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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO

Territorial Conflicts, Bureaucracy, and State Formation in Chile's Southern Frontera 1866-1912.

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

Amie Campos

Committee in charge:

Professor Eric Van Young, Co-Chair
Professor Matthew Vitz, Co-Chair
Professor Raymond Craib
Professor Gary Fields
Professor Wendy Matsumura
Professor Max Parra

2022

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University of California San Diego

2022

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my mom who has always been an unconditional source of love and support, and to my mentor Wendy with gratitude.

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My research has benefitted from the generosity of multiple funding sources over the years, including grants from the Tinker Foundation and the UCSD Institute of Arts and Humanities. A Fulbright IIE grant made my research year to Chile possible and allowed me to collect the bulk of my source materials along with connecting with an amazing group of scholars. The early stages of writing this dissertation were funded by a UCSD CRES grant, and later the American Association for University Women dissertation completion fellowship.

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every conversation with Wendy, I always left feeling like my scholarship could be worth something. She is a fierce advocate in her organizing for marginalized students, and leads with empathy and compassion for others. I learned how to be a better scholar and teacher because of the example Wendy set, and although I will not remain in academia, I strive to be the strong and caring human being she is.

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VITA

2011 Bachelor of Arts, University of California, Los Angeles

2016-2017 Teaching Assistant, University of California San Diego

2017 Master of Science, University of California San Diego

2020-2022 Teaching Assistant, University of California San Diego

2022 Doctor of Philosophy, University of California San Diego

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FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

Studies in Modern Latin America

Professors Matthew Vitz and Eric Van Young

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Territorial Conflicts, Bureaucracy, and State Formation in Chile's Southern Frontera 1866-1912.

by

Amie Campos

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California San Diego, 2022

Professor Eric Van Young, Co-Chair

Professor Matthew Vitz, Co-Chair

My dissertation, "Territorial Conflicts, Bureaucracy, and State Formation in Chile's Southern *Frontera* 1866-1912" is an agrarian and social history of settler colonialism in the Araucanía region of Southern Chile beginning in 1866 when Chile established its first colonization laws and concluding in 1912. Using national, regional, and local archival sources as its foundation, it seeks to understand the ways in which the Chilean state, as represented by government bureaucrats such as engineers and officials at the Ministry of Colonization,

developed and enacted its visions of economic progress. Local Indigenous Mapuche tribes were significantly impacted by these land transformations, as many communities were forced off their lands and in some cases found no other recourse than to navigate the long, bureaucratic process of lawsuits to regain their lost lands. My research begins with the question of how different groups, including European colonos and Chilean settlers sought to impose (or preserve) a particular vision of space, progress, and development in the region. Although my study fully recognizes the violence that was required to establish control over the region, it is my contention that an equally important part of this process was the state's deployment of techniques that have usually been seen as relatively neutral in both their intent and impact upon state-peasant relations. In this way, my project makes the historiographical push to go beyond the military histories of the region to think about the day-to-day interactions between bureaucrats and local communities. Techniques such as mapping and parceling were both the result of, and the necessary prerequisite to, various forms of violence associated with pacification, occupation, and the creation of the region as an underdeveloped internal periphery. The information that these practices produced helped to further knowledge about exploitable resources and profitable territories and were pivotal in the formation of more overt ways of exerting control over the peoples of the region.

Introduction

In 1902, José Carvajal, Vicente Huenan, and Pascual Temu, three Indigenous Mapuche farmers from the town of Toltén, wrote to the Chilean President Germán Riesco Errázuriz in a desperate state. The three men owned land in the Araucanía, a southern region six hundred miles south of the capital of Santiago that the Chilean military had occupied in the 1880s. At that time, government bureaucrats from the Ministry of Colonization began redistributing lands to European *colonos* who had titles and non-Indigenous Chilean settlers arrived hoping to apply for titles. Carvajal was the proprietor of an *hijuela*, a plot of land where he had lived for thirty-five years and grew crops to sustain his family; in 1898, he temporarily left for Argentina to pursue business ventures. On his arrival back to Toltén, Carvajal found that Chilean settlers had seized twenty hectares of his property. While Carvajal did not immediately notify local authorities to avoid any conflicts, a year later the invading settlers occupied an additional extension of land that was five hectares wide and thirty hectares long. Fearing the loss of his entire property, Carvajal decided to write to the President pleading for a solution to these problems, “The straits in which they leave us are so dire, dear sir, we fear that for the coming year we will not have land to plant our crops and both parents and children run the risk of dying of hunger. We are not even left enough land to keep a little animal. As the first president of the nation, we hope that V.E. (Your Excellency) will deign to remedy these evils of which we are continuously and remain the victims.”¹ Vicente Huenan faced a similar predicament. Like Carvajal, Huenan returned from Argentina to find that Chilean settlers occupied part of his lands. The plot, which he had inherited from his father forty years before, was expansive and particularly valuable. As it

¹ Solicitud de José Carvajal Germán Riesco Errázuriz, 1903, Archivo Nacional de la Administración hereby referred to as ARNAD: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores hereafter Minrel, vol. 1086.

stood, however, the usurpers had not left him enough land to grow crops or sustain the livestock that his large family depended on for survival.² On his return to Toltén, Pascual Temu, like Carvajal and Huenan, also found that his lands were occupied by Lisandro Brito, Ricardo Oses, and other Chilean settlers. For over a year, Brito and Oses repeatedly harassed, mistreated, and in one instance nearly beat Temu to death.³ Bedridden due to multiple head injuries, Temu accused bureaucrats from the local Ministry of Colonization of allowing these abuses to continue. He specifically blamed the engineers who worked for the Ministry's Topographic Commission that responsible for verifying land claims, and the local Protector of Indigenous Peoples who served as the Mapuche's legal representatives for tolerating the theft of Indigenous land. Though Temu repeatedly notified the Protector of these incidents, the government did not apprehend Brito, Oses, or other settlers for their crimes.

The three men ultimately sought the aid of the President because they did not believe that their cases would receive fair treatment at the local Ministry offices in the nearby town of Temuco. While the cases of Carvajal, Huenan, and Temu were forwarded to the Ministry of Colonization's central offices in Santiago, it is unclear whether the president received their letters or if they were answered. It is likely, however, that their petition for aid was sent to the Ministry of Colonization's regional office in Temuco. Once there, it would likely land on the very same desk of the bureaucrats and Protector that Temu claimed had refused to help them. Given their previous interactions with these officials, it is unlikely that their concerns were ultimately addressed.

My dissertation is an effort to provide a multiscalar agrarian and social history that examines the settler-colonial process in the Araucanía region that led to the dispossession of

² Solicitud de Vicente Huenan al presidente Germán Riesco Errázuriz, 1903, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1086.

³ Datos que servirán al indígena Pascual Temu, 1903, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1086.

farmers like Carvajal, Huenan, and Temu. This research shifts the dominant regional historiographical foci from ethnographic and environmental approaches to questions about the relationship between state formation and land policies that reveal the importance of mid-level bureaucrats in processes of dispossession that extended well beyond the Wars of Occupation (1880-1883). I argue that in order to understand the settler-colonial project in the region, it is necessary to trace the actions of bureaucrats at the Ministry of Colonization and their responses to land petitions, which allowed them to enact, interpret, and shape land policies locally. By using national and regional archival sources, my research traces how the Chilean state, as represented by these agents, developed and enacted its visions of economic progress through land redistribution projects that regulated land use in the region and granted itself the political and legal authority to distribute land to foreign and Chilean settlers.

Engineers, recruiters, and Ministry officials both in Europe and the Araucanía play a central role in this story. Following the three-year War of Occupation (1880-1883), they were charged with bringing stability and prosperity to a vast region previously under the control of Mapuche communities. Engineers parceled territories and Ministry bureaucrats redistributed them to European and Chilean agricultural settlers with the purpose of promoting new agrarian technologies in the Araucanía. In so doing, engineers established themselves as the arbiters of land ownership and transformed how local communities understood land relationships. The agents of the Ministries of Foreign Relations and Colonization aided the region's Topographic Commission in its mission to redistribute land by hiring engineers to engage in mapping expeditions, embarking on recruitment campaigns through embassies in Europe to attract racially 'desirable' settlers, and mobilizing their expansive network of surveyors and government officials in southern Chile to promote and enact colonization. This study asks three questions

about this history of nation-building and expansion of state control over an agrarian, frontier society. What role did bureaucrats and the local population play in the creation and collection of cartographic knowledge, and how did such information impact existing relationships between peasants and the land, and by extension, the state? How did bureaucrats respond to the friction among European colonos, Indigenous peoples, and Chilean landless peasants, and how did their actions affect these relationships? How were colonos and settlers affected by legislation around land, and how did they respond?



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Figure 1: Instituto Geográfico Militar, “Región de la Araucanía,” Ministerio de Educación, Gobierno de Chile <https://www.curriculumnacional.cl/portal/Educacion-General/Historia-Geografia-y-Ciencias-Sociales-I-basico/HI01-OA-09/132550:Mapa-region-de-la-Araucania-color>, accessed 4/6/22.

Historical Background

The captaincy of Chile developed throughout the colonial period as a result of Spanish economic and military ventures that shaped relationships with Mapuche Indigenous tribes. A large concentration of Mapuche groups lived in the Araucanía, a region south of the Biobío and Toltén Rivers that encompasses an area bordered by these rivers to the north, the Pacific Ocean to the west, the Andean cordillera to the east. It is comprised of four provinces: Cautín, Malleco, Arauco, and Biobío.⁴ Spanish forces were unable to subdue Mapuche armies throughout the sixteenth century, and the Biobío River became a natural border between these societies. The colonial authorities that largely shaped policies toward the Mapuche resided in Santiago, the economic and political capital of the captaincy. The southern frontier experienced periods of extreme violence due to ongoing conflicts over the establishment of borders during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In an effort to bring peace to the region, Spanish and Mapuche forces established *parlamentos* as political spaces to mitigate ongoing disputes and negotiate treaties. While occasional skirmishes occurred between the independent Mapuche groups and colonial forces, trade relationships developed and expanded in the eighteenth century and linked the Araucanía to Santiago and Lima, where demand grew for salt, meat, and leather goods deriving from Mapuche livestock.⁵

After Independence in 1818, the new Chilean republic began the process of consolidating its territory and redefining its relationship to the southern frontier. As historian Julio Pinto argues, although the early leaders of the independence movement initially wished to incorporate

⁴ Thomas Miller Klubock, *La Frontera: Forests and Ecological Conflict in Chile's Frontier Territory*. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 9.

⁵ *Ibid*, 9-10.

Mapuche peoples into the Chilean state during the republic's first years, this attitude soon shifted from a politics of inclusion to exclusion influenced by racial perceptions among Chile's governing elite.⁶ Throughout the nineteenth century, proponents of Mapuche exclusion would advocate for a military campaign that would be preceded by a bureaucratic expansion southward from the nation's capital. The constitution of 1833 under Diego Portales further centralized political power in Santiago and gave the president the power to appoint intendants and governors in each of the country's provinces and administrative subdivisions.⁷ The concentrated authority in the office of the president, along with laws that granted the office wide-reaching powers over "tierras baldías" and the evolving economic needs of the country, played a crucial role in southward expansion and the enforcement of land legislation. This included the creation of laws outlining the parameters of European colonies in remote regions of the Araucanía during the 1840s.

In the mid-nineteenth century, young republics throughout Latin America sought to commodify their resources and industrialize their societies. While the Chilean state, defined by its government officials and various Ministries, struggled to integrate into the growing global market through the production of wheat, flour, and other exports, private actors aided by the state expanded their agricultural ventures southward. In the southern frontier, however, local farmers and traders maintained tenuous relationships with Mapuche chieftains, and there remained occasional conflicts that resulted in raids or uprisings with sometimes fatal consequences.⁸ An economic recession in 1857-58, followed by a civil war in 1859 and another economic downturn in 1873, only highlighted the potential that the region's integration could provide by contributing

⁶ Jorge Pinto. *La formación del estado y la nación, y el pueblo mapuche: de la inclusión a la Exclusión*. (Santiago: Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos, y Museos, 2003), 25-26.

⁷ Brian Loveman, *Chile: A Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism*. (New York: Oxford University Press), 1979, 124.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 153.

to the nation's economy. In 1863 the government established forts in the Araucanian towns of Angol and Mulchen and mobilized troops in Traiguén in response to the instability of the frontier, as well as an increase in Chilean settlements seeking to profit from the growing demand for wheat production.⁹ The arrival of the Chilean army effectively pushed Mapuche communities southward and foreshadowed the beginning of a more extensive military campaign.

Prior to the occupation of the Araucanía in 1880, the Chilean government prepared legislation that would legitimize its authority over the region. From the offices of the Ministry of Colonization and congressional chambers in Santiago, major decisions on the fate of the Araucanía were largely disconnected from the experience of communities living along the frontier. In 1845, congress passed a law that authorized the president of Chile to establish colonies of foreigners that might contribute to the country's future industrial and agricultural development. This legislation applied from Copiapó in the Northern Atacama Desert to Cabo de Hornos in the Magellan region, thus encompassing the entirety of the Araucanía.¹⁰ In 1851, congress amended this law to grant the president the authority to use all empty lands for colonization. Two years later, an additional decree created the office of Protectors of Indigenous Peoples, intended to function as mediators between Indigenous communities and the state. The 1866 and 1874 land laws further outlined procedures for distributing territories in the regions south of the Biobío River. The creation of these laws ultimately reinforced the state's jurisdiction in the soon to be occupied region.

At the forefront of the subsequent colonization project were bureaucrats such as engineers, who surveyed and created maps used to designate areas for railroad tracks, designed

⁹ Ibid., 154.

¹⁰ Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización: Informe, Proyectos de Ley, Actas de las Sesiones y Otros Antecedentes* (Santiago: Sociedad "Imprenta y Litografía Universo," 1912) 3-4.

the layout for cities in the region, and divided parcels that future settlers would occupy. The finished maps created by the Chilean government's Topographic Commission ultimately reflected the national interests in the region: each parcel's size in hectares, its physical characteristics, and the names of people living in the space were carefully recorded. With these specifications, engineers and other Ministry bureaucrats assigned parcels of land a monetary value based on their location and potential uses. The maps were crucial to the *remates* (auctions) of territories in Santiago, a metropole far from the territories being sold. These fiscal lands were then purchased by wealthy landowners, businessmen, and foreign companies interested in expanding their assets in the region. Other lands were set aside for European colonos to settle, these *hijuelas* were distributed by local bureaucrats from the Ministry of Colonization alongside engineers from the Topographic Commission. Altogether, this process was crucial to cementing Santiago's place as a center of power and capital and transforming the Araucanía from a previously unincorporated territory to an internal periphery of the state that would both serve as the breadbasket of the growing population of Santiago and contribute to the country's wheat exports.

In the south, new towns and infrastructure developed in the service of the colonization project. Agricultural colonies like Angol housed groups of engineers, and Temuco, founded in 1881 by the invading Chilean army, soon emerged as a town shaped to facilitate local cartographic knowledge production and governance. Engineers produced maps, planned surveying expeditions, and shared information on the region's topography and land uses at the headquarters of the Topographic Commission in Temuco. The Ministry of Colonization also established its regional headquarters there, and all land petitions in the region arrived at these offices. The information gathered the Temuco office was ultimately transmitted to bureaucratic

and governmental institutions in Santiago. From there, the Chilean government rapidly mobilized its elaborate networks of consulates and agencies in Europe that formed part of the larger Ministry of Foreign Relations to promote the region's colonization.¹¹ Moreover, Temuco and Angol are both examples of how the development of local agriculture occasioned the establishment of centers of governance within a peripheral border region, which engineers then used to conduct mapping and parceling expeditions further south. The priority European families and colonization companies received in land distribution throughout the colonization project reflected the goal of transforming the Araucanía into another major source of wheat production in addition to the central valley of Chile. Ministry officials also hoped that Europeans could further diversify the agriculture in the region and create markets for other goods such as olive oil and cheese. As a part of the recruitment campaigns, prospective *colonos* were shown blank maps that indicated little about the people who still lived in these spaces. These maps, in turn, became a reflection of how the Chilean state viewed the region: as an empty space ripe for settlement and agricultural development.

During the mid-nineteenth century, there was considerable debates in congress regarding whether Araucanian Indigenous communities should be allowed to retain some of their lands after occupation. Despite the racialist notions among some Chilean deputies, in December 1866 congress passed a law that created a path to land ownership for Indigenous communities. Congressmen who supported these laws believed that allowing Mapuches to participate in the process of obtaining land titles could help them abandon their cultural practices and ultimately

¹¹ A primary example of "industrious Europeans" were Germans, who settled in the Valdivia region south of the Araucanía beginning in the 1840s and were lauded for making the peripheral area productive. Before the conquest of the Araucanía, this ethnic group was courted to bring industry and culture and was provided with large tracts of land and resources on arrival. More on the establishment of German settlements can be found in George Young, *The Germans in Chile: Immigration and Colonization: 1849-1914*. (New York: Center for Migration Studies), 1974.

integrate into Chilean society. While their views were prevalent throughout debates over Indigenous land legislation, a minority, including the famous statesman Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, argued that the Mapuche were a “race degraded by alcohol” that was too primitive to make their lands productive.¹² The prerequisites for a land title encroached on cultural practices, for example, Indigenous children to state run schools where teachers punished them for speaking their native languages. Indigenous boys were also required to enroll in military service once they came of age. Unlike Chileans and Europeans, Indigenous groups were required to seek legal representation through Protector of Indigenous peoples, a bureaucratic official appointed by the Chilean government. This agent verified that Mapuche families met the requirements for a title. These policies and others related to land use made it exceedingly difficult for Mapuche communities to acquire titles. Many petitioners were unfamiliar with the Chilean judicial system, faced language barriers, and did not have documentation to prove long-term ownership of their ancestral lands. As petitions and the memoirs of Protectors of Indigenous peoples will demonstrate, many communities with land titles struggled to retain their lands. They remained subject to the whims of unsympathetic bureaucratic officials, usurpers, or local elites who may have wanted these lands for themselves.

While Indigenous land laws sought to both marginalize and distinguish Mapuche groups, in actuality their lifestyles were very similar to their non-Indigenous Chileans and European colono counterparts. Mapuche peasants engaged in cattle raising, grew a variety of crops including potatoes and beans, and traded goods in local markets.¹³ Although many Mapuches

¹² As Lorenzo Veracini argues, within settler colonial societies there can be varying interpretations of what it means to make the native population “go away.” For some it could mean the physical extermination of natives, displacement of native populations, or the erasure of cultural practices with the goal of “absorbing” or “assimilating” these communities into the larger population. Lorenzo Veracini, “Introducing Settler Colonial Studies” *Settler Colonial Studies* 1, No. 1 (2011): 3.

¹³ José Bengoa, *Mapuches, Colonos, y el Estado Nacional* (Santiago: Catalonia Ltda. 2014), 53.

lived in small homes with straw roofs, some wealthier Mapuche caciques enjoyed more elaborate lodgings and dressed in a manner similar to affluent Chileans.¹⁴ Wealthier caciques lived in large adobe homes (*rukas*) that could house up to fifty family members. Within Mapuche society, the *lonko* (tribal chieftain) and *caciques* (political leaders) represented their tribe in diplomatic matters, since they typically understood more about non-Indigenous Chilean customs than other members of their tribe. After the occupation, lonkos and caciques also represented the interests of their tribe before Ministry bureaucrats and Protectors of Indigenous peoples.

During the late 1860's and early 1870's sporadic conflicts emerged in the region as the military continued expanding its system of forts further into Mapuche territory. The settler colonial ideology that emanated from Santiago during this period was driven by three major motives: the first was to integrate these lands into the nation in order to make them economically productive. The second was to bring "Chileanization," that is, Chilean values and culture through the creation of European settlements. While European colonos were not Chileans, they formed part of the ideology of "Chileanization" because of the technology, knowledge, and work ethic government officials believed they possessed. These values, government officials believed, were Chilean, though they were transmitted by Europeans. Finally, the Chilean government sought to remove the Mapuche from their ancestral homes through policies that made obtaining land titles difficult and encouraged them to abandon their claims to land. Those who did not migrate across the cordillera to Argentina searching for land to settle became part of a class of landless peasants that would labor in towns or the scattered estates in the region.

In 1879, as Chile engaged in a war with Peru and Bolivia to expand its borders north into the lucrative nitrate regions, the military also made plans to launch a campaign southward. The

¹⁴ Ibid., 50-53.

following year, the Chilean military undertook a three-year "War of Occupation" in the Araucanía to integrate the region into the Chilean national body and end Mapuche sovereignty south of the Biobío River. Mapuche tribes, under the leadership of their lonkos and caciques, launched counterattacks against the military fortresses scattered throughout the region with significant Mapuche casualties. In 1882 the Chilean government founded the cities of Ercilla, Imperial, Carahue, Galvarino, and Freire in the region as the military campaign progressed and Mapuche forces were gradually defeated. The foundation of the town of Villarica on January 1, 1883, in the province of Cautín symbolized the end of the military conflict and the beginning of the colonization project.¹⁵

Historiography of the Araucanía

The colonial and Chilean states' relationship to the Mapuche has largely shaped the abundant historical literature on the Araucanía region. Early historical works chronicled the Spanish conquest, ongoing conflicts in the frontier, and colonial relationships with the Mapuche. Clergymen and observers of the conflict wrote many of the early accounts that were the foundation of later histories perpetuating a view of the Spanish conquest as one of civilization over savagery.¹⁶ Nineteenth century works, including those of the famous historian Diego Barros

¹⁵ Pinto Rodríguez, *La Formación del Estado y la nación*, 244-245.

¹⁶ Early colonial accounts of the Spanish-Mapuche conflict had a lasting impact on the region's historiography. One of the earliest and most far-reaching stories of the war in terms of audience and influence is the epic poem "La Araucana," an epic poem by Alfonso de Ercilla, the first part of which was published in 1569, then subsequently in 1578 and 1589. Ercilla wrote the epic poem throughout his stay in Chile and used the testimony of soldiers along with his observations to detail the events of the conflict between the Spanish and Mapuche. Intertwined in his narrative were the capture and execution of Pedro de Valdivia, the war of Arauco, and the heroic actions of Mapuche caciques such as Lautaro and Caupolicán. Chronicler Diego De Rosales, who witnessed the conflicts between the Spanish and Mapuche and served as a chaplain during the Arauco War, benefitted from a residency in the Araucanía where he learned Mapudungun. The first two volumes of the *Historia General* provide an extensive account of the region's geography and Mapuche traditions and customs. Gonzalez de Najera used his experiences as a soldier in the Arauco war to dispel misconceptions about the Mapuche army and offer strategies that the Spanish army could use to defeat Mapuche forces. Alonso de Ercilla y Zúñiga, *La Araucana*, (Salamanca: Casa de Domingo de Portonaris), 1574, Diego De Rosales, *Historia General Del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano*, segunda edición. (Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1989), Alonso González de Nájera, *Desengaño y reparo de la guerra de Chile*. (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria 1970).

Arana, relied heavily on these earlier narratives to promote military expansion. In his sixteen-volume survey of Chilean history, Barros Arana argued that the Mapuche were unworthy stewards of their lands who could not be expected to modernize and integrate into Chilean society.¹⁷ These and other historical works, many written by Chile's elite, were used to justify the region's occupation. Travel narratives also formed part of this literature, and after 1883 anthropologists documented the customs and lifestyle of Mapuche communities.¹⁸

Throughout the 1960s and '70s historians reexamined major conflicts between the Spanish and Mapuche during the colonial period and began moving away from early narratives of Spanish patriotism and bravery. Influenced by political events such as the Vietnam War, the Cuban Revolution, and Mapuche organizing during the presidency of Salvador Allende (1970-1973) these scholars focused on Mapuche enslavement during the sixteenth century and institutions like the Catholic Church that intermittently supported the violence in the frontier.¹⁹ By focusing on these relatively unknown topics, historians attempted to move away from nineteenth century narratives that portrayed the occupation as a triumph of civilization over savagery and restore Indigenous perspectives. While there were few works on the War of Occupation until the 1980s, these new interpretations of the Spanish-Mapuche relationship

¹⁷ Benjamin Vicuña McKenna, a nineteenth-century politician instrumental in shaping policies of southern expansion, shared Barros Arana's hostility toward the Mapuche, and used his experience writing about the Mapuche involvement the Independence struggle to argue against their integration into Chilean society. Diego Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile, Tomo XI-XII*. (Santiago: Universitaria: Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, 1999). Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, *La Guerra a Muerte: Memoria Sobre las Últimas Campañas de la Independencia de Chile 1819-1824* (Santiago: Imprenta Nacional, 1868). More on how Vicuña McKenna's ideas of exclusion affected state policy can be found in, Pilar Herr, *Contested Nation: The Mapuche, Bandits, and State Formation in Nineteenth-Century Chile* (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 2019) 101-102.

¹⁸ In 1912 Tomás Guevara published *Las Ultimas Familias I Costumbres Araucanas*, a multivolume work that described cultural practices prior to the 1880-83 conflict and included the first Mapuche testimonies of the Wars of Occupation.

¹⁹ Some examples include, Álvaro Jara. *Guerra y Sociedad en Chile: La transformación de la guerra de Arauco y la esclavitud de los indios*. (Santiago: Universitaria, 1971) 14, Jorge Randolph, *Las guerras de Arauco y la esclavitud*. (Santiago: Impresora Horizonte, 1966.)

opened the door for scholars to reevaluate archival sources and incorporate interdisciplinary methods.²⁰

The dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990) significantly impacted the historiography of the Araucanía and its occupation. Officially, the state supported a narrative of the conquest of the Mapuche, and repressed activists and scholars linked to Mapuche solidarity groups. From these circumstances and earlier historical works two schools of thought emerged that continue to exist in the Chilean historiography of the conflict today. Scholars who supported a nationalist narrative centered their accounts around military exploits and portrayed the nineteenth-century expansionist projects of the Chilean state as necessary to the progress of the nation and to the benefit of Mapuche tribes. These histories largely conceptualized the Chilean-Mapuche conflict of the 1880s as a War of Pacification rather than a War of Occupation.²¹ Scholars who prioritized the recovery of Mapuche perspectives and believed the Chilean-Mapuche conflict was a War of Occupation faced significant challenges during the dictatorship, including the possibility of political persecution as well as archival limitations, since many government documents reflect the perspective of state authorities.²² The Mapuche peoples of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries left few written records detailing their experiences, and many works relied on archival sources where their perspective was largely absent. The

²⁰ Chilean archeologist Mario Orellana Rodríguez has used ethnolinguistic, ethnohistorical, and anthropological sources to argue that some Spaniards deserted their camps during the war to join the Mapuche side, complicating early accounts such as Najera's and de Ercilla's that emphasize the conflict between the two groups. For a discussion of negotiations between Spaniards and Mapuches during the early colonial period, see also, Jose Bengoa, *Historia de los Antiguos Mapuches del Sur: Desde antes de la llegada de los españoles hasta las paces de Quilin*. (Santiago: Catalonia Ltda., 2003).

²¹ Sergio Villalobos R., eds. *Relaciones Fronterizas en la Araucanía*. (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1982). Using the term "War of Occupation" is tied to a political belief that delegitimizes the Chilean state's claim over Wallmapu, a term used by the Mapuche to describe their ancestral home and encompasses Southern Chile and Argentina. By referring to it as an occupation, there is also hope that these lands could one day be returned to the Mapuche.

²² Some historians were targets of the dictatorship due to their scholarship, which was largely tied to their political activism. One famous example is Gabriel Salazar, a social and labor historian who was also militant of the MIR and spent three years in the Villa Grimaldi detention center.

incorporation of anthropological and oral history methods allowed some scholars to emphasize elements of Indigenous resistance and survival during the Wars of Occupation to counter national histories and reflect Mapuche practices of oral knowledge transmission. While shying away from making direct connections to Mapuche repression under the Pinochet regime, these studies were foundational to contemporary works on the War of Occupation.²³ Their interdisciplinary nature created an avenue for future scholars to begin exploring questions of memory and incorporate Mapuche songs, poetry, and sources in Mapudungun, the Mapuche language.

After the dictatorship, both Chilean and Anglophone scholars in the 1990's and 2000's wrote about state-Indigenous relations primarily through the framework of racialized violence. These works have examined the long-term effects of state policies that marginalized the Mapuche after the occupation. The large chronological scope of their work allowed scholars to make contemporary connections and contextualize political instability that still exists in the region today due to the issue of Indigenous sovereignty. Historical relationships between various groups living in the Araucanía, such as Chilean settlers and European colonos, were present in these works but played a marginal role in these studies. Other works have examined the rural underdevelopment in the region exacerbated by the neoliberal policies imposed during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, including Mapuche responses to the destruction of local forests and overfishing by Chilean corporations.²⁴ Recent works have also reexamined the relationship

²³ In what was likely a reference to Mapuche oppression under the Pinochet regime that he could not directly critique, Bengoa began his book with the lines, "Esta es una historia acerca de la intolerancia. Acerca de una sociedad que no soporta la existencia de gente diferente... La historia de los que no aceptaron ha sido silenciada." José Bengoa. *Historia del Pueblo Mapuche, Siglo XIX y XX*. (Santiago: Ediciones Sur), 1985, 5. Raúl Molina O., Eduardo Castillo V., Raúl Rupailaf M., María Alicia Fuentes D., and Sebastián Cox V. *Territorio mapuche huilliche de Osorno y legislación (Historia de un despojo)* (Santiago: Programa Jurídico Popular del Centro El Canelo de Nos: Sociedad Mapuche-Huilliche Monku Kosobkien Freder), 1990.

²⁴ Guillaume Boccaro, "The Mapuche People in Post-Dictatorship Chile" *Études rurales* No. 163/164, *Territoire Appartenances* (Jul. - Dec. 2002), 283-303. Journalists such as Adrián Moyano have endeavored to explore the

of the Mapuche and missionaries during the colonial period and nineteenth century, exposing how both religious and later secular education was used to assimilate Mapuche children into the Chilean state.²⁵ The anglophone historiography of the region, while relatively scarce before 1990, has steadily increased and built on the approaches and methods pioneered by Chilean scholars.²⁶ While influenced by trends in Anglophone Latin American historiography, such as the cultural and environmental turns, these studies have focused on understanding contemporary relationships between the Mapuche and the state.²⁷ However, studies in English on the

transnational bonds that endure between Mapuche communities in Chile and Argentina in the late twentieth century, particularly as both confront challenges stemming from neoliberal policies of industrial expansion into their ancestral territories. He also examines how the ideological creation of regions, such as Patagonia, during the nineteenth century was used to dispossess Mapuches from the lands and consolidate the Argentine republic. Adrián Moyano, *De mar a mar. El Wallmapu sin fronteras*. (Santiago: Lom Ediciones, 2016). See also, Jorge Pinto. *La formación del estado y la nación, y el pueblo mapuche*.

²⁵ The recent work of Christian Perucci has argued against narratives that portray Mapuche-Missionary relationships solely within the lens of conquest and demonstrated that in some cases Mapuche chieftains welcomed the presence of missionaries to create political alliances. Azócar, Alonso & Valdebenito, Luis & Chávez, Jaime & López, Sandra & Pailahual, Stefanie. (2015). “La Targeta Postal Fotográfica y la Escuela Misional en la Araucanía: El Discurso Visual Capuchino Sobre sus Logros en la Transformación de la niñez Mapuche (1898-1930)” *Signa*. 24. 215-230, Cristian Perucci, “Entre el deseo y el dolor: franciscanos, capuchinos y el poder de los ñidol-lonko en vísperas de la guerra de Pacificación” *Revista Tiempo Histórico*, no. 16, Jan.-June 2018, pp. 83-108. Jorge Pinto Rodríguez, eds. *Frontera, misiones y misioneros en la Araucanía, 1600-1900*, Temuco: Ediciones de la Universidad de la Frontera, 2015. Historian Romina Green’s work has demonstrated how the vocational curriculum in Capuchin schools in the decades after occupation was used to integrate Mapuche children into the regional agrarian economy. Romina Green, ‘Useful citizens for the working nation:’ Mapuche Children, Catholic Mission Schools, and Methods of Assimilation in Rural Araucanía, Chile (1896-1915) *Historia Agraria de América Latina*, vol. 1, no. 1, April 2020, pp. 114-136, Romina Green, “To Govern is to Educate: Race, Colonization, and Education in La Araucanía, Chile, 1883-1920.” PhD. diss., (University of California Irvine, 2018).

²⁶ Some early works include Maria Gascon, *The Southern Frontier of the Spanish Empire, 1598-1740*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968. Luis Gladames, *A History of Chile*. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press), 1941. Kinsbruner, Jay. *Chile: A Historical Interpretation*. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973. Eugene H. Korth, *Spanish Policy in Colonial Chile: The Struggle for Social Justice, 1535-1700*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968, Carl E. Solberg, “A Discriminatory Frontier Land Policy: Chile, 1870-1914” *The Americas*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Oct. 1969).

²⁷ Joanna Crow, *The Mapuche in Modern Chile: A Cultural History* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida), 2013. Patricia Richards, *Race and the Chilean Miracle: Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Indigenous Rights* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), 2013. Florencia Mallon’s 2005 work, *Courage Tastes of Blood* takes a novel approach to the narrative of state-Mapuche relations by focusing on the trajectory of a small community throughout the twentieth century. In doing so, she incorporates generations of testimony from one geographic area to demonstrate how living archives can exist through shared experiences. Florencia Mallon, *Courage Tastes of Blood: The Mapuche Community of Nicolas Ailio and the Chilean State, 1906-2001*. (Durham: Duke University Press), 2005. The relationship between Mapuche demands for land and neoliberal development policies is further examined in Kelly Bauer, *Negotiating Autonomy: Mapuche Territorial Demands and Chilean Land Policy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), 2021, and Sarah H. Kelly, “Mapping hydropower conflicts: A legal geography of dispossession in Mapuche-Williche Territory, Chile” *Geoforum* vol. 127, Dec. 2021, pp. 269-282. Moving away from previous approaches centering state-Mapuche relationships, Klubock demonstrates how forest policy and the

Araucanía during the colonial period, nineteenth century, and early twentieth century are still relatively scarce.²⁸

In more recent years Mapuche scholars themselves have written histories of the Araucanía to address contemporary issues within their communities, including defining their relationship with the Chilean state and supporting the efforts of activists fighting for land rights.²⁹ This labor is rooted in a desire to develop a history of the Araucanía that is more autonomous and independent of the nationalist Chilean historiography while interrogating the layered nature of colonial violence and the evolution of local Mapuche resistance movements. Along with focusing on the preservation and recovery of cultural traditions, some works have also examined how Mapuche communities have developed understandings of territory and defined Wallmapu, the ancestral lands of the Mapuche. These studies, in particular, have been used to counter nationalist narratives justifying the occupation of the region.

Historiographical Contributions

Analyzing the actions of mid-level state bureaucrats, particularly the ways they mapped the region, enacted and adjudicated land claims, along with the conflicts these processes created, marks my intervention into the existing historiography of the region. Engineers have played a

development of the lumber industry were used as a tool of state-building in the region and incorporates the development of working-class organizing that brought Mapuches and non-Indigenous Chileans together. Klubock, *La Frontera*.

²⁸ Anglophone literature on the colonial period is still largely missing. The works of Jesse Zarley and Pilar Herr have opened new avenues for future research by examining how Mapuche and Pehuenche leaders used *parlamentos*, *juntas*, trade fairs, and raids to negotiate political alliances along the frontier. See, Herr, *Contested Nation*, and Jesse Zarley, “Between the *Lof* and the Liberators: Mapuche Authority in Chile’s *Guerra a Muerte* (1819–1825)” *Ethnohistory* 66 no. 1 (January 2019): 117–139, Jesse Zarley, “Towards a Transandean Mapuche Politics: Ritual and Power in Chile and Argentina 1792-1834” Ph.D. diss., (University of Maryland, 2017).

²⁹ For a great example of these continued efforts, see: Enrique Antileo, Luis Cárcamo-Huenchante, Margarita Calfio, Herson Huinca- Piutrin, eds. *Awükan ka kuxankan zugu Wajmapu mew. Violencias coloniales en Wajmapu* (Temuco: Ediciones Comunidad de Historia Mapuche, 2015), Pedro Cayuqueo, *Historia Secreta Mapuche* (Santiago: Editorial Catalonia), 2017, and José Millalen, Pablo Mariman, Rodrigo Levil, and Sergio Caniuqueo. *¡Escucha Winka! Cuatro ensayos de Historia Nacional Mapuche y un epílogo sobre el futuro*. (Santiago: Lom Ediciones), 2006.

marginal role in narratives of the decades following the occupation, yet, as historian Kyle Harvey has demonstrated, they had a significant role as the overseers of large infrastructure projects in peripheral regions of Chile and other parts of Latin America. The occupation of the Araucanía brought with it the construction of roads, bridges, and the development of towns, all of which were overseen by engineers who through their technological expertise brought a “sense of stability and certainty” to these potentially financially risky projects in which the state invested considerable sums of money.³⁰ As members of the “techno-political” state, their professional role as engineers brought a perceived scientific objectivity and neutrality to mapping and parceling expeditions.³¹ These projects, however, were also shaped by the local “on the ground” experiences of engineers, who encountered significant difficulties due to weather, the challenging terrain of the area along with periodic funding shortages. Their experiences, however, also gave engineers at the Topographic Commission an intimate knowledge of the region in comparison to other bureaucrats at the Ministry of Colonization, and much like their Argentinean counterparts they served as an “administrative memory” that collected maps and knowledge crucial to the redistribution of land.³² By bringing mapping practices, land titles, and the lives and testimonies of the laborers behind these projects to the fore, we can begin to understand how acts such as fencing represented the creation of new spatial realities that made Mapuche ways of life impossible. The information that these maps and petitions contained helped further knowledge about exploitable resources and were pivotal in exerting greater control over communities in the region. Moreover, engineers’ execution of mapping projects and

³⁰ Kyle Harvey, “Engineering Value: The Transandine Railway and the ‘Techno-Capital’ State in Chile at the End of the Nineteenth Century” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, no. 20 (2020), 715.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 713.

³² Pierre Gautreau and Juan Carlos Garavaglia, “Inventando un nuevo saber estatal sobre el territorio: la definición de practicas, comportamientos y agentes en las instituciones topográficas de Buenos Aires, 1824-1864” in, *Mensurar la tierra, controlar el territorio América Latina, siglos XVIII-XIX*, Pierre Gautreau and Juan Carlos Garavaglia, eds. (Rosario: Prohistoria Ediciones, 2011) 95.

the development of settlements of European colonos often occurred hand in hand with the formation of repressive state structures, such as the rural police force. Created to protect European and Chilean colonizers and their property, the rural police aided in the removal of Indigenous people from their lands.

An equally understudied, yet no less important group throughout the occupation were the local bureaucrats that formed part of the Ministry of Colonization. During the 1820s, the newly formed republican government began further dividing the territory into subdistricts, including the Araucanía, south to the Strait of Magellan. This revealed both the political reality of the time and the aspirations of the newly formed post-independence government.³³ Together with other offices, Ministry of Colonization agents formed part of a larger process of bureaucratic expansion that began in the 1840s as the Chilean government began investing in the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Relations.³⁴ Bureaucrats played two important roles in rural, frontier regions such as the Araucanía: the first was reinforcing the centralization of political power in the city of Santiago, and the second was to curb the authority of local elites. This was especially important during the first decades after the independence movement when President Diego Portales and others centralized political power around the executive branch and Ministry offices in Santiago. Bureaucrats serving throughout the country such as intendants and other lower level *funcionarios* were appointed in Santiago and were seldom from the regions where they received their appointments. Having no familial or other relationships to bureaucrats was a way to separate these elites from positions of political authority and superimposed a new hierarchy

³³ Maria Carolina Sanhueza, “La Primera División Político-Administrativa de Chile 1811-1826,” *Historia*, no. 41, vol. 2, Jul-Dec 2008, 464.

³⁴ Elvira López Taverne, “The Structuring of a Bureaucratic Corps in the State-Building Process: Chile 1810-1860” in, *Latin American Bureaucracy and the State Building Process (1780–1860)* Juan Carlos Garavaglia, and Juan Pro Ruiz, eds. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013) 226.

created by the state. While the job description of each bureaucrat was also determined by their corresponding Ministry office in Santiago, as historian Elvira López Taverne argues, there was a considerable distance between their roles on paper and the duties they performed on a daily basis.³⁵ Ministry bureaucrats in the Araucanía were emblematic of this distance, and their roles evolved to meet both the changing policies of the central offices of the Ministry of Colonization in Santiago and the needs of the local population.

Following the trajectory of local agents such as Protectors of Indigenous Peoples, members of the Topographic Commission, and employees at the Ministry of Colonization reveals the tenuous position of the Chilean state in the Araucanian periphery and creates a new dimension of analysis. The decisions made by the groups of bureaucrats, alongside recruiters in Europe, shaped social relationships in the region, and their enactment of government policies reinforced existing hierarchies favoring Europeans over Chileans and Mapuches. As the local face of the state that had the power to adapt and interpret land policies, dispossessed farmers who accused ministry bureaucrats of having a lack of solidarity with their fellow countrymen. Indigenous peoples were heavily dependent on the labor of Protectors of Indigenous Peoples, who contended with the challenges of an office that was frequently understaffed, underfunded, and had little authority to protect Indigenous lands. While many agents believed they were performing a patriotic duty, others expressed their concerns and doubts about the colonization project's feasibility and effectiveness in private correspondence with the central office of the Ministry of Colonization in Santiago and openly in congressional sessions. In this way, we see that contrary to historiographical assumptions about the behavior of state agents in which they

³⁵ Elvira López Taverne, *El proceso de construcción estatal en Chile. Hacienda pública y burocracia (1817-1860)*, (Santiago: Ediciones de la Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos, Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana) 198, 216.

have been mainly portrayed as a monolithic unit eager to enact the policies developed in Santiago, bureaucrats were nuanced figures who at various moments upheld, elucidated, and challenged policies emanating from the central government.

Within the Araucanía, my geographical focus is on the provinces of Cautín and Malleco, which were the first to be mapped and supported some of the region's largest towns and agricultural colonies. While other scholars have studied colonization in Cautín and Malleco, this focus provides an opportunity to examine the trajectory of the bureaucracy of colonization, the consequences of decisions made by its agents, and how these shaped land relations over time. The two provinces were home to a sizeable Mapuche population, had the largest concentration of bureaucratic offices, and many of the conflicts between Chileans, Mapuches, and European colonos that emerged during this period were concentrated in this area. Authorities from the regions of Valdivia and Magellan, who were in the early stages of colonization in the 1890s were attentive to how bureaucrats in the Araucanía mediated conflicts. While doing so, they worked to avoid making similar mistakes, such as excluding Chileans from land ownership and showing a preference for European settlements while the colonization project expanded southward.

This study encompasses a period of nearly five decades (1866-1912) during which the Araucanía experienced a profound social and territorial transformation with lasting consequences. Some of the most prominent studies of the region, many of which have focused on the evolving relationship between the Chilean state and the Mapuche, have taken a long-term approach that begins with the antecedents to occupation and concludes their narrative in the present day. Popular works such as José Bengoa's 2014 book *Mapuches, Colonos, y el Estado Nacional* have been periodically updated to include current events and draw connections between colonization as a foundational event and the political instability still seen today in the

region. While my study is interested in contributing to our understanding of the ongoing tensions over land rights in the Araucanía, shortening the chronology of this work has allowed me to focus on important episodes crucial in the stories of European and Chilean colonos. Although other laws related to state expansion into the Araucanía region were promulgated before this date, the December 1866 land law was foundational to the settler-colonial project in the region. It resulted in a reconceptualization of property ownership and established the authority of government bureaucrats as the arbiters in processes of land redistribution.

Within this chronology, other dates emerge as critical junctures for non-Indigenous Chileans, Europeans, and the bureaucrats who enacted colonization legislation. In the larger narratives of the region, there has been little emphasis on dates at which mid-level bureaucrats played a significant role in how land was distributed in the Araucanía, such as the creation of the 1898 law that permitted Chileans to own *hijuelas*, and the 1896 law that allowed repatriated Chilean peasants to apply for land titles. My dissertation concludes in 1912, at the end of the *Comision Parlamentaria's* two-year report on the colonization project. This evaluation of the successes and failures of colonization, much of which was conducted by local bureaucrats with the aid of members of the *Comisión Parlamentaría*, is a significant moment at which the Chilean government begins to reevaluate its land policies and colonization mechanisms. In practice, however, processes of Indigenous displacement and ongoing conflicts continued long after this report, though its creation provides a multiscale evaluation of how different social groups, such as foreign and national colonos and local bureaucrats, understood the colonization project and its progression. By shifting the focus from the long-term effects of occupation to the spatial dynamics of the first decades of colonization in the Araucanía, my project demonstrates the

importance of midlevel bureaucrats who navigated and negotiated the local tensions that emerged among various social groups.

Methods

Much like the work of other Anglophone and Chilean historians, this study is heavily rooted in both national and regional archives. At the National Historical Archive, I studied the everyday practices of land surveying in the region through correspondence between engineers in the Araucanía and the central government in Santiago and records of land sales and their advertisements in local newspapers within the Araucanía and Santiago. The historical archive also housed the records of Chilean consulates throughout Europe that provided information about the recruitment of *colonos* and diplomatic disputes that emerged at various junctures. These documents helped me understand the evolving priorities of the Ministry of Colonization in Europe and trace the conflicts between local bureaucrats in the Araucanía and the central government in Santiago. The National Library's newspaper archive provided periodicals run by both Chilean and foreign *colonos* that helped me understand their local priorities and concerns.

The National Administrative Archive, which contained land petitions from Europeans, Chileans, and Indigenous communities, illuminated how colonization was experienced by each group and the ways they understood their rights to property. Many of these land petitions contain snippets of their cases, and because of their fragmented nature scholars often focus on haciendas or industries, which are owned by wealthier families and frequently have more archival documentation. While these smaller land petitions are often missing documents, they nevertheless reveal the friction caused by bureaucrats' unequal enactment of legislation and the evolution in the role of engineers in land disputes. The regional archive in the Araucanía region of Southern Chile offered government documents on land parceling, agricultural developments,

and the development of local towns and infrastructure that came as a result of colonization. If read critically as documents of both colonial power and negotiation, the maps and land petitions produced throughout the first decades of colonization illuminate the ways that different historical actors brought to bear their own understandings of positive social transformation and development could mean.

Chapter Breakdown

My dissertation consists of four chapters, each exploring how the Chilean state imposed its vision of space and economic development on the region. The first chapter, "Empty Promises of the Frontier," analyzes the policies and recruitment efforts geared toward European immigration. These processes reflected the Chilean state's belief that in order to make the land in the region productive, it needed to be settled primarily by European colonizers who bring their superior agricultural knowledge and work ethic with them. These policies were largely tinged by racist assumptions toward the Mapuche. From their offices in Berlin and Paris, officers from the Ministry of Foreign Relations recruited European colonizers with promises of fertile soil and economic prosperity through pamphlets and maps. The reality on the ground, however, was far from prosperous. Letters between Europeans and the Ministry of Colonization that detail the experiences of foreign colonos allow me to demonstrate how during times of financial precarity petitions for aid often fell on deaf ears. As the colonization project grew and an already large bureaucracy struggled to address the challenges of mapping, distributing, and settling the territory, many colono concerns went unaddressed. *Colonos* responded by contacting other authority figures, such as clergymen and their local consulates, to gain support for their petitions. Their pleas reveal the financial precarity of the colonization project, as some of these colonos were one failed crop cycle away from starvation. They also demonstrate the lack of a local

structure to deal with the needs of these new communities, and the Chilean governments priority to populate the region rather than meet the needs of its *colono* communities. While some families wrote that they were in desperate need of food and supplies, many of the petitions that overwhelmed the Ministry regarded smaller matters, such as requests for additional livestock or land. As *colonos* contemplated migrating to Argentina, local presses began to question whether the Chilean government could handle a large colonization scheme while attempting to settle an unstable frontier.

My second chapter, "Agents of Stable Culture: Engineers and State Formation in Chile's Southern Frontier 1866-1912," explores the role engineers played in the reconceptualization and redistribution of territory in the Araucanía region throughout the process of parceling and colonization of the territory, as well as the challenges that emerged from these practices. Despite the ambitious scope of the colonization project, the engineers of the topographic commission charged with mapping the newly occupied region were chronically underfunded. Although engineers frequently expressed their frustration with the level of state resources through letters and petitions, I demonstrate how engineers used their positions to redraw the landscape to meet the fiscal needs of the Chilean state and the European *colonos* they would eventually recruit. When conflicts emerged over contested lands at the turn of the twentieth century, their roles also evolved, and their expertise was used in lawsuits. As engineers began their mapping expeditions, local challenges also emerged. Despite the existence of laws that reinforced state authority in the region, the usurpation of state-owned lands increased much to the chagrin of engineers and the Ministry of Colonization. State attempts to address these challenges through legislation did little to curb complaints about the land usurpation, banditry, and discontent voiced by local bureaucrats and engineers as they attempted to parcel and redistribute lands.

The third chapter, "'A Mockery of Justice': Mapuche Land Disputes in the Araucanía," examines Mapuche responses to threats of encroachment and explores their relationship to the Protector of Indigenous Peoples, the government representative who served as their intermediary in government affairs. I specifically follow the case of the Mapuche farmer Mateo Huenchumen Huenteo, who in 1889 sought to protect his lands against Jervasio Alarcón, a hacienda owner notorious in the region for stealing lands from Mapuche communities. While his case was one of many that can be found in the archives, this chapter uses land petitions and memoirs to argue that Indigenous policies on land ownership were created to encourage these communities to abandon their claims to land. These policies also left Indigenous communities at the mercy of local bureaucrats who in some cases were either unwilling or unable to enforce land laws. The Protectors of Indigenous Peoples were frequently unable to stave off land encroachment efforts due to settler colonial policies that gave their offices limited authority to protect Mapuche lands. In practice, protectors verified that Indigenous communities met the requirements for titles, some of which infringed on their traditions and cultural practices. Most importantly, this chapter reveals what was at stake for both historical actors in this lawsuit: for Alarcón, the expansion of lands meant an increase in future profits, and more landless peasants in the region meant more potential laborers for his hacienda. For Huenchumen, losing his ancestral lands meant not only the loss of his former way of life but also the threat of starvation and poverty for his family.

The final chapter, "Contesting the 'limitless frontier': The Nacionales Law and Land Petitions in Cautín and Malleco 1900-1912," focuses on the organizing efforts of displaced Chilean settlers who lost their lands to European colonization companies, usurpers, or hacendados. The creation of the land laws of 1896 and 1898 that outlined a path for land ownership arrived during a contentious period in which Chileans and Europeans competed for

increasingly limited land. By 1900, the majority of land in the more northerly provinces of Cautín and Malleco was mapped and redistributed, and many of the land conflicts that were soon observed in the Magellan region were in many ways foreshadowed by the events of the Araucanía. The evolution of land petition use, from demonstrating land ownership to advocating for the needs of entire communities, reveals how Chilean landless peasants understood land ownership. Most importantly, in these petitions they also challenged how local bureaucrats enacted land policies that reinforced social hierarchies favoring European colonos and colonization companies. European *colonos* also pursued their interests through these petitions and lawsuits while appealing to the contracts made by the Ministry of Colonization to ensure access to land and financial resources. These disputes opened the door to emergent solidarity movements and fostered dialogue among landless peasant groups, which began to articulate their views of land rights in newspapers and petitions. These efforts and informal organizations, though sometimes short-lived, potentially formed the beginnings of what would soon become an emerging agrarian labor movement in the southern frontier. As the face of the Chilean government in the area and witnesses to the evolving conflicts, local bureaucrats produced reports and contended with policies that favored European colonization and were dispossessing Chileans living in the area. They often clashed with petitioners and local *vecino* organizations formed by Chilean settlers in response to what they understood as negligence on the part of the central government to address local concerns as the state pursued a larger goal of national economic development. I propose that looking at these early forms of land advocacy can help us understand important labor conflicts in the region that are outside of the scope of this dissertation, such as the union organizing that led to land takeovers in the 1930s and culminated with the Ranquil massacre in 1934.

I conclude with a reflection on the destruction of the statue of Teodoro Schmidt, the head of the Topographic Commission who established offices in Temuco soon after the colonization project began. In October 2019, his statue was vandalized and dragged through a town square in Temuco during a month-long period of social upheaval. I trace specific historical moments, such as the erection and destruction of the statue, to draw connections between the legacies of the colonization project and points of contention that remain today as Mapuche families seek to recover lost ancestral lands and avoid further encroachment from industrial corporations and logging companies. As elected delegates began writing the new constitution under the leadership of the Mapuche professor and activist Elisa Loncón, the question of historical land rights emerged once more in the region in the hope that new legislation may remedy the injustices committed during colonization.

Chapter 1: “Empty Promises of the Frontier: The Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization and the recruitment of European Colonos 1883-1910.”

In November 1889, the Chilean Inspector of Colonization, Martin Drouilly, responded to a request from the German immigrant Federico Hartling, who was seeking to re-gain *colono* status from the Ministry. This coveted title would grant him a land parcel of eleven hectares in the Araucanía and an additional nine hectares for every son in his family. In Hartling’s case, he had been waiting for his parcel of land since his arrival to Chile in 1885 and later moved to the Araucanian city of Traiguen, where he met his future wife. Hartling requested the land neighboring his father-in-law’s home, arguing that as someone who once had *colono* status, he had developed the skills and financial means to make the land agriculturally productive in the colony of Europeans he lived in.³⁶ Hartling had never received the lands promised to him in his initial *colono* contract; however, the new grant could be a way for the government to fulfill their agreement. The following month Drouilly offered this sharply worded reply, “In the present case, the solicitant has not even produced for his colony; therefore, he never was a *colono*. Now that everything is populated and the territory has much more value, he comes to ask for (land worth) double what he would have been offered to come to Chile. In the judgment of this office, there is no reason to make exceptions for the solicitant, and his request must be denied.”³⁷

Hartling’s petition and Drouilly’s response reflect the importance of *colono* status in the recently occupied Araucanía region in granting, administering, and regulating access to both land and financial aid from the government. Property in the area of Traiguen had increased in value by 1889, and Drouilly was reserving the scarce amount of land available for newly arrived European colonos. Those who had arrived years prior, such as Hartling and native-born Chileans,

³⁶ Carta al Ministro de *Colonización* Martin Drouilly, 17 Oct., 1889, ANH, Minrel vol. 436.

³⁷ Respuesta a Federico Hartling, 23 Oct., 1889, ANH, Minrel, vol. 436.

were reclassified as *nacionales*, a category reserved for Chilean persons that could not qualify for a land title until 1896.³⁸ While Hartling's was classified as a *colono* years prior, the state spent large sums of money transporting European *colonos* to their newly parceled territory with the expectation that within a few years, they would develop their farms using the latest agricultural technologies and methods. These expectations, however, ignored local realities, mainly that *colonos* like Hartling did not always receive their plots in a timely manner, and many others often struggled to make their lands productive due to financial constraints. The *colono* category carried with it significant privileges, mainly a land title recognized by the government, which were above those of native-born Chileans and Indigenous peoples. These privileges created a social hierarchy in the region that at the turn of the twentieth century led to lawsuits over land and the conditions for land grabs that disproportionately affected Indigenous communities and often resulted in displacement. Despite their privileged position, European *colonos* like Hartling soon found that the Ministry of Colonization struggled to meet the needs of their communities.

While the rejection of Harling's request reflected the state's vision for agricultural development in the region as one dependent on new arrivals from Europe, for Hartling and those in similar situations, the decision had a significant impact on their livelihood. With a *colono* designation, he would be entitled to land and the financial protection of the Ministry of Colonization should he encounter crop failure. In practice, however, the Ministry often ignored or was unable to fulfill these requests. Though his land title would not guarantee protection from swindlers and the land grabs that were becoming commonplace in the region, having a legal document that proved ownership of the parcel was becoming increasingly valuable as lawsuits

³⁸ More on the creation of this category in chapter 4.

over disputed territories frequently asked for legal proof of ownership. And, as Minister Drouilly indicated, when lands in the south were mapped, they gained a monetary value that was affected by the potential development of industry in the region. These lands would either be given to *colonos* or sold in land auctions both in Santiago and other cities in the Araucanía. After fulfilling their contractual obligations with the state, the European *colono* could sell their land for a sizable profit. With more lands parceled and the formation of small towns, land in the region grew in monetary value, making the *colono* designation financially significant.

This chapter analyzes the enactment of settler-colonial policies concerning land redistribution by examining the archival records of two primary state apparatuses that recruited and settled European colonizers in the region: The Ministry of Colonization and the Agency General of Immigration and Colonization. Together, both offices formed part of the larger Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization and reflected a single vision for the development of Araucanía that centered on the creation of European *colono* communities. I argue that the challenges local Ministry bureaucrats faced in the Araucanía arose from colonization policies that prioritized populating the region rather than providing the infrastructure European colonos needed for their survival. From Santiago, the central offices of the Ministry of Colonization did not provide sufficient resources to newly arrived colonos who struggled with the unforgiving terrain, banditry, and financial challenges of making their lands profitable. Instead, the Ministry of Colonization, together with the Agency General, focused their efforts on meeting immigration quotas in order to compete with neighboring countries such as Argentina. Altogether, these challenges reveal the fragmented nature of the Chilean state in the frontier that struggled to retain the European colonos in the region and later avoid conflicts over social hierarchies that favored Europeans over Chileans and Mapuches. It also reveals the disconnect of local bureaucratic

authorities like Drouilly who were at times dismissive of concerns expressed by colonos struggling to survive and instead focused on redistributing land to newcomers. The first section of this chapter considers the background leading to the Wars of Occupation and explains why the Chilean state considered European colonization crucial to the nation's economic and social progress. The second section examines the creation of the Agency General of Colonization in Europe, and the challenges that emerged as colonos were recruited and struggled to survive in the Araucanía. The final section examines the domestic challenges the Ministry of Colonization in Chile faced from Congress as the Araucanía became more unstable due to limited lands available. This resulted in land usurpation, a rise in crime, and strained relationships between colonos, Mapuche communities, and non-Indigenous Chileans who were all competing for the same resources. This chapter sets the stage for a more extensive discussion of conflicts between European colonos and Chilean settlers, which I explore in the fourth chapter.

An analysis of the policies and recruitment efforts in the two decades following the Occupation of the Araucanía reflected the Chilean government's belief that to make the land in the region profitable, it needed to be settled primarily by European colonizers. From their offices in Europe, bureaucrats of the Agency General of Colonization recruited European colonos with promises of fertile soil and potential economic prosperity. Simultaneously, the propaganda created throughout these efforts demonstrates how the Chilean state wished to portray itself to the European community: as a rapidly modernizing country that could provide significant economic opportunities for agricultural and industrial growth. The need for advances in agricultural technology became more pressing as the Chilean population grew steadily both in the cities and northern mining regions. However, local Ministry of Colonization bureaucrats in Southern Chile lacked the resources to meet the growing demands of the European colonos who

migrated to the area and did not provide the infrastructure that would help them assimilate or protect them from bandits. The failures of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization, as a result, were indicative of a state that was highly centralized and unable to meet the needs of its peripheral population effectively.

Precursors to Colonization

The mostly rural population of Chile experienced steady growth after the wars of Independence, though the push for agricultural development was driven by a desire to both industrialize and meet the needs of a growing urban population. As historian Arnold Bauer observes, by the end of the nineteenth century, the number of people had more than doubled to 2.7 million inhabitants, with a sharp stratification between a growing, urban population that had a desire for imported goods and a sparse rural population that made its living through subsistence farming. The rural communities of Chile, however, primarily grew the same crops for generations with little diversification.³⁹ With the opening of trade routes in California and Australia after 1850, Chilean elites saw an opportunity to move away from the pastoral economy of the colonial period, and toward the industrialization of agriculture that required technological advances and a greater focus on cash crops.⁴⁰ To accommodate growing global and domestic demands, farmers of the central valley of Chile began moving away from cattle ranching and toward wheat production.⁴¹

Embedded within the discussions of economic progress and the territorial growth of the Chilean nation was the equally important question of where Indigenous peoples fit into this

³⁹ Arnold Bauer, *Expansión económica en una sociedad tradicional: Chile Central en el siglo XIX*. (Santiago: Ediciones Historia, 1970) 138.

⁴⁰ More on Chile's trade relationship with California can be found in, Edward Dallam Melillo. *Strangers on Familiar Soil: Rediscovering the Chile-California Connection*. (New Haven: Yale University Press), 2015.

⁴¹ Bauer, *Expansión económica en una sociedad tradicional*, 140.

larger vision of modernity in the South, if at all. Popular national newspapers such as *El Mercurio* depicted the Araucanía as a lush, fertile land, while the Mapuche were portrayed as its inefficient stewards that were too lazy and uncivilized to cultivate its potential fully. Throughout the colonial period and until the mid-nineteenth century, two perceptions of Indigenous peoples emerged. One originated from Alfonso de Ercilla's sixteenth-century poem, "La Araucana," where the Mapuche were depicted as noble warriors and thus worthy opponents of the Spanish Conquistadors. At the same time, another description of their "savage" and "barbarous" behavior also emerged from these same conflicts. When the Chilean state began making inroads south, the national newspaper *El Mercurio* began publishing articles portraying the Mapuche as savages, with traits and vices antithetical to the civilized, modern image the Chilean state wanted to portray of its citizenry.⁴² They were, in essence, a remnant of a distant, unmodern past, and the question emerged of what place if any, an Indigenous person could have in a developing nation. During the 1860s, congressional debates reflected the belief that Chile was divided into two nations: a growing, industrial, and technologically advanced nation that wanted to model itself after European societies, and another of inferior, non-white country of Indigenous peoples with customs and practices that were

⁴² As Rebecca Earle argues in her book, *Return of the Native*, countries such as Peru and Mexico shifted back and forth between policies that sought to assimilate or exclude Indigenous communities. These changes were partially shaped by elite views on whether Indigenous peoples could form part of nineteenth-century nation building projects. In some cases, like Argentina, creole elites were ultimately unwilling to reject their European roots and found indigenous peoples incompatible with the modern nations they were trying to form. Rebecca Earle, *Return of the Native: Indians and Myth-Making in Spanish America, 1810-1930* (Durham Duke University Press, 2007), 6. See also, Ernesto Bassi, The 'Franklins of Colombia': Immigration Schemes and Hemispheric Solidarity in the Making of a Civilized Colombian Nation, *Journal of Latin American Studies* 50, no. 3 (2018), and Brooke Larson, *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810- 1910* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).



Figure 2: *Writer, historian, and politician Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, who was influential in policymaking that led to the occupation of the Araucanía. Source: <http://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl>.*

incompatible with the goals of the state.⁴³ In 1868, politician Benjamin Vicuña argued before congress that the Mapuche were the enemies of civilization because they were emblematic of the treachery and vice that existed in the lowest rungs of society.⁴⁴ Expansion into the Araucanía, therefore, represented a unique opportunity for the Chilean state to enact settler-colonial policies

⁴³ As Stephen Aron and Jeremy Adelman argue the transition from colony to nation in North America led to a shift from “fluid and “inclusive” intercultural frontiers to “hardened and exclusive hierarchies.” The expulsion of indigenous communities in the Southern regions of Argentina and Chile point to a similar phenomenon of expulsion and social exclusion. The extermination of indigenous communities in Argentina during the Conquest of the Desert was an extreme case of implementing these policies. Aron, Stephen, and Adelman, Jeremy, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History" Vol. 104, No. 3 (Jun. 1999), pp. 814-841. An earlier examination of empire building in frontier zones can be found in Walter Nugent, "Frontiers and Empires in the Late Nineteenth Century." *The Western Historical Quarterly* 20, no. 4 (1989): 393–408.

⁴⁴ Bengoa, *Mapuches, Colonos, y el Estado Nacional*, 110. Elite constructions of national identities in Latin America are further examined in, *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America* edited by Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, Karin Alejandra Roseblatt (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003). For a broader discussion on national identity, see, Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, third ed. (New York: Verso Press, 1993).

of private property ownership and potentially reshape the racial demographics of the region. Scholars Mahmood Mandani and Lorenzo Veracini have argued that settlers in a settler colonial society differ from migrants because they “are made by conquest, not just by immigration.” While migrants can move and create diasporic lives in another country, settlers, in contrast, have arrived to their country.⁴⁵ The Agency General of Colonization, through its propaganda that depicted the region as an empty space, encouraged European settlers to envision themselves as the missing part of a community that while coming from Europe also inherently belonged in the Araucanía as part of a broader project of “Chilenización.” The creation of European agricultural colonies and individual land titles colono families received also marked a transition from collective to private property ownership. With more plots of land given to newly arrived colonos, less territory would be available for the Mapuche communities that remained after the Wars of Occupation. Therefore, the goals of European settlements were to contribute to the agricultural development of the south, change the racial demographics of the region, and further encourage Mapuches to renounce any claims to land and leave the Araucanía. Altogether, these ideas point to a new imaginary that existed among Ministers and central government in Santiago of a “limitless southern frontier,” which they could financially exploit and expand from the central regions down to the strait of Magellan.

The growth of the German colony of Valdivia in the southern Araucanía served in many ways as an example of what the Chilean state hoped to achieve in the region. Founded in the 1840s by a small group of German migrants, immigration to Valdivia increased throughout the 1850s, and because the area developed with the strong economic and military support of the Chilean government, local industries and agriculture developed rapidly. Settlers to the region

⁴⁵ Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, 3.

enjoyed vast parcels of land, and goods from Valdivia were exported to Central Chile and Europe.⁴⁶ By the 1860s, Valdivia owned the most industries of any other city in Chile, making it an example to follow for other cities in the Araucanía such as Concepción and later Temuco. The inhabitants of Valdivia also came to embody many of the qualities of the ideal settler of the Araucanía: industrious, hardworking, and foreign.⁴⁷ The region was administered by Chilean military officers; these often lived in areas close to indigenous populations to protect Valdivia and keep any potential violence at bay.

With the growth of the Valdivia colony, state policies began reflecting a politics of gradual colonial expansion southward. This evolution is reflected by the Chilean president Manuel Bulnes' authorization to construct a military fort in the Magellan region in 1843, and the simultaneous founding of the city of Punta Arenas. These small settlements and isolated colonies resulted from a growing discussion among the nation's capitalist bourgeoisie class and the press about how the young republic wanted to see itself in relation to the developing countries of South America and Europe. The economic crisis of 1857 only contributed to calls for further expansion south, and by 1862 the city of Angol, which would later become a significant agricultural colony for European settlers, was founded in Mapuche territory.⁴⁸ The occupation of this territory came to symbolize another form of land enclosure for the Mapuche. During the mid-nineteenth

⁴⁶ More on these early colonies can be found in, George F. Young, "Bernardo Philippi, Initiator of German Colonization in Chile" *The Hispanic American Historical Review* Vol. 51, No. 3 (Aug. 1971), p 485.

⁴⁷ While the Chilean government came to view these settlers as the example for potential Chilean settlers to follow, there was much debate within these colonies as to whether they identified with any form of Chilean national identity. Krista O'Donnell, Renate Bridenthal, and Nancy Reagan, eds. *The Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness*. University of Michigan Press, 2005.

George F. Young, *The Germans in Chile: Immigration and Colonization, 1849- 1914* (New York: Center for Migration Studies New York, 1974) 49.

⁴⁸ The creation of the agricultural colony of Angol is further described in, Cornelio Saavedra, *Documentos relativos a la ocupación de Arauco: que contienen los trabajos practicados desde 1861 hasta la fecha: i demás antecedentes que pueden contribuir a ilustrar el juicio de los señores diputados en la próxima discusión sobre el ultimo proyecto del ejecutivo*. (Santiago: Imprenta de la Libertad, 1870).

century, the Mapuche were able to migrate south to escape the encroaching colonization policies of the Chilean government. However, the creation of settlements in the Northern Araucanía, and the expanding colony of Valdivia in the South, made migration increasingly complicated. These settlements were a sign of a hardening border that foreshadowed the resettlement of territory after the Wars of Occupation in the 1880s.

The southern region of Chile was linked to European settlements through colonies of immigrants, travel literature, and scientific exploration. Famous naturalists who were widely read during the nineteenth century such as Charles Darwin and his earlier counterpart Alexander Humboldt formed part of elaborate networks of scientists that explored the natural environment of South America to classify new flora, fauna, and previously unexplored terrain.⁴⁹ Embedded within these missions, which were often conducted with the aid of South American governments, was the idea of exploration and later mapping as crucial to the domination of wild territory. The region of Patagonia, for example, was a common site of exploration that was portrayed as vast and empty, further contributing to the idea of the region as one in need of settlement. In cases where Indigenous people were mentioned, they were primarily depicted as savages. The government of Chile encouraged exploration of remote regions such as Tierra del Fuego and the Strait of Magellan with the goal of consolidating the entire territory. Scattered European colonies such as Valdivia, which were a financial success, served as hubs where scientists could conduct mapping projects to increasingly remote areas. The governments of Chile and Argentina benefitted from these exploratory missions by obtaining knowledge of natural resources for

⁴⁹ The contributions of German scientists in Chilean and South American travel literature are further examined in, Carlos Sanhueza Cerda, *Chilenos en Alemania y Alemanes en Chile: Viaje y nación en el siglo XIX*. (Santiago de Chile: Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos, Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana: LOM Ediciones, 2006), 49-59, and H. Glenn Penny, *In Humboldt's Shadow: A Tragic History of German Ethnology*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2021.

exploitation and potential areas where colonies could be built. Explorers and scientists played a role in the colonization project since their reports and their observations and illustrations made these formerly unknown areas accessible for South American governments and a European audience.⁵⁰

European colonization would not have been possible without an extensive bureaucratic system in Europe, Santiago, and towns throughout the Araucanía. The government branch in charge of the colonization of the Araucanía and Southern Chile more broadly was the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Colonización. (The Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization)⁵¹ Originally founded in 1814 as the country was engaged in a war of Independence from the Spanish, the Ministry of Foreign Relations primarily served as a diplomatic intermediary between the central government of Santiago and other countries through its embassies around the world. In 1871, the word “colonization” was added to the government branch’s title, signifying an increasing priority from the government to colonize the south with foreigners. The term “colonization” in the Ministry’s title was removed in 1924; by that time settlement projects in the Araucanía and extending to the Strait of Magellan were completed. As coordinators of the

⁵⁰ As Marie Louise Pratt and Candace Slater have astutely argued, Alexander von Humboldt along with other European explorers have used nature and travel writing as a means of erasing the presence of Indigenous people from their environment. These natural spaces, in turn, represented very different things for the Indigenous peoples who lived in these lands, and Europeans who saw scientific and economic opportunities. By placing themselves as interlocutors for both a European and American audience, European naturalists formed part of a discourse of exploration as a means of both possession and conquest. Recognizing the cultural importance of prominent geologists and explorers, in 1896 the Agency General of Colonization proposed recruiting Nils Otto Gustaf Nordenskjöld, a Swedish geologist known for his expeditions in Patagonia, to promote the colonization of Southern Chile to Scandinavian communities. Marie Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*, second edition (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), Candace Slater, *Entangled Edens: Visions of the Amazon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), Beth Fowkes Tobin, *Colonizing Nature: The Tropics in British Arts and Letters, 1760-1820* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), Alexander Von Humboldt, *Views of the Cordilleras and Monuments of the Indigenous Peoples of the Americas: A Critical Edition*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

⁵¹ In 1888, the Ministerio changed its name once more, and was known as the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Culto y Colonización (1888-1924). The term Culto refers to a third office primarily charged with the reparation and restoration of churches.

colonization project, representatives of the Ministry of Colonization in southern Chile worked in tandem with local administrative intendencies that had existed in some form since the colonial period.⁵² Bureaucrats from the Ministry of Colonization opened offices in towns throughout the Araucanía to handle land distribution and other matters relating to titles, and the regional headquarters was established in Temuco. Local intendants were in close contact with the Ministry of Colonization as they attended to different needs that arose from the colonization project, such as the creation of a rural police force and matters related to public health. By working with the intendencies, the Ministry of Colonization expanded its influence in the southern region and its legitimacy as an arbiter of land use.

Colono Recruitment in Europe

The Agency General of Immigration and Colonization in Europe began as a supreme decree that was passed on October 10, 1882, with the aim of promoting and facilitating the migration process. While smaller embassies and offices had previously handled these cases, the creation of this larger agency represented the growing priority of colonizing the Araucanía and the southern regions. Its existence also aligned with the events of the Wars of Occupation, and the perception among the Chilean military and government that the defeat of Mapuche forces was imminent. Some European governments were not receptive to recruitment efforts, and Paris soon emerged as the center of the Agency General due to the lack of restrictions the French government placed on foreign recruiters.⁵³ The evolving nature of recruitment restrictions meant that an important part of the labor of agency agents was to negotiate with other diplomats and

⁵² For a study on the continuities of Chilean bureaucratic systems from the colonial to the national period, see, Elvira López Taverner, *El proceso de construcción estatal en Chile: Hacienda pública y burocracia (1817-1860)*, (Santiago: DIBAM, Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, 2014).

⁵³ An initial priority for the Agency was immigrants from Spain and the Basque country for cultural and linguistic reasons; due to difficulties with recruitment in these countries, those preferences were soon abandoned. *Memoria Sintética de las Operaciones de la Agencia General de Colonización de Chile en Europa, desde su creación en 1882 hasta 1894 inclusive* (Paris: Imprimerie Paul Dupont, 1895), 26.

European officials to ensure that they could fulfill the immigration quotas set by the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Relations. Though the Agency courted immigrants from most European countries, those from France, Switzerland, Germany, and later Scandinavian countries were the most sought after.⁵⁴ While agency *memorias* stressed the importance of recruitment from a plurality of European nations, migrants from the aforementioned countries were in practice a priority of the Agency due to their perceived industriousness.⁵⁵

From its offices primarily in Berlin and Paris, the Agency General courted potential European settlers, emphasizing those with a knowledge of agriculture and industries that were in demand in the Araucanía. Between the years 1882-1894, the Agency successfully recruited 6,357 colonos to the region.⁵⁶ These settlers could bring their families with them and, depending on the financial status of the Ministry, have their voyage from Europe paid for along with steamship tickets to the port of Talcahuano in the Araucanía along with railway fare to their destination. Once there, they would receive a provisional land title from the Ministry of Colonization's Temuco office, which would allow them to claim temporary ownership of an *hijuela*. Before making travel arrangements, potential settlers would need to meet specific requirements. Firstly, male *colonos* would ideally be married and travel with their families. Depending on the availability of land, male heads of the family would typically be entitled to eleven hectares of

⁵⁴ The Swiss government intermittently prohibited emigration to Chile in 1883 and 1887. In the first instance, Agency officials reported that Chile had recruited too many Swiss immigrants, and in 1887 the Swiss government prohibited emigration citing letters from Swiss citizens in Chile who complained of ill-treatment in the country. In response, Agent General Isidoro Errázuriz published a pamphlet, "Les Suisses aux Colonies du Chili," exalting the successes of Swiss colonies in the Araucanía. *Ibid*, 10-11.

⁵⁵ Agency bureaucrats believed that one of the advantages of recruiting Europeans without an emphasis on any particular nationality would ensure a speedier assimilation process into Chilean society. Argentina was cited as an example of a country that took a substantially different approach in favor of primarily Italian and Spanish migration. Such policies, agency officials argued, created situations in which immigrants created cultural enclaves that allowed them to resist assimilation into the larger society. Agents also noted the practical advantages of having farmers from various European countries familiar with different farming tools and could work in varying climates. *Memoria Sintética de las Operaciones de la Agencia General de Colonización de Chile en Europa, desde su creación en 1882 hasta 1894 inclusive*, 27.

⁵⁶ *Gráfica de los Emigrantes (Colonos É Industriales) Enviados a la Republica, ANH, Minrel, vol. 721.*

land. Each son over the age of eleven would qualify for an additional nine hectares. The ideal candidate should have a background in agriculture or a profession that would play some role in the colonization industry, such as a welder, a cobbler, or railway experience.⁵⁷ Vetting migrants was a five-step process that required documents verified by the local public authorities. Future *colonos* needed to present the birth certificates of all family members that were migrating with them to Chile and a marriage license. Once their identities were verified, the Agency would determine the fare required for railway and steamship passages; depending on the financial situation of the Agency General, migrants may ask for loans for this fare, or the Chilean government would pay for them.⁵⁸ Migrants also needed to present certificates proving that they were agricultural labors, as well as a legally verified sanitation certificate confirming that the applicant was free of any serious illness or contagious diseases. Potential candidates should also demonstrate a degree of literacy. In nearly every European country, potential emigrants needed to take an exam that determined both the honorability and intellectual aptitude of the applicant. The applicant was also required to report on their finances and, in some cases, needed to demonstrate that they had savings of thirty to forty thousand francs.⁵⁹ As a final requirement, a certificate of good moral character was provided, indicating that the potential colono had no criminal record.

⁵⁷ “Notizen über Chile und dessen Colonisationsverhältnisse druck von C.L Pfeil” (Notes about Chile and its Colonization Conditions by C.L Pfeil), Aug. 1883, ANH, Minrel, vol. 439.

⁵⁸ Despite the agreements that existed between the Chilean government and European steamship companies, paying for the steamship and railway fare of was one of the costliest lines on the Agency’s budget. Nevertheless, officials considered free passage a crucial incentive that could motivate potential migrants. *Memoria de los Trabajos Ejecutados por La Agencia General de Colonización de Chile en Europa en 1895* (Paris: Imprimiere Paul Dupont, 1896), 5.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*




Figure 3: Copy of a migrant card which verified that the future colono had met Agency requirements and entitled its holder to a free railway passage upon arrival to Chile. Source: *Memorias de Colonización 1882-1894. ANH, Minrel, vol. 144.*

From these documents, bureaucrats at the Agency General would draw up a contract both in Spanish and in the native language of the colono that detailed the amount of time colonos were required to remain on their hijuelas and other prerequisites. After fulfilling these

requirements, colonos received a permanent land title. According to the contract, new settlers must personally live in the territory for no less than five years with their families and could not be absent from their *hijuela* for more than four months of the year without permission of the Inspector General of colonization. Within three to five years, the new settlers should fence their territory and spend no less than 500 pesos to erect buildings on their land.⁶⁰ Once these terms were accepted, the Chilean government paid for the colono's steamship tickets, provided them with a sum of money, and helped install them in these newly redrawn territories. One of the necessary conditions for a permanent land title was that the colono successfully grow crops on their plot, and by doing so, contribute to the growth of the local economy of the region.

While the Agency General worked to recruit more settlers, The Ministry of Colonization's local offices in the Araucanía kept records of where colonos lived and ensured that they met the requirements for both the provisional and permanent land titles. While settlers underwent a screening process in the offices of Berlin and Paris before their arrival, it was not uncommon to encounter cases where these colonos did not meet specific criteria, especially pertaining to the additional hectares given for children. Settlers, in some cases, provided forged documents or had false witnesses to vouch for the ages of their sons, and officials from the Ministry of Colonization traveled to their neighborhoods to investigate the validity of their claims by speaking to them directly or consulting with neighbors.⁶¹ Engineers working with the Ministry as part of the Topographic Commission traveled to the parcels of colonos to ensure that they met the requirements stated in their contracts. The potential for fraudulent claims by *colonos* added an additional challenge for these engineers, and the arrival of hundreds of migrants each year complicated their ability to verify titles promptly.

⁶⁰ José Bengoa, *Historia del Pueblo Mapuche Siglo XIX y XX*. (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2000), 344.

⁶¹ Carta de Horacio Echecri a Sebastián Lachsinger, Mar. 3, 1892, ANH, Minrel, vol. 984.

While the Agency General's operations were primarily driven by the goal of populating the Araucanía and Magellan region, external global migration patterns were also influential. Agency General bureaucrats regularly compiled information on recruitment efforts from other countries and paid particular attention to how Latin American nations were enticing migrants to their shores.⁶² As such, a challenging aspect of the Agency General's job was determining how to market emigration to Chile for a European audience. Chile was a relatively unknown country for many potential migrants, and agency recruiters were competing with other countries, mainly the United States and Argentina, for potential settlers. Some migrants had familial connections in these countries, and correspondence from family members and word of mouth made these already popular destinations even more enticing. Even for those who did not have familial connections, cultural connections through ethnic enclaves in these countries made assimilation feasible. For example, New York City and its growing multicultural boroughs were a desirable destination for Europeans and others.⁶³ Easy access to an expansive railway system in the cities,

⁶² As European communities migrated to Latin America during the nineteenth century, many had to consider which aspects of their identity to retain as they integrated into their new homelands. Many communities were motivated to migrate due to the economic opportunities found in countries like Brazil, Argentina, and to a lesser degree, Mexico, Peru, and others. The debates among these diasporic communities are further examined in Nancy Appelbaum, *Muddied Waters: Race, Region and Local History in Colombia 1846-1948* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), Jürgen Buchenau, "Small Numbers, Great Impact: Mexico and Its Immigrants, 1821-1973." *Journal of American Ethnic History* 20, no. 3 (2001): 23-49, Jürgen Buchenau, *Tools of Progress: A German Merchant Family in Mexico City, 1865-Present*. (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 2004), Jeffrey Lesser, *Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities, and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), José Moya, 'A Continent of Immigrants: Postcolonial Shifts in the Western Hemisphere,' *Hispanic American Historical Review* vol. 81 no.1 (Feb. 2006) 1-28, and Giralda Seyferth, "German Immigration and the Formation of German-Brazilian Ethnicity" *Anthropological Journal on European Cultures*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (1998), 131-154.

⁶³ In particular, agency bureaucrats and recruiters admired the diversity of migrants that the United States attracted and their ability to create communities that led to permanent settlements. The Agency also closely observed the reservation system that the US government created for its Indigenous population as well as the progress of westward expansion. As agency bureaucrats noted, migrants to the great plains, while living in scattered rural settlements, formed an active part of the dispossession of native tribes. These bureaucrats believed European migrants could have a similar impact with the Mapuche population that remained in the region after 1883. However, the historiography of nineteenth-century migration reveals a far more nuanced process of integration and assimilation that varied greatly by community and geography. Within the historiography of American immigration, several works have focused on how certain ethnic groups integrated into American society through the "othering" or marginalization of other minority or marginalized groups based on their race, homeland, or legal status. Others have explored how legal categories of citizenship, institutionalized discrimination against migrant communities, and how

in turn, also made it possible for migrants with an agricultural background to travel to the Midwest and join existing settlements in the Great Plains. In South America, Buenos Aires also became home to predominantly Italian, German, and Spanish neighborhoods where new migrants could join others with similar cultural backgrounds. Encroachment into lands in rural Patagonia, and the significant loss of native lives during the Conquest of the Desert, opened the region to Welsh and British settlements. Brazil also opened its doors to migrants from all over Europe and employed laborers in the cities and rural sugar plantations.⁶⁴ Chile, for its part, had much smaller and scattered cultural enclaves in the Southern regions that were often isolated from one another and were far from urban centers. While Santiago and Valparaíso were growing urban centers, the railways were still in construction, meaning that communities of European colonos were not as readily accessible.

As the Ministry of Colonization settled hundreds of Europeans in their new homes in Chile each year, the Agency General worked extensively to promote colonization through

these processes can be traced to nineteenth-century nativist thought. For surveys on the varied experiences of European migration in the United States, including their interactions with Native American communities, see Donald H Akenson, *Ireland, Sweden, and the Great European Migration, 1815-1914*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), Tobias Brinkmann, ed. *Points of Passage: Jewish Migrants from Eastern Europe in Scandinavia, Germany, and Britain 1880-1914*. 1st ed. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), Karen V. Hansen, *Encounter on the Great Plains: Scandinavian Settlers and the Dispossession of Dakota Indians 1890-1930* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). The marginalization of minority groups as a means of integration for European migrants is examined in Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*. (New York City: Taylor & Francis Press, 2012), Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), and Shirley Yee, *An Immigrant Neighborhood: Interethnic and Interracial Encounters in New York Before 1930* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2012).

⁶⁴ The Brazilian Imperial government began its own recruitment of Prussian migrants as early as 1845, and much like Chile sought to transplant families who would create permanent European settlements. Debates soon emerged about whether European migrants should be used as a substitute for slave labor or whether they should be used to settle unused public lands. As historian José Juan Pérez Meléndez observes, many studies of Brazilian colonization have traditionally viewed the crown's interest in European colonos as primarily driven by the need for more labor due to the deteriorating slave trade. His work offers a more nuanced view and argues that private European colonization companies' political and economic practices were used to solve both short- and long-term political crises. José Juan Pérez Meléndez, "The Business of Peopling: Colonization and Politics in Imperial Brazil 1822-1860" Ph.D. diss., (The University of Chicago, 2016), Giralda Seyferth, "The Slave Plantation and Foreign Colonization in Imperial Brazil." *Fernand Braudel Center* vol. 34, no. 4 (2011), 339-387.

pamphlets.⁶⁵ Initially, many of these works were meant to introduce European audiences to Chile and portrayed the country as an idyllic, pastoral land with limitless potential for foreign investors and any potential agricultural settlers. To introduce the Araucanía to this audience, the agency hired European illustrators and travel writers to create pamphlets and articles that focused the country's geography, agriculture, and natural resources of the southern regions.⁶⁶ These travel writers and illustrators built on the works of earlier explorers and scientists while at the same time exalting Chile as a land on the cusp of modernity with limitless potential for any would-be industrialist or farmer looking to make his fortune. Excerpts of these works appeared in European newspapers, which often served as recruitment tools for colonization. Maps created by engineers in the Araucanía also formed an indispensable part of this propaganda and depicted clearly delineated parcels ready for agricultural development. For many migrants who received these maps with their contracts, this was the first glimpse of their future home. These maps, which ignored Mapuche communities already living on these lands, represented for these colonos the potential to create a prosperous future for their families.

While the Agency General of Colonization primarily focused on recruiting European agricultural workers, other industrial sectors throughout Chile actively sought to increase their labor force through foreign migration. Along with vetting potential colonos, the Agency General aided Chilean corporations who worked to recruit migrants for specific industrial projects such as railway construction in the Northern and Southern Regions. Railways in Chile became increasingly crucial as connectors between cities and ports and in relation to the booming nitrate industry in Northern Chile. The Sociedad de Fomento Fabril, founded in 1883, was a

⁶⁵“Reporte sobre la colonización Europea,” 6 Dec. 1894, ANH, Minrel, vol. 603. While other satellite offices existed in Seville and later Rome, the offices of Berlin and Paris were the headquarters of the Ministry's operations throughout the process of colonization.

⁶⁶ Reporte del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores en Berlín, 24 Oct. 1893, ANH, Minrel, vol. 550.

confederation of businesses that worked closely with the Agency General to recruit workers for various industrial projects and followed similar protocols to colono recruitment. Free migrants, or those who did not immigrate to Chile under the colonization program of the Agency General, also formed part of this labor force. Since these migrants did not arrive as part of the Colonization program, they were not provided a land title, and many of these worked in the major cities and ports. While some decided to settle in the Araucanía in hopes of acquiring colono status, free migrants and others like Federico Hartling were seldom given this designation.

Challenges from European Colonos and Diplomatic Conflicts

Colonos arriving in the Araucanía were soon confronted with a reality far from the idyllic pastoral landscapes depicted in pamphlets and the maps in their contracts. The homes colonos saw in the booklets and propaganda were not built yet, and families arrived on plots of land that were not clearly delineated. Many lived in poorly built homes, and since colonos arrived year-round to the Araucanía, these families did not always come during the planting season. Those that arrived in the winter months were therefore left without crops to sustain themselves. While intendency offices attempted to gather resources to help these families, they often learned about their arrival at the last minute. Local bureaucrats, including Ministry employees, lacked the resources and lodgings required to house newly arrived colonos for long periods of time.⁶⁷ *Colonos* who arrived years earlier hastily built hotels, shops, and entertainment venues built to support the colonization project, though these efforts were largely insufficient to meet the needs of the hundreds of colonos who arrived each year. To further encourage the creation of new businesses, the Ministry of Colonization provided the open lands needed for these projects to

⁶⁷ *Memoria de la Inspección General de Tierras y Colonización Correspondiente a 1903* (Santiago: Imprenta, Litog. I Enc. Esmeralda, 1904), 6.

colonos and other settlers who had been able to accumulate some wealth to invest.⁶⁸ While it was not uncommon for the Ministry to give additional lands to wealthy European colonos with an eye for new business, these practices further reduced the amount of land available for new colonos and for sale as fiscal properties. This added more pressure for engineers to accelerate their mapping efforts and move further south into the Magellan region throughout the 1890s. The few businesses available, lack of lodgings, coupled with long rainy seasons challenged even the most seasoned farmers who struggled to clear surrounding forests in time to plant their crops and acclimate to their new homes.

The lack of infrastructure needed to meet the needs of these new communities was reflected in the 1889 report from the Inspector General of Colonization Martin Drouilly to the Minister of Colonization in Santiago. As Drouilly explained, colono communities wrote to him in desperate need of food and farming supplies such as shovels, sickles, and plows. Many of the petitions that soon overwhelmed the local ministry offices concerned matters unrelated to land titles, such as requests for loans to purchase livestock, and money to cover medical bills. This meant that the petitions of communities in very precarious conditions often went unattended by the already overwhelmed Ministry that was focused on distributing land titles. Their pleas reveal the financial precarity of the colonial project, as some of these colonos were one failed crop cycle away from starvation.⁶⁹ While the lands owned by European colonos would only increase in value as the land was distributed, some abandoned their plots to work in local towns or migrated to cities due a lack of resources and hardships.⁷⁰ Others decided to move across the

⁶⁸ Carta de Arturo Bernard al Ministro de Colonización, 3 Dec., 1889, ANH, Minrel, vol. 426.

⁶⁹ Reporte Anual de Martin Drouilly al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Sept. 1889, ANH: Minrel, vol. 442.

⁷⁰ Some examples include, Luis Lizot a Martin Drouilly, 10 June 1889, ANH, Minrel, vol. 439, Charles von Unger a Martin Drouilly, 25 June 1889, ANH, Minrel, vol. 439,

cordillera to Argentina and became a financial loss for the Agency General that paid for their transportation costs.




Figure 4: *Topographer and Inspector General of Colonization Martin Drouilly. After serving as lieutenant coronel in the national guard, he was named Inspector General of Colonization by supreme decree on March 29, 1883. Originally from Ernesto Greve Schlegel, Don Amado Pissis y sus Trabajos Geológicos en Chile. (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria), 1946. Source: <http://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/>*

Finding many of their concerns unaddressed, colonos contacted other authority figures from their countries of origin. Individuals often wrote to religious leaders and embassy officials asking them to write to the Ministry of Colonization in Santiago on their behalf. In some cases, colonos of the same nationality made their petitions as a community in hopes of getting the attention of

the Minister of Colonization or the Inspector General of Colonization.⁷¹ In 1889 a British archbishop wrote to Martin Drouilly to inform him about the conditions of colonos who had recently immigrated to the region. While the archbishop assured Drouilly that they were not in any immediate danger, he nevertheless expressed concern that these colonos had arrived after crop season and were unlikely to have enough food to survive through the winter season. Moreover, the colonos claimed that the government subsidy they received on arrival was cut off quickly, and the animals they were loaned were weak and unable to perform the necessary farm duties.

The British archbishop soon learned that Ministry officials were unable to provide support for foreign colonos or did not consider their needs a priority. Martin Drouilly argued dismissively that the British *colonos* were doing well and had sufficient funds to live comfortably through the winter months.⁷² Drouilly's report and response to the archbishop reveal the ongoing challenges the colonization project would confront in the 1890s. Firstly, between 1886 to 1889, colonization in Araucanía reached a peak as 2,114 colonos arrived in the region, and prices went up for *hijuelas* due to a scarcity of land available for distribution.⁷³ The Ministry of Colonization, in turn, became preoccupied with giving new settlers land titles and continued to neglect the requests of colonos already living in the region. Secondly, there were no clear protocols or diasporic communities that could help colonos acclimate to the area, something other countries such as Argentina enjoyed and largely contributed to the success of their migration projects. Lastly, Drouilly's response to the archbishop and the inability of local Ministry offices to address the quotidian needs of colonos help explain the European

⁷¹ Reporte Anual de Martin Drouilly al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Sept. 1889, ANH: Minrel, vol. 442.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Gráfica de los Emigrantes (Colonos É Industriales) Enviados a la Republica, ANH, Minrel, vol. 721.

immigration bans that would soon come in the 1890s. As colonos began writing home to relatives in Europe revealing the dire conditions in southern Chile, and these letters began appearing in newspapers, the Ministry finally decided to respond to their concerns. The letters from these migrants reflect a growing concern that the Ministry of Colonization was incapable of coordinating mass migration to the region and served to dampen the image of Chile as a land of opportunity.

For colonos who found their concerns ignored or dismissed at the local level, the European press provided an opportunity to voice their grievances about how the Chilean government coordinated the settlement process. These articles threatened to undermine the efforts of the Agency General as it attempted to recruit more colonos and meet its migration quotas. In June 1889, the European press reported abuses against immigrants on the steamship *Imperial*. Some immigrants claimed that Chilean bureaucrats asked them to pay for their passages despite the Agency General's promises to cover transportation costs.⁷⁴ Francisco Gandarillas, the head of the Agency at the time, denied what he referred to as unfounded claims but expressed concern to the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Santiago about how these reports might affect the reputation of the colonization program. In the coming months, more reports appeared in the newspapers with testimonies about missing luggage on voyages and robberies aboard the steamships, all of which added to the growing concern of the Ministry. In August of the same year, the Ministry dismissed more complaints from colonos claiming that the government had done little to help them settle and find employment, thereby putting their families in financial jeopardy. Gandarillas argued that migrants often lied throughout the vetting process, making it difficult to discern each colono's skills. These settlers, he observed, were also

⁷⁴ Francisco Gandarillas al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, June 28, 1889, ANH, Minrel, vol. 440.

aware of the Chilean government's particular interests in *colonos* with a background agriculture and did not possess the knowledge to grow crops successfully.⁷⁵ The Ministry, therefore, was not responsible if these settlers were unable to find employment upon arrival.

Agency recruitment efforts were also affected by the increase in crime throughout the region, which threatened colonization efforts and strained diplomatic relationships abroad. Newly arrived European *colonos* were particularly vulnerable since bandits knew they had traveled with their belongings and savings. On April 26th, 1884, over a year after the Wars of Occupation had ended, Martin Drouilly wrote an alarming letter to Aniceto Vergara, a local bureaucrat that aided new arrivals to the region, on the inability of the rural police to curb the rise of crime in the European colonies:

General Arriagada is not a friend of colonization; you know more than most about the bad selection of colonos from Europe that we have had, we have had to fight here in the frontier against illegitimate interests, to these immense difficulties we should add the indifference of the administration. It is hard to put this clearly but suffice it to say that ever since we have had colonos, which is about eight months, they have been robbed, assaulted, and killed, and not a single criminal has been apprehended. It is understandable with close to 1000 men in the troop around the colonies that you cannot, because of logistical issues, rid yourself of these evils that have been growing. I tell you until now no evildoer has been taken prisoner. I don't have any power, nor can I fix these problems.⁷⁶

As government bureaucrats charged with distributing land titles, neither Drouilly nor Vergara had jurisdiction over General Arriagada and the police force in the region. Nevertheless, their failure to address the rising crime rate by working separately from the Ministry of Defense that oversaw the rural police reveals an inefficiency to address a problem that affected the well-being of colonos.

⁷⁵ Carta al ministro de Colonización, 9 Aug. 1889, ANH, Minrel, vol. 440.

⁷⁶ Martin Drouilly a Aniceto Vergara, 26 Apr. 1884, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Archivo Histórico, hereby referred to as MRE, AGH, vol.103 A.

The news of crimes and assassination in the southern region soon made its way to Europe, and countries such as Italy and later Switzerland began banning immigration to Chile over concerns regarding the welfare of their citizens. Italy, in particular, cited information gathered from letters written by colonos as one of the main reasons why the country restricted immigration to Chile in 1890.⁷⁷ The growing political instability in Chile that came with the civil war of 1891 only reinforced the claims in European newspapers that the government was too unstable and unorganized to support colonization on a large scale.⁷⁸ For the Agency General of Colonization, which was responsible for meeting immigration quotas set by the central government every year, a ban on immigration from several European countries could potentially have a paralyzing effect. Recruiters attempted to offset these setbacks by focusing their efforts on French farmers, a task that was made easier with the formation of a second colonization office in France.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the possibility of more immigration bans remained as the threat of

⁷⁷ More on violence in the region and responses from Chileans and European colonos can be found in chapter 4. Carta al Ministerio de Colonización, 21 Aug. 1890, ANH, Minrel, vol. 440, Nicolás Vega, *La inmigración Europea en Chile 1882 á 1895* (Paris: Agencia General de Colonización del Gobierno de Chile, 1896).

⁷⁸ Colonization efforts were also negatively impacted by rumors that the Chilean government would imprison any colono who could not pay debts acquired during migration. The Agency debunked these rumors by stating that the fiscal government in Chile was the same as any other contractor, and foreigners in Chile enjoyed the same civil rights as Chileans. While the Chilean government could potentially collect their home and furniture due to unpaid debt, there would be no imprisonment for debt or any form of coerced labor. *Memoria Sintética de las Operaciones de la Agencia General de Colonización de Chile en Europa, desde su creación en 1882 hasta 1894 inclusive*, 15.

⁷⁹As Argentina populated much of its southern region with European settlers (primarily from Italy, Spain, and Germany), the Chilean government became increasingly concerned about Argentina using this influx of immigrants as a justification to populate the Patagonia region and expand into Chile, until 1898 the region had a fluid borderline. Though some European communities existed in Patagonia, many of these immigrants settled in multiethnic neighborhoods in Buenos Aires. Throughout the colonization project, bureaucrats at the Agency General looked to Argentina as a model to follow and frequently reported on the country's evolving immigrant demographics. For more on European migration to Argentina, see Samuel Baily, *Immigrants in the Lands of Promise: Italians in Buenos Aires and New York City, 1870–1914* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), May E Bletz, *Immigration and Acculturation in Brazil and Argentina: 1890–1929*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), Jose Moya, *Cousins and Strangers: Spanish immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850-1930*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), and Ronald C. Newton, *German Buenos Aires 1900-1933: Social Change and Cultural Crisis* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977). The Argentinian government's plans to use European labor for agricultural development are further explored in Jeremy Adelman. *Frontier Development: Land, Labor, and Capital on the Wheatlands of Argentina and Canada, 1890-1914*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), and Alberto Harambour-Ross, "Region, nation, state-building: On the Configuration of Hegemonic Identities in Patagonia, Argentina, and Chile, 1870s-1920s." In *Regions of Culture - Regions of Identity / Kulturregionen - Identitätsregionen*, ed. Sibylle Baumbach. Trier: GCSC-WVT, 2010, 49-62. More on boundary disputes between

banditry continued.⁸⁰ In 1901, Sir Barry Cusack Smith, the British counsel general in Valparaíso, wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Relations about reports from his fellow compatriots who lived with the constant fear of violence and requested that decisive actions be taken to protect migrants residing in the Araucanía. He argued that, “Immigration requires for its basis the most abundant guarantee that the life of the Immigrant and the lives of those near and dear to him shall be efficiently and completely safeguarded by the country of his adoption, and that his property and his hard-earned gains be they house, cattle or money shall be protected from lawless brigandage.”⁸¹ By failing to address the concerns of its *colono* population, the Ministry of Colonization created the perception among foreign governments and diplomats that it was unprepared to help these communities thrive in their adopted country.

Domestic Challenges

The colonization project faced challenges domestically as the press, congress, and other government officials questioned whether colonization was worth the financial cost, particularly in times of crisis. Some congressmen balked at the increasing expenses of the Agency General and Ministry of Colonization, particularly during tumultuous periods such as the three-year civil war in 1891 that destabilized its government. While Agency funding was affected by these domestic disputes, it continued to expand into the Scandinavian regions and France to

Chile and Argentina can be found in George Rauch, *Conflict in the Southern Cone: The Argentine military and the boundary dispute with Chile, 1870-1902*. (Westport: Praeger Press, 1999), 19-35.

⁸⁰ In November 1896, the Swiss Newspaper *Basler Nachrichten* published an article titled “Is there reason, justice, and personal security for Swiss Citizens in Chile?” that warned against emigration to Chile by detailing the experiences of Enrique Meier, a Swiss citizen who was mistreated by the Commander of the Victoria police department during an interrogation session. As the article explains, in February of the same year a police soldier was found dead on Meier’s premises and confessed to the murder after being brutally beaten and tormented. The circumstances of Meier’s confession were questioned by the local community, and although the perpetrator of the crime eventually turned himself in, a Chilean judge repeatedly ignored calls for Meier’s release. Upon the publication of the article, Meier remained in jail. The article ends by condemning the Chilean government for its mistreatment of colonos like Meier, who worked hard, had good reputations in their native towns, yet could not count on the Chilean judicial system to protect them. Carta al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Nov. 30, 1896, ANH, Minrel, vol. 706.

⁸¹ Carta al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, June 24, 1901, ANH, Minrel, vol. 596.

compensate for immigration bans set by other countries.⁸² There were also questions about whether the migrants traveling to the area were an expense the Chilean government could afford. During the 1890's the local Ministry of colonization in Temuco also attempted to address some of the aid petitions from colonos to counter the negative propaganda, which further extended their budget. This meant that failed crop cycles, illness, and other unforeseen circumstances only added to Ministry spending. While the agency bureaucrats asked *colonos* about their savings and finances during the screening processes, there were no protocols to verify whether this information was accurate. The Agency's plans to expand to offset immigration bans, the burden of financing newly arrived colonos, and other expenses gradually eroded some of the colonization project's support in congress. The Agency General of Colonization defended these frequent petitions for more funding by arguing that European colonos were inherently valuable due to their skillset as agricultural laborers, and represented a long-term investment for the country, "The capital carried by the emigrants consists of money and effects and tools... In this there are no illusions or exaggerations, since such emigrants, if they were worth nothing or produced nothing and were of no use, would not have created the country of the United States, an absolutely exclusive work of European immigration."⁸³ The chronic lack of funds, the agency argued, deterred immigrants from migrating to Chile and instead favored neighboring countries such as Argentina that were benefitting from the economic benefits of immigration.

Critics of the colonization project also expressed concerns both in congress and the press about the moral character of the colonos themselves. While there were reports in Araucanian newspapers such as *El Colono de Angol* that lauded the achievements of European colonos, there were also concerns of migrants who were using the Chilean government's funds to travel to other

⁸² Carta al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Dec. 16, 1894, ANH, Minrel vol. 603.

⁸³ *Memorias de Colonización 1898*, ANH, Minrel, vol. 144, 34-35.

South American nations, and taking advantage of layovers in the ports of Montevideo or Buenos Aires to reunite with relatives there.⁸⁴ Other newspaper reports questioned the moral character of the Europeans recruited by the Agency due to robberies in the ship's cabins. Along with fears of criminality, reports of disease outbreaks aboard vessels and towns throughout the Araucanía raised public health concerns. Throughout the first two decades of the colonization project, several smallpox outbreaks in the region alarmed the Supreme Council of Public Hygiene and the Ministry of Colonization. Hospitals in the Araucanía were underfunded, and local intendants frequently wrote to the central government in Santiago petitioning for vaccines and funding to hire more doctors. As the Chilean newspaper *El Ferrocarril* and others began reporting on ships full of sick migrants arriving to Argentina and Uruguay, this only added to existing fears that both the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization had been careless in their recruitment of settlers and were not doing enough to protect the welfare of Chilean citizens.⁸⁵ These sporadic

⁸⁴ An examination of domestic complaints raised against the colonization project can be found in, ANH: *Memoria de los Trabajos Ejecutados por La Agencia General de Colonización de Chile en Europa en 1896*, vol. 144, 42-77. More on the successes of European migration to the Araucanía can be found in, "Introducción de Capitales Extranjeros" *El Colono de Angol*, no. 2811, 11 Jul. 1897, p. 2, and "Don José Bunster" *El Colono de Angol*, no. 3548, 19 Apr. 1902, p. 1.

⁸⁵ From 1890 onward, reports appeared in the Chilean press of European migrants with contagious diseases such as leprosy and smallpox. However, the Agency General claimed that the few isolated cases were an exaggeration fabricated by misinformed people or the "enemies of colonization." The Agency responded that only two migrants had arrived in Chile with leprosy from 1890-1895 (the migrants in question denied having smallpox). These two new cases were either migrants from Argentina or had extensive contact with Argentines. However, reports in the press were severe enough that the Chilean Superior Counsel of Public Hygiene petitioned for a particular medical exam to be conducted in all ports of departure and entry, including screenings for leprosy, tuberculosis syphilis favus, and herpes tonsurante. The Agency argued that the requirement of these exams, which European governments did not require for their migrants, would only create a significant financial and logistical burden. The Agency would need to hire doctors in Liverpool, Hamburg, Amberes, La Pallice, Coraña, Vigo, and Lisbon, and the exams would cost no less than five francs per person. These exams were also performed in a semi-public space, and there were concerns about whether male heads of the family would allow their female family members to be screened for these diseases. Furthermore, these exams were only required for European migrants and no other immigrants to Chile. From the Ministry of Colonization's perspective, these measures would serve only as a deterrent to any *colonos* that could interpret these measures as an insult. Ongoing discussions remained between the Superior Council of Public Hygiene and the Agency General about whether these precautionary measures were worth the effects on colonization that these policies could have. More on these proposed measures can be found in, *Memoria de los Trabajos Ejecutados por La Agencia General de Colonización de Chile en Europa en 1895*, 32-38, William F. Sater, "The Politics of Public Health: Smallpox in Chile" *Journal of Latin American Studies* 35, no. 3 (2003): 513-43, as well as, María Angélica Illanes, *En el hombre del pueblo, del estado y de la ciencia: Historia social de la salud pública, Chile 1880-1973* (Santiago: Ministerio de Salud, 2010). More on the links between migrants,

outbreaks, along with press reports, made it easy to correlate the new settlements with these diseases. The skepticism expressed by these press sources only added to the pressure the Ministry of Colonization and Agency General were facing. In August 1895, the head of the Agency General of Colonization Nicolás Vega responded to the allegations. He argued that the European families chosen by the Agency were in good health, robust, and had industrial training that could benefit the country.⁸⁶ Despite ongoing debates about whether migrants could introduce new diseases to the country and financial concerns, the Chilean government nevertheless continued to support the program as crucial to the development of the south.

Lastly, throughout the late 1890s reports both in congress and the press began questioning whether too much land had been ceded to colonies of European colonos instead of Chilean farmers. This debate emerged as mapping efforts expanded into the Magellan region, and those lands were prepared for parceling. The Agency General of Colonization responded by supporting proposals to create colonies for Chilean agricultural workers adjacent to European colonos, arguing that Chileans could learn cultivation methods from their European neighbors and further promote assimilation among the colono communities. However, by the time these proposals were drafted in the 1890s, they would do little to curb the growing tensions around land ownership in the Araucanía. While more land was redistributed to European migrants, fewer plots were available for Chilean farmers and indigenous communities struggling for the same resources.⁸⁷ The very policies of land distribution created by the Ministry of Colonization, which offered a clear path to permanent land ownership to European colonos but not Chileans, were a

infectious disease, and nativism can be found in Alan M. Kraut, *Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes, and the "Immigrant Menace"* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

⁸⁶ Nicolás Vega al Ministro de Colonización Aug. 15, 1895, ANH, Minrel, vol. 603.

⁸⁷ *Memoria de la Inspección General de Tierras y Colonización 1902*, ANH, Minrel, vol. 169, 9.

significant source of enduring conflict that would only worsen at the turn of the twentieth century.

By 1895, the Agency General of Colonization had interrupted its service no less than sixteen times due to diplomatic conflicts, domestic disputes regarding colono recruitment policies, and budgetary constraints. Despite the efforts of its bureaucrats, the Agency seldom met the immigration quotas created by the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and reports of ongoing conflicts in the Araucanía and rising crime rates negatively impacted migration. A lack of finances also affected *colonos* who could not build their homes and erect fences around their plots; both were requirements for a permanent land title. The Inspector General of Colonization observed that *colonos* arrived with temporary titles, and unlike migrants to the United States or Argentina, they did not have salaried positions. These opportunities would have allowed migrants to save enough money to purchase land and tools needed for the plot's upkeep.⁸⁸ Instead, these migrants arrived without much capital and struggled to adjust to the lack of infrastructure and resources available to enable their financial success and integration. In 1898, Nicolas Vega continued defended the work of his office as a patriotic duty to both Chile and its citizenry, "Is it possible to imagine that Chileans do not want to reach the levels of civilization of the United States? And if it is that or another similar civilization that the strive for, why not open the Chilean nation up to the same route that has led the great North American Republic to a most fantastic and inconceivable prosperity?"⁸⁹ Populating the southern regions with European migrants, as the Agency interpreted it, was tied to a larger mission of civilization and modernization of the country that depended on these laborers for its success.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Ibid., 20.

⁸⁹ *Memoria de los Trabajos Ejecutados por La Agencia General de Colonización de Chile en Europa en 1896*, ANH, Minrel, vol. 144, 43.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 42.

Conclusion

Although thousands of migrants settled in Southern Chile through efforts of the Agency General and Ministry of Colonization, it is challenging to categorize its efforts as entirely successful considering its struggle to permanently settle colonos and the land conflicts that arose as a result of these ventures. The Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization had goals to civilize the region through European migration, resulting in the displacement of thousands of Indigenous peoples and eventual conflicts between colonos and Chileans who would eventually compete for limited land and resources. While the government's goals for migration were not unlike those of its neighbors, they were largely disconnected from the conditions these colonos faced once they reached Chile. Logistical and financial challenges made permanent settlement difficult, and many also struggled due to threats of land usurpation and violence despite their land titles. The Agency General's recruitment efforts were also affected by the lack of infrastructure and resources to support large waves of migration because the occupation of these lands was a recent occurrence. While some colonies were successful, Chile never achieved the migration numbers of its South American neighbors, and only recruited a few hundred colonos each year. Recruitment efforts in Europe and the treatment of colonos in Chile negatively affected diplomatic relationships that led to occasional interruptions in migration and ultimately affected the creation of permanent settlements. The Ministry of Colonization, for its part, did little to address the pleas and complaints of migrants already settled in the Araucanía and instead focused its efforts on mapping and settling growing cases of land disputes between Chileans, Indigenous peoples, and European Colonos.

The category of colono, as demonstrated throughout this chapter, distinguished this group from non-Indigenous Chileans and native communities, and gave Europeans a plot of land

with a map that the Ministry of Colonization legitimated. In a contentious territory like the Araucanía, this immeasurable privilege gave European colonos an advantage over Chilean and Indigenous peoples in lawsuits and disputes. Although land usurpation remained a constant threat, a land title (either temporary or permanent) provided colonos with a degree of legal protection most Chilean and Indigenous communities did not possess. As the third chapter of my study will demonstrate, Indigenous communities were given land titles as a group, which made obtaining land titles a years-long process. Europeans, in contrast, arrived in the Araucanía with a temporary land title in their hands that detailed the limits of their parcels. However, the challenges European colonos faced as they attempted to create successful settlements in the region also reveal the limits of the Chilean settler-colonial state. It was easier for the local Ministry of Colonization to administer land titles that reinforced their own authority than create the infrastructure to help colonos make their lands profitable. The policies emanating from the central offices of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization in Santiago reveal a more significant concern with recruitment and migration quotas rather than ensuring that colonos could successfully survive in their new homes.

The integration of Europeans into Chile also faced challenges in other parts of the country, some of which had migrated from the Araucanía to other regions. Relationships between European laborers and industrialists did not fare much better in urban spaces. As explained in a 1910 report from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, wages were temporarily raised in the aftermath of the 1906 earthquake in Valparaíso, only to be lowered once the economy recovered.⁹¹ This created tensions among laborers and their bosses, and the budding

⁹¹ Tensions and labor solidarities that emerged after the 1906 Valparaíso earthquake are further explored in, Joshua Savala, “Let Us Bring it with Love”: Violence, Solidarity, and the Making of a Social Disaster in the Wake of the 1906 Earthquake in Valparaíso, Chile, *Journal of Social History*, Volume 51, Issue 4, Summer 2018, 928–952. For a

labor movement in Chile as well as the role of Europeans who had participated in labor movements in their own respective countries, created an additional layer of animosity and suspicion toward these workers who might have brought radical ideologies with them. The worsening situation in the Araucanía due to growing conflicts between colonos, Chileans, and Indigenous peoples at the turn of the twentieth century also contributed to European migration to the cities. However, archival records do not provide concrete data on the number of colonos who abandoned their plots. The following chapter will examine the labor of engineers who were charged with mapping these plots, and the evolution of their roles as the Ministry struggled to mediate conflicts between the various social groups. The final chapter of my study will also examine how the Ministry's attempts to recruit colonos through European colonization companies would only exacerbate land disputes with non-Indigenous Chilean settlers in the region.

By 1910, Chile was nearing its centennial celebrations, and the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization created a new narrative to continue justifying the need for European colonos. While European colonization was portrayed throughout much of the nineteenth century as a future investment in the region's "Chileanization," the instability created by ongoing conflicts for land undermined this view. The Ministry instead proposed that Chile look to its past to resolve its contemporary issues in the region. In a 1910 report, the Minister of Foreign Relations did not invoke Chile's future as a state in need of civilization and modernity that depended on European migration but instead looked to the state's very formation during the independence period. Bernardo O'Higgins, by this point widely recognized as a founding father of the country, was himself half Irish and had actively courted European migrants to form part of

broader examination of labor conflicts during the early twentieth century see Loveman, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism*, 202-228.

the new society he was trying to create.⁹² In this way, the Minister argued that European colonization formed a part of the country's very foundation, and continuing the pursuit of *colonos* represented a pillar of Chilean society that remained thoroughly intertwined with both its past and future.

⁹² *Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Culto y Colonización 1910* (Santiago: Imprenta Cervantes, 1911), p.442.

Chapter 2: “Agents of ‘Stable Culture’: Engineers and State Formation in Chile’s Southern *Frontera* 1866-1912”

In 1891 the German-born engineer Teodoro Schmidt Weichsel wrote a pamphlet that would serve as a recruiting tool for his team of engineers and surveyors at the Topographic Commission in the Araucanía. He hoped to recruit illustrators and surveyors to join the already existing team in charge of mapping new fiscal territories, or government-owned lands. There was an urgency to his recruitment campaign because the coming of summer meant that only three months of fieldwork remained until the fall season would bring rainy weather – this would make the completion of surveying and mapping expeditions difficult. The arrival of waves of European colonos, discussed in the previous chapter, also put pressure on the Topographic Commission to map and parcel the region as quickly as possible. Though some applicants who applied to work for the Topographic Commission came from local communities in the Araucanía, most engineers who answered his call came from schools in Santiago, and proper arrangements were made for the future surveyors to sign a contract and travel to the region. The maps these engineers created of the newly occupied territory would be used for land auctions and to recruit potential *colonos* from Europe. As such, they formed the foundation of a larger project of settler colonialism that reflected the Chilean state’s program to populate the region, primarily with people of European descent whom government officials believed were more economically productive than the Indigenous inhabitants already living there. By 1891, when Schmidt wrote his pamphlet, it had been seven years since the military conflict between the Chilean state and the Mapuche people of the Araucanía had ended, but the process of colonization was only beginning and mapping would be central to that endeavor.

Despite Schmidt’s best efforts, his recruiting campaign faced significant challenges that persisted throughout his tenure as head engineer. While external factors such as bad weather and

challenging terrain were often problems, a more significant issue arose from the central government in Santiago. As he described in an 1889 letter:

The work of colonization to transform the immense extensions of empty lands in the republic into a stable culture have not always been supported, as one might expect on the part of the government: on the contrary, the supreme dispositions have often been deficient and opposed to the public interest. The government for twenty-one years has not thought seriously, nor has it realized exactly what has happened, nor has it taken advantage of the experience [of engineers] due to the continuous changes of engineers and ministers.⁹³

The grievances of Teodoro Schmidt embody many of the issues the Chilean state faced as it attempted to consolidate its authority in the southern periphery after the Wars of Occupation in the early 1880s. This chapter examines the role engineers played in the re-conceptualization and redistribution of territory in the Araucanía region throughout the process of parcelization and colonization of the territory, and the challenges that emerged from these practices. Schmidt's frustrations about the level of state resources devoted to his work notwithstanding, the Chilean government granted engineers wide-ranging powers to redraw the landscape to meet the fiscal needs of the state.

My chapter has drawn on two lines of historical research in Latin American borderlands and state formation in peripheral zones. Foundational works on Latin American borderlands during the nineteenth century focused on the violence and social transformations resulting from state expansion and colonization projects.⁹⁴ Subsequent works explored such processes through

⁹³ In order to support his claim, in the same letter Schmidt provided the names of all the engineers that had once worked and subsequently left the Araucanía from the years 1868 to 1886 along with their titles and the number of hectares that each engineer had measured for the government. Teodoro Schmidt al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, 2 Mar. 1889, ANH, MRE, vol. 233.

⁹⁴ Reflections on the definition and formation of borderlands can be found in: Stephen Aron and Jeremy Adelman, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History" Vol. 104, No. 3 (June 1999), 814-841. Some of these important works include, Jeremy Adelman, *Frontier Development: Land, Labor, and Capital on the Wheatlands of Argentina and Canada 1890-1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), Osvaldo Bayer, *Patagonia Rebelde*, (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1980); Gilbert M. Joseph and Allan Wells, *Summer of Discontent, Seasons of Upheaval: Elite Politics and Rural Insurgency in Yucatán, 1876-1915* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Catherine LeGrand, *Frontier Expansion and Peasant Protest in Colombia 1830-1916* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press), 1986; James R. Scobie, *Revolution on the Pampas: A Social History of Argentine Wheat, 1860-1910* (Austin: University of Texas Press), 1964; David J. Weber, *The Mexican Frontier, 1821-1846: The American Southwest Under Mexico* (Albuquerque:

the lens of industrial development, as well as how the integration of peripheral regions into larger national and global markets affected relationships between the state and local communities. The question of agency of local communities' figures prominently in later studies within both threads--in particular, the way that Indigenous communities negotiated settler colonial policies and practices.⁹⁵ Other studies have expanded on these works and illuminated the ways in which local communities have negotiated and pursued their own visions of market integration and capitalist expansion. Some scholars have also examined the social and economic impacts of colonization schemes, with a particular focus on how land privatization and colonial policies affected Indigenous peoples.⁹⁶

The analysis of the mechanisms of state expansion into frontier zones has also drawn attention to engineers that formed part of colonization and land redistribution projects in addition to the technologies they mobilized.⁹⁷ Some historians have examined the role of cartographers

University of New Mexico Press), 1982.

⁹⁵ Examples include, Gregory T. Cushman, *Guano and the Opening of the Pacific World: A Global Ecological History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Alberto Harambour-Ross, *Soberanías Fronterizas: Estados y Capital en la Colonización de Patagonia (Argentina y Chile, 1830-1922)* (Santiago: Ediciones UACH, 2019); Robert Holden, *Mexico and the Survey of Public Lands: The Management of Modernization 1876-1911* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994); Emilio Kouri, *A Pueblo Divided: Business, Property, and Community in Papantla, Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Casey Lurtz, *From the Grounds Up: Building an Export Economy in Southern Mexico*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019); Daniel Nugent, *Spent Cartridges of Revolution: An Anthropological History of Namiquipa, Chihuahua* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Julio Pinto, *La formación del estado y la nación, y el pueblo mapuche: de la inclusión a la Exclusión*. (Santiago: Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos, y Museos, 2003).

⁹⁶ José Bengoa, *Mapuches, Colonos, y el Estado Nacional* (Santiago: Catalonia, 2014); Riet Delsing, *Articulating Rapa Nui: Polynesian Cultural Politics in a Latin American Nation-State* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2015); Carolyne R. Larson, eds. *The Conquest of the Desert: Argentina's Indigenous Peoples and the Battle for History* (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 2020). Other contemporary works that have centered how colonial and expansionist projects affected indigenous social relationships include, Stuart Banner, *Possessing the Pacific: Land, Settlers, and Indigenous People from Australia to Alaska* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Ned Blackhawk, *Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.)

⁹⁷ Foundational works in the history of cartography and theories of space have enabled historians to delve into the politics behind map production, and in turn, the role of engineers and cartographers as producers of knowledge and state agents. Some of these include, Tim Creswell. *Place: A short Introduction*. (New York: Wiley-Blackwell Publishers, 2004); J.B. Harley, "Deconstructing the Map," *Cartographica*, vol. 26, no. 2 (Spring 1989), 1-20; J.B. Harley, "Maps, Knowledge and Power" in Dennis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, eds. *The Iconography of Landscape* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 277-312; Doreen Massey, *For Space* (London: SAGE

and engineers as knowledge producers for the state and argued against a homogenous view of these as people and entities that blindly carried out the will of central governing bodies. These studies have also drawn attention to the role of maps as objects of conquest, negotiation, and tools used by states to incorporate peripheral or contested regions.⁹⁸ Much of the historical literature on the occupation of the Araucanía region has focused on the violence of Mapuche displacement, and while violence played a central role in this process, the role of engineers has largely remained in the background of this historiography.

This chapter contributes to both lines of inquiry by looking more closely how the Chilean state relied heavily on experts like engineers to stabilize the so-called frontier. What can the role of engineers in the Araucanía tell us about state formation in the region? The maps and land policies engineers helped produce represented the creation of new spatial realities that significantly altered both the landscape and social relationships in the region. The evolving role

Publications Ltd, 2005); Neil Smith, *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space* (Atlanta: University of Georgia Press, 1984).

⁹⁸ Many of these works have been influenced, either directly or indirectly, by James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Within Latin America, historians have examined the role of engineers and cartographers in expanding state knowledge both in the colonial and modern periods, some examples include, Nancy Appelbaum, *Mapping the Country of Regions: The Chronographic Commission of Nineteenth-Century Colombia* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press) 2020; D. Graham Burnett, *Masters of All They Surveyed: Exploration, Geography, and a British El Dorado* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Raymond B. Craib, *Cartographic Mexico: A History of State Fixations and Fugitive Landscapes* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Lina Del Castillo, *Crafting a Republic for the World: Scientific, Geographic, and Historiographic Inventions of Colombia* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 2018; Jeffrey Erbig, *Where Caciques and Mapmakers Meet: Border Making in Eighteenth-Century South America* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2020); Kyle E Harvey, “Engineering Value: The Transandine Railway and the Techno-Capital State in Chile at the End of the Nineteenth Century” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 52, no.4 (2020): 711-33; Holden, *Mexico and the Survey of Public Lands*; Barbara Mundy, *The Mapping of New Spain: Indigenous Cartography and the Maps of the Relaciones Geográficas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Outside of Latin America, historians of cartography in Europe have explored these themes within the lens of empire, colonialism, and nationhood, see for example: Lindsay Braun, *Colonial survey and native landscapes in rural South Africa, 1850-1913: The Politics of Divided Space in the Cape and Transvaal*. (Boston: Brill Press, 2014); Simon Ryan, *The Cartographic Eye: How Explorers Saw Australia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Steven Seegal, *Mapping Europe's Borderlands: Russian Cartography in the Age of Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation* (Honolulu: U. of Hawai'i Press, 1994). For a broader study on the relationship between land control and state power, see: Roger Kain and Elizabeth Baigent, *The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State: A History of Property Mapping* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

of engineers, from their beginnings as creators of maps that reconfigured the Araucanian landscape to that of adjudicators in land disputes, reveals an additional dimension to state formation in the south that further illuminates its tenuous authority. Engineers, as increasingly powerful agents representing state authority in the region, were held responsible for redistributing land when the colonization process began, and their roles extended to serving as arbiters in lawsuits as Indigenous Mapuche communities and other settlers fought against displacement. Their roles changed but did not diminish as the Chilean central government, in the form of congress and the Presidents that presided over this period, became overwhelmed with a colonization and land redistribution project that proved not to be the economic and political success they had imagined. The maps produced by these engineers, and their contributions to land disputes, have had lasting impacts in the region since they are still being used by Mapuche communities seeking to recover their ancestral lands.

This chapter begins by examining the establishment of fiscal territories and the introduction of legislation in 1866 under the Chilean republic that provided the legal grounds for colonization and land redistribution in the region. The December 1866 land law established the parameters for the creation of fiscal territories and distinct categories of land ownership. This legislation also reinforced the role of engineers as agents that redrew the landscape into private properties, prepared parcels for fiscal auctions, and enforced fencing laws. This latter requirement specified the necessary materials for fencing, as well as the timeline by which European colonos needed to fence their lands to be eligible for a permanent land title. As colonos who arrived with temporary land titles granted by the government and Chilean settlers migrated to the region to petition for land titles by the end of the 1880s, the Chilean government made ongoing efforts to centralize authority in the hands of engineers. These efforts attempted to

prevent local power holders and new settlers from accumulating large tracts of land. I conclude by exploring how, as land disputes emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, the role of engineers evolved once more as they became crucial in deciding the outcome of lawsuits and the structure of property ownership.

Mapping “La Frontera”

The designation of all Chilean territories as fiscal lands after independence in 1821 transformed the state’s relationship to land and the Mapuche. The Chilean government defined fiscal lands as those that fell under the territorial limits of the state and did not have an owner. The government could sell any fiscal lands to the public as a source of revenue to Chileans or foreigners.⁹⁹ The creation of fiscal territories granted the state the power to displace anyone on these lands, including Mapuches and other Indigenous groups who did not possess land titles, and safeguarded territories against speculators or settlers that would not leave enough lands available for European colonization in the Araucanía.¹⁰⁰ Through the creation of fiscal territories, the state set a precedent to grant itself legal and military sovereignty over the territories south of the Biobío River after the Wars of Occupation.

The Chilean state sought to render land legible, including territories that had not yet been militarily acquired. This was achieved through a series of colonization laws beginning in 1845 that designated both land use and the local actors, such as engineers and other Ministry bureaucrats, who would determine legal enforcement. These laws addressed preexisting land relationships that existed in rural Chile during the colonial period and early nineteenth century and anticipated how the landscape of Southern Chile would be shaped after military

⁹⁹ Congreso Nacional, Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización, 87.

¹⁰⁰ Bengoa, *Mapuches*, 45, and José Bengoa, *Historia de un Conflicto: El Estado y los Mapuches en el Siglo XX*, Segunda Edición (Santiago: Editorial Planeta, 1999), 45.

occupation.¹⁰¹ Simultaneously, they also established new hierarchies in which state appointed bureaucrats, including engineers, would have authority to determine land ownership in the region in order to disrupt existing social relationships in the countryside. In the nineteenth century and until the 1930s, nearly 80 percent of the population lived in rural Chile. These communities remained subject to the centuries-old political and social relationships established by local hacienda-owning elites who owned most of the land in these areas.¹⁰² As the Chilean central government in Santiago sought to impose its authority further south during the mid-nineteenth century, it enacted legislation that sought to prevent these same social and political relationships from taking hold in soon-to-be-acquired territories. Instead of hacienda owners, *intendentes* and engineers would designate land use and, by extension, use their positions to reinforce the central government's authority in the southern regions. Throughout the 1850s, the Chilean government created new districts in the Araucanía and established a new bureaucratic structure that would replace many local officials with those appointed by the central government in Santiago.¹⁰³ By doing so, the government shifted the authority in these areas from local elites to their own appointed bureaucrats.

As an integral part of this newly formed bureaucratic system, Teodoro Schmidt ran the Topographic Commission which oversaw the mapping and parceling of the newly occupied region, for over a decade. Prior to his tenure at the commission, Schmidt gained a degree of fame

¹⁰¹ For more on the relationships between inquilinos and landed estates, see Arnold Bauer, *Chilean Rural Society: From the Spanish Conquest to 1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Cristobal Kay, "The Development of the Chilean Hacienda System 1850-1973," In, *Land and Labour in Latin America: Essays on the Development of Agrarian Capitalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, edited by Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 103-140; Gabriel Salazar, *Labradores, Peones, y Proletarios: Formación y Crisis de la sociedad popular chilena del siglo XIX*. (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2000) 158-77. See also, Pinto, *La formación del estado y la nación*, 191-97.

¹⁰² Brian Loveman, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism*, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 30.

¹⁰³ Pinto, *La formación del estado y la nación*, 187.

for constructing the “Cuesta del Melón,” a tunnel known for its technological innovations that played an important role in connecting the Northern and central regions of the country.¹⁰⁴ The commission carried out various surveying expeditions throughout the region, prioritizing lands that were deemed more fiscally valuable. Together with illustrators, surveyors, and landscapers, the commission formed part of an elaborate network charged with mapping and redrawing the landscape of the region in a way that would make it profitable both to the state and industrialists. Mapping played a crucial role in the larger colonization process in lands appropriated from the Mapuche. The maps these engineers produced played a role similar to those produced in other regions of the world experiencing processes of colonialism and imperial expansion.¹⁰⁵ For

¹⁰⁴ There are few sources with biographical information on Teodoro Schmidt. Born in Darmstadt in the Grand Duchy of Hesse, he migrated to Chile in 1858 and through his connections with the wealthy Ovalle Vicuña family received work at the various haciendas in the Central Valley. In 1868, he joined the *Comisión de Ingenieros Militares* in the city of Angol, where he began measuring local territories under control of the Chilean government. Over the next decade, Schmidt worked alongside military forces who slowly progressed into Mapuche territories, and became familiar with the terrain of the region. After working for the Ministry of Colonization for thirteen years, Schmidt retired from his position as head engineer in 1896, and died nearly two decades later on August 28th, 1924 in Temuco. On October 26, 1979, the Chilean Ministry of the Interior created the Comuna Teodoro Schmidt in the Cautín province to honor Schmidt’s work at the Topographic Commission, Ernesto Greve, “Necrología: Teodoro Schmidt” *Anales del Instituto de Ingenieros de Chile*, No. 8 (Aug. 1924) 449-453. See also, Bengoa, Mapuches, Colonos, y el Estado Nacional, 68. “Decreto Ley 2868, Artículo 15” Biblioteca Nacional del Congreso Nacional de Chile, accessed 24 February, 2022, <http://bcn.cl/2f4r4>.

¹⁰⁵ During this period, South Africa and Eastern Europe emerged as other examples of regions undergoing similar processes of mapping and demonstrate the links to economic development by state entities. Simultaneously, these works also point to sites of tension between surveyors and the local populations. As historian Lindsay Braun demonstrates, during the mid-nineteenth century there existed a sharp divide between how the colonizing British understood the land, and how native non-white peoples conceptualized it, and the act of surveying, while meant to include landscapes and places, also simultaneously obfuscated them. Many of the surveyors originated from Europe, and the maps they produced reflected the values and knowledge valued by the colonizing forces. These surveyors became the interpreters between the local community that provided knowledge for these maps, and the European metropolises that demanded these areas be categorized with precision so that they may be used for agricultural development. Steven Seegal also notes this disconnect between surveyor and the local population in *Mapping Europe’s Borderlands*, while noting that agricultural development by growing nation states in Eastern Europe led to the creation of centers of capital in peripheral areas that served as satellites of administrative control for what were becoming centralized governments. Lindsay Braun, *Colonial survey and native landscapes in rural South Africa, 1850-1913: the politics of divided space in the Cape and Transvaal*; Raymond B Craib, *Cartographic Mexico: A History of State Fixations and Fugitive Landscapes*; Jordana Dym and Karl Offen, Eds. *Mapping Latin America: A Cartographic Reader* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Malcolm G. Lewis, *Cartographic Encounters: Perspectives on Native American Mapmaking and Map Use* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); LeGrand. *Frontier Expansion and Peasant Protest in Colombia 1830-1916*, Seegal, *Mapping Europe’s Borderlands: Russian Cartography in the Age of Empire*. A wonderful case study on the relationship between mapmaking and the development of national identity in this time period can be found in, Catherine Tatiana Dunlop, *Cartophilia: Maps and the Search for Identity in the French-German Borderland* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).

example, they provided the state with knowledge of newly acquired lands and served to legitimize political control in the region. Simultaneously, they also represented the illusion of a state with an effective bureaucracy that could enforce the property lines drawn on these maps.




Figure 5: Map of the town of Traiguen created by the Topographic Commission of Engineers in Arauco (year unknown). This commission was accountable to Teodoro Schmidt's Topographic Commission in Temuco. Source: <http://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/>



Figure 6: An 1884 map of the proposed colony of Huequén located in the province of Angol, where numerous agricultural colonies were founded. The creators of this map are unlisted. Source: <http://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/>

The Topographic Commission’s mapping expeditions in the Araucanía, while contributing to the larger project of redistributing land to non-Indigenous settlers, also enabled the development of urban spaces in the southern frontier. The state reinforced its authority in the region by providing funds for city maintenance, infrastructure projects that enabled the development of industry, and settlements of European and later Chilean *colonos*.¹⁰⁶ At the core

¹⁰⁶ In some instances, engineers from the Comisión were hired by the Fiscal office to work in infrastructure projects throughout the region. For example, in 1889 an engineer named Pedro Juan Ojeda was contracted to work on the construction of the Bulnes hospital. While his services were needed at the Comisión for the distribution of 78,000 hectares of mountainous terrain, Schmidt recognized the role engineers played in other projects that aided the

of the land redistribution project and the formation of these cities was the idea of civilizing the Araucanía as a space of stable culture. For Schmidt, his team of engineers, and the bureaucrats charged with overseeing colonization stable culture meant populating the region with people who could make lands productive. From their headquarters in Temuco and satellite offices in other towns, engineers searched rural areas for particularly fertile lands, and those that showed potential, such as around the town of Angol, were designated “agricultural colonies.” A growing bureaucracy of government officials in agricultural colonies redistributed these valuable lands mostly to European colonos. The expansion of mapping expeditions in the region also enabled the creation of new centers of governance. The foundation of the city of Temuco in 1881, for example, was a direct result of mapping and colonization efforts and housed the Civilian Court of Temuco as well as the regional offices of the Ministry of Colonization. These towns and their government offices expanded the colonization project by serving as outposts for engineers as they traveled to increasingly remote areas, allowing them to create more expansive networks for further mapping expeditions.

Parcelizing the Araucanía

The land law of December 4th, 1866 was the most instrumental in defining land and property ownership in the Araucanía. Building on previous legislation that had established all Chilean lands as fiscal territories of the state, the law granted the Chilean president José Joaquín Pérez the authority to establish new settlements on Indigenous lands. It effectively granted him, along with the corresponding bureaucratic entities, the authority to reshape the region’s landscape well before the Wars of Occupation began in 1880.¹⁰⁷ Fourteen years before the

region’s development. Teodoro Schmidt al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores i Colonización, Oct. 18 and 20, 1889, ANH, Minrel, vol. 233.

¹⁰⁷ *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1894*, ANH, MRE vol. 155, CXX.

military struggle for control over the Araucanía began, the law of December 1866 outlined three categories for land use that the Topographic Commission enforced in the region. These categories remained consistent throughout much of the colonization process which continued until the 1920s.¹⁰⁸ The first category, *reducciones*, (reductions) was the state's response to Mapuches living in the region; these were legally recognized territories that would belong to local Indigenous communities. The second, agricultural colonies, would be dedicated to growing crops that would support the flourishing export economy and were occupied by European *colonos*. The third category of fiscal territories denoted lands that would be auctioned to Chilean citizens or Europeans to profit the state. Fiscal territories were also parcelized into *hijuelas* if land for European *colonos* was scarce. The law's precise delineation of these categories of lands reflected its desire to funnel varied populations into different relationships to land from the outset.

The tensions that soon emerged between government officials and Indigenous communities as engineers began drawing property lines led to the creation of bureaucratic structures that would mediate conflicts. In 1883, the Chilean government established a subcommittee of the larger Topographic Commission to handle Indigenous communities' land petitions. This subcommittee would be in dialogue with the Protector of Indigenous Peoples, a lawyer that the government assigned to mediate between Indigenous communities, other settlers, and the state. This subcommittee of engineers, like other Ministry of Colonization offices, suffered from a lack of funding and staff that affected their ability to verify land claims effectively. In 1885, the Officer of Indigenous Affairs, Ramon Gargueto, wrote to the Minister of Colonization in Santiago detailing the difficulties he had keeping up with the extensive backlog

¹⁰⁸ *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1887*, ANH, MRE, vol. 148, LXIII.

of Indigenous claims to territory. He wrote that some of these claims were years old, and more engineers were required to deal with these claims in a timely matter.¹⁰⁹ The following chapter of my study will examine how the numerous petitions from both Mapuche communities and some sympathetic protectors, these communities were seldom treated as citizens equal to the *colonos* and Chilean settlers in land disputes since many of their claims were ignored and their land was illegally occupied.¹¹⁰

Land redistribution had immediate consequences for the Indigenous population of the Araucanía. They quickly found themselves restricted from lands where they grazed cattle and grew crops, and Mapuche caciques traveled to meet with Chilean presidents over the years to negotiate for access to more land and potentially save their communities from starvation.¹¹¹ After being reassured by local representatives of the Ministry of Colonization that indigenous lands would be protected by the government, these caciques went home to find that their requests were not honored. In many cases, their lands were deemed too economically valuable by surveyors, or were reserved for the building of cities or roads. Mapuche landholdings in the Araucanía in some cases conflicted with plans to expand the railroad in the region, which by this period had become a symbol of civilization and economic progress not only in Chile but throughout much of Latin America.¹¹² In cases where engineers planned to build railroad lines on Mapuche territories,

¹⁰⁹ Ramon Gargueto al Ministro de Colonización, April 11, 1885, ANH, MRE, vol. 315.

¹¹⁰ More on the growing cases of land usurpation in indigenous lands can be found in, *Memoria de la Inspección General de Tierras y Colonización 1902*, ANH, MRE, vol. 169, 8-9.

¹¹¹ Bengoa, *Historia del Pueblo Mapuche*, 340. Historian Joana Crow notes that as a result of colonization and displacement, Mapuche communities retained only five percent of their ancestral territories. Joanna Crow, *The Mapuche in Modern Chile: A Cultural History* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2013), 46.

¹¹² For the Chilean case, see Kyle E. Harvey, "Engineering Value: The Transandine Railway and the Techno-Capital State in Chile at the End of the Nineteenth Century"; and Ian Thomson, *Historia del ferrocarril en Chile* (Santiago: DIBAM, Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, 1997). For other case studies throughout Latin America, see, John Coatsworth, *Growth against Development: The Economic Impact of Railroads in Porfirian Mexico* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981); Colin Lewis, *British Railways in Argentina 1857–1914* (London: Bloomsbury Press, 1983); and William Summerhill, *Order Against Progress: Government, Foreign Investment, and Railroads in Brazil, 1854–1913* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

some communities sent representatives to the capital to ask for diversion of construction from the area.¹¹³ When the viaduct of the Rio Malleco was created, for example, fifty indigenous caciques went before President Balmaceda to demand that their lands remain intact.¹¹⁴ Although the government promised to provide ample land for these communities to support themselves, the viaduct was built as originally planned, and the resulting encroachment led to the division of these Mapuche communities.

Due to the loss of their lands, Mapuche populations dealt with pestilence, hunger, and the loss of their traditions and way of life. As one military official reported in an 1884 memoir of the war, Indigenous peoples in the Araucanía received rations from the local government for over a year as a result of the extreme poverty in which they lived.¹¹⁵ After being pushed to migrate into the cordillera of the Araucanía, these Indigenous groups were unable to provide sustenance for themselves and either returned to the regions they were from in search of food or migrated to Argentina. Other groups moved to Santiago where they became wage laborers. Once Mapuche communities abandoned their communal lands, engineers would travel to these areas, survey them, and report to the Ministry of Colonization on the potential uses of the new *hijuelas* they mapped.

While Mapuche peoples struggled to maintain enough land for their survival, engineers focused their efforts on mapping agricultural colonies that could produce crops considered integral to the growing domestic and export economy. The Chilean state encouraged the cultivation of wheat which was lauded as representing the future of the country.¹¹⁶ Agricultural

¹¹³ During the winter months where fieldwork was not possible, engineers were authorized to work with the Ministry of Public Works to plan the creation of aqueducts, railroad tracks, and other projects requested by local municipalities. Teodoro Schmidt al Señor Ministro de Obras Públicas, Sept. 3, 1888, ANH, Minrel, vol. 233.

¹¹⁴ Carl E. Solberg, "A Discriminatory Frontier Land Policy: Chile, 1870-1914" *The Americas*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Oct. 1969), 117.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ Arnold Bauer, *Expansión económica en una sociedad tradicional: Chile Central en el siglo XIX*.

colonies, such as the one founded in Angol in 1863, also served as administrative centers for smaller provinces, as well as outposts housing engineers who conducted urban and rural surveying projects. Smaller communities in the southern Araucanía, such as Arauco, Valdivia, and Llanquihue in the late 1880s and 1890s for example, would each have one engineer, while older, larger colonies such as Angol would have four engineers as well as aides who helped with the surveying and mapping of the surrounding territories. Agricultural colonies, or territories that could potentially be designated as such, were a priority for engineers due to both their economic potential and the appeal they had for Europeans migrating to Chile.

In 1874, the government amended the December 1866 land law to reflect the growing interest of the Chilean government in European colonos, declaring that only foreign migrants could inhabit these colonies. These requirements, which engineers and other bureaucrats were in charge of enforcing, ensured that European colonos would not rent lands to other settlers or leave prematurely. Non-Indigenous Chileans were not allowed to rent or purchase lands in agricultural colonies but could purchase fiscal territories in other parts of the region. Colonos were given temporary land titles upon their arrival, and within three years they were required to fence their parcel and spend no less than 500 pesos to erect buildings on it.¹¹⁷ Engineers were responsible for ensuring that the fencing met government regulations, and if these prerequisites were met, a permanent land title was issued.¹¹⁸ At the Topographic Commission, Schmidt and his group of

(Santiago: Ediciones Historia, 1970), 140. The expansion of the wheat industry is also detailed in, Edward Dallam Melillo, *Strangers on Familiar Soil: Rediscovering the Chile-California Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).

¹¹⁷ Bengoa, *Mapuches*, 59.

¹¹⁸ Although engineers did not play any role in determining migration quotas in Chile, Schmidt like other bureaucrats in the Ministry of Colonization paid close attention to global migration trends and how immigrants were screened. In 1889, Schmidt wrote to the Ministry of Colonization with observations on immigration patterns in the United States and their open migration policies, and noted that anarchists, socialists, former prisoners and impoverished migrants were allowed to enter the country in large numbers which later resulted in migration restrictions. As mentioned in chapter 1, the Ministry of Colonization required that any future colonos submit

engineers tracked the amount of land that was redistributed to European colonos, the crops grown in these lands, and periodically reported on the overall agricultural progress of the new settlements.

In the Araucanía, these mapping projects were organized and expanded outward from an administrative and fiscal center. While Temuco served as the headquarters from which Teodoro Schmidt and his engineers operated, the process of parcelization also created smaller centers in the towns of Traiguén and Angol.¹¹⁹ As colonization progressed, towns such as Arauco and Chiloé also became small centers as parcelization expanded southward toward the Magellan region. The administration of these projects reflected the advancement of the colonization project southward and the growing importance of these developing towns. Some of these towns had smaller Topographic Commissions that handled local projects, such as surveying Indigenous lands. These Commissions also handled colonos' requests for land measurements, and their engineers' verified claims made in land disputes. However, throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Temuco remained the administrative center of mapping projects in the region, with smaller Topographic Commissions reporting to Teodoro Schmidt and his team of engineers. Along with their teams of illustrators and landscapers, engineers surveyed and parceled entire areas to meet quotas of no less than 20,000 hectares for the seven-month surveying season.¹²⁰ Territories surveyed would be subdivided into numbered plots, each abiding by the requirements set by Teodoro Schmidt regarding the creation of fences and the procedures for obtaining temporary and permanent land titles. Local civil and police authorities were responsible for aiding engineers if they encountered any difficulties throughout their fieldwork

notarized documents proving that they did not have a criminal background. Teodoro Schmidt al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores I de Colonización, 15 Mar. 1889, ANH, Minrel, vol. 233.

¹¹⁹ *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1887*, ANH, MRE vol. 148, LXII.

¹²⁰ Teodoro Schmidt al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, 3 Feb. 1890, ANH, MRE, vol. 233.

duties. Each map contained information on both the physical landscape and any people who inhabited the land. Once drafted, engineers sent copies of these maps to the Ministry of Colonization.¹²¹ Using information provided by the surveyors, such as the parcels' size and proximity to resources such as rivers or railways, the Ministry of Colonization assigned a monetary value to the lands in preparation for auction.

Lastly, the Chilean state publicly auctioned designated fiscal lands that served as a revenue source for the government and were typically purchased by wealthy Chilean or European landowners. Less wealthy non-Indigenous Chileans and European colonos purchased these lands by applying for loans in local banks. The auctions for fiscal territories were organized by the Ministry of Colonization and advertised in local newspapers in Santiago and local presses in the Araucanía. The ministry worked with the engineers of the Topographic Commission who provided descriptions and locations of fiscal territories used in the auctions. Before the auction both government agencies determined which areas of the newly occupied region were priorities for parcelization. The Ministry of Colonization presented maps of these parcels in auctions that took place in Santiago and in the southern city of Talcahuano, where individuals paid the first third of the total cost of the territory to the fiscal office within thirty days of the auction. Individuals who purchased land were not required to meet stipulations imposed on colonos and Mapuche groups seeking land titles. Once payment was received and verified by an engineer, they would then schedule a date with the purchaser of the territory during which the engineer would deliver paperwork dictating terms of ownership and would sign off on delivery within six months of the auction date. In accordance with the December 1866 law and the addendum of 1874, yearly payments would be made over the course of ten years after which, if all payments

¹²¹ Teodoro Schmidt al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, 3 Feb. 1890, ANH, MRE, vol. 233.

were received in a timely manner, a permanent land title would be decreed.¹²² In addition to payments, successful acquisition of a land title depended on the owners' ability to pass inspection. The most important step in this process was demonstrating that the lands were properly fenced in accordance with the conditions outlined in their temporary titles. Their instructions were specific, and indicated the types of material, length, and height of the required fences. If the conditions were met, the engineer would issue his approval, and the office of the General Inspector of Colonization would grant a certificate stating that the lands had met the fencing requirements. Any delays in fencing could result in fines, and land that remained unfenced after two years was subject to repossession for re-auctioning.¹²³

The process of obtaining this permanent land title reinforced at every step engineer's authority over land in the region. From the collection of information to setting rules on matters such as the types of nails that were acceptable in fences, each of these steps was meant to reinforce a semblance of state authority and control over the region through engineers that enforced these requirements.¹²⁴ The act of fencing property, therefore, visually demonstrated the limits of a property border and implicitly conveyed an image of the presence of the state. The emphasis on fencing also reflected the growing challenges engineers faced as reducciones, agricultural colonies, and fiscal territories were illegally usurped by squatters. When more settlers arrived after the Wars of Occupation ended in 1883, many forcibly occupied lands that belonged to local peoples or Indigenous communities, while other would-be usurpers forged

¹²² The land laws of December 6th, 1866, August 4, 1874 and other subsequent amendments further clarified conditions of fiscal property ownership. There would be a two percent penalty for any late monthly payments, and if three consecutive payments were unmet the government reserved the right to re-auction the land with no possibility of repayment. Any lands that the government required for the construction of railroads or roads were also subject to re-acquisition. Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización: informa, proyectos de ley, actas de las sesiones y otros antecedentes*, 6-10. See also, *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1894*, ANH, MRE, vol. 155, CV.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid, CVI.

documents in order to remove people from their lands. The lack of fencing in the southern Araucanía area was of particular concern to the central government because it enabled the migration of people and allowed land usurpers to ignore the borders drawn by engineers.

More importantly, land usurpation became a way in which settlers challenged state power over the territory and appropriated large parcels; this resulted in the loss of fiscal lands and potential income for the Chilean government. In reports sent to the Minister of Colonization, local intendants in the Araucanía reported usurpers who appropriated territories in addition to those granted by the government or used empty neighboring lands for crops or cattle raising. In accordance with Chilean law, all empty and unfenced lands were part of the fiscal territories of the state.¹²⁵ Usurpations were serious enough that in 1885 Teodoro Schmidt moved his headquarters from Angol to Temuco in order to stay in close proximity to the southern areas as the expansion of roads and railroads accelerated.¹²⁶ With a limited police force and thinly spread bureaucratic system, however, local colonos were relatively unsupervised, which meant land grabs and usurpation of territories continued.¹²⁷ The *reclamos* (denunciations) against land usurpation and fraud also became a frequent issue in the local courts, adding pressure to a bureaucracy that was ill-equipped to handle the large number of land claims and reclamos received.

Concerns about the enforceability of property boundaries on the southern frontier were exacerbated by reports of banditry in the region. The rise in banditry not only called into question the authority of local state agents in the region, but also represented a threat to the

¹²⁵ Patricio Bernedo Pinto, and José Ignacio González Leiva, “Cartografía de la transformación de un territorio: La Araucanía 1852-1887” *Revista de Geografía Norte Grande* Vol. 54 (2013), 186.

¹²⁶ Bengoa, *Historia del Pueblo Mapuche*, 349.

¹²⁷ *Colono de Angol*, March 19, 1904, p. 2, no. 3841, “Los Jendarmes de las Colonias: Suprimidos o no? Tres Meses Sin Sueldo”



Figure 7: The interior of a Mapuche ruca (family home) around 1890. Ministry officials believed, with little evidence, that the size of these homes and the plots they were in would enable bandits to hide. Source: <http://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/>

government's fiscal interests. In an 1886 letter to the Minister of Colonization in Santiago, the local secretary of governance for the city of Angol Alejandro Larenas cited the importance of protecting territories that were of fiscal importance from bandits who might use large, deserted landscapes to hide from the police. Embedded within these claims was the idea that fencing and small parcels brought social order and civilization.¹²⁸ In this correspondence the Minister also emphasized the importance of employing Mapuche *caciques* and leaders of *reducciones* to monitor for any Indigenous criminals that might be hiding amongst their larger, communally owned properties. This portrayal of bandits hiding in large landholdings, and the depiction of these as a hotbed of potential criminal activity, supported the efforts of the central government to

¹²⁸ Alejandro Larenas al Ministro de Colonización, 10 Feb. 1886, ANH, MRE, vol. 345.

keep parcels small in order to reinforce local authority.¹²⁹ Local newspapers such as *El Colono de Angol* cited the rise of banditry as symptomatic of the misery of living on the frontier, where few roads existed, crop failure was commonplace, and settlers were largely left to fend for themselves with little government support.¹³⁰ In 1904, Angol's congressional deputy Alfredo Irrarrázaval accused the Chilean government of using empty rhetoric towards the southern region that hid false promises of financial support. Since the Araucanía was physically far from Santiago, he argued, so were its concerns.¹³¹ The inability to curb the rise of crime, in turn, became one of the most visible examples of challenges to the colonization project and by extension the authority of engineers in the region.

Engineers as Local Intermediaries

As issues of land usurpation worsened on the southern frontier, President Jose Manuel Balmaceda responded by reasserting his authority and that of his local agents. On December 28, 1889, Balmaceda presented an addendum to the December 1866 land law that further centralized political authority in the region and bolstered the central government's position through its bureaucrats.¹³² The president would be directly in charge of approving any new settlements in the Araucanía, including the naming of new towns and their respective border lines. The Inspector General of Colonization would provide maps that required the president's approval, along with additional information the Ministry of Colonization collected from colonos, such as

¹²⁹ Martin Drouilly a Aniceto Vergara, 26 Apr. 1884, MRE, AGH, vol.103 A.

¹³⁰ "Las Causas de Nuestra Desgracia," *El Colono de Angol*, 20 Oct. 1898, p.1, no. 142. For rising levels of crime and banditry, see, "La Criminalidad en Victoria," *El Colono de Angol*, 20 June, 1899, p. 1, no. 3116, Las Depredaciones en los Campos." *El Colono de Angol*, 24 June, 1899, no. 3120, p.1, "More examples can be found in, Daniel Palma, "Policías rurales en Chile: los Gendarmes de las Colonias (1896-1907)" *Claves: Revista de Historia*, Vol. 3, No. 4, Enero-Junio 2017, 118-126.

¹³¹ *El Colono de Angol*, 8 and 10 Nov. 1904, "Los Agricultores de la Frontera: Discurso Pronunciado Por El Diputado de Angol Don Alfredo Irrarrázaval" no. 3938 and 3940, p. 2 in both.

¹³² *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1894*, ANH, MRE, vol. 155. CXXI.

the names of people inhabiting the settlements, their age, and their professions. If their lands did not have fixed property limits, the Inspector General of Colonization, through local engineers, would survey and assign boundaries with the president's approval.¹³³ By establishing this clear chain of command, the president not only reinforced the central government as the ultimate authority on the landscape of the newly acquired territory, but also that of engineers in the region.

While the December 1889 amendment was created to curb illegal settlements and reinforce state authority, it did little to address parcels that were acquired illegally and impacted Indigenous communities the most. The fixation of size limits in *reducciones* meant that large Mapuche landholdings were reduced significantly, resulting in a scarcity of food that forced many communities to disperse and resume semi-nomadic lifestyles. The reconfiguration of Mapuche landholdings also forced communities to disband entirely, further disrupting their lifestyle and cultural practices.¹³⁴ While European colonos who arrived in Chile were better protected by the government from land usurpers than Mapuche or Chilean settlers due to their titles, some nevertheless fell victim to fraudulent claims. Land speculators, estate owners, and later colonization companies created artificial property lines, fictitious contracts, and falsified land registration to steal land from Indigenous communities, European Colonos, and the Chilean government through its fiscal lands.¹³⁵

While President Balmaceda sought to strengthen the legitimacy of both the central government and its local representatives, engineers continued serving as intermediaries between local and state interests. While the land law of December 1866 and its amendments in subsequent

¹³³ *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1894*, ANH, MRE, vol. 155. CXXI.

¹³⁴ Bengoa, *Mapuches, Colonos, y el Estado Nacional*, 63.

¹³⁵ Klubock, "Ranquil," 123.

decades outline many of the responsibilities of engineers in the region, engineers had the additional responsibility of understanding and anticipating the types of problems that could emerge with land redistribution.¹³⁶ Due to the deeply embedded hacienda system that existed in the central valley of Chile, the government passed laws so that no single individual could accumulate large plots of land through auction sales.¹³⁷ Throughout the nineteenth and well into the twentieth centuries, the expansive rural estates of Chile's central valley served as agricultural centers. A local, elite class of hacienda owners subsequently emerged that played a significant role in the political and social life of their communities and the country. Due to the expansive nature of these haciendas and the social relationships embedded within them, historians such as Brian Loveman have argued that these landholdings served as quasi-political units, where hacienda owners controlled access to land, housing, and employment.¹³⁸ In a newly occupied region such as the Araucanía, a local landed elite class posed a potential threat to local bureaucrats and engineers working to establish themselves as the mediators of both the parameters of private property and commercial land use. Therefore, the task of engineers and bureaucrats was to ensure that an elite landed class did not emerge in the south as it had in the central valley of Chile.

While the Araucanía did not have large, landed estates during the colonial period, local elites looked to take advantage of land redistribution to add to their existing property through the purchase of fiscal lands or by displacing colonos and Indigenous peoples. As state representatives, engineers kept a close watch on individuals who might consolidate too much

¹³⁶ Teodoro Schmidt al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, 3 Sept. 1886, ANH, MRE, vol. 233.

¹³⁷ Teodoro Schmidt al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, 2 Dec. 1889, ANH, MRE, vol. 233.

¹³⁸ Brian Loveman, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism*, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 29. For the enduring nature of these relationships between hacendados and workers into the twentieth century, see Brian Loveman, *Struggle in the Countryside: Politics and Rural Labor in Chile* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 29-40.

land and exploit Chilean settlers and European *colonos*. Because individuals purchasing fiscal territories paid a third of the land's total cost within the first thirty days, it was not uncommon for poorer, would-be landowners to seek loans from banks owned by these landed, local elites. In one case, Teodoro Schmidt reported on rumors that a local hacienda owner named José Bunster exploited the loans he offered new *colonos* by demanding repayment long before it was due.¹³⁹ Bunster's family were British merchants from Valparaíso, and José used his wealth to invest in properties along the Southern frontier during the late 1850's, though his lands were lost during an 1859 Mapuche raid. Once the military began making inroads south with the foundation of the fort of Angol in 1863, Bunster once more began investing in grain mills, a railroad, and created the Banco Bunster.¹⁴⁰ Since *colonos* did not have the loaned amount when he demanded it, he would repossess their *hijuelas* that were used as collateral to add to his growing hacienda. Bunster's lands were located between two areas designated for *colono* use, making the rumors of exploitation more credible. Much of the Bunster family-owned large estates in the region, and José later became known as the "King of Wheat" due to his expansive wheat fields.¹⁴¹ While successive government correspondence does not confirm the validity of these rumors, this case points to fears of land concentration and fraud as auctions continued on a larger scale. While article 3 of the 1866 land law limited *hijuelas* (plots) to 500 hectares without the possibility of absorbing adjacent lands, there were varied interpretations of the article relating to parcels with

¹³⁹ Article 14 of the decree made on June 19, 1894, sought to address these concerns, stating that no person owning auctioned lands may sell their lands to a neighbor that already owns two thousand hectares if they are still making payments to the government for lands received. 2000 hectares was the limit of auctioned land that any single person could own at the time. Bunster's case appears in, Teodoro Schmidt al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, 3 Sept. 1886, ANH, MRE, vol. 233. For more on stipulations regarding land sales see, *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1894*, ANH, MRE, vol. 155, CVII.

¹⁴⁰ A more extensive discussion of the trajectory of the Bunster family in the Araucanía can be found in, Thomas Miller Klubock, *Ranquil: Rural Rebellion, Political Violence, and Historical Memory in Chile* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022), 64.

¹⁴¹ José Bengoa, *Historia Rural de Chile Central Tomo II: Crisis y Ruptura del Poder Hacendal* (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2015), 179.

inaccessible areas or extremely thick brush, thus reducing the amount of productive land available.¹⁴² In these situations, engineers made exceptions that accounted for the varying sizes of *hijuelas*. However, these inconsistencies, paired with issues of land usurpation and the threat of local elites expanding into fiscal territories, made land redistribution an often-complicated process.

Cases of excessive land concentration and fraud were particularly alarming to engineers and the Ministry of Colonization for several reasons. Not only would fears of exploitation deter potential colonos from wanting to take part in the colonization process, but the concentration of land in the hands of a few individuals could potentially challenge the power of local state representatives such as *intendants* and engineers themselves. As individuals with large concentrations of wealth and land, these *hacendados* could play a role in shaping local realities concerning land that state officials were trying to control.¹⁴³ Some of these power relationships between elite families and local communities existed since the colonial period in the central valley, and the Ministry hoped to curb similar dynamics from occurring in the Araucanía. Land concentration and the political relationships reinforced in the process could potentially challenge redistribution efforts and the local authority of government bureaucrats.

Along with local elites and European migrants, the central government feared that its own bureaucrats could use their positions to illegally acquire large plots of land. Engineers were responsible for ensuring that other local bureaucrats did not take advantage of their positions of power for economic gain, since they were frequently underfunded and, in many cases,

¹⁴² Teodoro Schmidt al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago, December 2, 1889, ANH, MRE vol. 233.

¹⁴³ More on these relationships in Bauer, *Chilean Rural Society*; Kay, "The Development of the Chilean Hacienda System 1850-1973."

underpaid.¹⁴⁴ As the process of land redistribution and colonization grew after the military occupation of 1883, so did the number of sub-districts and colonies in remote areas. The number of government employees employed to handle land claims, administrative tasks, and Indigenous affairs also increased to meet these needs. Each of the local intendencies was in frequent correspondence with the central government on public health issues, administration of territories, and judicial matters together with other local ministries and the municipalities of smaller towns. The growth of these intendencies also meant an increase in correspondence to Santiago, and challenges in communication became more frequent despite the expansion of the telegraph system. While in 1880 the Intendency of Concepción was the center for the region's administration, by 1886 the municipalities of Angol, Arauco, Lebu, and Temuco grew considerably as the colonization project in the Araucanía developed southward. Local bureaucracy expanded alongside the mapping and creation of cities; however, these employees, among them the engineers themselves, were often underpaid. The Ministry justified the low salaries for these workers by claiming that many of their jobs, while sometimes tedious, did not require special skills that would justify more pay.¹⁴⁵ While local governments were concerned with the allocation of financial resources and the overall welfare of their citizens, the central government prioritized European migration to the Araucanía, as well as the administration of the

¹⁴⁴ Teodoro Schmidt al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, 3 Feb. 1890, ANH, MRE vol. 233

¹⁴⁵ Like other Ministry bureaucrats, workers at the Topographic Commission also experienced delays in their salaries, and Schmidt warned that this would have a significant impact in the pace of parcelization. The Commission hired the surveyors, landscapers and illustrators that accompanied them on parceling fieldwork during the three months of the year that they conducted expeditions, and a lack of consistent wages could result in staff shortages. Ibid. See also: *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1889*, ANH, MRE, vol. 150, 312. For more on the underfunding of police, see, *El Colono de Angol*, 8 June, 1899, p. 1, no. 3111, "Bandidaje en la Frontera"; as well as "Los Jendarmes de las Colonias: Suprimidos o no? Tres Meses Sin Sueldo." *El Colono de Angol*, 19 Mar. 1904, p. 2, no. 3841,

more profitable mining regions of northern Chile.¹⁴⁶ By 1889, some local bureaucrats had used their positions to produce crops on fiscal territories belonging to the government. The Ministry did not have the political power to ask them to abandon these lands, since many of these had connections to local elites in remote areas where government presence was minimal.¹⁴⁷ Without any legal authority to enforce laws on their own, engineers could not curb the illegal land grabs of their public-employee colleagues.

As the exemplary models of civilization in the region with an intimate knowledge of its landscape, engineers were not allowed to use their positions to parcel territory for themselves and were required to abstain from participating in farming. These stipulations reveal a larger question of loyalty: engineers, as representatives of the colonization project, should be servants to their country and avoid working with any outside interests that could put the territorial and financial interests of the nation in jeopardy. The information engineers gathered while on mapping expeditions came from sources that the government deemed reliable, mainly other engineers and bureaucrats. Engineers were not allowed to consult the local population, particularly Indigenous peoples, for any information they might have on the physical features of the terrain or the names of locations during their mapping process.¹⁴⁸ The restriction of interactions between scientists and indigenous peoples allows us to draw conclusions about the types of knowledge the state valued. As James C. Scott demonstrates in *Seeing Like a State*, one of the ways in which a state asserts control over a territory is by creating its own knowledge of the region and reshaping it physically.¹⁴⁹ By ignoring the knowledge of local peoples, the state

¹⁴⁶ Part 3 of the *Memorias de Colonización 1882-1894* is a defense of the colonization program, particularly against the claim that the Chilean government was putting the interests of European colonos above the domestic interests of its citizens. *Memorias de Colonización 1882-1894*, ANH, MRE, vol. 144, 29-57.

¹⁴⁷ Teodoro Schmidt al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, 3 Sept. 1886, ANH, MRE, vol. 233.

¹⁴⁸ Teodoro Schmidt, Reglamento para los ingenieros ocupados con la mensura I hijuelación de los terrenos baldíos del estado, 11 Apr. 1889, ANH, MRE, vol. 233.

¹⁴⁹ Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 82.

through agencies like the Topographic Commission asserted its authority over the region, from the naming of new cities to deciding how lands should be used. The process of land redistribution, and the exclusion of Indigenous peoples raises the question of where these communities fit within the state's new vision of the territory. Ultimately, by giving these lands new names, government officials were not only claiming ownership of these territories. Renaming lands erased a part of their history and created a "blank slate" that allowed the state to determine who could live in these spaces and what uses they could have. The treatment of these lands as empty negated the existence of the communities that lived there and their history in that territory. This stance became increasingly apparent as Chilean settlers and European *colonos* arrived in the region and settled on Indigenous lands.

Engineers as Arbiters in Land Conflicts

By the turn of the twentieth century, the role of engineers had once more evolved as most of the land in the Araucanía was mapped. With the growth of lawsuits and petitions concerning land ownership, engineers became key players in these cases and their word carried significant weight in determining the outcome of disputes. One such example was the case of Eugenio Zúñiga, a local Chilean farmer. According to the account presented by his representative from the Huenivales Agricultural Society in 1908, a wealthy figure named Carlos Raunet arrived at Zúñiga's plot and offered to install a sawmill on his property in Huenivales, a mountainous region in the Araucanía. The sawmill could aid him greatly in clearing excess brush on his property to grow crops, and Zuniga accepted the offer. Raunet soon arrived at Zúñiga's property with an engineer named Arellano that drew up papers verifying the land had always belonged to Raunet and his associate Onofre Montecino, who used the pretext of building the sawmill to lay claim on his property. Arellano's backing gave legitimacy to Raunet's claim, and finding himself

without recourse, Zúñiga ceded eighty hectares of his over one-hundred-hectare plot. He nevertheless repeatedly petitioned the Ministry of Colonization to help return the lands that Raunet had stolen. After several ignored requests, including one where he mentions an attempt against his life in the streets of his neighborhood, Eugenio Zúñiga was beaten to death by one of Raunet's employees. His murder, however, did not stop the escalating violence on the property. Montecino and Raunet soon employed men to physically assault the remaining members of Zúñiga's family to coerce them into leaving. His widow and remaining family members sought justice from the Ministry, arguing that they continued to live under the threat of violence but would nevertheless remain in the lands that they claimed rightfully belonged to them.¹⁵⁰

Over a year later, the Zúñiga family's lawsuit remained tied up in the complex bureaucracy of the Ministry of Colonization, and the case file does not reveal a definitive conclusion. This is not uncommon in the hundreds of lawsuits and petitions relating to land ownership in the Araucanía during the early twentieth century. Onofre Montecino defended himself against what he referred to as unfounded claims, asserting that the engineer who visited the disputed lands supported his argument and Raunet's. Despite the circumstances of Zúñiga's violent death, none of the documents in his file mention any arrests made or police investigations. This is unlike other land dispute cases that refer to potential criminal activity, where accusations of arson or assault detail any criminal charges made. For example, in 1906 José Pardo together with his Chilean neighbors in Pitrufquén filed a lawsuit against European colonos who attempted to take their lands and were later accused of setting fire to lumber on the contested hijuelas. The suspects were later arrested and held in the Valdivia penitentiary. It is likely, therefore, that if criminal charges were made, they would be mentioned in Zúñiga's case

¹⁵⁰ Caso de Eugenio Zúñiga, 8 Jan. 1909, ARNAD, MRE, vol. 1449.

file.¹⁵¹ The Ministry of Colonization's final responses appeared to favor Raunet and Montecinos due to the evidence presented by the engineer Arellano. While Zúñiga's case represents an example of extreme physical violence rooted in conflicts over land ownership, we can draw conclusions from the case that speak to the evolving role of engineers in the region. His case and hundreds of others in the archival record ultimately reveal how engineers had become arbiters in legal cases, as many petitions passed across their desks and formed part of the complex bureaucracy revolving land disputes.¹⁵²

The fluidity and instability of land ownership and the lack of response and delays from the Ministry of Colonization contributed to the growing tension around land ownership and the inability to address developing land ownership issues at the turn of the twentieth century. While Indigenous peoples were often the victims of displacement from their lands, cases like Zúñiga's and Bunster's also reveal the importance of other factors, including the social class and ethnic background of the accused. Bunster and Raunet were both European, and although each obtained their lands by illegal means, they nevertheless belonged to ethnic groups favored by the state. Ultimately, the Zúñiga case also demonstrates the legitimacy and authority of engineers in making what could be life-altering decisions. As the frontier became more populated, efforts to fence land and obtain titles were contested and this led to conflicts among neighbors. In their daily interactions, settlers competed with others for the same territory, and the growing monetary value of the land only heightened existing tensions.¹⁵³ The precariousness and instability of shifting land relationships along the frontier led to legal confrontations that took years to resolve.

¹⁵¹ For a similar case in which criminal charges were recorded, see, Caso de Juan B. Pardo y Otros, 5 Nov, 1906, ARNAD, MRE, vol. 1335.

¹⁵² Many of these can be found in the volumes of solicitudes particulares in the ARNAD. Some examples include, MRE vol. 1086, 1120, 1126, 1335, 1336, 1339, 1449.

¹⁵³ Examples can be found in, Solicitud de Lorenzo Leviman, January 1903; and Solicitud de Mateo Huenchumen Huenteo, June 12, 1903, both in ARNAD, MRE, vol. 1126.

While bureaucrats and engineers sent claims from one office to another, this often-created significant delays that had real-life consequences as people were forcibly evicted from territories that in some cases legally belonged to them. In 1903, the Inspector General of Colonization Ramon Briously wrote to the Ministry of Colonization offices in Santiago about delays in naming engineers of Colonization, who distributed land titles and investigated disputes among colonos.¹⁵⁴ Additionally, these engineers also worked with the offices of Protectors of Indigenous Peoples. Without a permanent staff to work on these claims, Briously argued, the work of colonization would be severely impacted. Local government officials, such as Angol's deputy Alfredo Irrarrázaval pleaded with the central government for more aid and a definitive solution to land disputes, but with little success. In a 1904 speech before congress, Irrarrázaval pushed congress to stop ignoring the situation in the frontier, "I have been charged by numerous farmers of the frontier to come here and defend their most vital interests, in defense of their sacred right to the properties that they have formed with their sacrifices and effort and to beg my fellow ministers to suspend their hostilities against the inhabitants of this part of the country."¹⁵⁵

In the meantime, conflicts involving property ownership continued between neighbors and, in cases like Zúñiga's, escalated to physical violence. While Zúñiga's case is unique in the archival documents due to the record of repeated physical violence against his family, the dynamics in his file reflected enduring and widespread problems along the frontier. Land encroachment remained commonplace, and the relationship between local elites such as Raunet and engineers enabled abuses and the growth of estates by coopting or corrupting engineers like

¹⁵⁴ Ramon Briously al Ministro de Colonización, 26 Mar. 1903, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1120.

¹⁵⁵ "Los Agricultores de la Frontera: Discurso Pronunciado Por El Diputado de Angol Don Alfredo Irrarrázaval" *El Colono de Angol*, 8 and 10 Nov.1904, no. 3938 and 3940, p. 2 in both.

Arellano.¹⁵⁶ In the first decade of the twentieth century, petitions and lawsuits demonstrate how maps and the local engineers behind them made territory legible for the legal system and the bureaucrats who presided over such cases. The engineer's word or that of the Topographic Commission was frequently decisive in whether individuals kept their lands, since these officials produced the documents that legitimated land ownership.

Along with conflicts over disputed lands, the situation of non-Indigenous Chileans who had not received land title only worsened as the backlog of petitions grew, and engineers struggled to fulfill their myriad duties. By 1907 the Ministry of Colonization was overrun with petitions from Chileans seeking titles and aid against land usurpation and encroachment. While the Chilean government had favored European colonization and provided resources that made obtaining a permanent land title easier, until 1896 and 1898 no land law existed that cohesively outlined how Chileans themselves could acquire land titles.¹⁵⁷ Engineers in the late 1890s were also preoccupied mapping the southern region of the Araucanía, and the distribution of land titles faced significant delays that pushed some non-Indigenous Chilean settlers to the verge of starvation. In response, the government issued a decree in 1907 that effectively suspended all land petitions from Chileans, claiming that due to a backlog of claims and uncertainties about the exact number of fiscal lands available for distribution, all petitions would need to cease.

The Inspector General of Lands and Colonization along with his team of bureaucrats and engineers worked to assess whether each case fulfilled the requirements for a title, focusing on

¹⁵⁶ More on the violence around land disputes in Klubock, *La Frontera*, 16. See also, Pinto, *La formación del estado y la nación*, 231-35.

¹⁵⁷ While legislation was passed in 1896 detailing how Chileans emigrants to Argentina could obtain temporary land titles in the Araucanía, the 1898 law provided a clear process by which Chileans who did not emigrate could obtain permanent land titles. More on the context behind the creation of the 1896 and 1898 land laws can be found in chapter 4. Within the legal context, Chileans with land titles were referred to as *nacionales*. See, Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 20. The government's neglect of Chilean colonization in the region is described in, *El Colono de Angol*, 11 Oct. 1898, p.1, no. 138, "La Emigración Chilena" as well as, *El Colono de Angol*, 20 Oct. 1898, p.1, no. 142 "Las Causas de Nuestra Desgracia"

settlers who had been living on the petitioned lands before the year 1901.¹⁵⁸ While this decree attempted to alleviate the situation of Chileans who had been waiting for titles for nearly a decade, a closer analysis of the requirements for a land title reveals the state's inability to understand the local conditions of the frontier. To gain *nacionales* (Chilean colono) status, families needed to live on their proposed lands for eight uninterrupted years without a land title. Given the number of cases of land usurpation and encroachment from other Chilean settlers, European colonos, and later colonization companies, this would have been a challenging requirement to fulfill. It also required that engineers verify prior residency by visiting the plots of these families and potentially consulting with neighbors to corroborate their claims, which was a time-consuming process.¹⁵⁹ Establishing a consistent residency, in other words, did not account for the complexities of settlement on the frontier. Additionally, the required investment of 200 pesos assumed that families made a profit from these lands or that there would be surplus funds to invest.

The growing number of cases from non-Indigenous Chilean settlers petitioning the government for financial support at this time indicate that like their Indigenous counterparts Chileans suffered through harvest variations and struggled to afford the tools necessary to turn a profit on their lands. Unlike European colonos, who were automatically entitled to financial assistance for the purchase of tools, farm animals, and seeds, these settlers needed to arrive with

¹⁵⁸ Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 29.

¹⁵⁹ The difficulties families had while selling their crops and receiving their *hijuelas* are detailed in, "Los Agricultores de la Frontera: Discurso Pronunciado Por El Diputado de Angol Don Alfredo Irrázaval" *El Colono de Angol*, 8 and 10 Nov. 1904, no. 3938 and 3940, p. 2 in both. For more on the financial challenges of foreign colono families in the frontier, see: Reporte Anual de Martin Drouilly al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Sept. 1889, ANH, MRE, Vol. 442; Martin Drouilly al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, 9 Aug. 1889, ANH, MRE, Vol. 440; and *Memorias de la Inspección General de Tierras y Colonización 1903*, ANH, MRE, vol. 171.

the money to buy items crucial to the success of their farms.¹⁶⁰ As the final chapter of my dissertation will demonstrate, these forms of assistance that prioritized Europeans, in fact, were among the most significant factors in the conflicts between Chilean settlers and were often cited in cases brought to engineers and other Ministry bureaucrats.¹⁶¹

Conclusion

The mission to create a “stable culture,” as Teodoro Schmidt described it, meant far more than drawing lines on a map, as the evolution of the role engineers played in colonizing the Araucanía demonstrates. The legislative precursors that gave engineers the authority to redistribute land and designate the parameters of ownership were decades in the making. While Schmidt and his team of engineers redrew boundaries for the sale of property, a local bureaucratic apparatus also grew and bolstered their role as the new authorities on land use and ownership.¹⁶² As the surveyors designated fiscal territories and property for colonos, they redrew the region's landscape and made it legible for the government. When challenges emerged as colonos fought for limited available lands and cases of usurpation grew, engineers were consultants and authorities who often decided who would retain their lands. Due to their privileged position, they played a pivotal role in the Chilean colonization project. The following chapter will examine how other bureaucratic offices working alongside the Topographic

¹⁶⁰ In response to the lack of government assistance for poor farmers, local community members organized weekly and monthly collections of money in order to create a small emergency fund. *El Colono de Angol*, June 24, 1899, no. 3120, p.1, “Las Depredaciones en los Campos.”

¹⁶¹ More on these conflicts can be found in, Klubbock, “Ránquil;” and Loveman, *Struggle in the Countryside*, 144-45.

¹⁶² Throughout his career in the Araucanía, Schmidt constantly pushed for the creation of a school of mapping in the region that could train engineers using the latest technologies from Europe. He justified this need by observing that the terrain of the region was different from that of Santiago, and as such, engineers needed additional training that could only be provided locally. While he was unsuccessful in his requests, partly due to a lack of funding and resources, they nevertheless point to the importance of local knowledge making by these agents of the state. Reglamento para los ingenieros ocupados con la mensura I hijuelación de los terrenos baldíos del estado. Apr. 11, 1889, ANH, Minrel, vol. 233.

Commission, mainly the offices of the Protectors of Indigenous Peoples, enforced land laws that ultimately displaced Mapuche communities from their lands.

The labor of engineers on the Southern Frontier, and the social conflicts that emerged from the land distribution projects they oversaw, had lasting consequences beyond the period of colonization. The conflicts that followed this period of colonization, most notably the 1934 Ranquil massacre and later struggles for agrarian reform during the 1960s, were directly linked to disputes about land rights and the dispossession of Indigenous peoples. Mapuche communities today continue petitioning for their lost territories, in some cases using the very same maps that Teodoro Schmidt and his team of engineers produced. In the regional archives of the Araucanía, it is not uncommon to find archivists and Mapuche families sifting through these documents and maps, which as this chapter demonstrates, were hardly neutral depictions of who lived in these contested lands. These maps, in other words, have had an enduring quality. Despite their production as tied to colonization processes, Mapuche communities today have begun appropriating them in their ongoing struggle for justice.

Chapter 3: “A Mockery of Justice: Indigenous Land Laws and Mapuche Displacement in Southern Chile 1883-1912.”

On June 3rd, 1903, the Indigenous *cacique* Mateo Huenchumen Huenteo filed a petition with the Ministry of Colonization against his neighbor, the wealthy landowner Jervasio Alarcón. According to Huenchumen’s account, his nearly 130-hectare property in Pellahuen had been in his family for ninety years, during which he and his father before him had peacefully farmed it. In 1895, eight years before Huenchumen submitted his petition, Jervasio Alarcón, with his employee’s help, an Indigenous man identified as Millan, had encroached on 40 hectares of Huenchumen’s land. With the help of Millan, Alarcón built three ranchos over the contested territory, robbing Huenchumen of access to *barbecho*, or land that he crucially needed for wheat crop rotations. Huenchumen argued in his petition that by doing so Alarcón had robbed his family (he was the father of 11) of their food source for the upcoming year.¹⁶³ Alarcón also had roads built over Huenchumen’s property, and in the process of building the ranchos his men had destroyed fences and robbed six of his cattle. In the petition, Huenchumen asked the government to remove Alarcón’s employees from his property and burn down the ranchos. He further requested that the Ministry heavily fine Alarcón should he attempt to encroach on his property again.

This was not the only petition filed against Alarcón in 1903 by an Indigenous head of family claiming that the hacendado had illegally usurped their lands. Lorenzo Leviman, on behalf of his fifty family members, also sought to have their lands legally recognized to protect against encroachment from Alarcón and his men.¹⁶⁴ By the time Huenchumen submitted his petition, twenty years after the conclusion of the Wars of Occupation, countless Mapuche

¹⁶³ Reclamo de Mateo Huenchumen Huenteo contra J. Alarcón, June 12, 1903, ARNAD Minrel, vol. 1126.

¹⁶⁴ Reclamo de Lorenzo Leviman contra J. Alarcón, January 1903 ARNAD Minrel, vol. 1126.

families had lost much if not all of their ancestral lands to Chilean settlers and European colonos by legal and illegal means. It is likely that Huenchumen understood how difficult it would be to win a case against a local hacendado, especially one with Alarcón's resources. He went before Ministry officials to plead his case without the help of the Protector of Indigenous Peoples, a government-appointed lawyer familiar assigned to cases such as Huenchumen's. Representing himself, he risked making a mistake that could result in the loss of his lands. Huenchumen concluded his petition with an assessment that embodied the plight of many Indigenous families on the frontier struggling to protect lands that were intricately tied to their survival:

....This sir is how justice is practiced in the frontier because Jervasio Alarcón, who lives here, imposes his claims upon Indian men, and writes to his friends so that they can execute his mandates, mocking justice to appropriate the few territories that the government had conceded Indigenous people. Because so much is his ambition, sir, that having a tremendous amount of land in Contulmo, thousands of hectares, it is now 20 leagues to the orient, and he now wants to appropriate the lands of the Indians through his agents, employing all kinds of injustices and treachery that are not worth the dignity of the supreme government to let them pass and tolerate without the respective punishment. This is the cause of the calamities of Indigenous peoples who continuously come to La Moneda (presidential palace) to ask for aid and help for their properties from the government, aside from those that have the resources to go to Santiago, there are in the Araucanía indigenous peoples dispossessed of their interests. This is your excellency/sir the situation in the frontier of the poor Indigenous communities. For this reason, we bother to seek the government's attention with such frequency, which I am obligated to now do.¹⁶⁵

Mateo Huenchumen Huenteo's case is emblematic of the challenges Mapuche communities faced as they struggled to retain their territories after the Wars of Occupation. While his case is one of many petitions filed by Indigenous peoples during this period, his impassioned plea to the Ministry of Colonization reveals the social and political dynamics that resulted in the loss of Mapuche lands. Land laws implemented by the Ministry of Colonization and the Chilean judicial

¹⁶⁵ Reclamo de Mateo Huenchumen Huenteo contra J. Alarcón, June 12, 1903, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1126.

system were largely unknown to Indigenous communities, leaving them at the mercy of local bureaucrats such as Protectors of Indigenous Peoples that in some cases were unwilling or unable to stop encroachment on their lands. Legislation around property ownership did not protect Indigenous lands. Instead, the bureaucratic structures and land laws created by the Chilean government were elements of an occupying force that remained well beyond the end of the military conflict in the region. In this chapter, I argue that as a settler-colonial society, the Chilean government used land legislation to encourage Mapuche communities to abandon their land claims. While laws existed recognizing Indigenous rights to property, the office of Protectors of Indigenous peoples in practice often prevented Mapuche land claims from being approved. As a result, Mapuche communities retained only five percent of their ancestral territories.¹⁶⁶

This chapter is divided into three sections, each analyzing the evolving nature of land laws and the institutions behind their implementation to demonstrate that the Chilean state's vision of the Araucanía as an empty space for settlement extended beyond the maps and advertising aimed at European *colonos* illustrated in the first chapter. Although legislation on Indigenous lands extended to other native communities in the Araucanía and later the Magellan region, Mapuche communities lived in large concentrations in Cautín and Malleco and are the focus of this chapter. The first section explores the dynamics of land redistribution during the colonial and republican period, when the Chilean government gave the president wide-ranging powers over the Araucanian territory through the passage of laws that outlined how Mapuche lands should be distributed decades before the state occupied the region. The second section examines the bureaucratic structures in the Araucanía charged with enforcing Indigenous land

¹⁶⁶ Crow, *The Mapuche in Modern Chile*, 46.

laws, mainly the position of the Protector of Indigenous Peoples. This government appointed official served as legal representative for native communities applying for land titles, or *títulos de merced*. The office was plagued by a lack of funding, staff, and did not have the authority to enforce laws that could protect Indigenous lands from illegal usurpation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how land legislation and interactions with bureaucratic structures affected Mapuche community relationships between themselves and outsiders, as well as their efforts to retain their lands.

Historians have typically used the term colonialism to describe the political and social dynamics between the Chilean state, settlers in the Araucanía, and the Mapuche. Settler colonialism is a less commonly used but fruitful category of analysis that can help us understand why, despite the Chilean state's aim to resettle Mapuche lands with European settlers, they nevertheless created laws to grant land titles to Indigenous Peoples. Settler colonialism is defined as mode of domination that is interested in the erasure of colonized subjects rather than a replication of their subjugation.¹⁶⁷ In contrast to colonialism, in which native subjugation results in these communities laboring for the colonizer, settler colonial societies are more interested in the removal of native people to empty the land in order to bring other laborers in. According to Patrick Wolfe, settler colonialism is premised on a “logic of elimination” in which the native society is replaced by one imported by the colonizers.¹⁶⁸ The elimination of the native society could take various forms. It could be genocidal, as in the case of Argentina, or it could mean the creation of prerequisites to land ownership that would discourage Indigenous communities from petitioning for titles. As Brenna Bhandar demonstrates, in settler colonies “modern” forms of

¹⁶⁷ Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini, eds. *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism* (New York: Routledge Press, 2017), 3.

¹⁶⁸ Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* (London: Cassel Press, 1999), 26.

land ownership, such as those that require engagement in registration systems, can also exist alongside possession as a means of ownership. This entails an intention to control a territory, its physical occupation, and the use of legal techniques to dispossess native peoples.¹⁶⁹

While the Chilean congress debated both possibilities during the mid-nineteenth century, it ultimately settled on the creation of land laws that would encourage Mapuche communities to leave their ancestral homes. In the three decades after occupation, the Ministry of Colonization enacted policies such as communal land titles to force Indigenous communities to work on smaller plots that made survival nearly impossible for the Mapuche, who depended heavily on large expanses of land to raise their livestock. Further prohibitions on the selling of Indigenous property also tied them to small plots that did not meet the financial needs of their often-large communities. Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo Veracini have argued that inherent within settler colonialism is the idea of “civilizing” what were considered “savage” or “barbarous” peoples and absorb them into the dominant society.¹⁷⁰ The requirements for land titles reflected this view and encouraged Indigenous communities to send their children to state run schools, abandon their native language, and farming customs. These policies were in stark contrast to those aimed at European and Chilean families, who received individual titles, were granted larger parcels of land, and had no requirements tied to their cultural identity and customs.

The Offices of Protectors of Indigenous Peoples formed an important role within this settler society. As Lauren Benton and Adam Clulow demonstrate, throughout the nineteenth century the discourse of protection “flourished especially in zones of ambiguous control” and the lack of a precise definition of the term made the responsibility of protectors toward native

¹⁶⁹ Brenna Bhandar, “Possession, occupation and registration: recombinant ownership in the settler colony”, *Settler Colonial Studies*, 6:2, 2016, 121-122.

¹⁷⁰ Veracini, “Introducing Settler Colonial Studies”, and Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” *Journal of Genocide Research*, 8:4, 387-409.

communities elusive, allowing for varying interpretations of their role to exist simultaneously.¹⁷¹ While in the Araucanía some Protectors endeavored to protect Indigenous lands from encroachment, these bureaucrats along with engineers and other staff mainly functioned as the “arbiters of civilization” that enforced the state’s requirements for land titles. This included verifying language and literacy requirements, confirming Indigenous identities, and ensuring that all protocols were followed for a title. The challenges that Protectors frequently faced, from deficiencies in funding, consistent staff, and no legal powers to remove usurpers from Indigenous lands were consistent with the state’s goal to remove as many Mapuches from their lands as possible. With little political and legal power, Protectors were unable to protect even Indigenous communities that did have titles. Since Protectors were unable to stop Indigenous communities from losing their lands, this created more opportunities for European settlements or open land that could be designated as fiscal property and sold.

Lastly, Indigenous communities’ refusal to leave their lands, and their use of legal and political institutions that treated them as secondary citizens to defend themselves is emblematic of resistance under a settler colonial society. In settler-colonial societies, the subjugated group may choose to participate in unequal labor relationships if they can remain in their ancestral lands.¹⁷² In order to compensate for lost income from their reduced plots, Mapuche peoples worked on Chilean and European owned farms and haciendas built on lands that had once belonged to them. In these farms and haciendas, they were paid meager wages and treated poorly compared to their Chilean and European counterparts. Simultaneously, they also filed petitions with their local Protectors, lobbied for legal representation and represented themselves before

¹⁷¹ Adam Clulow and Lauren Benton, “Introduction: The Long, Strange History of Protection,” in *Protection and Empire: A Global History*, eds. Bain Attwood et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 2.

¹⁷² Veracini, “Introducing Settler Colonial Studies”, 4.

civil courts to protect the few lands they retained. Although the Chilean government imposed its legal system without Mapuche consent, their continuous engagement with its structures in the decades following the occupation demonstrated their unwillingness to accept the loss of their land.

Indigenous-State Relationships During the Colonial and Republican Periods

During the colonial period, Indigenous communities living north of the Biobío River under Spanish control were subject to laws that regulated their access to land. While these laws outlined a path for Indigenous peoples to own land, historians such as Tamar Herzog have argued that land legislation was also a means for colonial authorities to impose their legal systems on subjugated peoples.¹⁷³ This land legislation also made colonial bureaucrats the adjudicators over how formerly Indigenous lands would be used and sold. In 1571, a law gave Indigenous peoples the right to sell their inherited lands with a colonial judge's authorization. This process would require a judge to verify the validity of their ownership of these lands and determine their monetary value. Subsequent legislation, including the *Tasa de Gamboa* in 1580, also outlined the physical structure of Indigenous pueblos (each should have a church, stocks, and a jail) and designated colonial administrators for each of these settlements. Indigenous peoples were allowed to elect a mayor and sheriff that was accountable to the local *corregidor* and other colonial officials.¹⁷⁴ In 1603, Alonso de Ribera's government acknowledged the creation of the *Pueblos de Indios* as territories set aside for Indigenous

¹⁷³ Tamar Herzog, "Colonial Law and Native Customs": Indigenous Land Rights in Colonial Spanish America," *The Americas*, 9:3, Jan. 2013, 303-321.

¹⁷⁴ The *Tasa de Gamboa* was a series of regulations that along with outlining parameters for Indigenous property also established policies over systems of tribute, which could be paid in the form of money or spices. Fernando Silva Vargas, *Tierras y Pueblos de Indios en el Reino de Chile*, (Santiago: Editorial Universidad Católica, 1962), 89.

communities to reside. The 1603 law outlined land ownership requirements in these pueblos and established both individual and collective property. The distribution of property in Indigenous pueblos allowed one individual to own five *cuadras*, a cacique ten, and widowers three. For every ten people, there were 24 *cuadras* set aside as communal property. These regulations also did not exclude the possibility that these Indigenous people might own other lands outside of the pueblos collectively or individually.¹⁷⁵ While Indigenous communities north of the Biobío River were subject to laws created by the Spanish crown, Mapuches living south of the river lived in communal lands represented by lonkos. Colonial era Indigenous land laws, however, would later provide a foundation for the Chilean state to create its own legislation after the military conquest.

The hostility between the Spanish crown and Mapuche tribes' over political and territorial disputes made *parlamentos* (diplomatic meetings) a critical space in which treaties were negotiated between the parties during the colonial period.¹⁷⁶ While settlements along the Biobío River remained volatile for the first part of the seventeenth century, there were long periods of stability during the latter half of the century as a series of treaties allowed for peaceful interactions between the two groups. Pilar Herr, among other historians, has argued that these *parlamentos*, together with the economic relationships Mapuche groups developed along the frontier with Spaniards and other tribes, allowed these communities to open a line of

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, 29. While the law provides little evidence that individuals from the tribe could own private property, there were records of caciques owning private property. This was likely due to their social and political status as tribal leaders.

¹⁷⁶ *Parlamentos* were diplomatic ritual meetings that were used to solve grievances between Spanish colonial forces and the Mapuche that began in 1641 and were held intermittently throughout the late colonial period. There has been some debate among scholars about whether *parlamentos* were used as tools of assimilation by the Spanish. While Pilar Herr argues that the *parlamentos* demonstrate the independence of Mapuche tribes since they retained territorial independence, Guillame Boccara, Fernando Casanueva, and Antonio Varas have argued that *parlamentos* imposed Spanish legal norms as well as religious and cultural values. More on this debate in Herr, *Contested Nation*, 77. More on the evolving dynamics of *parlamentos*, and broader discussions of Mapuche diplomacy during the late colonial period and early republican period can be found in, Zarley, "Toward a Transandean Mapuche Politics: Ritual and Power in Chile and Argentina 1792-1834."

communication and to establish a degree of political autonomy that ended with the independence period.¹⁷⁷ The issues of borderlines and property arose frequently in the *parlamentos*, and beginning in the eighteenth century local clergyman in the Araucanía started keeping a record of where Indigenous families lived and their plot size. Nearly a century later, protectors of Indigenous peoples used these documents to legitimate land claims on their behalf.¹⁷⁸ As Creole interactions with the Spanish crown began to deteriorate at the end of the eighteenth century, Mapuche relationships with the state would soon be renegotiated. The new post-independence government would seek to incorporate the region through military intervention and bureaucratic absorption and would no longer provide avenues for negotiation with Mapuche and other Indigenous groups.

The passage of the first liberal laws by the newly independent Chilean government represented a shift in how the state recognized Indigenous land rights. While independence leaders such as Bernardo O'Higgins recognized Mapuche sovereignty south of the Biobío River, in 1813 the Chilean government declared all Mapuches citizens of Chile, allowing legislators to abrogate any protections over their lands established by the Spanish crown.¹⁷⁹ This action soon resulted in the loss of remaining Mapuche lands in the Central Valley, which were quickly purchased and absorbed into local haciendas.¹⁸⁰ Subsequent governments passed laws that continued the process of encroachment southward into the Araucanian territory. Local Indigenous communities that either sold their lands willingly, or were induced to do so under

¹⁷⁷ Herr, *Contested Nation*, 93

¹⁷⁸ Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 170.

¹⁷⁹ As historian Pilar Herr argues, although Mapuche peoples were considered citizens, this did not mean they enjoyed the same rights as the elite or merchant classes, particularly in terms of suffrage. In order to vote, a citizen needed to fulfill one of the following criteria: own property worth 200 pesos, be catholic, or know how to read and write. These categories were made to restrict voting to certain classes of people and limited Mapuche interests from being represented in governing structures. Herr, *Contested Nation*, 22.

¹⁸⁰ Bengoa, *Mapuches, Colonos, y el Estado Nacional*, 45.

fraudulent circumstances, were integrated into the hacienda system as *inquilinos*. Local *hacendados* acquiring the newly available lands thus benefitted from the presence of a landless labor force to grow their crops. An additional law passed on May 12th, 1823, decreed that local *intendentes* in the provinces north of the Biobío should measure Indigenous territories for redistribution to Chilean settlers.¹⁸¹ This law effectively established a precedent by which bureaucratic authorities representing the new Chilean state legitimized Indigenous land ownership within a liberal, privatization framework that represented a shift in how the government would deal with Mapuche tribes. While the colonial government had used *parlamentos* to negotiate treaties and matters of local governance, the independent Chilean state was not interested in negotiating territorial claims with Mapuche tribes. As a result, by the 1850s the *parlamentos* between the Chilean government and Indigenous groups were little more than traditional formalities with minimal political purpose.

Foundations for the Redistribution of Mapuche Lands

In the 1850s the Chilean government began creating new governmental structures and enacting legislation crucial to Indigenous land displacement in the Araucanía.¹⁸² The Chilean state granted itself legal dominion over lands south of the Biobío through a right of conquest, its legal authority over the lands of all Chilean citizens, and a predominant view of the Araucanía as an empty space. The politicians and military men who were the architects of these laws also reflected societal views of the Mapuche as barbarous and ultimately unworthy stewards of their territories. Spanish colonial encounters with the Mapuche influenced these perceptions. While the Chilean government did not begin the active military occupation of the Araucanía until 1880,

¹⁸¹ *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1910*, ANH, Minrel, vol.176, 467.

¹⁸² Throughout the colonial period and well into the nineteenth century the city of Concepción and its intendency offices boasted the largest concentration of colonial and government officials in the frontier, reflecting the political boundaries that been intermittently negotiated.

the land legislation drafted in the preceding decades reflected the views of politicians and military officials who viewed the region as crucial to the economic development of the country. Anthropologist José Bengoa has argued that throughout the mid nineteenth century most of Santiago's elites also viewed the Araucanía as a "terra nullus," or land that belonged to no one despite the presence of native communities.¹⁸³ Prominent military figures such as Cornelio Saavedra attempted to persuade Congress to launch a full invasion in the early 1860s by reinforcing this view, and proposed that the few Indigenous peoples left would be easily defeated by the Chilean army.¹⁸⁴ His argument was supported by a mid-century population census indicating that only 30,000 people lived in all of the Araucanía. This was comparatively small for such an extensive region, especially compared to smaller provinces such as Rancagua, that reported 103,000 inhabitants in the 1865 census.¹⁸⁵ A campaign of invasion, Saavedra argued, would not require many men or resources and could have significant benefits for the country.¹⁸⁶ His previous campaigns across the Biobío River to establish military fortresses and settlements, including one that resulted in the foundation of the town of Angol in 1863, lent legitimacy to his claims that the military would likely succeed in future expansionist ventures.¹⁸⁷ As detailed in the first chapter, although Chile did not have a population large enough to settle the Araucanía entirely, European *colonos* emerged as potential stewards that could usher in an era of industrial development and economic prosperity despite the challenge of cultural and economic integration. The success of the German colony of Valdivia further cemented this view, and the Chilean

¹⁸³ Bengoa, *Mapuches, Colonos, y El Estado Nacional*, 58.

¹⁸⁴ During this time, Saavedra also purchased lands from Mapuches on behalf of the Chilean state to establish new settlements and avoid the accumulation of land in the hands of a few settlers. Ibid., 53, and Jorge Iván Vergara del Solar and Héctor Mellado, "La violencia política estatal contra el pueblo-nación mapuche durante la conquista tardía de La Araucanía y el proceso de radicación (Chile, 1850-1929)" *Diálogo Andino*, no. 55, 2018, 8.

¹⁸⁵ Andrés Estefane, "Estado y Ordenamiento territorial en Chile, 1810-2016", in *Historia política de Chile, 1810-2010 Tomo II: Estado y Sociedad*, Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 109.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 33.

government during the 1850s and 1860's would begin creating structures that enabled bureaucrats, European colonos, and other usurpers in displacing Mapuches from their lands.

Encroachment began with the establishment of bureaucratic offices such as new intendencias, coupled with laws that gave the Chilean government, specifically the president, wide-ranging political powers over the unincorporated region. Article 3 of the July 2nd, 1852 law created the province of Arauco and declared that "The president of the republic is authorized to give the orders he considers convenient for the better government of the frontier, for the most efficient protection of the Indigenous, to promote their civilization and to arrange the contracts and relationships of commerce among these."¹⁸⁸ Intendency offices, civil courts, and Ministry of Colonization offices enforced any proclamations decreed by the president. Together these institutions formed the backbone of colonization in the region and housed offices where land grants and disputes were settled. While the province of Arauco was located only 45 miles south of Concepción, this administrative penetration southward into Indigenous territory allowed local bureaucrats to create networks allowing engineers to begin the mapping, measurement, and redistribution of Mapuche lands soon after the wars of occupation ended in 1883. In 1887, four years after the wars ended, the government created the provinces of Cautín and Malleco, reflecting both the triumph of military occupation and the Chilean government's intention to continue the colonization project southward into the Magellan region.¹⁸⁹ These implanting of these bureaucratic structures reflected the views of Saavedra and others of the Araucanía as a space primed for occupation.

¹⁸⁸ "Ley del 2 de julio de 1852", ANH: *Memoria de la Inspección General de Tierras y Colonización 1906*, vol. 173, 155.

¹⁸⁹ Jaime Flores Chávez, "La construcción del Estado chileno en la Araucanía a través de los papeles del Fondo de Intendencia de Cautín, 1887-1914," *Bajo la Lupa*, Subdirección de Investigación, Servicio Nacional del Patrimonio Cultural, 7.

The December 1866 land law radically altered the landscape of the Araucanía by establishing both the parameters of foreign colonization and the protocols for Indigenous land titles. Articles in the law detailed the requirements by which engineers would measure Indigenous lands and the means through which these communities could petition for land titles, a process known as *radicación*. If the prerequisites were met, a *título de merced*, or land title, was granted with the head of the tribe, typically a lonko or cacique, as the primary holder of the deed.¹⁹⁰ Subsequent articles delineated the rules through which engineers could measure Indigenous property and the procedures for obtaining the *título* and specifying areas in the region where non-Indigenous peoples could not own land. While the 1866 law recognized that Indigenous peoples were entitled to land, this right could only be recognized by the state if the Ministry of Colonization provided a land title.¹⁹¹ When colonization progressed after 1883, Mapuche families struggled to meet the evolving requirements for a *título de merced* and risked losing their lands during the lengthy *radicación* process. Together, these land laws provided the framework and legal precedent for colonization and land redistribution in the Araucanía. While the exact number of Indigenous communities who were displaced is unknown, anthropologist José Bengoa estimates that at least 20,000 Mapuche peoples lost their lands during the first two decades of the occupation.¹⁹²

In order to apply for a *radicación*, Mapuche petitioners, usually *caciques* who represented their tribes before the Ministry, were required to prove their Indigenous identity. This created a

¹⁹⁰ Congreso Nacional, Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización, 6.

¹⁹¹ *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1910*, ANH, Minrel, vol.176, 468.

¹⁹² While cautioning against viewing this estimate as definitive due to numerous limitations including a lack of consistent data, Bengoa arrived at this number by using information from the Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agrícola (CONADI), along with data from *títulos de merced* gathered from the Archivo General de Asuntos Indígenas. Bengoa, *Mapuches, Colonos, y el Estado Nacional*, 82-83.

situation in which the Chilean state used the term Indigenous as a legal category.¹⁹³ According to the articles of colonization, an Indigenous person retained the name, language, traditions, habits, and possessed the soil “with a spirit of domination (ownership) and permanently.”¹⁹⁴ However, as Protector Euljio Robles Rodríguez later argued, the definition was exclusionary to some Indigenous groups in Chile, particularly the phrase “and permanently”, which refers to the sedentary lifestyle of Indigenous communities. While this categorization applied to some Indigenous groups in Chile, it excluded tribes from the Magellan and Tierra del Fuego regions that were nomadic. Indeed, the Mapuche themselves were a semi-nomadic group that did not precisely fit the Ministry of Colonization’s definition. Robles also observed that the other clauses in the definition, such as knowledge of an Indigenous language and adherence to traditions excluded native peoples who had “embraced civilization” and abandoned the customs of their elders. Because these groups did not meet all the criteria in the definition, they could be wrongfully excluded from receiving *títulos de merced*. Despite the limitations of this definition, it did not change throughout the colonization process.¹⁹⁵ The December 1866 law further entitled Indigenous communities to *títulos de merced* if their lands were not of fiscal interest, meaning that the state would need them for the development of infrastructure, or if other individuals did not contest the community’s claim. Indigenous communities would need to prove that they had

¹⁹³ The use of the “Indigenous” category as a tool of colonialism and land displacement has also been observed by historian J. Kēhaulani Kauanui. In particular, she has analyzed how categories of indigenous were used in Hawaii by the US government as it attempted to redistribute native lands and argued that some Hawaiian nationalist groups sought to avoid being labeled as “Indigenous,” a legal title and identity they believed had enabled land dispossession on the US mainland. Nationalist Hawaiians also sought to distinguish themselves from mainland indigenous groups by arguing that they were a kingdom that had negotiations with other countries on equal footing. J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, *Paradoxes of Hawaiian Sovereignty: Land, Sex, and the Colonial Politics of State Nationalism*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018), 10,

¹⁹⁴ “Memoria del Protector Euljio Robles,” *Memoria de la Inspección General de Tierras y Colonización 1906*, ANH, Minrel, vol. 173, 156-157.

¹⁹⁵ “Reorganización del Servicio de Colonización Año 1905” in Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 97.

lived in the petitioned lands for a minimum of one year, and local Protectors verified individuals' identities before proceeding with the *radicación* process.¹⁹⁶ While Ministry officials claimed that the Indigenous category guaranteed these communities protections over their lands, in practice the Chilean state was largely unwilling to ensure such protections in a region where there was heavy competition for land and few resources to enforce such laws.¹⁹⁷

After the occupation, one of the most significant changes for Indigenous communities was the imposition of bureaucratic and legal institutions that controlled their access to land. This was a significant contrast from the colonial period, in which Mapuche groups and the Spanish negotiated the location of *parlamentos* where they discussed territorial disputes. Instead, the Chilean government created these institutions to centralize political and legal power primarily around Temuco, founded in 1881 as the region's capital.¹⁹⁸ In 1884 the Civilian Court of Temuco was created to mediate various conflicts that emerged between Chileans, European colonos, and Indigenous people.¹⁹⁹ The geographical proximity and collaboration of these offices made Temuco a center of government power in the region, and offices in smaller towns in the area were accountable to administrative and legal bodies in Temuco. Government offices in Temuco, in turn, were in close contact with the headquarters of the Ministry of Colonization in Santiago. For Indigenous communities in the countryside, the centralization of these offices in Temuco meant spending additional time and resources traveling dangerous and poorly maintained roads. The cacique Ambrosio Paillalef detailed these challenges in 1908 when he

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ While Protectors of Indigenous peoples such as Daniel Cerda relied on the local police force to provide aid to indigenous communities, the rural police force of the Araucanía was largely underfunded and often lacked sufficient manpower to effectively perform their duties. The Ministry of Colonization also relied on the rural police in order to enforce the removal of Mapuche peoples from their lands.

¹⁹⁸ "Memorias del Protector de Indígenas Daniel Cerda" in Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 171.

¹⁹⁹ The civilian court of Temuco also mediated smaller conflicts between community members including debt payments and disputes over transactions such as the sale of cattle.

sought help for the fifty-five people living in his *reducción* under threat from land usurpers despite having a government-issued *título de merced*. Paillalef described that one of the biggest challenges for his community was that they far from, "...the centers where the true authority resides in charge of watching over the interests of those of us who make up the last offspring of the true children of Chile."²⁰⁰ Although his case was settled that same year, many other land disputes, especially those in which Indigenous people needed to provide documented proof of ownership, often took years to resolve due to extensive bureaucratic processes and could become costly.²⁰¹ The geographical challenges posed by the centralization of Ministry offices were just one of the many obstacles Indigenous communities faced as colonization progressed in the region. A lack of efficient local legal representation in heavily Indigenous areas, as well as the many requirements they needed to meet to receive land titles, would make retaining their ancestral lands increasingly difficult.

The Protectors of Indigenous Peoples and their limits

The conflicts that arose as European and Chilean settlers began occupying formerly Indigenous lands highlighted the importance of the Protectors of Indigenous Peoples. Protectors were typically lawyers whose official role was to serve as a mediator between Indigenous peoples, the state, and their new neighbors. Offices of Protectors of Indigenous peoples were located in each of the five provinces in the Araucanía that existed after 1883, and much like protectors in other settler colonial societies, their primary goal was to "civilize" the natives while providing legal representation.²⁰² A secondary function, in which they were far less effective,

²⁰⁰ Solicitud de Ambrosio Paillalef, Jan, 22, 1908 ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1389.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² During the nineteenth century, the British empire much like Chile, utilized the protector as a tool of an expanding empire that could help "civilize" the native peoples of Australia and New Zealand. Scholars Alan Lester and Fae Dussart have argued that the idea of humanitarian governance, which protectors were part of, was part a violent process in which Aboriginal communities were forced to compromise, resettle elsewhere, or lose their lands.

was the defense of Indigenous lands against usurpation or encroachment. Typically, this occurred when European or Chileans attempted to form settlements on their lands, or when these same groups presented fraudulent cases before the courts and claimed ownership of Indigenous lands. In the first instance, Indigenous Peoples called on protectors, and these would contact other bureaucratic offices, and in some instances the police, to help remove the usurpers. In cases where Chileans or Europeans claimed ownership over Indigenous lands, protectors gathered evidence from the native community to represent them in court. Protectors were also charged with helping Indigenous communities legitimate their land claims and verify whether they met the minimum requirements for a *titulo de merced*. Once petitioners met these requirements and their land was surveyed by an engineer, a *titulo de merced* would be issued. While the Protectors of Indigenous peoples' offices worked alongside the Ministry of Colonization and the Civil court of Temuco, the Ministry and civil court ultimately made decisions in land dispute cases. While Protectors often worked in favor of Indigenous petitioners, others opposed Mapuche land claims, especially if the other party in the dispute was a member of the local elite such as Jervasio Alarcón.²⁰³ When colonization increased, Mapuche communities' demands for Protectors' services placed considerable strain on the five offices. Despite Mapuche community efforts, the

Amanda Nettelbeck has further demonstrated how protectors in Australia during the 1840's, while rhetorically presenting themselves as the "friends and benefactors" of Aboriginal communities, in practice brought these communities closer to repressive institutions such as the police and prison systems. Other humanitarian organizations also used similar rhetoric to promote sending Aboriginal children to state run schools and eventually use them as part of a colonial labor force. For more on the role of Protectors of Indigenous Peoples and their role in the consolidation of the British Empire, see Amanda Nettelbeck "'A Halo of Protection': Colonial Protectors and the Principle of Aboriginal Protection through Punishment", *Australian Historical Studies*, vol. 43, no. 3, 2012, 396-411, Alan Lester and Fae Dussart, *Colonization and the Origins of Humanitarian Governance Protecting Aborigines across the Nineteenth-Century British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014) 4, Rebecca Swartz, *Education and Empire Children, Race and Humanitarianism in the British Settler Colonies, 1833-1880* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2019).

²⁰³ Reclamo de Matero Huenchumen Huenteo contra Jervasio Alarcón, June 12, 1903, ARNAD Minrel, vol. 1126.

Protectors of Indigenous peoples were unable to protect Indigenous lands amid a rising tide of European and Chilean settlements.

Like many bureaucratic offices within the Ministry of Colonization, the offices of Protectors of Indigenous Peoples also suffered from a lack of government funds that undermined any attempts to help these communities. In some instances, intendants wrote to the central government complaining that their protectors had gone for months without receiving their salary, which had only lowered morale and made their job increasingly difficult. Furthermore, protectors did not receive any raises throughout the first three decades of colonization, and their allowance did not adequately cover the expenses accrued from frequent travel between the courts of Concepción, Temuco, and Valdivia.²⁰⁴ The process of proving Indigenous rights to land was a slow and laborious one requiring that protectors and their staffs to spend a significant amount of time verifying their claims. Offices of Indigenous Peoples, in turn, relied on employees familiar with parochial records and other documents that could confirm the location of ancestral lands. According to a 1911 report from Protector Daniel Cerda, this task was further complicated because Indigenous peoples sometimes changed their children's names when they were baptized, making their lands harder to trace.²⁰⁵ While protectors understood how land laws should be enforced and the processes of *radicación*, not all protectors understood Mapudungun, the language spoken by the Mapuche. Translators were required in some offices, though there was not always funding to employ them. This created an additional responsibility that often fell to the Mapuche petitioners themselves.²⁰⁶ These translators were often members of their communities,

²⁰⁴As colonization expanded southward appeals were also filed in Valdivia. Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 429.

²⁰⁵“Informe del Protector de Indígenas de Llanquihue Daniel Cerda”, in Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 171.

²⁰⁶ Otto Rehren al Ministro de Colonización, May 19, 1893, ANH, Minrel, vol. 593.

though not every Mapuche community had the resources to provide a suitable translator that understood the procedures required by the protector. Equally important to the land title process were engineers, who traveled to Indigenous lands to take measurements and verify any claims of usurpation or disputes.²⁰⁷ In 1893 Teodoro Schmidt wrote to Otto Rehren, the Inspector General of Colonization, about the importance of hiring translators that could travel with engineers and communicate with Indigenous communities to verify land claims. Nearly two decades later, in 1911 Temístocles Urrutia, who then served as the Inspector General of Colonization, observed that the scarcity of funding to employ the adequate staff constituted a major challenge. Without engineers it was not possible to proceed with any Indigenous land claims, contributing to the constant backlog faced by Protectors. Translators were nearly as indispensable.²⁰⁸ A lack of funds and staffing only worsened matters for Protectors that were overwhelmed by the number of claims they were receiving and ultimately increased the likelihood of losing their lands.²⁰⁹

Mapuche communities unable to access a Protector's services sought the aid of local intendencias that did not possess the resources or knowledge to navigate these cases. These disputes and claims often fell to local officials. When the arrival of European colonos and Chilean settlers' led to an increase in usurpation cases, local intendants responded by writing to the Ministry of Colonization asking for more protectors.²¹⁰ One such official was the intendant of

²⁰⁷ Ramón Briously al Ministro de Colonización, Mar. 21, 1903, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1120, see also, *Memoria de la Inspección General de Tierras y Colonización 1906*, ANH, Minrel, vol. 173, 140-141.

²⁰⁸ "Informe del Inspector General de Colonización Don Temístocles Urrutia", Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 230.

²⁰⁹ "Informe del Protector de Indígenas de Llanquihue Daniel Cerda", in Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 171.

²¹⁰ The Araucanía had three intendencias (Cautín, Malleco, and Arauco) during this period with one intendente each, and after 1975 Arauco was redesignated as part of the Biobío province. As historian Andres Estefane demonstrates, the creation of new provinces and administrative reorganization in the Araucanía, much like in northern Chile and Easter Island, was linked to processes of colonial expansion and Chileanization. Estefane, "Estado y Ordenamiento territorial en Chile, 1810-2016," 107-108. See also, Ramon Briously al Ministro de Colonización, Mar. 21, 1903, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1120.

Arauco who wrote to the bureaucrat Ramon Briously at the Offices of the Inspector General of Colonization, “There have been many occasions in which the tribal leaders of Cañete have presented themselves to this intendency presenting evidence to the abuses of which Indigenous people are victims ... The intendency has sought the aid of the Ministry various times in light of these allegations.” The request was forwarded to the Ministry of Colonization’s headquarters in Santiago, and Briously added that his office had made similar petitions in the past. Briously and other officials soon realized that the protection of Indigenous lands was not a priority for the Ministry of Colonization, and requests for more protectors were often ignored. When intendants were not available to assist with Mapuche claims, other bureaucrats such as fiscal protectors attempted to help these communities, though their knowledge of Indigenous land laws was limited, and their ignorance could have detrimental effects on the case. Without a protector, Mapuche peoples would need to represent themselves before the Ministry and potentially make a mistake that could result in losing their lands. Understanding the significant disadvantage of not having a protector, some communities, such as those living in Angol, traveled to Temuco seeking legal representation. In 1908, Jose Llanca Penapil, Pedro Canal, and others petitioned for an interpreter to be sent to Angol to assist their community with land disputes since they did not have a protector. Their petition was denied by the Ministry of Colonization offices in Santiago, indicating that an interpreter was not needed since they did not have a protector.²¹¹ The reply ignored the local challenges, mainly the chronic lack of protectors, that led Peñapil and others to ask for an interpreter to help them present their own case. This response, along with the lack of reply to petitions made by the intendants, demonstrates that although mechanisms and

²¹¹ Solicitud de Jose Llanca, Pedro Vayal y Otros ,19 May 1908, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1389.

institutions existed through which Mapuche peoples could petition for title to their lands, it was not a priority for the government to make these avenues accessible.

The relationship between Protectors and local Mapuche communities was complex, and much like other bureaucrats and government officials of their time they also held prejudiced beliefs against Indigenous peoples. In case files and their annual reports, protectors such as Euljio Robles Rodríguez complained about Indigenous communities' vices, such as laziness and alcoholism, and argued that they should take steps toward becoming more civilized before receiving a *titulo de merced*. In Robles' view, this included learning how to read and write along with meeting other requirements for the *titulo*.²¹² Broader societal views also reflected a skepticism toward the government's ability to integrate Indigenous peoples into Chilean society despite these requirements. In his autobiography José Miguel Varela, a veteran of the War of Occupation, remarked on how gullible, desperate Mapuches were willing to trade their animals, provisions, and even their lands for a few coins to buy alcohol. With no shortage of unscrupulous notaries who were available at all hours of the day, he commented, these lands would be easily lost even if Mapuches received titles.²¹³

Local press sources such as *El Colono de Angol* also portrayed Mapuche peoples as woefully unfit to adapt to their new reality, though they attributed this to an inherent laziness, "Those times passed and the Indian preserved his laziness... reduced to live in small plots of earth and obligated to work for his daily sustenance, today he lives burdened by two of his great enemies: work and hunger."²¹⁴ In an article titled, "Los Ultimos Araucanos" on the deteriorating

²¹² "Memoria del Protector Euljio Robles Rodríguez," *Memoria de la Inspección General de Tierras y Colonización 1906*, ANH, Minrel, vol. 173, 156-157.

²¹³ Vergara del Solar and Héctor Mellado, "La violencia política estatal contra el pueblo-nación mapuche durante la conquista tardía de La Araucanía y el proceso de radicación (Chile, 1850-1929)" 12-13.

²¹⁴ "Problemas de la Araucanía: La Civilización de los Indígenas" *El Colono de Angol*, no. 3204, 18 Jan. 1900, p. 1.

situation of Mapuche communities, the author expressed some sympathy for communities who continued fighting for land titles in the courts, but claimed that they were doomed to extinction because of their cultural traditions and growing poverty. These Mapuches, unlike their brave, heroic ancestors, lived in meager huts and did not have the resources to sustain themselves. The author argued that the retention of their cultural traditions such as playing the flute, their growing desperation, and their physical mistreatment at the hands of others ensured that this generation of Mapuches would be the last since they were ultimately “worse than animals, they were Indians.”²¹⁵

Some protectors who held intolerant views perceived Mapuche petitions as a burden for the Ministry and were not inclined to support their cases. One example was the case of Santos Ancapi, a Mapuche peasant who together with other family members, denounced their local protector for ignoring their repeated pleas for aid. Their community was gradually and violently displaced from over 500 hectares of land, as he described it. At first usurpers had taken 250 hectares, then 20 more, and onward. Ancapi concluded that Indigenous communities were losing their lands due to the inaction of local bureaucrats and cited several ongoing cases. The protector rejected the charges and responded that Indigenous people complained too much and blamed everything on their local protectors. He further denounced Indigenous communities who out of desperation went to Santiago to attempt to speak to the president. The protector referred to these cases as a nuisance both for the president and for Ministry officials because these Indigenous petitioners did not follow the bureaucratic chain of command.²¹⁶ Despite their views, protectors were one of the few and best resources Indigenous communities had as they attempted to preserve their lands and apply for titles.

²¹⁵ “Los Últimos Araucanos” *El Colono de Angol*, no. 3181, 25 Nov. 1899, p. 1.

²¹⁶ Solicitud de Santos Ancapi, 1909, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1449.

Protectors who were inclined to help Indigenous communities did not have the legal authority to enforce laws and were subject to decisions made by the Ministry of Colonization and the Civil Court of Temuco. The members of these institutions, however, were entwined in the social hierarchy of the region that favored local wealthy landowners, and their decisions made in land cases usually favored these elites. Attention to local social hierarchies was crucial in a recently occupied region as government bureaucrats formed relationships with these local elites, simultaneously reinforcing both parties' political authority. As the Protector of Indigenous Peoples Daniel Cerda observed in his 1911 report, the decisions of predatory bureaucrats and judges in local courts made it likely that these communities would lose their lands. By his estimate, Mapuche petitioners lost more than half of the cases they filed due to unscrupulous bureaucrats.²¹⁷ In one such example, a Mapuche community from Purén argued that their land title excluded the most fertile lands in their plot. This land, they declared, had belonged to them “since time immemorial.” While their corresponding Protector of Indigenous peoples and the local sub-delegation supported their claim, a local landowner named Don Bernardo Oenick had already purchased their lands from the government. An engineer from the Ministry of Colonization supported Oenick's claim, indicating that there was no record of this Indigenous community owning the lands in question. Oenick invested significantly in the property by constructing fences and homes for workers that only bolstered his rightful claim to the contested land in the Ministry's eyes. In 1910, the Ministry further justified its ruling by adding that the Mapuche people of Purén had done little to make the lands productive.²¹⁸ The local protector did

²¹⁷ “Informe del Protector de Indígenas de Llanquihue Daniel Cerda”, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 170-171.

²¹⁸ *Solicitud de Indígenas de Purén*, 1910, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1335.

not have the legal authority to fight these verdicts, and while the archival record ends with the Ministry's ruling, it is likely that the community of Purén did not recover the contested land.

By 1911, Protectors in the southern Araucanía wrote to the Ministry of Colonization offices in Santiago explaining why the *radicación* of Mapuche communities was failing. The problems faced by their offices were worsened by long-standing issues, such as a lack of consistent funding and staff, which only added to the backlog and increased the possibility of an error in the handling of cases. While an appeals process existed, once the Ministry of Colonization or civil court ruled against an Indigenous group, there was little protectors could do to stop their lands from being taken. Despite the office's severe limitations, however, it was one of the few recourses Mapuche communities had if they hoped to retain some of their territories. As some sympathetic protectors petitioned for more aid and resources, a 1912 report from the Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización (Parliamentary Commission on Colonization) reached a different conclusion. The report recommended reducing the number of Protectors of Indigenous Peoples by combining Malleco and Arauco's offices on the justification that there were few Indigenous people there "who have not entered the normal regimen of civilization."²¹⁹ The year prior, the number of engineers was also reduced in the region from five to three. These measures effectively ensured that Mapuche petitioners would need to wait even more time to have their cases processed. Altogether, the inefficiency and lack of legal power of protectors of Indigenous peoples was by design and reflected the government objective of displacing as many Mapuche communities as possible from their lands.

²¹⁹ Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, xxxvii.

Prerequisites to Land Ownership and their Effect on Mapuche Communities

The consequences of colonization and the subsequent loss of lands for many Mapuche communities were immeasurable. Along with the loss of life caused by the Wars of Occupation, surviving Mapuche groups faced the immediate threat of starvation in the war's aftermath. The process of land redistribution resulted in waves of Mapuche migration into the cities and ports to look for employment. Much like other landless Indigenous peasants from the central valley of the country, this integrated Mapuche communities into an emerging labor migration chain at the turn of the twentieth century. Other Mapuche groups crossed the cordillera into Argentina, seeking larger spaces to continue grazing cattle and growing crops without the threat of encroachment.²²⁰ For Mapuche families that stayed behind, however, life on the frontier would become increasingly unstable as the Chilean government did not grant remaining Indigenous peoples in the Araucanía *títulos de merced* by 1904, an aspiration of some bureaucrats at the Ministry of Colonization. While *radicación* remained the goal of a few Protectors of Indigenous peoples who believed that *reducciones* would result in the eventual integration of Indigenous peoples into Chilean society, land ownership requirements further marginalized and made survival increasingly difficult for these communities. While these prerequisites changed as colonization progressed, the government only created more requirements for Indigenous communities to fulfill. The Ministry of Colonization argued that Indigenous land ownership requirements were needed to civilize what they perceived as barbarous tribes. While Protectors

²²⁰ Exact figures on the number of Mapuches living and emigrating from the Araucanía during this period, along with the amount of Mapuches who died during the Wars of Occupation, have been difficult to reconstruct. In 1907, the Chilean government conducted the first *Censo de Indígenas* that was supervised by Capuchin monks. As Father Jerónimo de Ambergá observed, many communities refused to participate, and surveyors were unable to reach all locations with Indigenous populations. The census concluded that there was a total of 101,118 Mapuches living in the Araucanía, with the highest concentrations in the provinces of Cautín 46,781, Valdivia 26,134, and Malleco 12,259. These figures, however, were disputed by the anthropologist Tomas Guevara who was living in Temuco at the time and estimated that the number of Mapuches in the Araucanía was closer to 150,000. Bengoa, *Mapuches, Colonos, y el Estado Nacional*, 81-82.

of Indigenous Peoples, ministry bureaucrats, and the local press proposed that private land ownership was the eventual goal, in practice communal landownership was detrimental to these communities. Indigenous land policies damaged community relationships, reduced their possibility of their survival because small plots were inadequate for farming, and increased encroachment by the government.

With an increase in the region's population and a scarcity of lands available, Mapuche groups vied against one another for lands the Ministry of Colonization reserved for Indigenous peoples. The Protector of Indigenous Peoples Daniel Cerda recounted in his 1910 report to the Ministry of Colonization that Mapuche peoples came to his office with increasing frequency to question the Indigenous identity of their neighbors to gain more lands. Mapuche witnesses argued that individuals were not Indigenous, when according to the protector it was clear from the language, the last name of the person in question, their customs, and their physical appearance that they were. Other Mapuche communities, aware that collective titles were awarded based on the number of community members living in the parcel, attempted to gain more lands by adding non-Indigenous peoples to their list of family members.²²¹ These situations led to infighting among neighboring communities, and created an additional problem for local Protectors who verified their claims.

After 1910 the Chilean government began requiring Indigenous people to apply to an official registry to receive a *titulo de merced* under the guise of resolving identity disputes. Once protectors verified their identities, their names were published in the *Diario Oficial*, an official

²²¹ Cerda's statements suggest that indigenous people were also categorized as such based on their physical appearance and presented themselves physically before Protectors in order to verify their identity, and no genealogical criteria was used to verify their ethnic identity beyond their appearance and the testimony of community members which verified that they followed the customs of their Indigenous community along with speaking the language. Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 171.

record of government activities published daily in Santiago. Once their names appeared in the *Diario Oficial*, a process that could take months if not years, Protectors of Indigenous peoples could then proceed with the *radicación* process. While created to address the concerns of Protectors of Indigenous Peoples such as Daniel Cerda, the registry processes delayed Indigenous land claims. It also proved to be an additional obstacle to land ownership that Europeans and Chileans living in the region did not face. In contrast to the Mapuche, these communities did not have to prove their identities, which were not subject to questioning by potential usurpers such as land speculators, hacendados, or their neighbors.²²² The existence of an Indigenous registry and registration requirements was evidence of the Chilean state's use of identity as part of their settler colonial aims. Their Indigenous designation, which distinguished them from other citizens, created additional barriers that made obtaining land titles more difficult. The registry's creation, therefore, was not created to address the enduring issues of land displacement that Protectors of Indigenous people were largely unable to handle.

²²² Registries of European communities that migrated to the region were maintained, though these were used to keep track of the professions, family members, and the resources allocated to each family, and did not affect the process of distributing land titles. More information on these records can be found in, ANH, Minrel, vol. 720, and ANH, Minrel, vol. 144.



Figure 8: A Mapuche family circa 1890. Source: <http://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/>

Unlike European and Chilean families, Indigenous communities in the Araucanía were given land titles as groups, which only further strained communal relationships. Originating from the 1866 land law, this procedure was among the most important in shaping the region's landscape because it placed Indigenous communities at a significant disadvantage compared to Europeans and Chileans, who received land titles by individual families. The Chilean

government believed that communal titles were the first step to individual ones, and if Mapuche groups could make communal lands productive through the growth of profitable crops such as wheat, the government could one day create laws allowing them to apply for individual titles. Mapuche *títulos de merced* could have well over fifty people on a single title, and interpersonal conflicts soon emerged within these communities about who would receive larger land plots. In 1909, for example, 320 *reducciones* were awarded land titles for 9,699 individuals, with an average of thirty people per title. In some instances, individuals received five to eight hectares each, a stark contrast to Europeans who received forty hectares per head of family and twenty more hectares for every male son under the age of 25.²²³ While land distribution rules among individual European families were clearly defined as early as 1874, these did not exist for Indigenous lands at that time. In some cases, caciques were given more territory due to their position as community leaders. Mapuche communities, in essence, were given land titles similar to their colonial holdings while living in a region undergoing processes of capitalist accumulation, further diminishing their ability to survive. Europeans and Chilean families possessed more property per individual than Mapuche people, placing the latter at a disadvantage when it came to the cultivation and sale of crops in local markets.

The lack of support from the Chilean government for Mapuche communities applying for titles, along with the states grouping of Mapuches in collective titles irrespective of familial or communal ties created tensions among these communities. As anthropologist José Bengoa has argued, the Ministry of Colonization's *radicación* process also complicated tribal relationships by arbitrarily giving *títulos de merced* to individuals with whom they had no familial ties. Since tribes typically applied for titles with their family members, sharing land titles with

²²³ Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, xxx.

strangers created problems and internal disputes that required government intervention in some instances. Bengoa observed that during the first decade of the twentieth century Mapuche communities fought amongst themselves more than non-Indigenous people.²²⁴ Annual reports from Protectors of Indigenous Peoples support this view and add that the influx of lawsuits and *denuncias* from Mapuche peoples was primarily an act of desperation from communities without sufficient land to sustain themselves. Living on reduced lands with a large group of people did little to ease tensions. In some cases, Mapuches denounced one another or served as witnesses for non-Indigenous usurpers, resulting in a further breakdown of community relationships.²²⁵

As the military occupation of the Araucanía progressed, and Mapuche forces were nearing defeat, the Chilean government passed a law on January 20th, 1883, prohibiting Indigenous communities from selling or renting their lands for ten years. While Protectors argued that following these laws only helped to civilize Mapuche groups, in practice the prohibition encouraged them to abandon their land claims. The ten-year period was intended to force these communities to adapt to smaller plots, a significant change for cattle herding Mapuche tribes who had lived on expansive lands before the Wars of Occupation. Cattle grazing and the maintenance of other livestock required large plots of land, and many communities were no longer able to rely on them for their sustenance. Mapuche communities also relied on foraging for fruits, mushrooms, and fishing as part of their diet, which required unrestricted access to land.²²⁶ Reduced plots forced Indigenous communities to grow other crops that they may not have been accustomed to farming since they no longer had access to what became

²²⁴ Bengoa, *Mapuches, Colonos, y El Estado Nacional*, 76.

²²⁵ Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 171.

²²⁶ Pablo Marimán Quemenado, "Los Mapuches Antes de la Conquista Militar Chileno-Argentina," in ¡Escucha Winka! *Cuatro ensayos de Historia Nacional Mapuche y un epílogo sobre el futuro*, ed. José Millalén Paillal, Pablo Marimán Quemenado, Rodrigo Levil Chichahual, and Sergio Caniuqueo Huiricapán, 57.

privately owned lands. The law initially extended to the Araucanian provinces of Malleco and Cautín with large Mapuche populations and excluded areas with scattered settlements. When colonization forces moved south, the prohibition further extended to the southern Araucanian border areas of Valdivia, Chiloe, Llanquihue, and Magallanes.²²⁷ The ten-year restriction also ensured that Mapuche tribes did not financially profit from selling their ancestral territories. For communities who refused to abandon their lands but were struggling to adapt to the reduced parcel size, this requirement brought some to the verge of starvation. The restrictions set on the selling of Mapuche lands were also a contrast to the early land laws of the independence period that permitted Indigenous peoples to sell their lands freely. In 1893, the Chilean government extended the prohibition for another ten years, arguing that the situation pertaining to Indigenous lands was too unstable.²²⁸

While some bureaucrats at the Ministry of Colonization and Protectors of Indigenous peoples believed that the prohibition extension would safeguard remaining Indigenous lands, in practice it did little to protect them from land encroachment. The prohibition only further highlighted their status as secondary citizens who were unable to make decisions over when to sell their property despite their precarious living situation.²²⁹ While the Chilean government did not allow European *colonos* to sell their lands for five years, these communities had access to other resources such as diplomats from their home countries that could advocate for their needs. Unlike Mapuche and Chilean farmers, each European family was entitled to financial support to invest in their farms, even if the Ministry of Colonization did not always provide it. This obligation, coupled with the fear of negative propaganda, made it more likely that they could

²²⁷ “Memoria del Protector Euljio Robles,” *Memoria de la Inspección General de Tierras y Colonización 1906*, ANH, Minrel, vol. 173, 160.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Bengoa, *Mapuches, Colonos, y El Estado Nacional*, 46.

obtain some form of aid. In some cases, the government also provided loans to buy their tools and materials for fencing and cattle-raising, resources Indigenous people did not receive with their land titles.²³⁰ According to the December 1866 land law, Indigenous individuals who left their lands relinquished any present or future ownership claims. As a result, groups on the verge of starvation faced a difficult decision: keeping their reduced lands or migrating to seek opportunities elsewhere.²³¹ Some Indigenous groups crossed the border to Argentina in search of more land, while others migrated to other parts of Chile searching for work. Abandoned lands ultimately represented a financial opportunity for the Chilean state. According to the December 1866 law, any abandoned Indigenous lands automatically became fiscal properties of the state and could be sold as fiscal properties in auctions. Or, at the Ministry of Colonization's request, these lands could be redistributed to European colonos. Furthermore, the state was under no obligation to provide Indigenous communities who abandoned their land with plots elsewhere.

The legislative requirements for land ownership aimed to incorporate the Mapuche into a capitalist economy by encouraging them to grow profitable crops, namely wheat, on smaller plots. In this way, the Chilean government intended to gradually “civilize” Indigenous peoples through land titles. By participating in the *radicación* process, Mapuche communities learned to engage the proper bureaucratic channels, and by remaining on their lands they would eventually adapt to new farming methods. By growing and selling a crop that was in demand both in the cities and abroad, Ministry officials believed these Mapuche communities could contribute to the economy, though these views ignored the crops that already formed part of the Mapuche diet,

²³⁰As examined in chapter one, the benefits European families received upon their arrival largely depended on the budget of the Ministry of Colonization. More information on these contracts can be found in ANH, Minrel, vol. 720, and vol. 144.

²³¹ Two examples include, *Solicitud de Vicente Huenan al presidente Germán Riesco Errázuriz*, 1903, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1086, and *Solicitud de José Carvajal a Germán Riesco Errázuriz*, 1903, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1086.

mainly squash, beans, potatoes, and other vegetables. This meant that Mapuche families were required to tend to both wheat and their traditional crops. While the Ministry of Colonization promoted the idea that communal land ownership was the first step in a process that would someday culminate in private property ownership once the Mapuche proved that they could make their lands profitable, in practice no steps were taken to do so.²³²

The Chilean state also used prerequisites for land titles to mold the Mapuche into what lawmakers from congress considered proper Chilean citizens. As an official from the Ministry of Colonization reflected in his 1903 report, the goal of integrating Indigenous communities through the series of land laws was that eventually the “stronger race would absorb the weakest.”²³³ Further requirements for land ownership passed in the first decade of the twentieth century, such as sending Indigenous children to a religious or state-run school, were emblematic of this larger goal. Historians Sol Serrano has argued that public education advanced alongside state encroachment in the Araucanía with the goal of integrating their pupils into the nation.²³⁴ One Protector of Indigenous people stressed that, “The solution is to civilize them, building schools in the countryside, forcing them into military service, forcing them to give up polygamy, and making *cacicazgo* disappear. Nothing contributes more to those objectives than school and the constitution of Indigenous people’s individual property, since the indigenous person has asked for the latter, it is only evidence of their progress.”²³⁵ Civilization, as defined by the

²³² Protectors of Indigenous peoples reflect on the goal of one day distributing land to individual families, but as of 1911 no Protector mentioned a specific date for when this might occur.

²³³ *Memoria de la Inspección General de Tierras y Colonización 1902*, ANH, Minrel, vol. 169, 11.

²³⁴ Sol Serrano, “De escuelas indígenas sin pueblos a pueblos sin escuelas indígenas: La educación en la Araucanía en el siglo XIX.” *Historia*, vol. 29, 1995-1996, 423-474. More on how generations of Mapuche families used state institutions to advocate for their communities, and the broader role of education in the colonization project can be found in, Florencia Mallon, *Courage Tastes of Blood: The Mapuche Community of Nicolás Aillío and the Chilean State, 1906–2001* as well as Julio Pinto, *La formación del estado y la nación, y el pueblo mapuche: de la inclusión a la Exclusion*.

²³⁵ “Memoria de Austin Edwards,” *Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores 1910*, ANH, Minrel, vol.176, 470.

protector, meant a renunciation of Mapuche identity and traditions. Scholar Andrés Donoso Romo has observed, however, that Mapuche *lonkos* also utilized educational requirements to their advantage and encouraged students to use the knowledge received in these schools to advocate on behalf of their tribes. Although some Mapuche communities abided by these requirements, this did not significantly improve the odds of protecting their territories from encroachment.

Conclusion

The evolution of Indigenous land laws in the three decades following the Wars of Occupation ultimately resulted in more Mapuche communities being displaced from their lands, since the new legal framework made it increasingly challenging to obtain land titles. While legislation moved to include more requirements regarding such elements as education levels and proof of Indigenous heritage, the amount of time spent fulfilling these requirements created more opportunities for land disputes and displacement. The Chilean government created conflicts over scarce lands, and the disputes and separations of families who could no longer afford to live together broke significant social and cultural bonds in these communities. These displacement mechanisms were all facilitated by a bureaucracy that was largely inefficient by design in protecting Mapuche land rights. Though land laws were theoretically created and evolved using the rhetoric of further protecting Mapuche land rights, in reality the criteria for establishing Indigenous identity and the requirements communities needed to meet to receive land titles made obtaining them exceedingly tricky. In 1906, the local newspaper *El Colono de Angol*, republished an article titled “Radicación de Indígenas” from the national newspaper *El Diario Ilustrado* that summarized the plight of Mapuche vagabonds roaming the streets due to dispossession from lands that had once belonged to their parents. At the time it was printed, over

50,000 Indigenous peoples in the region had not received a title. Nevertheless, the article denounced *caciques* who went to Santiago complaining about dispossession and claimed that laws existed to protect these communities and their lands. It concluded by stressing the importance of “properly training” Mapuche communities by sending them to school before they could be considered worthy of land ownership.²³⁶ Altogether, these laws produced a class of landless Mapuche people who struggled to provide for their families. From the government’s perspective, there were numerous advantages to displacing Indigenous peoples beyond having more land to redistribute to private owners or redesignated as fiscal territories. Mapuche communities, familiar with local farming methods, would help elites in the region who needed labor for their growing haciendas. Having a large class of peasants like that of the central valley meant more farmhands for Chilean and foreign landowners, workers for the growing railway system, and a labor force for growing towns. By the turn of the twentieth century, landowners in the Araucanía such as José Bunster, “The King of Wheat,” and Jervasio Alarcón had purchased or stolen enough land to form large estates and required a large workforce to maintain their haciendas.²³⁷ As we will see in the next chapter, Chilean settlers also had conflicts with *hacendados* and used the legal system to promote their ideas of land ownership.

For Mateo Huenchumen Huenteo, much like the countless Indigenous families who filed petitions against abusive landowners like Jervasio Alarcón, justice was elusive. The Commission for Lands and Colonization, an office within the Ministry of Colonization, ultimately ruled in favor of Alarcón, dictating that the property Huenchumen and his family lived on did not legally belong to them. In 1903, an engineer from the Commission drew a map of the property to make a

²³⁶ “Radicación de Indígenas” *El Colono de Angol*, Oct. 6, 1906, no. 4233, p.2.

²³⁷ Jervasio Alarcón’s encroachment on other Indigenous territories, as well as the expansion of haciendas in the region are further documented in Klubock, “Ranquil: Violence and Peasant Politics on Chile’s Southern Frontier” 126-127.

ruling in the case; if the lands Huenchumen claimed were outside Alarcón's property, the Commission would consider his request to recognize an Indigenous colony in the area. The protector of Indigenous peoples in the area also contributed to the report, indicating that Huenchumen had never informed him of any conflicts with Alarcón. By doing so, the protector had weakened Huenchumen's claims since he had not followed the proper bureaucratic chain of command. An update on June 25th from the engineer assigned to the case confirmed that Huenchumen's land was included in Alarcón's property. The Commission ultimately ruled in Alarcón's favor, declaring that Huenchumen and his family would need to vacate their lands and form a colony elsewhere. Lorenzo Leviman, who had also filed a petition against Alarcón on behalf of his fifty family members, did not fare much better. In his case, the Commission also ruled in favor of Alarcón, and his family was forced to relocate. Despite land laws that entitled Indigenous peoples to the lands that belonged to their ancestors, the Commission nevertheless ruled that both Leviman's and Huenchumen's lands belonged to Alarcón. Huenchumen's case file concluded by declaring that the ruling was a favorable outcome to what the Commission described as "both Indigenous and fiscal interests."²³⁸

Mapuches that were able to retain their property were continuously under threat from land usurpers, local elites who used their socioeconomic status to rob them of their territory, and laws that resulted in further displacement. In 1913 the prohibition on sales of Indigenous lands expired, once more raising the question of whether the government would grant these communities a greater degree of autonomy over their land. The prohibition had been extended once over a twenty-year period, and by 1913 nearly all the land in the Araucanía had been mapped and redistributed. The Ministry of Colonization once more prohibited indigenous people

²³⁸ Reclamo de Mateo Huenchumen Huenteo contra J. Alarcón, June 12, 1903, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1126.

from selling their lands, arguing that the Mapuche were unfit for private land ownership because they had not yet reached a sufficient grade of civilization. The Ministry concluded that allowing Mapuches to sell their lands without a transition period would ultimately mock the purposes of protecting their property.²³⁹ The following chapter will demonstrate how the Ministry of Colonization also struggled to meet the needs of non-Indigenous Chileans in the region. The inability of local bureaucrats to adjudicate between the different social groups in the region, including European colonos, Indigenous communities, and landless Chilean peasants, led to increased disputes and collective movements that challenged the way land laws were enacted in the region.

²³⁹ Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, Xxxix.

Chapter 4: Contesting the “Limitless Frontier”: The Nacionales Law and Land Petitions in Cautín and Malleco 1900-1912.

On October 12, 1903, Cayetano Sepúlveda, Baldomero Gangas, and other members of the Democratic Party of Southern Chile made a formal petition to the Ministry of Colonization on behalf of 7000 Chilean settlers seeking to become *nacionales*, the legal designation of Chilean colonos with land titles. The Ministry oversaw the redistribution of most lands in the Araucanian province of Cautín where these petitioners lived, while the government reserved some of the remaining territories for fiscal auctions. The petitioners asked that the government definitively suspend the auctions and give all remaining land to Chilean settlers that currently occupied them. Displacement from these lands would mean financial ruin for the families since their homes, crops, and livelihoods were built on these government-owned territories. As Sepúlveda and members of the recently formed, prolabor Democratic Party argued, these families had contributed to the region's progress by clearing forests and making the surrounding lands productive, compared to other settlers who purchased fiscal properties only to abandon them.²⁴⁰ Without the government's help, these families were prepared to travel across the cordillera to Argentina in search of support. The petition concluded that removing these families from the soil where they had lived and worked would be a violent and unjust act.²⁴¹

The Ministry of Colonization summarily dismissed the claim, arguing that the lands were too fiscally valuable to be given to Chilean settlers, especially those that did not meet the criteria for a land title. Furthermore, the lands were not extensive enough to give all 7000 petitioners

²⁴⁰ The Democratic party was formed in 1887 and was linked to the artisan societies of the 1840s. While the party had been successful in organizing unions and protests in other parts of the country and was most famous for its organization of demonstrations against transit hikes, it was unsuccessful in its goal of becoming the major leftwing party of the time. J. Samuel Valenzuela, 1995, “The Origins and Transformations of the Chilean Party System” The Hellen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, December 1995, 19-20.

²⁴¹ Solicitud de Cayetano Sepúlveda i otros al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Culto I Colonización, 12 Oct. 1903, ARNAD, Minrel., vol. 1126.

titles, and a portion of this territory was already reserved for newly formed European colonization companies. The curt response ignored other dynamics voiced in the claim, such as the accumulation of property in the hands of a few hacienda owners, which had only reduced the amount of land available for Chilean settlers. While these decisions were based on the economic value of land and allotting it to those who the Ministry believed could maximize their monetary worth, they resulted in the displacement of thousands of Indigenous people and non-Indigenous Chilean peasants along the Southern frontier.

This chapter focuses on the creation of the *nacionales* colonization law that granted Chileans the ability to petition for land in the Araucanía, as well as the land disputes that emerged among both European colonos and Chilean settlers between the years 1900 and 1912. By the turn of the twentieth century, the Ministry of Colonization had been unable to resolve the issue of land concentration, and local elites enjoyed large plots that they ran like Central Valley haciendas. The fears from Ministry bureaucrats of land concentration in the hands of a few hacendados had largely come to fruition as Europeans, Chileans, and Mapuche communities competed for the scarce land owned by Chilean government as fiscal territories. Many Chileans and Europeans without land titles found no recourse but to travel to Argentina in search for land to settle. The vast amount of land granted to foreign colonization companies in the region only exacerbated fears among Chilean settlers that their government was prioritizing the needs of Europeans before their own and was unable to meet the needs of its citizens. As participants in the settler-colonial project, Chilean *nacionales* and foreign colonos did not confront the discriminatory policies Indigenous communities faced while petitioning for land titles. When non-Indigenous Chileans became eligible for land titles after 1896, their land law did not reflect settler colonial ideas about civilization through the required prerequisites. Despite their

advantageous position over local Mapuche communities, the social hierarchies in the region favoring European colonization created conditions in which Chilean settlers faced economic precarity through potential displacement, forcing them to sell their labor on haciendas under frequently exploitative circumstances. The varying land conflicts that emerged during this period resulted in the publication of an extensive report commissioned by the government in Santiago in 1910 that thoroughly evaluated the success and failures of the colonization project beginning in 1883, though few solutions emerged from the report.

I argue that the evolution of land petition use in the Araucanía, from single families to larger collectives of hundreds and thousands of people, became a way that Chilean settlers challenged government-created land legislation and its enactment by local bureaucrats. While these settlers initially used these *reclamos* (petitions) to prove that they met the criteria of land ownership, these documents became an avenue through which settlers demanded rights and sought to influence policy. Both Europeans and Chileans used local media such as newspapers and organized forums to gain popular support for their demands. The results of these efforts were twofold: the petitions reinforced the position of the Ministry of Colonization and its agents in the Araucanía as a political group that would mediate the relationships of local people to the land through a complex bureaucracy. Simultaneously, the organizing around the creation of these petitions and the use of newspapers and public forums revealed the deficiencies petitioners saw in how Ministry bureaucrats handled land relationships, their preference for European colonos, and their slow implementation of the nacionales law. While the voices of government bureaucrats in Santiago and local officials in the Araucanía are the most prominent in the archival sources pertaining to colonization, understanding the evolving use of land petitions

alongside newspaper sources can help historians include the diverse perspectives of individual peasants overshadowed in narratives of this period.

The first section of this chapter focuses on the local dynamics behind the creation of the 1898 land law giving Chileans a pathway to ownership by designating them as *colonos nacionales*. For these would-be *nacionales*, the Araucanía presented an opportunity to own land which had become more elusive in the central valley. The second section focuses on how Chileans used land petitions to challenge the Ministry of Colonization's preference for European *colonos* and European Colonization Companies.²⁴² The third section examines the government policies that forced foreign and national *colonos* to form alliances, and how these groups used newspapers alongside these petitions to expose their grievances to a broader audience. The chapter concludes with the creation of the *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización* (Parliamentary Commission on Colonization), a government-appointed committee responsible for creating a large-scale study of the ongoing challenges of frontier settlement. The Commission's findings, mainly that the lack of access to land and government policies led to conflicts between national and foreign *colonos*, reflect the importance of these land petitions as a way in which *vecinos* (neighbors) attempted to challenge how local bureaucrats enacted legislation that affected their livelihoods.

²⁴² Land petitions as archival sources are not without their limitations. Firstly, the petitioners could not be too critical of government policies nor question the Ministry's authority if they hoped to receive a favorable response. Second, petitions went through a local subinspector who, depending on the claim, determined whether these would be forwarded to authorities in Santiago or handled in Temuco. While some cases, such as those of colonization companies, produced extensive paperwork, many others representing claims of individual families or groups of *vecinos* might leave less documentation or lack a response from the Ministry. Many cases in the ARNAD's records of land petitions during this period fall into this category. Lastly, as cited in the Salas case later in this chapter, a lack of infrastructure and the expenses required to travel to Temuco prohibited many Indigenous and non-Indigenous settlers from filing land claims. This may be a factor in why some cases were missing responses from the petitioners.

These early forms of organizing during the early 1900s foreshadowed the political organizations and land takeovers that erupted in the region during the 1930s.²⁴³ In the decade prior, rural workers including peasants and inquilinos formed unions to demand access to lands they worked by petitioning the government, conducting a series of work stoppages, and occupying estate lands. These events resulted in the Ranquil massacre of 1934, in which the Chilean military killed 477 forestry workers revolting against the administrators of a lumber mill. The Ranquil massacre and other episodes have formed part of a larger pattern of violence in the region that stemmed from land conflicts in earlier decades and the social hierarchies created by colonization. This chapter supports the argument made by historian Thomas Miller Klubock that collective organizing around land rights in the Araucanía occurred much earlier than the historiography centering on the political organizations of the 1920s might suggest. The historical literature on these early organizing efforts is slim, however, and has largely overlooked the perspective of smaller groups of peasants outside of haciendas that petitioned the government for access to land at the turn of the twentieth century. Moreover, the predominant narratives of colonization in the first decades of the twentieth century have focused on the evolving nature of state-Mapuche relationships and have largely ignored the origins of peasant organizing in the region that occurred because of these processes. While many of these organizations were small

²⁴³ The historical literature on the Ranquil massacre itself and its antecedents is scarce. However, recent works have attempted to make broader links between labor, state violence, and the development of unions. For more on the organizing leading to the Ranquil uprising, see, E. Téllez Lúgaro, C. Arancibia, J. Canales, L. Ruit, R. Quinteros, & Y. Quintupirray, “El levantamiento del Alto Biobío y el Soviet y la República Araucana de 1934.” *Anales de la Universidad de Chile*, (13), (2001), Olga Ulianova, “Levantamiento campesino de Lonquimay y la Internacional Comunista.” *Estudios Públicos*, (89), (2003), 173-223. The Ranquil Massacre has been fictionalized in several works including, Reinaldo Lomboy, *Ránquil. Novela de la Tierra*. (Santiago: Editorial ORBE), 1942, Isidora Aguirre, *Los que van quedando en el camino*, (Santiago: Imprenta Mueller), 1970. Forestry worker organizing is further examined in Thomas Miller Klubock, *La Frontera: Forests and Ecological Conflict in Chile’s Frontier Territory*. The land takeovers of the 1970s in Southern Chile, which were also rooted in grassroots organizing, are further contextualized in Marian Schlotterbeck, *Beyond the Vanguard: Everyday Revolutionaries in Allende’s Chile* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 2018.

and short-lived, they served to illustrate how peasants attempted to address the lack of financial and political support of the Chilean government, which instead invested heavily in European colonization.²⁴⁴

The Creation of the *Nacionales* Law of 1898

The arrival of non-Indigenous Chilean settlers to the Southern frontier, and the push for a colonization law that included this group, are tied to the labor and social relationships of the central valley where haciendas continued to dominate rural society. Although not all Chilean settlers in the frontier who applied for titles were peasants, most were according to information provided in their petitions. As mentioned in chapter one, by the mid-nineteenth century the Chilean government's motivation to integrate into international markets had significantly impacted land relationships in the rural central valley, which were based mainly on the growth of wheat for export and livestock raising. While the evolving international and domestic market dictated which crops were grown in a particular season, and the number of workers needed during the harvest, embedded social relations in hacienda remained stagnant. For the most part,

²⁴⁴ One way that peasants in the Araucanía advocated for their interests was by creating agricultural societies that focused on advances in technology, cultivation methods, and the well-being of agricultural laborers. These organizations provided peasants opportunities for networking and building relationships linked to common concerns such as the well-being of livestock and lobbying congress for aid during poor crop seasons. Among the two most important societies in the Araucanía were Sociedad Agrícola de la Frontera, which functioned primarily from Concepción, and the Sociedad Agrícola del Sur formed in 1898 with headquarters in Temuco. As these societies grew, they developed international networks and participated in agricultural conferences in Europe, where they learned about new farming methods and statistics on topics such as soil quality along with seed exchanges. While focusing on the creation of agricultural schools and lobbying the government for loans that benefitted peasants, the societies continuously advocated for the needs of peasants through newspaper articles printed both locally and in Santiago detailing the effects that economic policies had on the lives of peasants. Each society also reported on the local effects of large-scale deforestation and regularly communicated with Congress to provide recommendations. A component of these societies were mutual aid groups that helped impoverished members. These aid groups were inspired by agricultural unions formed in Europe at the turn of the century. Reflecting the evolving circumstances of the frontier, in 1907 the Sociedad Agrícola de la Frontera's amended statutes expressed their support of immigration and the formation of a union. For more on the formation and goals of these agricultural societies, see, "Sindicatos Agrícolas" *El Colono de Angol*, 15 Mar. 1900, no. 3228, p. 1, "Memoria Que Presenta la Sociedad Agrícola de la Frontera", *El Colono de Angol*, 3 May 1900, no. 3248, p.1. "Sociedad Agrícola de la Frontera" *El Colono de Angol*, 30 Aug. 1900, no. 3298, p.1, "Actualidades: Sociedad Agrícola" *El Colono de Angol*, 3 Sept. 1898 no. 124, p.1, "Actualidades: Sociedad Agrícola de la Frontera", *El Colono de Angol*, no 3347, 27 Dec. 1900, p. 2, "Sociedad Agrícola de la Frontera," *El Colono de Angol*, 19 Dec. 1907, no. 4709, p. 2.

peasants resided within the hacienda, and their social and labor position depended on their access to the land owned by the hacendado. Inquilinos were among the most prominent labor groups in the hacienda system and worked on a rented plot where they would give half of the crops produced to the hacendado.²⁴⁵ Peasants existed in the complex hacienda system with varying degrees of responsibilities and financial stability, though there were few opportunities for to purchase land of their own. The social community of an hacienda included schools, company stores, a church, and other services that asserted and reinforced the paternalistic authority of the hacendado, who often maintained strong relationships with other local elites and political figures in nearby towns.²⁴⁶ During the 1880s international markets outpaced Chilean wheat exports, and haciendas in the central valley once more turned to cattle raising which required fewer workers and diminished labor opportunities.²⁴⁷ In some cases, peasants who were unable to find employment became part of the migratory flow of labor that prevailed well into the early

²⁴⁵ Kay, "The Development of the Chilean Hacienda System 1850-1973," 104-105.

²⁴⁶ The historical literature on rural society during the late nineteenth century has largely focused on the hacienda dynamics in the central valley, particularly the evolution of social and economic relationships. Several works also explored conflicts between inquilinos and hacendados due to exploitative labor practices. See, J. Carriere, "Landowners and the Rural Unionization Question in Chile: 1920- 1948." *Boletín de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe*, (22) (1977). José Bengoa, *Historia Rural de Chile Central Vol. 1* (Santiago: LOM Ediciones), 2016, Arnold Bauer, *Chilean Rural Society: From the Spanish Conquest to 1930* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 2008. Brian Loveman, "Property, Politics and Rural Labor: Agrarian Reform in Chile, 1919- 1972". Ph.D. Diss., (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1973). 34-52, Brian Loveman, *Struggle in the Countryside: Politics and Rural Labor in Chile 1919-1973*, Claudio Robles-Ortiz, "Agrarian Capitalism in an Export Economy: Chilean Agriculture in the Nitrate Era, 1880-1930." Ph.D. diss., (University of California, Davis. 2002). The recent publications of Claudio Robles, Thomas Miller Klubock, and others have encouraged historians to think about the role of technology and labor organizing in Southern Chilean haciendas and have expanded geographical analysis of rural society beyond the Central Valley to include the Araucanía. E. Gallardo, "Modernización ganadera en el sur de Chile: Osorno y sus contactos chileno-alemanes en perspectiva transnacional, 1917-1939." PhD diss., (Freie Universität Berlin, 2017). Thomas Miller Klubock, *Ranquil: Rural Rebellion, Political Violence, and Historical Memory in Chile* (New Haven: Yale University Press), 2022. Claudio Robles-Ortiz, "Agrarian Capitalism and Rural Labour: The Hacienda System in Central Chile, 1870-1920." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41, no. 3 (2009): 493–526. Others have examined how the Chilean government's interpretation of Mapuche land claims in the region has evolved throughout the twentieth century and how individual communities have sought to preserve their ancestral lands. Kelly Bauer, *Negotiating Autonomy: Mapuche Territorial Demands and Chilean Land Policy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), 2021, Florencia Mallon, *Courage Tastes of Blood: The Mapuche Community of Nicolás Ailío and the Chilean State, 1906–2001*.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 110.

twentieth century. This entailed traveling to growing urban centers, ports, and later nitrate mines searching for temporary employment.

For peasants who wanted to rid themselves of the embedded patriarchal relationships of the hacienda, the Araucanía represented an opportunity to have a plot of their own.²⁴⁸ Like European colonos who migrated to the region, Chilean settlers found that acquiring a parcel was increasingly complex. Many arrived as squatters in fiscal lands owned by the government in the hope that they could one day apply for a title. By the late 1880s and throughout the 1890s, there were far more settlers arriving at the region than parcels available in Cautín and Malleco, and there was no law that outlined a path to land ownership for Chileans until 1896. Furthermore, as the *hijuelas* created in the 1880s and 1890s were reserved primarily for European colonos, leaving Chilean settlers petitioning and waiting for land titles that were far from guaranteed. With the delay in land adjudications throughout the 1890s, many Chileans, European colonos, and Mapuches eyed lands beyond the Chilean cordillera in Argentina to settle.²⁴⁹ This became more commonplace beginning in the mid-1890s as the Ministry of Colonization continued dealing with a lack of financial support from the central government, and negatively affected all of the aforementioned groups. In his 1905 report on Colonization, Víctor Aquiles Bianchi, the Chilean counsel in the Argentine border territory of Neuquén, estimated that there were 25,000

²⁴⁸ For a discussion on the background and problems created by fiscal properties in the Araucanía, see, “La Propiedad Fiscal: Un Proyecto Digno de Estudio,” *El Colono de Angol*, 27 Aug. 1898, no. 121, p. 1.

²⁴⁹ Historian Benjamin Hopkins has argued that frontier governmentality is linked to the state's ability to discipline its subjects through economic subjugation. Policing, economic expansion due to larger global trade, and the recruitment of workers into specific labor systems along with migration all formed part of a relationship in which governments exploited frontier peoples to benefit their colonial goals. For impoverished frontier communities who did not benefit from colonial rule, migration to find employment away meant further dependency on the imperial economic system and separation from their homes. Chilean settlers in the Araucanía, while in a privileged position to indigenous communities who were subject to more stringent land policies, were tied to an economic system in the region that encouraged their integration into an exploitative hacienda system due to the scarce lands available. Benjamin D. Hopkins, *Ruling the Savage Periphery: Frontier Governance and the Making of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020), 21-22.

Chileans who emigrated to the region.²⁵⁰ Many of these settlers had their own homes, registered their children as Argentines, and showed gratitude toward their hospitable neighbors. Those who did not settle along the border sought employment throughout the immense Argentine Pampas. The lack of a law that granted Chilean peasants a land title made emigration to Argentina an increasingly viable option. They were frequently joined by their European counterparts, known as free immigrants, who also lacked colono status and arrived in the Araucanía seeking a land title.²⁵¹ There were no laws that provided a path to land ownership for free migrants until 1896, and by then, many preferred to leave rather than stay to navigate the complex bureaucracy of land petitions in which there was no guarantee of a permanent title.²⁵²

The Chilean government was aware of the allure of emigration, and consuls along the cordillera monitored the movement of migrants at the border. Bianchi reported that these newly arrived settlers were searching for land titles and added that the welcoming nature of the Argentine government along with the available land was sure to entice more Chileans in search of wealth and employment.²⁵³ In some cases, even European colonos with titles chose to emigrate in search of better opportunities. By leaving their *hijuelas*, former European colonos breached their contract and did not always regain their colono status and lands if they returned to Chile. Those that did might receive lands elsewhere of a lesser monetary value. However, not all emigrants found prosperity on the other side of the cordillera and return migrants to Chile faced an uncertain future. Alarmed by the number of Chileans who were emigrating, the government

²⁵⁰ Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 24-25.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*

²⁵² While both countries had engaged in wars against Indigenous communities that resulted in displacement and the destruction of the lifestyle and customs of these groups, Argentina's conquest of the desert became a war of extermination that resulted in a significant loss of indigenous life. The Argentine government used formerly Indigenous lands to court foreign settlers. More on the long-term effects of this conflict can be found in Larson, eds. *The Conquest of the Desert*.

²⁵³ Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 388.

established in 1896 a law through which any Chilean emigrant could gain colono status if they returned.²⁵⁴ Despite the creation of this law, its slow implementation, and the scarcity of land available, did not stop the flow of Chilean settlers to Argentina.

While the emigration of Chileans to Argentina was driven by the lack of a Chilean colonization law and scarcity of lands available, this problem was significantly worsened by the Chilean government's priority of establishing colonies of European *colonos* in the Araucanía. With the southern progression of colonization into the Magellan region during the mid-1890s the Ministry of Colonization found itself with a limited number of European settlers in the Araucanía, and the government began employing private colonization companies that recruited colono communities from various cities across Europe. The evolving political relationships between the Agency General of Colonization and European governments further complicated the process of recruiting European colonos, who were subject to immigration bans or quotas on how many migrants could leave their country of origin. Furthermore, transporting individual colono families to Chile was costly, and any Europeans who migrated to Argentina posed a significant financial loss.²⁵⁵ Colonization companies were headed by an administrator who served as the liaison between the colony and the Chilean government, one of their tasks was to ensure that the colonies had the resources to survive in the Araucanía. By settling large groups of colonos from

²⁵⁴ The parameters to regain lost colono status required that settlers submit a petition proving that they met the requirements of a European colono (such as literacy, no criminal record, good moral character) as well as proof of the dates during which they were in Argentina. Those that met these requirements would be given a fiscal territory or *hijuela* of up to 80 hectares for each father of a family, with up to another 40 acres for every male child over the age of 16 in the provinces of Cautín, Malleco, or Valdivia. Colonos with a provisory title were required to follow the requirements set for other colonos to obtain a permanent title, such as building a home on their *hijuela*, remaining in residency for five years, leaving only with the permission of the Inspector General de Tierras y Colonización, and working the land themselves. Furthermore, colonos must make no agreements or contracts to sell those lands until the Ministry granted a permanent land title. "Ley 380" Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, accessed January 21, 2022, <http://bcn.cl/2i2jx>.

²⁵⁵ As explained in chapter one, these quotas were directly influenced by the amount of colonos arriving to other neighboring countries such as Argentina and Brazil, the latter of which also used colonization companies to attract European settlers. For more on colono quotas, see ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores vol. 244.

similar backgrounds, the Chilean government hoped to establish new colonization centers to diversify local agricultural production and the fomentation of certain industries that did not exist in Chile such as silk, fruits, legumes, poultry. For example, the Ministry believed that Colonization companies that recruited Italian colonos could bring their knowledge of olive oil extraction to the region with them and create new businesses around its production.²⁵⁶ By doing so, these colonos would positively contribute to the region's economy and potentially create new employment opportunities as well.

One of the most important colonization company owners was the French businessman Charles Colson, who during the late 1890s signed several contracts with the government to recruit thousands of European colonos.²⁵⁷ In 1896, the Chilean government contracted Colson to bring 5000 families over ten years, with an emphasis on migrants from the Basque Country and Northern Europe, to Llanquihue and Valdivia. Companies such as Colson's collaborated with the Ministry of Colonization by providing information about the recruited colonos, organizing passages, and helping these colonos settle in lands that the Ministry provided. By doing so, colonization companies alleviated the burden of the Agency General of Colonization, who focused their efforts on settling any diplomatic conflicts that emerged during this decade.²⁵⁸ Depending on the number of families in the colony, these parcels could be hundreds or thousands of hectares in size. While the government hired many of these colonization companies to populate particularly remote regions of the Southern Araucanía and Magellan region, others

²⁵⁶ Larraín also provided the Ministry with information on European cultivation patterns, geography, and the internal migration patterns of farmworkers. Memoria sobre la Agricultura en la Exposición Universal de Paris, 4 Feb., 1901, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1037.

²⁵⁷ Decreto del 14 de febrero de 1896, 14 Feb. 1896, ANH, Minrel, vol. 720.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

resided in more populated sectors. In either case, the Ministry provided these colonies with the most fertile lands.²⁵⁹

The success of European colonization companies in the Araucanía depended on several factors, including their proximity to local towns where they could obtain necessary supplies. The weather also played a significant role in whether these communities could successfully grow crops that colonos could sell in local markets. European colonos in more isolated colonos, or in those that struggled to produce crops were less likely to qualify for permanent land titles and often abandoned their lands. One such example was the Sociedad Lanin, a colonization company that received over 200,000 hectares along the Villarica Lake. After several years, only 20 families recruited by the company met the requirements for a permanent land title, and of the 200,000 hectares granted, the colony kept only 15,000 hectares. The Ministry redesignated the rest of the 200,000 hectares as fiscal territories. These communities were also surrounded by Chilean and Indigenous neighbors who did not always have land titles. When land became scarcer, tensions developed as Chilean settlers without land titles began to resent the privileges and financial aid given to foreign colonos. At the same time, many Chilean settlers struggled to make it through their initial harvest seasons and found themselves facing the lengthy bureaucratic process required to obtain a temporary land title.

In 1898, the government passed the *nacionales* law of colonization that delineated a clear path to land ownership for Chilean settlers to alleviate escalating tensions amongst themselves, European colonos, and Mapuche communities. Within a broader national context, the *nacionales* law emerged as rural workers moved away from the countryside into the cities like Concepción

²⁵⁹ The Sociedad Agrícola de Queule was another colony that much like Sociedad Lanin, had struggled to retain colonos. The government granted the colony 60,000 hectares for 400 families and at the time of the Comisiones' report the success of their colony remained unclear. Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, XVII.

and Talcahuano searching for stable employment. At the same time, concerns emerged among Chilean elites about how the growing militant labor movement of the northern nitrate fields could affect social relationships in rural areas. The nacionales law, therefore, could be interpreted as an attempt not only to address ongoing discontent among European colonos and Chileans, but avoid potential militant labor movements from forming in the recently occupied regions. To gain colono status, a Chilean settler like their European counterparts should demonstrate proof of no criminal antecedents, be a male head of a family, and know how to read and write. Once the requirements for colono designation were met, every concessionary gained a 50 hectare *hijuela*, with an additional 20 hectares for every legitimate son over the age of 12. After nacionales were granted temporary land titles, they were required to remain in their lands for five years and abide by regulations regarding the fencing and growing of crops. While the government created the nacionales law to improve the conditions of Chilean settlers, their dissatisfaction with its regulations was expressed through local presses such as *El Colono de Angol*. In the February 1898 article "Colonización Nacional," the authors criticized Congress for enacting legislation that, while useful, arrived too late for some settlers," Several days ago, the new national colonization law was enacted, as has been rightly appreciated by the press and by the sensible opinion of the country, without any discrepancy. It is a somewhat late, but always timely, reparation law, which is reacting against the capitalist error of colonizing state lands by foreign immigrants to the detriment of national (Chilean) workers who were tacitly pointing to expatriation as the last resort."²⁶⁰

As witnesses to the consequences of the social hierarchies created by colonization in the Araucanía, some *diputados* (deputies) and governors from the Magellan region expressed

²⁶⁰ "Colonización Nacional," *El Colono de Angol*, 10 Feb. 1898, no. 37, p. 1.

skepticism of legislation that initially favored foreign colonization over Chilean settlements. By this time, the area was experiencing a large influx of European colonization and land distribution similar to processes in the Araucanía during the late 1880s and early 1890s. An 1895 report from the governor of Magallanes, Manuel Señoret, reported that most settlements in the regional capital of Punta Arenas and its surrounding industries were foreign-owned.²⁶¹ This was largely due to an 1874 law that had designated land use in the Magellan region and outlined requirements for colono status, one of these was that the person receiving a title be born in Europe or the United States.²⁶² Governor Señoret calculated that roughly 350 Chileans lived in Punta Arenas in 1895 and lamented that very few Chileans were enticed to settle in the region. Despite the influx of foreigners, harsh climate conditions made clearing the forests for cattle ranching and farming challenging. In an attempt to avoid future land disputes between the few Chileans living in the region and Europeans, Don Gonzalo Bulnes, a deputy representing the region, put forth a motion in 1902 that would reserve 300,000 hectares of land exclusively for Chilean colonization before Congress. Citing the conflict between Chileans, Indigenous communities, and European colonos in the Araucanía, Bulnes disputed the efficiency of spending resources and privileging these migrants over Chileans. He claimed that Europeans in the Magellan region often moved to Buenos Aires rather than establishing roots in Chile because there was nothing that materially, or morally, that tied them to the country.²⁶³ Chileans, in contrast, had a connection to their homeland, and could be depended on to make lands productive. Along with the reasons cited by Bulnes, the financial costs of colonization remained

²⁶¹ Manuel Señoret, *Memoria que el Gobernador de Magallanes presenta al Ministerio de Colonización en 1895* (Santiago: Imprenta Mejía 1895), 48-68.

²⁶² Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 56.

²⁶³ Oficio de Domingo de Toro Herrera al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Nov. 14, 1901, ANH, Minrel, vol. 615, "Los Agricultores de la Frontera: Discurso Pronunciado Por El Diputado de Angol Don Alfredo Irrarrázaval" *El Colono de Angol*, 8 and 10 Nov., 1904, no. 3938 and 3940, p. 2 in both.

a source of concern for members of Congress. On November 14, 1901, deputy Domingo De Toro Herrera of La Serena, Coquimbo, and Elqui called for a compilation of data that indicated how much the government had invested in colonization, the number of migrants who received the colono designation, and how many of these had stayed in the country. Herrera further pushed for Congress to determine the monetary cost of each colono that migrated to Chile. Alfredo Irrarrázaval, a deputy for Angol, echoed Bulnes' concerns and chastised the Chilean government for their inability to resolve the land disputes that arose due to European colonization that affected Chilean peasants.

Challenging Social Hierarchies through Land Petitions

The creation and establishment of colonization companies in regions with scarce lands available created conflicts between Ministry officials and local settlers that in some cases began well before the arrival of colono families. In Llanquihue, for example, all of the 235,000 hectares designated for the 1500 families in Charles Colson's colony were inhabited by local settlers who claimed ownership of the territory. Anticipating the possibility of displacement, the community did not allow engineers to enter their lands to take measurements.²⁶⁴ Unlike Chilean settlers who were squatting in fiscal lands hoping that they could one day meet the requirements for a land title, incoming European colonos recruited by companies had access to colony administrators that served as spokesmen for the needs of their communities.²⁶⁵ Administrators of colonization companies wielded significant control over the land titles of their inhabitants, and in some cases made them subject to potential abuses and fraud. Nevertheless, these administrators had direct

²⁶⁴ Carta de Agustín Baeza Espiñeira al Señor Ministro de Colonización, Aug. 1, 1903, ANH, Minrel, vol. 615.

²⁶⁵ In 1905, the government sent a representative to investigate whether there was truth to the denunciations of Nueva Italia who traveled to Santiago claiming that their administrator was corrupt. The government representative, Señor Canales, cast doubt on the accusations, observing that very few people in the Nueva Italia colony were willing to speak to him or support the claims. The rest of the inhabitants were generally happy, and Canales deduced that the claims resulted from a few disgruntled members. "Lo de la Colonia Nueva Italia," *El Colono de Angol*, May 20, 1905, no. 4021, P.2.

access to Santiago's local officials and governing bodies, placing the colonos in a privileged position compared to Chilean settlers and Indigenous communities who often waited months or years for the government to address their petitions. Colonos who migrated through colonization companies, along with enjoying the financial privileges afforded by the government, also collectively filed petitions to enforce the clauses set in their contracts. In 1910, the Nueva Italia Colonization company, one of the most important and lucrative in the region, filed three petitions to ensure that the government would honor the geographical boundaries set in the company's contract.²⁶⁶ Collective organizing in many ways was also easier for these communities since many of these families had migrated together from Europe, often spoke the same language, shared similar socioeconomic backgrounds, and developed relationships throughout their migration and settlement process in Chile.

The lack of defined borders and the financial and administrative privileges received by European colonization companies directly contributed to local conflicts between Chileans and Ministry officials. In 1908, Benicio Manriquez filed a petition on behalf of a group of vecinos against the Nueva Italia Colonization company, accusing its members of expanding into lands that belonged to their Chilean neighbors and violating the rights of those who purchased fiscal lands from the government. Manriquez argued that the local Fiscal Promoter would not aid petitioners or take any actions that could affect Nueva Italia and pointed to the employees of the fiscal office as collaborators in actions that were putting the lands of Chileans at risk.²⁶⁷ Manriquez further added that in cases where the court has ordered the Fiscal promoter to represent his office, he instead, "has intervened as the supplemental judge in favor of the

²⁶⁶ Solicitud de Salvador Nicosia al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Culto I Colonización, 24 May 1910, ARNAD, Minrel., vol. 1335.

²⁶⁷ Solicitud de Benicio Manríquez: Acusación contra Sociedad Nueva Italia, 9 Apr. 1908, ARNAD, Minrel, vol 1389.

interests of Salvador Nicosia” the legal representative of Nueva Italia. Due to the repeated abuses committed by Nueva Italia on six other occasions and the “complicity” of the Fiscal office, Manriquez expressed skepticism that Ministry officials could effectively address the animosity between the petitioners and Nueva Italia, adding that colonos from the company continued to block traffic and the transport of lumber that was not their own.

In the face of government indifference and to combat future abuses, Benicio Manriquez and 250 local constituents formed the Purén Sociedad de Colonización Nacional (Purén Society of National Colonization) in 1907. Its aims were “to make national (Chilean) colonization a reality,” support Chileans who had independently purchased fiscal territories, and “especially resist any advances (on property) and abuses” from members of Nueva Italia. In particular, Manriquez and other vecinos created the society after an incident where a local farmer named Eleodoro Ramirez was whipped and dispossessed of his property by armed forces working for the Nueva Italia colonization company.²⁶⁸ Members of the Purén Sociedad resolved to recover the lost territory, destroy any fences Nueva Italia constructed, and erect the houses demolished by the colony’s inhabitants. Furthermore, the members were prepared to “defend and counteract against the spirit of absorption that dominated among colonization company members.”²⁶⁹ In response to petition, the Ministry agreed to investigate the claims of illegal expansion by reviewing the boundary lines between Nueva Italia and the plots of the petitioners.

Despite the existence of the 1898 law for colonos nacionales, communities of Chilean settlers remained vulnerable to displacement even when meeting the criteria for a land title, particularly if the government could give the lands in question to European colonos. On June 24,

²⁶⁸ Telégrafo al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Nov. 22, 1907, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1389,

²⁶⁹ Solicitud de Benicio Manríquez: Acusación contra Sociedad Nueva Italia, 9 Apr. 1908, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1389.

1903, José Miguel Sepúlveda, Pedro Guzmán, and others presented a petition before Congress on behalf of over 600 people who demanded that the government prioritize the needs of colonos nacionales. The petition resulted from large gatherings in Temuco supported by the newspaper *El Chileno* and denounced the government's preference for foreign colonization while the "sons of the nation" were removed from lands that were rightfully theirs.²⁷⁰ Information from the gatherings was published in *El Chileno* and allowed the petitioners to bring their issues to a wider audience to gain public support for their claims. The arrival of hundreds of European families to Pitrufquén only worsened the fears of displacement, as many of these Chilean families had lived in the contested lands for nearly ten years. By giving the land to individual European colono families and colonization companies, the petitioners argued, the Chilean government was handing these settlers the hard work and sacrifice of the peasants who had made the lands productive. The delegates at the meeting blamed the Inspector of Land and Colonization, Agustín Baeza Espiñeira, for favoring European colonos and ignoring Chilean petitions for titles despite the existence of the nacionales law. According to the petitioners Baeza Espiñeira had "personally notified each Chilean settler to abandon their homes or face severe penalties" with the purpose of redistributing the land to European colonos. Many of these Chilean settlers had lived on these territories for years waiting to apply for a land title.

Faced with little recourse, the petitioners, like other landless Chileans considered emigration, "We add, to our embarrassment, that we have sent to the Argentine government 800 signatures that ask for lands for 5000 (Chilean) families in the same conditions that all other foreign migrants face."²⁷¹ The petition warned Congress of potentially fatal consequences if the Ministry did not address the actions of the Inspector, noting that the hatred between Chileans and

²⁷⁰ La Colonización Nacional: Un Meeting en Temuco, 24 June 1903, ANH, Minrel, vol. 614.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

European colonos was already great and previous meetings with the Intendant in Temuco were not fruitful. While some Chilean settlers were willing to leave if the Ministry mandated it, others anticipated forced removal "with their arm in hand" and prepared for a violent response, "Our informants assure us that if the government does not hurry to take some steps to protect the evident rights that the Chilean settlers have... we will have to regret some excesses, the limits of which are difficult to define."²⁷² Many of the claims made by the Sepúlveda and Manriquez cases were also echoed in a similar petition filed in September of the same year. After holding a public assembly, the vecinos of Nueva Imperial in the Cautín province asked the government to enforce the national colonization law by redesignating fiscal territories for Chileans who were squatting in these lands. The would-be colonos argued that national colonization was more useful, economical, and just than European colonization.²⁷³

While José Miguel Sepúlveda's published petition did not include a response and the result of Manriquez's was largely inconclusive, the arguments made by the vecinos of Nueva Imperial were disputed by Agustín Baeza Espiñeira himself, who received the claim and forwarded it to Ministry officials in Santiago. As Baeza explained, Chileans had a clear route to colono status that local Ministry offices meticulously enforced. Many of the petition supporters did not meet the requirements for a land title and resided in cities, which also disqualified them from a title. Furthermore, foreign colonization was crucial to developing countries, and Baeza cited Argentina as an example of a country that embraced foreign colonization and was growing economically as a result. Hoping to achieve a similar result in the Araucanía, the Chilean

²⁷² More examples of violence and forced removal of Chileans from their lands can be found in, Caso de Eugenio Zuniga, January 8, 1909, ARNAD, MRE, vol. 1449, and Caso de Juan B. Pardo y Otros, November 5, 1906, ARNAD, MRE, vol. 1335.

²⁷³ Vecinos de Álvarez, José Fidel I otros, conclusiones del comicio publico, Sept. 3, 1903, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1126.

government recruited Europeans not only for agricultural labor, but also to diversify local industries. In 1906, for example, 100 Italians were recruited to live in the Nueva Italia colony specifically to make cheeses in the hopes that this would create new business opportunities in the region.²⁷⁴

Despite the limited success of the Chilean petitioners, the above examples along with the petition from Cayetano Sepúlveda at the beginning of the chapter reveal an evolution in the use of land petitions over time. While originally only used to prove colono status or mitigate conflicts amongst individual settlers around disputed territories, these later became mechanisms through which Chileans could collectively advocate for their positions regarding land distribution. These petitions gain greater significance when viewed within the broader context of labor organizing in Chile during this decade. In Chile's major urban centers and mining regions, a nascent working-class consciousness grew in the first decade of the twentieth century. Workers held strikes and organized political parties to advocate for better working conditions.²⁷⁵ While

²⁷⁴ Carta al Ministro de Colonización, 14 Sept. 1903, ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1126, "Colonos Industriales a Nueva Italia" *El Colono de Angol*, 20 Jan. 1906, no. 4124, p. 2.

²⁷⁵ Much of the historical literature on labor and working-class organizing centers on the nitrate north and urban centers during this period. During the early twentieth century, many laborers migrated throughout Chile for seasonal employment opportunities in the cities, ports, and the countryside, allowing laborers to leave whenever working conditions became unfavorable due to low wages, the suppression of unions, and unsafe working conditions, the latter of which was a persistent issue in the nitrate fields. The migratory flow of labor also allowed for the growth of unions and political organizations to develop, which alarmed the Chilean government and company owners throughout the country. Southern Chile and the Araucanía were a less integral part of the migratory flow, as many laborers found employment in the central valley where there were many large established estates. It was also a more expensive and longer journey to travel to the Araucanía, where employment was more unstable than the Central Valley. For these reasons, there is significantly less literature on organizing in the Araucanía until Mapuche political movements emerged in the 1920s and the Ranquil massacre in 1934. In the Magellan and Patagonia regions, the prevalence of certain industries such as sheep farming provided opportunities for organizing around similar demands. For more on labor organizing in mining regions, see Thomas Miller Klubock, *Contested Communities: Class, Gender, and Politics in Chile's El Teniente Copper Mine, 1904-1951* (Durham: Duke University Press), 1998, Michael Monteon, *Chile in the Nitrate Era: The Evolution of Economic Dependence 1880-1930* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press), 1982, Angela Vergara, "Company towns and peripheral cities in the Chilean copper industry: Potrerillos and Pueblo Hundido, 1917- 1940s" *Urban History*, December 2003, vol. 30, No. 3 pp. 381-400. The creation of an urban labor movement is further examined in Peter DeShazo, *Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile 1902-1927* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press), 1983, Elizabeth Hutchinson, *Labors Appropriate to Their Sex: Gender, Labor, and Politics in Urban Chile, 1900-1930*. (Durham: Duke University Press), 2001, and Fernando Ortiz Letelier, *El Movimiento obrero en Chile 1891-1919* (Madrid: Ediciones Michay), 1985. For a recent

the vecinos in the Araucanía do not use the language of working-class struggle used by labor parties in the region decades later, these petitions instead demonstrate how peasants invoked the language of equal treatment before the law, property rights, and the government's responsibility to enforce its Nacionales law and curb favoritism from its bureaucrats toward European colonos. Their shared experiences as settlers in danger of losing their lands allowed them to form solidarities and networks that empowered them to demand increased rights and, by extension, challenged local bureaucratic authorities in the region.

“En Beneficio de la Frontera:” Chileans and Europeans Organize Together

While the social hierarchies created by land redistribution often placed Chilean landless settlers and foreign colonos against each other, there were also instances in which these groups worked together toward common goals. Among the concerns shared by both groups were fears of banditry, concerns about the lack of resources allocated to local police, and access to government institutions like the Ministry of Colonization. Although animosity among European colonos and Chilean settlers remained, both groups used petitions and later the local press to share how the lack of police and bandits was affecting their communities. Beginning in the late 1890s and throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, local presses such as *El Colono de Angol* aided Chilean settlers and European colonos by providing them avenue to express their viewpoints anonymously regarding land legislation and the government's inefficiencies in handling the rise of crime in the area.

Banditry and criminality along the frontier threatened both the stability of European agricultural colonies, the safety of Chilean settlers, and affected colono recruitment processes.

study on labor organizing in the port of Valparaiso, see Joshua Savala, *Beyond Patriotic Phobias: Connections, Cooperation, and Solidarity in the Peruvian-Chilean Pacific World* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 2022.

The rise in crime and the gendarmes' inability to capture bandits and other criminals, therefore, was portrayed by *El Colono de Angol* as emblematic of government inefficiency in the region. In one 1897 article titled "Lo que dicen los colonos alemanes," some of the colonos interviewed argued that due to the unresolved violent crimes in the region, they felt like they were playing with their families' lives by choosing to stay in Chile. Some of their neighbors, the anonymous interviewees explained, had chosen to make the long journey back to Europe rather than continue risking their lives by remaining in the colony.²⁷⁶ The article also cited an extensive list of attempted murders, homicides, and people injured due to criminal activity, and condemned the government's abandonment of such a productive territory and its people.²⁷⁷ The Municipalities in the Araucanía had been living under the threat of violence for years. Despite this threat, colonos had learned to care for one another without the government's help.²⁷⁸ A subsequent article in 1898 examined the efforts of the Camara de Diputados to fund the Gendarmes police force and

²⁷⁶ The article was a reprint from the German newspaper *Das Echo*, and the editors of *El Colono de Angol* argued that some of the positions expressed were exaggerated or erroneous. Nevertheless, the editors wanted to represent the German perspective in the colonies. They reprinted the piece in hopes that the government could take decisive actions to address the concerns of these colonos. *Das Echo*, they noted, was a universal newspaper with a readership that spanned across various continents, and articles such as these could directly impact the reputation of the Chilean government. "Lo que dicen los colonos alemanes" *El Colono de Angol*, 12 Aug., 1897, no. 2857, p. 2, 4. Further references of assaults and banditry in the region can also be found in "El Bandolerismo en Traiguén" *El Colono de Angol*, 23 Mar., 1899, no. 3079, p.1, and "El Bandidaje en la Frontera" *El Colono de Angol*, 8 June, 1899, no. 3111, p.1.

²⁷⁷ Along with violent acts committed against colonos, robberies of cattle were also commonplace. "Los Gendarmes de las Colonias," *El Colono de Angol*, 25 Feb. 1904, no. 3831, p. 2, "El Bandidaje en la Frontera" *El Colono de Angol*, 18 May 1899, no. 3102, p. 1.

²⁷⁸ While the rural police were a welcome presence for many Chilean and European settlers in Southern Chile, their Argentinian counterparts in Patagonia and Northern Chile had a more contentious relationship with the police. As Alberto Harambour and Oscar Bayer have argued, the growth of the sheep industry and the state's territorial sovereignty also included the expansion of a police and military force that the Argentine government used as a means of social control. As radical labor movements began demanding increased worker rights, the police violently suppressed anarchist unions. Laborers in Northern Chile were also subject to police and military violence due to their organizing efforts. More information on the first massacre of workers in Northern Chile during the early twentieth century can be found in Eduardo Devés, *Los que van a morir te saludan. Historia de una masacre: Escuela Santa María, Iquique, 1907*. (Santiago: Ediciones LOM), 1989. For more on labor organizing in Patagonia, see Osvaldo Bayer, *Patagonia Rebelde*, (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1980), Alberto Harambour-Ross, "Monopolizar la violencia en una frontera colonial. Policías y militares en Patagonia austral (Argentina y Chile, 1870-1922)". *Quinto Sol* vol. 20, no 1 (2016): 1-27, and Alberto Harambour-Ross, "Sheep Sovereignities: The Colonization of the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, Patagonia, and Tierra del Fuego, 1830s-1910s" *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History* (New York: Oxford University Press), 2016.

improve the conditions of struggling peasants. However, the measures were criticized as woefully insufficient to fight the rise of crime in the area.²⁷⁹ Another letter written to the newspaper by an anonymous source hypothesized that the government had hesitated to provide funding for police and relief efforts in the colony because no rich landowners lived there, hence why there were entire neighborhoods without a single policeman.²⁸⁰ The newspaper lamented government negligence of colono safety and argued, "It is the agriculturalists who have civilized and continue to civilize the Araucanía. To their efforts, we owe the existence and foundation of more than ten cities that symbolize works whose progress has no parallel anywhere else in the country."²⁸¹

The rural police force, and later the gendarmes, suffered from a lack of basic resources since the beginning of the colonization project, and *El Colono de Angol* allowed the gendarmes to expose their labor conditions to gain public support for their funding requests. While the chiefs of the gendarmes repeatedly wrote to the Ministry of Colonization explaining how underfunding affected their ability to curb the rise in crime, funding remained scarce. Journalists from *El Colono de Angol* blamed, "the mess (*desbarajustes*) that reigned in all aspects of the government" for these issues, and reported on the deplorable conditions of police barracks, which were lacking in basic furniture such as chairs and did not have enough rooms to perform their duties. Other police barracks did not have stables for their horses or lacked saddles to ride them as well as winter jackets for their officers. In the worst situations, some gendarmes units lacked horses and were on foot, placing them at a significant disadvantage to bandits and other

²⁷⁹ "La Frontera ante la Camara de Diputados" *El Colono de Angol*, 1 Oct. 1898, no. 134, p. 1.

²⁸⁰ The connection between concentrations of police and centers of capital was echoed by a 1903 letter from the commissary of the gendarmes to the Ministry of Colonization, which denounced the larger government investment in urban police while the rural areas and the colonies remained unattended. "Carta Anónima" *El Colono de Angol*, 20 Oct. 1904, no. 3931, p.2. The lack of police in certain neighborhoods is further discussed in "Policías" *El Colono de Angol*, 27 Oct. 1904, no. 3934, p.2.

²⁸¹ "La Frontera ante la Camara de Diputados" *El Colono de Angol*, 20 May 1905, p. 1.

criminals.²⁸² At various points, the gendarmes also had a scarcity of guns and basic ammunition such as bullets, while criminals had the latest Winchester arms. Due to their lack of funding, many police barracks in the colonies were understaffed, and the officers who remained were not always compensated. In the March 19, 1904, article, “Los Gendarmes de las Colonias, suprimidos o no?” the newspaper reported on how the gendarmes who were “always unattended by their government” had gone three months without receiving their salary.²⁸³ While the army received clothing and ammunition regularly, it was unknown how the gendarmes had received these without consistent government support. The article “La criminalidad en Victoria” explained how a lack of proper clothing could create impediments for the gendarmes who during the winter months were exposed to heavy rainfall that impeded their efforts to capture criminals, “With a disastrous climate for national prosperity, with 60 days of rain without being able to work, there is barely a few hours available to pursue a robbery, discovering a crime, or asking for protection or justice that is never found with the necessary efficiency.” While the leader of the Gendarmes, Hernan Trizano, had spoken to the Minister of Colonization about the lack of payment weeks prior and received promises that the government would resolve the situation, funding for the remaining gendarmes was increasingly scarce.²⁸⁴ Although by 1904 banditry had

²⁸² Much like their North American counterparts, the Texas Rangers and Canadian Mounted police, newspapers depicted the Chilean rural police as crucial to the larger project of frontier expansion. Both the Mounties and the Rangers were reorganized during the 1870s to address ongoing conflicts with native communities in Texas and Western Canada. In Chile, calls for more funding for the rural police were linked to the threat of violence amongst both settlers and indigenous peoples. More on the relationship between rural police and settler-colonial societies can be found in Andrew R. Graybill, *Policing the Great Plains: Rangers, Mounties, and the North American Frontier, 1875-1910*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 24.

²⁸³ “La criminalidad en Victoria” *El Colono de Angol*, 20 June, 1899, no. 3116, p. 1. See also, “En el Cuartel de Gendarmes”, *El Colono de Angol*, 2 Nov. 1901, p. 1, no. 3478, as well as, “Sobre los Jendarmes de las Colonias” *El Colono de Angol*, 12 Nov. 1901, no. 3482, p.1.

²⁸⁴ “Los Jendarmes de las Colonias: Suprimidos o no? Tres meses sin sueldo” *El Colono de Angol*, 19 Mar. 1904, no. 3841, no. 3953, p. 2, “El Bandidaje en Acción: Penetra a la Provincia I Amenaza a los Pueblos” *El Colono de Angol*, 10 Dec. 1904, p. 1, “Los Jendarmes de las Colonias: Falta de Cabalgaduras” *El Colono de Angol*, no. 3659, J 13 Jan. 1903, p.2, “Las Cabalgaduras de los Gendarmes: ¡Es Una Vergüenza!” *El Colono de Angol*, 20 Dec. 1904, no. 3957, p. 1.

largely subsided in the Araucanian countryside, fears of a resurgence persisted due to ongoing staffing shortages among the rural police force and gendarmes.

Access to government services and institutions such as the Ministry of Colonization was crucial for any potential settlers or colonos regardless of nationality. In 1903, Eduardo Salas along with vecinos both Chilean and foreign from the cities of Concepcion, the Biobío Region, Malleco, Cautín, Valdivia, and Llanquihue responded to the relocation of the Subinspección de Tierras y Colonización (Offices of the Sub-inspection of Lands and Colonization) with a petition to bring the offices back to Temuco. To process their claims or provide evidence for land ownership, petitioners needed to travel to the city of Temuco where the offices of the Sub-inspection were located. For many colonos living outside of Temuco, traveling to the city was an arduous task that required days or even weeks of travel on dangerous and poorly built roads and bridges.²⁸⁵ Banditry only made travel more dangerous, and some colonos were robbed on isolated roads despite the efforts of the rural police and gendarmes.²⁸⁶ When the Chilean government moved the Sub-inspection of Lands and Colonization from Temuco to Santiago in May 1895, colono groups believed the decision would make the legal processes of obtaining land titles nearly impossible to continue. Temuco, established as a center of colonization since its foundation in 1881, was home to many colonos both foreign and national. Travel to Santiago, in contrast, required a train ride to make the over 600-mile trek to the city and funds for lodgings. The 1903 Salas petition, which was comprised of hundreds of signatures, argued that keeping the

²⁸⁵ The lack of infrastructure in the region was especially detrimental to colonos living in remote areas. In 1900, a group of 60 colonos nacionales from the Huenihuali colony petitioned the subinspector of colonization for a bridge, claiming that during the winter months the conditions in the river isolated them from other local towns where they obtained articles of consumption that were crucial to their survival. Camilo Gonzales i Eugenio Barriga al Sr. Inspector de Tierras y Colonización, Apr. 24, 1900, Archivo Regional de la Araucanía, hereby cited as ARA: Intendencia de Cautín, hereby cited as IC: vol. 13.

²⁸⁶ The Chilean rural police force protected the lands and inhabitants living outside of the agricultural colonies.

Sub-inspection offices in Santiago would have “incalculable ill effects” on the colonization project that was geographically centered in Southern Chile.²⁸⁷ For many impoverished peasants, in other words, the move to Santiago meant that the loss of their lands was a near certainty. Moving the offices away from Temuco represented not only a geographical challenge but also symbolized a larger disconnect between settlers who increasingly needed access to government institutions and policymakers whose interests and goals were largely removed from their constituents. Citing their rights under article ten of the constitution to petition the government, Salas and others argued that their claim was in the best interests of the nation and its new citizens. Recently arrived European colonos, including new colonies of Boers and migrants from the Canary Islands, had an “indispensable” need to access local offices to obtain their temporary land titles. Colonos who purchased fiscal properties in addition to the *hijuelas* granted to them by the Ministry were required to pay dividends and interest charges to the treasury offices that were now housed in Santiago. The ministry office that remained in place of the sub-inspection did not have the resources to fulfill the bureaucratic needs of European colonos, who according to the Chilean government, represented one of the many improvements that came as a result of colonization. The few bureaucrats who remained in the offices of Temuco, the petitioners nevertheless concluded, were serving in the best interest of the south as well as the country and required the support of their government in order to faithfully execute their duties. Moving the office back to Temuco would ultimately “better serve the interests of the frontier and all of the South.”²⁸⁸

²⁸⁷ Solicitud de Eduardo Salas I otros vecinos de Concepción, Biobío, Arauco, etc. al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Culto I Colonización, 23 Oct. 1903. ARNAD, Minrel, vol. 1126.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

While the local representative who received the petition agreed to forward the case to Santiago, the response from the Ministry of Colonization was dismissive of the challenges faced by the petitioners, and justified the move by citing a lack of resources and manpower that was further exacerbated by the civil war of the 1890s. Funding for the Ministry and its offices was also affected by the growth of the nitrate industry in the northern region, which became a growing economic priority along with subduing the growing labor movement in the north. Due to these concerns, the poorly resourced offices of Tierras y Colonización had difficulty retaining personnel and resources to keep local offices open in Temuco. Furthermore, in 1899 under government decree the offices of Lands and Colonization were transferred to Santiago to further centralize government power and reduce costs. As one government official responded to the Salas petition, the offices were relocated to Santiago for “the same reasons that the railroads, the post offices and the central governing bodies existed there.”²⁸⁹ While reducing government personnel might have been fiscally prudent during a crisis, the further centralization of power around Santiago demonstrated that the Chilean government largely underestimated the growing tensions around land scarcity in the Southern Frontier.

Although the government eventually moved the sub-inspection office back to Temuco, the rhetoric of the petition that focused on the needs of European colonos rather than Chilean nacionales demonstrates that Salas and others understood that Europeans were a continued priority for the Ministry of Colonization. Access to revenue through the repayment of debt and obtaining permanent land titles for these settlers was directly tied to the financial interests of the country, and Chilean nacionales could invoke the needs of European colonos to benefit themselves. Citing the interests of foreign colonos as a reason behind their petition, these vecinos

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

were also petitioning against the further centralization of their government. The further away their access from local land governance, the harder it would be to obtain permanent land titles, keep filing necessary petitions, and maintain access to bureaucrats and engineers who had authority over their right to land. These vecinos, much like the Chilean landless settlers filing reclamos against the Nueva Italia colonization company, were in essence petitioning to have a voice in policies around land distribution that directly affected their livelihoods. One of the most striking aspects of this document is the geographic diversity of the hundreds of petitioners who signed the petition, which represent both rural and larger settlements in the Araucanía. Obtaining hundreds of signatures required significant travel and organization as each person had to agree on the language used in the petition. The effort and time required to obtain these signatures demonstrate how important and urgent access to government offices became for these would-be colonos. To draw attention to their reclamo from the wider public, Salas and the others published their petition in a supplement to the German-language newspaper *Der Grenzboten* that they addressed to colonos both foreign and national.²⁹⁰ By publishing the reclamo in Spanish with the signature of the primary petitioners, they hoped to bring their requests to a wider audience and gain support from its local audience in Temuco.

Collectively, the responses to the petitions and newspaper articles exposed in this chapter reflect a disconnect between the interests of local communities and bureaucratic offices, both in Temuco and in Santiago. Throughout these and other cases in the archival record the response is similar: The Ministry of Colonization did not prioritize granting Chilean settlers land titles whenever giving these lands to Europeans was a possibility. Furthermore, the Ministry of Colonization's position as the authority over land ownership in many ways replicated the

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

paternalistic relationships these Chilean settlers had left behind in the central valley or urban factories. Instead of an hacendado father figure who controlled access to land, natural resources, tools, and mitigated social hierarchies within the community, it was now local bureaucrats and a central governing body in Santiago that presided over these matters in the name of the president, who took the place of the hacendado.

Faced with little recourse and a social hierarchy that favored Europeans, many Chileans and Indigenous peoples who could not gain a permanent land title became part of the labor force that worked in haciendas throughout the region. Furthermore, the ongoing nature of these petitions and the large number of participants raised questions about the long-term success of the colonization project. Could the southern frontier be stabilized, and petitions decrease if the legal categories created by the Chilean state favored certain groups over others? Would peasants and Indigenous peoples successfully adapt to working within the hacienda system? And how might the ongoing abuses from land usurpers and hacendados affect the tenuous authority of the Ministry of Colonization in the region?

The Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización (The Parliamentary Commission on Colonization)

On a warm day in December 1910, members of Chile's government gathered at the congressional chamber at the heart of Santiago to discuss these questions and the instability of the southern frontier. Earlier that month, as a response to the repeated *reclamos* and petitions from Chilean landless settlers and *colonos nacionales*, the senate approved the creation of a task force that was charged with compiling all data on the Colonization project in the region, from its legislative beginnings in 1845 to the most current reports from local *intendentes*, representatives from the Ministry of Colonization and the protectors of Indigenous people. The few dozen men

who formed part of this Parliamentary Commission on Colonization consisting of deputies, Ministers, and diplomats, each of them a member of the country's elite, were charged with understanding what were the biggest challenges of colonization to date. They were also tasked with determining what could be done to speed up the process of land distribution and improve the conditions of Chilean settlers in the region.²⁹¹ As the sessions continued over the following months, it soon became clear to the members of the commission that finding solutions to these long-standing issues would be no easy task. To better understand the enactment of land laws in the region, several delegates traveled to the Araucanía on behalf of the commission. They assisted in compiling the large volume of data required for the report. Based on the exhaustive data presented by this commission, Congress would make recommendations to the president of the republic, approve a new budget, and provide a series of decrees and policies to address the issues found by the commission. To support the investigation, in 1911 congress passed a law authorizing the president to spend up to 200,000 pesos to ensure that the existing colonization laws that pertained to indigenous peoples and Chileans were enforced and cover any expenses deemed necessary by the Parliamentary Commission.²⁹²

Members of the commission began by investigating whether the lawsuits and *reclamos* coming from European and Chilean colonos and Indigenous peoples resulted from bureaucratic abuses, usurpation by large estates, or wrongdoing from colonos and others. The commission was also interested in examining whether the ongoing conflicts among colonos and Indigenous communities were a result of laws that were not in place or inefficiency in their enforcement at the local level. Over the next year, members of the commission would repeatedly visit some of the most affected provinces, including Cautín, Valdivia, and Llanquihue, the latter of which was

²⁹¹ Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, 7.

²⁹² "Ley 2465" Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, accessed January 21, 2022, <http://bcn.cl/2k1dy>.

still in the process of land redistribution. Members also visited the regional capital of Temuco and the surrounding towns of Villarrica, Pitrufquén, and Osorno. Due to a lack of railways, the committee was unable to travel further south to investigate the conditions of isolated communities. The commission, furthermore, was required to hold forums in major towns in the region that would allow locals who had filed petitions to come and express their concerns. For colonos that lived in the Araucanía, it would be the first time that they would see many of the deputies who participated in the enactment the laws that significantly impacted their access to land. The Inspector General of Colonization presided over the audiencias, as well as the Director of the Office of Measurement of Lands, the Controller of the Colonies, and the Protectors of Indigenous People. While 2,114 petitions had been filed at the time of the report, the official gatherings throughout the region were attended by thousands of people since several of these petitions were submitted by large groups of people and others who wished to learn more about the status of the colonization project.²⁹³

While the Parliamentary Commission on Colonization broadly concluded that many of the complaints made by both Chilean settlers and Indigenous peoples were justified, it did not offer many solutions that effectively addressed the issues raised in the petitions throughout this chapter. The report found that while the delay in the creation of a nacionales land law and its unequal enactment by local officials created conflicts in the region, the solution was to further educate bureaucrats on the content of land laws so that they might enforce them correctly.²⁹⁴ Delays in granting titles had only worsened relationships between European Colonos and Chilean settlers, yet the commission claimed that local bureaucrats were already addressing the matter. Protectors of Indigenous Peoples who contributed their observations proposed Mapuche

²⁹³ Congreso Nacional, *Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización*, XI.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, XIV.

communities were often the victims of land usurpers and were treated inhumanely by land speculators, who used varying means, both legal and illegal, to rob them of their lands.²⁹⁵ They confirmed the validity of claims that Mapuche communities and Chileans had been violently dispossessed and acknowledged the criminal cases as a result of land disputes, though many did not obtain justice because of a lack of proof or deficiencies in their case. Nevertheless, the Comisión concluded that many of these problems had been resolved and proposed reducing the number of offices of Protectors of Indigenous Peoples in the Araucanía. European colonos who did have land titles in some cases were also found to be the victims of usurpers who sometimes used forged legal documents to drive them off their lands. The controller of the colonies, Otto Rehren, indicated in his 1911 report for the commission that while colonization companies such as Nueva Italia were relatively successful in recruiting European colonos that remained in the Araucanía long enough to obtain permanent land titles, many others were either unable to recruit colonos or had difficulty providing the resources for them to settle permanently.²⁹⁶

The government's inefficiency in its handling of usurpation cases, and its preferential treatment of European colonos and hacendados would soon yield disastrous results. In 1913, a violent conflict emerged between local peasants and the Chilean police (Carabineros) over the Pellahuén Estate owned by Jervasio Alarcón. Like the case of Mateo Huenchumen Huenteo in chapter three, over the years Alarcón continued to collude with local bureaucratic authorities and used varying means (many illegal) to displace fifteen hundred Indigenous peoples and Chilean peasants from their lands.²⁹⁷ Jervasio called on his brother Matías Alarcón who was serving as the governor of Imperial to use carabineros to evict the peasants who were occupying his estate

²⁹⁵ Ibid., XIII.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., 249-260.

²⁹⁷ Klubock, "Ranquil: Violence and Peasant Politics on Chile's Southern Frontier," 127.

in an effort to regain lost lands. These and the subsequent land takeovers leading to the Ranquil massacre reveal how the frontier remained a contested space long after the Occupation of 1883 and how these conflicts were rooted in the land policies the vecinos in this chapter sought to change.

Conclusion

Although the Araucanian colonization project was the product of a settler-colonial imaginary that emerged from the central government in Santiago before the conclusion of the Wars of Occupation in 1883, by the early twentieth century the land policies that emerged from this vision were met with resistance from the local Chilean population. It was an imaginary in which the Araucanía region symbolized limitless expansion southward, and the possibilities of reengineering land use to make the region a center of agricultural diversity and productivity driven by European colonos and colonization companies. As a result, local Chileans were alienated from land titles and the late 1890s and early 1900s settlers used land petitions to fight for lands in the region. They participated in broader discussions around land use through newspapers and community meetings. While the government created the land laws of 1896 and 1898 to resolve land conflicts and provide Chilean settlers with the opportunity to obtain land titles, the social hierarchies created by the government and their inability to distribute land equitably created deep-rooted conflicts in the region. The examples cited in this chapter demonstrate that although no large collective movements existed in the Araucanía in the first decade of the twentieth century, groups of vecinos worked to advocate for land rights through collective petitions. In view of the land takeovers of the 1930s, we can begin to understand these petitions as early mechanisms that challenged government policies that potentially predated the creation of larger aid societies and unions.

The creation of collective petitions and the act of gathering with neighbors to collect signatures gave them opportunities to discuss their visions of agricultural development and the role of their government should be in their respective communities. Quotidian common lived experiences such as fears of crime, poor infrastructure in their towns, as well as shared grievances toward both local and national policies of land ownership brought thousands of Chileans and foreigners together. European colonos sought to retain their land privileges in a terrain where they faced hostile neighbors who did not enjoy the financial assistance and land titles they received. Hierarchies of land ownership also created animosity in the frontier, as Chilean peasants were brought together by their need for access to land, and their resentment of European colonos who received the best parcels. Moreover, these petitioners were united by a need for their government to provide the financial assistance necessary during failing crop seasons, safety from bandits and criminals, as well as access to governmental institutions. In land petitions, we can ultimately identify the roots of what these broader movements became in the next decade: the need for land titles for all peasants, an end to laws that favored some social groups over others, and greater participation in policymaking that affected their daily lives.

Conclusion

In October 2019, over a century after publication of the findings of the Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización, Chile underwent an “Estallido Social,” a nationwide uprising that lasted several weeks and was rooted in discontent over neoliberal policies enacted during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990). While stagnant wages, the high cost of living, and a deficient pension system were broader national issues, in the Araucanía, much like in other peripheral regions of Chile, there were local grievances that took the fore. Due to the economic reforms implemented with the backing of the 1980 constitution, the development of the lumber industry on contested Mapuche lands worsened relationships between the state and Indigenous activists seeking to recover ancestral territories.²⁹⁸ During the 1990’s and early 2000’s the situation grew more tense as logging corporations exerted pressure on the government to use the *carabineros* (national police) to violently suppress Mapuche protestors.²⁹⁹ Lumber corporations, many of which are owned by the descendants of European colonos and hacendados, used the burning of trucks and lumberyards by protestors to pressure the government into taking harsh measures against Mapuche activists. In 2012, the Chilean congress responded by passing a terrorism law that led to the incarceration of dozens of Mapuche activists. Later that year, Andrés Chadwick, then the Minister of the Interior, visited the region in support of lumber corporations and in response activists published a photograph on social media with the banner “Fuera colono

²⁹⁸More on the implementation of neoliberal reforms and the forestry sector can be found in, Thomas Miller Klubock, “Labor, Land, and Environmental Change in the Forestry Sector in Chile 1973-1998” in *Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era 1973-2002*, ed. Peter Winn (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

²⁹⁹ The gendarmes, or police force charged with protecting agricultural colonies, were the inspiration behind the founding of the Carabineros in 1907. Daniel Palma, “Policías Rurales en Chile: Los Gendarmes de las Colonias (1896-1907).”

del territorio Mapuche!” (Colonos out of Mapuche lands!)³⁰⁰ In November 2018, nearly a year prior to the estallido, Camilo Catrillanca, a Mapuche farmer and activist, was shot by Carabineros while riding a tractor in Temucuicui, an Araucanian locality comprised of various Mapuche communities. After his death and legal proceedings in which no police officer was found guilty of any wrongdoing, the subsequent protests throughout the country once more highlighted issues of state violence, Mapuche civil rights, and the ongoing demands of activists.

Amid the 2019 estallido, the statue of Teodoro Schmidt, situated in the town square bearing his name at the center of Temuco was destroyed. It was originally erected in 1950 as a tribute to the role he played in the foundation of the city and his labor for the Topographic Commission.³⁰¹ Below Schmidt’s bust was a bronze image of the engineer with a theodolite and sitting at the feet of the engineer was a Mapuche woman. During the protests Schmidt’s bust was removed, and with a noose around its neck was dragged through the city streets, many of which are named after Mapuche military leaders such as Caupolicán who died fighting Spanish colonial forces. In plazas throughout the city, other statues of popular historical figures including Pedro de Valdivia and Diego Portales suffered a fate similar to Schmidt’s. Valdivia’s statue was also doused in red paint, symbolic of the bloodshed caused by Spanish colonialism. Monuments commemorating Mapuche historical figures, however, were not defaced, used by demonstrators to write their demands. Caupolicán’s statue, for example, was inscribed with the words “New constitution or nothing” in graffiti. Images of the defaced statues were depicted in national media

³⁰⁰ “Cayuqueo: En una década de conflicto mapuche nunca se ha dado con extranjeros operando” <https://www.cooperativa.cl/noticias/pais/pueblos-originarios/mapuche/cayuqueo-en-una-decada-de-conflicto-mapuche-nunca-se-ha-dado-con/2012-12-26/130305.html>, 26 Dec. 2012, Accessed 8 Apr. 2022.

³⁰¹ Jamie Egardo Flores-Chávez, “Procesos de Significación de una Ciudad: Temuco 1881-2019” *Arquitecturas del Sur* vol. 38, no. 58, 31.

as emblematic of the continuous violence permeating the region, part of the larger “Mapuche conflict.”³⁰²

On November 19, 2019, the Popular Plurinational Assembly of Temuco, composed of various Indigenous tribes, symbolically renamed Teodoro Schmidt Plaza as Plaza *Leftxaru* (Lautaro).³⁰³ Ana Llao, a deputy in the assembly, explained the significance of recovering Mapuche territory and the “symbolic importance of dispossessing colonizing figures... who under the mantle of historical figures established a logic of impunity that today is replicated without punishment for perpetrators.”³⁰⁴ For the Plurinational assembly and protestors, the motivation to reclaim public spaces was rooted in a larger goal of recovering a local history erased by non-Indigenous Chilean occupation continuing into the present day. By March 2021, the local government had not taken measures to restore Teodoro Schmidt’s statue, and his great grandson Andrés Montero wrote to the national newspaper *La Tercera* to denounce what he believed was an injustice to the memory and contributions his family had made to the Chilean nation:

(Teodoro) Schmidt was a peaceful man who contributed his knowledge, was key in the foundation of various cities, and measured extensive territories that were later given to Mapuches and colonos. The statue was the Chilean state’s recognition of his selfless professional contributions. Among his descendants are a current Minister of state, two notable ambassadors who are currently serving, and an honorable deputy, along with the numerous Chileans who are exemplary

³⁰² According to a 2016 survey conducted by the Center for Public Studies at the University of Chile, 70 percent of respondents characterized the political situation in the Araucanía as violent. Approximately 68 percent of Mapuches who responded to the survey believed that the region had become more violent over the last ten years. Sylvia Eyzaguirre, “El Conflicto Mapuche” *La Tercera*, <https://www.latercera.com/opinion/noticia/el-conflicto-mapuche/416940/>, 25 Nov. 2018, Accessed 8 Apr. 2022. Mapuche activists have argued that the term “Mapuche Conflict” implicitly blames the Mapuche for the violence in the region, absolves the police from any responsibility and delegitimizes the demands Mapuche communities have made regarding their sovereignty.

³⁰³ Lautaro was *toqui* (axe bearer) famous for developing military strategies critical to Mapuche resistance during the Arauco War against Spanish colonial forces.

³⁰⁴ Flores-Chávez, “Procesos de Significación de una Ciudad: Temuco 1881-2019”, 36-37.

public servants. The complicit silence of the government will only contribute to the rewriting of Chilean history in a twisted way (*de manera torcida*).³⁰⁵

Altogether, Montero's and Llao's statements, and the ongoing repression of Mapuche land activism reveal enduring tensions about the role of state agents in the region, and legacies of settler colonialism that are at the center of this work.

While Montero claimed the destruction of Teodoro Schmidt's statue represents an erasure of great grandfather's contributions and those of other bureaucrats working for the Ministry of Colonization, my dissertation seeks to place their actions at the center of the historical narrative of the Araucanía. I have argued that in order to understand how various communities, such as Mapuches, European colonos, and Chileans were affected by the Chilean state's settler colonial project in the region, it is necessary to analyze the role of bureaucrats like Schmidt in interpreting and implementing land policies. These agents have been largely ignored in contemporary works that have focused on the state's relationship with the Mapuche to contextualize existing conflicts in the region. This dissertation was written in an effort to contribute to this ongoing conversation by demonstrating that the actions of local bureaucrats, while not monolithic, nevertheless contributed significantly to the force of occupation. While laws regarding land distribution in the region were created by policymakers in Santiago, my study shows how the enactment of these laws by local bureaucrats directly influenced the conflicts that emerged between Mapuche communities, European Colonos, and non-Indigenous Chileans in the decades following the Wars of Occupation. By doing so, they form an important part of a larger history of dispossession that continues to affect Mapuche communities today.

³⁰⁵ Andrés Montero, "Monumento Vandalizado" *La Tercera*, 17 Mar. 2021, <https://www.latercera.com/opinion/noticia/monumento-vandalizado/Q5M2AHRMKN65KKYBSYC6MGXC4/> Accessed 7 Apr. 2022. Translation from the Spanish my own.

“Disentangling” a Complex History

One of Montero’s arguments, mainly about the important contributions his family of German descent has made to Chile, is not dissimilar to the rationale Ministry of Colonization agents and other government officials made about the benefits of European immigration. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine nineteenth-century bureaucrats from the Agency General of Colonization or congressmen such as Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna lauding the Schmidt family as exemplary of the industriousness, hard work, and economic potential European colonos could bring to the Araucanía. When thousands of colonos arrived after 1883, however, the Ministry’s local offices were largely unable to address the needs of the influx of immigrants, which soon threatened to disrupt the ambitious immigration quotas set by the Chilean government. These quotas were driven by the Chilean government’s efforts to emulate the perceived economic success of other countries such as Argentina and the United States, which officials believed were flourishing due to their large immigrant populations. The Ministry’s inability to effectively provide consistent financial and infrastructural support for colonos reveals that the government prioritized populating the region during the first decades of the colonization project. Local ministry bureaucrats were at various moments unwilling or unable to help these colonos, who struggled with poor crop seasons and banditry. Despite diplomatic conflicts and internal disputes over the efficacy of colono recruitment, Agency General officials and the Ministry of Colonization continued to support the immigration of European colonos whom they believed represented the future of agricultural productivity in the region.

“From Empty Lands to Stable Culture” reveals that the consequences of the actions of Teodoro Schmidt and the engineers of the Topographic Commission were far more complicated

than his great grandson portrayed. The fieldwork and mapping projects of the Commission, conducted independently of the Mapuche inhabitants of the region, contributed to a settler colonial project intended to erase their history and legitimize the Ministry's role as the arbiter of who could own land in the region. Mapping in the region preceded the creation of settlements and towns that all formed part of a process of occupation, and the lines drawn represented an illusion fabricated by a state that did not always have the manpower or resources to enforce them. The engineers' role evolved throughout the first decades of the occupation to meet the needs of the Ministry, and they became important individuals that both verified land claims and provided their expertise during legal disputes. Mapuche communities seeking to recover their ancestral lands continue to use maps made by the Topographic Commission, which the government still recognizes as accurate representations of property ownership. This discussion challenges this notion and helps contextualize why the renaming of Teodoro Schmidt's Plaza in Temuco was viewed by Popular Plurinational Assembly as a necessary act of "dispossession" in a process of decolonizing public spaces.

While the Ministry of Colonization granted some Mapuches land titles based on the maps created by engineers, cases like Mateo Huenchuen Huenteo's were emblematic of the majority of Mapuches who struggled to obtain *titulos de merced*. Though the land distribution projects spearheaded by the government led to a wave of Indigenous migration to urban areas, thousands remained in the region and applied for titles. Despite their efforts, Mapuche families, including Huenteo's, lost their lands to local hacendados like Jervasio Alarcón who used a variety of tactics, both illegal and legal, to displace them from their lands. The requirements for *titulos* further reflected the government's goal of removing as many Indigenous communities from their lands as possible to redistribute their lands to European colonos. This helps us understand why

the office of Protectors of Indigenous Peoples had limited legal authority to effectively defend Mapuche communities in cases brought against potential usurpers. Instead, Protectors ensured that Mapuches met requirements that included sending their children to state run schools, growing crops on reduced parcels, and eventually providing proof of Indigenous identity. Altogether these requirements served a dual purpose: they made obtaining titles increasingly difficult, which encouraged Mapuche families to forfeit their claims to land; and they forced those who received a title to “civilize” according to the Ministry’s criteria. The plight of Mapuches displaced from their lands, as well as those who struggled to meet the many requirements for obtaining a title, reveal an enduring dimension of settler colonial violence enacted long after the military occupation ended.

Lastly, the organizing efforts of Chilean peasants who also struggled to obtain land titles only emphasized how important bureaucrats were in the implementation of land legislation. By the late 1890s land in the region was increasingly scarce, and non-Indigenous Chileans had no law that provided a path to land ownership. The 1896 repatriation and 1898 *nacionales* land laws were an effort to discourage Chileans from crossing the cordillera into Argentina in search of land to settle by outlining requirements for a land title and attempted to address the growing conflicts between Chilean peasants, European colonos, and colonization companies. With regard to these competing claims over land, Ministry bureaucrats wielded significant authority, since they determined who would receive a title and how laws would be enacted. Local agents who sided with European colonos drew the ire of the colonos’ Chilean counterparts, accusing them of ignoring the *nacionales* law to redistribute these lands to European families and colono companies. In response to policies and bureaucrats that favored Europeans, Chilean peasants presented their *reclamos* with hundreds of signatures to show their collective discontent. This

represented a significant shift in how these claims were originally used and presented. While previously the intent was to prove that individual families met the requirements for a title, landless Chilean peasants later used these to denounce the actions of local bureaucrats and to criticize national policies that favored Europeans. At times, landless Chileans and European colonos were forced to place their differences aside for a common cause, such as banditry and public safety, and collective *reclamos* provided an opportunity to voice the concerns of their communities. The 1912 Comisión Parlamentaria de Colonización report offered few solutions to the nascent problems surrounding land redistribution, and instead proposed the consolidation of offices such as the Protectors of Indigenous Peoples. These proposed consolidations ensured that Mapuches applying for titles would be negatively impacted, since existing offices of Protectors were already struggling to keep up with the existing number of petitions. Ultimately, The Ministry of Colonization and Chilean governments disconnect from the concerns of non-Indigenous Chileans, Mapuches, and European colonos would foreshadow violent conflicts between hacendados and peasants in the coming decades.

A Reconciliation with the Past

As this study demonstrates, the local issues raised during the *estallido social* have deep historical roots in the nineteenth century. After weeks of protest, during which right-wing media sources such as *El Mercurio* attempted to portray as random acts of violence with little purpose, an overarching message emerged: various sectors of Chilean society were demanding a new constitution that addressed the country's socioeconomic issues. In May and October 2020, the government held two elections, one to decide if the constitution of 1980 should be replaced, and another to determine who would be the representatives at the constitutional convention. The

following year, representatives at the convention (*constituyentes*) elected the Mapuche activist and university professor Elisa Loncón as their first president. Originally from the Araucanian town of Traiguen in the Malleco province, Loncón is the daughter of a carpenter and a horticulturalist who sold vegetables in local markets. Her maternal grandfather, Ricardo Atilio, was jailed during the Pinochet dictatorship due to his land rights activism, and her great grandfather served under the lonko José Santos Quilapan, a famous Mapuche military leader who fought the occupation of the Araucanía.³⁰⁶ Her family's story, in essence, was closely tied to the history of other Mapuche families who remained in the region during the twentieth century and joined various land rights organizations. Loncón's activism, and her academic work focusing on the recovery of the Mapudungun language, encouraged *constituyentes* who hoped that the new constitution would redefine Chile as a plurinational society. By doing so, supporters hoped to address ongoing issues of Indigenous representation in the government along with the local concerns of native tribes including police violence, environmental concerns, and land rights.

³⁰⁶ Loncón is also well known for her participation in the creation of the Mapuche flag that represents Araucanian communities. ¿Quién es Elisa Loncón, la profesora Mapuche elegida presidente de la convención constituyente de Chile? <https://www.elmostrador.cl/nueva-constitucion/2021/07/04/quien-es-elisa-loncon-la-profesora-mapuche-elegida-presidenta-de-la-convencion-constituyente-de-chile/>, 4 Jul. 2021, Accessed 7 Apr. 2022.



Figure 9: Dr. Elisa Loncón addresses the Chilean Constitutional Convention at its first meeting on July 7th, 2021.³⁰⁷

Loncón began the first session of the constitutional convention in the former congressional chambers in Santiago. Within this building, whose construction dated back to the late 1870's, congressional deputies made important decisions relating to the occupation of the Araucanía, and the Comisión Parlamentaria met decades later. Above her podium hung a mural of the conquistador Pedro de Valdivia titled "The Discovery of Chile" that depicted the Spanish colonial army riding through the Andes into the valley of Copiapó with the aid of Indigenous guides. In her inaugural speech, she recognized the historical significance of the moment and promoted a vision of Chilean society in which an egalitarian relationship between Indigenous communities and others could exist, "It's a dream of our ancestors and this dream has come true...It's possible, brothers and sisters, to re-found this Chile, to establish a relationship between the Mapuche people... and all the nations that make up this country."³⁰⁸ The other constituyentes themselves represented a significant break from the last constitutional convention when Augusto

³⁰⁷ Elisa Loncón, @elisaloncon, "¡Comenzamos! con el newen de todas las y los constituyentes esta primera sesión se está haciendo posible." Twitter Photo, 7 Jul. 2021, <https://twitter.com/elisaloncon/status/1412777652063195143>.

³⁰⁸ Eva Ontiveros, "Elisa Loncón: From Poverty to PhD to writing Chile's constitution" <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-57733539>, 11 Jul. 2021, accessed 7 Apr. 2022.

Pinochet had personally selected the members. Chosen through an electoral process, within the makeup of the 2021 convention there is parity between men and women, and from the 155 seats available 17 were reserved for the native tribes of Chile.³⁰⁹ While Loncón's term lasted only six months, her election, and the continued participation of Mapuche and other Indigenous constituyentes has a powerful political and symbolic meaning. For the first time in its history, Chile has Indigenous tribes playing an active role in shaping a constitution that can begin to address long standing issues revolving land rights, and work toward creating a more just future.

³⁰⁹ Mapuche tribes have the most representatives (7), these were allotted according to where their populations are located. The Araucanía, Biobío, and Ñuble region, for example, have four representatives because of the large Mapuche populations in these areas. "Para saber un poco más sobre las Elecciones de los Escaños Reservados" <http://www.conadi.gob.cl/elecciones-escaños-reservados>, accessed 11 Apr. 2022.

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BN	Biblioteca Nacional de Chile, Santiago.
ARNAD	Archivo Nacional de la Administración, Santiago.
MRE	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Archivo Histórico, Santiago.
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