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Ellipsis in Japanese Discourse

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DOCTORAL DEGREE CONFERRED
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Ellipsis in Japanese Discourse

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To My Mother

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Introduction

The literature on Japanese language and culture makes frequent references to the tendency of Japanese to use elliptical expressions.¹ This phenomenon -- ellipsis (or deletion) -- has, likewise, been a popular subject in the field of theoretical Japanese linguistics. Nominal ellipsis, in particular, has received the majority of attention while other types of ellipsis have been studied to a relatively lesser degree. Notwithstanding the contributions of previous studies, much remains to be explored in the realm of ellipsis in Japanese.

The prevailing assumption that underlies previous studies is that the function of ellipsis is to avoid redundancy. Under this assumption, efforts have been mainly directed to syntactic or (discourse-)structural analyses of ellipsis. (See Section 1.1. for further discussion.) It is, however, evident that an understanding of ellipsis cannot be adequate without taking into consideration its pragmatic aspect. With respect particularly to the functions of ellipsis, a pragmatic approach is indispensable. A redundancy theory alone is not sufficient for it fails to fully take into account the above-mentioned common perception that Japanese like to use elliptical expressions.

In the present study, I reexamine ellipsis in Japanese primarily from a pragmatic perspective. I consider three types of ellipsis: nominal, verbal, and clausal. The two focal areas of investigation are the functions of ellipsis and the interpretation of ellipsis. Before outlining the organization of the present study, I shall characterize the notions of nominal, verbal, and clausal ellipsis that are used in this study.

Like many linguistic terms, the term 'ellipsis' is by no means endowed with a clear meaning: What is regarded as ellipsis may differ depending on the theory and on the individual. To avoid confusion, it is therefore necessary to distinguish different strata of ellipsis. In the broadest sense, any non-verbalization of

a meaning expected to be conveyed in some way to other person(s) may be considered ellipsis (of a verbal expression). In the polar extreme, a total silence in an interactional situation or a silence interpolated in a discourse may be intended to be a "sign" of a certain meaning: For example, giving no response to a question may suggest a denial of an answer, that is, feelings such as anger or disinterest.² It is often the case that a silence is accompanied by extralinguistic signs, such as facial expressions and gestures³: In English speaking culture, giving only a shrug to a question may suggest that one is unable or unwilling to respond verbally for some reason; in Japanese culture, acquaintances sometimes greet with each other just by bowing. Facial expressions, such as frowning and smiling may transmit certain (culturally-bound) meanings without words.

It is usually the case that the term 'ellipsis' is used in relation to some utterance as the non-verbalization of a meaning that is expected to be indicated by the utterance. Here, we may distinguish three major levels of ellipsis: one that is recognized to be based primarily on a semantic/pragmatic consideration, one that is treated purely syntactically (or grammatically), and one that involves both semantic/pragmatic and syntactic considerations. The term 'ellipsis (or deletion)' is most commonly applied to the second and third levels of this classification.

Non-verbalization of a meaning that is indirectly indicated by a speech act substitution⁴ may be considered ellipsis that concerns primarily semantics/pragmatics. For example, one may ask someone to close the window by uttering a declarative sentence 'It's cold in here'. To construe this sentence as a request for a certain action is up to the addressee's judgment about the semantic and pragmatic appropriateness of the utterance (Grice 1975; Searle 1975). In other words, one's knowledge of the world instructs him/her whether

to assume that even though something is not verbalized, it must be implied by the utterance. Not only implicata⁵ through indirect speech acts, but many other unexpressed presuppositions and entailments associated with an utterance may be considered, in a broad sense, semantically/pragmatically oriented ellipsis.⁶

Ellipsis as syntactic process connotes the deletion of a constituent from the basic syntactic structure of a sentence. It is to be recognized independently from the context of the utterance, although the recognition may vary depending on what is theoretically regarded as the basic underlying structure of a sentence. A typical example of such treatment of ellipsis is seen in transformational grammar. For example, the sentence *John wa karee o tabe-ta-gat-te iru* 'John wants to eat curry' is assumed to be derived from the base structure "(John (John (John karee tabe)-ta)-gat)te iru" via the application of Equi-NP deletion transformation to the two subject NPs in the verbal complements (Inoue 1976:132).

In this view of ellipsis, whether or not a sentence is considered elliptical depends on the underlying form of the sentence that is assumed to exist independently of the context, the speaker, and the interpreter. And, the meaning of an elliptical sentence is completed by recovering the full form. That is to say, the meaning of the sentence is assumed to depend on the abstract underlying form. Thus, a sentence in a given context is elliptical if some constituent in the underlying structure is missing in the surface structure; and the "full" meaning of the sentence preexists whether or not the interpreter feels the need for supplying any meaning. Such a static view of ellipsis may be useful in explaining certain syntactically controlled phenomena,⁷ but, it ignores one's motivation for interpreting an (elliptical) sentence (or utterance) -- i.e., the desire to make sense in the situation involved; it falls into what Morgan

(1975:433) called "the view of sentences as things -- abstract formal objects."

Ellipsis that is recognized to be based on semantic/pragmatic as well as syntactic consideration is what I am concerned with in the present study. Its recognition is context-dependent and may vary depending on the interpreter. It is the non-verbalization of a meaning which is assumed by the interpreter to be semantically or pragmatically necessary in the context involved, and whose verbalization is assumed to be a possible syntactic constituent of the sentence. Treating ellipsis in this way is in congruent with what Morgan (ibid.: 436) described as "the view of sentences as purposeful events taking place in time." In other words, it involves utterances rather than abstract sentences.

For example, when one encounters an utterance *Kaita yo* 'wrote', one may assume, variously, that the Agent and the Object of the writing are not verbalized, but need to be filled in, or that the Agent, the Object, the Goal, the Instrument, the Time, and the Location are to be supplied even though they are not mentioned, etc. All these items (the participants and/or circumstances) could be expressed as syntactic constituents (e.g., subject NP, direct object NP) of the sentence whose verbal is *Kaita yo*. But, depending on context, different items may be assumed to be unexpressed: This assumption is based on the interpreter's judgment about the semantic/pragmatic necessity of the item in the context -- that is, the necessity of the item for the model of the discourse world he/she is currently constructing. The key point is that the recognition of the ellipsis is not absolute since it rests on one's judgment about the semantic/pragmatic necessity of the item in the context, rather than on the context-free syntactic necessity. Verbalization of the item as a syntactic constituent is only presumed to be *possible*; no syntactically *obligatory* slot is assumed to preexist. Given an utterance, one may recognize an "existence" of ellipsis (i.e., recognize the utterance as elliptical) and attempt to interpret it

not because there is a syntactic slot that must be filled in from a grammatical point of view, but because one feels that the item -- which could be syntactically realized -- is necessary from a semantic/pragmatic point of view. (See Section 1.2.1. for further discussion of this topic.)

It follows, then, from the above, that the term 'nominal ellipsis' may be used for the non-verbalization of an item which could be manifested as a noun phrase, and which is thought to be semantically/pragmatically necessary in understanding the utterance. For example, in the utterance *Kaita yo* 'wrote', the Agent could be realized as a noun phrase; and if the interpreter thinks that this is to be filled in for the semantic/pragmatic coherence of the utterance, then it is assumed that it is a case of nominal ellipsis for the Agent. Similarly, by the term 'verbal or clausal ellipsis' is meant the non-verbalization of an item which could be realized as a verbal or a clausal constituent of the sentence, and which is assumed to be needed for the semantic/pragmatic appropriateness. If one interprets an utterance *Taroo ga ano kabin o* 'Taroo, that vase' as 'Taroo broke that vase', there is assumed to be verbal ellipsis; the meaning 'broke' is thought to be needed and it could be expressed as a verbal. If an utterance *Hayaku shinai to* 'If (you) don't hurry' is interpreted as 'If you don't hurry, you'll be late for the meeting', there is assumed to be clausal ellipsis; the meaning 'you'll be late for the meeting' is assumed to be necessary and it could be expressed as a clause. Thus, the assumption about the "existence" of ellipsis is relative to the context and ultimately up to the interpreter's judgment. (The assumptions about ellipsis made in the presentation and discussion of examples in the present study are, in this connection, mainly based on the judgment of the present author.¹⁾)

It should be noted that expressions, such as 'interpretation of ellipsis' and 'referent of ellipsis' are used in this study for the sake of convenience. The

expression 'interpretation of ellipsis' is to be understood as 'interpretation of an elliptical utterance'; the expression 'referent of ellipsis' refers to the item that is assumed to be unexpressed, etc.

The following is an outline of the organization of the present study. There are two major parts: Part I concerns nominal ellipsis, and Part II verbal and clausal ellipsis.

The first section of Part I (1.1.) reviews previous studies on nominal ellipsis in Japanese. I discuss the interpretability of nominal ellipsis versus the recoverability of the syntactic full form, and proposes a reexamination of the interpretation of nominal ellipsis particularly from a semantic/pragmatic perspective. I also point out the need for an investigation of the pragmatic functions of nominal ellipsis.

In the second section of Part I (1.2.), I investigate the interpretation of nominal ellipsis based upon four general principles each of which are discussed in sub-sections (1.2.1.-1.2.4.). The four principles are: 1. Principle of Role Assignment for the "Referent," 2. Principle of Local Interpretation, 3. Principle of the Use of Syntactic Clues, 4. Principles of Pragmatic Interpretation. Most instances of nominal ellipsis to be analyzed in 1.2.1. - 1.2.4. have specific "referents." In Sub-sections 1.2.5. and 1.2.6., instances of nominal ellipsis whose "referents" are vague and/or general are examined in relation to the four general principles.

The third section of Part I (1.3.) discusses two major pragmatic functions of nominal ellipsis: (1) mitigation of speech acts (1.3.1.) and (2) avoidance of commitment to a particular reference (1.3.2.).

The first section of Part II (2.1.) reviews previous studies of verbal and clausal ellipsis in Japanese. The remainder of Part II is devoted to the investigation of the functions of verbal and clausal ellipsis. The second section (2.2.)

discusses one of the most important functions, namely, satisfaction of politeness. The sub-sections under 2.2. demonstrate different ways in which verbal and clausal ellipsis satisfy politeness: (1) mitigation of speech acts (2.2.2.), (2) intensification of speech acts (2.2.3.), and (3) avoidance of commitment to a particular honorific or non-honorific expression (2.2.4.).

Sections 2.3. through 2.6. of Part II deal with other functions of verbal and clausal ellipsis: the avoidance of responsibility, the indication of intimacy, power, or emotion, and attention getting.

The interpretation of verbal and clausal ellipsis is not treated as an independent section as in the case of nominal ellipsis; rather it is discussed whenever necessary throughout Part II. It should become evident through the discussion in Part II that the general principles postulated for the interpretation of nominal ellipsis (particularly the Principle of Pragmatic Interpretation and the Principle of the Use of Syntactic Clues) are applicable as well to the interpretation of verbal and clausal ellipsis.

Footnotes to Introduction

1. See Section 2.1.1. for further discussion on this point and references.
2. See Bruneau (1973) and Philips (1985) for discussion related to this topic.
3. See Wolfgang (1979) and Kendon (1985) for discussion related to this topic.
4. The term 'speech act substitution' is adopted from R. Lakoff (1980).
5. Following Grice (1975), the term 'implicatum' is used here in the sense of what is implied.
6. For further discussion, see Section 1.2.1. in which different kinds of missing link are described.
7. See Section 1.2.3. for examples.
8. Although I have checked my judgment about the "existence" and interpretation of ellipsis with a few other native speakers of Japanese, I am responsible for the final judgments with respect to the examples presented in this study. I assume that my judgments are natural or appropriate ones; but, as discussed earlier, I do not mean to suggest that they are absolute. Perhaps, for future research, it would be worthwhile to check them, in some objective way, with a substantial number of native speakers of Japanese, and compare their judgments with the ones presented in the present study.

I. Nominal Ellipsis in Japanese

1.1. Background

Part I investigates the use and interpretation of nominal ellipsis in Japanese discourse. This initial section consists of two parts: (1) discussion of previous studies on nominal ellipsis in Japanese, (2) presentation of the theoretical framework of my research.

Nominal ellipsis, as the term is used here, refers to the non-lexicalization of a participant: i.e., the non-use of any noun phrase reference for a participant in the situation described by the sentence. The term does not presuppose the existence of a particular underlying syntactic full form and its deletion. (See below for further discussion.)

1.1.1. Functions of Nominal Ellipsis in Japanese: Textual and Pragmatic Functions

Nominal ellipsis in Japanese has been widely studied in Japanese linguistics. While most of the earlier studies were concerned with the syntactic analysis of intra-sentential ellipsis, recent research mainly analyzes ellipsis in discourse from cognitive and textual perspectives. All previous studies have assumed (explicitly or implicitly) that the basic function of nominal ellipsis in Japanese is avoidance of redundancy: Kuno (1978), for example, states that the main purpose of ellipsis is to reduce the redundancy of referring to an item which is obviously recoverable/inferable without an explicit reference (ibid. 8). Following this assumption, it has also been maintained that the basic condition on the use of nominal ellipsis is the recoverability of the ellipted noun phrase or the inferability of the "referent."¹ Accordingly, a number of studies have

investigated structural and cognitive factors that may affect this basic condition. (See Sub-sections 1.1.2. and 1.1.3.)

In addition to the basic condition on the use of nominal ellipsis (i.e., recoverability/inferability), textual conditions, which are assumed to be superimposed on the basic condition, have been described in terms of various discourse-oriented notions, such as old-new information and theme. Several studies (Kuno 1980, 1983; Hinds 1978, 1983, 1984; Hinds and Hinds 1979; Clancy 1980; Makino 1980) have noted that the application of nominal ellipsis is blocked when the continuity of discourse is interrupted in some way, for example, when a topic/theme shift, a paragraph/episode boundary, a shift in viewpoint/empathy, contrastiveness or emphasis occurs. Along these lines, Hinds (1983, 1984) has claimed that ellipsis, as compared to explicit NP *ga* and NP *wa*, is the unmarked form of topic continuation. Examining the informational value of items in a sentence, Kuno (1978, 1980) has argued that it is inappropriate to apply ellipsis to newer information while using a lexical form for older information.

What these studies suggest is that the textual function of nominal ellipsis is not only avoidance of redundancy, but also de-emphasizing or de-focusing certain items, which, in turn, contribute indirectly to highlighting lexicalized items. When the grammar of a language accepts a use of nominal ellipsis as perfectly grammatical, as in Japanese, to employ an explicit reference can produce some kind of emphatic/highlighting effect. In other words, nominal ellipsis can be said to "indicate" the ground as opposed to the figure in the situation described by the sentence. Items that are considered to be the ground may be described as theme/topic, old information, etc., as noted by the studies cited above. Yet, these discourse-oriented notions are somewhat unclear, since they are usually used without a definition. To account for the textual function of nominal

ellipsis fully, these notions must be characterized clearly.

Nominal ellipsis has pragmatic functions in addition to textual ones, although this matter has not been discussed extensively in theoretical linguistics. Besides merely avoiding redundancy, nominal ellipsis, as was said above, can de-focus certain items. And, this, in turn, may produce various pragmatic (social and/or psychological) effects. That is, the speaker may employ nominal ellipsis so as to be intentionally less explicit in indicating certain information for some pragmatic reasons. As will be shown in Section 1.3., showing politeness, evading responsibility, and avoiding commitment to a particular reference (due to its social connotations), for example, are sound pragmatic reasons for the use of nominal ellipsis. Whether the speaker uses an explicit reference or ellipsis, the referent may be understood equally. Yet, the explicit reference and the implicit indication can be quite different in the pragmatic effects they create. Furthermore, even if ellipsis is assumed to be uninterpretable for the addressee (or for the bystander(s)), it may be used in case the speaker intends to hide the information in question.

1.1.2. The Basic Condition on the Use of Nominal Ellipsis: Recoverability vs. Interpretability

As was mentioned earlier, previous studies have assumed (explicitly or implicitly) that the basic condition on the use of nominal ellipsis is the recoverability of the ellipted noun phrase or the inferability of the "referent." In this sub-section (1.1.2.), I will demonstrate that the basic condition should be inferability/interpretability rather than recoverability. (As was just mentioned, there are cases in which ellipsis is used even when this condition is not met: The speaker may exploit ellipsis in order to conceal certain information. See Section 1.3.)

It was also said earlier that a number of studies have investigated structural and cognitive factors that may affect the recoverability of the ellipted noun phrase or the interpretability of nominal ellipsis. With few exceptions,² these studies have analyzed the use of ellipsis from the encoder's point of view, rather than the interpretation of ellipsis, that is, ellipsis from the point of view of the decoder. In this and the following sub-sections (1.1.2. and 1.1.3.), I will demonstrate that despite the array of previous studies, the basic condition on the use of nominal ellipsis -- i.e., the interpretability of nominal ellipsis -- is not yet fully understood. I will argue further that more adequate understanding requires that nominal ellipsis be approached from the point of view of its interpretation. Below, I will review the major works in this area starting with the syntactic approach to nominal ellipsis.

A syntactic approach to ellipsis has been employed by Kuroda (1965) and Ohso (1976, 79). Within the framework of transformational grammar, these studies treat ellipsis as a parallel to pronominalization in English.³ Ellipsis, or a zero pronoun to use their term, is regarded as a derivative of a transformational rule of zero pronominalization which replaces the underlying full noun phrase with a zero pronoun under condition of identity with the antecedent noun phrase.⁴ The motivation advanced for applying zero pronominalization is to avoid the use of a repeated noun phrase since the latter, even if deleted, is thought to be recoverable from the antecedent noun phrase.

It has been argued extensively with regard to pronouns in English,⁵ that pronouns can not be considered derivatives of pronominalization transformation. The existence of the syntactic underlying full form for a pronoun has been questioned particularly on the basis of the invalidity of the condition of identity of the underlying full form and the antecedent noun phrase. Correspondingly, to view ellipsis, or a zero pronoun, as a derivative of deletion

transformation seems inappropriate. Kuroda (ibid.:104-115) distinguished ellipsis that is derived transformationally from ellipsis that is chosen independently, such that the latter was said to be applicable only when the identity of the participant corresponding to ellipsis is clear from the extralinguistic or discourse context. Kuroda did not examine circumstances under which the participant's identity is assumed to be clear, since this type of ellipsis was not his concern. At any rate, it remains unclear why ellipsis was considered to have two different sources as Kuroda claimed. I will illustrate this point further through the following examples.

- (1) Sakki kara nando mo yonde ita noni, kikoenakatta no.
(I) have been calling (you) many times. Didn't (you) hear (that)?
- (2) Ashita chotto yoo ga atte, paatii ni ikenai n da kedo, zannen da wa.
(I) have something to do tomorrow, so (I) can't come to the party, and (I) regret (that).
- (3) (A and B have been waiting for Mr. Yamada. A asks B:)
A: Mada konai n desu ka.
A: Hasn't (he) come yet?
- (4) Koocha ni miruku to sukoshi shinamon o ireru to oishii yo.
If (you) put milk and a little cinnamon in black tea, (it) tastes good.
- (5) Suupaa wa benri da. Kago hitotsu motte itara nan demo kaeru.
Supermarkets are convenient. If (you) have one basket, (you) can buy anything.

All instances of ellipsis in these examples can not be regarded as derivatives of zero pronominalization; they all lack an antecedent noun phrase (or NP node) so that the underlying forms, whatever they may be, can not be deleted under condition of identity with the antecedent.

- (6) Taroo wa Jiroo kara karita hon o nakushita.

Taroo lost the book (he) borrowed from Jiroo.

- (7) Atarashii kuruma o katta John wa mainichi no yoo ni migaite iru.
(Ohso 1979 : 418)

John, who bought a new car, is polishing (it) almost every day.

The instances of ellipsis in (6) and (7), on the other hand, may be considered to be derived transformationally if *Taroo* in (6) and *atarashii kuruma* 'new car' in (7) are assumed to be the antecedent and the underlying full form for each ellipsis. Yet, there is no reason why the instances of ellipsis in (6) and (7) should not be treated in the same way as those in (1)-(5). Based on the speaker's assumption that the "referent" is clear from the context, it may justly be said that the ellipsis in (6) and (7) is chosen independently in exactly the same way as in (1)-(5). Furthermore, although the underlying full forms for the ellipsis in (6) and (7) may be assumed to be *Taroo* and *atarashii kuruma*, respectively, there is no evidence in support of this assumption. Nothing guarantees that the underlying full form, if any, for the ellipsis in (6) is *Taroo* rather than *kare* or some other noun phrase, and that the underlying full form for the ellipsis in (7) is *atarashii kuruma* rather than *sono kuruma* 'that car' or *John ga katta kuruma* 'the car John bought' or some other noun phrase. Pursuing this line of argument to its conclusion, if any noun phrases other than *Taroo* and *atarashii kuruma* were the underlying full forms, the condition of identity, and hence zero pronominalization, could not be applied.

Examining the use of ellipsis in the framework of Functional Sentence Perspective, Kuno (1978) assigned the criterion of "recoverability from the preceding discourse" as the basic condition for the use of ellipsis. Ellipsis, he states, can be used when the speaker assumes that the addressee is able to recover its full form from the preceding context (ibid.:8-12). Although Kuno does not stipulate any syntactic condition of identity of the antecedent noun phrase and the underlying full form, his use of the notion of recoverability presupposes that

ellipsis is a process of deletion of the underlying full form, as in the analysis of zero pronominalization transformation.

The case may be made that the existence of the syntactic underlying full form for ellipsis is questionable. As the above discussion regarding the underlying full form for the ellipsis in (6) and (7) indicates, there is an ever-present problem of indeterminacy of the underlying full form. As a further illustration of this point, take the instances of ellipsis in (1) and (2) that are used for the speaker and the addressee; Is the underlying full form of the ellipsis for the speaker *watashi* 'I', *boku* 'I-male-informal', *ore* 'I-male-vulgar', or some other noun phrase like a kinship term? Is the underlying full form of the ellipsis for the addressee *anata* 'you', *kimi* 'you-informal', *omae* 'you-vulgar', or some other noun phrase like the addressee's name or title? These questions can not be answered decisively. A similar indeterminacy also applies to all other instances of ellipsis in (1)-(5). (See also Matsumoto 1981a for discussion on the indeterminacy of deleted elements for ellipsis.)

Aside from the matter of indeterminacy of the underlying full form, it seems even more problematic to assign any underlying full form for ellipsis from semantic and pragmatic points of view. As mentioned above, a use of an explicit reference instead of ellipsis can create an emphatic effect of some sort. Ellipsis, on the other hand, may be used to de-focus the "referent," which, in turn, may produce various pragmatic effects: For example, it can mitigate the force of the speech act, which enables the speaker to show his/her politeness or to avoid the responsibility for his/her utterance. (See 1.3.) Furthermore, whether, for example, the underlying full form of the ellipsis for the addressee in (1) and (2) may be assumed to be *anata*, *kimi*, or *omae*, or some other noun phrase, it should be remembered that each of these noun phrases carries differing social connotations. In effect, by choosing a particular expression, the

speaker commits him/herself to a certain connotation and, thereby, to a certain interpersonal relationship with the addressee. Ellipsis may be employed in order to avoid such commitment. Thus, a sentence with an explicit reference to a particular item and that without it may not be semantically and pragmatically equivalent. It seems often to be the case that the use of an explicit reference restricts or specifies a semantic and pragmatic value which in fact may not take place in the case of ellipsis.

The preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that ellipsis can not be understood solely on the basis of deletion of the underlying full form; rather that it is chosen independently as a non-application of any reference for a particular participant (or semantic item) in the situation being described by the sentence. This participant is usually identified in the world evoked linguistically or extralinguistically, namely, the context. For example, ellipsis is used in (1), not for some (underlying) noun phrase, but for (the concept of) the speaker and (that of) the addressee. Ellipsis is also used for (the concept of) a particular act of speaking (or calling) which has been evoked by the preceding clause. In (2), ellipsis is used for the speaker and (the concept of) a particular fact that has been talked about in the preceding discourse. In (3), (the concept of) a certain third person who is in the extralinguistic world is subject to ellipsis. In (4) and (5), (the concept of) a person in general is not given an explicit reference. In (4), ellipsis is also applied for (the concept of) a certain object (i.e., black tea with milk and cinnamon) that has been evoked linguistically. Just like these instances of ellipsis in (1)-(5), those in (6) and (7) can likewise be assumed to have been applied not to the noun phrases *Taroo* and *atarashii kuruma*, but to (the concept of) a particular person and an object that have been evoked linguistically by the preceding discourse.

It follows from the previous discussion that the cognitively-based use of

ellipsis depends upon the speaker's assumption concerning its interpretability (or, more accurately, the interpretability of the elliptical sentence) for the addressee, rather than his/her assumptions about the recoverability of the full form. In fact, the question of recoverability does not arise since nothing is assumed to have been deleted, and hence, nothing is to be recovered. From the addressee's point of view, then, his/her task, on encountering ellipsis (or an elliptical sentence), is to interpret it appropriately rather than to recover its full form. (See 1.2.1. for further discussion on the nature of ellipsis.)

1.1.3. Factors Affecting the Interpretability of Nominal Ellipsis

A number of later studies have analyzed the use of nominal ellipsis in the context of discourse rather than at the level of sentence, and have provided (discourse-)structural and cognitive factors as conditions on the use of ellipsis. These factors can, in fact, be regarded as factors that may affect the interpretability of nominal ellipsis. Yet, none of them seem to account sufficiently for the interpretability of nominal ellipsis.

In a quantitative analysis of the use of ellipsis (and full noun phrases) in discourse, Clancy (1980) examined two cognitive constraints: (1) the amount of time that has passed since the last mention of a referent and (2) the number of intervening referents between two mentions of the same referent. Her analysis shows (1) that most instances of ellipsis occur after two or fewer clauses, or when no more than one other referent has been mentioned and, (2) that the use of ellipsis decreases as the number of intervening elements increases. While this result describes appropriately the general tendency of the use of ellipsis, yet the number of the intervening elements does not by itself determine directly the interpretability of ellipsis and hence its use. As will be seen in Sections 1.2.4. - 1.2.6., the semantic and pragmatic properties associated with

intervening "referents," as well as other potential "referents," must also be taken into consideration in examining the interpretability of ellipsis.

Yano (1977, 81) stipulates a condition on (zero) pronominalization as follows: Unless the concept is a discourse topic, its (zero) pronominalization is blocked when an intervening concept has the same or similar semantic properties as the concept in question, and has equal or higher prominence than the concept in question. Yano outlines the following sequence of the hierarchical order of prominence: discourse topic (topic > sub-topic > sub-sub-topic > ----) > theme (i.e., sentence topic) > subject > object > others. Granted the relative prominence and the semantic properties of intervening concepts referred to in the above condition are important factors in so far as they may affect the interpretability of ellipsis, they do not provide necessary and sufficient conditions. As will become evident later (Sections 1.2.4.-1.2.6.), there are many instances of ellipsis which violate this condition.⁶ It should also be noted that the notion of topic as it is employed in the condition outlined above is unclear. Yano, like many other linguists, defines 'topic' in terms of 'aboutness'. But, 'aboutness' is determined more or less on the basis of our intuitive judgment. We do not know how abstract or how absolute such topics may be. Hence, the notion of topic must first achieve some objective status.⁷ Yano's position that hierarchy of prominence coincides with hierarchy of discourse⁸ and sentence organization is also highly questionable: Intuitively speaking, at a given point in the discourse, a lower level concept (e.g., sub-topic) may be more prominent than a higher level concept (e.g., discourse topic). If Yano's condition on (zero) pronominalization is to be useful, these points must be clarified.

Previously (Okamoto 1981), I analyzed the use of ellipsis in Japanese by employing the cognitive notion of givenness characterized by Chafe (1974, 76). Following Chafe, I assumed that ellipsis may be used for given items (or in

Chafe's term, given information), that is, items that are assumed to be in the addressee's consciousness - except in cases of potential ambiguity. Potential ambiguity is considered present when there are two or more given items at the time of the utterance. However, it is usually the case that two or more given items are present at the time of the utterance⁹ and that even under such circumstances, ellipsis may be appropriately used without ambiguity. (See the examples in 1.2.4.-1.2.6.) Further, there are cases in which ellipsis may be applied to non-given items (e.g., general items which are often a non-given item). (See the examples in Sections 1.2.5. and 1.2.6.) Thus, although the notion of givenness is useful in so far as it serves to reduce the number of potential "referents," the existence of two or more given items can not by itself be used to determine the potential ambiguity or interpretability of ellipsis.

In sum, none of the studies reviewed above provide sufficient explanations of the interpretability of ellipsis. In order to understand this problem more adequately, it is, therefore, of interest to investigate further the question of how ellipsis is interpreted. As will be shown, such an investigation can not be carried out without taking into consideration the addressee's pragmatic knowledge, the crucial factor for the interpretability of nominal ellipsis.

1.1.4. Rules of Interpretation of Nominal Ellipsis

Hinds (1976-77, 1980 a,b, 1982) has published a number of important studies on the interpretation of nominal ellipsis in Japanese. He advanced two basic ordered rules for the interpretation of ellipsis: (1) the referent of an ellipted item is assumed to be a paragraph topic or sub-topic which is compatible with the markers of the propositional verbal associated with the ellipted item, and (2) the ellipted subject (NP ga) of a declarative sentence is the speaker, whereas the ellipted subject of an interrogative sentence is the

addressee. Rule (2) is said to be applied when Rule (1) does not produce an acceptable "referent." Hinds (1980 a,b, 1982) points out that there are cases in which Rules (1) and (2) may be violated, arguing that in order to interpret these exceptional instances of ellipsis, both the accretion of information throughout a discourse and the knowledge of scripts are necessary.

Rule (1) is based on the notion of topic. However, since Hinds does not define this notion explicitly, it is unclear how topics are identified. This makes Rule (1) difficult to apply, since, as discussed earlier, for the notion of topic to be useful, it must be given some objective characterization. Aside from this problem, basic rules (1) and (2), as Hinds himself points out, are subject to many "exceptional" cases. If, for example, a paragraph topic and sub-topic, whatever they may be, include more than one item compatible with the verbal, Rule (1) can not single out the correct "referent." According to Hinds' view, in Example (1) below, Taroo, his new house, and the fact that he bought a new house, supposing these are topics, can all be candidates for the Object of *siru* 'know' in B's utterance.

(1) A: Nee Taroo ga kono aida atarashii uchi o katta no yo.

A: Hey, Taroo bought a new house the other day.

B: Um, shitte ru yo.

B: Yah, (I) know (that).

Rule (1) can, in addition, produce an unacceptable "referent." In (1)-B, for example, to obtain the correct Experiencer for the verb *siru* (i.e., B, the speaker), Rule (2) must be applied. However, Rule (2) can not be applied, for the reason that Rule (1), by precedence, assigns Taroo --if he is the topic-- for the Experiencer since he is compatible with the verb.

Rule (2), as well, has many "exceptional" cases. The ellipted subject of a declarative sentence may be the addressee (e.g., (2) below) or some other

exophoric item (e.g., (3)) rather than the speaker. The ellipted subject of an interrogative sentence may be the speaker (e.g., (4)) or the speaker and the addressee (e.g., (5)) or some other exophoric item (e.g., (6)) rather than the addressee. As Examples (4) and (5) below indicate, ellipted subjects may have to do with types of speech act, such as request for permission and invitation. (See 1.2.3.5. for further discussion.)

- (2) (The speaker tells the addressee who has left behind his umbrella:)

A, kasa wasurete ru yo.

Oh, (you) forgot (your) umbrella.

- (3) (The speaker, looking at a painting, says:)

Maa, suteki.

Oh, (it's) nice.

- (4) Moo kaette mo ii desu ka.

May (I) leave now?

- (5) Suwaroo ka.

Shall (we) sit down?

- (6) (The speaker, looking at what the addressee is eating, says:)

Oishii.

Is (it) good?

There are further limitations: Rule (2) concerns only ellipsis in the subject position and not in other grammatical positions (of a main clause). Neither does it concern ellipsis in a dependent clause (e.g., (7) (8)).

- (7) Kinoo katta seetaa dare ka ni ageru no.

Are (you) going to give the sweater (you) bought yesterday to someone?

- (8) Kono aida mita eega omoshirokatta ne.

The film (we) saw the other day was interesting, wasn't it?

As I will show in detail later (Section 1.2.6.), ellipsis may also be used for general items (e.g., (4) and (5) in Section 1.1.2.). Neither Rule (1) or (2) covers these cases.

We have seen that Rules (1) and (2) offered by Hinds may or may not produce an acceptable "referent." The crucial question is, *how do we know whether the "referents" produced by these rules are acceptable or not?* Rules (1) and (2) themselves do not provide the answer. This question must be answered on some other grounds. Thus, it seems inappropriate to regard Rules (1) and (2) as the basic rules for the interpretation of ellipsis, for we do not know the circumstances under which these rules are applicable.

Although certain elements, such as topics, the speaker, and the addressee, may usually be considered potential "referents" for ellipsis, the ultimate determination of the "referent" must depend, not on structural rules like (1) and (2), but on the addressee's judgment about the semantic and pragmatic appropriateness of the item. The judgment of such appropriateness, then, must be based on the addressee's semantic and pragmatic knowledge. The addressee's knowledge of the world plays a crucial role in the interpretation of ellipsis in all cases, and not only in "exceptional" cases, as Hinds has suggested. This, however, is by no means to deny importance of discourse structural and syntactic factors for the interpretation of ellipsis. As we have seen, discourse structural factors, such as topic, contributes to the interpretation in so far as it reduces the number of potential "referents." (See Section 1.2.2. for related discussion.) Syntactic factors such as honorific words can also be helpful clues. (See Section 1.2.3.) The major point to be made, however, is that, although discourse structural and syntactic factors may be useful clues, interpretations must always be checked against the addressee's expectations about their semantic and pragmatic appropriateness or normality.

1.1.5. The Framework of the Present Study (Part I)

In this review of previous studies on nominal ellipsis in Japanese, I have argued the following points: (1) The (cognitively-based) use of ellipsis must rely on the speaker's assumption of its interpretability for the addressee rather than on his assumption about the recoverability of the lexical full form. (2) To understand the (cognitively-based) use of ellipsis more adequately, a further investigation of ellipsis from the point of view of interpretation is necessary. (3) The addressee's expectation about the semantic and pragmatic appropriateness or normalness plays the crucial role in the interpretation of ellipsis. (4) Nominal ellipsis is used not only to avoid redundancy in communication but also to attain various social, psychological and textual effects.

The remainder of Part I is devoted to the problems raised in this section. Section 1.2. concerns the interpretation of nominal ellipsis, and Section 1.3. the pragmatic use of nominal ellipsis. Through an analysis of examples, I will reexamine in Section 1.2. the question of how ellipsis is interpreted in order that the interpretability of ellipsis, -- i.e., the basic condition on the use of ellipsis -- can be accounted for adequately. Below I present four principles as the general principles for the interpretation of nominal ellipsis:

1. Principle of Role Assignment for the Referent : Assign the semantic role of the unexpressed item by making reference to the frame of the situation described by the sentence as well as examining the relevancy/importance of the item to the situation.
2. Principle of Local Interpretation : Regard items in the immediate context as the potential "referents."
3. Principle of the Use of Syntactic Clues : Use the syntactic clues when available and when necessary.
4. Principle of Pragmatic Interpretation : On the basis of the knowledge of the world, choose from the potential "referents" an item which is pragmatically most appropriate/normal as the "referent."

Section 1.2.1. examines the first principle. It discusses the nature of nominal ellipsis or the question of why the addressee recognizes the "existence" of ellipsis and attempts to interpret it. Section 1.2.2. concerns Principle 2. It discusses the nature of the immediate context and its relation to the potential referents for nominal ellipsis. Section 1.2.3. concerns Principle 3. It describes various syntactic features which may serve as clues for the interpretation of nominal ellipsis. Section 1.2.4. concerns Principle 4. It investigates in detail the nature of pragmatic knowledge the addressee makes use of, the way such knowledge is integrated in the interpretation, and the way Principle 4 operates in concert with the other three principles. Section 1.2.4. analyzes mainly instances of nominal ellipsis whose "referents" are specific and clear. The "referent" of nominal ellipsis may also be vague or general. Instances of such nominal ellipsis are examined in Sections 1.2.5. and 1.2.6. Note in addition that in certain cases Principle of Local Interpretation may be overridden by Principle of Pragmatic Interpretation. Sections 1.2.5. and 1.2.6. discusses such cases. Finally, Section 1.3. discusses pragmatic functions of nominal ellipsis. It will analyze two functions: (1) mitigation of speech acts (Section 1.3.1.) and (2) avoidance of commitment to a particular reference (Section 1.3.2.).

1.2. Interpretation of Nominal Ellipsis

1.2.1. Principle of Role Assignment for the "Referent"

Section 1.2. investigates the interpretation of nominal ellipsis in Japanese. Sub-section 1.2.1. is concerned with the first of four general principles concerning the interpretation of nominal ellipsis. Principle One, the Principle of Role Assignment for the "Referent," states as follows: Assign the semantic role of the unexpressed item by making reference to the frame of the situation

described by the sentence (or the case frame of the verbal) as well as examining the relevance/importance of the item to the situation. Principle One refers to the most fundamental question having to do with the nature of nominal ellipsis: Why does the addressee, on encountering an elliptical sentence, attempt to search for a certain item, thinking that something which has not been uttered needs to be filled in?

Hinds (1980 a,b, 1982) approaches this question based on the notion of the obligatory case frame of a verbal. He views nominal ellipsis in Japanese as a surface grammatical phenomenon -- as "the omission of an element or elements from the surface form of an utterance" (1982:3). Ellipsis, he states, "operates on the assumption that native speakers of Japanese have a feeling for surface frame patterns" (ibid.:22). In this view, native speakers of Japanese have knowledge about the obligatory surface case frame for each verbal, such that when they encounter an elliptical sentence, "the obligatory case frame of the verbal provides a signal to the addressee to search memory for appropriate arguments" (ibid. 31). For example, "a verbal, such as *yomu* 'read', being transitive, requires that NP *ga* and NP *o* be specified," with the conditions that "NP *ga* must be a sentient being" and that "NP *o* must be decodable material" (ibid.28). Accordingly, when the person hears an utterance like *yonda yo* 'read', his/her first task is to associate the verbal with its obligatory case frame, which, in turn, signals him/her to search his/her memory for the items appropriate for NP *ga* and NP *o*.

Hinds argues further that the obligatory case frame for a verbal "may differ depending on the context in which it is used:" (ibid. 38) That is, depending on the context, normally obligatory noun phrases may be suppressed, and "normally optional noun phrases may become obligatory" (ibid. 42). Normally obligatory noun phrases are assumed by Hinds to be those in "neutral contexts"

(ibid. 43). For example, the verbal *kuru* 'come' requires that NP *ga* (for a movable object), NP *kara* (for a distant location) and NP *ni/e/made* (for a proximate location) be specified. Hinds says that "depending on context, either one or the other of the location noun phrases may be suppressed by default" (ibid. 39) or that normally optional noun phrases, such as the one for the instrument, may become obligatory.

What remains unclear in this argument is the underlying notion of the obligatory case frame of a verbal. Each verbal is assumed to require certain noun phrase arguments in neutral contexts. It never becomes clear what constitutes a "neutral context" or why certain noun phrases are considered to be obligatory in such a context. Moreover, the obligatory case frame of a verbal is said to differ according to context, and this suggests that the obligatoriness of noun phrase arguments is determined in relation to the context of the utterance, and that it is not something that pertains inherently to each verbal.

It appears that two kinds of obligatoriness are involved in Hinds' argument: one which exists independently (or in "neutral context") as the inherent syntactic feature of a verbal, and another which is relative to the context of the utterance. Of the two, Hinds seems to assume that the former is most important in recognizing ellipsis. In any event, either kind of obligatoriness according to Hinds is obligatoriness which noun phrase arguments possess in the surface structure of the sentence. My contention is that such syntactic obligatoriness is not of primary importance in Japanese. Of far greater significance is the semantic and/or pragmatic obligatoriness which is dependent on the context of the utterance. That is, given the context of an utterance, certain arguments become obligatory because the addressee thinks they are necessary in order to establish the particular situation described by the sentence as semantically and pragmatically complete/coherent, not because the verbal requires that

their noun phrase references be specified. What motivates the addressee to recognize and search for the unexpressed arguments is his/her desire to make sense of an utterance. Granted, in English, a sentence usually¹⁰ requires the presence of the subject noun phrase, and sentences with certain transitive verbs also require the presence of the direct object noun phrase. Japanese sentences, however, do not have such grammatical constraints: They can be perfectly grammatical without subject and object noun phrases. Thus, it can not be said that the verbal in a given sentence requires surface specification of certain noun phrases. It follows, then, that it is inappropriate to assume that such a syntactic requirement triggers the addressee's search for the unexpressed item.

As a syntactico-semantic property, each verbal does indeed have a certain case frame: Associated with each verbal, there exists a set of arguments which the verbal may *potentially* take. Some of these arguments are nuclei, others are peripheral. (For discussion of this subject, see Fillmore 1968, Chafe 1970, Halliday 1967-68, Anderson 1970.) And, while it is also true that native speakers of Japanese have knowledge of the case frames of verbals, it does not follow that the verbal in a given sentence requires the specification of certain noun phrases, (i.e., that the addressee searches for the missing arguments because of the requirement for the surface frame structure). The case frames of verbals and the obligatory (syntactic) case frames of verbals are not synonymous.

Whether an argument in the case frame of the verbal in a given sentence is considered to be obligatory or not depends on the addressee's feeling about the need for it in establishing the particular situation described by the sentence rather than on his/her need for "completing" the surface sentence structure. The addressee searches for an unexpressed argument only when he/she feels that this is necessary in order for the situation described by the sentence to

make sense to him/her. This intuiting by the addressee comes from the examination both of his/her knowledge about the situation in the normal world; or the frame of the situation in question (or the case frame of the verbal) and the relevance of the argument to a particular situation.

For example, when the addressee encounters the utterance *kaita yo* 'wrote/have written', he/she assumes that the speaker is talking about one particular instance of writing which occurred in the past. His/her knowledge about a normal situation of writing (or the frame for a writing situation) may inform him/her that a writing situation includes the writer (or the agent), the object, the goal, the instrument, the location, the time, the reason/purpose and the manner. (Cf. These items correspond to the (maximum) case frame of the verb *kaku*.) Some of these items, such as the writer and object, are generally considered more important than others. (Cf. Items like the writer and object correspond to the nucleus of the case frame, and the other items to the periphery.) When the speaker describes a particular writing situation, it is usually the case that not every item in the frame of this writing situation is included in his/her concern; some items may be irrelevant, and, therefore, be suppressed or backgrounded. Although the items in the frame that are generally regarded as less important tend to be suppressed, the ultimate judgment depends on the context. The generally less important items, therefore, may just as easily not be suppressed in a particular situation.

Thus, when the addressee hears the utterance *kaita yo*, he/she assumes it to be an elliptical sentence making reference to his/her knowledge about the frame of the writing situation; he/she, then, attempts to fill in those items which he/she considers to be currently relevant. Judgments concerning the relevancy/importance of the item(s) depend both on the context of the utterance and on the addressee's interest in the item(s) at the time of the utter-

ance.

(1) A: Sakubun kaita?

A: Have (you) written the composition?

B: Un, kaita yo.

B: Yes, (I) have written (it).

(2) A: O-kaa-san ni tegami kaita?

A: Have (you) written a letter to (your mother)?

B: Un, kaita yo.

B: Yes, (I) have written (it to her).

(3) A: Ano tegami pen de kaita?

A: Did (you) write that letter with a pen?

B: Un, kaita yo.

B: Yes, (I) wrote (it with a pen).

Compare B's utterances in Examples (1)-(3) above. They all contain the same sentence *kaita yo*. But, the kind of items (or arguments) which the addressee assumes to be unexpressed and, hence, attempts to fill in are not identical. The unexpressed items are: the Agent and the Object in (1)B, the Agent, the Object and the Goal in (2)B and the Agent, the Object and the Instrument in (3)B. (These assignments are not absolute. See below for further discussion.) They differ since the context of the utterance renders different items relevant hence necessary, particularly, in the case of Examples (1)-(3), because of the world evoked by the preceding sentence. All this connotes that the recognition of the "existence" of nominal ellipsis is not controlled syntactically by the verbal itself. Rather, it is dependent on the addressee's judgment about the need for each item in any given situation, a judgment which is relative to the context of the utterance.

In the previous section I have argued that nominal ellipsis is not a deletion of the underlying full noun phrase (as this notion is used both in transformational grammar and in other theories).¹¹ Rather, it is a non-lexicalization of a participant in the situation described by the sentence. In a broader sense, the non-lexicalization of any item in the frame of a given situation (or in the semantic case frame of the verbal) is an instance of ellipsis. For example, in (1)A above, except for the Object, which is mentioned explicitly, every item in the frame of a writing situation is not lexicalized. In this sense, they are all instances of ellipsis. However, we do not feel that in (1)A, for example, the items, such as the Instrument and the Reason are unexpressed and need to be filled in. Rather, our feeling is that ellipsis has been applied only to the Agent. (This feeling is not absolute. See below.) In a narrower sense, then, nominal ellipsis is a non-lexicalization of the participant which is assumed by the addressee to be relevant to, and hence necessary for, the particular situation described by the sentence.

It should be pointed out that the distinction between necessary and unnecessary items is neither absolute nor discrete. Ultimately, it is up to the interpreter to determine whether an item is necessary or not. For example, in (1)A some may feel that the Agent is a necessary but unexpressed item; others may feel that another necessary item -- Time -- is not expressed, either. The degree of necessity may differ also depending on the item. For example, among the unexpressed items in (1)A, the Agent is probably assumed to be the most relevant/important one, and hence, most necessary item. Time may also be considered necessary, but probably less so than the Agent. Other items (e.g., Instrument and Location) are probably less relevant and hence, less necessary.

(4) Jitensha nusumarechatta.

(Lit.) (I) got (my) bicycle stolen.

Again, the Experiencer of the event in Example (4) is probably the most necessary item. The Agent and the Time are comparatively secondary; yet other items, such as the Reason are certainly the least necessary.

Thus, the recognition of the "existence" of ellipsis, or the motivation for filling in a certain item, arises from the addressee's judgment about the need for the item in a particular situation. The addressee thinks that the item is not expressed, but that it should be supplied because it is necessary in order to make the situation being described meaningful. In the following, I will explicate this point further, based on the notion of a model of the discourse world.

Based upon discussions by Fillmore (1982), Webber (1979, 1981) and others, I assume here that comprehension of discourse involves a construction -- or an envisionment -- of a model of the discourse world.¹² The discourse world is the world which the speaker is assumed to intend to convey to the addressee through his/her utterance. It consists both of individuals (e.g., persons and objects) and of various states of affairs (involving the individuals). To construct a proper model of the discourse world, (i.e., a world which pragmatically makes sense), the addressee often needs to fill in various items or missing links.

Many different kinds of missing links need to be filled by the addressee, such as, (1) individuals, (2) states of affairs which must be satisfied for the situation being described to be valid, (3) states of affairs which are assumed to follow from the situation being described, and (4) relations between the situation described by the sentences in the same discourse.¹³

(5) 1. Komban, Yamada-kun no paatii ni ikenai n da.

1. (I) can't go to Yamada's party tonight.

2. Ashita, shiken ga aru n da yo.

2. (I) have an exam tomorrow.

An instance of the first type of missing link is shown in Example (5)1 which includes the use of ellipsis for the person who can not go to Yamada's party, that is, the speaker. The "referent" for nominal ellipsis generally belongs to this type. S(5)1 also provides an example of the second type: Although the fact that Yamada is giving a party and that the speaker is invited is not mentioned explicitly, this state of affairs must, nevertheless, be satisfied for the situation described by Sentence (5)1 to be valid. An instance of the third type is seen in S(5)2. Although not mentioned explicitly, it is implied that the speaker is going to study for the exam during the evening in question and for this reason will not have time for other activities. The causal relationship between the two situations described by S(5)1 and S(5)2 illustrates the fourth of the typology described above.

This typology of missing links is by no means exhaustive. I have presented four examples only to show that the addressee needs to fill in various kind of missing links in order to construct an appropriate model of the discourse world. Thus, the "referent" for nominal ellipsis is only one type of missing link which needs to be supplied so that a model of the discourse world can be properly constructed.

The Principle of Role Assignment for the "Referent" follows directly from the above discussion: On encountering an elliptical sentence, the addressee must above all recognize that certain items are left unmentioned and need to be inferred so that his/her model of the discourse world can be created appropriately. That is to say, he/she must determine the semantic role of the items which are to be inferred. This recognition, as noted above, is made with reference to the frame of the relevant situation and with consideration of the relevancy/importance of the items pertaining to this situation.

1.2.2. Principle of Local Interpretation

The present section discusses Principle Two of the general principles employed to interpret nominal ellipsis in Japanese, the Principle of Local Interpretation. It stipulates the following: Regard items in the immediate context as potential "referents" for nominal ellipsis. (See Fillmore (1982) and Brown and Yule (1983) for discussion related to this Principle).¹⁴ In the following, I will discuss briefly the concept of the immediate context and its relationship to the interpretation of nominal ellipsis in Japanese.

Needless to say, the context of an utterance is of crucial importance for the interpretation of references, for example, definite noun phrases, pronouns, and ellipsis. Usually, one expects to find the referent in the context of an utterance (Karttunen 1969; Isard 1975; Halliday and Hasan 1976; Grosz 1977; Webber 1979; Lockman and Klappolz 1980). The (global) context is the domain/world in the addressee's memory which is perceived as relevant to the current utterance.¹⁵ This domain appears to be organized like a concentric circle with the immediate context as its center. The immediate context is the domain which is marked as the most relevant to the current utterance -- or that part which usually receives the most attention in the addressee's consciousness (Chafe 1974, 76).¹⁶ The Principle of Local Interpretation assumes that the "referent" for nominal ellipsis is found in the world of the immediate context. This assumption is made not only because the items in the immediate context are most readily accessible to the addressee, but also because it is natural to expect that the speaker talks about items in what is for him/her the most relevant world. Consequently, the Principle of Local Interpretation reduces the extensiveness of the search for the "referent" by excluding the less relevant parts in the global context, or entire memory. Essentially, this principle narrows down the number of potential "referents."

The immediate context of an utterance, that is, the currently most relevant domain, comprises the world as it is evoked by the immediate extralinguistic environment of the discourse event and/or the world as it is evoked by the immediately preceding discourse. The former includes elements of the discourse event, such as the speaker, the addressee, the discourse itself, and the time and place of the discourse event. (See Hymes 1964; Halliday and Hasan 1976; Lyons 1977; Brown and Yule 1983.) It may also include other items that are present in the environment. In some cases, however, items that are not present in the environment are considered to be in the (semi-)immediate context. As the "referent" for the ellipsis in Example (1) indicates, these items are usually something with which the addressee supposedly is currently concerned.

- (1) <Situation> A student has taken an important exam at school. When he comes home, his mother asks him:

Doo datta.

How was (it)?

As well, the world evoked by the immediately preceding discourse constitutes the immediate context (Webber 1979; Brown and Yule 1983). This world has a certain consistency with respect to (major) individuals, time, place, etc. As the discourse proceeds and some of the elements change, there is created a shift of the world.

- (2) 1. Kinoo wa boku no tanjoo-bi datta. 2. Chichi ga ude-dokee o kureta. 3. Mae kara hoshii to omotte ita node totemo ureshikatta. 4. Haha wa seetaa o kureta. 5. Italia-see de naka naka sharete iru.

1. Yesterday was my birthday. 2. Father gave (me) a wrist watch. 3. (I) wanted (one) from before, so (I) was very happy. 4. Mother gave me a sweater. 5. (It)'s made in Italy, and is quite chic.

For example, in Example (2) there is a shift of world in Sentence 4 which is caused by a change of individuals. The immediate context for S5 is the world

evoked by S4. The world preceding S4 is less relevant. (When the speaker abruptly changes the discourse world, he/she usually indicates this overtly in some way -- e.g., lexically, by the use of a phrase like 'by the way').¹⁷

Items in the immediate context, as stated in the Principle of Local Interpretation, are regarded as potential "referents" for nominal ellipsis. This is illustrated in S5 above. For the subject-referent in the first clause, whose semantic role is Object (Principle of Role Assignment), the sweater, which belongs in the immediate context, is the first candidate for the "referent," while the wrist watch, which belongs in the earlier world, is not.

It should be noted that the world of the immediate extralinguistic environment does not always constitute the immediate context of an utterance. In a discourse like a fairy tale, for example, once the discourse has evoked the new world of the story, the extralinguistic environment becomes less relevant; although it still retains some importance in the global context of the utterance.

The Principle of Local Interpretation may not be applicable in certain instances. This is the case when the addressee does not find the "referent" in the immediate context. Examples of this kind are discussed in Sections 1.2.5. and 1.2.6.

1.2.3. Principle of the Use of Syntactic Clues

The Principle of the Use of Syntactic Clues, the third of the four general principles for the interpretation of nominal ellipsis in Japanese, instructs the addressee to use the syntactic clues when available and when necessary. As we noted in Section 1.1., although the knowledge of the world which is used to judge pragmatic appropriateness is crucial in the interpretation of nominal ellipsis, syntactic clues may sometimes be helpful.

The present sub-section discusses such syntactic clues. The six syntactic features that will be taken up are: (1) honorific verbals, (2) giving and receiving verbals, (3) subjective verbals and evidentials, (4) conjunctive particles, (5) expressions of invitation, etc., (6) expressions of generality. Some of these features have received recognition in previous studies as clues for the interpretation of nominal ellipsis (Kuno 1978; Hinds 1982; Monane 1984). Since all the features listed above have been assigned their grammatical descriptions independently in the literature, most of the following discussion will reexamine and explicate these features as clues for the interpretation of nominal ellipsis.

1.2.3.1. Honorific Verbals

Among Japanese honorific verbals, so-called respectful words (e.g., *meshi-agaru* 'eat', *o-yomi-ni naru* 'read') are used for subject-referents that are to be elevated, and so-called humble words (e.g., *mooshiageru* 'tell', *o-yomi-suru* 'read') for subject-referents that are to be lowered. The latter, in result, elevate the recipients of the actions of the subject-referents. (For discussion on the use of Japanese honorifics, see Miyaji 1971; Harada 1976, Shibatani 1977, 1978.)

In (1) and (2) below, A and Yamada are professors, and B is A's secretary.

(1) A: 1. Yamada-sensei, osoi desu ne.

A: 1. Professor Yamada is late, isn't (he)?

B: 2. Ee, kaigi wa sanji kara da to mooshiageta no desu ga.

B: 2. Yes, (I) told (him) that the meeting would start at three o'clock *ga* (but).

(2) A: 1. Yamada-sensei, osoi desu ne.

A: 1. Professor Yamada is late, isn't (he)?

B: 2. Ee, kaigi wa sanji kara da to osshatte ita n desu ga.

B: 2. Yes, (He) was saying that the meeting would start at three o'clock *ga* (but).

Grammatical constraints in the use of honorific verbals assist in the interpretation of nominal ellipsis, as follows. In Sentence 2 in (1), the humble word *mooshiageru* 'tell' indicates that the subject-"referent" is someone who is to be lowered while the indirect-object-"referent" is someone who is to be elevated. Accordingly, among the potential referents in the immediate context, B, the speaker, who is in a socially lower position than A and Yamada, can be regarded as the subject-"referent" and either Yamada or A as the indirect-object-"referent." (Cf. For the latter, the choice between Yamada and A must depend on a pragmatic inference. See Section 1.2.4.) In Sentence 2 in (2), on the other hand, the respectful word *ossharu* 'say' indicates that the subject-"referent" is either Yamada or A, and not B, though whether it is Yamada or A must be determined on the basis of pragmatic knowledge. (See Section 1.2.4.)

1.2.3.2. Giving and Receiving Verbals

In Japanese, there are two sets of verbs of giving: *ageru* (plain), *yaru* (vulgar), and *sashiageru* (humble), on the one hand, and *kureru* (plain) and *kudasaru* (respectful), on the other. There is also a set of verbs of receiving: *morau* (plain) and *itadaku* (humble). (See Miyaji 1965; Kuno 1973; Ooe 1975; Kuno and Kaburaki 1977 for discussion on Japanese verbs of giving and receiving.)

The giving verb *ageru*, *yaru* or *sashiageru* is used when the speaker describes the event from the point of view of the subject-referent, that is, the Giver, whereas the giving verb *kureru* or *kudasaru* is used when the speaker describes the event from the point of view of the indirect-object-referent, that is, the Receiver. The receiving verb *morau* or *itadaku* is used when the event is described from the position of the subject-referent, that is, the Receiver.

In the event that the speaker him/herself is either the Giver or the

Receiver, naturally he/she takes that point of view. If, for example, the speaker is the Receiver, he/she does not take the position of the Giver, so in such a case, the use of the giving verb *ageru*, *yaru* or *sashiageru* is inappropriate, as shown in (3) below.

- (3) *Yamada/Kimi wa boku ni hon o ageta.

Yamada/You gave me a book.

If the speaker is the Giver, he/she may not take the point of view of the Receiver. Accordingly, the use of the giving verb *kureru* or *kudasaru* or the receiving verb *morau* or *itadaku* would be inappropriate, as demonstrated in (4) and (5).

- (4) *Boku wa Taroo/kimi ni hon o kureta.

I gave Taroo/you a book.

- (5) *Taroo/kimi wa boku ni hon o moratta.

Taroo/you got a book from me.

Where the Giver is the addressee and the Receiver a third person, the speaker takes the addressee's point of view unless the third person is someone perceived as psychologically closer to the speaker, like a family member. In this case the verb *ageru*, *yaru* or *sashiageru* is likely to be used instead of the verb *kureru* or *kudasaru*. Compare Examples (6) and (7) below.

- (6) Kimi ga Yamada ni hon o ageta no?

Did you give Yamada a book?

- (7) Kimi ga imooto ni hon o kureta no?

Did you give my sister a book?

Likewise, when the Giver is a third person and the Receiver is the addressee, the verb *kureru* or *kudasaru* is more naturally used, than the verb *ageru*, *yaru*, or *sashiageru* unless again the addressee is someone perceived as less closer to

the speaker. When both Giver and Receiver are third persons, the verb *kureru* or *kudasaru* may be used only when the Receiver is someone perceived as closer to the speaker.

In addition to the syntactic constraints specified above, each verb of giving or receiving attaches other conditions to the Giver and the Receiver concerning their relative social status: The verbs *ageru*, *kureru* and *morau* are used when neither the Giver nor the Receiver needs to be elevated or lowered. *Yaru* is used when the Receiver is to be lowered. *Sashiageru* is used when the Giver is to be lowered, which, in result, elevates the Receiver. *Kudasaru* and *itadaku* are used when the Giver is to be elevated. When ellipsis is applied to the Giver and/or the Receiver in a sentence that contains a giving or receiving verb, the syntactic constraints outlined above, help narrow the number of potential referents.

Corresponding to each verb of giving or receiving, there is an auxiliary verb (e.g., *te ageru*, *te kureru*, *te morau*) which is used whenever the action referred to by the main verb is viewed as something favorable for the recipient of the action. Since they carry the same syntactic constraints as their corresponding verbs, here again, their inclusion functions as a useful clue for the interpretation of nominal ellipsis.

1.2.3.3. Subjective Verbals and Evidentials

In expressions of one's psychological state, the Japanese language makes a sensitive distinction of self and the other. Generally speaking, when one talks about his own feeling, sensation, etc., he states it directly by using a so-called subjective verbal (Ooe 1975) without an evidential auxiliary verb. On the other hand, when one describes someone else's feeling, sensation, etc., a subjective verbal must be accompanied by an evidential auxiliary verb. (Regarding this

topic, see Kuroda 1973; Ooe 1975; Akatsuka 1978, 1979; Teramura 1979.)

Subjective verbals include adjectives of feeling and sensation (e.g., *ureshii* 'happy', *sabishii* 'lonely', *zannen da* 'regretful', *hoshii* 'want', *itai* 'painful' *atsui* 'hot'); verbs of cognition and feeling (e.g., *omou* 'think', *shinjiru* 'believe', *komaru* 'be troubled')¹⁸; and auxiliary verbs of feeling and intention (e.g., *tai* 'want (to)', *tsumori da* 'intend (to)'). They are termed subjective because their bare forms -- verbs without an evidential auxiliary verb -- can be used as direct expressions of psychological states not immediately perceptible by others.

Evidential auxiliary verbs, such as *rashii*, *yoo da*, *soo da*, *mitai da* 'seem/appear/look', *soo da* '(I) hear', *daroo* 'probably/(I) suppose', *ni chigainai* 'must/(I)'m sure' and *garu* 'show a sign of',¹⁹ express varying degrees of the speaker's certainty about the truth of the situation which he describes. Their uses are based on the nature of the evidences (e.g., first-hand or second-hand) to which the speaker resorts. (See Teramura 1979; Kashioka 1980; for further discussion on this subject.) All the evidential auxiliary verbs just listed can follow either a verb or an adjective, except for the auxiliary verb *garu*, which follows only an adjective.

(8) a. Boku wa kanashii.

a. I am sad.

b. * Boku wa kanashii yoo da.

b. I seem sad.

c. * Boku wa kanashi-gatte iru.

c. I am showing a sign of being sad.

(9) a. * Taroo wa kanashii.

a. Taroo is sad.

b. Taroo wa kanashii yoo da.

b. Taroo seems sad.

c. Taroo wa kanashi-gatte iru.

c. Taroo is showing a sign of being sad.

In Example (8), the speaker is stating his own feeling. Accordingly, (8)a, in which the adjective *kanashii* is in its bare form, is fine, whereas (8)b and c, in which the adjective is accompanied with an evidential auxiliary verb, are not appropriate. The opposite holds when the speaker describes someone else's feeling, as shown in (9). (See below for exceptions.)

These constraints on the use of subjective verbals applies to cases of past tense as well. For example, *Boku wa ureshikatta* 'I was happy' is fine, while *Taroo wa ureshikatta* 'Taroo was happy' is not. (See below for exceptions.)

All the auxiliary verbs cited above usually do not co-occur with the first person subject of a subjective verbal, as seen in Sentences (8)b and c. The auxiliary verb *no da* 'it is that',²⁰ which can also be considered as an evidential, may, however, co-occur with the first person subject. Thus, Examples (10) and (11) below are both acceptable.

(10)

Boku wa kanashii no da.

(It is that) I am sad.

(11)

Taroo wa kanashii no da.

(It is that) Taroo is sad.

The auxiliary verb *no da* usually gives the sentence the nuance of providing (or demanding)²¹ an explanation for what has been said or done or for the state the speaker is in (Kuno 1973:223-233). It is considered an evidential because the sentence with *no da* expresses the speaker's judgment. A sentence like (10), therefore, does not represent a direct expression of the speaker's emotion, but rather a statement of his judgment about his emotion.

The auxiliary verb *te iru*, which expresses a stative aspect of the concept denoted by a verb, may also appear with the first person subject of a subjective verb. Thus, sentences in (12) and (13) are all fine except for (13)a.

(12)

- a. Boku wa Hanako ga kuru to omou.
- a. I think that Hanako will come.
- b. Boku wa Hanako ga kuru to omotte iru.
- b. I am thinking that Hanako will come.

(13)

- a. *Yamada wa Hanako ga kuru to omou.
- a. Yamada thinks that Hanako will come.
- b. Yamada wa Hanako ga kuru to omotte iru.
- b. Yamada is thinking that Hanako will come.

When nominal ellipsis is applied to the subject of a subjective verbal, the syntactic constraints specified above may serve as clues for the interpretation. Note, however, that there are apparent exceptions to these syntactic constraints. When the bare form of a subjective verbal appears in an interrogative sentence, the subject referent is necessarily the addressee rather than the speaker. In narratives, a third person subject may be present in a sentence which contains a subjective verbal in its bare form because in narratives, a third person character may represent 'I'. Other apparent exceptions are to be found in quotations, such as in Example (14). Cases when the self is split into two are also apparent exception, as in Example (15). (See Ooe 1975 for further discussion.)

(14)

Taroo wa Hanako ni watashi ga sabishi-gatte iru to itta. (Ooe 1975:212)

Taroo told Hanako that I am lonely.

(15)

Osanai koro boku wa sono hanashi o totemo omoshiro-gatta. (Ooe 1975:213)

When (I) was little, I was very amused with that story.

1.2.3.4. Conjunctive Particles

Although the majority of conjunctive particles (e.g., *kara* 'because', *noni* 'even though') allow either the same subject or different subjects in the two connected clauses, some conjunctive particles, such as *nagara* 'while', *tsutsu* 'while' and *kuse ni* 'even though', require the same subject.

(16)

Nando mo itta noni, mada yatte inai no?

Even though (I/he/she/they) said (it) many times, (you) haven't done (it) yet?

Even though (you/he/she/they) said (it) many times, (you/he/she/they) haven't done (it) yet? (Cf. The two subjects are to be read as the same.)

(17)

Nando mo itta kuse ni, mada yatte inai no?

Even though (you/he/she/they) said (it) many times, (you/he/she/they) haven't done (it) yet? (Cf. The two subjects are to be read as the same.)

The above constraints help the interpretation of nominal ellipsis as follows. In Example (16) the *noni* allows either the same- or different-subject interpretation. (Cf. That the subject in the second clause is not the speaker is based on a pragmatic inference. To choose one interpretation from the various possibilities also depends on pragmatic inferences. See 1.2.4.) In Example (17), on the other hand, only a same-subject interpretation is possible due to the word *kuse ni*, which is usually used to make a strong reproach.

1.2.3.5. Expressions of Invitation, etc.

In expressions of order, request, invitation and volition, usually the Agent is not mentioned explicitly.²² However, certain syntactic constraints of these expressions provide clues for identifying the Agent. For example, in expressions of order or request (Examples (18) and (19), the Agent of the action is, naturally, the addressee.

(18)

Ike.

Go.

(19)

Itte kudasai.

Please go.

In an utterance with the phrase *verb-(i)masen ka* (or its plain form *verb-nai ka*), which is used to make an invitation or offer, the Agent may be either the speaker and the addressee(s) together, or the addressee(s) alone. It can not be the speaker alone (Example (20)). On the other hand, in an utterance with the phrase *verb-(i)mashoo ka* (or its plain form *verb-(y)oo ka*), which is also used to make an invitation or offer, the Agent may be either the speaker and the addressee(s) together, or the speaker alone, but it can not be the addressee(s) alone (Example (21)).

(20)

Suwar-imasen ka ?

Why don't (we) sit down?

Won't (you) sit down?

(21)

Suwar-imashoo ka?

Shall (we) sit down?

Shall (I) sit down?

The phrase *verb-(i)mashoo* (or its plain form *verb-(y)oo*) is used in expressions of invitation, offer, or volition. In the case of invitation, the Agent is the speaker and the addressee(s) together, whereas in the case of offer or volition, the Agent is always the speaker (Example (22)).

(22)

Ik-imashoo.

Let'(s) go.

(I)'ll go.

The phrase *verb-mai* expresses a volition or conjecture. When it expresses a volition, the Agent is the speaker. When it expresses a conjecture, the Agent is not the speaker (Example (23)).

(23)

Moo nido to asoko e iku mai.

(I) will not go there again.

(He/she/they) will probably not go there again.

If an honorific verbal or giving or receiving verbal -- which we have seen earlier -- is used along with these expressions of invitation, etc., it will further assist the identification of the Agent (Examples (24) and (25)).

(24)

O-suwari-ni nar-imasen ka?

Won't (you) sit down?

(25)

Suwatte kure-masen ka?

Won't (you) please sit down (for me)?

1.2.3.6. Expressions of Generality

(26)

Ichī ni ni o tasu to, san ni narimasu.

When (you) add two to one, (it) becomes three.

Example (26) above is a generic statement: What is said in the sentence is true at any time. The Agent of *tasu* 'add', to which nominal ellipsis is applied, is anyone; it may be the speaker, the addressee, or any other person. The generic reading here is based on the tense of the main verbal --i.e., non-past tense, as well as the content of the sentence. In Sentence (27) which is in past tense, on the other hand, a generic reading is not possible.

(27)

Ichī ni ni o tasu to san ni natta.

When (I) added two to one, (it) became three.

As the examples show, generic statements are often made with a verbal in non-past tense, though it may not be an absolute criterion for genericness.²³

Other features that may indicate a generic interpretation of a sentence are: adverbial phrases, such as *ippan ni* 'generally', *futsuu wa* 'usually' and *gaishite* 'generally', auxiliary verbs, such as *mono da* 'it is generally the case that' and predicates of a sentential subject, such as *(no ga) futsuu da* 'it is usually the case that' and *(no ga) jooshiki da* 'it is a common sense that'. (See Sections 1.2.5. and 1.2.6. for further discussion on expressions of generality.)

1.2.4. Principle of Pragmatic Interpretation

The Principle of Pragmatic Interpretation, the last of the four general principles for the interpretation of nominal ellipsis in Japanese, states that on the basis of the knowledge of the world, one chooses from the potential "referents" an item which is pragmatically most appropriate/normal as the "referent." This

sub-section investigates, through an analysis of discourses, the nature of the knowledge of the world which is used for the interpretation of nominal ellipsis; the way in which this knowledge is integrated in the interpretation of nominal ellipsis; and the way in which the Principle of Pragmatic Interpretation operates along with the other three principles which are outlined in the previous sections.

Knowledge of the world, pragmatic knowledge, may be specific or general. Specific knowledge involves particular objects, persons, and situations. It may be context-dependent when it is acquired through the context of the current discourse (i.e., the world which is evoked by the discourse and/or by the extralinguistic environment); or it may be context-free when it is not acquired through such means. General knowledge, on the other hand, is knowledge about stereotyped/normal properties of various types of objects, people and situations. It is knowledge about frames, scripts, schemata, and so on (Minsky 1975; Schank and Abelson 1977; Fillmore 1976 a,b, 1982; Brown and Yule 1983).²⁴ For example, regarding commercial events in general, one usually has knowledge or a frame which consists of individuals, such as a seller, a buyer, an object of selling/ buying, money, the act of exchange of the object and money, etc. (See Fillmore *ibid.*) Because of general knowledge, or knowledge about frames, the addressee has certain expectations about the situations in the discourse world -- expectations that affect the way the discourse is interpreted.

As will be seen below, in the interpretation of nominal ellipsis, it is often necessary to use a combination of specific and general knowledge of the world. At times the use of specific knowledge alone is sufficient. There are also cases when multiple frames need to be applied. Nor is it not necessarily the case that there is only one way to arrive at the interpretation. Different interpreters may arrive at the same interpretation through different channels depending upon

the quantity and quality of the knowledge available to them. It is also possible that due to the misapplication or lack of knowledge, the addressee may fail to extract the interpretation that is expected by the speaker.

Among the numerous frames the addressee knows, some concern aspects of discourse events: for example exchanging information or carrying out a particular type of discourse. The frame 'Information Exchange' and frames of different types of discourse (e.g., face-to-face-conversation, personal letter, novel) are highly useful in the interpretation of nominal ellipsis. This will be illustrated below through an analysis of some instances of discourse. At the same time, I will illustrate how the Principle of Pragmatic Interpretation operates along with the other three principles.

1.2.4.1. Application of Specific Knowledge

(1) A: Nee, kono aida katta jisho tsukatte ru?

A: Hey, are () using the dictionary () bought the other day?

B: 1. Uum, sore ga ne, nakushichatta no. 2. Iwanakatta?

B: 1. No, ah, well, () lost (). 2. Didn't () tell () ().

<Situation 1> A and B are friends. Recently, B bought a dictionary for his own use. Both A and B know about this fact.

<Situation 2> A and B are sisters. Recently, A and B bought a dictionary to share. Both A and B know about this fact.

We will suppose, alternatively, that Conversation (1) is carried out under Situation 1 and Situation 2. (Needless to say, possible situations for (1) are infinite.) On the basis of the Principle of Role Assignment for the "Referent" (henceforth, PRAR), it can be assumed that nominal ellipsis has been applied to the Agent of *kau* 'buy' in (1)A. The Principle of Local Interpretation (henceforth, PLI), then, provides A, the speaker, and B, the addressee, as candidates for the Agent of *kau* since they are in the immediate context. (Obviously, other

items in the immediate context, such as the objects in the extralinguistic environment, are irrelevant since they can not play the role of the Agent of *kau*.) Between the two candidates, B is the Agent in the case of Situation 1, while both A and B are the Agent in Situation 2. The choice of the correct Agent here is made based on the Principle of Pragmatic Interpretation (henceforth, PPI). In the case of Situation 1, B, the addressee, knows that (A, the speaker knows that) B bought a dictionary recently. Accordingly, it is most appropriate to assume B to be the Agent of *kau*. Likewise, in the case of Situation 2, the relevant specific knowledge assigns both A and B as the Agent of *kau*. Thus, what is crucial in these identifications is the specific knowledge the addressee has.

1.2.4.2. Integration of Specific and General Knowledge of the World

Following PRAR, it can be assumed that the Agent of *tsukau* 'use' in (1)A is not expressed. PLI, then, establishes A, the speaker, and B, the addressee, as potential Agents. In Situation 1, the Agent is B. This identification is made through the use of both specific and general knowledge of the world (PPI): B knows, as part of his specific knowledge, that recently she bought a dictionary for her own use. B also knows, as part of her general knowledge (i.e., the frame 'Buying-Using'), that if one buys something for his/her own use, he/she will be its possible user. B can instantiate this general knowledge by applying it to the specific situation in question, and can infer that A, the speaker, is thinking that since B bought a dictionary, she may be using it. Thus, it is most appropriate to identify B as the Agent of *tsukau* in Situation 1. There follows a summary of the process of this identification:

1. *Principle of Role Assignment for the "Referent"*

--- jisho tsukatte ru? -----> The Agent must be specified.

2 *Principle of Local Interpretation*

potential Agents ----> A and B

3 *Principle of Pragmatic Interpretation*

(specific knowledge) B bought a dictionary for her own use.

(general knowledge) If one buys something for one's own use, he/she is its possible user.

B may be using the dictionary. ---> the Agent of *tsukau* = B

The Experiencer and Object of *nakusu* 'lose' in Example (1)B1 are not expressed (PRAR). In Situation 1, candidates for the Experiencer are A and B (PLI). A candidate for the Object is the dictionary. The correct Experiencer is B, and the Object is the dictionary. This identification is made in a similar manner as that of the Agent of *tsukau* in (1)A -- that is, by instantiating general knowledge in a specific situation (PPI). The relevant general knowledge (or the frame 'Buying-Losing') is something like the following: If one buys something for one's own use, he/she will probably possess it; and if one possesses something, he/she may possibly lose it.

1.2.4.3. Application of the Frame 'Information Exchange'

As was seen above, in Situation 1, the Agent of *tsukau* 'use' in (1)A is B. It is also B in Situation 2. However, the way this identification is made differs slightly from that in Situation 1. As in Situation 1, the potential Agents in Situation 2 are A and B (PRAR and PLI). If we follow the frame 'Buying-Using' mentioned above, A and B can both be the Agent of *tsukau* since they bought the dictionary to share. However, A is excluded as the Agent because if A herself was using the dictionary, she would not ask a question like (1)A's to B. Accordingly, B is considered to be the most appropriate Agent of *tsukau*.

What is at work in this identification is the frame 'Information Exchange'.

This frame corresponds to descriptions like the following:

Usually, the speaker does not present the information which the addressee is assumed to know as new information; nor does he/she ask the addressee for the information which he/she already knows and which the addressee can not possibly be assumed to know.

This frame is useful again in the identification of the Experiencer of *nakusu* 'lose' in (1)B1 in Situation 2. As in the case of the Agent of *tsukau*, A and B are both candidates for the Experiencer of *nakusu* because they both possess the dictionary. However, A, the addressee, is excluded because she knows, as part of her specific knowledge, that she did not lose the dictionary, and, further, because if A had lost it, B would not have said (1)B1, which treats the fact that A lost the dictionary as new information for A, which would, of course, be inappropriate.

Based on PRAR, PLI, and PPI, the Object of *yuu* 'say' in (1)B2 in both Situations 1 and 2 can be recognized as the fact that B lost the dictionary. The frame 'Information Exchange' is helpful to identify the Agent of *yuu* as B and the Goal as A: A's utterance in (1)A indicates that A did not know that B lost the dictionary. It would be unlikely for B to ask A if A had told B about this fact; B, on the other hand, was in a position to be able to tell it to A. That (1)B1 is couched in the form of a negative question suggests that B thought she told it to A, but she is not sure about it.

It may be recalled from Section 1.1. that Hinds set up two basic rules for the interpretation of nominal ellipsis. The second rule, which is said to be applicable when the first rule does not produce the correct "referent," states the following: The ellipited subject (NP *ga*) of a declarative sentence is the speaker; whereas the ellipited subject of an interrogative sentence is the addressee. We saw in Section 1.1., however, that there are many exceptions to

this rule. (Sentence (1)B2 above is another example.) The determining factor in such cases seems to be the knowledge of the frame 'Information Exchange', as well as specific knowledge rather than a structural rule like the one stipulated by Hinds. Utterances (2) and (3) below provide some additional examples of how the frame 'Information Exchange' is significant.

(2) A, kasa wasurete imasu yo.

Oh, (you) forgot (your) umbrella.

(3) Machigatte ru?

Am (I) wrong?

1.2.4.4. Application of Frames of Discourse Types

Example (4) below is excerpted from a newspaper.²⁵ The original discourse was a short essay titled "The General's Meals" in a column called "From My Diary."

(4) Junshoo no Shokuji : Takahashi Osamu

The General's Meals : by Osamu Takahashi

1. Nyuuzuuiik no Dojaa-junshoo kyuushutsu no kiji o yonde, warai-korogeta.

1. (I) read the article about the rescue of the General Dosier in Newsweek, and (I) burst into laughter.

2. Rikugun-byooiin ni hakobareru to, chiizu-baagaa, jagaimo no furai, koka-koora no chuumon o dashita to yuu.

2. (It) says that when (he) was taken to the army hospital, (he) ordered a cheeseburger, french fries, and coke.

3. Sekai yuusuu no shoku no kuni Betonamu, Itaria ni sumi-nagara, ryookoku no shoku ni miserare- nakatta no daroo ka?

3. Having lived in Vietnam and Italy, countries world renowned for (their) (good) foods, wasn't (he) attracted to the foods of the two countries?

4. Kari ni inochi hitotsu hirottara, nani o kuu to kangaeta.

4. (I) thought about what (I) would eat if (I) escaped death.

5. Itaria nara ika no sumi no supagetti.

5. If (it) were in Italy, (I would eat) spaghetti with squid ink.

6. Betonamu nara deruta no gogatsu no nezumi.

6. If (it) were in Vietnam, (I would eat) rats from the delta in May.

⋮

(other examples of countries and the speaker's choice of foods in those countries)

⋮

7. Moo saki ga mieta, isshoku mo orosoka ni wa dekinai to saikun ni wa googan ni nozomu.

7. By saying "(I) do not have many years left, so (I) can't ignore even one meal," (I) am acting arrogantly toward (my) wife.

8. Gaikoku de wa tochi no mono bakari o kuu.

8. In foreign countries, (I) eat nothing but local foods.

9. Sore ga ichiban umai rikutsu da.

9. That should make the most tasty (meals).

10. Reegai wa aru.

10. There are exceptions.

11. Igrisu, tsugi ni Amerika.

11. England, and then America.

12. Dakara, taizai ichi-nen-han no aida, Amerika-ryoori naru mono wa kuchi ni sezu, moppara uchi no meshi o kutta.

12. So, in one and a half years of living (in America), (I) didn't eat American foods, and just ate meals at home.

13. Shikashi, kodomo-ra wa kekkoo Amerika-ryoori mo konomi, rusu da to naru to faasuto-fuudo mo kutte mawatta.

13. However, the children liked American foods so much that whenever (I/we) was/were not home, (they) wandered about eating fast foods.

14. Shita no kyooiku o okotatta wake de wa nai.

14. It is not that (I/we) neglected the cultivation of (their) sense of

taste.

15. Shoonan de sodate, sakana wa gensen-shita.

15. (I/We) brought (them) up in Shoonan, and selected fish very carefully.

16. Sono see ka, yooji no koro Tokyoo no manekareta saki de kuchi ni shita sashimi o haki-dashita koto ga aru.

16. Maybe because of that, when (one of them/sonie of them/they) was/were small, at a place in Tokyo where (he/she/they/we) were invited, (he/she/they) spit out the sashimi (i.e., raw fish) that (he/she/they) had put in (his/her/their) mouth(s).

17. Heekoo-shita.

17. (I/We) was/were embarrassed.

18. Are dake no shita o motte ita noni to nageita ga, Amerika-shoku no ryookan ni sunao ni kookan o motta yoo da.

18. (I) regretted that even though (they) used to have such good sense of taste, (now they are losing it); but (they) seem to have been simply attracted by the (large) quantities of American foods.

In Sentence 1 of (4), the Agent of *yomu* 'read' and the Experiencer of *warai-korogeru* 'burst into laughter' are not mentioned explicitly (PRAR). (Cf. The time and place of the event are not mentioned, either, since it is not intended that these data be defined; they are vague. See Sections 1.2.1. and 1.2.5.) The frame 'Reading a Magazine' forms a description as follows: When one reads a magazine, one might burst into laughter if it is funny. It can be inferred from this that the two events connected by the conjunctive particle *te*, which simply conjoins two clauses, are in temporal sequence (in Sentence 1 of (4)), and that the Agent of *yomu* and the Experiencer of *warai-korogeru* are the same person.

Candidates for the Agent and Experiencer are the writer of the essay, the reader(s), and the General Dossier (PLI). Among these, the writer is the correct Agent and Experiencer. In such an interpretation, besides the frame 'Information Exchange', the frame for essays/diaries written for a newspaper column is

useful (PPI). First, readers are excluded from among the candidates: Not only does the frame 'Information Exchange' suggest that it is unlikely that the writer reports what the reader(s) did as new information, but the frame 'Essays/Diaries in a Newspaper Column' implies that the readers are less relevant to the discourse world. General Dosier is also excluded from the candidates: The General is a figure in an article in Newsweek magazine. Since the writer probably does not know him in person, he is less likely to describe the General's reaction to the article in question as if the writer was a witness. (It is possible for the writer to report the General's reaction, but, in such a case, the writer would most likely use an evidential auxiliary verb.) In any event, the frames 'Information Exchange' and 'Essays/Diaries in a Newspaper Column' strongly suggest that it is most appropriate to assume that a writer is telling the readers about his experience in the style of dairy, and hence that he is the Agent of *yomu* and the Experiencer of *warai-korogeru*.

There are numerous discourse types and sub-types (e.g., face-to-face conversation, telephone conversation, personal letter, novel, fairy tale, recipe). One knows the frame for each type of discourse. The nature of the frame gives rise to certain expectations from a discourse one encounters. This, in turn, affects one's interpretation of the discourse. If one reads a news story in a newspaper, he expects it to contain headlines, a short summary of the story, and an expanded report about the event. He assumes that it is written by a professional journalist and that it is addressed to the public. Depending upon the kind of newspaper (e.g., a local paper or a national paper), he may also have certain expectations about the quality of the news story, type of the readership, etc.

It is not the intention of the present study to describe the frames of a large variety of types of discourse. It suffices to point out that frames of

discourse types, in particular, that part of the frame that concerns topics of the discourse (or participants in the discourse world), can assist in the interpretation of nominal ellipsis.

In a discourse such as an essay in a newspaper, readers are not likely to be characters in the discourse world, whereas the writer is, especially when he employs the style of a diary as in Example (4). We would expect, that in addition, the writer would talk about events concerning people and objects in the real world. In a discourse such as a novel or a fairy tale, on the other hand, neither writer nor readers are expected to appear as participants in the discourse world, though the narrator may assume the first person reference. The characters in such a discourse world are supposed to be fictitious. Similarly, in a news story, neither writer nor readers are likely to be talked about, with the difference in that case, however, that the characters in the discourse world are third persons who are not fictitious.

In a discourse such as in a casual conversation or a personal letter, the speaker/writer and the addressee(s), as well as other third persons in the real world, are likely to be talked about. In a face-to-face conversation, objects and third persons present in the situation are often talked about without explicit references, whereas this is less likely to occur in a telephone conversation or in a letter. A discourse, such as a recipe, usually does not refer to the writer or to the individual readers, though anyone -- including the writer or any reader -- is expected to be a possible Agent of the actions specified in the recipe. The types of discourse cited here are far from exhaustive, but they should serve to show that part of their frames can help the interpretation of nominal ellipsis.

1.2.4.5. Different Ways of Arriving at the Same Interpretation

- (4) 2. Rikugun-byooiin ni hakobareru to, chiizu-baagaa, jagaimo no furai, koka-koora no chuumon o dashita to yuu.

2. (It) says that when (he) was taken to the army hospital, (he) ordered a cheeseburger, french fries and coke.

In Sentence 2 in Example (4) above, nominal ellipsis is used for the Agent and Patient of *hakobu* 'carry/take', the Agent of *chuumon o dasu* 'order/put out an order', and the Agent of *yuu* 'say' (PRAR). The writer of the essay, and General Dosier are candidates for these participants (PLI). The readers of the essay are not candidates because the frame 'Essay/Diary in a Newspaper Column' suggests that they are less relevant to the discourse world, and because the immediate context for S2 is the world evoked by S1, which does not contain the readers. The article in Newsweek is also a candidate for the Agent of *yuu* (PLI). Among the candidates, the General is the Patient of *hakobu* and the Agent of *chuumon o dasu*, and the article in Newsweek is the Agent of *yuu*. The Agent of *hakobu* is to be understood as someone, whoever it may be, who did the carrying. This vague interpretation for the Agent of *hakobu* will be discussed in Section 1.2.5. Here, I will analyze the interpretation of the other three specific participants.

Let us consider first the identification of the Patient of *hakobu*, General Dosier. The correct identification can be reached through different channels depending upon the quantity and quality of the knowledge the readers have. Before reading the essay, some readers may be familiar with the fact that General Dosier, who was in the American Army, was kidnapped in Italy and subsequently rescued and taken to the army hospital in Italy. Some readers may have been informed about the kidnapping and not the rescue. Others may have known nothing at all about the incident. In either case, it is possible to choose from the candidates the correct Patient of *hakobu* based on PPI, though the

more the reader knows about the incident, the easier the identification is. The process of identification in each case is outlined below:

1) If the reader knows about the kidnapping as well as the rescue, he/she can relate this specific knowledge directly to S2, and choose the General as the Patient of *hakobu*.

2) If the reader knows only about the kidnapping, and not about the rescue, he/she must first recognize, through the phrase *Dojaa-junshoo kyuushutsu* 'rescue of General Dosier', that the General has been rescued from the kidnapper(s). Then, employing the frame 'Kidnapping-Rescuing', he/she can infer that after having been rescued, the General was taken to the army hospital: Part of the frame 'Kidnapping-Rescuing' may state that when one is rescued from a kidnapper, he/she may be physically and/or mentally in a serious enough condition to be hospitalized.

3) Even if the reader does not have any prior knowledge about the incident, he can infer the Patient in the following manner. The phrase *Dojaa-junshoo kyuushutsu* 'rescue of General Dosier' in S1, which is ambiguous, tells the reader that either a general called Dosier was rescued from some danger, or he rescued someone from some danger. The reader also knows through S2 that someone was taken to an army hospital. He can, thereby, incorporate this specific knowledge with the frame 'Rescuing', which contains a description, such as the following; when one is rescued from some danger, one may be physically and/or mentally in a serious condition, and may need to be taken to the hospital. From this, the reader can infer that either General Dosier was taken to the hospital by someone or someone was taken to the hospital by the General. Since a passive Agent, when it is not expressed, is often identified only vaguely (see Sections 1.2.5. and 1.2.6.), the reader can conclude that the (passive) Agent of *hakobu* is someone, whoever it is, and that its Patient is the Gen-

eral.

The reader of the essay could conceivably consider the possibility of identifying the writer as the Patient of *hakobu*, thinking that when the writer burst into laughter after reading the article in Newsweek, he had a heart attack, and was taken to the hospital. But, this inference is rather less natural compared to the inferences drawn in the previous three cases. In addition, the frame 'Military' supports the identification of the Patient as the General rather than the writer since both the concepts 'general' and 'army hospital' belong to the frame 'Military'.

The Agent of *chuumon o dasu* 'put out an order' is also the General. Following the frame 'Rescuing', the most appropriate assumption is that when the General was taken to the hospital, he ordered some food. If the writer of the essay was regarded as the Agent, then S2 would have to mean that when the General was taken to the hospital, the writer ordered some food. This is, obviously, nonsensical. If the reader knows that the General is an American, then S2 would make much more sense to him, since S2 would mean that the General, after having been released from the isolation from the world, ordered a cheeseburger, etc., that is, his favorite American foods.

Following the identification of the Patient of *hakobu* and the Agent of *chuumon o dasu* as General Dossier, the Agent of *yu* 'say' can be inferred as the article in Newsweek which the writer read: It is most appropriate to assume that the indirect quotation in S2 is from the article in Newsweek.

- (4) 3. Sekai yuusuu no shoku no kuni Betonamu, Itaria ni sumi-nagara, ryookoku no shoku ni miserare-nakatta no daroo ka?

3. Having lived in Vietnam and Italy, countries world renowned for (their) (good) foods, wasn't (he) attracted to the foods of the two countries?

In (4)3, which is repeated above, nominal ellipsis is used for the Agent of

sumu 'live' and the Experiencer of *miserareru* 'be attracted to' (PRAR). Candidates for these two participants are General Dosier and the writer of the essay (PLI). Between the two, the General is both the Agent and Experiencer. Based on the Principle of the Use of Syntactic Clues (henceforth, PUSC), the reader can assume that the two participants are the same individual since, as was seen in Section 1.2.3., the conjunctive particle *nagara* 'while' in S3 takes the same subject-referent in the two clauses it connects. Another syntactic clue in S3, namely, the subjective verbal *miserareru* followed by the evidential verbal *daroo ka* 'I wonder', indicates that the two participants in question are not the writer of the essay, but General Dosier.

The PPI further confirms this identification, though, again, differences in the amount of knowledge lead to different ways of confirmation. If the reader knows about the fact that the General served in Vietnam and Italy and that he was kidnapped in Italy, he can relate this knowledge directly to S3. Even if the reader does not know anything about the General, he can make certain of the identification by recognizing that the second clause in S3 (i.e., *ryookoku no shoku ni miserare-nakatta* 'was not attracted to the foods of the two countries') is a paraphrase of the second clause in S2 (i.e., *chiizu-baagaa, jagaimo no furai, koka-koora no chuumon o dashita* 'ordered a cheeseburger, french fries and coke').

1.2.4.6. Application of Multiple Frames

In the remainder of this section, I shall examine the interpretation of nominal ellipsis in S13-S18, Example (4), which requires the use of multiple frames. First, a brief remark regarding the instances of nominal ellipsis in S4-S12.

(4) 4. Kari ni inochi hitotsu hirottara, nani o kuu to kangaeta.

4. (I) thought about what (I) would eat if (I) escaped death.

In S4 above, nominal ellipsis is used for the Experiencer of *inochi o hirou* 'escape death', the Agent of *kuu* 'eat' and the Experiencer of *kangaeru* 'think' (PRAR). Candidates for these participants are General Dosier and the writer of the essay (PLI). Between them, it is the writer, not the General, who plays the three participant-roles in question. In PUSC, that the main verb *kangaeru*, a subjective verb, is not accompanied with an evidential auxiliary verb indicates that the Experiencer of *kangaeru* is the writer himself. PPI, then, suggests that the General is not the Experiencer of *inochi o hirou* and the Agent of *kuu*. Since the reader knows that the writer already knows through the article in Newsweek what the General ate when he escaped death, there is no need for the writer to wonder about the General's choice of foods. Accordingly, all three participants in question can be regarded as the writer. Though I will skip over the discussion, all the instances of nominal ellipsis in S5-S12 that are used for the writer of the essay can be interpreted fairly easily by construing the discourse in S5- S12 to be about the writer's preference of foods. (Cf. The verbal ellipsis in S5 and S6 will be discussed in Part II.)

- (4) 13. Shikashi, kodomo-ra wa kekkoo America-ryoori mo konomi, rusu da to naru to faasuto-fuudo mo kutte mawatta.

13. However, the children liked American foods so much that whenever (I/we) was/were not home, (they) wandered about eating fast foods.

Now, let us move to S13 above. In S13, the Object of *rusu da* 'be absent/not at home' and the Agent of *kutte mawaru* 'wander about to eat' are not mentioned explicitly (PRAR). Their potential candidates are the writer and his children who have been introduced by the first clause in S13, and, probably, the writer's wife who has been introduced in S7, and who is in the (semi-)immediate context (PLI). (Cf. The phrase *kodomo-ra* 'children' is to be understood as the writer's children.²⁶) The correct Object of *rusu da* is the writer (and, probably, his wife) and the Agent of *kutte mawaru* is the writer's children. (Cf. Regarding

the inclusion of the writer's wife as part of the Object of *rusu da*, see Section 1.2.5.) To derive these identifications, it is necessary to employ more than one frame as well as specific knowledge.

From the preceding discourse, the reader of the essay knows that the writer does not like American foods and did not eat them when he was in America, whereas his children like them pretty much. Using the frames 'Liking' and 'American Foods', the Agent of *kutte mawaru* can be regarded as the writer's children: The relevant part of the frame 'Liking' may say that if one likes something, he may do it excessively; if one likes some foods, he may eat them excessively. The frame 'American Foods' includes the concept 'fast foods'. From these, it can be assumed that the writer's children who liked American foods wandered about eating fast foods.

The Object of *rusu da* is the writer (and probably his wife). To derive this identification, the frame 'Parent-Child Relation' is useful. The relevant part of this frame states as follows: Usually, children are under supervision of their parents; when their parents are at home, they do as their parents do; however, when their parents are away from home, they may do things differently. The reader can incorporate this knowledge with his specific knowledge about the liking and behavior of the writer and his children, and can infer that the Object of *rusu da* is the writer (and his wife). Incidentally, the frame 'Parent-Child Relation' further supports the identification of the Agent of *kutte mawaru* as the children.

(4) 14. Shita no kyooiku o okotatta wake de wa nai.

14. It is not that (I/we) neglected the cultivation of (their) palate.

15. Shoonan de sodate, sakana wa gensen-shita.

15. (I/We) brought (them) up in Shoonan, and selected fish very carefully.

In (4)14-15 above, nominal ellipsis is used for the Agent of *okotaru* 'neglect', the Agent and Patient of *sodateru* 'bring up', and the Agent of *gensen-suru* 'select very carefully' (PRAR). The candidates for them are the writer of the essay, (his wife),²⁷ and his children (PLI). Among them, the writer (and, probably, his wife) is (are) the Agent of *okotaru*, *sodateru* and *gensen-suru*, and the writer's children are the Patient of *sodateru*. Besides specific knowledge, two frames, namely, 'Palate' and 'Parent-Child Relation' are useful for these identifications. S14 says that it is not that someone neglected the cultivation of the palate. First, it is necessary to interpret the word *shita* 'palate/tongue' as the palate of the writer's children. The frame 'Palate' contains a description as follows: If one neglects the cultivation of one's palate, one may eat unsavory foods without noticing anything. From the preceding discourse, the reader of the essay knows that the writer's children liked to eat American fast foods, which the writer considers to be unsavory foods. By integrating this specific knowledge with the relevant part of the frame 'Palate', the reader can assume that the word *shita* refers to the palate of the writer's children. Then, the frame 'Parent-Child Relation' indicates that the Agent of *okotaru* is the writer (and, probably, his wife) rather than the children themselves: Part of the frame 'Parent-Child Relation' may state that usually parents bring up their children; they take care of their children's meals; and they may cultivate the children's palate or they may neglect such a task. Consequently, it can be understood that S4 means that it is not because the writer (and his wife) neglected the cultivation of their children's palate that their children like unsavory foods like American fast foods.

The instances of nominal ellipsis in S15 can similarly be interpreted by the use of the frames 'Palate' and 'Parent-Child Relation' as well as specific knowledge. The frame 'Parent-Child Relation' suggests that the Agent of

sodateru is the writer (and his wife), that its Patient is the writer's children, and that the Agent of *gensen-suru* is the writer (and his wife). To understand S15 fully, that is, to understand why the writer (and his wife) -- who does not think he (and his wife) neglected the cultivation of his children's palate -- brought up their children in Shoonan, and why they selected fish very carefully -- the frame 'Palate' and specific knowledge about Shoonan are needed. Part of the frame 'Palate' may state that to eat savory foods, one must select the foods very carefully; one may also want to live around a fine seashore where one can get fresh fish. Shoonan is a well-known coastal area in Japan where one can get fresh seafoods. With this knowledge S15 becomes fully meaningful, and further, the validity of the interpretation of the three instances of nominal ellipsis specified above can be guaranteed.

As in S13-15, interpretation of the instances of nominal ellipsis in S16-18 requires the use of multiple frames as well as specific knowledge. Rather than describe the process of the interpretation of each nominal ellipsis in S16-18, I will only list the names of the necessary frames: The frames needed to interpret the instances of nominal ellipsis in S16 are 'Visiting Someone', 'Palate', and 'Manners'. The interpretation of the instances of nominal ellipsis in S17 requires the frames 'Manners' and 'Parent-Child Relation'. Finally, for the interpretation of the instances of nominal ellipsis in S18, the frames 'Parent-Child Relation' and 'Palate' need to be employed. (Cf. Sentences 16 and 17 will be further discussed in the following section.)

1.2.5. Vague "Referent" for Nominal Ellipsis

So far, I have analyzed the interpretation of nominal ellipsis whose "referent" is specific. However, the "referent" for nominal ellipsis may also be vague or general. Nominal ellipsis of this sort has hardly been investigated

except in Matsumoto (1981a,b).²⁸ This and following sub-sections examine instances of this type of nominal ellipsis. I will attempt to answer the following two questions: (1) What sorts of vague or general "referent" for nominal ellipsis exist? (2) How is nominal ellipsis which has a vague or general "referent" interpreted?

With regard to the first question, I will demonstrate that there are classes of vague and general "referents" which vary depending upon the nature of the vagueness and the generality of the "referents." Only a very broad scheme of classification could group all these various "referents" under the single rubric of "vague or general referents." The treatment of so-called agent-less passives in English serves to illustrate this point. The unexpressed Agent in English passive sentences is usually characterized by the use of the single notion 'general' (Leech 1974), 'indefinite' (Allerton 1975), or 'nothing' (Thomas 1979). As shown in the two examples below, however, these agents may in fact be specific: In (1) the Agent is the writer of the sentence, in (2) the Agent is the students of the teacher:

- (1) It was mentioned in the previous section that nominal ellipsis is not a deletion of the underlying full form.
- (2) The homework must be turned in by next Friday.

Furthermore, the unexpressed Agents may differ in their generality or indefiniteness:

- (3) John's been murdered.
- (4) This museum was built in 1970.
- (5) (in a recipe)
The onion should be coarsely chopped.
- (6) On a clear day, Mt. Fuji can be seen from here.

(7) Nominal ellipsis has been widely studied in Japanese linguistics.

(8) Mishima's novels are well read in Western countries.

(9) It is said that Japan is a closed society.

In Example (3) the Agent (or persons) who murdered John is a particular individual (or individuals) assumed to exist in the real world, although his/her exact identity is not known to the speaker and/or the addressee. In (4) the Agent is the authority who built the museum. In (5) the Agent is not a particular person, but any (prototypical) person who happens to use the recipe. Similarly, the Agent in (6) is any person who attempts to see Mt. Fuji on a clear day from the speaker's location at the time of the utterance. The Agent in (7), on the other hand, is a group of linguists. In (8) the Agent is people living in Western countries. In (9) the Agent is some sort of general wisdom.

While all these Agents are vague or general enough in one sense or another that the addressee may not pay much attention to them, this is not to imply that Thomas (ibid.) is correct when he states that in agent-less passives "'what is deleted and understood is nothing' and it is difficult to see how 'nothing' can be either deleted or understood." As the above examples indicate, the unexpressed Agents are understood -- no matter how vaguely -- in one way or another.

In Japanese, the vague or general "referent" for nominal ellipsis may likewise vary according to the nature of the vagueness and the generality. I propose to classify these "referents" into two major types: (1) vague "referent" and (2) general "referent." The term "vague referent" is used for a particular item that can be identified only vaguely. The term "general referent" is used for an item that possesses generality to a greater or lesser extent: It may be an individual in the sense of 'any individual'; or it may be some kind of group. I will first investigate the vague "referent." It is sub-divided into two types: (1) known

"referent" and (2) unknown "referent." The general "referent," to be discussed in a subsequent section, is sub-divided into five types: (1) anyone, (2) any addressee, (3) a group of third persons, (4) the speaker's group and (5) the addressee's group.

The interpretation of the different types of nominal ellipsis just listed will be investigated through analysis of available data. Interpretations follow the four general principles stipulated in the present study. The Principle of Local Interpretation may sometimes be obviated particularly when the "referent" is vague or general: that is, when the "referent" cannot be found in the immediate context, it must be inferred as some other item(s) on the basis of the Principle of Pragmatic Interpretation.

1.2.5.1. Known "Referent"

The "referents" for the instances of nominal ellipsis in the following examples are specific items known to the addressee, although at the same time they possess a certain vagueness.

(10)

(the same as Example (4) 13-15 in Section 1.2.4.)

13. Shikashi, kodomo-ra wa kekkoo America-ryoori mo konomi, rusu da to naru to faasuto-fuudo mo kutte mawatta.

13. However, the children liked American foods so much that whenever (I/we) was/were not home, (they) wandered about eating fast foods.

14. Shita no kyooiku o okotatta wake de wa nai.

14. It is not that (I/we) neglected the cultivation of (their) palate.

15. Shoonan de sodate, sakana wa gensen-shita.

15. (I/We) brought (them) up in Shoonan, and selected fish very carefully.

As I noted in the earlier section (1.2.4.), the Object of *rusu da* 'be

absent/not at home' in S13 can be identified either as the writer of the essay alone or as the writer and his wife, the writer's wife having been introduced in S7. While it is unclear which identity the writer has in mind, this lack of clarity is not crucial to the overall understanding of S13. The Object of *rusu da* can be taken as being vague with respect only to the inclusion of the writer's wife.

If the reader of the essay presumes, based on the frame 'Husband and Wife', either that the writer's wife has the same kind of negative attitude toward American fast foods as the writer, or that she just conforms to her husband's way of thinking, he/she can infer that the writer's children went out to eat fast foods when both parents were away from home and unable to supervise them. In this interpretation, the writer's wife is included in the Object of *rusu da*. On the other hand, if the reader thinks that he/she can be positive only about identifying the writer as the Object of *rusu da*, because, based on the preceding discourse, he/she knows only about the writer's attitude toward fast foods and nothing about his wife's, then, the writer's wife is not included in the Object of *rusu da*.

The same vagueness as the Agent of *rusu da* may be observable with respect to the Agent of *okotaru* 'neglect' in S14, the Agent of *sodateru* 'bring up/raise', and that of *gensen-suru* 'select very carefully' in S15. If it is presumed that both the writer and his wife were taking the responsibility of cultivating the children's palate, then both of them are regarded as the Agent of the three actions in question. If, on the other hand, it is supposed that only the writer was taking such responsibility, he is regarded as the Agent of the three actions. The first identification (the inclusion of the writer's wife) would be considered more natural if the reader, based on the frame 'Wife's Role', thought that cultivation of the children's palate is largely a wife's job.

(11)

(the same as Example(4)16-17 in Section 1.2.4.)

16. Sono see ka, yooji no koro Tokyoo no manekareta saki de kuchi ni shita sashimi o haki-dashita koto ga aru.

16. Maybe because of that, when (one of them/ some of them/they) was/were small, at a place in Tokyo where (he/she/they/we) was/were invited, (he/she/they) spit out the sashimi (i.e., raw fish) that (he/she/they) had put in (his/her/their) mouth(s).

17. Heekoo-shita.

17. (I/We) was/were embarrassed.

In (11)16, nominal ellipsis is used for the Object of *yooji* '(be) a child', the Agent and Object of *maneku* 'invite', the Agent of *kuchi ni suru* 'put into mouth' and that of *haki-dasu* 'spit out' (PRAR). The candidates for these unexpressed participants are the writer of the essay, his children and his wife. (The writer's wife has been introduced in the previous discourse and is in the semi-immediate context.)

The identification of these participants can only be vaguely made, even though this vagueness does not hinder the overall understanding of S16. Let us first examine the Object of *yooji*, and the Agent of *kuchi ni suru* and that of *haki-dasu*. The plural marker *ra* in the noun phrase *kodomo-ra* in S13 indicates that the writer of the essay has more than one child, although the exact number of children is not specified. The reader knows from the preceding discourse that the writer, and probably his wife, attempted to cultivate their children's palate. From this knowledge, it can be inferred that as a result of their effort, the children had developed a refined sense of taste and were thus sensitive to the quality of fish. S16 says that someone spit out the *sashimi* 'raw fish' served at some place to which he/she had been invited. Part of the frame 'Palate' may state that if one has a good sense of taste, one might refrain from eating or indeed might spit out unsavory foods. On the other hand, part of the frame 'Manners' may state that spitting out food in front of one's host is bad

manners, a behavior that might be characteristic of children. Combining these frames with the specific knowledge mentioned above, the reader is able to infer that the writer's children, or at least one of them (when they/he/she were/was small) spit out presumably unsavory *sashimi* served at someone else's house. In this inference, the Object of *yooji*, the Agent of *kuchi ni suru* and that of *haki-dasu*, can be only identified vaguely as all of the writer's children, or some of them, or only one of them.

Similarly, the Object of *maneku* 'invite' in S16 can be all of the writer's children, some of them, or just one of them. In addition, the Object may include the writer and his wife as well, if the reader, based upon the frame 'Visiting Someone', presumes that the child/children visited someone's house in Tokyo with his/their parents. In fact, S17 indicates that the latter was the case. Incidentally, the phrase *sono see ka* 'maybe because of that' in S16 can be interpreted as "maybe (because the writer's children had a refined sense of taste) because of their parents' effort in cultivating their palate." (The identification of the Agent of *maneku*, is discussed in the following sub-section.)

The identity of the Experiencer of *heekoo-suru* 'feel embarrassed' in S17 is also unclear. It may be the writer of the essay or both the writer and his wife. That the Experiencer is the parent(s), and not (one of) the children, can be inferred through the frames 'Manners' and 'Parent- Child Relation'.

1.2.5.2. Unknown "Referent"

The "referents" for the instances of nominal ellipsis below are particular items unknown to the addressee -- items that are supposed to exist, but whose exact identities are not known to the addressee. This type of "referent" is usually less relevant/important to the situation described by the sentence.

(12)

(the same as Example (4)2 in Section 1.2.4.)

2. Rikugun-byooiin ni hakobareru to, chiizu-baagaa, jagaimono no furai, koka-koora no chuumon o dashita to yuu.

2. (It) says that when (he) was taken to the army hospital, (he) ordered a cheeseburger, french fries, and coke.

In (12)2 the Agent and Object of *hakobu* 'carry' and the Agent and Goal of *chuumon o dasu* 'order/put out an order' are not expressed (PRAR). In the earlier section, I described how the Object of *hakobu* and the Agent of *chuumon o dasu* are identified as General Dosier. The Agent of *hakobu* and the Goal of *chuumon o dasu*, on the other hand, are to be understood only vaguely as a certain person (or persons) who performed the acts in question (but not as any individual). Based on PRAR, the reader can assume that there was/were a person/persons who did the carrying and a person/persons who received the order of a cheeseburger, etc. Since there does not seem to be in the immediate context anyone who is appropriate for these roles (i.e., the PLI is not applicable), the Agent of *hakobu* and the Goal of *chuumon o dasu* are regarded only vaguely as some person(s).

(13)

(the same as Example (4)16 in Section 1.2.4.)

16. Sono seeka, yooji no koro manekareta saki de, kuchi ni shita sashimi o haki-dashita koto ga aru.

16. Maybe because of that, when (one of them/some of them/they) was/were small, at a place in Tokyo where (he/she/they/we) were invited, (he/she/they) spit out the sashimi that (he/she/they) had put in (his/her/their) mouth(s).

In a similar vein, in (12) 16, the Agent of *maneku* 'invite' is assumed to be the person(s) who gave the invitation of whom the readers know nothing.

(14)

Kinoo, chikaku no kooen de otoko no hito ga korosareta.

Yesterday, a man was killed in a nearby park.

(15)

Kyoo, densha no naka de saifu o surareta.

Today, in the train my wallet got stolen.

The Agent of *korosu* 'kill' in (5) and that of *suru* 'steal/pickpocket' in (6) are also to be regarded as those persons who performed the acts in question. As in these examples, the unexpressed Agent in a passive construction is often understood vaguely as some individual(s) who is (are) unknown to the addressee.

1.2.6. General "Referent" for Nominal Ellipsis

The general "referents" to be examined here are classified into five types: (1) anyone, (2) any addressee, (3) a group of third persons, (4) the speaker's group, and (5) the addressee's group. Through an analysis of examples, I will demonstrate that the four general principles described earlier (PRAR, PLI, PUSC, PPI) also apply to the interpretation of these instances of nominal ellipsis, although, as will be shown, the PLI may be overridden at times. At the same time, the analysis specifies the kind of general knowledge and syntactic clues which are useful when these instances of nominal ellipsis are to be interpreted.

The distinction between general and specific referents applies to any noun phrase reference as well as to nominal ellipsis. For example, the noun phrase *otoko no hito* 'man' may refer to a specific man or men in general, or a non-specific (prototypical) man. I will show that in order to interpret nominal ellipsis as having a general "referent," it is sometimes necessary to first interpret a certain noun phrase in the preceding discourse as referring to a general item.

1.2.6.1. Anyone.

Each instance of nominal ellipsis to be examined in this sub-section is best interpreted as "anyone" -- the speaker, the addressee, or anyone else in like circumstances; that is, the "referent" has maximum generality.

To interpret nominal ellipsis this way, it must be recognized that the sentence itself is a general remark which is applicable to any individual at any time. Sentences of this sort are often found in maxims, truisms, proverbs, expressions of common senses, descriptions of the functions of objects, instructions of procedures of things, etc. Besides the content of the sentence, knowledge about these general expressions may assist in the interpretation of this type of sentence and of nominal ellipsis. (See below.) As noted in Section 1.2.3., syntactic elements are also useful for this kind of interpretation: These elements may include the tense of the main verbal, the auxiliary verb *mono da* 'it is generally the case that', certain adverbial phrases (e.g., *ippan ni* 'generally', *futsuu wa* 'usually') and certain predicates of a sentential subject (e.g., *jooshiki da* 'it is a common sense that').

(1)

⋮

(a story about how the park came to be built)

⋮

1. Hobo kansee-shita kooen wa, shoomen no mon kara yaku 50m ga ichoo-namiki.

1. In the park which is almost complete, there is a row of ginkgo trees about 50m long starting at the main gate.

⋮

(a description of other elements in the park, such as the tea room and the pond)

⋮

2. Ike no katawara ni wa 3.6m² no azumaya.

2. By the pond, there is an arbor of 3.6m².

3. Sansaku ni tsukareta toki wa, koko de yasumu koto mo dekiru.

3. When (one) gets tired of strolling, (one) can take a rest here.

Example (1) above is from a newspaper article²⁹ about a park newly built in Tokyo. In S3, the identities of the Experiencer of *tsukareru* 'get tired' and the Agent of *yasumu* 'take a rest' are not expressed (PRAR). The writer and the readers of the article can be candidates for these roles (PLI), although the frames 'Information Exchange' and 'News Story' indicate that they are unlikely to be participants in the discourse world. Prior to S1 (in a section not included here), the founder of the park is introduced, but shortly after, he is backgrounded and, hence, is not a strong candidate (PLI). In any event, any individual can be considered appropriate for these roles, even though the concept 'any individual' (i.e., a prototypical person) is not evoked in the immediate context. (Note, however, that the Experiencer and the Agent must be the same individual.)

This interpretation is substantiated in the following manner. First, using the frame 'Park', S1 through S2 can be regarded as a description of the layout of the park. S2 introduces the arbor. Then, the first clause in S3 talks about *sansaku* 'strolling'. Again, based on the frame 'Park', which contains the concept 'strolling', the *sansaku* in S3 can be interpreted as strolling in the park. Subsequently, the frame 'Arbor' indicates that the referent of the word *koko* 'here', that is, the locus of *yasumu* 'take a rest', is the arbor in the park: The frame 'Arbor' can suggest that one may rest at an arbor when one gets tired of strolling in a park, so that we may regard S3 as a description of the arbor's function. That S3 is in present tense further indicates that S3 is about a property of the arbor which is true at any time. The very frame 'Function of an Object' also suggests that the content of S3 must be applicable to anyone. In

this way, the Experiencer of *tsukareru* and the Agent of *yasumu* can be assumed to be any person.

Example (2) below, taken from a newspaper,³⁰ records an interview with a famous businessman (B) by a news reporter (A).

(2) A: 1. Suupaa o doo mite imasu ka?

A: 1. How do (you) view supermarkets?

B: 2. Suupaa ga don don nobite kita no wa benri ga ee kara desu wa.

B: 2. The reason why supermarkets are growing more and more is because (they) are convenient.

3. Kago hitotsu motte ittara, ik-kasho de minna kaeru deshoo.

3. If (one) takes a basket, (he/she) can buy everything at one place.

S3 in (2) contains an example similar to S3 in (1) -- that of a functional description, in this case, of supermarkets. In addition to the content of S3, the frames 'Supermarket' and 'Function of an Object', as well as the present tense of the main verbal, contribute to the generic interpretation of S3. As a result, the unexpressed Agent of *motte iku* 'take' and that of *kau* 'buy' can be regarded as anyone, although the two Agents must be the same individual. It is incidentally also a prerequisite to interpret the noun phrase *suupaa* 'supermarket' in S1 as supermarkets in general.

(3) A: 1. Keeee no kotsu o ooku no hito ga shiri-ta-gatte imasu.

A: 1. Many people want to know the secret of management.

B: 2. Keeee no kotsu chuu no wa nee, yuu ni iwaren aji desu wa.

B: 2. The secret of management has an indescribable flavor.

3. Oshaka-san wa nan-nen-kan mo yama nan ka de zuibun kugyoo-shita.

3. Shakyamuni trained himself intensively in the mountains for many years.

⋮

(a story about how Shakyamuni trained himself)

⋮

4. Oshaka-san no yoona hito de mo soo desu wa.

4. Even a person like Shakyamuni was like that.

5. Soyakara, kotsu o oshieru hoochoo wa nai.

5. So, there is no way (for anyone) to teach the secret (to anyone else).

6. Shugyoo-shi-tara, aru teedo satoreru hazu desu wa.

6. If (one) practices hard, (one) should be able to understand (it) to some extent.

Example (3) is also an excerpt from a newspaper interview.³¹ As in Example (2), A, a news reporter is interviewing B, a famous businessman.

In S5 in (3), the Agent and Goal of *oshieru* 'teach' are not mentioned explicitly (PRAR). Candidates for these roles are Shakyamuni, the speaker (B), the addressee (A) and the people who want to know the secret of management. (PLI: The last candidate is talked about only in S1, hence he may be in the semi-immediate context.)

Among the candidates, the speaker and the people who want to know the secret seem to be most appropriate for the Agent and Goal of *oshieru*, respectively. This interpretation seems satisfying in response to the (indirect) request made in S1. However, it is possible to regard the Agent as any master of the secret of management and the Goal as any person who wants to learn the secret. According to this interpretation, the message in S5 is that the secret cannot be taught by anyone to anyone else and, hence, that the speaker (B) cannot teach, either.

The generic interpretation can be made by assuming that S5 is a description of how to teach the secret of management in general rather than a statement about the speaker's ability to teach such a secret. In fact, the latter

assumption is more appropriate since the speaker, starting with S2, has been talking about the secret of management in general. Furthermore, under this assumption, S5 can be viewed as a generalization based on the specific example given in S3-S4 (i.e., the story about the great master Shakyamuni).

In S6, the Agent of *shugyoo-suru* 'practice' and the Experiencer of *satoru* 'understand/realize' are not expressed (PRAR). Here again, the generic interpretation is most appropriate. That is, any person who attempts to obtain the secret of management can be the Agent of *shugyoo-suru* and the Experiencer of *satoru*, though the two roles must be played by the same individual.

In S5, since the speaker expressed the impossibility of teaching the secrets of management, it follows that S6 should be interpreted as an instruction of an alternative way of acquiring the secret. That is, S6 can be understood as a description of what the speaker believes to be applicable to anyone who attempts to know the secret of management and, hence, to constitute an instruction to any individual.

Sentences 5 and 6 in (3) constitute, in a sense, wise sayings. More examples of this are shown in (4)-(6) below. (Example (4) is an excerpt from a newspaper.³²)

(4) 1. "Hoshi no Ooji-sama" no chie-sha wa yuu.

1. The sage fox in "A Little Price" says;

2. "Kokoro de minakucha, monogoto wa yoku mienai tte koto sa.

2. "If (one) does not see with (his/her) mind, (he/she) can not see things well.

3. Kanjin na koto wa me ni wa mienai n da yo."

3. The important things, (one) cannot see with (his/her) eyes."

(5) Furusato wa tooki ni arite omou mono.

(One's) homeland is something (one) longs for from afar.

(6) Atsumono ni korite, namasu o fuku.

(Lit.) When (one) has a painful experience with hot foods, (one) tries to cool off (even) cold foods.

Generic uses of nominal ellipsis are also found in expressions of common senses and common rules, as in Example (7) below.

(7) 1. Odoroita no wa baiorin no Sheringu ga Beetooben no "Kuroitseru sonata" no dai-ichi-gakushoo o hiki-oeta totan, ichibu ni kanari seedai na hakushu ga okotta koto de aru.

1. What (I) was surprised at was that the moment the violinist Szerying finished playing the first movement of Beethoven's "Kreutzer Sonata," rather loud applause occurred among part (of the audience).

2. Gakushoo no kire-me de wa hakushu-shinai no ga jooshiki de aru.

2. That (one) does not applaud between movements is a common sense.

Example (7) is an excerpt from a newspaper essay written by a critic.³³ In S2, the Agent of *hakushu-suru* 'applaud' is not expressed (PRAR). Here, candidates for the Agent are the writer of the essay, Szerying and the audience at his concert (PLI). However, note that the appropriate Agent is none of these candidates, but any person in the audience in any concert. This interpretation is based on the following reasoning. First, by applying the frame 'Classical Music Concert', the Agent of *hakushu-suru* can be assumed to be the audience. Then, based on the predicate *jooshiki da* 'it is a common sense that', S2 can be interpreted generically (PUSC). In other words, S2 can not be taken as a description of a particular event which occurred at Szerying's concert. Rather, it should be regarded as a statement of an informal rule which must be obeyed by any audience at any classical music concert. Accordingly, the phrase *gakushoo* 'movement' in S2 must be regarded as any two successive movements in a classical music piece, and the Agent of *hakushu-suru* as any person in the audience in a classical music concert.

1.2.6.2. Any Addressee

Each "referent" discussed below can be described as any addressee. "Referents" of this type are often seen in advertisements and in instructions of procedures for handling certain objects.

- (8) VW o o-kai-age-ni narimasu to 330 yo kasho no Yanase Saabisu Netto Waaku ni kuwaete, jidoo-teki ni JAF Saabisu mo go-riyoo-ni naremasu.

If (you) buy a VW, (you) can automatically use JAF service system in addition to the 330 Yanase service network.

Example (8) is part of an advertisement of Volkswagen.³⁴ The unexpressed Agent of *o-kai-age-ni naru* 'buy' is any reader who is a potential buyer of a VW, and the unexpressed Agent of *go-riyoo-ni naru* 'use' is any reader who eventually buys a VW. Based on the knowledge that Example (8) is an advertisement, the reader can assume that the two Agents comprise not only him/herself but anyone among the readers who is a potential buyer of a VW.

- (9) Honshi ni taishi go-iken, go-yooboo ga areba, itsu demo henshuu-bu made o-shirase kudasai.

If (you) have some opinion or request regarding this magazine, please let the editorial staff know (about it) any time.

Similarly, in Example (9) above, the unexpressed Possessor of *aru* 'have' can be regarded as any reader of the text (9), and the unexpressed Agent of *shiraseru* 'let know' as any reader who has some opinion or request regarding the magazine.

1.2.6.3. A Group of Third Persons

Each "referent" discussed in this section is to be understood as a certain kind of non-specific third person; that is, the speaker and the addressee(s) are not among the "referents." These "referents" may be perceived distributively or collectively. Below, I will consider each possibility in greater detail.

a. Distributive

Each "referent" in the following examples is a group of non-specific third persons. The members of a group are perceived distributively: That is, the responsibility of the action (described by the sentence) lies with each group member rather than with the group as a whole. These "referents" are not as general as "anyone," rather they are general to the extent that the members of the group are not limited to particular people who can be identified by the addressee; they include all the non-specific persons who share a certain characteristic.

(10)

1. Insert Example (7)1 here.
2. Insert Example (7)2 here.
3. Hakushu ga mondai ni naru no wa shu to shite kooshita hayasugi de aru.
3. Applause becomes a problem mainly in the case of premature (applause) like this.
4. Dooshite isogu no ka?
4. Why do (they) hurry?
5. Ichi-ban-nori-shite tokui na no ka?
5. Are (they) proud of being the first?

Example (10) above is excerpted from the same essay as Example (7). In S4, the Agent of *isogu* 'hurry' is not mentioned explicitly (PRAR). Likely candidates for the Agent are the audience at Szerying's concert who applauded too early and the audience at another concert who also applauded too early (i.e., those who are introduced between S2 and S3). However, the appropriate Agent is not just these particular people, but all the people who hasten to applaud at any classical music concert.

This interpretation is arrived at as follows: That S4 is in the present tense indicates that the speaker is not talking about a specific past event. Based on tense and on the word *kooshita* 'such/this kind of' in S3, S3 can be taken as a generalization -- as a description of problematic applause in general (PUSC). Based on these considerations, then, it can be inferred that S4 is also about problematic applause and audience in general.

Through the same process, the unexpressed Agent of *ichi-ban-nori-suru* 'become the first one/arrive first' and the unexpressed Experiencer of *tokui da* 'be proud of' in S5 may be regarded as one and the same group of people (those who applaud improperly at a concert).

Example (11) below, taken from the readers' column in a newspaper,³⁵ is part of a reader's letter titled *Tsuri-bito yo* 'To Anglers'.

(11)

1. Shi no uni-zuri-shisetsu e itta kaeri, michi ni ochite ita ito-tsuki no tsuri-bari ga watashi no ashi ni hikkakatta n desu.

1. On the way back from the municipal seaside fishing site, a fishhook with a string that lay on the road caught in my foot.

⋮

(a description of how badly the writer was hurt)

⋮

2. Ato kara ato kara chi ga dete sanzan na me ni aimashita.

2. The blood ran freely, and (I) had a painful experience.

3. Ki o tsukete itadaki-tai wa nee.

3. (I) would like (them) to be careful.

4. Kooshita kikenna mono wa gomi-bako e suteru ka, uchi e mochi-kaette morai-tai mono.

4. (I) want (them) to throw such dangerous things into a trash can or to take (them) home.

The Agent of *ki o tsukeru* 'be careful/pay attention' in S3 is not expressed (PRAR). In the discourse preceding S3, the person who dropped the fishhook that caught in the writer's foot is not mentioned explicitly. Only the fact that there was a fishhook on the road is clearly stated in S1. However, based on the frame 'Going Fishing', we can infer that it was someone who went fishing who must have dropped the fishhook since only people who go fishing carry fishhooks. Then, the Agent of *ki o tsukeru* can be identified as the one who dropped the fishhook since he/she is the one who should have been careful with fishhooks. By this identification, S3 can be taken as an admonition to the person who dropped the fishhook that caught in the writer's foot.

It may be even more appropriate to assume that the writer of S3 has in mind not only the particular person who dropped the fishhook, but all individuals who go fishing. This added assumption renders S3 much more meaningful in so far as the writer's purpose in stating S3 (and the entire letter) was probably to warn all fishermen in order to prevent further accidents. Therefore, everyone who goes fishing becomes the appropriate Agent of *ki o tsukeru*. Incidentally, in this interpretation of S3, the word *tsuri-bito* 'angler' in the title of the letter can be interpreted as anglers in general rather than one angler in particular.

Accordingly, the unexpressed Agent of *suteru* 'throw away' and that of *mochi-kaeru* 'take home' in S4 can be inferred as non-specific anglers. The noun phrase *kooshita kikenna mono* 'such dangerous things' in S4 supports this inference because it indicates that the speaker is concerned with more than one specific past event.

Even more generally, the noun phrase *kooshita kikenna mono* may refer not just to fishhooks but to any other dangerous objects. In this sense, it is also possible to regard the Agent of *suteru* and *mochi-kaeru* more generally as any

reader who potentially may be carrying dangerous things. In this sense, S4 may be regarded as a warning to any reader.

Example (12) below is an excerpt from an essay in a newspaper column called 'From My Diary'.³⁶

(12)

1. Konogoro wa eki no shyuhen no dooro nado ni wa yataru ni jiten-sha ga nori-sute-rarete ite, aruku no ni mo nanjuu-suru kurai de aru.

1. Nowadays, on the streets near stations and the like, lots of bicycles are left/parked randomly, and (we) find it almost difficult to walk.

2. Aayuu jitensha wa amari doroboo-sarenai no daroo ka?

2. Don't those bicycles get stolen often?

The Agent of *nori-suteru* 'leave/park one's vehicle' in S1 is not mentioned explicitly (PRAR). No specific person is introduced as candidate for the role of Agent in the immediate context. Certainly, the writer himself can not be the Agent since, as indicated by S1, he is the one who looks with disfavor on bicycles left on the road. Rather, the appropriate Agent is assumed to be a group of non-specific people who park their bicycles on the road. Various elements in S1 (i.e., the present tense, the words *konogoro* 'these days' and *dooro nado* 'streets and the like') indicate that S1 is about recurrent events. Accordingly, the Agent can be regarded as those non-specific people who park their bicycles on the street and the like.

In a similar manner, the Agent of *doroboo-suru* 'steal' can be assumed to be non-specific thieves, a group of people different from the Agent of *nori-suteru*.

b. Collective

Each "referent" examined below also belongs to a group of third persons; that is, the speaker and the addressee(s) are not included as a possible "referent." Unlike the previous examples (10)-(12), however, these individuals

are perceived collectively: The action, or the process, described by the sentence applies to the group as a whole and, hence, the responsibility for the action lies with the group as a whole. Usually, these groups are institutions and their members are viewed as people having the institutional responsibility or the authority.

Example (13) below is excerpted from a letter sent to the readers' column in a newspaper.¹

(13)

"Kaku-sherutaa" toka yuu kaku-bakudan no higai o sakeru tame no kapuseru ga uri-das-arete iru soo desu ga, iya na mono o tsukuru n desu ne.

(I) hear that capsules called "Nuclear Shelter" for protection from a nuclear bomb are being placed in the market, but (they) make disgusting(-looking) things, don't (they)?

The Agent of *uri-dasu* 'place in the market' is not expressed (PRAR). No specific person is introduced as candidate for the role of Agent in the immediate context. The appropriate Agent is, however, not "anyone," but the company (or companies) which is (are) manufacturing and selling "Nuclear Shelter" capsules. This inference is based on the frame 'Placing Products in the Market' which includes the following description: Placing products in the market is usually done by a company or by a consortium of commercial entrepreneurs. In a similar vein, the Agent of *tsukuru* 'make' can be assumed to be the same company (or companies) selling the products, "Nuclear Shelter." In order to substantiate this interpretation, it is also necessary to interpret the noun phrase *iya na mono* 'disgusting(-looking) thing' (i.e., the Object of *tsukuru*) as the products "Nuclear Shelter."

Example (14) below is another excerpt from a letter printed in a newspaper's readers' column.²

(14)

1. Watashi-tachi no shi no moeru gomi shuushuu-bi wa kyuujitsu o nozoku mainichi desu.

1. Combustible garbage collection day in our city takes place everyday except holidays.

2. Demo, mainichi shuushuu-suru hitsuyoo ga aru no deshoo ka?

2. But, do (they) have to collect (it) every day?

The Agent of *shuushuu-suru* 'collect' in S2 is not clearly expressed. Candidates for the Agent are the writer of the letter, his/her city, and citizens other than the writer (PLI). Based on the frame 'Collecting Garbage in a City', the Agent of *shuushuu-suru* can be identified as the city or the city authority rather than as the residents themselves.

Example (15) below is another excerpt from a letter in a readers' column.³⁹

(15)

1. Chiba-ken bunka-kaikan de hirakareta ninki-kashu no konsaato e ikimashita.

1. (I) went to the concert of a popular singer held in the cultural hall of Chiba prefecture.

2. Koko de taihen fuyukai na omoi o shita n desu.

2. (I) had a very unpleasant experience here.

3. Kippu o watasu toki, hando-baggu no naka o misete kure to yuu no desu.

3. When (I) gave the ticket (to them), (they) told (me) to show (them) the inside of (my) handbag.

The unexpressed Agent of *hiraku* 'hold/open' in S1 is some kind of organization which held the concert in question: a concert is usually arranged by an organization rather than an individual.

The unexpressed Agent and Goal of *watasu* 'give/hand over' are, respectively, the writer of the letter and the ticket collector. The ticket collector is not explicitly mentioned in (15). However, resorting to the frame 'Concert', we

can infer that the *kippu* 'ticket' mentioned in S3 was intended for the concert to which the writer went. We then also assume that there was a ticket collector at the entrance of the concert hall and that the speaker, a concert goer, gave her ticket to the ticket collector. Here, the ticket collector is seen as a person with institutional authority.

The same ticket collector is also the Agent of *yuu* 'tell' in S3. The frame 'Concert' suggests that the noun phrase *hando-baggu* 'handbag' in S3 refers to the handbag of the writer, who was entering the concert hall, and that the Goal of *miseru* and the Agent of *yuu* are the ticket collector, or the authority, and not the speaker.

1.2.6.4. The Speaker's Group

Each nominal ellipsis examined below can be interpreted as a group of people of which the speaker is one member. The addressee, on the other hand, may or may not be a member. Like the examples in the previous section, these "referents" may be viewed distributively or collectively.

a. Distributive

Example (16) below is an excerpt from an essay printed in a newspaper column called 'From My Diary'.⁴⁰

(16)

1. Hachi-gatsu ni naruto, Nihon-jin wa sensoo to heewa ni tsuite shink-enni kangaeru.

1. When August comes, Japanese people think seriously about war and peace.

2. Shikashi, juugo-nichi o sugiru to, nichijoo-seekatsu ni owarete, kono juudai-mondai o wasure-gachi de aru.

2. But, after the 15th (of August), being preoccupied with mundane matters, (we) tend to forget about this important problem.

The unexpressed Object of *ou* 'chase/occupy' and the unexpressed Experiencer of *wasureru* 'forget' in S2 are not just the writer of the essay, but the Japanese people in general of which the writer is one. To arrive at this interpretation, it is first necessary to presume that the noun phrase *Nihon-jin* 'Japanese' refers to Japanese people in general because no specific Japanese person is introduced, and because the act described by S1 is something that can be performed by every Japanese person. Suppose then that the noun phrase *juugo-nichi* '15th' in S2 refers to the 15th of August, the memorial day for Japan's surrender in World War II, and that the noun phrase *kono juudai-mondai* 'this important problem' in S2 refers to the problem of war and peace which was mentioned in S1. Suppose also that the Object of *ou* and the Experiencer of *wasureru* are the same Japanese people who are talked about in S1. Under these suppositions, the two events described by S1 and S2 can be assumed to be in temporal sequence, which seems the most natural interpretation. Thus, the Object and the Experiencer in question can be assumed to be Japanese people in general who usually think about war and peace every year in August.

b. Collective

Example (17) below is from a letter printed in the readers' column in a newspaper.⁴¹

(17)

1. Watashi wa byooki de guntai ni wa ikimasendeshita ga, yuujin ya senpai-tachi wa zoku zoku to nyuutai.

1. Because of illness, I didn't enter the military, but (my) friends and seniors entered it one after another.

2. Soshite, "Sakura no yoo ni chiri-giwa yoku" to kyooiku-sarete, sono ooku ga mijikai isshoo o oeta no desu.

2. And (they) were taught (with words like) "(Die) without reluctance

like cherry blossoms" and many of them died young.

3. Sensoo, sore ni tsuzuku haisen to yuu konnan no sue ni eta tootoi heewa.

3. The precious peace (we) got after the hardship, that is, the war and the succeeding defeat in the war.

4. Nido to wakamono-ra o senjoo e okuri, "Chiru sakura, nokoru sakura mo chiru sakura" nado to yuu kanashii isho o kakasete wa naranai.

4. (We) should never send young people to battle-fields again and make (them) write sad wills like "Falling cherry blossoms, the remaining blossoms will also be falling."

The Agent of *eru* 'get' in S3 is not expressed. Its candidates are the writer of the letter, his friends, and seniors who died in the war and the military authority (i.e., the Agent of *kyoouiku-suru* 'teach' in S2). However, the appropriate Agent is not just these people, but the whole Japanese nation of which the writer, the other candidates and most of the readers are members. From the noun phrase *haisen* 'defeat in war' in S3, we can assume that the writer of the letter is talking about World War II. Then, the one who got "precious peace" through the "hardship" of the defeat can be inferred as the whole Japanese nation rather than some individuals.

The unexpressed Agent of *okuru* 'send' and that of *kakaseru* 'make (one) write' in S4 are also the Japanese nation: The frame 'War' and the specific knowledge about the Japanese nation and war indicate that the most appropriate assumption is that the Japanese nation, rather than some individuals, is responsible for sending young people to war and subsequently making them write sad wills.

(18)

Tekitoo na kaisha ga ari, sono sha no jinji-ka e itte rireki-sho o watashi-mashita tokoro, "Isshuu-kan hodo de mensetsu-bi o renraku-shimasu."

There was an appropriate company, so (I) went to the personnel office of that company, and handed in (my) resume, then (they said), "In a

week or so, (we) will let (you) know the interview date."

In Example (18), also an excerpt from a letter in a newspaper's readers' column,⁴² the unexpressed Agent of *renraku-suru* 'notify' is the personnel office of which the speaker of the quoted part in (18) is a member: The Agent is not the speaker of the quoted part as an individual, but rather as the speaker's office as a whole, since the latter carries the responsibility for the act of notifying the interview date.

"Referents" as institutional persons like the one in (18) are often seen in advertisements. The Goal of *go-yoyaku-kudasaru* 'order' and the Agent of *okuri-suru* 'send' in (19) below⁴³ are such examples.

(19)

Shoten ga tookute, o-motome-ni nari-nikui kata mo chokusetsu go-yoyaku-kudasareba, hakkoo-bi ni wa o-temoto ni o-okuri-itashimasu.

Even if you have difficulty in buying (our magazine) because book-stores are far away, if (you) order from (us) directly, (we) will send (one to you) by the date of issue.

1.2.6.5. The Addressee's Group

The instances of nominal ellipsis in the examples below can be interpreted as a group of people of which the addressee is a member. The "referents" of this type may be viewed distributively or collectively.

a. Distributive

(20)

Anata no inaka de wa o-shoogatsu wa donna fuu ni iwau no desu ka.

In your hometown, how do (you) celebrate a new year?

In Example (19), the speaker is talking about the addressee's hometown. Accordingly, the unexpressed Agent of *iwau* 'celebrate' can be regarded, not

just as the addressee, but as the people in the addressee's hometown where the addressee is a resident member.

b. Collective

(21)

(at a department store)

Kyaku: Kono terebi, kyoo motte kaerenai n desu ga, uchi made todokete kuremasen ka?

Customer: (I) won't be able to take this TV home today, but can't (you) deliver (this) to (my) home?

Since delivering merchandise is the store's responsibility, the unexpressed Agent of *todokeru* 'deliver' in (21) can be assumed to be the department store at which the addressee works; i.e., the addressee as an institutional person rather than as an individual.

1.3. Pragmatic Functions of Nominal Ellipsis in Japanese

I pointed out in Section 1.1. that although avoidance of redundancy is an important function of nominal ellipsis in Japanese, it is not the only one. We must not overlook the pragmatic functions of nominal ellipsis. Section 1.3. discusses such pragmatic functions. I will analyze two major functions: (1) mitigation of speech acts (Sub-section 1.3.1.) and (2) avoidance of commitment to a particular reference (Sub-section 1.3.2.). As will be shown, reasons for employing nominal ellipsis with these functions are politeness, avoidance of responsibility, avoidance of certain social connotations associated with explicit references, etc.

1.3.1. Mitigation of Speech Acts

Speaking explicitly may sometimes cause an unnecessary friction in human relations, for to use an explicit expression is to impose the speaker's meaning on the addressee. Depending on the nature of this imposition, it may hurt the addressee's feelings to a greater or lesser extent. Various forms of indirect, or inexplicit, expressions have evolved in Japanese in order to prevent such unpleasant consequences.

Japanese culture, compared to some other cultures, seems to especially favor indirect expressions as signs of politeness. This tendency seems largely due to the nature of Japanese society, which has been variously described as "closed," "homogeneous," and "group-oriented" (Nakane 1967, 1972; Suzuki 1975; Minami 1983). In a society of this sort, one tries to assimilate as much as possible so as to be comfortably accepted by the society to which he/she belongs. Under these circumstances, if one asserts (verbally) him/herself strongly, the chance of making the others frown is not insignificant: To say directly what one has in mind might suggest that he/she is confronting the addressee and does not mind being different from others. To give such an impression is considered offensive and rude. Accordingly, native speakers of Japanese are generally extremely cautious and sensitive about the use of direct and indirect expressions. (See Part II for further discussion on this topic.)

Nominal ellipsis is one means Japanese people employ for making utterances less direct and/or less offensive. (Other means are different kinds of hedges, substitutions of speech acts, verbal and clausal ellipsis, intransitive as opposed to transitive sentences, sentence-initial, -medial, and -final particles, etc. See Part II for further discussion.) As we have seen, in Japanese a sentence is grammatical even if the subject, direct object, indirect object, or any other noun phrase argument is not specified. Thus, to state a referent explicitly

when it is inferable/clear without any overt reference is to place emphasis on the referent in question. Such emphatic reference is often used at paragraph/episode boundaries or when some kind of contrast is made. (See Hinds 1978, 1984; Hinds and Hinds 1979; Kuno 1978, 1984; Clancy 1980; Makino 1980 for discussion of these uses of explicit references.) But when there is no need for emphasis, then an overt reference may become disturbing to the addressee: For one thing, it is rude to say, overtly, things that are obvious to the addressee; for another, it suggests that the speaker is being unnecessarily assertive. It follows from this that the use of nominal ellipsis can bring about an effect of making an utterance less imposing and less offensive.

In the following, I will discuss some examples in which different kinds of speech acts are mitigated through nominal ellipsis. The major reason for making an utterance less direct through the use of ellipsis is politeness. But, as will be shown, there exist other reasons such as avoidance of responsibility. It will also be demonstrated that ellipsis may be employed even when it is uninterpretable, or interpretable only vaguely. Such cases occur when the speaker intends to hide certain information for some reason.

(1) (Watashi ga) sekkaku katte kita noni, (anata) tabenai no.

(I) bought this specially (for you), but (you) are not going to eat (it)?

(2) (Watashi wa kachoo-san ga) osshatta toori ni shita n desu ga.

(I) did exactly what (you, the chief) told (me) to do *ga*.

(3) (Kimi ga) anna koto o suru kara ikenai n da yo.

Since (you) did such a thing, (this) is not good.

Examples (1)-(3) are typically used for making a complaint, accusation, and/or objection. (I am assuming that speech acts of utterances are indeterminate. See Leech (1983) for discussion on this matter.) If the agents of the actions in the two clauses in (1) are overtly mentioned, as shown in the

parentheses, the agents become more contrastive: The utterance can be taken as "*I* did such a nice thing for you, but *you* do not appreciate it." (In Examples (1) through (9), words that could be expressed are specified in parentheses.) Accordingly, the tone of accusation or complaint becomes stronger. Unless the speaker intends to use such a strong expression, he/she would leave the agents unspecified. (The speaker might make use of explicit references in (1) to accuse the addressee in a joking manner, especially when the speaker and the addressee are in close relation.)

Similarly, if both agents in Example (2) are specified, the force of the complaint, objection and/or accusation intensifies: The explicit references increase the degree of confrontation between the speaker and the addressee since they mark clearly that the addressee, not the speaker, is responsible for the (unpleasant) event in question. Thus, in a situation like (2) in which the addressee is socially higher than the speaker (cf. indicated by the honorific verb *ossharu* 'say'), it would be prudent to use ellipsis. In a similar vein, the ellipsis for the agent of *suru* 'do' in Example (3) would weaken the force of the accusation and/or complaint while an explicit reference for the agent would be more offensive, since it singles out the agent (or the accused) overtly.

In Examples (1)-(3) above, ellipsis is applied for the speaker and addressee. Ellipsis can also be used to indicate a third person less directly.

(4) A: Ara, moo kaeru no.

A: Are (you) leaving already?

B: Um, osoku naru to mata (o-shuutome-san kara) iyami o iwareru kara.

B: Yes, if (it (my return)) is late, (I) will be criticized (by my mother-in-law) again.

A: Soo. Anata mo (o-shuutome-san ni wa) iroiro ki o tsukatte ru no ne.

A: Oh, you are quite concerned (with your mother-in-law), aren't

(you)?

Both A and B in Example (4) use ellipsis in talking about B's mother-in-law, (a) because the "referent" is obvious for them without an explicit reference, and (b) because they are speaking ill of B's mother-in-law behind her back. Especially when there is a bystander who may feel uncomfortable with A and B's conversation, the use of ellipsis is apposite. (Depending on context, the bystander may or may not understand whom A and B are talking about.) As in this example, one might employ nominal ellipsis when backbiting someone or when talking about a taboo or anything unpleasant: By ellipsis, he/she can be less embarrassed with him/herself, and also can lessen the degree of offending others, such as the third person "referent" and bystander(s). Furthermore, when the "referent" is assumed not to be inferable for the bystander(s), one can use ellipsis to hide the "referent."

(5) Wife: Kyoo (anata no) o-kaa-sama ga o-sushi o tsukutte kudasatta wa.

Wife: Today, (your) mother made sushi (for us).

Husband: Soo. Ofukuro no sushi wa umai n da yo naa. Nanishiro, (ofukuro wa) ryoori no meejin da kara. (Ofukuro no) nimono nante saikoo da ne.

Husband: Is that so? My mother's sushi is delicious. (My mother) is an expert at cooking. (My mother's) *nimono*, (the name of a Japanese dish) for instance, is superb.

In Example (5), where, instead of ellipsis, the husband uses the word *ofukuro* 'my mother' three times, his utterance may be offensive because the explicit references may be construed as contrastive (i.e., his mother who is good at cooking as opposed to his wife who is not): It increases the chance of his utterance being taken as a criticism of his wife.

Incidentally, in the above example, the wife is referring to her mother-in-law as *o-kaa-sama* 'mother'. When the mother-in-law lives with the couple, for the wife to call her *anata no o-kaa-sama* 'your mother' would displease her

husband unless there is a need for disambiguation or contrast: To keep calling her *anata no o-kaa-sama* would be to say "she is your mother, not mine," and hence to remain distant.

- (6) O-heya ga chirakatte imashita node, (watakushi ga) katazukete okimashita.

Since (your) room was untidy, (I) cleaned (it for you).

- (7) A: Anoo, chotto sumimasen.

A: Ah, excuse me.

B: Ha, (anata wa washi ni) nani ka go-yoo desu ka?

B: Yes. What do (you) want (of me)?

Suppose the speaker of Example (6) is the addressee's secretary. If the speaker specifies the agent of *katazukeru* 'clean/tidy up', the assertion becomes stronger, and the speaker may appear to be imposing her favor on the addressee: The explicit reference would lay stress that it is the speaker, and no one else, who did the act in question for the benefit of the addressee.

In Example (7), if B makes explicit reference to the addressee and to himself, his question may be taken as a challenge, or as accusing the addressee of disturbing the speaker, rather than as an offer of help: Explicit references would emphasize the beneficiary (the one who is disturbing the other) or the benefactor (the one who is disturbed.)

Example (6) above demonstrates a principle of politeness such as the following: When you do a favor for someone, try not to impose the favor. (See R. Lakoff 1975; Brown and Levinson 1978; Leech 1983 for discussions of different kinds of politeness principles. See also Part II for further discussion of these principles.) Using ellipsis for the agent of an action makes the favor appear less imposed.⁴⁴ However, when one has to take responsibility for the action in question, it is better to state the agent explicitly. Conversely, when one wishes to

evade responsibility, ellipsis can be a useful tool.

(8) Kyoo (watashi ga) o-heya o katazuketa n desu ga.

(I) cleaned (your) room, today *ga*.

For example, suppose the addressee of Example (8) is looking for some memo he thought he had put on his desk. Thinking that she might have thrown away the memo, the speaker tells the addressee that she cleaned his room. The use of ellipsis for the agent of *katazukeru* 'clean/tidy up' does not nail down the location of the responsibility which might make the speaker, the agent, look less responsible.

(9) Kyoo (Tanaka-san ga) o-heya o katazuketa n desu ga.

(Ms. Tanaka) cleaned (your) room today *ga*.

Suppose the situation of Example (9) is the same as (8) except for the identity of the agent of *katazukeru*. In this case, the use of ellipsis for the agent enables someone other than the speaker to escape the responsibility. Thus, ellipsis can also be used to protect others. However, in another context (e.g., when (9) is uttered simply to inform the addressee that someone did a favor for him), Example (9) can be exploited to take credit that belongs to someone else. These examples demonstrate that nominal ellipsis is useful for hiding certain information which the speaker does not wish the addressee and/or the bystander(s) to know, and/or for misguiding them to the direction that is desirable for the speaker. In these cases, ellipsis is interpretable only vaguely, or uninterpretable. In other words, such uses of ellipsis do not meet the basic condition on the use of ellipsis -- i.e., interpretability.

1.3.2. Avoidance of Commitment to a Particular Reference

Another important pragmatic function of the use of nominal ellipsis in Japanese is the avoidance of commitment to a particular reference. Here, the use of nominal ellipsis is passive unlike previous instances (i.e., nominal ellipsis for mitigation of speech acts). In this case, it is resorted to simply because the speaker is unable to find a proper reference.

Any native speaker of Japanese must have sometimes encountered a situation in which he/she could not find an appropriate reference to a particular person and evaded this problem by not referring to the person at all -- by using nominal ellipsis. Example (1) below, an excerpt from a reader's letter printed in the women's column in a Japanese newspaper, illustrates this problem eloquently. (This example was quoted by Jugaku (1966:196-197) who used it to demonstrate generational conflict concerning the usage of certain words. The translation, however, is the present author's.)

- (1) Kochira e oyome ni kite mamonaku, o-shuutome-san ni chuui o uketa koto ga aru. Sore wa watashi ga otto o yobu toki ni S-san to yobu sono koto ni tsuite de atta. O-shuutome-san no kotoba ni yoreba, "Ikura tayori nai otoko demo otoko wa otoko, uchi no naka de doo yoboo to kamawanai keredo, kaisha kara hito ga mieta toki toka tanin-sama ni taishite wa "shujin ga mooshimashita" toka "shujin ni tsutaemasu" to yuu yoo ni" to no koto de atta. "Ikura watashi ga baka demo, sono kurai no koto wa" to hiraki-naori-tai tokoro o, shushoo rashiku "Hai, ki o tsukemasu" to kotaete oita ga, soo iwarete kara o-shuutome-san ni taishi, otto no koto o yuu baai, nan da ka totemo kodawaru yoo ni natte shimatta.

Yoso no hito ni wa "shujin ga, shujin ga" to ietemo o-shuutome-san ni taishite wa doo ittara ichiban o-ki-ni-iru no yara, S-san ga ikenai nara, anata no musuko-san to mo ienai shi, umi no oyago-san ni taishite "shujin ga" o furi-mawasu no mo okashii. Soko de, sore igo wa zutto shugo o nukashite, "Hai, yoru o-kaeri-ni nattara tsutaete okimasu" toka "Amai mono wa koobutsu desu kara, kitto o-yorokobi-ni narimasu" to yuu yoo ni atsukatta mono da.

After I got married and came to this house, my mother-in-law once criticized me. It was about my calling my husband "S (the husband's first name)-san." She said, "No matter how unmanly he is, a man is a man. I don't care what you call him at home, but when people from his office visit us, or when talking to others, you should say, for example, "*shujin*

'husband - lit. master/the main person' said so" or "(I) will tell so to *shujin*." I wanted to say to her, "No matter how stupid I may be, (I know) that much," but, instead, I answered her meekly, "I'll be careful." Since then, I have become very conscious about referring to my husband when I talk about him to my mother-in-law. When talking to outside people, I can use the word *shujin*, but when talking to my mother-in-law, what would be the most satisfying word for her? "S-san" is not good (even though she said she did not care how I call him at home).⁴⁵ But, I cannot say *anata no musuko-san* 'your son', either. "*Shujin*" is equally funny when talking to his own mother. So, ever since then, I have been managing to deal with this problem by deleting subjects of sentences as in "*Hai, yoru o-kaeri-ni nat-tara tsutaete okimasu.*" (Yes, when (he) comes back, (I) will tell (him) so.) or "*Arigatoo-gozaimasu. Amai mono wa koobutsu desu kara, kitto o-yorokobi-ni narimasu.*" (Thank you very much. Since (he) likes sweets, (he) will certainly be pleased.)

Difficulty in finding appropriate personal references, such as that experienced by the writer of the above letter, occurs because personal (full) nouns and personal pronouns in Japanese usually carry with them certain social connotation, and hence their usage is far more restricted than usage of, say, English personal pronouns. (Apropos of this, Suzuki (1973) and others have argued that the uses of so-called personal pronouns in Japanese are so restricted that it is inappropriate to regard them as personal pronouns in the same sense as in European languages.⁴⁶) The inappropriate choice of a personal reference may be considered impolite; it may even carry a particular image of the speaker which he/she does not intend to carry. (See below for further discussion.) The employment of nominal ellipsis, then, functions as a compromise to circumvent such a problem.

Japanese people seem to find it difficult to choose appropriate personal references especially for the second and the third person(s). Example (1) above demonstrates such a dilemma surrounding third person references. The writer of the letter wants to be polite to her mother-in-law by using language properly. However, her calling her husband by his first name apparently offended her mother-in-law. For the older generation, calling one's own husband by his first name may suggest that the wife is treating her husband as an equal and, hence,

that she does not fit the model of the traditional wife. She seeks another more "appropriate" reference, but nothing seems to be suitable. As a last resort, she opts out of using any explicit reference to her husband in front of her mother-in-law, relying solely on syntactic and contextual clues. (It seems that recently, referring to one's husband by his first name when talking to one's mother-in-law (or other family members) is becoming more acceptable; and a response like the mother-in-law's in Example (1) is becoming less common.)

A similar phenomenon may occur when one speaks of his/her own spouse to people outside the family. In the case of Example (1), the writer chooses to use the word *shujin* when talking to outside people. However, the less "traditional" women refuse to use the word *shujin* which literally means "master/main person." They then have the problem of finding a good alternative. Examples of candidates for an alternative are: the husband's first name with, or without, the (semi-)polite suffix *-san*, the family name, the words *otto* 'husband', *teeshu* 'husband', *tsureai* 'spouse/partner', *kare* 'he', and *paatonaa* 'partner'. None of these may be satisfying for some women, or for some situations: The words *teeshu* and *tsureai* may seem a little out of date, and the use of the word *paatonaa*, which one sees nowadays in popular magazines and so on, is probably too "fashionable/affected" for most women. The word *kare* may be disliked because of its informal use for 'lover/boyfriend'. While use of the family name is not uncommon in formal occasions, it may have the same effect as the use of the word *shujin*. In addition, it is too stiff for informal speech. The word *otto* is likely to be too formal or impersonal when talking to close friends. Using the first name may be uncomfortable since one may not be used to calling other adults by their first names: In Japan, an adult usually calls other adults who are not family members, or relatives, by their family name. The use of the first name may sound too "sweet." In spite of the abundance of synonyms

for husband, it can be an uneasy task to settle on an appropriate reference unless a woman is able to accept the overtones carried by a particular reference.

Referring to one's own wife when talking to outside people can equally be troublesome for some men. Besides the first name of the wife, there exist a variety of words for wife, such as *kanai*, *tsuma*, *nyooboo*, *waifu*, *kajin*, *uchi no*, *tsureai*, *kanojo* and *paatonaa*. Like the words for husband, each of these words has a certain overtone. And, depending on the situation, some people might find none of them suitable.

Similar problems often arise when one talks to others about his/her own girl/boyfriend. Terms available for referring to one's own girlfriend are: the first or the last name of the girlfriend, the words *kanojo* 'she', *gaaru-furendo* 'girlfriend', *koibito* 'sweetheart/love', *paatonaa* 'partner', and probably others. Terms available for referring to one's own boyfriend are: the first or the last name of the boyfriend, and the words *kare/kare-shi* 'he', *booi-furendo* 'boyfriend', *koibito* 'sweetheart/lover', *paatonaa* 'partner', and probably others. All these references, except for the last name, are generally too casual to use in formal situations. Even in informal situations, none of them may be easy to use for some people: The use of the first name might be too "sweet." Or it may be uncomfortable when one is unused to calling other adults by their first names. The words *kare*, *kanojo*, *booi-furendo* and *gaaru-furendo* may be too casual, or a little flashy or indecent, especially for the older generation. The word *koibito* is too flashy or too "sticky," because it is often used in love stories. The word *paatonaa* is too "fashionable/affected." Clearly, then, it is not unusual for one to be unable to find a satisfying term of reference to his/her own girl/boy friend, and the best one can do in such a situation is not to commit to any explicit reference.

Finding an appropriate second person reference can also become burdensome, depending on the situation. The so-called second person pronouns in Japanese, such as *anata*, *kimi*, *omae*, and *kisama* cannot be used freely to refer to any addressee like the pronoun *you* in English. The pronoun *kisama* is abusive; *omae* is vulgar or very informal; *kimi* is informal; and, *omae* and *kimi* are usually used toward a friend or a person of a lower status. The three pronouns *kisama*, *omae*, and *kimi* are mainly used by men.

The pronoun *anata* may be said to be quite neutral. However, even this cannot be used, without being impolite, to refer to the addressee who is (in one way or other) superior to the speaker or whom the speaker does not know well. One's superior is usually referred to by his/her title (e.g., *kachoo* 'section chief') or by his/her occupation (e.g., *sensee* 'teacher') or by the relevant kinship term in the case of a relative. Calling one's superior by the pronoun *anata* or even by his/her last name with the suffix *-san* is considered impolite. When the last name is used, it should be followed by the title or occupational name. (See Suzuki 1973:151-156 for discussion on the use of the second person references.)

A problem occurs when one does not know the addressee's name, title, and/or occupation. To use the pronoun *anata* (not to mention the pronouns *kimi* and *omae*) for such an addressee is not desirable particularly when he/she is older than the speaker or when he/she seems to be socially in a higher position. Again, the speaker's compromise in such a situation is to avoid committing to a use of any explicit reference to the addressee.

Knowing the addressee well, including his name, title and/or occupation, does not guarantee the choice of a good reference to the addressee. For example, suppose that the speaker is senior to the addressee, but the addressee is his boss at work. In such a case, the speaker may be ambivalent (particularly outside of the work situation) about whether to call the addressee by his title

or by his last name with the suffix *-san*.

Another example of this problem is that between a married couple. References available to a husband for calling his wife are: his wife's first name, usually without the suffix *-san*, the pronouns *kimi*, *omae* and *anata* and some others. References available to a wife for calling her husband are: her husband's first name, usually with the suffix *-san*, the pronoun *anata* and some others. For various reasons, however, one may not find a reference to his/her own spouse which he/she can use comfortably. The pronouns *kimi* and *omae* may sound condescending particularly for a "liberated" wife. The pronoun *anata*, may sound too distant. Using the spouse's first name may not be comfortable either, if one is not used to calling other adults who are not family members or relatives, by their first names. (A spouse is a family member, but not of the original nuclear family.) Thus, under the circumstances, it is not surprising to find Japanese couples who manage daily conversation with their spouse explicitly referring to the spouse as little as possible.

Finding a reference for oneself seems less problematic particularly for women. The pronoun *watashi* or *watakushi* is most commonly used by women. (When talking to a younger family member or relative, the relevant kinship term is used.) Men also use the pronouns *watashi* and *watakushi*. There are also other pronouns available, such as *boku*, *ore* and *washi*. And, compared to women, men seem to encounter more frequently difficulties in referring to themselves. In formal situations, the use of *watakushi* seems most common. *Watashi* may also be used, but it is not as stiff as *watakushi* and/or may sound a little feminine. When talking to a friend, an older family member or relative, or one's own wife, the pronoun *boku* may be preferred to *watakushi* and *watashi*, which may sound too formal or feminine. But, some men might not like the word *boku* because it is a little student-like. Some may use *ore*, but this may be

too vulgar. Some elderly men or men in a higher position may use the word *washi*. But, this may be a little out of date or vulgar. Other pronouns, however, may be equally uncomfortable to use for the same reason explained above.

Footnotes to Part I

1. It is not entirely appropriate to speak of a "referent" in ellipsis since ellipsis does not refer. However, for convenience sake, I will be using the term "referent" in ellipsis to mean the (implied) participant corresponding to nominal ellipsis.
2. As will be discussed later on in this section, Hinds (1980, 1982) has examined nominal ellipsis in Japanese from the point of view of its interpretation.
3. See Lees and Klima (1963), Langacker (1969) Ross (1969) for pronominalization in English.
4. As will be elaborated below, Kuroda distinguished two kinds of ellipsis; he did not treat all instances of ellipsis as derivatives of a transformational rule.
5. See arguments of the interpretivists's view of pronouns (e.g., Dougherty 1969; Bach 1970; Jackendoff 1972; Wasow 1972; Hankamer and Sag 1976). See also Gensler (1977) and Webber (1979) who demonstrate the non-syntactic nature of the antecedents for pronouns.
6. For example, ellipsis may be applied to an obviously less prominent concept as in a case where the concept is a general and vague item. (See Sections 1.2.5. and 1.2.6.)
7. The kind of study done in van Dijk (1977, 1981) may provide some initial clues for approaching this problem. There, van Dijk characterizes topics at different levels as propositions that are drawn by semantic reduction based on entailments of propositions.
8. As has been much discussed in the literature (e.g., Grimes 1975, 1981; van Dijk 1977, 1981; Kintsch and van Dijk 1978; Longacre 1979, Hinds 1977, 1979, 1980a, 82), a discourse seems to be organized more or less according to the hierarchy of topics, though, as was pointed out earlier, the notion of topic is only vaguely understood.
9. Items in the immediate context evoked linguistically or extralinguistically are usually assumed to be given, and the number of such items are usually more than one.
10. In informal discourse, the subject of a sentence may not be expressed. (See Akmajian, Demers, and Harnish.)
11. Both in transformational grammar and in other theories (e.g., Kuno 1978), deletion is applied to the underlying syntactic full form. Deletion in transformational grammar is unique due to the particular underlying structures it assigns to sentences: For example, the sentence *John wa karee o tabe-ta-gat-te iru* 'John wants to eat curry' is assumed to be derived by the application of Equi-NP deletion transformation to the two subjects in the verbal complements in the underlying structure (Inoue 1978:132).

12. In Fillmore, the notion of envisionment of the world of the text is used to explain the process of reading comprehension. In the present study, it is applied to discourse comprehension in general. As noted in Fillmore (ibid. 258), the word 'envisionment' is not to be taken as suggesting too strongly the visual aspect of a text world.

13. See also Crothers (1978) which distinguishes three types of inferences: propositional inferences, connective inference, and inferences of elements of proposition.

14. Fillmore (1982) speaks of a 'Parsimony Principle', characterizing it as "a text-interpretation maxim that says something like: Don't bring more people or props into the text world than are needed to make the text cohere (ibid. 259). Similarly, in Brown and Yule (1983), a 'Principle of Local Interpretation' is said to instruct the addressee "not to construct a context any larger than he needs to arrive at an interpretation (ibid. 59).

15. Regarding this point, see particularly Grosz (1977).

16. See Chafe (1973, 74) and Klatzky (1975) for discussion on the notion of consciousness and related notions.

17. Such a change is a violation of the Gricean conversational maxim of relevancy. See R. Lakoff (1973) and Brown and Levinson (1978) for discussion on the linguistic markings for such violations.

18. Some verbs of feeling (e.g., *yorokobu* 'be pleased', *kanashimu* 'feel sad') are not subjective verbs: They can not be used by themselves as direct expressions of one's own feeling.

19. Some of these words are almost impossible to translate into English. The English equivalents given here are rough approximations. The translation for *garu* is taken from Kuno (1973:84).

20. The translation for *no da* is taken from Kuno (1973:223).

21. In an interrogative sentence, *no da* is used to ask the addressee for explanation.

22. The Agent may be expressed for the purpose of emphasis, contrast, or disambiguation. (E.g., *Kimi ga ike*. 'You go'.)

23. A generic statement may be made with a verbal in past tense, as in the following example: *Mukashi wa ichi-man-en areba, zuibun ironna mono ga kaeta*. (In the old days, if (you) had 10,000 yen, (you) were able to buy quite a lot of things.)

24. Fillmore (1976:10), for example, explains that the frame identifies the experiences as a type and gives structure and coherence - in short, meaning - to the points and relationships, the objects and events within the experience. Schank and Abelson (1977:41) define the script as a "predetermined,

stereotyped sequence of actions that defines a well-known situation."

25. Asahi Newspaper February 1982.

26. Like the interpretation of nominal ellipsis, the noun phrase *kodomo-ra* 'children' is interpreted based on PLI and the frame 'Adult', which may include a description like the following: Usually, an adult (like the writer of the essay) has children.

27. Regarding the inclusion of the writer's wife as a candidate, see discussion in Section 1.2.5.

28. Comparing Japanese film scripts and their English translation, Matsumoto (1981 b) discusses examples of ellipsis in Japanese whose referent is vague or ambiguous and analyzes how they are translated into English.

29. Asahi Newspaper, September 1981.

30. Asahi Newspaper, August 1982.

31. Asahi Newspaper, August 1982.

32. Asahi Newspaper, August 1981.

33. Asahi Newspaper, August 1981.

34. More (magazine), October 1984.

35. Asahi Newspaper, October 1981.

36. Asahi Newspaper, September 1981.

37. Asahi Newspaper, August 1982.

38. Asahi Newspaper, January, 1982.

39. Asahi Newspaper, September, 1981.

40. Asahi Newspaper, August, 1982.

41. Asahi Newspaper, April, 1981.

42. Asahi Newspaper, April, 1981.

43. Kurashi no Techoo (magazine), November/December 1983.

44. Other means for offering or mentioning a favor in a less obvious manner are: use of an intransitive verb instead of a transitive verb, use of a hedge, verbal or clausal ellipsis, etc. For example, one can say, *Heya ga katazukimashita*. 'The

room became clean.' instead of *Heya o katazukemashita*. '(I) cleaned the room.' Such uses of intransitive verbs are common in Japanese. (See Ikegami 1981 for discussion on the use of intransitive verbs in Japanese. See also Section 2.2.2.1.)

45. The note in the parentheses is added by the present author.

46. In the present study, I maintain the term "personal pronoun" since their uses differ from other references in that they are deictic.

II. Verbal and Clausal Ellipsis in Japanese

2.1. Background

Like nominal ellipsis, the use of verbal and clausal ellipsis is pervasive in Japanese. Social, psychological and rhetorical reasons appear to have a great deal to do with this, although avoidance of redundancy is a factor.

Part II investigates verbal and clausal ellipsis in Japanese, particularly with respect to its functions. This initial section (2.1.) consists of two parts: (1) review of previous studies on verbal and clausal ellipsis in Japanese, and (2) presentation of the theoretical framework of my research.

It is important to note at the outset that verbal and clausal ellipsis, as the term is used here, refers to the non-lexicalization of (i.e., non-application of any verbal or clause for) a certain (semantic) item in the situation described by an utterance. ((1)B and (2)B below are examples of verbal ellipsis; (3)B and (4) are examples of clausal ellipsis.) Like nominal ellipsis, the term does not presuppose the existence of a particular underlying lexical full form and its deletion.

(1) A: *Komban o-sushi demo tabe-ni ikimasen ka.*

A: How about going to eat sushi or something this evening?

B: *Ee, demo kyoo wa chotto yoo ga.*

B: *Ee* (Yes/Well), but today chotto (a little) something to do *ga*.

(2) A: *Tanaka-san wa doo desu ka.*

A: How about Takana?

B: *Ee, demo ano hito wa amari.*

B: *Ee* (Yes/well), but he is (not) so much.

(3) A: *Komban o-sushi demo tabe-ni ikimasen ka.*

A: How about going to eat sushi or something this evening?

B: *Ee, demo kyoo wa chotto yoo ga arimasu node.*

B: *Ee* (Yes/well), but today (I) have *chotto* (a little) something to do *node* (so).

(4) *Tanaka-san wa ii hito na n desu ga.*

Mr. Tanaka is a nice person *ga* (but).

As will be demonstrated in later sections, it is inappropriate to regard a particular lexical "full" form as the source of an elliptical utterance: The two differ from each other with respect to their semantic and pragmatic properties. The meaning of an elliptical utterance is often vaguer and more inclusive than that of the "full" form. And, for this reason, an elliptical utterance may bring about a pragmatic effect different from its "fully" specified form.

2.1.1. Previous Studies

To characterize appropriately the functions of verbal and clausal ellipsis in Japanese, one must inevitably view it in relation to the significance of silence and inexplicit expressions in Japanese communication. Literature on Japanese language and culture usually refer to inexplicit expressions, along with silence, as two of the most important features of Japanese communication (Kindaichi 1957, 1962, 1975; Suzuki 1975; Toyama 1976; Nomoto 1978; Gunji 1978; Haraguchi 1982). The popular Japanese phrases, *ishin-denshin* 'communication through heart' and *sasshi no bunka* 'culture of understanding others without words' encapsulate this aspect of Japanese communication. In Japan, it seems generally accepted that one of the most effective ways of communication is to remain silent, or inexplicit, about certain things, thereby leaving the addressee with the responsibility, or the freedom, of supplying the unsaid. Japanese communications, then, may be characterized, to use R. Lakoff's terms, as "hearer-

based" rather than as "speaker-based" (R. Lakoff 1984; Aoki (1985) also supports this view).

A communication which favors inexplicit expressions and silence might be considered to be unfaithful to Gricean maxims of conversation, which are to advance perspicuous expressions for the sake of "maximumly efficient exchange of information" (Grice 1967, 1975).¹ (The use of verbal or clausal ellipsis may be regarded as a violation of the maxims of Quantity and Manner.²) That our conversations (in any language) do not always follow Gricean maxims for some pragmatic reason (e.g., politeness) has been pointed out by a number of linguists and anthropologists (R. Lakoff 1973; Keenan 1976; Brown and Levinson 1978; Leech 1983; Matsumoto 1983).³ Granted that inexplicit expressions and silence play an important role in any culture, there seem, nonetheless, to be cultural differences in the degree of significance of such expressions (or the degree of (un)faithfulness to Gricean maxims). In cultures, such as Finnish (Lehtonen and Sajavaara 1985), Athabaskan (Scollon 1985), and Malagasy (Keenan 1978), inexplicit expressions and/or silence seem to be more valued than in cultures, such as Korean (Watanabe and Suzuki 1981), New York Jewish (Tannen 1985), Italian-American (Erickson 1982), and Igbo (Nwoye 1985). In this respect, Japanese culture certainly belongs to the former group.

The development of a communication which favors silence and inexplicit expressions in Japanese, is often attributed to the closed and homogeneous nature of the Japanese society. (See, for example, Suzuki 1975; Nakane 1967, 1972.) Since people in such a society know each other well, they understand each other without recourse to explicit verbalizations. Moreover, in such a closed society, it is desirable to avoid confrontations as much as possible. Japanese society is, in addition, strongly group-oriented as well as rigidly hierarchical. (See Nakane 1972; Minami 1983.) This social nature seems also to

have contributed to the distaste for confrontation and, hence, to the development of indirect communication.

Among the diverse phenomena covered by the terms 'inexplicit (or indirect) expressions' and 'silence' (e.g., hedges, speech act substitutions, particles, metaphors, ellipsis, and pauses), Part II takes up verbal and clausal ellipsis. Compared to nominal ellipsis, verbal and clausal ellipsis have so far received less attention in theoretical Japanese linguistics, despite its significance for Japanese communication. Literature on Japanese language and culture often point out that Japanese tend to equivocate sentence-finals (as seen in the use of verbal and clausal ellipsis), because they are generally fond of inexplicit and soft expressions (Kindaichi 1957, 1975; Toyama 1976, 1983). However, descriptions of this tendency usually do not go beyond this general point.

Hinds (1982) has examined verbal ellipsis in Japanese with emphasis on the reconstruction of missing verbals. In order to fill in the verbal, he argues, the addressee must rely on the noun phrases and accompanying postpositional particles and, above all, on the relevant nonlinguistic situational information (Hinds *ibid.* 57). Hinds, however, provides no discussion on the functions of verbal ellipsis.

"Nihongo Notes" by Mizutani and Mizutani (1977-1984) offers explanations about the usage of various common Japanese expressions, including examples of verbal and clausal ellipsis. For each example, Mizutani and Mizutani consider specific situations and give insightful explanations about its usage in relation to Japanese culture. For example, (5) below is uttered by a wife who is urging her husband to leave the house so as not to be late for a movie. Mizutani and Mizutani say that (5) could be followed by a clause, such as *osokunarimasu* '(we)'ll be late'. But, such an explicit utterance, they explain, would sound more

demanding or as if the wife were criticizing her husband (ibid. 1979:56-57).

(5) *Moo sorosoro dekakenai to*

If (we) don't go out soon

(6) *Dekinai wake ja arimasen kedo*

(I) don't mean to say that (I) can't do (it), but

Utterance (6) above is an answer to a request for doing some work. Mizutani and Mizutani explain that when an utterance like (6) is used, the speaker is usually implying refusal. Such an inexplicit expression is said to be used to avoid saying 'no' directly to the addressee's request (ibid. 1980:84-85).

(7) *De, kyoo wa ?*

(lit.) Then, today *wa* ?

(8) *Koko wa watashi ga*

(lit.) As for this place, I *ga*

The speaker of (7) is asking his visitor what brought him to the speaker's place that day. Mizutani and Mizutani explicate that after *De, kyoo wa, nan no goyoo desu ka* '(lit.) what business do you have?' or *nani ka goyoo desu ka* '(lit.) do you have some business?' is left out, and that saying it out loud sounds rather coarse and impolite (ibid. 1979:114-115). (8) is uttered in a situation in which the speaker, having finished dinner at a restaurant with his friend, is offering to take care of the bill. Mizutani and Mizutani state that after *koko wa watashi ga*, the verb (e.g., *o-harai-shimasu* '(I)'m going to pay this bill' is not mentioned because people consider it impolite to mention it when one should be polite (ibid. 1984:80-81). The present study has benefited considerably from these examples and apt explanations given by Mizutani and Mizutani.

Monane (1984) characterizes the function of verbal and clausal ellipsis (or extended ellipsis, to use her term) as follows: The use of verbal and clausal

ellipsis enables the speaker to satisfy the expectations/obligations imposed by the Japanese culture under certain social situations (Monane *ibid.* 116). Monane stipulates Japanese cultural expectations (or rules) such as follows: (1) One may not express certain information explicitly; rather, one should let the addressee infer the meaning through hints. (2) When one's social status is lower than the addressee's, he/she should not impose his/her intention, or command, etc. (3) In the case of clausal ellipsis, leave the dependent clause and the conjunctive particle and delete the main clause which is to convey the direct message.

The first expectation cited above is one of the most basic principles for making polite indirect speeches in general. The third expectation describes one general aspect of polite utterances with clausal ellipsis. It is the task of further research to investigate, through an analysis of various examples of verbal and clausal ellipsis, questions, such as: (1) what kind of things may or may not be expressed in making a particular type of speech act; (2) what kind of politeness principles control the phenomena described under (1). The second expectation delineated by Monane may be considered one of the general politeness principles. However, it is to be noted that one may avoid imposing his/her intention or ordering, etc., not only because of his/her relative social status, but also because of the nature of the propositional content and the seriousness of the illocutionary goal. The present study examines various politeness principles relevant to different kinds of verbal and clausal ellipsis. Regarding the third expectation described by Monane, it will be argued here that (particularly when coordinate clauses are involved) a clause which is to convey the direct, or main message may or may not be left unsaid depending on how the unsaid is expected to function.

Although politeness, as suggested by previous studies, is probably a major

factor which triggers a use of verbal or clausal ellipsis, other factors, such as avoidance of responsibility and the creation of expressive effects, should not be ignored.

2.1.2. The Framework of the Study in Part II

The direction of Part II is to set forth a systematic account of the functions of verbal and clausal ellipsis in Japanese. Section 2.2. examines the most important function, namely, realization of politeness. Following the preliminary remarks (2.2.1.), I will discuss three different ways in which verbal and clausal ellipsis satisfy politeness: (1) mitigation of speech acts (2.2.2.), (2) intensification of speech acts (2.2.3.), and (3) avoidance of commitment to a particular honorific or non-honorific expression (2.2.4.). Concerning speech act mitigation, I will first compare verbal and clausal ellipsis with other modes of speech act mitigation in Japanese to see how verbal and clausal ellipsis differ from others. Then, mitigation through verbal and clausal ellipsis will be analyzed in detail with respect to the following types of speech acts: (1) assertion, (2) objection, complaint, and accusation, (3) request, (4) refusal, (5) offering and invitation, (6) suggestion and advice. Under the rubric of intensification of speech acts (2.2.3.), the following speech acts will be analyzed: (1) condolences, (2) apology, and (3) thanking.

Section 2.3. discusses avoidance of responsibility, another important function of verbal and clausal ellipsis. This function is also effectuated through mitigation of speech acts. Examining different types of speech acts, such as assertions and promises, I will investigate how speech act mitigation by verbal and clausal ellipsis enables the speaker to avoid the responsibility for his/her utterance.

Other functions of verbal and clausal ellipsis to be examined in Part II are

as follows: "indication" of intimacy or power (Section 2.4.), "indication" of emotions (Section 2.5.), and attention getting (Section 2.6.).

2.2. Politeness and Verbal and Clausal Ellipsis

2.2.1. Preamble

Politeness is a major activator in the use of verbal and clausal ellipsis in Japanese.⁴ I suggest that there are three different ways in which the use of verbal and clausal ellipsis satisfies the speaker's concern with politeness: (1) mitigation of the illocutionary force of an utterance, (2) intensification of the illocutionary force of an utterance, and (3) avoidance of commitment to a particular honorific or non-honorific expression. The first of these is the most widely used; the third function is also in common usage. The second function seems to be more restricted. (The third function may operate in conjunction with either the first or the second function. The first and second functions tend to be mutually exclusive, although a mitigation of one illocutionary act may bring about an effect of intensification of another illocutionary act. See 2.2.3.)

The succeeding two sub-sections, 2.2.2. and 2.2.3, respectively, discuss mitigation of illocutionary force and intensification of illocutionary force, analyzing how different types of speech acts are mitigated or intensified by verbal and clausal ellipsis. For each type of speech act, the analysis is concerned with the following points: (1) semantic and pragmatic properties of both what is explicitly said and what is implied; (2) politeness principles relevant to (1); (3) differences in the effects created by elliptical and explicit utterance; and (4) the question of how the speaker may successfully imply what he/she intends to imply.

Sub-section 2.2.4. analyzes the third function, avoidance of commitment to

a particular honorific or non-honorific expression. In Japanese interpersonal communication, speakers are expected to choose, from different levels of honorific and non-honorific expressions, words that appropriately indicate the speaker's recognition of the social relationship between him/herself, the addressee (or the third person), and the setting. However, there may arise occasions in which the speaker is unable to find an appropriate expression that does not offend the addressee. Verbal and clausal ellipsis may then be employed as the solution to, or escape from, this vexatious problem. Subsection 2.2.4. examines social situations in which such uses of verbal and clausal ellipsis occur.

Various (universal) politeness principles have been described by a number of scholars. R. Lakoff (1973) stipulates the following three rules: (1) Don't impose, (2) Give options, and (3) Be friendly. The maxims offered by Leech (1983) include: (1) Minimize cost to other (and maximize benefit to other), (2) Minimize dispraise of other (and maximize praise of other), (3) Minimize disagreement (and maximize agreement), and (4) Minimize antipathy (and maximize sympathy). Brown and Levinson (1978) distinguish positive and negative politeness: The former is approach-based -- oriented toward the positive face of the addressee, the positive self-image that he/she claims for him/herself. The latter is avoidance-based -- oriented toward the negative face of the addressee, his/her basic need to be unimpeded by others. Brown and Levinson provide detailed strategies for realization of each type of politeness.

The basic politeness principle for verbal and clausal ellipsis in Japanese may be generalized as avoidance of imposition. It embodies R. Lakoff's first rule "Don't impose," and is related to Leech's principle "Minimize cost to other," as well as to negative politeness in Brown and Levinson's meaning. In verbal or clausal ellipsis, the speaker avoids certain utterances. What is avoided ulti-

mately is the imposition of an intended illocutionary goal. In the following subsections, I will describe more concretely what kinds of impositions are avoided through using a particular speech act. I will point out other politeness principles relevant to verbal and clausal ellipsis when used with particular speech acts. These principles, which are listed below, are mostly related to the basic principle of non-imposition.

Don't impose.

Give options.

Don't be brusque; show interest.

Don't say unpleasant things; don't disagree; don't dispraise other.

Be humble; don't praise yourself; defer to others; be apologetic.

Don't presume.

Be reasonable; give reasons.

Sympathize.

Politeness as examined in the present study is relative, rather than absolute: We are looking at politeness relative to situation. Leech (1983) distinguished relative and absolute politeness in order to study "absolute" politeness. For example, in making this distinction, (1) "Just be quiet" might be thought to be less polite than (2) "Would you please be quiet for a moment?" Leech goes on to explain that there are occasions where this may not hold true: i.e., (2) may be less polite than (1) where, for example, (2) was interpreted as a form of banter, and where (2) was used ironically. Politeness in such cases, Leech says, can be discussed only in a relative sense (Leech *ibid.* 102). Leech proposes, ultimately, that general pragmatics may reasonably confine its attention to politeness in the absolute sense (*ibid.* 84).

The present study examines relative politeness of utterances: absolute politeness, or politeness outside a context, is unimaginable. My assumption is that

an utterance can be polite or impolite only with respect to some (real or possible) social situation. Example (1) above may be said to be *generally* (but not absolutely) less polite than (2) since situations in which such a judgment is true are probably far more common than situations in which it is not. The present study maintains that politeness of utterances is dependent on such situational factors as: (1) the power-relationship and degree of intimacy between the speaker and the addressee (and the bystander), between the speaker and the third person referent, or between the speaker, the addressee, and the third person referent; (2) the degree of formality of the setting; (3) the nature of the propositional content; and (4) the seriousness of the illocutionary goal (e.g., a request for a small or big favor).

Leech argues further that some illocution types involve politeness while others do not, and that the former may be inherently polite or impolite. An illocution type called "competitive (e.g., ordering, demanding, begging)" is said to be inherently impolite. The "convivial (e.g., offering, inviting, thanking, congratulating)" type is seen as inherently polite. For the "collaborative (e.g., asserting, reporting, announcing, instructing)," politeness is largely irrelevant. And, for the "conflictive (e.g., threatening, accusing, cursing, reprimanding)" type, politeness is out of the question (Leech 1983: 83, 104-105). Leech concludes: "In considering polite and impolite linguistic behavior, we may confine our attention mainly to competitive and convivial illocutions" (ibid. 105). (In a similar vein, Brown and Levinson (1978:70-71) state that certain acts (e.g., orders, requests, suggestions, offers, promises) are intrinsically threatening to the addressee's negative face and that others (e.g., criticism, complaints, accusations, disagreement) are intrinsically threatening to the addressee's positive face.)

Although it may be generally true that illocution types like ordering are

offensive whereas illocution types like offering are not, it does not follow that utterances used in these categories of illocution are always polite or impolite. For example, offering may become impolite depending upon how it is said within a particular social situation. Illocutions, such as asserting and accusing, for which, Leech says, politeness is irrelevant, may become more or less impolite depending on the way they are expressed. It may be said that an utterance of any type of illocution has a potentiality to become impolite. In a language like Japanese, particularly, the wrong choice of honorific or non-honorific words makes an utterance impolite quite apart from the illocution type. Examination of the use of verbal and clausal ellipsis in the following sections will also demonstrate that virtually any illocution type may be potentially impolite. "In considering polite and impolite linguistic behavior," particularly in Japanese, there is no reason to confine our attention to certain illocution types such as "competitive" and "convivial." Accordingly, the investigation in the following sections is not restricted to only certain types of illocutions.

Lastly, it is to be noted that in the present study, the illocution type of a particular utterance is assumed to be indeterminate. Although I will discuss the illocution type which seems to be most plausible for a particular utterance, that will not mean that it is the only possible illocution type for the utterance. For example, one given utterance could be an assertion, accusation, and/or suggestion, etc. (See Leech 1983 for further discussion on this point.)

2.2.2. Mitigation of Speech Acts

Within a particular social situation, the speaker may attempt to mitigate the illocutionary force of his/her utterance through various means. The main reasons for mitigation are: (1) the speaker's desire to show his/her politeness toward the addressee (and/or the third person referent), and (2) his/her

desire to avoid the responsibility for his/her utterance. Sub-section 2.2.2. investigates the relationship between politeness and mitigation of illocutionary force through verbal and clausal ellipsis.

2.2.2.1. Verbal and Clausal Ellipsis and Other Modes of Speech Act Mitigation in Japanese

It will be helpful to review the various means for mitigating the illocutionary force of an utterance. R. Lakoff (1980), in analyzing modes of speech act mitigation in English, discusses sentential hedges, lexical hedges, tag questions, and speech act substitution. Ellipsis (nominal, verbal, and clausal ellipsis) is another useful means, particularly in Japanese. Other important means available in Japanese for speech act mitigation include: intransitive verbs as opposed to transitive verbs, and several kinds of (sentence-initial, -medial, and -final) particles.⁵ In what follows, we will take up some examples of different modes of mitigation and compare them in order to see how verbal and clausal ellipsis differ from other modes of mitigation.

- (1) Ano hon wa omoshiroku arimasen.

That book is uninteresting.

- (2) Ano hon wa omoshirokunai to omoimasu.

(I) think that that book is uninteresting.

- (3) Ano hon wa chotto omoshirokunai to omoimasu.

(I) think that that book is *chotto* (a little bit) uninteresting.

- (4) Mada yomi-hajimeta bakari na n desu ga, ano hon wa amari omoshirokunai yoo desu.

Although (I) have just started reading (it), it seems that that book is not so interesting.

- (5) Anoo, ano hon wa omoshirokunai n ja nai deshoo ka.

Anoo, isn't it the case that that book isn't interesting?

(6) Ano hon wa amari omoshiroku arimasen nee.

That book isn't so interesting, is it?

(7) Ano hon wa omoshiroku arimasen wa.

That book isn't interesting *wa*.

(8) Ano hon wa omoshirokunai to omoimasu ga.

(I) think that that book is uninteresting *ga* (but).

(9) Ano hon wa amari.

That book is (not) so much.

Example (1) is a straightforward assertion. It presents the speaker's opinion as if it were undeniably true, suggesting that the speaker is fully committed to take the responsibility for the truth of his utterance. Accordingly, as R. Lakoff (1980:31-32) explains, the choice of an unqualified assertion, such as (1), lays on the addressee the obligation of belief, which, in turn, may offend the addressee. In stating one's opinion, the use of an unqualified utterance like (1) is seldom observed in Japanese except in arguing, quarreling, etc.

Example (2), on the other hand, contains a sentential hedge *to omoimasu* '(I) think' as well as ellipsis for the subject of *omoimasu*. The use of the word *omoimasu* shows a slight reserve for the assertion because it indicates explicitly that the propositional content is the speaker's judgment, not the 'absolute' truth. It thus implies that the proposition is challengeable and that the addressee is not under obligation of belief. The nominal ellipsis for the subject of *omoimasu* further weakens the force of the assertion by obscuring the agent of the judgment: If the subject is expressed, it is likely to imply contrastiveness ('I' as opposed to 'you'), and, hence, may increase the tension of confrontation. (See Section 1.3.1. for discussion on pragmatic effects of nominal ellipsis.)

Example (3) contains the lexical hedge *chotto* '(lit.) a little bit' in addition to the sentential hedge *to omoimasu* '(I) think'. The adverb *chotto* may be used

to qualify (part of) a propositional content; in this example, the degree of the predication (i.e., the un-interestingness of the book) may be qualified. However, the more likely interpretation of (3) is one which takes the word *chotto* as a qualifier of the speech act. (See Matsumoto 1983 for discussion on speech act qualification by the word *chotto*.⁶) In the case of Example (3), the use of *chotto* indicates the speaker's hesitation in describing the book in question as *omoshirokunai*. It is as if he/she were making an excuse, saying "I'm not entirely happy with the words I am going to use, so please be understanding." Even if the speaker thinks that the proposition is definitely true, by adding the word *chotto* he/she can suggest that he/she is not making his/her assertion straightforwardly, that he/she wants the addressee to be prepared for what he/she is going to say, and that after all he/she is concerned with the addressee's feeling. The word *chotto* can ease the bluntness and strength of the assertion.

Example (4) includes the sentential hedge, *mada yomi-hajimeta bakari na n desu ga* 'I have just started reading it, but', and two lexical hedges, *amari* '(not) so much' and *yoo desu* 'seem'. The sentential hedge informs the addressee that the basis for the speaker's judgment about the quality of the book in question is rather weak. This is to suggest that the speaker could be wrong, and, therefore, that he/she is not making a strong assertion. The adverb *amari* '(not) so much' qualifies the extremity of the predicate *omoshirokunai*, making the speaker's opinion safely moderate. The evidential auxiliary verb *yoo desu* 'seem' further weakens the assertion: It makes it explicit that the speaker is not fully confident of his/her judgment because under the circumstances it is merely a conjecture. By this, the speaker (makes it look like he/she) is leaving some room for the addressee to doubt his/her opinion.

Utterance (5) is an instance of speech act substitution. It also contains

the hesitation particle *anoo*. Although the speaker of (5) ultimately wishes to make an assertion, he/she is taking the option of a question: That is, he/she states his/her opinion, but leaves, at least on the surface, the responsibility of the final judgment with the addressee. In this way, (5) formally indicates that the speaker in no way intends to impose his/her opinion on the addressee, and that he/she is paying respect to the addressee's face.

The particle *anoo* at the beginning of the utterance (5) expresses the speaker's hesitation in making the forthcoming utterance: It may be paraphrased as "Sorry to disturb you for a moment. I'm trying to tell you something, so I hope you are prepared." This particle functions as an apologetic prelude to the main theme, and contributes to easing the harshness of the ultimate assertion since it indicates that the speaker is not invading the addressee's current mental state abruptly and disregarding his/her feeling. The particle *anoo* may seem to resemble the lexical hedge *chotto*, which we saw earlier. But, unlike the word *chotto*, *anoo* does not bear a denotational meaning and does not pretend to qualify the propositional content of the utterance. *Chotto* is an excusatory hedge for an inappropriate choice of words or unpleasant speech act, but *anoo* is an apologetic hedge for disturbing the addressee by the very act of speaking. It may be said that *anoo* is a manifestation of more innocent disconcertedness. (In other contexts, the particle *anoo* is also used as a filler when the speaker is having difficulty finding the appropriate word.)

Example (6) contains the sentence-final particle *nee* as well as the lexical hedge *amari* '(not) so much'. The particle *nee* has a function similar to the English tag question (with falling intonation): The use of *nee* is to seek the addressee's agreement with the speaker's opinion, which, in turn, implies that the speaker wishes to share his/her feeling with the addressee, and hence that

he/she has regard for the addressee's feeling. Accordingly, compared to the utterance without *nee*, the utterance with *nee* sounds much softer. (See also Uyeno 1972:74 for discussion on the function of the sentence-final particle *nee*.)

The sentence-final particle *wa* (with slightly rising intonation) in Example (7), on the other hand, adds to the utterance a flavor which is very different from the particle *nee*. The particle *wa* is primarily used by women, and it appears in declarative sentences. Kokuritsu-kokugo-ken (1951:233) explains that the sentence-final particle *wa* indicates a weak assertion and makes an utterance sound milder. (See also Uyeno 1972; Kitagawa 1979.) That an utterance becomes milder with the particle *wa* seems due to the nuance of femininity that this particle carries: What it says may be paraphrased as "I'm making an assertion, but being a woman, I'm doing it gently." Thus, by the use of *wa*, the speaker can prevent her utterance from sounding brusque.

Example (8) is an instance of clausal ellipsis. The difference between it and Example (2) is the presence of the particle *ga* at the end of the utterance. While (2) is a structurally and semantically complete sentence, (8) may give the impression of incompleteness.⁷ The particle *ga* when used between two clauses functions as a conjunction of two (disjunctive) propositions. The occurrence of this particle at the end of the clause in (8) and the subsequent silence may, thus, suggest that the utterance is suspended, and that what precedes the *ga* is not all that the speaker wants to say. Followed by silence, the particle *ga* functions as a signal for the existence of an implicatum⁸ that depends on the meaning of *ga*. (See the following sub-section for discussion of the meaning/function of the particle *ga*.) In (8), what the speaker really means is probably something like "I think that that book is uninteresting, but what do you think?/but I may be wrong." In this way, the force of the assertion is weakened. In this exam-

ple, the assertion which precedes the *ga*, is, informationally, all that the speaker needs to convey to the addressee; but, adding the particle *ga* induces an implicatum that alleviates the force of the assertion.

The particle *ga*, as exemplified in (8), is so conventionalized that it may appear to be a sentence-final particle. Indeed, Kokuritsu-kokugo-ken (1951) treats it as a sentence-final particle which expresses "*hakkiri yuu no o habakaru kimochi* 'one's feeling of hesitation for saying explicitly (everything one wishes to say)'." It appears that whether the particle *ga* of this type is considered a sentence-final, or conjunctive particle depends on the interpreter's feeling about the structural and semantic (in)completeness⁹ of the utterance. As will be seen in the following sub-sections, this feeling about the (in)completeness differs depending on the utterance: The more the use of a sentence-type with the final *ga* is conventionalized, the greater the feeling of completeness.

Yet, no matter how complete an utterance may appear, the particle *ga*, as exemplified in (8), is not to be regarded as a sentence-final particle in the same sense as particles like *nee* (e.g., (6)) and *wa* (e.g., (7)), because the implicatum of the particle *ga* varies depending on the utterance and cannot be reduced to a "single" context-free meaning. The meaning of the utterance-final *ga* is still that of the conjunctive particle *ga*, and the implicatum of the utterance depends on this meaning. The "meaning" of the utterance-final *ga* given by Kokuritsu-kokugo-ken is, as shown above, "one's feeling of hesitation for saying explicitly (everything one wishes to say)" -- a "meaning" obviously too vague and abstract to be assigned as the unique meaning of this particle. The succeeding sub-sections will demonstrate that other particles, such as *nado* 'because', *to* 'when', and the *te* gerundive form of a verbal used at the end of an utterance also "express hesitation for saying things explicitly." As we shall see,

different particles evoke different implications in different utterances, and the differences in implications depend on the meanings of the particles as conjunctions.

Example (9) is an instance of verbal ellipsis. The speaker started out saying something, but did not finish his/her sentence with a verbal. All he/she said is *ano hon wa amari* 'That book is (not) so much'. From this, the addressee feels that the utterance is unfinished, and that the speaker must not have expressed everything he/she wants to convey; the addressee is then obliged to infer the unsaid. In the case of (9), the unsaid can be construed as something negative about the book in question, such as 'uninteresting' and 'not good' -- an inference based on the assorted linguistic, paralinguistic, and extralinguistic, contextual cues (e.g., the negative polarity adverb *amari* '(not) so much', the tone of the utterance, and the addressee's facial expression).

Among the nine examples proffered, Example (9) is the least assertive. The speaker is opting out of stating the main predicate which is supposed to express his/her opinion about the book. It is as if the speaker were trying to say, "I'm afraid to say anything negative about the book since it might offend you. So I choose to omit the main predicate. I hope you can read my mind from the little clues available. However, even if you are able to read my mind, you are free to ignore my opinion in case you don't like it. Just pretend that you didn't hear it, since in reality I didn't say anything explicitly." Even if the predicate is not specified, the contextual cues usually enable the addressee to infer the implicatum, vague though it may be. The issue is that to utter the predicate differs in pragmatic effect from not uttering it. In (9), if the predicate is specified, it may result in exposing an unpleasant matter in public, which, in turn, may affront the addressee. Furthermore, by not expressing the predicate, the speaker leaves, at least superficially, the interpretation in the addressee's

hands, and can appear to be far less assertive. As well, this is a most convenient way of "expressing" one's opinion when the speaker does not want to take the responsibility for what he/she says. (See Section 2.3. for discussion on this point.)

(10)

A: Komiban o-sushi demo tabe-ni ikimasen ka.

A: Shall (we) go eat *sushi* or something, this evening?

BI: 1. Ee, ii-desu ne. 2. Demo, kyoo wa chotto yoo ga aru n desu.

BI: 1. *Ee* (yes/well), that would be nice, wouldn't it? 2. But, (I) have something else to do this evening.

BII: 1. Ee, ii-desu ne. 2. Demo, kyoo wa chotto yoo ga arimasu node.

BII: 1. *Ee* (yes/well), that would be nice, wouldn't it? 2. But, (I) have something else to do this evening *node* (so).

Compare (10)BI and BII. Both BI and BII are indirect refusals: Both contain the same sentential hedge, *ee, ii-desu ne* 'yes/well, that would be nice, wouldn't it?' Although B's answer to A's invitation is really 'no', B, out of courtesy, first utters this hedge in order to avoid outright disagreement and confrontation: The hedge extends a token agreement and shows that B is interested in A's proposal. By this, A's face can be saved.

The second sentences in BI and BII are the same except for the sentence-final form in BII-2, the conjunctive particle *node* 'because'. BI-2 is an instance of speech act substitution (i.e., assertion for refusal), whereas BII-2 is an instance of clausal ellipsis. In BI-2, a complete sentence, the speaker describes a certain fact and pretends it is what he/she wants to do. The addressee is, then, expected to infer that B is making an indirect refusal -- that BI-2 is not just a mere description of a fact, but also the reason for the refusal. Whether the addressee draws this inference or not is left entirely to his/her judgment about the pragmatic appropriateness (or relevance) of the utterance.

In BII-2, on the other hand, the particle *node* explicitly indicates that what precedes the *node* is a reason for something. The silence after *node* may suggest that the speaker is holding back from telling what this something is. This causes the addressee to start working on figuring out the "meaning" of the unsaid, which is something like "I can't go" or "I can't accept your invitation." Unlike BI-2, the speaker in BII-2 does not pretend as if what he/she actually uttered is all he/she wants to say. Rather, he/she gives the impression that his/her remarks are only half-expressed, which, in turn, is expected to make the addressee search for the implicatum. The speaker chooses not to say the second-half, even though it constitutes his/her main illocutionary goal: This is withheld because its explicit mention would be unpleasant for the addressee.

(11)

A: *Komban o-sushi demo tabe-ni ikimasen ka.*

A: Shall (we) go eat *sushi* or something, this evening?

B: 1. *Ee, ii-desu ne.* 2. *Demo, kyoo wa chotto yoo ga.*

B: 1. *Ee* (yes/well), that would be nice, wouldn't it? 2. But, today, *chotto* (a little) something to do *ga*.

(11)B-2 is a case of verbal ellipsis. The speaker began the utterance by saying *Demo kyoo wa chotto yoo ga* '(lit.) But, today, *chotto* (a little) something to do'. But, he/she does not finish the utterance with a predication for the *yoo ga*. The addressee can probably easily infer what the speaker is implying from the words *demo* 'but', *chotto* '(lit.) a little bit', and *yoo* 'something to do/business', and the tone of the utterance. Therefore, the speaker chooses not to specify the predicate, and leaves (at least superficially) the interpretation up to the addressee. To express the predicate is to persist in exposing the more unpleasant part in public. (11)B is doubly indirect in that the addressee is expected to figure out the predicative content, as well as take the utterance as a refusal of his/her invitation. Whether the predicate is specified or not, the

ultimate meaning of the utterance (11)B would be the same. However, the omission makes a difference pragmatically: It reduces any bitterness of the illocutionary act (i.e., refusal).

(12)

O-shokuji no yooi ga dekimashita.

Dinner is ready./ The preparation of dinner has been done.

(13)

O-shokuji no yooi ga dekimashita node.

Dinner is ready *node* (so).

(14)

O-shokuji no yooi ga.

(The preparation of) dinner *ga*.

Examples (12)-(14) may be used as an indirect offer/invitation. (12) illustrates a speech act substitution, (13) a clausal ellipsis, and (14) a verbal ellipsis. In addition, in (12) and (13), the intransitive verb *dekiru* 'become ready/be done' is used rather than the transitive verb *suru* 'do'.

Offering could place one under obligation of acceptance, depending on how it is made. For example, instead of using one of the sentences (12)-(14), one could use a sentence, such as (15) below.

(15)

Doozo o-meshi-agari-kudasai.

Would (you) please eat (it).

(15) takes the form of a direct request for an acceptance of the offer. Compared to (12)-(14), (15) puts more pressure on the addressee to accept the offer, especially if he/she is not so eager to do so. However, if the speaker is more concerned with the addressee's desire, he/she would use an indirect

expression like (12)-(14) rather than (15). The ways in which the three modes (i.e., speech act substitution, verbal and clausal ellipsis) mitigate the force of the offering in (12)-(14) are basically the same as the earlier examples of these modes. (Like (11)B-2, (14) is doubly indirect.)

The use of an intransitive verb, rather than a transitive verb, can also be a useful mitigator in making an offer. Rather than the transitive verb *suru* 'do' ('I prepared the dinner'), the choice of the intransitive verb *dekiru* disregards the agent, making the situation look as if it occurred naturally and effortlessly. Accordingly, the choice of *dekiru* over *suru* makes the addressee feel less obliged to the agent. Hence, the speaker can show his/her reserve.

In this section, we have compared different modes of speech act mitigation in order to see how verbal and clausal ellipsis differ from other modes. While such devices as sentential and lexical hedges and particles may be considered conventional overt signs which work actively for qualification of speech acts, verbal and clausal ellipsis operate subtly by suggesting that the utterance is suspended at mid-point. Verbal and clausal ellipsis also differ from (unconventional)¹⁰ speech act substitution in that they do not pretend to be only a speech act which corresponds to the face value of the utterance. Rather, through an utterance which gives the impression of incompleteness/unfinishedness, the speaker indicates the existence of an implicatum. In Brown and Levinson's metaphor, by ellipsis, the speaker leaves the implicatum "hanging in the air" (Brown and Levinson 1978: 232). While the speech act substitution alleviates the illocutionary force by one deceptive speech act, which is not the main speech act, verbal and clausal ellipsis reduces the illocutionary force by indicating that what is overtly expressed is not all that the speaker wants to say.

2.2.2.2. Mitigation of Assertion

Verbal and clausal ellipsis is a widely used means for mitigation of assertions in Japanese. Clearly useful when the content of an assertion is something that may displease the addressee, it is nonetheless not restricted to such occasions. Even when the content of an assertion is not unpleasant, it is employed pervasively in Japanese simply to avoid sounding blunt. In Examples (8) and (9) in the previous section, I briefly discussed how verbal and clausal ellipsis weaken the force of an assertion. In this sub-section, we will pursue this question through further analysis. The main part of the sub-section is devoted to the analysis of clausal ellipsis; verbal ellipsis receives attention at the end of this sub-section. The conjunctive particles included in the following examples of clausal ellipsis are: *ga*, *kedo*, *node*, *kara*, and the *te* gerundive form of a verbal. These particles are most commonly used for mitigation of assertions (a few other particles (e.g., *ba*, *to*) are also available). We will begin with examples of utterances ending with the particle *ga*.

(1) A: Konkai no konsaato, doo omoimashita.

A: What did (you) think of the concert this time?

B: Soo desu nee, kono mae no wa totemo ii to omotta n desu *ga*.

B: Well, (I) thought that the previous one was very good *ga* (but).

In (1) above, A is asking B about the concert they have just heard, but B answers by giving A his opinion about the previous concert, saying nothing about the current one. Yet, it may be inferred that he does not hold a positive opinion about the current concert mainly through the aggregation of the expressed proposition and the particle *ga* followed by silence. There may be other para- and/or extralinguistic cues for this implicatum (e.g., the tone of the utterance, the speaker's facial expression): In an utterance like (1)B, the particle *ga* tends to be uttered in a characteristically trailing manner to indi-

cate that the speaker is suspending his/her utterance midway. When such an utterance is written, the final particle is likely to be followed by several dots (the graphic symbol for ellipsis), as in (1)a below:

(1)a

B: Kono mae no wa totemo ii to omotta n desu ga

B: (I) thought that the previous one was very good *ga* (but)

The particle *ga* is particularly important for the implicatum in (1)B. The function of the conjunctive particle *ga* is to combine two clauses that are semantically discontinuous in one way or other. A variety of inter-clausal relations may be marked by the particle *ga*, of which the following two are representative and relevant as well to clausal ellipsis: (1) the two propositions combined by *ga* are in some way unexpected (e.g., (2)-(4) below), (2) the clause preceding *ga* is an introductory or prefatory remark for the clause to follow (e.g., (5) and (6) below).¹¹ The first is semantically based while the second is rhetorically based. Unexpectedness in the first relation may vary as follows: (1) two propositions may be contrastive (e.g., (2) below); (2) one proposition may be concessive to the other (e.g., (3) below); or (3) one proposition may be contrary to what is normally expected, given the other (e.g., (4) below).

(2) Ani wa Jazu ga suki da *ga*, boku wa kirai da.

(My) brother likes Jazz, but I don't like (it).

(3) Amari ki ga susumanai *ga*, iku tsumori da.

(I)'m not so keen (to do so), but (I) plan to go (there).

(4) Kare wa nihon-jin da *ga*, hashi ga tsukaenai.

Even though he is Japanese, (he) can't use chopsticks.

(5) Tsugi ni, yosan-mondai desu *ga*, kore wa Tanaka-san no hoo kara setsumee-shite itadakimasu.

Next, (it) is the budgetary problem *ga*, this, (I) will have Tanaka explain (it for us).

- (6) Kore kara Tanaka-san to au n desu *ga*, nani ka kotozuke demo arimasu ka.

(I)'m going to meet with Tanaka shortly, *ga*, do (you) have any message (to him) ?

Returning to Example (1)B, although the particle *ga*, as explained above, is potentially ambiguous, in (1)B it marks two contrastive propositions, one of which is the implicatum. Based on the words *kono mae no* 'the previous one' followed by the emphatic/contrastive particle *wa* and *totemo ii* 'very good', and maybe other extra- and/or paralinguistic cues, it is most natural to assume that the proposition which may follow the *ga* -- and which the speaker is implying -- runs something like 'the current concert was not so good' or 'the current concert was terrible'. But the speaker does not express this proposition because of its negative content. Instead, he describes a situation that is in contrast with what he has in mind. What he states explicitly is the positive aspect of a parallel matter, which functions as a sentential hedge for what is implied. Thus, in this example, both what is expressed and the act of ellipsis serve to mitigate the force of the assertion.

The politeness principles relevant to (1)B are: Don't impose your opinion; give options; don't dispraise other. The second principle, 'give options', is exercised through the vagueness of the implicatum. In (1)B, B alludes only to the fact that he has some negative opinion about the current concert. How negative it is is not clear because B does not intend to disclose his opinion entirely. For one thing, his opinion is negative, for another, he does not know A's opinion about the current concert; so it is safer to vaguely suggest his opinion. In this way, B gives his addressee a certain degree of freedom in interpreting his implication. At the same time, B leaves himself some room for modifying his opinion in later utterances.

How to accept and develop the vague implicatum in (1)B is largely left up to

the addressee. If A, the addressee, is interested in exploring B's opinion more concretely, he may try to induce it by pressing a further question, such as (1)b below, which takes the form of confirmation of the implicatum which A has drawn from (1)B.

(1)b

A: Konkai no wa dame deshita ka.

A: Was the current one a failure?

Or, if A agrees with what B (vaguely) implied, he may elaborate it as he wishes, as in (1)c below.

(1)c

A: Soo desu nee. Konkai no wa chotto hakuryoku ga arimasen deshita nee.

A: *Soo desu nee.*¹² The current one lacked the power a little bit, didn't it?

A response such as (1)b and c serves not only to confirm B's vague implicatum, but also to relieve B from the burden of returning a negative opinion: Thus, A in (1)b and c completes, on behalf of B, what B earlier hesitated to say. Thus, clausal ellipsis like that in (1)B may function as a means to let someone else "finish" the utterance, or corroborate what one cannot easily say.

Suppose, on the other hand, that A in (1) does not agree with B's opinion as indicated by the implication. Here, A might first elaborate, as a token agreement, B's implicatum as he wishes, and then state his real opinion, as in (1)d below.

(1)d

A: Soo desu nee. Bubun-teki ni wa nanten mo atta yoo desu nee. Demo, zentai to shite wa nakanaka yokatta to omou n desu ga.

A: Well, it seems as if there were some partial shortcomings. But, as a whole, (I) think (it) was pretty good *ga*.

On hearing the response (1)d, announcing that A has a positive opinion about the current concert, B may opt to modify his opinion in his succeeding utterances if he wants to avoid confrontation of disagreement, and he can do this because the original implicatum in (1)B was indicated vaguely.

Example (7)B below is similar to (1)B.

(7) A: Kondo haitta Tanaka-kun, doo desu ka.

A: What do (you) think of Tanaka who has just joined (us)?

B: Soo desu nee, shigoto wa hayai n desu ga.

B: Well, (he) does (his) job quickly *ga* (but).

The speaker is suggesting that he is hesitating to say aloud everything he has in mind. The expressed proposition and the particle *ga* (and other extra- and/or paralinguistic cues, if available) indicate (vaguely) that the opinion the speaker is withholding is something negative about Tanaka, which may be something like 'Tanaka is sloppy' or 'Tanaka is not so serious about his work'.

In both (1)B and (7)B above, the main message for the assertion is veiled; it is indicated only vaguely through the implication. What is made explicit is a clue for the implicatum. In these examples, the clausal ellipsis is employed to avoid bringing certain information to the surface.

In the subsequent examples, the speaker's motivation for using ellipsis is not so much to veil certain information, rather, the speaker explicitly states the main message for his/her assertion. But, at the same time, he/she attempts to mitigate the force of the assertion through the implicatum.

(8) A: Kondo haitta Tanaka-kun, doo desu ka.

A: What do (you) think of Tanaka who has just joined (us)?

B: Soo desu nee, chotto shigoto ga osoi n desu ga.

B: Well, (he) is a little slow in doing (his) job *ga*.

In (8)B above, where the speaker expresses his negative opinion about Tanaka, to have not used the particle *ga* after *osoi n desu* 'is slow', would have been to ascribe to Tanaka's characters a wholly negative quality. The harshness of such a speech act is softened by the addition of the particle *ga* at the end of the utterance. By this, the speaker concedes that he could have remarked something like 'otherwise, Tanaka is all right' or 'we can't help it' -- or that he could have expanded on the problem in question by say something like 'what shall we do about it?' or 'do you have any suggestion about this matter?' Although that Tanaka is slow may be all that B needs to convey as a response to A's question, adding the particle *ga*, he shows that he does not mean to be thoughtlessly opinionated. Furthermore, by leaving the implicatum vague, B allows A the freedom to take the initiative in dealing with the opinion B has presented.

(9) Ano hon wa omoshirokunai to omoimasu *ga*.

(I) think that that book is uninteresting *ga*.

(10)

< A is trying to find an apartment for B. >

A: X-apaato nan ka doo desu ka.

A: How about X-apartment?

B: Ee, demo, ano atari wa kankyoo ga yokunai soo desu *ga*.

B: *Ee, demo* (yes, but), I hear that it is not so safe around there *ga*.

Examples (9) and (10) above are similar to (8). ((9) here repeats the same as Example (8) of the previous section.) The speaker states explicitly his/her opinion about the subject matter, but softens the force of the assertion through the implication triggered by the particle *ga*: Utterance (9) implies something like 'I may be wrong' or 'what do you think?'; (10) implies something like 'what do you think?' or 'could that be true?' These implicata are vague, and

cannot be translated explicitly. (See below for further discussion on this point.) The politeness principles important to (8)-(10) are the following: Don't impose your opinion; don't be blunt; give options.

In (8)-(10), the speaker evaluates subject matter, which might affect the addressee negatively. The example below, however, is neutral in this regard.

(11)

< A is a doctor; B is A's patient. >

A: Doo shita n desu ka?

A: What is wrong?

B: Ee, konogoro zenzen shokuyoku ga nai n desu ga.

B: Well, (I) don't have any appetite at all lately *ga*.

The final particle *ga* in (11)B is to indicate that it could be followed by a clause denoting something like 'can you examine me?' or 'I want to know why?' In effect, this particle can transform the preceding statement into an introductory remark for the further development of the dialogue, consequently, B's utterance sounds less blunt in response to A's question. The use of the particle *ga* as exemplified in (11) is very common. (12) below provides familiar examples.

(12)

< a telephone conversation >

A1: Moshi moshi, Tanaka-san no otaku desu ka.

A1: Hello, is this Mr. Tanaka's residence?

B1: Hai, Tanaka desu ga.

B1: Yes, it is Tanaka's *ga*.

A2: Anoo, Yamada to yuu mono desu ga, go-shujin irasshaimasu ka.

A2: My name is Yamada *ga*, is (your) husband there?

B2: Shujin wa chotto dekakete orimasu ga.

B2: (My) husband is chotto (a little bit) out now *ga*.

A3: Aa soo desu ka. Nan-ji goro o-modori-ni naru deshoo ka.

A3: Oh, is that so? What time do you think (he) will be back?

B3: Soo desu nee, hachi-ji goro ni wa modoru to omoimasu ga.

B3: Well, (I) think (he) will be back by 8 o'clock or so *ga*.

A4: Aa soo desu ka. Jaa, sono koro mata o-denwa-shimasu.

A4: Is that so? Then, (I) will call (you) again around that time.

B1, B2, and B3 in (12) all end with the particle *ga*. From an informational standpoint, B could have eliminated the particle *ga*. This particle is added for a pragmatic purpose. It suggests that the speaker means to convey not only what she has actually uttered, but other meanings as well: In B1, this extra meaning may be something like 'what can I do for you?' or 'who is this?' In B2, it is 'did you want to talk with my husband for some particular reason?' or something of this nature. In B3, it is 'can you call us again, later, or what would you like to do?' or something similar.

It is important to note that the implicatum in each of these examples is so vague as not to be paraphrased. To attempt to paraphrase it with one sentence is to restrict its meaning. Rather, these implicata encompass multiple meanings -- which the final particle allows.

The flavors added by the particle *ga* in B's utterances show that B is attentive to A's interests and that she is positively engaged in the current conversation. If she did not use the particle *ga* in B1, B2, and B3, it might give the impression that B is imparting only minimally required responses and that she is not fully engaged in the interchange. The politeness principles most relevant to these examples are: Don't be blunt; show interest/involvement.

In (8)-(12), it may appear that the speaker could have continued his/her utterance after the particle *ga* in order to state his/her positive attitude more explicitly. For example, instead of (10)B, the speaker could also use a sentence

like (10)a B1 or B2 below.

(10)a

A: X-apaato nan ka doo desu ka.

A: How about X-apartment?

B1: Ee, demo, ano atari wa amari kankyoo ga yokunai soo desu ga, doo o-omoi-ni narimasu ka.

B1: *Ee, demo* (Yes, but), I hear that it's not so safe around there *ga*, what do (you) think?

B2: Ee, demo, ano atari wa amari kankyoo ga yokunai soo desu ga, hontoo ni soo na n desu ka.

B2: *Ee, demo* (Yes, but), I hear that it's not so safe around there *ga*, is that really the case?

Compared to (10)B, (10)a B1 and B2 may sound stronger. Both (10)a B1 and B2 seek to elicit specific information. Explicit questions like these leave the addressee no choice but to answer, and hence they may be even taken as a challenge to the addressee. Thus, more wording may become less effective. In (10)B, on the other hand, the speaker's question is left unfinished so that the addressee need not be pressed. Neither (10)B without the particle *ga* nor (10)B with the explicit second clause are able to create the uncritical, mild atmosphere as does (10)B through its vague implication(s).

(12)a

B1: Hai, Tanaka desu ga, dochira-sama desu ka.

B1: Yes, this is Tanaka's *ga*, who's speaking?

B2: Shujin wa ima chotto dekakete orimasu ga, shujin ni nani ka go-yoo deshoo ka.

B2: (My) husband is *chotto* (a little bit) not in, now *ga*, did (you) have something to talk about with (my) husband?

Similarly, responses like (12)a B1 and B2 force the addressee to answer a specific question, and hence deprives the addressee of the freedom of responding to them in some other way he/she might choose.

Above we have examined various utterances that end with the particle *ga*. The semantic properties of the particle *kedo* appears to function almost the same as *ga*, although a conclusion must await a further study. Stylistically, the two particles seem to differ slightly: The particle *ga* seems to be little more formal and stiff than *kedo*, and, for this reason, *kedo* is used more traditionally by women. Some examples of utterances ending with the particle *kedo* follow. (They are not discussed in great detail since they are parallel to the previous group of the examples that end with the particle *ga*.

(13)

A: Yamada-san tte omoshiroi hito deshoo.

A: Yamada is an interesting person, isn't he?

B: Ee, omoshiroi koto wa omoshiroi n desu kedo.

B: Yes, (he) is interesting all right *kedo*.

(14)

A: Doo shita n desu ka.

A: What's the matter?

B: Ee, chotto kibun ga warui n desu kedo.

B: *Ee* (Yes), (I)'m *chotto* (a little bit) not feeling well *kedo*.

(15)

A: Konban hima.

A: Are (you) free this evening?

B: Iya, chotto dekakeru n da kedo.

B: No, (I)'m *chotto* (a little bit) planning to go out *kedo*.

We turn now to examples of utterances ending with the particle *kara* or *node*.

(16)

A: Tanaka-san wa kyoo kite kureru no ka naa.

A: (I) wonder if Tanaka is (doing me the favor of) coming today.

B: Saa, kyoo wa chotto yoo ga aru to itte mashita node.

B: *Saa (Well), (he) was saying that today* (he) has some business to take care of *node* (so).

(17)

A: Mariko-san, osoi wa nee.

A: Mariko is late, isn't she?

B: Soo nee, ano hito no koto da kara.

B: *Soo nee* (Yes/Well), that's her/knowing her *kara* (so).

The conjunctive particles *node* and *kara* connect two clauses that refer to situations that are in causal relation. The difference between the two is subtle. It has been said that *node* describes the causal relation objectively, and *kara* subjectively (Nagano 1952; Morita 1980: 110-113). In most cases, the two particles are interchangeable (e.g., (18) below); but when the subjectivity of the judgement is clear, *kara* may be more appropriate than *node* (e.g., (19), (20)).

(18)

Heya ga kitanai node/kara, katazuketa.

Because the room was dirty, (I) cleaned.

(19)

Heya ga kitanai kara/??node, katazuke nasai.

The room is dirty, so clean (it).

(20)

Anata ga anna koto o yuu kara/??node, ikenai no yo.

Your saying such a thing, (it)'s not good.

Due to the subtle nuances of objectivity/subjectivity these particles carry, the use of *node* is sometimes perceived as being slightly more reserved than the use of *kara* (e.g., (21) below).

(21)

Kyoo wa amari jikan ga arimasen *node/kara*, kore de shitsuree-shimasu.

(I) don't have much time today, so (I) would like to leave now.

Returning to our discussion of clausal ellipsis, the utterances in (16)B and (17)B above are suspended at the particles *node* and *kara*, respectively. We can assume from the function of these particles that what is expressed is, in fact, the reason for what is implied. Then, what is implied in (16)B can be inferred as something like 'I don't think Tanaka is coming today' or 'Tanaka may not come today'; and what is implied in (17)B is something predictable from Mariko's past behavioral patterns in certain situations (e.g., 'Mariko may be fooling around again', 'Mariko is probably taking her time to get ready').

What is implied in these examples constitutes the main message for the assertion. Yet, speakers chose not to express it fully, but rather to hint at it by giving the reason behind it: This is because the full expressions could be unpleasant for the addressee (or the third person), and because it is more or less inferable. The politeness principles relevant to (16)B and (17)B are: Don't impose your opinion; don't say unpleasant things; give reasons.

Let us compare utterances ending with *ga/kedo* and those ending with *node/kara*.

(10)

< A is trying to find an apartment for B. >

A: X-apaato nan ka doo desu ka.

A: How about X-apartment?

B: Ee, demo, ano atari wa amari kankyoo ga yokunai soo desu ga.

B: *Ee, demo* (Yes, but), I hear that it's not so safe around there *ga*.

(22)

A: X-apaato nanka doo desu ka.

A: How about X-apartment?

B: Ee, demo, ano atari wa amari kankyoo ga yokunai soo desu kara.

B: *Ee, demo* (Yes, but), I hear that it's not so safe around there *kara*.

(23)

Tanaka-san ga o-mie-ni narimashita kedo.

Mr. Tanaka has come *kedo*.

(24)

Tanaka-san ga o-mie-ni narimashita node.

Mr. Tanaka has come *node*.

The pairs of examples above were chosen to demonstrate the differences in the effects created by the particles *ga/kedo* and *node/kara*. Example (10)B, which contains *ga*, could be followed by an utterance that means something like 'what do you think of that?' or 'is it true?' This is not the case with (22)B which contains *kara*: (22)B could be followed by an utterance that means something like 'I'm not interested in renting X-apartment' or 'I'm worried about the danger'. In both (10)B and (22)B, B expresses her unwillingness to accept A's suggestion. However, because of the implicata the particles *ga* and *kara* bring about, (10)B is (at least superficially) a little more conceding than (22)B: (10)B treats the expressed proposition (i.e., 'it's not safe around X-apartment') as one whose truth could still be examined, whereas (22)B treats it as a presupposition for the implicatum. Examples (23) and (24) also exhibit differences. (23), which contains *kedo*, may convey a nuance such as 'would you like to meet with Tanaka?' (24), which contains *node*, on the other hand, may imply something like 'please go meet with Tanaka'. Compared to (24), (23) gives the addressee more freedom in responding to the fact that Tanaka has come.

Ending an utterance with the *te* gerundive form of the verbal is another common Japanese linguistic phenomenon, of which (25)B and (26)B in the following are examples.

(25)

< A gave a book to B recently. >

A: Ano hon yonde mita.

A: Have (you) read that book?

B: Um, sore ga, kono tokoro totemo isogashikute.

B: *Um, sore ga* (Well, but), (I)'ve been very busy lately *te*.

(26)

< A is trying to match B and Mariko. >

A: Mariko-san ni atte mita n deshoo. Doo deshita.

A: (You) have met Mariko, haven't you? How was (she)?

B: Soo desu nee, chotto otonashi-sugite.

B: Well, (she) is a little too quiet *te*.

The *te* gerundive form of a verbal may be used to conjoin clauses that refer to (1) sequential events (e.g., (27) below), (2) coexistent situations (e.g., (28)), (3) members of a list (e.g., (29)), (4) a cause/reason and its consequence (e.g., (30)), or (5) an action and its means (e.g., (31)) (Kokuritsu-Kokugo-ken 1951; Ikeo 1964).

(27)

Uchi e kaet -*te* benkyoo-shita.

(I) went home and studied.

(28)

Hanako to koohii o non -*de* oshaberi-shita.

Having coffee, (I) talked with Hanako.

(29)

Kinoo wa imooto ga ban-gohan o tsukut *-te*, ototoo ga heya o sooji-shi *-te*, watashi ga sentaku o shita.

Yesterday, (my) younger sister made dinner, (my) younger brother cleaned the room, and I did the laundry.

(30)

Tonari no sutereo ga urusaku *-te*, nemurenai.

(My) neighbor's stereo is too noisy, and (I) can't sleep.

(31)

Kyoo wa arui *-te* gakkoo e kita.

Today, (I) came to school on foot. (Today, (I) walked and came to school.)

Examples (25)B and (26)B above end with the *te* form of the verbal. Judging from the context, it can be assumed that what precedes the *te* form of the verbal in both examples contains the reason for what the speaker chose not to express after the *te* form, but, rather, is implying: In (25)B, what is implied is something like 'I haven't read it'; and in (26)B, it is something like 'she doesn't suit me'.

It is possible to use the particle *node* or *kara* instead of the *te* form in both (25)B and (26)B, as shown below.

(25)a

B: Um, sore ga, kono tokoro totemo isogashii kara.

B: *Um, sore ga* (Well, but), (I)'ve been very busy lately *kara*.

(26)a

B: Soo desu nee, chotto otonashi-sugiru node.

B: Well, (she) is a little too quiet *node*.

The effect of the *te* form compared to *node* or *kara* is slight. The implicata in both cases are more or less the same. However, the use of the gerundive form

may sound a little less assertive than the use of *node* or *kara*. Both *node* and *kara* unambiguously announce the causal relation whereas the gerundive form is ambiguous and indicates the causal relation through the context.

To replace the gerundive form in (25)B with the particle *ga* or *kedo* is not impossible but it is probably less appropriate if the speaker has not yet read the book in question.

(25)b

B: Um, sore *ga*, kono tokoro totemo isogashii n da *kedo*.

B: *Um, sore ga* (Well, but), (I've been very busy lately *kedo*).

(25)b above, for instance, could imply that B intends or will try to read the book when he finds the time, or something of this sort. Such an implicatum presupposes that B has not yet read the book -- a presupposition which should serve as the answer to A's question. Such an answer, however, seems too roundabout; it could be used if, in actuality, the speaker wants to obscure his answer.

The particle *ga* or *kedo* could also be used in the context of (26)B. Here, however, it is more appropriate to place the evidential verbal *yoo* 'seems' before either *ga* or *kedo*, as shown below.

(26)b

B: Soo desu nee, chotto otonashi-sugiru *yoo* desu *ga*.

B: Well, (she) seems to be a little too quiet *ga*.

(26)b is less assertive than (26) and (26)a. It could imply things such as 'what do you think?' and 'is she always like that?' Unlike (26) and (26)a, (26)b makes no attempt to draw a negative conclusion (in the implication) like (26) and (26)a.

Examples (25)B and (26)B are cases where the speaker shows his/her hesitation for expressing a potentially unpleasant matter. As well, the *te* gerundive

form of a verbal (followed by silence) may be used when the propositional content is not negative.

(32)

<A, an acquaintance of B, greets B on the street.>

A: O-dekake desu ka.

A: Are (you) going somewhere?

B: Ee, hisashiburi ni musume no tokoro e itte koyoo to omoimashite.

B: Yes, (I) thought (I) would visit (my) daughter's place after a long absence *te*.

Although the speaker in (32)B above could have used the sentence-final form of the verbal, *omou n desu* '(it is that I) think', she chose the *te* form of the verbal because it leaves the addressee more with the feeling that the conversation is to continue, and hence softens the utterance. The *te* form in (32)B could be followed with a clause such as *dekakeru n desu* '(I)'m going out'. But, this is redundant, and moreover, if it was said, the whole utterance might even appear defiant to the addressee: 'I'm going out, and do you have any objection to that?'

Using the particle *node* or *kara* in the context of (32)B, as shown in (32)a below, would be slightly more excusatory. The use of the *te* form sounds lighter and seem to be more suitable in a situation like (32), which is an exchange of greetings.

(32)a

B: Ee, hisashiburi ni musume no tokoro e itte koyoo to omoimasu kara.

B: Yes, (I) thought (I) would visit (my) daughter's place after a long absence *kara*.

(32)b

B: Ee, hisashiburi ni musume no tokoro e itte koyoo to omoimasu ga.

B: Yes, (I) thought (I) would visit (my) daughter's place after a long absence *ga*.

To use the particle *ga* or *kedo* instead of the *te* form in (32)B (above) is less appropriate, because the speaker's decision of going to see her daughter is not tentative, and because she need not be vacillating about her decision.

(33)

A: Tanaka-san ni o-ai-ni natta n deshoo. Donna hito na n desu ka.

A: (You) have met Mr. Tanaka, haven't you? What kind of person is (he)?

B: Ee, nakanaka omoshiroi hito deshite.

B: Yes, (he) is a pretty interesting person *te*.

If the sentence-final form of the verbal *omoshiroi hito desu* 'is an interesting person' above was used instead of the *te* form, it might suggest that *omoshiroi* 'interesting' is the only thing the speaker can say about Tanaka. It might give the impression that the speaker is not so eager to develop the conversation any further. The use of the *te* connective form, conversely, can clue the addressee that the speaker is interested in elaborating further about Tanaka's personality. Accordingly, the utterance becomes more polite.

(33)a

B: Ee, nakanaka omoshiroi hito desu *ga*.

B: Yes, (he) is a pretty interesting person *ga*.

If the particle *ga* was used instead of the *te* form in (33)B (Example (33)b above), the orientation of the conversation would change: The *te* form leads one to expect that B will further describe Tanaka positively in a tone similar to (33)B, whereas using the particle *ga* hints that B may describe Tanaka negatively.

(34)

< B is a businessman. >

A: Itsumo o-isogashi soo de, kekkoo desu ne.

A: (You) seem to be always busy, and (it)'s good (for the business), isn't it?

B: Ie, tada isogashii dake deshite.

B: No, (I)'m only busy *te*.

An utterance like (34)B is often used self-depreciatorily in response to a compliment given by others. Here, again, neither the use of the sentence-final form *isogashii dake desu* 'only busy' nor the overt mention of the second clause would make the utterance as mild as (34)B.

The remainder of this sub-section discusses examples of verbal ellipsis used for mitigation of assertion.

(35)

Ano hon wa amari.

That book is (not) so much.

(35)a

Ano hon wa amari

That book is (not) so much

As an example of verbal ellipsis, I stated in the previous sub-section (Example (9) in 2.2.2.1.) that Utterance (35) shows the speaker's hesitation to specify the main predicate, yet, he is suggesting that he has some negative opinion about the book in question. This suggestion is made through the negative polarity adverb, *amari* '(not) so much' and other extra- and/or paralinguistic cues: The last word in (35) is likely to be pronounced in a trailing manner. When (35) is written, it is likely to be marked by several dots, as shown above. As in the case of clausal ellipsis, the dots in (35)a indicate the existence of the implicatum.

Again, the implicatum in (35) is vague: What kind of negative opinion the speaker is holding back is not clear. The implicatum, however, is intentionally

made vague. Like a play in a card game, the speaker shows a part of his hand, watches how the opponent reacts to it, and then decides his next move according to the opponent's reaction.

As shown in (35), verbal ellipsis is often used when the content of the utterance is potentially unpleasant for the addressee or the third person.

(36)

A: Moo, kaeru no.

A: Are (you) leaving already?

B: Ee, osokunaru to, mata o-shuutome-san ga.

B: Yes, if (I) go back late, (my) mother-in-law again *ga*.

(37)

A: Nee, sono nekutai doo.

A: What do (you) think of that tie?

B: Um, ii gara na n da kedo, iro ga chotto.

B: Well, it's a nice pattern, but the color is a little.

In (36)B, what is implied is something like '(my mother-in-law) will get angry (again)'; in (37)B, it is something like '(the color) is not so good' or '(the color) is too loud (or dark)'. These implicata are indicated (vaguely) by the linguistic and extralinguistic context.

Verbal ellipsis may also be employed even when the propositional content is not negative.

(38)

< A is B's mother-in-law. >

A: Kyoo no o-kyaku-sama wa daijina kata desu kara, o-motenashi ni wa kuregure mo ki o tsukete kudasai ne.

A: Today's guest is a very important person, so please be very careful how you treat (him).

B: Hai, sore wa moo yooku.

B: Yes, that (I) very well.

For example, in (38)B, the speaker could use a verbal, such as *wakatte orimasu* 'understand' after the *yooku* 'well'. However, even without this verbal, what the speaker means is inferable. In a situation like (38), not to use an explicit verbal might make the speaker appear more sincere and obedient. The use of an explicit verbal may suggest that the speaker is declaring that she understands well what the addressee has told her, and, hence that she thinks that the addressee does not have to tell her that.

(39)

< A is giving a basket of apples to B. >

A: Kore, inaka kara okutte kita mono na n desu ga, omeshiagari-ni natte mite kudasai.

A: These have been sent (to me) from (my) home. Please try (them).

B: Soo desu ka. Ja, sekkaku desu kara, enryo naku.

B: Is that so? Well, then, since you offer, without hesitation.

The speaker in (39)B could use a verbal, such as *itadakimasu* 'receive'. She does not do so, because to declare explicitly that she is going to accept the gift might make her look less reserved.

2.2.2.3. Mitigation of Objection, Complaint, and Accusation

Speech Acts, such as objections, complaints, and accusations may be considered variants of assertions. What this class of speech acts has in common is that the speaker asserts his/her disagreement with the addressee or the third person referent, or his/her negative evaluation about matters that concern the addressee or the third person referent. These speech acts are therefore likely to precipitate a tense situation or confrontation. Verbal or clausal ellipsis employed to lessen such tension allows the speaker to avoid expressing that

part which is potentially most conflicting with, or offensive to, the addressee (or the third person referent). Politeness principles relevant here are as follows: Don't impose your opinion; don't confront; don't say unpleasant things; don't disagree; don't dispraise other.

As in the case of indirect assertions, the conjunctive particles *ga*, *kedo*, *node*, and *kara* and the *te* gerundive form of a verbal are often used in utterances with clausal ellipsis of indirect objection, complaint, and/or accusation. The conditional particles *ba*, *to*, *tara*, and *temo* are also in common use. Below, I will present examples of utterances ending with the particle *ga*, *kedo*, *node*, *kara*, or *te*. I will offer only brief explanations for each example since they parallel what has been said in the previous sub-section (2.2.2.2.)

(1) A: Kono shigoto wa Yamada-san ni yatte moraimashoo ka.

A: Shall (we/I) ask Yamada to do this job?

B: Soo desu nee, Yamada-san mo ii desu ga.

B: Well, Yamada is good, too *ga* (but).

(2) A: Kyoo deshita ne, Tanaka-san no tokoro e iku no wa.

A: (It)'s today, isn't it, -- to go to Yamada's?

B: Ie, kinoo itte hoshikatta n desu ga.

B: No, (I) wanted (you) to go there yesterday *ga* (but).

In (1)B, which is an indirect objection, the speaker first offers a token agreement, but then suggests by using the particle *ga* that he does not quite consent to the addressee's idea and that there may be a better alternative. (2)B is an indirect accusation and/or complaint. The speaker expresses a desire which remained unsatisfied due to the addressee's misunderstanding. He does not say directly what the addressee failed to do; it is implied. At the same time, by the particle *ga*, the speaker in (2)B can imply some concessive proposition such as '(I wanted you to come yesterday, but) it's all right'. Thus, by (2)B

the speaker indicates that he is not faulting the addressee directly, and also that there is room for concession.

(3) < A is B's wife. >

A1: Buchoo-san nan ka o-maneki-shite, umaku omotenashi dekiru kashira.

A1: (We) invited (your) boss, but (I) wonder if (we/I) can host (him) well.

B: Daijoobu da yo. Nan toka naru yo.

B: Don't worry. We will manage somehow.

A2: Anata wa sonna fuu ni kantan ni ossharu kedo.

A2: You speak of (it) so easily *kedo* (but).

(4) < A is B's son and a husband of Mariko. Yamada is B's friend. >

A: Yamada-san yuuhan tabete ikanakatta no.

A: Did Yamada leave without having dinner?

B: Ee, watashi wa Mariko-san ga hikitomete kureru to ii to omotte ta n da kedo.

B: Yes. I was thinking, it would be nice if Mariko detained (her for me) *kedo* (but).

In (3)A2, which is an indirect objection and/or complaint, the speaker refers to a situation that is actually contrary to what she believes is the case. The addition of the particle *kedo* followed by silence indicates that she is withholding her main opinion which is something like 'it's not so easy for me/a woman to host an important guest like your boss'. (4)B is similar to (2)B. The speaker makes an oblique accusation and/or complaint, stating her desire was overlooked due to what she thinks (and insinuates) is the addressee's fault.

(5) A: Yamada-kun ni Tanaka-san no musume-san o shookai-shiyoo to omou n da ga, doo ka na.

A: (I)'m thinking of introducing Tanaka's daughter to Yamada *ga*, what do you think?

B: Soo desu nee, ii kamo shiremasen nee. Demo, kare wariai bijin-

gonomi na node.

B: Well, it may be a good idea. But, he likes rather pretty women *node* (so).

(6) A: Kono shigoto Yamada-san ni yatte moraimashoo ka.

A: Shall (I/we) ask Yamada to do this job?

B: Soo desu nee. Demo, Yamada-san wa kono bunya no semmon ja arimasen kara.

B: Well, but Yamada is not specialized in this field *kara* (so).

(7) < A is B's husband. >

A: Konban dooryoo to nomi-ni iku kara, osoku naru kamo shirenai yo.

A: (I)'m going to have a drink with (my) colleagues this evening, so (I) may come back late.

B: Ara, demo, kyoo wa otoo-sama ga irassharu kara.

B: Oh, but today (your) father is coming *kara* (so).

(5)B and (6)B are indirect objections. (7)B is an indirect objection and/or complaint; it could also be an indirect request that the husband come home early. The speakers in these examples state reasons which are intended to justify the implicatum which makes up the objection, complaint (and/or request).

(8) A: Atama ga itai naa.

A: (I) have a headache.

B: Yuube anna ni nomu kara.

B: (You) drank so much last night *kara* (so).

In (8)B, the speaker is accusing the addressee of having drunk too much. In referring directly to his bad behavior, she does not express a proposition, such as 'you have a headache' and 'you are to blame'. Compared to (6)B and (7)B, the degree of mitigation by ellipsis in (8)B seems less because the speaker points out explicitly the addressee's bad behavior. Yet, (8)B is relatively less strong than an explicit utterance like (8)a or b below, which is more impor-

tunate.

(8)a

B: Yuube anna ni nomu kara atama ga itai no yo.

B: Because (you) drank so much last night, (you) have a headache.

(8)b

B: Yuube anna ni nomu kara ikenai no yo.

B: Because (you) drank so much last night, (you) are to blame.

(9)B below differs from (8)B in that it contains the sentence final particle *yo*, which may be paraphrased as 'I'm telling you'.

(9) A: Atama ga itai naa.

A: (I) have a headache.

B: Yuube anna ni nomu kara yo.

B: (It)'s because (you) drank so much last night *yo*.

What is not expressed in (9)B is the subject-"referent." The speaker could have said (9)a below instead, but chose ellipsis for the subject-"referent" mainly because of redundancy.

(9)a

B: Atama ga itai no wa yuu be anna ni nomu kara yo.

B: The reason why (you) have a headache is because (you) drank so much last night.

Unlike (8)B where the implicature is ambiguous, what is not expressed in (9)B cannot be other than what is given/evoked -- the fact that A has a headache. It cannot be a new referent like 'the reason why A is to blame' (e.g., (9)b) because the subject-referent of a pseudo-cleft sentence -- which is the base-structure for (9)B -- is the presupposition for the assertion being made.

(9)b

B: *Ikenai no wa yuube anna ni nomu kara yo.

B: The reason why (you) are to blame is because (you) drank so much last night *yo*.

(8)B, on the other hand, could be expanded into either *Atama ga itai no wa yuube anna ni nomu kara yo* 'The reason why (you) have a headache is because (you) drank so much last night *yo*' or *Yuube anna ni nomu kara atama ga itai no yo/ikenai no yo* 'Because (you) drank so much last night, (you) have a headache/(you) are to blame'. (9)B may also imply ultimately 'A is to blame'. However, (8)B and (9)B differ slightly in the way the implicatum is indicated.

(6)B and (7)B, on the other hand, could not be followed by the particle *yo* like in (7)a below; nor could they be expanded into a pseudo-cleft sentence like (7)b below. This is because the implicatum in (7)B cannot be a presupposition. All this is by way of saying that the avoidance of redundancy is not the motive for using ellipsis in (6)B and (7)B.

(7)a

B: *Ara, demo kyoo wa otoo-sama ga irassharu kara yo.

B: Oh, but because (your) father is coming today *yo*.

(7)b

B: *Ara, demo hayaku kaette kite kurenai to komaru no wa kyoo wa otoo-sama ga irassharu kara yo.

B: Oh, but the reason why (I)'ll be troubled if (you) don't come back early is because (your) father is coming today.

In (10)A1 below, A is complaining about her mother-in-law. A1-2 and A1-3 end with the *te* gerundive form of the verbal. The speaker in these utterances refers to the reasons for the implicata. What is implied in both A1-2 and A1-3 is something like 'it's annoying' or 'I can't stand it'. A2 also ends with the *te* gerundive form. It is an indirect complaint and/or accusation. The implicatum

is something like 'you never think about this problem seriously' or 'you never do anything about it'.

(10)

< A is B's wife. >

A1: 1. Okaa-sama ni sukoshi kaji o yatte itadakoo kashira. 2. Ima nani mo nasatte inai node, nani ka to watashi no suru koto ni kanshoo-nasatte. 3. Watashi, nan da ka itsumo kanshi-sarete iru yoo de.

A1: 1. (I)'m wondering if (I) should ask (your) mother to do a little housework. 2. (She) is not doing anything now, so (she) often meddles in what I do *te*. 3. I feel (I)'m always being watched *de*.

B: Kimi ga ii to omou yoo ni sure-ba ii yo.

B: (It) would be good (for you) to do what you think is best.

A: Anata wa itsumo sonna fuu ni ossharu dake de.

A: You always just say something like that *de*.

Now we will move to examples of utterances ending with the conditional particles *ba*, *to*, *tara*, and *temo*. First, I will describe briefly the functions of these conjunctive particles based on explanations offered by Kokuritsukokugo-ken (1951) and Kuno (1973), which I have modified and adapted.

In Sentence X *ba* Y, Proposition X is a preparatory condition for Proposition Y to be true. X *ba* Y may refer to (1) a suppositional event (e.g. (11) below)¹³ or (2) habitual/repetitive events (e.g., (12)); the suppositional event in X *ba* Y may be contrary to fact (e.g., (11)a).

(11)

Ashita, jikan ga are -*ba*, ikimasu.

If (I) have time tomorrow, (I)'ll go.

(11)a

Kinoo, jikan ga are -*ba*, itta n desu ga.

If (I) had had time yesterday, (I) would have gone *ga*.

(12)

Yamada-kun wa maitoshi natsu ni nare -ba, Hawai e ikimasu.

Every year, when summer comes, Yamada goes to Hawaii.

In Sentence *X to Y*, Proposition *X* is a preparatory condition for *Y* to be true. *X to Y* may refer to (1) a suppositional event (e.g., (13) below),¹⁴ (2) habitual/repetitive events (e.g., (14)), or (3) a specific fact (e.g., (15)).¹⁵ The suppositional event in *X to Y* may be contrary to fact (e.g., (13)a). In the suppositional use of *X to Y*, Event *Y* is uncontrollable for the subject-referent (e.g., (13)b).

(13)

Ima kare ni korareru -to, komaru.

If he comes now, (I)'ll be in trouble.

(13)a

Moo sukoshi jikan ga aru -to, deki-ta n da-ga.

If (I) had had a little more time, (I) could have done (it) -ga.

(13)b

*Ashita jikan ga aru -to, ikimasu.

If (I) have time tomorrow, (I)'ll go.

(14)

Yamada-kun wa maitoshi natsu ni naru -to, Hawai e ikimasu.

Every year, when summer comes, Yamada goes to Hawaii.

(15)

Kesa uchi o deru -to, ame ga furi-dashita.

When (I) left home this morning, (it) started raining.

In Sentence *X tara Y*, Proposition *X* is a preparatory condition for *Y* to be true. *X tara Y* may refer to (1) a suppositional event (e.g., (16)),¹⁶ (2)

habitual/repetitive events (e.g., (17)), or (3) a specific fact (e.g., (18)).¹⁷ The suppositional event in *X tara Y* may be contrary to fact (e.g., (16)a).

(16)

Ashita jikan ga at *-tara*, ikimasu.

If (I) have time tomorrow, (I)'ll go.

(16)a

Kinoo jikan ga at *-tara*, itta n desu ga.

If (I) had had time yesterday, (I) would have gone *ga*.

(17)

Yamada-kun wa maitoshi natsu ni nat *-tara*, Hawai e ikimasu.

Every year, when summer comes, Yamada goes to Hawaii.

(18)

Kesa uchi o de *-tara*, ame ga furi-dashita.

When (I) left home this morning, (it) started raining.

In *X temo Y*, Proposition Y is contrary to what is expected from Proposition X. *X temo Y* means that (if not X, then Y, but) if X, still Y (e.g., (19), (21), (22) below). It may also mean that (if not X, then Y, but) if X, also Y (or something similar to Y) (e.g., (20)). *X temo Y* may refer to (1) a suppositional event (e.g., (19)-(21); the first clause in (21) refers to the situation that is contrary to fact), (2) habitual/repetitive events (e.g., (22)), or (3) a specific fact (e.g., (23)).

(19)

Ashita jikan ga at *-temo*, ikimasen.

Even if (I) had time tomorrow, (I) would not go.

(20)

Amari undoo o shi-sugi *-temo*, karada ni yokunai.

If (you) do too much exercise, (it) would not be good for (your) body (either).

(21)

Doose jikan ga at *-temo*, ikanakatta n desu ga.

Even if (I) had had time, (I) wouldn't have gone *ga*.

(22)

Boku wa mainichi donna ni tsukarete i *-temo*, joggingu o suru.

No matter how tired I am, (I) always jōg.

(23)

Kusuri o non *-demo*, naoranakatta.

(I) took medicine, but (it) still didn't cure (me).

Among different uses of the conjunctive particles *ba*, *to*, *tara*, and *temo*, those involving suppositional events are most commonly observed in elliptical utterances that are used for making an objection, complaint, or accusation.

(24)

A: Yamada-san ni moo sukoshi hayaku shigoto o suru yoo ni itte mi yoo ka.

A: Shall (I/we) tell Yamada to do (his) jobs a little bit faster?

B1: Ee, demo seeippai yatte ru yoo desu kara, sonna koto o ie-ba/yuu to/it-tara.

B1: Yes, but (he) seems to be doing (his) best, so (we/you) tell (him) such a thing *ba/to/tara* (so, if (we/you) tell (him) such a thing).

B2: Ee, demo seeippai yatte ru yoo desu kara, sonna koto o it-temo.

B2: Yes, but (he) seems to be doing (his) best, so (we/you) tell (him) such a thing *temo* (so, even if (we/you) tell (him) such a thing).

B3: Ee, demo ki no yowai hito desu kara, sonna koto o ie-ba/yuu to/it-tara.

B3: Yes, but (he) is a very sensitive person, so (we/you) tell (him) such a thing *ba/to/tara* (so, (we/you) tell (him) such a thing).

B4: Ee, demo ki no yowai hito desu kara, sonna koto o it-temo.

B4: Yes, but (he) is a very sensitive person, so (we/you) tell (him) such a thing *temo* (so, if (we/you) tell (him) such a thing).

B1 in (24) above is an indirect objection to what A has just said. The utterance is suspended at the particle *ba*, *to*, or *tara*; the implicatum is something like 'we/you would hurt him' or 'he would be distressed'. This implicatum, in turn, suggests that B disagrees with A's idea. (The implicata triggered by the *ba*, *to*, and *tara* in B1 are more or less the same.) B could have expressed everything he meant to convey, but it might have been too insistent. B3 implies almost the same thing as B1.

B2 and B4, ending with the particle *temo*, are also indirect objections. In B2, *temo* could be followed by a clause which means something like 'we/you would only hurt him'. The implicatum in B3, which contains *ba*, *to*, or *tara*, and that in B4 are almost the same. But, B3 and B4 differ in that the speaker in B4 assumes that even if A (and B) does (do) not tell Yamada to work faster, Yamada may already be hurt/worried, whereas the speaker in B3 does not make this assumption.

(25)

< B is A's daughter-in-law, and Keiko's mother. >

A: Keiko shukudai ga dekinakute komatte ru yoo da kedo, sukoshi tetsudatte age-tara doo?

A: It seems that Keiko is struggling with (her) homework *kedo*, why don't you help (her) a little?

B1: Ee, demo watashi ga tetsudae-ba/tetsudau to/tetsudat-tara.

B1: Yes, but I help her *ba/to/tara* (if I help her).

B2: Ee, demo watashi ga tetsudat-temo.

B2: Yes, but I help her *temo* ((even) if I help her).

Similarly, in (25)B1 and B2, both of which are indirect objections, B does not say all she means. The implicatum in B1 is something like 'it wouldn't be good for Keiko'. In B2, it is something like 'I wouldn't be able to handle Keiko's homework' or 'it won't really help Keiko'. Or it can be something like 'it

wouldn't be good for Keiko'. The difference in B2 is that the speaker is assuming that it would not be good if she helped Keiko, nor would it be good if she did not help her.

(26)

< the same situation as (25) above. >

A: Keiko konogoro kaeri ga osoi wa nee. Sukoshi chuui-shita hoo ga ii n ja nai?

A: Keiko comes home late these days. Wouldn't it be good if (you) admonished (her) a little?

B1: Ee, demo ikura it-temo.

B1: Yes, but no matter how much (I) tell (her).

B2: Ee, demo amari it-temo.

B2: Yes, but if (I) tell (her) too much.

The implicatures in (26) B1 and B2 do not have the same kind of ambiguity as in (25)B2. (26)B1 corresponds to the earlier example (19), and (26)B2 (20): In (26)B1, B means that if she did not tell Keiko to come home earlier, would come home late, but even if she told her very pointedly, she would still come home late. In (26)B2, B means that if she did not tell Keiko to come home earlier, it would not be good, but if she did tell her so, this would not be good, either. Thus, (26)B1 suggests that B is giving up changing Keiko's behavior, but B2 indicates that B thinks that there may be some other effective solution to the problem.

(27)

< A is B's husband. >

A: Ashita, dooryoo to gorufu ni itte kuru yo.

A: (I)'m going to go play golf with (my) colleagues tomorrow.

B1: Ara, ashita wa oo-sooji o shiyoo to omotte ru kara, anata ga inakere-ba/inai to/inakat-tara.

B1: Oh, (I)'m thinking of cleaning the whole house, so you are not

home *ba/to/tara* (if you are not home).

B2: ??Ara, ashita wa oo-sooji o shiyoo to omotte ru kara, anata ga inaku-temo.

B2: Oh, I'm thinking of cleaning the whole house, so you are not home *temo* (even if you are not home).

(27)B1 is an indirect objection and/or complaint. B is implying that she would be troubled if A went out to play golf. In this context, the use of the particle *temo* is not appropriate, -- as it is shown in Example B2.

The following examples involve suppositional events that are contrary to fact.

(28)

A: Kono aida no konsaato nakanaka yokatta desu nee.

A: The other day's concert was pretty good, wasn't (it)?

B1: Ee, soo desu nee, demo moo sukoshi maromi ga are-ba/aruru to/at-tara.

B1: Yes, (it) was, wasn't it? But, if (it) had had a little more mildness.

B2: Ee, soo desu nee, demo moo sukoshi maromi ga at-temo.

B2: Yes, (it) was, wasn't it? But if (it) had had a little more mildness.

In (28)B1 and B2, B refers to a situation which he thinks does not square with the concert in question. What B really means by B1 is that if the concert had had a little bit more mildness, it would have been better/good; and, since it lacked mildness, it wasn't that good/good. The nuance of B2 is slightly different from B1. In B2, B means that the concert was good, but if it had been a little milder, it would have been even better. Thus, B2 is a weaker criticism/objection as compared to B1.

Hinting at what actually took place by referring to what did not take place is a useful technique for making a complaint or accusation. (29)B and (30) below are examples of this (explanation omitted for these examples).

(29)

< A was supposed to help B with some work, but she came late. >

A: Ara, moo hotondo owatte shimatta no ne.

A: Oh, (you) have almost finished (it), haven't you?

B: Ee, moo sukoshi hayaku kite kurere-ba/kureru to/kure-tara.

B: Yes, if (you) could have come a little bit earlier.

(30)

A: Anna koto nasaranaku-temo.

A: Even if (you) had not done such a thing.

Following are examples of verbal ellipsis used for indirect objection, complaint, and/or accusation. It will suffice to present the examples alone since the implicata together with the mitigating effect of ellipsis must be clear to the readers.

(31)

< A is B's husband. >

A: Yamada-kun no kekkon-iwai go-sen-en gurai no mono de ii ka na.

A: (I) wonder if something around the value of 5000 yen would be enough for Yamada's wedding gift.

B: Saa, sore ja ammari.

B: Well, that is too.

(32)

< A is B's mother-in-law. >

A: Okaa-sama kyoo wa watashi ga ban-gohan o tsukurimasu node.

A: Mother, I will make dinner today *node* (so).

B: Soo, arigatoo. Yappari mainichi watashi no tsukuru mono ja akiru deshoo nee.

B: Oh, thank you. (Eating) what I make everyday, (you) are probably getting tired of (them), aren't you?

A: Watashi, sonna tsumori de.

A: (lit.) I, with such intention. (I didn't mean that.)

(33)

< A talking to her friend: >

A: Anata n toko no o-shuutome-san yasashikute ii wa nee. Sore ni hikikae, uchi wa.

A: Your mother-in-law is kind, so it's nice. Compared to that, in my family.

(34)

< A is talking to his friend who created some trouble. >

A: Kimi, dooshite anna koto o. Anna koto o shi-tara, minna ga komaru tte koto gurai, kimi mo.

A: Why (did you do) such a thing? You, also, (should have known) this much; if (you) did such a thing, everyone would be troubled.

2.2.2.4. Mitigation of Request

The speech act 'request' is another area which often requires the use of an indirect expression.¹⁸ Different kinds of request are as follows: (1) The speaker may ask the addressee to perform a certain action (e.g., (1) below); (2) he/she may ask the addressee for a permission to perform some action (e.g., (2)); or (3) he/she may ask for some information (e.g., (3)).

(1) Ashita kite kudasai.

Please come tomorrow.

(2) Ashita Kyooto e it-temo ii desu ka.

May (I) go to Kyoto tomorrow?

(3) Ashita kimasu ka.

Are (you) coming tomorrow?

Depending on context, straightforward requests like (1)-(3) above may dis-

turb the addressee. Verbal and clausal ellipsis can be useful means for avoiding such direct requests. Politeness principles that are most relevant here are: Don't impose your request; give options; don't be blunt; be reasonable; defer to the other.

I will first discuss examples of utterances used in requesting an action by the addressee. An utterance like (1) is clearly very demanding because it indicates that the speaker presumes the addressee can comply with his/her request. Accordingly, it becomes difficult for the addressee to refuse such a request because it may force a confrontation and offend the addressee.

- (4) Ashita kite kudasaimasen ka.

Won't you please come tomorrow? ((lit.) Won't you do me the favor of coming tomorrow?)

- (5) Ashita kite itadakeru deshoo ka?

Would you mind coming tomorrow? ((lit.) Might I have the favor of your coming tomorrow?)

Speech act substitutions, such as (4) and (5) above are in common use as polite requests, though they are highly conventionalized.

- (6) Ashita kite itadaki-tai n desu *ga/bedo*.

(I) would like (you) to come tomorrow *ga/bedo* (but).

- (7) Chotto o-negai ga aru n desu *ga/bedo*.

(I) have *chotto* (a little bit) something to ask (you) *ga/bedo*.

- (8) Ashita wa hito-de ga takusan iru n desu *ga/bedo*.

(We)'ll need a lot of hands tomorrow *ga/bedo*.

(6)-(8) are examples of clausal ellipsis. In (6), the speaker states his desire. The addition of the particle *ga* or *bedo* at the end is expected to lead to the implicatum which is something like 'can you come?' or 'you don't have to

come if you can't/don't want to'. In (7), the speaker makes an introductory remark by referring to the forthcoming speech act itself. The implicatum in (7) is something like 'would you listen to what I want to tell you?' or 'can I present my request?' In (8), the speaker refers to a situation which suggests that he is hoping that the addressee will come to help him. By the use of the particle *ga* or *kedo* in (8), the speaker treats the statement that precedes it as a preparatory remark for making a request.

(9) Ashita wa hito-de ga takusan irimasu *node/kara*.

(We)'ll need a lot of hands tomorrow *node/kara* (so).

In Example (9) above, which ends with the particle *node* or *kara*, the speaker points to the situation in question as the reason for his request. (8) and (9) are paralleled in (10) and (11) below in which the speaker is asking the addressee to be quiet. (10) is weaker in requesting than (11).

(10)

Kodomo ga nete iru n desu *ga/kedo*.

(My) child is sleeping *ga/kedo*.

(11)

Kodomo ga nete imasu *node/kara*.

(My) child is sleeping *node/kara*.

Utterances ending with a conditional particle (e.g., (12)-(14) below) are also frequently used in indirect requests.

(12)

Ashita o-jikan ga are-ba.

If (you) have time tomorrow.

(13)

Moshi go-meewaku de nakat-tara.

If (you) are not bothered.

(14)

Ashita kite itadakeru to.

If (you) could come tomorrow. ((lit.) If (I) could have the favor of your coming tomorrow.)

(15) and (16) below are examples of verbal ellipsis. In (15), the speaker is asking the addressee to pass her the salt. In (16), the speaker is asking the addressee to smoke outside of the room.

(15)

Anoo, sumimasen kedo, soko no o-shio chotto.

Ah, excuse me, but the salt over there *chotto* (a little bit).

(16)

Anoo, dekire-ba, soto de.

Ah, if possible, outside.

I will move now to examples of utterances used for request for permission.

(17)

Ashita tomodachi to Kyoto e iki-tai n desu *ga/kedo*.

(I) would like to go to Kyoto with my friend tomorrow *ga/kedo*.

(18)

Tomodachi ga ashita Kyoto e ikanai ka tte itte ru n desu *ga/kedo*.

(My) friend is suggesting that (we) go to Kyoto tomorrow *ga/kedo*.

(19)

Tomodachi ga ashita Kyoto e ikanai ka tte itte masu *node/kara*.

(My) friend is suggesting that (we) go to Kyoto tomorrow *node/kara*.

Utterances, such as (17)-(19) above may be replaced with a direct request form like the previous example (2). In (17), the speaker's desire is expressed. In (18) and (19), the reason for asking for a permission is stated, although the

particles *ga* and *kedo* in (18) do not describe it explicitly as the reason.

(20)

Anoo, chotto samui n desu *ga/kedo*.

Ah, (I)'m a little cold *ga/kedo*.

(21)

Chotto nodo *ga* kawaite iru n desu *ga/kedo*.

(I)'m a little thirsty *ga/kedo*.

Depending on context, (20) and (21) could be requests for permission or requests for an action. (20) could imply something like 'can I close the door?' or 'can you close the door?' (21) could imply something like 'can I drink this coke?' or 'can you give me something to drink?'

(22)

Okaa-san, kono shukudai o shi-tara.

Mother, if (I) finish this homework.

(22), which contains the conditional particle *tara*, could be used, for instance, to ask for permission to watch television.

(23)

< A child talking to his parents: >

Anoo, ashita tomodachi to Kyooto e.

Ah, tomorrow, with (my) friend, to Kyoto.

(24)

Okaa-san, ano meron sorosoro.

Mother, that melon, now.

(23) and (24) above are examples of verbal ellipsis. (23) could be used as an introduction for requesting permission to go to Kyoto. In (24), the speaker is asking the addressee to allow him to eat the melon.

Requests for information may also be made indirectly using verbal or clausal ellipsis.

(25)

Anoo, chotto o-ukagai-shimasu *ga*/kedo.

Ah, *chotto* (a little bit) (I)'m going to ask (you) something *ga*/kedo.

(26)

Anoo Tanaka-san no o-taku o sagashite iru n desu *ga*/kedo.

Ah, (I)'m looking for Tanaka's house *ga*/kedo.

In (25), the speaker makes an introductory remark by referring to the intended speech act itself. In (26), instead of asking directly the location of Tanaka's house, the speaker describes a situation which suggests that he wants to know where Tanaka's house is.

(27)

< A is a journalist asking questions to B, a medical doctor.¹⁹ >

A1: Saikin wakai hito no haien *ga* fuete kita soo desu *ga*.

A1: (I) hear that recently pneumonia is increasing among young people *ga*.

B1: Ee, kore wa taitee maiko-purazuma haien desu.

B1: Yes, this is usually a mycoplasma pneumonia.

⋮

A2: Uirusu ni yoru haien mo aru to kikimasita *ga*.

A2: (I) heard that there is also a pneumonia caused by virus *ga*.

B2: Sono ichiban hidoi no *ga* infuruenza-uirusu no haien deshoo. Uirusu wa koosee-busshitsu *ga* kikanai n desu.

B2: The worst among them is probably the pneumonia caused by influenza virus. For a virus, antibiotics do not work.

A3: To iimasu to.

A3: (lit.) To say that *to*. (That means?)

In (27)A1 and A2, A presents topics in order to elicit some information about them from the addressee, a specialist in the subject. The implicatum in both A1 and A2 is something like 'can you tell us about it?' A3 is frequently used in asking for elaboration. Instead of articulating the full phrase *To iimasu to doo yuu koto desu ka* '(lit.) To say (that) means what?' A only says *To iimasu to*. This is enough to make A's illocutionary goal clear and it is less pressing.

(28)

Anoo, watashi ni nani ka.

(lit.) Ah, me, something?

(29)

Dochira e.

Where to?

Instead of (28), the speaker could have said *Anoo watashi ni nani ka go-yoo desu ka*. 'Ah, do (you) need me for something?' Depending on context, this might sound like a defiance or inquisition. Similarly, instead of (29), the speaker could also say *dochira e odekake desu ka* 'where are (you) going?' As a greeting, the effect of (29) is lighter and softer.

2.2.2.5. Mitigation of Refusal

Expressing a refusal to a request, offer, or invitation is never an easy thing to do. An explicit refusal may cause a serious loss of face for the addressee. Verbal and clausal ellipsis can be serviceable in tendering an indirect refusal. Politeness principles that are most relevant here are: Don't impose your opinion; don't confront; don't say unpleasant things; give reasons; be apologetic.

(1) A: Komban o-sushi demo tabe-ni ikimasen ka.

A: Shall (we) go eat sushi or something this evening?

B: Ee, ii desu nee. Demo, kyoo wa chotto yoo ga arimasu node.

B: Yes/Well, (that) would be nice, wouldn't it? But, (I) have *chotto* (a little bit) something (else) to do this evening *node* (so).

(1)a

B: Ee, ii desu nee. Demo kyoo wa chotto yoo *ga* aru n desu *ga*.

B: Yes/Well, (that) would be nice, wouldn't it? But, (I) have *chotto* (a little bit) something (else) to do this evening *ga*.

Offering the reason for the refusal, as in Example (1)B above, is a common way of making an indirect refusal. In (1)B, the particle *node* marks the preceding proposition as the reason for the implicatum -- i.e., the refusal. But in (1)aB, on the other hand, the particle *ga* does not specify the same proposition as the reason. Rather, it treats it as a state of affairs that is open to some consideration; that is, the clause preceding the *ga* is presented as a preparatory remark for further discussion. By this, (1)aB suggests that the refusal is provisional. Accordingly, (1)aB appears, at least on the surface, to be a weaker refusal as compared to (1)B. Even if the ultimate illocutionary goal in (1)aB is the same as that in (1)B, (1)aB presents it more indirectly.

(2) A: Ashita, oo-sooji suru n da kedo, tetsudatte kurenai?

A: (I)'m going to clean the whole house tomorrow *kedo*, won't (you) help me?

B1: Ashita wa chotto isogashii kara.

B1: Tomorrow, (I)'ll be a little busy *kara*.

B2: Ashita wa chotto isogashii n da kedo.

B2: Tomorrow, (I)'ll be a little busy *kedo*.

(3) < A is offering sake to B. >

A: Sa, doozo, enryo-naku.

A: Please, without reserve.

B1: Ee, demo, isha kara sukoshi sake o hikaeru yoo ni iwarete imasu kara.

B1: Yes, but, (I) was told by the doctor to refrain from alcohol a little

kara.

B2: Ee, demo, isha kara sukoshi sake o hikaeru yoo ni iwarete iru n desu kedo.

B2: Yes, but, (I) was told by the doctor to refrain from alcohol a little *kedo*.

The pairs of examples (2)B1 and B2 and (3)B1 and B2 are parallel to the pair (1)B and (1)aB. (2)B1 and B2 are indirect refusals to a request for help. (3)B1 and B2 are indirect refusals to an offer.

(4) O-yaku ni tachi-tai n desu ga.

(I) would like to be of help *ga* (but).

(5) Taihen mooshi-wake nai n desu ga.

(I)'m very sorry *ga* (but).

(6) Go-kooi wa arigatai n desu kedo.

(I) appreciate (your) kindness *kedo*.

Other familiar ways of making an indirect refusal are: (1) to show that the speaker has at least a positive attitude toward the addressee's request, even though he/she is not able to comply with it (e.g., (4) above); (2) to apologize for, or to show regret for, the refusal (e.g., (5)); (3) to show appreciation for the offer (e.g., (6)), etc.

(7) A: Komban o-sushi demo tabe-ni ikimasen ka.

A: Shall (we) go eat sushi or something, this evening?

B: Ee, ii desu nee. Demo, kyoo wa chotto yoo ga.

B: Yes/Well, (that) would be nice, wouldn't it? But, today, *chotto* (a little bit) something (else) to do *ga*.

(8) A: Keeki yaita n desu kedo, ikaga.

A: (I) baked a cake *kedo*, would (you) like (some)?

B: Iya, boku wa amai mono wa doomo.

B: (lit.) No/Well, I, sweet things somehow.

(9) A: Ashita oo-sooji suru n da kedo, tetsudatte kurenai?

A: (I)'m going to clean the whole house tomorrow *kedo*, won't (you) help me?

B: Ashita wa chotto tomodachi to Kyoto e.

B: (lit.) Tomorrow, *chotto* (a little bit), to Kyoto.

(7)-(9) are instances of verbal ellipsis. (7) (like Example (11) in 2.2.2.1.) is an indirect refusal to an invitation; (8) is an indirect refusal to an offer; and (9) is an indirect refusal to a request for help.

2.2.2.6. Mitigation of Offering and Invitation

Offers and invitations usually stem from one's goodwill. Yet, they can be embarrassing to the receiver depending on how they are presented.

(1) Kore agemasu.

(I)'ll give this to (you).

(2) Kore sasiagemasu.

(I)'ll give this to (you).

Examples (1) and (2) above announce the offer directly. Concerning these expressions, Mizutani and Mizutani (1980: 62-63) state that "it is not quite appropriate to use any word directly meaning 'to give' in social situations." Even the use of the humble form *sashiagemasu* 'give (humbly)' (e.g., (2)) does not do away with a certain rudeness. Utterances, such as (1) and (2) are very likely to sound arrogant or childish.

(3) Doozo, o-osame kudasai.

Please, accept (this).

(4) Doozo, uketotte kudasai.

Please, accept (this).

(3) and (4), which take the form of a request for the addressee's acceptance of the offer, are generally more polite than (1) and (2). However, these expressions may place one under obligation of acceptance. In some cases, they may even make the speaker appear to be presumptuous or pushy.

Direct expressions of offer or invitation, such as (1)-(4), may be mitigated through verbal or clausal ellipsis. Politeness principles that are most relevant here are: Don't impose your offer or invitation; give options; don't presume; be humble.

- (5) Kore, tsumaranai mono desu ga.

This is a trifling thing *ga*.

- (6) Konna mono, o-kuchi ni aimasen deshoo kedo.

Things like this wouldn't suit (your) palate *kedo*.

- (7) Hon no o-kuchi-yogoshi desu ga.

(This) is just to smear (your) mouth *ga*.

- (8) Nani mo o-kamai-dekimasen kedo.

(I) won't be able to entertain (you) much *kedo*.

(5)-(8) above are familiar expressions used for indirect offers. They serve as introductory/preparatory remarks for what is implied -- i.e., the offer. These expressions all disparage the offer, by which the speaker shows that he/she is humbly offering. If the illocutionary goal is expressed, -- if, for example, (1), (2), (3), or (4) is added after (5), -- the speaker may appear to be unrefined or too demanding.

- (9) O-cha ga hairimashita kedo.

Tea is ready *kedo*.

- (10)

Keeki yaita n da kedo.

(I) baked a cake *kedo*.

(9) and (10) are not self-abasing remarks as (5)-(8). They simply introduce the object of the offering.

(11)

O-cha ga hairimashita *kara*.

Tea is ready *kara*.

(12)

Keeki yaita *node*.

(I) baked a cake *node*.

(11) and (12) also introduce the object of the offer. Here, the particle *kara* or *node* marks the preceding proposition as the reason for making the offer. Compared to (9) and (10), (11) and (12) are relatively stronger as a request. In (9), for example, the particle *ga* allows (9) to be followed by a clause like *doo nasaimasu ka* 'what would (you) like to do?' In (11), on the other hand, the particle *kara* leads most naturally to a clause like *irasshutte kudasai* 'please come' or *o-nomi-ni natte kudasai* 'please drink'. In other words, (9) gives more options than (11). This explanation amounts to the explanation given by Mizutani and Mizutani (1979:77) in which they state that when the speaker "says --- *kara*, he is asking someone to do him a favor as a matter of course," and that "if he says --- *kedo*, it shows that he is hesitant about making the request."

(13)

Kore, tsumaranai mono desu ga, inaka kara okutte kimashita *node*.

This is a trifling thing, but (my) family sent (it to me) *node*.

(14)

Chichi kara o-tetsudai-suru yoo ni iwaremashita *node*.

(I) was told by (my) father to help (you) *node*.

(15)

Mina-san amai mono ga o-suki da to ukagaimashita kara.

(I) heard that all (of you) like sweets *kara*.

(16)

Hon no kimochi dake desu kara.

(This) is only a little *kara*.

Like (11) and (12), (13)-(16) above present the reasons for (justifying) the offer. (The expressed proposition in (16) is not the reason for the offer, but rather the reason for justifying the offer.)

(17)

O-yaku ni tatere-ba to omoimashite.

(I) thought that (I) could be of help *te*.

(18)

O-too-sama ni meshiagatte itadaki-takute.

(lit.) (I) wanted to receive the favor of (your) father eating (this) *te*.

(17) and (18) end with the *te* gerundive form of the verbal. (17) may imply something like 'I have come to help you'. (18) may imply something like 'I have brought/prepared it'. (Note that in (17) clausal ellipsis is also applied within the dependent clause.) The speakers in these expressions present the offer as their desire, suggesting that for the addressee to accept the offer would be to do the speaker a favor.

(19)

Maa, soo ossharanaide.

Maa (Well/please), without saying so.

(20)

Doozo, enryo-nasarazu ni.

Please, without reserve.

Phrases, such as (19) and (20), which end with the negative *te* gerundive form of the verbal or its variant *(a)zu ni*, are commonly used to urge one to accept the offer.

(21)

Moshi yoroshikat-tara.

If (you) like.

(22)

O-hima deshi-tara.

If (you) have free time.

(23)

O-yaku ni tatere-ba.

If (I) can be of help.

(24)

Konna mono de yokere-ba.

If something like this will do.

Stating a condition for acceptance of the offer or invitation as in (21)-(24) is another commonly used way of making an indirect offer or invitation. (21)-(24) all indicate that the addressee need not be obligated to accept the offer or invitation unconditionally. (21) and (22) pay respect to the addressee's circumstances. (23) and (24) are to examine humbly the value or quality of the offer or invitation.

(25)

Koko wa watashi ga.

(lit.) As for this place, I *ga*.

(26)

Dekiru kagiri no koto wa watashi-tachi ga.

(lit.) To the best of (our) ability, we *ga*.

(27)

Nani mo dekimasen kedo, semete kore gurai.

(lit.) (I) can't do anything (for you), but at least this much.

(28)

Doozo, nan demo o-suki na mono o.

Please anything (you) like.

As we saw in a previous section (Example (8) in 2.2.1.), (25) can be used as an indirect offer, in this case, to take care of the bill at a restaurant (Mizutani and Mizutani 1984:80-81). The speaker avoids expressing the verbal (e.g., *o-harai-shimasu* 'will pay') so as not to sound arrogant. Similarly, (26)-(28), in which the verbal is not expressed, can be used as an indirect offer.

2.2.2.7. Mitigation of Suggestion and Advice

The speech acts 'suggestion' and 'advice' are also kinds of 'assertion' and either may sound arrogant or may be taken as criticism or defiance. The force of the suggestion or advice can be alleviated through verbal or clausal ellipsis. Politeness principles most relevant here are: Don't impose your opinion; give options; don't presume; be humble.

(1) Moo sorosoro dekaikenai -*to*.

(lit.) If (we) don't leave soon.

As we saw in 2.2.1., Example (1) above, in which the addressee is urged to leave the house soon, Mizutani and Mizutani (1979:56-57) explain that if the main clause (e.g., *osoku narimasu* '(we)'ll be late') was stated explicitly, it would sound more demanding or as if the speaker were criticizing the addressee.

Like in (1) above, referring to a preparatory condition for the implied proposition is common in making an indirect suggestion or advice. The implicatum in (2)B below is something like 'it's not good for your health'. The implicatum in (3)B is something like 'you will understand/find out what to do.'

(2) A: Konya wa tetsuya ni naru- kamo shirenai naa.

A: Tonight, (I) might have to stay up all night.

B: Demo, amari muri o suru to.

B: But, if (you) overwork too much.

(3) Watashi mo yoku wakaranai n desu-kedo, setsumee-sho o o-yomi-ni nare-ba.

I don't know (it) well, either, but if (you) read the explanation.

(4) and (5) below end with the particle *temo*. In (4), the speaker means to say 'it may not be a good thing if you don't overwork at all; but, if you overwork too much, it is not good, either'. In (2)B, however, the speaker does not make any assumption that it may not be good if the addressee does not overwork at all. (5)B implies something like 'Tanaka would not know it' or 'you would not find it out'.

(4) A: Konya wa tetsuya ni naru ka mo shirenai naa.

A: Tonight, (I) might have to stay up all night.

B: Demo, amari muri o shi-temo.

B: But, if (you) overwork too much.

(5) A: Tanaka-san ni kike-ba, wakaruu daroo ka.

A: If (I) asked Tanaka, would (he) know (about it)?

B: Iyaa, Tanaka-san ni o-kiki-ni nat-temo.

B: Well/No, even if (you) asked Tanaka.

The speaker may also specify the reason for what he/she is suggesting the addressee should do, as in (6) below.

- (6) Tabako wa karada ni yokunai kara.

Cigarettes are not good for (your) health *kara* (so).

(7) and (8) below can be followed by a verbal, such as *ii desu yo* 'is good' or *ii n ja arimasen ka* 'isn't (it) good?' (9)B can be followed by a verbal, such as *ikaga desu ka* 'how is/about' or *doo deshoo ka* 'how is/about'. (10)B can be followed by a phrase, such as *kekkon-shita hoo ga ii yo* 'you had better get married, too' or *kekkon no koto o kangaeta hoo ga ii yo* 'you also had better think about your marriage'. Ellipsis is preferable in (7)-(10) in order to reduce the force of the suggestion or advice.

- (7) O-isha-san ni mite moratta hoo ga.

(You had better) have the doctor examine (you).

- (8) Amari muri o shinai hoo ga.

(You had better) not overwork too much.

- (9) A: Kono shigoto dare ni tanome-ba ii daroo.

A: (I) wonder whom (I) should ask to do this job.

B: Soo desu nee. Yamada-kun nado wa.

B: (lit.) Well, Yamada or someone *wa*.

- (10)

Yamada-kun raigetsu kekkon-suru rashii kedo, kimi mo sorosoro.

(I) heard that Yamada is getting married next month *kedo*, you, too, soon/slowly.

2.2.3. Intensification of Speech Acts

This section (2.2.3.) discusses the intensification of speech acts through verbal and clausal ellipsis. The types of speech acts to be examined here are: (1) condolence, (2) apology, and (3) thanking. It will be shown that intensification of these speech acts is accomplished via mitigation of assertions

or requests.

(1) Kono tabi wa hontoo ni doo mo.

(lit.) This time, really, very.

(2) Kono tabi wa hontoo ni tonda koto de.

(lit.) This time, really, a terrible thing *de*.

(3) Hontoo ni nan to mooshi-agete ii ka.

(lit.) Really, what to say.

Examples (1)-(3) above are expressions typically used to condole with someone upon his/her misfortune. In a serious situation like someone's death, we feel that it is almost impossible to express any commiseration; the grief of the person may be too deep for words. We feel if we offer too many soothing words, then, we may sound insincere. In (1) and (2), it is possible for the speaker to complete his/her utterance with the verbal *go-shuushoo-sama de gozaimasu* '(it) is grievous'. He/she may choose not to make an explicit declaration about the situation -- to express that his/her sympathy is so deep that he/she is at a loss of words. Similarly, if the speaker in (3) asserted overtly, using the verbal *wakarimasen* 'don't know', that he/she does not know what to say to the addressee, he/she might appear indifferent -- to the addressee's misfortune. As we can see, the illocutionary force of condolence in (1)-(3) is, in fact, augmented through mitigation of the assertion.

(4) A1: Anoo, musuko ga taihen go-meewaku o o-kake-shita soo de.

A1: *Anoo*, (I) heard that (my) son troubled (you) a lot *de*.

B1: Ie, taishita koto ja nai n desu ga, chotto.

B1: Well/No, it wasn't a serious matter, but *chotto* (a little bit).

A2: Mooshi-wake-gozaimasen. Hontoo ni nan to o-wabi-shite ii ka.

A2: (I)'m very sorry. (I) really (don't know) how to apologize.

B2: Ie, kondo kara ki o tsukete kudasare-ba, sore de.

B2: Well/No, if (your son and you) will be careful from next time, then.

A3: Hai, nido to konna koto no nai yoo ni yooku itte kikasemasu node.

A3: Yes, (I)'ll tell (him) strongly not to do this kind of thing again *node*.

Here again, in apologizing for one's fault, he/she may appear to be insincere if he/she speaks too fluently. For example, in (4) above, A1 could be completed with a clause like *mooshi-wake-gozaimasen* '(I)'m very sorry'. The second sentence in A2 could be completed with a clause like *dooka o-yurushi-kudasai* 'please forgive (us)'. However, depending on how A presents these "complete" utterances, he may not sound earnest. On the other hand, the elliptical utterances A1, A2, and A3 may help to show that the speaker feels so bad about what happened that he cannot speak glibly and/or that words do not fully express his feeling. More specifically, the ellipsis in A1 and A2 mitigates the force of the assertion, and the ellipsis in A3 the force of the request. In consequence, A's apology may actually become more forceful and effective -- assuming that his utterances are accompanied by appropriate para- and extralinguistic signs (e.g., tone of the voice, intonation, gesture). (Note that B's utterances in (4) are also elliptical, which is to soften the force of his accusation/complaint.)

(5) < A is B's daughter-in-law. >

A1: *Mooshi-wake-gozaimasen. Watashi ga itaranai bakkari ni.*

A1: (I)'m very sorry. Simply because I was careless.

B: *Wakatte kurere-ba, ii n desu yo.*

B: As long as (you) understand (it), (it)'s all right.

A2: *Hontoo ni yuki-todokimasen-de.*

A2: (I) really wasn't attentive enough *de*.

Similarly, A's elliptical utterances in (5) above may make a more eloquent apology than an explicit utterance. They may show, further, that A is totally

submissive to B, and that she does not have courage to speak explicitly and freely.

(6) < A and B are friends. >

A: Konna koto ni natte, honto ni mooshi-wake-nakute.

A: (It)'s turned out this way, and (I)'m really sorry *te*.

B: Iie, watashi no hoo koso sukkari meewaku o kakete shimatte.

B: No, I am the one who troubled (you) totally *te*.

(6)a

A: Konna koto ni natte shimatte, honto ni mooshi-wake-arimasen.

A: (It)'s turned out this way, and (I)'m really sorry.

In (6)A above, instead of suspending the utterance with the *te* gerundive form of the verbal, A could complete the utterance as shown in (6)a. However, by the use of an "incomplete" utterance, A shows that words of apology like in (6)a are inadequate: The implicatum in (6)A is something like 'I don't know how to express my apology'. If, however, A were to actually express this implicatum, her apology might not be as effective, she might sound insincere. Likewise, B's elliptical utterance is probably more expressive as an apology than a fully articulated utterance.

(7) Itsumo go-busata bakari shimashite.

(I) am always neglecting staying in touch with (you) *te*.

(8) A: Senjitsu wa doomo arigatoo-gozaimashita.

A: Thank you very much for the other day.

B: Iie, nan no o-yaku ni mo tachimasen-de.

B: No, (I) couldn't be of any help *de*.

(7)A and (8)B are also apologies. But, they are somewhat token apologies. Both (7)A and (8)B end with the *te* gerundive form of the verbal. The implicatum in both utterances is something like 'I'm sorry' or 'please excuse me'.

Explicit apologies can be less effective in a greeting situation like (7) and (8). What the speaker intends to do through these utterances is not to make a serious or profound apology, but to exchange a light greeting. These elliptical utterances are to indicate implicitly (and, at the same time, expressively) that the speaker is being humble and is concerned with maintaining a good relationship with the addressee.

(9) A: Kyoo wa sukkari gochisoo ni natte shimatte.

A: (I)'ve fully received (your) hospitality (a good meal), today *te*.

B: Iie, rokuna o-kamai mo dekimasen-de.

B: No, (I) couldn't entertain (you) well *de*.

(9)a

B: Iie, rokuna o-kamai no dekimasen-deshita.

B: No, (I) couldn't entertain (you) well.

(9)b

B: Iie, rokuna o-kamai no dekimasen-de, sumimasen./mooshi-wake-gozaïmasen.

B: No, (I) couldn't entertain (you) well, and (I)'m sorry.

Compared to the "complete" utterances (9)a and (9)b, (9)B is a softer assertion. And, as a greeting, it effectively conveys a warm, gentle feeling.

(9)A is an expression of gratitude. It also ends with the *te* gerundive form of the verbal. What might follow the *te* form is a phrase like *doomo arigatoo-gozaïmashita* 'thank you very much'. However, (9)A can mean not only 'thank you very much', but includes other meanings, such as 'I'm sorry to have troubled you' and 'I feel bad about having availed myself of your kindness'. An expression like (9)A is appropriate particularly at the initial, or medial, stage of thanking. At the final stage, a direct and "complete" thanking seems more appropriate.

(10)

A: Anoo, kore, honno hito-kuchi na n desu kedo.

A: *Anoo*, this is only a mouthful *kedo*.

B: Maa, kore wa kore wa.

B: (lit.) Oh, this is, this is.

(10)B likewise expresses the speaker's gratitude. It means 'this is delightful' or something similar. The short utterance indicates that the offer was a surprise to the speaker, which is to convey effectively the speaker's feeling of appreciation of the offer.

(11)

Hontoo ni doomo.

(lit.) Truly, very.

(12)

Go-shinsetsu ni doomo.

Kindly, very.

(13)

Doomo doomo.

Very, very.

Examples (11)-(13) are commonly used in thanking. They can be followed by a phrase *arigatoo(-gozaimasu)* 'thank you'. However, the shorter expressions (11)-(13) may indicate more eloquently that the speaker is overwhelmed with the addressee's kindness. Moreover, they can imply not only 'I thank you', but other things, such as 'I'm obliged to you' and 'I'm sorry for troubling you'. Thus, depending on context, (11)-(13) can be more effective than "complete" utterances.

2.2.4. Avoidance of Commitment to a Particular Honorific or Non-honorific Expression

As mentioned in 2.2.1., in Japanese interpersonal communication, one is supposed to use appropriate levels of speech corresponding with the social relationships between the speaker, the addressee, and the third person referent (and the bystander), as well as with the level of formality of the setting. The wrong choice of an honorific or non-honorific word may disturb the addressee. Therefore, when one is unable to think of the proper word(s), he/she may resort to verbal or clausal ellipsis to escape from this frustrating problem. In the following, I will analyze such uses of elliptical utterances by examining social situations in which these problems may occur. As will be self-evident from the examples, elliptical utterances used to avoid committing to a particular expression may, at the same time, have the effect of mitigating or intensifying the force of the speech act.

(1) Ima doko ni.

(lit.) Now, where?

Suppose that the speaker in (1) is asking the addressee where he lives currently. Although the speaker only says *ima doko ni*, it can be interpreted appropriately if there are enough contextual cues. The speaker, as in (1), may opt out of saying the words for 'do you live?' if he/she cannot come up with an expression of an appropriate level. Expressions for 'do you live?' include the following, although these are not exhaustive:

(2) O-sumai desu ka.

(3) Sunde irassharu n desu ka.

(4) Sunde iru n desu ka.

(5) Sunde ru no.

Of the four examples above, (2) and (3) are the most polite. (4) is semi-polite, and (5) is informal. Depending on the situation, the speaker may face the difficulty of deciding between (4) and (5), or between (2) or (3) and (4). For example, suppose the relationship between the speaker and the addressee is somewhere between acquaintance and friendship, and their social statuses and ages are about the same. In such a situation, the speaker might find it overly friendly and casual to use (5); but he/she might consider the use of (4) too distant and formal. Or, suppose the speaker is in his forties and the addressee around twenty-five years of age; the two are acquaintances. If (5) was used in this setting, the speaker might appear to be treating the addressee like a child. If, on the other hand, (4) was used, it might sound too formal for the addressee's age.

There are situations in which the choice between (4) and (2) or (3) may become difficult. If the speaker is slightly younger than the addressee but he is the addressee's boss at work, (4) may be impolite, but (2) or (3) may sound too polite. The same problem may arise when a speaker in his forties is an acquaintance of an addressee, in his thirties and the speaker's social position is higher than the addressee's.

(6) Ima mo kookoo no sensee o.

(lit.) Still now, a high school teacher o?

(7) Jikan ga are-ba, doozo.

If (you) have time, please.

(8) Nani mo arimasen kedo.

There is nothing (good), *kedo*.

A problem similar to (1) may motivate the use of the utterances (6)-(8) above. Example (6) might be used to ask if the addressee is still working as a high school teacher. Phrases that could follow (6) include: (a) *nasatte ru n*

desu ka, (b) *shite irassharu n desu ka*, (c) *shite iru n desu ka*, and (d) *shite ru no*. All these phrases mean 'are (you) doing? (i.e., are you (a high school teacher?)' (a) and (b) are most polite; (c) is semi-polite; (d) is informal. Candidates for the second clause in (7) are: (a) *irashhatte kudasai*, (b) *o-koshi kudasai*, (c) *kite kudasai*, and (d) *kite choodai*. All these mean 'please come'. (a) and (b) are most polite; (c) is semi-polite; and (d) is informal. Example (8) may be used as an indirect offer of some food. Candidates for the second clause are: (a) *o-meshi-agari-ni natte kudasai*, (b) *meshiagatte kudasai*, (c) *tabete kudasai*, all meaning 'please eat'. (a) is very polite; (b) is polite; (c) is semi-polite. (The following polite form is perhaps more appropriate as a clause preceding (a) or (b): *nani mo gazaimasen ga* 'there is nothing (good) *ga*'. Informal expressions, such as *tabete* 'please eat' and *tabete choodai* also 'please eat' are less appropriate for (8).) Despite the existence of a number of candidates, the speaker may prefer to use (6), (7), or (8), if none of the candidates seem suitable.

(9) Ja, san-ji goro ni sochira ni.

(lit.) Then, around three o'clock there.

Example (9) demonstrates a case where the (unexpressed) verbal concerns the action or state of the speaker him/herself. Suppose that by Utterance (9) the speaker means that he is coming to the addressee's place around three o'clock. Candidates for the verbal meaning 'will come' include: (a) *mairimasu*, (b) *ukagaimasu*, (c) *ikimasu*, and (d) *iku yo*. (a) and (b), which contain a humble form, are polite; (c) is semi-polite; and (d) is informal. (It is more likely that with the informal verbal (d) *iku yo*, the word *sotchi* 'there' is used rather than *sochira* 'there'.) The same kind of difficulty in choosing the verbal discussed earlier in relation to Example (1) may arise in uttering (9), which forces the addressee to avoid expressing the verbal.

(10)

A: Anoo, kore hon no o-ree no shirushi na no desu ga.

A: *Anoo*, this is only a token of (my) gratitude *ga*.

B: Maa, go-teenee ni doomo.

B: Oh, (it)'s thoughtful (of you) and (thank you) very much.

Similarly, the speaker may utter (10)B to opt out of expressing the verbal *arigatoo* or *arigatoo-gozaimasu* 'thank you': Depending on the addressee, *arigatoo* may sound too casual and a little impolite while *arigatoo-gozaimasu* may be too formal and too polite.

(11)

A: Tanaka-san irasshatte masu ka.

A: Has Mr. Tanaka come?

B: Ee, oosetsu-ma no hoo ni.

B: (lit.) Yes, in/into the drawing room.

Example (11)B has to do with the third person referent. (11)B can be interpreted as either 'Tanaka is in the drawing room' or 'I have shown him into the drawing room'. Candidates for the verbal in the first interpretation are: (a) *irasshaimasu* and (b) *imasu*. The respectful form *irassharu* 'to be' in (a) elevates Tanaka, the subject-referent, while the plain form *iru* 'to be' in (b) does not do so. (The auxiliary verb *masu* in both (a) and (b) shows that the speaker is being polite to the addressee.) Candidates for the verbal in the second interpretation (i.e. 'I have shown him into the drawing room') are: (a) *o-tooshi-shite okimashita* and (b) *tooshite okimashita*. The humble form *o-tooshi-suru* 'show/usher' in (a) lowers the speaker while elevating Tanaka. The plain form *toosu* 'show/usher' does not lower the speaker, and hence does not elevate Tanaka.

In some situations, the speaker may prefer to use (11)B, opting out of choosing one verbal from the candidates. For example, suppose A is B's boss at work. A is in his fifties, and B is in his forties. Tanaka, who is a customer of A and B's company, is visiting A and B's office. He is in his forties. Tanaka and B are friends. A is being polite to Tanaka, using the respectful form *irassharu* 'come' ((11)A), since Tanaka is a customer. B, on the other hand, being Tanaka's friend, may feel uncomfortable using an overly respectful word for Tanaka, such as *irassharu* 'to be' or a humble word for himself, such as *otooshi-suru* 'show/usher'. But, the use of a plain form, such as *iru* 'to be' or *toosu* 'to show/usher' would sound a little impolite and inappropriate particularly when A, B's boss, is employing a respectful word for Tanaka.

(12)

A: Dare ka ga kimi ni soo suru yoo ni to itta n desu ka.

A: Has anyone told you to do so?

B: Ee, Tanaka-san ga.

B: Yes, Mr. Tanaka *ga*.

The hypothetical situation just described above may motivate the speaker to use (12)B above. Verbals which B is avoiding in (12) are: (a) *osshatta n desu* and (b) *itta n desu*. Both (a) and (b) mean 'said'. (a) contain the respectful form *ossharu* and (b) the plain form *yuu*.

Another conceivable situation which might create difficulty for B in choosing an appropriate verbal in (12) is the following: A is B's boss at work. A is in his fifties, B in his forties. B and Tanaka are colleagues but they are not very close and when they converse, they usually use polite language. In this situation, B might feel uneasy using a plain word such as *yuu* 'say' for Tanaka since he normally uses polite words when talking to him. The use of a respectful word, such as *ossharu* 'say', on the other hand, might be too polite since A is

Tanaka's superior as well as B's.

(13)

Yoshio-san ga soo suru yoo ni to.

Yoshio (told me) to do so.

Suppose that the speaker of (13) is Yoshio's wife and that she is talking to Yoshio's mother. Verbals for 'told' include: (a) *osshatta n desu* and (b) *itta n desu*. Under the circumstances, the speaker uses ellipsis because she thinks that (a) is too polite in talking about her own husband whereas (b) seems a little bit impolite to her mother-in-law.

2.3. Avoidance of Responsibilities and Verbal and Clausal Ellipsis

The previous section (2.2.) investigated in detail how verbal and clausal ellipsis facilitate politeness of utterances. The present section (2.3.) discusses another important function of verbal and clausal ellipsis, avoidance of responsibilities. This function, too, is effectuated via mitigation of speech acts. We saw in 2.1. and 2.2. that by using an elliptical utterance, one can reduce the illocutionary force, or equivocate the illocutionary goal and convey the real message as an implicatum. However, due to the very nature of implicata, that is, non-materialization, it is possible for the speaker to deny the implicatum ever having existed. By doing so, he/she may be able to evade responsibility for having made the speech act in question. (Evasion of responsibility is also applicable to indirect speech acts by means of other modes of mitigation, such as speech act substitutions and hedges.) In what follows, I will discuss the above point concretely by analyzing utterances of different illocution types. It is worth noting that satisfaction of politeness and avoidance of responsibilities are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it often seems the case that the same one utterance may meet both needs.

(1) A1: Kondo haitta Tanaka-kun, doo desu ka.

A1: What do (you) think of Tanaka who has just joined (us)?

B1: Soo desu nee, shigoto wa hayai n desu ga.

B1: Well, (he) does (his) job quickly *ga*.

A2: Soo, yaru koto ga chotto zatsu ka mo shirenai na.

A2: Well/Yes, what (he) does may be *chotto* (a little bit) sloppy.

B2: Ee, chotto.

B2: Yes, *chotto* (a little bit).

(1)B1 above was used in a previous section (Example (7) in 2.2.2.2.) to show mitigation of an assertion for the sake of politeness. The same utterance may also serve for avoidance of the responsibility. Suppose B thinks Tanaka is definitely sloppy with his work. By uttering B1, B alludes to his negative opinion about Tanaka only vaguely. And, in fact if he chooses, he can deny any implied negative opinion since he has never actually mentioned it. Thus, B1 lets the speaker evade the responsibility for making a negative evaluation of Tanaka. Furthermore, if A takes over Utterance B1 by stating A2, which expresses what B really wanted to say, B may be said to have succeeded in making A shoulder the responsibility for the negative evaluation of Tanaka. Likewise, in B2, B prudently avoids any explicit mention of his opinion.

(1)a

A2: Soo, yaru koto ga chotto zatsu kamo shirenai na. Demo, kare, shoorai-see ga aru to omou n da ga.

A2: Well/Yes, what (he) does may be a little sloppy. But, (I) think he has a promising future *ga*.

B2: Ee, nakanaka yuunoo na hito no yoo desu nee.

B2: Yes, (he) seems to be a pretty capable person, doesn't he?

Suppose A responds to Utterance B1 in (1) with Utterance A2 in (1)a above. Because B, having said B1, does not have to be responsible for his negative

evaluation of Tanaka, it is easy for him to change his opinion (at least superficially) and align himself with A's positive evaluation of Tanaka, as in B2 in (1)a above.

(2) A: Yamada-kun nan-ji ni kuru ka wakaru.

A: Do (you) know what time Yamada is coming?

B: Um, ni-ji goro ni wa.

B: Yes, by approximately two o'clock.

(2)a

B: Um, ni-ji goro ni wa kuru yo.

B: Yes, (he) will come by approximately two o'clock.

In (2) above, in case Yamada does not come at two o'clock, B can defend himself on the basis of a weak assertion. (2)B certainly renders the speaker less responsible for his prediction than (2)aB.

(3) A: Kono shigoto, Yamada-san ni tanomoo to omou n da ga, doo daroo.

A: (I)'m thinking of asking Yamada to do this job *ga*, what do (you) think?

B: Soo desu nee. Demo, Yamada-san wa kono bunya no semmon ja arimasen kedo.

B: Well, but, Yamada is not specialized in this field *kedo*.

(4) Ashita wa hito-de ga takusan iru n da kedo.

Tomorrow, (I)'ll need many hands *kedo*.

(5) A: Ashita kite kuremasen ka.

A: Won't (you) come (for me) tomorrow?

B: Anoo, ashita wa chotto dekeyoo to omotte ta n desu kedo.

B: *Anoo*, (I) was thinking of *chotto* (a little bit) going out tomorrow *kedo*.

In a similar vein, Utterance (3)B enables the speaker to deny, if he chooses, that he has any objection to A's idea. The speaker of (4) can insist that he has

never requested help. Utterance (5)B makes it possible for the speaker to cancel any implied refusal to the addressee's request. Even if it is palpably a lie, the speakers can claim, on the basis of the ellipticalness of their utterances, that they have merely described facts.

(6) A: Kono mondai ni dare ka kuwashii hito wa inai ka naa.

A: (I) wonder if there is someone who is familiar with this matter.

B: Soo desu nee, Tanaka-san ni kike-ba.

B: Well, if (you) ask Mr. Tanaka.

(7) A: Komaban, Tanaka-san ni denwa-shite oite kuremasu ka.

A: Will (you) please call Tanaka this evening?

B: Ee, moshi jikan ga are-ba.

B: Yes, if (I) have time.

Equivocation of sentence-finals through verbal or clausal ellipsis may also be advantageous when in making a suggestion (e.g., (6)B above) or promise (e.g., (7)B), one does not wish to guarantee its outcome.

2.4. Intimacy, Power, and Verbal and Clausal Ellipsis

Section 2.4. discusses verbal and clausal ellipsis as "indications" of intimacy between the speaker and the addressee, or of the speaker's power over the addressee.

Recalling that in Japanese interpersonal communication, the speaker is expected to choose an appropriate speech level using honorific or non-honorific words that are suitable for the speaker, the addressee, and the third person referent, as well as for the setting:

(1) Ashita wa irasshaimasu ka.

(2) Ashita wa irasshaimasu no.

(3) Ashita wa kimasu ka.

(4) Ashita wa kuru no ka ne.

(5) Ashita wa kuru no.

(6) Ashita wa kuru.

For example, in order to ask the question, 'Are you coming tomorrow?' one must choose an appropriate expression among many candidates, (1)-(6) above (and others). Example (1), which is polite and formal, is used when the addressee is the speaker's superior, or with someone whom the speaker does not know well. (2), which is also polite and formal, maybe, a little less so than (1), is used mainly by women, and sounds less stiff than (1). (3), semi-polite, is used when the addressee is not the speaker's superior, but when the speaker wants to maintain some degree of formality (as in a work place). (4), informal, is used by men who are superiors of the addressee. (5) and (6), also informal, are used among close friends, family members, or toward children or the speaker's inferior. (Because of the sentence-final particle *no* in (5), (5) seems to carry a somewhat stronger illocutionary force as a question than (6).)

(7) Ashita wa.

Tomorrow *wa* ?

Example (7), in which the verbal is absent, may also be used to ask if the addressee is coming next day, provided that there are enough contextual clues for the appropriate interpretation. Relative to the discussion in 2.2., here the speaker's concern about politeness (or deference) may lead him/her to use an elliptical utterance like (7) in order to mitigate the force of the question, that is, to make the question less pressing, or to avoid committing to any honorific or non-honorific verbal which may improperly represent the speaker's recognition of the social relationship between him/her and the addressee.

On the other hand, using an utterance like (7) can become a sign of intimacy between the speaker and the addressee or a sign of the speaker's power over the addressee: (7) may be addressed to a close friend or inferior of the speaker. Used in this way, it(7) is informal and blunt speech -- a kind of lazy way of talking. But, if it(7) is used out of politeness, it is the result of the speaker's reserve or hesitation. Note, however, that the paralinguistic features of (7) would vary in different situations: When (7) is used for the sake of politeness (or deference), it is likely to be uttered in a hesitant manner and the last syllable *wa* prolonged with a level tone. When (7) is used informally -- e.g., addressed to a close friend or inferior of the speaker, it is uttered without hesitation and the last syllable tends to be short with a rising tone.

(8) O-kaa-san wa dochira ni irasshaimasu ka.

Where is (your) mother?

(9) O-kaa-san wa doko ni imasu ka.

Where is (your) mother?

(10)

O-kaa-san wa doko?

Where is (your) mother?

(11)

O-kaa-san wa.

Mother *wa* ?

In (8)-(11) above where the speaker asks where the addressee's mother is, (8) is the most polite, (9) is semi-polite, and (10) is informal. Like (7), (11) can be used for mitigation of the question or for avoidance of commitment to a particular level of verbal. In a different situation, the use of (11) may suggest the closeness of the speaker and the addressee or the speaker's power over the addressee.

(12)

Ni-kai ni orimasu.

(She) is upstairs.

(13)

Ni-kai ni imasu.

(She) is upstairs.

(14)

Ni-kai desu.

(She) is upstairs.

(15)

Ni-kai ni.

Upstairs.

(16)

Ni-kai.

Upstairs.

(12)-(16) above might be used as an answer to the question (8), (9), (10), or (11). (12) is polite; (13) and (14) are semi-polite. (15), uttered with the trailing last syllable, may also be used out of the speaker's concern for politeness; it indicates the speaker's hesitation to assert something and/or for using a particular level of verbal. (16) is similar to (15), both specify only the location of the speaker's mother; unlike (15), (16) lacks the location marker *ni*. (16) is blunt, and can be used only informally or by a small child.

(17)

A: Anoo, o-mochi ikutsu gurai meshi-agarimasu ka.

A: *Anoo*, about how many rice cakes would you like to eat?

B: Soo desu nee, futatsu gurai o-negai-shimasu.

B: Well, please prepare two or so.

(18)

A: O-mochi ikutsu.

A: How many rice cakes?

B: Futatsu.

B: Two.

Compare the dialogues (17) and (18) above. (17) is polite, formal conversation in which both A and B use a "fully specified" sentence with appropriate honorific words. A conversation like (17) may take place between participants who do not know each other well. (18), on the other hand, is informal: Both A and B use an elliptical sentence consisting of the minimally necessary words. A conversation like (18) may take place between close friends or family members. ((18)A could also be used out of concern for politeness, in which case it is uttered in a hesitant manner and may be preceded by a hesitation particle *anoo*. The same may be said about (18)B, but in this case, (18)B is likely to be accompanied with hedges as in *Soo desu nee, futatsu gurai* 'Well, two or so'.)

(19)

< At a restaurant; A is a waitress, and B a customer. >

A: O-nomi-mono wa nani ni nasaimasu ka.

A: As for drinks, what would (you) like to have?

B1: Boku wa biiru o kudasai.

B1: Please give me beer.

B2: Boku wa biiru ni shimasu.

B2: I'll have beer.

B3: Boku wa biiru desu.

B3: (lit.) I'm beer.

B4: Boku wa biiru ni suru yo.

B4: I'll have beer.

B5: Boku wa biiru ni suru.

B5: I'll have beer.

B6: Boku wa biiru da.

B6: (lit.) I'm beer.

B7: Boku, biiru.

B7: (lit.) I, beer.

B8: Biiru.

B8: Beer.

In a situation like (19) above, where B, as a customer of A, has power over the addressee, it is alright for B, but not for A, to speak informally or even bluntly. As an answer to A's (polite) question in (19), B may use one of the expressions in B1-B8. (Other expressions can also be used.) If B wants to take a relatively polite attitude toward the waitress, he²⁰ may use B1, B2, or B3. Compared to these three, B4-B8 are informal and less polite. B4 and B5 are the same except for the sentence-final particle *yo* in B4. Because of this particle, B4 would sound softer or more friendly than B5 which ends with the plain form of the verb (i.e., *suru* 'do/make'). Like B5, B6, which ends with the plain form of the auxiliary verb (i.e. *da*), is a straightforward assertion; it is blunt and, perhaps, masculine and, depending on how it is uttered, it could sound arrogant. Sentence fragment B7 is also blunt, but it may sound less strong than B6 because of the absence of the particle *wa* and the auxiliary verb *da*: depending on the way it is said, it might sound a little childish. Similarly, B8, which expresses only the minimally necessary word, is blunt.

(20)

Dewa, kore wa ikaga desu ka.

Then, how about this one?

(21)

Ja, kore wa doo desu ka.

Then, how about this one?

(22)

Ja, kore wa doo.

Then, how about this one?

(23)

Ja, kore wa.

Then, this one *wa* ?

With (20)-(23), the speaker can make a suggestion and/or ask a question. Regarding usage, the explanation made for Example (8)-(11) parallels (20)-(23).

2.5. Emotional Utterances and Verbal and Clausal Ellipsis

It was argued in 2.2.3. that verbal and clausal ellipsis may intensify speech acts, which, in turn, contributes to politeness of utterances. It was explained there that depending on context, elliptical utterances may serve to make speech acts, such as condolence, apology, and thanking more effective than any explicit utterance because they show that the speaker's feeling of commiseration, apology, gratitude, etc. is deeper than he/she can articulate.

The present section(2.5.) deals with similar phenomena, that is, elliptical utterances that manifest emotion. Unlike examples in 2.2.3., politeness is not so relevant here: The speaker may overleap considerations of politeness due to the loss of his/her composure.

A typical example of these phenomena is observed in cases in which one is caught by surprise and is unable to talk calmly using "fully" specified sentences.

(1) A, jitensha ga.

Oh, (my) bicycle *ga*.

(2) Ara, Yamada-san *ga* *anna tokoro ni*.

Oh, Yamada (is) over there (in such a place).

(3) Maa, *kore wa watashi no*.

Maa, this is my.

(4) Maa, *kore wa watashi no daijina*.

Maa, this is my precious.

Sentence fragments like (1)-(4) above are often used when the speaker discovers something unexpectedly. If, for example, one finds that his/her bicycle is missing, he/she may utter only an interjection and the subject noun phrase, as in Example (1). The speaker of (2), who sees Yamada unexpectedly, refers only to the subject and the location. The speaker of (3) and (4), upon finding that her precious roses have been damaged, mentions only the subject and part of the predicate.

(5) A1: *Kinoo ne, disuko de buchoo-san ni atta no yo*.

A1: Yesterday, (I) saw (our) boss at a disco.

B1: E, *buchoo ga disuko ni*.

B1: What? (Our) boss, at a disco?

A2: *Soo yo. Oku-san mo go-issho datta wa*.

A2: That's right. (His) wife was also (there) with (him).

B2: E, *Oku-san mo*.

B2: What? (His) wife, too?

(6) A: *Chotto dekakete kimasu*.

A: (I)'m going out, *chotto* (a little bit).

B: E, *konna jikan ni*.

B: What? At this time?

In sentence fragments (5)B1 and B2 and (6)B, also expressions of surprise, the speaker's surprise, here, is a reaction to what the addressee has said.

Anger also triggers the use of an elliptical utterance.

(7) Kora, yoku mo uchi no ko o.

(lit.) Hey, how dare (you), my child o.

(8) Honto ni omae to yuu yatsu wa.

Really, a thing/guy like you *wa*.

(9) Taroo wa honto ni moo.

(lit.) Taroo *wa*, really, *moo*.²¹

Example (7) may be used instead of a "complete" sentence like *kora, yoku mo uchi no ko o ijimeta na* 'Hey, how dare could (you) bully my child!' Examples (8) and (9) may be followed by a predicate, such as *shoo ga nai yatsu da* 'be a hopeless thing'. Here again, the speaker is either too upset to compose a "full" sentence, or his/her anger cannot be fully expressed verbally. Consequently, these elliptical utterances may have the effect of intensifying the accusation. In the same vein, Examples (10) and (11) below are instances of clausal ellipsis.

(10)

Aitsu, hito o baka ni shite.

That fellow, making a fool of me *te*.

(11)

Are dake itte oita noni, moo.

Even though (I) told (you that) so strongly, *moo*.

Ending an utterance with the *te* gerundive form of a verb of emotion as in the following examples ((12)-(14)) is common as an emotional expression.

(12)

Konna koto mo wakatte moraenai no ka to omou to, nasakenakute.

When (I) realize (I) can't even make (him) understand this, (I) feel miserable *te*.

(12)a

Konna koto mo wakatte moraenai no ka to omou to, nasakenai.

When (I) think (I) can't even make (him) understand this, (I) feel miserable.

(13)

Ashita tsui ni Yamada-san ni aeru no ka to omou to, ureshikute.

When (I) think (I) can finally meet Yamada tomorrow, (I)'m delighted *te*.

(14)

Taroo ga inai kara, sabishikute.

Taroo isn't here, so (I) feel lonely *te*.

If the sentence-final form of the verbal is used instead of the gerundive form in (12)-(14) above (e.g., (12)a), it may decrease the emotionality of the utterance. Ending the utterance with the *te* gerundive form adds a meaning like: 'I don't know what to do', 'it's unbearable', or 'I can't help feeling this way'.

(15)

Maa, yoku go-buji de.

Oh, (you)'ve been all right *de*.

(16)

Maa, konna ni ookiku natte.

Oh, (you)'ve grown up so big *te*.

(17)

Honto ni yoku shite moratte.

(I)'ve been treated truly kindly *te*.

(15)-(17), which also end with the *te* gerundive form of the verbal, are expressions of the speaker's delight. ((17) can also be an expression of

gratitude.) With these "incomplete" utterances, the speaker implies such things as 'I'm very happy' and 'it's delightful/wonderful'.

2.6. Attention Getting and Verbal and Clausal Ellipsis

This last section (2.6.) examines verbal and clausal ellipsis which contribute to getting the addressee's attention. Examples of elliptical utterances analyzed are: (1) utterances in emergency, (2) catchphrases, and (3) headlines and headings.

Sentences without a verbal like (1)-(3) below are common in cases of emergency.

(1) Hayaku mizu o!

Quickly, water o !

(2) Hayaku Keesatsu e!

Quickly, to the police!

(3) Sugu, kyuukyuu-sha o!

Immediately, an ambulance o !

In uttering (1), (2), or (3), the speaker orders or requests the addressee to perform an action unhesitatingly. To receive the addressee's attention and efficient response, the speaker must make his point directly with the minimally necessary words, as in (1)-(3). Although verbals are not specified, utterances like (1)-(3) can be interpreted appropriately given the contextual clues: In case of a fire, for example, (1) is interpreted as 'Bring water quickly', 'Throw water on the fire quickly', or something similar. Through verbal ellipsis, the speaker attains the brevity of utterance required for an urgent situation.

Nor, in matters of great urgency, is politeness of the utterance at issue: Short utterances like (1)-(3) (with their particular intonation) which would nor-

mally sound blunt when, say, talking to one's superior, are permissible in exigencies. If the speaker in (1), for instance, attempted to express the verbal, it follows that he/she might be forced to consider the politeness level of the verbal, -- a cumbersome requirement when facing a pressing matter.

(4) O-kaa-san, o-too-san ga!

Mother, Father *ga* !

Suppose (4) is uttered by a child who is informing his mother of an accident to his father. From (4), the addressee might be unable to tell exactly what happened to her husband, however, even if the information in question is inadequately conveyed, the utterance effectively catches her attention. (It is also possible that the speaker uses (4) because he is emotionally upset and is unable to express the verbal. See Section 2.5.)

The effectiveness of the attention-getting factor in such elliptical sentences is well understood by those who develop advertising catchphrases. To attract attention, catchphrases must have the qualities of brevity, rhythm, novelty, appeal, and suspense. Elliptical sentences are one of the commonly used devices.

(5) Kekkon no okuri-mono ni '*Kurashi no Techoo*' o.

For a wedding gift, '*Kurashi no Techoo*' o.

(6) X keshoo-hin de o-hada ni uruoi o.

With X cosmetics, to (your) skin, moisture o.

Example (5) advertises a magazine²² and (6) cosmetics. Although both examples lack verbals, what they say can be easily understood. If (5) were "completed" with a verbal, such as *o-okuri kudasai* 'please send' or *o-motome kudasai* 'please buy', and if (6) contained a verbal, such as *o-atae kudasai* 'please give' or *ataemashoo* 'let's give', these additions would blur the sharpness of the catchphrases. Furthermore, such "complete" sentences might sound

insistent or demanding.

(7) Umi o koete, Nihon-josee no suhada e, ima.

(lit.) Crossing the ocean, now, to Japanese women's skin.

(7) above is used in an advertisement of foreign cosmetics.²³ If, for example, (7) were "completed" as *Umi o koete, Nihon-josee no suhada e ima X keshoo-hin ga yatte kimashita* 'Crossing the ocean, now X cosmetics has come to Japanese women's skin', it becomes too extended to be suspenseful. For, as this example demonstrates, elliptical sentences are useful in making the addressee expect something unspoken, and hence pay more attention to the utterance.

(8)-(10) below²⁴ are also suspenseful. (8) is an advertisement for cosmetics, (9) for chocolates, and (10) for frozen food. What is left unsaid in these examples seems rather vague and intangible. But, the sense of incompleteness is doubtless the intention behind these advertisements: The messages become less ordinary through mystification by allowing the reader to 'write in' what is left unsaid.

(8) Mitasarete, kirameite.

Fulfilled *te*, glistening *te*.

(9) Fureatte, tokeatte.

Touching each other *te*, melting together *te*.

(10)

Naze ima wafuu na no ka to iimasu to.

Why is (it) Japanese style, now, *to*.

Catchphrases like (11) and (12) below are used to appeal to the public for some commitment. Like previous examples (5) and (6) whose verbals are not expressed, (11) and (12) are more pointed than any "fully specified" version.

(11)

Kono ko-ra ni ai o.

To these children, love o.

(12)

Kiyoki ippyoo o.

An honest vote o.

In headlines and headings, which are designed to draw the readers' attention, and encapsulate information, conciseness is the paramount quality. Japanese newspapers commonly use Chinese compound nouns for headlines and elliptical sentences like (13)-(17) below²⁵ preponderate.

(13)

Suudan ni mo shokuryoo zokuzoku to. Dokusha kara no kyueen-busshi, nammin-ra "arigatoo".

(lit.) Also to Sudan, foods, one after another. Relief goods from the readers, the refugees "Thank you."

(14)

Dai-kuushuu yonjuu-nen, gisee-sha yo, yasuraka ni.

(lit.) Forty years (since) the mass air raids; the victims, peacefully.

(15)

Shijoo-kaihoo, isogi taioo-saku kyoogi e.

(About) opening the market, quickly toward discussion of the policies.

(16)

Iryoo-hi setsugen ni atarashii shiten o. (a headline of an editorial)

To (the problem of) reduction of medical expenses, a new point of view o.

(17)

Chihoo-gyoo-kaku o jishu-teki ni. (a headline of an editorial)

Regional administrative reforms, voluntarily.

Elliptical sentences are familiar with photogravures in women's magazines.

(18)

Kotoshi no jaketto no dookoo wa.

This year's jacket trends *wa*.

(19)

Kono shatsu de kotoshi-rashii hyoojoo ni.

With this shirt, looking like this year.

(20)

Toppu wa yutori no aru beeshikkuna dezain o. Shatsu nara-ba suso o dashite rafu ni.

A top - full and basic design *o*; a shirt - casually leaving the tail out.

(18)-(20) above²⁶ are captions for photographs of women's clothing.

(21)

Kinoo-teki na shiroi beddo wa shitii-kankaku de wakawakashiku.

Functional white beds - with urban and youthful feelings.

(22)

Aiborii-shoku taipu wa romanchikku de yasashikute.

Ivory-color types are romantic *de*, gentle *te*.

(23)

Yuugana nemuri taisetsu ni.

(Make) much of leisurely sleep.

(21)-(23) above²⁷ are captions for photographs of beds. Like the catchphrases in advertisements, headings, such as (18)-(23) aim at brevity, rhythm, the unusual and suspense. In addition, these elliptical sentences sound soft and seductive because of their inexplicitness or indecisiveness.

Footnotes to Part II

1. The Cooperative Principle of conversation formulated by Grice (1975) consists of the following categories and their accompanying maxims.

Quantity: 1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange). 2. Do not make your contribution more than is required.

Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.

Relation: Be relevant.

Manner: Be perspicuous.

2. It should be noted that violations of Gricean maxims as in the case of verbal and clausal ellipsis and other indirect expressions are not serious in the sense that they are not meant to impair the communication. When we speak of violations of the maxims, we should recognize, as Grice points out, different kinds of violations; some more serious and others less so. We may distinguish at least four kinds of violations: (1) involuntary violations of the maxims due to the speaker's incompetence in carrying out an intelligible communication, (2) intentional and ostentatious violations of all the maxims -- totally uncooperative -- that is, the speaker refuses to engage in the talk exchange, totally, as in quarreling, (3) intentional and quiet violations of the maxim of Quality, as in lying -- the maxim of Quality is violated, and yet, the speaker intends to make the addressee believe that he is observing the maxim, (4) intentional and ostentatious violations of one or more maxims -- generally beneficial to the communication, as in the use of various kinds of indirect expressions.

The first and the second type of violation are more serious in that they block carrying out an intelligible communication. And, these violations are probably less culturally defined. Violations of the third type -- intentional and quiet violations of the maxim of Quality -- may or may not be serious depending on the nature of the information which the speaker chooses, or does not choose, to convey to the addressee. Cultural differences may be embedded in this type of violations: In some cultures, telling the truth is more valued than in others. Keenan's observation of the Malagasy culture and language demonstrates one such example (Keenan 1976).

The fourth type of violation -- intentional and ostentatious violations of one or more maxims -- are generally not serious; rather, they are intended to help the communication in one way or another. These violations concern how to express what the speaker wishes to convey to the addressee, and they usually take the forms of less direct, or less explicit, expression. The degree of preference for such expressions seems to differ from culture to culture (and, needless to say, from individual to individual).

Note also that these violations of the fourth type take place mainly at the level of the 'literal' meaning of sentences. At the level of the conveyed meaning, the maxims and the overall CP may not be violated totally, as long as the speaker manages to convey his/her intended meaning, no matter how vague it may be, to the addressee.

3. The main criticisms of Gricean maxims may be summarized as follows: (1) the purpose of talk exchange may not necessarily be a "maximally effective exchange of information," as Grice's system apparently assumes (Grice 1975). Other purposes, such as reinforcement of human relationship, may often be more important. (2) Depending on the purpose of the talk exchange, one or more Gricean maxims may be violated. In other words, when Gricean maxims are violated -- which is a common phenomenon -- the speaker usually has a reason for the violation. However, the Gricean system is not concerned with reasons for violations of the maxims. (3) There are cultural differences in the way in which the Gricean maxims are adopted in conversation.

4. The use of verbal and clausal ellipsis for the sake of politeness is, of course, not restricted to Japanese, although it is particularly prevalent in Japanese. Brown and Levinson (1978: 232) give a few examples from English and Tamil.

5. This obviously cannot be an exhaustive list of modes of speech act mitigation in Japanese. Other modes include indirect expressions, such as metaphors and euphemisms and honorifics. (See also Ide (1982) which lists various modes of polite expressions.)

6. See also Kay (1984) and Brown and Levinson (1978) for discussion on the lexical hedges 'sort of' and 'kind of' in English which function similar to the word *chotto* in Japanese.

7. An utterance may be considered structurally incomplete, not because the grammar of the language requires the obligatory presence of certain syntactic elements in the surface structure, but because the interpreter thinks that a fully specified structure of an utterance could contain those elements.

8. Following Grice (1975:44), I will use the term 'implicatum' as synonymous with 'what is implied'.

9. See Footnote 7 above.

10. When a speech act is conventionalized, it becomes an overt qualifier.

11. Other disjunctive relations marked by the particle *ga* are as follows: (1) The clause following the *ga* is an additional remark in the sense that 'S1 *ga* S2' means 'not only S1, but also S2' (e.g., *Tanaka-san wa eigo mo hanaseru-ga, supein-go mo doitsu-go mo hanaseru.i* 'Tanaka can speak English *ga*, he can also speak Spanish and German'); (2) Two clauses connected by the particle *ga* refer to two sequential events; and the occurrence of the second event is somewhat surprising or unexpected from the first event (e.g., *Keiko wa shibaraku soko ni suwatte ita-ga, futo tachi-agatte, heya o dete itta.* 'Keiko sat there for a while *ga*, (she) stood up suddenly, and left the room').

12. *Soo desu nee* in (1)cA may be translated into 'yes' or 'I agree with what you mean'.

13. In *X ba Y* which refers to a suppositional event the subject-referent may be specific (e.g., (11)) or generic as in the following example: *Ichini ni o tase-ba, san ni naru.* 'When/If (you) add two to one, (it) becomes three.'

14. The subject-referent of *X to Y* which refers to a suppositional event may be generic: E.g., *Ichini ni o tasu to, san ni naru.* 'When/If (you) add two to one, (it) becomes three.'

15. Event *Y* in *X to Y* which describes a specific fact is something beyond the speaker's control (e.g., (1) and (2) below). *Y* may be controllable for the third person-referent (e.g., (3) below). (See Kuno 1973.)

(1) *Kesa uchi o deru to, ame ga furi-dashita.* 'When (I) left (my) house this morning, it started raining.'

(2) **Kesa uchi o deru to, takushii o hirotta.* 'When (I) left (my) house this morning, (I) picked up a taxi.'

(3) *Yamada-san wa kesa uchi o deru to, takushii o hirotta.* 'When Yamada left (his) house this morning, (he) picked up a taxi.'

16. The subject-referent of *X tara Y* which refers to a suppositional event may be generic: E.g., *Ichini ni o tashi-tara, san ni naru.* 'When/If (you) add two to one, (it) becomes three.'

17. Event *Y* in *X tara Y* which describes a specific fact is something uncontrollable for the subject-referent (e.g. (1)-(3) below). (See Kuno 1973.)

(1) *Kesa uchi o de-tara, ame ga furi-dashita.* 'When (I) left (my) house this morning, it started raining.'

(2) **Boku wa kesa uchi o de-tara, takushii o hirotta.* 'When I left (my) house this morning, (I) picked up a taxi.'

(3) **Yamada-san wa kesa uchi o de-tara, takushii o hirotta.* 'When Yamada left (his) house this morning, (he) picked up a taxi.'

18. The literature on English directives indicates that in English, the speech act 'request' is one of the areas in which indirect expressions are most highly developed (Gordon and Lakoff; 1975; Sadock 1970; Searle 1975; Green 1975; Ervin-Tripp 1976; Leech 1983).

19. Example (27) in 2.2.2.4. is taken from a magazine *Kurashi no Techoo* (September 1984). I have modified the forms slightly in order to make the text shorter.

20. The use of *boku* 'I' in B1-B7 indicates that the speaker is a male.

21. The word *moo* in Example (9) is an interjection that indicates the speaker's anger.

22. Example (5) is taken from a magazine *Kurashi no Techoo*.

23. Example (7) is taken from a magazine *More*.

- 24. Examples (8)-(10) are also from *More* magazine.
- 25. Examples (13)-(17) are taken from *Asahi* newspaper.
- 26. Examples (18) and (20) are from *More* magazine.
- 27. Examples (21)-(23) are also from *More* magazine.

Conclusion

It was the premise of the present study that a syntactic or (discourse-)structural approach, which numerous previous studies have adopted, cannot by itself provide an adequate understanding of ellipsis in Japanese, and that a pragmatic approach must be incorporated. It was also assumed, in relation to this premise, that one recognizes the "existence" of ellipsis and attempts to interpret it not because he/she identifies a syntactically obligatory slot that must be, for the sake of grammaticality, filled in by recovering the deleted full form; but primarily because he/she who has knowledge of a potential slot realizes that some meaning must be supplied for the sake of the semantic/pragmatic appropriateness of the utterance.

Based on these premises, the present study investigated two major aspects of ellipsis in Japanese -- (1) the interpretation of ellipsis and (2) the functions of ellipsis. The interpretation of ellipsis was examined in order to attain a better understanding of interpretability as the basic condition for the use of ellipsis. It was discussed mainly with regard to nominal ellipsis. Four general principles for the interpretation of nominal ellipsis were proffered and their applications were demonstrated with examples. The four principles are: (1) Principle of Role Assignment for the "Referent," (2) Principle of Local Interpretation, (3) Principle of the Use of Syntactic Clues, and (4) Principle of Pragmatic Interpretation. In particular, the application of Principle of Pragmatic Interpretation was illustrated in considerable detail showing how different kinds of pragmatic knowledge (e.g., knowledge of various frames) are integrated in order to reach an appropriate interpretation. The illustration was made with instances of ellipsis whose "referents" are specific as well as with instances of ellipsis whose "referents" are vague and/or general.

As for the functions of ellipsis, the present study concentrated on the

investigation of the pragmatic functions with the understanding that avoidance of redundancy is not the only function of ellipsis in Japanese, and that the significance of the pragmatic functions needs to be recognized. With respect to nominal ellipsis, two pragmatic functions were described: (1) mitigation of speech acts and (2) avoidance of commitment to a particular reference. With respect to verbal and clausal ellipsis, the following functions were discussed: (1) satisfaction of politeness (a. mitigation of ellipsis, b. intensification of ellipsis, c. avoidance of commitment to a particular honorific or non-honorific expression), (2) avoidance of responsibility, (3) indication of intimacy or power, (4) indication of emotion, and (5) attention getting.

The functions of ellipsis examined in the present study are by no means exhaustive. Investigation of other functions, such as rhetorical effects of ellipsis in literary works must await further study. In Section 2.2.2.2., verbal and clausal ellipsis as modes of mitigation of speech acts were compared with some other modes of mitigation in Japanese. A separate and more systematic study which compares overall modes of speech act mitigation in Japanese (including elliptical utterances) seems to be needed. Such a study would certainly provide a more comprehensive view of the pragmatic functions of ellipsis.

General principles similar to those described for the interpretation of nominal ellipsis (1.2.) are probably useful not only in the interpretation of verbal and clausal ellipsis, but also in the interpretation of other elements in utterances (e.g., noun phrases, pronouns) and utterances themselves. The present research on the interpretation of nominal ellipsis is to be incorporated, in the future, into a more integrated theory of interpretation of Japanese discourse.

The present study did not deal with ellipsis of particles (or postpositions). Nor did it discuss so-called postposing constructions in Japanese which are closely related to ellipsis. It would be worth reexamining these phenomena with

emphasis on their pragmatic functions. To give some examples, (1)a below, in which the subject NP and the direct object NP are not marked by a particle, bears a tone different from (1)b, in which the two NPs are marked by a particle: (1)a sounds softer, less assertive, and/or more informal.

(1)a

Watashi o-sake amari suki ja nai n desu.

I don't like sake so much.

(1)b

Watashi wa o-sake ga amari suki ja nai n desu.

I don't like sake so much.

Postposed elements in postposing constructions are often said to be afterthoughts, or for disambiguation, or emphasis. Other pragmatic functions also seem to be important as shown in (2) and (3) below. The speakers of (a) sentences in (2) and (3) appear to be more emotional than in the speakers of (b) sentences. And, for this reason, (2)a may sound a stronger or more sincere apology as compared to (2)b. Likewise, (3)a may be used to intensify the force of the accusation/complaint.

(2)a

Mooshi-wake-gozaimasen, osoku narimashite.

(I)'m sorry, (I)'m late *te*.

(2)b

Osoku narimashite, mooshi-wake-gozaimasen.

(I)'m late, and (I)'m sorry.

(3)a

Dame da naa, omae wa hontoo ni.

No good, you are, indeed.

(3)b

Omae wa hontoo ni dame da na.

You are indeed no good.

Lastly, the interpretation of elliptical utterances and their explanations given in the present study are mainly based on my own judgments. Although I do not claim that my judgments are absolute, I hope to have shown that they are both appropriate and reasonable. However, experimental data might constitute another and complementary source of information that could further substantiate the conclusions drawn in this study. For example, we might present elliptical sentences (together with descriptions of context) to native speakers of Japanese and ask them to interpret the sentences or to specify what they think is left unexpressed. Or, we might present pairs of elliptical and "fully specified" sentences to native speakers of Japanese and ask them to describe the differences, if any, between the two types of sentences. Experiments like these might advance even further our knowledge of elliptical utterances in Japanese.

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