UC Berkeley

UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

After Servitude: Bonded Histories and the Politics of Indigeneity in Reformist Bolivia

Permalink

https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4v34b13v

Author

Winchell, Mareike

Publication Date

2015

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

After Servitude:

Bonded Histories and the Politics of Indigeneity in Reformist Bolivia

by

Mareike Winchell

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Anthropology

and the Designated Emphasis in Critical Theory

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Charles K. Hirschkind, Co-Chair
Professor Saba Mahmood, Co-Chair
Professor Charles L. Briggs
Professor Judith P. Butler
Professor Sinclair Thomson

Abstract

After Servitude: Bonded Histories and the Politics of Indigeneity in Reformist Bolivia

by

Mareike Winchell

Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Charles K. Hirschkind, Co-Chair

Professor Saba Mahmood, Co-Chair

This dissertation examines the ways that histories of agrarian servitude in Bolivia condition the terms and experiences of state reform and political collectivity today. Building from 20 months of fieldwork in Bolivia, the research aims to critically intervene in contemporary debates concerning indigeneity, political subjectivity, and justice. Bracketing the assumption that histories of servitude operate primarily as corrosive or destructive forces, I explore what it means to live in a place perceived as still in the grips of the hacienda past and examine how inherited patterns of exchange and aid condition and are in turn transformed by current indigenous reform initiatives. Indeed, while Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party officials see rural practices of god-parenting, informal adoption, and land gifting as colonial survivals that fuel indigenous dependency and exploitation, many rural families understand these same practices as expressions of former landlords' obligations to former servants, including to children fathered through rape. Despite aggressive MAS reform initiatives aimed at uprooting rural relations that have grown out of the hacienda system, Quechuaspeaking villagers continue to invoke patronage ideals in order to demand resources and aid not only from former landowning families but also from a new gold mining elite. Thus, while bonded histories condition and complicate state reform projects, they also give way to specific rural approaches to indigenous injury and historical reconciliation. By tracing competing approaches to past servitude, my research foregrounds the creative ways that inherited forms are inhabited and imbued with new reconciliatory possibilities, possibilities that challenge normative political analytics that locate justice in the inevitable and necessary superseding of past in present.

More broadly, the work sheds light on the long-run process by which governmental concerns with bonded labor and agrarian servitude gave way to a particular form of indigenous claim-making, one that shared or at the least echoed reformers' faith in property as a stepping-stone to modern citizenship. In particular, I show how the reformist and popular focus on land rights as an antidote to servitude and as a means to political inclusion drew from and consolidated a particular political typology, the propertied subject contrasted with and at the same time partially-productive of an appositional figure of the landless, indentured servant. However, building from ethnographic research in former hacienda villages, I show that alongside this focus on property another political tradition has persisted, one concerned not only with land or rights but also with the problem of

landlords' obligations to hacienda servants. Here, rural opposition to MAS reforms stems from the existence of a distinctly post-hacienda mode of collectivity, one whose practices of labor, land use, and exchange do not map onto statist projects of propertied citizenship as well as more recent community land schemes. Examining servitude both as an object of agrarian reform and as a focus of reconciliatory action today, my research sheds new light on the limits to institutional approaches to justice while at the same time showing how those limits are inhabited by other traditions of moral and reconciliatory practice. By tracking the complexities of Bolivian agrarian reform, the work offers a critical reframing not only of bonded histories in Latin America but, more broadly, of the centrality of servitude and possession to modern categories and juridical projects of rights-based justice.

Attention to the ways that Bolivia's history of indentured servitude shapes current agrarian reform efforts and rural modes of post-hacienda collectivity brings to light a range of questions that are obscured when servitude is examined primarily as an economic system or when political practices are fixed simply to oppositional acts of hacienda resistance or rebellion. Instead, I underline the generative workings of labor histories and consider how various forms of agrarian-based belonging and exchange resurface within or get destabilized by contemporary indigenous reform projects. At its heart, then, the dissertation aims to contribute to the task of critically re-evaluating and potentially expanding the contours of the legibly political. What modes of fulfillment or desire, morality or belonging, can be accounted for within reformist approaches to slave abolition and indigenous justice? While scholars have suggested the limits to reified categories of indigeneity, can we think through these limits without falling back upon an oppositional narrative of resistance, absorption, or inevitable displacement? At stake in this work, then, is an effort to bracket the oftenuncritical adoption of rights-based logics as heuristics for understanding political or reconciliatory practices, ones that tend to align justice with the fraught yet necessary disentangling of a subject from an earlier order.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	iii
Introduction. Servitude, Citizenship, and Indigenous Justice	1
Patronage as Historical Practice	4
The Paradoxes of Indigenous Governance	12
Servitude as a Condition of Modern Citizenship	20
Organization of the Work	29
Part One. Servitude and Political Modernity in Bolivia	31
Chapter 1. Bonded Histories	32
Precolonial Patterns and Inca Transformations	33
Instituting Exchange: Spanish Colonialism and Inca Patronage	37
Land Resettlement and the Making of Indian "Community"	41
The Rise of "Native Oligarchy": Shifting Regimes of Land, Labor, and Exchange	48
"Wandering Corpses": Hacienda Servitude and Agrarian Reform	54
Republican Rule and the Liquidation of Collective Lands	62
Conclusion: From "Personal Service" to "Slavery": Servitude in Longue Durée	66
Chapter 2. Stigmas of Subjection	69
A Life of Scraps: Entanglements of Land, Labor, and Value	71
Against Pongueaje: Hacienda Servitude and Peasant Insurgency	76
Servants as "Slaves": Lived Entwinements of Subjection and Stigma	84
Abolitionary Instabilities: The Tragedy of the Rotting Oca	92
Fractured Teleologies of Reform: "Slavery Returned"	103
Impossible Loss: Reformist Failure and Post-Hacienda Collectivity	107
Conclusion: Paradoxes of Emancipation	111
Part Two. Sanitizing States	114
Chapter 3. Paper Rituals	115
1	117
Just Documents: Land Sanitation and Community Renewal Aligning Property in Past and Present: Compressed Cartographies of Reform	117
Peasants as Machines and Children	131
Against Transparency: Land Titles and the Politics of Indigenous Representation	131
Revolutionary Offerings: A Municipal Sacrifice	144
Conclusion: Indigenizing Bureaucracy	150

Chapter 4. Implementing Community	153
"There is Nothing Here": Archival Absence and State Presence	156
Funding Indigeneity: European Sources of Land Collectivization	163
Unwelcome Reforms: On Uses, Customs, and Being Treated "Like a Park"	165
"Walking Forward All Together": Unity, Unionism, and the Pain of Reform	169
Good Unity as Andeans: Post-Hacienda Belonging and the Indigenous Supplicant	176
"Son of a Landlord": The Intimacies and Exclusions of Revolutionary Land Reform	180
Conclusion: The Rifts of Collectivizing Change	183
Part Three. The Ethics and Encumbrances of Exchange	186
Chapter 5. After Servitude	187
The Intimacies of Agrarian Servitude	190
Hacienda Kinship and the Indio Landlord	193
"He Who Remains a Slave": Enduring Patterns of Stigma and Subjection	198
Post-Hacienda Patronage as "Moral Obligation"	204
Reconciliatory Rituals: Ch'allas, Chicha, and the Ethics of Exchange	208
Andean Reciprocity and Hacienda Servitude: Historicizing Lo Indigena	215
Conclusion: Toward an Indigenous Politics of Attachment	221
Chapter 6. Gold Dreams	224
Instabilities of Capital: Reciprocity, Redistribution and the Demand for Relation	226
Unlikely Alliances: Hacendado Authority and the Perils of Refused Patronage	232
Itinerant Labor and the Politics of Peregrination	237
Perils of Progress: Mining Patronage, Union Repression, and the Élan of Elite Alliance	240
Escaping Obligation: Wealth, History, and the Exculpations of Rights	243
Evo as Godfather: The Family Romance of Indigenous Nationalism	248
Conclusion: Encumbrance, Exchange, and the Occlusions of Reformist Justice	253
Bibliography	256

Acknowledgements, or, On Ethnographic Debts

I sleep fitfully. I dream that I am invited to a friend's birthday gathering but have forgotten to bring a gift. Walking along a roadside in my dream, I struggle to assemble a bouquet, a final effort at a gift. But each flower that I pick, while vibrant and alive at a distance, crumbles as it touches my fingers, its petals dry and disintegrating, its leaves scattered with insects or mold. My repayment, my little token of gratitude, is painfully insufficient. I scramble, scampering down sandy mountain slopes in search of fresh flowers, but my attempts to craft an impromptu gift meet a disappointing end. I stretch upward unsteadily toward elusive petals, yet the flowers always escape me. The flowers, much like a broader sense of indebtedness, remain partially beyond me, beyond reach or apprehension; I cower below them, meek and empty-handed, bearing only the feeling of my own inadequacy and vast indebtedness.

November 11th, 2011, Cochabamba Bolivia

The old Patron names haunt my sleep. With them, the thin, frail voices of elderly men and women circle in and out of dreams. I spend the days listening to recordings of Quechua oral histories. Elderly voices cracked and breaking, their words punctuated by bird song. As one woman tells me of the hacienda days, some tears spill from her small eyes, and she lifts a hand dark with earth and rough from work, using the softer part of her index finger to wipe away a tear.

January 31st, 2012, Ayopaya Bolivia

To engage in ethnography, not unlike the art of living, is to be entangled in relations one has not necessarily chosen and which introduce various forms of social indebtedness. As Marcel Mauss noted some time ago, gifting relations rest on both a temporal lag and a constitutive asymmetry, and it is in these various gaps and incapacities that moral life unfolds. Yet, these gaps and incapacities take on special weight for those whose research focuses on histories of violence and their continued grip on the present. In my own case and given my own positioning as a North American researcher, it was not just that I was writing about the weight of the past but that I myself became caught up in questions of how to engage, live, maneuver, trust, or forge friendships despite vast, often racialized chasms in resources and life possibilities. As indicated by the ethnographic vignettes reprinted above, my own fieldwork experience was animated and disturbed by a profound sense of indebtedness to my ethnographic interlocutors, a sensibility whose emotive grip loosened somewhat with time but whose moral and political incitements have continued to animate, disturb, sustain, and nourish the present work.

In the case of ethnography, perhaps one of the greatest gifts one receives are words. And these words and stories, then, also elicit various forms of debt or experiences of indebtedness. This is particularly so in conditions where to speak the past, to tell or to narrate, can itself arise as a sort of re-experiencing or return. Indeed, this was very much the case for many rural farmers whose historical accounts were paired with anxious concerns that, in speaking about the past, the past might return. Thus, former servants' and former landlords' narratives of mid-century labor violence and political turmoil themselves arrived to my ears as gifts that came at a cost, eliciting tears and at other times seemingly cathartic experiences of recounting and re-telling. In return, I listened, I attempted not to prod or to elicit these stories. I waited for words to come without demanding them or forcing them out, taking a somewhat more passive role than that of the exegetical interviewer. And yet, I remained indebted to many fieldwork interlocutors and their gifts of hospitality as well as stories. Despite the vegetables, bread, sugar, or salt which I often brought along to interviews, my fieldwork bears the marks of a broader, largely unreconciled sense of accountability, one that has shaped this work and the questions to which it attempts to

respond. Ethnographic debt, then, is not simply something that can be resolved or overcome by naming or acknowledging the various people who enabled and facilitated this research; it is a more enduring force that is interwoven into my analysis and that requires an attentiveness to the shape of practices and sensibilities that often diverge sharply from what I might have anticipated writing before I set out to do this research. While not resolved, however, it is the least one can do to recognize the work's various intellectual and material interlocutors. The errors and oversights are, of course, my own.

Unfortunately, concerns with the privacy preclude naming in full all the persons who have helped bring this work to fruition. In Ayopaya, countless individuals offered advice, connections, conversation, rides, and a place to sleep. Zaida welcomed me into her home, providing me with a place to stay before I was able to get settled in the town I call Laraya. Along with her, Huascar, Christina, Vitalio, Raquelle, Wilder, and Don Tito took an interest in me and my research, inviting me to join them on trips to former haciendas, providing transportation to mines, introducing me to acquaintances, and igniting my own curiosity and interest in the region's labor history. Doña Simona provided company and candy, her brother Don Eloy kindly offered to rent out a small cabin to me. In addition, people from the surrounding mining towns and former hacienda villages suspended their initial suspicions, allowing me into their homes and agreeing to interviews and oral histories. This work would not have been possible without them.

In Cochabamba, I want to thank Ramiro *de la plaza*, who approached me many years ago and, unwittingly, thereby drew me into a much more proximate engagement with the lived channels of indigenous activism in Cochabamba. What began with afternoon *api* in the Mercado de 25 de Mayo gave way to various excursions to the sites of public and popular memory—Heroínas de la Coronilla, the *chicha* breweries of Quillacollo, and various gatherings of musicians, artists, and intellectuals around *La Llaqta*. Over the years, our excursions turned into a set of conversations, about history and indigeneity, social change and tradition, and, above all, about the possibilities and disappointments of Bolivia's political present. Gracias, *amiguy*.

Many people made me feel welcome during my early days in Cochabamba in 2010 include Marisol *de la plaza*, Jesusa Delgado, Florencio Condori Chavéz, Raúl López Soria, Edmundo Arze, Juan Espinoza, Walter Gonzales Valdivia, Shirley Zenteno Villarroel and her parents Cynthia and Cesar. Other institutions offered library access, workspace, archival materials, and early fieldwork guidance. These include: the Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia (CEDIB), Agroecología Universidad Cochabamba (AGRUCO), Centro de Comunicación e Desarrollo Andino (CENDA), and Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Económica y Social (CERES). My first landlord in Cochabamba, Sergio Escobar, and his son Sergio Jr., kindly invited me to spend Christmas Eve with them, helping to soften the blow of passing the holiday season alone.

Throughout my time in Cochabamba and, later, during intermittent visits, fellow Bolivianists Sarah Hines, Carwil Bjork-James, Alissa Bernstein, Carmen Soliz, and Jason Tockman provided friendship, advice, laughter, and good company. I'm especially indebted to Sarah and Carmen, who first encouraged me to visit the INRA archive and, unknown to me then, in this way allowed me to enrich and open up the research in new ways. Conversations—including at times heated ones—with Carwil over the years have further enlivened my thinking, demonstrating the richness of intellectual exchange even and particularly across divergences of opinion and theoretical orientation. In addition, exchanges with Bruce Mannheim, Guillermo Delgado, and Pablo Regalsky brought me in conversation with Latin Americanist circles of research and writing, helping me to further clarify and develop my argument.

Finally, I want to thank the members of my dissertation committee at Berkeley: Charles Hirschkind, Saba Mahmood, Charles Briggs, Judith Butler, and Sinclair Thomson for their unwavering support over the long process of research and writing. In particular, I want to thank Charles Hirschkind for his careful reading of and invaluable advice concerning earlier chapter drafts. I also want to thank Sinclair Thomson for his prompt replies to my email inquiries and his always-thoughtful responses to research queries and questions. Earlier versions of this work were presented at the Departments of Anthropology at the University of Chicago, Wellesley College, Johns Hopkins University, and the University of California Santa Cruz. Questions and comments from these various audiences further enriched my thinking and pushed the work in new, fruitful directions. I am also grateful for generous funding from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, the Townsend Center for the Humanities at UC Berkeley, and the Josephine de Karman Fellowship Trust, whose grants supported dissertation fieldwork and writing. My parents, Leonore Hildebrandt and Bob Winchell, not only supported my graduate school pursuits; their artistic sensibilities and accompanying commitments to form have conditioned my thinking and writing in subtle yet constitutive ways. My greatest debt is to Michael for his ceaseless generosity and patience, without which this work would have been impossible, and to Henry, whose joyful dwelling in the immediacy of this world might serve as a paragon of life for all of us.

Introduction. Servitude, Citizenship and Indigenous Justice

The truck wound precariously along a road carved from a rocky mountainside, snaking through villages flanked by steep, fertile ravines. We pass a girl standing on the side of the road, and Don Raul—the nephew of a particularly violent mestizo hacienda landlord—chimes in from the back seat, admonishing the driver Lorenzo, the son of hacienda laborers, for not having stopped. A rifle wedged between his legs and a cigarette dangling from his lips, Don Raul notes sternly, "One must be friendly. You should have asked if she wanted a ride." On the next turn, and without a word from Don Raul, Lorenzo slows down and then stops, giving an elderly man walking along the dirt road time to climb up into the truck-bed. Later, when we stop in a small village to buy freshly made sheep's cheese, the man, carrying a woven *q'ipiri* blanket laden with food, climbs down from the truck-bed and then approaches the driver's side window. "How much?" (*Maschka valen*), he asks, facing Lorenzo but with his eyes directed at the reddish clay at his feet. Don Raul replies in Quechua that it's all right; there is no need to pay. As the truck pulls away, I turn, catching sight of the man disappearing into the underbrush toward a thatched adobe hut where two children await him.

In a nation perhaps best known for the mass mobilizations that swept the country and led to the election of Latin America's "first indigenous president" Evo Morales in 2005, the exchange between Raul and the farmer traveling by foot may seem relatively insignificant, evidence, perhaps, of the rural limits of political movements or the persistent challenges facing state reform initiatives. Indeed, as discussed below, it was in precisely such terms that Bolivian state officials understood rural relations, that is, as indications of the staying power of entrenched agrarian orders and the need for ever more intense and expansive reform efforts. And yet, it is possible to discern in this exchange a particular moral stance that is noteworthy in its direct engagement with the problem of social inequality, a stance demanding of further attention. Along with ride sharing, former landowning families act as godparents, adopt children and sponsor religious events, in this way distributing food, clothing, medicine, and money to former servant families. While seemingly marginal to national politics, then, such practices of aid are nonetheless crucial to rural life, particularly in Ayopaya, which was until the mid-20th century home to a severe labor system built on the unpaid work of Quechua and Aymara-speaking peasants in the fields and kitchens of sprawling agrarian ranches or hacienda estates.

Relations of aid among mestizo elites and indigenous peasants raise questions about ways that rural lives are both entangled in but also attempt to respond to the burdens of a divisive hacienda past. On the one hand, such practices reproduce some of the racialized dynamics so pivotal to the earlier hacienda system, dynamics evident in the exchange between Don Raul, a rifle-carrying "friendly" mestizo elite, the Quechua-speaking farmer to whom we offered a ride, and Lorenzo, the Quechua-speaking owner of the truck who Raul instructed to stop. At the same time, however, Don Raul's instruction to Lorenzo to "be friendly" suggests a particular orientation to others, particularly peasants, and to the region's past, one not necessarily shared by all elites or upwardly mobile Quechua-speaking townsfolk. Indeed, almost a year later, Quechuaspeaking villagers' outrage with one owner of a gold mine culminated in calls for his expulsion from the region, a conflict hinging, among other things, on villagers' accusations that he had failed to give miners and local peasants rides in his truck. Thus, while such practices begin from and unfold through various forms of economic and racialized difference, they also draw people together across these differences, supplying a moral framework and a relational medium by which to address the question of elite's accountability to the region's violent past, including the lingering forms of social vulnerability and inequality it has generated. Disturbing as they are to

rights-based ideals of equality and citizenship, then, practices like these must be attended to in the ways they shape—and potentially undo—certain forms of shared life.

This dissertation examines the ways that histories of agrarian servitude in Bolivia condition the terms and patterns of state reform and rural collectivity today. Bracketing the assumption that histories of servitude operate primarily as corrosive or destructive forces. ¹ I consider what it means to live in a place perceived as still in the grips of the hacienda past and query the ways that inherited patterns of exchange and aid condition and are in turn transformed by current indigenous reform efforts. As for 18th century Bourbon administrators, Bolivian state reformers today worry about the entailments of rural patronage, hacienda forms felt to displace indigenous life-ways and victimize workers, producing a particularly servile Quechua-speaking peasantry. Yet, despite aggressive state reform initiatives aimed at bolstering indigenous autonomy and self-determination, I show how hacienda-based relations of patronage and aid remain crucial to rural life, conditioning relations among families as well as to former landlords and new gold mining elites. Alongside governmental programs and popular projects of indigenous rights, then, my work highlights the subjacency of rural practices of exchange and aid and their moral and reconciliatory possibilities for everyday life in the aftermath of servitude. In the process, I call attention to the centrality of labor histories for Bolivia's political present and show how hacienda-based relations are both challenged by and in turn pose challenges to reformist projects and legal imaginaries of indigenous justice.

My concern, then, is not simply with tracking the continuity or rupture of rural labor regimes but, more broadly, with situating them within the broader transformation of governmental and reformist assessments of the region's hacienda system. Beginning with late colonial concerns with indentured labor and peasant landlessness, I trace emergent governmental unease with hacienda servitude. This growing unease was accompanied by a growing reform focus on the problem of rural land relations, particularly what was seen as the problem of indigenous labor for Spanish-descendent landlords. Reforms since the liberalizing Bourbon period reflected heightened concern with property, conceived of as a stepping-stone to modern citizenship. This reformist ideal of the propertied subject was contrasted with and at the same time partially productive of an appositional figure of the indentured servant. These coupled understandings of propertied subjects versus landless servants have driven state reform efforts, land reform programs becoming a privileged means by which to modernize the countryside and its indigenous inhabitants, yet they have also been taken up within native peasant movements, the focus on property fueling rural demands for emancipatory land redistribution. In the remaining chapters, I show how the opposition between servitude and citizenship remains crucial to reform projects and indigenous movements in Bolivia today, justice identified with the transformation of rural agrarian society. Yet, my fieldwork demonstrates that alongside this reformist and populist concern with propertied citizenship another political tradition persists, one focused not only on land rights but also on the entailments of authority, particularly hacienda landlord's obligations to former servants and peasants. Attending to this alternate register of claim-making raises questions about the limits to reformist approaches to justice while at the same time showing how institutional programs are accompanied by and interact with other forms of political and moral practice.

-

¹ Drawing from the work of Walter Benjamin, anthropologists have turned to an exploration of "imperial debris" as effects of history's corrosive workings in the present, one embodied above all in material sites. See the edited volume by Ann Laura Stoler (2013), especially the introduction.

Attention to the ways that Bolivia's history of indentured servitude shapes current agrarian reform efforts and rural modes of post-hacienda collectivity brings to light a range of questions that are obscured when servitude is examined primarily as an economic system or when political practices are fixed simply to oppositional acts of hacienda resistance or rebellion. Instead, I underline the generative workings of labor histories and consider how various forms of agrarian-based belonging and exchange resurface within or get destabilized by contemporary indigenous reform projects. What forms of belonging and exchange are fostered in the aftermath of Ayopaya's history of servitude and abolitionary violence? How do these practices of exchange and patronage influence or complicate rural perceptions of governmental projects of political change, including agrarian reform? What are the entailments of reform programs for these forms. ones which villagers attribute a certain moral force as reconciliatory engagements with the hacienda past? Finally, how do histories of agrarian servitude and their ambivalent targeting by colonial, republican, and now "revolutionary" reformers influence or effect current relations in former hacienda regions and among the kin of former hacienda landlords, servants, and tenant farmers? Are such relations cleansed of history's saturating or polluting force or are elements of them re-activated as the basis for political and moral claims at odds with governmental rationalities and reformist desires?

By suspending a purely negative reading of histories of servitude (that is, as the absence of rights or as an atomized collectivity of servants or slaves), this work aims to critically reframe anthropological and philosophical heuristics of political subjectivity and moral practice, attending to the residue of movement forms and modes of indigenous and non-indigenous relation at odds with reformist ideals of propertied citizenship and indigenous autonomy. In so doing, I build not only from political theories of slavery and servitude but also from a range of studies attesting to the complexity of Andean labor histories and their fraught place in modernizing efforts since the late colonial, Bourbon reform period. By situating my ethnographic analysis within a longer history of agrarian transformation in the central Andes, particularly in Cochabamba, I highlight the *longue durée* of rural relations of land, labor, and exchange and consider how their contemporary re-articulations complicate reformist and populist approaches to indigenous justice.² To do so opens up new ways of thinking, theorizing, and writing not only about subjects and places but also about inherited attachments and the possibilities enfolded within inter-racial histories of labor and exchange, questions that are particularly pressing given the tendency to flatten indigenous lives into a familiar portrait of homogenous, spatiallybounded, and timeless collectivity.

These fraught histories of labor and exchange, reform and insurgency, suggest that servitude, both as a concept and as a history of labor and exchange, has been and remains crucial to moral and political life in rural Bolivia. Thus, if political subjectivity—particularly modern citizenship—is commonly approached as a universal or even a priori human condition, this dissertation tracks the repercussions of a particular notion of the propertied citizen that emerged within 19th century modernizing agrarian reform efforts. Along with opening up possibilities for claiming rights and land, I argue that this model of the rights-bearing subject muted and mutated another set of moral and political practices, ones organized not only around elaborations of citizenship or property but also by ideals of elite accountability among differentially-situated persons and to the past. And yet, this new notion of the political subject—and its accompanying elaborations of indigenous collectivity and peasant injury—did not altogether displace or uproot an earlier topography of claims. Thus, while popular peasant movements increasingly drew from

² See my discussion of Braudel (2013) in the conclusion. For Cochabamba, see Larson (1998)

a notion of the propertied citizen to articulate demands for land and rights, within and beside these movements linger another form of claim-making, one hinging less on land or rights than on the entailments of agrarian authority and the moral possibilities of exchange. The interplay of these varied modalities of injury and redress, collectivity and claim making, reveal the multiple possibilities enfolded in the colonial past while at the same time highlighting the cracks and fissures in a postcolonial present.

Patronage as Historical Practice

Raul's call to be friendly points to an effort to distinguish himself from the cast of violent landlords, gold-hungry missionaries, and abusive Spaniards commonly understood to populate the region's past. This effort was especially pressing, if fraught, given that Raul belonged to a family infamous for its cruelty and violence. His uncle was known as perhaps the most wicked of the region's former landlords, a title earned both through the sheer violence of his managerial style as well as his relentless pursuit of indigenous women and female servants. It was this depraved character, peasants noted, that resulted the landlord's early death, the details of which were many and inconsistent, from accounts of his murder by *colono* workers to talk of a traffic accident to hints that he was bewitched, dying of an unidentified disease. Raul's grandmother, was also known to have been particularly cruel, taken to fits of rage in which she would beat workers until they died or, more often, until one of her children intervened. In addition to belonging to a fairly vilified hacienda family, Raul himself had worked as a military captain under former Bolivian president and dictator, Hugo Banzer. Coupled with his family history, former employment under Banzer raised further questions about Raul's moral character and the shadowy sources of his current prosperity.

Yet the concern with how to inhabit authority, including one's relationship to and obligation to the past, was not just Raul's. Rather, Raul's call to inhabit his elite status in a particularly generous way, evident in his insistence on offering rides to peasant pedestrians, was echoed in local historical narratives and tales of the region's past. In one story, said to refer to the regional famine of the 1930s, a young pair of hacienda workers (colonos) invite an impoverished beggar who comes to their door to share a soup made of corn remnants collected when they cleaned their grain mill.³ After he leaves, they find gold and silver pellets in their *moté de maiz* (boiled corn). While the beggar had instructed them to leave the hacienda without looking back, the young wife could not help herself. As she peered around, she was swept up in a great torrent of dust and then turned to stone. As we drove over a mountainous overpass, the now-elderly daughter of an impoverished hacienda widow pointed to a peak where the event occurred, a slab of stone resembling a woman nursing a child. Situated within the region's longer history of social mobility marked by the development of a formidable peasant landowning class in the 1870s, the story registers concern with the divisive effects of social mobility both for the hacienda institution as well as for existing village and kin relations. Like Raul's instruction to "be friendly," then, the story engages the problem of wealth, implying that the rapid acquisition of money, particularly through precious metals, both requires and subsequently entails a shift from sharing with others to turning one's back on home and family.

Thus, at stake in the exchange with the pedestrian farmer was not just the problem of transportation. Rather, this act of ride-sharing belonged to a broad range of relations among elites

³ For Cochabamba 20th century history of famine, see Jackson (1994).

⁴ Jackson argues that small landholders took advantage of a crumbling landholding class in the 1870s to purchase land (1994:86, 151-153). For the growth of a peasant landholding class in Cochabamba, see also Gotkowitz (2007).

and peasants which I term "post-hacienda patronage," a term that I use to mark their conditioning by hacienda-era inequities and attachments and their divergence from patronage at large. Such relations of aid included ride-sharing as well as a whole range of informal and institutionalized forms such as god-parenting, adoption, religious sponsorship, and the daily circulation of money, food, medicine, clothing, and other basic goods from regional elites to former hacienda servants and their kin. Unlike more general practices of patronage, then, these relations of aid bore the marks of the region's distinct history of agrarian servitude, including its relational channels and affective structures of exchange and aid, authority and violence. Situated within these historically inflected patterns of aid, ordinary acts like ride sharing took on a notable moral force, arising as evidence of elites' acceptance or refusal of their accountability to impoverished peasants. In the process, authority emerged as a source of duty to peasants *and* as mode of post-hacienda accountability to the region's violent past.

It was this conscious sense of obligation to others—and, in turn, their obligation to vou that struck Edward B. Tylor as particularly "curious" and "quite novel" to the Englishman. ⁷ In his classic study of god parenting in Mexico, Taylor went so far as to note that, given the widespread influence of god-parenthood, "it is necessary to count it among the things that tend to alter the course of justice in this country."8 Other works foreground the transformations of patronage relations in the face of political instabilities. In their seminal study of god parenting in Latin America, for instance, Sidney Mintz and Erik Wolf outline the unexpected ways that godparenting ties are maintained in the face of "progressively accelerating social change," leading them to wonder whether the elaboration or extension of patronage might be part of "the community's unconscious effort to answer new problems." The authors predicted that ritual kinship structures would react to "the weakening of certain traditional obligations" by expanding to include new categories of contemporaries, resulting in the multiplication of patronage ties to meet accelerated social change. 10 While attentive to the creative workings of god-parenting and monetary sponsorship within hacienda life, such classic accounts have emphasized the economic or material workings of "vertical relations" as a means by which landlords solidified their power. 11 Countering assertions of intractable hegemony, more recent works have reframed kinship ties, god-parenting relations, and even marriage as mechanisms of resistance by which peasants subvert economic power and obtain precious resources. 12 And yet, heuristics of oppression and resistance alike seem to overlook the specific historical patterns or moral meanings embedded within patronage relations. ¹³ More functionalist readings have emphasized patronage relations as devices of subjection and resistance, hegemony and survival, yet they often dismiss the emic or internal stakes of such practices, that is, the meanings people

⁵ Anthropologists have recently returned to the topic of patronage, itself a classic anthropological object, particularly in Latin America and the Mediterranean. See, in particular, Abranches (2014); Anjaria (2011); Jauregui (2014); and Piliavksy (2014) for the moral dimensions of patronage practice. See Guyer (2012) for a helpful review of this literature.

⁶ See Shever (2012) and Auyero (2000).

⁷ See Taylor (1861: 250-251 cited by Mintz and Wolf 1950:352).

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Mintz and Wolf (1950: 362).

¹⁰ Mintz and Wolf (1950: 361, 364).

¹¹ Mintz and Wolf (1950); Ossio (1984).

¹² Guerrero (1991); Spalding (1970); Wade (2009).

¹³ This is a point also made by Lyons (2006:12). For a discussion of how my work builds from yet also reframes the question of authority as treated by Lyons, see chapter 4.

themselves assign such forms and how such meanings draw from or engage specific histories of labor and exchange that link indigenous groups and Spanish-descendent elites.

As scholars note, practices of religious patronage grow out of overlaid Iberian-Christian and Andean traditions and should not be taken as pre-colonial holdovers. ¹⁴ John Murra's seminal work on "vertical archipelagos" drew attention to Andean systems of barter and exchange across distinct ecological zones and social groupings, islands of agricultural production reproduced in haciendas and upheld by rural farmers. ¹⁵ More recently, ethnographers have documented the ways moral ideals of reciprocity (*ayni*) saturate ordinary life, conditioning market practices as well as agriculture, kinship relations as well as ritual offerings. ¹⁶ Other work locates patronage in popular relations to governmental institutions, unions, and political parties, ¹⁷ arguing that such relations point to the overlay of Andean traditions of collectivity and more recent participatory governmental reforms since the 1990s. ¹⁸ And yet, not only do such approaches often overlook the legal history of patronage as a target and model of reform, ¹⁹ they also obscure the question of the reconciliatory dimensions of such relations. Had we been driving in another part of Bolivia, it is unlikely that Raul would have insisted on pulling over. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 6, it was not all elites but, rather, elites with familial and spatial ties to the hacienda that were most vulnerable to peasants' redistributive demands.

Rather than simply repeating a cultural logic of elite duty, then, Raul's case seems to highlight the "elasticity of obligation," that is, the ways that patronage forms enfolded within hacienda-based mores are re-crafted as critical responses to region's violent agrarian past.²⁰ More specifically, Raul's expression of a sense of duty to poor peasants and its implicit engagement with the region's history of violence points to the reconciliatory dimensions of what scholars have described as a distinctly Andean "authority complex." As M.J. Sallnow notes, precious metals in the Andes historically belonged to a complex religious formation in which silver and gold encased entire imperial buildings, ornaments, and ritual objects and in some ways "encoded" the power of local chiefs, kuraka lords, and state elites. ²¹ Given this particular tradition of inhabiting authority and linking it to redistribution, present-day accounts of the dangers of extraction should not be reduced simply to the problem of individualistic greed or focus on private gain on the part of mine-owners. 22 Rather, they might be considered as evidence of the "lineaments of a cultural logic" in which extraction is linked to morality, on the one hand, and to superordination, on the other.²³ Superordination, then, is linked not only to domination but also to the act of ordination, that is, of assigning a given position within an existing field of differentiated social groupings, a process crucial to early colonial legal logics premised on distinguishing Indians and Spaniards and assigning each a disparate legal code.²⁴ Wealth refers, then, not only to an object to be possessed but also describes a social relation to others, including requisite acts of aid and exchange through which authorities attain and retain legitimacy.

14

¹⁴ Abercrombie (1999:22).

¹⁵ Murra (1972).

¹⁶ Allen (1988); Harris (1995); Isbell (1977).

¹⁷ See Albro (2007); Lazar (2008).

¹⁸ See Postero (2008); Shakow (2014).

¹⁹ See chapter 1. See also Larson (1998).

²⁰ See Guyer (2012).

²¹ Sallnow (1989:209).

²² This is a point Sallnow makes (1989). See Taussig (1980); for another critique see Nash (1992).

²³ Sallnow (1989).

²⁴ See Thurner (1997); Herzog (2015); Pagden (1995).

Following this line of inquiry, then, relations of patronage and aid like Raul's offering of a ride to need to be situated within long-run patterns of authority and exchange in the Andean region. Indeed, historians have linked the conspicuous display of wealth in colonial cities like Lima to the transposition of elements of baroque modernity to the Spanish colonies, while other works have considered how Roman ideas inspired and shaped monarchical languages of lordship and bondage in New Spain.²⁵ Yet, we should also be attentive to the ways that existing practices of authority and justice, particularly elements of Inca political culture, both conditioned and reshaped early modern forms of rule, including in the Andean colonies.²⁶ During the Inca era, gold and silver were understood as forms of divine tribute, that is, gifts from natural spirits to religious and political leaders. Like agrarian gifts among kuraka lords, Inca elites, and laborers, gold and silver were used in a complex set of gifting and counter-gifting relations in which kurakas used community mines as sources of tribute or gifts of precious metal to the king.²⁷ In these ways, then, precious metals arose as a "medium through which imperial power and the articulation of local, regional, and state elites were expressed."²⁸ While the movement of resources upward to lords was seen as exemplary, upholding state hierarchies, their movement downwards led "to political disintegration, moral decay, and the collapse of food production."29 With the Spanish conquest, however, not only this framework of wealth but the very material topography of land and mines shifted, mercantile mining arising as a challenge to now-defunct Inca supremacy. Indeed, according to a myth collected in Puno, "when the Spanish killed Inkarrí all the gold was turned to stone." Thus, the "veins" of gold and silver dried up in the mines and the fields would no longer yield abundant crops as they did before.³⁰

If Spanish colonial rule transformed existing political, religious, and economic relations, then, it also drew from existing arrangements and idioms of authority and exchange that had been particularly key to agriculture and mining practices. As Sallnow notes, conquistadores' "lust for gold" was accompanied by an evaluation of mining as an "illicit, amoral and ritually dangerous activity," a view that continues to shape popular anxieties with the repercussions of gold mining and, more generally, the ambivalent entailments of wealth. However, as discussed in chapter 1, for farmers and miners in Cochabamba who had previously worked under the Inca as royal field hands and rotating *mitayo* miners, wealth was not only a source of corruption but also of political legitimacy, evident in a sort of virtuous authority that was upheld by acts of religious patronage, fictive kinship, and in the distribution and sharing of food and resources.³¹ While it is difficult to detect with any certainty the origins of such a patronage framework, whether stemming from Baroque expectations of divine duty or Inca sensibilities of political authority and exchange, it is generally accepted that some notions of distinction among native lords and their subjects preceded Spanish conquest. ³² Regardless of their amalgamated origins.

²⁵ For a study of Baroque Modernity in Lima, see Osorio (2008); for the ways Roman ideals shaped early Spanish imperial culture in South America, see Pagden (1995).

²⁶ For the ways Inca political and cultural systems shaped and complicated the colonial extraction and the broader problematic of authority and possession, see Herzog (2004, 2015), Larson (1998), and Sallnow (1989).

²⁷ Sallnow (1989:225); Santillán [1563] (1968:116) Thus, mining "mobilized the same moral relationships that were founded upon mutual assistance and sustenance in agropastoral production of food and also of cloth" (Sallnow 1989:225: Murra 1962).

²⁸ Sallnow (1989:225).

²⁹ Sallnow (1989:220).

³⁰ Sallnow (1989:220-221).

³¹ See, in particular, Larson (1998); Gotkowitz (2007).

Thus, as caciques were imbued with authority by the colonial state, caciques' relations to communities also shifted, marked by "distinction" from, and not simply accountability to, Indian "commoners" (Thomson 2002:34-

however, scholars have shown that "verticality" has been pivotal both as a material, spatial agrarian order and as a moral framework guiding understandings of political authority and moral practice. In the Cochabamba region in particular, appeals to notions of elite duty and agrarian exchange were crucial to mid-20th century peasant politics. For instance, in hacienda peasants' reform proposals, union petitions, and legal complaints in the late 1930s, peasants expressed demands that *hacendado* elites uphold certain duties or responsibilities, expectations for better treatment and for the distribution of food and resources to workers whose transgression often abetted calls for the abolition of forced labor. Peasants' complaints of labor demands bereft of landlords' traditional obligations to workers culminated in legal appeals as well as an armed rebellion, evident in the uprising of hacienda *colono* laborers in Ayopaya in 1947.

In contemporary Ayopaya, wealth arises as a critical lens through which villagers make sense of the region's shifting topographies of exchange and social order, particularly in periods of dramatic political upheaval. Along with the story of famine, people recalled the shifting patterns of wealth with the Socialist Revolution of 1952 and following the nation-wide agrarian reform law in 1953. Confronted with mounting anti-hacienda rebellions beginning around 1938 and culminating in a 1947 uprising in which haciendas were sacked or burned and several landlords killed, hacienda lords were forced to depart quickly on mule or horseback.³⁶ Chased off the land by militant hacienda farmers and union leaders, many landlords had to leave the gold behind, hiding their riches in kitchen cupboards, grain pots, and flour tins, or burying gold and silver in the grey sands of the winding Sacambaya River. It was not the first time that revolutionary events had elicited transformations in social order. Similarly, villagers noted that Jesuit missionaries fleeing after the expulsion of the Jesuits from South America in 1767 had buried their gold in the river or in the now over-grown tangle of semi-tropical mountain forests that rise above.³⁷ After missionaries and then landlords fled the region, many peasant families were believed to have accrued vast fortunes overnight, finding treasure troves of silver goblets and gold pellets hidden in former hacienda buildings. As these accounts suggest, political transformations were paralleled in the vast reversal of fortunes, peasants appropriating or pillaging the goods of Spanish-descendent elites, whether Jesuit priests or hacienda landlords.³⁸ Such narratives share a concern with the ramifications of shifting social orders, the possibilities and perils of the abrupt overturning of entrenched relations of master and servant, rich and poor, indigenous and elite. Enduring into the present, these narratives register a sense that the

40). Furthermore, Thomson notes, "While there is limited evidence regarding the traditional prestige and ritual practices surrounding caciques' privileged rights to land and labor services within the community, we do know that they antedate the conquest" (2002:41).

³³ On verticality in kinship and economy, see Harris (1976). For the dynamic or creative workings of "complementary" see Salomon (1985); on verticality and agrarian practice see Murra (1962); for reciprocity and its possibilities as a source of peasant resistance, see Orlove (1977) and Lyons (2006).

³⁴ Gotkowitz (2007). See also chapters 1 and 2.

³⁵ See Gotkowitz (2007).

³⁶ For historical accounts of the 1947 uprising in Ayopaya, see Jackson (1994); Dandler and Torrico (1987); Gotkowitz (2007).

³⁷ In Ayopaya, some of the largest and most profitable haciendas had been founded buy Jesuits who had come to Cochabamba before 1767 and whose haciendas had the largest number of yanacona servants in the region (Larson 1988: 225).

³⁸ As scholars note, this broad notion of temporal rupture and overturning is related to the Quechua term *pachakuti*, meaning "the subversion and transformation of social relations" (Aguilar, Thomson, and Skar 2014).

surrounding landscape is somehow imprinted by, and potentially destabilized by, the region's conflictive colonial past.³⁹

Yet Ayopaya's mountainous river valleys were also etched with more recent pasts, hacienda remains persisting alongside or even housing the remnants of state military rule, lasting from 1964 to 1989. Later in the drive with Lorenzo, nearing Ayopaya's border with the more tropical lowlands of the La Paz region, Lorenzo noted, "In the woods near here a metal door was found, and it had gone through an oxidation process that showed people had been trapped below." He continued, explaining that the underground structure originated in the dictatorial era of Hugo Banzer, military president from 1971 to 1978 and then serving as constitutional president from 1991-2001. Indeed, it was Banzer who was later forced to flee the presidency during the famous 1999 Cochabamba Water War. In the 1970s, Lorenzo noted, people in the municipal town of Laraya "saw a military airplane pass and fly up here." In such accounts, the dense semi-tropical mountains arose as spaces of uncertain violence that were replete with secrets as well as gold, where rumors circulate but few people pass.

These overlaid histories of violence often cohered in the same material forms, primarily in the rural homes of mestizo landlords who were often also active in or at the least aligned with past military governments. As one municipal worker recalled, "During the dictatorships, haciendas were used to trap and torture people." Others underlined the structural continuities, noting that, after the 1953 revolution, the former landlords aligned themselves with the state and became union leaders and government officials. Earlier, of course, the landlords had themselves also worked as military generals, screaming insults at hacienda *colonos* recently released from hacienda labor in order to receive military training for Bolivia's Chaco War (1932-35). In these accounts, then, the violence of colonial hacienda subjection, mid-century revolution, and military dictatorship were positioned as continuous rather than wholly disparate. This continuity of violence, however, was not just a matter of speculation. Indeed, Don Raul belonged to what had been an influential Spanish-descendent family, his grandparents holding broad expanses of hacienda lands, some of which he inherited. Later, during the Banzer dictatorship, he had worked for the state as a military captain, a position that resulted in the dramatic expansion of his landholdings in the region.

While these narratives betray a concern with the Ayopaya region's especially violent history of extraction and violence, they also suggest a particular conception of wealth and its importance for broader assessments of legitimate and illegitimate authority. On the one hand, wealth could be redemptive, for instance in gold appropriated from fleeing colonialists, missionaries, and hacienda landlords. Yet wealth, particularly mineral wealth, was also understood as bearing certain unavoidable risks. Indeed, villagers noted matter-of-factly that "the bad landlords were killed," cruel and greedy hacienda landowners having perished either in armed confrontations with former colono workers or in less determinate fates, such as through illness or bewitching. Importantly, this was a narrative accepted by the kin of landlords as well, including Raul, who described his own family as "terrible" in their violence and insatiable greed. In this regard, then, mestizos' ability to live in the countryside today was understood as conditional upon their (and their predecessors') virtuous treatment of peasant neighbors and workers. Thus, rural life in the present, particularly for the kin of former hacienda landlords, was marked by an awareness of the tenuousness of daily relations, a tenuousness demanding of them a particular moral stance toward peasants and to the region's extractive past.

³⁹ On the history of mining and colonial extraction in the Andes, see Taussig (1987) and Nash (1992).

9

Former landlords were not the only ones concerned with the instabilities and obligations accompanying wealth. Miners, peasants, and mine-owners alike acknowledged the risks of the mining life, a source of employment that would make you rich but also make you sick, ensuring a lonely death. Such risk was further elaborated upon in stories of carbon accumulated in treasure chests, erupting upon exposure to oxygen and killing its would-be beneficiary. Oricling past one peak, Lorenzo recalled that a Jesuit treasure trove was rumored to be buried nearby, but that whenever foreigners, archeologists, or elite nationals came searching for it in helicopters, the sky would open up and eat them, obscuring their view with a dense fog. Thus, while people with the resources came searching, in four-wheel-drive SUVS or in airplanes for lost treasure, the landscape seemed to subvert their efforts. In these accounts of abusive hacienda landlords, greedy Jesuit missionaries, and corrupt friends of military dictators, wealth and violence are conceptually paired, suggesting the underpinnings of a particular popular orientation to hacienda authority or mestizo status as a sort of depraved condition calling forth more exemplary relations of assistance and aid to rural peasants and former hacienda workers.

As evident in the ride-sharing case discussed above, these concerns with the entailments of wealth oriented memories and historical accounts, yet they also conditioned lived relations among families and to former landlords. Narratives of greedy elites not only set the precedent for critiques of elite corruption but also frame the past as introducing, particularly for Spanishdescendent and mestizo elites like Raul, a certain accountability and responsiveness to Quechuaspeaking peasants in the present. Thus, while the colonial and hacienda past could be narrated as the violent unfolding of mestizo greed, these narratives imply that there is also something potentially redemptive about wealth. 41 I approach these anxieties with the ramifications of wealth not simply as expressions of their variance from primordial cultural logics of collectivism or exchange but, rather, as emerging from within a particular tradition of practice in which authority and exchange are ineluctably intertwined. 42 Accounts of disappeared treasure, of the sky "closing up," and of people turned to stone, suggest the ways that natural topographies themselves resist or challenge a sort of malevolent extraction. Extraction, and its accompanying forms of wealth, are problematic not simply for their locatedness in mercantile capitalism but, rather, insofar as they attempt to decouple authority from duty. It is in their attempts to sustain this coupling, I argue, that we might understand the moral and political force of post-hacienda patronage in rural Bolivia today.

In this regard, contemporary relations of post-hacienda patronage emerge as *historical* in at least two ways. First, and as discussed in chapter 1, practices of aid and exchange are conditioned by earlier patterns and frameworks of authority and aid derived in part from the region's longer history of agriculture and mining, including the distinct institutions of labor and exchange accompanying hacienda servitude. Secondly, and as elaborated upon in chapters 5 and 6, such patronage relations are historical insofar as they centrally address the problem of accountability to the past, in particular, the continued encumbrances or weight of hacienda violence for the living descendants of hacienda landlords. Given the generality of the term "history," some clarification may be in order. In this work, I approach the hacienda past

⁴⁰ See Gordillo (2014) for an account of *entapados* and material topographies of colonial violence in Bolivia's eastern lowlands.

⁴¹ As scholars note, in the Andes greed is itself an object of much aesthetic and narrative work, evident in accounts of fat-sucking *pishtacos* and of mine-owners as living off the labor and lives of their indigenous workers. See, in particular, Weismantel (2001) and Nash (1992).

⁴² Sallnow (1989:227); Harris (1989).

simultaneously as a reform object and as a set of patterned practices, including relations of exchange and aid, kinship and labor. 43 Thus, while I take seriously the semantics of historical time. I approach history as more than simply a remnant or a transformation of a previous form of experience. 44 While often arising as a figure against and through which modernizing efforts unfold, then, the region's agrarian past also conditions more intimate, everyday forms, including rhythms of labor and exchange, affect and violence. 45 History, then, is not simply a sort of fractured image of previous wholeness nor is it the dilapidated material ruins or remains of modernity's ceaseless forward motion. It is also a positive, that is, enabling condition, one whose inherited relational forms and affective structures not only condition life today but also supply the modalities by which various pasts are engaged and even, at times, transformed.

In my attention to the historical patterning of affective and relational forms, I shift away from the tendency to posit emotion or sense experience as the absence or antithesis of structure and language, reason and rationality. 46 Instead, I draw attention to the ways that histories of labor and exchange condition and generate distinct modes of collectivity, in a sense supplying the terms through which subjects assess the moral ramifications of their own and others' acts. Inherited frameworks of exchange and their expression in contemporary relations of exchange and aid point to forms of belonging and attachment in excess of reified notions of racialized or class-based difference, suggesting the ways that histories of movement retain a residue or roughness at odds with the identitarian grids produced by and partially fixed by reform languages. 47 This creative re-crafting of patronage as a reconciliatory practice challenges more teleological approaches that assume the inevitably transformative effects of shifting labor relations or economic paradigms.⁴⁸

And yet, while these patronage relations might seem to be intractably incompatible with state projects of revolutionary political change, we might also be attentive to the ways they condition and re-shape rural perceptions and relations to political elites, including President Evo Morales, and reformers' own assessments of the stakes of resource reform. In this regard, heightened concern with the region's history of colonial extraction past in Ayopaya today has likely been shaped in part by the state's politicization of inequity as a historical and political and not simply economic problem. Yet, while both government initiatives and rural villagers engaged the problem of wealth and its historical underpinnings, they arrived at very different answers as to how these inherited inequities should be engaged or remedied in the present. To better understand this divergence, let us now shift to a consideration of the Bolivian government's current reform program, including its focus on transforming and thereby improving the lives of

⁴³ This dual connotation is aptly captured in Michael Lambek's phrase "bearing the past." See his ethnography of Sakalava history for a helpful discussion of the phrase (Lambek 2002).

44 That is, the ways it was "the philosophy of historical process which first detached early modernity from its past

and, with a new future, inaugurated our modernity" (Koselleck 2004:21). See also Benjamin (1969) and Braudel (2013).

45 For history as a patterning of action see Lambek (2002), Das (2006), and Mueggler (2001).

⁴⁶ Building from the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1980) and earlier phenomenological approaches, anthropologists like Massumi (2002) and Stewart (2007) have attended to the collective dimensions of affects is that disrupt historical patterns. For a critique, see Terada (2001).

⁴⁷ As Carter (2009:83) notes, "Spatial history put bodies back into the historical picture by asserting that space—the operational domain of white settler societies—is the discursive residue of a collectivity of movement forms, histories, and experiences. [...] The idea was not to mitigate a violent history but to show that within it there always lay another possibility, a potentiality for meeting differently."

⁴⁸ On money as an encumbered form, see (Sallnow 1989:209), see also Parry and Bloch (1989); Graeber (2001); Yanagisako (2002).

rural indigenous farmers. In considering these reforms, I raise questions about the difficulties revolutionary programs of social change face and suggest that such difficulties stem not simply from the inefficacies of law or the uncertainties of implementation but, rather, reflect some of the broader tensions within the very project of indigenous governance.

Paradoxes of Indigenous Governance

In Bolivia, 2005 marked and promised a radical rupture from an existing socio-political order. After decades of racialized exclusion and economic marginality, Evo Morales Ayma, cocagrower and a self-ascribed member of Bolivia's excluded indigenous majority, was elected to the presidency. In his inaugural address, tears streamed down the president's cheeks as declared the "end of a colonial and neoliberal era." He then vowed, "We will not allow capital to be concentrated in so few hands that many die of hunger. [Others] have the right to live better, but without exploiting, stealing, humiliating, or subjecting people to slavery." Challenging dehistoricizing logics of economic development, 49 the MAS government articulated a policy vision that links indigenous justice to resource rights, a coupling seen as necessary given the tragic effects of earlier foreign policy interventions aimed at structural re-adjustment and the neoliberal privatization of the nation's natural resource economy. ⁵⁰ Since 2006, the MAS government had undertaken a nation-wide reform program remarkable, among other things, for the breadth of its transformative vision. Known in everyday parlance as "the change," short for its policy name, "The Process of Change," 51 MAS party reforms include a new constitution, approved by popular referendum in 2009, as well as legislative changes addressing land and labor relations, education, agriculture, technology, healthcare, military and police work, racism, maternal and child health, as well as national and regional structures of political order at large. 52

When I arrived in Bolivia to begin dissertation fieldwork in 2010, the initial period of euphoria and the accompanying outpouring of popular support for President Evo Morales following his 2005 election seemed to be waning. Mass protests challenged governmental cuts in food and gas subsidies in January 2011 were coupled with the TIPNIS conflict hinging on the construction of a road through protected regions of the eastern lowlands in September 2011. ⁵³ Both waves of protest marked and contributed to waning popular support for Evo Morales. More specifically, the pointed to a growing rift or divide between Bolivia's popular masses, to which Morales claims to belong, and indigenous, union, and peasant groups. More broadly, the protests indicate the instability of Morales' own positioning as a sort of generous, almost-fatherly political authority whose attentiveness to the needs of the marginalized poor broke sharply from the austerity of earlier neoliberal policies. This sensibility was apparent in one taxi-driver's

⁴⁹ See Ferguson (1990); Mitchell (2002).

⁵⁰ This dual articulation of the so-called ethnic and economic belongs to what pro-indigenous politicians like Felipe Quispe describe as a "theory of the two eyes." For MAS then, racialized poverty and political marginalization are taken as dual outgrowths of a history of extraction that has continued from the colonial past into the postcolonial or, rather, neo-colonial present. See Sanjinés (2004); see also Goodale (2008); Perreault (2013).

⁵¹ In Spanish, El Proceso de Cambio.

⁵² This includes a 2010 autonomy law providing regional governments greater control over the use and allocation of municipal funds as well as the direction and planning of local development initiatives.

⁵³ Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory is a protected ecological area and a native community lands region through which a road to the eastern lowlands was proposed in 2011. See NACLA 2012, https://nacla.org/blog/2012/2/24/bolivia%E2%80%99s-tipnis-conflict-letting-people-decide for a review of the conflict. In 2015, Morales approved a revised proposal, emphasizing the importance of the development project as an "anti-poverty" tactic. See NACLA 2015. https://nacla.org/blog/2015/06/15/morales-greenlights-tipnis-road-oil-and-gas-extraction-bolivia%E2%80%99s-national-parks. Accessed August 2015.

defense of Morales in the face of national protests challenging subsidy cuts. As he noted, "The masses want and want. But how are you going to ask for more, when you know your father doesn't have it?" Countering accusations of failed generosity, then, this supporter of Morales appealed rather to Morales' exemplary nature as an impoverished "father" struggling with the masses' ceaseless demands for more resources and more aid. If the man challenged recent critiques of Morales, his defense of the president shared with critiques a sort of redistributive beneficence as a judge of legitimate political authority.⁵⁴

By 2015 this transformation seemed to be more or less complete. In lieu of earlier speeches calling for popular support for the state's revolutionary project, pro-indigenous activists, intellectuals and labor organizers in Cochabamba in 2015 gave public speeches outlining the divergence between state movements, including the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party, and social movements, los movimientos sociales. This critique of the cooptation of popular movements into "state movements" should be located within the nation's history of military rule, namely National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) party coup in 1953 may have initiated Bolivia's socialist revolution, yet it rapidly dissolved into some 25 years of military dictatorship. Such uncertainty, then, reflects concern with the ossification of "organic" political movements⁵⁵ located in the corruption of and subsequent abandonment by specific political leaders following their exposure to the comforts of state officialdom. As one man put it, "It's that Evo has enjoyed life in the Big House, the good food, the nice clothes." Morales's claim to not only represent but himself belong to Bolivia's marginalized indigenous and peasant majority, while tenuous before, seemed by 2015 to be largely untenable.

Growing popular opposition to MAS is often understood as resulting from the party's failure to diverge completely from the modes of governance and extraction endemic to earlier neoliberal states, a failure evident in the state's continued reliance on foreign capital investments to fund the largest sector of the national economy, resource mining. ⁵⁶ However, and as discussed in chapter 3, the very framing of this problem is revealing. In particular, such critiques render explicit the ways that MAS political legitimacy is bound up with its promise to break from earlier governments, not only neo-liberal ones but, as the Latin American connotations of that phrase suggest, colonial ones.⁵⁷ Yet this project is complicated, not least insofar as the very structures of political rule, including reformist approaches to indigeneity and justice, have been molded by and through the country's legal and political past. 58 Thus, while the MAS party has passed significant reform legislation, including laws heightening protection against racism and slander, quotas ensuring women's equal representation in government institutions, an augmentation of the national minimum wage, and increased spending in rural infrastructure projects, the very focus on reforming rural life-ways and indigenous habits places it squarely

⁵⁴ As discussed in chapter 6, here patronage ideals continue to infuse and condition popular relations to political elites, one that often merges with kinship-based ideals of paternal protection and aid. See Auyero (2000); Shever

⁵⁵ See Gramsci (1971) for the problem of the "organic intellectual." For a critique of vitalistic readings of popular movements and their opposition to what are taken as the mechanistic workings of state governance, particularly in postcolonial settings, see Cheah (2006).

³⁶ On contemporary resource politics and MAS nationalism in Bolivia, See Fabricant (2014); Perrault (2014); Hindery (2014); Bebbington and Bury (2014).

⁵⁷ For vernacular uses of the term "neoliberalism" as a synonym for neo-imperialism in Latin America, particularly Argentina, see Shever (2012).

58 My thinking on this point has been shaped by what Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000:3) calls the "postcolonial paradox."

within, and not outside, earlier modernizing efforts from the late 18th century onward.⁵⁹ While trying to diverge from the neo-colonial past, then, the more laws get passed and the more Morales speaks of aggressive and incontrovertible reforms, the more the MAS party seems to repeat or at least echo earlier modernizing initiatives, with their nervous attempts to fix subjects, remap lands, and transform rural life-ways.

Thus, the challenges facing MAS party reform efforts cannot be understood simply as following naturally from the efficacy or inefficacy of reform measures and laws but should be explored instead as partially shaped by the broader paradoxes of that reform process. ⁶⁰ What does it mean to try to govern in an indigenous way? How does this problem require new attempts to determine what the neo/colonial is and what the indigenous is or could be? And how can governance change or break from what it was, becoming indigenous, when the very terms of that project, including national improvement as peasant transformation and indigeneity as a horizontal, bounded collectivity, have been partially-produced in and through an earlier history of colonial law and republican reform? As these questions demonstrate, the Bolivian state, no less than the rural countryside, inherits the problem of how to inhabit a condition of being constitutively structured by what precedes it, here specific patterns of colonial subjection and subsequent governmental anxieties with their reform and eradication.

Attempts to distinguish current state forms from earlier ones is particularly challenging in the case of agrarian reforms, which were historically the cornerstone of colonial and early republican modernizing initiatives and which promised to transform rural peasants and hacienda colonos into modern, rights-bearing citizens. Like these earlier reformist initiatives, the MAS party's land reform program promises the radical, even revolutionary, redistribution of national resources, yet in its implementation such reforms often protect the interests of a landed elite. Indeed, this has led frustrated members of a landless peasant movement to describe, or rather accuse, Evo Morales of being a new *patron*, that is, landlord. Here, then, the nation's agrarian past supplies a hermeneutic frame in which state alliances with landed elites serves to enervate MAS claims to diverge from earlier colonial and military patterns of indigenous land expropriation and their subsequent state protection. And yet, rather than locate failure only in the incomplete rupture of past or present marked by the failure to implement radical social change, I have sought to highlight the ways that such instabilities are internal to the reform project itself, resulting in part from the inherited nature of reform anxieties as well as their well-trodden institutional cures. The story I tell is, then, in many regards an account of the paradoxes of attempting to transform the state in a condition where the broader terms and patterns of state rule and reform have been carved—or better yet, grooved—by the state's political past and where such grooves seem in a sense to over-determine the outcomes of MAS rule. Yet, on the other hand, I show how the paradoxes of indigenous rule are simultaneously the sites of other articulations and efforts at historical reconciliation and indigenous justice. In their impurities and

⁵⁹ For accounts of 18th century Bourbon reform and its entailments for rural life, see Larson (1998); Stephenson (1999).

⁶⁰ Goodale (2008) and Postero (2006) have addressed this question of the paradoxes of the MAS reform project. Yet rather than take liberalism as a stable set of ideas of "patterns of intention" or policy, I am interested in tracing the ways that the nation's past, including colonial histories of subjection and violence, have conditioned and molded existent approaches to citizenship and justice. Thus, rather than appearing as monolithic or universal, the liberal itself is fractured by its constitutive by histories against and within it has developed and sought to distinguish itself. Yet, I do not see this complexity as singular to Bolivia. See my argument about the importance of servitude for modern citizenship in the final section of this chapter.

entanglements with the colonial past, relations of post-hacienda aid and exchange attest to modes of collectivity and political practice at odds with more reified approaches to indigeneity, including the reformist focus on land as the central hinge on which rural justice depends.

It is in this broader condition, then, that rural critiques of MAS and accompanying opposition to land reform become intelligible not simply as complaints of incomplete application but, more broadly, as expressions of a sort of visceral understanding of the challenges enfolded within the project of indigenous governance. Is it possible to forge a rupture with a thing while maintaining its form? What are the material limits to political transformation? That this problem lies at the heart of contemporary MAS political culture is evident in ritualized political events performing and asserting the "re-founding" of Bolivia. 62 Despite these performative attempts to divorce MAS from the governments that preceded it, rural Bolivians are dubious. 63 Indeed, as I discuss in chapter 4, in a union statement describing the reason for the ousting of the National Land Reform Institution (Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria, INRA) from Ayopaya, rural union leaders noted that the state's attempt to seize and control land smacked of a "return to colonialism." As this statement suggests, for many rural subjects revolutionary state promises and popular hopes of indigenous self-determination have seemingly dissolved into yet another modernizing mission. To understand contemporary perceptions of the MAS government, then, especially in ostensibly marginal provinces like Ayopaya, requires attention to the nation's complex history of agrarian reform, on the one hand, and to the subjacency of rural patterns of agrarian authority and exchange, on the other. When united in this way, we find that the longevity of hacienda-based attachments is also a story of the limits to and fractures of indigenous governance, one marked by the state's incomplete attempts to disentangle itself from earlier colonial and republican governments as well as rural groups' evocation of the nation's political history as a source of state critique.⁶⁴

While living in Cochabamba between November 2010 and March 2011, I became interested not only in the modes of historical consciousness shaping state reform efforts and popular organizing but also their occlusions and absences, histories that arose as inappropriate within an exemplary and revivalist history of indigenous militancy. The nation's hacienda past was precisely one of those. Rather than approach this reformist problematic from urban centers and cities, then, I wanted to examine how it was experienced by people living in rural areas where reform logics are less entrenched, on the one hand, and where the identitarian claims undergirding indigenous nationalism may not appear as natural or self-evident than in cities like Cochabamba, itself the center of Bolivia's 1999 Water War. At the same time, I was interested in how Cochabamba's distinctive history of labor and land use might influence or complicate popular views of Morales, particularly on the part of Quechua-speaking groups who have traditionally had an uncertain relation to the reformist state. Evo Morales, along with many of the La Paz activists and intellectuals who have since taken up work in the central government, belong to an Aymara-based political tradition of Katarismo, a mode of indigenous revivalism that took its current form beginning in the early 1980s. 65 In contrast, Quechua-speaking groups in Bolivia have had a less secure place in recent institutional reform efforts in Bolivia. Not only

-

⁶² See Gustafson (2009).

⁶³ On performativity, see J.L. Austin (1975).

⁶⁴ Yet, as discussed in chapters 3 and 4, given the radical re-composition of state institutions resulting from the increased employment of people with rural and indigenous backgrounds since Morales' election in 2006, even the boundaries of the so-called "state" are difficult to draw with certainty and "popular" critique of MAS can emanate not only from outside but also from within governmental institutions.

⁶⁵ On the rise of Katarismo and its aesthetic politics, see Sanjines (2004).

this, but they are often explicitly stigmatized as less authentic or less militant than their Aymara counterparts. Due in part to my interest about how such political and historical marginality plays out in the contemporary reform moment, my research locates these questions in the rural, predominately Quechua-speaking region of Ayopaya.

Between March 2011 and March 2012, I lived in the rural town of Larava. 66 located in the province of Ayopaya eight hours from the city of Cochabamba. Laraya is the municipal center of the province, with a population of about 2000 people, including merchants, farmers, the children of former hacienda laborers, as well as a small mestizo (mixed Spanish and indigenous descendent) elite. About 90% of the region's residents speak Quechua, making it one of the most heavily Quechua-speaking provinces of Bolivia. 67 Agriculture, mining, and manufacturing constitute the dominant sources of employment. ⁶⁸ In Laraya, I attended union meetings, joined people in their farmlands and orchards, attended monthly *ch'alla* rituals, accompanied municipal officials to survey roads, celebrated holidays and patron saint festivals, and gathered with villagers and townsfolk for two much-anticipated visits from President Morales. In addition, I visited former hacienda buildings and agricultural lands, gold, antimony, and sodalite mines, abandoned mills, churches, and a distillery. Along with 17 months of fieldwork between 2010 and 2012 and 3 months of fieldwork in 2008, this research builds from 120 open-ended Quechua and Spanish interviews with members of ex-landowning and servant families, farmers, shopowners, municipal and state officials, domestic workers, mine-owners, and miners. About half the interviews were conducted in Laraya while the other half occurred during research trips to nearby villages. Finally, the project builds from archival research conducted at the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA) in Cochabamba in 2012.

Ayopaya's history of entrenched labor on hacienda states, combined with its often ambivalent relation to 20th century state reform projects, made it an ideal site in which to explore the ways that regional histories of indentured labor condition and complicate current agrarian reform efforts. As noted above, haciendas were landed agrarian estates supported by the unpaid labor of Quechua- and Aymara-speaking tenant farmers, weekly laborers, and domestic servants [Figure 1]. Originally consolidated by the titling of colonial land grants or *encomiendas* in 1645, haciendas provided land and tribute to Spanish administrators, merchants, and imperial elites. ⁶⁹ In contrast to other regions in Bolivia's eastern lowlands, Cochabamba's haciendas also included smaller family farms, often owned by former tenant farmers or small bosses (*juch'uy patrones*) who bought their way out of servitude, producing a particularly close-knit domestic sphere that contrasted somewhat from larger monoculture-based plantations of the Eastern lowlands. ⁷⁰ Men labored in agriculture, while widows, children, young girls, and unmarried women worked cooking, cleaning, raising children, sewing clothes, attending to pigs and chickens, and weaving

6

⁶⁶ A pseudonym.

⁶⁷ According to Bolivia's most recent census (INE 2001), about 90% of the province's 26,825 residents speak Quechua, and more than 92% identify as indigenous Quechua. This makes Bolivia's citizens include members of 37 indigenous groups and overwhelmingly identify as Quechua (45%) or Aymara (42%).

⁶⁸ According to the INE (2001), agriculture accounts for 58% of employment, mining for 13%, and manufacturing for 8%.

⁶⁹ For accounts of the development of the hacienda in the Cochabamba region, see Jackson (1994:29) and Larson (1988).

⁷⁰ On the development of Ayopaya haciendas, see Jackson (1994:182) and Larson (2004). For a comparison of the development of agricultural labor in Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America, including a discussion of slave labor on plantations, see Klein and Vinson (2007).

blankets.⁷¹ While largely absent from historical accounts, according to former servants practices of shared residence, live-in servants, adopted children, and sexual relations were widespread in Ayopaya's haciendas. Indeed, it was the ubiquity of "unnatural" or sexual abuses combined with the tight control over labor conditions that culminated in widespread anti-hacienda uprisings in Ayopaya in 1947, remarkable as the only case of 20th century armed rebellion in Cochabamba preceding the National Revolution of 1952.

Following hacienda abolition in 1953, most of the lands of hacienda estates in Ayopaya were redistributed or abandoned. Yet, today the kin of several former landlords continue to live and work in the region, agriculture largely replaced by small-scale mining operations in search of gold, antimony, and sodalite. While inherited patterns of inequity related to Bolivia's colonial past are evident throughout the countryside, they are especially pronounced in former hacienda regions like Ayopaya, a region known for an entrenched labor system whose severity disturbed late colonial reformers and led to early calls for the abolition of *pongueaje* or debt peonage. Ayopaya's entrenched history of labor servitude as well as its importance as a key battleground in Bolivia's Independence War made it a target of aggressive state reform initiatives. These included Cochabamba governor Viedma's 1791 agrarian reform as well as early 20th century programs focused on regulating unpaid services and hacendado violence as well as installing in rural farmers new, more efficient, agricultural practices. More recently, and as discussed in chapter 3, MAS state officials complain that Ayopaya's hacienda past has produced entrenched ideas of hacendado authority and property ownership that work against programs of land redistribution and agrarian growth.

Beginning in 2006, the Ayopaya region has been targeted for reform by officials of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform. The region has been the focus of much debate and deliberation concerning the possible conversion into Native Community Lands. Today, state officials are easily identified by their green vests adorned with a *wiphala* or rainbow flag marking the nation's "pluri-national" composition, land reform officials circling in four wheel drive jeeps as they undertake re-titling projects, re-initiated in 2012. In addition, President Morales visits several times a year, his speeches recalling the region's historic role in the Independence War of 1809 and recounting his sojourns through the neighboring mountains herding llamas as a child. For most villagers and peasants, union meetings constitute the primary site where governmental reforms are communicated to rural residents. Every two weeks the regional branch of the national union or *Central Obrera Boliviana* (COB) meets in Laraya, supplying a forum in which to review reforms and distribute pamphlets summarizing new laws.

Within MAS's broader reform climate, the enduring legacy of the nation's hacienda past arises as highly problematic. In a nation-wide agrarian reform program initiated in 2006, laws outline the parameters by which to title lands redistributed to hacienda *colono* workers following national land reform in 1953.⁷⁴ The 2006 law was amended in 2008, when an additional Supreme Decree *Relations of Servitude and Verification of their Existence* was added. This 2008 servitude law empowers land reform officials to "reverse haciendas with systems of servitude [and] to

7

⁷¹ For a detailed account of hacienda labor in Cochabamba, see Gordillo (2000). See also chapter 2.

⁷² See my discussion in chapter 1 of a report prepared by Governor of Cochabamba Francisco de Viedma, following his tour of the Ayopaya region the late 1700s.

⁷³ For the earlier period of Viedma's reform, see Larson (1998). For 20th century rural reform efforts organized around the 1938 First Peasant Congress see Gotkowitz (2007).

⁷⁴ The reform includes the Ley de Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria and the Ley (No. 3545) de Reconducción Comunitaria de la Reforma Agraria, both passed in 2006. For the details of the processes leading up to the agrarian reform, see chapter 3. See also Fabricant (2014) on the rise of the landless movement in Bolivia.

liberate captive families." The 2008 decree defines "servitude" (*servidumbre*) not only as a condition of indentured labor but also as arrangements where people work in exchange for basic living needs, such as food, or to repay outstanding debts. MAS concerns with labor conditions are evident no only in the 2008 agrarian law but also in recent labor reforms, including a child labor bill was passed in 2013 that prohibits children ages 5 to 14 from working. Both the focus on labor, particularly bonded labor, in the 2008 servitude law and the 2013 child labor reform suggest the ways that MAS's current reform program inherits from earlier governments an anxiety with rural subjection, one that is primarily to be addressed and resolved through the institutional mechanisms of agrarian reform.

Such reforms need to be considered in light of the ubiquity of informal labor and kinship arrangements throughout the Andean region, particularly in Cochabamba. As scholars note, arrangements of god parenting, fosterage, and informal adoption are common throughout Latin America, supplying a means by which to address poverty and organized by moral ideals of assistance to the poor, particularly indigent kin and neighbors. 75 Yet, as discussed in chapter 1, these relations have a particularly complex history in Cochabamba. ⁷⁶ In the colonial era, various classes of itinerant and mobile workers were often absorbed into encomienda and later hacienda households, integrated as kin or servants whose labor was repaid in land access as well as wool and cloth, chicha beer and food. 77 While these practices of patronage were initially encouraged and even instituted by colonial reformers as models of peaceful agrarian order based on an earlier Inca political order, they were later targeted by Bourbon administrators as expressions of a pre-modern agricultural order in desperate need of reform. ⁷⁸ Today then, as in the nation's past, , the designation "servitude" operates not only to describe but also to make available and legible a range of rural social and economic relations as objects of legal intervention to be addressed through agrarian reform. And like earlier state programs, these interventions position rural populations not only as agents of political change but also as objects of reform, justice contingent upon expelling the abiding traces of colonial subjection.⁷⁹

These long-run patterns of rural labor and exchange have ramifications for present-day experiences and assessments of MAS governance. Indeed, contemporary attempts to subject an ever-expanding field of practice to reformist scrutiny do not go unchallenged. For instance, the 2013 ban on child labor generated widespread protests, largely by unionized child workers, forcing the government to retract the law and pass new legislation in 2014 decriminalizing work for children as young as ten. ⁸⁰ These protests, coupled with the ousting of the land reform institute in Ayopaya in 2011, suggest the limits facing MAS reform efforts, particularly those concerning the institutionalization of legal standards controlling labor practices. While MAS is adamant in its commitment to install a new paradigm of national rule, many Bolivians, particularly in rural regions, draw from the country's earlier histories of colonial intervention and

⁷⁵ For Andean kinship relations, see Van Vleet (2008), for the importance of god-parenting and informal adoption in particular, see Leinaweaver (2007) and Weismantel (1995).

⁷⁶ Larson (1988).

⁷⁷ See Larson (1988).

⁷⁸ See Gotkowitz (2007).

⁷⁹ For the likenesses between indigenizing reform and earlier colonial state paternalism, see García (2005) and Medeiros (2005).

⁸⁰ For newspaper coverage of the protests, including an online video, see El Pais Internacional, 25 diciembre 2013. Online resource: http://internacional.elpais.com/

internacional/2013/12/25/actualidad/1387985009_067644.html. Accessed January 2015. For English language coverage of the debate, see www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-28360838. Accessed January 2015.

republican paternalism to make sense of and critique current indigenous reform projects. ⁸¹ Thus, while Bolivians of a range of backgrounds voted for Morales in large numbers and, overwhelmingly, continue to support the MAS party, this does not mean that the government's attempts to translate reform models into ordinary practices has run smoothly nor does it mean that reformist visions of justice constitute the only or even the most accepted answer to the problem of how to address the continued reverberations of the nation's hacienda past. As evident in rural groups' evocations of past colonialism, Ayopaya's hacienda past conditions current patronage relations among former landowning and servant families yet the forms of collectivity and political experience conditioned by the region's reformist past also act as sources of popular opposition and mistrust toward the MAS state today. Put differently, at the same time that past hacienda servitude is addressed through contemporary moral relations of exchange, state reform efforts targeted at transforming hacienda relations since the late colonial period also work to condition and destabilize rural political relations to the MAS government.

While scholars often position MAS party concerns with indigenous rights and justice as outgrowths or expressions of the rise of ethnic politics following the Indigenous Decade of the 1980s, putting the state's focus on rural land and labor conditions in a broader historical frame shows that these concerns are hardly new. For late colonial and then republican administrators, too, modernizing reforms focused on uprooting rural relations of servitude and unpaid labor, land resettlement programs and later the distribution of property titles promising to convert hordes of miserable peasants into modern subjects and later citizens. That current legal measures and protections against servitude are located principally in agrarian law suggested the continued problem of hacienda-based institutions not only for land relations but also for the broader problem of national citizenship and, arguably, postcolonial modernity. In MAS reform laws as in the past, citizenship is constitutively defined against servitude, itself remediable through and calling forth the need for rural agrarian reform and, in particular, land titling.

Taking my cue from Bolivia's agrarian record, then, the following chapters approach the remapping of space, the titling of land, and the reform of existing relations of labor and exchange as intractably entwined. As in earlier land resettlement programs, property lines attempt to impose grids of intelligibility not only upon land but also persons and relations, including what are often taken as insidious entanglements of affect, affinity, and violence. The stakes of land reform, then, need to be considered in light of an earlier problematic of servitude, with its distinctions between those with and without land and the entailments of these distinctions for the regimes of both labor and law. And yet, the region's agrarian past arises not simply as a target of reform but also as a site of practice, including patterned relations of authority and exchange, patronage and aid. Along with comprising crucial reconciliatory forms, these relations also form the shared ground from which villagers act politically and experience the state. Indeed, in a national climate marked by radical discontinuities between popular expectations and governmental promises and by the continued grip of neo-colonial patterns of indigenous exclusion and social vulnerability despite state reform efforts, relations to regional elites also arise as an important modality of claim making. Not only do they provide access to material

⁸¹ As discussed in chapter 2, this includes comparisons of the MAS to the National Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Nacoinal Revolucionario*, MNR) under whose aegis the redistribution of hacienda farm-lands to indigenous workers and servants was first realized in 1953.

⁸² Gotkowitz (2007).

⁸³ Indeed, as noted above, current land reform programs remain focused not simply on property relations but also, and revealingly, labor relations.

goods and services, they also offer a way to address what has become for many a tense rural climate marked by the ever-present possibility for violent clashes between rural indigenous peasants and mestizo elites, including agronomists, reform officials, and scholars of Quechua and Aymara-speaking backgrounds. Thus, I am interested not only in the ways that previous and ongoing reform initiatives condition and transform rural relations, but also in outlining how rural labor histories and contemporary post-hacienda relations influence the very terms and experiences of that reform. To do so unsteadies presumed distinctions between tradition and law, indigeneity and the state, complicating linear accounts both of law's transformative displacement of rural life-ways or, conversely, of social forms as somehow inviolable to the effects of introduced political and juridical categories.

Servitude as a Condition of Citizenship

The figure of the landless servant or slave occupied a central place in early modern debates concerning political subjectivity in Europe. 84 This was particularly true in Spain, given the monarchy's explicit links to Roman imperial ideology. Roman models of empire—including the legal contrast between citizen and slave, human and barbarian—arose as a structuring armature within Spanish monarchical approaches not only to non-Christians in Europe but also for imperial expansion outward into what is today South America. Indeed, unlike other European countries, mid-century Spain's monarchy seriously considered the possibilities of world rule, a "lordship of all the world" modeled on the Roman idea of a single 'orbis terrarum'. 85 Roman political ideologies were "renovated" by the Spanish monarchy to justify imperial expansion and to outline a contrast between the juridical person or citizen, on the one hand, and other class of barbarians whose natural state, it was thought, was one of slavery and thus which, as Cicero had argued, should be subjected to servitude "for their welfare." Within early modern Spain. categories of the barbarian merged with that of the non-Christian, civitas being a condition distinctly inhabited by Christians yet which promised to integrate non-Christians or barbarians through civilizing them, a term initially marking a change of status from one set of laws to another. 87 Thus, from the early modern period onward, notions of citizenship rested on distinctions among various genera of peoples, including the divergence of Christian subjects from slaves and servants. The colonial "discovery" of new classes of people in South America may have confused this binary, yet Spanish administrators, priests, jurists, and royal officials also drew upon Roman typologies as they attempted to legitimate the imperial project and struggled to render new classes of people and territory intelligible and governable.

Even before the problem of slavery arose as a crucial site of moral and political debate in Europe beginning in the late 18th century, early modern monarchies, particularly in Spain, invoked Roman oppositions between slavery and citizenship as models for and legitimations for colonial rule. In colonial Peru this resulted in a particular juridical structure premised on a divide between a Republic of Spaniards (Christians) and a Republic of Indians (non-Christians), each corresponding to a distinct legal code. ⁸⁸ While some scholars, like Anthony Pagden, have argued

20

-

⁸⁴ Pagden (1995); see also Skinner (1988); Nietszche (1886). For an account of the colonial slave trade in South America, see Klein and Vinson (2007) and for a useful treatment of the relation between hacienda servitude and colonial slavery, particularly in the Andes, see Keith (1977).

⁸⁵ Thus, as Pagden argues, the "European empires in America had been created in the shadow of an ancient and medieval legacy of universalism, of a presumed right of lordship over the entire world" (1995:4-5, 8).

⁸⁶ Pagden (1995:20) citing a report by Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* (XIX:21).

⁸⁷ See Pagden for an account of Roman understandings of civilization and civilizing (1995).

⁸⁸ On the dual-republic system in colonial Peru, see Thurner (1997).

that this view of lordship was universal, the universality of humanity or of the citizen was not initially or in any obvious sense of principle concern. This was, then, a sort of universalism without humanism. Yet, with growing political anxiety concerning the legitimacy of colonial rule and subjection related to nascent notions of natural rights and citizenship in 18th century Europe, this changed. The Bourbon reforms in Bolivia, beginning around 1791, can be understood precisely as reflecting a changing political climate in which earlier distinctions between classes of persons and divisions between the citizen and the barbarian could no longer be upheld.⁸⁹ If new colonies were being created in India and Africa, these were marked by attempts to distinguish new, ostensibly "commercial" endeavors from earlier colonial and missionary ones. 90 For those concerned with distinguishing and validating Europe's 'Second empires,' imperialism "fell into that large group of surviving features from an earlier age." In short, it seemed colonial institutions had outgrown themselves, and the legal logics and juridical structures that initially supported and organized Spain's brutal imperial exploits in South America now arose as moral and political problems in dire need of reform.⁹²

Of course, the challenge to early modern imperial rhetorics from within Europe should not obscure the continuities between the earlier colonial phase of expansion and the so-called Second Colonialism. 93 Indeed, the civilizing, that is, transformative possibilities of law were a key feature of Roman law. Indeed, following from Roman law, these two classes of persons and their accompanying categories were not seen as absolute. Strangers or barbarians could be integrated into *civitas* by way of their civilization, that is, a shift from one legal status to another. One means of such a process was manumission, another conversion. But, more generally, transformations in conditions of labor and religion were taken as enabling a possible shift in the legal category of personhood. It is this earlier notion of civilizing that would become key to the so-called Second Empires in Indian and Africa, legitimated by narratives of universal civilizing efforts rather than, simply, languages of imperial expansion, extraction, or evangelization.⁹⁴

As scholars note, one of the sources of critique of early modern imperial expansion can be found in the nascent language of natural rights. Here thinkers in Britain and France waged critiques of Roman models in their challenges to natural rights, drawing from a more explicitly Greek tradition in outlining a new model of republican government and introducing some of the earliest critiques of colonial slavery in the European empires. 95 For instance, mid-17th century parliamentary debates in Britain were marked by a new concern with liberty, one in which, following Roman thought, the "loss of liberty" was aligned with a condition in which actions do not follow from will. 96 Increasingly, what was thought to made slaves unfree was not being coerced into action but rather a legal distinction between "those who are, and those who are not,

⁸⁹ Pagden (1995).

⁹⁰ See Pagden (1995) for a discussion of the First and Second Colonialism and the shift away from religious to commercial ideologies.
⁹¹ Pagden (1995:7 citing Schumpeter 1951:84).

⁹² For these reform debates in colonial Peru see Larson (1998); for the Cochabamba region in particular see Gotkowitz (2007).

See Pagden (1995) for an account of this continuity. See also Herzog (2015) and McCormack (2007).

⁹⁴ Such a model of imperial rule as civilizing can be detected, according to Pagden, in the works of Adam Smith and Anne Robert Turgot, attempts "to formulate entirely new principles for any future colonial relations, ones which were precisely conceived on Greek rather than Roman models" (Pagden 1995:9).

⁹⁵ In Spain, in contrast, this more divided legalistic Roman-inspired tradition persisted much later. See Pagden (1995); see also Vinson and Klein (2007) on the spread of abolitionist discourses to the South American colonies. ⁹⁶ Skinner (1998:40).

sui iuris, within their own jurisdiction or right." Problematic for 17th century British reformers, then, was less the transferability of the person than its disruption of the natural progression from free will to action, one described as a state of "dependency." Yet, while being subject over one's self is first opposed to the renunciation of will, it is also understood as a precondition for willingly transferring one's sovereignty to the state, that is, becoming a citizen. In this way, then, a rights-based approach to subjectivity sanctioned practices that a non-subjectivist stance did not, rendering the subject transferable via the forfeiture of rights. Here, one detects the sources of conflict between an Spanish colonial model of two republics and two sets of law, in which Indians had rights but not the same rights as Spaniards, and an incipient view of natural rights in which, however, those natural rights were thought to be universal and a priori and yet could be—for instance, in the case of slavery—decoupled from the person. 100

In European debates as in their colonial deployment, these categories of servitude and slavery were geographically and racially distributed, entwined with conceptions of civilized metropolis and barbarian colony or hinterlands. Indeed, somewhat revealingly, in the British parliamentary debates, the condition of "Brutish servitude" was applicable not only to persons but also to unfree cities and states. ¹⁰¹ Thus, just as children would grow to be masters of their own house, for early state subjects of metropole and colony to mature required a process of supervised training, one where state pedagogical efforts and civilizational programs were deeply intertwined. ¹⁰² It was a similar logic, of course, that shaped late colonial debates about the problem of indigenous servitude in Bolivia, evident in arguments that rural subjects should be provided the conditions within which to foster liberty without being assigned full political rights. ¹⁰³ Some have argued that this is why the colonies of South America were much more tolerant and even encouraging of processes of manumission, one that distinguished them from their North American counterparts. ¹⁰⁴ In part following from this civilizational logics in which rural subjects were not categorically unsuited to self-rule and yet lacked the appropriate state of maturation, rural subjects were held in a sort of limbo, an in-between condition in which the very

⁹⁷ See Skinner (1998:40-41). Thus, a slave might avoid coercion but still be unfree insofar as he is "subject to the jurisdiction of someone else," or in a state in *potestate domini*, within the power of a master other than that of the self (1998:41).

⁹⁸ Here, servitude was a term used to describe bodies at the "mercy of their masters" (Skinner 1998:42-43), those "perpetually subject or liable to harm or punishment" (1998:42). Freedom can be forfeited or undermined in two primary ways. The first is "state coercion" and the second, which was the concern of the neo-Roman theorists, is to "merely fall into a condition of political subjection or dependence" (1998:69). To be any less than "Maisters of Family in their own house" is to be reduced to "slaves and vassals" (Skinner 1998:75).

⁹⁹ For instance, it was only when medieval approaches to "property rights" as claims gave way to the late Middle Ages view of property rights as "freely transferred," that liberty was first seen as something alienable (Asad 2003:130). In this way, as Asad points out, "a theory of rights sanctioned practices – such as slavery – that an antisubjectivist theory disallowed" (2003:130 citing Tuck 1979:49).

¹⁰⁰ Of course, as discussed in chapters 1 and 2, colonial juridical categories in Peru were by no means constrained to two classes of persons; instead a range of intermediary positions including *forasteros* (landless workers), *mitayos* (seasonal tribute workers), *yanaconas* (forced laborers), *mestizos* (mixed bloods with no tribute obligations) occupied a space between but also a bridge from Indio to Spanish legal status.

Thus, building from the parliamentary debates, Skinner notes that unfree cities or states, like subjects, pointed to a condition of "brutish Servitude" (1998:38).

¹⁰² Thus, importantly, the relation of colony to empire parallels this relation of slave to master; each exist in a state of *obnoxio* (dependence) insofar as the conditions of action and existence are not determined by the will of the sovereign state or self.

¹⁰³ See Gotkowitz (2007).

¹⁰⁴ See Klein and Vinson (2007).

question of the legality of forced labor was left markedly ambiguous. 105 Thus, if early modern legal categories of citizenship premised on distinctions between Christians and Pagans shaped and legitimated imperial expansion, growing concerns with natural rights and universal citizenship also destabilized those very logics and made them subject to internal reform.

But early modern legal ideas and later republican logics were not simply logics of empire or mechanisms of colonial rule. They were also taken up and critically redeployed by the colonized, fueling anti-colonial movements for national independence and self-rule and accompanying calls for the abolition of slavery and forced labor. In Bolivia, mass rebellions swept the country in 1791, the same year as the Haitian Revolution, foreshadowing Bolivia's long struggle for Independence in a war that lasted some 15 years, from 1809 to 1825. 106 Thus. while notions of liberty and servitude shaped and perplexed European reformers and revolutionaries, they were also crucial to the course of nationalist movements and reform projects in the so-called colonial peripheries. Indeed, some historians have gone so far as to argue that Spanish experiences of territorial conflict in South America critically transformed existing legal understandings of possession and property in Spain. 107 As these concepts were taken up and redeployed in colonial settings, they were also reshaped by and absorbed into existing political traditions of rule and authority, transforming popular notions of personhood as well as attendant understandings of collectivity, property, and possession.

In particular, scholars have noted that between the late 16th and early 19th century a shift in existing understandings of territory took place both in South America and in Spain, one that sedimented a shift away from property as a result of customary practices and historical uses and toward a more rigid conception of place as the product of volition and, with it, more malleable rights. 108 In a sense then, if early modern political logics installed new juridical mappings of civilized and barbarian, Spanish and Indian, they also in the 18th century produced new, more expansive understandings of the possibilities and hopes of liberty, one located in the promise of transforming subjects and expanding territory. These transformative possibilities of law, in particular the conversion from slave to citizen or from barbarian to civilized, arose as a key promise and mechanism of Spanish rule in Upper Perú or present-day Bolivia. In this regard, then, the roots of modern citizenship—with its attendant modes of civilizing and governing subjects—were enfolded in the earlier juridical structures of colonial governance. Along with shaping possibilities, however, newly consolidated legal categories of person, property, and injury also delimited and conscribed existing fields of political action and claim making. Put differently, a specific delineation of human, civilizational unfolding was accompanied by a new concern with the risks of historical stagnation, a concern embodied par excellence in the figure of the landless servant or the slave. 109

The risks of stagnation were located not only in external forms, such as landlessness or bonded labor, but also in "internal" forms of consciousness and sentiment. As scholars note,

¹⁰⁵ Gotkowitz (2007).

¹⁰⁶ For the ways that French Revolutionary ideas shaped the Haitian Revolution as well as the Bolivian Revolution, specifically debates about slavery and forced labor, see Scott (2004) and Klein and Vinson (2007). ¹⁰⁷ See Herzog (2015).

¹⁰⁸ See Herzog (2015).

¹⁰⁹ As Arendt (2006) notes, alongside the attention to the development of a particular conception of political freedom, Arendt's account also attests to what was taken as the corrosive effects of "stagnation," one opposed to the liberating effects of unfolding or development in which to be human is to be free. For attention to how the figure of the servant/slave conditioned citizenship debates and reform efforts in Bourbon Peru, see chapter 1. See also Larson (1988) and Gotkowitz (2007).

shifting understandings of political subjectivity between the so-called First and Second Colonialism were marked by a growing focus on interiority as the proper condition of political deliberation and action, a form of consciousness and reason at odds with more embodied relations and their moral claims. 110 Thus, as Hannah Arendt notes, the tendency to locate freedom in the interior of the subject should be seen not as natural but rather as reflecting a moment of "estrangement from the world in which worldly experiences were transformed into experiences within one's own self."111 Here, nascent legal frameworks in Europe produced a political subject understood in more atomized terms, political deliberation occurring "inside" a self who then acts in accordance with prior thought. This model betrayed a particular orientation toward "external" or embodied practices, not only as illegitimate domains of political expression but also as obstructions to reasoned personhood and civilizational progress. As evident in the work of German Enlightenment philosophers like G.W.F. Hegel or Immanuel Kant, while bodily and sensory forms constitute the media through which thought moves and moral consciousness advances, they are ultimately scaffolds to be shed, mind emerging as autonomous from its lowly, organic matter. Similarly, the traditions colonialists found were often understood as the initial or child-like stages of worldly religious belief and human civilization, yet ones that evangelizing missionaries and colonial reformers should ultimately seek to uproot and supersede. 112

New understandings of political subjectivity rooted in natural rights paradigms problematized existing colonial legal and labor arrangements. While early colonial rule in Upper Peru was built upon notions of religious and civilizational distinction as the basis for a dual republic system, 18th century concerns with natural rights and universal citizenship problematized these distinctions, fueling reform programs aimed at dismantling colonial architectures of juridical difference by civilizing and then integrating hordes of indigenous peasants. These efforts had minute implications for existing labor and land relations, including accompanying notions of subject, labor, and land. 113 In particular, the Bourbon reforms of the late 18th century, then, challenged the greed of a landed Spanish-descendent oligarchy and located new reform efforts in aggressive attempts to transform rural life-ways in order to modernize the nation and, eventually, convert the colonized into full-fledged citizens. ¹¹⁴ In this way, colonial legal projects centered not only on the problem of facilitating political rights but also on reforming what were seen as anti-modern, colonial or feudal arrangements of hacienda servitude—particularly labor relations premised on bonded labor on the part of landless peasants. And yet, the very ideal of the transformation through law paralleled earlier neo-Roman imperial logics, including understandings of liberty and humanity is a status achieved by law and conferred by the state. Indeed, in many 20th century peasant appeals for rights and land in Bolivia, citizenship is framed not as a priori characteristic of the subject, as in a natural rights doctrine, but rather as a status conferred by law and thereby contingent upon the state. Citizenship as an achievement may have enfolded the possibilities of a transformation from

¹¹⁰ See Locke (1983[1689]) for a discussion of tolerance and its relation to faith. For a critical discussion of the concept and its relation to repulsion, see Brown (2008).

Arendt (2006:145) links this transformation to the problem of time, arguing that a particular modern conception of history that replaces other ways of understanding the relation of action to thought, producing an account of the political as a free space of spontaneous mental activity in which one is able to reflect and thus master the otherwise violent and unwieldy mediation of natural forces.

¹¹² See Masuzawa (2005) on world religion; see Orta (2004) for a contrast with new "inculturation" evangelical missions in Bolivia.

¹¹³ These transformations are the focus of chapter 1.

On the Bourbon reform process, particularly in present-day Bolivia, see Larson (2004) and Gotkowitz (2007).

servitude to rights, yet it also introduced the problem of the malleability of persons to their material surroundings, namely their pollution or denigration by what were taken as "lowly" conditions of life, especially servile labor arrangements. Thus, as Viceroy of Cochabamba Viedma noted in a 1788 report, "For the Indians who till the soil on the pitiful parcels of land the owner gives them, [land reform] will be an alternative to the misery that burdens people in their lowly station of life."¹¹⁵

Understandings of the sub-human beast were not only invoked by reformers anxious to undo hacienda labor, but also informed peasant demands. Indeed, it was precisely this language of reforming "beasts of burden" into political subjects that hacienda tenant farmers mobilized in 20th century legal appeals for the abolition of forced labor and hacienda land redistribution. In the course of appealing for land redistribution and rural education, one supplicant noted, "If our hopes are realized . . . the Indian will go to school, never again will [the Indian] be the beast of burden. [The Indian] will be the citizen who wins respect for Bolivia."116 Here, then, the indigenous hacienda worker as a "beast of burden" was contrasted with the "citizen who wins respect for Bolivia." As evident here, liberation from forced labor was understood not simply as the outward expression or political culmination of an innate or natural set of rights but, rather, required the active conversion of beasts into humans, a transformation that would gain Bolivia international respect. Yet, here the transition from animal to subject rested constitutively on the transformative force of law. Within this appeal for rights, the tenuousness—marked by the conditional "if"—of political conversion into citizens is rendered explicit, one that challenges ideas of the primordial or natural condition of rights. Thus, while the political marginality of indigenous groups is often taken as evidence of the opposition between formal and substantive rights, this view of citizenship as conferred by the state and as contingent on bodily conditions suggests an alternate reading. Namely, it suggests the ways that neo-Roman (rather than natural rights-based) understandings of juridical categories as premised on conditions of life, particularly labor, remained crucial to reform languages and popular political claims in Bolivia's republican period. As the slogans accompanying 20th and early 21st century peasant and indigenous movements indicate—"a revolution for our rights" and "now we are citizens"—Bolivian political culture remains imprinted not only by a sense of historical lag, that is, the seeming sluggishness of modernity, but also by an awareness of the tenuousness and conditionality of legal inclusion. Such instability or tenuousness denaturalizes scholarly heuristics that treat rights and citizenship as a priori rather than achieved and thereby vulnerable to dissolution. 117

More broadly, these earlier reform processes and archival traces demonstrate the ways that juridical categories work not only to exclude certain classes of persons (the woman, the slave, the dependent, the native) but also to condition and reshape political experiences and self-understandings. ¹¹⁸ Such "looping effects" challenge attempts to secure the distinction between descriptive forms and the realities they purport to describe, between representative (political) logics and their interventions in existing fields of action and experience. ¹¹⁹ Thus, statements

¹¹⁵ Viedma, Descripción geográfica (1788:162, cited in Larson 1988:255).

¹¹⁶ Gotkowitz (2007:223).

¹¹⁷ These slogans are discussed in two important works tracing Bolivian political culture, the first in mid-20th century (Gotkowitz 2007), the second in the mass mobilizations in the early 2000s (Postero 2004).

Thus, scholars highlight how contemporary rights doctrines rely on ideals of horizontal personhood and negative liberty that fail to account for group or difference-based claims. See, in particular, Kymlicka (2008); Markell (2006); Tully (2007); and Povinelli (2002).

Hacking (1995:239); see also Kuhn (1962); Strathern (2004). That is, "inventing or molding a new kind, a new classification, of people or of behavior may create new ways to be a person, new choices to make, for good and evil.

about how the world is both enfold and reproduce certain normative assessments as well as possibilities for acting and being and for understanding oneself as a political subject or an almost-inhuman beast. At the same time, however, colonial logics of (religious and political) conversion also supply the terms for understanding the transformation from one category of legal personhood to another, a promise of change imbedded in early Spanish colonial law, with its distinction between and attempt to civilize or convert heathen barbarians into Christian citizens. Not only the notion of civilizational progress, but its very referents of citizen and slave, can be located in Roman-inspired legal categories that traveled, by way of Spanish monarchical expansion, to Peru in the early 16th century. ¹²⁰ From that period until Bolivian independence in 1825, these categories were transformed and re-grafted in the course of Spain's conflictive pursuit of territory and subjects and accompanying efforts to legally substantiate rights to territory and labor both in New Spain as well as Europe. 121

In New Spain, then, imperial imaginaries of servitude were consequential for colonial rule as well as for peasant critiques to colonial subjection in the late colonial and early republican moment. Notions of legal difference arose as increasingly problematic in the late 1700s, when colonial administrators undertook a dramatic reform of existing colonial juridical and labor institutions. Not only ideas but also institutions of servitude like the forced mita mining labor draft or domestic forms of agrarian servitude like *yanaconaje* that had initially been accepted and even encouraged by colonial administrators would, in 18th century Upper Peru and then, after 1825, the Republic of Bolivia, become objects of fervid debate and aggressive reform, evident in wide-ranging set of tributary, labor, and agrarian reforms. Liberation, both from colonialism and from Spain, was thus rooted in the promise of expanding citizenship as a means to transform abject indigenous peasants into modern political subjects. These decolonizing and abolitionary reform projects, however, did not simply institute a rupture with an earlier colonial order, but also necessarily drew from the framings of subjectivity and liberty that had been articulated within and supported an earlier political regime. 122 Attended to in this way, emancipation appears less as a grand rupture than a gradual transition, one where ideas of citizenship worked in tandem with older ideas of alterity and its transformation rather than simply superseding or uprooting them. Indeed, in the Andes as in the antebellum north, rights and humanity were not systematically denied to the un-free but, rather, were configured in a delimited, inegalitarian way. In the Andean case, this was most evident in legal elaborations of Indians as members of a republic with rights, yet one different from and inferior to the Spanish one. 123 In this way, exclusions arise as internal, and not simply external, to the Bolivia's history of rights, earlier elaborations of servitude and "slave humanity" informing and conditioning the broader juridical frame within which ideals of liberty and abolition were both imaginable and

There are new descriptions, and hence new actions under a description. It is not that people change, substantively, but that as a point of logic new opportunities for action are open to them" (Hacking 1995:239).

¹²⁰ For the links between Roman thought and early colonial rule in Peru, see McCormack (2007).

¹²¹ For a historical account of the ways that changing ideas of possession and territory in Spain drew both from colonial and European political conflicts, see Herzog (2015).

¹²² Similarly, Hartman (1997:6) argues, the notions of subjectivity and liberty instituted in abolitionary programs in the postbellum period drew from and in some ways were continuous with the notions of property and subjection on which slavery rested.

123 Hartman (1997:6).

eventually instituted. 124 And yet, the Bolivian case further complicates this story, raising questions about the unexpected ways that early modern legal imaginaries remained consequential to the later period of republican reform, one that destabilizes more monolithic framings of liberalism in past and present.

Thus, instead of opposing the postcolonial to the colonial, this dissertation draws from recent approaches in anthropology and political theory to consider how the juridical categories and political imaginings rooted in early modern and later modernizing reform projects came to shape the very ways liberation could be thought. And yet, I show that along with conditioning the terms of liberation, such juridical categories and reform projects also shape and condition present-day approaches and popular conceptions of (hacienda) subjection. Returning to the supplicant demanding land rights in Cochabamba, here the promise of liberty depends upon and at the same time introduces a new tense, the conditional, the "if" or "when" upon which justice depends for its conferral. ¹²⁶ Subsequent to the Bourbon reforms, conditions of unpaid labor upon another's land were increasingly collapsed within a broad category of servitude or even "slavery," a depraved condition taken to be fundamentally at odds with any mode of political expression or peasant agency. Yet, sources from the early colonial period suggest that this not always so. In contrast, in early colonial ethnographic and historical accounts of Inca economic and political life, former Inca field hands and Quechua-speaking farm laborers in Cochabamba described "personal services" in homes as a customary duty expected of Inca subjects in that region.

In contrast, as discussed in chapter 1, by the late 1800s hacienda servants decried domestic duties for landlords as non-customary, colonial impositions. While certainly reflecting changing labor arrangements and land conditions, these shifting conceptions of domestic labor should also be approached as insight into broader transformations in governmental and popular orientations to labor, one marked by a growing focus on land rights and an accompanying concern with the perils of unpaid labor on the part of landless peasants. Here, colonial juridical languages constitute a sort of "permanent legacy" that continues to supply the conditions both of political subjectivity and legal claim making. ¹²⁷ To this legacy belong not only a natural rights perspective but also a conception of rights as an achievement, a view that might be located not only in liberal logics but also, in part, in earlier imperial and neo-Roman concerns with religious alterity and the "civilizational conquering of nature." ¹²⁸ In what follows, I consider how this language of the opposition between different classes of subjects—beasts of burden and the rights-bearing citizens—continues to shape and complicate contemporary reformist and populist struggles over land and rural justice. What results is not simply the politicization of land or property rights as necessary preconditions of citizenship, but also an abiding anxiety with the

¹²⁴ Hartman (1997) argues that this circumscription is not accidental but rather should be taken as a constitutive form of exclusion internal to liberalism, one authorized by and rendered available through projects of citizenship and rights-based recognition.

The question, then, is not whether "authentic difference is disappearing or surviving, but that difference, such as it is, is increasingly obliged to respond to—and be managed by—the categories brought into play by European modernity" (Scott 2004:8-9).

¹²⁶ On the conditional tense of liberal politics, see Povinelli (2011).

¹²⁷ In particular, Scott argues that anti-colonial struggles are driven and shaped not only by volunteers but rather by "conscripts of modernity," that is, by people who inhabit and assume terms and logics not entirely of their own making (2004:19, 21, 91-92). In Bolivia, this legacy includes not only a natural rights perspective but also a conception of rights as an achievement, a view I locate not in early colonial and neo-Roman concerns with religious alterity and the civilizational conquering of nature. ¹²⁸ Scott (2004:91-92).

polluting or even de-civilizing force of rural labor regimes, especially tenant farming and domestic labor, which are seen as posing challenges to propertied citizenship and, with it, to Bolivian political modernity more broadly.

Shifting perceptions of servitude (or "personal service") and accompanying efforts to expand land rights show that legal institutions do not simply absorb or translate citizen claims but also partially determine and delimit them. In particular, the growing focus on land raises questions about the transformations necessary for moral claims to be converted into a form legible to law raises questions about the very adequacy of a language of rights to speak to fulfillment, not only due to its complicity in the history of subjection but also in terms of the forms of aspiration or yearning it allows and disallows. ¹²⁹ In Bolivia as elsewhere, forms of desire or expressions of fulfillment at odds with those sanctioned with rights-based imaginaries of liberation have often been perceived as the irrational child-like yearnings or utopian fantasies of an immature political subject. ¹³⁰ Yet, the very existence of claims in excess to reformist visions—including demands for good treatment or patronage sponsorship on the part of hacienda colonos and their kin from the early 1900s to the present—demonstrate that reform frameworks do not altogether displace or disable alternate registers of claim-making. If reform logics saturate and partially-determine possible political yearnings, such saturation is not absolute nor does it work in a predictable or linear fashion. ¹³¹

Indeed, despite the ubiquity of a land-based peasant politics in Bolivia, this dissertation shows how the stigmatized spheres of subjection also supply the condition from which demands for post-hacienda accountability emerge and are partly legible. Taking seriously the partial opacity of such claims, I am interested less in disentangling material needs from reconciliatory imaginaries, for instance, than I am with tracing the affective and relational contours of rural, post-hacienda claims. What sort of a moral imaginary undergirded Raul's call to "be friendly"? What sorts of claims does this moral imaginary enable and what are their relations to state projects of indigenous justice or political change? What forms of belonging or affinity do such moral imaginaries and post-hacienda claims draw from or reproduce? Thus, more than an attempt to recuperate voices or render their claims wholly transparent, my inquiry focuses largely on their form and texture. However opaque, then, I argue that these claims are instructive, alerting us to the entanglements between histories of subjection and subsequent imaginaries of citizenship and political action while, at the same time, demonstrating that bonded histories and their reform may condition but in a sense do not determine the contemporary shape of rural moral and political practices.

1′

¹²⁹ This inadequacy is captured in what Hartman terms the oppositions between a "politics of fulfillment" and a "politics of transfiguration" (1997:13).

¹³⁰ Indeed, it is in precisely such terms that contemporary rural demands for post-hacienda patronage are often

framed by urban residents and reformers. Demands for both for the sponsorship of landlord and for developmental aid for certain projects are seen as expressions of false consciousness or the fanciful, immature whims of an unreasoned, child-like self (for irrationality and political desire in the antebellum United States, see Hartman 1997:13 citing Gilroy).

¹³¹ Hartman (1997:6). In particular, Hartman argues that the form of subjectivity slavery created equated responsibility with blameworthiness, a legacy she argues has continued to shape the alignment of the free individual with guilt and "castigated agency" today (1997:6). At the same time, emotional qualities like playfulness and joy that supposedly demonstrated the slave's contentment and "African's suitedness for slavery" (1997:6), would reemerge in debates in which idleness and "intemperate consumption" figured to legitimate further calls for reform (1997:6-7).

For a critical account of the limits to recuperationist or revivalist approaches to the archive and a discussion of opacity as the condition of archival hermeneutics, see Arondekar (2009).

Organization of the Work

The dissertation is organized into three sections, each of which correspond with and engage a distinct field of scholarship. Part 1, *Servitude and Political Modernity*, draws from interdisciplinary debates in critical theory, anthropology, history, and Andean studies concerning the problem of servitude and its importance for late colonial and republican programs of modernizing reform in Alto Perú and then Bolivia. Building from research concerning agrarian relations, labor practices, and land use in the Cochabamba region of Bolivia, chapter 1 looks at the region's history of changing land relations and tracks the emergence of a new language of modern citizenship, one articulated against the figure of the hacienda servant or "slave." The chapter demonstrates that this new language both enabled new sorts of land claims and popular articulations of indigenous collectivity while at the same time displacing and even stigmatizing a competing set of demands made by hacienda servants and domestic laborers, many of them women. In chapter 2, I draw from ethnographic work to show how the presumed antinomy between servant and citizen continues to splinter rural communities that were previously haciendas, creating fractures among villagers while at the same time eliciting a range of relational and ritual forms by which villagers engage and seek to remedy a divisive past.

The second part of the dissertation, *The Sanitizing State*, considers the ways that labor and land relations rooted in the region's hacienda past are targeted for reform by the contemporary MAS-ruled government. Integrating scholarship on indigeneity, law, and land politics, I suggest that the urgency of land re-titling efforts emanates from their broader promise to impose order upon disorder, cleansing rural spaces and subjects of the impurities of the colonial, hacienda past. Chapter 3 outlines the formal dimensions of MAS land reform, foregrounding the ways that abiding concerns with servitude and bondage condition and shape a nation-wide program of agrarian "sanitation" or land re-titling. In chapter 4, I consider the ways that rural subjects experience these land reform efforts, showing how the region's labor and land history complicates governmental attempts to bind persons to place through land titles. Here, I approach the popular challenges to land re-titling efforts as insight into the unstable workings of documentary forms, specifically land titles and cartographic maps, showing how stalled land redistribution efforts expose the limits to the very logic and promise of documents as bound to their material referents, that is, land. By attending to these land reform conflicts, I raise critical questions about the limits to formal approaches to indigenous justice while at the same time showing that legal approaches do not exhaust existing ways of reckoning with a violent past.

The third and final part of the dissertation, *The Ethics of Exchange*, engages scholarship concerning embodied relations of exchange and kinship in the fields of Andean studies, anthropology, philosophy, and critical theory. Broadly, I argue that shifting histories of labor and land use in Cochabamba yield specific patterns of belonging rooted in bodily intimacies and accompanied by a particular understanding of exchange as an ethical form. Chapter 5 extends this discussion to an exploration of contemporary relations of post-hacienda patronage between former servant and landlord families in Ayopaya today. In so doing, it demonstrates the ways that inherited relations of patronage and aid come to take on or accumulate new, reconciliatory dimensions in Bolivia's revolutionary present. Chapter 6 revisits these relations of exchange and authority after servitude, considering how patronage relations are not simply destabilized but also creatively reworked and even extended as rural groups respond to state programs of labor and land reform under the MAS party. Focusing on workers' demands for resources and aid from mining elites, I demonstrate the unexpected ways that inherited frameworks of elite

accountability condition and complicate mining economies, new elites unsuccessfully struggling to disentangle themselves from the hacienda-based relations of aid that preceded them.

Together, these chapters aim to contribute to the task of critically re-evaluating and potentially expanding the contours of the legibly political. What modes of fulfillment or desire, morality or belonging, can be accounted for within reformist approaches to slave abolition and indigenous justice? While scholars have suggested the limits to reified categories of indigeneity, can we think through these limits without falling back upon an oppositional narrative of resistance, absorption, or inevitable displacement? At stake in these questions is an effort to bracket the often-uncritical adoption of rights-based logics as heuristics for understanding political practices, ones that tend to align justice with the fraught yet necessary disentangling of a subject from an earlier order. As evident in Bolivia's 20th century history of agrarian reform, state projects of expanding rights and transforming hacienda workers into citizens also resulted in the marginalization and even stigmatization of landless peasants, including domestic servants. The peasant protagonist or proto-citizen that emerged, then, was the unionized, tenant farmer who struggled both against authority and for land. And yet, this was not the only subject whose claims are imprinted in the historical or ethnographic record. Thus, by reworking familiar narratives of the past, including the relation of servitude to citizenship, my hope is to offer a more expansive and less predictable account of our political present. What follows, then, is not only an attempt to reveal the unwitting occlusions of institutional approaches to justice but also to highlight the ways that those occlusions are inhabited by other modes of world-making, shared efforts to address a divisive past and to thereby render life habitable today.

Part One. Servitude and Political Modernity in Bolivia

Chapter 1. Bonded Histories

Following a tour of the province published in 1788, Bourbon reformer Francisco de Viedma noted, "[T]he human condition is even worse in Ayopaya than in the other districts. The Indians shoulder the burden of agricultural work and are at the mercy of tyrants whose only title of authority is that of 'employer' [patron]." Viedma's portrait of abject suffering was coupled with an account of crumbling haciendas burned and charred by the Indian rebellions of 1781. As his account suggests, the hacienda institution occupies an important place in colonial and later republican reform imaginaries, initially a site of extraction modeled on Inca tribute that, later, arose as a target of wide-ranging land and labor reforms. In what follows, I consider agrarian resettlement initiatives and debates about labor as bound up with questions of colonial rule, land resettlement becoming a key modality of modernizing intervention by which governments sought to address not only the so-called "Indian problem," but, increasingly, what was taken as the distinctly colonial problem of servitude.

Beginning with precolonial, Incaic expansion into the Cochabamba valleys and ending with 20th century peasant uprisings against the hacienda system, this chapter examines changes in agrarian institutions in the Cochabamba region, particularly the province of Ayopaya, and their importance for patterns of rural collectivity and political claim-making. In particular, my discussion hinges on two related concerns. First, I look at the ways that land practices and labor institutions have been historically entwined in ways that exceed late colonial and republican arguments that landlessness was simply coterminous with subjection. Secondly, I suggest that the relationship between land and labor became further solidified—and transformed—within late colonial debates concerning agrarian modernization and peasant citizenship, ones in which property rights were increasingly aligned with citizenship while, conversely, "service" was stigmatized as an accompaniment to slavery fundamentally incompatible with rights-based modernity. Here, the stigmatization of hacienda labor gave way to shifting accounts of its historical trajectory. While forced labor was initially modeled on Inca systems of tribute, by the late colonial period it was understood, rather, as evidence of the colonial corruption of native systems of rule, rural servitude or *pongueaje* taken to synthesize the miseries of indigenous dependency on Spanish overlords. In the course of these shifting debates about servitude and subjection, citizenship was more tightly bond to the problem of land rights in ways that profoundly shaped and reshaped rural peasant struggles into the 21stth century.

The temperate valleys of Cochabamba are known for their vibrant peasant economy based on grain, maize and wheat production and marked by an expansive system of hacienda servitude on regional agrarian estates owned by Spanish-descendent and smaller mestizo (mixedblood) and *cholo* (urbanized Indian) landowners. 135 Attempts to civilize Indians and then to rescue them from the miseries of colonial subjection played out in particular ways in Ayopaya, a province in Cochabamba known among colonial reformers for an entrenched hacienda system that was seemingly impervious to state regulation and reform. This remained the case into the 20th century. Indeed, while other regions saw decreases in the numbers of hacienda *colonos* or tenant farmers in the early 20th century, in Ayopaya their numbers actually rose. ¹³⁶ The obduracy of rural hacienda servitude in Ayopaya, coupled with the inroads made by new indigenista and union movements pressing for hacienda abolition and land redistribution, culminated in two

¹³³ Viedma (1788:57-58) cited in Larson (1998:187).

On the "Indian problem," see in particular, Jackson (1994:70); Gotkowitz (2007) and Zulawski (2000).

¹³⁵ My discussion here draws heavily from the work of historian Brooke Larson (1998).

¹³⁶ See Jackson (1994:182-186).

massive peasant revolts in Ayopaya, one in 1927 and another in 1947. Hacienda workers ambushed haciendas, pillaged food, slaughtered animals, and, in some cases, killed landlords. 137 While no doubt shaped by new networks of rural political struggle in the 20th century, these mobilizations also echoed earlier struggles opposing colonial land expropriation, tribute payment, and shifts in the terms of native political and social order.

In Bolivia, colonial attempts to consolidate Spanish rule and appropriate and possess native lands had been repeatedly challenged in massive anti-colonial rebellions that swept the Andean region. The largest of these was the 1780-1781 insurrection led by Aymara peasant leader Túpaj Katari, a partial outgrowth of the 1780 insurgencies led by Túpac Amaru in Peru. Anticipating later 20th century anti-hacienda mobilizations, insurgents spread across the countryside from estate to estate, destroying hacienda buildings and mills, burning crops, and slaughtering landlords' animals. 138 The rebellion was spurred in part by the passing of unpopular Bourbon reforms in 1780 as well as by a general crisis of an existing system of indirect rule through native ethnic lords or *caciques*. ¹³⁹ As scholars note, in rebellions like these, native Andeans combined calls for self-rule and autonomy with highland systems of community political order and land tenure, producing a "collectivist refashioning" of populist and Europeaninspired ideals of emancipation and self-determination. 140 While the mobilizations focused on land and tribute, these concerns were bound up with larger concerns hinging on the legitimacy of colonial rule and the state's penetration into rural native life, often by way of encomiendas or colonial land grants.

Thus, looking closely at practices of labor and land use in Cochabamba from the early colonial period onward suggests the insufficiency of approaching the hacienda simply an accompaniment to or means of colonial extraction. Put differently, historians have often argued that mobilizations were fueled by worsening working conditions, ¹⁴¹ yet this overlooks the shifting nature of the political imaginaries guiding rural claims. For instance, early mobilizations for land in Cochabamba appealed to the generosity of colonial lords rather than simply opposing Spanish rule in its entirely. Opposition to colonial reforms included legal appeals to Incaic privileges as well as the subversion of regulatory regimes through informal labor arrangements and patterns of mobility and spatial movement, Indians fleeing from tribute towns and becoming absorbed in "free" encomienda and hacienda regions. Indeed, the early colonial state often sought to reign in the force of Spanish encomenderos, instituting models of Inca patronage derived from detailed ethnographic studies of Inca political life. Yet if forced mita labor on haciendas and in mines was initially understood as continuous with precolonial rule, by the end of the colonial period forced labor institutions arose as highly problematic for nascent rightsbased sensibilities of liberty and rights, increasingly stigmatized by reformers as a backwards colonial institution.

Pre-Colonial Patterns and Inca Transformations

Nestled in the fertile river valleys between the arid highland plains of the Andean highlands or altiplano regions of La Paz, Oruro and Potosí and the fertile tropical lowlands of Santa Cruz and Beni, the former colonial province of Cochabamba had long been a crucial agricultural hub of

¹³⁷ Jackson (1994:165). ¹³⁸ Larson (1998:213, 235).

¹³⁹ Thomson (2002:11).

¹⁴⁰ Thomson (2002:10). See also Murra et al. (1986); Urton (1991); Wachtel (1992); and Abercrombie (1998).

¹⁴¹ See Larson (1998); Gotkowitz (2007).

grain, wheat, and maize production. Its temperate valleys benefitted from rivers originating in glacial mountain lakes, attracting Andean cultivators and then Inca administrators before the region's "discovery" by European colonists in the 16th century. For the Incas, the altiplano or highland plains constituted a "corridor of movement" linking the imperial center of Cusco to Qollusuyu, the southeastern quarter of the empire, known to the Spanish as Alto Perú. Within Cochabamba, Ayopaya is located in the northeast corner of the province at a distance of about 240 kilometers from the central valley. In reports published following his botanical expeditions in the late 18th century, Czech geographer Tadio Haënke focused upon the striking natural diversity of the Ayopaya valleys, his romantic portrait remarkable in its contrast to Viceroy Francisco de Viedma's earlier account of burnt hacienda ruins and abject human suffering, cited above. It was this seemingly paradoxical landscape—vast, fertile valleys paired with mass hunger and indigence—that would disturb colonial reformers and fuel popular uprisings throughout Cochabamba, a landscape synthesizing the injustices of hacienda servitude.

Prior to the arrival of the Incas, Aymara tribes made use of the diverse landscape of high plains, fertile valleys, and tropical lowlands for a range of pastoral and agricultural practices. Local chiefdoms were strongly stratified, with chiefs having multiple wives, servants, and access to the labor of the community at large. Labor was reciprocated in the generous and festive distribution of food and drink. According to classic ethnographic studies, the dual moiety *ayllu* community which spanned the Andes was comprised of an upper *urco* and lower *uma* parts, the upper part associated with virility and violence and the lower part with fertility and "considered to be subordinate to the core ethnic group of the puna." In fertile valleys, including that of Ayopaya, people grew maize, chili peppers (*aji*), squash, coca, and fruits like *chirimoya*. Abundant maize harvests were stored for communal use in silos used to mitigate food shortages from drought or disease. In addition to providing peasant families sustenance, maize was also significant as a ceremonial crop, consumed as *chicha* and offered to local deities.

As demonstrated in classic studies of Andean agriculture, these various ecological zones were not divided among divergent clans but rather were controlled by single communities who created "peripheral islands" of kinsfolk in the eastern *kichwa* regions, enabling access to a whole range of produce throughout the year and protecting groups against famine in cases of crop failure at one level. 148 Outlying encampments or islands were termed *mitimaes* their *mitmaq* inhabitants grew cocoa, maize, ají, and cotton. As discussed below, these more fluid patterns of labor and land ownership later posed problems for tribute collectors and limited the colonial state's ability to secure a permanent labor force, particularly for the silver mines of Chayanta, later known as Potosí. Indeed, this so-called archipelago model contrasted sharply with nucleated settlements familiar to Europeans and instituted as part of the later *reducción* of native Andeans to villages, towns, and "Indian communities" during the Toledo program of forced resettlement in the late 16th century. Attending to this long arc of dispersed settlement and migratory movement offers a rich portrait of Andean relations to land and labor in the region. Along with denaturalizing romantic ideas of a timeless, bounded highland community, it also raises

_

¹⁴² Larson (1998:2).

¹⁴³ Haënke (1974); Larson (1998:187)

¹⁴⁴ Larson (1998:17) see also Murra (1975).

¹⁴⁵ Lyons (2006:36); see also Ramón Valarezo (1987); Salomon (1986).

¹⁴⁶ Larson (1998:18;) see also Bouysse-Cassagne (1978).

¹⁴⁷ Larson (1998:19).

¹⁴⁸ See Murra (1960; 1975); see also Larson (1998:20); Harris (1976); Salomon (1985).

¹⁴⁹ Larson (1998:77) see also Spalding (1984) and Wachtel (1977).

questions about the specificities of exchange and alliance in the Cochabamba valleys, ones premised on a set of cross-cutting attachments across divergent settlements that imbued agricultural practices of exchange and patronage with importance as political and moral forms.

Precolonial land settlement patterns included a range of satellite settlements, a "mosaic" of divergent clans that were often separate from neighbors but which maintained strong links to their highland kin groups. This archipelago system is significant not only for rural patterns of land use but also, as historians note, marked an ideal of verticality crucial to the ordering of social relationships and kinship ties. 150 Indeed, anthropologists have long argued that a crucial component of the *ayni* or reciprocity concept lies in the presumption of inequality as a condition of exchange, one in which providing aid is linked to the production of virtue and authority on the part of the generous, assisting party. 151 Here, reciprocity does not necessarily require equality, but is enveloped rather in a system of "advances and restitutions" which necessarily unfold through hierarchies and yet also address unjust cleavages in resources and social standing. 152 In the Inca system, such redistributive practices were key to notions of legitimate political authority. 153 Thus, while some historians have made much of the subsistence possibilities of this system that limited elite accumulation, one might also examine the other side of this process, the ways that productive processes were mediated by ideals of unequal exchange or "reciprocity" in which authority was imbued with a certain expectation of assistance to one's subjects, laborers, or kin. While scholars note how the ideology of reciprocity may have worked to obscure relations of domination, 154 this seems to overlook the importance of hierarchy for this ideal of generous authority. A model of authority premised on redistributive capacities was important for kin relations yet it also guided the terms of justice and social legitimacy. 155 As Brooke Larson notes, these relations of authority constituted a "pattern of moral rights and expectations that both governed social behavior within a kin group or ethnically bounded community and provided the normative order or standards by which people judged their own behavior and that of outsiders." 156 As discussed below, this model was actively studied and applied by Spanish colonial elites who recognized that colonial authority could not be secured without replicating or at the least integrating some aspects of an earlier moral economy.

In the precolonial Andes, then, systems of vertical control premised on notions of reciprocity organized dispersed settlements, kinship figuring both as a model for and a structural form mediating the exchange of labor, resources, and aid. Unlike nucleated settlements, such patterns were premised on "nested groups" including ayllus, lineages, community, tribe, and ethnic lordship themselves linked by a shared ancestor-god and divided into dual moieties and

1.57

¹⁵⁰ Larson (1998:20) see also Harris (1976); Salomon (1975); Murra (1975).

¹⁵¹ Allen (1988); Van Vleet (2008). As evident in Therese Bouysse-Cassagne's studies of the coupled *urco* and *uma* notions of upper and lower moiety, such elaborations of mutual aid were not reciprocal yet not necessarily egalitarian (see also Sánchez 1977).

¹⁵² Meillassoux (1975); Wachtel (1973); Harris (1976); Bradby (2007); Orlove (1977). As Thomson (2002:29) notes

heillassoux (1975); Wachtel (1973); Harris (1976); Bradby (2007); Orlove (1977). As Thomson (2002:29) notes of authority in Aymara communities in La Paz in the mid 18th century, "The hierarchical exercise of power within the community could often be blunt or abrasive, yet it was invested with a seemingly natural legitimacy and durability." The constitutive role of inequality for relations of reciprocity is often overlooked by contemporary urban revivalist discourses of ayllu collectivity in which *ayni* appears as the more egalitarian, even socialist, antecedent and opposite of liberal democratic norms. For an account of ayllu-based urban activism in Cochabamba, see Andolina (2001). For a comparison of ayllu-based and liberal democracy-based political systems, see Rivera (1990). ¹⁵³ Lyons (2006:38); Murra (1962); Wachtel (1977).

¹⁵⁴ See Stern (1982); Bradby (1982); Murra (1975).

¹⁵⁵ Larson (1998:24).

¹⁵⁶ Larson (1998:24).

satellite *mitmae* settlements. 157 This system was not accidental; but rather constituted a model through which ideals of self-sufficiency and community were realized among Aymara kingdoms and within Inca imperial rule. 158 Extended kin groups were organized by intricate systems of hierarchical rule based on *mallkus*, or superior chiefs, and *hilicatas*, or secondary chiefs who governed at the avllu level. Authority was tightly interlinked with the exchange of "gifts and services" both to native lords and with place-based deities and responding to conjoined ideals of reciprocity and redistribution. 159 Legitimacy stemmed from redistributive capacities and was guided not simply by materialist concerns but also by religious authority in which local chiefs mediated relations with unruly local deities who were thought to control rain and drought and thus had to be appeased through gifts and sacrifice. 160

In the mid-15th century, Aymara systems of political rule and agriculture were transformed by Inca expansion under emperor Pachacuti (1438-1471). Inca warriors expanded from the north to the lower Lake Titicaca region, and despite opposition, eventually absorbed Aymara chiefdoms into an expanding Inca frontier. The capacity for emperor Huayna Capac (1493-1527) to mobilize Aymara groups to fight as warriors for the Incas is attributed, by historians, to the Inca state's deft integration of the pre-existing norms of vertical reciprocity and authority. 161 However, unlike an earlier Aymara-based political system, tribute was paid not in products or labor but in the life of young male Aymara warriors. Their efforts were rewarded with the "generosity" of the Inca state in elaborate feasts where maize beer, quinoa flour, meat, and other valuable items were distributed as well as through land grants to valuable maize plots in the Cochabamba valley. 162 Communities who provided warriors to the Incas were also absolved of other tribute burdens, including "personal services" like herding, serving in seasonal labor duties or the *mit'a*, weaving cloth, or agricultural labor. ¹⁶³ Legal records from the early colonial period attest to the sense of injury experienced when, under the Spanish, Aymara groups were stripped of what they described as these earlier benefits and special treatment. ¹⁶⁴

The fertile valleys then became maize-growing colonies, often peopled by ethnically Inca or Quechua groups who replaced earlier populations. 165 The valleys remained comprised of a range of ethnic groups inhabiting neighboring lands and organized into long strips or *chácaras*. While four out of five of these farms or *chácaras* produced grain that went to the Inca state, the rest was used to feed the people working the parcels as well as other Inca administrators living in the region. Here, then, despite the radical reconstitution of settlement and agrarian patterns, Inca lards continued to respect a pre-existing system of reciprocated labor, providing for the subsistence needs of tribute-paying populations. 166 While mitmag laborers constituted a sort of migrant labor force for the Inca state, maintaining important ties to highland communities, field hands were "corveé laborers brought into the valley for three months of intensive agricultural

¹⁵⁷ Larson (1998:21).

¹⁵⁸ Thomson (2002:23-24).

¹⁵⁹ Larson (1998:22).

¹⁶⁰ Larson (1998:23); see also McCormick (1993).

¹⁶¹ Larson (1998:26); see also Murra (1967, 1978); and Pease (1982).

¹⁶² Larson (1998:27).

¹⁶³ Larson (1998 citing Soriano 21-24).

¹⁶⁴ Indeed, Larson (1998:27) argues that the complaints of former Inca field hands in Cochabamba attest to the significance of these arrangements for local Aymara populations. Thus, claimants may have exaggerated Inca beneficence in order to exact related benefits from colonial lords, yet "their collective testimony of Inca generosity bespoke the special relationship the Incas established with certain Aymara chiefs" (Larson 1998:27).

¹⁶⁵ Larson (1998:28).

¹⁶⁶ Larson (1998:29).

labor" who returned when the crop season passed. 167 Thus, the transformation of productive relations under the Incas introduced the large-scale movement of migrant laborers from the highlands to the fertile valleys and introduced a system of forced labor tributes or *mit'as*, a model for later silver and tin mining in colonial Potosí. Thus, while Inca rule transformed the contours of agricultural production and community life in Cochabamba, Inca labor arrangements did not homogenize the various ethnic groups inhabiting the valleys but rather maintained systems of social differentiation even various groups were integrated into new labor flows. This history marked Cochabamba with a specific sort of political system, one marked by divergent collectivities who coexisted in close quarters and yet were not necessarily united or absorbed into a single entity. 168 Indeed, while the Spanish later drew from the Inca *mit'a* system, such migratory movements and overlaid land cultivation strategies complicated colonial attempts to secure a stable, spatially-bounded territory more amenable to colonial tribute extraction.

Instituting Exchange: Spanish Colonialism and Inca Patronage

In December 1530, Francisco Pizarro began his third voyage, leaving Panama and setting sail for Peru. Two years later, in 1532, the Inca king Atahualpa Inca was captured in Cajamarca. Lower in the Inca empire, in the Collasuyu region later known by the Spanish as Alto Perú, an almost yearlong struggle in Cochabamba in 1538 culminated in Tiso Yupanqui's surrender of Charcas to the Spanish in 1539, ending the second rebellion to Spanish colonial expansion. As Larson notes, this was a crucial victory insofar as the Spanish colonialists hoped, in this way, to separate the Cochabamba valley from the rebel forces of Cuzco and, even more importantly, to secure access to the fertile and mineral-rich terrain of the central Cochabamba valleys and surrounding mountains. Cochabamba became particularly important given the Spanish practice of bestowing *encomiendas* or grants of native communities along with their inhabitants who had to pay tribute to the most powerful colonial leaders.

While encomiendas were modeled on pre-existing kin and ethnic groups in the Inca Empire, early colonial attempts at delimiting the nature and type of tribute in 1550 introduced shifts in patterns of land use and often split apart moieties, limiting access to earlier vertical archipelagos. In particular, the institutionalization or "stamping" of administrative units onto pre-existing Andean territories (with their fluid patterns of labor mobility and dispersed settlement patterns) ended up fragmenting and rearranging existing relations to place and conceptions of territory. Originally encomenderos were allowed unlimited control over the extraction of tribute from southern populations of Alto Perú, but by the mid 16th century the audiencia in Lima established new tribute regulations. Thereafter, caciques were to make Andean peasants pay tribute not only in labor, in accordance with Incaic custom, but rather in a mixture of labor, goods, and money. Patterns of agricultural practice had to be shifted in order to ensure sufficient produce to pay tribute. In addition, the payment of tribute out of crops no longer

37

¹⁶⁷ Larson (1998:30).

¹⁶⁸ Larson (1998:28-29); see also Wachtel (1977) and Murra (1972).

¹⁶⁹ See Hemming (1970:247); Larson (1998:32).

¹⁷⁰ Larson (1998:33).

As Larson notes, *encomiendas*, also known as *repartimientos*, "grouped the Indians in units (ayllus, moieties, and confederated lineages) that corresponded loosely to pre-Hispanic ethnic and kin patters, and the caciques (as the Spaniards called the kurakas), and the mitmaes subject to them, remained in their units" (1998:34; see also Saignes 1983)

¹⁷² Larson (1998:35); see also Spalding (1984) and Saignes (1983).

¹⁷³ Larson (1998:34).

accounted for temporary shortages related to crop failure from frost or drought. Finally, and in contrast to earlier Inca lords, scholars have argued that these systems of tribute payment were no longer accompanied by the material and religious modes of reciprocity entailed in Inca tribute payment. ¹⁷⁴ Thus, the monetization of tribute required that Andeans depart from farming practices and seek wage-labor either in other encomiendas or in mines. ¹⁷⁵ Others began to demand tribute paid in ore, particularly in silver from Potosi's mines. These shifts were, of course, never absolute. Indeed, Spanish colonialists had to exercise caution in negotiating with caciques, as exceeding the bounds of an appropriate tribute relation could spur rebellion or tribute violation. 177

In the valleys of Cochabamba, scholars have argued that precolonial traditions were mostly uprooted or displaced by Spanish customs and mores, Cochabamba imagined as a region constituted by cultural absence and ruin. Yet, given the fluidity of Cochabamba's *mitmaq* relations, there is no reason to believe that dispersed settlements necessarily resulted in the total crumbling or rupture of field hands' ties to original, kin-based communities to which mitmags and other Inca laborers traditionally belonged. As discussed above, migratory patterns of movement across the region were foundational to the pre-Incaic and later Inca agricultural landscape. The fluidity of these land practices, evident in precolonial migratory flows and mitmag settlements, are overlooked in arguments that encomenderos in the Cochabamba valleys "inherited only vestigial mitmag communities, which now fell under the jurisdiction of local caciques."¹⁷⁹ Surely, the violent colonial wars and the attacks on Inca nobility had left lingering scars, but to assume that "tradition" rests only in authorities or in formal political structures overlooks the ways that former mitmag laborers and Inca field hands drew from reciprocitybased mores as they sought to negotiate life under new Spanish lords. 180

Thus, while the absence of Inca-based lords surely weakened the ability of encomienda laborers to negotiate with Spanish encomenderos, this should not be equated with the absence of any set of "traditional values" guiding such relations. This insight raises a new question, namely, as subjects of the former Inca empire par excellence—field hands entrusted with producing and storing grain and maize, which had a ritual significance as the key ingredient in *chicha* which was used in offerings and imbibed during religious festivities—how did Cochabamba agriculturalists and mitmag laborers' more pronounced relation to the former Inca state inform or condition their perception of Spanish elites? Whether as a sense of lingering Inca allegiance and thus opposition to the new rulers which had replaced them or as an ingrained sense of loyalty or devotion to agrarian overlords for whom one labored and on whose good will one depended, the

¹⁷⁴ Larson (1998:36); see also Spalding (1984); Stern (1982); and Wachtel (1977).

¹⁷⁵ In addition to monetary tribute demands, sheep's wool, wheat, eggs, maize, and honey were to be included in tribute payments.

¹⁷⁶ By 1550, new regulations stipulated that tribute had to be paid in imported pesos, a law that, Larson argues, led to the accelerated commodification of staple goods and which effectively forced native Andeans to become partially integrated within an emerging colonial commercial economy (1998:37). Central to this change were the New Laws of 1542 which sought to extinguish encomiendas after the life of current lords and to shift from unpaid encomienda labor services to a state-wide introduced *mita* draft (Jackson 1994:30).

¹⁷⁷ Larson (1998:39); see also Stern (1983).

Larson, for instance, argues that in Cochabamba colonialists came to occupy a "power vacuum" produced by the crumbling of Inca rule (1998: 38). There, in the valleys, she notes, "Andean tradition had little relation on the bearings and balance of power" between encomenderos and caciques (1998: 38). ¹⁷⁹ Larson (1998:38).

¹⁸⁰ Larson notes, "There was no dominant ethnic group in the region, no powerful ethnic lords who, in their role as stewards of community norms and resources, could mediate labor relationships" (1998: 38).

Inca legacy surely affected the terms of political experience and claim-making on the part of Quechua-speaking subjects in early colonial Cochabamba. To get at these relations, it is necessary to consider how earlier Inca modes of authority and generosity, and not simply Aymara political systems, conditioned valley subjects' experiences of colonial rule. 181

Along with implicitly shaping the terms of early colonial rule in Cochabamba, Inca traditions of land use and exchange were also used by colonialists to uphold or deny existing land rights. Indeed, disentangling land gifts, usufruct rights, and property arose as a key problem for the early colonial state. 182 More traditional Aymara groups were felt to have little exposure to the notion of private property and thus did not deserve to have Inca land grants upheld, while valley groups with their exposure to the Incas and ongoing relations to the Spanish were deemed worthy of being allotted land. Thus, colonial assertions of the absence of European notions of territory and property rights in highland areas also enabled native valley peasants to stake claims to land premised on earlier Inca allegiance and culture. Here, colonial administrators' seemed to have attempted to position themselves in continuity with earlier Inca lords, reserving special privileges for valley groups seen as having been most loyal to the Inca (and now Spanish) political order. 183 This suggests the importance of precolonial legal forms (land grants) for the colonial order, which itself developed as a sort of sedimented political entity that, in the Cochabamba valleys, sought to buttress its own moral legitimacy through the partial adoption of Incaic policy. 184 Along with upholding gifts of land given by the Incas to faithful valley *mitmags*, the colonial state also asserted an intractable divide between colonial property rights and prior reciprocity-based tribute systems, one that then enabled the state to deny certain Andean groups' access to land. In this way, Incaic patronage conditioned valley groups' land claims and sense of allegiance to the colonial state but it also shaped early colonial adjudication of land and rights.

If colonial reformers drew on studies of precolonial systems of reciprocity-based exchange in order to deny highland groups land rights in the fertile valleys, they also recognized the usefulness of earlier systems of tribute exaction as a model of colonial taxation. Indeed, from the mid-16th century on Spanish colonialists faced endemic labor shortages at the Potosí silver mines. Despite the tendency to capture members of Amazonian tribes on their way to pay tribute in Potosí as indentured servants or *vanaconas*, colonial magistrates like Matienzo were alarmed to find that Andean workers, including *yanaconas*, actually controlled the refining process. According to colonial administrators like Matienzo and Polo de Ondegardo, the secret to tribute extraction and labor shortages alike could be found in encouraging a greater commercial economy. Closely related to the problem of labor shortages at Potosi was the early colonial state's concern with tribute payments. Administrators feared that excessive tribute demands were driving Indians away from encomiendas and thereby decreasing the state's tributary resources.

¹⁸¹ Evidence that earlier relations to Inca rulers might have shaped the divergence between valley and highland experiences of encomenderos is Larson's discussion of the ways that caciques in the Cochabamba region "leaned heavily on their European patrons" (1998:40).

¹⁸² Indeed, land conflicts in Cochabamba spread from the 1550s to the 1570s and concerned the nature of Inca tribute, specifically whether land gifts made to highland caciques by the Incas constituted (or were deserving of recognition as) property rights (1998:41).

¹⁸³ As Mumford notes, in the case of mitimaes, both native and Spanish litigants "continued to evoke Inca authority as the ultimate source of legitimacy in the Andes" (2008:36). In the process, "one side would call the other newcomers, vagabonds, drunken idolaters, while those so accused would solemnly identify themselves as mitimaes, legitimized by the long-dead Inca kings" (2008:37).

¹⁸⁴ In this sense, colonial debates over land access synthesized broader uncertainties concerning the appropriate role of tradition, itself potentially and somewhat paradoxically a source of colonial legitimacy. See Herzog (2004); Hanke (1949) and Pérez (1984).

Concerned with the "unbridled greed" of encomenderos, Toledo called for a wideranging set of reforms aimed at controlling and eventually disbanding the encomienda elite. ¹⁸⁵ The Toledo reforms, modeled in part on the earlier thinking of Juan de Matienzo, sought a stronger centralized colonial state charged with control over the terms of peasant exploitation and tribute. ¹⁸⁶ Despite aims to intervene in encomienda abuses, these reforms also introduced new subsidies to aid non-first generation colonial elites, thereby upholding systems of colonial patronage. ¹⁸⁷ Yet, patronage was not just a logic governing state relations to elites. In invoking its position as a beneficent protector of Indians, the Toledan state also upheld its earlier emphasis on maintaining partial continuity with elements of Incaic rule, particularly surrounding land and agrarian patronage. Thus, while scholars have generally framed colonial beneficence and extraction as antithetical, the Toledan state drew from Inca models not only as effective modalities of tribute extraction but also as paragons of political legitimacy and moral rule.

The unstable relation of the precolonial to the colonial is evident in Toledo's implementation of a forced labor draft or mita. Toledo was concerned not only with encomienda labor abuses, but also with their ramifications for labor and tribute. A key source of tribute lay in the system of rotating, forced labor known as the *mita* and modeled on the earlier Inca *mit'a* system. 188 While not the first labor draft, Toledo was the first to use state power to require labor migration to the Potosí mines. These laborers, called *mitayos*, consisted of adult males from sixteen provinces and comprised about 12,600 persons each year, a sum which increased by between one third and one half the existing number of Indian laborers. 189 Accompanying shifts in technology and more centralized systems of silver refining transformed labor conditions, introducing a divided system of workers including those salaried with wages (jornales), tribute laborers (mitayos) and mingas (free wage workers). Mita laborers or mitayos worked in a range of labor positions, including mines, textile workshops, public works like roads or irrigation, domestic service, agriculture, and farming. 190 If Toledan reformers opposed encomiendas as archaic, feudal systems, their proposed wage system was based on precolonial, Incaic labor drafts (the *mit'a*) for maize production in the Cochabamba valley. 191 Mitayos were required to work for the owners of mines and mills except during certain "rest weeks," during which time they were free to rent out their labor freely to others for wages. 192 Yet, while the mita labor draft

_

¹⁸⁵ These divisions had to do with growing concern that encomenderos were benefitting unfairly from colonialism and, in abusing native subjects, feeding opposition to the colonial state. As Larson notes, colonial elites including merchants, mine-owners, administrators, priests and Spanish nobles "coveted fertile lands and a servile labor force [and] opposed the 'archaic' system of extraction which gave private encomenderos a virtual monopoly over the goods and services of Andean peoples" (1998:51).

¹⁸⁶ Larson notes that the Toledo reforms were accompanied by a "more paternalistic tone" premised on the claim

¹⁸⁶ Larson notes that the Toledo reforms were accompanied by a "more paternalistic tone" premised on the claim that encomenderos had failed to protect their Andean subjects and that colonial authorities now had the right and duty to guard natives against abusive encomienda owners (1998:53).

¹⁸⁷ In this way, the reforms "preserved the power of patronage upon which the state rested" (Spalding 1984:156 cited by Larson 1998:53).

¹⁸⁸ Larson (1998:55); see also Rowe (1957), Cole (1985), and Bakewell (1984).

¹⁸⁹ Larson (1998:60) see also Bakewell (1984), Crespo Rodas (1955), and Zavala (1978).

¹⁹⁰ Lyons (2006:41).

¹⁹¹ Larson (1998:60).

¹⁹² Importantly, at this time the distinction between free or unfree laborer was of little concern to the colonial government. The boundaries between free and unfree labor were somewhat fluid and, by the same token, the mita was more than a system of forced labor. See Larson (1998:59).

aimed at establishing a more rationalized labor force yet it also facilitated the partial absorption of existing subsistence practices into new labor and wage-based economies. ¹⁹

By considering the early Spanish moment with a focus on the specific relations of authority, patronage, and land use in the Cochabamba valleys we are able to detect the ways that precolonial traditions not only of Aymara highland collectivity but also Inca patronage and land use in the valleys came to shape and be adopted by Spanish administrators. Colonial rulers used elements of precolonial practice, like the mita and patronage relations, as mechanisms by which to secure political authority and tribute as well as a premise for distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate land claims. While many highland Aymara-speaking groups were denied property rights on the premise that they had no prior contact with the notion of property, or that they had not improved the land by way of agriculture, Quechua-speaking field hands under the Incas fulfilled understandings of property ownership—long-term occupation and land improvement through farming—and were thus more likely to have favorable responses to their appeals for land. 194 The Cochabamba case, then, suggests the unstable relation of the precolonial to the colonial while at the same time transforming the common tendency to align precolonial tradition primarily with Aymara—rather than Incaic—systems of political and spatial order.

Land Resettlement and The Making of Indian "Community"

Toledo's mining *mita* draft was accompanied by an aggressive policy of tax assessment calling for the forced resettlement of Indian villages to facilitate tax collection and to limit tax evasion resulting from administrative gaps in information pertaining to rural demographics and land use. New nucleated settlements not only enabled the collection of tribute but also facilitated religious conversion, newly established villages spatially centered around a plaza and including a church parish with its own rural priest. 195 Before rural communities and hamlets were "reduced" to towns and villages, however, a first step consisted in gathering information pertaining to population and resources in order to insure valid tax assessments. Along with statistics, reformers conducted interviews and researched the past, including tribute payments to the Incas. 196 In the process, new social scientific and cartographic tools were put to use in order to render more knowable and transparent the composition and resources of rural Indians, purportedly to ensure an equitable tax levy but also as part of an emerging instrument of modern governance premised on new statistical knowledges and accompanying notions of population. 197

To ensure the tribute and labor of rural communities, rural peasants had to be protected from the encroachments of encomenderos and other colonial elites. Toledo invoked a

¹⁹³ Here, as Amith (2005:162) notes, migration during the colonial era was not just one of physical resettlement but also of "shared personal experiences that develop into (or maintain and reproduce) public patterns of identity and

community."

194 For the importance of "improving land" through agriculture as a model of legitimate property ownership in early modern Spain and Spanish America, see Herzog (2015).

While Larson's initial work (1998) interprets such efforts as effects, in part, of the colonial state's concern with ensuring subsistence goods for the social reproduction of rural communities—necessary as sources of labor and tribute—they also of course belonged to broader efforts at securing colonial order through transforming at times elusive rural populations into a mass that was readily knowable, governable, and able to be converted to Christianity (see Larson 2004; McCormick 1991).

196 Larson (1998:65 citing Romero 1924: 115-186).

¹⁹⁷ Indeed, as Larson notes, tax assessments were important not only for ensuring reasonable tribute demands but also for rationalizing rural land tenure and, more broadly, instituting a shift toward titled property. On mapping in early modern Spain and Mexico, see Mundy (1996). On modern logics of governance, territory, and statistical knowledges, see Foucault (2004, 2010).

paternalistic discourse that defended what was seen as the maintenance or reproduction of existing community life. Nucleated towns and "Indian communities" were to replace dispersed and fragmented land use typical of the earlier mitmag system and maintained, albeit in a transformed way, through the migratory cycles of mitayo labor in the mines as well as the encomienda labor of the valleys. ¹⁹⁸ Interestingly, then, the notion of community, one often attributed as a primordial characteristic of Andean native populations, was itself a juridical construct invented and applied as a means to transform more fluid patterns of kinship, agricultural production, and land use in following with European norms of centralized social life and bounded land tenure. Here, new understandings of bounded territory and population were introduced by and at the same time consolidated new forms of centralized governance and knowledge collection. 199

The importance of installing a more rigid, orderly mode of rural life was particularly clear in the spatial layout of new towns, modeled on the grid-based patterns of Spanish towns and each with a prison, schoolhouse, and parish church centered around a plaza. ²⁰⁰ In towns, colonial officials could collect taxes and priests could hold mass, thereby facilitating evangelization.²⁰¹ In addition, by way of the *reducciones*, people who cultivated land or herded animals in the mountains or in distant chácras would be more easily integrated into colonial life, spatially distanced from pagan ritual sites like mountains which had traditionally held special significance for Andean populations and whose religious authority challenged that of the church.²⁰² In the highlands, these policies created villages with multiethnic compositions, at times causing internal conflict between what had been divergent avllus. Forced resettlements were accompanied by a land redistribution policy based on usufruct rights and requiring resettled Indians to be assigned land grants, grants that at times displaced non-resettled Indians as well as Spaniards. The land resettlements and granting of new lands that had previously belonged to native ayllus elicited a torrent of land conflicts which colonial administrators were then was called upon to arbitrate and adjudicate. 203

The forced resettlement plan was accompanied by attempts to replicate the sort of subsistence equilibrium thought to have governed Inca life. 204 This included new regulations pertaining to the allocation of surplus crops and the establishment of a community treasury where money from the shared crops would be collected, subsequently used to aid poor

¹⁹⁸ On the colonial reducciones during the Toledo reforms, see also Mörner (1970, 1985), Medina (1974), and Gade

¹⁹⁹ See Foucault (2004). For the transformation in Spanish and Spanish colonial conceptions of territory between 1600 and 1800, see Herzog (2015). In particular, Herzog draws attention to the shift from territory as a result of use and occupation to a new understanding of territory (and property) as effects or expressions of human will and volition, evident in contractual agreements and land titles.

²⁰⁰ Larson (1998:67).

²⁰¹ Jackson (1994:25).

²⁰² Larson (1998:68). Such shifts in rural settlement were dramatic. For instance, in the Valle Bajo of Cochabamba, the reduccion policy converted what had been 130 hamlets to 3 villages (Jackson 1994:25). ²⁰³ Larson (1998:68).

²⁰⁴ By way of interviews, historical reports, and litigations (with their own often ethnographic dimensions) in which imperial subjects challenged Spanish legitimacy premised on its failure to deliver the sorts of obligations and privileges of Incaic rule, reformers had attempted a partial reconstruction of Inca rule, one that served at times as a model for Spanish authority (Larson 1998:69). For work on the ethnographic dimensions of litigation in 16th century Peru, see Mumford (2008). For early colonial ethnography in the Andes see Rowe (1964); MacCormack (1999); and Pagden (1982).

community members.²⁰⁵ In the process, certain parcels of land were made communal and were to feed the most indigent members of the village or be sold, their proceeds augmenting the community caja. Through these risk-managing techniques, the colonial state hoped to ensure a level of subsistence stability that would discourage people from fleeing the villages and communities and thereby abet in the establishment of permanent settlements and uninterrupted tribute flows. ²⁰⁶ These shifts, despite their protectionist underpinnings, eroded existing practices, practices that were partially reconstituted through the movement of rituals and ceremonial life to more distant mountain top *huacas* and to the spaces more protected from the colonial gaze, including intimate spheres of home and hearth.²⁰⁷ And yet, these interventions were not always successful; ideals of reciprocity across kinship ties remained salient, increasingly transformed into a formal policy aimed at securing subsistence security, conscribing a bounded native "community" that, one might add, also increased the ease of colonial surveillance.

Colonial attempts at integrating norms of subsistence and reciprocity were accompanied by efforts to absorb native forms of authority into its political armature. ²⁰⁸ Toledo's reforms included stipulations outlining the nature and limits of each authority and their role in the community. These included managing mitayo tributaries leaving for Potosí and overseeing the annual tax collection. Remarkably, these regulations also included stipulations requiring chiefs' obligations to organize collective work parties for repairing churches and building roads and bridges and to reciprocate labor through feasting and the sharing of drink, food, and seeds with workers.²⁰⁹ In addition, the reforms imbued native lords with the authority to oversee local land matters, resolving disputes and distributing rights to land and pastures in accordance with colonial law. In exchange, the principle kuraka was allowed to enlist the community to provide field hands to produce corn, potatoes, and wheat. 210 In this way, Toledo's reforms sought to define the contours of legitimate power on the part of native lords (kurakas or caciques) and to limit abuses that could foment unrest, breeding opposition to the political system and to the colonial state more broadly. In the process, Spanish reformers used their understanding of the prior Inca system as a model for consolidating legitimate political authority and for securing economic extraction (qua the *mita*). While the dual aims of authority and prestige are often seen as antithetical, then, they might also be approached as conjoined in a form of post-Incaic patronage in which elites were deserving of special treatment (land and labor) but, in turn, owed generosity, gifts, and protection to their subjects.

In the Toledan era, concerns with tribute, labor, and popular rebellion culminated in a series of land resettlement policies. 211 In many cases, such land shortages encouraged people to leave the towns, returning to native lands or escaping to other (mitmag) regions as migrants. In

²⁰⁵ Larson (1998:69).

²⁰⁶ Such ideals, of course, were not singular to the Incas but were, of course, also interpreted through Baroque ideas of nobility and virtue in which authority and generosity were tightly entwined, their coupling related to the notion of divine right. On Baroque political modernity in Peru, see Osorio (2008).

²⁰⁷ This, historians argue, was the paradox of colonial rule: the attempt to uphold certain cultural traditions premised on reciprocity, redistribution, and subsistence security and yet put to use as a mechanism by which to secure new, more extreme modes of tributary extraction and labor-based exploitation, a tragic sort of "form without content" (Larson 1998:69; see also Wachtel 1977).

²⁰⁸ Primarily, this included the *kuraka* chiefs, *principales* (heads of ayllus moieties) and a range of secondary chiefs who had together made up a native political hierarchy. ²⁰⁹ Larson (1998:71) citing Levillier (1935-42: 340-353).

²¹⁰ Larson (1998:71).

²¹¹ The reducciones had resettled many Indians into Spanish-style towns which had insufficient land on which to pasture animals or to grow subsistence crops (Larson 1998:73).

other cases, it encouraged people to take up residence on what were developing as haciendas, large landed agrarian estates on which Indians could work as tenant laborers, securing access to fertile lands and often escaping onerous tribute payments. ²¹² However, the tribute payments of absent community members still had to be accounted for, leaving resettled families with the burden of paying additional taxes or goods to the colonial state. This made hacienda workers—as escaped tributaries who put additional burdens on kin and fellow community members—particularly stigmatized by native lords who saw them as betraying their communities. Haciendas, of course, were not comprised simply of escaped mitayos or forasteros (landless persons) but also by people who had been farming the land before, pushed out of native communities and forced to resettle on the hacienda for subsistence.²¹⁴ In addition, haciendas were increasingly peopled by children born from consensual as well as coerced unions between indigenous women and Spanish or mestizo landowners and priests, children often integrated into the hacienda's labor force. 215

In part addressing such flight, a petition by Aymara lords in the 1580s expressed renewed concern with the problem of colonial land-tenure patterns, particularly the toleration of royal land grants that had taken land away from mitmag communities. 216 If community members could escape to haciendas and mines to avoid tribute payments, the Spanish colonial state could not secure full tribute payments and unfair burdens would be placed on town residents. While Larson emphasizes the economic dimensions of fleeing tribute, recourse to more distant lands, whether mitmag settlements or Spanish chácaras, suggests the ways that a set of more fluid land use and settlement arrangements challenged colonial authority, not simply due to tribute payments but also given a broader concern with reforming Indians into a more manageable collectivity of colonial subjects who resided in towns and could be educated in European (and Christian) ways. Here, native Aymara lords or *caciques* often shared with the colonial state a concern with absent tributaries, thereby overlapping with reform measures in their emphasis on instituting a more centralized, enclosed patterns of land use and limiting migrant labor and movement among satellite communities, encomiendas, and emerging haciendas. In this way, categories of belonging were deeply entwined with emerging conflicts over land and property, with notions of residency naturalizing Spanish landholdings and limiting Indian challenges to an expanding (now Spanish-owned) agrarian frontier. ²¹⁷ In particular, the notion of "vecino" or neighbor was aligned, as it was in early modern Spain, with a sort of Christian rights-bearing subject or protocitizen contrasted with non-Christian groups or uncivilized barbarians.²¹⁸

Reforms aimed at securing the territorial integrity of newly resettled Indian "communities" also enabled increasing Spanish land acquisitions in the fertile kichwa valleys of Cochabamba, Yet, in the outlying provinces of the Cochabamba valleys, like Tapacarí and Avopaya, reformers were not always successful at reducing Indians or uprooting mitmag settlements. For instance, census data from 1618 shows that Tapacarí ayllus maintained mitmag "colonists" (colonos) into the seventeenth century, these satellite communities located

²¹² For a comparison with Ecuador see Lyons (2006:43); and Valarezo (1987).

Thus, Larson notes, "every absent tributary meant extra labor for others in the community" (1998:73).

²¹⁴ See Wolf and Mintz (1957); for Ecuador see Lyons (2006:44).

²¹⁵ See Lyons (2006:48); Moreno Yánez (1989:135).

²¹⁶ Larson (1998:73).

²¹⁷ In the process, Indians were denied the right to challenge these land holdings, the category of vecino being used "to confer, ipso facto, landholding rights" (Larson 1998:77). ²¹⁸ Herzog (2015).

predominately in the fertile river valley of Ayopaya. ²¹⁹ The importance of iterant laborers (including possible mitmag migrants) for Spanish vecino-owned agrarian estates is evident in reports describing the shortage of mitayo laborers as people fled the "obligated villages," that is, towns with tribute demands, into "free" Spanish territory and other sorts of labor arrangements.²²⁰ Field laborers, herders, weavers, and domestic laborers had to be secured from "itinerant and seasonal laborers or Indian retainers." ²²¹ Indeed, here Indians might spend a season away from their ayllu, selling their labor on a Spanish estate in the intense harvest months of July and August before returning to their villages. In this way, in the example of Tapacarí for instance, traditional patterns of mitmag settlement seem to have mixed with emerging hacienda forms, with hacienda colonos or laborers comprised of ayllu members from more distant villages employed in wage work and, at the same time, cultivating satellite territories and securing access to range of agricultural crops for the year ahead. Seasonal laborers who were employed on estates as tenant farmers contrasted with permanent laborers who did not have their own land and depended upon landlords for subsistence. 222 As I discuss in the subsequent chapter, this division remains salient in former hacienda regions, with former hacienda servants seen by rural community members as subservient, on the one hand, and as traitors of the indigenous cause. The stigmas of hacienda servitude, then, seem to have historical roots in the vilification of estate workers who abandoned their villages and in so doing left fellow villagers and kin with increased tribute burdens.²²³

This period also saw growing numbers of Indians who were defined by their "informal bondage to Spanish landlords." Known as "rural yanaconas," these workers constituted the agrarian counterparts to forced mine laborers. While some scholars have argued that yanaconas consisted in the most alienated of laborers, severed from their families and native lands, others have argued that neither official status as yanaconas nor spatial separation from communities should be reduced to alienated autonomy. Yet, given that yanaconaje itself had its origins in Incaic systems of service and patronage, this raises the question of the ways moral and political frameworks governing the Inca system continued to shape or were transformed with the colonial assimilation of yanaconaje. Thus, the key question seems less that of alienation from labor and rather of the specific entwinements of labor, service, inequity, and authority governing Incaic yanaconaje and its persistence or transfiguration in the colonial era.

2

²¹⁹ Larson (1998:79).

²²⁰ Larson (1998:81).

²²¹ Larson (1998:81).

²²² For early hacienda arrangements of servitude and dependency, see Stern (1982); Macera (1977); Keith (1976); and Mellafe (1969).

²²³ Here, "yanaconas were stigmatized as the lowest-ranked laborers, who occupied inferior positions of servitude and subordination to a landlord and who passed their position on to their children" (Larson 1998:85, 171-209). ²²⁴ Larson (1998:82).

²²⁵ According to Toledo himself, these "yanaconas de servicio" lived on Spanish and mestizo-owned estates which expanded significantly in Cochabamba accompanying agrarian expansion in the first half of the 17th century (Larson 1998:83). As Larson notes, the term yanacona was adopted from an earlier Incaic system and was increasingly used to describe "detached" Indians who lived "near or for a Spaniard" (1998:82 citing Murra 1975: 225-242). According to census material considered by Larson yanacona populations constituted a growing group, particularly in the Cochabamba valleys. Colonial estimates (Larson 1998:83 citing Barnadas) remarked that some 50,000 yanaconas were integrated into the Spanish colony of Peru.

²²⁶ Larson (1998: 84) see also Barnardas (1976); Saignes (1985).

²²⁷Larson suggests that "yanacona families may have woven new webs of reciprocal rights and obligations with each other, allowing them to spread risk and retain some of their traditional rituals, customs, and norms, even within the confines of the hacienda" (1998:84; Saignes 1987; Zulawski 1995).

Indeed, growing numbers of yanaconas elicited new colonial attention, arising as figures calling forth and legitimating heightened state intervention. This was evident in a set of reforms Toledo instituted after travelling in Chuquisaca in 1572. Toledo worried that yanaconas were being corrupted by their masters and were in need of Christian teachings. In 1574 he enacted a broad set of reforms aimed at regulating the relationship of landlords to yanaconas throughout Alto Perú. Yanaconas were not to leave the land of the estate without hacendado permission but were legally free and had tribute obligations. Each yanacona was to provide five days of labor per week. Other changes included the need for a priest on each hacienda estate, religious instruction for boys, the prohibition of alcoholic substances, and the "protection of Indian women from abusive behavior by unmarried landlords." Remarkably, however, the reforms not only aimed at constricting landlord power or limiting abuses; they also emphasized the revival of a sort of moral economy or contract-based equilibrium rooted in colonial understandings of precolonial, Incaic relations of labor and land. In so doing, these reforms echoed the reciprocity-based norms that were earlier mandated of kuraka lords, extending these to a new class of Spanish agrarian landlords.

Among such norms were regulations stipulating that landlords allot land to yanaconas for subsistence needs, provide a plow and animals during the harvest season, and allow peasant families some time to work their own subsistence lands.²³¹ In addition, landlords were to pay yanaconas' tribute to the state or to give each yanacona ten days off during which time to earn the tribute payment elsewhere.²³² The regulations also included detailed rules concerning gifts and service. Landlords, in turn, "were obligated to supply a piece of rough woolen cloth to their yanaconas each year, to care for the sick and infirm, and to grant one day of rest each week (except for during planting and harvest)."²³³ In addition, regulations stipulated that yanaconas were permanent tenants, unable to own land and with limited rights to commerce and travel except to transport grains for landlords and fulfill labor needed to pay the tribute. Given that property ownership was largely seen as an effect of inhabiting or occupying space, the explicit refusal of yanacona land ownership also seemed to have attempted to mitigate against territorial incursions and subsequent land claims on the part of indigenous laborers who could, if they had been converted to Catholicism, act on the part of the Spanish (or Portuguese) Crown.²³⁴

Toledo's reform of yanaconaje was remarkable in its reliance less on a nascent paradigm of natural rights than on colonial administrators' attempts to replicate Incaic models of beneficent authority. At the same time, these labor relations had implications for territory. Rules governing landlords' behavior reflected concerns with rural subsistence and preventing rural mobilizations but also, in its stipulations concerning illness or the distribution of cloth, recalled earlier regulations requiring encomenderos to reciprocate Indian labor through feasts

_

²²⁸ Larson (1998:85).

²²⁹ Jackson (1994:35).

²³⁰ Jackson (1994:35).

²³¹ Larson (1998:85); Jackson (1994:35-36).

²³² This was the only time yanaconas were allowed to sell their labor to another party (Larson 1998:85).

²³³ Larson (1998:85).

²³⁴ See Herzog (2015) for the role of colonial subjects as chattels of the Spanish King who were, as such, able to claim territory for him based on their own spatial incursions into new "vacant" territory.

²³⁵ Given that the Incas were seen as a sort of proto-Christian society premised on the worship of Wiracocha or the

Siven that the Incas were seen as a sort of proto-Christian society premised on the worship of Wiracocha or the Sun God, it is possible that the institution of Inca social mores was understood as a mechanism by which to institute Catholic sensibilities and, eventually, European civilization and religion (Durston 2007:2007:314; see also de las Casas 1993 [1552]; Poma de Ayala 2009 [1615]; Adorno 1986; and MacCormick 1991).

and drink. These attempts at adjudicating labor premised on Inca systems attest to the problem of legitimate authority in the colonial Andes, one requiring accumulated knowledge about Inca political culture and religiosity and, on the other hand, transforming and translating this knowledge into Spanish juridical frameworks and Christian missionary logics.²³⁶

Given labor shortages and concerns over colonial tribute payments, the stability of the yanacona system also constituted a key problem of governance. Toledo's 1574 reforms introduced regulations governing encomienda labor and land practices but also outlawed the usurpation of Indians from communities to haciendas and encomienda estates. Thus, landlords were to rely increasingly on non-tribute populations including African slaves and day laborers. Yet, despite these regulations the problem of Indians "escaping" to haciendas only grew. By the late 16th century, problems of escaped yanaconas culminated in conflicts between chacareros and caciques concerning yanaconaje and absent tributaries. Remarkably, however, even as cacique authority was challenged, hacienda systems of labor and exchange were explicitly required to adopt and integrate some of the social norms governing earlier relations of cacique lords to their subjects, including obligations to provide for subsistence needs and to offer care to the sick. Thus, the conflict between caciques and chácareros might be understood not only as a competition over labor or land, but more broadly, as a contest of moral authority in which cacique legitimacy was increasingly weakened and in which hacienda owners were explicitly instructed to integrate some characteristics of Inca authority premised on the redistribution and exchange of goods.

Rather than assuming the displacement or uprooting of native systems of rule, then, we might attend to the question of their transmogrification or absorption into an emerging colonial agrarian economy built around hacienda labor. In the process, colonial society came to be split not simply along ethnic lines, with Indian communities and native lords on one side and Spanish colonial administrators and landlords on the other, but rather consisted of cross-cutting ties across colonial and native society and, on the other hand, hierarchies internal to so-called native society. In the process, native lords or caciques, hilicatas, collectors, and Spanish judges often comprised one groups who, together, sought to hunt down itinerant Indians who owed tribute and had outstanding debts to their communities, on the one hand, and a group of vanaconas and other migrants (increasingly termed "forasteros") and their "host Indian communities, local corregidores, or hacendados willing to shield their workers from claims arising out of previous affiliations."²³⁹ For rural communities and cacique lords these fiscal arrangements were also explicitly moral problems, hinging on the problem of mita duties and evidenced in the problem of community members forsaking their kin and escaping to agrarian estates to avoid onerous tribute payments. A lingering question, then, is how such groupings functioned not only as legal or economic alliances but also as the forging of new collectivities premised on allegiances that exceeded ethnic divisions marked in the contrast between colonial and native life. 240

²³⁶ Such translations are evident not only in legal ethnographic studies (Mumford 2008) but also in early missionary culture, where the bible was rendered into the Quechua language and nuns offered public readings of Christianized accounts of the Inca past (Durston 2007: 2007:314; see also MacCormick 1998a; 1998b).

²³⁷ Larson (1998:87).

²³⁸ As evident in legal complaints filed by valley caciques, Indians from rural communities had been integrated into towns and haciendas until their status as "indio usurpado" (escaped Indian) had been forgotten and they blended in with yanaconas.

²³⁹ Larson (1998:94).

²⁴⁰ As Jackson notes, forasteros supplied labor and protected lands that otherwise would have been vacant given the absence of mitayo laborers and could have been usurped by Spanish landlords (1994:29).

As colonial debates about forasteros suggest, land and labor relations constituted a privileged site of contestation and conflict concerning transformed relations of belonging and their challenges to the (fiscal) terms of colonial rule.²⁴¹ Here, regional practices of migration, movement, and return to native kin groups complicated colonial efforts to differentiate various fiscal groups, including distinguishing temporary migrants from those "rootless Indians" who had cut ties with their native communities. 242 However, while scholars like Larson interpret Cochabamba's burgeoning forastero population in terms of the "decay" of existing modes of ethnic identification related to the "crumbling" of extractive institutions, we might also ask how these distinct modes of collectivity and exchange infused and conditioned the hacienda system. producing overlapping systems of labor, land use, and spatial and economic mobility that at times blurred the lines between migrant laborers (forasteros) and yanaconas as well as between Indians and mestizos.²⁴³ In contrast to the absolute fiscal categories modeled on ethnic differences evident in varying degrees of rights and property, claimants of the era appealed to a form of shared experience marked by subjection to landlords. As one mestizo tenant farmer remarked in a 1747 report on hacienda tributaries, "We [arrenderos] all live under the same wretched conditions."²⁴⁴ This phrase, with its use of the pronoun "we" and the adjective "wretched," offers strong evidence of a nascent sense of political collectivity built around a shared sense of injury. While this elaboration of collectivity seems to have absorbed reformist languages of hacienda abjection, in its imbrications in colonial hacienda life and agrarian bondage it also diverged notably from existing models of native collectivity rooted in highland ayllus and from new, nascent conceptions of rights-based citizenship.

The Rise of "Native Oligarchy": Shifting Regimes of Land, Labor, and Exchange

The formation of agrarian haciendas in Cochabamba did not take a single path, but rather unfolded through a series of conflictive and often contested processes. These processes included the transformation of colonial *encomiendas* (land grants) into *repartamientos* (land partitions) and their subsequent regularization through land titling initiatives between 1540 and 1700.²⁴⁵

²⁴¹ As noted above, this was related in part to the ways that haciendas offered protection from tribute payments at least until the inauguration of new tribute reforms under Viceroy Palata in the late 1700s, one that in turn led to a new succession of migratory flight away from communities and toward ostensibly safe havens on agrarian estates (1998:99). As Larson notes, the Palata reforms of the 1680s introduced tribute payments for forasteros, a shift that elicited widespread opposition from landlords (1998:103). Belonging to a second reduccion beginning in the 1630s, later reforms sought to limit the escape of potential tributaries to haciendas in order to secure mine labor, inaugurating another wave of regulations limiting movement across the countryside and "enforcing compulsory residence (Larson 1998:105). Here, forasteros consisted in a group seen as subordinate to originarios (native groups) as well as agregados (assimilated outsiders who owned land) but whose ranks continued to increase until, according to a 1754 census, they constituted no less than half of the tributary population in the bishoprics of La Paz and Chuquisaca (Larson 1998:98; see also Thomson 2002:23).

²⁴² (Larson 1998: 95). The economic dimensions, as discussed above, stemmed from the fact that mestizos, cholos, and forasteros were exempt from mita labor and tribute payments. As Larson notes, "forastero," "mestizo," and "originario" were primarily fiscal categories, associated with differential scales of tribute payment. Both mestizo and cholo constituted "insterstitial categories" that exempted persons from both "the rights and obligations assigned to Indians by the colonial state" (Larson 1998:112). Thus, in order to secure colonial rule (and resources), movement across a set of traditionally dynamic fiscal (and ethnic) categories had to be prevented (Larson 1998: 111-112).

²⁴³ As Larson notes, Viceroy Castelfuerte remarked that "if cholos were exempt [from paying tribute], Cochabamba 'would be without tributaries'" (Larson 1998: 111). For more on the growth of mestizo or 'cholo' landlords see Larson 1998:103.

²⁴⁴ As cited in Larson (1998:112). ²⁴⁵ Jackson (1994:23).

These land expansion projects often held an ambivalent relation to colonial laws, themselves at times indeterminate and contested at various levels, ²⁴⁶ requiring shadowy acquisitions of former community lands and the usurpation of vacant crown lands (baldios). 247 In this way, Inca lands obtained through colonial land grants (chácaras) eventually became medium- and large-sized properties later known as haciendas. By the 1700s, haciendas referred to agrarian estates owned by church organizations or private Spanish or Spanish-descendent families. 248 The process of hacienda consolidation often challenged colonial tribute systems, in part because landlords could under-report tributaries and thereby profit from Indian labor themselves. ²⁴⁹ Of equal concern was the problem of people passing as *mestizo*, a fiscal category describing those with at least one European parent and who were free of tribute duties. 250 What followed were new census counts and then fiscal tribute reforms aiming both at regulating people and land, limiting hacienda expansion while fixing colonial subjects to existing as well as emergent tributary categories.

In part a response to these conditions, in the 1730s new reforms sought to end the limitation on tribute payments for forasteros and other groups. This was achieved by creating a new fiscal category called "forastero with land" which included required mita labor and tribute payment.²⁵¹ In addition, the reforms sought to clarify the ambiguity of *cholos*, understood as those with at least one guarter European descent. If mestizo status could not be proven, people were to be categorized by default as *forastero*, and thus responsible for mita and tributary payments. 252 These tensions culminated in a "regional tax rebellion" in 1730, in which a crowd of 200 residents killed the Cochabamba mayor who had aggressively sought to institute the policy of listing persons as *forastero* unless mestizo status could be proved. ²⁵³ The uprising was characterized by colonial administrators as a "race war" between mestizos and white vecinos, and the leader of the rebellion, a mestizo called Alejo Calatayud, and 50 others were strangled in the central plaza and their body parts strewn along the road as a warning to others. Here, then, Cochabamba posed a special problem to the colonial state, a "mestizo province" whose mobile labor economies challenged tributary and census categories and, at the same time, was marked by a heightened propensity for anti-colonial violence.²⁵⁴

After the tax rebellion, subsequent reformers were more careful, avoiding widespread tribute reform while at the same time imposing mercantile laws (the "repartimiento de mercancías") which aimed to supply additional funds for the colonial state. By the 1780s, the colonial state relied heavily on renting political offices to *corregidores* aligned with Lima

²⁴⁶ For the heterogeneity of colonial juridical models at odds with a singular notion of colonial or Spanish law, see

²⁴⁷ Jackson (1994:33); Larson (1998:106).

²⁴⁸ As a series of epidemics including measles, influenza, and the bubonic plague swept the countryside between 1719 and 1720, problems of colonial tribute once again became central to the Spanish imperial project. This period followed from a recession that had begun in 1680 and was related, in part, to competition from English agriculture and industries (Larson 1998:109-110).

²⁴⁹ Indeed, colonial rulers like Viceroy Castelfuerte worried that local administrators were taking advantage of recent epidemics to underreport tributaries and coerce Indians into working on their own private textile workshops and haciendas.

²⁵⁰ Larson (1998:111). ²⁵¹ Larson (1998:113).

²⁵² While scholars have noted that these reforms were not actually instituted into after the Indian uprisings of 1781, they point to the problem of more fluid categories in Cochabamba and anxiety with hacienda owners as blockages to the colonial extraction of tribute and to its access to reserves of Indian labor.

²⁵³ Larson (1998:114). ²⁵⁴ Larson 1998:115.

merchants and traders and who paid for five-year terms of office, holding "a right to distribute a fixed volume of commodities to the Indians under their jurisdiction."²⁵⁵ This policy overlapped with a partial recovery of Potosi's mines in the mid 18th century, and along with it a new colonial merchant industry. From the 1740s onward, practices of forced purchase and tribute embezzlement fueled widespread opposition to the colonial state yet also generated fissures in rural life. Throughout the Andes, rural groups protested fiscal and administrative reforms, including not only the *repartimiento* (1751-58) which enabled provincial governors to violently force their constituencies to purchase goods at inflated prices but also the later Bourbon reforms of the 1770s. 256 Corregidores often relied on native lords or *caciques* as intermediaries, requiring them to distribute commodities to local peasants and then to aid in the later enforcing of the repayment of debts.²⁵⁷

In several court cases brought before the crown in the capital of La Plata in the 1740s, peasants challenged the abuses of a local Corregidor and complained of double tribute payments both to the king and to local colonial authorities. ²⁵⁸ Thus, opposition to colonial abuses was growing in the Cochabamba countryside, particularly in Ayopaya, well before the widespread rebellions of 1781. These cases hinged centrally on the inter-related problems of land tenure, with its relation to political status and exchange relations. Thus, it was not only an extractive labor regime that was at stake. Given caciques' role as mediating with the colonial state, these shifts also negatively impacted their ability to embody a their position as beneficent providers and protectors of their rural constituencies. ²⁵⁹ Thus, shifts in colonial authority at the administrative level elicited fragmentation in rural community or ayllu life and at the same time fueled opposition to the colonial state.

Legal complaints against the excesses of the repartimentiento often did not achieve any change in its structure, and between 1780 and 1781 rebellions broke out across the Andean region. In the course of these rebellions, corregidores arose as figureheads of colonial abuses and excesses. Thus, scholars argue that it was the shift away from the sensitivity to the Incaic models of legitimate authority that led to the crumbling of Spanish colonial authority in the 18th century. New forms of rationalized knowledge collection such as census counts and tribute exactions neglected the importance of kinship and community arrangements that early colonial administrators had so scrupulously studied and sought to apply. ²⁶⁰ And yet, opposition stemmed not only from the shifting terms of rule but also, more broadly, from internal divisions among caciques and native communities and their relations to corregidores. In legal proceedings, one cacique referred twice to the problem of wealthy Indians or "proto-hacendados," a term suggesting the increased concentration of wealth as well as land by members of a native elite which, it seemed, had been partially absorbed into and refigured by new arrangements of

²⁵⁵ Larson (1998:119).

²⁵⁶ Thomson (2002:15).

²⁵⁷ Larson (1998:128); Thomson (2002:111).

²⁵⁸ In the parish of Yani, located in Ayopaya, peasants complained of forced purchases were accompanied by a report by the local creole mayor noting that he himself had become "a victim of debt because, even with threats and force, he was unable to distribute all the merchandise consigned to his district" (Larson 1998: 131).

²⁵⁹ In the La Paz province, for instance, caciques traditionally sought to limit the encroachment of hacendados, defend native lands, and provide for community members. As Thomson (2002:28) notes, according to testimony of community members in 1742, the cacique Calaumana "demonstrated cacique 'reciprocity' and patronage when he supplied foodstuffs to mitayo families on their way to Potosí, not out of legal obligation but as a 'voluntary act based solely on fairness and kindness." ²⁶⁰ Larson (1998: 135).

hacienda labor, land accumulation and tenant farming. 261 This is particularly evident in a dispute in the village of Tapacarí, bordering Ayopaya, in a 1787 case. The case hinged on a complaint that the local cacique had been distributing lands to followers of his, who were outsider, to "newly arrived forasteros...you could almost call them hacendados" whose Indian tenants worked in exchange for land rights.²⁶²

While administrators like Viedma remarked upon what seemed to constitute a "native landed oligarchy, ²⁶³ caciques' complaints also suggest a sense of frustration with land being allotted to illegitimate landowners, including recently arrived forasteros and supporters of the cacique, often in return for favors or loyalty to landlords. ²⁶⁴ In addition to such gifting arrangements, forasteros might gain access to land through marriage. Indeed, the reference to such caciques' followers as "proto-hacendados" is remarkably revealing, signaling the emergence of a new category of landholder that fit unsteadily within existing categories either of Spanish landholders or of native peasants and which seemed to mark a shifting topography of political relations rooted in transformed land tenure patterns. While these complaints marked shifting labor and land relations, they also seem to indicate a transformation in existing understandings of legitimate authority and land tenure holdings, one in which peasants now expected to be paid for "traditional" labor services like work in irrigation ditches or domestic work, "services" that caciques and encomenderos had previously demanded of local subjects. 265 Read through an emergent discourse of the critique of hacendado profit and upward mobility on the part of indigenous forasteros, even relations of exchange and authority that might have had some origin in earlier Incaic systems increasingly seemed increasingly antithetical to a proper political hierarchy. 266 Larson herself implies at this possibility when she notes that "customary labor prestations had become servicio personal in the eyes of many peasants, and work on socalled community lands no longer guaranteed subsistence rights."²⁶⁷ This raises the question of how broader reformist critiques of a greedy hacendados may have recalibrated rural assessments of cacique behavior and accumulation. 268

Claimants from villages like Tapacarí characterized "personal service" in the haciendas of colonial governors as a vast divergence from prior traditional labor prestations to caciques. Of course, at issue in these accounts is the question of pay or return. As one woman noted, she

²⁶¹ In his defense, the cacique noted that he did not use the profits or products of his lands for personal gain or for his followers but rather used them to feed visiting corregidores and to pay for tribute payments in cases of death or absenteeism (Larson 1998:155).

²⁶²Larson (1998:154).

²⁶³ Inequity of land tenure was remarked upon by Viceroy Francisco de Viedma in his report of Ayopaya following a visit in the 1780s, in which he reported "the lands that the originarios hold are unjustly and unreasonably distributed; some [originarios] do not hold the two topos of land stipulated by the royal statues, while the caciques and principales have 50, 60, or more fanegadas of land" (Viedma, Descripción geográfica, 64 as cited by Larson 1998:156).

²⁶⁴ That is, the caciques were referring to "the mechanism of land redistribution whereby some forasteros were granted land in the village in return for favors or loyalty to their patron" (Larson 1998:156).

265 Indeed, Larson includes the account of widows who noted that she "must give domestic services to the governor

and other nobles of the pueblo. [...] I never owed these obligations in the past, but now many widows and tributaries must pay them out of fear of the governors" (Larson 1998:158).

²⁶⁷ (1998:159)

²⁶⁸ In contrast, Larson analyzes these complaints of land and corruption in terms of "economic tyranny" related to "accumulated grievances" on the part of caciques (Larson 1998:156). Yet, such complaints also seem to hinge on a set of unsettled authority stemming from a shift away from prior relations of redistribution and return among caciques and subjects and toward more overt models of land accumulation modeled on the hacienda.

received no pay except for a daily ration of food. 269 Thus, if "personal services" on encomiendas initially were to replicate traditional labor arrangements and yet increasingly lacked the sort of reciprocal obligation initially instituted by the Toledo reforms. As noted before, these had required corregidores to fulfill the subsistence needs of Indian villagers, reciprocating labor in food and drink and providing for the ill and the indigent. Along with very real material shifts in the quantity and nature of labor returns, these complaints raise the question of how the monetization of labor in forced mita tributary payments had commodified labor to such a degree that a gift of service was no longer thinkable in the same terms as before. In the process, relations of loaning draft animals, giving domestic work, and rotating field labor for the cacique were newly understood as instances of servitude at odds with traditional labor relations.

Of course, this transformation was not absolute. Indeed, despite the commodification of labor and staple goods, scholars note that rural families continued to rely upon informal caretaking arrangements in which animals, land, homes, and even children were left in the care of others while people left to complete their mita obligations in the Potosí mines. ²⁷¹ Thus, while authorities increasingly reneged on earlier reciprocity-based relations, it is argued that these relations were upheld at the familial and community level. Yet, the idea that reciprocal norms could unfold only among community members and not with new cacique landowners betrays a bias, revealing the assumption of a relatively brittle, inflexible "traditional context" or "traditional norms." Larson argues that these practices reflected both Christian and Andean customs and norms of behavior, yet 200 years after Toledo instituted such norms as required upon hacienda estates, they were as much hacienda customs as Andean ones.²⁷² This raises the question of the ways that precolonial lifeways were absorbed into colonial structures of rule, evident in the importance of forasteros and mitmag laborers for hacienda encomiendas as well as the ideal of reciprocity-based authority whose violation was, after all, the cause of various legal petitions and formal complaints against corrupt caciques. At the same time, it suggests how existing relations of authority born of the intersection of precolonial patterns of authority and exchange and colonial structures of labor and tribute were rendered increasingly problematic in the late 18th century, taken as violations of new economic relations premised on the payment of all (private, non-mitayo and non-slave) labor.

Argument that such conflicts resulted simply from cacique's unfair land accumulation are unsteadied by the relative penury of many caciques at this time. Indeed, in one dispute a rival cacique warned of his rival's "sad little farm of 20 fanegasas of rocky, dry soil" that he "called an hacienda." Of course, the implication of this complaint was that the other cacique was unfit to rule given his penury. Yet, his complaint also highlights the important ways that native authority remained bound up with assessments of wealth and caciques' accompanying abilities to

_

²⁶⁹ Larson (1998:158).

²⁷⁰ Larson (1998:71;85).

²⁷¹ See Larson (1998:160,170). While Larson argues that such relations of collectivity and reciprocity "took root outside of traditional kinship and cultural contexts" and "were born of a material and moral necessity to widen the range of subsistence options available," this overlooks the ways that reciprocal norms had traditionally been enfolded within various hierarchical tiers and labor arrangements and evident, in part, in prior Incaic expansion.

²⁷² As Larson notes, "His testimony projected the self-image of a native lord whose generosity took the specifically Andean form of gift-giving, supposedly part of an ongoing reciprocal relation with village Indians" (1998:163).

²⁷³ Larson (1998:162).

generously share their resources with their subjects. 274 Given the importance of these reciprocal relations for attempts at limiting encomendero abuses and establishing colonial authority at the local level, it remains difficult to ascertain to what degree relations of exchange and generosity were associated with native lords as opposed to colonial landowners. Rather than simply reflecting the dual appeal to Christian and Andean norms, then, it seemed that what is remarkable in this case is its attesting to the ways that cacique power was imbricated within an expanding hacienda system in which the figures of native caciques and hacienda "over-lords" came to be used almost synonymously.

This raises a set of questions: Had the hacienda become a new model or unit of localized political rule? And, if so, how had it come to absorb elements of authority and aid first modeled on Incaic generosity and increasingly cited as evidence of the corruption of the cacique institution? Finally, how did critiques of landed hacienda power shape or reshape local peasants' assessments of their native caciques? Thus, while contained lands were certainly units of local political rule during the repartimiento period, the Tapacarí case discussed above is remarkable in its explicit collapsing of the categories of cacique and landlord. While these historical questions are beyond my purview here, perhaps pointing to new points of archival inquiry, they are meant here to reframe analyses of rural conflicts by introducing the broader question of how such conflicts were shaped not only by changing material circumstances but also by transformed interpretive climates, ones in which older frameworks of exchange and authority grew increasingly problematic for state reformers leading up to the modernizing Bourbon reforms. First, such conflicts suggest the ways native relations were shaped by or absorbed into haciendabased economies, economies that were themselves influenced by the state's institutionalization of Incaic patronage standards. Secondly, the case suggests that such colonial patronage relations—ones modeled on traditional duties of exchange as well as expectations of unpaid labor and loyalty—came under new critique in the late 18th century. Critiques of colonial exploitation and rural inequity, then, not only enabled new challenges to Spanish landlords but also recalibrated local understandings of authority and accompanying assessments of native caciques, whose claims to land and labor were increasingly taken as evidence that caciques had been converted into "proto-hacendados." 275

The instability produced by transformed assessments of authority is evident in the widespread Indian rebellions that swept Cochabamba—and colonial Peru at large—beginning in 1780.²⁷⁶ The rebellion swept the town of Tapacari on a Sunday morning during mass, killing the parish priest and 100 others. The caciques, like later landlords, had been warned and already fled. The rebels then took one of the caciques' haciendas and continued a battle that would last for a month between the rebels and royalists troops. Opposition to caciques often took on kinship-based languages, centered on challenges to the privileges of caciques' "son in laws." Here, caciques themselves were often elders who claimed Inca nobility. Thus, not only Spanish royalty but also the kin of former Inca nobility were taken as lazy and idle, embodiments of a

²⁷⁴ Indeed, one cacique invoked this sense of beneficence and partaking to defend their own propriety as local rulers, describing how he helped to plant and harvest crops, "give gifts" of wine, and share "abundant amounts of food and chicha" during local festivities (Larson 1998:163).

²⁷⁵ In the Tapacari case, Larson notes that "proto-hacendado" caciques were "Hispanicized native landholders [who] were hardly distinguishable from other members of the colonial hierarchy" (1998:167). Thomson (2002:70).

sort of parasitic accumulation that paralleled that of colonial elites. 277 Echoing the popular complaints of the gluttony of royal elites in France around this same time, here caciques—as vestiges of precolonial royalty—arose as a stigmatized class at odds with nascent egalitarian ideals. 278 Scholars have treated the uprising as evidence of the amalgamation of Andean ideals of reciprocity and redistribution, whose colonial application as regulatory standards of hacienda life clearly remained significant to rural life in Cochabamba and whose violation could result in widespread rebellions and the death of negligent, greedy landowning caciques.²⁷⁹ At the same time, in my reading I have raised questions about the ways that critique of cacique authority reflected not only their disavowal of traditional reciprocity mores but, more broadly, reflected and was enabled by broader, reformist concern with hacendado accumulation. Critiques of cacique authority, then, not only followed from new forms of native oligarchy but also integrated late colonial concerns with the nature of oligarchy and its challenges to equity and justice, concerned that worked to problematize and subsequently transform rural groups' own assessments of native authority.

"Wandering Corpses": Hacienda Servitude and Agrarian Reform

As suggested by Francisco de Viedma's account of the devastating human condition in Ayopaya, discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the official image of haciendas was built around the opposition between violent landlords and docile laborers whose insulation from colonial society made them particularly vulnerable to landlords' excesses. ²⁸⁰ Yet as discussed in the previous section, by 1748 there had already been significant changes to rural land tenure patterns. While some hacienda landlords and landowning caciques, for instance in the Tapacarí case discussed above, faced mounting peasant challenges to land acquisition, elsewhere in Cochabamba hacienda estates were being splintered through sale, inheritance, or rental. The hacienda's splintering, in turn, elicited new profit-seeking mechanisms which, combined with rural famine, worsened rural misery, evident in an 1805 report in which Viedma described the emaciated frames of rural peasants as "wandering corpses." Peasant indigence, coupled with new profitseeking mechanisms in haciendas, fomented new calls for the abolition of hacienda labor and for national agrarian reform, calls that point to a dramatic shift in governmental approaches to the hacienda since the earlier period of Toledan rule.

As noted above, beginning in the late 1700s haciendas had come under attack as feudal institutions at odds with agrarian productivity and the modernization of the countryside. If European travelers like Vásquez de Espinoza, traveling in the 1740s, emphasized Cochabamba's idyllic valleys of irrigated fields with more than 300 haciendas, Francisco de Viedma, writing in 1788 and observing the lingering effects of the 1784 drought, were disturbed by the poverty and human suffering in the region. How could a region so rich in agricultural resources and with such

²⁷⁷Thomson (2002:80); Larson (1998:167). Thus, caciques were accused of having "rejected or forsaken their Andean heritage to serve their own class interests and those of the state" (Larson 1998:168). These descriptions are echoed in accounts of hacienda caciques, kurakas, and domestic servants in Ayopaya today. See chapter 2. ²⁷⁸ For critiques of the gluttony of French royalty, see Hunt (1992).

²⁷⁹ According to one firsthand account stored at the municipal archive in Cochabamba and recorded by Larson, a young mestizo woman recalled "Indian rebels came from Challapata and Ayopaya killing Spaniards and all white people." In addition, the woman noted that the caciques "are very rich men and in all parts of this land the Indian insurgents hunt the rich to rob them and take their lives" (1998:169 citing AHMC Leg 1275, 1781).

280 Larson (1998:171); see also Chevalier (1952); Mörner (1973); Van Young (1983); and Florescano (1984).

fertile lands also contain a population that suffered such calamity?²⁸¹ Viedma, unlike other travelers, recognized that this suffering was related to vast inequities in land and wealth related in no small part to the region's dominance by landed agrarian estates or haciendas.²⁸² Reformists' concerns with the abjections of hacienda servitude, were, in turn, echoed in popular complaints about abusive landlords, ones that often drew from reformist distinctions between free tenant farming arrenderos and a servile population of "miserable" yanaconas or domestic laborers.

Looking at shifts in agrarian order from the mid-18th century onward problematizes models of rural society in terms of the existence of two dramatically opposed camps. Indians and colonial elites, shedding light on the existence of a cross-cutting set of ties among and across groups whose land holding and labor relations exceeded strict fiscal categories like those of white, mestizo, forastero, and Indian. These rural modes of agrarian collectivity have often been overlooked by the scholarly presumption of more reified identitarian constructs of ethnicity and class. 283 Drawing from this view, new forms of Quechua-speaking elites are often taken as evidence of social "whitening" and the birth of a middle class, an argument that seems to deny the historical underpinnings of an indigenous or at least Quechua-speaking land-holding elite in Cochabamba from the 1700s onward. Reframing this history is important as it raises the question of the ways that rural hacienda landlords, for instance in Ayopaya, could maintain close ties to peasant communities as well as to related ritual and kinship forms. Despite their ties to more traditional relations of authority and exchange—ones that were themselves in part elements of colonial economic design—these rural hacienda relations arose as increasingly problematic for reformers from the late 18th century onward. As discussed above, reformist concerns with the hacienda institution reconfigured self-understandings of labor and authority. In addition, and as discussed below, these concerns introduced new terms of reference through which to make sense of hacienda subjection and political injury, ones that focused above all on the problem of domestic labor as a condition of miserable dependency. Thus, if in cacique debates in the late 1700s "personal service" was taken as an affront to traditional modes of authority rather than an expression of existing labor prestations, by the 1800s such services were taken not only as problematic but as repugnant, offensive embodiments of hacienda "slavery."

As scholars note, Cochabamba's haciendas traditionally exceeded classification in the two dominant models of feudalism built around the distinction between manorial labor and tenant farming.²⁸⁴ Instead, agrarian estates in the valleys consisted in a mixture of labor relations, including permanent yanacona laborers, migrants from outlying valley lands, and hired

²⁸¹ Viedma himself noted, "Upon hearing a geographical description of the entire province, who would not consider it to offer the greatest possibilities for human happiness on earth? And upon hearing of the region's abundant resources and population, who would not wonder why [the region] has suffered such calamities" (Viedma, *Descripción geográfica* 159, cited by Larson 1998:174).

²⁸² Viedma noted that the haciendas of the central part of Cochabamba or Cercado "resemble small villages"

²⁸² Viedma noted that the haciendas of the central part of Cochabamba or Cercado "resemble small villages inhabited by Indians and mestizos who till the soil of their rancherías as tenants of the landowners who possess them" (Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, 45, as cited in Larson 1998:177).

²⁸³ Thus, Quechua-speaking elites are often understood as evidence of a new "middle class" or group of mestizos who are partially produced by new economic flows since the 1980s. See Shakow (2014).

²⁸⁴ Drawing from the history of cereal production in 17th century Germany, these models include the *Gutsherrschaft* manorial model premised on peasant labor and the *Grundherrshaft* model premised on the leasing of the state to small-scale cultivators. For comparisons of Latin American and European feudalism see Chevalier (1952); Góngora (1970); Mörner (1973). On hacienda "resource payment" as an alternative to cash remuneration see also Alier (1977) and Baraona (1965).

wageworkers and built upon the payment of rent in labor, cash tribute and shares of produce. In some cases, tenant farmers had to supply additional labor during harvest seasons, requiring them to lease out some of their plots to another tier of laborers (arrimantes) who then worked for them during the harvest season. In this way, labor relations varied greatly across different haciendas and included an "intricate network of obligations binding peasants to the landlord," to hacienda resources, and to one another. Even tenant labor usually included some degree of "personal service" to the landlord, as women and children were sent to work in the household "cleaning, cooking, and supplying firewood." Thus, while reformers distinguished yanaconaje (pongueaje in the 20th century) from tenantry, stigmatizing the former, both arrangements included "personal service" or domestic labor. Along with these overlapping labor forms, haciendas were not spatially integrated in the ways presumed by feudal analysis. Indeed, despite the popular notion of an integrated hacienda premised on a bounded expanse of land, most landowners had scattered plots, accompanied by a growing class of peasant landowners and a decrease in yanaconaje. 288

This spatial fragmentation and variation of tenant and labor arrangements meant that Cochabamba's haciendas often enfolded Indian collectivities, thus combining tenant labor for landlords with "communal production along traditional lines." Recalling Toledo's instituting of a system by which landlords provided for yanacona's subsistence needs, discussed above, haciendas in the late 18th century included reciprocal relations that went beyond the exchange of money or produce for land use. Despite the fragmentation of hacienda estates, however, and these overlapping systems of labor and land use, scholars note that haciendas continued to be shaped by the sort of reciprocity-based moral economy instituted by Toledo in the late 1500s.²⁹⁰ Tenants paid rent in cash, produce, or labor and landlords offered payment "in hacienda resources, 'gifts' of food and drink, and sometimes cash wages."²⁹¹ In addition to these arrangements, landlords and tenants often worked certain parcels together or "in company," that is, in sharecropping arrangements. Furthermore, the tenants might have access to multiple plots, central fields on which they paid rent and more distant plots which were used for family subsistence needs.²⁹² In addition, tenants held "the right to collect firewood, to graze sheep on the estancia, or to call upon the landowner for cash advances or credit." They also included assistance in cases of famine or illness and "gestures of generosity and of ritual kinship" at different times.²⁹⁴ Cases of landlord negligence could also, of course, be addressed through

2

²⁸⁵ Larson (1998:190).

²⁸⁶ Lyons (2006).

²⁸⁷ Jackson (1994:38).

²⁸⁸ By the end of the colonial era in 1803, yanaconas were reported to made up only 3 percent of Indians in the Cochabamba region (Larson 1998:197). Yet, given the stigmatization of yanaconas, it is also possible that new terminologies and arrangements arose which might complicate the classificatory systems used in census data. ²⁸⁹ Larson (1998:193).

²⁹⁰ As Larson poignantly remarks, however, neither state nor market controlled the terms of hacienda labor; rather, it was driven by the "force of custom," including peasant expectations and landlord demands premised on norms not only of rent payment to landlords but also of landlords' provision of some degree of hacienda resources.

²⁹¹ Larson (1998:194).

As noted above, by the mid 18th century most haciendas had already undergone a dramatic process of fragmentation, evident in *padrones* or notarial books which attest to "the movement of land titles, not only and not primarily to whole estates, but to bits and pieces of them" (Larson 1998:196).

293 Larson (1998:198).

²⁹⁴ As Larson notes, these practices point to "unwritten forms of patronage and protection" that had come to be expected of landlords and whose violation, evident in the Tapacarí mobilizations against local caciques discussed

judicial measures. In addition to confrontation and legal measures, tenant farmers could also flee to estates in the lowland coca regions or in other urban or mining centers like Oruro, Potosí or Cochabamba.

Court cases challenging abusive landlords suggest that conflicts often arose when haciendas were taken over by new owners who, historians argue, violated customary and reciprocity-based arrangements, requiring that tenant farmers and women not only work weaving or in homes but also offer a range of "personal services" to landlords. ²⁹⁵ Complaints of abuse include cases where women and children were made to weave with less than their traditional remuneration, receiving only salt or sugar in payment. They also include cases where peasants were required to ferment maize²⁹⁶ for customary festivities as well as cases of harsh discipline and whipping. In these cases, witnesses contrasted present-day abuses to the "old ways" before the most recent owner had purchased the hacienda. Importantly, they did not oppose forced labor itself, but rather it's terms. Thus, one claimant noted that men's work on hacienda lands and women's weaving was not considered "unjust [..] nor objectionable," but rather than what was problematic was the landlords' failure to heed traditional obligations. This included his demands for servicio personal coupled with physical abuse. In these ways, claimants noted that he had reduced them from arrenderos to servants. In one testimony, a man ends by noting that he was a "free person" and not a "miserable yanacona." Here, then, claimants associated yanaconaje with a state of labor that was unfree but that, importantly, was thus bereft of traditional patronage obligations from landlords. As in earlier judicial cases decrying corregidores who violated royal statues pertaining to reparto labor and reciprocity, then, hacienda tenants challenged landlords by pointing to their divergence from the obligations previously regulated by the state. ²⁹⁸ At the same time, such complaints seem to express a sense of injury adopted in part from reformist anxieties with the injustices of bonded labor.

While scholars have interpreted this case as evidence of an emergent "judicial politics," as well as popular opposition to changes in hacienda economies, it is also signification in its demonstration of the ways that reformist distinctions between free and unfree labor, and their normatively weighted nature, came to condition and shape peasant claims. Indeed, in these complaints, the figure of the *yanacona* often merged with that of the slave. Indeed, in a 1795 complaint concerning peasant women's violent treatment by the landlords' wife or patrona, one man complained that the patrona "keeps [his] wife almost a perpetual slave." Here, then, the "slave" arose as a negative referent against which hacienda tenants distinguished themselves and which seemed to mark the landlord's failure to uphold traditional duties to hacienda workers. Located some 30 years before Bolivia's national revolution of 1825, these judicial complaints register worsening labor conditions but they also seem to anticipate a nascent language of rights premised on the opposition of free subject and slave, a divergence mapped onto hacienda spaces,

above, might result in popular rebellions against negligent landlords (1998:198). See my discussion of post-hacienda patronage in Chapter 3.

²⁹⁵ (Larson 1998:200-202). Similarly, Gotkowitz (2007:134) notes that "landlords in certain parts of the country violated longstanding customary arrangements by heightening labor and service duties and transferring taxes to resident workers."

²⁹⁶ This form of *muqu* labor is discussed in Chapter 2.

²⁹⁷ Larson (1998:201).

²⁹⁸ As Larson notes, these included detailed regulations about the nature of the payment due to the landlord from each tenant as well as how many days of labor were required in exchange for maize, barley, and which established the location of the tenants' hut (Larson 1998: 201-202).

²⁹⁹ Larson (1998:200).

kitchens and agrarian plots. This emergent political imaginary shaped new aspirations for rights yet it also stigmatized a particular class of domestic worker, slaves and "miserable yanaconas," felt to inhabit a grotesque state of dependency marked by their reliance on landlords for subsistence. However, while reformers saw *yanacona* labor as problematic in its imbrication in hacienda life and accompanying challenges to the natural rights of the subject, rural claimants seemed to imply that such labor relations were problematic for their refusal of traditional patronage ties between landlords and their laborers.

At a national level, however, it was not simply *yanaconas* who bore the stigmas of subjection. Rather, all hacienda laborers were associated with a miserable status of life in need of reform. Indeed, it was their improvement, Viedma promised, that could be achieved through an agricultural diversification plan of settling the lowlands. ³⁰⁰ Yet, while domestic laborers on haciendas, also called yanaconas, were seen as servile dependents of the landlord, they were also part and parcel of an emergent peasant landholding class. In addition to purchase or inheritance, landlords might leave land and animals to "faithful yanaconas" as well as to their children. 301 In one case, for instance, the landlord noted that he had left "good land, and not stony waste land" to his two yanaconas and their children. The bequeathing of land to heirs other than one's legitimate children was not unusual, evident in the existence of partible inheritance laws spelling out the entailments of land inheritance for legitimate, illegitimate, and adopted children. Here then, domestic laborers inhabited a seeming paradoxical position, at once miserable servants and nascent landowners whose status derived neither from class nor from blood but rather through labor, in particular, their spatial and affective affinities to elite landlords.³⁰³

By the end of the 18th century, growing peasant landholding and merchant class. competition from European textiles imports, depressed agricultural prices, and hacienda fragmentation resulting from inheritance or debt, had "reduced haciendas to mere paper units of reckoning."304 Official reports blamed these economic crises on the work habits of native peoples, complaining of their "indolence, sloth, and laziness" and echoing earlier concerns that with the abolition of repartimiento labor Indians would return to their idle ways.³⁰⁵ Other reports, like Viedma's, had explained rural underproduction in terms of abandoned haciendas and alcoholic peasants. ³⁰⁶ Official reports of rural sloth were coupled with accounts of rural misery related to rural droughts that had produced a new class of rural beggars who wandered the

³⁰⁰ As he noted, "For the Indians who till the soil on the pitiful parcels of land the owner gives them, there will be an alternative to the misery that burdens people in their lowly station of life" (Viedma, Descripción geográfica, 162, cited in Larson 1998:255).

³⁰¹ Larson (1998:207).

³⁰² Inheritance laws established in 1829-1839 under Andrés Santa Cruz and later in 1971-1978 under Hugo Banzer Suárez included partible inheritance with differential shares depending on relationship including those of legitimate, illegitimate, and adopted children (Jackson 1994:150; see my discussion of hacienda inheritance in Chapter 2).

As Thomson notes, communities had long been concerned with such newcomers who had "few ties binding them morally to the community" and whose various forms of intermarriage and rapid accumulation of wealth could "violate everyday codes of Andean morality and hierarchy" (2002: 79, 78). Such concerns were likely strengthened by a series of subsistence crises related to the rebellion of 1781, a drought in 1784, and a longer drought in 1803-1805 and later 1878-1879 (Larson 1998:208; Jackson 1994: 18).

³⁰⁴ Larson (1998:210-213); for a critique see Jackson (1994:53).

³⁰⁵ Larson (1998:214). These sentiments remain prevalent in the Ayopaya countryside, as the kin of landlords and mestizo merchants complain that, following hacienda abolition, the countryside is no longer productive since the

peasants are lazy and are fail to work the land as well as before.

306 In his 1788 report, for instance, he decried Indians' contentment with traditional crops and blamed rural poverty on their "languid and licentious life" (Larson 1998:215 citing Viedma 159-160).

countryside looking for food. 307 Yet, despite Viedma's assessments of elite landowners and lazy peasants, the early 19th century witnessed a rising group of peasant landholders as well as the increasing penury of a traditional Spanish-descendent landholding class. 308 Responding to pressure from a new class of peasant maize producers as well as church creditors seeking to reclaim debts, many landlords shifted away from production toward the rental of hacienda estates either for agrarian production or tithe farming.³⁰⁹

And yet, this dissolution of the hacienda system in the Cochabamba center was not always paralleled in Ayopaya, a province more isolated from colonial reformers—and later union activists—than the central valleys. Haciendas in Cochabamba contrasted from the plantations of Bolivia's eastern lowlands, in that they were mainly smaller farms or ranches in which landlords sought profits from livestock and a range of agricultural products rather than from a single crop like coffee, sugar, or coca. 310 Landlords also profited from systems of *yerbaje*, that is, of renting pasturelands out in the highlands above fertile valleys.³¹¹ In addition, Avopaya was remarkable for having the largest native population in the province.³¹² The bleak conditions of hacienda life were alluded to in the complaints of a local alcalde mayor in 1773 who noted the burdens placed on local Indians by its greedy Corregidor. This had resulted in many people fleeing to the yunga lowlands to work on coca plantations.³¹³ At the same time, in Ayopaya Indian debts might be paid by lending or "gifting" children and women to landlords who often then sent them to work in distant farmlands in the lowlands, ³¹⁴ relations seem to have some origin in early cacique and hacendado behavior. 315 Hacienda owners often had more than one estate, splitting their time between agricultural estates in Ayopaya and coca and coffee plantations in the yungas.³¹⁶

Thus, if in other provinces the fragmentation of the hacienda occurred as early as the 1840s, in Ayopaya it seems to have begun much later, between the 1920s and the 1940s. As

³⁰⁷ Larson (1998:215-217).

This was evident in a complaint by one landowner opposed to increased land taxes who complained, in 1825, "Those who call themselves landowners in this province actually own a ridiculously small part of their property"

⁽Larson 1998: 222). ³⁰⁹ In addition to rent, landlords also profited from *diezmeros* (tithe farmers), people who would bid for the right to collect one-tenth of a parish (or hacienda's) grain harvest (Larson 1998:227). Tithe farming was accompanied by speculation aimed at manipulating crop prices to sell at the highest value and to lend bonds to one another, usually kin, in order to profit from the sale of lands. I discuss the practice of tithe farming in Ayopaya in the subsequent chapter.
310 Larson (1998); Gordillo (1997); Jackson (1998:182).

³¹¹ Jackson (1994: 15-16).

According to a 1683 census, it had 9759 Indians but by 1786 this declined by 44 percent, a shift Larson explains as a result of emigration (Larson 1998:187).

Larson (1998:187); see also (Klein 1975).

³¹⁴ Indeed, until hacienda abolition in 1953, landlords in Ayopaya often owned properties in a range of ecological zones, growing potatoes and livestock in the mountainous river valleys while producing coca and coffee at a lower site in the jungle or selva. Rather than being competing labor economies, then, the La Paz yungas and Ayopaya highlands were linked both through trade networks and through labor flows premised on the existence of various ecological islands of hacienda production and kinship relations, suggesting yet another way in which hacienda forms absorbed or sought to integrate labor and land practices initially modeled on the earlier Incaic and cacique system. As Thomson notes, as a form of nobility caciques betrayed an enduring concern with kinship-based lineage and

ancestry. Children whose fathers were unknown were stigmatized, and children born to unwed or widowed women were often taken to belong to the cacique by "natural dominion" (Thomson 2002:34).

³¹⁶ These partially dispersed patterns of hacienda production seem to have historical origins. Larson, drawing from the accounts of European informants Viedma and Paula Sanze, notes "the strong trade currents between Ayopaya's highland haciendas and the flourishing coca enterprises in the tropical lowlands" (Larson 1998:188).

elsewhere, landowners sold off lands to pay off outstanding debts, due to insolvency, as inheritance, or particularly in Ayopaya, to escape from heightened tensions and violent uprisings targeting elite landowning families. While in other countries and other Bolivian provinces, the break-up of corporate lands led to the expansion of hacienda estates, in Cochabamba this was not always the case. Because former community lands remained in the control of peasant leaders and families, their break up partially-enabled the creation of a new land-holding class, piqueros or "independent peasant landowners." Until the 1950s, the hacienda system organized rural agricultural production, one fueled by the labor of unpaid servants and tenant farmers. Indeed, while most provinces in the Cochabamba department saw a decline in colonos or hacienda workers and a general break-up of hacienda lands between 1840 and 1929, in Ayopaya the number of *colonos* actually increased during between the years of 1882 and 1912. The As I discuss in chapter 2, popular frustration with the obduracy of the region's hacienda system and its demonstration of the inefficacies of national reforms remain crucial to political relations to the state in Ayopaya today.

The longevity of the hacienda system heightened reformers' attention to the Avopaya valleys and to its systems of labor and land tenure. Indeed, it was concerns with practices like the tithe system—one that aptly synthesized the immorality of an extractive system whose profit derived from others' suffering—that fomented calls for shifts in taxation as well as land reform in the final years of the 18th century. Such reforms grew out of a sense of disappointment and confusion that a region with such ecological potential that had produced such abjection. In an 1805 report Viedma noted, "Everything is lamentable. People wander in masses, begging in the towns and countryside. They eat roots of withered grass in order to survive . . . [They] are wandering corpses, and many collapse, dead from starvation."³¹⁹ In 1808, religious institutions, landowners, merchants in Cochabamba were taxed for the first time, paying 15 percent interest on property and loans. These fiscal pressures culminated in the insurgencies of 1810-1812 and Bolivia's subsequent independence in 1825, when Creole landowners sided with peasants and cholo and indigenous peasants fought side by side against the royalists. Key to such alliances was a shared frustration with a colonial state that had demanded more tribute than ever during one of the worst famines between 1804 and 1808. 320 While this alliance was impermanent and was later complicated by lingering class antagonisms, it pointed to Cochabamba as a particular sort of volatile political collectivity, one with a traditionally unsteady or "refractory" relation to state institutions that, thereby, demonstrated the incomplete reach of the centralized state.³²¹

Thus, while Viceroy Toledo and Francisco Viedma shared a concern with Indian moral character and its reform, a key shift seems to have occurred in national debates concerning tribute and forced labor from the 16th to the early 19th century. This is particularly evident in late 18th century debates pertaining to the mita draft and hacienda "slavery." Between 1793 and 1797, intendant Francisco de Paula Sanz and president of the audiencia Victorián de Villava became embroiled in a debate hinging on whether or not the mita could be justified in terms of

³¹⁷ Jackson (1994:58).

³¹⁸ Jackson (1994:164-196).

³¹⁹ Larson (1998:290).

³²⁰ Larson (1998:293).

Larson (1998:294). As I discuss in the following chapters, however, refractory objects also recombine, regional relations of land and labor integrating older ideals of authority and exchange in ways that created new forms of collectivity.
³²² Larson (1998:273-284).

the good of the colony at large.³²³ Given these disagreements, Viedma did not take a stance either for or against the mita but rather called for broad land reform in order to distribute land more democratically. Specifically, he called for underused or unused lands to be distributed to forasteros, who were now given the fiscal status of *originario*. According to Viedma, this land reform would resolve both financial and moral problems, creating more tribute while also allowing "the Indians to break their bonds of slavery and escape the misery they suffer as dependents of the few originarios who have land."324 In this way, land reform constituted a key mechanism by which the late colonial state sought to intervene in rural hierarchies, a concern that marked a dramatic shift from Toledo's attempts at integrating Incaic hierarchies and labor arrangements in order to facilitate tribute and secure colonial authority. 325 Thus, from a policy of partial autonomy in Toledo's era. Viedma marked a more interventionist state that drew from paternalistic notions of protecting Indians from their own elites, caciques, and hacienda lords in order to facilitate community well being.

More than an attempt to re-institute the extractivist model first imposed by Toledo, then, we might ask about the ways that Viedma's reforms reflected a disparate political moment in which labor arrangements—including mitayos mine labor, yanaconaje, or personal service were increasingly disturbing and even repugnant to new sensibilities of natural rights and citizenship. Thus, what shifted was not simply that these relations had become harsher or more extractivist, but also that the interpretive conditions for understanding them had changed. What in Toledo's time appeared as a legitimate mechanism for tribute extraction and rural order (forced labor, agrarian servitude) now arose as grotesque embodiments of subjection that had to be regulated, protected against, and ultimately uprooted. Erasing the legal history in which colonialists had sought to institutionalize these practices as remnants of an exemplary Incaic patronage, reformers like Viedma blamed these practices on the corruption and backwardsness of native lords who had transgressed a traditional moral order. In the course of this 200-year period, then, forced labor—initially modeled on the Inca system of seasonal mit'a agricultural and rotating domestic "personal service"—had shifted from an exemplary Incaic custom to be replicated to a vulgar instance of "slavery." Such shifting moral assessments of labor did not only affect reform visions but also rural peasants and caciques, who were increasingly accused of forsaking traditional duties when they assumed access to coveted lands or when they demanded labor prestations or communal labor responsibilities.

Approaching the crumbling legitimacy of the hacienda institution (and the colonial state more broadly) as an effect of more oppressive labor conditions or elites' failure to uphold traditional obligations overlooks a key shift in reformist and rural perceptions of patronage and subjection. If, under Toledo, Inca systems of mit'a tribute, land settlement (chácaras), and patronage (the exchange of gifts, drink, and subsistence for encomendero labor) constituted models for colonial governance, by the 18th century they highlighted the miserable unfreedom of forced laborers, the archaic nature of mita extraction, and the backwardsness of hacienda servitude. In their place, new political ideals inspired by Enlightenment philosophies and transported through Spanish Bourbon reforms sought to modernize Peru, requiring transformations not only in landholding patterns but also in the nature of labor, fueling calls for a shift away from servitude toward free wage labor and delimited property rights. More than the results of intolerable rural suffering or officials failure to uphold traditional duties, then, rural

³²³ Larson (1998:276).

³²⁴ Viedma (1788:64 as cited in Larson 1998:278).

³²⁵ Larson (1998:280).

opposition to the colonial project also emerged from within the very terms of that project, including Bourbon ideals of freedom and rights that rendered servitude, forced labor, and land inequity as a *moral* as well as a political problem.³²⁶ Such shifts not only conditioned the terms of late colonial rule but also shaped and reshaped indigenous claims, rendering patronage and subjection grotesque in their divergence from an emergent (yet often framed as primordial) model of egalitarian social order.³²⁷

Republican Rule and the Liquidation of Collective Lands

Attempts to transform rural land ownership and life-ways were key to national legislative debates following Bolivian independence in 1825.³²⁸ At issue was not only the reform of indigenous community lands but also corporate lands including haciendas and latifundios owned by religious institutions, clergy-members, and private families. 329 Beyond inscribing new boundaries and title lands, the reform project also hinged on attempts to institutionalize a new notion of individual property.³³⁰ To do so, reforms necessarily had to address colonial privileges as well as establish requirements for new (peasant) landowners, for instance requiring that new landowners build spacious and well-ventilated homes within one month. 331 The liquidation of corporate lands faced such opposition that laws withdrawing the state's recognition of communal landholdings were not successfully implemented until the late 19th century.³³² Following Andrew Jackson, this process of liberalizing land reform in Cochabamba unfolded in two phases. First, the Bolívarian liberalism of the 1820s focused on transforming Andean society and wrestling land away from royalists and regular clergy members. 333 The 1860s to 1870s belonged to a second period of reform, shaped by a sort of "native liberalism" concerned with eliminating "corporate communities" particularly highland avllu collectivities and which, somewhat paradoxically, often ended up extending the boundaries of some hacienda and parish estates. 334

Following the transition to Republican rule in 1825, President Andrés Santa Cruz put forth a number of proposals, among them a call to abolish tribute and effectively end the recognition of collective landholding in the *ayllu* system. The proposals faced significant opposition, both from native communities as well as landlords and a mining elite. The tribute was re-instated in 1831, and abolished only in 1882. Scholars have argued that this opposition had to do with a violation of a broad "pact of reciprocity" between rural communities and the

³²⁶ See Larson (1998: 274-275).

³²⁷ Thomson (2002:92).

³²⁸ On the history of land reform in Bolivia see Erick Langer (1998), Erick Langer and Robert Jackson (1997), Tristan Platt (1982), Herbert Klein (1982, 1993), Erwin Grieshaber (1980), and Brooke Larson (1998). ³²⁹ Jackson (1994:7).

³³⁰ As Larson notes, "In the rural hinterlands, liberal policy involved the redrawing of lines on a map, the redefinition and allocation of land ownership, and the conversion of communal forms of landed possession to individual property" (2004:12). See also Herzog (2015) for a more comprehensive examination of the concept of "possession" in early modern Spain and Spanish America.

³³¹ Larson (2004).

³³² Historian Robert Jackson (1994) has challenged Larson's account for overstating the efficacy of the earlier reform program, noting that peasant opposition resulted in an only partial implementation of liberalizing land reforms.

³³³ Their focus was *mortmain*, "dead hand" or corporate-owned lands that, reformers worried, were not being exploited to their fullest potential (Jackson (994:56).

³³⁴ Jackson (1994).

state, particularly in the Aymara-dominated highlands.³³⁵ In Cochabamba, in contrast, Larson argues that the tributary tradition was less accepted, the Bourbon reforms had produced painful memories of an invasive state. 336 And yet, this overlooks the ways that tributary relationships seemed to have remained significant as a prevalent mode of reciprocal exchange upon haciendas, where Toledo's reforms had installed modes of gifting, feasting, and the exchange of subsistence security for labor as parts of an official policy for securing and maintaining the moral legitimacy of the encomienda system. Thus, suspending the assumption of the intractable loss of tradition in Cochabamba raises new questions about the transposition of tribute-based logics from those of state-subject to hacendado-laborer as well as about the ways valley peasants made sense of the new Republican state and its shifting land and labor policies.

Reforms initiated by Maríano Melgarejo in the 1860s began the process of selling community lands, often distributing them to landless forasteros and in this way creating a new class of landed originarios. ³³⁷ In other cases, Indians pooled resources and purchased entire haciendas from their prior owners. ³³⁸ In contrast to the colonial methods of indirect rule through tribute exaction and respect of semi-autonomous ayllus (and haciendas), the late 1800s saw governmental attacks on corporate lands fueled by a dual focus on modernizing rural agriculture and assimilating rural peasants.³³⁹ Driven by racialized notions of Indians as an inferior class and an obstacle to civilizational progress, these reforms sought to administer the shift in land ownership "from the dead hands [manos muertas] of Indians to those of an intelligent and productive white race." An 1866 law stipulated that Indians had 60 days to pay between twenty-five and 100 pesos to consolidate title to their lands or else face the loss of their land through public auction. 341 Remarkably, here it was individual property titles that were imbued with the singular force of civilizational progress, thought to bring "the extinction of the communities" which hindered civilization and blocked the "fusion of the two races into one homogenous society."342

Crucial to the second phase of land reform was the 1874 law of ex-vinculación, a law that required corporate communities be converted into individual landholdings and be titled appropriately. The law effectively ended the recognition of corporate landholdings and included a widespread policy of distributing titles to *comunerios* with documented usufruct rights.³⁴³ It also introduced fees for the purchase of sealed paper to be used to record land titles. Finally, in 1880, revisions were made allowing for some land to be held *pro-indiviso* (undivided commonly

63

As she notes of highland ayllus in Chayanta (now Potosí), the people there "sought to maintain their tribute obligations to the state, for tribute simply represented one side of the traditional, asymmetrical 'pact of reciprocity' that had always governed relations between the ayllus and the state" (Larson 1998:306; see also Sánchez-Albornoz 1978; Platt 1982; and Grieshaber 1980).

³³⁶ Here, the tribute was taken as evidence of a "naked extraction" that was not understood through patrimonial discourses prevalent in the highlands (Larson 1998:307).

The sales drew from an 1862 government deslinde or examination of land titles and boundaries, which had elicited revolts in privately owned areas and haciendas (Jackson 1994:69).

³³⁸ Ibid:70; See also my discussion of one such case in Chapter 2.

The most intense period of change occurred between 1864 and 1871, when the Melgarejo administration began to sell lands taken from community members who had failed to provide proof of purchase through title or who had not paid "consolidation" fees (Jackson 1994:72). ³⁴⁰ Dorado (1864 cited by Jackson 1994:72).

Jackson (1994:72). Much of these sales of community lands elicited protests which the government could not handle and which the Morales regime, following Melgarejo, later redacted.

³⁴² Pantaleón Dalence (1874 cited in Jackson 1994:74).

³⁴³ Jackson (1994:74).

held land), itself in part a response to widespread highland mobilizations. These reforms required new forms of measurement and cataloguing. New special land commissions (*mesas revisitadores*) were created to carry out this measurement, itself eliciting opposition from community members who blocked officials' access and destroyed their records. Due to this opposition, the distribution of land titles was drawn out and, in some cases, never achieved. As discussed in the next chapter, this second stage of liquidating collective lands and converting them into private titled properties elicited further mobilizations. Indeed, the period from the late 19th century export boom to the 1952 revolution was marked by a series of major rebellions as well as legal initiatives. Revolts were tightly organized and occurred alongside petition drives, rural labor strikes, political assemblies, and congressional lobbying. From the 1930s onward, peasants often organized into *sindicatos* or peasant leagues, conflicts with landlords and government officials often brutally repressed by national military troops. 347

The question of how hacienda laborers made sense of these Republican agrarian reforms has been partially obscured by reified accounts of regional peasantry. Here, Cochabamba is associated first and foremost with the central valleys, whose urban centers were particularly active in Bolivia's Independence War. 348 Despite Ayopaya's centrality in the Independence War, not all populations were equally active in the independence movements nor equally accepting of an emergent revolutionary logic of national struggle and citizenship. 349 Servants and laborers on haciendas, in particular, faced limits in their participation in such mobilizations and, at the same time, likely had a particular relationship to the Republican State that was mediated in part by localized relations to hacienda overlords, historically charged with protecting and guarding workers against colonial tribute burdens and forced mita labor. 350 There were also other factors at work, including new forms of land holding that did not always produce a singular valley perspective. 351 Scholars have tended to argue that class relations had taken primacy over patron relations to the state, thus allowing for an "easy transition" to republican rule and legalized private landholdings in Cochabamba. 352 This transition is then framed as a natural outcome of a "long process of internal decay of community life and norms" in this region. ³⁵³Yet, this assumes that the legacy of colonial rule, qua decay, is simply a negative process, an assumption that obscures attention to the emergence of new forms of collectivity from within this process. As the old system of consolidated land tenure by valley landlords broke up between the late 19th century

_

³⁴⁴ Jackson (1994:74).

³⁴⁵ Jackson (1994:75-80).

³⁴⁶ As Gotkowitz shows, the revolts of 1899, 1927, and 1947 were not simply populist mobilizations opposed to legal processes but rather were marked by the integration of populist and legal battles, mobilizations often the culminations of unsuccessful legal battles.

³⁴⁷ Jackson (1994:83). For a discussion of the military's repression of mining sindicatos, see Nash (1992).

³⁴⁸ For instance, Larson notes of central valley peasants that "their protonational sentiment and participation in the independence movement had raised expectations about a new social order that would finally shatter the institutions of mita and tribute" (Larson 1998:307).

³⁴⁹During the lengthy struggle for Bolivian independence between 1809 and 1825, Ayopaya was the site of an extended guerilla campaign against royalist forces (Jackson 1994:83). Indeed, to this day Ayopaya's municipal center, Villa Independencia, gained its name following its importance in the Independence War.

³⁵⁰ Larson (1998:99).

³⁵² As Larson notes, "peasant flight" and the passing of people for cholo or mestizo but also to the ways that the "primacy of agrarian class relationships had marginalized the patron-state and undermined its ability to exact tribute (1998:309). Thus, "peasant perceptions of the moral authority of the republican state [. . .] can only be understood in light of the different legacies of colonial rule" in the highlands and the valleys (Larson 1998:309).

³⁵³ Larson (1998:311).

and the 1930s, a result of both by new tax burdens and by foreign trade competition, a new class of small landholders or *piqueros* comprised of peasants who had saved money to purchase land titles and who often had less conflictive relations to landlords than colonos in highland communities.³⁵⁴

At the same time, with the affront to collective land holdings following the 1874 law. 355 a new class of "landless laborers, squatters, and subtenants" emerged, those who were particularly vulnerable in so far as they were unable to purchase land nor "secure the customary patronage of their landlords."356 What resulted was a variety of labor arrangements including day laborers, the leasing of lands, wage work, and migration to highland mining centers and Chilean salt flats.³⁵⁷ At the same time, the decay of an initial Spanish land-holding class also generated new conditions for small peasant maize farmers as well as for a range of migratory arrangements that earlier tributary policies had sought to reform. For instance, Cochabamba saw the growth of a class of domestic laborers who were integrated into haciendas and often assumed ambiguous positions as servants and miners as well as godchildren or even adopted kin. 358 Thus, while scholars like Larson argue that these long-run histories of agrarian change culminated in the production of an industrial proletarian cut off from social ties and more vulnerable than ever to the ebb and tide of national and international economies, this account partially overlooks the question of the impacts of late 19th century land reform for non-agricultural relations and labor practices. While landlessness might be identified with an urban proletarian, it was also an older condition marking rural agrarian life. In subsequent chapters, I raise questions about the ways that Ayopaya's hacienda past shapes rural relations today, not simply conditioning labor forms but also informing specific orientations to agrarian authority and exchange.

At the same time, reform logics were not always efficacious in their attempts to transform rural life-ways. Despite legal reforms aimed at challenging corporate land ownership—including haciendas—in the mid-19th century, the Ayopaya hinterlands proved unusually resistant to republican land reform efforts. ³⁵⁹ According to Larson, this condition resulted from population growth, land tenure structures, and relative isolation from regional markets.³⁶⁰ The monopoly over land by a set of interrelated elite families created notable tensions, eliciting two bloody rebellions in Ayopaya—one in 1927, another in 1947—that sought to challenge oppressive labor conditions and land encroachments from a mestizo elite. 361 Jackson notes that these rebellions stemmed in part from the presence of peasant landowners in nearby central valleys and from the "growing politicization of peasants" in the 1930s and 1940s related to an emergent class-based sindicato politics. However, as discussed in the subsequent chapter, such mobilizations also drew heavily from state reform languages, particularly the government's growing concern with pongueaje as a mode of slavery. 362

possibilities of saving money with which to purchase land (Jackson 1994:166). ³⁶¹ Jackson (1994:89); see also Dandler and Torrico (1987:334-378).

³⁵⁴ Larson (1998:312-314).

³⁵⁵ Jackson (1994).

³⁵⁶ Larson (1998:316).

³⁵⁷ Larson (1998:316-319).

³⁵⁸ See Chapter 3 for a discussion of such informal domestic arrangements in Ayopaya.

As Jackson notes, up to 1950 "Ayopaya Haciendas owners exercised a virtual monopoly over agricultural land, and landless peasants had the option of either migrating from Ayopaya or remaining as service tenants (1994:165). ³⁶⁰ In addition, landlords "maintained stricter control" over service tenants than in other regions, limiting

³⁶² From the 1930s onward, Bolivian reformers called for agrarian reform, arguing for the need to uproot "what were seen as anachronistic colonial institution" include service tenantry and the "feudal hacienda" (Jackson 1994:176). Reform debates were accompanied by mobilizations on the part of Cochabamba peasant leagues demanding agrarian

While scholars of Bolivian land reform have positioned Avopaya as an outlier—one whose entrenched hacienda system did not give way to the same sorts of peasant landholding arrangements than in other parts of Cochabamba—in my own fieldwork I encountered many Quechua-speaking townsfolk who identified as the children of former landlords. In Ayopaya, too, it seems that shifting land tenure patterns also facilitated the growth of a new class of peasant landowners. As in the central Cochabamba valleys, haciendas were owned not only by an elite class of patrones but also included smaller landowners (juch'uy patrones) who spoke Quechua and were of peasant descent. 363 Rather than being merely absorbed into the ranks of a mestizo middle-class or converted into a docile class of hacienda workers, members of such groups often identify as indigenous and demonstrate a particularly ambivalent relationship to the central government.³⁶⁴ Thus, and as elaborated upon in subsequent chapters, to understand rural opposition toward new MAS land reforms in Ayopaya, particularly land retitling, such reforms must be situated within Cochabamba's long history of legal intervention in existing land and labor relations through state agrarian reform. 365 Here, liberalism did not constitute an immediate shift to legal inclusion and rights, but rather involved the production of new modes of hierarchy. Yet, in contrast to the argument that *hacendado* rule was imposed in a vacuum left by the crumbling of a "tributary/caste system," 366 my account of Cochabamba's past has emphasized the unstable ways that colonial administrators drew from understandings of Incaic tradition as models of authority, forms of patronage and prestige bound up in distinct relations of labor and land that remain consequential long after the shift to Republican rule. In this partial continuity, then, Cochabamba's hacienda past was also shaped particular forms of regional belonging and exchange that would fit unsteadily within both national ideals of citizenship and highland elaborations of ayllu collectivity.

From "Personal Service" to "Slavery": Agrarian Servitude in Longue Durée

By tracing shifting understandings of rural labor relations and their accompanying practices of patronage and exchange during the colonial period, this chapter has examined the ways that tribute relations initially modeled on Incaic political systems shifted from exemplary models of ethical rule to a mode of feudal, backward order at odds with innate human dignity and obstructing the nation's civilizational progress. In particular, I have raised questions about the ways that Ayopaya's history of agrarian transformation produced land conflicts and mass mobilizations while at the same time generating specific sorts of attachment and exchange built around shared idioms of authority and obligation, prestige and duty, idioms that were not simply the organic persistence of a precolonial culture but, rather, were themselves studied, instituted, and reformed by colonial administrators. In particular, I have raised questions about how

reforms, on the one hand, and which organized militias that invaded and occupied hacienda lands, discussed at greater length in the subsequent chapter. ³⁶³ Larson (1998); Shakow (2014:105). As Jackson notes, many such small land-holders had taken advantage of the

³⁶⁶ Larson (2004:14).

downward mobility of a traditional landholding class in the 1870s to purchase land (1994:86, 151-153).

³⁶⁴ Jackson argues that in the highlands many communities "completely disappeared, absorbed by existing haciendas or included in the growing number of rural estates created after the passage of the law of ex-vinculación" (1994:85). While structurally this may be true, the movement of persons from communities to haciendas need not be seen as synonymous with the inexorable loss of collective belonging nor more traditional Aymara or Quechua values. See Shakow (2014) as well as Chapter 7 for my discussion of forms of post-hacienda indigenous belonging. ³⁶⁵ Here, liberalizing efforts to convert rural "Indian" hordes into citizens through individual property titles were

often experienced as equally if not more coercive than the earlier dual-republic system premised on the partial autonomy on indigenous communities or ayllus (Larson 2004:6).

hacienda relations were problematic for reformers not only in their capacity to function as a catalyst for rural unrest or as a means to escape tribute but also insofar as they were organized by patterns of authority and subjection that, in the late colonial period, arose as challenges to the integrationist and modernizing thrust of a soon-independent Republic. Thus, while my account foregrounds legal debates about hacienda extraction, my hope is to raise broader questions about agrarian pasts and the terms of regional belonging today. 367

In the following pages of this dissertation, I explore the ways that ideals of generosity and reciprocity continue to shape agrarian relations, not simply upon what are often characterized as more traditional Aymara ayllus but also in upon agrarian estates and in the aftermath of hacienda servitude. Thus, rather than hacienda factures or ayllu survivals, Ayopaya's history of hacienda labor and abolition points to ambivalent experiences of state reform in which imbrication within rural systems of labor both respond to and sustain their own quite distinct understandings of collectivity and virtuous exchange, practices that have been shaped and reshaped by colonial and republican histories of agrarian reform but which, I shall suggest, exceed the determinants of those legal histories. These crosscutting relations and attachments pose challenges to dominant accounts of Cochabamba's agrarian past where forms of indentured labor are generally taken to produce a fractured, atomistic social order opposed to traditional ayllu collectivities in the highlands. 368 While this mode of collectivity diverges from more romanticized portrayals of ayllu community, then, it nonetheless enfolds specific elaborations of authority and exchange which arose as increasingly problematic to new modernizing sensibilities, expressed in Viedma's account with which I began. Thus, if haciendas weakened certain community structures they also absorbed elements of precolonial and early colonial patronage traditions, practices of agrarian authority and exchange in part upholding certain prestige traditions despite their challenges to nascent citizenship ideals and the more spatially-circumscribed elaborations of community that were formalized by colonial policies of land resettlement and tribute.³⁶⁹

In attending to the hacienda both as an object of legal intervention and as a material site marked by and generative of specific elaborations of shared life and rural collectivity, my account shifts away from political-economic concerns to attend to the distinct forms of authority, prestige, and patronage shaping hacienda life. The following chapters consider how Cochabamba's long arc of agrarian change and state reform has limited the intelligibility of certain moral and political claims, including those of hacienda servants whose conceptions of responsibility and justice do not always map onto larger 20th century peasant movements for freedom, land, and autonomy. While popular struggles inspired by legal imaginaries enabled new and creative appropriations of the language of rights, this language also imposed certain limits or constraints on the sorts of claims that could be represented in popular movements and made legible to Bolivian reformers. Rather than see such exclusions as accidental, that is, as oversights reflecting the marginality of Quechua domestic workers, the history of agrarian transformation and labor regulation suggests that such limitations be situated within broader shifts in governance and political rationality. As discussed in the next chapter, this antinomy

-

³⁶⁷ I take up this problem in greater detail in the next chapter, where I examine 20th century debates concerning hacienda servitude and their implications for relations of collectivity and conflict in former hacienda villages today. ³⁶⁸ See Larson (1998); Platt (1982); Stern (1993); for a critique see Lyons (2006). For instance, in the temperate valleys of Cochabamba, Larson (1998:304) argues, "ideals of self-sufficiency, reciprocity, and collectivity [. . .] had ceased to govern or mediate social relations in many Andean villages" by the early 17th century. For a similar binary between highland Aymara and lowland Quechua traditions, see Greishaber (1980).

³⁶⁹ On the ways haciendas upheld traditional Andean virtues of exchange, see Lyons (2006).

³⁷⁰ See Gotkowitz (2007); Thomson (2002).

between servitude and citizenship would culminate in 20th century mobilizations to abolish pongueaje, movements in which new languages of peasant citizenship were grafted upon earlier forms of anti-colonial, indigenous nationalism.³⁷¹

By re-reading historical accounts of the late colonial period, I have sought to highlight the ways that hacienda laborers shifted from being potential recipients of hacendado patronage and aid to being the abject figures of landlessness and indentured subjection. While certainly rural labor conditions had shifted, this change also begs the question of the broader process by which new egalitarian and rights-based sensibilities worked to render illegible the earlier moral and political dimensions of agrarian patronage.³⁷² This long arc of reformist and popular anxiety with servitude remains crucial to Bolivia's political present. Like Republican attempts to uproot archaic relations of servitude and slavery once modeled on Inca systems of tribute and patronage. the MAS state today approaches the Ayopaya countryside as beholden to a backwards, feudal hacienda order obstructing agricultural modernization and constraining indigenous citizenship. Yet, as discussed in the next chapter, while rural life inherits particular patterns of authority and exchange as well as reformist anxieties with those forms, it also makes of these patterns something new. 373 Unlike reformers' assessments of inherited institutions as blockages to progress, then, contemporary relations in Ayopaya today suggest that this agrarian past also operates as the relational ground for modes of attachment and moral action very different from the categories of subjectivity and pathways of political practice instituted by the reformist state.

-

³⁷¹ Thus, for late colonial reformers as for 20th century revolutionaries, domestic labor within hacienda estates came to symbolize a particularly miserable human condition, a space of dependency and subjection essentially incompatible with citizenship. See chapter 2. See also Gotkowitz (2007:284).

³⁷² As discussed above, these concerns with patronage are paralleled in debates about the mita draft, initially taken as

a mode of securing tribute and loyalty and, increasingly, seen as an illegitimate mode of colonial slavery.

373 In this way, history arises not simply as the dead iteration by which an existing order is passively replicated nor as a moment of sublime shock that compels us to act; history is also lively and creative, reconfigured and engaged in the present. On history as a call to moral action, see Benjamin (1969). For history as creatively recrafted and engaged in the course of everyday ritual and kinship practices, see Lambek (2002).

Chapter 2. Anti-Pongueaie Politics and the Stigmas of Subjection

Not far from the Jesuit chapel where weekly sermons had been held during the earlier hacienda era, we spill out of the truck, which has been hired to carry several municipal officials back to the village they are from for the Virgin of Candelaria patron saint's day celebration, which is today. 374 Moments later, Oscar and I descend downward along the muddy path through old hacienda parcels, where he points to some sunken adobe just past a row of eucalyptus trees, explaining, "This is the landlord's old house [casa antigua]." Nearby, along an old adobe wall, Oscar paused and pointed to a green potato plot, explaining, "This land belongs to my father, it was a gift from the landlord." I ask whether his father had been an hacienda melga runa or hilacata, but Oscar shakes his head. "No," he replies, "It's that my father's mother was raped by the landlord, and so he gifted her land." He continued, "My father has nearly no land here. At the age of nine he left for Chapare to make a life for himself, and only recently returned here." In cases like this, then, landlords did not always recognize children nor leave him an official inheritance, but they may have bequeathed their children or mistresses land, often a fertile plot of land in the central part of the hacienda.

We continue down the path into the valley toward the house where his parents live. When we arrive, Oscar's sister serves us each a plate of food while her young daughter plays with drying cornhusks laid out to dry on a woven mat in the patio. After we eat, Oscar and his father prepare for the day's festivities, putting on colorful woven ponchos adorned with white cloth squares or *qhawas* and gathering their *chiriguano* pan-flutes for a long day of music making. He grabs his camel-colored felt hat, and Oscar and I head off toward the festivities of the sponsor across the river rather than those of his father's neighbor. ³⁷⁵ Pasantes, much like political candidates, compete for the support of villagers, their successful sponsorship of ritual events like this a requisite step in the gradual movement through the village political hierarchy. Later that afternoon, the two pasantes would face off in the vard of the old Jesuit church, each surrounded by a group of flute-playing dancers, including Oscar, whose participation marked their support for one candidate. In Sarahuayto, however, the *pasante* structure also reflected the intimate legacy of the region's hacienda past. After land redistribution in 1953, the village had subsequently been divided into two villages, Sarapaya and Sarahuayto, with the former part housing located closer to the former hacienda building and inhabited predominately by laborers who worked within the hacienda and harbored closer ties to the landowning family. Sarahuayto, in contrast, had been comprised predominately of tenant farmers and their small adobe homes, which, with the agrarian reform, became their property. Thus, labor tenure today was informed in part by previous labor hierarchies, hierarchies that today influence both the terms of village belonging and conflict.

We file out of the yard, the thatch roof illuminated in the late afternoon sun, and I follow Oscar along a muddy path that leads from his house over a field to the house of the pasante. We enter the yard, a festive scene. Around us, young men are dressed in their ritual ponchos hanging over jeans or dress pants, their white fabric squares adhered to their backs and blowing in the

³⁷⁴ The Candelaria festival originates in Peru and seems to have begun to be celebrated, in Bolivia, around 1850. Anthropologists note that it began in Bolivia as a place where mestizo elites from La Paz confirmed and strengthened fictive kinship bonds to rural Indians, arguing that by the 1990s the fiesta functioned to replace longstanding fictive kin relationships to short-term economic arrangements aimed at providing resources and revenue for the annual fiesta (Crandon-Malamud 1993:575).

³⁷⁵ Conceptions of the upper and lower parts of Andean communities, the urco and uma, have been examined in the work of Bouysse-Cassagne (1986).

wind. Oscar quickly goes to join a crowd of male friends who are playing the pan-flutes, and I make my way over to an adobe wall, to accompany an acquaintance and his two adolescent daughters who traveled with us from Laraya. Upon entering, we are provided large metal cups of chicha by the pasante's wife. I then join Ramiro, an older man and the *pasante*, who waves me over from his seat underneath a ledge of tin roofing. He is one of the fiesta pasantes as well as an alcalde indígena (indigenous mayor) of Sarapaya, a status marked in his red poncho or chimborno. Alcaldes are usually indigenous villagers, yet both alcalde, or alcalde vara (staffholding mayor) are positions held by those who, traditionally, sponsored religious festivals upon haciendas. ³⁷⁶ As I arrived with Oscar. Ramiro mistakes me for a government official, remarking that the village lacks medical care, as the government-affiliated nurse is constantly underway on his motorcycle, and does not attend to villagers on scheduled days. When I clarify that I'm not a governmental official but rather a foreign researcher interested in labor histories, Ramiro shakes his head, and then notes, pensively, "Life before was desperate. There was nothing to eat." We sit for a moment, sipping *chicha*. Ramiro's wife brings me a bowl of soup. I comment that I find it disturbing that the landlord's grandson continues to reside in a nearby village, indeed, in the former hacienda building. We sit in silence, sipping chicha, and then Ramiro notes, seemingly referring to the former hacienda system, "It has not been overcome." 377

In Sarahuayto, popular accounts of the region's hacienda past are bound up with critical assessments of its incomplete displacement and, with it, the inefficacy or failure of national land reform measures since 1953. Sarahuayto was home to one of the largest hacienda estates in the region, notable in the landlord's prolonged opposition to state redistribution efforts and evident in an extended legal battle that was not resolved until 1986. In particular, the alcalde's lament that the hacienda had not been overcome challenged the common designation of the hacienda as abolished or lost, *chinkachin*. Ramiro's lament, then should be understood as emanating from Sarahuayto's nearly half-century long battle over hacienda lands, first with the former landlords and then among villagers. Yet, rather than being negated in the course of ritual action, community festivities seemed to take this enduring fracture as a constitutive and necessary part of the day's ritual activities. Thus, it was notable that the fiesta had two *pasantes*, one from Sarapaya and the other from Sarahuayto, the celebrations of the day mimicking and spatially imitating the land conflicts between the upper and lower moieties. Indeed, it was significant that Oscar, following his father's lead, had made his way down to the Sarapaya *pasante*'s house rather than, and nearly, being convinced to partake in the festivities above.

Oscar's long walk from his father's home in Sarahuayto to that of the *pasante* in Sarapaya signaled the continued force of such divisions and, in particular, marking his affiliation to a particular sector of the former hacienda village today. As noted, the landlord had left his father a fertile plot of land in Sarapaya, steps from the former hacienda. Here, the lower and higher parts of the community correspond with the more fertile and less fertile plots of the

³⁷⁶ Thurner (1993:53) notes that such status points to the "blurring of civil and religious authority" upon haciendas, yet the assumption that these two would be divided in the first place imposes a secular rubric not entirely appropriate for haciendas, which were, as we have seen historically simultaneously sites of economic production and Catholic indoctrination. See also Larson (1998); Lyons (2006).

³⁷⁷ The Quechua phrase for "not lost" is "mana chinkachinchu."

³⁷⁸ For instance, Quechua-speaking villagers in Ayopaya described the hacienda as lost. For instance, when I asked one man whether the landowners' children still come to visit, he answered, "We can not permit them to come anymore. [The hacienda] is lost" (*Chinkachin*). Similarly, another woman whose parents had worked for the late landowner, noted of the hacienda, "It is good that it has been lost." "Now," she added, "is the time of good liberty." For the significance of the -chi suffix, see Peña and Lara 1994:215.

hacienda, the most fertile valley lands originally closest to the hacienda and, in the land reform era, divided predominately among the most privileged hacienda workers as well as among domestic laborers and families with ties to the landlords. With conflictive struggles for hacienda land redistribution that lasted from the 1950s to 1986, these patterns of exchange among landlords and servants became not only key sites of legal reform but also crucial points of community tension. It was this entwinement in hacienda hierarchies that frustrated union leaders, causing them to accuse some villagers of having betrayed their fellow villagers. Indeed, Don Luis remains partially estranged from many members of the village, particularly the Sarahuayto moiety, described by some as a *yanqha*, a "good for nothing" who benefits from elites rather than partaking in the life and labor of the peasant community.

In this chapter, I examine contemporary tensions concerning Ayopaya's history of forced labor and situate them within a trend of mounting reformist and populist concern with hacienda pongueaje beginning in the early 20th century. I begin by tracing the ways that peasants' expectations of and demands for hacienda overcoming, however unfulfilled, absorb and express a particular historical sensibility which draws from reformist notions of hacienda subjection as a challenge and blockage to citizenship and rights. Yet, I suggest, anxiety with hacienda-based systems of labor and exchange are not related only to their challenges to modern citizenship. Instead, I suggest, they reflect a particular concern with servitude, especially domestic labor, as fundamentally incompatible with political practice, a stigmatized form of subjection that, in the village context, shapes attempts to distinguish between different classes of workers, particularly servants and tenants. Tracing the sources of tensions within specific mid-century debates concerning domestic labor, gender relations, and labor practices, I argue that the stigmas of servitude derive not only from inter-community tensions but also absorb broader reformist anxieties with contrast between free and unfree labor and its importance for differentiating between two disparate kinds of rural subjects: abject servants, on the one hand, and more militant peasant farmers, on the other. In the final part of the chapter, I return to the Candelaria festival as a point of insight into the ways that villagers both inhabit and address these divisions today.

A Life of Scraps: Entanglements of Land, Labor, and Value

In the fertile Ayopaya river valleys, overlapping practices of sharecropping, unpaid domestic labor, and salaried work on hacienda estates and *hacendado*-owned mines continued to organize rural life until at least the early 1950s. Tenant farming *colonos* labored in agriculture, giving a share of produce and livestock to the landlord or working for a certain number of days each week for the hacienda in exchange for small subsistence plots or *pegujales*, while widows, girls, and unmarried women worked in rotating turns of "personal service" to the landlords, their labor including tasks like cooking, cleaning, raising children (including illegitimate children raised as "orphans"), herding animals, chewing *muko* paste, spinning wool (*hilado*) and weaving blankets, delivering messages or running errands (*cacha*), and sewing clothes. ³⁷⁹ In addition, wage-earning miners worked in a handful of gold mines situated upon hacienda lands. These labor

-

³⁷⁹ As Gotkowitz (2007:136) notes, mitanaje typically applied to *huarmisapas*, Quechua for single women and widows who exchanged domestic service or shepherding labor for a small hut and a small plot. The term *mitani* stems from the word *mit'a*, denoting season, station, period, turn, or weather, and likely relates to the Inca rotating labor system of the same name, later incorporated by the Spanish Crown as mita. See Larson (1988).

arrangements often involved landowners' close involvement in peasants' lives, evident in the distribution of food, coca, and during religious and agrarian festivities, corn beer or chicha. 380

Most villagers' accounts of the region's labor past focused on the violence and desperation of hacienda subjection, yet as suggested by Ramiro's commentary, such reflections were also interwoven with critiques of the incomplete displacement of hacienda-era inequities by national land reform. For unionists, particularly those who had been involved in popular organizing for hacienda land redistribution, hacienda inequity was most palpable in current land relations. Don Angelo, a bilingual Quechua and Spanish speaker in his 70s, was a former unionist who had been pivotal in regional struggles for land redistribution. Angelo followed in a long line of politically-active peasants, his father having worked as a *colono* tenant farmer on the nearby hacienda before becoming active in land redistribution politics, and his grandfather having been an influential indigenous leader, even invited to attend the first Indigenous Congress of 1945. Today, Angelo was well-respected figure among fellow villagers as well as townsfolk in Laraya, a man known for his role in hacienda land recuperation efforts in the 1980s. Indeed, the landlord had taken him to court for organizing labor strikes, land squatting, and the pillaging of produce, resulting in Angelo serving a three year jail term.

Seated in Angelo's kitchen with my research assistant one evening, we listened as Angelo described the fraught story of the village's hacienda system and peasant efforts to overthrow the landlord. He began by noting that there had been four classes of workers (*runa ruwaq* or "people who do") or four classes of *servitude* (*servidumbre*). These included *pongos* (peons or male servants), *mit'anis* (female domestic servants), *melgueros* or *melgas* (hacienda overseers), and *jatun melgas* (hacienda managers or bosses). Those who "served" lived off the hacienda's scraps, yet these same laborers employed weeklong laborers who "lived off of them." Thus, while the landowner "had" his *melguero*, this *melguero* also "had," that is employed or called upon the labor of, his weekly laborer (*semanero*). Because of the extensive burdens and debts of hacienda tenantry and "personal services," people often relied on *arrimantes*, landless men and women who were often kin, to fulfill some of the duties and who owed obligations to colonos. Thus, Angelo's accounts suggest how intricate relations of mastery and subjection splintered across hacienda labor hierarchies, evident in overlapping forms of free and unfree labor as well as the rotating labor regimes. 382

Angelo's narrative bore the traces of earlier juridical and reform languages, among them the very category of "servitude" (*servidumbre*). ³⁸³ Furthermore, and tellingly, Angelo excluded the category of tenant farmer from his labor typology, an bracketing noteworthy as this group comprising the most common labor position, comprising about 400 workers in Sarahuayto. This exclusion seems to inherit a distinction, crucial to mid-century labor debates, between tenant

See Gotkowitz (2007:135); Rodríguez and Solares (1990); and Larson (1988).

³⁸¹ Here, the position of *jatun melga* seems to correspond loosely to what in other haciendas were *kipus*, men selected by the landlord to manage work over central agricultural plots and to dole out whippings to noncompliant workers. However, as Thurner notes, *kipus* were also at times active in anti-hacienda mobilizations and in several cases served as militant leaders (1993:53).

³⁸⁰ More than expressions of a timeless culture, then, such exchange relations have emerged out of and been reshaped in complex ways by the nation's history of agrarian, tributary, and labor reform since the colonial period.

Arguably, elements of these practices have historical antecedents in the colonial and even precolonial period, particularly *yanacona* labor (Larson 1988). As Laura Gotkowitz (2007:138) notes, the right to hire part-time laborers to augment lacking time in which to tend to one's own plots was a key demand colonos' made of landlords in the course of conflicts over *pongueaje* from the 1880s onward.

As discussed below, such juridical languages were popularized in the late 1930s, evident in peasant proposals and petitions for hacienda abolition (see Gotkowitz 2007). I discuss these petitions later in this chapter.

farmers and hacienda servants. In addition, and likely shaped by his own involvement in land politics, his account focuses particularly on the consequences of hacienda labor economy for land rights. Of course, the sources of this entwinement of labor positions and land access were evident in the language itself. Indeed, the term *melga* derives from a Spanish administrative system, denoting a single parcel of land. *Sobra melga* and *jatun melga*, then refer not only to workers' status positions in a labor hierarchy but also signal the differential access of each laborer to larger and then "leftover" plots of land. Thus, the tiered hacienda system pointed to the partial collapsing of land and labor hierarchies, each also assigned particular forms of value.

This entwinement of hacienda labor and land was so much the case that Angelo immediately linked labor hierarchies in the hacienda to a discussion of the ways the 1953 reform re-entrenched existing land inequities. Yet, while Angelo critiqued hacienda inequities, he also seemed to share the evaluative assessment of this hierarchy, that is, of labor position (and thereby land access) as a measure or expression of the value and even morality. Thus, Angelo noted somewhat indignantly, *sobra melgas* lived off of the *puchita*, that is, scraps or leftovers, of the wealthier class of managers or *melgas*. While indignation at the privileges accompanying the more elite labor positions, such as managers and overseers, seemed understandable given Angelo's class sympathies, more surprising was his explicit stigmatization of *pongos* or servants. As he laid out the various tiers of hacienda labor, Angelo noted that *pongos* were "pig farmers and chicken farmers" who tended to animals and had no lands. He then added, "The *pongo* ate in the hacienda. Today we still scorn them. 'Your food was from the hacienda, what did you earn?' Today we still talk like this."

Angelo's scorn for pongos (and, by structural extension, female *mit'anis*) was disturbing. Given Angelo's sympathies with a peasant labor movement, wouldn't he empathize with the suffering of this most vulnerable group of servants? Why then, this sense of denigration and scorn? Furthermore, and even more alarming, this scorn was crucial to assessments of character and value today. Here, I explore how Angelo's rebuke seemed to adopt a particular assessment of value, here negative value, assigned to non-agricultural work, including domestic labor. On the one hand, the value linked to earning one's subsistence through labor draws from Quechua notions of livelihood or *kawsay*, the value of living from subsistence, as well as of personhood as established through community relations of religious sponsorship. Tet this concern with *pongos* landless condition also uncannily echoed mid-century reform debates privileging tenant farming as an exemplar of peasant productivity and labor. Indeed, Angelo emphasized the fact that *pongos* had not had their own land or animals, but rather, had depended on hacienda lords for food and resources, a condition Angelo aligned with a compromised moral condition. ³⁸⁶

As scholars note, within many hacienda villagers in the Andes, those who do not sponsor fiestas are considered worthless, "like a dog, without any obligation." Without land or goods to offer to fulfill roles in prestige hierarchy, hacienda workers were, like failed sponsors, akin to

21

³⁸⁴ As he noted, "In the agrarian reform *jatun melgas* were handed over large lands, while *sobra melgas* were handed over only leftover lands."

³⁸⁵ Miguel Morato-Peña (2007), personal communication. See also Harris (1989), Nash (1979), and Parry and Bloch (1989).

³⁸⁶ Such dependency was inscribed in their title, *pongo*, derived from the Quechua *punkurina* or *punku puerta* (doorman), alluding to the person who slept by the door of the hacienda in the place of, and sometimes alongside, the dog (Gotkowitz 2007:137).

³⁸⁷ (cited in Lyons 2006:119).

"snot-nosed children." Indeed, if Don Angelo accused the supporters of the landlord of being "good for nothings" who are greedy and act out of self-benefit, it was precisely this term that scholars elsewhere have found applied to people who do not sponsor fiestas. Given that personhood is established through reciprocal ties, relying on others for food, clothing, and land fundamentally marginalized hacienda servants and alienated them from within a local system of prestige. It was this alienation that was marked, indirectly, by Don Angelo's complaint that the landlords' favored servants were "good for nothings" who acted out of self-benefit rather than the good of the community. Thus, here reformist and rural peasant discourses of prestige seemed to overlap. For mid-century reformers, hacienda servants were grotesque, childlike figures who had not yet attained political maturation; for hacienda tenant farmers they were stigmatized for their inability to partake in local systems of religious sponsorship and redistribution, acts that "transformed young people into moral and social persons." "390"

My conversation with Angelo raised a question of the ways that reformist languages of labor and value in mid-20th century agrarian debates—and popularized in mid-century peasant organizing for land, like the 1945 congress—not only conditioned a militant sense of peasant collectivity, but also, influenced the estrangement of certain groups or laborers from village life. Speaking to others, I learned that this stigmatization was not particular to Angelo, nor to older unionists who had been involved in the region's anti-hacienda struggles. Gregorio, another union leader whose parents worked as hacienda tenant farmers in the region, noted that the landlords "had their pongos, their slaves, their people." While these narratives attempt an honest account of the formal dimensions of the hacienda labor economy, they also seem to reify (or to adopt reformists' reifications of) various labor positions, particularly servants. Yet, these reified categories of the region's labor history were complicated by the accounts of former servants and hacienda workers. Indeed, given that each female *colona* was required to also provide rotating service in the household in *mitanaje*, the very divide between tenants and servants was destabilized in practice. Furthermore, even tenant status was not always permanent, as colonos served turns at rotating labor throughout the year, working a week for the landlord, usually during the labor-intensive periods of planting and harvest.³⁹¹

In their accounts, former hacienda workers recalled both severe labor conditions as well as a range of unpaid "personal services" required of colono families and the sole duty of domestic laborers. ³⁹² In addition to domestic labor, "personal services" included the preparation of *muko* paste, the most prized base for chicha that had to be made using saliva and chewing corn kernels, required of colono farmers. ³⁹³ In preparation for seasonal patron saint's day festivities,

3

³⁸⁸ In Lyons's (2006:12) account of Ecuadorian haciendas, he found that this term was used to describe people who do not sponsor fiestas.

³⁸⁹ Lyons (2006:12).

³⁹⁰ Lyons (2006:121). As Lyons notes, adulthood in former haciendas was imagined as a shift from having a father or mother who gives you grain, bread, or fruit to that of a position in which one partakes in a broader religious relation to gods and as an authority (Lyons 2006:123).

³⁹¹ See Gotkowitz (2007).

³⁹² For the limits to "official versions" of the hacienda past like those of unionists, see Thurner (1993:45). On "personal services" in Cochabamba haciendas, see Gordillo (1997), Jackson (1994).

³⁹³ As Gregorio, the son of former hacienda colonos explained, "They ground corn into flour, and each person had to make five kilos of *muko* [a sweet corn paste used for *chicha* beer]." Doña Carmen, an ex-servant born in 1927, recalled that she had "served the patron" as a *mukoq*. They then had to transport the processed *chicha* to the nearby mining center of Tapacarí, 20 miles to the south, to sell to the miners. In Cochabamba, the preparation of *muko* was particularly significant given that the region's largest economy consisted in the production of *chicha* or corn beer (Gotkowitz 2007:138).

not simply *mukogs* but rather all servants were required to chew five kilos of corn into *muko* for corn beer. For instance, Doña Ormega was an elderly woman who had worked alongside her parents "serving" the landowner. As a child they moved from one hacienda to another, leaving if the conditions were too bad. Her mother had been a *michiq*, herding animals, and her father transported goods for the landowner. She herself had been a mukog, chewing dried corn to produce *muko*, a sweet paste used to make corn beer. In addition, *colono* families also had the burden of transporting goods for landowners, serving as kachags or carriers, a task requiring arduous travels along dangerous roads with heavy loads strapped to one's shoulders or loaded on one's own mules or horses. ³⁹⁴ Thus, if union men like Angelo and Gregorio evoked an absolute divide between "servants" and "tenants," workers' memories destabilized this divide.

Here, remarkably, servants themselves never described themselves as "slaves"; this was a term leveled at them by members of a younger generation, including their children, as well as by union leaders, its antecedents evident in anti-hacienda petitions and reform debates from 1938 onward, discussed below. ³⁹⁵ For instance, one man recalled how the *hilacata*'s children were cruel, noting "they punished my mother for damaging the fields, tying her up with a lasso, like a slave."³⁹⁶ Not only hacienda servitude, then, but also particular cases of extreme physical violence were often described by recourse to a complaint of "slavery." But why this turn to the notion of slavery? Was the term used for emphasis, that is, by evoking such a weighted term did the speaker seek to affectively register the appalling or extreme nature of violence or labor relations? Was the term slave meant to draw attention to the racialized dimensions of hacienda suffering, thereby working against more conservative defenses that it was simply an economic or labor relation? What was it that made the two categories analytically commensurate? Was it the shared condition of landlessness among servant and slave, and their accompanying dependency on masters or landlords, or more broadly, had the two categories somehow become analytically entwined? That is, had the hacienda servant become thinkable only as a slave?

While it is perhaps impossible to answer these questions with certainty, one fruitful point of entry seems to lie in the question of landlessness, a problem itself central to mid-century labor debates. Before the 1953 land reform tenant farmers worked in sharecropping arrangements, giving a ten percent share of harvests and animals to the landowner but maintaining their own plots on which they grew food, *pongos* depended entirely on the hacienda for food. With the 1953 reform, hacienda tenants were to be made owners of their usufruct plots or *pegujales*. ³⁹⁸ *Pongos* and *mit'anis*, having no such land, often received drier, more distant plots, in some cases, to lands that had previously been only pasturelands. However, conversely, hacienda workers on best terms with the landlord were often given access to or bequeathed quite fertile lands. Thus, and as suggested in the case of land gifting with which I began, hacienda servants were not just abject figures of subjection but, at the same time, were at times recipients of particular forms of

³⁹⁴ Don Juato, adds that he served the landowners carrying *k'achas*—food, supplies, and mail—from Cochabamba to nearby Tiquirpaya. To this day, he noted, he has back pain and soreness in his feet and joints, particularly when exposed to cold water. For the colonial politics of carrying in the case of Andean silladores, see Taussig (1987).

³⁹⁵ Indeed, in contrast to the notion of hacienda slavery anthropologists have long noted that what distinguished haciendas and plantations was the existence of "semifree" rather than slave or simply wage labor upon haciendas (Wolf and Mintz 1977; see also Lyons 2006:73). ³⁹⁶ Hilacatas were originally indigenous leaders hired as colonial managers (Thomson 2002).

³⁹⁷ This remained true in the present, when people complained of working hard, noting that they have worked "like a slave," or "like a black." ³⁹⁸ See Gotkowitz (2007).

elite aid and resources.³⁹⁹ Thus, it seemed that the stigmas of subjection resulted not simply from servants' dependency or landlessness but, also, registered competing understandings and assessments of hacienda-based systems of patronage. In particular, servants arose as embodied reminders of a competing system of authority and prestige, one born of entanglement in hacendado lives and homes. To better understand the sources of such an evaluative framework, I now consider mid-century political debates hinging on political modernization and on accompanying problem of uprooting rural *pongueaje* or hacienda servitude.

Against Pongueaje: Hacienda Servitude and Peasant Insurgency

In the 1940s, Bolivia underwent a remarkable period of political upheaval and social change, including the founding of unions of colono laborers who, by way of petitions to the national government, demanded land rights and hacienda abolition. In part responding to their desperate appeals for aid and reform, in 1945 the government sponsored the first National Indigenous Congress to which rural representatives from around the country flocked. Following the death by hanging of president Villarroel in 1946, a wave of repression swept the countryside. Despite military intervention, however, anti-hacienda mobilizations continued to wreck havoc in the countryside, as peasant militias attacked haciendas and forced their owners to flee at gunpoint. These mobilizations culminated in the abolition of hacienda pongueaje in 1953, a year after the nation's socialist revolution. Yet abolition also followed from and elicited further governmental attempts to control and discipline rural bodies, evident in the creation of agrarian inspectors charged with fostering agrarian productivity and creating a new class of modern laborers. The disciplinary workings of Bolivia's labor history suggest the insufficiency of imagining abolition as a break between servitude and liberation, highlighting rather the new sorts of insubordination and stigma accompanying a nascent language of rights.

Given the extensive nature of national debates concerning hacienda servitude since at least the late colonial period, discussed in the previous chapter, it is rather surprising that servitude or pongueaje was not outlawed until Bolivia's 1938 National Convention, including its new constitution. While ostensibly concerned with the "Indian question," the new constitution did not completely refigure the place of Bolivia's indigenous masses yet it did institutionalize new social rights for workers, mothers, and children. 401 These measures stemmed in part from the demands of women's groups speaking to the tragic effects of the Chaco War—in which Aymara and Quechua Indians dominated the ranks of the dead and the injured—for kinship arrangements and with them national moral order. Thus, concerns about pongueaje or hacienda servitude were accompanied with renewed governmental and (labor activists') attention to gender and the family. 402 Concerns with servitude and family life led to new initiatives focused

This was not particular to Sarahuayto; rather, as discussed in the previous chapter, had to do with a much longer history of agrarian patronage as well as particular entwinements of authority and exchange in what had previously been Inca territories.

⁴⁰⁰ The Convention occurred in the aftermath of Bolivia's dramatic defeat in the Chaco War (1932-35) with Paraguay. Following a general strike, in 1936 a group of self-proclaimed "military socialists" took over the government, introducing a reform agenda centered on new visions of citizenship and nation that took as its most pressing concern the misery of the "indigenous race. See Gotkowitz (2007:101).

401 See Stephenson (1999). In the Chaco War, Gotkowitz notes, "the equation between indigenous and frontline was

virtually absolute" (2007:105; see also Dunkerley 1987 and Klein 1969).

⁴⁰² On the one hand, this convergence of interests stemmed from the specific dimensions of rural hacienda labor during and following the Chaco War, with labor shortages, shifting gender relations, and increased rural land grabbing. At the same time, women unions since 1927 had pushed for the regulation of domestic labor, including 8hour workdays, equal pay, and the end of a certificate of "good health" required to be submitted to municipal

on rural education, obligatory unionization, and policies aimed to improve hygiene, health, and agriculture. Thus, in May 1938, under the Busch government, male delegates from a range of political parties and representing new women's movements, veteran association, and organized labor along with traditional political parties met to debate the course of the nation.

The convention grew up of a concern with indigenous peoples' majority status in the nation and of how "racial factors" were limiting or blocking the "spirit of cohesion." A central mechanism by which to integrate Indians and establish a more unified, homogenous nation was through citizenship, namely voting rights. Thus, the convention made changes to existing voting rights, removing 1880 property ownership and primary school requirements. At the same time, reformers remained concerned the relationship between labor and citizenship. In debates about work, for instance, representative called for citizenship for men and women based on their "productive capacity." Only women who work with "virtue," not women who cheated on husbands or became prostitutes, should be eligible for citizenship. In the end, voting rights for women were denied, yet the debates suggest not only growing concern with voting or education, but rather, I would argue, an anxiety with the moral repercussions of particular labor relations—particularly those defined as "non-virtuous," including prostitution, domestic labor, and laborers without property. The problematic status of servants' ties to landlords, then, seems to stem in part from a nationalist glorification of mestizo and peasant revolutionaries, models of productive citizenship established against white oligarchs and non-virtuous servants.

The concern with labor was coupled with a focus on property rights. Reforms included changes to 1880 law, shifting from the language of "absolute" property to one of property that was protected only "as long as it served a social function," a stipulation further reproduced in Bolivia's 2006 land reform (discussed in chapter 4). A new chapter of the constitution was introduced which proposed the inalienable status of Indian community lands and further sought to legitimate community requests for the expropriation of land they cultivated for landlords so long as the owner received compensation. While not approved, these suggest existing reformist concerns with individual and collective property, the productivity of agriculture, and the status and modernization of Indian communities. This is evident in calls for land redistribution, for instance on the part of Walter Guevara Arze, who later wrote *Manificsto de Ayopaya*, that land should be distributed "so Indians can 'dress like we do,' 'improve their condition as men,' and become an 'integral part of the nation.'" Thus, like earlier resettlement initiatives under Toledo, land was a site in and through which the Indian was to be liberated from the chains of "slavery." Land, then, was not just an accompaniment to cultural change or civilizing attempts but was, rather, a key material site in which such a reform could and had to be implemented.

officers. In addition, after the war, international feminist associations like the Legión Feminina de Educación Popular América promoted women's civil and social rights and lamented the increase in "illegitimacy, child abandonment, prostitution, and poverty." See Stephenson (1999:15); Ardaya (1992); Lehm and Rivera (1988); Mendicelli (1989).

⁴⁰³ See Gotkowitz (2008:113). Vocational schools for Indians were thought to spread new knowledge and instill new habits, accompanying a broad policy of Indian "rehabilitation." In addition, the schools were to keep Indians "close to the land" yet divorced from an indigenous environment, thereby facilitating their training as agricultural technicians who Busch argued one could then "reincorporate" into the nation.

⁴⁰⁴ Gotkowitz (2007:116-120).

For gender reforms, see Stephenson (1999). For the anti-Semitic views of the MNR party and opposition to tin oligarchs see Gotkowitz (2007:173).

⁴⁰⁶ Gotkowitz (2007:122-124; see also Arze (1988); Trigo (1958:424). While Gotkowitz reads Arze's comments as evidence of an understanding of citizenship as achieved not only by land but also by "cultural improvement," his comments rather seem to suggest the entwinement of each in the other.

These views drew from evolutionary frameworks of property rights as "phases congruent with stages of social evolution," a position articulated by Austrian-American historian Frank Tannenbaum. 407 Agrarian reform, then, was taken not only as necessarily in order to foreclose a violent revolution but was also understood as a central mechanism by which to expand productive citizenship. In addition, Arze appealed to pre-Incaic systems of collective agrarian production as having created a particular biological "indigenous communitarian ethos" that would facilitate large-scale production. 408 Tellingly, Arze's defense of this proposed reform did not build from petitions outlining abuses but, rather, appealed to the "contrast between the insecurity and abuse suffered by indebted resident workers, versus the independence achieved by the former colonos who created unions." That is, it was not rural suffering in Ayopaya per se that was at issue, as it had been for reformer Viedma, but rather the importance of facilitating a shift from indebted worker to independent farmer as a means or stepping-stone in the road to modern citizenship. Along with this debate about hacienda workers land rights, the convention also addressed servitude. Thus, the 1938 charter repeated the 1880 chapter "Rights and Guarantees" which included an article stating, "Slavery does not exist in Bolivia. . . Any slave who sets foot in Bolivia is free" but added to this statement of the nonexistence of slavery the prohibition of "personal services." Thus, it noted, "No form of servitude is allowed and no one can be forced to render personal services without consent and fair compensation." Yet, despite outcry against servitude in abstract, however, legislators continued to uphold the institution of pongueaje and denied these demands for its abolition, invoking its civilizing possibilities in encouraged contact between Indians and cities. 410

These decrees, however legally unbinding, elicited various legal proposals and petitions pushing for the abolition of forced labor and requesting land redistribution. In addition, the late 1930s and early 1940s saw growing rural unrest including labor stoppages and strikes upon haciendas and rural activist claims to land and calls for land collectivization. Following the 1938 constitutional convention, colonos from various provinces in Cochabamba filed complaints and petitions against continued servitude and pushing for the write to unionize. In Ayopaya, a number of such petitions were lodged after 1939. In them, leaders appealed to earlier laws to contest the landlords' arbitrary change to usufruct plots as well as evictions, plot substitution,

_

⁴⁰⁷ Gotkowitz (2007:125); see also Kourí (2002) and Hale (1995).

Here, then, as in the past, reformists' understandings of the nation's Incaic—and even pre-Incaic past—served as a referent for instituting changes in land tenure, constituting a productive extractive model that could secure the shift to modern agriculture where colonial and "feudal" systems had not (Gotkowitz 2007:125).

409 Gotkowitz (2007:126).

⁴¹⁰ As noted above, the tension between slavery and citizenship had been typical of labor systems and reform debates in Cochabamba, yet it was often complicated by existing practices. Indeed, Gotkowitz notes, this tension "marked labor relations within sub-regions and sometimes even inside a single property" (2007:127). As Gotkowitz points out, the term pongueaje itself was not mentioned yet it did not need to me, "local communities would make this leap themselves" (Gotkowitz 2007:127).

⁴¹¹ Gotkowitz (2007:131-132).

⁴¹² These petitions are remarkable in their absorption of a language of awakening and renewal, both of which as we have seen were key to reformist calls for hacienda abolition. For instance, hacienda colonos of Ghochi (Cochabamba) noted in a petition scripted by union leaders, "we have opened our eyes believing our unhappy fate has changed and that the moment has arrived for us to think about our economic and intellectual renewal (As cited in Gotkowitz (2007:146).

⁴¹³ In the hacienda of Yayani, the alcalde Hilarión Grájeda appealed to the state for the rights of indigenous colonos. In a 1942 petition, Grájeda and other union leaders described the conditions of labor for the 160 colono families employed on the hacienda.

and continued mitanaje. 414 In addition, the petition introduced two complaints that had not been mentioned by the 1938 convention: the rape (estupro or violacion) of "single and married women" and the whipping of colono workers. Other complaints hinged on specific abuses within haciendas, including one case where the landlord's lover had beaten a pongo for letting a baby chicken die and then had punished him by refusing food to all the domestic workers. These petitions were remarkable in their language of subjective "renewal," one that drew from reformist conceptions of slavery as a blockage to freedom and progress. 415

According to Gotkowitz, the limits to Ayopaya colonos' struggles for justice emanated from the ways that contact agreements with the Ministry of Labor could be used to reinforce landlord interests, including introducing new stipulations that colonos needed permission to plant beyond usufruct plots and had to compensate landlords for missed work during rest periods. 416 More broadly, she notes, the limits to these arrangements had to do with the "unenforceable status of contracts and laws" as well as the complicity of reform officials and judges with landlords. Finally, she notes that the law itself was notoriously ambiguous in its legislation against servitude, including decrees limiting forced labor and decrying slavery while at the same time often upholding landlord's rights to farm and pressing forward a broad modernization platform premised precisely on maintaining rural agricultural productivity. Landlords, alarmed by these strikes and claims to property ownership, accused colonos of misunderstanding the law and of acting on the "erroneous and dangerous belief that the land belonged to them." 417

Yet, pinning failure to corruption and lacking implementation overlooks the problem, raised in the introduction, of the constraints to rural political action inherited in part from reformist imaginaries which, as we have seen, fundamentally hinged not simply on the reform but also the inferiority of a certain class of hacienda workers—pongos and mit'anis—as appropriate or even thinkable political subjects. Not only this, it overlooks the ways that such claims might have been shaped not only by nascent rights-based imaginaries but also by more subjacent histories of exchange; indeed, the petitions mentioned above speak not only to the problem of land or rights but also, precisely, to abuses and to lapses in existing land arrangements. Thus, presuming that what is really at issue is land obscures the ways that consolidation of a peasant movement around land also may have reified possible venues for claim making as well as the possible imaginings of colono, or servant, injury. Indeed, despite the dominant focus on land redistribution, in legal petitions, including a 1941 case in Ayopaya, colonos' claims also touched on the familial dimensions of hacienda labor, including practices of inheritance.418

⁴¹⁴ As Gotkowitz notes, the appeal against mitanaje stands out as it suggests that, in Ayopaya unlike most regions of Bolivia, pongueaje continued to be practiced by landlords despite the fact that it had been formally abolished by a labor contract approved by the Ministry of Labor in 1940.

⁴¹⁵ For instance, in his presidential address in 1936 Toro had noted that peasant autonomy was a step toward the liberation from pongueaje (Gotkowitz 2007:147).

⁴¹⁶ Gotkowitz (2007:149).

⁴¹⁷ Gotkowitz (2007:155).

⁴¹⁸ While inheritance cases were rare, however, their grounding namely the problem of hacienda sexual violence is indicated in the prominence of petitions decrying sexual abuse. In the later 1945 Indigenous Congress, then, "abusos deshonestos [indecent assaults]" were the most prominent form of complaint of landlord violence in Ayopaya. Within an incipient language of legal appeal premised on egalitarian and democratic distribution of land, any special treatment was seen as violating citizen rights. Despite their relative scarcity, however, claims concerning land gifting suggest that legal understandings of property and democratic order were not the only ideals guiding rural experiences of the hacienda. Gotkowitz (2007:156).

Thus, new forms of legal petitioning and popular organizing introduced shifts in rural agrarian order, not simply with landlords and leaders but also among colonos, servants, and other community members. As suggested in the ethnographic material presented above, these shifts also drew new wedges between rural hacienda populations, as indigenous leaders and colono organizers adopted reformist understandings of servants as passive, even grotesque, dependents of landlords who were not (yet) prepared for full citizenship and who seemed to embody a blocked political consciousness. These conceptions of servants meant that while rural indigenous and peasant leaders might appeal to the reformist state to outlaw or abolish servitude, they also absorbed and integrated a more conscribed approach to the problem of political order, locating justice in the abolition of institutions of forced labor, tribute, exchange. In the process, relations to landlords and land-owning elites, even former caciques, were intelligible only as outgrowths of colonial slavery that had to be overcome by way of the awakening and renewal of rural indigenous groups. Thus, whether or not actual laws had yet abolished pongueaje, various national decrees infused the countryside with a sense of anticipation and expectation, a feeling that servitude "was about to end or had already been abolished."

Such expectations drew from a range of formal decrees, first in the 1938 Congress and then in 1941, when General Peñaranda sent a memo to prefects requiring them to announce publically the probation of pongueaje. These announcements were accompanied by the circulation of duplicates of the "law," among local leaders and with the aid of urban, progressive lawyers. While these conflicts were shaped by conflicts over ownership and elite conduct, they hinged, centrally, hinged on the shifting terms of political subjectivity, new understandings of a moral order situated in the near future and a stigmatization of existing practices of land and labor not premised on property rights and paid labor contracts. It was here—in an understanding of the necessity and even inevitability of a modernizing agrarian reform—that rural petitioners and reformers overlapped. What was needed—evident for instance in the earliest calls for agrarian reform under the labor party Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionario (PIR) said to have been very popular in the Ayopaya countryside, was the technical "improvement" of rural communities, embodied in an agrarian reform that could eliminate the "unproductive, feudal latifundio," end Indian servitude, and establish agrarian collectives. 422 Thus, while anti-hacienda mobilizing was not doubt shaped by worsening conditions in rural estates, 423 popular organizing for land rights and the abolition of pongueaje must also be situated within growing reformist concern with servitude first articulated in Viedma's Bourbon reforms.

Villarroel's government continued to draw from the military socialists' languages of national unity and progress, yet also turned to the Inca past as a source of national pride that could uproot "all regionalism. . . which poisons the atmosphere and sickens the social

⁴¹⁹ Thus, Gotkowitz notes, certain colonos like Grájeda "acquired prestige as legitimate leaders who were conversant in the law," often displacing or substituting hitherto rural indigenous appointees including *alcaldes de campo*, *kurakas*, and *hilacatas* selected by landlords, efforts that to some degree drew from the earlier caciques apoderados practices of attempting to reclaim control over native institutions understood to have been appropriated and corrupted by the colonial and republican governments (2007:151).

⁴²⁰ As discussed in the prior chapter, demands for privileges in exchange for patronage relations had been crucial to

⁴²⁰ As discussed in the prior chapter, demands for privileges in exchange for patronage relations had been crucial to the demands of Quechua farmers in Cochabamba during the colonial era, norms themselves instituted by the early colonial state and modeled on Incaic practices.

⁴²¹ Gotkowitz (2007:158).

⁴²² Gotkowitz (2007:160).

⁴²³ Gotkowitz (2007:142); Larson (1988).

organism."⁴²⁴ While situating the nation's rural indigenous majority in a subordinate place, then, Villarroel's concern with obstructions to progress qua national unity and his sympathies for the labor movement, evident in the MNR's denunciation of the 1942 Catavi Mine massacre, led to his defense of rural strikes and his partial support for rural anti-hacienda movements. ⁴²⁵ Focusing on agricultural modernization and stigmatizing oligarchs and Jewish mining elites, the MNR party reclaimed an exemplary *mestizo* (mixed race) citizen as the source of racial unity, thereby appropriating yet reconfiguring current trends in racialized biologism that likened admixture to illness, defect, and "biological decline." ⁴²⁶ Instead of the mixture of blood, however, MNR nationalism took the unity of mestizaje to stem from a collective historical struggle premised, remarkably, on the Incas. ⁴²⁷ Thus, rather than erasing indigeneity, midcentury MNR nationalism articulated an indigenous past as a unifying force while at the same time re-inscribing the subordination of indigenous peoples who became, in a sense, the unmolded clay out of which national character could and had to be carved.

Along with urban reforms centered on hygiene, health, and women's suffrage, Villarroel government increasingly found it had to address rural conflicts in the countryside. Concern with rural conflicts and labor abuses evident in *colono* petitions spurred Villarroel to summon the Indigenous Congress of 1945. In the Indigenous Congress, delegates sought clarification of earlier decrees abolishing pongueaje and servitude. 428 The main goal was to develop a program for rural development and to counter what was largely seen as the lawless countryside controlled by landlords rather than the state. This goal followed from Villarroel's broader project which, he had noted in 1944, was rooted in the "juridical form" as a way to "grant the state more vigor, efficiency, and technical capacity." Before the government printed an official agenda, the Indigenous Committee of delegates published its own, circulating some 25,000 copies of what they called an "independent newspaper" publicizing the agenda by way of 100 messengers across the countryside. Along with calls for "land for he who works it," the program noted the need for Indians right to "special protection" and for a legal system that was harsher on "whites." Along with these appeals for protection, the Indigenous Committee called on the need for freedom and equality, noting that Villarroel himself had told them, "We are all equal, there should not be any pongos or mitanis in Bolivia." In addition, the bulletin called on the government to enforce Article 5 of the Constitution, which outlawed slavery and servitude. More broadly, it described the congress as the result of five years of toil to end "the disgrace of the pongo and the mitani."⁴²⁹

Central here was a language of appeal premised on the injustice of servitude, often described or conflated with "slavery." At Gotkowitz notes, this conflation was not accidental. Liberation was taken as the antithesis of servitude, and in the requirement to "serve" the patron, committee member Ramos argued that pongueaje constituted slavery. Thus, while landlords

1

⁴²⁴ Gotkowitz (2007:165) citing Villarroel 1944:70.

⁴²⁵ Gotkowitz (2007:169-171).

⁴²⁶ Indeed, certain strands of the MNR drew from Nazism. See Gotkowitz 2007:171. See also Arguedas, *Pueblo enfermo* (1909); for the biologization of society and the emergent of racial sciences in Germany, see Traverso (2003). On the history of *mestizaje* and its relation to social eugenics, see Stepan (1991); Lomnitz-Adler (1992); de la Cadena (2000, 2005); and Gould (1998).

⁴²⁷ Thus, in a 1942 Manifesto, the MNR noted that rather than being inferior, Bolivians glory lay in their "legacy as sons of the Sun" (Gotkowitz 2007:172).

⁴²⁸ The congress was modeled in part on Mexico's Inter-American Indigenista Congress and responded to the critique that Bolivian indigenismo was well meaning but lacked statistics and data. Gotkowitz (2007:193-205). ⁴²⁹ Gotkowitz (2007:205).

noted that servants were not bound to one hacienda and thus were not slaves, for members of the indigenous delegation at issue was not mobility per se but rather the broader state of serving or waiting on another. Thus, the committee noted, compensation was not the problem, "A man can never serve as a pongo and a woman never as a mitani, even if the patron wants to pay in silver or gold; . . . the landlords should wait on themselves." Only by eradicating the action itself, that is, service, can the status or mode of subjectivity of each be overcome. And through such an overcoming, the citizen can be born. Thus, they argued that servitude not only violated constitutional rights, it also a modern nation. Its abolition, then, could "save the Indian and Bolivia." The only way to secure such overcoming, however, was to give Indians land.

In exchange for their protection and freedom, the delegates promised various forms of self-development and improvement. In this appeal, it seemed, indigenous delegates themselves highlighted their intimate and accurate understanding of the intertwined nature of land rights, modern citizenship, and the abolition of servitude. If the slave, symbolizing the feudal, the backwards, the colonial, depended upon and served the landlord, the modern subject dressed in new clothes and labored upon his own lands. Thus, rather than being accompanying claims supplementing the crucial issue of land, a strategic exchange of self-civilizing appeals for land claims, such appeals absorbed and then re-performed the fundamental logic of agricultural modernization, the opposition not simply between slavery and freedom but also between the non-landholding servant and the property-holding citizen.

Following Villarroel's meeting with the delegates, he called for the abolition of servitude, yet such declarations had little legal counterpart. In addition, and as discussed below, leading up to the official congress there was mounting repression, including landlords' refusing to allow delegates through towns and the incarceration of many leaders as a form of "preventive detention," in addition, other people without documents or certificates of transit were labeled "agitators" and send to agricultural labor colonies. Yet, following the formal meeting of the Indigenous Congress the following February 1945, Villarroel ended with four important decrees. These decrees outlawed unpaid services and made colonos "absolute owners" of their crops while preserving the right for landlords to require colonos to transport goods and to use colonos' animals for agricultural labor. Indeed, while framed in the language of hacienda abolition, the council meeting still emphasized abuses in terms of landlord "excesses" which epitomized lawlessness and which had upset a balance of rights and obligations among landlords and

4

⁴³⁰ While Gotkowitz reads this statement as a refusal of discrimination, it seems to be that rather what is at issue is a moral stigmatization of service qua servitude, one in which the autonomy of the self—both servant and master—is compromised by the dependencies of one person waiting on another. Echoing Fanon's reading of Hegel, then, it seems that what is needed is not an absence of discrimination but an implosion of the modes of activity and encounter that configure two radically different subjects given their position in this labor relation.

⁴³¹ Gotkowitz (2007:206).

⁴³² For instance, in the bulletin they "offered to 'civilize' themselves in exchange for land," and called on the state to "assist with women's and men's change of dress." Gotkowitz (2007:207).

⁴³³ It is not surprising, then, that in their informal meeting with Villarroel following from the cancellation of the set date of 25 December 1944 (rescheduled for the following February), delegates emphasized manners of agricultural production, including tools, infringements on titles and property borders, protection from eviction, and an end to abuses "against their person and property." Gotkowitz (2007:209).

⁴³⁴ Gotkowitz (2007:212).

⁴³⁵ Gotkowitz (2007:222).

colonos.⁴³⁶ At the same time, the decrees declared, "slavery does not exist in Bolivia."⁴³⁷ Here, the indeterminacy of such laws could also work also generatively. In one case, a state legal advisor was called to hacienda strikes in Ayopaya to "explain to the peasants the true meaning of the [1945] agrarian-social laws" in order to correct their interpretation in an "irregular manner." Thus, reformers argued, rural *colonos* had "misunderstood" the decrees.

Yet, such decrees were limited not only in their non-enforceable nature. More than a "double-edged sword" that could empower peasants or subject them to elite or landlord corruption, mid-20th century debates about indigeneity and land popularized a new conception of the citizen, more tightly bound up with land rights and opposed to an inhuman beast, the slave. It was only through the efficacy of law, then, that an animal state could be overcome. Indeed, in its own statement the Indigenous committee noted, "If our hopes are realized. . . the Indian will go to school, never again will [the Indian] be the beast of burden. [The Indian] will be the citizen who wins respect for Bolivia."439 In so doing, the conditions of political subjectivity were located in the ability to realize a broad shift or rupture in existing social and economic order. And if not? If these hopes are not realized, then, by implication, must the Indian remain a beast, an animal? Thus, the 1945 congress points to an incipient logic by which reformist understandings of the dependency of citizenship upon rural transformation was consolidated and whereby the uprooting of servitude or "slavery" emerged as a crucial component of rural political life and national reform. Here, then, citizenship as a recognizable status of humanity was linked to the efficacy of modernity as the successful uprooting of entrenched modes of rural agrarian practice and the transformation or "awakening" or rural subjects.

As discussed in subsequent chapters, here a certain form of claim was increasingly marginalized or even unintelligible from within legal logics, namely, the demands for the retribution for former violence or rape by way of land gifting or other privileges, one that often would come from women servants who, as we have seen, occupied one of the most stigmatized positions for reformers and rural leaders alike. Thus, the limits to this incipient language of indigenous legal claims was not simply that agreements could privilege landowning elites or responded to unenforceable laws, but rather stem from broader shifts in official understandings of rural labor arrangements since the colonial period, relations whose moral logics became increasingly problematic to reformers and in law and, as such, were categorically excluded from the domain of rural indigenous and union claim-making. For reformers, petitioners, and current unionists like Angelo, those without land—including *pongos* and *mitanis*—were not and could not be proper political subjects until receiving official property rights. In the process, a whole range of practices of authority and reciprocity shaping rural hacienda life, particularly within domestic spheres, including relations of god-parenting, the distribution of land to servants and unrecognized children, and landlords' aid in cases of illness or disease, were supplanted by a focus on formal freedom and land rights.

-

⁴³⁶ This suggests the unstable displacement of what remained a dominant understanding of landlord behavior in rural zones, one premised on upholding obligations and on limiting 'excesses,' that is, violence, by a new language that saw any form of service as absolutely incompatible with legal order and citizenship. Gotkowitz (2007:217).

⁴³⁷ Gotkowitz (2007:223).

⁴³⁸ Gotkowitz (2007:225).

⁴³⁹ Gotkowitz (2007:223).

Servants as "Slaves": Lived Entwinements of Subjection and Stigma

Descriptions of domestic servants within haciendas as slaves or as "like slaves" suggest the ways that mid-century reformist concerns with rural land relations and with the forging of modern laborers came to infuse rural life, shaping and re-shaping peasant and peasant leaders' own understandings of the region's hacienda past as well as their relations and assessments of neighbors and kin. At their heart, these stigmatized views of domestic servants need to be situated as partial outgrowths of heightened reformist concern with institutions of forced labor from the late 18th century onward. As discussed in the previous chapter, the late 18th century Spanish colony of Upper Peru—and, after 1825, the Republic of Bolivia—was the site of shifting assessments of bonded labor, including a growing tendency among colonial administrators and Bourbon reformists to characterize unpaid labor in haciendas as a form of slavery. First the French and then the Haitian Revolutions sent shock-waves throughout the British, French, Dutch and Spanish Empires of Central and South America. 440 In addition, pro-abolition campaigns were gaining support within Europe, including the French Amis des Noirs founded in 1788 and the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, formed in England in 1787. 441 While the British spearheaded anti-slavery efforts, passing treaties in 1815 and 1817 in which the French and Portuguese promised to gradually abolish slavery and patrolling the seas of the African coast searching ships for slaves, both Spain and Portugal refused to terminate the slave trade. Indeed, it was not until U.S. and British military ships blocked sea access to Cuba in the 1860s that the Atlantic slave trade ultimately ceased. 442

Of course, while the Spanish colonial state was notably stubborn in its refusal to abolish the slave trade, this does not mean that Spanish imperial and colonial administrators were unaffected or unconcerned with the problem of servitude and slavery; to the contrary, questions of agrarian servitude were central to modernizing reform efforts, particularly in central Cochabamba. 443 As discussed in chapter 1, the travel logs of Francisco de Viedma, governor of the new Intendancy of Cochabamba in the late 18th century, were notably for his observations of the misery and suffering of rural peasants, particularly workers on hacienda estates. His views point to a shifting political moment in which rural poverty and hunger were explicitly linked to colonial institutions and in which calls for agrarian reform intermixed with a nascent political discourse of liberty and rights. These new political understandings conditioned new sorts of popular and legal political movements, 444 yet they also led to the reification of a certain mode of indigenous collectivity—a community or ayllu of indigenous land-holders—as a political ideal and model of claim-making, one that both produced and reproduced another class of indentured laborers, pongos and mit'anis, as the most abject of colonial victims. 445 Thus, this collapsing of hacienda servants as slaves suggests the continued reverberations of a new language of citizenship in which the political subject was increasingly opposed to the indentured, dependent

.

⁴⁴⁰Both revolutions were, of course, predated by both philosophical and religious critiques of slavery and labor bondage, including the work of Montesquieu, Smith, and particularly evangelical Protestant movements See Klein and Vinson (2007:227-246).

⁴⁴¹ Vinson and Klein (2007:228-229).

⁴⁴² Vinson and Klein (2007:230).

⁴⁴³ Gotkowitz (2007).

⁴⁴⁴ Gotkowitz (2007); Thomson (2002)

As discussed below, this bifurcation of a class of tenant farmers (*colonos*) and hacienda domestic servants and slaves (*yanaconas*, *esclavos*, *mit'anis*, *pongos*) would remain significant for the political movements of the 19th and 20th centuries.

laborer and where the absence of land rights—whether formal or usufruct—was seen as an indicator of an impossible political subject. 446

The collapsing of hacienda laborers with abject slaves overlooks the nuances of agrarian and domestic labor arrangements in the Cochabamba region. 447 These various rungs of labor were expressed in the spatial layout of haciendas, in particular, in land access as well as proximity to the central hacienda building and to domestic space. 448 In addition to landlord-based assessments of status, haciendas were also marked by internal divisions among various laborers related, in part, to the history of domestic servants, historically known as *yanaconas*, as traitors to the community and as undeserving beneficiaries of Spanish-descendent landlords. Yanaconas, later known as *pongos* and *mitanis*, tended to come from a class of itinerant laborers or forasteros, initially a fiscal category marking an outsider status with no land rights. 449 These forasteros—who escaped colonial tribute burdens by working as yanaconas on encomiendas and later haciendas—sapped community resources and labor as they continued to be counted toward each Indian community's tribute duties to the crown. 450 For this reason, escaped Indians (indios usurpados) like forasteros and vanaconas were stigmatized by native lords (caciques) and colonial officials alike, seen as inhabiting a miserable state of dependency stemming from their ruptured ties to kin and community. Both caciques and colonial reformers shared a stigmatized view of hacienda laborers, particularly domestic servants, as a sort of renegade economic class that transgressed colonial tributary orders and, on the other hand, encumbered their original Indian communities with additional tax duties. Thus, the comparison of hacienda servants to slaves needs to be positioned not simply as a reflection of economic or material conditions but rather as the partial product of a new political language premised on a reified opposition between the free and the unfree, property holders and the property-less.

Popular and abolitionist concern with the compromised or even depraved condition of domestic servitude seemed to haunt popular accounts of hacienda labor among unionists and other rural indigenous leaders in the Ayopaya valleys. Villagers, particularly the kin of former anti-hacienda leaders, expressed understandable anger bitterness toward hacienda overseers, including *melgueros* and *hilacatas*. ⁴⁵¹ And yet, the view of melgas simply as hacienda authorities who controlled land and labor overlooks their immersion in broader forms of "prestige hierarchy" that included and seemed to echo many of the ideals of beneficence and generosity earlier identified, by the Toledan state, as components of a precolonial Inca religious order. ⁴⁵²

⁴⁴⁶ As discussed in the Introduction, this understanding of the citizen and the slave as mutually-exclusive categories is itself a crucial tenet of liberal political theory, a dualism that can be problematic in its obfuscation of the continued forms of insubordination and subjection internal to abolitionary projects of citizenship and self-crafting (Hartman 1997).

⁽Hartman 1997).

447 As noted above, Ayopaya's haciendas were organized by a vast and overlaid hierarchy based on various tiers of labor and whose different rungs of hacienda managers, servants, and tenant farmers complicate attempts to draw an intractable tenant/servant divide. See Chapter 1 for the history of these agricultural orders in Cochabamba.

⁴⁴⁸ Lyons, too, has noted these spatial dimensions of hacienda hierarchy (2006:76).

As discussed in Chapter 1, hacienda servants were originally known as *yanaconas de servicio*, the agrarian counterparts of forced mine laborers (*yanaconas*), a labor position with Incaic origins (see Larson 1988; see also Harris (1995:354).

⁴⁵⁰ See Larson (1988).

⁴⁵¹ As Laura Gotkowitz notes, landlords "often appointed alcaldes, kurakas, and hilacatas from among the colonos that they considered loyal to them" (2007:135).

⁴⁵² As Thurner (1993:53 citing Lentz 1986:195) notes, in many haciendas the melga (or elsewhere, *kipu*) occupied a religious position in a prestige system in which "was integrated (and also controlled by) a dense web of reciprocal

These managers were then charged with enforcing service obligations and, in return, often received larger usufruct plots and were exempt from pongueaje and other service duties."⁴⁵³ In this way, then, foremen occupied a position of "double articulation" in which they served an important role in patron saints day festivals as well as in labor relations, linking the "community civil and religious hierarchy" within haciendas. ⁴⁵⁴ Importantly, this prestige position was both expressed in and determined the contours of local land access.

On the one hand, then, the stigmatization of former hacienda servants and managers might be understood to stem from the fact that these workers at times ended up with particularly coveted land plots. Indeed, and somewhat remarkably, differential access related to this prestige system continued to determine land access in many former haciendas. For instance, two former hacienda servants, Doña Ormega and Don Juato had both worked as hacienda colonos, transporting goods and chewing corn for the ex-landlord. In the 1950s, they had received title to a parcel of ex-hacienda land on a dry slope several miles from the village. Distance from the center of the village meant they did not have access to irrigation water. It also required them to walk for about an hour each day to tend to their lands, or to transport crops from their fields to their home. In contrast, an elderly woman aged 82 whose father had worked as a hilacata (hacienda managers). The woman's relation as the daughter of an hacienda hilacata had led her to inherit a fertile plot in the center of the village, a fact she herself recognized, noting that because of her father's labor position she "did not have to work very much." Furthermore, it was by way of this labor position that she had "won" her current land plot in the agrarian reform. 456 Yet, she recalled, they were still required to hand over a ten percent share of their share chickens, animals, and eggs to the landlords. When her 90-year old husband joined us, he explained that he too had received land in town because he had been a *melga runa*, and his father a *hilacata*. 457 The two contrasting cases of the kin of colonos and hilacatas attests to the importance of the hacienda for relations of land tenure today and points to the persistence of hacienda-based divisions in the present. This persistence undergirds the claim, made by unionists like Angelo, that land reform, rather than being a benign mechanism of land redistribution, consolidated land inequities along prior hacienda-based lines of allegiance and labor. 458

While lingering anger and resentment toward hacienda overseer by former tenant farmers is not unexpected, more surprising were the ways that former domestic servants were attributed

and redistributive mechanisms, whose obligations served to brake his upward economic mobility and abuse of hacienda authority.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Thurner (1993: 54) citing Abercrombie (1991).

⁴⁵⁵ This expression of prestige in land access seems to echo Incaic practices, evident in claims to land on the part of Quechua-speaking field workers and warriors in the Cochabamba valleys who appealed to the early colonial state to uphold the land grants provided to them by the earlier Inca state (see Larson 1988).

⁴⁵⁶ She noted that she had "won" the plot from the central hacienda lands (*haciendaq hallpaq*) during the national land reform, an expression imitating the language of "lottery" that served as a model for the 1953 land reform officials yet which usually excluded more fertile lands.

⁴⁵⁷ As discussed in Chapter 4, given current processes of land reform, talk of these agrarian pasts, particularly the ways that hacienda labor positions shaped contemporary land tenure, were experienced as deeply fraught. Indeed, as we were leaving, Don Juato asked nervously, "There won't be any problems, right?"

⁴⁵⁸ As we shall see, awareness that land inequalities between Quechua and Aymara families had been strengthened rather than dismantled by the nation's mid-century land reform led people to be cautious in their approaches to contemporary land reform efforts on the part of the revolutionary MAS government. See Chapters 4 and 5.

with a sort of guilty, blame-worthy consciousness. In addition to manumission, more informal relations of bondage upon haciendas were also accompanied by land gifting relations. As noted in the previous chapter, the exchange of labor for land, goods, political protection, and other resources was common throughout the Andean region and, particularly in Cochabamba, should be situated in light of pre-colonial practices of agrarian patronage and imperial hierarchy. The beneficiaries of such practices of exchange were not simply hacienda overseers and managers, but also domestic servants and their children. This was particularly true in cases of illegitimate children following from either consensual or nonconsensual relations among hacienda women and landlords. Rather than being born into a status of chattel slavery or indentured servitude, as was common in plantation-based slave societies, in Bolivia the children of illegitimate couplings between masters and domestic servants and slaves were often integrated into hacienda households and might often be raised as kin.

During fieldwork, I learned about cases in which domestic hacienda servants were raped, their illegitimate children raised as "orphans" within haciendas, at times inheriting servant status and in other cases raised as a child of the household, often separated from the (servant) mother and educated in a nearby urban center. 462 According to Angelo, for instance, these mit anis "were young single women. If they were attractive the patrones might bring her there and aprovechar [enjoy, rape] her." Gregorio, for his part, noted that the abuse and rape of colonos' virgin daughters had been ubiquitous in these parts, noting that in the hacienda where he had grown up, "none of the girls escaped the landlord." Afterwards, he added, the single mother had to raise the baby. Former servants, too, noted that the landowners had unrecognized children who lived in the households and were raised as wagchas (orphans). 463 In another case, an former mitani servant recalled carrying around such wagchas on her back until they were old enough to walk, at which point they would be expected to help out in the household. 464 When we asked another former servant whether the landowner ever had out-of-wedlock children, she remarked that this had occurred often, and turned away from her potatoes, pointing up the slope, "Indeed, there is a woman who lives up there who was the child of this."⁴⁶⁵ In other cases, histories of sexual violence and forced sterilization arose in the conspicuous absence of children of a certain generation. For instance, one landlord, while formally untrained, was known to have acted as a medic or doctor. While some ex-laborers noted, gratefully, that he offered medical care to villagers, people claimed that he used sterilization vaccines on local women, performed

-

⁴⁵⁹ This echoes similar processes, both in North and South America, in which some women were freed or were able to achieve manumission (self-purchase) through relationships with plantation owners and hacienda lords (Hartman 1997; Klein and Vinson 2007). For instance, Hartman argues that legal responsibility in the post-abolition period was most often aligned with a sort of blame-worthiness, locking the recently-emancipated into a nascent category of black criminality (Hartman 1997).

⁴⁶⁰ See chapter 1; see also Larson (1988).

⁴⁶¹ Indeed, records of slave plantations in Brazil for instance suggest that a sizeable number of children of slaves were freed by their masters who were often also listed as their father (Klein and Vinson 2007:201). This is evident in the high numbers of children and women among those manumitted in Spanish and Portuguese America into the 18th century.

⁴⁶² Gotkowitz (2007).

⁴⁶³ Fieldnotes 1/27/2012.

⁴⁶⁴ Sound recording DM420047.

⁴⁶⁵ Sound recording DM420085.

abortions, and sacrificed these fetuses to the devil in order to ensure success in his mine and lands 466

As these accounts suggest, in Ayopaya as in other systems of indentured labor and slavery, domestic labor often included the rendering of sexual services whereby the body itself became an extension of the master's property, both sexual and re/productive. 467 While Hartman argues that such relations must necessarily be defined as rape, such an understanding seems to over-state the transparency of such relations or their availability to present-day interpretation. This is particularly so in smaller family-run farms, such as those in Ayopaya, where couplings between domestics and lords often produced long-term relationships and even marriages, arrangements that seem to exceed the trappings of rape, a term that seems to evoke a singular instance of sexual violence defined by a lateral, non-reciprocal desire. Without being able to determine in a transparent way what precisely the nature of such relations were—and indeed, it is likely that they did not operate the same everywhere—it is possible to ask about the particular sorts of exchange relationships and moral frameworks that shaped these relations in the Cochabamba region, a region where histories of indentured labor and land exchange have been structurally entwined. 468 In addition, and given the politicized nature of indigenous land rights in Bolivia's present, we might consider how such histories of intimacy and exchange implicate or complicate current efforts to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate property relations and, more generally, to police or more sharply differentiate the boundaries between an authentic indigenous collectivity and its compromised contours or limits.

Attention to the parallels between the stigmatization of hacienda servants as "slaves," and earlier reformist and cacique debates about forasteros and other escaped tributaries provide a basis from which to re-examine the question of the estrangement of Don Luis related to the land he received from the landlord. As noted above, this act of land gifting provoked anger from unionists like Angelo, who saw such practices as evidence of the continued force of an inegalitarian hacienda labor hierarchy that privileged workers who were most loyal to landlords. Indeed, on one occasion Angelo bitterly recalled—though left nameless—one family who had "switched to the side of the patron" in order to gain more fertile lands following 1950s land conflicts. Of course, as in earlier cases in which indigenous tributaries escaped to haciendas to avoid repressive colonial labor systems, relations to landlords might partially secure relief from military violence and, at the same time, enable continued access to land and resources. 469 And yet, as discussed in the introduction, such practices were not simply expressions of a material interest but also followed from a long-run history of agrarian patronage. Similarly, Angelo's stigmatization of Don Luis followed from a well-worn path; like earlier Bourbon reformers and caciques, mid-20th century peasant leaders saw hacienda servants—like earlier *vanaconas*—as dispossessed yet also privileged, challenging both nascent citizenship-based articulations of collectivity while at the same time destabilizing existing relations of authority and exchange within highland peasants communities.

4

⁴⁶⁶ For an ethnographic account of miners' sacrifice to the spirit of the mine or "El Tio" and accompanying ideas of selling one's soul to the devil, see Nash (1992) and Taussig (1980). For historical accounts of the introduced notion of the devil see Salomon (1983) and Silverblatt (1987). I discuss Ayopaya gold mining in Chapter 6.

⁴⁶⁷ Hartman (1997).

⁴⁶⁸ See Larson (1988).

⁴⁶⁹ As I describe in Chapter 3, families with closer ties to the hacienda often sought out landowners as godparents, as they could offer resources including access to medicine, education, and political protections. This might include protection from military violence following the November 1964 coup overthrowing the revolutionary MNR president Victor Paz Estenssoro by the military junta of Chairman René Barrientos.

Thus, the stigmatization of servant families for their links to landowning elites echoes the earlier estrangement of *yanaconas*, *forasteros*, and *mitayos*, seen by Aymara caciques as betraying their communities as they escaped tribute benefits and relied on haciendas for relief or safety from extractive colonial governments and mine-owners. These long-run tensions over labor and land thus might be seen to have some roots in Cochabamba's history of ethnic conflict between highland and lowland groups and related to practices of Quechua groups' mobility and absorption into haciendas in contrast to Aymara politics of community land ownership, an aim echoed in anti-hacienda mobilizing in 20th century Ayopaya, discussed below. Indeed, Oscar, who is from Sarahuayto (specifically the moiety of Sarapaya), noted that the conflict between servants and tenants of the Sarahuayto hacienda is related to its location on the border of what were originally Inca/Quechua and Aymara territories. Thus, whereas there was a defense of the landlord in the lower moiety of Sarapaya, the higher moiety of Sarahuayto had been home to a violent insurgency against hacienda servitude. In this way, then, he mapped the conflict between hacienda servants and hacienda tenants upon understandings of Aymara autonomy and Quechua embeddedness within haciendas (and earlier Inca maize farms), discussed in Chapter 1.

If these more intimate terrains of hacienda life including domestic co-residence, sexual violence, and subsequent land gifting seemed to consolidate the boundary between servants and tenant farmers, they could simultaneously blur the line between elite landlords and servile workers. Indeed, while caciques and the colonial and then republican state had historically seen mitanis and pongos as the most dispossessed and dependent of groups, this group—comprised of domestic laborers, single and widowed women, and their children and other "orphans"—were often absorbed into agrarian estates through adoption, god-parenting, intermarriage, as well as through "possession" as the property of the landlord, a practice which arose as increasingly problematic from the period of Bourbon reform in the 18th century, culminating in the complaints of sexual abuse on the part of hacienda laborers in Ayopaya in legal petitions submitted in the 1940s⁴⁷⁰ and echoing earlier debates in the 1920s which saw the servility of rural *mitanis* as a crucial site in which to uproot slavery and institutionalize modernity. ⁴⁷¹ As evident in Oscar's case, discussed above, domestic servants—particularly raped women—were often left land by landlords, a practice that destabilized existing norms of collectivity and hierarchy yet which at the same time suggests the longevity of certain arrangements of labor and land exchange which, as we have seen, developed in conjunction with earlier Inca expansion. 472

While these practices of gifting and exchange have been framed by caciques, reformers, and 20th century peasant movements as perversions of rural land relations, they seems to have some antecedent in earlier Inca practice of giving land grants to field hands working on imperial maize farms in the fertile Cochabamba valleys. Despite accusations of their colonial origins, such practices of domestic servitude remained prevalent among native *caciques* in the 18th century. Thus, assessments of pongos as akin to slaves overlook the various modes of mobility and motion undertaken by hacienda laborers historically and into the 20th century. In a sense,

.

⁴⁷⁰ Gotkowitz (2007).

⁴⁷¹ Stephenson (1999:23); see also Lehm and Rivera (1988:40-41), Wadsworth and Dibbits (1989:91-92).

⁴⁷² Thomson (2002). This destabilization was particularly evident in Angelo's account, discussed above, when he noted both that *pongos* inhabited a state of dependency (emblematized in their reliance on the hacienda overlords for food) while at the same time often ending up with more fertile lands that were "given" to them by the landlord.

⁴⁷³ Larson (1988).

⁴⁷⁴ Thomson (2002).

⁴⁷⁵ As Gotkowitz notes, for instance, hacienda laborers had historically been one of many "wanderers" who travelled along the Cochabamba countryside in the early 20th century and who might be leaders evicted from haciendas,

then, that pongo and mitani servants became increasingly intelligible only as slaves suggests that an interstitial category between servant and community member so important to earlier debates about *mitayos*, *forasteros*, and *yanaconas* since the 18th century had given way to a more dualistic understanding of subjectivity premised on the opposition between having and not having land, that is, a residence. This opposition between free and unfree was premised on land access, echoing the centrality of property for early 20th century debates concerning the conversion of "slaves" into citizens.

As noted above, the opposition between tenants and servants overlooks the often-blurred line between permanent servants (mitanis) and colonos' wives who were also required to provide rotating labor in *mitanaje*. ⁴⁷⁶ In small haciendas with few laborers, the rotating duty of mitanaje occurred very frequently and dramatically limited the ability of colono families to maintain plots as well as care for their children and animals. 477 In its frequency, then, the division between servants and tenants was rendered unstable. Thus, today the stigmatization of former *mitanis*, discussed below, could seemingly expand to include most elderly women—and older unionists' wives—in former hacienda villages like Sarahuayto. Yet, this rendering of domestic servants into slaves overlooks the specific elaborations of exchange, authority, and aid shaping agrarian economies in the Andes and, at the same time, understates the various forms of mobility, movement, and kinship historically characteristic of hacienda laborers in Cochabamba. ⁴⁷⁸ These include many cases in which hacienda laborers became property owners themselves, often via inter-marriage or informal land gifting. In contrast, the servant as slave foregrounds what is taken as a passive submission to landlords, both in terms of economic and sexual relations.

Thus, the popularization of a particular language of abject servitude produced lingering emotional effects in former hacienda regions. Today, these stigmas of agrarian servitude were hard to shed, often expressed not only by former union leaders but also by one's own children. For instance, Doña Carmenia had worked as a *mitani* in Sarahuayto. She lamented, "I tell my children about the hacienda, but they say, 'If the hacienda were to return, I would escape!' They ask 'How could you have called the landowner mother and father?' and tell me that in order to call someone mother or father, that person must have conceived me." She sighed, "I don't think today's children would be able to survive this. I'm already old. The landowners left everyone fighting." She paused. "I herded pigs and sheep, and I made cheese for the patron. Now sorrow returns to me, dealing with what was."⁴⁷⁹ Carmenia's account suggests the difficulty of translating experiences of servitude across generations, yet it also highlights the ways that the stigmatization of servants may occur on the part of their very children. This disdain toward earlier hacienda servitude has also been documented in haciendas in Ecuador. According to a former hacienda colona, "It's only nowadays that people are getting smart, it's like people are waking up. The young people nowadays are becoming smart. In the old days, it wasn't like that. People just endured it, through life, like fools." However, the same woman noted that, in the "childish way of thinking" earlier in her life, she thought that if she talked back to the hacienda

expelled arrimantes, colonos fleeing abusive landlords, landless forasteros, or people searching for work in the mines or cities (2007:141; see also Lagos 1994, Klein 1969, and Dandler 1971).

⁴⁷⁶ Along with a permanent domestic labor force that seems to echo earlier vanaconaje arrangements, colonos' wives, daughters, and sisters were also required to fulfill mitanaje services (Gotkowitz 2007:136).

⁴⁷⁷ Gotkowitz (2007:137); see also Jackson (1994); Lagos (1994).

⁴⁷⁸ See Larson 1988. I discuss these forms of mobility and kinship in Chapter 3.

⁴⁷⁹ The Quechua reads,"Kunan phutirikuni, juk averiapuni karqa." The word averiapuni builds from the Spanish term avería (breakdown) or averiguar (to find out, deal with, manage). 480 See Lyons (2006:177).

overseers the Virgin would punish her. Here, then, new understandings of freedom created tensions between families and even within subjects, an earlier "childish" condition contrasted to later awakening.

Not only the content but also the form of ex-servants' narratives that offend a younger generation schooled in Western historiography and in populist chronologies of revolution and reform. Indeed, the children and grandchildren of servants complained that elderly ex-servants' memories were "confused" and lacking order. Former mitanis, too, often apologized for their own narratives, explaining that they lacked formal schooling and thus could not "speak well." The disavowal of hacienda servants' experiences suggest an enduring exclusion within populist and reformist imaginaries which, on the one hand, enabled new articulations of rights and demands for land while, at the same time, establishing a certain class of worker as marked by her lack, a lack of education, of schooling, of rights, in short, of citizenship. Such stigmas seem to arise as the negative side of a positive model of citizenship premised on autonomy, self-determination, and land rights, a model first popularized during the anti-hacienda mobilizations of the 1940s, discussed below.

Here, and echoing reformist concerns with the family discussed shortly, the hacienda is understood as a site in which kinship norms were perverted and strategically manipulated.⁴⁸¹ As evident in Carmenia's account, discussed above, her children ridicule their ex-servant parents for having served the landlord, for not understanding that one only addresses one's parents with the titles "my mother, my father". Coupled with a sense of repugnance for mistaking one's master for one's parent is what people describe as domestic servants' child-like dependency on landlords. *Pongos* and *mitanis* relied on landlords for their livelihoods and were called, by these lords, "daughter" and "son." These affective dimensions of subjection are unintelligible to a younger generation, evident in the children of former servants who ridicule their mothers for having served the patron. Such concerns echoed reformist debates in the early 20th century that saw servitude as a perverse variation of natural kinship relations and as an institution fundamentally at odds with the development of a modern nation. 482 Thus, it was not their place as potential recipients of hacienda patronage that made former servants so problematic for populist union leaders. Rather, as expressed in Angelo's description of the "scorn" he feels for domestic laborers like pongos, former servants continue to be blamed for what is taken as their prior passivity, a grotesque condition of dependency on the landlord that, simultaneously, offended movements for peasant autonomy whose legal antecedents include growing concern with yanaconaje and forced labor from the period of agricultural modernization under Viedma in the 1770s onward. Here, dependency is figured as lack, a lack that is taken as deeply personal, as a mark of flawed character or submission rather than as a relational experience with its own antecedents in regional histories of agrarian patronage. 483

Echoing earlier debates concerning yanaconaje yet increasingly reifying labor positions depending on land possession, Ayopaya villagers' accounts of life prior to hacienda abolition

⁴⁸¹ This perversion is located in the fact that domestic servants were required to call their hacienda overlords by kinship names, rendered with the Quechua possessive suffix (–y) as "mamay" and "taytay," my mother and my father.

⁴⁸² Stephenson (1999); Gotkowitz (2007).

⁴⁸³ Gotkowitz (2007:137, 288). As Gotkowitz (2007:288) notes, "Symbols of an enduring colonial order, these victimized figures [pongo and mitani] stood not only for the oppression of intimate service in the landlord's home but also symbolized (and continued to symbolize) the deep structures of racism." Yet, I argue that at stake in these victimized figures is not only racism but, more broadly, the question of humanity itself, one linked to a framework of modern citizenship for whom the servant or slave serves as the racialized, inhuman other.

displayed particular concern with the problem of "personal services" required of hacienda servants and demanded on a rotating basis of colono families and at the same time suggest the stigmatization of hacienda domestic servants as holding a marginal relation to tenant farmers and rural community members. The stigmatization of former hacienda servants hinged in particular on the perversions of kinship—evident in acts of naming and sexual violence—as well as what was taken as servants' dependency on landlords and betrayal of fellow villagers, stigmas that echoed earlier cacique concerns with the betrayal of forastero populations. 484 At the same time, unionists expressed mistrust toward hacienda managers, melguero managers and hilacata representatives were stigmatized for having chosen the luxuries of hacienda life—fertile lands, access to animals, tools, and seeds, and political protection—in lieu of foregrounding their commitments and accountability to Quechua villagers and kin. 485 Thus, while accounts of hacienda servitude attested to the violence of everyday life marked by the authority and violence of landlords, they also pointed to a set of internal fractures among hacienda laborers and related to the stigmatization of domestic servants and hacienda managers. In the next section, I examine popular struggles and reform efforts against hacienda pongueaje preceding Ayopaya's 1947 antihacienda rebellion, highlighting the antecedents of the *mitani* and *pongo* stigmatization in broader regional and national debates concerning the mutually exclusive nature of hacienda servitude and modern citizenship. 486 Here, servitude arose as a site of petition and complaint as well as a civilizing ground; a site of intervention and reform aimed transforming labor relations in order to install a new, property-holding citizen.

Abolitionary Instabilities: The Tragedy of the Rotting Oca

In Ayopaya, villagers recalled the first wave of anti-hacienda organizing as beginning in the mid-1940s, spurred in part by connections to new political networks linking hacienda colonos to sympathetic union groups, indigenous leaders, and *indigenista* officials, particularly in La Paz. In 1947, waychus or armed militias arrived in Ayopaya from La Paz. 487 These anti-hacienda militia groups came looking for landowners, seeking to kidnap them or force them out. Don Felix had been a prominent union official in the 1950s and recalled leading peasant militias that chased out recalcitrant landlords in the 1940s. Encircling the property by night, militias would demand of the hacienda owners: "Landlords take leave this good night or die here. Or all of you die here, because now there is the agrarian reform."⁴⁸⁸ However, in many cases insurgents arrived to a vacant house, as the landowners "had already been informed" and had escaped for the city of Cochabamba. And so, he noted, they came to villagers' homes. People were nervous, he explained, that they would be punished for their affiliation with the waychus, so they sought to distance themselves. The waychus "entered houses and took food, beds, and blankets. They also

⁴⁸⁴ As discussed in Chapter 1, escaped tributaries often fleed to haciendas, a practice which produced divisions between yanacona groups and their overlord "protectors," on the one hand, and tenant farmers and Andean leaders and caciques, on the other.

For scholarship on the figure of the "patron protegido" (protected patron), see Regalsky (2010), Dunkerley (2007).
486 Gotkowitz (2007:147).

While some residents linked the term *waychus* to earlier indigenous insurgencies, others used the term to describe the peasant militias of the 1940s. Waychu is the Quechua spelling for a town in Puerto Acosta or Huaycho, in the La Paz province. Little research exists on the rural presence of waychus in the 1940s. Indeed I was unable to find any reference to this popular term, a term that might be regionally specific.

⁴⁸⁸ The Quechua reads, "Propietarios kunan ch'isi lloqsipuichis de buenas o wañunkichi kaypi. O wañusunchis kaypi enteritunchis, porque tiyan reforma agraria kunanga."

assaulted villagers. After this, the landowners returned anew to their lands." Yet, while *waychus* nominally supported the peasant cause, villagers viewed their arrival with fear and worry. Epifania, drawing from her mother's account, noted, "They came in through open doors and found the food hidden in the back. They would escape with clothes and food. They came with machetes." People were forced to escape. She continued, "My grandfather escaped with my grandmother through a path in the ravine. People escaped to many places."

Others recalled the "revolutionaries" who came and hid in their villages, eliciting confrontations with the armed guard who was sent from Oruro and La Paz in which local villagers and *colonos* used as camouflage. In one memorable case in the village of Tiquirpaya, for instance, an indigenous leader called Sabino Wallku, who was not from there, was being hunted down by troops. He hid himself under a woman's layered *pollera* skirt, shooting his rifle from under the bountiful layers. After shooting and killing two officials, one a police leader and another a teacher attempting to intervene, the man was shot and killed. While heralded as a martyr for whom the elementary school is today named, villagers' accounts suggest uncertainty about where leaders' allegiances rested. On the one hand, villagers' noted that rebels were fighting "for liberation," while, on the other, they seemed unconvinced of whether this liberation was their own, remarking on rebels who subsequently "switched sides" to support landlords and who, as evident in the above case, used local villagers both as camouflage as well as fodder. Far from a consolidated block in favor of reforms or collectively supporting unions or peasant militias, then, villagers' accounts of 1947 unrest displayed great fear and ambivalence.

For landlords of Ayopaya, too, February 1947 was a month of grave destruction, an indigenous insurgency or "indiada" that descended upon towns and villages, haciendas and farmlands. As historians note, many landlords in Ayopaya were killed, houses destroyed, burned, and pillaged, violence often understood by surviving landlords and their kin in terms of an age-old "race war" between indigenous peasants and mestizo or criollo elites. While a detailed discussion of these events are beyond my purview here, today the children of hacienda landlords decry the senseless destruction of the era, evident in the burning of haciendas and the destroying of machinery and agrarian equipment. For instance, one man recalled, before this one landlord knew how to make sausages in the German style; with the "Indiada" his equipment and knowledge perished. Others noted that, having burned haciendas, rural farmers often went hungry, the seed stored in the hacienda and thus destroyed in the course of the uprisings. Thus, landlords' kin noted, *colonos* should have learned from and appropriated existing agricultural techniques and technologies rather than simply destroying and burning everything. These critiques drew from mid-century ideals of modernization and agricultural productivity, suggesting that ways abolitionary instabilities had reversed gains made in rural development.

As historians note, Ayopaya is remarkable for the magnitude of the 1947 rebellions, ones that drew in between 3,000 and 10,000 individuals and were centered on the hacienda of Yayani, located on the border with the La Paz province. For a week beginning on February 4th, colonos attacked and pillaged haciendas including that of Yayani and eight others. In addition to killing the landlord of Yayani, lawyer José María Coca, and his assistant, Lt. Col. José Mercado, who had been employed to guard the hacienda in the months before, rebels also destroyed a school and threatened to hang its teacher, also employed by Coca. ⁴⁹⁰ In addition to killing Coca and his legal advisor, insurgents visited the office of the local Corregidor where they destroyed paperwork and ransacked the office, and then visited the tax collector where they "charged"

_

⁴⁸⁹ See Gotkowitz (2007:236); see also Dandler and Torrico 1987:334-378).

⁴⁹⁰ Gotkowitz (2007:237).

[their] own tax" and recovered goods, mostly clothing, that had been confiscated in cases when colonos had failed to pay muko and chicha taxes. As these activities suggest, in rural Ayopaya the hacienda was, until at least the 1950s, experienced as a sort of local unit of political rule whose undoing required the absorption or appropriation of law. These popular attempts to integrate and manipulate legal forms were not new but rather grew from the earlier involvement of Ayopaya leaders in the 1945 Indigenous Congress. Indeed, along with popular insurgencies, in 1947 colonos continued to wage juridical battles in which they accused landlords not only of violating labor contrasts but also rape and forced labor services.

Legal petitions and other forms of rural organizing increased following the 1938 constitutional assembly and leading up to the National Indigenous Congress of 1945. Hilarión Grájeda, known to have been one of the leaders of the 1947 revolt, had been a key figure in the 1945 Indigenous Congress. At the time of the 1947 revolt, he had been evicted from the hacienda of Yayani and was in hiding somewhere in Ayopaya, accused by landlords of holding secret meetings with colonos. Like other indigenous leaders, Grájeda had been involved in local political affairs at the village level, and was alcalde de campo (village mayor) of Yayani at the time of the 1945 congress. Grájeda was not the only local leader who had been involved in the 1945 Indigenous Congress. Indeed, according to Angelo his grandfather had been brutally punished by the Rodriguez landowners for attempting to participate in the first National Indigenous Congress in La Paz in 1945. As a rural indigenous leader, the man had been expected to travel to La Paz, bringing musicians and dancers to the congress. However, the group was obstructed in Laraya, the municipal center governed largely by wealthy landowning and merchant families opposed to the MNR government. Later, the hacienda lords regained their strength and the communal mayor, Angelo's grandfather, was tied to a nearby elder tree and beaten, "like a slave." To this day, Angelo notes his feelings of "vengeance for the landowners." For, he says of the landowners' kin, "I am of this blood, so you will pay for this with me."

As discussed above, a number of worker's parties had formed during the 1930s. The *Nationalist Revolutionary Movement* (MNR), created in 1941, received widespread support primarily among leftist intellectuals and blue-collar workers. In 1945, under President Villarroel, the MNR organized the first *National Indigenous Congress*. The Congress's aim was to discuss rural issues and the well being of peasants. However, the MNR government was overthrown in July 21st 1946, and Villarroel's body was hung in La Paz from a lamppost in La Paz. According to Angelo, after the military junta overthrew president Villarroel, there was a persecution against groups that had been sympathetic to the ex-hacienda agenda. In one case, the new renter of an hacienda in Yayani re-imposed the obligations abolished earlier, noting to his colonos, "your President has died . . . Everything has changed." When a colono representative went to the renter Ramos bringing documents or "papers of guarantee" provided by the lawyers of the Defensa Gratuita, a free legal defense service provided by the state, the renter simply confiscated them. 495

Indeed, while scholars of revolution often emphasize the shared quality of political dissent leading to popular mobilizations, in Ayopaya many villagers described the beginnings of

⁴⁹¹ Gotkowitz (2007:237).

⁴⁹² Gotkowitz (2007:252).

⁴⁹³ Gotkowitz (2007:263).

⁴⁹⁴ Gotkowitz (2007:239).

⁴⁹⁵ As we shall see, such experiences of such radical and tragic reversal generate caution toward the reformist state—and titling initiatives—and a partial estrangement from urban, populist movements. See chapters 3 and 4.

the revolutionary period in terms of the appearance of strangers or *revolucionarios* who advised them and organized them, calling for them "to be alert." Angelo, for instance, described the appearance of strangers from other parts who secretly informed hacienda workers of impending uprisings. The links between these strangers and the local villagers were certain *compañeros*. These strangers visited the homes of *compañeros*, men who would were or would become involved with the socialist cause. However, their news never traveled as intended. Not only *compañeros* and villagers would learn of impending unrest, but also others, namely the landowners. Much like the news of hidden livestock or secret union meetings, the landowners had sympathizers or accomplices who informed them of planned attacks or plans for the hacienda's overthrow. One union leader explained that it was the landowner's godchildren who informed him. With this news, landowners fled, thus avoiding the penalty of law or the retributions of their hacienda workers.

Gregorio, an ex-union leader whose father had been pivotal in union organizing in the 1950s recalled the year of 1950, just as he began school. "They were fighting for liberation," he noted. "Afterwards there was the agrarian reform, the Revolution of April 9th, 1952." But first we should back up a little, he noted. "With President Villarroel, people had to work only five days, not six. Later it was further reduced to three. They punished the union leaders, who were not permitted to meet. So they met in the night, secretly, in the mountain, where no one knew. But then the very same *colonos* would tell the landlord that there had been a meeting." This account builds from his father's experience agitating for hacienda abolition during this period. His father had been a prominent union leader whose name I found on signed land reform documents requesting the re-allocation of lands in a neighboring hacienda. I asked Gregorio how it was that the landowner would learn of secret meetings. "One colono would betray them, in order to be recommended for better treatment. There was spying too." Here, as scholars note, the "paternalistic bonds" of hacienda life were drawn upon in order to secure landlords' safety. 497 However, in 1952, "They said 'There is no slavery anymore,' and everything flipped around. The colonos and sobra runa were left with all of what the landlord had previously received. They worked the landlord's lands collectively. The landlord had to escape, for those who came were well armed. Afterwards, the landowners made themselves union leaders, and in this way returned. Then the landlord's properties were sold, but he ended up with the best lands."

Here, Gregorio describes the tumultuous rise of the MNR party. Between 1946 and 1952, the PIR was discredited for its alliance with conservative forces, and the MNR emerged as the favored opposition party. Yet, MNR attempts to gain power during this period were largely unsuccessful. Following the death of Villarroel and the 1947 rebellions, which for some were understood as a reprisal for his death, rural repression was extreme, particularly in Ayopaya. Along with the formation of military brigades to detect insurgents, there was the formation of civil agents," voluntary corps comprised of young men who were given arms by the military and charged with finding the Indians who had killed Lt. Col. Mercado in Yayani. At attempted MNR coup in 1949 failed, as did its attempt to take the office after an electoral victory in the May 1951 elections, as Bolivia's communist party (PCB) aligned itself with the outgoing president and convinced the military to step in and block the MNR from assuming office. It was not until April 1952, following hunger marches, and then an armed rebellion in La Paz in which

4

⁴⁹⁶ The term has since become popularized and is today a common way to address not only fellow unionists in community meetings but also government staff in municipal government meetings.

⁴⁹⁷ Gotkowitz (2007:253).

⁴⁹⁸ Gotkowitz (2007:258).

armed miners seized arsenals and distributed weapons to civilians, and following three days of fighting, that the army surrendered and the MNR was able to take office, and Victor Paz Estenssoro became president. In January of the following year, the MNR established the Agrarian Reform Commission, and that August an national Agrarian Reform Law was passed that abolished forced labor and established a program of expropriation and redistribution from traditional landlords to rural, indigenous farmers. Doña Maria, one former servant, recalled the relief accompanying news of hacienda abolition, "We said, 'It is good that they leave. Now we will rest.'" She paused, as if savoring the memory, "Let them leave, we said. That they may suffer like we have." Soo

Yet, even the children of influential rural union leaders, like Gregorio, described the revolutionary unrest of the late 1940s and early 1950s in terms of "those who arrived." In the aftermath of uprisings, he noted, the landlords became unionists and the unequal division of lands persisted. That is, while the COB had originally been a mechanisms with which to demand labor reform and new mining laws, after the election of Estenssoro it became a more moderate institution to which ex-landlords might belong and in this way exert political influence and control the leftist and more radical wings of miners and rural campesinos. As we shall see in Chapter 4, residents complain of a parallel process occurring in the post-revolutionary moment since 2005. Indeed, Gregorio noted that today the ex-landlords of his childhood village were aligning themselves with the national COB union and the INRA land reform institute. In this way, attempts at redistribution that had been outstanding since 1953 remain stagnated. For Gregorio, this had led him to give up on the land reform at large. He says he no longer expects to the lands of the late landlord to be redistributed. Thus, in contrast to a political imaginary in which poverty and inequality reflect marginality from the state and liberalizing reforms, Gregorio conceived of rural ills as the result of prior and ongoing processes of land reform. Here, legal failure was explained not as a result of its unrealized nature but rather as a constitutive or internal feature of reform itself. He concluded, "The reform here was never to the benefit of the peasant." As for other unionists, recollections of the 1952 revolution and the subsequent land reform were linked to suspicion of land reform and disenchantment with the state at large.

This uncertainty was coupled with the enduring of other ways of related to landlords and regional space. In Sarahuayto, for instance, the announcement of hacienda abolition was complicated not because landowners had aligned themselves with unionists, but because some villagers felt commitments to prior landlords. Indeed, residents recalled, preceding the reform a peaceful, even "saintly" brother was left in care of the hacienda. Because of this, and due to the fact that he was not "culpable for earlier suffering," colonos and villagers could not bring themselves to harm him, and he was warned of impending attacks. Thus, villagers recalled, due to the current caretakers peaceful nature, workers did not rise up against the hacienda institution again until news spread of President Victor Paz Estenssoro's signing of a national land reform law (Decree 3463) on August 2nd, 1953. Along with formally abolishing the hacienda servitude, the law also declared that hacienda lands would be redistributed to hacienda laborers and turned over this process to agrarian trade unions.

In Sarahuayto, memories of Estenssoro's abolition of hacienda labor in 1953 hinged on the oca harvest, the task with which local colonos and laborers were busy that week. That morning, villagers had gone to finish harvesting the oca. Oca, villagers explained, does not dry like potato. It has to be laid out to dry, so you have to dig under the edges with another person

. .

⁴⁹⁹ The Quechua reads: "Allin ripunku ah, kunanqa samarisunchik ninku."

⁵⁰⁰ The Quechua reads: "Allin ripun niyku. Paykuna sufrichun kikin."

following behind to unbury it. Angelo recalls, "There was a whole section, all of it, all of it, the earth ready. They only thing missing was to collect (the oca). All of the ground, the oca all yellow (ch'iqchiriq karqa)!" Angelo described what happened, "Up there, a little up there in the mountain, there appeared a compañero with a pututu (conch shell), playing the pututu, screaming 'Come compañeros, come we will meet here.' Some went and some were paralyzed by fear of what might happen now. They gathered like that, gathered all together. 'We were required to,' people say. There this Vitalio Condori blew the pututu, grabbing his rifle, and said, 'On this day the work we have to do on the hacienda is over! For now and forever, there is no more hacienda. From this day onward, it is abolished.' And so the people said, 'What will happen with the oca?' A whole section of oca was ready to be harvested. 'Now who will collect it?' There the oca remained, rotting." Thus, with the official notice of hacienda abolition, union leaders initiated a labor strike and required all labors halt. One elderly ex-servant shook her head sadly, saying she "felt bad for the oca, just lying there."

News of Estenssoro's agrarian reform law spread quickly through union channels that had proliferated since the early 1940s. Upon receiving word, likely by way of anti-hacienda leaders who had also been significant in the distribution of an informal program for the 1945 Indigenous Congress, discussed above, village union leaders shot rifles and blew their pututus (conch horns), calling from mountaintops and passing through haciendas declared hacienda abolition. Declarations of the hacienda's formal abolition were coupled with calls by local union leaders and anti-hacienda organizers asserting that all labor halt. And yet, residents wondered what would become of the oca, which was due to be harvested that very day. Indeed, while hacienda abolition in 1953 is often described as a liberating moment in which villagers took up arms against hacienda lords, according to local villagers this moment was experienced also as one of great fear, when people hid in their homes, hoping to escape the violence of revolutionaries or counter-attacks by the ruling *hacendado* class. Such fear was not unwarranted. Earlier work stoppages, strikes, and attempts at claiming hacienda land had resulted in laws suits, fines, and the imprisonment of union leaders. Indeed, the rotting harvest was the catalyst for legal charges that the landlord pressed against union leaders, accusing them of fomenting unrest and of encouraging people to pillage hacienda property (the oca produce).

Remarkable in villagers' recollections of hacienda abolition is the profound ambivalence of this moment, one experienced not immediately in terms of relief but rather in terms of uncertainty, fear, and discomfort. Thus, if residents in neighboring villages recalled participating in peasant militias that encircled haciendas by night, in Sarahuayto, villagers to whom I spoke recalled hacienda abolition less as a local achievement than as a chaotic, violent moment in which everything flipped over and reversed. A stranger appeared, blowing a *pututu* or conch shell. Many villagers were paralyzed or stunted by fear, afraid of what would come to pass. According to villagers' accounts, local colonos had not organized the meeting but rather "a stranger" who demanded their attendance. The impassioned announcement of hacienda abolition was met neither with glee nor with festivity. Instead, people asked, what is to become of the oca? Here Angelo's wife added, "It was the people's work to collect the oca. Why not collect it?" To leave the fruits of physical and ritual labor out to rot was unimaginable. Angelo continued, "Like this it all stayed, they say. Neither the *hilacatas*, nor the *mayordomos*, wanted to leave it there, on the ground, around the field, turning yellow. 'Come, come let's gather it!' they said capriciously. People say the *hilacatas* and *mayordomos* begged the people to harvest it. The people did not pay them any attention. Some came to collect the oca with their woven blankets to carry off what they had collected. Most said, 'It's finished,' and left the oca on the ground. Then

there was no one, just the patron in his house. The people returned his animals and his cows to him, as servitude had ended (*tukukapun servidumbre*). They said, 'If he has sheep he has to herd them. If he has cows he has to herd them.'" Here, *colonos* were caught between the demands of their now-obsolete lords and the demands of new union leaders. So some arrived, with their *q'ipiris* or woven blankets, to carry off the oca, while the majority refused. Then, everything was still. What had been a landed estate with more than 400 laborers seemingly dissipated overnight.

To understand the discomfort accompanying the rotting oca harvest, it is useful to consider the important religious and spiritual dimensions of agrarian practice in the Andean region. As scholars note, in much of the Andes practices of harvest belong to an ongoing process of ritual exchange between pachamama or earth mother and human groups, a framework of sacred exchange with roots in the pre-colonial Inca administrative practices. ⁵⁰¹ Indeed, as scholars note, ideals of reciprocity embodied in the exchange of gifts also shaped the relations of hacienda laborers and landlords, indeed, in some cases labor itself was taken as a gift or was taken as responding to debts accrued through landlords' prior favors. ⁵⁰² Given these entanglements between the harvest—as a sort of gift or moment of broader ritual exchange with the pachamama—we might about the discomfort or anxiety produced by the act of letting the oca rot. In Ayopaya, understandings of obligation and exchange traversed not only "earth spirits" but also extensive, often long-term relationships to hacienda landlords. 503 In this way, the strike and its call to abandon the oca disrupted local sensibilities in which labor was not simply a separate category but was entwined in other relations of agrarian religiosity, patronage, and exchange with landlords. To abandon the harvest then, in accordance with tenantry arrangements, also seemed to compromise one's claim to use that land. 504

Instead, for servants, the declaration of hacienda abolition came as another sort of command. Don Humberto, now in his 90s, had been one of the landowner's favored *pongo* servants. He had attended to guests, managed other servants, and assisted the landlord Don Carlos in his day-to-day work. Humberto recalled the day of hacienda abolition, "There were lots of people gathered into a big group. They told us 'You are not to attend to this mill.' From there they went to the mine, saying, 'Get out of here!' They told us we had to go to the mine, to the mills, and then they blew on their conch horns. I came to the house. It was full of people. Then, someone announced, 'Compañeros, this is the day compañeros. From tomorrow onward you won't work for the landowners. You won't pay them any mind. There is no hacienda anymore. The landowners have to plant their own corn. You will not work anymore.' People were chanting, 'Down, down with the hacienda.'" Waking up the next morning, the landowner and Humberto planned on leaving. But that morning all the villagers of Sarahuayto were there with horses, already mounted. According to Humberto, they shouted, "That's it! There is no hacienda anymore. The hacienda is gone." He went on to describe how the landowner fled for

5(

⁵⁰¹ See, in particular, McCormack (1991), Murra (1962, 1978), Rowe (1946), Salomon and Urioste (1991), and Wachtel (1977:83).

⁵⁰² See Langer (1985, 1989), Larson (1991), Lyons (2006:17, 19, 43), Oberem (1981), Orlove (1974), and Pérez Tomayo (1947). Remarkably, however, few studies have linked an ethnographic analysis of reciprocity practices to their longevity as an legal norm inscribed by colonial governance, a history that complicates ideas of timeless tradition but which also would partially explain the longevity of such norms in agrarian settings.

There is a rich literature on the relation between Andean communities and non-human earth beings and sentient others, including *apu* spirits of mountains, and other beings that reside in rivers and mines. See Abercrombie 1998; Allen 2002; Canessa 2012, de la Cadean 2010, Durston 2007, Earls 1969, Flores-Ochoa 1977, Gose 1994, Harris 2001, Isbell 1978, Nash 1979, Orta 2004, Platt 1997, Sallnow 1987, Taussig 1988, Valderrama-Escalante 1988. This is an argument put forth by Gotkowitz (2007:253-254).

Cochabamba. Because rebelling laborers had taken his horses, the elderly landowner escaped seated on a chair and carried by two *pongo* servants to a nearby town some 20 kilometers away.

Like other Ayopaya landlords, Don Carlos had been an authoritative, at times violent, boss of his hacienda lands, where several hundred Quechua and Aymara-speaking *colonos* labored in exchange for meager subsistence plots while a handful of domestic servants as well as *colona* tenant women offered "personal service" in the home. And yet, it seemed that at stake in evaluations of him as good or bad had to do with more than violence or servitude. Rather, villagers' memories of him and his moral integrity seemed to hinge on the question of whether or not he had fulfilled a range of obligations and practices of informal assistance to servant families. Along with medical services, people recalled that he offered people rides in his truck, participated in patron saint festivals, and provided services like schooling for male children of farm workers. He had also informally adopted several children into his household. Further, unlike the older style of agrarian patronage of his father, Don Carlos resided in the area and managed the property himself. Thus, Carlos was good or "all right" (*waleqlla*) landowner insofar as he had shared in the lives of local communities and, in his capacity as an elite landlord, aided them as was considered culturally appropriate.

In Ayopaya, people often remarked that the cruel landlords were killed while the peaceful or generous ones survived. One former colono explained, "Some of the hacienda administradores were good, while others were bad. The bad ones, such as the landowner of Challahuanca, were killed." This was, in part, because as we have seen above the escape of landlords following the land reform required aid from former colonos and pongos. And yet, remarks about "good patrones" fundamentally destabilized the reform logics in which the very act of demanding service, or requiring or depending upon the labor of an other, were stigmatized as backwards, as a colonial form blocking the development of the modern nation and facilitating the reproduction of a "feudal" system of forced labor. It was not only former servants who held fond memories of certain landlords or who described them as having been generous or even "all right" (waleglla). Instead, the contrasting notions of the good and bad patron permeated recollections of the earlier hacienda system. For instance, Emiliano, a former hacienda colono, noted that the area of Arani originally had three landowners. He explained, "One landowner was cruel. The other two were good." These accounts shared the curious description of landowners as being not only cruel or "malo," but also good or "bonito." Another man, who had worked as a melga runa on the Sarahuayto hacienda years ago, recalled the patron as "a good man, not a demon (sagra hina)." He pointed down the mountain at "the house over there," the original hacienda farmhouse where the patron's grandson Martin now lives, explaining that that is the hacienda but that today he lives off the lands he had previously worked for the *patron*. "Now the land is mine." A moment later the man's son appeared. In his 50s, and unlike his father, he spoke to me in Spanish. Hearing our talk of the late landowners, he interjected, "[The patron] was a good man. He knew how to cure illnesses. He was a doctor." But, I responded, I heard that the Sarahuayto landlords were abusive. He nodded, "Yes, they were horrible, the two of them, fighting all the time."

Here, in the course of a single account former tenants and servants might describe the landlord as a "good man," a sort of beneficent caretaker and the curer of illness, and, at the same time, note that he was "horrible" and violent. Their accounts suggest the limits to an oppositional moral binary; landlords could be both "good"—that is, beneficent, generous, helpful

⁵⁰⁵ Barry Lyons (2006:9) notes that similar views of landlords were held in Ecuador, where people both asked landlords to be godparents while, at other times, noting that they had sold their souls to the devil.

in providing services or aid, and at the same time "bad," that is, abusive and violent. Barry Lyons notes that these ideals of generosity and beneficence were based on the behavior of indigenous elders who "modeled notions of authority that hacienda residents drew on in judging hacienda bosses critically" (2006:81). And yet, this overstates the divide between an "indigenous tradition" of respect and an hacienda-based system of authority which, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, have been historically intertwined for some time, as Spanish colonialists drew from Incaic models and in which the very persons (native lords, caciques) of importance to native prestige hierarchies were absorbed into new colonial and then republican systems of rule. Indeed, Lyons's own account includes references to a pair of *mayordomos* who were considered good because they were "sociable with the people" and would eat lunch with the people workings and "be together with people" (2006:152). 506

Accounts of "good landlords," like laments of the rotting oca, suggest the instability of reformist discourses that tended to reify elites as brutal colonial lords and their imperfect displacement of earlier moral ideals. In contrast to reformist typologies, then, rural villagers and former servants continued to draw from everyday relations of exchange and proximity as the basis for evaluating landlord character. With the 1953 agrarian reform, it was not simply labor but also the range of affective practices of commitment, obligation, and moral evaluation that were made subject to the scrutiny of the state, often by way of a new class of rural agrarian inspectors. This suggests that reformist ideals of labor and subjectivity—evident in the oca harvest as well as contemporary assessments of prior landlords—were not immediately a settled matter, but required active effort and often took the shape of a new class of administrators, union officials, and rural indigenous leaders whose task was to transform both labor practices as well as existing modes of political and moral subjectivity, primarily those of former servants and colonos. ⁵⁰⁷

Don Adolfo, now 84, had been a union representative of the local branch of the union during the 1953 land reform. His parents had been hacienda *colonos*. After military training, he had worked as an agrarian inspector. He described the nature of his work, "The agrarian inspector was the person who commanded the peasants, who taught them to work, to produce." That is, he specified, "The agrarian inspector ordered the peasants so that they would work well and not do any work for free. They had to be paid." Adolfo had returned from required military service in the early 1950s and, as for many leaders, the physical and political training received in the military made him a desirable candidate for the local union. His parents had labored for under the hacienda and, like many other union leaders, here the children of *colono* laborers became political advocates of land reform. Yet, as evident in Adolfo's description of his work as an agrarian inspector, here advocacy of the peasant cause included "commanding" and "ordering" the peasants, "teaching" them how to "produce" and "work well." They had to be

5

⁵⁰⁶ As discussed in later chapters, this moral framework implies an ideal of exemplary relation evident not only in distributing resources like food and drink but also embodied in a sense of everyday sociability (see Chapters 5 and 6).

For the second s

⁵⁰⁹ On military training and unionism in Bolivia, see Canessa (2012) and Gotkowitz (2007).

taught not to work for free. Strangely enough, here it was the youth – young men in the early 20s - who were employed in efforts to teach and reform the actions of their fellow villagers, particularly the elderly, including their parents. The revolutionaries and unionists – strangers who appeared overnight and made new demands on rural peasants and ex-servants – were now one's children, one's brothers, and one's neighbors. The state, once embodied by the distant INRA institute in La Paz, became a more proximate, even familial, presence. 510

Thus, while scholars have argued that the formation of peasant unions and rural reform reflected a form of grass-roots organizing that was driven by local interests and not simply by urban and unionists discourses, ⁵¹¹ my account foregrounds the striated and at times internallyfraught nature of the "local" unfolding of such organizing. Divisions had to do not only with the contrast between labor and indigenous leaders but also the division between servants and colono tenant farmers. And, yet, both classes of workers experienced abolition with great uncertainty, revolutionaries described as "strangers" who "organized us and instructed us on how to act." often ravaging homes and leading villagers to escape to nearby mountains. 512 While conflicts between hacienda servants and colonos partially reflected longstanding inequities in land tenure and hacienda privileges, these inequalities were politicized in a new way by the political logic of mid-century revolutionary nationalism. Experiences of an obligation or duty to work, to harvest the oca, or to maintain ties to former landlords were configured into evidence of the grotesque persistence of a pre-modern slavery. And yet, here, reform logics were not absolute, co-existing rather with other understandings of appropriate action governing practices of labor, land use, and exchange.⁵¹³

These fraught histories of land reform and abolitionary violence raise the question of the historical antecedents of the internal divisions of post-hacienda life. While commonly understood as an expression of shared awakening to the possibilities of justice, I have showed that the terms of such awakening and their accompanying notions of justice were historically specific, configured in part from within the terms of liberation established by reformist and popular debates concerning hacienda abolition, pongueaje, and land redistribution that took on a national prominence from about 1938 onward. Along with conditioning new forms of political action and land claims, reform logics also rendered unintelligible other logics of appropriate action and collective life and, at the same time, generated new rifts in rural life that transformed hacienda servants into a new category of a backwards non-citizen whose very being called forth and provided evidence for a failed modernity. In the process, the cause for failed of failure for an incomplete shift to modern citizenship and indigenous justice came to be situated in rural bodies themselves, certain modes of labor—particularly agricultural work on lands other than one's own and domestic work—came to carry new stigmas as holdovers from a colonial past. Along with creating the servant as the non-citizen slave, this era saw the development of a new, increasingly militarized ideal of the citizen linked to union participation, land rights, and gun ownership. 514

Attempts to convert hacienda workers into modern citizens and to reclaim hacienda lands were complicated, in Sarahuayto, by stagnated legal battles as well as lingering sympathies for the former landlord. Thirteen years after formal hacienda abolition, in 1965, with the process of

⁵¹⁰ This process echoes the agrarian reform process in Maoist China, as described by Erik Mueggler (2001).

⁵¹¹ Jackson (1994:202).

⁵¹² The violence of Bolivian unionism has been examined in the work of Brooke Larson (2004) and Sylvia Rivera Cusicangui (1983).

⁵¹³ For the historical antecedents of such patronage relations, see chapter 1. For their contemporary expressions in Ayopaya, see chapter 5. 60tkowitz (2007:277).

land redistribution stunted by legal battles with the Rodriguez family, the landowners returned, bringing with them legal documents validating their land possessions and engineers who "took the villagers' titles and measured everything." The 1953 process of land reform required and was based on a *levantamiento* or topographic analysis, conducted by engineers employed the by the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA), the institution charged with facilitating the land reform. Active local indigenous and union leaders accused the engineers of being bribed by landlords, and in neighboring ex-hacienda villages these conflicts were so profound that engineers were chased off of lands, local opposition that, in formal statements, they noted had obstructed their ability to carry out the analysis. In other villages, former colonos noted that topographic INRA maps had been torn up or destroyed when detected or encountered. Thus, if the revolutionary period began with grand declarations of historic rupture and servitude's end, by the 1980s it had withered into prolonged legal battles, which, according to the landlord's grandson, cost him more than the land was worth. In these ways, Angelo concluded, "Slavery returned from afar."

And yet, if slavery "returned," it was also, as a category of labor and subjectivity, relatively novel. Indeed, the language of return can be somewhat misleading, partially obscuring the ways that "slavery" as a political category of the non-citizen was itself produced and popularized during early to mid- 20th century reform debates and peasant mobilization in the Bolivian hinterlands. This process was not limited to Bolivia. In Ecuador, too, scholars have described the ways that rural villagers, often the children of hacienda workers, oppose a prior uncivilized state of "slavery" to the more civilized and educated ways of the present (1993:73). 516 And vet, in attending to villagers' ambivalent memories of abolitionary violence and their discomfort with the rotting oca harvest. I have sought to highlight the instability of and limits to this new political language, one that not only expands into nothingness but rather but wrestle and jostle unsteadily with pre-existing frameworks of value, labor, and moral action. 517 As these accounts suggest, 20th century debates about citizenship and hacienda *pongueaje* popularized a new temporal frame, reordering history into a new typology opposing animal-like slavery and modern citizenship. In the course of this popularization, not only time but also people were differentiated, people of the present, citizens, distinguished from the walking dead, those slave-like souls still bound to the hacienda. Thus, while hacienda abolition promised freedom from an entrenched system of labor extraction and violence, it also destabilized

-

⁵¹⁵ As I discuss in Chapter 3, this consisted in a topographic analysis of the characteristics of the property, as well as the nature of the labor, the number, age, names, and marital status of all workers, and other facts felt to be relevant to determining whether or not the estate warranted redistribution.

⁵¹⁶ Thurner (1993:73) recounts that the son of former hacienda servants notes that "los indios" were not civilized

before, "but now the Indians [are] more civilized, more aware of things. . . On the hacienda, they had lived like slaves." In addition, he includes accounts collected by Lenz, including a statement noting, "We lived in a kind of slavery, suffering on the hacienda" (Thurner 1993:73 citing Lenz 1986:190).

⁵¹⁷ Such divisions should caution us against assuming a unified peasant class or peasant movement. For peasant studies approaches in the Andes see (Stern 1987; Pallares 2002; Tullis 1970; Zamosc 2007). See Thurner (1993) for a useful account of the limits to peasant typologies. While Turner (1993) considered the problem of the displacement of vara authority by peasant union leaders, his argument continues to hinge on the peasantry as a level of generality that dismisses internal division between tenants and servants.

⁵¹⁸ Thurner (1993:74) makes a similar point about the temporal dimensions of languages of civilization and precivilization, yet locates them around the question of Catholic versus Protestant and argues that they rest fundamentally on a logic of conversion and change related to the spread of capitalism and its displacement of an hacienda moral economy.

villagers' relationships to each other and to a surrounding landscape, recoding the lived present into a past that had not yet been eradicated.

Fractured Teleologies of Reform: "Slavery Returned"

As historians note, haciendas in most of Cochabamba showed multiple signs of decline by 1916, including landlords' inability to pay mortgages, increasing practices of leasing and rental, and the subdivision into medium-sized properties. 519 Yet, in the most entrenched hacienda regions of Ayopaya, Tapacarí, Arque, and Mizque, colonaje remained a dominant labor form until at least 1953. In many cases colonaje gave way to sharecropping, an arrangement which shifted the burden of tools and seeds away from landlords and peasants without removing the personal services typical of colonaje. 520 In addition to sharecropping, Cochabamba haciendas often also gave way to arrangements of arrenderos, that is, colonos who rented additional land from townsfolk with which to augment limited hacienda plots. 521 Oral accounts and land reform proceedings in Ayopaya suggest that conflictive legal battles persisted among union representatives and the landlord of Sarahuayto, not being resolved ultimately until 1986. To this day, and as discussed in subsequent chapters, the grandson of the original landowners maintains ownership over 200 square meters of fertile cropland as well as one of the original hacienda buildings. 522 For Ayopaya villagers like Angelo, landlords' continued ownership of land and the persistence of domestic and agricultural labor, even if remunerated, attesting to the hacienda's failed overcoming.

From 1965 to 1983, landowners continued to operate in the region, relying upon the labor of local Quechua villagers. At this time the process of land division and re-titling of parcels was initiated. Another interlocutor, Don Miguel, had told us that the lands entered a lottery. The expectation was that ex-colonos and ex-servants would receive their own lands, lands obtained by dividing up the landed estates. Redistribution was complicated by the appeals of two distinct groups, not only ex-colonos but also returned migrants and veterans. 523 These populations now returned to the countryside, encouraged by promises of land. In this way, the reform had to manage the land claims not only of ex-laborers (including domestic servants, agrarian workers, and miners), but also of these recently returned migrants or *solicitantes*. According to residents, this created a shortage of lands to be redistributed. Those who already had parcels they had been tending, such as the ex-colono workers, were to become owners of this land. However, the land reform stipulated that if the landowners could demonstrate "personal intervention in the work of the hacienda" the estate would be declared a "medium-size property" rather than a "latifundio." In Sarahuayto, and the landowners maintain legal rights to 200 square hectares of land, lands of their choosing. The landowner chose the most fertile lands, and poorer quality lands were added to a lottery for redistribution. Further, if any *colonos* happened to be working lands that were of better quality, these parcels would be taken from them and enter the lottery. What followed was the bribery of INRA technicians by union leaders and by landowners, group alliances with

-

⁵¹⁹ Gotkowitz (2007:140-141); Jackson (1994).

⁵²⁰ See Gotkowitz (2007:141); Jackson (1994:164); Reyeros (1949).

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² See Chapter 6.

⁵²³ Indeed, land reform cases I accessed in the INRA archive included reference to returned veterans as well as people who had earlier migrated to the cities of Cochabamba, La Paz, Santa Cruz, and to the mining regions of Oruro and Potosí. Others were aging ex-combatants of the Chaco War (1932-1935).

patrones in order to secure more desirable lands, and land grabbing among villagers. In the end, "People divided (qichuy) up each others' lands and not those of the patron." ⁵²⁴

Rural land conflicts emerged from and were reinforced by already-existing differences generated by the tiered labor system. For instance, Angelo noted, the *melgas* aligned themselves with the engineers and collaborated with the patrones to obtain the best lands. Those with ties to the landowners were able to maneuver legally to ensure that they received more desirable plots. The *colonos*, in contrast, were left with the small parcels they had worked before the reform or if they no land, were made subject to the fortune or misfortune of the lottery. In this way, the reform did not simply divide up the landowner's lands, it also facilitated a process of land grabbing among villagers. After 1952, ex-laborers had not yet procured titles but continued working the land they had worked prior to the reform. Those who did not have lands worked "in company," a term referring to an arrangement in which ex-laborers collaborated with the exlandowners in planting and harvesting crops. People explained that as the landowners had always controlled the crops, with the land reform, many people lacked the basic materials with which to plant, including seeds or plows. Villagers constructed houses, planted crops, and herded animals on the lands directly surrounding the hacienda building. Upon the return of the landowners in 1965, people were thrown off of the lands, their crops and livestock appropriated. Thus, even as most people "respected" the hacienda limits, others constructed homes directly adjacent to the hacienda house. Here, "respect" was opposed to the prominence of informal land appropriations by way of de facto occupation. 525 While absent, however, landowners like the Rodriguez family remained the legal owners of the land.

In this way, villagers worked in a sharecropping arrangement with ex-landowners throughout the 1960s and 1970s, unpaid labor and "personal service" not ending until 1983. With the fall of Estenssoro in 1964, and the subsequent Military-Campesino Pact, peasants were painted as traitors of the nation, and a wave of repression spread across the countryside. As one ex-servant recalled, "We were beaten much worse with Barrientos. They kicked us like dogs, whether we produced what they wanted or not, or if we could not work one day." Yet rural residents continued to mobilize for land redistribution. Indeed, Angelo had a pivotal place in this movement. In July of 1983, Angelo visited Don Carlos on behalf of local villagers, chastising him for continuing to exploit local villagers by way of unpaid favors and tenant-like arrangements in which the landowner received a share of produce grown. Angelo implored the landowner to renounce such injustice and sell the villagers his lands. When they next met, the landowner told the union leader that he does not want to sell the land, for "The hacienda is my pride." Angelo then made a legal and moral appeal, asking the landowner "How is it that you want to continue enslaving us?" He added, "The time of slavery has long passed." Invoking the 1953 agrarian reform law, he repeated once again, "That time passed long ago."

To understand the sense of disappointment, even rage, shaping demands for land redistribution in the 1980s it is important to recall that, as early as 1941, Ayopaya *colonos* submitted petitions to the state demanding the abolition of pongueaje and the distribution of land among hacienda laborers. As discussed above, the 1940s produced a deep sense of anticipation

104

⁵²⁴ The Quechua reads: "Kay runamanllataq jallp'asta qichunku mana patronpata qichunkuchu."

⁵²⁵ In chapter 3, I offer a detailed discussion of the figure of respect as an object of concern in present-day land reform efforts. For a detailed discussion of the religious genealogy of the Andean notion of respect, see Lyons 2006. ⁵²⁶ Fieldnotes 10/13/2011.

⁵²⁷ The Quechua reads: "Esclavitud tiempo pasakapunña."

⁵²⁸ The Quechua reads: "Chay tiempoqa pasakapunña unay."

and expectation, an understanding of inhabiting a moment on the cusp of a radical reordering of existing relations. Thus, while local unionists certainly evoked the moral and legal language of exploitation and land reform, their complaint was not simply that labor arrangements were unjust, but rather that they had persisted after their time. With the landowner refusing to leave the area and continuing with practices that had legally abolished, including free services and tenant-like farming, Angelo threatened him with legal action. He headed to La Paz the very night of the dispute, bringing a legal claim against Don Carlos. However, while he had expected the support of local villagers and ex-laborers, the opposite happened. Half the people "turned on us to favor" the patron. 529 The traitors are a couple who live "above," a part of the village located on the opposite side of the river. 530 These were the *yanghas* (good-for-nothings) who supported the landowner. 531 He continued, "All of them turned into enemies." 532 In this case, neighbors and fellow villagers suddenly turned (kutirin) against him, becoming (rikhurinku) enemies. For Angelo, this shift from friend to enemy led to his being charged with attempted homicide, a charge for which he spent three years (1983-1986) in prison. While he was in prison, the lands were sold to his enemies. Now, those who live across from the river remain divided off from Angelo and the villagers who live below. Indeed, Sarahuayto is divided into two different villages. To this day, Angelo noted, "We are enemies" (*Enemigos kaq*). Today, "We do not give them even a thing."⁵³³

The ex-servant Don Humberto recalled the local occupation of hacienda lands in 1983 very differently. He noted, "The Sarahuayteños wanted to take the lands." He had gone to Sarahuayto to buy oca seeds. As discussed above, sharecropping arrangements shifted the burden of obtaining seeds to farmers who, previously, had been provided seed by hacienda landlords. Indeed, complaints waged in 1940s petitions against Ayopaya landlords hinged precisely on claims that landlords had failed in their responsibilities to provide seed to laborers. In Sarahuayto, conflicts over access to seeds in the 1980s culminated not in a direct confrontation between landlord and colono unionist but, rather, between colono and pongo servant. As he was returning to the house of the hacienda to sleep, Don Carlos told Humberto, "'Now, secure the hacienda building with another padlock, and secure the doors. There are lots of people outside. Don't leave until the morning. Come and sleep in my room." He continued, "We were really careful. 'No one should be let in,' he told me. In the morning we left for the cornfield, and just then Angelo appeared, saying, 'That's it!' There was the sounding of pututus all around and there were a lot of people. They grabbed and hit me again and again, [yelling] 'Get out of here! Suck my dick!' This time they got us. This street is the last I remember. Afterwards I woke up all bloody. I was told I had been beat by Angelo." Here then, anti-hacienda leaders beat hacienda servants, confronting them the street outside the hacienda building. The gendered workings of these confrontations are evident in the Angelo's instruction to Humberto, "suck my dick."

Not only domestic servants but also hacienda field foremen or *mayordomos* were vulnerable to union violence. As one former union leader noted, mayordomos were hired by the landlord and acted as managers yet were usually from local villagers. 534 In cases where the

⁵²⁹ The Quechua reads: "Chanta khuska runa kutirin a favor."

⁵³⁰ Studies of Quechua villages have long noted a geographic and ritual split between aransaya (above) and uransaya (below). See Ramos Flores 2003:46, unpublished dissertation.

The Quechua reads: "Chaykuna a favor del patron correayqachriq kanku."

⁵³² The Quechua reads: "Chaykuna enemigosnin rikhurinku."

⁵³³ The Quechua reads: "Kunawan mana quykuchu ni imata."

⁵³⁴ This contrasts with other haciendas for instance in Ecuador where, as Thurner notes, the *mayordomo* foreman was "inevitably a bilingual mestizo" (1993:53).

landlords were absent, the *mayordomos* realized their orders. With the land reform, the man recalled, "They had to leave with the landlords, otherwise we would have killed them." I ask if there are still problems caused by the differences among families of colonos and mayordomos. He replied, "Oh yes, there is still lots of resentment, because some people ended up with better and bigger lands than others." Thus, it was not only landowners' servants but also indigenous leaders and unionists who were felt to have betrayed their rural followers. One ex-servant told me about the case of Sabino Wallchu, a militia leader from Oruro who "was on the side of the revolutionaries but then switched." I ask why. He rubbed his fingers together, *golge* (money). Adolfo, an ex-union leader who oversaw much of the titling process in the region, also admitted to having received money from landlords in exchange for assisting them to reclaim livestock and goods at abandoned haciendas from which they had been chased by rural militias led by Adolfo himself 535

As we have seen, 1953 marked a rapid shift in political and agrarian order, one that followed from the popularization of new conceptions of labor, subjectivity, and citizenship since rural activism and reform debates going back at least to 1938. Hacienda abolition created the conditions for new sorts of political claims yet also generated rifts in rural life, "scorn" leveled at former servants who were, increasingly, seen as embodiments of a tragic and stubborn premodern era whose eradication was required in order to achieve a more egalitarian rural order. And yet, in Sarahuayto the transformations reformers and popular activists sought was complicated by other, more enduring, relations to landlords and labor. Indeed, in part related to many villagers' support for the landlord, his overthrow in Sarahuayto was drawn out and remarkably peaceful. Elsewhere, union leaders and organized militias forced landowners out at gunpoint. Houses were burned and pillaged, and animals were slaughtered. In Sarahuayto, by contrast, animals were even returned to the patron. Instead, the violent rifts unfolded between hacienda workers themselves, pitting hacienda colonos against pongos, rifts that remain unresolved, sedimented in local patterns of land ownership. Indeed, as discussed below, to this day Sarahuayto remains split in two, comprised of two moieties with formal village status and with their own municipal representative, unions, and school. Families whose commitments during the land reform were to unionists and revolutionary political leaders reside on the higher half of the moiety, while those seen as *hacendado* sympathizers reside on the other. ⁵³⁶

For Sarahuayto villagers, then, the region's past lingered on as an obdurate, volatile presence, a subterranean force dispersed on the surface of things. Reflections on the hacienda's persistence, however, were accompanied by affective and political appeals to an ideal of social change. People were adamant that things had changed, that they were no longer unpaid servants. As the daughter of a *mitani* servant who had grown up in the hacienda household explained. 537 "Before, all this land belonged to Don Carlos, and after the Agrarian Reform they divided it among the workers. Before, the earth was good but now it is dry and is falling. Before, we

⁵³⁵ Such ties could extend as far up as state administrators and the president. Indeed, Adolfo bragged that he had been good friends with the late president René Barrientos, "I would give Barrientos a little money like this, low." He mimicked the act of handing someone a wad of cash at waist level. "Barrientos," he continued, "even gave me a gift,

a pistol."

536 As anthropologists, historians, and archaeologists have shown, the division of moieties into two parts is characteristic of the "dual organization" of political institutions and space in Quechua and Aymara villages throughout Peru and Bolivia (Gelles 2000). As Andrew Canessa (2012) has shown, traditional systems of dual moiety division were transformed by land reforms and directly implicated in conflicts surrounding hacienda land redistribution in Bolivia. ⁵³⁷ Fieldnotes 5/11/2011.

worked *qasiy* [in vain, unpaid]. Now we are paid. We are no longer like we were before." Her explanation suggest the ways that people grapple not only with political disappointments but also with the broader ontological problem of continuity and change, the before and the now. Here, times *have* changed; identity is not continuous. And yet, a certain "we" is possible precisely because all traces and vestiges are not erased. This 'we' is, of course, both inclusive and exclusive. Thus, for instance, villagers of Sarahuayto proudly recounted their history of antihacienda mobilization, contrasting their Aymara roots with Sarapaya villagers, comprised of many former hacienda servants who had "turned" on the upper moiety to support the landowner during the 1983 conflict. In this way, villagers of former haciendas drew from historical patterns of conflict between Aymara and Quechua groups, infusing historically produced ethnic typologies with new meaning as they were aligned with hacienda-based labor distinctions between more autonomous tenant farmers and more submissive hacienda servants. In the final section, I examine how these hacienda-based fractures in village life are engaged and rendered habitable in the present.

Impossible Loss: Reformist Failure and Post-Hacienda Collectivity

We arrive at the chapel, entering the courtyard through a stone archway grown over by fur trees. Historically, the archway was significant as marker of entering the more intimate domain of the hacienda, where churchly authority presided and the more communal territory ended. 540 On most days, the space is abandoned, used to pasture cows. On occasions like this, however, the yard has been transformed into a bustling dance-floor packed with bodies that sway and swing with the rhythm of pan-flutes. There are two centers of movement, each surrounded by circling bodies that move as one. Men and boys of all ages, and in all states of inebriation, are absorbed into the two circles. The circles rub together in the middle, as members from one brush against or bump up with members from the other. Each circle represents a *pasantes* and his group of supporters, musicians. To occupy any point of higher authority, one must have been pasante of all the festivals, and so in some ways this is a test of strength of one possible candidate against another. The pasante dances in the midst of the circle to the right, at times shifting to the outskirts, where he holds his vara or baston de mano, a staff marking his authority. Along a brick wall off to the side, women, children, and visitors are crowed. I stand beside Don Vicente and his daughters, while women gather under an overhang to my right and outside the chapel. To the left of the door, Alcaldes in red *chimbornos* gather together, drinking and talking.

As the afternoon draws on, the flute playing continues, the men growing more and more inebriated. Women continue to deliver large vats of *chicha*, lugging buckets and large 2-liter soda bottles out into the center of the church courtyard. Hours pass, and the dancers begin to wobble as they walk, struggling to keep pace with other dancers. Their antics cause the audience of women and girls to laugh, young women shyly covering their mouths. Off to the left of the two circulating groups, young men and teenagers sit around drinking or stand talking in groups. Municipal authorities and union men from other villages greet the dancing men, particularly the pasantes, and take part in a ritual of reciprocal drinking, first filling the mug or *tutuma* (coconut shell) with chicha from their own supply and offering it to their drinking partner before the other reciprocates. Once in a while, people break off from the dancing and stand together, in groups of

⁵³⁸ As Caroline Walker Bynum notes, "Without change, we have no story. [...] It is when shape no longer carries story, when the traces or vestiges are completely erased, that identity is gone" (2001:182). ⁵³⁹ Fieldnotes 2/2/2012.

⁵⁴⁰ On the significance of the hacienda archway see Thurner (1993:55).

two or three, involved in an intense discussion, their faces so close they nearly touch. These conversations often digress into argument, escalating into pushing before another flute-playing companion joins them and intervenes. Then, embracing drunkenly, they stumble back and are reabsorbed into the circling dancers. Some men, attempting to step away or "escape," are playfully corralled back to the center by the alcaldes, including the pasante Ramiro. In the circles, men play passionately, leaning forward toward their component in a stylized dance that moves abruptly in a sway from right to left, back and forward.

According to villagers, Candelaria constitutes one of several important ritual occasions in which villagers work through their conflicts, confronting arguments and each other in order to produce and sustain an exemplary sort of community belonging. Unresolved conflicts could produce jealousy and envy, foreclosing a healthy sense of unity which was felt to be crucial to obtaining and maintaining the approval of the pachamama or earth mother. The year before, people recalled, the fiesta had been poorly attended, resulting in sparse rains and producing only a small harvest. Indeed, as noted, the intensity of conflict is central to the flute playing, recalling the form of conflictive battle dance or t'inku typical of the Aymara highlands. As the afternoon continues, men face off in a sort of ritualized combat that appears, from a distance, as though the groups are on the cusp of physical confrontation. But the conflict takes the form of music, specifically, flute playing. The flute-playing is shaped not only by the conflictive motion of the two circles, but also by various forms of pedagogical instruction by way of accompanied or partnered playing across generations. Within each circle, older men are paired up with younger boys, but rather than escalating tension or competition, the older man leads by example, showing the younger initiate the correct ways to move his body with the motion of the dance and the rhythm of the flute music. Younger children from five year old up are paired with older men, their eyes interlocked as they play. In this way, embodied approaches to conflict are sustained and reproduced, enabling what villagers describe as an important moral state of social cohesion. Importantly, theirs is a notion of cohesion as sustained by division and, necessarily, by a degree of conflict. Indeed, on the drive home, Oscar explains that there are always two groups of flute players, even if there is only one *pasante*. In that case, those who support are "are with" one pasante play the pan-flutes in one circle while the rest comprise a second group. Oscar recalls long nights of flute playing as a child, boys gathering into two circles and playing until dawn.

In Sarahuayto, villagers explained that the Virgin Candelaria (by way of her image) had been brought by the landlords from the tropical lowlands Santa Cruz to the village. In many haciendas, as in rural ayllu communities, relations to the saints are understood as fundamentally reciprocal. Indeed, it is through rituals of reciprocity and redistribution that saints, as well as place-based deities like the *pachamama* are understood to regenerate fertility.⁵⁴¹ Here, then, agricultural fertility is understood as a sort of divine gift, and gifs are meant to be shared. Thus, the failure to harvest grain or wastefulness are taken as the failure to receive a gift from the saints.⁵⁴² It is precisely this sort of a moral logic that, as discussed above, introduced such discomfort with the strike. In the present, and following the often violent toppling of an earlier form of hacienda-based religious and political hierarchy, the sources of legitimate authority and their capacities or incapacities to sufficiently attend to the spirits remained in question. Indeed, as we were leaving the fiesta, I remarked to Oscar that Don Angelo had been absent. Earlier, he had

-

⁵⁴¹ See Abercrombie (1998); Allen (1988; Bastien (1978).

⁵⁴² As Lyons' (2006:102) notes of the views of Quechua-speaking former hacienda villagers in Ecuador, "harvesters who let grain be trampled and people who waste good are rejecting God's gift, and God may punish them by leaving them hungry in the future."

noted that Angelo "had to attend." Learning of his absence, Oscar shook his head nervously in disbelief. The failure to gather together, coupled with the unwillingness of certain leaders, particularly unionists like Angelo—who, importantly, had converted to Protestantism—to participate in key festivals of the religious calendar was a bad omen for the year to come, evidence of a hubris that might leave some villagers hungry.

There are a number of ways to interpret such religious events and the importance of hacienda landlords in them. On the one hand, scholars note, they seem to suggest the continuity of some elements of indigenous highland traditions within haciendas. On the other hand, they may suggest the ways that hacienda-based systems of authority and prestige were re-absorbed into and reshaped community life among colono workers. In many cases, it was the landlord or an hacienda administrator who would act as the sponsor or *pasante* of the religious festival. As Lyons notes, the fiestas thus may have served as a sort of safe space for the expression of conflict with landlords. 543 For instance, in ritual battles, known as *pukllay* or "play," hacienda villagers and neighboring communities would ritually invade the town plaza and "fight" on another, often representing or replicating anti-hacienda uprisings. 544 However, relations to landlords in fiestas were not only negative. In many cases, villagers explicitly identified with "their landlord" as a source of belonging and a marker of local space, pointing to the importance of the boss (patron) or lord (amo) as a figure of protection, aid, and beneficence. 545 Thus, authority was linked to forms of deference and violence that were not simply imposed but rather, it seemed, remained salient to forms of community belonging after servitude and which were often embodied in religious festivities like patron saints. In other cases, landlords were also associated with the devil or fat-sucking foreigners (the *pishtaco*), suggesting the difficulty in mapping a singular understanding of hacienda authority among former hacienda laborers. 546 And yet, while attentive to the divergences in ex-workers' memories and the experiences of landlords. scholars seem almost to have studiously avoided the question of how hacienda-based systems of labor-based prestige shape or complicate modes of post-hacienda belonging, a problem that was key to Sarahuayto villagers' accounts of the hacienda system.

Within rural variants of Catholicism, fiesta sponsorship is taken as a crucial practice to attainting full personhood. As a pasante, one embodies a position as a servant of the saints, and saint's day festival begin with ritual visits to the houses of *pasantes* and other sponsors. Such visits comprise one of a range of overlapping practices of reciprocity and exchange, including the sharing of meals, visiting homes, musicians who play in support of their *pasante* who, in turn, provides them with food and drink, gifts such as food given to pasantes to help with fiesta preparations which will be reciprocated in the future. Typically older couples sponsor and those who do not sponsor may be characterized as *gamonales*, rich landlords who have no interest in serving the virgin. Here, then, the fiesta expresses a central dimension of hacienda (and community) life, embodying an exemplary respect for elders. Through such idioms, wealth is imbued with a certain prestige or authority as the source of beneficence that is also religiously inflected, shared by sponsors as authorities and as aids or servants of God. In these

⁵⁴³ Lyons (2006:60); Thurner (1993).

⁵⁴⁴ Lyons (2006:94).

⁵⁴⁵ Indeed, Lyons' (2006:96) account of an Ecuadorian hacienda includes songs in which villagers invoke the force of their boss who will aid them and help them in times of crisis or conflict.

⁵⁴⁶ Weismantel (2001).

⁵⁴⁷ Lyons (2006:106); see also Allen (1988); Colloredo-Mansfeld (1999).

⁵⁴⁸ Lyons (2006:113).

⁵⁴⁹ Lyons (2006:115).

ways, then, sponsorship arises as an "idiom of hierarchy" with often racial connotations, typically associated with whites, the powerful and the wealthy or at the least he politically powerful who, it is understood, God will further abet and reward. 550

However, more than a persistence of tradition as such, I was interested to find that the Candelaria patron saint festival includes forms of ritualized conflict that respond to forms of social fracture themselves generated in part through the region's hacienda past and, in particular, with land reform politics which aligned each of the two moieties more tightly with distinct two labor positions, servants and tenant farmers. In the case of Sarahuayto, then, what stands out is the ways that forms of fracture and stigma related to reform debates and anti-hacienda mobilizations and hinging on the paradoxical position of the servant—as both occupying the lowest, most dependent tier of hacienda labor yet also as the recipient of gifs, favors, and land from landlords—are integrated into ritual life. Thus, Sarahuayto suggests shared attempt to wrestle with questions of prestige-based authority and ritual action in the absence of former landlords and yet in the shadow of the forms of inequality and prestige shaping hacienda life and so problematized by reformers. 551 Thus, while scholars have attended to former hacienda workers' ambivalent experiences of the break-down of systems of ritual reciprocity with landlords, ⁵⁵² the system of *pasante* sponsors suggests the internal transposition of prestige hierarchies that were historically inhabited by hacienda elites. More than a triangle with no top, the hacienda left a set of multiple and interspersed geometries of inequity in which the hacienda persists not only in shaping village hierarchies but also the very terms of difference.

In particular, events at the Candelaria festival suggest the ways that exclusionary sensibilities related to new citizenship models are themselves addressed and elaborated upon in a series of highland ritual forms that scholars have tended to align more with native Andean communities or ayllus than with haciendas. More than a problem of the persistence of indigenous logics, then, or their assimilation or displacement by hacienda systems of authority, the Candelaria festival in Sarahuayto suggests the complex ways that local relations to place and persons have been shaped by hacienda-based rifts between different groups, rifts that are elaborated through religious forms that are themselves never completely independent of this past. Interestingly, the resolution of hacienda-era conflicts concerning land inequities in patron's saints day festivals suggest how reform concerns are integrated into community life and yet dealt with in ways that diverge notably from legal and juridical mechanisms, including land redistribution. As evident in Oscar's nervous acknowledgement of Angelo's absence, a enduring question was how to live appropriately given the absence of earlier hacienda-based authorities and the accompanying the transposition of hacienda hierarchies into village relations and contingent on prior relations of labor and affinity.

Fearful memories of the arrival of revolutionaries as "outsiders" challenge dominant readings of peasant action in terms of a shared rural base and highlight, rather, more ambivalent experiences of abolitionary change. In so doing, I have attended to the more subtle, everyday ways that the hacienda past shapes material relations, bodies, lands, and affects. More than passive ruins or haunting afterlives, the materiality of the hacienda past also constitutes the

⁵⁵⁰ Lyons (2006:116).

Thus, scholars have often made sense of haciendas as shaped by a triangle without a base, that is, forms of authority linking workers to the landlord and precluding forms of collectivity among them. This model has been rightfully critiqued (see Lyons 2006; Thurner 1993), yet what I find is not simply that, with the absence of landlords, what remains is a sort of egalitarian base.

⁵⁵² See Thurner's account of the ways that former workers continued to deliver *camari* gifts to landlords even when the former landlords refused to attend religious festivities (1993:61).

relational ground upon which shared negotiations of past and present unfold. This is particularly evident in a series of ritual practices by which community members of Sarahuayto engage present-day divisions and resentments stemming from what is taken as the hacienda's stubborn enduring. These practices point to the continued importance of the hacienda past, not simply as a political question of land tenure but also as a moral problem concerning the antinomy of servitude and citizenship that, I argue, was popularized in mid-20th century revolutionary politics. Thus, today villagers both bear and address this conflictive past, one etched not only in land tenure patterns and bodies, but also in enduring tensions among villagers and kin. Yet, while refracted by the hacienda history, villagers also seek to engage and remedy this divisive past. In ritual practices and religious festivities, villagers attempt to grapple with and manage lingering divisions stemming not only from differential hacienda-based labor positions but also the evaluative frameworks introduced by mid-century reformist and populist struggles for land and citizenship. This structuring force of the region's history of servitude and agrarian reform, in turn, raises new questions concerning the relationship between bonded histories and the shape and texture of rural political collectivities in Bolivia today.

Conclusion: Paradoxes of Emancipation

A long-term symbol of rural suffering and civilizational backwardsness, hacienda servants and their relations to mestizo landlords took on new significance in 20th century national debates, servitude becoming entwined with broader concerns with racial homogenization, the reproduction of the Bolivian family and nation, and the embodiment of the lack of modern sensibilities—ones that then could be introduced through various and often interlinked projects of hygiene, education, changes in taste and fashion, and the regulation of rural labor. 553 Indeed, as discussed below, in petitions submitted to the government in the 1930s, alliances of indigenous villagers and hacienda colonos of Ayopaya foregrounded the problem of sexual violence on haciendas. 554 While related to the shifting contours of kinship relations following the devastating losses in the Chaco War, renewed concern with women's condition also followed from new feminist and anarchist organizing that drew from mestizaje discourses to configure the virtuous chola, often an indigenous woman who worked the urban home, as the center of a Bolivian miscegenist project. 555 Her rural counterpart, the *mitani*, was seen as the embodiment of the traditional, the dirty, the servile, and the slave—a discourse of subjection which, as discussed in Chapter 1, grew out of Bourbon reformers' concern with the abject suffering of rural Indians. Agrarian modernization promised the displacement of slavery by freedom, a shift central not only to national reform efforts as well as popular insurgencies for land and rights.

By situating 20th and 21st century concerns over the hacienda as outgrowths of earlier colonial and republican debates over servitude, this chapter and the last have sought to historicize contemporary anxieties concerning indigenous autonomy and property rights, shedding light on antecedents that stretch back before the "new discourse of democracy" following WW II or the burgeoning of a "new lexicon" of indigenous rights since the 1980s. 556 However, while concerns with servitude were not altogether new, Bolivia in the early 20th century was remarkable in the dramatic popularization of reformist understandings of particular labor positions as intractably incompatible with democracy and citizenship, eliciting demands for

⁵⁵³ Stephenson (1999:15).

⁵⁵⁴ See Gotkowitz (2007).

⁵⁵⁵ See Stephenson (1999:15).

⁵⁵⁶ See Gotkowitz (2007); Postero (2007:11).

reform that then came to organize rural land claims and demands for rights to a degree unprecedented in the nation's past. Yet, while Bolivia's abolitionary reforms of the mid-20th century aimed to liberate hacienda peasants. I have argued that they also introduced new selfunderstandings and elaborations of collectivity, creating possibilities for new claims as well as new exclusionary sensibilities, stigmatizing a broad class of hacienda laborers as embodiments of an almost inhuman abjection.

As we have seen, a yearning for the liberation of rural indigenous subjects—imagined as a radical rupture from an existing neo-colonial agrarian order by way of rural property rights—as well as widespread disappointment with its absence or delay, continue to shape political claims in former hacienda regions like Ayopaya. Yet so do the darker undersides to these elaborations of incipient citizenship: the stigmatization of hacienda servants in gendered languages that associate domestic laborers with submission, dependency, and betrayal. Thus, while reform languages focused on uprooting rural servitude enabled new imaginaries of liberation and autonomy, providing a legal basis for land claims and calls for the abolition of "personal services," they also conditioned what can be taken as a constitutive set of exclusions premised on the abjection of the servant-slave and the antinomy of modern citizenship and hacienda pongueaje. This stigmatization of hacienda servants in light of their lack of property and their habitation within haciendas—with its accompanying risks of sexual violence—are apparent in views of Ayopaya unionists and indigenous leaders, who like earlier administrators like Viedma align servitude with a depraved moral condition unintelligible only as lack, that is, as evidence of incomplete citizenship and hindered political consciousness. This lack was, in many ways, reinscribed by the land reform which distributed land to the male head of household and which limited land to unmarried women and estate workers.⁵⁵⁷

However, this collapsing of servant and abject slavery was not always so. Indeed, prior to the 1770s their were multiple conceptions of servitude, not only as a "feudal" or "colonial" order but also in terms of the lived dimensions of patronage and authority, one shaped by a sense of virtuous loyalty to and protection by Inca or Spanish lords, practices of absorption into and care by elite landlords and caciques, attempts to escape colonial tribute and mining labor, patterns of mitmaq farming and mobility at odds with nucleated colonial resettlements, and the origins of a new class of Quechua-speaking landlords. 558 In the early colonial period, then, the "dependency" of hacienda servants and reciprocal ties to landowning encomenderos and caciques was treated as a model of tribute and authority. Furthermore, and as suggested by early appeals to the colonial state to uphold the obligations of the earlier Incaic regime, such relations of patronage, aid, and authority were not simply strategies of rule or techniques of subjection. This history, then, suggests a different sensibility of justice, one hinging less on equality than on the obligations and duties aligned with elite status and authority.

These Spanish colonial approaches to the problem of indentured labor and slavery, in turn, have their own distinct juridical antecedents.⁵⁵⁹ The challenge, then, is to let this political

⁵⁵⁷ Gotkowitz (2007:280).

⁵⁵⁸ See Larson 1988.

⁵⁵⁹ Here, care must be taken not to treat as universal a particular (North American) history of slavery. Indeed, as scholars note, while the slave or servant has often been understood as the opposite of the political subject, and indeed who was in the United States denied the right of contract as well as legal self-representation, in Iberian law since the 15th century the category of slave was accompanied by limited legal rights including the right of contract, legal representation, the protection of basic "Christian rights" against unjust abuses, and, importantly, the right to self-purchase. These limited rights stemmed from Iberian legal codes initially developed to regulate relations to between Christians, Jews, and Moors. As scholars note, Iberian legal codes drew both from Roman law and

history destabilize the facile collapsing first of hacienda servitude and slavery, and secondly, of slavery as a universal condition of a subject without rights or claims to answerability. Positioning the condition of servitude (or slavery for that matter) as the effect of the absence of law or of rights obscures the ways that conditions of labor subjection are themselves entangled, enabled, and transformed by histories of law and modern political reform. The challenge then, is to allow these more complex genealogies of authority, violence, and accountability complicate the reification of a condition of slavish dependency, one that now only enables grievances but also obscures the political experiences entwined within conditions of servitude and their aftermath. Rather than seeing such occlusions as accidents of reform, I have suggested that such exclusions be explored as constitutive referents (albeit negative ones) within an emerging political design premised on an increasingly reified opposition between citizenship and servitude. ⁵⁶⁰

And yet, as the Sarahuayto case suggests, the hacienda past operates as more than a legal object or a discursive historical referent. Thus, while rural union leaders saw the hacienda's enduring as evidence of present-day political ills, the problem of the hacienda past also elicited moral practices by which to address this fragmenting past. Relations of alliance and allegiance during the period of anti-hacienda mobilization remained palpable in long-term conflicts between the two village moieties, the higher one identifying itself as having originated from free Aymara communities while the other was said to have stemmed from Quechuas-speaking Inca laborers who had been integrated into haciendas. ⁵⁶¹ I have argued that these rifts be treated as more than historical effects of land disputes or divergent settlement patterns but, rather, drew from and were in part enabled by particular reformist visions premised on the problematic nature of hierarchy and the subjection of domestic workers. In so doing, I have sought to destabilize reified characterizations of peasant and indigenous experience, contrasting the views of tenants and domestic laborers and raising questions about experiences of political change for subjects for whom autonomy did not appear as the only or even most exemplary end of action. Both uncertainty toward the rotting oca and bitterness of union violence against servants highlight the ambivalences of reform in which emancipation was experienced not simply as a condition of liberation but also as the rapid and at times unsettling undoing of an existing order.

Christian conceptions of piety, one that had put particular emphasis on the rights of manumission, rights that were subsequently partially-eroded in the 16th and 17th centuries during the Spanish Inquisition (Klein and Vinson 2007:193).

⁵⁶⁰ This is an argument Gotkowitz's makes when she notes that the MNR agrarian reform "ignored Indian communities' historic grievances" (2007:280). While these reforms may have "ignored" them or contributed to their invisible, I argue, this cannot be reduced simply to a sort of exclusion but rather needs to be located within the shifting logics of citizenship and rights that emerged in that period.

⁵⁶¹ For conflicts between upper and lower moieties and their relationships to free communities and those integrated within hacienda estates, see Thurner (1993:52) and Webster (1991).

Part Two. Sanitizing States

Chapter 3. Paper Rituals

Mr. Arpasi and I sat in his spacious office on the fourth floor of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform in Cochabamba. A lawyer by training, Mr. Arpasi is in his mid-30s and bilingual in Spanish and Quechua. Today he works as a senior official at the land reform office in Cochabamba. At his desk, his fingers interlocked and his hands placed on the wooden desk in front of him, Mr. Arpasi outlined the importance of land "sanitation" or re-titling. First, he noted, it is important because "rural peasants don't use documents to account for property." This, he explained, causes irregularities in titling and limits the government's ability to offer assistance in the case of crop failure. ⁵⁶² Thus, he noted, "As President Morales said while passing out titles, 'The land has to have its identification document just like people do.'" In addition to regularizing land ownership and thereby protecting peasants from drought or crop failure, he noted that titling initiatives also held promise for improving rural relations. As he noted, "Land sanitation is important because it can resolve internal conflicts. With personal property rights, you can clean up a parcel." In accordance with this view then, land with a valid title is "clean," and a clean parcel is free of conflict.

Indeed, Mr. Arpasi noted, land sanitation was crucial in its ability to resolve longstanding disagreements among rural villagers in former hacienda regions. As he noted, "These are conflicts that have continued for years and years and nobody resolved them. There was a lack of initiative. For example, in some places people still don't touch the landlord's lands even though he left years ago. Only after we enter and we tell them that today the land is theirs, will they use the lands. If not, they say, 'How could I? This belongs to the landlord.' They respect this." As these comments suggest, current land reform initiatives have more at stake than simply titling land or securing rationalized property relations, but rather hinge crucially on transforming broader rural relations, particularly what are perceived as the affective debris of the nation's history of agrarian servitude. Current land conflicts, reformers argue, are partial products of earlier hacienda-era conflicts that have been left to fester, persisting unresolved despite earlier and ongoing state agrarian reform initiatives. Thus, for land reform officials the titling process is not simply about governance or legal order but also enfolds broader concerns with decolonization and its ramifications at the level of everyday sensibilities and emotions, such as respect. Here, the notion of "sanitation," while generally a referent to processes of rationalization of order, also assumes moral weight as an antidote to histories of subjection and their entrenched affective orders.

But these reform initiatives do not always work as promised. Indeed, while a central goal in current sanitation efforts is the eradication of rural conflicts premised on lingering respect for landlords, both rural groups and officials note that the reform has actually produced a surge in rural land conflicts. When we spoke, I asked Mr. Arpasi about such conflicts. He nodded, "Yes, it's true. People say that before INRA arrived they did not have a single problem, and now with [the land reform program underway] they have problems. Before, they did not have property rights, they were planting on what they had inherited and they made their own documents. With land sanitation there are problems and conflicts that we have to regulate. For instance, you go and ask a local where his land is, and another person points to the same land. The two are owners. For this reason, we are regulating and perfecting. We make declarations and

-

⁵⁶² At the same time, through land titling useful lands can be distinguished from useless lands. Indeed, a key part of the 2006 legislation is a demand that land serve a "social and economic-social function." Those that do not become "fiscal property," that is, they turn over to the state. Mr.Arpasi explained, through *saneamiento* "We can find fiscal lands, verify their social and economic-social function. We find available and non-available fiscal lands."

we resolve these problems." As these statements suggest, land reform initiatives are not always experienced in the beneficent terms reformers assign them. Put differently, titling efforts promise to cleanse rural relations of inherited conflicts yet at the same time they also seem to exacerbate these conflicts. However, for reform officials like Mr. Rodrigues this fact does not challenge the legitimacy of titling efforts but rather confirms their necessity. Paradoxically, then, surging land conflicts are used to justify rather than challenge the reform, former hacienda regions emerging as spaces of unruly disorder that call forth and legitimate the regulatory force of law.

While Mr. Arpasi's comments might be read as indicative of a particular reformist approach to the hacienda past, the concern with uprooting hacienda-based sensibilities was also evident, even central, to progressive and urban understandings of rural life. From complaints of the longevity of hacienda-based relations of authority and inequity to remarks about the hopeless passivity of villagers in former hacienda zones, urban residents too emphasized the material and affective debris of earlier labor systems and the need to uproot these rural sensibilities. Such views were aptly synthesized in a comment made by André, a progressive sociologist from Cochabamba, when he noted, "Peasants have to lose all the vestiges [vestidos, clothing] of the hacienda in order to construct something else." More than persisting simply in land tenure patterns, then, the hacienda was linked to a broader bodily and emotional state, a sort of relational bearing felt to hinder the forging of a revolutionary present. Indeed, it was precisely this problem of the hacienda past and of purifying inherited agrarian sensibilities that guided the government's contemporary program of land "sanitation," a re-titling program aimed at upending land inequities by way of an aggressive program of rural land titling.

Continuing with my focus on the moral and political entailments of the nation's history of hacienda servitude in present-day Bolivia, this chapter shifts away from village life in Ayopaya to consider how hacienda-based sensibilities arise as targets of urban and reformist projects of political change. In particular, I direct my attention to a current land re-titling initiative, focusing on the ways that agrarian reforms are guided by attempts not only to remap land but also reshape rural relations. Yet, rather than being a perversion or mis-implementation of the law, I argue that this concern with transforming rural relations bears the markings of Bolivia's distinct, and particularly fraught, history of agrarian reform. As discussed in the previous chapter, from the 1880s onward, both reformers and peasants approached property titles as stepping-stones to modern citizenship. 563 By suspending the assumption that land reform is simply about land, then, I diverge sharply from much work concerned primarily with the problem of implementation and its ramifications for Bolivian land redistribution efforts since 2006. Without dismissing the importance of equity or land rights, then, I argue that using equity as a heuristic for making sense of Bolivian agrarian reform assumes precisely what needs to be explained: Why the abiding popular and reformist concern with land as a means to or a measure of citizenship? What political projects cohere around or are marginalized by this focus on land and property rights? What challenges do these more delimited elaborations of indigenous injury and historical harm confront, and with what entailments for indigenous politics in Bolivia today?

I begin by introducing the MAS party's current project of land reform, raising questions about its relationship to the anxieties with propertied personhood and abject servitude so key to early 20th century agrarian reforms. I then trace the formal dimensions of land titling, including

⁵⁶³ For instance, for late 18th century administrators like Francisco de Viedma titled property constituted a key means to modern citizenship that, at the same, solidified a step forward from a miserable condition of servitude (Larson

^{1998).} See my discussion of Viedma's land reform in chapter 1 and my account of 20th century agrarian reform

its attempt to align documents and land not only across space but also time. In the next section, I look at the moral and political stakes of land retitling for agrarian reform officials, stakes related to a broader progressive orientation to the nation's bonded past. In the second half of the chapter, I shift to a critical examination of the limits these bureaucratic efforts confront and produce. In particular, I consider popular challenges to the politics of representation at work in land titling. evident in the ways that rural subjects challenge the alignment of paper and place in order to put forth a broad critique of MAS populism. Finally, I look at the ways that the instabilities of reform are inhabited by other modes of political collectivity and orientations to place, ones that destabilize MAS party claims and land reform efforts but which, at the same time, are also absorbed into rural municipal politics. In concluding, I consider how these slippages challenge familiar scholarly heuristics, including presumed distinctions between state and citizen, model and materiality, law and land. What are the entailments of approaching land as more than property, and what sort of an entity emerges when subjects identify with or assert they "are" the state?⁵⁶⁴ What happens to theories of bureaucracy as mediation when its poles and scales are not secured or already given? And, finally, how are these slippages implicated in broader projects of indigenous governance and postcolonial justice?

Just Documents: Land Sanitation and Community Renewal

Supervised by the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA) and regulated by a 2006 law "Agrarian Policy in the Era of Community Reorganization," ⁵⁶⁵ Bolivia's current land reform program includes a range of initiatives ranging from land titling, legal aid and institutional support for collective land titling, and new legal protections for rural agricultural and domestic workers. While the law is guided by attempts to complete the titling of agrarian lands redistributed in Bolivia's 1953 land reform, it also has more recent antecedents, including a 1996 land reform law expanding sections on community and indigenous land ownership and inaugurating a renewed process of land titling or land "saneamiento." Legislation passed in 1996 initiated a process of land titling and a year later, in 1997, efforts at land sanitation began. 567 Through titling brigades, INRA officials visited rural lands and sought to title land as well as to ensure that land ownership aligned with the redistributive models undergirding the 1953 reform. Following national and international critiques of the reform's marginalization of small-holders and its failure to install gender equality in property ownership, the 1996 law also included changes to a 1979 Family Code encouraging the distribution of titles to women and cotitling to partners or married couples. 568 These efforts were accompanied by "information campaigns" explaining the procedure in Quechua or Aymara languages and encouraged women

⁵⁶⁴ This perception of Evo Morales as a sort of synecdoche for Bolivia's indigenous poor has been crucial to claims that he not only represents but is the public. Thus, MAS party supporters have noted, President Morales "is one of us. We are now part of the state," and, thus, now "We are Presidents" (cited in Postero 2007 and Fabricant 2012).

⁵⁶⁵ These revisions include the Ley de Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria and the Ley No. 3545 de 28 de noviembre de 2006 Ley de Reconducción Comunitaria de la Reforma Agraria.

⁵⁶⁶ Zimmerer (2014:5); see also Urioste (2011).

⁵⁶⁷ Namely, Law 1715, Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria.

⁵⁶⁸ Critics argue that the 1996 INRA Law applied neoliberal policies of land privatization and titling of smallholder lands and indigenous territories, and simultaneously protected large landowners (Zimmerer 2014:5, Kohl 2003). Thus, despite the reform's egalitarian ideals, few people and even less women received titles to redistributed lands (Lastarria-Cornhiel 2007:8). Despite the focus on allotting titles to both men and women, then, it seems in practice only widows and female heads of household received titles (Lastarria-Cornhiel 2007). Following pressure from nongovernmental organizations, in 1996 INRA adapted the 1979 Family Code which encourages the titling of lands to women and co-titling among partners (Lastarria-Cornhiel 2007:9).

to have their names included on titles.⁵⁶⁹ Thus, while the 2006 reform includes new legislation encouraging community land titling, it also follows from the well-worn grooves of earlier reform initiatives not only in 1996 but also in the early 20th century that focused on land titling and the distribution of land to poor peasants and former hacienda farmers.⁵⁷⁰

In this sense, then, the 2006 reforms follow from the legal imaginaries and institutional footprints of the 1953 reform. The 1953 law, La Ley Del Servicio Nacional de la Reforma Agraria, abolished hacienda servitude, landlords' agrarian parcels legally declared the property of their colono tenant farmers. At the same time, the 1953 law established the institution charged with overseeing current land titling, INRA. Today, as discussed below, the land maps and agrarian files collected at that time continue to serve as guides for the current titling process, referents against which to differentiate tenable from untenable land claims. Thus, the bureaucratic and cartographic designs of the 1953 reform establish the framework within which current MAS agrarian reform initiatives unfold. As such, it is perhaps unsurprising that President Morales has struggled to differentiate the current initiative from the 1953 one. In public speeches and interviews. President Morales has framed the current reform as an outgrowth yet ultimately a corrective to the 1953 reform. Thus, he noted in a 2007 interview, "In [the 1950s], our grandfathers, our ancestors rose up, rifle at shoulder, to recover lands held by the patrones." He then went on to clarify that "One of the errors of the [1953] reform was [their] individual titling, the lack of respect for the native community lands." Thus, he noted, in contrast to the earlier reform, "We speak of an agrarian revolution that provides assistance in obtaining land to those people without or with insufficient lands."571

As evident in the President's efforts to distinguish current revolutionary from earlier reformist approaches to land, it take political and discursive work to secure the distinction between current measures and earlier ones. The distinction between reform and revolution has not only guided MAS attempts to distinguish itself from earlier reform governments but also supplied a point of popular critique, evident in challenges to "MAS reformism." Both critiques of reformist and MAS efforts to distinguish current "revolutionary" efforts from those of 1953 suggest the insufficiency of framing current land titling initiatives simply as the institutional culmination of an earlier, incomplete revolution, an analysis that imposes a teleological dimension absent both in MAS government understandings as well as popular perceptions of the state. This is not to say, of course, that the post-2006 reform does not remain imprinted by earlier agrarian reform efforts, indeed it is my crucial claim that they do. However, it is to suggest that this relationship is insufficiently understood simply as one of an extension or continuity with an earlier order.

Indeed, a crucial difference is the fact that the 2006 law, unlike its 1953 counterpart, offers only limited support for the legal break-up of latifundio lands in order to distribute land to poor peasants, a crucial feature of the earlier reform. Proposals to redistribute latifundio and hacienda lands have been a central point of contention in the reform program. Indeed, several months after President Morales' public announcement of an "agrarian revolution," the New

⁵⁶⁹ See Lastarria-Cornhiel (2007:9), Camacho Laguna (2003).

This includes Law 3495, included in Bolivia's new 2009 constitution.

⁵⁷¹ As cited in Fabricant (2012:138).

⁵⁷² This is evident, for instance, in graffiti accompanying the 2006 Land March that read, "Enough with MAS reformism, Maoist Revolution Now!" (Fabricant 2012;152, my translation). ⁵⁷³ See Kay and Urioste (2007).

⁵⁷⁴ For a critique of assertions of continuity since 1953, see Hylton and Thomson (2007).

⁵⁷⁵ For a discussion of latifundio redistribution measures in the 2006 reform, see Fabricant (2012).

Agrarian Reform Law was stalled on the senate floor, facing opposition from the conservative Podemos Party. 576 Stalled reform processes, particularly limited state report for the seizure of latifundio lands, were addressed in Bolivia's Fifth National March for Land and Territory in 2005, which included the proposal of a New Agrarian Reform Law. 577 When a new land reform law was passed in 2006. Morales himself announced the new law, joining the announcement with the publicized distribution of land titles to representatives of sixty indigenous communities. He also promised to title 20 million more hectares in the next five years and vowed to take land from those who had obtained it illegally, including through political ties to former military dictators. When a rain torrent interrupted his speech, Morales added, "The great patrones of the Oriente [the eastern lowlands] are crying. They are hysterically crying because they know that their glory days are over . . . We sill seize their unproductive land and give it to poor campesinos!",578

Yet, as the President's reference to land titles obtained illicitly through ties to former dictators suggests, current reform efforts also respond to political concerns that have surfaced since the 1953 reform. 579 Another notable divergence between the 1953 and post-2006 reforms hinge on the problem of community lands, historically a central point of contention yet marginalized in the 1953 reforms. Indeed, post-2006 land reform efforts have focused renewed attention on the titling of Native Community Lands, a process first initiated in 1996. 580 Scholars have argued that MAS concern with collective lands indicates novel linkages between land rights and ecological and indigenous justice, ones that indicate new modes of "environmental governance." Others have, more cautiously, noted that the dual focus on property formalization and community self-determination has led to new sorts of bureaucratic arrangements, including practices of "internal sanitation" whereby villages and communities can elect to undertake their own land titling review process, aided by reform officials. 583 Finally,

⁵⁷⁶ In the senate, Podemos members attempted to negotiate changes to the proposed law, including a call that land distributed to peasants come from state lands rather than from the expropriation of latifundio lands. See Fabricant

^{(2012:141). 577} The march followed growing grassroots protest between 2000 and 2005, responding to frustration that only 15 million of roughly 107 million hectares had been "sanitized" since 2006 (Fabricant: 138: Assies 2006). Protestors called for a new Community Renewal Law addressing land as well as mechanization, credit, and support for ecomarkets (Fabricant 2012:138; Urioste 2007). In particular, protesting groups' demands for the state seizure of lands, the distribution of tractors to poor peasants, the creation of a rural, agricultural bank to supply lower interest loans, and support for sustainable markets (see Fabricant 2012). ⁵⁷⁸ Cited in Fabricant (2012:140).

⁵⁷⁹ Of course, as discussed below, problems of elite land seizure often parallel and are interpretively positioned as continuities within a longer colonial history of economic exploitation and indigenous land expropriation. See the introduction for a discussion of these perceived continuities as well as the question of land obtained through connection with dictatorial presidents, particularly Hugo Banzer.

580 That is, *Tierras Comunitarias de Origén*, TCOs. However, the recognition of indigenous collectivities has a

much longer legal history, one that goes back to the early colonial period and the extension of Incaic patronage systems premised on the indirect rule of rural highland communities or ayllus (see Larson 1998). For the debates about collective land ownership in the modernizing Bourbon reform period, see also Larson (2004).

Lemos and Agrawal define environmental governance as "interventions [of both state and non-state institutions and actors] aiming at changes in environment-related incentives, knowledge, institutions, decision-making, and behaviors...regulatory processes, mechanisms and organization through which political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes" (2006:208 as cited in Zimmerer 2014:1). 582 That is, "saneamiento interna."

⁵⁸³ As Zimmerer notes, the Bolivian program is identified as participatory "since [land reform officials] hold responsibility principally for surveys and titles of the overall boundaries of community territory while community leaders oversee actual land re-titling" (2014:5).

critics have noted that these reform processes, including that of land sanitation, can marginalize the most vulnerable members of the community. ⁵⁸⁴ Thus, scholars note that while titling efforts attempt to achieve a more equitable and rational configuration of resources, they rarely achieve these equalizing aims.⁵⁸⁵

However, the focus on equity as the judge of the efficacy or inefficacy of recent reform initiatives seems to overlook the relatively novel nature of the very goal of equity, itself often accompanied by the argument that such equity is furthered by collective land ownership. Yet, equity and equal representation are not natural or timeless characteristics of community nor of the specifically Andean ayllu form. Rather, scholars have shown that what often appear as their eminently democratic elements were also partial products of colonial policy, particularly agrarian reform. For instance, as discussed in chapter 1, the model of a spatially bounded and representative "community" was initially instituted by Toledo during his resettlement policy in the late 16th century. 586 These early colonial reforms introduced rotating political leadership and required the spatial reorganization of native groups and mitmag collectivities into geographically bounded territories termed "Indian communities." These efforts were conditioned by reformers' awareness of the risks of too rapidly reorganizing precolonial systems of political order, yet they were also driven by concerns with tribute collection and with securing a less mobile labor base for the colonial silver mines, particularly of Potosí. Later, in the 18th century, colonial policies of "community renewal" were initially implemented in order to encourage bounded if collective land ownership, which reformers argued would protect indigenous groups from the abuses of *encomienda* owners, thereby preventing rural unrest and clamping down on tributary flight. 588

Positioned within this longer arc of agrarian reform, some components of the current land reform program that might otherwise appear as paradoxical are revealed rather as partial products of the nation's reformist past. In regard to the post-2006 agrarian reform, then, scholars have pondered the compatibility of what are taken to be its dual aims: indigenous and ecological justice, on the one hand, and industrial growth and extraction, on the other. 589 According to this line of thought, attempts to integrate indigenous rights while maintaining a focus on development have created hybridized forms of governance or modes of "indigenous development." 590 And yet, this linking of economic rights and political freedom is not novel either in Bolivia or in economic

⁵⁸⁴ In particular, Farthing and Kohl (2012) warn that the internal sanitation process devolves land re-titling to the status quo and further consolidates the interests of more powerful members and leaders of the community. In many cases, the process has led to the titling of previously collective land use areas such as pasturelands as private, individually-owned property. In the process, the poorer or less influential members of communities may lose access to resources that they depend upon, often more so than more influential or wealthy residents who secure their own access or title to larger plots.

⁵⁸⁵ See, among others, Achtenburg 2013, Assies 2009, Benton 1999, BIF 2012, Camacho 2003, Chumacero 2012, Nuñez 2013, Rojas 2012, Solón 1995, Urioste 2001, 2005, 2008, 2009, and Urioste and Barragán 2007.

⁵⁸⁶ See Larson (1998); Ouweneel (2003:92); see also chapter 1. As Ouweneel (2003:92) notes, the ayllu was "established as part of a lordship . . . [but then] became more egalitarian during the Spanish period because of Spanish pressure to rotate its principal office and to secure it within fixed boundaries" (as cited in Lazar 2008:11). See Larson (1998). For an account of the democratic workings of avllu community, see Rivera Cusicanqui (2007). 588 See Larson (1998); Gotkowitz (2007). See also chapter 1.

⁵⁸⁹ See Farthing (2009); see also Andolina, Laurie, and Radcliffe (2009); for a comparison with Ecuador see Walsh (2010). ⁵⁹⁰ Fabricant (2012:129 citing Andolina, Laurie, Radcliffe 2009).

or political theory. ⁵⁹¹ In its focus on fostering agrarian productivity, current reforms heavily echo earlier land reform projects since the 1950s. Indeed, as historians have shown, a concern with "social and economic function"—a key notion in post-1996 sanitation efforts—was a central component of land redistribution schemes since Viedma's era. ⁵⁹² In addition to earlier debates about forced labor and agrarian productivity. Bolivian reformers in the 1940s drew from racialized typologies of biological difference to argue for an "indigenous communitarian ethos" that they took to have been evident in pre-Incaic systems of collective agrarian production. For administrators like Walter Guevara Arze, then, this "ethos" suggested that the state could use land collectivization as a way to draw from racialized dispositions in order to facilitate largescale agricultural production.⁵⁹³

As in the late 19th century, then, mid-20th century land redistribution promised to replace the inefficient use of land on the part of church and private haciendas with the diligent, tireless peasant workers would ensure that rural lands were put to their maximum use. 594 These earlier land debates and reform initiatives hinging on the communitarian dimensions of native Andeans demonstrate that the post-2006 concerns with indigenous collectivity are hardly new. While collective forms have historically arisen as challenges to ideals of modern individualism and citizenship, they were also implemented as mechanisms of governance, raising questions about the limits to positioning current efforts as a break with private property or from liberal or neoliberal strategies of rule. Instead, they raise several questions: How do current MAS reforms, like earlier ones, depend upon and reproduce a somewhat romantic image of Andean community?⁵⁹⁵ At the same time and given new titling initiatives, how might post-2006 efforts point to the collusion of older figures of primordial Andean community with renewed governmental efforts to map and fix rural collectivities and peasant subjects in land and space?

These resonances between the reformist past and present attest to the ways that recent and ongoing agrarian initiatives in Bolivia remain imprinted with the reformist anxieties as well as the legal technologies of earlier colonial and republican administrators. This is evident not only in the promise of community but also in the problem of servitude. As the residue of failed civilizational efforts, landless hacienda workers were from the late 18th century onward increasingly identified as figures of abject suffering and landless subjection produced by colonialism and at odds with nascent ideals of propertied citizenship.⁵⁹⁶ It was this claim, and its accompanying push for property rights, which drove both reform proposals and rural peasant

⁵⁹¹ Rather, the idea that by expanding rights one will consolidate industrial growth can be found both in late colonial land policy debates in Bolivia as well as in the classical economic theories of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, or John Stuart Mill. Furthermore, while Marx's normative assessment of the entailments and paradoxical workings of economic and political freedom challenges that of classical economics, he too assumes a linkage between shifts in productive forms and the emergence of new forms of political subjectivity. ⁵⁹² See Gotkowitz (2007); Jackson (1994); Larson (1998).

⁵⁹³ Here, then, as in the past, reformists' understandings of the nation's Incaic—and even pre-Incaic past—served as a referent for instituting changes in land tenure, constituting a productive extractive model that could secure the shift to modern agriculture where colonial and "feudal" systems had not (Gotkowitz 2007:125).

⁵⁹⁴ See Jackson (1994) for 19th century land reform in Cochabamba. See Sanjines 2004 for the association between indigenous peasants and bodily strength.

⁵⁹⁵ See Gotkowitz (2007).

⁵⁹⁶ Indeed, scholars have argued that the dual republic system resulted in the alienation of Andean peasants from their traditional means of self-sufficiency (Klein 1983), an argument that echoes the Marxist critique of the loss of access to the means of production. For other discussions of the alienating effects of liberalizing reform in the Andean region, see Nash (1992) and Taussig (2010).

organizers in the 1930s, in particular, calls for hacienda abolition and land redistribution. With the 1953 land reform, each *colono* at least in theory was to become an owner of the parcel he had cultivated under the hacienda regime. Each laborer was allotted about 20 square hectares while each landowner could rightfully maintain up to 200 square hectares of arable land (if the property was declared a medium-sized property rather than a *latifundio*). Yet, while midcentury reformers were concerned with converting subjugated workers into property-bearing citizens, they were *not* principally concerned with land equity. The 2006 reform law, in contrast, defines *saneamiento* or land sanitation as a "means by which to overcome unjust, unfair and inequitable land tenure." Seen in this historical light, the current reform—particularly the 2006 Community Renewal Law—is remarkable in its focus on equity as the goal of agrarian reform. At the same time, however, and like earlier reformers, collectivization is treated as means to such equity, a position rooted in ideas of a horizontal, inherently democratic Andean community.

Perceptions of property rights, Andean community, and indigenous justice as entangled remain crucial to current land politics in Bolivia, conditioning reform initiatives but also shaping popular claims. For instance, Bolivia's Landless Peasant Movement (MST)⁶⁰² is organized around appeals for community rights and protections on the part of landless farmers who identify as a "displaced" population. Participants include laborers who migrated, whether voluntarily or by force, from the highlands to the lowlands to work on sugarcane plantations.⁶⁰³ Scholars studying such movements often echo the language undergirding such landless claims, opposing individualized "slave labor" with Andean community and viewing the latter as a model for collaborative farming initiatives.⁶⁰⁴ This assessment draws from earlier debates that saw slavery as paradigmatic of a state of atomized abjection, an argument that skirts the question of the suitability of the notion of "slavery" to describe hacienda labor and, at the same time, downplays

50

⁵⁹⁷ See Gotkowitz (2007).

⁵⁹⁸ The slogan of the 1953 reform, *la tierra es para el que la trabaja* – the land is for he who works it – suggests the ways that notions of work and labor emerged as ethical categories deserving of protection and acknowledgement by the socialist state.

⁵⁹⁹ In addition to these structural inequities between former colonos and landlords, the previous chapter showed how the 1953 reform also reproduced hierarchies among former *colonos* and servants. See chapter 2.

⁶⁰⁰ As discussed in Chapter 1, neither was land the central problem for many migrant populations and domestic laborers (*yanaconas*, *forasteros*, and *mitayos*) in Bolivia, whose legal claims tended to rest on issues of tribute abuse and duties required of authorities and native lords given certain labor arrangements (Larson 1998). Contestations of colonial authority, then, were not initially concerned so much with inequality in the abstract or with free and unfree labor, but rather integrated existing approaches to prestige and patronage in which wealthy elites (including *encomenderos*, *hacendados*, and caciques) were expected and indeed legally required to distribute certain goods, including wool, food, and coca, to their laborers (see Larson 1998).

Of course, if the ideal of equity was related to the spread of rights-based discourses of modern citizenship in the late 18th century and preceding Bolivian independence in 1825, calls for equity were also creatively integrated within popular struggles for land rights and *ayllu* recognition (Gotkowitz 2007; Thomson 2002). A more reified, romantic notion of indigenous collectivity seems to have been further solidified with the growth of Aymara Katarista nationalism in the 1980s, one that attributed highland ayllu communities with all the characteristics that a previous colonial order lacked, including equity, equal representation, and autonomy (see Sanjines 2002). However, while in this earlier moment equity was aligned with equal representation conferred by citizenship and property rights, in the present it is newly tied to equity in land ownership.

⁶⁰² In Spanish, *Movimiento Sin Tierra* or MST.

⁶⁰³ Some scholars, echoing populist and activist discourses, narrate these relations as effects of people's prior manipulation, noting that workers had been "lured to the lowlands" as contract laborers (Fabricant 2012:3). ⁶⁰⁴ Thus, in lowland farming cooperatives, food "was produced, not with individualized slave labor in the fields, but as part of a collective and collaborative process" (Fabricant 2012:122).

the agentive dimensions of regional histories of migration and mobility. ⁶⁰⁵ In addition, assessments of lowland slave subjection absorb the figure of the atomized migrant as a culmination of specifically neoliberal economic and market processes. ⁶⁰⁶ Thus, paradoxically, in appealing to ideals of Andean community and property ownership, MST land claims collapse regional histories of mobility into cases of "displacement" while, at the same time, aligning labor relations not premised on property ownership with slavery and subjection.

Popular land movements, including MST, have been key in pressing for a new agrarian policy since 2006, making agrarian reform a key site of national tension as well as inter-regional political conflict. Such conflicts have led to notable concessions to more conservative interests, including limits to Morales' political term, new departmental autonomy measures including the right of departments to administer their own revenues, and a lack of government support for landless movements who, in some cases previously abetted by INRA, attempted to seize and gain title to "unproductive" latifundio land. In particular, properties with large landholdings were grandfathered in, the limit of 5000 hectares per property not being imposed retroactively. Instead, land re-titling initiatives were to work by redistributing existing state lands, the state refusing to support the seizure of latifundio or hacienda land by peasant unions. And yet, the concern with land needs to be positioned not simply as an effect or expression of indigenous self-realization but also should be explored in its affinities with older,

60

⁶⁰⁵ These historical patterns of mobility and labor migration in Bolivia are addressed, the analysis does not consider how such patterns effect or complicate political languages of landlessness and displacement (2012:22). See Lyons (2006) for a critique of assigning the designation "slavery" to hacienda labor; see Larson (1998) for an account of histories of mobility and migration in Cochabamba in particular; see Shakow (2014) for an account of contemporary relations of migration and mobility in Bolivia; see also my discussion of earlier reformist concerns with servitude and landlessness in chapters 1 and 2.

furthermore, these activist categories are then uncritically integrated into scholarship as heuristic categories rather than empirical constructs (Fabricant 2012:19-21). Thus, after describing workers' accounts of hacienda labor as a condition, Fabricant notes "Indians were turned into slaves through practices such as the mandatory service known as mit'a (a kind of tribute in the form of corvée labor to the Inca empire), while in the Amazon, the *enganche* system (a form of labor through a system of credit and debt) tangled indigenous populations in cycles of debt and dependency" (2012:21). However, these divergent systems are compressed in the analysis into a reified notion of Andean "slave labor" (2012:1, 186, see also 24, 31,168). Such an arguments echoes the logics of mercantile capitalism, namely, the assumption that shifts in productive relations and land practices from in the liberal and later neo-liberal era necessarily create an atomized class of capitalist workers or neoliberal refugees. This image of the atomized effects of liberalizing reform has been crucial to representations of the effects of market expansion in Cochabamba (see Larson 1998). More recently, scholars like Fabricant note that landless workers in Bolivia might be understood as "refugees of neoliberalism" (2012:5 citing Davis 2006). For a discussion of the fragmenting social effects of neoliberal economic orders, see Harvey (2006).

⁶⁰⁷ Indeed, the 2009 constitution reflects a range of concessions to the original agrarian proposal put forth by activists in the 2005 March for Land and Territory, concessions following from widespread opposition to land reform in the lowlands. Opposition to proposals put forth in the 2008 National Constitutional Assembly, particularly land reform proposals, culminated in what the President has called a "civil coup," an attempted overthrow of his administration organized by lowland "autonomy activists" and supporters of the conservative Podemos party. Conservative regional autonomy activists occupied buildings, burning many, and destroyed documents including land documents on the part of pro-peasant NGOs. When the US Ambassador Philip Goldberg flew to meet with one of the leaders of the autonomy movement, Governor Costa, Morales had him expelled from the country. Goldberg's expulsion then elicited more pro-autonomy protests, in which those in Pando were particularly violent, resulting in the death of 15 peasants and the wounding of some 100 MAS supporters (Fabricant 2012:172; see also Gustafson (2008, 2010); Soruco (2011); and Postero (2010).

⁶⁰⁸ See Fabricant (2012:173); see also Postero (2010).

⁶⁰⁹ Garcés (2011:62 cited in Fabricant 2012:174).

⁶¹⁰ Fabricant (2012:174); see also Urioste (2010).

more subjacent understandings of the importance of property both for revolutionary reform and peasant justice. 611

The limited profitability of agriculture today coupled with increasingly levels of urbanization means that the political focus on land and its linkages to indigenous justice needs to be unpacked rather than assumed. While clearly having land is also part of a broader and shared peasant identity, its moral and political stakes are more complex than simple expressions of material need. Indeed, elderly residents in Ayopaya lamented that their children had abandoned them for urban as well as international destinations, a result of the fact that young people today "don't want to farm." There, some of the children and grandchildren of former hacienda workers in Sarahuayto had become active in the MST movement. These children were not entirely without land, but rather had inherited land plots from their parents, who had been allotted land during the 1953 hacienda redistribution. This land had subsequently been subdivided among children, resulting in land shortages. 612 Thus, to explain landlessness as a product of need and a result of displacement overlooks the complexity of the region's labor history, one that demonstrates that land conflicts are products not only of landlessness or post/colonial displacement but also of differential peasant land rights instituted by the 1953 reform.

Such complexities, in turn, require scholars look more critically at the very categories of land and inequity as they guide reform projects and underpin popular political claims. Instead of identifying land claims as results of need or displacement, then, we might explore how current agrarian politics draw from existing analytics of subjectivity and justice, ones produced from within the nation's fraught history both of agrarian reform and popular land movements. ⁶¹³ Arguments that current land claims follow simply from land shortages or material needs or that to be landless is to be akin to a slave not only smooth over the nuances of resistance movements and political claims in Bolivia's past, they also deny the historical presence a group of laborers who did not hold land. 614 Thus, rather than analyze landless politics as a mere re-iteration of ageold indigenous struggles against colonial subjection, we might ask how these continuities are discursively established and on what sort of analytic categories (propertied citizenship, the slave, the egalitarian community) they draw, a question that raises the related problem of the limits to such a politics. Like the property-bearing citizen, the landless subject has also been produced as a legitimate claimant through a specific trajectory of reform. Attending to this trajectory and its contemporary reverberations provides new insight into the moral dimensions of land politics and agrarian reform in present-day Bolivia. Land titles, then, are not only about securing land but also about a broader nationalist and popular attempt to combat victimhood and vulnerability with new model of indigenous citizenship. As such, growing reformist initiatives and popular struggles for land rights belong to a specific historical trajectory of political claims, one marked

⁶¹¹ In contrast, Fabricant argues that the focus on land resulted from people "realizing [it] was perhaps the single most important issue" (2012:3).

⁶¹² For the effects of the division of land through inheritance in the haciendas of Cochabamba and Ayopaya in particular, see Jackson (1994) and Larson (1998).

While certainly a key component of political conflict in the Andean region, land alone was not the only or even necessarily the primary concern guiding indigenous opposition to colonial rule. Indeed, scholars have shown that even struggles over ayllu territories responded to broader issues of authority, legitimacy, and political power, evident in rural conflicts concerning transformations in systems of indirect rule by native lords or *caciques* in the late colonial era (Thomson 2002).

⁶¹⁴ More than the effects of recent land displacement, practices of agricultural and domestic labor on the part of workers who did not formally own land can be traced back to the colonial and, in the case of *vancaconaje*, to the pre-Columbian, Inca era (Larson 1998).

by an increasingly reified portrait of peasant injury.⁶¹⁵ Seeing land politics as a partial translation or winnowing of a range of possible claims raises questions about the instability and contestation of this more delimited elaborations of injury, a question I take up in the next chapter.⁶¹⁶ First, however, let us examine the technologies of agrarian reform, namely, land titles.

Aligning Property in Past and Present: Compressed Cartographies of Reform

After climbing four flights of stairs on my way to the Sanitation Office⁶¹⁷ at the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA) office in Cochabamba, I make my way through the bustle of mostly men in slacks and pressed shirts. I squeeze past women in *pollera* skirts toting toddlers on their backs, noticing that the building is unusually full. People wind there way up and down the stairs, waiting patiently outside fluorescent-lit offices on each floor. When I arrive at the fifth floor, I join Huascar, who works in the land sanitation department, in the office he shares with three other engineers who conduct the topographic review of lands "in saneamiento," that is, undergoing the land sanitation process. In the office, Huascar chats with Germaine, a supervisor who leads "field brigade" teams to rural regions to conduct land surveys. Huascar asks how many brigades he has and he notes that he has thirteen but would like to have twenty. After I join pull up a seat in front of Huascar's computer, he guides me through a step-by-step process of "sanitizing" the land, one that involves aligning 1953 topographic maps with more recent Geographic Information System (GIS) data. In this way, I learn, officials attempt to achieve a more "truthful" representation of land, aligning land maps and land usage, and, thereby, detecting whether the terms of 1953 land redistribution are being upheld in rural forms of property ownership and land use today.

Huascar and I look over the electronic agrarian file together, studying a map of the Chapare region displaying a property that Huascar is currently "sanitizing." On the screen, he reworks a green image with thin black lines and numbers dividing properties and parcels, a grid of ex-hacienda land plots with a blue river winding south among the parcels on the lower half of the screen. Huascar adds coordinates using Global Positioning System (GPS) software and GIS information. Germaine looks on from behind us, explaining that this cartographic work "makes the process more exact and eliminates corruption." Files move through the INRA bureaucracy, information from original *expediente* maps are combined with data garnered through GPS data. Ultimately, the aim of the process is to ensure that survey maps and rural field sites align, in this way securing the alignment of land titles and land plots and distinguishing valid from invalid land claims. These concerns with corruption, irregularity, and invalid land claims respond not only to the problem of the incomplete titling of redistributed hacienda lands following the 1953 reform, but also seek to prevent illicit land grabs, evident in the ubiquity of large land grants

⁶¹⁵ As discussed in chapter 1, reformists' and militant's outcry over servitude and "slavery" were not only shaped by worsening conditions of labor but were also conditioned by shifting assessments of forced labor and hacienda-based exchange. Thus, governmental views of informal labor relations in Bolivia have shifted over time. If relations of agricultural and labor exchange were initially treated as an exemplary model of generous authority in the early colonial era under Toledo, by the late 18th century they were taken by Viedma as evidence of the miseries of hacienda subjection.

⁶¹⁶ As discussed in chapter 2, this portrait of injury not only historically excluded many women, it also muted claims hinged not simply on property or equity of land ownership but also on the broader terms of exchange. In chapters 4 and 5, I look at the ways that Ayopaya villagers contest this more reified portrait of indigenous injury.

⁶¹⁷ In Spanish, Oficina de Saneamiento.

distributed by military dictators from the mid-1970s onward.⁶¹⁸ In this sense, then, the "sanitizing" dimensions of land re-titling include attempts to foreclose corrupt land gifting evident in the nation's dictatorial past.

Huascar clicks away at the key board, narrating for me the complex process by which original cartographic maps from the 1953 agrarian files are overlaid with new data supplied by GIS survey techniques. By overlaying or combining archival maps and new cartographic data, INRA officials are able to ascertain the precise latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of each property. In this way, he explains, he collects the "clerical information" that precedes INRA visits to the property itself. Later, "rural brigades" of INRA workers, trained as engineers, agronomists, lawyers, geographers, and survey technicians, will carry out surveys in various locations in the countryside. This "clerical" dimension occurs here, in the Sanitation Office, where a regional map of the former hacienda property included in the mid-century agrarian file serves as a beginning blueprint for land re-titling efforts. In this regional map, the property is located in regard to regional geologic characteristics including elevation marked by traditional signage (rings or lines to mark elevation grade), rivers and the boundaries of properties (including ex-haciendas, ex-latifundios, and mid-size properties or *propiedades medianas*) each distinguished from other lands with bold lines indicating borders. The map also includes a key linking numbers in the map to the names of various property-owners, thereby delineating the property of landlords as well as the plots and parcels worked by hacienda *colonos* or tenant farmers. In the case of hacienda workers, the parcels mark the lands each peasant worked and that, following the 1953 land reform, were to become the titled property of the former colono worker.

The first step is to overlay the original topographic map from the older agrarian file (expediente agrario) with a more recent survey map of plots "sanitized" by INRA. As noted above, reform officials used the term sano or saneado in multiple ways. In regard to the 1953 land reform maps, sanitized lands mean lands in which engineers, cartographers, and land reform officials have mapped ex-haciendas and divided the lands into parcels worked by each exlaborer. Even where titles were not distributed, this process was understood to have clarified land use and in this way laid out the groundwork for land redistribution. Here, the hand-drawn original map, damaged and showing signs of wear in the creases, becomes the backdrop for a computer generated outline, in white, of the periphery of the ex-hacienda property and individual plots allotted to each ex-hacienda worker (colono) and servant. Finally, in the third stage, the antiquated map with an overlay of the property taken from prior INRA surveys is aligned with miniaturized versions of individual plot maps from the original land reform file. In this way, the process of overlaying multiple maps brings together spatial knowledges across time and scale. Integrating this information, the point of view of the map seems to move outward, offering a more abstract and all-inclusive image from above.

Yet, while offering a more distant and all-inclusive picture, the new map also integrates photographs of the original cartographic maps, in this way absorbing the granular detail from existing individual plot maps (themselves derived from aerial photographs). In the fourth stage, the ground of the image shifts, the original topographic map replaced by an ortho-photographic

⁶¹⁸ On political patronage and land gifting to families aligned with military dictators, see Fabricant (2012); Urioste (2003, 2006); Soruco, Plata and Medeiros (2008); and Soruco (2011). See also my discussion of land ownership and the Banzer dictatorship in the introduction.

⁶¹⁹ This is akin to what Foucault (1995:206), drawing from Bentham, calls the "panopticon" and what Michel de Certeau (2011) describes as the "bird's eye view" logics of cartography.

image derived using GIS technology. Derived from an aerial photograph, an ortho-photograph adjusts for topographic relief, lens distortion and camera tilt. By way of uniform scale, the photograph allows for a measure of "true distance." As enfolded in the very meaning of the term "ortho-photograph," this image promises to get as close as possible to truth, attempting to approximate an accurate representation of the Earth's surface. For land reform officials, the promises of these new technologies were to counter the imprecision of earlier methods, that is, of manual survey techniques and hand-drawn maps used in the post-1953 titling process. In this way, they argued, new survey and global information technologies also promise to counter corruption. Indeed, in the 1950s, it was common for hacienda landlords to bribe engineers into misrepresenting the size of hacienda estates and of individual plots. By making the hacienda appear smaller, for instance, arguments that it was a medium-sized property rather than a latifundio could more easily be upheld. On the other hand, inflating its size might result in large land plots being maintained by the landlord and his or her family or for arguments that former tenants' plots had been smaller than the lands they sought to title. The topographic misrepresentation or distortion of land, then, was felt to enfold and enable corruption.

After aligning the earlier maps drawn up by mid-century land reform surveyors, these are then superimposed by an aerial image or ortho-photograph derived through GIS, the GIS data then combined with recent survey information obtained by way of INRA officials or "field workers." While this process at large is described as of sanitation, in the phrase "sanitized lands" same term also connotes land that has been redistributed from a prior hacienda or latifundio. Finally, and as the final stage of the process, the topographic map is delimited to a discrete representation of the property, no longer accompanied by the rest of the landscape, with its geologic features, but rather by longitude and latitude lines. At this point the referents of the map shift, no longer centered on the property but rather placed within a global imaginary of space, being tilted appropriately so that north corresponds with the top of the image, and south with the bottom of the map. The granular details of the ortho-photograph, used to align the earlier map and the recent survey data, now fall away. The land within the property is rendered uniform, represented as beige, and beyond the periphery of the property is undifferentiated white, except for three rivers, colored blue, that weave around the property boundary. Subdivided lands, that is, plots redistributed by the 1953 reform, are spatially organized through a series of linked points on the map each of which correspond to a number on a list of the present-day owners.

Next, the GIS data is enriched by use of GPS technology. In particular, GPS technology aids reform officials to detect any geologic changes since the survey data was taken in 2005. As Huascar explained, ortho-photographs are inaccurate at times due to the earth's curvature as well as geologic changes in altitude. He shows me an image of a river, but then notes that the GIS data is inaccurate, as the river has changed its course. He explains, "The river changed its course and with it, all the land was reconfigured. As a result, it is difficult to account for these [transformed geologic] conditions, the topography. This is the situation." Thus, topographic changes require old data be supplanted by new, in this way attending to shifting geologies and their challenges to 1953 property lines. In particular, shifting river courses create islets that

⁶²⁰ According to the Oxford Dictionary, the term "orthophotograph" was coined in the 1950s and refers to "An image produced optically or electronically from aerial photographs by eliminating distortions of angles and scales so as to give a result corresponding to a planimetric map."

⁶²¹ Indeed, in my work in the INRA archive, discussed in chapter 4, I came across a number of complaints of corruption, accusations against landlords as well as union leaders for having bribed engineers and surveyors to misrepresent ex-hacienda properties in order to facilitate larger property endowments in the course of the implementation of the 1953 reform.

cannot be farmed and thus, which are not appropriate to title. In these cases, Huascar explained, you "have to do an analysis," that is, the land has to be reviewed by officials and possibly retitled. Yet, he noted, by and large they attempt to maintain existing borders, giving title to land that has "already been sanitized," that is, that was redistributed after 1953. Such plots, according to Huascar, range from about 7 to 25 square meters per person, an estimate that itself suggests the problem of the subdivision of earlier hacienda plots which, in accordance with the 1953 reform, were usually about 25 square meters per person.

At its heart, then, sanitation rests on attempts to align multiple maps and then make that compressed image correspond accurately to the land itself. As Huascar noted as she guided me through this process on his computer, "I'm super-imposing the sanitized map with the earlier one." Furthermore, they recognize that this alignment provides the basis for differentiating legitimate from illegitimate claims. Thus, after he finished the alignment between the original *expediente* map and the GIS data, the next step is to write up an *informe* or report. In the report, the sanitation official indicates "whether the current beneficiaries coincide with the initial beneficiaries" or, in other cases, whether the land is a shared use area or a collectively titled property. In this way, he notes, he is able to determine whether the people using the land today correspond with the "actual beneficiaries" of the earlier 1953 reform. Thus, land ownership is contingent upon alignment with land reform maps as the source of legitimate titles. Where current land use and superimposed agrarian map do not align, a process of investigation begins to ascertain the sources of their divergence.

After the superimposition of topographical data and its enrichment with aerial photographs, the survey maps are understood as "sanitized." Interestingly, while the process itself unfolds through the overlaying of cartographic forms over time, the final product is understood as "sanitized" and, to Huascar's mind, now is differentiated from the original. Thus, when I asked if they combine the data from the earlier and current maps, as seemed to be patently the case through the transposition of maps I had just witnessed, Huascar was adamant that they were distinct. Thus, he clarified, "We differentiate the two." In the process, drawn geologic characteristics like rivers are the replaced by legend map symbols. Thus, Huascar added, "See, this is a river that has been digitized. So too with these contour lines." Thus, in the final moment of overlay, the map itself disappears even as a backdrop and a more abstract, decontextualized representation of spatial coordinates along longitudinal and latitudinal axes. It is this differentiated, "sanitized map" that is then supplied to the owner of the land and used as a further guide for property relations, or what Huascar called as an "archive" for the property owner. After this process of sanitization or cartographic overlay, the earlier titles are annulled.

Looking carefully at the land sanitation process and its historical underpinnings forces a re-evaluation of reified conceptions of bureaucratic practice as well assumptions of the invisibility of the form of mediation. While documents are often aligned with a distinctly modern node of technocratic power that works by imposing "the line" or distinction between spaces and persons, engineers like Huascar are themselves very much aware of challenges or limits to documentary representation. For instance, the day before Huascar had explained that some original *expediente* maps were scaled inaccurately and for this reason had had to be redrawn. I now asked how such cartographic problems effect land re-titling. He replied, "This is the problem of precision. In some cases there were problems in the management of [survey]

128

⁶²² Here, my formulation of and complication of "the line" draws from Carter's (2009:4) formulation, "The line son the map, the outlines on the urban plan, may pose as the minimalist representations of pure ideas, but they contain within them a history of earlier passages."

equipment, not in all cases, but in some." So, I asked, are most of the maps accurate? "All of them are," he paused, then added, "almost well-done. They are all right. I don't wanted to say that they are badly done, but yes in some cases there were [inaccurate]. In these cases, from what I've seen, you have to do away with the folders altogether. In these cases, there is a kind of 'displacement.' If the maps do not coincide, we once again have to do away with them. In this case, a new land survey has to be approved." But this only occurs rarely.

Thus, while documents are often taken as erasing existing patterns of human action and movement. 624 in Bolivia survey techniques on the part of agrarian reform officials have also been concerned with correctly annotating and marking the human geographies of agrarian labor and land use. These mapping projects are eminently historical, in the dual sense introduced in chapter 2; that is, they arise as sedimentations of former reform processes while at the same time attempting to address and transform those very antecedents or coordinates. In its final product, new GIS and GPS-based mapping practices do culminate in the partial erasure of the process of mediation (i.e. their absorption of earlier topographic data from 1953 maps). And yet, clearly INRA sanitation officials engage the problem of the paper medium, of multiple cartographic representations, and the entailments of their translation into an electronic form. This accumulatory relation to earlier survey knowledges highlights the limits to theorizing the electronic or the global as a rupture from the sedimented logics of the modern archive. 625 In this case, rather than being "immediated," the materiality of the mediating form is itself a fraught site of political and historical reflection on the part of land reform officials. 626 The imposition of a line, whether through the mapping or the subsequent titling of those sanitized lands, is important not only as means of governmental knowledge, including efforts to regulate, tax, and gather information about persons and property, but also as a part of the political promise of earlier hacienda redistribution efforts. To institute the line, to make former colono families long-awaited owners of their agrarian plots, was to intercept in what reformers understood as the indeterminate and tragically expansive property claims of a neo-colonial elite.

Thus, Huascar's awareness of the failures of documentary forms, that is, the non-correspondence between maps and land, was crucially linked to his awareness of the importance of land maps not only as representations but also as models for reform. In the case of variation between different maps or between maps and survey data, an attempt is made to remedy the disjuncture. As Huascar noted, the sanitation office is charged with verifying field data that is, comparing it to earlier archival as well as new global information systems information. As he put it, "What I do is to verify, to ask 'How is this?' 'Is it true what they are telling me?' Are the superimposed graphics and ortho-photos lining up? If it is not true, then I ask, "What happened here?'" In the case of a divergence, he calls the union leader and asks "Why this variation?" If the union leader agrees, the sanitation process is redone and the union leader provided a new survey map which reflects changes that the leader can accept or reject. Thus, he concluded "In *el campo* [INRA officials] must show them the graphics, the new map." The importance of getting a map right was linked to ensuring the fairness of land redistribution. Indeed, Huascar went so far as to frame this work as one of distinguishing what is "true" from what is not. Thus, while Huascar emphasized the problem of cartographic representation and material truth, this labor was

⁶²³ The term he used was *replanteo*, which has no direct translation in English but refers to the act of conducting a new land survey. A more literal translation would be re-planting.

⁶²⁴ See Carter (2009).

⁶²⁵ See Povinelli (2011); Riles (2006); see also Derrida (1996).

⁶²⁶ See Mazzarella (2006) for the politics of immediation. See Hull (2012) for the materiality of mediation.

located within a moral project of uprooting corruption and of empowering rural peasants, particularly former *colonos*, by confirming the legal status of redistributed land.

As suggested in the interplay between INRA officials and rural community leaders and unionists, this process is not simply one of state imposition but rather relies on a complex convergence of authorities who come both from government institutions and rural villages. Thus, before the hand-drawn maps in the 1953 agrarian files are replaced with the new "sanitized" files, the new map has to be "validated." The process of validation is carried out by a "Sanitation Committee" comprised of five people from the community or village in question. Of course, actual land practices do not always follow from these norms. As Huascar himself noted, "people work the land by use and custom." Following traditional practices, then, people "more or less reach an internal agreement about who will work it." Thus, it would be incorrect to say that INRA technicians were ignorant of the limits to their own representative logics; nor were they unaware of the fragility or tenuousness of the title as a determinant of actual land relations. Indeed, it was in part a result of concern with the limits to paper—its vulnerability to damage and dissolution as well as corruption by way of disappeared files—that underpinned reformers' decision to shift from paper to electronic survey systems.

Sanitation officials' concerns with the limits to their representation technologies coupled with their awareness of the lived consequences of these representation forms challenge dominant approaches to the study of documents, including their place in modern bureaucracy. 628 These include analyses of bureaucratic forms as mechanisms of state power or arguments that cartographic forms displace existing relations or seek to introduce a landscape bereft of human subjects. The sanitation process works by drawing from the authority of earlier files and documents, including cadastral surveys, topographic land maps, and lists of workers and land plots. To be sure, the maps erase subjects insofar as they include only land parcels labeled by number, each number corresponding with hacienda colono and soon-to-be property owner, but each plot is in a sense also an etching of a particular history of labor, a fact that destabilizes arguments that land and people are somehow analytically disentwined in the course of mapping projects. Of course, land sanitation efforts are not external but rather unfold alongside and within governmental institutions' efforts to fix and adhere land to particular persons or groups and to delimit the boundaries both between property and persons. And yet, the ways this fixing occurs and the moral stakes attributed to it unsteady assumptions that documents, or bureaucratic work, are simply handmaidens of modern governance.

Thus, while it is tempting to see the title—or sanitized survey map—as a displacement or disavowal of earlier forms, including relations of labor, the material and affective dimensions of mediatory practices in the land reform archive complicate this notion of rupture, in this regard

The Spanish phrase, echoing the protection of traditional practices in the constitution, "por usos y costumbres." Studies of bureaucracy have tended to emphasize the rationality of documentary practices (Weber 1978). As Matthew Hull notes, this has often resulted in "looking through rather than at paper" (2012:12). Instead, my work builds from recent work exploring the materiality of bureaucracy, including documents are more than a medium through which the state functions or implements policy (Gupta 2012; Hull 2012; Riles 2006). Yet, in contrast to recent work on the material dimensions of cartographic practices, I challenge the facile collapsing of maps with colonial expansion that characterize landscapes as bereft of human inhabitants. For instance, Paul Carter (2009:4) notes, "Mediating ideal forms and their design on the world are bodies—human bodies, atmospheric bodies and the movement forms they constantly assume and leave behind. Yet the plans, the maps—and the future history they inaugurate, of colonization, of territorialisation, and the authorization of new political and social orders—entirely discounts them."

paralleling the broader challenges facing state promises of revolutionary change. ⁶²⁹ Land reform efforts remain encumbered not only by prior administrative forms, such as 1953 agrarian files, but also by earlier state anxieties with the problem of elite corruption and the accompanying victimization of indigenous groups. ⁶³⁰ In the process, titles arises a particular technology of revolutionary governance, yet one that is bound up both in earlier relations of labor as well as mid-century reformist concerns with the linking of property and citizenship. This boundedness imbues the image with a moral dimension, distorted representation aligned with corrupt land expropriation. While sanitation processes aid governmental regulation and reform, then, these historical encumbrances challenge the notion that documents work the same way everywhere or that their rationalities are somehow determined by their mediating, paper form.

"I Don't Know What You Need in Your Own House": Peasants as Machines and Children As discussed earlier, for land reform officials like Mr. Arpasi the stakes of land reform include not only the rationalization and titling of land, with accompanying possibilities of government protection and aid, but also the eradication of lingering conflicts in former hacienda regions. In particular, reform officials blamed rural peasant abjection on the continued prevalence of outdated notions of respect and authority stemming from the hacienda past. At the same time, they implied that border conflicts were results of amorphous and under-defined systems of rural property use evidenced in the problem of multiple owners of one parcel of land. Here, officials linked rural conflicts and land shortages to entrenched relations of servitude, outmoded ways of relating both to land as well as to authority. In this way, villagers in former hacienda regions were characterized as lacking the critical tools with which to consciously recognize and thereby ameliorate their social condition. Both of these problems—rural vulnerability and festering land conflicts—were to be remedied by way of land titling, a process that promised to install a shift not only in land tenure relations but also in ways of thinking and feeling. Titles, it was thought, would transport rural life from entrenched sentiments of "respect" for former landlords toward an awareness of the benefits of self-determination.

Yet, it seemed rural groups did not always accept the gift of self-determination. Indeed, recent reform initiatives, in Ayopaya as elsewhere, had not only displaced outdated sensibilities of place but had also fueled opposition to the state. Reform officials, including Mr. Arpasi, explicitly recognized this problem reform officials, who remarked that reform efforts had been complicated by rural "mistrust" toward the INRA institute. When we spoke, I asked whether he thought this mistrust stemmed from misinformation or from peasants' earlier experiences of being deceived by the state. He answered, defensively, "It comes from a lack of information. Sometimes we are [in rural parts] explaining to them and they do not understand. It is like they are in the first grade. They don't understand. So we have to explain four times, in different ways, with examples. And afterwards, they still don't understand. It's like this. (He gestured at the

_

⁶³¹ In Spanish, desconfianza.

⁶²⁹ Early understandings of mediation as a sort of "aufhebung" or overcoming can be found in the work of G.W.F Hegel (1807). While Hegel was attentive to the materiality of mediation, subsequent scholars have not always been. 630 My notion of encumbrance parallels Paul Carter's point that "The lining, which is simultaneously the rhythmic geography underwriting the map and the vernacular choreography of other bodies [...] is stitched into the garment of representation, but it does not adhere to it completely; there are gaps between the stitches, the hem of the lining is puckered, and the body of it may billow out like a shadow" (2009:14). While Carter emphasizes the gaps between the adhering of representation to its movement histories, I approach this relation conversely, to ask how this partial attachment challenges characterizations of the rationality of documents as unsoiled by their movement histories or the accompanying promise of revolutionary rupture from the reformist past.

blank screen of his computer.) Blank. Nothing. So, because of this, it is difficult. They belong to another generation. In other places it is not so much like this. Their children have already left to study in the city. They say "Papiy, I want to do this" (retitle the land) and it's done. But in other cases no. We have to enter, speaking Quechua, in order to explain."" Thus, despite the stated aims of land re-titling and regularizing land use, the everyday labor of INRA officials also enfolds pedantic exercises aimed at making the people "understand." The people, that, rural folk, must be made to understand that there is no longer a landlord, that things have changed, but peasants, like blank computer screens or uneducated children, do not understand.

It was not the first time I had heard MAS state officials, including those of rural background, liken rural peasants to children. Oscar, who I introduced in chapter 2, works in Laraya's municipal government. When we spoke, he explained that peasants in Ayopaya were limited by a clientelist approach to development shaped by the earlier Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), ⁶³² a populist party founded in the 1970s which, like Juan Perón in Argentina, established personal ties to citizens and, at the same time, argued for leaders' redistributive obligations to citizens. 633 Oscar argued that the MIR had ingrained peasants with a preoccupation with "having" (tener). Following this mindset, peasants today pester the state for development projects yet lack "a vision of how [the project] will benefit them." As Oscar noted, "They say 'I want, I want,' like a child. This seems terribly spoiled, like children."634 Oscar described his frustrated attempts to change this pattern of thought, one that should be understood in light of his position as a coordinator of local development projects. He explained, "It is difficult to change this mentality because I have to plant and propose some ideas [so that they think about] how they can change their form of life, of organization." Like Mr. Arpasi, then, Oscar located the sources of obstructed development in the sensibilities and lacking political consciousness of rural, former hacienda peasants. In particular, he argued that such patterns stemmed from paternalistic logics of redistribution and aid. He explained that rural groups face corruption because they lack a more militant political education. Thus, he noted, "You go to the masses [bases] and if they are not politically well-armed the bureaucrat will distort reality. But other sectors are well-educated politically, that is, they know where they want to advance to, and so they are in opposition [to the state]." Thus, for Oscar, avoiding being manipulated by corrupt bureaucrats required a form of "well-armed" political organization, an aim undergirding efforts at instating a more mature consciousness through rural development work and political training.

While Oscar blamed this child-like focus on handouts on military clientelism, reform officials at INRA blamed it on the trappings of the hacienda past. Thus, Mr. Arpasi described the

⁶³² In Spanish, Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria.

finded, scholars have suggested that MIR campaigns belonged to a sort of redistributive populism in which the party appealed to voter precisely based on its claims to provide a direct, unmediated and affective relationship to political leaders (Lazar 2008:94). Yet, scholars have challenged the degree to which clients are passive or uninformed, underlining rather the active ways that citizens engage populist political parties and the moral understandings of obligation that, particularly in the Andes, suggest that what is involved is a much more direct, emotional relationship to patrons marked by a sense of reciprocal duty in which citizens support politicians and politicians attain resources and embody generosity (Lazar 2008:105). Political patrons are often at the same time known as generous persons in the community, a generosity often embodied in acts of godparenting. See my discussion of post-hacienda patronage in chapter 3. I discuss the ways patronage shapes popular relations to political parties in chapter 6.

⁶³⁴ Given Oscar's critique of paternalism, the comparison of peasants to children was somewhat inconsistent, confirming rather than challenging the kinship logics of state paternalism. It should be noted here that the category of Ayopaya peasant Oscar so renounced included his own family, suggesting the generational dynamics at work the stigmatization of former hacienda laborers (see chapter 2).

frustration reform officials face as they attempt to institutionalize more "sanitized" relations in rural, former hacienda regions. One such frustration stemmed from elderly, former hacienda workers' continued respect for landlords. As he explained, "It is not just that the *patrones* [or landowners] left. People come here and say 'This *patron* did this,' and we say 'But there are no *patrones* anymore.' It's not the *patron* but rather his son or grandson, but people [continue to] think like this." Thus, new titles promise to uproot entrenched relations among former landlords and hacienda workers, enabling a shift both in rural relations among subjects and to lands. Scholars have gone so far as to describe sanitation as a process of "healing," and yet, while this may be a crucial promise on the part of reform officials, it is not always upheld in rural experiences. 635

Here, then, the promises of sanitation seem to be twofold. First, there was a sense of bureaucratic rationality linked to the correspondence between titles and land. Secondly, however, there was a notion of moral purity or healthfulness facilitated by the absence of conflict and corruption and thus, presumably, a stronger and more robust mode of rural collectivity. Indeed, when we spoke and knowing of my fluency in Quechua, Mr. Arpasi playfully noted that the goal of land sanitation is to make the land "*chuya*," a Quechua term associated with a sense of moral purity and cleanliness. These moral associations were not limited to Quechua. Bolivians commonly use the term "sano" to refer not only to a state of health or cleanliness but also to an emotional condition marked by upright or uncontaminated relationships and often contrasted with negative emotions like greed, jealousy, or envy. Thus, while sanitation could be taken as an instance of broader neoliberal ideals of heightened regulation and efficiency, it also seemed to enfold a broader sense of moral purpose, one related on long-term efforts to displace perilous attachments based on lingering ties to or "respect" for landlords. 636

These distributions of affect and attachment were understood as generational. Thus, Mr. Arpasi felt that old age was partly to blame for stalled land reform efforts. As he discussed rural opposition to reform, he implied that this was predominately limited to an older generation who, "like children" do not understand the benefits of land titling. Thus, he noted, of los viejos in the countryside, "They are of another generation, of another time." Yet, by describing land conflicts and opposition to land re-titling as results of misinformation, old age, or continued oppression, the experiences of peasants in former hacienda regions are depoliticized. Furthermore, these arguments of false consciousness work to further legitimize reformist interventions, supporting state effort to transform rural sensibilities through educational programs as well as political training, one that often draws from philanthropic methods of "capacitating" [capacitación] subjects through workshops. The language of "capacitating" is itself revealing, suggesting that life without access to a rights-based political language constitutes a state of incapacity or misery. Like cartographic processes of sanitation, then, land titling was sustained by a broad faith in documents not only to deliver transparency but also to transform existing material relations. Much like earlier land titling laws, such as the 1874 "Law of Unchaining the Peasant Communities," in the present too land titles are attributed with a

⁶³⁵ For an account of the "healing" dimensions of Bolivian land retitling, see Valdivia (2010). For a discussion of the ideal of transparency is *saneamiento*, see Fabricant (2012) and Valdivia (2011).

⁶³⁶ On the notion of respect for Quechua-speaking former hacienda workers in Ecuador, see Lyons (2006).
637 It is crucial, here, to keep in mind that Mr.Arpasi's parents were hacienda laborers, a detail he told me the first time we met, and that he comes from a Quechua-speaking family. The fractures of revolutionary change are not reducible to divisions of class or race, but rather are more intimate affairs that unfold within families and across generations.

distinctly liberating as well as civilizing force, securing the end of subjection and thereby, facilitating national progress.⁶³⁸

It was by way of this transformation that rural life was to be improved, not least because, officials argued, these measures would increase agrarian output. Thus, Mr. Arpasi noted, paraphrasing the President, "As the president says, 'land is like a person, you have to feed it. If you give it better food, it works better, it produces more." By way of heightened regulation achieved by land re-retitling, officials hope to be able to detect lands that are not being productively farmed. Indeed, a key part of the 2006 legislation is a demand that land serve a "social and economic-social function." Those lands that do not shall become "fiscal property," that is, they are turned over to the state. Lands claimed by INRA or the state then turn over to people "without land, or people with very small parcels." In this way, Mr. Arpasi noted, land retitling can also entail and enable the redistribution of lands and the production not only of a more productive but also a more egalitarian rural land order. Mr. Arpasi's concern with agrarian security should be located within a broader context of mounting political movements for "food sovereignty" in Bolivia, reflected in Article 16 of the new constitution which guarantees all people the right to food and water and notes the state's obligation to secure agrarian security by providing for subsistence needs. 639 And yet, anxieties with rural agrarian orders and property titles are by no means new to Bolivia, and neither are they limited to state reformers.

Indeed, concerns with transforming hacienda-based sensibilities were widespread among progressive city-folk in Cochabamba. Of course, concern with the agrarian past itself emerged out of specific familial orientations to the agrarian system, as many progressive intellectuals and university-trained agronomists belong to former landowning families. Indeed, André, the progressive sociologist discussed earlier, was the son of a man who had owned vast swaths of hacienda land in Ayopaya, infamous among villagers as one of the cruelest landlords. These days, André and his sister Margaret were largely estranged from the rest of their family, having severed ties with other kin and finding work as government employees and self-ascribed agents of the indigenous cause. Margaret's sense of repulsion and estrangement from this familial past were so strong that she refused to discuss Ayopaya's hacienda past with me, noting, "I'm opposed to this history. I do not want to recover it, nor do I care to speak about it." On the one hand, her comments capture a sophisticated critique of the limits to a romantic politics of historical recuperation, a position that was particularly remarkable as she is employed in a governmental archive. And yet, her statement betrays as assumption that history is only engaged if one chooses to do so. This sense of a safe distance from the past was very different from the sensibilities of rural villagers in Sarahuayto, discussed in chapter 5, whose reconciliatory engagements with the past were perceived less as matters of will than of moral necessity. Put differently, for rural subjects, the hacienda past arose as a sort of everyday force whose proximate presence foreclosed facile attempts or calls for its overcoming. Paradoxically, then,

⁶³⁸ Of course, that the earlier distribution of property titles had not immediately elicited a shift to more rationalized market relations is itself noteworthy, challenging arguments of capitalism's inevitably transformative workings. Namely, while 19th century reformers assumed that property titles would naturally subject rural groups to the "civilizing influence of the market," current reformers are preoccupied with the negative side of the process, that is, with disabling or suspending other place-based attachments and historical entwinements (Harris 1989:239; see also Gotkowitz 2007). For the presumed teleology of capitalism evident in analyses of the money form, see Parry and Block (1989).

⁶³⁹ See Fabricant (2012:177).

progressive and reformist sensibilities could also foreclose a more direct engagement with the hacienda past. ⁶⁴⁰

As evident in Mr. Arpasi's remarks, this more estranged stance toward the nation's bonded past was not delimited to the urban kin of former hacienda landlords. Rather, many Quechua and Aymara-speaking researchers, pro-indigenous activists, intellectuals, and government workers echoed this understanding of the hacienda as an inhibiting force counter not only to political change but also to historical awareness. For instance, a Quechua-speaking sociologist sympathetic to national labor politics was alarmed to find that, in the northern part of Ayopaya, some villagers have fond memories of former landlords. This led him to conclude that in former hacienda regions, "people misrecognize their past." ⁶⁴¹ This view was echoed by another acquaintance, a Quechua-speaking musician, who noted that in Ayopaya people "lack a historical consciousness." Here then, more ambivalent relations to the agrarian past were intelligible only as a form of lack or political misrecognition. In contrast, to be "historical" implied both a limited temporal frame and a specific orientation to the past. As discussed in chapter 2, such occlusions stem in part from earlier nationalist citizenship projects, including mid-century formulations of a militant peasant subject that equated other modes of historical or political orientations with a sort of pre-awakened, child-like consciousness.

In these ways, current land reform efforts not only unfold within but also seem to absorb some of the broader currents of progressive nationalist thought about the hacienda. Indeed, while INRA officials certainly would have challenged André's dismissive account of rural resentment toward former landlords, they would have agreed with him that the enduring nature of hacienda-based sensibilities is of crucial concern and that this problem must be resolved by way of state reform. Here, as for Viedma, popular assessments of hacienda entrenchment in the countryside, particularly in Ayopaya, both conditioned and fueled reform initiatives. Today, arguments that untitled lands result from state absence not only naturalizes and legitimates governmental interventions, it also overlooks the region's history of anti-hacienda mobilization since the 1930s, discussed in the previous chapter. At the same time, such accounts deny the possibility that failed land re-titling might result from opposition to the reformist state or from the limits to reformist sensibilities rather than following naturally from entrenched hacienda sensibilities. 644

Interestingly, officials themselves reflected on the ways that the transformation in existing relations among villagers and to state institutions, ostensibly a required step in a broad

⁶⁴⁰ Indeed, it was precisely these informal relations of aid land gifting and god-parenting, that supporters of the MAS government, including land reform administrators and Quechua-speaking unionists in Ayopaya, deemed regressive (see chapter 5). I discuss this contrast between urban and rural sensibilities of bearing the hacienda past on the part of the kin of former landlords at greater length in chapter 6.

⁶⁴¹ In this regard, the scholar assumed that to study the hacienda in former hacienda regions requires a sort of suspicious or critical approach to empirical findings, uncovering their true meaning. For the limits to such a "hermeneutics of suspicion" and a discussion of its problematic assumptions about form and content, exteriority and interiority, see Ricoeur (1996). For an account of the ways that assumptions about the inauthenticity or masking of form shape indigenous politics, see Nelson (1999).

⁶⁴² As scholars of Bolivian *mestizaje* like Javier Sanjines (2002) argue, for early 20th century indigenista politics the Incas arose as the models of indigenous authenticity. This shifted in the 1970s with the popularization of Katarismo, for which Aymara leaders served as guides to political action and national collectivity.

⁶⁴³ As discussed in Chapter 1, since the period of Viedma Ayopaya has been identified with a state of miserable hacienda subjection, a region particularly resistant to state reform efforts (Larson 1998; Jackson 1994). ⁶⁴⁴ For a critical account of the relationship between assertions of political disorder and the legal interventions of postcolonial governments, see Comaroff and Comaroff (2006).

shift to a more 'participatory' course of development, might be jarring. 645 Yet, while jarring. officials argued that rural peasants would eventually come to recognize its benefits. Mr. Arpasi explained, "I am from the campo, from a region that had haciendas. We had to walk one and a half hours to school each day. Today, there are better schools. Things are changing. Before, people were used to accepting [development] projects, of being told what they needed. Now, they have to decide for themselves. As the government tells them, 'I don't know what you need in your own house, that is for you to decide.' Thus, they have to decide if they need schools, medical posts, a new sports stadium, it is up to them. This is a big change, and often they object, 'But before...' However, in the end they are pleased with it. They say 'We didn't have this before." Here, Mr. Arpasi speaks as a subject who has weathered this "big change," as someone who has learned how to decide. His words suggest the ways that reform officials themselves reflect upon and grapple with the lived ambiguities of revolutionary reform. For him, clearly, the stakes are enormous. Thus, the transparency enabled by land reform is itself also a moral transition away from a conflictive past and toward space of possibility and potential that will, it is hoped, ultimately provide rural subjects with a new orientation as citizens. Through such efforts, then, reform officials hope to transform former hacienda peasants into exemplary indigenous subjects, ones who are self-determined and "well-armed politically"—in short, the reverse of their grandparents or abuelos who labored on hacienda estates and called the landowner Taytay, my father.

Instructive techniques and pedantic exercises for teaching people how to live after servitude echo the efforts of earlier agrarian inspectors following 1953 hacienda abolition in Bolivia. 646 And yet, as suggested in Mr. Arpasi's words, processes of uprooting hacienda-based sensibilities were not only about reframing the past but also required transforming the present, including political understandings and moral calibrations of everyday life. In the process, and as evident in the views of reform officials from rural backgrounds, present-day life in rural regions was refigured as a trace of a subjacent past. Such a retrospective view of the present positions continued suffering in largely instrumental terms, that is, as a soon to be displaced stage in the road to future progress. 647 Paradoxically, then, attempts to institutionalize agency also must disavow the validity of certain moral claims and experiences of marginality, suffering rendered a necessary step in a process of social betterment whose benefits will only be evident afterwards. 648 Thus, from his post as a relatively youthful yet senior government official, Mr. Arpasi's account seems to overstate the ease of such rural transformations. Are all subjects equally able to shed the weight of the past? For what subjects might those attachments be harder, or even impossible, to part with? In this way, his view of the necessity and inexorability of the process invokes more rigid conceptions of historical change and progress that, at the same time, render unintelligible other modes of collectivity or moral action, hitherto legible only as anachronism.

⁶⁴⁵ Like Huascar's account of sanitation, Mr. Arpasi emphasized that such processes were not state impositions but rather followed from the solicitation of rural communities. Indeed, according to Mr.Arpasi, the retitling process is initiated by way of a written request submitted by local municipal officials or union leaders and then works through collaboration with rural communities.

⁶⁴⁶ See chapter 2.

⁶⁴⁷ See Povinelli (2011); Scott (2004).

⁶⁴⁸ See Povinelli 2011 for the sense of displacement of existing experience which, she argues, is emblematic of juridical approaches to justice, one in which the present becomes the instrumental means to a future end.

As we have seen, for INRA officials land sanitation arises as a way to purify the present of the "stain of colonialism," in this way fixing, that is, securing as well as mending, uncertain histories of relation. ⁶⁴⁹ Given the hacienda's entwinement in material forms including relations of exchange, scarred bodies, and gifted lands, demands that history be uprooted or shed also require a sort of a violent sundering, one that, for land reform officials, constitutes a necessarily pre-condition for formal justice. Yet, these purifications do not go unchallenged. Indeed, while reformists' frame the 2006 law as the much-awaited culmination of the 1953 reform, villagers often perceive the project rather as an outgrowth of colonial histories of intervention. As discussed in the next chapter, rural opposition to land re-titling culminated in the ejection of the land reform institute from the Ayopaya region in 2011. Due in part to mounting popular opposition, in 2010 the MAS government extended the land reform process for an additional three years and then, in 2013, for another four years. Such instabilities were not limited to Ayopaya. In the department of Cochabamba in 2010, the land reform program had granted titles to about half of agricultural lands. 650 As of October 2013, only 30% of the nation's land had been sanitized. 651 Of course, these numbers are themselves revealing a particular reformist imaginary. an expansive bureaucratic order that seeks to saturate and "sanitize" each parcel of the Bolivian countryside. Yet, the spatialized imaginary of state expansion through agrarian reform also elicits critique. In its parallels to earlier modernizing initiatives, then, sanitation efforts complicate MAS party attempts to distinguish itself from the reformism of earlier governments.

Against Transparency: Land Titles and the Politics of Indigenous Representation

Today, the former landlord's home is little more than a pile of rubble strewn amid agricultural plots along a gentle mountain slope. It is drizzling, and I'm seated with several local men, the children of hacienda tenant farmers, eating peaches about ten yards from the former hacienda building. Gregorio, a former union leader and trained agronomist, had planted the peach trees when his parents died some years ago. While his sister recounted sorrowful stories of the violence their parents faced at the hands of the landlords for whom they had to grown corn and potatoes, today the lands feel oddly still, even serene. The Quechua-speaking children of former *colono* laborers, like Gregorio, live in villages nearby and also migrate to urban centers like Cochabamba and Oruro for work or to educate their children. Indeed, as we sit around, the men joke that in Quillacollo, a suburb of Cochabamba, there is a whole district comprised of migrants from this very village. Yet the migrants return often, every few weeks, attending to their fruit trees and agricultural crops and joining old friends for ritual celebrations including Carnival, the February *ch'allas*, patron saint's day holidays, birthdays, marriages, and funerals. Others, mostly the elderly, have stayed in Ayopaya, living in thatched-roof homes near the river below or in the municipal town of Laraya.

Gregorio was precisely the sort of rural subject targeted by reform officials. His parents had been left land when the hacienda was abolished and land redistributed following the MNR

137

⁶⁴⁹ This insight draws from Fabricant's attention to the postcolonial logics of historical cleansing. As she notes, "Through their Andean dances, stories, and tales in the Plaza Murillo, they used highland indigenous culture as a conduit for reordering and cleansing Bolivian society of the stain of colonialism, which they believed had been further tainted by the evils of capitalism and neoliberalism (2012:155 citing Cusicanqui Rivera 1989; Postero 2007). In addition, my attention to the reconciliatory dimensions of land retitling draws from Nelson's insight as to the dual workings of healing as a mode of fixing (1999:12). For a discussion of Bolivian land sanitation as a healing process, see Valdivia (2010).

⁶⁵⁰ See Zimmerer (2014:5); INRA Packet (2010).

⁶⁵¹ Los Tiempos 1/11/2013.

revolution of 1952. And yet, like many Ayopaya peasants, his parents had never received title to the land. Even preceding their death, there had been a drawn-out conflict with the former landlords concerning the matter of land redistribution. And so the tiles never materialized. As I spent time with Gregorio in the following months and over the course of a year, I learned about the details of the land conflict as well as its long-term effects on Gregorio's assessment of MAS reforms. Indeed, today he claims indifference toward the possession of a property title. While he may not have a title, he has usufruct usage rights obtained through planting and harvesting the lands, and this is good enough for him. Thus, a half-century long struggle for land titles had not only been exhausting, it had also alerted Gregorio to the futility of a title as the basis for upholding property rights. In this way, as I discuss at greater length below, his experiences of drawn-out agrarian reform fundamentally challenged reformers' political promises, including assumptions of the coupling of property and titles and, relatedly, that only through access to titled property could a violent past be ameliorated or overcome.

After we finished eating our peaches, carefully storing the rest away in grain bags to bring back to Laraya, we walked through the land that Gregorio's parents left him. Upon informing me that he did not have a title to the land, I asked Gregorio whether he was going to try to obtain a title through the land retitling program or *saneamiento*. He shrugged dismissively, playfully calling back through the light rain, "For what? It's half gone anyway." Indeed, in recent years he had lost half his plot to erosion related to the shifting river course of the Sacambaya river that snakes below. "But how do people differentiate their land or know who is whose if they don't have a title?" I ask. Gregorio laughed, likely at what seemed to him to be a naïve question. He replied, "People know their lands like they know how to play a guitar. You just know." He spoke to me in Spanish, his words inflected by the regional dialectic of Quechuaspeakers. It had been this Quechua inflection that, in his years as a schoolboy attending elementary school by living and laboring in the house of a local priest and Gregorio's god-father, had subjected him to such ridicule from his mestizo teachers and classmates. "Sabenps" (They know), he concluded decisively. Upon hearing about Gregorio's lack of a title and his seeming disregard for this lack, I was intrigued. Gregorio, a unionist and the child of former hacienda laborers whose union leaders, had struggled for years to obtain title to the lands inherited from his father. And yet, today he was unconvinced of the purported benefits of land sanitation. One source of his doubt was the inability of the land titles to account for shifting property borders, including that resulting from erosion related to the shifting route of the river below.

Yet it was not simply the problem of erosion that informed Gregorio's uncertainty toward the land re-titling initiative. Later that day, after harvesting the peaches, we sat together on a hilltop eating lunch. Gregorio pointed to the lands below, explaining to me in Spanish about one former landowner who had aligned himself with the regional agrarian union. Another landlord, he added, still owned a large parcel of fertile land in the valley below. Looking over the crumbling walls of an old hacienda building, I remark that it seems most landowners abandoned their remaining lands after the 1953 agrarian reform. Don Gregorio nodded, pointing over at the ruins of the old hacienda, "It has fallen." I ask if it crumbled naturally or if people destroyed it. He shook his head, "[It crumbled] by way of its own liking" [de su proprio gusto]. He explained that first the roof crumbled and then the walls fell apart. Later, people planted eucalyptus trees within these dilapidated walls. Indeed, today the old building has several mature eucalyptus trees growing out of it. Then, in Quechua, Gregorio turned and spoke rapidly to his friend. They discussed the details of large landowner, noting that not all of his lands have been re-sold and that, indeed, the family still owns property here.

Alongside the more publically available forms of historical reflection on the official hacienda past, then, the fraught details of disappointing land conflicts were delicate, even secretive matters that are discussed only among trusted friends. As evident here, peasant's avoidance of former landlords' plots was not simply a product of their lacking awareness of ownership. It was, in part, a reflection on the imperfect displacing of hacienda-based systems of land tenure by the 1953 reform. Entrenched respect for landlords was less a product of false consciousness than it was a partial expression both of the former landlords' continued control over land. "Respect," then, constituted a state of critical awareness based on assessments of the longevity of rural systems of authority and violence despite optimistic narratives of reformist change and historical overcoming. In addition to avoiding former hacienda lands, people had also refused to profit from former hacienda resources, including wood. For instance, when the landlord of Sarahuayto got news of the land reform, he quickly felled a row of large eucalyptus trees, hoping to sell the wood for profit. Former *colono* workers and unionists would not let him take it away, and so the eucalyptus had been left to rot, like beached gray whales, on the plot nearest to the hacienda building. Like Gregorio's comment on abandoned hacienda lands, the untouched wood suggests the material effects of an abiding awareness of the longevity of hacendado authority coupled with a sort of legal realism, an awareness of the incomplete displacement of hacienda-based systems of property and authority by the 1953 reform. 652

For others, these historical entrenchments took ecological form. For instance, on one occasion I visited Don Theodoro, a middle-aged union leader, as he and his family harvested potatoes. They were sparse, evident from the contents of a small pile of collected potatoes gathered on a tarp beside them. Another union leader, standing off to the side, commented on their sparseness, "There are very few" (Pisilla.) "Yes, very few," Don Theodor agreed. He explained that the potatoes have a disease. "Before," he noted sadly, "when the land produced well, we were exploited (aprovechado) by the landowner." We had to give two of every three rows of potatoes and one of ten pigs to the landowner. "But now, the land doesn't produce well. It provides only just enough to eat. It's contaminated. In some ways, slavery continues."653 Here, then, land degradation was described in both ecological and historical terms. On the one hand, villagers drew on environmental discourses, noting how pollution and climate change had "contaminated" the land. Toxic pollutants include pesticides as well as mercury from a nearby gold mine. 654 Yet, these reflections on degrading soil quality also drew from a particular notion of history. Before, during hacienda servitude, the land produced well and Spanish-speaking landlords prospered. Today, locals toil on degraded soils and sell oats to foreign companies. Given these vulnerabilities, why should villagers believe reformists' promises of the liberating effects of governmental land reform? Given widespread poverty, land shortages, and dry and eroded parcels, a title alone would resolve little.

⁶⁵² That is, infertility was produced by the earlier failure to fulfill required acts of offering and devotion during the hacienda era. As scholars note, throughout much of the Andes agricultural fertility is approached as an uncertain state achieved through an ongoing if tenuous relation of exchange with non-human entities and unfolding through acts of devotion, offering, and sacrifice. See Taussig 1980; Nash 1992 for accounts of infertility or receding mineral veins in mines resulting from a compromised relation to place-based deities in Columbia and Bolivia; See also my discussion of post-hacienda collectivity and ritual exchange in Chapter 2 and my discussion of ch'alla offerings in Chapter 3.

⁶⁵³ The Spanish reads, "Escalvitud ha continuado seguiendo."

⁶⁵⁴ Conversations with owners of adjacent mines confirmed that they use mercury to process minerals and precious metals including gold and antimony.

Speaking with other Ayopaya peasants, I learned about the shared worry that, by registering their land with the state, more informal, union-ordered control over land would be renounced, the national government ultimately becoming the judge and arbiter of local property rights. Furthermore, people explained, the process of *saneamiento* was undesirable as it would fix existing land usage, even unfair ones. Indeed, when I spoke to people about land inherited from hacienda abolition, they were full of stories of people—often the children of hacienda overseers such as *melgueros* and *hilicatas*—who had ended up with large fertile parcels for which they had never paid. Thus, in many cases labor-based and familial affiliations enabled some peasants to gain access to more desirable, greener agricultural plots while others had to toil away at their dry, crumbling parcels. "Why would we want her to get a title for that land?" one woman whispered to us, as the woman of whom she spoke, a friend of hers, was stooped nearby, washed their pots from lunch in the river below. Thus, according to many villagers, the process of land retitling would formalize land ownership practices that rural residents themselves saw as unjust. In another similar case, a neighbor complained of two sisters who had ended up with much larger land parcels simply because of their parents' labor positions.

As these accounts suggest, rural peasants often rejected INRA officials' claims that land titling was an efficacious mechanism by which to resolve longstanding conflicts or to remedy inequities resulting from the earlier distribution of hacienda lands. Not only this, they also fundamentally disagreed with the logic of land titling, the notion that securing permanent property rights and more closely binding persons to place and titles to land was a good thing. 655 Here, we would do well to recall the interventionist workings of land surveys—which remain a crucial component of land titling—in Bolivia's colonial past. The first survey occurred in 1550, when Pedro de la Gasca who was president of the audiencia of Alto Perú organized inspectors to survey rural regions and detect possibilities for future colonial resources or profits. Not unlike the later Toledo reforms introduced rural inspections or visitas, Gasca sought to "rationalize" tribute collection and draw it more firmly into state systems of regulation and rule. Ten years later, Polo de Ondegardo noted that the tribute payments had decreased and that Indians were poorer than before. In addition, he worried that Indians were avoiding tribute payment. He focused not only on state encomiendas but also private ones, instituting a more strict tribute payment schedule and sending royal inspectors out to rural hamlets and encomiendas to collect detailed assessments of cultivated fields, herds, and any other resources. 656

In Ayopaya, the region's history of colonial land surveys and tribute collection seemed to produce particular mistrust for survey technicians and agrarian reform officials. In the 1950s, parties of engineers charged with surveying former hacienda lands had arrived in the countryside, paralleling the earlier *visitas* of *hacendados* and their *cacique* and *mayordomo* managers. Rural villagers responded to the survey efforts of INRA engineers by tearing up survey maps and chasing survey parties from the region. Traces of these conflicts arise in formal appeals on the part of landowners archived at the National Land Reform Institute, noting that

-

⁶⁵⁵ As discussed in previous chapters, historically land use in Cochabamba was not delimited to a spatially bounded mode of individualized property tenure. Evident in earlier forms of mitmaq farming, for instance, land cultivation might occur across disparate islands or archipelagos rather than upon a single delimited parcel. In addition, land was often bound up with patterns of labor and land use, property as such identified less with an unchanging claim to ownership than with a sense of usufruct rights obtained through cultivating the soil. These more ambiguous patterns of land use continued during the hacienda era, when colono tenants obtained access or usufruct rights to certain plots of land by way of their farming of those plots as well as, at times, as an exchange for labor, sexual services, intermarriage, or illegitimate children.

⁶⁵⁶ Larson (1998:48 citing Polo de Ondegardo *Informe* 161).

redistribution had been stunted by the inability of engineers to realize topographical analyses in former haciendas. Contemporary mistrust toward agrarian officials and engineers builds from these mid-century experiences of land reform, when villagers chased topographers out of their lands, destroying land maps, and accusing engineers of bribery by landlords. Given this past, current ambivalence toward land reform efforts is understandable, shaped by an almost visceral experience of the slippages between record-taking and reform, redistribution and intervention.

In light of Ayopaya's history of rural land surveying and agrarian reform, Gregorio's opposition to land titling seemed to indicate worries that, by registering their lands with the state, more informal relations of land use would be replaced by more inflexible and governmentmediated property relations. In this way, what made titling necessary to land reform officials— Ayopaya's hacienda past—was precisely the source of popular uncertainty in former hacienda regions. Indeed, Gregorio linked his disdain for current land reform efforts to memories of the revolutionary redistribution of hacienda lands following the 1953 reform. For instance, Gregorio compared the more sympathetic stance of Víctor Paz Estenssoro's government in the 1950s, whose Decree 3464 abolished the hacienda and established land redistribution mechanisms, with that of the Evo Morales-led MAS government today. Shaking his head sadly, he explained, "After this business of the landlords [hacienda servitude], the [MNR] government gave out titles for free. The topographer came and you had to cook chicken for him. Now you have to pay [for titles]." If this were not bad enough, he added, "Today, the landlord's children and grandchildren are aligned with [the land reform institute]." In these ways, the children of former hacienda laborers expressed their concern with the to which the MAS government was on their side. This critique was fairly explicit. As Gregorio noted, "In this country, reforms have never been to the benefit of the peasant."

This enduring sense of suspicion toward the reformist state resulted not only in skepticism toward land re-titling but, more broadly, an attentiveness to the futility of legal mechanisms of political change, evident in Gregorio's contestation of the very necessity of a title. The sources for such pessimism became clear to me when I spoke with Gregorio later that month. Gathered outside his agrarian organization for a monthly *q'oa* offering, talk turned to the land conflict in Raqarani, the former hacienda village where Gregorio and his co-workers are from. Gregorio explains that the hacendado family has managed to maintain legal ownership to over 80 hectares of the most fertile lands of the former hacienda. Furthermore, he explains, villagers still do not have titles since there was not enough land to go around at the time of land redistribution, though of course there had been plenty for the *patron* and his family. I sympathize with them, exclaiming that it's remarkable that the lands still have not been titled. The men sit around wordlessly, and Gregorio shakes his head. He looks discouraged, looking forward and not at anything in particular as he chews the coca, tearing the stem from the coca leaf before placing the smooth green blade in his mouth.

Cheek bulging with coca, Gregorio explains that the landlord had been stalling the process with his lawyers, always adding another request or complaint, and that, for this reason, the titles have still not been forthcoming. Having reviewed a number of agrarian files (expedientes agrarias) from the late 1950s and 1960s which outlined the process of titling, I ask how it was that the property had not been fully redistributed, noting that properties declared "latifundios" were generally to be distributed or "affected in their totality." Gregorio explains, "It was a latifundio, of course, but the landlord fought to have it declared a medium-sized property. He never worked here [in Ayopaya], nor cultivated the lands." By citing the landlord's physical absence from the property and his failure to work engage directly with the agricultural processes

on the estate, Gregorio appealed to two pivotal legal criteria that, in accordance with the 1953 reform, determined the legal categorization of the property and, with it, the degree of its redistribution to former workers. Trying to be encouraging, I add that maybe INRA could help, as the process of *saneamiento* was geared at aiding the families of former hacienda workers in gaining property to land and in this way resolving outstanding conflicts. Gregorio and Max shook their heads and explained, politely, that INRA has been no help at all. Indeed, the INRA officials, solicited by the former landlord, had come to look at the lands with him.

Later that week, Gregorio and I met in a room of the agricultural NGO building for an interview. Gregorio, along with several other Quechua-speaking former unionists, had founded the agrarian organization with funding from German donors, its aims to encourage the diversification of forests through the planting and replanting of native tree species that have been displaced by deforestation related to agriculture and coca-farming. On this occasion, the door to the wooden building stood eschew, and we sat together at a long wooden table. Gregorio began his account with the moment of hacienda abolition, noting that in 1952, "The state declared the end of slavery, and everything flipped around." *Colonos* were to be provided title to lands that worked for the landlords, and the remaining land was to be worked collectivity. In addition, Gregorio recalled, militants "killed people, ravaging the haciendas and pillaging goods." Peasants had to escape. Yet, he noted, this too had ended in disappointment. He explained, "Afterwards the landlords were named union leaders, and the landlords entered. Finally the hacienda lands were sold, but the former landlords were able to maintain the best lands."

Yet, despite the bitterness of Gregorio's narrative, things has not always appeared so futile to him. Indeed, in 1986 Gregorio had been a union leader of the former hacienda village of Ragarani. At that time, peasants' access to land titles had seemed immanent. He recalled, "The titles to redistributed hacienda lands had already been signed. They were ready to be distributed. But, then, the former landlord intervened. The reform here was never to the benefit of the peasant." In this way, then, a drawn out land conflict had solidified an understanding of the futility of having faith in the government, no matter how sympathetic to the campesinos cause. Indeed, as noted above, a similar pattern plagued the present, in which INRA officials and landlords are aligned and in which you have to pay for titles. Gregorio explained, "Now, with INRA, you have to pay 2000 B for a parcel as well as 70 B to INRA. Today, nothing is free for the *campesino*." As evident in Gregorio's account of the Ragarani land conflict, Ayopaya residents do not always experience land reform as the magnanimous act that reformer's intend. Rather, they reflect on the continuities that link current processes of land sanitation to regional histories of land redistribution since the National Revolution of 1952. These disappointments are even more dismal given their ironic pairing with a celebratory language of indigenous justice and self-determination.

While the region's history of hacienda servitude and conflictive land redistribution shaped rural political perceptions, this was not simply due to some sort of child-like or subconscious fear of former hacienda lands. If history persists in material relations and the sedimentations of place, then, such relations are not necessarily reduced to debris. As evident in the former hacienda plots and ruins of hacienda homes as well as the very shape of land plots and rural agrarian landscapes in Ayopaya, old forms might wither but they are rarely "emptied of all indigenous meaning." Rather than see such land relations as ruins, a framework which seems to be to over-state the efficacy of reformists' transformative desires, I have attended to the ways

⁶⁵⁷ As Seremetakis notes, dust gathers around the old that has left its traces behind (1996:35). For indigeneity and its relation to history and landscape in North America, see Basso (1996).

that rural villagers like Gregorio actively engaged and critically reflected upon the material sedimentation of the hacienda—and reformist—past. ⁶⁵⁸ Thus, far from the remnants of a now-defunct system of colonial extraction, the region's history of hacienda servitude and conflictive abolition are actively arise today as insight into the perils of national land reform, exposing the naiveté of nationalist projects of political change through legal intervention. Thus, land arises as a sort of lasting tangibility that is not simply inherited or stigmatized but also supplies the terms of active reflection and political critique, unsteadying statist narratives of history and collectivity and, at the same time, creating and recreating other modalities of belonging and political critique.

Given these critical reflections on the longevity of the hacienda system, to demand that people "shed" the hacienda past not only downplays villagers' active grappling with the hacienda past but also denies and depoliticizes the existence of alternate orientation to the past. As we have seen, reformers explained opposition to land reform as a product of underdeveloped political consciousness, overlooking Ayopaya's historically marginal relation to the populist state and downplaying the disenchanting effects of centuries of stalled land redistribution. Yet, while government officials attribute former hacienda peasants with a sort of child-like, prepolitical naiveté, peasants of Ayopaya were actually much more cynical of the promises and potentials of state reform than their reformist peers, whose naive certainty about the beneficial results of land reform contrasted sharply from the more cautious stance of villagers, like Gregorio, whose experiences of long-run legal conflict had produced a weariness not only about land re-titling, but also about state reform more broadly. Here, it seemed rural residents preferred their own imperfect approaches to the hacienda past to fruitless alliances with state institutions whose only consistency lay in their continued failure to deliver the long-awaited titles.

After decades of mobilization for land, some rural villagers question the very link to land that imbues titles with their material force. As we have seen, for Ayopaya villagers, the failure to account for shifting geologic conditions points to the limits to the broader representational aims undergirding land titling. If titles exist but have no material correlate, what authority or significance lies in a title? The reverse was also true: If local populations have depended on regional systems of land management and land use given the stunted nature of land titling following redistribution in the 1950s, then clearly titles are not necessary. Both of these cases, titles without land, and land without titles, decoupled the elaboration of natural or necessary pairing of legitimate land ownership and paper on which broader INRA reform logics relied. Thus, Ayopaya villagers' experiences of state bureaucratic efforts offer sophisticated insights into at least two limits to documentation as a technology of representation, pointing to the material limits to land re-titling as a means to secure rural land ownership and resolve outstanding conflicts. In addition, such critiques foregrounded the epistemic limits to paper mediations, documents' inadequacy to account for what they name, one evident in the unstable and uncertain correspondence of a title to a land plot, and of past to present.

In Ayopaya, then, critiques of rural land titling drew from a doubt—derived both historically and experientially—that the promises of paper mediation would come to fruition. Not only did titles often not correlate adequately to local lands but, more broadly, lands seemed to need no title in order to be accounted for within rural systems of land use and property management. In short, then, rural residents and peasant leaders challenges the logic of

⁻

⁶⁵⁸ Thus, Stoler emphasizes the ways that imperial forms remain durable as ongoing, persistent parts of their ontologies (2008:192). She argues that such processes include "lasting tangibilities," the forms that "people are 'left with': to what remains, to the aftershocks of empire, to the material and social afterlife of structures, sensibilities, and things" (2008:194).

representation by which land use is legitimate only insofar as it is depicted or represented in another form, a land title. Furthermore, if lands could exist and be managed without their external objectification through the paper medium, was the state the only entity that could control or improve rural lives? Just as documents seemed at times to lack a material correlate, could MAS claims that President Evo Morales not only represented by partly embodied Bolivia's indigenous poor, be upheld? In this regard, popular opposition to land titling also linked in to broader skepticism regarding the instabilities of MAS political representation. Here, the failure to link across scales (citizen and government, land and title) pointed to an uncertainty concerning the promises of political representation at large, a logic of linkage across scales so key to democratic logics of citizenship and inclusion.

These critical approaches to land redistribution and MAS governance challenge accounts that foreground indigenous people's "deception" by reform languages, formulations that seem to rely on an assumption that rural groups have little or no familiarity with bureaucratic logics. More than interventions in rural life, current land sanitation efforts must be located within contested histories of modernizing agrarian reform, histories that accumulate in unpredictable ways, generating political imaginaries in excess of state imaginaries. Indeed, as discussed in the next chapter, rural groups often turned bureaucratic technologies back upon themselves, engaging legal institutions and mobilizing documents (petitions, titles, and files) to contest agrarian reform efforts. Such sophisticated legal maneuvers challenge reformists' complaints that rural peasants lack political finesse. More broadly, they destabilize reformists' claims that land sanitation is necessarily the principle or singular means by which to engage the past. Yet, if governmental institutions in distant cities could not be trusted, there was important work to be done closer to home, evident in the labors of local union leaders and municipal officials whose successes were measured not only in paper but also in blood, that is, llama blood.

Revolutionary Offerings: A Municipal Sacrifice

Along a gravel road, children soak each other with water balloons. In a parking lot above, twenty of us are gathered. Three tractors are parked to our right, and to the left a table and chairs have been erected under an overhang. It is drizzling. Young men in slacks and light coats stand around, joined by two women, one in jeans and another in a *pollera* skirt with a woven shawl drawn tightly around her shoulders. They are union officials and employees of the municipal government, supporters of the ruling MAS party. Between us stands a large white llama, with a rope around its neck. At its feet are two metal bowls. We stand around for a moment, and then, moving quietly, the men encircle the llama and gently lower it to the ground. One young man lifts a knife and starts cutting the llama's neck. The blood is collected into the two bowls, the rest forming dark rivulets that stream toward the road, attracting two stray dogs. The mayor and head union leader each take a bowl into their hands, and moving the bowl abruptly, they spill the

⁶⁵⁹ This position is expressed, most paradigmatically, in the work of Enlightenment philosopher G.W.F. Hegel.
660 As Fabricant notes, "indigenous groups were legislatively deceived into believing they would receive land rights through this process of surveying and redistributing land and eventually would become full-fledged citizens" (2012:5). In other research, Kohl (2003) draws a contrast between the symbolic alignment of land redistribution and citizen rights and its material failure. Thus, scholars note, between 1996 and 2003 only 10 million acres were awarded to 550,000 peasants, while 79 million went to large parcels, often to former hacienda landlords (see Friedsky 2005). For a similar reading of the deceptions of bureaucracy in India, see Gupta (2012).

⁶⁶¹ This is evident in histories of anti-hacienda petitioning, requests for land surveys, and legal appeals on the part of native caciques, colono unionists, and peasant militants from at least the 1910s onward (Gotkowitz 2007; Thomson 2002).

blood in each direction, leaving red blotches on tractors and trucks. When the bowls are empty the process is repeated, as the men cover a broader periphery of space. Each time the blood is thrown, the men shout "Jallalla! Jallalla!" Later in the afternoon, this phrase, Aymara for "live," took varied forms, "Long live Bolivia!" "Long live MAS" "Long live Evo!"

It had been raining, but now a little sunshine made its way through the clouds, exposing lush mountain slopes above. My friend and I rested behind one tractor to avoid the spray of blood. After dousing the surrounding tractors, trucks, and earth, several men began skinning the animal. They cut carefully so that the fur is removed intact, while others set about removing the heart, which must be warm when placed in the sacred q'oa bundle. Later that night the Mayor, a Quechua-speaking man who grew up in a nearby village, led the group in prayer before the q'oa was ritually burned. "Good, well today our president Evo came to [nearby villages]. We offer you this q'oa so that these projects yield success, and so that there will be more projects in the future." Don Silvio, a weathered man in a dark *sombrero*, continued, "This q'oa is for the Pachamama, asking for help in our municipality and with the process of change." The q'oa is made of folded paper containing incense and offerings of candy and coca leaves. We drop more coca leaves on each corner, right to left, while uttering a prayer. Another official approaches, dripping corn beer on the bundle, "To the projects in Rami, may they go well." Afterwards, the men lift the wet bundle and place it in the embers to burn, the color of the ash later taken as an omen for the peril and promise of the year to come.

What does it mean for state bureaucrats and municipal officials to host a *ch'alla* sacrifice, offering libations of alcohol and gifts of coca, anise, wool, and llama blood to the *pachamama* in the hope that the next year will yield fruitful development projects and limit accidents on the part of municipal workers traveling along often eroded, wash-out roads on trucks and tractors? What are the understandings of generosity and sacrifice, authority and mutual aid, shaping the ch'alla event? What might it tell us about the ways that agrarian traditions of reciprocity and redistribution remain salient not only for regional conceptions of post-hacienda patronage and exchange, discussed in the previous chapter, but also for popular relations to the state and municipal relations to place? More broadly, then, how the conceptions of ritual health and purity shaping the ch'alla offering compare to the notions of transparency and accountability through documentation guiding the INRA process of land sanitation or re-titling? Let us begin by considering the stakes of the *ch'alla* itself.

As scholars note, *ch'allas* arise as material expressions or embodiments of a particular logic of sacrificial exchange, ones accompanied by specific understandings of political authority and exchange. As ethnographers note, rural Aymara and Quechua groups in the Andean region practice a range of ritual and agrarian forms premised on an understanding of land and community as entwined through relations of co-dependency and exchange. Classical studies of Andean reciprocity have shown that sacrificial offerings belong to what are conceived of as ongoing and exemplary processes of ritual exchange that are contingent upon particular understandings of authority and beneficence. Anthropologists have documented the ways that such frameworks of exchange shape ritual practices and offering both to particular places as well as geologic formations, including mountain *Apus* and religious figures understood to preside

662 On Andean approaches to authority, see Sallnow (1996); for accounts of ch'alla rituals in the Andes, see Nash

(1992); Lazar (2006); and Harris (2000).

As noted in chapter 1, the coupling of authority and exchange has been shaped not only by precolonial but also by colonial reform projects. For their precolonial and colonial underpinnings, see McCormack (1991), Murra (1962, 1978); Rowe (1946); Salomon and Urioste (1991), Wachtel (1977:83).

over certain rivers and mines. 664 Thus, practices of sacrifice often conceived through idiom of exchange, principally as an offering or "feeding" to the pachamama or local place-based spirits (achachilas in Bolivia, apus in Peru) have historically been key elements of "colonial Catholicism" in the Andes, understood as a distinct religious tradition growing out of the transformative intersection of Spanish and pre-Columbian values and modes of collectivity⁶⁶⁵

Of course, *ch'allas* are not simply instances of exchange with deities but also mediate human relations, embodying and becoming occasions for the expression of ideals of mutual aid, reciprocity, and interdependency over time. 666 In short, then, ch'allas are also material sites in which patronage logics are called upon and consummated. As discussed in chapter 2, in Ayopaya such religious forms are historically entwined less in autonomous indigenous collectivities or ayllus than in particular histories of hacienda labor and their accompanying forms of social and religious hierarchies. 667 Thus, rather than recover the agency of things, 668 aligning earth spirits and Apus with a new form of political actor, my aim is to examine the ramifications of the absorption of such "earth-practices" into bureaucratic efforts. My concern, then, is less with the incommensurability or friction between indigenous traditions of material and religious practice, one the one hand, and state political rationalities, on the other, than with their unexpected convergences in Bolivian reform efforts. 669 This is not, however, simply the insurgence or emergence of indigeneity. 670 As discussed earlier, indigeneity has not simply imploded upon state rationalities; it has also been actively crafted, transformed, and elaborated within prior colonial and republican reform projects. ⁶⁷¹ Furthermore, rather than being a relation simply of conflict and disruption, frameworks of agrarian religiosity and sacrifice also condition and infuse reform processes in subtle ways, conditioning officials' own perceptions of possible avenues of future development, as evident in the municipal *ch'alla* above.

And yet, despite their historical entanglements, elaborations and absorptions of traditional logics and ritual forms do of course belong to a unique historical moment marked by a reframing of the relation between tradition and the state. Municipal sacrificial practices like the ch'alla belong to broader governmental attempts to integrate or absorb indigenous value systems into state law, evident in Bolivia's 2009 Constitution. In so doing, MAS reformers explicitly aim to actively reverse centuries of indigenous marginality, evident in the exclusion of indigenous persons from governmental corridors or public spaces like plazas or state buildings. Thus, the

⁶⁶⁴ For anthropological approaches to sacrificial practices of religious exchange in the Andes, see Abercrombie (1998); Allen (2002); Canessa (2012), de la Cadena (2010), Gose (1994), Harris (2001), Isbell (1978), Nash (1992), Orta (2004), Platt (1997), Taussig (2010).

⁶⁶⁵ On such transformation, see in particular Abercrombie (1991); Harris (2006); Lazar (2008).

⁶⁶⁶ This point draws from Sian Lazar (2006:10, 149).

⁶⁶⁷ For Andean relations of authority exchange and their absorption into hacienda life, see Lyons (2006).

⁶⁶⁸ As Marisol de la Cadena notes, studies have been limited by a tendency to align native religiosities with 'culture,' one then taken as bereft of political importance, or at the least, as something less than political actors.

⁶⁶⁹ On the "friction" between indigenous materialities and developmental and environmental technologies, see Tsing (2005); for an account of the disruption or clash between indigenous religiosities and state logics in Peru, see Cadena (2010).

⁶⁷⁰ It has been common, following the post-structural turn, to frame indigeneity as a construct or creation. See Niezen (2009); Clifford (2013); for a parallel account of becoming campesino, see Boyer (2003).

⁶⁷¹ According to Marisol de la Cadena, pagos, despachos, and misas in Peru suggest the "the emergence of indigeneity" not simply a new way of being indigenous but rather as the "insurgence of indigenous forces and practices with the capacity to significantly disrupt prevalent political formations, and reshuffle hegemonic antagonisms" (2010:336). Yet this begs the question of how such efforts at integration relate to earlier attempts to institutionalize native Andean systems, including the mit'a and patronage. Thus, native forms have also been instituted as models of governance and political authority. See Larson (1998); see chapter 1.

municipal ch'alla breaks sharply from the exclusions and extirpations of non-Catholic religiosities in Bolivia's colonial and postcolonial past. While we can critique the efficacy of these forms in terms of achieving what they promise, we should not overlook their very real material consequences, including their transformations of rural self-understandings and historical imaginaries. ⁶⁷² Furthermore, while clearly state initiatives do not simply transpose governmental aims into material realities, these reform processes affect peoples' lives and well being, shaping local development projects and enabling as well as complicating rural peasants to leave land to their children. 673 Thus, such practices cannot be dismissed as residues of an imperfectly overcome religious tradition nor should they be sequestered off from the sphere of politics, treated as another variant of an apolitical, timeless Andean culture. 674 Instead, these requests for the pachamama's care and assistance in aiding local development projects suggest the reelaborations of indigeneity from within governmental spaces, ones that is erroneously framed as a reversal of the historical exclusion or disayowal of indigenous forms but rather should rather be explored as another iteration within a long-run history of state concern with the place of indigenous tradition in public life and its ramifications for governance and law. Rather than assume the radical divide between bureaucracy and regional relations of exchange and religiosity, I raise the question of the unstable ways that revolutionary reform efforts both engage and at the same time come to absorb vernacular value systems and approaches to authority.⁶⁷⁵

The challenges facing attempts to absorb or integrate existing ritual traditions like sacrifice and libation into municipal activities was evident in a set of critical questions participants raised. After the ch'alla, one Quechua-speaking woman who keeps books in the municipal government asked, "Why do we say jallalla, jallalla?" On the one hand, her question might be interpreted as an expression of her estrangement from ritual traditions, occupying a sort of uninformed stance to rural religious life. Dressing in jeans and a leather coat rather than the pollera skirt of her peers, the woman's very bodily comportment suggested an estrangement from village ways premised on a more urban, educated sensibility. And yet, the woman had grown up in Laraya and spoke fluid Quechua. Thus, it seemed, her critique seemed to emerge less from an acting of estrangement than with challenging the integration of a more recent revivalist political language into the ritual event. Thus, just because these bureaucratic forms attempt to absorb some dimensions of vernacular traditions does not mean that they go unchallenged. This is particularly so given that the efficacy of the ritual form is tightly abound up with conceptions of its being conducted properly. Thus, in the case of such ch'allas "religious belief, although strong, cannot be assumed to be constant and unquestionable. Even the best-established and most explicitly devotional elements of the fiesta are subject to debate, scrutiny, and doubt."676

۵.

⁶⁷² It is an attempt to distinguish indigeneity as culture and performance from the structural real that undergirds recent work on Bolivian land reform politics. For instance, Fabricant notes "Yet these indigenous performances remain separate and severed from real structural change" (2012:9).

⁶⁷³ I discuss the ramifications of INRA land collectivization schemes for property inheritance in chapter 4. ⁶⁷⁴ Indeed, the failure to draw lines between indigenous life-worlds and broader historical and political events was, for Orin Starn (1991:41), endemic of an 'Andeanism' that disavows the contemporaneity of indigenous peoples by aligning them with a seemingly ahistorical, apolitical sphere of cultural meaning and aesthetic practice. For a critique of the anthropocentrism of Western political frameworks and their entailments for theorizing Andean political culture, see de la Cadena (2010:343).

political culture, see de la Cadena (2010:343).

675 See Lazar (2012). Yet in Ayopaya patronage is not a product simply of indigenous culture but also has been filtered through hacienda economies as well as prior reform initiatives.

In the municipal *ch'alla*, such doubt seemed to cohere around the problem of what becomes of traditional forms, including sacrificial offerings, in their absorption into more institutionalized spheres, such as the municipal government. Thus, when the female municipal worker asked about the term "jallalla," she seemed to be registering a sense of doubt with the integration of more populist political terms into the ritual. Indeed, the expression "jallalla" is more commonly heard at political rallies than at rural ch'allas. The term, Aymara for "live," is often exuberantly chanted by supporters of the MAS government, taking the form of "long live Bolivia, long live Evo, long live MAS." In drawing attention to the term the municipal worker was marking herself as a critical observer installing her own understandings of the appropriate parameters of ritual practice while, at the same time, rendering visible and challenging admixture of ritual forms with nationalist political phrases. Interestingly, however, no one directly answered the woman's question. After it was asked, an older Quechua-speaking unionist to her right looked at her quizzically. "I don't believe that you don't know." She sipped her beer before answering him. "I don't ask questions for which I know the answer."

This tense exchange suggests the fraught nature of attempts to absorb or integrate indigenous forms into the state, particularly municipal government relations. At the same time, of course, given that *ch'allas* traditionally are comprised of offerings meant to secure fertility and life in the coming year, the notion of "Long live" marked an apt overlap in the focus on vitality shaping both Andean agricultural traditions and populist nationalism. And yet, of course, the expression "long live" drew more from European traditions of nationalism than it did the specificities of Andean sacrificial offerings, in which life cannot simply be invoked or declared but is, rather, understood as the uncertain outcome of a ritualized form of exchange. Indeed, as suggested in the very act of offering or feeding the *pachamama* as a condition of health, safety, and well being in the future, it is religious entities rather than human supplicants whose authority, ultimately, presides over matters of life and death. As such, the declaration of the government's continued vitality could be seen as expressing an unjustified declaration, one betraying not an insignificant human hubris, that one could declare rather than merely pray for a good year.

Others critiqued the *ch'alla* for the particular objects that were being offered in the sacrificial bundle. After beer and coca were passed out and before platefuls of the cooked llama meat were distributed, municipal workers distributed handfuls of anise sugar candy, some of which had been used in the ritual bundle or *q'oa*. A middle-aged Quechua-speaking union leader seated among us eyed his handful doubtfully. "Why do we eat these when we *ch'allar?*" he asked. He followed this up with second question, "Is it because it is for sale, or what?" While he could be seen as proposing an anti-consumerist stance, the man's question, like the municipal worker's discussed above, seemed to express an uncertainty with whether the ritual had been conduced properly. Rather than challenging a new market in ritual commodities, then, the union leader's seemed to be expressing a concern with whether the materials being consumed as part of the ritual were appropriate, and, in turn, what kind of a collectivity was produced or implied by event's material details. ⁶⁷⁷ The question, then, registered discomfort with the use of more urban or mestizo *ch'alla* forms, including confetti and anise, into a revolutionary sacrifice.

-

⁶⁷⁷ Indeed, widespread international markets in ritual paraphernalia are not new, regional trade in ritual objects like incense, dried llama fetuses, confetti, and wool, have a long history stretching back to the colonial era, evident in peasant markets that linked merchants in Lima to others in Potosí, Oruro, and Cochabamba (Larson 1998).

As these critiques demonstrate, the municipal government's ritual sacrifice was subject to a fair amount of scrutiny and critique on the part of participants. 678 In particular, people's discomfort rested on the problem of the transformative entailments of integrating indigenous practices into institutional and governmental spheres, ones that, they seemed to note, also resulted in transformations to that original form, evident in the invocation of "jallalla" as well as the use of more urban ritual objects like anise candy. These critiques, in turn, and their concern with the transformative entailments of inclusion were echoed in other government workers' challenges to MAS reform processes. Oscar, for instance, who worked for the municipal government but whose grandparents had labored as hacienda servants noted, "In the end the socalled indigenous, the campesino, or the *originario* is difficult to recuperate because all of this has been lost. We are speaking of many decades, centuries of transformation. When you mix everything, and then from this hodgepodge want to make change, you take from the collectivity the most representative as an inspiration to realize a revolution." Oscar's comment registers a concern with the instrumental workings of inclusion, that is, the use of certain elements due to political expediency. In such an instrumentalist approach to difference, Oscar implied, contemporary revivalist politics seemed to disavow the enduring entwinements between colonial and indigenous-derived forms. Given Oscar's own familial past, the stakes of such a critique were not abstract; they also reflected his own experiences, particularly his father's stigmatization for his intimate entwinements in Ayopaya's hacienda past. 679

As these critiques suggest, reform officials actively grappled with the complexities and entailments of indigenous reform. As Ricardo, a Quechua-speaking INRA official, discussed bilingual education proposals with me, he noted, "This is like extracting a heart and putting it in another body. This crime is being committed to us." Ricardo was staunchly opposed to the proposal as he worried it would require the standardization of Quechua and with it, its transformation. Here, then, a sanctioned mode of indigeneity was experienced as something uncanny, the search for unity or a sort of self-same composition that required its artificial sundering from prior amalgamations and entanglements. Like the doubts expressed at the *ch'alla*, Ricardo's comment registers a fear that, in attempting to integrate indigenous forms, they were also being purified and transformed. Critiques of MAS reform efforts, then, point to widespread discomfort and even distress with the ramifications of indigenous revivalism, including of state attempts to institute and thereby fix a more purified variant of indigenous belonging. That these concerns emerged not from the margins of the state or law but rather from within its institutional frames and bureaucratic corridors suggests that the reifying force of "the state" was not only being critiqued, it was also being imploded.

6

⁶⁷⁸ This critical element challenges the notion that ritual efficacy somehow lies in an organic association between symbol and meaning, a critical assessment of material forms potentially creating an "infelicity condition" that might destabilize if not disrupt the validity of the form (Austin 1975:20).

⁶⁷⁹ As discussed in chapter 2, Oscar's father had inherited land from the landlord after his mother was raped and had an illegitimate child.

⁶⁸⁰ On the colonial history of Quechua translation, particularly into the Christian Bible, and its entailments for transfiguring existing linguistic forms as well as their accompanying practices, see Durston (2007).

⁶⁸¹ As Nelson notes, "uncanny suggests the feeling of being cut off from something that was once intimately part of the self, a sense of eerie alienation" (1999:26). Thus, in the context of identitarian organizing, this uncanny seems to register a new feeling of foreign-ness opposed to what was once the familiar or the home, a sense of being "cut off from something that was once intimately part of the self" (1999:26).

Conclusion: Indigenizing Bureaucracy

This chapter has traced the work of land reform officials employed at National Institute for Agrarian Reform, looking closely as the process of land "sanitation," the conversion of original post-1953 files into updated "sanitized" files that then guide land retitling. In so doing, I underline the unexpected ways that concerns with rationalized land use and agrarian security echo earlier colonial and republican debates concerning agrarian modernization and the problem of Indian community, a resonance I have described as the "encumbrance of form." As discussed in chapter 1, late 18th century debates were centrally concerned with the *mita* labor draft and its repercussions for hacienda "slavery." Between 1793 and 1797, intendant Francisco de Paula Sanz and president of the audiencia Victorián de Villava debated whether or not the *mita* or forced labor draft, applicable both to mines and haciendas, was justifiable as a public good of the colony. Villava, integrating new Enlightenment understandings of virtue and personhood, appealed to the "moral character" of the native to argue against the tendency to deny rationality to Indians, noting that such a view had reduced Indians "to children or machines." Sanz, on the other hand, argued that pragmatically a "new mita" was needed in order to enable the regulation of forced labor that could, by this means, be "cleaned up" and incorporate more Indians. ⁶⁸⁴ Given these disagreements Viedma, the governor of Cochabamba at the time, did not take a position on the mita tax, but rather called for a broad land reform in order to distribute land more democratically.⁶⁸⁵

These earlier debates suggest how concerns over hacienda-based forms of labor and sociality have historically been addressed through agrarian reform measures. If forced labor reduced Indians to children and machines, by way of their transformation and integration into the nation labor could be "cleaned up," a process requiring the state's heightened regulation of the countryside. As in these earlier reform debates, current saneamiento efforts are guided by an understanding that agrarian reform is crucial to the transformation of rural life-ways, property ownership securing the transition from lingering post-hacienda sensibilities (where peasants arise again as children or machines) to a new form of indigenous, even militant, citizenship. ⁶⁸⁶ And vet, as discussed in previous chapters and as evident in the municipal *ch'alla*, rural life in Ayopaya remains imprinted by particular histories not only of labor but also of authority and exchange, histories that not only shape relations to the state, but also enter into municipal politics, evident in the llama sacrifice. 687 By shifting away from agrarian reform as a problem of failed implementation, then, my analysis raises new questions about the paradoxes of indigenous reform projects, including its absorption and simultaneous transformation of existing indigenous practices. Viewed as mediation, bureaucracy often arises as a sort of empty husk or shell, a chattel that delivers content to an already existing form. ⁶⁸⁸ as though these categories were

⁶⁸² Larson (1998:273-284).

⁶⁸³ Larson (1998:274 citing Zavala 1979:101).

⁶⁸⁴ Larson (1998:275); see also Arce (1978); Buechler (1974).

⁶⁸⁵ As Larson notes, this often displayed "little regard for [Indians'] cultural or social links to their communities" (Larson 1998:277).

⁶⁸⁶ See Larson (1998) and Gotkowitz (2007).

⁶⁸⁷ As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, today these practices enable responsiveness both to histories of sexual violence and abuse as well as to other forms of vulnerability related to migration, widowhood, illness, or the loss of crops to disease or drought.

⁶⁸⁸ Here I borrow from Matthew Hull's attention to the materiality of documents. Drawing from Latour (2005:39), he notes that graphic artifacts are not "neutral purveyors of discourse" but rather "mediators that shape the significance of the linguistic signs inscribed on them" (Hull 2012:13).

somehow already established. In contrast, by attending to the material and affective labors of MAS officials, I problematize accounts that identify bureaucracy as a mediation across scales, as thought these categories or scales were somehow already established. By contrasting multiple spaces of administrative practice, I have shown that the poles of mediation, state and citizen, law and land, are not given but rather arise as unstable historical achievements.

Such instabilities caution scholars against framing land, or materiality at large, as selfevident or universal in scope. 690 Indeed, the case of land erosion as well as the municipal sacrifice illuminate the fact that land is not an already existing entity, potential property to be titled and sanitized, but rather contains geologic contours and spiritual force that reform officials must reckon with. Thus, while INRA reform efforts are guided by a faith in paper, the promise of titles to deliver transparency and even justice, municipal officials and union leaders understood the conditions of rural well-being differently, one that required not only administrative work but also sacrificial offerings and prayers for a fertile year and for more revenue for development projects. At the same time, rural subjects and municipal officials destabilized state attempts to position itself as the legitimate source for determining or improving rural life, whether in the shape of land titling or as the sponsor of the municipal ch'alla. Instead, rural subjects implied that property titles might be extraneous rather than pivotal, and that, as evident in the ch'alla, the government's command of an authentic indigeneity was itself shaky. Thus, it is not simply that local level or popular politics are "scaled up" to the state level, but rather, that in the course of these indigenous reform efforts the very distinctions between political entities and scales on which modern governance relies are destabilized and contested.⁶⁹¹

By shifting from the issue of failed implementation to its bureaucratic form, then, my discussion raises new questions about the paradoxes of indigenous revivalism and accompanying state efforts to absorb and purify indigenous practices. Thus, it is not simply that indigeneity is an "open canvas" that can be strategically manipulated either by MAS politicians or by popular groups⁶⁹² nor is it that liberalism as a universal "pattern of intention" is taken up by the state or subjects. ⁶⁹³ but rather than MAS officials inherit from the nation's past a specific set of reformist anxieties concerning as well as mechanisms for regulating rural life. By bracketing our political heuristics, then, I highlight the ways that reformist categories of property, slavery, citizen, or the landless are also historical achievements whose entrenchment complicates MAS assertions of it difference from earlier reform governments. In lieu of the more facile narrative that indigenous life-worlds are recognized or integrated after centuries of exclusion, I have raised questions about the difficulties of transformation within an entity whose reformist contours have been in a sense historically fixed. At the same time, and as evident in the questions that followed the municipal sacrifice, these attempts at indigenizing the state are also incomplete, governance arising as an active site of self-reflection, critique, and discomfort rather than as a given. By allowing those sentiments into the spheres of administrative practice, state workers display a

6

⁶⁸⁹ Indeed, if scholars have tended to frame bureaucracy as a medium through which state power is enacted (Gupta 2012), this chapter points to workings of bureaucracy as a material practice as well as an arena of contestation and instability (Hull 2012).

⁶⁹⁰ See Boillat et al. (2013:664).

⁶⁹¹ Thus, it is not simply a question of the ways that "local level" politics can "scale up to other spaces of governing" (Fabricant 2012:8-9) but rather than what occurs on the ground fundamentally destabilizes the terms of modern political practice and, at the same time, materially comprises and actuates a form of state political action or municipal practice.

⁶⁹² This is an argument put forth by Fabricant (2012:168).

⁶⁹³ See Goodale (2008) on liberalism as a "pattern of intention" and the paradoxes of Bolivian modernity.

radical open-ness to conceiving and grappling with the limits and incapacities of Bolivia's current reform project, critiques that work against the nationalist reification of indigeneity. Thus, while encumbrance might suggest a sort of intractable pattern or even teleology, Bolivian reforms also show that new things emerge out of the inherited, and that enduring forms are also open to a degree of creative re-crafting.

To indigenize bureaucracy, then, is a specific governmental aim guiding contemporary reform efforts in Bolivia, yet it might also be approached as a broader point of inquiry into the colonial inheritances and creative re-elaborations of administrative entities. Efforts to indigenize bureaucracy, then, would seem to consist of two elements: First, at attempt to situate administrative spheres in specific national, cultural, and historical trajectories and, secondly, to ask how those trajectories shape not only the poles of mediation (state and subject, law and land), but also the contours of their connection or disconnection. ⁶⁹⁴ Bureaucratic mediation, then, arises as more than an empty husk or an instrumental plot line linking state power outward or to subjects; it also has a texture and a form. ⁶⁹⁵ Form, however, is not universal or a given but needs to be explored in light of a set of encumbrances, including the state's indebtedness to earlier reform anxieties as well as its inheritance of particular regulatory technologies, here property titles. Chapter 4 takes up this problem from a slightly different angle, looking at the ways that rural subjects mobilize paper forms and institutional channels not only to press for land or rights but also to contest the state's heightened presence in rural life. For rural subjects, then, as for INRA officials, agrarian reform hinges not only on land or titles but also on the continued grip of the hacienda past and its unstable repercussions for modes of rural belonging and indigenous collectivity today.

⁶⁹⁴ Such an effort is particularly pressing in countries like Bolivia, whose national government is actively grappling with the problem of post-coloniality and with the difficult task of attempting to transform the very terms of governance, attempting to integrate indigenous persons, histories, and modes of knowledge into the form and practice of modern governance.

⁶⁹⁵ Like attempts to provincialize European histories and theories of state practice, then, indigenizing bureaucracy

⁶⁹⁵ Like attempts to provincialize European histories and theories of state practice, then, indigenizing bureaucracy requires an attentiveness to the impurity of state rationalities and their constitutive shaping by histories and relations in excess of their institutional frames. See Chakrabarty (2000).

Chapter 4. Implementing Community

In May 2011, following threats to his life and that of his family, union representative Eduardo Choque signed a document formally annulling the process of land sanitation in Avopava. 696 In a signed statement, Choque noted that he himself supported recent efforts to convert the subprovince into collectively titled Native Community Lands (TCO)⁶⁹⁷ but, following escalating rural land conflicts and growing popular opposition to the plan, he was now formally requesting its nullification. The file for the case, located in the archive of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA), bears the traces of this conflict, its bound pages containing letters, union petitions, and legal denunciations challenging not only the administrative process of land sanitation but, more broadly, claims that land collectivization is beneficial for rural groups. Indeed, in a formal complaint outlining union opposition to the TCO plan, the regional union warned that imposing such a plan smacked of a "return to colonialism." In the annulment letter cited above. Choque and other union leaders criticized INRA for its collaboration with a university-supported agrarian institution, the Center for Communication and Andean Development (CENDA), noting that CENDA misrepresented the process of land collectivization in order to garner popular support for a regional TCO. In the letter, leaders invoked villagers' traditional rights to individual land ownership premised on "local uses and customs" and challenged land collectivization which they equated with "being managed like a park."

The Ayopaya land sanitation conflict suggests the challenges facing state agrarian reform efforts in contemporary Bolivia. These challenges are related, in part, to rural groups' remarkable attentiveness not only to the colonial underpinnings of agrarian reform in the nation but, in addition, to the challenges facing state attempts to completely distance or disentangle itself from previous reform initiatives. As discussed in chapter 1, in the colonial era land titles were crucial mechanisms for the usurpation of native lands as well as for Spanish colonial control over rural systems of political order and economic and cultural life. In the present, too, land titles seemed to arise as tools of legal control by which the state not only protected but might also discipline and control rural Quechua- and Aymara-speaking groups. As Choque's letter indicates, popular opposition to land reform and property titling in Ayopaya should be situated within the region's fraught reform history, one in which governmental agrarian reforms have been bound up in spatial resettlement plans that facilitated the heightened regulation of rural land and labor relations. By comparing contemporary agrarian reform initiatives to those of the colonial era, unionists rejected the state's claim that land collectivization was an expression of or compatible with indigenous self-determination. At the same time, they drew attention to the potential political and spatial constraints accompanying collectivization, constraints marked in their invocation of being "managed like a park," that is, an environmental protection area. Such opposition derives in part from Ayopaya's particular hacienda past, one that has shaped distinct modes of belonging and exchange at odds with both liberal, modern models of individuated property use, and, on the other hand, populist ideals of ayllu collectivity. ⁶⁹⁹ At the same time, it

⁶⁹⁶ See INRA Expediente 58170-45974-49394 CBBA, in particular TCO03030001 I-800. This name is a pseudonym.
⁶⁹⁷ In Spanish, Territorios Comunitarios Originarios.

⁶⁹⁸ For an detailed discussion of the sanitation process and TCO status, see chapter 3.

⁶⁹⁹ See chapter 1 for the historical underpinnings of the region's agrarian relations. See chapter 2 for an elaboration of how this history shapes opposition to the state. See also Shakow (2012); Gotkowitz (2007); Larson (1998).

seems to reflect heightened concern with the reifving effects of indigenous reform efforts and their divisive entailments for existing practices and modes of rural collectivity. 700

In this chapter, I build from archival and ethnographic materials collected at the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA) as well as in interviews, fieldwork, and conversations and debates regional union meetings, highlighting the volatility of land re-titling efforts, particularly proposals for land collectivization. As discussed in the chapter 3, for INRA officials land sanitation is related to broader concerns with achieving revolutionary change, purifying the present of the "stain of colonialism" and in so doing attempting to fix, that is, secure as well as mend, rural relations in the shadow of hacienda servitude. 701 Yet, state sanitation efforts do not go unchallenged. Indeed, as indicated by Choque's letter, while reformists' frame land reform as a means to indigenous justice, villagers often perceive it rather as an outgrowth of prior, colonial interventions. Rural opposition to land re-titling culminated in the ejection of the land reform institute from the Ayopaya region in 2011, one finalized by Choque's letter. Due in part to such challenges, in 2010 the Bolivian government extended the land reform process for an additional three years and then, in 2013, for another four years. Ayopaya was not alone in its opposition to the land reform. In the department of Cochabamba at large, INRA had granted titles to about half of agricultural lands in 2010. 702 As of October 2013, only 30% of the nation's land had been sanitized. 703 These numbers, of course, themselves reveal a particular spatial imaginary of reform as an expanding process that aspires to saturate or "sanitize" each corner of the Bolivian countryside. As we shall see, this expansionism is also an object of critique. In its parallels to earlier modernizing initiatives and imperialist spatial imaginaries, ⁷⁰⁴ sanitizing efforts reveal the challenges facing MAS reformers' claims to break from the nation's colonial past.

Documentary forms, however, do not simply work in a linear way, comprising an interventionist line that can be taken up or resisted, but work in a more unstable way, potentially inhabited by other sorts of collectivities and other sorts of political claims. Both the TCO proposal and the opposition it faced highlight the ways that "graphic artifacts" including union petitions, land surveys, and property titles come to circulate beyond formal bureaucratic spheres, documentary forms getting drawn into regional land conflicts shaped by localized histories of agrarian practice and exchange at odds with MAS reformists' design. 705 These modes of posthacienda collectivity and their accompanying land practices often diverge sharply from governmental and reformist elaborations of national citizenship and indigenous collectivity. Here opposition to such reform efforts adopted not only its language but also its form. Here, and somewhat paradoxically, documents and governmental archives supply the medium with which

⁷⁰⁰ For the reifying effects of indigenous revivalism, see my discussion in chapter 3. See also Canessa (2012) and

This insight draws from Fabricant's attention to the postcolonial logics of land sanitation as a form of cleansing. As she notes, "Through their Andean dances, stories, and tales in the Plaza Murillo, they used highland indigenous culture as a conduit for reordering and cleansing Bolivian society of the stain of colonialism, which they believed had been further tainted by the evils of capitalism and neoliberalism (2012:155 citing Rivera 1989; Postero 2007). In addition, my attention to the reconciliatory dimensions of land retitling draws from Nelson's insight as to the dual workings of healing as a mode of fixing (1999:12). For a discussion of Bolivian land sanitation as a healing process, see Valdivia (2010).

⁷⁰² See Zimmerer (2013:5); INRA Packet (2010).

⁷⁰³ Los Tiempos 1/11/2013.

⁷⁰⁴ On Spanish imperial imaginaries of space, particularly in regarding to territorial expansion, see Herzog (2015). For Spanish imperial cartographies and their partial indebtedness to earlier medieval spatial imaginaries, see Padron (2004).
⁷⁰⁵ Hull (2012).

rural groups contest reformist projects of indigenous collectivity and postcolonial justice. These sanitation conflicts are remarkable not only in highlighting rural opposition to statist elaborations of indigeneity and justice but also in marking the ways that political opposition adheres itself to and works through the institutional modalities and paper logics supplied by the state.

Continuing with my focus on land reform, then, this chapter shifts away from the institutional labors of land sanitation on the part of INRA workers to a consideration of how villagers and unionists in Ayopaya engage, oppose, and appropriate INRA reform technologies (agrarian files, land titles, petitions, legal claims) and mediatory forms (the INRA archive) and how these engagements cohere to shape particular sorts of political claims. At the same time, I am interested in how rural opposition to land reform intersects with the specific dynamics of land use and exchange produced in part by way of Ayopaya's distinct hacienda past. As discussed in chapter 3, while INRA officials understand land re-titling as a way to resolve longstanding conflicts stemming from hacienda era patterns of land use and affect, they were also aware that land sanitation has worsened rural land conflicts. In what follows, I look carefully at the nature of such land conflicts, including opposition to state land sanitation, as insight into the limits to reified models of indigenous collectivity as well as the fractures their institutionalization elicits. At the same time, such challenges to statist elaborations of indigenous community also work through and produce articulations of regional unity premised on a shared hacienda past. ⁷⁰⁶

As discussed in chapter 2, 20th century political languages of campesino justice worked in part to reify the terms of national citizenship and peasant inclusion, resulting in the present-day stigmatization of persons whose familial pasts complicate dual categories of *mestizo* elite and indigenous peasant. To Current land re-titling initiatives, then, might be seen as microcosms of broader national conflicts over the terms of revolutionary, post-hacienda collectivity. Like earlier peasant mobilizations for land and rights, then, land reform struggles under the MAS government create new possibilities of land relation and rural community while at the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, partially marginalizing a specific group of former hacienda laborers while at times consolidating the land rights of former landlords. Thus, while INRA reformers deploy technologically-savvy systems of surveying and mapping in order to align titles and land in order to achieve "truth," they problematize and render explicit less codified approaches to land ownership that, as discussed in previous chapters, enable a more fluid and conditional responsiveness to the specificities of labor relations, inheritance practices, and kinship structures. These fraught histories of servitude and exchange re-appear in the course of

-

odds with the spatially-circumscribed and homogenizing assumptions often built into the notion of community, particularly indigenous community. For a somewhat different reading focused around "community without unity," see Corlett (1993). For a treatment of the complexities of indigenous recognition, particularly insofar as regulatory processes integrate criteria related to romantic, essentialist narratives of indigeneity, see Povinelli (2002). Indeed, union leaders berated Quechua-speaking domestic laborers or illegitimate children for speaking to me about the region's hacienda history. Thus, heightened conflicts are linked to the revival and resilience of a nationalist language of indigenous belonging that draws from earlier indigenism as well as Aymara Katarista politics (Nelson 1999; Ramos 1998; Sanjines 2004). As discussed below, the familial dynamics of this elaborations of national belonging (and exclusion) is most evident in the ubiquitous slur waged against individuals whose ties to mestizo groups (landowners, urban culture, Spanish-speaking ways), "child of a landowner" (hijo del patron).

This is not altogether surprising given that, as noted in chapter 4, the land reform is modeled on the 1953 redistribution of hacienda lands which itself often replicated and entrenched existing inequities in usufruct land rights related to the tiered system of hacienda labor. See my discussion of mid-century land reform in Ayopaya in chapter 2. See also Gotkowitz for an account of the consolidation of hacienda inequities in Cochabamba land reforms (2006).

land reform efforts, conditioning alliances as well as unexpected rifts within what is often characterized as a unified *campesino* collectivity.

The chapter begins with an examination of archival practices in Bolivia's National Institute for Agrarian Reform or INRA. As described in chapter 3, INRA archival files from the mid-20th century constitute the legal precedent for contemporary land sanitation initiatives. Understanding this well, rural residents and unionists consult the archive as an initial step in advancing land claims or legal denunciations (denuncios). And yet, political claims are not necessarily exhausted by reformist discourses of justice or land rights. Indeed, in Ayopaya the regional union formally ejected the INRA land institute in 2010, asserting that land re-titling challenged villagers' control over land use and constituted a "return to colonialism." While Quechua-speaking groups in Cochabamba are often characterized as the more passive, even effeminate complements to their militant Aymara highland neighbors, ⁷⁰⁹ I take seriously rural opposition to land collectivization measures and property titling as a point of inquiry into an alternate elaboration of community after violence and of the legal conditions of postcolonial justice. To do so complicates causal assessments of the flow of reform law—via documentsfrom center to periphery. Not only did rural opponents to land titling draw from the region's complex history of agrarian reform, they also used its very institutional mechanisms and paper forms to advance a shared politics at odds with statist elaborations of indigenous community.

"There Is Nothing Here": Archival Absence and State Presence

The land reform office is located in a modern cement building in a bustling commercial district of southern Cochabamba. After checking in with the security officer seated at a desk outside in an entrance that doubles as a garage, visitors pass into a main hallway from which stairs ascend to the remaining five stories. Off the hallway, visitors have access to public restrooms and a photocopier available to the public for a small fee per printed page. Across from the photocopier, a door opens into the public records office or INRA archive, which is open to the public during business hours. Inside, the director of the archive, Carlos, sits at a desk flanked by three others where younger officials click away diligently at their computers. Visitors enter through the side door and approach a tall desk where they are attended to by him or another assistant. In the back of the room, several rows of grey metal bookshelves are stacked with thread-bound agrarian files organized numerically by case number (*número de expediente*). I, the anthropologist, sat at a desk in the back of the room, making my way through page after page of dusty agrarian files.

The doors open promptly at nine AM. After checking in at security an older gentleman in a white shirt and baseball cap enter the public records office, approaching an elevated counter where Carlos attends to them. The elder of the two does not seem to speak Spanish, or at least not comfortably, and his back is hunched. He is accompanied by a younger man who seems to be his son. After approaching the counter, the younger man explains that they have come due to a land dispute and that they would like to see the corresponding agrarian file. In front of me, the younger man leafs through one of the bound case files. Father and son talk among themselves in hushed tones as they turn its pages, the father saying, "What is this?" They seem to be searching for a particular document, one needed to resolve a local land conflict or to attest to their legitimate ownership of land. Outside in the hallway, the staircase is busy, people in traditional rural dress moving steadily in and out of the building. In comparison to other governmental

 $^{^{709}}$ See chapters 1 and 2 on historical divergences between highland Aymara ayllus and the lowland, Quechua valleys.

buildings, the INRA building has a distinctly rural feel, populated by men in bowler hats and women in woven woolen shawls and layered *pollera* skirts.

As the conversation between the two visitors and Carlos unfolds, the men make clear that they have come in search of "original" land titles—that is, titles distributed by executive order during the period of national land redistribution after 1953—and to submit a complaint against an INRA engineer who required a fee for a legal certificate that should have been freely available. The younger of the two men is guiding the elder one, his father, through each of the documents. It seems they are looking for evidence to support an accusation of foul play. The younger man explains, "See? That is your signature." But the document they are looking for missing. The older man speaks in Quechua to his son, who then translates his fathers' concerns into questions for Carlos. Now, the younger man turns to Carlos, and explains, "It should be here." Carlos, seemingly trying to get a handle on what they are looking for and why, asks the older man, "You're an ex-union leader, right?" The older man responds simply "Yes," nodding. His son relaxes a bit and smiles at Carlos, who leafs through the bound file looking for the missing document. The older man then complains, to his son, that recently "the engineer" associated with the land survey process had charged them 70 Bolivianos (about 10 USD) for a certificate of validation. The younger man adds, "But the certificate should be free, right?" In addition, the father objects, the engineer "doesn't come to the [union] meetings at night, although he should." Throughout the exchange, Carlos is busily leafing through the bound agrarian file, seemingly determined to locate the missing document. Still standing across from him at the window, the younger of the two men makes a phone call on his cell phone, speaking at a volume loud enough that everyone in the room can hear. "We want to defend our government, that's why [I need your help], my brother," he says. From his tone, it seems he is calling an authority who he is friendly with, perhaps a government official, bureaucrat, or lawyer, in order to locate the missing document. At the same time, his clearly audible statement that he is seeking to "defend our government" locates him as a supporter of MAS, or *Masista*, thereby communicating that his inquiry is not meant as an offence to the official, nor as an affront to the MAS party government, but rather is meant to aid or abet the broader revolutionary cause.

This exchange at the INRA archival counter suggests the imbrications of archival documents in current land conflicts and, at the same time, points to the ways files come to be managed not only by state officials but also by rural unionists and members of the public. In particular, it shows how the archive serves as a sort of public records office providing the public access to former agrarian files, archival documents serve not only as a resource for learning about the past than as a source of legitimacy and support for contemporary land claims. In the above case, for instance, the man and his son were able to ask Carlos about institutional norms as well as their transgression, including cases of extortion, bribery, or corruption. On the other hand, rural groups' agile use of institutional structures and documentary forms challenge the notion that bureaucracy is largely an extension or mechanism of state power.⁷¹⁰ When visiting the public records office, rural residents bring with them their own copies of case documents, signed agreements, petitions, or even land titles. Thus, legal documents may emerge out of state institutions yet they circulate in ways that can also challenge governmental visions and programs of reform. 711 Indeed, in a sense it was precisely the delicacy of such matters politically that were marked in the man's claim to "defend the government."

⁷¹⁰ This is a central tenet of classic studies of bureaucracy who draw largely from the work of Max Weber. For more recent work adopting this approach, see Gupta (2012).

711 See Gotkowitz (2007); for a comparative case in Pakistan see Hull (2012).

Here, the spatial layout of the INRA building in some ways parallels the route of a land claim. The process begins with a consultation with Pavel in the archive and culminates, potentially and with any luck, with a meeting with the INRA director on the fifth and ultimate floor. The INRA archive, then, conveniently located on the ground floor, constitutes the initial step in what may potentially culminate in any number of formal legal steps including requests for land sanitation, whether private or collective, or the "pulling" [sacar] of a new title. Thus, the archive is much more than an assembly of accumulated historical documents. Given that land redistribution maps and cadastral surveys realized in the 1950s serve as models for the post-2006 land sanitation project, the legal momentum or precedent for current land ownership claims resides in the archive, a fact that makes its contents, as well as its gaps, particularly consequential for the resolution of current land disputes.⁷¹² Thus, the lowest rung of the building, the archive, serves as a sort of institutional hinge linking members of the public to agrarian files while at the same time linking them into what can become a longer process of deliberation and eventual claim-making. A visit to the archive, then, can offer a sort of testing ground for a potential claim, a place to gage the chances of its approval. Indeed, visitors were permitted to take the file over to a photocopier on the far side of the entrance hall, paying 20 centavos (about 3 cents) per page to a woman supervising the photocopier. The next step is a day's wait in long lines and over-crowded rooms upstairs, a process that could be repeated for days or even weeks until the appropriate officials are available.

Popular and peasant engagements with documentary forms and bureaucratic institutions has a long history in Bolivia as throughout Latin America, petitions and letters arising as crucial forms by which to express political outcry and moral complaint at imperial violence and land expropriation in the early colonial era. 713 To this day, many cases rural families maintain their own agrarian files complete with "original" colonial records—often consisting in an amalgam of photocopied records, forgeries, and documents drafted by rural communities, unionists, and bearing stamps of public notaries rather than the state. Since the 1950s these collaborations have been marked by the important role of unionist who often work in cohort with INRA officials. Following the 1953 reform, recently formed agrarian unions were the key representatives of former hacienda villages comprised of what had been, and in some cases remained, colono tenant labors. This history of 1950s socialism and of peasant brigades are also imprinted upon the organizational form of the INRA bureaucracy, comprised of "field brigades" who travel to rural sites surveying land, conducting census work, leading workshops and discussing land boundaries with rural union leaders, land owners, and villagers. In addition, the bound agrarian files or expedientes bear traces of these former modes of institutional collaboration, including union legal appeals to the state to enforce the abolition of the hacienda and to demand former hacienda landlords to comply with land redistribution proceedings. That documents travel across multiple collectivities, including illiterate ones, is evident in the use of fingerprints attesting to the approval of union-INRA agreements by subjects unable to sign [Figure].

This history of collaboration between the INRA institute and union officials seems to provide hints at why the remark of the older man being a former unionist was so significant. . It

⁷¹² For mid-century documents, particularly cartographic maps, as models for agrarian reform, see chapter 3. For an account of Cochabamba's history of mid-century land reform, see chapter 2.

⁷¹³ See Gotkowitz (2007) for the case of Andean land titles and petitions; see Salomon (2004) for a comparison with pre-colonial systems of bureaucratic accounting and Salomon (1991) for early colonial writing and political complaint. See Thomson (2002) for the petitions of the native caciques in the late colonial period. Finally, see Larson (1998) for a discussion of early letters of complaint on the part of former Inca field hands in Cochabamba. For an account of the relations of early colonial scribes, chiefs, and ethnographers in Panama, see Howe (2009).

also highlights why the younger man would invoke "defending our government" as an appeal for further assistance from other authorities, an appeal and a declaration clearly meant to be heard by the INRA archival staff. At the same time, this collaborative, even sympathetic, relation of INRA officials also indicates why Carlos goes to such great lengths to assist members of the public in locating files, patiently detecting the course of conflict and then explaining possible avenues for its resolution. At the same time, this more militant history of the institution might suggest why there was uncertainty about hosting a foreign researcher. Carlos directly spoke to this nervousness as we stood outside one morning over a morning cigarette. He recounted that INRA had not been much with Bolivian researchers but that now, "with you [an American] here, they are uncertain about people coming and digging through the folders." He paused, and then noted in exasperation, "But there is nothing here! I mean, according to US standards, these are not secret or classified documents." However, he noted, the directors are nervous, "It is that they are lawyers. They have a different point of view. I think researchers should be able to come and use the archive as an academic resource." He added, "It's that for me these things are history. For [the officials], they are something else."

As suggested by my conversation with Carlos, INRA officials themselves disagree about the nature of the archive, whether it should be open and available to researchers and the public or whether, in contrast, in constitutes a certain kind of classified or delicate knowledge. While Carlos emphasized the files as "resources" and called for their public availability, other INRA officials were explicit in their assessments of the political dimensions of the agrarian file. In this broad condition of mistrust, then, Carlos's insistence on the archive as a resource seemed to point to a principled stance in support of transparency and opposed to the sequestering of records away from the public, or from researchers. In so doing, he articulated a stance that drew from more objectivist historicist logics that saw archives as amalgams or accumulations of documents rather than a position that recognized the files importance as a sort of political technology or techne. At the same time, this position was all the more striking given his daily work with rural members of former hacienda communities for whom the files were crucial instruments for the delivery of land claims or as a basis for opposing land sanitation efforts. Thus, not unlike the critical stances of state officials challenging the municipal government's ch'alla or querying the entailments of bilingual language reform, discussed in chapter 3, Carlos's position points to a sort of critical position within the INRA institute, pointing to the practices of self-reflection and critique occurring within Bolivian bureaucratic spaces.

Yet, neither were INRA workers like Carlos, despite his more public availability in the first floor archive, wholly disentangled from the broader state reform processes or from the INRA institute's place in them. On morning, a young man wearing a baseball cap and jeans came to the office, evidently concerned with recent titling proposals made in the course of land sanitation. The man complained, "They want to be one unified community [TCO] and we don't want it.... Where are the documents? In sanitation?" Carlos went on to explain, patiently and somewhat pedantically, that, within the land sanitation process, "You will all gather together and decide how you want it to go. If there is no existing dialogue they will make you meet collectively. Like other divided communities, you will all meet up to see whether you would like to remain as one or become two." Thus, Carlos insisted, "It is up to you how you want to be organized." The man continued to express his concern to Carlos, who then patiently repeated, "If you are like two communities now. . . Well, it depends on you. If they are fertile lands, you will take advantage of sanitation to discuss [these concerns]."

This exchange suggests the ways that sanitation processes—including archival consultations—intersect with state policies of self-determination, discussed in chapter 3. In the very tone and language Carlos employed, including his insistence "they will make you meet collectivity" and "you will take advantage of sanitation," he marked the paradoxical ways that self-determination was a quality being required and instructed upon by INRA reform officials. That is, community dialogue and deliberation were to a degree imposed, required, though they were positioned as benefits or advantages offered by the current sanitation process. In this language, then, Carlos revealed the ways that community self-determination—and its terms—can be externally imposed. At the same time, this imposition is then framed as a gift that people should take advantage of or benefit from. In this regard, Carlos's advice to the man—which, it should be noted, was partially coupled with his lack of concern with the specificities of the man's complaints—echoed the words of Mr. Arpasi that I discussed in the previous chapter. Mr. Arpasi, a senior official at INRA, had noted that peasants must "decide for themselves" how they want to organize themselves or what they need, and that such decision-making might initially be experienced as unpleasant or difficult but that its benefits, eventually, would become evident. Here, the insistence of self-determination did indeed seem to smack of colonialism, of a sort of partisan stance that insisted that peasants, like children, had to learn to resolve their own conflicts, a position that partially ignored the state's own role in producing those conflicts.

Not only this, but the insistence on community self-determination seemed to overstate the political unity of peasant families and, in so doing, downplay or discount the factionalization of former hacienda villages following 1953 agrarian reform. As discussed in chapter 2, former hacienda villages remain divided both by land conflicts related to divergent land holdings originating in hacienda labor hierarchies and in some cases formalized in 1953 land redistribution. At the same time, as evident in the cases of stigmatization against former hacienda servants, such conflicts did not derive simply from land tenure issues but also from entrenched evaluative frameworks for judging former hacienda workers, ones that worked to differentiate and divide former tenant farmers from former servants. Thus, the argument that rural conflicts somehow reflected an inability to "decide for themselves" or to "meet collectivity" seemed to overstate the ease or naturalness of rural collectivity. In so doing, it also discounted the ways that unity itself might be experienced as a state imposition rather than as the expression of a preexisting, organic form. ⁷¹⁴ As in reformers expression of their own discomfort with a more purified vision of indigeneity, discussed in chapter 3, these processes were haunted by lingering questions of the compatibility between statist elaborations of indigeneity, on the one hand, and existing practices of rural collectivity, on the other.

These concerns take particular shape in the specific case of the collective titling of community lands, ones in which the attempt to recuperate previously marginalized social forms can, paradoxically, enfold new forms of marginalization and stigma. In particular, land sanitation efforts organized around collective land titling raise a number of questions: Under what conditions is "community" possible? What sorts of affinities or antipathies—as well as histories of relation—go unmarked by this designation? And how does the presumption of the naturalness or organicism of Andean community—one first formalized in Toledan land resettlement policy and later revived by mid-century reformers who saw communalism as an innate biological quality particularly amenable to mass agricultural production—disavow the very real divisions

⁷¹⁴ As discussed in chapters 1 and 3, notions of primordial Andean community were used by modernizing reformers as models for agricultural production and, later in the 19th century, were drawn upon as the basis for military government's articulation of a revolutionary peasant base.

marking rural life, particularly in former hacienda villages? Finally, by naturalizing community, how are divisions or differences of opinion made to appear as evidence of a lack—a failure of choice or of the capacity to self-organize or deliberate? If unity is not a natural condition or a biological state inherent to all Andean peasants or indigenous groups, then what legal and political interventions are required in order to institutionalize or "recuperate" community?

It was in this broader reformist condition, then, that the earlier question, posed on the part of the pair of visitors to the INRA archive, becomes intelligible. As the younger man had hurriedly insisted, turning to Pavel, "Where are the documents?" In this case, the missing documents likely demonstrated the existence of two earlier villages at the time of hacienda redistribution could complicate others' efforts to consolidate the village into one, a consolidation required in order for the collectivization of land as a TCO. Plans to collectively title two communities, for instance, based on two *cantónes* or political regions, might be contradicted by archival material demonstrating that the 1953 reform transferred the land to rural ex-*colono* groups as one property rather than as two. Not surprisingly, however, the file could not be found. Pavel explained that this may be because the lands are actively under consideration or review by the land reform or *saneamiento* officials, a process that may at times result in the transportation of documents to the central La Paz office. It could also, of course, be that proponents of the land collectivization scheme had disappeared the files. In such cases, then, the archive could supply the material for opposing sanitation even as it also served as a precedent or model for reform.

Thus, in INRA land sanitation, the complexities and limits to state attempts to institutionalize community were often most apparent in a set of archival absences, in particular, in missing documents. Given that earlier agrarian files served as guides and models for contemporary reform, information at odds with reform proposals could be made to disappear. Land reform officials understood this well; indeed, it was precisely such awareness that shaped their concern with allowing me access to the INRA archive. In 2011, I arrived at INRA for my second visit with the president of the Cochabamba branch of the national INRA institute, who was charged with either accepting or denying my research request. For three months, I myself had been embroiled in a lengthy process of gaining permission to conduct research at INRA, one involving my own assembly of a file complete with HIV blood tests, health exam certificates, gas and electric bills, and international police records. After this lengthy process, I was anxious to hear the outcome of my application. After I entered his office, a senior INRA official turned to me and noted, unapologetically, "The director recommended that I not approve your proposal to conduct research here." Surprised, to say the least, I could only reply, "But why?" The official explained, "You see, there are certain problems emerging out of this hacienda past, and we, along with the unions, use the archive as a reference point for these disputes. There is a worry that you will take data from the archive and use it to create problems. For instance, there are some communities that were originally haciendas and were one property. The property was subsequently divided, that is, the community divided into two or more separate villages with their own union and village authorities. Today, there are efforts to consolidate each of these separate villages into their own community, despite the fact that the archive says that the land was originally one community. However, people in the community today say that no, we are not one community anymore. But the data in the archive says something else."

Thus, what Carlos takes as "history" or as a record of past events are also the very same files or documents used to settle land disputes and, in addition, to set precedent for current land sanitation cases. Here, these two possible understandings of the archive—as political *techne* and as historical accumulation, as absence and as presence—are inter-related. Given the importance

of earlier land reform documents for land sanitation, the archive serves as a precedent for sanitation decisions as well as a source of popular or union opposition to INRA reform proposals. Here then, "nothing" is political, particularly when that which is absent are files or documents needed to submit, appeal, or oppose a sanitation proposal. Indeed, in reviewing land case files, I found many instances of missing documents, whose absence was internally remarked upon in the file. For instance, in Sarahuayto, home to a particularly conflictive land reform case in which titles were not released until 1986, the following was printed in thick red ink on the final available page: "Where are pages 103-155?" Then, in underlined red capital letters, as if confirming the question: "PAGES MISSING." Thus, it is not only the presence of documents in the archive and their linkages to the state adjudication of land claims, but also their absence that ramifies reform processes. Here, absent files registers conflict or opposition, less in a generalizable way than as an indication of the active movement of the file through sanitation and of accompanying concerns and opposition. The While absent files could complicate sanitation processes, they could also abet them, particularly in their contents challenged reformist or unionist characterizations of the region's history of land use and community.

The significance and complexity of archival files derives in part from the fact that the earlier files, particularly surveys of redistributed land following the 1953 land reform, serve as precedents for the current delimitation of land and community. Indeed, officials' initial refusal of my request for archival access stemmed from a then-current political conflict in Avopava hinging on land collectivization. Namely, the village of Sarahuayto, had been considered one hacienda in the 1953 titling, providing support for certain community members interested in consolidated the community as a TCO and eliciting opposition from others that the community had, since, always operated at two distinct villages. Thus, for reform officials—themselves trained as lawyers, agronomists, survey technicians, and environmental engineers—the workings of the 1953 reform maps as models for current land reform projects lent the documents a certain legal efficacy and legal volatility. Not only did agrarian files from the 1950s serve as guides for resolving rural land conflicts, they also arose as models for legitimate property ownership in the present (see chapter 4), a spatial and propertied design for current land re-titling efforts. In this case, as in others, the archive is dangerous because it claims to proffer access to an authentic, historical pattern of collectivity with which current claims must comply, or, if not, risk accusations of being illegitimate. Paradoxically, then, the hacienda continues to frame the terms of recognizable territory and land claims, even and despite the ideals of instituting a totalizing break from the bondage of the hacienda past.

For sanitation officials and rural supplicants, then, even archival absences—one that shifts around slightly the terms of Carlos's view of the archive as "nothing"—carry political and legal repercussions. Archival documents or their absence enable certain claims and invalidate others, destabilizing certain titling proposals (such as that of a collective title or TCO). In this way, the archive of agrarian files holds a form of evidentiary authority at odds with assessment of their pure historicity, that is, their apolitical nature. This evidentiary authority is in part related to the structure of colonial law. 717 As discussed in previous chapters, topographic maps, cadastral

_

⁷¹⁵ I discuss Sarahuayto and its hacienda and reformist past in chapter 2.

As other anthropologists note, the most conflictive cases tend to be fractured by absence, missing papers invalidating claims or, simply, slowing down a legal process such that it might be drawn out indefinitely (see Hull 2012).

⁷¹⁷ For the problem of evidentiary authority and absence in the colonial archives in India, particularly in regard to sexuality, see Arondekar (2009).

surveys, and land titles have long constituted and consolidated the presence of the government, and law, in rural districts. Land titles, for instance, were historically crucial to the colonial spatial and political remapping of rural agricultural life, documents not only representing land but also resettling and regrouping rural land and people. Documents like maps and titles then, have worked not only to represent but also to reshape the landscape, including its property boundaries as well as rural relations of labor, kinship, mobility, and exchange. Of course, the efficacy of documents as models for reform should not be overstated. Thus, if documents operate as models for reform for a sort of "rule by record," they are also entangled in other sorts of claims. To consider the ways that documents are drawn into alternate political projects, including opposition to state land sanitation, let us now return to the land collectivization case in Ayopaya.

Funding Indigeneity: European Sources of Land Collectivization

During the first six months I lived in Ayopaya, the region was home to an acrimonious union conflict concerning land sanitation, in particular, the titling of the region as Native Community Lands (TCO). It was, indeed, during my first month in the region that when I was invited to a local union meeting, that the issue first arose. In the course of the daylong meeting in a large hall in Laraya, various union leaders and Quechua-speaking peasants discussed the problem of "gringos coming" and intervening in local land affairs. Some months later, at the annual Candelaria festival in Sarahuayto, as guests sipping chicha at the home of the *pasante* or fiesta sponsor, an elderly Quechua-speaking man had berated one of the younger union leaders, his complaints hinging on the problem of land inheritance to children. On multiple other occasions, in clay-floored *chicha* breweries in Laraya, drink and emotions flowing alike, men spoke fervidly at tables in dim corners about land sanitation, their voices rising at times into angry shouts and emotive, lyrical complaints, resuming later into tearful embraces. It was not until the end of fieldwork, however, that anyone spoke openly of the conflict to me. It was Don Angelo, who we met in chapter 2, who first hinted most explicitly at the fact that there had been some foul play in a local land collectivization scheme.

As it turned out, at precisely the time when I had been appealing to conduct research in the INRA office in Cochabamba, the region had been embroiled in a tumultuous conflict that drew together actors across Bolivia as well as Europe, involving several Bolivian agrarian NGOs, a university-sponsored agrarian program, municipal government officials, INRA workers, and the Dutch government. In this section I discuss the conflict to the best of my knowledge, which is, like all forms of knowledge, partial and incomplete. In particular, my account does not integrate the views of members of one NGO nor of the Dutch government. However, I do draw heavily from a range of conversations, interviews, and union debates in Avopaya. My focus, then, is less with providing a seamless narrative than with attending to the some of the complex ways that pro-indigenous funding programs play out on the ground, and the conflicts and stakes of such programs for Quechua-speaking villagers themselves. This case is instructive not only in its cautioning of the challenges facing international development programs, but, more broadly, as a point of insight into the paradoxes of pro-indigenizing development initiative. Importantly, these complexities are not simply resolved even when programs assign indigenous political leaders and unionists a pivotal place in directing or overseeing local development initiatives. Instead, global pro-indigenous initiatives can link into national land collectivization schemes, ones that rely on more reified models of indigenous

⁷¹⁸ See Smith (1996) on colonial land titling in India.

community. At the same time, the case raises broader questions for the patterns of post-hacienda authority and of what subjects are made to speak for the collective and with what entailments.

It began with a generous grant from the Dutch government back in 2003. This offer following from decades of international aid, configured as a Dutch bilateral development initiative. Indeed, according to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs report in 1996, the Netherlands had provided 840 million Dfl. (Guilders) to Bolivia between 1969 and 1996. 719 In 1996, indeed, Bolivia was the largest recipient of Dutch aid in Latin America. ⁷²⁰ This aid continued into the early 2000s, with Bolivia remaining the second largest (12%) recipient of all reported international aid in 2003. Dutch funding in the early 2000s supported a range of programs including agricultural resources, civil society, water sanitation, documentation corruption, education, environmental policy, as well as unspecified sectors. 721 According to the Dutch Foreign Ministry, the money was made available both through the bilateral program as well as being channeled through "co-financing agencies," including the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) and multilateral organizations in Bolivia. 722 A former government official who had been working in the Cochabamba municipal government in 2003 noted that, in particular, 8 million USD was specifically earmarked for aid in a project of instituting and titling a region of Ayopaya as Native Community Lands (TCO). The project had initially been proposed in the northern part of Ayopaya, the municipality of Cocapata, a predominately wooded, semi-tropical region that borders the La Paz jungle. Members of two Bolivian NGOs, including one situated in the city of Cochabamba, Center for Andean Communication and Development (CENDA) and a regional NGO in Ayopaya, Foundation for Self-Determination and the Environment (FUPAGEMA), ⁷²³ leaders of the region's peasant union, the Central Union of Campesino Workers of Ayopaya (CSUTCOA), 724 members of the municipal governments in both Ayopaya and Cochabamba, and the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA) began collaborating on the project, which they were enthusiastic about.

In 2011, this proposal was still on the table, not integrated into new sanitation policies on the part of the Bolivian state. Yet, according to critics, while the money was initially to be made available for a TCO in northern Ayopaya, in order to get access to the available funds there was hope that the region could expand southward, consuming the entirety of the Ayopaya province. This generated difficulties, not least because much of Ayopaya is comprised of small towns populated not only by rural Quechua-speaking farmers but also by mestizo members of former landowning families who would, of course, be entirely opposed to the loss of their private land titles. In addition, opposition to the plan stemmed from broad perceptions that prior international funding initiatives in the region had been corrupt, the money being pocketed by union leaders and municipal officials rather than funding the proposed project. Not only did the development programs seem to produce very little material benefit, but they also seemed to pit various

⁷¹⁹ Dutch foreign currency, Netherlands Antillean Guilder, whose exchange value is about .56 US dollars each.

⁷²⁰ See Bolivia: Evaluation of the Netherlands Development Programme with Bolivia (ENDP), Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published in 1996. Electronic resource: http://www.oecd.org/countries/bolivia/35164822.pdf

⁷²¹ See the report, Aid Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2001-2002, OECD 2003. E-Book available online: http://www.oecdbookshop.org/browse.asp?pid=title-detail&lang=en&ds=&ISB=9789264103856.

⁷²³ Fundación para la Auto Gestión y el Medio Ambiente. More information about the organization is available online: http://www.afsai.it/progetti/icye-lt/fupagema-fundaci%C3%B3n-para-la-auto-gesti%C3%B3n-y-el-medioambiente ⁷²⁴ Listed as "Central Sindical Unica de Travajadores [sic] Campesinos Originarios de Ayopaya."

members of the community against one another, giving union leaders undo weight over the deliberation process while alienating other sectors and their political interests.

As Don Angelo, a former union leader noted, villagers are suspicious of CENDA because the organization brings development projects with lots of financing, but then in the end nothing changes, nothing is done. "What happens with the money? This is the question" Don Angelo remarked. For this reason, he noted, there is a lack of trust (confianza) in NGOs. (Revealingly, it was this same expression "a lack of confidence" that Mr. Arpasi the senior INRA official had used to characterize rural opposition to land sanitation. Don Angelo went on, noting that similar problems had plagued the local agrarian institution FUPAGEMA, one that was primarily funded by Germany. According to its former director, the problem began eight years ago, in 2003, when the leadership changed and the new directors re-organized the institutional structure, giving the directorial committee a majority vote and using this vote to dramatically increase their own salaries. The group had also forged signatures, eliciting the ire of Don Angelo, who travelled by bus to La Paz to deliver a denuncio at the office overseeing the German aid project. This conflict, which occurred in the mid-2000s, set the stage for the conflicts accompanying the collaboration proposal from the Netherlands.

According to the former municipal official from Ayopaya, like these earlier corruption schemes, the terms of the TCO project proposed in 2011 were changed so that the money—8 million USD, an enormous sum in Bolivia—would become available. That is, learning of the resources available for the plan, there emerged proposals to extend the region covered by the proposed TCO to all of Ayopaya. Yet, this elicited a lot of concern, not only from former landlords and their children, but also from rural villagers concerned that they would lose access to their land or not be able to pass along the land titles to their children. In these ways, land collectivization schemes faced challenges that stemmed particularly from a set of concerns rooted in the region's hacienda past, concerns hinging not only on regional patterns of land use and property but, also, with the interventionist entailments of agrarian reform.

Unwelcome Reforms: On Uses, Customs, and Being Treated "Like a Park"

The agrarian file for the proposed TCO in Ayopaya consists of 28 thread-bound booklets, each organized by case number. 725 According to the file, the proposed TCO would apply to the rural cantons of Cocapata, Icari, and Choquecamata. The claimant in each case, as indicated in the title page, is the Central Union of Campesino Workers of Ayopaya or (CSUTCOA). 726 Documents in booklet 28 are stamped in red ink with a sign that reads "National Institute for Agrarian Reform URGENT," the word URGENT printed in large red block letters on the top of each page. The second page consists of a form with boxes indicating the nature of the claim. The boxes "Sanitation Unit Valley Region" and "Urgent Attention" are checked, and the form is dated May 11th, 2011. The remainder of the file consists primarily of a back and forth letter exchange between the CSUTCOA peasant union and INRA, including the Sanitation Office and the Legal Affairs unit. The most recent document, located at the top of the file, is a letter written to the General Director of Sanitation, Giovana Mallea Valencia on May 11th 2011. It is from Dr. Juan Manuel Zurita Portillo, INRA's General Director of Legal Affairs, who submits a request that more information be collected regarding the sanitation process in Ayopaya. In particular, in the letter Dr. Zurita Portillo requested additional information concerning the annulment of the region's sanitation as a TCO. In addition, he called for INRA's release of any Executive Files,

⁷²⁶ Listed as "Central Sindical Unica de Travajadores [sic] Campesinos Originarios de Ayopaya."

165

⁷²⁵ See Expediente 58170-45974-49394 CBBA, in particular TCO03030001 I-800.

that is, original post-1953 land titles, which had been collected in preparation for their replacement by a collective title. Finally, Dr. Zurita Portillo requested that a formal statement be prepared by the Legal Affairs unit speaking to the current state of the sanitation process and given that "there exists conflict in the process of sanitation" in Ayopaya.

After Dr. Zurita Portillo's letter, the file contains an earlier letter drafted by the union of Altamachi (one of the sub-provinces included in the proposed plan) and noting that they have unanimously voted for the cancellation of the process of sanitation in their region. It is accompanied by a report on the results of the vote. Containing the seal of the CSUTCOA union across the top of the page, the report reads as a record of a union vote conducted in a public meeting in April 2011. 727 The report was subject to administrative language, complete with enumeration and date and titled, Voto Resolutivo Alt. D-1/No 001/2011. The report, configured in the shape of letter to INRA, reads: "In accord with the [union] meeting of April 25th 2011 and with the support of the municipal government of Cocapata, the union of Villa Vinto, and in regard to the topic of emergency, TCOs, in the region of Altamachi, [the union] requests: That, following the organic analysis made by all of the participants in the meeting, the social sectors that make up the regional union of Altamachi unanimously determined the [in bold] Annulling of Sanitation of the TCO and furthermore the definitive expulsion of the SENDA [sic, CENDA] institute from the region. This was determined and decided during an ordinary congress in the region on March 28th and 29th, and furthermore this decision is newly ratified by the 11 sub-central [unions], 33 sindicatos of the Altamachi region, and the municipality of Cocapata." The remainder of the letter, itself a product and a record of the March 2011 union vote, goes on to list the reasons for the annulment. These are:

With sanitation as a TCO, our region would become considered and regulated as a park and in accordance with the Law 3545, article 44.

With sanitation as a TCO we would be returning to the era of colonialism where residents (*compañeros*) or each affiliate of the region would no longer be owners of their lands and/or no longer have titles to their individual properties.

The districts or sub-centers that want to urbanize themselves with higher population and personal affluence could not urbanize if sanitized as a TCO.

The lands would be indivisible and non-transferable to children, grandchildren, etc. with sanitation as a TCO, since the property right is of the community or region and not of the individual persons. Each *compañero* would be vulnerable to being expelled from or stripped of their lands with sanitation as a TCO, because he/she would not have a title to the individual property and the right of the collectivity would predominate.

[The NGO] SENDA is advancing a false discourse [discurso falso] of recuperating natural resources (mineral and petroleum concessions) through sanitation as a TCO, [claiming] that we would be owners of both, which is false given that these resources are administered directly by the central government following article 3, number III, of the Law 3545, and the community does not participate.

With sanitation as a TCO, the authorities of the public administration would not have enough salary as a TCO, that is, they could not realize work on roads and public administrative tasks.

The letter ends with the union seal, centered in the bottom margin. The first reads, "Struggle for Power, Territory, and Sacred Coca," and is followed by a second line, "United, We shall Overcome!"

⁷²⁷ I arrived in Ayopaya in March 2011, suggesting that the document in some ways synthesized the fragments of conflict I had learned about during the initial weeks there.

The next page of the union letter puts forth a series of request. First, it calls for the annulling of the process of sanitation as a TCO and of the accompanying nullification of the executive titles (that is, the individual property titles distributed by executive power following the 1953 reform). It also calls for the ejection of the CENDA institute from Altamachi, Ayopaya, "for having fooled people in their explanation of the entailments of a TCO." It also calls for "respect for consuetudinary tradition" of each region, and for the "regularization and actualization of individual titles." Next, it requests the certification of property registers in each union part of the region, as conducted by INRA. The document concludes, "Because of the above, we consider and reiterate that by unanimous decision the representatives of the Regional Center (Union) of Altamachi and other representatives of social sectors have determined (bold, all capitals, and underlined) THE ANNULLING OF THE PROCESS OF SANITATION AS A TCO and of the executive titles collected, and in the case that our petition is declined, we will be obliged to take methods of direct action with the participation of our bases [peasant groups], against the Departmental INRA, the National INRA, and other Institutions that are participating in TCO sanitation. Given this, and following the submission of this petition we declare ourselves in a [all capitals] STATE OF EMERGENCY in all of the region of Altamachi in the province of Ayopaya in the department of Cochabamba." The document is signed by the Executive Leader of the Altamachi union, his signature followed by the seals and signatures of government officials, union leaders, and sub-central union leaders who are in support of annulling the process of land re-titling initiated by INRA and assisted by CENDA.

The annulment letter is followed with subsequent documents noting the steps that have already been taken to reverse the re-titling of the land as a collectivized TCO. A final document is a letter prepared by Choque, and cited in the introduction to this chapter, recounting how the proposal as a TCO came about, the challenges that were faced—including popular opposition stemming from the fact that "titles from fathers and grandfathers would not secure land ownership," as well as problems with several mine-owners), and the reasons why he is removing his own support for the proposal, which as discussed earlier, had subjected him and his family to threats against life and well-being. Thus, Choque's letter in some ways synthesizes the case, one that derives from multiple stances including both support and opposition for the proposal and which draws, among other things, from concerns about the ramifications of TCO status for existing land relations, including individual property rights and inheritance, as well as the future course of the region, evident in the discussion of urbanization schemes and their incompatibility with TCO status. In addition, the file speaks to the ways that Ayopaya's distinct economic and social history shapes assessments of state sanitation processes, evident in the reference to conflicts with mine-owners (discussed in the next chapter). Here, the divisions stemming from the region's agrarian and labor past fit unsteadily within legal models of communal land use, not only the diversity of actors but also their fraught relations to one another arising as challenges to a more unified model of peasant or indigenous community.

More broadly, the letter signals the adept legal knowledges of union actors, documents including reference to legal codes to challenge governmental (INRA) and nongovernmental (CENDA) claims about the benefits of collective land titling. Not only this, but it expresses clear outrage and frustration particularly with INRA, for what it claims to have been a manipulative misrepresentation of legal reality in order to foster support for the TCO plan. This sophisticated legal knowledge is particularly remarkable given the characterization, on the part of higher-level INRA officials, of peasants in former hacienda regions like Ayopaya as essentially unable to

⁷²⁸ See "Ref.: Retiro de Rúbrica de la Demanda TCO Ayopaya." INRA Archive, Cochabamba.

critically engage with political problems or collaborate collectively to their self-benefit. Instead, the file suggests that collaboration can occur in terms not sanctioned by governmental languages of political subjectivity and indigenous unity. Furthermore, such collaboration not only supports or augments state reform policy but also works to contest and destabilize it.

Noteworthy in the language of the union rejection of the sanitation scheme is its integration and mobilization modern governmental languages, evident in the invocation of a "state of emergency" in Altamachi, the language of a "unanimous vote" and in the form of "congresses". 729 Yet, what is especially surprising is the combination of this language of representative democracy and governmental structures with an invocation of "direct action," that is, rural mobilizations, road blockades, or the storming of buildings. This threat is directed both at INRA as well as the municipal government, signaling the ways that popular confrontations with state entities are not only normalized, they are in a sense evidence of political outrage or outcry. 730 In challenging a range of state and non-state institutions for their responsibility in the case, one that it was argued, constituted a purposeful deceit of rural groups, Ayopaya unionists rejected claims that land sanitation or collectivization as a TCO were simply expressions of popular will. More broadly, then, in outlining the reasons for annulment of the TCO titling process, Ayopaya peasants challenged the claim that collectivization was a result of or compatible with self-determination. Instead, the union positions itself and its members as unwilling recipients of indigenizing reform, rendering explicit their preference for supposedly more western legal forms like individual titles, as well as their interest in the possibility of development not delimited to a romantic idea of timeless indigenous community. These include concern with future urbanization as well as a focus on land inheritance to children and within families, inheritance that, within collective rights, would be absorbed into collective lands.

Without analyzing the entirety of the file then, these critical documents are revealing of broad rural opposition to land sanitation as Native Community Lands (TCO). The explicit comparison of imposed sanitation efforts today and earlier colonial agrarian reforms attest to the existence of sophisticated rural historical consciousness in Ayopaya, one that identified land and land reform as crucial mechanisms in past and ongoing state regulatory efforts. As discussed in Chapter 2, uncertain relations to revolutionary governments and to land reform in Ayopaya stems in part from its particular experience with prior agrarian reforms including the incomplete redistribution of former hacienda lands, the seizure of land by some community members from others, and the inequities and conflicts concerning land and labor hierarchies following 1953. Given the individual cultivation of land and its importance of property both of worth and for national political subjectivity, collective rights were not particularly desirable. Not only would they risk leaving lingering conflicts over land in the hands of union leaders, who most often were descendants of hacienda tenant farmers rather than former hacienda servants, they also invited concern over the broader vulnerability and even abjection produced by not having access to land, evidenced by an individual property title. In a sense then, both Ayopaya's particular hacienda past and the nation's broader political history, with its long-term concern with agrarian titles as a

⁷²⁹ Congresses, of course, are not new to the Bolivian countryside but have been significant at least from 1938 onward, when the first National Peasant Congress was held. For a discussion of these earlier congresses, see chapter 2. For a broader account of the integration of legal languages into peasant organizing in 20th century Bolivia, see Gotkowitz (2007).

⁷³⁰ This in turn echoes understandings of rights as existing only in their exercise, a Roman understanding that, Herzog (2015) argues, meant that in early colonial Latin America protest was a constitutive part of political subjectivity, arising not simply as the expression of rights but as their most important form.

means and an indication of national inclusion and citizenship, converged to make collective land titling unfeasible and undesirable for Ayopaya villagers.

Thus, while urban government officials characterize rural groups as somehow ignorant and incapable political subjects, this legal conflict demonstrates sophisticate and minute awareness of legal codes and reform proposals. Both legal knowledges then, and the very paper form of bureaucratic practice, including letters with figurehead and institutional seals, petitions, and reports or minute from regional meetings or "congresses" suggested that opposition to governmental reform initiatives also worked with and integrated the very modalities or media of the state, particularly the INRA bureaucracy. 731 In Bolivia, these legal engagements are not new, pointing not only to the creative appropriation of legal tools but, more broadly, of critical and vigilant ways of inhabiting bureaucratic spaces and dialogues. ⁷³² Today, these legal practices show that long-term indigenous and union engagements with the centralized state have in a sense supplied rural groups with the knowledge and institutional know-how not only to accept international donor aid or to comply with state reform initiatives, but also to critically evaluate and reject them. At the same time, these collaborative refusals of land sanitation also demonstrate that post-hacienda life is much more than a place of lack. Indeed, while the union letter to INRA rejected state elaborations of indigenous community, it also drew from ideals of regional unity, evident in the use of "we," for instance "we would be returning to the era of colonialism" as well as in the union seal, "United, We Shall Overcome!" Thus, more than a fragmented scattering of atomized servants unable to mobilize politically, this case shows how histories of subjection can also yield unexpected articulations of regional belonging.⁷³³

'Walking Forward All Together' (Purishanchis): Unity, Unionism, and the Pain of Reform As suggested in land sanitation case discussed above, agrarian reform efforts in Bolivia confront broad rural opposition, particularly in former hacienda regions like Ayopaya. While aimed at recuperating or re-integrating previously marginalized social forms, like the Andean ayllu, reform efforts can be experienced by rural subjects rather as another chapter in a long history of state regulation and reformist transformation qua agrarian reform. Opposition to state land reform was consequential insofar as it posed broader challenges to the MAS party claims to facilitate indigenous representation and inclusion. Indeed, as noted in chapter 3, many reform officials come from rural backgrounds and are deeply committed to the indigenous cause. Yet, reform officials tended to explain opposition to land retitling as a result of rural groups' lack of critical thinking skills, thereby depoliticizing their opposition and sidelining the problem of whether MAS approaches to indigenous justice can account for the particular configurations of land and sociality in former hacienda regions. Indeed, officials complained that opposition to the TCO plan had simply been a result of a several misinformed individuals who had rallied the union against INRA. For instance, as we discussed how Ayopaya had ousted INRA from the region, one INRA official noted, it had been impossible to set the record straight because one man working in the region's Quechua-language radio station had been "spreading lies about land sanitation and building up opposition to it."

⁷³¹ Here, as Matthew Hull has noted, "petitioners enact an ambiguous political subject by combining the discourse of a supplicant with the graphic organization used by bureaucrats in their memos" (2012:16).

⁷³² Indeed, as historians including Laura Gotkowitz (2007) and Sinclair Thomson (2002) have demonstrated, in Andes indigenous petitions and claims both engage and subvert legal meanings and yet continue (or even extend) their channels of claim making.

⁷³³ For the fragmenting effects of hacienda servitude, see Larson (1998). I discuss the exclusions of such unity latr in this chapter as well as in chapter 5.

Yet, drawing from the conversations and debates that transpired during an eight-hour union meeting in Ayopaya in April 2011, I argue that opposition to state agrarian reform cannot be explained, or dismissed, simply as the product of a few misinformed voices. Instead, I argue, the union debate suggest the ways that rural groups engage with the problem of their own relationship to the state, of their partial estrangement from the national level union, COB, and with the broader problem of who should or does hold the power of decidability over matters of rural life, including land conflicts. Should villagers turn to traditional modes of conflict resolution in the case of border disputes or land conflicts? Or should they turn to state institutions, like INRA, to decide such matters? And could INRA be trusted, given its imbrication in the recent CENDA conflict? Finally, how could the region empower itself? How could it achieve unity in order to secure political representation and thereby "advance"? Should this occur by way of support for the national level union, or would it require a special attentiveness and critical stance both toward the COB and the state? These questions were engaged from a range of positions and on the part of various actors, yet they seemed to agree on two things: first, forging regional unity was of pressing concern as it would secure political representation, and secondly, the terms of this unity were not clear, but it was evident that they would not fit easily or unproblematically into governmental or international models of indigenous community. Rather, speakers drew from the specificities of the region's past, recalling their fathers' and forefathers' land struggles and calling for vigilance in protecting these inheritances from state intervention.

On the second Sunday of April 2011, about 80 people crowded into the union building in the municipal center of Ayopaya. The speaker brought the meeting to order, and began by taking attendance, calling out the name of the representative of each regional sub-center (subcentral). When called, each leader answers "yes" or "here." One man, drunk from the night before, provided a loud and loquacious response, eliciting subdued laughter and some eyebrow raising. The meeting opened with a presentation by a MAS-party government representative from Cochabamba, who stood in front of the hall with a bound file of photocopied laws in his hands. Recently passed legislation included a new development law and new counter narco-trafficking measures, as well as a new border control policy. In Spanish but with a smattering of Quechua, the official noted that there have been over 100 new laws passed since the unions last meeting, with 80 to discuss today. 734 He then went on to remark that the union had met only three times in 2010, and that its president had changed several times. Thus, he noted, you "need to meet a bit more often, and you are lacking order." Finally, he discussed several proposed development projects, including a potato commercialization project. As he passed around pamphlets summarizing new legislation, including a participatory Autonomy Law, 735 he returned to the topic of the potato project, noting "You have to coordinate with the state if you want to do the project. I'm not saying you have to accept it, but if you do, you have to coordinate with the state."

As suggested in these initial moments of the union meeting, rural villagers and unionists are caught in a particularly paradoxical relation to the state, one in which they are at once

⁷³⁴ By and large, the men at the front of the room, who are union leaders, managed the Quechua less fluently than their peers.

⁷³⁵ This was Decreto Supremo Nº 802, passed on February 23rd 2011, which revised an existing Autonomy Law passed in 2010, titled Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización "Andrés Ibáñez," passed on July 9th 2010.

informed of their power to control the terms of local development, and yet pedantically told they must meet more often and organize themselves more affectively. They are also told clearly that while they have a power to choose or reject local development initiatives, they "have to coordinate with the state," that is, its modalities or forms are not open to revision. At the same time, the government officials' visit suggests the at times confusing results of such rapid legal processes of reform, with some 100 new laws to review, a number that was clearly unfeasible. Here, legal legislation focused on autonomy and participation confronts the problem of getting people to participate in the terms satisfying to government officials, including their requirement that rural groups make themselves familiar with new legislation.

The government official took his seat, and the head union representative rose from his chair around a table on the stage (the union hall was also the elementary school performance auditorium), calling on the audience to discuss and evaluate "whether there are advances in the government or not." In addition, he called on audience members to consider the "spirit of the law," that is, its broader aims and goals. Another union representative encouraged people to be patient, noting that people "want projects for the future, but they want results now." He also brought up for later discussion the issue of border conflicts in Cocapata. At this point, a petite woman who had entered late with her baby stood up and took the floor. A provincial representative of the National Bartolina Sisas Campesino, Indigenous, and Native Women's Union, 736 the women's branch of the national COB, she wore a velvet *pollera* skirt with a woolen, checkered blanket over her shoulders. She noted that "in order for us to advance" (avancanapaq) changes would have to be made to acknowledge that leaders have babies. This statement should be situated within ongoing debates over childcare as well as the treatment of mothers on union-controlled transport. Calling for the support of her fellow unionists, she noted, "We need good unity (sumag unidad) as Andeans." As she explained, "Just as there have been divisions in the Andean zone, so too with Ayopayans." In closing, she notes that there is hope that the national COB will make more effort to aid women with children. However, she laments, "In the Andean region there doesn't exist much questioning (tapuy) of the way things are."

The discussion turns to the *Estatuto Organico de Ayopaya*, a recently passed national legislation outlining the implications of legal autonomy for the province of Ayopaya, in particular, the focus is on the ways that the regional COB union, by way of *technicos*, engineers and agronomists, have been intervening in the regional union. Thus, he notes, what is needed is autonomy at the municipal level. A man to the left of the main speaker, an *alcalde* or indigenous village leader, now addresses this situation, noting, "Ayopaya is a big province, and sometimes there isn't enough information about the national situation." The drunken man begins talking loudly out of turn, telling the authorities to get on with it, and people seated near him silence him gently with shushing hand motions, waving hands up and down.

The issue, it seems, hinges on the problem of how to secure national level union representation for Ayopaya. As the regional union representative notes, He notes, "the [COB] is forceful and can instruct the government." (The man next us interrupts loudly again.) However, he explains, "If we don't have a representative at the national level we cannot call on the government or president to help us." What is needed, he notes, is someone from Ayopaya to represent the province in the national union and in this way to carry weight in national governmental debates. Then his tone shifts, and he speaks more rapidly in Quechua as he

⁷³⁶ In Spanish, Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia "Bartolina Sisa" (CNMCIOB), or the Bartolina Sisas.

describes the conflictive and uncertain relation between the COB and the MAS government, which, as mentioned before, had been embroiled in this time in conflicts concerning food and gas subsidies and then a development plan through the eastern lowlands. In rapid Quechua, he notes, "There have been problems with the [COB], problems with the marches and blockading of roads. People were directed [to participate] by the *Federación Unica*. We have to evaluate what it is that the government is doing. We have to remember the passivist march. This work is hard; there are provincial problems. We have to strengthen ourselves in order to develop, as often the economy is lacking." The man who has been interrupting now shouts loudly, "Enough already, we get it." People admonish him in Quechua, telling him to be quiet as it is an *informen* or presentation. Finally, a union leader from the front table escorts him outside by the arm.

The comments of the union leader as well as the Bartolina Sisa representative highlight the problem of regional unity in what is felt to be an uncertain relation both to the national COB as well as to the national MAS government. In these statements, union officials lingered with the problem of how to "advance," understanding "good unity" (sumaq unidad) as a means to political representation at the national level and, with it, a chance to direct or redirect the terms of national debate and policy. Interestingly, speakers invoked both the unity of the region as Ayopayans as well as a form of Andean collectivity. More broadly, the comments highlight a critical engagement with the national political climate and an uncertainty about to what degree they, as a regional union, should or were expected to support or work in cohort with the nationallevel COB. There was the related question, in addition, of whether alignment with the national COB might endanger or weaken their ties to the national government and to control over policy processes. Finally, speakers challenged their peers and fellow unionists to take a critical stance toward the way things are, from questioning (tapuy) the treatment of women to reflecting on whether the broader national union or COB conflict with the government and President Morales was a problem of concern to them. What emerges then is a picture of a region concerned with its relation to other entities, including the national COB and the state, and at the same time concerned with achieving some sort of unity as a condition of political strength and "advancement," that is, development.

Indeed, the next topic to be discussed concerns the "unity of the province," a concern that, the speaker tells us, requires evaluating the different municipal governments of Ayopaya, Morochata, and Cocapata. One man in the audience begins, "Ayopaya and Cocapata are doing well, but where is Morochata? It has help from certain groups. We have to make sure to defend the land titles. There is the problem of social control as [COB] directs [us from] the department level. We and our problems are very distant as a province [from COB]." In particular, he noted that several government institutes, among them members of the Ministry of Development and Rural Land, the National Institute for Agrarian Reform, and the Ministry of Government or National Cabinet had been interfering in municipal affairs. He then posed a question to the audience: "What do we do about this social control? Well, each leader has to make decisions organically. When there are conflicts we do not understand each other. We have to talk beforehand." He continued, now bringing up problem of international aid for local development projects, "In regard to the international groups, we have to ask do they respect the communities or not, for instance [the NGO] Yachay Wasi wants to start working here in February 2012 but they never informed us, they just informed the departmental level [COB]."

The question of international donor aid then quickly shifted to the ongoing conflict in Ayopaya concerning the sanitation of collective lands as a TCO. Thus, one man began by raising the question of the TCO by noting, "There is this problem of titling, archives, and the

lack of a solution in regard to the agrarian doctoral student." According to the speaker, the problems had begun when a doctoral student, in affiliation with the agrarian institute CENDA as well as an agrarian track at the University of San Simon, had proposed to study "communitarian land use in Ayopaya." Yet, the director of the institute had failed to ask the permission of local unions and had asked only the departmental union. One man noted, "This is discriminatory." Now, the regional union is debating ejecting CENDA, along with INRA, as the study had caused conflict among communities and unions. In particular, as the study was underway it became clear that its interests were not simply to document but rather to the forging, with the assistance of CENDA and INRA, a regional TCO despite the fact that many local leaders and residents were uncertain of their own support. One man stood up, and raised his fist, "We have to kick out all the people doing theses with CENDA." Another man rose and added, "They took peoples' land titles. This has consequences. What are they going to give their children?" He continued, "This has caused division and discrimination."

Finally, another speaker took the floor, linking the problem of land sanitation to the right to departmental and regional autonomy in political affairs, noting that CENDA released a public denunciation of Cocapata regional authorities when they opposed the land re-titling efforts as a TCO. This, he implied, constituted a violation of the right to autonomy. He held up a document, a copy of the recently passed *Estatuto Organico*, noting, "This [law] says that each form of autonomy has to be within the other." That is, regional municipal autonomy has to be respected and cannot be subverted by international or national institutions, including CENDA and the INRA administration. Perhaps attempting to placate the angry crowd and redirect the conversation, the government representative seated at table on the stage noted, almost apologetically, "We are in a profound process of change with Evo. We have to see how the question of autonomy figures in this process, with more profundity." Bypassing complaints of "social control" and the subversion of local autonomy, the government official invoked a collective national "we" who are, together, embedded in the government's "process of change."

One man in tattered clothes stood up to speak in support of collective land titling, that is, sanitation as a TCO, in northern Avopaya, or Cocapata. He countered previous speaker's critique, asking how collective titles would affect everyone. Another man responded, "It will affect us because we have property titles and instead we will have just one title for the province. We know this will affect us. What sacrifice, what pain [dolor] will be caused by this [legislation], signed by our president? And knowing this we told people and started to question the study and project to create an autonomous indigenous area. Our grandparents got this land as it is, individually, and that is how we want to walk onward into the future (purishanchis)." Notably, the man arguing against the TCO is wearing a new coat, denim jeans and shiny leather shoes. Despite his appearance, however, he affectively invokes past suffering of "our grandparents" and, in Quechua, calls for a future of private, rather than collective, land ownership. Another man rises, clarifying that the issue with CENDA hinged less on the problem of collectivization than that people were not consulted, only the department leaders in Cochabamba. One man complains, "Gringos are interfering. Instead, these decisions must come from our union center. These gringos are interfering with our lands, as they have in the past." Talk of the INRA law and TCO continue, as various audience members share their stance, some supporting the plan and others in opposition. One man, a union representative who had invited me to the meeting, explained that he supports it. He explains, "We always need projects because, well, there is no process of change [proceso de cambio mana kanchu]. There is much suffering."

A senior union representative agrees, "It is true. We must ask 'Where is the process of change?' And it is worse still because the COB is using these laws to divide us."

As this conversation indicates, the issue of land collectivization in northern Ayopava was extremely fraught, invoking emotional appeals to the suffering of parents and grandparents in the hacienda era and past struggles for land and rights while at the same time noting that, in the present, development moneys were precious given the failure of state efforts at social change and accompanying forms of rural suffering marking life in the countryside. Of crucial concern in the conversation was not only the question of the liquidation of former private land titles but also the broader issue of self-determination. How, in the name of indigenous self-determination, could all these various institutions and government agencies be so bent on manipulating the course of the region's future development? The case, then, synthesized broader concerns with the problem of past colonialism and the racialized forms of power that had traditionally determined the course of life in the region, one marked by one man's angry complaint that "the gringos are interfering with our lands, as they have in the past." Thus, even as speakers refused a facile narrative of timeless indigenous community—evident in the invocation of grandparents, that is, former hacienda tenants, receiving private land titles—this did not mean that participants did not link current events to broader colonial histories of governmental meddling, nor did it preclude impassioned appeals to regional unity in past and present.

The final discussion point, concerning land conflicts, suggested that these debates were not simply matters of principle or of political positioning, but rather had minute material effects for people's ordinary lives. In particular, the conversation concerned a border conflict between two sub-provinces, Cocapata and Morochata. The area had originally been an hacienda, but after it changed owners, it had been unclear where the border is and to which sub-province it belongs. One man spoke and noted that, according to the law, it belongs to Morochata. Another man disagreed, not with his claim but with its premise, "The problem is not one of the law but one of customary use (usos y costumbres)." Thus, while formally the land belongs to Morochata, for some time farmers from Cocapata had used it.⁷³⁷ Here, traditional or customary use should be understood as partially determined by the earlier structure of *colono* labor under the hacienda system. As discussed in the previous chapter, the agrarian reform of 1953 cared little which colono was originally from what place; what mattered more was where they had cultivated land. Thus, Even if laborers were not originally from one village or hacienda, if they worked the land as tenant farmers they were made legitimate heirs to the land, deserving of national titles distributed through the executive branch and known as títulos ejecutoriales. (The problem, of course, is that the 1953 reform did not recognize the fluid labor relations marking haciendas in the region, including part-time laborers, seasonal workers, weeklong laborers, people who might work for some time but then leave to mine elsewhere, and so on.) This indeterminacy had created conflicts today. Namely, while these hacienda laborers were traditionally residents of Cocapata, their children feel they have a claim to the land in Morochata.

Another man rose and suggested a solution, in Quechua, "You need to write up a document outlining the border, and calling for repercussions if these borders are not heeded. The

_

⁷³⁷ The understanding of rights to possession as depending upon usage echoes early colonial applications of Roman understandings of right in South America. As Tamar Herzog (2015:42) notes, "Because rights hinged on possession, which depended on activity, the territory that resulted was often discontinuous. Rather than consisting of a line or a front or even an amorphous area, it was made of fields, farms, woods, and settlements and their hinterlands, thus taking the form of an archipelago, with 'islands' of occupation surrounded by a 'sea' of 'unoccupied land.'"

municipality is incompetent to solve this problem. So how else will we solve it?" Next, the man next to me, the representative from Cocapata spoke again, calling for reciprocal respect among provinces as a means to address the conflict, "We need to respect each other, respect each other like Christians. This is the moral thing to do. Morochata needs to respect Cocapata, Cocapata needs to respect Morochata." Others continued raising their hands, re-iterating the argument that the land belongs to Cocapata through "use and custom." Around me, people began growing impatient and whispering loudly. One man declared to people within earshot, "What they are saying amounts to a proposal that the land is theirs. This is not the appropriate place to introduce such a proposal." Mutual respect or traditional uses, it seemed, would not be sufficient to determine the line. Instead, the conflict would require a shift to documents and to national law.

This conversation suggests the ways that, with INRA's recent emphasis on the transparency of property rights and the absolute delineation of borderlines, other overlapping and less determinate land use arrangements arose as increasingly insufficient. More broadly, the question of property lines between sub-provinces was of pressing concern as, with potential land sanitation processes, land collectivization in one sub-province would entail other parties' lack of claim to the land from that point onward. Paradoxically, then, the politicization of land rights in recent agrarian reform proceedings had given new weight to old problems of borders and property lines. With the new focus on an absolute delineation of the correct or true owner—one that, it should be noted, continued to evoke and be positioned within the details of the region's agrarian history of hacienda labor—old systems of land use and conflict remediation seemed increasingly insufficient. Thus, even where rural villagers were skeptical of the benefits of land reform, sanitation proposals seemed to have fomented conflicts hinging on the question of the decidability of property ownership and the arbitration of claims. Here, as evident in the remark that the union congress was an inappropriate sphere in which to deliver a land claim, ongoing reform efforts also worked to circumscribe assessments of the legitimate scope and scale of regional union politics and, simultaneously, to position governmental intervention as inevitable.

Concerns with land politics linked in to broader anxieties concerning the question of autonomy or self-determination and, on the other hand, the weakening of regional political force resulting from social divisions and conflicts. Yet, as evident here, such conflicts had also been produced in part by reform processes, including land sanitation proposals to title part or all of Ayopaya as a TCO. Thus, to put in plainly, it seemed that national and international efforts aimed at increasing indigenous autonomy and preserving cultural traditions through the establishment of Native Community Lands had, unwittingly, weakened the ability of regional authorities and unionists to adjudicate land disputes, land disputes that became all the more pressing given the potential solidification of existing land use and land ownership practices by way of recent and ongoing land titling efforts. It was, in turn, this problem of the fracturing of regional modes of collectivity—forms of collectivity, however, that diverged sharply and explicitly from narratives of a timeless indigenous inhabitance of the countryside—that fueled participants' many calls for unity. Unity, it was recognized, would also ensure strength, strength against both the imposition of foreign development plans or against the corruption of local authorities or unionists working in cohort with state agencies or nongovernmental NGOs. And yet, unity seemed increasingly challenging in the face of growing conflicts just as selfdetermination seemed complicated by authorities' necessary reliance on INRA to ascertain with certainty and precision the nature of property and sub-provincial boundaries.

Thus, the force of law seemed ambivalent. On the one hand, participants of the union congress invoked "the law" (embodied in a bound booklet of recent laws distributed at the

beginning of the meeting) in defense of regional rights to autonomy and in opposition to meddling from national and international institutions. At the same time, they expressed an understanding of this "autonomy" as both warranted and thus delimited by broader bureaucratic spheres, such as INRA, and their specific protocols of claim making and refusal. Thus, the call for good unity as Andeans or Ayopayans, with its accompanying turn to notions of "uses and customs" and reciprocal respect, appeared as insufficient as some participants argued that a formal complaint would need to be lodged with INRA. At the same time, neither were people satisfied with mechanisms of conflict resolution offered by the INRA institute, one that seemed to respond less to provincial needs and more to political (and economic) concern with establishing a TCO. Thus, participants in the Ayopaya union meeting recognized the limits to broader statist schemes of land reform while also elaborating a view of their inevitability as a mediating body and as a legitimate arbiter of claims.

As evident in the union meeting, the critique of state-sanctioned models of community is, particularly of Native Community Lands (TCOs) was not at odds with the simultaneous expression of alternate elaborations and ideals of unified collectivity. In a sense, then, it was perhaps less that participants were opposed to community as such than that they challenged the configuration of the form within land collectivization schemes. Such challenges are not new. Indeed, while in the colonial period ideals of segmentary relations to land based on spatiallycircumscribed territory were instituted as parts of sweeping rural reforms concerned with tribute, labor access, conversion, and the civilizing of natives, in colonial documents native or indigenous claimants often appealed to the notion of community in ways that complicated these more spatially and socially-reified elaborations of the term. ⁷³⁸ Given these spatializing interventions, the persistence of border conflicts such as that between Morochata and Cocapata in some ways indicates the ways that rural land relations continued to take a more amorphous shape than the models of bounded community and delimited land use despite earlier reform efforts. At the same time, and as evident in the heightened vulnerability of such relations in the face not only of sanitation efforts but, in particular, collective land titling, suggests the paradoxical ways that attempts to recognize or integrate indigenous community also problematizes and enervates precisely the sorts of more fluid spatial patterns and agrarian practices that seem have persisted in part despite colonial land reforms. ⁷³⁹ Thus, in a region like Ayopaya where rural life has been organized less around ayllu-based collectivities than elaborations of possession by use related to the structure of hacienda labor and 1953 agrarian reform, attempts at collectivizing land appear as yet another cycle in an ongoing effort to pin rural groups to delimited spaces in order to more fully integrate them into centralized systems of political rule. Let us now consider how the delimitation of informal land practices shaped by new, more reified ideals of peasant collectivity define and redefine the contours of rural land use.

Good Unity as Andeans: Post-Hacienda Belonging and the Indigenous Supplicant

The focus on regional unity supporting and in part reproduced in union calls to eject the INRA institute suggest the need to re-evaluate arguments that supplication and its accompanying modes

-

⁷³⁸ As Thomson (2002:24) notes, in colonial documents native claimants often appeal to the notion of community in a way that maintains segmentary relations to land at odds with more bounded, territorially delimited understandings of the term.

⁷³⁹ As discussed in chapter 1, Ayopaya like many of the Cochabamba valleys were marked by migratory flows and more fluid patterns of land use including the existence of archipelago or outlying islands of agricultural production across ecological levels. See Murra (1967) on the "vertical archipelago" model of agrarian production in the highland Andes.

of collectivity are necessary short-lived, representing organic surges or events that then dissolve after a claim has been made. 740 This assessment of the temporality, that is, the short longevity, of a group of petitioners or claimants draw in part from arguments that such collective forms are themselves effects of the administrative and legal categories introduced in modern governance. Thus, groups converge around difference as the premise for a sort of more delimited "political society," one at odds with broader, more activities and ideals of homogenous civil society. ⁷⁴¹ Yet in Bolivia, known in the colonial era as Upper Peru or Charcas, indigenous masses never belonged simply to some marginalized underbelly of Spanish civil society. Rather, as discussed in chapter 1, they comprised their own "Republic of Indians," subject to a distinct if unequal set of juridical norms, rights, and laws. 742 More than the upsurge or short-lived appearance of a small group of supplicants allied in their claim to difference, indigeneity was a constitutive part of colonial law and was itself assigned an appropriate system of documentation, denunciation, claim-making, and appeal. As evident in union participants' appeals to "good unity" as Andeans, the colonial history of adjudicating indigenous difference remain crucial to contemporary elaborations of regional collectivity and ethnic belonging. And yet, they do so in ways that are neither short-lived nor, for that matter, conscribed entirely to the colonial terms of difference.

As discussed in this and the previous chapter, elaborations of regional unity or collectivity drew in bureaucratic and documentary forms while at the same time rejecting statist plans and proposals for the institutionalization of community, namely as a TCO. The petition lodged by union representative Eduardo Choque on the part of unionists of Ayopaya show how such documentary forms arise as modalities of political critique, not only of state intervention but of the attempt to fix and adhere subjects to a more conscribed elaboration of indigenous community. Thus, rural opposition to the TCO plan shows that groups of supplicants or petitioners engaged with documents as a premise for claim-making are not simply the effects of interpellative encounters with the state. 743 At the same time, and relatedly, the case shows how colonial and republican attempts at defining and delimiting the legitimate shape of difference—either as modern property-bearing subjects or as indigenous members of highland ayllus—have remained incomplete and fraught, accompanied by and enfolding other relations to space and land that are, in turn, conditioned by traditions of land use and conflict management at odds with reformist ideals of drawing determinate lines around property, whether individual or collective. 744

7

⁷⁴⁰ For instance, Matthew Hull emphasizes that the alliances generated by the circulation of documents are often irregular and short-lived (2012:20). He notes, "A list of names entitled to compensation for expropriated land engenders an alliance (in legal terms, a "conspiracy") between senior bureaucrats and villagers, crossing the antagonisms between the state and the village. Unlike a public, these associations are not easy to identify and generalize about, partly because, being irregular and often relatively short-lived, they are rarely culturally typified like more common or stable forms of sociality that have labels such as 'directorate,' 'family', or '*biradart*' (kinfolk or community)" (2012:20).

⁷⁴¹ For "political society" as a collective claimant rooted in colonially-produce difference, see Chatterjee (2004).

⁷⁴² See Thurner (1997) for a historical account of the dual republic system in colonial Peru.

⁷⁴³ For the subject as a partial product of encounters with the state, particularly police, and of this relation as one of "interpellation," see Althusser (1971). This notion has subsequently been taken up by poststructuralist philosophers as a way of understanding the production and fixing of political subjects in processes of modern law and governance.

governance. ⁷⁴⁴ As noted in chapter 3, here my engagement with the problem of property boundaries draws from Paul Carter's (2009) elaboration of "the line" but as a form of spatial conscription and as an attempt at rendering transparent or decidable otherwise more amorphous relations to place.

Yet, to say that Ayopaya petitioners belonged to a more enduring mode of collectivity than that of a short-lived alliance between bureaucrat and supplicants is not to say that regional elaborations of unity were simply structurally unchanging or mechanistic in form. 745 Something can be both enduring yet also porous, open to re-elaboration and transformation. As is clear in the existence of peasant petitions in Avopava from at least 1938 onward, 746 alliances facilitated by bureaucratic technologies of writing and rooted in the production and circulation of documents are not necessarily short-lived and disorderly. In Bolivia, petitions supporting land claims—both individual and collective—have a long history, one that belies arguments of indigenous collectivity simply as a product of colonial law or as a more recent invention of identitarian movements for indigenous rights or environmental justice. 747 Thus, while ethnic movements might reshape the legitimate forms of recognizable or exemplary collectivity, this does not mean they are the only elaboration of belonging that guide rural lives nor that their growth or proliferation simply uproots or displaces other ways of being indigenous. ⁷⁴⁸ Not only do other elaborations of regional, post-hacienda collectivity persist, they also become a source of critique and reflection on the limits of statist approaches to indigenous justice. Thus, as noted in Choque's letter annulling the land sanitation process, the state's attempt to seize and control local lands constituted a "return to colonialism." Thus, as rural groups draw from documentary forms as sources of complaint and critique, state institutions are always confronted by the problem of the indebtedness of bureaucratic forms to an earlier colonial and republican era.⁷⁴⁹

Despite my argument that rural forms of claim-making premised on ideals of regional unity demonstrate a collective supplicant whose trade in bureaucratic technologies of writing and documentation is not altogether new, this continuity does not mean that claims do not undergo dramatic shifts. Rural demands for the abolition of hacienda labor after 1938, and later demands for hacienda land distribution culminating in the 1953 agrarian reform, were driven by appeals to the state as a source of beneficent protection and aid. They also were accompanied by supplicants' promise that they would aid in the process of rural transformation, changing their habits and modes of dress. ⁷⁵⁰ Today, in contrast, rural union groups and peasant associations seize upon the paper form to challenge and obstruct the state process of agrarian reform. In the

⁷⁴⁵ Here, I respond to the risk—in the opposition between civil and political society or between publics and supplicants—of reproducing a vitalistic portrait premised on the opposition between structures or institutions including 'the public,' seen as unchanging, general, or even structural, and informal 'associations' and 'alliances,' treated as generative and ever-changing. For instance, Hull writes, "They are often much more transient and always more particular, irreducibly dependent on the peculiar characteristics of the graphic artifacts around which they form and the milieu in which they are taken up" (2012:20). Se also Chatterjee 2004; for a critique of vitalism as a heuristic for understanding civil society see Cheah 2003.

⁷⁴⁶ On the 1938 congress and accompanying petitions on the part of hacienda colonos in Ayopaya, see Gotkowitz

<sup>(2007)
&</sup>lt;sup>747</sup> See Chapter 1 for a discussion of altiplano or highland collectivity in relation to Bolivia's 1952 revolution and in response to 1953 land reform efforts.

⁷⁴⁸ For the displacing effects of reifying discourses of indigeneity for existing ways of being indigenous or *jaqi* in contemporary Bolivia, see Canessa (2012). The slippages between state models and existing practices of collectivity is discussed in Hull (2012). For instance, he notes, Thus, documents, petitions, or other "graphic artifacts" gather around themselves distinct "forms of sociality" and are shaped by "institutional structures, kin, friendship, and financial relationships" that make them more than mere "materializations, projections, or realizations of these relationships constituted by other means" (Hull 2012:21). Yet, as noted above, my analysis diverges in underlining the longevity of a collectivity premised on the figure of the rural, post-hacienda supplicant.

⁷⁴⁹ See chapter 3 for the encumbrances of bureaucratic form. This is a point also made by Hull (2012) when he notes that bureaucratic forms often inherit infrastructural qualities from earlier colonial state administrative systems. ⁷⁵⁰ See my discussion of the mid-century period of anti-hacienda organizing in chapter 2. See also Gotkowitz (2007).

present, as in the colonial period, documentary forms and bureaucratic technologies are turned back upon the state. A petition using a union seal and demonstrating sophisticated command of bureaucratic norms of writing, appeal, and legal claim-making work toward neither the realization of reforms (calls for modernization) or merely as a sort of creative re-appropriation (the use of falsified documents or copies to replicate or perform the authority of legitimate, state-sanctioned documents). Instead, formal letters addressed to INRA officials both requested and declared rural groups' rejection of the terms of reform, citing the possibility for "direct action" while at the same time re-iterating other forms of regional unity as a source of strength and vitality in fending off what was seen as an incursive, and manipulative, state. Thus, more than a subaltern politics embedded in the shadows or underbelly of liberal democratic mechanisms of bureaucratic association or legal complaint, the Ayopaya case shows how rural supplicants inhabit and maneuver within their relations to state institutions and through paper forms.

A lingering question is how such rural engagements with documentary forms and state institutions shape the terms of administrative practice. That is, are forms of documentation and writing simply instruments of pre-existing social or political design or, rather, are they themselves transformed by their movement and encounter with the things they seek to represent or transform, including rural land relations and post-hacienda villages. Indeed, as discussed earlier in this chapter, it is in a sense precisely these public engagements with the INRA archive that have lent themselves to the production of particular understandings of the archive. As evident in Dr. Arpasi's concern about my proposal to conduct research at INRA, the documents—even in their absence—do things, they set the precedent for state processes of land sanitation at the same time as they enable and complicate rural contestations and claims. More than simply an accumulation of documents but, rather, as a sort of political *techne* that enables claims even as it complicates state agrarian reform efforts.

Furthermore, while some scholars have characterized the relation of institutional or bureaucratic spheres to their objects of representation as one of being interrupted or remade by new modes of circulation, this chapter and the last have also shown that "the bureaucracy," including INRA labors of land sanitation and property titling, is in part constituted through its fraught encounters with other patterns of collectivity and land use. Put differently, it is the enduring of other forms of more fluid property use and of alternate elaborations of collectivity that calls forth and becomes the material through and upon which land sanitation efforts work. At the same time, new political conditions such as indigenizing reform and international aid for land collectivization also reshape these bureaucratic labors, both providing moral and financial impetuses for creating more TCOs while, at the same time, destabilizing state claims that such collectivization schemes express or are even compatible with rural, indigenous self-determination. In short, mediation is not simply a space between subjects nor a technology of statist intervention, it is also a material process shaped and reconfigured by the things and

-

⁷⁵¹ Several scholars of mediation have taken up this question of how mediatory forms are reconfigured by their encounter with the things they claim to represent or link. See Hull (2012:21); Bessire and Fisher (2013).
⁷⁵² I discuss this question of how bureaucracy is shaped and enabled by the things and people it claims are outside of it in chapter 3. As Hull (2012) notes, part of this transformation may be characterized as a process wherein the things (and persons) purportedly represented by documents transform the nature of documentation itself.
⁷⁵³ See Veena Das and Deborah Poole (2004:15), as well as Erik Mueggler's account (2001) of the importance of documents in facilitating the state's penetration into the everyday. As Mueggler argues, the state's relation to the rural margins is not simply an extension of centralized political power through law but also or rather a shifting in rural terrains of practice, subjectivity, and morality.

persons it seeks to link, transform, or regulate. 754 Yet, this focus on the interplay between mediatory institutions and rural bodies risks overstating the breadth of bureaucratic force or efficacy. Reform processes did not always work as planned nor did they simply confirm or strengthen regional unity. Collectivity, both the mode sanctioned by land reform as well as unionist elaborations of Avopava unity, faced limits, limits related to the specificities of the region's hacienda past and to its production not simply pattern of claim making but, relatedly, of the bounds of a legitimate peasant supplicant.

"Son of a Landlord": The Intimacies and Exclusions of Revolutionary Land Reform

Pavel was in his early 40s, the grandson of Quechua farmers who had been overseers of a nearby hacienda estate. His parents were left some relatively fertile lands, having been favored servants. Pavel inherited the title to these lands. In the fifties, his father had been an influential unionist, even working for the MNR state as an agrarian inspector in the 1950s. Pavel had cultivated the land plots he inherited from his father, but in 2008 he left for Spain, where he worked in building construction, sending money home to support his wife, a local chicha-brewer, and his three young daughters. Yet, it was hard to procure work in Spain, and he returned home in late 2011, in financial ruin. He set about preparing his land to plant *chirimoya*, a coveted tree fruit for which the region is famous. After several months preparing the soil for planting, including arduous labor or removing stumps and trees that had sprouted up, it was ready to be planted. Yet, at precisely that time—around the same time that the land conflicts concerning INRA sanitation had been mounting—the regional union or CSUTCOA⁷⁵⁵ had intervened. In accordance to the new 2006 Land Reform, lands left unattended for two or more years failed to serve a "social and political function," and thus, were susceptible to state or union repossession and redistribution. ⁷⁵⁶ Indeed, citing the 2006 law, unionists and former hacienda tenant families had insisted that the land was theirs, assuming the plots Pavel had so tenderly prepared.

After interviewing Pavel's uncle, I accompanied him and Pavel on a drive to their former lands. 757 The rusty jeep paused at the cemetery, then stopping just after a hilly curve where three men napped in the grass. This area is home to the town cemetery and, they noted, is called Avsamana, Quechua for "the resting of all, living and dead." After parking the jeep, the three of us stand at the edge of the road, surveying the sprawling golden fields in the valley in front of us. Pavel's uncle points to the various land parcels, following their place names with the a remark concerning their former hacienda owner. To the north, across the valley, Pavel points out the village of Chullpani. The village was built around a former hacienda, owned by an influential mestizo landowner called Carlos Espada, who had owned the vast expanse of land stretching from Chullpani to a more distant village, Pampa Redonda. In the late 1940s, Pavel's grandparents, Pedro Soliz and Sabina Quirosa, received some land in Chullpani from the former Espada landlords. As Pavel noted, this had been an "inheritance" from the landlord

⁷⁵⁴ Hull notes that "such documents often become mediators that incorporate aspects of the people, things, and processes they were designed to control from a distance" (2012:21).

755 Listed as "Central Sindical Unica de Travajadores [sic] Campesinos Originarios de Ayopaya."

⁷⁵⁶ See chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of MAS's 2006 Agrarian Reform Law, one which drew from and made changes to a 1996 Sanitation Law.

⁷⁵⁷ See fieldnotes 12/1/2011.

⁷⁵⁸ For instance, they explain, there are Colchini, Chullpapampa, Churiwaranka, and Salvani, are all owned by the Orihuela patrón. Then we turn to the east, looking over the village of Pajchanti, previously owned by the Mercado family.

acknowledging his grandfather's good work as a mayordomo or hacienda manager. Such land gifts, as discussed in chapter 2, unfolded within a broader set of patronage relations between hacienda landlords and workers, predominately domestic servants and prestigious laborers like mayordomos and jilikatas. At the time when the land was gifted to Pavel's grandfather, it had been cultivated by a group of unpaid tenant colonos, who, subsequently, became his grandfather's workers and servants. This case, of course, was not singular but rather should be understood as embedded within the broader emergence of a group of small, peasant landowners (juchuy patrones) throughout Cochabamba. 759

Pavel contested union claims that the land was not his. On the one hand, the land had been inherited by his grandfather. However, as we went on to discuss the case, I learned that it had been redistributed by 1953 land reform, the Executive Titles distributed by the MNR government that attested to former tenant colonos' legitimate ownership of the land they had formerly worked. As discussed in chapter 3, Bolivia's land reform of 1953 was configured by the ideal (and slogan), "the land is for he who works it." More recent land legislation in the 1990s, precisely the 1996 Land Sanitation Law, declared fallow lands turn the property of the state or, in the case of recognized "original communities," the property of the local community. ⁷⁶⁰ However, the former *colono* worker, Pavel's father's god-child, had died some years ago, and the children had been passed down to his children, who migrated to Chapare to farm coca and start a gasoline transportation business. Thus, and drawing from reformist languages of "social and political function," Pavel argued that since current owners had abandoned the land it should be his to use. According to him, they had left their land fallow for some 26 years. Yet, in 2011 and likely in no small part caused by the heightened concern with property formalization with the land sanitation process underway, the legal owners of the land had returned, insisting that the land was theirs. Interestingly, the legal owners of the land were the godchildren of Pavel's father. That is, even in cases of legitimate ownership premised on titles and property ownership conferred by INRA in the 1950s, property ownership was configured within and not outside regional histories (and hierarchies) of hacienda labor and kinship. So, too, the reconfiguration of these land relations were experienced as an affront to inherited relations of kinship and aid. As Pavel noted, the lands had been his father's inheritance, a repayment for his unpaid work as a mayordomo. Blinking away tears, he added "What jealousy."

Pavel was particularly disgruntled by the fact that the legal owners had waited until he had gone through the arduous process of preparing the soil for planting before submitting a claim to the land. Thus, while they themselves had left the lands abandoned, as soon as they noticed the plots carefully tilled and prepared just so, they intervened, asserting that the land was theirs. According to Pavel, he had initially been hopeful that they could arrive at some sort of a shared agreement. The union leaders, he noted, initially seemed sympathetic to his claims, noting that they were willing to "find a solution" together. Thus, upon their insistence, he went to meet with them. Yet, according to him, when he arrived in Chullpani, the site of the former land and the home of the former hacienda tenants and their families, the legal owners—his father's godson had aligned himself with the regional union. Thus, as noted, the former colonos were gathered and soon together "with the Central," or union, a spatial and political proximity marked in Pavel's language. Thus, after a drawn out process, the union eventually determined that the lands belonged to the former tenants. In a regional union meeting Pavel attended, a union

⁷⁵⁹ For a discussion of the growth of a small peasant landholding class, see chapter 1. See also Gotkowitz (2007) and Shakow (2014). For its underpinnings in valley agrarian relations, see Larson (1998). ⁷⁶⁰ See Kay and Urioste (2005) for a discussion of 1996 and 2006 land sanitation laws.

representative went to length to note that, counter to Pavel's assertion of abandoned land resulting in the forfeiture of land rights, "These lands will belong to them even if 100 years pass." Their reasoning was that these land plots, regardless of their yearly cultivation, belong to broad redistribute efforts and, in providing shared pasturelands or informal land use to local peasants, combat the vulnerabilities of the hacienda past, thus "serving a social or economic function." Pavel was dissatisfied with the union ruling, arguing that it contradicted the 1996 reform law and its accompanying focus on land cultivation as a premise for continued property rights. Thus, he argued, requirements of continued use in order to serve a "social or political function" were being applied unequally, used as the premise to appropriate land from nonunionists or to secure unionists' land but never the reverse. This position was evident in Pavel's remark, "The land should be for he who works it, and it was abandoned. If I were to abandon my lands, they would be appropriated in no time, but not with their lands."

As Pavel's account of this conflict suggests, rural villagers and townsfolk are attentive to the ways that hacienda-era relations shape and condition legitimate land use even today. They are also aware, it seemed, that there was a fundamental divide between what sorts of former hacienda workers were considered worthy supplicants or claimants in current land reform cases. While unionists supported and backed the claims of former tenant farmers, this was not always the case with other labor positions, regardless of whether those laborers had been equally abject or indigenous. Here, as discussed in chapter 2, those with more intimate ties to former landowning families were characterized as compromised by the hacienda past, a compromised condition of affinity to landlords and estrangement from former colono peasants often synthesized in the expression "son of a landlord," a term used as a slur against mestizos as well as Quechua-speaking villagers not embedded in peasant union. Indeed, when I asked Pavel whether he thought the union's decision over the land conflict might have stemmed from the fact that his rivals were of ex-colono descent while his own sense of land ownership stemmed from mayordomo descent, specifically, due to his grandfather's ties to the former landlord or patron. Pavel quickly agreed, "Exactly." He went on to note that the man with whom he was scuffling over the land was a direct descendent of Victor Cejas, who had been a colono or unpaid agrarian laborer for his grandfather, a mayordomo turned small-scale landowner. 761 Of course, his grandparents had by no means been elites. Rather, according to Pavel, they had been landless herders or *forasteros* who, later, were hired by the landlord *mayordomos*. Then, in 1946—a year before violent anti-hacienda mobilizations swept the Ayopaya countryside—they were left land by the landlord. Thus, his family's position as forasteros and then hacienda managers had created a political estrangement from populist modes of union belonging based on former hacienda tenantry. This estrangement, it seemed, worked to foreclose Pavel's inclusion in a collectivity of indigenous or peasant claimants, despite his Quechua accent or work as a local chicha brewer. Pavel was aware and critical of this alienation from union politics. As he noted bitterly, "The Central [union] wants to help campesinos. They can easily take lands. Yet, for me, they did not make justice."⁷⁶² This, he added ironically, is "community justice."

On the one hand, one can easily understand why regional unionists—themselves the organizational product of the region's history of hacienda tenant mobilization—would prioritize the problem of former colonos' rights. Objectively speaking, this priority is sanctioned by law,

⁷⁶¹ As scholars have shown, the Cochabamba department is distinct from other parts of Bolivia in that many landowners were small-scale farmers who themselves had escaped forced labor or managerial work on haciendas but saving money and buying their own land (Shakow 2014; Larson 1998). ⁷⁶² In Spanish, "*A mi no me han hecho justicia.*"

given that the legal status of land rights in former hacienda regions is determined less by uses of customs than by titles distributed by the state following the 1953 land reform. As such, it is not unexpected that the union would be critical to land rights achieved by way of inheritance within earlier structures of hacienda prestige and labor hierarchy. And yet, the reasonableness and legal legitimacy of this focus on former tenants' land rights does not mean it does not exclude or marginalize some groups. Not only this, but the shape of its marginalization—of former hacienda servants who depended upon the hacienda for food—echoed the earlier stigmatization of dependent laborers so important to reformist and popular movements for land rights and hacienda abolition in 20th century Bolivia. ⁷⁶³ Despite Pavel's limited financial resources and his own often-racialized encounters with mestizo elite, he did not qualify for inclusion in this regional elaboration of post-hacienda, peasant collectivity. In this way, Pavel's case highlights the unexpected ways that older reform logics come to saturate contemporary reform processes, even in a region that explicitly rejected more formal, statist approaches to land sanitation. In the process, heightened concerns with land and property boundaries related to land sanitation reconfigured people's ordinary lives and life possibilities. Not only this, but it re-iterated historical divisions between different classes of laborers, reintroducing a more delimited understanding of the bounds of legitimate peasant collectivity. As we loaded back into his rusted jeep, Pavel reflected on his decision to return from Spain, noting "While I was there I thought, 'Why work in Spain, when I have land in Bolivia?" He paused, and added pensively "Perhaps I should never have left [for Spain]." But it was too late. The land was gone.

Conclusion: The Rifts of Collectivizing Change

This chapter has explored the everyday workings of MAS land reform in Bolivia, beginning in the land reform archive and then moving to union meetings and land conflicts in rural Ayopaya. Thus, while scholars have explored the reifying effects of indigenous revivalism for existing experiences of identity and collectivity, my account foregrounds the internally-divisive workings of such reifications in their everyday unfolding as well as the ways that such divisions draw from and absorb earlier reformist hierarchies of labor and value. 764 This approach diverges from the tendency to treat bureaucracy or documents as somehow determined by their form, whether as an inheritance of colonial infrastructures or an accompaniment to modern governmental technologies and legal forms. ⁷⁶⁵ The remapping of spaces and of rural collectivities can reproduce historical patterns of inequity and stigma, yet they also contain other political possibilities, including the elaboration of modes of belonging and land use at odds with those sanctioned by the reformist state. 766 In the process, I have sought to address the ways that rural opposition to land reform draws both from historical experiences of injury as well as from enduring patterns of collectivity related to hacienda-based systems of labor and land use. Importantly, I have shown that reform projects reconfigure, complicate, and at times enervate existing forms of collectivity and land practice even in those places or cases where rural groups explicitly reject the mechanisms and ideals of governmental land reform.

⁷⁶³ See chapter 2 for the stigmatization of former hacienda servants both preceding and following the 1953 agrarian reform. See also Gotkowitz (2007).

⁷⁶⁴ For ethnic revivalism and the creation of a more generalized platform of belonging, see Fabricant (2012); Canessa (2012). For a related discussion of the ways such new articulations of collectivity render the mestizo uncanny, see Nelson (1992).

⁷⁶⁵ On the inheritances of colonial infrastructures, see Smith (1996) and Hull (2012).

⁷⁶⁶ Here, the "making of space" through technologies of property and territory not only reproduce historical patterns of division and exclusion but also "generate political possibilities" (El-Haj 2002:197).

In the process, I have raised questions about the unwitting exclusions of indigenizing reform as well as post-hacienda elaborations of peasant collectivity. Because of his grandfather's position as a mayordomo or land steward rather than an unpaid farmer, Pavel exceeded the bounds of a recognizable, legitimate form of "indigenous subject" whose land rights the union could or would defend. Yet, this marginalization from the contours of a recognizable or legitimate mode of indigenous supplicant did not mean he was protected from the racialized stigmas of town life. Indeed, one evening we met in a local *chicharia* to have a drink and talk. Near us, two older gentlemen—the children of former hacienda landlords—were playing a game of k'acho or dice. As all the tables were full, one of the men invited us to join their table. In the course of the next hour, one of the men chastised Pavel for failing to address them with the formal title, Señor. Later, when they invited us to play k'acho, the other man berated Pavel for his unfamiliarity with the rules of the game, noting, "What did you play with when you were a child? Shit?" The hacienda past, then, seems to have produced a group of Quechua-speaking subjects who hover uncomfortably between the poles either of legitimate peasant or exemplary mestizo. Rather than ameliorating their vulnerability, the politicization of the hacienda past has positioned them, once again, as traitors to their indigenous compañeros and as undeserving of special protection or land rights within union and INRA land reform processes.

Pavel's case suggests the enduring effects of earlier reformist and populist logics of peasant nationalism. In elaborations of mestizo nationalism from the 1930s to more recent indigenous revivalist projects in the 1980s, including Katarismo, citizenship was configured around a figure of the militant hacienda peasant who would risk everything, including his own life, for the revolutionary cause. Illegitimate children, like Oscar's father, challenged the notion of a smooth wedding of white and indigenous, embodied histories not only of violent confrontation but also of intimacy and relation—however saturated with violence--between hacienda workers and landlords. Similarly, Pavel's case suggests forms of exchange and authority at odds with unionist and peasant politics and, at the same time, suggests how such patterns were not only problematized but also came to condition 1953 land reform, with his father's godson gaining title to the land previously left by the small landlord to his children. Thus, in a sense land retiling too is about instituting a sense of ethnic purity, of consolidating land claims premised on indigenous peasant workers by aligning current land use with land redistribution by the populist MNR government in 1953. In so doing, the impurities of form land use practices emanating from shared histories of exchange, violence, and mutual aid—must be replaced with cleaner, less conflictive, and more evidently peasant land claims, the claims of former hacienda tenant farmers who were less absorbed into hacienda households.

Along with highlighting the existence of a group of Quechua-speaking subjects, often relatives of *juch'uy patrones* or of former hacienda servants, my account has also drawn attention to the tensions and disagreements within peasant elaborations of regional collectivity. As evident in the union conflict concerning the proposal to establish all or part of Ayopaya as a TCO, current land sanitation efforts confront entrenched understandings of appropriate land use and post-hacienda collectivity, ones that often vary dramatically from the ideals of native community and land collectivization guiding INRA land reform efforts. I have suggested that these divisions, too, should be situated within the region's precarious position within post-1953 agrarian reform efforts, one that saw both the delayed distribution of land titles as well as the reentrenchment of hacienda hierarchies in the course of hacienda land redistribution. This suggests that, even as the forms of supplication and land claims in Ayopaya grow out of the hacienda past, they also point to the present as a distinct historical moment, one in which rural groups are much

less optimistic about the promises of revolutionary reform. Land reform officials recognized the disenchanting risks of delayed land titling early on. Indeed, in final letter from INRA officials, written in 1986, and calling for the release of Executive Titles to former colono farmers in Sarahauyto, one official penned, "This process of land titling is of dramatic urgency, given the risk that peasants lose faith in the reform."

Yet, popular opposition to agrarian reform does not mean that sanitation efforts have no rural effects. Despite broad pessimism with national land reform, the anxieties with determining property boundaries and clarifying legal ownership have also produced a condition in which state intervention and adjudication appeared as natural and even necessary. Thus, it is not simply that there is a disjuncture between two contrasting—one reformist and one populist—approaches to justice. Rather, state land sanitation efforts reconfigured existing modalities of assessing and adjudicating rural relations stemming from region's former hacienda system. As a result, land disputes no longer became appropriate subjects of union congresses but, rather, were to be addressed by submitting formal appeals to the INRA institute for land sanitation. Thus, the possibility and inevitability of land titling efforts or sanitization also led unions and rural groups to attempt to fix lands in ways that contrasted sharply from the patterns of mobility, labor, land use, and exchange that preceded them. In the process, many of the most vulnerable of rural subjects, including the kin of domestic servants and landless peasants, were marginalized, a legitimate indigenous politics hinging on the claims of former tenant farmers and male unionists. Thus, even as the land reform initiative enabled new sorts of claims for land and rights, it also transformed the terms of rural political practice and collectivity, eliciting a subtle shift from informal land relations to the certainty of titled property, from union engagements and deliberations to impassioned calls for state intervention.

Part Three. The Ethics and Encumbrances of Exchange

Chapter 5. After Servitude

Ramón and I sat together on a ledge outside the former hacienda building, a wooden construction nestled on a gentle slope in one of Ayopaya's fertile river valleys. Ramón was in his 90s, his thin frame bowed from years of farm work. As we spoke, he recounted how he had worked in the hacienda since the age of eight, laboring unpaid for the landlord as a *pongo* servant. These days, he continued to reside in the former hacienda building, which had recently been sold from the former landlord's nephew to his grandson. Like other former hacienda servants, Ramón had a somewhat estranged relation to other Quechua-speaking villages. Before visiting him one day, we chatted with his neighbors, who noted that he "remained a slave." As we spoke, they recalled the hacienda era when Ramón would walk along the dirt road with the landlord's son Fabio, then only a child, perched on his shoulders. The landlord for years Fabio had continued to visit the old man, picking him up in his truck and driving him to the village market to buy food. After the house was sold in 2010, however, this had changed. During a visit in 2011, Ramón lamented the fact that Fabio had stopped coming to visit and noted that he had hurt his back. When asked if Martín, the current owner, assisted him, Ramón answered bitterly, "No. He does not give to me."

In the following months, Ramón's health worsened. With his injured back, he could no longer walk to the public market for food, nor carry it home. Furthermore, while Fabio and his wife claimed that they continued to send food to their former servants, including Fabio, nothing arrived at his doorstep. Martín, in turn, who had bought the house from Fabio, was adamant that it was Fabio's duty to help Ramón. Yet, as Fabio's condition further declined and likely due in part from my own and a friend's inquiries and reports of his ill health, Martín eventually hired a woman—the wife of one of the miner's employed in his gold mine—to make sure Ramón had food and to tidy up the house. Indeed, his desperation during our 2011 visit had been so dramatic that a friend and I had sent along a box of food with one of Martín's workers. Ramón died the following December. One of the owners of an adjacent gold mine discovered the body, and Martín subsequently phoned Fabio to make arrangements for a funeral. After a day passed, Fabio had still not returned his call, and so Martín bought a casket in town that Sunday and began to prepare for the burial. The miners' wives and women servants of the former hacienda household had helped to wash the body and to prepare it to be buried. In part marking Ramón's alienation from the community related in part to years of service in the hacienda household as well as the stigmas associated with hacienda labor in the region, his funeral was sparsely attended. Martín, along with several of his longtime farm workers, gathered around to drink beer on a field not far from the former hacienda building, and then the casket was lowered.

But the conflicted problem of responsibility for Ramón's health and well being persisted. Indeed, upon encountering Fabio at the weekly Sunday market in Laraya, where Martín stocked up on food and shared a few beers with acquaintances, Martín asked Fabio to repay him for the casket. Fabio, hearing the cost of the casket, berated Martín for buying such an expensive one. Martín retorted that there had only been one model and that that was the price. In the end, people said, Fabio did not contribute even a cent. This lapse did not go unnoted by villagers and townsfolk, but was rather a subject of much concern and reflection, as people asked themselves how Fabio could have been so negligent to a former servant. Some explained that it was because his own health was in decline. Others noted that his wife was dying of cancer, and that the costs

_

⁷⁶⁷ As Thurner notes of haciendas in Ecuador, childhood affections between hacienda children and servants offered carried over into the present, as "hacendado's sons and daughters became heirs to the hacienda and favored their former childhood playmates as their new mayordomos, mayorales, or just *peones queridos* (much-loved peons)" (1993:35).

of her chemotherapy had left him completely penniless. Martín, however, rejected these explanations. According to him, regardless of one's own financial situation, such an event required a certain responsiveness. Thus, as a group of us discussed how Fabio could have been so heartless, Martín put it simply, "It's that it doesn't awaken anything in him. He isn't affected." At this same time, this declaration secured his own position as a sort of beneficent patron, a position with which Martín continued to identify.

Both in his life and after his death, Ramón's case called my attention to the ways that rural villagers' remained entangled in a set of affective relations with former landlords, relations that contrasted sharply from the ideals of indigenous self-determination and militant citizenship undergirding MAS party efforts. In particular, Ramón's declining health and the subsequent conflict concerning his care raised questions about the longevity of aid relationships between agrarian elites and servants. While reform officials and unionists viewed the hacienda past as a sort of constraint or blockage, for former landlords and servants it also seemed to be an active and generative site of self-reflection and even moral practice. Where did this moral sensibility come from? Was it a continuation or outgrowth of hacienda patronage or was it a more recent response to the current national political moment, with its emphasis on the injustices of the colonial past? Regardless of its origins, however, the concern and sadness that Fabio's behavior evoked among townsfolk suggested that the case had touched upon something important, if largely articulated, undergirding relations after servitude. Indeed, as the months drew on, I had the opportunity to speak to other former landlords about the question of providing aid to former servants. In the process, I learned that the arrangement between Ramón and Fabio, while instructive in its violation of implicit moral ideals, was by no means unusual. ⁷⁶⁸ As discussed below, while townsfolk described these practices as originating in the hacienda era, they attributed the practices importance as reconciliatory forms by which to reckon with its enduring patterns of racialized inequality and indigenous vulnerability.

In this chapter, I examine the ways that Ayopaya's history of hacienda subjection shapes ordinary relations today. Here, I approach servitude not only as a historical referent or as a source of land claims but, more broadly, as a relational hinge drawing together the families of former landlords and servants. As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, the former hacienda region of Ayopaya has a distinct labor history marked by overlapping relations of labor and land use premised upon the partial integration of migrants, farmers, mine-workers, or landless peasants (forasteros) into households as well as the subsequent growth of a small, Quechua-speaking landholding class (juch'uy patrones). While reshaped and transformed in the late colonial and republican eras, relations of gifting and aid also retain particular resonances with the region's precolonial, Inca past, in which royal field hands and mine workers labored for Incaic lords and were, at the same time, provided food, wood, chicha, coca, and other resources in exchange for their labor. 769 As discussed in the introduction, this framework might be understood as a particular sort of "authority complex" traversing what have historically been the interlinked spheres of economic, religious, and political practice. 770 While the region's hacienda system has been the target of aggressive agrarian reform measures since the late 18th century, unpaid agrarian and domestic labor on hacienda estates persisted until at least the mid-19th century. evident in Ramón's case. Current INRA reform efforts, discussed in chapter 3, suggest that

⁷⁶⁸ Here, as Michael Lambek (2010) has noted, moral ideals were most evident in their lapse or violation.

⁷⁶⁹ Larson (1998). See chapter 1 for a more detailed review of literature on systems of exchange in the precolonial Andes.
770 Sallnow (1989).

hacienda-based sensibilities remain a furtive site of state reform today. And yet, Ramón's case suggests that reformist understandings and assessments of this labor economy and its aftermath do not exhaust possible ways of reckoning with the hacienda past. More than an object of state intervention, then, today the region's agrarian past also informs specific sensibilities of authority and exchange that remain crucial for contemporary relations in former hacienda villages and towns.

The chapter begins by examining the intimate dimensions of hacienda life, including practices of shared residence, the absorption of servants and children into hacienda households, and both consensual and nonconsensual sexual relations among female mit'ani servants and landlords. As noted earlier, in their integration into hacienda households, servants' experiences of the hacienda institution often varied notably from those of tenant farmers, comprising a mode of subjectivity that has been and remains particularly problematic both for rural unionists and state reformers. 771 And yet, Ramón's case suggests that former servants, like *mit'anis* and *pongos* in the hacienda era, are not only objects of village stigma but also recipients of a degree of aid and assistance from former landlords. Thus, while patronage is often located in more institutional or formal political settings and is felt to be concerned primarily with political or financial support, I draw from the specific history and form of hacienda "patronazgo" as insight into a specific relation of moral exchange located in more intimate, ordinary spaces of engagement and proximity. As noted in the introduction, here patronage relations include practices of godparenting, adoption, and financial assistance for landlords' illegitimate children. Drawing from cases of patronage between former servants and landlords, I consider patronage as a sort of relational template upon which specific elaborations and engagements with the region's violent past unfold and are newly elaborated upon. Despite longstanding reformist concern with such relations, then, I show how a set of reciprocal yet asymmetric relations among elites and peasants continue to shape ordinary life in former hacienda villages, supplying a mode of reconciliatory practice that varies dramatically from reformist ideals and state approaches to indigenous iustice.⁷⁷²

Thus, while the previous chapters focused on the emergence and enactment of a particular topography of claim-making centered on land rights and opposed to the figure of the abject hacienda servant, 773 this chapter shifts to attend to a somewhat more marginal political tradition, one whose distance from reform projects offers a new point of inquiry into the limits and fractures in governmental projects of rural development and political change. More broadly, rural patronage relations after servitude offer insight into a mode of reconciliatory practice at odds with the tendency to fetishize temporal rupture as a condition of justice. That patronage—as an institution incontrovertibly bound up in the region's agrarian past—is also felt to accrue or transform into a reconciliatory practice suggests the political possibilities and moral potentials

⁷⁷¹ Such hacienda-based attachments and their stigmatization by colonos and unionists have been under-accounted for by existing studies of Bolivian land reform and anti-hacienda rebellion, an oversight possibility related to the presumption of a shared peasantry. For writing on Bolivian peasant politics see Dandler and Torrico (1989); Stern (1987); for a critique see S. Rivera (1987).

772 As historians note, hacienda relations both integrated and transformed elements of pre-Columbian economic and

political traditions, including a notion of verticality not simply as the form of exchange but, more broadly, as "an 'ideal' that shaped the social relations of production and exchange within Andean society and formed an integral part of an ideology and a worldview" (Larson 1998:20; see also Harris 1976, Murra 1975, Salomon 1991, Wachtel 1977:83). At the same time, and as discussed later in this chapter, such relations are not inviolable to populist critiques nor, for that matter, from the range of gendered and racialized risks they identify.

773 For the 20th century history of peasant mobilizations for land and rights, see Gotkowitz (2007).

internal to inherited forms. In their transformation from within, then, these practices alert us to the need to rethink the very teleology implied by notions of historical longevity or institutional enduring. On a more empirical level, of course, the very persistence of these structures of exchange raise questions about the limits to statist interventions in rural life.

In considering these relations and their accompanying moral claims. I take seriously their partial opacity, bracketing the desire (shared by hermeneutical anthropology and legal exegetics alike) to uncover, extract, or render transparent their "true" meaning or source. 774 Rather than pinning such relations to individual circumstances and needs, then, I am interested in their broader collective shape, that is to say the form or pattern of embodied actions and interactions as well as the moral and historical imaginaries the practices draw from and sustain. At the same time, neither do I assume that the terms of that collectivity are given, hinging, for instance, on class-based status or a sort of a priori ethnic belonging. Instead, I take seriously peoples' own ways of narrating and attributing moral sense to their own and others' lives. In so doing, my analysis breaks from the primacy that both Marxian scholars and Bolivian reformers give to material needs, a primacy that renders any other sorts of claims or imaginaries fanciful or childlike, utopian or otherwise politically ineffectual. 775 At the same time, I take seriously the excessive nature of such claims. In closing, then, I raise questions about what the existence and vitality of moral practices at odds with reform logics and nationalist desires might tell us about the broader instabilities and fractures of postcolonial politics in Bolivia and beyond.

The Intimacies of Agrarian Servitude

The truck curves precariously above steep mountain ravines, the sun rising slowly out the thick fog below. As we drive, Mery, a Quechua-speaking woman from Cochabamba, rehearses folk stories that her mother had told her. They concern the difficult lives of rural "cholitas," Quechuaspeaking women who work in chicha-breweries, restaurants, markets, or as domestic servants in mestizo homes.⁷⁷⁶ In one story, a woman called Carmenita is raped by a government official visiting the village to regulate municipal affairs. 777 She has a child, but upon learning that the child's father is planning to return with a group of senior officials to present his child to them, she kills her baby. The story culminates in a grotesque moment when the woman serves the child's father the baby cadaver prepared as *chicharron* or grilled meat. The man takes her to court, but local officials are initially unwilling to deliver a sentence, knowing that Carmenita's mother had also been raped and then abandoned by the man, finally committing suicide. Yet, in Carmenita's case her rapist bribes the judge and she is ultimately sentenced to death. In another similar story, a *chicharia*-owning cholita is raped and has a child. When townsfolk visit the chicharia they catch sight of the baby's "demonic face" and resolve to kill it. On their next visit,

⁷⁷⁴ See Paul Ricoeur (1976) for a critique of hermeneutic desire. Like detectives, anthropologists often treat acts as products of a singular cause, one that then enables normative assessments not only of culpability or guilt but also of a fully-fledged or vexed political consciousness. See the latter half of this chapter for an account of anthropological approaches to patronage in the case of Andean agriculture and mining.

See Hartman (1997) for the assigning of fantasy to slave desires and political visions at odds with those of postbellum reformers. See Thurner (1993) for a critique of the argument that hacienda laborers were somehow "prepolitical." See Lyons (2006) for a review of literature concerning hacienda patronage.

776 On the figure and history of the Andean "chola" or "cholita," see in particular Weismantel (2001); Stephenson

^{2010;} de la Cadena (2000).

This is the shifting figure of the $\tilde{n}akaq$ or pishtaco, a priest or hacendado, white man or even doctor who extracts the fat of indigenous bodies (Weismantel 2001:3, Crandon-Malamud 1991).

as the *cholita* goes to prepares their meal, they kill the child. From that day onward, people say, the village was destroyed and everyone killed. Only the ruins of abandoned homes remain.⁷⁷⁸

Such tales, like Andean accounts of fat-eating *pishtacos* and lascivious priests common in the Andes, suggest the ways that aesthetic and narrative forms come to integrate and at the same time address specific histories of violence. In these stories in particular, *cholita* bodies emerge as apt figures for the gendered vulnerabilities of rural life, particularly the penetrating force of various strangers, including *criollo* state administrators, priests, and hacienda landlords. ⁷⁷⁹ In addition, they address the problem of the tragic and divisive effects of such sexual violence for the contours of rural family life and community. As evident in ubiquitous complaints against "unnatural abuses" or rape in *colono* petitioners' complaints of landlords' abuses in early 20th century Ayopaya, gendered violence within the region's hacienda past seems to have been common. ⁷⁸⁰ It is also possible that such abuses were exacerbated by the effects of Bolivia's Chaco War, in which thousands of rural Quechua and Aymara-speaking men, many of them hacienda *colonos*, perished. ⁷⁸¹ Indeed, the relationship between military drafts and rural violence seems to be indicated the fact that the post-Chaco war moment was marked by heightened reformist concern with rural gender relations.

Along with capturing a particular history of gendered violence shaped by both rural hacienda subjection and aggravated by Bolivia's Chaco War, such accounts draw attention to the entailments of hacienda intimacies for rural life. Thus, while previous works have examined the problem of whether or not *mestizaje* is inclusive or exclusive, ⁷⁸³ instead I approach these narratives as insight into the sexual practices upon regional haciendas estates and the nature of rural groups' assessments of such ties, including their corrupt legal adjudication, the violence and stigma facing raped women and their children, and the ruinous effects of region's histories of labor and servitude, particularly for chola women who, scholars note, often mediate or bridge peasant and *mestizo* worlds.

The victimizing effects of sexual relations in conditions of hacienda servitude have been addressed as a crucial problem underlying reform projects aimed at modernizing relations of labor, gender, and kinship in rural regions of Bolivia. Early 20th century reformers from the 1930s onward underlined problems of sexual violence against *mit'ani* servants. *Mit'ani* labor was stigmatized as a non-virtuous form of employment undeserving of voting rights, state reformers casting the virtuous *mestiza* as a paragon for family reform in which kinship arose as a

_

⁷⁷⁸ This story has multiple variants. In others it is a colono family who offer travelers a soup of leftover corn grinds after the landowners refuse to share their food. The family is warned not to look back, but when they do the entire landscape is turned to tumult. This echoes the biblical story of Lot's wife in Genesis, the story of Sodom and Gomorah, and the problem of divine retribution.

Gomorah, and the problem of divine retribution.

779 See also Taussig (1980); Weismantel (2001); for Mexico see McDowell (2008); for Columbia see Avelar (2002).

Here, then, the line between fiction and real is blurred, such narrative accounts working through specific histories of violence while also accumulating some of its very analytics and frameworks of thought.

⁷⁸⁰ See Gotkowitz (2007); Stephenson (1999) on early 20th century colono complaints and the problem of gender and kinship relations for state reformers at that time.

⁷⁸¹ In Bolivia's Chaco War (1932-1935), more than 65,000 Bolivian soldiers—25 percent of the country's forces—died in combat or in subsequent detention. The majority of those killed were Quechua and Aymara villagers as well as *colono* workers on haciendas. See Gotkowitz (2007:104); Dunkerley (1987); Klein (1969).

⁷⁸² As discussed in chapter 2, this concern responded not only to urban feminists' and women unionists' demands the state intervene in hacendado encroachments on land. See Gotkowitz (2007).

⁷⁸³ See, in particular, de la Cadena (2000), Gow (1991), Hale (1996), Jackson (2002), Mallon (1996), Poole (1997), Sanjinés (2004), Seligmann 1993, Wade (1997, 2005, 2009), and Warren (1998).

privileged microcosm of national morality and modern citizenship. The regrounding racial admixture as the means to forging a sort of post-indigenous, unified peasant nation, reformers challenged the stigmatization of racial miscegenation in modern eugenics and European nationalism. Urban, educated mestizas arose as paragons of a new, hardworking public, upperclass *criollas* were seen as lazily elite and domestic *campesina* and *mit'ani* counterparts as grotesquely uncultured. In this regard, conditions of gendered violence and domesticity upon haciendas expose the limits of assimilationist projects of modern citizenship. Thoroughly embedded in the affects and affinities of hacienda life, domestic laborers and their kin were neither modern citizens nor rebellious peasant militants. If a nationalist logic of *mestizaje* promised to make modern citizens, then, the racial admixtures entwined with rural hacienda subjection challenged nationalist ideals of political subjectivity and kinship alike.

The family histories of former landowning families in Ayopaya attest to the fraught ways that hacienda intimacies shaped local kinship relations and problematized landlords' attempts to secure the *mestizo* family as a legally and relationally-bounded channel of property inheritance. In local accounts of the hacienda past in Ayopaya, sexual violence constituted an often unspoken premise upon which family histories unfold. For instance, I heard about cases in which landowning sons were cast out of haciendas for eloping with local women as well as cases of half-siblings fathered with *mit'ani* servants. Such histories produced unknown cousins or kin, heirs who could potentially challenge the legal and moral integrity of the *hacendado* family. 785 Sorrowful accounts described cases in which children, particularly boys, were born from the coupling of local chola women "of the skirt" (de pollera) and local landlords, their landowner fathers whisked them off to the city for schooling where they often never saw their mothers again. And finally, there were the earnest warnings of the Quechua-speaking women who described the sons of former landlords as lustful and greedy womanizers, just "like their fathers and grandfathers." In Ayopaya today, the living products of such couplings, known as "natural children" or "love children," occupied an ambivalent position both to mestizo elites and to Quechua-speaking peasants, a stigma and an estrangement marked by the disparaging phrase "child of the landlord" (hijo del patron). 786

As these historical accounts demonstrate, the stories Mery told also diverged from the local family histories, holding out the promise of a subversive stance toward sexual violence. In particular, they indicated cases where mothers or villagers would prefer to kill children born of hacienda rape rather than raise them or absorb them into families. In recounting women who preferred to kill their children or be charged with death than raise *mestizo* children born of rape, theses stories challenge the logics of *mestizo* kinship. Importantly, the state figures centrally in these narratives, imagined as a sort of masculine presence that penetrates into the interstices of rural life, impregnating women and imbuing rural relations with new forms of stigma, division,

_

⁷⁸⁴ Such views are apparent in reform debates concerning citizenship in the 1938 peasant congress, where it was proposed that only virtuous women should be able to vote, that is, women who were not prostitutes or domestic servants. See Gotkowitz (2007); see also Stephenson (2002) and Weismantel (2001). Unexpectedly, this earlier concern with the sexual vulnerability of hacienda workers was shared both by liberal reformers and, more recently, by indigenista and nativists political movements since the 1970s, including Katarismo (Sanjines 2004), which focus on reclaiming an indigenous racial heritage and rejecting the discourse of mestizaje as a mode of cultural assimilation.

⁷⁸⁵ For an account of cases of children disowned for relations with servants on Brazilian sugar plantations, see Klein and Vinson (2007).

⁷⁸⁶ I discuss the term "hijo del patron" and its resurgence since the election of the MAS party to government in chapter 4.

and risk. Central here, and evident in Cochabamba's past, is an attempt to reckon with the meaning of admixture not only as a condition of national citizenship or progress but as a lived experience of being torn between worlds. Along with facing hacienda sexual abuses, then, local Quechua-speaking women and their families and neighbors were also left with the fraught problem of how to live in the aftermath of such violence. While the female protagonists of these stories often killed themselves or the children born of rape, many local women did of course live to raise children fathered with landlords.

Indeed, Ayopaya's history of agrarian servitude is marked by common practices of absorbing Quechua-speaking women and children into hacienda households not simply as servants but also as kin, children, and wives. Given the prevalence of intermarriage between peasant women and landlords and the accompanying creation of a Quechua-speaking landholding elite, ⁷⁸⁷ such hacienda intimacies also complicated elite attempts to uphold the purity of the mestizo family. Sexual relations were accompanied by a range of domestic arrangements including intermarriage between landlords and servants, the elopement of landlords' sons and local women, the absorption of illegitimate children into hacienda households as workers and adopted "orphans." In these arrangements, domestic servants were not only abject, socially stigmatized strangers to peasant life but also, at times, recipients of special treatment and resources on the part of landlords. Such relations produced a class of children (and servants) who could at times demand land, even if inheritance was not legally required. 788 These relations of sexual violence, domestic co-habitation, inheritance and land gifting demonstrate the intimate dimensions of hacienda servitude in the Ayopaya region. In the rest of this chapter, I consider how such intimacies shape or complicate current relations in Ayopaya, In particular, I examine the ways that hacienda-based relational forms complicate the certainties of racialized difference while at the same time shaping particular reconciliatory approaches to the region's violent past.

Hacienda Kinship and the Indio Landlord

We are seated around a blue sodalite table under a thatch hut in the center courtyard of the former hacienda building. Martín, the youngest heir to the hacienda, is sharing a drink with several acquaintances, including me, as well as his uncle and his cousin, who brought him a bottle of liquor in the hopes of convincing Martín to lend him his tractor. After the first round, talk turns to the history of Martín's landowning family, Martín listing the names of his grandfather's children, including five sons and five daughters. As he concludes, his godson adds playfully, "Ten *that we know of.*" Martín turns to me to explain, "You see, I am the only son my father had, and he was his father's only son, but when I go to town and tell people this they all laugh and say, 'Here, this is your aunt, this is your uncle." Indeed, on a later occasion, another relative appeared. Someone had asked Martín how many children his grandfather had, and he struggled to remember, "There were five," he notes, "and then that one whose name I can never remember." He paused, and then added, "Hugo, the eldest. My grandfather disowned him, taking away his last name and all of his fortune."

Hugo, we learned, was disowned by his father for his involvement with a local peasant woman, or, as Martín put it, a woman "from around here, from the countryside." His father had been disapproving. When the Chaco War started, Hugo refused to leave for military service and

⁷⁸⁷ Larson (1998).

⁷⁸⁸ See Gotkowitz (2007).

so, Martín explained, his father threw him out for "being a *maricón*, ⁷⁸⁹ for mixing himself up with an old lady, with a peasant." His friend interjected, "Just like your other uncle Rafael got mixed up with Linda, right?" Martín nodded, "Exactly. And my grandfather disowned him and Hugo left. We only learned about him years later." Martín's friend turned to him, "Your grandfather also had lots of children, right?" Martín nodded, "Supposedly yes, but the only one who was recognized was my father. He appeared as the sole heir, and the rest were not recognized. What luck for me! But then it had always been like that. People had children everywhere but it was looked down upon to recognize them all." I asked if he knows his other uncles, to which he replied, "I know one of them, but it's a messy situation. My father recognized him as his brother and continues to help him, but he does not share our last name."

In this case, sexual relations between landlords and local, Quechua-speaking women were characterized as a form of perversion, a mode of desire at odds with an exemplary masculinity forged through military service. 790 Such stigmas echoed reformist views of hacienda domesticity, seen as perilous perversions of an ideal kinship form comprised of the modern mestizo family. Yet, such couplings were not only challenging to reformist sensibilities of kinship and racialized belonging, they also had material consequences for the shape of hacienda families and mestizo land tenure. Involvement with local women could result in landlord fathers disowning children, perhaps in part because out-of-wedlock children could claim land and thereby challenge the racial and economic stability of the hacienda institution. ⁷⁹¹ Such relationships were also threatening in a more affective ways, evident in the risks of "going peasant," hacienda children abandoning mestizo sensibilities and assuming lives as *campesinos*. Such fears shaped dramatic forms of racialized fear and control within the region's hacienda homes. For instance, one woman recalled how she and her siblings were not permitted to leave the garden, for fear that they would be polluted by the Quechua language and low culture of the street, including the hacienda servants' children who played there. Nor were they allowed to speak Quechua, although their servants did.

Visiting Martín's gold mine one day, his cousin looked around and commented to Martín, "Uncle Rafael's house was around here, right?" Martín gestured over to a dry hill, replying, "Yes, up over there." They point to the remains of a building and an old stonewall bordering the road, the house where his uncle had lived. Martín explained, "My uncle turned *campesino*, or worse. He stopped bathing and just chewed coca. Actually, there were two of them. Now they moved to Santa Cruz." Yet, it was not that the region's hacienda elite had ever been entirely *criollo* or purely Spanish. Thus, if relations with local women seemed to threaten mestizo status, it was because this status was already rendered somewhat tenuous by their position as relatively penniless rural landowners. As discussed in chapter 1, Cochabamba's haciendas were distinct in their inclusion of small Quechua-speaking landlords or *juch'uy patrones* often marginalized from urban political culture and with closer ties to rural peasant and indigenous families. While Martín's family had owned land in Ayopaya since the 1770s, having received land from Jesuit missionaries, they inherited this risk of the potential stigmas of rural agrarian culture and its spatial and familial ties to indigenous peasant families.

⁷⁸⁹ Throughout Latin America, *maricón* is used as a slur to describe a homosexual man.

⁷⁹⁰ For the importance of military service for masculinity and male citizenship in Bolivia, see Gill (2013); see also Canessa (2012).

⁷⁹¹ Indeed, as discussed in chapter 4, in Sarahuayto, which had belonged to Martín's family, land had been distributed by way of gifts to out-of-wedlock sons like Oscar's father.

Seated in the center of the hacienda courtyard with his cousins and friends later that evening, Martín dug up an old newspaper article, published *Los Tiempos* in 1992. In it, it described the history of his family, noting that one "Indio Rodriguez" had first come upon land in this area by way of a land grant from Jesuit missionaries in the 18th century. Along with the newspaper, he went and retrieved a worn document dating back to the 1770s and outlining a land grant made from Jesuit missionaries to the Rodriguez family to which he belongs. After Martín read an excerpt from the newspaper, his cousin looked over at him, notably disturbed, "But why do they describe him in such a derogatory way, as an *Indio*?" He paused, and then added, almost as though convincing himself, "He was *mestizo*." Martín shrugged dismissively, adding "We're all a little bit Indian." Thus, if eloping with local women highlighted the tenuousness of elite mestizo status, anxiety with maintaining the integrity of this category was all the more heightened given common knowledge that landowning families in the region had been partially "mixed," indigenous blood that made rural landowning families today vulnerable to racialized and classist diminution by urban elites.

Yet, while sexual relations with domestic servants or local women arose as highly problematic for reformers and hacendado families, these were not the only shape that hacienda intimacy took. In Sarahuayto, the hacienda households was comprised not only of the landowners but also of *mit'ani* and pongo servants, their children, orphans, and other children integrated into the hacienda household. Thus, while "intimacy" is often approached as synonymous with sexuality, these relations of hacienda domesticity and co-residence suggest a more ample sphere of relation premised not simply on sexual practices but also broader forms of cohabitation and affect related to the bodily proximities of domestic life as well as practices of wet-nursing and child raising. Thus, the term intimacy might seem vague, obscuring or even masking the violent nature of hacienda relations, I use this term to indicate the range of bodily and affective forms marking hacienda life and to maintain a partial opacity of such relations.

As discussed below, these relations included rape as well as long-term romantic partnerships and even marriages. Here, sexual and kinship relation in haciendas are insufficiently accounted for by imposing contemporary heuristics of rape or forced labor but should rather be situated within broader cultural and religious frameworks of authority, gifting, service, and exchange. As discussed in chapter 1, domestic servitude and its accompanying sexual relations were not wholly colonial creations. Both forced *yanaconaje* labor and the absorption of women and children into rural caciques' homes had precolonial precedents. Without presuming the fixity or certainty of meaning, then, then, I use the term intimacy as a way to retain this partial opacity while at the same time indicating the risks of hermeneutic uncovering or transparency.

_

 ⁷⁹² My elaboration of intimacy builds from the work of Berlant (2000), Butler (2005), Nancy (2005), Povinelli (2006), and Stoler (2002).
 ⁷⁹³ While some scholars, then, have argued that sexual relations between masters and subjects must necessarily be

described as rape, this analytic also risks obscuring the range of experiences and meanings assigned to such relations, introducing a false sense of certainty or transparency to the nature of such relations. The reductive risks of sweeping declarations of rape are particularly pronounced given that, in comparison to US slavery for instance, the division between mestizo landlords and indigenous peasants was itself not always clear, particularly given Cochabamba's distinct history of upwardly-mobile peasants or "small bosses" (*juch'uy patrones*). See Larson on histories of mobility, labor, and exchange in Cochabamba. See Hartman (1997) for the argument that sexual relations within US plantations be considered rape. See Leinaweaver (2012) for the moral ideals underpinning practices of child circulation in the Andes.

⁷⁹⁴ See chapter 1. See also Larson (1998) and Thomson (2002).

⁷⁹⁵ Here I am drawing from the work the hermeneutics school, including Giambattista Vico and Johann Gottfried Herder, who first developed a theory of *verstehen* or "understanding" as methods of interpretive research.

A critical stance toward our own interpretive practices is particularly crucial given the ways that desires for transparency underpin current state reform efforts in Bolivia, discussed in chapters 3 and 4.796

Along with sexual relations, then, haciendas included a range of practices that drew together landowning and servant families, including cases of adoption and god parenting. Indeed, along with distributing land to out-of-wedlock children, the Sarahuayto landlord and Martín's grandfather had also adopted other children into the hacienda household, including the brothers Frederico and Hans. When I spoke to Martín, he explained that the men had been informally given to the landlord as children, their mother hoping to thereby supply them a better life. ⁷⁹⁷ He explained, "They were given without papers, without anything. [At the time] this was normal. Their mother gifted them because she could not maintain them or provide them with food. My grandfather accepted what was given. And so it happened that my grandfather and his wife brought the children here and raised them in this hacienda." According to Martín, Frederico and Hans had been adopted in the early 1970s, well after hacienda abolition but prior to the height of community-hacendado land conflict in 1986. 798 The landlord, Martín's grandfather, raised them and educated them, the eldest eventually receiving his bachelor's degree. During his education, Frederico lived at Martín's parents' house in the city of Cochabamba and worked unpaid as their cook. When he returned to Arapampa, he worked on the hacienda. In addition to supporting their education, the landlord had also paid additional costs related to a work accident. Namely, in the 1980s, Frederico's leg became caught in a grain mill. He was rushed to Oruro for surgery. In the end, he lost the leg and received a prosthetic one. According to Martín, the landlord paid \$8000 for the surgery in Germany. As Martín noted, "They sent him all the way to Germany so that it would be done precisely and so that Frederico would not feel the absence of his leg. That's how much they loved him." In addition, and like other cases discussed in chapter 2, the landlord left the men two fertile plots of land and a house.

In this case, practices of monetary exchange or of exchanging labor for aid took on explicitly moral dimensions. ⁷⁹⁹ Indeed, Martín's account emphasizes the affective nature of such labor relations, economic relations accompanied by and enfolding practices of cohabitation as well as of paternal care including providing for medical expenses and the costs of schooling. Of course, we should keep in mind that Frederico's injury resulted from his unpaid work in the hacienda mill, a fact obscured by Martín's framing of his grandfather's medical expense in terms of a generosity or even "love" toward his adopted son. 800 At the same time, however, this case also asks us to bracket the assumption that unpaid labor and affection are necessarily antithetical. Frederico's place in the hacienda was not quite one of a free, contractual subject but neither was

⁷⁹⁶ Indeed, it is to some degree precisely the ambiguity of such relations that gave way to particularly fervid reform efforts focused reforming rural agrarian institutions in the Ayopaya valleys. In the 1930s, state reformers' concerns with hacienda relations focused on sexual as well as labor and kinship on rural haciendas, concerns often funneled into agrarian reform measures. Yet, while the condition of servitude may have been feminized by reformers or rural anti-hacienda activists, hacienda domesticity was not simply a women's space. As we have seen, domestic servants included men, who were also subject to heightened political scrutiny related to their presumed dependency victimhood, suggesting that what was at stake was not simply gender but rather a broader assemblage that included hacienda-based relations of labor and domesticity, authority and care, tribute and exchange, one that arose as increasingly problematic to 20th century ideals of revolutionary citizenship.

⁷⁹⁷ See recording DM4200077.

⁷⁹⁸ See chapter 2 for an introduction to Sarahuayto and post-hacienda land conflicts there.

⁷⁹⁹ Indeed, there is a robust literature focusing moral meanings and practices of monetary exchange in the Andes (Ferraro 2004; Gelles 1995; Harris 1985, Nash 1979; Van Vleet 2008).

800 For an examination of discourses of emotion and "love" in Andean child adoption, see Leinaweaver (2009).

it simply one of coercion or abuse. Instead, it seems to point to a more ambivalent form of relation that slipped through the cracks of state regulatory systems of paid labor markets and, at the same time, was structured by particular sensibilities of obligation and aid for hacienda servants. Indeed, as Martín's noted, the relation was neither documented nor regulated by the state, the children having been "given without papers." Here, as in contemporary Avopava relations to land titling efforts, documents were not only copied or forged but disregarded and dismissed, the paper form seen as largely inconsequential or unnecessary to the shape or legitimacy of rural relations.801

Frederico, one of the men who had been adopted as a child, framed the arrangement less as one of an affective kinship relation than one of his mother's agentive choice to seek selfbetterment for her family. These days, Frederico lived down the path about a twenty-minute walk from Martín's ex-hacienda, his house located on the plot of land left to him by the landlord. A long-term servant of Martín's shows us the way, and as we walk he explains that Frederico and his brother had been brought to Ayopaya from the La Paz jungle, where the landlord had a second hacienda. Arriving at his home, we wait outside fending off barking dogs and chatting with his neighbor. As we stand around, the neighbor, an older man who himself had worked as an hacienda *melguero* turns to me and explains matter-of-factly, "Frederico was brought from the jungle when he was just a boy." Frederico emerges a bit later, and an acquaintance of mine Sylvia asks what he remembers. He recalls, "It was just us, my brother and I, those who wanted to come." He continued, noting that they "lived in the [hacienda] house." When asked whether he was "raised by" the landlord, he answered ambiguously, "Yes, since we were little we raised ourselves with Don Carlos." Instead of echoing the question, that is, whether he had been raised by Don Carlos, Frederico seemed to choose his words carefully, using the reflexive form "we raised ourselves." Before I could stop her, Sylvia, an acquaintance and research assistant from Laraya, asked if they had wanted to come. Frederico squinted into the sun. "Well, I don't remember well. I was only five." She added, perhaps thinking of her own son, "But it must have been hard, no? One misses one's mother." Frederico nodded. "Yes, at first. You have to accustom yourself to the people here. And being just a child people can be abusive."

Indeed, there had been months on end when Carlos traveled to the city of Cochabamba, leaving the boys under the care of a senior servant who watched over the house and managed the servants and farm workers. Having heard elderly women describe caring for orphans during their rotating labor shifts in the hacienda as mit'anis, I now asked whether these women were like mothers. Frederico replied, "Some, yes. But they rotated and did not stay. Some were good and some were bad. Nowhere does everyone have the same character." In this way, Frederico framed his childhood as a matter of the inevitability of cruelty and abuse, describing the need to habituate or accustom oneself to the variability in human character. Interestingly, while the children of former landlords often recalled romantic memories of days spent playing with servants' children, Frederico emphasized the economic dimensions of hacienda life, with its rotation of domestic servants who came and went and who, like others, were not all of the "same character." Thus, if there were kinship dynamics in hacienda households these were clearly note commensurate with family life per se. The children were integrated into the household, their food, clothing, and education paid for, yet ultimately they were left to fend for themselves, "raising themselves" and carefully avoiding "abusive" overseers or servants.

⁸⁰¹ As discussed in chapter 3, reformists' attempts to imbue rural groups with the necessity or value of more transparent and documented relations also requires a fair amount of political and bureaucratic work.

As evident in the case of Frederico and his brother Frederico, Avopaya's regional hacienda estates included not only particular forms of "sexual service" but also other relations of cohabitation and domesticity premised on the absorption of impoverished and "orphan" children into haciendas. Scholars have suggested that sexual services, too, belonged to broader exchange patterns in which labor (including sex) might be reciprocated with food and unrecognized children left land. 802 Girls would be "delivered" to landlords, female children born following such couplings often integrated into haciendas while boys were sometimes left land. 803 The gifting of land to illegitimate children, discussed in chapter 2, suggests that even cases of rape were not treated as taboo but rather seemed to be absorbed and approached by both landlord and servant families in terms of broader frameworks and patterns of exchange and aid, including land gifting and the adoption of illegitimate children, discussed below. In addition to indigent children who were adopted, like Frederico and Frederico, hacienda households also integrated the children born to long-term *mit'ani* servants, including cooks. With this broader understanding of the intimate and affective dimensions of hacienda life, let us revisit the case of Ramón with which I began.

"He Who Remains a Slave": Enduring Patterns of Stigma and Subjection

It was in Arapampa, a village adjacent to the former hacienda of Sarahuayto, that I first learned about what villagers described as the odd case of Ramón. Seated in the shade outside of Doña Julia's home, Doña Julia and her sister described how they had both "served" the former hacienda landlord as rotating mit'ani servants. They went on to note that the current owner, the former landlord's grandson, is a good man who pays his workers well and, in any case, lives from gold mining rather than agriculture. Pausing from her work scraping kernels from dried cornhusks, Doña Julia suggested we visit "Ramón, in Don Fabio's home, who remains a slave." As noted above, Fabio was the nephew of the late landlord and Ramón his childhood servant. While the house had since been bought by Martín, Ramón continued to live there, keeping up the building as best he could and vigilantly defending it against encroachers attempting to break in at night. "He has accustomed himself to it," Doña Julio noted, using the reflexive verb acostumbrarse. This is why Ramón never left, she explained, "He doesn't know anything else." Elsewhere, others noted that it was also the reason his wife left him, moving to Cochabamba to live by herself instead. She could not handle (aguantar) living in the former hacienda, but Ramón could not be convinced to leave.

Doña Julia's assertion that Ramón "remains a slave" indicates what many villagers see as the problematic longevity of hacienda-based arrangements. Yet, as discussed in chapter 2, it also reflects the particular stigmatization of hacienda servants related to the region's particularly conflictive history of anti-hacienda mobilization and agrarian reform. Within reformist and populist movements, domestic workers came to emblematize the grotesque abjection of a rural class of landless servants. 804 In this way, Doña Julia's description of Ramón as a slave incorporated a particular sense of scorn for former servants, even as she herself noted that she had worked in rotating domestic labor service or *mit'anaje*. As noted earlier, this scorn was also shaped by the fact that permanent domestic workers were often the recipients of landlords' affection and aid, a position differentiating them from *colonos* or tenant farmers. Thus,

⁸⁰² On sexual services on Ecuadorian haciendas, see Lyons (2006:168).

⁸⁰³ Thus, as Lyons notes, if girls were "delivered" to landlords, female children were also integrated into haciendas, and males sometimes given land (2006:168-170). See Gotkowitz (2007).

ascriptions of hacienda status were themselves fraught, partially inheriting reformists' concern with the problematic entailments for the forging of a modern nation of rights-bearing, propertied citizens. As evident in Doña Julia's comment, however, concerns with subjection arose as more than state concerns but also comprised a popular heuristic for making sense of labor relations in past and present. In Ayopaya, this popular political heuristic conditioned calls for regional unity and calls for local control over land affairs. As evident in the conflicts discussed in chapters 2 and 4, however, populist visions of regional collectivity were also somewhat exclusionary, privileging certain categories of personhood and labor and marginalizing others, particularly those of former hacienda servants.

Given the peculiar 20th century anxieties surrounding hacienda subjection in Bolivia, then, Doña Julia's assertion that Ramón "remains a slave" points to their assessment of him as having failed to disentangle himself from the patterns of labor and exchange marking hacienda life, including its affects and relational entwinements with former landowning families. As noted, today Ramón continues to reside in the former hacienda building and to keep up the grounds. He is not paid for this labor, nor does he own the building or any land—a fact that is significant given the centrality of landlessness to reformist assessments of hacienda subjection. But is slavery the only way to make sense of this relation? Indeed, today Ramón's labor was neither imposed nor required by anyone but him. To the contrary, Ramón's continued presence in the home coupled with his complaint that Fabio had not "entrusted" him with anything seemed to be a source of some embarrassment for former landlords. This was also the case for the new owner, Martín, who once remarked wryly that he had "bought the house and Ramón with it." And yet, Martín's implicit objectification of Ramón as a part of the hacienda and, thus, as an extension of his own property overlooks the fact that it was Ramón who had insisted on maintaining some elements of hacienda patronage and labor relations. So, too, Doña Julia's accusation of slavery needs to be approached as expressing something more than a description of oppressive labor arrangements. Instead, this concern with Ramón seemed to betray anxiety with a particular sort of affective and moral bearing. Such a reading seems to be supported by the fact that Doña Julia had herself lingered on the intimate ties between Fabio and Ramón. She had noted that they had been very close when Fabio was a child, almost like father and son. Here, as for unionists like Angelo, discussed in chapter 2, subjection was not just a labor condition but, also, a specific and problematic relation of entwinement and reliance on hacienda landlords. 807

Ascriptions of slave status, then, were not straightforward assessments of labor conditions but, rather, suggest the ways that rural life has partially absorbed a set of earlier reformist concerns with hacienda bondage. As discussed in chapter 1 and 2, this concern with hacienda labor culminated in the late colonial Bourbon reforms and then was taken up and further elaborated upon by agrarian reformers and peasant supplicants since the mid-20th century. Yet, this comparison overlooks the differences between highland and valley haciendas and lowland plantations. Indeed, classic comparisons between plantations and haciendas treat the "semi-free" status of hacienda workers as the main premise for differentiating hacienda servants

_

⁸⁰⁵ See Larson (1998).

⁸⁰⁶ See chapter 3 for a discussion of the problem of servitude and post-hacienda sociality in current agrarian reform efforts on the part of the Movement Toward Socialism or MAS government.

⁸⁰⁷ See my discussion of Angelo's remark that he continues to "scorn" former pongos for their dependence on the hacienda for food, in chapter 2.

⁸⁰⁸ See Klein and Vinson (2007).

from plantation slaves. 809 To collapse the two not only erases the differences between hacienda labor conditions and those of African and Amazonian bondage in larger, lowland plantations, it also disavows the specificity of the emergence of a language of slave injury on the part of hacienda colonos. Even attempts to draw a determinate line between forced and "semi-free" labor, with the former designated as a product of colonial expansion, are complicated by the various forms of labor preceding the Spanish conquest, which included indentured domestic and mine workers who were not, however, precluded from certain practices of mobility or from shifting labor arrangement such as seasonal agricultural work. Furthermore, as scholars note, even colonial systems of forced *mita* labor in the silver mines did not consist simply in "unfree" labor but rather included overlapping and often ambiguous relations of free and unfree work, wage labor as well as rotating and seasonal labor services. 811 In the Andes, then, hacienda servants and other categories of "forced laborer" including *mitayos*, *yanaconas*, *pongos*, *mit'anis* should not be collapsed with the history and reformist figure of the African slave but, rather, need to be positioned within a set of more fluid patterns of labor and mobility prevalent in the pre-Columbian period and drawn upon and transformed in the early colonial one. 812

In Ayopaya, informal labor arrangements traversing economic and familial spheres were not limited to the colonial past. Indeed, in a case I discuss shortly, two young men recounted how their mother had "gifted" them to the hacienda landlord when they were just children, thereby hoping to enable them a better life. Ramón, too, narrated his life in the hacienda as the product of an "arrangement" between his father and the landlord. Thus, even within the hacienda system, the designation "slave" is not entirely fair to the range of life stories shaping domestic servitude. Rather, this term should be situated within a particular trajectory of national concern with bondage, one that lent itself to the creation of a politicized category of the hacienda servant. While the collapsing of slave and servant highlights the racialized vulnerabilities of labor relations within haciendas, it should not, then, be approaching simply as an empirical referent or apolitical description of that system of labor. To get at such complexities requires greater care in attending to the specificity of hacienda labor and landlessness in Bolivia. 813 While earlier chapters have traced the specificity of "slavery" and "servitude" as languages of accusation and complaint that stretch across reformist and populist political spheres, I here take up the question of what such a designation obscures, namely, the ways that slavery as description and analytic may work disavow the specific entanglements of authority, patronage, and aid shaping hacienda servants' lives. Attending to such entanglements is also important in raising the question of how

⁸⁰⁹ Andean haciendas contrasted with plantations in the Amazonian lowlands as well as Brazil and the Caribbean in hacienda servants' relative mobility, that is in their ability, at least in theory, to leave one hacienda if conditions there became too oppressive. On the differences between haciendas and plantations in Latin America, see Wolf and Mintz (1957).

⁸¹⁰ Yanaconas or forced laborers were historically comprised of kidnapped or captured highland populations and, in the colonial period, of slaves transported from Africa. For the history of indentured labor in the Andes, see Taussig (1980); Larson (1998); see also Klein and Vinson (2007); for work on the history of slavery in Peru, see Tardieu (2001) and Bowser (1974).

⁸¹¹ See Keith (1977); Larson (1998); Wolf and Mintz (1977).

⁸¹² As discussed in chapter 1, these included labor migrants and other classes of moving persons, children and women gifted to encomenderos, native caciques, and landlords, as well as godchildren and "orphans" integrated into agrarian households. See Larson (1998) for the history of labor and mobility in colonial Bolivia, particularly Cochabamba. See Shakow (2014) for an elaboration of how these historical forms of mobility implicate contemporary forms of political subjectivity and national belonging.

⁸¹³ Here, scholars at times uncritically absorb the reformist language of hacienda labor as "slavery." See Fabricant (2012).

the intimacies of hacienda labor have come to condition or complicate reconciliatory relations in the aftermath of hacienda abolition.

The coupling of patronage and servitude is not particular to Ayopaya's haciendas or to Bolivia. In Ecuadorian haciendas too, former servants often described former landlords as having been "like parents," recalling how the landlords had "adored" them, and how they, in turn had enjoyed their company. 814 Like Ramón, former servants there gave fond accounts of the hacienda days, and of landlords providing servants with coffee, rolls, and money. 815 These accounts were bound up with particular evaluations of servant labor, ones that break sharply from its stigmatization by hacienda tenant farmers as well as state reformers. Indeed, one former servant narrated the landlords' affection and love as a reflection of his own moral character, noting that perhaps it was because they recognized that he had a "good heart." Others explained that the people most subject to landlords' abuses had been those who stole, talked back, or were lazy or slow. As Lyons' notes, such assessments should not be seen simply as evidence of false consciousness but should be located within a specific religious and social formation in which moral character, authority, and prestige were interlinked. 816 Yet, lacking in this assessment of authority is its differential mapping across various spheres of hacienda labor, namely servants and tenant farmers. 817 These divisions continue to effect modes of rural collectivity today, former hacienda servants occupying a more marginalized position vis-à-vis local peasant villages while, at the same time, remaining partially embedded in earlier and re-elaborated relations of patronage with former landowning families.

Very few studies have considered hacienda servants' ambivalent experiences of emancipation and post-abolition reform, an oversight that stems in part from scholarly ideals of a shared and autonomous peasantry as well as from intellectuals' own political commitments to popular movements for land and rights. In the studies of hacienda kinship and exchange that do exist, scholars have tended to echo the positions of state reformers and peasant leaders, approaching rural patronage as evidence of lingering dependencies at odds with a more liberated form of political consciousness. Assuming that a "developed consciousness" will necessarily result in a shift away from existing ties to landlords to a more class-based reflection on one's labor and livelihood, anthropologists have gone so far as to caution against attention to indigenous peoples' lingering ties to elites, a focus on "acquiescence" that, it has been argued, obscures and erases indigenous agency. But this seems to problematically accept the reformist terms of agency and politics.

In particular, analytics of dependency, like those of slavery, seem to presume rather than critically examine the normative or moral dimensions of life after servitude. As scholars note,

⁸¹⁴ Lyons (2006:182).

⁸¹⁵ Lyons (2006:185).

⁸¹⁶ See Lyons (2006).

⁸¹⁷ As discussed in chapters 2 and 4, lacking from the scholarship on haciendas and subsequent land movements is the crucial question of how such clashing assessments—hacienda servitude as stigma, and hacienda servitude as a potentially moral relation of service—were themselves shaped by and mobilized within the apposition between agricultural and domestic labor. Here, *pongos* and *mit'anis* who constituted a particular class of domestic servants who was more tightly immersed in the household and who often violently clashed with former hacienda *colono* tenant farmers, particularly within militant movements calling for hacienda abolition from about 1947 onward. See also Gotkowitz (2007).

⁸¹⁸ See Dandler and Torrico (1989); Stern (1987); for a critique see Sylvia Rivera (1987).

⁸¹⁹ For instance, in her compelling work on Bolivian tin mining, June Nash contrasts miners with nostalgia toward former bosses to miners with a "more developed consciousness" (1993:31).

⁸²⁰ See Postero (2007:187).

modern juridical ideals of independence and autonomy ignore the ways that, given kinship relations and the radical open-ness of the body to other forms of relation, being born into the world also necessarily enfolds us in certain patterns of dependence and relation. By critiquing patronage relations as productive of dependency, then, scholars have tended to uphold a European-derived juridical standard of autonomy without querying the conditions in which such a condition is or is not considered exemplary. Indeed, given the long-run histories of mobility, aid, and exchange in this part of the Andes, the very assumption that the autonomy of a subject or collectivity is politically desirable is itself. The need to re-assess normative assumptions about autonomy and dependency are all the more pressing given Ayopayans' opposition to governmental efforts to implement Native Community Lands (TCOs) as a means to indigenous autonomy, discussed in the previous chapter. S23

Instead of approaching dependency or "acquiescence" as though these were terms or practices whose meaning could be ascertained beforehand, we might look more carefully at the sensibilities enfolded within and accompanying specific histories of subjection. Bracketing normative analytics of dependency and autonomy allows us to approach the embeddedness between former servants and landlords as a question or point of inquiry rather than as a normative judgment, that is, as the lack of agency or politics. This raises a number of questions: Are relations to former landlords always or necessarily expressions of indigenous acquiescence? Conversely, how might demands for aid and exchange be understood to shape, reshape, or constrain possible modes and practices of authority? Finally, how do elaborations of authority and responsibility draw from the specific relational entanglements marking hacienda servitude, specifically the cohabitation of servants and landlords? Finally, what do such elaborations do? That is, what shared visions of responsibility do they attempt or uphold, and with what repercussions for dominant narratives of personal wealth and unencumbered authority? Such an effort might seem to risk romanticizing hacienda bonds, thereby paralleling earlier apologists of slavery and servitude who emphasized the existence of a "moral equilibrium" between servants and masters. 824 And yet, to ask these questions is to take seriously Ramón's demands for aid and care, not simply as evidence of political lack but, rather, as expressions of a particular moral imaginary of authority that remains crucial for rural life today.⁸²⁵

Indeed, the issue for Ramón was precisely not one of securing his own autonomy from former landlords, but, rather, with elaborating what for him appeared as Fabio's alarming abandonment of requisite ties and obligations. Here, and as discussed at greater length in chapter 6, ideals of citizenship and progress might support new sorts of political imaginaries and fuel new demands for land, but they could also work to de-legitimate and render anachronistic other moral and political claims. Thus, instead of dismissing Ramón's case as evidence of an enduring subjection or of false consciousness, I am interested in how it builds from a distinct form of "authority complex," one within which claims become legible not only as unreflective iterations of the past but rather as parts of an active attempt to grapple with histories of violence and

-

⁸²¹ Butler (2002); Nussbaum (1990); Strathern (1988).

⁸²² See Larson (1988).

⁸²³ I discuss the reformist implementation of community and the challenges it faces in Ayopaya in chapter 4. For this critique in regard to US slavery, see Hartman (1997).

⁸²⁵ See the introduction for a discussion of authority and exchange in the Andes. See also Sallnow (1989) for an account of an Andean "authority complex" and its relation to colonial and precolonial elaborations of wealth, particularly gold and silver. For a counter argument based on the view of wealth as an expression or synthesis of colonial greed against a more balanced Andean reciprocity-based equilibrium, see Taussig (1981).

subjection and the sorts of rural abjection and racialized privilege they left behind. ⁸²⁶ More than evidence of continued abjection, then, demands for aid from former landlords point to the importance of authority as a basis for relations of exchange that are at once both redistributive and reconciliatory.

Reframing the problem of patronage after servitude in this way offers a new point of inquiry from which to examine former servants' elaborations and expectations of aid from former landlords. In this sense, Fabio's failure to provide for Ramón in his old age and after his death rendered explicit an otherwise largely unspoken moral expectation that former landlords uphold or maintain a certain responsibility to their former servants. Ironically, it was Fabio's wife who outlined this sense of responsibility to me. Speaking to Lola, she noted that she continued to send food to her own childhood servants, including the woman who had worked as a *mit'ani* cook for her parents and grandparents. To clarify this sense of duty to me, Lola recounted a conversation she had with the young man charged with delivering food to former servants. When he complained that they should not bother bringing food, Lola had admonished him, noting "Some day you will be old and need help, and others will care for you in the same way." While Lola abstracted the problem of obligation as a matter of old age, the very structure of her address—her insistence on aiding former servants communicated to a current Quechuaspeaking servant—reveals the imbrications of these patronage relations within the specificities of the region's intimate architectures of labor and exchange.

Even if specific obligations to former servants were not always upheld, then, they belonged to broader field of expectation that former hacienda authorities provide for or remain accountable to former servants. Here, then, Ramón's case drew people together, providing a context in which to render explicit feelings of guilt and sadness as well as accompanied articulations of elite obligation and duty. Echoing Martín's assessments of Fabio's failure to be properly affected, one woman noted, "He is a man without shame." In Ramón's case, landlords' sense of obligation to former servants was situated within a recognition of the particularly intimate nature of hacienda relations in the region. As one woman recalled, "Ramón and Fabio were very close. Ramón carried him on his back when he was a toddler." Others recalled that the two men had been very close, "like father and son." Here, evocations of bodily proximity and affective closeness revealed the ways that servitude arose not only as a labor condition but also as a specific mode of affinity and exchange. By calling forth the image of two men walking together, villagers aligned servitude with an almost-familial closeness that contrasts sharply from scholars' focus on the economic dimensions of hacienda life. 827 Furthermore, Ramón's stooped back coupled with Fabio's negligence also pointed to the dark underbelly of these intimate pasts, the differential distribution of history's burden or weight among servants and landlords today. Without assuming the past can or should be properly shed, then, we might consider who bears the past and how bearing can become not only a burden but also a moral claim to and demand for others' responsibility and aid in the present.

In the context of current land sanitation efforts driven by a more romantic ideal of autonomous indigenous community, these histories of intimacy and their continued re-elaboration in the course of patronage ties took on important political dimensions. On the one

⁸²⁶ For an account of Andean exchange relations see Harris 1989; Sallnow 1989; For a comparison with Ecuador see Lyons 2006:231). My attention to the reconciliatory dimensions of kinship practices draws from the work of Veena Das (2005), Michael Lambek (2003), and Erik Mueggler (2001).

⁸²⁷ Of course, the image was also interesting as it reversed the generational dynamics of hacienda paternalism. In this case, the father figure was not a landlord but rather was a servant, and the child the landlord's son.

hand, and as discussed in chapter 2, recollections of earlier hacienda past could work to highlight the failures of revolutionary projects of rural social change since hacienda abolition in 1953. Thus, one former servant noted that life was "better before." Under the hacienda system, he received three warm meals and unlimited coca leaves each day; these days, in contrast, he is paid only 45 bolivianos (5 USD) a day and is lucky to receive soup for lunch. Former servants' memories of the hacienda were not, however, apolitical yearnings for a return to the past but, rather, arose as critical reflections on the amorality of current bosses and the failures of state reform. As the son of an illegitimate child of one landlord poignantly put it, "For this government, we are not history." Such critiques indicate the ways that Ayopaya's distinct labor history and its related patronage frameworks destabilize governmental and populist elaborations of justice, ones that require and presume indigenous people's inevitable overcoming of the bonded past and their subsequent integration into the modern nation. Unfolding in the absence of such overcoming, post-hacienda relations supply their own answer to the question of what indigenous justice might look like.

Post-Hacienda Patronage as "Moral Obligation"

It was late February, and the Carnival celebrations were well underway in the municipal town of Laraya. Over a case of beer left over from the government's celebrations, a group of men and women carried on with the festivities around the table in the kitchen of one municipal worker. Raul, a Quechua-speaking agronomist whose family is from Laraya but who today splits his time between Cochabamba and Laraya, was telling me his family's history as hacienda owners. According to him, his grandmother who had owned an hacienda not far from here. When she separated from her husband, she left for town and brought her children with her, including Raul's mother. Her ex-husband, however, continued to live on the hacienda. Raul noted, somewhat ambiguously, "This was the situation in which the *campesinos* offered someone to the hacienda. They brought a woman called a *mit'ani* to the house in order to serve. This ended with children being born there, my mother's siblings." As if anticipating my question of what this arrangement might have looked like. Raul added, "It is not that there was a rape or anything like that. [The woman] ended up living with my grandfather, but she was very young." Indeed, they lived together until his grandfather died. Raul continued, explaining that such arrangements were quite common, women sent to work as unpaid domestic servants upon the regional haciendas. Implicit in his description, however, was the suggestion that sexual services were a normalized part of mit'anis domestic labor. As he put it, "If at some time the landowner wanted something, he had the service of the *mit'ani*. And so children were born."

Service, the root of the word servitude (*servidumbre*) carried multiple valences, including a particular sense of providing for another's needs, including sexual needs. ⁸²⁸ As elsewhere, such relations included racialized perceptions of certain laborers perhaps less as the possession of another person than as subjects charged with satisfying or fulfilling landlords' "needs." Don René, the son of particularly violent hacienda landlords, put it bluntly: "To what degree was it rape, and to what degree was it *not*?" Indeed, he noted, in some cases women sought out landowners as desirable fathers for their children and subsequently lived with landlords and even

⁸²⁸ In this regard, the term echoes Hegel's elaboration of "being for itself" and opposed to "being for another," a state that many have argued is comparable to that of slavery. However, critics have pointed out, Hegel uses a different term for institutional slavery (*Sclaverei*, German for slavery) than he does for the condition of "being for another," which he equates with *Knechtschaft*, that is, bondage, servitude, or serfdom. (See Collins 2013:286, footnote 4).

married. Furthermore, while Raul emphasized that such arrangements were "not rape," the younger unionists and children of former servants tended to describe these instances more as ones of *violación* (rape). But even this view was not monolithic. Yet the understanding of such relations as a specific sort labor arrangement was not simply an argument made by former landlords. For instance, the son of a couple of hacienda workers whose mother had "served" in rotating *mit'ani* service recounted that *colono* laborers were required to "deliver their daughters to the landlord."

Frederico, too, who had himself been integrated into the Sarahuayto hacienda as a child, narrated his own case in terms of his mother's and his own desire to "earn something," that is, to gain access to money as well as education and upward mobility. In using this language, Frederico introduced a rubric of intentionality that repositioned the past as an outcome of individual aspirations and tactics for self-betterment rather than simply as an effect of lacking will or choice. 10 In their attentiveness to the ambiguities of such arrangements, then, both the children of landlords and servants attributed relations of hacienda domesticity with a certain sense of agentive choice, of seeking out landlords as elites who might aid in abetting rural peasants. At the same time, frameworks of agency and choice could also be used against hacienda workers, evidence of their sly attempts to "get something out of" landlords. This then arose as further evidence of the depraved nature of hacienda servants, who were often seen as self-interested subjects whose ways contrasted with the hard work and communitarian ethos of hacienda tenant farmers and free peasants.

As noted earlier, these evaluations and stigmatizations of servants should be positioned in regard to Cochabamba's long history of mobility and exchange on regional agrarian estates. In this regard, hacienda servants seem to retain some of the stigmas attributed to an earlier class of landless labor migrants, including *yanacona* laborers and *forasteros*. As discussed in chapter 1, these groups were highly problematic for colonial administrators, imploding state efforts to resettle indigenous groups into nucleated towns and communities. At the same time, scholars have suggested, these populations and their labor practices were also stigmatized by native caciques and indigenous political leaders or chiefs, for in escaping tribute by fleeing to haciendas they left their families and fellow community members with heightened tribute burdens. Not only the integration of itinerant and migrant workers into hacienda households in cases of poverty, illegitimate children, and landless servants but also their stigmatization by hacienda tenant farmers and other rural indigenous communities have antecedents in colonial-era debates over rural land and labor relations.

Yet if relations of assimilating landless indigenous persons into haciendas had origins in the colonial period, today these same relations retain a moral quality at odds with reformist and populist stigmas. Indeed, speaking to former landlords and servants it seemed that practices of informal adoption and god-parenting were approached not only as expansions of hacienda sociality but, at the same time, were understood as actions taken by landlords in response to a lingering sense of guilt and responsibility for the violence and abjection of hacienda servitude. Thus, Raul explained, his mother and her brother had felt bad for the innocent children, their

⁸²⁹ See Leinaweaver (2008) for understandings of mobility and social betterment as they shape informal adoption in Peru.

 ⁸³⁰ See chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of the bifurcation of servant and tenant farmer and accusations of greed or laziness leveled by peasant union leaders against former hacienda servants.
 831 See Larson (1998); Jackson (1994).

⁸³² See Larson (1998); for the inter-community conflicts generated by a new more mobile class of hacienda managers and owners, including native caciques, see Thomson (2002).

younger half-siblings. According to Raul, his uncle had remarked, "My father did this and it is not the children's fault." The two siblings responded to this situation by absorbing their half-kin into their own families as children, Raul's uncle informally adopting his half-brother and Raul's mother Flora adopting two girls, her half-sisters. Here, it should be noted, the very structure of the adoption seemed to mark the risk for more sexual violence. Thus, women opened their doors to illegitimate daughters and men to illegitimate sons. Eventually, as the children got older and following the death of Flora's brother, all three children came to lean heavily on her not only for room and board but also for broader forms of aid, Flora acting as their god-mother.

While Raul noted that the absorption of *mit'ani* women into haciendas not only as laborers but also as sexual partners was common, he also sought to differentiate his own family from others based on their exemplary responsiveness to the past. In particular, he framed his mother's deeds as exemplary in her effort to confront rather than deny the violence so endemic to hacienda servitude. As he noted of his mother and uncle, "They did not deny (rechazar) the situation, though that would have been normal. Most [landowning families] denied it." As elsewhere in the Andes, then, accountability is opposed to the tendency to refuse or deny (rechazar) the past. 833 When I asked him why he thought this was, Raul identified two characteristics particular to his family. First, he attributed the aid provided to illegitimate children as an expression of his mother's moral character, in particular, of her own sentiments of sadness and empathy, including tenderness (cariño) toward the children. Thus, he explained, "There was a lot of tenderness because my mother felt very sad about what had happened with my grandfather, so she ended up being a mother to them. She raised them. Serapio was her eldest son, more or less, although he was actually her brother. That is, she assumed the responsibility of her father. There was a moral, familial obligation." In this way, informal adoption and godparenting were not simply outgrowths of common practices of absorbing servants and illegitimate children into hacienda households but, rather, took on force as reconciliatory practices by which to address intimate histories of familial violence. In the process, kinship served as more than a cloak shielding or obscuring hacienda violence but rather was invoked as an inherited relational form from within which former landlords sought to address and remedy past violence.

While Raul made a claim to the particularity of his own family in their responsiveness to this violent past, such relations were not rare. This is evident in the case of land gifting to illegitimate children discussed in chapter 2 as well as the assistance Sarahuayto's landlord provided both to his own half-siblings as well as Frederico. What was distinct, however, was Raul's explicit narration of these relations as reconciliatory forms. As he put it, his mother's actions were spurred not only by tenderness for her half-siblings but also by a sense of "moral, familial obligation" to take responsibility for her father's actions. At stake in these gestures of aid was not simply the consolidation of hacienda authority, then, but rather also a sense of attempting to remedy or improve upon the moral shortcomings of the past. In this vision, historical accountability was not simply a matter of institutional efforts or formal inheritance procedures, but also hinged upon and thus required a specific sort of moral and affective bearing. This included empathy and attentiveness to others' suffering as well as a recognition of one's

-

⁸³³ Elsewhere in the Andes, scholars have found similar logics at work guiding relations after hacienda servitude. In Lyons (2006:169-170) account, for instance, one former hacienda servant describes her half-sister, who was fathered with the landlord, as real "señora" with red hair. Rather than thinking herself too good for her half-kin, she noted, her half-sister had aided her kin. In this way, the informant noted, she did not "deny her family" but rather continued to foster relationships with them in socially appropriate ways.

own imbrication in the historical patterns that cause present-day suffering and, relatedly, a reflection on the lived entailments of such historical responsibility for ways of acting and being in the present.834

Of course, Raul's forthcoming attentiveness to the moral dimensions of such intimate histories was partly enabled by his own temporal distance from the hacienda moment. Histories of sexual violence and uncertain kinship were much more fraught for those who had lived through them, such as Raul's other uncle who had until his death refused to formally recognize his half-siblings. With his uncle's death some years ago, Raul felt at greater liberty to talk about the family's hacienda past. As he explained, "My uncle died and I am not afraid to tell this history, because in the end it is the history of my family." But it was not simply the history of his family that was at stake. Indeed, for Raul the significance of these acts went beyond the problem of his grandfather's hacienda. As Raul noted, thoughtfully, "It seems that history depends on what passes, one goes forgetting or one goes improving it, I don't know. This is the true history." In this way, practices of aid and assistance after servitude indicated the broader possibilities of "improving" history by way of an exemplary reflection on and embodied response to the debts it leaves behind.

This burden did not, however, seem to be evenly distributed. As evident in Fabio's failure to be properly "affected" by Ramón's death, not everyone was attentive to or responsive to the debts introduced by the region's hacienda past. Thus, while hacienda relations everywhere enfolded certain modes of intimacy and violence, only some former landowning families took these intimacies as a point of departure for a moral engagement with former servants. Thus, Raul added, "All of the landowners committed errors with their female servants. Those few who were recognized belonged to my family." When I asked why, he replied quickly, "Because my grandfather was not from here. He was from Cochabamba, a *forastero* [landless peasant]. He, too, was other." Thus, here it was not an elite position in general but rather an unstable sort of authority on the part of a Quechua-speaking landholding class comprised of prior landless laborers and migrants that Raul identified as the source of a moral responsiveness to the hacienda past. In the process, the locatedness of particular landlords and families within the region's historical patterns of labor and mobility were felt to condition and enable a particular moral stance toward hacienda violence, in particular, the vulnerabilities facing (landless) children born to hacienda landlords and domestic servants. Unexpectedly, then, it was not all landlords but rather a more humble class of juch'uv patrones or small landlords who felt obliged to use their often limited resources to secure the welfare and well-being of former servants and unrecognized hacienda children. In this regard, Raul's narrative suggests the remarkable ways that the region's history of landless labor and migrant mobility comes to shape a particular rural orientation to the intimacies of hacienda subjection.

While Raul described this responsiveness in terms of being "other," that is, of a historical experience of partial estrangement from peasant community life as well as mestizo hacienda culture, it is noteworthy that the region's hacienda past also provided the relational structures with which to address the past. As discussed in chapter 1, the integration of servants into the region's encomiendas and later haciendas was common in the colonial period, practiced not only on the part of Spanish landlords but also native *kuraka* lords. 835 Thus, rather than diverging from relations of adoption, god parenting, religious sponsorship, or land gifting common in the

⁸³⁴ I introduce this question of responsibility to the region's violent past in the introduction. See, in particular, the case of Rene (pages 1-13).

835 See Larson (1998).

region's hacienda estates prior to the 1953 land reform, subjects like Flora and her brother drew from these existing forms of practice and kinship but attempted to make of them something new. Namely, if orphans had been integrated into haciendas, Flora too brought her unrecognized half-siblings to live with her. But these old forms worked in new ways. Thus, if the integration of children within haciendas was previously partially a means by which to expand landlords' authority and prestige or to increase the servant class, this did not stop Raul's family from approaching these relational mechanisms as mechanisms by which to address and "improve upon," rather than simply consolidate, hacienda subjection. As this case suggests, moral grammars of reciprocity over time and exchange as a moral form my exist in a more abstract form but the ways they are actualized and enacted depends on particular regional and familial patterns of labor and belonging.

As discussed in the preceding chapters, the Cochabamba region stands out for the historical development of what scholars describe as a native or peasant landholding class. 836 In contrast to the Spanish-descendent landlords most typical of Latin American haciendas, many landlords in Cochabamba were of Indian or mestizo descent and had acquired title to land through accruing money as wage-laborers, through intermarriage, or through informal systems of land gifting. 837 According to Raul, his grandfather the landlord was born a forastero or landless peasant. 838 In this way, the family's partly estranged relation within local systems of land tenure and ayllu collectivity as well as elite systems of *criollo* land ownership conditioned a particular responsiveness to hacienda servants. Like the somewhat marginalized hacienda servants who often stigmatized by state reformers and rural unionists as neither authentically indigenous nor sufficiently mestizo, the peasant class of small landholders or *juch'uy patrones* of Cochabamba inhabited a liminal space marked by their tenuous distinction from hacienda tenants—a category to which they might have belonged only a few years before, as in the case of Pavel's grandfather, discussed in chapter 4—as well as by what was taken as their inferiority to Spanish-descendent, criollo landlords, most of whom did not reside in the countryside but rather managed their agrarian estates from the safe distance of colonial cities and towns. The estranged position of Ouechua-speaking, mestizo landlords lent itself to particular relations of accountability and answerability to the suffering Quechua-speaking *campesinos*, including former servants, relations rendered particularly evident in Flora's position in Laraya.

Reconciliatory Rituals: Ch'allas, Chicha, and the Ethics of Exchange

Several days after speaking to Raul, I attended Flora's *ch'alla de terrenos*, an agrarian ritual centered around the sacrifice of a sheep or a llama typically performed in February, during the fecund, rainy months following Carnival. ⁸³⁹ The *ch'alla* began in the late morning, when Flora and her sons, other family members, townsfolk, municipal officials, local villagers, rural farmers, and the town anthropologist gathered together on a fertile hillside outside of the town of Laraya. Earlier that day a sheep had been sacrificed, blood offered as a requisite gift to the pachamama and hoped to secure continued fertility and crop health. The meat of the sacrificed animal was cooked or smoked along with potato in traditional earth-oven or *pampakuy* style, an oven buried

o,

⁸³⁶ See Larson (1998); Larson and Harris (1995).

⁸³⁷ See my discussion of land gifting in chapter 2.

As noted in chapter 1, this term was originally a fiscal category marking a non-community member who did not own any land. See Larson (1998).

⁸³⁹ The term *ch'alla* is Quechua for drinking, imbibing, and inebriation. In common use it describes a sanctification ritual for non-human objects, including businesses, homes, cars, and lands.

in the ground and then covered with stones. Beside the oven, a *q'oa* or ritual bundle was burned, itself a sacrificial offering composed of coca, candy, incense and the hooves and skull of the sacrificed animal, in this case a male sheep. After the meat was cooked, a meal was served to all the guests, who included townsfolk as well as rural villagers and members of former servant families from the hacienda lands Flora had inherited from her father. In addition to the food, coca, chicha, beer, and cigarettes were distributed. Guests stood in a circle, eating and drinking, before Flora's son Raul and his friends retrieved their guitars and charangos, then singing songs in Quechua about bathing *campesinas*, unrequited love, the miners' struggle, and the glory of Bolivian nation and soil ("*mi tierra Boliviana*"). After the meal, a campfire was built up, and the singing continued. After the sun had set, I accompanied a crowd of people, mostly men, as they carried cornstalks on their shoulders from the farmlands to Flora's *chicharia* in town. *Charango* and guitar music and the men's singing lasted until dawn, as guests gathered around the long wooden tables of the chicha-brewery that Flora runs out of the outdoor patio of her home.

Each year, during the seasonal *ch'alla de terrenos* rituals of February, families of former landlords and servants, unionists and municipal officials gather together to drink *chicha* corn beer and eat meat roasted in the earth in the traditional *pampakuy* style. As suggested by the Quechua verb *pampay*, to bury or engulf, in this meal villagers collectively consume the fruit of the soil, unearthing sacrificed sheep or llama meat from the earth oven below. The *q'oa* is offered to the earth or pachamama, and it is in her soils that the meat is engulfed and cooked. The ritual offerings unfold upon hacienda lands inherited from landlords or redistributed during the 1953 land reform. The materiality of the hacienda past, its former pasturelands and fertile plots, thus comprise the ground on which and within which rural villagers and townsfolk collectively engage each other and the region's agrarian past. People eat and drink, accompanied by the melodic tune of *charangos* and guitars that echo across lush valleys below.

In the preceding chapters, I described the Ayopaya countryside as the sites of agrarian servitude as well as indigenous mobilization and abolitionary violence. In the mid-20th century, anti-hacienda rebellions swept these fertile valleys, hacienda *colonos* challenged hacendado abuses and land appropriation. Despite this violence, however, Flora's *ch'alla* suggests that these green hillsides are also the spaces upon which rural groups grapple with the region's violent past, former hacienda plots also arising as sites where ex-landlords' children and ex-servant communities reach out to one another, inviting one other to participate in seasonal events like the spring *ch'allas* of late February. Yet, while rural practices of ritual feasting, like institutional approaches to state land reform, address the problem of rural relations in former hacienda regions, they supply very different answers to what reconciliation might look like. Namely, practices of ritual patronage and related acts of land gifting, god-parenting, and informal adoption diverge from state reform efforts insofar as they are not organized by an ideal of disentangling past and present. Responsiveness, in a sense, requires and is facilitated by relation, that is, forms of contact and exchange between differentially situated groups. ⁸⁴⁰

As in other former hacienda regions in the Andes, then, the *ch'alla* offering seems to have begun as a sort of ritual act of tributary payment to landlords, a competitive practice in which various villages of tenant farmers competed over who could deliver more bounty to the town home of the patron. Here, practices of ritual offering belong to a broader cultural formation hinging on multiple scales of exchange. Historically, the generous distribution of food and drink on the part of landlords was then ritually reciprocated by workers who delivered farm

 ⁸⁴⁰ For relation as an ideal guiding patronage practices among rural villagers and gold mining elites, see chapter 6.
 841 See Thurner (1993:70; see also Webster (1981:623).

produce, here cornstalks, to the landlords home, constituting a sort of tributary payment which, traditionally, belonged to a whole range of labor practices that were understood exchanged for continued access to land. 842 Yet, while in other regions, such as Ecuador, scholars argue that such patronage forms, such as fiesta sponsorship, broke down after agrarian reform, in Ayopaya such relations remained imbued not only with inherited patterns of hacendado authority but also sought to make sense of how to address a fragmenting hacienda past. The ch'alla, then, consists of a ritualized modality of exchange that engages and works through a set of overlapping reciprocities, sacrifice of blood made for earth deities, local embodiments of the pachamama, in exchange for continued fertility. The sacrifice of blood, originally said to have been of Inca virgins, is accompanied by a requisite state of heightened drunkenness, the drinking of copious amounts of chicha and beer on the part of participants who, before drinking, tip the cup, offering a drink to the pachamama earth below. 843

Practices of ritual feasting respond to ideals of sacrificial exchange that may have precolonial origins but were transformed and even partially revived in the colonial era. 844 In particular, the notion of the saint and the patron saint were introduced by Spanish colonialists. missionaries, and administrators who brought with them Catholicism and with it practices of patron saint's day feasts. 845 In scholarship on the Andes, the importance of carefully cultivating ties to patron saints is a key problem of religious life. 846 Patron saints can bring rain or withhold it, and are thus honored in a series of feasts and other calendrical religious festivals. Such moral frameworks also infused hacienda life, as practices of reciprocity included the exchange of gifts and favors and in which labor itself was sometimes understood as a gift responding to the debts related to landlords' previous favors. 847 While there have been limited studies of such feasting and other religious relations on haciendas, 848 landlords often brought images of particular patron saints, imposed heavy fiesta obligations, and allowed workers to congregate in hacienda chapel and yards for the feast. 849

Flora's relations to villagers and townsfolk, then, seemed to respond to a particular rural ideal of agrarian patronage bound up in the prior hacienda system. Like older and, arguably, continuing formations of political order, here authority is achieved and secured by way of exchange, claims to prestige and honor resting on authorities' capacities to distribute food and coca to farm laborers. 850 Not only hacienda landlords but also native lords or caciques had originally fulfilled this honor, labor repaid by way of continued land access as well as provisions of food and coca and belonging to a broader complex in which lordship and wealth were bound together and linked to redistributive practices and, on the other hand, where tribute was a source

⁸⁴² See Harris (1989); Thurner (1993).

⁸⁴³ See Harris (1989:233),

⁸⁴⁴ Ethnographers have linked ethical frameworks of reciprocity, gifting, and care and their relation to Andean ideals of equilibrium and complementarity among disparate parts. See Brush (1977), Ferraro (2004), Gelles (1995), Harris (1978), Isbell (1976), Orlove (1974), Ossio (1992), and Van Vleet (2008). Abercrombie (1998:223-258); Christian (1981); Foster (1960).

⁸⁴⁶ As noted in chapter 1, these relations of labor and tribute seem to have pre-colonial origins in Inca practices of exchanging usufruct land rights and partial community autonomy for the collection of tribute. See McCormack (1991); Murra (1962, 1978); Rowe (1946); Salomon and Urioste (1991), Wachtel (1977).

847 See Langer (1985, 1989), Lyons (2006:17, 19), Orlove (1974), Oberem (1981), and Pérez Tomayo (1947).

⁸⁴⁸ As Lyons (2006:101) notes, there has been limited attention to how such religious festivals and feasts operated upon haciendas. See Chance and Taylor (1985); Greenberg (1981:1-22); Skar (1981).

⁸⁴⁹ See Burgos Guevara (1997); M. Harris (1964).

⁸⁵⁰ Sallnow (1989).

of legitimate land tenure. 851 Indeed, as discussed above, Flora maintained a set of religious traditions including practices of animal sacrifice understood to secure the fertility of local soils and to ward off jealous or disgruntled spirits. 852 In this way, Flora's case highlights the ways that haciendas integrated some elements of Quechua and Aymara-based traditions, including practices of agrarian ritual, sponsorship, and religiously inflected tribute payment. 853

Scholars have critiqued the languages of obligation and reciprocity between master and slave as obscuring the violence of chattel slavery. Yet, it is not my intention to flatten or deny the violence of hacienda subjection but, rather, to attend to the specific entanglements between authority, subjection, and patronage and to ask how this formation shapes reconciliatory relations in the aftermath of violence. 854 Assuming that obligation or exchange operates only negatively as a hegemonic imposition or an apologist discourse—means that demands for historical accountability from former servant or slave families can be analyzed only as anachronisms whose moral or political demands have no place in the present. But this presumes a particular progressivist genealogy in which the problem of former subjection can only be addressed, following abolition, through legal or juridical means. In contrast, Flora's ch'alla suggests a tradition of reconciliatory practice at odds with governmental claims to absolute control or decidability over the terms of rural life. The ways that rural groups address a violent past, then, may be unsettling or even disturbing, but to immediately assume their illegitimacy is to reproduce the hubris of modern law, one itself is entangled in reformist histories of paternalism, intervention, and violence. 855 Thus, my claim is not that reciprocity or obligation work to equalize status or liberate, but that, nonetheless, such logics enable a particular register of claimmaking and reconciliatory relation, ones whose logics or stakes are rendered illegible if taken only as reflections of the constraints or hegemony of dominant economic systems. Attending to such complexities all the more important given Ayopaya's specific genealogy of agrarian exchange and its legal transfiguration since the late colonial period. 856

Flora's *ch'alla*, then, can be understood as a contemporary re-elaboration of earlier patterns of ritual exchange both among humans and earth deities that, today, unfolds between former landlords and the kin of their former laborers. 857 Of course, for participants ritual offerings are experienced less as an exchange than as a mode of "feeding" or nourishing the earth. As scholars have shown, landlords' involvement in such ritual practices has historically been key to popular assessments of their moral legitimacy as an agrarian or political authority. Thus, one woman was described as mean "in not offering food and hospitality (no sabe invitar)" while other traders and merchants were described as good because they combined profit making with generosity. 858 Inequality, then, is less problematic that the attempt to decouple it from

851 Harris (1989:241).

⁸⁵² Sallnow (1989); Isbell (1977); Harris (2000).

⁸⁵³ See Lyons (2006).

⁸⁵⁴ For a discussion of the risks of employing obligation as a heuristic for understanding subjection, see Hartman (1997).
⁸⁵⁵ See Hartman (1997).

⁸⁵⁷ As scholars note, traditionally cross-sex siblings give ceremonial gifts of cloth, clothing, livestock, or labor to the sponsors of such ritual feasts with the expectation that the goods or labor will be reciprocated in future occasions. See Harris (1989:244-245).

858 Harris (1989:246).

particular exchange relations. 859 As discussed in previous chapters, former hacienda servants and tenant farmers made similar assessments of the moral character of landlords, one that was premised not simply on evidence of exploitation, violence, or inequality but, also, stemmed from landlords' perceived fulfillment of a range of obligations stemming from his or her position of authority. 860 Indeed, Flora's case suggests that such practices of generous patronage remained crucial to villagers' assessments of her legitimate ownership of former hacienda lands.

This was a fact Flora herself seemed to recognize and which, it seemed, drew from her own childhood experience living through the region's tumultuous abolitionary past. As noted above, Flora's grandparents had owned humble parcels of land outside of town. Then, in 1953, the land reform occurred. According to Flora, "It was a severe time. I remember there were searches for property owners. They took the lands of my grandparents and all of his family. Everything was taken." Flora recounted how she and her siblings had hidden, huddled up at home and afraid that militants would enter and kill them. As she noted, "I remember those days of 1952, during the revolution. The *Indios* rose up. They were cruel. In Tiquirpaya they killed three people. They came with their concha shells and they made us suffer. We hid ourselves. 'They are coming to kill us,' people said. 'They are going to slit our throats,' said the children. They had killed a professor, an officer, and another one too. Did you know?" I nodded. Yet such turbulence was not simply a thing of the past. Indeed, Flora noted that the year before her greatnephew had gone to visit inherited former hacienda lands. According to Flora, he was sleeping in his truck waiting for it to get light when he was awoken to the words, "Leave now, before something happens to you, before we enact community justice. We will kill you. Because this is not your land." These words, it should be noted, are almost a verbatim repetition of the demands put to hacienda landlords in 1952, as recounted by leaders of rural anti-hacienda militias, a fact that might be related either to Flora's own compression of historical periods or to the continued use of the slogan to chase out mestizo intruders. 861 According to Flora, her cousin responded by leaving hastily. Thus, she reflected, "These conflicts continue."

Flora saw such conflicts as a product of lacking "tenderness" toward former hacienda landlords. Thus, she noted, "peasants don't have even a little bit of tenderness for the person they loved so much before. Instead, they are always trying to damage the landowners. But there aren't landowners anymore." Here, her narrative was caught in the instability of historical rupture. If there were no longer landlords, then how could she lament peasants' lack of tenderness for them? At the same time, her comments clearly suggested that, despite hacienda abolition, she expected a certain continuity in affective relations between rural villagers and mestizo landlords, ones that were not always upheld. And yet, here Flora described herself as an exception to the rule. Indeed, she recalled, "Last year my relatives went to the lands by truck and were told that they should leave before blood runs. They were told that the villagers do not want to see them there, because the lands do not belong to them and that now the local peasants are the owners. Upon telling me this, the peasants came and said to me, 'Mamitav the lands are yours. Why don't you come? If you visit we will roast a sheep. We will make you grilled meat, mamitay, with corn too. Just come.' They came to the *chicharia* and suggested this to me."

⁸⁵⁹ As Harris notes, then, wealthier merchants were not problematic because of their status but rather, were stigmatized when they did not betray display generosity by sharing food through practices of ritual feasting and sponsorship.

860 See, in particular, chapter 2.

See chapter 2.

Here, then, it seemed that former hacienda worker families were more sympathetic to the land claims of the landlord's daughter than those of local villagers—here the Quechua-speaking *mit'ani* who ended up marrying Flora's father. Popular critique of servants who married into hacienda families seems to follow from the common practice of stigmatizing hacienda servants as greedy and self-interested. More than papers or bureaucratic processes, then, the authority of land ownership seemed to reflect a rapport established through everyday relations of patronage and ritual, including Flora's relations to her half-siblings as well as the seasonal *ch'alla* rituals. ⁸⁶³

Indeed, on the evening of the *ch'alla*, I joined Doña Flora and her guests at her chicharia. We were served chicha and I spoke to several villagers, the children of her father's former hacienda servants. Out of earshot from Flora, a young Quechua-speaking union leader gave his own account of the land conflict with Flora's cousin who was attempting to "recuperate" former hacienda lands. The relative claimed to have purchased rather than inherited the lands, as he had been an unrecognized hacienda child. Villagers, however, had been unsympathetic to his claims. Indeed, as evident in the presence of these rural villagers at Flora's *ch'alla*, despite or perhaps precisely because of her more proximate ties to the prior hacendado family, rural peasants seemed to privilege her claims to land and authority. Not only had local villagers invited Doña Flora to her father's lands, promising to butcher a sheep for her, but Doña Flora drank with them in her *chicharia* and supplied a meal and drinks during the ritual sanctification of her lands. More broadly, then, Flora's case suggests the ways that tense conflicts over land and hacendado inheritance were accompanied by and even resolved through more intimate forms of embodied exchange, of eating and drinking together in Flora's *ch'alla* or chicharia.

While Flora's son narrated these forms as reconciliatory practices. Flora described them rather as the continued upholding of hacienda patronage. As she noted, "I have helped many people. As you saw yesterday, the way I provided a meal for all of the people. Ours is the only hacienda that still has these customs, that attends to all of the people who come. Here too in the chicharia, in the early mornings and for the poor I always bring clothes to distribute. I give to those in need, those who do not have food. Help arrives even to those who don't need it sometimes." When I asked when these "traditions" began, she noted that she had "always done this," but that it had been even grander when her husband was still alive. Then, she noted, it was attended not only by campesinos but also by fine townsfolk. "But," she added, her face brightening slightly, "yesterday many good people were introduced to us, no? Doctors, people from the municipal government, the mayor, and the architect sleeping." She lifted her arm and waved vaguely toward the man snoring at the far end of the table. She turned away from him, and was silent. "These customs haven't been taken away. I've continued with them." As if on cue, a man in rags stumbles in, leaning unsteadily on his cane. Calling out to him in Ouechua, she waves him over to a table, and turned to me in a hushed voice: "He's half stupid. He's asking for food that one gifts. One always has to gift it to them. He always comes like this, asking for food." She gestured to the young woman who worked for her, who promptly brought the man a bowl of soup from the kitchen located under an overhang in the far side of the room.

Flora narrated such patronage as a product of her own religious devotion to God. Describing the aid she had provided to her half-siblings she noted, "I give them a lot. For His wishes, one has to give every day. Food, clothes, a bed, I give a lot. What can I do? I simply

213

⁸⁶² As noted in chapter 2, former hacienda servants were often condemned as *yanqhas*, good-for-nothings who acted out of self-benefit rather than the interests of the community.

Mamitay combines the Quechua possessive suffix -y with the Spanish diminutive -ta.

have to give." Unlike an easy partaking among friends or family, then, such practices necessarily engage people who are perceived as grotesquely other, including "pure campesinos" and "half-stupid" beggars. This was also true in the case of Flora's assistance to her half-siblings, fathered by the landlord and the daughter of a Quechua-speaking *mitani* servant, evident in the ways Flora described her half-siblings. She noted, "These are Indian hicks with their same faces. They are the children of *campesinos*, and their mother has the same face. The same face. They did not come out our color, because I have two other brothers from my father with another concubine, but they have my eyes." Doña Flora continued, contrasting her father's light-skin and blue eyes to the "dark face" and *pollera* skirts of his mistress. For the descendants of landowners, the need "to be better" was taken as a direct response to their forefathers' violence, yet one that continued to be imbued with often racialized understanding of indigenous and peasant inferiority.

Such relations of patronage among former landlords and servants were fairly common, the children of hacienda laborers might obtain education by way of vertical ties to landowning families who would sponsor them, paying for school materials and offering room and board in exchange for unpaid labor. As discussed in chapter 1, these frameworks of landlord generosity have their own complex legal and cultural histories. Not only were practices and redistribution and labor reciprocity upon encomiendas regulated from the late colonial period onward, but also practices of monetary exchange today remain implicated within particular religious frameworks of exchange and sacrifice. Rotationary exchange including offerings and gifts were made not only to Catholic and Andean religious figures including place-based deities, the *pachamama*, patron saints, and *El Señor*, or God himself but also to embodiments of divine authority including *kuraka* lords and priests. Indeed, in the case of Frederico and Frederico, discussed above, children circulated in ways that were structurally akin to historical practices of sacrifice and gift giving to religious and political authorities.

Indeed, in Ayopaya, too, understandings of patronage at times drew explicitly from the parallels between patron saints and hacienda patrons or landlords. According to villagers in Ayopaya, in some cases hacienda landlords became saint. For instance, villagers described the *Señor de Machaca*, a landowner turned saint, as simultaneously a "gentleman" and a "mountain." The saint was discovered when a disabled child left to herd animals all day and returned satiated. In this way, it was determined that this *Señor* provided the child with food. Here, not only ex-landowners' kin but also ex-servant communities characterized magnanimous character as reflecting the fulfillment of an exemplary, vertical, relation of care. Like the patron saint *Señor de Machaca*, good landowners are those who provide for the ill and the indigent. Thus, landlords were described as having been "good" when they acted as guardians and protectors and as having acted in culturally appropriate ways given demands of patronage and generosity, providing food and coca to workers and, at times, facilitating access to medical services and transportation.

Flora's position in Laraya raises questions about the enduring nature of a particular understanding of authority and its transformation as an explicitly reconciliatory form. Here, the violence of past servitude required specific acts of assistance, the flow of money and resources

-

⁸⁶⁴ Harris (1989); Larson (1998); Sallnow (1989).

⁸⁶⁵ Harris (1989).

⁸⁶⁶ Aquino and Galarza (1987:5-6).

⁸⁶⁷ Elsewhere, anthropologist have shown that hacienda landlords, patron saints, and God himself were often associated as embodiments of a sort of paternal generosity, an understanding shaped by the fact that haciendas included various forms of Catholic religious instruction which implicitly drew parallels between the divine beneficence of God and the authority of landlords. Lyons (2006).

from the wealthier to the poor, from the kin of ex-landlords to those of ex-servants. Unlike statist approaches to land reform, the problem of the hacienda past was not simply one of formal or institutional proposals or demands but, rather, was a more intimate, interfamilial affair in which even or perhaps particularly the most fraught relations required an attentiveness to the burdens of the hacienda past. This burden was not a matter of volition or choice; that is, it was not simply a case of learning about or positioning oneself as sympathetic to the claims of former hacienda servants an their children. Rather, this burden was experienced viscerally as something objective, a weight or force that did not simply reflect a moral state but rather, a broader, even unwilled condition. Thus, as Flora remarked, "What can I do? I simply have to give."

And yet, attempts to remedy the past or to inhabit authority in a moral manner were not always received as hoped. Indeed, Flora noted the growing tension accompanying her relation to her half-brother. She explained, "I helped them a lot since they were young. I helped Serapio, who is a lawyer, [and] his sisters since they were young. For this reason they will never forget me. When I am there, these girls bring me to their homes or call me over and give me gifts. Only Serapio is proud. One day he came to my door with his big truck as if to say, 'Look how I am now.' 'Flora,' he said. 'What?' I said. I've told him, I am the godmother of your marriage, and you should call me *madrina*. But he doesn't anymore. 'Flora.' 'What?' His wife sat beside him and behind her their servant. 'This is our new automobile. Now I don't have any reason to suffer.' He is very proud." Here, Flora describes how she assisted her half-siblings, her father's unrecognized children. While the girls are appreciative, Serapio is "very proud." He refuses to call her godmother and taunts her with his newfound wealth, implying that their respective positions have reversed. While Serapio, the once-impoverished child of a kitchen servant, is today a prominent municipal government official and the owner of new four-wheel drive truck, Flora spends the afternoons with the flies and drunks in her run-down *chicharia*.

Andean Reciprocity and Hacienda Servitude: Historicizing Lo Indigena

In the Andes, exchange constitutes a key object of historical, archaeological, and ethnographic research pertaining to indigenous culture. In particular, exchange has been examined through the lens of "reciprocity" or *ayni*, an ideal located in agrarian relations evident in the precolonial "vertical archipelago" system. ⁸⁶⁸ Others have considered how Inca and pre-Inca relations of exchange shaped regional agrarian economies in the Andes, particularly Cochabamba, from the colonial period onward. ⁸⁶⁹ Reciprocity has also been traced as a moral ideal guiding relations of kinship, practices of advance and restitution that fan outward, absorbing fictive kin, regional elites, neighbors, and friends into existing family arrangements. ⁸⁷⁰ Finally, scholars have considered the religious dimensions of exchange, relations of sacrifice and offering in which reciprocity arises as a cosmological framework for understanding the interchange, in agriculture and ritual, between humans and spirit world and which, scholars have shown, was both integrated and transformed by Spanish Catholicism. ⁸⁷¹ In these various accounts, reciprocity arises as the foundation of Andean culture, a social and religious form targeted by colonial reformers whose longevity is then treated as evidence of the vitality and persistence of precolonial tradition. According to this argument, due to their more insulated or "private" nature,

⁸⁷⁰ Harris (1976).

⁸⁶⁸ This archipelago and its relations of reciprocity were modeled on the exchange of agricultural goods across ethnic islands and ecological levels. See Murra (1977).

⁸⁶⁹ Larson (1998).

⁸⁷¹ Abercrombie (1991); MacCormack (1991); Allen (2002); Isbell (1977).

rural religiosities, kinship relations, and agricultural techniques were particularly resistant to the transformations wrought by colonial and later republican rule.

While scholars of Andean agriculture, kinship, and ritual life have celebrated reciprocity as a moral outlook and a material practice of exchange, anthropological studies of labor and economic life have often foregrounded the risks of reciprocity as veiling or even consolidating oppressive regimes of colonial extraction between Spanish-descendent landlords and indigenous laborers. Contrasting sharply from more celebratory accounts of god-parenting and monetary sponsorship in Andean kinship, studies of the hacienda emphasize the economic and political workings of "vertical relations" as a means by which landlords solidified their power. 872 Countering assertions of intractable hegemony, others have argued that practices of reciprocity and kinship constituted a sort of subterranean level of cultural persistence and material resistance, kinship ties, god-parenting relations, and even marriage seen as subversive practices by which peasants challenged landlords and gained access to resources. 873 In addition, cultural relations of reciprocity and kinship are seen as a sort of hidden layer of sociality in which the Andean was able to weather the effects of colonial subjection and, in particular conditions, which fueled more explicit acts of resistance and rebellion. Thus, scholars suggest that practices of exchange and mutual assistance allowed servants and laborers to assist one another and thereby to counterbalance the power of landlords. 874 In this way, even practices of apparent acquiescence to authority could be revealed as subversive, consolidating an alternate culture of worker collectivity premised on veiled or feigned loyalty to landlords.

The study of the ways that Andean relations of kinship and authority shaped hacienda life is significant as it challenges more economically-deterministic accounts which have framed haciendas as outgrowths of Spanish colonialism or European capitalism. 875 Instead of being merely the transposition of a colonial or global form, this scholarship highlights the intimate and affective dimensions of hacienda life to show how Andean redistributive frameworks were absorbed into haciendas, manipulated by landlords and workers alike as a means to authority as well as assistance. 876 This has led to a problem, namely, how to square the difference between what is taken as the egalitarian ideal of reciprocity and the inherent inequities of hacienda domination. When framed as fundamentally antithetical to authority, reciprocity then emerges either as its dark, manipulative underbelly or as its subversive accompaniment. Importantly, despite their variances this scholarship shares a tendency to disaggregate the Andean precolonial and the Spanish colonial, locating reciprocity on the side of the cultural and the hacienda on the side of the economic. In so doing, however, this approach seems to overlook the ways that authority and aid, reciprocity and inequality, have historically been interlinked components of a specific sort of Andean prestige complex.⁸⁷⁷ Furthermore, reciprocal relations were historically drawn into colonial arrangements of land and labor, redistributive relations themselves instituted as a necessary part of encomienda labor by colonial administrators. 878 This history suggests that

^

⁸⁷² For instance, in their classic study, Eric Wolf and Sidney Mintz describe such practices a "binding mechanisms" that reinforce workers' economic dependence on the landlord and in which paternalism becomes a force consolidating landlords' authority (1957:41-44 cited by Lyons 2006:12). See also Anrup 1990; Keith 197; Mintz and Wolf (1950); Ossio (1984).

⁸⁷³ See Guerrero (1991); Spalding (1970); Wade (2009).

⁸⁷⁴ See Guerrero (1991); Mallon (1983); Martínez Alier (1977); Crespi (1968).

⁸⁷⁵ See Assies (2002); Fabricant (2012); Soruco (2011).

⁸⁷⁶ See Lyons (2006:14); Bauer (1979); Ramón Valarezo (1987); Guerrero (1991); Thurner (1993).

⁸⁷⁷ See Sallnow (1989); see also the introduction for a discussion of this "authority complex."

⁸⁷⁸ On the Andean "authority complex," see Sallnow (1989). See also Larson (1998).

it is insufficient to treat the hacienda a separate economic or colonial entity and reciprocity as its cultural underbelly.

Part of the impetus for the distinction between the hacienda as economy and reciprocity as culture lays in the attempt to differentiate the inegalitarian from the egalitarian, one that echoes classic anthropological accounts of primitive life as shaped by a mode of closelybounded, horizontal community. 879 Yet, the assumption that reciprocity should or is inherently occurs within an egalitarian social field tells us more about the assumption of the ethnographer than the informant. Rather, returning to classic anthropological accounts of Andean exchange, reciprocity as a system of advances and restitutions over time inherently involves a degree of asymmetry or inequity, itself elaborated through notions of exchange across verticality as an ideal. 880 Indeed, it was precisely this inegalitarian dimension of reciprocity that has, since the 1970s, led a number of anthropologists to call for a re-assessing of the moral dimensions of the historical practice and, on the other hand, supported attempts to reframe reciprocity as a mode of veiled or hidden resistance.⁸⁸¹ Thus, if we assume that reciprocity is always linked to certain understandings of authority and prestige, one does not need to resolve the paradox of reciprocity in hacienda life in terms of a binary between the economic and the cultural. Rather, we might ask about the ways that a coupled understanding of exchange and authority related to Inca and even pre-Inca religious and agrarian relations remained salient in the colonial period and came to shape the terms of hacienda labor as well as reformist debate concerning agrarian economies. That the persistence of the so-called cultural in a non-egalitarian social form is so difficult to think about should alert us to prevalence of a set of romantic oppositions between culture and economy, indigeneity and the colonial.

Seen in this light, arguments of economic hegemony and cultural resistance alike deny the moral frameworks of asymmetry and exchange that were historically so key to Andean political and economic systems. As discussed in Chapter 1, Cochabamba's historic role as Inca wheat fields wherein farm hands were allowed usufruct land rights in exchange for labor, both full-time and rotating as mitayos, and its later importance for the growth and extension of an hacienda economy have given shape to particular approaches to patronage which drew from and integrated some elements of pre-Columbian mores while, at the same time, being deeply impacted by the expansion of an hacienda agrarian economy in the colonial era. Thus, despite the risks of overstating the integrity or homogeneity of Andean culture, are alier accounts of agrarian prestige and paternal authority are important as they refuse the temptation to isolate the economic from the cultural, authority and reciprocity. Attending to the entwinement between economic relations and social forms not only challenges approaches to economic forms as distinct from the cultural (or rather, as simply a colonial or neo-colonial imposition), yet it also reframes the study of Andean tradition, one often treated as an autonomous sphere of cultural activity severed from agrarian histories, legal forms, or post/colonial economic life.

Ω

⁸⁷⁹ I have in mind here the distinction Emile Durkheim (1912) draws between "mechanical" and "organic" solidarity.

⁸⁸⁰ See Harris (1976); Murra (1977); Meillassoux (1975); Wachtel (1973).

⁸⁸¹ Orlove (1977).

⁸⁸² Indeed, it was an interest in the ways that cultural frames shape exchange relations that was so key to classic studies of Andean agricultural and economic life (see Murra 1962, 1978; Wachtel 1977; Harris 1986, 1989; Sallnow 1989). See also Larson (1998) and Jackson (1994) on the Cochabamba region.

⁸⁸³ Starn (1992).

⁸⁸⁴ See Van Vleet (2008); Leinaweaver (2007, 2008); Weismantel (1995).

Renewed efforts to consider how Andean traditions have infused or reshaped hacienda relations, particularly among hacienda tenant farmers or workers, constitute a crucial intervention in existing scholarship on the hacienda. 885 In so doing, scholars have raised important questions about the ways that Andean systems of religiosity and exchange have shaped hacienda forms, particularly modes of kinship, exchange, and reciprocity among tenants. Yet, in the effort to recover a sense of community among workers, scholars have often overlooked some key distinctions between different sorts of workers, namely servants and tenant farmers. 886 In addition, scholars have rarely asked about the reconciliatory dimensions of such patronage relations, particularly in the context of new forms of ethnic revivalism since the early 1990s.⁸⁸⁷ Here, the scholarly enthusiasm to portray a picture of an agentive, autonomous social world forecloses attention to the ways that the terms of community have themselves been shaped by earlier colonial and republican debates as well as more recent forms of ethnic revivalism. 888 Thus, in attempting to imbue hacienda collectivities with a politics, scholars often end up imbuing them with their own politics, a politics that emphasizes qualities of agency and autonomy which were themselves instituted as necessary characteristics for colonial legal recognition and subsequent inclusion as citizens. 889 Thus, the assumption that indigenous collectivities in the Andes necessarily must be accompanied by equity and autonomy, characteristics themselves instituted by Toledo's resettlement plan, 890 understates the asymmetrical and exchange-based dimensions of Andean lives. Not only does this result in the downplaying of the divisive force of external agents, including reform logics, for rural lives, it also forecloses the question of the ways that inherited practices might themselves attempt to respond or address such divisions as well as broader state or reform processes.

In contrast, historical and archaeological accounts suggest that ideals of reciprocity and redistribution shaped kinship and economic relations in ways that exceeded an autonomous native sphere of equity and exchange, entangled rather with broader political conditions marked

⁸⁸⁵ Attention to the ways that Andean understandings of exchange and authority shaped hacienda life is central to a recent anthropological work considering the hacienda system in Ecuador. By attending to workers' own relations and their upholding of traditional forms, recent studies argues that hacienda workers should not be seen as dependent or passive subjects but, rather, should be recast as agents of their own "autonomous" social worlds. Here, idioms of generosity, respect, and loyalty traditionally treated as forms of acquiescence are rather considered as morally-weighted idioms have been shaped by indigenous traditions and reshaped by Catholic and then evangelical discourses of conversion. See Lyons (2006:14). Historian Laura Gotkowitz (2007), too, argues for the "autonomous" nature of many colono communities in Cochabamba.

⁸⁸⁶ As discussed in chapter 2, these divisions may partially reflect Quechua-specific understandings of personhood and value yet they also follow from with the popularization of reformist views of citizenship and slavery in the 20th century.

887 To be fair, Lyons (2006) himself addresses this potential pitfall in his book.

⁸⁸⁸ Gotkowitz (2007); see also chapters 1 and 2.

⁸⁸⁹ Lyons is not the only scholar to privilege the political analytic of autonomy. In her work on landless politics in Bolivia, discussed at large in chapter 4, Fabricant describes the ways that movements for autonomy present themselves as timeless indigenous struggles. As she notes, "Displacement, migrations, disassembly, and reassembly of life and livelihood link disparate groups in a common struggle to claim territory, framing the present moment as a continuation of an age-old ethnic battle to hold on to historic rights to land, community, and ways of governing—in essence, autonomy" (2012:51). Yet what is absent in this account is, however, the political claims and historic struggles of groups who have not so self-evidently identified with the category and ideal of autonomy nor with land rights as an amelioration of a social condition, including hacienda servants and mobile laborers in the past, including yanaconas, forasteros, and mitayos (see also Larson 1998).

890 See chapter 1.

by vast inequities, authority, prestige, and indigenous subjection. 891 As such, to argue for an autonomous, self-determined social world may fulfill the scholar's desire to demonstrate hacienda workers' agency, yet it seems to me to disavow often violent histories of intervention and conflict that, I argue, have complicated and continue to complicate people's own assessments of their moral and political condition. 892 Here, ideas of awakening and liberty must be situated not only within liberation theology but also earlier colonial and republican reform debates concerning the miseries of hacienda *pongueaje* and its problematic position in national projects of civilizational modernity. Rather than ignore the entwinement between state reform projects and Andean traditions of collectivity and exchange, then, these entwinements should be approached as a question: How do inherited frameworks of authority or aid shape contemporary experiences of hierarchy and collectivity? Are those frameworks or accompanying practices transformed by new reformist evaluative structures, or do their frameworks shift to reflect or respond to such change? Indeed, the focus on reconciliation in Raul's narrative, for instance, certainly seems driven in part by the politicization of indigenous subjection accompanying nationalist indigenous movements since the mid-1990s. Such approaches not only ask rural subjects to inhabit an impossible state of purity, they also ignore ways of being or experiencing indigeneity at odds with statist visions of bounded and egalitarian indigenous community.⁸⁹³

Attending to the continued salience of hacienda-based ties, particularly in cases when servants were absorbed into hacienda households and when landlords fathered children with Quechua-speaking servants, adds a new fold to debates about Andean kinship and hacienda subjection, raising questions about the reconciliatory nature of such classically redistributive practices and their relationship to this longer arc of rural agrarian reform and violence. ⁸⁹⁴ Thus, while studies have been attentive to the hacienda past as a historical antecedent to life in the region they study, they have often failed to link contemporary political and moral relations to earlier agrarian forms or legal reforms. ⁸⁹⁵ For instance, scholars have argued that Andean

-

⁸⁹¹ As discussed in Chapter 1, "Andean" moral ideals of authority, prestige, and accountability were not simply transposed randomly from indigenous communities to hacienda worlds but, emerging as a evaluative framework by which Quechua workers judged landlords (as Lyons argues) but were historically entwined with broader colonial and then republican debates hinging on Inca tradition, its absorption as a model of exemplary cacique and encomendero authority, and, in the republican era, as expressions of a problematic "colonial" or feudal economic institution. See Mintz and Wolf (1977); Sallnow (1989); Harris (1989)

⁸⁹² Indeed, such complexities is embedded in Lyons' ethnographic material, evident when a former hacienda servant describes herself as a childish fool until she awakened and "got smart," that is, encountered anti-hacienda political thought (Lyons 2006:177).

⁸⁹³ An exception is Andrew Canessa's (2012) examination of the transformation of rural jaqi life into a more reified portrait of indigenous collectivity. My work draws from Canessa, but brackets the assumption of the teleology or linearity of this process.

histories of land, labor, tribute, and aid in Cochabamba that took particular form in hacienda life, relationships that, I argue, remain consequential and problematic in the present. In so doing, I follow from recent efforts to situate Andean forms of collectivity within a shifting political landscape, yet, I argue, this landscape needs to be attended to given the specificities of the agrarian past and not simply by recourse to more recent political changes related to the spread of liberation theology, participatory political reforms, or of nationalist ethnic revivalism since the 1980s. See Van Vleet (2008); Leinaweaver (2008), For liberation theology in Ecuadorian haciendas, see Lyons (2006); for participatory populist reforms in Bolivia, see Lazar (2008); for indigenous revivalism in Bolivia see Canessa (2012).

⁸⁹⁵ Indeed, it is remarkable that scholars often draw from fieldwork situated on former hacienda lands without explicitly thematizing the agrarian past or asking how hacienda-based relations of exchange, and not simply Andean forms of collectivity or kinship, shape the terms of moral life today. See Canessa (2012); Lazar (2008); Van Vleet (2008).

relationality is marked by a special focus on reciprocity and exchange. 896 This might be so, but such relational forms cannot be disentangled from political histories, including the institutionalization of agrarian patronage as a guide to encomienda and cacique relations or the more recent 20th century concern with rural family life and gender relations. ⁸⁹⁷ Even ethnographic accounts tracing intimate forms in villages bordering hacienda ranches where villagers worked and with whom the landlords fathered some children have rarely considered how the modes of domesticity and exchange in hacienda life shaped or were reshaped by Quechua-speakers' forms of community and moral practice. 898 Other works, too, trace popular elaborations of patronage and their indebtedness to Andean modes of collectivity, but they rarely link such relations to regional histories of hacienda servitude.⁸⁹⁹

In these studies, the disaggregation of empirical material from historical material secures a certain sort of anthropological argument. In particular, it enables the anthropologist to artificially isolate a particular dimension of social life as evidence of an enduring form of indigenous tradition (whether household practices, kinship relations, or elaborations of collectivity and sponsorship) without considering its entwinement in broader political histories and colonial institutions, like the hacienda. Thus, rather than simply integrating attention to kinship alongside classic studies of culture, 900 what is needed is attention to the ways that, following agrarian histories of exchange and labor in the Andes, kinship is in a sense already embedded in a broader relational entity that implodes sociological determinants. Such attention is particularly pressing given the centrality "vertical exchange" to economic, familial, and political institutions in the Andean region. 901 Exchange, even in classic accounts, was never simply about agrarian goods but also pointed to a broader ethic of goods, resources, and aid as moving laterally across zones. Like earlier mitmag farming techniques, haciendas integrated production across zones but this production was related to broader forms of labor and exchange, the ability of landlords to distribute various goods contributing to their ability to present themselves as "generous patrons," here echoing the acts of virtuous redistribution on the part of native cacique lords and encomendero owners who proceeded them and whose generosity itself was administered as a crucial element of colonial legal design. 903

As evident in the cases of Fabio and Flora, the requirement that former landlords continue to distribute goods to former servants persists as an expectation of an appropriate relationship after servitude and, as discussed in Chapter 6, remains consequential not only to relations among former landlords and servants but also of villagers to a new class of mining elite. Here, then, more than a timeless indigenous value, reciprocity is bound up with a specific history in which political (and earlier agrarian authority) was linked to norms of generosity, hospitality, and consideration. In former hacienda regions, then, it is taken as crucial that one recognize

⁸⁹⁶ Van Vleet (2008).

⁸⁹⁷ See Larson (1988) for the instituting of patronage under Toledo. See Stephenson (2002) and Gotkowitz (2007) for 20th century gender and family reforms and their relation to anti-hacienda campaigns.

⁸⁹⁸ Van Vleet (2008:5). Even as Van Vleet includes an interlude addressing the moral problems of payment and subjection in regard to hacienda labor, the analysis brackets the hacienda past and fails to thematize patronage as a moral or political problem that might shape or complicate the broader theoretical commitment to Andean kinship as such. See Van Vleet (2008:46-47).

⁸⁹⁹ Lazar (2008).

⁹⁰⁰ Van Vleet (2008:7).

⁹⁰¹ Lyons (2006:88); Murra (1975).

⁹⁰² See Lyons (2007:89).

⁹⁰³ Larson (1998); Sallnow (1989).

one's dependencies on others, 904 a form of dependency that is not just material or practical but, also, moral and emotional. 905 In contrast, landlords who are seen as most cruel were not so simply because they were the agents of servitude but, rather, because they did not act appropriately as such. This includes "refusing social discourse, being stingy instead of generous, and failing to give positive consideration to others' needs and desires." However, more than an expectation of redistribution, this sense of exchange is premised on a "flow of obligations and counter-obligations" that takes particular form in hacienda regions. Here, the sharing of food takes on particular force for the children of hacienda landlords, like Flora, who models her behavior on that of a saintly relation of beneficence to former servants and the needy. 907

Relations of religious patronage, then, partially reflect overlaid Iberian-Christian and Andean traditions and are not simply the uninterrupted iterations of pre-colonial forms. 908 Indeed, even native spirits are often aligned with Catholic saints or even former hacienda landlords. Thus, Catholic saints are often "born" in places in which they were known to have acted particularly generously. In Ayopaya, too, local patron saints were described as generous hacienda landlords who then became saints. In haciendas, then, figures of authority and beneficence such as landlords often melded with religious figures and images, such as of saints and mountain lords, with the notion of service linking villagers' relations to landlords and their devotion to God. In particular, saints were understood as the "muchachos" or servant boys of God and landlords or *patrones* as enacting a sort of divine generosity to their workers. ⁹⁰⁹ Thus, while the central problematic of exchange points to specific "cultural" norms of Andean aid and return which seem to have precolonial origins, in hacienda regions like Cochabamba these values have been entwined for some time with the agrarian dimensions of hacienda labor and land use from the colonial period onward. By attending to such relations, scholars might be more attentive to the moral and political entailments of relations that have not always been treated as appropriate resources of indigenous politics, including practices of exchange, attachment, and aid between the kin of mestizo landlords and Quechua servants. 910

Conclusion: Toward an Indigenous Politics of Attachment

In this chapter, I have examined the modes of attachment forged through hacienda-based relations of labor, land, and kinship and their importance as a source of moral and reconciliatory action in Ayopaya's post-hacienda present. However, rather than see hacienda-based ritual traditions simply as a means to landlords' power—for instance, as a way to prepare children to serve the landlord—I have considered the ways rural patronage forms remain crucial as a way

9

⁹⁰⁴ Lyons (2006:91).

⁹⁰⁵ Parry (1989).

⁹⁰⁶ Lyons (2006:93); see also Allen (1988).

⁹⁰⁷ Lyons (2006:94, 103)

⁹⁰⁸ Abercrombie (1999:22).

⁹⁰⁹ Lyons (2006:105); see also Allen (1988); Bastien (1978).

⁹¹⁰ While ethnographers have attended to Andean kinship practices and their divergence from occidental logics of self and society, few works consider how such practices affect or are affected by indigenous reform projects. Several exceptions include Andrew Canessa's (2012) study of the displacement of *jaqi* life by more reified notions of indigeneity and Sian Lazar's (2008) study of how rural agricultural forms shape collectivist politics in Bolivia.

⁹¹¹ Several anthropological accounts of servitude and sentiment that have been consequential to my analysis include Stoler (2002:201); Ray and Qayum (2009).

for rural groups to grapple with the intimacies of past hacienda subjection and violence. ⁹¹² As anticipated in my earlier discussions of *hacendado* moral evaluation and the ambivalences of the oca harvest, prestige-based relations of patronage and aid should be treated not simply as expressions of peasant acquiescence but rather as a specific modality of claim making with its own complex political and legal history. ⁹¹³ In particular, Ramón and Flora's cases highlight the continued salience of an older framework of exchange-based authority that, I have argued, emerges out of specific pre-colonial and colonial histories of labor and law yet which today are drawn from in creative ways as rural groups attempt to forge lives together in the aftermath of often intimate modes of hacienda violence. ⁹¹⁴ Inherited forms, then, also arise as critical sites of moral and political engagement by which to grapple with the very question of that inheritance.

Such entanglements between mestizo and indigenous groups and their importance as a reconciliatory form have often been overlooked by anthropologists anxious to attest to the agency of indigenous peoples and in part blinded by more romantic narratives of indigenous autonomy and resistance. Yet, commendable as these political commitments may be, the uncritical adoption of reformist measures of justice can work to disavow the moral or political entailments of relational forms that unfold partly within, rather than outside, historical patterns of authority and violence. 915 In the case of Flora's aid as well as of Ramón's demands for Fabio's assistance, rural patronage relations both draw from yet also seek to transform hacienda-based forms of authority, vulnerability and violence. Given the entwinements between former servant and landlord families, and such entwinements as a source of reconciliatory action, the common scholarly' insistence that the only legitimate form of subaltern or indigenous politics necessarily emerges from exteriority, that is, from a position outside of or other than that of modernity, seems misplaced. 916 As the focus on autonomy suggests, ethnographic accounts of reconciliation or postcolonial politics have been partially over-determined or constrained by scholars' own commitments to historical rupture as a gage or measure of justice. 917 Yet by foregrounding the problems of indigenous autonomy or agency, scholars have unwittingly absorbed the standards that guiding earlier modernizing reform efforts, efforts that, I have shown, narrated progress in terms of the necessary overcoming of hacienda sensibilities and thereby reduced hacienda workers to beasts, children, or inoperative machines. 918

_

⁹¹² Barry Lyons, writing about Ecuadorian haciendas, notes that haciendas could contribute "to the persistence of reciprocity and redistribution as principles of Runa social life and moral judgement" (2006:68). At the same time, he notes that patronage could be used to train future children as servants.

⁹¹³ Wolf and Mintz (1977); Anrup (1990).

⁹¹⁴ Situating relations of reciprocal exchange in the specificities of the agrarian past extends our historical lens beyond the rise of clientelist politics in post-dictatorial Bolivia (Albro 2007; Lazar 2008) or the growth of new forms of community organizing following the Popular Participation Law of 1992 (Postero 2008; Shakow 2014). At the same it, positions patronage as something more muddied than simply the persistence of Andean kinship (Van Vleet 2008).

⁹¹⁵ See chapter 6.

⁹¹⁶ On Bolivian *katarismo*, see Sanjines (2004:13).

⁹¹⁷ Following Marilyn Strathern (1988:29), such a framing unreflectively borrows from a Western epistemology for whom the individual/society conflict has, historically, been taken as central. As she cautions, neither this opposition nor its centrality to gender relations should not be taken as universal.

As discussed in chapter 1, for Bourbon reformers hacienda *pongueaje* constituted a miserable state of dependency in need of colonial intervention and aid. Later, in the 20th century, hacienda *pongueaje* became crucial to what reformers and popular activists increasing saw as the constitutive antinomy between servitude and citizenship, beast and human. For a political history of the figure of the slave or servant in Bolivia's colonial past, see the introduction. See also Pagden (1996) and Herzog (2015).

As evident in the unwitting parallels between the political subject of modernizing reform and the political subject of social scientific analysis, scholars have not always been as critical as they might be of reform logics or their limits as a heuristic for approaching the terms of political and moral life. 919 In Ayopaya particularly, the focus on a rupture from pre-existing relations overlooks the region's history of inter-racial, inter-class relations evident in labor practices. kinship arrangements, and land tenure patterns. Rather than imposing juridical or reformist categories as the basis for a normative assessment of the promise or peril of certain relational forms, then, this chapter has looked at the ways that agrarian authority has an remains entangled with the problem of elite patronage and exchange. Yet, I have also shown that practices of duty and aid take on particular characteristics, shaped in constitutive ways by the intimate dynamics of the region's labor past. In examining the reconciliatory possibilities of relational forms rooted in the region's agrarian past, I have shed light on a mode of moral claim-making at odds with state reform projects and populist land movements alike. By bracketing more reified portraits of hacienda workers and their opposition to colonial or postcolonial overlords, my account draws attention to relations of attachment and exchange among former landlords and servants, relations that unsteady romantic narratives of egalitarian indigenous community.

Taking seriously the reconciliatory workings of patronage ties in the aftermath of servitude offers a new point of inquiry for the study of justice at large, one attentive to the historical specificity of a language of autonomy and its at times violent disavowal of other forms of moral action. Given that total independence always falls short in practice, 920 the collusions between reformist and social scientific heuristics behoove us to bracket, or at the least to critically re-assess, the political ideal of rupture. Instead, I have shed light on the seemingly mundane ways that people inhabit history's incessant and in a sense inevitable enduring. In Ayopaya today, the relations of attachment and exchange rooted in an oppressive labor regime not only constrain political consciousness but rather seem to supply a form or modality by which to address and even transform enduring experiences of vulnerability and violence. Here, then, reconciliatory relations need not break entirely with what preceded them, but rather can grow out of a condition of partial embeddedness or encumbrance in the very thing they seek to address. 921 While this argument might seem overly pessimistic, it is meant rather as a more generous and even hopeful stance, one that attends to the possibilities enfolded in the actual rather than insisting, with reformers, that such possibility lies ahead. In the process, I have foregrounded the traces of a justice that is not simply an elusive ideal toward which the present inexorably marches but, rather, is a tenuous condition achieved by and thus contingent upon the shape of everyday acts and their necessarily historical bearings. 922

-

⁹¹⁹ As Thurner (1993:45) notes, scholars and the children of hacienda peasants share "commonsense notions" of peasants as pre-political preceding land reform. As such, he calls for a "more critical engagement of the more influential attempts to theorize historical practice" (1993:43). Re-assessing the normative focus on autonomy is all the more pressing given the ways that frameworks of autonomy have been drawn upon by lowland elites to block MAS land redistribution efforts (Fabricant 2012:158-182; Postero 2010)

⁹²⁰ See Lambek (2010:4); Strathern (1988).

⁹²¹ Englund (2011).

⁹²² See Povinelli (2011); Scott (2004).

Chapter 6. Gold Dreams

To the grating rhythm of an air compressor outside the gold processing plant, René recounted how he procured his Avopava gold mine in 2002. René and his cousins had initially purchased the mine from Fabio Rodriguez, the nephew of the Sarahuayto landlord. 923 The sale had been aided by a friendship among old classmates. René's father having studied with Fabio in the city of Cochabamba. This produced what was initially a smooth relationship between the new mining entrepRenéurs and the prior owner, Fabio, himself the son of a local hacienda landlord. According to René, during the initial years Fabio advised them and collaborated as a local business partner. At the same time, however, Fabio also worked to ensure his continued grip on the mine, reminding the new mining novices of the instability that would ensue without his continued support. Thus, René recalled, "Fabio said 'It would be impossible for you to work here without me. I was a landlord. They've known me all of my life. They would throw you out." In this way, René explained, "Fabio inculcated us with this [sense of instability]. We were afraid." As René's case suggests, the workings of René's gold mine—itself located on a former hacienda and purchased from Fabio, the landlord's son—was entangled in the region's recent history of agrarian servitude. It was by way of ties to former landlord that René and his cousins initially learned of and eventually purchased the mine, and it was through the affective channels opened up through previous patronage relations that René and his co-owners sought the achieve and struggled to sustain the legitimacy they felt was needed in order to work in the region.

Yet, those ties to the prior hacienda system, and their accompanying patronage responsibilities, also became points of contention and conflict. For instance, René and his cousins had only been working in the mine for several months when a dispute arose between two villages that border the mine, and also the former hacienda. One village had historically had an amicable relation to the Rodriguez landlords, and was comprised principally of former servants who continued to live and work the lands adjacent to the former hacienda and its now independently operated gold mine. The other village was located on the mountainside above them, where former tenant farmers and their children had inherited dryer, less fertile land parcels. Unlike the former servant village, tenant farmers in the upper village had been involved in long-term legal and physical confrontations with the landlords. When the lower village proposed the installation of a water turbine with which to procure electricity—and aided by a generous contribution from René—the higher village objected, noting that since the water flowed through their land, it was only right that they too should gain access to the electricity produced by the new turbine.

Over the spring months of 2003, the turbine conflict escalated, eventually drawing René's mining operation to a halt. Frustrated by their exclusion from these new, if entrenched, channels of gifting and aid and angry that their (former hacienda servant) neighbors were benefitting—once again—from alliances with Spanish-speaking elites, the higher village took about blocking off the road. They used boulders and sticks and human bodies. Afterwards, neither the mind owners nor their workers were allowed passage, thus cutting off access to the mine. Even after the barricade was opened, union-affiliated villagers worked in shifts patrolling the roadway, searching passing vehicle to ensure that no one from either village was hidden inside. In this way, René lamented, they came to lose some of their best workers, those who had worked for the earlier hacienda and thus had valuable knowledge of the mine. This loss was all the more

-

⁹²³ See chapter 2 for an introduction to the former hacienda village of Sarahuayto.

⁹²⁴ Within traditional dual community or *ayllu* system, water rights traditionally lay in the hands of the higher community Gelles (2000).

devastating to the mine given that no one there, neither René nor his cousins, had any prior experience working with gold mining. Indeed, one of the cousins later explained, they imagined it would be possible to work the mine relying principally on the technical know-how of older miners, in this way sparing themselves the cost of paying a trained mining engineer. In this regard, the loss of senior gold miners who had worked under the Rodriguez family since the hacienda era produced a devastating blow to the mining operation. In the end, the conflict was partially resolved when René agreed to pay the higher village 4000 *bolivianos* in order that a second turbine, and accompanying water plant, be constructed in the lands above. Only after agreeing to this bargain was René ensured that his person, as well as his workers, supplies, and gold mineral, could enter or exit the mine. The senior miners, however, would never return.

While it occurred almost a decade before my own fieldwork in the region, this earlier mining conflict concerning competing bids for turbine-based electricity is important as it shows the constitutive yet volatile force of Ayopaya's hacienda past in conditioning present-day relations and extractive economies in the region. Hacienda-based relations shaped alliances between former agrarian and new gold mining elites, yet they also set the terms of negotiation and conflict among elites and former hacienda villages, many of whose residents remain employed in the mine into the present. Thus, on the one hand, the mine owners gained knowledge about and access to the mine by tapping into existing mining infrastructures and worker expertise established by prior hacendado presence in the region. Not only did René and his cousins discover the mine through a mutual friend of the family's, but their ability to move through the region's infrastructure—its dirt roads or water channels needed for mineral processing—rested on part on their continued willingness to negotiate with local villagers and their patronage demands, including money for transportation or water turbines. On the other hand, the ways that villagers perceived and engaged with mine-owners like René were also shaped by and compared the earlier relations of hacienda conflict and exchange, the contrasting figure of the generous or the greedy patron haunting local perceptions of new gold mining elites. In these ways, the former hacienda system laid the groundwork, structurally and affectively, for continued gold extraction in the region.

In the remainder of this chapter, I trace a more recent conflict over resources and aid and consider how it unsteadied René's gold mining operation. More broadly, I approach this case as insight into the unexpected ways that historical patterns of hacienda patronage and aid condition and complicate contemporary gold mining relations in Ayopaya today. As discussed in chapter 2, the Ayopaya region is infamous among state reformers for an entrenched labor system that has seemed impervious to governmental reform efforts since the late colonial period. Indeed, as discussed in previous chapters, it is precisely this seeming tenacity of the hacienda system that has made Ayopaya the focus of heightened agrarian reform efforts today. Chapters 3 and 4 considered the complexities of agrarian reform today, focusing on a state-sponsored land retitling program and tracing challenges this reform program faces in Ayopaya. In the process, these earlier chapters raised questions about the forms of collectivity and critique related to the region's history of hacienda servitude and land reform complicate current MAS reform projects, particularly land collectivization projects aimed at titling Native Community Lands. In the previous chapter, I shifted away from state agrarian reform efforts and rural opposition to them, considering instead how the limits to state reform projects are also the sites of alternate moral and reconciliatory traditions that unfold through inter-familial pathways and affective attachments conditioned by the region's hacienda past. This chapter takes this analysis one step further, tracing the ways that frameworks of patronage and aid rooted in the prior agrarian

system come not only to shape villagers' relations to former landlords but also their responses to and evaluations of a new class of *mestizo* entrepreneurial mining elites, such as René.

While previous chapters have foregrounded the instabilities and challenges created by the divergence between state-sanctioned models of indigenous collectivity, one the one hand, and post-hacienda relations of belonging and exchange, on the other, in this chapter I re-examine the assessment of these two forms as irreconcilably opposed. Along with shaping relations to mineowners, it seems that moral sensibilities related to an enduring sort of "authority complex" condition popular relations to the state, conferring authority with legitimacy not only as a relation of distinction but also as a source of redistributive aid and material assistance. 925 Indeed. here regional elites are not the only subjects attributed or vulnerable to demands for accountability within an inherited framework of post-hacienda patronage and reconciliation. To the contrary, the final section of the chapter also raises questions about the unexpected ways that historically-entrenched notions of responsibility and relation come to infuse more formal political life, guiding rural villagers' relations to the MAS government, including President Evo Morales. While hacienda-based sensibilities and patronage ties arise as targets of state reform, then, they also seem to subtly shape the terms—and with them, the limits—of legitimate political authority, producing unwitting parallels between former landlords, on the one hand, and contemporary government leaders, on the other. The absorption of rural post-hacienda imaginaries of authority and exchange into contemporary political relations to the MAS government points to the remarkable "elasticity of obligation," yet it also suggests the limits to statist models of progress and historical change. 926 In lieu of reformist teleology, then, we gain insight into a form of historical continuity that unfolds through the coupling of inheritance and emergence, a kind of transformative repetition aptly synthesized in the unsteady iteration and reiteration of agrarian patronage in rural Ayopaya today.

Instabilities of Capital: Reciprocity, Redistribution and the Demand for Relation

René was in his late 30s and had grown up in the city of Cochabamba. He was from a wealthy *mestizo* family, his grandparents having been owners of hacienda estates in the eastern part of the city and shareholders in one of the city's largest newspapers, *Los Tiempos*. In Ayopaya, René and his two cousins had purchased a gold mine from Fabio, the nephew of the former hacienda landlord. The mine was located in Arapampa, among lands originally owned by Martin's grandfather and divided among his children during the 1953 land reform. The villages, like many in the region, had originated as housing settlements for hacienda servants and farmers. Today, René employed about 30 workers and 7 domestic maids, members of local Quechua-speaking families as well as migrant laborers from Oruro and La Paz. Workers stay in shared rooms in housing quarters bordering the processing plant, located beside a private apartment where the owners reside during rotating shifts overseeing the mine. Martin the landlord's grandson also owned a mine, though of smaller "artisanal" style and employing about 15 workers and 2 maids. The two mines differed both in the quantity of workers and in technology, Martin's mine located under dilapidated sheets of tin roofing while René's boasted a new processing plant built and a mechanized panning system built in 2002.

When René and his cousins first arrived to begin work in the gold mine, they found the area sorely lacking in the amenities they had expected. There was only one store, and no

-

⁹²⁵ This phrase is Sallnow's (1989). For a discussion of the historical underpinnings of this authority complex, see the introduction and chapter 1.

⁹²⁶ Guyer (2012). See also chapter 2.

electricity. People gathered wood for fires, and indeed one of the initial demands workers made was that they the mine-owners help them to transport this wood in the back of their trucks. René and his cousins agreed, subsequently framing their assistance with rides along with the distribution of work uniforms as evidence of "helping" locals. As René recalled, "We helped them. The first thing everyone asked for were watches. We bought watches as a gift . . . then boots, helmets, and over-alls. They were very happy." In addition, they established electricity in the mine and extended lines outward to two neighboring villages. While these relations unfolded between employers and workers, they echoed the frameworks of generosity, assistance and aid mobilized by former landlords like Flora. ⁹²⁷ And it was not only that former landlords and new mine-owners narrated relations to villagers in terms of an exemplary patronage; the mineworkers working both mines were themselves often the children of and in several cases had themselves been laborers on the Sarahuayto hacienda and its two gold mines.

The parallels between the languages of elite beneficence shared by the children of landlords as well as new mine-owners coupled with the very fact that the mine was located on a former hacienda that was still inhabited and owned by the late landlord's kin raised a number of questions. Was René's understanding or approach to patronage the same as that of the former landlords? If not, how did it differ? Were mine-owners' acts of gifting and aid expressions of more general patronage ideals available at the societal level, or did they absorb or inherit some of the specificities of the distinct forms of hacienda exchange particular to Ayopaya? Furthermore, what were the entailments of such patronage relations? Did they simply secure economic order or was more at stake, particularly given that it was exactly at this time that new state reforms "nationalizating" mines had been proposed? How did various elites' engagement in such patronage relations with local villagers affect or confer authority as legitimate owners of either land or mines? Did the mine-owners benefit from their ability to differentiate themselves from the region's hacienda past or was such a claim inherently unstable? And what of Martin, the owner of the late hacienda adjacent to the mine and himself the owner of another gold mine? Was he able to draw from the region's past in order to consolidate his own position as a sort of generous patron, or did this violent past make him inherently vulnerable to attacks as yet another iteration in a long history of greedy mestizo elites? Finally, and given the conflicts at René's mine, would the mine-owners collaborate as parts of a unified regional elite or, conversely, could the hacienda past create alliances between landlords and workers? And with what effects for the shape of rural post-hacienda economies and accompanying forms of extraction, aid, and labor?

Since René and his cousins had purchased the mine from the late landlord's nephew Fabio, the gold extraction had been coming along well. However, in the final months of 2011, the mining operative was challenged when René and his cousins faced mounting opposition from workers as well as residents from neighboring villages. According to villagers and townsfolk, the opposition stemmed from a broad consensus that René had rescinded on his patronage duties, including promises to deliver electricity and potable water to the region. In Laraya, perspectives on René's rights to the mine varied. Outside his wife's produce store, Severino was hurriedly preparing a delivery of dry goods for René. After securing a tarp over the truck bed, he disappeared through the back door, re-emerging moments later with a large manila envelope. Inside were legal documents from René's lawyer, attesting to René's ownership of the mine. René later circulated these documents to union leaders, villagers, and municipal officials, attempting to prevent further opposition. Upon seeing the envelope, Severino's wife commented "René had better consult well with his lawyer." Another man seated nearby chipped in, "Yes, but

02

⁹²⁷ See chapter 5.

if all his legal business is in order, there should be no problem." Martin, whose workers were loading goods onto his truck, interrupted, "His legal matters are in order. But this has to do with more than law: If local peasants are frustrated with him, they will not let him work. They could take over his equipment or attack the mine. He has the law on his side but that doesn't mean anything." Other residents, including ex-servants' children, made similar remarks, describing local mines as increasingly vulnerable to union appropriation.

Importantly, growing opposition to René coincided with recent proposals for resource reform, including a law "nationalizing" Bolivian mines and supporting mining collectives. Supreme Decree (No 1308) was proposed and subsequently implemented in August 2012. 928 Two years later, in 2014, a related mining law was passed (Ley 535 de Minería y Metalurgia), one that partially reflects growing governmental negotiation with a public mining sector, predominately mining unions. 929 Article 151 of the law prohibits association between cooperative and private companies. This new reforms—first as decree and then as reform stipulate that mines cannot be bought, sold, or change owners, thereby encouraging the creation of mining "collectives," corporate or co-operative entities. While no one ever directly cited the law as a basis for conflict in the mine, it is fair to say that the conflict, occurring in the fall of 2011, was shaped in part by mounting national and reformist concern with the coloniality of extraction, that is, the fact that most of Bolivia's natural resources were mined by foreign companies or Bolivian elites who then funneled the money both to an elite criollo oligarchy as well as overseas. As in Bolivia's colonial past, then, it seemed that the nation's natural wealth was extracted yet rarely aided Bolivians themselves, particularly the nation's indigenous poor. Using tree trunks and boulders, residents of adjacent villages blocked off the road to René's mine. Locals speculated that anger stemmed not only from the failure to deliver goods and resources, like the bridge, but also from René's withdrawn relation to local villagers and his tendency toward racist slander. One Quechua-speaking man speculated, "The people must have heard exactly what René says about them, all his talk of Indios." Others noted that René had promised villagers "a thousand huevadas (little eggs)" but delivered none. Thinking René lacked a bill of sale, local residents circulated a public denunciation calling for his expulsion from the region. Faced with mounting opposition, René left for the city where he hired a lawyer.

Challenges to René's mine must be situated within mounting conflicts between miners, mining unions, the national police force, and mine-owners. Mining occupations have a long history in Bolivia, beginning with strikes that culminated in massacres in 1918, 1923, and 1942 as well as a prolonged struggle between 1946 and 1969, discussed at greater length below. ⁹³⁰ In Bolivia, questions of resource wealth have since the early 20th century been bound up with nationalist articulations of postcolonial sovereignty, questions that hark back to concern with the colonial fate of the silver of the Potosí's mines—exploited by Spanish colonialists and fueling Spanish and European industrial growth—as well as other resources including Amazonian rubber, the tin mines of Oruro and, since the 1990s, reserves of gas and oil. ⁹³¹ Indeed, according to scholars, mounting frustration with the foreign extraction of resources like water and gas was important in fueling the popular mobilizations that eventually brought Evo Morales to power in

-

⁹²⁸ Decreto Supremo No 1308 (2012, August 1). Gaceta Oficial del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. < http://www.gacetaoficialdebolivia.gob.bo/normas/listadonor/11/page:2>, as of April 18th, 2014.

⁹²⁹ Law 535 is available as an electronic resource, see http://www.cedib.org/post_type_leyes/ley-535-de-mineria-y-metalurgia-promulgada-28-05-2014/> accessed March 15th, 2015.
930 See Nash (1993:218).

Perrault (2013:72). Here, as scholars note, struggles over resources are also struggles over space, citizenship, and the contours of national belonging (Gustafson 2011; Postero 2007).

2005. These include the Water War of 2000 and the Gas War of 2003, the latter ending in violent confrontations with police in which more than 70 people were killed. 932 Far from being resolved, then, conflicts over mines and resources remain crucial in the reformist present, the government caught between the demands of foreign companies, on the one hand, and powerful alliances of peasant and mining unions, on the other. 933 Reflecting both growing popular concerns with environmental justice as well as new mining legislation, Ayopaya has seen rising levels of rural resource conflicts since about 2010. Most recently, in April 2014, in confrontations with police following one blockade outside the mining town of Kami, 2 miners were killed and 40 injured. 934

Yet, in the course of conducting fieldwork in Ayopaya, it seemed that not all mines were equally vulnerable to union agitation or demands for collectivization. Indeed, I was surprised to learn that, with mounting levels of resource conflict in the region, it was René's and not Martin's mine that faced growing opposition from villagers and mineworkers. Opposition might have been shaped in part by the differential worth of each mine—René's mine had newer technology—but also seemed to reflect the divergent relationship between villagers and each mine-owner. As noted above, Martin inherited the mine from his grandfather, the mine owner. While René initially learned of the mine and subsequently gained access to it through ties to the former landlords, he did not himself belong to a family that had owned haciendas in Ayopaya. Yet, despite this, René was expected to fulfill patronage obligations related to earlier patterns of aid between former landlords and villagers. Thus, since beginning their mine work in the region in 2002, René and his cousins provided mine workers with watches, food, mining uniforms, helmets, and flashlights as well as aid in obtaining water and electricity. René also paid for local transportation, hiring a van that provided Quechua-speaking villagers and mine workers with access to the nearby municipal town of Laraya.

And yet, opposition to René stemmed from the widespread perception that he accrued wealth without giving anything back. That René spent weeks on end in the city, coupled with his failure to deliver resources, offer rides, or provide meat in his workers' meals, positioned him as a negligent boss and greedy q'ara, a term used to refer to whites and foreigners whose wealth results from others' exploitation. 935 One Quechua-speaking villager stated simply of the conflict, "It's that the rich get richer, and the poor stay poor." Others complained that René spoke no Quechua. Thus, a central point of contention was not only wealth but also a broader sense of elite's willingness to partake in rural life. Indeed, when I stayed with Quechua-speaking acquaintances in the nearby village, people complained of René's unwillingness to "compartir" (partake, share) with them, recalling that even when they encountered him passing them in the road, he failed to greet them. As suggested in the term *compartir*, expectations of patronage span material and affective registers, including not only the distribution of resources by way of unions but also broader associational elements including ordinary forms like greeting people, driving thoughtfully, or sharing food or resources with workers and their families.

Perceptions of René's frugality toward workers drew in part from his ways of managing the mine, and its partial disregard for regional traditions of patronage and its embodiment in

⁹³² Perrault (2013:83).

⁹³³ The new 2009 constitution, too, treats mining unions as equal players in the mining sector alongside private foreign and national companies.

⁹³⁴ ACLO (2014). 935 Van Vleet (2008:51); see also (Isbell 1978); Nash (1993).

relations of shared feasting and ritual sponsorship of events. ⁹³⁶ For instance, René commonly invited friends and acquaintances to his living quarters on the mine for weekend barbeques. While not uncommon in Bolivia, what was uncommon was his failure to include or invite workers or members of neighboring villages. Unlike other the children of former hacienda elites such as Flora or Martin, then, René neither invited his workers nor distributed any grilled meat to them. Not only this, but I overheard him hastily direct the kitchen maid to store the grilled meat, before any workers get their hands on it.

As noted in chapter 5, such practices, more privatized eating practices might be common in urban centers, they are largely unheard of in rural settings. When food is prepared in a shared space in is typically offered to everyone present, and without any pay being offered. For instance, as discussed in the prior chapter, Flora continued to host annual feasts, serving copious amounts of food and drink to villagers and ex-servant families. To this day, then, Flora's ch'alla begins with the sacrifice of a sheep. In addition, she commonly distributes food and drink to poor peasants who come to her *chicharia*. In this sense, René's relations to his workers diverged sharply from the hacienda-based mores of feasting commonly practices by former landlords and expected by workers and villagers. The importance of hosting events and distributed food and drink to workers was well known among other bosses in Ayopaya. For instance, one overseer of a construction company in Laraya explained that one had to host Friday ch'allas with workers, otherwise they would lose motivation and not come to work. The complaint of René's unwillingness to *compartir*, then, marked a complaint about lacking redistribution and relation, aligning him with a more naked extractive logic embodied in the figure of the western colonialist or white boss, the q'ara, Quechua for "peeled" or uncultured. 937 It also suggests that the failure to uphold redistributive duties can itself be linked to a challenge or destabilization of legitimate authority.

Yet, René's treatment of workers was not simply mindlessly dismissive. Rather, he belonged to a more progressive, urban population that found both patronage expectations and accompanying ideals of sharing food or rides unusual, even problematic. Indeed, according to René, these patronage expectations were wholly unwarranted and even unfair. He noted, "The times change, and I'm in accord with them changing, but I am not in accord with people walking all over you and violating your rights. Because I did not do anything to them. I did not enslave them. I pay taxes. I'm legally established. It's ridiculous that because I work in this region they think they have a right to climb up and travel in my truck. After all, I'm the one who pays them. Yet, I'm supposed to be at their service." Here, René described patronage as a "violation of rights," one that entailed an unreasonable accountability to his workers. Invoking his own rights to property and to profit, then, René seemed to reject a tacit understanding, evident in other sots of regional patronage relations, that to work and live as a regional mestizo or Creole elite in Ayopaya necessarily required a certain form of comportment or affective sensibility, one René gestured as a reversal of historical patterns of hacienda servitude whereby, today, workers demand "service" of him. However, it was not simply that René was unaware of this expectation, but that he refused its very premise. Thus, as we spoke about the patronage duties that villagers had attempted to extend to him, René noted bitterly to me, "I did not enslave them." It was not,

.

⁹³⁶ For relations of feasting and their relatios to political authority in Cochabamba, see Larson (1998). For an archeological approach to this problem, see Bray (2007). For an account of contemporary feasting politics in Bolivia, see Albro (2000). For Bolivian clientelism more broadly see Albro (2007). Finally, for a broader comparative treatment of the political and moral ramifications of feasting, see Dietler and Hayden (2010).

⁹³⁷ See Van Vleet (2008) for an analysis of the category of the *q'ara* and its racial and economic connotations.

then, that René was unfamiliar with regional norms of elite accountability or aid but that, as an urban elite who had not grown up with such conditions, such demands appeared to him as unrealistic, childish, and even unjust. 938 In his contestation of such patronage responsibilities, René points to an experience of giving quite divergent from the sorts of "active compassion" commonly attributed to elite sponsors of aid or patronage. 939

René did not simply reject any patronage demands. As discussed above, while he had accepted the more institutional dynamics of business patronage like the distribution of uniforms and related goods, he contested more intimate patronage demands like ride sharing or food distribution. Here, seemingly mundane acts—the upkeep of buildings, workers' meals, or the sharing of rides—took on profound political and moral valences. Instead, the forms of obligation and duty expected of him by villagers and workers appeared to René as outmoded and perilous. In his attempt to shed the hacienda past, then, he also subjected himself to mounting moral critique. At the same time, and perhaps unwittingly, his own refusal of patronage responsibilities put Martin, the landlord's grandson and the owner of another nearby gold mine, in a more positive light. Indeed, despite Martin's explicit evocations of the hacienda system and what was, indeed, his fondness for describing himself as the "last patron," Martin appeared to many as the more sympathetic of the two, a man who might impose order through violence and yet, at the same time, upheld the obligations expected of and aligned with his rank.

As noted, René's gold mine faced growing popular opposition in the former hacienda village where it was located, opposition related to René's refusal to respond or uphold all of the patronage duties assigned to him by villagers and workers, many of whom had previously worked for the former hacienda landlord. Martin, on the other hand, was the godson of the former landlord and today owned a gold mine located on lands he had inherited. In the course of escalating rural conflicts concerning gold mining, I was surprised to learn, however, that Martin seemed to be relatively unscathed by these conflicts. Given the very explicit links between himself and the former hacienda system, I found this unusual, and even disturbing. My surprise was only heightened upon learning about Martin's own imbrication in earlier land conflicts in the region. Indeed, he had accompanied his grandfather and military police when they had approached Don Angelo in 1984, subsequently arresting him for threats against the landlord, for organizing labor strikes, and for pillaging hacienda produce. To this day, he boasted of his position as the last patron, carrying a rifle in his truck at all times and making a point of conducting target practice on the outskirts of the hacienda land and in full view of peasant neighbors. To understand the divergent fate of each gold mine, then, it is necessary to position Martin and René more broadly in their relations to the community.

As noted above, the two men were very different not only in their backgrounds but also, relatedly, in their everyday comportment and treatment of Quechua-speaking villagers. René was in his 40s and from a wealthy Creole family from Cochabamba. Indeed, his father had received military training in the United States and had subsequently been involved, at least according to René, in General Banzer's military coup of 1964. René himself had gone to an American School in Cochabamba and insisted we conduct interviews in English. He drove a shiny new imported four-wheel drive truck, usually at an unsafe pace. Don Martin, in contrast, came from a mestizo

⁹³⁸ For the alignment of political claims outside of rights-based sensibilities with a form of childish idealism or fanciful utopia, see Hartman (1997).

⁹³⁹ For the active or volitional dynamics of gifting in philanthropy and humanitarian work, see Bornstein (2012) and Elisha (2008). For godparenting relations to mine-owners as parts of a subversive material politics, see Taussig (1980).

family who had received land in Ayopaya through Jesuit land grants in the late 18th century. While the family owned a sizeable plot of hacienda land, it was by no means wealthy, at least not in the ways that René's was. Indeed, on many occasions Martin spoke sadly about the familial problems his own mining business had cost him, as his siblings were envious of his land inheritance. His truck was rusted and old, but he nonetheless never hesitated to allow as many workers as would fit to catch a ride in its truck-bed. Thus, the relations of villagers to each should be situated within this divergence, including the differences in bodily and moral comportment of both men. René, though slight in frame, carried with him a sense of intrinsic superiority to indigenous groups and to Bolivia's peasantry, one that shaped his evaluations of Evo Morales and his accusations of his being unfit as president. Don Martin, while problematically situated within the region's history of agrarian servitude and land conflict, nonetheless shared a language with rural villagers, acting in a way that was intelligible from within the trappings of the region's history of agrarian authority and exchange. 940

Unlikely Alliances: Authority, Obligation, and the Perils of Refused Patronage

While Don Martin had lived and worked in Cochabamba for years, had the swagger of a rural cowboy. His shirts remained partially unbuttoned at the chest, and he wore a leather sombrero in the style of the Santa Cruz *gauchos* or ranch-owners. ⁹⁴¹ On Sundays, Martin could be found in his usual drinking place, the curb of a humble store owned by the son of a longtime field hand who, indeed, continued to work for Martin. In the course of long afternoons spent on the cement stoop outside the store, beer in hand, he caught up with friends and acquaintances, including his uncle and godchildren, some of whom were the children of his grandfather's servants and tenant farmers with whom he maintained friendly if at times tense relations. For instance, one man several men one of whom was a regional union leader, approached him to ask for a ride to Arapampa later that day. Martin told him he had space for one more person, and no more. The man contested, playfully, and asked whether his brother couldn't also come. Martin refused, but the man added that they would see. Then, as if in a culmination of the banter, the man nodded to Martin and commented that I knew Ouechua, and that he had better learn to. Martin, without skipping a beat, replied that better yet the man should learn to speak Spanish. The man, of course, was speaking in Spanish, thus Martin's retort implied his inadequate knowledge of the language, a critique weighted with the modernizing projects of mid-century reform and the accompanying stigmatization of native languages stemming back to the colonial era.

Despite such often-tense exchanges with people who lived on neighboring villages or worked for him, Martin was also an important figure of elite beneficence, evident in his position as a godparent to several rural village children. On one occasion, Martin was seated outside the store on a Sunday when an adolescent girl came up and greeted him. Her hair was separated into two neat braids, and she wore a dark maroon pollera skirt, an embroidered white shirt, and black shoes. Standing in front of Martin, she appeared somewhat nervous, her hands clutched in front of her. Martin introduced her to me as his goddaughter, explaining that he pays for her room and board as well as schooling costs so that she can attend middle school here in the municipal center. He patted her on the shoulder, telling her that I am getting my doctorate and already have a master's. Turning to me, he remarked that they hope she can get a master's too. He then gave

232

⁹⁴⁰ Here, following Wittgenstein (1953), to share a language is also to share a world, that is, certain moral expectations and evaluations of possible action as well as embodied sensibilities and experiences of action or practice.

941 For the gauchos of the lowlands and their ambivalent relations to Bolivia's colonial past, see Gordillo (2014).

Mela some money for coloring pencils and a new notebook which she needed for school, digging into his pocket to pull out a crumpled bill. When Mela's girlfriends who had been waiting patiently behind her in the street began to leave, Martin waved her off, noting, "Go ahead, go with them, it's okay." They embraced, and she shuffled off, looking relieved.

After she left, Martin explained that Mela is the eldest of seven children, from a very poor family. Her father, indeed, was one of the best workers in Martin's gold mine, having worked for the landlord earlier and thus boasting a detailed knowledge of the internal channels or "veins" of the mineshaft. When Mela had turned thirteen her mother came with her and asked if he would be the *padrino* or godfather of her education. Martin spoke fondly of Mela, noting that she was hardworking and sharp. He added that he came to town and visited her school every week, chatting with her professors to hear how she is going and to make sure she is behaving herself. For, as he noted, "She has to study and go to school, that's all. That's what I am paying for." On other occasions, I joined Martin, his partner, and Mela for lunch. During one lunch, he explained that he saw his relation to her as something of an investment. He hoped that by helping her, he would provide her siblings with a positive model of upward mobility and education, one that, he hoped would also "transform their lives." By way of this arrangement, then, it was hoped that Mela would be able to pursue high school and perhaps even a college degree. Indeed, Mela was about to graduate from middle school, and would have to move to Cochabamba to attend high school. Thus, the arrangement was for her to live with Martin's parents in order to cut down on the cost of room and board and in order to be able to continue with her education.

Like Flora's adoption of her half-siblings, discussed in chapter 5, Martin's position as a godparent to Mela suggests the unsteady ways that patronage relations both are shaped by yet also attempt to address the region's history of agrarian servitude. Of course, and unlike Flora and her half-brother, neither Martin nor Mela had themselves experienced the hacienda era. Here, then, the more intimate expectations of patronage and aid not only conditioned relations among former landlords and servants but also more distant relatives, suggesting the ways that haciendabased systems of labor as well as aid continued to shape and reshape rural patronage relations, even in the absence of that system. Similarly, hacienda-based patterns of labor and aid also conditioned popular views of Martin in the village where he worked. Indeed, villagers described Martin as a "good man," a generosity that echoed villagers' recollections of his landowning grandfather. When I asked Doña Juana whether it was strange to see someone return to the hacienda house in 2002, she answered, "Don Martin is good. When Don Paulo died, he [Martin] returned. But only to mine. He plants potatoes to eat is all. He doesn't make anything [from farming]." Yet Martin's moral nature was linked not only to an act of monetary payment, itself in stark contrast to years of unpaid tenant and domestic labor on his grandfather's hacienda, but also my seemingly mundane everyday acts of assistance like offering someone a ride in your truck. Thus, Doña Juana, an elderly woman who had worked as a domestic servant for Martin's grandfather, noted, "Don Martin is good, he is not bad. He carries us in his car. He pays us and helps us. He is good." In this way, perceptions of moral character were linked both to perceptions of a discontinuity in economic arrangements—from forced labor to paid, from agriculture to mining—as well as by reference to Martin's upholding of earlier relations of patronage, evident in acts of financial assistance, god-parenting, transportation and assistance with rural infrastructure.

Yet, while people like Flora or Martin maintained features of earlier hacienda-based patronage relations, this focus on exchange and aid from former landlords' children were commonly described as products of villagers entrenched sensibilities. For instance, Don Alejo,

the grandson of landowners, explained that interlinked notions of respect and accountability were "something that stays with them," that is, with the kin of servants. In contrast, members of a new entrepRenéurial class like René sought—with limited success—to avoid or at least limit their involvement in what were perceived as antiquated patronage networks to which rural residents subjected him. For the descendants of landowning families, then, these entanglements of wealth and patronage, of care and authority, belonged to an earlier time of injustice from which they differentiated themselves, and more liberal perceptions of the "equality of blood." In this regard, expectations and ideals of patronage contrasted sharply with modern, liberal ideals of citizenship and horizontal exchange around which the educated, more urban descendants of landowners organized their own lives. However, as evident in the case of Flora, discussed in chapter 5, ideals of hacienda patronage not only "stayed with" ex-servants but also with the children of former landlords, often as the unexpected coupling of expressions of racialized superiority and a sense of guilt for the "errors" committed by their landowning parents or grandparents.

In the present, such sensibilities were often perceived as inappropriate or anachronistic, even embarrassing to the children of landlords. In a sense, such perception seemed to stem from the ways that such relations interrupted attempts to inhabit a more unmarked position as a modern elite. This position was aptly captured in the views of Don Alejo, the director of a religious school for poor, indigenous children. He explained that his parents had been landowners, but that he belongs to another time. "I don't discriminate. I belong to another epoch. I recall my father's character, for instance, as very different from my own because he lived another time. Furthermore," he added, "it's my position based on what I've seen and heard that the systems they maintained were unjust." He explained that rural, Quechua perceptions of him continued to build from his own familial lineage as belonging to ex-landowners. He noted, "For example, there are still several elderly villagers who call me niño [my child, the greeting of hacienda servants to the children of landlords], and they greet all the children of former landlords with this title. Other times, he noted, they simply call him patron." He recalled the surprise that this custom had elicited from German philanthropists with whom he works, noting "When I'm working next to Europeans people call me *niño* and the Germans are surprised, but this is something that has stayed with them and although you tell them don't say it I am not your child nor your boss, you can't erase it." On one occasion, this address had been challenged by another man who works with Alejo. Enrique was from Laraya but employed at the religious school with Alejo. When they were working in a rural village, they stayed with an acquaintance, a local villager, and he called Alejo "my child" (niñoy). Enrique asked the man why he called Alejo "my child" and not him. To which the man turned to Enrique and said, 'You are an *Indio* just like me. He [pointing at Alejo] is a son of landlords." Don Alejo turned to me. "This stays with them. And you can't take it away." He turned to me pointedly, "Look, the [agrarian] reform happened some fifty or so odd years ago, but it remains, at least for some, for the people who served the landlord. I haven't had tensions with people here, neither with the elderly nor the young." In lieu of tensions, indeed, there had also been requests for aid. Thus, Alejo explained, "In many cases people see the child or descendent of the landowner as a person who would make a good godparent of their child, who could help [help them] in baptism or to build a house. This, too, continues to be the case."

Alejo's discussion of the ways that hacienda-based patronage relations continue to infuse rural relations between former landlords and servants provides some insight into the complexity of Martin's relations to local villagers. As noted above, Martin acted as a godfather to many of the children of hacienda servants. Furthermore, as evident in the accounts of his Quechua-

speaking neighbors, his own continuation of patronage relations from the hacienda era and in the footsteps of his grandfather were often perceived as evidence of his good character. Yet, while his generosity to former servants or laborers might make rural support for him unsurprising, his relations to local villager was were more ambiguous, marked not only by a sort of shared reflection on the past but also by a racialized understanding of social difference and of this difference as the basis for superiority. Thus, while he, like his father, acted as a godfather to local villagers' children or aided in establishing electricity and water throughout the region adjacent to the mine, these acts were combined with an aggressive, even violent, demeanor toward these very same subjects, particularly to his own agrarian workers. Martin himself recalled, for instance, how when workers approached his door at night drunk and complaining about late paychecks, he would simply shoot a round of rifle shots into the air and then ask who was there. It never failed to scare away disgruntled workers. Similarly, on one occasion, neighboring villagers had let their donkey out to graze, and it had eaten some of the vegetables in Martin's garden. In response, he had shot the animal and then driven through the village with its corpse tied to the back of his truck. The latter incident had resulted in a formal complaint, in which the municipal government charged him a fine and required him to pay the villagers a sum reflecting the worth of the dead donkey.

This coupling of the display of force and acts of patronage—both of which harked back in explicit ways to the earlier hacienda system—was approached by other mining elites, such as René and his cousins, as both problematic and venerable. That is, while such acts were certainly alarming to progressive sensibilities, they also seemed effective as a way to manage relations to Quechua-speaking villagers as well as mine workers. For instance, René's cousins who also owned the gold mine, spoke about Martin with both fascination and disgusts. Martin, although he was there age, always insisted that they call him *Don* Martin. Not only this, but he always made sure to be armed. Once, Roberto, one of the cousins had been out drinking with Martin when Martin had asked what sort of a gun he carried. Roberto had shown him his gun, and Martin had laughed, taking the gun and firing it into the air. He then raised his own gun and fired, the echo of the shot contrasting sharply with the hollow 'put, put' sound of Roberto's more modest weapon. Martin had then warned Roberto, "Your gun won't do anything to these Indios." Martin mimed the act of brushing dirt off one's chest. He continued, "They have skin as thick as animals." Roberto, with his educated urban sensibilities, had been so disturbed he had not known how to respond. Martin, noticing villagers at adjacent tables staring at them, had turned around and said, "What are you looking at?" The man responded deferentially, "Nothing, Don Martin."

It was apparent in Roberto's narration that this incident had both shocked and disturbed him. For him, it confirmed the entrenched nature of the hacienda system in rural regions like Ayopaya. As he noted, "When I first arrived here he realized that there was something I didn't understand, something of *el campo*, the countryside, which is more akin to what relations to *hacendados* were like in Cochabamba some 50 or more years ago. It's a different world." Roberto's brother added, thoughtfully, "What is so sick is that even as we know that Don Martin is the worst, we also want to be like him." Roberto objected, loudly interrupting, "No!" His brother cut him off, "Well," he continued, "It's Don Martin they respect. They say 'Oh yes, Don Martin, of course, Don Martin.' And to us? They show up late to work and take two-hour lunch breaks. There is something that has stayed with Martin, something of the *haciendas*, that we don't have." He continued, "And while Don Martin's name is always uttered with deference and respect, if we try to give us orders, they just laugh at us."

Roberto's experience, and its subsequent recounting, indicate the ambivalences accompanying Martin's common of a seemingly anachronistic position of authority, an ambivalence most disturbing perhaps to fellow elites as well as progressive townsfolk in Laraya. Furthermore, this behavior—one that seemed darkly evocative of the racialized forms of authority and violence conditioning the hacienda economy—was crucial in maintaining certain stability in rural mining relations on his land. For urban mestizo mine-owners, Martin pointed to the limits to their own authority and of a more urban modality of managerial method and of treating rural workers. In this way, new mine-owners juggle a liberal sensibility that recognizes the pernicious quality of racism and economic extraction with a sort of ambivalent respect for the authority and vitality achieved by Martin and echoing the old hacendado ways. Indeed, Roberto and his brother were known as sympathetic in the region, sharing not only rides with workers but also pikchando, chewing coca, with them during breaks. If Martin's relation was marked by an exemplary division and hierarchy between differentially situated subjects, one whose contours attempted to replicate those of the earlier hacienda order, the young mine owners attempted to collapse or implode such division. In this light, René's complaint about patronage obligations becomes clearer. In attempting to treat people as equals and with purposeful disregard for the hacienda past, the young mine-owners had expected that workers would do the same. That is, jovial interactions in the work place were not to counteract authority, yet this was a degree and shape of authority very different and aspiring to be more egalitarian than that captured in Martin's more authoritative yet generous relations to his workers. Yet, this expectation proved unrealistic. While the lenient managerial style facilitated friendly relations with workers, it did not cancel out or erase workers' accompanying expectations of duty and aid. This manner was only further complicated by the fact that René, unlike his cousins, not only refused to engage with workers but also denied union requests for funding and infrastructure.

The fact that village and union opposition to local mining culminated in conflicts with one mine, and not both, challenge arguments that resource conflicts hinge simply on matters of class. Instead, to understand the divergent fate of each mine it is necessarily to consider the relation of each to regional histories of exchange and authority. As such it becomes apparent that Martin, despite or perhaps because of his problematic use of force and his authoritative manner, was intelligible within an existing language or style of relations marked by the earlier figure of the generous patron. René, in contrast, smacked of a sort of liberal, progressive disregard for indigenous peoples or their demands, one that drew from more abstract ideals of rights and citizenship to deny any culpability or responsibility to the region's past. (His cousins, for their part, seemed to be seen as amicable if ineffectual managers who worked under René.) Thus, more than simply a reflection of mounting critiques of capitalist extraction, the challenges to René's and the continued support for Martin grew out of specific relations of patronage and alliance between hacienda elites and Quechua-speaking villagers. This was particularly evident in the location of mines. Despite René's attempted distancing from the region's hacienda past, try as he might he could not escape the fact that the mine was located on former hacienda lands and had been owned by Fabio, the landlord's nephew. Thus, regardless of his own sense of appropriate action, his position and the requisites of legitimate authority were in a sense determined by factors beyond his control. He might have refused the title patron or denied any culpability to the hacienda past, but the mine in its material and infrastructural relation to former hacienda villages demanded an accountability to rural villagers, one whose denial could culminate in both physical and legal conflicts.

Itinerant Labor and the Politics of Peregrination

If evaluations of elite's character drew from ordinary acts—such as ride sharing or food distribution--as the basis for moral judgment, they also elicited forms or contestation and critique that worked through equally quotidian channels. Indeed, while challenges to René's authority and legitimate ownership of the mine took legal and juridical form, they also took more mundane form, shaping and reshaping patterns of rural labor and movement. Indeed, legal challenges to René were paired with the movement of miners and domestic laborers from René's to Martin's mine. Crossing paths with René in the truck one day, one miner noted jokingly, "We are carrying off all your maids. They are not going to work for you anymore." But it was not simply a manner of playful banter. It was true that local villagers had elected to stop working in René's mine, a choice that many people attributed to a regional union vote. One Quechua-speaking miner explained that people preferred Martin, the ex-landlord's grandson, whose truck was always full of villagers and whose workers' mid-day meals always included meat. Speaking to two of René's female cooks one day, the older woman noted in exasperation, "We don't want to cook for the miners anymore. We've had enough." Indeed, René's primary maid Rosalin had recently left his mine, electing to work for Martin instead. According to her, she left not only for better pay but also to escape unwelcome sexual advances from René.

Chatting with Rosalin in her new place of employment at Martin's home—and the antiquated hacienda building—she explained that she first started wanting to leave René's mine because there were several times when René tried to enter her room at night. He would come knocking at her door in his underwear, drunk, trying to press past her and saying she should come sleep with him. She shares a room with an older female cook, a woman *de pollera* (of the traditional multi-layered skirt), who had been very frightened at the site of him standing half-naked in her doorway. Rosalin told him no, but he was relentless. He would come and tell her that she should come have a drink with him in his bedroom, but she always declined. This is why, she explained, before she left she told René's girlfriend Maria that her boyfriend was bringing other girls to the mine when she was not there. The day she left, René reprimanded her for lying to Maria, and Rosalin answered, "Then why do you always come bothering me in your underwear?" In recounting this moment, Rosalin could not help but break into a satisfied giggle, perhaps recalling René's frustrated face as she explained to him her small act of revenge.

Rosalin's account of her move from René's mine to Martin's hacienda suggested the ways that workers, particularly female workers, continued to be approached as a sort of extension of hacienda or mine owners' property. Thus, when Rosalin left people were surprised, given her particular role as his private maid. She was, as the put it, "de René," that is, the servant specifically designated to ensure his comfort and fulfill his domestic needs. The boundary between domestic and sexual needs was a precarious one, which, when transgressed multiple times made Rosalin unwilling to carry on working for him. So, too, the language she used to describe the aftermath of her departing from the lower mine, that is, from René's mining camp, echoed languages of romantic love. Indeed, Rosalin noted that René had since tried to "get her back." One time, for instance, when he was visiting Martin, he got very drunk. He had ended up outside her room, screaming over and over "Rosalin," in the way he always did back at the mine where she had worked for him for two years. He even went looking for her in an adjacent room off of the central patio where he thought she was staying, but fortunately she had moved to another room. She stayed in her room, hiding quietly and with the light off, until he left. As she waited, she heard him screaming that he was going to "bring her to the mine below" and insisting that she should come work for him again. Earlier that day, before getting drunk, he had been

insisting that she return to work for him again, asking her to come back and querying whether she preferred "the business below [i.e. my mine] or this one, Martin or me?" Indeed, in our conversation Rosalin herself equated René's behavior to that of the sons of hacienda landlords, noting, "They think it's like that, that you can just have sex with whomever." In electing to leave his mine, then, Rosalin also attempted to decouple the act of domestic service as an extension of René's property and, with it, connotations of sexual service or romantic attachment. And by informing his current partner of his sexual pursuit of other women, she also ensured that her own victimhood at his hands would not remain inconsequential to his own life and relations, including his romantic relationship.

This movement of miners from René's mine to Martin's former hacienda and mine was accompanied not only with challenges to the legitimacy of René's mine but, more unexpectedly, with hopes of a potential alliance with Fabio, its original owner and the landlord's nephew. In letters to the municipal government drafted by the regional union, villagers noted that René's mine violated new restrictions on the family-owned mining. A formal document drafted and delivered to René himself described him as a "persona non grata" and called for his immediate departure from Ayopaya. And yet, this was not a general call for the ejection of mestizo mineowners from the region. Indeed, amid threats to René's life and business, rural residents began soliciting Fabio, the ex-landlord's nephew, to reclaim his post as the mine-owner and to form a collective with them. By founding such a collective, villagers hoped, they would be able to regain control of the mine and, at the same time, ensure René prompt departure. Fabio, for his part, seemed to believe that such an alliance might enable him and Martin to regain control of the second mine. In conversations with rural villagers, he appeared nervous, attempting to demonstrate his interest in such an arrangement without revealing what he must have known to be true, that he had sold and not leased the mine to René and that, as such, a legal case was untenable.

Villagers' interest in a collaborative alliance with Fabio drew from the nascent 2012 reform law, which, as noted earlier, limits the inheritance of mines within families and, instead, encourages the establishment of working collectives. Indeed, René had been able to consolidate his own mine through precisely such a legal maneuver, re-branding the business as a nominal collective while at the same time ensuring that he himself maintained rights to it. However, what villagers did not know is that such an arrangement had already been consolidated with René, whose brother-in-law was a lawyer and had, with national legislative proposals for mining reform, ensured that the legal documentation maintained the family's ownership of the mine. Yet, while the establishment of a gold mining collective built on a partnership between local Quechua-speaking villagers and members of the former Rodriguez landlords never came to fruition, the proposal suggests rural groups' potential interest in collaborating with former landlords. Such collaboration drew from the affective and relational grooves of earlier systems of hacienda-based patronage and alliance, showing how patronage not only enabled elite presence in the region but could also, in certain cases, be used to dispute and contest it.

Both the movement of workers to Martin's mine and with villagers' proposal to form a collective with Fabio, resource conflicts did not unequivocally pit local Quechua-speaking villagers against regional elites but rather drew villagers and ex-landlords into a bloc opposed to new mining entrepRenéurs. Here, mining conflicts hinged not only on monetary redistribution but also on the broader question of elite's willingness to partake in peasant life, evident in daily acts of greeting, feeding, or ride sharing. At the same time, women's labor and the movement of their bodies became a mode through which villagers materialized their support for or opposition

to different bosses. As evident in this shift of workers from René to Martin's mine, what arose as problematic in recent resource conflicts was not extraction or labor per se, but rather their attempts to decouple authority from a sort of exemplary understanding of duty or patronage obligations to one's workers and to adjacent villages comprised of former hacienda servants and tenant farmers. These demands for aid and exchange highlight the continued force of haciendabased idioms and their unprecedented force in shaping and potentially disrupting rural economic life. As these conflicts suggest, opposition to mining did not stem so much from its challenge to timeless ideals of ecological equilibrium but, rather, reflected specific histories of conflict and exchange with former landlords. At stake in the conflict, then, was not simply the problem of extraction but its ramifications and embeddedness in broader interfamilial patterns of elite duty and accountability. This is particularly evident in the ways that unionists and village opponents to René did not invoke simply his greed or wealth but, rather, linked these to a sense of his refusal of sociality, his failure to partake and share in the lives of neighboring villages. This failure was evident in his own bodily comportment, his hasty reckless driving along the mountainous roads, his unwillingness to distribute food or give rides, his disrespectful treatment of local women, and his failure to greet villagers. At stake in the mining conflict, then, was not simply extraction but rather the larger and yet equally entrenched question of regional elites' relations to Quechua-speaking workers.

This movement of workers and renewed ties to former landowning families demonstrates the unexpected ways that rural resource conflicts related to new mining reform proposals did not simply enable mine appropriation or collectivization by unions and peasant groups, but could also at times be accompanied by continued reliance on inherited patronage networks related to the former hacienda system. As discussed in earlier chapters, this conjoining of wealth and responsibility was not accidental. Rather, it reflected an understanding that might be located within what scholars describe as a particular Andean "authority complex," one whose salience was particularly crucial in regions like Cochabamba which had been populated much earlier by Inca field hands and which, I have suggested, seemed to have a distinct relation to colonial lords and encomenderos that their Aymara-speaking, highland counterparts. 943 Wealth, particularly gold and silver, was then imbued with broader religious and social connotations, ones that lent themselves to a particularly entrenched set of redistributive expectations whose negligence would not go unnoted. Where there was wealth, there was also a latent claim to be made concerning the obligations that such stature required and enfolded. Inhabiting elite status in an unmarked way, as René attempted, was simply unfeasible. Not only was it unfeasible, however, it also worked to disavow the enduring structures of inequity and privilege marking relations among mestizo elites and Ouechua-speaking villagers. Summoning one's rights as a citizen, then, worked less to equalize differences than to deny the inequities between differentially situated groups and, with them, the problem of one's own accountability or responsibility to that gap in resources and life possibilities.

Villagers opposition to René's gold mine, then, is insufficiently understood in terms of indigenous groups defending nature or opposing economic extraction, but rather seemed to hinge also on the appropriate flow of resources and revenue, the ways that extraction was linked to

⁹⁴² Sallnow (1989). See also Nash (1992).

⁹⁴³ For a more detailed discussion of this literature, see the introduction and chapter 1. For the generosity of Inca lords and their relations to food sharing and land gifting, see Larson (1998).

accountability to poor, ex-servant communities who live near the mine. 944 Thus, while villagers' anxieties with René and a new mining elite seemed to have been shaped in part by their reflection on the wealth he reaped and its dependency on impoverished village workers, this structure in itself was not problematic enough to warrant protest until it became clear that, along with benefitting from prior hacienda alliances and from the underpaid labor of Ouechua-speaking miners, René refused to uphold the responsibilities of other, former hacienda elites. It was not capitalism, per se, but its accompanying refusal of its own historical entwinements and their accompanying ramifications for present day life that became problematic. This critique moved across scales and spaces, applicable not only to gold mining entrepRenéurs like René but also to a whole class of similarly positioned businessmen and their national referents, thereby becoming imbricated in broader postcolonial critiques of violated sovereignty and global inequality. For, as one Quechua-speaking municipal official who worked in development projects put it, "One community gets jealous of what their neighbors have, just like Latin America does with other countries like the United States. It's like when we ask, why does the United States have wealth, while we live in poverty?"

The answer to this question, it was implied, requires attention not only to presentist economic assessments of growth or debt but rather required attention to their historical patterns, from the silver of the colonial mines of Potosi's that fueled industrial growth in modernizing Europe to the collusion of the US government in Banzer's oppressive military regime, with its violent repression of union politics. At the same time, the case suggests the ways that relations among agrarian elites and workers remained important despite or perhaps precisely with the destabilized trust in the government, one typified in the "military-campesino pact" of the MNR government. Along with suspicions of reform and revolutionary collectivity, then, came a continued entwinement in the patterns of agrarian patronage and exchange that had preceded them. In the next section, I consider the historical underpinning of gold mining in Ayopaya and raise questions about its relationship both to governmental reform initiatives, on the one hand, and its consequences for contemporary relations to the children of former hacienda landlords.

Perils of Progress: Mining Patronage, Union Repression, and the Élan of Elite Alliance Mining in the Ayopaya region has along history in the Andes, Jesuit missionaries having discovered and started using Inca gold mines in the outskirts of the Amazonian region even before the territorial boundaries between Portuguese and Spanish colonies had been established. 945 Even before the Jesuits, however, the Incas had worked mines in the Ayopaya river valleys. Both in the precolonial and colonial period, mine work remained imbued with a particular set of redistributive expectations. Indeed, despite early colonial reform efforts, discussed in chapter 1, minga workers or kajchas (silver thieves) continued to claim rights to abandoned or extra chunks of ore, la corpa, which augmented their salary and which resulted in a system like sharecropping. 946 Furthermore, and as discussed in the introduction, the region's mining history was, like the hacienda past, an object of critical reflection on broader racialized patterns of extraction and their entailments for life in the present.

⁹⁴⁴ For a critical account of the anthropological tendency to romanticize "place" and make it the ground of local resistance, see Moore (2008).

⁹⁴⁵ For a discussion of the region's earlier history of Jesuit missionization and gold mining, see the introduction. For an account of mining reforms and reformist debates about the mit'a labor draft, see chapter 1. See Herzog (2015) for an account of Jesuit missionaries in Bolivia as vassals of the King of Spain and, at the same time, as claimants of rights to territory and persons. ⁹⁴⁶ See Larson (1988:59, 121).

The analysis of agrarian and mining forms has often remained distinct, with archeologists and historians noting the parallels between ideals of exchange and redistribution operative in both fields. Yet, as should be evident from my earlier discussion of gold mining in Ayopaya, there this divergence does not make sense. Gold mines were imbricated within systems of hacienda labor and patronage. Workers might have been paid, thus divergent from hacienda laborers, yet in many cases mine workers and field hands were one and the same. ⁹⁴⁷ Thus, the forms of ritual sponsorship and exchange scholars have traced in Bolivian gold mines, such as ch'alla sacrifices, are in Ayopaya also standard parts of agrarian ritual. ⁹⁴⁸ Instead of keeping these two forms of labor and economic institutions separate, then, we might ask about the ways that mines' locatedness of haciendas shaped the terms of local relations among workers and mine owners, on the one hand, and how those sorts of relationships diverge from the relations fostered by a set of more recently-arrived mine owning groups who may not share the same sorts of patronage sensibilities with workers that older hacienda and mine bosses did.

At the same time, rural mining relations should be located within Bolivia's particularly conflictive history of union politics since the mid-20th century. Here, in many ways it was precisely in the aftermath of the dismounting of the hacienda institute—and its accompanying forms of patronage and aid—that a new relation of exchange and authority attempted to dominate the countryside, one premised on military might and on nationalist political leaders as godparents and patrons of rural development. At the same time, and as discussed below, we might also as how the instability of those newly imposed structures of political patronage—often known as the "military-peasant pact"—were affected by the relatively rapid dissolution of a revolutionary government sympathetic to peasant politics into a military dictatorship that brutally repressed both peasant and union groups. In short, I am asking how the instability of rural peasant and union relations to the state beginning in the 1960s have challenged the attempted dismounting of hacienda patronage. In the face of not simply reformist failure but what many understood as the betrayal of a state that had promised its support for rural peasants, how might older channels of exchange and alliance with local landlords—and in the case of Ayopaya, landlords who owned gold mines—have complicated or affected broader relations to the state?

Thus, mining politics in Ayopaya should be situated in light of broader political events from the mid 20th century onward, events marked by the risky repercussions of alliances with the state (particularly with Barrientos' signing of the Military-Campesino Pact in 1964) and the subsequent brutal repression of mining union movements, most notably the repression of the Catavi and Siglo XX mines in Cochabamba in 1967 and culminating in Banzer's 1971 coup. How might this history of repression and reversal under military rule have shaped local mining politics? Could popular experiences of the perils of state alliance related to the violent rural effects of governmental coups in part have supported a union politics premised not simply on opposition to regional elites but, rather, on tenuous sorts of alliance with local landowning and mine-owner families?

Beginning in 1964, miners experienced severe repression under the military dictatorship which culminated in a 1971 coup on the part of Colonel Hugo Banzer. As noted in chapter 2, Bolivia had shifted to military rule with the coup of General René Barrientos in 1964. While subsequent governments, including that of President Alfredo Ovando Candía (1969-1970, also 1964-66) and President Juan José Torres (1970-1971) had been more sympathetic with mineworkers and peasants, this policy rapidly reversed with Banzer, who brutally repressed peasant

_

⁹⁴⁷ Larson (1988)

⁹⁴⁸ See Nash (1992); Lazar (2007); Tausig (1981).

and union movements, leading to the death of over one hundred peasants as well as an unknown number of miners in Cochabamba. 949 Union protests and legal mobilizing at this time was aided in part by the Anti-Slavery Society of Great Britain, whose 1977 report "Report on a Visit to Investigate Allegations of Slavery" provides one of the most important records of the abuses of workers and the brutal repression of union organizing. In the course of the three-day coup, hundreds of people were murdered, universities closed, and students, workers, labor leaders, and political activists were imprisoned and tortured.

Banzer's government—which framed its program as an attack on Communism—was supported by the US government, which provided economic assistance and loans in the amount of an initial \$10.6 million and then another \$4.5 million for special programs including market reforms. 950 Banzer's government introduced strict price controls which, coupled with rising inflation after the state's deflation of the Bolivian currency, elicited a rural condition in which many people starved or were at the least struggling to feed themselves. 951 With Banzer, the National Workers Union (COB) was declared illegal in 1974 and in its place state-sanctioned coordinadores laborales were established. Peasants unwilling to join these official trade unions were arrested. Along with the repression of unions, Banzer undertook an agrarian modernizing initiative that sought to develop what was described as unsettled agricultural lands. According to Dr. Guido Strauss, who was the under-secretary for immigration at the time, the government hoped to encourage the settling of these regions by white immigrants from Namibia, Zimbabwe Rhodesia, and South Africa. According to the government newspaper the *Presencia*, the government expected about 150,000 whites and would be supported by funds from the Federal German Republic, including some US \$150 million that had been offered. 952 White immigrants. then, would be made owners of agrarian estates on which "non-integrated" lowland indigenous groups would work. 953 These groups, including highland indigenous peoples as well as lowland Avoreo tribe members, were then promised land and wages on agrarian estates. Echoing the language of earlier reformers, these estates were described by Bolivian journalists as "slave camps. "954

In this way, the affront on peasant unions which had gained force since the 1930s was coupled with migration to the lowlands to work in agriculture, a process that was further encouraged by the closure of national mines with the international collapse of tin in 1985 and the mass migration of highlanders, including Evo Morales' family, to the tropical lowlands to farm coca. Thus, and as discussed in chapter 2, in Ayopaya the progress promised and claimed by reform movements—including hacienda abolition in 1953—seemed perilous and risky, given to return and reversal. Not only "slavery," but the repressive state that supported landlords and challenged unions, seemed to have returned. In this way, we see how Don Angelo's account of the precarious pattern of hacienda abolition in Ayopaya overlapped with peasants' sense of uncertain allegiance to the state. In the face of such uncertainty, former landlords remained consequential both as potential allies and as protectors against the abuses of military rule. Indeed, it had been precisely in 1984 that Don Angelo had been imprisoned for his union activity, and a

Nash (1992:xviii citing *Excelior* newspaper, June 23rd, 1977).

⁹⁴⁹ Nash 1992:xi; see also "The Massacre of the Valley," Justice and Peace Commission 1974.

⁹⁵⁰ See Nash 1992:xii-xiii.

⁹⁵¹ For instance, as Nash (1992:xii-xiii) notes, a 1988 Bolivian Ministry of Health report notes that in 1977 the estimated life expectancy of the Bolivian peasant was less than 35 years. 952 Nash 1992:xviii.

⁹⁵³ See Nash 1992:xvii, citing the International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs 1978 which included a published report by Normal Lews, Document 31.

year later the Rodriguez landlord returned to the countryside to continue farming and mining upon his hacienda. Thus, as recalled in chapter 2, villagers recalled how they were abused far worse the fall of Estenssoro in 1964 and the subsequent turn to military dictatorship. The return of the landlords and their shift to gold mining, then, appeared to many as the reversing fortunes of the revolutionary headway made in the period of anti-hacienda mobilizing that culminated in the 1953 agrarian reform.

While Banzer's dictatorship came to an end when General Padilla gained power in 1978, this period of military dictatorship and its accompanying forms of union repression and white agrarian settlement remain consequential to rural relations in Ayopaya today, generating uncertainty about the instabilities of aligning oneself with the reformist state while, at the same time challenging the abilities of unionized workers to counter the political power of mine owners as well as agrarian elites. Furthermore, not only did Banzer's dictatorship at times consolidate and extend the ownership of former hacienda elites (discussed in the introduction), it also produced avenues of migration for new farmers and mine-owners. At the same time, modernizing initiatives in Bolivia's mines that culminated in the austerity measures introduced from about 1983 onward clamped down on what had been a powerful union movement and, with them, limited the power to negotiate with regional elites. Thus, while mines located on former hacienda lands seemed to be marked by the partial maintenance of some patronage relations, more recent mines and those with foreign owners seemed less bound by older patronage ties related to the prior hacienda system.

Escaping Obligation: Wealth, History, and the Exculpations of Rights

Yellow-green mountains rise above, thick clouds clinging to their peaks. The rains have just started to give color to the parched grass that lines the steep slopes. I am in Martin's truck, accompanying him on a trip to buy a generator from Rich, the owner of a sodalite mine. Rich is in his late 60s with a light complexion, a prominent nose, and a graying mustache. Below his eyes are dark circles, and his face quivers slightly as he talks. He is missing most of his front teeth, with jabs of yellow, like mountain peaks, protruding from his fleshy gums. When he speaks, his voice is high and shaky, as if he were not quite settled into his body. This is likely an effect both of prolific smoking as well as having grown up in his father's asbestos mines in Africa. Si Rich runs a sodalite mine and has been in conversation with Martin about developing a processing plant to extricate gold, even diamonds, from the mineral medley of his quarry, rumored to have once been an Inca silver mine. Indeed, it was Martin who introduced me to Rich, and who had invited me to join him on the trip to Rich's mine, where he hoped to buy a used generator from him.

We get out of the truck at the quarry, and I see two rounded caves above. Martin tells me they were Inca mines, and that the Incas "exploited the sodalite using fire and water." Beyond these gaping half-moons, there is a much larger, deeper gash in the mountain face. The cave is about 40 feet tall, as Rich has been digging deeper and lower than the original Inca mine. It goes in about 40 yards, and inside there are flat shiny surfaces where blue, brown, and black stone swirl together with other colors. To one side, Martin inspects the wall with his flashlight, asking if Rich has done any sort of a mineral placement test. Rich shakes his head, "No. Nothing." The unexplored, untested walls of the mountain mouth contain the promise of unimaginable wealth and riches just beyond one's fingertips, a mineral wealth lurking, and awaiting discovery.

⁹⁵⁵ Sodalite is a natural silicate mineral shown to have mild radioactive properties (See Cano, Wataname, Blak and Yauri 2010).

243

Indeed, Martin explains that the white rock we are seeing is very good, as it can suggest the formation of diamonds. While such aspirations might seem unrealistic, Martin too began with antimony mining and, only in the last years, discovered gold and profited considerably.

Martin is trying to convince Rich to look for gold, a project Martin himself is particularly interested in given declining returns at his own mine. Rich answers uncertainly, "This is a big investment." He passes where I'm standing, looking over at the mountain and the cascades above. "And up there the condors live!" he exclaims. They are still inspecting the mountain wall, and they tell me that the gold is pyrite or fool's gold (oro del tonto). The clouds are dropping quickly, and when I next look up, the waterfalls have disappeared, and it is only the three of us on this island of stone and boulder, the river echoing upwards from the cloudy expanse below us. The men are talking about how to get into the other part of rock wall to see if there is gold or silver. While Rich wanted to simply work his way in from the outside of the mountain, Martin suggests a four or five meter long cut into the stone from inside the existing mine mouth in order to see if there is anything of value. Rich tells him he could do this cut and the test in about three weeks, and Martin says he will come to see and help with the analysis. He turns to Rich, "I'll come back in three weeks. We'll do the mineral test and see whether it's profitable or not."

Back at the sodalite processing plant, Rich offers to sit down and tell me a bit about how he came to work here. 956 He begins, unsolicited, at the place of his birth in 1957. "I was born in Kenya, in the British Commonwealth, and then lived there for 15 years. We left because the government nationalized all of the companies. My father had a pen factory. We left for South Africa, where I lived from 1972 to 1991. From there I came to Bolivia. We had a mine that he sold at that time. My father said, 'It's time to move on.' Nelson Mandela had just come out of jail, and so he [my father] came to Bolivia and fell in love with it and built the company." I ask how his father learned about sodalite. "My father had a black granite mine in Africa, and he was talking to a Chilean geologist in Italy when he was visiting family and the man told him about this old Inca mine. I lived here four years and then left and went to Zambia. I was working in emerald mining there." I ask why he came back. "I came back because my father was sick and eventually died, and I had to come take over or else sell." He went on, explaining, "We export sodalite to Italy, the US. It's used in Germany a lot, also China, and Saudi Arabia." They imported the machinery form Italy and Sweden, he explains. Indeed, according to him, "This is the first mine of this type. The others still use old techniques, blasting everything away. Here I cut everything with diamond wire. It is a modern technique." He explains that his father started mining in the 1950s, first in an asbestos mine in Kenya, an asbestos and then an emerald mine. Later, he switched to factories.

We sit at the blue sodalite desk. Rich sits across from me, and now lights another cigarette. He recalls when he first came to the mine, "I remember coming from Cochabamba during the first years, and I had an car accident in Charahuayto. There was this young man on a motorcycle who was hurt, and we had to drive him all the way to Cochabamba to the hospital there. And when I came through again, the whole *pueblo* was there waiting. They stopped me. They wanted to lynch me. But then two people recognized me and saved my life." This had been the initial conflict, and then there had been a second problem concerning Rich's plans to install a landing strip. I comment to him that some villagers had mentioned that there had been worries that he would take the wealth away by plane. He laughed, and then added, "I take the riches away by truck all the same." He explained that the issue had been funding. He was a pilot and wanted to be able to drive his helicopter from Cochabamba. While the municipal government

⁹⁵⁶ See recording DM420071.

had initially offered to match his funds, nothing had come of it. Now the beginnings of the strip are a sandy gnash on the top of one of the nearby mountains, not far from where locals claim to have found a hidden enclosure used to torture people during the Banzer dictatorship. Don Martin entered the room to prepare a coffee, and they chat briefly about the landing strip. Don Rich repeats the punch line, "I extract the riches in trucks anyway" and they laugh. Don Martin shakes his head, "In these parts, things get very distorted."

A few months earlier, I had heard a contrasting account of the landing strip. Driving through a rural village with Wilder, he pointed up at the mountain peak above," They were building an airplane strip but the people don't want it. They said that all of the riches were going to be carried away." And so the project stopped. I look below, where a man is plowing his fields with two oxen. I comment to Wilder that perhaps the people are not so wrong, because many times people from away do come and disappear with money and riches. He nodded, and went on to tell me about Manfred, the old governor of Cochabamba. "He escaped with all the money from the bridge in Sacambaya." That is, he pocketed many millions of dollars that had been loaned to the government to construct a bridge, connecting a road across the Sacambaya River, and left the bridge incomplete. Like the half-constructed landing strip, the base of the bridge sits eerily in the middle of the river, a suspended infrastructure embodying the dual problems of extraction and corruption, the movement of money and resources from the countryside to global cities. Today, the river bears only the traces of this earlier effort, metal posts dotting the brown, muddy waters of the Sacambaya River that flows below, snaking through the valley and linking the various mines and their run-off.

Back at Rich's mine, the conversation shifts. Martin and Rich discuss the ways that the landscape itself has been shaped by the presence of strangers like themselves. Martin notes, "The roads wouldn't even exist if it weren't for the mines." Rich adds, "And the haciendas." Rich goes on to talk about his relation to the nearby towns and villages, "I contributed sodalite to the Church of Machaca. They also wanted me to be the mayor of Laraya, but I said no. In the municipal government and local *pención*, you can find sodalite from this mine. And the last time that Evo came, did you see, I was there talking to Evo and giving him a present. The Mayor was drunk, and Evo was angry with him as he forgot to send the trucks to pick people up and so there was no one there. So I gave him a gift." Thus, Rich recalled that he had brought a sodalite sculpture as a personal gift to the President, meant to appease him in the context of the what he described as the negligence of local municipal officials. Martin asks Rich if he has been to town lately, or if he went to the *promociones* (high school graduation celebrations) at all. Martin adds that he served as the godfather for two people this year. Rich shook his head, "No. I escape when they want something." Martin turns to me, explaining that people often seek out mine-owners to be the godfathers or fiesta sponsors so that you will help them pay for music, food, or drink.

Yet it seemed mine owners like Rich could not entirely escape the costs of the mining life. On the drive back to Laraya, Martin notes wistfully, "Mining has its social cost. It makes you sick. It has its cost. You become an alcoholic or an anti-social. But with Rich there aren't problems. He simply stays in his house and doesn't scream at people, like René does." The first time he came to Rich's mine, he tells me, he had been working as an environmental engineer and when to mentioned to Rich that he too wanted to start a mining business, Rich had cautioned him. Apparently he had told him, "Well, you will be rich, but don't expect to have someone to wake up next to every morning." For Martin and Rich, the rural mines were imagined as a place beyond the state, a place of distortion and tragedy, of fantastic wealth wedded to remarkable social loss. Wealth came at a cost, bringing alcoholism and loneliness, along with the physical

ailments of over-exposure to mining chemicals and, in Rich's case, to radioactive stone. Rich's declining health was well known in town, particularly in the case of shop-owners who were able to gage his worsening drinking problem. An acquaintance of mine noted, in passing, that Martin used to drink one bottle of alcohol a week. Now it is three. She shook her head, "He's not well." If Rich had grown poorer and sicker with time, he dreamed of gold. Like the dreams of wealth and privilege on the part of local groups who saw landowners and mine-owners alike as a local elite, learning to extract resources—be it gold or cocaine—from these dry mountain passes was intertwined with hopes for a better life. Indeed, people note that the drug trade has changed the way people think. "These days they don't want to work like they used to. They want to be rich overnight." These comments echo similar explanations made by educated social workers in Laraya, who saw the cocaine trade as the source of conflict among rural peasants and exlandowners. Landowners do not want to be responsible for cocaine processing plants that have sprung up in the mountains, on lands villagers expropriated from them.

Here, gold and cocaine were similar, enabling rapid shifts in social standing and inaugurating new possibilities for families and their children. 957 Yet, while the coca boom of the 1980s has come and gone, the political geography of resource extraction is undergoing rapid changes. Mine-owners note that there is a lot of foreign interest in Bolivian mining, but that the Morales government has scared investors away. With the new MAS mining law, rural union leaders brought documents declaring claims to local mines and calling for the banishing of new mine-owners and entrepRenéurs who, like Rich, found in the Ayopaya mountains the promise of grand fortunes in untapped mineral wealth. As demonstrated in previous chapters, landowners' status was often seen as synonymous with an exemplary position as godfather or local sponsor for events and persons. And yet, frameworks of vertical care and economic accountability were not simply displaced by new languages of indigenous justice and rights, but rather came to be creatively refigured. Indeed, Rich's comment that he tries to escape when people want something from him is revealing of the ubiquitous nature of claims and demands directed toward a new class of local elites distinct from a regional hacienda elite. Furthermore, his ailing health and socially estranged position seemed to arise as apt reminders of the perils of refused patronage ties, the mining life that left you sick and ensured you would die alone.

Thus far, I have traced the stories of three mine owners: René, Martin, and Rich. I have suggested that these various subjects were differentially encumbered by the past, and have argued that this divergence should be located within the broader history of each mine, from Martin and René's mines located on former hacienda lands to Rich's mine, which had been in disuse since the Inca period. While the case of gold mining on former haciendas and on the part of the kin of hacienda elite might initially seem to represent the most pernicious sort of continuity with the extractive past, I have raised questions about the perils accompanying more progressive managerial relations, with their high-tech diamond wire cutting techniques and their attendant presumptions of non-affliction to other elite's accountability to the hacienda past. These cases raises questions about the relationship between mining and patronage relations that grew out of the region's hacienda system: What are the entailments of historical encumbrance for the shape of patronage ties, or their absence, and with what ramifications for local villagers and mine workers? How do more recent mine owners who arrived since the period of neoliberal reform in the mid-1980s distinguish themselves from the earlier landlords who "enslaved" local villagers? Yet, in so doing, do they arise as magnanimous figures or, rather, as evidence of the

-

⁹⁵⁷ See Shakow (2014) for the parallels between cocaine and gold and popular interpretations of their perilous consequences.

risks of progressive ideals of egalitarianism which often overstate history's disentanglement from the present? That is, how do mine-owners own lives and bodies, particularly Rich, come to synthesize regional accounts of the tragedies of unreciprocated exchange and the perils of denied dependency on others? Thus, while Rich should appear as the modern success story, the international entrepRenéur who brings global mining technologies to the Ayopaya hinterlands, how does he instead synthesize the risks and perils of extraction without exchange, of economy without patronage?

Following my earlier examination of the entailments of land reform in rural Ayopaya, my discussion of mining politics in Ayopaya has highlighted both the longevity and instability of hacienda-based relations of patronage. If, for landowning daughters like Flora or former servants like Ramon, the hacienda arises as a sort of embodied visceral weight that demands attention and amelioration through everyday patterns of exchange and aid, for new gold min owners like René or Rich such elaborations of patronage belong to an antiquated moral imaginary best left behind. These shifts raise questions about the limits to reform projects and their complication by other sorts of moral and political imaginaries, ones that not only shape the boundaries of those histories—for instance, conditioning relations among former landlords and servants—but also spill outward, conditioning the terms of political practice, relations to new gold mining elites, and the ideals and expectations on the part of post-hacienda peasant collectivities in rural Ayopaya today. Both the subjacency of the affective and relational forms that grew out of the hacienda system and their creative extension and absorption into other domains of economic and political life suggest that the failures of the state are not simply dead-ends but also open up into other forms of worlding. The limits to modernity's claim to teleological efficacy, the capacity to reproduce itself or create worlds in its own image, simultaneously supplies the ground for other sorts of productions and reproductions.

In attending to this process, I have focused on the material and affective workings of patronage and the lived entailments of its refusal. In the contrast from Martin to Rich, we see a scale of embeddedness in rural lives. From entwined networks of former hacienda patronage in which bodies, gifts, money, and resources circulate between Spanish and Quechua groups, we see a shift to the refusals of responsibility to rural villagers. Thus, this mode of patronage as a historical practice diverges importantly from a more general framework of patronage as a mode of economic redistribution or elite accountability. 958 At the same time, and as indicated in René's conflict with the mining union and Rich's comments about his own relations of gifting to Evo Morales, such frameworks are not simply displaced but are also transformed, shifting from interfamilial affairs to more institutionalized manners. Indeed, this process was foreshadowed in my discussion of Ayopaya's regional agrarian union in chapter 4, in which popular deliberation over manners of land conflict was increasingly accompanied by union calls for support from the state, the national workers union (COB), or reform institutions like INRA. Unlike earlier patterns of aid premised on the exemplary linking of authority to a shared obligation to the region's violent past, mine owners like Rich manage to sidestep direct patronage relations while, to a limited degree, involving themselves in more institutionalized political networks.

As evident in the conflict concerning René's mining business, patronage networks were not simply uprooted or displaced. Rather, elaborations of exemplary exchange shifted from the more intimate spheres of kinship, labor history, and homes. Instead of the inherited inter-familial networks described in previous chapters, now union groups appealed directly to wealthy elites and to government officials for aid and assistance. What was obscured in the process was the

²⁵⁰

⁹⁵⁸ On patronage as elite accountability, see Englund (2011); Lazar (2008); Shakow (2014).

particularity of claims, not simply a demand for resources premised on groups relations (indigenous vs. mestizo, poor vs. elite) but the attention and ability to respond to arrangements that hung unsteadily between more reified characterizations of group belonging. Thus, in contrast to Doña Flora in chapter 2, demands for aid and assistance increasingly unfold not through specific interfamilial alliances but rather through group-based patterns of affinity mediated by formal political institutions such as agrarian unions, mining businesses, and bureaucratic associations, as well as the national government.

Evo as Godfather: The Family Romance of Indigenous Nationalism

Every year shortly before Christmas, rural villages and towns prepare for one of the most important school events of the year, the *Fiestas de Promoción* in which school age children are celebrated for their educational progress and receive gifts—predominately money—from family, friends, and acquaintances, resources that are then meant to enable continued training and schooling. These celebrations are typically sponsored or paid for by a former alumni, a wealthy resident or relative, or even a state official. In the case of a small village about half an hour from Laraya, the *Promociones* of December were sponsored by two people. A young woman named Sandra, a Quechua-speaking businesswoman from the city of Cochabamba whose parents had owned hacienda lands in the region, served as madrina or god-mother of the fiesta, and the godfather, as announced loudly on buzzing speakers throughout the soccer stadium, was the President himself, Evo Morales Ayma. This position included the payment of a sizeable chunk to aid in the cost of the event. In the case of Sandra, she had paid some \$200 dollars.

I had traveled to one rural village with several acquaintances from Laraya, including Pavel and his wife, a local chicha-brewer who planned to profit from the evening activities. Pavel and his wife were going to sell pitchers of chicha out of the back of their truck, and Sandra and Sonia join us. Like the relations between godparent and child, wealthier folk can also be godparents of particular events. In this event, then, economic responsibilities for schooling are distributed both among wealthier families and state officials. By way of national funding for local education programs, political leaders like Evo Morales himself come to merge with the older figure of the generous (land-owning) godfather, the government occupying the exemplary role of sponsor and supporter previously retained for the kin of landowners. Later in the day, a thunderstorm causes the electricity to go down. Yet, other than the music the fiesta activities are barely affected.

As the afternoon draw on, people make house visits to relatives, kin, and acquaintances. Both in houses and in the village public market – refurnished into a dance floor – local adults, guests, and government officials show their support and sponsorship for school children. They stand in a reception line waiting to shake hands with the recent graduate. When they encounter the graduate, they receive a ring of flowers around their neck and a handful or two of confetti on their head. Money, in particular bills of five, 10 or 20 Bolivianos, are pinned to the graduates' shirts. In the *promociones*, then, distribution took on an explicitly material form. In the shape of bills flapping in the wind and fastened carefully to shirts and dresses, poor students' bodies were adorned with the materiality of wealth, cash that flowed from the wealthier, including the grand-daughters of late landowners to mine-owners to government officials acting in the capacity of President Morales.

The acts of redistributing wealth in the graduation celebrations suggest the ways that ideals of wealth as entwined with questions of redistribution and accountability come to shape relations not only among former landlords but also rural villagers and townsfolk more broadly.

Yet, in the importance of the state in such relations, these practices also raise new questions about the ways that the state or state officials come to be absorbed into such rural channels of patronage and exchange. Thus, if the cases of mine-owners like René and then Rich point to the tenuousness of rural patronage relations, the *promociones* paint a somewhat different picture. In so doing, they alert us to the ways that reform projects focused on targeting hacienda-based sensibilities are also themselves in part entwined in and thereby encumbered by this past. Here, President Morales and the kin of former hacienda landlords come to occupy structurally similar positions, pointing in some ways to the incomplete displacement of hacienda patronage by what reformers since the 1950s imagined as a shift away from rural patrones and toward a patronage pact with political elites. Thus, we should be careful not to overstate the transformative efficacy of reform programs, including 20th century programs aimed at dismantling rural agrarian systems or their affective expression in a set of shared relations among elites and peasants.

Rather than being wholly displaced, then, it seems that the ideals of patronage previously associated with hacienda landlords have become the basis for new popular assessments of nationalist sentiment or devotion. 959 The national politics of wealth, or the importance of mining to nationalist sentiment, became especially clear to me in a set of conversations concerning Simón Iturri Patiño Bolivia's most famous tin baron. 960 During one late night conversation the heated debate centered on the figure of Simón Iturri Patiño, Bolivia's famous tin baron, nicknamed "the Andean Rockefeller." Several of Patiño's mines was located in Ayopaya, the site of an infamous Catavi massacre in 1941 and, in 2014, the site of clashes between unionized mine workers and military police. Namely, two acquaintances of mine became involved in a heated debate about whether Patiño was a good man or not. Both men, educated Quechua-speakers who live in Ayopaya, agreed that Patiño had been a grand figure. One, however, noted that he had been a wonderful nationalist, while the other recalled that he had taken all his riches and sent them to Spain. In response, the other man noted that Patiño was a colonial type in any case, to which the other replied, "No, he was an *Indio*, an *Indio* like you and me."

The argument, and its emotional appeal to a sort of shared indigenous belonging that preceded the rise of Evo Morales or identity politics, raises questions about the ways that expectations of aid and redistribution have shaped not only perceptions of Spanish-descendent elites but also conditioned the terms of national inclusion. To be a true Bolivian, a nationalist, is to maintain one's wealth in the motherland. It is here that earlier frameworks of patronage and authority merge with a broadly based postcolonial and anti-imperialist stance on extraction. Thus, while the intimate dimensions of redistribution were increasingly displaced, a concern with the moral entailments of wealth and authority permeated national level debates about the problems of resource rights and the perils of their expropriation into other countries, particularly former colonies like Spain. The linking of patronage and political authority, of course, is not new. Neither are the more intimate expressions of patronage, for instance in god-parenting relations. Indeed, in many cases the vision of former landlords as godparents partially shifted from former hacienda elite to new political figures including the president. This shift seems to have earlier roots, beginning in the 1950s and marked by rural relations to revolutionary

⁹⁵⁹ The continued politics of redistribution has been particularly evident in the widespread protests opposed to the rise in subsidy prices, popular demands for the nationalization of mines and natural resources more broadly, and institutional framings and rural views of the president himself as a an exemplary "god-father." Here, hunger becomes a site that registers the limits to the material promises of the state, one that is particularly politicized given what has traditionally been the tight entanglement between legitimate modes of political authority and food distribution. See Stephenson for the politics of hunger in Bolivia (1999). Harris (1989); Sallnow (1989); Nash (1992).

president Victor Paz Estenssoro, as well as earlier President Gualberto Villarroel (1943-46), both of whom are said to have acted as godparents and ritual sponsors for rural union leaders and peasants in Ayopaya. ⁹⁶¹

Scholars have tended to map such relations of patronage onto a somewhat romantic notion of "Andean collectivity," ones based on spatialized belonging and virtuous exchange. Yet, such an analysis seems to uncritically adopt, or at the least leave unexamined, revivalist positions that assume the purity of the indigenous community. However, not once in the analysis does the question arise of how the specific forms of labor and exchange related to hacienda patronage might shape the practices she describes. Thus, by re-assessing more romantic characterizations of native community, we are able to consider the complexities of everyday forms of collectivity, relationality, and exchange without dehistoricizing such entwinements as evidence of timeless community or thereby erasing the often violent transformations wrought by their legal and political histories. On the one hand, then, some elements of indigenous value systems focused on prestige, redistribution, and reciprocity made their way into hacienda life. Yet, as emphasized in chapter 1, these values themselves have never been isolated or external to broader political histories hinging on the transformation of indigenous collectivities.

These relations pose challenges not only to Bolivian reform processes but, with them, to the broader questions of the transformative workings of economic systems and what are often treated as the teleological effects of new sorts of labor and monetary regimes. 965 Despite Marx's own critique of capitalism, for him too freedom is possible only as the end result of a progressive process marked by the monetization not only of labor but also exchange, one that "dissolves the bonds" of dependency, unfreedom, and kinship, replacing what anthropologists earlier described as more "primitive" gift relations with relations of market exchange and free personhood. 966 And yet, it is precisely the inevitably transformative workings of money that are challenged by Andean peasants who, in the 20th century, reflected on what was taken as the problematic longevity of hacienda-based bonds of dependency despite the general shift to monetized payment. Indeed, in petitions submitted and in legal demands circulated by anti-hacienda militants from the 1940s onward, they noted that it did not matter how much hacienda colonos or pongos are paid or whether landlords pay in gold and silver; at issue is the very relation of agricultural and labor service, regardless of monetary remuneration. Thus, reformists' and popular concerns point to the enduring nature of hacienda-based bonds of dependency and obligation even with an increasingly monetized labor arrangement, one that challenges what

_

⁹⁶¹ See chapter 2 for this political history.

⁹⁶² While Lazar (2007) mentions 20th century clientelist politics, the work does not raise the question of how everyday relational ties to landlords or their kin might shape the contours of collectivity or exchange in the former hadienda region where research was conducted.

⁹⁶³ Lyons (2006).

⁹⁶⁴ This is evident in the state resettlement of a fluid labor force into towns, villages, and communities in the Toledo era, the attempts to rescue escaped tributaries from the miseries of hacienda servitude in the late colonial period of Viedma's reform, the Renéwed concern with mitani labor and servitude in the 1930s, and, most recently in post-MNR populism and, with Evo Morales, re-articulations of the beneficent ruler and "father" or god-father.

⁹⁶⁵ As Parry and Block (1989:5) suggest, the assumption of the transformative workings of money has been a key feature in social theories of money. Despite the divergent positions of scholars from Simmel (1978) to Marx (1964), for both, "whether for good or for ill—money acts as an incredibly powerful agent of profound social and cultural transformations (1989:3). Thus, for both Marx and Simmel, the introduction of the money form is taken as pivotal to bringing about (or anticipating the shift) from feudal systems of labor to capitalist relations of exchange, from bondage to freedom.

⁹⁶⁶ Parry and Block (1989:5). See also Mauss (1966) and Simmel (2011).

many social theorists have assumed is the inevitable displacement of pre-existing ties by relations of moneyed exchange.

And yet, even in the absence of their displacement particular patterns of exchange and patronage do not simply persisted unchanged. Indeed, while reformist attempts to dismantle inherited structures of assistance and care have proved perhaps more difficult than anticipated. the tensions created by reform processes—such as the mining nationalization law—had notable effects, both problematizing relations to former landowning elites while making rural groups more reliant than ever on their patronage and aid. In the mining conflict, for instance, Quechuaspeaking farmers and mineworkers drew from older moral and political logics as they negotiated the instabilities generated by resource reforms as well as the new vulnerabilities linked to gold mining. Yet, rural practices of exemplary exchange in Ayopaya point to something other than the absolute uprooting or displacement of post-hacienda patronage. Rather, the process I have traced is subtler, involving the transfiguration of post-hacienda patronage into a more general framework of elite duty. 967 Increasingly, the specificity of this network is replaced by a more general ideal of patronage, that is, the requirement that elites and middle class Bolivians offer monetary and material support to political and economic institutions (union groups, political parties, businesses) in return to favors and continued congeniality (or labor arrangements, in the case of René). With this shift comes the partial erasure of the relational specificities I have characterized by the term "post-hacienda." 968

This shift was aptly captured in the account of Julio, the unrecognized child of hacienda owners remarked upon the growing instability of patronage relations. According to Julio, a fruit farmer in Ayopaya, these pressures had culminated in mounting land conflicts since 2005, the year Evo Morales was elected to the presidency. When we spoke, Julio lamented that the neighbors he had walked to school with each day as a child no longer speak to him. Though the illegitimate child of a landlord and Quechua servant, he is disparagingly dismissed as an *hijo del patron* (son of the landlord). Thus, while he had previously celebrated *Carnival* with these friends each year, sometimes spending the night sleeping on their floor, with following the rise of the MAS party this had changed. "There is no tenderness anymore," he lamented. When I asked whether the source of this change emanated from his neighbors or from him, he paused, "It is come from them, but also from me. I've withdrawn too, fearing for my safety."

With the modification of patronage networks from family-based alliances linked through shared histories of servitude to formal institutional structures (political parties, mining businesses, unions), claimants were required to acquire formal support. The need to be affiliated with unions risked removing what was so remarkable about these post-hacienda ties: their attempts to remedy historical events without reifying either history as such or the groups (mestizo and indigenous, poor and elite). At its heart, practices of post-hacienda patronage were born of a lived recognition that the past was not distributed evenly. It raised the key question of who should bear the burden for the past, and answered this question in a way that accounted for the particular inter-familial histories not only of labor (which is more public information) but also more intimate histories of elopement, rape, informal adoption, and the fathering of children

_

⁹⁶⁷ As discussed in chapter 5, post-hacienda patronage marked an overlapping moral framework specific premised on individual's and family's responsiveness to particular histories of labor, sex, and kinship between families.

⁹⁶⁸ Like the term postcoloniality, I use the suffix 'post-' to foreground the present as beholden to the past, including its rhythms of desire and politics. In so doing, I aim to highlight the contested nature of time itself, that is, whether it is possible to fully supercede history (Said 1978; Spivak 1988).

out-of-wedlock, practices that created persons who did not fit within more reified characterizations of a nation split between mestizo landlords and indigenous peasants. 969

This partial shift in patronage from a way to remedy intimate histories of hacienda violence to constituting a more formal process of demanding support from regional elites premised on their economic standing, also reconfigured the gendered nature of claims and assistance. On the one hand, beneficiaries were less likely to be women and girls and more likely to be union groups. On the other hand, exemplary patrons were no longer embodied in the figure of the suffering mother and Christian martyr, like Flora, but rather were embodied in the virile bodies of young men like Martin, René, or Evo Morales. As patronage claims and demands shift to more institutional structures like unions and political parties and away from families of landlords and servants and their children, not only the patrons but also the potential beneficiaries are increasingly men. Indeed, as evident in Rich and René's cases, unionists and government officials relied on regional elites to provide support for municipal events, even asking Rich to formally welcome Evo Morales to the municipal center by offering a sodalite statue as a welcoming gift. So, too, René's workers—by way of their affiliations with the local union demanded of René that he make good on his promises of water turbines and road renovations. What changed was not the practice per se—the redistribution of goods and services from elites to Quechua-speaking farmers—but rather it's logic. Rather than being a way to improve upon the past, patronage arose as a structural remedy for poverty as such. In the process, an appreciation of the specific encumbrances of the region's extractive past was lost.

As money flows more through institutional channels led predominately by middle-aged or young adult men, the question of accountability shifts in form. Indeed, perhaps the most momentous shift from post-hacienda patronage to patronage, and one related to the first shift from specific to general, was the evacuation of the problem of history from the logic and morality of patronage-based exchange. While in the past, the kin of former landlords like Doña Flora informally adopted her unrecognized half-siblings, today an exemplary relation to the past shifts from one of specific familial duty to a broader class-based rhetoric of redistribution. The wealthy owe something to the poor, elite mine owners must provide or give something back to their workers; the state, like the patrons of before, are charged with the responsibility to enact political change and provide for Bolivia's indigenous poor. No longer a problem of everyday action and historical knowledge, the problem becomes a question of broader patterns of inequality, one where the state—and those charged with authority by way of ties to the government, like the union leaders in Carlos's case—increasingly claim for themselves a position as mediator of local relations and legitimate arbiter of justice. In the process, the importance of a specific regional form of historical consciousness falls away. As evident in the case of Ramon, discussed in chapter 5, this does not mean that specific entanglements between families remains simply fade away or are displaced. Rather, what shifts is that such relations are not longer aligned with importance for the broader issue of rural, post-hacienda justice. Justice, now writ large, lies in empowering indigenous campesinos and redistributing resources. In the process, the sorts of reconciliatory relations among former servants and landowners are aligned

-

⁹⁶⁹ Shakow (2012). Several persons who occupied such an interstitical position were Doña Flora's family and the former servant Karl (discussed in Chapter 2), as well as Carlos, the grandson of an indigenous steward whose history excludes him from union affiliation despite the fact that he speaks Quechua, owns a chicha-brewing business, and struggles to support his family.

with an anachronous "custom" best forgotten. ⁹⁷⁰ At the same time, however, these transformed iterations of an inherited "authority complex" also conditioned rural relations to President Morales, imbuing political leaders with importance in both kinship languages and, less directly, as a mode of authority upheld by redistributive acts.

Conclusion: Encumbrance, Exchange, and the Occlusions of Reformist Justice

Gold dreams are dreams of wealth and fortune, dreams of escape and remaking, of leaving the past behind and starting anew. In both gold mining and state reform alike, such aspirations are built less on the architectures of historical exchange than on attempts at an exemplary forgetting: practiced efforts to shed, as best one can, affective legacies of extraction, exchange, and affinity linked to specific arrangements of labor and kinship during the hacienda period. In lieu of post-hacienda ideals of improving the past by engaging and inhabiting it, the past is to be overcome and left behind. This position, one evident in land reform initiatives of uprooting enduring hacienda-based sensibilities, uncannily echoed the refusals of new mine owners like Rich and René. As giving shifts from a required moral burden to respond and thereby bear the past to a discretionary act of distributing money or supporting certain institutions or families, the moral underpinnings of post-hacienda patronage are reconfigured and, arguably, diluted.

At the same time, the denial of post-hacienda duties is, in accordance with liberal ideals of horizontal citizenship and national collectivity, exemplary rather than problematic. Thus, refusing obligations to prior servants or peasants, evident in the case of Fabio and René, could increasingly be reframed as generous, progressive acts, expressions of a recognition of rights and a refusal of superiority. At the same time, as land reform officials argued, by cutting the ties to the past he was countering longstanding dependencies and refusing the clientelism introduced by past military dictatorships. Indeed, mestizo elites and MAS government officials shared the critique of rural 'hand-outs' rooted in past patronage. Structurally then, regional elites, government officials, and reform workers occupied a shared ideological stance, positioning themselves as embodiments of a political and intellectual vanguard premised in a capacity to recognize and act in accordance with an exemplary division of present from past. Thus, it became possible for René to defend his refusal to provide even minor assistance to his workers and their families by invoking an ideology of citizenship and liberty. In so doing, his own rootedness in the hacienda past, his family had been one of the most powerful landowners in the city of Cochabamba, was elided, and he could present himself as a citizen among others. In this way, elaborations of unmarked citizenship evoked by mestizo elites like René shared with reformist elaborations of indigenous overcoming a sense that history was best resolved by way of absence or overcoming, an assumption that facilitated new sorts of unmarked authority premised on the exemplary refusal of the intimate ties to the hacienda past.

Attending to the transformed terms of rural patronage highlights the ambivalent effects of revolutionary reform and the unexpected ways that rights-based ideals can displace, strengthen, or reconfigure moral and political claims to elite aid and assistance. While rights-based frameworks carry with them new imaginaries of self and collectivity, justice and rights, they also

__

⁹⁷⁰ On separate occasions, Doña Flora and Martin referred to patronage as a "tradition" and a "custom." Martin remarked, thoughtfully, "Customs, both the good and the bad, are passed on." Doña Flora, for her part, identified the *ch'alla de terrenos* (see chapter 2) as evidence of "hacienda traditions." These terms, customs and traditions, draw from a more folkloric understanding of alterity in which practices at odds with contemporary citizenship practices arise as more reified embodiments of national culture or "patrimony" which can celebrated and aesthetically performed but which ultimately belong to Bolivia's past (Gildner 2012).

challenged existing approaches to the problem of the past. If arrangements of post-hacienda patronage were premised on an unavoidable and at times exemplary entanglement among families and to the region's past, proponents of indigenous justice articulate an aspiration that history be overcome, or, at the least, that one act as if this were the case. Like dreams of gold-based wealth, the promise of rights-based justice evoked a somatic shift from immersion in an imperfect present to a shared longing for an imminent future. In so doing, appeals to an architecture of family-based allegiances and historical debts were increasingly subordinated to a horizontal imaginary of justice premised on overcoming the past. For, to recall the story of the maize mill owners discussed in the beginning pages of this dissertation, to look back at the past or at one's former hacienda kin seemed increasingly to risk being frozen in time, unable to walk forward; dreams of progress and indigenous justice, like schemes to get rich quick through gold mining, required turning away from a shared hacienda past.

On the one hand, then, the gold mining conflict seems to confirm what scholars have found to be true in other former hacienda villages. 971 Namely, that hacienda relations often absorbs some dimensions of popular Andean ideals of reciprocity and redistribution as well as ritual forms that coupled authority and honor, prestige and moral order. Yet, I have also sought to highlight the ways that reform logics work to shape and delineate political expectations, political and moral concerns with lacking resources and persisting hacienda conflicts expressed through a language of failed or incomplete abolition, that is, the partial or even blocked arrival at a truly modern, post-hacienda present. Taking the hacienda's enduring force not only as a discursive move but, more provocatively, as a partial reflection of the continued encumbrances marking rural life in Ayopaya, I have sought to attend to the forms of attachment and belonging shaping hacienda life. Despite hacienda abolition and the accompanying shift from a system premised on the exchange of labor for land to monetary payment, then, I have suggested that such bonds or attachments were partially sustained. Thus, by exploring the forms of belonging and exchange sustained within what are often approached as purely economic or labor relations, I have challenged teleological narratives both of markets and of the state, ones premised on the assumption of money's intractably transformative effects on social life and the accompanying assumption that, with monetized labor, the forms of bondage and attachment marking previous systems will necessarily give way to relations of free exchange and citizenship. 972

Instead of being determined by their historical origins, however, encumbered forms work today in a multitude of ways. In some cases, patronage ties could enfold and enable authority, paired with violent threats aimed at securing order in former haciendas. Yet in other cases hacienda-based ties were drawn upon by former landlords or their children as a premise for elite's responsiveness to the needs of former servants. Patronage, then, was not simply an imposed practice but also enfolded a range of moral assumptions about proper forms of comportment and authority, assumptions that informed the ways that villagers themselves engaged and perceived regional elites, including political officials. In sum, then, hacienda

_

⁹⁷¹ See Lyons (2006); Thurner (1993).

⁹⁷² As Parry and Block note (1989:5), drawing from Marx, when "the direct labour a medieval serf owed his lord was commuted into a rent-in-kind and then (more significantly) into a money-rent, a contractual relationship replaced the bonds of personal dependence between them and many peasant holdings were expropriated, while the serfs managed to buy themselves free from their rent obligations and become independent peasants with property rights in the land" (citing Roberts and Stephenson 1983:20-21). For Simmel, too "The lord of the manor who can demand a quantity of beer or poultry[...] from the serf, thereby determines the activity of the latter in a certain direction. But the moment he imposes merely a money levy the peasant is free, in so far as he can decide whether to keep bees [...] or anything else" (1979:286 cited by Parry and Block 1989:5).

patronage also formed part of a broader shared language of authority that not only drew together former landlords, servants, and new mine-owners but also members of the government, conditioning practices of food offering and feasting evident during Presidential visits and shaping assessments of state authorities' obligations to rural peasants. The extension of hacienda-based expectations both to new mine-owners and to political leaders indicates the unexpected elasticity of patronage but, at the same time, cautions us about being too certain that inherited forms simply repeat or iterate themselves. Instead, we see the ways that the encumbrances of form also shape and condition new elaborations of rural collectivity and new engagements with the revolutionary state, ones that diverge from reformers' ideals and yet supply their own answers to the exigencies of rural life and to past violence.

By tracing the complexities of patronage in the former hacienda region of Ayopaya, this dissertation has sought to highlight the tensions within nationalist projects of postcolonial justice and indigenizing reform. Ten years after President Morales' election and following a decade of remarkable legal reform, relations of aid and exchange between former landlords, new gold miners, and Quechua-speaking villagers raise questions about the longevity of hacienda-based ties and the problems such ties present for indigenous reform projects. While land reform officials see these practices as inimical to political agency or justice, for rural groups living in former hacienda regions, history's burden is not a matter of choice, not a weight or burden that can so easily be thrown aside. Instead, like other structures of the *longue durée*, entrenched understandings of authority and duty bound up in the specificities of the region's particular hacienda past are hard to shed, conditioning attachments as well as conflicts and providing a moral lens with which to assess others' acts, and failures. And yet, President Morales's own position in the rural *promociones* cautions us against overstating this divergence, suggesting the unsteady ways that the social forms targeted for reform also come to saturate and thereby reshape the contours of that very reform project.

Attending to the longevity and encumbrance of hacienda-based sensibilities indicates that political life is neither as constrained nor as determine as we might have imagined. Thus, "getting to know slower temporalities, almost immobile ones" allows us to partially extricate ourselves from the "inexorable march of historical time, to leave it behind, and then to return to it with new eyes, with new uncertainties, with new questions."973 By attending to this long arc of agrarian authority and exchange and the creative recrafting of these forms today, I have sought to re-assess the notion that abiding practices are somehow determined by their form. Instead, I have argued that encumbrance is necessarily bound up with emergence, old forms persisting and getting extended and transformed in the present. A key question is what challenges such encumbered forms pose to theories of justice as a problem of overcoming the past. Can we imagine a justice that reconsiders not only the possibility but also the very exemplarity of history's shedding or supplanting? And what would such a political project look like?

⁹⁷³ Braudel (2012: 252).

Bibliography:

Abercrombie, Thomas

1991 To Be Indian, to Be Bolivian: 'Ethnic' and 'National' Discourses of Identity. In Greg Urban and Joel Sherzer, eds. National States and Indians in Latin America. Austin: University of Texas Press.

1998 Pathways of Memory and Power: Ethnography and History among an Andean People. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Achtenberg, E.,

2013. "Bolivia: The Unfinished Business of Land Reform." Rebel Currents (NACLA), 1.4.2013.

Alberti, Giorgio and Enrique Mayer eds.

1974 Reciprocidad e intercambio en los Andes peruanos. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Albó, Xavier

1987 From MNRistas to Kataristas to Katari. In Steve Stern, ed. Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, Eighteenth to Twentieth Centuries. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

1991 El sinuoso camino de la historia y de la consciencia hacia la identidad nacional Aymara. In Segundo Moreno Yañez and Frank Salomon, eds. Reproducción y transformación de las sociedades andinas, siglos XVI-XX. Quito: ABYA-YALA and MLAL>

Albro, Robert

2000 The Populist Chola: Cultural Mediation and the Political Imagination in Quillacollo, Bolivia. Journal of Latin American Anthropology 5(2):30-88.

2007 Indigenous Politics in Bolivia's Evo Era: Clientelism, Llunkerío, and the Problem of Stigma. Urban Anthropology and Studies of World Economic Development 36(3): 281-320.

Allen, Catherine

1982 The Hold Life Has: Coca and Cultural Identity in an Andean Community. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books.

2011 Foxboy: Intimacy and Aesthetics in Quechua Stories. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Alonso, Ana Maria

1994 The Politics of Space, Time, and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism, and Ethnicity. Annual Review of Anthropology 23: 379-405.

Andolina, R., N. Laurie, and S. A. Radcliffe,

2009. Indigenous Development in the Andes: Culture, Power, and Transnationalism. Durham: Duke University Press.

Anrup, Roland

1990 El taita y el toro: En torno a la configuración patriarchal del regimen hacendario cuzqueño. Stockholm: Nalkas Boken Förlag, Goteburg University, University of Stockholm.

Aguino A., Jorge and Jaime Galarza

1987 Trabajos y Materiales. No. 4. Entrevista Realizada en La Localidad de Machaca. Independencia, 15 July 1987. Independencia, Bolivia, unpublished manuscript.

Arendt, Hannah

2006 [1954]. Between Past and Future. Penguin Classics: New York.

Arnold, Denise Y. ed.

1997 Más allá del silencio: las fronteras de género en los Andes. La Paz: CIASE/ILCA.

Arondekar, Arjani

2009 For the Record: On Sexuality and the Colonial Archive in India. Duke University Press.

Asad, Talal

2003 Formations of the Secular. Stanford University Press.

Austin, J.L.

1975 How To Do Things With Words. Second Edition. William James Lectures. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Auyero, Javier

2001 Poor People's Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Antezana, L., 2006. La Política Agraria En La Primera Etapa Nacional. La Paz: Plural Editores.

Arnade, Charles W.

1957 The Emergence of the Republic of Bolivia. Gainesville: Nabu Press.

Assies, W.,

2006. "Land Tenure Legislation in a Pluri-Cultural and Multi-Ethnic Society:

The Case of Bolivia." Journal of Peasant Studies 33(4): 569-611.

2009. "Land tenure in Bolivia: From colonial times to post-neoliberalism" In

Legalising Land Rights: Local Practices, State Responses and Tenure Society in

Africa, Asia and Latin America. eds. Ubink, J., A. Hoekema, and W. Assies. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 293-324.

Aylwin, J., 2002. "El Acceso De Los Indigenas a La Tierra En Los Ordenamientos Juridicos De America Latina: Un Estudio De Casos." Serie Desarrollo Productivo no. 128. Santiago: CEPAL.

Barragán, R., 2012. "Los Títulos de la Corona de España de los indígenas: Para una historia de las representaciones políticas, presiones y negociaciones entre Cádiz y la República liberal." Boletín Americanista, no. 65: 15-37.

Basso, Keith

1996 Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language Among the Western Apache. University of New Mexico Press.

Bastien, Joseph W.

1978 Mountain of the Condor: Metaphor and Ritual in an Andean Ayllu. St. Paul: West Publishing C.

Bauer, Arnold

1979 Rural Workers in Spanish America: Problems of Peonage and Oppression. Hispanic American Historical Review 59:34-63.

Bebbington, Anthony and Jeffrey Bury (eds)

2014 Subterranean Struggles: New Dynamics of Oil, Mining, and Gas in Latin America. University of Texas Press.

Behar, Ruth

1986 The Presence of the Past in a Spanish Village, Santa María del Monte. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Benjamin, Walter

1969 Illuminations: Essays and Reflections. Hannah Arendt, ed. Harry Zohn, trans. Schocken Books.

Benton, J., 1999. Agrarian Reform in Theory and Practice: A Study of the Lake Titicaca Region of Bolivia. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Berlant, Lauren

2000 Intimacy: A Special Issue. *In* Intimacy. Lauren Berlant, ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bessire, Lucas and Daniel Fisher

2013 Radio Fields: Anthropology and Wireless Sound in the 21st Century. New York University Press.

Bolton, Ralph and Enrique Mayer eds.

1977 Andean Kinship and Marriage. Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association. Special Publication Number 7.

Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo and Tyrone A. Forman

2000 "I am not a racist but...": Mapping White college students' racial ideology in the USA. Discourse and Society 11(1):50-85.

Bourke, L. Nicole

1997 Making Space: Social Change, Identity and the Creation of Boundaries in Central Ecuadorian Andes. Bulletin of Latin American Research 16(2):153-167.

Borneman, John

2001 Caring and Being Cared For: Displacing Marriage, Kinship, Gender, and Sexuality. In The Ethics of Kinship. James D. Fabion (ed). Pps 29-46. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Boyer, Christopher

2009 Becoming Campesinos: Politics, Identity, and Agrarian Struggle in Postrevolutionary Michoacan, 1920-1935.

Braudel, Fernand

2013 The Longue Duree and World Systems Analysis. Richard E. Less, ed. State University of New York Press.

Brown, Wendy

2006 Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire. Princeton University Press.

Brush, Stephen B.

1977 Mountain, Field and Family: The Economy and Human Ecology of an Andean Valley. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Bunster, Ximena and Elsa M. Chaney

1985 Sellers and Servants: Working Women in Lima, Peru. New York: Praeger.

Butler, Judith

2000 Antigone's Claim: Kinship between Life and Death. Columbia University Press.

Blanco, Hugo

1972 Land or Death: The Peasant Struggle in Peru. New York: Pathfinder Press.

Boillat, Sébastien, Elvira Serrano, Stephan Rist, and Fikret Berkes 2013. "The Importance of Place Names in the Search for Ecosystem-Like Concepts in Indigenous Societies: An Example

from the Bolivian Andes." Environmental Management 51:663-678.

Bolivia Information Forum (BIF), 2012. "Land and Land Reform: Where Are We Now?". BIF Bulletin, no. 12.

Bornstein, Erica

2012 Disquieting Gifts: Humanitarianism in New Delhi. Stanford Studies in Human Rights. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bourricaud, François

1962 Changements à Puno: Étude de Sociologie Andine. Institute des Hautes Etudes de l'Amérique Latine.

Bouysse-Cassagne, Thérése,

1986 *Urco* and *Uma*: Aymara Concepts of Space. In John Murra, Nathan Wachtel, and Jacques Revel, eds. Anthropological History of Andean Polities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buck-Morss, Susan

2001 Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West. MIT Press: Boston.

Bynum, Caroline Walker

2001 Metamorphosis and Identity. Zone Books.

Camacho Laguna, D. 2003. Derecho de las mujeres a la tenencia de la tierra. La Paz: INRA & COSUDE.

Canessa, Andrew. 2012. Intimate Indigeneities: Race, Sex, and History in the Small Spaces of Andean Life. Duke University Press.

Carsten, Janet

1997 The Heat of the Hearth: The Process of Kinship in a Malay Fishing Community. Oxford Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology. New York: Oxford University Press.

Carter, Paul

2009 Dark Writing: Geography, Performance, Design. University of Hawaii Press.

Cattelino, Jessica

2008 High Stakes: Florida Seminole Gaming and Sovereignty. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Cheah, Pheng

2006 Inhuman Conditions: On Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights. Harvard University Press.

Collier, Jane F. and Sylvia J. Yanagisako

1987 Gender and Kinship: Essays Toward a Unified Analysis. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Carter, W.E., 1964. Aymara Communities and the Bolivian Agrarian Reform. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.

Carter, Paul

2009 Dark Writing: Geography, Performance, Design. University of Hawaii Press. Writing Past Colonialism Series.

Casagrande, Joseph B.

1980 Strategies for Survival: The Indians of Highland Ecuador. Pp 260-277 in Cultural Transformations and Ethnicity in Modern Ecuador. Norman E. Whitten, Jr. ed. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Cervone, Emma

1997 Los desafíos de la etnicidad: las luchas del Movimiento indígena en la modernidad. Journal of Latin American Anthropology 4(1):46-73.

Chávez, L. F., 2009 [1956]. I Censo Agropecuario de 1950. Versión reeditada y digitalizada por la Fundación Tierra. La Paz: Fundación TIERRA.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh

2000 Provincializing Europe. Princeton University Press.

Chatterjee, Partha

1993 Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. University of Minnesota Press.

2001 The nation in heterogenous time. The Indian Economic and Social History Review. 38:399-418.

Cheah, Pheng

1999 Spectral Nationality: The Living On [sur-vie] of the Postcolonial Nation in Neocolonial Globalization. Boundary 2 26.3 (1999) 225-252.

Chumacero, J.P.,

2012 "Una Mirada a La Estructura De Tenencia De Tierras En Bolivia En Los Últimos 60 Años." Fundación TIERRA, 2.8.2012.

Chumacero, J.P.,

2011 "Informe 2010. Territorios Indígena Originario Campesinos en

Bolivia. Entre la Loma Santa y la Pachamama." La Paz: Fundación TIERRA.

Eckstein, S. et al., 1978. Land reform in Latin America: Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

1997 The Time of History and the Time of the Gods, *In* The Politics of Culture, in the Shadow of Capital. Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd, eds. Duke University Press.

Colloredo-Mansfield, Rudi

1998 Dirty Indians, Radical Indígenas, and the Political Economy of Social Difference in Modenr Ecuador. Bulletin of Latin American Research 17(2):185-206.

Comaroff, Jean and John Comaroff eds.

2006 Law and Disorder in the Postcolony. University of Chicago Press.

Crandon-Malamud, Libbet

1991 From the Fat of our Souls: Social Change, Political Process, and Medical Pluralism in Bolivia. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Clifford, James

2013 Returns: Becoming Indigenous in the 21st Century. Harvard University Press.

Crespi, Muriel Kaminsky

1968 The Patrons and Peons of Pesillo: A traditional Hacienda System in Highland Ecuador. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois.

Cuadros y Villena, Carlos Ferdinand

1949 El 'Arriendo' y la reforma agraria en la Provincia de la Convención. Forum sobre desarollo enconomico. Sociedad de Ingenieros del Peru. (1966): 61-99.

De la Cadena, Marisol

2015 Earth Beings: Ecologies of Practice across Andean Worlds. Duke University Press. Dandler, Jorge and Juan Torrico, A.

1987 From the National Indigenous Congress to the Ayopaya Rebellion: Bolivia, 1945-1947. In Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries. Edited by Steve J. Stern. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Das, Veena

2006 Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary. University of California Press: Berkeley.

Das, Veena and Deborah Poole

2004 Anthropology in the Margins of the State. School of American Research Press.

Davila, M.

1971 Compadrazgo: fictive kinship in Latin America. In Readings in kinship and social structure (ed.) N. Graburn, 396-46. New York: Harper & Row.

de Certeau, Michel

2011 The Practice of Everyday Life. University of California Press: Berkeley. Third Edition.

Deere, Carmen D. and M. Leon.

2001 Empowering Women: Land and property rights in Latin America. University of Pittsburgh Press: Pittsburgh.

Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari

1987 A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. University of Minnesota Press.

Derrida, Jacques

1982 Différance. Alan Bass, trans. In Margins of Philosophy. University of Chicago Press.

1996 Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. University of Chicago Press.

de la Cadena, Marisol

1995 'Women Are More Indian': Ethnicity and Gender in a Community Near Cusco. Pp. 328-348. In Ethnicity, Markets, and Migration in the Andes: At the Crossroads of History and Anthropology. Brooke Larson and Olivia Harris, eds. Durham: Duke University Press.

2000 Indigenous Mestizos: The politics of race and culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919-1991. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

2010 Indigenous Cosmopolitics in the Andes: Conceptual Reflections beyond 'Politics.' Cultural Anthropology 25(2):334-370.

Douglas, Mary

1990 Foreword, *In* The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. W. D. Halls, trans. Pp. vii–viii. New York: W.W. Norton.

Duncan, Kenneth and Ian Rutledge, eds.

1977 Land and Labour in Latin America: Essays on the Development of Agrarian Capitalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dunkerley, James

1984 Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-82. Verso.

Durston, Alan

2007 Pastoral Quechua: The History of Christian Translation in Colonial Peru, 1550-1650. University of Notre Dame Press.

Duncan, Kenneth and Ian Rutledge eds.

2009 Land and Labour in Latin America: Essays on the Development of Agrarian Capitalism the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Cambridge Latin American Studies. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Earls, John

1969 The Organization of Power in Quechua Mythology. Journal of the Steward Anthropological Society 1:63-82.

Elisha, Omri

2008 Moral Ambitions of Grace: the Paradox of Compassion and Accountability. Cultural Anthropology 23(1): 154-189.

El-Haj, Nadia

2002 Facts on the Ground: Archaeological Practice and Territorial Re-Fashioning in Israeli Society. University of Chicago Press.

Englund, Harri

2011 Human Rights and African Airwaves: Mediating Inequality on the Chichewa Radio. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Fabricant, Nicole

2012 Mobilizing Bolivia's Displaced: Indigenous Politics and the Struggle over Land. University of North Carolina Press.

Farah, I., and Vasapollo, L. (eds.), 2011. Vivir bien: ¿Paradigma no capitalista? La Paz: Plural.

Farthing, Linda

2009 Bolivia's Dilemma: Development Confronts the Legacy of Extraction. NACLA Reporting on the Americas. Electronic resource: https://nacla.org/node/6096.

Farthing, Linda and Benjamin Kohl

2012. Material constraints to popular imaginaries: The extractive economy and resource nationalism in Bolivia. Political Geography 31:225-235.

Faubion, James D. (ed)

2001 The Ethics of Kinship: Ethnographic Inquiries. Rowman and Littlefield.

Ferraro, E.

2004 Owing and being in debt: A contribution from the Northern Andes of Ecuador. *In* Social Anthropology 12(1):77-94.

Field, Les. W.

1994 Who are the Indians? Reconceptualizing Indigenous Identity, Resistance, and the Role of Social Science in Latin America. Latin American Research Review 29 (3):237-238.

Flores-Ochoa, Jorge ed.

1977 Pastores de Puna: uywamachiq punarunakuna. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Foucault, Michel

1995 Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Vintage Books.

2005 The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collége de France 1981-1982. Picador Press.

Franklin, Sarah and Susan McKinnon

2001 Relative Values: Reconfiguring Kinship Studies. Duke University Press.

Frevre, Gilberto

1946 The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization. Samuel Putnam, trans. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Fried, Jacob

1962 Social Organization and Personal Security in a Peruvian Hacienda Indian Community: Vicos, American Anthropologist, Vol. 64 (2): 771-780.

García, Maria Elena

2005 Making Indigenous Citizens: Identities, Education, and Multicultural Development in Peru. Stanford University Press.

Gelles, Paul H.

1995 Equilibrium and extraction: Dual organization in the Andes. American Ethnologist 22(4):710-742.

2000 Water and Power in Highland Peru: The Cultural Politics of Irrigation and Development. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Gill, Lesley

1994 Precarious Dependencies: Gender, Class, and Domestic Service in Bolivia. Columbia University Press.

Grieshaber, E.P.

1979 Hacienda-Indian Community Relations and Indian Acculturation: An Historiographical Essay. LARR 14(3):107-128.

1980 Survival of Indian Communities in Nineteenth-Century Bolivia: A Regional Comparison. Journal of Latin American Studies 12, no. 2: 223-69.

Godelier, Maurice.

1999 The Enigma of the Gift. Trans. Nora Scott. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Goodale, Mark

2008 Dilemmas of Modernity: Bolivian Encounters with Law and Liberalism. Stanford University Press.

Gonzalez, Olga M.

2012 Unveiling Secrets of War in the Peruvian Andes. University of Chicago Press.

Goodale, M.R.G. and P.K. Sky, 2000. A Comparative Study of Land Tenure, Property Boundaries, and Dispute Resolution: Examples from Bolivia and Norway. Madison: Land Tenure Center. University of Wisconsin.

Gordillo, Gaston

2014 Rubble: The Afterlife of Destruction. Duke University Press.

Gordillo, José M.

1997 Arando en la historia: la experiencia política campesina en Cochabamba. Cochabamba: Plural.

2000 Campesinos revolucionarios en Bolivia: Identidad, territorio y sexualidad en el Valle Alto de Cochabamba, 1952-1964. La Paz: Plural Press.

Gose, Peter

1994 Deathly Waters and Hungry Mountains: Agrarian Ritual and Class Formation in an Andean Town. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Gotkowitz, L.

2007 A Revolution for Our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 1880-1952. Durham: Duke University Press.

Gould, Jeffrey

1990 To Lead as Equals: Rural Protest and Political Consciousness in Chinandega, Nicaragua, 1912-1979. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Gow, Peter

1991 Of Mixed Blood: Kinship and History in Peruvian Amazonia. Clarendon Press: Oxford.

Graeber, David

2001 Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams. Palgrave Macmillan.

Guerrero, Andrés

1991 La semántica de la dominación: El concertaje de indios. Quito: Ediciones Libri Mundi.

Gupta, Akhil

2012 Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India. Duke University Press.

Gustafson, Bret

2008 La educación y el resurgimiento indígena en Bolivia: deafíos al proyecto de descolonización. In Mable Moraña, ed. Cultura y Cambio Social. Madrid, Frankfurt. 2010 When States Act Like Movements: Dismantling Local Power and 'Seating' Sovereignty in Bolivia. Latin American Perspectives 37(4).

Guerrero, Andrés

1977 La hacienda precapitalista y la clase terrateniente en América y su inserción en el modo de producción capitalista: El caso ecuatoriano. Anuario Indiggenista 37 (Dec.): 65-130.

1983 Haciendas, capital, y lucha de clases andina. Quito: El Conejo.

1991 La semántica de la dominación: El concertaje de indios. Quito: Ediciones Libri Mundi, Enrique Grosse-Luemern.

Guillet, David

1979 Agrarian Reform and Peasant Economy in Southern Peru. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.

Guyer, Jane

2012 Obligation, binding, debt, and responsibility: provocations about temporality from two new sources. Social Anthropology 20(4): 491-501.

Haënke a Viedma, Tadeo

1799 Introducción a la historia natural de la provincia de Cochabamba y circumvecinos. Cochabamba. Orig. AGÍ Sevilla, Charcas 436, muchas copias. Publicado por la primera vez en Buenos Aires, 1801. F. d'Azara: T. Haenke, Voyages dans l'Amérique méridionale, t. I-IV. Vase G.Ovando--Sanz: op. cit., pp. 13-113.

Hale, Charles R.

1996 Mestizaje, Hybridity, and the Cultural Politics of Difference in Post-Revolutionary Central America. Journal of Latin American Anthropology 2(1):34-61.

Han, Clara

2012 Life in Debt: Times of Care and Violence in Neoliberal Chile. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Harris, Olivia

1978 Complementarity and Conflict: An Andean View of Women and Men. Pp 21-40 *In* Sex and Age as Principles of Social Differentiation. J.S. La Fontaine, ed. London: Academic Press.

1980 The Power of Signs: Gender, Culture, and the Wild in the Bolivian Andes. *In* Nature, Culture, and Gender, ed. Carol MacCormack and Marilyn Strathern. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1982 The Dead and the Devils among the Bolivian Laymi. Pp 45-73 *In* Death and the Regeneration of Life. Maurice Bloch and Jonathan Parry, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1986 From asymmetry to triangle: Symbolic transformations in Northern Potosí. *In* Anthropological History of Andean Politics. John V. Murra, Nathan Wachtel, Jacques Revel (eds.) Cambridge University Press.

1989 Money and the morality of exchange: The sources and meaning of money in Northern Potosí. *In* J. Parry and M. Bloch (eds), Money and Morality of Exchange. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.

Harrison, Regina

1989 Signs, Songs, and Memory in the Andes: Translating Quechua Language and Culture. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Hartman, Saidiya

1997 Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America. Oxford University Press: New York.

Harvey, Penelope

1998 Los 'hechos naturales' de parentesco y género en un contexto andino. In Gente de carne y hueso: Las tramas de parentesco en los Andes, Denise Y. Arnold, ed., pp. 69-82. New York: Routledge.

Hegel, G.W.F.

1977[1807] Phenomenology of Spirit. A.V. Miller, trans. Oxford University Press.

Herring, RJ. 1999 "Political Conditions for Agrarian Reform and Poverty Alleviation." IDS Discussion Paper 375. Paper presented at DFID Conference on 2001 World Development Report on Poverty (Birmingham, England). August.

Herzog, Tamar

2004 Upholding Justice: Society, State, and the Penal System in Quito (1650-1750). University of Michigan Press.

2015 Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas. Harvard University Press.

Hirschkind, Charles

2006 The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics. Columbia University Press.

Howard-Malverde, Rosaleen

1990 The Speaking of History: "Willapaakushayki" or Quechua Ways of Telling the Past. London: Institute of Latin American Studies Research Papers.

1989 Storytelling strategies in Quechua narrative performance. In Journal of Latin American Lore 15:3-71.

1988 Talking about the past: Tense and testimonials in Quechua narrative discourse. Amerindian 13:125-155.

Hull, Matthew 2012 Government of Paper: The Materiality of Bureaucracy in Urban Pakistan. University of California Press.

Hylton, Forreset and Thomson, Sinclair

2007 Revolutionary Horizons: Past and Present in Bolivian Politics. Verso.

Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE)

2001. Censo de Población y Vivienda 2001. www.ine.gob.bo

Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (INRA)

2008 "Breve historia del reparto de tierras en Bolivia." De La Titulación Colonial a La Reconducción Comunitaria De La Reforma Agraria: Certezas Y Proyecciones. La Paz: INRA.

Irurozqui, M.

1999. "Las paradojasde la tributación. Ciudadanía y política estatal indígena en Bolivia, 1825-1900." Revista de Indias LIX, no. 217: 705-40.

Isbell. Billie J.

1976 La otra mitad esencial: un estudio de complementaridad sexual en los Andes. Estudios Andinos 5(1):37-56.

1977 Those who love me: An analysis of Andean kinship and reciprocity within a ritual context. *In* Andean Kinship and Marriage. Ralph Bolton and Enrique Mayer, eds., pp. 81-105. Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association.

1978 To Defend Ourselves: Ritual and Ecology in an Andean Village. Latin American Monographs. Austin: University of Texas Press.

1997 Time, Text, and Terror. Pp 57-76 in Structure, Knowledge, and Representation in the Andes. Journal of the Steward Anthropological Society 25.

Jackson, Robert Howard

1988 Evolución y persistencia del Colonaje en las haciendas de Cochabamba. Siglo XIX 3:6.

1994 Regional Markets and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia: Cochabamba 1539 - 1960. Albuquerque: NM: University of New Mexico Press.

Jauregui, Beatrice (ed)

2014 Patronage as Politics in South Asia. Cambridge University Press.

Johnson, Lyman, and Sonja Lipsett-Rivera

1998 The Faces of Honor: Sex, Shame and Violence in Colonial Latin America. University of New Mexico Press.

Jones, Donna

2011 The Racial Discourses of Life Philosophy: Negrítude, Vitalism, and Modernity. Columbia University Press.

Kay, C.

1998 "Latin America's agrarian reform: lights and shadows." In Land reform. Land settlements and cooperatives. ed. P. Groppo. Rome: FAO, 8-32.

Kay, Cristóbal and Miguel Urioste

2005 Bolivia's Unfinished Agrarian Reform: Rural Poverty and Development Policies. ISS/UNDP Land, Poverty, and Public Action Policy Paper No. 3. Institute of Social Studies (ISS). The Hague, Netherlands.

Keane, Webb

2007 Christian Moderns: Freedom and Fetish in the Mission Encounter. University of California Press: Berkeley.

Kelley, J., and Klein, H.S.

1981 Revolution and the Rebirth of Inequality : A Theory Applied to the National Revolution in Bolivia. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Keith, Robert G. ed.

1977 Haciendas and Plantations in Latin American History. Teaneck, NJ: Holmes and Meier Publishing.

Klein, H.S.

1993 Haciendas and Ayllus. Rural Society in the Bolivian Andes in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

1982 Bolivia: The Evolution of Multi-Ethnic Society. New York.

Klein, Herbert S. and Ben Vinson

2007 African Slavery in Latin America and the Caribbean. Oxford University Press.

Koselleck, Reinhart

2004 Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. Keith Tribe (trans). Columbia University Press.

Kohl, B.

2003 "Restructuring Citizenship in Bolivia: El Plan de Todos," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 27(2), 337-351.

Lambek, Michael

2002 The Weight of the Past: Living with History in Mahajanga, Madagascar. Palgrave Macmillan Press.

2010 Ordinary Ethics: Anthropology, Language, and Action. Fordham University Press.

Langer, Erick D.

1985 Labor Strikes and Reciprocity in Chuquisaca Haciendas. Hispanic American Historical Review 65:255-277.

1988 "El liberalismo y la abolición de la comunidad indígena en el siglo XIX," Historia y Cultura 14.

1989 Economic Change and Rural Resistance in Southern Bolivia, 1880-1930. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

2009. "Bringing the Economic Back In: Andean Indians and the Construction of the Nation-State in Nineteenth-Century Bolivia." Journal of Latin American Studies (41): 527-51.

Langer, Erick and Robert Jackson

1997 "Liberalism and the Land Question in Bolivia, 1825 – 1920," in Robert Jackson, ed., Liberals, the Church, and Indian Peasants: Corporate Lands and the Challenge of Reform in Nineteenth Century Spanish America, Albuquerque.

Larson, Brooke

1991 Explotación y economía moral en los Andes del sur andino: Hacia una reconsideración crítica. In Reproducción y transformación de las sociedades andinas, siglos XVI-XX, ed. Segundo Moreno Yánez and Frank Salomon. Movimiento Laicos para Améria Latina (MLAL), vol. 2. Quito: Ediciones Abya-Yala.

1998 Cochabamba, 1550-1900. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

2004 Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes,

1810-1910. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Larson, B., Harris, O. and E. Tandeter. eds.

1995 Ethnicity, Markets, and Migration in the Andes: At the Crossroads of History and Anthropology. Durham: Duke University Press.

Lastarria-Cornhiel, Susana

2007 "Who Benefits from Land Titling?: Lessons from Bolivia and Laos." International

Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). Gatekeeper Series 132: 3-23.

Latour, Bruno

1993 We Have Never Been Modern. Harvard University Press.

2007 Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor Network Theory. Oxford University Press.

2013 "Another way to compose the common world". Paper presented at the American Anthropological Association meeting, Chicago, IL.

Lazar, Sian

2008 El Alto, Rebel City: Self and Citizenship in Andean Bolivia. Duke University Press.

Leinaweaver, Jessica

2008 The Circulation of Children. Duke University Press.

Lemos, Maria Carmen and Arun Agrawal

2006 "Environmental Governance." Annual Review of Environment and Resources. Vol. 31:297-325.

Lieberman, Sima

1961 Economic and legal aspects of the Bolivian agrarian reform of 1953: a study in institutional barriers to economic development. Dissertation. UC Berkeley.

Lyons, Barry

2006 Remembering the Hacienda: Religion, Authority, and Social Change in Highland Ecuador. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Leenhardt, Maurice

1978: Do Kamo. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude.

1969 The Elementary Structures of Kinship. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.

1987 Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss. Felicity Baker, trans. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

López Mejía, Adelaida

1995 Debt, Delirium, and Cultural Exchange in Cien años de Soledad. Revista de Estudios Hispánicos 29(1):3-25.

Mahmood, Saba

2009 Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide? Critical Inquiry 35 (4).

2005 The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton University Press.

Mallon, Florencia E.

1983 The Defense of Community in Peru's Central Highlands: Peasant Struggle and Capitalist Transition, 1860-1940. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Mangin, William P.

1954 The Cultural Significance of the Fiesta Complex in an Indian Hacienda in Peru. Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University.

Mannheim, Bruce

1998 "Time, not the syllables, must be counted:" Quechua parallelism, word meaning, and cultural analysis. *In* Linguistic Form and Social Action. Michigan Discussions in Anthropology 13:245-287.

Mannheim, Bruce and Guillermo Salas Carreño

Forthcoming. "Wak'a: Entifications of the Andean Sacred."

Martínez Alier, Juan

1977 Relations of Production in Andean Haciendas: Peru. *In* Land and Labour in Latin America: Essays on the Development of Agrarian Capitalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Massumi, Brian

2002 Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Duke University Press.

Mauss, Marcel

1990 The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. Trans. W.D. Hall, W.W. Norton: New York.

Mayer, Enrique

1977 Beyond the nuclear family. In Andean Kinship and Marriage. Ralph Bolton and Enrique Mayer, eds., pp. 81-105. Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association.

Mayer, Enrique and Ralph Bolton eds.

1977 Andean Kinship and Marriage. Indians of South America. Arlington Country, VA: American Anthropological Association.

Mazzarella, William

2006 Internet X-Ray: E-Governance, Transparency, and the Politics of Immediation in India. Public Culture 18(3): 473-505.

McCormack, Sabine

1991 Religion in the Andes: Vision and Imagination in Early Colonial Peru. Princeton University Press.

Medeiros, Carmen

2005 The right "to know how to understand": coloniality and contesting visions of development and citizenship in the times of neo-liberal civility. Dissertation, City University of New York.

Mendoza, T.R. et al.

2000. Caminando por el territorio de los ayllus y markas del Qullasuyu. Manual de exposición sobre propiedades agrarias. La Paz: CDIMA.

Mintz, Sidney and Eric Wolf

1950 An analysis of ritual co-parenthood (compadrazgo). Southwestern Journal of Anthropology **6**, 341-68.

1957 Haciendas and Plantations. *In* Haciendas and Plantations in Latin American History. Robert G. Keith ed. New York: Holmes & Meier.

Mitchell, Timothy

2002 Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. University of California Press: Berkeley.

Mueggler, Erik

2001 The Age of Wild Ghosts: Memory, Violence, and Place in Southwest China. University of California Press: Berkeley.

Munn, Nancy.

1992 The Fame of Gawa: A Symbolic Study of Value Transformation in a Massim (Papua New Guinea) Society. Duke University Press.

Murra, John

1962 Cloth and Its Functions in the Inca State. American Anthropologist 64:710-728. 1978 La organización económica del estado Inca. Mexico City: Siglo XXI.

Mróz, Marcin

1992 Los runa y los wiraqueha: La ideología social andina en la tradición oral quechua. Warsaw: Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos, Universidad de Varsovia.

Nash, June

1993 We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us: Dependency and Exploitation in the Bolivian Tin Mines. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Navaro-Yashin, Yael

2012 The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity. Duke University Press.

New York Times

Coca Advocate Wins Election for President in Bolivia. Juan Forero. December 19th, 2005.

Nelson, Diane M.

1999 A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala. University of California Press.

Nuñez, E.

2013. "Luces y sombras en seis décadas de reforma agraria." Página Siete, 4 8 2013

Oberem, Udo

1981 Contribución a la historia del trabajador rural en América Latina: "Conciertos" y "huasipungueros" en Ecuador. In Contribución a la etnohistoria ecuatoriana. Segundo Moreno and Udo Oberem, eds. Octavalo: Instituto Otavaleño de Antropología.

Orlove, Benjamin S.

1974 Reciprocidad, desigualidad y dominación. In Reciprocidad e Intercambio en los Andes Peruanos. Giorgio Alberti and Enrique Mayer, eds. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Orta, Andrew

2004 Catechizing Culture: Missionaries, Aymara, and the "New Evangelization." New York: Columbia University Press.

Orlove, Benjamin S.

1974 Reciprocidad, desigualdad y dominación. *In* Reciprocidad e Intercambio en los Andes Peruanos, ed. Georgio Alberti and Enrique Mayer. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Osorio, Alejandra

2008 Inventing Lima: Baroque Modernity in Peru's South Sea Metropolis. Palgrave Macmillan.

Ossio, Alejo M.

1984 Cultural continuity, structure, and context: some peculiarities of the Andean compadrazgo. In Kinship ideology and practice in Latin America (ed.) R.T. Smith, 118-46. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

1992 Parentesco, reciprocidad, y jerarquía en los Andes: Una aproximación a la organización social de la comunidad de Andamarca. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Perú.

Ouweneel, Arij

2005 The Flight of the Shepherd: Microhistory and the Psychology of Cultural Resilience in Bourbon Central Mexico. Aksant Academic Publishers.

Ovando Sanz, J.A.

1985 El Tributo Indígena En Las Finanzas Bolivianas Del Siglo XIX. La Paz: Comité Ejecutivo de la Universidad Bolivar.

Pagden, Anthony

1998 Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain, and France, c. 1500-1800. Yale University Press.

Palacios P., Gustavo

1957 Relaciones de trabajo entre el patron y los colonos en los fundos de la provincia de Paucartambo, Revista Universitaria Cusco. 112: 174-222.

Pallares, Amalia

2002 From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance: The Ecuadorian Andes in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Parry, J. and M. Bloch (eds)

1989 Money and Morality of Exchange. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.

Peréz, Emma

1999 The Decolonial Imaginary: Writing Chicanas Into History. Indiana University Press.

Pérez Tomayo, Aquiles R.

1947 Las mitas en la Real Audiencia de Quito. Quito: Imprenta del Ministerio del Tesoro.

Piliavsky, Anastasia

2014 "Introduction," in Patronage as Politics in South Asia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pps 1-38.

Platt, Tristan

1984. Liberalism and Ethnocide in the Southern Andes. History Workshop Journal 17, no. 1: 3-18.

1982 Estado boliviano y ayllu andino. Tierra y tributo en el Norte de Potosí. Lima. 1987. "The Andean Experience of Bolivian Liberalism." In Resistance, Rebellion and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World 18th-20th Century. ed. S. Stern. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 280-326.

Poole, D

1997 Vision, race, and modernity: a visual economy of the Andean image world. Princeton: University Press.

Postero, Nancy Grey

2007 Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia. Stanford University Press.

2010 Morales' MAS Government: Building Indigenous Popular Hegemony in Bolivia. Latin American Perspectives 37(3): 18-34.

Povinelli. Elizabeth

2006 The Empire of Love: Toward a Theory of Intimacy, Genealogy, and Carnality. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

2011 Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Ramirez, Susan

2005 To Feed and Be Fed: the cosmological bases of authority and identity in the Andes. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Ramón Valarezo, Galo

1987 La resistencia andina: Cayambe 1500-1800. Quito: Central Andino de Acción Popular.

Rasnake, Roger Neil

1988 Domination and Cultural Resistance: Authority and Power among an Andean People. Durham: Duke University Press.

Ray, Raka and Seemin Qayum

2009 Cultures of Servitude: Modernity, Domesticity, and Class in India. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Regalsky, Pablo

2010 Political Processes and the Reconfiguration of the State in Bolivia. Latin American Perspectives 37:35-50.

2008 Fluid modern ethnic spaces: contesting the spatial ordering of the State in Bolivia. Area 40(1):34-44.

Reyeros, Rafael

1949 El pongueaje la servadumbre personal de los Indios bolivianos. La Paz.

Riles, Annelise (ed)

2006 Documents: Artifacts of Modern Knowledge. University of Michigan Press.

Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia

1987 Oppressed but Not Defeated: Peasant Struggles among the Aymara and Qhechwa in Bolivia, 1900-1980. Geneve: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Rodriguez García, Huáscar

2010 La Choledad Anti-Estatal: El Anarco-Sindicalismo en el Movimiento Obrero Boliviano (1912-1965). Libros de Anarres: Buenos Aires.

Rojas, J.C.

2012. Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia at Risk. BIF Bulletin, no. 22.

Rowe, John H.

1946 Inca Culture at the Time of the Spanish Conquest, Washington, Smithsonian Institution. In J. Steward, ed., Handbook of South American Indians, Volume 2.

Rubin, Gayle.

1975 The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex. *In* Wayne R. Reiter, ed., Toward an Anthropology of Women. New York: Monthly Review Press: 157-210.

Sahlins, Marshall.

1972 The Spirit of the Gift. *In* Stone Age Economics. Chicago: Aldine: 149-184.

Sallnow, Michael

1987 Pilgrims of the Andes: Regional Cults in Cusco. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.

1989 Precious Metals in the Andean Moral Economy. In Money and the Morality of Exchange, Parry and Bloch, eds. Pps 209-231.

Sanjines, Javier

2004 Mestizaje Upside Down: Aesthetic Politics in Modern Bolivia. University of Pittsburgh Press.

Salomon, Frank L.

2004 The Cord Keepers: Khipus and Cultural Life in a Peruvian Village. Durham: Duke University Press.

Salomon, Frank and George L. Urioste

1991 The Huarochirí Manuscript: A Testament of Ancient and Colonial Andean Religion. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Scott, David

2004 Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment. Duke University Press.

Scott, James C.

1971 Patron-Client Relations and Political Change in Southeast Asia. The American Political Science Review 66(1): 91-113.

1976 The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Resistance in Southeast Asia.

New Haven: Conn.: Yale University Press.

1985 Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Scheper-Hughes, Nancy

1993 Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Seligmann, Linda J.

1993 Between worlds of exchange: Ethnicity among Peruvian market women. Cultural Anthropology 8(2):187-213.

Seremetakis, Nadia

1996 The Senses Still: Perception and Memory as Material Culture in Modernity. University of Chicago Press.

Shakow, Miriam

2014 Along the Bolivian Highway: Social Mobility and Political Culture in a New Middle Class. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Shever, Elana

2012 Resources for Reform: Oil and Neoliberalism in Argentina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Simmons, Roger Albert

1971 Toralapa-Tuturuyu: a study of the effects of revolution on two Bolivian haciendas. Dissertation. UC Berkeley.

Skar, Harald O.

1981 The Warm Valley People: Duality and Land Reform among the Quechua Indians of Highland Peru. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Skinner, Quentin

1998 Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Solón, P.

1995 La tierra prometida. Un aporte al debate sobre las modificaciones a la legislación agraria. La Paz, CEDOIN.

Soruco Sologuren, Ximena

2011 La ciudad de los cholos: mestizaje y colonialidad en Bolivia, siglos XIX y XX. Lima PIEB.

Soruco Sologuren, Ximena, Wilfredo Plata, and Gustavo Medieros 2008 Los barones del Oriente. El Poder de Santa Cruz Ayer y Hoy. Fundacion Tierra.

Sousa Angelo, B. de

2012 Cuando los excluidos tienen Derecho: justicia indigena, plurinacionalidad e interculturalidad. Justicia indigena, plurinacionalidad e interculturalidad en Bolivia. La Paz: Abya Yala, Fundacion Rosa Luxemburgo.

Spalding, Karen

1970 Social Climbers: Changing Patterns of Mobility among the Indians of *Peru*. Hispanic American Historical Review 50 (1970): 645-664.

1980 Class Structures in the Southern Peruvian Highlands, 1750-1920. *In* Land and Power in Latin America, Benjamin Orlove and Glenn Custred, eds. 79-97. New York: Holmes and Meier.

Spedding, Alison

1998 Contra-afinidad: Algunos comentarios sobre el compadrazgo andino. *In* Gente de carne y hueso: Las tarmas de parentesco en los Andes, Vol. 2, Parentesco y género en los Andes, Denise Y. Arnold, ed. 115-137. La Paz: Centre for Indigenous American Studies and Exhcnage.

Stephenson, Marcia

1999 Gender and Modernity in Andean Bolivia. University of Texas Press.

Stern, Steve ed.

1987 Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Stoler, Ann Laura

2002 Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule. University of California Press: Berkeley.

2008 Imperial Debris: Reflections on Ruins and Ruination. Cultural Anthropology 23(2):191-219.

Strathern, Marilyn

1988 The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with Society in Melanesia. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Starn, Orin

1991 Missing the Revolution: Anthropologists and the War in Peru. Cultural Anthropology 6(1):63-91.

Stern, Steve J.

1987 Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World. 18^{th} to 20^{th} Centuries. University of Wisconsin Press.

Stewart, Kathleen

2007 Ordinary Affects. Duke University Press.

Smith, Richard Saumerez

1996 Rule by Records: Land Registration and Village Custom in Early British Panjab. Oxford University Press.

Taussig, Michael

1988 Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing. University of Chicago Press.

1980 The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Thomson, Sinclair

2002 We Alone Will Rule: Native Andean Politics in the Age of Insurgency. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Thurner, Mark

1993 Peasant Politics and Andean Haciendas in the Transition to Capitalism: An Ethnographic History. Latin American Research Review 28(3):41-82.

Tullis, F. LaMond

1970 Lord and Peasant in Peru: A Paradigm of Political and Social Change. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Tsing, Anne Lowenhaupt

2005 Friction: An Anthropology of Global Connection. Princeton University Press.

Urioste, M.

2001 "Bolivia: Reform and Resistance in the Countryside." Occasional Papers. London: Institute of Latin American Studies.

2005 Bolivia: La Reforma Agraria abandonada. Valles y Altiplano. La Paz: Fundación TIERRA - ILC – IDRC.2008. "La reforma agraria en la nueva constitución." Pulso, 2-8 November: 8-9.

2009 "From INRA to Revolution" Bolivia post-constituyente. ed. Fundación TIERRA. La Paz: Fundación TIERRA, 55-8.

2011 Concentración y extranjerización de la tierra en Bolivia. Fundacion Tierra: La Paz. Urioste, M., Barragán, R. and G. Colque, eds., 2007. Los Nietos De La Reforma Agraria. Tierra Y Comunidad En El Altiplano De Bolivia. La Paz: Fundación TIERRA - CIPCA.

Valderrama, Ricardo and Carmen Escalante

1988 Del Tata Mallku a la Pachamama: Riego, Sociedad y Rito en los Andes Peruanos. Cuzco: CERA Bartolomé de la Casas.

Vásquez, Mario C.

1952 La antropología cultural y nuestro problema del Indio: Vicos, un caso de antropología aplicada, Peru Indígena 2(5-6):7-157.

Valderrama, Gregorio and Carmen Escalante

1988. Del Tata Mallku a la Pachamama: Riego, Sociedad y Rito en los Andes Peruanos. Cuzco: CERA Bartolomé de la Casas.

Valdivia, G

2010 Agrarian Capitalism and Struggles over Hegemony in the Bolivian Lowlands. Latin American Perspectives. 37(4):67-87.

Van Vleet, Krista

2008 Performing Kinship: Narrative, Gender and the Intimacies of Power in the Andes. University of Texas Press.

Wachtel, Nathan

1977 The Vision of the Vanquished: The Spanish Conquest of Peru through Indian eyes, 1530-1570. New York: Barnes and Noble.

Weber, Max

1968 Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Weismantel, Mary

1995 Making Kin: Kinship Theory and Zumbagua Adoptions. American Ethnologist 22(4): 685-709.

2001 Cholas and Pishtacos: Stories of Race and Sex in the Andes. Chicago, IL:

University of Chicago Press.

2006 Ayllu: real and imagined communities in the Andes. In The seductions of community: emancipations, oppressions, quandaries (ed.) G.W. Creed, 77-100. Santa Fe, N.M.: School of American Research.

White, Hayden

1987 The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Whyte, William Foote, and Giorgio Alberti

1976 Power, Politics, and Progress: Social Change in Rural Peru. New York: Elsevier.

Williams, Derek

2003 Popular Liberalism and Indian Servitude: The Making and Unmaking of Ecuador's Antilandlord State, 1845-1868. Hispanic American Historical Review 83(4): 697-733.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig

2005 [1953] Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

Wolf, Erik and Sidney Mintz

1977 Haciendas and Plantations. In Haciendas and Plantations in Latin American History. Robert G. Keith ed. New York: Holmes & Meier.

Yanigasako, Sylvia

2013 Transnational Family Capitalism: Producing 'Made in Italy' in China. In Vital Relations: Modernity and the Persistent Life of Kinship. Susan McKinnon and Fenella Canell, eds. Santa Fe: SAR Press.

Zamosc, Leon

2007 1994 Agrarian Protest and the Indian Movement in the Ecuadorian Highlands. Latin American Research Review 29(3):37-68.

Zimmerer, Karl

2014 "Environmental governance through 'Speaking Like an Indigenous State" and respatializing resources: Ethical livelihood concepts as versatility or verisimilitude?" Geoforum.