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Choi, Shinhye

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**Essays on Strong Presidencies and the Politics Behind the Ballot:
Evidence from South Korea**

by

Shinhye Choi

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requirements for the degree of

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University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Pradeep Chhibber, Chair
Professor Sean Gailmard
Professor Jasjeet S. Sekhon
Professor Frederico Finan

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Abstract

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This dissertation project seeks to understand the political dynamics of ruling parties under strong presidencies at the legislative recruitment stage with a regional focus on South Korea. The first paper introduces my main argument regarding how strong presidencies can determine the form and function of ruling party reforms such as legislative primaries. I argue that under strong presidential systems, wherein the executive abides by formal rules but is still willing to push her de facto power to its constitutional limits, ruling party elites - especially those who do not belong to the president's faction - can counteract presidential discretion by voluntarily democratizing the candidate selection process. I provide empirical evidence of these dynamics from South Korea during 2008-2016. The second paper formalizes the conditions under which ruling party elites endogenously choose to implement legislative primaries as a means to prevent the president from interfering in the party nomination process and provides implications of ruling party reforms on voter welfare. Whereas the first two papers study the contexts under which competing factions within the ruling party are able to agree upon the party's nomination processes and outcomes, the third paper examines a case of a failed coordination. The paper draws upon empirical evidence from the 2008 South Korea Legislative Election, where some party elites chose to defect from the ruling party and successfully formed a transitory electoral alliance.

Contents

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Many third-wave democracies implemented presidential systems, defined by the separation of powers between the chief executive and the legislative body, but an uneven distribution of power between the two branches has been one of the defining characteristics of these regimes. While existing research tends to highlight the trade-off between strong executives and unstable party systems, less attention has been directed towards understanding how strong presidencies determine the political dynamics within ruling parties. Previous studies often posit the idea that the concentration of power within the executive branch is great enough that internal party conflicts between a term-limited president and ruling party elites, the latter of whom are vying for power within the party leadership, are easily resolved by existing institutional rules.

However, the overarching idea underlying this dissertation project is that strong presidencies breed more rather than less conflict within the ruling party. In fact, it is in the interest of ruling party elites, especially those who do not belong to the president's faction, to compete for control over the party against the executive whenever possible. This dissertation project examines how strong presidencies shape reform incentives of ruling party elites, with a regional focus on South Korea under the period of conservative rule during 2008-2016. In particular, the collection of three essays in this dissertation focus on various aspects of "politics behind the ballot," wherein members of the ruling party compete against the president and her faction over nomination power in the run-up to legislative elections. The first two essays study legislative primaries, a democratic party reform of the traditional appointment-based candidate selection process, as one way for ruling party elites to resolve internal power struggles under strong presidencies. The third essay studies the effects of failed coordination, when ruling party incumbents lost the nomination battle, and temporarily defected from the party and formed a transitory alliance in the run-up to the legislative elections.

The first paper, "Legislative Primaries under Strong Presidencies: Evidence from South Korea," sheds light on roles played by legislative primaries under strong presidencies, one of

the most powerful institutions that have largely been neglected by recent scholarship on the origins of democratic party reforms. Under strong presidencies, where the executive abides by the rules but is still willing to exercise her power to the constitutional limit, I argue that legislative primaries can help party establishment candidates win the party nomination ticket against outsiders who would otherwise have won under the traditional elite arrangement system. These outcomes are possible so long as the establishment candidate has popular support, even if the outsider candidate has the support of the president's faction.

Using a novel dataset on the profiles and attributes of the entire pool of contestants competing in the ruling conservative party in the run-up to the 2012-2016 South Korean National Assembly Elections, I provide supporting evidence for the claim that legislative primaries tend to favor party establishment candidates. In a country where high legislative turnover is thought to originate from internal power struggles between the president and ruling party elites of other factions, these findings imply that legislative primaries help provide party members with career-building incentives to build their local support base and make their fate less dependent on whether they belong to the president's faction. While existing literature tends to see primaries as a loss of elite power, either in favor of local party actors or rank-and-file members, the findings from this study imply that ruling party elites may voluntarily use legislative primaries as a means to retain their power within the party.

In the second paper, titled "Parties versus Presidents: The Strategic Use of Legislative Primaries," I develop a formal model of intra-party candidate selection that analyzes the conditions under which legislative primaries are endogenously held by ruling party elites under strong presidencies. A term-limited executive exercises presidential discretion to nominate her preferred candidate who is a party outsider, while ruling party elites generally favor establishment candidates as a means to enforce party discipline. The ruling party elites can counteract executive's interference in the candidate selection process under a closed door nomination system (under which nomination decisions are made under elite arrangement) by transitioning to party primaries (where voters select the party's final nominee) during legislative elections.

The model shows that legislative primaries care an endogenous choice by ruling party elites when the public believes the party establishment candidate is of higher quality than the executive's preferred outsider candidate, even when this is not actually true. Moreover, party elites sometimes choose not to hold primaries and instead nominate the executive's preferred candidate, even when the establishment candidate is of higher quality. This implies that under strong presidencies, even democratic reforms such as legislative primaries may occur as an outcome of pandering by ruling party elites, and thus do not necessarily promote political accountability.

The third paper, titled "Successful Defections: Factionalism Under Mixed-Member Electoral Systems and Strong Presidencies," examines the effect of failed coordination between the

president's faction and other factions within the ruling party by situating the phenomenon in relation to recent scholarship on mixed-member electoral systems (MMS). While recent developments in this literature emphasize the importance of taking constitutional contexts into account in understanding the effect of such systems, these studies tend to overly focus on the comparison between the number of factions in the pre- and post- electoral reform period. As such, these studies erroneously conclude that factional conflicts and party splits have decreased after the implementation of MMS.

In contrast, I argue that when popular support for the president is high and the governing party expects to receive large voter support in the legislative elections, MMS provides particularly high institutional incentives for members from losing factions (i.e. those outside the president's faction) to defect and form a transitory electoral alliance. The formation of transitory alliances is less costly for losing factions under MMS because of the benefits conferred by running under a new alliance name: not only are alliance members better able to secure nomination in the single-member district (SMD) tier, but they are also able to increase the likelihood that alliance members will win votes in the proportional representation (PR) tier. To test this argument, I examine transitory electoral alliances that occurred in the 2008 South Korean Assembly elections, where governing party members who lost the nomination to members of the president's faction decided to form an electoral alliance mobilized around Park Geun-hye, who was then a popular conservative party leader but still lost in the recent presidential primary.

Using geocoded polling station data, I exploit quasi-random variation in geography when estimating the effects of the 2008 South Korean Assembly elections. Focusing on polling stations in neighborhoods that were most adjacent to each other at the electoral district boundary, I compare PR vote shares between districts where a candidate from Park's Alliance was nominated and districts where no candidate was nominated. This geographic variation minimizes confounders that arise due to parties strategically placing a SMD candidate in districts where they expect to receive more votes. My findings show that members of the Park Alliance were able to significantly increase their representation in districts where they ran a candidate in the SMD tier, an effect which largely stems from a decrease in the PR vote share for the governing party.

While existing scholarship portrays strong presidencies as a fundamental institutional barrier to promoting party democracy in relatively young democracies, the three essays in this dissertation demonstrate that under certain conditions, a strong presidency can instead pave the way for parties to voluntarily adopt democratic reforms.

Chapter 2

Legislative Primaries under Strong Presidencies

2.1   Introduction

In 2015, leader of the then ruling conservative New Frontier Party (NFP) of South Korea (hereafter Korea) told the press that he would implement a bottom-up nomination process for the coming 2016 Legislative Elections as a means to eradicate the factional politics which had played a large role in determining nomination outcomes in traditional backroom systems. Lamenting the so-called politics behind the ballots, where even the most electorally competitive incumbents sometimes fail to win the party's renomination, he even suggested that both the ruling and the main opposition party should consider adopting open primary elections on the same day, a sweeping reform plan that seemed difficult to implement given the party's lukewarm interests in holding primaries in the past.[1] Although his promise was never fully realized, the party decided to hold a primary in almost half of all constituencies where the party placed a candidate in the 2016 elections, the largest number held in any legislative elections and almost a three-fold increase compared to the previous elections in 2012. The sudden increase in legislative primaries, at least to the eyes of outside observers, did not provoke any serious political backlash within the party or precipitate major party defections.

Contrary to the Korean case, existing literature often tends to see party primaries as a weakening of the party elite and thus not something that would be undertaken voluntarily. For instance, primaries are seen as an inevitable loss of elite power, either in favor of local party actors (Ichino and Nathan 2012, 2013) or rank-and-file members (Epstein 1967, Ranney 1975, Serra 2011). However, the literature singularly focuses on the costs and benefits of primaries to parties and party elites, completely overlooking one of the most powerful political institutions in democratic systems: the presidency (Shugart and Carey 1992, Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, Cox and Morgenstern 2001).[2]

This tendency to ignore presidencies in understanding the nature of democratic party reforms in the candidate selection process can be especially problematic when we consider *strong* presidencies,[3] where the executive abides by formal rules but can still push her de facto power to its constitutional limits. Under strong presidencies, the nomination power within the ruling party does not always lie within the hands of party elites as the existing scholarship

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[1]*Hankook Ilbo*, 2015. "Kim say both parties should adopt open primary elections." http://www.hankookilbo.com/v/15e8ab80f69b4ffca731c45f7c209219 (July 15, 2015).

[2]With the exception of Ichino and Nathan (2013) who explain different legislative primary effects for the ruling and opposition parties in Ghana, there have been few attempts to understand the logic of legislative primaries under strong presidential systems. Even Ichino and Nathan (2013) do not consider the president to be the main player in legislative primaries. The ruling and opposition parties differ only in the sense that being a legislative member of the ruling party potentially promises more benefits of winning the election, which may indirectly affect primary competitions between the parties.

[3]As pointed out by Samuels and Shugart (2010), the tendency to overlook the importance of the constitutional separation of powers on the organizational and behavioral imperatives of parties is common practice, and is not unique to the study of party reforms, although there are a few exceptions Coppedge (1997), Romero (2005).

assumes. Rather, the executive and her faction often wield considerable influence in the ruling party nomination process and nominate their preferred candidates in the backroom (Carey 1997, Weldon 1997, Batto and Huang 2016), marginalizing the status of other factions within the party. If it is plausible to expect that internal party reforms can be achieved only in coordination with an agreement from the de facto party leadership, we need to consider presidencies in order to understand how legislative primaries work under strong presidential systems.

I argue that ruling party elites under strong presidencies want to voluntarily hold legislative primaries when party establishments in their faction cannot secure nomination against party outsiders who are preferred by the president and her faction. When nomination power lies in the hands of the president's faction, ruling party elites outside the president's faction under these systems are willing to democratize the candidate selection process as a means to counteract presidential discretion and to secure their own survival. After all, if they have a strong support base, contesting the seat in a party primary is likely to give them a higher chance of securing their nomination rather than completely giving it away to party outsiders who are favored by the president's faction under the elite-arrangement system.

However, whether legislative primaries are successfully held is determined by the relative power of different factions within the ruling party. This is because the de facto power of the president, which in turn affects the extent to which her faction exercise influence within the ruling party, varies according to the presidential election cycle (Shugart 1995). For incoming presidents, popular support is very high, such that the new president may be able to exercise greater leverage over other factions when negotiating nomination decisions, which makes it difficult for party elites to hold legislative primaries. For outgoing presidents, lame duck sessions enable other factions to secure their nomination preferences without having to hold a primary in all constituencies. When legislative elections are held during presidential midterms, however, more equal competition between the rising faction and the president's faction results in more party primaries, since this candidate selection method produces outcomes that are more difficult to contest (Kemahlioglu, Weitz-Shapiro and Hirano 2009).

To support the theoretical arguments of this paper, I examine the case of Korea. Korea is a relatively new but stable democracy with a strong presidency (Hahm and Plein 1995, Fish and Kroenig 2009, Horiuchi and Lee 2007) whose two major political parties have held legislative primaries since 2004, but have had uneven success. Its presidential and legislative elections are held in alternations, and gaps between the two election cycles allow us to examine the relationship between the likelihood of the ruling party holding legislative primaries and the timing of presidential election cycle.

I first present a naive evidence that shows the number of districts where a legislative primary was held for the ruling party increases during presidential midterms and decreases otherwise between 2008-2016. I then complement this finding by using lasso logistic regressions

to explore which candidate characteristics are important predictors of winning the party's nomination. Specifically, we can examine whether individual contestants selected through legislative primaries have different political backgrounds and experiences from those selected by backroom procedures, depending on the type of candidate selection procedures and when in the presidential election cycle the legislative elections were held.

The empirical analysis is based on a novel dataset on the main profiles and attributes of the entire pool of contestants competing in the candidate selection process of the conservative ruling party in the run-up to the 2012 and 2016 South Korean Legislative Elections. I focus on these election-years because of Korea's recent enactment of a pre-registration electoral law, which allows us to identify who contested the party's nomination during the candidate selection stage. The candidate profile data does not solve the fundamental problem of not being able to identify whether each political aspirants belong to the president's faction at the time of the election.[4] However, it still provides a unique opportunity to test implications from my theory.

The analysis finds supporting evidence for my arguments. First, being an incumbent legislator is still the most powerful predictor of winning the ruling party nomination, conditional on a legislative primary being held in the district. However, this is not necessarily true in districts where the nomination decisions were made under the elite arrangement. This is consistent with my theoretical assumption that the elite-arrangement system does not guarantee incumbents with renomination under strong presidencies. Second, the incumbent advantage is relatively attenuated in legislative primaries held in the run-up to a presidential election, where other candidate characteristics such as being a local governor or being the chairperson of party's local office equally increases the probability of winning the nomination. On the other hand, the results show that party establishments are more likely to secure the ruling party nomination for legislative elections held during the presidential midterm rather than in the run-up to a presidential election, irrespective of the type of candidate selection method. This implies that a relatively even distribution of power among the president's faction and its rival factions makes it even more difficult for party outsiders to win party nomination over party establishments.

This paper contributes to the growing literature on the origins and institutional role of legislative primaries in new democracies by shedding light on the importance of a strong presidency when understanding party behavior and the nature of democratic party reforms. The findings from this study imply that the institutional role of "democratizing" candidate selection may be less about appeasing voters or lowering entry barriers to party outsiders. Instead, it is about ensuring the survival of sitting incumbents. For incumbent legislators outside of the president's faction, legislative primaries may be the only legitimate means to

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[4]Several Korean news media occasionally report on factional conflicts within political parties and provide a classification of factions within the parties. However, the reports usually include only the most prominent legislators, and are often inaccurate as a former legislator explained in his book (Jung 2016).

secure a seat in the legislature and the president's party. The strategic use of legislative primaries under strong presidencies may thus provide party members with incentives to redirect more efforts to building a support base rather than building connections to the de facto party leadership.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. I review the literature on primaries in new democracies and then develop a theory of legislative primaries under a strong presidency as a function of the presidential election cycle. Before presenting and discussing empirical analysis and results, I explain the landscape of factional politics within parties and provide background information on recent reforms of the candidate selection process in Korea. The final section discusses the implications of my findings and the external validity of the theory.

2.2 Motivating Concerns

The conventional wisdom in existing scholarship is that democratizing the process of candidate selection is costly for party elites because doing so inevitably requires them to hand power over nominations to party outsiders. For instance, it is often assumed that party coherence and discipline is undermined once primary elections are introduced, because rank-and-file party members confront fewer incentives to comply with the party elites as their survival in the next election is no longer determined entirely by elite discretion (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, Aragón 2014, Serra 2011). Were legislative primaries to be held, the costs of holding primaries - relinquishing power over nominations - must be compensated by benefits-such as attracting more qualified outsiders (Snyder and Ting 2011, Serra 2011), preventing party splits and defections (De Luca, Jones and Tula 2002, Rahat, Hazan and Katz 2008, Kemahlioglu, Weitz-Shapiro and Hirano 2009), and collecting rents from primary aspirants (Ichino and Nathan 2012, 2013). What is implicitly assumed in these theories is that party elites, who are often incumbent legislators themselves, are the most powerful actors within the party determining whether to hold a primary.

Under strong presidencies, however, the president is not only the head of the state, but also the *de facto* leader of the governing party. For instance, Figueiredo and Limongi (2000) show that most of the bills passed in Brazil since the enactment of the 1988 constitution were in fact introduced by the executive with the reliable support from parties in the governing coalition, concluding that Brazilian presidents have been both de jure and de facto legislators. In addition to having legislative power, strong presidencies enjoy formidable nomination and appointment powers which extend beyond the cabinet (Weldon 1997, Schoenherr 2017). As long as the spoils of political office are mostly controlled by a separately elected president, parties become presidentialized under separation of power systems and the executive exercises enormous power over her co-partisans (Samuels and Shugart 2010).

Once we consider the role of the president as the ruling party leader under strong presi-

dencies, the cost-benefit calculations of introducing legislative primaries are fundamentally different. For instance, if the president were receiving strong support from the public and the constitution does not prevent her from wielding power over ruling party nomination outcomes for legislative elections, why would the president or her faction forego their power over nominations under the backroom system and hold legislative primaries? Instead, the president and her faction could expand their influence in the governing party by recruiting their favored candidates, such as those who helped the president with her campaign, or any members from the patronage network of the president. Party incumbents who belong to the president's faction also do not want to give away the chance to strengthen their own status within the party; after all, nomination tickets are invaluable distributive pork.

Another point that has been neglected in the recent scholarship is that while many political parties in democracies outside the U.S. have introduced legislative primaries, few have *institutionalized* primaries for legislative elections. Not only does the number of districts where the party's candidate is nominated through primaries fluctuate across different electoral cycles, but also districts where a primary is held may alternate from year to year. This neglect is reflected by the fact that almost all of these studies have employed district-level data to predict which districts are more likely to hold primaries. However, if district-level covariates - such as the party's previous vote share or the number of contestants - are ultimately what determine whether primaries will be held in a district, it seems natural to expect primaries to have been institutionalized in certain districts over time.

One important motivation behind this paper is that *who runs* matters. This is especially true where primaries are not institutionalized but only selectively held. Political parties still have tremendous discretion over determining the districts where they are going to hold primaries, influence who runs in the primaries, and sometimes even override their previous decision and cancel the primary (Ichino and Nathan 2012). In the case of Korea, information about the list of major applicants for party nomination is publicly accessible well before the party elites decide where to hold a primary, and some popular candidates end up running in a different district from where they previously ran as a result of the party nomination decisions. An analysis at the electoral district-level may tell us little about the politics behind the ballot and the decisions to hold legislative primaries. It is not where primaries are held that matters, but who runs in primaries. Looking at the political background and previous experience of various candidates under different types of candidate selection methods, we may have a better understanding of the institutional role of legislative primaries on party nominations and democratic accountability under strong presidencies.

A new theory should be able to explain why party elites in these scenarios introduce primaries in some districts, but never all, and only selectively, when they have power over choosing which candidate nomination method will be applied in each district. It should also be empirically tested with a candidate-level data.

2.3   Theoretical Argument

President's Faction vs. Other Factions: A Commitment Problem

Competition over nomination power between the president's faction and rival factions within the ruling party is inevitable under presidential systems. This is because neither side can credibly commit to supporting each other throughout the president's term, due to different incentives and time horizons facing each side. This is especially the case when the president has constitutional term limits. For instance, Moe and Caldwell (1994) argue that a president may primarily be interested in successfully initiating her reform agenda until the end of her presidency based on the support from her party, while party elites in general are more interested in retaining their power within the party and winning seats in future legislative elections.

The president's inability to credibly commit to ruling party elites from other factions originates from institutional constraints embedded in presidential democracies; she must step down from the presidency once her term ends. Even if the president promises to be a faithful agent of other factions in return for their support in her presidential campaign, the promise cannot be credible once she steps into power because her survival is not in the hands of the party. She may even face incentives to block party leaders of other factions from gaining popular support too early on during her term, because it might accelerate her lame duck session within the party well before she steps down. In fact, failure to cut down the power of other rival factions has been found to increase legislative fragmentation (Golder 2006).

The non-president faction also cannot credibly commit to support the president throughout her presidency, since doing so may sometimes risk the survival of their own party in future elections. Some of the president's agenda may lose public support by the time of the next legislative elections approach and the party may be punished for being the incumbent. Members of the non-president faction also need to prepare for the next presidential election so that the potential candidate whom they back up can become the next president, which may sometimes require withdrawing their support for the sitting president. The president recognizes that the threat of defection is greater among members outside of her faction. To counteract this threat, the executive and her faction under strong presidencies can increase their influence within the ruling party by nominating new political aspirants who they prefer. As a result of the nomination war between the president's faction and rival factions, incumbents who belong to losing factions in the upcoming legislative elections are often replaced with new political aspirants. This may partly explain why legislative turnover tends to be higher in countries where candidate selection procedures are relatively centralized (Crisp et al. 2004).

Legislative primaries and the presidential election cycle

Party elites generally do not want to give away their nomination power to their rank-and-file members and the public. However, when much of the nomination power within the ruling party is in the hands of the executive and her faction and the party elites' own renomination chances are likely to be threatened because they belong to non-president factions, the elites may prefer democratizing candidate selection process as a last resort. This is because the president and her faction's attempt to distribute nomination tickets to loyalists will be more institutionally constrained under primary rather than under the elite arrangement, as long as there exists an advantage for being a party establishment under primaries.

In fact, any candidate who has a wider support base and is capable of mobilizing vote support in his constituency, such as incumbent legislators and local party leaders, is likely to win nomination in districts where primaries are introduced. The fact that incumbent legislators tend to win primary races is often used as evidence of the ineffectiveness of using primaries as a means to lower entry barriers to party outsiders in the U.S. (Ansolabehere et al. 2006). However, under systems with a strong presidency, legislative primaries may now become the only opportunity for qualified incumbent legislators and local politicians to win renomination, since there exists a credible threat that they may lose their seats to the president's faction if final decisions are made in the backroom.

This does not necessarily mean the ruling party elites outside the president's faction always successfully implement nationwide legislative primaries. Nor is it the case that the president and her faction always entirely control nomination outcomes under strong presidencies. The president's de facto power is a function of the duration of her remaining term (Shugart 1995). The ruling party is likely to receive a surge in vote support for being the incoming president's party in general elections that are held soon after a presidential election (Campbell 1986), giving more justification to the president and her faction to take over the party during the nomination process. However, as the president's popular support generally declines as the end of her term approaches, the ruling party faces more incentive to detach their dependence on the president. Thus, the extent to which the president and her faction exert influence over the ruling party generally declines over time, whereas the status of other rival factions, especially if the factions successfully placed the party's next presidential candidate, are generally on the rise within the party.

This implies that when political parties still have discretion to decide where to hold primaries, the likelihood of legislative primaries being held under strong presidencies is likely to be a function of the presidential election cycle. That is, legislative primaries for the ruling party nomination are less likely in elections that are held early after a presidential election. Much of the nomination power is already in the hands of the new president and her faction, who want to make decisions behind the doors as much as possible. A threat of defection by non-president factions is low, because the president's faction still expects that the ruling party can secure enough votes in the upcoming legislative election. Similarly, as the end of the term

Figure 2.1: The likelihood of legislative primaries under strong presidencies

approaches, the likelihood of a legislative primary being held decreases, because once party members begin investing in the next presidential candidate, control over the distribution of spoils from office will soon be given to the new candidate and his faction. The party's next presidential candidate then becomes the de facto leader of the ruling party and is likely to prefer taking control of distributing the party's nominating tickets in backroom systems rather than democratizing the candidate selection procedure by holding primaries.

On the other hand, there may be room for negotiation between factions as the president's power lapses. As the strength of the non-president factions increases, defection becomes more costly so that leaders from competing factions may decide to hold legislative primaries as a way to defuse intra-party conflict and prevent party splitting. The competing factions can agree on holding primaries in selective districts because candidates tend to find it more difficult to protest against primary election results (Kemahlioglu, Weitz-Shapiro and Hirano 2009).[5] Thus, the likelihood of legislative primaries is higher during the presidential midterm elections and lower otherwise. These dynamics are depicted in Figure 2.1.

My theory generates a few other testable hypotheses. First, if power struggles between

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[5]In the case of South Korea, the election law stipulates that political aspirants who lost party primaries are not allowed to run in the general election under other party's banner or as an independent. Contestants who want to run in the general election but are likely to lose the party primary should run as an independent without competing in the primary.

the president's faction and rival factions within the ruling party affect whether a legislative primary is held, then we should expect to see more *competitive* primaries during presidential midterms, when the level of factional conflicts is high. That is, more primaries during presidential midterms are likely be held in competitive districts and ruling party strongholds, where there exists a real chance of winning in the general election and more high quality challengers are likely to contest the nomination. Second, while legislative primaries generally tend to favor party establishments such as incumbent legislators and local party leaders who have a strong support base, the extent to which the party establishments win in the primary is likely to be strengthened in legislative primaries held at presidential midterms. Differently put, it becomes more difficult for political aspirants who are less established, such as party outsiders, to win in primaries for legislative elections held at presidential midterms. This is partly because during presidential midterms, more legislative primaries are likely to be held in districts where there is a sitting legislator, but also because neither faction can exclusively exercise power over nomination so that the party leadership has less control over who runs in legislative primaries. As a result, more party establishment candidates compete in primaries and are more likely to secure the nomination since the chance of their winning is not affected by factional conflicts.

The theoretical argument developed in this paper is similar to Rahat, Hazan and Katz (2008), who argue that intraparty competition and internal disagreement over nomination decisions are likely to increase the number of party primaries. However, unlike their argument, my theory explicitly predicts strategic *under*-institutionalization of legislative primaries in strong presidencies. It also shows that the nature of competition in legislative primaries is also likely to differ as a function of the presidential election cycle.

2.4   Evidence from South Korea

I examine the case of South Korea, a relatively new democracy whose strong presidency is often considered an important determinant of a wide range of political outcomes such as pork-barrel benefits (Horiuchi and Lee 2007) and even appointments to a number of public and private sector jobs (Schoenherr 2017). Since the country's transition to democracy in 1987, elections have been free and fair with two main political parties- one conservative and the other progressive- having occupied most of the seats in the legislature since early 2000s. Both parties have won the presidency in the post-democratization era.

There are 246 single-member legislative districts, wherein approximately 30% of the districts are considered competitive since winning vote margins tend to be less than 7% of the district's total votes.[6] The competitive districts are heavily concentrated in the region of Seoul and

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[6]The country adopted a mixed-member majoritarian system in the 2004 Legislative Elections. There are a total of 300 legislative seats, 246 single-member districts (hence 246 SMD seats) and 54 Proportional

Gyeonggi Province, where most of the political, economic, and financial sectors are located. The remaining regions are considered strongholds for either party, although the conservative New Frontier Party (NFP, which has been renamed the Liberal Korea Party since February 2017) often enjoyed a strong support base in a majority of these remaining regions except for Jeolla Province, which is the regional base for the progressive bloc.

Due to the availability of data, I focus on the period of 2008-2016, during which NFP was the governing party and also the majority party in the legislature during the same period,[7] until its main center-leftist opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) - the successor party of New Political Alliance for Democracy (hereafter NPAD) - won the largest number of seats in the 2016 Legislative Election.[8] Given our theoretical argument about how legislative primaries for the ruling party are held under strong presidential systems, the NFP will be the main focus of this paper, although I provide a brief background of how legislative primaries were first introduced in 2004.

Political parties in South Korea are highly centralized at the national level in that the central party determines its main policy platform, orchestrates the distribution of pork to its local offices, and upholds party discipline in the legislature (Hix and Jun 2009, Rich 2014). With its centralized power structure, candidate selection has mostly been determined by party leadership under the elite arrangement. Rarely was information about how nomination decisions were made and who contested party nominations revealed to the public. There was only media speculation about the existence of intense factional conflicts within the party when those who were not nominated defected from the party in protest.[9]

Since 2004, the main political parties began to form a nomination committee of 10-15 people in the run-up to legislative elections, usually consisting of both party elites and a selected group of outsiders for advice. The parties stipulated that the committee selects the district nominations based on several criteria such as electorability, previous contributions to the party, democratic representativeness, and legislative performance such as the number of successful bills passed (a criterion which can only be applied to incumbents). They also decided in which districts to hold a legislative primary and who could contest in the primary.

Representation seats from a nationwide PR district. Although it is told that political party elites exert influence over which candidates get their name on the party's PR list as well, we focus on nomination outcomes for the SMD races.

[7]NFP was in government during 2008-2016 after losing the presidency to the predecessor party of the opposition NPAD during the period 1998- 2007.

[8]Political parties are notorious for frequently changing their name. However, given the majority of the members of the conservative NFP have remained the same and no major party mergers or splits took place during the period 2004-2016, I consider the party and their predecessors to be the same. NPAD has been renamed to DPK since December 2015 and underwent a few mergers and splits during the period when the progressive bloc was out of government.

[9]SK Shin. 2000. *The Hankyoreh*. 2000. "Candidates who lost party nomination are defecting the Democratic Party." http://legacy.h21.hani.co.kr/h21/data/L000221/1p9p2l26.html (May 12, 2017)

This is not to say that party leadership completely delegated their nomination power to the nomination committee. The party leadership still selects members of the committee and committee's decisions are always reviewed by the party leadership. The party statute states that the leadership can ask for re-consideration and repeal if more than two thirds of the nomination committee agree. This implies that the leadership still has considerable discretion to overrule the committee's decisions, undermining the credibility of the nomination committee as an independent body within the parties. Nevertheless, NFP remained as the most cohesive and electorally competitive party in South Korea during 2008-2016.

Legislative Primaries Since 2004

The two major political parties introduced legislative primaries for the first time in the run-up to the 2004 Election. However, the reform was mainly adopted by the then-ruling progressive Uri party which introduced legislative primaries in 85 single-member districts. This was a part of the internal party reform movements initiated under the reformist Roh Moo-hyun regime to improve transparency in the candidate selection procedures behind the doors. The main conservative opposition Hanara Party (the predecessor party of NFP) showed a lukewarm interest in the reform led by the ruling progressive and reluctantly held a party primary in only 15 districts, less than 10% of the entire districts in which the party placed a candidate. When they were first introduced in 2004, legislative primaries were held in a haphazard fashion, with little participation among the public and many protests by those who failed to receive nominations.[10]

Legislative primaries in South Korea have taken various forms. But the most popularly used method is a combination of a real primary election (where party members participate and cast a vote at a designated polling place by the central party) and a so-called "polling primary" (Yu, Yu and Shoji 2014), in which political parties hire private polling companies (which must follow the National Election Committee's public survey guidelines) to conduct telephone surveys among the voting population in the targeted electoral district using a sampling technique known as random-digit dialing. For polling primaries, survey respondents who identify as either an active party supporter or a non-partisan voter are eligible to participate in the primary. Legislative primaries have proven to be effective in resolving internal party conflicts over nomination decisions. This is partly due to a Korean electoral law, which stipulates that political aspirants who decide to enter a party primary race must comply with primary outcomes, and cannot defect from the party after losing the primary and run as an independent. Individuals who expect to lose a primary should thus defect from the party before a primary is held. Despite the considerable discretion the party leadership still has over where to hold a primary and who runs, it is widely believed that there are

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[10]*The Hankyore.* 2004. "Legislative primaries are facing criticisms." http://legacy.www.hani.co.kr/section-003400000/2004/03/003400000200403031854241.html (May 15, 2017)

non-negligible uncertainties involved with primary outcomes such that incumbent legislators are not guaranteed to win all primaries.[11]

Party reforms as a Function of the presidential election cycles

Differences in term length between legislative and presidential offices makes Korea a particularly interesting case. As Figure 2.2 shows,[12] national elections are held non-concurrently in Korea; Legislative Elections are conducted every four years, while presidential elections are held every five years. This difference in term length creates variation in the ability of the president and party elites from the president's faction to exercise de facto leadership of the ruling party. For instance, when legislative elections are held only a few months after a new president steps into office, which is precisely when the president is most likely to enjoy the highest level of support from members of her party as well as from the general public, the president may be able to exert maximum power over ruling party nomination decisions for the upcoming legislative election. The unilateral exercise of nomination power by the president and her faction is viable because the internal rival, i.e., ruling party elites from non-president factions, are likely to have been marginalized and thus cannot credibly threaten the faction in power with defection.

In fact, this is what happened in the run-up to the 2008 Legislative Elections, which were held only a few months after the 2007 Presidential Election when the conservative NFP candidate Lee Myung-bak won the presidency. The public support for the new executive reached its highest point during Lee's presidency, with presidential approval ratings hitting 52%.[13] Various public polls in the run-up to the general election reported that the ruling party was going to easily secure the majority within the legislature.[14] Unsurprisingly, no primary was held and nomination decisions were made entirely by backroom elite arrangement in 2008.

As the general election approached, it became apparent that the status of the rival faction within the ruling party was being dampened by the new president's faction, who gained control over the nomination process. Many of the party's incumbent legislators who belonged to the rival faction began to quickly defect from the ruling party, foreseeing that they were

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[11]*Chosun Ilbo*, 2016. "Incumbent legislators lost their renomination ticket in a primary." http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/03/19/2016031901078.html (May 23, 2016)

[12]With the country's unprecedented impeachment of President Park Geun-Hye in April 2017, the 2017 Presidential Election took place in May 2017, approximately 7 months before the initially scheduled date. The president's being ousted does not affect our analysis, because it occurred unexpectedly and thus did not affect the distribution of power across different factions within the ruling party in the run-up to the 2016 Legislative Elections in any way.

[13] Gallup Korea. 2008. *Gallup Poll*, Retrieved from: http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/gallupdb.asp (June 4, 2017)

[14]Realmeter. 2008. "80% of the respondents believe that the ruling party will win landslide victory." *Realmeter Poll*, Retrieved from: http://www.realmeter.net/2008/02/ (June 4, 2017)

Figure 2.2: Korean National Electoral Timeline (2007-2017). Red dashed points represent presidential job approval ratings from Gallup Korea.

not going to win renomination. Even an incumbent legislator who previously served as a member of the party's supreme council could lose the renomination ticket, mostly because he belonged to the faction of the party's losing presidential primary candidate.[15] Defectors created an transitory electoral alliance called the "Pro-Park Alliance," named after the losing presidential candidate Park Geun-hye and nominated themselves as candidates. Others contested the general election as independents and successfully retained their seats.

Despite the successful defection of the Pro-park Alliance, the ruling conservative party nevertheless won 131 among 245 district seats, a landslide victory given that the party replaced 42 out of its 108 single-member district incumbent legislators with new political contestants. Additionally, according to a biographic report of the legislators who won the 2008 compiled after the election by a Korean newspaper, among the new 58 winners of the conservative ruling NFP candidate, 27 candidates were identified to be among the close circle of the newly elected president Lee, serving either as a policy recommender in the undertaking committee to the president, or as the chief manager of the president's campaign office (Seoul Newspaper, 2008). I now turn to the main focus of this paper, the 2012 and 2016 Legislative Elections

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[15]TW Kim, 2008. *Monthly Chosun.* http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?nNewsNumb= 201105100010 (July 18, 2016)

in Korea.

The 2012 and 2016 Legislative Elections

The 2012 and 2016 Legislative Elections in South Korea are an ideal paired comparison for our study, where the country's recent pre-registration electoral law allows us to identify not only who ran in the legislative elections, but also who contested the party's nomination during the candidate selection stage.[16] The "pre-registration" rule requires political aspirants who wish to run in the general elections to register with the National Electoral Committee approximately three months prior to the election date. Once a candidate has registered, he is allowed to engage in a limited number of campaign activities.[17]

While the extent to which the pre-registered contestant can campaign seems very limited, this is a huge bonus for serious contestants, for two reasons. First, because there is no way aspirants can predict with certainty whether party leaders are going to hold primary elections in any given constituency, it is prudent for them to start campaigning early in preparation for the possibility that primaries will be held. For political aspirants who have a relatively low pubic profile, pre-registering with the Election Committee is essentially the only way to increase their public recognition and support base in advance of the general election. Second, given that the actual campaigning period for the general election is only two weeks, it is better for serious candidates to begin campaigning as early as possible.

2012: End of President's Term

The 2012 Legislative Election was unique in that they took place a few months *prior* to the 2012 Presidential Election in December. The lame duck session of president Lee had already begun, and power within the ruling party had already begun shifting towards Park and her faction, who had previously lost the presidential primary candidacy to President Lee in 2007. It was widely perceived both within the party and among the public that there were no competitors to Park for presidential candidacy by the time of the 2012 Legislative Elections. Park was the party's new de facto leader and thus ready to control the distribution of resources. Unsurprisingly, she became chair of the party's emergency planning committee by the end of 2011 when the National Electoral Commission's pre-registration period opened,

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[16]The election law was implemented as a part of the party reform package in 2004 under the Roh Moo-hyun government. However, it was adopted only a few weeks prior to the 2004 Legislative Election so that few political aspirants found it useful in 2004.

[17]For example, only his family can be involved in campaigning. No other person can distribute any name cards or pamphlets to any organization, only the pre-registered candidate himself can hand out such material. The total amount of campaigning money he can spend during the three months is proportional to the number of voters of his district. Contestants who pre-register must pay a registration fee of approximately $3,000.

until the end of the 2012 Legislative Elections.[18] This was in contrast to the opposition NPAD where power within the party leadership was more fragmented between members who belonged to the inner circle of the party's former president and those who did not. The ruling NFP nominated a candidate in 234 districts, including some of the opposition NPAD's stronghold districts where the party had essentially zero chance of winning.[19] The party held legislative primaries in 47 districts, approximately 20% of the districts where the party's candidates were competing in legislative elections, and most of the districts where a primary was held had an open seat.

Korean mass media reported that being in the party's declining faction was portrayed as a major factor in losing the party's renomination in 2012. For instance, one newspaper reported that while 42 of 55 NFP incumbent legislators who were considered a part of the next presidential candidate's inner circle were able to secure renomination in the 2012 election, only 33 of 95 incumbents in outgoing President Lee's inner circle achieved the same results.[20] Among the 144 NFP incumbent legislators, there were 13 drop-outs and 47 candidates who did not win renomination for the 2012 election. The candidate replacement rate was high at about 40 percent, which was similar to the 2008 election.

2016: Midterm Election

Importantly, the 2016 Legislative Election was a midterm election, which took place almost three years after NFP's new president Park Geun-hye won the presidency in December 2012. The general approval rating of President Park was around 35% according to various polling firms, but generally on decline as shown in Figure 2.2. Various news media reported that the relative power of the president's faction within NFP was declining and that the power within the party was more evenly distributed between the so-called "pro-Park" and "non-Park" factions.[21] The balance of power between the two competing factions was reflected in the composition of the party's special nominating committee for the 2016 elections; both factions had their six party incumbents in the nominating committee, who were to negotiate the districts where the party holds primaries and which candidates to run in district elections where no primaries were to be held.

For the 2016 Legislative Elections, NFP placed a candidate in a total of 248 districts and held legislative primaries in 123 districts where multiple political aspirants applied for nomination,

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[18]The 2012 Legislative Elections were held in April, while the 2012 Presidential Election was held in December. In fact, the next presidential candidate became the party's leader only temporarily during the period of the legislative elections, after she resigned and became the party's next presidential candidate.

[19]This is due to a generally accepted expectation that running a district candidate has a positive effect on the party's PR vote share in the district (Herron and Nishikawa 2001, Crisp, Potter and Lee 2012).

[20]"Incumbent replacement at 41%." (2012, March, 19). *Hankook Ilbo*, p.A4.

[21]*Maeil Business Newspaper*. 2015. "Factional Landscape of NFP." http://www.raythep.com/newsView.php?newsView.php?cc=270001&page=0&no=4167 (June 24, 2017)

New Frontier Party (2004–2016)

Figure 2.3: The share of legislative districts where NFP (and Hanara, NFP's predecessor party) held a primary since 2004.

which accounts for about half of the districts where the party nominated a candidate. The share of districts where the conservative party held a legislative primary since 2004 is shown in Figure 2.3, which shows that the likelihood of legislative primaries being held for the ruling party under strong presidencies is higher during presidential midterm elections and lower otherwise.

To support the claim that the increased use of primaries in the 2016 election compared with the 2012 election was mostly due to intense intraparty conlicts between the president's faction and its rival faction, I provide a histogram of the party's vote share margin in the previous legislative elections in districts with and without primaries for the 2012 and 2016 elections in Appendix. The histograms show that while NFP held a primary evenly across districts with varying degrees of previous vote share margin in 2012, the party extended primary contests in competitive and party stronghold districts in 2016, where the number of contestants for the party nomination tends to be higher. The Appendix also provides logistic regression results, which shows the relationship between the likelihood of a legislative primary being held in that district and district-level covariates such as the party's previous vote share, the number of pre-registered contestants, and whether or not the district had an open seat, for both the 2012 and 2016 elections. The results show legislative primaries were more likely to be held in districts with a higher number of political aspirants contesting for the nomination in both elections. However, whereas primaries were more likely to be held in

open seat districts in 2008, districts where the party's previous vote share was higher were significantly more likely to hold a primary in 2016. This preliminary evidence is consistent with the claim that more legislative primaries are likely to be held in contested districts at presidential midterms when the power within the ruling party is more evenly distributed between the president's faction and rival factions.

2.5 Empirical Analysis

Candidate Profile Data

I created a new dataset on short profiles of all contestants who applied for a nomination ticket to the ruling NFP for the 2012 and 2016 Legislative Elections in Korea, which was based on information from the National Election Committee website and party websites. With very few exceptions, most candidates pre-register with the Electoral Commission three months before the election, and apply for the party's nomination once the application is open (usually about two months before the election). The pre-registration data usually includes information such as occupation and education of all the applicants. However, it is not publicly available once the general election campaign period begins. The 2012 Elections data used in this paper was obtained through a formal process of petitioning the South Korean government for the release of the information for a research purpose. The National Electoral Commission approved of the use of the pre-registration data for the 2012 Legislative Elections, but did not release all the information due to privacy concerns. Thus, the pre-registration data is complemented by another dataset that was collected directly from party websites and local newspapers. For the 2016 Elections, I obtained the profile data directly from the National Election Committee website before it became publicly unavailable. For cases where the parties overturned their initial nomination decisions and gave the ticket to another contestant, I only record final outcomes. The data includes information on districts where legislative primaries were held.

The dataset also includes information on the contestant's name, the district where he applied for a nomination, age, gender, and a short profile (usually less than 4-5 items) of the contestant. Because there is a strict limit to the number of profile items that each candidate can provide, contestants almost always list the highest positions they have served over the course of their career. For instance, contestants with extensive previous political experience are generally higher ranked in the party or in the legislature. This means that if a candidate who previously served as a committee chair in the legislature, he would first identify himself as a former committee chair, rather than simply "a former legislator." On the other hand, contestants whose profile does not indicate any prominent experience either in the party or in politics are almost always likely to be relatively new to politics.

For the sake of analysis, I created a number of dummy variables indicating political back-

ground based on the contestants' profiles. I repeated the process of creating a new dummy to categorize each contestant's profile, until less than 1% of the contestants did not belong to any of the categories. This gives us more than 30 candidate characteristics covariates whose full description are available upon request. A summary statistics for the candidate characteristics covariates for NFP in 2012 and 2016 elections with a detailed description of how other candidate characteristics were defined is provided in Table 2.6 and Table 2.1.

I find a few interesting patterns. First, a large number of new entrants seem to be political aspirants who have either been elected to local political office, or climbed the ladder to a high government position in the local bureaucracy. This implies that building local support bases is important in paving one's political career to the national legislature. Second, an alternative way to start establishing one's political career seems to be either serving as secretaries to party leaders, elites, and incumbent legislators, or participating in the campaign office for the party's presidential candidate. Third, in both elections, approximately 15% of incumbent legislators ran for re-election both in 2012 and 2016 elections, although we find a higher share of former incumbent legislators among the contestants in the 2016 elections.

Variable Selection

The most challenging issue with predicting who wins nomination based on candidate characteristics variables is data *sparsity*. Sparsity is partly due to the fact that only a small number of people have a real opportunity to serve in one of the highest positions within a party or government. The situation gets worse when legislative turnover is high and there are many party outsider candidates who tend to come from a more diverse background. Covariates that describe these groups of candidates will be sparse, thus adding little information to the final analysis. As such, entering all of the available candidate covariates into a logistic regression in order to predict the probability of winning nomination is likely to result in quasi-separation problems (i.e. one or more variables perfectly predicts the outcome), as well as serious overfitting (Zorn 2005, Heinze and Schemper 2002).

One way to deal with these issues is to run a logistic *lasso* (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator) regression, which penalizes the size of regression coefficients toward exactly zero by constraining the norm of the coefficient vector (Tibshirani 1996), and gives sparse solutions, performing a variable selection procedure. It works especially well when many coefficients of predictors are sparse, Specifically, the logistic lasso solves the following problem:

$$\min_{(\beta,\beta_0)\in\mathbb{R}^{p+1}} - \left\{ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} y_i \cdot (\beta_0 + x_i^T\beta) - \log(1 + e^{(\beta_0 + x_i^T\beta)}) \right\} + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^{p} |\beta_j|$$

where $\lambda \geq 0$ is a tuning parameter, p the number of parameters, and $\sum |\beta_j|$ is the l_1 norm of a coefficient vector β. In my analysis, the dependent variable y_i is an indicator for whether a contestant won the party's nomination and x_i^T is the vector of political aspirant i's candidate characteristics as well as a few district-level covariates. Since my theory expects a different political dynamic depending on where within the presidential election cycle legislative primaries are held, I subset the data into political aspirants who ran in districts where a legislative primary was held and those without a primary, and run a separate regression. In addition to the individual-level characteristics data, I included the party's district vote share margin in the previous legislative election, regional dummies, and the number of political aspirants who contested the party nomination in the same district.

The role of the tuning parameter λ can be understood as a budget constraint in any optimization problem and the size of λ determines the degree to which the coefficients are constrained or "*regularized.*" Because the l_1 penalty of lasso is an absolute value function, the solution to this problem is sparse in that some of the coefficients are set exactly to zero over a range of different values of the tuning parameter. A higher (lower) penalty, there will be more (less) covariates with a zero coefficient. Covariates whose regression coefficients blows up due to separation or high collinearity will also likely to be penalized as λ increases. The lasso thus works as a variable selection mechanism, which selects a group of variables that are informative (i.e. non-zero) in predicting the dependent variable, which in turn is desirable for the purposes of interpretation when the number of predictors is large.

The recommended value of the penalty is one that gives the lowest mean squared cross-validation error, or the largest value of the penalty that is within one standard error of the minimum (Friedman, Hastie and Tibshirani 2001), each of which is denoted as $\underline{\lambda}$ and λ', respectively, below.[22] Once the lasso selects a group of non-zero covariates at the suggested level of the λ, I use the `selectiveInference` package in `R` to calculate the posted selection-adjusted confidence intervals and the p-values of the lasso estimates at the fixed values of the penalty (Lee et al. 2016, Taylor and Tibshirani 2015). The lasso coefficients are calculated by using the `glmnet` package in `R`. Finally, with highly correlated predictors, lasso can sometimes randomly select one or the other. To make sure that our results do not include a random subset of predictors that are highly correlated with another, I repeated the analysis 20 times to see if a different group of variables is selected. None of the repeated regression results included a substantially diverging pattern from the one presented below.

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[22]While I present the regression results based on these two values of λ, the entire paths of the lasso coefficients depending on the value of the penalty can be found in a series of figures in Appendix.

Results

Table 2.2, Table 2.3, and Table 2.4 show the lasso logistic regression results. In Table 2.2, the first two columns show the non-zero predictors and their (standardized) coefficients for districts where the NFP held a primary for the 2012 Election, where the selection-adjusted p-values were calculated at $\lambda = \lambda'$ and $\lambda = \underline{\lambda}$. The third and fourth columns show results for districts where no primaries were held in 2012 with different values of the penalty. Since λ' is always larger than $\underline{\lambda}$, there are more non-zero coefficients in the second and fourth columns than in the first and third columns. The regression results for the 2016 Election are provided in Table 2.3 (with primaries) and Table 2.4 (without primaries). I ran separate analyses with and without the previous election outcomes for the 2016 Election, because legislative redistricting took place a couple of months before the 2016 Election, including the party's previous vote share margin to our analysis significantly reduces the number of observations. The first two columns in each of the tables show the non-zero coefficients selected among all predictors available in our data, where as the third and fourth columns exclude the party's performance in the previous legislative election.

I find that there exists an incumbent advantage under legislative primaries: Being an incumbent legislator is a significant predictor of winning nomination under legislative primaries in both 2012 and 2016 elections. It is an especially informative predictor in who wins the party nomination in districts with a primary at the presidential midterm (2016) when more sitting incumbents had to compete in a primary for renomination. However, whether being an incumbent significantly increases the probability of winning the party nomination in districts with no primary is less clear. For instance, the sign of the coefficient is positive but the predictor is not significant for districts where nomination decisions were made by the elite arrangement in 2016. This implies that while some incumbents were still able to secure their renomination without even having to go through an internal competition, others were deprived of a chance to re-run by the elite arrangement.

The results also show that it is not party primaries but the traditional backroom system where party outsiders may find a way to enter politics because primaries tend to favor party establishments who have a relatively strong support base. For instance, I observe a few candidate characteristics that describe party outsiders, such as being a prosecutor or a former minister, were associated with increasing the probability of winning the nomination in districts where no primary was held. The finding is consistent with the theoretical assumption that incumbents of the ruling party may prefer contesting in a primary for their renomination because under the elite-arrangement system their own survival may threatened by the internal power conflicts between the president's faction and rival factions.

Consistent with the argument, I also find that party establishments who are likely to have a relatively strong support base are more likely to win the nomination in districts with primaries. Candidate characteristics such as having served as the chairman of party's local branch or previously being elected as a local mayor or a provincial governor were signifi-

cant predictors of winning nomination under primaries in both elections, which implies that primaries are likely to elect candidates who have previous political service and mobilizing power. The main difference in the primary outcomes between 2012 and 2016 elections is that political aspirants who were categorized as national party elites of NFP - defined as candidates who previously served in the party's supreme council or was in the party leadership- and former incumbents were also one of the significant predictors of winning the nomination in districts with a primary in 2016. This shows that during presidential midterms (i.e., when both factions within the ruling party are more equal), even former party elites at the national level had to contest in a primary to secure renomination and being a party establishment candidate was a great advantage in winning nomination in districts with a primary.

2.6 Discussion

This paper argues that legislative primaries of the ruling party under strong presidencies are brought by party elites as a means to counteract the president and her faction taking over nomination power within the party. Contrary to the assumption that existing scholarship on the institutional role of party primaries imposes, some ruling party elites may prefer democratizing the candidate selection methods because their own status within the party is threatened under the traditional elite-arrangement system when the de facto power within the party lies in the hands of the president and her faction, who want to marginalize their rival factions within the ruling party. Moreover, since the de facto power of the executive changes as a function of the presidential election cycle, my theory predicts that legislative primaries are more likely to be held when internal competition between the president's faction and a rising faction is high, especially in midterm elections. When legislative elections are held towards the end of an outgoing president's term or within a new president's honeymoon period, the ruling party is less likely to call for primaries. Legislative primaries thus reflect internal power struggles between major factions within the governing party under strong presidencies.

By focusing on the case of South Korea 2008-2016, my findings provide supporting evidence that legislative primaries in strong presidential democracies may reflect a contest between the president's faction and rival factions over who controls the distribution of spoils from office. One implication from the findings is that when the president is willing to exert power over her party aggressively, and intraparty conflict between the president and party elites outside her factions becomes fierce, legislative primaries may be an effective institution to protect qualified incumbents. This means that the effectiveness of democratic party reforms such as legislative primaries may largely depend on the quality of establishment candidates who are more likely to survive and win nomination under primaries. If they are more qualified than potential replacement candidates, then primaries would generally improve democratic accountability by protecting the future career of high quality incumbents who

might otherwise have lost their seat when the new president comes into power. Another implication of my theory is that if establishment candidates in party's strongholds are likely to be low quality, a complete institutionalization of legislative primaries may undermine democratic representation under strong presidencies, closing down an entry opportunity for party outsiders being recruited when party establishments are marginalized by the incoming president's faction.

The main limitation of this paper is that it does not look beyond the Korean case to test the external validity of the theory, although it is mostly due to a relatively short history of legislative primaries being introduced in democracies outside the U.S. and the lack of data on internal party affairs. Here I only discuss how my theory may be applied to other democracies with a strong presidential system.

An important assumption in my theory is that the executive faces a term limit while party elites do not. If the president can rerun for the office, legislative primaries of the ruling party under strong presidencies are most likely in the president's last term. This is because the behaviors of the president and ruling party elites are likely to vary depending on whether the president faces a binding term limit (Besley and Case 1995). For instance, if the president is able to run again, the cost of party splitting becomes higher for both the president's faction and other factions so that neither wants to unilaterally determine nomination outcomes in favor of their group, internalizing the cost of factional conflicts. In contrast, legislative primaries are least likely if legislators are term-limited and that party elites are always marginalized vis-à-vis the president. As in the case of Costa Rica (Carey 1997), the presidency is likely to enjoy even more discretion over the nomination process for legislative elections because political aspirants no longer have to build personal connections to party elites who will step down before the next legislative election. The legislative term limits provides political aspirants an incentive to fully devote their loyalty to the party's next presidential candidate who is likely to assume the presidency.

Finally, my theory only complements existing scholarship on primaries in that the theory does not provide a full explanation on why opposition parties under strong presidencies still introduce legislative primaries even when they are out of power. Instead, I implicitly held the election-year specific level of inter-party competition constant and focus on variations in the level of intra-party conflicts across different elections, which can be justified given the fact that NFP remained the most electorally popular party during the period of our study. However, when the popular support of the ruling party is declining fast so that there may be a slim chance that the party takes over the presidential office, legislative primaries may be held to serve a different institutional role.

Descriptive statistics (NFP, 2012)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	947	54.37	7.22	27	77
Gender	947	0.92	0.28	0	1
MP Secretary	947	0.03	0.16	0	1
Presidential Administration	947	0.05	0.22	0	1
Incumbent	947	0.14	0.34	0	1
Former Legislator	947	0.06	0.24	0	1
Government Secretary	947	0.01	0.10	0	1
Journalism	947	0.04	0.20	0	1
Law	947	0.09	0.28	0	1
Professor	947	0.15	0.36	0	1
Doctor	947	0.02	0.15	0	1
Business CEO	947	0.07	0.25	0	1
Labor Union Leader	947	0.01	0.09	0	1
Student Union Leader	947	0.01	0.12	0	1
Military	947	0.02	0.14	0	1
Local (Elected) Politicians	947	0.19	0.39	0	1
Local Party Elite	947	0.03	0.16	0	1
Public Sector	947	0.08	0.27	0	1
Private Foundation	947	0.02	0.12	0	1
National Party Elite	947	0.08	0.27	0	1
White Collar	947	0.096	0.29	0	1
Interest Group Leader	947	0.17	0.37	0	1
Local Party Member	947	0.074	0.26	0	1
Campaign Office for Park (2008)	947	0.04	0.19	0	1

Dummy variables whose mean is less than 0.01 are not shown. Party service is a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 when the candidate reports service within the national party organization in a non-elected position. Local bureaucracy is a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 when the candidate reports holding a non-elected position within provincial or municipal governments. National bureaucracy is a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 when the candidate reports holding a non-elected position within the national ministries or agencies. Presidential administration is a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 when the candidate reports serving in a non-elected position within the Office of the President. Campaign Office for Park is a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 when the contestant claims to have worked in the campaign office for Park during the 2008 presidential party primary.

Descriptive statistics (NFP, 2016)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	857	56.04	7.52	25	77
Gender	857	0.91	0.28	0	1
Incumbent Legislator (2012-2016)	857	0.15	0.36	0	1
Former Incumbent (2008-2012)	857	0.12	0.32	0	1
Former Incumbent (2008 <)	857	0.08	0.26	0	1
Professor	857	0.17	0.37	0	1
Prosecutor	857	0.03	0.18	0	1
Judge	857	0.01	0.09	0	1
Lawyer	857	0.06	0.24	0	1
SKY University Alumni	857	0.32	0.47	0	1
Local/State Legislator	857	0.08	0.27	0	1
Former Minister	857	0.05	0.21	0	1
Chairman of Local Party Office	857	0.15	0.36	0	1
Committee Chair of NFP Central Office	857	0.08	0.27	0	1
Military	857	0.03	0.18	0	1
National Party Elite	857	0.04	0.19	0	1
Journalist	857	0.03	0.17	0	1
Local Mayor/Governor	857	0.08	0.28	0	1
Campaign Office for President	857	0.09	0.29	0	1
Presidential Office	857	0.02	0.15	0	1
Secretary for MP	857	0.02	0.12	0	1
Interest Group Leader	857	0.02	0.15	0	1
Doctor	857	0.01	0.10	0	1
Business	857	0.02	0.15	0	1

Table 2.1: Dummy variables whose mean is less than 0.01 are not shown. Campaign Office for Park is a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 when the contestant claims to have worked in the campaign office for Park during the 2012 presidential election.

Regression Results - (NFP, 2012)

	Dependent variable: *Won Party Nomination*			
	Primary Election		*No* Primary Election	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
λ	(λ')	$(\underline{\lambda})$	(λ')	$(\underline{\lambda})$
Incumbent Legislator		0.361*	0.654***	0.654***
		(0.059)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Party vote share margin (t-1)				-0.304
				(0.221)
Former Incumbent (2004-2008)		0.243		
		(0.174)		
National Party Elite				0.173
				(0.381)
Former Minister		0.752		0.095
		(0.673)		(0.256)
Chairman of Local Party Office		0.320**		-0.141
		(0.048)		(0.687)
Local Mayor/Governor		0.295*	0.296**	0.296**
		(0.079)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Local Assemblyman		-0.133		-0.388
		(0.561)		(0.673)
Prosecutor		0.132	0.296**	0.295**
		(0.430)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Journalist		-1.241		0.119
		(0.670)		(0.321)
Whitecollar			-0.517	-0.517
			(0.253)	(0.253)
Interest Group Leader			-0.749	-0.749
			(0.298)	(0.298)
Gender				0.207
				(0.705)
# of Primary Aspirants		-0.657**	-0.756**	-0.756**
		(0.007)	(0.789)	(0.789)
Observations	210	210	611	611
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Previous Election Outcomes	Yes	Yes	No	No

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

Table 2.2: Coefficients are standardized. P-values for the lasso estimates at a fixed value of the tuning parameter lambda (Lee et al. 2016) are in parentheses. Other (insignificant) predictors not appeared in this table for column (4) are omitted due to limited space. These variables include: *Lawyer(-), Judge(-), MP Secretary(-), Business Leaders(-), Doctor(-), Labor Union Leader(-)*, and some regional dummies.

Regression Results - (Primary Election, 2016)

	Dependent variable: *Won Party Nomination*			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
λ	(λ')	$(\underline{\lambda})$	(λ')	$(\underline{\lambda})$
Incumbent Legislator	0.790***	0.790***	0.710***	0.710***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Former Incumbent (2008-2012)	0.273	0.273	0.306**	0.306**
	(0.717)	(0.717)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Former Incumbent (2008 <)		0.101		
		(0.519)		
National Party Elite	0.348*	0.348*	0.318*	0.318*
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Former Minister				0.259**
				(0.026)
Chairman of Local Party Office	0.679	0.679	0.580**	0.580**
	(0.518)	(0.518)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Local Mayor/Governor	0.580	0.580	0.644*	0.644*
	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.061)	(0.061)
SKY University Alumni	0.390**	0.390**	0.403	0.403
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.324)	(0.324)
Prosecutor		0.195		
		(0.177)		
Journalist		-1.359		-1.393
		(0.645)		(0.643)
Campaign Office for President				-0.250*
				(0.086)
Presidential Office				0.148
				(0.184)
# of Primary Aspirants		-0.214	-0.358	-0.358
		(0.357)	(0.274)	(0.274)
Observations	346	346	517	517
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Previous Election Outcomes	Yes	Yes	No	No

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

Table 2.3: Coefficients are standardized. P-values for the lasso estimates at a fixed value of the tuning parameter lambda (Lee et al. 2016) are in parentheses. The variables are selected from logistic lasso regressions where the lambda was set either at the value that gives minimum mean cross-validated error or the value which gives the most penalized model such that error is within one standard error of the minimum (Tibshirani 1996). Other (insignificant) predictors not appeared in this table for column (4) are omitted due to limited space. These variables include: *Gender, Military, Business*, and *Professor*.

Regression Results (*No* Primary Election 2016)

	Dependent variable: *Won Party Nomination*			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
λ	(λ')	($\underline{\lambda}$)	(λ')	($\underline{\lambda}$)
Incumbent Legislator	1.175	1.175	1.115	1.115
	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.195)	(0.195)
Former Incumbent (2008-2012)		0.251*	0.271	0.271
		(0.052)	(0.498)	(0.498)
National Party Elite			0.467	0.467
			(0.510)	(0.510)
Former Minister				0.398**
				(0.019)
Chairman of Local Party Office		0.261**		
		(0.024)		
Judge/Attorney		0.650	0.634	0.634
		(0.362)	(0.657)	(0.657)
Campaign Office for President		-1.799	-0.673	-0.673
		(0.474)	(0.171)	(0.171)
# of Primary Aspirants	-1.035	-1.035	-1.148	-1.148
	(0.660)	(0.660)	(0.262)	(0.262)
Observations	202	202	285	285
Regional Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Previous Election Outcomes	Yes	Yes	No	No

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

Table 2.4: Coefficients are standardized. P-values for the logistic lasso estimates at a fixed value of the tuning parameter lambda (Lee et al. 2016) are in parentheses.

Appendix

NFP – No primary election

Frequency Count in 10% Bins

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

−0.5   0.0   0.5   1.0

Previous Vote Share Margin

NFP – Primary election

Frequency Count in 10% Bins

15

10

5

0

−0.5   0.0   0.5   1.0

Previous Vote Share Margin

Figure 2.4: Histogram of NFP's vote share margin in the previous legislative elections in districts without primaries (left) and with primaries (right) in the 2012 Legislative Elections.

## NFP – No primary election (2016)   NFP – Primary election (2016)

Figure 2.5: Histogram of NFP's vote share margin in the previous legislative elections in districts without primaries (left) and with primaries (right) in the 2016 Legislative Elections.

Table 2.5: Logistic Regression Results

	Dependent Variable: Held a Legislative Primary in 2012			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Was an open seat district	0.398	0.984**	0.966**	0.962*
	(0.338)	(0.470)	(0.476)	(0.504)
Party's vote share in 2008		2.378*	0.828	1.838
		(1.342)	(1.510)	(1.831)
of political contestants			0.282***	0.309***
			(0.105)	(0.118)
# of parties ran in 2008				0.197
				(0.184)
Population Density				−0.00002
				(0.00002)
Share of Elders				−0.0001
				(0.0001)
No. of households				0.00004
				(0.0001)
Area of Land				−0.000
				(0.000)
Percent of land growing rice				0.000
				(0.000)
Percent of land for agriculture				−0.312
				(2.765)
Population density				−0.00004
				(0.00004)
Constant	−1.589***	−2.909***	−2.936***	−1.588
	(0.245)	(0.796)	(0.894)	(2.131)
N	221	221	206	206
Log Likelihood	-109.617	-107.985	-101.404	-96.021
AIC	223.233	221.971	210.808	220.042

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. Unit of Analysis: Constituency

Table 2.6: Logistic Regression Results

| | Dependent Variable: Held a Legislative Primary in 2016 | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Had an open seat	0.067	0.613	0.498	0.122
	(0.303)	(0.402)	(0.453)	(0.347)
Party's previous vote share		3.264**	2.325	
		(1.596)	(1.852)	
# of contestants			0.629***	0.641***
			(0.117)	(0.116)
Constant	−0.043	−1.801**	−3.342***	−2.127***
	(0.206)	(0.884)	(1.079)	(0.438)
N	175	175	173	173
Log Likelihood	-121.273	-119.027	-98.105	-98.942
AIC	246.547	244.054	204.209	203.884

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. Unit of Analysis: Constituency

Figure 2.6: Sample: Political aspirants in districts where a primary was held for the 2012 Election. Each colored line corresponds to a predictor, where each point on the path represents the logistic lasso coefficient at different values of the tuning parameter (log) lambda.

Figure 2.7: Sample: Political aspirants in no primary election districts for the 2012 Election. Each colored line corresponds to a predictor, where each point on the path represents the logistic lasso coefficient at different values of the tuning parameter (log) lambda.

Figure 2.8: Sample: Political aspirants in districts where a legislative primary was held for the 2016 Election. Each colored line corresponds to a predictor, where each point on the path represents the logistic lasso coefficient at different values of the tuning parameter (log) lambda.

Figure 2.9: Sample: Political aspirants in no primary election districts for the 2016 Election. Each colored line corresponds to a predictor, where each point on the path represents the logistic lasso coefficient at different values of the tuning parameter (log) lambda.

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Chapter 3

Parties versus Presidents: The Strategic Use of Legislative Primaries

3.1 Introduction

Under strong presidencies, executive's power of nomination and appointment often extends
to internal affairs of her party. The executive intervenes in her party nomination process
and exerts significant influence over nomination outcomes as a means to enforce discipline in
her party and distribute patronage (Carey 1997, Weldon 1997, Samuels and Shugart 2010,
Batto and Huang 2016, Choi 2016).

This implies that traditional "backroom" selection procedures, systems in which party nom-
ination decisions are made behind closed doors under elite arrangements, are a double-edge
sword for ruling party elites under strong presidencies. On the one hand, keeping the back-
room systems can be costly for the ruling party elites because it leaves room for the executive
to take away power over nominations from the party elites by nominating her preferred can-
didates who are party outsiders. The ruling party elites may thus prefer to democratize the
candidate selection process and instead hold legislative primaries as a means to counteract
the executive exercising presidential discretion in party nomination decisions.

On the other hand, the backroom systems are still attractive under strong presidencies
because they can be one of the most efficient ways to recruit fresh, high quality party
outsiders without revealing too many internal divisions to the public (Caillaud and Tirole
2002). It could be that executive's preferred candidates may be electorally more competitive
than party establishment candidates, and that the elites may benefit from better electoral
performance. What is more, even if the executive's preferred outsider candidates were less
qualified than the party establishment candidates, a candidate replacement may send the
public a false signal that the party attempts to be more accountable by screening out their
low-quality candidates.

I analyze this intuition in a model of candidate selection. In my model, the party (elite)
has two political aspirants in the candidate pool whose quality is a private information, and
decides whether to make nomination decisions in the backroom or allow the voter to choose
the party's nominee in a legislative primary. I distinguish the party's two candidates by
calling the first an *establishment* candidate and the other an *outsider* candidate.[1] I assume
that the establishment candidate is the preferred candidate of the party elites (Keyes et al.
1979), whereas the outsider candidate is the preferred candidate of the executive.

The party is assumed to accrue benefits from retaining power over nominations in the absence
of any pressure from the executive and assigns an intrinsic weight on establishment candidates
winning in the general election. When the executive recommends her favored candidate under
the backroom system, the party can either nominate the executive's outsider candidate in

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[1]A straightforward example of an establishment candidate would be a politician who ran under the
party's banner in the previous election, or a local party leader with a dense network of party activists.
An outsider candidate is a political aspirant who is relatively new to politics, but may have accumulated
professional experience outside the party and the government.

the backroom, or hold a primary so that the voter can decide between the establishment candidate and the outsider.[2] A representative voter can tell when any candidate replacement occurs.

The voter in the model wants to elect a high quality legislator and does not have any intrinsic preference over a particular candidate as long as the candidate is high-quality. Replacing a low quality establishment (outsider) candidate with a high-quality outsider (establishment) in the backroom therefore always makes the voter better off. However, the voter also knows that the nomination process may not necessarily reflect the quality of candidates, but rather their relationship to the executive. In particular, a high-quality establishment candidate may be replaced with an low-quality outsider simply because the latter has a close connection to the executive. I identify equlibrium conditions under which the ruling party elites under strong presidencies hold legislative primaries, given the voter preference.

As with recent literature on the institutional rationale for party primaries (Meirowitz 2005, Snyder and Ting 2011, Serra 2011), legislative primaries in my model serve an informational role. When a primary is held, a representative voter may receive additional information about the quality of candidates. After all, when nomination decisions are made in the backroom, there tends to be more room for the party to choose not to reveal all information about their candidate quality in public. In order to prevent the voter from switching support to the opposition party when the party inevitably replaces the establishment candidate in the backroom, the ruling party can hold a legislative primary in the district, which in turn helps the voter learn additional information about the relative competency between candidates. In this respect, primaries in the model play a similar role in helping the voter select a high-quality candidate by revealing more information about candidate valence (Snyder and Ting 2011). However, in the model presented by Snyder and Ting (2011), parties have incomplete information about the quality of their primary contestants and do not prefer a particular candidate a priori. When a primary is held, parties acquire new information about the candidate quality as well. When it is not held, candidates are chosen to run under the party's banner at random. In contrast, the ruling party elites in my model have superior information about the quality of their candidates than the voter and they can decide how much of this information is revealed to the voter.

My equilibrium analysis shows legislative primaries can generally be held when the public believes the party establishment candidate is of higher quality than the executive's preferred outsider candidate. When the establishment candidate is better qualified than the president's preferred candidate, legislative primaries improve political accountability because the voter can now select the establishment candidate as the party's final nominee.

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[2]In the real world, the executive does tend to bring in party outsiders, but party establishment candidates are also likely to support the president and become a member of the president's faction within the party. However, in order to abstract away from factional politics and to simplify the analysis, I assume that executive's candidates are limited to party outsiders.

However, this does not necessarily mean that legislative primaries always improve voter welfare because of pandering by the party elites. The model shows that the ruling party elite will still hold a primary even when the establishment candidate is of worse quality, as a means to send out a false signal to the voter that the party establishment candidate is better qualified than the outsider candidate. Moreover, moral hazard can arise when parties deliberately replace their establishment candidate with the executive's as a way to send out a false signal to the public that the party replaced a low quality establishment with a high quality outsider, when in fact the new replacement was never strictly better quality. In such all of these cases, the voter would have been better off under the backroom system.

The important implication of my analysis is that legislative primaries are sometimes held because the ruling party "panders" (Canes-Wrone et al. 2001, Maskin and Tirole 2004, Ashworth and Shotts 2010). That is, despite their privileged information indicating that the voter is ill-informed about the party candidates quality and that he is better off when the executive's candidate wins party nomination, the party instead conforms to the voter's misinformed belief by holding a legislative primary so that the voter mistakenly selects the establishment candidate as the party's final nominee. As a result, democratizing the candidate selection procedure may *worsen* voter welfare. This is in contrast to what existing theoretical models claim, that the benefit of primaries as an information-revealing institution exists even when political parties selectively implement them in districts where doing so does not hurt their chances of winning in the general election. Existing scholarship has claimed that primaries, once held, never worsen voter welfare because of the functional role that they play in keep political parties accountable. my analysis shows that the statement is only partially true.

Legislative primaries under strong presidencies, when they are selectively held by ruling party elites, serve dual institutional roles, which in turn have dual effects on voter welfare. When the executive's candidate is more likely to be high-quality than the party's outsider candidate, the executive's influence over the party nomination process can potentially make the voter better off by improving the general quality of the alternative candidates pool. In such cases, legislative primaries give the public a chance to screen out a worse contestant from a candidate pool that is, on average, of higher quality than it would have been had the executive not interfered. However, legislative primaries can also make voters worse off by protecting low quality party establishments, especially when voters are misinformed about the candidate quality. Political party elites may be pandering under the disguise of democratic party reforms.

3.2   Motivating Concerns

Empirical scholarship on party primaries suggest that the consequences of legislative pri-
maries have not been as radical. At least the expansion of the selectorate does not seem
to have excited the public as much as theory would predict. For instance, one recent study
reports that congressional primaries in the U.S. tend to have the lowest turnout among party
primaries for various political offices. Even restricting to contested congressional primaries
in the U.S., the average turnout in primary races during 2006 and 2010 was between 4.6 and
7.5 percent of the voting age population (Kamarck 2014).

When voter participation is low and winning legislative primaries only requires small, yet
reliable, voter support, legislative primaries may actually *favor* establishment candidates
who tend to have a stronger support base than party outsiders, irrespective of their quality.
In fact, Ansolabehere et al. (2007) find that an incumbency advantage in party primaries
in the U.S. first appeared as early as 1910s, as well as a preliminary evidence suggesting
that the substantial increases in a primary incumbency advantage during the 1940-50s may
have facilitated the growth of incumbency advantage in the general elections a decade later.[3]
Hogan (2003) claims that electoral competition in U.S. state legislative primaries tend to be
lower with the presence of an incumbent. Moreover, even non-incumbent candidates with
previous experience in office were more likely to win in both competitive and noncompetitive
districts in U.S. congressional primaries (Snyder and Hirano 2012), adding more credibility
to my claim that legislative primaries are likely to have an establishment advantage.

Party primaries are relatively recent phenomena in democracies outside the U.S., but this
establishment protecting nature of legislative primaries seems to travel beyond the U.S.
In South Korea, being an incumbent and former local party elite Ire associated with a
higher probability of winning in legislative primaries, whereas the vast majority of party
outsiders who became the final nominee ran in districts where the traditional method of
elite arrangement was applied for candidate selection (Choi 2016).

In light of these empirical findings, I make an important assumption in the model that
while legislative primaries serve an informational role, the extent to which they can reveal
information about the quality of primary contestants is limited in that the information can
only reveal to the voters the *relative* quality between established party candidates and party
outsiders. If voters are not sufficiently informed about the quality of outsiders, legislative
primaries may *systematically favor* established party candidates over party outsiders, un-
less a party outsider candidate is strictly better quality. The fact that legislative primaries
may be more favorable for established party candidates can be one of the important con-
siderations for party leadership in most democracies where primaries are not mandated by
constitution. Especially when established party candidates have a strong support base in

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[3]The data used for study includes party primaries for state executive elections, as well as for legislative
elections in the U.S.

his district, contesting the party nomination ticket under a legislative primary may actually give them a higher chance of winning the party nomination than under the elite arrangement system where internal power struggles between party elites often drastically affect nomination decisions.

3.3   The Model

To direct attention to the strategic choices made by the ruling party elite against the executive exerting influence over candidate selection, I simplify my model by not allowing the party the option to consider nominating an outsider when the executive does not nominate a candidate. This setup simplifies my equilibrium analysis in that candidate replacement directly signals to the voter that the executive exerted influence in the party nomination process by backing her favored candidate.

Setup

There are three actors in my model: the executive E, the ruling party elite P, and a representative voter. Both the executive and the party elite want to nominate their preferred candidate who can be high quality (type h) or low quality (type l), which is determined by Nature. Political elites have privileged information about the quality of their would-be candidates. I model this asymmetry by allowing the candidate quality to be revealed to both the executive and the party, but remain private information to the voter. For the sake of tractability, I use female pronouns for the executive, plural pronouns for the party, and male pronouns for the voter.

The executive is a non-strategic actor who can take away the party's benefit from keeping the nomination decisions in the backroom by nominating her favored candidate. She can be either cooperative with her party (type c) or non-cooperative (type n/c). A cooperative executive nominates her candidate only when he is high-quality; a non-cooperative executive nominates her candidate regardless of the candidate's quality. The executive's type is determined by Nature, and is revealed to the party but unknown to the voter. The probability that the executive is cooperative is $q \in (0,1)$, and the probability that her candidate is high quality is $\pi_1 \in (0,1)$. One could interpret q in terms of the executive's willingness to cooperate with her party: for instance, a low value of q may indicate that the executive just stepped in her office and that she is willing to push her de facto power within the ruling party to the constitutional limit.[4]

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[4]Throughout this paper, I assume that legislative elections are single-member district systems, despite a few exceptions in the real world. For instance, the executive's power in Brazil is considered to be relatively strong (Reich 2002), but the country has a proportional representation system for legislative elections.

I model a strong presidency first by allowing the executive to decide whether to nominate her candidate, who is a party outsider. Once she nominates her candidate, the party can only choose between nominating the party outsider (which automatically replaces the established party candidate) in the backroom or holding a primary so that the voter can decide between the party's establishment candidate and the executive's candidate. I restrict the available actions for the party when the executive does not nominate; the establishment candidate is nominated - who can be either high quality (type h) or low quality (type l)- in the backroom and collects $\alpha > 0$ for keeping the nomination decisions under their control. The probability that the established party candidate is high quality is $\pi_0 \in (0, 1)$. No further information about the quality of the candidates is revealed to the voter under the backroom system.[5]

When a primary is held, the voter may receive extra information ω about the quality of candidates. The uncertainty resolves with probability $\rho \in (0, 1)$ and $\omega = \emptyset$ when it does not resolve. However, the nature of the information which primaries may reveal is somewhat constrained in my model in that they favor the established party candidate unless the outsider is strictly better quality. I model this establishment-preserving nature by assuming that the only two signals which can be revealed by Nature under a primary are '$[\geq]$' and '$[<]$', which mean 'the establishment candidate is as good as the challenger' and 'the challenger is strictly better quality than the establishment', respectively. Thus, the only state of the world when Nature can reveal $[<]$ is $(\theta_0, \theta_1) = (l, h)$. For the rest of the possible states of the world (i.e. $(\theta_0, \theta_1) = \{(h, h), (h, l), (l, l)\}$, Nature reveals $[\geq]$. It is important to note that Nature's signals are still truthful; they are simply establishment-preserving when the quality of both candidates is the same.

When Nature does not send any signal and uncertainty remains unresolved, the voter follows his prior belief about candidate quality. Finally, when the party's final nominee is selected, the voter casts his vote either for the party or for opposition in the legislative election. The probability that the opposition candidate is high quality is $\gamma \in (0, 1)$.

The sequence of the baseline game is as follows:

1. Nature chooses the executive type, as well as the quality of the executive's favored candidate (θ_1) and the establishment candidate (θ_0).

2. The executive chooses whether to exert influence by nominating ($N_E = 1$) her favored candidate or not ($N_E = 0$).

3. If the executive exerts influence, the party decides whether to select a candidate through a legislative primary ($L = 1$) or nominate the executive's candidate under

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[5]One could relax these assumptions by allowing the party to nominate a challenger and collect the rent when the executive does not nominate and the voter to (sometimes) receive extra information about the quality of the party nominee even when the candidate was nominated under the elite arrangement, and still get a result that is substantially the same with my results.

the elite arrangement ($L = 0$). If the executive does not exert influence, the established party candidate wins nomination.

4. If a legislative primary is held, Nature sends $\omega \in \{\geq, <\}$ with ρ and $\omega = \emptyset$ with $1 - \rho$.

5. If a legislative primary is held, the voter observes (ω) and decides whether to keep the established ($N_V = 1$) or select the party outsider ($N_V = 0$).

6. After the party's nominee is selected, the voter decides whether to vote for the party ($X = 1$) or the opposition ($X = 0$) in the legislative election.

Preferences

Let θ_p denote the quality of the party's final nominee and θ that of the elected legislator. The voter's payoff function is

$$U_v(X, \theta) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \theta = H \\ 0 & \text{if } \theta = L \end{cases} \tag{3.1}$$

The voter receives a normalized payoff 1 if he elected a high quality legislator and 0 otherwise. However, he does not care who made the nomination decision, nor does he intrinsically favor a particular candidate nomination procedure over another. The party's payoff function is

$$U_p(N_E, L, X, \theta) = \alpha(1 - N_E)(1 - L) + \begin{cases} \beta & \text{if } X = 1 \text{ and } \theta_p = \theta_0 \\ 1 & \text{if } X = 1 \text{ and } \theta_p = \theta_1 \\ 0 & \text{if } X = 0 \end{cases} \tag{3.2}$$

The party gets an exogenous bonus $\alpha > 0$ for keeping the backroom system, which can still be taken away when the executive exerts influence. Winning a seat in the legislature gives the party a normalized payoff of 1 regardless of who their final nominee is. $\beta > 1$ is the party's intrinsic Iight on having their establishment candidate win the general election.

Strategies and Beliefs

Voter's Decision in the Legislative Election. Let $\mu(\cdot)$ be the voter's belief about the probability that the party's final nominee is high quality, where μ is a function of a quadruple (N_E, L, ω, N_V), which specifies the history of the executive's choice (N_E), the party's choice on the nomination procedure (L), the realization of Nature's signal (ω), and the voter's

candidate nomination decision (N_V), if a legislative primary was held.[6] As the expected
value of voting for the party in the legislative election is just the voter's belief at each of the
information sets where he casts a vote in the legislative election, the voter chooses to vote
for the party if and only if

$$\mu(N_E, L, \omega, N_V) \geq \gamma$$

and vote for the opposition otherwise. Let $\upsilon_X(\cdot)$ represent the probability that the voter
supports the ruling party in the general election $(X = 1)$.

Voter's Candidate Choice under a Primary. I identify voter's beliefs and strategies in the
following three information sets, all of which are reached if a primary is held: uncertainty (ω)
is resolved and Nature reveals that $[\geq]$, uncertainty is resolved but Nature reveals that $[<]$,
or any extra information about the relative competence between the two candidates is not
revealed $(\omega = \emptyset)$. Let μ_ω^i be the voter's belief about the probability that the party's candidate
θ^i, $i \in \{0,1\}$ is high quality given Nature's signal $\omega \in \{[\geq], [<], \emptyset\}$ under a primary.[7]

Let $\upsilon_N(\cdot)$ denote the probability that the voter selects the establishment candidate under
the legislative primary $(N_V = 1)$. As the voter does not have any intrinsic preference over
a particular party candidate, he chooses $\upsilon_N(\cdot)$ such that maximizes his expected value of
voting for the party in the general election $\mathbb{E}_V(X = 1|\mu_\omega^i)$, where it is simply the voter's
belief about the likelihood of θ_i being high quality. Thus, the voter selects the established
party candidate if and only if

$$\mu_\omega^0 \geq \mu_\omega^1$$

but replaces him with the challenger otherwise.

Party's Choice on Candidate Selection Methods. Since the party has full information about
the type of executive and the state of the world, the party's beliefs are trivially defined.
Let $\sigma_t(N_E; \theta_0, \theta_1)$ be the probability the party holds a legislative primary $(L = 1)$ under the
type t executive when the state of the world is (θ_0, θ_1). The party's decision is a function
of the executive's decision N_E given the state of the world and the executive's type. By the
setup of the game, the party cannot hold a primary whenever the executive does not exert

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[6]If a legislative primary is not held, no additional information about the candidate quality is revealed and
the voter does not get to make the nomination decision, hence $\omega = \emptyset$ and $N_V = \emptyset$ by default. For instance,
the quadruple $(0, 0, \emptyset, \emptyset)$ denotes the history when the party nomination decision was made under the elite
arrangement and the established party candidate is selected (because neither the executive nominated her
candidate, nor was a primary held).

[7]μ_ω^i is distinguished from μ in that the former denotes the voter's belief about a particular party candidate
quality under a primary, whereas the latter denotes his belief about the quality of the party's final nominee
in the general electino.

influence ($N_E = 0$), which occurs only when the executive is a cooperative type ($t = c$) and thus does not nominate her low quality candidate ($\theta_1 = l$). The establishment candidate automatically wins the party nomination ($\theta_p = \theta_0$) in this case and thus $\sigma_c(N_E = 0; \theta_0, l) = 0$ for $\theta_0 \in \{h, l\}$.

Suppose the executive wants to nominate her preferred candidate ($N_E = 1$). The expected utility to the party of keeping the backroom system and nominating the executive's candidate is

$$\mathbb{E}_P(L = 0 | N_E = 1) = I_{\mu(\cdot) \geq \gamma}$$

where $I_{\mu \geq \gamma}$ is an indicator function, taking on a value of 1 if the voter believes that the party's final nominee (who is θ_1 in this case) is more likely to be high quality than the opposition candidate given history. Note that the expected value of keeping the backroom system conditional on the executive's choice depends only on the voter's strategies and not the state of the world. This is because in the baseline model, I do not assume that the voter has a complementary source of information about the candidate quality before the general election unless a primary is held, and that the voter's posterior beliefs are consistent with his prior beliefs and Bayes' Rule on the equilibrium path given equilibrium strategies. However, the party's expected utility of holding a legislative primary is more complicated because I additionally need to take into account for the possibility of uncertainty resolution, which varies according to the state of the world. Since the main focus of my analysis is to look for the conditions under which the party endogenously holds legislative primaries under strong presidencies and their choice on voter welfare, I specify party's strategies in different equilibria more in detail below.

Finally, I define executive's type-dependant strategies for notational convenience. Let $\eta_T(\cdot)$ be the probability the type $t \in \{c, n/c\}$ executive exerts influence so that her preferred candidate may win party nomination ($N_E = 1$).

3.4 Equilibrium Analysis

The equilibrium employed in this study is (pure) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A PBE requires that players' strategies be sequentially rational at every information set, given their beliefs regarding other player's strategies. In particular, I focus on two types of PBE, which differ in terms of how the ruling party responds to the executive's attempts to take away their perquisites by nominating her favored candidate. I first explain the definition of equilibria types and then provide results from my analysis.

Definition of Equilibria

I call the first type a *primary* equilibrium in which the ruling party elite always holds a legislative primary whenever the executive exerts influence in the nomination process, irrespective of the state of the world. In this equilibrium, legislative primaries are sometimes held precisely because the party prefers to democratize candidate selection procedure as a means to *resist* the executive's taking away their control over the party organization. The fact that a legislative primary is held in a given district provides a direct signal to the voter that there may exist an internal disagreement between the executive and the party elite and that the party wants the voter to have a final say about their candidate selection.

Definition: A PBE in which the party always chooses $L = 1$ whenever the executive chooses $N_E = 1$, and otherwise chooses $L = 0$, $\forall \{\theta_0, \theta_E\} \in \Theta$ is called a *primary* equilibrium.

In the second type, the party always colludes with the executive by nominating her preferred candidate under the backroom system whenever the executive exerts influence in the nomination process, irrespective of the quality of the new candidate. As a result, legislative primaries are never held, and the executive's candidate successfully secures the party nomination whenever she exerts influence. I call this second type a *backroom* equilibrium.

Definition: A PBE in which the party always chooses $L = 0$ whenever the executive chooses $N_E = 1$, and otherwise chooses $L = 0$, $\forall \{\theta_0, \theta_E\} \in \Theta$ is called a *backroom* equilibrium.

Equilibrium Results

In both types of equilibrium, the executive's interference in the ruling party nomination process is fully revealed to the voter, as the party does not vary their decision according to the state of the world but separates depending on the executive's behavior. Before providing the set of the conditions under which the two types of equilibria exist, I first establish their uniqueness for any given set of parameter values - π_0, π_1, ρ, and γ by showing that there exists no equilibrium in which the party separates between different states of the world given the executive's interference. That is, any choice that the party makes given the executive's interference directly signals to the voter information about the executive's action.

Lemma 1 *There exists no equilibrium in which the party chooses $\sigma_t(1; \theta_0, \theta_1) \neq \sigma_t(1; \theta_0', \theta_1')$, $\forall (\theta_0, \theta_1), (\theta_0', \theta_1') \in \Theta$ and $(\theta_0, \theta_1) \neq (\theta_0', \theta_1')$.*

Proof. In Appendix.

Lemma 1 states that the party can never credibly reveal more information to the voter about the true state of the world other than the executive's action. For instance, it is intuitive that the party never finds it optimal to separate when $\theta_0, \theta_1 = (l, l)$ from other candidate pairs. Doing so provokes the voter to choose the opposition in the general election with certainty whenever he sees the party's action that signals to him that both of the party's candidates are low quality, and thus the party always has incentive to deviate so as to lie about the true state of the world. Suppose now that the party separates when $\theta_1 = h$ from $\theta_1 = l$. Once the voter believes that the challenger is high quality with certainty under a particular nomination system, then it is sequentially rational that the voter votes for the party with certainty upon observing the party's choosing that particular system and defects to the opposition under the other system, giving the party incentive to deviate from their separation strategy whenever their outsider candidate is low quality.

There are two implications of Lemma 1. First, if there exists an equilibrium, it is either a primary or a backroom equilibrium. Given that the party's choice on the candidate selection procedures in both types are mutually exclusive, any equilibrium, if it exists, is unique for for any set of parameter values, π_0, π_1, q, and γ. Second, the fact that the party does not reveal any information about the true state of the world in any equilibrium tells us that a legislative primary can be held in equilibrium as a result of party's pandering, in which case the voter could have been better off had the party simply nominated the party challenger under the elite arrangement. I turn to each of these points in more detail below.

Equilibrium Strategies and Beliefs. In a primary equilibrium, holding a legislative primary directly signals to the voter that the executive exercised power in the nomination process. If Nature reveals $[\geq]$, the voter updates his belief so that

$$\mu_{\geq}^0 = \Pr(\theta_0 = h | [\geq]) = \frac{\pi_0}{\pi_0 \pi_1 + (1 - q)(1 - \pi_1)}$$

and

$$\mu_{\geq}^1 = \Pr(\theta_1 = h | [\geq]) = \frac{\pi_0 \pi_1}{\pi_0 \pi_1 + (1 - q)(1 - \pi_1)}$$

Note that $\mu_{\geq}^0 > \mu_{\geq}^1$, $\forall \pi_0, \pi_1$, and q, so the voter always selects the established party candidate in the primary ($N_V = 1$) conditional on the Nature's signal being $[\geq]$. If Nature reveals $[<]$, However, the voter learns that the state of the world is $(\theta_0, \theta_1) = (l, h)$ and thus updates his beliefs accordingly:

$$\mu_{<}^1 = 1 > 0 = \mu_{<}^0$$

In this case, the voter knows for sure the challenger is high quality. Hence the voter's equilibrium strategy is to select θ_1 in the primary ($N_V = 0$) when $\omega = [<]$. If the uncertainty is not resolved, the voter's belief about the established party candidate being high quality is simply his prior,

$$\mu_\emptyset^0 = \pi_0$$

because the quality of the establishment candidate is independent of the executive's type and likelihood of exerting influence. This is not true for the challenger's quality. By Bayes' Rule,

$$\mu_\emptyset^1 = \frac{\pi_1}{\pi_1 + (1-q)(1-\pi_1)} > \pi_1$$

which takes into account the fact that a cooperative type executive is not going to exert influence over the party nomination process if she finds out that her preferred candidate is low quality.

Having specified voter's beliefs on the equilibrium path, I define his off-path beliefs. The only information set that is off the equilibrium path is the one in which the party nominates the executive's candidate under the backroom system after the executive chooses $N_E = 1$. No additional information is revealed unless a legislative primary is held, hence one reasonable candidate for the off-path belief is

$$\mu^1(N_E = 1, L = 0) = \mu_\emptyset^1$$

which is simply the voter's belief under a primary when the uncertainty about the candidate quality is not resolved. When $\omega = \emptyset$, the voter's equilibrium candidate choice under the primary, which in turn affects his optimal vote choice in the general election, depends on the value of parameters π_0, π_1, γ and q.

Proposition 1. *If $\pi_0 \geq \pi_1$, there uniquely exists a primary equilibrium conditional on the executive's interference.*

Proof. In Appendix.   □

Proposition 1 states that if the voter's prior beliefs say that the established party candidate is more likely to be high quality than the party outsider, then the party holds a legislative primary conditional on the executive's interference for any parameter values. It is intuitive that the proposition holds for any values of q, the likelihood that the executive being a cooperative type because the quality of the established candidate is independent of the executive's type and whether she intervened in the nomination process. How the voter evaluates γ is also inconsequential to the party under this case because when γ is sufficiently

low, the voter believes that either candidate from the party is more likely to be high quality
than the opposition candidate. The party can therefore exploit the fact that they are going
to win the general election regardless of which candidate they nominate, and hold a primary
so that their establishment candidate can be selected by the voter.

On the other hand, when γ is sufficiently high the voter never votes for the party in the general election unless he knows for sure that the party's final nominee is high quality. When
the state of the world is (l, h), there exists a strictly positive chance that the true quality of
the executive's candidate can be revealed to the voter with certainty under a primary. For
other states of the world, the party is indifferent between $L = 1$ and $L = 0$ because they are
going to lose the general election anyway.

Corollary 1. *If γ is sufficiently high, then the party is always better off by holding a legislative primary conditional on the executive exerting influence $\forall \pi_0, \pi_1$, and q.*

Corollary 1 specifies the condition under which a legislative primary with an informational
function, despite its limitation, can still result in a Pareto improvement outcome for the
party and the voter. Because primary elections generally tend to favor party established
candidates, the fact the voter may be able to learn that the party outsider is strictly better
than the establishment candidate under a primary provides the party with incentive to
democratize the candidate selection procedure.

The next proposition identifies the conditions under which a legislative primary can still be
held in equilibrium, despite when the voter thinks that the executive's candidate is more
likely to be high.

Proposition 2. If $\pi_1 > \pi_0$, a primary equilibrium uniquely exists under each of the following
conditions:

1. q is sufficiently large $q > \overline{q}$.

2. q is sufficiently small $\overline{q} > q$, and either $\mu_{\geq}^0 > \gamma$ or $\gamma > \mu_{\emptyset}^1$ holds.

where $\overline{q} \equiv 1 - \frac{\pi_0 \pi_1}{\pi_1 - \pi_0}$.

Proof. In Appendix.   □

The first condition of Proposition 2 goes against a common intuition: How can holding a

primary be optimal for the party when the voter believes that the executive is sufficiently likely to be a cooperative type and her candidate is more likely to be high quality? Does the establishment preserving nature of primary elections prevent the voter from recognizing party outsiders who are likely to be high quality?

Under the first condition, q is sufficiently large so that it is better for the voter to support the party in the general election if the executive's candidate becomes the party's nominee under the elite arrangement. However, a sufficiently large q also reinforces the voter's posterior belief that the establishment candidate is high quality conditional on a legislative primary being held and Nature's signal $[\geq]$. Given that there is a sufficiently high chance that the executive is going to be cooperative and intervenes in the nomination process only when her preferred candidate is high quality ($\theta_1 = h$), it also decreases the voter's perception about the likelihood of the state of the world being (h, l) or (l, l) when Nature reveals $[\geq]$. In other words, with a sufficiently large q, holding a primary may be even more beneficial for the party if uncertainty is resolved, because the voter perceives the likelihood of the establishment candidate being high quality given Nature's $[\geq]$ (i.e. $\mu_{\geq}^0$) is even higher than the likelihood of the executive's candidate being high quality without any additional information revealed under the backroom system. In this case, the voter selects the established party candidate under the primary and supports the party in the general election, giving the party the highest payoff they could receive.

In the second condition, q is sufficiently small that there is not much selection effect produced by the executive's move (since a non-cooperative type always nominates her preferred candidate, irrespective of candidate quality). Then a primary equilibrium can only be held when γ is sufficiently large or small. When $\mu_{\geq}^0 > \gamma$, whichever candidate the voter selects in a primary does not change his vote choice in the general election; he supports the party anyways, but the party can be strictly better off by holding a primary when Nature reveals $[\geq]$ and thus the voter selects the establishment candidate. If $\gamma > \mu_{\emptyset}^1$, the voter always supports the opposition, unless the state of the world is (l, h) and the uncertainty is resolved under the primary (i.e. Corollary 1).

Since these cases are distinguished by a particular threshold for q, I generate comparative statics on $\overline{q}$.

Lemma 2. *As $\pi_1 - \pi_0$ increases, $\overline{q}$ increases.*

Proof. $\overline{q}$ is increasing in π_1 and decreasing in π_0.

$$\frac{\partial \overline{q}}{\partial \pi_1} = \frac{\pi_0^2}{(\pi_1 - \pi_0)^2} > 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \overline{q}}{\partial \pi_0} = -\frac{\pi_0^2}{(\pi_1 - \pi_0)^2} < 0$$

$\square$

Lemma 2 states that $\overline{q}$ is increasing in $\pi_1 - \pi_0$, the difference between a voter's prior evaluation of the quality of the party outsider and the establishment candidates. This means that when the executive's candidate is further ahead of the established party candidate, it becomes more difficult for q to lie above the threshold. Conversely, as the voter finds it more difficult to tell the difference between the quality of the party's candidates, $\overline{q}$ decreases, which in turn leads to q being more likely to lie above the threshold $\overline{q}$. In such a case, holding a primary is the party's equilibrium strategy, and it must be the case that the voter's decision under a primary is not expected to change the general election outcome. Either both candidates are better quality than the opposition candidate, or none of the party candidates are likely to be better than the opposition candidate.

What if the voter perceives that the executive's candidate is more likely to be high quality than the establishment candidate and his choice under a primary does determine whether the party's wins in the general election? The two types of equilibrium are mutually exclusive, hence a backroom equilibrium exists whenever the party wants to deviate to nominating the party outsider under the elite arrangement for any state of the world.

Proposition 3. *If $\pi_1 > \pi_0$, there uniquely exists a backroom equilibrium when $\overline{q} > q$, and $\mu_\emptyset^1 > \gamma > \mu_\geq^0$.*

Proposition 3 states that when the executive's candidate is perceived to be a better quality than the establishment candidate but the gap between the quality of the party candidates is not sufficiently large, the party finds it optimal to keep the backroom system and replace the establishment candidate with the new candidate. Holding a primary is risky for the party under this condition, precisely because of the informational role that party primaries serve. If the state of the world is anything but (l, h) and uncertainty is resolved once the party holds a primary, then the voter is going to select the party establishment given Nature's signal $\omega = [\geq]$. However, he is going to defect and support the opposition in the general election since $\gamma > \mu_\geq^0$. In this case, the party is better off simply nominating the party outsider in the backroom. The voter supports the party in the general election, following his prior belief that the executive's candidate is likely to be better than the opposition candidate. Even with the institutional tools to protect the party establishment candidate whose quality is at least as good as the party outsider candidate, the party strategically colludes with their executive, undermining voter welfare. This result tells us that a backroom equilibrium exists as a result of pandering by the ruling elite. Voters are strictly worse off in the backroom equilibrium as long as the party outsider is not strictly better than the established candidate

(in which case the voter is indifferent between the different nomination systems).

3.5   Conclusion

This paper presents an intra-party candidate selection model for the ruling party under strong presidencies. The results from the model show that ruling party elites under these systems may endogenously choose to adopt democratic party reforms like legislative primaries mainly due to political pressure from the executive in her party nomination process to take away control over the party by recruiting party outsiders from her own personal network. Based on the theoretical findings from the model, I make three main contributions.

First, as with existing theoretical models of primaries, I shoId that democratizing candidate selection procedures can be Pareto efficient both to the party elite and the voter, when the public mistakenly believes that the opposition candidate is likely to be better than any of potential nominees of the ruling party. This holds even when legislative primaries tend to favor party establishment candidates who have a stronger support base than party outsiders.

Second, contrary to conventional wisdom, my equilibrium analysis shows that voter welfare can sometimes be *worsened* because primaries Ire held as a result of pandering by the party elite. For instance, if the voter believes that the party establishment is ahead of the executive's candidate even when the latter is strictly better quality, the voter is worse off under a legislative primary because no additional information about the relative candidate competency was revealed, and he ends up electing the low quality ruling party establishment as a legislator. Even democratic party reforms such as legislative primaries could have these dual effects.

Finally, this paper contributes to the growing comparative literature on the causes and institutional role of legislative primaries. The existing literature tends to see primaries as a loss of elite power, either in favor of local party actors (Ichino and Nathan 2012, 2013) or rank-and-file members (Epstein 1967, Ranney 1975). Primaries are thus seen as a Iakening of the party elite. The findings from this study, by contrast, imply that party elites may voluntarily use legislative primaries as a means to protect party establishments who would otherwise lose party nomination tickets to party outsiders recruited by the executive. Rather than Iaken their position within the party, it instead cements their status against the mighty president.

3.6 Appendix

Proof of Lemma1

Lemma 1 *There exists no equilibrium in which the party chooses $\sigma_t(1; \theta_0, \theta_1) \neq \sigma_t(1; \theta'_0, \theta'_1)$, $\forall (\theta_0, \theta_1), (\theta'_0, \theta'_1) \in \Theta$ and $(\theta_0, \theta_1) \neq (\theta'_0, \theta'_1)$.*

Proof. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which the party separates different candidate quality pairs given the executive's interference. The voter's best responses are

$$v_X^* = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \theta_p > \gamma \\ 0 & \text{Otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{3.3}$$

where $\theta_p = \theta_1$ if the backroom is kept.

i) Suppose that in such equilibrium, the party separates between $\theta_0 = h$ and $\theta_0 = l$, and that $\sigma_t^*(1; h, \cdot) \in \{0, 1\}$ where $\sigma_t^*(1; l, \cdot) = 1 - \sigma_t^*(1; h, \cdot)$. If $\sigma_t^*(1; h, \cdot) = 1$, then $\theta_p = \theta_0$ under the primary. The party receives $\beta > 1$ if the primary is held $\forall \pi_0, \pi_1, \gamma$, and q, since the voter's equilibrium beliefs are $\mu_{\geq}^0 = \mu_{\emptyset}^0 = 1$. The party is strictly better off by deviating to $\sigma_t'(1; l, \cdot) = 1$. In contrast, if $\sigma_t^*(1; h, \cdot) = 0$, then $\theta_p = \theta_1$ regardless of the party's decision. If $\mu > \gamma$, the party is indifferent. If $\mu < \gamma$, the voter never supports the party's candidate in the general election. The party is strictly better off by deviating to holding a primary when the state of the world is (l, h) because doing so gives him $\rho > 0$.

ii) Now suppose that in such equilibrium, the party separates between $\theta_1 = h$ and $\theta_1 = l$, and that $\sigma_t^*(1; \cdot, h) \in \{0, 1\}$ where $\sigma_t^*(1; \cdot, l) = 1 - \sigma_t^*(1; \cdot, h)$. If $\sigma_t^*(1; \cdot, h) = 1$, then the equilibrium cannot sustain because by choosing $\sigma_t^*(1; \cdot, l) = 0$ the party loses the general election for sure because the voter knows that the executive's candidate who was nominated under the backroom system is low quality with certainty. If $\sigma_t^*(1; \cdot, h) = 0$, then the voter always supports the party's candidate, which gives them incentive to deviating to the backroom system when (θ_0, l).

iii) By the same logic, the party can never credibly separate between different states of the world whenever the separating strategy results in $\mu = 1$ under one particular system. This implies that there also does not exist any equilibrium in which the party either holds a legislative primary or keeps the backroom for only one state of the world given $N_E = 1$.

iv) The only remaining candidate for a separating strategy given $N_E = 1$ is the party separating between $\{(h, h), (l, l)\}$ and $\{(h, l), (l, h)\}$. Let the party's strategy be $\sigma_t(1; \theta'_0, \theta'_1) \in \{0, 1\}$ if $\theta'_0, \theta'_1 \in \Theta$ and $\theta'_0 = \theta'_1$, and $\sigma_t(1; \theta_0, \theta_1) = 1 - \sigma_t(1; \theta'_0, \theta'_1)$ where $\theta_0, \theta_1 \in \Theta$ and

$\theta_0 \neq \theta_1$. If $\sigma_t^*(1; \theta_0', \theta_1') = 0$, then

$$\mu_{\geq}^1 = \mu_{<}^0 = 0$$

$$\mu_{\geq}^0 = \mu_{<}^1 = 1$$

$$\mu_{\emptyset}^0 = \frac{(1-q)\pi_0(1-\pi_1)}{(1-q)\pi_0(1-\pi_1) + (1-\pi_0)\pi_1}$$

$$\mu_{\emptyset}^1 = \frac{(1-\pi_0)\pi_1}{(1-q)\pi_0(1-\pi_1) + (1-\pi_0)\pi_1}$$

whereas the voter's belief if the party keeps the backroom is

$$\mu(L = 0) = \frac{\pi_0 \pi_1}{\pi_0 \pi_1 + (1-q)(1-\pi_0)(1-\pi_1)}$$

Suppose $\gamma > \mu(L = 0)$. Then the party can always be better off holding a primary because whenever uncertainty resolves, the voter is going to support the party in the general election given $\mu_{\geq}^0 = \mu_{<}^1 = 1$. Suppose $\mu(L = 0) > \gamma$ and $\max\{\mu_{\emptyset}^0, \mu_{\emptyset}^1\} > \gamma$. Then the party receives a payoff of 1 for any (θ_0, θ_1) in the backroom, whereas they can be better off holding a legislative primary whenever $(\theta_0, \theta_1) \neq (l, h)$ since by doing so they may nominate the establishment candidate with probability ρ if $\max\{\mu_{\emptyset}^0, \mu_{\emptyset}^1\} = \mu_{\emptyset}^1$ and with certainty otherwise. Suppose now $\mu(L = 0) > \gamma > \max\{\mu_{\emptyset}^0, \mu_{\emptyset}^1\}$. Then the party deviates to keeping the backroom whenever $\theta_0 \neq \theta_1$.

Suppose $\sigma_t^*(1; \theta_0', \theta_1') = 1$. Then the voter's belief if the party keeps the backroom is

$$\mu(L = 0) = \frac{(1-\pi_0)\pi_1}{(1-\pi_0)\pi_1 + (1-q)\pi_0(1-\pi_1)}$$

whereas

$$\mu_{\geq}^0 = \mu_{\geq}^1 = \mu_{\emptyset}^0 = \frac{\pi_0 \pi_1}{\pi_0 \pi_1 + (1-\pi_0)(1-\pi_1)(1-q)}$$

$$\mu_{\emptyset}^1 = \frac{(1-\pi_0)(1-\pi_1)(1-q)}{\pi_0 \pi_1 + (1-\pi_0)(1-\pi_1)(1-q)}$$

Note that Nature's signal does not give the voter any additional information because the voter already knows that the party holds a primary only when both candidates have the same quality, thus I have $\mu_{\geq}^0 = \mu_{\geq}^1 = \mu_{\emptyset}^0$. If $\gamma > \mu(L = 0)$, then the party deviates to holding a primary whenever (l, h). If $\mu(L = 0) > \gamma$ and $\mu_{\geq}^0 > \gamma$, the party deviates to holding a primary whenever (h, l). Finally, $\mu(L = 0) > \gamma$ and $\mu_{\geq}^0 < \gamma$, the party deviates to keeping the backroom system whenever $\theta_0 = \theta_1$. $\qquad \square$

Proof of Proposition 1-3

1. Suppose $\pi_0 > \pi_1$. First, I look for q' such that $\pi_0 = \mu_\emptyset^1$.

$$q' \equiv 1 - \frac{(1 - \pi_0)\pi_1}{\pi_0(1 - \pi_1)}$$

a) Let $q' \geq q$, so that the voter selects θ_0 when $\omega = \emptyset$. Then I have

$$\mu_<^1 > \mu_\geq^0 > \pi_0 = \mu_\emptyset^0 \geq \mu_\emptyset^1 > \pi_1$$

Given the voter's equilibrium beliefs, the party's expected payoff from holding a legislative primary when $(\theta_0, \theta_1) = (l, h)$ is

$$\mathbb{E}U_p[L = 1; (l, h)] = \begin{cases} \rho + \beta(1 - \rho) & \text{if } \mu_\emptyset^0 > \gamma \\ \rho & \text{if } \mu_\geq^0 > \gamma > \mu_\emptyset^0 \\ \rho & \text{if } \gamma > \mu_\geq^0 \end{cases} \quad (3.4)$$

and when $(\theta_0', \theta_1') = \Theta/\{(l, h)\}$ is

$$\mathbb{E}U_p[L = 1; (\theta_0', \theta_1')] = \begin{cases} \beta & \text{if } \mu_\emptyset^0 > \gamma \\ \rho\beta & \text{if } \mu_\geq^0 > \gamma > \mu_\emptyset^0 \\ 0 & \text{if } \gamma > \mu_\geq^0 \end{cases} \quad (3.5)$$

whereas their expected value of nominating the challenger under the elite arrangement system $\forall(\theta_0, \theta_1) \in \Theta$ is

$$\mathbb{E}U_p[L = 0; (\theta_0, \theta_1)] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \mu_\emptyset^1 > \gamma \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3.6)$$

b) If $q' < q$, I have
$$\mu_<^1 > \mu_\geq^0 > \mu_\emptyset^1 > \pi_0 \equiv \mu_\emptyset^0 > \pi_1$$

so that the voter selects θ_1 when $\omega = \emptyset$.

Then the party's expected payoff from holding a legislative primary when $(\theta_0, \theta_1) = (l, h)$ is

$$\mathbb{E}U_p[L = 1; (l, h)] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \mu_\emptyset^1 > \gamma \\ \rho & \text{if } \mu_\geq^0 > \gamma > \mu_\emptyset^1 \\ \rho & \text{if } \gamma > \mu_\geq^0 \end{cases} \quad (3.7)$$

and when $(\theta_0', \theta_1') = \Theta/\{(l, h)\}$ is

$$\mathbb{E}U_p[L = 1; (\theta'_0, \theta'_1)] = \begin{cases} \rho\beta + (1 - \rho) & \text{if } \mu^1_\emptyset > \gamma \\ \rho\beta & \text{if } \mu^0_\geq > \gamma > \mu^1_\emptyset \\ 0 & \text{if } \gamma > \mu^0_\geq \end{cases} \tag{3.8}$$

whereas their expected value of nominating the challenger under the elite arrange-
ment system $\forall(\theta_0, \theta_1) \in \Theta$ is

$$\mathbb{E}U_p[L = 0; (\theta_0, \theta_1)] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \mu^1_\emptyset > \gamma \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{3.9}$$

As long as the voter's prior tells that the established party candidate is more likely
to be high quality than the executive's candidate $\pi_0 > \pi_1$, there exists a primary
equilibrium $\forall q, \rho$, and γ.

2. Suppose $\pi_1 > \pi_0$. Then $\nexists\, q \in (0, 1)$ such that makes $\mu^0_\emptyset = \mu^1_\emptyset$, and I know that

$$\mu^1_< > \mu^1_\emptyset > \pi_1 > \pi_0 = \mu^0_\emptyset$$

and the voter's equilibrium strategy is to select the challenger with certainty under the
primary when Nature sends $\omega = \emptyset$. In order to identify the voter's best responses at
his remaining information sets, let $\bar{q} \in (0, 1)$ such that makes $\mu^1_\emptyset = \mu^0_\geq$.

$$\bar{q} \equiv 1 - \frac{\pi_0\pi_1}{\pi_1 - \pi_0}$$

a) Let $\bar{q} > q$. Then I have

$$\mu^1_< > \mu^1_\emptyset > \mu^0_\geq > \pi_0$$

Given the voter's equilibrium beliefs, the party's expected payoff from holding a
legislative primary when $(\theta_0, \theta_1) = (l, h)$ is

$$\mathbb{E}U_p[L = 1; (l, h)] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \mu^0_\geq > \gamma \\ 1 & \text{if } \mu^1_\emptyset > \gamma > \mu^0_\geq \\ \rho & \text{if } \gamma > \mu^1_\emptyset \end{cases} \tag{3.10}$$

and when $(\theta'_0, \theta'_1) = \Theta/\{(l, h)\}$ is

$$\mathbb{E}U_p[L = 1; (\theta'_0, \theta'_1)] = \begin{cases} \rho\beta + (1 - \rho) & \text{if } \mu^0_\geq > \gamma \\ 1 - \rho & \text{if } \mu^1_\emptyset > \gamma > \mu^0_\geq \\ 0 & \text{if } \gamma > \mu^1_\emptyset \end{cases} \tag{3.11}$$

If the party deviated to nominating the challenger, he would receive

$$\mathbb{E}U_p[L = 0] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \mu_\emptyset^1 > \gamma \\ 0 & \text{if } \gamma > \mu_\emptyset^1 \end{cases} \tag{3.12}$$

A primary equilibrium does not exist when $\mu_\emptyset^1 > \gamma > \mu_\geq^0$.

b) Let $q \geq \bar{q}$. The voter's posterior beliefs are

$$\mu_<^1 > \mu_\geq^0 \geq \mu_\emptyset^1 > \pi_1 > \pi_0$$

Given the voter's equilibrium beliefs, the party's expected payoff from holding a legislative primary when $(\theta_0, \theta_1) = (l, h)$ is

$$\mathbb{E}U_p[L = 1; (l, h)] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \mu_\emptyset^1 > \gamma \\ \rho & \text{if } \mu_\geq^0 > \gamma > \mu_\emptyset^1 \\ \rho & \text{if } \gamma > \mu_\geq^0 \end{cases} \tag{3.13}$$

and when $(\theta_0', \theta_1') = \Theta/\{(l, h)\}$ is

$$\mathbb{E}U_p[L = 1; (\theta_0', \theta_1')] = \begin{cases} \rho\beta + (1 - \rho) & \text{if } \mu_\emptyset^1 > \gamma \\ \rho\beta & \text{if } \mu_\geq^0 > \gamma > \mu_\emptyset^1 \\ 0 & \text{if } \gamma > \mu_\geq^0 \end{cases} \tag{3.14}$$

The party's payoff choosing the off-path strategy remains the same.

When the executive's candidate is more likely to be high quality than the establishment candidate ($\pi_1 > \pi_0$) and when the executive is sufficiently less likely to be a cooperative type,

3. Suppose $\pi_0 = \pi_1$. Then $\forall q \in (0, 1)$, I have

$$\mu_<^1 > \mu_\geq^0 > \mu_\emptyset^1 > \pi_0 \equiv \mu_\emptyset^0 = \pi_1$$

because

$$\frac{\pi_0}{\pi_0 \pi_1 + (1 - q)(1 - \pi_1)} > \frac{\pi_0}{\pi_0 + (1 - q)(1 - \pi_1)}$$

$\forall q \in (0, 1)$ as long as $\pi_0 = \pi_1$. The equilibrium strategies for the party and the voter are the same as when $\pi_0 > \pi_1$ and $q' < q$.

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Chapter 4

Successful Defections under Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

4.1 Introduction

Under strong presidential systems, where the executive exerts significant influence over his co-partisans, the president and his faction take over the de facto party leadership (Batto and Huang 2016), and expand their influence within the party by giving nominations to their preferred candidates in a smoke-filled back room (De Luca et al. 2002). As a result, incumbent legislators of losing factions (i.e. those outside the president's faction) are often denied renomination. Confronting the marginalization of their status within the party, members of losing factions can either comply with the party's nomination decisions or simply defect and form a transitory electoral alliance to secure their own renomination in the upcoming legislative election.

Building on recent scholarship on mixed-member electoral systems in constitutional context (Batto et al. 2016), I argue that mixed-member electoral systems (MMS) under strong presidencies provide particularly high institutional incentives for members from losing factions within the ruling party to defect and form a transitory alliance before legislative elections.[1] This is because MMS allow them to garner additional votes in the proportional representation (PR) tier by placing a candidate in single-member districts (SMD), even where there is essentially a zero chance of winning the district race as a non-mainstream party. Despite of being only a transitory alliance, political campaigning by the defection group can be effective in increasing their vote support in the PR tier because they often mobilize around a popular leader who may have lost the presidential primary but still has a strong support base across regions. This is especially likely in emerging democracies where voters are less attached to political parties but more likely to cast their votes based on their attachment to individual leaders within the party (Hagopian 2007). Strategic supporters of the ruling party, especially those in competitive districts, are not likely to waste their SMD vote by voting for the alliance. However, running a candidate in local districts is going to effectively induce some of the ruling party supporters to split their votes and cast their PR vote for the transitory alliance, which is mobilized around their preferred leader.

However, estimating whether there exists such a strong positive spillover effect between the two different tiers for the transitory alliance remains difficult, partly because political parties do not randomly choose to nominate their candidate in certain districts in general; rather, they are more likely to do so in districts where they expect to receive more votes, especially when their budget is constrained and the likelihood of wining seems slim. Public support for a political party in a given local district is likely to affect both the treatment assignment (the party's decision to nominate a candidate in a district) and the outcome variable (electoral

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[1]Mixed-member electoral systems typically refer to systems with two distinct sets of voting rules that allocate legislative seats, a typical example being a combination of single-member district (SMD) plurality and proportional representation (PR) rules. This system usually involves each voter casting two votes in the election - one vote in the SMD tier to elect a local district representative and the other in the PR tier to support the most preferred party. In this chapter, I focus on mixed-member majoritarian systems, a particular type of MMS where seat allocation in the two distinct tiers is independent from each other.

performance in that region). If this is the case, simply comparing aggregated electoral outcomes between districts where the party nominates a candidate and where it did not may overestimate the true magnitude of the treatment effect.

This paper proposes a novel identification strategy to estimate spillover effects under MMS by exploiting geography. In particular, I focus on the 2008 South Korean Legislative Election, where many governing party members of non-president faction who failed to win renomination decided to form an electoral alliance mobilized around Park Geun-hye, who was then a popular conservative leader of the losing faction. The so-called "Pro-Park Alliance" had been formed just a few weeks prior to the 2008 South Korean legislative election and dissolved afterwards as the successful candidates of the alliance rejoined the ruling party after the election.

The legislative election data is available at the polling station level, which provides us with an excellent opportunity to examine the *causal* effects of placing a district candidate on the party's performance in the PR tier. Exploiting quasi-random variation in geography, I look at polling stations in neighborhoods that were most adjacent to each other at the electoral district boundary and compare PR vote share for Pro-Park Alliance between districts where they placed a candidate and districts where it did not. One important assumption behind this approach is that neighborhoods located "close enough" to one another are likely to be comparable except for the treatment assignment. To improve the comparability of the neighborhoods (*dong*) under study, I focus on polling stations in Seoul, the capital of the country. Most of the 25 administrative municipalities (*gu*) in the city are divided into two or three electoral districts due to their unusually high population density.[2] Fortunately for my study, several of these municipalities had only one of their electoral districts in which Pro-Park Alliance candidates ran in the 2008 legislative election, primarily due to the party's resource and time constraint.

This creates a geographic natural experiment setting, where neighborhoods on one side of the electoral district boundary are assigned into the treated group and those on the other side, but still within the same municipality, into the control group. The within-municipality comparison allows us to compare electoral outcomes at polling stations located less than 1km away from the district boundary, on average. As the validity of the comparison between units in treated and control regions is crucial under this design, I present quantitative evidence that show neighborhoods under study are well balanced across a number of observable pretreatment covariates. Any difference in the PR vote share for Pro-Park Alliance in adjacent treated and controlled polling stations is therefore likely to represent a *causal* effect of the alliance nominating a district candidate on the likelihood of vote splitting among conservative supporters in the district.

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[2]Seoul has a current population density of 17,255 people per a squared kilometer (km^2). Nearly one fifth of the country's entire population live in the city. The index is from Statistics Korea (2013), available at http://www.index.go.kr/

I find strong evidence that when the alliance ran a candidate in a local district, their PR vote share increased approximately 1.8 percentage point. This point estimate may not seem to contain any meaningful substantive implication. However, given the average PR vote share for the alliance in the neighborhoods in the control group was only about 10.3 percentage points, the treatment led to about 17% increase in the outcome. Moreover, my results suggest that it was mainly conservative voters who split their PR votes to the alliance: while the PR vote share of the conservative ruling GNP decreased approximately by 2 percentage points in regions where a Pro-Park Alliance candidate was placed, the PR vote shares for other parties are the same in treated and control regions. I also run a placebo test, where I compare electoral outcomes in neighborhoods on both side of the electoral district boundary within the same municipality, where the alliance did not place any candidate. Consistent with the main results, I do not find any difference in the outcome.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I give an overview of the formation of Pro-Park Alliance before the 2008 legislative election in South Korea. In section 3, I discuss the geographic identification, followed by empirical results. The last section concludes.

4.2 Successful Defection in the 2008 Legislative Election

South Korea instituted the mixed-member majoritarian system in 2004; legislators serve a four-year term, thus the 2008 election was only the second election since the mixed-member system was adopted. There are 246 SMDs seats and a nationwide PR district with 54 PR seats available under the new electoral system. Two major political parties, one conservative and the other progressive, have been dominating the legislature since the country's democratic transition in 1987. Although the major parties have selectively held legislative primaries since 2004, nomination decisions are mostly made under the elite arrangement system where a small group of party elites who are the de facto party leadership determine nomination outcomes. Moreover, a popular executive can exert considerable influence over his co-partisans, so that the power status of the president's faction within the ruling party waxes and wanes with the presidential electoral cycle (Choi 2016).

The 2008 South Korean Legislative Election was unique in that it was held about four months after the 2007 Presidential Election and only around 50 days after the conservative Grand National Party (GNP) presidential candidate Lee Myung-back stepped into office in February. Given the approval ratings for the new president was still very high well above 50%, it was generally expected that the legislative election would heavily be affected by the presidential election outcomes and that the ruling conservative party was going to win a landslide victory (Kang 2008). This gave the president's faction within the ruling party an opportunity to take over the de facto leadership in the candidate recruitment process for the

2008 legislative election.

When it was later revealed that many incumbent legislators who belonged to losing factions within the ruling party lost their renomination ticket to party outsiders who were preferred by the president's faction, the members decided to defect from the governing party and mobilized around Park Geun-hye, who was then a popular conservative leader of the losing faction, just a few weeks before the general election. They named themselves the "Pro-Park Alliance," despite of the fact that Park stayed the ruling party and was never a member of the alliance that was named after her. Given such a short period of time to campaign as a separate entity defected from the governing party, naming the alliance after Park proved to be an effective way to appeal for support to conservative voters who felt more affiliated with Park than President Lee, the de facto leader of the ruling party. The Alliance ended up placing a candidate only in 50 districts. Surprisingly, the Alliance nevertheless won in 6 district seats and secured 8 PR seats, which was the largest number of PR seats gained by a non-major party.

4.3 Geographic Identification

Estimating the *causal* effects of placing district candidates on voting behavior under MMS is difficult because political parties facing a resource constraint do not randomly choose the districts in which they place a candidate. Even if we had reason to believe that political parties do not strategically choose electoral districts to nominate candidates, this does not guarantee that pre-treatment characteristics are balanced across comparison groups. One may still estimate spillover effects under MMS after controlling and adjusting for a number of observable covariates such as the party's vote share in the previous election, and other socioeconomic and demographic variables at the electoral district level. In fact, many of the previous studies on spillover effects under mixed-member electoral systems in various democracies adopt this approach (Herron and Nishikawa 2001, Cox and Schoppa 2002, Karp 2009).[3] However, even with this approach, there is still the possibility that unobserved electoral district-level confounders are unbalanced across treatment and control groups.

To minimize potential confounders, I take an alternative approach by exploiting a quasi-random variation in geography. That is, I focus on electoral outcomes at polling stations in neighborhoods that were most adjacent to each other at the electoral district boundary, comparing PR vote shares between districts where a party's candidate was nominated and districts where no candidate from the party was nominated, but still within the same municipality. The main idea underlying this geographic identification is that these boundaries were drawn in a more or less arbitrary way that neighborhoods located "close enough" to one another are likely to be comparable except for the treatment assignment (Keele and

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[3]However, there are a few exceptions. See Hainmueller and Kern (2008), Maeda (2008).

Titiunik 2014), especially in terms of a number of socioeconomic variables which are likely to shape residents' political preferences. Comparing vote shares at these polling places in treatment regions with those in control near the electoral district boundary that divides those areas seems much more valid than simply comparing aggregated electoral outcomes in treated districts and those in control.

In terms of the potential outcomes framework, we would ideally like to estimate $\tau_j = Y_j(1) - Y_j(0)$ where $Y_j(T = 1)$ and $Y_j(T = 0)$ denote the potential outcomes of interest in electoral district j had a party nominated a candidate in district j ($T_j = 1$) and had it not ($T_j = 0$), respectively. However, the fundamental problem of causal inference is that we never observe both Y_{j1} and Y_{j0} in the real world, but only $Y_j = T_j Y_{j1} + (1 - T_j)Y_{j0}$ for any district j. Under random assignment, we can estimate the average treatment effect $\bar{\tau}_j = \mathbb{E}[Y_{j1} - Y_{j0}] = \mathbb{E}[Y_{j1}|T_j = 1] - \mathbb{E}[Y_{j0}|T_j = 0] = \mathbb{E}[Y_{j1}] - \mathbb{E}[Y_{j0}]$.

However, if the party did not randomly choose in which district to place a candidate, we can still make progress by assuming that treatment assignment is independent of the potential outcomes conditional on $\mathbf{X}$ (i.e., $Y_j(1)$, $Y_j(0)T_j|\mathbf{X}$) where $\mathbf{X}$ is a vector of observable pre-treatment covariates at the electoral district level, and the overlap condition holds, i.e. the probability of being treated is not a deterministic function of $\mathbf{X}$ (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). When both of these conditions hold, treatment assignment is strongly ignorable and we can estimate the average treatment effect for the treated $\tau_j|(T = 1) = \mathbb{E}\{Y_j(1) - Y_j(0)|T = 1\}$ by assuming that $\mathbb{E}(Y_j|(\mathbf{X_j}, T_j = 1) = \mathbb{E}(Y_j|(\mathbf{X_j}, T_j = 0)$.

Below I provide a corresponding assumption discussed in Keele and Titiunik (2014) to estimate average treatment effects $\mathbb{E}(\tau_{ij})$ under identification exploiting variations in geography. To indicate whether units are in treated or control groups, I let $\mathcal{A}_t$ represent electoral districts where a party nominated a candidate (i.e. *treated* areas) and $\mathcal{A}_c$ represent where the party did not run a candidate (i.e. control areas) under MMS.[4] Note that treatment status defined here is determined by whether units are located in either $\mathcal{A}_t$ or $\mathcal{A}_c$.

Assumption (Local Geographic Treatment Ignorability): When $\mathcal{A}_t$ and $\mathcal{A}_c$ are adjacent, $Y_{ij}(1)$, $Y_{ij}(0)T_{ij}$ only for units who are close to the boundary that separates $\mathcal{A}_t$ and $\mathcal{A}_c$. That is, $Y_{ij}(1)$, $Y_{ij}(0) \perp T_{ij}$ for $d_i < D$ where $D > 0$ is a scalar and d_i is unit's shortest distance to the boundary from i's location.

I mainly look at polling stations in electoral districts in Seoul, the capital city of Korea, to ensure comparability among neighborhoods in the treated and control groups. There are three main advantages of focusing our attention to constituencies in Seoul only. First, due to the city's unusually high population density, most of the administrative municipalities in the

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[4]I adopt the basic notations used in Keele and Titiunik (2014).

city are divided into two (sometimes three) electoral districts. The Alliance candidates often ran in only one district in each of these municipalities in the 2008 election.[5] By comparing electoral outcomes at polling stations in the neighborhoods located in a treated district and those in the neighborhoods located in a control district in the same municipalities, we can control for potential municipal level confounders, such as municipal tax rate and public school quality.

Second, the high population density in Seoul allows us to avoid small sample size issue. The unit of analysis of this study is a polling station, where each polling station in Seoul covers about 20 to 50 blocks (*tong-ban*), the primary division of a single neighborhood (*dong*), which is the smallest level of a local government. Neighborhoods are also the lowest level of a local government where basic demographic data is available.[6] Within each of the 489 neighborhoods in Seoul at the time of the 2008 election, there were often four to six different polling stations covering different blocks, sometimes up to more than nine depending on the population density of each neighborhood. The size of eligible voting population at each of the 2211 polling stations in Seoul varies from 407 to 5401, with the average being 3588 persons. The size of eligible voting population in each neighborhood varies from 520 to 50770, with an average of 21370 persons. The location of all poling stations can be found in Figure 4.1.

Third, we can also compare electoral outcomes at polling stations located less than 1km away from the district boundary by focusing on electoral districts in Seoul. I assume that polling stations located within a small geographic buffer from the electoral district boundary cover the most adjacent blocks within neighborhoods that uniquely share district boundaries. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of the PR vote share of the Alliance at different polling stations in each electoral district in Seoul. A naive comparison shows that the Alliance's PR vote share is generally higher in districts where they placed a candidate. Below I attempt to identify whether there exists a causal effect of the Alliance placing a candidate in a local district on its PR vote share by comparing the outcome in the most comparable neighborhoods that are adjacent to electoral district boundaries.

To ensure the Local Geographic Treatment Ignorability assumption holds, I first look for district boundaries that are shared between treated and control districts within the same municipality; I define these boundaries as "boundary regions." I then look for neighborhoods in these treated and control regions that are adjacent to *only one* of the boundary regions under study in order to avoid potential issues that may arise when looking at neighborhoods that are adjacent to multiple district boundaries. This gives us 8 boundary regions with 297 polling stations in 59 neighborhoods in 16 different constituencies in 8 municipalities.

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[5]Moreover, many of the districts located outside of the Seoul area where the Alliance candidates are not adjacent to one another, which makes it difficult to implement identification based on variations in geography.

[6]The mean and median area of each neighborhood is 1.24 km^2 and 0.84 km^2, respectively.

Moreover, to ensure that the geographic boundary is a valid treatment assignment mechanism, I provide a placebo test where I first look for district boundaries that are shared between both control districts within the same municipality. I define these boundaries as "placebo regions," and randomly assign neighborhoods, which are adjacent to only one of the district boundaries, into two control groups. Because neither districts had an Alliance candidate in the local district race, we should expect to see no meaningful difference in the outcome. The placebo regions include 13 boundaries with 592 polling stations in 123 neighborhoods in 27 different constituencies in 12 municipalities. Both the boundary regions and placebo regions can be found in Figure 4.3.

Finally, I also assume SUTVA (Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption). However, I explain the possibility of a potential SUTVA violation. The SUTVA may be violated when voters in treated districts communicate with voters in neighboring districts where the Alliance did not place a candidate and talk about their district candidates: this may affect the voters in the neighboring districts to be equally aware of the transitory electoral alliance, despite the fact that an Alliance candidate never ran in their local district. However, this is unlikely to be a serious concern in urban areas where residents generally do not engage in conversations on elections and politics with their neighbors to the extent that they influence their neighbors' vote decisions (Keele and Titiunik 2014). I assume residents in the Seoul area are no different and that the potential SUTVA violation will not be a great concern for our study. Even in an extreme case where the assumption is violated, the estimate can still be interpreted as the lower bound of the spillover effects.

Geographic Data

The data used in this study can be divided into spatial and attribute data. The administrative boundary map of Seoul at the neighborhood level is provided by the Korea National Statistical Office.[7] Based on this map, I created both a spatial polygons data of the electoral constituencies and a spatial line data of the boundary regions, which allows me to find the neighborhoods that are adjacent to the electoral district boundary in each municipality in Seoul. Using the information on the location of polling stations in Seoul provided by the National Election Committee (NEC) website,[8] I retrieved the geocoded data via Google Map$^{©}$.

In order to check the accuracy of the geocoded data of the polling place locations, I overlaid the geocoded data with a map of Seoul provided by both Google Map and Google Earth. These figures can be found in Appendix. While the location of the polling stations match

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[7]The map is available from http://sgis.kostat.go.kr/. For this study, we keep the map's original coordinate reference system, EPSG 5170, in order to keep the meter unit. All spatial data analysis is done in **R** version 3.0.

[8]NEC website: http://info.nec.go.kr

up perfectly with the Google Map of Seoul, the overlap is less consistent when the polling stations are re-projected onto the coordinate reference system of the administrative boundary map of Seoul; in the latter case, I find several polling stations that are located outside of the neighborhood boundary (when they should lie inside). This suggests that the reprojection between the ESPG 5170 and the coordinate reference system used by the Google Map and Google Earth produces a little noise in measuring the exact distance of each polling station to the neighborhood boundary, as well as the relative position of the polling stations to one another.[9] However, these "outlier" polling stations do not fall outside a buffer of 500 meters from the boundary region. Moreover, several of the polling places were schools and buildings that are large enough to accommodate enough people who want to cast a vote, which sometimes are more than 100 meters in length. All of these polling stations are geocoded as points on a map, which does not take into account the relative size of the buildings. Hence, I assume that these differences in location generated by reprojecting the polling stations data are negligible.

Attribute data are available at three different levels: polling station, neighborhood, and electoral district level.[10] As mentioned above, each polling station covers from between 20 to 50 different blocks in a neighborhood. It covers exactly the same blocks across different elections (both presidential and parliamentary), as long as there is no significant change in the net migration in these blocks between different elections. Hence for the polling station level data, I use the vote share of the conservative ruling GNP in the 2007 presidential election as a proxy of the baseline support for the party and the turnout rate in the same election.[11] This can be justified by the fact that approximately 80% (45 out of 56) respondents in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 3 Survey who reported to have voted for the Park Alliance in the PR tier had voted for the conservative ruling GNP in the 2007 presidential election. Note that we do not include the PR vote share of the party in the previous 2004 legislative election as a baseline pretreatment covariate because it might have been affected by whether or not the party placed a candidate in the local district in 2004.

The neighborhood level data provided by the Seoul City Statistics Office are available for covariates such as population density, city and municipality tax (in millions of won), the number of households, net migration, foreign population, birth population, population over

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[9]This is mainly why I do not adopt a geographic discontinuity design (Dell 2010), where the exact geographic distance to the boundary cut point as a running variable is critical.

[10]No geographic characteristics (such as elevation and slope as in Dell (2010)) is considered, as there are little variation in terms of such covariates for the neighborhoods included in our sample.

[11]A significant decrease in the population living in certain blocks will lead to the neighborhood being redistricted (usually in the form of being absorbed to another neighborhood). An increase in the net change in migration will lead to either an increase in the number of polling stations in a neighborhood, or the neighborhood being divided into multiple neighborhoods. There are 126 polling stations (54 treated, 72 control) within our sample that were in neighborhoods redistricted between the 2007 presidential election (held in December, 2007) and the 2008 parliamentary election (held in April, 2008). These are dropped in the analysis.

65, and the number of households on the government subsidy programs.[12] Finally, I run an OLS regression of the Alliance's PR vote share on the treatment status as well as a number of pretreatment covariates at the polling station and neighborhood levels.

4.4 Statistical Results

Balance test results

Table 4.1 provides balance on a number of pretreatment covariates at the polling station and neighborhood levels.[13] The first four column provides the mean difference between treated and control units in *all* neighborhoods located in Seoul in terms of various covariates. The naive comparison shows that the units are not balanced on a number of pretreatment covariates, such as the previous vote share for various parties and the turnout rate in the 2007 presidential election, and the share of foreign population, although the absolute size of the mean difference does not seem large.

However, when I subset the sample into polling stations in neighborhoods that are most adjacent to the boundary regions, I find that the treated and control units are balanced in terms of all observable covariates at the two different levels as can be seen from the last four columns. The columns report the mean difference of the polling station level covariates after restricting the sample to the polling stations located in the neighborhoods adjacent to the boundary regions. I further subset the data into polling stations in neighborhoods which are located within one kilometer and 800 meters from the district boundarty. As shown in Table 4.2, units in the treated and control districts are well balanced across observable pretreatment covariates. I do not further subset to polling stations within a geographic buffer that is smaller than 800 meters due to the potential noise in the distance generated after re-projecting the geocoded data. I also find from the placebo test that treated and control units are balanced on all observed pretreatment covariates, which is shown in Appendix.

Regression Results

Table 4.3 provides the OLS regression estimates of spillover effects in the 2008 legislative election for Park Alliance using different regression specifications. The regression estimates show that the PR vote share of the Alliance increased about 1.8 percentage point as a result of placing a candidate in the local district. The results are robust across different specifications, although the estimate slightly decreases to 1.3 percentage point when neighborhood-level

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[12]http://stat.seoul.go.kr/

[13]I do not include electoral district level covariates, since there are only 8 districts in each of the treatment and the control groups. I also do not include any municipal level covariates here, as these should be completely balanced across treatment and control units in the sample, given our within-municipal comparisons.

controls are added. Although the absolute size of the spillover effects may seem negligible, the treatment effect accounts for almost 17% of the average PR vote share of 10.3% that the Alliance received in the Seoul region. The size of the treatment effect is surprising, given that none of the 11 district candidates who ran under the Alliance banner in the Seoul region was even close to winning in the district race; the average single-member district vote share of the alliance in the treated neighborhoods in the sample is about 4.6 percent. Consistent with my expectation, there is essentially no difference in the outcome between neighborhoods adjacent to the district boundaries in the placebo regions, i.e. boundaries that separate electoral districts within the same municipality where the Alliance did not place any candidate. The regression results from the placebo test is provided in Appendix.

Moreover, I provide a supporting evidence that the positive spillover effect can be attributed to vote-splitting among conservative voters, I compare the average PR vote shares for the two main political parties, the conservative ruling GNP and the main progressive opposition United Democratic Party (UDP), as well as other minor parties in the treated and control neighborhoods.[14] As shown in Figure 4.4, the PR vote share for the conservative ruling GNP, where members of the Alliance were defected from, was larger in the control neighborhoods approximately by 1.7 percentage point, which is about the size of the spillover effects we observed. All other parties, including the main opposition UDP, earned essentially the same PR votes in the neighborhoods under study.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I argue that when the public support for the president is high and that the president's faction exerts significant influence over legislative nomination outcomes, mixed-member electoral systems provide particularly high incentives for losing factions within the ruling party to defect from the party and form a transitory electoral alliance. This is because by placing a candidate in local district races, members of the losing factions can garner additional votes from the PR tier because they tend to be party establishments with a strong support base and relatively high public recognition. By exploiting geography, this paper proposes a causal identification to estimate the causal effect of placing a candidate of a transitory alliance defected from the ruling party in the 2008 South Korean Legislative Election on voter behavior. I showed that the alliance was able to significantly increase their PR vote shares in districts where they placed a candidate in the single-member district tier, an effect which largely stems from a decrease in the PR vote share fore the ruling party.

The implication of the findings suggests that mixed-member electoral systems under presidential systems may provide losing factions with more negotiation powers with the president's

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[14]I highlight the PR vote shares for the two main parties because only these parties placed a candidate in all electoral districts in Seoul and received the highest vote support in the region.

faction over nomination outcomes for legislative elections because the potential threat from successfully defecting is high. However, even if the negotiations between the factions within the ruling party fail, losing factions may lose relatively little under mixed-member systems.

Sample All polling stations	All Tr-Co neighborhoods				Boundary Neighborhoods (μ distance: 554.45 m)			
	Mean Treat	Mean Control	Mean Diff. (Tr-Co)	P-value	Mean Treat	Mean Control	Mean Diff. (Tr-Co)	P-value
Polling Station level								
GNP vote share in 2007	0.504	0.534	-0.030	0.00	0.509	0.511	-0.002	0.73
LFP vote share 2007	0.121	0.117	0.004	0.00	0.122	0.120	0.002	0.24
UDP vote share 2007	0.264	0.246	0.018	0.00	0.257	0.262	-0.005	0.31
voting pop in 2007	3490	3603	-112	0.00	3621	3508	113	0.19
turnout in 2007	0.615	0.622	-0.007	0.01	0.608	0.616	-0.008	0.31
voting pop in 2008	3513	3609	-96	0.01	3673	3618	54	0.46
Neighborhood level								
Pop Density	26893	26042	851	0.56	26591	27583	-992	0.75
No. of Household	8244	8326	-81	0.82	9598	9557	40	0.97
Local tax per household	1.083	0.364	0.719	0.17	0.283	0.357	-0.074	0.68
net migration	-110	-125	15.	0.85	-183	-367	184	0.33
Foreign population (%)	0.044	0.026	0.002	0.018	0.034	0.030	0.004	0.72
Birth population (%)	0.010	0.009	0.001	0.88	0.009	0.008	0.001	0.02
Age over 65 (%)	0.089	0.086	0.003	0.38	0.090	0.089	0.000	0.92
Household on Govt. subsidy (%)	0.032	0.027	0.005	0.22	0.034	0.034	0.00	0.96

continued

Sample All polling stations	All Tr-Co neighborhoods -				Boundary Neighborhoods (μ distance: 554.45 m)			
	Mean Treat	Mean Control	Mean Diff. (Tr-Co)	P-value	Mean Treat	Mean Control	Mean Diff. (Tr-Co)	P-value
N - Polling stations	490	1721			154	143		
N - Neighborhoods	108	381			31	28		
N - Electoral districts	11	37			8	8		

Table 4.1: Balance test results. Municipal tax in millions of Won. Net migration and population in numbers. Population density in the size of population per km². Foreign and birth population, population over 65 are per population. Government subsidized households denote the proportion of households on the subsidy program. 2007 refers to the 2007 Presidential Election. 2008 refers to the 2008 Legislative Election.

Sample Polling stations within:	Boundary neighborhoods 1km (μ distance: 430.81 m)				Boundary Neighborhoods 800m (μ distance: 351.34 m)			
	Mean Treat	Mean Control	Mean Diff. (Tr-Co)	P-value	Mean Treat	Mean Control	Mean Diff. (Tr-Co)	P-value
Polling Station level								
GNP vote share 07	0.508	0.506	0.002	0.74	0.508	0.504	0.004	0.55
LFP vote share 07	0.107	0.107	0.00	0.88	0.122	0.122	0.000	0.92
UDP vote share 07	0.258	0.266	-0.008	0.14	0.259	0.268	-0.009	0.11
voting pop in 2007	3590	3507	82	0.37	3587	3467	120	0.24
turnout in 2007	0.606	0.613	-0.007	0.38	0.604	0.610	-0.007	0.44
voting pop in 2008	3651	3621	29	0.72	3645	3590	54	0.54
N - Polling stations	139	117			124	99		
N - Neighborhoods	31	28			30	27		
N - Electoral districts	8	8			8	8		

Table 4.2: Balance test results. 2007 refers to the 2007 Presidential Election. 2008 refers to the 2008 Legislative Election.

Dependent Variable: *Park Alliance's* PR vote share	Specifications						
Treatment	0.018** (0.002)	0.018** (0.002)	0.017** (0.002)	0.019** (0.002)	0.018** (0.002)	0.013** (0.002)	0.012** (0.003)
Polling station level covariates	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Neighborhood level covariates	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Electoral District level covariates	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Lat/Long controls	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	297	235	297	235	235	235	235

Table 4.3: OLS regression estimates of spillover effects in neighborhoods adjacent to the boundary regions. Standard errors are in parentheses. $**p < 0.01$ $*p < 0.05$.

Figure 4.1: Locations of each polling station in Seoul. Green lines indicate electoral districts. Grey lines indicate neighborhoods.

Figure 4.2: Distribution of PR vote share of Park Alliance at polling stations in 48 electoral districts in Seoul. Boxplots colored in red are treated districts where the party nominated a candidate in the 2008 election, while those in blue are the control.

Figure 4.3: Map of boundary regions. Red lines denote the boundaries between treated and control neighborhoods in the same municipality. Blue lines represent the boundaries between control districts within the same municipality.

Figure 4.4: Boxplots of PR vote share for the two major political parties, the conservative ruling Grand National Party (GNP) and the progressive opposition United Democratic Party (UDP).

Appendix

Sample: All polling stations	All Tr-Co neighborhoods -				Boundary Neighborhoods (μ distance: 554.45 m)			
	Mean Treat	Mean Control	Mean Diff. (Tr-Co)	P-value	Mean Treat	Mean Control	Mean Diff. (Tr-Co)	P-value
Polling Station level								
DLP vote share in 07	0.001	0.00	0.000	0.46	0.001	0.34	-0.001	0.48
turnout in 07	-0.004	0.08	0.002	0.72	0.003	0.56	0.011	0.11
Neighborhood level								
Pop Density	2141.23	0.08	1579.26	0.44				
Population	-578.16	0.46	-31.05	0.98				
Pop per Household	0.010	0.01	0.002	0.84				
City tax per household	2.150	0.15	-0.047	0.75				
Gu tax per household	0.281	0.23	-0.058	0.43				
net migration	-72.12	0.50	135.72	0.38				
Foreign population	0.001	0.85	0.003	0.54				
Birth population	-0.001	0.58	0.000	0.77				
Age over 65	-0.002	0.72	0.001	0.81				
Govt. subsidy	0.008	0.07	0.003	0.53				

continued

Sample All polling stations	All Tr-Co neighborhoods -				Boundary Neighborhoods (μ distance: 554.45 m)			
	Mean Treat	Mean Control	Mean Diff. (Tr-Co)	P-value	Mean Treat	Mean Control	Mean Diff. (Tr-Co)	P-value
Electoral District level								
DLP run in 04	0.03	0.83	-0.05	0.79				
CON win in 04	-0.11	0.43	-0.13	0.40				
N - Polling stations	2211		757			593	375	
N - Neighborhoods	489		156			156	156	
N - Electoral districts	48		38			38	38	
N - Boundary Regions	85		20			20	20	

Table 4.4: Balance test results. City and municipal tax in millions of Won. Net migration and population in numbers. Population density in the size of population per km². Foreign and birth population, population over 65 are per population. Government subsidized households denote the proportion of households on the subsidy program. 07 refers to the 2007 presidential election. 04 refers to the 2004 parliamentary election.

	Specification Tests						
Treatment	0.0095 *	0.0101*	0.0098*	0.0099*	0.0100*	0.0108*	0.0106*
	(0.0006)	(0.0008)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)
Polling station level covariates	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Neighborhood level covariates	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Electoral District level covariates	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Lat/Long controls	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Boundary F.E.s	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	757	631	631	631	631	540	540

Table 4.5: Sample: Boundary neighborhoods (including where the New Progressive Party placed a candidate). OLS regression estimates of spillover effects in neighborhoods adjacent to the boundary regions. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the neighborhood level. $*p < 0.001$.

Figure 4.5: Location of each polling station in Seoul overlaid with Google Map.

Figure 4.6: The map of administrative boundary of Seoul overlaid with Google Earth map

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Chapter 5

Conclusion

The three papers in this dissertation examine ruling party politics under strong presidencies with a regional focus on South Korea during 2008-2016. By focusing on the politics behind the ballot, it sheds light on internal power struggles among competing factions over nomination power within the ruling party. Under strong presidencies, the executive exercises her de facto power in the candidate selection process so that her favored candidates win nomination against party establishment candidates.

However, ruling party elites, especially those who do not belong to the president's faction, may counteract the president by voluntarily holding legislative primaries and thus increase the likelihood that they retain power within the party. While democratizing the candidate selection process is usually not the most preferred choice for ruling party elites, this type of party reform can sometimes be the only available means to protect party establishment candidates and secure their survival in the long run. This does not necessarily imply that legislative primaries are the only institutional means by which ruling party elites can retain power. My project also presents a case where competing factions within the ruling party failed to agree on party nomination outcomes and that members of losing factions chose to defect from the party. To test the observable implications of the overarching argument, I use both quantitative and qualitative evidence that I gathered during fieldwork in Korea.

There are three main contributions of this project. First, this project contributes to a growing literature on the institutional origins of democratic party reforms by bringing constitutional contexts to the center of the analysis. Recent scholarship examining why party elites voluntarily introduce party primaries in new democracies tends to overlook the role of the president, whose institutional power often extends to internal governance of the ruling party. By overlooking the role of president, these works can misrepresent such reforms as a bottom-up process. However, decisions over candidate selection methods as well as nominations are still overwhelmingly dominated by ruling party elites so long as their status within the party is not interfered by presidential discretion. By situating legislative primaries in the

context of strong presidencies, this project enhances our understanding on the relationship between the separation of powers and the rise of legislative primaries within the ruling party in new democracies.

Second, this project enhances our understanding of the role of legislative primaries under strong presidencies by providing systematic empirical evidence based on candidate-level data at the nomination stage. Existing literature on internal party reforms tends to depend heavily on qualitative evidence as it often suffers from lack of reliable data at the legislative recruitment stage. While candidate-level data does not perfectly reveal insider politics within the ruling party, it provides supporting evidence to my argument that legislative primaries for the ruling party are endogenously held by party elites to favor establishment candidates.

Lastly, this project provides a theoretical foundation to understand the relationship between legislative primaries and political accountability under strong presidencies. Holding legislative primaries is likely to promote political accountability when party establishment candidates are better qualified than the president's favored outsider candidates. This implies that a strong presidency may open the way for democratic party reforms by triggering power struggles between the executive and ruling party elites. Yet, legislative primaries could also undermine political accountability when ruling party elites want to send a false signal to the public that establishment candidates are of higher quality when in fact the president's recommended party outsiders are better qualified. In other words, legislative primaries under strong presidencies can still occur as a result of elite pandering.