

Institutionalizing Unsustainability

The Paradox of Global Climate Governance

Hayley Stevenson

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"Presents a compelling and novel argument: that collective efforts to combat climate change have actually contributed to less sustainable modes of industrial growth. Much work has looked at the details of national and international climate change policy, but no one has addressed whether any of this effort is likely to make a real difference, and what the broader factors are that account for policy changes. . . . Will be attractive both for scholars of climate change and for policy makers." **PETER HAAS,** University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Climate change is a global phenomenon that requires a global response, and yet climate change governance depends on the ability of individual states to respond to a long-term, uncertain threat. Although states are routinely criticized for their inability to respond to such threats, the problems that arise from their attempts to respond are frequently overlooked. Focusing on the experiences of India, Spain, and Australia, Hayley Stevenson shows how these countries have struggled to integrate global norms around climate change governance with their own deeply unsustainable domestic systems, leading to profoundly irrational ecological outcomes.

HAYLEY STEVENSON is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield.

Studies in Governance, 1

INSTITUTIONALIZING UNSUSTAINABILITY

The Paradox of Global Climate Governance

HAYLEY STEVENSON

Institutionalizing Unsustainability

STUDIES IN GOVERNANCE

Christopher Ansell and Mark Bevir, University of California, Berkeley, Editors

1. *Institutionalizing Unsustainability: The Paradox of Global Climate Governance,* by Hayley Stevenson

Institutionalizing Unsustainability

The Paradox of Global Climate Governance

HAYLEY STEVENSON

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Preface

Global climate change may well be the greatest environmental, political, economic, and moral challenge of our times. Much popular and scholarly concern centers on the exceedingly slow pace of international negotiations and national planning and action. Indeed, the pace of decision-making does seem entirely disconnected from the urgency of the problem. These concerns about inaction and slow action, however, are not the focus of this book. My purpose is rather to draw attention to the problematic action that *has been* and *is being* taken. In the process of dissecting the foundations of global climate governance that have been successfully institutionalized over two decades, I expose a paradox. Of course, this is not the first paradox of crisis that has been brought to our attention in recent times—Sir Anthony Giddens has lent his name to "Giddens's paradox," which refers to the long-recognized dilemma that people do not address intangible and incremental dangers until they are visible and acute, by which time it is too late to avoid them (Giddens 2009, 2). This is undoubtedly a valid concern. But here I look beyond this classic dilemma and highlight a paradox of more recent salience and considerable concern.

In the process of negotiating international agreements to mitigate climate change, attention has gradually shifted from historical emissions to future emissions and from domestic mitigation efforts to transnational ones. In this book, I show how this shift has produced a paradox in global climate governance. Although successful global action to avoid climate change depends on states complying with international agreements, the present system induces states to comply with global norms in ways that actually exacerbate unsustainable development. By shifting attention away from historical emissions to future emissions, and from domestic mitigation to transnational mitigation efforts, a techni-

cal representation of the climate change problem has been institutionalized. Viewed through a technical lens, the specific sources of emissions, as well as the social and political objectives they serve, are treated as irrelevant: avoiding dangerous climate change simply requires limiting overall global emissions. Global climate governance has thereby become a task principally of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions at the cheapest possible source, rather than one of transforming the political, economic, and cultural drivers of excessive emissions. By inducing wealthy states to offset their ecologically insensitive policies, practices, and systems in distant, poorer states, global climate governance is institutionalizing unsustainability.

Whereas states are routinely criticized for their inability to respond to threats of a long-term and uncertain nature, less attention has been given to the problems that arise from their actual efforts to respond to such threats. This book is an attempt to identify and explain such problems. To do this I have documented the experiences of three states as they have sought to internalize global norms concerning *who* should take responsibility for mitigating climate change, and *how* such mitigation should be pursued. I analyze the process of norm diffusion as one of "congruence building," namely, building congruence between a state's domestic conditions and global norms of climate governance. As the principal mechanisms of congruence building, "framing" and "grafting" have enabled actors to align themselves with global norms, but they have proven entirely inadequate for triggering the radical shifts needed to advance long-term sustainability. Global climate governance norms have merely been absorbed into existing domestic structures, which in many cases embody ultimately unsustainable features such as emissions-intensive transport systems, urban designs that create dependencies on private vehicles, and policies of infinite economic and/or population growth.

I explore these problems in the context of Australia, India, and Spain. However, it must be emphasized that these states cannot be dismissed as somehow exceptional or "rogue" cases: institutionalizing unsustainability is a global problem that will need to be tackled at various levels, from the local to the global. Figuring out how to progress to more equitable and sustainable processes of climate governance is no simple task, but understanding the nature and scope of the problem that has been created is an important first step.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used throughout the text, notes, and references.

AGBM	Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate
AGGG	Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases
ALP	Australian Labor Party
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APP	Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
AWG	Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol
BCA	Business Council of Australia
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party (India)
CAN	Climate Action Network
CBDR	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CEOE	Confederation of Employers and Industries (Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales [Spain])
CFCs	chlorofluorocarbons
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government

CII	Confederation of Indian Industry
CNC	National Climate Council (Consejo Nacional del Clima)
CO_2	Carbon dioxide
CoA	Commonwealth of Australia
COAG	Council of Australian Governments
COP	Conference of the Parties
CSE	Centre for Science and Environment (India)
DNA	Designated National Authority
E4	Strategy for Energy Savings and Efficiency in Spain (Estrategia de Ahorro y Eficiencia Energética en España)
EC	European Community
EIA	Energy Information Administration (United States)
EU	European Union
FEIQUE	Spanish Chemical Industries Federation (Federación Empresarial de la Industria Química Española)
FICCI	Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
G-77	Group of 77
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHG	Greenhouse gas
GNP	Gross National Product
GoI	Government of India
GoS	Government of Spain
IBEF	India Brand Equity Foundation
ICEX	Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade (Instituto Español de Comercio Exterior)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INC	Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPT	Interim Planning Target
IR	International Relations
JI	Joint Implementation
LULUCF	land use, land change, and forestry
MMA	Ministerio del Medio Ambiente (Spain)
MNRE	Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (India)
MOEF	Ministry of Environment and Forests (India)

MRET	Mandatory Renewable Energy Target
Mt	million tons
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NCAS	National Carbon Accounting System
NEPIs	New Environmental Policy Instruments
NFLF	National Front–Left Front (India)
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NGRS	National Greenhouse Response Strategy
OECC	Spanish Office for Climate Change (Oficina Española del Cambio Climático)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PP	Partido Popular (Popular Party [Spain])
PSOE	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español)
QELROs	Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Objectives
SBIs	State Electricity Boards
SLATS	Statewide Landcover and Trees Study
TERI	The Energy and Resources Institute (India)
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESA	Spanish Electricity Industry Association (Asociación Española de la Industria Eléctrica)
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WRI	World Resources Institute

1. Institutionalizing Unsustainability

Global Climate Governance

The literary world of my childhood was defined by the popular "Choose Your Own Adventure" series of books. These stories promised a variety of possible endings depending on the course of action chosen by the reader. Of course, the choices presented to me as a reader were not infinite: I chose from a small number of options, knowing that the consequences of my choice could be profound not just for the main character but also potentially for her family, her community, and even the entire planet. The sense of responsibility might have been overwhelming were it not for the knowledge that I could always go back and choose a different adventure if my first choice led to a dire outcome. In a sense, our collective humanity is now the cast of a modern-day "Choose Your Own Adventure" story. But in the present context most of us are not readers—those with the power to choose—but rather background characters. The readers determining our fate and the fate of the planet are the political elites responsible for designing and implementing a plan to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions beyond the year 2012. Of course, in this real-life story there is no option to go back and choose a different action if the first choice results in 4°C global warming, sea level rise, species extinction, desert expansion, widespread starvation, and massive human displacement. Instead, the choices made now will have a significant impact on human and planetary well-being for many, many years. Like the individual reader, political elites are constrained in their choices by a range of factors. The international scientific community has set out a small number of options for action while offering some obvious clues as to where each option will lead. Our leaders can choose to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by an insignificant 5 percent, a more significant 25 percent, or an ideal 40 percent of 1990 levels by 2020. They can

choose whether to aim to limit warming to 1.5°C, 2°C, or 4°C above pre-industrial levels. They can choose whether to aim at stabilizing carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere at 300, 350, 450, or 550 parts per million. They can choose which among them can and ought to shoulder most of the cost and responsibility for achieving the agreed target. And they can choose whether to pursue a mitigation plan that favors least-cost options, or one that focuses on the more challenging sources of excessive emissions. Through these choices, our political leaders will determine whether or not future generations will inherit a safe climate system, and whether or not they will have equitable access to the atmosphere within its sustainable limits. The choices of these actors are constrained not only by the limited number of options presented to them by the international scientific community, but also by their earlier decisions. Over the course of two decades, the foundations of "global climate governance" have been institutionalized and these now condition elite reasoning and decision-making capacities. The purpose of this book is to take us back to the beginning of the global climate governance story to assess whether these foundations are strong, fair, and ecologically sound. Unfortunately, the findings that emerge do not bode well for future sustainability. The central argument that I develop in this book is that global climate governance is characterized by a serious paradox. Successful global action to avoid climate change depends on states' complying with international agreements, but the present system induces states to comply with global norms in ways that actually exacerbate unsustainable development. To many, this may seem surprising, perhaps implausible: surely any action is better than no action when we are faced with such a serious problem. In fact, what I will argue is that the action that has been taken by the international community in response to the threat of climate change is so problematic as to be not necessarily preferable to no action at all.

This book is divided into two parts. In part 1, I have two broad aims. The first is to set out the scientific, political, and normative dimensions of climate change and global climate governance. The second is to present a theoretical framework for understanding the paradox that has come to characterize global climate governance.

The task of dissecting the foundations of global climate governance is taken up in chapter 2. This takes us back to the late 1980s, when the issue of climate change evolved from a purely scientific concern to a political one. This transition was enabled by a complex web of actors (scientific activists, international organizations, and environmentally conscious political elites), events (the 1985 Villach Conference on greenhouse gases,

the Villach and Bellagio policy workshops in 1987, and the adoption of the Vienna Convention for ozone protection in 1985), and other phenomena (prolonged droughts in North America and heightened public awareness of ozone depletion, deforestation, and transnational pollution). Together these factors generated an interest within the international community for governing climate change. Domestically, recent decades have seen the emergence of flexible styles of setting and enforcing rules, in which the authority of the state has partially devolved to a range of other public and private actors. At the global level, states remain the most pivotal actors, but their authority on many issues is increasingly shared with intergovernmental bodies and private market actors. The concept of "governance," which is widely used across many disciplines to capture important shifts in the way rules are set and enforced within a given polity,[1] in this context refers to the processes that coordinate the behavior of all of these actors to achieve collectively agreed outcomes. I use the term "global climate governance" to refer to the mechanisms and institutions that coordinate state and nonstate activities for mitigating and adapting to global climate change. While such coordination involves an increasing number of public, private, and hybrid actors,[2] the most important source of international coordination remains the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This institution comprises a set of principles, objectives, and commitments, and a comprehensive procedural architecture designed to protect the climate system for present and future generations (UNFCCC 1992). Norms, or "collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity" (Katzenstein 1996, 5), are a fundamental element of global governance. Bernstein explains that norms simultaneously (but to different degrees) serve three functions in global governance: constitutive, regulative, and deontic: "Norms constitute identities and meanings by defining who may act, in what context they may act, and what their actions mean in that particular context. They regulate by pre/proscribing how actors should behave in defined contexts. Finally, norms serve a deontic function when they express values that create rights and responsibilities and thereby empower actors by providing reasons or justifications for particular actions" (2001, 5).

Since the UNFCCC became functional in 1994, global climate governance has evolved as states have extended and enacted its directives, interpreting and reinterpreting the boundaries of appropriate conduct. I scrutinize this evolution by focusing on two norms that have emerged from debates about *who* should take responsibility for mitigating climate change, and *how* such mitigation should be pursued. These norms have

not been static but rather have evolved over time (for earlier treatments see Betsill 2000; Cass 2006; Eckersley 2007c; Harris 2000, 1999; Hoffmann 2005). The first, concerning responsibility, emerged from the successful negotiation of the Vienna Convention in 1985 and attracted the label of "common but differentiated responsibilities" (CBDR). The second dealt with appropriate processes of mitigation and sanctioned "domestic emission reduction targets and timetables." Collectively, these norms initially drew attention to the historical emissions of developed countries and focused action on their domestic mitigation efforts. But over time their accepted interpretation has evolved and directed attention toward the future emissions of developing countries, and directed action toward transnational mitigation options. There thus have been significant shifts in the constitutive, regulative, and deontic functions of climate governance norms. The UNFCCC still defines states as the principal actors in the governance of climate change, but since transnational mitigation has been prescribed as appropriate, market actors also have been constituted as important governance partners. Meanwhile, the shift in focus from historical to future emissions has altered the balance of responsibilities and rights, thereby changing the deontic function of climate governance norms. This normative shift, I argue, has produced an important paradox in global climate governance. To repeat, although successful global action to avoid climate change depends on states complying with international agreements, the present system induces states to comply with global norms in ways that actually exacerbate unsustainable development. By shifting attention away from historical emissions to future emissions, and from domestic mitigation to transnational mitigation efforts, a technical representation of the climate change problem has been institutionalized. Viewed through a technical lens, the specific sources of emissions and the social/political objectives they serve are treated as irrelevant: avoiding dangerous climate change simply requires limiting overall global emissions. Global climate governance has thereby become a task principally of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions at the cheapest possible source rather than one of transforming the political, economic, and cultural drivers of excessive emissions. By inducing wealthy states to offset their ecologically insensitive policies, practices, and systems in distant poorer states, global climate governance is institutionalizing unsustainability. This normative shift partly reflects the discourse of "liberal environmentalism," which came to dominate global environmental governance more broadly during the 1990s (Bernstein 2001). As Bernstein explains, the "compromise of liberal environmentalism" mitigates the eco-

nomic disruptions that environmental protection may cause by absorbing environmental concerns into the liberal economic order itself; environmental protection has thus become seemingly dependent on securing continued economic growth and accumulation" (ibid.).

In Chapter 3, I look to the discipline of International Relations (IR) for guidance in understanding how this paradox came about. What I find is that it is necessary to look beyond the field's traditionally dominant theories—realism and liberalism—to understand the paradox. There are several inherent features of the realist and liberal approaches that render them ill-suited to understanding themes of global environmental change and global norms. Their emphasis on stable material interests is unsuitable for investigating how states have negotiated questions of responsibility and appropriate action for responding to an unconventional threat such as global climate change. Moreover, their narrow understandings of rationality and regime effectiveness make them inappropriate for understanding how states have internalized the norms of global climate governance, and for assessing its broader social and ecological implications. As an alternative, I propose an innovative framework for understanding the paradox of global climate governance that draws together insights from constructivist IR and green political theory. This "green constructivist" framework overcomes the limitations imposed by traditional theories of International Relations by shifting attention beyond material factors to the interaction between state actors and underlying political institutions and social structures, as well as to socially constructed interests and forms of rationality. This shift enables a greater appreciation of the complex interactions that enable and constrain state actors as they seek to comply with collective expectations of appropriate behavior that emerge at the global level.

Given that global climate change is fundamentally an environmental problem that challenges the sustainability of present social, political, and economic systems, it is useful to look to green political theory for guidance on responding to this problem in a rational way. The concept of "ecological rationality," defined as the capacity to reason and function in a genuinely sustainable fashion, thus becomes an important element of the green constructivist framework. If the accumulation of excessive greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is understood as a reflection of disequilibrium in the relationship between humans and the rest of the natural world, it seems a worthwhile task to consider whether state actors are responding to the problem of climate change in an ecologically rational way and, if not, what may be impeding such rationality. The green

political theorist Val Plumwood (2002) has shown that the realization of an ecologically rational form of agency is currently obstructed by the "remoteness" institutionalized in modern social, political, and economic systems. As will become evident in part 2 of this book, various forms of remoteness have been institutionalized in global climate governance as attention has shifted from historical emissions to future emissions, and as action has shifted from domestic mitigation efforts to transnational ones. The problem of "remoteness," then, is central to the paradox of global climate governance and will need to be understood if we are to make the transition to a more sustainable model of governance.

At this point it is important to digress in order to clarify the epistemological commitments of the approach I adopt here, which diverges in key ways from the mainstream of positivist social science research. Positivism is committed to the unity of science, which demands that the generation of knowledge about the social world mirrors the generation of knowledge about the natural world. The purpose of such science is to generate general laws by identifying patterns of relationships among directly observable phenomena. These general laws in turn provide a basis for making predictions about the social world (Blaikie 1993, 6–7; Smith 1996). Whether implicitly or explicitly, every social scientist has to either align her- or himself with this vision, or distance her- or himself from it. My own position is that the positivist vision is deeply flawed for two basic reasons. First, our understanding of the social world will always be incomplete and potentially erroneous if it is informed only by phenomena that are directly observable. The domestic conditions that constrain state actors in responding to global norms are almost entirely constituted by ideas and meanings, which of course are not directly observable and measurable. Moreover, ideas (whether in the form of norms, identities, or institutions) are inherently fluid and contextual. So even if the positivists were to concede the importance of accounting for ideas and meanings in social science (and some do; see Neufeld 1993, 41–42), we would still have to reject their vision because of its commitment to making predictions based on general laws. General laws are only plausible in closed systems characterized by stability and consistency. The social world is not such a system (see Hopf 1998, 183). My approach, by contrast, is interpretivist. Interpretivists assert that the social world is constituted by "webs of meaning" that vary across time and space; the only way such a world can be understood is through interpretation (Neufeld 1993). Social scientists should, then, direct their attention towards "uncover(ing) the beliefs or meanings that make actions and

practices possible" (Bevir 2006, 283). Interpretation works at two levels here because the scientist must interpret actors' own interpretations of the world; this is referred to as the "double hermeneutic." This relies on an *abductive* mode of reasoning, whereby underlying causes or reasons are inferred from actors' language, actions, theories, and everyday practices. In Chapter 3, I offer a more detailed account of this mode of reasoning, which, I argue, is conducive to building an account of the domestic conditions that have constrained and enabled state actors in responding to global climate governance.

An important element of the interpretivist approach I take in this study is the philosophy of historicism. In IR, historicism is perhaps most commonly associated with the work of the critical theorist Robert W. Cox, who offers the following elegant explanation:

> The historicist approach to social science does not envisage any general or universally valid laws which can be explained by the development of appropriate generally applicable theories. For historicism, both human nature and the structures of human interaction change, if only very slowly. History is the process of their changing. One cannot therefore speak of "laws" in any generally valid sense transcending historical eras, not of structures as outside of or prior to history. . . . The research program of historicism is to reveal the historical structures characteristic of particular eras within which such regularities prevail. Even more important, this research program is to explain transformations from one structure to another. (Cox 1996, 53)

Historical structures here are understood as frameworks of thought patterns, material conditions, and human institutions (Cox 1981, 135). The intepretivist social scientists Mark Bevir and Rod Rhodes also approach the study of governance from an historicist perspective (Bevir 2010, 2006; Bevir and Rhodes 2010, 2006). Bevir reminds us that historicism rejects reification and determinism, instead emphasizing contingency and nominalism (2010, 5). This means that ideas, behavior, and other phenomena are only ever specific to a certain context so can only ever be interpreted and understood in this context. Attempts to universalize contingent phenomena are bound to produce erroneous knowledge because contexts are fluid and may be inadvertently or deliberately changed as a result of social activity. The historicist researcher is instead concerned with understanding the present by understanding the continuities and discontinuities that, over time, have shaped but not inevitably determined the present conditions.

Interpretivist social scientists recognize that our quest for knowledge

about the world has necessary limitations. These limitations concern the possible validity and applicability of research findings. The rejection of empiricism in favor of interpretation should certainly not be understood as an acceptance of a radical relativism. Many interpretivist scholars reject the relativist conclusion that all interpretations and explanations are necessarily equal. Pointing to a Skinnerian influence in constructivist historical inquiry, Reus-Smit notes that "(f)or constructivists . . . the fact that history is 'interpretation-dependent' does not mean that it is unknowable, only that the test of historical knowledge must be plausibility not infallibility" (2008, 405). If we accept that plausibility is a more appropriate standard of validity than infallibility, it is easy to see that some explanations and interpretations are more plausible and logical than others and thereby avoid the relativist trap. Limitations in applying research findings emerge from the contextual and complex nature of individual cases that interpretivists aim to understand. Positivist scientists assume that their explanations can form the basis of hypotheses and formal theories with general applicability across a range of spatial and temporal contexts. Interpretivists, by contrast, accept that while lessons may be drawn from specific cases, we should not assume that our explanations will serve in different cases.

Part 2 of this book presents three state-based case studies in which I explore how global norms of climate change have diffused in ways that institutionalize unsustainability. It is important to be clear about the purpose that case studies serve in interpretivist research. Bevir explains that "(i)nterpretive social science appeals to a case or series of cases to illustrate an aspect of the world rather than as systematic evidence of its extent or inner logic. The result is a new way of seeing—a new picture or concept rather than a new formal theory" (2010, 8). Or, as Lebow observes, "(f)or many interpretivists case analysis is the ultimate goal, while for positivists it is only a means to the end of theory building and testing" (1999, 36). Interpretivist case selection, then, does not conform to strict formulas designed to "achieve conditions for valid causal inference" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 115). Instead, the reasons underlying a case selection will vary depending on the what a researcher wishes to illustrate, highlight, or problematize.

The cases I present in this book are Australia, India, and Spain. This selection provides three principal advantages. First, it provides a broad representation of the dominant positions in early climate change debates and negotiations. Early scholarship identified a general fault-line between coalitions of activist states and veto states (Paterson 1996; Young 1994;

Yamin 1998; Chasek, Downie, and Brown 2006). It has been suggested that the position of states across this fault line was largely determined by domestic relationships between fossil fuel resources and development, or "energy cultures" (Paterson 1996; Paterson and Grubb 1992; Chasek, Downie, and Brown 2006). Three cultures were initially considered dominant: the energy exporters, the energy importers, and the inefficient fossil fuel consumers.

The first energy culture is characterized by a structural dependence on fossil fuels, which are a major contributor to the accumulation of greenhouse gas (GHG) in the atmosphere. A relatively low degree of economic diversity in many states, including the oil and coal exporting states of the Middle East, Canada, Norway, and Australia, has produced long-term dependencies on the export of fossil fuels for generating wealth. This energy culture is generally associated with obstructionist behavior in international climate change negotiations, as the interests of these exporters tend to be perceived as threatened by efforts to curb emissions. The second culture is characterized by a historical or contemporary dependence on imported energy resources for economic development, as reflected in Japan and most states within the European Union, including Germany, Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Paterson notes that advancements in non–fossil fuel–based energy technology could improve the balance of payments in such states, while reducing their dependence on foreign energy resources (1996, 77–80). Consequently, during the early debates and negotiations on climate change, this energy culture was associated with an activist position and proactive behavior. The third domestic energy culture is characterized by relatively large and cheap indigenous fossil fuels, which have allowed (or can be expected to allow) such states as the US, China, India, Russia, Brazil, and Mexico to pursue a fossil fuel–based growth path relatively unimpeded by efficiency concerns. Many of these states are not dependent on these resources for export revenue but have nevertheless been quite hostile to efforts to minimize the consumption of fossil fuels, due to their own inefficient development trajectories.

Each of these energy cultures is represented in part 2: the energy exporters (Australia), the energy importers (Spain), and the inefficient fossil fuel consumers (India). My analysis casts doubt on purely materialist explanations for state behavior by highlighting how each of the energy cultures oscillated between activist and veto behavior in international climate negotiations. This suggests that we should also be wary of explanations that focus exclusively on the North-South divide in interna-

tional climate change politics. Such materialist explanations are reminiscent of Krasner's earlier "structural conflicts" whereby states' preferences in international regimes are understood purely as a product of their status as either developed or developing (Krasner 1985). The interpretivist approach here instead draws attention to differences and discontinuities in states' positions, which we can only appreciate by being attentive to ideational phenomena rather than exclusively material phenomena.

The second value of this selection of cases is that the appropriate meanings and/or legitimacy of the global norms of climate change were at times contested by each of the states. This contestation offers a valuable context for explaining how particular domestic factors generated resistance to global norms, and how the norms evolved as state actors reconciled norms with their domestic conditions. And third, this case selection shifts the focus away from the major powers in global climate change governance, which have largely functioned as "norm-makers," to those states in the potential position of "norm-takers." This shift provides an opportunity for considering how states may respond to norms that they may have played a limited role in forming. Although these states cannot necessarily be considered major powers within the international system (though India is increasingly considered as such), the responses of these three states to the global norms of climate governance have hardly been inconsequential. The contestation, legitimization, and operationalization of the norms in these countries certainly have important normative and ecological implications and contribute to the evolution of the norms themselves. Moreover, they offer insight into the colossal challenge of ensuring that efforts to mitigate and adapt to global climate change are conducive to long-term global sustainability.

Each case study chapter is presented in two parts because the green constructivist framework demands consideration of underlying domestic conditions before tracing how these conditions have enabled and constrained the state's response to global norms. The domestic conditions are conceptualized as the material foundations, the political institutions, and the social structure of a state. These conditions collectively enable and constrain a state's environmental foreign policymakers in responding to global climate governance norms. The term "structure" is understood by constructivists in ideational terms as intersubjective meanings, or "collectively meaningful" processes (Adler 2002). To apply this understanding to a study of international norm diffusion where a multitude of collective meanings and ideas can be expected to be of consequence, it is useful to draw on Peter Hall's concept of the "policy paradigm." Hall defines a

policy paradigm as the interpretive "framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kinds of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing" (1993, 279). Drawing on this concept allows us to consider the diverse range of meanings and ideas that have conditioned actors' behavior in the context of climate change, as well as the way in which these meanings evolve over time. The idea of the domestic "social structure" is thus treated in this book as the range of policy paradigms that orient governance within a state. The issue of climate change is multidimensional and cuts across several policy areas, particularly environmental, economic, and foreign policy. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the paradigms that operate in each of these policy areas have contributed to domestic actors' understanding of the climate change problem and the most appropriate way to respond to it. While the social structure by definition tends toward stability, it should not be understood as static. An important concern of the first part of each case study chapter is to trace how policy paradigms have evolved over time, as well as how ecological rationality has been either institutionalized or suppressed in this process.

The second part of each case study chapter then traces the development of each state's response to the global climate governance norms over a period of two decades from the late 1980s to 2007, when the international community embarked on a process of renewing the global climate regime. This timeframe captures the emergence of climate change as an issue of international political concern, followed by negotiations for a framework convention and accompanying protocol, as well as an additional ten-year period during which the norms were institutionalized at the domestic level. The process of norm diffusion traced in each case does not manifest as either a direct transfer of norms from the global to the domestic sphere, or as a linear process where the norms are gradually embedded in domestic conditions over time. Instead, in each of these states the norm diffusion process manifests as a dynamic and unpredictable process of congruence building. During this dynamic process, state actors have oscillated between perceptions of congruence and incongruence between the global norms and domestic conditions. Congruence building can potentially take different forms and incorporate a range of different actors. In the cases explored in this book, two forms emerge as most salient: *grafting* and *framing* (or "discursive manipulation," in Acharya's terms (2004, 243). Grafting, which is central to Amitav Acharya's understanding of congruence building as *localization*,

is defined as "institutionaliz(ing) a new norm by associating it with a preexisting norm in the same issue area, which makes a similar prohibition or injunction" (ibid., 244). Framing, meanwhile, is defined as "select(ing) some aspects of a perceived reality and (making) them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (Entman 1993, 51–52). Framing an issue can thereby render it congruent with the existing domestic conditions.

Chapter 4 explores the Australian case, which has been characterized by a lengthy period of contestation during which domestic actors challenged the logic of focusing on each nation's historical responsibility and their domestic efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Australian environmental foreign policymakers dealt with their perception of incongruence between their domestic conditions and the norms of climate governance by reframing the problem to which these norms respond. Through public rhetoric and formal documentation, these actors have sought to shift attention away from uneven and excessive emissions by representing the problem as largely a technical one, in which the specific sources of emissions, and the social/political objectives they serve, are treated as irrelevant: avoiding dangerous climate change simply requires limiting overall global emissions. This framing seemingly justifies shifting attention away from historic and present excessive and uneven emissions to the anticipated emissions of developing countries. More recently, Australia has agreed to comply with the global norms of climate change governance, but the legitimacy now attached to the technical representation of the problem has allowed the present government to adopt a compliance policy that places no limits on purchasing foreign credits to meet Australia's domestic target. Hence, Australia can comply with global norms without addressing the unsustainable consumption patterns that have contributed to the threat of climate change.

In India, discussed in chapter 5, domestic actors initially framed climate change as a problem characterized by globally inequitable patterns of development and unsustainable consumption in the North. This directed attention away from India's own coal-dependent development trajectory and toward the responsibility of wealthy countries to reduce their own emissions. Despite the global South's success in institutionalizing this political representation of the problem, a perception of normative incongruence later emerged as the norm of domestic emission reduction targets assumed an increasingly transnational character. Concurrent domestic shifts in India's economic and foreign policy paradigms in the

1990s weakened the country's attachment to Third World solidarity and centralized planning and made state actors more amenable to global integration and market-based governance. As we see in chapter 5, external nonstate actors actually took the lead in establishing alliances with domestic nonstate actors and grafting the transnationalized norm of domestic emission reduction targets onto India's emerging economic policies and objectives, thereby generating a perception of normative congruence among India's environmental foreign policymakers. India has since become a major player in the global carbon market and an attractive site for states and companies seeking to offset unsustainable activities.

Chapter 6 explores the case of Spain, which reflects recurrent processes of policy grafting. An initial perception of normative incongruence was overcome by grafting the norm of CBDR onto the existing goals and objectives of the European Union in such a way that invested it with local characteristics. The precedence of "burden-sharing" within the EU to promote economic convergence among member states provided a foundation for Spanish state actors to advocate an extension of the CBDR norm to the regional level, thereby enabling cooperation on an issue which presented quite a challenge to the economic policy paradigm of growth, competitiveness, and economic convergence. As the perception of normative incongruence re-emerged several years later, Spanish state actors sought to build congruence between the norms of climate governance and their domestic conditions by grafting the issue onto their existing objectives of diversifying energy sources and internationalizing Spain's economy. This has resulted in a significant emphasis on transnational mitigation mechanisms to augment domestic modernization initiatives. Confronted with the challenge of remaining a good European citizen while also pursuing high economic growth rates, Spain has resorted to purchasing "environmental space" from developing countries in Latin America and elsewhere via extensive use of transnational mitigation mechanisms.

Each case illustrates the paradox of global climate governance: representing climate change as a technical problem and denying its social and political dimensions has legitimized such activities as emissions offsetting and the purchase of carbon credits. This, in turn, has institutionalized a high degree of "remoteness" into global climate governance. "Remoteness," referring to the disruption of "connections and balances between decisions and their consequences" (Plumwood 2002, 72), manifests in a variety of forms, including consequential, communicative, epistemic, temporal, and technological remoteness. Perhaps the most obvi-

ous manifestation is spatial remoteness: the spatial distance between the production of a problem and its resolution disassociates states and societies from the social and ecological consequences of their choices. The three states explored in detail here are in no way isolated cases. While it is beyond the scope of this book to dissect a range of other cases, casting a critical eye briefly over a few other states suggests that institutionalizing unsustainability is a wider problem. Canada, for example, has long cultivated a reputation as a leader in international environmental governance. Yet in responding to the problem of climate change, it has attempted to comply with international obligations within the confines of existing unsustainable conditions. The result has been a massive growth in domestic greenhouse gas emissions. By 2007, Canada's emissions were 26 percent higher than in 1990, placing their Kyoto Protocol target of -6 percent well out of reach (Environment Canada 2007). Coming to power in 2006, the Conservative Party made no secret of its contempt for the Kyoto Protocol and later aligned itself with the nonbinding and exclusive Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Energy and Climate. The Conservatives' Clean Air Act, introduced in 2006, did set out an emissions reduction goal for Canada of 45–56 percent below 2003 levels by 2050. But the act has been criticized by environmentalists and opposition parties for providing a completely inadequate goal and offering no concrete measures for even achieving it (Donner 2007, 4). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how Canada could set itself on a truly sustainable path unless efforts are made to transform its expanding fossil fuel-based economy.

Another example is Norway, who in the late 1980s fashioned itself as a leader on climate change action. Recognizing the seriousness of the problem, a domestic target was set to stabilize emissions at 1989 levels by the year 2000. Sadly, this goal was placed out of reach by the expansion of oil and gas production, a sector in which emissions grew by a massive 90.3 percent between 1990 and 2008. Overall emissions grew by 8.4 percent between 1990 and 2008, despite Norway's pledge to limit growth to 1 percent under the Kyoto Protocol (Statistics Norway 2009). The extent of unsustainability in Norway is partially obscured by its heavy reliance on imported goods for domestic consumption. Thus, the contraction of emissions from manufacturing industries by 27 percent between 1990 and 2008 (ibid.) produced a more favorable emissions inventory than would have been the case if each country were held responsible for their final consumption. In fact, it has been estimated that Norway's carbon footprint abroad grew by 33 percent between 2001 and 2006 (Reinvang and Peters 2008, 3). This obviously casts doubt on the country's capacity to pursue its

seemingly ambitious 2020 target of 40 percent below 1990 emissions in a sustainable and equitable manner.

As the birthplace of the Kyoto Protocol, Japan may appear to offer some hope for environmental leadership. Yet despite the significant symbolic importance attached to the agreement, Japan has struggled to bring its emissions under control (Tiberghien and Schreurs 2007). By 2008, Japanese greenhouse gas emissions were 16 percent higher than their agreed target of -6 percent under the Kyoto Protocol (Fujioka 2009). Given these circumstances it is perhaps unsurprising that the Japanese government has opted to buy its way out of the problem. Indeed, in 2006 Japan became the largest purchaser of offset credits on the international market. In exchange for an investment in new technology for chemicals plants in South Korea and Brazil, Japan will receive 10 million tons in credits that can be discounted from its Kyoto target. A further 90 million tons in credits are expected to be purchased between 2008 and 2012 to fulfill Japan's obligations under Kyoto (Szabo 2008).

Finally, the European Union has been widely commended as a leader in global climate governance. Yet even this group's putative ambition is less impressive once the extent of offsetting is acknowledged. Despite initially adopting a negotiating position critical of the use of flexible offsetting mechanisms and emissions trading, the EU has metamorphosed into perhaps the most ardent supporter of this approach to climate governance (Cass 2005). Under the EU's emissions trading scheme, sectors can meet up to 50 percent of their targets through the purchase of carbon offsets. Sectors outside the trading scheme, including transport, buildings, agriculture, and waste, can meet 73 percent of their reduction target through offsets (Bullock, Childs, and Picken 2009, 11). Critics argue that the high level of offsetting permitted in the emissions trading scheme has the effect of justifying carbon-intensive development (ibid.). Illustrative is the extension of London's Heathrow airport, which is expected to emit an additional 180 million tons of CO_2. The UK's former minister for transport, Geoff Hoon, dismissed suggestions that aviation expansion is incompatible with environmental sustainability by pointing to the expected inclusion of aviation in future emissions trading: "Emissions trading allows us to say, clearly and unequivocally, that expanding aviation does not lead to increased CO_2 emissions. Any expansion would have to live within the tight caps proposed by the EU and any growth in aviation emissions will be fully offset by a reduction in emissions elsewhere. That is a huge achievement, which sets the industry firmly on the path to long-term sustainability" (Hoon 2008).

These brief accounts of the climate governance experience elsewhere in the world serve to illustrate the fact that institutionalizing unsustainability is a global problem, not one that can be attributed to a few countries alone. The three cases explored in part 2 allow us to appreciate the nature of the paradox of global climate governance and the ways in which it has emerged as a significant problem of our times. The lessons that emerge have relevance beyond the borders of these states, and these lessons are drawn out in the book's concluding chapter. It is clear that, for now, congruence has been constructed between the global norms of climate governance and domestic conditions in Australia, India, and Spain. But it is also clear that congruence has been established through ecologically irrational reasoning processes. The result is that the norms have been absorbed into unsustainable institutions and policy paradigms rather than triggering their transformation. In the final chapter, I explore the possibility that the source of this undesirable outcome lies in the congruence-building mechanisms that have defined the norm diffusion process in each of these states. The mechanisms of grafting and framing each rely on a limited number of actors with an evidently limited capacity for consequential innovative reasoning, which is necessary to transform unsustainable conditions. One mechanism that may be more appropriate for internalizing global norms at the domestic level is public deliberation. The transition to ecologically rational global climate governance cannot be realized in the absence of collective reasoning about social, economic, environmental, and political goals. Inclusive participation in such a process would likely, at least in democratic states, provide a more conducive setting for consequential innovative reasoning on the part of authoritative actors; that is to say, innovative reasoning that successfully modifies or transforms the underlying structures that are incompatible with the realities of climate change. The public momentum that built up during the months leading up to the 2009 climate summit in Copenhagen was much greater than it had been at anytime throughout two decades of global climate governance. Rebuilding and maintaining this momentum may present the greatest potential for transforming the paradox of global climate governance.

PART I

Scientific, Political, and Normative Foundations

2. The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change

Coordinated effort to protect the climate system for present and future generations dates back to the late 1980s. Our present capacity to govern climate change is conditioned by the decisions and actions that have been institutionalized over the course of more than two decades. This chapter takes us back to the beginning of the global climate governance story to unearth the foundations that were set, and to assess the degree to which they are strong, fair, and ecologically sound.[1] I begin by briefly tracing the scientific community's interest in climate change, which was sparked at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was some eighty years before key scientists were sufficiently confident to assume the role of "knowledge brokers" and advocate for global cooperation on climate change. I then trace their efforts to transform the issue from a purely scientific one into one of political concern. I then turn my attention to the nascent governance norms that emerged from early intergovernmental meetings. These norms, namely "common but differentiated responsibility" and "domestic emission reduction targets," concerned *who* should take responsibility for mitigating climate change, and *how* such mitigation should be pursued. As we will see, the nature of global climate governance has been shaped by contestation over the appropriate interpretation and application of these norms. In the final section of this chapter I turn my attention to the implications of normative shifts in global climate governance. The unavoidable conclusion is that global climate governance has become characterized by the paradox outlined in the previous chapter. Of course, to appreciate how this paradox has come about we need to return to the beginning of the story.

THE SCIENCE OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

Global climate change has attracted the interest and concern of scientists for several decades. In fact, the idea that an increased concentration of carbon dioxide (CO_2) in the atmosphere may lead to global warming was first proposed in 1906 by the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius and later supported in 1938 by the British engineer Guy Callendar (Dessler and Parson 2006, 8–9). Arrhenius and Callendar noted that a precise concentration of CO_2 and water vapor was necessary to maintain an average surface temperature on earth of 15°C, hence an alteration to this concentration could produce a change in the average surface temperature (ibid.). However, this idea remained marginal until the 1950s and 1960s, when scientific tools became sophisticated enough for scientists to measure changes in the absorption of infrared spectra in the atmosphere. Considered together with the evident increase in fossil fuel use, many scientists began to support Arrhenius's earlier hypothesis. Others remained skeptical and assumed that the earth was due for a long-term cooling period in accordance with past climatic oscillations, as well as recent cooling trends observed between 1945 and 1975 (ibid.). The early 1980s saw predictions of global warming assume increasing legitimacy and consensus within the international scientific community; not only had the observed cooling trends reversed, but a range of data was also demonstrating an increase in the earth's average surface temperature, and that human activities were increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere. Since this time, scientists have continued to track changes in the earth's temperature and the concentration of atmospheric GHGs to construct hypothetical scenarios that may eventuate as a result of these changes. The data used for such measurements include records of direct surface air temperature recorded since the mid-nineteenth century, records of glacier measurements recorded since 1860, data from tide gauges to assess changes in sea levels, measurements of sea ice thickness recorded since 1948, measurements of ocean temperatures, and the use of climate "proxies" that provide insights into the earth's climate over the longer term, including tree rings, ice cores, coral, ocean sediments, and boreholes (ibid.). Evidence from all of these sources was incorporated into the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC's) Fourth Assessment Report and prompted the group to claim that "(w)arming of the climate system is unequivocal" (IPCC 2007a, 1). The hypothesis that has most significantly shaped the international political community's response is that human activities are largely responsible for

global warming. The relative stability of atmospheric CO_2 concentrations over at least several centuries was significantly disrupted by the onset of the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century. The increasing use of fossil fuels throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, together with increasing deforestation and agriculture, has produced extraordinary increases in the concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere. Various emissions scenarios modeled by the IPCC have projected a likely increase in the earth's average surface temperature of between 1.1°C and 6.4°C by the end of the twenty-first century (ibid.). Such increases are expected to produce a range of effects with different levels of intensity, including sea level rises; increased rates of species extinction; coral bleaching; decreased agricultural productivity in some regions; decreased water availability in semi-arid and arid areas; increased coastal flooding, droughts, and heat waves; and increased rates of malnutrition and infectious diseases (ibid.).

TRANSFORMING CLIMATE CHANGE INTO AN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ISSUE

A series of factors and events throughout the 1980s pushed the issue of climate change onto the international political agenda, eventually producing consensus around the idea that the global climate system is a common concern of humankind and should be protected for present and future generations (UN 1989, 1988). Key to this development was the willingness of some scientists to act as "knowledge brokers" by translating and disseminating scientific knowledge of climate change into public and policy-making circles through conferences, workshops, non-specialist journals, and direct communication with government officials (Bodansky 2001, 27). Following the Villach Conference of 1985,[2] which for the first time called for international political cooperation on climate change, the World Meteorological Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme, and the International Council of Scientific Unions united to form the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases. The purpose of this body was to promote the issue of climate change and generate support for a global treaty. Efforts to bring climate change to the international political agenda continued throughout 1987 at policy development workshops in Villach and Bellagio, in Italy, attended by scientists, NGOs, and several government officials (Jäger 1988). Discussion here moved away from scientific research findings to the timeframe for action;, the costs of different policy options, and the institutional mechanisms necessary to coordinate such action (ibid., 32–33).

Signs that the issue was slowly moving onto the political agenda came in 1988, when high-level officials participated in the Toronto Conference on the changing atmosphere. The participation of Norway's prime minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, served to maximize the legitimacy and exposure of the conference and its final declaration (Agrawala 1999, 162–63). Although this meeting did not constitute a formal intergovernmental negotiating session, its call for action proved immensely influential on the national climate change strategies of several states. The Toronto Declaration was unequivocal in defining climate change as an urgent issue warranting immediate action:

> Humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war. The Earth's atmosphere is being changed at an unprecedented rate by pollutants resulting from human activities, inefficient and wasteful fossil fuel use and the effects of rapid population growth in many regions. These changes represent a major threat to international security and are already having harmful consequences over many parts of the globe. (The Changing Atmosphere 1988)

The declaration called for governments to establish an international framework convention to protect the atmosphere, as well as a World Atmosphere Fund financed partly by a levy on the use of fossil fuels in industrialized countries. The participants also noted that the industrialized countries bear the main responsibility for taking action to address climate change, because these countries are the main source of emissions. A global goal was proposed to reduce CO_2 emissions by 20 percent of 1988 levels by the year 2005. Such a goal could be achieved, it was suggested, through energy efficiency and conservation, and shifting to renewable energy and low-CO_2 fuels including nuclear energy (ibid.). The Toronto call was subsequently strengthened during a ministerial meeting in Noordwijk, Netherlands, in 1989, where the final declaration called on industrialized countries to initiate domestic action and reduce emissions, as well as to begin considering quantitative emission targets to limit or reduce emissions (Noordwijk Declaration 1989).

The replacement of the AGGG with the IPCC in 1988 was a further sign that governments were willing to engage with the issue of climate change—this replacement was instigated by governments and carried out by the World Meteorological Organization and the UNEP (Bodansky 2001, 28–29). Through their periodic assessment reports, the IPCC has since become the most authoritative scientific voice on matters relating to climate change.

Scientific advocacy clearly played a key role in the transformation of climate change into an issue of political concern. But the post-1985 political climate was also fundamental. Concerns over ozone depletion, deforestation, pollution of the oceans, and acid rain were receiving greater attention and thereby creating an opening for the promotion of climate change as an issue of political concern. The adoption of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985 is likely, in particular, to have provided an opportunity for promoting a similar convention to protect the global climate system.[3]

NORMS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE

The high level of international attention to climate change during the 1980s eventually resulted in a general consensus that the climate system is a common human concern deserving of protection. This consensus was communicated most explicitly and significantly in two UN General Assembly resolutions adopted in the late 1980s (UN 1989; 1988). Since this time, international debate has revolved around normative questions of responsibility and appropriate mitigation strategies. Two principal ideas initially established dominance as appropriate norms.[4] The first stipulated that international efforts to reduce emissions should be based on universal participation but guided by the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR). The second stipulated that climate change mitigation should be achieved through domestic emission reduction targets and timetables.

Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)

CBDR is based on two key ideas: first, that the protection of the global environment is the responsibility of states, and second, that industrialized countries bear primary responsibility on the basis of their historical contribution to pollution and/or their greater capacity to bear the costs incurred (Rajamani 2000, 121). This norm has an established history in environmental governance and appears in the Conventions on the Law of the Sea, the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal Protocol, and the Basel Convention on Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes (ibid.). The preamble to the 1985 Vienna Convention, for example, calls for consideration of the "circumstances and particular requirements of developing countries" in pursuing the goals of the convention (UNEP 1985). This principle also has been institutionalized in the Rio Declaration on Environment and

Development, adopted in 1992, Article 7 of which reads: "[s]tates shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command" (Rio Declaration 1992).

The earlier environmental conventions and protocols clearly influenced state and nonstate actors when climate change began to ascend to the international political agenda. This is evident in the Toronto and Noordwijk declarations, and the 1990 Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference. The latter stated that the "principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibility of countries should be the basis of any global response to climate change" and "developed countries must take the lead" (Ministerial Declaration 1990). As I will explain later in this chapter, this norm continued to influence international negotiations on responding to climate change, however, the precise interpretation of CBDR and the appropriate definition of differentiation were increasingly contested throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

Domestic Emission Reduction Targets and Timetables

The assumption that international action against climate change should be pursued via domestic emission reduction targets and timetables is evident in many of the early conference declarations, as well as actual state policies.[5] Like CBDR, this norm had already been institutionalized in earlier environmental agreements. The emergence of climate change and GHGs as an issue of political concern coincided with the signing of two agreements that sought to limit other atmospheric pollutants. The Montreal Protocol (1987) and the European Community's Large Combustion Plant Directive (1988) were based on the assumption that mitigating the damage of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide, respectively, required states to adopt domestic emission reduction targets and timetables (Grubb 1990, 71–72). Consequently, it appears to have been taken for granted by many state and nonstate actors that an international agreement on climate change mitigation would also be based on domestic targets. This is evident, for example, in the 1989 Noordwijk Declaration. Although the Toronto Declaration proposed a global target rather than domestic targets, many states subsequently

adopted the "Toronto Target," or a similar version, as a domestic target for reducing emissions. Australia, Austria, and Denmark adopted the Toronto Target, while New Zealand pledged to reduce its emissions by 20 percent of 1988 levels by the year 2000. Germany pledged to aim for a 25–30 percent reduction of 1987 levels by the year 2005. Norway committed to stabilize its CO_2 emissions at 1989 levels by the year 2000, while Luxembourg, Finland, Switzerland, Canada, and the United Kingdom all pledged to stabilize their CO_2 emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Luxembourg further committed to attempt to reduce emissions by 20 percent by the year 2005). France and Japan both set per-capita stabilization targets (IEA 1992). The European Community (EC) implemented a climate change policy in 1990 that pledged to stabilize the community's CO_2 emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Grubb 1995, 164–67).

NEGOTIATING THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

In the absence of appropriate legal codes, the norms of CBDR and domestic emission reduction targets and timetables appear to have initially established the boundaries of appropriate conduct for responding to global climate change. These norms were often emphasized in formal declarations and statements and also often guided state behavior. However, norms are not static; instead, they are dynamic and open to contestation and reinterpretation. Consequently, the essence of these norms has evolved as a result of states' contestation.

Domestic Emission Reduction Targets and Timetables

Since state actors began discussing the issue of climate change, the norm of domestic emission reduction targets and timetables has been contested, particularly by the United States. The 1989 Noordwijk Conference formally brought government ministers together for the first time to discuss the issue. While most of the sixty-seven states represented agreed on the matter of targets and timetables, the US, Soviet Union, and Japan were opposed (Bodansky 1993, 467–68). The US claimed that targets and timetables were too rigid and did not take into account each state's special circumstances; they argued, instead, for further scientific research and the development of national programs and strategies (Bodansky 2001, 28–29). The conference's final declaration reflected a careful compromise between the two views, noting that many states believed that emissions stabilization should be achieved by no later than 2000 (Bodansky 1993,

468). This disagreement was played out again in 1990 at a ministerial meeting in Bergen, Norway, where the United States resisted pressure to consider any firm targets or timetables for stabilizing emissions (Dow Jones News Service 1990). The conference participants instead settled on a declaration that called for the industrialized countries to stabilize their emissions "as soon as possible," and acknowledged "with appreciation" the efforts of some states to set targets and timetables (Bodansky 1993, 468). Similarly in 1990, the Ministerial Declaration adopted at the Second World Climate Conference acknowledged and welcomed the pledges of several states and the EC to stabilize emissions by the year 2000, yet did not recommend that other states follow suit (ibid., 469–70).

In December 1990, the UN General Assembly established an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to complete a Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in time to be signed at the Earth Summit in 1992. The INC was composed of representatives of states and specialized agencies, including the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization; this committee met five times between February 1991 and May 1992 (ibid., 474). Throughout the negotiation of the UNFCCC, the question of targets and timetables continued to be divisive. While the EC and most developing countries continued to support a focus on targets and timetables for industrialized countries, this approach was strongly opposed by the US, who, with the support of the oil producing states, pushed for a framework convention based on more general national programs and strategies (ibid., 478). Nevertheless, the norm's legitimacy was reflected in the number of proposals for specific targets and timetables submitted throughout the INC process. Vanuatu, on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), proposed a draft convention in the second session (INC-2) that included a commitment for parties to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at an agreed level by an agreed date (Vanuatu 1991). At the same time, Denmark reiterated the Toronto Target by proposing a 20 percent reduction from 1990 levels by the year 2005 (Bodansky 1993, 513). Japan proposed a compromise through a process of "pledge and review"; this would involve each state pledging specific strategies for limiting their emissions, which would subsequently be evaluated and reviewed by a panel of experts (ibid., 486). However, Japan's proposal failed to attract the support of the European Community, which argued that such a process would be satisfactory only as a supplement to targets and timetables (ibid., 486–87). A draft convention text included in the proceedings of INC-4 included

a range of possible domestic targets and timetables for reducing GHGs in the industrialized countries. The possible commitments ranged from a reduction of 25 percent of 1990 levels by the year 2005, to a reduction of emissions to an unspecified level between the years 2005 and 2010 (INC 1992).

During the final session of the INC before the Earth Summit in 1992, AOSIS sought to maintain a focus on targets and timetables by tabling a proposal for a CO_2 stabilization target at 1990 levels by the year 1995, and reduction targets thereafter (Bodansky 1993, 488–89). Nevertheless, the final text of the convention featured mainly qualitative commitments for Annex I parties,[6] referring to such activities as compiling national GHG inventories, national strategies, and reporting; almost all references to quantitative targets appearing in earlier drafts had been removed. Instead, it was agreed that such specific matters should be negotiated later as part of a legal instrument to supplement the framework convention. A compromised "quasi-target," however, appears in Article 4.2 of the final text; this article instructs industrialized countries to adopt and report on national policies "with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 (GHG) levels" (UNFCCC 1992). Bodansky notes that "[a]lthough this phrase has been equated with stabilization, the term 'return' unlike 'stabilize' does not necessarily have an ongoing temporal dimension. Thus, a state could potentially argue that, once it had achieved a 'return' to 1990 levels, emissions increases would be allowed" (Bodansky 1993, 515). The extent of the ambiguity of this commitment became evident after the convention was adopted; one US Presidential policy adviser, Clayton Yeutter, claimed that "there is nothing in any of the language which constitutes a commitment to any specific level of emissions at any time" (quoted in ibid., 516), while the British negotiator David Fisk claimed that Article 4.2 was "indistinguishable" from an absolute guarantee (quoted in ibid., 517).

In a further departure from the original meaning of "targets and timetables" norm, during an early session of the INC Norway mooted the possibility of achieving targets through emission mitigation projects implemented in developing countries (Borione and Ripert 1994, 87). Norway argued that in the interests of cost effectiveness and economic efficiency, states should be able to claim credit toward their targets from such projects implemented in cooperation with developing countries. The rationale for this proposal, known as Joint Implementation, was that in terms of reducing the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere, the precise location of mitigation is irrelevant; hence, if it would be cheaper for one coun-

try to reduce emissions in a another country rather than reduce their own domestic emissions, there is no reason why such an option should not be pursued (Bodansky 1993, 520). This emphasis on cost-efficient mitigation in developing countries stands in contrast to the earlier emphasis on fossil fuel consumption in industrialized countries. The Toronto Declaration, for example, emphasized the need for a transition to a sustainable future through energy conservation and efficiency, and an increased reliance on non–fossil fuel–based energy sources, principally within those countries that are the major source of emissions (The Changing Atmosphere 1988). This declaration also called for the North to reduce its consumption of energy to compensate for necessary increases in energy consumption in the South. Indeed, those countries who adopted the Toronto Target, or a modified version, clearly intended to pursue this target through domestic measures. Austria, for instance, intended to achieve its target through energy conservation and a shift to renewable energy, while Denmark and the Netherlands planned to supplement such measures with those applied to their transport sectors. Japan emphasized the need for forestry conservation, the development of technology for renewable energy, and reforming the production structure and transport system (IEA 1992). Many developing countries clearly interpreted the norm of domestic emission reduction targets and timetables as entailing domestic mitigation efforts and were critical of the Joint Implementation proposal. As Cass notes, many states objected on the grounds that it violated the norm of CBDR, which demanded that industrialized countries reduce their emissions first (2006, 118). Some within the Indian government perceived Joint Implementation as a form of "neo-colonialism" that would enable industrialized countries to coerce developing countries by shifting the governance of climate change to the bilateral arena (Gupta 1997, 118). Indonesia was also opposed to the scheme, with many state actors claiming that it "would allow 'profligate' lifestyles in the North" (ibid., 118). Similarly, Brazil considered the proposal "'fraudulent and dishonest' since Joint Implementation would allow [industrialized countries] to evade their responsibilities under the FCCC" (ibid., 119). Despite the concerns raised by developing countries,[7] the Joint Implementation proposal was institutionalized in Articles 3.3 and 4.2(a) of the UNFCCC, which stipulate, respectively, that "[e]fforts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested Parties"; and "Parties may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention" (UNFCCC 1992, 4, 6).[8]

Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)

The norm of CBDR was not subject to the same degree of contestation throughout the INC process as was that of targets and timetables. The proceedings of INC-3 show that the inclusion of CBDR in the convention was "broadly supported" by the parties (INC 1991). Discussion centered not on the appropriateness of this norm, but rather on the definition of the categories of "developed" and "developing." The negotiating parties considered defining the categories according to per capita income, listing the states that belong to each category, or a combination of the two approaches. In the end, the parties eschewed the task of explicitly defining the two categories and simply listed countries under two categories: Annex I and Annex II (largely developed countries and economies in transition), while developing country parties are referred to as non–Annex I parties. CBDR was subsequently institutionalized in Article 3 of the convention, which reads: "The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof" (UNFCCC 1992).

NEGOTIATING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

The Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted in May 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit, but it did not officially enter into force until 21 March 1994, ninety days after the document had been ratified by fifty countries. During this time, the INC met five times to discuss such matters as commitments, financial and technical support for developing countries, and procedural, institutional, and legal matters (IISD 1995h).

One of the most contentious issues discussed at these meetings was Joint Implementation. European and South Asian NGOs were particularly vociferous in opposing Joint Implementation, arguing that such a measure would increase global inequities and jeopardize the overall objective of the convention (Rahman 1994). A compromise was eventually reached stipulating that Joint Implementation would apply only to Annex I parties, but that a pilot phase of "activities implemented jointly" could commence between industrialized and developing countries. The pilot phase would be voluntary and not produce any credits toward the FCCC targets of industrialized countries (UNFCCC 1995a). Nevertheless,

as will become evident later in this chapter, the Joint Implementation proposal succeeded in triggering a shift in focus away from domestic targets that would address the structural sources of emissions in industrialized countries, to a focus on domestic targets that could be achieved in the most cost-efficient and flexible manner.

In late 1994, AOSIS ensured that the matter of domestic targets and timetables remained on the negotiating agenda by introducing a draft protocol for consideration at the final session of the INC and the first Conference of the Parties (COP) to the FCCC. The AOSIS Protocol reiterated the norms of domestic targets and timetables and CBDR by calling on each of the Annex I industrialized parties to "[r]educe its 1990 level of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide by at least 20 percent by the year 2005" (INC 1995). Importantly, the draft protocol did not impose any further commitments on developing country parties. The AOSIS Protocol attracted wide support from many industrialized and developing countries who maintained that existing commitments were insufficient for controlling emissions (IISD 1995g). Germany, however, sought to challenge the existing understanding of CBDR by suggesting that further differentiation be drawn between the developing countries to allow discussion to begin on limiting emissions growth in the "more advanced developing countries" (German Federal Ministry for the Environment 1994). The developing countries were united in their rejection of the German proposal, which was subsequently withdrawn (IISD 1995g; Agarwal, Narain, and Sharma 1999, 44). Although Germany regretfully accepted the opposition to further differentiation and consideration of commitments for developing countries, the US ensured that these ideas remained on the negotiating agenda. While ostensibly maintaining support for the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, the US announced in 1995 that it was time to consider commitments for developing countries. In accordance with Germany's earlier proposal, the US raised the possibility of establishing new categories and corresponding commitments for developing countries (UNFCCC 1995b, 83, 91–92). Both Germany and the US justified their proposals on the grounds that meeting the objective of UNFCCC would only be possible if future emissions in both the developed and developing countries were limited.[9] Already, then, two distinct interpretations of the CBDR norm were becoming discernible: one emphasizing the historical responsibility and moral obligations that should be assumed by the industrialized countries, and the other emphasizing the necessary responsibility that the developing countries should assume. Nevertheless, at the close of COP-1, the participants adopted the Berlin Mandate, which acknowledged

the inadequacy of existing commitments yet reinstitutionalized the first interpretation of CBDR. The Berlin Mandate called for the AOSIS Protocol to guide further negotiations on a legal instrument to govern post-2000 mitigation (UNFCCC 1995a). An Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) was subsequently established and met eight times over the next two years to formalize the text of what became the Kyoto Protocol.

Throughout the AGBM negotiation process, two trends shaped the normative framework of climate governance. The first trend was the continued emphasis placed on developing countries' emissions by members of the US delegation. One of the most explicit demonstrations of this was at the second meeting of the AGBM (AGBM-2) in 1995, where a US delegate presented a series of slides that purported to show that the "greenhouse forcing" (or radiative power) of developing countries' emissions would be greater than that of the industrialized countries' emissions (IISD 1995a). The conclusion drawn by the delegation was that developing countries must adopt targets for limiting their emissions growth. The presentation was strongly criticized by developing countries, who pointed out that the data overlooked the role of historical emissions, and that in accordance with the principle of CBDR, the Berlin Mandate focused exclusively on the commitments of the industrialized countries (ibid.). Nevertheless, the United States raised the matter of developing countries' participation at every opportunity and later expressed disappointment that the chair omitted from the negotiating text its proposal that all parties adopt quantifiable emissions obligations by 2005 (IISD 1997d). The US feared that developing countries would have an unfair economic advantage and attract American manufacturing and jobs if they were not obliged to adopt mandatory emission targets (Rajamani 2000, 128). This prompted the US Senate to unanimously adopt the Byrd-Hagel Resolution in July 1997, which read in crucial part as follows:

> (1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would—
>
> (A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period, or
>
> (B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States . . . (United States Senate 1997)

While acknowledging that this "sounds ominous to those concerned about CBDR," Paul Harris argues that the Byrd-Hagel Resolution simply reflects a different interpretation of CBDR (1999, 37–38). The United States' understanding of common but differentiated responsibilities is not incompatible with targets and timetables for developing countries and suggests that all countries should adopt differentiated targets. In accordance with their own understanding of CBDR, the US senators assumed that developing countries have a responsibility to place limits on their future emissions growth while the industrialized countries would seek to stabilize and reduce their emissions (ibid., 39). By contrast, developing countries assumed that, for the foreseeable future, the norm of CBDR would only require them to participate in such activities as sustainable development, cooperation, national reporting, and adaptation (Rajamani 2000, 128–29).

Adopted as it was in the lead up to the final negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution affected the negotiations by narrowing the options for an agreement that would be acceptable to the US Senate (Tamura 2006, 297). This placed increasing pressure on developing countries to adopt voluntary targets or commit to greater participation by accepting a package of flexible mechanisms as proposed by the US in the final months of the AGBM negotiations (Gupta and Lobsinger 2004, 80).

The proposed flexible mechanisms emerged from the increasing focus on flexibility and cost-efficiency in the climate change negotiations. This second trend significantly reshaped the normative structures of climate governance following the adoption of the UNFCCC. In 1996, at AGBM-4, the negotiating agenda began to focus on maximizing the "flexibility" of commitments for Annex I countries. The concept of "emissions trading" was proposed by the Business Council for a Sustainable Energy Future and endorsed by the US delegation, who declared that international emissions trading must be part of any future climate change regime (IISD 1996b; UNFCCC 1996). This proposal subsequently attracted the support of several parties (IISD 1996a), as well as the concern of others. China, for example, raised concerns that emissions trading "would replace government commitments with activities of firms and individuals" (IISD 1997f), while France noted that such a system would reward the largest GHG emitters (IISD 1997e). The EU was less supportive of the market-style approach to governance than the US and demonstrated a greater interest in maintaining a domestic regulative approach. One of the key concerns of the EU was the issue of "hot air," a term which referred to the purchase of emission credits from the economies in transition, whose

credit supplies would be inflated by the economic decline of the 1990s. Under such circumstances, an emissions trading scheme would fail to produce a net reduction in emissions (Depledge 2000, 83).

Emissions trading was eventually institutionalized in the final text of the Kyoto Protocol as part of the package of flexible mechanisms insisted on by the US as a condition for accepting a quantifiable emission reduction target. This package comprised emissions trading, Joint Implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (IISD 1997c). The CDM was introduced as an advancement on Brazil's earlier proposal for a Clean Development Fund (Brazil 1997, 8). The Clean Development Fund was intended to finance adaptation and mitigation in the developing countries through penalties imposed on Annex I parties who failed to comply with their periodic commitments. By contrast, the adopted Clean Development Mechanism allows Annex I countries to finance emission mitigation projects in the developing countries in return for claiming the averted emissions as credits toward their own domestic targets. The transformation of the punitive fund into a market mechanism occurred behind closed doors during an informal meeting of delegates convened by the government of Japan at COP-3, in Kyoto (Depledge 2000, 75). Many of the developing countries in attendance are thought to have been persuaded by the US of the benefits of CDM for their national interests (IISD 1997b).

The Kyoto Protocol was adopted at COP-3 in 1997 and subsequently ratified by 174 countries. It entered into force on 16 February 2005 following the 55th ratification by countries accounting for more than 55 percent of total emissions in Annex I parties. This agreement reinstitutionalized the original norms of global climate governance, albeit in a somewhat compromised form in the case of the domestic emission reduction targets and timetables norm. Despite the persistent efforts of the US to redefine the norm of CBDR by calling for developing countries to adopt emissions targets, the original interpretation of this norm was reinstitutionalized in the Kyoto Protocol. Although no specific targets were set for developing countries, their participation was secured through commitments such as reporting and cooperation in market mitigation measures. In the years following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, the call for developing countries to increase their participation in global climate governance has strengthened. Despite the fact that many Annex I countries have struggled to meet their existing commitments, calls for developing countries to adopt targets have become increasingly commonplace.

In addition to reinstitutionalizing the norm of CBDR, the Kyoto Protocol also reinstitutionalized the idea that mitigation should be pursued

through domestic emission reduction targets and timetables. National targets were negotiated within a global reduction target of 5 percent below 1990 emissions level by the period 2008–12. The final domestic targets for this commitment period, which cover carbon dioxide and five other GHGs (methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride), were as follows (UNFCCC 1997):

EU-15,[10] Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland	–8%
United States	–7%
Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland	–6%
Croatia	–5%
New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine	0
Norway	+1%
Australia	+8%
Iceland	+10%

These targets were not necessarily based on an assessment of each country's historical contribution to the problem and present ability to bear the costs of mitigation; instead, the targets emerged from each developed country's calculation of what could realistically be domestically achieved. Based on these calculations, each Annex I party proposed a range of figures within which they were prepared to negotiate (IISD 1997b).

The emphasis on flexibility and cost-efficiency ensured the successful negotiation of a package of flexible mechanisms that would enable Annex I parties to pursue their targets in cooperation with other countries, including developing countries with no targets of their own. The package of flexible mechanisms comprised emissions trading, Joint Implementation (JI), and CDM. Both JI and the CDM are emissions offsetting mechanisms; JI generates emissions credits for Annex I countries that invest in a clean development project in another Annex I country, and CDM generates credits from investment in developing countries.

SUPPRESSING THE SIGNS OF UNSUSTAINABILITY

These flexible mechanisms have contributed to a gradual redefinition of the governance of climate change. The declarations and policies of

the late 1980s and early 1990s revealed a concern with addressing the domestic sources of excessive emissions, including transport systems and energy consumption in the industrialized countries. The shift from such regulative governance to flexible governance, as reflected in the Kyoto Protocol, redefined climate governance as principally a task of mitigating emissions at the cheapest possible source rather than addressing the unsustainable structural and cultural causes of excessive emission levels. These causes are many and varied and addressing them may well be an immensely difficult and disruptive process. Ultimately this would require not technological innovation but rather political innovation, behavioral changes, and public deliberation on which GHG emitting activities and products should be prioritized given the finite absorptive capacity of the atmosphere and other natural "sinks." This suggests that climate change is indeed an inherently political problem. Yet by shifting attention away from historical emissions to future emissions, and from domestic mitigation to transnational mitigation efforts, a technical representation of the climate change problem has been institutionalized. Viewed through a technical lens, the specific sources of emissions and the social and political objectives they serve are treated as irrelevant, and the unsustainable nature of many emission-intensive activities is rendered invisible. As Parikh and Parikh (1991, 43) have pointed out, we could prevent the annual emission of 1,000 tons of GHGs either by taking 800 cars off the road in the United States, or by asking 12,000 Bangladeshis to stop eating rice. These figures belie the assumption that GHG emissions are purely material phenomena that can be satisfactorily mitigated through technocratic processes divorced from social and ethical considerations.

Treating emissions as purely technical phenomena that are devoid of social, cultural, and human meaning obscures the need to confront challenging questions of equity and value. Should atmospheric space be reserved for providing essential warmth to the world's energy-deprived majority, or for running patio heaters for the world's wealthy minority? Should space be reserved for operating public transport for the many or private transport for the few? Should space be provided for rice production to nourish the majority, or for the international transportation of pineapples for the perennial indulgence of the minority? These socioeconomic trade-offs cannot be appreciated and deliberated if climate change is treated as a technical problem that ought to be mitigated at the cheapest possible source. Open deliberation about the trade-offs that accompany a global response to climate change would ultimately draw attention to the ecologically insensitive policies, practices, and systems that simply

cannot be sustained in a finite world. For many years now, our collective demand on the biosphere has exceeded its productive and absorptive capacity. In fact, the resource- and waste-intensive practices that occur in high-income countries could only be sustained on a global scale if an additional three planets were at our disposal.[11]

The message of unsustainability, especially in wealthy countries, is no longer novel, yet it seems that its implications have yet to be fully grasped. The idea of "sustainable development" has been familiar for more than two decades, but it has generally failed to move beyond rhetoric. It is difficult to avoid this conclusion regardless of whether we use a standard or strong definition of sustainable development. A standard definition is that popularized by the Brundtland Commission: "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED 1987, 43). A more ambitious and demanding definition can be found in the work of ecological economists: "A nation is achieving sustainable development if it undergoes a pattern of development that improves the total quality of life of every citizen, both now and into the future, while ensuring its rate of resource use does not exceed the regeneration and waste assimilative capacities of the natural environment. It is also a nation that ensures the survival of the biosphere and all its evolving processes while recognising, to some extent, the intrinsic value of sentient non-human beings" (Lawn 2010, 96). Equity considerations must surely demand that a practice only be considered sustainable if it can be sustained on a global scale; that is, without drawing on others' share of biospheric "services." Thus, a practice that can be locally sustained only by offsetting its waste in a distant (and probably impoverished) place can hardly be considered sustainable. Yet, as this chapter has shown, the global system for addressing climate change has evolved in such a way that will perpetuate the cultural, political, and economic drivers of excessive emissions rather than catalyzing their transformation. These drivers manifest differently in different places; nevertheless, common cultural, political, and economic factors underling excessive emissions can be identified.

Anthropocentrism, or human-centeredness, is an underlying cultural driver of many ecologically insensitive policies, practices, and systems. Anthropocentrism is characterized by three assumptions: "the belief that there is a clear and morally relevant dividing line between humankind and the rest of nature, that humankind is the only or principal source of value and meaning in the world, and that nonhuman nature is there for no other purpose but to serve humankind" (Eckersley 1992, 51). In con-

trast to these assumptions, which Plumwood (2002, 97) refers to as the "Illusion of Disembeddedness," is the ecocentric understanding of "internal relatedness" in which humans and other natural organisms are deeply and inescapably interrelated with their environment (Eckersley 1992, 49). The importance of this principle for global climate governance will be discussed in more detail in the chapter 3.

Politically, the anthropocentric fallacy has been institutionalized in many modern societies in the tradition of liberal democracy. The liberal conception of the disembedded individual is fundamentally anthropocentric; as one liberal theorist acknowledges, "liberalism is by definition focused on the welfare and well-being of humans, thus not just placing human interests, wants and desires above others but making them the exclusive measure of morality" (Wissenburg 2006, 21). Nature is thus denied any inherent value independent of its instrumental value for human ends. In a persuasive critique, Eckersley points out that the idea of autonomy that informs liberalism is based on an "incoherent and undesirable ontology . . . of social and biological detachment" (2004a, 104). This assumption of detachment produces a representation of the citizen as a rational utility-maximizer for whom other citizens and noncitizens (including nature) are sources of either competition or exploitation in the pursuit of self-interest (ibid., 104–5). On the basis of such a representation, democracy becomes a system for facilitating bargaining between the private preferences of ostensibly equal and autonomous citizens and other political actors, including industry associations. Such a system reduces environmental considerations to private conceptions of "the good life," thus forcing them to compete with other private preferences in bargaining processes; if environmental considerations are overlooked it is simply a case of the majority not sharing the same values as those of environmental advocates.

Economically, there are clearly many ecologically insensitive activities that drive excessive emissions. Generally what lies beneath these discrete activities is an economic system that is completely antithetical to living sustainably within a finite world. Within modern states, including both those characterized by widespread deprivation and those characterized by material abundance, it is almost universally accepted that the economy should be oriented toward perpetual growth. While the global economic crisis has presented a temporary speed bump, the world economy is expected to continue along its growth trajectory (IMF 2009). This increase in production of goods and services will place a significant strain on available water, land, air, and other elements of the natural world.

As the ecological economist Herman Daly has observed, "The remaining natural world can no longer support the existing economy, much less one that continues to expand" (2008, 46). Yet despite the evidence that a finite world cannot support infinite growth, it remains heresy to economists in most modern states to question the need for economic expansion. Such apparent irrationality is based on two pervasive myths. The first concerns an assumed connection between individual and social well-being and the market cycle of production and consumption. Economic indicators, including GDP and surpluses and deficits are prominent indicators of progress and well-being in political discourse and the media. Given the emissions-intensity of this market cycle, it is worth critically examining its importance for long-term well-being, and at least two factors suggest that this connection is dubious. First, the ends of private procurement could be satisfactorily met through alternative means; for instance, the needs satisfied by privately purchasing a book, child's toy, or lawnmower could also be met through social sharing sites such as public libraries (Wall 2009). And second, studies have consistently suggested that above a certain level, wealth and consumption is inversely related to human well-being, both emotional and physical (Diener and Seligman 2004; Kasser 2002).

The second myth that supports the apparently irrational pursuit of infinite growth in a finite world is the myth of dematerialization (Trainer 2001). Technological optimists and mainstream economists are quick to point out that economic growth in industrialized countries has now been largely decoupled from energy consumption and GHG emissions. Advancements in efficiency are said to nullify the imperative to curb growth in response to climate change and the realization that the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere is finite, because over time the material output is decreasingly dependent on natural resources. Again, given the enormity of what is at stake, it is worth interrogating this assumption as well. It is undeniable that efficiency standards have improved dramatically in industrialized countries over the past forty years; in fact, even on a global scale energy intensity was 33 percent lower in 2008 than in 1970 (Jackson 2009, 48). But if we are concerned about long-term sustainability in a finite world, relative decoupling is far less relevant than absolute decoupling. In other words, we need to reduce the amount of resources that are being used rather than just reduce the rate at which they are being used. Here, the news is less positive. Between 1990 and 2008, global GDP grew at a faster rate than GHG emissions, but emissions still grew by forty percent over this period. Focusing attention only

on the OECD countries seems to somewhat ameliorate the situation and offer signs for optimism in terms of eventually achieving absolute decoupling. In the period 1990–99, GHG emissions grew by 4 percent within the OECD, while GDP grew by almost 23 percent (OECD 2002, 24). But this data contains a fundamental omission: the emissions embodied in goods imported for domestic consumption. One of the most comprehensive attempts to draw together data on embodied emissions has been made by Peters and Hertwich (2008). Their calculations suggest that the more economically advanced countries are net importers of GHG emissions, while the developing countries are net emissions exporters. This means that consumption and economic growth in wealthy countries is much more emissions-intensive than typical data would suggest. This also raises the thorny question of whether developing countries should be held responsible for the emissions they produce in the process of satisfying the consumption demands of developed countries.

Instead of attempting to navigate its way through these challenging questions, the international community has constructed a climate change regime that obscures the underlying drivers of excessive emissions. International trade has long presented an opportunity for states to obscure the magnitude of their ecological footprint, and now the global climate regime offers an additional tool: carbon offsetting. As we move forward, this practice will merely compound the existing false impression of the progressive decoupling of economic growth and GHG emissions and energy consumption in many industrialized countries.

3. Understanding the Paradox of Global Climate Governance

Understanding how the global system for governing climate change has evolved in such a way that threatens to exacerbate unsustainability is a difficult task within International Relations. It is difficult because it requires serious consideration of two themes that have long been neglected by the field, namely global environmental change and the role of ideas and norms in shaping state behavior and coordinating action at the global level. In this chapter I show that the theoretical frameworks that have dominated the study of International Relations are inappropriate for explaining the paradox of global climate governance. My critique of these frameworks operates at two levels; first at the metatheoretical level where rationalism dominates the discipline, and, second, at the substantive theoretical level where (neo)-realism and neoliberal institutionalism are dominant.[1] I propose an alternative framework that draws together insights from constructivism and green political theory. This "green constructivist" framework overcomes the limitations of the dominant frameworks in International Relations and allows us to understand the paradox of global climate governance.

NORMS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

As we saw earlier, norms are commonly understood as "collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity" (Katzenstein 1996, 5). There is now widespread agreement among scholars of IR that norms do exist and hold some degree of relevance in the interaction of states in the international system. A remaining source of dispute is the reason for states' compliance with international norms. Two contrasting streams of thought have emerged on this matter and these are effectively

captured by March and Olsen's dichotomous logics of action (1989, 1998). On the one hand, rationalist scholars (including realists and neoliberal institutionalists)[2] explain norm conformance as driven by the "logic of consequences": "Those who see actions as driven by expectations of consequences imagine that human actors choose among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious that other actors are doing likewise. A consequential frame sees political order as arising from negotiation among rational actors pursuing personal preferences or interests in circumstances in which there may be gains to coordinated action" (March and Olsen 1998, 949). The logic of consequences emphasizes autonomy and the capacity of actors to exercise choice in bargaining. Rationalist scholars assume that actors make strategic cost-benefit calculations, based either on material or social incentives or disincentives, in order to maximize their exogenously given interests. An alternative explanation for norm conformance can be found within the constructivist tradition of IR. Constructivist scholars invoke March and Olsen's "logic of appropriateness," which points to rule-based behavior. As March and Olsen explain: "Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations" (1998, 951). "Appropriate" behavior may be understood to have a cognitive foundation or an ethical foundation: actors may behave in a manner that is judged to be consistent with their identity, or in a manner that is judged to be virtuous. While March and Olsen's dichotomy is useful for capturing rationalist and constructivist scholars' diverging explanations for norm compliance, it is important to note that constructivists tend to be quite critical of the assumption that logic operates at an individual level. As I discuss in more detail below, constructivists instead emphasize the social or collective basis of logic and norm conformance.

Understanding the process by which norms for governing climate change have diffused throughout the international system is best approached from a constructivist position. While many scholars now tend to call for an assimilation of rationalist and constructivist research in IR, I argue that there are numerous reasons to avoid such an assimilation in our quest to understand global climate governance. Overall, the value of constructivism lies in its capacity to explain the deeper ideational foundations that affect states' responses to emerging global norms, whereas the principal flaw of rationalism is its incapacity to appreciate these foun-

dations. This flaw emerges from three aspects of the rationalist ontology: the distinction between ideas and interests, the ontological and methodological commitment to the individual, and the essentialization of instrumental rationality. Each of these aspects is worth briefly highlighting.

The rationalist distinction between ideas and interests is based on an assumption that actors' identities and interests exist prior to social interaction and that interests have no ideational basis (Ruggie 1998). By taking the identities and interests of actors (i.e., states) for granted, scholars working from a rationalist perspective are unable to explore their foundations and their capacity to change. There are numerous obvious cases of states' interests shifting in line with new identities and norms, including Japan's and Germany's internalization of antimilitarism; South Africa's internalization of racial equality; and Australia's internalization of multiculturalism. Rationalism is unable to explain such shifts in identity and interests because of its failure to recognize the constitutive role of norms, rules, and institutions, that is, their capacity to enable certain identities, interests, and practices that were previously not possible (ibid.). Just as neoclassical economists take "the market" for granted without considering the institutional frameworks that enable such economic relations, when scholars import rational choice theory to political science they remain blind to the institutional frameworks that enable states and the international system to function as they presently do. By denying the constitutive role of norms, rationalism is, as Ruggie observes, "capable of explaining the origins of virtually nothing that is constitutive of the very possibility of international relations: not territorial states, . . . not any concrete international order, nor the whole host of institutional forms that states use, ranging from the concept of contracts and treaties to multilateral organizing principles" (1998, 871).

The second flaw concerns the individualism that is inherent in the rationalist understanding of the political world and produces an assumption that ideas are merely beliefs held by individuals.[3] The inclusion of ideational phenomena (such as norms, rules, and institutions) in rationalist-informed research can therefore only be of limited value; many ideas such as money, private property, and sovereignty cannot be reduced to individual beliefs because they constitute shared (or intersubjective) knowledge that rests on "collective intentionality" rather than belief (Ruggie 1998). This erroneous assumption creates methodological problems for the rationalist scholar. If ideas are understood as individual beliefs, human behavior can only be explained by ascertaining the beliefs held by individuals. Yet an idea can certainly inform an actor's behavior,

and this actor can in turn reproduce this idea, without necessarily believing in the idea.[4]

A third assumption that undermines rationalism's capacity to explain the role of ideas in International Relations is its essentialization of instrumental rationality. To appreciate why this ontological assumption is erroneous it is necessary to briefly examine what the concept of "rationality" entails. "Rationality" can be conceptualized in terms of foci and form. Baber and Bartlett (2005) identify three different foci to which the concept of rationality can be applied: the system, the choice or action, and the reasoning process.

1. *Functional rationality applies to the level of the system.* "The functional rationality of a system is the degree to which system behavior is organized according to particular principles and can be understood by reference to principles of order" (ibid.). Dryzek explains that a system is functionally rational if it is organized to "consistently and effectively promote or produce some value" (1987, 25).
2. *Substantive rationality applies to the level of the individual choice or action.* Choices and actions can be described as rational if they appear to be "appropriate to the achievement of given goals within the limits imposed by given conditions and constraints" (Simon 1976, 130).
3. *Procedural rationality applies to the level of the reasoning process.* "Behavior is procedurally rational when it is the outcome of appropriate deliberation," rather than merely impulse (ibid., 131).

In addition to these three foci, there are numerous forms to which the concept of rationality can be applied, namely technical, economic, social, legal, political, and ecological rationality.[5] These forms of rationality can be found at all levels of focus: functional, substantive, and procedural. A comprehensive account of each of these forms of rationality is not necessary for us to appreciate that rationality is a broad and complex concept. Yet in spite of this evident breadth and complexity, the metatheory of rationalism strips the concept of rationality down to a single focus (choice or action) and two related forms (technical and economic); the result is an assumption that instrumental rationality, based on principles of efficiency and utility-maximization, is universally inherent to individuals prior to any social interaction. A commitment to this understanding of rationality effectively rules out the possibility that actors may reason

about ends as well as means; instrumental rationality is concerned with achieving pregiven goals, and any behavior which is conducive to these goals is considered rational, irrespective of the desirability of the goals themselves. This excessively narrow conceptualization in turn diminishes the consideration that can be given to the role of ideas and norms in International Relations; in particular, it precludes consideration of the very ideas and institutions that generate and institutionalize particular forms of rationality. Moreover, it precludes consideration of how particular forms of rationality may be problematic in specific contexts, and consideration of the desirability of promoting alternative forms of rationality. The green constructivist framework that I put forward in this chapter is based on an alternative assumption that forms of rationality are socially constructed and highly contextual. Given that global climate change is a fundamentally environmental problem, primacy should rightly be given to "ecological rationality," and this framework enables consideration of how such rationality manifests (or fails to manifest) in global climate governance. However, before turning attention to this alternative framework I will consider the ways in which the dominant substantive theories of IR are inappropriate for explaining issues of global environmental change.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

An enduring preoccupation with matters of security and conflict within IR has seen the theme of environmental change consigned to the margins of scholarly interest. Assumptions that are central to the realist canon, including international anarchy, absolute gains, and balance-of-power are not readily compatible with the study of nontraditional threats such as global climate change. Indeed, realism can lay claim to only two significant contributions to the study of global environmental change. In 1994, Robert Kaplan highlighted the potential for climate change, among other forms of environmental change, to weaken national borders and lead to actual conflict between states; in fact, Kaplan identified the environmental as *the* national security issue for the twenty-first century (Kaplan 1994). Similarly, Thomas Homer-Dixon more recently has drawn attention to the threat posed to national security and stability by environmental degradation and resource scarcity (Homer-Dixon 2001). Neorealist theories of hegemonic stability, game theory, and rational choice allow for some form of international cooperation on transnational issues to

potentially develop, yet realism is unable to account for cases of international cooperation in which either the global hegemon is opposed, or the issue under discussion challenges the material interests of the participating states (Kütting 2000).[6] This ultimately undermines the theory's utility for studying the governance of transnational threats such as climate change, which, in spite of recurrent objections from the United States, has attracted the participation of a large number of states (including many that would appear to have a vested interest in avoiding such governance).

The emergence of international institutions concerned with such diverse environmental issues as ozone protection, desertification, biological diversity, acid rain, and climate change has instead tended to attract the attention of neoliberal institutionalist scholars. Central assumptions of this tradition include absolute gains and international cooperation; hence, it is more readily appropriate for understanding these developments in International Relations than the realist tradition. Neoliberal institutionalist scholarship has focused largely on the question of how to structure incentives to promote effective cooperation and compliance on global environmental problems among almost two hundred sovereign states (e.g., Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992; Young 1999; Porter and Welsh-Brown 1991; Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993; Chasek 1999; Speth and Haas 2006). However, three fundamental problems are inherent to the approach.

The first problem concerns the narrow understanding of regime effectiveness. In her broad examination of this concept, Gabriela Kütting (2000) points out that effectiveness is understood within this tradition as merely successful regime construction and compliance, while the more important matter of whether a successfully negotiated agreement succeeds in mitigating the problem it purports to address is rarely considered.

A second and related problem, as identified by Robyn Eckersley, is that the neoliberal focus on incentives and the efficient exploitation of nature "implicitly sanctions an instrumental orientation toward the nonhuman world and leaves little room for understanding or promoting alternative 'green identities' of particular states or nonstate actors" (Eckersley 2007a, 256). This problem can be understood as emerging from the rationalist assumption that instrumental rationality is an essential feature of human nature and thereby an unavoidable feature of state-based decision making.

A third problem which emerges from the neoliberal institutionalist focus on strategic and self-interested bargaining is that this tends to obscure the normative and ideational context within which climate

change and other environmental negotiations have taken place (Eckersley 2004b). As I discussed in chapter 2, norms concerning *who* should take responsibility for mitigating climate change and *how* mitigation should be pursued have underpinned negotiations since this issue emerged on the political agenda in the late 1980s. These norms are not unique to global climate governance but rather have emerged from prior environmental and atmospheric agreements. Understanding the development of global climate governance requires an appreciation of this normative context which the neoliberal institutionalist tradition is unable to provide.

AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK: GREEN CONSTRUCTIVISM

Understanding how norms of global climate governance have evolved in such a way that threatens to exacerbate unsustainability requires a theoretical framework that attends to two particular themes: global environmental change and the role of ideas and norms in shaping state behavior. By exploring the assumptions embedded in the metatheory and substantive theories that dominate International Relations it has become clear that this task demands a departure from the traditional frameworks. I propose that this task is best pursued through an alternative framework that integrates insights from constructivism and green political theory; the essential features of which are described below.

John Ruggie's definition of constructivism offers a useful point of entry: "[C]onstructivism concerns the issue of human consciousness in international life: the role it plays and the implications for the logic and methods of inquiry of taking it seriously. Constructivists hold the view that the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place" (1998, 879). To tease out these characteristics of constructivism and juxtapose their strengths against the limitations of the competing approaches outlined above, I begin with a discussion of the constructivist ontology.

"Ontology" is the theory of being and concerns the nature of the (social/political) world: its essence, boundaries, and constitutive units (Hay 2002). All social and political theories embody an array of presuppositions about the nature of social and political reality: these presuppositions form a theory's ontology. The ontology of constructivism is informed by the assumption of the mutual constitution of structure and agency. This

implies that structure constrains and enables the behavior of actors, but that structure itself is reproduced and transformed through actors' behavior. The two interact and shape one another, hence neither can be ontologically privileged over the other, and neither is static nor determinant (Klotz and Lynch 2007). Structures are understood by constructivists in ideational terms as intersubjective meanings, or "collectively meaningful" processes (Adler 2002). Whereas rationalists conceptualize ideas as individually held beliefs, constructivists emphasize the social and collective nature of ideas. As Emanuel Adler explains, "intersubjective meanings are not simply the aggregation of the beliefs of individuals who jointly experience and interpret the world. Rather, they exist as collective knowledge. . . . This knowledge persists beyond the lives of individual social actors, embedded in social routines and practices as they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their production and workings" (2002, 327). Although this explanation presents structures as essentially ideational phenomena, constructivists do not deny the existence of material phenomena that exist independently of shared beliefs about their existence. Indeed, material and ideational phenomena are considered to be intimately connected. Material structures, including brute facts such as weaponry, ecosystems, and topography, exist independently of human understandings. Social facts, on the other hand, are material structures to which collective meaning has been attached, including states and state-practices, resources, and property (Ruggie 1998). Unlike brute facts, ideational structures do not exist independently of human behavior because they are constituted by this very behavior.

Agency, by contrast, is a property of actors which denotes their capacity to act upon situations and formulate and implement decisions. Intersubjective meanings constitute structures, which in turn constitute agents. The government of Australia, for instance, could not exist on the basis of brute facts alone: the physical presence of a group of individuals in Canberra would be inconsequential in the absence of social facts such as the "sovereign state," "national citizens," "voting," and numerous others that constitute these individuals as a single actor. Actors' interests and identities therefore cannot exist prior to their interaction with structures: they are endogenous to this process. Consequently, understanding interests and identities requires attention to the social context in which they are formed and transformed (Guzzini 2000). The capacity of actors to act and reason, though, is quite distinct from the capacity for autonomy. This distinction is captured by Bevir and Rhodes's concept of "situated agency." Whereas autonomy implies that individuals have a capacity

to "have experiences, reason, adopt beliefs and act, outside all contexts," situated agency recognizes that individuals "can reason and act in novel ways . . . [but] only against the background of the contexts that influence them" (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 4). This constrained capacity for innovation is a source of potential change in underlying structures. By their very nature structures tend to remain stable, but they can be modified if agents reinterpret their interests and/or understanding of "appropriate" behavior. Bevir and Rhodes suggest that this capacity for innovation is likely to be triggered when actors are confronted with new ideas or problems that cannot easily be accommodated within their existing cognitive, ideational, or instrumental toolkits. In seeking to accommodate a new idea or solve a new problem, actors may be forced to interrogate their existing assumptions in such a way that produces a structural transformation. Of course, as will become apparent in the following chapters, dilemmas are not guaranteed to generate transformations. At least two reasons for potential failure are immediately evident. First, an actor behaving or reasoning in an innovative way may simply be marginalized and ignored, and second, the new idea or problem may be distorted to accommodate it within the existing structure. This point is very important in the context of global climate governance. Responding to the problem of climate change will require a transformation of existing structures, but so far the nature of the problem has been distorted to accommodate it with existing unsustainable structures. The dilemma presented by climate change has prompted some degree of innovative behavior and reasoning but this has only produced small changes in the existing structures, rather than the transformations required for long-term sustainability.

Another aspect of the constructivist ontology that needs to be appreciated is the understanding that intersubjective meanings are context-specific rather than universal or static: intersubjective meanings are spatially, temporally, and socially specific, and they are open to transformation. Ideas like capitalism and development, for example, manifest differently in different contexts, and thus may produce different interests and identities in different contexts (Klotz and Lynch 2007). This context-specific nature of ideas extends to the constructivist understanding of rationality. In contrast to the essentialization of instrumental rationality that informs the metatheory of rationalism, constructivists understand forms of rationality as socially constructed and highly contextual. This ontological assumption draws the analyst's attention beyond the individual decision-maker and the choices available to him or her, to the structures that generate and institutionalize specific forms of rationality (Weldes

1998). As two nonrationalist scholars of IR have observed, "The truths that rationalists appeal to . . . are time and space specific, and the product not of reason, but recurrent practices and instituted belief systems" (Amin and Palan 2001, 564). Constructivists thus remain open to the possibility that noninstrumentalist forms of rationality may either presently exist in practice or potentially emerge in the future (Laffey and Weldes 1997). Given that global climate change is fundamentally a problem of sustainability, it is useful to look to green political theory for guidance on responding to this problem in a rational way. By integrating green political theory into the constructivist framework for analyzing global climate governance, we avoid a pitfall that characterizes existing IR scholarship; namely, the tendency to apply traditional theoretical and methodological tools to the study of environmental problems instead of questioning whether the specific nature of these problems may require a departure from traditional approaches within IR.[7]

The work of green theorists such as Robyn Eckersley (1992; 2004a), John Dryzek (1987), Andrew Dobson (2007), and Val Plumwood (1991, 2002) usefully reminds us that socially constructed forms of rationality can effect harm not only on particular groups within society, but also on the nonhuman natural world. Taking an ecocentric position, these theorists denaturalize the anthropocentrism that is embedded in instrumental rationality. Anthropocentrism is defined by Eckersley as "the belief that there is a clear and morally relevant dividing line between humankind and the rest of nature, that humankind is the only or principal source of value and meaning in the world, and that nonhuman nature is there for no other purpose but to serve humankind" (1992, 51). This position is based on a distinction between humans and nature which green political theorists reject on the basis that it is an ontological fallacy and/or environmentally damaging (Fox 2003; Paterson 2001; Eckersley 1992). In contrast to this distinction, ecocentrism is based on an understanding of "internal relatedness, according to which all organisms are not simply interrelated with their environment but also *constituted* by those very environmental interrelationships" (Eckersley 1992, 49). However, ecofeminists caution against merging the self with nature in such a way that the two become indistinguishable; instead, as Plumwood argues, a "relational account of self, which clearly recognizes the distinctness of nature but also our relationship and continuity with it" offers a more appropriate alternative to anthropocentrism (1991, 20). McMahon usefully elaborates on this notion of "relational self"; she writes: "In ecofeminist analysis, self and other are neither merged nor opposed. Rather, drawing on feminist analysis of care it attempts to

construct a model of a sustainable relationship in which the integrity of both the . . . self and nature . . . are maintained—a feminist ethic is one that acknowledges both interdependence and autonomy" (1997, 170)

Dryzek (1987) reminds us that the onus of establishing and maintaining this mutually supportive relationship with nature necessarily falls on humans, because nature can exist without humankind, yet humankind cannot exist without nature. This suggests that the concept of "ecological rationality" should be based on the overarching goal of establishing and maintaining a mutually supportive relationship with nature. Whereas rationalists understand the goals of efficiency and utility-maximization as inherent to human nature, for green theorists the identification of such a goal is a normative exercise. Given that the conditions for sustained human life are dependent on a healthy environment, our overarching goal *should* be the maintenance of a healthy environment.[8] As Plumwood argues, even if we take a minimally anthropocentric approach and value sustained human life, it is essential that ecological rationality be constructed and prioritized over other forms of rationality: "If forms of rationality that treat the earth as plunder . . . have become a danger to us and to the rest of the inhabitants of the earth, we need to . . . develop new forms. These will be ecologically sensitive forms of rationality that judge what currently passes for reason by the standards of ecological success or failure, among other things" (2002, 18).

On the basis of this discussion it is possible to identify how ecological rationality manifests at each of the three levels of focus identified earlier:

1. The system: A system or organization would be ecologically rational if it is organized in such a way that it could "consistently and effectively . . . provide the good of human life support" (ibid., 25). Baber and Bartlett suggest that such a system would be organized according to a fundamental principle of "biogeophysical interdependence" (2005, 19).
2. Choice or action: Human behavior would be ecologically rational if it could be judged as appropriate to the goal of achieving and maintaining a mutually supportive relationship with the biosphere.
3. Reasoning process: An ecologically rational reasoning process would entail a "higher-order form of critical, prudential, self-critical reason which scrutinises the match or fit between an agent's choices, actions and effects and that agent's overall desires, interests and objectives as they require certain ecological conditions for their fulfilment" (Plumwood 2002, 68).

To the extent that the accumulation of excessive greenhouse gases in the atmosphere can be understood as a reflection of disequilibrium in the relationship between humans and the rest of the natural world, it seems a worthwhile task to consider whether state actors are responding to the problem of climate change in an ecologically rational way and, if not, what may be obstructing such rationality. This task is aided by Val Plumwood's scholarship on "remoteness" (2002). Plumwood has shown that the realization of an ecologically rational form of agency is presently obstructed by the "remoteness" that has been institutionalized in modern social, political, and economic systems. This idea of remoteness resembles Princen's concept of "distancing," namely "the severing of ecological and social feedback as decision points along the (commodity) chain are increasingly separated along the dimensions of geography, culture, agency, and power" (Princen, Maniates, and Conca 2002, 16).[9] Remoteness manifests in several forms, the most obvious one being spatial: the spatial distance between practices of production and consumption disassociates people from the ecological consequences of their choices. However, there are other forms of remoteness that artificially disassociate people from the ecological relationships in which they are embedded; these include consequential, communicative, epistemic, temporal, and technological remoteness (Plumwood 2002, 71–73). If we were to only to address the spatial form of remoteness (for example, by localizing economic and political processes), these other forms of remoteness would continue to obstruct ecological rationality. This leads Plumwood to conclude that "remoteness reduction" ought to be understood as "a political and not only a spatial organizing principle for ecological rationality" (1998, 568). I return to this idea in chapter 7 to consider the possibilities for enhancing the rationality of global climate governance.

The green constructivist framework provides a strong foundation for analyzing global climate governance. Unlike traditionally dominant approaches in International Relations, it allows us to seriously consider how norms of global climate governance have diffused and conditioned states' responses to the problem of climate change; it also provides the scope for evaluating the wider social and ecological implications of global climate governance. While neoliberal institutionalist scholars are content with evaluating the effectiveness of global cooperation in terms of regime construction and compliance, the green constructivist framework incorporates a more stringent assessment of regime effectiveness. By integrating the concept of ecological rationality, this framework provides the scope for considering whether global climate governance is suc-

ceeding in actually mitigating the problem of global climate change. As will become evident in part 2 of this book, various forms of remoteness have been institutionalized in global climate governance as attention has shifted from historical emissions to future emissions, and as action has shifted from domestic mitigation to transnational mitigation efforts.

THE NORM DIFFUSION PROCESS

The green constructivist approach directs attention to the underlying ideational structures within states and how these condition the diffusion of global norms. This approach requires consideration of how states' positions in international negotiations are enabled and constrained by domestic conditions, and how states' actions on climate change either reproduce or transform these conditions. A number of scholars have explored the causal power of domestic actors, institutions, political culture, and material interests to explain variation among states in conforming with global norms (Checkel 1999; Risse-Kappen 1994; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Bernstein 2002; Cass 2006). Two influential models have been developed to describe the process by which international norms enter the domestic realm. The first is Finnemore and Sikkink's "norm life cycle" model (1998). The three stages of the life cycle involve the initial emergence of the norm, which may be followed by a "norm cascade" once it is broadly accepted by a large number of relevant state actors, and finally, norm internalization may eventuate if the norm assumes a taken-for-granted quality. The second model is Risse and Sikkink's "spiral model." This model seeks to bridge rationalist and constructivist approaches to analyzing the norm diffusion process by allowing a role for both within their five-stage diffusion process. This process incorporates the interaction of state, nonstate, and transnational actors. The first three stages involve a sequence of denial, repression, and tactical concessions as state actors exercise instrumental reasoning in response to pressure and criticism from networks of domestic and transnational actors; the last two stages involve the socialization of state actors leading to their acceptance of the norm and, eventually, norm-consistent behavior (Risse and Sikkink 1999).

Two problems with existing constructivist research on the norm diffusion process have been identified. The first concerns the notion of normative "fit" that is either explicit or implicit in this literature.[10] Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes (1997), as well as Amitav Acharya (2004), point out that the notion of a "fit" between a state's existing domestic conditions and a global norm has been inadequately theorized and tends to imply that this

match is static and existential. Laffey and Weldes argue instead that "the 'fit' between various ideas and the plausibility, or not, of new ideas are actively constructed rather than simply 'there' in the ideas themselves." Normative fit, they suggest, must *always* be constructed, whether actors are conscious of this process or not (Laffey and Weldes 1997, 225–26). Similarly, Acharya prefers to conceptualize the notion of normative fit as "a dynamic process of *matchmaking*," which he refers to as "localization." Localization stresses the agency of local actors and their capacity to build congruence between a foreign idea and their local practices and beliefs through discursive manipulation or the "grafting" of the idea onto other related and legitimate ideas, in such a way that invests the foreign idea with local characteristics.

The second problem concerns the implicit assumption that global norms retain their essence and meaning throughout the diffusion process. Van Kersbergen and Verbeek (2007) argue that scholars have not been sufficiently attentive to the potential for the integrity of a norm to be challenged after it has been rhetorically accepted. They critique Finnemore and Sikkink's "norm life cycle" model on the basis that it focuses on the successful or failed internalization of a norm in its original form rather than allowing for the possibility that a modified version may be internalized after domestic actors have contested the original meaning of the norm. Van Kersbergen and Verbeek explore this possibility in the context of the diffusion of the norm of subsidiarity throughout the EU; they show that once the norm was accepted by member states a political contest over the appropriate meaning of this norm emerged as state actors began the process of institutionalizing the norm within their domestic jurisdictions; the result was a reformulation of the original norm. Hence, while Acharya's study reveals that the local content of a foreign norm can change once it is domestically institutionalized, Van Kersbergen and Verbeek's study suggests that norm diffusion may sometimes occur as a two-way process in which the meaning of the original norm is challenged and potentially altered by the "feedback" produced by domestic congruence-building.[11]

The problems identified by Laffey and Weldes, Acharya, and Van Kersbergen and Verbeek offer guidance for analyzing the norm diffusion process. It is clear that such analysis should consider the extent to which norm diffusion entails a dynamic process of "domestic congruence building" between global norms and domestic conditions, during which changes in the norms or the domestic conditions may occur. In accordance with the green constructivist framework outlined above, I

conceptualize the domestic conditions as comprising the material foundations, the political institutions, and the social structure.[12] These conditions collectively enable and constrain a state's environmental foreign policymakers in responding to global climate governance norms. Earlier I explained that structures are understood by constructivists in ideational terms as intersubjective meanings, or "collectively meaningful" processes (Adler 2002). To apply this understanding to a study of international norm diffusion where a multitude of collective meanings and ideas can be expected to be of consequence, it is useful to draw on Hall's concept of the "policy paradigm." Hall defines a policy paradigm as the interpretive "framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kinds of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing (1993, 279). Drawing on this concept allows us to consider the diverse range of meanings and ideas that have conditioned actors' behavior in the context of climate change, as well as the way in which these meanings evolve over time. Thus, I treat the domestic social structure as the range of policy paradigms that orient governance within a state. The issue of climate change is multidimensional and cuts across several policy areas, in particular environmental, economic, and foreign policy. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the paradigms that operate in each of these policy areas have contributed to domestic actors' understanding of the climate change problem and the most appropriate way to respond to this. It is important to remember that although the social structure tends to remain stable over time, this is not a necessary and inevitable condition. The innovative behavior or reasoning of actors responding to new problems or ideas has the potential to transform one or more paradigms within the social structure.

INTERPRETING THE DIFFUSION OF GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE NORMS

A green constructivist framework requires confronting the challenge of analyzing unobservable phenomena. While the material foundations that constitute a state's domestic conditions may be directly observable and measurable, the underlying norms, institutions, and actors' identities and interests are not. The task of analyzing unobservable phenomena demands a set of tools that social scientists rarely draw on given the traditional positivist dominance. As I discussed in chapter 1, the positivist commitment to the unity of science requires the generation of general

laws by identifying patterns of relationships among observable phenomena (Smith 1996). Such a pursuit is patently incompatible with the green constructivist framework, which emphasizes the conditioning effect of underlying ideational phenomena that are not directly observable. Moreover, the positivist task of identifying general laws and making predictions about the social and natural worlds is incompatible with the constructivist assumption that identities, interests, and norms are fluid and highly contextual.[13]

The constructivist assumptions of intersubjectivity and the mutual constitution of structure and agency are compatible, rather, with an interpretivist conception of science. Mark Bevir (2006, 283) explains that interpretivists "seek to uncover the beliefs or meanings that make actions and practices possible." Agents and structures are constituted by collective knowledge, and can therefore only be understood through interpretation. To interpret the world of International Relations we need to move beyond the basic Humean model of causality that tends to inform political science; this model is based on the assumption that causes can be inferred from "human observations of 'constant conjunctures' of events" (Kurki 2006, 192), and can be captured in the following syllogism (Patomäki and Wight 2000, 228):

> If event *A* occurs, then event *B* must occur.
>
> Event *A* has occurred.
>
> Therefore event *B* must (had to) occur.

Consistent with its positivist foundations, this model treats only directly observable phenomena as relevant in explaining outcomes, and further posits that "causes should 'temporally precede' and be 'independent' of effects" (Kurki 2006, 208). Constructivists reject these premises, as well as its built-in determinism, favoring a constitutive causality that sees *reasons as causes* (Adler 1997, 329). Human behavior emerges from intersubjective knowledge, which provides the "conceptions of possibility" (Laffey and Weldes 1997, 201). Consequently, as Adler explains, interpreting causality "involves specifying a time-bounded sequence and relationship between the social phenomena we want to explain and the antecedent conditions, in which people consciously and often rationally do things for reasons that are socially constituted by their collective interpretations of the external world and the rules they act upon" (1997, 330). Such interpretation can be based on an "abductive" mode of inference. While deductive and inductive modes of inference rely exclusively on direct observation to generate particular hypotheses or more general the-

ories, abduction involves inferring underlying (and often unobservable) causes from actors' language, actions, theories, and everyday practices. Blaikie explains that this "begins by describing . . . activities and meanings and then deriving from them categories and concepts that can form the basis of an understanding or an explanation of the problem at hand" (1993, 163).[14]

To understand the ways in which states have responded to the norms of global climate governance, I have employed an abductive mode of inference. Rather than explaining a state's response to norms exclusively on the basis of observable phenomena such as material resources, policies, and statements, I have sought to infer the underlying domestic conditions (i.e., the material foundations, political institutions, and the domestic social structure) that have provided actors with the "conceptions of possibility" in responding to global climate change. My interpretation of the diffusion of norms of global climate governance in the context of three states was a three-stage process; the first two stages are analytical and the third is evaluative.

The first stage was directed toward formulating an account of the domestic conditions of each state, the first dimension of which is the material foundations. Here I was concerned with identifying each state's national GHG emissions profile, "energy culture," and the standard of living of their citizens; each of these material factors is likely to influence a state's response to global norms of climate governance. Such information is easily drawn from the published data of governments, and national and international economic and energy institutions. Establishing an account of the political institutions through which decisions are made is a similarly straightforward task. National constitutions and legislation clearly define the rules of engagement between citizens and the state, and between subnational units and the state. In each of the case studies explored in the second part of this book, such political features as the liberal-democratic tradition, federal structure, and/or membership of a wider transnational community conditioned the response of domestic actors to the norms of global climate governance in important ways.

Interpreting the policy paradigms that constitute the domestic social structure is less straightforward. There is obviously a range of policy paradigms that orient governance within a state. Attending to this social structure in constructivist-informed research requires identifying those paradigms most relevant to the issue of interest. The issue of climate change is multidimensional and cuts across many policy areas, in particular environmental, economic, and foreign policy. Consequently, it is reasonable

to assume that the paradigms that operate in each of these policy areas have contributed to domestic actors' understanding of the climate change problem and the most appropriate way to respond to this. The content and essence of these policy paradigms can partially be inferred from important policy documents, initiatives, and actual practices. But to develop a complete picture of paradigmatic evolutions in each of these policy areas, I relied on existing historical and critical accounts of state-nature relations; economic development trajectories; and international relations. For this purpose, I was attentive to the mechanism of "articulation," through which political elites establish "compelling links between different elements of meaning" (Muppidi 2004, 26). As Stuart Hall explains (1986), articulation does not imply a necessary connection, hence dominant norms may shift if an alternative articulation becomes persuasive:

> [T]he term has a nice double meaning because "articulate" means to utter, to speak forth, to be articulate. It carries that sense of . . . expressing, etc. But we also speak of an "articulated" lorry (truck): a lorry where the front (cab) and back (trailer) can, but need not necessarily, be connected to one another. The two parts are connected to each other, but through a specific linkage, that can be broken. An articulation is thus the form of the connection that *can* make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time. (Ibid., 53)

As I discuss in chapter 4, for example, a recurring concept in Australia's economic policy paradigm is that of development, but the precise meaning of development has changed over time. Australia's governing elites have at various times throughout the country's modern history created persuasive connections between "development" and "civilization," "development" and "national security," and "development" and "economic growth." There is no necessary connection between any of these concepts and meanings, yet their articulation normalizes certain actions and renders other actions impossible, illegitimate, or unacceptable.

Throughout the period of analysis (late 1980s to late 2007), the frameworks of ideas and standards governing foreign policy evolved to varying degrees in each of the case study states. In the case of India, the end of Cold War presented domestic actors with a dilemma that prompted them to reorient economic and foreign policy to accommodate new international conditions, pressures, and expectations. By contrast, such shifts in Spain and Australia were produced by changes in the national governing party. Evidence of these shifts in foreign policymakers' perceptions of the

international system, and the position of their state within this system, was gathered from the analysis of historical monographs, political party material, and speech transcripts, as well as secondary analyses.

The second stage of analyzing the diffusion of these norms involved tracing the development of each state's response to the norms over a period of two decades. This involved the review and analysis of a range of documents including government reports and publications; transcripts of speeches and parliamentary debates; research reports; publications of nongovernmental organizations, business associations, and trade unions; and publications and Internet material from the European Commission. To discern the negotiating positions of states it is necessary to draw both direct and indirect information from such data. Direct information refers to the factual content of a document; for example, the official communiqué of the inaugural meeting of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate provides useful factual information concerning the core agenda items and the Work Plan and Task Forces established (APP 2006). However, it is also possible to draw important information indirectly from the primary data by being attentive to its "unwitting content" (Finnegan 2006, 150). A more nuanced understanding of a state's position in international negotiations may be garnered by considering not only what is referred to in an official document, but also what is omitted from the document. This required looking at how various dimensions of the climate change issue were framed. An analysis of the APP's Communiqué, for example, reveals a strong emphasis on the technological dimension of climate change and the exclusion of any reference to the extant norms of climate governance embedded in the UNFCCC.

While constructing a chronological account of the policy development process in each state, I was attentive to two potential forms of congruence building, namely "framing" and "grafting" (Acharya 2004, 243–44). I follow Entman's definition of "framing" as "select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and [making] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (1993, 51–52). Framing an issue can thereby render it congruent with the existing domestic conditions. "Grafting," meanwhile" is defined as "institutionaliz[ing] a new norm by associating it with a preexisting norm in the same issue area, which makes a similar prohibition or injunction" (Acharya 2004, 244). At the same time, I was attentive to the potential for changes to occur within the domestic conditions (for example, changes in the governing party, economic conditions, or institutionalized norms),

and the subsequent potential for this to affect state actors' responses to the international norms. For this stage of the research I employed a method of process tracing. Most process tracing is either implicitly or explicitly positivist by relying on a Humean model of causality. Indeed, Checkel has argued that process tracing "only works if you hold things constant in a series of steps: A causes B; B then causes C; C then causes D; and so on." He concludes, therefore, that process tracing "is fundamentally at odds with more interpretative epistemologies . . . [and] cannot capture the recursivity and fluidity of most post-positivist epistemologies" (Checkel 2005). However, contrary to Checkel, I argue that process tracing can be compatible with a constructivist framework based on an understanding of "reasons as causes," in which the variables are not static but rather susceptible to change. Bennett and George, who have been particularly influential in developing process tracing as a research method, define process tracing as "the attempt to trace empirically the temporal and possibly causal sequence of events within a case that intervene between independent variables and observed outcomes" (2001, 144). Their clarification of the concept of "causal mechanisms" dispels the false assumption that process tracing is incompatible with an interpretivist understanding "There is . . . substantial agreement that causal mechanisms operate within a given context or "causal field," and their effects depend on interaction with other variables. . . . Causal mechanisms involve physical, social, or psychological processes that ultimately cannot be directly observed. We can only hypothesize about underlying causal mechanisms and make imperfect inferences about them on the basis of observed data" (ibid., 139).

The final stage of interpreting the diffusion of the norms of global climate governance is an evaluative stage. Unlike the traditionally dominant approaches in International Relations, the green constructivist framework employed here provides scope for evaluating the wider social and ecological implications of global climate governance. While neoliberal institutionalist scholars tend to evaluate the effectiveness of global cooperation in terms of regime construction and compliance, the green constructivist framework incorporates a more stringent assessment of regime effectiveness. By integrating the concept of ecological rationality, this framework provides the scope for considering whether global climate governance is actually succeeding in mitigating the problem of global climate change. There are three levels at which this evaluation should occur: the level of the system; choice/action; and reasoning process. In chapter 2, I argued that the normative shift in global climate governance has produced a paradox which allows this system to actually exacerbate

global unsustainability. By allowing the mitigation of greenhouse gases to occur at the cheapest possible source rather than targeting the political, economic, and cultural drivers of excessive emissions, global climate governance has become an ecologically irrational system that cannot "consistently and effectively . . . provide the good of human life support" (Plumwood 2002, 25). The irrationality of global climate governance at the system level may be partially mitigated through norm diffusion if the choices or action and/or reasoning processes at the domestic level are characterized by ecological rationality. However, through an analysis of three state-based case studies in part 2 of this book, it becomes clear that unsustainability has been deeply institutionalized through the process of domestic congruence building. In each case we see that ecologically irrational reasoning processes are deeply embedded in liberal-democratic political institutions, and policy paradigms oriented toward such goals as infinite economic growth and maximizing international competitiveness. It will becoming evident over the next three chapters that this has prompted state actors to pursue compliance with global norms in ways that reinforce and further institutionalize unsustainability. Consequently, although the international community has successfully established a regime through which most states can cooperate in responding to global climate change, this regime is characterized by such a serious paradox that it cannot effectively respond to the problem.

The following three chapters explore this problem in more detail in the context of Australia, India, and Spain. In the concluding chapter I will review the normative and ecological implications of the paradox in global climate governance, and reflect on the prospects for responding to climate change in a more sustainable fashion in the post-2012 phase of global climate governance.

PART II

Case Studies

4. Australia

The case of Australia offers an insight into how the global norms of climate governance have failed to trigger the paradigm shifts necessary for responding sustainably to climate change. This failure emerges partly from the global climate governance system itself. As I have argued in the previous two chapters, by allowing the mitigation of GHGs to occur at the cheapest possible source rather than targeting the underlying drivers of excessive emissions, global climate governance has become an ecologically irrational system that cannot "consistently and effectively . . . provide the good of human life support" (Plumwood 2002, 25). However, rationality is not only a system-level attribute, but also an attribute of reasoning and choices and action. Hence, the irrationality of the system may be partially mitigated if the norms of climate governance are absorbed into the domestic conditions via ecologically rational actions and/or reasoning. The process of normative congruence building in Australia, though, has not been characterized by ecological rationality. Despite the evidence that climate change is a manifestation of deeply irrational modes of reasoning and acting, Australia's own response has so far merely reinstitutionalized existing ecological irrationality. Incremental domestic changes have certainly occurred during the process of building congruence between global norms and domestic conditions, but these changes only concern how policy objectives are pursued rather than any transformation of the objectives themselves. Appreciating this dilemma requires an understanding of the material and ideational elements of Australia's domestic conditions, because these have constrained and enabled the norm diffusion process. This interpretive task, as I have argued, is aided by a green constructivist theoretical framework that overcomes the limitations imposed by traditional theories of international relations by shifting attention beyond

material factors to the interaction between state actors and underlying social structures, as well as socially constructed interests and forms of rationality. So before considering Australia's position in global climate governance, I develop an account of the constitutive elements of this state's domestic conditions—its material conditions, political institutions, and social structure.

DOMESTIC CONDITIONS

Material Conditions

First, Australia's domestic material conditions have affected the norm diffusion process. The four most salient features here are the anticipated domestic impacts of climate change, Australia's GHG emissions profile, its "energy culture," and the living standards of its citizens.

Geographically, Australia is one of the world's largest countries and is thus characterized by a range of climate patterns. Risk assessments carried out in recent years by government bodies suggest that the impacts of climate change will be acutely, but variably, felt across most of the country (Preston and Jones 2006; CoA 2005a, 67–82). Australia, which is the driest inhabited continent on Earth, has recently experienced its worst drought on record, and such conditions are likely to be exacerbated throughout the century as temperatures rise and rainfall decreases. While the northwest of the country may experience an increase in precipitation, the southeast and southwest (both important agricultural regions) are expected to become drier. Meanwhile, coastal regions, where human settlements are concentrated, are likely to experience further erosion and inundation from sea-level rise. Vulnerability is a product of both exposure and response capacity, and Australia's own vulnerability to climate change is moderated by strong economic and human capital. However, response capacity has its limits and this point was brought into sharp focus by a set of events in early 2009. In what has become known as Black Saturday, 173 Australians perished in bushfires on or around February 7, while several thousand others lost homes and community infrastructure in the southeastern state of Victoria. At the same, the country's northeast was experiencing its worst flooding in history, as Cyclone Ellie and unprecedented monsoonal rains inundated half of the state of Queensland. Irrespective of their connection to global climate change, these events delivered a devastating reminder of people's vulnerability to extreme weather events, which are expected to increase in rate and intensity throughout the century.

In accordance with Australia's responsibilities under the UNFCCC, periodic national communications have been submitted to provide detailed inventories of domestic GHG emissions. The Fourth National Communication was submitted in December 2005 and outlines the period of 1990 to 2003 (CoA 2005a).[1] According to this inventory, in 1990 Australia emitted a total of 511.5 million tons (Mt) of greenhouse gases; this figure encompasses the energy, industrial, agricultural, forestry, and waste sectors. In 2003, this figure had risen by almost 2 percent to 521.4 Mt (ibid., 2). However, it must be noted that these figures are highly skewed by the problematic inclusion of emissions from land use, land change, and forestry (LULUCF). The emissions produced by this sector are notoriously difficult to calculate; according to one expert, real figures may be 80 percent above or below estimates (Kay 1998). According to the National Greenhouse Accounts, emissions from land use change dropped by an estimated 59 percent between 1990 and 2004 (70 percent of which is attributed to changes in the state of Queensland) (Macintosh 2007, 1). However, as Macintosh reveals, the government's official data, which are based on the National Carbon Accounting System (NCAS), is contradicted by the findings of the Statewide Landcover and Trees Study (SLATS). This study estimated that the area of land cleared in Queensland between 1989–90 and 2000–2001 was 50 percent higher than estimates produced by the NCAS, thus casting doubt on the accuracy of the National Greenhouse Accounts (ibid., 1–3). For the sake of gaining a truer representation of Australia's emissions profile it is worth considering changes in emissions over time, *excluding* LULUCF. The figures provided in Australia's Fourth National Communication reveal an increase in 1990 emissions (excluding LULUCF) of 23.3 percent by 2003; in fact, emissions from stationary energy and transport (which account for the majority of Australia's emissions) rose by 37.2 percent and 28.8 percent, respectively (CoA 2005a, 2). In per capita terms, Australia's emissions are extremely high relative to global standards. Although Australia accounts for just 0.3 percent of the global population, it is responsible for 1.6 percent of global emissions in the energy sector (CoA 2004, 24). In fact, at 6.8 tons of CO_2 equivalent, Australia's per capita emissions are amongst the highest in the world (Baumert and Pershing 2004, 10–11).

As well as accounting for the majority of Australia's domestic emissions, energy plays an important role in Australia's international trade. Australia therefore represents an energy culture of fossil fuel exporters. Australia is a country very rich in natural resources and the presence of vast reserves of coal, natural gas, uranium, and various minerals

has played an important role in shaping the country's economy. In fact, Australia's material prosperity can largely be attributed to its considerable natural wealth. Energy exports earn more than $54 billion each year (CoA 2009, 5), but this sector employs only a small percentage of the Australian workforce (ABS 2008). Moreover, the large reserves of fossil fuels have provided energy-intensive industries, businesses, and households with energy that is much cheaper than in most developed countries (CoA 2004, 10). In terms of energy resources, Australia's substantial fossil fuel reserves are complemented by large reserves of non–fossil fuel based energy resources, especially solar and wind. However, the potential of renewable energy sources has been comparatively ignored in favor of nonrenewable energy sources (Riedy 2005, 216). Furthermore, as Yu and Taplin have noted (2000, 110), successive Australian governments have failed to take advantage of the country's substantial human capital and high technological potential by focusing instead on the export of nonrenewable energy, minerals and agricultural products.

Also relevant to the material dimension of the domestic social structure is the fact that a large majority of Australians enjoy a high standard of living with attendant high levels of material consumption and wasteful consumption. The Australian Bureau of Statistics estimates that on average, each Australian generates 450 kilograms of municipal waste each year. The emissions produced by food waste alone (which constitutes almost half of all waste) equate to approximately 158 kilograms of GHG per Australian per year (ABS 2007a).[2] In monetary terms, this equates to US$6.5 billion dollars, or 13.1 percent of total household food expenditure (Hamilton, Dennis, and Baker 2005, 12). In addition, in a country where fuel and electricity prices are amongst the lowest in the industrialized world (CoA 2004, 12), there is little incentive for Australians to exercise constraint in their energy consumption. This is reflected in the fact that household energy consumption increased by nearly 10 percent between 2000 and 2005 (ABS 2007b). Many decisions relating to energy consumption, though, are undoubtedly constrained by factors largely beyond the control of individuals, for example by the design and infrastructure of towns and cities. The urban sprawl that characterizes Australian cities has undoubtedly contributed to a widespread reliance on private cars as a means of transportation. This is compounded by the fact that in the absence of adequate investment, rail infrastructure in Australia has deteriorated dramatically over the last few decades. For more than twenty-five years, commonwealth investment in roads has been twenty times greater than investment in railways (CoA 2002a).

Political Institutions

Political institutions also, of course, have affected the diffusion of global climate governance norms. The Australian state is characterized by a federal structure, which comprises six states and two mainland territories, as well as many local councils within these states. Although actors at the substate level have no direct influence on international negotiations, including those pertaining to environmental matters, the federal structure can affect the diffusion of global norms. Although the jurisdiction of specific issues may be clearly defined in the constitution, the interconnectedness of many issues that are governed by different levels of government can hinder the effective implementation of new policies. Although the central federal government has jurisdiction for all international affairs, Australia's international obligations may reach beyond the federal government's jurisdiction to that of the state and territory governments and local councils. For example, jurisdiction over energy policy is shared between the central commonwealth government and the state and territory governments, and coordinated by a Council of Australian Governments (COAG). State governments also have responsibilities for transport, land use, urban planning, and infrastructure, while local councils are responsible for waste management, and limited land use and transport planning; all of these tasks impact on the national GHG inventory (Yu and Taplin 2000, 105).

Australia has a liberal-democratic political system. Notwithstanding the many positive attributes of such a system, its impact on the prospects for ecological sustainability is far from benign. As I have discussed in chapter 3, the anthropocentrism inherent in liberal democracy is ecologically irrational. The erroneous assumption that humankind is not only separate from nonhuman nature but also morally superior to it manifests as the subordination of "biogeophysical interdependence" (Baber and Bartlett 2005, 19) to individual freedom and liberty.[3] This misplaced priority undermines the capacity of the system to "consistently and effectively . . . provide the good of human life support (ibid., 25).

Moreover, the system of bargaining characteristic of liberal democracy is inappropriate for addressing environmental concerns. From the perspective of critical political ecology, the understandings of autonomy and preferences on which the practice of bargaining rests are fundamentally flawed. Citizens' preferences are not necessary formed and fixed outside of social interaction but rather are socially conditioned; although individuals have a certain capacity for creative choice, this choice is ulti-

mately constrained by existing social norms and identities. Moreover, an appreciation that the social world is embedded in the natural world prompts a rethinking of the liberal conception of individual autonomy. Given the potential for individual decisions to have consequences both for other individuals and for the nonhuman elements of nature, public deliberation offers a far more appropriate avenue for decision-making than political bargaining.[4]

Finally, the short election cycles of liberal democracies tend to produce short-sighted policies, to the detriment of the environment. In an effort to maintain the support of voters, Australia's political leaders are generally reluctant to consider any policy that entails a delayed payoff while imposing a cost on the current electorate. Moreover, the widespread belief that the electorate rewards good economic management has led political leaders to disproportionately privilege and protect economic indicators over other social and environmental indicators (Head 1986, 55).

Social Structure

From a governance perspective, social structure can be conceptualized as the range of policy paradigms that orient governance within a state. In chapter 3, I explained that this conceptualization of the social structure draws on Hall's concept of the "policy paradigm," which he defines as the interpretive "framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kinds of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing" (1993, 279). Attending to the social structure in constructivist-informed research requires identifying those policy paradigms most relevant to the issue of interest. In the context of global climate governance, three specific policy paradigms are relevant to the norm diffusion process: environmental, economic, and foreign policy.

Environmental Policy Paradigm The idea that environmental degradation can negatively affect human well-being and should therefore be controlled has a long tradition in Australia. The environmental impacts of agricultural development, industrialization, and urbanization were already becoming apparent to some Australians in the nineteenth century. Recognition of this led first to a Royal Commission inquiry and, later, to the introduction of public bodies to regulate the use of natural resources and limit pollution (Christoff 2005, 26–30). Over time, as environmental awareness has grown, governments have slowly allocated more funds to strengthening environmental governance. In 1996, an autono-

mous federal department of environment (Environment Australia) was established, together with numerous other programs and agencies in subsequent years (ibid., 35–36). However, in spite of the expansion of environmental institutional capacity, the degradation of Australia's environment has continued. This is unsurprising given the tendency to ignore and marginalize those critics who have questioned the compatibility of the Australian environment with growth-based development. As Walker has observed, "Though a small but vocal minority persistently pointed out the devastating effects of European settlement on the Australian environment, they lacked, in the main, access to the ruling circles and the machinery of opinion" (1999, 41–42).

An important qualifier to the conservationist norm in Australia which must be acknowledged is that environmental conservation and intervention have not been pursued in the interests of ecological integrity itself, but rather as means of securing long-term market sustainability. By and large, Australia's environmental policy paradigm is defined by a strictly "anthropocentric utilitarian conservation" ethic (Garden 2005, 82). In this sense, the imperative of capital accumulation requires natural resources to be used in a moderately sustainable manner to secure future production prospects.

An important dimension of the policy paradigm is the preferred kinds of instruments for attaining specified goals. In Australia, responsibility for environmental matters normally falls at the substate level on states and territories. There are exceptions to this norm, though; local governments are responsible for local-level waste management and land-use planning, while the federal government tends to take responsibility for environmental issues that are considered global in scope. State and territory governments in Australia have traditionally relied on regulatory instruments to manage environmental problems. This tradition of command-and-control persisted throughout most of the 1980s in spite of a wider national project of economic deregulation (Christoff 1995, 167). Although regulation has been the preferred approach, the implementation and monitoring of environmental regulations has often been weak and partial. Furthermore, as Taplin has observed, "stringent regulatory standards are not set when it is perceived industry is not able to comply with them" (2004, 493). By the 1990s, the preference of federal and state and territory governments for environmental statutory intervention was beginning to weaken. This was partly influenced by the growing international salience of a discourse of "sustainable development," which casts the relationship between business and environment as harmonious

rather than antagonistic by proposing that environmental protection can be profitable for business (Papadakis 2002a, 33–34). Legislation and regulation are rendered seemingly redundant by the discourse of sustainable development, as it assumes businesses will voluntarily adopt measures that will maximize their profits. This has led to a growing interest among Australian governments in the use of new environmental policy instruments (NEPIs), such as voluntary measures, taxes and subsidies, and the creation of new markets and trading systems (Papadakis and Grant 2003, 32). However, these new instruments have not entirely replaced regulation; instead, Australia's approach to environmental policy has been described as a "light-handed regulatory approach" (ibid., 31). This light-handed approach combines flexible regulation and experimentation with NEPIs.

Economic Policy Paradigm Economically oriented policymaking in Australia is governed by a paradigm of developmentalism.[5] Australia's colonial heritage has produced a commitment to a concept of development informed by Enlightenment principles of progress and the human domination of nature, which, as Walker (1999) has persuasively argued, is patently ill-suited to the unique ecological systems of Australia. S.J. Butlin explains that this dominant conceptualization of development has always been characterized by growth, which, in turn, "is seen as having two dimensions—geographical spread and quantitative increase" (1962, 12). Since colonial settlement in 1788, such growth has been widely accepted as imperative, natural, and self-evidently positive. In this sense, developmentalism functions as a policy paradigm. However, as Walker (1999) observes, this idea has also persistently functioned as a political strategy because the popular association of development with the common good has enabled successive Australian governments to incorporate business interests into the political agenda on the premise that what is good for business is good for Australian society as a whole.

The developmentalist paradigm has gone through three general phases throughout the nation's modern (i.e., post-colonization) history, which I characterize as colonial, nationalist, and economic developmentalism. Each phase is characterized by a slightly different understanding of development and its ultimate purpose for society.

Colonial developmentalism. The origins of the modern Australian state trace back to 1788 when Britain established a self-supporting penal colony in Sydney. Throughout the next several decades, successive waves of convicts and free immigrants arrived and seized lands inhabited by

aboriginal peoples, with the purpose of mastering, developing, and prospering (Garden 2005, 91). Don Garden (2005) explains that three aspects of the British mindset shaped the colonists' relationship with the Australian environment: Christianity, capitalism, and contempt, none of which instilled a general sense of respect or care for nature. Faith in a Christian account of creation, in which God created man in his image, distinct from and superior to nature, convinced the colonizers that it was their religious duty to improve and civilize the untamed continent (White 1967). The expansion and exploitation imperatives of capitalism resonated with this sentiment to produce a perception of Australia's environment as "a place waiting for development, essentially a collection of resources waiting to be turned into wealth" (Garden 2005, 67–68). Garden's reference to contempt alludes to the dominant belief in British superiority and the manner in which this shaped the colonizers' aesthetic and utilitarian evaluations of the landscape and indigenous people, flora, and fauna.

The instrumentalist view of the environment prompted extensive deforestation for the purpose of establishing agricultural and pastoral lands. Frawley suggests that such clearing "was symbolic of bringing civilization" (1994, 62). Garden likewise argues that land-clearing was not a purely economic pursuit but also had "cultural connotations, representing mastery, the establishment of order, and the opening of the country for productivity and improvement, as well as making it more aesthetically appealing to the immigrant eye" (2005, 89). The articulation of civilization and the felling of trees is evident in one colonist's description of a journey through the Mount Lofty Ranges, in South Australia: "occasionally in some deep glen in the mountain forest there is suddenly revealed a group of busy workmen, with their gypsy-like encampment around them scattered with felled timber and planks on all sides, while the sharp sound of the axe rings echoing through the solitude, proclaiming the dawn of civilization and industry" (George Angus quoted in Lines 1991, 68). The agricultural activities pursued by the European settlers were strongly oriented toward the local market, in particular for the consumption of meat and crops (Jackson 1998, 3–4). By contrast, exports accounted for just 2–3 percent of GDP in 1821 (Butlin 1994, 179), and until 1840 the sea rather than the land provided the main source of export income. As N. G. Butlin has documented, sealing and whaling were important commercial activities in the nascent colony, and the marine resources were exploited for export purposes to the point of depletion (1994, 172; Horne 1976, 26–27). Such activities can be understood, in Plumwood's terms, as a case of *consequential remoteness* (2002, 72): the consequences of the depletion of seal

and whale populations fell on other species within marine ecosystems, while the original decision-makers remained largely unaffected as they were able to shift their focus to the exploitation of terrestrial resources for economic development. The exploitation of the land's natural resources intensified following the discovery of gold in 1850: this provided the initial insight into Australia's substantial mineral wealth. Replicating the exploitation of Australia's marine resources, within a decade the goldfields were mined to the point of depletion (Catley 1996, 44).

N. G. Butlin (1994) persuasively argues that understanding the colonial developmentalist paradigm in Australia requires paying attention to the urban setting, because the early colonial economy was shaped by joint urban-rural development. While the majority of the colonial population was engaged in rural and marine resource–based activities, a significant number were employed in trades and services in urban settings. In spite of the vast space and small population, colonial society was quick to urbanize and by the end of the 1830s approximately 40 percent of New South Wales's colonial population resided in urban settlements. The life experiences and worldviews of the convicts and free immigrants were predominantly urban; few were adapted to rural or pastoral life, and many preferred to congregate in urban settings for reasons of aesthetics and employment opportunity (ibid., 152–54). Yet apart from the small minority employed in small-scale manufacturing, the urban population relied on the provision of rural natural resources for employment in the trade and service sectors, and this created linkages between rural and urban development in the colonial economy (ibid., 195). It is therefore evident that since European colonization, a social divide has been present in Australia between a minority rural population whose economic well-being relies directly on the manipulation of nature and the extraction of natural resources, and an urban population that benefits from (and is in many ways dependent upon) this distant manipulation and extraction. Garden notes that the "ecological footprints" of the urban centers have always exceeded the geographical area they physically occupied: consumables and raw materials were sourced from distant locations, while distant rivers were dammed to satisfy aesthetically motivated water consumption habits ill-suited to the driest continent on earth (2005, 91). This discussion allows us to see that the urban-rural divide that developed in colonial Australia began to institutionalize an ecologically irrational economic paradigm that is defined by spatial, temporal, and epistemic remoteness. The distance of urban settlements from sites of resource extraction tended to preclude any awareness of the immediate consequences produced by

urban decision-making on the environment and aboriginal peoples, and the consequences for future urban-based populations. The faith in British superiority and Christianity created epistemic remoteness by dismissing Australia's indigenous people as uncivilized and their knowledge as worthless superstition, which thereby extinguished a source of ecologically sensitive knowledge of the environment.

Nationalist developmentalism. In 1901, the six separate British colonies federated to form the Commonwealth of Australia. Frawley observes that at this point "the 'progress through development' ethos became part of a national vision" (1994, 66). Economic rhetoric in which the nation itself was represented as a business was common during the early decades of the twentieth century; for example, during the 1919 election campaigns, citizens were told that they were all "shareholders in the great company of Australia Unlimited" (Horne 1976, 134). Later, Prime Minister Stanley Bruce referred to himself as "the managing director of the greatest company in Australia, the Commonwealth Government," and commented that this company's "duty is to develop Australia" (quoted in Horne 1976, 134).

During this era, the idea of "development" that defined Australia's economic paradigm was also articulated to the nation's security and place in the wider world. Development came to be viewed as a patriotic and moral duty to which all Australians could contribute. This is partly reflected in the early-twentieth-century writings of the historian A. W. Jose:

> To this point, then, the course of Australian history has led us—that we hold a whole continent of valuable land, using it very imperfectly, but free for the moment from outside interference. This free moment we must use, if we want to retain our hold; we must use it to take seriously in hand the developing of the country's natural resources by cultivating its richer soils, irrigating its drier, exploiting the fisheries along its coasts, opening up and thoroughly working the mines below its surface. . . . To do [these things] . . . is Australia's task for the future; and young Australians cannot serve their country better than by preparing themselves with zealous study to take their share in the task. (1911, 202)

At this time, the edict of "populate or perish" was a powerful one: the sparsely populated interior was deemed to pose a risk to Australia's very survival. Populating the interior with European "kith and kin" was considered a necessary measure to protect the nation from the "colored races" to Australia's north (Horne 1976, 134). Rhetoric of this era articulated development in terms of various nationalist sentiments, including racial purity, defense, and moral occupation. In 1922, Prime Minister Billy

Hughes claimed that Australia must increase its population to justify occupying a land capable of carrying fifty to one hundred million people; he warned that maintaining a "dog in the manger" policy would damage the country's international reputation (Horne 1976, 134).[6] Similar sentiments were expressed later, at a 1954 seminar on the development of northern Australia where delegates noted that "Australia could not justify her retention of it unless she exploited to the full its mineral resources and its capacity for food production" (Cowper 1954, xiii). Meanwhile, the governor general defended the cost of developing northern Australia by cautioning delegates to look at the situation through "Asian eyes," suggesting that "if twelve hundred million eyes looking hungrily for land see to the south of them a million square miles occupied by only 100,000 Australians, sooner or later they may not be content with looking" (Slim 1954, xii). Social Darwinism had reinforced the existing belief in British superiority, hence fears of potential Asian migration or invasion had prompted the introduction of the White Australia Policy in 1901, as well as the encouragement of population growth in central Australia: "More people meant more defenders" (Garden 2005, 102).

The articulation of development as nationalism was highly successful and persuasive. This is evident in Australia's treatment of the geographer Griffith Taylor, whose questioning of the natural limits of Australia's physical environment was unique at this time and earned him public and professional ostracism (Powell 1993). In contrast to suggestions that Australia was capable of accommodating between 100 million and 500 million people, Taylor proposed that 20 million was a realistic figure because "settlement already closely approximated the limits which had been set by the nature of the physical environment" (quoted in Powell 1993, 20). Taylor's reasoning was evidently informed by an understanding of humans as embedded in ecological relationships; however, this directly conflicted with the dominant assumption of humans as the masters of nature. The anthropologist Daisy Bates criticized Taylor's "pessimism" as a "gross slander on the spirit and skills of Australia's British pioneers," and his introductory textbook on Australian geography was banned in Western Australia (Bates quoted in Garden 2005, 25).

Economic developmentalism. By the 1960s, development was becoming synonymous with economic growth and had assumed an inherently positive quality. As Lines explains, "Development became a necessary good in and of itself; development required no further justification" (1991, 211). This was first evident in the state-promoted expansion of large-scale development in Western Australia, which entailed the construction of

an oil refinery, large cement works, a steel rolling mill, and the mining of iron ore, nickel, salt, mineral sands, bauxite, oil, and gas (ibid., 208–9). The prospects for employment generation were not a concern for the Western Australian government; indeed, industries offering a large number of jobs were often rejected in favor of "efficient" operations. This is revealed in then-premier Charles Court's assertion that "[w]e must ask firms which approach us, not how many men can you employ but how few? How efficient can you be, how much can you mechanize and automate?" (quoted in Harman 1982, 171). Given that the benefits of such development were unlikely to be self-evident to the general public, the government produced substantial pro-development propaganda replete with "statistics of development," which measured the benefits in terms of tons of ore extracted, kilometers of roads and railways built, and watts of electricity generated (Lines 1991, 210–11). But as Lines explains, these benefits accrued only to the resource extraction industry, not the wider population: "most of the domestic benefits of development remained in the realm of an abstract, oblique political discourse" (1991, 211).

The resource dependency of development in Australia intensified throughout the 1960s and 1970s as the extraction and export of coal and minerals expanded. The 1973 international oil crisis fueled this expansion as many countries made structural changes in favor of coal; as a result, between 1970 and 1992 the export of coal quadrupled (Robinson, Loughran, and Tranter 2000, 135–36). While its essence remained unchanged, the economic policy paradigm was redefined during the 1980s in terms of the instruments deemed appropriate for pursuing development. This era has been described as one of "state-sponsored marketization" (Walker 1999, 81). This marked a shift from the protection of the domestic economy to the embrace of global market forces in pursuit of growth, and consequently it has been characterized by deregulation and privatization. This has seen the role of government in development merely change rather than decline, and as Wanna and Weller have pointed out, this shift does not signal "a change of commitment to development, just new methods of achieving the objectives" (2003, 82). Since the 1980s, the globally hegemonic discourse of "international competition," which "remake[s] government in the image of the market" (Ernst 1998, 223), has become a salient feature of Australia's economic policy paradigm. This early salience was reflected in then–Prime Minister Bob Hawke's declaration that the "overriding objective" for the foreseeable future was "building a competitive Australia" (Hawke, Keating, and Button 1991, 1–2). Pusey's work provides an important insight into the institutionalization of a neoliberal (or "eco-

nomic rationalist," as it was known in Australia) policy paradigm during this time. Pusey observes that the upper echelons of Australia's federal bureaucracy came to be dominated by young men who attended the country's most exclusive private schools and held "conservative 'new right' political attitudes" (1991, 4). Such men were also predominately educated in a neoclassical economics curriculum. This stands in contrast to the characteristics of the older generation of executive bureaucrats who came from more modest social backgrounds and were most likely to have been influenced by Keynesian economics, personal experience of unemployment and war service, and the Great Depression (ibid., 4–6). This shift in bureaucratic culture has played an important role in shaping policy in Australia and realizing the economic restructuring objectives.

The objective of building a competitive Australia required an expansion of those industries with a strong "competitive advantage," namely the resource-extraction industry, agriculture, and tourism, as well as the minimization of uncompetitive industries, in particular manufacturing (Robinson, Loughran, and Tranter 2000, 242). The "natural capital" dependency that this has generated renders Australia's economy comparable to that of many developing countries, and has reinforced what Bolton refers to as the "socioeconomic paradox" of Australia, that is, the dependence of a heavily urbanized society on the export of nonrenewable rural resources for its material wealth (Bolton 1992, 22). As noted earlier, this socioeconomic paradox is based on spatial, temporal, and epistemic remoteness and has thereby produced ecologically irrational behavior (i.e., behavior which is inappropriate to the goal of achieving and maintaining a mutually supportive relationship with the biosphere).

Foreign Policy Paradigm Because the Australian Constitution authorizes the federal government to make decisions on matters that have an international dimension, in terms of public policy climate change can be appropriately understood as an issue of foreign policy. In this context, foreign policymaking is restricted to the prime minister, foreign minister, trade minister, environment minister (now climate change minister), the cabinet, and their respective advisers. Since climate change first appeared on the international political agenda, Australia has had two changes in national government, and therefore foreign policymakers. From the late 1980s until 2006, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) was in power, and a coalition government of the Liberal and National parties was in power from 1996 until late 2007, when the ALP was again returned to power. The Labor and coalition parties have traditionally been guided by slightly

different foreign policy paradigms, and this can be seen to have affected their respective responses to the global climate governance norms.

Building on the internationalist tradition developed by then–Foreign Affairs Minister H. V. Evatt in the aftermath of World War Two, the Hawke and Keating Labor governments favored a foreign policy strategy of "middle power diplomacy" (Gyngell and Wesley 2007, 214–16; Ungerer 2007; Evans and Grant 1995). Evatt's own conception of the middle power emerged from a worldview characterized not only by major powers and small powers, but also by those states "which by reason of their resources and geographic position will prove to be of key importance for the maintenance of security in different parts of the world" (H. V. Evatt quoted in Ungerer 2007, 541). Evatt is credited with establishing a Labor tradition of middle-power diplomacy defined by three characteristics: nationalism, internationalism, and activism (Evans 1997, 12). Nationalism referred to his efforts to craft an independent foreign policy instead of aligning the national interests with those of Great Britain; internationalism referred to the imperatives of relying on "soft" power and advancing foreign policy objectives through multilateral channels in the absence of material power; and activism referred to the development of an extensive and professional diplomatic service to sustain the promotion of foreign policy objectives on the international stage (Ungerer 2007). The conceptualization of Australia's role in the international order as a middle power was influential throughout the Whitlam and Hawke Labor governments of the early 1970s and 1980s, but it is Gareth Evans who is widely acknowledged for seizing the opportunity provided by the end of the Cold War to revitalize middle-power diplomacy as "a complete doctrine" of foreign policy during his term as foreign minister in the Keating government (Gyngell and Wesley 2007; Ungerer 2007; Cheeseman 2004). Under Evans's leadership, Australia's identity as a middle power assumed two faces: the multilateral entrepreneur and the good international citizen. The former demanded an active contribution to the reform of existing international institutions and to the construction of new regional institutions (Gyngell and Wesley 2007), while the latter required the pursuit of national economic and political interests "in a way that makes as positive a contribution as possible to a more peaceful and prosperous world" (Evans and Grant 1995, 343). Evans himself (1997, 19) explained that good international citizenship was considered not merely an idealistic stance, but also a pragmatic approach necessitated by an increasingly interdependent international environment. This tradition—of identifying the nation as a middle power and engaging in diplomacy deemed consistent

with such an identity—is a reflection of the underlying worldview held by Labor's foreign policymakers. This worldview is characterized by the assumption that states in the international system are unavoidably interdependent, and that the unilateral or exclusively bilateral pursuit of security and prosperity is consequently futile. Instead, multilateral cooperation at both the regional and global levels offers the most promising means of achieving these objectives.

Labor's defeat in 1996 signaled a shift in Australia's approach to foreign affairs. Holding a fundamentally different worldview, Prime Minister John Howard and his foreign affairs minister, Alexander Downer, rejected the conception of Australia as a middle power and the commitment to multilateralism that it entailed. Downer suggested that the middle-power concept greatly underestimated Australia's potential role in international affairs, asserting that "I do not accept Australia as merely a middle power. Rather, I believe Australia is a "pivotal" power" (quoted in Ping 2005, 49). Howard emphasized the primacy of the nation-state in the international order and assumed that "static" multilateral arrangements were ill-suited to the "messy and uncertain" reality of international relations; the "[p]ragmatic management of bilateral relationships" was deemed far more appropriate for a world characterized by diverse values and interests (Wesley 2007, 42; Cotton and Ravenhill 2007). Although the conservative side of Australian politics had traditionally favored bilateralism over multilateralism, Dalrymple (1997, 251–52) notes that the failure to secure a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council in 1996 (a bid inherited from the Keating Labor government) reinforced the coalition's shift away from multilateral cooperation toward bilateral diplomacy. Similarly, the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 reinforced its assumption that regional institutions were ineffective for promoting stability and prosperity (Cotton and Ravenhill 2007, 9).

The Howard government surprised many within foreign policy circles by strengthening bilateral ties within Asia during its terms in power (a region traditionally viewed with considerable ambivalence by Australia's conservative parties); however, primacy was clearly attached to maintaining Australia's "special relationship" with the United States. Some have argued that Australia's loyalty to the US was not merely a reflection of a realist pursuit of the national interest but instead a reflection of the prime minister's willingness to draw national values into foreign policy (Wesley 2007; Smith and Lowe 2005). Wesley explains Howard's loyalty as an extension of the value of "mateship": "a concept that encompasses unconditional acceptance, mutual and self-respect . . . , trust . . . , selfless-

ness and absolute interdependence" (2007, 275). By contrast, Howard's perception of Asia and the international system as a whole as sites of diverse values and interests appears to have prompted a pragmatic and flexible approach to diplomacy in these realms, rather than an approach informed by national values.

The return of the Labor Party to federal power in November 2007, under the leadership of Kevin Rudd, saw the tradition of middle-power diplomacy rise to prominence once again. This became evident through numerous government media releases and speeches by and interviews with the prime minister and foreign affairs and climate change ministers (Rudd 2007a; Smith 2007; Wong 2008). Illustrative is this announcement, made by the Rudd government in February 2008: "The Australian Government is committed to restoring Australia's place as a nation of creative middle power diplomacy—both in our region and in broader international forums. Australia has the potential to be a significant force for good in our region and on the world stage, including through our diplomatic efforts, increased contribution to efforts to reduce extreme poverty and fostering stability and peace in our region" (Rudd 2008).

In summary, the domestic conditions that have affected the process of norm diffusion in the case of Australia comprise the material foundations, political institutions, and the set of policy paradigms that define the social structure. The second half of this chapter presents an account of how Australia's environmental foreign policymakers have attempted over time to build congruence between these conditions and the global norms of climate governance in an environment where neither is fixed or stable.

THE NORM DIFFUSION PROCESS

The process of building congruence between the norms of global climate governance and Australia's domestic conditions has passed through four distinct phases, during which Australia has oscillated between activist and veto behavior. During a period of lengthy contestation, domestic actors challenged the logic of focusing on individual nations' historical responsibility for and domestic efforts to reduce GHG emissions. This has contributed to institutionalizing a technical representation of the problem, in which the specific sources of emissions, and the social and political objectives they serve, are treated as irrelevant: avoiding dangerous climate change simply requires limiting overall global emissions.

More recently, Australia agreed to comply with global norms of climate governance, but the legitimacy now attached to the technical representation of the problem allowed the Rudd government to adopt a compliance policy that places no limits on purchasing foreign credits to meet Australia's domestic emissions target. Hence, Australia can now comply with global norms without transforming the drivers of excessive GHG emissions that emerge from Australia's ecologically irrational domestic conditions. To appreciate how this situation has come about, below I present an account of the normative congruence-building process in Australia, which has effected slight changes in domestic conditions but not the actual transformation required to sustainably address climate change.

Phase 1: Acceptance of the Norms, 1988–1994

Initially, neither the overall idea of climate protection nor the emerging norms of climate governance encountered resistance in Australia. In the late 1980s when the issue of climate change made the transition from a scientific issue to one of political importance, Australia was governed by the Labor Party, under the leadership of Bob Hawke. During these early years, the Hawke government displayed enthusiasm for cooperating closely with other countries to establish a multilateral framework on climate change mitigation. Such a positive response was a clear reflection of Labor's embrace of "middle power diplomacy." In accordance with Labor's self-identification of Australia as both multilateral entrepreneur and good international citizen, Australian scientific and political delegates maintained an active involvement in both the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In a further reflection of Australia's commitment to international cooperation on climate change, in March 1989 then–Foreign Minister Gareth Evans signed the Declaration of the Hague, which called on all countries to acknowledge the importance of climate change and participate in a UN framework on mitigation (Wilkemfeld, Hamilton, and Saddler 1995, 8). Prior to signing this document on Australia's behalf, Evans described climate change as "the biggest problem . . . faced by mankind in this or any other age" (quoted in McDonald 2005, 220). As I explained in chapter 3, the recognition of such new problems has the potential to trigger actors' capacity for innovative reasoning and behavior, this in turn has the potential to effect a change in underlying ideational structures. Indeed, Evans later told the Senate that while it would be "wildly premature" to reconsider the nation's export policy, it

would be rational "to reduce our dependence on fossil fuel burning in favour of much greater reliance on nuclear energy in the period ahead" (CoA 1989, 814). He followed this claim with the statement that "the rest of the industrialised world contributes something like 98.5 per cent to the problem, so any contribution that we might make to its resolution is not going to make much difference unless it is done in unison with the other industrialised nations of the world. It is a global problem which demands a global response. It may well be that part of that response is to reduce dependence on the particular kinds of fuel burning that are particularly harmful in this respect" (ibid.). Nevertheless, the innovative reasoning triggered by dilemmas is not guaranteed to generate an ideational transformation, or paradigm shift. In this case, Evans's novel suggestion to reduce Australia's dependence on fossil fuels was evidently ignored by the Australian government. Emerging evidence that the burning of fossil fuels was detrimental to the health of the biosphere was evidently insufficient to prompt a reconsideration of the nation's development trajectory or style of infrastructure. Instead, the framework within which Australian responded to international expectations was one which did not genuinely challenge the domestic conditions.

Shortly before the Second World Climate Conference in late 1989, the Hawke government followed the lead of several other countries and adopted an Interim Planning Target (IPT). The IPT aimed to reduce emissions to 1988 levels by the year 2000, and by a further 20 percent by 2005, but with the caveat that such reductions would have no negative impact on the economy or Australia's competitiveness (Lowe 1994, 315–16). Then–Environment Minister Ros Kelly explained in a media interview that she "wanted an Australian commitment to a national reduction of 20 percent in greenhouse gas emissions so that Australia would be one of about 16 nations at . . . [the] conference in setting an example for the world" (quoted in Taplin 1995, 17). The announcement of the IPT was proceeded by a two-track process to assess how such reductions could be achieved. At the prime minister's request, a Greenhouse Working Group was established by the existing Ecologically Sustainable Development Working Groups to assess the costs, benefits, and options for reducing emissions.[7] Meanwhile, the Industry Commission was asked to consult with industry representatives to assess the likely costs and benefits to Australian industry of meeting the IPT. Despite reaching very different conclusions, the Ecologically Sustainable Development process and the Industry Commission reports were both consistent with the dominant economic policy paradigm of this time. In particular, neither group challenged the growth imperative or even the

assumption that increased energy production and consumption are vital for economic growth (Downes 1996, 186). On the basis of these two inquiries a strategy of "light-handed regulation" was drafted and later adopted by the Council of Australian Governments in 1992. This strategy, labeled the National Greenhouse Response Strategy (NGRS), was designed to control domestic emissions and meet Australia's obligations under the FCCC (Bulkeley 2001, 158–59). In spite of the Hawke (and later Keating) Labor government's international display of cooperation and responsibility, the NGRS was widely criticized by environmentalists and scientists as a weak and inadequate strategy for reducing emissions. In fact, the chair of the IPCC, Bert Bolin, dismissed the NGRS as a "typical weak example of a draft national action that would fail to live up to commitments under the treaty" (quoted in Taplin 1994, 149). Rather than establishing far-reaching measures and programs for achieving the IPT, the NGRS was little more than a statement of the status quo, based as it was on the continuation of "no-regrets" measures already implemented by the various tiers of government, as well as a commitment to further research with the aim of reducing uncertainties surrounding the impacts of climate change. Nevertheless, despite the level of criticism these outcomes attracted, the mere process of setting the IPT and initiating a dialogue on domestic action to stabilize and reduce emissions does indeed reflect Australia's recognition of the early norms of climate governance and the imperative of being seen as a cooperative and compliant member of the international community. Furthermore, notwithstanding the weakness of domestic action, throughout this time Australia maintained a cooperative position in multilateral discussions on the forthcoming framework convention. Australia continued to support the setting of domestic emissions reduction targets, and when an agreement was finally reached on the UNFCCC Australia was one of the first countries to immediately ratify the agreement.

A further development during this phase was the transition in leadership of the Labor Party from Bob Hawke to Paul Keating. This shift is particularly noteworthy as it saw the issue of the environment shift from a relatively prominent position to the margins of the government's agenda. Referring to environmental protection more broadly, Timothy Doyle notes that the subsequent coalition government's "savage assault was made possible by Labor's retreat from environmental issues under Keating" (2000, 177). This observation has particular salience in the domain of climate policy. One of the earliest indications of Keating's limited interest in the environment was his decision not to attend the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, where the UNFCCC was opened for signature. Although the event

was attended by over 100 heads of government, Keating argued that "it doesn't require a trip across the Pacific for a six-minute speech by me for a protocol that is already agreed," and instead appointed the environment minister to lead the delegation in his place (quoted in Johnston 1992, 10). Moreover, although the assessments of the Industry Commission and the Greenhouse Working Group were initiated by Hawke, it was Keating who announced that the resulting "no-regrets" NGRS would form the basis of Australia's response to climate change (McDonald 2005, 222).

In sum, during these early years of global climate governance, there was a general perception among Australia's environmental foreign policymakers that the emerging global norms were congruent with their country's domestic conditions. The idea that industrialized countries should take the lead in reducing their emissions did not meet any resistance in Australia during this initial phase. Moreover, the IPT and NGRS reflect an acceptance of the principle that mitigation should be pursued through domestic action. The Labor government's commitment to the foreign policy tradition of middle-power diplomacy, and the manifestation of this tradition as a multilateral entrepreneur and good international citizen, enabled this perception of congruence between the domestic conditions and the climate governance norms. Despite the growing salience of competitive developmentalism within the economic policy paradigm, there were no evident overriding concerns that cooperating with the international community to protect the climate system would undermine the pursuit of economic growth and competitiveness. Only Gareth Evans expressed concern that responding to the problem of climate change might require a new approach to economic development, one that was less dependent on fossil fuels. This somewhat innovative reasoning contradicted the domestic conditions and failed to make any impact on the Labor government's policies. Instead, it was assumed that "no regrets" measures would constitute a sufficient domestic response to the problem. While this response can be understood as rational in terms of being consistent with the domestic conditions, it is evidently ecologically irrational as it failed to give due consideration to the long-term sustainability of the ecological systems on which present and future generations of Australians are dependent.

Phase 2: Growing Resistance to the Norms of Climate Governance, 1995–2000

By 1995, an imminent shift in Australia's response to the established norms of climate governance was becoming increasingly apparent. First,

rising emissions and international and domestic criticism of the NGRS generated public discussion on alternative mitigation measures and the possibility of a carbon tax. By this time, however, the domestic fossil fuel industry had become better organized in protecting its interests and successfully precipitated a shift in the climate debate from a focus on global responsibility and the impacts of climate change to a focus on the potential economic costs and impact of mitigation efforts. Discussion about a possible carbon tax, for example, was quickly terminated by strong industry opposition, which successfully created a perception that such a measure would have a negative impact on the competitiveness of Australia's coal, gas, and aluminum exports, and the domestic economy as a whole (Tait and Simonian 1995, 4). The economic policy paradigm was evidently narrowing the parameters around which approaches to climate change mitigation could be considered acceptable. The Keating government thus found itself in the challenging position of trying to balance its international obligations with its taken-for-granted interest in placating industries dependent on low-cost energy. The government's response to this challenge took the form of Greenhouse 21C, which was announced in 1995 as a supplement to the NGRS (Yu and Taplin 2000, 97–98). Encompassing a range of voluntary programs in which Australian businesses and the wider community could partake, Greenhouse 21C was based on the expressed willingness of industry to reduce their emissions via voluntary measures. Hence, this policy was consistent with the environmental policy paradigm and its embedded preference for light-handed regulation, which assumes that businesses will recognize that the efficient use of resources maximizes profits and thereby render strict command-and-control measures unnecessary. The second clear sign that Australia's response to the climate governance norms was shifting emerged in mid-1995 at the first Conference of the Parties to the FCCC (COP-1), held in Berlin. The Australian delegation called for the conference to establish a Joint Implementation pilot phase, and thereby lent its support to the shift in focus from mitigating emissions within the industrialized countries themselves to a focus on cost-efficient mitigation through investment in developing countries (IISD 1995d). Moreover, in contrast to the cooperative stance taken during the earlier INC meetings, at COP-1 Australia chose to align itself with the "Umbrella Group": a group of countries united in their opposition to establishing a legal agreement before greater scientific certainty had been reached on the causes and effects of climate change (Agarwal, Narain, and Sharma 1999, 47).[8] As the challenge of reconciling domestic conditions with global norms became more apparent,

Australia's environmental foreign policymakers sought to build normative congruence by contributing to efforts to redefine the norm of CBDR. Illustrative is the support given to the US in calling for "meaningful participation" on the part of developing countries, especially the "more advanced developing countries" referred to in Germany's earlier proposal. This pattern continued into 1996, though now under the direction of John Howard's coalition government of the National and Liberal parties. At COP-2 in Geneva, Australia attracted criticism from several other parties over its continued opposition to legally binding targets and insistence on a new application of the differentiation principle (IISD 1996c). This presented a direct challenge to the extant notion of differentiation as institutionalized in the convention, which is based on the differentiation of developing and developed countries. Australia's own conception of differentiation was based on the idea that Australia warranted favorable treatment on the basis of its unique geographic, economic, and demographic features (CoA 1997a, 10921), yet this was clearly informed by an interest in maintaining the country's international competitiveness and reducing the domestic costs of conforming with an international mitigation agreement.

By 1997, the Howard government had had sufficient time to reflect on the issue of climate change and clarify the position Australia would take at COP-3, which was expected to produce a legally binding agreement on the reduction of emissions. Throughout this time, the underlying social structure conditioned the Australian government's re-assessment of the global norms of climate governance. The foreign affairs and trade white paper, "In the National Interest," which was released in August 1997, offers an insight into the foreign policy paradigm guiding the new government, and its attendant understanding of Australia's place in the world. The white paper underscores the primacy of the nation-state in the international order and rejects the Labor tradition of middle power diplomacy in place of the "[p]ragmatic management of bilateral relationships" (Wesley 2007, 42). Multilateral institutions are deemed to have a role to play, but only insofar as the objectives of such institutions align with Australia's own core interests, identified as "the security of the Australian nation and the jobs and standard of living of the Australian people" (CoA 1997b, iii). Importantly, the document alludes to a possible shift from broad multilateral cooperation to a strategy of "coalition-building," namely "putting together issues-based coalitions of countries to pursue a shared objective" (ibid., vi). Whereas multilateral institutions tend to rely on compromise and bargaining, coalition building appears to be based on selective

cooperation only with like-minded states. All of this points to a view of the world in which nation-states have to fiercely protect their national interests from the intrusion and interference of regimes pursuing common interests. The image of Australia standing strong against a multilateral regime in defense of the national interest was repeatedly projected throughout 1997, especially in the context of climate change. On numerous occasions John Howard and his foreign minister, Alexander Downer, publicly stated their strong opposition to the proposed mandatory targets, even tying Australia's ratification of the Kyoto agreement to the withdrawal of this proposal. In reference to Australia's advocacy of its differentiation approach, Howard stated in June 1997, "I will just continue to put Australia's case . . . and if at the end of the day we are not successful in obtaining accommodation well, the arrangement will not be something that we can be part of" (Howard 1997a). This remark points to a fundamental shift away from Australia's identity as a "good international citizen" under the previous Labor governments. Indeed, as Howard himself later defiantly acknowledged, many domestic critics labeled Australia an "international pariah" for its stance on this issue (Howard 1998a).

Australia's new identity as a defensive and strong sovereign state was again clearly apparent in the prime minister's policy statement on climate change, "Safeguarding the Future" (Howard 1997b). Given in the lead-up to COP-3 in Kyoto, it laid out the principles that were to underpin Australia's position at the negotiations and beyond. Foremost was the importance of promoting the national interest (defined as protecting Australian jobs and industry) while simultaneously contributing to global efforts to reduce emissions. Also prominent was the idea that Australia is geographically, economically, and demographically unique; these unique features justified a carbon-intensive profile and, therefore, provided grounds for rejecting the mandatory reduction targets under negotiation. Third, it emphasized developing countries' participation in efforts to reduce emissions, citing climate change's global character and noting that by the early twenty-first century developing countries would account for over 50 percent of global emissions. While the accuracy of these assumptions may be questionable, Australia's approach at COP-3 certainly led to a favorable outcome for the Howard government, at least in terms of its narrow conception of the national interest.

Although mandatory reduction targets were featured in the Kyoto Protocol, several states (including Australia) succeeded in producing different targets for different Annex I countries. Australia was one of only three countries to secure a target that allowed an *increase* of emissions

above 1990 levels, in the period 2008–12. Officially, Australia's target was set at +8 percent, however Hamilton (2001, 98–103) has calculated that the effective target may be as high as +33 percent, due to the inclusion of an additional clause in the final hours of negotiation. Robert Hill and other members of the delegation had been working behind the scenes to convince the EU, US, Japan, and others of the merit in Australia's proposed clause, but its inclusion remained uncertain until the final reading of the draft agreement. An interjection from Hill at 1:42 A.M. on the final night secured the inclusion of the following amendment to Article 3(7): "Those Parties included in Annex I for whom land-use change and forestry constituted a net source of greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 shall include in their 1990 emissions base year or period the aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions by sources minus removals by sinks in 1990 from land-use change for the purposes of calculating their assigned amount" (UNFCCC 1997). It has been observed that Australia is the only country which stands to benefit from this clause (Hamilton 2001, 98; Macintosh 2007, 5): unlike other Annex I countries, Australia cleared a considerable area of land in 1990, with the resulting emissions constituting approximately 23 percent of Australia's total in that year (Macintosh 2007, 5). As expected, this rate of clearing had significantly decreased by 1997 and was expected to decrease further in the following years The expected reductions from land use effectively removed any requirement to stabilize emissions from other sectors, including the energy and transport sectors. The Howard government thus was consistently able to claim that Australia was on track toward meeting the Kyoto target of +8 percent (e.g., Campbell 2005a), although by 2004 emissions in the energy and transport sectors had increased by 43 percent and 23.4 percent, respectively, above 1990 levels (CoA 2006a, 4). It is unsurprising, then, that John Howard considered the outcome of COP-3 a "splendid" and "gratifying" result (Howard 1997c).

Perhaps even more revealing of the domestic social structure's strong influence is Howard's remark in early 1998 that "[t]he way [Hill] handled the climate control issue at the Kyoto Conference in 1997 won him the respect of the whole of Australian industry" (Howard 1998b). Later, at a meeting of the Liberal Party, he remarked, "who will forget [Hill's] masterly handling of the Kyoto Conference . . . where against all predictions and all odds he won an outstanding victory for Australian industry and for a balanced outcome so far as industry and the environment is concerned" (Howard 1999). By securing Australia's natural resource–based growth agenda Hill had acted in a manner consistent with the

domestic conditions, but irrationally in the sense of dismissing signs that Australia's infrastructure and development trajectory may be unsustainable in the long term. The persistence of such ecologically irrational behavior during this phase was reinforcing the remoteness embedded in Australia's political institutions and social structure. Remoteness can manifest in a variety of forms (Plumwood 1992), and here Australia's successful bid for special treatment reflects consequential, temporal, and spatial remoteness. The potential opportunity to reflect on the ecological impact of the practices that produce excessive emissions in Australia was lost, hence their anticipated consequences were effectively deferred to present and future, human and nonhuman, others. Once again, the dilemma posed by climate change was diffused through strategic negotiations, thus thwarting the potential for innovative reasoning and action to transform the domestic conditions.

During this second phase, Australia's contestation of the normative structures of climate governance was not limited to CBDR; Australia's environmental foreign policymakers were also strongly in favor of redefining the norm concerning *how* mitigation should be pursued. Following the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the use of "sinks" and flexibility mechanisms remained unresolved. Disagreement centered around the appropriate type of mechanisms and the extent of their use. The EU and many developing countries were in favor of placing a cap on the use of sinks and flexible mechanisms as a means of ensuring that domestic targets were met largely through domestic action (Cass 2006, 38–40). Conversely, with a view to avoid any interruption to Australia's own growth trajectory, Australia joined the Umbrella Group in strongly opposing any restrictions on the use of these mechanisms (IISD 1998a; Papadakis 2002b, 273–74). Australia's push for maximum flexibility extended also to the type of projects that should be permitted. Whereas several parties were reluctant to include such projects as carbon sinks and nuclear reactors in the mechanisms, Australia's delegation argued that decisions concerning the exclusion of certain projects should be made by individual developing countries on a case-by-case basis (IISD 1998a). According to Australia's ambassador for the environment, Ralph Hillman (who subsequently became executive director of the Australian Coal Association), "a minimal institutional structure (would) . . . ensure the CDM's environmental integrity, keep administrative costs low, and thereby increase the CDM's attractiveness to the private sector" (Hillman 2000).

By the end of the 1990s, Australia was still *rhetorically* recognizing the significance of climate change and the consequent need to reduce

emissions, yet the government's determination to avoid any long-term changes to the nation's development path was undeniable. Illustrative are Hill's failed efforts to legislate a "greenhouse trigger" under the new Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (Hill 1999; Hill 2000a). His proposal sought to ensure that an environmental impact assessment would be carried out before approval could be given to any new major developments likely to annually generate more than 500,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO_2E). Reflecting Hill's conviction that "Australia should not lose sight of the social implications of our pursuit of economic growth" (Hill 2000b), this novel proposal met with widespread resistance. While the greenhouse trigger attracted the support of the two minor parties (the Greens and Democrats), and of the renewable energy sector, other members of cabinet and most sections of industry stridently opposed it, arguing that it would have a devastating effect on employment, investment, and competitiveness (ABC-Australia 2000). Deputy Prime Minister John Anderson and Industry, Science and Resources Minister Nick Minchin were particularly critical of any measure that would potentially hamper future resource development (Anderson 2000). Hill's critics eventually succeeded in overturning the proposed trigger, thereby thwarting the attempt to build congruence between global climate governance norms and Australia's domestic conditions in a somewhat ecologically rational manner.

Phase 3: Advocacy of an Alternative Governance Architecture, 2000–2007

Despite the favorable concessions that Australia had secured through the existing processes of climate governance, in 2001 the government began to promote a redesign of climate governance norms and the international architecture in which they were institutionalized. This was precipitated by newly elected US President George W. Bush's announcement that the Kyoto Protocol would not be submitted to the US Senate for domestic ratification. While Bush's decision drew condemnation from Europe, Japan, New Zealand, environmentalist groups, and other members of the international community (Mann 2001; Agence France-Presse 2001; *Waikato Times* 2001), Australia was supportive (e.g., Howard 2001). In an allusion to the pending directional change in Australia's approach to climate governance, in April 2001 Hill (then environment minister) raised the idea of redesigning the "international architecture" of climate governance: "If the United States has . . . determined that the Protocol is unacceptable . . . we will want to explore with the United States its views on the international

architecture which can deliver an optimal global response" (Hill 2001). In November 2001, the Howard government was re-elected for a third term, and in a cabinet reshuffle Hill was moved from Environment to Defense. For a government determined to avoid any significant changes to its development trajectory, an environmentally conscious minister was evidently better placed within the Defense portfolio. His replacement, David Kemp, made no secret of his skepticism about the connection between human activity and climate change (Wilkinson 2007a). This shift reflects the difficulty faced by actors who seek to alter the very structure that grants them agency: ideas that are incongruent with the domestic conditions face potentially instant rejection, while the actors who propose such ideas face potential marginalization. The novel reasoning of mavericks confronting an ideational dilemma is thus unlikely to produce a successful structural transformation.

During this phase Australia's policymakers directed their attention away from the multilateral processes of the UNFCCC to "coalition-building," which was highlighted as a national objective in the foreign affairs and trade white paper "In the National Interest." Accordingly, in 2002 and 2003, Australia established bilateral partnerships with four countries in the Asia-Pacific region: the US, Japan, New Zealand, and China (CoA 2007b). In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol's focus on emissions reductions, these partnerships were based on technological development, the exchange of expertise, and the promotion of greater participation in responding to climate change. This new emphasis coincided with Howard's formal announcement that Australia would not be ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the increasing pressure exerted on Australia that emerged following Japan's and the EU's ratifications, Howard chose World Environment Day to reiterate Australia's refusal to ratify the agreement. Addressing Parliament, Howard reaffirmed his belief that "[i]t is not in Australia's interests to ratify the Kyoto protocol . . . because the arrangements currently exclude—and are likely under present settings to continue to exclude—both developing countries and the United States." Without more active participation from these states, he argued, the protocol would damage Australian industry and cost Australian jobs (CoA 2002b, 3163). The most significant manifestation of Australia's efforts to construct alternative processes of climate governance was the creation, in July 2005, of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP): a selective multilateral initiative of the United States, Australia, Republic of Korea, China, India, and Japan. Later, in 2007, Canada also joined the partnership. Despite the immediately apparent differences between the APP and the UNFCCC, the partnership's member

states—except Australia—were adamant that the initiative was designed to complement the protocol, rather than compete with it. Australia's different understanding was exposed in an interview with Environment Minister Ian Campbell in which he criticized the Kyoto Protocol for ignoring "the big looming problem [of] . . . the rapidly developing countries" (Campbell 2005b). He stated that this was Australia's rationale for working with the nations of the APP to design an arrangement that would be more effective than the protocol. The clear implication was that from Australia's perspective, the APP was an alternative rather than complementary arrangement (ibid.).

The exclusive nature of these partnerships is perhaps of less consequence than the discursive representation of climate change they began to institutionalize. As Shinko notes (2004, 64), "Representations create social reality"; by constructing alternative representations of a problem, actors are engaged in creating alternative and competing accounts of social reality. Following Entman, (re)representation may be understood in terms of conscious or unconscious framing, which he defines as "select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and [making] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (1993, 51–52). Australia's efforts, together with those of the US, to redesign the architecture of climate governance entailed a gradual reframing of the problem of climate change to which the governance norms respond. The UNFCCC had institutionalized a representation of the problem as environmental and inherently political, characterized on the one hand by the accumulation of excessive emissions in the atmosphere and, on the other, by the globally uneven distribution of these emissions and the differentiated capacity of states to respond. The solution that follows from such a representation is a reduction of emissions by the major emissions contributors, who moreover are most capable of responding. By contrast, the communiqués of the APP and Australia's bilateral partnerships began to shift attention away from uneven and excessive emissions by representing the problem as a largely technical and technological one: the problem did not lie in the practice of emitting GHGs, but rather in the absence of technology capable of negating the effects of these emissions.

The APP's initial communiqué identifies one of its key objectives as "work[ing] together to develop, demonstrate and implement cleaner and lower emissions technologies that allow for the continued economic use of fossil fuels while addressing air pollution and greenhouse gas emis-

sions" (APP 2006). Crucially, no mention is made in these documents of domestic emission reduction targets or timetables. The voluntary, technology-oriented nature of the APP, in which each member may set their own targets for "greenhouse gas intensity," stands in sharp contrast to the UN-facilitated and binding processes of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, which aim to mitigate climate change through the reduction of absolute emissions (McGee and Taplin 2006, 174). The difference is crucial, as the World Resources Institute explained (Herzog, Baumert, and Pershing 2006): "Greenhouse gas *intensity targets* are policies that specify emissions reductions relative to productivity or economic output, for instance, tons CO_2/million dollars GDP. By contrast, *absolute emissions targets* specify reductions measured in metric tons, relative only to a historical baseline" (emphasis in original). Clearly, a pledge to reduce the carbon intensity of one's economy does not necessarily translate into a likely reduction in overall emissions, because the emissions saving is likely to be negated by increased economic growth. The appeal of emissions intensity targets over absolute emissions targets for those with an interest in maintaining the status quo is clear: unlike absolute targets, which have the potential to negatively affect economic growth, intensity targets are conducive to sustained economic growth. Consequently, the APP's intensity targets are obviously more congruent with Australia's growth focus than Kyoto's absolute targets.

Australia's reframing entailed a deflection of attention away from Australia's domestic GHG profile. Following the creation of the APP, Australia began to focus increasingly on future emissions in the South, particularly in China and India. Rejecting the dominant interpretation of CBDR, which obliged developed countries to take the lead in reducing emissions as a reflection of their historical responsibility and present capacity, the Howard government consistently claimed that any international agreement that exempts China and India from mandatory reductions would be unfair and ineffective. The joint statement in which Australia's foreign and environment ministers announced the creation of the APP is illustrative:

> [W]e have never been afraid to state plainly that Kyoto does not—and will not—work. . . . Developing countries—those expected to account for over half of all greenhouse gas emissions by 2020—have no Kyoto targets, and are—quite understandably—not willing to sacrifice economic growth to negotiate them. . . . The importance of developing country participation can be illustrated quite starkly. Australia accounts for only 1.4 percent of global greenhouse gas

> emissions. Even if Australia took the alarming step of closing every power station tonight, China's industrial growth is so rapid that the greenhouse gas savings made by this gesture would be replicated by China in just one year. A long-term, effective response to climate change needs to be one that includes all major emitters. (Downer and Campbell 2005)

By focusing on national aggregate emissions, Australia's domestic emissions were framed as inconsequential and irrelevant (e.g., CoA 2005b, 102). Although Australia is responsible for just 1.6 percent of global energy-related emissions, it should be acknowledged that Australia accounts for just 0.3 percent of the global population. By contrast, China and India collectively account for 17.4 percent of global emissions in the energy sector despite also accounting for approximately 27 percent of the global population.[9] Presenting the problem in this way also displaced the importance of historical emissions. In contrast to the CBDR norm, the alternative governance structures promoted by Australia placed chief responsibility on the South on the basis of their projected future emissions.

Focusing on national aggregate emissions and failing to put these into perspective in terms of population size severely curtails the potential for responding rationally to climate change. This lies in the close relationship between inequality and unsustainability: higher levels of inequality (in terms of power distribution and economic wealth) have been found to be associated with greater levels of pollution and environmental degradation and more inequitable distributions of environmental harm (e.g., Boyce 2008; Holland, Peterson, and Gonzalez 2009; Dorling 2010; Neumayer 2011). Hence, maintaining and even perpetuating existing global inequalities in emissions, incomes, and power risks further exacerbating the problem of unsustainability. As Plumwood argues, "inequality, whether inside the nation or out of it, is a major sponsor of ecological irrationality and remoteness" (2002, 81). Casting high per capita emissions in a wealthy and low-population country as inconsequential while placing the onus of mitigation onto highly populated countries marked by widespread poverty creates an undesirable likelihood that existing global inequalities will be frozen, or even exacerbated, by climate governance processes. Such inequalities, in turn, provide "systematic opportunities and motivations to shift ecological ills onto others rather than to prevent their generation in the first place" (ibid., 81). The root of this problem lies in the disempowered position of a group of people in an unequal society: not only are these people often unable to adapt to environmental change by relocating or upgrading their existing living arrangements, but power

imbalances also often leave them unable to demand justice and compensation from the distant perpetrators of some forms of degradation.

The APP's technologically oriented approach created additional problems by preferring not renewable energy but rather "carbon sequestration": the capture and underground storage of carbon emitted from the burning of coal (Diesendorf 2003). Domestically this preference was reflected in the Australian government's 2004 energy white paper, "Securing Australia's Energy Future" (CoA 2004). Here the government reiterated the economic importance of fossil fuel resources for Australia and argued that Australia would be better placed to contribute to international climate change efforts if technology could be developed to reduce the greenhouse impact of fossil fuels. The historically entrenched commitment to resource-based growth constrained the government's capacity to consider the potential of renewable technologies. Indeed, the energy white paper revealed that the existing Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) would be neither increased nor extended.[10] It was noted that an independent review of the MRET had recommended that the target be extended from 9,500 gigawatt hours (GWh) by 2010 to 20,000 GWh by 2020 and beyond; while the government acknowledged that such a target would provide "a subsidized growth path for renewable energy," it was nevertheless rejected on the basis that it "would impose significant economic costs through higher electricity prices . . . [which t]he Australian government does not believe . . . can be justified" (CoA 2004, 147–48). The white paper outlined the government's intention to look beyond renewable energy technology to "a broader range of low-emission technologies," namely carbon sequestration and "clean coal" technology, for which a $500 million development fund was created (ibid., 148). An investigation carried out by the Australian Broadcasting Commission in 2004 revealed that this proposal emerged from confidential meetings with the government-appointed "lower emissions technical advisory group," which comprised fossil fuel–producing companies and high-volume fossil fuel consumers and generators, at the exclusion of the renewable energy industry (Fowler 2004). Although the Howard government claimed in the energy white paper that Australia was not contemplating the domestic use of nuclear power (CoA 2004, 135), in May 2006, just three months after the first meeting of the APP, Howard announced that the nation had a responsibility to debate the issue of nuclear power, on the basis that it is "clean" and "green" (Howard 2006a). In statements reminiscent of the ostensibly moral justifications for development in the early twentieth century, Howard claimed that Australia had the potential to be an "energy super-

power" and "should supply the domestic and world economies with low-cost energy," instead of neglecting the nation's "enormous God given endowment of fossil fuels, this great resource that we have been given by providence" (Howard 2006b; CoA 2006b, 43).

Plumwood (2002, 84–85) has warned of the potential for *technological* remoteness to obstruct the emergence of ecologically rational forms of agency, and the APP seems to be a good representation of such remoteness. Carbon sequestration, for example, would distance the present generations of wealthy societies from the potentially damaging consequences that may manifest in the future. These consequences may potentially later effect harm on the biosphere or on future generations. Furthermore, in the event of technological failure, the resulting effects of climate change will disproportionately impact the most vulnerable populations in both the North and the South, rather than necessarily the original decision makers.

While directing its efforts toward a re-representation of climate change and the construction of alternative processes of climate governance, the Australian government also sought to claim the moral ground within existing normative structures. The annual release of national emission data was typically accompanied by a statement from the environment minister applauding the strong efforts of the Australian government, industry, and the wider community toward reducing emissions and meeting the Kyoto target (Campbell 2006). Presenting the figures as a symbol of honesty and integrity, a spokesperson for the environment minister stated that "it is not unlike Prince Hal in *Henry IV,* part I, when he says in confronting Hotspur: 'I never promised to pay, but now that I am here I shall pay thee double.' The message is very simple. There are those that promise and fail to deliver, and there are those that make no false promises but actually deliver. That is why Australia is not only not a pariah but, among the Western and developed nations of the world, one of the few that can stand up, proud and strong" (CoA 2005c, 28). Yet the extent to which such pride was justified is highly questionable, especially in light of Australia's extraordinarily favorable target in the protocol. A 2002 Senate inquiry into Australia's greenhouse response is also telling. The final report expressed particular concern over "the rapid and unrestrained growth in energy emissions"; electricity generation and transport had increased by 24.3 percent and 18 percent, respectively, between 1990 and 1998. It also noted the failure of voluntary initiatives like the Greenhouse Challenge "to achieve significant, verified emissions reductions"; the government's failure "to integrate greenhouse policy with taxation, competition reform,

transport, industry, agriculture and energy policy"; the lack of funding for climate change research; and lack of attention toward raising public awareness of climate change (CoA 2002a, xxvi).

While the Howard government was focused on advocating alternative international climate governance processes, domestic developments were shifting national opinion. Awareness of climate change within the national electorate was increasing, along with the growing salience of a perception that the threat posed by climate change is greater than the threat posed by climate change mitigation. In late 2002, a number of domestic nonstate and subnational actors began to adopt new positions on international and domestic climate governance. As a consequence, the government found itself increasingly isolated in its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and the norms embedded within it, as well as in its stalling approach to reducing domestic emissions. A review carried out by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG)[11] into the national energy market recommended in November 2002 that an economy-wide national emissions trading system should be established to mitigate emissions in a cost-efficient fashion (COAG 2002). This was followed by a cabinet submission in which the Treasury and Environment Ministry also proposed the creation of a national emissions trading system by 2013. This submission was reportedly rejected by the prime minister following consultation with the Minerals Council and the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CoA 2003, 22442). Nevertheless, in the absence of federal initiative, Australia's state and territory governments began discussions on a national emissions trading scheme in late 2003 (Australian Associated Press 2003). At the behest of Bob Carr, then premier of New South Wales, a working group was established to develop a model for such a scheme that would be compatible with the Kyoto Protocol and its flexible mechanisms, as well as operational with or without the involvement of the federal government (Government of NSW 2004).

One of the most significant shifts in the position of business on climate change governance was brought about by the Business Council of Australia's (BCA's) review of its position on Australia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. In March 2003, at the completion of this review, the BCA announced that it had not been able to reach a common position due to the high level of division among its 102 members (BCA 2003). As a result, the BCA's position shifted from one of active opposition to one of neutrality. While the fossil fuel energy and mining industries continued to view the protocol as a threat to their interests, many companies within the financial, insurance, agricultural, and alternative energy

industries had begun to perceive either climate change itself as a threat to their interests, or the protocol as presenting new market opportunities from which they could benefit.[12] Six companies (BP Australia,[13] Insurance Australia Group, Origin Energy, Swiss Re, Visy Industries and Westpac) from the latter category subsequently came together with the Australian Conservation Foundation to form the Australian Business Roundtable on Climate Change. In April 2006, the group released a report titled "The Business Case for Early Action," which promoted the argument that avoiding or delaying emissions reduction would inflict greater damage on the Australian economy than implementing mitigation emissions immediately (Australian Business Roundtable on Climate Change 2006).

Domestic perceptions were further affected by the release in the UK of Sir Nicholas Stern' report on "The Economics of Climate Change" in October 2006. This report, which had been commissioned by the British chancellor, advanced an argument similar to that put forward by the Australian Business Roundtable on Climate Change, concluding that "the benefits of strong, early action considerably outweigh the costs" (Stern 2006, ii). It suggested that if the planet's temperature was allowed to rise by 5–6°C by the end of the century, the loss of global GDP could reach 5–10 percent (ibid., ix). The report further proposed that mitigation and economic growth are entirely compatible, so much so that "[t]ackling climate change is the pro-growth strategy for the longer term, and it can be done in a way that does not cap the aspirations for growth of rich or poor countries" (ibid., ii). The report received a rather critical response from the Howard government, with the treasurer, Peter Costello, rejecting Stern's assertion that climate change is "the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen" (ibid., i; Australian Associated Press 2006). Howard dismissed suggestions from the British prime minister that the European emissions trading system be extended to Australia by challenging the environmental credentials of the EU: "Most of the sermonisers . . . on this issue—namely many of the European countries—are falling a long way short of their Kyoto targets" (quoted in Fraser 2006). The Labor Party's response differed markedly from that of the government. The report's conclusions resonated with Labor's existing stance on climate change; the party has consistently advocated that Australia should ratify Kyoto, and their Climate Change Blueprint, released in March 2006, argued that a failure to mitigate climate change would threaten Australia's economy and industry, while mitigation itself would present market opportunities: "Yesterday's choice between sustainability and prosperity is a false one" (Beazley 2006, 3). The blueprint also outlined the party's intention,

if elected in 2007, to establish an emissions trading scheme and commit to a 60 percent reduction in Australia's emissions by 2050 (ibid., 10–11).

The popular impact of the Stern report was bolstered by two other developments in 2006: the release in Australia of Al Gore's popular documentary *An Inconvenient Truth* in September, and the announcement from national water experts that Australia may have been experiencing a thousand-year drought, which the national scientific body had earlier linked to climate change (Topsfield and Grattan 2006). Just as a prolonged drought in North America had sparked public concern in that region in the late 1980s, the combination of the Stern report, Gore's documentary, and the drought produced heightened concern about climate change. The perception that the threat of climate change was greater than the threat of climate change mitigation was beginning to gain traction. The Howard government reacted by renewing its attempts to convince the electorate that domestic measures were being taken to mitigate climate change, while concurrently seeking to legitimize its preferred processes of global climate governance. Despite rejecting emissions trading in Australia for more than a decade, by late 2006 the Howard government's position had shifted. An investigation carried out by *The Age* newspaper revealed that Howard still remained opposed to emissions trading by as late as October, yet in November the government announced that a joint business-government task group (the Emissions Trading Task Group) would be established to consider the potential for an emissions trading system in Australia (Howard 2006c). Consistent with the Howard government's tradition of favoring the interests of the fossil fuel industry, the industry representation on the task group was dominated by the mining industry and excluded participation from scientists, the renewable energy industry, and the environment sector (Bunce and Crawshaw 2006; Wade and Banham 2006). In response to widespread criticism of the group's skewed representation, the government announced that the group would release a discussion paper for public comment (Coorey 2006).

By late 2006, the Howard government was struggling to maintain the image that it was in control of national climate policy. The perception that business was driving a shift in policy was enhanced following the BCA's announcement in April 2007 that it had reached a common position on climate change policy to set Australia on the path to a low-emissions economy and create investor certainty. The focal point of this position was support for a national cap-and-trade scheme that could link into those emerging in other countries. Such a scheme, the BCA proposed, should set annual and long-term targets, encompass all GHGs,

allow for maximum offset credits both domestically and internationally, and include as many sectors as possible while providing free permits to those companies who would be economically disadvantaged, and devising mechanisms to protect "trade-exposed industries" (BCA 2007, 3–4). The BCA's Strategic Framework was later reproduced to a considerable extent in the form of the Emissions Trading Task Group's final report released in June 2007. In particular, the final report endorsed the establishment of an emissions trading scheme to begin operating in 2011 or 2012 and highlighted the importance of protecting the international competitiveness of emissions-intensive industries. The report also recommended most of the features earlier flagged by the BCA for a least-cost scheme (CoA 2007a, 1–2). The prime minister accepted these recommendations yet refused to announce the long-term "aspirational" target that would accompany the scheme until after the 2007 federal election (Howard 2007a).

While attempting to placate domestic concern about climate change policy, the Howard government continued to focus on legitimizing its preferred processes of global climate governance throughout 2006 and 2007. In October 2006, Howard reaffirmed his refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and instead called on the international community to consider a new agreement on climate change, which he dubbed a New Kyoto (IISD 2006b). Howard's address to Parliament at the end of October 2006 revealed three things: his contempt for the norm of CBDR as enshrined in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol; his ignorance of the fundamental categories that define the protocol and differentiate responsibilities for China, India, and other developing countries; and his proposed alternative agreement's normative dimensions:

> [W]e do need a new Kyoto, because the old Kyoto has failed. The old Kyoto has been a failure because the old Kyoto did not have India and it did not have China. It had India and China as sort of nominal members, but they were—what do you call it in the jargon?—annex 2 countries. Or was it annex 1? In other words, they were signatories but they were not obligated. . . . We would be part of a new Kyoto if the new Kyoto embraced all of the countries of the world, put us all on a proper footing and, very particularly, included all of the world's great emitters. (CoA 2006b, 29)

> What form might this new Kyoto take? To start with, it would include all of the world's major emitters. What is the bridge that joins Australia to all of the world's major emitters? It is the Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate . . . , the Asia-Pacific partnership points to the future. (CoA 2006c, 29)

Hence, despite the careful efforts of the members of the APP to present the arrangement as complementary to Kyoto, the Howard government patently perceived it as an alternative arrangement based on present and future emissions, but blind to historical emissions. Nevertheless, just days after the parliamentary address in which Howard mooted the idea of a New Kyoto, a national poll indicated that 79 percent of Australians (including 71 percent of coalition voters) wanted Australia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and set targets for reducing domestic emissions; in addition, 91 percent (including 90 percent of coalition voters) wanted Australia to rely less on coal-generated electricity and more on renewable energy sources (*The Australian* 2006). This latter finding stands in contrast to Australia's historical trajectory of natural resource–based growth, but this expressed preference has not altered the norm diffusion process. Overall, Australia has absorbed the norms of climate governance into its coal-driven growth objectives instead of innovatively molding these objectives around the realities of climate change.

Sydney's hosting of the 2007 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum provided the government with a further opportunity to promote its preferred processes of global climate governance, while also promoting its ostensible leadership efforts on climate change to the critical Australian electorate. Addressing the Asia Society in June 2007, Howard spoke of the unique style of international cooperation that characterizes the region and APEC in particular, and implicitly contrasted this with the European style of international cooperation:

> In my view, one of APEC's most important contributions is its distinctive regional style and approach to addressing problems. Much of APEC's best work is done under the radar. It's not as dramatic or as eyecatching as formal treaties. But it makes a measurable difference to people who live and work in our region. . . . APEC works best when it sets a broad shared objective without seeking to be overly prescriptive about how member economies should pursue it. This recognises the legitimacy that resides in national governments and that many of the levers required to respond to globalisation and transnational problems remain in their hands. APEC's strength lies in its ability to build consensus that a problem exists and to develop practical concerted responses. (Howard 2007b)

Howard's speech further detailed his hopes that the participating members of APEC would use the Sydney APEC summit, in September 2007, to forge a new post-Kyoto approach to climate governance consistent with this style of cooperation and the APEC philosophy of "concerted unilater-

alism." Such an approach should include all major emitters while allowing each state to pledge their own flexible "objectives", and should emphasize "practical" cooperation through "technology partnerships and forest stewardship" (ibid., 8–9). Like the APP and Australia's numerous bilateral climate agreements, this APEC proposal conforms closely to the economic and foreign policy paradigms that oriented the Howard government by emphasizing the primacy of sovereign states and seeking to protect Australia's economic developmentalist trajectory. However, the government's aspirations were thwarted at the Sydney summit when China and the Philippines, among others, reaffirmed their commitment to Kyoto and the multilateral processes of the UNFCCC, which Chinese President Hu Jintao described as "the most authoritative, universal and comprehensive international framework" for responding to climate change (quoted in Wilkinson 2007b). While the leaders gathered in Sydney did release a Sydney Declaration on Climate Change, Energy Security, and Clean Development, it merely noted the members' agreement "to work to achieve a common understanding on a long-term aspirational global emissions reduction goal," and at China's insistence included a recognition of the norm of CBDR. Importantly, and disappointingly for the Howard government, the declaration referred only to a "post-2012" international climate change arrangement, rather than the "post-Kyoto" reference for which Australia had strongly advocated (APEC 2007).

While the government focused largely on discrediting the Kyoto Protocol and promoting its preferred approach, the Labor Party made the issue of climate change a focal point of its early election campaigning throughout 2007. Indeed, upon becoming leader of the Labor Party in December 2006, Kevin Rudd immediately named climate change as an issue on which his party would provide an alternative policy to the coalition (O'Brien 2006). The gap between much of the electorate's expectations and the government's actual performance provided the opposition with an opportunity to depict the Howard government as irresponsible and out of touch. On various occasions, for example, Rudd suggested that Howard had "sat on his hands," "buried his head in the sand," and had "spent 11 years not being fair dinkum" on climate change (quoted in Middleton 2007 and Coorey 2007).[14] Three key initiatives marked Labor's efforts to fashion itself as the progressive party on climate change. The first was the national climate change summit convened by Labor in March 2007, which was intended to help shape the party's policy on this issue and was attended by members of the business community, NGOs, environment groups, and all state premiers (Topsfield 2007). Second was the

reaffirmation of Labor's long-term target to reduce emissions by 60 percent below 2000 levels by 2050 (Beazley 2006, 10; Rudd 2007b). The third initiative was the commissioning of the Garnaut Review: an "Australian Stern Review" to "examine the impacts of climate change on the Australian economy, and recommend medium to long-term policies and policy frameworks to improve the prospects for sustainable prosperity" (Garnaut Climate Change Review, n.d.). Professor Ross Garnaut was commissioned jointly by the ALP and state and territory governments to carry out this review.

By the middle of 2007 there was evidence that the views and preferences of many within the wider Australian public were being challenged by the issue of climate change. A survey carried out by the Sydney-based Lowy Institute for International Policy indicated that climate change was perceived by Australians as the greatest threat to Australia from the outside world, and that tackling this problem was more important than ensuring economic growth. Ninety-four percent of respondents believed that tackling climate change was either a very important or fairly important goal for Australia's foreign policy (Lowy Institute 2007, 3, 19). In fact, various polls conducted in the months leading up to the election suggested that climate change was one of the top four issues that would influence voters' choice on election day (Climate Institute 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). The November election subsequently granted a victory to Kevin Rudd and the Labor Party, and ushered in a new phase of climate politics in Australia.

Phase 4: Post-November 2007—Returning to Kyoto

Under the new Labor government, the global norms of climate governance assumed a degree of domestic salience that had not been seen since the early 1990s.[15] In contrast to the Howard government's efforts to construct alternative structures of international climate governance, the Rudd government, with the support of the domestic electorate, was committed to the existing processes of the United Nations. The norm of domestic emission reduction targets and timetables was evidently deemed legitimate by the government, as illustrated by the long-term target set in 2006 to reduce Australia's emissions by 60 percent below 2000 levels by 2050. The salience of the norm of CBDR, though, was somewhat more ambiguous. In contrast to the Howard government's rejection of the interpretation of CBDR institutionalized in the Kyoto Protocol, Rudd and the Labor Party had consistently supported the idea that industrialized countries should take the lead in reducing emissions during the first commitment

period of 2008–12 (Uhlmann 2007). Yet the Rudd government's capacity to maintain an open and flexible position on the application of the CBDR norm in a future agreement was significantly weakened by the coalition's insistence that Rudd clarify the Labor Party's conditions for approving a post-2012 agreement ahead of the 2007 election. In October 2007, Labor's environment spokesperson, Peter Garrett, stated that a Labor government would sign onto a post-2012 agreement regardless of whether the US and China did so. Garrett's comments implied that his interpretation of CBDR exempted developing countries from adopting commitments until the developed countries had shown serious leadership in reducing their own emissions: "The heat in the system is a consequence of the developed countries' emissions. They need to commit to reduce. As they commit to reduce, the developing countries come on board" (ABC-Australia 2007). The high level of criticism this position attracted from the coalition prompted Rudd to offer an alternative position in which CBDR was interpreted as exempting developing countries from quantitative commitments only during the first commitment period. Hence, the expectation that developing countries would adopt targets was no longer conditional on the demonstration of genuine leadership by the North. Rudd explained that binding targets from both developed and developing parties, albeit of a differentiated nature, would be a "pre-condition" for Australia's signature on a future agreement (Uhlmann 2007). While Labor's position at this time implicitly supported the norm of CBDR, it did so within the interpretive boundaries established by the coalition, which posited that present and future emissions are the legitimate focus of climate governance, while historical emissions are relatively inconsequential.[16]

The thirteenth Conference of the Parties, held in Bali in December 2007, provided the new Australian government with an opportunity to project itself as a good international citizen on the issue of climate governance. The Bali negotiations were widely seen as crucial for designing a two-year "road map" to achieve a post-2012 agreement by the end of 2009. In his first act as prime minister, Rudd signed the instrument of ratification for the Kyoto Protocol and handed this to the UN secretary general in Bali, a move that was greeted with applause at the December climate meeting. In a media interview immediately prior to COP-13, Rudd explained that Australia would assume the role of a multilateral diplomat in climate change negotiations: the Australian delegation would present the nation's own position as well as attempt to "bridge the gap between the positions of the developed and developing world on future

emissions controls" (quoted in Banham 2007). Nevertheless, the capacity of Australia's new delegation of environmental foreign policymakers to fulfill such a role was curtailed by the prime minister's refusal to endorse binding targets at the level called for in the latest report of the IPCC. This report indicated that emissions would need to be reduced by 10 to 40 percent of 1990 levels by 2020 to avoid a rise in the average global temperature of more than 2 percent (IPCC 2007c, 39, 90). Although Rudd claimed to accept the science behind these figures, he resisted pressure to endorse binding targets of between 25 and 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020 until the Garnaut report had been delivered in late 2008 (Wilkinson and Forbes 2007, 1; Rudd 2007c). He used his speech on the tenth day of the conference to highlight Australia's commitment to a multilateral response to climate change and spoke of Australia's expectation that all developed countries embrace binding targets beyond those of Kyoto, yet at the same time he noted that the Bali meeting should merely "map out the process and timeline in which this will happen" (Rudd 2007a). By contrast, the EU, New Zealand, and developing countries all supported the inclusion of an interim target in the Bali roadmap. Yvo de Boer, then the UNFCCC executive secretary, argued that this inclusion was vital "to give a clear signal that is where industrialised countries intend to go" (quoted in Wilkinson 2007c). In the end, despite the fact that no direct reference was made to this target range in the final report of the convention, COP-13 was widely judged a success as participants managed to agree on a "comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012, in order to adopt a decision (in 2009)" (UNFCCC 2007). An Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention was established to facilitate this process, which would involve dialogue on commitments for both developed and developing countries (ibid.). A compromise reached in the final hours of the conference ensured that the norms of CBDR and domestic emission reduction targets and timetables would be reinstitutionalized in the post-2012 agreement. This compromise was the result of India's proposal to include consideration of "[n]ationally appropriate mitigation actions by *developing* country Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building," in exchange for consideration of "quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all *developed* country Parties" (emphasis added, ibid.). Although the Australian delegation had not been openly campaigning for developing country commitments during COP-13, this compromise would cer-

tainly have been a source of relief for the Rudd government following the earlier announcement that such commitments were a precondition for Australia supporting a post-2012 agreement.[17] This development thus allowed the Rudd government to begin its term in power as a middle power diplomat in the context of global climate governance.

To some extent, it appears that the normative congruence-building process came full circle in Australia: after lengthy periods of contestation, the norms had found acceptance once again by the end of 2007 when the international community began negotiating a new phase of climate governance. But the normative congruence established by the Rudd government was also characterized by ecological irrationality. The complexity of both the issue of climate change and the emissions reduction legislation proposed by the Rudd government undermined the potential for close and effective public scrutiny. As a result, the Rudd government was able to fashion itself as ambitious and innovative while actually avoiding genuine transformations in domestic conditions. Despite the evident recognition of the threat posed by climate change and consequent need to reduce GHG emissions, the proposed (but later shelved) Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme placed no cap on the emissions credits that may be purchased in international markets, including the Clean Development Mechanism (CoA 2008).[18] Therefore, this proposed legislation would allow Australia to comply with global norms without transforming the ecological irrational conditions that drive excessive domestic emissions of greenhouse gases. This generates a range of problems. The purchasing of credits temporarily obscures the ultimately unsustainable nature of those activities that produce excessive GHG emissions. This illusion is temporary because offsetting is an exhaustive process that cannot be indefinitely sustained. Moreover, the act of offsetting ecologically insensitive policies, practices, and systems in distant poorer states (for example, through the purchase of carbon credits) risks consolidating and exacerbating existing global inequalities. Whether or not one agrees that this is a socially unjust outcome, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it augurs badly for global sustainability given Plumwood's observation that "inequality, whether inside the nation or out of it, is a major sponsor of ecological irrationality and remoteness" (2002, 81). Creating greater distance between the sites of excessive emissions and the efforts to sequester these emissions and mitigate their adverse effects is likely to suppress "ecological and social feedback" (Princen, Maniates, and Conca 2002, 16), which in turn weakens the potential for ecologically rational reasoning and actions to develop in the future.

In sum, the case of Australia makes it quite clear that ideas do matter in processes of global governance. Global climate governance has been shaped by ideas concerning *who* should take responsibility for mitigating climate change and *how* such mitigation should occur. As these ideas diffuse throughout the international system they confront domestic material and ideational structures with which they may or may not be readily compatible. Normative congruence building thus emerges as an important and iterative aspect of the norm diffusion process. Ignoring the domestic ideational level may lead us to expect that Australia's economic dependence on energy exports would inevitably produce obstructionist behavior in international climate negotiations. But as we have seen, this expectation is false. In fact, Australia has oscillated between activist and obstructionist behavior in ways that cannot be explained simply by looking to domestic material conditions. This oscillation should not be surprising if we recognize that neither global norms or domestic conditions are static but rather fluid; shifts in either the global norms or the domestic conditions may disrupt existing perceptions of congruence or, alternatively, enable a perception of congruence that was previously impossible. Unfortunately, though, Australia's periods of activism have been driven more by the aim of generating an image of good international citizenship rather than innovatively and ambitiously responding in a sustainable manner. Even once Australia had realigned itself with the global norms of climate governance in 2007 and 2008, the effect has been to merely reinstitutionalize the existing ecological irrationality that has long characterized domestic conditions. Overcoming this paradox will require a much more radical transformation of political institutions and the policy paradigms that define the social structure. It will not be enough to alter the means by which ecologically insensitive goals and objectives are pursued; instead, these goals and objectives need to be redefined in ecologically rational terms through processes of inclusive public deliberation rather than liberal bargaining or market processes. How this can be achieved remains uncertain; this is a challenge I examine in more detail in chapter 7.

5. India

The diffusion of norms around global climate governance to India, as with Australia, has been nonlinear. The fluid nature of domestic conditions and global norms has precluded a gradual process of building congruence between them. Instead, India's process has been characterized by oscillation between acceptance and contestation of the norms, and between perceptions of normative congruence and incongruence. Three distinct phases can be discerned: first, an acceptance of the norms of CBDR and domestic emission reduction targets, and the staunch defense of their original integrity; second, a cautious phase characterized by careful compromises on transnational mitigation alongside the continued defense of CBDR; and finally, India's acceptance and embrace of the transnationalization of global climate governance. Throughout this process, India has inadvertently consolidated the paradox of global climate governance. Domestic actors in India initially perceived climate change as an inherently political problem characterized by globally inequitable patterns of development and unsustainable consumption in the North. But in the process of building congruence with the transnationally oriented norm of domestic emission reduction targets, India's environmental foreign policymakers have legitimized a technical representation that treats emissions as purely material phenomena: the different value of the human activities associated with emissions is denied and luxury and subsistence emissions are conflated. Such a representation marginalizes the pursuit of a globally equitable balance between the excessive emissions of a global minority and the minimal emissions of a global majority. To understand this shift and appreciate its social and ecological consequences, it is necessary to look to the domestic context where norms are institutionalized and enacted.

This chapter's structure follows that of the previous one. In the first half, I develop an account of the material and ideational elements of India's domestic conditions that have enabled and constrained the norm diffusion process. This account offers an insight into the socially constructed interests and forms of rationality that are often overlooked by traditional theories of International Relations. The second half then chronologically traces the efforts of India's environmental foreign policymakers, in collaboration with various nonstate actors, to build and rebuild congruence between these conditions and the global norms of climate governance over time.

DOMESTIC CONDITIONS

Material Conditions

The aspects of India's material conditions that have affected the norm diffusion process most significantly are the anticipated domestic impacts of climate change, India's GHG emissions profile, its "energy culture," and its citizens' living standards. First, the Indian state covers a vast terrain characterized by a range of distinct climatic conditions, and the impacts of climate change are likely to be felt differently in different states and by different communities. Few areas, though, will avoid seriously adverse effects on the country's biodiversity and human well-being. A UNFCCC National Communication prepared by the government of India in 2004 identified a number of anticipated impacts including reduced food production, coastal inundation in highly populated areas, increased rate of vector and water-borne diseases, and decreased water availability (GoI 2004, chap. 3). India's greatest vulnerability emerges from the dependence of its people and economy on the summer monsoon, which provides most parts of the country with their only annual rainfall (ibid.). Modeling suggests that the intensity and variability of the monsoon will increase across India as a whole. On average, the rainfall from the summer monsoon is expected to rise by 20 percent; yet decreases are expected in Tamil Nadu in the southeast, as well as in the northwest in Rajasthan and India's "food basket" state of Punjab (Panda 2009, 106). Such changes in rainfall, together with associated changes in temperature and soil conditions, are likely to have a serious effect on the production of wheat and rice, on which so many of India's rural population depend for sustenance and income (ibid.).

India's exposure to the anticipated effects of climate change is disproportionate to its contribution to the problem. The first national com-

munication was submitted in 2004 and provided a detailed inventory of domestic emissions for 1994; this remains the most recent verified data available (GoI 2004). At that time, India annually emitted approximately 1,228.54 million tons of GHG, equating to less than one ton of CO_2 per person (ibid., 32). Therefore, while India is one of the world's largest emitters of GHGs, in per capita terms its emission are very small, amounting to just 28 percent of the global average, 10 percent of Japan, 8 percent of Germany, and 4 percent of the United States (ibid.). More recent estimates of present and projected emissions reflect little change in these comparisons. In 2000, for example, India emitted approximately 1,484.62 Mt of GHGs, which in per capita terms equates to approximately 6.5 percent of the United States' emissions (Sharma, Bhattacharya, and Garg 2006, 328). In accordance with India's projected trends in economic development and population growth, the country's emissions are projected to rise by almost 300 percent by 2020 relative to 1990 levels. This estimate takes into account various expected mitigation measures, including improved energy efficiency, promotion of renewable energy sources, and reforestation (ibid., 331–32). Despite such high projected growth, India's per capita emissions level will remain half of the global average, and just 7 percent of the United States' level (Pew Center n.d., 2).

The majority (61 percent) of India's emissions are produced by the energy sector, including transport, industry, and residential consumption, followed by the agricultural sector (28 percent), industrial processes (8 percent), waste disposal (2 percent), and land use, land-use change, and forestry (1 percent) (GoI 2004, 32–33). Given that the energy sector is the greatest source of emissions, the domestic energy culture is a highly relevant aspect of India's material conditions. Here, India is an example of the culture of inefficient fossil fuel consumption. The country's network of provincial State Electricity Boards (SBIs) was never designed around the goals of efficiency and profit, but rather social development. Electricity was understood as a right rather than a commodity, and the state took responsibility for providing it (Ahmed 2006, 96–97). Over time, the deterioration of infrastructure, widespread electricity theft, and poor management practices increasingly undermined the capacity of the SBIs to generate and distribute power efficiently. Their relatively high running costs also deterred private investment once the industry was partially liberalized in the 1990s.[1] The general trend over the last few decades has been toward improved energy intensity levels in the economy, measured in terms of energy consumption per unit of production (India's Energy Portal n.d.). Nevertheless, fossil fuel–based power generation remains highly ineffi-

cient by international standards, as illustrated in an international comparison study carried out by Graus and colleagues at the Netherlands-based research institute Ecofys. The study compared the energy efficiency of fossil-fired power generation for Australia, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, the Nordic countries, South Korea, the United Kingdom and Ireland, and the United States, which together account for 65 percent of worldwide fossil fuel–based power generation. Within this group of countries India's performance was the worst, at 13 percent below average (Graus, Voogt, and Worrell 2007, 3946).

The expansion of industry and transportation since liberalization in 1991 has intensified the demand for energy and has exacerbated the existing demand-supply gap in India's energy sector. Successive governments have sought to deal with this problem by diversifying their energy supplies and developing relations with numerous fossil fuel exporting countries, including Venezuela, Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Syria, Egypt, and Russia (Sharma 2007). With 17 percent of the world's population, India has just 0.8 percent of the world's oil and gas reserves; hence, a large proportion of the country's commercial energy demand is met through its reasonably vast indigenous coal resources, as well as imported coal (GoI 2004, chap. 1). Given the cost competitiveness of coal relative to gas, the government assumes that it will remain the most important energy source until at least 2032 (GoI 2005, ii). Yet India's coal is highly polluting and very GHG-intensive because of its high ash content and low calorific value. Despite the dominance of hydrocarbons, efforts have been made in recent decades to diversify the energy mix by developing hydro- and nuclear power; however, these remain relatively minor resources and collectively provide just 3.67 percent of commercial energy (GoI 2005, 26).

A department for dealing with renewable energy has existed within the Indian government under various names since 1981, and now operates as the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE). Despite progress made over two-and-a-half decades, renewable energy still only accounted for 6.5 percent of grid-connected electricity in 2006 (MNRE 2006, 55). The MNRE has set a target of increasing renewable-based electricity from its 2006 level of just over 8,000 megawatts to 25,000 megawatts by 2012. This increase is expected to come primarily from wind power and biomass, and to a lesser extent solar power and hydrogen (ibid.). However, one energy analyst raises the concern that the increasing reliance on market mechanisms in India's energy sector will obstruct the development of renewable sources of power, given that they are not as cost efficient as hydrocarbon sources (Banerjee 2005, 271–72).

Although India is a large consumer of energy on the global scale, this does not translate into high standards of living for the country's 1.14 billion people. In fact, in 2004–5 27.5 percent of the total population lived below the poverty line, with several states reaching 40 percent (GoI 2007a). On a per capita basis, India's energy consumption is one of the lowest in the world, yet this fact masks the reality of large inequalities in domestic energy consumption. A tiny elite, constituting approximately 1 percent of the total population according to one estimate (Ananthapadmanabhan, Srinivas, and Gopal 2007, 2), enjoys a standard of living not unlike the middle classes in OECD countries, complete with modern-day appliances such as air conditioners, washing machines, plasma televisions, and private vehicles. The carbon footprint of the consuming class is only slightly smaller than the global average of five tons of CO_2, well above the globally sustainable average of 2.5 tons (ibid., 2). Meanwhile, less than half of all rural households have access to electricity, and even in urban areas 12 percent of households are still deprived of electricity (GoI 2005, 3). Cooking is the main energy-based activity in rural subsistence-based households, fueled primarily by biomass including dung, firewood, and agricultural waste. The use of such fuels may produce few greenhouse gases but nevertheless entails significant health risks, risks that fall disproportionately on women and girls, who are generally responsible for cooking and collecting fuels (GoI 2005, 7). Beyond direct energy consumption, many indicators of well-being remain grim for large sections of society; this is partially captured by the UNDP's Human Poverty Index (HPI), which measures the proportion of people experiencing deprivation in survival, education, and standard of living. India's HPI value of 31.3 percent puts it in 62nd place out of 108 developing countries (UNDP 2007, 239–40), suggesting that India still faces a huge human development challenge in the years ahead that will undoubtedly require significant increases in energy consumption.

Political Institutions

Politically, like Australia the Indian state is characterized by federalism and the tradition of liberal democracy. Although the Indian Constitution makes no reference to the term "federalism," the document did indeed create a federal structure under the name of a "union of states." Initially fourteen states and six union territories were established, yet this arrangement has been revised several times and India now has twenty-eight states and seven union territories (Mathew 2006). The fourteen original states were based on the historical demarcations of the colonial

era but were later revised along linguistic and cultural lines. Due to the principal concern of maintaining a single united state, the Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting the national constitution established the central government as the strongest authority (Mathew 1997, 103). The distribution of powers and responsibilities between the central government and state governments is neither straightforward nor fixed; the Constitution makes allowances for this distribution to be revised as necessary for the national and public interests. Broadly, though, the central government is responsible for defense, foreign affairs and international treaties, foreign trade and investment, all matters pertaining to immigration and citizenship, national infrastructure that crosses state borders, and a large number of economic functions. The state governments generally maintain responsibility for a range of health and welfare functions, local law and order, most matters of environmental protection, and regulation and development of some industries (Mathew 2006). This federal structure significantly affects the design and implementation of policies relating to cross-sectoral issues like climate change, as well as India's representation in international debates and negotiations. Although the central government has the constitutional responsibility to attend to foreign affairs and international treaties, the implementation of the commitments entailed in international treaties often falls to state governments. Such a situation demands close cooperation to ensure effective outcomes, yet such cooperation is often not a strong feature of India's federal system. Peritore (1999, 74) also notes that the environmental policies drafted by the central government are often "prestige oriented" and lack specific timeframes and technical standards, and they are rarely accompanied by sufficient financial resources for state implementation.

Democracy in India is widely acknowledged to be robust and dynamic in spite of pervasive social and economic inequalities. Sunil Khilnani notes that a great deal of faith was placed in the idea of liberal democracy at the time of independence, despite the prevailing "unpropitious" conditions: "Huge, impoverished, crowded with cultural and religious distinctions, with a hierarchical social order almost deliberately designed to resist the idea of political equality" (1997, 10, 16). India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and other members of his Congress Party believed that participation in democratic institutions would gradually diminish caste-based inequalities and religious- and caste-based loyalties, which were considered markers of underdevelopment and backwardness (Chatterjee 1997a, 41). Yet a considerable degree of social and economic inequality has remained and continues to undermine democratic

practice. For example, although participation in elections is relatively high, large numbers of people are ill-informed about the substantial differences between different parties or unable to identify parties with their election symbols (Drèze and Sen 2002, 10–11). Arundhati Roy's observations of the irrelevance of national politics to the vast number of Indian citizens are insightful in this context: "The majority of India's citizens will not . . . be able to identify her boundaries on a map, or say which language is spoken where or which god is worshipped in what region. Most are too poor and too uneducated to have even an elementary idea of the extent and complexity of their own country. The impoverished, illiterate agrarian majority have no stake in the State. And indeed, why should they, how can they, when they don't even know what the State is? To them, India is, at best, a noisy slogan that comes around during the elections" (1999, 149). This problem extends beyond periodic elections to the marginalization of the interests of the majority in broader public life, which Drèze and Sen suggest is the product of an uneven distribution of powers and influence that favors the elite and middle classes. This asymmetry is reflected, for instance, in government spending, parliamentary debates, the news media, the legal system, and foreign policy (2002, 25–26). This situation has important implications for the potential for ecologically rational systems of governance given that inequality "is a major sponsor of ecological irrationality and remoteness" (Plumwood 2002, 81). The effective exclusion of a group of people from democratic practices creates opportunities to "shift ecological ills . . . rather than to prevent their generation in the first place" (ibid.). Hence, it is perhaps reasonable to suggest that the presence of vast social and economic inequalities in India exacerbates the existing tendencies of the liberal democratic system toward ecological irrationality.

Social Structure

As I discussed in chapters 3 and 4, social structure can be conceptualized in governance terms as the range of policy paradigms that orient governance within a state. As in the previous chapter, I consider three policy paradigms that have affected the norm diffusion process: environmental, economic, and foreign policy.

Environment Policy Paradigm India's environmental policy domain is governed by a paradigm of weak "sustainable development." At the substate level, environmental concerns are quite salient as reflected in the strength of the environmentalist movement; according to one estimate,

there are over 7,000 environmentalist NGOs in India (Herring and Bharucha 1998, 398). However, the impact of this movement on India's role in international climate change governance has been limited by the fact that these NGOs tend to be exclusively concerned with local environmental issues: the issues that preoccupy international environmental negotiations rarely attract the attention of Indian environmentalist NGOs. Two exceptions to this trend are the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) and The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI, formerly Tata Energy Research Institute), which have been influential in defining India's priorities and positions in international negotiations on climate change.[2]

At the national level, domestic environmental legislation was initially catalyzed by the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment. Following this conference, a National Council for Environmental Policy and Planning was set up within the existing Department for Science and Technology, and this council later became the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) in 1985 (Lall and Garai 2005, 137). Additionally, a 1976 amendment saw two clauses pertaining to environmental protection added to the Indian Constitution. The first clause was inserted as a Directive Principle and stipulates that "[t]he State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country" (Constitution of India, Part IV, Article 48a). The second clause was inserted as a Fundamental Duty and stipulates that "[i]t shall be the duty of every citizen of India . . . to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures" (Constitution of India, Part IVA, Article 51A[g]). Some claim that these constitutional allowances are bolstered by the respect for nature that is embedded in the cultural traditions of India; K. C. Pant explains that "[t]he central tenets of Indian culture and philosophy lead to solicitousness for life in all its forms, and to preservation of the environment and ecology as central desiderata of existence. . . . Protection and regeneration are inherently more desirable in Indian ethos than wanton destruction and exploitation" (2002, 245–46).

In recent times, the norm of "sustainable development" has become increasingly salient in India. This is reflected in a number of publications from government and industry. In 2002, the MOEF released a report outlining India's strategy for pursuing sustainable development; this strategy revolved around four key objectives: poverty reduction, empowering village-level governance, drawing on competences in science and

technology, and improving environmental standards (GoI 2002, 8). The 2006 National Environment Policy also recognizes poverty alleviation as the dominant development imperative, while acknowledging that natural resources must be sustained to secure the livelihoods of the Indian people (GoI 2006, 2). The treatment of sustainable development by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) provides what is perhaps a more realistic representation of the dominant interpretation of sustainable development in India. The CII's "Mission on 'Sustainable Growth'" suggests that India will need to increase its use of natural resources to accelerate the national rate of economic growth to achieve, in turn, the status of "developed country" by the year 2020; to ensure this growth is sustainable, these resources should be used as efficiently as possible. The core purpose of this mission is defined as "[t]o promote and champion sustainable growth in Indian Industry, without compromising on high and accelerated growth" (CII 2007). This subordination of longer-term sustainability to shorter-term economic objectives is undoubtedly widely supported throughout government and business circles in India, as reflected in the United Front Government's decision in the late 1990s to exempt small businesses (comprising approximately 90 percent of all Indian businesses) from environmental regulations to prevent expensive monitoring and a disruption to economic growth (Stuligross 1999, 395–96). Hence, despite the rhetorical salience of sustainable development within India, in practice sustainability is often compromised in the pursuit of greater economic development.

Economic Policy Paradigm The economic policy arena in India can be understood as being shaped by three successive paradigms throughout the country's modern history: the late colonial paradigm, the post-independence Nehruvian paradigm; and the post-liberalization paradigm. As with Australia, this policy arena for many years has been characterized by varying levels of ecological irrationality: namely, the failure to establish and sustain a mutually supportive relationship between society and the nonhuman aspects of nature.

Late colonial economic paradigm. The nationalist movement to free India from the grip of colonial rule was not exclusively a political mission, but also a deeply economic one; indeed, Wyatt argues that "[i]t was axiomatic among Indian nationalists that political independence meant economic independence" (2005a, 168). Throughout two centuries of colonial rule, India served Britain as a supplier of cheap raw materials, including rice, cotton, jute, gold and teak, as well as providing a market

for British manufactured products; the flow of resources was, therefore, highly imbalanced (Gadgil and Guha 1995, 11). In the late nineteenth century, Indian intellectuals became increasingly conscious of the "wealth drain" from India and successfully articulated the wealth of the colonizers to the poverty of the colonized (Deshpande 2003; Dutt 1992). This sense of exploitation provided a point from which to mobilize the nationalist movement; within such a diverse society a "discourse of exploitation" played a vital role in creating a common interest and identity, and a sense of national unity (Deshpande 2003). The economic struggle against colonial rule centered largely on the *swadeshi* campaign (self-reliance, or literally "of one's own country"), which was led by Mohandas Gandhi in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This campaign was an attempt to shift from a dependence on British trade to local self-sufficiency by promoting and favoring locally made goods, and those goods made by hand rather than machine (Sinha 2000, 230–31). The *swadeshi* campaign was thereby able to articulate a vision of the nation as a "site of production," while also projecting an image of the future nation as an economic arrangement embedded in social and moral responsibilities (Deshpande 2003, 62).

Post-independence economic paradigm. The Indian National Congress was the driving force behind the nationalist movement during the early 1900s, and its members shared an understanding that the raison d'être of an independent Indian state would be to "develop" the nation. Yet there was a range of competing perspectives on how development should be conceived: while many were convinced that industrialization was the only plausible path, others shared Gandhi's vision of India as a "village utopia" (Dutt 2002, 241; Khilnani 1997, 69–70). Gandhi objected to modern technology and industry, which he deemed incapable of producing a just and humane economy; instead, he assumed that India's destiny lay within its villages. He believed that *sarvodaya* (well-being and spiritual development) could best be secured for India's people through the construction of a network of self-reliant and democratic villages (*panchayats*); in addition, by maintaining subsistent lifestyles within these villages, the well-being of the natural environment could also be secured (Peritore 1999, 62). The principle of *swadeshi* was central to Gandhi's conception of development; for his followers this implied a return to Indian agrarian values and products instead of excessive material consumption and an overvaluation of Western goods and markets, which were seen to contribute to rural impoverishment in India (Jenkins 2003).

Despite Gandhi's enormous influence over the nationalist move-

ment, his development vision did not inspire the minds of those men who formed the Planning Commission, a body established in 1937 to plan for the future independent state's development, and later to advise the state's civil service outside "the squabbles and conflicts of politics," in the words of Jawaharlal Nehru (quoted in Chatterjee 1997b, 274). The members of the Planning Commission were predominantly upper-caste, well-educated men who shared Nehru's national vision, namely a secular democratic state pursuing industrialization and social and economic redistribution (Khilnani 1997, 76). Irrespective of the merits and flaws of Gandhi's alternative model of development, the pattern of resource use that became characteristic of Nehruvian developmentalism can be seen as highly ecologically irrational by creating a vast distance between the benefits of development and its cost on both human and nonhuman elements of nature.

Although the Nehruvian vision of development that came to define the post-independence economic policy paradigm differed from the Gandhian vision in fundamental ways, the principle of *swadeshi*, or self-reliance, remained central (Muppidi 2004, 44–48). Yet the proponents of Nehru's vision did not interpret self-reliance as entailing the preservation of India's premodern agrarian system, but rather the pursuit of national and economic modernization independently of foreign resources: any reliance on foreign capital should be strictly limited to the short term and have no influence on the orientation of development (ibid., 46). The idea that the state should take responsibility for the planning and investment of development was widely shared by both Congress Party members and industrialists in the private sector (Guha 2007, 213). Indeed, the commitment to self-reliance meant that state-directed planning was largely inevitable given the absence of sufficient private capital, weak and hesitant entrepreneurship, undeveloped markets, and very low levels of industrialization (Gupta and Tivari 2002, xiv). Following independence in 1947, the Planning Commission institutionalized Nehruvian developmentalism through the drafting and implementation of Five Year Plans, which, as Deshpande notes, became a powerful nationalist tool that allowed Indians "to imagine a collective project that is the nation" (2003, 67).

The Nehruvian development paradigm was supported by most members of the Congress Party, who believed that a stable and united nation required a single strong economy, which could be achieved only through heavy industrialization (ibid., 65). Nehru, whose Western education invested him with a respect for science and technology, saw agriculture

as a backward vocation and refused to consider that India's future may lie in her villages (Ishii 2001, 301). This idea was shared by many of his Congress Party colleagues, who believed that agriculture "fragmented the country, confined man's vision to the narrow limits of his village, and was a breeding ground of ignorance, traditionalism, passivity, narrow-mindedness and superstition." Faith was instead placed in the superiority of industrialization (Parekh 1991, 37).

Throughout the 1950s the construction of physical infrastructure assumed a metaphorical and literal significance in the construction of the Indian nation and identity (Wyatt 2005b, 468). This in turn made the task of nation building an inclusive one in which a vast number of Indians could participate. Through the construction of energy infrastructure, the production of steel and cement, and the construction of manufacturing cities, the nation assumed a visual form that promised a future for India as an industrial giant, and represented the construction of a new society characterized not by tradition, religion, and superstition, but rather by modernity, rationality, and science (Khilnani 1997, 62). Of special significance was the construction of large hydroelectric dams, which Nehru famously likened to modern-day "temples" and "mosques" and considered as sites for the veneration not of deities but of men who "work for the good of mankind" (quoted in ibid., 61). Deshpande notes that the connection drawn between nation building and physical construction in turn established a strong link between work and patriotism: Indians could contribute to nation building by contributing to the country's physical construction. "Patriotism [was] . . . quite literally the act of building a nation" and the "producer-patriot" thereby became "the protagonist of this model of national development" (Deshpande 2003, 68). Patriotic production represented a modern manifestation of the principle of *swadeshi:* whereas the original campaign was designed to support small-scale production at the village level, in the modern context it became associated with large-scale industrialization. Nevertheless, this connection between patriotism and production, and the significant transfer of resources from the hinterland to sites of production, were both established at the expense of vast sections of the Indian population, including rural landless laborers, subsistence farmers, rural artisans, fishing communities, tribals, and others (Gadgil and Guha 1995). In contrast to the Gandhian village model of development, Nehruvian developmentalism not only denied these groups an important place in the national vision but also depleted the resource base on which their livelihoods were dependent. The environmental historians Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha have documented the

extensive ways in which heavy industrialization was ecologically irrational, as well as detrimental to the four-fifths of India's population who found themselves struggling to stay afloat in the "oceans of poverty" surrounding the few metropolitan "islands of prosperity" (1995, 34).

The post-independence nation builders maintained the bureaucratic apparatus for acquiring resources that they inherited from the British. According to Gadgil and Guha, "[t]he British were interested in acquiring these resources as cheaply as possible. They had no interest in the sustainable use of these resources. . . . This apparatus with its historical baggage was now put to the service of a new set of political masters. In this framework, the process of development has come to be equated with the channelling of an ever more intense volume of resources, through the intervention of the state apparatus and at the cost of the state exchequer, to subserve the interests of the urban and rural elite" (1995, 15). They have described this model of development as "parasitic" (1995, 3–4), based on their categorization of India's people into three groups: ecosystem people, ecological refugees, and omnivores. "Ecosystem people" constitute an estimated 80 percent of the population (1994 estimate) and are defined by their dependence on the local natural environment for satisfying their material needs; hence, a deterioration in local environmental conditions will correlate to a deterioration in their standard of living. When and as the natural world (soil, water, forests, fisheries) is depleted, ecosystem people are forced to become "ecological refugees" by relocating to urban or other rural areas in an attempt to earn a living. A small minority of the population is "omnivorous," consuming "everything produced all over the earth": if a resource is depleted, omnivores are those in a position to source alternative products from places beyond their own surroundings. Gadgil and Guha argue that the minority omnivore population, comprising large landowners, urban professionals, and the formal work sector, was the beneficiary of state-led industrial development throughout the first four decades of independence. As the services of the natural world were harnessed by the state to provide for the commercial demands of a minority population and create an export base, fisheries, soil, and bamboo forests were depleted and community-based water management systems neglected (Gadgil and Guha 1995, 16-32). Ecosystem people found themselves increasingly restricted in their ability to support a subsistence livelihood. Nehruvian developmentalism, then, conveyed the immediate benefits of development policies to the policymaking elite and minority urban and rural affluent population, while diverting the present and future costs and consequences onto distant others, human and non-

human. Such consequential and temporal remoteness (Plumwood 2002) marks one key aspect of its ecological and social irrationality.

The salience of this policy paradigm began to weaken following Nehru's death in 1964. Under the leadership of Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, the Congress Party placed greater emphasis on economic growth and the support of big business by allowing the private sector to move into areas of industry previously dominated by the government, and by placing restrictions on the freedoms of labor (Kohli 2006a). At the behest of large business associations, tight import restrictions were maintained to protect local production; nevertheless, the "growth first" strategy of Indira Gandhi's government throughout the 1970s and early 1980s created the space for later governments to pursue far more liberal economic agendas that departed considerably from Nehruvian tradition.

Post-liberalization economic paradigm. The commitment to self-reliance was displaced in the early 1990s as a consensus emerged among governing elites that liberalization, privatization, and globalization would provide the most promising path to development. The effects of this paradigm shift have been considerable: rural dwellers and small-scale or subsistent producers have been further marginalized; the "producer patriot" has been displaced as a principal protagonist in favor of the affluent "cosmopolitan consumer" and the export-oriented producer—identities reserved for the minority who is able and willing to engage with India's new role in the global market (Deshpande 2003, 72–73).

The Congress government of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao initiated extensive liberalization in 1991 in response to an external debt crisis that emerged as a result of piecemeal liberalizing policies introduced in the 1980s by Rajiv Gandhi's government. These policies were expected initially to produce a surge in imports that would later be exceeded by exports, yet the growth in exports was much slower than expected and resulted in a major balance of payments deficit. This in turn prompted a massive withdrawal of investment from Non-Resident Indians who anticipated a devaluation of the Indian rupee (Rothermund 2000, 55; Alamgir 2007, 155–56). While it is widely acknowledged that the Rao government had no alternative than to accept a World Bank loan to maintain stability in the Indian economy, some observers note that the government seized the opportunity to completely dismantle the Nehruvian economic paradigm by implementing a much wider range of reforms than those necessary to conform with the loan conditions (Vanaik 2001, 46; Thakur 1997, 16). This decision was prompted by an association of the existing paradigm with the "Hindu rate of growth," which at 3–4 percent per annum

compared unfavorably with other countries in the region (Pachauri 2004, 703). Rao explained that reforms were intended to break away from this pattern to "accelerate technological change and modernize the Indian economy in order to make it efficient and internationally competitive" (quoted in Muppidi 2004, 33).

Rao's reforms included the downsizing of the public sector and the privatization of more publicly owned infrastructure; the removal of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, which sought to limit the growth of business and prevent the monopolization of industries; the reduction of tariffs and removal of import quotas; the devaluation of the rupee; and changes to restrictions on foreign investment (Kohli 2006b). Kholi notes that these reforms were enabled both by external circumstances, including pressure from the World Bank and the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as by internal circumstances, principal of which was the political split in capital. India's two main chambers of commerce, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Assocham), maintained an interest in the closed and protected system that marked the earlier paradigm. However, this consensus was disrupted by the formation of the CII, which represented the more competitive and modern industries that were interested in participating in an open and global market (ibid.).

While liberalization has apparently produced higher sustained growth rates than those of earlier decades, there is no consensus on whether India's integration into the global economy has reduced aggregate levels of poverty. However, it is evident that the benefits of liberalization have been unevenly distributed across regions and sectors, and have disproportionately benefited the most privileged and wealthy (Datt and Ravallion 2002; Mahendra and Ravi 2007). An undeniable derivative of the present economic policy paradigm is, then, the intensification of inequalities. Vanaik (2001, 50–51) notes that this new paradigm favors urban over rural populations, richer states over poorer states, and land owners and professionals over wage owners and the poor. This observation is supported by the 1994–95 National Sample Survey, which found that the consuming middle and upper classes had been the beneficiaries of economic reforms. These groups, which account for approximately 13 percent of the population, are responsible for increased sales of consumer and luxury items, while the consumption share of the poorest 30 percent of the population has been in constant decline since 1991 (Sharma 1999, 357–58). While the fluid nature of poverty definitions and methodology makes it

difficult to estimate real changes in the incidence of poverty since 1991, the Planning Commission's data are indicative. They show that the percentage of the population living below the poverty line increased from 34.3 percent in 1989 to 40.7 percent in 1993 (GoI n.d.). As I noted earlier, the latest data show that 27.5 percent overall continue to live below the poverty line, with intrastate averages ranging dramatically from less than 10 percent to more than 40 percent (GoI 2007a).

The Congress government's liberalization measures were initially met with widespread opposition, not only from FICCI and Assocham, but also from consumer groups, environmentalists, intellectuals, some political parties, and large sections of the wider population (Alamgir 2007, 158–60). The Congress Party was defeated in three of the four states where elections were held in 1994, a result that was widely attributed to the unpopularity of liberalization (ibid., 160). Moreover, the stability of central governance was disrupted as successive governments sought to maintain momentum along the liberalization path in the face of widespread opposition. Although the Congress Party managed to maintain a majority in the elections of 1994, they were defeated by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1996. Between 1996 and 1999 there were a further three changes in central government, thus marking a significant shift in the erstwhile stability of politics in India (ibid., 160–61).[3] However, consensus on economic policy among all the major parties prevented the pervasive dissatisfaction with liberalization and privatization from registering a conclusive impact through the national elections (Vora and Palshikar 2004, 28).

This paradigm shift toward neoliberal globalism has had wide and far-reaching consequences. As noted earlier, this shift has displaced the "producer-patriot" in favor of the affluent "cosmopolitan consumer" and the export-oriented producer. As Wyatt (2005b) observes, the vast majority of the Indian population is marginalized by this paradigm:

> To the extent that the economic basis of citizenship has shifted from production to consumption, a new and less democratic form of citizenship is being opened up. The old economic imaginary glorified the hard labour that built the temples of modern India. The sacrifices that could be made were limited by one's ability to labour. This is much less the case where consumption is concerned. Participation in the retail economy is determined by disposable income, which covers a much wider span than the availability of an individual's labour. . . . If to be Indian is to buy Indian, and some citizens are able to buy much more than others, what is left for the latter? (Wyatt 2005b, 477)

Mani and Varadarajan note that this shift has also placed greater emphasis on nonresident Indians who clearly represent citizens of "global India." They suggest that the transition from economic nationalism to neoliberalism required "national subjects who would legitimize [India's] new path and potentially consolidate its economic and symbolic power"; the "national citizens" who constitute the majority of India's citizenship are less suited to this role than the minority globally oriented self-enterprising citizen-subjects (Mani and Varadarajan 2005, 65; Ong 2006, 14).

This new paradigm is actively legitimized and reinforced by the India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF), a public-private partnership established by the CII and the central Ministry of Commerce and Industry to promote an image of India as a major global actor. This image is clearly based on India's successes rather than on its poverty, and the young, urban, affluent consumer rejecting archaic frugality is the key success story of this era of market reforms (IBEF n.d.). The image of India as an aspiring major power, which the IBEF promotes and which the rest of the world is increasingly acknowledging, is based exclusively on India's "new" economy, namely the information technology sector and other service-based sectors; the agricultural sector, on which approximately 60 percent of the national population is dependent, is rendered invisible, as it contributes just 23 percent to India's GDP (Kumar 2005, 44; IBEF 2005). Preoccupation with measures like GDP prompted the IBEF to conclude that concerns and anxieties about the annual monsoons are "purely psychological," although the well-being and livelihoods of millions of Indians are fundamentally affected by fluctuations in annual rainfall (IBEF 2005). Such comments are particularly disturbing when one considers that over 100,000 farmers burdened by drought-induced debt committed suicide in India between 1993 and 2003 (Thornton and Thornton 2006, 406). This imagery of India extends beyond the international promotional material of the IBEF; Malhotra and Alagh (2004) have observed that the articulation of Indian identity to material wealth has become dominant in Hindi cinema since 1991, while Kumar (2005), Sainath (2006), and Palriwala and Pillai (2008) note that the national media is increasingly preoccupied with the successes, interests, and concerns of urban middle-class Indians at the expense of those of the urban poor and rural populations. As Thornton and Thornton point out, "[e]ven non-business TV channels often carry stock market ticker updates at the right hand corner of the screen, which for most viewers can only have a 'let them eat cake' connotation" (2006, 409).

Despite the enormous growth that has been achieved in India since

1991, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that that the dominant development model is exacerbating the ecological irrationality that characterizes India's political institutions. The persistence of extreme inequalities poses a challenge for domestic sustainable development, and this challenge is magnified as India is further integrated into the global economy and sites of global governance. We have seen that inequality fosters remoteness and provides opportunities to displace problems rather than address their source; in the second half of this chapter it will become evident that this mutually reinforcing problem is manifesting in the context of global climate governance and is further undermining prospects for global sustainability and inequality.

Foreign Policy Paradigm India's position in international negotiations on climate change has been determined primarily by the MOEF and the Ministry of External Affairs, and to a lesser extent by the prime minister, who is formally briefed on this position prior to international meetings (Jakobsen 1998). The prime minister has rarely taken an interest in international environmental negotiations, with the notable exception of Indira Gandhi's speech at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1972. Influenced by the extant Nehruvian tradition of foreign policy, she established a connection between the environment and the concerns of the Third World, in particular the concern of poverty: "We do not wish to impoverish the environment any further and yet we cannot for a moment forget the grim poverty of large numbers of people. Are not poverty and need the greatest polluters? . . . How can we speak to those who live in villages and in slums about keeping the oceans, the rivers and the air clean when their own lives are contaminated at the source? The environment cannot be improved in conditions of poverty" (quoted in Rajan 1997, 25–26). This discourse has strongly influenced India's subsequent environmental foreign policymakers, including in their approach to global climate governance. However, this influence has been tempered in recent years by an important shift toward neoliberal globalism. The collapse of the Soviet Union and increasing economic globalization, together with major economic and political shifts domestically, prompted a major reconsideration of the Nehruvian tradition that had guided India's foreign policy since independence (Mohan 2004). Thus, while it makes sense to demarcate foreign policy paradigms along party lines in the cases of Australia and Spain, in the Indian context the most logical demarcation is a temporal one, with 1991 as the dividing line. Nevertheless, this shift has not had such a decisive impact on the coun-

try's position in international climate negotiations as may be expected; neoliberal globalism is still consolidating, and hence India's present climate policy remains a reflection of the two competing paradigms.[4]

Nehruvian foreign policy paradigm. Nehru was the chief architect of India's foreign policy at independence, and his approach reflected liberal internationalism and a commitment to nonalignment and multilateralism (Mohan 2004). India's refusal to align itself with either bloc in the bipolar order emerged from a rejection of power politics, which Nehru associated with imperialism and conflict. He believed that dismantling the bipolar camps in the international system would be essential to facilitate the spread of peace, which in turn was deemed necessary for internal progress (Misra 1969; Mohan 2004). As he stated, "We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale" (Nehru 1961, 2). While the notion of non-alignment was originally conceived as providing a compass for India's own foreign policy, in the years following independence Nehru also showed leadership in forming the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as a forum focused on non-alignment with the superpowers as well as such principles as respect for human rights, sovereignty, equality of nations, international justice and responsibility, and the rejection of war as a means of solving problems. India's involvement in the NAM was a reflection of the country's commitment to Third World solidarity and the process of decolonization (Rajan 1997; Cohen 2001), a commitment also reflected in India's membership of the Group of 77 (G-77).[5]

The tendency of India's foreign policymakers to view international affairs through the prism of Third World interests prompted one scholar to depict the nation as a strategic porcupine: "The famous defensiveness of the porcupine became the hallmark of India's approach to the world. India was a reactive power; when the world impinged on it, India put up its sharp quills to ward off the threats. The quills symbolized the principles of fairness, justice and equality as defence against what India saw as unacceptable demands from the international system" (Mohan 2004, 260). The commitment to international peace, both as a desirable end in itself and as an imperative for internal progress and poverty eradication, led India to place great emphasis on the United Nations as a means of conflict resolution.[6] India participated actively in the United Nations and displayed an interest in promoting the participation of all nations in the United Nations, as well as seeking the expansion of its membership, especially to the inclusion of China (Pandit 1956).

The internationalism characteristic of the Nehruvian tradition was also tempered by a solid commitment to the national interest. Nehru asserted that "[w]e may talk about international affairs and goodwill and . . . peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do any thing which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country" (Nehru 1961, 28). This dual interest in internationalism and the national interest has prompted some scholars to describe the tradition as a synthesis of idealism and realism (e.g., Bandyopadhyaya 1976, 183). The relative continuity of Nehruvian foreign policy from independence until the early 1990s owes to the continuity in India's foreign policy environment, chiefly the bipolar international order and tensions with China, as well as the fact that Nehru's successors were either unskilled in foreign policy or already committed to his principles (Cohen 2001, 37).

Post-liberalization foreign policy paradigm. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent liberalization of India's economy catalyzed a major reconsideration of India's foreign policy orientation (Baru 2006, 136). In the absence of bipolarity, non-alignment was widely considered to have no relevance for India or the rest of the world. Furthermore, as the global economy began to assume a new significance within India, the traditional commitments to Third World solidarity and multilateral diplomacy were increasingly perceived as a handicap rather than a virtue. Although the legacy of Nehruvian foreign policy continued intermittently to exert influence during the 1990s and into the new century, the paradigm increasingly has been displaced by one characterized by closer relations with the West and particularly the US, greater emphasis on "pragmatism" and strategic alliances, and greater emphasis on commercial diplomacy (Chenoy and Chenoy 2007). The rapprochement with the United States reflects the altered world order of US hegemony, as well as India's post-liberalization aspirations of major economic power status. Nevertheless, the warming of Indo-US relations was very gradual throughout the 1990s as India maintained lingering concerns about US international dominance (Mohan 2007). US President Clinton's visit to New Delhi in 2000 marked a breakthrough in relations and was followed by a series of bilateral agreements on security and energy matters. Perhaps the clearest sign that India was willing to abandon its long-standing commitment to non-alignment came after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, when India's Prime Minister Vajpayee surprised many within India's foreign policy community by immediately extending the nation's unre-

served moral and military support to the US in its war on terror (Mohan 2004, xi–xii). Some scholars suggest that this new relationship reflects India's adoption of an ideologically neutral "pragmatism" as a new foreign policy compass (e.g., Baru 2006, 60; Mohan 2004, xix–xx). Such pragmatism is also reflected in India's increasing preference for strategic alliances in place of broad support for inclusive multilateralism and Third World solidarity, for example, India's participation in, or formation of, the G-4, G-15, G-20 and G-33, the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India, China), and the Asia Pacific Partnership, as well as its efforts to join APEC (Chenoy and Chenoy 2007).

Dissenting from the pragmatist explanation, Ramakrishnan (2005) suggests that India's putative pragmatism simply masks its ideological commitment to neoliberal globalism, which is characterized by the subordination of people's political interests and aspirations to the interests of the economy and accumulation, and a limitation on state involvement in the economy to the mere promotion of accumulation opportunities. Ramakrishnan's view is supported by the growing emphasis on commercial diplomacy in India's foreign policy. As Jakobsen (1998) notes, liberalization in India saw primacy in foreign affairs "given to economic diplomacy in order to convey the message to the world that the Indian economy was poised for massive and unprecedented modernisation." In the second half of this chapter, it will become apparent that these two competing paradigms, Nehruvian and neoliberal globalist, both continue to exert an influence on India's response to the norms of global climate governance.

THE NORM DIFFUSION PROCESS

As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the process of building congruence between domestic conditions and global norms of climate governance in India has passed through three distinct phases since the late 1980s. In the first phase, India's environmental foreign policymakers accepted the norms as legitimate and defended them against attempts to reinterpret their meaning. As international pressure mounted to institutionalize transnational mitigation measures, India moved into a phase of careful compromise: while continuing to defend CBDR, India began to compromise on domestic emission reduction targets. In a third phase India has accepted and embraced transnational mitigation measures while deflecting attention away from domestic emissions through the promotion of CBDR. This pattern of congruence building is the product of ideational developments at both the domestic and the global levels.

Phase 1: Principled and Proactive, Late 1980s-1993

The emergence of climate change onto the international political agenda coincided with a period of significant transition and paradigmatic shifts in India. As outlined above, many within the political elite were reconsidering the orientation of the country's domestic and external politics at this time. It is unsurprising, then, that climate change did not attract the levels of concern in India that it did in some other countries. Nevertheless, it did register an interest with then–Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and others within the foreign policy community for two principal reasons. First, the ozone negotiations that led to the Montreal Protocol in the mid-1980s served as a lesson to India and other developing countries that international environmental negotiations can have implications for their countries' wider economic development interests, hence nonparticipation is not a viable option.[7] The consequences of ozone depleting substances, like those of GHG emissions, were not salient concerns in India's domestic context, but India's increasing production of ozone depleting substances ensured that it was identified as a key actor in international negotiations. As the implications of this became apparent, India's environmental foreign policymakers sought to resist what they perceived as the North's attempts to place responsibility on the South for a problem of their own making. India's position in the Montreal negotiations centered on demands for technology transfer and financial assistance for phasing out ozone depleting substances (Sims 1995, 270–71), two demands that were later taken to the climate change negotiations.

India's active participation in early climate change debates can also be explained by the apparent opportunity the issue posed for highlighting unequal global structures, including the debt-poverty nexus resulting from a focus on the financial debts of the South instead of the ecological debts of the North, and international trade arrangements, which privilege the interests of affluent countries in the North at the expense of those of the South (Gupta 1997, 280–87). Thus, while the North sought to represent climate change as an issue of common global concern, India and other countries in the South perceived and promoted this as a North-South issue associated with global inequalities.

The North-South lens through which India initially perceived the problem reflects their persistent allegiance to Nehruvian foreign policy, with its emphasis on the advancement of international justice, equality, and responsibility, as well as Third World solidarity. During this phase Indian actors, both governmental and nongovernmental, undertook ini-

tiatives to develop domestic understanding of climate change and integrate the interests of the South into the a global discussion that predominantly had been defined by scientists and political elites in the North. As early as February 1989, the influential New Delhi–based TERI organized the Conference on Global Warming and Climate Change: Perspectives from Developing Countries. This conference focused on the science of climate change and its anticipated effects, as well as energy issues and policy options for countries of the South (Nath 1993). Shortly thereafter, the MOEF established an Expert Advisory Committee on Global Environmental Issues to keep the government informed on developments in the international realm and to "advise the Government on all aspects related to global warming" (GoI 1990). Also in 1989, Rajiv Gandhi mooted the creation of a Planetary Protection Fund at a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade. Gandhi suggested that this fund should be supported by contributions of 0.1 percent of the GDP of all countries except the least developed, which would amount to over US$15 billion annually for the purchase of clean and efficient technology that could benefit both developed and developing countries (Bhalla 1992, 155–56). Rajiv Gandhi's proposal was endorsed in the meeting's final Belgrade Declaration, and later at the gathering of the Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOG) Meeting in Malaysia in October 1989 (Agarwal, Narain, and Sharma 1999, 30). Although a fund was later established under the guise of the Global Environment Facility, it lacked many of the significant features India had advocated (a point I discuss below).

In 1990 the Indian government organized the New Delhi Conference of Select Developing Countries on Global Environmental Issues. The meeting's purpose was to exchange knowledge, highlight the links between disparate global environmental problems, and to mobilize cooperation between countries of the South ahead of the first official international negotiations in December of that year (Rajan 1997, 103). In a paper presented at this meeting, the Indian government outlined the position that it would hold in subsequent international negotiations on climate change. This position had three key features: first, the argument that countries of the North had generated the threat of climate change and must take responsibility for mitigating it by limiting their emissions; second, that the South will require extensive technological and financial assistance to contribute to mitigation; and third, that due to socioeconomic underdevelopment, many countries in the South may be unable to contribute to mitigation and can only be expected to do so if this does not impede their economic development or access to resources necessary for develop-

ment (ibid., 103–4). India's emphasis on differentiated responsibility was largely endorsed by the other participants, as indicated in the Chairman's Summary:

> Even assuming high economic growth by developing countries and stabilization of energy consumption by the developed countries over the next 20 years, the developed countries would continue to be responsible for a major portion of the [GHG] emissions. The developing countries would require to increase their energy consumption for their development and for alleviation of poverty. The responsibility for reduction of emissions to prevent a climate change would, therefore, rest with the developed countries. The developing countries will be prepared to cooperate in energy efficiency measures but no targets can be fixed for the reduction of emissions by them. (GoI 1990)

India's position was highly influenced by a report released in 1990 by the US-based World Resources Institute (WRI), and a rebuttal published by India's Centre for Science and Environment (CSE). The WRI report established a Greenhouse Index of all countries' share of the responsibility for global warming, based on their emissions of the three major GHGs, carbon dioxide, methane, and CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons). Their calculations presented the United States as the largest contributor, followed by the USSR, Brazil, China, and then India (WRI 1990, 15). Although the report did note per capita emissions as a matter of interest, its conclusion was that "[i]f just China and India . . . raised their per capita emissions to the current world average . . . , total worldwide additions to the atmosphere would increase 28 percent"; this concern was raised even though neither China nor India appeared within their Per Capita Greenhouse Index of the fifty highest contributors to global warming (ibid., 17). The report did note that the source of most emissions in the South is rice cultivation and deforestation, while the source in the North tends to be high levels of energy consumption, yet it failed to draw out the ethical implications of this distinction. By contrast, this important distinction informed the CSE's report, published in 1991 as a critical response (Agarwal and Narain 1991). The CSE report criticized the WRI's assumption that all GHGs and all of the human activities associated with their emission should be treated equally. In particular, the report's authors criticized the failure of the WRI to distinguish between the "survival emissions" of the poor and the "luxury emissions" of the rich: "The methane issue raises . . . questions of justice and morality. Can we really equate the carbondioxide contributions of gas-guzzling automobiles in Europe and North America or, for that matter, anywhere in the Third World with the methane emis-

sions of draught cattle and rice fields of subsistence farmers in West Bengal or Thailand? Do these people not have a right to live?" (ibid., 3). This point is also starkly illustrated by Parikh and Parikh's observation that the reduction of 1,000 tons of CO_2 equivalent can be translated into a variety of socioeconomic trade-offs: it could be achieved by taking 800 cars off the road, producing 7,500 fewer tons of cement for 1,000–3,000 moderate-sized homes, or ceasing rice production on 750 hectares of land that feeds 12,000 people each year in a developing country (1991, 43–45).

The CSE's report further suggested that the treatment of aggregate emissions and the omission of the capacity of the earth's "sinks" to absorb pollutants led the WRI to overestimate the culpability of highly populated countries and underestimate the responsibility of countries with relatively small populations (Agarwal, Narain, and Sharma 1999, 6–9). The CSE proposed that the world's oceanic and terrestrial sinks be considered a global common and its total absorption capacity allocated equally on a per capita basis. On the basis of this principle, the CSE calculated that only two developed countries, Albania and Portugal, were within their permissible emission limits for CO_2, and only thirteen within their methane limits. Developing countries, by contrast, were by and large using less than their permissible levels of both CO_2 and methane. On the basis of these calculations, China and India's contribution to net global emissions amounted to less than 0.5 percent (ibid., 10). The report's conclusion was that the countries of the North should greatly reduce their domestic emissions to allow those of the South to increase theirs as necessary for alleviating poverty. This normative basis clearly resonated with India's Nehruvian foreign policy tradition, and this, together with the respect that the report's authors commanded among environmental ministry personnel at this time, ensured that the report captured the attention of India's environmental foreign policymakers (Jasanoff 1993, 34–36; Gupta 1997, 87).

Drawing on the CSE's line of reasoning, India's environmental foreign policymakers were able to establish congruence between their domestic conditions and the emerging norms of climate governance by framing the problem as one of globally inequitable development. This directed responsibility for mitigation primarily to the North and thus allowed India to actively participate in international climate negotiations without jeopardizing its coal-dependent development trajectory. During early intergovernmental negotiations, India's chief negotiator, Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, presented the CSE's original case for per capita shares of atmospheric space as the nation's formal position by proposing an "equitable formula" for reducing global emissions, based on the convergence of CO_2

emissions at a common per capita level and taking into consideration historical emissions. Such a formula would clearly promote India's development aspirations, and it was also consistent with India's favored representation of climate change as an inherently and exclusively political problem reflecting the global imbalance of GHG emissions and historically inequitable patterns of development. At an early intergovernmental meeting in June 1991 Dasgupta stated:

> [G]lobal warming is caused not by emissions of greenhouse gases as such but by excessive levels of per capita emissions of these gases. If per capita emissions of all countries had been on the same levels as that of the developing countries, the world would not today have faced the threat of global warming. It follows, therefore, that developed countries with high per capita emission levels of greenhouse gases are responsible for incremental global warming. In these negotiations, the principle of equity should be the touchstone for judging any proposal. Those responsible for environmental degradation should also be responsible for taking corrective measures. Since developed countries with high per capita emissions of greenhouse gases are responsible for incremental global warming, it follows that they have a corresponding obligation to take corrective action. (quoted in Dasgupta 1994, 133–34)

Dasgupta's statement reflects the essence of a "non-paper" submitted by India to the INC Secretariat ahead of the second negotiating session.[8] India's non-paper offered a complete draft text for a Framework Convention on Climate Change that was consistent with the position outlined earlier at the New Delhi Conference of Select Developing Countries on Global Environmental Issues. The text drafted by India's delegation included the following key principles and demands:

- Developed countries are largely responsible for excessive past and present emissions, and the main responsibility for mitigation therefore lies with these countries.
- Developing countries' contributions to mitigation is dependent upon the provision of "adequate, new and additional financial resources and technology transfers on preferential and non-commercial terms" (GoI 1991).
- Long-term emission stabilization objectives should be based on an "equitable formula" that should include the convergence of CO_2 emissions at a common per capita level and take into consideration historical emissions.

- A Climate Fund should be created by contributions from developed countries to meet the costs of mitigation and adaptation in the developing countries (ibid.).

India's proposed text reflects strong support for the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. For the Indian delegation, CBDR placed primary responsibility for mitigation on countries of the North, not only because of their greater capacity to do so, but also crucially because these countries bore the main responsibility for generating the threat of climate change. In addition, India's proposal for stabilization objectives to be pursued along the lines of per capita convergence can be read as support for the extant norm of domestic emission reduction targets and timetables.

India's draft text received a mixed response from the international community. The North was by and large critical of India's exclusive emphasis on the responsibility of developed countries to limit emissions and finance mitigation measures in the South; more specifically, the concept of per capita emissions convergence was considered outrageous by most developed countries (Rajan 1997, 122). By contrast, India's position attracted the support of many countries in the South and many nongovernment organizations, one of which, the Climate Action Network (CAN), described India's position as "more far-sighted and more in tune with the thoughts and hopes of people all over the world, than the disingenuous rhetoric of many rich countries" (quoted in ibid.). CAN also pointed out that the concept of per capita entitlement was consistent with the United Nations charter, which enshrines the equality of all people in all countries of the world. Within the South there was consensus on the norm of CBDR and the consequent emphasis on the historical responsibility of the North; there was also fairly widespread agreement that countries in the South might contribute to mitigation efforts if they were financed by the North and involved extensive technology transfer (Borione and Ripert 1994, 83–84; Rajan 1997, 133). However, the countries of the South diverged on several aspects of the negotiations, including on the notion of equal per capita entitlements. China strongly supported India's per capita proposal; others, including Mexico, Brazil, and Malaysia, were neither supportive nor resistant, while high-emitting countries with small populations (namely the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East) vehemently objected (Rajan 1997, 122–23). The North's hostile reception to the notion of per capita emission entitlements, as well as the lack of Southern consensus, appears to have influenced India's position. In subsequent ses-

sions of the INC, the Indian delegation softened its demand for including per capita entitlements in the text of the FCCC. In the end, the adopted convention text made only one reference to per capita emissions: the preamble notes that per capita emissions in the South are relatively low and will increase in accordance with the pursuit of social and development objectives (UNFCCC 1992).

Even after this demand was later abandoned, India continued to defend the norm of domestic emission reduction targets and timetables against the proposal of Joint Implementation (JI, discussed in chapter 2). India opposed Norway's proposal for three main reasons. First, many believed that JI violated the spirit of CBDR by allowing the developed countries to dilute their responsibilities for limiting their own emissions; second, there was a fear that it would become a form of neocolonialism, through which the North would appropriate more of the resources of the South and thereby exacerbate existing global inequalities. Third, there was a fear that such a measure would shift the governance of climate change from the multilateral sphere to the bilateral sphere in which developing countries are far more vulnerable to coercion and persuasion from developed countries (Gupta 1997, 118). This last concern was particularly salient in India at the time as a result of the internal economic crisis discussed earlier. Rajan explained that the structural reforms implemented by the Rao government in mid-1991 rendered the country particularly vulnerable and dependent on Northern assistance. The pervasive fear that this could be exploited was compounded by a report released by the US Environmental Protection Agency suggesting that "[t]he US can help developing countries reduce their greenhouse gas emissions through its foreign aid programs and contributions to the World Bank and other multilateral development banks. . . . Although all such programs . . . address only a small percentage of total investment in developing countries, they can exert disproportionate influence because they leverage much greater amounts of funds and certify the financial merit of particular technologies and projects" (Lashof and Tirpak 1990, 782–83). Rajan (1997, 118–19) explains that this report was perceived by India's environmental foreign policymakers as evidence of the US's willingness to influence the climate change policies of developing countries through bilateral channels. Consequently, the Indian delegation displayed a keen interest in ensuring that all commitments were limited either to the multilateral sphere of the UNFCCC, or to the domestic spheres of the countries of the North. In the end, however, Joint Implementation was endorsed by the FCCC, albeit in rather vague terms that stipulated only that mitigation mea-

sures may be implemented in cooperation with other parties, the criteria for such projects were left open for future debate at the first Conference of the Parties in 1995.

The Indian delegation made a range of other demands, either independently or in concert with other countries of the South, during the INC negotiations that were not institutionalized in the final text of the FCCC. These included the demand for technology transfer, the establishment of a new financial mechanism to be managed independently of existing international institutions, as well as the argument that CBDR should require the North to cover the entire cost of implementing the FCCC in the South. In terms of technology transfer, the final text merely stated that developing country parties should "take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties" (UNFCCC 1992, Article 4.5). The promise of financial transfers was similarly vague and guaranteed funds only to enable developing countries to fulfill their commitment to submit their national communications to the FCCC Secretariat (Article 4.3). Despite a common objection from the South, the Global Environmental Facility was designated as the Convention's financial mechanism, albeit only on "an interim basis" (Article 21.3). In response to the concerns of India and other developing countries about the lack of transparency and equity in the management of the Global Environmental Facility, and in particular about its control by the World Bank, the FCCC merely acknowledged that it should be "appropriately restructured" along unspecified lines.

The final text did, however, reflect many of the priorities that India and the South had pursued, particularly the demand that no legally binding commitments be imposed on the countries of the South. The final text also recognized that "economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties," and that the fulfillment of these countries' commitments would be dependent on the provision of financial assistance and technology transfer from the North (Article 4.7). Although India endorsed the final text and added its signature to the document at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the delegation initially considered withholding its support on the basis that too few of India's interests, and those of the South as a whole, were reflected in the text. During the final session of negotiations before the Earth Summit, the Indian cabinet informed Environment Minister Kamal Nath that India could boycott the FCCC if the nation's interests were not protected—but only on the condition that India was not isolated

by other developing countries, or at least had the support of China. Given that such support was not forthcoming from these countries, who by and large maintained that they could support any convention that did not impose excessively onerous obligations on them, the Indian delegation backed down from its opposition once an important concession had been made by removing a clause tying international trade to climate change, a clause which India feared may potentially lead to unilateral sanctions (Agarwal, Narain, and Sharma 1999, 39–40; Rajan 1997, 144–45).

During these early years of global climate governance, then, congruence between global norms and India's domestic conditions was established by framing climate change as an inherently and exclusively political problem generated by excessive consumption patterns in the North, and as a reflection of globally inequitable patterns of development. This congruence allowed India to participate proactively in international negotiations without jeopardizing the country's coal-dependent development trajectory. Although India's environmental foreign policymakers were unsuccessful in their attempts to institutionalize per capita entitlements in the normative structures of climate governance, the norms of CBDR and domestic emission reduction targets and timetables were deemed consistent with India's domestic conditions and were steadfastly defended against attempts by some developed countries to dilute them.

Phase 2: Cautious Compromise, 1994–2001

As international climate change negotiations shifted to a focus on the mechanisms of the FCCC and the future Kyoto Protocol, India's climate diplomacy began to shift away from a strong and principled defense of the interests of the global South to a willingness to compromise with developed country parties on particular matters. On the norm of CBDR, India remained resolute and continued to frame the problem as one of globally inequitable development. However, on the norm of domestic emission reduction targets and timetables, India demonstrated a willingness to compromise. The transition to a phase of cautious compromise was initially very subtle but is discernible in the renewed debate over Joint Implementation in INC meetings throughout 1993 and 1994. The Indian delegation remained concerned that transnational mitigation measures might allow the North to evade its historical responsibility. Such evasion, it was feared, would consolidate global inequalities while allowing profligate lifestyles to continue unabated in wealthy countries (Jakobsen 1998; Rajan 1997). However, by the final INC meeting before the inaugural Conference of the Parties in February 1995, India's environmental for-

eign policymakers were demonstrating a greater willingness to compromise on this matter by seeking to protect only their most direct national interests rather than negotiating on the principles of global equity and fairness. As an increasing number of states began to support transnational mitigation options, it became increasingly difficult for India to sustain its insistence that domestic targets be pursued domestically. At this final INC meeting, the G-77 and China submitted a joint proposal on criteria for Joint Implementation that suggested that they would withdraw their objection to this mechanism as long as it was restricted to cooperation only between the developed countries and countries in transition, and kept entirely distinct from, yet additional to, financial assistance for sustainable development in the South (Gupta 1997, 119). This proposal was not accepted by the countries of the North, as they were eager to secure the participation of developing countries in the mechanism and thereby maximize their opportunities for cost-efficient abatement options (IISD 1995f). An agreement was finally reached at COP-1 that reflected a compromise between the competing positions of the developing countries and negotiating blocs of the North. This compromise took the form of a flexible mechanism for use between developed and transitional countries, called Joint Implementation, and a separate pilot phase of Activities Implemented Jointly: a bilateral mechanism through which all parties could voluntarily cooperate on GHG abatement projects. At the insistence of India and other developing countries, Activities Implemented Jointly would be purely experimental and therefore not generate any credits toward meeting the emissions targets of the developed country parties (IISD 1995d). Moreover, India's environment minister, Kamal Nath, insisted that neither JI nor Activities Implemented Jointly should be "used as an excuse by the North to continue with their present profligate consumption patterns which are at the root of the unsustainable mess we find ourselves in." Nath further insisted that such flexible mechanisms as Activities Implemented Jointly and JI may exacerbate the problem of climate change "unless they are properly referenced to targets and timetables to be observed by those responsible for the damage to the atmosphere" (Nath 1995).

India's decision to shift its position from outright opposition to JI to careful compromise can be understood as a reflection of the tensions within domestic sources of influence. As I mentioned earlier, India's stance on climate policy had been strongly influenced not only by its foreign policy traditions but also by two important NGOs, TERI and the CSE. Before the JI initiative was proposed, TERI's and the CSE's positions had

generally converged upon concern about global warming and support for India's insistence on an equitable international approach to climate governance. However, whereas the CSE objected to JI on the basis that it would avoid confronting unsustainable consumption patterns and global inequities, TERI supported the proposal as a means of securing financial support for its research into renewable energies, as well as of attracting further support for sustainable development in India (Jakobsen 1998). The close associations between India's environmental foreign policymakers and these two organizations was clearly reflected in Nath's statements at COP-1, in which he emphasized the culpability of unsustainable consumption patterns in generating the threat of climate change while carefully conceding that transnational, cost-effective abatement projects may contribute to its mitigation (IISD 1995d).

The matter of the adequacy of existing commitments in the FCCC was also on the agenda of COP-1 in February 1995. This presented a further challenge for India when the US sought to redefine CBDR by shifting attention away from the historical and moral responsibility of the industrialized countries to the necessary responsibilities that developing countries would need to assume to fulfill the objectives of the FCCC. This was most explicit, as noted in chapter 2, in the US delegation's presentation, which purported to show that the "greenhouse forcing" of developing countries' future emissions would be greater than that of the industrialized countries' emissions. This provided the basis for a proposal for further differentiation of the developing countries into categories of "developing countries" and "more advanced developing countries," with emissions limitation targets to be negotiated for the latter (UNFCCC 1995a, 91–92). India's delegation loudly opposed the United States' proposal for further differentiation; Kamal Nath described it as "insidious" (IISD 1995c) and continued to stress the importance of basing international climate change policies firmly on the principle of global equity. He used his address at COP-1 to remind the international community of the different purpose that emissions fulfill in the North and the South; he urged that "[t]here should be no comparison between the 'survival emissions' of developing countries and the 'luxury emissions' of the developed world" (Nath 1995). He also argued that further differentiation violated the spirit of CBDR because the developing countries were already fulfilling their responsibility simply by participating in the FCCC processes, and because the Convention correctly places responsibility for limiting emissions on the industrialized countries on the basis of their historical emissions: "To us, terms like 'future' and 'potential' emissions

have no meaning unless these are linked to cumulative 'historical' and 'past' emissions. The future is still in the realm of conjecture. But the past is a shameful historical fact, the tragic fruits of which we are living with today, and which has necessitated the very drawing up of such a Convention" (Nath 1995).

Beyond its defense of the original interpretation of the CBDR norm, the Indian delegation played a crucial role at COP-1 in brokering a compromise between parties on future domestic targets and timetables. With their confidence and authority undermined by the absence of Kamal Nath, the delegation maintained a fairly low profile throughout most of the meeting. Their initial response to the AOSIS Protocol, which called on Annex I parties to reduce their emissions by 20 percent by the year 2005, was cautiously critical. Although India supported meaningful commitments for industrialized countries, Indian delegates feared that strong pressure might rebound on developing countries if the Annex I parties responded by pushing for correspondingly ambitious commitments for developing countries. These concerns were shared by China and the oil-exporting members of the G-77, who argued that it was premature to consider a protocol in light of remaining scientific uncertainties. However, representatives of the CSE succeeded in convincing the Indian officials that a strong protocol, such as that presented in the AOSIS proposal, was in India's interests due to the anticipated effects of climate change on the country's agricultural systems and coastal areas (Agarwal, Narain, and Sharma 1999, 45). The arrival of Kamal Nath in the final days of the meeting then saw India reassume its leadership position within the South by convening a group of seventy-two "like-minded countries" from the G-77 to cooperate with the CSE and the CAN in revising the AOSIS Protocol as a "green paper."[9] This paper called for negotiations on a climate protocol to be finalized at COP-2, and for Annex I parties to adopt legally binding emission reduction targets within the context of this protocol. To maintain the integrity of CBDR, no further commitments for non-Annex parties were specified in the green paper (ibid., 45). This proposal, described by Nath as "a rare example of cooperation between government representatives and nongovernmental organizations" (UNFCCC 1995b, 23), eventually formed the basis of the Berlin Mandate, which laid out a negotiating process to produce a protocol by 1997.

Despite the directions set out in the Berlin Mandate, throughout subsequent meetings of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate and the COP, the US persisted with its insistence on stronger commitments for developing countries. The most concerted attempt to draw these coun-

tries into mitigation efforts occurred at the second COP in July 1996. Here, the US offered a somewhat conciliatory proposal in which, for the first time, reference was made to the importance of medium-term emission targets and a longer-term goal for atmospheric GHG concentrations. The caveat, however, was that such targets should be reached through Activities Implemented Jointly and a global emissions trading system involving both developed and developing countries. The G-77 and China objected to this proposal, yet the Indian delegation played a relatively minor role in these debates. (Oberthür 1996, 198). A glance at the domestic political landscape of 1996 reveals that such a situation was perhaps inevitable. The May general elections produced a hung parliament, with the BJP winning 160 parliamentary seats to Congress's 141 seats, and the National Front–Left Front (NFLF) coalition's 120 seats. The BJP was invited by the president to form a government, yet without the support of other parties this government survived for just thirteen days. The NFLF subsequently formed a coalition government, comprising fifteen parties from across the political spectrum and now under the banner of the United Front party (Ganguly 1997, 126–30). This internal political upheaval changed the composition of India's delegation to the international climate negotiations and left it unprepared and incapable of adopting a strong position in debates at COP-2.

On the eve of COP-3 in Kyoto, in 1997, it was evident that the Indian government had yet to form a clear and unified national position on international climate governance. During a meeting of the CHOG in October 1997, Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral supported a statement that stipulated that after the negotiations in Kyoto all countries will need to pursue policies to reduce emissions (CHOGM 1997). This prompted the directors of the CSE to write directly to the prime minister to highlight how this position violated the norm of CBDR and the common position of the South in international negotiations, as well to outline the position that India should adopt at the Kyoto negotiations.[10] Anil Agarwal, then CSE's director, was subsequently invited to provide support to the environment minister, Saifuddin Soz, at the ministerial component of the Kyoto negotiations. The influence of the CSE is highly discernible in statements made by the Indian delegates throughout these negotiations. In his speech to the gathering delegates, Soz argued that the equitable entitlements of the developing countries to "environmental space" for growth must be respected and that such entitlements could most fairly be distributed on a per capita basis (Soz 1997). Although India, together

with all other developing countries, lent its support to Brazil's proposed Clean Development Fund, it was highly critical of the transformation of this punitive instrument into the market-based Clean Development Mechanism (IISD 1997a). Yet as with most other developing countries, intensive pressure and persuasion from the United States, both openly and behind closed doors, appears to have convinced India's delegation to support the inclusion of the CDM in the Kyoto Protocol as part of the package of flexible mechanisms proposed by the US. The successful institutionalization of this and other market mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol, together with the US's insistence on "meaningful participation" from developing countries in return for its ratification, led one Indian delegate to conclude that the norm of CBDR had been significantly diluted in the accord: "The reality of the 1992 agreement has been deformed by the 1997 agreement; in Kyoto the whole approach appears to have been compromised, the first world appears to be saying, we will not expend any sweat, let's make money and sell technology. The common but differentiated approach seems to have lost meaning and unsustainable patterns of living seem to be the dominating approach" (quoted in Gupta 2001).

Throughout 1998, India's environmental foreign policymakers focused on influencing the rules of the CDM by consulting with other countries of the South to determine their key concerns and to limit the extent to which this market mechanism could exacerbate global inequalities in development and technology. To this end, the G-77 and China submitted a joint paper to the second meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice in 1998, outlining their position on the CDM and other mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. The Indian delegation played a leading role in drafting this paper, which emphasized, first, that the CDM should be understood principally as a means toward sustainable development in the South, rather than merely as a market-based offsetting mechanism; and second, that it should be used purely on a supplementary basis after considerable action had been taken domestically by the developed countries (UNFCCC 1998, 9–11). This paper reflected the optimism of many developing countries, including India, of the resources and technology that the CDM may deliver for sustainable development, yet for India's environmental foreign policymakers the same concerns they held for the Activities Implemented Jointly continued to linger, namely that this transnational mitigation measure would exacerbate global inequalities and shift the responsibility for emissions abatement from the developed to the developing world.[11]

Nevertheless, within a short time India's foreign policymakers had begun to engage with domestic and external nonstate actors in such a way that secured normative congruence between their domestic conditions and the evolving global norm of domestic emission reduction targets. Two specific conditions enabled this engagement. In the first instance, the increasing consolidation of a new economic paradigm characterized by neoliberal globalism endowed the world market with a degree of domestic importance that had not been seen throughout the post-independence era. This, together with economic liberalization, had empowered a new group of internationally and competitively minded industry actors (chiefly the CII) who were interested in engaging with global market actors. The second enabling condition was India's pragmatic and globalist turn in foreign policy and the rapprochement in Indo-American relations, which in turn enabled state and industry actors within the United States to form an economically oriented discourse coalition with industry and other nonstate actors within India.[12] Previously, US climate diplomacy had been focused on the multilateral space of the INC and COP; however, in the late 1990s US representatives shifted their attention to bilaterally persuading governmental and nongovernmental actors in the South of the benefits of GHG mitigation and the flexible mechanisms. In India, the attention of the US was initially focused on nongovernmental actors, in particular TERI, and later the CII. Throughout 1999, two US climate policy officials, Kathleen McGinty and Karl Hausker, were based at TERI in New Delhi as senior visiting fellows with the objective of "develop[ing] more common ground between the US and India on climate change" (Hausker and McGinty 2001, 11).[13] McGinty and Hausker have recounted how the MOEF was initially quite hostile to the idea of the CDM, which one official likened to "a dying man [an industrialized nation] asking for a blood transfusion from a friend [a developing country]" (ibid., 11–12). Yet by the end of their twelve-month fellowships, a significant shift in the attitude of the MOEF and other ministries and industry stakeholders had been secured through formal and informal means. Some of the more prominent initiatives instigated by McGinty and Hausker included the Indo-US Dialogue on the Clean Development Mechanism, which brought together Indian and US business leaders to discuss the profitable opportunities presented by the CDM; and a ministerial meeting between India's minister of external affairs, Jaswant Singh, and US Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, which produced a "Joint Statement on Cooperation in Energy and Related Environmental Aspects." This statement included a resolution to work closely together to achieve an early agreement in the UNFCCC on the ele-

ments of the flexible mechanisms, as well as a resolution to "work closely together with other countries to develop . . . international rules and procedures for the Kyoto Mechanisms, including the Clean Development Mechanism" (Embassy of India 2000).

Following the Indo-US Dialogue on the CDM in 1999, the CII established a Climate Change and Outreach Awareness Program, which was partly funded by USAID. Its objective was to promote awareness of the impact of climate change on India's economy and industry, influence the nation's position at international climate change negotiations, and "foster partnerships for CDM related projects" (Roy and Raghuraman 2000, 3). In mid-1999, USAID, on behalf of the CII, commissioned the international consultancy firm Hagler Bailly to collaborate with the Credit Rating Services of India Ltd. in an assessment of the investment potential of the CDM for India (Hagler Bailly Services 1999). According to the assessment, global investment in the CDM was anticipated to reach between US$5.2 billion and $17.4 billion each year, and India could expect to attract between 7 percent and 14 percent of this investment, primarily in the transport, electricity, and certain industry sectors where efficiency improvements could be expected. This was predicted to translate into $1 billion in additional foreign investment each year (ibid., 1).

By establishing alliances with nonstate actors and grafting the transnationalized norm of domestic emission reduction targets onto India's emerging economic policies and objectives, these US nonstate actors were able to generate a perception of normative congruence among India's environmental foreign policymakers. This in turn catalyzed a significant change in India's position on international climate governance. But the actions of McGinty and Hausker were only consequential by virtue of the wider ideational shifts that were occurring within India's economic and foreign policy domains. Actors' reasoning and behavior is always influenced by underlying material and ideational contexts: agency is never autonomous but rather situated (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 4). The underlying ideational shifts in India's domestic context thus enabled the problem of climate change to be perceived differently by India's environmental foreign policymakers. Rather than understanding climate change strictly as a political problem reflecting excessive consumption in the North, these domestic shifts created the possibility for understanding climate change as a technical problem of emissions per se. While the earlier perception directs responsibility exclusively to the North, the latter creates a possibility for the South to contribute to mitigation efforts.

Phase 3: Maximizing Opportunities, 2001–Late 2007 and Beyond

As India began to institutionalize the CDM domestically, the country entered a new phase in climate diplomacy characterized by an interest in maximizing the opportunities that transnational mitigation could offer it and its major industry interests. This new phase indicates a shift away from support for the original interpretation of the domestic emission reduction targets norm to support for the fulfillment of targets through transnational and domestic means. Nevertheless, India's environmental foreign policymakers continued to defend the norm of CBDR by arguing in international forums that it was still premature to discuss commitments for developing countries, as the developed countries had not yet made adequate progress in reducing their own emissions. This was supported by the argument that India was contributing to global climate governance in a "meaningful" way by participating in multilateral, regional, bilateral, and domestic arrangements, but due to persistent levels of poverty could not adopt commitments to limit domestic emissions.

Since shifting its position on the CDM from one of caution to one of acceptance, the Indian government has made a concerted effort to operationalize the mechanism by developing strong institutions and promoting its more extensive use in international climate governance. In 2003, a CDM Authority was established as the host country's designated national authority (DNA). The agency is based within the MOEF, yet comprises representatives from a range of government ministries, including those concerned with power, nonconventional energy, external affairs, and industry. Given that the CDM is intended to operate as an international market mechanism, this agency has been designed to play a minimal role in its operation, but like other markets the CDM cannot function without a carefully designed architecture, and the DNA plays an important role by providing the legal framework for the endorsement of proposed projects and assessing whether they fulfill the requirements outlined in the Kyoto Protocol (GoI 2003). Projects are expected to assist host countries in achieving sustainable development; make "[r]eal, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change"; and result in a genuine reduction in emissions as against the expected outcome in the absence of the project (UNFCCC 1997, Article 12; UNFCCC 2001, 20–24). In addition to the support of the DNA, the Indian government clearly plays a crucial role in operationalizing the mechanism through its domestic and international "marketing" efforts to present India as a competitive site for CDM investment and the provision of carbon credits.

This emerged from the recommendations of a working group within the Planning Commission, which advised that the government would need to carry out "aggressive international marketing" to maximize CDM investment against "competitors" in the developing world (GoI 2003, vi). In stark contrast to the early to mid-1990s, in recent years India's environmental foreign policymakers have used their interventions in meetings of the UNFCCC to encourage more extensive use of the CDM. In the first session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), in 2006, India urged the developed countries to adopt more ambitious targets while allowing certain Annex I parties to make greater use of the CDM to fulfill these targets. Whereas India had formerly interpreted equity exclusively in North-South terms, now it was suggesting that "equitable burden sharing" could involve the differentiation of developed countries to allow those countries that will incur higher compliance costs to meet a larger share of this target with credits generated through the CDM (UNFCCC 2006, 17). This argument was also repeated the following year at the fourth session of the AWG-KP, where the Indian delegation stated that one of the "building blocks for action" should be "an expanded CDM that would enable Annex I parties to take more ambitious QELROs (Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Objectives) and allow for enhanced mitigation in developing countries" (GoI 2007b).

By June 2008, India had already approved 344 CDM projects, representing over 30 percent of the global market and over 30 million carbon credits (UNFCCC 2008b). With a market price of approximately US$13 for each carbon credit (FICCI 2007), this sector has become increasingly important in the Indian economy and resonates strongly with the neoliberal globalist economic paradigm that dominates India's social structure. Yet despite the vast economic revenue that the carbon sector is now generating in India, there remain lingering doubts about whether the CDM is contributing to sustainable development and whether genuine emissions abatement is taking place. The Indian economist Smita Sirohi suggests that the CDM's heavy emphasis on industrial energy efficiency and renewable energy generation precludes any significant impact on rural poverty alleviation (2007). She has also observed a concentration of CDM projects in the wealthier southern states, with relatively few projects approved in the poorer northeastern states. Data from 2007 reveal that this trend has continued, with just one project proposed for the poorest state of Bihar compared to sixty-eight projects either registered or approved in the wealthiest state of Andhra Pradesh (FICCI 2007). The fact

that the poorest segments of Indian society generate such small volumes of GHGs renders them "uncompetitive" in the carbon market, despite the ostensible expectation that this market will contribute to sustainable development. The most attractive host for a company seeking to utilize the CDM is one that offers the greatest emissions reduction potential for the smallest degree of effort. Moreover, the competitive nature of this mechanism requires competing host countries in the South to simplify the process by which prospective investors seek the necessary approval for their proposed projects. To this end, the Planning Commission has recommended that the sustainable development criteria be considered in such a way that will ensure a "maximum number of [CDM] projects" (GoI 2003, vi). The implication is that such criteria may be compromised in the interests of securing as much industry investment as possible from the CDM. The CSE further suggests that the very institutional design of the CDM in India precludes serious consideration of sustainable development requirements, as the DNA generally meets just once a month to review between ten and forty project proposals. One representative of the DNA, R. K. Sethi, acknowledged that rejections are rare because the international consultants prepare good submissions (Gupta, Kazi, and Cheatle 2005). Yet an investigation carried out by the CSE has found serious flaws in the implementation of the CDM in India. The CSE visited two prominent CDM sites in India and found that no measures had been put in place to monitor the project's effect on sustainable development, and that there was no visible evidence that such requirements were being met (ibid.). Moreover, considerable doubt was placed on the validity of accounts of community-based consultation carried out in preparation of project proposals, when it was found that the international consultant had attributed exactly the same questions and responses to two different communities, in different states, in relation to different projects (ibid.).

Despite such concerns, the Indian government has demonstrated an eagerness to maximize the country's role in the global carbon market and continues to support transnational mitigation measures as a principal means of international climate governance. India's advocacy of the CDM on grounds of promoting sustainable development points to a narrow interpretation of sustainable development as simply more efficient economic growth wherever it occurs. This interpretation neglects to consider the social as well as the economic and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. The original conceptualization of "sustainable development" proposed by Brundtland Commission in 1987 proposed a normative policy framework that contained a range of princi-

ples and requirements relating to the satisfaction of basic human needs and the equitable distribution of wealth across and within states (WCED 1987; Langhelle 1999; Najam and Cleveland 2003). In defining sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs," the commission stipulated that the needs of world's poor should be given "overriding priority." The commission acknowledges that economic growth will be necessary in those places where basic needs (i.e., food, water, shelter, clothing, education, and employment) are not being met. In already wealthy places, by contrast, economic growth is deemed acceptable only if its material intensity is reduced to a sustainable level and only if its distribution is made more equitable (Langhelle 1999, 136; WCED 1987, 54–55). In such places where living standards exceed ecologically sustainable levels, sustainable development should entail an examination of socially and culturally produced "needs," as well as "the promotion of values that encourage consumption standards that are within the bounds of the ecologically possible and to which all can reasonably aspire" (WCED 1987, 55). Consequently, insofar as the CDM and other transnational mitigation mechanisms exacerbate inequalities across and within states, it is misleading to defend their use on grounds of promoting sustainable development. Inequality fosters remoteness and ecological irrationality, thus the institutionalization of the CDM can be understood as a case of reinstitutionalizing the existing level of ecological irrationality that was shown earlier to characterize India's domestic conditions.

The response to the CDM represents one of the most prominent shifts in India's climate change diplomacy. While the pressure applied by the United States was initially a critical factor in generating this shift, the zealous institutionalization of the mechanism in India is better explained by the paradigm shift in India's foreign policy since the late 1990s. India's earlier opposition to the CDM was a reflection of the lingering Nehruvian influence during the 1990s. During this time, this paradigm continued to provide the interpretive "framework of ideas and standards" (Hall 1993, 279) through which the problem of climate change was understood. Accordingly, India's foreign policymakers sought to defend the interests of the South by (according to Mohan's porcupine metaphor) erecting its quills of justice, fairness, and equality to ward off predatory demands from the North. Meanwhile, India's embrace of the CDM resonates with the paradigm shift toward neoliberal globalism, which has seen Third World solidarity replaced with a greater emphasis on "commercial diplomacy,"

as well as closer relations with the West, with the aim of growing the nation's formal economy and maximizing international competitiveness.

The new commitment to "strategic partnerships," which is characteristic of India's post-liberalization foreign policy, is reflected in the government's decision to join the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate in July 2005. This partnership bypasses the climate governance norms established by the UNFCCC: the commitments and responsibilities of the member parties are not formally differentiated, and targets and timetables are rejected; instead, the focus is on cooperation to develop and implement technologies that will avoid disruption to the economic growth trajectories of all member parties while potentially reducing the GHG intensity of their economies (APP 2006). At the launch of this initiative, India's then–Minister for External Affairs R. I. Singh shared his optimism that the "action-oriented partnership" would "produce quick results on the ground" and help developing countries to grow in a sustainable way (Singh 2005). Although India and other Kyoto signatories within the APP were careful to emphasize that the initiative was designed to complement the Kyoto Protocol rather than compete with it, the climate governance norms promoted by the APP stand in clear opposition to those institutionalized within the UNFCCC. As I noted in chapter 4, the voluntary, technology-oriented nature of the APP, in which each member may set their own targets for "greenhouse gas intensity," stands in sharp contrast to the UN-facilitated and binding processes of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, which aim to mitigate climate change through the reduction of absolute emissions. Kamal Mitra Chenoy has drawn a distinction between the "tough" option of the UNFCCC, and the "soft" option of the APP, predicting that "[o]ver time, the Indian government will tend to take the soft option. . . . That would be in keeping with its elitist and consumerist oriented policy" (quoted in Bidwai 2005). This is perhaps an increasingly likely scenario as India is pressured in multilateral forums to adopt commitments to limit its national emissions in post-2012 climate governance arrangements. The response of India's leaders and negotiating delegations has been to highlight the persistent levels of poverty in India and the inevitability of growth in energy consumption as the country seeks to meet the Millennium Development Goals.[14] In addition, India has sought to divert this pressure by drawing attention to its achievements, including direct and indirect initiatives that have reduced the country's contribution to global emissions. The national planning process has involved efforts to improve energy efficiency, increase the use of renewable energy, substitute coal for oil

and gas in some sectors (including the railways), and increase the rate of afforestation (Shukla et al. 2002, 2; Parikh 2004). Moreover, the rate of recycling of municipal solid waste is substantially higher in India than in most developed countries: 70 percent of such waste is recycled in India, compared to 30 percent in the US, 47.3 percent in Germany, and 53 percent in Japan (Sethi 2008). India has also promoted the range of initiatives that it has joined to develop carbon sequestration technology that will ostensibly enable a continued reliance on coal with no adverse environmental effects. With this objective in mind, India joined the sixteen-country Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum in 2003, the APP in 2005, and the Government Steering Committee for the FutureGen initiative in 2006 (Shahi 2006, 20–21).

In addition to highlighting these initiatives, in June 2007 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh sought to force the developed countries' demands for commitments for China and India into India's original per capita paradigm. Addressing the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, Singh pledged that India's per capita emissions would never exceed the average per capita emissions level of industrialized countries, "even while pursuing policies of development and economic growth" (quoted in GoI 2007c, 2). Singh later noted that such a pledge was a two-way deal because if the North reduced their own emissions this would reduce the threshold for emissions growth in India (Singh 2008).

The promotion of India's per capita commitment and emissions abatement efforts is also increasingly valuable in the domestic realm because since 2007 the issue of climate change has become progressively salient in India. Although the vast majority of the Indian population is unaware of global debates on climate change, or perhaps consider it a remote issue of minor relevance at best, members of the political elite have begun taking a greater interest in this issue. Illustrative of this was the first parliamentary discussion on climate change, in May 2007, during which politicians from across the political spectrum expressed their concern. Some called for India to take on greater leadership in international forums and show solidarity with other countries of the South, others expressed concern at the level of responsibility that was being placed on the South, and many highlighted climate change as a domestic priority and called on relevant ministries to coordinate in more extensive mitigation and adaptation efforts. Proposed domestic measures included the promotion of public transport and improvements in road safety to allow more people to use bicycles in India's cities, the removal of unnecessary and energy-wasteful functions on appliances, a reduction in the production of plas-

tic bags and cars and less reliance on private vehicles for members of Parliament, and a rejection of the growth patterns and lifestyles that are the norm in the North (GoI 2007d).

Less than two weeks after this parliamentary debate, Prime Minister Singh convened a high-level review meeting to discuss the IPCC's latest findings and to review India's position in international climate change negotiations. A set of preliminary reports released by the IPCC in early 2007, ahead of the formal release of its fourth assessment report in November 2007, suggested that India would be particularly vulnerable to climatic changes (IPCC 2007a). Anticipated effects related largely to water stress, including the reduced availability of fresh water, increased salinity, increased incidence of monsoonal flooding, increased incidence of water-borne diseases, and reductions in mean rainfall in the northeast, the country's poorest region (IPCC 2007b). These effects would, in turn, affect agriculture and the production of staple crops, including wheat and rice. The chair of the IPCC, Dr. Rajendra Pachauri, who is also Director of India's TERI, was closely involved in the PM's review meeting following his earlier call for the Indian government to closely consider the implications for India of climate change (Deshpande and Sethi 2007; Sethi 2007a). The review meeting prompted Singh to commission TERI to carry out a study of India's energy consumption and compile a set of recommendations for reducing emissions in industry, transport, and agricultural sectors (*Indian Express* 2007). The PM's review meeting was followed in June 2007 by the formal establishment of the Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change, comprising the ministers for external affairs, finance, environment and forests, agriculture, water resources, and science and technology and senior bureaucrats; as well as a range of non-official members including Pachauri, industry leaders, media representatives, and Sunita Narain from the CSE (*The Hindu* 2007). The objectives of the council include the preparation of a national report on the impact of climate change, followed by a National Action Plan to detail the efforts that have already been made, and to outline the plans for future "new and greener ways of development" (Singh 2007). This plan was expected to be released in December 2007, ahead of COP-13 in Bali, yet its release was delayed due to the PM's dissatisfaction with the draft, which several council members noted had placed too much emphasis on past initiatives rather than future plans (Sethi 2007b).

The original interpretations of the norms of climate governance resonated with India's interpretation of climate change as a problem generated by excessive consumption patterns in the North, and as a reflection

of globally inequitable patterns of development. Throughout recent years, India's environmental foreign policymakers have continued to reinforce this representation by consistently emphasizing the importance of the CBDR norm in international negotiations and agreements, and arguing that countries with low per capita emissions have a right to pursue convergence with more highly developed countries' emissions levels (Singh 2008). However, India's continued capacity to promote this political representation and deflect attention away from its own coal-dependent development path has been undermined by its participation in the APP and its active acceptance of transnational carbon offsetting as an appropriate mode of climate governance. In the process of building congruence with the transnationally oriented norm of domestic emission reduction targets, India's environmental foreign policymakers have legitimized a technical representation that directly conflicts with the political representation embedded in CBDR. The Clean Development Mechanism and the agenda of the APP treats emissions as purely material phenomena: the different value of the human activities associated with emissions is denied and luxury and subsistence emissions are conflated. The pursuit of a globally equitable balance between the currently excessive emissions of a global minority and the minimal emissions of a global majority is thus marginalized. So while India has seemingly established congruence between its domestic conditions and the two norms of climate governance, this congruence rests on shaky foundations of competing and incompatible representations. Indeed, there are now signs that the position and legitimacy of India's environmental foreign policymakers are being subjected to closer domestic scrutiny. Over the last two years, domestic nonstate actors have begun to drawn attention to the fact that India's support of these competing problem representations can only be accommodated by its willingness to "hide behind the poor." One critic, the Indian journalist Praful Bidwai (2005), describes the government's claims that emissions cannot be reduced because of widespread poverty as "utterly hypocritical." He points out that India's low per capita rate obscures "yawning gaps in consumption . . . between the rich and the poor," and that, moreover, the country's negotiating position protects the interests of the consuming elite. India, Bidwai argues, could and should make significant cuts in emissions by placing restrictions on "private vehicles, the profligate use of energy and water by the rich and the rocketing consumption of air-conditioners, washing machines, microwave ovens and plasma and liquid crystal display television sets" (quoted in Johnson 2007). This argument is supported by a report released by Greenpeace India entitled "Hiding

behind the Poor," which advocates for the intranational application of CBDR (Ananthapadmanabhan, Srinivas, and Gopal 2007). Greenpeace India's report was based on a study that measured the "carbon footprints" of the country's middle and wealthy classes and found that the per capita emissions of 1 percent of the population is only slightly smaller than the global average of five tons of CO_2, yet larger than the globally sustainable average of 2.5 tons (ibid., 2).[15] However, the poverty experienced by millions of Indians serves to keep the national per capita emissions level at just two tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per year. Greenpeace India concludes that just as the North must reduce its emissions to create "space" for development in the South, wealthy consumers in India must limit their emissions to create "space" for improving the well-being of the nation's majority (ibid., 2).

These charges of hiding behind the poor point to the problematic implications of limiting the norm of CBDR to the international level. While states from the global South have vociferously defended its integrity, the call for its extension to the domestic sphere has been rather muted. The rationale for the CBDR norm lies in the recognition of global inequalities in historical and present emissions, as well as consequent differences in levels of development and capacities to contribute to global mitigation efforts. These inequalities are perhaps most evident between states; as noted above, in per capita terms, India's emissions amount to just 4 percent of those of the United States, 8 percent of Germany's, and 10 percent of Japan's. Similarly, in per capita terms, the emissions of developing countries as a whole are just 16 percent of those of the developed countries as a whole (Baumert, Herzog, and Pershing 2005). However, as Greenpeace and other commentators have established, the levels of inequality in energy consumption and emissions *within* many developing countries is as acute as that *between* developed and developing countries (Siddiqi 1995). Recognition of the extent of emissions inequalities within states offers grounds for extending the CBDR norm from the international sphere to the domestic sphere to ensure that the governance of climate change does not exacerbate existing inequalities within and between countries. Irrespective of whether we find such an outcome socially offensive, it is clear that exacerbating inequalities undermines the potential for responding to climate change in a sustainable manner. Plumwood's observation that inequality is "a sponsor of remoteness and ecological irrationality" by creating opportunities to "shift ecological ills . . . rather than to prevent their generation in the first place" (2002,

81) serves as a reminder that global climate governance must confront inequalities rather than exacerbate them.

In sum, we should be wary of assessing the norm diffusion process as successful in the Indian context. Neither global norms nor domestic conditions are fixed and stable; instead, they are fluid and shifts in either realm can disrupt perceptions of normative congruence. In the case of India, normative congruence was established during this final phase of analysis, but this congruence rested on shaky foundations of competing and incompatible problem representations. Under these conditions of normative inconsistency and domestic criticism, it is perhaps unsurprising that tensions emerged within India's core negotiating group ahead of the Copenhagen negotiations in 2009. This became apparent in the lead up to the fifteenth Conference of the Parties, in Copenhagen, when India's environment minister, Jairam Ramesh, sought to develop a more flexible negotiating strategy dubbed "per capita plus." Ramesh argued that insisting on per capita emission entitlements while refusing to discuss reduction targets was an unsustainable negotiating strategy (*Hindustan Times* 2009; *Times of India* 2009; GoI 2009). This move was criticized by opposition parties and long-serving negotiators who saw it as a step closer toward the positions of developed countries. India did manage to present a unified position at the Copenhagen negotiations and pledged to "endeavour to reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 20–25 percent by 2020 in comparison with 2005 levels" (excluding the agriculture sector) (GoI 2010). In fact, India played a key role in drafting the Copenhagen Accord with the US, China, Brazil, and South Africa after wider negotiations failed to produce agreement on the future climate regime. While disagreements may have been publicly patched up during this important meeting, tensions within the core negotiating group have proved to be irreconcilable. As a result, three senior negotiators (Shyam Saran, Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, and Prodipto Ghosh) will no longer represent India in continuing international negotiations on the future of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol (United News of India 2010; Sethi 2010).

6. Spain

Spain's experience as an "energy island" dependent on imports may suggest that it would consistently adopt an activist position in global climate governance. As a fossil fuel–importing state, Spain can expect to benefit from advancements in nonfossil energy technology through improvements in their balance of payments and a reduced dependence on foreign energy resources. But Spain has not earned a reputation as a champion of sustainability within global climate governance. As with Australia and India, the diffusion of global climate governance norms in Spain has not been a linear process. Instead, there is considerable evidence of progressive and regressive change as foreign policymakers have sought to build congruence between the norms and their domestic conditions. Spain's position in global climate governance has gone through four phases. During the first phase, initial resistance was diffused by the successful institutionalization of CBDR at the EU level, thus enabling the transition to a second phase of broad support for the norms and opposition to efforts to modify them. The subsequent deterioration of an erroneous perception of normative congruence then generated a third phase of renewed resistance to the norm of domestic emission reduction targets and timetables, and contestation of the regional application of CBDR. A fourth phase later emerged that was characterized by a renewed commitment to the norms of climate governance. Nevertheless, this renewed commitment and support is not an entirely positive development from the perspective of ecological rationality. Confronted with the challenge of remaining a good European citizen while also pursuing high economic growth rates, Spain has resorted to purchasing "environmental space" from developing countries in Latin America and elsewhere via extensive use of transnational mitigation mechanisms. The internalization of global climate gov-

ernance norms has thus failed to trigger the domestic policy paradigm shifts required to place Spain on a genuinely sustainable path. Moreover, Spain's policy of pursuing domestic growth and material accumulation through the purchase of environmental space carries a risk that global inequalities will be exacerbated.

As in the previous two chapters, I begin with a detailed account of the domestic conditions that have enabled and constrained Spanish foreign policymakers in contributing to global climate governance. In the second half of the chapter, I trace Spanish efforts to build and rebuild congruence between these conditions and the global norms of climate governance over time.

DOMESTIC CONDITIONS

Material Conditions

As with India, the four most salient aspects of Spain's material conditions for climate change governance are the anticipated domestic impacts of climate change, Spain's GHG emissions profile, its energy culture, and the standard of living of its citizens. In 2007, Spain's then prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, commissioned a team of experts to prepare a report on the domestic context of global climate change (MMA 2007). One of the report's key messages was that Spain is highly vulnerable to climate change, with some effects already being visible (ibid., 12). Particular sources of concern included considerable loss of biodiversity and damage to ecosystems; significant reductions in available water resources, particularly in the already arid regions of the south; coastal damage and salt-water intrusion associated with sea-level rise; increasing desertification above the 31.5 percent of Spanish territory already affected; heightened air and water temperatures, including an increased rate and intensity of heat waves; an increased rate of vector-borne diseases originating in North Africa; and increases in the rate, duration, and intensity of forest fires. All of these changes entail serious human-related costs due to their attendant impacts on agricultural and fishing production, tourism revenue, and human health. In fact, Spain is one of Europe's most vulnerable countries to the negative effects of climate change, and hence the level of public concern over climate change is higher in Spain than in almost any other country in Europe (Eurobarometre 2007, 5).

Spain's contribution to the threat of climate change can be assessed using data from national communications prepared by the Spanish government in accordance with its responsibilities under the UNFCCC. A

fourth report, submitted in March 2006, provides data on the period from 1990 to 2003 (GoS 2006a).[1] The emissions inventories provided here show that in 1990 Spain emitted a total of 283.8 million tons (Mt) of GHGs, which increased by almost 42 percent to 402.2 Mt in 2003, 80 percent of which can be attributed to carbon dioxide (ibid., 51–52). In per capita terms, Spain's annual 7.6 tons of CO_2 emissions are well above the global average of 4.5 tons, yet remain below the OECD average of 11.5 tons (UNDP 2007, 48, 69). The vast majority of Spain's emissions came from the energy sector (77.8 percent in 2003), followed by agriculture (11 percent in 2003), and industrial processes (7.9 percent in 2003) (ibid., 54). More recent data reveal that in 2007, Spain's overall emissions were 52.3 percent higher than in 1990, even though Spain pledged to keep emissions growth to just 15 percent above 1990 levels (Rodrigo and Santamarta 2008). In fact, Spain's emissions since 1990 have grown at a faster rate than any other OECD country. This sharp rise has been attributed to relatively high economic growth rates of almost 4 percent per annum, population growth rates exceeding the European average, and droughts that have reduced the capacity of hydraulic power (GoS 2007, 3). An additional driver was the decade-long boom in the construction sector, which ended with the 2008 global financial crisis. During this boom, the Spanish construction sector accounted for up to 17.7 percent of the total GDP and up to 40 percent of total construction in Europe (Chaney 2007; Ham 2007). While this augured well for short-term economic indicators, the effect of such construction on environmental sustainability has hardly been benign.

Spain's domestic energy culture (and that of the Iberian Peninsula as a whole) is shaped by its character as an "energy island." It has a limited supply of hydrocarbon energy resources, and the vast Pyrenees mountain range separating Spain from France creates transportation challenges. The country's vulnerable energy supply has been further exacerbated by ongoing delays in constructing a cross-border electricity cable between France and Spain. After more than a decade of delays, the project is now due to be completed in 2013 (*European Daily Electricity Markets* 2009). In 2007, more than 80 percent of Spain's primary energy was imported, a figure surpassed in Europe only by Italy (Cámara et al. 2007, 47). Although Spain continues to draw on its own indigenous coal deposits, this coal cannot compete with imported coal in terms of quality and production cost; as a result, coal production has been gradually scaled down since 1990 (Gummer and Moreland 2000). In spite of its limited indigenous hydrocarbon resources, energy consumption in Spain continues to depend on coal, natural gas, and oil: together these account for

83 percent of consumption (EIA 2005). Nuclear energy provides approximately 10 percent of Spain's total energy production, but the importance of this sector has been in decline since a moratorium on the construction of new power plants was issued in 1983, and the depletion of Spain's limited uranium reserves saw the cessation of uranium mining in 2000 (OECD, NEA, and IAEA 2004, 212–16). In contrast to Spain's limited hydrocarbon and uranium resources, the potential supply of renewable energy is abundant, particularly in terms of wind and solar energy. After a considerable period of neglect, the potential for drawing on these renewable resources is now beginning to be realized; illustrative is the national Renewable Energy Plan of 2005–10, which set a renewable energy target of 30 percent of primary energy supply and 12 percent of electricity generation by 2010 (GoS 2007, 9).

The "energy island" experience instills a sense of vulnerability in many economic and political actors (see, e.g., Aizpiri 2004). In 1990, domestic resources provided 35.7 percent of the primary energy consumed in Spain, yet by 2002 this figure had dropped to 21.7 percent (Ruiz 2006, 200). The vulnerability is compounded by two other factors. The first is Spain's dependence on oil and gas imports from undemocratic, unstable, and unpredictable states in the Middle East and Africa, which carries a high degree of political risk (Isbell 2006). Second, in stark contrast to the energy intensity trends of many other OECD countries, between 1990 and 2005 Spain's energy consumption increased at a significantly faster rate than its gross domestic product. According to one estimate, the GDP grew at an annual rate of 2–3 percent during this period, while energy consumption grew at 5–6 percent per annum (Velázquez de Castro González 2005, 198). Fortunately, signs of improvement began to show in 2005 thanks to the implementation of a range of efficiency measures (GoS 2007, 3).

Finally, since shaking off its "developing country" status in the mid-1960s, Spain's citizens have enjoyed a dramatically improved standard of living. Within a decade, consumption and lifestyle habits traditionally reserved for the nation's elites had become much more commonplace, including increased meat and dairy consumption and the use of telephones, cars, and appliances (Hooper 2006, 16). This initial boom was also characterized by a mass rural exodus, as young Spaniards from across the country erected temporary dwellings on the urban outskirts in search of employment in the cities where foreign investment was concentrated. While this initial boom brought many people out of poverty and up to a moderate standard of living, it was the more recent eco-

nomic boom that brought living standards close to the European average. Improved socioeconomic conditions have been accompanied by significant increases in greenhouse gas emissions. While the residential sector accounts for a smaller proportion of overall emissions than industry, the growth in residential energy consumption has been considerable. Not only has the number of dwellings grown dramatically since the early 1990s (by some 150,000 per year), but the trend has also been toward constructing larger dwellings with central heating and cooling systems, and extensive use of electrical appliances (Davila and Pineda 2007). Significant as the residential living arrangements are for Spain's national emissions, this sector's contribution is dwarfed by the transport sector as private transportation has become the norm. In 2007, it was estimated that some 85 percent of all land-based passenger travel was taken in private cars, while bus and train use has been in steady decline (OSE 2007, 22). As with Australia, the responsibility for car dependence cannot be shouldered entirely by the Spanish people themselves. In recent decades, urban planning has moved away from the dense and compact urban model to one characterized by urban sprawl, which reduces the capacity of citizens to cycle or walk between destinations. At the same time, investment has increasingly favored private transport over public transport infrastructure (Santamarta and Nieto 2006; *El País* 2006).

Political Institutions

Like Australia and India, Spain's political space is characterized by liberal democracy and decentralization, but Spain also has the unique attribute of European Union membership. Spain's democratic system is of quite recent origins. The transition from Francisco Franco's thirty-six-year dictatorship to democracy was instigated in the immediate aftermath of his death in 1975 by King Juan Carlos, who assumed the role of head of state. Assuming that a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy offered the most promising option for peace and stability in Spain, King Juan Carlos appointed the liberal Adolfo Suárez as prime minister in 1976. Despite his ties to Franco's Falangist party, Suárez was committed to democratization and carefully initiated the necessary moves to reform the system peacefully while appeasing those with a vested interest in the past (Romero-Salvadó 1999, 162–66). Suárez's centrist party enjoyed a brief period of electoral success, but Spanish politics has since come to be dominated by two other parties, namely the center-right Partido Popular (Popular Party; PP), and the center-left Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE; Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) (Hopkin 2005).

Notwithstanding the obvious positive developments that have accompanied political liberalization in Spain, the institutionalization of the liberal democratic tradition carries with it the factors that constrain the protection of the environment and the formulation of long-term environmental policies. As I noted about Australia in chapter 4, the short election terms characteristic of the liberal democratic system tend to produce short-sighted policies: in an effort to maintain voter support, political leaders are generally reluctant to consider any policy that imposes an immediate cost to deliver a delayed payoff. In addition, liberalism erroneously reduces environmental considerations to private, individual values that must compete with other such values (Eckersley 2004a, 93–105). This general problem of liberal democracy is perhaps exacerbated in the Spanish context where civil society organizations, and environmentalist organizations in particular, have generally had a weak presence on the national political scene. A legacy of the long authoritarian years is a weak associational culture, and green parties and groups have for many years struggled to build up the necessary support base to adequately represent environmental concerns (Holliday 1997).

Although Spain is not constitutionally a federal state, its internal institutional arrangements are characterized by decentralization. While the notion of regionalization was embraced in the Constitution enacted in 1978, the formal federal institutions that ensure regional representation at the central level were not adopted (Colomer 1998). Moreover, although the Constitution outlined the distribution of competences between the state and autonomous communities, the means of coordination were left largely undefined. This quasi-federal model has important implications for policymaking around issues like climate change. By virtue of the issue's transnational nature, state-level policymakers are responsible for representing Spain at regional and international negotiations, yet responsibility for the commitments made at this level falls on different levels of government. For example, although the central government is constitutionally responsible for the energy sector and establishing minimum environmental legislation, the autonomous communities are responsible for implementing this legislation as well as for such sectors as housing, town planning, and transport, which are consequential for the control of emissions (Kingdom of Spain 1978, Articles 148–49). Such multisectoral governance demands a high degree of coordination between the different levels of administration, yet as many commentators have observed, intergovernmental coordination in Spain is often quite weak (Hernández et al. 2004, 384; Aguilar Fernández 2003, 681).

Social Structure

The third feature of a state's domestic conditions is the social structure, which can be conceptualized as the range of policy paradigms that orient governance. As in the previous two chapters, I consider three policy paradigms that have conditioned the norm diffusion process in Spain: environmental, economic, and foreign policy.

Environmental policy paradigm The idea of sustainable development, which demands that present development must not compromise the well-being of future generations, has steadily established salience in Spain. This has largely been a result of the country's integration into the European Community (EC). Prior to 1986, Spain's environmental governance framework was extremely weak (Font 2001). Industrial development proceeded throughout the 1960s and 1970s within an environmental legislative vacuum; the contamination of land, water, and urban areas was seen as a small and legitimate price to pay for reaching a desired level of development and well-being (Grau Creus 2002). Although the 1978 Constitution institutionalized the principle that all Spaniards have a right "to enjoy an environment suitable for the development of the person, as well as the duty to conserve it" (Article 45), a comprehensive legislative framework for protecting the environment did not really begin to take form until Spain's accession to the EC in 1986. In accordance with the conditions of membership, Spain was obliged to incorporate European environmental legislation, comprising more than one hundred rules, into domestic law (Ojeda Rivera 1999). The Europeanization of Spain's legal framework has been beneficial on many levels, however the potential for protecting the Spanish environment through EU laws and regulations is somewhat inhibited by the specific understanding of environmental protection that is embedded in this legislation. EU legislation tends to reflect the environmental problems and concerns of the Union's central and northern European members because it was debated and drafted before Spain and other southern countries began to actively participate in such negotiations. As a result, environmental problems that manifest predominantly in southern Europe, such as soil degradation, desertification, forest fires, and water shortages, tend to receive much less attention than industrial pollution issues which are of primary concern elsewhere in Europe (Aguilar Fernández 1997, 100–101).

Throughout the last two decades, the postmaterialist values and ideas associated with sustainable development have achieved a moderate level

of public salience in Spain, but the gulf between rhetoric and behavior often can be quite vast. Numerous studies and surveys carried out during the last two decades have revealed a high level of concern for environmental problems among a significant proportion of the Spanish population (de Esteban Curiel 2000). A 2007 study found that over 72 percent of Spaniards perceive environmental conservation as an immediate and urgent problem, and that close to two-thirds believe that environmental protection is absolutely necessary even if this sometimes carries a high economic cost (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 2007). Moreover, according to a 2007 Eurobarometer survey, concern about climate change is higher in Spain than in almost any other European country. In fact, 70 percent of Spanish respondents claimed to be "very much" concerned about the issue, compared to the European average of just 50 percent (Eurobarometre 2007, 5–7). Yet Mireia Grau Creus notes that in contrast to survey responses, Spaniards rank below the European averages in terms of individual and collective actions toward environmental protection, including recycling, "green" consumption, environmental cleanup efforts, donations, and membership of environmentalist associations (2002, 94).

In terms of the preferred policy instruments for regulating environmental degradation, the command-and-control approach has been dominant for some time. But since entering the EU it has become increasingly apparent that this approach is inadequate for implementing the range of directives issued from Brussels (Aguilar Fernández 2004, 184). The 1990s saw Spanish policymakers begin to experiment with more collaborative approaches to environmental regulation including environmental pacts and voluntary agreements. Environmental pacts have promoted greater cooperation between industry and regional governments, while voluntary agreements have promoted greater cooperation between the central government and different sectors of industry. A further experiment has been the attempt to establish permanent forums among state actors and interest groups; an example of this is the Advisory Council for the Environment, which was established in 1994 (ibid.). But as Aguilar Fernández notes, "old habits die hard" (ibid.), and this inclusive approach was marginalized during the eight years of conservative rule between 1996 and 2004. Indeed, the Advisory Council on the Environment was not even called together between 1999 and 2003 (Ecologistas en Acción 2004). A National Council of Climate Change was established in 1998, comprising central government actors, regional representatives, scientists, and business, consumer, and environmentalist groups, yet it also

remained inactive until 2002 (Ecologistas en Acción 2002). More recent collaborative initiatives include the Social Dialogue Tables, which were established in 2006 to bring together representatives of government, business, and trade unions to work on mitigating the negative social effects of Spain's complying with the Kyoto Protocol (GoS 2006c). In addition to collaborative instruments, economic instruments began to gain acceptance throughout the 1990s, especially in water management, where private markets have been created. However, eco-taxes have been actively resisted: only a few regional governments have introduced such a tax and these are said to have been oriented more toward revenue generation than environmental protection (Labandeira and Rodríguez 2006).

Economic policy paradigm Spain, like Australia and India, has made the pursuit of "development" a crucial feature of its economic paradigm throughout its modern history. The idea of development has been articulated to a range of other ideas, symbols, and myths in three distinct phases, which we can describe as colonial developmentalism, technocratic developmentalism, and competitive developmentalism. Each has fundamentally shaped Spain's present social structure.

Colonial developmentalism. The pursuit of development in Spain's early modern history was characterized by external expansion through colonization of the Americas, northern Africa, and the Philippines. This colonial project parallels the Australian experience to a degree; like the British colonizers in Australia, the Spanish conquerors perceived their mission as a civilizing one in which they were fulfilling a "divine mandate" (Feros 2005, 118). However, perhaps unique among the colonizing nations, Spain perceived its own colonizing efforts as the geographical and racial expansion of the Spanish nation rather than the building of an empire in which the colonized were exploited for the benefit of the colonizers. The development of the Spanish nation was clearly articulated to colonization and civilization during this phase; as the nineteenth-century intellectual Joaquín Maldonado Macanaz wrote, "Nothing is more dignifying for a nation . . . than 'to discover islands and unknown lands, establish prosperous settlements, teach and civilize savage populations'" (quoted in Feros 2005, 114). Spain's colonization of the Americas was a "national and patriotic enterprise" (Jerónimo Bécker quoted in Feros 2005, 120). Nevertheless, the pursuit of wealth in the colonial project was undeniable; in the words of one of the conquistador Hernán Cortés's foot-soldiers, "We came here to serve God and His Majesty, and also to get rich" (Bernal Díaz del Castillo quoted in Barton 2004, 109). The transfer

of wealth from the colonies to the motherland largely occurred through the imposition of the Quinto Real, a tax of 20 percent on all revenues in the colonies, as well as the confiscation of large amounts of silver and gold (Hunt 2001, 52). Nevertheless, this accumulation did not spread evenly throughout Spain's regions; the majority of Spaniards lived in rural areas on subsistence diets, as agricultural productivity was very low.

A high degree of ecologically irrational remoteness characterized colonial developmentalism: valuable resources were extracted from the colonial periphery and then transported to colonial cities and ports for the development of settlements and for transfer to the core, the motherland (Moore 2007, 130–31). The beneficiaries of this extraction chain were consequentially and temporally removed from both the environmental degradation associated with resource depletion and the adverse effects on indigenous peoples.

Historians of Spain's development have described a widespread belief during this time that distant colonial assets merely complemented the vast natural wealth with which Spain was already blessed, a conviction that one historian has labeled the *leyenda de oro* (golden legend) (Driever 1998). This legend was built on the nation's ostensibly fortunate geographical features, as reflected in the words of Antonio Remón Zarco del Valle, the Spanish engineer and founder of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Madrid: "The conditions that Spain combines by its geographical position and its topography in support of scientific progress are and have always been numerous and exceptionally good" (quoted in ibid., 38–39). A later critic of the legend, Joaquín Costa, described it thus: "There is no climate as mild as our climate, nor sky as propitious as our sky, nor soil as fertile and abundant as Spain's soil; here, nature generously provides for the sustenance of man without effort. . . . [T]he other nations would die of hunger if we did not offer them the leftovers of this splendid feast to which Nature has perpetually treated us" (quoted in ibid., 40). However, contrary to such assumptions about the country's natural wealth, internal economic development was limited to dry-land farming on semifeudal estates in the country's south. The limited availability of water in this drought-prone region ensured that such farming was only viable through strict market protection that blocked the entry of cheaper agricultural imports (Swyngedouw 1999, 451). Despite its geographical reality, Spain remained a predominantly agrarian society; low population rates and high death rates prevented the emergence of surplus labor and urban migration. Consequently, the industrial revolution that passed through Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries failed to manifest in Spain.

Technocratic developmentalism.[2] Colonial development was brought to an end during the nineteenth century when most colonies secured their independence and others were annexed by the United States in 1898. The ensuing climate of deep national reflection created an opportunity for a new school of intellectuals and geographers to push for a new phase of domestically oriented development, one informed partly by an honest appraisal of Spain's geographical features. The Generation of '98, as these thinkers are now known, championed an ideology of *regeneracionismo* (regeneration), which involved the reform and revitalization of Spain's environmental, economic, political, and social landscapes (Swyngedouw 1999, 451–52). Gómez Mendoza and Ortega Cantero associate *regeneracionismo* with three principal beliefs: "Firstly, the restoration of wealth in Spain should be based on the knowledge of the laws and balances of nature. . . . Secondly . . . , that this aim required 'the correction of the defects' of the geographical shape of Spain, and particularly the imbalances in its climatic and hydraulic regimes. . . . Lastly . . . , that this enterprise of geographical rectification, because of its range and importance, could only be carried out by . . . the State administration" (1999, 137–38).

Lucas Mallada and Joaquín Costa, two of the most influential members of the Generation of '98, sought to discredit what they saw as the tyrannous and narcissistic *leyenda de oro* and set the nation on a path toward modernization (ibid., 138). A central feature of their ideology was the vision of a Green Spain that would have to be engineered into existence; extensive irrigation was seen as a potentially modernizing force that could transform the dry cereal-based farmlands into fertile land capable of producing fruit, meat, and wool for the international market (Jiménez Torrecilla and Martínez-Gil 2005, 5). Encouraged by the recently published findings of an inquiry into Spain's physical geography, Costa challenged the inherited wisdom of Spain's natural wealth: "our climate is among the worst, our soil among the least fertile, our sky among the most harsh and stingy, our life among the most distressing and difficult, our nation among the most hungry and shabby. . . . [I]f in other countries it is sufficient for man to help Nature, here it is necessary to do more: it is necessary to create her" (quoted in Driever 1998, 40). The creation of nature was intended to "correct" Spain's hydraulic and climatic "defects" by developing a countrywide "hydraulic artery system" of dams and channels that would irrigate all of Spain's regions (Swyngedouw 1999, 454–60). However, *regeneracionismo* was both an ecological and a social project of modernization: its advocates highlighted the importance of educating the peasants and restructuring the economic order away from the highly protected and semifeudal *lati-*

fundia system toward a focus on a liberalized economy based on petty ownership (ibid.). Given the threat this project posed both to the interests of Spain's traditional agricultural elites and to the dominant myths of Spain's natural wealth and fertile countryside, it is unsurprising that *regeneracionismo* encountered strong resistance, as demonstrated by the response of Martín Ferreiro, founder of the Geographic Society of Madrid: "No and a thousand times no! I resist with all my force the unavoidable conclusions that are drawn, in spite of us, from the statements made in the course of this discussion" (quoted in Driever 1998, 44). In a similar fashion to Australia's reaction to Griffith Taylor's unfavorable geographic assessments in the early twentieth century, Lucas Mallada's response to critics was evidently censored and excluded from the *Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza* (Bulletin of the Free Institute of Education), which had originally published his assessments (ibid., 45).

The regenerationist ideas were not institutionalized until Francisco Franco's fascist regime was established in 1939. Unlike the early *regeneracionistas*, Franco discarded the social and liberal economic elements of this modernization project and incorporated the notion of ecological engineering into his vision of a nationally sufficient economy (Swyngedouw 2007, 11–16). The construction of mega-dams would serve two purposes: first, the irrigation of drylands for agricultural production, and second, the provision of hydropower for the nation's nascent industrialization. Consequently, as Jiménez Torrecilla and Martínez-Gil note, during the three decades of Franco's authoritarian rule dams became a symbol of Spain's industrial and agricultural progress, as well as of man's domination of nature (2005, 6–7). This symbol points to the articulation of development with industrialization, modernization, and the technocratic command over natural forces for social and economic ends. Throughout this phase of technocratic developmentalism the pursuit of economic development was also deeply embedded in elitist nationalism, as Franco's development ambitions were conditioned by his worldview of Spanish exceptionalism: the West's imposition of postwar isolation was thereby seen as an opportunity to "restore Spain's lost *grandeur*" (Swyngedouw 2007, 21). As Torreblanca explains: "Spain was not isolated, the official propaganda argued, but self-excluded from a world where two options dominated: liberalism, whose individualism was a dangerous source of corruption of Catholic values and personal ethics, and Communism, which was simply evil. Spaniards were asked to be proud of being different, of having based their political system on institutions such as the family, church and (single) trade union" (2001, 706–7).

Yet Spain's isolation from world markets resulted in shortages of the capital, energy, and equipment needed for realizing the technocratic vision of a countrywide hydraulic artery system. Therefore, between 1939 and 1955 a relatively small number of dams were built. It was only after Franco's regime began to soften its commitment to autarky in the 1950s that the construction of mega-dams was able to begin in earnest. This process began in 1953 with the signing of the "Pact of Madrid" between Spain and the United States, a secret agreement that allowed the US to establish several military bases on Spanish territory in exchange for economic, technical, and military aid (Swyngedouw 2007, 23). However, the most significant reforms were made after 1958, when several more liberal-minded economists attained prominent positions within the key economic portfolios of the cabinet. This led Spain to join the World Bank and IMF in late 1958 and the Organization for European Economic Development in the following year (Baklanoff 1996, 107). Measures were subsequently taken to liberalize international trade and attract foreign investment. The effect of these structural economic changes on Spain's geographical landscape was dramatic. The increased availability of capital and materials enabled the construction of more than 500 dams and mega-dams between 1960 and 1978, which, as Franco had hoped, changed the country's geography (Franco 1959). Indeed, not a single river now exists in Spain that has not been "altered, managed, engineered, and transformed" (Swyngedouw 1999, 450).

The technocratic paradigm that was dominant during these years transformed not only Spain's environmental landscape but also its socio-economic landscape by enabling the partial transition from an agrarian to an industrial society. The increased energy needs demanded by such a transition were partly absorbed into the regime's existing irrigation vision as the articulation of modernization with ecological engineering had already been successfully established via the discourse of *regeneracionismo*. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, more than 50 percent of the dams constructed were designed for energy production and the associated aim of driving urbanization and industrialization in northern Spain and attracting foreign investment in this area (Baigorri 1999, 8–9).

Saurí and del Moral have noted that the "production of nature" during this phase of technocratic developmentalism reduced the natural world, and water in particular, to the purely material national interest: the ecological dimension of nature (water) was subordinated, together with its cultural, aesthetic, and emotional dimensions (2001, 355). This points to a deeply embedded anthropocentric mode of reasoning: "The hydraulic

paradigm epitomizes a totally instrumental approach to natural resources using a discursive pattern keen on sheer numbers: water deficits, water surpluses, disequilibria, supply and demand figures and projections, and so forth. There is no space left for other dimensions, as they become sacrificed to the fulfillment of human material needs" (ibid., 360). Indeed, by harnessing water for industrial purposes many river systems in Spain have become polluted to the point where they can serve no nonproductive purposes. The high degree of social and ecological remoteness involved in this model of development has been observed by Jiménez Torrecilla and Martínez-Gil, who note that the submergence of canyons, historical villages, and valleys and the displacement of their inhabitants were "brutally ignored" by those who have benefited from the transformation of nature (2005, 6–7).

Competitive developmentalist paradigm. The economic development paradigm entered a new phase after Franco's death in 1975 and the subsequent transition to democracy. Although a small number of bureaucrats and military elites remained convinced of the superiority of the Francoist regime following the dictator's death, a broad consensus emerged among both socialist and conservative political actors that democratization was inevitable or desirable (McVeigh 2005, 95–96). The Spanish exceptionalist worldview reflected in the Francoist slogan "Spain is different" was abandoned in favor of a focus on convergence with the rest of Europe (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001, 764). Maximum economic growth is now considered imperative for convergence with the combined average income of the original fifteen states of the EU. The fundamental importance placed on economic growth by successive Spanish governments since the early 1980s has been legitimized and reinforced by the EU, which also aims to reduce disparities in wealth amongst its member states (Maastricht Treaty 1992, Article 2). This objective has been pursued largely through the distribution of Structural and Cohesion Funds amongst the poorer member states. Prior to the expansion of the EU in 2004, Spain received approximately 22 percent of the European structural funds and these were used to develop the infrastructure necessary for successful integration into the Single European Market (Magote 2004, 165). Since 2004, Spain has been eligible for a smaller share of the total structural funds and this has been directed toward establishing greater income equality within Spain by promoting the integration of the poorer regions of the country into the Single European Market.

In addition to the emphasis now placed on economic growth and convergence, competitive developmentalism in Spain has been marked by two

fundamental processes: neoliberalization and internationalization. Although Franco had already initiated the process of liberalization throughout the 1960s and 1970s, at the time of Spain's accession to the European Community (EC) in 1986 its economy still remained one of the most highly protected in Europe. With preparations for the Single European Market already under way at this stage, Spain was obligated to implement a much more drastic liberalization program before its formal introduction in 1992 (McVeigh 2005, 98–99). This obligation was the catalyst for the construction of a competition state in Spain: the overarching goal of maximizing the country's international competitiveness now tends to color Spanish policymakers' view of the world. With a view to complying with Single European Market requirements, maximizing competitiveness, and attracting foreign investment, throughout the 1980s Spain's first post-Franco democratic government, led by the center-left PSOE, progressively deregulated the market, reformed the labor market to increase flexibility, and privatized most state-owned industries. As a parallel to efforts to attract foreign direct investment, Spain has also pursued economic convergence with Europe via the internationalization of its own economy. Indeed, as the world's sixth largest investor, Spain has ceased to be a net recipient of foreign direct investment and overseas aid and now invests more capital than it receives (Powell, Torreblanca, and Sorroza 2005, 26). Driven by the competitive developmentalist paradigm, in 1987 the PSOE government established the Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade (ICEX, Instituto Español de Comercio Exterior) to promote the internationalization of Spanish industries. More recently, in 2004, the Ministry of Industry, Tourism, and Commerce, and the Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations (CEOE, Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales) produced the Integral Plan for the Development of Markets. This plan seeks to promote the diversification of foreign trade and investment into new markets, including China, India, Russia, the US, and others (Mejía Gómez 2005, 394). Shortly after, the PSOE government cut corporate taxes to assist Spanish governments with maximizing their global competitiveness. The expansion of Spanish telecommunications, energy, finance, and transport sectors has enabled Spain to become integrated into the global market not only as a globalized state, but also as a globalizing state (Grasa Hernández 2001, 76). Overall, the economic policies pursued with a view toward convergence with Europe have reduced the income disparity between Spain and the EU average. Upon accession to the EC in 1986, Spanish per capita income was a mere 54.5 percent of the EU-15 average, however by 2004 this figure had increased to more than

75 percent (GoS 2006a, xi). By 2006, Spain's per capita GDP was 98.5 percent of the average in the expanded EU-25 (in purchasing parity terms) (Chislett 2006). In contrast to the consistent approach taken by different Spanish governments toward economic convergence with Europe, Spain's post-Franco governments have differed somewhat in their pursuit of political convergence with Europe. This is a theme that will be discussed in more detail below.

In sum, within the presently dominant economic paradigm, development is articulated to European integration, international competitiveness, and globalism. In a sharp shift from the former vision of a self-reliant and exceptional nation, Spain's economic destiny is now seen as inextricably entwined with that of Europe and the wider international community.

Foreign policy paradigm Since the issue of climate change emerged on the international agenda, Spain's central political landscape has been dominated by the PSOE and PP. The manner in which each party has approached European and international negotiations and obligations while in government has been conditioned by two somewhat different foreign policy paradigms.

Under the leadership of Felipe González, the PSOE held power when climate change emerged as a matter of international concern, and remained in power until 1996. The party returned to power again in 2004, this time under the leadership of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, and was re-elected for a successive term in 2008. The outlook of the PSOE has been conditioned by what Closa refers to as its "traumatic view of Spain's 20th-century history" (2004, 321), during which the party was deemed illegal by the Franco regime, thereby forcing many of its members into exile. This experience generated a worldview in which Franco's legacy of oppression, isolation, and economic backwardness was juxtaposed by Europe and Europeanization, a process promising harmonization, normalization, and modernization (Torreblanca 2001). Indeed, Felipe González once referred to Europe as the "frontier" of Spain's ambition, a symbol not only of the earlier aspiration of liberty, but also of future aspirations concerning Spain's role in international politics (González 1999). As one foreign relations analyst observes, throughout the PSOE's first period in power, spanning fourteen years from 1982 to 1996, Spain's national interests were largely conflated with wider European interests: "all the positions Spain had adopted in areas such as disarmament and non-proliferation, multilateral trade and investment, international financial cooperation,

human rights and democratization, peace-keeping or global warming, could only be understood in the framework of Spanish membership of the EU" (Torreblanca 2001).

While Europe is in many ways the bedrock of Spain's identity as projected by the PSOE, it also places considerable symbolic importance on Latin America and strengthening Ibero-American relations. As Jean Grugel (2002) notes, the discourse of *hispanidad*, based on the notion of an Hispanic "family" with a common heritage, language, and culture, has been central to Spain's national identity and the country's perception of its role in the world. Throughout the Franco dictatorship this discourse was largely rhetorical and privileged Spain as the "mother nation." Since democratization this metaphor has been replaced with that of Spain as a "bridge" between Latin America and Europe, and has been bolstered by the development of clear policies rather than mere rhetoric. The Latin American dimension of the PSOE's foreign policy prior to 1996 was centered initially on mediation and the promotion of human rights in Central America, and democratization in South America. In the early 1990s, emphasis began to be placed on broader cooperation and development. Illustrative of Latin America's significance in the PSOE's foreign policy was the creation in 1985 of a Secretariat of State for International Cooperation and a Secretariat of State for Ibero-America that, together with the existing Secretariat of State for the European Communities and the General Secretariat for Foreign Policy, formed the Spanish Foreign Ministry (Baklanoff 1996, 110). In addition, the Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and Government was formed in 1991 and has met on an annual basis since then to promote dialogue and multilateral cooperation among the states of Iberia and Latin America. While a persistent challenge for PSOE governments has been reconciling their European and Ibero-American interests, the general assumption has been that these two dimensions of Spanish foreign policy can be mutually reinforcing. As Youngs (2000) explains, "the stronger Spain's 'embeddedness' in the incrementally accumulating dynamics of the EU, the stronger would be the force of its own political and economic presence in Latin America, a presence which would, in turn, strengthen its own weight within the EU" (108). The idea of mutually reinforcing interests is also reflected in the metaphor of Spain as bridge between the two continents: during Spain's presidency of the EU, Felipe González proposed that the only possible and desirable role for Spain in the EC was to keep matters of political and economic development in Latin America on the community's agenda (González 1989). In the second half of this chapter we will see that

this idea has been particularly influential as Spain seeks to reconcile its domestic conditions with obligations associated with global norms of climate governance.

Under the leadership of José María Aznar, the PP came to power in 1996 and remained in government until March 2004. The PP's historical experience differs markedly from that of the PSOE, and this has fostered a different identity and view of the external world. Unlike the PSOE, members of the PP are mainly children and grandchildren of Franco's political elites (Balfour 2005, 147). Whereas the PSOE has tended to privilege political objectives over economic ones, and consequently has viewed Spain's ascension to the EC as a major victory for modernization, the PP has privileged economic objectives over political ones and therefore viewed Franco's era as a time of great economic development pursued in a uniquely southern European style (Torreblanca 2001). Torreblanca suggests that the PP's interpretation of twentieth-century Spanish history has enabled the party to adopt a more pragmatic and utilitarian approach to European integration, an approach that does not conflate European and Spanish interests but assesses them on a case-by-case basis (ibid.). Aznar and the PP held the belief that integration into Europe must continue only insofar as it benefits Spain economically and politically, and that, furthermore, integration must not come at the expense of national identity (Farrell 2005, 218). During the PP's first four-year term, the party tended to project a moderate image, partly to assuage fears that it was "Francoism by the back door," and partly to maintain the support of the two minor parties with whom the PP had to form a coalition in 1996 to establish a legislative majority (Balfour 2005, 154). Following the 2000 elections, in which the PP alone established a legislative majority, the party's conservative agenda began to manifest in domestic and foreign policy. An important divergence from the established tradition was Aznar's Atlanticist vision, which sought to realign Spain's foreign relations from an emphasis on France and Germany, representing "old Europe," toward closer relations with the United States (Ruiz Sandova 2004). This vision aligned with Aznar's objective of establishing Spain as a deservedly important player on the international stage, independently of the country's European affiliation; as Farrell observes, "For Aznar, the identity of Spain was that of a leading nation in Europe and in the world" (2005, 218). That Aznar sees Spain as worthy of great power status is evident, for example, in a speech he made to an international audience in 2000: "The Spain of the year 2000 is an old nation with no complexes, and it is ready to assume its place in a globalized world" (quoted in Closa 2004, 321–22).

Aligning itself with the global hegemon would, it was believed, facilitate Spain's ascent to international power, and in particular to the G7; the fact that this approach was opposed by the majority of the Spanish people, as well as by Spain's traditional allies in Europe as well as Latin America, was apparently of minor importance (Farrell 2005, 219).

While the PP maintained the Latin American emphasis of Spanish foreign policy, its nature shifted slightly during the party's terms in power. In contrast to the PSOE's emphasis on political cooperation with the countries of Latin America, the PP's policy had a clear commercial basis and a strategic rather than cultural justification. The Ibero-American summits subsequently became less focused on matters of governance and civil society in favor of commerce. This shift was precipitated not only by domestic ideational factors in Spain but also by an increasing demand from some Latin American countries to be treated as equals (Youngs 2000, 119).

The domestic conditions that have constrained and enabled Spain's environmental foreign policymakers in responding to global norms of climate governance are thus fluid and evolving, like the norms themselves. In the second half of this chapter I trace the process by which Spanish actors have sought to build and rebuild congruence between these two evolving spheres.

THE NORM DIFFUSION PROCESS

The norm diffusion process in Spain has developed over four distinct phases.[3] This has not been a linear process but rather one characterized by progressive and regressive change and intermittent contestation of norms. During the first phase, initial resistance to the norms of global climate governance was diffused by the successful institutionalization of CBDR at the EU level. This then enabled the transition to a second phase characterized by broad support for those norms and efforts to defend their original integrity. Yet this phase was based on an erroneous perception of normative congruence that deteriorated in the late 1990s and prompted a third phase of renewed resistance to the norm of domestic emission reduction targets and timetables, and contestation of the regional application of CBDR. Finally, changes at the domestic level prompted a further shift in Spain's approach to global climate governance, and this fourth phase has been characterized by a renewed commitment to norms of climate governance. But, as we will see, this renewed commitment is predicated on the extensive use of transnational offsetting mechanisms, which carries a range of social and ecological problems.

Phase 1: Insistence on Differentiation, Late 1980s-1997

Just two years after Spain's accession to the EC in 1986, the issue of climate change emerged as a matter of international political concern, especially within the EC (and, after 1992, the EU).[4] This posed a considerable challenge to Spain, as the potential obligations and responsibilities involved in responding to climate change were perceived as incongruent with certain elements of the country's domestic conditions. The European identity of González's PSOE government, as well as the discourse of Spanish Europeanization that was highly salient at the time, rendered Spain particularly amenable to cooperation with the rest of the EU member states. Nevertheless, the paradigm of competitive developmentalism by this time had established prominence and economic growth and convergence were understood as overriding policy priorities. Hence, the task of constructing a normative "fit" between Spain's domestic conditions and international expectations on climate change was undoubtedly an immense challenge.

Spain's climate diplomacy during this initial phase was two pronged: internationally Spain ardently defended the EU's position, but within Europe Spain led the "cohesion countries" in strongly advocating for the application of the differentiation principle within the EU.[5] Spain initially responded to the Commission of the European Communities' call in 1990 for urgent action to stabilize emissions with resistance.[6] The country's energy-related emissions were projected to rise by 45 percent between 1990 and 2000 (Acosta Moreno et al. 1996, 7), and policymakers were reluctant to curb emissions and forgo corresponding economic growth. Spain joined Britain in arguing that it was premature to make any policy commitments until the science was more conclusive (Carritt 1990). Such resistance persisted throughout the following six months of negotiations, yet by the end of October the Commission's Environmental Council had reached agreement among the member states to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Costa 2006a, 227). Spain's decision to support the commitment can be explained both by the interest in cooperating with the EC member states, as well as by successfully "grafting" CBDR onto the European political landscape in such a way that invested the norm with local characteristics.[7] The legitimacy of the burden-sharing principle that is embedded in the CBDR norm had already been established in Europe during the mid-1980s, when a response to the problem of acid rain was negotiated; the Large Combustion Plant Directive of 1988 sought to reduce emissions of sulfur dioxide within the EC through

the allocation of differentiated reduction targets that took into account the different levels of economic development among the member states. Spanish foreign policymakers were able to draw on this principle during the EC's 1990 climate change negotiations to secure an assurance that Spain and the other cohesion countries would be allowed to increase their emissions throughout the period of 1990 to 2000. The result was the successful institutionalization of the norm of CBDR at the regional level, and the successful construction of a fit between Spain's domestic conditions and the demands of global climate governance. Reporting back to Parliament following a meeting of the Council of Environment Ministers, Spain's representative explained this as a positive development for the country:

> Europe has agreed to stabilize its CO_2 emissions at 1990 levels, considered as a whole. That is to say that some countries have to reduce their [emissions] and others can increase them, because we all come from very different positions. Of course, having said that, one automatically provokes the ecological and environmental critics. But how can you intend to increase your CO_2 emissions? It's not that we increase them because we love to do so, but because any model of development that increases our levels of wellbeing has to pass through some increased levels of energy production and consumption to bring us close to the European standards. . . . other countries have to reduce theirs to make room for ours. (Borrell Fontelles 1994)

The anticipated reduction in Germany's emissions was expected to create the necessary space for the cohesion countries to increase their GHG emissions without jeopardizing the EC's target of emissions stabilization at 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Ringius 1999, 139).

The regional institutionalization of the CBDR norm is further reflected in the Council of Energy and Environment Ministers' formal announcement of the EC-wide commitment in October 1990: "Stabilization of CO_2 emissions should be in general achieved by the year 2000 at 1990 levels, although the Council notes that some Member countries . . . are not in a position to commit themselves to this objective. In this context countries with, as yet, relatively low energy requirements, which can be expected to grow in step with their development, may need targets and strategies which can accommodate that development, while improving the energy efficiency of their economic interests" (quoted in Haigh 1996, 161–62). While this announcement was not accompanied by a document outlining the specific division of burden, there was an informal consensus among the member states that the cohesion countries would eventually be given a

more generous target than the other EC members (Ringius 1999, 138–39). This matter of internal differentiation was brought back onto the agenda in 1996 once all states had informally pledged their domestic targets. On the basis of an expected annual economic growth rate of 3.6 percent, Spain initially argued that it would not be feasible to limit the domestic growth of emissions to less than 25 percent by the year 2000. When this anticipated rate of economic growth did not materialize during the early 1990s, Spain scaled down its domestic pledge to a limit of 15 percent above 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Acosta Moreno et al. 1996, 3–7).

In advance of its six-month presidency of the EU, which was due to commence in January 1997, the Netherlands commissioned a group of energy experts to devise a multisectoral framework for the internal burden-sharing negotiation process. The framework's methodology, and the findings that emerged from its application, provided the basis for the eventual differentiation of commitments.[8] In accordance with its assumed leadership role in international climate change negotiations, in March 1997 the EU proposed that all OECD countries reduce their emissions by 15 percent by 2010 compared to 1990 levels (Ringius 1999, 134). It was therefore politically vital that the EU's internal differentiation of commitments be capable of producing a joint reduction of emissions of at least 15 percent. However, on the basis of the member states' informal pledges, the joint target barely reached –10 percent, leading to the unusual decision to maintain the –15 percent target while accepting the –10 percent differentiation as a temporary solution that would be resolved at a later time. Spain's target within this agreement was a limitation on emissions growth of 17 percent above 1990 levels by the year 2010. Although this target was more demanding than Spain's negotiators had hoped, it was considered a politically necessary compromise. Ringius explains that while the EU member-states acknowledged the importance of easing the burden on the cohesion countries, many argued that this should not come at the expense of a respectable EU-wide target, namely a target below –10 percent. Consequently, political pressure was exerted on the cohesion countries to limit their emission increases: "If negotiations broke down, the cohesion countries would be publicly criticized for their lack of willingness to cooperate and their disregard of the global warming issue" (Ringius 1999, 151). As it turned out, the targets of most individual member-states were later scaled down in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, which required the EU to reduce emissions to 8 percent below 1990 levels during the commitment period of 2008–12. Under the EU's burden sharing agreement, Spain is required to limit its emissions growth to 15 per-

cent above 1990 levels during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.[9]

Domestically, there was a general consensus that Spain had received an achievable target from the European negotiations; in fact, several political and nongovernmental actors within Spain voiced concern that the country's target was too lenient and questioned the appropriateness of applying the differentiation principle in this context. Speaking at a meeting of the Congress of Delegates (the lower chamber of the Spanish Parliament), a spokesperson for the Catalán Parliamentary Group pointed out that while Spain's per capita emissions were lower than the European average, they remained far higher than the global average, and that on a global scale Spain's per capita emissions level would be unsustainable (Recoder I Miralles 1998, 11152). This criticism was shared by Domingo Jiménez Beltrán, a former PSOE policymaker, who labeled the Spanish position "environmental and socioeconomic suicide" (quoted in Bustos 1996). While other political parties, including the PSOE, criticized the target as excessively lenient it must be recalled that, while in power, the PSOE had pushed strongly for an even more lenient target during the preliminary EC/EU negotiations (Costa 2006a, 228).

In contrast to Spain's self-interested response to the norm of *who* should take responsibility for mitigating climate change, the country took a more principled approach to the norm of *how* such mitigation should be pursued, strongly supporting the EC/EU's insistence on domestic targets and domestic regulatory changes.[10] In fact, there was consensus among Spain's political parties that the country's own target should be pursued exclusively within the national borders (Costa 2006a, 228). That Spain responded to this climate governance norm in this way is unsurprising—on the surface, it appeared to be entirely congruent with Spain's domestic conditions. During Spain's first phase of climate policy, its membership of the EC/EU was seen as providing a protective bubble within which it could avoid implementing challenging measures for reducing emissions. The perception among state and nonstate actors that Spain's target was reasonably unrestrictive suggests that they considerably underestimated the degree to which the target would conflict with Spain's developmental trajectory (Tábara 2007, 170). It is perhaps fair to assume, therefore, that Spain's resistance to flexible mechanisms stemmed, in part, from an understanding that Spain itself would not need to purchase carbon credits to comply with its Kyoto target. In fact, Costa suggests that Spain feared that flexible mechanisms would benefit only those states "with the capacity to acquire emission rights on a large scale," and that their inclu-

sion in an international agreement may inflate Annex I countries' stabilization and reduction commitments (2006a, 228). Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to dismiss the influence of the Europeanization discourse on Spain's decision to vocally defend the EC/EU's negotiating position. Although this discourse was generally most influential during the years of the González PSOE government, it continued to have a perceptible influence on the PP's foreign policy on climate change. As one minister explained to the Spanish Parliament in the lead up to the negotiations in Kyoto, Spain's negotiating position "is framed within the position of the European Union" (Michavila 1997), which reflected a strong commitment to multilateralism and an ambitious but accommodating protocol. Spain's environment minister, Isabel Tocino, assumed that the EU member states should negotiate their preferences within the community, but that the EC/EU should "speak as a single voice" on the international stage (quoted in Serrano 1998). Spain clearly shared the vision of European leadership in international climate change negotiations; Spanish political actors made numerous references to the EU's commitment to climate change mitigation, as well as later to the Kyoto Protocol as a symbol of Europe's potential on the international stage.[11] One negotiator to the Spanish Parliament in 1996 explained: "The Government has associated itself with the position that the European Union members have jointly adopted, yet without renouncing the specificity of the Spanish case, and has defended equity in sharing the burden between countries" (Michavila 1996).

Throughout this first phase, then, efforts by Spanish actors to build congruence between domestic conditions and the global norms of climate governance were influenced by their perception that climate governance posed a threat to Spain's economic competitiveness. The potential threat posed by climate change itself—increased desertification and soil erosion, decreased precipitation, and a rise in sea levels—was largely overlooked. This perception is entirely consistent with Spain's domestic social structure and the ecological irrationality embedded in its technocratic approach to development, which, as I have argued, emerged from a conviction that nature should be molded to the state's economic and social interests, thus rejecting the possibility that state interests should be defined within the limits of the natural world. The evident persistence of this mode of reasoning suggests that the paradigm of sustainable development was still quite weak in Spain during the 1990s. Indeed, the discussion of the Spanish social structure in the first part of this chapter pointed to a strong emphasis on economic growth and convergence,

and an economic paradigm characterized by competitive developmentalism. Given the perception of climate governance as a threat, Spain's active participation in international climate change debates and negotiations can only be explained by the influence of a Eurocentric foreign policy paradigm, which motivated Spanish actors to cooperate with other members of the EC/EU. This commitment to Europeanization persisted beyond the PSOE's terms in government and into the era of Aznar's PP government. Reconciling the cautious perception of climate governance with the commitment to European cooperation and integration was only possible by advocating a wider application of the differentiation principle to the European arena, in which Spain belongs to the geographical and political (socioeconomic) South. As a cohesion country of the *European* South, Spain successfully secured for itself the differentiated treatment that has been accorded to the developing countries of the *global* South, thus creating an opportunity to support the EC/EU's leadership ambitions in this area without compromising Spain's development trajectory. The Spanish process of normative congruence building presented here illustrates the potential for the meanings of norms to alter upon entering the domestic sphere: the norm of CBDR that had been institutionalized in the UNFCCC was understood in terms of differentiation between the global North and South, yet to establish a fit between its domestic conditions and global climate governance norms, Spanish actors tied the norm of CBDR to the European norm of economic convergence and successfully made a case for extending the application of CBDR to the regional level.

Phase 2: "Passive Kyotoism," Late 1998–2000

Between 1998 and 2000, climate change was of marginal concern to Aznar's PP government, yet it was not entirely absent from the agenda of Spain's environmental foreign policymakers.[12] In fact, the dearth of domestic action on climate change during this phase contrasted significantly with Spanish rhetoric in the international arena. Internationally, Spain demonstrated a commitment to the EU's leadership ambitions in this area; this is evident, for example, in Spain's defense of the ecological integrity of the Kyoto Protocol and support for the EU's resistance to flexible mechanisms. Environment Minister Tocino warned that the international community would need to remain "vigilant" to avoid "environmental fraud" (1998b, 11149). Purchasing carbon credits abroad while avoiding limitations on domestic emissions would only amount to "self-deceit" and would not produce a cleaner or more environmentally sound policy

in industrialized countries, she argued (ibid.). To this end, Spain advocated the application of concrete limits on the use of flexible mechanisms toward achieving domestic targets under the Kyoto Protocol (Tocino Biscarolasaga 1998a, 16911). Spain maintained this position throughout the negotiations of 1998, 1999, and into 2000, when the PP was re-elected for a second term and Jaume Matas replaced Tocino as environment minister. In November 2000, Matas reiterated Spain's support of this position in a parliamentary speech: "In relation to the flexible mechanisms of the protocol . . . , our position is to set some rules on the basis of which action at the internal level should be the principal means of complying with the commitments. That is to say, yes to the flexible mechanisms, yes to emissions trading, yes to joint implementation, yes to the CDM, but always safeguarding the basis of internal policies as an important part of a country's effort" (Matas I Palou 2000, 3887).

In contrast to the principled rhetoric offered on the international scene, minimal effort was made to develop Spain's own internal policies for meeting the country's commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. During this second phase, as Costa explains, "the Spanish government understood that since Spain formed part of the EU and it had achieved a favorable burden-sharing agreement, it was unnecessary to develop any internal or external strategy on the question of the fight against climate change" (2006a, 229). Europe's burden-sharing agreement had evidently diminished the initial perception of climate governance as incongruent with Spain's domestic conditions. Moreover, Spain had managed to keep its emissions growth to just 3.5 percent between 1990 and 1995 without implementing any specific programs or policies, however this was only possible under conditions of economic recession (Power Europe 1995). Although the Spanish economy regained momentum in the latter half of the decade, reaching annual growth rates of more than 4 percent (GoS 2002), no serious consideration was given to how Spain would control emissions under such conditions.

The most significant, albeit largely ineffectual, program implemented by the PP government during this phase was an interministerial National Climate Council (Consejo Nacional del Clima; CNC), composed exclusively of central government actors. The council was established in 1998 and endowed with the responsibility of defining a national strategy against climate change that would set Spain on a path toward compliance with its Kyoto commitments (*Cinco Días* 1998; Serrano 1998). In accordance with Article 12 of the UNFCCC, Spain was required to submit a detailed inventory of emissions by source as well as a plan outlining the measures that would be taken to comply with the country's

international obligations. The CNC was expected to prepare this data for submission. In announcing the new council, Tocino championed it as an initiative of solidarity with future generations (quoted in Serrano 1998); such rhetoric can be understood as a reflection of the growing salience of sustainable development within Spain. Tocino spoke of the important role the CNC would have in proposing concrete measures for stabilizing emissions in all sectors of society, including the promotion of clean and green energy, as well as public transportation to reverse the dominance of private transport in Spanish cities (ibid.). In fact, she went so far as to suggest that Spain was ready to "reorient modes of production and consumption with the purpose of combating climate change" (quoted in Fernández-Cuesta 1998). In spite of these ambitious words, the CNC was beset with structural and substantive problems from the beginning and remained largely inoperative throughout this phase. The lack of regional and nongovernmental representation significantly weakened the council and undermined its legitimacy. By 2000, the CNC had only drawn up a preliminary progress report that outlined a number of technical measures for responding to climate change in various sectors, including transport, energy, industry, agriculture, and waste (Cortes Generales 1998). However, no concrete policies or timeframes accompanied the report and Spain's emissions continued to grow rapidly as contradictory policies were implemented across most of these sectors (Rivera 1999). Despite the acknowledged importance of reducing CO_2 emissions in the transport sector, during this phase the government continued to promote private transport by investing in highways and lowering motorway tolls to avoid inflation (*El País* 2006).

In the absence of genuine efforts to curtail the growth of emissions during this phase, by the year 2000 Spain's emissions were 27 percent above 1990 levels, yet the country's commitment within the EU "bubble" stipulated that emissions growth must be limited to 15 percent above 1990 levels by 2008–12. Although Spain's environmental foreign policymakers vocally defended the Kyoto Protocol at international conferences and continued to speak of the urgency of climate change mitigation, in reality this issue was of marginal concern to the Aznar government, both domestically and in foreign policy. Instead, almost all the government's policies at this time were designed to maximize economic growth and international competitiveness at all costs. Even no-regrets strategies that would benefit the environment and the economy were overlooked. The most notable absences were measures for conserving energy and increasing energy efficiency in the industrial, commercial, and residential sec-

tors (Santamarta and Nieto 2006). In fact, at this time Spain was one of the only industrialized countries where the energy intensity of the economy was actually increasing rather than becoming progressively more efficient (Ruiz 2006, 199–200).

Phase 3: Domestic Debate and Resistance, 2001–2004

Oriol Costa suggests that COP-6 signaled a turning point for Spain's climate policy and diplomacy (2006a, 230). The highly political and technical nature of this meeting, which took place at The Hague in November 2001, took many actors by surprise, and Spain's environmental foreign policymakers found themselves ill-prepared to contribute to discussions on carbon sinks, supplementarity, compliance, and adaptation funds. Grubb and Yamin note that "the issues on the table at The Hague were too political for the technocrats to resolve, and too technical for the politicians to understand" (2001, 269). A lack of institutional capacity, and indeed political will and interest, meant that Spain had never formed an independent understanding of climate change. However, the growing divisions among the member states over the EU's common negotiating position eventually provided a catalyst for Spain to give greater attention to understanding its own national interests rather than only defending the mainstream position. While some states, including the Netherlands and Italy, actively opposed the EU's demand for "concrete ceilings" on the use of flexible mechanisms for meeting national targets, Spain continued to support Germany, Austria, and Denmark on this matter at The Hague (Cass 2005, 47–48; Matas I Palou 2000, 3886–869). Shortly after this round of negotiations, Spain began to develop and restructure its internal institutional capacity for responding to climate change and actively participating in international negotiations. The most important steps taken were the creation of the Spanish Office for Climate Change (Oficina Española del Cambio Climático; OECC) and the restructuring of the CNC. The OECC was created in April 2001 within the Ministry of Environment (now Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Environment) to promote and coordinate climate change policies among the various government departments and regional communities, as well as to represent Spain in the international arena (GoS 2001). The OECC was also given responsibility for the technical and management functions of the CNC. Seven months later, the CNC was completely restructured to allow for greater representation and efficiency. The existing members remained and formed the plenary membership, while a second tier of membership was established as a "vocal consultancy group," formally known as the Permanent Commission, which

included representatives of the autonomous regions and various scientific, economic, social, trade unionist, and environmentalist organizations (Tábara 2003, 24).

The former CNC had neglected to produce an official climate change strategy for complying with Spain's international commitments. Unsurprisingly, Spain's emissions continued to rise rapidly and by 2002 were 40 percent higher than 1990 levels (Aizpiri 2004, 18). Consequently, it was becoming increasingly apparent to Spanish policymakers that the global norms of climate governance posed a significant challenge to Spain's domestic conditions, in particular to its competitive developmentalist trajectory and ambitions of European economic convergence. The perception of climate change as a distant international or European concern with limited domestic relevance for Spain began to erode at this time as the social and economic implications of climate governance became apparent, thus sparking debate among groups within society that had previously paid little attention to the issue (Costa 2006b). Yet Spain's capacity to redefine its position on climate governance was constrained by domestic political-institutional factors. Spain's membership in the EU entailed a responsibility to assume the presidency of the Union on a periodic basis, a responsibility that Spain was due to fulfill at the same time that the EU was expected to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, in 2002. By this time, Spain was the only country in the EU without a national strategy for compliance with the protocol (Carrasco 2001). Nevertheless, the PP government submitted the protocol to the Spanish parliament for approval in early 2002, thus paving the way for Spain to ratify the agreement at the same time as the EU on 31 May 2002 (Tábara 2003, 24–25). However, in accordance with its transatlantic foreign policy ambitions and pragmatic approach to Europeanization, the PP government did not use its presidential term to enhance Spain's European credentials, but rather to pursue Spain's particular interests. Climate change clearly had not increased as a priority for the Aznar government during its six-month EU presidential term and appears to have been approached pragmatically, allowing Spain to focus on its official priorities, including terrorism and the enhancement of transatlantic relations (Barbé 2003, 45–48), as well as the unofficial priority of promoting Spain's credentials for membership in the G8 while representing the EU at its 2002 summit (Woodworth 2004, 7). Costa observes that the cessation of Spain's presidency in July 2002 provided the country with an opportunity for greater flexibility in its position on the norms of global climate governance (2006b, 231). From this time until the beginning of 2004, three patterns of behavior domi-

nated domestic climate politics: procrastination by the PP government, division and opportunism among domestic industry actors, and resistance to climate governance norms.

Procrastination. In May 2002, as the newly restructured CNC commenced efforts to draft the official national climate strategy, the PP government submitted Spain's Third National Communication to the UNFCCC in which a series of indirect measures for mitigating emissions were outlined (Tábara 2007, 171). The measures outlined in this report certainly did not constitute a comprehensive strategy for complying with Spain's international commitments, not least because little effort was made to quantify the anticipated effect that these measures would have on mitigation (Torres et al. 2004, xv). In fact, the measures outlined in this document were an indication of the PP government's effort to avoid confronting the more significant inconsistencies between emissions mitigation and Spain's development trajectory. The proposed measures were designed to stimulate economic growth while avoiding any disruption to existing growth strategies. Illustrative is the Plan for Developing Renewable Energies, which aspired to increase the share of renewable energy to 12 percent of total energy production by 2010 (GoS 2002, xv). This plan had obvious benefits for the security of the energy supply, but due to the expected increase in energy demand during this period it could not have been expected to reduce the country's overall emissions (Tábara 2003, 25). Other examples include the promotion of energy efficiency in residential, commercial, and institutional buildings, as well as a set of fiscal and voluntary measures directed at the transport sector to promote vehicle renewal and the use of cleaner fuels, improvements in the design of roads and highways, and the "cosmetic promotion" of rail over road transport (ibid.; Torres et al. 2004, 15–16). While such measures may be positive in themselves, it must be noted that their capacity to contribute to domestic mitigation is severely curtailed by the fact that they were merely absorbed into the existing competitive developmentalist trajectory, rather than forming an alternative vision of development. Many of the shortcomings in the third national communication were also reflected in the working drafts of the Spanish Climate Change Strategy, as well as the final draft, which was eventually approved by the Plenary in February 2004, more than six years after the process was initiated (GoS 2004). Environmentalist groups, trade union representatives, and several political parties were unanimous in criticizing the final document as a mere descriptive report that was entirely devoid of objectives, timeframes, and financing, and did not constitute a strategy that would ensure compliance with the Kyoto Protocol and

Spain's commitments within the European "bubble" (WWF et al. 2002). Joaquín Nieto, environment secretary for the Confederation of Workers' Commissions, suggested that the weaknesses in the strategy reflected the strong resistance and opposition shown by the Ministries of the Economy, Public Works, and Housing during the drafting process (2004).

Division and opportunism. As preparations for a European emissions trading scheme began in Brussels in 2003, domestic industry actors in Spain could no longer afford to maintain passive. Different perceptions of the issue generated division among these actors: while some came to recognize climate governance as an opportunity to expand their operations and capitalize on a new market, the dominant perception was of a serious threat to economic growth and competitiveness. In 2003, several actors began to openly criticize the government's position on complying with the Kyoto Protocol. In May, for example, Manuel Melgar, the president of the CEOE, expressed concern about the effect an emissions trading scheme would have on Spanish competitiveness, arguing that "environmental provisions should be decided only after carrying out an adequate economic analysis" (quoted in Fernández 2003, 14). Five months later, the CEOE announced that compliance with the Kyoto Protocol would cost Spain up to four billion Euros each year and would lead to higher unemployment and the relocation of Spanish industries to other countries (Carcar 2003). The CEOE argued that a reduction of emissions would compromise both Spain's economic convergence with the EU and the competitiveness of Spanish businesses, and subsequently called on the government to commit to purchasing emission credits from other countries (Malverde 2003). The reasoning behind this demand was that since the PP government had made the mistake of underestimating Spain's expected emissions growth during the negotiating stage, it should now cover the costs of meeting its stringent target (Díaz Varela 2003). These sentiments were echoed by the cement and chemical industries (Cerrillo 2003b). Juan José Nava, vice president of the Spanish Chemical Industries Federation (Federación Empresarial de la Industria Química Española; FEIQUE), argued that Spain's target was completely incompatible with the objective of real economic convergence with the EU. In fact, FEIQUE called for a revision of the Kyoto Protocol because, from a per capita perspective, Spain had received an unreasonable and inequitable target (Cerrillo 2003a). This perceived injustice was based on the calculation that Spain had negotiated a limit of eight tons of emissions for each Spaniard, as compared to eleven tons for each German, and an average of sixteen tons for each European (Fernández 2003).

In mid-2003, divisions began to appear within the electricity sector, which had thus far maintained a cautious position on Spain's Kyoto commitments. This division initially manifested in July, when the Spanish Electricity Industry Association (Asociación Española de la Industria Eléctrica; UNESA) initiated a debate about the future of domestic electricity generation. Spain's largest electricity company, Endesa, together with other major companies, Unión Fenosa and Cantábrico, shared a vision in which coal remained the dominant source of electricity on the basis of its stable cost and supply. However, the second largest company, Iberdrola, together with several smaller companies, believed that all investment should be directed toward the construction of wind farms and natural gas plants (*Expansión* 2003). Later in the year, during negotiations between the sector and the national government over the allocation of emissions rights in Spain, Iberdrola claimed that Spain could and should comply with its Kyoto Protocol commitments. This directly contradicted UNESA's position that such commitments were excessive in times of high economic growth and must be renegotiated, and subsequently prompted other electricity companies to label Iberdrola as "irresponsible" (*El País* 2003; Monforte 2003). Iberdrola supported its argument with reference to the "polluter pays principle." The company's vice president, Ignacio Galán, claimed that if this principle benefited his company at the expense of other companies it was simply because Iberdrola had already responsibly invested in low-emissions technology in Spain, while other companies had directed their investments abroad (Delgado 2004). Galán maintained that Spain could comply with its international commitments if Spanish companies purchased their own emission rights and reoriented their investments toward renewable options, saying, "The wind blows in favor of all . . . [and] the water falls equally for all" he said (quoted in Delgado 2004).

The nuclear industry and its supporters also joined the domestic debate in 2003, perceiving climate governance as an opportunity to secure a future for nuclear energy in Spain. As noted above, a moratorium was placed on the construction of new nuclear plants in 1983 and the importance of nuclear power had since been in steady decline. However, doubts over the future of coal-fired power plants presented an opportunity for supporters of nuclear energy to promote theirs as a "clean" and "green" carbon-free source of energy. In July 2003, the president of the Nuclear Security Council claimed that nuclear energy is "essential" to comply with the Kyoto Protocol, reduce atmospheric pollution, and guarantee the supply of electricity in Spain (Agencia EFE 2003b). However, with a federal election scheduled for early 2004, political actors were careful to

avoid initiating or entering any debate on the future of nuclear power in Spain, given the highly sensitive nature of the issue among the Spanish electorate. As two close observers noted, "To talk of nuclear energy is to tread on mined territory" (quoted in Fernández and Navares 2005). Indeed, a 2007 survey revealed that due to the hazards associated with nuclear waste and the risk of accidents, only 18 percent of Spaniards believe that nuclear power should be increased to avoid climate change (Eurobarometre 2007).

Although the opportunism displayed by some actors during this phase was not driven by the sustainability concerns that are inherent to the norms of climate governance, this shift in perception is a clear example of norm localization in which some nonstate actors have attempted to build congruence between the international norms and their own specific conditions. The perception held by some of climate governance as an opportunity rather than merely a threat prompted some domestic actors to respond positively to the norms of international climate governance and generate some domestic pressure on state actors to control domestic emissions.

Resistance. In response to the strong resistance from most domestic industry actors, the PP government gradually adopted a more critical position on the Kyoto Protocol and pending emissions trading scheme. The government's empathy with affected industries prompted the secretary of state for energy and industrial development, José Folgado, to claim in late 2003 that "[n]obody will force us to comply [with the Kyoto Protocol] on a graveyard of businesses" (quoted in *Europa Press—Noticias Energía* 2003). In a sign of how the domestic debate had eroded Spain's international position on climate governance, at a meeting of the EU Environment Council in March 2004, Spain's environment minister joined her Italian counterpart in calling for the EU to focus on developing *strategies* instead of *targets* for the post-Kyoto period (Cañas 2004). Costa explains that this suggestion has much greater significance than it would initially appear: "[w]hile an apparently semantic difference, the proposal implied questioning the traditional insistence by the EC/EU on *targets and timetables* in the context of the international regime on climate change" (2006a, 232).

During this third phase, then, passive support for Kyoto was replaced by the emergence of domestic debate and resistance among many state and nonstate actors as the domestic implications of controlling emissions became apparent. The emerging trends in Spain's domestic emissions suggested that earlier congruence-building efforts had been insufficient to construct a genuine and enduring normative fit between norms and

domestic conditions. As this became increasingly apparent, continuing the earlier passive position was no longer tenable. Moreover, the increasingly technical nature of international negotiations exposed the weakness of Spain's institutional capacity for climate governance and negotiation and prompted the creation of new institutions (and the renovation of old institutions) to represent the national interests as required in the international arena. Driven by an economic policy paradigm of international competitiveness and a consequent desire for European convergence, state actors in Spain began to resist their European and international commitments and question whether the principle of differentiation had been interpreted fairly within the European context.

Phase 4: Catching Up, Adjusting, and Advocating Equity, Post–2004

The terrorist attacks on Madrid's train network on 11 March 2004, just three days before federal elections, prompted a voter backlash against Aznar's PP government and resulted in a surprise victory for the PSOE, under the leadership of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. This signaled the beginning of a new phase of climate politics in Spain. Within the first two months of government, both Prime Minister Zapatero and his environment minister, Cristina Narbona, declared their commitment to the Kyoto Protocol and promised to work diligently toward complying with Spain's commitments (Rodríguez Zapatero 2004, 19; Narbona Ruíz 2004, 136). The enormity of the challenge confronting the new government in 2004 cannot be overstated: Spain's emissions were 47.87 percent higher than the 1990 base year; the Spanish Strategy on Climate Change had still not been submitted to the executive for approval; the European Commission had opened an infraction against Spain for failing to transpose the directive concerning emissions trading into domestic law; and the National Allocation Plan had not been finalized for submission to the European Commission by 31 March 2004 (Aizpiri 2004, 19). Yet in spite of such setbacks, the Zapatero government maintained its commitment to the Kyoto Protocol and its associated European directives. Four plausible reasons are evident.

First, the European Council reaffirmed in March 2004 that the EU would deliver on its Kyoto target, even if the agreement failed to enter into force. Uncertainty over the protocol's future had undoubtedly made member states, particularly Spain, reluctant to implement costly and complicated mitigation measures (European Community 2004). Second, during this phase climate change became an increasingly salient domestic issue, as several European and Spanish surveys carried out in 2007 attested. As

noted earlier in this chapter, a 2007 Eurobarometer survey found that concern over climate change was higher in Spain than in any other European country, and that 70 percent of Spanish respondents were "very much" concerned about the issue, compared to the European average of just 50 percent. These findings were supported by a survey conducted by Spain's Center for Sociological Research in March 2007, which found that 95 percent of Spaniards had heard of climate change and global warming, and that the vast majority (87.6 percent) would either certainly or probably be willing to modify their consumption habits and/or lifestyles to adapt to the process of global warming (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 2007). This survey followed the Spanish release of Al Gore's documentary, *An Inconvenient Truth*, which was marked for distribution throughout all Spanish schools by Zapatero, and for which Gore won the prestigious Premio Príncipe de Asturias (Prince of Asturias Prize) for excellence in international cooperation (Fundación Príncipe de Asturias 2007). A third plausible reason for the PSOE government's renewed commitment to Kyoto is the strength of the European dimension of the PSOE's identity and its consequent interest in enhancing Spain's reputation among the other member-states of the EU. In this context, the reputation that Spain was earning as the worst Kyoto offender, both within Europe and the wider international community (Velázquez de Castro González 2005, 198; Costa 2006b, 162), was highly undesirable. A related reason is that the articulation of Europe to modernization, which was characteristic of the party's foreign policy paradigm, created an opportunity for a new perception of climate governance to emerge within Spain. The PP government had maintained a perception of global climate governance as a threat to Spain's economic interests, international competitiveness, and convergence with the EU. However there are signs that the dominance of this perception has partially eroded within the PSOE government.

The perception of climate change that emerged during this phase is characterized by the recognition of climate governance as an opportunity for modernization in Spain. Members of the Zapatero PSOE government perceived climate governance not so much as a threat as an impetus for realizing Spain's developmental aspirations while diversifying its energy sources. Numerous comments made throughout 2004 by Cristina Narbona and others within her ministry reflect this perception:

> It is essential that we comply with the Kyoto Protocol, which, furthermore, is an opportunity to confront an unresolved matter that we have: energy efficiency and conservation. (Aizpiri quoted in Rivera 2004, 33)

> (Spain should reduce its emissions), even if the Kyoto Protocol isn't ratified, even if scientists were to say that CO_2 doesn't contribute to climate change. . . . Reducing emissions means reducing fossil fuels, and therefore the foreign energy dependence. (Narbona quoted in *El País* 2004, 30)

These comments point to a process of normative congruence building: the earlier perception of the incongruence between the norms of climate governance and domestic conditions has been displaced by a process of grafting these norms onto Spain's objectives for economic modernization. The norm of domestic emission reduction targets and timetables can be seen as consistent with the domestic imperatives of minimizing the energy intensity of the Spanish economy, minimizing Spain's dependence on external energy, and minimizing the wealth gap between Spain and the European average. A number of domestic initiatives addressing these objectives have been implemented, but this change in perception has not always manifested in highly effective or ecologically rational decisions. Clearly, the dominance of an energy-intensive development model based on growth and competitiveness serves as an obstruction to the design and implementation of successful sustainable policies. The following examples reveal a mixed record for climate policy in Spain after 2004.

One of the first initiatives was an amendment to the Strategy for Energy Savings and Efficiency in Spain 2004–10 (Estrategia de Ahorro y Eficiencia Energética en España, widely known as E4).[13] Although the E4 was approved under the previous government at the end of 2003, it remained largely inoperative in its original form due to the absence of specific actions, timeframes, financing, methodology for measuring impact, and the delegation of responsibility among relevant actors. (GoS 2006a). The document was widely criticized on the basis that it aspired merely to limit the rate of energy consumption growth instead of reducing consumption below 2004 levels, and to reduce the economy's energy intensity by just 7.2 percent as compared to the expected Europe-wide figure of 13 percent (Asunción 2003). In an attempt to compensate for the weakness of the original strategy, the PSOE government implemented two action plans for the periods 2005–7 and 2008–12. Although these plans compensated for the omissions outlined above, they did not address the more fundamental weakness concerning the unsatisfactory objectives of the E4 (European Commission 2006a).

On a more positive note, the PSOE government has begun to address the long-neglected residential sector, which is responsible for a considerable and increasing proportion of Spain's total emissions. The Technical

Code for Buildings introduced in 2006 brought Spain into line with EU standards by establishing minimum requirements for energy efficiency and conservation, and the use of renewable energy in both public and residential buildings (GoS 2006b). It has been estimated that the code will reduce the energy consumption of each new building by 30–40 percent (European Commission 2006b). This initiative was widely welcomed by environmentalist and trade union groups as a belated but necessary first step toward reducing energy demand and favoring solar as a source of energy (Ecologistas en Acción de Aragón 2006; Santamarta and Nieto 2006). In accordance with the PSOE's experimentation with inclusive forums of state actors and interest groups, as outlined in the first half of this chapter, a Council for Sustainability, Innovation, and Quality in Building was concurrently created to promote and develop the implementation of the Technical Code for Buildings (GoS 2006d).

Another positive development was an amendment to the Plan Prever, which was introduced in 1997 to support the Spanish automobile industry by offering a permanent tax break to those who traded in an older car for a new car. As a result of the plan, car sales soared by more than 11 percent in twelve months (*ABC* [Madrid] 1998). As Spain's environment minister acknowledged in 2007, although the new cars were less polluting than the older cars, the benefits had effectively been negated by the enormous increase in vehicles on the roads (Flamarich 2007). Although in 2006 overall car sales fell by 1.6 percent, sales of four-wheel-drive (4WD) vehicles rose by 12.3 percent (Papasian 2007). This statistic clearly illustrates the gulf between environmental rhetoric and public behavior: at the same time that the vast majority of Spaniards reported their willingness to alter their consumption patterns and lifestyles, they bought dramatically increased numbers of 4WDs, the epitome of unsustainable mobility. Given that transport emissions grew by 77 percent between 1990 and 2004, this sector clearly presented an urgent priority for the PSOE government in its efforts to comply with Kyoto (Flamarich 2007). Accordingly, Cristina Narbona announced in mid-2007 that effective in 2008, the plan would differentiate between high-emitting and low-emitting vehicles. A registration tax of between 4.75 percent and 14.75 percent would be applied to vehicles on the basis of their emissions levels, while low-emitting cars would be exempt from a registration tax (*Automotive World* 2007). While it is hoped that this will encourage Spaniards to purchase lower-emitting vehicles, it must be acknowledged that the potential for this plan to reduce emissions in the transport sector is hindered by the broader structure of urban design in Spain, which in most cities has

created a dependency on private transport at the expense of public and pedestrian mobility (*El País* 2006). This problem has not passed unnoticed by the PSOE government: Narbona has acknowledged that much more needs to be done to create a cleaner transport network that in particular promotes a considerably greater use of bicycles and low-emitting vehicles (Prádanos 2007).

The difficult task of constructing a genuine and stable fit between the norms of climate governance and Spain's domestic conditions is also reflected in the 2007 Spanish Climate Change and Clean Energy Strategy and its accompanying Urgent Measures Plan. The urgent measures are designed to secure Spain's compliance with Kyoto, whereas the strategy as a whole extends to 2020 to place the country in a suitable position to adopt commitments in the post-Kyoto period (GoS 2007). Although the draft strategy was ostensibly compiled through interministerial cooperation, the Ministry for Industry's own seven-year plan contradicts the modest objectives of the climate change strategy and urgent measures. The Ministry for Industry plan is based on an anticipated annual growth in energy consumption of 2 percent, while the climate change strategy expects an annual reduction of 1 percent until 2012 (Méndez 2007a). Moreover, despite its comprehensive coverage of numerous areas, including institutional and international cooperation, flexible mechanisms, sinks, carbon sequestration, and technological development, as well as the transport, residential, waste, and commercial sectors, the documents have been criticized as unambitious and insufficient for compliance (*El País* 2007; Agencia EFE 2007a). Greenpeace and other environmentalist groups have also criticized the strategy's strong emphasis on Kyoto's flexible mechanisms at the expense of domestic action: they believe that this undermines the environmental integrity of the international agreement and will reduce the amount of public money available for investing in renewable energy and energy efficiency (WWF/Adena et al. 2007). The government, by contrast, has come to view flexible mechanisms as a key instrument for international cooperation on climate change, and importantly also as an opportunity for building normative congruence.

After their election win in 2004, the PSOE's congruence-building efforts took on a new international dimension, which appeared as an attempt to graft Spain's GHG commitments onto its existing interest in strengthening Ibero-American relations and internationalizing its domestic economy. Indeed, without the option of participating in an international carbon market, Spain's target within the European "bubble" would be entirely out of reach (*Expansión* 2006). Between 2005 and 2007, the

Spanish government signed twenty bilateral memoranda of understanding, seventeen of which are with Latin American governments, while the others are with China, Morocco, and Egypt (GoS 2007). Their purpose is to promote cooperation on climate change mitigation and adaptation, and in particular the implementation of CDM projects. In September 2004, following a proposal from the Zapatero government, Spain, Portugal, and the countries of Latin America established the Ibero-American Climate Change Bureau Network. The fundamental objectives of this initiative are "to integrate climate change into political dialogue at the highest level, promote strategies aimed toward sustainable development and at a low-carbon economy, and the identification of common problems and solutions in relation to impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation to climate change" (GoS n.d.). These initiatives also obviously play an important role in facilitating the entry of Spanish companies into Latin American markets to exploit the flexible mechanisms (CONAMA 2007, 87–90; GoS 2006a).

The heightened salience of competitive developmentalism has seen considerable emphasis placed on the internationalization of the domestic economy; the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms have presented a new opportunity to pursue this objective. The PSOE government's recognition of this opportunity and willingness to exploit it is clearly evident in Spain's National Allocation Plans for emission allowances. The first plan, which was released in late 2004 for the period of 2005–7, established a net emissions target for Spain of 24 percent above 1990 levels by the end of 2012. This figure included the 15 percent allocated within the European "bubble," the maximum 2 percent allowed for sink absorption, and 7 percent for credits obtained via flexible mechanisms (GoS 2004). The second plan, released in late 2006 for the period of 2008–12, increased the net target to 37 percent above 1990 levels based on an increased allocation of credits obtained via flexible mechanisms to 20 percent (GoS 2006b). Hence, in order to recognize CBDR, which demands action from the global North ahead of the South, Spain has had to compromise its commitment to the principle of domestic action ahead of the purchase of foreign credits: despite its initial caution, Spain has now legitimized the transnationalization of the norm of the domestic emission reduction targets and timetables. Consequently, Kyoto's flexible mechanisms, and the CDM in particular, have provided an opportunity for Spain to build congruence between the norms of climate governance and its economic policy paradigm, yet the result is the further institutionalization of the transnational interpretations of these norms, as well as the reinstitutionalization of the remote-

ness that has recurrently featured in Spain's successive economic policy paradigms The avoidance of difficult domestic structural changes and of confronting the unsustainable nature of many production and consumption objectives by purchasing "environmental space" from distant others is a clear example of such remoteness and ecologically irrationality.

The recognition of the Clean Development Mechanism as a valuable opportunity is strongly reflected in Spain's Fourth National Communication to the UNFCCC, which was submitted in March 2006. In sharp contrast to this country's original cautious position, this document identifies the CDM has "a key cooperative instrument for international action against climate change, due to its capacity to generate low-carbon economies while generating wealth and prosperity in local communities" in the global South (GoS 2006a, 6). Further reflecting Spain's present economic policy paradigm, the government explicitly acknowledged its support for the CDM as an avenue to promote foreign investment through Spanish businesses; to this end the report highlights the importance given to cooperation between Spain's foreign embassies and the ICEX (GoS 2006a, 6–7). While Spanish environmental foreign policymakers have generally been careful to highlight the complementary nature of the CDM and its focus on sustainable development, actors within the commercially oriented ministries and nonstate actors have been less subtle. In selling the notion of the CDM to the business community, one official of the Ministry of Economy and Housing noted that "[f]rom the private sector's point of view, the implementation of (CDM) projects . . . opens a window of opportunity for aligning corporate climate change strategies with business development strategies. In the case of Spain, the use of these flexible mechanisms can be converted into an excellent opportunity to facilitate the presence and development of our businesses abroad" (Ramos Gorostiza 2005, 133).

In an attempt to encourage more extensive use of flexible mechanisms among Spanish companies and reduce the potential effort, risks, and uncertainties involved in doing so, the Spanish government established a Carbon Fund through the World Bank in 2004. This fund allows companies to collectively invest in CDM and JI projects administered by the World Bank. The original financial resources required to establish this fund were provided by the Spanish government and have since been augmented through the participation of Spain's major electricity, gas, and cement companies (ibid.; World Bank n.d.). By 2008, the Spanish government (working in cooperation with private Spanish companies) had registered a total of forty-four CDM projects, which represents 3.4 percent

of the global CDM market and makes Spain its seventh largest investor (UNFCCC 2008a). While some projects have been implemented in China, India, Egypt, and the Philippines, the vast majority of Spain's CDM projects have been implemented in Latin America, reflecting the historical, cultural, commercial, and strategic ties valued by Spain's governing elites (GoS n.d.). Meanwhile, while the Spanish government and private companies have invested in such projects as waste management, fuel switching, and wind farms, the type of project evidently favored by Spain is both large- and small-scale hydroelectricity, which is unsurprising given the significance of hydrological engineering and the ideology of *regeneracionismo* to Spain's modernization.

Despite the CDM's ostensible objective of minimizing the challenge of reducing emissions in Annex I (industrialized) countries while promoting sustainable development, considerable doubt has been cast over its capacity to contribute to the social, environmental, and economic dimensions of sustainable development. Haya and colleagues (2002, 11) are particularly critical of the inclusion of large-scale hydro projects in the CDM (defined as those with an electricity generating capacity of more than 10 megawatts). Echoing the criticisms of remoteness leveled at Spain's own hydrological modernization project, they note that the large-scale promotion of hydropower entails significant costs on communities and ecosystems, and especially on the most vulnerable people in society; the widespread displacement of peoples for dam reconstruction has resulted in "community disintegration, impoverishment and disease," which remains largely invisible for those who benefit from such projects (ibid., 10). Pointing to the inherent ecological irrationality of the CDM, they further observe that the promotion of "large hydro through the CDM means that the overconsumption of Northern countries is being subsidized at the cost of the rivers and riverine people of the South" (ibid., 2). In the case of Spain, the use of the CDM perpetuates existing Ibero-American inequalities. In fact, in 2007 the 43 million residents of Spain emitted as much GHG as 144 million residents of six Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay) (Pérez Gil 2007). The implication is that unless the CDM is redesigned to address the social dimension of sustainable development (which addresses the satisfaction of basic human needs and the equitable distribution of wealth across and within states), it will merely exacerbate existing inequalities both between and within countries.

Other concerns about the potential for the CDM to contribute to sustainable development relate to the mechanism's competitive nature, which

requires competing host countries in the global South to simplify the process by which prospective investors seek the necessary approval for their proposed projects. As my earlier discussion of the CDM experience in India revealed, this simplification generally comes at the cost of sustainable development requirements; countries have the incentive to chase the largest possible number of CDM projects. These concerns have been further substantiated by a recent research project carried out by the International Institute for Sustainable Development, which evaluated all CDM projects approved to mid-2006, in terms of their "development dividend," i.e., their contribution to economic, social, and environmental development objectives (Cosbey et al. 2006). Of the nine Spanish-sponsored projects (either solely sponsored or in collaboration with other governments and/or companies) assessed, the highest scoring project was the Las Vacas hydroelectric project in Guatemala, which scored 43 points out of a possible 100; the lowest scoring project, a thermal oxidation project in Jiangsu Province, China, scored just 2 points. These nine projects scored particularly poorly in terms of their contribution to the social dimension of sustainability, which concerns the benefits for marginalized and energy-poor peoples, and overall community resilience.[14] In fact, the Spanish CDM projects were awarded an average of just 20 percent of the potential points in this category, compared to an average of 24 percent and 35.3 percent in the economic and environmental categories, respectively.[15]

Even with the option of maximizing Spain's use of flexible mechanisms, the Zapatero government faced an enormous challenge in its efforts to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. The magnitude of this challenge influenced the position of Spain's environmental foreign policymakers in European and international negotiations on the post-2012 period. While advocating environmentally ambitious targets for a future agreement, Spain's negotiators have been careful to place great emphasis on the importance of regional and global justice and equity, which is understood in terms of per capita emissions at the national level and emissions per unit of GDP at the industry level (*El País* 2007; Narbona Ruíz 2006). This interpretation of equity reflects the earlier observations and demands of key industry actors during the third phase of Spain's climate policy. Throughout 2007, several high-level government officials made reference to the inequitable burden shouldered by Spain relative to other members of the European "bubble" during the first commitment period of 2008–12 (Agencia EFE 2007a; Agencia EFE 2007b; Agence France-Presse 2007). Despite this perception of inequity, Spanish officials continue to insist that Spain will comply with its existing commitments, yet with the ex-

pectation that the norm of CBDR will be applied differently in future agreements. As European environment ministers gathered in Brussels in February 2007, Cristina Narbona played down the significance of Spain's emissions growth by insisting that on the basis of any comparative analysis, Spain's position is "cleaner" than the major European countries: "In the EU there are still countries whose emissions are three times as high as Spain's. Logically, this is something that I think should be considered at the hour of distributing the burden in a global agreement" (quoted in *Europa Press—Servicio Internacional* 2007). Another high-level official within the environment ministry, Arturo Gonzalo Aizpiri, similarly argues that although Spain is the eighth largest economy in the world, it is only the twenty-third largest emitter of GHG on a per capita basis (quoted in Méndez 2007b). Clarifying Spain's position on equity in climate governance, Narbona argued that per capita emissions should be taken into consideration not only within the EU, but also when negotiating an agreement at the international level with the emerging powers: "While there are immense differences between the per capita emissions of a Chinese, an Indian, and a European resident, it will be very difficult to ask them to reduce their emissions" (quoted in *Europa Press—Servicio Internacional* 2007). Although the question of domestic targets was not to be included in Europe's negotiating agenda until 2008, the twenty-seven member states agreed to a Europe-wide target of 20 percent below 1990 levels by 2020; while this was a minimum unilateral target, the EU indicated that it would be pushing for a 30 percent global target and may be willing to increase its own target if international cooperation was forthcoming (European Community 2007).

Cristina Narbona's visit to China in October 2007 for the Sino-Spanish Water Forum provided a further opportunity to strengthen Spain's position on equity at both the regional and global levels (GoS 2008, 132). Following a meeting with China's minister of science and technology, Narbona announced that China was pleased with the Spanish position of per capita emissions convergence and ensuring that a future agreement is more equitable than the last by demanding a greater effort from the developed countries (Agencia EFE 2007c). Interestingly, the circumstances underlying Spain's emissions growth (high economic growth and an expanding population) have prompted one observer to propose that Spain is the China of Europe (Méndez 2007b). Arturo Gonzalo Aizpiri suggests that while the specific context of the two countries is different, China "together with Spain, demands equity and that per capita emissions be taken into account" (quoted in ibid.).

In sum, throughout this phase a renewed interest in constructing a fit between the norms of climate governance and Spain's domestic conditions emerged and gathered momentum as Spain's state actors were able to graft their greenhouse commitments onto existing interests in strengthening Ibero-American relations and internationalizing the domestic economy. In addition, a number of domestic strategies were designed in pursuit of a lower-carbon economy and modernization through efficiency. While Spain has recognized the long-term merit of such a domestic process (e.g., Narbona Ruiz 2007), there remains a distinct lack of confidence in tying the modernization process to short-term emissions targets. This is reflected most clearly in Spain's efforts to promote greater use of the CDM while also promoting a per capita interpretation of differentiation and equity, which would translate into a more favorable emissions target for Spain in the next commitment period. The appeal to differentiation has been a consistent theme in Spain's environmental foreign-policy over the last two decades; however, it is only in recent times that a per capita interpretation of this principle has been advocated in European and international negotiating circles. While an awareness of the globally inequitable nature of present per capita emissions is evident among Spanish environmental foreign policymakers, there has been no attempt to define a globally sustainable level of per capita emissions on which both the North and South should converge. Instead, Spain's environmental foreign policymakers have demonstrated a preference for applying the norm of CBDR in such a way that produces greater regional equity and allows Spain to catch up with the wealthier member states of the EU.

The Spanish case illustrates the challenge of effecting sustainable changes in deeply unsustainable domestic conditions. Spain would seemingly offer one of the most promising sites for shifting to a low-carbon and ecologically rational path of development. Its limited indigenous fossil fuel resource base has generated significant interest and investment in renewable energy technologies, and climate change has been widely recognized, both publicly and politically, as a serious threat to Spain's economy and environment. Yet in the short term, the challenges and costs associated with instigating radical domestic shifts apparently seem insurmountable. Hence, while internalization of global climate governance norms has prompted piecemeal departures from business as usual, it has yet to trigger the radically innovative reasoning and behavior required to respond to the threat of climate change in an ecologically rational fashion. In fact, Spain's heavy reliance on transnational offsetting mechanisms threatens to exacerbate the remoteness that already exists in this

country's political institutions and social structure. These mechanisms effectively suppress the signs of unsustainability that are necessary for ensuring that social and economic activity are conducive toward maintaining a mutually supportive relationship between human and nonhuman elements of nature. Minimizing dependence on problematic mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism will be essential for governing climate change in an ecologically rational manner.

7. The Future of Global Climate Governance

Prospects for Ecological Rationality

With the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol due to expire at the end of 2012, the international community has been moving slowly toward a new phase of global climate governance. It remains unclear whether this next phase will be characterized by coordinated global action under new or renewed United Nations treaties, or rather only by fragmented action under the authority of diverse market-based and state-based actors.[1] Ultimately, however, any future agreements or actions will be futile at best (and damaging at worst) if lessons are not learned from the previous phase of climate governance. The Kyoto Protocol has always been widely recognized as a first and small step toward avoiding dangerous climate change. As such, while it is important to take stock of progress, our expectations and evaluations should be commensurate with original intentions and expectations. Instead of measuring progress in terms of averted emissions or impact on global temperatures, it is perhaps more appropriate to critically examine the normative foundations of climate governance that have been institutionalized since the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997. These foundations can be understood in terms of two norms: "common but differentiated responsibilities," defining *who* should take responsibility for mitigating climate change, and "domestic emission reduction targets," defining *how* such mitigation should be pursued.[2] While these ideas develop their normative force at the global level, they become consequential only once institutionalized and acted upon at the state level where primary authority in the international system continues to lie. In this concluding chapter, I reflect on the lessons that may be drawn from my accounts of this process during the first two decades of global climate governance. In the first section of this chapter, I consider what can be learned about the norm diffusion process from the three cases

studies presented. The principal lesson, I argue, is that normative congruence building should be understood as an integral and iterative aspect of norm diffusion. Neither domestic conditions nor global norms are static, thus shifts at either level may disrupt or enable perceptions of congruence or incongruence. In the subsequent section I reflect on the immense challenge of ensuring that efforts to mitigate and adapt to global climate change are conducive to long-term global sustainability. In Australia, India, and Spain, the processes of framing and grafting succeeded in producing perceptions of normative congruence, but they have had the consequent effect of locking in a cycle of inequality and ecological harm that undermines global sustainability. What these mechanisms evidently lack is the potential for transforming unsustainable structures. Ensuring that future global climate governance proceeds in an ecologically rational fashion will require new congruence-building mechanisms. This chapter presents a tentative inquiry into the potential form that an ecologically rational mechanism may take. Here I follow in the tradition of many green political theorists and turn to the literature of deliberative democracy for guidance.[3]

THE IMPORTANCE OF NORMATIVE CONGRUENCE BUILDING

The three domestic cases explored in this book have generated insights into the process by which norms diffuse from the global level to the state level. As we saw in chapter 3, the successful diffusion of global norms is commonly understood to depend on their compatibility with domestic institutions, political culture, and/or the material interests of domestic actors. What the cases of Australia, India, and Spain clearly demonstrate is that that normative fit is not a static and existential match, but rather a condition that may need to be continuously constructed. Moreover, congruence building is not linear: instead of gradually building congruence between global norms and domestic conditions over time, state actors oscillated between perceptions of normative congruence and incongruence. This should perhaps not be surprising if we recall that both global norms and domestic conditions are inherently fluid, thus shifts in either may disrupt existing perceptions of congruence or incongruence. It follows, then, that congruence building should be understood as an integral and iterative aspect of the norm diffusion process.

In Australia, emerging climate governance norms received broad support among the country's environmental foreign policymakers during the

early years of climate negotiations; the incumbent Labor government's commitment to the foreign policy tradition of middle-power diplomacy was the crucial factor behind this perception of normative congruence. However, as the government began to grasp the magnitude of the challenge posed by reconciling its foreign policy aspirations with the development aspirations embedded in its economic policy paradigm, this initial perception gave way to one of incongruence, thus prompting Australia to contest the appropriate meaning and application of the CBDR norm. The electoral victory of a coalition government in 1996 consolidated this shift in diplomacy. The foreign policy paradigm that influenced the coalition was fundamentally different from that of former Labor governments: a valuing of multilateralism and good international citizenship was replaced by a view of the world in which nation-states have to fiercely protect their national interests from the intrusion and interference of regimes pursuing common interests. A result was a reorientation in Australia's engagement with the international community, including in the area of climate governance. The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol were evidently perceived as incongruent with Australia's domestic conditions as the coalition government pursued alternative governance arrangements that responded to the technical and technological dimensions of climate change while overlooking the inherently political dimension acknowledged by traditional multilateral arrangements. Yet the fluid nature of perceptions of congruence was again confirmed as domestic concern about the potential effects of climate change grew among subnational and nonstate actors, as well as within the Australian electorate in the lead-up to the 2007 federal election. This domestic shift contributed to the victory of the Labor Party, which remained committed to international norms of climate governance and by this time perceived climate change itself as a threat to Australia's development aspirations.

In India, climate change was initially perceived as a North-South issue by environmental foreign policymakers. The early normative structures of climate governance, which emphasized the excessive historical emissions of developed countries and their domestic mitigation efforts, were entirely consistent with this perception. The gradual transnationalization of climate governance norms was consequently met with resistance among India's environmental foreign policymakers. However, over time, as shifts in the economic and foreign policy paradigms consolidated throughout the 1990s, India's state and nonstate actors became more amenable to perceiving transnational processes of climate governance as acceptable and consistent with domestic conditions. Indeed, by 2001 a process of con-

gruence building had successfully generated such a perception and India began to institutionalize the transnationally oriented norms.

The case of Spain also supports the argument that perceptions of normative congruence are fluid rather than permanent. The emerging norms of climate governance initially posed a significant challenge to Spain's policymakers as the potential obligations and responsibilities involved in responding to climate change were perceived as incongruent with certain elements of the country's domestic conditions. In particular, the expectation that states in the global North would control their emissions was fundamentally at odds with the competitive developmentalist direction of Spain's economic policy paradigm, and the associated objectives of economic growth and European economic convergence. Nevertheless, the institutionalization of the CBDR norm at the regional level produced an ultimately erroneous perception of normative congruence, which allowed Spain to cooperate with European and international efforts to mitigate climate change while avoiding any disruption to domestic development aspirations. By the late 1990s, the sharp growth in emissions had eroded this perception and Spanish state and nonstate actors had begun to perceive climate governance as a greater threat than climate change itself. Moreover, between 1996 and 2004 the political landscape was dominated by a center-right PP government, which was in some ways less committed to European cooperation and therefore less likely to compromise short-term interests for the sake of compliance with European expectations. The return of the more European-oriented PSOE to government in 2004 prompted the pursuit of transnational options for complying with European and international expectations; this in turn generated a new perception of congruence between the norms of climate governance and Spain's domestic conditions.

THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSFORMATION

Whether or not one considers these states as major powers in the international system, their responses to global norms of climate governance have hardly been inconsequential. The contestation, legitimization, and operationalization of norms in these countries certainly have important normative and ecological implications and contribute to the evolution of the norms themselves. Moreover, they offer insights into the colossal challenge of ensuring that efforts to mitigate and adapt to global climate change are conducive to long-term global sustainability. In each of the states analyzed, normative congruence was established through

ecologically irrational reasoning processes. The result is that the norms have been absorbed into unsustainable institutions and policy paradigms rather than triggering their transformation. This can be seen as an outcome of the dominance of inappropriate congruence-building mechanisms. Normative congruence building can potentially take different forms and incorporate a range of different actors; in the cases explored in this book, two forms have been salient: *grafting* and *framing*.

In Australia, environmental foreign policymakers within the coalition government dealt with their perception of incongruence between their domestic conditions and the norms of climate governance by reframing the problem to which these norms respond. Through public rhetoric and formal documentation, these actors sought to shift attention away from uneven and excessive emissions by representing the problem as largely a technical one: the problem did not lie in the practice of emitting GHGs, but rather in the absence of technology capable of reversing the effects of these emissions. Moreover, the specific sources and end objectives of such emissions were rendered irrelevant in Australia's framing. This justified shifting attention away from historic and present excessive and uneven emissions to the anticipated emissions of developing countries.

The case of Spain pointed to recurrent processes of policy grafting. The initial perception of normative incongruence was overcome by grafting the norm of CBDR onto the existing goals and objectives of the European Union in such a way that invested it with local characteristics. The precedence of "burden-sharing" within the EU to promote economic convergence among member states provided a foundation for Spanish state actors to advocate an extension of the CBDR norm to the regional level, thereby enabling cooperation on an issue that presented quite a challenge to Spain's economic policy paradigm of growth, competitiveness, and economic convergence. As the perception of normative incongruence reemerged several years later, Spanish state actors sought to build congruence between the norms of climate governance and their domestic conditions by grafting the issue onto their existing objectives of diversifying energy sources and internationalizing Spain's economy. This resulted in a significant emphasis on transnational mitigation mechanisms to augment domestic modernization initiatives.

The case of India exhibits instances of both framing and grafting. As the issue of climate change ascended onto the international agenda, India's environmental foreign policymakers were careful to frame it as an inherently political problem generated by excessive consumption patterns in the North, as well as a reflection of globally inequitable patterns of devel-

opment. This directed attention away from India's own coal-dependent development trajectory and toward the responsibility of wealthy countries to reduce their own emissions. Despite the success of the South in institutionalizing this political representation of the problem, a perception of normative incongruence later emerged as the norm of domestic emission reduction targets assumed an increasingly transnational character. As I showed in chapter 5, external nonstate actors then took the lead in establishing alliances with domestic nonstate actors and grafting the transnationalized norm of domestic emission reduction targets onto India's emerging economic policies and objectives, thereby generating a perception of normative congruence among India's environmental foreign policymakers.

While these processes of framing and grafting succeeded in producing perceptions of normative congruence, they have had the effect of locking in a cycle of inequality and ecological harm that undermines global sustainability. As I explained in chapter 3, the green constructivist framework used in this study provides the scope for a socially and ecologically informed evaluation of norm diffusion that is not available to the traditionally dominant approaches in International Relations. While neoliberal institutionalist scholars tend to evaluate the effectiveness of global cooperation in terms of regime construction and compliance, the green constructivist framework incorporates a more stringent assessment of regime effectiveness. By integrating the concept of ecological rationality, this framework provides the scope for considering whether global climate governance is actually succeeding in mitigating the problem of global climate change. In each of the cases explored in this book, my account of the domestic conditions pointed to a range of ecologically sensitive practices, paradigms, and institutions. Deeply flawed anthropocentric assumptions have been politically institutionalized in each state through their liberal democratic systems. This system reserves value exclusively for human beings who are further understood as autonomous units detached from society and nature. As I explained in chapter 2, the liberal democratic system reduces environmental considerations to private conceptions of "the good life" and forces them to compete with other private preferences in bargaining processes or market exchanges. The short election cycles that are characteristic of liberal democracies further undermine this system's capacity for establishing and maintaining a mutually supportive relationship with the rest of nature; this is because the long-term vision required to acknowledge sustainability concerns is inconsistent with the politician's concern for re-election. Anthropocentrism was also a salient

feature of successive economic policy paradigms in Australia and Spain, where the noneconomic values of nature have been consistently marginalized in the process of material accumulation. This feature is less salient in the case of India, but the parasitic model of development pursued there following independence exacerbated national inequalities, which are an important driver of unsustainability.

The consequence of these ecologically irrational domestic systems is the frequent exercise of ecologically irrational modes of reasoning, namely, modes of reasoning that fail to acknowledge that humans are embedded in ecological relationships and therefore do not direct decision making toward the maintenance of a mutually supportive relationship between the human and nonhuman elements of nature. State actors in Australia, India, and Spain have, in turn, overcome their perceptions of incongruence between their domestic conditions and the global norms of climate governance by either reframing the problem of climate change or grafting global expectations onto existing goals and objectives. This has had the effect of reinstitutionalizing the ecological irrationality already present in their domestic systems, and generating a paradox in global climate governance. Although these states have indeed aligned themselves with global norms of climate governance, the manner in which they have done so is undermining global sustainability. Val Plumwood (2002) has suggested that the potential for ecological rationality is suppressed by the remoteness that characterizes modern social, political, and economic systems, and such remoteness has been an integral part of the normative congruence-building process in Australia, India, and Spain.

In Australia and Spain, normative congruence building has been based on efforts to establish greater distance (in its spatial, consequential, temporal, and technological forms) between the practice of emitting GHGs and the effects and mitigation of these gases. The effect is a greater disassociation of the benefits of development and accumulation from the damage it effects on human and nonhuman others. In Australia, this distancing took the form of framing climate change as a technical and technological problem in which the source of emissions is irrelevant. This justified a shift in emphasis away from the historical excessive emissions of the North and toward the anticipated emissions of vast and highly populated nations, including China and India. I argued in chapter 4 that focusing on national aggregate emissions and failing to put these into perspective on the basis of population size severely curtails the potential for responding to climate change in an ecologically rational manner, since "inequality, whether inside the nation or out of it, is a major

sponsor of ecological irrationality and remoteness" (Plumwood 2002, 81). Casting high per capita emissions in a wealthy and less-populated country as inconsequential while placing the onus of mitigation onto highly populated countries marked by widespread poverty creates an undesirable likelihood that existing global inequalities will be frozen, or even exacerbated, by climate governance processes. Such inequalities, in turn, provide "systematic opportunities and motivations to shift ecological ills onto others rather than to prevent their generation in the first place" (ibid.). The root of this problem lies in the disempowered position of a group of people in an unequal society: not only are these people often unable to adapt to environmental change by relocating or upgrading their existing living arrangements, but they are also often unable to demand justice and compensation from the distant perpetrators of some forms of degradation, due to a range of power imbalances.

This distancing took a second form in Australia as the institutionalization of technological remoteness in the joint construction of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate. Carbon sequestration, for example, will distance the present generations of wealthy societies from the potentially damaging consequences of their actions that may manifest in the future. These consequences may potentially later effect harm on the biosphere or on future generations. Furthermore, in the event of technological failure, the resulting effects of climate change will disproportionately impact the most vulnerable populations in both the North and South, rather than necessarily the original decision makers.

In Spain, the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol and the CDM in particular have provided an opportunity to construct normative congruence. Yet as I argued in chapter 6, this congruence is highly irrational, as it exacerbates the inequalities that sponsor remoteness and creates greater distance between the beneficiaries of unsustainable growth and the adverse effects of such growth on human and nonhuman elements of the natural world.

In the case of India, the distancing between the production of GHGs and the effects and abatement of these gases has been facilitated by the embrace and operationalization of transnational mitigation measures. Moreover, through a diplomatic strategy of "hiding behind the poor," India has successfully resisted calls to adopt an emissions limitation target. A potential effect of this strategy is the exacerbation of domestic inequalities. The legitimization of transnational processes of climate governance poses the risk of exacerbating existing inequalities between and within countries, as well as the subsequent potential for reinstitutionalizing eco-

logically irrational modes of reasoning and remoteness. To the extent that wealthy groups within the North and South are given an opportunity to avoid addressing the social and economic practices that produce an excessive level of emissions within their domestic borders, temporal and consequential remoteness becomes a problem. The practice of emissions offsetting, which is characteristic of the CDM, entails temporal and consequential remoteness by obscuring the long-term unsustainability of particular practices. In this sense, the problem is institutionalized as a technical one of emissions per se rather than a political problem concerning the activities which produce emissions. In other words, transnationally oriented climate governance attends to the symptoms of the problem rather than its cause. Emissions offsetting allows the challenge of confronting the cause of the problem (namely, the unsustainable nature of various social, economic, and political practices) to be deferred to a future generation, while the present responsibility for dealing with the present symptoms (namely, emissions) is transferred to present generations in distant places. The avoidance of difficult domestic structural changes, and the avoidance of confronting the unsustainable nature of many production and consumption objectives by purchasing "environmental space" from distant others, is a very clear example of the remoteness and ecologically irrationality that defines the paradox of global climate governance.

The processes of framing and grafting that have defined congruence building in these cases are evidently problematic for the pursuit of ecologically rational climate governance. The problem may lie in the fact that these processes rely on a limited number of elite actors with an evidently limited capacity for consequential innovative reasoning. This was perhaps most clear in the case of Australia, where proposals for reducing the nation's dependence on fossil fuels and for designing a "greenhouse trigger" to regulate the expansion of coal-fired electricity generation were ignored by the wider policymaking community. As we saw in chapter 3, although structures by their very definition tend to remain stable, they may be modified if actors reinterpret their interests or understanding of "appropriate" behavior. In their account of "situated agency," Bevir and Rhodes (2006) propose that these moments of innovative reasoning are likely to be triggered when actors are confronted with new ideas or problems that cannot easily be accommodated in their existing worldview and policies. This "dilemma" may then prompt an actor to interrogate their existing assumptions in such a way that produces structural transformation. I argued earlier that dilemmas may fail to generate transformations for two reasons: first, an actor behaving or reasoning in an innovative

way may be marginalized or ignored; or, second, the dilemma may be diffused by distorting the idea or problem to accommodate it within existing structures. Both of these reasons have manifested in the cases explored in this book. In some instances innovative ideas have been ignored and marginalized, and in other instances the problem of climate change has been erroneously framed as a purely material phenomenon that can be satisfactorily mitigated through technocratic processes. Yet it is increasingly undeniable that responding to the climate change will require a transformation of existing unsustainable structures; continuing to absorb the issue into these existing structures simply will not do in the long-term.

What is evidently required is an alternative congruence-building mechanism that subjects dilemmas to genuine scrutiny and promises greater potential for reorganizing structures that are inconsistent with new knowledge. Given their apparent inadequate capacity for consequential innovative reasoning, an alternative congruence-building mechanism will need to rely on the agency of a wider set of actors than we've seen in processes of framing and grafting. Given the evident shortcomings of liberal democracy, many green political theorists have turned to deliberative democratic theory in search of more ecologically sensitive political institutions.[4] The privileged position of the public sphere and civil society in deliberative democratic theory suggests that this may offer a plausible context for expanding our thinking on agency in the norm diffusion process.[5] The public sphere is populated not by "liberal individuals" but rather by "social individuals."[6] The "liberal individual" is characterized principally by an individual consciousness, self-interest, and a legally sanctioned existence autonomous of others (Tétreault and Lipschutz 2005, 19). By contrast, Tétreault and Lipschutz's constructivist concept of the "social individual" recognizes that people are *social beings* "born with and socialized into relationships that grow over a lifetime, who create and rely on mutual relations with others and responsibilities to them, who develop through their own histories, and who act historically, materially, and collectively" (ibid., 20). This latter conceptualization endows people with the capacity and motivation to engage in public deliberation about collective goals and decisions. Such capacity and motivation is critical if, as I argued in chapter 2, addressing the unsustainable structural causes of climate change requires not technological innovation but rather political innovation, behavioral changes, and public deliberation on which GHG emitting activities and products should be prioritized given the finite absorptive capacity of the atmosphere and other natural "sinks." Public deliberation, as defined by John Gastil, is "discussion that

involves judicious argument, critical listening, and earnest decision making. Following the writings of John Dewey, full deliberation includes a careful examination of a problem or issue, the identification of possible solutions, the establishment or reaffirmation of evaluative criteria, and the use of these criteria in identifying an optimal solution. . . . [D]eliberation sometimes starts with a given set of solutions, but it always involves problem analysis, criteria specification, and evaluation" (Gastil 2000, 22). Inclusive and sustained public attention to the socioeconomic trade-offs inherent to any response to climate change may ultimately expose the ecologically insensitive policies, practices, and systems that simply cannot be sustained in a finite world. Taken-for-granted ideas and goals, such as the importance of universally sustained economic growth and accumulation, and the inalienable sovereignty of the citizen-consumer in liberal democracies, are difficult to defend once their social and ethical implications are exposed through reasoned argument. To repeat an example raised in chapter 2, few would explicitly endorse a policy that allowed a minority to indulge on imported pineapples at the expense of basic sustenance for the majority. Yet in the absence of critical deliberation on the trade-offs that are unavoidable in a finite atmosphere, such policies are implicitly endorsed on a global scale.

In each of the cases explored in this book, decision makers have responded to global norms of climate governance in a manner appropriate for achieving taken-for-granted goals in the short-term, but ecological rationality requires these goals themselves to be scrutinized. Therefore, the transition to ecologically rational global climate governance cannot be realized in the absence of collective reasoning about social, economic, environmental, and political goals. Inclusive participation in such a process may generate new knowledge and awareness that provide a more conducive setting for consequential innovative reasoning on the part of authoritative actors, that is to say, innovative reasoning that successfully modifies or transforms the underlying structures that are incompatible with the realities of climate change. Of course, collective reasoning is alone unlikely to be a panacea for unsustainable development, but it is likely to be an important and necessary part of the process. Indeed, although he does not explicitly develop a deliberative argument, Anthony Giddens implicitly acknowledges the importance of the public sphere for overcoming his paradox whereby people do not address intangible and incremental dangers until they are visible and acute, by which time it is too late to avoid them. He writes that "success will depend a great deal upon *government* and *the state*. Whatever can be done through the state

will in turn depend upon generating widespread political support from citizens, within the context of democratic rights and freedoms" (Giddens 2009, 91). Unlike Giddens, though, I am not optimistic that appropriate leadership will come from governments. Instead, given that state actors have exhibited a limited capacity for consequential innovative reasoning, leadership must come from below. A continued reliance on leadership from above, and a reliance on state actors to interpret global norms in domestically convenient ways, will see governance continue to institutionalize unsustainability.

On turning to deliberative democratic theory in search of more ecologically sensitive political institutions and mechanisms, one has to confront the question of scale. Deliberative theory is highly diverse and one point of divergence among theorists is their emphasis on micro or macro deliberation.[7] According to Hendriks, "for micro deliberative democrats deliberation is an activity that takes place in structured fora where free and equal participants come together to decide on an agenda, reason and argue together and settle on an outcome. . . . In contrast, *macro* deliberative theorists emphasise informal discursive forms of deliberation, which take place in the public sphere. . . . Their primary focus is on the unstructured and open conversations outside formal decision-making institutions" (Hendriks 2006, 492, 486–87). At which scale, then, is deliberation likely to perform a more ecologically rational congruence-building function than framing and grafting? It is almost certainly the case that deliberation at both the micro and the macro scale is necessary. For the foreseeable future, climate governance will continue to operate within the structures of liberal democracy,[8] therefore realistic ambitions must be limited to enhancing the rationality of decisions made within liberal democratic institutions. At the micro scale, formally constructed spaces (forums, commissions, and committees) that bring together government and nongovernment actors to deliberate on the most rational means of complying with international expectations will be important. Such spaces could ensure that proposed policies and action are subject to a stricter level of scrutiny than has so far been the case. But participation in such settings is necessarily limited and only representative at best, and they are therefore likely to be of limited value in undermining the anthropocentrism that permeates wider social systems. For this purpose, a stronger presence of sustainability ideas in macro deliberative spaces is required; such ideas are already present but will need to be more widely and thickly disseminated by progressive media and think tanks, public intellectuals, social movements and community groups.

Approaches to mitigating and adapting to climate change are unlikely to be uniform across countries. There is certainly scope for diversity, but such diversity should occur within defined parameters of sustainability. Ecological rationality, as will be recalled from my discussion in chapter 3, demands that public deliberation on climate governance be informed by the overarching principle of "biogeophysical interdependence" (Baber and Bartlett 2005, 19). This would ensure that reasoning is conducive to providing the minimal conditions for human and nonhuman life support.[9] Beyond this more abstract principle, two specific principles would orient climate governance toward creating and maintaining a mutually supportive relationship with the biosphere. The first is an extension of the "common but differentiated responsibilities" norm to the domestic sphere to confront the positive correlation between inequality and ecological harm (Boyce 2008; Holland, Peterson, and Gonzalez 2009; Dorling 2010; Neumayer 2011). The rationale for the norm of CBDR lies in the recognition of global inequalities in historical and present emissions of greenhouse gases, as well as consequent differences in levels of development and capacities to contribute to global mitigation efforts. These inequalities are perhaps most acute between states. As discussed in chapter 5, in per capita terms India's emissions amount to just four percent of those of the United States, eight percent of Germany's emissions, and ten percent of Japan's emissions (GoI 2004, 32). Similarly, in per capita terms, the emissions of developing countries as a whole are just sixteen percent of those of the developed countries as a whole (Baumert, Herzog, and Pershing 2005, chap. 4). However, as Greenpeace India and other commentators have established, the levels of inequality in energy consumption and GHG emissions within many developing countries is as acute as that between developed and developing countries (Ananthapadmanabhan, Srinivas, and Gopal 2007, 2). Siddiqi reveals that in the Indian city of Pune, for example, the high-income group uses approximately nine times as much electricity as the low-income group; while within South Asia as a whole, upper-middle class consumes approximately the same amount of energy as the middle class in many OECD countries (1995, 450–52). Recognition of the extent of emissions inequalities within states offers grounds for extending the CBDR norm from the international sphere to the domestic sphere. Indeed, failure to extend this norm will allow consuming elites in the South to continue to "hide behind the poor." This proposal has received some attention in recent years. Jiahua Pan, for example, has argued for institutionalizing this extension by tying emissions limitation commitments for developing countries to the fulfillment

of the Human Development Goals; this, he argues, would ensure that greenhouse gas emissions are tied not directly to economic growth but to human development (2005).

The second specific principle is remoteness reduction. As I have argued throughout this book, remoteness in its various manifestations (technological, spatial, consequential, temporal, epistemic, and communicative) lies at the heart of the global climate governance paradox. Efforts to respond to climate change are therefore unlikely to foster long-term sustainability unless the principle of remoteness reduction guides the choice of mitigation measures. This means confronting the conditions and processes that enable a disassociation of the benefits of development and material accumulation from the damage effects on human and nonhuman others. For Plumwood, "[r]emoteness reduction is a good decision-making principle, because remoteness disturbs feedback and disrupts connections and balances between decisions and their consequences that are important for learning and for maintaining motivation, responsibility and correctiveness" (2002, 72). This principle has enormous relevance in the context of global climate governance, where existing inequalities and widespread acceptance of cost-effective emissions offsetting have created new opportunities for suppressing the signs of unsustainability. Responding to the problem of global climate change in a fair and sustainable manner will require a reduction in the distance between the emission of GHGs and the effects and mitigation of these gases. While spatial distance is the most obvious manifestation of remoteness here, it will also be important to reduce other forms, including temporal, technological, and consequential remoteness. What this means in practice is that the responsibility for avoiding emissions and mitigating the effects of unavoidable emissions ought to be borne by those enjoying the benefits of those emissions. It now seems inevitable that future generations will be adversely affected to some degree by historical and present emissions, but the principle of "remoteness reduction" demands that all feasible effort be taken to assume responsibility in the present rather than defer it to the future. It also means that potential technological solutions ought to be subject to critical scrutiny that considers more than mere cost-effectiveness. To the extent that technology is mobilized irrespective of its potential impact on human and nonhuman others, technological remoteness becomes a problem (Plumwood 2002, 73). Plumwood has reminded us that remoteness reduction is ultimately a political organizing principle for ecological rationality. This underscores the importance of public deliberation on the myriad political, economic, and cultural causes of excessive GHG emis-

sions. Such deliberation may prove most fruitful for slowly cultivating consensus on sustainable forms of political, economic, and cultural life.

GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE: BEYOND 2012

As 2007 drew to a close, the international climate change community of state negotiators, civil society, and the interested private sector gathered on the island of Bali, Indonesia, for the thirteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. The objective of this meeting was to draft a negotiating "roadmap" that could ensure a smooth transition to a new phase of global climate governance after 2012. Despite the contestation to which the global norms of climate governance have been subjected since the late 1980s, the resulting Bali Action Plan reinstitutionalized the fundamental ideas embedded in these norms. While states may have disagreed on the scope and appropriate application of these norms, they broadly accepted that international efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions should be based on universal participation but guided by the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and that mitigation should be pursued through domestic emission reduction targets and timetables. The Bali negotiations were unsurprisingly characterized by considerable disagreement among many developed and developing countries over the question of who should be expected to assume commitments in the post-2012 agreement. However, a compromise was reached in the final hours of the conference that ensured that the norms of domestic emission reduction targets and CBDR would be reinstitutionalized in the post-2012 agreement. This compromise was a result of India's proposal to include consideration of "[n]ationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity building," in exchange for consideration of "quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all developed country Parties" (UNFCCC 2007). Although this clause does not determine how differentiation will be interpreted in any post-2012 agreements, it has ensured that the norms of CBDR and domestic emissions reduction targets inform high-level deliberations and negotiations on these agreements.

Despite the important level of commitment displayed by the parties in Bali, expectations about their capacity to deliver an effective and comprehensive framework for governing climate change beyond 2012 have eroded throughout the course of negotiations. The level of public and media interest in climate change was unprecedented during the months

leading up to the 2009 summit in Copenhagen, where it was hoped a deal would be reached. But "Hopenhagen" turned into "Brokenhagen" when the 130 heads of government gathering in the Danish capital failed to produce an agreement that would satisfy public or scientific demands. The inept and opaque manner in which the Copenhagen Accord was drafted and presented ensured that the text, inadequate as it was, could only be taken note of and not formally adopted as an agreement under the UNFCCC. With extended mandates, negotiators sought to move forward in the aftermath of failure in Copenhagen, but the process has been characterized by mistrust and low expectations both inside and outside negotiating rooms. Such sentiments may have been slightly eased by the relative success of the sixteenth conference of the parties in Cancún, where parties managed to adopt a preliminary set of decisions on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, and forestry. However, although this outcome will maintain some momentum in the multilateral process, it can only be cast as an accomplishment in a political sense not in any substantive sense. Although parties agreed to a goal of keeping global warming to below 2°C (with an intention to later reconsider a goal of 1.5°C), there remains an enormous gap between stated collective goals and cumulative levels of ambition. On the basis of pledged state action and targets, the planet is likely to warm by between 2.6°C and 4°C by the end of the century (Chen et al. 2010).[10]

While it would be perhaps unwise to expect ambitious domestic action on climate change in the absence of an international agreement, it would be equally unwise to see such agreement as a panacea for the dangers of global warming. Although the outcome in Cancún was greeted with applause and a standing ovation by government delegates and civil society alike, it is certainly questionable whether weak action is better than no action. Despite two decades of purported global action on climate change, efforts have thus far actually managed to reinforce a cycle of inequality and ecological harm that undermines sustainability. Irrespective of the shape and substance of any agreements reached in the coming years, their capacity to shift societies onto an ecologically sustainable path will depend on the manner in which they are interpreted and institutionalized at the national level. Ultimately, though, the paradox of global climate governance will not be successfully overcome by the decisions and actions of state elites and bureaucrats. Only an expansion in public awareness and a subsequent demand for transformative action rather than piecemeal reformist policies will produce an effective response to the threat of climate change. This conclusion is, in fact, good news. Instead of placing

hope in the hands of state elites wrangling over bracketed and compromised text in distant and privileged settings, progressive civil society is best placed to mobilize people for transformative change. To return to my opening analogy, progressive civil society and citizens cannot remain among the background cast of characters in this ongoing story but instead needs to direct our next course of action. Of course, there is a long way to go and a stable climate is not guaranteed, but rebuilding public momentum offers the best hope for overcoming the paradox of global climate governance.

Notes

CHAPTER 1

1. For a comprehensive overview of how this concept is used in the social sciences, see Bevir (2009).

2. Discussion of these multiple sites of governance can be found in Pattberg and Stripple (2008).

CHAPTER 2

1. This chapter does not offer a complete account of the first two decades of international climate negotiations. Instead, my focus is on the first ten years during which climate change became a political issue, and the UN Convention and its Kyoto Protocol were negotiated. This limited focus is designed to highlight the normative foundations of climate governance that were initially constructed. The period beyond 1997 (when the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated) is explored in subsequent chapters in the context of the three case studies.

2. The full name of this conference was the International Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and of Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts.

3. On the negotiation of this convention, see Litfin (1994).

4. Earlier accounts of these norms are presented in Betsill (2000); Cass (2006); Eckersley (2007c); and Harris (2000, 1999).

5. Here "targets" refer to the agreed level of emissions at which stabilization should occur. "Timetables" refers to the agreed date for stabilization.

6. The UNFCCC creates three categories of parties: Annex I parties are the industralized states (the twenty-four original members of the OECD, member states of the EU, and fourteen countries with economies in transition); Annex II countries (the original twenty-four members of the OECD, and EU member states) have particular financial and technological responsibilities to developing countries; and non-Annex I parties are those states who have ratified the convention but are not included in Annex I.

7. See chapter 5. Agarwal, Narain, and Sharma (1999, 33–35) also offer a useful overview of the concerns of developing countries.

8. For discussion on whether these articles should be interpreted to refer only to developed countries, or to both developed and developing countries, see INC (1993).

9. Article 2 of the UNFCCC identifies the overall objective as the " stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."

10. The European Union negotiated a common target within which each member state assumes an individual target. This will be discussed in further detail in chapter 6.

11. This idea is popularly known as the "ecological footprint," a term coined by Wackernagel and Rees. They define it as "a measure of the 'load' imposed by a given population on nature. It represents the land area necessary to sustain current levels of resource consumption and waste discharge by that population" (1996, 5). The globally sustainable footprint is presently 2.1 global hectares per person, whereas the footprint of high-income countries is 6.4 global hectares per person (WWF, Zoological Society of London, and Global Footprint Network 2008, 14, 32).

CHAPTER 3

1. Whereas substantive theories offer hypotheses and predictions about international politics, metatheories make claims about the nature (or ontology) of the social and political world, including its essence, boundaries, and constitutive units.

2. Rationalism here denotes a metatheory that is dominant in IR. This approach should not be strictly conflated with the concept of rationality. Rationality is a broad and complex concept, while rationalism is based on a very thin conceptualization of rationality, namely instrumental rationality. The concept of rationality, as distinct from the metatheory of rationalism, will be further discussed later in this chapter.

3. This assumption can be seen in the work of Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 3), for example.

4. Michael Barnett's (1999) account of his role as a foreign policy bureaucrat is illustrative: in this role he acted upon and reproduced certain ideas by fulfilling such tasks as drafting memos and cables; certain ideas made Barnett's actions possible, yet individual belief played no role in the execution of his duties.

5. For accounts of these different forms see Baber and Bartlett (2005, 18–19); and Dryzek (1987, 55–60).

6. Examples of work that does seek to apply neorealist theories to the issue of climate change include Ward, Grundig, and Zorick (2001); Ward (1996); and Vezirgiannidou (2008).

7. Several scholars have drawn attention to this tendency, including Hovden (1999); Eckersley (2007); and Vogler and Jordan (2003).

8. Dryzek also makes this point when he argues that ecological rationality should have "lexical priority" over other forms of rationality (1987, 58–59).

9. Also see Dryzek's related discussion of "displacement" (1987, 16–20).

10. The term normative "fit" is explicitly used by Betsill (2000) and Bernstein (2002, 2001), but the idea is also implicitly used throughout the constructivist literature on norm diffusion.

11. The concept of feedback is Acharya's (2004, 246). He does not rule out that norm diffusion may be two-way process, but his study is not concerned with this possibility.

12. The domestic social structure should not be confused with the related concept of "domestic structure." Cortell and Davis (2005) have conceptualized the domestic structure in terms of state-society relations and the "structure of decision-making authority"; similarly, Risse-Kappen treats this concept as a three dimensional space comprising the state structure, societal structure, and policy networks (1994, 20–25).

13. For further discussion about the epistemology of constructivism see Hopf 1998; and Klotz and Lynch (2007).

14. For more discussion on the abductive mode of inference, see Gabbay and Woods (2006); Chong Ho (1994); Danermark et al. (2002); and Marsden (2000). Note that abduction is often also referred to as retroduction.

CHAPTER 4

An earlier version of this chapter was published in the *Australian Journal of International Affairs* (Stevenson 2009).

1. At the time of research this was the most recent report. A fifth report has since been submitted (CoA 2010).

2. GHG emissions data are sourced from Sustainability Victoria (n.d.): "About 1 tonne of food waste sent to landfill produces methane with the equivalent of about 750kg of CO_2."

3. For further discussion on this point, see Shearman and Smith (2007).

4. For further discussion, see Eckersley (2004a).

5. The idea of developmentalism is developed in Walker (1999); Aplin (2004); Mercer, Christesen, and Buxton (2007); Stratford (2008); and Beresford (2001).

6. The "dog in the manger" refers to one of Aesop's fables, the moral of which is that "[p]eople often begrudge something to others that they themselves cannot enjoy" (Gibbs 2002, 84).

7. The ESD process was initiated by the Hawke Government in 1990 to consult with environmental, business, trade, and social representatives on institutionalizing the principle of "sustainable development" in economic policy. See Downes (1996).

8. The Umbrella Group comprises Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, Norway, New Zealand, and Russia.

9. For emissions data see CoA (2004, 24).

10. The MRET was set in 2002 with the aim of increasing the generation of electricity from renewable sources by a mere 2 percent (9500 GHw) by 2010. Riedy (2005, 145) noted that due to the total increase in electricity generation, the MRET would increase the overall share of renewable energy to just 0.5 percent in 2010.

11. "The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) is the peak intergovernmental forum in Australia. COAG comprises the Prime Minister, State Premiers, Territory Chief Ministers and the President of the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA)" (COAG n.d.).

12. A partial list of member companies' positions is presented in Greenpeace Australia (2003).

13. BP Australia was not an obvious contributor to this group, yet by this time the company had begun to remarket itself as a progressive and sustainable energy company.

14. "Fair Dinkum" is a colloquial Australian expression meaning fair and genuine.

15. The period of analysis presented in this book spans two decades, from the late 1980s to late 2007. Some more recent developments are observed but not discussed in any detail.

16. Eckersley (2007b) has also detailed the way in which Labor has allowed the coalition to frame key aspects of the climate debate.

17. Australia did on one occasion call for "a long-term aspirational goal to which all can contribute"; however, this was the only implicit suggestion that both developed and developing countries should assume targets (IISD 2007d).

18. As already explained, more recent developments in climate policy in each of the case study states is beyond the scope of the analysis presented here. However, following repeated failure to pass the legislation in the Australian Senate, the CPRS was set aside in April 2010. Kevin Rudd lost leadership of the government in June 2010. At the time of this writing, the future of climate policy under the Labor Prime Minister Julia Gillard remains uncertain.

CHAPTER 5

A condensed version of this chapter is published in *Review of International Studies* (Stevenson 2011).

1. For further discussion on this theme, see Simms (1995) and Ahmed (2006).

2. Other smaller domestic research institutes and rural development organizations are also known to have advised the Indian government on climate-related matters over the years, largely through personal contacts. For more detailed discussion on this, see Jakobsen (1999, 230–33).

3. The other notable exception to this political stability is the authoritarian Emergency between 1975 and 1977, when civil and political rights were suspended, elections postponed, the media censored, and political opponents imprisoned. However, the Congress government of Indira Gandhi, which initiated the Emergency, was defeated in the 1977 election, an event widely viewed as a victory for democracy in India. See Vora and Palshikar (2004, 17–18).

4. The continuing tensions between India's old and emerging foreign policy paradigms is discussed in more general detail by Vanaik (1997) and Mohan (2004).

5. The G-77 is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1964 by seventy-seven developing countries "to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the United Nations system, and promote South-South cooperation for development" (Group of 77 n.d.).

6. One Indian diplomat and minister explained the logic: "our need for peace is imperative. . . . We have problems to face in India that would tax the energies and resources of a nation far better equipped and developed than ours. We need peace not in order to become more powerful or more prosperous, but in order to exist" (Misra 1969, 72–73).

7. This has also been observed by Sprinz and Weiß (2001); Jakobsen (1998); and Rajan (1997). For further discussion on India's position and experience in the ozone negotiations see Sims (1995).

8. A "non-paper" is an unofficial submission that outlines a country's, or group of countries', position on a particular matter under negotiation.

9. The Climate Action Network (CAN) is a network of more than 450 environmentalist organizations from around the world.

10. The text of this letter is available online, but it is incorrectly dated 1998 (CSE 2007).

11. This is evident in India's statement on environmental space at the eighth meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies in 1998. See IISD (1998b).

12. Formerly, the private sector had taken little interest (and in many cases, no interest) in the issue of climate change. As Rajan (1997), Gupta (1997), and Jakobsen (1998) all attest, India's environmental foreign policymakers made no effort to involve business and industry actors in developing their negotiating position, and these actors made no effort to pressure the government.

13. Kathleen McGinty was President Bill Clinton's senior environmental adviser from 1993 to 1998, and Karl Hausker was the lead official on climate change at the US Environmental Protection Agency from 1993 to 1995.

14. See India's comments at COP-8, COP-10, COP-12, and COP-13 (IISD 2002; IISD 2004; IISD 2006a; IISD 2007a).

15. This figure is based on the level at which the increase in global temperature can be expected to remain below 2°C.

CHAPTER 6

All translations from Spanish in this chapter are my own unless otherwise indicated as quoted in an English language source.

1. At the time of research this was the most recent report. A fifth report has since been submitted (GoS 2009).

2. This phrase has been used by Jiménez Torrecilla and Martínez-Gil (2005).

3. This temporal delineation is strongly influenced by Oriol Costa (2006a), however my characterization and definition of the four phases is somewhat different from his.

4. Given that this first phase of Spain's response to international governance norms coincides with the period of transition from the EC to the EU, at times throughout my discussion of this phase I will refer to the EC/EU.

5. At this time there were four "cohesion countries": Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland. With a per capita GNP below 90 percent of the EU average, they were eligible for Cohesion Funds to "reduce economic and social disparities and to stabilise their economies" (European Commission 2008).

6. The Commission of the European Communities was a joint executive and legislative institution responsible for the European Economic Community, European Coal and Steel Community, and European Atomic Energy Community, which together formed the European Communities. See Freestone and Davidson (1988, 6).

7. Ringius (1999) makes a similar observation about Spain's compliance.

8. For an extensive discussion of this approach see Ringius (1999, 142–45).

9. For a list of all provisional and revised targets under the EU's burden sharing agreement, see Lacasta et al. (1997, 225)

10. For a more detailed discussion of the EU's position, see Cass (2005) and Fajardo del Castillo (2005).

11. Examples can be found in various parliamentary statements including Tocino Biscarolasaga (1998a, 16911; 1998b, 11148);and *Ambienta* (2001, 14).

12. The term "passive Kyotoism" was coined by Costa (2006a, 228).

13. E4 refers to the Spanish acronym for *Estrategia de Ahorro y Eficiencia Energética en España*.

14. The assessment criteria are defined on pages 13–14 of the report.

15. These are my own calculations and they are based on the report's own data with the additional support of project details available at UNFCCC (2008a).

CHAPTER 7

1. This latter form is captured partly by Keohane and Victor's climate change "regime complex" (2010). But decisions are already being taken and enacted in a range of networks and markets that do not feature in this depiction of a regime complex (see Pattberg and Stripple 2008; Andonova, Betsill,

and Bulkeley 2009). On the nature and consequences of fragmented climate governance arrangements, see Biermann et al. (2010); and Zelli et al. (2010).

2. For other analyses of these norms, see Betsill (2000); Cass (2006); Eckersley (2007c); Harris (2000, 1999); and Hoffmann (2005).

3. It is impossible to do justice to this rich literature in my concluding chapter. The intention is merely to sketch a potential avenue for overcoming the problems highlighted by this study.

4. Robyn Eckersley makes this observation. A summary of some of the relevant literature is provided in Eckersley (2004a, 275–76).

5. My discussion of deliberation here remains grounded at the level of the state. There is now a growing body of literature looking at how deliberative democratic practices can be taken beyond the state to the global level (e.g., Bohman 1999; Dryzek 2006). It is beyond the scope of this book to consider how this might be possible in the context of global climate governance; this is the subject of a research project that John Dryzek and I are carrying out in 2009–12 (see Dryzek and Stevenson 2011; Dryzek and Stevenson 2012a and 2012b.).

6. This distinction is made by Tétreault and Lipschutz (2005, 19–20).

7. Hendriks (2006) presents a good discussion of this point of divergence and offers an integrative approach to bridge the divide.

8. Of course, not all states are liberal democracies but my discussion here is limited to such polities.

9. This raises a number of epistemological questions that warrant closer attention. For a discussion of how the interests of the nonhuman elements of nature can and ought to be represented in public deliberation, see Eckersley (2004a, chap. 5) and Dryzek (1996).

10. The Cancun Agreements are available at http://unfccc.int/2860.php.

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