parlamentos del reyno diuido del de los Católicos." Herrera, 353-4.

Moreover, to cement his point, he remarks that Henry recently established an ordinance allowing Huguenots their own separate tribunals in all the *parlements* of France.²⁵⁵

With these remarks Herrera makes a final plea that the Spanish crown's military involvement in the French Wars of Religion was justified and laudable: Philip II's duty was to protect the Church and wage war against the lapsed heretic Henry of Navarre. By declaring the Philip II as the "First Prince of Christendom" the royal historian espouses a message of imperial triumphalism that asserts the Spanish crown's superiority in the face of the defeats and setbacks of the final decade of the sixteenth century.

Through this vindication of the Spanish crown's historical image Herrera in turn attacks Clement VIII for his decision to side with Henry of Navarre. While Philip II made tremendous sacrifices to protect the Catholic faith in France, these efforts were ultimately for naught thanks to the Pope's troubling decision to absolve the former Huguenot. Indeed, Herrera's mention that after his absolution Henry IV allowed the Huguenots to have their own separate recognized tribunals in the *Parlements* reveals the extent of Clement VIII's error. In spite of his previous claims of piety, Henry IV still colluded with heretics and remained a danger to the Catholic faith. Reason of state politics and heresy had won the day in France thanks to the misjudgment of the Papacy and the treachery of the French Catholics.

Conclusion

In many ways the *Historia de los sucesos de Francia* is a reaction to the changing political landscape of Europe at the close of the sixteenth century. By the time of the history's publication in 1598 Philip II was on his deathbed, and the Spanish crown was forced to reach a humbling peace with Henry IV after a decade of military defeats and economic troubles. In contrast, France's power was on the ascendant after over thirty years of civil war, thanks in large part to the charismatic leadership of Henry IV and his ability to mend the fissures of the French Wars of Religion. While Clement VIII's absolution of Henry did not lead to a definitive souring of Spanish-Papal relations, the move nevertheless was a clear embarrassment for Philip II that augured a weakening of Spanish influence in Rome.²⁵⁶

Herrera attributes these troubling developments not to Spain's military weakness or the failings of Philip II's aggressive foreign policy, but to the pernicious spread of reason of state politics. According to the royal historian's assessment, the Machiavellian disregard of religion in pursuit of political power had not only taken over France and the courts of Italian princes who claimed neutrality, but it had also infected the Papal Court. Herrera's remarks about Henry IV's impiety insure that the legitimacy of his conversion remain in question and tarnish the former Huguenot's shining image. Herrera argues that only the Spanish crown truly stood above the toxic influence of reason of state politics. Indeed, this history frequently demonstrates that Philip II made great military and financial sacrifices in order to protect the Catholic faith in France with no expectation of political gain. In contrast, Catholic proponents of reason of state, such as the *politiques*, willingly hurt the Church in order to strike a blow against the Spanish crown. This lofty portrayal of Philip II in turn counters the accusations of Spain's enemies that the monarch sought to annex French territory during the war against Henry of Navarre. The Spanish crown thus emerges in Herrera's text as the unquestioned defender of the Catholic faith in this climate of moral turpitude and impiety.

²⁵⁵ Herrera, 354.

²⁵⁶ For example, shortly after the absolution Clement VIII appointed two cardinals at Philip II's request. Dandeleit, 94.

The *Historia de los sucesos de Francia* is a prime example of how the Spanish crown used history writing as a political tool to maintain its *reputación* and historical image. Philip II commissioned Herrera to write a history that spun a costly and failed military campaign into a just religious war that highlighted the benevolence and piety of the Spanish crown. The fact that the history played a large part in Herrera's elevation to the post of Royal Chronicler of the Indies suggests that the Spanish court was pleased with the historian's demonization of Henry IV and his justification of Spain's intervention in the French Wars of Religion. As such, an in depth analysis of this history can grant the reader an understanding of how the Spanish crown sought to portray itself and its controversial involvement in France. This glimpse into the Spanish imperial *mentalité* reveals that the crown continued to espouse a model of Catholic triumphalism in the face of the defeats of end of Philip II's reign. This portrayal accordingly contains a notable didactic element. Herrera dedicates his history to the future Philip III, and through his account of the French Wars of Religion he imparts crucial lessons about kingship and foreign policy. The royal historian stresses the importance of protecting the Catholic faith and avoiding the temptations of reason of state politics. He presents Philip II as the model king that his son should emulate. Moreover, in spite of the Peace of Vervins, Henry IV remained a dangerous enemy who still threatened the Church and the Spanish empire.

Although Spain had lost the military war in France, Herrera attempts to insure that the crown did not lose the war of words. Nonetheless, while Herrera asserted the Spanish empire's superiority, the following chapters will show that non-royal historians took a different view towards France and the intervention in the French Wars of Religion.

Chapter 3

The Two-Faced King

Introduction

Modern scholars have portrayed Franco-Spanish relations during the early modern period as characterized by unremitting hostility. For instance, Henry Kamen in *Imagining Spain: Historical Myth and National Identity*, characterizes France as the “fundamental enemy” of early modern Castile, and the Spanish crown’s “antagonist in every war, century after century.” He anchors his argument by referencing contemporary books that supposedly demonstrate visceral hostility between Spain and France.²⁵⁷

Asensio Gutiérrez advances a similar argument in *La France et les Français dans la littérature espagnole: un aspect de la xénophobie en Espagne, 1598-1665*. Gutiérrez emphasizes the long-lasting hostility between France and Spain in the first half of the sixteenth century, and sees relations quickly deteriorating again after the signing of the Peace of Vervins in 1598.²⁵⁸ According to Gutiérrez, in the histories and literature regarding the French produced during this period “Hostility dominates and regulates everything.”²⁵⁹ Similarly, the Spanish assessments of Henry IV had an unremitting polemical tone that was uniformly hostile, shallow, and lacking in curiosity.²⁶⁰ Henry IV was portrayed as a cultural and political “other.”

Luis de Bavia’s *Tercera y quarta parte de la historia pontifical y general*, Diego de Villalobos y Benavides’s *Comentarios de las cosas sucedidas en los Países Baxos de Flandes desde el año de 1594 hasta el de 1598*, and Fray Marcos de Guadalajara y Javier’s *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica* reveal a more complex and nuanced view of Henry IV. Instead of pursuing a discourse of alterity, these authors, to varying degrees, humanize and familiarize the French monarch. Bavia, for instance, praises Henry IV’s leadership abilities, military acumen, and occasional benevolent acts. In Bavia’s narrative Henry also loses his status as “other” through his absolution, an event portrayed by the Spanish historian as a triumph for Catholicism and source of inspiration for the Counter-Reformation. Guadalajara y Javier is more skeptical of Henry IV’s sincerity, and characterizes the absolution as a bitter yet necessary move in support of the Church. Despite this reservation, the Aragonese historian recounts Henry’s honorable treatment of defeated enemy troops at the end of the siege of Amiens. For his part, Villalobos y Benavides humanizes Henry IV by relating his virtues as a ruler and as military commander, and by chronicling the monarch’s personal interactions with the Spanish soldiers at the siege of Amiens. The historical image of Henry IV becomes familiarized through these incidents of personal inter-action and reconciliation.

Histories written by Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides reveal a more nuanced assessment of Henry IV that replaces the image of heretic adversary with that of a converted Catholic monarch who possessed admirable personal and professional qualities. Their portrayal of Henry IV as a complex and dynamic figure contrasts markedly with the negative view given by Herrera and the other polemical writers of Philip II’s reign. In effect, the Peace of Vervins in 1598 and the death of Philip II had facilitated reflection and a reassessment of the

²⁵⁷ Henry Kamen, *Imagining Spain: Historical Myth & National Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 175.

²⁵⁸ Asensio Gutiérrez, *La France et les Français dans la littérature Espagnole: un aspect de la xénophobie en Espagne, 1598-1665* (Saint-Étienne: Université de Saint-Étienne, 1977), 14.

²⁵⁹ “L’hostilité domine et uniformise tout.” Gutiérrez, 15.

²⁶⁰ Gutiérrez, 317-19.

controversial French king. In turn this change in the representation of Henry IV points to the emergence of a more reflective and multi-faceted approach towards Spain's imperial history in the early seventeenth century.

The shifting image of Henry IV in seventeenth-century histories has some kinship with what literary theorists call "imagology." This relates to images in texts through the emergence, formation, and dissemination of representations. According to Yolanda Rodríguez Pérez, imagology "focuses on the processes by which these images are repeated, confirmed, supplemented, varied, rendered more precise or less black-and-white."²⁶¹ This approach juxtaposes the construction of the image of the "other" and the formation of an alternative identity based on observation and argument. "By analyzing how a specific culture characterizes a different group and passes value judgment on it, much can be discovered about the construction of the identity of that culture."²⁶² This insight has been used to understand the construction of images of a group or culture, but it can also be applied to well-known individuals. This applies to how Spanish historians shifted their representation of Henry IV, in comparison with sixteenth-century Spanish historians, and constructed an alternative image based on reflection and observation. The following discussion also reveals how the changing methods and concerns of Spanish historians shaped images and meaning of important personalities and events.

Seventeenth-century texts humanized and familiarized Henry IV, but they also viewed him critically as a partisan of reason of state politics. Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides all portray Henry as following this dangerous line of political thinking. Although they all shy away from explicitly calling the French monarch a reason of state practitioner, their criticisms strongly suggest that they believed Henry practiced this policy. For example, these historians observe that Henry IV could be disturbingly cruel, ambitious, unscrupulous, and brutal, characteristics associated with reason of state methods. Moreover, they demonstrate that the former Huguenot was willing to disregard a greater good, such as the peace of France or the well being of the Church, in order to achieve his own political ends. As such, Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier and Villalobos y Benavides strongly imply that Henry was a dangerous and politically ambitious monarch at odds with ideal precepts of statecraft and faith.

Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides were all writing for the present political moment, and their mixed portrayals of Henry IV serve as commentary on the state of Franco-Spanish relations during the reign of Philip III. The double assessment of Henry IV found in these histories is a reflection of the cautious *détente* between France and the Spanish monarchy in the early seventeenth century. The two crowns had enjoyed an official peace since 1598, yet hostilities still lingered between the two long-time rivals. A major issue at stake was Henry IV's historical legacy. By the time he was assassinated in 1610 Henry IV had enjoyed widespread popularity amongst his subjects, and he was quickly enshrined as one of the greatest monarchs of French history.²⁶³ Given these historians' concern over Henry's of reason of state politics, it stands that they would be troubled by the monarch's fame. It also follows that their remarks critique the political culture of early seventeenth-century France. As such, Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides, undermined Henry IV's elevated status, while still recognizing his political importance. Writing for the Spanish, they drew attention to Henry

²⁶¹ Yolanda Rodríguez Pérez, *The Dutch Revolt Through Spanish Eyes: Self and Other in Historical and Literary Texts of Golden Age Spain (c. 1548-1673)* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008), 13.

²⁶² Rodríguez Pérez, 14.

²⁶³ Mark Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV: The Struggle for Stability* (New York: Longman, 1995), 254-56.

IV's dangerous political practices, a cautionary tale for those who celebrated and embraced reason of state policies. These histories in turn function as a warning against complacency toward the kingdom of France. While the Spanish and French crowns were at peace at the beginning of the seventeenth century, France could nonetheless still pose a threat given its troubling political values and heroes.

Background

Luis de Bavia, Fray Marcos de Guadalajara y Javier, and Diego de Villalobos y Benavides were not royal historians, such as Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas or Gil González Dávila, but they were nonetheless respectable figures whose histories were acknowledged by the crown. Bavia's father was silversmith to Anne of Austria, the Queen of Spain, which may have also given him some name recognition at court.²⁶⁴ Bavia drew the attention of the crown with his first major publication, a translation of Geronimo Franchi Conestagio's *History of the Union of the Kingdoms of Portugal and Spain*, from Italian to Spanish, which justified Philip II's annexation of Portugal based on dynastic inheritance. In recognition for this accomplishment, Philip III appointed Bavia royal chaplain in the city of Granada, where the historian spent the rest of his life.²⁶⁵

In Granada, Bavia wrote his continuation of Gonzalo de Illescas' *Historia pontifical* (published, 1575), which surveyed the history of the Popes from antiquity to the mid-sixteenth century. Unlike Illescas, Bavia devotes most of his attention to Spanish affairs, particularly the later period of Philip II's reign. In fact, Bavia mostly uses the Pontificates as a point of chronological reference. As such, this *Tercera y quarta parte de la historia pontifical* offers an insightful account of Spain's intervention in the French Wars of Religion. As further evidence of Bavia's scholarly achievement and the political importance of history writing, the *Cortes* of Aragon sent the historian gifts of silver platters and other vessels in recognition of his sympathetic treatment of the Aragonese revolt in 1590.²⁶⁶

Compared to Bavia, we know slightly more about Guadalajara y Javier's early life. Born and raised in the city of Zaragoza in Aragon in 1560, Guadalajara y Javier joined the Carmelite order in 1579. He drew the attention of his teachers at the monastery of Carmen de la Observancia for his intelligence and promise, and received his doctorate in theology. In 1606 his Superiors urged him to accept the Priory of the monastery at Alcaniz, but Guadalajara y Javier refused on the grounds that he wanted to study history, with the specific goal of writing a general history of the Carmelite Order.²⁶⁷ While Guadalajara y Javier never finished this project, he published several ecclesiastical and political histories. The Aragonese historian is perhaps best known for his polemical histories that justified the 1609 expulsion of the *moriscos*, descendants of Muslims suspected of secretly practicing Islam.²⁶⁸ Guadalajara y Javier was highly regarded within the Carmelite order, and Philip IV granted him an annual pension of 200 ducats of silver in recognition of his publications.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁴ *Indice biográfico de España, Portugal e Iberoamérica*, ed. by Victor Herrero Mediavilla, (Munchen: K.G. Saur, 1986), text-fiche, 105F125.

²⁶⁵ Joseph Antonio Alvarez y Baena, *Hijos de Madrid, ilustres en santidad, dignidades, armas, ciencias, y armas* (Madrid: 1790), 3:403.

²⁶⁶ Alvarez y Baena, 3:402-3.

²⁶⁷ Félix de Latassa y Ortín, *Biblioteca nueva de los escritores aragoneses que florecieron desde el año de 1600 hasta 1640* (Pamplona, 1799), 3:455.

²⁶⁸ *Indice biográfico de España, Portugal e Iberoamérica*, text-fiche, 1072O358.

²⁶⁹ Latassa y Ortín, 3:455, 3:457.

Guadalajara y Javier's first published work was the *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica*. Much like Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier sought to continue the project of Illescas, who was a fellow Carmelite. It does not appear that the two collaborated, but they used the project in similar ways to analyze and comment on Spanish political affairs in the late sixteenth century, particularly Spain's intervention in the French Wars of Religion.

Villalobos y Benavides's life and career differed from Bavia's and Guadalajara y Javier's. The son of Pedro de Villalobos, the governor and captain general of the provinces of Guatemala and Charcas (Mexico), Villalobos y Benavides was born in Mexico City.²⁷⁰ After studying the *belles lettres* with the Jesuits, Villalobos y Benavides left for Europe at a young age to pursue a career as a soldier. He entered the Army of Flanders, fought in campaigns in the Low Countries and in France, and was promoted to the rank of captain. Villalobos y Benavides participated in many of the major battles of these conflicts, including those at Calais, Hust, and Amiens. He consciously modeled himself after Julius Caesar and other famous military commanders of antiquity by writing about the battles that he had fought. The *Comentarios* was the fruit of this labor.²⁷¹ Villalobos y Benavides would later abandon his career as a soldier and become a *corregidor* of Málaga, a position that involved the collection of taxes and administration of local justice.²⁷²

It is worth noting that the histories of Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides passed through the strict censorship requirements of the early modern Spanish press. Their works received official approval from the Inquisitor General's office and from a royal historian at court.²⁷³ In keeping with his attachment to Granada, Bavia wrote his dedication to the Duke of Cea, Don Cristobal Gomez de Sandoval y Rojas, the military governor of the Alhambra. Guadalajara y Javier in turn wrote his dedication to Philip III,²⁷⁴ and Villalobos y Benavides to Philip III's Royal Council of War.²⁷⁵

Publication records reveal that Bavia's *Tercera y quarta parte de la historia pontifical y católica* and Guadalajara y Javier's *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica* were re-printed several times during the first half of the seventeenth century. Bavia's history was printed in Madrid in 1608 and 1609, and in Barcelona in 1609 and 1621.²⁷⁶ Guadalajara y Javier's work was printed in Zaragoza in 1612, and reprinted in Barcelona in 1630 and in Madrid in 1630 and 1639. By way of comparison, Luis Cabrera de Cordoba's famous and oft-cited *Historia de Felipe II, Rey de España* had only one official printing run in Madrid, in 1619.²⁷⁷ The first part of Herrera y Tordesillas' royally sponsored *Historia general del mundo* was only printed twice: in Madrid in 1601 and Valladolid in 1606. Part two of the history was printed

²⁷⁰ Alejandro Llorente y Lannas, "Introduccion," in *Comentarios de las cosas sucedidas en los Países Baxos de Flandes desde el año de 1594 hasta el de 1598* (Madrid: Aribau y Compañía, 1876), v.

²⁷¹ *Indice biográfico de España, Portugal e Iberoamérica*, text-fiche, 1020L87.

²⁷² Alejandro Llorente y Lannas, xi.

²⁷³ See fol.1-4 of vol. 1 of Luis de Bavia, *Tercera y quarta parte de la historia pontifical y general* (Madrid, 1608), and fol. 1-3 of Fray Marcos de Guadalajara y Javier *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica* (Zaragoza, 1612).

²⁷⁴ Luis de Bavia, *Tercera y quarta parte de la historia pontifical y general* (Madrid, 1608), 1:1-2. Fray Marcos de Guadalajara y Javier, *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica* (Zaragoza, 1612), fol.2.

²⁷⁵ Diego de Villalobos y Benavides, *Comentarios de las cosas sucedidas en los Países Baxos de Flandes desde el año de 1594 hasta el de 1598* (Madrid, 1612), 1.

²⁷⁶ Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano*, vol. 7 (Barcelona: Libreria Palau, 1954), 30.

²⁷⁷ Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano*, vol. 3 (Barcelona: Antonio Palau, 1950), 8. For this chapter I used the earliest editions of Bavia's and Guadalajara y Javier's histories. No major changes in terms of content were found in the later editions.

once in Madrid in late 1601, and part three printed once in Madrid in 1612.²⁷⁸ Compared to the histories of Bavia and Guadalupe y Javier, Villalobos y Benavides's work had a more limited printing run, having only been printed once in Madrid in 1611.²⁷⁹ Nevertheless, his history is valuable because it provides a first-hand account of the later years of the final battles of Spain's intervention in France.

Henry IV An Enemy No Longer?

Written in 1608, just ten years after the end of hostilities between the French and Spanish crowns, Luis de Bavia's *Tercera y quarta parte de la historia pontifical y general* view of Henry IV contrasts sharply with the polemical sixteenth-century histories discussed in the previous chapter. Unlike Cornejo and Herrera, Bavia refrains from demonizing Henry IV, and instead admires the controversial monarch's virtues and accomplishments. These positive assessments help to humanize the former Huguenot for the Spanish reading audience. This dramatic change in attitude is all the more remarkable given the relatively short amount of time that had elapsed between the composition of Bavia's history and Herrera's *Historia de los sucessos de Francia*, thus pointing to the dynamic nature of Spanish political and imperial thought.

Bavia writes that Henry IV could at times be munificent, observing that the monarch displayed remarkable clemency towards his enemies in spite of the fierce and bitter religious and factional hatred that characterized the French Wars of Religion. One example is Henry's humane treatment of the defeated members of the Catholic League after a battle near the Loire River. Bavia writes, "The Prince of Bearne, with a magnificent liberalness, graciously gave them liberty, without asking them anything [in return]."²⁸⁰ Moreover, Henry ordered the body of the fallen Leaguer the Duke of Joyeuse to be embalmed and "with much honor sent it to Paris."²⁸¹ Indeed, Henry's benevolent treatment of his former enemies in France played a large part in his successful campaign to consolidate his control over the kingdom.²⁸²

Bavia also praises Henry IV's honorable behavior following the capture of Paris in 1594, which he accomplished without bloodshed thanks to the defections of the Leaguers inside the city. Upon his entry into Paris, Henry gave the nearly 1,000 captured enemy soldiers (Spaniards, Germans, and Italians) three days to gather their arms and supplies and safe passage to the nearest Leaguer-held territory in Picardy. Henry also allowed the wives of the Leaguer nobles the choice of remaining in Paris or accompanying their husbands to enemy held territory.²⁸³ In the end, the Prince of Bearne occupied the city "with such grand benevolence and love," and he "smoothly won over the all the city..."²⁸⁴ Bavia's history humanizes Henry, whose behavior was associated with actions expected of a benevolent prince, and rejects the simplistic characterization of the prince as a politically ambitious heretic. He does not interpret Henry's actions as political tactics designed to consolidate quickly his control over Paris, a long-time bastion of the Catholic League and the capital of France.²⁸⁵ Bavia's depiction of the event

²⁷⁸ Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano*, vol. 5 (Barcelona: Libreria Palau, 1951), 582.

²⁷⁹ Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano*, vol. 27 (Barcelona: Antonio Palau Dulcet, 1975), 130-1.

²⁸⁰ "A todos los quales con una magnifica liberalidad, les dio el Principe de Bearne, libertad graciosamente, sin pedilles nada." Bavia, 2:448.

²⁸¹ "con mucha honra le embio a Paris." Bavia, 2:448.

²⁸² Joseph Perez, *L'Espagne de Philippe II* (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 335.

²⁸³ Bavia, 2:199.

²⁸⁴ "con tan gran benignidad, y amor"... "suauemente atraía assi las voluntades de toda aquella ciudad..." Bavia, 2:199.

²⁸⁵ N.M. Sutherland, *Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion* (Bristol: Elm Bank, 2002), 8-9.

largely reflects the historical record. While Henry forcibly expelled a few diehard members of the Catholic League from Paris, he undertook no other acts of reprisal against his rivals in the city. Moreover, the Spanish commanders stationed in Paris were amazed by Henry's behavior and reported on his munificence.²⁸⁶

Bavia also comments favorably on Henry IV's talents as a military commander and leader of men. Describing him as "*prudentissimo*," he notes how Henry outmaneuvered the Duke of Parma's army and gained a decisive advantage at Aumale in Normandy.²⁸⁷ According to the Spanish historian, Henry followed the prudent tactic of never engaging with the enemy unless he possessed a known strategic advantage; in this vein he insured victory by isolating the hungry Spanish troops in the hostile French countryside before pressing his attack.²⁸⁸

Beyond his brilliance as a strategist, Bavia considered Henry IV an inspiring and brave leader. Bavia salutes Henry's valor at Aumale, writing "with a truly royal spirit, and at risk of his own person, he sought to insure the safety of his men as he did. This was not without great risk of his life, having been hit lightly by the shot of a arquebus."²⁸⁹ Henry IV's willingness to jeopardize his personal safety to protect his troops, in fact, helped him claim an important tactical advantage over Parma.²⁹⁰ Henry's charisma, his "*buenas palabras*," moreover, allowed him to recruit in short order twenty thousand infantry, seven thousand cavalry, six thousand scouts, three thousand light cavalry, and twelve pieces of artillery.²⁹¹ Similarly, Bavia recounts that Henry's troops and supporters were in turn greatly devoted to him, and willingly endured hardships and dangers due to their admiration and respect for the prince. The chaplain historian clearly admired this ability to fashion such a large and disciplined army.²⁹²

In sum, this characterization of Henry IV as a charismatic and gifted commander contrasts with the narratives penned by Cornejo and Herrera on the French Wars of Religion. Bavia's balanced account humanizes Henry IV and acknowledges his regal attributes, rather than demonizing him as a depraved heretic unworthy of sitting on the French throne.

The thrust of Bavia's narrative, however, focuses on Henry IV's conversion from Protestantism to Catholicism and his absolution. For the chaplain historian, Henry's positive traits as a military commander and ruler paled in comparison to the importance of his eventual acceptance back into the Catholic Church, which he considers pivotal for Christendom. Henry IV effectively loses his status as an "other" in this history through Bavia's nuanced and sympathetic treatment of the king's prolonged absolution. Bavia composed his work nearly two decades after the Papacy recognized Henry IV's return to the Church, yet his conversion remained controversial among Spanish writers. Bavia chronicles the arguments against Henry's absolution, but rejects them and considers the event a triumph for the Church.

Bavia views Henry IV's conversion and absolution as a complicated matter. The historian acknowledges that doubts of Henry's orthodoxy were logical and legitimate. Bavia recounts in some detail an incident prior to the battle of Rouen when Henry rejected the eloquent plea of a leading Catholic supporter, the Marshall of Biron, imploring him to renounce Calvinism. Henry nonetheless refused to convert, arguing that it would be perceived as a political move at

²⁸⁶ Sutherland, 534.

²⁸⁷ Bavia, 2:27.

²⁸⁸ Bavia, 2:47.

²⁸⁹ "con animo verdaderamente Real, quiso con riesgo de su propia persona, asegurar su gente como lo hizo. No fue esto sin peligro grande de su vida, por auerle tocado un golpe de arcabuz..." Bavia, 2:27.

²⁹⁰ Bavia, 2:29-30.

²⁹¹ Bavia, 2:43.

²⁹² Bavia, 2:26.

the time; moreover, he claimed that the defeat of the Catholic League and Spain required his complete attention.²⁹³ Modern studies of Henry's conversion in fact argue that these were the primary factors behind the monarch's delayed return to the Church. In particular they emphasize that Henry concentrated mostly on his survival, as the outcome of the war was very uncertain in the first half of the 1590s.²⁹⁴

Bavia nevertheless rejects the logic of Henry's argument, and he sympathizes with the sincere Catholic nobles of France who were outraged by this move. He writes:

Henry's response neither satisfied nor calmed those princes; before they surmised that his intention was none other than to draw out the resolution of a matter so important. And in this way they feared what was likely the certain ruin of all the Catholic cities of the kingdom, and with them, the [ruin] of the true Catholic religion, entering in its place the heresy of Calvin, which Henry had then professed.²⁹⁵

In Bavia's eyes the conversion was a matter of the utmost importance, yet Henry of Navarre nonetheless chose to ignore the just pleas of the faithful and delayed renouncing Calvinism.

Bavia also questioned the thoroughness and sincerity of Henry IV's eventual conversion to Catholicism, even implying that Church authorities rushed through the process. For example, Bavia claims that the Archbishop of Bruges, who decided to admit Henry into the Church prior to receiving Papal approval, spent a mere an hour and a half instructing Henry in the faith. The rushed meeting caused Bavia to question the thoroughness of this catechism. "The instruction was actually rather short to properly smooth so many difficulties, as Henry publicly professed to have in it [the catechism]..."²⁹⁶ Pope Clement VIII, remembering that he had once before asked for absolution and then changed his mind, also doubted the sincerity of his conversion.²⁹⁷ The brevity of Henry's catechism and his failure to perform any substantial penitential acts likewise gave members of the Catholic League serious pause.²⁹⁸

Still, Bavia stops short of accusing Henry IV of converting merely to obtain the French crown. Indeed, he writes that it was incredibly difficult to judge Henry of Navarre's motivations at the time, and he believes that the matter accordingly was ultimately in God's hands.²⁹⁹ Bavia presents evidence supporting the sincerity of Henry's conversion, which departs from the accounts of Herrera and other sixteenth-century Spanish historians. He writes that "Henry truly proceeded with such great displays of religion and holiness," to the point where many observers genuinely believed he had no pretenses behind his desire to convert.³⁰⁰ Bavia also reminds

²⁹³ Bavia, 2:37.

²⁹⁴ See Sutherland's *Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion* and Michael Wolfe *The Conversion of Henri IV: Politics, Power, and Religious Belief in Early Modern France* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993).

²⁹⁵ "No satisfizo la respuesta de Henrico, ni quieto los animos de aquellos Principes; antes conocieron que su intención no era otra que ir allargando la resolución de negocio tan importante. Y en este medio temian auia de ser cierta la ruyna de todas las ciudades Católicas del Reyno, y con ellas, la de la verdadera religión Católica, entrando en su lugar la heregia de Caluino, que entonces professaua Henrico." Bavia, 2:37.

²⁹⁶ "Realmente la instrucción fue bien breue para allanar tantas dificultades, como Henrico publicaua tener en ella..." Bavia, 2:118.

²⁹⁷ Bavia, 2:102-3.

²⁹⁸ Brian Sandberg, *Warrior Pursuits: Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France* (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 278.

²⁹⁹ Bavia, 2:103.

³⁰⁰ "realmente procedía Henrico con tan grandes muestras de Religion, y Santidad..." Bavia, 2:122.

readers that Henry subordinated himself to the Papacy, and had humbly begged the Pope on four separate occasions to grant him absolution.³⁰¹ In the end, Bavia concludes that Henry IV was a complicated man capable of impiety and piety, an impressive commander and leader, whose conversion presented the Church with complex questions regarding faith and politics that could not be easily resolved.

Bavia does not neglect the Spanish opposition to Henry IV in his narrative of the absolution. The chaplain historian saved some of his sharpest words for the French Catholic nobility who had withdrawn their allegiance from the Spanish crown. This was an affront to Philip II who had provided the Catholic nobility of Paris “with so many and such excessive expenses” in order to preserve the Catholic faith and protect their interests, only to see them selfishly and impiously side with Henry before his absolution. Bavia considers this base and deceitful behavior: “Such is the vulgar, to so inconsistently proceed in matters of such quality and importance.”³⁰² While Bavia’s anger over the nobles’ callous acts is more muted than Herrera’s, his remarks convey a sense of betrayal and loss for Philip II and the Spanish crown.

As such, Bavia qualifies his embrace of Henry IV’s absolution with observations about its negative impact on Philip II’s historical legacy and the Spanish crown’s *reputación*. Most pointedly, Bavia recounts the views of the Duke of Sessa, Philip II ambassador to the Papacy, who expressed concern that Henry’s absolution would prejudice Philip’s legitimate claims to Navarre and Burgundy. In fact, the absolution represented a grievous insult to Philip II and his sacrifices to conserve the Catholic faith in the France.³⁰³ These objections “were of such quality, that many could stop the resolution [the absolution] that had been taken, and giving signs to put it into execution.”³⁰⁴ Bavia’s concern over Philip II’s legacy and dynastic claims underscore the importance of history writing in this period as a vehicle for airing complex arguments over high politics and confessional conflict. On balance, Bavia is more concerned with the damage done to the Spanish crown’s *reputación* than with lingering doubts about the sincerity of Henry IV’s religious conversion or historic role as an arch-heretic.

Bavia also recognizes that the vast majority of the French accepted Henry IV as their Catholic king. The French desired and deserved a king “who in name and deeds was most Christian,” and accordingly “everyone had very certain hopes that it [the king] had to likely be Henry; and that his Holiness had to absolve him, and admit him into the body of the holy Church, as he did.”³⁰⁵ In contrast to Herrera, Bavia attributes Henry IV’s success to his charisma and piety, and does not dwell on the duplicity of French nobles and the Papal court. For instance, Bavia argues that the defection of the Leaguer city of Meaux to Henry emanated from the king’s demonstrated piety, rather than vile politics sweetened by a bribe for the governor, as claimed by Herrera.³⁰⁶ Indeed, Meaux emerged as an important symbol of Henry’s successful campaign to

³⁰¹ Bavia, 2:236.

³⁰² “con tantos, y tan excessiuos gastos” “Tal es el vulgo, y tan inconstantemente procede en cosas de tanta calidad e importancia.” Bavia, 2:200-1.

³⁰³ Bavia, 2:241.

³⁰⁴ “eran de tal calidad, que mucho pudieran detener la resolución que auian tomado, y dado muestras de ponerla en execucion.” Bavia, 2:241.

³⁰⁵ “que en nombre y obras fuese Christianissimo,” “tenian todos muy ciertas esperancas de q lo auia de ser Henrico; y que su Santidad le auia de absolver, y admitir al gremio de la santa Iglesia, como lo hizo.” Bavia, 2:197.

³⁰⁶ Bavia, 2:197.

reconcile with French Catholics, as he promised to protect Catholic institutions in the municipality and forbade any form of Protestant worship within its walls.³⁰⁷

According to Bavia, Clement VIII absolved Henry IV out of concern for the prince's soul and the spiritual welfare of the French.³⁰⁸ The conversion, described by the author as a "so notable act, so fresh, and hoped by many with particular desire,"³⁰⁹ provoked spontaneous outbursts of jubilation in Rome. Witnesses' shouted their happiness, and cannons blasted from the Castel Saint-Angelo. "What most solemnized the celebration were the devout tears that the [statue of] the Pieta shed, as witnessed by one of those illustrious Cardinals, seeing already the end of the travails of the most flourishing kingdom of France, and the extirpation of heresy in it."³¹⁰ Bavia makes no mention of the displeasure of the Spanish ambassadorial contingent during the three-day celebration of the absolution.³¹¹

Moreover, Bavia believes that Henry IV's conversion served as a turning point for the Church in its battle against heresy in Europe. The prince's conversion balanced out the loss of England and parts of Germany to Protestantism, and held out "very certain hopes" for a renewal of the Church.³¹² Henry IV's example served as a defining spiritual moment, rather than a political maneuver, in Church history. In Bavia's words, the conversion was

the most famous and worthy of memory of all those [conversions] that had happened in the history of the Church, since Christ our Lord founded it," because it served as an important lesson to the disobedient temporal Princes, "showing the superiority and magisterium that the Roman Church has over all those [princes] of the world."³¹³

While politically speaking the outcome of the Papal conclave was unfavorable for Spain in the short term, Bavia nonetheless believed that it ultimately proved beneficial for Christendom as a whole. The recognition of Henry's conversion not only helped to insure the security of Catholicism in France, but also served as a proud testament to the universal authority of the Holy See.

This favorable treatment of Henry IV's conversion and absolution is a crucial difference between Bavia's *Tercera y quarta parte de la historia pontifical* and Herrera's *Historia de los sucesos de Francia*. Although he takes into account the negative consequences that the Papacy's recognition of Henry's conversion had for the Spanish crown, Bavia still provides a glowing account of the Prince of Bearne's official reentry into the Church. This triumphal spin on the event in turn serves to humanize the historical figure of Henry IV. By portraying Henry of Navarre as a genuine convert, and not a conniving heretic, Bavia familiarizes the French monarch and strips him of his status as "an other." The absolution was the definitive moment in

³⁰⁷ Vincent J. Pitts, *Henri IV of France: His Reign and Age* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 178.

³⁰⁸ Bavia, 2:238.

³⁰⁹ "tan notable acto, tan nuevo, y esperado de muchos con particular deseo" Bavia, 2:241.

³¹⁰ "Mas viuamente solenizaua la fiesta, eran las deuotas lagrimas, que la piedad Christiana hazia salir, de los ojos demás de uno de aqueolos ilustrissimos Cardenales, viendo ya el fin de los trabajos del florentissimo Reyno de Francia, y la extirpación de las heregias en el." Bavia, 2:244.

³¹¹ Sutherland, 583.

³¹² "muy ciertas esperancas" Bavia, 2:244.

³¹³ "el mas celebre y digno de memoria de quantos han sucedido en la Yglesia, después que Christo nuestro Señor la fundo" "mostrando la Yglesia Romana la superioridad y magisterio que sobre todas las del mundo tiene." Bavia, 244.

which the Huguenot transformed from an archenemy of the Church into a true Christian, thus gaining legitimacy for his rule.

Bavia's *Tercera y quarta parte de la historia pontifical* challenges the conclusion in modern scholarship that seventeenth-century Spanish histories were shallow and prejudiced texts that uniformly condemned Henry IV.³¹⁴ Unlike Herrera's account, Bavia's comparatively nuanced discussion rejects the image of Henry as arch-heretic in favor of a discourse of Catholic triumphalism. In contrast to Herrera, Bavia depicts the absolution was a watershed moment in the history of the Church which sparked hopes that other Protestant rulers could be brought back into the Catholic flock. As such, far from demonizing Henry IV, Bavia familiarizes the historical figure of the monarch by transforming him into a laudatory symbol of the authority of the Catholic Church.

Fray Marcos de Guadalajara y Javier also offers a general re-assessment of Henry IV that disagreed with sixteenth-century texts in his *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica* in 1612. This history charts a middle course between the critical views of Herrera and the more favorable views of Bavia. For Guadalajara y Javier, Henry IV's conversion to the Catholic faith was not a great cause for jubilation. Despite its obvious historical significance for the Church and France, the historian doubted Henry's piety and spiritual commitment. On the other hand, like Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier praises Henry's skills as a military strategist and leader of men; moreover, he also acknowledges his noble and benevolent actions during the siege of Amiens.

Guadalajara y Javier turns a guarded and skeptical eye toward Henry IV's conversion to Catholicism. On the one hand, the historian acknowledges that, through his conversion, the Prince of Bearne "recognizing the past errors, and obtained absolution from some bishops..."³¹⁵ These expressions of penitence and submission suggested a sincere conversion. Still, Guadalajara y Javier also notes disquieting signs that the king's conversion may have been feigned or, at the least, spiritually shallow. For example, like Herrera and Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier observes that after his conversion ceremony Henry of Navarre spent little time confessing his sins to the Archbishop of Bruges.³¹⁶ The short duration of the confession appeared to contradict his earlier signs of penance, and raised the possibility that Henry merely returned to the Catholic Church for political purposes.

Like Herrera, Guadalajara y Javier also mentions that after the ceremony of his conversion the Prince of Bearne met privately for two hours with the English ambassador. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Henry stipulated as a condition for accepting absolution that he be allowed to maintain his long-standing alliance with Elizabeth I.³¹⁷ Interestingly, Bavia leaves out this detail in his history.³¹⁸ While Guadalajara y Javier does not note explicitly say what the two were talking about, for the Aragonese historian it is nonetheless troubling that Henry would spend such a large amount of time with the heretical English official while only briefly meeting with the archbishop.

In the end, Guadalajara y Javier stops short of dismissing Henry's conversion as mere power politics, while declining to embrace it as a triumph for the Church. He writes "If this conversion was feigned, or true, only the scrutator of the hearts of men knows: who is God,

³¹⁴ Kamen, 175. Gutiérrez, 317-19.

³¹⁵ "reconociendo los errores pasados, y optuuo la absolución por algunos Obispos...." Guadalajara y Javier, 95.

³¹⁶ Guadalajara y Javier, 127.

³¹⁷ Patrick Williams, *Philip II* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 226.

³¹⁸ Guadalajara y Javier, 127.

whom we must not scrutinize, and not pass judgment on the appearances of his good works.”³¹⁹ Thus, he stakes out a middle ground between the skeptical Herrera, and the optimistic Bavia concerning the authenticity of Henry’s spiritual motives for re-entering the Church. Indeed, Guadalajara y Javier attributes outside influences to Henry’s decision to return of the Church. The historian speculates that Henry was likely moved by the personal ministrations of his Catholic aide, Bishop Jacques Davy Du Perron, and the intervention of the Spanish crown in the French Wars of Religion. Guadalajara y Javier believes that these two influences were not mutually exclusive, and postulates that the Holy Spirit could have likely acted through both the Spanish army and Du Perron.³²⁰ By noting the role of these outside forces Guadalajara y Javier demonstrates that Henry’s decision to return to the Catholic faith was not solely the product of a profound sense of internal piety and contrition, thus tarnishing the spiritual luster of the conversion.

Like Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier recognizes that Henry’s absolution was a complicated matter for the Papacy. He discusses the prevalent fear that refusal to recognize Henry’s absolution could result in a schism and the creation of a French Catholic Church, which the Papacy feared many Frenchmen would welcome.³²¹ Compared to Bavia, however, Guadalajara y Javier appears to sympathize less with Henry of Navarre’s supporters in the Papal debate. Many of those who favored absolution “not because they took him [Henry] for a Catholic, [but] only to remove the many trails and continuous miseries [from France].”³²² While their desire to finally achieve peace for war-torn France was somewhat laudable, for Guadalajara y Javier it was nevertheless troubling that these supporters would willfully ignore the questionable aspects of Henry of Navarre’s commitment to Catholicism, and instead support his absolution solely for political reasons.

Still, Guadalajara y Javier characterizes the debate over Henry’s absolution as a holy and solemn occasion. The assembled cardinals sought God’s guidance and honored the Apostolic See, “without attention to temporal princes.”³²³ Parting company with Herrera, Guadalajara y Javier considers the deliberations more of a sacred than a politically minded affair.³²⁴ After pondering the absolution for a day, it happened “that nearly all were of the opinion that Henry be absolved; where it was clearly deduced that this was the best course for the Church and all of Christendom.”³²⁵ The nearly unanimous vote softens the controversy; moreover, given this support, he also notes that the Papacy ultimately believed the absolution to be for the good of all of Christendom.

Nonetheless, Guadalajara y Javier’s assessment is guarded in comparison with Bavia’s. Henry’s conversion is not presented in redemptive terms, he downplays the jubilation that greeted the event, and Henry seems a risky ally. This was a positive development for Catholic

³¹⁹ “Si fue fingida, o verdadera esta Conuersion, sabelo el escudrinandor de los coracones de los hombres: que es Dios, a quien no auemos de remitir, y no condenar las buenas apariencias de las obras.” Guadalajara y Javier, 127.

³²⁰ Guadalajara y Javier, 127. More will be said later in next chapter about view that Spanish intervention caused Henry’s conversion. Recall that Herrera made a similar argument.

³²¹ Guadalajara y Javier, 132-3.

³²² “no porque le tuuiesen por Católico, sino por salir de tantos trabajos, y continuas miserias” Guadalajara y Javier, 133.

³²³ “sin tener respeto a Principes temporales.” Guadalajara y Javier, 217.

³²⁴ Recall Herrera’s assertion that some cardinals encouraged the Pope to absolve Henry of Navarre in order to balance out the power of Spain and enrich the Papacy. This potentially damning accusation concerning the motivations of some members of the Papal enclave is not present in Guadalajara y Javier’s history.

³²⁵ “que casi todos eran de parecer, que Enrico fuesse absuelto; de donde infería claramente, que era lo que mas conuenia a la Iglesia, y a toda la Cristianidad.” Guadalajara y Javier, 217.

Europe, but not a turning point in the way that Bavia framed it. Given Henry IV's strength and the looming possibility of a schismatic French Church, Guadalajara y Javier presented the absolution as a bitter pill that had to be accepted. Regardless, although the Aragonese historian treats the absolution with little fanfare, he does not use his account of the event to demonize the historical image of Henry IV.

While Guadalajara y Javier does not celebrate Henry IV's absolution, he familiarizes the king by devoting considerable attention to his military skills, leadership, and occasional acts of benevolence. Guadalajara y Javier praises the prince's abilities as a commander in the final stages of the French Wars of Religion. For example, he writes that Henry of Navarre was able to provision his army because he "prudently preserved the amnesty of the nearby towns,"³²⁶ which gave him a tactical advantage over the Duke of Parma. In the same campaign, Guadalajara y Javier praises Henry for ably commanding his troops and restraining the violence, impertinence, and pride of the French soldiers.³²⁷ Henry deserved admiration and respect for his prudence and honorable actions.

In his history, Guadalajara y Javier also characterizes Henry IV as gracious and honorable. The author devotes special attention to the siege of Amiens, a pivotal event for many Spanish historians.³²⁸ Toward the end of the conflict, Spanish forces captured Amiens by surprise and valiantly held off a much larger relief army commanded by Henry IV for several weeks. The Spanish eventually surrendered the city in late 1597 after a six-month siege.³²⁹

Guadalajara y Javier salutes Henry IV for his "good inclination" toward the defeated Spanish troops. These soldiers were permitted to take all their belongings and arms, and Henry IV treated Spanish commanders very humanely and courteously.³³⁰ Guadalajara y Javier marvels at the king's chivalry, generosity, and benevolence.

In this characterization of Henry IV Guadalajara y Javier departs from the polemical accounts of Herrera and Cornejo. The Aragonese historian is more constrained in his praise of Henry than Bavia, but he nonetheless recognizes the king's strengths as a military commander and his benevolent acts. Through this acknowledgement of the former Huguenot's admirable personal and regal qualities Guadalajara y Javier in turn humanizes Henry IV.

The analyses of Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier represent significant departures from the late sixteenth-century Spanish histories of the French Wars of Religion. In contrast to Cornejo and Herrera, who perpetuate the image of Henry IV as an irredeemable and scheming arch-heretic who caused irreparable harm to the Catholic faith, Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier adopt a more nuanced representation of the monarch. Rather than viewing Henry IV as an alien other, these seventeenth-century historians portray the king as a complicated figure who possessed considerable strengths as a ruler, and whose conversion was of some benefit to the Church and to France.

Diego de Villalobos y Benavides's *Comentarios de las cosas sucedidas en los Países Baxos de Flandes desde el año de 1594 hasta el de 1598* perhaps does more to familiarize and humanize Henry IV than the works of Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier. A captain in the Army of Flanders and veteran of the French Civil Wars, Villalobos y Benavides concentrated his narrative

³²⁶ "conseruando con prudencia la amistad de los pueblos comarcanos," Guadalajara y Javier, 39.

³²⁷ Guadalajara y Javier, 39.

³²⁸ The capture and siege of Amiens will be covered in more detail in Chapter 5.

³²⁹ Olivia Carpi, *Une République imaginaire: Amiens pendant les troubles de religion (1559-1597)* (Paris: Belin, 2005), 217-18, 221-2.

³³⁰ "buena inclinación" Guadalajara y Javier, 398-99.

on campaigns that he had participated in, especially the siege of Amiens. He was one of the first Spanish historians to write on the events in Amiens, and his history provides an eyewitness account of Henry IV's actions at the pivotal battle.³³¹

While the focus of Villalobos y Benavides's narrative is on Amiens, he does offer a few choice observations concerning Henry IV and his turbulent path to the French throne. Generally speaking he presents Henry in a favorable light, describing him as a generally honest and sincere man who had to navigate a difficult course to gain the throne. "The valor and fortune of Henry, although pitted against the will of many of his vassals, who had confederations amongst themselves and with some princes of Christendom, crowned him king."³³² And "after lengthy events, he valorously emerged with the crown, taking the kingdom, [which was] greatly troubled with civil wars."³³³ Villalobos y Benavides thus views positively Henry IV's ascension to the throne because it brought an end to the sectarian and religious strife in France. This conclusion is based on concerns over the damages caused by the fighting, as well as recognition of Henry's personal and military qualifications to rule. Still, it is striking given that Villalobos y Benavides fought on the opposing side.

Villalobos y Benavides also views Henry IV's conversion as a sincere and necessary step toward achieving peace. The historian writes that the king "asked for absolution for his errors, and in view of his demonstrations, he was received into the body of the Church by the Pontiff Clement VIII, [and] with this absolution the objections of the true Catholics of his kingdom were stilled, [and] the Grandees were reconciled."³³⁴ Unlike Bavia, however, Villalobos y Benavides stops short of framing Henry's absolution as a great victory for the Church, and he devotes comparatively little attention to the event.

More than other Spanish historians, Villalobos y Benavides humanizes Henry IV through relating episodes and anecdotes from the siege of Amiens that reveal the friendlier aspects of the French king's personality. For example, Villalobos y Benavides describes Henry's reaction to a prank played by Spanish soldiers on English mercenaries under his command, which creates a favorable image. It seems that the Spaniards tricked the English into giving them much needed supplies, and then made fun of their victims once safely behind their fortifications. According to Villalobos y Benavides, Henry IV was also amused of the ruse and joined the Spaniards in laughing at the duped English.³³⁵ By choosing to write about this episode, the historian humanizes Henry by portraying him as a good-natured adversary able to share a laugh with the enemy. The king emerges more fully formed as a personality and a human being, rather than being stereotyped as the heretic king.

Villalobos y Benavides's account of the siege of Amiens elevates Henry to the status of gracious and honorable adversary. Henry was described as "very happy and content" when the Spanish commander sued for peace. According to Villalobos y Benavides, the French king responded by graciously noting that the Spanish should be proud that they acted as such valiant

³³¹ Olivia Carpi and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, "Les noix, les espions et les historiens: réflexion sur la prise d'Amiens," *Histoire, Économie et Société*, vol. 23:3 (2003), 326.

³³² "El valor y fortuna de Enrico, aunque contra la voluntad de muchos de sus vassallos, que tenían confederaciones entre si, y con algunos de los Principes de la Christiandad, le coronaron Rey." Villalobos y Benavides, 2.

³³³ "después de prolixos sucesos, valerosamente salió con la Corona tomando el Reyno, bien molestado de guerras ciuiles." Villalobos y Benavides, 3.

³³⁴ "pidió absolución de sus errores, y vistas sus demostraciones, fue recebido al gremio de la Iglesia, por el Pontifice Clemente VIII con esta absolución aquieto los animos de los verdaderos Católicos de su Reyno, compuso los particulares de los Grandes." Villalobos y Benavides, 3.

³³⁵ Villalobos y Benavides, 155.

soldiers during the siege, and stating “I would prefer to have you as friends rather than as enemies.”³³⁶ The Spanish historian thus presents Henry IV as honorable and conciliatory in negotiating the truce. Although Henry had the advantage over the beleaguered Spanish forces, he treated the enemy with courtesy and respect. By complimenting the Spanish soldiers, he bolsters the reputation of the *tercios*, while simultaneously softening his own image. He appears as gracious and non-vindictive.³³⁷

Villalobos y Benavides’s decision to quote Henry merits comment. Giving Henry voice and relating words that honored Spanish troops served to heal the scars of war and to form a personality and persona to replace the image of the Protestant enemy created by Herrera, Cornejo, and others. Moreover, by directly addressing the Spanish troops, Henry interacts with them on a more personal level, king to soldier. Among the historians consulted for this study, Villalobos y Benavides is the only one who quotes Henry, and he was likely the only one to have seen him. The substance and the timing of the quote give it substance and historical significance.

Villalobos y Benavides also elaborates on Henry IV’s gracious treatment of the defeated Spanish forces at Amiens. Henry was steadfast in guaranteeing the safety of the Spanish leaving the city, commanding that

“The manner of care of the officials of the French camps was such that no harm was done to any of those [Spaniards] that left, that the [French] knights carried no concern other than to insure that none of the servants that exited were robbed or plundered; consider how much better kings are served by love than by fear...”³³⁸

The historian observes that Henry IV went to considerable lengths to assure the terms of the surrender and the safe retreat of the Spanish soldiers. In other words, he fulfilled his chivalrous promise. The king was inspirational and displayed the characteristics of a good monarch.

A further indication of Henry IV benevolence, Villalobos y Benavides also observes that the French monarch inquired of *sargento mayor* Ortiz the identities of each Spanish captain, who he then personally greeted as they exited Amiens. Henry IV “Speaking to them with much courtesy, he said to them that he was happy to see them outside of Amiens, making offers of granting them rewards, honoring their courage and valiance, and they [the Spanish] thanked him for his courtesy, passed with all of their men...”³³⁹ This episode forges an image of a chivalrous warrior-king who honors the vanquished but proud adversary. Henry’s interactions with Spanish soldiers create a sense of reconciliation between the French and the Spanish. Henry’s historical image undergoes a process of familiarization, and his image as antagonist of the Spanish crown becomes decisively blurred and softened.

Even more so than Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier, Villalobos y Benavides complicates the established view that seventeenth-century Spanish histories of Henry IV were both shallow

³³⁶ “mas os quiero por amigos, que para enemigos.” Villalobos y Benavides, 153.

³³⁷ Chapter 5 will cover in more detail Villalobos y Benavides’s praise for the soldiers of the Spanish nation.

³³⁸ “Era de modo el cuydado que los oficiales del campo Frances tenían, de que no se hiziesse daño a ninguno de los que salian, que los Caualleros no trayan otro cuydado sino que no se robasse ni desbalixasse a moco ninguno de los que salian; echause de ver quanto vale mas el ser seruidos los Reyes por amor, que por temor...” Villalobos y Benavides, 156.

³³⁹ “hablandoles con mucha cortesía, les dixo se holgaba verlos fuera de Amiens, haciendoles ofrecimientos de hacerles merced, honrando su esfuerzo y valentia, y ellos, agradeciendole su cortesía, pasaron con toda su gente...” Villalobos y Benavides, 157.

and antagonistic.³⁴⁰ While all the historians discussed in this chapter humanize Henry, Villalobos y Benavides is most ebullient in his praise of the monarch. Specifically, unlike his contemporaries Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier, the soldier presents a more personal side to the Prince of Bearne. Although Guadalajara y Javier also celebrates Henry's behavior at the siege of Amiens, Villalobos y Benavides provides a deeper insight into Henry IV's character and personality.

A close reading of the histories of Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides reveals that they did not examine Henry IV through the lens of alterity. Henry IV's absolution and the signing of the Peace of Vervins opened up new avenues for historical study in Spain of Henry IV and Franco-Spanish relations. No longer burdened by the dominating and polemical trope of Henry as arch-heretic, a more nuanced discussion of the controversial king emerges.

Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides familiarize the historical figure of Henry IV emphasizing different positive aspects of the king's reign or character. Bavia celebrates Henry's absolution and its importance for his salvation, France, and the Church. Guadalajara y Javier and Villalobos y Benavides, on the other hand, concentrate more on Henry's chivalrous, honorable, and personal actions during the siege of Amiens, with Villalobos y Benavides providing intimate details and quoting Henry at some length.

This reevaluation of Henry IV also suggests a shifting imperial outlook in Spain under Philip III. The changing emphasis from stereotypical "other" found in sixteenth-century texts, to a monarch with admirable traits as ruler and individual, indicates a possible reassessment of Spain's imperial presence. The door seems open to co-existence with the Bourbon monarchy in France and the formulation of a more defensive framework of Spanish imperium in comparison with the aggressive assertion of power and influence during the final decade of Philip II's reign.

The Dangers of Reason of State

Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides recognize that Henry IV and France's interests did not mirror those of Spain, and their nuanced accounts left plenty of space for critical assessments of Henry's policies, particularly regarding his impious actions. Such activities included his sympathies towards Protestants in France and Europe, and his expulsion of the Jesuit order. They also recounted that Henry, while gracious in victory at Amiens, could also be a ruthless and cold-blooded combatant capable of committing brutal acts in order to achieve victory. In sum, Spanish historians of the period balanced their familiarization of Henry IV with frank assessments of the king's controversial behavior and tactics which could be termed reason of state politics.

Popularized by Giovanni Botero's *Della ragion di Stato* in 1589, the term "reason of state" soon came to symbolize Machiavelli's controversial political doctrine. J.A. Fernández-Santamaría writes that early modern Spanish political theorists saw this reason of state as "what the prince must but ought not to do." As covered in the previous chapter these critics believed that reason of state advocated deceit, a pessimistic view of man, an emphasis of power over justice, and fomenting chaos and war in the international order. Perhaps most troublingly of all was reason of state's "destruction of religion as the ethical instrument designed to provide a measure of restraint in politics." For Spanish thinkers this odious divorce of politics from religion led to the ruin of the state itself.³⁴¹ Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y

³⁴⁰ Gutiérrez, 317-19.

³⁴¹ J.A. Fernández-Santamaría, *Reason of State and Statecraft in Spanish Political Thought, 1595-1640* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1983), 3, 5.

Benavides all saw Henry IV engaging in these troubling political practices associated with reason of state.

Bavia's triumphal interpretation of Henry's absolution did not blind him to the king's support of Protestantism. Bavia condemns the French monarch's backing of the Huguenots and Elizabeth I and Lutheran German princes, observing that these heretics caused great sadness and fear in France.³⁴² Henry allowed the Huguenots to ravage large swaths of France during the Wars of Religion, most notably in Languedoc, which was a center of Protestant power in the kingdom.³⁴³ Bavia writes that the heretics held the province in a "miserable state" which "recalled the old impiety of the Albigensians."³⁴⁴ The Protestants desecrated the sacred memory of Saint Louis VIII with their diabolical practices, "causing no small harm in that land, afflicting the few Catholics that inhabited it."³⁴⁵

Bavia believed that Henry IV possessed questionable scruples and displayed a ruthless ambition that bordered on the Machiavellian. He writes that during the negotiations over the election of the new king of France in 1593 there was agreement amongst many of the delegates [at the Estates Council] to extend the temporary peace agreement in order to continue the discussion over matters "so arduous, and of such great consequence."³⁴⁶ Yet Henry of Navarre brushed aside these requests, "always so attentive to know to take advantage of events, knowing the meager forces of his opponents; and the doubt, or neutrality, of many of the cities; he did not want to extend the treaty."³⁴⁷ This incident reveals Henry IV to be a savvy political opportunist who exploited the weakness of his opponents and was willing to advance his own goals at the expense of the general good. The election of a new French king was an important issue that warranted deliberate discussion, yet Henry shut down this debate in order to consolidate his own power. Indeed, it was in the Prince of Bearne's interest to sabotage the meeting of the Estates, since its likely outcome would have been the election of either the *Infanta* or a Leaguer candidate. Henry's prevarication, coupled with the Leaguer Duke of Mayenne's obstinacy, effectively doomed the convocation to inaction.³⁴⁸

For Bavia, Henry IV's expulsion of the Jesuits was another Machiavellian move that ran counter to the greater interests of France, her subjects, and the Catholic faith. Shortly after ascending to the throne Henry narrowly escaped an assassination at the hands of a student from a Jesuit school in Paris. The holy order were some of Henry's most fanatical opponents, and they threatened to continue their seditious activities after his coronation. In response to the assassination attempt, Henry IV ordered the Jesuits to be expelled from the kingdom of France.³⁴⁹ Bavia writes "The cruelty with which these Religious were treated greatly perturbed all the good Catholics; it seemed to them, and not without reason, that this [treatment] was more to avenge old passions than to punish present offenses..."³⁵⁰ Predictably, the Huguenots, who held many administrative positions under Henry IV, supported the expulsion "in order to more

³⁴² Bavia, 1:445.

³⁴³ Sandberg, 280.

³⁴⁴ "miserable estado," "renovando la impiedad antigua de los Albigenses." Bavia 2:96.

³⁴⁵ "causando no pequeños danos en aquella tierra, afligiendo los pocos Católicos que en ella auia." Bavia, 2:96.

³⁴⁶ "tan arduo, y de tan gran consecuencia." Bavia, 2:123.

³⁴⁷ "atentissimo siempre a saberse valer de las ocasiones, conociendo en esta las flacas fuerças de sus contrarios; y la duda, o neutralidad de muchas ciudades; no quería alargar la tregua." Bavia, 2:123.

³⁴⁸ Pitts, 167-8, 177.

³⁴⁹ Sutherland, 533. Pitts, 192.

³⁵⁰ "Sintieron grandemente todos los Buenos Catolicos el rigor que con estos Religiosos se usaua; pareciendoles, y no sin razon, que mas era esto vengar pasiones pasadas, que castigar delitos presentes..." Bavia, 2:207.

freely practice their nonsense.”³⁵¹ For Bavaria, the expulsion was an unjustified and faithless political act motivated by personal revenge.

Despite his absolution, the persecution of the Society of Jesus indicated Henry IV’s adherence to reason of state politics. While Bavaria never uses the term “reason of state” in his account of the expulsion, Henry’s crass separation of religious considerations from his political goals in this episode points to adherence to the reason of state philosophy. The expulsion of the Jesuits solidified Henry’s hold on the monarchy, but the moral and spiritual costs were unacceptable. The criticism is significant because it qualifies Bavaria’s exaltation of Henry’s absolution and its value in the struggle against Protestantism. In this text, Henry IV is fully formed as a human being, as opposed to the “other,” but emerges as a flawed monarch with questionable loyalties and motives who cannot be counted on to pursue policies that aided the Catholic cause.

Guadalajara y Javier focuses a more critical eye on Henry IV’s politics than Bavaria. A harsher critic of the king, Guadalajara y Javier was more skeptical from the start about the sincerity of Henry’s conversion. The historian peppers his narrative with facts and rumors that damage Henry’s character and reputation and fashion an image of a reason of state politician. Of particular importance, Guadalajara y Javier criticizes Henry IV’s support for the Huguenots after his conversion to Catholicism. The Aragonese historian exaggerates the close relationship between Henry and his Huguenot supporters, which had markedly cooled after his conversion.³⁵² In his view Henry IV remained a staunch supporter of the French Calvinists. For instance, he writes that the king granted Huguenot ministers and seminary students one hundred and twenty thousand ducats per year, and the enactment of “these writs (being passed by the Royal Council and stamped with the royal seal) was to profane the seal of France and the Lilies, free of the stain of heresy, shaming the image of the past kings that was engraved in the seal with scepter in hand, as a ray against heresy, in service of the Church.”³⁵³

Guadalajara y Javier also recounts that Henry of Navarre made systematic moves towards granting the heretics toleration in France, including his intention of re-issuing a previously annulled edict from 1577 that granted liberty of conscience in the kingdom. The historian is also outraged that Henry wanted to establish a two-part parliamentary body (“*una Camara bipartite*”) in Paris divided between Catholics and Protestants. These proposals greatly disturbed Parisians and caused them to distrust Henry.³⁵⁴

This active push for the toleration of Huguenots through institutional means coincided with Henry’s lobbying of the Papacy to grant him absolution. Guadalajara y Javier finds this audacious and immoral, but it was also a classic political maneuver illustrative of reason of state politics. Interestingly, Bavaria makes no mention of Henry’s effort to establish religious toleration, a divergence in narrative which speaks to Guadalajara y Javier’s more critical view of the monarch. Unsurprisingly, Henry IV’s support of the Huguenots, which cumulated with the Edict of Nantes, was troubling proof of his impiety and insincere devotion to the Church in the eyes of devout Catholics in Spain and France.³⁵⁵

³⁵¹ “para exercitar mas libremente sus disparates.” Bavaria, 2:207.

³⁵² Pitts, 208-9.

³⁵³ “y que aquellas patentes (siendo pasadas por el Consejo y selladas) era profanar el sello de Francia, y los Lirios limpios de mancha de heregia, auergoncando la Imagen de los Reyes pasados, que estaua esculpida en el sello con el Cetro en la mano, como rayo contra la heregia, en seruicio de la Iglesia.” Guadalajara y Javier, 125.

³⁵⁴ Guadalajara y Javier, 185.

³⁵⁵ Pitts, 212-15. Mateo Ballester Rodríguez, *La identidad española en la Edad Moderna (1556-1665): discursos, símbolos y mitos* (Madrid: Tecnos, 2010), 370, 375.

Guadalajara y Javier casts further doubt on Henry's political character and piety by repeating the rumor that he plotted with the Ottoman Empire against Spain after his conversion. The story is based on a rumored letter found in Savoy that Henry IV supposedly wrote to the Sultan Murad III (1574-95). The letter congratulated the Sultan on territorial gains in Hungary and attacks near the Neapolitan coast, and proposed an alliance between the Ottoman Empire and France against Spain. Guadalajara y Javier's comment that "if this letters was faked or not, God knows,"³⁵⁶ indicates that the authenticity of the letter was in doubt. However, by discussing the letter in the text, Guadalajara y Javier still tarnishes Henry's reputation. As such, he takes a middle position between Herrera, who does not doubt the letter's authenticity and condemns Henry for it, and Bavia, who does not mention the letter. While Henry IV never did attack Spanish territory with the Ottomans, he nonetheless did enter into an alliance with Murad's successor Ahmed I in 1597.³⁵⁷

This claim of a proposed joint French and Ottoman assault on the Spanish empire remains a damning accusation that calls into question Henry's commitment to the Catholic faith. Indeed, there is a particularly disturbing element in Henry's alleged congratulatory remarks concerning the Ottoman gains in Hungary and in the Mediterranean. If actually true, then this letter would be a definitive example of Henry IV's pursuit of reason of state politics, as it reveals that the king was willing to jeopardize the security of Christendom in order to gain a tactical advantage over his Hapsburg rivals.

Moreover, the Aragonese historian writes that the English and the Dutch could exercise a great deal of influence over Henry. He notes that Henry's desire to convert caused great consternation among these Protestant powers, as they feared that it would cause him to enter into an alliance with Spain, thus putting their own plans into disarray. Concerned over this possible partnership between Catholic Spain and France, the Dutch and English sent ambassadors to dissuade Henry from going forward with the absolutism and to renew his alliance with them. According to Guadalajara y Javier, only the intervention of the Cardinal of Florence, the Papal legate, prevented Henry from agreeing to the Protestant's offer, and convincing him to convert, swear friendship with the Pope, and agree to peace with Spain.³⁵⁸ While this less than flattering account ultimately confirms Henry IV's commitment to the Church, it also reveals the monarch's untrustworthy character and questionable political practices.

Like Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier predictably criticizes Henry IV's treatment of the Jesuits, to which he adds some disturbing details. The Aragonese historian asserts that Henry had a visceral hatred of the Jesuits, and after he ascended to the throne he ordered the murder of the members of the order who he suspects of aiding the Catholic League.³⁵⁹ This account is somewhat hyperbolic, as Henry only ordered the death of one member of the order for possessing and distributing seditious literature.³⁶⁰

According to Guadalajara y Javier, the Jesuits were widely loved in France because of their indefatigable efforts to extinguish heresy, and their expulsion "gave very great discontent to the better men of France...."³⁶¹ He thus is deeply offended by Henry IV's decision to erect a monument in the form of a massive marble pyramid to commemorate the Jesuits' expulsion. The

³⁵⁶ "si esta carta fue fingida, o no, Dios lo sabe," Guadalajara y Javier, 196.

³⁵⁷ Pitts, 292.

³⁵⁸ Guadalajara y Javier, 309.

³⁵⁹ Guadalajara y Javier, 195.

³⁶⁰ Pitts, 192.

³⁶¹ "dio grandissimo descontento a los mejores hombres de Francia..." Guadalajara y Javier, 196.

monument featured a list of crimes supposedly committed by the Company of Jesus against Henry and France, which delighted the Huguenots.³⁶² In sum, Henry IV's brutal and crass abuse of the Jesuits raised doubt in the historian's mind about the king's piety and political values.³⁶³

Like his contemporary Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier does not specifically accuse Henry IV of reason of state politics. However, the historian's critique of the king's dealings with Protestant monarchs, support of the Huguenots following his conversion to Catholicism, and persecution of the Jesuits, characterize this political philosophy and its insidious divorcing of religion from politics. Guadalajara y Javier stops short of dehumanizing Henry IV as heretic outcast, but the monarch is represented as duplicitous and Machiavellian ruler.

Villalobos y Benavides's history is less concerned with the potential shakiness of Henry's Catholic faith, and more focused on his leadership during the Civil Wars. As a combatant on the Spanish side, Villalobos y Benavides found much to admire about Henry's personal qualities, including gestures of mercy and good humor, which serve to humanize and familiarize the adversary. Nevertheless, the historian balances these observations by relating episodes of Henry's cruelty, and by offering critical remarks about the French national character. In a sense, these observations lend credence to this history, as one would expect battlefield excesses by the opponent.

Villalobos y Benavides writes that Henry had a reputation for cruelty among the Catholic opposition. The Leaguer sympathizers in Amiens accordingly feared the French king, who in the past had repeatedly threatened the residents of the city. Villalobos y Benavides writes that due to this treatment, the city's inhabitants fled in droves as the French army approached.³⁶⁴ It should be noted that prior to the Spanish takeover of the city, Amiens was still under the control of Henry IV, not the remnants of the Catholic League. While the residents of Amiens were not responsible for their city's capture, they nonetheless feared Henry's arguably unjust reprisal. Indeed, the French monarch would exile burghers who he had suspected of collaborating with the Spanish when he recaptured Amiens.³⁶⁵ Although Villalobos y Benavides does not discuss this banishment, he details other brutal actions by Henry IV that revealed that the residents' fears were justified.

He writes that upon his approach to the recently occupied city Henry IV ordered many of the surrounding suburbs to be burned in order to clear a way for his army and destroy any potential hiding spots of the enemy troops, as well as to punish the region's inhabitants. Within a matter of hours many houses completely burned down, and the poor residents fled to the city and surrounding camps with their crying children and only a handful of belongings, creating heart-wrenching scenes. "A spectacle certain to cause pity, and men do not fear to give a large part of their wealth in order to pursue a good as great as to live in peace."³⁶⁶

Villalobos y Benavides's treatment of these unjustified acts of cruelty reveals a brutal and cruel aspect to Henry IV's character and rule. In demolishing the suburbs of Amiens the French king demonstrates that he was not above trampling over his own subjects in order to achieve victory. In spite of his benevolent acts Henry IV could still be a vicious and dangerous opponent.

³⁶² The structure was called the Jean Chastel Pyramid, named after Henry IV's would be assassin. Roland Mousnier, *The Assassination of Henry IV: The Tyrannic Problem and the Consolidation of the French Absolute Monarchy in the Early Seventeenth Century*, trans. by Joan Spencer (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), 221.

³⁶³ Guadalajara y Javier, 196.

³⁶⁴ Villalobos y Benavides, 96-7.

³⁶⁵ Carpi, 222.

³⁶⁶ "Espectaculo cierto para dar lastima, y no temer los hombres dar mucha parte de su hazienda, por conseguir un bien tan grande como es viuir en paz." Villalobos y Benavides, 97.

According to Villalobos y Benavides, shortcomings in the French national character help to explain this cruel behavior. For example, he characterizes the French nobility as infamous for pursuing their own selfish interests, and “and this [pursuit of self-interest] was practiced more in that kingdom than in any other of Europe, because of the perpetual inconstancy of spirits which that land [France] breeds.”³⁶⁷

This made the French prone to dangerous factionalism, and contributed to the brutality and cruelty of French soldiers. For instance, he describes the slaughter of several Spanish servants by French troops at Amiens. The French troops

murdered eighty servants, and it was a pitiful thing to see them: some were boys, most eight to ten years old; they [the French] caused much grief, [and] they took some cows and horses: the [Spanish] men of the garrison were left very angry upon seeing the fury of the French soldiers against the poor servants, because amongst soldiers one does not usually harm them [the servants].³⁶⁸

Villalobos y Benavides’s description of the “*rabia*” of the French soldiers and their lust for murder closely resembles contemporary depictions of the Ottoman Turks and their lust for bloodshed.³⁶⁹ While the Spanish historian stops short of stating that all Frenchmen shared this propensity for barbaric violence, the incident tarnishes the image of French battlefield honor.

Villalobos y Benavides both departs from and adheres to the stereotyped image of the French found in Habsburg Spain. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he does not portray the French as being naturally prone to heresy. Nevertheless, he follows the commonly held view amongst Spaniards that the French were inconsistent and discordant regarding political behavior and loyalties.³⁷⁰ As such, he disparages the rival nation along civil, rather than religious lines. Importantly, by portraying the French as inclined to selfishness, factionalism, and violence, Villalobos y Benavides suggests that peace with the kingdom might be tenuous.

It follows that Villalobos y Benavides’s remarks concerning the French bear some resemblance to those found in the late sixteenth-century histories of Spain’s intervention in the French Wars of Religion. As with the soldier’s chronicle, Cornejo and Herrera comment on the French inclination towards civil violence and factionalism in their works. All of these historians observe that the selfishness inherent to the French character can create a toxic political environment rife with discord and mistrust. Nonetheless, Villalobos y Benavides discusses these faults in a much less polemical manner. Unlike Cornejo and Herrera, he provides no grim account of brother turning against brother and towns being torn apart along Leaguer and royalist lines in the civil war. He does not go into tremendous detail regarding the defects of the French character, and his assessment of the French is less damning than that of Cornejo and Herrera, who considered the French beyond the pale. The few genuinely devout Leaguers possessed noble intentions, but were still helpless against Henry without Spain’s help. Villalobos y

³⁶⁷ “y esto se usa mas en aquel Reyno que en otro ninguno de la Europa, por la perpetua inconstancia de los animos que engendra aquella tierra.” Villalobos y Benavides, 2.

³⁶⁸ “mataron ochenta mocos, y era cosa de compasión verlos: eran muchachos algunos, y los mas de ocho a diez anos; hizieron mucha lastima, llevaronse algunas bacas y cauallos; quedo la gente de la guarnicion enojadissima de auer visto la rabia de la gente Francesa contra los pobres mocos, porque entre soldados no se suele usar el herirlos.” Villalobos y Benavides, 121.

³⁶⁹ See Pedro de Salazar’s *Hispania Victrix* and Luis Cabrera de Cordoba’s *Historia de Felipe II* in Chapter 6 for Spanish views of the Ottomans.

³⁷⁰ Ballester Rodríguez, 370, 373.

Benavides does not offer blanket condemnation of the French, but retains serious reservations about them going forward.

Villalobos y Benavides penned his history after the signing of the peace treaty between the French and Spanish crowns, and at a time when France was re-emerging as a powerful kingdom. The historian's views reflected this political reality, and contrasted with the more negative and polemical assessments of major sixteenth-century historians, such as Cornejo, López Madera, and Herrera, who portrayed France as being in the midst of an irreversible decline.

Villalobos y Benavides's discussion of Henry IV offers elements of an objective account of the king. He frames his discussion with episodes of Henry as benevolent commander giving safe passage to the defeated Spanish at Amiens, and capable of sharing a joke with the enemy at the expense of his own English mercenaries at the same siege. The darker side of the monarch's character, however, is also revealed through unjust lingering hostility towards former Catholic League sympathizers and his brutal drive to achieve victory at the expense of his own subjects. Such troubling practices harken to reason of state's divorce of ethics from political goals. A complex image of the man emerges. He is a formidable force in Europe, and he rules over a people of questionable character.

Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier, both clerical historians, remind us of Henry IV's impious and politically dangerous acts. Bavia finds hope in Henry's conversion, but is troubled by the king's willingness to disregard the general good for his own ends, his support of the Huguenots and other heretics, and his persecution of the Jesuits. Guadalajara y Javier is more skeptical about the sincerity of Henry's conversion, and documents the king's egregious courting of Protestant favor and atrocities against Jesuits. The image of Henry IV as a Machiavellian practitioner of reason of state politics emerges.

The histories reveal something about the state of Franco-Spanish relations in the early seventeenth century. Their criticisms erode the luster from Henry IV's historical image at a time when he was already emerging in the French historical imagination as one of the country's greatest kings, and his reign as a Golden Age.³⁷¹ Their histories acknowledge elements of Henry's greatness, but they also pointedly document his shortcomings, especially for a devout Spanish audience. Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides, condition their readers to the dangers of a France capable to making alliances with heretics, including the Ottoman Turks, and relentlessly pursuing reason of state politics. Catholic Europe would need to keep its guard up against the unpredictable French. This view also reflected historical memory of Spain's long-standing rivalry and periodic wars dating back to Ferdinand and Isabella. Indeed, the containment of France had long been a cornerstone of the Spanish crown's international policy.³⁷²

Conclusion

The works of Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides all challenge the traditional assessment that Henry IV was demonized and cast as a political and cultural "other" in the histories and literature of the Spanish Baroque. Rather, these historians provide comparatively balanced assessments of Henry IV and the Civil Wars in comparison to studies produced in the late sixteenth century, that reflect their concerns over the re-emergence of a powerful France, the sincerity of Henry IV's conversion, the future of the Catholic Church in France, and the emerging image of Henry IV as a great king. Overlaying more of their

³⁷¹ Greengrass, 254-56.

³⁷² Henry Kamen, *Philip of Spain* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 279. Ballester Rodríguez, 358.

discussion are concerns about protecting the Church against the spread of Protestantism and reason of state politics, which emerge as twin evils.

In Bavia's history, Henry IV effectively loses his status as an "other" via his absolution. While the chaplain historian does praise the French monarch's skills as a commander and occasional acts of benevolence, a significant focus of his narrative is on Henry's eventual acceptance into the Catholic faith. In a marked departure from the sixteenth-century histories of the French Wars of Religion, Bavia frames this turn of events as a monumental victory for Catholicism, touting the former Huguenot's acceptance into the one true faith as an example of the superiority of the Church and the Papacy. This unequivocal celebration of the absolution serves to familiarize the historical image of Henry IV by transforming him into a potent symbol of Catholic triumphalism.

Unlike Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier questions the sincerity of Henry IV's absolution. While the Aragonese historian writes that it was necessary in order to bring peace to France and preserve the unity of the Church, he views the king's faith as calculated and insincere. On the other hand, Guadalajara y Javier portrays the monarch as a talented military commander, and documents Henry's gracious and benevolent treatment of the Spanish troops at the end of the siege of Amiens. This account effectively softens and humanizes the king. A discourse of familiarization, not alterity, runs through Guadalajara y Javier's discussion of Henry IV at Amiens.

Villalobos y Benavides presents the most personal, sympathetic and modern portrait of the monarch. The soldier historian does not dwell on the religious controversies surrounding Henry, but focuses on his admirable qualities as a ruler and military commander. Villalobos y Benavides provides eyewitness accounts of Henry IV's humor and mercy toward the enemy, while recognizing his willingness to be ruthless in the pursuit of victory. On balance, these battlefield moments add a humane element to the king's historical image.

Henry IV's absolution and the Peace of Vervins resulted in the opening up of new avenues for the historical interpretation of the monarch for Spanish intellectuals. Compared to authors writing in the late sixteenth century, Spanish historians in the early seventeenth century were less inclined to vilify Henry, given his acceptance into the Catholic faith. The powerful image of Henry IV as arch-heretic had lost its meaning. As a result of this toxic image being set aside, seventeenth-century historians considered both the positive and negative qualities of Henry IV in their assessment of the monarch, and their writings gave form to a more multi-faceted and diverse historical image of his rule. This range of interpretations is evidenced by the different ways that Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides humanize Henry IV.

This "opening up" of historical views regarding Henry IV reflects a re-evaluation of Spain's imperial history and image, and the dynamism of Spanish historical and imperial thought. History writing has its political motivations. Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides offer commentaries on the state of Franco-Spanish relations, the future of the Church and Spain, reason of state politics, and Henry IV's historical legacy.

Henry IV's prioritization of political goals over matters of religion, his dealings with heretics, his brutal treatment of his enemies, and a calculating willingness to pursue his own ends no matter the cost, show that the French king followed reason of state politics. No longer dehumanized as a fierce enemy of the Church, the king held a subtler antagonistic place in Spanish historical thought. These historians never explicitly accuse Henry of following a reason of state politics, which was a rhetorical strategy due to the signing of the peace. A more roundabout discourse was indicated.

The negative images of Henry IV portrayed by Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides are a reflection of Franco-Spanish relations in the early seventeenth century. For their contemporaries in both France and Spain the hostility between the French and Spanish crowns was regarded as a given in international politics at this time. Although the two powers were at peace during the reign of Philip III, the Spanish crown worried about French aid to the rebellious United Provinces; the French crown in turn was perpetually uneasy about the constant and menacing presence of Spanish troops in the Low Countries.³⁷³ The eventual Franco-Spanish marriage between the young Louis XIII and the *Infanta* Anne of Austria in 1615 did lead to a thawing of relations between Paris and Madrid.³⁷⁴ However, tensions once again resumed when Spain and Savoy went to war in 1616.³⁷⁵

While these historians stop far short of dehumanizing the French monarch, their portrayals of Henry are nonetheless unsettling. This mixture of disquieting criticism and seeming acceptance mirrors the uneasy *détente* between the French and Spanish crowns during the reign of Philip III. Just as hostility lingered, an embedded apprehension emanates found within these seventeenth-century texts. This discourse of anxiety and caution differed from the polemical hostility of the late sixteenth-century histories discussed in Chapter 1, it nonetheless speaks to the lasting tensions between France and Spain.

Although Henry IV was dead by the time that Guadalajara y Javier and Villalobos y Benavides were writing, all of their remarks carried weight regarding the status of the kingdom of France in the early seventeenth century. For these seventeenth-century Spanish historians, it was troubling that the French would hold Henry IV in high regard given his Huguenot roots and routing of the Catholic League. Henry's beloved status suggests that reason of state philosophy had become enshrined in the French political culture of the early seventeenth century. In this regard the works of Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides serve as a warning about France. Free from the Wars of Religion, it was possible that the French would return to their aggressive and expansionist ways of the Italian Wars.

³⁷³ J.H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 52-53.

³⁷⁴ Ballester Rodríguez, 377-8.

³⁷⁵ Elliott, 53-4.

Chapter 4 A New Vision of Empire

Introduction

This chapter further explores the central political themes found in early seventeenth-century Spanish histories of the French Wars of Religion, turning to how historians during the reign of Philip III depicted Spain and its intervention in France during the final decade of the sixteenth century. Similar to their interpretation of Henry IV's rise to power and rule, Luis de Bavia and Fray Marcos de Guadalajara y Javier propose substantially different critiques of Spanish imperial policy compared with sixteenth-century histories. These divergences point to a fundamental shift in Spanish imperial identity in the early seventeenth century.

A close examination of Bavia's and Guadalajara y Javier's depictions of the French Wars of Religion offers a fascinating view into the fluid and dynamic imperial culture of Hapsburg Spain. Their histories document the frequently politicized nature of early modern Spanish history writing and serve as lessons for the king and his advisors to succeed in the tumultuous international political arena of the early seventeenth century.

In contrast to the established view that Philip II enjoyed an enshrined position in early modern Spanish historical thought, Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier criticize the Prudent King for his decision to intervene in the French Wars of Religion. While they believe that Philip II's intentions for intervening were admirable, they show that the enterprise itself was ill advised, costly, and ultimately disastrous. They argue that Philip II's order to send the Army of Flanders to war with Henry of Navarre resulted in the direct endangerment of the loyal Low Countries and paved the way for the advances of the rebellious Dutch. The intervention ultimately exhausted royal resources and weakened the defenses of the Spanish imperium.

Bavia's and Guadalajara y Javier's critical assessments of Philip II's intervention in France are indicative of a more sweeping reassessment of the Spanish empire. Their histories, the *Tercera y quarta parte de la historia pontifical y general* and the *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica*, contain the stunning admission that the Spanish empire was not invincible. In effect, they call for a departure from Philip II's overly aggressive and even cavalier policies of empire building in the final decade of his reign. They spell out a lesson for Philip III that he should not follow his father's risky path. Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier use history writing to weigh in on Spain's imperial policy at this critical juncture in the early seventeenth century.

While Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier argue for a scaling back of costly military aggression, they are far from pacifists. In a telling indication of the politicized nature of their texts, Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier use their histories to comment on the Twelve Years' Truce between the Spanish crown and the United Provinces. The result of over a decade of negotiation, the agreement ended hostilities between Spain and the Netherlands and reopened trade between the two powers, but gave no guarantees concerning the open practice of Catholicism in the United Provinces.³⁷⁶ This shaky peace between Spain and the Dutch rebels was one of the most controversial measures of Philip III's reign.³⁷⁷ Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier illustrate the folly of this agreement by chronicling the extensive atrocities committed by Dutch rebels against loyal Flemish Catholics in the Low Countries following the diversion of the Army of Flanders to

³⁷⁶ Paul C. Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), vii, 230-1.

³⁷⁷ Antonio Feros, *Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 196.

France, and by showing the United Provinces' troubling aspirations toward becoming a sea-born empire. Thus, much like their contemporaries the early *arbitristas*, they are in favor of reigning in the costs of empire. However, in contrast to these writers, Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier call for continuing the war against the Dutch. Although the two historians recognize that Spanish power had its limits, they advocate a stout defense of imperial interests.

Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier lay out their own map for the recovery of the Spanish empire following the calamities and of the late sixteenth century. In criticizing Philip II's ill-advised intervention in France and advocating for a renewed war against the Dutch, the two historians issue a call for a consolidated vision of Spanish imperial power that prioritizes the defense of Spain's own domains. Such a stance foreshadows a broader reevaluation of Spanish imperial policy and identity during the reign of Philip III.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the histories of Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier were printed multiple times and thus reached a larger reading audience than better-known Spanish historians of the early seventeenth century such as Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas. Both historians received rewards from the crown in recognition of their scholarly accomplishments, and their histories were sold in both Castile and Aragon well into the reign of Philip IV.³⁷⁸ Their uncensored criticisms of Philip II's intervention into France reflected changing views of Spanish imperial identity in the seventeenth century.

The Prudent King's Legacy Redefined

In spite of the controversy surrounding Spain's involvement in the French Wars of Religion, most Spanish historians in the early seventeenth century supported Philip II's intervention. Major figures such as Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas and Luis Cabrera de Córdoba rejected foreign writers' claims that Philip II intervened to gain control of France. Instead, they argued that the Prudent King only sought to defend the beleaguered Catholic Church in France.³⁷⁹

In general, Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier agree with this interpretation of Philip II's motivations. Bavia argues that Philip II intervened to protect the Catholic Church in France following the death of Henry III and the Huguenots' subsequent military success under Henry of Navarre.³⁸⁰ Bavia writes that Philip II forbid the Duke of Parma from occupying French territory, and, after Parma had lifted the siege of Paris, the commander of the Army of Flanders swore before an assembly of French nobles that Philip II's policy was to aid the Church and the Catholic League.³⁸¹

Guadalajara y Javier also offers a sympathetic, but comparatively shorter, assessment of Philip II's reasoning for intervening in the French Wars of Religion. Guadalajara y Javier writes

³⁷⁸ Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano*, vol. 7 (Barcelona: Librería Palau, 1954), 30. Félix de Latassa y Ortín, *Biblioteca nueva de los escritores aragoneses que florecieron desde el año de 1600 hasta 1640* (Pamplona, 1799), 3:455, 3:457. Joseph Antonio Alvarez y Baena, *Hijos de Madrid, ilustres en santidad, dignidades, armas, ciencias, y armas* (Madrid: 1790), 3:403.

³⁷⁹ See Book IV, Chapter XII of Luis Cabrera de Córdoba's *Historia de Felipe II*, ed. by José Martínez Millán and Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales (Salamanca: Junta de Castilla y León, 1998), pgs. 90-99 of Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas' *Historia de los sucesos de Francia...* (Madrid, 1598), and p. 2 of Diego de Villalobos y Benavides' *Comentarios de las cosas sucedidas en los Países Bajos...* (Madrid, 1612).

³⁸⁰ Luis de Bavia, *Tercera y quarta parte de la historia pontifical y general* (Madrid, 1608), 1:586.

³⁸¹ Bavia, 1:590-1.

that the advances of Henry of Navarre and the rapidly declining fortunes of the Catholic League alarmed Philip II, and caused the Spanish king to order the intervention to protect the Church.³⁸²

A critical view of the conflict itself, however, distinguishes Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier from Herrera, Cornejo, and López Madera, whose works were covered in the first two chapters of the dissertation. The imprudent campaign in France threatened the Spanish empire, and Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier clearly place the blame on Philip II. Their criticisms of Philip II's imperial policy toward the end of his reign signal a re-interpretation of the great king's reputation shortly following his death.

Modern scholars argue that seventeenth-century historians sincerely revered Philip II and supported his policies. Richard Kagan argues that the king kept tight control over his historical image and its diffusion and, unlike his father the emperor Charles V, Philip II blocked the publication of an official history of his reign for much of his rule.³⁸³ Although Kagan characterizes the crown's attempts at censorship as clumsy, at times the government was effective, such as when Philip II ordered all copies of a history critical of his repression of a revolt in Aragon to be confiscated on grounds of sedition.³⁸⁴ It is also commonly assumed that Philip II's efforts to control his historical image within the Spanish kingdoms succeeded. For example, according to Henry Kamen, no Spanish histories written in the seventeenth century offered any substantial criticisms of Philip II. Kamen writes that the "world at large" accepted the unfavorable image of Spanish imperial power, "but nothing of substance was said by Spaniards inside the country against the reputation of the king."³⁸⁵

Even many of the often outspoken reformist writers known as *arbitristas* did not blame Philip II for the ills of seventeenth-century Spain. The *arbitristas* frequently railed against what they saw as the failures of the Spanish economic and political system.³⁸⁶ In his memorandum to Philip III about how to improve the Spanish empire, the *arbitrista* Alamos de Barrientos writes that Spain was surrounded by enemies, impoverished, and its people exhausted. However, he avoids laying the blame on Philip II, and instead focuses on the shortcomings of the nobility.³⁸⁷

The historical figure of Philip II was enshrined within the Spanish court itself. According to J.H. Elliott, the courts of Philip III and Philip IV valorized the Prudent King. Elliott writes that many in Philip III's court "...looked back with growing nostalgia to the reign of the Prudent King, who had not been afraid to discharge the responsibilities of world-wide power."³⁸⁸ This nostalgia increased steadily overtime, and by the end of Philip III's reign, his father's rule was enshrined as an age of epic achievements which cast upon the "Castilian consciousness a particular image of kingship—just, firm, authoritative, and intensely personal."³⁸⁹ The reform-minded *privados* (court favorites) Baltasar de Zúñiga and the Count-Duke of Olivares attempted to restore Spain to their vision of its former glories under the Prudent King.³⁹⁰ Rodríguez Pérez

³⁸² Fray Marcos de Guadalajara y Javier, *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica* (Zaragoza, 1612), 5.

³⁸³ Richard L. Kagan, *Clio and the Crown* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 94-95 and 98-99.

³⁸⁴ Richard L. Kagan, "Clio and the Crown," in *Spain, Europe, and the Atlantic World* (New York: Cambridge, 1995), 83.

³⁸⁵ Henry Kamen, *Imagining Spain* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 54.

³⁸⁶ J.H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 88-90.

³⁸⁷ J.A. Fernández-Santamaría, *Natural Law, Constitutionalism, Reason of State, and War* (New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 2:373.

³⁸⁸ Elliott, 57.

³⁸⁹ Elliott, 91-2.

³⁹⁰ Elliott, 57.

in her work on Spanish histories and plays about the war in the Netherlands writes that Olivares viewed the reign of Philip II as a highpoint of Spain's glory. Seventeenth-century historical plays accordingly would frequently fall back on the "splendid past" of the sixteenth century and portray Philip II as the ideal monarch.³⁹¹

The histories of Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier depart from the standard interpretation of Philip II. While they admire the king's piety and defense of the Church, they paint the final decade of his rule as a period of unsettling threats to the Spanish empire. The two argue that the intervention in France quickly turned into a quagmire for the Spanish forces. The Catholic League itself represented the largest obstacle to military success. Bavia writes that the Catholic nobles were initially happy to accept military provisions and four hundred infantry, seven hundred cavalry, and two thousand Italian foot soldiers.³⁹² This sense of goodwill, however, soon gave way to mistrust. For example, Bavia remarks that when Philip II's ambassador, Bernardino de Mendoza, attempted to distribute much needed alms during Henry of Navarre's siege of Paris, the devout Catholic Parisians reacted to this act of Spanish generosity with resentment and suspicion.³⁹³

According to Bavia, the truculence and unreliability of the French allies compounded the difficulty of an already arduous enterprise. His history recounts setback after setback for the Spanish forces and the unreliable Catholic League. For example, poor relations between the Army of Flanders and the Leaguers caused the loss of Corbel. Bavia writes that Parma initially captured the city, with the Spanish troops subsequently engaging in a sack that the chaplain historian described as "more cruel than rich."³⁹⁴ Bavia downplays this Spanish transgression, however, by writing, "but the military license in all the nations tends to be the same, and the effects of war are almost always the same."³⁹⁵ Nevertheless, the sack's consequences were significant, as the Catholic League only permitted Parma to garrison the captured city with a meager force of sick and wounded Spanish and two hundred Germans. Unsurprisingly, following Parma's return to Flanders, Henry of Navarre quickly retook the city with little resistance from the League.³⁹⁶ Bavia blames the setback on the Catholic League's decision that "it did not consent to the Duke of Parma stationing a sizable garrison of better men."³⁹⁷ According to Bavia, many contemporary observers believed that the Leaguers followed this disastrous policy because they wrongly believed that the Spanish "wanted to secure their occupation of some of the good fortified areas of France."³⁹⁸

Bavia's discussion of the battle for Corbel highlights the almost absurd nature of Philip II's intervention in France. Bavia argues that Henry of Navarre gained many other important towns because of the League's distrust of the Spanish and their refusal to allow Parma to adequately garrison French cities.³⁹⁹ The commander's well-meaning oaths that the Spanish

³⁹¹ Yolanda Rodríguez Pérez, *The Dutch Revolt Through Spanish Eyes: Self and Other in Historical and Literary Texts of Golden Age Spain* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008), 172, 180.

³⁹² Bavia, 1:445.

³⁹³ Bavia, 1:633.

³⁹⁴ "mas cruel que rico," Bavia, 1:647.

³⁹⁵ "mas la licencia militar en todas las naciones suele ser una, y los efectos de la guerra casi siempre son iguales." Bavia, 1:647. Chapter 5 covers in detail how Spanish historians depicted mutinies and other transgressions in the armies of the Spanish crown.

³⁹⁶ Bavia, 1:647.

³⁹⁷ "que no quiso consentir que pusiese el Duque de Parma grueso presidio de mejor gente." Bavia, 647.

³⁹⁸ "quisiesen afirmar los pies en algunas buenas placas [plazas] de Francia." Bavia, 1:647.

³⁹⁹ Bavia, 1:647.

crown had no intention to occupy French territory had little impact on his allies. Thus, the Catholic League's foolhardiness doomed the Duke of Parma's campaign by effectively preventing him from holding on to his military gains.

Guadalajara y Javier agrees that French antipathy toward the Spanish intervention contributed to the failure of the Army of Flanders. The Aragonese historian observes that French peasants and townsman viewed Spanish troops as foreign interlopers and frequently refused to help them, forcing troops to forage for food. Similarly, Guadalajara y Javier remarks that the Catholic League made for very unreliable allies. He is incredulous that while the Leaguers had reached out to Philip II for aid against Henry of Navarre, they largely mistrusted the Spanish and refused to fully cooperate with Parma. The Aragonese historian attributes this behavior, in part, to the overly prideful and impetuous French character.⁴⁰⁰

For Guadalajara y Javier, one of the most striking examples of this poor state of relations between the Army of Flanders and the Catholic League was their defeat at the crucial battle at Rouen. The area had traditionally been a bastion for the League, and the combined Leaguer and Spanish forces substantially outnumbered Henry of Navarre's army. Nonetheless, in spite of this tactical advantage, Guadalajara y Javier writes that the Catholic forces lost because of the "little cooperation" between the Spanish and French troops.⁴⁰¹

Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier largely blame the failure of Spain's intervention in the French Wars of Religion on the Catholic League. Despite Henry of Navarre's conversion to Catholicism, the intervention was judged too costly to Spain's treasury and reputation. The two historians consider Philip II's intervention as a tactical blunder that failed to consider the predictable antipathy of the French people, Catholic and Protestant, toward the Spanish, and the potential military consequences in the Low Countries that stemmed from the redeployment of the Army of Flanders in France. According to Bavia, Philip II's decision to commit so many troops to fight Henry of Navarre took a great deal of unnamed observers in Spain and in France by surprise. In Bavia's opinion "there could not have been many good military reasons to have sent away the men who defended that province [Flanders], at a time when enemies [the Dutch] undertook very important enterprises."⁴⁰² Yet Parma ultimately departed "with very large forces, whereby the affairs of the Catholic King would come to be weakened in Flanders, so that such States would be left to be dispossessed by its enemies."⁴⁰³ Bavia even states that this move appeared to go against good governance.⁴⁰⁴ Philip II's gamble in France to help the Catholic Church was noble in principle, but risked Spain's possessions in the Low Countries. The intervention was ill conceived from the perspective of safeguarding imperial interests.

Bavia also asserts that Philip II's audacious intervention even caught Henry of Navarre by surprise. He writes that Henry

never thought that the Duke of Parma would abandon those provinces for sacking by rebels against the Catholic King. Neither did he believe that the forces that Spain had

⁴⁰⁰ Guadalajara y Javier, 39.

⁴⁰¹ "poca conformidad," Guadalajara y Javier, 38.

⁴⁰² "por razón de guerra, no podían ser muchos, pues no se auia de desguarnecer aquella prouincia de gente que la defendiesse, a tiempo que los enemigos tentauan importantissimas empresas." Bavia, 1:630.

⁴⁰³ "con grandissimas fuerças, por lo qual se vendieran a enflaquecer de manera las cosas del Rey Católico en Flandes, que quedarían aquellos Estados por despojo de sus enemigos." Bavia, 1:630-1.

⁴⁰⁴ Bavia, 1:631.

there [in Flanders], were so large that they were sufficient to safeguard the States [of Flanders], by bringing to France so many and such magnificent men.⁴⁰⁵

The unexpected entry of such a large force provoked Henry into making tentative overtures of peace with the Catholic League. According to Bavia, the offers of negotiation arrived too late, as Parma's army was already advancing on Paris, and Philip II remained foolishly confident of victory.⁴⁰⁶

Guadalajara y Javier writes that Philip II ignored the sound advice of his closest advisors, who denounced the intervention as expensive and warned that the French would ultimately reject foreign troops quartered in France. He writes that the "Illustrious Knights and experienced Captains"⁴⁰⁷ of the king's Council of War "could all fear and doubt the French nature (being such affectionate lovers of their homeland) that they would readily pardon past insults, and would clear up past differences, in order not to see foreign armies in their country."⁴⁰⁸ The councilors rightfully surmised that the intervention of foreign troops would rally many Frenchmen to the side of the Prince of Bearne. In the end, Philip II's pious motives for intervention lost out to Henry, who employed superior military tactics and appealed to his fellow Frenchmen. In a place divided along confessional and factional lines, an emerging sense of cultural nationalism and fear of the foreign invader benefitted Henry.

Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier argue that the creation of a second military front in France pushed Spanish forces to their limits. The question of imperial overreach looms large in these histories. The two historians explicitly link Spanish losses in the Netherlands to the departure of Parma for France. Bavia observes that reverses in the Low Countries quickly followed: "the rebels very prudently had known to take advantage of the Duke's absence in such a grand occasion."⁴⁰⁹ The Dutch position also improved with the arrival of significant aid from England and promises of provisions from the French Huguenots.⁴¹⁰ The rebellious Dutch made good use of their strategic advantage.

According to Bavia, the withdrawal of the Army of Flanders soon resulted in the Dutch capture of the city of Breda, which he describes as a vastly important event that caused "the Duke much sorrow."⁴¹¹ Breda's strategic importance at the confluence of the Mark and Aa rivers gave whoever held it easy access to much of the Low Countries; moreover, the fortified city was a crucial lynchpin in the arc of Spanish fortresses along the border of the territory controlled by the United Provinces.⁴¹² Breda's fall had a domino effect, and led to the capture of Sangtrudembergh two years later, and left other territory vulnerable to the rebels. Indeed, Bavia

⁴⁰⁵ "Nunca pensó que el Duque de Parma desamparara a Flandes, y dexara aquellos Estados por despojo de los rebeldes del Rey Católico. Ni creyo que las fuerças que Espana allí tenia, eran tan grandes que bastasen a dexar assegurados los Estados, y traer a Francia tanto y tan luzida gente." Bavia, 1:640.

⁴⁰⁶ Bavia, 1:640.

⁴⁰⁷ "Illustres Caualleros y experimentados Capitanes," Guadalajara y Javier, 5.

⁴⁰⁸ "podían todos temer y dudar de la condición Francesa (siendo tan tierno amadores de su patria) que perdonarían presto las injurias, y compondrían sus diferencias, por no ver estrangeras banderas en su patria." Guadalajara y Javier, 5.

⁴⁰⁹ "los rebeldes prudentissimamente, se habian sabido se auian sabido aprouechar en la ausencia del Duque de tan gran ocasión." Bavia, 1:650.

⁴¹⁰ Bavia, 1:650.

⁴¹¹ "gran sentimiento al Duque." Bavia, 1:650.

⁴¹² R.A. Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 98.

remarks that this turn of events would not have been possible if the Spanish had retained control of Breda.⁴¹³

The French intervention created a two front war that Spain could not manage. Maurice of Nassau's streak of victories forced Parma to return to the Low Countries, which in turn granted Henry of Navarre the opportunity to recapture territory he had lost to Spanish forces and the Catholic League.⁴¹⁴ Bavia writes that the Army of Flanders' departure from France

had caused much harm to the League: because [with the departure] the kingdom lost any opportunity that would be for its benefit: and the Catholic Princes [Leaguer nobles], in part because of their small forces, and in part because of the secret disagreements and rivalries they had amongst themselves, weakly dealt with the enterprise.⁴¹⁵

Henry's decisive victory at Montmélián and other military gains led Philip II to order Parma, once again, to abandon the Low Countries for France. The Spanish king, according to Bavia, feared for the future of the Catholic Church in France. Parma was given "the explicit order that in no case that the Catholic Religion be left at risk in that kingdom."⁴¹⁶

The timing of Parma's return to France could not have been worse. When the order arrived, Bavia writes that Parma was consolidating the scattered defenses of the Low Countries and preparing to repel Maurice of Nassau's attacks on Frisia.⁴¹⁷ According to Bavia, the Duke of Parma questioned Philip II's strategic thinking: "Yet it did not seem to him [Parma] that he should put at evident risk the patrimony of the Catholic King [in Flanders], in order to go to help France, especially because the Catholic Religion was in no less danger in one region that it was in the other."⁴¹⁸ Thus, Bavia's history raises the question of whether or not the Spanish crown should have endangered its own domains to intervene in France. Importantly, since the Dutch rebels were heretics, the Catholic faith was also threatened in the Low Countries. In Bavia's view, by the end of his reign, Philip II simply did not have the resources to act as the sword of the Counter-Reformation without incurring tremendous costs for his own empire.

Bavia effectively demonstrates that by the 1590s the Army of Flanders could not carry out effective military campaigns in two theatres of war. Indeed, he writes that Parma correctly "affirm[ed] that it was impossible to insure at the same time the safety of France and of Flanders."⁴¹⁹ Philip II commanded that heresy should be defeated in France,⁴²⁰ Parma resolved to leave the Low Countries "as best as he could provide: he entrusted [the matter] to divine providence (as he said), and departed for France."⁴²¹ As such, Bavia depicts this exit from the

⁴¹³ Bavia, 1:650. In fact the Spanish crown would not recover Breda until 1625 after a costly siege.

⁴¹⁴ Bavia, 1:666.

⁴¹⁵ "porque el reino perdía ninguna ocasión que fuese de su provecho auia causado muy grandes danos a la Liga: porque el Reyno perdía ninguna ocasión q fuese de su prouecho: y los Principes Católicos, parte por sus pocas fuerças, parte por secretas diferencias q entre ellos auia, tratauan el negocio floxamente." Bavia, 1:665.

⁴¹⁶ "con orden expresso que en ningún caso dexasse correr peligro la Religion Católica en aquel Reyno." Bavia, 1:682.

⁴¹⁷ Bavia, 1:682.

⁴¹⁸ "Mas con todo no parecía le parecia que deuia dexar correr manifiesto riesgo el patrimonio del Rey Católico, por ir a socorrer a Francia, mayormente que no menos en la una que en la otra parte, corria la Religion Católica peligro." Bavia, 1:682.

⁴¹⁹ "afirmando que era imposible asegurar a un mismo tiempo las de Francia, y de Flandes." Bavia, 1:685.

⁴²⁰ Bavia, 1:683.

⁴²¹ "como mejor pudiesse proueydos: encomendados (como el dezia) a la diuna prouidencia, y pasar en Francia." Bavia, 1:683.

Netherlands as a moment of resigned desperation for Parma. The move placed a tremendous burden on the over-taxed Spanish forces and left the security of the Low Countries in a deeply uncertain position.

Bavia's account presents an alternative view of Philip II as the model king of early modern Spain. The French intervention quickly became a lost cause,⁴²² which Philip II failed to recognize, despite the obvious incompetence of the Leaguers and the demonstrated military skill and popularity of Henry of Navarre.⁴²³ Bavia approved of Henry IV's absolution, as discussed in the previous chapter, but he argues that it was not worth Spain's costly intervention.⁴²⁴ The France adventure was a humiliating defeat for Spain's valiant army, "which had always protected the cause of religion in that kingdom, and had done so at excessive costs in the space of four years, without any satisfaction..."⁴²⁵

In contrast to the hopelessness of the situation in France, Bavia speculates that Parma could have made substantial gains in Flanders. For example, he writes that Parma was on the verge of capturing Brill after a long siege when orders arrived to re-invade France.⁴²⁶ Thus, "the new order greatly perturbed the Duke in this occasion, since it appeared to him that with having to lift the siege the enemy would recover their reputation, because without a doubt they did not have the strength to relieve the fortified city..."⁴²⁷ In Bavia's view, Parma could have easily defeated the Dutch rebels in this instance. "But to return to France with a powerful army...doubtlessly weakened the standing forces of the critical areas of those States [Flanders]..."⁴²⁸

Guadalajara y Javier echoes Bavia's critical assessment of the French intervention. The reckless enterprise strained Spain's imperial defenses and depleted its resources. Guadalajara y Javier also criticizes Philip II for ignoring the advice of his councilors, and underscores the hostility of the French peasants toward Spanish forces, sent to save their Church.⁴²⁹ Without local support, the Spanish forces had to survive on "twelve ounces of very black bread worth two reales," and many horses died because of shortages of grass.⁴³⁰ Due to a dire lack of pay the Spanish soldiers roamed the countryside "leaving their lodgings in order to find food, and of these some were left dead or captured."⁴³¹ By contrast, "the French camp was abundant with men and provisions: conserving with prudence the good will of the neighboring towns."⁴³² While Henry of Navarre enjoyed the growing support of the French people, the Spanish nearly starved.

⁴²² Bavia, 1:681.

⁴²³ Bavia, 2:43.

⁴²⁴ Bavia, 2:198.

⁴²⁵ "que siempre auian amparado la causa de la religion en aquel Reyno, y hehco en el por esta causa por espaico de quatro anos excessiuos gastos, sin satisfacci3n alguna..." Bavia, 2:202.

⁴²⁶ Bavia, 1:685.

⁴²⁷ "sintio el Duque en esta ocasi3n la nueua orden grandemente, por parecerle que con auer de leuantar el cerco cobraua reputaci3n el enemigo, que sin duda no auia tenido animo de socorrer el fuerte..." Bavia, 1:685.

⁴²⁸ "Mas boluer en Francia con poderoso exercito...era sin duda debilitar las fuerças que tenian en pie las principales placas de aquellos Estados." Bavia, 1:683.

⁴²⁹ Guadalajara y Javier, 39.

⁴³⁰ "doze oncas de pan bien negro valian dos reales" Guadalajara y Javier, 39.

⁴³¹ "dexando sus alojamientos para buscar de comer, y dellos unos quedauan muertos o presos." Guadalajara y Javier, 39.

⁴³² "el campo de Enrico abundaua de gente y vastimentos: conseruando con prudencia la amistad de los pueblos comarcanos." Guadalajara y Javier, 39.

In Guadalajara y Javier's history the connection between the Spanish intervention and Henry of Navarre's conversion remains unresolved, leaving the reader to decide amongst the different explanations. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Guadalajara y Javier concludes that only God knew if Henry of Navarre's conversion was truly genuine or actually feigned.⁴³³ This equivocal outcome underscores Guadalajara y Javier's critical view of the intervention as a whole; it is truly unknown if Spain's sacrifices were worth it.

Guadalajara y Javier observes that Philip II's intervention placed the Spanish kingdoms themselves in some danger. According to the Aragonese historian, during the war a sizable band of French "Lutheran" raiders invaded the kingdom of Aragon.⁴³⁴ He writes that "The news of the Lutherans having arrived so deep into Spain notably shook the land, and it was marvelous, that without waiting for any order...those of the kingdom [Aragon] expelled them."⁴³⁵ Shockingly, the "Lutherans" defeated a militia and might have captured Huesca if not for the mobilization of the city's students and clergy, who armed themselves and repelled the heretics. The Aragonese historian proudly notes that he participated in this impromptu defeat of the French invaders, writing "I left the monastery with the other monks, with my spear to my shoulder."⁴³⁶

Aside from revealing Guadalajara y Javier's strong patriotic sentiment for his native Aragon, a theme that Chapter 5 will cover in more detail, this account of the Protestant incursion demonstrated Spain's vulnerability in the 1590s. The entry of these foreign heretics into Aragon was proof that Spain's military forces had become over-stretched. For Guadalajara y Javier, however, the real crisis was in the Netherlands. Like Bavia's history, the Aragonese historian's *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica* argues that the intervention in France led to disastrous defeats in the Low Countries with long-term consequences.

Guadalajara y Javier writes in dramatic terms how the Army of Flanders' departure undermined Spain's defense of the Low Countries. He states

I cannot without tears stress the many troubles and ravages that the Low Countries of Flanders suffered with the departure of the Prince of Parma, taking with him to France many splendid men, and the flower of the captains: allowing the rebels against God and their king to disturb the obedient and Catholic lands: inflicting a thousand injuries to God and his Church, and [inflicting] the faithful with oppressions, thefts, and destructions.⁴³⁷

For the time, this was a stinging critique of the king's policy as harmful to the maintenance of the Spanish Hapsburg patrimony and the protection of the beleaguered Church in the Low Countries.

Like Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier argues that Parma's departure for France severely imperiled the Low Countries. The Aragonese historian writes that the United Provinces rapidly

⁴³³ Guadalajara y Javier, 127.

⁴³⁴ The French raiders were in fact likely Calvinists.

⁴³⁵ "La nueva de auer llegado los Luteranos tan dentro de España, turbo notablemente la tierra, y fue marauilla, que sin esperar orden...los del Reyno a echar los fuera." Guadalajara y Javier, 20.

⁴³⁶ "Salí del conuento con los demás Religiosos, con mi pica al ombro." Guadalajara y Javier, 20.

⁴³⁷ "No puedo sin lagrimas encarecer las muchas molestias y estragos que padecieron los Payses Baxos de Flandes, con la salida del Principe de Parma, lleuandose consigo para Francia mucha y lucida gente, y la flor de los Capitanes: abriendo puerta a los Rebeldes de Dios y su Rey, para molestar las tierras Católicas y obedientes: haciendo mil injurias a Dios y a su Iglesia, y a los fieles opresiones, robos, y destruyones." Guadalajara y Javier, 68.

gathered a force of thousands of troops “with such promptness and secrecy,” and set about “to sack and destroy the land as soon as they received notice of his [Parma’s] departure.”⁴³⁸ He views the Dutch Protestants as vicious opponents who inflicted great harm on Spain’s loyal subjects. Without Parma’s troops, Spain’s provinces and loyal Catholic subjects were vulnerable.⁴³⁹

The works of Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier reach similar conclusions. By the 1590s the Spanish empire did not have the military and economic capacity to protect the Netherlands and to fight Henry of Navarre. Through their accounts Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier question Philip II’s priorities and offer a critical perspective to the Prudent King’s historical legacy in the early modern period.

Although the two historians acknowledge the monarch’s pious motivations in France, they stress that Philip II’s intervention weakened and endangered the empire. Recognizing Spain’s limitations, Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier argue for a more restrained application of Spanish military power. In their view, the Spanish crown should have focused on defending its own territories instead of intervening in France.

The Dutch Threat

With their critical assessments of imperial overreach, Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier might be viewed as members of the emerging *arbitrista* movement from Philip III’s reign. Named after the *arbitrios*, or assessments, that they sent to the court, the *arbitristas* were clerics, merchants, royal officials, and lawyers who considered themselves the reformers of the Spanish state. According to J.H. Elliott, these writers sought to prevent Spain’s decay by rooting out corruption and revitalizing the moribund economy; to this end they bombarded the Spanish crown with proposals and published numerous tracts.⁴⁴⁰

Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier shared the *arbitristas*’ concern over the miss-use of resources during a period of increased competition between European imperial powers. The *arbitristas* did not always agree on the cures for the ills that beset the Spanish empire, but they shared a common belief that Spain’s fortunes could decline without meaningful reforms. The dawn of the seventeenth century represented a historical crossroad for what had been Europe’s greatest empire. Generally speaking, most *arbitristas* favored reigning in the costs of maintaining the empire, and arguing against further imperial entanglements in wars of religion on the continent.⁴⁴¹ Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier agreed with this general assessment.

Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier part company with most *arbitristas*, however, in their stance on the war in the Netherlands. Many *arbitristas* during the reign of Philip III argued that the conflict was bleeding Spain dry, and favored the Twelve Years’ Truce and handing the governance of the territories over to Archduke Albert and Archduchess Isabella. For his part, the prominent reformist writer Alamos de Barrientos advocated clemency for the Dutch rebels as an incentive to ending the conflict and securing the territories for the Spanish crown.⁴⁴² By contrast, Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier favored all out war against the Dutch rebels, and other rebellious subjects who threatened Spain’s empire. By chronicling the atrocities committed by the Dutch against the loyal Flemish, the historians illustrate the urgency, on both religious and strategic

⁴³⁸ “con tanta presteza y secreto,” “saquear y destruyr la tierra, que les llegasse notica de su salida.” Guadalajara y Javier, 69.

⁴³⁹ Guadalajara y Javier, 108.

⁴⁴⁰ Elliott, *Oliveres*, 88-9.

⁴⁴¹ Fernández-Santamaría, 2:349.

⁴⁴² Fernández-Santamaría, 2:384-5.

grounds, for pressing the war in the United Provinces. The accounts of Dutch brutality undermine the feasibility of negotiating with ruthless, immoral heretics, and demonstrate the folly of entering into agreements such as the Twelve Years' Truce, which would only encourage the expansionist inclinations of the Protestant Dutch.

Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier chronicle the suffering of the Flemish Catholics while the Army of Flanders was away in France. Dramatic action was needed to stop the atrocities. For instance, Bavia writes that the loyal Catholics did what they could to sustain the "little life" that remained of their cause, and prayed that the king would "cure them of that dangerous sickness that afflicted them."⁴⁴³ The chaplain historian's use of the language of contagion imparts a dire sense of urgency to the crisis in the Netherlands. The Catholic faith was "near death" and without "curative" action the sickness would spread and ultimately lead to death, in other words the complete loss of the region to heresy.

Bavia views the Flemish Catholics as long-suffering, pious, and devoted subjects of the Spanish crown who were constantly threatened by the heretical rebels. For example, he points to the travails of the loyal city of Groningen.

In this time the city of Groningen feared some sinister misfortune in its affairs. Its residents lived oppressed by the forces of the Calvinists, and the Spanish forces, from whom they could expect their rescue, were poor or far away. For years this city remained very faithful to God and to the king.⁴⁴⁴

Yet in their desperate hour of need the overextended Spanish forces could do little to help them.

Bavia's remarks about Groningen serve as another condemnation of Philip II's intervention in the French Wars of Religion, and exposed loyal Flemish Catholics to atrocities committed by the Dutch heretics. Philip II's policy had failed in France, and had weakened Spain and the Catholic Church in the Low Countries.⁴⁴⁵ The account highlights the suffering of Catholics at the hands of Protestants, as Bavia notes that they gleefully sacked Groningen's Catholic Churches.⁴⁴⁶

Guadalajara y Javier also chronicles atrocities committed by the Dutch against the Flemish during the Army of Flanders' absence. For example, he writes that "the Duke of Bullon came in with a sizable army through the dukedom and lands of Luxembourg, robbing, killing, and putting in fear all of its inhabitants."⁴⁴⁷ Spanish forces were stationed in nearby Picardy, but they were under orders to support the Catholic League and remain in France.⁴⁴⁸

The Aragonese historian also chronicles the plight of the Flemish Catholics in the city of Goreniga. He writes that after Parma's departure to France the Dutch quickly attacked the city, and its residents endured "insufferable injuries and damages" and experienced "all sorts of

⁴⁴³ "poca vida," "sanarlos de aquella peligrosa enfermedad que padecian." Bavia, 2:86.

⁴⁴⁴ "Tenia en este tiempo la ciudad de Groningen, gran temor de algun siniestro accidente en sus cosas. Vean a sus vecinos oprimidos de las fuerças de los Caluinistas, y las de los Españoles, de quien podian esperar su remedio, flacas, o lexos. Años auia que permanecia esta ciudad fidelissima a Dios, y al Rey." Bavia, 2:78.

⁴⁴⁵ Bavia, 2:79.

⁴⁴⁶ Bavia, 2:79.

⁴⁴⁷ "el Duque Bullon entro con grueso batallón por el Ducado y tierras de Lutzenburgo, robando, matando y poniendo en grande espanto a todos sus habitantes." Guadalajara y Javier, 108.

⁴⁴⁸ Guadalajara y Javier, 108.

dangers, fearing their total destruction...⁴⁴⁹ The city fathers pleaded for reinforcements to rescue them from “their misery and of the many damages that they received everywhere from the rebels.”⁴⁵⁰ The Count Ernesto de Mansfelt eventually sent an army under Colonel Francisco de Verdugo to relieve Goreniga, but Guadalajara y Javier argues that the city came close to falling.⁴⁵¹

Nijmegen’s loss to the Dutch looms large in the histories of Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier. Both depict the Catholic city’s grim fate as an illustration of Dutch barbarism and hostility towards the Church. Their accounts cast doubt over the success of the Twelve Years’ Truce between Spain and the United Provinces. Bavia notes that Nijmegen fell only after Parma had departed for France. The Calvinists negotiated the city’s surrender “with truly uneven conditions.”⁴⁵² According to the historian, “The first of these [conditions] was absolutely abominable: that the practice of the Catholic religion be eradicated from the city.”⁴⁵³ Bavia also writes that as soon as the Dutch entered the city they ordered the transfer of Church property to the United Provinces and “began to turn against the Temples, Images, relics, and sacred things with such a great fury that in a short time the city was left in such a state so that for many years there would be no Temples, nor the practice of the Catholic religion.”⁴⁵⁴

Bavia portrays the takeover of Nijmegen as a disaster that demonstrates the intensity of Dutch hatred for the Catholic Church. The shocking speed and totality of the Calvinists’ iconoclastic fury conveys the vivid message that a Dutch victory heralded doom for Catholicism in the Low Countries. Bavia writes that in Nijmegen “a small number of residents [continued] to profess [the Catholic faith], not wanting to abandon it, and voluntarily went into exile: it did not appear to them that ... they could remedy the abominable sacrileges that those people [the Dutch] committed without reason.”⁴⁵⁵ The Flemish city was becoming a bastion of heresy, and Bavia dehumanizes the Dutch as violent and unrestrained heretics, underscoring the high stakes at risk for Spain and the Catholic Church.

Bavia’s description of the dire religious consequences of Nijmegen’s fall is ripe with political meaning, as the account seriously questions the feasibility of negotiating with the Dutch. Bavia published his history in 1608 just one year before the Spanish crown and the United Provinces agreed to the Twelve Years’ Truce. Since 1605 the government of Philip III had been considering ending hostilities with the Dutch due to mounting costs and the failure to achieve a lasting military breakthrough. The proposed plan included nominally ceding control of the Spanish Netherlands to Philip II’s daughter Isabella and the Hapsburg Archduke Albert, with the Spanish crown effectively continuing its control over the province. Predictably, the prospect of entering into a peace with the heretical Dutch drew opposition in the Spanish court and in

⁴⁴⁹ “insufrible injurias y molestias,” “rodeados de tantos peligros, temiendo su total destruycion...” Guadalajara y Javier, 68-69.

⁴⁵⁰ “de su miseria y de los muchos danos, que por todas partes recibian de los Rebeldes...” Guadalajara y Javier, 69.

⁴⁵¹ Guadalajara y Javier, 69.

⁴⁵² “con bien desiguales condiciones.” Bavia, 1:687.

⁴⁵³ “La primera della fue de todo punto abominable, que se desterrase desterrase de la ciudad el exercicio de la religion Católica.” Bavia, 1:687.

⁴⁵⁴ “empecaorn a hazer contra los Templos, Imágenes, reliquias, y cosas sagradas, con tan gran rabia, que en breue tiempo quedo la ciudad de suerte, como si en muchos anos no huuiera auido Templos, ni exercicio de la religion Católica.” Bavia, 1:687.

⁴⁵⁵ “Algunos pocos que la profesaban professauan, y no la querían dexar, tomaron un voluntario destierro: no pareciendoles que con su presencia podían remediar los abominables sacrilegios que aquella gente sin razón cometían.” Bavia, 1:687

intellectual circles. Many Spanish elites believed that the proposed peace suggested that Philip III was more concerned with temporal affairs than with spiritual matters.⁴⁵⁶

In the peace negotiations, Spain frequently demanded religious freedom for Catholics in the United Provinces.⁴⁵⁷ The Dutch ultimately refused to honor this provision during the last stages of the negotiations, which took place after Bavia published his history.⁴⁵⁸ As such, the historian rightfully surmises that Dutch tolerance for the Church would be a dangerous fantasy. In his view the Dutch possessed an unrestrained hatred for the Catholic faith, with his account of Nijmegen's fall a vivid illustration. Bavia's chronicle of the Dutch rebels' anti-Catholic atrocities would have struck a powerful chord against the controversial prospect of rapprochement between the Spanish crown and the United Provinces. Thus, this discussion reveals how history writing could serve as a provocative and engaging medium for political discussion in early modern Spain.

Guadalajara y Javier also uses the fall of Nijmegen to illustrate Dutch brutality and to express concern over the Low Countries. The Aragonese historian demonstrates that Maurice of Nassau and his compatriots quickly spread heresy throughout the captured Catholic city. According to Bavia, the United Provinces' persecution of Catholicism illustrated the grossly unfavorable terms of surrender.⁴⁵⁹ In contrast, Guadalajara y Javier observes that Maurice of Nassau initiated the anti-Catholic campaign through devious means. He writes that Maurice of Nassau quickly intervened to resolve a conflict in municipal governance stemming from the disqualification of two councilors from office, one accused of an unnamed offense, and the other for conviction of theft and homicide. Maurice considered "the city without any form of justice and government," and intervened to monitor administration of Nijmegen.⁴⁶⁰

Maurice of Nassau's benevolence, however, was only a ruse. It did not take long for the Dutch to appoint officials and "*Capitanes*" to repress Catholicism in Nijmegen, in violation of the terms of surrender. According to Guadalajara y Javier, Dutch officials set about to

persecute the booksellers of importance, banish the religious orders, trouble the Catholics, taking away their arms, and burning the Images, turned them into ash and spread them in the river: they seized the deacon and canons, forcing them with torture to hand over all the chalices and gold and silver vessels used in the service of the Church. In this way did the modest and tender spirit of the damn Calvin inspire these infernal rebels, knocking down the old seat of the powerful Charlemagne.⁴⁶¹

Guadalajara y Javier and Bavia agree that Maurice of Nassau sought to obliterate the Catholic faith in the city; and their histories serve to shock their Catholic readers about the persecution of the church. For both historians the fate of Nijmegen sent a clear message: Dutch victory signaled doom for the free practice of Catholicism in the Netherlands.

⁴⁵⁶ Feros, 192-3, 197.

⁴⁵⁷ Feros, 196-7.

⁴⁵⁸ Allen, 230-1.

⁴⁵⁹ Bavia, 1:687.

⁴⁶⁰ "la Ciudad sin forma de justicia y gouierno," Guadalajara y Javier, 70.

⁴⁶¹ "perseguir las librerías de importancia, desterrar los Religiosos, molestar a los Católicos, quitándoles las armas, y abrasar las Imágenes, q vueltas en ceniza las esparcieron en el rio: prendieron al Decano y Canonigos, forcandoles "con tormentos, a entregar todos los Calizes y vasos de oro y plata del seruicio de la Iglesia. De esta manera soplaau en estos Rebeldes infernales el espíritu de modestia y blandura del maldito Caluino, dando en tierra con el antiguo asiento del poderoso Carlo Magno." Guadalajara y Javier, 70.

Guadalajara y Javier notes that the United Provinces used Nijmegen as a base of operations to stage attacks on neighboring Catholic areas rendered vulnerable by the absence of the Army of Flanders. The Aragonese historian describes how days after taking Nijmegen, the Dutch cavalry raided the nearby Abbey of Steynfelt without encountering meaningful resistance. As a result, the Dutch once again desecrated a Catholic center: “and although it was defended by some farmers more daring than prudent, they were broken and [the Dutch] entered the town, sacking whatever they could ahead of them, profaning the Church, to the incredible distress of the Catholics.”⁴⁶²

Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier disagree over the origins of the Protestants’ persecution of the Church in Nijmegen. An explanation rests with the timing of publication of their books. Bavia wrote his work on the eve of the Twelve Years’ Truce. Accordingly, his commentary can be read as criticism of the looming peace between Spain and the United Provinces. By depicting the Dutch as untrustworthy, expansionist and violently anti-Catholic, Bavia argues against the feasibility of making peace with the United Provinces. Negotiating terms of surrender over Nijmegen with a dishonorable and heretical adversary led to the sacking of the city. The chaplain historian’s framing of the origin of the tragedy at Nijmegen is a cautionary lesson against negotiating with the heretical Dutch.

In contrast, Guadalajara y Javier wrote the *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica* in 1612, three years into the truce. The Aragonese historian’s framing of the fall of Nijmegen likewise reflects the state of Spanish-Dutch relations at this time. Unlike Bavia’s account, Guadalajara y Javier attributes Nijmegen’s plight to the duplicitous behavior of Maurice of Nassau and the Dutch officials who obliterated the Catholic faith in the city after it had capitulated to the United Provinces. Guadalajara y Javier’s framing of this event depicts the Dutch as devious opportunists.

This portrayal of the Dutch as a subversive and deceitful enemy is a bold criticism of the already enacted Twelve Years’ Truce. Guadalajara y Javier’s account can be read as a warning that the Dutch, regardless of what they sign, will stop at nothing to destroy the Church. Given this dangerous heretical fervor, Spain could not count on the United Provinces to observe any peace treaty for long.

Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier both use their histories as political primers to argue against negotiating with the Dutch. The two historians illustrate that failure to continue the war against the United Provinces would carry consequences that reached beyond the Netherlands. Indeed, while Spain was bogged down in France in the 1590s, they write that the Dutch were threatening Spanish interests overseas. Bavia comments that at this time “the United Provinces attempted a journey, no less brave than memorable, which for that nation could result in great honor, which attempts at heroic undertakings bring out, as well as other no small gains often born from similar enterprises.”⁴⁶³ According to the historian, the Dutch goal was to chart a new route through the Pacific to the East Indies to gain access to the spice trade and Japan.⁴⁶⁴ This was a direct threat to Spain’s overseas interests in Asia, greatly intensified since the merger between the Spanish and Portuguese empires in 1580. Bavia’s remarks are tinged with the

⁴⁶² “y aunque fue defendida por algunos labradores con mas osadía que prudenica, fueron desuaratados y entrada la villa, saquearon quanto se les pudo delante; profanando la Iglesia, con increíble sentimiento de los Católicos.” Guadalajara y Javier, 70.

⁴⁶³ “intentaron los Estados de Flandes una jornada, no menos animosa que memorable, y de q a aquella nación le pudiera resultar muy grande honra, fuera de la que trae consigo emprender cosas hazañosas, y a otras no pequeño provecho, qual suele nacer de las empresas semejantes.” Bavia, 2:196.

⁴⁶⁴ Bavia, 2:196.

rhetoric of imperial competition; the Dutch expedition represented an audacious challenge to Spain's global interests and status.

Guadalajara y Javier expresses similar concerns over Dutch imperial ambitions in the 1590s. The United Provinces sought "to disturb the affairs of the Catholic king in any place," including Asia.⁴⁶⁵ Guadalajara y Javier believed that the United Provinces "were determined to send their fleets to the Indies through the route ordinarily taken by the Portuguese, seeing that at certain points Francis Drake and other English pirates had undertaken this with great strength and gain..."⁴⁶⁶ Maurice of Nassau in fact ordered the construction of a large and well-armed fleet that was capable of traveling great distances. He named the most imposing vessel the "*Mauricio*" and outfitted it with twenty cannons. The flotilla reached the Pacific and its arrival foretold a potential shift in the balance of commercial and military power in the region.⁴⁶⁷ As such, like Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier views the inroads of the Dutch into the Southern Sea within the context of imperial competition. Indeed, the United Provinces' imitation of Francis Drake's routes is a disturbing evocation.

Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier thus provide alarming accounts of Dutch aspirations to global empire. They portray the United Provinces as an expansive and opportunistic power capable of taking advantage of Spain's exhausted state to expand their maritime and mercantile interests overseas.

These remarks about the rise of Dutch maritime power would have been poignant when published. Accounts of the Pacific voyages are critical commentaries on the truce between the Spanish crown and the United Provinces. By 1608 the Dutch had infiltrated trade in the West Indies and in the East Indies. Such incursions were a major embarrassment for the Spanish crown and posed a particular threat to Portuguese holdings in Asia. Indeed, while peace negotiations were underway, Dutch raiders had attacked the Portuguese colony at Malacca in present day Malaysia.⁴⁶⁸ This aggressive expansion of Dutch power in the Indies became another major point of contention in the peace talks. In theory, the Twelve Years' Truce prohibited Dutch trade in Spain's territories in the New World and in Asia, although it allowed the United Provinces to trade with "princes" outside of Europe.⁴⁶⁹

Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier stoke the flames of colonial competition and reaffirm that the United Provinces posed a clear threat to the Spanish crown's territories in the New World and in Asia. Their histories challenge the Twelve Years' Truce on both religious and imperial grounds. Peace would give the heretical United Provinces the space they needed to pursue their colonial aspirations, and to continue their persecutions of Catholics in the Low Countries. Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier argue that the Netherlands should have been the highest priority of Philip II, and demonstrate that the Spanish crown still could not afford to ignore the Dutch threat. Like the early *arbitristas*, they urged a change in course in foreign policy through a scaling back of costly military commitments. They parted company with the *arbitristas*, however, by urging Spain to press the fight in the Low Countries. For Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier, the growing power of the United Provinces loomed large over Spain's Catholic subjects and commercial and colonial interests in Europe, Asia, and the Americas.

⁴⁶⁵ "turbar las cosas del rey Católico en qualquier lugar," Guadalajara y Javier, 277.

⁴⁶⁶ "determinaron embiar a las Indias sus Nauios por el camino ordinario de los Portugueses: viendo que algunas vezes auia emprendido esto con buena fuerte y ganancia Francisco Draque y otros Cosarios Ingleses...." Guadalajara y Javier, 277.

⁴⁶⁷ Guadalajara y Javier, 277.

⁴⁶⁸ Allen, 207.

⁴⁶⁹ Allen, 232.

Their histories represent vivid examples of the political uses of history writing to critique recent policy and to offer rationale for a change in course.

Conclusion

The histories of Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier provide an illuminating perspective into the Spanish imperial *mentalité* during Philip III's rule. Both historians use their works to advance a striking political message that reflected the shifting conditions of the Spanish empire at the turn of the seventeenth century. Their respective assessments of the intervention in the French Wars of Religion hint at a larger reevaluation of Spanish imperial power.

In stark contrast to the triumphalist accounts of the late sixteenth century, Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier offer a harsh and insightful critique of the Spanish crown's military involvement in the civil wars in France. While the two historians hold Philip II's piety in high esteem, they view his French intervention as overly aggressive and cavalier. The criticisms of Philip II, heretofore a monarch considered above reproach by historians of the day, signal history writing's potential for political commentary and criticism. Beyond this, they advocate for a new foreign policy and vision of Spanish imperial power centered on protecting Spain's domains, at a time when Philip III and his councilors could repair some of the damage that had been done. The specter of imperial decline looms large in these works. Lessons could be learned from the debacle of the French intervention.

Imperial over-reach in France was hastened by the unreliability of the Catholic League, the crown's limited financial and military resources, and the hostility of the French people towards the Spanish troops. Bavia's and Guadalajara y Javier's histories came to terms with the emerging reality that Spain was not invincible. Philip II should have listened to those advisors who had warned against ordering the Army of Flanders to invade France.

Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier believe that more conservative policies by Philip III could repair some of damage done by his father's intervention in France. As such, the works of Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier reveal history writing's potential as policy critique for the king and his counselors in early modern Spain. In true Tacitean fashion, the two historians lay out the shortcomings of Philip II's strategic policy as a lesson for their contemporaries.

Specifically, their critical accounts of the final decade of Philip II's reign contain two central messages. First, the Spanish empire needs to make careful use of its limited resources. Spain simply could not afford to continue Philip II's aggressive and quixotic military policies. Secondly, the Twelve Years' Truce with the United Provinces would prove to be a serious mistake. Although Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier are in favor of reigning in the costs of empire, they argue that war is the only way to protect the Catholic faith in the Low Countries and to stop Dutch imperial designs, which would come at the expense of Spanish interests.

The multiple printings of the *Tercera y quarta parte de la historia pontifical y general* and the *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica* in Castile and in Aragon show that the books attracted significant interest over decades. The fact that these histories would have passed through the hands of royal censors, despite their pointed criticism of Philip II's policies, indicates that their arguments in favor of imperial restraint and vigilance against the United Provinces were viewed as acceptable critiques of recent crown policies and advice for the future.

Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier believed that Spain was at a crossroads during the reign of Philip III, and their histories represent a departure from the triumphalist praise associated with Philip II's reign. They advocate a more focused foreign policy designed to protect Spain and its

empire based on their sincere and thoughtful concern for the motherland. Indeed, the next chapter will show how their histories articulated a patriotic vision for the Spanish “nation.”

Chapter 5 Victory in Defeat

Introduction

In their accounts of the French Wars of Religion Luis de Bavia and Fray Marcos de Guadalajara y Javier engage in a critical discussion of Philip II's policies that reveals the limits of Spanish imperial power. It would be a mistake, nonetheless, to label the two seventeenth-century historians as fatalists who believed in the inevitability of the Spanish empire's decline. Not only do Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier argue that war against the United Provinces would have been winnable, but they also celebrate the bravery and accomplishments of the Spanish soldiers who fought in France and the Netherlands at the end of Philip II's reign.

This chapter explores the patriotic messages found in the early seventeenth-century Spanish histories of the French Wars of Religion. In addition to covering the works of Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier, this analysis will also include Diego de Villalobos y Benavides's *Commentarios*. While the three authors wrote histories of a conflict that ended poorly for Spain, their accounts of the war still contain a striking patriotic element that valorizes the Spanish nation.

In keeping with the politicized nature of history writing in early modern Spain, the Black Legend of Spanish imperialism occupies a central place in this discourse of patriotism. Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides each labor to write a "true" history of the French Wars of Religion that counters the spurious claims of foreign historians against Spain. From these attempts to combat the Black Legend there emerges an articulation of Spanish national identity in which the three historians identify a common set of exemplary Spanish characteristics and traits. The siege of Amiens, which was one of the last major battles in the war between Philip II and Henry IV, occupies an increasingly important place in the patriotic narrative of later Spanish historians. Guadalajara y Javier and Villalobos y Benavides transform the Army of Flanders' surprise capture, defense, and eventual loss of the French city into a triumphal struggle that exemplifies the superior traits of the Spanish nation. A close reading of these texts points to the existence of a fluid and evolving national consciousness in early seventeenth-century Spain rooted in the shared experience of empire.

These histories as such can offer an illuminating look into the often-debated issue of national identity in early modern Spain. While many scholars have asserted that the notion of Spain as a nation was little more than an illusory fiction during the reign of the Hapsburgs, others have argued for the existence of a definitive Spanish national sentiment in the early modern period that transcended the local, corporate, and regional divisions of the old regime.

On one end of the spectrum, Tamar Herzog argues that the question of "Spanishness" in the early modern era was not tied to a political or cultural identification with a nation or proto-nation, but instead centered on religion and civic community. In her monograph *Defining Nations*, Herzog uses judicial records to show the centrality of local actions and interactions in determining whether an individual was a "native citizen" in Spain and Spanish America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Rejecting the notion of the "state" and "nation" being asserted from above through the crown, Herzog instead stresses the importance of horizontal social ties in this construction of identity. She writes that in early modern Spain "no such [national] sentiment existed...because there was no community of Spanish natives or because

this community, which included both local and foreign vassals, failed to generate distinctions between Spaniards and non-Spaniards.”⁴⁷⁰

I.A.A. Thompson likewise stresses the dominance of the local and the regional in his essay on political identity in early modern Spain entitled “Castile, Spain and the Monarchy: The Political Community from *patria natural* to *patria nacional*.” Thompson writes that from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century in Spain the city was the embodiment of community, and there effectively was no theory of association between “the city, or the locality and the kingdom, and *a fortiori* between one kingdom and another, diverse in government, culture and history. Without such a theory, there was no bond between the kingdoms but a common ruler, a common faith and the contingency of common interests.”⁴⁷¹ This held especially true for Castile, the center of Spanish power, where the prevailing understanding of community was civic rather than national. Indeed, Thompson writes that although during the second half of the sixteenth-century Castilians began to speak of Spain when they meant Castile, this trend was soon reversed with the re-emergence of a revived understanding of Castile “as an entity distinct from both the monarchy and from Spain in the early years of the seventeenth century.”⁴⁷²

The collection of essays in *National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early-Modern Europe* offers a similarly skeptical assessment on the existence of national identity in the old regime. In his introduction to the volume Orest Ranum writes that national consciousness was a force that “rarely if ever manifested itself overtly in an age still dominated by court politics, localism, and imperial-papal universalism.”⁴⁷³ With regards to Spain, Helmut Koneigsberger writes that while he cannot deny the existence of a sort of national consciousness in early modern Spain, this sentiment was undoubtedly weak. In his view the religious motivations behind the Spanish crown’s wars could not justifiably be linked to a national purpose, and the Castilian imperialism of the ruling classes that emerged during the sixteenth century could “only very marginally be identified with Spanish nationalism. Genuine Spanish nationalism, as an effective political force, does not seem to have appeared before the Napoleonic Wars in the early nineteenth century.”⁴⁷⁴

In recent years, however, scholars have begun to shift away from the traditional view that the concept of the Spanish nation only took root during the French Invasion.⁴⁷⁵ Yolanda Rodríguez Pérez argues that the Spanish crown’s wars played a central role in the construction of a Spanish national identity during the early modern era. She writes that the sixteenth-century wars with the “other,” especially the rebellious inhabitants of the Netherlands, led undeniably to the formation of a patriotic vision of national unity in Spain, “whether it was a deliberate process or not.”⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷⁰ Tamar Herzog, *Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 65.

⁴⁷¹ I.A.A. Thompson, “Castile, Spain, and the Monarchy: The Political Community from *patria natural* to *patria nacional*,” in *Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World: Essays in Honour of John H. Elliott*, ed. by Richard L. Kagan and Geoffrey Parker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 127-8.

⁴⁷² Thompson, 137, 144.

⁴⁷³ Orest Ranum, “Introduction,” in *National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early-Modern Europe*, ed. by Orest Ranum (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 12.

⁴⁷⁴ Helmut Koenigsberger, “Spain,” in *National Consciousness*, 167, 170-2.

⁴⁷⁵ Mateo Ballester Rodríguez, *La identidad española en la Edad Moderna: discursos, símbolos, y mitos (1556-1665)* (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 2010), 25.

⁴⁷⁶ Yolanda Rodríguez Pérez, *The Dutch Revolt through Spanish Eyes: Self and Other in Historical and Literary Texts of Golden Age Spain (c. 1548-1673)*, 16-17.

Likewise, in *Imagining Spain* Henry Kamen writes that the experiences of Spaniards abroad led them to formulate a sense of national identity. Kamen writes that living outside of the Iberian Peninsula helped to give reality to the idea of a Spanish nation, and in particular the emergence of the Spanish empire “bestowed on ‘Spain’ a significance, a role and an ethic which helped the peoples of the peninsula to realize that they now shared a common enterprise which gave them an unprecedented new identity.” Kamen nonetheless also cautions that this sense of nation was a fiction that did not reflect the reality of the composite political framework of the Spanish kingdoms, which in no way had the attributes of a “nation” in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁴⁷⁷ Indeed, he writes that the Spanish ultimately failed “to create a homogeneous national identity and a coherent, commonly shared historical memory.”⁴⁷⁸

Thomas Dandeleet offers a concrete example of the construction of Spanish national identity through the shared experience of empire abroad in *Spanish Rome*. He writes that in the second-half of the century during the height of Spanish power in Rome “the previously disparate Iberian ‘nations,’ including the Castilians, Catalans, and Portuguese, were effectively consolidated in Rome by the Spanish monarch, his ministers, and the confraternity as the much stronger and effective Spanish ‘nation.’” The process of “Spanish nation-building” had two major aims in Rome: “achieving a union in name for all Iberians and institutionalizing a union of charity by means of the confraternity.”

This campaign not only helped to solidify Spanish power in Rome, but it also achieved a union of the Iberian nations within the city, which the Spanish crown had been attempting to accomplish in the Iberian Peninsula. “Reference to, and identification with, other Iberian ‘nations’ took a second seat to, or were immersed in, the larger Spanish ‘nation.’”⁴⁷⁹ As such, while Dandeleet notes that this use of the term “Spanish nation” should not be confused with the modern definition of the nation state, “it clearly played an important role in forging a new, expanded version of the Spanish nation that represents an important transition between the medieval and modern understanding of Spain.”⁴⁸⁰

Dandeleet’s work on the Spanish confraternities in Rome thus points to the definitive emergence of a unified sense of Spanish national identity beginning in Philip II’s reign. The various Iberians living in Rome clearly thought of themselves as “Spanish.” History writing from the period can also offer us a window into this process of early modern “nation building” in Spain. In his essay “La historia, los historiadores y el Rey en la España del Humanismo” Alfredo Alvar discusses how many Spanish histories from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries contained a patriotic message. Looking specifically at the dedicatory sections of histories from the period, Alvar argues that Spanish historians articulated a sense of national cohesion and created a sort of national consciousness as they extolled upon the didactic and political ends of historical truth.⁴⁸¹ He concludes that the pedagogical and moral thrusts of history writing lead to the same avenue: “the creation of history as one of the pillars of nationalism.”⁴⁸²

⁴⁷⁷ Henry Kamen, *Imagining Spain: Historical Myth & National Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 21-2.

⁴⁷⁸ Kamen, 210.

⁴⁷⁹ Thomas James Dandeleet, *Spanish Rome, 1500-1700* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 113-4.

⁴⁸⁰ Dandeleet, 118.

⁴⁸¹ Alfredo Alvar, “La historia, los historiadores y el Rey en la España del Humanismo,” in *Imágenes históricas de Felipe II*, ed. by Alfredo Alvar Ezquerro (Alcalá de Henares: Centro de Estudios Cervantinos, 2000), 241.

⁴⁸² “la creación de la Historia como uno de los pilares del nacionalismo.” Alvar, 248.

This chapter expands upon Alvar's initial inquiry into how history writing could serve as a vibrant medium for the expression of proto-nationalism in early modern Spain. A close reading of the works of Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides throws into relief both the strengths and limits of national sentiment in early seventeenth-century Spain. Through their efforts to combat the growing Black Legend these historians express a defined sense of the Spanish nation and portray Spain as a distinctive cultural and political unit. These historians foster a sense of proto-national identity that was closely tied to the practice of empire, as they engage in a discourse that valorized the Spanish *nación* and its unwavering service to the crown and commitment to defending the Catholic faith. Yet this vision of Spanish identity was not always unitary. The Castilians Bavia and Villalobos y Benavides effectively present Spain as a homogeneous and united entity. In their praises for the Spanish *nación* they make no distinctions between the various regions and kingdoms that encompassed Spain.

Guadalajara y Javier, however, takes a different stance to this issue of patriotism. While he repeatedly refers to the greatness of the Spanish nation as a whole, the historian largely reserves his praise for his fellow Aragonese. Guadalajara y Javier thus exhibits a fascinating *mélange* of proto-national and regional patriotism in his work. Rather than being subsumed under the broader category of "Spain" as in the accounts of Bavia of Villalobos y Benavides, Aragon instead occupies a proud and unique place within the larger political framework of the Spanish kingdoms. The concept of the Spanish nation was far from uniform or monolithic in the early seventeenth century.

In Defense of the Nation

Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides all strive to insure that the Spanish nation and its soldiers are given their proper due. In a reflection of the politicized nature of their texts, each of these historians is in dialogue with foreign writers who they saw as either ignoring or outright slandering Spain and its accomplishments. In other words, they are actively engaged with the early proponents of the Black Legend of Spanish imperialism.

The Black Legend refers to the negative and stereotyped image of Spain that took shape from the growing body of anti-Spanish propaganda in the second half of the sixteenth century. This collection of anti-Spanish writings, which included histories, pamphlets, and plays, typically portrayed the Spanish as cruel, arrogant, cringing, and cowardly; in turn these works exaggerated Spain's imperial misdeeds. While usually associated with the Protestant Dutch and English, French and Italian writers also contributed to the Black Legend. All these writers often pointed to the atrocities committed during the conquest of the New World and the war against the Dutch rebels in the Netherlands as proof of the Spanish nation's inferiority and depravity.⁴⁸³ There was a decidedly anti-Catholic bent in the works of the Dutch and English authors, who depicted the Church as a den of vice and the Inquisition as greedy and sadistic.⁴⁸⁴ The Black Legend gained especially forceful momentum in the 1580s as Philip II's foreign policy took a decidedly more aggressive turn.⁴⁸⁵ The Black Legend came to have an enduring impact on Spain's image in Europe in the early modern period and beyond. French, English, and Dutch aspirants to overseas empire would cite Black Legend accounts of Spanish cruelty in the New World to delegitimize Spain's unrivaled position of ruler of the New World. In turn, the Black

⁴⁸³ William S. Maltby, *The Black Legend in England: The development of anti-Spanish sentiment, 1558-1660* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1971), 4, 11, 17, 44.

⁴⁸⁴ Maltby, 35-6.

⁴⁸⁵ Henry Kamen, *Philip of Spain*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 241.

Legend of Spanish cruelty came to play an important role in the construction of Protestant national identity, particularly in the case of the United Netherlands.⁴⁸⁶

There is a common perception that Spaniards of the early modern period did little to combat this torrent of anti-Spanish texts; one scholar recently remarked that Northern Europe unequivocally won the war of words against Philip II and the Spanish Empire.⁴⁸⁷ Although the Dutch, French, English, and other adversaries of Spain certainly did produce a huge amount of Black Legend material, by no means did the early modern Spanish themselves passively lay down in this intellectual and cultural conflict. The works of Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides are prime examples of how the Spanish actively sought to counter the growing wave of anti-Spanish literature that had reached a swell by the turn of the seventeenth century.

Case in point is Bavia's goal to give the Spanish soldiers who fought in the French Wars of Religion and in the Netherlands their proper historical recognition. In the beginning pages of his work he expresses the view that for the many Spanish (*Españoles*) who fought in these campaigns "it is not just to defraud them of the honor that they were able to gain from here, nor [defraud] history of its principle end, which is to teach great deeds to the coming ages, which ought to follow with similar deeds."⁴⁸⁸ Accordingly, he sees fit to include in his history heroic actions "done in defense of Religion, and of the Church, of which it is head. Such has been what the Spanish have done in Flanders, and ultimately in the defense of the Catholic League of France, of which I must treat..."⁴⁸⁹

As such, a clear historical injustice had been done to the Spanish soldiers who served in the Low Countries and in France, as foreign writers have either unfairly neglected or vilified these brave troops. Bavia accordingly sees himself as having a solemn duty to fill this grave historiographical lacuna and properly laud these Spaniards for their heroic service. The thrust of such patriotic proclamations boils down to a historiographical defense of the Spanish "nation," which in turn functions as a firm articulation of Spanish identity tied to a national commitment to defending the Catholic Church.

Importantly, by collectively referring to these soldiers as "*Españoles*," Bavia engages in a broad hispanization of the Spanish kingdoms that effaces its internal divisions. All countries of the early modern period consisted of a diverse collection of peoples, polities, customs, and languages.⁴⁹⁰ Spain itself had a composite political structure, in which the separate kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, Navarre, and Valencia, and the principality of Catalonia each had their own institutions, laws, and privileges.⁴⁹¹ Bavia essentially advances an understanding of Spanish national identity that incorporates this diverse composite patchwork into a unified collective entity.

⁴⁸⁶ See Benjamin Schmidt's *Innocence Abroad: The Dutch Imagination and the New World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁴⁸⁷ Kamen, *Imagining Spain*, 53.

⁴⁸⁸ "no es justo defraudar de la honra que de aquí les podía resultar, ni la historia del fin principal que tiene, que, es enseñaron hechos tan grandes a las venideros siglos, lo que deuen imitar con hechos semejantes." Luis de Bavia, *Tercera y quarta parte de la historia pontifical y general* (Madrid, 1608), 1:9.

⁴⁸⁹ "hecha en defensa de la Religion, y de la Yglesia, de quien el es cabeza. Tales han sido las que los Españoles han hecho en Flandes, y últimamente en la defensa de la liga Católica de Francia, de que tengo tratar..." Bavia, 1:9.

⁴⁹⁰ Kamen, *Imagining Spain*, 11.

⁴⁹¹ J.H. Elliott, "A Europe of Composite Monarchies," *Past and Present*, No. 137 (1992), 52-3.

Villalobos y Benavides likewise places a strong emphasis on the need to bring to light the accomplishments of the Spanish nation, which he describes as the driving motivation behind his work. The soldier historian writes in the opening of his *Comentarios*

And that which most animated me to bring to light this work, has been the manifest affront that certain foreign writers have made, and continue to make, against the Spanish nation, relating its deeds very imperfectly, and removing the names of the squadrons, attributing the famous deeds to their nations, creating squadrons and *tercios* in many occasions, that as an eyewitness, I nearly did not meet a man of that nation.⁴⁹²

Like Bavia, Villalobos y Benavides expresses a firm belief that foreign writers have done a grave disservice to the Spanish soldiers who served in the Flemish and French campaigns of the 1590s; he accordingly presents his history as a noble effort to right this systematic wrong. After casting aspersions at these foreign writers for their errors, he writes

but the great fault is mine, that [although] knowing the truth and having the pen, because of fear of my own rough language and meager erudition, I allowed this insult to be made against the entire Spanish nation, and against other valorous men of other nations, who in the service of God risked and lost their lives in the course of these years of war.⁴⁹³

On a basic level *nación* in early modern Spain usually referred to the territorial unit of a kingdom or province, or denoted the place of one's birth.⁴⁹⁴ This term, however, began to take on an expanded cultural, intellectual, and political meaning during the reign of Philip II. As the Spanish imperium under the Prudent King took shape, Spaniards, particularly those of the socio-political and intellectual elite, perceived nation as denoting an idiosyncratic collective based on a shared and unique history, language, and territory.⁴⁹⁵ This elaborated understanding of *nación* acutely comes to play in the texts of Bavia, Villalobos y Benavides, and Guadalajara y Javier.

Villalobos y Benavides focuses on recounting the “true” history of Spain’s intervention in the French Wars of Religion that properly honors the sacrifices of the Spanish soldiers and their allies during this costly conflict. Interestingly, as the above quote suggests, he also pays heed to the accomplishments of the non-Spanish soldiers who served in the Army of Flanders. Elsewhere in his history he writes that that the Burgundians and Walloons were “*muy buenos soldados*” and very useful due to their languages’ similarities with French.⁴⁹⁶ Similarly, he talks at fair length about the valor of the German commander Colonel Tisling while fighting the Dutch

⁴⁹² “Y lo que mas me animo a sacar a luz esta obra, ha sido el manifiesto agrauio que algunos escritores estrangeros han hecho, y haz en a la nación Española, contando sus hechos muy sobre peine, y quitándoles a los esquadrones los nombres, atribuyendo los hechos famosaos a sus naciones, criando esquadrones y tercios en muchas ocasiones, que como testigo de vista, casi no conoci hombre de la tal nación.” Diego de Villalobos y Benavides, *Comentarios de las cosas sucedidas en los Países Baxos de Flandes desde el año de 1594 hasta el de 1598* (Madrid, 1612), fol. 2

⁴⁹³ “mas grande la culpa mía, que sabiendo la verdad, y teniendo la escrita, por temor de mi corto lenguaje, y poca erudición, consintiese este agrauio hecho a toda la nación Española, y a otros valerosos hombres de otras naciones, que en seruicio de Dios auentaron, y perdieorn sus vidas en el discurso destes años de guerra.” Villalobos y Benavides, fol. 2.

⁴⁹⁴ Sebastián de Covarrubias Horozco, *Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española*, ed. by Martin Riquer (Barcelona: Alta Fulla, 1985), 823. Kamen, *Imagining Spain*, 12.

⁴⁹⁵ Ballester Rodríguez, 45, 47.

⁴⁹⁶ Villalobos y Benavides, 31.

at the island of Húst.⁴⁹⁷ As such, the soldier historian's account is a fascinating acknowledgement of the actual multi-national make up of the Spanish crown's armies in the early modern period.⁴⁹⁸ This recognition is a notable divergence from Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier, who largely neglect to mention these foreign troops. This could likely be due to the fact that Villalobos y Benavides served in the French Wars of Religion and in Flanders, and he saw the need to give his non-Spanish compatriots proper credit for their services.⁴⁹⁹

Nonetheless, while Villalobos y Benavides recognizes the accomplishments of the many foreign soldiers serving in the Army of Flanders, he reserves most of his praise for the Spanish. As with Bavia's history, Villalobos y Benavides's patriotic defense of the Spanish soldiers is a forceful articulation of Spanish national identity. Through defending his fellow Spaniards from the negligence and slander of foreign authors, he reinforces a concrete notion of "Spain" as a unique and superior nation deserving of praise and recognition. Much like Bavia, a fellow Castilian, Villalobos y Benavides does not acknowledge the composite political structure of the Spanish kingdoms in his frequent references to "*España*;" rather, he consolidates and immerses this patchwork framework into a united Spanish nation.

Guadalajara y Javier's efforts to give the Spanish "nation" its deserved praise take on a different scope. On the one hand, much like Bavia and Villalobos y Benavides, he does state that a major goal of his work is to give the Spanish soldiers their proper due for their accomplishments during the French Wars of Religion and Dutch Revolt and to correct the disparaging errors of foreign historians. He writes

I have an obligation as a Spaniard to give priority to the singular and celebrated matters of my nation, especially finding them in the [works of] modern and foreign authors with little adornment, something lightly treated and obscured, or by neglect put into oblivion, or maliciously celebrating and exaggerating certain disgraceful actions.⁵⁰⁰

This desire to counter the Black Legend and defend the Spanish nation as a whole bears many similarities to the patriotic rhetoric of Bavia and Villalobos y Benavides and their vision of a unified Spain.

In contrast to the above Castilian historians, however, Guadalajara y Javier often singles out the Aragonese soldiers for their valor and military skill during the French and Flemish campaigns. While the autonomous kingdom of Aragon was considerably less populous and wealthy than neighboring Castile, Guadalajara y Javier asserts that his fellow Aragonese made a heroic contribution to the war in France and the Low Countries.⁵⁰¹ He writes

⁴⁹⁷ Villalobos y Benavides, 68.

⁴⁹⁸ Henry Kamen's *Empire: How Spain Became a World Power* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003) talks at length about the international makeup of the Spanish empire's armies in the early modern period. In the case of the Army of Flanders, while Spanish troops often formed the core of these forces, Italian, and German soldiers were also present in large numbers. Other armies in the early modern period similarly had an international composition.

⁴⁹⁹ Interestingly, as a whole Villalobos y Benavides appears to have a far more nuanced view of non-Spaniards compared to many other Spanish writers of the time. Recall that in comparison to his contemporaries, the soldier historian held the most balanced view of Henry IV.

⁵⁰⁰ "Obligación tengo como Español, dar el primer asiento en las cosas singulares y señaladas a los de mi nación, especialmente hallándolas en los autores modernos y extranjeros con poco adorno, de passo y algo escurecidas, o por desuydo puestas en olvido, o maliciosamente celebrando y exagerando algunos descuidos." Fray Marcos de Guadalajara y Javier, *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica* (Zaragoza, 1612), 349.

⁵⁰¹ Patrick Williams, *Philip II* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 4. In 1591 Castile had a population of 6,617,251, while Aragon's population was 1,132,002.

and to say it all, [I am] also moved by the proper love of my *patria*. Imparting (for that which I intend to relate) that the lessons of the invincible Sertorius, Scipio, and the other Roman captains endures, and will endure, in the bosom of the Aragonese, to use them whenever their Catholic King will entrust them with a military post or important enterprise.⁵⁰²

As such, Guadalajara y Javier engages in a patriotic celebration of both his nation and his *patria* that asserts the lasting importance of regional identity and resists the centralizing framework of the Castilian historians. Rather than being assimilated within a unified Spain, the kingdom of Aragon occupies a proud position within this composite vision of early nationalism.

Once can see this divergence in Bavia's and Guadalajara y Javier's contrasting depictions of the battle of Lan during the French Wars of Religion, where the Spanish were able to prevent a route of the Catholic forces thanks to their timely intervention. In Bavia's account of the battle, he notes that at the last minute a squadron of forty Spanish saved the Catholic forces by valiantly fighting off a much larger enemy force.⁵⁰³ The chaplain historian in essence celebrates this incident as a Spanish feat and an indication of his nation's strategic acumen; he mentions that only Spanish soldiers took part in this action.

On the one hand, Guadalajara y Javier likewise speaks highly of these Spanish soldiers, writing "that no other nation of the world was able to accomplish it [the maneuver] with such excellent order, nor able to endure so in the trial that they suffered." Nevertheless, he also singles out the heroism of the Aragonese captains Don Agustin Mexía, Don Alonso Ydiaquez, and Don Alonso de Mendoza, as he asserts their prudence and bravery were responsible for the battle's honorable outcome for the Spanish.⁵⁰⁴ Thus, Guadalajara y Javier's treatment of the battle advances a message of both regional and national patriotisms that gives credit to both Aragon and the nation of Spain as a whole for the skillful maneuvers. Guadalajara y Javier's effort at writing a "true" patriotic history of the intervention in the French Wars of Religion thus consists of two parts: to defend the Spanish nation from hostile foreign writers, and to bring to light the achievements of his fellow Aragonese fighting in the campaign, a matter which Castilian historians neglected.

In spite of their differences, Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides all demonstrate an active engagement with combating what they saw as a systematic historiographical attack on the Spanish empire in the early seventeenth century. Such efforts are an indication that early modern Spaniards did not passively stand by as Dutch, English, French, and other foreign proponents of the Black Legend assaulted the *reputación* of their "nation." In their attempts to set the historical record straight these historians convey a triumphal message that exalts Spain above all other nations. In spite of Bavia's and Guadalajara y Javier's criticisms of Philip II's cavalier international policy and warnings about the limits of Spanish imperial power as covered in the previous chapter, they nonetheless have a proud view of Spain and its might. The two historians were hardly imperial fatalists.

⁵⁰² "y por decir lo todo, mouido también del propio amor de mi patria. Dando a entender (por lo que pretendo contar) que duran y duranaran en los pechos Aragoneses las liciones militares del inuencible Sertorio, Scipion, y los demás Capitanes Romanos, para emplearlas siempre que su Catholico Rey confiare dellos placa, o empresa importante." Guadalajara y Javier, 349.

⁵⁰³ Bavia, 2:204.

⁵⁰⁴ "que ninguna nación del mundo la podía hazer con tan gentil concierto, ni durar tanto en el trabajo que padecieron." Guadalajara y Javier, 189.

Villalobos y Benavides's own vision of Spanish power deserves a few words. While at the beginning of his work the soldier historian does remark that the Spanish empire was in a weakened state by the last decade of Philip II's rule, in stark contrast to the accounts of Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier his history contains little in-depth discussion on the Spanish crown's desperate strategic situation during the French Wars of Religion.⁵⁰⁵ Specifically, Villalobos y Benavides does not offer any criticisms regarding Philip II's decision to intervene in the French Wars of Religion, and refrains from commenting on how the war against Henry of Navarre imperiled the Low Countries.

While arguably paling in comparison to the anti-French polemic of Madera or the imperial messianism of Cornejo, Villalobos y Benavides's sense of triumphalism nevertheless is striking. He writes to the Council of War of Philip III of

the Spanish name with its virtues being almost immortal, from the most Antarctic regions of the world, to the Arctics of our Pole, passing the hot regions of the equator; following the diligent path of the sun, going round the sea and the land, without leaving any part where the Spanish crosses have not been known; punishing the rebellious provinces of Chile, to look carefully for the hidden paths of the *rio de la Plata* and [the straits of] Magellan, much far from where Roman potency reached; and breaking the stubbornness of the Flemish, guiding the Catholic armies, [who] were witnesses to many of the events that I write in my *Commentaries*.⁵⁰⁶

This dedication thus presents the Spanish empire as a globally dominant force, contrasting markedly with the views of Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier. Villalobos y Benavides offers a portrait of an empire that was not weakened and in danger of sinking into decline, but instead stretched all over the world and conquered its enemies in both the New World and Old. Importantly, as a result of the conquest of the Americas, Spain's imperial might essentially surpassed ancient Rome's. This comparison with the Roman Empire was in fact a common theme in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spanish imperial thought. Spanish writers and statesmen frequently used the Romans as an imperial mirror and a point of contrast to underline the superiority of the Spanish empire.⁵⁰⁷

In Villalobos y Benavides's eyes this triumphant imperial enterprise was a Spanish accomplishment. Through his celebration of empire he consolidates the various polities and peoples of the Spanish kingdoms into a united nation, which expanded its power throughout the globe. The construction of empire and Spanish identity were closely intertwined processes.

Through their efforts to write a true history of the wars in France and the Low Countries in the 1590s, Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides produce a prideful formulation of Spanish identity and lay out what they see as the defining traits and

⁵⁰⁵ Villalobos y Benavides, 3.

⁵⁰⁶ "siendo con sus virtudes el nombre Español casi inmortal, desde las regiones mas Antarticas del mundo, hasta las Articas de nuestro Polo, pasando las calurosas regiones de la Equinocial, siguiendo el presto camino del Sol, dando vueltas a la mar y a la tierra, sin dexar parte donde las Cruces Españolas no ayan sido conocidas, castigando las Prouincias rebeldes de Chile, ni quiriendo los caminos ocultos del rio de la Plata, y Magallanes, donde tan lexos estuu de llegar la potencia Romana, y que brantando las duras ceruizes de los Flamencos, guiando los exercitos Católicos, fueron testigos de muchos de los hechos que en estos mis Commentarios escriuo." Villalobos y Benavides, fol. 1

⁵⁰⁷ Thomas Dandeleet, "An Imperial Renaissance," in *The Renaissance World*, ed. John Jeffries Martin (New York: Routledge, 2007), 317.

accomplishments of their nation. These interpretations of Spanish identity are often ripe with political meaning. For instance, all three historians identify exceptional loyalty and resolve as Spanish characteristics. By emphasizing the steadfastness and dedication of their countrymen in the face of adversity they counter one of the early modern Spanish military's major blemishes: a history of engaging in widespread and violent mutinies during long campaigns in which pay was intermittent and scarce. This problem had become particularly acute during the long war against the Dutch. Not only were these mutinies an international embarrassment for the Spanish crown, but they also effectively paralyzed military campaigns and jeopardized the security of loyal Flemish towns.⁵⁰⁸ While these mutinies occurred throughout the 80 Years War in Flanders, the Sack of Antwerp in 1574 was perhaps the most infamous. In what was termed the "Spanish Fury," mutineers from the Army of Flanders stormed into Antwerp where they massacred the city's inhabitants and destroyed the principle buildings of the rich trading metropolis.⁵⁰⁹

Bavia references the battle of Lain as a notable instance in which Spanish troops displayed immense bravery and military skill when faced with desperate odds and scarce resources. He writes that in spite of the fact that the Spanish troops found themselves greatly outnumbered by the French and were dangerously exposed to enemy artillery, they valiantly attacked Henry's forces and inflicted serious damage while emerging from the encounter relatively unscathed. Later, the Prince of Bearne managed to ambush the contingent of Spanish soldiers guarding the Catholic forces baggage and supplies. According to Bavia, this attack was a major coup for the French, as 400 out of the 1,000 Spanish soldiers died in the ambush, and a great deal of badly needed supplies and munitions were taken or lost. Due to these severe losses, the commander of the Catholic forces the Conde de Mansfelt was forced to retreat, which Bavia states would have likely resulted in the loss of the nearby city of Lain to Henry of Navarre. Fortunately, the timely intervention of a Spanish squadron averted this grim outcome. The chaplain historian shows that even though the Spaniards were afflicted by hunger and other hardships, they were nonetheless able to disperse the enemy forces and save the city thanks to their martial skill and valor.⁵¹⁰

Bavia recounts a similar episode of Spanish bravery during desperate conditions in his account of the Battle of Fotenta. He writes that while the Spanish forces fought with great spirit for over two hours, victory seemed uncertain, since their cavalry only numbered 350; in contrast, the French possessed 1,500 led by "all the nobility of the French army."⁵¹¹ Yet, in spite of being vastly outnumbered in this engagement, the Spanish commander the Constable of Milan, with "his spirit and valor" won the day thanks to a skillful flanking maneuver.⁵¹² As a result of this reversal and display of Spanish valor, Henry doubted his chances of victory and ordered his forces to withdraw.⁵¹³ In sum, the Spanish frequently displayed an impressive ability to turn a crisis around and achieve victory even in the most dire of circumstances.

Bavia's treatment of the Dutch assault on Stenuich in particular highlights his revisionist stance regarding the discipline and resolve of the Spanish military. According to the chaplain historian, foreign writers claimed that while the city was under attack Spanish troops garrisoned in the Low Countries refused orders to mobilize and attack the Dutch. Bavia writes that the

⁵⁰⁸ Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 157.

⁵⁰⁹ Kamen, *Philip of Spain*, 160.

⁵¹⁰ Bavia, 2:203-4.

⁵¹¹ "toda la nobleza del exercito Frances." Bavia, 2:222.

⁵¹² "su animo y valor," Bavia, 2:223-4.

⁵¹³ Bavia, 2:224.

foreign texts grossly exaggerated the number of Spaniards who refused this order; moreover, those who did refuse the order did so not because they were disobedient or mutinous, but because they were awaiting the direct order from the Duke of Parma, who was returning from France. In reference to these foreign writers, Bavia remarks

some think that they [the Spanish] caused no small harm to the successful happenings that could be expected by the king. Those who claimed this were not well fond of this nation, that they should not be given much credit: it is ultimately a doubtful case, and with that it is not good to lay blame on a nation so devoted to the service of its king, for whom it has performed such heroic deeds in these States.⁵¹⁴

As such, for Bavia the incident at Stenuich encapsulates the larger predicament facing the Spanish nation and its image: foreign writers often exaggerated his countrymen's acts of disobedience in order to defame and demonize Spain. Through this defense of the Spanish troops and their rightful claim to glory Bavia advances a formulation of Spanish national identity that emphasizes his countrymen's discipline, loyalty, and committed service to the crown.

Guadalajara y Javier's history contains similar accounts of Spanish valor and discipline in the face of the poor odds and harsh conditions frequently encountered in France. For instance, he writes with admiration about how a small Spanish fleet defended the fortress at Blaye in southwestern France from a much larger force of French and English ships. Guadalajara y Javier considers the victory of forty Spanish vessels over the 85 enemy ships to be "one of the distinguished heroic deeds of our times."⁵¹⁵ This naval victory thus represents a point of immense pride for Guadalajara y Javier. It serves as a striking demonstration of Spanish military skill and proof of the Spanish nation's discipline and resolve. Moreover, his remarks indicate that while he maintains a prideful vision of his kingdom of Aragon, this emphasis on regional patriotism still does not exclude him from celebrating the Spanish nation as a whole.

Villalobos y Benavides likewise provides a glowing account of the Spanish soldiers in the French campaign, who he writes were superbly well disciplined even during difficult conditions. A vivid example of this lofty view can be found in his account of the Army of Flanders's behavior during the battle for Cambrai. He remarks that the Spanish engaged in this campaign were devout and the models of stellar military conduct. In reference to the claims of foreign writers regarding the supposed violent brutality of the Spanish, Villalobos y Benavides states

that if certain well-known men have apparently been found to be heartless, most of this old army is to have good customs so in keeping with its moral virtues, that whoever with care would have noticed that, [and] a great sense of charity and order will always be found in this army, to the effect that it is very rare to hear mention of fights or quarrels.⁵¹⁶

⁵¹⁴ "piensan algunos que causaron no pequeño dano a los Buenos sucessos, que por parte del Rey se podian esperar. No eran los que dezian esto tan bien aficionados a esta nación, que se les deua dar mucho crédito: ello al fin es caso de duda, y con ella no es bien cargar culpa a una nación tan aficionada al seruicio de su Rey, y que por el han hecho en aquellos Estados tan heroicas hazañas." Bavia, 2:82.

⁵¹⁵ "fue una de las señaladas hazañas de nuestros tiempos." Guadalajara y Javier, 127.

⁵¹⁶ "que si alguno famosos hombres se han hallado al parecer ser desalmados, lo mas general deste exercito antiguo, es tener buenas costumbres, y en las virtudes morales tanta correspondencia, que quien con atención lo huuiere notado, aura hallado siempre en este exercito una caridad muy grande, y conformidad de modo que muy raro se oye decir de riñas ni pendencias." Villalobos y Benavides, 41.

These descriptions of spectacular virtues and clean practices amply demonstrate that the soldier historian's fellow Spanish soldiers were far from the debased and uncontrollable brutes commonly portrayed in foreign writings. In truth they were the ideal Catholic soldier: generous, steadfast, and righteous. Thus, through his efforts to bring luster back to the Army of Flanders's tarnished image Villalobos y Benavides establishes the pious and disciplined character of the Spanish nation.

Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides all write that their countrymen heroically endured great hardship in the service of the crown and the Catholic faith. In addition to emphasizing their nation's discipline and resolve, the historians relate other representative Spanish traits.

For instance, Bavia talks at length about what he sees as the exemplary bravery of the Spanish nation. Throughout his history the chaplain historian relates that the Spanish had an inspirational presence during the French and Flemish campaigns, and that the bravery and honor of his fellow Spaniards surpassed that of other "nations." For example, while as a whole the Hapsburg forces fought honorably during Parma's assault on the fort of Esclusa in the Netherlands, those who stood out most for their valor were the Spanish soldiers, "with whom [the other nations] always held in honored emulation."⁵¹⁷ He thus identifies exceptional gallantry as a Spanish characteristic, and he uses the trait to define and exalt Spain as a nation.

Moreover, Bavia emphasizes his countrymen's unique confessional identity, and he frequently imparts strong religious meaning to his countrymen's military feats and victories. For the chaplain historian, patriotism and piety went hand-in-hand. The close linkage between confessional and national identity in the chaplain historian's thought suggests that the universalism of the Church does not obliterate or overshadow Spanish patriotism; instead, Bavia grants his nation a special position in the Catholic world. Rather than being an impediment to the formation of national consciousness in the early modern period, as some scholars have asserted, the Catholic faith could in fact serve to sharpen and reinforce a unique sense of Spanish identity.⁵¹⁸

For example, in his account of fighting at Noyon Bavia remarks that the Spanish won the day thanks in large part to their pious resolve. He writes that the battle occurred on the Day of Annunciation of our Lady, which bolstered the Spaniards' confidence in divine favor.⁵¹⁹ Similarly, he notes that the Spanish took their victory at Dorlans as a sign of divine favor because it occurred on the Vespers of Santiago. Writing of this triumph, "[It was] very important for Spain's reputation, and very harmful for the affairs of Henry IV, because of the many men that he lost in this enterprise, [some of whom] were persons of weight and standing."⁵²⁰

While this rhetoric pales in comparison to a more overtly messianic vision of Spanish imperial power, such as Pedro Cornejo's late sixteenth-century account of the intervention in France, Bavia's remarks nevertheless lionize his nation along religious lines by highlighting its special devotion and unique place in the Catholic community. Indeed, the cult of Santiago coalesced into a forceful symbol of the Spanish nation that fostered a sentiment of common

⁵¹⁷ "con quien siempre tenían una honrada emulación." Bavia, 2:12.

⁵¹⁸ Ranum, 12. Koenigsberger, 170-2.

⁵¹⁹ Bavia, 2:93.

⁵²⁰ "Importantissima para la reputación Española, y muy dañosa para las cosas de Henrico Quarto, por la mucha gente q perdió en esta empresa, personas todas de cuenta y oficio." Bavia, 2:278.

Hispanic identity in the early modern period.⁵²¹ Bavia imparts a strong sense of mission and preeminence to Spain by proclaiming that his devout countrymen enjoyed the special protection and blessing of God on auspicious holy days, especially those associated with St. James.

Closely tied to this discussion of the blessings of the Spanish nation are the battlefield apparitions that were reported to have appeared during the *Reconquista* and the conquest of the Americas. Spanish histories of these conflicts stated that holy apparitions, most often of the Virgin Mary and Santiago, appeared in the middle of pivotal battles in order to aid the Spanish in their hour of need.⁵²² Although Bavia does not mention any such apparitions, his treatment of holy days inspiring Spanish soldiers relates to an understanding that the Spanish nation enjoyed special divine protection in its military engagements against the enemies of the Church. The chaplain historian fosters a shared sense of Hispanic identity through religion.

Bavia further highlights this linkage between Catholic piety and patriotism in his accounts of the Spanish commander the Governor of Milan and Constable of Castile Juan Fernandez de Velasco, who entered into the war in France after the Duke of Parma's death.⁵²³ In a notable expression of national consciousness the chaplain historian writes that Fernandez de Velasco was "truly Spanish in name and in deeds," and "has labored for the good of our Spain and the service of the king."⁵²⁴ Moreover, the governor represented the many defining virtues of their proud "nation," most notably prudence, valor, and "a great zeal for the Catholic Religion and its benefit."⁵²⁵ Thus, through his glowing description of the governor Bavia lays out a striking definition of what it means to be Spanish, with his "nation's" special confessional identity occupying a central place in this formulation of proto-national identity.

Bavia seeks to both shape and provide a clearer definition of Spanish identity. In his view there was little question that Spain existed as united "nation" with its own unique and exemplary characteristics. The Castilian historian constructs this sense of "Spanishness" by recounting his nation's shared political, cultural, and confessional characteristics. Importantly, these collective Spanish traits transcend the divisions of the composite structure of the early modern Spanish kingdoms. In his glorification of the Spanish nation Bavia makes no distinctions between the Castilians, the Aragonese, or the other Spanish peoples of Iberia.

Amiens and the Spanish Nation

The experience of empire emerges as an integral component in the construction of national identity in these texts. As Bavia's history illustrates, praise for the accomplishments of the Spaniards fighting in France and the Low Countries was an articulation of Spanish patriotism that brought into relief the collective superiority of the Spanish nation. Villalobos y Benavides and Guadalajara y Javier likewise use their accounts of Spanish military feats to advance their respective visions of Spanish identity. Unlike Bavia, however, the two historians heavily emphasize the importance of the capture and siege of Amiens.

In 1597 a group of 20 Spanish and Walloon troops successfully smuggled themselves into the city of Amiens in Picardy under the cover of night by dressing themselves as peasants and hiding in potato sacks. Upon opening the city gates a nearby force of roughly 4000 troops from a contingent of the army of Flanders entered Amiens, overwhelmed the French defenders, and

⁵²¹ Ballester Rodríguez, 97.

⁵²² Joseph O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 194-8. D.A. Brading, *Mexican Phoenix* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 33.

⁵²³ Bavia, 2:210.

⁵²⁴ "verdaderamente Español en nombre y obras," "ha tratado siempre en bine de nuestra Espana, y seruicio del Rey." Bavia, 2:210.

⁵²⁵ "un gran zelo de la Religion Catolica, y aumento della." Bavia, 2:210.

took over the city. This surprise capture was a blow for Henry IV and a coup for the Spanish. The city's loss was an embarrassment for Henry IV, and the continued occupation of the city by the Spanish threatened the stability of his newly established rule. With control of the city the Spanish would have had easy access to attack Paris.⁵²⁶ Moreover, Henry IV had also been using Amiens as a major storehouse for arms in preparation for an attack on Spanish Flanders. The French monarch quickly laid siege to the city. The main body of the Army of Flanders was unable to intervene, and the Spanish defenders capitulated after six months in late 1597.⁵²⁷

The battle of Amiens has received somewhat sparse treatment in recent scholarship. Olivia Carpi and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez write that the surprise attack and capture of Amiens carried a great deal of importance for both the Spanish and the city's diehard French Catholics. The piece mostly focuses on the battle's lasting legacy for the remaining supporters of the Catholic League, many of whom had fled to the Spanish-held Low Countries. These Leaguer holdouts viewed the ejection of Henry IV's forces as a divine sign for the true Catholics of the kingdom to continue the fight against the Huguenots and *politiques*. The collaboration of the residents of Amiens with the occupying Spaniards was advanced as a lesson for the rest of France that the blood shed in this battle was a small price to pay for the restoration of the Catholic faith. These Catholic exiles in turn framed this struggle as a sort crusade that would liberate the Catholic people of France.

The two authors also touch on the views of the Spaniards at the time, who likewise portrayed the capture of Amiens within the context of a holy war. In their view, this event stood as a sign of God's favor for his Catholic servants. In turn, these Spanish observers hoped that the city's capture would reverse the Spanish crown's many defeats and setbacks of the past two years, perhaps the most notable embarrassment being Philip II's declaration of bankruptcy.⁵²⁸

Carpi and Ruiz Ibáñez place more weight on the lasting historical impact of the capture and siege of Amiens for the French, although they do offer a few remarks regarding Spanish histories of the event. Importantly, for the purposes of this chapter, the two write that Villalobos y Benavides was one of the first writers to offer an account of the battle, and they refer to his 1612 work as canonical. Many later Spanish historians in fact did rely heavily on his account, albeit with some minor adjustments, in their own treatment of Amiens.⁵²⁹

Villalobos y Benavides did indeed play an instrumental role in the enshrinement of Amiens in the historical memory of early modern Spain. Prior to his work's publication in 1612 the capture and siege of the city did not register that strongly in other Spanish histories of the French Wars of Religion. Nonetheless, this claim that other Spanish historians essentially copied Villalobos y Benavides's original account is somewhat of an exaggeration. As will be shown later in the chapter, Guadalajara y Javier takes a markedly different approach to the events at Amiens.

In support of Carpi's and Ruiz Ibáñez's argument, Bavia only provides a brief discussion of the battle for Amiens in his earlier 1608 history. The chaplain historian does not pay much attention to how the city itself was captured, and instead concentrates on the discussion amongst the command of the Army of Flanders over whether or not to relieve Amiens. He writes that the

⁵²⁶ Kamen, *Philip of Spain*, 306.

⁵²⁷ Olivia Carpi, *Une République imaginaire: Amiens pendant les troubles de religion (1559-1597)* (Paris: Belin, 2005), 217-18, 221-2.

⁵²⁸ Olivia Carpi and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, "Les noix, les espions et les historiens: réflexion sur la prise d'Amiens," *Histoire, Économie et Société*, vol. 23:3 (2003), 329.

⁵²⁹ Carpi and Ruiz Ibáñez, 326.

acting commander Cardinal Ernesto de Mansfelt ultimately decided not to send a large relief force due to the riskiness of the enterprise. Bavia devotes some space to the eventual capitulation of the Spanish force defending Amiens, and he uses this account to humanize the historical figure of Henry IV and valorize the Spanish soldiers. The chaplain historian notes that during the surrender Henry publically stated that he greatly admired the valor of the Spanish, and that he would much prefer to have them as his friend than as his enemy; as a sign of his benevolence he ordered his men to treat any wounded Spaniard.⁵³⁰ In sum, this discussion of Amiens focuses more on its place as an endpoint in the long-standing hostilities between Henry IV and the Spanish crown.

In contrast, Amiens is the central focus of Villalobos y Benavides's history. The soldier historian himself was present at the capture and siege of the city, and while he acknowledges that the Spanish did eventually surrender, he nonetheless depicts the battle as a moment of great symbolic importance for his nation.

A striking discourse of Spanish patriotism defines Villalobos y Benavides's history of Amiens, and his work reads as a litany of praise for the small Spanish force that took over and held Amiens. In contrast to Bavia's earlier treatment of the subject, the soldier historian marvels at the ingenuity of the commander Hernan Tello and his men, who were able to capture the fortified city by sneaking soldiers dressed as peasants through the gates; similarly, he recounts with astonishment how droves of French burghers fled from such a small Spanish force. Moreover, after the initial capture of the city these Spanish troops were the model of military skill and discipline, according to Villalobos y Benavides. He writes that the Spaniards immediately posted guards along the walls, and that everyone acted with great effort and vigilance to quickly secure Amiens.⁵³¹ Crucially, the account emphasizes the orderly behavior of the Spanish troops, who treated the consolidation of the city's defenses with the utmost priority while coping with limited resources. The Spanish soldiers in fact participated in few altercations during their takeover of the city, as they left the women and places of worship of Amiens relatively undisturbed.⁵³²

Without a doubt the soldier historian portrays the capture of Amiens as one of the most triumphant events of his day. He writes that the small Spanish force consisting of only 4,000 troops was able to overcome a myriad of difficulties and take hold of the important and well-fortified city through ingenuity and valor.⁵³³ Viewed within the context of Spain's ultimately failed intervention in the French Wars of Religion, the capture of Amiens was one final triumph for the Spanish forces during the long and costly campaign. In a commentary on the overburdened condition of the Army of Flanders at the time, Villalobos y Benavides stresses that Governor Hernan Tello and his troops were able to accomplish this great feat with so few men and so little resources at their disposal.

In keeping with Villalobos y Benavides's uncommon recognition of the accomplishments of the foreign soldiers in the Army of Flanders, the soldier historian does remark that non-Spaniards had a hand in the capture and defense of Amiens. In his account of the companies and their commanders who took part in the battle, he notes that many Italians served alongside the Spanish.⁵³⁴ Likewise, he writes that Burgundian soldiers, including one captain who was a

⁵³⁰ Bavia, 2:337-8.

⁵³¹ Villalobos y Benavides, 88, 90.

⁵³² Carpi, 219.

⁵³³ Villalobos y Benavides, 90

⁵³⁴ Villalobos y Benavides, 86.

“valiant soldier,” played an instrumental role in the plot to sneak into the city in peasant’s garb due to their knowledge of the French language.⁵³⁵

Nevertheless, the spotlight of Villalobos y Benavides’s celebratory narrative remains on the Spanish, and he frames Amiens as a victory for Spain. In keeping with his triumphalist declaration in the preface concerning “the almost immortal Spanish name,” the soldier historian’s patriotic account of the capture and defense of Amiens counters the Black Legend and lionizes the Spanish nation.

For instance, Villalobos y Benavides often emphasizes the benevolence and charity of his fellow Spanish soldiers. According to the soldier historian, the residents of Amiens and its surrounding areas faced great hardship due to the fighting, years of poor harvests, and Henry IV’s cruel policy of destroying villages that he suspected of collaborating with the Spanish. In the countryside the French soldiers, who themselves were often hungry and poor, would frequently steal refugee peasants’ clothes if they appeared better than their own. Moreover, the writes that those girls and women who were unable to flee from the approaching army of Henry IV were often robbed and forced to serve in the French camp.⁵³⁶ These poor souls were in a truly desperate state, “without any remedy other than to cry to heaven.”⁵³⁷

Villalobos y Benavides presents a glowing account of the Spanish army’s compassionate treatment of the local French that obscures the hostility between the two sides during the siege. Contrary to the soldier historian’s account, the French peasantry fled both the Spanish and French army during the capture and siege of the city. While there was a core of French Catholic collaborators within Amiens itself, most residents of the city resented and feared the occupying Spanish force, and there was a great deal of celebration when Henry IV regained the city.⁵³⁸

In contrast to this state of affairs, Villalobos y Benavides asserts that the Spanish soldiers emerged as saviors for the French peasants and burghers of the area during a time of depredation and chaos. He observes that the Spanish readily let refugees take shelter within Amiens; moreover the plight of these poor Frenchmen moved the Spanish soldiers stationed at the city’s walls so much that they regularly gave them part of their already meager rations of bread. Villalobos y Benavides marvels at his countrymen’s generosity and piety, which he contrasts to the rapacious behavior of Henry IV’s troops.⁵³⁹ This juxtaposition of the cruelty of the French and the kindness of the Spanish serves to call into question the Black Legend of Spanish brutality. He demonstrates that while the ill-disciplined French were quite capable of committing wartime atrocities against their own countrymen, the Spanish treated the foreign French with compassion and care. The cruel behavior of the “other,” i.e. the enemy French troops, highlights the magnanimity and good will of the Spanish national character.⁵⁴⁰

Villalobos y Benavides once again uses the French as a foil to accentuate the virtues of the Spanish nation and its heroics in his account of an attempt by Henry IV’s troops to defect to

⁵³⁵ “valiente soldado,” Villalobos y Benavides, 88.

⁵³⁶ Villalobos y Benavides, 97-8. See Chapter 3 for a more at length discussion of Henry IV’s destruction of surrounding areas of Amiens during the siege.

⁵³⁷ “sin tener remedio, solo lamentarse al cielo.” Villalobos y Benavides, 98.

⁵³⁸ Carpi, 222.

⁵³⁹ Villalobos y Benavides, 98.

⁵⁴⁰ This discussion in fact resonates with Chapter 3’s discussion of Villalobos y Benavides’ overall depiction of the French and Henry IV as being capable of cold-blooded brutality. Recall that Henry IV destroyed the surrounding areas of Amiens both as retaliation for the region’s Spanish sympathies and in order to clear the way for his large army and its camp. In contrast to this cruel practice, the Spanish soldiers readily gave up their rations to help these poor French peasants.

the Spanish side. Interestingly, the soldier historian writes that he was present at this incident. According to Villalobos y Benavides, prior to the siege a group of ragged deserters from Henry IV's force approached him and his men near the gates of Amiens and asked if they could join the Spanish; these French troops claimed that they were dying of hunger, and it was their understanding that the Spanish camp enjoyed a relative abundance of food and supplies.⁵⁴¹

"To this the Captain [Hernan Tello] responded to them, that by his confession they forced him to have a low view of them, by being soldiers who, in service of their king, a little bit of hunger and need caused them to weaken their spirits..." Captain Hernan Tello in turn adds that

the king of Spain never would be served by soldiers who deserted their own [lord] because of a little bit of hardship that they presently had, thus it was more just to die than to do what they did out of fear of need: and he asserted that if their only intent was to flee work and for this they came to find the city [Amiens], that they would not want to serve with the soldiers of the Catholic King, because they were of such condition, that they desired work and hardship more than conquest, because if they did not greatly contribute to the triumph, they did not want reward from their king, [and] thus they desired more to deserve the rewards than to obtain them.⁵⁴²

This exchange highlights the honor and commitment of the Spanish as a whole. In contrast to the mercenary and shameless French deserters, Villalobos y Benavides stresses that the Spanish would never abandon their posts due to material hardship. Thus, as with his account of his compatriots' almsgiving at the walls of Amiens, he uses his negative depiction of the French as disloyal to elevate the historical image of the Spanish nation and its steadfast loyalty.

Like Bavaria, Villalobos y Benavides also emphasizes his nation's special devotion to the Catholic faith. In one particularly interesting account the soldier historian relates that during the siege the French and Spanish troops engaged in dueling displays of devotion to St. John and Santiago. He writes that Amiens was very devoted to St. John, and during the saint's feast day Henry IV ordered a massive display, including a ceremonial cannonade (*salua*), in order to show the residents of the besieged city his own devotion to the saint.⁵⁴³

Not to be outdone, on the day of St James the Spanish undertook their own impressive celebration for their patron saint. The soldiers placed torches and lamps all along the city's walls and assembled on to the battlements, where they all fired their guns in unison into the air, to the effect that it appeared that all of Amiens was lit up. "This salvo made the soldiers very happy, since it showed the French that their devotion to Santiago was not less than their devotion to St. John."⁵⁴⁴ Through this account Villalobos y Benavides reveals the linkage between national and

⁵⁴¹ Villalobos y Benavides, 98.

⁵⁴² "A esto les respondió el Capitán, que por su confesión le obligauan a estimarlos pocos, por se soldados que en seruicio de su Rey un poco de hambre y necesidad les hazia desallecer de animo..." "...y el Rey de España no se seruia jamás de soldados que desamparauan al suyo natural, por un poco de trabajo que entonces tenían presente, pues era mas justo morir que hazer lo que ellos hazina por temor de la necesidad: y que les asseguraua sino era otro su intento sino huyr el trabajo, y por esso venían a buscar la ciudad, que no quisisessen seruir entre los soldados del Rey católico, porque eran de tal condición, que mas deseauan los trabajos y necesidades que el vencer, porque sino vencían haciendo mucho de su parte, no querían merced de su Rey, pues desseauan mas el merecer las mercedes que el alcancallas." Villalobos y Benavides, 99.

⁵⁴³ Villalobos y Benavides, 142.

⁵⁴⁴ "Alegraronse mucho los soldados con esta salua, pareciéndoles, que con ella le auian mostrado al Frances no era menor su deuocion a Santiago, que el la tenia con san Juan." Villalobos y Benavides, 142.

confessional identity in early modern Spain. In essence he frames the dueling displays of St. John and St. James as a competition between the French and Spanish nations that highlighted the special piety of the Spaniards. These celebrations were infused with both patriotic and religious meaning, as devotion to Santiago reinforces a defined sense of Spanish collective identity in Villalobos y Benavides's telling of the episode.

Thus, for the soldier historian, the battle of Amiens was a glorious event that vividly brought to light the heroic virtues of the Spanish nation. He portrays the capture of the city as a substantial boost for Spain's image and an embarrassment for Henry IV and the French; according to his assessment the Spanish occupation of Amiens effectively prevented Henry from becoming the true ruler of France.⁵⁴⁵ Indeed, Amiens' capture was a serious blow to the king's reputation and authority, as Villalobos y Benavides asserts that Henry IV's failure to recapture the city would not only result in the resurgence of the Catholic League, but it would also cause many *politiques* (*realistas*) to desert him as well.⁵⁴⁶ While in reality the overextended and undersupplied Army of Flanders likely could have done little to take any advantage of this victory, Villalobos y Benavides nonetheless asserts that the struggle over Amiens was of vital strategic importance.⁵⁴⁷ In his view, the Spanish occupation of the major city sparked the possibility of renewed rebellion against Henry IV, and made it all but impossible for the king to consolidate his rule.

Villalobos y Benavides writes that this grim prospect of losing control propelled the French king to gather the bulk of his forces in the region and to move with all possible haste in order to retake the city.⁵⁴⁸ To make matters worse for the Spanish, Henry IV quickly took control of the areas surrounding Amiens, effectively cutting off the city from the Spanish forces stationed in northeastern France and Flanders.⁵⁴⁹ He remarks that the commander of the Army of Flanders himself Archduke Ernest of Austria was stationed 14 leagues (approximately 44 miles) away in the city of Arras; by the time that he had been informed of the siege and had mobilized his forces it appeared too late to intervene in the battle due to the considerable distance between his camp and the beleaguered city.⁵⁵⁰

In spite of these increasingly desperate odds and the death of Governor Hernan Tello, Villalobos y Benavides proudly writes that he and his compatriots continued their fight against the much larger French force. In the final days of the siege many French soldiers were killed or wounded during the attacks on the city, and in spite of these great costs the assaults made little impact on the Spanish defenses, according to the soldier historian. Moreover, in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to break the city's morale Henry IV even ordered bombastic music to be played along the city walls.⁵⁵¹

Nonetheless, although the besieged Spanish fought valiantly, their situation became increasingly desperate as their already small numbers dwindled and food had become scarce. When definitive word approached that it appeared that the Archduke would not be able to send a relief force in time, the acting commander at Amiens the Marquis de Montenegro spoke with his captains about calling a truce with Henry IV. While a few Spanish officers wanted to leave the

⁵⁴⁵ Villalobos y Benavides, 100.

⁵⁴⁶ Villalobos y Benavides, 116.

⁵⁴⁷ Carpi, 218.

⁵⁴⁸ Villalobos y Benavides, 100.

⁵⁴⁹ Villalobos y Benavides, 141.

⁵⁵⁰ Villalobos y Benavides, 153-4.

⁵⁵¹ Villalobos y Benavides, 146.

city and “set forth on the [French] camp with the ultimate resolution to die fighting,” in the end it was decided to call for an armistice.⁵⁵²

Villalobos y Benavides frames the surrender of Amiens in a manner that edifies the defeated Spanish. In an affirmation of his compatriots’ heroic resolve, he marvels at the fact that throughout the siege no enemy had been able to break through the city’s defenses.⁵⁵³ While in the end the Spanish surrendered, the capture and sustained defense of Amiens remained a spectacular military feat.

Villalobos y Benavides stresses that Henry IV paid special attention to the valor of the Spanish troops. As mentioned in Chapter 3, he writes that Henry IV and his guard stood at attention outside of the city gates after the formal surrender of the Spanish, and

all the men that left Amien’s garrison passed between the king and this squadron [honor guard]. With the king was sergeant major Ortiz, who in this defense fought valiantly and forcefully in many occasions; here he served to tell the king who each of the passing captains was...and speaking to them [the captains] with great courtesy, he [Henry] told them that he was delighted to see them outside of Amiens, making them offers to grant them rewards, honoring their strength and valor, the captains thanked him for his courtesy, passed with all of their men, who, with eight hundred wounded who were transported in boats, totaled one thousand and four hundred soldiers.⁵⁵⁴

Not only does this account humanize the historical figure of Henry IV, but also perhaps more importantly, it valorizes the defeated Spanish defenders of Amiens. Rather than perceiving this event as a shameful episode, Villalobos y Benavides presents it more as a victory parade that showcases the military heroics of the Spanish. Even during a moment of arguable defeat the soldier historian and his countrymen appear honorable and proud. By chronicling the French king’s amazement and respect for his enemy, Villalobos y Benavides effectively transforms the surrender of Amiens into a triumphant event for his compatriots and the Spanish nation. In keeping with his view that the battle of Amiens was a Spanish achievement, Villalobos y Benavides makes no mention of the French burgher collaborators who walked alongside the departing Spanish soldiers in this procession; Henry IV forced these residents of Amiens to leave their homes as punishment for aiding the enemy Spanish.⁵⁵⁵

In sum, this history establishes the battle of Amiens as an important final event in the war between Henry IV and Philip II while articulating a concrete model of Spanish national identity. In shaping the failed occupation of Amiens into a proud patriotic moment for Spain, Villalobos y Benavides relates a common set of Spanish national virtues that distinguishes his countrymen from other nationalities. In essence the soldier historian establishes exceptional valor, resolve, charity, and piety as Spanish characteristics. His celebration of these traits, coupled with his negative assessment of French behavior, is indicative of a belief of Spain as a uniquely superior

⁵⁵² “y saliessen al campo con ultima resolución de morir peleando,” Villalobos y Benavides, 152.

⁵⁵³ Villalobos y Benavides, 154.

⁵⁵⁴ “pasó por entre el Rey y este escuadrón toda la gente que salió de la guarnición de Amiens. Estaba el sargento mayor Ortiz junto al Rey, que en esta defensa peleó valiente y esforzadamente en muchas ocasiones; servía aquí de decir al rey quién era cada uno de los capitanes que salían...y hablándoles con mucha cortesía, les dixo se holgaba verlos fuera de Amiens, haciéndoles ofrecimientos de hacerles merced, honrando su esfuerzo y valentía, y ellos agradeciéndole su cortesía, pasaron con toda su gente, que, con ochocientos heridos que fueron en las barcas, en todos fueron mil y cuatrocientos soldados.” Villalobos y Benavides, 157.

⁵⁵⁵ Carpi, 222.

political and cultural entity. Although Villalobos y Benavides acknowledges the contributions of other nationalities in the Army of Flanders, these non-Spanish soldiers merely played a supportive role in this Spanish triumph.

The efforts of Bavia and Villalobos y Benavides to write a true history that counters the Black Legend results in a discussion of what it means to be “Spanish.” Their writings reveal a defined framework of a national consciousness. This discourse of early modern patriotism differs markedly from the modern concept of the nation as a sovereign entity that exists as an individual political and administrative unit.⁵⁵⁶ While the early modern Spanish kingdoms clearly lacked the institutional uniformity of this rubric, Bavia and Villalobos y Benavides still present Spain as a unique nation united by a shared culture, history, and mission. These bonds transcended the institutional divisions and differences of the composite monarchy.

As Castilians, it is unsurprising that the two historians advanced this centralizing framework that effaced other regional identities within Spain. Castilians commonly thought of their native kingdom as the political and cultural hub of Spain while viewing other regions of Spain as peripheral. The center of the Spanish monarchy was in Castile, and Castilians held the majority of administrative appointments. The wealthy and populous kingdom of Castile in turn shouldered the majority of the expenses of empire, most notably its costly defense.⁵⁵⁷

The Aragonese historian Guadalajara y Javier and his account of Amiens provide a different texture to the question of national identity in early modern Spain. Unlike Bavia and Villalobos y Benavides, Guadalajara y Javier articulates a regional patriotic discourse that glorifies both his own native kingdom of Aragon and the Spanish nation as a whole. This interesting *mélange* of regional and proto-national patriotism colors Aragonese historian’s discussion of the capture and siege of Amiens. Written shortly after Villalobos y Benavides’s history, Guadalajara y Javier’s pro-Aragonese take on the events at Amiens in his *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica* complicates the assessment that other early modern Spanish histories of the battle were largely derivative imitations of Villalobos y Benavides’s account.⁵⁵⁸

Like the soldier historian, Guadalajara y Javier puts a very triumphant spin on Amiens, writing that the fight over the city was one of the most noteworthy and singular events of recent history. He in turn portrays the city’s capture as a godsend for the beleaguered Spanish forces at the end of the French Wars of Religion. According to Guadalajara y Javier, on the eve of the city’s capture the war against the Dutch rebels was in a state of disaster, the commander of the Army of Flanders the Archduke Cardinal Albert had “little men and less money,” and it was certain that Henry IV would invade the vulnerable Low Countries in the Spring of that year, 1598.⁵⁵⁹ According to the Aragonese historian, it was well known that Henry intended to use Amiens as a central staging area due to its strategic location near the Flemish border. “But God freed Archduke Albert from this distress, with great credit to the Spanish nation, especially to Aragon.”⁵⁶⁰ As such, Guadalajara y Javier places the triumph at Amiens within the context of both proto-national and regional patriotism. He does articulate a clear sense of Spanish identity, but the accomplishments of his fellow Aragonese remain the clear focus of his celebratory

⁵⁵⁶ Ballester Rodríguez, 13, 48.

⁵⁵⁷ Kamen, *Imagining Spain*, 17-20. J.H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 124. Williams, 46-50.

⁵⁵⁸ Carpi and Ruiz Ibáñez, 326.

⁵⁵⁹ Guadalajara y Javier, 349-50.

⁵⁶⁰ “Pero libro Dios al Archiduque Alberto destas apreturas con gran valor y crédito para la nación Española, especialmente para Aragon.” Guadalajara y Javier, 350.

account of the siege. In other words, he argues that his countrymen were most responsible for the capture of Amiens and reversing the series of military defeats of the final days of Spain's intervention in France.

There are important parallels between Guadalajara y Javier's and Villalobos y Benavides's accounts of the battle of Amiens. Like the soldier historian, Guadalajara y Javier attempts to dispel the Spanish military's prevailing reputation for poor discipline and cruelty by drawing attention to the benevolence and orderly behavior of the Spanish troops and their allies after they had captured the city. He writes that "Abstaining from the violence, rapes, deaths, sacrileges, and other effronteries permitted by military force, the temperance and decency of the nations found in this occasion in favor of the Catholic [Army of Flanders] was a wonder."⁵⁶¹ Also like Villalobos y Benavides, Guadalajara y Javier writes that the Spanish troops kindly offered shelter and rations to the peasants who were fleeing from the surrounding countryside in order to escape the ravages of Henry IV's troops.⁵⁶²

Nonetheless, unlike the account of Villalobos y Benavides, Guadalajara y Javier makes little mention of the contributions of non-Spanish soldiers during the battle for Amiens. Rather, he devotes the bulk of his narrative of the famous siege to glorifying the Aragonese soldiers who took part in the fighting. In particular, he repeatedly highlights the heroic bravery of the Aragonese captain Francisco del Arco. Villalobos y Benavides remarks that del Arco, a captain "of much confidence and valor," planned and personally led a major Spanish counter-attack "that on account of being notable was called by the French the "*Gran Salida*" to distinguish it from the other sallies that occurred in this siege. During this "celebrated sortie" the Aragonese captain and his soldiers stormed the French batteries "with spirited courage."⁵⁶³

While Guadalajara y Javier considers this to be one of the most notable events of the siege, Villalobos y Benavides himself makes no mention of Captain del Arco's valiant attack. This divergence is a telling indication of the two historians' differing agendas and understanding of Spanish identity. While the Castilian soldier historian frames the battle of Amiens as the accomplishment of a uniform Spanish nation, Guadalajara y Javier privileges his own *patria* and its soldiers in his celebratory account of the battle. Indeed, the Aragonese historian again focuses on Captain del Arco in his description of the meeting between Henry IV and the Spanish captains after the city's eventual surrender. Like Villalobos y Benavides, he writes that the French king honored the Spanish captains with great courtesy and humility; yet he adds that "The one who was most honored and rewarded for his military deeds was Captain Francisco del Arco, being given [by Henry] a chain of much worth."⁵⁶⁴ In Villalobos y Benavides's text this meeting served to glorify the Spanish nation as a whole; in contrast, Guadalajara y Javier uses the occasion to honor Aragon. In his view, Amiens was an Aragonese triumph.

Guadalajara y Javier and Villalobos y Benavides agree that the battle of Amiens was a significant accomplishment, and they both use their histories to transform the Army of Flanders's eventual loss of the city into a triumphant event. They disagree, however, over the question of who precisely should lay claim to this glory. This divergence reveals the complicated and multi-

⁵⁶¹ "Fue marauilla la templanca y modestia de las naciones que en esta ocasión se hallaron en fauor del Católico, abstiniendose de violencias, estupro, muertes, sacrilegios, y otras insolencias concedidas por la fiereza militar." Guadalajara y Javier, 352,

⁵⁶² Guadalajara y Javier, 352

⁵⁶³ "de mucha confianza y valor," "que por ser notable la llamaron los Franceses la gran salida, a distinción de otras que sucedieron en aquel cerco," "esta tan celebrada salida," "con animoso pecho" Guadalajara y Javier, 374.

⁵⁶⁴ "A quien mas honro y auentajo por sus hechos militares fue al Capitán Francisco del Arco, dándole una cadena de mucha valor." Guadalajara y Javier, 399.

faceted nature of early modern Spanish patriotism. On the one hand, Guadalajara y Javier articulates the existence of a broadly defined Spanish nation, which includes his native kingdom of Aragon. Nonetheless, he asserts Aragon's proud position within this broad framework by focusing his narrative of Amiens on the valor, military skill, and honor of the Aragonese who took part in the battle, most especially Captain Francisco del Arco. As such, he asserts Aragon's greatness vis-à-vis the other Spanish kingdoms, namely Castile.

Guadalajara y Javier's celebration of the contributions of the Aragonese soldiery carries deep political weight when viewed within the context of early seventeenth-century Iberian affairs. Over the course of Philip II's reign the Aragonese grew increasingly dissatisfied at what they saw as the Prudent King's unjust treatment of their kingdom. Philip II rarely visited Aragon, which in theory was the equal of Castile, and he scarcely convened the *Cortes*. Moreover, the Spanish crown frequently gave administrative posts in Aragon, including that of viceroy, to Castilians.⁵⁶⁵ These tensions came to head in 1591 when Philip II's renegade secretary Antonio Perez fled to his native Aragon to escape the Castilian Inquisition, which had charged Perez with heresy and sodomy. Aragonese authorities refused to hand over the disgraced secretary to the Inquisition, which formally had no authority in Aragon. The city of Zaragoza expelled all supporters of the crown, and the *Diputacion* (the committee of Estates) formally declared war against Philip II. The rebellion was quickly squashed with relatively little bloodshed, and the aged Philip II personally traveled to the kingdom to issue a general pardon and enact reforms that increased royal authority.⁵⁶⁶

The wounds from this conflict still lingered in Aragon when Guadalajara y Javier composed his history. By advancing a model of patriotism that was both regional and national, Guadalajara y Javier attempts to demonstrate that his native kingdom still deserves a prideful and recognized place within the greater orbit of the Spanish nation in spite of the recent rebellion. His treatment of Amiens serves as a reminder that Castilians were not the only members of the proud Spanish nation. Rather, the Aragonese embodied what was best about Spain.

The siege of Amiens continued to be viewed as an event of important in subsequent Spanish histories. For example, Carlos de Coloma, a military commander of the Army of Flanders, wrote a history during Philip IV's reign that echoed many of Villalobos y Benavides's pro-Spanish assessments of Amiens, and he saw the siege as the final illustrious moment of Philip II's reign.⁵⁶⁷ Indeed, Amiens symbolized a moment in which the Spanish nation achieved triumph in the face seemingly insurmountable odds thanks to its resolve, valor, and ingenuity. This message of resilience likely carried a great deal of weight for the Spanish empire during the reigns of Philip III and Philip IV when the Spanish crown faced the possibility of decline as it came under increasing pressure from its European rivals.

Conclusion

In each of their histories Bavia, Villalobos y Benavides, and Guadalajara y Javier all recount similar positive attributes of the Spanish nation in the French Wars of Religion: valor, charity, and piety. By depicting the Spanish as model Catholic soldiers the three historians establish a set of national characteristics forged through the practice of empire that differentiated their countrymen from other nationalities. The foreign anti-Spanish writings that would provide the foundation for the Black Legend sparked this discussion over what it meant to be Spanish. The hostile accounts of Spanish cruelty from English, French, Dutch, and other foreign writers

⁵⁶⁵ Ballester Rodríguez, 139.

⁵⁶⁶ Williams, 214-20.

⁵⁶⁷ Fernandez Alvarez, 613.

prompted Bavia, Villalobos y Benavides, and Guadalajara y Javier to defend their nation and recount its virtues and accomplishments. This articulation of identity indicates a national consciousness on the part of these three historians. In their view Spain existed as a defined political and cultural entity.

Nonetheless, this early modern definition of Spain as a nation could be broad and inchoate. The writings of Guadalajara y Javier in particular reveal the competing loyalties and identities of the composite early modern Spanish kingdoms. In contrast to the Castilians Bavia and Villalobos y Benavides, who view Spanish identity as being homogenous, Guadalajara y Javier privileges his own Aragonese identity. While he still considers himself to be Spanish, regional patriotism trumps proto-nationalism in his history. This key difference between the Castilian and Aragonese historians points to the tension between the center and periphery in early modern Spain. While Bavia and Villalobos y Benavides advance a notion of a uniform Spanish nation, Guadalajara y Javier resists this centralizing formulation and asserts the kingdom of Aragon's prideful and important place within Spain. As such, a close analysis of these texts points to the presence in the Spanish kingdoms of a national consciousness that was in the continual process of being crafted and contested.

These works in turn reveals another aspect of history writing's potential as a medium for political expression in early modern Spain. Specifically, Bavia, Villalobos y Benavides, and Guadalajara y Javier use their histories to define nationality before the advent of mass print culture. As discussed in previous chapters, the works of Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier enjoyed extensive and multiple printing runs in the early seventeenth century; it is reasonable to assume that their formulations of national and regional identity reached a relatively wide literate audience within the Spanish kingdoms. Prior to the expansion of newspapers and the emergence of a large reading public in the nineteenth century, history writing thus could serve as a way to articulate, reinforce, and shape the concept of the Spanish nation in the early modern period.

Chapter 6 History Writing and Imperial Rivalry in the Mediterranean

Introduction

El Greco's the *Dream of Philip II* is a stunning example of the artist's transcendental mannerist style.⁵⁶⁸ Commemorating the Holy League's victory over the Ottoman Turks at the battle of Lepanto, El Greco portrays the Venetian Doge, Pope Pius V and Philip II kneeling in reverent thanks for their holy triumph. To the rulers' left is an assembled throng of similarly reverential worshipers. Standing in marked contrast to this display of piety, in the lower right of the painting a chaotic mass of dark figures representing the vanquished Turks is being thrust into a gaping maw of hell. Hovering above this juxtaposition of devotion and damnation is a ring of angels assembled around the divinely glowing name of Jesus Christ.

Amidst this swirling mass of activity the one figure who perhaps most stands out is the Prudent King, Philip II. Dressed in his traditional all-black garb with an expression of serene and enigmatic grace, the Hapsburg monarch immediately captures the eye's attention. The centrality and stark austerity of the king in El Greco's *Dream of Philip II* powerfully reminds the viewer that the Spanish empire lead Christendom to victory over the Ottomans. Similarly, the painting reveals the immense importance the triumph at Lepanto had for Spain and her king, as the artistic commemoration portrays the conquest of the infidel Turks as the fruition of a divine higher calling. El Greco's *Dream of Philip II* highlights the ideological centrality that the Ottoman conflict had for the Spanish empire in the early modern period. The naval engagement at Lepanto, although colossal in size, was just one battle in longstanding rivalry between the domains of the Spanish Habsburgs and the Ottoman Empire and its Muslim allies.

Whereas the previous chapters explored how histories of the French Wars of Religion reflected shifting concepts of imperium and national identity, this chapter examines how late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Spanish historians writing about the Ottomans used their works as tools of empire to cement Spain's definitive place as the protector of Christendom. This chapter thus adds another texture to the question of the political purposes of Spanish histories by exploring the confluence of history writing, empire, and early modern Orientalism. This chapter uncovers how Spanish historians framed, understood, and distorted the Ottoman Turks within the context of imperial rivalry in the Mediterranean, revealing this discourse of alterity's impact on the formulation of Spanish imperial identity.

This chapter focuses on two major histories during the reigns of Philip II and Philip III: Pedro de Salazar's *Hispania Victrix* (1570), and Luis Cabrera de Córdoba's *Historia de Felipe II, Rey de España* (1619). Pedro de Salazar was a relatively prolific historian in the mid-sixteenth century. Born into a *hidalgo* family from Madrid, Salazar first entered the employ of the crown as a captain during Charles V's reign. After his military service Salazar resided in Charles V's itinerant court as one of the emperor's chroniclers.

His best-known work from his time at the imperial court was his history of Charles V's wars against the German Protestants, entitled *Coránica del Emperador Carlos V, en la qual se trata la justísima Guerra que S. M movió contra los Luteranos y Rebeldes del Imperio, y los sucesos que tuvo* (1552).⁵⁶⁹ Although lauded for providing an accurate account of the war,

⁵⁶⁸ The painting is alternatively titled *Adoration of the Name of Jesus*

⁵⁶⁹ Joseph Antonio Alvarez de Baena, *Hijos de Madrid, ilustrados en santidad, dignidades, armas, ciencias y artes* (Madrid: Benito Cano, 1791), 3:176-7. In the same year Salazar also composed his *Historia de la Guerra y presa de África, con la destruccion de la villa de Monaster, Isla del Gozo, y perdida de Tripol de Berbería*.

Charles V's ambassador in Rome Diego Hurtado de Mendoza satirized Salazar's terse and unimaginative literary style.⁵⁷⁰ Salazar did not obtain the post of Charles V's official royal chronicler, and he continued to reside in the Spanish court as a historian during Philip II's reign. At this time he composed *Hispania Victrix* in 1570, which would be his last work.⁵⁷¹

Luis Cabrera de Córdoba in turn is one of the more famous figures in early modern Spanish history writing. He achieved fame for being the first Spanish historian to write a complete history of Philip II's reign.⁵⁷² Cabrera was from a fairly high ranking noble family whose history of service to the Spanish crown dated back to the Catholic Kings Ferdinand and Isabella in the late fifteenth century. Cabrera spent most of life in the crown's service as a courtier and ambassador. He served as Duke of Osuna, the viceroy of Naples, and the Duke of Parma in Flanders during the preparations for the Great Armada.⁵⁷³ During his lengthy travels Cabrera also served Philip II as a sort of informal spy.⁵⁷⁴

After his return to Spain Cabrera was a guard at El Escorial, and was made a member of the household of Philip III's queen, Margaret of Austria. Nevertheless, the courtier fell out of royal favor early into Philip III's reign due to his hostility towards the king's *privado* the Duke of Lerma. Cabrera was in fact placed under temporary arrest for attacking one of Lerma's lackeys with a sword. After this episode the disgraced courtier turned to history writing. Unable to receive any royal subsidies for his history due to the objection of Lerma, Cabrera nonetheless completed his monumental *Historia de Felipe II* after a lengthy delay in 1619.⁵⁷⁵

Hispania Victrix enjoyed two separate printing runs in 1570 and 1576 in Medina del Campo.⁵⁷⁶ The first part of the *Historia de Felipe II* was printed once in Madrid in 1619. The Cortes of Aragon blocked the publication of the second part of the history, which covered the later portion of Philip II's reign, due to Cabrera's critical treatment of the flight of Antonio Perez and the Aragonese revolt in 1591. The *Historia de Felipe II* would not be published in its entirety in Spain until the second half of the nineteenth century.⁵⁷⁷

Both *Hispania Victrix* and the *Historia de Felipe II* are excellent sources for studying representations of the Muslim "other" in early modern Spanish history writing. Salazar's work, composed one year before the battle of Lepanto, provides a detailed and triumphant account of the Spanish crown's wars in North Africa and the Ottoman siege of Malta when the tension between the Spanish and Ottoman empires was at its highest. Moreover, *Hispania Victrix* was the first Spanish printed history that provided an overarching narrative of both the conflict in the Maghreb and Malta.⁵⁷⁸ Cabrera's monumental *Historia* covers in detail the events surrounding the Philip II's long and war-filled reign, and it is considered to be one of the most comprehensive

⁵⁷⁰ Benito Sánchez Alonso, *Historia de la historiografía Española* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1944), 67.

⁵⁷¹ Alvarez de Baena, 4:177-8.

⁵⁷² Richard L. Kagan, *Clio and the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 102.

⁵⁷³ José Martínez Millán and Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, "Introducción" of *Historia de Felipe II, Rey de España* (Salamanca: Junta de Castilla y León, 1998), xi-xiii.

⁵⁷⁴ Kagan, 290.

⁵⁷⁵ Kagan, 290-1.

⁵⁷⁶ Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano*, vol. 6 (Barcelona: Libreria Palau, 1953), 351-2.

⁵⁷⁷ Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano* vol. 3 (Barcelona: Antonio Palau, 1950), 18.

⁵⁷⁸ Agustín Bustamante García, "El asedio de Malta de 1565. Visión de la guerra desde la corte," in *Centros de poder italianos en la Monarquía Hispánica (Siglos XV-XVIII)*, ed. by J. Martínez Millán and M. Rivero Rodríguez (Madrid: Ediciones Polifemo, 2010), 1:232.

early modern histories of the period.⁵⁷⁹ Importantly, the courtier historian discusses at length Philip II's many battles with the Ottoman Turks, and he places particular emphasis on Lepanto.

The question of the factual accuracy of Salazar's and Cabrera's portrayals of the Ottomans is not necessarily a paramount concern. During their careers as historians their lives more or less revolved around the court, and they did not have any direct experience with the Ottomans. Nonetheless, one should not disregard the importance of their accounts because of their lack of empirical evidence and precision. As Daniel J. Vitkus writes, the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European image of Islam bore little resemblance to the religion and culture it sought to describe, a distortion due in part to time, distance, and cultural mediation.⁵⁸⁰ Nonetheless, for Vitkus these misconceptions are still "real" in a sense. He writes that these representations are real because

for the vast majority of medieval and early modern Europeans, they served as the only readily available means for understanding (or perhaps we should say, misunderstanding) Islam. These representations are also 'real' in the sense that any such depiction has a material and ideological impact as a historical phenomenon: it is a mode of perception that shapes the way people think and therefore the way they act.⁵⁸¹

While the images of the Ottoman Empire found in *Hispania Victrix* and the *Historia de Felipe II* may be distorted, they can still tell us a great deal about the Spanish imperial mentalité during the reigns of Philip II and Philip III.

Stephen Greenblatt's model of engaged representation is useful for examining Salazar's and Cabrera's views of the Turks. In his *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World*, he writes that European responses to the strange and unfamiliar in the Americas "are not detached scientific assessments," but are instead "engaged representation, representations that are relational, local, and historically contingent. Their overriding interest is not knowledge of the other but practice upon the other..."⁵⁸² For Greenblatt, with these engaged representations of the other we learn much more about the writer of the account than we do about what the account is purporting to describe.⁵⁸³ In many ways this approach to New World encounter accounts is applicable to a reading of the Spanish texts on the Ottomans. In other words, Salazar's and Cabrera's descriptions of the Ottomans tells us much more about their world and their empire than it does about the Turks.

Much like the natives in the Age of Discovery texts that Greenblatt examines, the Ottomans and their Muslim allies are portrayed as an alien other in the histories of Salazar and Cabrera. As will be detailed later in this chapter, in the Spanish historians' view these people possessed a society, culture, and character that were fundamentally different and inferior from that of Spain's. With this representation of Islam in mind, these histories can be considered examples of orientalist discourse. As Edward Said argues, the Orient for Western scholars was a

⁵⁷⁹ Martínez Millán and Carlos Morales, xx.

⁵⁸⁰ Daniel J. Vitkus, "Early Modern Orientalism: Representations of Islam in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Europe," in *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Perception of Other*, ed. by David R. Blanks and Michael Frassetto (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 207.

⁵⁸¹ Vitkus, 207-8.

⁵⁸² Stephen Greenblatt, *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 12-13.

⁵⁸³ Greenblatt, 14.

“textual universe” meant to be studied and interpreted but never understood on its own terms.⁵⁸⁴ Following this approach, Europeans depictions of the Muslim other were frequently distorted representations that affirmed the superiority of the West.⁵⁸⁵

Given Said’s focus on nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western writers, his model of Orientalism does not fit perfectly in an early modern context. As David R. Blanks and Michael Frassetto note in their introduction to *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Perception of Other*, “the European view of the ‘other,’ like the European view of the ‘self,’ has since classical times revolved around an ever-changing set of historical circumstances.”⁵⁸⁶ In this regard Said’s model of discourse applies to the Age of Imperialism, but its strict application to other periods can be tricky. Indeed, this need to make a connection between representation of the Muslim other and a particular historical milieu has been skillfully analyzed by early modernists such as Daniel J. Vitkus and Nancy Bisaha.

In his essay on early modern Orientalism, Vitkus argues that amidst a backdrop of long-standing military aggression and cultural competition there existed in the medieval and early modern periods a kind of orientalist discourse that demonized the Islamic other. Importantly, this early modern Orientalism was based on a power relation between East and West that was markedly different from the one Said examined for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While for Said orientalist discourse was born out of European colonial dominance, Vitkus states that the Orientalism of early modernity was characterized by the West’s anxiety and awe of the Islamic World. He writes:

While the Christians of Spain, Portugal, England, and other nations were establishing their first permanent colonies in the New World, they faced the threat at home of being colonized by the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the power relations that were in effect in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are the opposite of those that operated later under Western colonial expansion and rule.⁵⁸⁷

This reversed power dynamic between East and West is a crucial aspect of early modern orientalist thought as Europeans came to define themselves vis-à-vis a threatening and imposing oriental other. With a tinge of irony, Western writers asserted the superiority of their culture while the Turks were seemingly battering down the gates of European civilization.

Nancy Bisaha examines this molding of an orientalist discourse at a time of Western vulnerability in the writings of Renaissance humanists. Like Vitkus, Bisaha argues that Said’s Orientalism based on the experiences of Western colonialism and imperialism is too restrictive. In particular, Bisaha rejects Said’s tight linkage of political power and knowledge in orientalist discourse. Instead, she argues that humanists asserted a sense of Western intellectual power and authority over the Muslim East well before Europeans imposed any sort of military or political control over the Orient.⁵⁸⁸ Indeed, in her book *Creating East and West*, Bisaha demonstrates that the humanists of the Italian Renaissance emphasized their culture’s superiority over that of the

⁵⁸⁴ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 52.

⁵⁸⁵ Said, 21.

⁵⁸⁶ David R. Blanks and Michael Frassetto, in Introduction of *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, 1.

⁵⁸⁷ Vitkus, 209-210.

⁵⁸⁸ Nancy Bisaha, “‘New Barbarian’ or Worthy Adversary? Humanist Constructs of the Ottoman Turks in Fifteenth-Century Italy,” in *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, 187.

Ottoman empire's at a time when Europe was fighting for its very survival.⁵⁸⁹ After such traumatic events as the fall of Constantinople, the conquest of Eastern Europe, and the yearlong occupation of Otranto on the coast of Italy itself, it appeared as if the Turks would soon ravish the entire West.⁵⁹⁰ Amidst this setting of fear, Renaissance humanists argued for and celebrated the supremacy of Western Civilization, and intellectuals couched this rhetoric in new and exciting terms.

For Bisaha, perhaps the most compelling characteristic of the humanists' writings concerning the Turks is their use of secular, classically inspired models for framing the representation of the oriental other. In addition to expressing the Turk's inferiority in religious terms, humanists, drawing on their classical training, also developed the discourse of European civility versus Asian barbarism to describe the Ottoman other.⁵⁹¹ Bisaha sees the use of the term "barbarian" to describe the Turks as pointing to the emergence of a secular worldview in the West. No longer were the Ottomans considered as mere infidels, but were now also seen as backward and savage. Through this labeling of Muslims as barbarians, the conflict against the Ottomans was not only a religious struggle, but also a lay cultural and political one.⁵⁹² Remarkably, this shift in discourse allowed some humanists to develop a more relativistic stance toward other cultures, including the Ottomans.⁵⁹³ Moreover, by asserting the West's superiority in non-religious terms, Bisaha argues that the humanists were instrumental in fashioning the secular idea of "Europe"; the ideological struggle against the Ottoman Empire was thus crucial for the formation of the concept of Western Civilization.⁵⁹⁴

This role of the Ottoman other in shaping a unique sense of identity strongly comes to play in the works of Salazar and Cabrera. For the two historians, however, the power dynamic between East and West was markedly different from the one described by Vitkus and Bisaha. In contrast, Salazar and Cabrera repeatedly assert that the Spanish crown was able to successfully engage the Ottoman Empire on a number of occasions.

This chapter argues that a discourse of imperial rivalry between Spain and the Ottomans characterized the representation of the Turkish "other" in the histories of Salazar and Cabrera. Much like the humanists covered by Bisaha, Salazar and Cabrera still present the Ottomans and their Muslim allies as fearsome and merciless opponents; moreover, Cabrera couches their inferiority in both religious terms and the Turks' status as barbarian. Nonetheless, fearsome as they may have been, Salazar and Cabrera paint the Turks as a threat the Spanish empire can and would overcome. Through their discussions of the Spanish defenses of Oran and other areas in North Africa the two historians illustrate that the Spanish crown was more than able to hold its own against the menacing Turkish threat.

Moreover, Salazar and Cabrera demonstrate that Spain not only protected itself from Ottoman incursion, but also saved other Christian powers from the Sultan and his Muslim client states. For Salazar and Cabrera, then, the Spanish and Ottoman empires unquestionably were the two great powers of the early modern Mediterranean. The two historians frequently depict the Spanish crown as readily answering the calls of the Papacy, the Italian States, and the Knights of St. John for aid against the Ottoman Empire. Through their histories Salazar and Cabrera

⁵⁸⁹ Bisaha, *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 6.

⁵⁹⁰ Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, 74.

⁵⁹¹ Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, 42-44.

⁵⁹² Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, 93.

⁵⁹³ Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, 174.

⁵⁹⁴ Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, 184.

triumphantly portray the Spanish crown as the unquestioned defender of the Christian Mediterranean, and assert that this benevolent defense of Christendom against the Ottomans was a defining aspect of Spanish imperial identity. The two historians use their accounts of the Ottomans as a tool of empire to proclaim Spain's superiority.

The Ottomans as the Model Enemy

Salazar and Cabrera demonize the Ottomans as a plague upon the Mediterranean. Presented as a cruel and vicious people devoted to a false religion, the Turks and other Muslims are a threat to the security and livelihood of Christian lands. As such, the conflict against the Ottomans as portrayed in *Hispania Victrix* and the *Historia de Felipe II* is an arduous struggle where victory is by no means a given.

By and large the Ottomans were perceived as a military threat in much of Europe for well into the seventeenth century, and the Turks were viewed with fear.⁵⁹⁵ Many came to identify the Ottomans with the infernal giants Gog and Magog from popular apocalyptic mythology.⁵⁹⁶ Medieval and early modern anti-Islamic polemics frequently identified Mohammed as a precursor to the anti-Christ and a Beast of the Apocalypse.⁵⁹⁷ Nonetheless, one should also consider that the perception of the Turkish threat and reactions to Ottoman incursions did vary within different temporal and regional contexts. By the seventeenth century some writers in northern France had come to believe that the Ottoman Empire had begun to enter into a state of relative weakness.⁵⁹⁸ The people of England's response to the victories at Malta and Lepanto were subdued in comparison to the responses in Italy, Spain, and the southeastern Holy Roman Empire; a reasonable variation given the island kingdom's distance from the Mediterranean.⁵⁹⁹

Importantly, Spain was situated right on the frontier of the Muslim world (the Maghreb), an area which served as a long-standing war front between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, as Andrew C. Hess demonstrates in his book *The Forgotten Frontier*. Hess writes that starting in the sixteenth century, the Strait of Gibraltar galvanized into an intense border region separating two competing Mediterranean civilizations throughout much of the early modern period.⁶⁰⁰ Salazar wrote his history on the eve of the battle of Lepanto when hostilities between the Spanish crown and the Ottoman Empire were at a fever pitch. In turn, although the dramatic naval battle had since passed when Cabrera released his history, the courtier historian would still have been writing within an environment of ongoing tension between Spain and the Ottomans. Both parties signed a series of short-term peace treaties in the 1580s and established spheres of influence in the Mediterranean.⁶⁰¹ Nevertheless, this was an uneasy *détente*, as hostilities once again broke out between the two empires in the 1590s, and in the early seventeenth century Philip III made forays into Ottoman-backed North Africa.⁶⁰²

⁵⁹⁵ Bisaha, *Creating East and West*, 3, Vitkus, 210.

⁵⁹⁶ Andrew Cunningham and Ole Peter Grell, *The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Religion, War, Famine and Death in Reformation Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 94.

⁵⁹⁷ Grace Magnier, *Pedro de Valencia and the Catholic Apologists of the Expulsion of the Moriscos: Visions of Christianity and Kingship* (Boston: Brill, 2010), 151-2.

⁵⁹⁸ Michael J. Heath, *Crusading Commonplaces: La Noue, Lucinge and Rhetoric Against the Turks* (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1986), 9.

⁵⁹⁹ Kenneth M. Setton, *Western Hostility to Islam and Prophecies of Turkish Doom* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1992) 43-4, Heath, 10.

⁶⁰⁰ Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 10.

⁶⁰¹ Joseph Pérez, *L'Espagne de Philipp II* (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 283.

⁶⁰² John Lynch, *Spain under the Habsburgs* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 1:248. Hess, 71. Magnier, 50.

With this context, let us turn to Salazar's and Cabrera's views of the Ottomans in their respective histories. Both historians present the Turks as the object of great fear in the Mediterranean. For instance, when Suleiman's armada approached Italy in 1558, Cabrera writes that the entire Peninsula fell into a state of dread because of the Turk's reputation.⁶⁰³ Salazar writes that when the Ottoman Armada left Constantinople to attack Malta, the multitude of Christian captives in Constantinople were left in a state of great sadness and grief; these captives dreaded the harm the fleet would inflict on their homes in Naples, Sicily, and Malta, where many had left their wives and children. Similarly, when the Knights of St. John and other residents of Malta learned of this armada's approach, Salazar notes that many became despaired and believed that the Ottomans were sent by God to punish them for their sins, and they thought it was not worth it to take up arms against them.⁶⁰⁴ Cabrera presents the viceroy of Sicily Garcia de Toledo as showing concern over the strength of the Ottoman Empire during the same attack on Malta. He describes the viceroy as urging an immediate intervention to aid the island because the Turks were great in number, audacious, unrelenting, and possessed an incorruptible discipline ("*disciplina incorrupto*").⁶⁰⁵ The Turkish threat in the Mediterranean was not to be taken lightly.

Through their presentations of the Ottomans' conduct in battle, Salazar and Cabrera demonstrate that this concern was well founded. For example, during his description of the Ottoman-led siege of Oran in North Africa, Cabrera writes "The Turks and Moors fought with great obstinacy, rage, and terrible fury, like beasts they blindly went into the artillery emplacements, driven by the desire to die in such a holy enterprise, according to how the *Morabito* [Muslim cleric] had convinced them."⁶⁰⁶ Likewise, in Salazar's account of the attack on Oran he notes that the Ottomans and their Berber allies paid little heed to the large number of men they had lost while capturing a Spanish fortification, and instead rejoiced in their victory.⁶⁰⁷ Moreover, according to Salazar's account of the siege of Malta, while the Ottoman forces as a whole fought without fear, the elite Janissaries and *Espais* (Turkish cavalry) were especially zealous.⁶⁰⁸ He writes that during the assault on Malta the Knights of St. John fought valiantly,

but the Janissaries and *Espais*, were so fierce and eager to kill them because of the harm that they had received from them, and not feeling the wounds they received, nor [paying heed to] the blood from their bodies that was spilled, they entered [the citadel] by the iron of their pikes to take away their [the Knights of St. John's] lives, and threw them into confusion...⁶⁰⁹

⁶⁰³ Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, *Historia de Felipe II, Rey de España*, ed. by José Martínez Millán and Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales (Salamanca: Junta de Castilla y León, 1998), 161.

⁶⁰⁴ Pedro de Salazar, *Hispania Victrix. Historia en la qual se cuentan muchas guerras sucedidas entre Christianos y infieles assi en mar como en tierra desde el año de mil y quinientos y quarenta y seys hasta el de sesenta y cinco. Con las guerras acontecidas en la Berberia entre el Xarife y los reyes de Marruecos, Fex, y Velez* (Medina del Campo, 1570), 151-2.

⁶⁰⁵ Cabrera, 328.

⁶⁰⁶ "Con grande obstinación, cólera y cruel rabia peleaban los turcos y moros, que como bestias se metían por las baterías ciegamente, llevados del deseo de morir en tan santa empresa, según les había persuadido el Morabito." Cabrera, 277.

⁶⁰⁷ Salazar, 59.

⁶⁰⁸ Salazar, 216.

⁶⁰⁹ "pero los Janicaros, y Espahis, yuan tan encarnicados, y desseosos de matarlos, por el daño q dellos auin recebido, q no sintiendo las herdias que recebian, ni la sangre q de sus cuerpos se derramaua se entrauan por los hierros de las picas a quitarles las vidas, y los desordenauan..." Salazar, 164.

Thus, Cabrera and Salazar dehumanize the Muslim “other,” as they present the Turks and Moors as being possessed with a bestial fury stoked by a desire to shed Christian blood and a belief that they were fighting a holy war.

Interestingly, Salazar and Cabrera emphasize the Turk’s practice of using overwhelming numbers in battle in a seeming disregard for human life. In the military engagements with the Ottomans and their allies covered in *Hispania Victrix* and the *Historia de Felipe II*, the Muslim forces often outnumber their Christian foes. For example, in his account of the attack on Oran Salazar writes that although the Spanish defenders killed a great number of Turkish soldiers, this appeared to make little difference, since the King of Argel possessed such a vast force he could easily replace these fallen troops.⁶¹⁰ Cabrera in turn writes that the Turks and Moors attempted to overcome the Spanish town with their superior numbers, and he describes the Ottoman army as a furious multitude that drew upon a seemingly endless supply of troops.⁶¹¹ This same pattern holds true for the two historians’ descriptions of the Turkish siege of Malta. Cabrera notes “the great number and fury of the barbarians,” which stood in contrast to the small yet devoted number of Christian soldiers on the island; Salazar likewise observes that while the Knights of St. John fought bravely, “the multitude of the Turks was so great, and so great was the diligence that they put in [the enterprise], that they climbed the gabions [barriers] almost to the height of the wall.”⁶¹² As such, Salazar and Cabrera present the Ottoman armies as an overwhelming inhuman force with a vast reserve of strength.

In turn, the two historians also frequently note that Ottoman commanders had little regard for the lives of their many soldiers, whom they often treated with great cruelty. According to Salazar, in a fit of rage the King of Argel threatened to kill all of his Berber and Turkish troops if they failed to capture Oran during the final days of the siege.⁶¹³ In describing the same battle Cabrera writes that an Ottoman commander was so enraged that he was unable to capture the town that he murdered 100 of his own troops.⁶¹⁴ Thus, the two historians convey a distorted view of the Ottoman character as being choleric and vindictive. Indeed, Cabrera notes that during the retreat from Malta the Turkish general Mustafa Alí supposedly killed his horse in frustration after he fell twice from the animal.⁶¹⁵ The sultans themselves accordingly come across in the Spanish historians’ accounts as excessively cruel towards their commanders and intolerant of failure. Cabrera writes that Selim II ordered the execution of his commander Farta killed in response to his defeat at Lepanto, even though, according to the courtier historian, he was the only general to prudently advise against engaging the Holy League.⁶¹⁶ Salazar similarly notes that Suleiman sought to put to death his admiral Piali for his failure to capture Malta, but was ultimately spared due to the intercession of the Sultan’s daughter.⁶¹⁷ The characterization of Ottoman sultans as tyrants was a common theme found in early modern accounts of the Turk.⁶¹⁸

⁶¹⁰ Salazar, 54.

⁶¹¹ Cabrera, 275.

⁶¹² “gran número y furia de los bárbaros.” Cabrera, 318. “la muchedumbre de los Turcos era tanta, y tanta la diligencia que en ello pusieron que subieron los cestones casi hasta igualarlos con el muro.” Salazar, 171.

⁶¹³ Salazar, 69.

⁶¹⁴ Cabrera, 266.

⁶¹⁵ Cabrera, 333.

⁶¹⁶ Cabrera, 603.

⁶¹⁷ Salazar, 267.

⁶¹⁸ Carina L. Johnson, *Cultural Hierarchy in Sixteenth-Century Europe: The Ottomans and Mexicans* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 220.

Interestingly, although Cabrera wholly disparages the character of the Ottoman Turks, he does offer some degree of indirect praise for their military virtues. Probably the best example of this admiration can be found in the statements of Cardinal Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle that Cabrera reproduces in his history. Given in the context of a debate over the need to form a league against the Ottomans, Cabrera relates that in his capacity of Philip II's representative in Rome Granvelle presented a fascinating account of the Turks' martial strength.

In his speech to Pius V, Granvelle claimed that Turkish power at the time appeared insuperable. According to Cabrera, the cardinal states that the Turks obsessively studied the practice of warfare while ignoring other arts and sciences. While this abandonment of learning can certainly be seen as a sign of barbarity that causes the Turks to appear more ferocious and strong than civilized, Granvelle does show that the Turk's focus on martial pursuits has produced remarkable results. He states that the Ottomans

Insult those who ignore opportunities, and distinguish themselves in laying siege, in fighting, in taking by storm very strong fortifications, in skirmishing on foot and on horseback, in land and sea battles, in fortifying and repairing walls, for there is nothing impossible for their incorruptible discipline.⁶¹⁹

For Granvelle, then, the Ottomans were not a ravaging and savage horde, but instead were an exceptionally capable and well-trained military force.

Interestingly, Granvelle also compares the Turks favorably with the Romans in their martial skill. Continuing his speech, the Ottomans

are not inferior to the Romans in this [warfare], nor in the good selection of soldiers from the best bellicose nations, in the fulfillment and payment of wages, reward of virtues and interests, that the most weak are made valiant and obedient, giving to the most virtuous the major posts and favors, coming by degrees to merit them, imitating Mohamet II and Selim I, their leaders.⁶²⁰

Thus, according to the cardinal the Turks possessed some truly admirable practices in both the arts of war and governance. Indeed, Granvelle marvels at the power wielded by the sultan, claiming that Turkish ministers and vassals recognize no other father or benefactor.⁶²¹ In this account the Ottomans are presented as possessing a significant degree of civilized virtues. While the Turk still appears as the "other" in Granvelle's speech, it is a representation tinged with a sense of respect.

Nonetheless, one should note that Granvelle's speech is hardly a panegyric for the Ottoman Empire. For example, the cardinal talks at length of the Ottomans' brutal rule in Greece.⁶²² Furthermore, Cabrera presents the speech as an argument against the formation of the

⁶¹⁹ "Injuria los que dexa en el reposo la ocasion, señálanse en sitiár, batir, expugnar placas fortísimas, escaramucar a pie y a caballo, en batallas de mar y tierra, fortificar y reparar los muros, con que no hay imposible a su incorrupto diciplina." Cabrera, 569.

⁶²⁰ "no son inferiores a los romanos en esto, ni en la buena elección de soldados de la flor de belicosas naciones, en la satisfacción y paga del sueldo, recompensa de honras e intereses; que los más débiles hacen valerosos y obedientes, dando a los más virtuosos los mayores cargos y Mercedes, llegando a merecellas por grados, imitando a Mahometo II y a Selín Primero, sus señores." Cabrera, 569.

⁶²¹ Cabrera, 569.

⁶²² Cabrera, 569-70.

Holy League. Indeed, Granvelle actively attempted to discourage Philip II from joining the alliance on the grounds that it would overly benefit the Venetian Republic.⁶²³ The views presented by Granvelle are not the beliefs of the courtier historian. While Cabrera does not explicitly judge Granvelle's statements, elsewhere in his history he criticizes the actions of the cardinal, such as his poor handling of organizing a relief expedition to Tunis.⁶²⁴ Therefore, in the scheme of the *Historia de Felipe II*, Granvelle's speech is a possible, yet by no means concrete, line of praise for the Ottomans. Indeed, the cardinal's comments serve to underscore the threat of the Ottomans.

Unsurprisingly, Salazar has few kind words for the Ottomans and their Muslim allies. Although he portrays the Ottoman Empire as being immensely powerful, there are no signs of admiration in these descriptions. For instance, he refers to the Ottoman fleet as an "*infiel armada*," and he describes its departure from Constantinople to Malta as a terrible sight. He writes that upon leaving the harbor the Ottoman Admiral [Baxa] Piali ordered all of his ships' cannons to be fired in a display of power, to the effect that

with such clamor and noise, that it seemed as if heaven broke, or that the sea roared, or that the earth split open, and all of the palace and the houses of the city trembled as if they wished to fall...and the Turks raised a very great shout of happiness, seeing such a powerful armada well equipped to conquer the Christians go with such great pomp, leaving some to say: That such a small enterprise did not warrant bringing out such a large and powerful armada....⁶²⁵

As such, Salazar advances this display of the Ottomans' immense might as a gross and bombastic spectacle that highlights the alien empire's arrogance and the threat that it posed to all Christendom.

Both Salazar and Cabrera argue that the Ottoman Empire was the unquestioned scourge of the Mediterranean, as they demonstrate that the Turks and their Muslim possessed a burning hatred for the Christian faith. In this regard Cabrera advances an almost cartoonish portrait of Islam. He writes that it is an "Abominable religion that appeases God with innocent life and blood, brought to Africa, where it was introduced by its founder in Carthage, derived from Pyrrhus, and maintained up until the present day by the Moors of that region."⁶²⁶ Islam is thus portrayed as a violent, frightening, and foreign religion; the faith serves as a reflection of the Ottomans' own reprehensible character. According to Cabrera, Muslims' "blood sacrifices" could be grim. For example, he claims that before the invasion of Cyprus, Selim II "had four Christians crucified and others skinned alive in sacrifice to Mohammed for his success."⁶²⁷

⁶²³ Lynch, 1:240.

⁶²⁴ Cabrera, 683.

⁶²⁵ "con tanto estruendo y ruydo, q no parecía sino que los cielos se rompiesen, o q la mar bramaua, o q la tierra se abría, y todo el palacio y las casas de la ciudad temblauan como que se quisiesen caer...y los Turcos a leuantar grandissima algazara de alegría, pensando viéndose yr tan pujantes, con su gran soberuia de q yuan bien bastecidos conquistar los Chrisitnaos, y derando se algunos dellos dezir: Que poca empresa era la q lleuauan para tan grande y tan poderosa armada..." Salazar, 151.

⁶²⁶ "Abominable religion aplacar a Dios con vidas y sangre inocente, traida de Africa, donde se introdujo en Cartago por su fundadora, derivada de Pirro, y guardada hasta los tiempos presentes en los moradores de aquella region." Cabrera, 482-3.

⁶²⁷ "hizo crucificar cuatro cristianos y desollar otros vivos en sacrificio a Mahoma por su buen suceso." Cabrera, 581.

Salazar's own views of Islam are negative, yet far less distorted than Cabrera's. While he refers to Islam as a false and alien religion and notes how Muslim preachers exhorted the Ottoman soldiers to enter into battle, Salazar offers no exaggerated accounts of bloody religious rituals.⁶²⁸

Regardless of their somewhat differing views of the Islamic faith, both historians vividly relate that the Ottomans, along with their Muslim vassals and allies, repeatedly and zealously sought to bring ruin to the Christians of the Mediterranean. Salazar and Cabrera illustrate that Muslims frequently committed brutal atrocities against the enemies of their faith with an inhumane sense of abandon. Particularly telling examples of this brutality in Cabrera's history are the atrocities committed by the *moriscos* during their revolt in Granada from 1568-71.

The *moriscos*, descendants of the Muslim population of the Iberian Peninsula, had long been a source of concern in Granada for the Spanish crown. Although nominally Catholic, the *moriscos* were widely believed to have secretly practiced Islam in private. The Turkish incursions into the western Mediterranean that occurred early into Philip II's reign heightened fears that the Arabic-speaking *moriscos* were a sort of Ottoman fifth-column within Spain. In response, Philip II ordered harsh restrictions on the *moriscos* to ensure their conversion to Catholicism. Among other impositions, these edicts prohibited the use of Arabic in public and in private, required that Castilian be learned within three years, and mandated that all communal celebrations be suspect to unannounced inspections by local authorities.⁶²⁹

These measures sparked an uprising in Granada that, while quickly put down in the city, spread throughout the surrounding mountainous countryside. The rebellion turned into a long and brutal war, as both sides committed atrocities. The *moriscos* tortured and killed many of the Christians that fell into their hands, while the Spanish levies under the command of Don Juan indiscriminately terrorized and slaughtered *morisco* encampments.⁶³⁰ Eventually the crown emerged victorious, and forcibly deported roughly 90,000 *moriscos* to Castile.⁶³¹

Cabrera thoroughly demonizes the *moriscos* in his account of the brutal conflict. He highlights the atrocities committed by the Muslim rebels, writing that they wantonly slaughtered children. To drive home the point of the *moriscos*' degeneration, he also claims that they lustfully stripped Christian women before murdering them.⁶³² The *moriscos* likewise turned their violent excesses against the Church. Cabrera claims that the *morisco* "king" Abenhumeya ordered his subordinate Farax to "to kill the Christians, profane and destroy the temples, martyr the priests..."⁶³³ These orders were violently carried out, according to Cabrera, as the *moriscos* murdered priests and anyone else who refused to abandon the Catholic faith, including women and children.⁶³⁴

According to Cabrera, the Ottomans themselves mirrored the *moriscos*' penchant for committing atrocious acts against helpless Christians and the Church. In his account of the siege of Malta, he writes that because of Suleiman's anger over the Knights of St. John's resolute defense of the castle of St. Michael the sultan ordered the destruction of Maltese houses, which in one quarter alone resulted in the burning of 8,000 houses.⁶³⁵ In a similar episode of revenge, Cabrera notes that a wounded Capuchin's heroic rally of the defenders of St. Michael with his

⁶²⁸ Salazar, 80-92.

⁶²⁹ Patrick Williams, *Philip II* (Palgrave: New York, 2001), 102-4.

⁶³⁰ Fernández Álvarez, *Felipe II y su tiempo* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1998), 463-4.

⁶³¹ Williams, 106.

⁶³² Cabrera, 467.

⁶³³ "matasen los cristianos, profanasen y derribasen los templos, martirizasen los sacerdotes..." Cabrera, 461.

⁶³⁴ Cabrera, 462, 466.

⁶³⁵ "en un barrio se quemaron ocho mil casas." Cabrera, 330.

vision that Jesus Christ, St. John the Baptist, St. Peter, St. Paul, and St. Francis would save Malta “so angered Suleiman, that because the Christians were beseeching God to free Malta, he ordered the church burnt, nothing else but only one cross miraculously survived not being consumed by the fire.”⁶³⁶

Salazar likewise details the cruel fate that innocent Christians often met at the hand of the Ottomans and other Muslims. For example, he vividly details the grim experience of a Christian slave that a Spanish ship had rescued from a defeated Turkish vessel. According to the historian, the recently liberated slave stated that it would have been much better to die than to have suffered the constant beatings and cruelties of his Muslim masters.⁶³⁷ Salazar similarly writes that Muslim corsairs were a serious blight in the Mediterranean, as they enslaved Christians and ravaged areas along the southern European coast. In this regard he notes the grave matters at stake surrounding the continued Spanish occupation of Oran in North Africa, which he viewed as impeding the worse depredations of the corsairs. Salazar writes that due to the Ottomans’ hold on Tripoli, Bugia (Béjaïa), and other North African ports in the Western Mediterranean, Oran’s loss would result in irreparable harm, since without the citadel the corsairs “will rob, burn, and ruin the land in such a manner, that no one will dare to live in the coastal areas on account of the crude troubles and vexations that they will receive from these enemies of God and of us...”⁶³⁸ In this context Salazar thus presents the corsairs as a plague that could easily devastate the Christian Mediterranean if given the chance.

Indeed, piracy in the early modern Mediterranean was an endemic problem that plagued the merchants, sailors, and coastal villages and cities of the region. Both Christians and Muslims engaged in pirating.⁶³⁹ Muslim pirates posed a perennial threat to the Western Mediterranean in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, as corsairs from the Barbary Coast attacked Christian ships and raided the coasts of Italy and Spain. As Salazar’s text notes, these pirates frequently took Christians captive to use as slaves or for ransom.⁶⁴⁰ Captives from all of Western Europe could be found in the markets of the great corsair city Algiers.⁶⁴¹ The scope and frequency of the attacks on the Spanish coasts grew to alarming levels from 1560 to 1570. In this period corsairs made daring raids on even fortified coastal towns; perhaps the most dramatic assault was on Órgiva in 1565, where the pirates marched 20 miles inland and repelled Spanish regular troops.⁶⁴² Another single attack on the kingdom of Granada resulted in the capture of 40,000 slaves. During this period settlements along the Spanish coast were outright abandoned due to fear of pirate raids.⁶⁴³ Salazar’s remarks on the depredations of the Muslim corsairs undoubtedly would have resonated with his Spanish readers.

Aside from corsair attacks, Salazar also highlights the sheer amount of destruction caused by the Ottoman forces. For instance, he writes that during the Turkish attack on Oran the

⁶³⁶ “Esto indigno tanto a Solimán, que porque los cristianos rogaban a Dios librase a Malta, hizo quemar la iglesia, sin quedar en ella más de una cruz, que milagrosamente no pudo abrasar el fuego.” Cabrera, 330.

⁶³⁷ Salazar, 116.

⁶³⁸ “robaran, abrasara, y arruynaran la tierra de tal manera, q no vuiera quien se atreuiera a habitar las tierras marítimas, por las cruds molestias y vexacions q de estos enemigos de Dios y nuestros recibieran...” Salazar, 96.

⁶³⁹ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995), 2:867.

⁶⁴⁰ Robert C. Davis, *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast, and Italy* (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 49.

⁶⁴¹ Braudel, 2:870.

⁶⁴² Lynch, 1:225.

⁶⁴³ Braudel, 2:881-2.

Spanish soldiers looked on with great sadness as the Turks inflicted seemingly irreparable damage on the farms and gardens outside of the desert fortress.⁶⁴⁴ The historian especially brings to light the destructiveness and brutality of the Ottomans through his stark descriptions of the battle for Malta.

Charles V granted Malta to the Knights of St. John in 1530 to compensate for their loss of Rhodes to Suleiman the Magnificent in 1522. Under their rule the Knights of St. John transformed the island into a major center for Christian corsair activity, and by the mid-sixteenth century the order had acquired a sizable fortune from preying on Muslim ships.⁶⁴⁵ In 1565 Suleiman decided to conquer Malta in order to put a stop to this piracy, to counter Philip II's growing naval presence in the Mediterranean, and to achieve one final dramatic conquest to end his long reign. The sultan amassed a massive force consisting of roughly 400 ships and over 40,000 men.⁶⁴⁶ In contrast, the Knights of St. John's had only 9,000 soldiers on the island.⁶⁴⁷ While the Spanish fleet ultimately drove off Suleiman's forces and relieved the Knights of St. John, the Ottomans still inflicted a great deal of damage on the island during the three month siege, and were able to capture the fortress of St. Elmo.

Salazar accordingly describes in vivid detail the devastation that the Ottoman inflicted on Malta. He writes that the massive Turkish artillery contingents fired indiscriminately at the fortresses of the Knights of St. John, and as a result a great deal of women and children perished in these barrages.⁶⁴⁸ Moreover, the growing lack of supplies and the hot weather resulted in the countless deaths of the many disabled and poor Christians that the Knights of St. John held in their care.⁶⁴⁹ Like Cabrera, Salazar emphasizes that the Ottomans brought a great deal of suffering to Christian innocents.

For Salazar, the Ottoman capture of the fortress of St. Elmo was perhaps the most brutal and tragic incident of the siege. He writes that upon finally breaking the defenses of the citadel the Ottomans set upon the defenders so violently that the historian described them as "hungry dogs eager to shed Christian blood."⁶⁵⁰ Soon after this entrance a hellish fracas broke out between the Turks and the surviving Knights of St. John, which Salazar describes as

so hard-wrought, cruel, bloody, and robust, that weapons were broken and shattered to pieces because of the many strong blows they gave....The color of the wall and moat was red on account of the great amount of blood that was spilled and shed, joining and mixing the Christian blood with the Saracen.⁶⁵¹

Moreover, to add to the horror of this incident, Salazar writes that instead of capturing the Christian women inside St. Elmo's and keeping them as slaves, as was the usual Turkish custom, the Ottomans slit their throats due to their insatiable desire for Christian blood and great enmity

⁶⁴⁴ Salazar, 84.

⁶⁴⁵ Williams, 100. Fernández Álvarez, 452.

⁶⁴⁶ Bustamante García, 1:227-8, 1:230.

⁶⁴⁷ Williams, 101.

⁶⁴⁸ Salazar, 203.

⁶⁴⁹ Salazar, 243.

⁶⁵⁰ "perros hambrientos deseseosos de derramar la sangre Christiana." Salazar, 194.

⁶⁵¹ "tan reñida, cruel, sangrienta, y trauada, que las armas trayan rotas y hechas pedacos, por los fuertes golpes que se dauan...El muro y foso todo era de color colorado, por la mucha sangre que de unos y otros se vertia, y derramaua, juntándose y mezclando la Christiana con la Serrazina." Salazar, 194.

for the Christian religion.⁶⁵² Finally, at the end of the fighting the Ottoman commander Mustafa Alí ordered that the corpses of the Christian commanders be desecrated and put on display, which resulted in the grim scene of “some without entrails, and others without heads, and others split in the middle.”⁶⁵³ The fortress of St. Elmo’s fate thus serves to vividly cement the Ottoman’s demonized status as the unquestioned scourge of Christendom.

As such, both Cabrera and Salazar present in graphic detail the inhumanity and barbarism of the Ottomans; the two historians completely dehumanize the Turks as an excessively cruel, deplorable, and bloodthirsty enemy. Importantly, they also demonstrate in their histories that his seemingly implacable foe was poised to strike at the Spanish empire itself. According to Salazar, the Ottomans not only sought to conquer Oran and bring it into the fold of their unholy empire, but they had designs on the European domains of Philip II.⁶⁵⁴

The historian in fact portrays the conquest of Spanish territory as being the primary motivation behind the attack on Malta. The island was a natural strongpoint of the region, and with control of its sizeable harbor the Ottomans would have easily been able to attack the Western Mediterranean and co-ordinate assaults against Spain with the corsair states in the Maghreb.⁶⁵⁵ Salazar writes that Suleiman not only considered the conquest of Malta itself to be a holy enterprise, but he also believed that the acquisition of the island would be an excellent way to strike at the Spanish crown, since it would pave the way towards an attack on Italy.⁶⁵⁶

Indeed, in a telling statement regarding the Ottoman’s frightening imperial ambitions, Salazar notes that Suleiman proclaimed that Malta’s conquest would allow him to begin his conquest of the Christians “and place the kingdoms and state of Philip [II] under the crown of our empire.”⁶⁵⁷ Moreover, according to the Spanish historian, the Ottoman admiral Ali Baxa wholeheartedly supported the feasibility of this move towards imperial expansion, as he asserted that the acquisition of Malta and the Spanish fortress at Goleta in North Africa would give the Turks mastery of the Mediterranean; with these gains the Sultan would have “open ports to undertake the conquest of the Christians, principally the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, which are very near Malta.”⁶⁵⁸

Cabrera likewise asserts that the Ottomans had designs to use Malta as a staging ground for the conquest of Spanish territory in the Mediterranean. According to the courtier historian, the Turkish captain Hagá said to Suleiman on the eve of the attack, that “There would be access to a great fortune once the island is won, a scale surely greater than of Sicily and of Italy, like his immortal grandfather, Mahomet with good principles attempted to plant his standard in Otranto, from where he only was able to pluck his unfortunate death.”⁶⁵⁹ Cabrera adds that before departing Constantinople the Ottoman soldiers vowed to fight to the death until both Malta and Sicily were conquered.⁶⁶⁰

⁶⁵² Salazar, 195.

⁶⁵³ “unos sin entrañas, y otros sin cabeças, y otros abiertos por medio.” Salazar, 197.

⁶⁵⁴ Salazar, 48-9.

⁶⁵⁵ Williams, 100.

⁶⁵⁶ Salazar, 144.

⁶⁵⁷ “y meter baxo de la corona de nuestro imperio los reynos y estados de Philppe.” Salazar, 146.

⁶⁵⁸ “puertas abiertas para entrar a conquistar los Christianos, máximamente los reynos de Napoles y Sicilia, que son muy cercanos a Malta.” Salazar, 146.

⁶⁵⁹ “Abría camino a gran fortuna ganada la isla, escala segura para señorear a Sicilia y a Italia, como su inmortal abuelo Mahometo con buen principio intentó fixando su estandarte en Otranto, de donde solamente le pudo arrancar su infelize muerte.” Cabrera, 302.

⁶⁶⁰ Cabrera, 305.

Moreover, Cabrera's vivid descriptions of the revolt of the *moriscos* illustrates that Spain came under Muslim attack from within. He echoes the common sentiment that the *moriscos* were a dangerous fifth-column in Spain, and he likens them to the gathering of secret seditious bands of Protestants in France and in the Holy Roman Empire.⁶⁶¹ In a further indication of Spain's vulnerability, Cabrera also remarks that Southern Spain frequently came under attack by corsairs, and he notes the complaint of the Chancellery of Granada that the coasts of the kingdom were not safe "because vessels from Barbary did them harm with the activity of the outlaws..."⁶⁶²

As such, Cabrera and Salazar paint the Ottoman Empire as possessing disturbing imperial pretensions that threatened to attack and even engulf the domains of the Spanish crown. In their view the sultan clearly aspired to dominance of the Mediterranean. While the two historians clearly consider the Ottomans a threat the Spanish empire and the other Christian powers of the Mediterranean, it is important to consider that the two historians wrote their works in different historical milieus.

As noted earlier, Salazar wrote *Hispania Victrix* in 1570, just one year before the epic battle of Lepanto. The Spanish historian thus composed his work at a time when Ottoman power was a very immediate threat; Salazar accordingly places particular emphasis on the explicit danger that the Turks continued to pose for Christendom. To this end he details a discussion in Suleiman's court after the defeat of the Turkish armada at Malta, in which the sultan decides to rebuild his fleet and attack the Christians once again. According to Salazar, after a brief period of melancholy the sultan ordered his admirals to form an even stronger fleet in order to capture territory in Calabria (Southern Italy) and to attack Spanish and Venetian holdings along the Mediterranean; in order to finance the reconstruction of the fleet Suleiman ordered heavy taxes on Christian Greeks.⁶⁶³ Thus, while the Ottomans were repelled from Malta at a great cost, by no means did this victory cripple the infernal empire's power. Rather, Salazar demonstrates that the Ottomans still possessed the means to imperil the Mediterranean; substantial vigilance would still be necessary to stave off this threat.

In contrast, Cabrera wrote his history within the context of an arguably less immediate Ottoman threat. While corsair raids still were a direct danger for coastal areas and merchants, the Holy League's victory at Lepanto effectively cut short any further Ottoman expansion in the Mediterranean.⁶⁶⁴ Nonetheless, a state of lasting hostility characterized relations between Madrid and Constantinople in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁶⁶⁵ Moreover, for many Spaniards and other Christians along the Mediterranean the Ottomans unquestionably still were an alien and dangerous threat. Cabrera's emphasis on the scheming and untrustworthy character of the Ottomans in his history reflects this state of smoldering tension between the Christian and Muslim Mediterranean. In contrast to Salazar, who makes little mention of the treacherous inclinations of the Turks, Cabrera repeatedly remarks that the Ottomans frequently did not honor their agreements, especially pacts made with Christians. For example, the courtier historian writes that the garrison at the Spanish fortress in Los Gelves (in North Africa) capitulated after the commanders of the besieging Turkish army agreed to guarantee the soldiers'

⁶⁶¹ Cabrera, 432.

⁶⁶² "porque bajeles de Berbia les hacían daños con el calor de los forajidos..." Cabrera, 402.

⁶⁶³ Salazar, 269-70.

⁶⁶⁴ See Davis, *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters*. Perez, 283.

⁶⁶⁵ Lynch, 1:248. Barbara Fuchs, *Mimesis and Empire: The New World, Islam, and European Identities* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 7-8, 45.

safety. However, after the soldiers laid down their arms, “The Turks entered the castle and not keeping the agreement, killed the soldiers they found and the rest they put in chains.”⁶⁶⁶

Likewise, Cabrera also argues that the Ottomans acted duplicitously in the realm of international relations. He claims that while Selim II was making overtures of peace to the Christian Mediterranean, in secret the sultan was building up a fleet to invade Cyprus.⁶⁶⁷ Unsurprisingly, the Ottomans broke their truce with the Venetian Republic right before they invaded the island.⁶⁶⁸ Thus, in a likely commentary on the tenuousness of the truce made between Philip II and the Ottomans, Cabrera portrays the Turks a treacherous people who cannot be trusted; any peace treaties accordingly made with them should be viewed as precarious at best.

Like many of the other histories covered in this dissertation, Cabrera and Salazar are writing for their own respective political moments. Their works contain different messages regarding the immediacy of the Turkish threat that reflect the differing military climates of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Mediterranean. Nevertheless, their overall depictions of the Ottomans contain similar tenors and themes. Both *Hispania Victrix* and the *Historia de Felipe II* advance a distorted view of the Ottoman Empire as a fearsome and alien entity that was posed to overtake the Mediterranean through its sheer military might. By revealing the Ottomans’ bloodlust, inhuman ferocity, and brutal treatment of their Christian enemies, Salazar and Cabrera paint the Turks and their Muslim allies as dangerous enemies that needed to be combated in order to insure the safety of Christendom. Indeed, both historians illustrate that the Spanish empire itself was threatened by Ottoman aggression.

While these two histories were written nearly half a century apart, there is a great deal of overlap in their respective treatment of the Spanish crown’s wars against the Ottomans. These parallels suggest that the Spanish depiction of the Turk changed very little from the reigns of Philip II and Philip III. Interestingly, Ottoman perceptions of the Spanish were similarly static in the early modern period. There was often very little variation in the depictions of different Spanish monarchs found in Ottoman histories, and Turkish writers often relied on a series of stereotypical images to portray the Spanish.⁶⁶⁹

The relative uniformity of the Ottoman image in early modern Spanish historical thought stands in marked contrast to the shifting representations of the French and Henry IV in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Spanish histories. As covered in the previous chapters, Spanish historians writing during the French Wars of Religion dehumanized Henry IV as a dangerous heretic, and stereotyped the French as irreligious, untrustworthy, and inconstant. In turn, histories written during Philip III’s reign took a much less polemical stance towards Henry IV. While still noting defects in the French national character and Henry IV’s practice of reason of state politics, early seventeenth-century Spanish historians also praised the French monarch’s virtues as a ruler and military commander.

The difference in portrayals of the Ottomans and the French difference provide an interesting window into the early modern Spanish view of the “other.” Although untrustworthy, the French were still (nominally) Catholic. As such, there was still the potential to co-exist and negotiate with this rival kingdom. No such potential existed for the Ottomans. In the eyes of the

⁶⁶⁶ “Los turcos entraron en el castillo, y sin guardar el acuerdo mataron los soldados que encontraron, y el resto pusieron en cadena.” Cabrera, 225.

⁶⁶⁷ Cabrera, 384.

⁶⁶⁸ Cabrera, 536.

⁶⁶⁹ Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, “Felipe II y su imagen en el mundo islámico,” in *Imágenes históricas de Felipe II*, ed. by Alfredo Alvar Ezquerro (Alcalá de Henares: Centro de Estudios Cervantinos, 2000), 23, 29-30.

Spanish the Ottoman Empire would always be the scourge of Christendom, even in a state of détente. Indeed, as will be shown, combatting the infidel was a central aspect of Spain's imperial identity.

Overthrowing the dominance of the “other”

Salazar and Cabrera both portray the Ottomans as terrifying and formidable foes; nonetheless, the two historians argue that the Spanish crown was able to meet this threat time and time again during the reign of Philip II. Indeed, the presentation of the Turk's terrifying strength serves to embellish the fame of the Spanish empire's achievement of confronting the infidel. Unlike the Italian and German humanists of the fifteenth century and sixteenth century often cited in studies on early modern Orientalism, Salazar and Cabrera emphasize the Spanish crown's repeated military success against the Ottoman Empire and their Muslim allies.⁶⁷⁰ While the forces of Islam are poised to attack Spain and its domains, the two historians show that the Spanish crown was able to repel these formidable incursions. Salazar and Cabrera demonstrate that Spain under Philip II rose to the challenge of dispelling the myth of Ottoman invincibility.

Hispania Victrix and the *Historia de Felipe II* reveal a remarkable sense of pride in Spain's role as a crusading power. The Spanish empire, arguably more than any other state of the early modern period, embraced the ideal of a crusade against the enemies of the Catholic faith. This hallowed tradition of crusade dates back to the *Reconquista*, and one can see the conflict with the Ottomans as a continuation of this struggle against Islam undertaken long ago and never fully abandoned.⁶⁷¹ Norman Housley in his study on the later crusades writes that this continuum of crusade is “most striking in the institutional sense that there was scarcely a break between the preaching of the *cruzada* and the levy of church taxes for the war against Granada, and identical grants being made for war against Muslim powers outside the peninsula.”⁶⁷²

The notion of crusade is acutely present in Salazar's work, as he infuses the Spanish crown's fight against the Ottomans with a profound sense of providential mission; in the historian's view the war in the Mediterranean was a sacred enterprise. At numerous points Salazar remarks that the Spanish fighting against the Turks did so with God's favor, and were performing a great good for the Christian faith.⁶⁷³ For instance, writing of a Spanish commander's regret over his soldiers who died fighting in Oran, he states that they were consoled by the fact that “they died in the service of God and the augmentation of his holy faith, for which they believed they would be well received before the divine majesty.”⁶⁷⁴

In turn, Cabrera also presents a clear connection between the ideals of the *Reconquista* and the war against the Ottomans in his history. The crusading continuum is perhaps captured best in Cabrera's remarks concerning the recruitment of Spanish soldiers during the attack on Malta.

They all came desirous to bravely undertake the dangerous and very distant from Spain enterprise, and therefore expensive and bothersome, but her nobility was always ready to fight against the Turks and Moors by inheritance from their grandfathers, that they achieved against them admirable victories, frequent and extraordinary, liberating their

⁶⁷⁰ See Bisaha and Vitkus.

⁶⁷¹ Paul Coles, *The Ottoman Impact on Europe* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1968), 125-6.

⁶⁷² Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades: From Lyons to Alcazar 1274-1580* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 308.

⁶⁷³ Salazar, 72.

⁶⁷⁴ “consolauanse q morían en seruicio de Dios, y en aumento de su sancta fe, por lo qual creyan q ante la diuina magestad seria bien recibidos.” Salazar, 92.

country from the tyranny of the Africans and taking to Africa their banners, where they won strongholds that they hold today.⁶⁷⁵

Here the courtier historian presents fighting Muslims as a venerable trait among those of Spanish noble blood, and therefore an essential aspect of his country's identity. It is a Spaniard's duty and destiny to crusade against Islam. The Mediterranean war against the Ottomans and their allies is essentially an extension of the holy enterprise of the Christian recovery of Iberia in the Spanish historical imagination.

In keeping with their advancement of the crusading image of Spain, both historians convey the triumphant notion that the tides have turned against the once dominant Muslim world. This view is especially evident in their historical representations of the conflict along the Maghreb in North Africa. According to Salazar and Cabrera, the Spanish have expelled the infidel from their lands, and have taken the fight into Ottoman territory. The conquered have become the conquerors, and the Spanish bases in North Africa serve as proud reminders of this triumphal blow to the tyranny of the Muslim other.

During the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic Spanish military expeditions established presidios along the North African coast at Melilla, La Goleta, Mers-el-Kebir, Oran, and Bujía. These fortresses not only afforded the Western Mediterranean some level of protection against the corsairs, but they also stood as proud monuments to the accomplishments of the Catholic Kings and the Spanish crown's commitment to continuing the *Reconquista*.⁶⁷⁶ Unsurprisingly, these bases came under frequent attack. Salazar and Cabrera demonstrate that the Spanish maintained their presence in the Maghreb through great effort and will, and the state of the North African frontier remained dangerous and tense. For instance, Cabrera writes that at the Spanish fort in Melilla the surrounding area was so dangerous that even gathering firewood outside of the town's walls was risky. Indeed, eventually a Muslim preacher claiming he could render the Spaniards' guns useless orchestrated a failed uprising against the fortified town.⁶⁷⁷ Similarly, Salazar notes that the Spanish occupied areas in North Africa lived under the constant threat of Ottoman and Berber attack, and were often in need of a substantial number of soldiers and supplies to maintain their harried defenses.⁶⁷⁸ Cabrera notes that on occasion Spanish forts in North Africa did fall to the overwhelming numbers of the Ottomans and the corsairs, the most noteworthy example being the loss of La Goleta in 1574, which occurred after Salazar wrote his history.⁶⁷⁹

For both Salazar and Cabrera, arguably the most stunning example of Spanish success in North Africa was the continued possession of Oran. Conquered by Ferdinand the Catholic's chief minister Cardinal Cisneros, Oran was widely considered the jewel of Spain's possessions in North Africa. In terms of strategic value, Oran lay directly across the coast of Spain. The occupation of the city also held a great deal of symbolic importance, as the battle for Oran was one of the most celebrated undertakings of the Catholic Monarchs' reign.⁶⁸⁰ Spanish chroniclers

⁶⁷⁵ "Todos venían deseosos de emplearse valerosamente en la empresa peligrosa y muy apartada de su España, y así costosa y molesta; pero la nobleza della fue siempre pronta para pelear contra los turcos y moros por herencia de sus abuelos, que alcanzaron contra ellos admirables victorias, generales y particulares; librando su patria de la tiranía de los africanos, y pasando a Africa sus banderas, donde ganaron placas que hoy mantienen." Cabrera, 315.

⁶⁷⁶ Fernández Álvarez, 437, 442. Fuchs, 8.

⁶⁷⁷ Cabrera, 325-7.

⁶⁷⁸ Salazar, 48, 52.

⁶⁷⁹ Cabrera, 687.

⁶⁸⁰ Fernández Álvarez, 450.

wrote that the sun was said to have stopped the moment when Cardinal Cisneros conquered the city.⁶⁸¹

With a hint of satisfaction Salazar and Cabrera relate that the Spanish occupation was a significant affront to the Ottomans and their Berber allies. Cabrera writes that Hascén Baxá, the “viceroy” of Argel (in North Africa) urged Suleiman to conquer Oran “because its people rob the country, travelers, towns, capture children and women and make them Christian, resulting in the lose of these souls, pained and crying, who seek their remedy through the conscience of the all-powerful sultan, which he could provide easily.”⁶⁸² Cabrera thus portrays Oran as a sort of bastion of Christianity in Muslim North Africa as it harasses the surrounding Moorish area and spreads the Catholic faith through captive Berbers. Likewise, Salazar writes that upon setting sight upon the “*tan hermosa*” Oran with his army, the “King” (viceroy) of Argel vowed to “*Ala*” to capture the city “where I command that you be exalted, and the offenses which the Christians committed in your sacred mosques can be cleansed.”⁶⁸³

Cabrera and Salazar thus depict the Spanish possession of Oran as being much more than just a thorn in the Ottoman’s side; rather, they demonstrate that the occupation of the city serves as a powerful reminder of the Spanish crown’s crusading power and proud ability to protect and spread Christianity in the Mediterranean. The subsequent Ottoman and Berber attack on Oran in 1563 led to one of the most brutal sieges in the city’s turbulent history. The engagement lasted over two months until a Spanish expeditionary force from Italy lifted the siege.⁶⁸⁴

Cabrera portrays the Spanish victory at Oran as a significant upset for the arrogant Ottomans, as he writes that they believed the conquest of the city to be an easy enterprise. According to Cabrera, while the Ottomans and their Berber allies made repeated and brutal assaults, they were continually repelled by the Spanish forces. Consequently, the city’s defenders receive a good deal of praise in the chronicle. Cabrera writes that during one particularly fierce Turkish attack the defending Spanish soldiers were “Admonished to keep their posts until death like good Christians in defense of their law and their king.”⁶⁸⁵ In the same siege the courtier historian claims that “On the wall the Christians were moving openly without any fear of death that showed that God was giving them strength and valor and like lions without taking a step backwards.”⁶⁸⁶ As such, the courtier historian advances the successful defense of Oran as proof that the Spanish in North Africa refused to submit to the arrogance and power of the Ottoman “other.” Indeed, the value of Oran in the court’s eyes is illustrated by the generous rewards Philip II gave to the city’s defenders after this particular siege. According to Cabrera, the Prudent King gave out *encomiendas* and royal salaries to the captains of the defending force, and he also rewarded the soldiers and their families.⁶⁸⁷

⁶⁸¹ Magnier, 94.

⁶⁸² “porque su gente robaba los campos, aduares, pueblos, cautivaba los hijos y mujeres y los hacía cristianos, perdiéndose aquellas almas, daño muy de llorar, y que tocaba su remedio a la conciencia de tan poderoso sultan, pues podía darle fácilmente.” Cabrera, 263.

⁶⁸³ “donde yo te mando glorificar, y puedan ser excusadas las offensas que por laos infieles Christianos en tus sagradas Mezclitas e te hacen.” Salazar, 52.

⁶⁸⁴ Fernández Álvarez, 450. Lynch, 1:237.

⁶⁸⁵ “Amonestóles el mantener los puestos hasta morir como buenos cristianos en defensa de su ley y de su rey.” Cabrera, 274.

⁶⁸⁶ “En la muralla descubiertos andaban los cristianos tan sin temor de la muerte que mostraban les ponía Dios fuerza y esfuerzo, y como leones sin volver pie atrás.” Cabrera, 277.

⁶⁸⁷ Cabrera, 280-1.

Salazar similarly infuses the defense of Oran with a great deal of symbolic meaning in *Hispania Victrix*. Perhaps more so than Cabrera, he emphasizes the brutal conditions endured by the brave yet grossly outnumbered Spanish defenders during the colossal Ottoman-led attack on Oran. Describing the siege as a “such a hard-fought, bloody, and lopsided battle of a great multitude of infidels against few Christians,” the historian writes that as the siege wore on the Spanish soldiers “who fought almost all were wounded, that it was a wonder how they could get on their feet, or offer their arms and swords...”⁶⁸⁸ In Salazar’s view, the defense of Oran was thus a superhuman effort. Indeed, according to the historian, in spite of these brutal conditions, the beleaguered Spanish in Oran fought on with the favor of God and the valiant spirit in their hearts, and frequently inflicted massive casualties on the Ottomans and their Berber allies while maintaining minimal losses.⁶⁸⁹ Moreover, in a comment that reveals the high stakes of this conflict, the Spanish historian notes that his fellow countrymen fought bravely not only for their king and for God, but because they feared the murder and enslavement of their wives and children if Oran were to fall to the Ottomans.⁶⁹⁰

Salazar’s account of the siege of Oran not only valorizes the Spanish defenders of the city, but it also glorifies the power of Philip II and the Spanish crown. For instance, he writes that in spite of the defenders’ precarious situation, including a lack of supplies and soldiers, the Spanish commanders trusted in God and in Philip II to be able to save them.⁶⁹¹ Accordingly, the historian paints the eventual arrival of the Spanish fleet that lifted the siege as a triumphant and glorious event. Salazar remarks that upon spotting the Spanish ships from off the coast, the commanders and soldiers in Oran emerged from their defensive bulwarks and were overjoyed, with all giving thanks to God, “appearing to them that the dead had returned to life, or at least the captives had become free...”⁶⁹²

In addition, he notes that the Franciscans who resided in the city organized a procession to give thanks for Oran’s liberation; in turn women and children assembled in the churches in the city to thank God while crying with relief that they no longer had to fear their deaths or enslavements at the hands of the Turks.⁶⁹³ As such, Salazar portrays the crown’s intervention as a veritable Godsend that rescued the city from the brink of ruin and defended the innocent Christians of the city. Philip II’s timely lifting of the siege showcases the Spanish crown’s power in the face of the formidable Ottoman threat.

Indeed, Salazar notes that the Ottomans and their allies in fact came to fear the power of the Spanish crown. According to the historian, soon after the lifting of the siege of Oran the King of Argel wrote to Suleiman and expressed his distress over how Philip II was able to send a mighty relief force of “thirty four royal galleys very well armed with veteran soldiers who he [Philip II] ordered to be brought from his kingdoms and his territories in Italy in which he had garrisons.”⁶⁹⁴ Moreover, Salazar remarks that after the successful defense of Oran the fleet of Don Garcia de Toledo, the future viceroy of Sicily, was able to capture the Ottoman fortress of

⁶⁸⁸ “tan reñida, y sangrienta desigual batalla, de tanta multitud de infiels contra con pocos Christianos,” “q peleauan casi todos estauan heridos, que marauilla era como se podian tener sobre los pies, ni mandar los bracos y espada ...” Salazar, 70.

⁶⁸⁹ Salazar, 70, 80.

⁶⁹⁰ Salazar, 92.

⁶⁹¹ Salazar, 53.

⁶⁹² “pareciendo les q de muertos voluian a viuos, o por lo menos de captiuos a libres...” Salazar, 95.

⁶⁹³ Salazar, 95.

⁶⁹⁴ “treinta y quatro galeras reales muy bien armadas de gente soldados veteranos que hauia mandado traer de sus reynos & tierras de Italia, que alli tenia en guarniciones.” Salazar, 98.

El Peñon in North Africa with no resistance, as the Turkish and Berber defenders fled upon hearing about the Christian armada's approach.⁶⁹⁵ While Salazar demonstrates that Ottoman power was indeed formidable, his history reveals that the Spanish crown's might in turn posed a considerable threat to the sultan and his Muslim vassals.

Protecting the Mediterranean.

For Salazar and Cabrera, the Spanish empire's victories in North Africa shattered the Ottoman Empire's image of invincibility, and served as proud evidence that the Spanish crown could successfully combat and resist its powerful Turkish foe along a hostile and turbulent imperial frontier. Both historians in essence frame the conflict in the Maghreb as an imperial competition between Madrid and Constantinople, with the Spanish emerging as the victor as they made successful and lasting inroads into Ottoman territory. Far from engaging in a discourse of Ottoman domination that characterized many other early modern European texts on the Turks, Salazar and Cabrera instead emphasize the Spanish crown's victories over the powerful Muslim "other."⁶⁹⁶

This formulation accordingly cements Spain's status as the dominant Christian power of the Mediterranean. In his discussion of Toledo's swift capture of the fortress of El Peñon de Velez, Salazar notes that the Spanish commander proudly proclaimed that this victory was important for Christendom "because of the great harm against Christians that emerged from it [the fortress] and from the territories it protected."⁶⁹⁷ Thus, the Spanish not only made advances along the North African frontier, but the power of the Spanish crown also served to protect the Christian Mediterranean as a whole.

In the first place, Cabrera and Salazar demonstrate that Spanish power limited the depredations of the dangerous Muslim corsairs that pirated and enslaved Christians in the Mediterranean. Salazar's above quote concerning Toledo's victory at El Peñon de Velez is a reference to the Moorish stronghold's use as a corsair base; by capturing the pirate fortress the Spanish crown dealt a blow to Muslim piracy and safeguarded the important east approach to Gibraltar.⁶⁹⁸ Both historians also note how even small and routine naval skirmishes carried a substantial benefit to the Christian cause, as these seemingly minor Spanish victories resulted in the liberation of captives from the defeated Turkish ships. Fear over Muslim slavers and their atrocities against Christians vividly come across in *Hispania Victrix* and the *Historia de Felipe II*. As stated earlier in the chapter, Salazar writes that the Spanish victory over a single Ottoman galley freed a great number of Christian slaves, who stated that they suffered so much in their captivity that they would have preferred to die rather than suffer the perpetual abuses of their Turkish overlords.⁶⁹⁹ Similarly, when a Spanish ship defeated a Turkish vessel off of Sardinia, Cabrera draws attention to how the victory resulted in the freeing of 80 Christian slaves.⁷⁰⁰ When Prince Don Juan rescues a stranded galley off the North African coast, the historian makes note of the crew's fear of being taken captive by corsairs, and he writes that that galley slaves lived in horrible conditions totally deprived of hope.⁷⁰¹ By chronicling these liberations, both

⁶⁹⁵ Salazar, 123.

⁶⁹⁶ Fuchs, 35. Fuchs argues that the sixteenth-century texts *La Araucana* and the *Guerreas civiles de Granada* highlights Spain's sense of vulnerability to Islam and the instability of its Mediterranean empire.

⁶⁹⁷ "por el mucho daño q del y de sus comarcas del amparadas procedia contra los Christianos." Salazar, 141.

⁶⁹⁸ Williams, 100.

⁶⁹⁹ Salazar, 96.

⁷⁰⁰ Cabrera, 295. For the psychological and economic affect corsair slavery had on Italy, see Davis' *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters*.

⁷⁰¹ Cabrera, 415.

historians assert that the Spanish empire did its part to help put an end to this particularly heinous practice of the Ottomans.

Beyond noting the Spanish crown's role in attacking Muslim piracy and freeing Christian slaves, Cabrera and Salazar in turn celebrate Spain's more dramatic victories over the Ottomans. Salazar devotes his attention to the lifting of the siege of Malta, while Cabrera venerates Lepanto; both historians portray these battles as being key examples of the Spanish crown using its tremendous power to benefit and protect other Christians.

Soon after hearing of the Ottoman's approach on Malta Philip II and Garcia de Toledo began organizing a relief expedition. Generally considered to be a ponderous response given the urgency of the situation, Garcia de Toledo acted with careful calculation and enacted a plan that minimized the risk to the Spanish crown's recently rebuilt Mediterranean fleet, which had sustained significant losses in the early years of Philip II's reign.⁷⁰² After deploying two small and initial relief parties, the viceroy sent a large force that minimized the use of galleys. The arrival of this massive number of Spanish infantry took the Ottomans by surprise, and forced the sultan's exhausted army to retreat within five days. Over the course of the siege the Ottomans had lost around 30,000 troops, and the Spanish sustained minimal losses. While Garcia de Toledo received substantial criticism for the perceived slowness of his response, Philip II was praised for successfully confronting the full might of the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁰³

Salazar accordingly frames the struggle for Malta as a costly yet monumental victory for Christendom that highlights the power and benevolence of the Spanish crown. According to Salazar, the holy order and Grand Master Jean de la Valette fought valiantly against the forces of Suleiman during their brutal assault on the island. For instance, the Knights of St. John put up such a tireless defense and inflicted such large casualties on the Ottomans during the assault on the fortress of St. Michael that the Ottoman commanders remarked that the Christian soldiers fought more like devils than men.⁷⁰⁴ Nonetheless, in spite of their brave efforts, Salazar argues that the Knights of St. John could not have possibly survived the relentless Ottoman assault for long on their own. He writes that the Grand Master exhorted and inspired his knights during this trial, "hoping that God would not forget him, although at certain times he was saddened to think how none of the Christian princes were going there to help to destroy this great armada of the enemy."⁷⁰⁵ Specifically, Salazar demonstrates that Malta desperately needed and awaited the Spanish crown's aid.

According to the historian, as soon as Grand Master Valette heard news of the Ottoman armada's approach he reached out to the Spanish crown, and he sent an urgent message to Viceroy Toledo begging him to send a relief force as quickly as possible to save the island.⁷⁰⁶ Salazar makes clear that only Spain could effectively drive off the Ottomans. Indeed, while he notes that the Papacy sought to provide relief for the embattled island, it could only manage to raise a small force to send to the island.⁷⁰⁷ In contrast, the Spanish historian proudly remarks that Philip II and Viceroy Toledo rushed to the Knights of St. John's aid and rapidly assembled a

⁷⁰² Bustamante García, 1:240.

⁷⁰³ Williams, 101-2.

⁷⁰⁴ Salazar, 217.

⁷⁰⁵ "esperando q Dios no le olvidaria, aunque algunas vezes se entristecia de pensar como los príncipes Christianos todos no le yuan allí a ayudar, para destruyr aquella guessa armada de los enemigo." Salazar, 176.

⁷⁰⁶ Salazar, 164.

⁷⁰⁷ Salazar, 152.

formidable army and armada to help Malta; this relief force consisted of roughly 150 ships and over 8,000 well-armed veteran Spanish and Italian troops.⁷⁰⁸

Salazar demonstrates that the Spanish crown treated the battle for Malta with the utmost importance, and believed that the struggle over the island carried high stakes. He writes that Toledo outlined the importance of saving the island in his speech to the assembled commanders of the Spanish armada, as he warned that Malta would make for a very effective forwarding base in the Ottomans' conquest of the Christian Mediterranean. According to Salazar, the viceroy stated

I acutely understand that it is very important to Christendom that infidels do not overtake this island, where they would be able safely come and go [throughout the Mediterranean] at all times, to the severe harm of the servants of Jesus Christ; and this is the principal reason that moved our Catholic king and lord to order this relief expedition.⁷⁰⁹

Salazar thus invests the battle over Malta with a large degree of religious significance, as he frames the siege as a monumental struggle between the forces of Christianity and Islam. Philip II and Spain accordingly played a central role in this epic confrontation.

Hispania Victrix's narrative triumphantly depicts the Spanish crown as the unquestioned savior of Malta, and by extension, of the Christian Mediterranean. Salazar writes that upon its arrival the Spanish force caused much dismay on the part of the surviving Ottoman commanders, and put the Ottoman army to flight.⁷¹⁰ Unsurprisingly, the Spanish historian shows that Grand Master Valette was overjoyed and incredibly thankful for the invaluable aid of Philip II in ending the ferocious siege; Salazar notes that in his letter of thanks to the Spanish king the Grand Master stated that Philip was responsible for having "saved, defended, protected, and helped Malta, and took away all the travails that it had seen with the oppression of the Turks," and that the island would have been lost if not for the Spanish crown's timely intervention.⁷¹¹

Salazar also remarks that Valette beseeched Philip II for further aid. According to the historian, after the lifting of the siege the Grand Master feared an even greater attack from an outraged and vengeful Suleiman in the following summer, which Malta would be ill prepared for due to the ruined state of the island and its defenses. Declaring that it would be an impossible task for the Knights of St. John to rebuild the fortress on their own, the Grand Master and his envoys ask the "so his and most Christian prince" Philip II for a massive amount of assistance: 10,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 60,000 ducats.⁷¹²

Remarkably, Salazar writes that the Spanish king went above and beyond with these requests, as he not only agreed to send soldiers from Lombardy and Naples to Malta, but he also provided a total of 80,000 ducats for the rebuilding of the island's fortifications. Moreover, in an illustration of the influence and power of the Spanish crown, Salazar notes that Philip II

⁷⁰⁸ Salazar, 170, 248. Predictably Salazar makes no mention of the criticism made against Garcia de Toledo for his slow response in coming to Malta's aid. Salazar's figures for the makeup of the Spanish force are accurate. Williams, 101.

⁷⁰⁹ "entendiéndolo mucho q a la Christiandad importa q infieles no se apoderan de aquella isla, de donde tan a su saluo, y tan en daño general de los sieruos de Jesu Christo podrían en todos tiempos hazer sus salidas y entradas, q es la principal causa q a nuestro Católico rey y señor a mouido para mandar hazer el socorro." Salazar, 248.

⁷¹⁰ Salazar, 262.

⁷¹¹ "guardado, defendido, fauorecido y socorrido a Malta, y sacado la de los trabajos en que se auia visto con la opresión de los Turcos," Salazar, 265, 268.

⁷¹² "tan alto y tan Christianissimo principe" Salazar, 265, 268.

promised to expedite the Vatican's own promise of monetary aid to the Knights of St. John, which had been delayed by the recent death of Pius V, by writing to the Sacred College [College of Cardinals] and his Papal ambassador Don Luis de Requesens y Zuñiga.⁷¹³

Salazar thus demonstrates that the Spanish crown readily shouldered the hefty burden of insuring Malta's continued safety from Ottoman attack. His treatment of Grand Master Valette's request for aid and Philip II's munificent response aggrandizes the Spanish crown by highlighting its unquestionable benevolence and reinforcing its role as the protector of the Christian Mediterranean. Salazar demonstrates that other Christians depended on the aid of the Spanish crown for protection against the Turkish menace, and that Philip II readily devoted his immense military and financial resources to carry out this much needed assistance.

While Salazar celebrates Malta as a great victory against the Ottoman Empire and a key symbol of the Spanish crown's benevolence and power, Cabrera emphasizes the importance of the battle of Lepanto in 1571, which occurred once year after the publication of *Hispania Victrix*. In 1570 Pope Pius V made overtures to form a Holy League between the Spanish empire, the Venetian Republic, and the Papal States in order to reverse Ottoman advances in the Mediterranean. While Pius V sought a general crusade against the Turk, the Spanish crown entered the alliance in order to both curtail Ottoman power and to help safeguard its own territory against corsair raids. Although Venice initially proved more reluctant to enter the alliance due to its trading ties with the Ottoman Empire, Selim II's attack on the Venetian colony in Cyprus pushed the Most Serene Republic into the Holy League. The three parties agreed that Spain would provide half of the forces, Venice a third, and the Papacy a sixth. While Venice provided more ships, Spain provided the bulk of the terrestrial forces.⁷¹⁴ In 1571 the Christian armada departed the coast of southern Italy under the command of Philip II's half brother, Don Juan of Austria.

In October the Holy League fleet encountered the Turkish Armada off of Corfu in the Gulf of Lepanto in the eastern Mediterranean. Don Juan took the Ottoman admiral Ali Pasha by surprise, who in his overconfidence had recently wasted energy and provisions on pillaging raids on Crete and around the Adriatic. The Holy League force consisted of 207 galleys, roughly 100 support ships, Venetian galleasses (large merchant galleys armed with heavy cannons), and 84,420 men. Ali Pasha had 250 galleys, 60 galeotes (smaller galleys commonly used by corsairs), and 75,000 men.⁷¹⁵ The massive battle was a complete rout for the Turkish forces, and resulted in the death of Ali Pasha and the destruction of nearly the entire Ottoman armada.

News of Lepanto met with jubilation in Rome, Madrid, and Venice, and the victory appeared to open up seemingly immense possibilities for the Holy League. Nevertheless, the fleet was forced to winter, giving Selim II time to rapidly rebuild his fleet. Moreover, Pius V's death severely destabilized the League. The Spanish crown was anxious to commit its resources to quelling the rebellion in the Netherlands, and Venice wanted to resume trading relations with the Ottomans. A later effort to attack the Ottomans off the coast of Morea in 1572 failed because the Turks refused to engage with the Holy League armada.⁷¹⁶ The Venetian Republic reached a separate peace with Selim II, which effectively dissolved the Holy League.⁷¹⁷

⁷¹³ Salazar, 268-9.

⁷¹⁴ Fernández Álvarez, 469.

⁷¹⁵ Williams, 107-8.

⁷¹⁶ Lynch, 1:247.

⁷¹⁷ Fernández Álvarez, 478.

While the short-term military consequences of Lepanto were thus arguably mixed, on a psychological and symbolic level the victory was important for the West. Lepanto played a large part in eventually dispelling the myth of Turkish invincibility and elevating Christian self-confidence in the later seventeenth century.⁷¹⁸ In turn, this dramatic defeat was serious blow to Ottoman confidence, and made Selim II less ready to commit his fleet westwards.⁷¹⁹ As such, it is not surprising that Cabrera strongly emphasizes the importance of Lepanto for the Christian Mediterranean in his history.

While Cabrera notes the valuable contributions of the Papacy and the Venetian Republic, particularly Pope Pius V's role in forging the Holy League, the *Historia de Felipe II* essentially portrays Lepanto as a Spanish victory. A couple of factors help create this impression. First, the courtier historian highlights that the Spanish empire bore the brunt of the costs for the venture. According to Cabrera, Spain paid for fully one-half of the naval undertaking, while the Papacy and Venice each footed a fourth of the bill.⁷²⁰ During the battle of Lepanto itself, Cabrera remarks upon the determination of the Papal and Venetian galleys, but the achievements of Spaniards stand out the most in his account. For example, Cabrera writes that the great deeds of Don Martin Padilla and his soldiers were on the tongues of all nations as they prevented the Turks from boarding their ships.⁷²¹ In contrast, the only specific account involving Venice is a fight that breaks out on a Venetian galley.⁷²²

Moreover, the heroic figure of Don Juan looms particularly large in Cabrera's account of Lepanto. Don Juan appears to possess an almost divine and supernatural quality during this particular portion of the *Historia de Felipe II*. Cabrera claims that during the mobilization of the fleet the Archbishop of Pera believed Philip's half-brother to be the great figure in St. Isidore's prophecy concerning the ultimate triumph of the Church.⁷²³ Likewise, Cabrera states that on the eve of battle he appeared before the assembled armada as "so dashing and courageous, with a countenance that exuded valor and a military Christian spirit, and a confidence in achieving victory, his face being cheerful, serious, and comfortable."⁷²⁴ The general then gave an inspiring speech to which the soldiers "Responded with the confidence of a supernatural enthusiasm and a forceful voice, and were committed to victory."⁷²⁵

For Cabrera, the forces of the Spanish empire under Don Juan's inspirational command carried the day at Lepanto. Without the participation of Philip II and his forces, victory against the Ottomans would not have been possible. The *Historia de Felipe II* presents this Spanish-led victory as spectacular indeed. Cabrera remarks that before engaging the Holy League, the Ottomans displayed their usual arrogance and were confident of victory.⁷²⁶ Yet once again Spanish valor demolished Turkish conceit.

Cabrera describes the battle itself in almost apocalyptic terms, writing:

⁷¹⁸ Housley, 142 and Hess, 193.

⁷¹⁹ Lynch, 1:245.

⁷²⁰ Cabrera, 577.

⁷²¹ Cabrera, 595.

⁷²² Cabrera, 591.

⁷²³ Cabrera, 588.

⁷²⁴ "tan gallardo y tan animoso, con semblante que ponía valor y espíritu militar y cristiano, y confianza de alcanzar vitoria, su rostro alegre, grave, desahogado." Cabrera, 593.

⁷²⁵ "Respondieron con seguridad de ánimo sobrenatural y voz esforcada, acometiese y no difriese la vitoria." Cabrera, 594.

⁷²⁶ Cabrera, 592.

There was never seen such a chaotic battle, the galleys engaged one on one, two or three with another, as luck would have it, clinging by the bows, by the sides, by the sterns, bows to sterns, dominating the situation. The scene was terrible because of the Turks' yells, because of the shots, fire, smoke, because of the laments of those that were dying. The sea turned into blood, a sepulcher of very many bodies that were moved by the waves, agitated and foaming because of the clashes of the galleys and horrible pounding of the artillery, the lances, arms with handles, swords, fires, a thick cloud of arrows, like hail, making the masts into sea urchins and porcupines, sail poles, shields and containers. Horrific was confusion, the fear, the hope, the furor, the defiance, the tenacity, the courage, the rage, the fury; the hurtful dying of friends, to encourage, to wound, to kill, to capture, to burn, to throw into the water heads, legs, arms, bodies, unfortunate men, some without souls, some giving up the spirit, some gravely wounded, Christians finishing them off with gun shots.⁷²⁷

Amidst this hellish and dramatic struggle the forces of Christendom emerge victorious and the once confident Ottoman forces are utterly broken. With some satisfaction Cabrera claims that during the battle the Ottoman commander Farta lamented that Lepanto was to be “the death of the best people and naval force of the Ottoman house.”⁷²⁸ Indeed, the courtier historian writes, “There died 200 of the most important Turks, 30 provincial governors, 150 bays and captains.”⁷²⁹ Turkish power was so broken during the battle that remarkably the Christian galley slaves turned against their Ottoman oppressors, as Cabrera comments that “The Christian slaves, understanding the betterment of their lot, fought with the Turks in their galleys, seeking their liberty with revenge for their injuries and the happy end of their slavery.”⁷³⁰ All in all, 5,000 Christian prisoners were freed through the victory.⁷³¹ In line with this message of Christian liberation from Turkish servitude, Cabrera claims that Lepanto gave hope to the oppressed living in the Ottoman Empire.⁷³²

For Salazar and Cabrera, the victories at Malta and Lepanto served as definitive proof that the Spanish empire could successfully turn back the Ottoman menace in the Mediterranean. These battles demonstrate that the Spanish crown munificently labored to protect other Christians. Their histories thus present victory against the Turk as difficult, yet uplifting enterprise that benefited Christendom as a whole.

⁷²⁷ “Jamás se vio batalla tan confusa, trabadas las galeras una por una, y dos y tres con otra, como les tocaba la suerte, aferradas por las proas, costados, popas, proa con popa, gobernando el caso. El aspecto era terrible por los gritos de los turcos, por los tiros, fuego, humo, por los lamentos de los que morían. El mar vuelto en sangre, sepulcro de muchísimos cuerpos que movían las ondas, alteradas y espumantes de los encuentros de las galeras y horribles golpes de la artillería, de las picas, armas enastadas, espadas, fuegos, espesa nube de saetas, como de granizo, volviendo erizos y espines los árboles, entenas, pavesadas y vasos. Espantosa era la confusión, el temor, la esperanza, el furor, la porfía, tesón, coraje, rabia, furia; el lastimosos morir de los amigos, animar, herir, matar, prender, quemar, echar al agua cabezas, piernas, brazos, cuerpos, hombres miserables, parte sin anima, parte que exhalaban el espíritu, parte gravemente heridos, rematándolos con tiros los cristianos.” Cabrera, 595.

⁷²⁸ “la muerte la flor de gente y fueras de mar de la casa otomana.” Cabrera, 597.

⁷²⁹ “Murieron doscientos turcos principales, treinta gobernadores de provincias, ciento y sesenta bays y capitanes de fanal.” Cabrera, 598.

⁷³⁰ “Los esclavos cristianos, conociendo la mejoría de su parte, combatían con los turcos en sus galeras en comencando a ser entradas, procurando su libertad con venganca de sus injurias y fin alegre de su esclavitud.” Cabrera, 597.

⁷³¹ Cabrera, 598. This number of liberated Christian prisoners is accurate. Fernández Álvarez, 476.

⁷³² Cabrera, 600.

While Cabrera and Salazar emphasize that the Spanish crown achieved decisive victories over the Ottomans, in their respective historical representations Spain does not dominate the Ottoman Empire, as the European colonial powers would do in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Rather, the two historians still portray the Ottomans as a dangerous threat to the Mediterranean. As such, the power dynamic between West and East portrayed in *Hispania Victrix* and the *Historia de Felipe II* occupies a sort of intermediary position between Said's model of European dominance and the framework of overwhelming Ottoman superiority found in studies of early modern Orientalism.⁷³³ The works of Salazar and Cabrera effectively portray the Spanish and Ottoman empires as butting heads along the frontiers of their respective Mediterranean realms.

Both the Austrian Hapsburg and Spanish Hapsburg empires confronted Ottoman domination in the early modern period. While the Turks threatened Naples, Sicily, and the coasts of Spain, they also attacked Croatia, Hungary, and Vienna itself. An analysis of the works of Salazar and Cabrera suggests that the cultural and intellectual responses to the specter of Turkish superiority varied between the two branches of the Hapsburg dynasty. In the second half of the sixteenth century German writers, courtiers, and preachers at the imperial court asserted the Austrian Hapsburg's authority vis-à-vis the Ottomans by distancing and denigrating the Ottomans as uncivilized.⁷³⁴ These writers engaged in a cultural distancing between the German Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires that exoticized the Turks and labeled them as inferior.⁷³⁵

Salazar and Cabrera employ a different strategy to come to terms with Ottoman power. The two historians responded to the threat of the Muslim "other" with a discourse of imperial competition. They frame the conflict between the Spanish crown and the Turks not as a confrontation between the civilized west and the exotic east, but as a clash between two great empires. Salazar and Cabrera depicted and understood the Ottomans along imperial lines. They depict the Spanish Hapsburgs and the House of Osman as two grand powers vying for supremacy in the Mediterranean, and they accordingly appear as the most powerful political entities in the Christian and Muslim world respectively. It is through this notion of competition of empire that one can gain an understanding of how the Ottoman "other" shaped Spanish imperial identity.

Salazar uses a framework of imperial rivalry in the Mediterranean to assert the Spanish empire's superiority vis-à-vis both the Ottomans and other Christian powers. The historian demonstrates that Philip II held a unique place of enmity in the Suleiman's eyes. According to Salazar, the sultan hated the Spanish king because he was the son of the "most Christian and most invincible" emperor Charles V, whose victories had deprived Suleiman of all of Hungary, Vienna, and Tunis.⁷³⁶ Moreover, in response to the Spanish crown's recent capture of Peñon de Velez, the sultan "had great hatred" for Philip

for having been so powerful and so good fortun'd, that out of all of the Christian princes he was the only one that he feared and held in esteem, because of the feats of arms he

⁷³³ See Bisaha, Vitkus, and Fuchs.

⁷³⁴ Johnson, 266.

⁷³⁵ Johnson, 198.

⁷³⁶ Salazar, 145.

knew he had performed...as well as for the damages that his own [subjects] had received from the captains of king Don Philip....⁷³⁷

This depiction of Suleiman invests Philip II and the Spanish crown with a significant degree of prominence. It reinforces the Hapsburgs' proud history of successfully waging war on the infidel, and firmly establishes Philip II' place within this crusading lineage. Salazar advances that defending Christendom against the Ottomans was an integral aspect of Spanish imperial identity, and accordingly asserts that the Spanish crown occupied a unique and celebrated place within the history of the holy struggle between Christianity and Islam.

Salazar's view that Suleiman only feared Philip II out of all the princes of Christendom provides a different texture to the standard discourse of early modern Orientalism and Ottoman domination, as the historian presents a distorted view of the Ottomans in order to highlight the power and ascendancy of the Spanish empire. This triumphant crusading rhetoric privileges Spain as the unquestioned protector of the Mediterranean while portraying the Turks as an omnipresent threat. Indeed, the historian establishes the Spanish and Ottoman empires as mirror opposites. He closes his history with the proud declaration that

Entreating our Lord to permit by his goodness, that he will always bring down this venomous Ottoman serpent [sent] against the Christians, just as it had then been routed and put to flight; and [entreating our Lord for] the health and life of our Catholic and noble king Don Philip, with such great power and strength he frees us from and protects us against [the Ottoman serpent].⁷³⁸

Salazar closely links the authority and prestige of the Spanish crown to its ability to combat the Ottomans and prevent their conquest of Christendom.

Cabrera also advances this notion of the Spanish and Ottoman empires as mirrored imperial powers in his history. In many instances the historical image of the Ottoman Empire emerges as a photographic negative of the courtier historian's presentation of Spanish empire. Accordingly the two empires offer two different models of imperial rule, one good and one bad. In this sense, the Turkish other serves as a foil for the Spanish imperial identity. The flaws in the Ottomans' character and actions serve to highlight and reinforce the ideals of empire and kingship presented in the *Historia de Felipe II*.

In the first place one can see this contrast between the two imperial powers in the vastly different portrayals of the character and ruling philosophy of Philip II and the Ottoman sultans. According to the courtier historian, the maxim of the Ottoman Empire was "He who does not expand does not retain."⁷³⁹ As such, the Ottoman Empire is portrayed as the aggressive conqueror in the *Historia de Felipe II*. Major Spanish campaigns are seen as responses to Turkish acts of belligerence, an example being the formation of the Holy League as a response to the conquest of Cyprus.⁷⁴⁰ In contrast, according to Cabrera, Philip II was devoted to the

⁷³⁷ "tuuiesse gran omezillo," "por auer sido tan poderosos y bien afortunado, q a solo el temía, reputaua, y estimaua entre todos los príncipes Christianos, por las grandes cosas q en armas sabia q auia hecho...como por los danos que los suyos auian recibido de los capitanes del rey Don Philippe..." Salazar, 144.

⁷³⁸ "Suplicando a Nuestro Senor permita por su bondad, que siempre que baxare esta sierpe Ottomana venenosa contra Christianos, vaya como agora fue, rota la cabeza y de huyda, y de salud y vida a nuestro Catholico y noble Rey Don Philippe, contanto poder y fuerças que siempre nos libre y ampare contra ella." Salazar, 271.

⁷³⁹ "No conserva quien no aumenta." Cabrera, 384.

⁷⁴⁰ Cabrera, 548.

peaceful maintenance of his own rightful realms. For instance, in the chronicle when Philip ascends to the throne, he states that he desires the continued security of his inherited territories, and conquest is not emphasized.⁷⁴¹

Cabrera also contrasts the benevolent patience of Philip with the choleric anger of Selim. The courtier historian claims that the sultan was obsessed with attacking Christian armadas no matter what the risks, and woe to the Ottoman commander who did not carry out this edict. For example, Cabrera writes that the Turkish admiral Piali fell from the sultan's grace because he was unable to engage the Venetian fleet during one summer.⁷⁴² As a result of the sultan's wrathful behavior, the Ottoman commanders at Lepanto made the rash and fatal decision of engaging the Holy League because, as one Turkish captain remarked "He wanted to expose his life to an enemy's blade rather than the envy of the Court and the fury of Selim."⁷⁴³ As such, Selim II's character defects are portrayed as being detrimental for his state.

In contrast, Philip II's benevolence helped keep the Spanish empire running and smoothed over disagreements between his generals. During a siege of Oran, Cabrera writes that initially the Genoese admiral Juan Andrea Doria refused to cooperate with his rival don Francisco in the relief expedition. However, the Prudent King convinced the reluctant admiral to cooperate, as Cabrera remarks "The benign nature of the king moderates bitterness."⁷⁴⁴ As opposed to Selim, Philip's cool understanding served as a boom for his empire's operations.

Similarly, the two rulers are portrayed as having different reactions to setbacks in the *Historia de Felipe II*. Cabrera writes that upon hearing of the devastating loss at Lepanto, Selim II became very sad and fearful, and that "With extreme emotions he said to his advisors that the defeat was the saddest case of misfortune, and it signaled the inevitable beginning of the demise of his reign..."⁷⁴⁵ In this abject state Selim II then ordered Spanish and Venetian slaves to be put to death, and unwisely forbade anyone from speaking of Lepanto again.⁷⁴⁶ In contrast, the courtier historian demonstrates that Philip II maintained his resolve during periods of bad fortune. After the fall of Tunis and La Goleta, instead of sinking into despair like Selim, the Prudent King resolutely ordered the construction of the fortress of St. Gregory at Oran, a supposedly unassailable fortification that insured the safety of the North African city.⁷⁴⁷ Thus, in the face of misfortune Philip II continues to productively labor for the security of his domains.

These contrasts between the Spanish and Ottoman rulers serve to reinforce Cabrera's portrait of Philip II as ideal king. Pitted into imperial competition with each other in the chronicle, this struggle reveals the virtues of Philip's model kingship and the vices of sultanhood. Similarly, further contrasts between the two empires in the *Historia de Felipe II* highlight the Spanish crown's pious dedication to the defense of Christendom.

The Spanish and Ottoman empires differ remarkably in their treatment of their beleaguered co-religionists. In the case of the Ottomans, the Muslims clamoring for aid in the *Historia de Felipe II* are the *moriscos*. Especially during the latter stages of their failed revolts, Cabrera repeatedly makes note of the *moriscos'* pitiful conditions, and the Muslim rebels

⁷⁴¹ Cabrera, 204.

⁷⁴² Cabrera, 581.

⁷⁴³ "Quería poner su vida al hierro enemigo antes que a la envidia de la Corte y la furia de Selin." Cabrera, 591.

⁷⁴⁴ "Templado el resentimiento con la benignidad del Rey." Cabrera, 273.

⁷⁴⁵ "Con excesivo sentimiento decía a sus consejeros, era el triste caso y desgracia (nunca tal) claro y fatal principio de la ruina de su monarquía..." Cabrera, 602-3.

⁷⁴⁶ Cabrera, 603.

⁷⁴⁷ Cabrera, 689.

frequently ask for the sultan to intervene.⁷⁴⁸ Indeed, the *moriscos* had counted on both the Ottomans and the corsair states to provide them aid when they commenced their rebellion. The *moriscos* ultimately received only a small amount of reinforcements from their Ottoman and Berber allies, which did not have a measurable impact on the overall course of the rebellion.⁷⁴⁹

According to Cabrera, when the *moriscos*' ambassador arrives in Constantinople, he claims that the sultan's provision of aid would be a pious act, and would accordingly please God.⁷⁵⁰ These religious exhortations fail to move the sultan, and the ruler instead listens to his minister Mustafa, who claims that intervention in Iberia would be a costly quagmire for the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁵¹ In the end, Selim II decided to invade Cyprus because the island was an easy target and had excellent wines.⁷⁵² Furthermore, Cabrera writes that the Turkish viceroy of Argel Aluch Ali largely ignored the *moriscos*' calls for aid because he was busy plotting the conquest of his Muslim rivals in Tunis.⁷⁵³

This selfishness of the Ottomans contrasts with the benevolent practices of the Spanish empire regarding fellow Christians in need in the *Historia de Felipe II*. One major example of Spain's helping endangered Christian states is its participation in the Holy League. In particular, Cabrera presents Venice and her colonies in the eastern Mediterranean as being in particularly dire straits during the League's formation. For instance, according to the courtier historian the Ottomans sacked the Venetian fortress at Xumarra with ease, and at the colony of Chefalonia the Turks capture more than 3,000 inhabitants. Likewise, the Venetian port of Famagusta falls to the Ottomans, and the town of Aulato was so beleaguered and vulnerable that women had to defend it.⁷⁵⁴

One can contrast this poor state of the Serene Republic's holdings with Spain's successful defense of its territories in North Africa. Venice needed the Holy League much more than the Spanish crown did. In this line Cabrera points out that Lepanto occurred in Venice's sphere of interest in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁷⁵⁵ As such, the *Historia de Felipe II* portrays the formation of the Holy League as an example of the Spanish empire's munificent defense of Christendom, which makes the Venetian's eventual independently made peace with the Ottomans all the more despicable.

According to Cabrera then, Spain's Mediterranean policy consisted of selflessly helping other Catholic powers, be it the Holy See or the untrustworthy Venetian Republic. In contrast to the portrayal of the Ottomans in the *Historia de Felipe II*, the Spanish empire devotes its resources to benefiting the cause of religion. Thus, through this comparison, the Muslim "other" comes to provide an alternative model of imperial rule, which Cabrera uses to throw into relief the benevolence and piety of the Spanish crown. The courtier historian defined Spanish imperial identity through his distorted portrayal of the faults of the Ottoman "other." Thus, by using the

⁷⁴⁸ Cabrera, 525.

⁷⁴⁹ Fernández Álvarez, 465.

⁷⁵⁰ Cabrera, 507.

⁷⁵¹ Cabrera, 509.

⁷⁵² Cabrera, 559.

⁷⁵³ Cabrera, 535.

⁷⁵⁴ Cabrera, 581-2, 587.

⁷⁵⁵ Cabrera, 580. Cabrera's idealized account conflicts with Philip II's actual misgivings about entering into the Holy League. Philip II was worried that the alliance would unduly benefit Venice, and he was unhappy about the stipulation that any territory gained during the expedition would revert to its original Christian owner, since the Venetian Republic would be likely beneficiary. Fernández Álvarez, 469.

Ottomans as an imperial foil in this fashion, Cabrera celebrates the Spanish crown's own power and asserts its authoritative position as the defender of the Christian Mediterranean.

Conclusion

A discourse of imperial rivalry between Spain and the Ottomans characterizes the representations of the Turkish "other" found in Pedro de Salazar's *Hispania Victrix* and Luis Cabrera de Córdoba's *Historia de Felipe II, Rey de España*. The two Spanish historians demonize the Ottoman Empire as the brutal, powerful, and unquestioned enemy of Christendom. In this distorted framing of the Ottoman "other," the sultan and his Muslim vassals sought to eradicate the Christian faith and dominate the Mediterranean. According to Salazar and Cabrera, although the frightening scope of Ottoman power endangered the Spanish empire, they demonstrate that the Spanish crown was more than capable of countering this alien threat. While the Ottomans certainly were formidable, the forces of the Spanish empire proved that they were not invincible. The two historians demonstrate that the Spanish crown was not only able to make successful incursions into Ottoman domains, as represented by Spanish victories in North Africa, but also protected other Christians against the threat of Ottoman domination.

Stephen Greenblatt's model of engaged representation vividly comes to play in Salazar's and Cabrera's portrayals of the Ottomans and their confrontations with the Spanish empire. Their distorted views of the Muslim "other" and celebratory accounts of Spanish triumphs in the Mediterranean tell the reader relatively little about the world of the Ottomans in the early modern period; instead, these formulations can uncover a great deal about Spanish imperial identity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By casting Oran, Malta, and Lepanto as monumental victories over a dangerous and alien foe, Salazar and Cabrera reveal the central place of the war against Islam in Spanish imperial thought. The two historians place immense stock in the Spanish crown's ability to successfully wage war against the Ottomans. In their view only Spain could truly achieve victory over the Turks, and through these triumphs they assert the Spanish empire's prestige, power, and authority within Christendom. Salazar and Cabrera use their histories to propagate this crusading image and the Spanish crown's status as the protector of the Catholic faith. In this vein, their works stand as notable examples of how history writing could be utilized as a tool of empire in early modern Spain.

Salazar and Cabrera's treatment of the relation between Spain and the Ottomans complements and complicates the binary theoretical structure of early modern Orientalism. On the one hand, the two Spanish historians clearly deform and dehumanize the Ottomans within the context of the fundamental division between the Christian and Muslim worlds. In turn, their writings point to a real sense of fear over Ottoman power in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Nonetheless, by positing Spain and the Ottoman Empire as the two great imperial powers of the Mediterranean, Salazar and Cabrera present a more or less balanced and equalized power dynamic between East and West that provides a different perspective to early modern Orientalism's discourse of Ottoman domination and its effects on the formation of European identity. As such, a close reading of these texts points to the need to take into account differing political, temporal, and geographic contexts when studying early modern European accounts of the Muslim "other" within an overarching theoretical framework.

Chapter 7 Peru and the Paths of Empire

Introduction

As the previous chapters of this dissertation have shown, history writing in early modern Spain carried deep political implications. Historians utilized their works as a political forum to either support or critique the Spanish crown's imperial entanglements in the sixteenth century. In turn, history writing could serve as a medium for the advancement of national, regional, and imperial identities.

This chapter explores the political importance of history writing as a tool to navigate questions of empire within the context of early seventeenth-century Peru. History writing in colonial Peru was often a charged political arena that reflected the lasting controversies surrounding its conquest, settlement, and royal administration. Spanish historians affiliated with the crown or the viceregal court used their works to champion the imperial enterprise in Peru; these histories demonized the Incas and denigrated the unruly *encomenderos* who engaged in the civil wars and rebellions of Peru's early colonial history. The Spanish crown attempted to exert a sort of historiographical monopoly over the Americas, as all histories pertaining to the New World required the approval of the office of the *Cronista Mayor de las Indias* before publication.⁷⁵⁶

Nevertheless, in an illustration of the dynamic and negotiated nature of Spanish imperial identity, non-royal historians from both sides of the Atlantic empire were able to publish works that resisted and countered the triumphalist historiographical formulations emanating from the pens of court chroniclers. This chapter focuses on providing a new analytical approach to the work of one such early modern historian who famously offered an alternative vision of Peru's pre-Columbian and colonial past: Garcilaso de la Vega El Inca.

The son of a high-standing *encomendero* and an Incan princess, Garcilaso is a complex and fascinating figure. Born and raised in Cuzco, Garcilaso traveled to Spain at the age of 21 in 1560. Originally named Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, he adopted his father's name Garcilaso de la Vega after crossing the Atlantic. After failing to receive any official recognition for his service in the campaign to suppress the Morisco revolt in Granada, Garcilaso retired to Andalusia and entered a life of scholarly pursuits. Eventually he would achieve a good amount of fame amongst the intellectual circles of Córdoba.⁷⁵⁷

The mestizo historian's best-known work is the *Royal Commentaries of the Incas and General History of Peru*. Organized into two separate parts, the first section of the history, entitled the *Royal Commentaries of the Incas*, provides a glowing account of the Incan Empire. The second section, the *General History of Peru*, details Spanish rule in Peru from the Conquest to the government of viceroy Francisco de Toledo in 1581. Initially published separately (*Royal Commentaries of the Incas* in Lisbon in 1609 and *General History of Peru* in Córdoba, 1617), Garcilaso conceived of the two sections as successive parts of a single work.⁷⁵⁸ Taken together the two parts provide an overarching and complementary narrative of Peru's pre-Columbian and

⁷⁵⁶ Margarita Zamora, *Language, Authority, and Indigenous History in the Comentarios reales de los Incas* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 47. For a more in-depth discussion on the position and duties of the royal chronicler of the Indies see Kagan's *Clio and the Crown*.

⁷⁵⁷ D.A. Brading, *The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State, 1492-1867* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 255.

⁷⁵⁸ Brading, 260.

colonial past.⁷⁵⁹ Interestingly, the two sections have different dedications. Garcilaso dedicated the *Royal Commentaries of the Incas* to Princess Catalina of Portugal of the House of Braganza, who had helped him publish his work. In turn, the *General History of Peru* was dedicated to the Virgin Mary, who Garcilaso portrays as the decisive force behind the conquest of Cuzco. It was common for historians from colonial Latin America to dedicate their works to the Virgin Mary.⁷⁶⁰

The influence of Garcilaso's history was far-reaching. In contrast to other famous indigenous histories such as Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayalla's *El primer nueva crónica y buen gobierno*, which remained unpublished until the modern era, the *Royal Commentaries* was widely read during the early modern period.⁷⁶¹ Indeed, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it enjoyed multiple printing runs within Spain, was translated into English and French, and was often quoted in European works on the Americas. In colonial Peru, Garcilaso's history was a guiding point for Peruvian and Andean identity until the Wars of Independence, and the text served as a major source of inspiration for Tupac Amaru's rebellion in the late eighteenth century.⁷⁶²

The complex *Royal Commentaries* accordingly continues to generate significant scholarly interest, and it remains ripe territory for fresh analysis. In recent years historians have examined the mestizo historian and his work from a variety of different analytical perspectives, including creole patriotism, Neo-Platonic humanism, the imperial renaissance, the birth of Peruvian national identity, and the emergence of "globality" and global history.⁷⁶³

While Garcilaso is often studied within the context of colonial Peruvian history, it is also important to fully take into account the trans-Atlantic dimensions of his work. He spent the vast majority of his adult life in Spain, and although he ultimately failed to obtain a court appointment from the crown through both military and scholarly endeavors, he nonetheless worked closely with major humanists and Spanish historians, including the royal chronicler Ambrosio de Morales and the linguist Bernardo de Alderete.⁷⁶⁴ Garcilaso El Inca hardly lived on the fringes of Spanish intellectual society. As such, while Garcilaso would prove to be a major figure in colonial Peruvian history, one should not completely separate his work from the context of early seventeenth-century Spain and the reign of Philip III.

⁷⁵⁹ For an alternative view concerning the narrative relation and the degree of separation between the *Royal Commentaries of the Incas* and the *General History of Peru* see Zamora's *Language, Authority, and Indigenous History*. Generally speaking the *Royal Commentaries of the Incas* has received more scholarly attention than the second half of the history. In this chapter I will refer to the two combined sections as the *Royal Commentaries*.

⁷⁶⁰ Mark Thurner, *History's Peru: The Poetics of Colonial and Postcolonial Historiography* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2011), 29, 52-3.

⁷⁶¹ Sabine MacCormack, *On the Wings of Time: Rome, the Incas, Spain, and Peru* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 236. MacCormack refers to the *Royal Commentaries* as remaining "tone-giving" for three centuries.

⁷⁶² MacCormack, 58, 65. For a discussion of Jean Bodin's translation of the *Royal Commentaries* for the court of Louis XIII see Sonia V. Rose "Los Incas en la corte de Luis XIII: Jean Baudoin y su traducción al francés de la primera parte de *Comentarios reales* (1633)" in *Entre la espada y la pluma: el Inca Garcilaso de la Vega y sus Comentarios reales*, ed. by Raquel Chang-Rodríguez (Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2010). Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del librero hispano-americano*, vol. 25 (Barcelona: Antonio Palau Dulcet, 1973), 401-3.

⁷⁶³ For Garcilaso as creole patriot see D.A. Brading's *The First America*. Sabine MacCormack's *On the Wings of Time* discusses themes of empire and the humanist influences in Garcilaso's work. Most recently, Mark Thurner discusses lasting influence of Garcilaso on Peruvian national identity in *History's Peru*.

⁷⁶⁴ MacCormack, 59.

Garcilaso wrote and published the *Royal Commentaries* during a transitional moment when Spanish writers engaged in serious political reflections over the course of Spain and its empire. Through their works these writers offered political counsel concerning how to best prevent the Spanish empire from sinking into decline. A close reading of Garcilaso's history suggests that the mestizo historian shared this reformist mentalité, as he engaged in a process of political critique and commentary that reflected a larger debate about empire.

Much like the histories of Luis de Bavia and Guadalupe y Javier covered in Chapters 3 and 4, Garcilaso's work points to a reevaluation of empire in the wake of Philip II's transformative and consequential reign. In the case of Bavia and Guadalupe y Javier, the failed intervention in the French Wars of Religion sparked a discussion regarding the costs of imperium and the strategic priorities of the Spanish crown. Similarly, Garcilaso's history weighs in on the crown's imperial policies, and offers an incisive political lesson for seventeenth-century Spain. In his recent monograph *History's Peru: The Poetics of Colonial and post-Colonial Historiography* Mark Thurner touches on the didactic element of Garcilaso's work. Thurner notes that Garcilaso inserts *The Royal Commentaries* within the "mirror of princes" tradition of Renaissance history writing, which called for readers to imitate historical figures' virtues and heroism while admonishing instances of tyranny and malice. In this vein, Garcilaso advances the last Incan emperor Atahualpa as a wicked tyrant whose despotic practices should be avoided by the Spanish in Peru.⁷⁶⁵

This chapter aims to expand upon this discussion and treat in an in-depth manner the plethora of the other historical lessons for ruling Peru found in *The Royal Commentaries*. Beyond serving as a general catalogue of princely virtues and tyrannical vices, Garcilaso's work offers a clear and specific model for successful colonial government. Written as a response to the lingering historical conflicts and controversies surrounding Peru's conquest and governance, this history is a political guide that charts the best and worst ways to administer Peru. The mestizo historian was not an anti-colonialist, as other authors have argued.⁷⁶⁶ Rather, through his discussion of the successes and failures of past governors and viceroys Garcilaso lays bear the problems of Spain's trans-Atlantic empire and charts a clear path for its reform.

Specifically, the misunderstandings born from linguistic, cultural, political, and spatial divides occupy a central place in Garcilaso's evaluations of colonial rule. He demonstrates that as soon as the Spanish set foot in Peru the failure to properly communicate with the native inhabitants was a serious problem that resulted in needless violence. Tragically, miscommunication severely marred what should have been an otherwise peaceful relationship between the Incas and the Spanish.⁷⁶⁷ Moreover, Garcilaso asserts that there was a gulf of misunderstanding between colonial Peru and the crown in Madrid; this disconnect could only be effectively overcome by listening to those who had experience in New World affairs. The crown's failure to understand conditions in the Americas resulted in civil war and fanned the flames of rebellion in Peru.

These problems of misunderstanding between Indians, Spanish settlers in Peru, and the crown informs Garcilaso's political advice and assessment of colonial government. In his view, the successful administration of a governor or viceroy rested on his ability to mitigate this

⁷⁶⁵ Thurner, 29, 42.

⁷⁶⁶ Zamora, "Regarding Colonialism in Garcilaso's *Historia general del Peru*," in *Entre la espada y la pluma: el Inca Garcilaso de la Vega y sus Comentarios reales*, ed. by Raquel Chang-Rodríguez (Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2010), 120-1

⁷⁶⁷ MacCormack, 102.

problem of “imperial confusion.” Garcilaso identifies tyrannical obstinacy, heavy-handedness, and a willful blindness towards the needs and advice of Peru’s *vecinos* (Spanish lord of Indian vassals) and Indians as the hallmarks of improper colonial administration. In turn, he argues that benevolence, mildness, and willingness to listen to the good counsel of the *vecinos* and the models of Incan imperial rule would lead to a prosperous and peaceful Peru.

The Confusion of Empire

In his history Garcilaso clearly demonstrates that his homeland occupied an invaluable place in the Spanish imperial system due to its immense wealth. As the opening pages of the second part of history indicate, Garcilaso believed that the gold and silver sent from Peru were the primary source of the Spanish empire’s power and greatness.⁷⁶⁸ With a fair degree of pride he relates that thanks to the sheer amount of lucre arriving from Peru, the coffers of the Spanish crown were so great that not even officials of the royal treasury could take a full account of the total funds available. Moreover, he observes that Peru’s wealth had a global impact, writing

it is public knowledge that whenever the Peru fleet puts into Seville its presence is bruited to the four corners of the Old World. For as the trade and commerce of mankind spreads from one province to another and one kingdom to another, and everything depends on the hope of gain, and the empire of Peru is an ocean of gold and silver, its rising tides bathe all the nations of the world, filling them with wealth and contentment...⁷⁶⁹

Interestingly, it has been suggested that Garcilaso’s ambiguous remarks concerning the moral effects of this influx of wealth bear a strong resemblance to the writings of the *arbitristas*, who likewise noted the negative consequences that silver and gold from the New World could have on Spain.⁷⁷⁰ Regardless, Garcilaso makes clear that Peru’s spectacular wealth served as the lynchpin of both the Spanish imperium and the emerging global trading network of the early modern world.

Importantly, throughout the *Royal Commentaries*, Garcilaso identifies Peru as an “empire,” as he stresses that the imperial title of the Incas passed on to the Spanish crown after Prince Manco Inca’s abdication; in this sense the Andean empire of the Incas lived on.⁷⁷¹ By referring to Peru as an empire he demonstrates that his homeland was not merely a territorial possession of the Spanish crown, but instead held a position of grandeur and dignity on par with European states.

Generally speaking, the imperial tradition played a central role in the construction of Peru as a country in the sixteenth century;⁷⁷² through both the Incas and the establishment of the seat of the viceroy in Lima, colonial Peru could claim a legitimate imperial status. As Sabine MacCormack writes, Garcilaso in turn favored empire over other kinds of states, and saw the world “through an imperial lens and in light of Roman antecedents, contrasts, and examples.”⁷⁷³ Moreover, by depicting Peru as an empire that consisted of kingdoms and provinces, the mestizo

⁷⁶⁸ Thurner, 9.

⁷⁶⁹ Garcilaso de la Vega, *El Inca, Royal Commentaries of the Incas, and General History of Peru*, ed. and trans. by Harold V. Livermore (Austin: University of Texas press, 1989), 645.

⁷⁷⁰ Christian Fernández, “Noticias del imperio: la crisis cinanciera de España,” in *Entre la espada y la pluma*, 118. See Chapter 4 for further information on the *arbitristas*.

⁷⁷¹ Thurner, 46.

⁷⁷² MacCormack, xviii.

⁷⁷³ MacCormack, 236, 242.

historian could place his homeland on equal semantic footing with Spain, France, and other polities of the Old World.⁷⁷⁴

While Garcilaso asserts Peru's majesty and splendor, he nonetheless demonstrates that the immense resources that it could offer Spain and the world were put in jeopardy. Indeed, he posits that his country had a troubled history beginning with the first meeting between Francisco Pizarro and the Inca Atahualpa. As other scholars have remarked, Garcilaso's idyllic and utopian account of the peaceful rule of the Incas found in *The Royal Commentaries of the Incas* contrasts with the turmoil and violence of the conquest, civil wars, and rebellions detailed in the *General History of Peru*.⁷⁷⁵ This stark juxtaposition should not be read as a complete indictment of Spanish rule. Garcilaso notes that although the arrival of the Pizarro brothers and Almagro heralded decades of conflict, it also brought Peru, and its many inhabitants, into the arms of the mother Church.⁷⁷⁶ Through Spanish rule Peru "found her true voice in the universal 'culture' or word of Christian history."⁷⁷⁷

Nevertheless, the mestizo historian asserts that mishaps and mistakes marred the conquest and administration of Peru. Specifically, Garcilaso argues that cultural and political miscommunication tarnished his country's transition into Christendom. The painful wounds resulting from the conquest, settlement, and governance of Peru in the sixteenth century could have been avoided. The confusion and lack of understanding between the Incas, Spanish *encomenderos*, and agents of the crown resulted in unnecessary conflict that served to threaten both the financial and spiritual fruits of Spanish rule in the Andes.

The dilemma of linguistic misunderstanding between Indians and the Spanish looms particularly large in Garcilaso's works. For instance, he describes at length the problems of miscommunication in his earlier *La Florida del Inca*, which chronicles Hernando de Soto's ill-fated expedition to the present-day southeastern United States.⁷⁷⁸ Garcilaso himself was keenly aware of the intimate relation between language and empire, and extensive commentaries on Antonio de Nebrija's famous linguistic works and Pedro Mexía's *Historia imperial y cesara* were found in his library.⁷⁷⁹

The cost of linguistic and cultural miscommunication was a matter that Peru's Indian and Spanish inhabitants were grappling with on a daily basis, and this same issue underlines Garcilaso's treatment of the fateful encounter at Cajamarca.⁷⁸⁰ Indeed, this first meeting between Atahualpa and Francisco Pizarro's band stands as arguably the most consequential example of confusion between the Spanish and the Incas in the *Royal Commentaries*. Garcilaso presents an idealized interpretation of the pivotal event, in which both sides possessed noble intentions; the Incas in particular had no desire to fight the newly arrived Spanish. Nevertheless, monumental linguistic barriers drastically hampered any efforts at meaningful communication.

⁷⁷⁴ Turner, 15.

⁷⁷⁵ Brading, 260.

⁷⁷⁶ Garcilaso, 635.

⁷⁷⁷ Turner, 15.

⁷⁷⁸ Lisa Voigt, "Captivity, Exile and Interpretation in *La Florida del Inca*," *Colonial Latin American Review* 11:2 (2002), 257.

⁷⁷⁹ MacCormack, 186-7. Nebrija is best known for his *Gramática de la lengua castellana*, in which he famously declared in his dedication to the Catholic Monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella that "language is the companion of empire." Mexía was a royal chronicler for Charles V. His *Historia imperial y caesarea* traced the history of imperial grandeur and dignity from Julius Caesar to Maximilian I.

⁷⁸⁰ MacCormack, 102.

He writes that the conquistadors' interpreter, the captured Indian Felipillo, faced an almost insurmountable task as he sought to translate the speeches and entreaties of the Incas and the Spanish. Garcilaso remarks that the unfortunate interpreter was unable to properly translate Hernando de Soto's speech, in which the Spaniard outlined the authority of God and the Spanish king, and requested that the Inca submit to the crown's protection and receive instruction in the Catholic faith.⁷⁸¹ Importantly, Garcilaso portrays this speech as a legitimate effort to get Atahualpa to peacefully submit to the Spanish; in truth it was likely a superficial attempt to fulfill the *Requerimiento*, the legal document outlining the sovereignty of the crown over the Americas and the authority of Church. The crown required the *Requerimiento* to be read to the native population before entering into hostilities.⁷⁸² Indeed, Pizarro and his companions aimed to repeat Hernán Cortés's successful tactic of quickly capturing the emperor in order to subdue his subjects and gain the support of his rivals.⁷⁸³

Regardless, Garcilaso notes that Felipillo misunderstood de Soto's well-intentioned speech, to the effect that "he rendered the words so barbarously and badly, giving many of them the opposite meaning, that he not only upset the Inca, but angered the hearers by belittling the majesty of the embassy, as if it had come from complete barbarians."⁷⁸⁴ Felipillo's language skills were rough and undeveloped, as he learned "the language of the Incas" from savage Indians in the Incan imperial periphery at Tumbes, and he only picked up Spanish by listening to Pizarro's soldiers. In addition, "Though baptized, he had received no instruction on the Christian religion and knew nothing about Christ our Lord, and was totally ignorant of the Apostle's creed."⁷⁸⁵

Likewise, Garcilaso writes that the failure to properly communicate severely hampered the efforts of Atahualpa and his noble retinue to revere the Spanish delegation. For instance, in his reply to Hernando de Soto, the Inca gave a moving speech in which he revered the Spanish as messengers of the god *Viracocha* and offered to submit to them, while also requesting that they take pity on his subjects after they had caused death and destruction while moving through the provinces of the empire. According to Garcilaso, "The [Spanish] ambassadors were very surprised to see the weeping of the captains and *curacas* at what the king so calmly said. They did not know the cause of these tears, but seeing such noble people shed them, they were filled with pity and compassion." Nevertheless, this sympathy quickly turned to apprehension and confusion, as the interpreter's mistranslation of the Inca's speech made it seem as if Atahualpa was not offering obeisance, but instead sought to avenge the damages that Pizarro and his companions had inflicted during their expedition.⁷⁸⁶

For Garcilaso, the problematic communication between the two parties became even more confused when Fray Vicente Valverde attempted to instruct Atahualpa in the basic tenants of the Christian faith and the Spanish crown's mission on the New World. Once again, the mestizo historian notes that the interpreter Felipillo faced an incredibly difficult task in mediating between the Incas and the Spanish during this crucial encounter. Speaking of his translation of the Dominican friar's speech, "he did it badly and often reversed the sense, but this was not done out of malice, but because he did not understand what he was interpreting, and

⁷⁸¹ Garcilaso, 673-4.

⁷⁸² For additional information on the *Requerimiento* see Chapter III of Lewis Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America*.

⁷⁸³ Peter Klarén, *Society and Nationhood in the Andes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 35.

⁷⁸⁴ Garcilaso, 673-4.

⁷⁸⁵ Garcilaso, 681-2.

⁷⁸⁶ Garcilaso, 675-6.

spoke it like a parrot.” Felipillo’s efforts at translating the instructions on the Holy Trinity proved to be especially problematic. He neither properly understood the theological concept, nor could he translate it in his crude Quechua; moreover, to underscore the impossibility of the situation, Garcilaso notes that the Catholic faith was alien to the Inca.⁷⁸⁷

Garcilaso remits both Fray Valverde and Felipillo for this failure to communicate religious matters with Atahualpa. Unlike many other Spanish chroniclers of Peru, Garcilaso does not outright disparage Felipillo as an imbecile.⁷⁸⁸ He instead writes that the Indian language itself lacked the words to adequately describe Christian doctrine; indeed, he notes that “more than eighty years after the conquest of the empire there are still no words in Indian for the matters of our holy religion,” and that priests are still were still struggling to learn native languages in order to properly catechize the Indians of Peru.⁷⁸⁹

Garcilaso paints the ultimately violent encounter at Cajamarca as a tragic episode that was rooted in the miscommunication between the Incas and the Spain. His account of the outbreak of fighting at the meeting absolves the Incas of any blame. According to the historian, while Atahualpa and his nobles did raise an outcry in response to the friar’s speech, they did so only because they remained confused about the justifications behind Fray Valverde’s demands for tribute for the Spanish crown.⁷⁹⁰ In fact, Atahualpa agreed to submit to the authority of Charles V, and he expressed respectful curiosity over the distorted account of Christianity given to him via Felipillo’s translations.

In reality Atahualpa was likely neither this benign nor cowed at Cajamarca. Traveling with his full military routine, the Inca was probably more focused on his triumphal entry into Cuzco after defeating his brother Huascar than the relatively small band of strangely dressed foreigners that had suddenly appeared. Later during his imprisonment Atahualpa allegedly admitted to Pizarro that he had planned to overwhelm and capture the Spanish at Cajamarca.⁷⁹¹ While both Atahualpa and the Spanish likely had less than peaceable intentions during this encounter, Garcilaso emphasizes that the emperor wanted to peacefully submit to the crown and comply to the Spaniards’ demands due to the Incan belief that they were messengers of the deified Inca Viracocha.⁷⁹² As such, the fault appears to lie with the Spanish in breaking the peace, as he writes that they began looting and plundering the assembled nobility because the soldiers “were unable to brook the length of the discourse” of Atahualpa’s reply to the Dominican priest.⁷⁹³ Indeed, this is one of the few instances where the mestizo historian is overtly critical of the early conquerors of Peru, who he often praises.⁷⁹⁴

As Garcilaso himself notes, this account of the clash at Cajamarca departs from many other earlier historians’ depictions, which assert that the Spanish only attacked the Incas in response to Frey Valverde’s cries of distress when Atahualpa threw the friar’s Bible on the

⁷⁸⁷ Garcilaso, 682-3.

⁷⁸⁸ Thurner, 23. Interestingly, like La Malinche in Mexico, the name Felipillo lives on as a derogatory term in Peru. “Felipillo” refers to a traitor and a sneak, and today is usually used for politicians who are seen as being too close to the governments of the U.S. or Chile.

⁷⁸⁹ Garcilaso, 683-4.

⁷⁹⁰ Garcilaso, 688.

⁷⁹¹ Klarén, 34-5.

⁷⁹² Garcilaso, 672. Thurner, 46.

⁷⁹³ Garcilaso, 687.

⁷⁹⁴ Brading, 266.

ground and impudently insulted the authority of the Pope and Charles V.⁷⁹⁵ He asserts that this scenario in fact never transpired, and that Fray Valverde himself dropped his Bible and his cross on the ground in response to the shouts of the Indians when the Spanish began looting. Crucially, instead of calling for the Spanish to attack the Incas, he

hurried to his companions, shouting to them not to harm the Indians, for he was much taken by Atahualpa, realizing his good sense and understanding from his reply and the questions he put. The friar was on the point of satisfying these questions when the uproar began; and because of this the Spaniards did not hear what the priest was saying on behalf of the Indians.⁷⁹⁶

As such, Garcilaso makes clear that the violence at Cajamarca could have likely have been prevented, or at least mitigated, through proper communication between the Incas and Pizarro's band. According to his take on the critical event, Atahualpa had every intention to welcome the Spanish and comply with their demands. While his treatment of Felipillo highlights the confusion surrounding this encounter and the potential difficulties of explaining the Christian faith to the natives, Fray Valverde's intercession reveals that the Spanish and Incas were capable of understanding one another on some level during their first meeting. The linguistic barriers of the encounter were imposing, but not completely insurmountable. Regardless, the Dominican friar was unable to deliver his message of peace to his companions, and Garcilaso demonstrates that the failure to communicate at Cajamarca carried vivid consequences. In effect he portrays the fracas between Pizarro's soldiers and the forces of the Incas as a slaughter, writing that the Indians dutifully carried out their emperor's order not to fight the Spanish. As a result, more than 5,000 Indians died, including 1,500 from a crowd of old men, women, and children who had gathered "to see and celebrate the arrival of those they regarded as gods."⁷⁹⁷

This consequential linguistic problem was not just limited to the fateful encounter at Cajamarca, but instead continued to be a major issue throughout the conquest, as the mestizo historian notes that this failure to communicate effectively cut short any possibility of peaceful transition to Spanish rule. For instance, Garcilaso asserts that mistranslations of Quechua and Spanish led to the deaths of the last two Incan emperors, Atahualpa and his brother Huáscar; in his view the passing of the two Incas plunged Peru's Indians into a state of disorder and made the establishment of Spanish rule more difficult.

Shortly the Spanish arrival in Peru, Atahualpa and Huáscar had been engaged in a civil war over the imperial title. This conflict resulted in the defeat and imprisonment of Huáscar, who Garcilaso and other Spanish historians of colonial Peru regarded as the legitimate imperial claimant. In fact, Atahualpa is commonly regarded as a brutal tyrant in colonial Peru's historiography.⁷⁹⁸ Garcilaso notes that the Inca carried out a brutal extermination of the Incan royal family to insure his ascension to the throne, and some members of the historian's family

⁷⁹⁵ For earlier accounts see Francisco López de Gómara's *Historia general de las Indias* and Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo de Valdés's *Historia general y natural de las Indias*. The early seventeenth-century historians Prudencio de Sandoval (*Historia de la vida y hechos del emperador Carlos V*) and Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas (*Historia general de los hechos de los Castellanos en las islas i tierra firme del Mar Oceano*) likewise assert that Atahualpa provoked the Spanish by dropping the cross and Bible on the ground.

⁷⁹⁶ Garcilaso, 688.

⁷⁹⁷ Garcilaso, 689.

⁷⁹⁸ Franklin Pease G.Y., *Las crónicas y los Andes* (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1995), 373.

were the victims of this purge.⁷⁹⁹ As noted earlier, Garcilaso advances the last of the Inca emperors as a model of tyranny and despotism that the readers of the *Royal Commentaries* should avoid.⁸⁰⁰ In fact, Garcilaso cites the Jesuit historian Blas Valera, who writes that Atahualpa's mild and gentle behavior at the meeting at Cajamarca was a miracle, since he normally was angry and bellicose.⁸⁰¹

Huáscar Inca remained imprisoned after Pizarro's capture of Atahualpa, and Garcilaso writes that Hernando de Soto and Pedro del Barco, two of Pizarro's soldiers, encountered the captive Inca at his prison while scouting shortly after the events at Cajamarca. According to Garcilaso, Huáscar begged the two to liberate him, since he rightfully thought that his brother would soon put him to death. As a reward he would give the Spanish even more gold than Atahualpa had promised for his ransom, since his brother was an usurper and did not know the location of many of the Inca's treasure caches. De Soto and Barco, while moved by the pitiful sight of the Inca, could only communicate via rudimentary signs with the captive monarch, and thus did not fully understand the dire urgency of Huáscar's peril. As such, they agreed to help him, but only after their return from their scouting mission.⁸⁰² This delay would indeed prove fateful; while under the captivity of the Spanish, Atahualpa clandestinely ordered the death of his brother in order to stop him from reaching any agreement with Pizarro and his men.⁸⁰³

Garcilaso believes that Huáscar's brutal execution, during which he was quartered and flayed, could have easily been prevented if not for this failure to communicate with Pizarro's scouts. He writes that de Soto and Barco did not understand "his offer to give them three times as much treasure as his brother had promised. If they had understood this, they would have stayed with him..."⁸⁰⁴ This take on the execution serves as further proof of the destructive consequences of linguistic confusion during the early period of Spanish rule in Peru.

Garcilaso also shows that communication problems led to Atahualpa's own execution at the hands of the Spanish. He relates that the interpreter Felipillo purposefully mistranslated the testimony of Indian witnesses during Atahualpa's trial to make it seem that the Inca had secret plans to kill the Spanish. The interpreter carried out this deception because he was in love with one of Atahualpa's wives, and he knew that the Spanish had no way of confirming any of his false translations; this bogus testimony in turn played an instrumental role in the eventual decision to execute the emperor. Garcilaso concludes, "We might therefore say that the lack of good and faithful interpreters was the chief cause of the deaths of these two powerful kings [Atahualpa and Huáscar]."⁸⁰⁵

Many earlier Spanish historians, most notably Pedro Cieza de León, argue that Spanish greed brought about the death of the last of the Inca emperors.⁸⁰⁶ Indeed, the Pizarro brothers and their supporters did not enjoy an entirely sterling reputation in the historical record, with the prominent historian Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés expressing a particular dislike of the conquistadors based on his own personal experiences with the family.⁸⁰⁷ In contrast, Garcilaso

⁷⁹⁹ Garcilaso, 619.

⁸⁰⁰ Thurner, 42. Pease, 374.

⁸⁰¹ Garcilaso, 688.

⁸⁰² Garcilaso, 700.

⁸⁰³ Garcilaso, 705.

⁸⁰⁴ Garcilaso, 705.

⁸⁰⁵ Garcilaso, 710-1.

⁸⁰⁶ MacCormack, 78.

⁸⁰⁷ MacCormack, 70. Garcilaso largely blames Pizarro's partner turned rival Almagro and his followers for pushing for Atahualpa's execution.

asserts that a failure to communicate was the primary driving force behind Atahualpa's death. By framing the execution in this manner, Garcilaso not only presents a more positive image of the conquerors of Peru, but he also further highlights the dangers of linguistic confusion.

The deaths of Huáscar and Atahualpa would come to carry fateful consequences. Although Garcilaso's sympathies clearly lay with Huáscar, he argues that both Incan brothers would have supported the Spanish in Peru, as he writes that even the once tyrannous Atahualpa had offered his obeisance to Pizarro and agreed to be baptized.⁸⁰⁸ Garcilaso asserts that prior to the deaths of these two emperors, the Incas offered no resistance to the Spanish, thus positing a marked contrast between the relatively orderly state of affairs while the two Incas were still alive, and the resulting chaos after their executions. He notes that their deaths paved the way for the eventual outbreak of war between the Spanish and the remaining forces of the Incas.

In the first place, the executions of Atahualpa and Huáscar threw the Indians into disarray. He writes, "With the death of the Incas, the Indians of both parties were like sheep without a shepherd, with no one to govern them in peace or war, either for their own good or to the detriment of their foes."⁸⁰⁹ This discord soon gave rise to the emergence of brutal and rebellious warlords such as the Incan commander Rumiñauí, who sought to solidify his power through brutal methods. Garcilaso writes that his cruel acts included the murder of Atahualpa's surviving relatives, including young girls and boys; he performed this abominable crime because the oldest surviving brother of Atahualpa refused to rise up against the Spanish.⁸¹⁰

Garcilaso notes that not all of the Incan military remained hostile to the Spanish in the wake of Atahualpa's death. Garcilaso writes that while the heir to the throne Prince Manco Inca and Pizarro were negotiating a peace agreement in Cuzco, the Spanish commander Alvarado had encountered the Indian captain Quízquiz. Countering the claims of the earlier historians López de Gómara and Agustín de Zárate, Garcilaso asserts that Quízquiz had in fact no intention to fight. As proof he notes that when the Spanish forces appeared, women and servants surrounded the Incan commander and his army, and Quízquiz made no move to mobilize his soldiers. Unfortunately, Alvarado and his men "were ignorant of Quízquiz's desire of peace and friendship," and no news of Manco Inca's peace treaty had yet reached them.⁸¹¹ "Thus the Spaniards were anxious to destroy Quízquiz, not knowing his peaceable intentions; if they had known of them, they would have accepted them most willingly, for they too desired peace, like the Indians."⁸¹² Alvarado and Quízquiz thus fought a needless and easily avoidable battle, which led to the deaths of 53 Spaniards and 60 Indians, according to Garcilaso.⁸¹³

The clash serves as another vivid example of the potentially disastrous consequences of miscommunication between the Incas and the Spanish. Through his account of the encounter between Alvarado and Quízquiz Garcilaso again demonstrates that the failure to communicate obfuscated the peaceful intentions of the Incas and led to unnecessary violence. Indeed, Garcilaso notes that due to the parity of casualties between the two sides, Pizarro and his men

⁸⁰⁸ Garcilaso, 712-3.

⁸⁰⁹ Garcilaso, 721.

⁸¹⁰ Garcilaso, 738-9.

⁸¹¹ Garcilaso, 765. Garcilaso notes that Almagro had departed earlier in search of Alvarado, but this was before news of Manco Inca's desire for peace had reached the Spanish camp through Francisco de Chaves, who had been taken prisoner in the above mentioned skirmishes with the Indians.

⁸¹² Garcilaso, 765.

⁸¹³ Garcilaso, 768.

viewed this encounter as an embarrassing defeat that helped to dispel the Spaniards' image of invincibility amongst the Indians.⁸¹⁴

In a telling remark about the tragic and lamentable nature of this battle, Garcilaso writes that "the devil went sowing discord with all his arts and wiles and frustrating the teaching of the Catholic faith so that those gentiles should not escape from between his claws and free themselves from his cruel oppression."⁸¹⁵ As such, not only did miscommunication result in needless bloodshed, but it also delayed the all-important evangelization of Peru, which he considered this to be the driving force and justification behind the Spanish mission in his homeland.⁸¹⁶

The *Royal Commentaries* relates that aside from the revolt of Manco Inca, which according to Garcilaso resulted from Francisco Pizarro's purposeful delay in granting the Indian prince territorial restitution, the majority of the other major violent episodes related to the conquest of Peru could have likely been avoided if the Spanish and Incas had been able to properly communicate.⁸¹⁷ In sum, miscommunication effectively marred what should have been the peaceful transition from Incan to Spanish rule in Peru. In keeping with his sympathetic view of many of the *encomenderos* and his valorization of the Incas, Garcilaso asserts that figures from both camps possessed admirable intentions; nevertheless, linguistic and cultural differences frustrated their noble designs.

Garcilaso also demonstrates that misunderstandings seriously undermined the relations between the *vecinos* of Peru and the Spanish crown. The gulf between Spain and the New World at times looms quite large in the *Royal Commentaries*. Garcilaso bases his own authority as an historian of Peru on his unique heritage. As Margarita Zamora writes, his explicit self-identification as a mestizo "allows him to proclaim his indigenous heritage as a differentiating and privileging factor simultaneously with his ties to Spain."⁸¹⁸ Garcilaso argues that his special access to his mother's Incan relatives and his experiences growing up in the household of his *encomendero* father enabled him to write an accurate history of Peru that corrected the errors and filled the lacunas of earlier Spanish historians, some of whom had never set foot in Peru. In his view, although authors such as Pedro Cieza de León or Francisco López Gómara certainly wrote with a good deal of passion and engagement, they nonetheless wrote about his Andean homeland as outsiders.⁸¹⁹

In contrast, while he had spent most of his adult life in Spain, Garcilaso claims a deep personal and familial connection to Peru. His authority on matters of Incan history rests on his knowledge of Quechua and his ties to his mother, who was an Incan princess.⁸²⁰ Through his mother Garcilaso had intimate access to the Inca's oral history and the surviving members of the Incan royal family, the most notable being Prince Sayri Tupac, who would occasionally descend

⁸¹⁴ Garcilaso, 769.

⁸¹⁵ Garcilaso, 765-6.

⁸¹⁶ Thurner, 15. Brading, 259

⁸¹⁷ Garcilaso, 795. In contrast to Garcilaso's reading of the event, Manco Inca was chosen as a puppet ruler by Pizarro and his men. Manco Inca chose to revolt in part because of the many personal slights and humiliations he had received at the hands of Cuzco's Spanish residents, including Hernando, Gonzalo, and Juan Pizarro. Manco Inca was also angered by his subjects being unlawfully pressed into labor gangs or personal service by the Spanish. See Klarén, 40.

⁸¹⁸ Zamora, *Language, Authority, and Indigenous History*, 48-9.

⁸¹⁹ MacCormack, 61-2.

⁸²⁰ Zamora, 45.

from the remote Incan fortress at Vilcabamba to visit Cuzco.⁸²¹ In turn, his father and namesake, Garcilaso de la Vega, was a *vecino* of high standing of Cuzco who participated in the conquest of Peru and fought on the side of the crown during the civil wars and rebellions that wracked the colony in its tumultuous early years. Garcilaso El Inca thus relied heavily on both family anecdotes and his own personal memories to cement the second-half of the *Royal Commentaries*'s historical authority.⁸²²

In this regard Garcilaso's work highlights the growing importance of experiential authority in New World history writing in the early modern period. In keeping with the influences of the classical authors Herodotus, Pliny, Thucydides, and Polybius, Renaissance historiography emphasized the importance of eyewitness testimony for recounting truthful histories.⁸²³ This especially came to be the case with histories of the New World, as the discovery of the Americas contradicted the revered writers of antiquity and thrust the authority of the eyewitness into an especially privileged historiographic position. New World historiography thus came to rely increasingly on the authority of those who had traveled to the Americas.⁸²⁴ Margarita Zamora writes,

One can, in fact divide colonial Latin American historical narrative into two general types: the bookish histories written from a distance and lacking direct contact with the material, and those which challenged them based on the authority of eyewitness testimony, either as an attribute of the actual narrator of the account or of the privileged source on whose prerogative the validity of the history rests.⁸²⁵

Having first-hand experience in the Americas enabled an author to write a more accurate and truthful history of the New World.

This emphasis on the importance of first-hand experience in the Americas when writing an accurate and truthful history of the New World is apparent in the *Royal Commentaries*. Garcilaso asserts that his own personal and familial links allowed him to avoid the pitfalls that bedeviled other historians who wrote about Peru, including a reliance on bad informants who gave distorted accounts to further their own ends.⁸²⁶ Indeed, the colony's controversial history was ripe territory for this sort of political bias. Garcilaso argues that it is inherently difficult to fully understand the Americas from the perspective of Spain due to a distance that was not only geographic, but also social and political.⁸²⁷ This trans-Atlantic disconnect in turn informs his view of Peru's colonial past and administration, as he demonstrates that confusion and misunderstandings marred the relation between his homeland and the Spanish metropole.

⁸²¹ Brading, 260.

⁸²² Brading, 267.

⁸²³ Thurner, 20.

⁸²⁴ Zamora, 39. Interestingly, the authority of the eyewitness was also highly valued in the legal system and notarial codes of the Spanish empire. See Roberto González Echevarría's *Myth and Archive: A Theory of Latin American Narrative*. For a more detailed discussion on the epistemological relation between the discovery of the New World and the Classical canon see Anthony Grafton's *Old Worlds, Ancient Texts*.

⁸²⁵ Zamora, 39-40.

⁸²⁶ Thurner, 20. See Garcilaso's remarks on Diego Fernández de Palencia, whom he argues wrote an inaccurate history of the Peruvian civil wars by using accounts from unsavory and politically biased witnesses who desired financial gain. Garcilaso, 1203.

⁸²⁷ MacCormack, 102-3.

For the mestizo historian, the New Laws were undoubtedly the most egregious example of imperial miscommunication. The New Laws were a series of reforms implemented by Charles V in 1542 to curtail the power of the *encomenderos* (holders of *encomiendas*) and mitigate their abuses of the indigenous populations. The *encomienda* in essence was a sort of trusteeship granted by the Spanish crown over a group of Indians in exchange for services undertaken during the conquest and colonization of the Americas. In return for collecting tribute in the form of labor and goods from their charges, the *encomenderos* in theory were responsible for their Christianization and protection. The *encomienda* proved to be one of the primary lynchpins of the conquest and settlement of the Americas. In the absence of formal funding from the crown this labor grant was a driving force behind the private expeditions to the New World. Indeed, in Peru the *encomienda* proved to be the greatest source of wealth and upward mobility for the colony's early conquerors.⁸²⁸

It stands that Indians often endured harsh treatment and exploitation at the hands of the *encomenderos* as they could be squeezed for tribute and treated as personal servants under this quasi-feudal labor arrangement. By the early 1540s accounts of these abuses had become widespread that many Spaniards, especially clerics, began calling for the abolishment of the *encomienda*. For its part the Spanish crown grew increasingly alarmed over the precipitous drop in the indigenous population, which advocates of imperial reform attributed to the exploitative *encomenderos*.⁸²⁹

The most famous and outspoken protector of the Indians was the Dominican Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas, who chronicled the atrocities of the conquest and Spanish rule in the Americas in his *Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies*. His charges of abuse set off a fierce debate in the court of Charles V over the justification of the Spanish presence in the Americas. Importantly, Las Casas asserted that the cruel treatment of the Indians at the hands of the *encomenderos* negated the Spanish crown's right to rule the Indies.⁸³⁰ In turn, Charles V and his ministers grew increasingly concerned about the power of the *encomendero* lords, many of whom had petitioned the crown to make their *encomienda* permanent across generations, essentially turning the grants into formal Indian fiefs.⁸³¹ After a great deal of debate, the emperor promulgated the famous New Laws on November 20, 1542.

The New Laws dramatically altered the political, social, and economic landscape of Spanish America. Aside from abolishing the enslavement of Indians and instituting other labor reforms, these ordinances placed major restrictions on the *encomiendas*. One law stipulated that the crown could immediately deprive an *encomendero* of his Indians if they were mistreated. Arguably the most controversial ordinance was Law 35, which took away all Indians from any *encomendero* who was a royal official or prelate, prohibited any future grants of Indians, and declared that all *encomiendas* would expire upon the death of their original holder, with the Indians returning to the care of the crown. The New Laws produced an immediate and violent backlash amongst the *encomenderos*, who saw their livelihoods and family's futures threatened by these reforms.⁸³²

⁸²⁸ Klarén, 41-2.

⁸²⁹ Klarén, 42, 45.

⁸³⁰ Lewis Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* (Dallas, Texas: Southern Methodist University Press, 2002), 83.

⁸³¹ Hanke, 86-7. J.H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 40.

⁸³² Hanke, 92.

Garcilaso accordingly portrays the New Laws as a disastrous mistake. In his view, the New Laws were the fruits of imperial misjudgment. Their supporters did not foresee the disastrous consequences of these ordinances in large part because they possessed an incomplete and inaccurate understanding of the Americas and its Spanish and Indian inhabitants. The architects of the New Laws were thus well intentioned but seriously misguided reformers who were “very zealous for the well being of the Indians without considering the difficulties and the harm that would result to the very persons they wished to assist from their ill advice and folly...” Garcilaso likewise writes that Las Casas “showed himself extremely zealous for the welfare of the Indians and spoke very warmly in their defence. He proposed reforms which, although they seemed good and holy, nevertheless proved very harsh and difficult to put to effect.”⁸³³

As such, these good intentions mattered very little in the face of a complete lack of knowledge concerning the proper administration of New Spain and Peru. Indeed, the New Laws could not have been implemented at a worse time for Peru, which had only just recovered between the violent and long civil war between the leading conquerors Francisco Pizarro and Diego de Almagro.⁸³⁴ According to the mestizo historian, many of the proposed ordinances shockingly revealed a complete ignorance of the affairs of these New World empires. For instance, he asserts that the law that prohibited any Spaniard from forcing an Indian to work was in fact largely unnecessary, and actually harmful to the indigenous population. He writes that while some conscienceless Spaniards engaged in this practice of forced Indian labor, by and large this was not the case for the majority of *encomenderos*,

for there were many who paid their Indians and treated them like their own children; and the Indians were and are prepared to work without pay, for they are like day laborers in Spain who hire themselves out to dig or reap and work for their food. To forbid Indians in this way was to do them much harm, for it deprived them of their right to eat. What should have been done was to order those who did not pay them to be severely punished.⁸³⁵

He in turn adds that the supporters of the New Laws “must have been misinformed” about the supposed severity of the *encomenderos*’ requirements of personal service from the Indians. Garcilaso states that contrary to the reformers’ exaggerated descriptions of onerous labor demands, this obligation merely entailed supplying the *vecino*’s house with fuel, water and fodder. Citing his own experiences in the household of his father, Garcilaso asserts that the Indians willingly performed this task with “ease and content,” noting that the crown eventually learned that both Indians and Spaniards found this practice acceptable, and made no attempt to alter it.⁸³⁶

Garcilaso echoes the assessment of the original opponents of the New Laws, stating that the reforms would amount to no less than the complete upending of the established economic and social order in New Spain in Peru.⁸³⁷ This is particularly evident with the ordinance that called for taking away the *encomiendas* of the *vecinos* who fought in the war between Pizarro

⁸³³ Garcilaso, 934-5.

⁸³⁴ Klarén, 42. This civil war, which claimed the lives of Francisco Pizarro, Diego de Almagro, and his son, was fought over the spoils of the conquest of the Incan empire. Garcilaso largely sides with the Pizarro faction in his history.

⁸³⁵ Garcilaso, 937-8.

⁸³⁶ Garcilaso, 938.

⁸³⁷ Hanke, 92-3.

and Almagro. In the mestizo historian's view, this was an overly draconian measure that revealed a grossly incorrect understanding of the conflict. Although he laments the destruction and chaos that came about from the fighting, he also notes that those most responsible for the outbreak of the war had already met justice by the time of the formulation of the New Laws. Importantly, this ridiculous measure, coupled with a separate law that prohibited anyone who held a governmental office from possessing an *encomienda*, meant that "practically nobody in Peru could have Indians or estates, and none of the people of standing in New Spain or Peru could have them... So that these two laws alone were like a sort of net that enclosed the whole of the Indies and excluded their owners."⁸³⁸

For Garcilaso, the New Laws in essence were rooted in ignorance of the Americas. This sentiment is especially clear in his account of the royal councilors who objected to the ordinances. He writes that all those opposed to the New Laws were "men of experience in Indian affairs," and with the exceptions Charles V's secretary Francisco de los Cobos and the president of the Orders Don García Manrique, all of the other officials in this camp had spent a significant amount of time serving the crown in the Americas. Garcilaso draws particular attention to the objections of cardinal of Seville Don García de Loaysa, who he writes was a member of the Supreme Council of the Indies "and had been a governor in the Indies for many years, and knew more about them and what was necessary for their good than many of those who had conquered them and settled there."⁸³⁹ In contrast, he downplays Las Casas's own experiences in the New World, writing that his time in the Americas was only limited to passing through the Antilles and parts of Mexico as a secular priest.⁸⁴⁰

With this discussion Garcilaso thus asserts the importance of proper experiential knowledge and authority in the governance of the New World. Cardinal Loaysa and the other above officials were able to see through the misunderstandings and misinformation circulating at court concerning the state of Spanish America because of their trans-Atlantic experiences. Garcilaso in turn notes that Charles V displayed a certain amount of naiveté in listening to the well-meaning but imprudent ministrations of Las Casas and passing the New Laws. The emperor was very religious, and "easily persuaded to do as the friar [Las Casas] wanted, for fear of the burden on his conscience if he failed to execute the new laws and ordinances that were necessary for the well being of the Indians."⁸⁴¹ The spatial and mental gulf between Spain and the New World was largely to blame for the emperor's failure to listen to his experienced councilors.

The New Laws resulted in catastrophe for Spanish Peru, an outcome which Garcilaso makes clear in his history. While the newly appointed viceroy of New Spain Antonio de Mendoza staved off revolt by declaring that the New Laws would not be implemented until the Council of the Indies could hear an appeal, the viceroy of Peru Blasco Núñez Vela unwisely followed a different course of action.⁸⁴² Completely misjudging the mood of the Spanish inhabitants of Peru, the viceroy chose to strictly enforce the ordinances.⁸⁴³ Knowing of these intentions before Núñez Vela's arrival, the town councils of the cities of Peru drafted a statement of opposition to the New Laws, while Gonzalo Pizarro claimed the governorship of Peru and

⁸³⁸ Garcilaso, 937.

⁸³⁹ Garcilaso, 935-6. Loaysa in fact had backed granting the *encomiendas* in perpetuity. The Cardinal would indeed be vindicated when Charles V was forced to revoke the New Laws. Hanke, 100.

⁸⁴⁰ Garcilaso, 934.

⁸⁴¹ Garcilaso, 936.

⁸⁴² Elliott, 132.

⁸⁴³ Klarén, 42.

raised an army in the name of the aggrieved *encomenderos*. Gonzalo's rebellion would engulf Peru and lead to the death of the viceroy at the battle of Añaquito.⁸⁴⁴ Garcilaso accordingly portrays the attempt to implement the New Laws in Peru as a disaster that

produced so many deaths and disasters, robbery, tyranny, and cruelty. Not a tenth of what the Indians and Spaniards suffered can be written down, for the calamities caused by the war to both sexes and all ages, throughout seven hundred leagues of territory, are impossible to fully describe.⁸⁴⁵

While this turmoil engulfed Peru, Garcilaso notes that Charles V's court in general was "astonished that the laws and ordinances framed for the universal welfare of Spaniards and Indians in Peru should have gone so awry as to cause the destruction of both and bring the kingdom to such a pass that the emperor was in danger of losing it."⁸⁴⁶ This telling statement underscores his views regarding the state of misunderstanding and confusion between Spain and the Americas. For those Spaniards who had proper experience in the New World, the disastrous effects of the New Laws would have been unsurprising.

Garcilaso's treatment of the debate and implementation of the New Laws imparts an important lesson concerning the disconnect between Spain and the Americas, and the resulting challenges surrounding the proper administration of this trans-Atlantic empire. In his view, it was inherently difficult to properly understand the practices and peoples of New Spain and Peru without first having some first hand experience in the viceroyalties. Las Casas and the crown believed that the New Laws would benefit the Indians, yet in reality these reforms merely led to violence and worsened the lot of all the inhabitants of Peru. This resulting destruction serves as a clear example of how the failure to bridge the gap between Spain and the Americas could jeopardize the peace and prosperity of the Spanish empire. By not more fully taking into account the impracticality of the New Laws and their impact on colonial society, Las Casas and his supporters at court pushed Peru to civil war and endangered the bonds between the *encomenderos* of the viceroyalty and the crown. For Garcilaso, the severity and injustice of the ordinances were largely to blame for the once loyal Gonzalo Pizarro's decision to take up arms.

Garcilaso's discussions of both the New Laws and the violent encounters between the Incas and the Spanish highlights one of the underlying arguments of the *Royal Commentaries*: miscommunication and misunderstanding marred Peru's colonial history. Linguistic and cultural barriers obscured the peaceable intentions of the Incas and Spanish and led to needless conflict between the two parties. Failure to communicate lay at the root of the violence of the encounter in Peru. In turn, the gulf between the New World and Europe posed a major problem for the colonial governance of Peru. The New Laws were based on a distorted and misinformed account of how colonial society actually operated, according to Garcilaso. The implementation of the ordinances thus reflected a fundamental failure to understand the economic, social, and political realities of the Americas. Misunderstanding thus was the main factor behind the brutal rebellion in Peru.⁸⁴⁷

⁸⁴⁴ Elliott, 132. Hanke, 96.

⁸⁴⁵ Garcilaso, 947.

⁸⁴⁶ Garcilaso, 1083.

⁸⁴⁷ Interestingly, Garcilaso's treatment of both the violence of the Conquest and the New Laws reveals the dangerous consequences of lack of proper mediation. In the case of the Incas, the poor interpretation of Felipillo exacerbated the confusion at Cajamarca and led to the death of Atahualpa. In turn, Las Casas failed as an intermediary figure

In sum, through these discussions Garcilaso outlines how miscommunication and misunderstanding tarnished what should have been the peaceful relationship between the Incas, the Spanish colonists of Peru, and the crown. For the mestizo historian, linguistic, political, and cultural confusions were intrinsic problems for a global empire that encompassed both the Old World and the New. This issue of the “confusion of empire”⁸⁴⁸ in turn heavily informs the didactic nature of Garcilaso’s work and his vision of a peaceful and prosperous Spanish-ruled Peru.

History and the Proper Arts of Rule

Like many of the other historians covered in previous chapters, Garcilaso uses his history to impart a political lesson for his readers. This aspect of his work clear becomes clear in the prelude to his discussion on the impact of the New Laws in Peru and in Mexico. Garcilaso writes that he gives his account of the divergent paths of the two vicerealties so that

Princes, kings, and monarchs may then note—since histories serve as examples of how they are to govern—and may beware of allowing such rigorous laws to be made, and of electing judges so severe that they oblige and force their vassals and subjects to lose respect and withhold the obedience they owe, and enable other princes to seek to command and govern them. For from divine and human history, ancient and modern, we see from long experience that no kingdom ever rebelled against its king because he gave it good treatment, but only on account of his harshness, cruelty, and tyranny and the excessive taxes and tributes he imposed.⁸⁴⁹

Although Garcilaso certainly is critical of certain colonial policies and administrators, his work is not a complete indictment of the Spanish imperial system in Peru.⁸⁵⁰ Rather, the *Royal Commentaries* contains important lessons on how to properly govern Peru, as Garcilaso advances models of good and bad colonial government through his work.

For Garcilaso, the effectiveness of royal administration boils down to how well a representative of the crown can deal with the problem of imperial confusion in colonial Peru. In this regard he stresses the fundamental importance of patience, mildness, and benevolence. Moreover, he asserts that an effective royal representative seeks to understand and cooperate with the inhabitants of Peru, most notably the *vecinos*.

Blasco Núñez Vela, the first viceroy of Peru, stands out as one of the major examples of bad colonial government in the *Royal Commentaries*. A seasoned royal administrator in Castile, Núñez Vela accepted the imposing and difficult task of bring Peru to heel and implementing the New Laws in the turbulent colony.⁸⁵¹ This refusal to compromise would fan the flames of the rebellion in Peru and eventually lead to his own death. Generally to be considered to be stiff, immoderate, and impolitic, Núñez Vela’s image in the Spanish colonial histories is somewhat mixed.⁸⁵² Oviedo advances a sympathetic portrait of the viceroy, as he favorably compared him

between the court and the Americas, as he gave an inaccurate assessment of the state of affairs in the New World due to his zealous desire to protect the Indians.

⁸⁴⁸ “Confusion of empire” is my term.

⁸⁴⁹ Garcilaso, 935.

⁸⁵⁰ Zamora, “Regarding Colonialism in Garcilaso’s *Historia general del Peru*,” 120-1.

⁸⁵¹ Prior to becoming Peru’s first viceroy Núñez Vela served as Inspector of the Guards in Castile, and was the *corregidor* of Cuenca and Málaga. As a captain-general he also had traveled to the Americas. Rubén Vargas Ugarte, *Historia General del Perú*, (Lima: C. Milla Batres, 1966), 1:185.

⁸⁵² Elliott, 42.

to the prudent, honorable, and tragic Athenian general Phocion, who was condemned to death by the Athenian assembly for speaking unpopular but unavoidable truths.⁸⁵³ Cieza de León, Fernandez, and Herrera criticize the viceroy for his intransience and shortsightedness while also sympathizing with his difficult position.⁸⁵⁴ Garcilaso departs from these other Spanish historians and completely demonizes Núñez Vela, portraying him as a tyrant with a “severe, harsh, and uncompromising character” who decided to rigorously enforce the New Laws “without in the least considering what was in the best interests of his king.”⁸⁵⁵

According to Garcilaso, the primary cause behind Núñez Vela’s horrible government was his myopic and obstinate approach. In his obsession to implement the full letter of the New Laws as quickly and completely as possible, the viceroy demonstrated a complete unwillingness to understand the “empire” of Peru and its inhabitants. Garcilaso writes that Agustín de Zárate, a member of the *audiencia* accompanying the viceroy, implored Núñez Vela to take a tempered and informed approach to the application of the New Laws shortly before his arrival in Peru.⁸⁵⁶ Specifically, Zárate recommended that he first survey the affairs of the colony, and enact the laws that would be appropriate for the good government of Peru and welfare of the Indians.

With regard to the laws that were too harsh and any others that seemed appropriate, it would be best to send His Majesty a report on them: then, if His Majesty again instructed him to carry them out, in spite of the information he was given, he would be in a better position to execute them...⁸⁵⁷

Yet this prudent advice to bridge the gap of misunderstanding between Spain and Peru angered the viceroy, and he “replied with some asperity, swearing to carry out the ordinances according to the stipulations contained in them and to brook no delay of postponement.”⁸⁵⁸ Núñez Vela staunchly refused to take into consideration conditions in Peru while carrying out his charge.

Indeed, Garcilaso draws particular attention to the viceroy’s seemingly willful ignorance of American affairs. He writes that one of his first acts upon arriving in the New World was to dissolve many of the *encomiendas* in Panama and send the Indians that the Spaniards had brought from Peru back to their home provinces.⁸⁵⁹ According to the mestizo historian, this act caused an uproar amongst both the Spanish and the Indians, who had converted to Christianity under the care of the *encomenderos*. The opponents of the measure made the reasoned argument that the primary objective of the Spanish presence in the New World was to spread the Christian faith, and this could not happen if the Indians were under the control of their *caciques*. Moreover, “it was obvious that if an Indian had become a Christian and then returned to his cacique’s authority, he would be sacrificed to the Devil.” Nonetheless, Núñez Vela refused to listen to these complaints, and ordered that the Indians be sent back to Peru against their will with scant provisions; as a result most died of hunger during the arduous journey from Panama.⁸⁶⁰ While a proper understanding of the New World would have likely prevented these

⁸⁵³ MacCormack, 71. Oviedo used allusions to Plutarch’s account of Phocion.

⁸⁵⁴ MacCormack, 88.

⁸⁵⁵ Garcilaso, 951.

⁸⁵⁶ Zárate would later write a history of the civil wars of Peru entitled *Historia del descubrimiento y conquista del Perú*.

⁸⁵⁷ Garcilaso, 952-3.

⁸⁵⁸ Garcilaso, 952-3.

⁸⁵⁹ Present day Panama was in the jurisdiction of the viceroyalty of Peru.

⁸⁶⁰ Garcilaso, 951-2.

deaths, the viceroy's strict approach ironically resulted in worsening the lot of the very Indians he was charged to protect.

The viceroy's uncompromising hostility towards the *vecinos* and other leading residents of Peru further highlights the tyrannical character of his rule. Garcilaso writes that as soon as Núñez Vela entered Peru he began dissolving *encomiendas*. Indeed, at his first stop in the northern city of Trujillo he enacted the New Laws in their entirety, stripping monasteries and royal officials of their Indians and dissolving the *encomiendas* of the Spaniards who participated in the conflict between Francisco Pizarro and Almagro.⁸⁶¹ Garcilaso notes the *vecinos* rightly objected to this on the grounds that the viceroy could technically only take away their Indians with the approval of the judges of the royal *audiencia*, which had not yet arrived in Peru.

Nonetheless, the viceroy refused to accept any of the petitions of the *encomenderos*, and he "intimidated and threatened those who persisted, spreading great distress and confusion in the hearts and minds of all of them when they considered how harsh the laws were, embracing them at large and sparing none."⁸⁶² The viceroy displayed a callous insensitivity towards Peru and its noble *vecinos*, as he prioritized the strict enactment of the New Laws above the well being of the colony itself. Indeed, in his zeal to enforce the royal ordinances and punish the *encomenderos*, he in fact likely circumvented proper legal procedure.

For Garcilaso, the viceroy's decision to treat the *vecinos* as his adversaries instead of attempting to come to any understanding with them in spite of their past loyalty and service to the crown was a grave error. He writes

wherever he [Núñez Vela] passed he put any part of the ordinances that was applicable into execution; and though he was aware of the disturbances and complaints this was producing, he did not cease to do so, but daily displayed greater rigor so as to prove that he was not afraid of the settlers and was determined to be a good servant of the crown and do the king's bidding: he kept saying that he would respect the king and no one else.⁸⁶³

Thus, in a gross miscalculation regarding the state of affairs in Peru and the character of the *encomenderos*, the viceroy sought to cow the *vecinos* into submission.

In marked contrast to this autocratic approach, Garcilaso notes that upon their later arrival in Peru the judges of the royal *audiencia* came to quickly understand the conditions in the viceroyalty, and accordingly opposed Núñez Vela's harsh methods. These judges tried to "temper the viceroy's wrath in the matter of executing the ordinances," since the New Laws "would lead to much greater disorders, and a kingdom that had only just laid down its arms after the recent wars could not stomach such severity, which might well bring about the perdition of them all and of the empire itself."⁸⁶⁴ In other words, the judges prudently advocated taking a measured course of action that was actually in sync with the reality of Peruvian affairs.

The grim predictions of the judges would indeed nearly come to pass, as the viceroy's failure to treat the *vecinos* with any sort of mildness and respect resulted in disaster for Peru. Shortly after his arrival in the colony Núñez Vela in fact enjoyed a fair amount of support from the *encomenderos*. When he made calls for the formation of an army to combat Gonzalo Pizarro

⁸⁶¹ Vargas Ugarte, 1:187.

⁸⁶² Garcilaso, 953.

⁸⁶³ Garcilaso, 963.

⁸⁶⁴ Garcilaso, 966.

many loyal *vecinos* rallied to his side, and he was able to gather five hundred of Peru's leading vassals.⁸⁶⁵ Nevertheless he quickly alienated these supporters. Garcilaso depicts a growing fundamental divide between the viceroy and the *encomenderos* of Peru. For instance, misunderstanding and ignorance marred his eventual attempts to appease these Spaniards after Gonzalo's revolt gained serious traction. Núñez Vela decided to finally suspend the ordinances, but he also announced that he only did so under duress, and that he would again rigorously enforce the New Laws after Peru had been brought to peace. Garcilaso writes that "the result was to anger everyone rather than to appease them. The incident clearly revealed the obstinacy of the viceroy in pursuing their common disadvantage." As such, the botched attempt at reconciliation further enraged the rebels and caused the viceroy's *vecino* supporters to become even more dejected and sympathetic towards Gonzalo Pizarro, "who had risked his neck for the sake of them all."⁸⁶⁶

Garcilaso notes that matters dramatically came to a head when, in a moment of desperation while Pizarro's army was marching in full strength towards Lima, the viceroy ordered the city to be completely evacuated and razed to prevent the encroaching rebels from finding supplies or collecting Indian serfs. This plan included sending the wives of the *vecinos* away via ships. Predictably, the scorched earth tactic raised the ire of the loyal *vecinos*, who did not want to see the city destroyed and their families "taken away by soldiers and sailors." The judges of the *audiencia* publicly opposed these tyrannous measures, which prevented the viceroy from carrying out the plan.⁸⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the episode caused significant damage to Núñez Vela's already troubled relationship with the loyal *vecinos*, as his plan to raze the city and deport their families without any sort of consent proved his callous disregard for the Peruvian *encomenderos'* welfare. Moreover, Garcilaso notes that this plan led the royal judges of the *audiencia* to place the viceroy under arrest, marking the beginning of the end of his government and throwing Peru into further confusion.⁸⁶⁸

Importantly, Garcilaso asserts that in spite of the viceroy's tyranny, some *vecinos* in fact chose to remain loyal to Núñez Vela and the crown throughout his administration, yet his imperious attitude indirectly cut off this crucial avenue of support. He writes that on the eve of the viceroy's arrest, noble *vecinos*, including Garcilaso's father, were journeying to Lima to help defend the city from the forces of Gonzalo Pizarro. However, Núñez Vela's incarceration at the hands of his judges prompted the loyal *vecinos* to scatter and go into hiding, as they were unaware of the judges' intentions, and it seemed as if they had chosen to side with Gonzalo Pizarro. Garcilaso writes that in this time of discord while many loyal *vecinos* hid in Lima, a good number of others feared for their safety in Peru and fled into the wildernesses beyond the viceroyalty, where many were killed by "unconquered Indians" or wild beasts. "All these misfortunes sprang from the passionate temper of the viceroy. If he had proceeded more

⁸⁶⁵ Vargas Ugarte, 1:197.

⁸⁶⁶ Garcilaso, 994-5.

⁸⁶⁷ Garcilaso, 995.

⁸⁶⁸ Garcilaso, 996-7. Garcilaso asserts that the judges arrested the viceroy not because they were rebels and had any sympathy towards Gonzalo Pizarro, but because they wanted to "avoid greater scandal" and prevent his murder. Garcilaso, 1004-5. The likely primary cause behind the viceroy's imprisonment was not this plan to evacuate Lima, but his murder of the well-respected factor Illán Suárez de Carvajal, who Núñez Vela suspected of secretly supporting Gonzalo Pizarro. Vargas Ugarte, 1:198-9. Núñez Vela would be shipped to Panama, where he was set free and returned to Peru to unsuccessfully fight Gonzalo Pizarro.

moderately, he would not have been arrested, for this succor would have reached him, consisting of many rich, noble, and powerful people, the flower of Cuzco and Los Charcas.”⁸⁶⁹

The depiction of Núñez Vela’s misrule found in the *Royal Commentaries* lays clear the consequences of failing to govern Peru with understanding and benevolence. In particular, the mestizo historian illustrates the fundamental importance of consulting and cooperating with the *vecinos* of his homeland. The viceroy’s unjust adversarial treatment of these subjects was perhaps the most egregious example of his failure to properly understand Peru and its inhabitants, as his harsh government created a growing and increasingly insurmountable divide between himself and the mistreated and victimized *encomenderos*. According to Garcilaso’s assessment, Núñez Vela utterly failed as an intermediary figure between the crown and the “empire” of Peru. The viceroy worsened, rather than mitigated, the imperial confusion that threatened the bond between Spain and Peru.

Although Núñez Vela’s failings as a viceroy stand out as the most spectacular in this history, Garcilaso writes that other representatives of the crown later sent to govern Peru made similar mistakes. He argues that a failure to understand conditions in Peru continued to be a serious problem for later governors and viceroys, leading to further injustice and conflict for the colony and its inhabitants.

In this vein Garcilaso gives a somewhat critical assessment of the cleric and president of the *audiencia* Pedro de la Gasca, who the crown sent to subdue Gonzalo Pizarro and restore order to Peru. Importantly, Garcilaso departs from other Spanish historians in his criticisms of Gasca, who generally viewed the president as a prudent and capable leader. Gasca adeptly gained the support of many of Gonzalo’s *vecino* followers by promising to not enact the New Laws, and by offering them administrative offices and bounties of silver from the recently discovered mines at Potosi. Through these methods Gasca was able to quickly outmaneuver and defeat Gonzalo, and by the end of his tenure in 1551 the president had successfully restored royal control in Peru.⁸⁷⁰ The sixteenth-century historians Cieza de León and Fernandez speak highly of his success in bringing peace to Peru, and they hold his administrative acumen and craftiness in particularly high regard.⁸⁷¹

Garcilaso in turn takes a different stance towards Gasca. On the one hand, he writes that in a marked departure from Núñez Vela Gasca chose to generally treat people with softness and suavity instead of harshness and severity.⁸⁷² Nevertheless, Garcilaso asserts that after Gonzalo’s defeat there was a growing gulf between the president and many of the *vecinos*, who petitioned Gasca for their just rewards for serving in the war. Indeed, these petitions were a major issue for the president during the remainder of his tenure, as over 2,500 soldiers sought compensation.⁸⁷³ Of particular note was the division of the sizeable *encomiendas* of the province of Huaynarmia, which were left vacant due to the deaths of their original holders during the war with Gonzalo. Gasca purposefully delayed making a decision in this matter, and he actively encouraged claimants to undertake expeditions outside of Peru.⁸⁷⁴ Garcilaso himself notes that although most of these petitions were justified, some dishonorable *vecinos* who had done very little during the war unfairly demanded compensation for their alleged service to the crown.

⁸⁶⁹ Garcilaso, 1005.

⁸⁷⁰ Klarén, 42-3.

⁸⁷¹ MacCormack, 82, 85-6.

⁸⁷² Garcilaso, 1243.

⁸⁷³ Vargas Ugarte, 1:263.

⁸⁷⁴ Vargas Ugarte, 1:268.

“Not a single one of them, however little he had done, failed to think himself worthy of the best allocation of Indians in all Peru.”⁸⁷⁵

Nevertheless, Garcilaso asserts Gasca handled this delicate situation poorly, as he haphazardly divided the precious grants of Indians and land without any seeming regard to who actually deserved the awards. Ignorance of Peruvian affairs lay at the root of this botched process. Gasca divided the allotments of Indians “without consulting anyone but himself and the archbishop Don Jeronimo de Loaisa—both of whom knew very little of the deeds and deserts of the claimants, as the later were quick to point out when they found they had been passed over...”⁸⁷⁶ Importantly, this unjust treatment of the *vecinos* would play a significant role in feeding the discontent that led to the later rebellion of Francisco Girón.⁸⁷⁷ Thus, in Garcilaso’s view, a more informed approach towards government that involved properly listening to the *vecinos* would have likely prevented this renewed outbreak of violence in Peru.

Garcilaso also has a negative assessment of the later viceroy the Marquis de Cañete Andrés Hurtado de Mendoza, who governed from 1556-1561. In his view, not only did Mendoza display an ignorance of Peruvian affairs, but he also lacked Gasca’s benevolence and patience. The disbursement of vacant *encomiendas* continued to be a lasting political issue in the viceroyalty, and Mendoza earned a reputation for brutality in his treatment of the discontented claimants. In one infamous episode he invited to the viceregal palace in Lima a large group of *vecinos* who were supposedly upset over the delay in the allotment of these *encomiendas*. While Mendoza claimed he wanted to dine with them, shortly after their arrival he placed the claimants under arrest and exiled them to Chile and Spain.⁸⁷⁸

Garcilaso accordingly portrays this punishment as a grave injustice. While Mendoza believed these *vecinos* to be potential rebels, Garcilaso asserts they were victims of slanderous campaign orchestrated by their rivals, “who were jealous of their merits and services.” These conspirators approached the viceroy and falsely accused the *vecinos* in question of fomenting rebellion. Garcilaso asserts that such allegations were absurd, as these *vecinos* “included the staunchest and best-known servants of the crown.”⁸⁷⁹

Nevertheless, Mendoza believed the lies of the accusers, and ordered that the *vecinos* be exiled to Spain, a punishment which they considered to be worse than death due to their love of their homeland. Garcilaso depicts the decision as a failure of understanding and judgment on the part of the viceroy, as he notes that Mendoza refused to listen to the many reasonable petitions made on behalf of the accused who had “done so much for the crown and wasted their substance on its behalf.” Indeed, the viceroy ignored the clear fact that many of these *vecinos* “bore wounds they had received in battle, fighting for their king, and they could show them in proof of their loyalty and their labors.”⁸⁸⁰ This obsession over the false rumors of rebellion blinded him to the true character and deeds of these *encomenderos*.

Moreover, during this troubling episode Mendoza displayed an obstinacy that was reminiscent of the tyrannous character of Núñez Vela. For instance, in response to the argument that the exiled *vecinos* would report their unjust treatment directly to the crown, the viceroy “replied angrily that he did not care a fig about how they went: it behooved the king’s service

⁸⁷⁵ Garcilaso, 1225.

⁸⁷⁶ Garcilaso, 1226.

⁸⁷⁷ Garcilaso, 1227-9.

⁸⁷⁸ Vargas Ugarte, 1:65.

⁸⁷⁹ Garcilaso, 1432-3.

⁸⁸⁰ Garcilaso, 1433.

and the peace of the empire that they should go, and it did not worry him what they said or did against him when they got back from Spain.”⁸⁸¹ Nevertheless, this callous and defiant attitude towards the *vecinos* would ultimately come back to Mendoza. With some satisfaction Garcilaso writes that the exiled *encomenderos* did in fact meet with Philip II, who awarded them generous pensions, and made moves to appoint a new viceroy upon learning of Mendoza’s actions.⁸⁸²

Although the mistakes of Gasca and Mendoza were far less spectacular than the failings of Núñez Vela, their missteps reveal the fundamental importance of listening to the crown’s subjects in Peru and paying proper heed to the grievances and needs of the colony’s *vecinos*. Through his discussion of these royal representatives Garcilaso singles out severity, obstinacy, and ignorance of Peruvian affairs as the hallmarks of poor government. In his view, these dangerous flaws would only serve to alienate the colony’s inhabitants, and thus widen the trans-Atlantic gap between Spain and Peru. As such, Garcilaso highlights the fundamentally important role that benevolence and understanding played in colonial governance.

Many early modern Spanish historians of Peru labeled as tyrants the rulers, rebels, and governmental figures of which they had a negative assessment. As previously mentioned, Garcilaso refers to Atahualpa as a tyrant in his work.⁸⁸³ Other historians in turn used this discourse of tyranny to demonize and delegitimize the past enemies of the Spanish crown in Peru. In his discussion of what constitutes good and bad government Garcilaso challenges some of these assertions. Specifically, he attempts to rehabilitate the historical image of Gonzalo Pizarro and the Incas, who had come to endure a vilified status in early modern Spanish historiography.

Under the guise of acting as the legitimate governor of Peru, Gonzalo Pizarro clashed with Núñez Vela, who he would defeat and kill at the battle of Añaquito in 1546 after the viceroy’s return from Panama. Confident of his cause’s legitimacy, Gonzalo replaced the royal arms present on his army’s standard with the Pizarro family coat of arms. Moreover, after the viceroy’s death many of his followers openly stated that Gonzalo Pizarro planned on proclaiming himself king of an independent Peru.⁸⁸⁴ Indeed, some of Gonzalo’s jurist supporters explored the possibility of gaining the support of Pope Paul III, who had come to resent the Spanish crown’s growing power in Rome.⁸⁸⁵ While Gonzalo himself would never issue these proclamations, he also did nothing to silence his followers. Nevertheless, his ensuing arbitrary and brutal leadership would soon come to alienate many of his supporters, which helped to pave the way for his defeat and execution at the hands of President Gasca.⁸⁸⁶

Given his controversial campaign against the Spanish crown it should come as little surprise that Spanish historians had few kind words for Gonzalo Pizarro. Oviedo and Cieza de León both refer to the rebellious conquistador as a tyrant and the enemy of the Spanish crown.⁸⁸⁷ Gonzalo continued to be demonized in early seventeenth-century histories. For example, in his *Vida y hechos del emperador Carlos V*, Philip III’s court chronicler Fray Prudencio de Sandoval describes Gonzalo Pizarro as a tyrant who threatened to put Peru to “fire and sword” if

⁸⁸¹ Garcilaso, 1433.

⁸⁸² Garcilaso, 1463. Philip II’s displeasure over Mendoza’s actions did play a large role in the premature end of the viceroy’s tenure. Vargas Ugarte, 1:97.

⁸⁸³ Garcilaso, 706.

⁸⁸⁴ Elliott, 132-3.

⁸⁸⁵ MacCormack, 223-4. Dandeleit, 51.

⁸⁸⁶ Klarén, 42-3.

⁸⁸⁷ MacCormack, 72, 91.

he was not made governor of the colony, and had unquestionable designs of making himself king.⁸⁸⁸ Such depictions deprive Gonzalo and his actions of any semblance of legitimacy.

The royal chronicler of the Indies Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas likewise presents a very negative image of Gonzalo Pizarro in his *Historia general de los hechos de los castellanos en las islas i tierra firme del Mar Oceano*. In contrast to Garcilaso's take on the history of the conquest and settlement of the New World, Herrera unequivocally paints the crown and its royal agents as enacting tremendous good in the Americas. He praises the monarchy for reigning in the abuses of the Spanish settlers and for spreading the Catholic faith in the New World; the royal historian accordingly speaks favorably of the New Laws.⁸⁸⁹ In turn, he demonizes Gonzalo Pizarro and his rebellious followers as brutal and seditious mercenaries who were directly at odds with the crown's civilizing and evangelizing mission in the Americas.⁸⁹⁰

The Incas had also acquired a negative image in Spanish history writing. While in the mid-sixteenth century Cieza de León spoke highly of the Incan empire and its achievements, Spanish historians during the reign of Philip II labeled the Incas as brutal tyrants.⁸⁹¹ Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa's *History of the Incas* (1572) is one of the most famous and polemical of these anti-Inca histories. Sarmiento was a sea captain and royal cosmographer in Peru who was commissioned by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo to write a history of the Incan empire using Indian informants in Cuzco. The political objective of this work is clear as Sarmiento defends the crown's imperial enterprise in Peru and supports Toledo's controversial and far-reaching reforms, most notably the viceroy's massive resettlement of Indians in the Peruvian countryside.⁸⁹²

In this vein Sarmiento seeks to invalidate the authority of the surviving Incan nobility, who still held a fair degree of local power before Toledo came to office. Sarmiento draws upon his indigenous sources to "learn about the tyranny of the cruel Incas of this land so that all the nations of the world can understand the juridical and more-than-legitimate right that the king of Castile has to these Indies and to other neighboring lands, and particularly to these kingdoms of Peru."⁸⁹³ He justifies the Spanish crown's right to rule Peru by demonizing the Incas as illegitimate rulers who terrorized and exploited the indigenous peoples of the Andes.⁸⁹⁴

The *Royal Commentaries* counters the above depictions of the Incas and Gonzalo Pizarro as tyrants. Garcilaso portrays Gonzalo as a tragic and misunderstood figure. In turn, he advances the Incas as a model of good government in Peru. In their stead the obdurate and harsh viceroys Núñez Vela and Toledo (as will be shown later) stand out as the most tyrannical figures in his work. In contrast to writers such as Sandoval and Sarmiento, Garcilaso uses a discourse of tyranny not to champion Spanish imperial power, but to highlight the dangers of colonial misrule.

Garcilaso's favorable portrayal of Gonzalo Pizarro is well known. In his study of creole patriotism *The First America*, D.A. Brading argues that Garcilaso implicitly endorsed Gonzalo's

⁸⁸⁸ Fray Prudencio de Sandoval, *Vida y hechos del Emperador Carlos V* (Valladolid, 1604), 2:477.

⁸⁸⁹ Richard L. Kagan, *Clio and the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 179-80. Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Historia general de los hechos de los Castellanos en las islas i tierra firme del Mar Oceano*, ed. by M. Cuesta Domingo Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1991), 4:158, 4:163

⁸⁹⁰ Herrera, 4:217, 4:268.

⁸⁹¹ MacCormack, 91-2.

⁸⁹² Klarén, 59.

⁸⁹³ Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, *The History of the Incas*, ed. and trans. by Brian S. Bauer and Vania Smith (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 59.

⁸⁹⁴ Sarmiento, 203.

rebellion and plans to establish an independent kingdom of Peru. He supports this assertion by referencing Garcilaso's reproduction of Francisco de Carvajal's speech to Pizarro during the highpoint of the rebellion. Carvajal, Pizarro's lieutenant and *maestro de campo*, urged his commander to crown himself king of Peru; the most telling element of Garcilaso's account of the speech is that Carvajal suggested that Gonzalo to marry an Incan princess so that he could rally all the Indians of Peru to his cause.⁸⁹⁵ According to Brading, this proposition would have been very appealing to the mestizo historian, as he argues that Garcilaso believed the union of Incas and Spaniards to be the true remedy of Peru.⁸⁹⁶ Indeed, he asserts that by using this speech as a clandestine medium to express his own support for the rebellion and the establishment of an independent Peru ruled by the *encomenderos* and Incas, Garcilaso was following a common technique of Italian humanists, who would advance dangerous propositions through the mouths of historical characters.⁸⁹⁷

Garcilaso's political views at times can be often difficult to pin down, and by examining his work through the lens of creole patriotism Brading accordingly places a significant amount of emphasis on his sympathetic outlook towards Gonzalo Pizarro and his separatist agenda. Brading defines creole patriotism as an intellectual tradition that "by reason of its engagement with the historical experience and contemporary reality of America, was original, idiosyncratic, complex, and quite distinct from any European model."⁸⁹⁸ Having antecedents in the writings of the early conquistadors as well as Las Casas, creole patriotism emerged in the 1590s and evolved over the course of the colonial period. Creole patriotism had a noticeable political component, as creoles took pride in the past and present glories of their American *patrias* while resenting the dominance of the metropole and the privileges of the *peninsulare* elite.⁸⁹⁹ Indeed, this framework was a major foundation for the independence movements of Latin America.

As noted previously, Garcilaso clearly advances a prideful vision of his Andean homeland in the *Royal Commentaries*. Much like the other creole patriot writers in Brading's study, Garcilaso accepts the conquest while also glorifying his *patria's* pre-Columbian past.⁹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, creole patriotism's emphasis on the fundamental divisions between the Americas and Europe and its association with independence movements can obscure other facets of Garcilaso's historical argument and political agenda. In particular, this analytical rubric does not fully take into account the imperial dimensions of the mestizo historian's work. As Sabine MacCormack notes, empire was the political order of the day for Garcilaso, and he drew heavily upon Roman and providentialist epistemologies in his discussion of Peru's Incan and colonial past.⁹⁰¹

In this regard Garcilaso's treatment of Gonzalo Pizarro's rebellion is a complicated issue that can be interpreted from multiple analytical perspectives. Viewed within the context of the *Royal Commentaries* as a political guide, the conquistador emerges as a cautionary figure not entirely worthy of emulation. In the first place, Garcilaso would not have found all aspects of Carvajal's speech to be completely positive. In this vision of an independent Peru under the rule of Gonzalo, the soldier suggests a separation of the Indians and Spanish, with a restored Inca

⁸⁹⁵ Garcilaso, 1072. Brading, 267.

⁸⁹⁶ Brading, 270.

⁸⁹⁷ Brading, 267.

⁸⁹⁸ Brading, 5.

⁸⁹⁹ Brading, 293, 300.

⁹⁰⁰ Brading, 270.

⁹⁰¹ MacCormack, 242, 261-2.

ruling over the indigenous population and Pizarro governing the Spanish.⁹⁰² Although Garcilaso does not offer any direct input about this proposition, he likely would not have viewed it with much favor. As noted previously, he believed the driving justification behind the Spanish presence in Peru was the evangelization of the native populace. Contact between the two populations facilitated the spread of Christianity in Peru, while a strict separation of Indians and Spaniards would hamper this all-important process.⁹⁰³

Gonzalo Pizarro stands as a complicated figure with notable virtues and flaws. According to Garcilaso, Gonzalo initially had no intentions to raise arms against the crown, and the municipal councils of the cities of Cuzco, Huamanga, and La Plata elected him to be their procurator general to represent their grievances during Núñez Vela's tyrannical enforcement of the New Laws. Unfortunately, Gonzalo's peaceable inclinations soon dissipated as the "terrible inflexibility of the viceroy's character and the news of his deeds that came every day to Cuzco caused Gonzalo not to trust his person any more to papers or written laws, even if they were in his favor, but to prepare arms and to ensure his safety, as we shall say."⁹⁰⁴ Gonzalo's gathering of troops, although at first done only for his own defense, nonetheless alarmed many *vecinos*, "for it had never occurred to them to ask for justice with their arms in their hands, but only with due submission and homage."⁹⁰⁵ From this point on the confrontation between Gonzalo and the obdurate viceroy gradually spiraled into a full-out rebellion as both sides failed to reach an understanding.

Garcilaso writes that Gonzalo often acted with benevolence and nobility during the early phase of the uprising. He notes that Gonzalo was "by nature compassionate," and during the opening stages of the campaign he frequently treated his defeated enemies with mildness and mercy,⁹⁰⁶ moreover, the rebel leader was pious and acted without guile.⁹⁰⁷ Contrary to the claims of his enemies and other historians, Garcilaso stresses that Gonzalo never carried on with any airs of grandeur, but always acted with humble kindness and civility. To back up this point the mestizo historian cites his own experiences dining with Gonzalo, who held his father in a comfortable captivity during the rebellion.⁹⁰⁸ In sum, Gonzalo was far from a reviled tyrant. Rather, Garcilaso asserts that the rebel leader "was loved by everyone for his military deeds and moral qualities, and though it was necessary to put him to death, leaving aside the question of the royal service, everyone in general regretted it on account of his many good qualities."⁹⁰⁹

While Garcilaso does much to redeem Gonzalo's historical reputation and character, his work is not a total panegyric for the fallen rebel *encomendero*. Rather, he notes that Gonzalo also possessed serious flaws that played a large part in his eventual undoing. For example, he believed that Gonzalo's boldness led him to disregard the wise counsel of his friends and to assume that he could defeat any opposition that the crown levied against him.⁹¹⁰ This overconfidence would cause him to angrily reject the pleas of the seasoned Carvajal to negotiate

⁹⁰² Garcilaso, 1072-3.

⁹⁰³ For a different perspective see Guaman Poma de Ayala, who argued that contact between Spaniards and Indians lead to moral degeneration.

⁹⁰⁴ Garcilaso, 975-6.

⁹⁰⁵ Garcilaso, 980.

⁹⁰⁶ Garcilaso, 1008.

⁹⁰⁷ Garcilaso, 1219.

⁹⁰⁸ Garcilaso, 1078-9.

⁹⁰⁹ Garcilaso, 1219-20. In contrast to Garcilaso, according to the accounts of other colonial historians Gonzalo Pizarro in fact died unrepentant. MacCormack, 225-6.

⁹¹⁰ Garcilaso, 1057.

with president Gasca and the royalist forces on the eve of the fateful battle of Jaquijahuana, which ended in Gonzalo's defeat and capture.⁹¹¹ Garcilaso also notes that Gonzalo grew unhinged during the later phase of his rebellion, when increasing numbers of his soldiers began to desert him due to Gasca's promise of a general pardon. Gonzalo flew into a rage in response to these desertions, and he ordered the torture and execution of the soldiers unfortunate enough to be caught outside the confines of the camp.⁹¹²

Garcilaso's thus advances Gonzalo as a cautionary model of leadership. Although his virtues made him a heroic figure in colonial Peru, his flaws nevertheless led to further bloodshed in the viceroyalty. Gonzalo lacked the patience and understanding that made for a truly successful leader in Garcilaso's estimation. The mestizo historian turns to other historical figures for examples of good government.

In the first place, Garcilaso advances the Incas as paragons of imperial rule. His famous celebration of the Inca Empire and its achievements challenges the assertion that the Incas were nothing more than illegitimate and brutal tyrants. He emphasizes that they ruled a vast and civilized empire governed according to the dictates of reason and natural law.⁹¹³ Importantly, their just rule lifted Peru from a state of savagery and made its inhabitants "capable of reason and receiving good doctrine," thus paving the way for the teaching of the Christian faith.⁹¹⁴ Garcilaso also asserts that the Incas' worship of the sun as their only god, belief in the immortality of the soul and a universal resurrection, and reverence for the shape of the cross indicated that they possessed some knowledge of God prior to the arrival of the Spanish.⁹¹⁵

Benevolence and moderation served as the foundations of the Inca's success. For example, Garcilaso writes that the Incas always sought to expand their empire gradually so that they could properly impart reason and order to the subjugated lands, "so that their subjects should appreciate the mildness of their rule and attract their neighbors to submit..."⁹¹⁶ He portrays this measured approach towards imperial expansion as quite successful, as he notes that Indian tribes often willingly submitted to the Incas upon hearing of their benevolent rule.⁹¹⁷ In turn, he stresses that "since their earliest kings" the Incas only waged war to either reduce barbarians "to a human civilized existence," or to protect their subject peoples from "untamed neighbors."⁹¹⁸ Magnanimity and mildness were thus the hallmarks of the Inca's efficacious expansion and governance of their empire. Importantly, the Incas spread civilization while asking little in return from their subjects; he notes that their demands for tribute were "so moderate that when one realizes what it consisted of an how much it was, it can truthfully be affirmed that none of the kings of the ancients, nor the great Caesars who were called Augustus and Pious can be compared with the Inca kings in this respect."⁹¹⁹

Beyond serving as a way to set straight the issue of the Inca's maligned historical image, this lofty portrayal also imparts a political lesson regarding imperium. Through his account of the Incas Garcilaso reveals the importance of ruling with understanding and patience in Peru. In his view, the Incas achieved their success not via brutal military power, but through the kind

⁹¹¹ Garcilaso, 1162-63.

⁹¹² Garcilaso, 1123-4.

⁹¹³ Garcilaso, 53.

⁹¹⁴ Garcilaso, 40.

⁹¹⁵ Garcilaso, 65.

⁹¹⁶ Garcilaso, 111.

⁹¹⁷ Garcilaso, 143.

⁹¹⁸ Garcilaso, 264.

⁹¹⁹ Garcilaso, 272.

treatment of their numerous and diverse subjects. This mild approach to empire allowed them to bring together the disparate Indian peoples with relatively little bloodshed, and usher in a long-lasting tranquility largely free of warfare, discontent, or rebellion. The Spanish crown could reap these same rewards of empire if it imitated this benevolence.

Garcilaso demonstrates that the more successful Spanish administrators of Peru did in fact govern with a munificent and mild style that resembled the imperial approach of the Incas. Past scholars have identified the mestizo historian as a sort of anti-colonialist. D.A. Brading notes that the chief object of Garcilaso's criticisms was the Spanish imperial system.⁹²⁰ More recently, Margarita Zamora has written that the harsh portrayals of viceroys found in the *Royal Commentaries* were meant to function as a critique of colonialism that both legitimized and provoked the dissent of Peru's indigenous and creole populace.⁹²¹

While Garcilaso certainly is critical of individual viceroys, these views do not amount to a flat-out attack on Spanish royal rule in Peru. Rather, Garcilaso asserts that Spanish imperial administration could exercise a positive role in Peru. He praises the officials who governed with patient understanding, and treated the Spanish and Indian inhabitants of Peru with respect and kindness. Crucially, through this tempered approach these governmental figures were able to overcome the gulf of misunderstanding between Spain and Peru and mitigate the problems of imperial confusion and miscommunication, thus bringing peace and prosperity to the colony.

For these reasons Garcilaso holds the governor Cristóbal Vaca de Castro in especially high esteem. A magistrate of the *audiencia* of Valladolid, the crown sent Vaca de Castro to put an end to the bloody war between the Pizarro brothers and Diego de Almagro; shortly after his arrival in Peru Francisco Pizarro was assassinated, and the title of governor passed on to Vaca de Castro in 1541.⁹²² In stark contrast to Núñez Vela, Garcilaso writes that Vaca de Castro took a very measured approach to his administration, and he labored to understand the political, economic, and social conditions of Peru when enacting any sort of major decision.

In the first place, he notes that the royal governor dealt with his immediate charge of ending the conflict between the Pizarros and Almagro's camp in a deliberate and tempered manner, as he sought to avoid further bloodshed. For instance, when Don Diego de Almagro the Younger was officially declared a rebel, Vaca de Castro wisely declined Gonzalo Pizarro's offer of military aid because his top priority was for the two factions to come to a peaceful accord. The governor

wished to avoid open conflict, fearing that, as the two parties were so impassioned, the struggle would lead to the destruction of both sides, and like a prudent man he wished to avoid so much bloodshed. He thought that if Gonzalo Pizarro were in his army, Almagro would not accept or even heed any offer or terms, or dare to place himself in his hands, fearing that Gonzalo Pizarro should wreak some cruel vengeance on him.⁹²³

⁹²⁰ Brading, 256.

⁹²¹ Zamora, "Regarding Colonialism in Garcilaso's *Historia general del Peru*," 128.

⁹²² Vargas Ugarte, 1:152-3.

⁹²³ Garcilaso, 917.

Although these efforts to negotiate ultimately failed, forcing Vaca de Castro to fight Almagro, they nonetheless reveal that the governor fully understood the delicate political situation in Peru and recognized the danger of inflaming the passions of the colony's sectarian divide.⁹²⁴

Moreover, Garcilaso notes that Vaca de Castro did not alienate Gonzalo in rejecting his offer of military assistance, but instead handled him with suavity and deference, and proposed that the *encomendero* act as his advisor.⁹²⁵ In keeping with his efforts to rehabilitate the historical image of Gonzalo, Garcilaso downplays the initial tension between the conquistador and the governor. In reality Gonzalo was quite upset that he was not made governor, and he and his followers tentatively proposed overthrowing Vaca de Castro during the early phase of his administration. Nevertheless, Vaca de Castro heard of these rumors and was successfully able to placate Gonzalo, who agreed to retire to his *repartimiento* in Los Charcas.⁹²⁶

Garcilaso recounts that Vaca de Castro treated the *vecinos* as a whole with tremendous respect during his tenure as governor. His behavior at the battle of Chupas is a notable example of his high regard for the Spanish settlers. For instance, in his speech to the royalist *encomenderos* on the eve of the battle, Vaca de Castro paid homage to their valor and loyal service to the crown,

bidding them remember who they were, whence they came, and why they fought. The possession of the empire [Peru] depended on their strength and efforts... He said that he realized that there was no need for him to exhort and encourage such noble gentlemen and brave soldiers: he indeed would rather take courage from them, which he did and would go ahead and break his lance before the rest.⁹²⁷

By thus recognizing their invaluable contributions affording them their proper respect, Vaca de Castro demonstrates his understanding of the loyal *vecinos* and their central place in Peruvian affairs. His ennobling and inspiring remarks would reap notable rewards, as the *vecinos* responded to the speech stating that "they too would be cut to pieces and die rather than be defeated, and each of them regarded the quarrel as his own."⁹²⁸ Vaca de Castro would go on to win the bloody yet pivotal battle, which led to the capture and execution of Almagro.⁹²⁹

In direct contrast to the tyrannical and disastrous approach of his successor Núñez Vela, Vaca de Castro recognized that maintaining an excellent relationship with the *vecinos* was a key to effectively govern Peru. According to Garcilaso, after the battle of Chupas, the victorious governor chose to give the *vecinos* their proper due, as he spent most of the night praising their bravery and determination, "recounting the valor they had shown in the royal service and the noteworthy deeds some had performed in particular, and these he mentioned by name."⁹³⁰

Vaca de Castro's appreciation for this service went beyond offering words of praise. Garcilaso recounts how in the aftermath of the war with Almagro the governor divvied up the

⁹²⁴ This depiction largely reflects the historical record. Shortly after his arrival in Peru Vaca de Castro attempted to broker a peace with Almagro in order to avert further bloodshed. Vargas Ugarte, 1:169.

⁹²⁵ Garcilaso, 917.

⁹²⁶ Vargas Ugarte, 1:174.

⁹²⁷ Garcilaso, 921.

⁹²⁸ Garcilaso, 921.

⁹²⁹ Chupas would prove to be one of the bloodiest battles in the war between the Pizarros and Almagro, with roughly 300 soldiers dying in the engagement. Vaca de Castro likely won because of his superior numbers. Vargas Ugarte, 1:172.

⁹³⁰ Garcilaso, 927.

lord-less Indians and gave them to the most deserving Spaniards who fought for the governor and did not possess an *encomienda*. He likewise bettered the lot of the *vecinos*, as he gave many loyal *encomenderos* better allocations of Indians, and allowed them to move to different cities according to their preferences. Garcilaso remarks fondly that because of the governor's edict, his own father was able to move from Los Charcas to the more desirable city of Cuzco.⁹³¹ Thanks to the staunch support of the *vecinos* that came about from these measures, Vaca de Castro was able to solidify his authority and finally bring peace to war-torn Peru after years of strife between the supporters of the Pizarro brothers and Almagro.⁹³²

Garcilaso in turn portrays Vaca de Castro's peacetime government as a great success, writing that the governor, "like a prudent man, governed with great rectitude and justice, to the general applause and satisfaction of Spaniards and Indians alike, for he made laws of great advantage to both."⁹³³ Vaca de Castro achieved this administrative triumph because he consulted with both *vecinos* and Indians when drafting many of his ordinances. The governor made his laws by "obtaining information from the old *curacas* and captains about the administration of the Inca kings, and choosing from these reports whatever seemed to him best adapted to the interests of the Spaniards and the improvement of the Indians' lot."⁹³⁴

One such specific ordinance was Vaca de Castro's reform of the *tambo* system. Originally implemented by the Incas, the *tambos* were a sort of inn that provided provisions and lodging for travelers along major roads. The Spanish conquerors maintained this practice, and under the Spanish the *tambo* system easily resulted in the abuse of the Indians who resided and worked at the inns. Spanish travelers would frequently take Indians from the *tambos* and force them to transport their goods and luggage without any sort of payment.⁹³⁵ Vaca de Castro mitigated the worst of these abuses by regulating what could be provided in the *tambos*, fixing the number of Indians that could accompany a Spanish traveler, and mandating that these Indian servants be paid for their services. Aside from reforming the *tambos*, Vaca de Castro also regularized the distribution and supervision of the *repartimientos*, improved the general working conditions of the Indians in this labor system, and restored the economic and political rights of the *caciques*, which had been usurped by Spaniards.⁹³⁶

According to Garcilaso, Vaca de Castro was able to overcome the confusion of empire that would later bedevil his successors. His remarks suggest that following the precepts of the Incas was a crucial factor in the governor's success as an administrator. Indeed, he notes "The Indians in particular received great pleasure and favor from his laws, and said they were very like those of their own Inca kings."⁹³⁷ Peru's history could offer a vital lesson for its rulers.

The contrasting depictions of Vaca de Castro's ordinances and the New Laws found in the *Royal Commentaries* provides a revealing look into Garcilaso's vision of empire. Both sets of laws were enacted to protect the Indians of Peru, yet their respective outcomes could not have been more different. According to Garcilaso, while the New Laws resulted in a brutal conflict that endangered all the inhabitants of Peru, Vaca de Castro's measures actually succeeded in bettering the lives of the Indians. For the mestizo historian, the underlying difference between the two sets of reforms was that Vaca de Castro enacted his laws in accordance with the actual

⁹³¹ Garcilaso, 930.

⁹³² Garcilaso, 932.

⁹³³ Garcilaso, 930.

⁹³⁴ Garcilaso, 932.

⁹³⁵ Roberto Levillier, *Don Francisco de Toledo, supremo organizador del Peru* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1935), 217.

⁹³⁶ Vargas Ugarte, 1:175.

⁹³⁷ Garcilaso, 930.

conditions in Peru. Unlike the drafters of the New Laws, the governor listened to the Spanish and Indian populations of Peru before enacting his reforms.

By breaking down the barriers of misunderstanding between the *vecinos*, the Indians, and the crown, Vaca de Castro not only insured the peace and welfare of Peru, but he also made the colony incredibly prosperous. Garcilaso writes that thanks to Vaca de Castro's reforms the Indians set about cultivating the land with renewed efficiency and vigor, and produced a great abundance of food. Moreover, during this peaceful time the Spanish found a number of rich gold mines throughout Peru, thus further enriching the colony.⁹³⁸ Spain and the crown accordingly benefited immensely, as the booming trans-Atlantic trade increased "in proportion to the amount of treasure found and extracted."⁹³⁹ As such, Vaca de Castro's reforms had fulfilled the twin goals of the New Laws as stated by Las Casas in Garcilaso's account, namely the protection of the Indians and the enrichment of the royal coffers.

Thus, in the eyes of Garcilaso, Vaca de Castro's tenure represented a golden era for Peru. He writes "With all this prosperity and the administration of a governor so Christian, so noble, so wise, so zealous in the service of our Lord God and his king, the empire flourished and improved from day to day." Importantly, this benevolent administration produced a treasure more valuable than gold and silver: the increased conversion of the native populace. With all the inhabitants of Peru happy,

the teaching of our holy Catholic Faith was spread throughout the whole land with great care by the Spaniards, and the Indians accepted it with no less gladness and satisfaction, for they saw that much of what they were taught was what their Inca kings had taught them and bidden them observe under their natural law.⁹⁴⁰

In sum, the *Royal Commentaries* is not an argument for the establishment of an independent kingdom of Peru. Garcilaso does not condemn the imperial system in its entirety; rather, he calls for its reform. His depiction of the government of Vaca de Castro reveals how an effective royal administrator could improve the lot of the Spanish and the Indians in Peru and be a tremendous force for good in the colony. Vaca de Castro's example imparts the crucial political lesson that the respectful treatment of the *vecinos* and consultations with the Indian and Spanish inhabitants of the colony were the undeniable foundations of a successful administration. Future viceroys and governors should accordingly follow this his approach if they wished to replicate Vaca de Castro's administrative triumph.

Garcilaso makes clear the importance of working with those who were most familiar with Peru in his treatment of the rumor that Viceroy Mendoza planned to establish an advisory council consisting of four of the most leading and well-established *vecinos* of the empire. This rumor circulated prior to the viceroy's arrival. Garcilaso writes that this group of *vecinos*, which supposedly included his father, "were to be free of prejudices and attachments, but acquainted with everyone in the empire and familiar with their merits, so that they could advise the viceroy on how to treat the claimants and see that he was not taken in by cock-and-bull stories." The news in turn elicited a joyous response in Peru, as it "stirred and delighted all the inhabitants of the empire, both Indians and Spaniards, ecclesiastics and laymen; and they all shouted that the

⁹³⁸ The largest of these mines discovered during Vaca de Castro's tenure was at Carabaya, which contained rich deposits of gold. Vargas Ugarte, 1:175.

⁹³⁹ Garcilaso, 932-3.

⁹⁴⁰ Garcilaso, 933.

viceroy had come from heaven since he proposed to govern the kingdom with such advisers.”⁹⁴¹ This rumor unfortunately proved to be false, and Mendoza’s government took a substantially different turn, as previously discussed. Instead of hearing the prudent advice of Peru’s *vecinos*, the viceroy chose to treat them with hostility and suspicion. The confusion of empire would continue to afflict Peru.

After Mendoza’s tenure the colonial administration of Peru underwent a major transformation as Viceroy Lope García de Castro (1564-69) began replacing the *encomenderos* with *corregidores* as the chief agents of local government.⁹⁴² *Corregidores* were royal magistrates who were responsible for collection of Indian tributes and the administration of local justice. *Corregidores* also formally presided over the council of any Spanish municipality within their wide administrating jurisdiction, thus superseding the authority of an *encomendero* or local magistrate. The most lucrative of these positions went to candidates in Madrid, and the remainder of the appointments was often given to the viceroy’s family and well-connected officials. In contrast to the fixed posts of the *encomenderos*, *corregidores* were appointed for limited terms of roughly five years to a district, and they became infamous for their attempts to squeeze as much profit as possible from their subjects during these appointments. Viceroy Toledo would formally organize this system and make it permanent.⁹⁴³

The *corregidor* system stands in direct opposition to Garcilaso’s vision of an ideal colonial government based on familiarity with Peru and regular consultations with its inhabitants. The models of good and bad administrations found in the *Royal Commentaries* serve as a warning against the potential dangers of this administrative change. Indeed, Garcilaso’s scathing account of Toledo’s tenure reveals that Peru was embarking on a dark and troubled course due to the viceroy’s reliance on figures who had a poor understanding of the colony.

Conclusion

Garcilaso’s critical take on Toledo in the last pages of his history is a well-known aspect of the *Royal Commentaries*.⁹⁴⁴ The viceroy draws the most ire from the mestizo historian for his order to execute the last of the Incan emperors, Túpac Amaru. According to Garcilaso, this unjust act demonstrated that misunderstanding and miscommunication remained a serious problem in Spanish Peru.

Garcilaso writes that Toledo initially attempted to enter into negotiations with Túpac Amaru, who lived in peaceful exile with his court in the Vilcambaba Valley. These efforts nevertheless failed in large part because Toledo lacked any knowledgeable Indian and Spanish intermediaries and advisors to help broker a meeting. In response, Toledo followed the disastrous counsel of his close advisors, who were grossly ignorant of Peruvian affairs. These unnamed collaborators suggested that Toledo should arrest and execute Túpac Amaru, since they falsely believed that the Inca would never leave his court peaceably and would accordingly pose a threat to the Spanish.⁹⁴⁵

According to Garcilaso, Toledo and his advisors possessed a dangerously distorted view of Peru and its Indian inhabitants. He writes that they falsely believed that Indian bandits were plaguing the Peruvian countryside, and that the colony’s Indians and mestizos were planning a

⁹⁴¹ Garcilaso, 1424.

⁹⁴² Guillermo Lohmann Villena, *El Corregidor de indios en el Perú bajo los Austrias* (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2001), 22.

⁹⁴³ Brading, 134-5.

⁹⁴⁴ Zamora, “Regarding Colonialism in Garcilaso’s *Historia general del Perú*,” 119. Brading, 268-272.

⁹⁴⁵ Garcilaso, 1472-3.

massive rebellion; Túpac Amaru's death would put a stop to these imagined threats. Garcilaso makes clear that these allegations of sedition were based on misinformation. In the case of the Indian banditry, he asserts that Indian raids had only occurred during the earlier rule of Manco Inca, and were undertaken out of dire necessity to acquire food. In turn, he writes that the mestizos of Peru were completely loyal to the crown, yet Toledo nonetheless cruelly ordered that they be rounded up and exiled on the false pretext they were all agents of the Inca.⁹⁴⁶

Miscommunication and confusion in turn marred the bogus proceedings against Tupac Amaru. According to Garcilaso, the Inca prince peaceably allowed himself to be taken by Toledo's soldiers "because he felt completely blameless and had never even thought of rebellion or any other criminal offence....He preferred to trust in the generosity of his pursuers than to perish in flight among the forests and the great rivers that pour into the river called La Plata."⁹⁴⁷ In fact, because of his innocence, Túpac Amaru assumed that Toledo had only wanted to give him homage, as past viceroys had done with earlier Incan rulers. Nevertheless, when he arrived in Lima, Túpac Amaru was sentenced to beheading without being told the reason for his execution.⁹⁴⁸

Garcilaso clearly shows that any reasonable observer would have correctly surmised that Túpac Amaru had no intentions to revolt whatsoever due to his miniscule army, his peaceful submission to Toledo, and his offer to travel to Spain "kiss the hand of his lord King Philip" and prove his innocence.⁹⁴⁹ Indeed, Garcilaso writes that seemingly the entire city of Lima raised an outcry in defense of the falsely accused prince, and the senior nobles and clerics of the city formed an assembly to petition Toledo to stop the execution. The viceroy, in his obstinacy, barred the door to his residence shut and ordered that anyone who attempted to enter be put to death. Toledo had Túpac Amaru quickly executed so that no one could come to his aid.⁹⁵⁰

With a certain amount of relish Garcilaso notes that Toledo received his just punishment for his transgressions. Upon his return to Spain the viceroy expected to be rewarded for his execution of the Inca and for increasing the revenue of the colony. Philip II, however, angrily rebuffed Toledo at court, "remarking that he had not been sent to Peru to kill kings, but to serve them." The viceroy's reputation was further damaged when it was discovered at court that he had committed gross accounting errors, resulting in a loss of over 120,000 ducats for the royal treasury. According to Garcilaso, Toledo soon after fell into a state of melancholy and died within a few days, thus authoritatively confirming his failures as a viceroy.⁹⁵¹

The final pages of the *Royal Commentaries* are not just a lament over the death of the last Inca. They also impart one last and crucial lesson regarding the dangers of imperial confusion. By concluding his work with Toledo's troubled rule Garcilaso demonstrates that fateful misunderstandings and miscommunications continued to plague the administration of Peru well after the tumultuous years of the conquest and the civil wars. In a likely jab at the imposition of the *corregidor* system, Garcilaso asserts that Toledo based his decision to execute Túpac Amaru on the advice of administrators who had an incomplete and distorted knowledge of the colony. The viceroy's lack of basic understanding of Peruvian affairs and failure to listen to even the most illustrious *vecinos* and clergy of Lima resulted in tragedy. While the Spanish crown was no

⁹⁴⁶ Garcilaso, 1472-3, 1475-6.

⁹⁴⁷ Garcilaso, 1474.

⁹⁴⁸ Garcilaso, 1478-9.

⁹⁴⁹ Garcilaso, 1478.

⁹⁵⁰ Garcilaso, 1480.

⁹⁵¹ Garcilaso, 1483.

longer in danger of losing Peru to Indian uprisings or *encomendero* rebels by the time of Philip II's rule, Toledo's missteps reveal that the colony's prosperity and peace were still at risk. Through this discussion Garcilaso highlights the need enact some form of change in the imperial administration of Peru.

Garcilaso's depiction of Toldeo further confirms the importance of munificence, patience, and restraint in countering the failures of communication and understanding that could easily emerge while governing a trans-Atlantic empire. The *Royal Commentaries* contains clear political models for the successful governance of Peru. Núñez Vela and Toledo stand out as clear cautionary examples to avoid for colonial administrators. Their severity, willful ignorance, and obstinacy alienated the crown's subjects in Peru and resulted in needless bloodshed, turmoil, and disaster. In stark contrast, Garcilaso touts Vaca de Castro as the standard for good colonial government. His benevolent style of rule, which privileged the input of both the Spanish settlers and the surviving Inca leadership, brought an unprecedented level of tranquility and wealth to the war-torn colony and its inhabitants. Importantly, these policies also filled the coffers of the Spanish crown.

Garcilaso's work speaks to the importance of history writing as a medium for political commentary in early seventeenth-century Spain. Through his history Garcilaso openly critiques the failings of Spanish rule in Peru while also offering suggestions for reform in imperial policy. In this regard *Royal Commentaries* points to a shift in a larger outlook towards empire during the reign of Philip III. While Garcilaso does not directly criticize Philip II, he nonetheless demonstrates that Spanish Peru had changed for the worse under his rule. The mestizo historian's work is a call for a reevaluation of the policies instituted during the Prudent King's rule. He portrays Philip as rebuking Toledo for his "reforms," but not actually reversing them. More substantial royal action would be needed to set Peru on the right course. Although Toledo's impactful government brought the death of the last of the Incas and transformed the colony's administrative structure, Garcilaso shows that his homeland could still have a bright future if its royal administrators listened to those who knew Peru best.

Conclusion

The historians covered in this project all reflect upon the monumental task of empire building in various contexts. Through their texts they bring to bear the difficulties of governing and protecting Spain and its far-flung domains in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. The weight of the world appeared to rest on the Spanish crown as it navigated through multiple wars, the economic complexities of imperial finance, and a shifting international climate. Given the immensity of these undertakings, it is unsurprising that the role of councilors at times loomed large in many of these histories. Spanish historians argued that prudent political advice could avoid disaster and lead to triumph, while rash and uninformed counsel could result in embarrassment, ruin, and needless war.

Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas remarked that imprudent advisors falsely suggested that Philip II's authority was greater than that of the Holy Roman Emperor or Pope, and accordingly urged him to occupy and annex French territory; the monarch wisely refused these entreaties that would have undoubtedly stained the crown's benevolent *reputación* according to Herrera's assessment.⁹⁵² Other historians demonstrate that the Spanish crown did not always choose so wisely. Luis de Bavía and Fray Marcos de Guadalajara y Javier wrote that Philip II did not heed his counselors' prescient warnings that a military intervention in the French Wars of Religion would likely fail and endanger the already vulnerable Low Countries.⁹⁵³ Garcilaso de la Vega El Inca asserted that Charles V listened to his advisors who were ignorant of the affairs of the New World and ignored the suggestions of those who had experience in the Americas when he enacted the disastrous New Laws in 1542.⁹⁵⁴

This emphasis on the importance of proper counsel highlights the political modalities of history writing in early modern Spain. In the view of Spanish historians in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, history itself could be an effective advisor and guide that offered lessons for rule. The study of the past carried a clear political purpose for these scholars as they assessed the present and future course of the Spanish imperium through their texts. This political function of history writing becomes particularly important during moments of crisis and change. Although they wrote about different subjects and came from different backgrounds, all the historians covered in this dissertation saw history writing as an instrument of empire.

Histories often lionized the Spanish empire. The works of Pedro Cornejo and Gregorio López Madera, for example, revealed how history writing served as an important platform for the expression of the bellicose imperial triumphalism that characterized the final decade of Philip II's reign. Cornejo and López Madera presented a radical framework of Spanish power that championed the crown's sacred responsibility to fight heresy and protect the Church well beyond the confines of the Hapsburg domains. Their histories demonstrated a firm belief in the unsurpassed might and righteousness of the Spanish empire during the height of its intervention in the French Wars of Religion.

The royal historian Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas's *Historia de los sucesos de Francia* was an even more expansive example of how history writing could be used in the service of the monarchy as a way to defend its *reputación* and image. Published in the same year

⁹⁵² Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Historia de Antonio de Herrera, criado de Su Magestad, y su cronista mayor de las Indias, de los sucesos de Francia desde el año de 1585 que comenzó la Liga Católica hasta en fin del año 1594* (Madrid, 1598), 129.

⁹⁵³ Fray Marcos de Guadalajara y Javier, *Quarta parte de la historia pontifical general y católica* (Zaragoza, 1612), 5. Luis de Bavía, *Tercera y quarta parte de la historia pontifical y general* (Madrid, 1608), 1:682.

⁹⁵⁴ Garcilaso de la Vega El Inca, *Royal Commentaries of the Incas, and General History of Peru*, ed. and trans. by Harold V. Livermore (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), 934-5.

of the Peace of Vervins (1598), Herrera's work spun the recently failed military campaign in France into a just religious war that highlighted the benevolence and piety of the Spanish crown and demonized Henry IV and the French. Herrera's official history revealed that the Spanish court continued to espouse a model of Catholic triumphalism in the wake of Philip II's final military losses. As such, the analysis of this work provided a revealing picture of how the monarchy used history writing to assert its superiority in a shifting international climate.

While Herrera used his work to vindicate Spanish policy and reputation, historians not affiliated with the Spanish court took a different stance towards the conflict and its participants. History writing was not uniform or stagnant, and the historical image of Henry IV and France changed in early seventeenth-century Spanish histories. Luis de Bavia, Fray Marcos de Guadalajara y Javier, and Diego de Villalobos y Benavides treated Henry IV's character and rise to power in a more balanced manner than sixteenth-century historians. Their histories revealed that early modern Spaniards did not uniformly demonize the French and their monarchs, as has been suggested in recent literature. While these historians believed that a lasting peace with France was a potentially tenuous prospect, their nuanced treatment of Henry IV suggested an important shift away from the aggressive imperial outlook characteristic of Philip II's reign.

Indeed, in their histories Bavia and Guadalajara y Javier critically reevaluated the imperial policies of the Prudent King. Their criticisms of Philip II for recklessly intervening in France at the expense of the security of the Low Countries challenged the prevailing view in current Spanish historiography that the monarch was universally beloved in seventeenth-century Spanish intellectual and political circles. These works signaled history writing's potential for political commentary and criticism during the reign of Philip III. Moreover, the multiple printings of Bavia's and Guadalajara y Javier's histories demonstrated that their arguments for imperial restraint and vigilance against the Dutch found positive reception in the Spanish kingdoms in the seventeenth century.

Beyond these specific historical themes, the works of Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Villalobos y Benavides revealed how history writing could serve as a platform to articulate and negotiate national identity in early modern Spain. Their prideful articulations of Spanish identity formulated in response to the growing body of anti-Spanish foreign writers indicated a defined understanding of national consciousness. However, this understanding of collective Spanish identity was by no means uniform. The Castilians Bavia and Villalobos y Benavides presented Spain and Spaniards as a unified entity. In contrast, the Aragonese historian Guadalajara y Javier asserted his native kingdom's prideful place within the larger Spanish nation. Their histories offer a new way to look at the question of nationality in the early modern period by revealing that the idea of the nation was in the process of being crafted and contested before the advent of print culture.

As members of one of the world's first global empire, Spanish historians accordingly used their works to discuss political relations beyond the confines of Europe, and this also shaped their views on identity of both themselves and the foreign other. The distorted depictions of the Ottomans found in the histories of Pedro de Salazar and Luis de Cabrera de Cordoba also reflected back upon Spanish imperial identity. Their works provided a different texture to our understanding of the theoretical framework of early modern Orientalism. In contrast to early modern German and Italian authors who demonized the Turks as uncivilized as a response to the threat of Ottoman domination, Salazar and Cabrera cast the Ottomans as imperial rivals. Through this discourse of imperial rivalry they established the Spanish crown's superiority not only over the Ottomans, but over other Christian powers in the Mediterranean as well.

The final chapter of this dissertation turned to colonial Peru and examined Garcilaso de la Vega El Inca's famous *Royal Commentaries and General History of Peru* within the context of history writing as a forum of political commentary and imperial criticism during the reign of Philip III. In contrast to the prevailing view in modern studies, the mestizo historian's critiques of past viceroys and royal governors for failing to overcome the miscommunications and misunderstandings that bedeviled Spanish Peru were not indictments of empire. Rather, his critical view of his homeland's colonial past was a guide for imperial reform that emphasized following the historical model of the Incas and listening to Peru's Indian and Spanish inhabitants. This new reading of the *Royal Commentaries* indicated that Garcilaso's work was another call in seventeenth century Spain to correct what was seen as Philip II's failed imperial policies.

Taken together, each of the historians and texts in this study provided a new perspective on the question of empire, politics, and history writing in the early modern Spanish world. An in-depth analysis of these histories revealed that they went beyond the established goals of the *ars historica* to edify their readers and instill moral values. These histories also sought to advance insightful political commentaries regarding the state of the Spanish empire during the reigns of Philip II and Philip III. The efforts of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century historians to shape royal policy revealed a far more complicated and contested political discourse in early modern Spain than has been previously acknowledged.

These works show us that history writing played a central role in the formation of political identity in Spain insofar as they were a vibrant medium for the articulation of a national consciousness and a collective Spanish identity that could both transcend and incorporate the divisions of the composite Spanish kingdoms. In addition, the threatening images of the Turkish "other" found in histories of the Ottomans served to mold and reinforce the Spanish crown's imperial identity as the preeminent crusading power of Christendom. Nevertheless, the depictions of Spain's enemies were not always black and white. In contrast to the demonized Ottomans, the image of the French and Henry IV shifted in Spanish histories in accordance with the changing diplomatic relations between France and Spain.

Indeed, empire was far from a static concept for the historians covered in this dissertation. They each advanced their own unique understanding of imperium, and they wrote their histories for diverse ends. Many of these writers demonstrate history writing's potential as a powerful tool of empire. In some form Cornejo, Madera, Herrera, Villalobos y Benavides, Cabrera, and Salazar all use their histories to adorn the Spanish monarchy's imperial image and champion its policies. They celebrated the crown's victories, defended its controversial actions, and demonized its enemies. When defeats occurred they came about not from any failings of Philip II, but from the betrayals of unreliable allies, acts of misfortune, or the mistakes of individual commanders. These triumphalist works cemented the Spanish empire's status as the unrivaled imperium of its day and the unquestioned champion of the Counter Reformation Church. This exercise was especially important when cracks began to appear on the Spanish monarchy's lustrous edifice and imperial rivals emerged to usurp Spain's greatness.

Nevertheless, there was another side to the political uses of history in Spain. The histories of Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Garcilaso El Inca offered an incisive and critical vision of the Spanish empire and its recent past. Instead of championing and lionizing the Spanish monarchy, these historians highlight the costs of the crown's missteps and failed campaigns. Although their agendas differed, the three historians believed that the Spanish empire was at an important crossroad in the early seventeenth century, and they used their texts to advocate reforms in imperial policy that would ensure the security and prosperity of Spain and

its imperium. Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Garcilaso very much saw themselves as writing histories in the service of the empire.

Printing records indicate that these two different groups of histories enjoyed diverging receptions amongst the readers of early modern Spain. The triumphalist works of famous Spanish historians, most notably Herrera and Cabrera, were only printed once in Madrid. In contrast, the more critical histories were printed multiple times throughout the seventeenth century in both the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon.

The extensive printing runs of these texts tells us a great deal about the political and imperial culture of early seventeenth-century Spain. The published histories of Bavia, Guadalajara y Javier, and Garcilaso all passed through the censorship process of early modern Spain. Their works met the approval of both royal and Inquisitorial censors. As such, far from restricting publications to those that praised the monarchy, the early modern Spanish state freely permitted criticism of its past imperial policies. This is a major departure from the established view that the Spanish crown consistently went to great lengths to control history writing in Spain and forbid the publication of works that would damage its reputation. The monarchy advanced its own narrative of the past through official histories, but it also allowed for competing historical accounts of empire. Indeed, those historians critical of the crown were not only permitted to publish their works, but they also received rewards from the court and municipal authorities for their scholarship.

Moreover, the multiple printings of these critical non-royal histories demonstrate that they found a favorable reception amongst the readership of the Spanish kingdoms. Contrary to the view that Spaniards in the early seventeenth century widely looked back upon Philip II's reign as a Golden Age, the considerable sales of these histories suggests that the Prudent King's policies, particularly his later campaigns, did not enjoy such an enshrined place. Robust book sales of histories critical of Philip II's policies demonstrate that in the seventeenth century a substantial number of Spaniards rejected the expansive vision of imperium advanced during the reign of the Prudent King, and instead favored prioritizing the defense of Spain and its domains. Imperial triumphalism was being challenged by a more critical and restrained understanding of empire that recognized the limits of Spanish power.

The historical significance Philip II's reign is evident. The histories covered in this dissertation cover only a few of Spain's imperial campaigns in the final decades of his reign, but their consequences tailored much of what followed. Indeed, Philip's intervention in the French Wars of Religion, his war against the Ottomans and Berbers, and reforms of the administration of the Americas transformed the early modern world. The end of Philip II's rule marked a major transitional moment for the Spanish empire in which the crown's subjects sought to both defend and reevaluate the monarch's imperial enterprise. In a reflection of the dynamism of Spanish imperial thought, the histories written during this period reveal an exciting evolution in how Spaniards viewed and depicted their empire. As competing visions of imperium emerged in the time of Philip III, the glorification of empire characteristic of Philip II's rule hardly disappeared, as historians continued to use their works to champion the Spanish crown's place of unrivaled superiority on the world stage. Nevertheless, other historians subsequently advanced a more sober assessment of Philip II's reign and advocated new policies. The new agenda included fewer military interventions outside the domains of the Spanish empire, and recommendations for polices in the New World that relied on experience and listening to colonials.

My conclusions illustrate that history writing mattered a great deal for early modern Spaniards. For historians and their readers, history writing served as a potent political tool that

served as a platform for articulating and shaping major questions of empire and identity in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain. All the authors covered in this dissertation used their works to address the major political issues of the day. They glorified the crown and the Church, criticized imperial policies, tried to understand the cultural and religious “other,” and defended their nation from “false” foreign histories. Their efforts reveal the importance of history writing in Hapsburg Spain.

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