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The Government and the Indians: The American Indian Occupation of Alcatraz Island, 1969–1971

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Alcatraz, a twenty-two-and-one-half-acre island situated in the bay between San Francisco and Sausalito, California, became an issue to American Indians in November 1969 when a group of Indians landed at the vacant federal penitentiary and claimed title to the island under the doctrine of "right of discovery."

On Sunday afternoon, 9 November 1969, fifty American Indians circled Alcatraz twice on a borrowed Canadian clipper ship, the *Monte Cristo.* Five men dove off and swam to Alcatraz Island to claim it. Originally, seventy-five Indians had planned to land on the island from five pleasure boats, but the plan failed when the armada did not show up. Richard Oakes got the urge to dive into the water from the *Monte Cristo,* and the other four followed. Walter Hatch was unable to finish the difficult swim, but the others made it to shore.[1] When they emerged from the water, they were greeted by island employee Glen Dodson, who asked them to leave; they left ten minutes later.

That same evening, the same four Indians, plus ten more, returned to Alcatraz on the *Butchie Bee* and landed around 6:00

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p.m.[2] The fourteen Indians were students from UC Berkeley, UC Santa Cruz, and San Francisco State College.[3]

Tom Hannon, regional administrator of the federal government's General Services Administration, region 9, in San Francisco, did not receive word of the landing until 10:00 a.m the next day. Hannon had complete federal authority over the island. He notified the U.S. marshal, who referred the matter to the U.S. attorney. Hannon contacted acting U.S. attorney Richard Urdan, who recommended that Hannon try to meet with the American Indians on Alcatraz and convince them to leave. In addition, Urdan suggested that Hannon advise them that they had made an illegal entry, were trespassing, and therefore were subject to misdemeanor charges. If they remained, Urdan stated, he would have the U.S. marshal take the trespassers into custody.[4]

There was "a cursory inspection" of Alcatraz Island, and, after a thirty-minute period, the Indians appeared from their hiding places.[5] They "came out of hiding behind shrubs" and gave Tom Hannon the proclamation claiming the island for the Indians by "right of discovery." The nineteen-hour Indian occupation appeared to be over. Hannon informed them that Alcatraz was federal property and that, if they had a claim to the island, they should pursue the matter in court; otherwise, they should seek legislation to convey the property to them. Knowing that a 1964 Sioux claim to the island had proved unsuccessful in the U.S. courts, the fourteen Indians subsequently left Alcatraz.

A larger group of Indian people landed a third time that month at 2:00 a.m. on 20 November 1969. At 1:53 that afternoon, the FBI in San Francisco sent a message to its Washington, D.C. office. The enciphered message reported that the "demonstration [was] peaceful," and "it [was] expected that all Indians [would] leave Alcatraz within twenty-four hours."[6] By midday, however, signs began to sprout up around Alcatraz Island. One read, "You Are Now on Indian Land." On the big water tower on the north end of the island, the occupiers painted the slogan "Peace and Freedom Welcome Home of the Free Indian Land."

While the Indians were beginning to organize on Alcatraz, the government started mobilizing on the mainland to handle the occupation. At 4:00 p.m., Hannon arrived on Alcatraz with two attorneys for the Indians, Aubrey Grossman and R. Corbin Houchins, and a representative from the Department of the Interior. Hannon had informed the Indians the night before that

they would be arrested unless they agreed to leave and that the expected supply boat from San Francisco would be impounded by the coast guard if it attempted to land.[7]

Initially, Hannon had been given an order over the telephone from Robert Kunzig, GSA administrator, to get the Indians off Alcatraz Island by noon on Friday. Hannon had gone to the U.S. attorney and submitted the formal request to the U.S. marshal for removal of the Indians. At the meeting, the head of the U.S. marshals, Frank Klein, "began to describe how he would do this—using such and such weapons, guns, ammunition, etc. . . . ." Hannon saw a potential bloodbath and suggested less violent tactics. Klein lashed back at Hannon, telling him "not to try to dictate to him what tactics he would use—that was putting his nose into business where it didn't belong." Upset with the U.S. Marshal Service, Hannon withdrew the request for their assistance and returned to his office.[8]

It was now 11:00 a.m. on Friday. Hannon was sitting in his office, agonizing about what he should do, when the phone rang. It was Kunzig. Of course, Hannon "had visions of Kunzig's giving him hell about not having completed the plans for removal." Kunzig instead told Hannon that he, Kunzig, had been "relieved of responsibility for Alcatraz and that in the future Hannon was to deal with some people at the White House named Garment and Patterson." Kunzig was extremely "vexed" at this, although this official instruction had come from the White House.[9] Soon after the second Kunzig phone call, Patterson called Hannon and established communication that was the essential link thereafter.

The Indian people on the island had thus made their presence felt in the White House. President Richard Nixon (1969–1973) had given his aides the authority to handle this crisis for the federal government earlier, when a teletype had informed him of the seizure. Aides Leonard Garment, special advisor to the president for minority affairs, and Brad Patterson, an executive assistant to Garment, handled the crucial situation.

Garment and Patterson told GSA commissioner Robert Kunzig that he was not to do anything; they were going to send a negotiating team instead of armed law enforcement. Patterson said force was never used because the White House did not want a massacre on its hands.[10]

Meanwhile, the occupational force of seventy-nine American Indians were making themselves at home on the Rock, and, sensing government intervention, they started to make plans. The

Indians and the government agencies began sensitive meetings.[11] Richard Oakes and R. Corbin Houchins, one of the legal advisors for the Indians, phoned Interior Department regional coordinator William T. Davorenon at 1:15 p.m. on a mobile phone and read a prepared proclamation.

This "proclamation demanded that Interior Secretary Walter Hickel meet with them on Alcatraz and turn the island over to the Indians within two weeks." In addition, the five-point proclamation demanded that the island be governed by an elected "Indian entity without participation in its management by any agency of government" and that the U.S. government supply enough money to develop and maintain "a major university and research and development center for all Indian people." The proclamation from "Indian Territory—Alcatraz" also demanded that supply boats for the occupation force be allowed to land with food and other necessities without harassment. "The choice now lies with the leaders of the American government," the proclamation said, "either to use violence upon us as before to remove us from the Great Spirit's land or to institute a real change in its dealings with the American Indian."[12]

On 21 November 1969, GSA personnel and a representative of the secretary of the interior met with two Indian representatives on Alcatraz. They agreed to inform the secretary of the interior of the Indians' desire for Alcatraz Island. At the time, the FBI was advised that the secretary of the interior expressed his desire that "no arrests be made" on Alcatraz.[13]

The *San Francisco Examiner* reported that a "Coast Guard blockade was established in an attempt . . . to keep Bay Area sympathizers from aiding the invaders, and the patrol warned any sightseeing sailors that they would be violating federal law if they attempted to land on the island."[14] Later in the day, the government eased restrictions and allowed supplies to land with donated food. While government officials were considering all the implications, the American Indian Center in San Francisco "issued a public appeal for money, food, blankets or other articles for the occupation force."[15]

That afternoon, the FBI office in Washington, D.C. received a phone call from San Francisco's assistant special agent in charge (ASAC), James Moreland. He advised the bureau that he had been contacted by the acting United States attorney (USA) at San Francisco, Richard Urdan, who sought FBI assistance. Urdan requested bureau agents to accompany him to Alcatraz Island to

confront the Indian group and to ask them to leave. If they refused to vacate the island, Urdan "wanted them forcibly removed." The GSA's noon deadline to vacate the island was approaching on the West Coast. Urdan planned to go over to Alcatraz if the Indians did not leave by noon. In Washington, D.C., the FBI had to make a quick policy decision, and A. Rosen concluded that Urdan's request appeared "to be a function of the United States Marshal's office rather than the FBI." Rosen instructed Moreland that Urdan would have to visit Alcatraz without FBI assistance, because the bureau "should not get involved either in the demands or the forcible ejection of the Indians from Alcatraz." At 9:25 p.m., the San Francisco FBI office advised the bureau that there were about 130 Indians on Alcatraz and that a United States Coast Guard cutter in San Francisco Bay, with United States marshals aboard, was preventing landings on Alcatraz.

On 22 November, the coast guard maintained a tight blockade of the island, patrolling the bay through the thick fog and preventing the Indians from entering or leaving. That same day, Robert Robertson, the government's middleman and executive director of the National Council of Indian Opportunity (NCIO), phoned Norm Rambeau of the American Indian Association. Robertson would become the government's chief negotiator, while Hannon was a West Coast liaison bureaucrat for the GSA and Garment the key White House figure directing this drama.

Robertson asked Rambeau how he would approach the island occupation, if he were in the government's shoes in Washington, D.C. Rambeau's "own personal feeling" was that a "confrontation wouldn't do the Indian people any good at all."[16]

The government now had a crisis on its hands. What had been planned as a symbolic action to draw attention to the problems of Indians had expanded to a demand for title to the island for exclusive Indian use and money to operate numerous facilities: a university, a cultural center, and a museum. Richard Oakes upset federal officials when he declared, on 25 November, "Alaska is next, yes Alaska."[17] Grossman later stated that there was no court for them to go to. Whether land was taken from the Indians by the United States illegally or improperly is a political question—and no court will consider a political question. The Supreme Court called the issue political or nonjustifiable.[18]

On 24 November 1969, Secretary of the Interior Hickel issued a news release saying that he was available to meet with Indian representatives regarding the future of Alcatraz, without any

preconditions—but not on Alcatraz. He also mentioned that he was "glad to pursue such discussions, even though it [was] not in [his] power to transfer ownership of the island or to alter it in any manner."[19] Hickel refused to meet with the Indians while they were on Alcatraz and noted that he would have to consider all possible uses of Alcatraz. At this time, the FBI notified Washington that the Indians on Alcatraz were running out of water and had requested replenishment of the supply.[20]

The same day, after the Indians had refused to leave the island, the San Francisco regional office of GSA asked federal law enforcement officials "to take steps" to bring the Indians back to the mainland, because the deteriorated property was extremely hazardous and the facilities were insufficient to accommodate the large throng on the island. The water supply, intended only for the caretaker, was exhausted and had caused a power failure from an overload on the electrical circuits. The GSA was concerned about the well-being of the Indians and issued a news release saying that there were "hazards on the island besides health; the buildings have broken stairs, crumbling walls, rusty nails, and inadequate lighting." But the Indians ignored the warnings and remained in the ghostly, crumbling buildings.[21]

On 26 November, the Indians issued a press release on Alcatraz that detailed their support. Meanwhile, GSA in San Francisco released a statement that requested the Indians "to come ashore and talk about the Alcatraz situation." The message reported that "it [was] being realized that urban American Indians have real problems." It stressed that "there has been no violence and no deadlines or ultimatums have been given to the Indians" and that the "GSA locally has been instructed by Washington not to force any confrontation with Indians."[22]

The GSA press release had been drafted in the White House.[23] Besides warning the Indians of the dangers on the island, it characterized the occupation as a peaceful demonstration and stated that "the use of force to remove the Indians from the island has been avoided." It further asserted that the government was interested in meeting with the group to discuss local educational and cultural needs, with good faith on both sides.[24]

On 27 November 1969, Thanksgiving Day, islanders invited newsmen to be pilgrims at their feast but warned that they wanted no militants, hippies, or tourists to visit. One Indian remarked, "[E]very day that we stay here, it looks more like we'll be able to remain indefinitely."[25] The president of the United Bay Area

Council of Indians, Adam Nordwall, said, "[W]e are attacking the whole system of the white man by attacking Alcatraz" and declared that the island had become a symbol for his people.[26]

On 1 December, the San Francisco FBI informed its Washington, D.C. office that GSA had issued a press release stating that the Indians "must get off voluntarily and no consideration of their problem [would] be given until they have vacated the island and ceased to violate the law."

On 2 December, the Interagency Regional Council held a meeting in San Francisco intended "to determine what interim assistance [could] be properly provided by the federal government to the Indians in establishing a cultural center and to meet their other needs." The regional council was composed of representatives from the Departments of Labor, Health, Education and Welfare, Housing and Urban Development, and the Office of Economic Opportunity. Also included were representatives of the Department of Justice Community Relations Service, Commerce's Economic Development Administration, the Small Business Administration, the Department of the Interior, and GSA.[27] This regional council meeting was called at the request of Leonard Garment at the White House, so that the Interior Department and the BIA could "be convened to review Indian problems to see what interagency action could be taken to alleviate them."[28] The meeting resulted in a discussion of a possible planning grant that could be given to an appropriate group of Indians on Alcatraz who would represent all of the occupiers.

Early on, the government dealt with three distinct groups involved in the Alcatraz "drama." The first, led by Richard Oakes, was composed of Indian college students who were more "single-minded" than the others about obtaining title to Alcatraz. The other groups were the United Bay Area Council on Indian Affairs, spearheaded by chairman Adam Nordwall, and the American Indian Center, run by its director, Earl Livermore.

Meetings were tense; not only was the government negotiating with a diverse group of people, but one of the leaders, Richard Oakes, sported a button saying, "We won't move." Hannon stated, "[W]e believe we can induce them to go."[29] The regional administrator said, "[T]hey would just come back here with the same problems. We're trying to learn what their problems are so another Alcatraz won't happen."[30]

In early December 1969, Robert Robertson phoned Brad Patterson and told him that he "thought we could go around [the

Indians'] flank by quietly taking care of whatever immediate problems they had in the San Francisco Bay Area." Patterson then quipped that "strategy is that nothing will really happen until they got off the island." Patterson then stressed that Garment was calling the shots; the government in San Francisco was not to make any promises; and since the press had been involved in the meetings to date "not much can be said."

On 12 December, Browning Pipestem, an attorney representing the Indian occupiers, had an off-the-record conversation with Robertson. Pipestem said that the Indians on Alcatraz wanted a number of significant things, and he believed the difficulty the "government was facing was finding some sort of hook to hang their hat on." He contended that the occupation "points up the desperate nature of the situation." Pipestem was correct in seeing that the island was "the only negotiating instrument they [had]" and that meaningful dialogue could be accomplished only when they were on the island. If they left Alcatraz, they would be in the same negotiating position as they had been before.[31]

On 18 December 1969, California Senator George Murphy informed the press that he had proposed to the White House that Alcatraz become an Indian National Park. Senator Murphy did not get a warm response from the Indians on Alcatraz. Dean Chavers quipped, "A national park, that means it would be federally run, doesn't it? We want it run by Indians and I speak for all two hundred on the island."

On 23 December, Leonard Garment realized the need for an ad hoc group "to give the needed policy direction to Regional offices in San Francisco" and to handle the daily "new account of demands or proposals." The new group was composed of C.D. Ward of the vice president's office, Bob Robertson, Snead, and Wing from the NCIO, Alan Kirk of Interior, Joseph Maldonado of OEO (assisted by James Wilson), Daniel Kingsley of GSA, Kenneth Kugel of the Bureau of the Budget (assisted by Stanley Doremus), designees from the Departments of Labor, HEW, HUD, and Garment and Patterson.[32]

Garment also suggested negotiation. First, forcible removal would not be considered as long as the Indians were peaceful, and second, the administration welcomed all suggestions from Indians on the fate of Alcatraz for initial consideration. Garment mentioned two sine qua nons in reference to the negotiations: (1) The press would not be allowed unless both sides agreed, and the negotiating group for the Indians must be representative of the

entire Bay Area; (2) the government did not want to deal with different factions that might repudiate an agreement at a future date.[33]

As the new year began, the Alcatraz Indians were beginning to plan phase two of their occupation. The occupation was phase one, and phase two involved "plans for development of facilities and curriculum for a Native American cultural and education center." With the government seemingly perplexed, the Indians announced that they planned to tear down the historic cellblock built in 1909 by army prisoners and place a large, symbolic, circular building on the island's highest ground.[34]

On Saturday evening, 3 January 1970, tragedy struck for the Indians on Alcatraz. Thirteen-year-old Yvonne Sherd Oakes, the stepdaughter of Richard Oakes, fell to her death in a stairwell of an apartment building.[35] Because of Yvonne's accident, the government began to learn more about conditions on the island. Richard's wife, Anna, told Hannon that they were going to leave because "there was much rivalry among the Indians on the island for leadership," and because of "drinking, use of drugs, fighting and disorder." Mrs. Oakes had "serious reservations on whether the fall was an accident"; she said her other children had been getting a lot of verbal abuse, and their oldest child had been "seriously beaten" two weeks earlier.[36] The Oakeses were also given conflicting reports of the accident by other Indians, which led Richard Oakes to say later, "[M]y daughter was murdered." Hannon did not call an investigation at this time, because he believed there was more "apparent emotion" than evidence. Initially, Richard did not tell Hannon that he thought Yvonne had been murdered, because he believed an investigation would precipitate forcible removal of the Indians.

The FBI did investigate Yvonne's death as a possible crime on government property. Agents interviewed Yvonne's fourteen-year-old cousin, and the facts were presented to former AUSA Jerrold M. Ladar, who contended "that based on interviews by bureau agents, there was no basis for any further investigation."[37]

On 7 January 1970, an interagency meeting occurred in Washington, D.C. Present at the meeting were the Indians' Washington legal counsel, Montgomery and Pipestem. Those present for the government said they were "anxious" to work out proposals as to what might be done for the Indians in the San Francisco Bay Area. They were quick to point out, however, that "Bay Area negotiations [were] not the place to solve nationwide problems," and

they recognized they had "a nationwide audience of urban Indians and Reservation Indians" watching. They sought the establishment of a representative group of Indians in the Bay Area so the government could "minimize the risk of making some agreements and then being whipsawed by dissident factions." It was suggested that the interagency San Francisco Regional Council put together a negotiating team and that Robertson, the executive director of the National Council on Indian Opportunity, become the principal negotiator and handle the press; GSA would remain in charge of logistics and security concerning Alcatraz. A planning grant from OED, HUD, Labor, and HEW was in the works for approximately forty thousand dollars. The government planned to give the funds to the all-Indian group so they could formulate workable proposals based on the needs of the Bay Area urban Indians. They also talked about a GSA arrangement where women and children would leave Alcatraz "for safety's sake," and the adult male Indians on the island would be given permits to remain on the Rock.[38]

The following day, an important step occurred when Robertson met with the council, and the group was told that the NCIO was a "coordinating instrument" in the Alcatraz situation. The morning meeting was not a negotiating session but an opportunity to talk to the Washington attorneys. Montgomery and Pipestem agreed with the group that, initially, they must have "negotiations about negotiations," and the composition of both negotiating groups must be discussed.[39] The Indians on Alcatraz did have a seven-member council that met weekly to decide the affairs of their community. Indians over eighteen years old who had lived on Alcatraz for more than a week elected the council.

The next day, Robertson wrote a memo to the vice president and Garment. He mentioned that one of the government officials on the West Coast had said, "[I]f we do nothing for two months the Alcatraz situation would die away but of course we can't do this." He also mentioned that Hannon believed "he should pull back now and not be out front, that he should be concerned only with the physical Alcatraz situation," and that it was agreed upon that Hannon should assume this new role. In a private meeting with Hannon, Robertson observed that the government should determine the tactics in handling the press, that Hickel should absorb the island into the federal park system, and that the local government's feeling was that Alcatraz "was a Federal problem: let them solve it."[40]

On 9 January 1970, the *San Francisco Chronicle* reported that the government planned "to begin serious negotiations," now that the authority to deal with the Indians was shifted from GSA to the NCIO. The paper quoted Robertson as saying that "our major aim now is to begin a meaningful dialogue, we're keeping our minds open on all possibilities," and that he was "willing to talk with the Indians anywhere—including on Alcatraz itself."[41]

On 11 January, Robertson met not only with the council but with all the Indians, including visitors. The council explained to Robertson that decisions were made by everyone, that there were no secret meetings, and that the council could take action only in emergency cases. When the government negotiators asked for the Indians' chairman, they were informed that, since the Indians were practicing "pure democracy," there was no such person. Robertson opened the meeting, noting that they had come to Alcatraz "to discuss the health and safety hazards on the island."[42] After a short presentation by Hannon on the federal law for disposal of property, Grossman said that "the government could do whatever it wanted in spite of the law." The Indians were unimpressed.[43]

In his report to the vice president and Garment, Robertson noted that "there [was] no real leadership" on Alcatraz because of the "pure democracy" of the island group. He stressed that the government should remain patient, because, "as the focus of attention [was] shifting to the planning activity on the mainland, the esprit de corps of the demonstrators will weaken even further."[44]

On 17 January 1970, the *San Francisco Examiner* reported a "water barge crisis on Alcatraz." The big, steel barge was missing.[45] Hannon reported that the barge, which would hold 160,000 to 200,000 gallons, was merely "being filled," and thus the scare was off for the moment.[46] Eventually, the government would remove and secrete the barge.

At this time, a number of people in the government expressed their support for the Indians on Alcatraz Island. Louis R. Bruce, commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and an Indian himself, wrote, "I heartily support this determination as vital in the development of the leadership that can help the Indian people effectively chart their own course to lives of dignity, self-respect and independence in modern American society."[47] Others also sympathized with the overall plight of the Indians.

Patterson observed that the Alcatraz episode is symbolic to Indians. To non-Indians, it represents the lack of services for

Indians in the San Francisco Bay Area. He also correctly noted that the White House "response to the Alcatraz situation has been one of restraint and willingness to remedy this lack of attention and to look at these unmet needs." Patterson expressed concern for the Indians' safety—he did not "want any more child injuries"—but was "disappointed at the lack of leadership" and their "pure democracy" that had made Robertson's three meetings as the principal negotiator at Alcatraz extremely difficult.[48]

On 30 January 1970, the ad hoc interagency group met in the vice president's conference room to discuss Alcatraz and the Bay Area urban Indians. The group concluded that the lighthouse must be secured; children would be urged to leave the island; the Alcatraz group should be represented on the new Bay Area Indian committee; Robertson could "hold out the possibility of a planning grant up to $40,000"; services should be improved to assist not only Indians but all people in the Bay Area; GSA and the Justice Department should challenge the papers of incorporation by the Alcatraz group; and Interior should prepare the cost estimated "for transforming the island into an Indian managed urban sanctuary, National Historic Site."[49]

After the meeting, Robertson considered the alternatives open to him as the principal government negotiator. The first was to let the situation continue as it was, but it was untenable. He could not "negotiate with a 'pure democracy' group"; they would probably not "accept anything less than all their demands," and they were unwilling to recognize any other Indian group except their own on the island. Further, the government was liable for their actions, and, even with a responsible island council, a maritime disaster could occur any day.[50]

Robertson noted that the current federal position was to do "something positive" with the Indian people regarding Alcatraz. He also realized that, "unless some move is made now all Indian effort expended regarding the island could be lost—that this effort is being undertaken nationally because all Indian people should be involved." Robertson believed that Secretary Hickel should create a park with Indian involvement; that an organization of national Indians should be formed; that the name of Alcatraz should be changed, perhaps to "Indian Island"; that an omnibus Indian cultural center should be constructed; that Indian training programs should be instituted on the island; and that the programs should be such that tourists would be involved. Robertson's argument for this plan was that a "'piece of pie' was

better than none at all" and that, when the island was made a park and the buildings were razed, no person would be able to "stay on the island." In concluding his notes, he observed that, "even though it is true that ignoring the island situation [would] eventually cause its demise, [he] knew there [was] a chance to do something positive, imagewise, for Indian people."[51]

On 9 February 1970, the Indians on Alcatraz issued a press release about a newly formed group that would soon meet with government negotiators. Approximately thirteen Indian organizations in the Bay Area had formed the Bay Area Native American Council (BANAC) to represent "40,000 Indians from over seventy-eight different tribes throughout Alaska, Canada, and the United States."[52]

On the night of 1 March 1970, the Indians of Alcatraz held a meeting on the mainland. Vern Conway "lost a round in the continuous battle" with Stella Leach for leadership of the island group, which meant that the government negotiators would now have to bargain with a less intelligent, militant group that condoned the use of alcohol and dope and did not control visitors and sanitary conditions.[53] On 16 March 1970, Robertson wrote an informative memo to the vice president and Garment, noting that the island's current leader, Stella Leach, had said their position was "negotiable." Robertson suggested that the objective of the government's counterproposal was to form a partnership between the "unstable" and "badly fractionated" Indians on Alcatraz and the Interior Department so that a park could be developed. Anticipating the Indians' "non-acceptance" of the offer, Robertson hoped to get "the highest possible visibility," so the reasoning of the action would be understood by all concerned.

Robertson also mentioned that the executive director of BANAC, Norman Rambeau, had informed him that, if the government met the "islanders' demands head-on" and if they were still "unreceptive," BANAC would probably move away from the Indians on Alcatraz and accept the planning grant. He believed the government's "symbolic transfer-of-title act," to be included in the counterproposal, was vital because it was "a face-saver for the island Indians."

Robertson maintained that, if the counterproposal was considered "unacceptable" to an uncooperative island group, the government could "just proceed and leave them" alone as long as the occupation was acceptable. This response, he believed, would "effectively destroy the group." Robertson recommended that the

government offer a counterproposal and give the Interior Department the green light to proceed with its park plan.[54]

On 25 March, Robertson began to formulate a serious counterproposal to offer to the Indians. He believed that the government would have "to face the issue squarely." The counterproposal that would be considered "final," since the Department of the Interior would then go ahead with its plans for conversion of Alcatraz into a park. Robertson stressed that the "central thrust" of the counterproposal would be that Alcatraz would "become a showcase for Indian heritage and culture and that this would be achieved by involving Indians in the park planning process."

The government's "very best offer possible" included maximizing Indian involvement in the park's planning stages and changing the name of the island, if the Indians so desired. The government would not veto the idea of a university, ecological center, cultural center, and museum but would promise to study the requests. The island could be run by Indian Park Service personnel, but ownership of Alcatraz should remain in Interior's hands "in the best interests of Indians and all other citizens." Finally, the government would deny the Indian group's request for $300,000, because the park plan "would eliminate" the need to acquire support services and materials.

Robertson expected that the more militant Indians on Alcatraz would reject this counterproposal, since they would not settle for anything less than ownership. He believed that, if the government proceeded with its plans, most Indians would leave Alcatraz, but the more militant people would remain and be reinforced by additional militants. Robertson was "against a physical confrontation if there is any way at all to avoid one." The NCIO director stated, "If we are faced with such a situation in the future," sympathy, both Indian and non-Indian alike, would be with the government if it "executed" its "plan properly." Robertson also believed that the current island group was more receptive to the government's proposal, because Richard Oakes had recently returned to Alcatraz and had removed Stella Leach from the council; Oakes was perturbed about the "dope and alcohol problems" on the island, which he thought were destroying "the Indian cause."

Robertson hoped that he could meet with the press before the counterproposal delivery date of 31 March 1970 to give the media an "off-the-record" account as to what really was happening on Alcatraz. Robertson knew "that the leading press people in San

Francisco would give us good treatment." He hoped that the counterproposal would serve "as a high visibility vehicle to restate in solid terms this Administration's Indian policy."[55] On Tuesday, 31 March, the first five months of the occupation ended as the government offered its park plan for Alcatraz with maximum Indian quality, which meant, for example, Indian monuments, Indian park rangers, and a possible name change of the island.[56]

The Indian occupation of Alcatraz had now consumed five months, and high-ranking officials of the U.S. government had yet to find a solution to this vexing problem. They felt impatient but remained cautious in policy. The government decided to continue this cautious response and the constant negotiations in hopes that the Indians would leave on their own.

On Tuesday, 31 March 1970, Robert Robertson met with thirty to forty Indians on Alcatraz, offered them the government's counterproposal, and released Hickel's Interior study "A New Look at Alcatraz," which had been completed on 25 November 1969. The proposal sought to turn Alcatraz into a federal park with an emphasis on Indian culture. Robertson shied away from making a commitment of a university on the island, noting that such problems as accessibility, water, sewage, heating, and lighting had led to the island's abandonment by the Department of Justice. Robertson told the press that "no deadline was set for a reply and there would be no effort to remove them if they refused the suggestion."[57]

On 3 April 1970, the Indians on Alcatraz turned down the government's proposal, contending that it "was a study that was taken before the Alcatraz invasion, thereby putting the lie to the statement that they had even considered [the Indians'] proposal." To them, it was a slap in the face. The Indians demanded another proposal with a deadline of 31 May 1970. The island group also indicated that the only negotiable items were "money and the time and the day that they will turn over the deed" to Alcatraz.

On 9 April 1970, H. Clyde Mathews, Jr., deputy regional civil rights director, DHEW, San Francisco region, wrote Robert Coop, regional director, DHEW, San Francisco region, correctly noting that the islanders would "attempt to keep the 'whip hand.'" He observed that the Indians "have conquered Alcatraz and are treating the government as peons." He believed that the government had made progress and that more negotiations might bring about a possible resolution. Mathews contended that the Indians

on Alcatraz were basically "trying to get all of the cards on the table and see who has the winning hand."[58]

As the occupation entered the month of May, the situation on the bleak island remained guarded. On 26 May 1970, the government issued a press release stating that it would remove the three caretakers because of "increasing concern" for their safety; the administration feared that the men would be kidnapped and held hostage. The press release also noted that the government would allow the Indians to remain on Alcatraz, "because their demonstration has been peaceful and has not disrupted normal government operations." Still, the government would hold to its present course. On 27 May 1970, Hannon announced that, at the request of the secretary of the interior, the island would come under Interior's control. The news release stated that the park idea was deemed "the most appropriate future for this unique island." It would have an Indian theme, and Hannon mentioned that the offer still stood to establish an Indian joint planning committee to confer with Hickel in developing the island park. He then called on the Indians to accept the government's plan and assistance, so "plans for the Golden Gate National Recreation area" could "move ahead."[59]

The Indians were not interested in the park, and it was now apparent that the government had started to flex its muscle with the islanders. In removing the caretakers and replacing the automatic lighthouse with buoys, the government had made it unnecessary to continue supplying the island with water.[60]

On Friday, 28 May 1970, the government cut off telephone service, electricity, and all water supplies. The Indians had a few generators, so the electricity shutoff was not a vital concern, but the water situation would present immediate problems, because hundreds of Indians had been invited to a weekend powwow for "Indian Liberation Day" on Alcatraz. Hannon said, "[W]e will just have to wait and see what the Indians will do."[61] It was apparent now that the federal government was not going to surrender to the islanders' demands.

On 30 May 1970, hundreds of Indians came to Alcatraz to challenge Hickel's intention to turn Alcatraz into a national park. They wrote a declaration on sheepskin stating that "we announce on behalf of all Indian people, or tribes that from this day forward we shall exercise dominion, and all rights of use and possession over Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay." The declaration also asserted that the occupation had been" done for Indians—but to

those whites who desire their government to be a government of law, justice and morality, we say we have done it also for you."[62]

That evening, while a thick fog covered the bay, fire destroyed several buildings on the island. The fires had been set in defiance of a country that had turned its back on the Indians' proposal.[63] While the embers were still hot on 1 June 1970, the government announced that Alcatraz would be made into a park as part of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area. The government was low key about the fire; Tom Hannon even told one reporter that a blockade was out of the question since "there [were] some wonderful people on the island."[64] He stated that removal of the Indians was "not worth the risk" and that "it [was] idiotic to fight for an island that's inactive."

On 8 June 1970, the *San Francisco Chronicle* announced that the coast guard had plans to restore the island's navigational light as soon as it was "practical." USCG Captain Charles Scharfenstein, 12th district commandant, reported that "the White House told us to deny electricity to the Indians" to pressure the occupying force to end its island stay.[65] The Indians actually restored the light with the help of Scott Newhall, a yachtsman and the editor of the *San Francisco Chronicle,* who provided a generator to restore the light as a makeshift beacon, but it was extinguished under White House orders.

The government's action against the Indians was a prelude to the ultimate act of removal. On 9 June 1970, GSA in San Francisco called a meeting to discuss plans for removal of the Indians. Realty officer Thomas Scott wrote, "[W]e feel we are prepared to initiate our [removal] plan if asked to do so by the Regional Administrator."[66] On 11 June 1970, the FBI office in San Francisco notified J. Edgar Hoover that the bureau's agents in San Francisco still would not go to the island to conduct any further investigations or assume a policing function. The *San Francisco Examiner* noted that, although "this might be called the battle of the redskins vs. the red faces, the palefaces are becoming red with embarrassment."[67]

The plight of the American Indian received national prominence when Richard Nixon addressed Congress on 9 July 1970. Although the president did not mention Alcatraz, he denounced the "centuries of injustice" to American Indians and proposed a comprehensive program to give them dignity and control over their destiny. He endorsed a "pending House Resolution that would return 48,000 acres of sacred land in New Mexico to the Taos Pueblo tribe." He also deplored a history of white "aggres-

sion, broken agreements, intermittent remorse and prolonged failure" in treatment of the Indians.[68]

Shortly after Nixon's message, Robertson wrote, "[I]f it were decided that a decisive move were to be made to remove the Indians from the island there will probably never be a better time than right now." Still, Robertson recommended that the White House avoid confrontation, as Nixon's message "created a fount of good will nationally for him."[69]

Since the Indians on Alcatraz believed their position was "tenable," Robertson thought that "getting them to take the final step actually deciding that they will give up the island—[would] be most difficult." If all other efforts failed, the government's response, according to Robertson, would be to set another deadline so that Interior could begin its park construction. The government would then wage an unofficial media war against the Indians by issuing press releases with substance from Nixon's message to Congress. If the Indians were still on the island, the government would remove them. Since public support for the Indians was "waning," the government had one final choice and that was to isolate the Indians and leave them alone on Alcatraz "to make their lives there more difficult" and thus persuade more to leave.[70]

From the onset, the government had avoided a confrontation with the Indians on Alcatraz, although it seemed only a matter of time before such an encounter would occur. On 28 July, Leonard Garment wrote a memo to director Shultz and John Ehrlichman. He stressed that the entire situation was "well suited to confrontation politics," which the government had recognized from the beginning, but it had "not reacted in any way which would play into their hands." Garment noted the government's "key strategy" of "restraint"; the government did "not want a Kent State on Alcatraz"—a situation, said Garment, that could be repeated on Alcatraz with "little effort." He further noted that the Bay Area Native American Council (BANAC) had privately told the government, "[T]he Alcatraz situation will die on the vine if they are given some more time."[71]

Garment's memo was prompted by a letter he received from John Ehrlichman after the latter had visited the GSA regional office in San Francisco. Ehrlichman had concluded that the entire situation "makes the Federal government look pretty bad" and that the morale of the government personnel in San Francisco concerning Alcatraz was "very poor." Ehrlichman recommended to Garment that the White House appoint an Indian as a White

House representative to "solve it in a way that saves face for the Indians."

Other White House aides were also making suggestions. Unaware of Garment's memo of 28 July, Don Murdoch and Bobbie Greene, two such aides, commented that "there has been only slight communication between the right Federal hand and the left Federal hand." They recommended that BANAC's planning grant be expedited and that the Interior's Department plan for Alcatraz be postponed indefinitely. Both believed that the Regional Council could insist that BANAC limit its operations to the mainland, which could be accomplished "through the proper use of the big money carrot." The two White House aides wrote that "negotiations between the White House and the Alcatraz group should be allowed to fade out," and "the group should not be honored with anymore visits from White House representatives." Both contended that the government's strategy would be to let the "controversy go out with a whimper, if that."[72]

On 17 August, the government formulated its removal plans, code-named Operation Parks. The "top super secret" operation would have the coast guard make another attempt to reactivate the aids to navigation. If they were repulsed, the marshals would take over and evict the Indians. After the operation, GSA Public Building Service guards would secure the island. The operation was the brainchild of GSA's Hannon and Phil Roach, Marshal Tobin, and USCG's Admiral Weyland.[73]

Through Governor Ronald Reagan, the federal government then announced its approval of the fifty-thousand-dollar planning grant on 21 August 1970 to the consortium of Bay Area Indian groups, the BANAC. Reagan also mentioned that the funds were made possible by a grant from the Office of Economic Opportunity.[74]

The Indians, in the ninth month of their occupation, suspected that an attack by the government was imminent. Steps were taken to fortify the island. The prison's recreation yard was dotted with more than thirty garbage cans stuffed with gasoline-soaked rags, to be lit in the event of a helicopter invasion.[75] When a coast guard helicopter hovered over Alcatraz on 28 August, taking numerous tactical photographs for the planned eviction, some of the Indians welcomed it with a barrage of rocks.[76]

On the morning of 2 September, the *San Francisco Chronicle* ran Herb Caen's column entitled "Pull Cord to Stop Press." Caen had managed to get his hands on a confidential dispatch from the

commander of the 12th Naval District to the commander of the Western Sea Frontier on Treasure Island. Caen told his readers that the government planned to evict the Indians from Alcatraz and that the action was code-named Operation Parks. The removal would be staged from nearby Treasure Island, and it would "be a Coast Guard show with Navy participation." Landing barges were to be employed but not helicopters. Caen queried, "How does the Coast Guard feel about being cast in the role of villain by the Navy?"[77]

That same day, Tom Hannon of GSA issued a press release stating that the government was acting with restraint, that discussions were still open, and that it was still possible to arrive at "an amicable solution." Hannon contended that, if the navigational aids on Alcatraz were reactivated and not interfered with, there was "no present intention to remove the Indians from the island by force." Referring to Caen's column, the regional administrator stated that he had "no knowledge of internal classified Navy messages."[78] The *Stockton Record* quoted Hannon as stating that "there has always been a plan to remove the Indians if and when such drastic action is necessary."[79] The next day, Caen revealed that, when the Indians were to be evicted from Alcatraz, "the actual dirty work [would] be done by U.S. Marshals—thereby providing an authentic Wild West touch."[80]

In the meantime, the government was considering its long-range plans for the island or, at least, some ideas that might persuade the Indians to leave. On 14 September, Garment wrote Ehrlichman, outlining seven steps the government would need to take to change the Indians' status from trespassers to government contractors; return approved navigational aids to the island; and get "the island into the hands of the Cabinet Officer who has the best use for the island in the long run."[81]

First, GSA would relinquish control of Alcatraz and transfer it to the Department of the Interior, as Secretary Hickel had requested. Garment noted that GSA could not give the Indians a lease or permit, because this would come under the terms of the Federal Property Act, which required fair market value. The island's $2 million-dollar price tag would mean a monthly lease fee of seventeen thousand dollars, which would be prohibitive. Second, Secretary Hickel should designate the island as a national historic site under 16 USC 461. Third, the National Park Service would contract with "responsible" Indians for maintenance and custodial services. Fourth, the USCG would contract with "re-

sponsible" Indians to operate the foghorns and lighthouse on Alcatraz. The hiring of these "lamplighters" was discouraged by the USCG, since they already were able to provide an in-house capacity. Fifth, the National Park Service should allow the Indians to set up and run the concessionaire services on Alcatraz. Sixth, the National Park Service would issue special use permits to the Indians. Seventh, Interior should provide the Indian contractors with power, water, and portable toilets, for a monthly fee. Garment contended that these seven steps would take the "heat" off, because the public would certainly "be outraged by forcible removal."[82]

Garment was quick to point out that the steps did not provide a symbolic ending to the takeover, nor did they guarantee a long-range solution. He noted that there might be a problem with getting the Indians to vacate the island, since they believed that Alcatraz was their "only trump card." The White House aide believed the steps were "just a holding operation; it doesn't really get us anywhere, except out of the box we are in now—which would itself be an accomplishment of some size." Garment stressed that the government's "simple solution" of forcible removal probably would end in bloodshed and create "negative consequences" as the election of 1972 loomed. Nevertheless, a case would have to be made for forcible removal if that road was chosen, and Garment wrote that it "may be the next order of business if the above plan fails."[83] Garment's plan was eventually carried out, and Alcatraz became a national park. There has been very little Indian involvement in running the island, which perhaps suggests what was thought about their motivations at the time.

On 14 October, Robert Robertson informed Brad Patterson that he had gotten word from a third party in Washington, D.C., who was in close contact with the Indians on Alcatraz, that the islanders would never accept any type of settlement. The islanders wanted to remain on the windblown island, because "at any time they [could] generate a situation which [would] create publicity, allowing them to speak out on national issues."[84]

Others were concerned with the lack of progress made by the government. On 9 November, Bud Krogh sent a memo to Brad Patterson, asking about the status of the Alcatraz situation and stating that he had "not heard of it since [their] decision not to mount a land-air-sea operation to extract the renegades."[85] Krogh also complained to GSA administrator Robert Kunzig "that those Indians would have been taken off the island long ago if it had not

been for 'that asshole' [Tom Hannon] who was the GSA Regional Administrator in San Francisco."[86] News reporter Mary Crawford correctly observed that the occupation was "a thorn in the side of the Administration."[87]

The situation soon turned potentially deadly for the federal government. On 19 November, the coast guard cutter *Red Birch* was servicing a buoy almost 160 yards from Alcatraz when eight rounds were fired in the direction of the ship from a handgun on the island. This action prompted the commander of the Twelfth USCG District, Mark A. Whalen, to inform the commandant that coast guard personnel had been harassed since 1 June 1970. Whalen contended that these incidents were "degrading to the Coast Guard personnel." Whalen reasoned that the USCG could not take any action to reactivate the navigational aids until the White House resolved the dispute with the occupying Indians. This "intolerable situation" was unsafe for personnel and equipment, and the commandant should "pursue the subject to this end."[88]

Ironically, the same day, the *San Jose News* quoted Hannon as saying that "the Indians are out on the island, and since they aren't bothering anyone, we aren't bothering them, there is no reason for the government to move against them at this time." The government's policy had to change because of the latest incident. Yet, as reporter Joan Jackson concluded, "Alcatraz today [was] being passed around like a political football."[89]

Others in the government were also becoming impatient. On 27 November, White House aide Geoff Shepard declared to Bud Krogh, *"I recommend we remove the Indians, forcibly if necessary, and prevent their return."* He urged that the White House request the FBI to "gather intelligence concerning population and activities" by infiltration and surveillance.[90] Shepard observed that Alcatraz had turned into a "public symbol for Indians everywhere." The White House aide stressed that the government had continued to tolerate an "armed trespass on federal property, destruction of federal buildings and property, larceny, drug abuse, and assaults on Coast Guard ships; and [they] have ignored the education and welfare of the children on the island."[91]

Shepard then discussed six alternatives that the government had at its disposal. The first was to remove the Indians forcibly, and the last was to maintain the status quo. Shepard reasoned that Nixon's "current goodwill" toward the Indians would be "jeopardized by movement in this area." The proposal to return Blue

Lake to the Taos Indians was coming up soon in Congress. Shepard ended his memo somewhat philosophically: "Having tolerated this problem for a full year, we might conclude that this is a condition rather than a problem that demands an immediate solution."[92]

After reading Shepard's memo, Brad Patterson wrote to Bud Krogh, outlining four options for the government. Initially, Patterson's option A was to "let things continue as they are" and continue to play a "waiting game." However, he crossed out that option and changed it to forcible removal. This option would leave President Nixon "to defend himself alone." Under option B, the government would continue to play a delaying game until Congress approved plans to include Alcatraz in the proposed Golden Gate National Recreation Area. This option would defer confrontation, pass "the buck to Congress," and create a situation where the Indians might disperse because of weather and boredom. Option C was known as the "Garment Plan." This would have the secretary of the interior declare the island a national historic site, whereby GSA would relinquish control to the National Park Service. The final alternative, option D, was Shepard's idea to allow the islanders to set up a daytime center that would assist urban Indians.[93]

Patterson concluded that "if point four, above, is what will really happen, then we are back to options A or B, but this time with the posture of having made a genuine and very reasonable compromise offer, including literally giving the Indians some of the island." Patterson suggested that the White House "gear up a public relations campaign" to point out the "reasonable offer to the public and Congress, especially in the Bay Area," so that "the unhappy consequences of taking the A option may be slightly mitigated."[94]

On 11 December, Bud Krogh informed John Ehrlichman of current developments. The latest intelligence report from the mainland recluse who had been observing the island on a daily basis stated that the island's population was down to twenty Indians. Krogh recommended that the FBI gather intelligence on the island group, that the USCG and GSA "confidentially prepare" to move on Alcatraz at twenty-four hours' notice, and that, if intelligence showed a "diminished number" of islanders, the above agencies should be prepared to move on the island and restore the aids to navigation. If forced eviction should occur, Krogh recommended, the government should not prosecute the

Indians on trespass alone, because the government had "tolerated the trespass for too long to prosecute on that basis alone." But the government should "at least" arrest the Indians for trespass and then "ask as a condition of bail" that the court instruct the defendants "not to return to the island."[95]

The situation for the Indians was bleak indeed. On 21 January 1971, after returning from a trip to Washington, D.C., LaNada Means observed, "[T]he government will not budge on the issue and are just watching us struggle," and "momentum of the Alcatraz issue has dwindled considerably." Since the Indian people did not have title and since the state of California would not recognize the legal incorporation of Indians of All Tribes, Inc., or give them federal tax-exempt status, large donors and the average American would not continue to give money to finance the occupation, because they could not "write it off their taxes."[96]

While the Indians' momentum was slowing down, the FBI was stepping up its investigations of the island group. J. Edgar Hoover's agents were now actively investigating the Indians to turn up anything that could be used against their cause and could serve as a reason for eviction. On two occasions early in February 1971, the FBI's San Francisco office determined that the islanders had transported copper, brass, and lead from Alcatraz and sold them to a local scrap dealer. United States attorney James L. Browning, Jr. decided that the government should not take action, because a witness would be needed. The FBI continued to keep a tight surveillance on the Indians.[97]

While the investigative branch of the Department of Justice watched the Indians like a hawk, the enforcement branch of the Department of Justice, the U.S. Marshal Service, sent a deputy to Alcatraz with the Indians' attorney on 11 February. The FBI report stated that, "when the Deputy Marshal landed on the island, he was met by approximately twenty young Indians, half of which were armed with .45 caliber automatics." A verbal confrontation ensued, and the U.S. marshal, outnumbered and outgunned, departed the island in disgust after failing to carry out his inspection.[98]

On 12 March, a meeting was held in San Francisco with U.S. attorney James Browning, Harlington Wood, and Wayne Colburn, chief U.S. marshal, Washington, D.C. These officials considered many plans to retake Alcatraz, but the one that stood out was an "assault by force of U.S. Marshals to forcefully remove Indians." The FBI observer at the meeting told the group that the FBI would

"furnish intelligence data" but "no agent would physically go to Alcatraz."[99]

On 4 April 1971, the San Francisco FBI notified its Washington, D.C. office that United States attorney James Browning had advised them that a secret meeting would occur on 13 April between the government and the Indians. Government participants included Browning, Harlington Wood (assistant attorney general, Department of Justice), Bob Ireland (acting regional director of the GSA), and Larry Anderson (GSA special agent, Office of Audits and Compliance). Representing the Indians were the Indian council and attorney Donald A. Jelinek.[100]

The meeting at Brooks Hall, which the press knew nothing about, was the result of John Trudell's announcement that the islanders wanted title to the disputed island, and they invited the government to comment on its current position. Attorney Browning started the meeting by saying that the government representatives could not make any binding agreements with the Indians, because the government had not authorized them to do so. He mentioned that the federal "government regarded criminal and legislative jurisdiction over the island as a matter separate and apart from title to the island." The lawyer also mentioned that the government's "matter of access to the island was a non-negotiable one" and that "the government [had] been most lenient with the Indians" in allowing their right of access. Browning mentioned the latter because of "several instances of crimes necessitating government access to the island," but, up to this point, the government had looked the other way in regard to the occupation. Relating to title, Browning stated that he hoped the Indians would realize that even Richard Nixon was subject to the law and that title transfer must be conveyed "under the rule of law" and not by any other means not in accordance with the law.[101]

They discussed the subject of navigational aids, and both sides agreed that aids were necessary to prevent possible collisions on the bay. The island group was also willing to make concessions in regards to federal jurisdiction of Alcatraz. The meeting closed with an agreement to meet in a week's time, but the subsequent meeting never took place.[102]

Browning later voiced his impression that the islanders would not settle for anything but title to Alcatraz: "[T]hey will not discontinue their militant stance against government access to the island in the absence of either title to the island or removal therefrom." He also observed that the islanders "neither regard

themselves as citizens of the U.S. nor do they regard the island as a part of this country," and "they see themselves as leaders of a race older than this nation controlling a small, but important, piece of 'land' which they propose to 'run' as their 'own show.'"[103]

The subsequent FBI report of 15 April concerning the meeting mentioned that Browning believed the meeting "accomplished practically nothing" and that "he did not know if any such meetings would actually be held or if it would even be worthwhile to hold any more meetings with the Indians."[104] This last meeting between the government and the Indians was significant, because the islanders had not backed down from their initial demands, but their support had dropped considerably.

After a year-and-a-half, the government's cautious response had worked: The occupation had begun to run its course, and bloodshed had been avoided. Yet acts of violence and the approaching election of 1972 set the stage for the government to seriously consider the removal option. Based on the Indians' lack of public support, the favorable press that the government had obtained, and the unlawful acts that had occurred on Alcatraz, removal would be the government's solution to the occupation. The drama was approaching its final act.

May 1971 brought with it an eerie silence from both the federal government and the Indians who remained on Alcatraz. The executives in the White House knew "they were dealing with public opinion and not just a bunch of Indians." Each decision from the White House was carefully thought out, because the Alcatraz occupiers "were on a world stage." With a limited number of options available, the White House staffers had to take action to end the drama.[105]

On 7 June 1971, unknown to the Indians on Alcatraz Island, a meeting was held in the White House to determine their ultimate fate. The meeting was hosted by Bud Krogh and included Under Secretary Beggs, Admiral Bender of the Department of Transportation, Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst, Harlington Wood of the Department of Justice, Leonard Garment, and Brad Patterson. Krogh subsequently outlined the details of the meeting in a memo to John Ehrlichman.[106]

The group reviewed the current situation and intelligence data from San Francisco. They learned that there were between eleven and fifteen Indians currently on the island, including three children, and reasoned that the adults were armed. The number of people was thought to be at a low point; summer vacation from

schools would soon swell the population. It was also reasoned that the group would not vacate the island in the near future.[107]

The officials discussed the collision in January of the two Chevron tankers outside the Golden Gate, which, according to Krogh, "dramatized the importance of proper navigational safeguards in San Francisco Bay." The accident was waiting to happen again, according to the group, because the temporary buoys were "not adequate." These buoys were placed one-quarter of a mile off each end of Alcatraz to replace the twenty-thousand-candlepower lighthouse and the two foghorns, each of which had a range of one mile. The group observed that,

> aside from the continuing trespass, the intentional destruction of property, and the general lawlessness of the group on the island, the lack of proper navigational aids [left] the federal government open to a possible negligence action should another maritime disaster occur.

The officials learned that, after the tanker accident, the *San Francisco Chronicle* had suggested that environmentalists urge the Indians to vacate Alcatraz. They also concluded that public support, which had been "strong," had "dwindled over time to almost nothing."[108]

The group noted that "although the United States has tolerated the Indian trespass since November 20, 1969, it has moved quickly in all other Indian occupation situations." It observed that "Alcatraz Island has continued to be an open wound—one that has become a symbol of different things to different people." Further,

> because of the small population, the lack of present public support, and the long interval of time between now and the next election, *it was the consensus of the group that if the decision is made to forcibly evict the Indians from Alcatraz, now is the most appropriate time to do that.*

Ehrlichman then learned about preparations for the "ultimate decision."[109]

Harlington Wood and Wayne Colburn, chief U.S. marshal, were flying to San Francisco that day to prepare "for the forcible removal of the Alcatraz Indians by a specially trained unit of the U.S. Marshals." Krogh pointed out that GSA would then secure Alcatraz with its Federal Protective Service officers, the coast

guard would restore all navigational aids, and the disputed property would become part of the Golden Gate National Recreational Area that President Richard Nixon had recommended on 10 May 1971, after touring the area.[110]

At the conclusion of Krogh's memorandum to Ehrlichman, he wrote and circled under the "Recommendation" heading that, "in spite of the risk of violence, I recommend we utilize the above outlined method and procedure of removing the Alcatraz Indians. The closer we get to the election, the more troublesome this 'symbol' can become." He believed they "should move now to preclude a more difficult problem throughout the time span between now and the election."[111]

On Friday, 11 June 1971, at 1:45 p.m. on the East Coast, Tod Hullin checked "E" (for Ehrlichman) in the approval section on the memorandum and wrote, "Bud: E agrees with you. Go! He read Garment's memo also!"[112] Years later, Leonard Garment said "they knew what President Nixon's feelings were" regarding Alcatraz, and they believed that the removal would be accomplished "without bloodshed."[113]

The United States Marshal Service was mobilized on 11 June 1971. Under direction of the attorney general through the White House, the stage was set, after nineteen months of lawlessness, for the enforcement of federal law on Alcatraz Island. The government's invasion force consisted of a disciplined group of marshals from the San Francisco, Sacramento, and San Diego offices. The United States Coast Guard surrounded Alcatraz, and the perimeter of the island was sealed.[114] The plan was to conduct the removal at low tide, so the barges could land with barbed wire, which, when erected, would protect the perimeter of the island from reinvasion.[115] In anticipation of resistance, the marshals were armed with handguns, M-1 30 carbos, and shotguns.[116] In addition, officers of the Federal Protective Service (FPS) landed on Alcatraz with the U.S. marshals. The FPS, the security arm of GSA, was formed in April 1971. Three months before the removal, the FPS was primarily a guard service, but now these former GSA guards were known as federal protective officers (FPOs). The FPOs sent to Alcatraz Island were equipped with radio transceivers, .38-caliber revolvers, ammunition, helmets, batons, and flashlights. Tom Hannon, regional administrator of GSA in region 9, left his second-story office at 49 Fourth Street and went to the roof of the Federal Building at 450 Golden Gate Avenue with binoculars to view the removal. Hannon was in constant

contact by radio with his command center on the eighth floor of 49 Fourth Street and law enforcement personnel on the scene.[117] Contrary to the FBI's official file, ten FBI agents also participated in the removal.[118]

Three hours after the White House gave authority to remove the Indians from Alcatraz, the islanders, who were enjoying "a beautiful sun baked afternoon," were surprised by three coast guard vessels, a helicopter, and about twenty to thirty armed U.S. marshals. The federal action met with no resistance and took less than thirty minutes. The fifteen Indians were frisked, and the six men, four women, and five children were put into protective custody. The press was not notified or allowed on Alcatraz during the removal.[119]

The islanders were not at all happy with the removal. Vicki Lee stated, "My little girl said they held a gun to her chest and she asked, 'are they going to kill me?' and my son hid under the bed but came out when they put a gun to his head." The thirty-year-old Shoshone from San Diego, California, said, "I don't think my husband should carry arms for the U.S. [in Vietnam] when his children are at gunpoint at home." She also warned that "we will return to Alcatraz, if not Alcatraz, someplace else. [W]e are prepared to die."[120]

Atha Rider Whitemankiller quipped, "The white man has once again followed the old ways . . . sitting at what he calls the peace table, then ripping us off." The twenty-two-year-old Choctaw from Oklahoma said, "They told us if we cooperated, we would not be handcuffed. They said they wanted to remove us from the island to repair the lighthouse. They were courteous all the way through. They didn't give us any time to collect our belongings."[121]

Whitemankiller stated, "Since when has it been illegal to possess a knife? In every American kitchen, you can find knives."[122] John Trudell later told the press that they had been in secret negotiations since mid-April with the government. The Sioux, who was not on the island when the removal occurred, said that U.S. attorney James Browning "lied to us . . . . He promised there would be no actions against us while we were still negotiating." Trudell said, "[T]he government talks of honor in Vietnam and lies to its own people."[123]

Attorney Browning said that the theft of $680 worth of copper by Eugene Cox, John D. Halloran, and James Robbins was "the straw that broke the camel's back." The FBI had arrested the trio earlier that morning in San Francisco selling sixteen hundred

pounds of copper wire from the prison's electrical system to A and K Metals.[124]

While the copper thieves were being arraigned before U.S. magistrate Richard Urdan, Browning stated, "[W]e have no desire to prosecute the Indians we took off the island," and "we are not out to fine them and put them in jail."[125] Browning incorrectly told the press that it was his "best belief that it was a decision [to take Alcatraz Island] that was made locally."[126] He said the Justice Department, DOT, and GSA decided to remove the Indians because the coast guard wanted to restore the island's navigational aids, the islanders were "harassing passing boats," the Indians were stealing federal property, and the government wanted to include the historic isle in its new Golden Gate National Recreational Area.[127] Actually, John Ehrlichman made the final decision for removal, because the government had finally won its media war and had turned public sentiment against the Indians. The government's actions in denying electricity, water, and telephone service accounted for the small population on the island, which undoubtedly made Ehrlichman's decision easier.[128]

While the fifteen Indians were given lunch and interrogated at nearby Yerba Buena Island, the marshals, with five GSA helmeted guards, swarmed over Alcatraz, carrying high-powered flashlights to search every inch of the island, including its Civil War-era underground tunnels.[129] The Indians were then given overnight accommodations in San Francisco at the Senator Hotel. There, Delbert Lee said that, during the removal, the U.S. marshals "were running around like chickens with their heads cut off."[130]

In securing the island, the government did not allow the press access. One television station landed its helicopter on the island, but the chopper retreated after it was met by angry U.S. marshals aiming weapons at it. A cyclone chain-link fence and highly trained security dogs were then supposedly brought to the island.[131] Years later, Tom Scott said the government never kept dogs on the island.[132] Foxholes were subsequently dug by the FPOs, and law enforcement personnel spent a few nights in them, armed with rifles to repel the Indians.[133] They did, however, paint signs around the perimeter of the island warning boaters of security dogs.[134]

On 13 June 1971, the government allowed the media to visit Alcatraz, and the *San Francisco Chronicle* reported that the tour was "more like an autopsy." They reported that they "found an unrelieved vista of squalor, filth, systematic pilfering and mind-

less destruction." The initial "romantic theatre" was now closed as the paper published its article entitled "The Dream Is Over: A Sad Visit to Alcatraz." GSA realty officer Thomas Scott told the newspaper that he "had a great deal of respect for Richard Oakes and some of the others who began this." He believed they "were articulate and very intelligent." However,

> somehow they began to get a lot of people from the Third and Howard area—wino types—who, when you talked to them, didn't respond, as if they were in a fog. At first, they were so excited, charged up with a real cause. Later, they didn't seem to know what the cause was or why they were here.[135]

On 22 June, Robert Coop, regional director of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in San Francisco, wrote to Brad Patterson and commented on the *San Francisco Examiner* editorial on 15 January 1971, entitled "A Dreary Ending on Alcatraz." Coop observed "As the newspaper [said], the string has run out, and, in my opinion, support for the Indian's position on Alcatraz [had] all but vanished."[136] The editorial mentioned that "the federal government wisely let the Indians play out their string."[137]

Despite the failure of the Indians to gain title to Alcatraz, the occupation remains a significant event in American history. It was the first time that many tribes came together to make a political statement. As a result of the Indians' high visibility on Alcatraz Island, positive policy decisions were made at the highest level in the White House. The historical record shows that the Nixon administration was sympathetic to the plight of American Indians. The White House response was consonant with President Nixon's overall Indian policy, which was positive. The government's early caution stemmed from a fear of bloodshed and negative public reaction and a concern for the occupiers' health and safety.

This essay demonstrates that the government allowed the occupation of Alcatraz to run its course. In the end, it was apparent that the Indians were their own worst enemy. Frustration with the island group grew because of acts of violence and drug abuse and the impending election of 1972. Ultimately, the Nixon administration had to bring the occupation to an end. Even though federal law enforcement personnel evicted the island group, the occupation of Alcatraz, 1969–1971, made a difference. It remains a positive symbol for American Indian people today.

NOTES

1. *San Francisco Chronicle,* 10 November 1969, National Archives, San Bruno, California.
2. GSA document date 10 November 1969, Regional Administrator–9A, Latest Indian Possession of Alcatraz to Commissioner, PMDS-D from Tom Hannon, General Services Administration (GSA), Record Group 291, box 5, folder 1, National Archives, San Bruno, California.
3. Richard Oakes, "Alcatraz Is Not an Island: Indian Occupation of Alcatraz," *Ramparts,* December 1972, 38.
4. Ibid.
5. GSA document date 10 November 1969, Regional Administrator–9A, Latest Indian Possession of Alcatraz to Commissioner, PMDS-D from Tom Hannon, GSA RG-291, box 5, folder 1, National Archives, San Bruno, California.
6. Alcatraz Indian Occupation, 1969–1971, File 70-51261, Federal Bureau of Investigation case file, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter cited as "FBI case files.")
7. Memo to file by Bradley H. Patterson, Reminiscences on Alcatraz, document date 5 December 1975, White House stationery, Patterson's personal files, Bethesda, Maryland.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid. (Brad Patterson knew how Tom Hannon felt because he interviewed him in Washington, D.C., in 1975, just three years before his sudden death by heart failure.)
10. Brad Patterson, interview by Garvey, 21 November 1984, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. (Patterson was interviewed on two occasions by the Garvey. Patterson knew how Kunzig felt, which is reflected in this paragraph. Subsequent footnotes will be in short title form, with date and location, when they differ from above.)
11. *San Francisco Chronicle,* 21 November 1969, 1.
12. Alcatraz Island Proclamation, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
13. FBI case files.
14. *San Francisco Examiner,* 22 November 22 1969, 3, National Archives, San Bruno, California.
15. *San Francisco Chronicle,* 22 November 1969, 1.
16. Subject: Alcatraz Indian Matter, 22 November 1969, National Council on Indian Opportunity Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
17. *Los Angeles Times,* 25 November 1969, 24.
18. *Washington Post,* 26 November 1970, N 2.
19. Department of the Interior news release, by Walter J. Hickel, 24 November 1969, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
20. FBI case files.
21. Alcatraz Island Disposal case files (Hannon for Scott), 1963–1971, box 6, Alcatraz news release, region 9, 26 November 1969, GSA RG-291, National Archives, San Bruno, California.

22. FBI case files.
23. Alcatraz timeline, Brad H. Patterson's personal files, Bethesda, Maryland.
24. GSA press release, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
25. *San Francisco Chronicle,* 27 November 1969, 1.
26. *Oakland Tribune,* 29 November 1969, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
27. Alcatraz Island Disposal case files (Hannon for Scott), 1963–1971, box 16, GSA press release, date 1 December 1969, GSA RG-291, National Archives, San Bruno, California.
28. Chronology of San Francisco Regional Council Activities Regarding Indians, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
29. *San Jose Mercury News,* 2 December 1969, 2.
30. *San Francisco Chronicle,* 3 December 1969, 6.
31. Subject: Off-record conversation with Browning Pipestem regarding Alcatraz, 12 December 1969, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
32. Memorandum by Leonard Garment, the White House, 23 December 1969, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
33. Ibid.
34. *Indian Community Action* 5, Arizona-California, December 1969–January 1970, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 5, folder 4, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
35. Regional Administrator–9A, Alcatraz incident, 6 January 1970, GSA RG-291, container 15, file–Alcatraz 2, second folder, National Archives, San Bruno, California.
36. Ibid.
37. FBI case files.
38. Interagency meeting of 6 January, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 2, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
39. Minutes of San Francisco Regional Council meeting, 7 January 1970, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 2, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
40. Memorandum for the vice president and Leonard Garment; subject: San Francisco federal regional council meeting, 8 January 1970, National Council on Indian Opportunity Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
41. *San Francisco Chronicle,* 9 January 1970, National Archives, San Bruno, California.
42. GSA statement, 12 January 1970, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 2, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
43. Ibid.
44. Memorandum for the vice president and Leonard Garment; subject: Alcatraz–visit and meetings of 10, 11, 12 January 1970, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 2, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

45. *San Francisco Examiner,* 17 January 1970, National Archives, San Bruno, California.

46. Note to file: Alcatraz, 20 January 1970, from Tom Hannon, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 2, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

47. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 26 January 1970, letter to Black Beaver II from Louis R. Bruce, BIA commissioner, Indians of All Tribes, Inc., Main Library History Room, San Francisco, California.

48. Points concerning Alcatraz, the White House, 26 January 1970, Nixon Project, file group–IN, box 1, folder title EX IN, 1-1-70 to 4-30-70 (1 or 2), Nixon Project, National Archives, Alexandria, Virginia.

49. Alcatraz–2, January–February 1970, consensus of ad hoc interagency group, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 2, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Press release, Main Library History Room, box 4, file 7, IAOT, Inc. collection, San Francisco, California.

53. GSA letter to file by Thomas N. Scott, date 2 March 1970; subject: Indian factions–Vern Conway vs. Stella Leach, GSA RG-291, National Archives, San Bruno, California.

54. Memorandum for the vice president and Leonard Garment; subject: Alcatraz, 16 March 1970, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 3, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

55. Memorandum for the vice president and Leonard Garment; subject: Alcatraz, from Robert Robertson, National Council on Indian Opportunity Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

56. A proposal for Indians of All Tribes, Incorporated, Alcatraz Island, California, from: Robert Robertson for the USA, 31 March 1970, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 3, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

57. Associated Press release, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 5, folder 4, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

58. United States government memorandum to Robert Coop, regional director, DHEW, San Francisco region, from H. Clyde Mathews, Jr., deputy regional civil rights director, DHEW, San Francisco region; subject: Alcatraz–Recent Reaction to Proposal, Date 9 April 1970, National Council on Indian Opportunity, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

59. GSA news release, 27 May 1970, statement of the regional administrator, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 5, folder 3, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

60. *San Francisco Examiner,* 28 May 1970, 1.

61. *Oakland Tribune,* 29 May 1970, E-15.

62. *San Francisco Chronicle,* 1 June 1970, 26.

63. *New York Times,* 3 June 1970, C-33. (Note: Joseph Morris, Blackfoot, an island resident, reported that Indians had set the fires.)

64. *Independent,* Long Beach, California, 4 June 1970, A-4.
65. *San Francisco Chronicle,* 8 June 1970, 1.
66. Letter to file by Thomas N. Scott, Realty Officer, 9 June 1970, GSA, region 9 correspondence copy, GSA RG-291, National Archives, San Bruno, California.
67. *San Francisco Examiner,* 15 June 1970, 33.
68. *New York Times,* 9 July 1970, 1.
69. To Mr. Jerry Warren, the White House, Miss Bobbie Green, the White House, from Robert Robertson; subject: Alcatraz Memorandum, 15 July 1970, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder B, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
70. Ibid.
71. Memo to Ken Cole from Tod Hullin, 6 July 1970, and memo from Leonard Garment to John Ehrlichman, 29 July 1970, Nixon Project, File Group–IN, box number 1, folder title, EX IN 1 May 1970–31 July 1970, National Archives, Alexandria, Virginia. (The Kent State incident occurred on 4 May 1970 and resulted in the deaths of four students at the hands of Ohio National Guard troops.)
72. Memo to John Ehrlichman from Don Murdoch, Bobbie Greene; subject: Alcatraz 1970, the White House, Nixon Project, File Group–IN, box 1, folder title, 1 August 1970–30 September, National Archives, Alexandria, Virginia.
73. GSA notes on Operation Parks, GSA, region 9, Alcatraz Records, RG-291, box 10, National Archives, San Bruno, California.
74. Office of the Governor, Ronald Reagan, news release 411, 21 August 1970, GSA, region 9, Alcatraz Records, RG-291, box 15, National Archives, San Bruno, California.
75. *San Francisco Chronicle,* 25 August 1970, 19.
76. Report from Source A and B, document date 31 August 1970, GSA, region 9, Alcatraz Files, RG-291, box 15, folder "Alcatraz Confidential," activities in parks of 28 August 1970, National Archives, San Bruno, California.
77. *San Francisco Chronicle,* 2 September 1970, 31.
78. Press release, GSA Alcatraz Records, RG-291, Container 15, folder–Alcatraz confidential, eighth folder, National Archives, San Bruno, California.
79. *Stockton Record, 3* September 1970, 5.
80. *San Francisco Chronicle,* 3 September 1970, National Archives, San Bruno, California.
81. Memorandum to John Ehrlichman from Leonard Garment; subject: outline of a solution for Alcatraz, date 14 September 1970, and letter dated 15 September 1970, to coast guard from Robert L. Kunzig, GSA administrator, Nixon Project, File Group–Krogh, box 10, folder title Alcatraz (1970–1971), National Archives, Alexandria, Virginia.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Memorandum to Brad Patterson; subject: Alcatraz paper by John Jolli, 14 October 1970, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 3, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

85. Memorandum to Brad Patterson from Bud Krogh, 9 November 1970, Nixon Project, File Group–Krogh, box 10, folder title Alcatraz (1970–1971), National Archives, Alexandria, Virginia.

86. Memo to file, the White House, Washington, D.C., 5 December 1975, Reminiscences on Alcatraz, Brad Patterson personal files, Bethesda, Maryland.

87. *San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle* (Sunday edition), 8 November 1970, A-11.

88. Department of Transportation, United States Coast Guard, 23 November 1970, memo from Commander, Twelfth Coast Guard District, Mark A. Whalen, to Commandant; subject: Alcatraz Island, GSA, region 9, Alcatraz Records, RG-291, container 15, folder–Alcatraz 4, National Archives, San Bruno, California.

89. *San Jose Mercury News,* 19 November 1970, 49.

90. Memo, recommendation re Alcatraz with attached revised draft memo, 27 November 1970, the White House, from Geoff Shepard to Bud Krogh, Nixon Project, File Group–Krogh, box 10, folder title, Alcatraz (1970–1971) (entire folder), National Archives, Alexandria, Virginia.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Memorandum to John Ehrlichman from Bud Krogh; subject: Alcatraz, the White House, 11 December 1970, Nixon Project, File Group–Krogh, box 10, folder title, Alcatraz (1970–1971), National Archives, Alexandria, Virginia.

96. Letter to IOAT, Inc., BANAC, Aubrey Grossman and Donald Jelnick, from LaNada Means, 21 January 1971, National Council on Indian Opportunity, box 4, folder 2, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

97. FBI case files.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

101. Meeting notes, GSA, region 9, Alcatraz Records, RG-291, container 15, folder–correspondence confidential, sixth folder, National Archives, San Bruno, California.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

104. FBI case files.

105. Bradley H. Patterson, Jr., interview, January 1987.

106. Krogh memo to Ehrlichman (JDE), Nixon Presidential Materials Project, File Group–Krogh, box 10, folder title–Alcatraz (1970–1971) (entire folder), 10 June 1971 document date, National Archives, Alexandria, Virginia.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.
113. Leonard Garment, President Nixon's legal counsel, telephone interview by Garvey, 22 July 1992, San Francisco to Washington, D.C.
114. Dick Billus, chief of U.S. Marshal Service in San Francisco, telephone interview by Garvey, 14 April 1987, San Francisco. (Billus is chief U.S. marshal. In 1971 he was a marshal working in the Sacramento office and arrived on the island three hours after the removal occurred.)
115. Thomas Sarver, former Federal Protective Service officer, General Services Administration, telephone interview by Garvey, 27 September 1989, San Francisco to New Orleans. (Sarver was one of the FPOs who evicted the American Indians.)
116. Dick Billus interview.
117. Carris Radcliff, former Federal Protective Service officer, General Services Administration, interview by Garvey, 24 November 1989, San Francisco. (Radcliff was one of the FPOs who evicted the American Indians from Alcatraz. This is one of two interviews.)
118. Thomas Sarver interview. Lou Lopez, former Federal Protective Service officer, General Services Administration, interview by Garvey, 1 June 1992, San Francisco.
119. *Oakland Tribune,* 12 June 1971, 1.
120. *San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle* (Sunday edition), 13 June 1971, 1.
121. Ibid.
122. *Oakland Tribune,* 12 June 1971, 2.
123. *San Francisco Chronicle,* 12 June 1971, 14.
124. *Oakland Tribune,* 12 June 1971, 2.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid., 1.
127. *Los Angeles Herald Examiner,* 13 June 1971, 2.
128. Krogh memo to Ehrlichman (JDE), 10 June 1971, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, File Group–Krogh, box 10, folder title–Alcatraz (1970–1971) (entire folder), National Archives, Alexandria, Virginia.
129. *Oakland Tribune,* 12 June 1971, 1.
130. *Sacramento Union,* 12 June 1971, 1.
131. *San Francisco Chronicle,* 12 June 1971, 1.
132. Tom Scott interview.
133. Carris Radcliff interview, 14 April 1989.
134. Tom Scott interview.
135. *San Francisco Chronicle,* 14 June 1971, National Archives, San Bruno, California.
136. Coop letter to Patterson, 22 June 1971, Brad Patterson personal files, Bethesda, Maryland.
137. *San Francisco Examiner,* 15 June 1971, E-1.

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