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the CID Report

Vol. 2, No. 2 CENTER FOR INNOVATIVE DIPLOMACY

March/April 1985

CID Helps Organize First U.S. Workshop on Municipal Foreign Policies

On March 29th, CID's efforts to get municipalities involved in foreign affairs reached a major milestone. Along with Local Elected Officials of America (LEO-USA), Business Executives for National Security, and the Center for Economic Conversion, CID brought together forty California local officials, and business and civic leaders to discuss new strategies for reversing the arms race through local initiatives.


The workshop's principal organizer was Larry Agran, founder and executive director of LEO-USA (see *The CID Report*, January/February). Agran called the meeting to order by pointing out how the \$4.5 billion the Reagan Administration wants to cut from city revenue shar-

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The Devil's Diplomacy

*Private aid to the Nicaraguan
contras must be stopped, lest it
taint all constructive citizen
diplomacy. . . . page 4*



The British destroyer H.M.S. Sheffield burns uncontrollably after being hit by an air-launched, precision-guided Exocet missile during the 1982 Falklands War.

Precision Guided Munitions: Toward a Truly Defensive NATO

by Hal Harvey

During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a few lightly armored Egyptian trucks knocked out 130 Israeli million dollar-plus tanks in two hours using cheap, twenty pound "Sagger" missiles. In 1982, during the Falklands War, Argentina made military history when it sank the *H.M.S. Sheffield*, a fifty million dollar British battleship, with a single French Exocet missile that cost a few hundred thousand dollars. In both instances, highly accurate weapons called precision-guided munitions, or PGMs, destroyed other weapons costing hundreds or thousands of times more. These recent experiences show how PGMs are revolutionizing military strategy. But perhaps the most revolutionary impact of PGMs is that they may offer Western Europe a reliable, low cost

defense that could reduce or eliminate its need for nuclear weapons.

According to Richard Barnet of the Institute for Policy Studies, the challenge ahead for NATO nations is to increase their own security without decreasing the security of other nations. Only when *all* nations feel secure, Barnet contends, will the world be rid of the creeping insecurities that tempt nations to launch preemptive wars. What NATO needs are purely defensive weapons, a possibility long deemed impractical.

In the 1950s, NATO responded to Soviet weapons buildups by deploying nuclear weapons aimed at the Soviet homeland and Eastern Europe, a policy that bolstered NATO's security by decreasing the security of the Warsaw Pact. NATO deliberately chose a policy of threat instead of defense because defenses against nuclear weapons seemed technically impossible and because defenses against conventional weapons seemed too costly. But this policy, as rational as it might have seemed thirty years ago, has since proved disastrous. Every NATO threat has triggered a Warsaw Pact counter-threat and vice-versa, setting in motion a deadly

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LETTERS

MICHAEL SHUMAN's arguments for the necessity of nations to submit a portion of their national sovereignty to stronger international institutions are reasonable, but I remain unconvinced that human beings ever will be able to transcend their national allegiances. We humans have a great need to identify with a larger group *which is distinct from and impliedly in opposition to* other groups. This psychological need has expressed itself in the form of racial and religious group affiliations that have led to countless wars. In this century, the two world wars make evident the progression to group affiliations at the level of the nation-state. Light-skinned and dark-skinned peoples, or Christians and Jews may be able to transcend the boundaries of race and religion and cooperate within the confines of a given nation-state, but as long as they identify themselves as Americans, or Soviets, or Germans, or whatever, what might be called the outermost threshold of their collective affiliation determines who is Us and who is Them.

Even if this threshold encompasses a group so large that the entire species contains only two groups, such as capitalists and communists, humans seem to need a group with which they can affiliate in opposition to

another group. Many remain willing to sacrifice their own lives for the sake of such a larger group, be it family, tribe, nation, or the preponderant "ism" of the day.

The realization of international institutions that would foreclose this opportunity to make "the ultimate sacrifice" would leave humanity without the common enemy it has shown itself over and over to require.

**Denise Ream
Palo Alto**

RESPONSE:

Denise Ream may be right that a common enemy is necessary for human cooperation, but this hardly is an argument against the realism of creating stronger international institutions.

If carefully structured, international institutions would allow human beings to identify themselves with groups "distinct and impliedly in opposition to other groups." In a world with stronger international law, socialists could still find common enemies in the capitalists, industrialists could find common enemies in the ecologists and labor unions, and fundamentalists could find common enemies in atheists. The difference is that the enmity would be played out through politics instead of nuclear weapons. International institutions are not aimed at eliminating conflict, but at channeling it in constructive nonviolent ways.

To the extent that international institutions imply some level of human cooperation, they are feasible because the threat of nuclear war *is* humanity's common enemy. As Rep. Ron Dellums once quipped, nuclear weapons are an "equal opportunity destroyer." The prospect of nuclear winter robs all lives of mean-

The Center for Innovative Diplomacy is a non-profit, non-partisan research organization striving to prevent nuclear and conventional war by increasing citizen participation in foreign affairs.

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
Meg Bowman

ing and denies a future for all children. Moreover, the half trillion dollars per year the world squanders on arms means continued hunger, illiteracy, disease, and alienation for most of the world's people. What bigger common enemy do we need? ■

Dwight Cocke Joins CID

In late March, CID hired Dwight Cocke as its new Executive Vice President. Cocke will be responsible for CID's administration, fundraising, membership development, and media coordination.

Having served as campaign manager and consultant on numerous ballot, lobbying, and media campaigns dealing with energy policy, smoking restrictions, and bottle and can recycling, Cocke brings a wealth of experience to CID. In the mid-1970s, Cocke was the Executive Director of Californians for Nuclear Safeguards, a 15,000 member organiza-



Dwight Cocke

tion pushing for safer nuclear power and greater energy conservation.

In 1982, Cocke was Executive Director of the California Water Protection Council, which sponsored a November 1982

ballot initiative promoting statewide water conservation. At the same time, he was a member of the state steering committee for Proposition 12, the statewide nuclear freeze initiative.

Throughout 1983 and 1984, Cocke was the Executive Director of the Second Biennial Conference on the Fate of the Earth, for which CID wrote the Conference "Policy and Action Statement" (see back cover).

"For ten years," Cocke says, "I have been involved in citizen movements to help give people greater control over public policy and greater chance for direct participation in decision-making. I therefore see CID's efforts to bring individuals into international affairs for the purpose of reducing the threat of nuclear war as extremely exciting, and I see tremendous potential for growth in the near future." ■

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ing is exactly the \$4.5 billion allocated to the MX and "Star Wars" weapons programs. "I, for one," Agran argued, "believe that America's estimated 500,000 local elected officials can play a decisive role in reversing the priorities of our national government and steering America on a humane, productive and peaceful course."

The workshop then shifted to various "case studies" of what California cities have already done. Lewis Lillian, assistant to San Francisco Supervisor Richard Hongisto, described Hongisto's fight to keep the battleship *Missouri* from mooring in the city because of its probable payload of several hundred cruise missiles. Chris Petersen, a member of the Fresno City Council, critiqued his own city's unsuccessful efforts to ban the production of nuclear weapons within city limits—efforts he now plans to renew. And Anne Rudin, the Mayor of Sacramento, detailed her city's growing interest in forming an official council of politicians, business executives, and labor leaders that would examine how the city could "convert" its weapons industries into nonweapons industries.

CID President Michael Shuman then presented an overview of the different types municipal foreign policies around the country. "As the advertisement for *Close Encounters of the Third Kind* admonished: 'We are not alone,' " Shuman joked. He then rattled off the following statistics:

- 370 city councils, 71 county councils, and 446 town meetings have endorsed the nuclear freeze;
- 120 communities have refused to cooperate with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's "crisis relocation planning;"
- 80 communities have declared themselves nuclear free zones;
- nearly 20 communities have pulled their money out of stocks and securities issued by firms investing in South Africa; and,
- three cities refuse to enter contracts with firms building first strike weapons.

Shuman also explained why, despite widespread beliefs that municipal foreign policies are unconstitutional, most of these policies are in fact legal: "First, local governments have virtually unlimited powers to speak, travel, and organize, even on foreign policy issues. Second,



Former Mayor of Irvine Larry Agran and CID President Michael Shuman being interviewed on San Francisco radio station KCBS the day before the Local Elected Officials Conference in April.

local governments have broad traditional powers in policing, planning, investing, and contracting that they can exercise to influence foreign affairs. Finally, while local governments technically cannot make agreements with jurisdictions abroad without congressional approval, a hundred years of congressional silence with regard to the hundreds of these agreements signed can be interpreted as *de facto* approval."

The remainder of the meeting was dedicated to discussing how a community might prepare conversion plans, how local elected officials might better communicate with one another through computer networks, and what California cities might do next. The participants were agreed that the next step was to achieve one "high visibility victory" in a politically moderate California community. Particular interest was expressed in helping Anne Rudin form a conversion commission in Sacramento.

Agran and Shuman now intend to replicate the San Francisco workshop throughout the country. They have already begun planning a second workshop in Santa Barbara for June and are making contacts with local elected officials for future workshops in New Hampshire, Iowa, Ohio, North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Michigan.

CID's role in these workshops will be to continue providing local elected officials with information on how to answer the common arguments that municipal foreign policies are improper or illegal. At the San Francisco meeting, CID

distributed a draft of its handbook on "Building Municipal Foreign Policies," which, once polished, will be distributed to several thousand other officials. ■

Northern California's New Diplomats

Below are the local elected officials who attended CID's first regional workshop on municipal foreign policies.

Larry Agran, City Council, Irvine
George Beland, City Council,
Auburn
Hal Conklin, City Council,
Santa Barbara
Joe Cucchiaria, Supervisor,
Santa Cruz
Ellen Fletcher, City Council,
Palo Alto
John George, Supervisor,
Alameda County
Peter Green, City Council,
Huntington Beach
Richard Hongisto, Supervisor,
San Francisco
Grantland Johnson, City Council,
Sacramento
Gary Patton, Supervisor, Santa Cruz
Chris Petersen, City Council, Fresno
Anne Rudin, Mayor, Sacramento
Maudelle Shirek, City Council,
Berkeley

Citizen Diplomacy

Devil's Diplomacy

The Alabama-based Civilian Military Assistance (CMA) is not exactly a typical citizen diplomacy group. Last September, CMA received national attention when the Nicaraguan government shot down a helicopter piloted by two of its members. These CMA victims apparently had been assisting Nicaraguan rebels, the so-called "contras," in an attack on a village near the Honduras border. For CMA, the deaths were merely two more losses in the line of duty—the duty of helping fledgling right-wing military efforts throughout the world. For the rest of the world, the incident raised knotty issues on the propriety of the United States allowing its citizens to engage in what might be called "devil's diplomacy"—the donation of money, aid, and assistance to rebels, terrorists, and other paramilitary forces.

Devil's diplomacy confirms some people's worst fears about the growing involvement of citizens in foreign affairs. These fears were aired extensively last summer, when Jesse Jackson helped win the release of 26 political prisoners from Cuba. James Reston of *The New York Times*, for example, called Jackson's initiative "bad politics, bad diplomacy and bad manners. . . [Jackson] is interfering with the constitutional rights of the President and Congress to conduct foreign policy." The *Times* editorial board went further, labeling Jackson's activities as "political opportunism in reckless disregard for American diplomacy. It is collaboration with the enemies of democracy. . ." To these and other political commentators who deem

Citizen Diplomacy is a regular column written by Michael Shuman describing recent, innovative efforts by individuals, communities, and states to influence foreign affairs.

federal autonomy in foreign affairs sacred, devil's diplomacy may provide the most compelling reasons yet for restricting the activities of citizen diplomats like Jackson.

But devil's diplomacy has little to do with citizen diplomacy. Indeed, while most citizen diplomacy is entirely legal, most devil's diplomacy is entirely illegal. And it is only because of the Reagan Administration's refusal to enforce the U.S. Neutrality Act that devil's diplomacy seems out of control and may wrongly lead Congress to pass new laws restricting all citizen diplomacy.

Democratic legal systems have long been capable of outlawing assistance to criminals without infringing on assistance to law-abiding citizens. A number of American laws have sought to make this distinction in international transactions as well. Thus, while Americans are free to make gifts or engage in commerce with most people abroad, the Neutrality Act provides sanctions against anyone who "knowingly begins...or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military expedition against a state with which the U.S. is at peace. . ." In other words, the Neutrality Act distinguishes devil's diplomacy—and outlaws it.

Despite the clear illegality of private efforts like CMA's to assist the contras' war against Nicaragua—clear because the U.S. is technically "at peace" with

Nicaragua—these private efforts remain completely unimpeded. Ever since 1984, when opponents of the Nicaraguan government were unable to get Congress to approve \$14 million in funds for the contra rebels, private funding began

It is only because of the Reagan Administration's refusal to enforce the U.S. Neutrality Act that devil's diplomacy seems out of control.

pouring in, with thinly veiled Presidential approval.

After the CMA helicopter crash, Philip Taubman reported that "Nicaraguan rebels have raised more than ten million dollars in the last six months from private corporations and individuals in the United States and from foreign governments, including Israel, Argentina, Venezuela, Guatemala and Taiwan. . ." Here are some of the particulars:

- CMA leader Thomas V. Posey boasts that his organization has sent about

Citizen Diplomacy Opportunities in Nicaragua

If you want to help Americans develop a positive political relationship with Nicaragua, here are some opportunities worth noting.

- **WORK BRIGADE EXCHANGES**—For an unparalleled taste of authentic Nicaraguan life, you can work with peasants in two to four week brigades to pick cotton or coffee through the Nicaraguan Exchange (239 Centre St., NY, NY 10013).
- **WAR-ZONE WATCH GROUPS**—If you want to help observe and report border aggression or human rights violations, a program that has successfully deterred much violence there and elsewhere, you can work

with Witness for Peace (515 Broadway, Santa Cruz, CA 95060).

- **CULTURAL EDUCATION**—If you want to immerse yourself in Nicaraguan culture and politics, you can learn Spanish at one of two schools there: Casa Nicaraguense de Espanol (70 Greenwich Ave., No. 559, NY, NY 10011) and Nuevo Instituto de Centro America (Box 1409, Cambridge, MA 02238).

- **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**—If you have special skills to offer Nicaraguans in economics, engineering, computers, and mechanics, you might consider sharing them through Technica (110 Brookside Dr., Berkeley, CA 94705).

- **BASIC TRAVEL**—And if you just want your basic American-style luxury tour, but from a genuine Nicaraguan perspective, try Tropical Tours (141 E. 44th St., Suite 409, NY, NY 10017).

\$60,000 to \$70,000 worth of medical supplies and military uniforms as well as given direct training to both the contras and El Salvador's military.

- The Human Development Foundation, Inc. of Miami has collected "refugee assistance" money for the contras through advertisements in major newspapers like *The New York Times* by

We should seek to counter destructive diplomacy with constructive diplomacy.

pleading that "The Victims of Communist Dominated Nicaragua Need Your Help."

- *Soldier of Fortune* magazine has collected tons of "non-lethal military equipment" and shipped it to Honduras for the rebels.

- The Houston-based Nicaraguan Patriotic Association, the Baton Rouge-based Shoebox for Liberty Project, and the Christian Broadcasting Network also have sent food, clothing, and other aid to Nicaraguans in Honduras.

- And the Brigade 2506 Veterans Association, made up of Cubans who were part of President Kennedy's Bay of Pigs operation, has sent \$200,000 worth of medical supplies and other equipment to the rebels.

While these donations seem to violate the Neutrality Act, Bill Girdner of the *Los Angeles Daily* reports that "the act has been narrowly interpreted by recent administrations [including the Reagan administration]...to prohibit only the launching of expeditions from the U.S." Others disagree. Representative Thomas S. Foley of Washington, the majority whip, recently said, "[Private aid to the contras] seems to me against the spirit of the Neutrality Act, if not a violation of it."

No matter what the legal status of devil's diplomacy, it continues unabated because only the President can enforce the Neutrality Act. And in contrast to his eagerness to prosecute private American military assistance to such unfriendly foreign powers as Iran, Libya, and Cuba, President Reagan refuses to stop any assistance to the contras.

"There's a double standard," contends Senator Jim Sasser of Tennessee. "Agen-



ILLUSTRATION BY CHRIS HANSEN

cies of the Government knew what was going on but looked the other way because the efforts were supportive of Administration policy. If they had been trying to help Libya they would have been quickly cut off."

Advocates of citizen diplomacy must seek to eliminate devil's diplomacy. If constructive efforts like Jesse Jackson's Cuba trip can generate such vociferous criticism of citizen diplomacy, the escalating bloodshed caused by devil's diplomacy has the potential to discredit popular participation in foreign affairs altogether. Unless citizen diplomats clearly disassociate their activities from the private military assistance programs, Congress may soon seek to end devil's diplomacy by strengthening such anachronisms as the Logan Act, which could stifle all kinds of citizen activities overseas, both good and bad.

A far better way to stop devil's diplomacy would be to strengthen the enforcement of regulations already on

the books. For example, we might follow the recommendation of a recent article in the *Harvard International Law Journal* that Congress appoint a special prosecutor to enforce the Neutrality Act whenever the President fails to do so.

Meanwhile, until Congress acts, we should seek to counter destructive diplomacy with constructive diplomacy. An example of how citizens have acted positively in Central America can be found in Boulder, where the city is building a child care facility in Jalapa, Nicaragua. Another example is the Palo Alto-based Community Data Processing, which has given pro-bono assistance to help the Nicaraguan government apply computers to its agricultural problems. If constructive citizen diplomacy can begin grabbing as many headlines as bellicose CMA diplomacy, it might inspire thousands of new initiatives that can begin solving conflicts like those in Central America through cooperation instead of bullets. ■

Profiles in Diplomacy

SETH ZUCKERMAN

Sharon Tennison: Grassroots Courage

To Sharon Tennison, a San Francisco nurse who describes herself as "an ordinary middle-class corporate wife," October 1983, with its mild weather and light tourist season, probably seemed like a perfect time for traveling to the Soviet Union. But the perfect timing literally went up in flames as Korean Air Lines flight 007 plunged into the ocean after being shot down by Soviet air defenses—ten days before Tennison's trip was to begin. East-West relations reached an all-time low as outraged Americans called for retribution against the "Evil Empire." With all air flights between the United States and the Soviet Union cancelled, Tennison's nine months of planning came close to collapsing.

But Tennison persisted. If American misperceptions of the Soviet Union contributed to Cold War hostility, she believed, it was even more important now than before to travel to the Soviet Union to unravel them. In recent years, as she spoke on behalf of Physicians for Social Responsibility, she had found herself unable to answer even the most basic questions about the Soviet Union. If she were ever to provide good answers for herself as well as her audiences, she would have to educate herself: "I had to go see for myself what the Enemy was

This is the second in the series of "Profiles in Diplomacy" which describes the personal stories of individuals who have undertaken noteworthy diplomatic initiatives. The following piece is an abridged version of a chapter written by Seth Zuckerman in the forthcoming CID book entitled The New Diplomats. Zuckerman is a former editor of The Stanford Daily and now works as a freelance reporter for Newsweek.

like." Tennison rearranged her flights and arrived in the Soviet Union as scheduled for a first hand look.

Cub Scout Leaders and Sunday School Teachers

In planning her trip, Tennison sought to avoid the usual packaged tours offered by the Soviet tourist-agency, Intourist: "I wanted it to be not a *tour* but a *journey*, she said. She approached Intourist officials on her own, and asked politely but firmly if they could please give her and her fellow travelers a guide and let them loose in the cities they visited. After some haggling, Intourist accommodated her request.

Meanwhile, she gathered traveling companions from the San Francisco Bay Area consisting of a couple of dozen people ranging from a firefighter to a city planner and flight attendant. None of them fit the stereotype of peace activists—a deliberate choice by Tennison. "The notion went through my mind," she says, "that it would be much better to have middle-class, professional Americans not associated with any particular group. . . They were a real good hodge-podge of past Cub Scout leaders and Sunday school teachers."

Before they set off, Tennison and her companions agreed on a couple of strict ground rules. They committed themselves to "unconditional friendship during their stay in the Soviet Union—no matter what." Stories abounded of groups that arrived in the Soviet Union only to fall apart because of internal conflict. Their other commitment was to perform six months of public education about their trip after they returned. "If we found 'barbarians,' " recalls Tennison, "we had to be willing to speak to that issue."

Tennison's final preparation was to visit the San Francisco office of the FBI—a precaution many citizen diplomats take to mollify government suspicions about their purposes or motives. "The FBI told me," she recalls, "I wouldn't be able to see anything or talk to anybody that hadn't been previously arranged, but I could go spend my money if I wanted to." The warning only solidified Tennison's resolve to ensure her encounters with Soviet people were spontaneous.

A Loose Tether

Even the first hours of the group's 17 day visit to the Soviet Union defied their

stereotypes. At airport customs, none of their luggage was even opened. That evening, Tennison reports the group got on the subways and "split in 10 different directions. If anyone was following us they would have had a very hard time."

The group went on to visit Leningrad in the northwest and Tbilisi in the southeastern region of Georgia. In each city, Tennison claims, they were free to go wherever they wanted, with Intourist guides leading only limited parts of the trip such as museum tours. Joggers hit the streets early. During the days, they all split up into groups of two to five to visit schools, pioneer palaces, a factory, a hospital, and churches of several faiths.

Especially memorable for Tennison, a former Texan raised as a Baptist, was her visit to a Baptist church. Arriving to a packed service, the group was warmly received by the congregation and given choice pews. The service itself was a combination of angelic singing from the choir and prayers offered from the pulpit; it ended with many of the singers—and then the members of the congregation—hugging and kissing one another. Tennison shivered, she says, to hear the Soviets singing "What a Friend We Have in Jesus." And the prayers "reminded me of the Baptist ministers of my childhood—the fervor building to a crescendo and then dropping to quiet tones of awe."

"All of a sudden," Tennison reflects, "you look at them and realize that they are warm, caring people just like we are. We've been programmed to see the Soviet landmass and people as faceless enemies." Tennison believes that the propaganda emanating from the United States has been more harmful than what the Soviets tell their people. "They have been programmed against our system and against our different administrations, but still programmed to see the American people as humans." Many people told her that "of all the people in the world we want to be like, it's Americans."

The "Orwellian" State

Tennison makes no pretensions that Soviets enjoy the same degree of freedom that Americans do, but believes many Americans' images of 1984 totalitarianism blind them to reforms now underway. An artist who hosted Tennison for dinner told her that "ten years ago, even five, I couldn't have had you at my home.



Sharon Tennison, a self-described "former corporate housewife" from San Francisco.

But I feel comfortable about it these days."

Tennison came to realize that differences in habits, customs, and priorities between Americans and Soviets lead citizens of each country to prefer their own system over the other. "They don't see life the way we see life, politically or economically," she says. "Their rights are to housing, education, medical care, food and safe streets, not to freedom of speech, assembly, or religion, like ours. Personal freedom is not as important there, and it may never be, because their value system is different."

During a private dinner conversation, Tennison asked a woman named Lilly what it was like to be under 'the control' of the State. Lilly could not even understand the question. When Tennison described "the maze of perceived controls I had in my mind," Lilly said in exasperation, "Do *you* have controls? Do *you* have to be at work by a certain hour in the morning? Do *you* have to do a certain amount of work to get paid?" For Lilly and other Soviets, these are not controls,

but simply mechanisms society needs to function.

That some people are willing to forego certain civil liberties in return for economic liberties was borne out by a woman named Paula at whose apartment Tennison dined in Moscow. Born in the United States, Paula fell in love with a Russian exchange student and followed him to the Soviet Union, where they married and had two sons. After five years, the marriage broke up and Paula returned to America with her children. After two years of working full-time, going to school, and caring for the two boys, she was in debt and exhausted. So she decided to return to the Soviet Union, where she knew she would receive free child care, an inexpensive apartment, and an education stipend. Paula's small, weathered apartment in which her two sons share the second bedroom was hardly luxurious, but one trade-off for its stoic simplicity was the absence of any graffiti or litter.

In other ways, Tennison could see how

Soviets were proud of their country's achievements. The city streets, for example, are safe; women never have to be afraid of walking alone at night. Some Soviets attribute this to the absence of violence on Soviet television and movies.

Perhaps Tennison's most surprising finding was the presence of some open dissent about government policies. She described one instance where three Americans on a bus in Leningrad listened to a dissatisfied Russian proclaim his opposition to the Soviet system and the war in Afghanistan. As they got off the bus, a young woman engineer walked up and began to berate the man for his criticism. The woman was appalled by the man's lack of patriotism, and a long, boisterous argument ensued. "We hadn't expected to hear disagreements between members of this society," recalls Tennison, "let alone have ringside seats while two very divergent segments battled it out in public."

Tennison makes clear that she is trying not to romanticize life in the Soviet Union, but merely to understand its strengths and weaknesses. As Tennison regularly tells interviewers, "The Soviet Union is definitely not a place that I would want to live. But that doesn't mean I think we should destroy them because I think they're different."

Bridges of Understanding

Since her initial trip in 1983, Tennison has returned three more times to the USSR and plans five trips for 1985. Back home, she has devoted much of her time to lecturing. Instead of talking to peace movement types, she has taken her eighty-slide show about everyday Soviet life to professional organizations, junior colleges, Rotary clubs—the people she considers the unconvinced. "There is a pervasive suspicion—even among right wingers—that we don't hear the whole truth about the Russians," she says.

Tennison hopes that her activities will create a ripple effect and spread far beyond the small number of people she actually speaks to. "My dedication is to open lines of communication between the two countries so we can walk together through a warring mentality. . . . If enough of us try and build bridges, maybe we can really change things. Nobody says it will be easy. There are risks in peacemaking just as there are risks in war-making. I choose the risks for peace." ■

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arms race that has left all Europe less secure than ever.

PGMs offer Europe a way out. By making defense cheaper than offense, PGMs could allow both the East and the West to reduce their offensive weapons arsenals, both conventional and nuclear. But these benefits will not occur automatically. If misused for offensive purposes, PGMs could actually further destabilize Europe. PGMs will help stabilize Europe only if NATO policymakers employ them with an explicitly defensive posture. Thus, while PGMs cannot guarantee regional security to Europe, they have, for the first time ever, made a policy of pure defense technologically and economically possible.

Offense and Defense

A growing number of strategic analysts believe that the world would be much more secure if nations deployed only defensive weapons. By definition, a world armed only with defensive weapons would be substantially immune from war. In this sense, offensive weapons are destabilizing, not only because they increase the incentives of nations possessing them to use them for attacks, but also because they increase the incentives of nations defending against them to attack preemptively.

Like all weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons have an inherent offensive potential. Because of their vast, unfocused destructive power, nuclear weapons must be targeted on *other* nations. Despite comforting labels like "deterrence," no nuclear arsenal can be made unambiguously defensive. But short of nuclear disarmament, some nuclear arsenals are more offensive than others. Especially destabilizing are the recent generations of weapons that have been given enough accuracy and speed to destroy Soviet silos. Since blowing up empty silos is absurd, these weapons can only be used for a preemptive first strike. Deployment of fewer weapons with less accuracy and longer flight times, therefore, can reduce the capability of an arsenal to strike first.

With conventional weapons, drawing a line between what is offensive or defensive is somewhat easier. Tanks, submarines, aircraft carriers, and long range aircraft, for example, are all offensive

because they are intended to "project force" into other nations' territory. Defensive conventional weapons, in contrast, have a very limited potential to attack. Examples include purely anti-tank weapons like bazookas or purely anti-aircraft artillery. These weapons all are capable of inflicting heavy losses on invading troops but cannot be used for an offensive assault into enemy territory.

With these different weapons, NATO planners can pursue a strategy of pure offense, a strategy of mixed offensive/defensive purposes, or a strategy of pure defense.

Today, NATO planners are pursuing a strategy of pure offense. In its nuclear weapons planning, NATO is deploying missiles like the Pershing II with high accuracy and short flight times to threaten Soviet missiles with a first strike. Moreover, U.S. efforts to modernize its forces by deploying the MX and Trident D-5 missiles, undertaken in part to strengthen NATO's security, are not simply reducing the vulnerability of NATO's nuclear deterrent, as Pentagon strategists have argued. The MX, at first deployed because Minutemen missiles were vulnerable to a Soviet first strike, is no longer mobile or uniquely based. And the Trident submarines have no greater range than their predecessors, the Poseidons. Moreover, both missile systems have such high accuracy that the Soviet Union cannot possibly interpret them as anything but purely offensive weapons.

In conventional weapons planning, NATO has deployed forces capable of making a "deep strike." The new carrier groups, Army divisions, and tactical aircraft wings are all capable of offensive attack, notwithstanding NATO reassurances to the contrary. Moreover, NATO has publicly declared that, in the event of attack, it intends to strike deeply into Warsaw Pact territory to destroy its support forces, ammunition dumps, bridges, and other rear-deployed assets before they can be used. To the Warsaw Pact, these capabilities can—and might—be used to support a NATO attack. Thus, like its nuclear weapons deployments, NATO's conventional deployments are essentially offensive and invite preemption.

To prevent the instabilities of a strategy of pure offense, some analysts have recommended a strategy of mixed offen-

sive/defensive purposes. So-called "defense reformers" like former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara have argued for a defensive nuclear arsenal, though they remain comfortable with deep-strike conventional deployments. The alternative mix—offensive nuclear arms and defensive conventional arms—was NATO's policy from the end of World War II to the late 1970s. In response to the Soviet conventional

PGMs offer Europe a way out. By making defense cheaper than offense, PGMs could allow both the East and the West to reduce their offensive weapons arsenals.

build-up following World War II, NATO decided to cut costs by meeting the threat through a doctrine of massive *nuclear* retaliation. Predictably, this calmed Warsaw Pact fears of NATO launching a conventional attack, but it fanned fears of NATO launching a nuclear first strike.

Only recently, with the emergence of the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement, has a strategy of pure defense received serious study. In *Defence Without the Bomb*, a coalition of END-sympathetic European scholars argued that arsenals capable of carrying out *any* offensive maneuvers are destabilizing, whether nuclear or conventional. The report advocated the elimination of all nuclear weapons from Europe and the establishment of a "dispersed" conventional defense that could "reduce the likelihood of Soviet forces using nuclear weapons on the battlefield, and could ensure a high attrition rate for advancing Soviet forces." Such a strategy, "relying heavily on PGM's, [imposes] a minimal threat to Eastern Europe, [reduces] tension, and [is] compatible with agreed measures to limit forces with a primarily offensive capability."

The strategy of pure defense holds the promise of increasing the security of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Without the

necessity of keeping forces on a hair-trigger alert, the chances for accidents leading to war would be substantially lowered. With both sides foresaking arms of attack, minor skirmishes would be less likely to lead to preemptive attacks. And if war did erupt, it would be more likely to ensure defeat for an aggressor.

What is remarkable about these different strategies is that each sees an enhanced role for precision guided munitions (PGMs). Thus, we must look carefully at how PGMs might lend themselves to either defensive or offensive strategies by examining the technology of PGMs—what they are capable of and at what cost.

PGM Technology: Types of Missiles

PGMs are nonnuclear munitions capable of homing in on their targets *after* they are fired. Accuracy is what sets them apart from other weapons; PGMs are generally defined as weapons with a greater than fifty percent probability of hitting their target. Traditional ballistic weapons, in contrast, are simply aimed and fired; if the target moves, or if the gunner's aim is poor, the projectile misses. But since a PGM can continually correct its flight

PGMs are nonnuclear munitions capable of homing in on their targets after they are fired. They are defined as weapons with a greater than fifty percent probability of hitting their target.

path as it flies, it need not rely on a perfect aim.

PGMs come in three technical varieties: (1) "command guidance" PGMs that rely on a gunner's continuous aim; (2) "homing-guidance" PGMs that find a target through automatic internal sen-

sors; and (3) "semi-active homing guidance" PGMs that rely on both gunner aim and internal sensors.

Command Guidance PGMs

Command guidance PGMs include the widely deployed U.S. Tube-launched Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles. They also include munitions controlled by radio and radar. TOW missiles and their counterparts, such as the Soviet Sagger, are launched by a "tube," a gun resembling a bazooka usually mounted on a jeep or helicopter. As a TOW flies toward its target, it spools out up to 3,750 meters of thin wire, through which the gunner can steer the missile to its target. All the gunner needs to do is keep his cross-hairs on a target until the missile strikes it.

While much more accurate than traditional "aim, fire, and hope-it-hits" munitions, TOWs are limited by the gunner's ability to see the target during a battle and keep it in view for the full ten to fifteen seconds before the missile hits. During this rather long flight time, TOWs may be rendered ineffective in darkness or fog, or by countermeasures like smoke screens. Moreover, this prolonged period of gunner concentration allows tank commanders to hide or to concentrate high-speed, kinetic fire on the launch site to distract or kill the gunner. Finally, because TOWs' range is limited by how far the gunner can see, targets must be within about a 3,000 meter range.

Even with their limitations, TOW missiles have gained widespread acceptance among military leaders. The U.S. Army now has some 100,000 unimproved TOW missiles in its inventory and is purchasing 20,000 more each year. Some 40 other nations have deployed an additional 200,000.

Solving some of the TOWs' problems are a new generation of command guidance PGMs called Fiber Optic Guided Missiles, or FOG-Ms. As with other TOW missiles, a gunner steers a FOG-M from the launch site to the target. But instead of spooling a wire, the FOG-M trails a fiber optic glass tube, which dramatically boosts the amount of information the gunner can receive from and transmit to the missile. With a small video camera tucked away in the missile's nose, FOG-Ms essentially put the gunner's eyes on the front of the missile.

FOG-Ms have a number of advantages

over TOWs. First, range is no longer limited by sight. Second, the gunner can stay in a protected site throughout the launch. Third, the fiber optic tube is much less vulnerable to countermeasures than conventional TOW wires. Finally, the high resolution of the visual image increases the accuracy of the missile.

Passive Homing-Guidance PGMs


Once aimed and fired, "homing-guidance" PGMs like the U.S. Sidewinder can follow targets. Homing-guidance weapons use sophisticated optical, infrared, or radar sensors to lock-in on their target. Since airplanes and ships are particularly easy to distinguish from their respective "backgrounds" of air and sea, homing-guidance weapons have been successful in air-to-air and surface-to-ship engagements. In time, as new sensors and mapping algorithms are developed, these PGMs should be able to identify ground targets as well.

Homing-guidance PGMs provide several advantages over conventional TOWs. By eliminating the need for the gunner's constant attention, the missiles are more accurate and the gunner is safer.

continued on page 10

Write Us

To make The CID Report a stimulating marketplace of ideas, we welcome your criticisms as well as your praise. We seek both letters and longer submissions relating to ways citizens can meet the nuclear threat through better means of participation in foreign policy. Send letters or other materials to Alex Kline, Newsletter Editor, The Center for Innovative Diplomacy, 644 Emerson St., Ste. 30, Palo Alto, CA 94301.



PGMs are now changing the entire face of warfare. They have made any very large weapon extremely vulnerable, leading many analysts to declare aircraft carriers, bombers, and some fighters virtually obsolete. They have also made it very unattractive for a military opponent to amass large concentrations of forces.

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Moreover, since the gunner does not need to receive and transmit signals, these PGMs are generally invulnerable to enemy jamming. Finally, eliminating the need for data transmission equipment such as antennae, power supply, and sophisticated circuitry save money and weight.

Semi-Active Homing-Guidance PGMs

Semi-active homing-guidance, or "launch it and leave it" PGMs, have a guidance system that involves both the gunner's aim and independent sensors. An example is the US missile Copperhead, which follows a laser beam pointed on the target by a remote controller, separate from the launch vehicle. The controller can be a hidden ground unit or a high flying airplane. Once the missile is released, it locks in on the laser, and the pilot or launcher can leave the area

immediately. Thus, while maintaining a high degree of missile accuracy, this type of PGM leaves launchers relatively invulnerable and protects controllers by keeping them distant from both the launch site and the target.

Defensive Strategic Implications of PGMs

The wide variety of technologies available suggests that, like virtually any weapon, PGMs can be put to many strategic uses. PGMs have both defensive and offensive capabilities, and any attempt to move toward a strategy of pure defense should seek to deploy defense-oriented PGMs and to prevent the deployment of offense-oriented PGMs.


The major reason PGMs can give a decisive advantage to defense over offense is economics. The examples from the Yom Kippur War and Falklands War cited earlier dramatically illustrate how

PGMs make defense cheaper than offense. While a tank often costs around \$500,000, a tank-destroying PGM usually costs about \$13,000, yielding a "cost-exchange ratio" of 38 to 1. In the case of a \$50,000-\$100,000 anti-ship PGM destroying a two billion dollar aircraft carrier, the cost-exchange ratio approaches an astounding 10,000 to 1.

PGMs are now changing the entire face of warfare and arms buildups. They have made any very large weapon extremely vulnerable, leading many analysts to declare aircraft carriers, bombers, and some fighters (e.g., F-111s, F-15s, and F-16s) virtually obsolete. They have also made it very unattractive for a military opponent to amass large concentrations of forces. Commanders are finding that only dispersed forces have the mobility to elude or hide from PGMs. But without large weapons or concentrated forces, opponents will find it almost impossible to launch an attack, especially along the fortified borders of Europe.

The defensive promise of PGMs will be realized so long as successful countermeasures are not developed. But as the tank case illustrates, most countermeasures can be easily foiled. Anti-tank TOWs might be defeated by thicker tank armor or faster tank speed, but these countermeasures work against one another. Thicker armor weighs down a tank and makes it slower; conversely, a faster tank requires thinner armor. Whatever advances a tank manufacturer makes can be easily countered by making the PGM a little "smarter" at a cost less than the

This is a cross section of the Army's "Copperhead" laser-guided artillery shell. A sensor in the shell's nose homes in on a laser beam directed at a target by a remote foot soldier.



countermeasure. So long as ever more compact and accurate defensive weapons can deliver more lethal blows to targets, large offensive weapons will increasingly find themselves vulnerable to low-cost destruction.


While PGMs can be used defensively to destroy high value *weapons* such as tanks, ships, and airplanes, they can also be used offensively to destroy high value *military targets*. The U.S. Army's "Airland Battle 2000" foresees American ground forces entering Warsaw Pact territory with medium and long-range PGMs to "crater runways, destroy bridges, stop second-echelon tank units, disrupt command, control, and communications networks, and generally wreak havoc on the Warsaw Pact's battle formation." With long-range propulsion systems, PGMs look more and more like offensive cruise missiles.

If PGMs are deployed for "deep strike" strategies, they will be highly destabilizing. Any "deep strike" must succeed quickly since its primary purpose is to deprive an opponent of the opportunity to bring second and third echelon forces into play. As political scientist Matthew Evangelista explains, it is

With a fifty thousand dollar anti-ship PGM destroying a two billion dollar aircraft carrier, the cost-exchange ratio approaches an astounding 10,000 to 1.

precisely this need for quick action that makes a "deep strike" destabilizing: "If the weapons, and the missions they are intended to fulfill, are perceived as more effective for offensive purposes than defensive ones, if they perform better when used preemptively or immediately at the outset of hostilities, they will contribute to *instability* and invite preemption in times of acute crisis."

"Deep strike" weapons are also destabilizing because the Warsaw Pact is



The diagram suggests how only an "alternative security" philosophy, unlike the philosophy of "doves" and "hawks," strives to increase the security of one's own nation without reducing the security of other nations. Reproduced from Dietrich Fischer's Preventing War in the Nuclear Age (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld: 1984).

aware that such weapons as the Army Lance, with a range of 130 kilometers, can carry either nuclear or conventional munitions. Because the Warsaw Pact will be unable to distinguish conventionally-armed Lances from nuclear-armed Lances, it will deem their deployment as extremely threatening. In a time of crisis, this will increase the incentives of the Soviets to strike preemptively.

In sum, PGMs will not automatically provide nations with a defensive strategic posture. On the one hand, PGMs offer military planners the chance to develop a reliable, manifestly defensive conventional force. But on the other hand, they can be used as part of a powerful, destabilizing "deep strike" force. Unless deployed with clearly defensive intentions, PGMs threaten to decrease all nations' security.

Smart Weapons Policy

If the goal of increasing *all* nations' sense of security is to be taken seriously, PGMs should be deployed, but only for defensive purposes. Fortunately, the time is now ripe for such a policy. While defensive PGMs have already been deployed, the "deep strike" arsenal proposed in "Airland 2000" has not. Long-range, offensive PGMs are a generation behind their short-range, defensive counterparts

because of the technical difficulties posed at long ranges. There is still time to stop offensive PGMs. If NATO were to renounce their development, testing, production, and deployment, the Warsaw Pact could have some confidence that NATO was taking a policy of pure defense seriously. And with such confidence, it might then begin its own defensive transition, opening dramatic new possibilities for both sides to negotiate deep cuts in both conventional and nuclear arsenals.

PGMs can do no more than give expression to strategic planners' intentions. If NATO continues to pursue a destabilizing, purely offensive strategy, PGMs will be given a deadly role. But if NATO wishes, it can use PGMs to create—for the first time—a purely defensive strategy that is both cost-effective and stabilizing. An unprecedented opportunity to choose defense lies before us. We should not miss it. ■

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Working Papers Available from CID

Each of the following CID Working Papers is available for \$4.00 (\$2.00 for members).

1. "Living Without Harvard: A Critique of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group," by Michael H. Shuman, November 1983.

In their highly publicized study *Living with Nuclear Weapons*, five professors and a graduate student from Harvard University argue that disarmament is a "fictional utopia" and that our only recourse is to continue modernizing our nuclear arsenals and negotiating modest arms control treaties. This paper criticizes Harvard's analysis on four points. First, Harvard refuses to face up to the ultimate need for disarmament for human survival. Second, it caricatures disarmament as requiring a tyrannical "world government," when, in fact, it really requires a concerted policy of international institution building. Third, Harvard places too much reliance on balance-of-forces arms control agreements, which have failed to sustain the kind of long-term public movement necessary for real arms control. Finally, Harvard pays inadequate attention to the concept of minimal deterrence, by which we could strengthen our national security with perhaps five percent as many weapons.

2. "International Institution Building: The Missing Link for Peace," by Michael H. Shuman, August 1984.

"World order has become everybody's favorite whipping boy, even the peace movement's" argues Michael Shuman in this critique of Jonathan Schell, Freeman Dyson, and the Harvard Nuclear Study Group. These analysts all focus their arguments on technical modifications of existing arsenals and refuse to endorse a political strategy of international institution building. Rather than dismissing world order out of hand as utopian, these authors should reconsider the necessity of forging stronger international institutions through such measures as United Nations reform, and increasing the power of the International Court of Justice. Even more important is the encouragement of greater international activity by non-state actors so that global political alliances can develop that transcend national identities. Without the political institutions for enforcement, the paper concludes, any disarmament scheme is bound to fail.

3. "Computers, Information and the Peace Movement: An Overview," by Hal Harvey and Eric Horvitz, October 1984.

Not all computers are necessarily calculating missile trajectories and laminar flows around ICBMs. This paper explains how computer communication can help the peace movement through electronic bulletin boards, mail systems, discussion trees, research databases, and office automation. It also gives an overview of existing resources such as USENET, ARPANET, and the ACCN (Arms Control and Computer Network). Finally, the paper describes C-NET, a prototype arms control communications network now being assembled in Northern California

4. "Precision Guided Munitions and the Defense of Western Europe," by Hal Harvey, October 1984.

This paper suggests how the "Defense Department," formerly "War Department," might finally be able to live up to its newer title. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) are non-nuclear munitions which home in on their targets either through remote control or advanced internal sensors. Small, inexpensive PGMs can reliably destroy tanks, ships, and airplanes costing hundreds or even thousands of times more than the PGM. The paper describes recent developments in PGM technology, which may soon enable the U.S. and its NATO allies to abandon nuclear weapons altogether and adopt a truly defensive defense with conventional weapons.

5. Policy and Action Statement of the Conference on the Fate of the Earth, (including Legislative Action Agenda), September 1984.

Complete text of the statement warning of the environmental and nuclear dangers facing the earth and prescribing new strategies for reversing these threats. Includes complete list of 20 Nobel Laureate signatories as well as those of over 200 leaders of environmental, arms control, and disarmament groups.

The logo for the Center for Innovative Diplomacy (CID) features the letters "CID" in a large, bold, serif font. Above the letters is a solid black horizontal bar.

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