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Shakespeare, the Illusion of Depth, and the Science of Parts: An integration of cognitive science and performance studies.

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Drama and Theatre

by

Amy Cook

Committee in charge:

Professor Bryan Reynolds, Chair
Professor James Carmody
Professor Mary Crane
Professor Gilles Fauconnier
Professor Louis Montrose
Professor Janet Smarr

2006

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The dissertation of Amy Cook is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm:

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Chair

University of California, San Diego
University of California, Irvine

2006

DEDICATION

Deep, gratitudinous genuflection to Bryan Reynolds, Jim Carmody, Janet Smarr, Louis Montrose, Gilles Fauconnier, and Mary Crane. I would also like to thank Seana Coulson, Rafael Núñez and the mental spaces group; Emily Starr; the Victoria & Albert Museum; and Sharon Lehner at BAM.

To Martha Cook who took me to *Annie* and Karen Finley
and didn't make a distinction between the two.

To John Cook who taught me not to let a little thing like a lack of expertise
get in the way of forming an opinion.

&

To Ken Weitzman who inspires me, challenges me, and brings me
home at the end of each day, wherever we are.

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Chapter four, in part, has been submitted for publication of the material as it appears in *SubStance* (2006), Cook, Amy; "Staging Nothing: *Hamlet* and Cognitive Science." The dissertation author was the primary investigator and author of this paper.

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"The Dangers of the New Scarlet S" *Early Modern Literary Studies* 10.3. January, 2005; 1-5. <URL: http://purl.oclc.org/emls/10-3/cooksubj.html>.

"Beauty" Performance Review of Tina Landau's *Beauty* at La Jolla Playhouse. *Theatre Journal* Vol. 56, Number 2, May 2004; 311-313.

"*Shuteye*: PigIron's physical rumination on sleep." *TheatreForum*, Summer/Fall 2003; 58-61.

Conference Presentations

"Making up Our Minds and Speaking in Tongues," *ATHE Conference*, Chicago, IL, 2006. Coordinating panel chaired by John Lutterbie called "Interdisciplinary

Encounters II: Different tongues: evaluating the impact of cognitive science on acting, consciousness, and performance theory."

"'I am Laertes. I am. I am.' Perspective, mirror neurons, and the cognitive science of Transversal theory," *Transversalities Conference*, Reading, UK, 2005.

"Going to the water: Looking at drowning in *Hamlet* through a cognitive linguistic lens," *ATHE Conference*, San Francisco, CA, 2005.

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"Conjuring the Equivocators: The Ghosts of *Doctor Faustus* and *Macbeth* in Jonson's *The Devil is an Ass*," *GEMCS conference*, Newport Beach, CA, 2003.

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Honors and Awards

- International Federation of Theatre Research's New Scholars Prize for "The Colon-ization of Character: What is displayed when eating takes the stage" (2005)
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Teaching Experience

***Instructor*, University of California, San Diego:**

*Theatre and Dance 120***:** *Early Modern History & Culture: Ensemble*, Winter 2006

Designed and taught this course to work with the cast of *The Beard of Avon* (Spring UG show) to explore production dramaturgy, selected English literature from early modern period, directing theories, verse work, ensemble building, and current theoretical approaches to Shakespeare's work.

Theatre History and Theory 11: Classics -- Renaissance, Summer 2005

Prepared all lectures, designed syllabus, led discussions, and graded papers. Instructor of record for this required course covering history of theatre from the Greeks through the Spanish Golden Age.

Topics in Drama and Literature 101: Theory and practice/theatre and science, Winter 2005

Designed and taught this upper level seminar to examine the interaction between theories of theatre/acting and science of the last hundred years. Students incorporated the theory into performances of scenes.

Theatre History and Theory 10: Play Analysis, 2004

Independently designed syllabus to include, among other things, an examination of Shakespeare's language in building the structure of *Richard III*. Lectured, led discussion, and graded papers. Required course for theatre majors.

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Independently designed syllabus, lectured, led discussion, and directed final performance. Students study playwriting, directing, acting and collaboration, leading to a public performance at the end of the quarter.

***Teaching Assistant*, University of California, San Diego:**

Solo Performance, Spring 2005

Conducted workshops based on professor's lecture material to guide the students to create their own solo performance piece. Lectured on Eve Ensler's *Vagina Monologues*.

Theatre History and Theory 11, 12, and 13, 2001-2003

Prepared and delivered lectures on Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, Strindberg's *The Father*, Harold Pinter's *The Homecoming*, and Anna Deveare Smith's *Fires in the Mirror*.

***Independent Teaching Positions*:**

Princeton Review, January-June 2001

Taught SAT preparation to high school students.

Playwrights Project, San Diego, CA, January-May 2001

Taught playwriting to high school students.

Women's Project and Productions, New York, NY, 1999 and 2000

Taught playwriting at Roberto Clemente School in Washington Heights. Directed final presentation of the students' scenes.

Editing Experience

TheatreForum, Managing Editor, 2002-2003

Responsibilities include coordinating article layout, working with editors on article and play selection and placement, and getting this international theatre journal to press.

TheatreForum, Editorial Staff Member, 2001-2004

Responsibilities include the editing, design, and layout of articles.

Selected Directing Experience

- *The Beard of Avon* by Amy Freed, May 2006. Directed UCSD undergraduate show in La Jolla Playhouse's new theatre.
- *The As-If Body Loop* by Ken Weitzman, April 2005; *Richard Aiken* by Ken Weitzman, April 2004; *Seascapes* by Andrea Stolowitz, April 2003; and *Knowing Cairo* by Andrea Stolowitz, April 2002. Staged readings for the Baldwin New Play Festival.
- *O Solo Walt Jones,* June 2002. Directed this collection of solo pieces by undergraduates written during seven weeks of writing exercises and rehearsals.
- *The Dumb Waiter* by Harold Pinter, May 2002. Directed for UCSD Graduate Cabaret.
- *Through the Window* by Amanda Smith, November 2001. Mentored this young playwright and directed her play for Playwrights Project, at The Globe Theatres, San Diego.
- *Crimes of the Heart* by Beth Henley, May 2000. Contagious Theater Company, New York, NY.
- *Lighted Fools*, a rendering of Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, August 1997. Adapted and directed this production for NY Fringe Festival, New York, NY.
- Assisted directors Lisa Peterson, Richard Nelson, Rob Bundy, Howard Shalwitz, and Lou Jacob at theatres such as Playwrights Horizons, New York Theatre Workshop, Mark Taper Forum, Blue Light, and San Diego Repertory, 1993-2001.

Dramaturgical Experience

- *Spin Moves* by Ken Weitzman for Summer Play Festival in NYC, 2004
- *Richard III* by Shakespeare at UCSD, 2004
- *Life's a Dream* by Pedro Calderón de la Barca at UCSD, 2001

Professional Associations

- American Society of Theatre Research (ASTR)
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Shakespeare, the Illusion of Depth, and the Science of Parts:
An integration of cognitive science and performance studies.

by

Amy Cook
Doctor of Philosophy in Drama and Theatre
University of California, San Diego, 2006
University of California, Irvine, 2006
Professor Bryan Reynolds, Chair

My dissertation interrogates theatre and performance theory through the lens of recent developments in cognitive science. I explore the power of poetry in performance to illuminate the connection and seams between body and language, actor and character, fact and fiction. I reexamine some of the work of new critics and new historicists given the latest developments within neuroscience and suggest a path of integration between the sciences and literary and theatre theory. Rather than simply referencing scientific research as supplemental evidentiary material to a re-reading of *Hamlet*, I investigate how cognitive science can unveil Shakespeare's textual theatrics and spot light blind spots in theatre and performance theory.

Chapter one – Introducing the story

On his death bed, Hamlet asks Horatio to tell his story:

> If thou didst ever hold me in thy heart,
> Absent thee from felicity awhile,
> And in this harsh world draw thy breath in pain
> To tell my story (5.2.351-54).[1]

But Hamlet's friend can only tell his version of the events. His story will be one "Of carnal, bloody, and unnatural acts, / Of accidental judgments, [and] casual slaughters" (5.2.386-87). Once the bodies are placed and the listeners assembled, Horatio would find that the representation of the story would distort it. In an attempt to tell Hamlet's story, Horatio can only tell his own. Each age "re-members" *Hamlet* to fit its image of itself; as Terence Hawkes suggests, for every age, there is a Hamlet. Put another way: for every age, there is a Horatio. Current research within the cognitive sciences has shifted how we think of the mind/body/brain in language and onstage sufficiently to demand just such a re-reading of *Hamlet*.

As an intellectual shibboleth, *Hamlet* can also provide a re-reading of the scientific research on the brain and its application within the humanities. While the argument I make about the theatrical experience illuminated by cognitive science—conceptual blending theory in particular--could apply to other plays and other playwrights, if it does not provide assistance in understanding the sustained popularity of, and academic obsession generated by, Shakespeare, it is incomplete. Just as current cognitive linguists argue that a language theory must first address

[1] This and all quotations from *Hamlet* are from the Arden Shakespeare, 1982.

how we make sense of sentences like "Now is the winter of our discontent" before explaining "the cat is on the mat," a discussion of how conceptual blending theory can unveil textual theatrics and spot light blind spots in theatre and performance theory should start with Shakespeare.

Finding direction in indirection: a nebulous critical infection

Terence Hawkes argues that each age reads *Hamlet* backward from its time, finding in its mysteries confirmation of the contemporary epistemology of the critics themselves. I would add that it seems that each new epistemology wants to claim Hamlet as its mascot. To survey the work on *Hamlet* is to survey the history of Western thought over the last four hundred years. Rather than begin at the beginning, I will take a brief look at three contemporary readings of *Hamlet*, two of which define poles of literary theory and one of which provides what Mary Thomas Crane has called a "cognitive reading" of Shakespeare.

In his doorstop book on Shakespeare's plays, *The Invention of the Human*, Harold Bloom aims to "foreground" the character of Hamlet, insisting on the universal appeal of Shakespeare's character and dismissing as "French" and unjustly political the new historicist attempts to "background" the character in the examination of plot and context. For Bloom, it is Hamlet (along with Falstaff) who is "the invention of the human, the inauguration of personality as we have come to recognize it" (4). Hamlet initiates meaning, rather than just repeating it; Hamlet, for Bloom is the big bang of character, personality, and inner life. Bloom examines Hamlet's parentage in the *Ur-Hamlet* (which he insists was written by Shakespeare)

and in the psychological impact of the death of Shakespeare's only son and father in the years between the 1589 (the date he gives for the composition of the *Ur-Hamlet*) and 1601 (the date of John Shakespeare's death and the presumed year Shakespeare wrote *Hamlet*).[1] He says that Hamlet is unimaginable in another play, but that he also is too big for the play he is in: Hamlet "transcends his play" (385). Following Bloom, I have referred to Hamlet rather than *Hamlet* in this paragraph, as Bloom seems to view him as independent from and more important than the play that bears his name. In this way, for Bloom, *Hamlet* can still be *Hamlet* without Polonius's scene with Reynaldo; indeed, Bloom's *Hamlet* would be better with more Hamlet in *Hamlet*.[2]

His easy derision of most critical theory after World War II (without citations, names, or footnotes) speaks to a book published for those hungry for a return to the scholarship of Samuel Johnson, whom Bloom follows in arguing that Shakespeare "justly imitates *essential* human nature, which is a universal and not a social phenomenon" (3). It is unclear to me what it means to invent the human, particularly because Bloom does not mean that Shakespeare created our construct of what it means to be human but rather that the inner sense of self that he birthed, whole cloth, is the "truth" that Shakespeare helped us to come to. Although Bloom is not interested in how language can shape and "invent" thought, I am. Bloom's understanding of Hamlet and Falstaff as examples of how "new modes of

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[1] Jenkins agrees with both of these dates in his "Introduction" in The Arden Shakespeare *Hamlet* (1 & 83).

[2] "The play is Shakespeare's longest because Hamlet speaks so much of it, and I frequently wish it even longer, so that Hamlet could have spoken on even more matters than he already covers" (423).

consciousness come into being" (xviii) is powerful for me in locating that consciousness in the language used by the characters. I do not disagree with Bloom that Hamlet could give birth to "new modes of consciousness;" but to understand Hamlet's power is to understand *Hamlet*'s; moreover, such an inquiry should focus not just on what Hamlet says, but on how he says it.

Stephen Greenblatt's *Hamlet in Purgatory* begins with a similarly reverential assessment of the "literary power" (4) of *Hamlet*. Greenblatt examines the ghosts of Catholicism in *Hamlet*, finding in Hamlet's ghost a generational echo of the reformation, since its purgatorial wanderings suggest Shakespeare's anxiety over his Catholic father's death in a protestant time.[3] Greenblatt's historical contextualization illuminates how Catholicism (and later Protestantism) used literature and fiction to invent (and later to destroy) purgatory; while the church certainly had the power to decree the existence of purgatory, they relied instead on fiction to define and disseminate the purgatorial world. Within fiction, Catholicism was able to bring the dead into the present (86). He argues that these stories of ghosts, troubled dead, and freed souls work to generate an anxiety in the living to be relieved through prayer and alms giving. Greenblatt situates the ghost onstage and sees in the theatricality of the ghost "theater's capacity to fashion reality" (200). Ghosts in Shakespeare convey different things in different plays, but through them, Greenblatt argues, Shakespeare is able to achieve "the remarkable effect of a

[3] While Bloom says simply that John Shakespeare "died a Catholic" (391), Greenblatt explains that this assumption comes from the discovery in 1757 of a testament left by John Shakespeare asking to receive the sacraments at his death and asking for pardon from God if he does not receive them (248). Such acts of Catholicism during the protestant reign of Elizabeth could be dangerous.

nebulous infection, a bleeding of the spectral into the secular and the secular into the spectral" (194). Performed fiction, bodies enacting alternate truths, shifted the epistemology of the period.

Throughout his book, Greenblatt marvels at the literary and theatrical power to create a belief or "fashion reality" and though he does not examine how this happens, his language continually describes the cognitive processes traced by George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Mark Turner, Gilles Fauconnier, and others. The "nebulous infection" that Greenblatt describes is a type of blend, wherein the spirit world is structured and defined by moments of religious salience in life, such as guilt, sin, redemption, punishment, and reward.[4] By enacting these blends in the theatre (blending them further with actors' bodies), Shakespeare is able to "bleed" the spectral into the secular. Greenblatt's description of the power of purgatory to scare people into penitence and prayer in this life so as to avoid it later sounds as if it could have been written by Fauconnier and Turner: "It is as if the entire Catholic vision of death, reckoning, purgation, and ascent had been compressed, reoriented, and forced into the drama of sickness and recovery in this life" (43). Greenblatt's beautiful language is not interrupted for an explanation of the science that might allow such a "bleeding", such a transformation of reality through fiction, but his depiction does cohere with research within the cognitive sciences. My project does pursue this question. Interested less in the theoretical power of performance than in

[4] Of course, the idea of redemption or revenge is similarly a blend in that the meaning of the act requires input from another act. As Fauconnier and Turner explain: "A later situation has meaning only with respect to an earlier one, and again the result is not one loss versus one win but instead a true integration in which the elements of the revenge situation are elements of the original situation" (260).

how science can illuminate this power and put pressure on assumptions made long ago about theatre, performance, acting, and even the self laid bare in performance.

Both Bloom and Greenblatt find in *Hamlet* “infinite reverberations” (Bloom 384) and a “magical intensity” (Greenblatt 4). While Greenblatt’s goal is not to justify the “*essential* human nature” Bloom sees Shakespeare to be imitating and Bloom’s goal is not to examine the anxiety provided by the reformation, both become vague when it comes to describing the power of Shakespeare to “inaugurate” us or “fashion” us, using metaphors that initiate more questions than answers. They both turn to metaphors of science (energy, invention, infection, consciousness) to capture and defend the role of Shakespeare’s plays in who we are and how we think. The move to incorporate scientific research into literary studies seems in part an answer to questions posed by literary critics such as Bloom and Greenblatt. Cognitive studies can provide tools to unpack the ways Shakespeare’s language can produce form out of “airy nothing.”[5] Though Greenblatt’s “poetics of culture” (1988, 5) proposes looking at the margins of a text, he believes in the place for “scrupulous attention to formal linguistic design” (4) in literary studies.

Such attention is being paid by literary theorists interested in expanding our understanding of literature to include the ways the cognitive sciences are thinking

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[5] From Theseus’s speech to Hippolyta in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* (5.1.17). While Theseus’s claim that poets make things from “airy nothing” is often invoked in discussions about the power of language and poetry, Lakoff and Turner argue that this is a “position reminiscent of a literal meaning theorist, arguing that poets are like lovers and madmen: they are fanciful and therefore misperceive the truth. Hippolyta correctly sees that Theseus’s dichotomy is mistaken: ‘But all the story of the night told over, / And all their minds transfigur’d so together, / More witnesseth than fancy’s images, / And grows to something of great constancy; / But, howsoever, strange and admirable’” (5.1.24 and qtd. in Lakoff and Turner 1989, 216).

about how we process, produce, and conceive ourselves through language. Mary Thomas Crane's *Shakespeare's Brain* reads Shakespeare with cognitive theory, tracing the ways in which the plays "experiment with different forms of polysemy and prototype effects" and how these "leave traces of cognitive as well as ideological processes on the text" (4). Crane argues that Hamlet's concern with identifying whether action is the *result* of an internal process or whether it is the *cause* of an internal formation, creates the delayed revenge. She views the play as moving from outside to inside and back again, both in terms of a spatial location (outside the castle to the closet and back) and in terms of Hamlet's "preoccupation with what is within himself and other people" (124). Ophelia and Gertrude seem to have nothing within and the concern of others is simply their "use"--as in Hamlet's hope that "use almost can change the stamp of nature" (3.4.168)--and symptoms—as in the "nothing" of Ophelia's speech in madness (4.5.7) and the details of her flowery grave. Finally, Crane argues that Hamlet brings an "an inner self into being by talking about it" and that he moves "toward a performative theory of self-fashioning" (141), trying out a language of action--"My thoughts be bloody or be nothing worth" (4.4.65)—that he hopes will "shape his very thoughts" (142). Hamlet is able to shape his action to the words he uses; as many have pointed out, this act four soliloquy is his last and ushers in a shift in Hamlet from brooder to doer.

Like Fortinbras's penetration of Denmark and Hamlet's use of the signet ring to claim the external power of kingship before he is able to claim his role as

"Hamlet the Dane," his use of language to shape thought completes the "triumph of outside over inside" (147) in the play. At the end, Hamlet is most concerned with his "wounded name" a point that Bloom uses to argue that "Not less than everything in himself, Hamlet also knows himself to be nothing in himself" (431) and Crane uses to suggest that Hamlet has recognized the "nonexistent interiority" and thus gives his "voice" to Fortinbras, "the quintessential performative subject" (147). Crane points out that though Shakespeare might depict Hamlet as recognizing a lack of interiority, the play provides insight into the writer's brain: the "polysemic web of 'acts' is not hollow but resembles Hamlet's imagined pliable matter reflecting the form and pressure of culture, as well as the cognitive systems within Shakespeare's brain" (154). Crane uses cognitive theory to illuminate the play and its hero in ways that respond to Bloom's articulation of its power (though this is not her objective) as well as Greenblatt's argument for the historical situatedness of the text.

In a 2001 issue of *SubStance*, a "Dialogue" took place between Ellen Spolsky on one side and John Tooby and Leda Cosmides on the other regarding the ways literature may be evolutionarily adaptable. [6] While both sides agreed on the value of literature, and used science to make an argument for it, the gulf between the two theories turned out to be fairly wide. Tooby and Cosmides follow a computational model of the brain derived from the work of Noam Chomsky and Steven Pinker; Spolsky argues along with cognitive scientists such as Eleanore Rosch and George Lakoff for an embodied brain. The paradigm shift between

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[6] I go into greater detail about this debate and its implications for theatre studies in chapter four.

seeing the brain as a computer, with input undergoing algorithmic processing, and viewing it more as an organism, shaping and being shaped by its environment, is beginning to have profound impact on various fields. Until the debate is settled, any application of science to the humanities should foreground the paradigm in which it operates. Perhaps the process of applying both paradigms can operate as a kind of natural selection, with "survival" being awarded to the one more fit to explain the aesthetic, emotional, and cognitive experiences that matter the most to us.

Taking the cat off the mat: a look at the lens

In the last thirty years, a profoundly different view of how we compose and understand language has taken shape within the cognitive sciences. The metaphor of the brain as computer has shifted to an embodied and creative brain. Cognitive science is the term that gets blanketed over various fields that look at the interaction between the mind, brain, body, language, and environment. It includes research from neurology, psychology, computer science, linguistics, and sometimes philosophy. Despite an effort to communicate and unify across the disciplines, there are major rifts within cognitive science stemming from different foundational assumptions as well as methodological differences. Of course the neurosciences are focused at the level of neurons while linguists are focusing on behavior, so a lack of communication between such areas might seem reasonable, but the major rifts actually begin within the areas of study. For example, most current cognitive linguists (defined here as those who study language and, through language, cognition) define themselves against the history of Chomskian generative grammar,

which believes that there is a language area of the brain with an inherited grammar structure that forms language based on words memorized as a child. According to generative grammar, language is primarily a system of rules that creates “correct” sentence structure around an objective meaning. This works well for sentences like “the cat is on the mat” but breaks down when linguists begin looking at sentence like “the beach is safe” or “there’s no there there.” Sentences like these cannot be understood by computing the meaning of each word in terms of its location in the sentence and then making adjustments for context. These sentences require a different idea of meaning creation and categorization. While I (and the cognitive linguists whom I have studied) am simplifying and generalizing this line of thinking, my goal is not to enter into the debate about language and meaning in its own terms, but rather to lay out the theory of language and cognition that I have found most helpful in illuminating the plays of Shakespeare.

In *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, George Lakoff outlines the ways in which a new understanding of categories shapes how cognitive linguists think about the brain and language. The traditional view of categorization argues that we categorize things by virtue of common traits shared by the members; Lakoff traces the development of a new theory of categorization, based primarily on the work of Eleanor Rosch but informed by the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, Paul Ekman, and others, that understands categories in terms of prototypes and basic-level categories. Rosch’s experiments with the language of Dani (a New Guinea language) showed that although the Dani speakers did not have words for certain

colors, they could see them and have a conceptual category for them; their language did not wholly determine their conceptual system. Categories have "cognitive reference points" and "prototypes" which organize the category, but which do not define the category. This is an important distinction in that it speaks to the discourse around language within the humanities: language can constrain thought without controlling it. In *Metaphors We Live By*, Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphors define what can be viewed as truth: "In a culture where the myth of objectivism is very much alive and truth is always absolute truth, the people who get to impose their metaphors on the culture get to define what we consider to be true—absolutely and objectively true" (160). Nonetheless, we can see a new color without first having to have a name for it.

Lakoff goes to great lengths to explain and elaborate on the paradigm shift that is Rosch's categorization challenge to the traditional "objectivist" view of categories and language. There are basic-level categories, such as "chair," and superordinate categories like "furniture" (47-52). While basic-level categories have prototypes (quick, think of a chair), superordinate categories do not (quick, think of a furniture). Because language exhibits "prototype effects" (ways in which our understanding of a sentence is based on a concept of a prototype of a category referred to within the sentence), Lakoff argues that that is evidence that "linguistic categories have the same character as conceptual categories" (67). This is important because the thrust of his book (and the work of cognitive linguists in general) is based on the fact that through language we can see important elements of the

mind/body/brain. His argument is that we organize our experience through idealized cognitive models (ICMs), compact models of how certain things work when imported to understand a given sentence. For example, because we have an ICM for "seeing" we use this to understand "see" found in a variety of contexts. He gives the example of the cluster of models that combine to understand "mother" (genetic model, the bearer of progeny and the nurturance model, the one who raises kids, etc.) (74). When we speak of a "working mother" we are only applying one of the models in the cluster (nurturance model), because we would not call a woman who gave birth to a child but put it up for adoption a "working mother" even though she is one in terms of the genetic model of "mother" and her employment.

The phenomenon of cluster models of a word is unexplained by the classic understanding of categories wherein concepts have "necessary and sufficient conditions" (76). In this view, categories have rules for inclusion; if a word fits all the rules, it belongs in the category. Defenders of the classic, or "objectivist," view see concepts as internal representations of external reality, and cognitive processes as algorithmic.[7] The sentence "the cat is on the mat" is constructed of a noun phrase, a verb, and an object; and its meaning can be computed by assessing the meaning of the parts in conjunction with the syntactic relationship among the parts. What the classic view fails to account for is the way, as Lakoff argues: "the meaning of the whole is often motivated by the meaning of the parts, but not predictable from

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[7] There are still defenders of this view. See, for example, Keysar, Shen, Glucksberg, and Horton (2000) and Steven Pinker's *The Language Instinct* and *Words and Rules*. Pinker follows the computational model of comprehension and construction, and argues that there is a language center of the brain and that our "instinct" to use symbols to communicate is hard-wired.

them" (1987, 148). If the meaning of "working mother" were constructed literally, it would lose its efficient ability to specify the *type* of mother and the *type* of work, a meaning motivated by the cluster models accessed to understand the phrase, not by reference to a long list of definitions of "mother." If categories are defined by prototype effects and ICMs, then thinking is primarily metaphoric, creative, and literary, rather than simply capable of such leaps given education, time, and talent.

This shift in the understanding of categories creates the larger seismic shift away from the "objectivism" of the traditional view of thinking towards the "experiential realism" (xv) of embodied, metaphoric thinking. Lakoff's work since 1987 has been an elaboration and entailment of the paradigm shift he articulates in the Preface, and I believe that we have only just begun to understand its ramifications in other fields. Literary criticism is based, at least in part, on understanding the way that symbols correspond to things in the "real world" and how reading is about manipulating symbols and meaning. If this is not how we make meaning, then we have an obligation to re-investigate our old assumptions and readings of classic texts. While classical critics like Caroline Spurgeon can explicate the disease metaphor in *Hamlet*, her reading is based on a correlation between the symbol and the reality. Disease, in this view, is a stable referent, something that is contained, objective, and requiring a name, rather than a collection of concepts held together by a word.

While the classic view acknowledges the way "dead metaphors" operate in language to color an idea, the binary created between dead metaphors ("I see your

point") and living metaphors ("sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought") obscures the powerful life of "dead" metaphors and the ubiquity of "living" metaphors. The very metaphor used to understand metaphor tells a story of a metaphor that lives until it dies, at which point its metaphoric origins are no longer visible. This privileges "living" metaphors and obscures the impact of "dead" metaphors. A more complicated view of category and metaphor will shift our reading of *Hamlet*. Lakoff summarizes the value of this conceptual shift as an ideological reformulation of what we are capable of seeing as "true" and "false": "If we understand reason as merely literal, we will devalue art" (xvi). Those of us whose life's work is the value and evaluation of art can benefit from the cognitive theories that place art in relationship to the mind/body/brain and its language.

Lakoff's work since the publication of *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things* has been to articulate the ramifications (both linguistically,[8] cognitively,[9] and politically[10]) of understanding that: 1) categories are based on prototypes and not

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[8] In *More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor*, Lakoff and Mark Turner argue that metaphoric thinking comes naturally and is not a specialized skill of the literary or poetic elite. We use metaphors to understand everything from "dead-end job" to "life is a tale told by an idiot." The metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY allows us to speak of "reaching goals" and "life in the fast lane." Because "knowing the structure of this metaphor [LIFE IS A JOURNEY] means knowing a number of correspondences between the two conceptual domains of life and journeys" (3).
[9] In *Where Mathematics Comes From*, Lakoff and Rafael Núñez argue that the history of mathematics is one of new metaphors generating new categories and thus new mathematic "realities." Zero was a metaphor before it was number; the only reason it became a number was because it provided enough value to justify the category extension of numbers.
[10] In "Winning Words," Lakoff argues, for example, that calling climate change "global warming" already cedes the debate about its urgency to the opposition: "'Warm' seems nice. So people think, 'Gee, I like global warming, Pittsburgh will be warmer.' 'Climate change' is an attempt to be scientific and neutral. 'Climate crisis' would be a more effective term. Climate collapse. Carbon dioxide strangulation. Suffocation of the earth. But it's not easy to change these things once they get into the vocabulary" (65). Lakoff has also written *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think* (1996), *Don't Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate* (2004) and

objectively assessed shared properties; 2) meaning is embodied; 3) metaphors exist in thought and language; 4) meaning is not literal or transcendental. In *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought*, Lakoff and Johnson argue that the "very structure of reason itself comes from the details of our embodiment" (5). One of the consequences of understanding language and cognition as coming from an embodied experience of the world is that there is no transcendental truth that thinking and language attempt to capture and represent. Our basic-level metaphor more is up comes from the experience of pouring liquid into a container, for example; our basic-level metaphor of the container structures our understanding of space, states, and even the mirror and comes from an experience of our body as having an inside and an outside.[11]

Abstract concepts such as time and life cannot be talked about non-metaphorically. In *The Metaphors We Live By*, Lakoff and Johnson argue that certain thoughts are contained and defined by the metaphor we use to talk about them. For example, a metaphor like TIME IS MONEY[12] will systematically lead to entailment metaphors (TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY) and our relationship to time becomes defined by this coherent system of thinking of time. This is how, in our society, time can be "spent" or "wasted," and time is seen as something one has

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recently started a progressive think-tank called the Rockridge Institute to help liberals articulate their positions differently.

[11] See, for example, Lakoff 1987, pg. 271 and Lakoff and Turner 1989, pg. 19.

[12] Whereas I.A. Richards referred to the parts of a metaphor as tenor and vehicle, where the vehicle is that which is providing information about the tenor, Lakoff used "target" and "source." In Lakoff's early work, he denoted metaphor as "target IS source" but Turner and Johnson use the convention "TARGET IS SOURCE," which I find more useful as it gives more visual status to the terms. Fauconnier and Turner breaks this binary down by arguing that many things we assumed were metaphors cannot be understood with this simple binary equation.

for one activity but not another.[13] Metaphors illuminate some elements of the abstract concept and hide others, since a metaphor will only map some information from the source domain (money) to the target domain (time). Lakoff's work has profoundly impacted cognitive linguistics; with his position on the role of metaphor and mapping in mind, I now turn to consider the work of Gilles Fauconnier and Turner on how cognitive blending theory explains language, metaphor, and *The Way We Think*.

In *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, Lakoff uses the example of the term "social lie" to explore the category of "lies" (74). While the idea of a social lie illuminates the graded way we categorize lies (some are intentional deceits while others are untruths spoken unknowingly or untruths spoken to protect a social contract), he admits that he does not know how the meaning of a social lie comes from the term, since the modifier "social" fails to explain completely the sense of the phrase. What Lakoff's conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) fails to account for, conceptual blending theory (CBT), or conceptual integration theory, explains brilliantly. CMT views meaning metaphorically, such that information from one domain (source) gets mapped onto a second domain (target) to understand the target domain in terms of the source. Life, for example, can be understood as having

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[13] A friend of mine did market research on how people conceive of luxury for Nissan Design Inc. in order to build a luxury automobile that matches people's ambition for luxury. She interviewed some of the heads of Europe's top "luxury" design houses (Gucci, Louis Vitton, etc.), to ask them what they thought luxury meant today. All of them said "time." Luxury can be time because time was money and money became less valuable than time. People have money so they attempt to buy time. They can only do this if they think of money as time to begin with. Although Gucci cannot sell us time, they can sell us an image of having time through a set of material items that express a superfluity of money. If time was not thought of in terms of money, Gucci would never think it could sell its customers time.

detours and rough patches because it is understood in terms of a path, where linearity and smoothness equal ease, and progress equals distance traveled. In *The Way We Think*, Fauconnier and Turner argue that there are many things that cannot be explained by an analysis of mapping between two domains.

Fauconnier and Turner apply Fauconnier's mental space theory to envision packets of information constructed and framed on the fly in which information is organized and from which information can be projected to a blended space. As Seana Coulson cogently explains:

> Among the basic concepts in conceptual integration theory are mental spaces, frames, or cultural models, and mappings. Mental spaces can be thought of as buffers in working memory that represent relevant information about a particular domain (Fauconnier, *Mental*). A mental space contains a partial representation of the entities and relations of a particular scenario as construed by a speaker. Spaces are structured by elements that represent each of the discourse entities and simple frames to represent the relationships that exist between them. Frames are hierarchically structured attribute/value pairs that can either be integrated with perceptual information or be used to activate generic knowledge about people and objects assumed by default. Socially shared frames are called cultural models. Finally, mappings are abstract correspondences between elements and relations in different spaces. (2005, 107-108)

Blends are constructions of meaning based on projection of information from two or more input spaces to a blended space, such that the blended meaning contains information and structure from more than one domain. Thus, the meaning of "social lie" depends upon projecting information regarding lying and information regarding the rules of social etiquette into a blended space.

In this way, a "lie" is not understood through mapping information from "social" onto our understanding of "lie," rather, both spaces contribute information

to the final understanding. There are single-scope blends, where the input spaces share an organizing structure that then projects without obstruction into the blend, and double-scope blends, where the input spaces have different and clashing structures and the final blend must get structural information from elements of both spaces. Single-scope blends are easier to see as metaphors. For example, to describe business competitors as boxers is to understand one domain (business) in terms of another (boxing). The structure of the blended space (the business men[14] "fighting" it out in the boardroom) comes from an "organizing frame" which views both activities as contentious. While boxers use their fists to score points, businessmen may use contracts or money, but both spaces are framed as "fights." The reason Fauconnier and Turner conceive of this as blending rather than as a special case of metaphor is that blending creates a third space where men behave like boxers *and* businessmen. Though Fauconnier and Turner address similar linguistic concerns and make similar arguments to Lakoff and his collaborators, they provide an articulation of meaning construction that is theatrical by its very nature, and thus tremendously powerful in reading theatrical texts and events.

What is so rich about this theory is how it explains so much creative elaboration of metaphoric thought and how taking it apart unveils hidden spaces and assumptions. Once we have blended boxers and businessmen, for example, we can fill out the blend in imaginative ways: we might say of a dispassionate boxer: "just

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[14] The blend puts pressure on me to envision them as men, since female boxers are not yet common enough to challenge our prototype of the male boxer. Therefore, to talk about business in terms of boxing (or war) is to reinforce our conception of the boardroom as a place for men.

another day at the office," or we might envision a business man stopping a meeting to go to his assistant in a corner for coffee or leaving the meeting with the contract over his head. The blended space is like a stage set with props and characters, a commedia script awaiting enaction and improvisation.

Double-scope blends create emergent meaning by combining structural information from both input spaces. Double-scope integration is not complex, weird, advanced, or literary; as Fauconnier argues, it is everyday and "a mainstay of human thought that shows up throughout human activity, be it artistic, religious, technical, or linguistic" (8).[15] In *The Literary Mind*, Turner explores such examples as Phèdre's speech to Hippolyte, Jesus's dying for our sins, and the children's story *The Runaway Bunny.*[16] In each case, there is information in the blended space that is not present in either of the input spaces but is a result of the blend. In Phèdre's evocation of the Minotaur myth, she is Theseus's lover and with her help, he beats the Minotaur. This blend creates the emergent meaning that she loves Theseus, which he understands through her double-scope blend, with the consequence being the events of the rest of the play. In the example of Jesus dying for our sins, the input space of Jesus as being without sin is blended with the input space of human beings who are sinful. In the blend, his death relieves human beings of the responsibility for their sins. His death becomes dramatic, meaningful, and iconic

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[15] Fauconnier goes on to add: "We have also argued that the capacity for double-scope integration could well be the crucial distinctive feature of cognitively modern humans, and we have shown how such a singularity could have emerged through standard evolutionary processes" (8). While such claims are not the focus of this project, it provides interesting fodder for the discussions about evolutionary psychology and fiction and may provide insight into future discussions of cognitive archaeology (which I will touch on briefly below).

[16] See Turner (2003) pg. 129, 123-128, and 133.

because we understand it not literally but as a blend; the blend then shapes how Christians think of the cross, suffering, death, and sin. I am not arguing against this or any blend on the basis of its not being literal, but rather using a lack of literality to expose unconscious assumptions that pervade our language.

Since double-scope blends create many of the most popular children's stories, Turner believes that the ability to understand blends is not something that requires advanced intellectual thought. *The Runaway Bunny* takes the already-blended story of talking bunnies (our mental space for bunny does not contain the ability to talk so the talking bunny space has come from a blending of our understanding of bunnies with our understanding of humans) and blends it with our mental space of mothers and children, fish and fishermen. When the bunny tells his mother that he is going to run away and be a fish so that the mother cannot get him, his successful escape depends on her remaining a talking mother bunny and therefore incapable of catching a talking baby fish bunny. Of course, the mother follows his lead and blends his story with one in which she is a fisherman talking mother bunny and thus able to catch the talking baby fish bunny. Fishermen use worms to catch fish and doing so usually kills the fish, but this is not projected into the blended space of the fisherman talking mother bunny. In the blended space the fisherman talking mother bunny uses a carrot to catch the talking baby fish bunny and she does so because she loves him, not because she wants to kill him.

Fauconnier and Turner argue that through blending we achieve "global insight, human-scale understanding, and new meaning. It makes us both efficient

and creative" (92). Compression is an important aspect of blending as it increases both the efficiency and the creativity of our communication. The compression that makes blending creative and efficient can also make it ideologically powerful. Successful advertisements and political sound bites generally make use of the compression in blending. In the example that follows, the importance of compression is visible in its absence. During the 2004 presidential campaign, John Kerry was criticized for being unable to communicate his message simply enough, i.e., his speaking lacked compression. Two headlines side by side in the *New York Times* provide an excellent example of the power of blending: "Bush Describes Kerry's Health Care Proposal as a 'Government Takeover'" and "Kerry Faults Bush for Failing to Press Weapons Ban." While the first headline paints a dramatic picture of the government invading health care to "take it over," the second depicts an undramatic failure to push. Kerry did not provide the writer with a good blend for the headline. The writer quotes Kerry as saying: "And so tomorrow, for the first time in 10 years, when a killer walks into a gun shop, when a terrorist goes to a gun show somewhere in America, when they want to purchase an AK-47 or some other military assault weapon, they're going to hear one word: Sure." If Kerry had applied the governing principles of blending to compress and intensify vital relations, achieving a human-scale example of the consequences of Bush's actions ("intensify vital relations" and "achieve human scale" are two of the governing principles of

blending articulated by Fauconnier and Turner, 309-52) his message would have been stronger.[17]

Where blending calls for compression, Kerry has used expansion. Simply reducing the number of hypothetical people and weapons in his quote, as in: "And so tomorrow, when a terrorist goes to a gun show for an AK-47 he will get what he wants," would increase the dramatic impact. If he had said: "Bush is handing out AK-47s to killers and terrorists" he would have had a more powerful headline. This highlights Bush's connection with the consequences of the expiration since his identity and that of the gun salesman are compressed. It also masks the entrenched blend of what Fauconnier and Turner call the "causal tautology" (76 and 292): a causal tautology blends cause and effect such that in the blended space, the cause of something is understood as the effect. President Bush's role in causing the lapse of the ban becomes the same as his being the effect of the lapse of the ban. The power of such a blend is that it highlights some information (Bush's role as cause) while masking others (Bush is not a gun seller). Dramatic power can be illuminated using blending theory; the process of illumination also unveils the often-hidden input spaces that help construct the blend in question.

[17] The "governing principles" of an effective blend as articulated by Fauconnier and Turner sound like aesthetic principles that might describe any good piece of theatre, rhetoric, or poetry. The tracts on the power of rhetoric during the early modern period said similar things, which can make Fauconnier and Turner sound derivative. It is not necessary, however, for them to be the first to say it; their aim is to say it such that it fits with research not on theatre, rhetoric, or poetry, but on how we think and communicate. In this way, their methodology, aim, and evidence can inform the studies of those of us who are studying theatre, rhetoric, and poetry. Not unlike Quintilian, Fauconnier and Turner can evaluate blends on "objective" principles; from this perspective, we could evaluate what makes a theatrical production "good" or "bad."

While the early modern period did not call them "soundbites," it was profoundly interested in the power of compressed language to sway a judge, move an audience, and create something out of nothing. Kerry could learn a lot from Quintilian, the early modern rhetorician. A classical rhetorician who was taught in grammar schools in the 16th Century, Quintilian argued for the power of emotionally-charged visions to persuade an audience, not unlike framing Bush as a gun seller. As Reynolds and I argue elsewhere, Ben Jonson's play *The Devil is an Ass* uses references to *Macbeth* and *Doctor Faustus* to instruct an audience in how to read through rhetoric: "The ghosts of *Macbeth* and *Dr. Faustus* in *The Devil is an Ass* haunt Jonson's argument regarding poetry and audience reception. Macbeth and Dr. Faustus, men felled by an inability to read through equivocation, provide guidance to an audience trying to decode Jonson's seeming attack on theater and the court of law" (36). Compressed in the reference is a reminder of what can happen when compression is not unpacked.

Although without reference to contemporary conceptual blending theory, many important scholars have written about debates concerning language and performance in the early modern period. In *Renaissance Self-Fashioning,* Greenblatt argues that Marlowe's use of proverbs suggested that they held currency; in Marlowe's writing, a proverb can operate like the soundbite that positions Bush as a gun seller: as the "compressed ideological wealth of society" (207). In *The Player's Passion*, Joseph Roach reads theatrical presentation through a study of how the body was understood at the time, rather than reading backward from a contemporary

scientific perspective. For Roach, the importance of rhetorical studies and the popularity of Quintilian's theories of how rhetoric generates feelings in others by experiencing the emotion in oneself lead to acting theories that privileged the imitation of emotions thought to actually be able to alter the interior (49). Mary Crane has argued that the importance of commonplace books in sixteenth-century England suggests a similar sense of currency in sayings. Once gathered, these commonplaces could then be re-assimilated or "framed" within a new context. Thus they created "a central mode of transaction with classical antiquity and provided an influential model for authorial practice and for authoritative self-fashioning" (1). According to Crane, the Humanist pedagogy of commonplace books created a currency around sayings that enabled social mobility. These works exhibit a thorough and useful historical perspective with which I do not intend quarrel; my aim is to look backward through a conceptual blending theory frame to re-visit the language of the time and the performance today.

One can find similar articulation of the ideas in psychoanalysis, transversal poetics, new historicism, new criticism, structuralism, and post-structuralism. My argument is not that the theory is novel, but that its methodology and specificity make it a more useful and insightful tool for analyzing literature and performance than others I have found. Blending theory might not surprise readers, but that is because it is articulating what we do everyday. Blending theory explains the emergent structure found in "working mother" or Hamlet's mirror in such a way that we can make assessments about the processes that went into the language to

begin with. Blending theory offers theatre practitioners and scholars a tool to improve staging and design (as I will explore in chapter three) because it provides a way to understand what is meant when we say one thing "works" and another does not. Blending theory echoes structuralism because it is interested in the form, in the structure and language of a work. It echoes new historicism because it acknowledges the profound impact of history, politics, context, and culture on meaning. Further, it creates a path of integration between these important, and yet ultimately incomplete, theories of the twentieth century.

A new understanding of how we compose meaning linguistically opens up new readings of old texts. In her 1935 book, *Shakespeare's Imagery: and What it Tells Us*, Spurgeon argues that Shakespeare's metaphors are an unconscious revelation of the man. Cognitive linguists would agree but go further, arguing that through an analysis of our image schemas we can see how we think and how we constrain thinking. Moreover, Spurgeon's reading of the disease metaphor in *Hamlet* does not question the metaphoricity of disease, or unpack the web of image schemas necessary to understand "rank" offenses or something "rotten." None of these are referring to a literal thing, but rather a metaphoric conception of illness that relies on an understanding of the body as container, illness as war, infection as invasion, seeing as knowing, etc. With the disease metaphor broken down further, it is possible to see a link between the disease metaphor and Hamlet's obsession with not seeming or with his need to write down that a man may smile and still be a

villain: if the body is a container, how does the outside reveal information about the inside?

Research on the brain, emotions, and the body over the last fifty years has dissolved distinctions between "mind" and "body,"[18] "thinking" and "feeling,"[19] "reasoning" and "imagining."[20] While there are still those who believe that language is primarily literal, that there is a structure to grammar that forms comprehension, and that language is separate from cognition, I follow the movement in the field as defined by Lakoff, Johnson, Fauconnier, and Turner, and agree that metaphor structures both language and thought, that there is no literal meaning that receives primary attention, and that all cognition and language is embodied. The history of the shift in cognitive linguistics from generative or objectivist theories of language to compositional and experiential theories of language has been well documented by Lakoff and Fauconnier and Turner. The cognitive linguistic lens provides a way of putting pressure on traditional ways of understanding theatre and performance yet is not so empirical that it calls for wiring up audiences to machines or bringing performance into the laboratory. That being said, some cognitive linguists are doing empirical research and cognitive linguists are in dialogue with the neuroscientists

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[18] Damasio argues that emotions are located in the mind/body/brain, breaking down a distinction between one that feels and one that generates the feeling. Patricia Churchland argues against the Cartesian dualism that sees the body as controlled by the mind/brain. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) trace the many studies on the role of embodiment in cognition and language.

[19] See both Damasio and LeDoux on the role of emotion in reasoning and the importance of reasoning in feeling.

[20] Lakoff and Johnson (1999) insist on the importance of imagination in reasoning, as does Fauconnier and Turner, and Turner (1996). While this may not be new--in his review of *The Way We Think* quoted on the back of the book, David Brooks notes: "After reading their book I'm more convinced than ever that Einstein was right when he said imagination is more important than knowledge"--cognitive linguistics is uncovering places where imagination works to generate reasoning that had previously been hidden.

and psychologists who are addressing other exciting areas that I look to for information about theatre and performance.[21] What unites the scientists I turn to is how their work re-imagines *Hamlet* and, through *Hamlet,* theatre. Conceptual blending theory illuminates for me why certain language explodes in my mouth like pop-rocks and provides a lens into the power of theatre.

Assessing the waight of the field: a look at the frame

> The traditional theory noticed only a few of the modes of metaphor; and limited its application of the term *metaphor* to a few of them only. And thereby it made metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of words, whereas fundamentally it is a borrowing between and intercourse of *thoughts*, a transaction between contexts. *Thought* is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison and the metaphors of language derive therefrom. (I.A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric,* 94)

Conceptual blending theory may not always seem to provide a radical re-reading of Shakespeare; many of the points I make in this and the following chapters may seem unoriginal. As opposed to the shock and awe a first encounter with Freudian theory elicits, blending theory rarely occasions gasps. Any three year oldknows that the toy duck sponge is a blend of information from different input spaces. This is where the gasps should be: it articulates what three year olds do every day and what Shakespeare did four hundred years ago to the winter of our discontent. Blending theory is the knife that cuts through the brilliance and gives us

[21] Neuroscientist V. S. Ramachandran's work on synaesthesia finds that the cross-modal wiring in the brain exhibited by synaesthetes—people who see numbers in a specific color, or sounds generate a taste, for example—is present in all infants at birth but that most people lose these connections. Ramachandran's study of synaesthesia grew out of an attempt to refute scientists who saw it as a particularly metaphoric way of thinking and thus not a genuine perceptual phenomenon. Since synaesthesia is most common in artists, scientists assumed that it was a part of an "artistic" way of looking at things, rather an actual biological phenomenon on the level of the neurons. Ramachandran concludes that synaesthesia might help to explain metaphor, as metaphors involve "cross-activation of conceptual maps" (17).

a language to discuss it. Theorists have said some of this before, but without the language provided by conceptual blending theory their arguments remain abstract. Bloom and Greenblatt provide examples above and throughout these chapters there are other critics making important points that are enriched and expanded by scientific research. For example, in *The Death of Character*, Elinore Fuchs points to the network of mental spaces accessed by "character": "'Character' is a word that stands in for the entire human chain of representation and reception that theater links together" (8). Blending theory spells out this chain, and provides a tool to analyze the theatre, the linking, and the chain.

The many homophones, puns, and blended words in *Hamlet* (such as "enacture" or "sallied") suggest that Shakespeare played with how meaning could slip and play in his wooden O. Against Sigurd Burckhardt's claim that Hamlet's punning "denies the meaningfulness of words" (qtd. in Ewbank 66), Inga-Stina Ewbank argues that in *Hamlet* "Language is being stretched and reshaped to show the form and pressure of the *Hamlet* world" (61). In his notes on the play, Jenkins calls the question of how Hamlet refers to his flesh the "most debated reading in the play in recent years" (437). Editorial preference has shifted from the Folio's "solid" to the First Quarto's "sallied" to the Second Quarto's "sullied." The tortuous textual history of *Hamlet* means that the traces of these questionable words still remain, since editors can continue to compare the Folios to the Quartos to investigate mysteries that previous editors had erased.

In her introduction to the *First Quarto of Hamlet*, Kathleen Irace notes that many words that have been corrected as spelling errors by editors might have been Shakespeare's attempts to create puns or new words. In the First Quarto, Hamlet responds to Claudius about the name of the play: "Mousetrap. Marry how? Trapically," (Q1.9.117) combining "tropically" (which is the folio spelling preferred by Jenkins) and "trap" playing on "Marry trap," which Jenkins glosses in his notes as being "an exclamation of derision when a man was successfully tricked or discomforted" (302). Irace points out the use of "ghest" for ghost (Q1.16.34) in the Quarto as well as "ceasen" as a combination of "cease in" and "season" (Q1.2.192). In his note on the "sullied" controversy, Jenkins admits: "The possibility of an intended play on both words cannot be ruled out; but what happens perhaps is that by a natural mental process the word (sullied) which gives at once the clue to the emotion which the soliloquy will express, brings to mind its near-homonym (solid), which helps to promote the imagery of melt, thaw, resolve, dew" (437-38).

Bruce Bartlett argues that Shakespeare uses "waight" at the top of the Lady Anne wooing scene in *Richard III* to refer to the weight of the coffin and to Richard's wait to ascend the throne (the topic of which is about to come up in Richard's wooing of Anne): "The manifestly visible waight may be Henry VI's coffin, but a subtlely abstract waight is also present: the plotted ambition of Richard's short-term designs on the crown (present even back in *3H6*)" (7). He then turns to the "waight" in *Othello* that occurs midway through the play in the pivotal scene where Desdemona pleads with Othello to speak with Cassio soon and then to

hear her "suite," that is "full of poize and difficult waight" (3.3.83). Bartlett argues that since poize is glossed by most editors as meaning "balance or weight," "waight" is redundant if it does not also convey the hand-wringing that Desdemona is likely engaged in, impatient with her husband's delay. It is just this delay that allows Iago to convince Othello to wait for the encounter with Cassio and that provides time for the handkerchief dropping. Finally, Bartlett examines the "waight" at the end of *King Lear*. Arguing that the lines should be given to Edgar (even though some editors give them to Albany), Bartlett connects the "waight of this sad time we must obey" (5.3.299) of the final moment of the play with Edgar's earlier assertion that "Men must endure / Their going hence even as their coming hither" (5.2.9-10). Here, the "miracle" of life referred to in act four becomes "a two-fold waight to be obeyed" (8). The "waight" of life in *King Lear*, set against the repeated "nothing" in the play, creates in one word the network of meanings evoked by both words.

Bartlett interrupts his text-based analysis at the end to suggest "Performances should give us a pregnant pause of a couple of seconds after Edgar's *waight*" (8).[22] Though he does not extrapolate, presumably this pause is meant to help the audience hear both meanings, in part because it allows time for the word(s) to reverberate (or "land" in acting parlance) and in part because the pause becomes the wait that helps evoke the "wait" in "waight"—particularly if the actor actually

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[22] Interesting choice of words for an essay focusing on the polysemy of words. Bartlett does not explain what the pause is pregnant with or what the gestation period is for pauses. Nor does he stipulate what makes one pause pregnant and another barren. Presumably this has to do with the performance energy of the actor, but he does not give any more acting notes on how to achieve the pregnancy of the pause.

paused for "a couple of seconds" which is an eternal pause on stage. Bartlett assumes that since there is no aural difference between "wait" and "weight" the performance must help convey the textual analysis he has unearthed. Yet Shakespeare encoded the double meaning in the sentence, which prompts for the blend in "waight" however the actor says the line:

> The waight of this sad time we must obey,
> Speake what we feele, not what we ought to say:
> The oldest hath born most, we that are young
> Shall never see so much, nor live so long. (5.3.299-302)

When the sentence begins, the article makes waight sound like weight, since weight is more often delimited in the precise measurements that "the" weight suggests. The sentence quickly prompts the other meaning, since time rarely has weight but often has wait. Through this word blend, Shakespeare gives matter to time while at the same time turning the "life's miracle" (4.5.55) into a specifically allocated "wait."[23] Shakespeare used language to perform this double meaning; he did not need to rely on the actor's "pregnant pause."[24]

In an argument based solely on the texts of the plays—and even more specifically two words that in performance sound the same—Bartlett's penultimate sentence shifts all the responsibility for conveying this meaning to the actor. The

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[23] Annabel Patterson has found a similar case of meaning in juxtaposition in her analysis of the abbreviated answer to why the Players have been away ("their inhibition comes by meanes of the late innovation") in the second Quarto of Hamlet: "Here I want simply to argue that what Hamlet's 'innovation' means must be affected by its semantic proximity to 'inhibition', that concreteness comes by the vibrations between these two Latinate abstractions" (27).

[24]As this project hopes to make clear, the performance of language is radically important to its meaning and reception. I do not mean to suggest here that such a pause might not aid the performance, only that cognitive linguistics illuminates how Shakespeare makes meaning at the level of the text as well.

potential richness in Bartlett's analysis comes from the other evocations of "wait" and "weight" in *King Lear* (the performance of Lear carrying Cordelia's dead body comes to mind) as well as the way it is set-against "nothing."[25] The reading I envision would include an examination of performance (Cordelia's dead body, the waiting of Lear and his fool, Lear's old age figured as "weight,"[26] and the corporeality of actors adding weight to Shakespeare's words), but it would also operate cognitive linguistically on the level of the text to trace out the network of meanings in "wait" and "weight" evoked throughout the text. Such a reading might uncover what Jenkins calls the "natural mental process" that allows "sullied" to be both "solid" and "sullied. Though neither Jenkins nor Bartlett extrapolate on this process, conceptual blending theory can be used as a new tool to illuminate old literary mysteries.

Many scholars allude to literature and art as involved in a relationship with the human biology, psychology, or neurology; few put pressure on how this might work or what it might mean given historical or contemporary scientific epistemology. There is a growing enthusiasm for the use of science as a tool to understand literature; what follows is a brief look at some of the ways literary critics are including scientific research into their work. The challenge they each face is how to engage with the work, rather than just use it.

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[25] Both Crane and Henry Turner excavate the role of matter and Aristotelian physics in the understanding of "nothing" in *King Lear*.

[26] This is examined in Crane's reading of *King Lear*, which I explore below.

In 1987, Mark Turner's *Death is the Mother of Beauty: Mind, Metaphor, Criticism* explored how an understanding of metaphor theory explained the power of poetic language. In this work, Turner distinguished between basic and creative metaphors. Basic metaphors are those that seem intuitive and confirm a basic conception of the comparison, such as MORE IS UP. Creative metaphors, on the other hand, "call for conceptual revision. They require us to reconceive the ontology of a thing" (19). One clearly is not the other, so the reader must figure out how to reconceive of one to fit with the other. By seeking to understand the cryptic math of metaphors, the reader engages her mind and imagination. Turner went on to write, with George Lakoff, *More Than Cool Reason,* a primer on how to use metaphor theory to read literature and then in 1991 Turner called for an overhaul of the literary discipline to accommodate and consider the research being produced in neuroscience and linguistics on how the brain reads and processes language. In *Reading Minds*, Turner argues that the mind is literary in thinking and speaking, in the sense that stories—not definitions, forms, or rules—form the basis of language composition and comprehension. In 2002, *The Way We Think*, written with Fauconnier, argued that conceptual blending theory provided an illumination ofliterature, creativity, and cognition. Over the last twenty years, Turner's work has gone from looking to linguistics to adumbrate literature to using literature to found new areas of cognitive linguistics. He has also paved the way for the cross-disciplinary travels of others.

In 1999, Mary Crane and Alan Richardson call for a "new interdisciplinarity" involving cognitive science and literary studies. Summarizing some of the important results of the sciences, their article points out how these developments counter Saussure and Derrida, arguing that environment shapes language and that meaning is not arbitrary. This is important as it articulates how blending theory can provide a third way; though it shares a focus on structure with the structuralists and poststructuralists, it does not omit attention on context and history. They recommend various directions for future combinations of literary studies with cognitive science, such as: looking at texts for traces of the cognitive process of the author and attempts made by authors to "imagine, understand, and represent their own cognitive processes" (7) and "neural historicism which would explore how the peculiar structure and workings of the human brain may enable cultural innovation over time" (11).[27]

Crane's book *Shakespeare's Brain* fits into the first category; it looks at the language of Shakespeare's plays and how it reflects and illuminates the brain that created the work. In another article, she examines how the language of *King Lear* might have effected, and been effected by, debates circulating at the time about matter and invisibility. She argues that through the language of the play, Shakespeare articulates a changing conception of "nothing." Through the twisting of the metaphors, "The play tests and questions its characters' reliance on such

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[27] Rafael Núñez is currently working on a cognitive archaeology of the Aymara Indians, exploring how their conception of time might have changed. Although this work is in its infancy, it provides an exciting way of looking at the early modern conception of the mirror and the self.

metaphors [old age as a weight, e.g.], and the assumptions about the nature of matter and the relationship between the material and immaterial that they represent" (9). In the same way that Crane finds an "epistemological rupture" in *King Lear*, she finds in *Hamlet* a meditation on the "relationships between the self, its actions, and its environment" through the words "act," "action," "actor," and "enaction" (2001, 116). Crane's focus on the language of the plays and how metaphor theory in particular opens up the processes that facilitate and constrain conceptual thought, provides an excellent model for her new interdisciplinarity.

Ellen Spolsky's work might fit into Crane's idea of a neural historicism. She applies the current research from the sciences to reimagine a historical moment in light of the minds/bodies/brains that found a particular work of art compelling. In 1993, her path-breaking book *Gaps in Nature* follows the way our minds fill in the gaps in nature to construct meaning. Through language comprehension we "vault the gaps in brain structure thus surpassing the limitations of the biological inheritance. The mind itself can hurt you into poetry" (2). Her discussion imagines how the modularity of the brain works to take in different information at the same time through different modules designed to process this information. In *Satisfying Scepticism,* (2001) Spolsky argues that the brain's very lack of complete knowledge (since the embodied brain can never know enough as it is always inseparable from that which it studies) creates art as a way of projecting ambiguity outside itself. She sees in the work of art of the early modern period, evidence of the "sometimes catastrophically sudden awareness of the gaps" (8) between what the human mind

can know and what there is to know. Though Spolsky's early work reflects "gaps" in her scientific epistemology,[28] her understanding of the embodied mind generates a refreshing reading of the early modern works of art she examines.

While not as scientifically exhaustive, Donald Freeman reads *Macbeth* and *Anthony and Cleopatra* guided by metaphor theory. Freeman views *Macbeth* as being tightly constructed around the image-schemata of PATH and CONTAINER[29] and notes that the metaphoric structure of the play then becomes the metaphoric structure of the critics who write about the play: "The critical tradition—including those who write against the grain of that tradition—understands *Macbeth* in terms of their [PATH and CONTAINER schemata] entities and structure" (693). F. Elizabeth Hart also interrogates *Macbeth* through the lens of metaphor theory, but focusing on the idea of time as situated on a linear path within the "Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow" speech. But her work does more than Freeman's, in that she calls for a materialist linguistics that would combine the work of the poststructuralists with the developments within the cognitive sciences. Her example of materialist

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[28] Her explanation of the blending theory feels incomplete while at the same time many of the phenomenon she discusses, such as "nostalgia" being something that "does not exist until you set yourself to think about what is not there" (123) and thereby producing it cognitively, fit in nicely with blending theory. Though perhaps not the way she understands it; her questioning of the theory exposes her misconception: "it is worth considering, further, whether it might not be the poor quality of mental imagery (as compared to normal seeing) that allows a blend to emerge" (72). "Normal seeing" versus "mental imagery" is a contested topic in the neurosciences. The role of representation in cognition is unclear. Many scientists (such as Ramachandran, Lakoff, Damasio, and MacWhinney) believe that the brain does not create a whole picture or image of the stimuli presented to it. In other words, whether there is a cat sitting right in front of me or someone describes a cat, similar firings occur in the brain. There is no internal movie screen where that which is right in front of you is projected clearly for viewing and other things are fuzzy.
[29] He uses "image-schemata" from the work of Lakoff (1993), Lakoff and Johnson (1980), and Turner (1987 and 1991) which are defined as skeletal structures that derive from an embodied understanding of abstract concepts such as life and meaning. "Container" is also an image-schema that drives the way we speak of the body, a room, a state, and others.

linguistics is an exciting start: she examines the scientific and literary consequences of the addition of over 30,000 new words to the English-language vocabulary between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Hart argues that tracing the evolution of vocabulary can be linked to a concomitant shift in the minds/bodies/brains speaking and conceptualizing the new words. If the metaphors used by the poet to understand his world are different from our own, than the meaning he is attempting to communicate will also be different.

Bruce McConachie places his lens where language and history meet. In his 1994 article for *Assaph*, McConachie applies the theories of Lakoff and Johnson to understand performance history in terms of the image schema that structure the popular forms of entertainment of a particular time period. Going from the assumption that culture generates performance that also generates culture, McConachie argues that the concerns found in both can be seen as emerging together and "constitute part of the cultural ecosystem of an historical era" (114). Some of the image schemata that he sees as operating in different modes of performance (which he glosses as "patterns of perception") are balance, surface, scale, counterforce, and containment. In his 2001 article for *Theatre Journal*, McConachie questions the role of experience in historiography and applies concepts of projection and embodied realism to a production of *A Hatful of Rain* in 1955. McConachie's work resembles Freeman's and Hart's, using metaphor theory to reimagine theatrical historiography. Written between 1995 and 2001, the articles using metaphor theory to examine literature unearth new relics in old text. Yet the

work rarely questions the theories it relies on and often fails to suggest where such a methodology might lead.

One exciting result of the work in this new area is the way it illuminates the importance of pieces of information that had seemed invisible or irrelevant. Lisa Zunshine refers to research on our ability to understand different perspectives and varied yet coterminous fictional worlds, what she labels "serially embedded representations of mental states" (271), to look at Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway* and the "zone of comfort" that it transgresses in terms of our ability to hold in consciousness several different levels of intentionality. This theory--our ability to read the minds of characters, to know that they reach for the gun in order to use it--under-girds our ability to read and enjoy fiction. Zunshine finds in Woolf's long sentences, sentences that traverse the perspectives of many characters, a marriage of form and function. The discomfort, explicated by current research into theory of mind, provides flashes of the modern experience: there is more to see than we are capable of processing comfortably.

Despite the difficulties of studying the ephemera of performance, Bruce Smith combines the materiality of the Globe Theatre with the science of sound to examine the impact of the noise machine on the content produced within the theatre's "wooden o."[30] In *The Acoustic World of the Early Modern Period*, Smith argues that the acoustics of the theatre had an effect on an audience and looks at

[30] From the chorus's prologue to *Henry V*: "can this cockpit hold / The vasty fields of France? or may we cram / Within this wooden O the very casques / That did affright the air at Agincourt?" (prologue 12-15).

how sound works on the body in the theatre. Like the cognitive scientists that guide this inquiry, Smith insists on an embodied understanding of sound, and therefore on works meant to be heard: “Texts can be read; works must be heard and seen. It is not only the performer’s body that distinguishes ‘work’ from ‘text’ but the *listeners* bodies’” (21). His work telescopes current acoustic research with a picture of an early modern world constructed by historians and new historians to provide a new way of understanding an old topic. Because of the importance of sound to language, meaning, and community, Smith argues that theatre enjoyed a “privileged position” in the “formation of early modern subjects” (284). By engaging with the science of acoustics, Smith is able open up our assumptions regarding the residues of performance that are Shakespeare’s texts and expose them to a new angle of inquiry.

New ways of seeing the mind/body/brain and its language demand new ways of reading and theorizing the works of art that have delighted the mind/body/brain. Spolsky presumes an interaction between the mind and the stories it creates and hears: “As digging tools are extensions of hands, so stories and pictures permit human minds to expand their control to realms beyond their borders, allowing a response to absence and anxiety. It has been conjectured as well that they also serve to keep minds flexible and ready to meet new experiences” (2001, 7). The pressure coming from the sciences as well as from inside the literary academy could prove to be, as Hart argues, “analogous to the impact of Marxism on liberal theories of history and economics” (329).

Drama and performance offer many new ways of integrating scientific work into our theoretical paradigms of meaning, aesthetics, and the evocation of memory and emotions. While theatre theorists have only just begun to tap the potential of this line of inquiry, the indications are that this area could provide, as Hart suggests, the kind of jolt to theatre and performance studies that psychoanalysis or Marxism once did. Theatre provides a live interaction with language, embodied performance, and the construction and manipulation of imagined mental spaces. As Turner suggests: "The brain is changed importantly by experience with language" (1996, 159), and studies examining the role of theatre on the brain offer exciting ways theories of theatre can provide counter-pressure to the sciences. As Louis Montrose argued in 1996, the "cognitive and ideological dissonance" (39) found in Shakespeare's plays adjusts cognition. Montrose's conclusion that "Elizabethan drama-in-performance also had the capacity to work as cognitive and therapeutic instrument" (40) should be pursued in light of new understanding of how language works on the brain. Through their interdisciplinarity, a growing number of scholars are painting radical pictures of "the purpose of playing."

Theatre theorists have long aimed to articulate the ability of language to move an audience. In his 1985 classic, *Great Reckonings in Little Rooms: On the Phenomenology of Theater*, Bert O. States saw in the theatre a radical power of movement, and argued that the prologue for *Henry V* is not an apology for the stage's lack but rather a boast of what it can do. Language, States suggested, has a material force, capable of shaping the mind: Shakespeare's characters—specifically

the Chorus of *Henry V* and Marc Anthony of *Julius Caesar* during his speech to the mourners—can call something into being through rhetorical tools of negation, suggestion, and counterfactuals in a more powerful way than if the thing itself arrived onstage. Language beats reality in Shakespeare's hands: "by eloquently naming the thing they would deny, [the characters] print it all the more firmly on the mind" (55). In 1989, Stanton Garner called the audience's meaning-making in theatre "a formidable nexus of creativity" (171) and suggested that "Drama offers grist for the student of cognitive process" (xvi). Despite the grist, there have very few students of these cognitive processes until now.

Unlike literature, theatrical language is embodied and ephemeral; how does the actor's body impact the meaning made and how does the emotions experienced in the theatre originate? In *The Literary Mind*, Turner provides an excellent example of the importance of performance in reading Shakespeare's text. When things are getting worse and worse for the king in *King John*, he instructs a messenger to "pour down thy weather." Turner unpacks the language that understands weather as news and also the way the king is simultaneously submitting himself to his powerlessness over the weather while maintaining an ability to control it. The full meaning of the line requires performance, as we must see the messenger kneeling before King John, lower than him, to understand another layer of the irony (66). This may not be the type of performance element generally noted by theatre critics and theorists ("shockingly, the director staged the messenger kneeling before the king!"), but the relationship of text to its performance is important to consider when examining how

meaning is made in Shakespeare's plays. Work integrating cognitive science and performance studies is in its infancy.

In "The Method and the Computational Theory of the Mind," Rhonda Blair uses Pinker's book, *How the Mind Works*, to read Stanislavsky. This cognitive perspective suggests that Stanislavsky work was right from the beginning, since, as Pinker says, information goes in, impacts thoughts and emotions, which impact behavior. Although Pinker argues that emotions and intellect interact, he still holds them relatively separate, and he maintains a view of a "real" world represented in symbols. Blair's simplification of emotions as "automatic or deliberate strategies" (212) for accomplishing objectives "that grow out of an intelligence-based 'wanting' grounded in a particular situation" (212) feels facile and convenient. Though I appreciate her connection between acting theory and cognitive science, to me, her essay falls victim to one of the traps of interdisciplinary work.

Hopefully, the future of this cross-pollenated field will yield more success, but it is too soon to tell. Bruce McConachie and F. Elizabeth Hart's edited collection, *Performance and Cognition*: *Theatre in the Age of New Cognitive Studies,* forthcoming from Routledge, is the first book to apply a cognitive framework to theories of performance. Elly Konijn applies the empiricism of the sciences to the aesthetics of acting and emotion.[31] Mark Pizzato's *Ghosts of Theatre and Cinema in the Brain* puts pressure on ideas of consciousness within the theatre, focusing on representations of ghosts, self, and other in drama. William Demastes

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[31] I will explore Konijn's work in more depth in chapter four.

and others have written on theatre and consciousness studies and Joseph Roach has used scientific epistemology to look at theories of acting, but work that rigorously applies contemporary scientific research on cognition to theories of performance, language, and theatre has only just begun.

Going to the water: what blending can tell us about drowning

To introduce how conceptual blending theory can provide us with our age's Hamlet, I will interrogate Laura Bohannan's 1995 article "Shakespeare in the Bush," that questioned the presumed universality of Shakespeare's Danish prince from within an anthropological framework. Bohannan describes her retelling of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* to the elders of a tribe in Africa and reports that their reactions indicate that Shakespeare's play does not express a universal human experience. Cognitive theories of language and meaning expose more than the cultural comparisons between these two worlds. What anthropology fails to show Bohannan is that the reactions of the elders yielded more than just insight into different cultural traditions. Conceptual blending theory displays the metaphoric conceptions that shape the language and determine the range of interpretations.

I should note first that Bohannan's short paper does not address her research, specifics of the tribe she is studying, the dynamics of her gender or race, her role as participant and witness, etc. Despite often being troubled by the ethnography in her work, I contain my examination to the reactions of the elders (Bohannan's term) to a couple of the conceptions in the plot of *Hamlet*. Since they are reacting to Bohannan's translation of the plot into their language, this is not a translation study

or an examination of the specific poetry. However, the idea of Ophelia's drowning is not misunderstood because of a translation problem; it is misunderstood because the elders generate meaning linguistically differently than English speakers do, forming a different idea of drowning.

Bohannan brought *Hamlet* with her to Tiv in West Africa where she was studying the ceremonies of a remote tribe. The elders persuade her to tell the story and she does, thinking of it as a chance to "prove *Hamlet* universally intelligible" (11). In a culture where a king takes many wives and upon his death they are distributed among his brothers, along with the responsibility for their children, Hamlet's reaction to his mother's remarriage will—not surprisingly—seem strange. A different understanding of succession has obvious cultural and literary counterparts, but there are other less obvious differences that led the elders to a radically different interpretation of *Hamlet*. For example, the elders do not believe that people can drown unless they are bewitched. One of the elders explains to Bohannan that: "Only witches can make people drown. Water itself can't hurt anything. It is merely something one drinks and bathes in" (16). Since females can only be bewitched by male relatives, the elders conclude that Laertes must have had Ophelia killed by witchcraft to sell her body to the witches for money to pay off the debts accrued—as Polonius feared—in France. Underneath this alternate story are traditions of a patriarchy that controls witchcraft, a belief in witchcraft, a family structure that defines who has power over whom in life and in death, and a different idea of the cause of death by drowning. A different understanding of dying in water

necessitates a different story: in the tribe Bohannan studied, Ophelia could not have drowned because water does not have the agency necessary to drown her without the witches' help. While a belief in witchcraft obviously alters the epistemology of a people, less obvious is the effect on epistemology of a shift in how death is talked about. For Bohannan, this only reflects different cultural traditions; conceptual blending theory shows how this reflects different linguistic structures that enabled and constrained different thinking.

English language can say that Ophelia drowned in water and then Elsinore can wonder about her mental state before her death. Was it a suicide? The result of madness? English mixes the effect of inhaling water and suffocating until the heart stops and life is over with the cause: she drowned. The agency this grants to water is inconceivable to the African elders, for whom such agency presumes intention. In English, water can cause death without our thinking that it did so intentionally. While the cultural traditions that lead them to say that Gertrude "did well" to marry Claudius illuminate our cultural traditions that call her marriage adulterous or incestuous (or at the very least "overhasty"), the difference between presuming that Ophelia's madness caused her death by water and blaming Laertes for selling her to the witches comes down to whether or not the language maps intention along with causal powers onto water.

The gravedigger plays with just this mapping in his discussion of whether or not Ophelia's drowning was a suicide or an accident: "If the man go to this water and drown himself, it is, will he nill he, he goes, mark you that. But if the water

come to him and drown him, he drowns not himself. Argal, he that is not guilty of his own death shortens not his own life" (5.1.16). The gravedigger parses out the warped legal argument that could justify her Christian burial in a parody of a famous legal argument at the time about the "three branches" of an act into imagination, resolution, and perfection (or completion). In addition to providing a theatrical justification for Hamlet's delay, this argument depends on a separation of the mind that thinks and the body that acts, with the agency located in the mind, not the action. If the mind did not resolve to do it, the body cannot be guilty of completing the action. The gravedigger's formulation gives agency to the water, but this is part of what makes his comment ridiculous. Shakespeare's language allows the grave digger to suggest that the water intentionally sprang up out of its banks to forcefully drown Ophelia because in English, water can "come to him" without intention or agency, but to make sense of "drown him," English speakers presume intention. The presumption comes in the placement of the water as subject of the verb. The joke is in the gravedigger suggesting intention where one is assumed to be impossible.

The African elders' reading of Ophelia's drowning unveils an inseparable coupling of intention with result. If Ophelia was hurt by water it was because someone wanted her hurt by water, bewitching the usually benevolent water into causing harm. It is not that our literal definition of drowning is different from theirs, it is that our language creates a conception of death by water to which it gives a name: to drown. Death by water is no more an objective thing out in the world

requiring a name than is death by witches. One language sees the effect of death in the cause (the water) and one language sees it in the intention to harm (the witches).

Reading Bohannan's essay and *Hamlet* with a cognitive linguistic lens calls attention to the different linguistic and cognitive mappings that under-gird the play but that generally go unnoticed. Looking at the language we think of as "literal," such as Ophelia's drowning, we can see the mental spaces and cognitive mappings that get combined and blended to yield both obvious and non-obvious meanings; blending theory illuminates not just the idea of Ophelia's drowning but also the split between action and agency in *Hamlet.* A complete description of the spaces within a network built by a blend is impossible, since there are an infinite number of associations. Conceptual blending theory does not need to be taxonomic in order to be valuable to performance. Its value lies in how it maps the likely spaces and uncovers connections not immediately apparent but maintaining power even in dormancy. Conceptual blending theory can provide theatre and performance theory with a cognitive barium milkshake, lighting up the process of thinking, talking, and understanding.

Finding that within in the show: a glance at what's to come

Four hundred years ago, Shakespeare's Hamlet used theatre to assay the guilt of the King and the trustworthy-ness of the ghost. Hamlet assumed that a play could display an internal truth hidden by outward appearances and "enacting." While Hamlet's Mousetrap did not work exactly as he intended it to, his assumption

that it would do something to its audience was correct. Theatre shows audiences a vision of an internal self in its external play.

Of course, Hamlet's mirror, held up onstage, would in reality indiscriminately reflect that which is in front of it, whether that be the foot lights, the front row, or the stage's fly space. Still, somehow in the idea of the mirror, Shakespeare creates a depth on the surface of glass. Theatre can create "that within which passes show," which may be why Hamlet, and so many since him, have found in theatre's mirror a hidden inside and an internal sense of self. Through language, embodiment, and suspension of disbelief, theatre provides an illusion of depth in a network of stories and truths. I am arguing not that theatre reflects our internal selves, but that it has created our sense of depth to begin with. Theatre constructs what it then reflects.

This project challenges foundational theories of theatre and performance in light of new research within the sciences and also puts pressure on the language and work of the sciences from the perspective of performance theory. In the next four chapters, I apply research from the cognitive sciences to Shakespeare's plays to argue that theatre constructs our internal sense of self. Cognitive linguistics opens up Shakespeare's language in a new way, exploring not just the poetics of the play but the intersection between surface and interior, container and frame, actor and character. I do not seek to reconstruct the experience of watching *Hamlet* performed at the Globe in 1604, but do not need to in order to examine the cognitive process an audience member experiences watching *Hamlet* now. I look to historical

information to provide a context for Shakespeare's use of the mirror metaphor, but the historical context is not my focus. The fact that it still means something to an audience today—and *how* it makes this meaning--is more central to my inquiry.

In chapter two I look into Hamlet's metaphoric mirror and unpack the web of meanings connected in Shakespeare's play to situate the self as a container with depth. Shakespeare's many mirrored surfaces, from *Hamlet*'s "glass of fashion and the mould of form" to Cassius's desire in *Julius Caesar* for "such mirrors as will turn / Your hidden worthiness into your eye / that you might see your shadow," create a conception of depth on the on the surface of this metaphoric glass. Writers of the period used the mirror to both reflect and shape—such as King James's directive to his son that the Bible provides a similar tool as the mirror: "for there shall yee see your selfe, as in a myrrour, in the catalogue either of the good or the evill kings" or the many manuals of correction framed as "mirrors." Visual artists such Quentin Metsys and Laux Furtenagel paint mirrors that reflect allegorically, not optically. Reading Shakespeare with a cognitive linguistic lens calls attention to the different linguistic and cognitive mappings that under-gird the plays but that generally go unnoticed. I know that Hamlet is speaking metaphorically; my inquiry hopes to complicate his use of metaphor by examining the construction of his meaning. I trace the technological advances in mirrors during the early modern period, their growing role in political discourse, and artistic representation and show how these factors impact the web of associations evoked in *Hamlet*'s mirror. This chapter focuses on the language of the mirror and reflection in the play with

reference to how the history of the mirror as a relatively new technical object altered and framed what was “seen” in the mirror metaphorically. This chapter also looks at how the interiority debate that has followed this play is structured on the mirror metaphor and how critics take on the language/image schema in their quest to find depth on Hamlet’s surface.

Moving our lens to the construction of meaning at the site of performance, the third chapter examines what happens when the metaphoric mirror gets represented onstage or on film. In the theatrical productions I discuss, I show how representation breaks down when the reflection in the mirror cannot be easily angled at “Virtue’s feature.” Here I provide a highly practical method of applying cognitive linguistics to studies of performance, design, and directing. I show how one director’s staging facilitates meaning and engagement through an expansion of the mirror metaphor into its parts while the other obscures meaning through representing it more literally. Conceptual blending theory explains why, for example, Ingmar Bergman’s use of symmetry and a small stage knife communicates the complicated web of meaning suggested by Hamlet’s “mirror held up to Nature” more clearly than Livliu Ciulei’s mirror onstage. I then discuss the way filmed *Hamlet*s shift the mirror to the space of the camera, locating the star and main character in the lens that controls the gaze and helps to make up our minds about this Danish prince incarnated through celebrity.

In chapter four I argue that Antonio Damasio’s work on emotion, theories of emotional “contagion,” and conceptual blending theory challenge theatrical theories

of "moving" an audience and suspension of disbelief. I interrogate Fauconnier's conception of emergent structure in language given Shakespeare's evocation of the zeros that make up a million in *Henry V* and Hamlet's reference to the "nothing" that lies between Ophelia's legs. Through looking at her "nothing," I articulate a strategy of construction of the not-there in Shakespeare's play through representing something else. Hamlet discusses this same powerful nothing in relation to the players who cry over it when Hamlet has non-nothing to cry over and yet remains idle. The chapter returns to the epistemological present, examining how current understandings of emotions illuminate ideas of persuasion in performance. A recent issue of the theoretical journal *SubStance* staged an important debate on evolutionary psychology and literature; I respond to the lack of performance theory exhibited in this debate and argue that theatre theorists must rethink a reliance on old metaphors of "movement," "belief," and "suspension." Such a reimagining unveils new images of the "nothing" that makes the player king weep for Hecuba and that Hamlet finds between Ophelia's legs. Breaking down the reliance within theatre studies on out-moded metaphors of "belief" and "suspension" creates new horizons of possibilities.

In chapter five I examine the ubiquity and power of perspective shifting in the theatre to call attention to the metaphors used to discuss characters and acting through an analysis of a National Public Radio story on a performance of *Hamlet* in prison. A careful examination of the language used by the prisoner/actors unveils a different conception of self, other, and acting. While the interviewer frames

questions in terms of containment ("Do you feel like you can be Laertes because so much of Laertes is inside James Word?"), the actors frame their experience in terms of divisible parts of selves ("I'm the body up there the words are coming from…uh…William Pride, the man that I killed—he's mostly the one talking"). I examine the role of paradox and double knowledge in new historicist work in light of Fauconnier's conceptual blending theory. I then turn to research on phantom limbs, autism, and mirror neurons to re-articulate an acting method based on the science of parts, not wholes. Here I stretch, without challenging, the important work of Robert Weimann and Bert States and discuss Joseph Roach's theory of "effigy" and Marvin Carlson's theory of "ghosting" in light of Ramachandran's work on phantom limbs. The cognitive linguistic theory of blending and perspective shifting and the neuroscience of phantom limbs and autism find the self in the theatrical space between locus and platea, part and whole, self and other.

Watching theatre, we see a depth to ourselves created in the blending of actor/character, backstage/onstage, and house-space/stage-space. In *Hamlet*, Hamlet is dis-membered, pulled into parts by the demands of the play and court. At the end, forever unable to suit the action to the word, he asks to be remembered. The theatre is a place of remembering. Through the embodiment of characters by actors, we are incarnated. This dissertation will interrogate the site of connection, in the language and on the stage, to find the experience of interiority created during performed blending.

Historically, science has been seen as verifiable, necessary, and literal while art has been viewed as metaphoric, imaginative, and an indulgence. Yet science speaks in artistic images and metaphor to explain, reify, and propel research areas and literary theorists and critics turn to the "literal" language of science to explain the power of literature and theatre. Damasio refers to the "theater of the brain," appropriating Hamlet's distracted Globe to imagine an organ of different players, watchers, scenery, and stories. In *The Way We Think*, Fauconnier and Turner write that sentence structure can "prompt" for blends.[32] These images are ported from theatre to science without regard to the theoretic pressure placed on the performance traditions and assumptions they convey. Similarly, literary and performance theorists have a responsibility to engage with the scientific theories, rather than offer them as explanations or justifications for the alleged power of their field of study. We can interrogate the research in other disciplines to question and/or unpack this "power," prying open entrenched narratives such as theatre's ability to move an audience or create a willing suspension of disbelief. Then, in turn, the scientist who wants to borrow the pastoral simplicity of a theatrical metaphor should be aware of the explosion or expansion of the image based on a thorough theoretical history of engagement. The easy cries for interdisciplinarity should be answered with a rigorous bartering between the poetics and hermeneutics of each discipline. With Shakespeare as a whetstone for contemporary cognitive science and cognitive

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[32] See, for example, page 13, 142, and 143. In "Contemporary Theory of Metaphor" (1993), Lakoff uses it: "The words are prompts for us to perform a conceptual mapping between conventional mental images" (230).

science as a wrench to open up new readings of *Hamlet*, I hope this project is just such a “bardering.”

Chapter two - Troubled doubles: tracing the mental spaces blended in Hamlet's Mirror

When I hear Hamlet's advice to the players in my mind, I usually hear it in a pretentious actor's voice, probably a slight British accent. Conveyed in this mental performance is the paradox of Hamlet's advice noted by Robert Weimann and Louis Montrose: while seeming to advocate a close theatrical mimesis, Hamlet rants and raves and "out-Herod's Herod" at the performance of the Mousetrap; in the overly annunciated British that I hear Hamlet's advice in, there is an outward show that belies the close theatrical mimesis the speech advocates. As I circle in to the words, however, my vision of what Hamlet is saying exactly gets more and more blurry. Hamlet's "purpose of playing" is hardly good director's notes: "could you angle that mirror a bit more towards Virtue, please." He is not being particularly poetic or obtuse; in fact, the line receives so little comment in the footnotes of the editions of *Hamlet* that I have read that one would think that what he is saying is obvious.[1] I do not mean to be dense,[2] I know that Hamlet is speaking metaphorically; my inquiry

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[1] Harold Jenkins assumes the meaning is clear but includes a reference to a postscript to *The White Devil* wherein Webster praises the acting for not "striving to make nature a monster" and adds: "The widespread Renaissance theory of drama as an image of actual life derives from Donatus on comedy, where it is attributed to Cicero" (288).

[2] Insofar as to be "dense" means not to get the dense condensation in Hamlet's language. To call a concept or work "dense" equates sight with knowledge such that language that is not transparent, that contains more than is easily perceived, becomes hard to see through, or dense. To describe myself as "dense" takes information about the language and projects it onto the subject, making it a character trait. Instead of describing the language (as dense), we describe an "internal" trait of mine (dense). Such a blend (which, admittedly, I do a simplistic job of unpacking here) figures the self as having an inside and an outside. Further, this inside is seen as impacting the outward behavior and outward behavior is believed to reflect internal qualities. This chapter will look at this formation again through the mirror blend.

hopes to complicate his use of metaphor by examining the construction of his meaning.

If cognitive linguistics has accomplished anything over the last thirty years, it has shown that there is content in the form; something is not "merely" metaphorical. Therefore, to examine Shakespeare's use of the mirror metaphor is to illuminate the cognitive structures constituted by and constituting the concept of mirroring and all the underlying assumptions the audience has to make to understand what Hamlet is saying to the players. This chapter examines the network of meanings in Shakespeare's use of the mirror in light of contemporary research in cognitive linguistics. With what is found in this mirror, I rethink the critical discussion regarding Hamlet's interiority. I then take the unpacking provided by blending theory and travel back to the historical moment, investigating the context that shaped the way mirrors were referred to in plays, art, and political writing. The chapter concludes by returning the critical eye to the way the mirror functions in the writing of critics, arguing that their mirror always reflects *Hamlet*. Through the confluence of images reflected in Shakespeare's mirror, we can see that within which passes show. If we can see that within which passes show, maybe there is no such thing.

Mirror held up to nature: unpacking the mirror blend.

Hamlet tells the actors before their performance of *The Murder of Gonzago* that they should not distort or exaggerate:

> Suit the action to the word, the word to the action, with this special observance, that you o'erstep not the modesty of nature. For anything so o'erdone is from the purpose of playing, whose end, both at the first and now, was and is to hold as 'twere the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure. (3.2.17-24)

Hamlet gives the players last minute directorial advice because he has high ambitions for their production; it is supposed to "catch the conscience of the King" (2.2.601) and strike him "to the soul" (2.2.587), forcing his guilt to "unkennel in one speech" (3.2.80). The player, though not given much opportunity to speak by the railing Hamlet, suggests that he understands Hamlet's direction, so he must not be translating Hamlet literally; as any actor will tell you, a mirror held up onstage will probably reflect the audience. Hamlet does not want Claudius to see his face reflected onstage *literally*, he wants Claudius to see his situation in "the very cunning of the scene" (2.2.586).

Hamlet advises that playing should "hold *as twere* the mirror up to nature" prompting the listener to construct a blend of mental spaces evoked by the concept of the mirror. Before unpacking Hamlet's language, it is important to be clear with our own. For the purposes of this discussion, I will refer to the reflecting object as a mirror and the concept of reflection as a Mirror. Thus, a mirror held up onstage will follow the laws of physics covering light, reflection, etc. The Mirror in King James's advice to his son hopes to instruct through analogy and disanalogy. This Mirror, as I will show, is an unstable blend of mental spaces evoked by the mirror, ideas about reflection, in-sight, similarity and difference. While it may not be possible to excavate all of the spaces in the network created by Hamlet's Mirror or

any of the Mirrors used in early modern literature and art, digging through the evidence unveils the possibility of a different Mirror and a different mirror in 1600. Such differences might also suggest a different holder and a different identification of the reflection.

Hamlet wants this Mirror to extract elements of “nature” (Claudius’s guilt) from what it reflects on its surface (the murder of Gonzago) so he creates a rich blend of mental spaces for flat mirrors, convex mirrors, contemporary handbooks of correction, and the Bible. His definition calls attention to the holding of the mirror while masking the role of the holder in deciding the angle. Put simply, while I might understand that Hamlet argues for a type of playing that is able, through imitation, to represent the most salient features of that which it imitates for the purposes of enlightenment or correction, cognitive linguistics calls my attention to *how* he means this and conceptual blending theory provides me with the tools to find out. Unpacking the use of the Mirror throughout the play illuminates how Shakespeare questions an equation of seeing equaling knowing and inside equaling deep.

Hamlet’s “purpose of playing” is a double-scope blend; the goal of theatre is both unmediated (it simply reflects what it sees on virtue’s face) and intentional in its angle (since it has a goal—the “purpose”—it can be neither accidental nor random). The input space for unmediated reflection contains different structuring information than the input space for educational and instructive. Hamlet’s blended Mirror/theatre space uses the agency of the holder of the mirror, who can angle it toward the feature he would like to comment upon, and the mirror itself, which

cannot comment but only reflect that which is placed before it. This reflection shows Virtue and Scorn the details of their outward appearance while conveying the exemplarity of one and the vice of the other. The emergent meaning in this blend is that—paradoxically--an unbiased, unadorned depiction of nature can be a didactic tract on the virtues and vices of the times.

Many of the blends in Hamlet's advice are so entrenched that we do not even notice them.[1] Virtue looking at her feature is presumed to obtain information about herself in this gazing. This is guided by the metaphor TO SEE IS TO KNOW.[2] This metaphor, goes on to structure how we think about knowing and seeing as well as how we talk about these things ("The committee has kept me in the dark about this matter" and "You'd need an electron microscope to find the point of this article" are two examples by Grady, Oakley, and Coulson). Virtue seeing her feature also depends upon the Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM) for seeing which he outlines as follows: "1. You see things as they are. 2. You are aware of what you see. 3. You see what's in front of your eyes" (128). This ICM for seeing is like a folk theory that specifies assumptions and entailments contained in a word.

The metaphor TO SEE IS TO KNOW is so powerful that we will construct logically crazy sentences ("Virtue saw her own feature in the mirror") because it is easier to understand virtue seeing a part of herself than to understand virtue

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[1] I am indebted to Fauconnier (in conversation) for much of the unpacking of the mirror blend that follows.

[2] In *Death is the Mother of Beauty* (1987), Turner describes understanding is seeing as a basic-level metaphor, so entrenched as to be generally invisible (18). Grady, Oakley, and Coulson refer to this as a conceptual metaphor (102). The point the different terminology is making is that the metaphor that maps information about seeing onto knowing structures our thinking and speaking. The abstract sense of to know must be specified through the experience of to see.

knowing a part of herself. But it also creates its own default frame, or another level of ICM, which assumes that one believes what one sees and communicates that knowledge without distortion or deception. An ICM is "idealized" for a reason; it assumes a certain set of conditions that may not always be true. However, since it does structure further thoughts and articulations, it is powerful in its simplicity. It is also a powerful tool for poets, as constructing an image or example that plays with or counters an ICM illuminates flaws in our operating models.

An understanding of the mirror is guided by two conflicting ICMs: the mirror gives you an accurate reflection, unaffected by intention or agenda, and the mirror is an optical instrument that allows you to see what you cannot normally see (around corners, your face) and in a way you cannot see (convex, concave, telescope).[3] When we look at our face in the mirror we (generally) believe it is giving us an accurate reflection; we also believe that faces provide access to internal emotional states. Since we see what is going on internally by looking at our face, we compress the causal chain so now the mirror showed us our insides accurately. It both reflects purely, and provides a tool. Perhaps this is why breaking a mirror brings seven years of bad luck: to break the object is to break the tool, the reflection, and the self that is visible therein.

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[3] Ramachandran reports the case of a woman who lost the ability to process the reflection in the mirror. Ellen, a stroke patient who no longer paid attention to objects in the left hand side of her visual field ("neglect"), understood that Ramachandran was holding up a mirror, yet when he asked her to reach for a pen held up behind her, she moved her hand toward the mirror, assuming it was located where the reflection placed it. He calls it "mirror agnosia" or "the looking glass syndrome" and wonders if Lewis Carroll might have suffered in a similar fashion (123-24).

Returning to Hamlet's mirror: in order to understand virtue as seeing a part of herself, of course, she must be split into two people: the person looking into the mirror and the person with the feature that represents Virtue's virtue. Here, Virtue and virtue's feature are interacting, and (by pattern completion) sharing information. This interaction is guided by the ICM of assessing internal feeling states on external facial features. Existing in a society relies on a constant need to translate information gathered off of someone's face into information about feelings, motive, etc.[4] This interaction creates a loop where Virtue and Virtue's feature can know what they cannot see by projecting what is invisible to them on to something visible, i.e., the other's face. Therefore, two people interacting are sharing information about each other; by watching how the other person's face reacts to one's own externalization of feeling states, one can attempt to adjust one's face to more accurately depict one's feelings. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty puts it: "I must be the exterior that I present to others, and the body of the other must be the other himself" (xiii).

This ICM of the social feedback loop is entrenched in our reading of social situations. Though Hamlet knows that "one may smile, and smile, and be a villain" (1.5.108), his writing it down suggests that his assumption to the contrary is too entrenched to notice without a written record of its error. And, alas, he still forgets since he assumes that Claudius's guilt will unkennel during the Mousetrap and be

[4] It is precisely this coding and decoding which troubles so much of Shakespeare's plays, particularly *Hamlet*, *Macbeth*, and *Richard III*, where such a simple mapping and social contract is broken and characters must discover other methods of knowing.

exposed on his face. This assumption drives and defines our social life. Erving Goffman articulates our common theory of social interchange: "as natural persons we are supposed to be epidermally bounded containers. Inside there are information and affect states. This content is directly indexed through open expression and the involuntary cues always consequent upon suppression" (572). To return to the political arena, during a 2004 political rally filled with entertaining stars, Billy Crystal joked about the man of honor: "John Kerry: if you are enjoying yourself, tell your face."[5] This joke plays on Kerry's reputation for having a stiff, sour face that does not register his internal affective states. Crystal suggests that Kerry employ an interlocutor who communicates his insides to his outsides so that others can see when he is enjoying himself. Crystal does not question his own ICM that facial expressions map to internal affective states, he assumes that Kerry's connection between internal and external has been interrupted. Critics of Kerry will similarly not question their ICM but will assume that since Kerry's expressions do not seem to map cleanly onto internal affective states, he is hiding something.

This is not unlike the coronation scene in *Hamlet* when Claudius expresses concern over Hamlet's face being difficult to read. First and foremost, however, Claudius and Crystal are looking to Hamlet and Kerry for information about themselves. Crystal wants to read Kerry's internal state on Kerry's face to know what Kerry feels; Crystal wants to know what Kerry feels because from that information he will gain information about his own performance as a comedian.

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[5] See "Kerry's 36-Hr. Stump-athon" in The New York Post, 26 June 2004.

This is not to suggest that Claudius is not vested in Hamlet's feelings (or Crystal in Kerry's), only that Claudius's reading of Hamlet (like Crystal's of Kerry) is already defined by the assumption that what he reads on Hamlet's face will indicate feelings which will indicate something about Claudius's security on the throne (or Crystal's comedy). We look to the other to know about ourselves.

Shakespeare questions this assumption in the first scene of the play, however, using a similar image to evoke a different meaning. In response to learning about the ghost, Horatio says "A mote it is to trouble the mind's eye" (1.1.115).[6] Though some editors choose the Second Quarto's "moth," the quote still evokes the passage in both Luke and Matthew of the mote in the eye:

> For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again. And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye but considerest not the beam [log] that is in thine own eye? Or how wilt thou say to thy brother, Let me pull out the mote out of thine eye; and, behold, a beam is in thine own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye. (Matthew 7:2-5)

This image of two people facing each other, seeing in the other's eye what cannot be seen in one's own, calls attention to the situated-ness of judgment and--foreshadowing the work of Merleau-Ponty, Eleanor Rosch, Lakoff, and others on the importance of understanding the role of embodiment in cognition--questions an easy optical assessment. How do you ever know if your vision is mote-less? In "Of A Kings Christian Dvetie Towards God" King James tells his son to beware the kind of comparison that Hamlet looks for in the Player, Laertes, and Fortinbras: "A

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[6] I am indebted to Emily DiLaura for pointing out this Biblical reference.

moate in anothers eye, is a beame into yours" (12). He suggests that what might be a small infraction or optical obstruction in someone else is a major sin in a king. While setting up a comparison, King James is saying that Kings cannot compare themselves to others because the differences are too great. It is also possible, though it seems less likely, that James is playing with the biblical parable and with a different meaning of "beam." In this interpretation, James is saying that the minor flaws of others provide a beam of light into your eye. The blinding effect of this beam of light would still make seeing difficult, decreasing the value of the comparison.

Many things trouble the mind's eye in *Hamlet* and I would agree with editor Harold Jenkins that Horatio means that the ghost is an irritant that will eventually make clear its portents (a "ghest"). Shakespeare could have had Horatio say this in many different ways; the form and contents of the phrase Horatio uses echo the biblical parable. With this image called to mind in scene one, mental spaces built subsequently pertaining to the "eye" or the ICM of interacting with another to gain information will be impacted by the biblical parable. As Fauconnier says: "What kind of meaning will actually be produced depends on the mental space configuration (generated by earlier discourse) that the sentence actually applies to" (1994, xxiii). Shakespeare's image of a speck in the mind's eye recalls the story of blind judgment at the start of the revenge play and suggests that perhaps the differences between person looking and person reflected are as salient as the similarities. If this is the case, seeing may not be the best way of knowing.

Knowing through sight means that the one thing we can least see (our face and thus our own internal states as reflected therein), we most want to know. The mirror is the instrument thought to expose the self because it is capable of displaying the face to the self. First, the self must be blended with the reflection in order to see the reflection as the self (this happens because the two share vital relations[7]—same features—and despite the fact that there are differences between the two—one is the left-to-right reverse of the other. In the Mirror blend, the similarities and differences are compressed and we see one identity where there are two images. Seeing the reflection in the mirror as "self" is such an entrenched blend that it is hard to notice. The ability to understand the relationship between self and image or between a three dimensional physical object and its two dimensional representation requires blending.[8]

While the image in the mirror is recognized as self, because it has come to be seen that way through blending, it can also be seen as two separate people facing each other. The network that combined them can be prompted differently so we see two faces, not one person. This is how Hamlet can see Virtue and her feature as related, but also as separate. For this blend, the input space of the person in front of the mirror is blended with an input space of the reflection in the mirror and rather than compressing identity, both identities are projected into the blend such that in

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[7] Fauconnier and Turner define vital relations as the elements of an input space which connect it with another (92).

[8] Jacques Lacan famously argued that babies recognize themselves in the mirror at about six months old. In "The Mirror Stage as formative of the function of the I," Lacan says that the infant identifies with the reflection (as "Ideal I" or Imago) and through this identification he assumes an image. Despite the fact that this Ideal I contrasts "with the turbulent movements that the subject feels are animating him" (2), he sees that the image is his.

the blend there are two people looking at each other. Through a process that Fauconnier and Turner call pattern completion, two people looking at each other are seen as interacting. This imports an integrated pattern or frame to structure the blend as tightly as possible: two people interacting are sharing information about each other.[9] We look into the mirror for information, information that we believe the image in the mirror can provide: how does my hair look? Do I have spinach in my teeth? The same mirror Hamlet hopes his words provide to Gertrude: “You go not till I set you up a glass / Where you may see the inmost part of you” (3.4.19). Since we trust that the vision we use to know others by their faces is accurate, we use this assessment on ourselves.

The disassociation between self and reflection enables a conception of the self as in a dialogue with the self. Lakoff shows how we do this in language by creating a separate self to analyze. In “Sorry, I’m not Myself Today: The Metaphor System for Conceptualizing the Self” Lakoff examines how certain cases of reflexive pronoun use (“I dreamed that I was Brigitte Bardot and that I kissed me”)[10] disrupt traditionally held conceptions of semantic comprehension and provide a view to how we conceptualize the self. He argues that thinking about our selves requires a distinction between an inner thinker and a self to be thought about.[11] His

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[9] This explains why children understand Snow White and the Seven Dwarves; looking into a mirror and asking it for information makes sense because we have a blended space available wherein a person looking into a mirror can be seen as two people interacting.

[10] Fauconnier also examines this example in *Mental Spaces*; it is originally from J. McCawley’s *Everything that Linguists Have Always Wanted to Know about Logic*. Chicago: U of Chicago P; 1981

[11] Greenblatt describes the moments in Hamlet when characters create a difference between oneself and oneself--Horatio saying that the ghost is like the King “As thou art to thyself,” Claudius

articulation of a multiple set of consciousnesses is useful in understanding how we can view the reflection in the mirror as self and not-self at the same time.

Throughout *Hamlet*, information about the self is gained through comparison with another or through projecting an image of the self outward. Hamlet compares himself to the Player in an effort to understand his inaction: "What would he do / Had he the motive and the cue for passion / That I have?" (2.2.554-56). Hamlet describes his conversation with Fortinbras's captain as being an "occasion" that informs against him because Fortinbras and his men are going to their "graves like beds" (4.5.62) "for a fantasy and a trick of fame" (4.5.61) while he has "a father kill'd, a mother stain'd, / Excitements of my reason and my blood" and yet lets "all sleep" (4.5.56-58). Here, analogy is structured like a mirror, since a comparison with the other forces one to highlight structure that otherwise might have been missed. In the differences between himself and Fortinbras's soldiers Hamlet sees that motivation and reason do not necessarily equal action. Before showing how the network of spaces prompted by Shakespeare's use of the Mirror in Hamlet leads us to a new reading of *Hamlet*, I will piece out and analyze the occurrences of the Mirror in Hamlet.

In Hamlet's advice, the holders of the mirror disappear and their role in constructing what is seen is masked by a description of what is seen. Though directed at the players who will be doing the holding, the blend is most specific

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describing Ophelia as "Divided from herself and her fair judgment" (4.5.81), Hamlet's description of his madness as taking Hamlet from Hamlet (5.2.230), and "But I am very sorry, good Horatio, / That to Laertes I forgot myself"—but he does not pursue the cognitive linguistic consequences of this strange articulation of self separation (211).

about what will be found in the mirror, without reference to its relation to the holder. What is performed in this conception: Is it the feature of Virtue? Virtue looking at her feature? Virtue, Scorn, and Time? Shakespeare's language calls attention to the role of the players by making them the subject of two verbs: to hold and to show, but chooses two verbs that transfer agency to the object held and shown. The purpose of playing is not to angle a mirror in the right direction or to choose a play that will fit your audience; the purpose of playing is simply to hold a mirror up. In this formulation the purpose of playing is to get out of the way.[12] The mirror, Shakespeare (through Hamlet) suggests, will do the rest. How the mirror does what it does is not examined or illuminated; only that it is held and what is found in it. While masking the technology that finds Virtue's feature in nature, Shakespeare's language blends the power found in various mirrors and mirror metaphors to create an image of what happens when the players mount the stage. While masking the role of the players in constructing the theatrical experience, Shakespeare's use of the mirror to communicate the purpose of playing unveils how we use the mirror to see our self as other as well as how we see depth on a surface.

Polonius sends Reynaldo to Paris to present a false reflection of his son in the hopes that the falsenesss of this image will be remarked upon by the acquaintances comparing Reynaldo's Laertes to the one they know. Through the disanalogies mapped across spaces (Laertes as Reynaldo describes him versus

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[12] David Mamet's articulation of his acting style in *Writing in Restaurants* sounds close to what Hamlet may have meant: "This actor brings to the stage his desire rather than completion, will rather than emotion. His performance will be compared not to art, but to life; and when we leave the theatre after his performance we will speak of our life rather than his technique" (127). In 1997 he said it a bit louder in *True and False: Heresy and Common Sense for the Actor*.

Laertes as his Parisian friends know him), Polonius will confirm Laertes' true character: "Your bait of falsehood takes this carp of truth; / And thus do we of wisdom and of reach, / With windlasses and with assays of bias, / By indirections find directions out" (2.1.63-6). Polonius has set this idea in motion during his conversation with Laertes: "This above all: to thine ownself be true, / And it must follow, as the night the day, / Thou canst not then be false to any man" (1.3.78-80) Laertes has to project a self outward to be true to which will in turn ensure that he is not untrue to another man, presumably because he will not be two-faced.

When Hamlet compliments Laertes to Osric, he does so by saying that only Laertes's mirror can match him: "But, in the verity of extolment, I take him to be a soul of great article and his infusion of such dearth and rareness as, to make true diction of him, his semblable is his mirror and who else would trace him his umbrage, nothing more" (5.2.115-20). While his language is geared to play with Osric's pretentious linguistic excess, Hamlet's use of the Mirror here recalls the way Ophelia describes Hamlet:

> O, what a noble mind is here o'erthrown!
> The courtier's, scholar's, soldier's, eye, tongue, sword,
> Th' expectancy and rose of the fair state,
> The glass of fashion and the mould of form,
> Th' observ'd of all observers- (3.1)

This Mirror is an ideal, a reflection one looks to for what the disanalogies between self and this reflection report about the self.

As Lakoff's inner thinker must separate from the self-to-be-thought-about in order to think about himself, we look into the mirror at doubles of ourselves in order

to see—and thus to know—ourselves. As mentioned above, Hamlet is often seeing in others images of himself (or his cause) in order to think about himself or his cause. Crane notes the use of proxies in *Hamlet*: "Almost everyone in Denmark employs spies, messengers, or other proxies to act on their behalf" and argues that "political life in Denmark seems for most of the play to operate at one remove from sources of power" (129), extending the reach of power's arm through the use of others. Brian Reynolds and Anthony Kubiak describe the "concentric wash of the watching" (3) as symptoms of the "deceit conceits" that permeate the play[13] and Patricia Parker sees in the spying and watching evidence of "the emergent world of statecraft contemporary with the play" (qtd. in Crane 129). I would add that these doubles and deceits are used to trap through similarity. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern[14] are called in because they "being of so young days brought up with him, / And sith so neighbor'd to his youth and havior" (2.2.11-12) thus might make Hamlet reveal to them that which is inside. Claudius hopes Hamlet will see himself in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and will speak freely, as if versions of himself projected outward in Lakoff's configuration or like Virtue seeing herself as separate in order to see herself. Looking in the mirror, or thinking about the self by projecting it outward, allows an interaction between self and self that facilitates knowledge through seeing.

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[13] "Deceit conceits" are defined by transversal theory as "clever schemes involving artifice and fiction performed in order to fracture, transform, and/or expand the conceptual and/or emotional range of an individual" (2).

[14] Themselves mirror images of each other, as Tom Stoppard has theatricalized

Shakespeare uses the comparison and antithesis of two people facing each other in Hamlet's "What a rogue and peasant slave am I" (2.2.544) and "to be or not to be" (3.1.56) soliloquies. Set up as dialectics—one idea compared with the other—these arguments recall Hamlet's comparing himself with Fortinbras and Laertes as well as Polonius's use of Reynaldo's defamation to see Laertes. Horatio uses the language of the mirror to articulate the similarity between the ghost and the dead King Hamlet: "I knew your father; / These hands are not more like" (1.2.211-12). The ghost was like Hamlet's father in the same way that Horatio's right hand is like his left hand: not the same (they are reversed left to right), but mirror images of each other. The use of "mirror image" suggests a use of Mirror that privileges the differences between the image and its reflection. A "mirror image" highlights the way in which a mirror flips the left and right; it is the same and yet different in key ways.[15] Horatio's description of the ghost as the mirror image of the dead king Hamlet, as the left hand is the mirror image of the right, simultaneously confirms that the apparition was and was not King Hamlet. The ghost of the person both is and is not the person, as I will explore further in the next chapter. Horatio's remark sets up the image of a mirror resulting in symmetry: what is on one side of the mirror is symmetrical with that which is on the other side. It follows that if you stood two similar things next to each other, it would be like there was a mirror

[15] In Weimann's *Actor's Pen and Author's Voice* he explains how the in the first Quarto, Hamlet's advice to the players is very different from the "naturalism" traditionally understood by the "purpose of playing:" "The Prince, 'thus' performing a clown's 'cinkapase of ieasts' and, with another 'thus,' so 'blabbering with his lips,' is telling the players what not to do, but he does so by doing it himself" (23). By saying one thing and doing the other, Hamlet is providing the "mirror image" of what he is saying.

between them. When symmetry is evoked, then, it is linked associatively with the mirror that created the symmetry between Horatio's hands. Throughout Hamlet, Shakespeare recalls the Mirror at the place between symmetry.

A visual and rhetorical antithesis is depicted in *Hamlet* as a mirror that provides, through the reflection, insight into that which is placed in front of it.[16] At the start of his confrontation with his mother, Hamlet insists she stay and hear his words: "You go not till I set you up a glass / Where you may see the inmost part of you" (3.4.19). He does not place her in front of a mirror but uses his words to reflect the bad marriage she has made; presumably she will "see" in his description of her two husbands the sins and faults on her inside that caused her to go from the "Hyperion" to the "Satyr" (1.2.140). After killing Polonius, Hamlet moves from words to images, from Mirrors to miniatures,[17] focusing Gertrude this time on "this picture, and on this, / The counterfeit presentment of two brothers" (3.4.53-54) and attempting to show Gertrude what he would like her to know. The two pictures of

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[16] We call it the "front" of the mirror because we picture it "facing" us, rather than, say, the wall. Lakoff (1987) argues that this common projection of front and back on to objects is a consequence of embodiment, though in the case of the mirror, we generally perceive it with our front, since that's what will be reflected if we are standing "in front" of it. Unless, of course, you are in a Magritte painting.

[17] The miniature portrait was similar to most mirror reflections of the time in that both provided a smaller version of the referent. Also, both mirrors and miniatures were worn as sartorial accessories. In "'Secret' Arts: Elizabethan Miniatures and Sonnets," Patricia Fumerton argues that the sonnet and the miniature functioned in Elizabethan Court society as a public display of the private. Miniatures were viewed in closets among intimates, held in the hand and showed only reluctantly. She describes a scene between Queen Elizabeth and a courtier whom Elizabeth was using to arrange a marriage between her sister Mary and Leicester where she brought him into her closet and opened a case within the closet to show him her miniatures. When he asked if he could take Elizabeth's miniature of Leicester to Mary, Elizabeth refused, preferring to send him with a diamond for her sister. Fumerton argues that these miniatures, worn to court, created a sense of privacy or secrecy in the midst of the artifice of court. "The 'true' Elizabethan self expressed in publishing the miniature was always hidden, even from intimates, by the very nature of the artifice that published it" (100). Miniatures were often enclosed within an ornately decorated case—similar to the fancy, symbol-rich frames that held the mirrors--creating a layer of images and symbols to veil the image within.

the brothers are like Reynaldo's description of Laertes and the true Laertes (or so Polonius hopes); the two are held as against a mirror to call into being that which is not there: the difference between the two.

Illustration 1: "Have you eyes?" Hamlet (Kenneth Branagh) shows Gertrude (Julie Christie) the miniatures of the two kings in Branagh's *Hamlet*.

With the picture for reference, Hamlet describes for Gertrude the magnificence of her former husband: "See what a grace was seated on his brow, / Hyperion's curls, the front of Jove himself, / An eye like Mars to threaten and command" (3.4.56-57). He then shows her the picture of Claudius "like a mildew'd ear" (3.4.64) and rather than describe what he wants her to see in the picture, as he does with King Hamlet, he asks her twice: "have you eyes?" (3.4.65 and 67). If she had eyes, she could see; if she could see, she would see what is in front of her; if she saw it, she would believe it. He is not suggesting that Gertrude is blind, but rather that she is blind to the difference between the brothers; it is not that she lacks eyes but simply that she has "Eyes without feeling, feeling without sight" (3.4.78). This distinction is important because it explains the difference between seeing the reflection and noticing the disanalogies salient in the particular comparison that he

has set up. Eyes alone could not sense the meaning conveyed in the Mirror of one brother in the other; feeling alone would not perceive the distinction between image and mirror image. Moreover, Shakespeare's language here constructs a mirror on the page, since a mirror placed after the first "feeling" reflects "feeling" to "feeling." Such a mirror, of course, would also reflect "sight" back to "eyes;" like Horatio's two hands, the same and different.

In the comparison between the two miniatures, Shakespeare's language creates a blend of King Hamlet—with his god-like qualities and exemplary behavior—with King Claudius—who in the blend is all that King Hamlet is not. This blend is like the "nonthings" created through counterfactual blends described by Fauconnier and Turner: "Counterfactuality is forced incompatibility between spaces, and when one is thinking about reality, counterfactuality is often a vital relation between spaces that involve some of the same people and the same events" (230). The "forced incompatibility" comes from an attempt to make one input space mirror the other; the ways in which they do not fit creates a nonthing.[18] Hamlet's mirror, his words which construct nonthings in the gap between what should be and what is, works to bring Gertrude's sins to her eyes: "O Hamlet, speak no more. / Thou turn'st my eyes into my very soul, / And there I see such black and grained spots / As will not leave their tinct" (3.4.89). Gertrude here figures herself in front of the mirror created in Hamlet's words, finding spots on the face of her soul like

[18] I will explore this further in chapter four.

Virtue looking for virtue in her features. The soul, like the face that requires a mirror to see and correct, can only be seen in a Mirror.

Gertrude's soul is depicted as if in a mirror, like one of the young women using a handbook of correction to "see" and "remove" her inward spots. In *Mirrhor of Modestie*, Thomas Salter's Mirror puts on the surface of the page an inward flaw perceived in young women: just as a maid "in deakyng her self by a Christall *Mirrhor*, will be sure not to suffer . . . so much as a spot, if she espies it upon her face . . . how ought her minde, in whiche is represented the true Image of God, to be kept . . . from greate spot of sinne" (69). As Gertrude and Salter's maids look "into" the Mirror they see "into" themselves. Hamlet's Mirror, then, creates a duplicate for comparison and then with this conception of exchanging information with another, finds in the reflection of self information not available to the self, information on the inside of the self.

Conceptual blending theory can help elucidate the way Shakespeare structures the many Mirrors in *Hamlet* into a network that complicates conceptions of seeing, doing, and being. Found in the Mirror at the center--the Mirror Hamlet suggests guide the players--are many of the blends necessary to understanding the moments in the play examined above. Again, according to Hamlet:

> …the purpose of playing, whose end, both at the first and now, was and is to hold as 'twere the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure. (3.2.21-4)

Virtue looks at her feature for information about her virtue. How is a trait both a woman and a feature indicating a trait? Several blends are necessary to make this

second layer of the quotation make sense. “Virtue looks at her feature” is an entrenched personification blend where a quality or event is anthropomorphized. This comes from an understanding of events as being actions, and therefore caused by something. The state of no longer being alive (death) becomes the agent that caused the state (“Death”) such that one can then say “Death, be not proud” and be understood. Such blends create a space where one might be in relationship with that object, quality, or event. The history of the vice characters in medieval drama is a clear example, as Good Deeds or Envy creatively and efficiently convey as people the dangers or value in the traits they personify.

If someone acts virtuously, something must have caused that behavior: virtue. This property then is understood as residing *in* the person who behaves that way. External behavior understood as caused by an internal trait. In Hamlet’s Mirror, then, the internal state is visible through the mirror on the feature of Virtue. What was outside to begin with is conceived of as inside and then projected onto the face. Virtue is a woman because it is a quality one looks for in a woman; so the trait is the woman, understood as examining her “feature” to know her internal essence.

Virtue’s feature is a metonymic blend of part for whole, wherein the feature is blended with the relevant aspects of virtue in order to convey the whole in the part. This is a common metonymy: the face is taken for the whole person. Hamlet assumes that when he shows Gertrude the pictures of the two brothers (3.4.53), she will take the partial representations for the men he refers to. A similar blend is at work for the people Hamlet derides who after making “mouths” at Claudius while

King Hamlet reigned now “give twenty, forty, fifty, a hundred ducats apiece for his picture in little” (2.2.361-62). While this combines the metonymy for face-identity and representation-identity, the point is the same: we quickly connect identity across disparate spaces so that what is globs of paint in one space is Claudius’s face in another which stands for King Claudius in the third.[19]

Virtue’s feature, is a blend of a mental space for the human face, with various features, and a mental space for the elements constituting an internal virtue. In the blended space, the features one might see in a mirror are physicalizations of internal features that do not have an outward counterpart visible in the mirror outside of the blended space. In unpacking the entrenched and seemingly invisible blend we unveil the contradiction at its core. “Virtue” is seen as being an internal feature of someone who is virtuous, but this is already a blend: the external virtuous behavior is seen as a constant trait of someone, such that what was always external (virtuous behavior) is found as a constant internal state of someone who regularly behaves in a virtuous manner. Internal virtue is also a blend of external behaviors with a feature of the insides that we imagine makes the manifestation of various features likely to occur. Once we uncover the blend, we can see that what is figured as manifesting itself externally in a “feature” was always external to begin with. Only through blending does it go inside and out, inside and out, creating the boundaries that it transgresses as it goes.

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[19] And the effigy which a miniature of King Claudius becomes is another blend where the picture/face/King is blended with the status, power, and near divinity of the monarch such that the picture itself contains the status, power, and near-divinity of that which it represents. For more on how talismans, sacred relics, and charms are blends, see Fauconnier and Turner, 207. For more on how effigy works in the theatre, see Roach 1996, 220.

an eye of you ~ an eye of view: corrosive inwardness

While many critics have looked in the early modern Mirrors for signs of change, subjectivity, and inwardness, without conceptual blending theory, it is difficult to articulate the relationship between object, context, and metaphor. Most critical works about *Hamlet* refer to what Greenblatt called his historically cherished "corrosive inwardness" (208). The assumption the critics make is that there is an "inner" to all of us that *Hamlet* either inaugurates, predicts, or troubles. Despite the fact that we talk about mirrors as if they were containers--looking into them, finding what's inside on their surface—the same way we talk about our bodies as containers, I would argue that neither are properly "containers" and therefore do not actually have an inside and an outside.

Debora Shuger's "The 'I' of the Beholder: Renaissance Mirrors and the Reflexive Mind" examines the relationship of the mirror to the referent that stands in front of it. She began her inquiry with the hypothesis that the modern subjective sense was born in this new mirror. What she found, however, was that the shifting availability of mirrors in the Renaissance did not create subjectivity or introspection. Rather, the mirror shows up in metaphors not as something to show the gazer his image, but as something that represents a self that "is not identical to oneself but *like* it" (37). She notes how in the bedroom scene in *Hamlet*, Gertrude confuses the miniatures of her husbands with her mirror image. The purpose, it seems to Shuger, is the same with both objects: to show "an ideal image, whose perfection discloses, by contrast, one's own deformities" (34). Shuger thus argues that mirrors did not provide an experience of subjectivity, but rather a more relational or transitive

experience of moral or spiritual correction. Shuger argues that the early modern mirrors are "platonically angled, tilted upwards in order to reflect paradigms rather than the perceiving eye" (26). Shuger's analysis is compelling, but a platonically angled mirror brings up more questions than it answers and does not account for the use of the Mirror as a warning.

In "Surpassing Glass: Shakespeare's Mirrors," Philippa Kelly argues that the reflection in the mirror is a "radically unstable trope of transition" (3). Through examining references to the mirror in the essays of Montaigne and statements by the Earl of Essex, she shows a mirror that does not offer a reflection of the person in front of the mirror so much as a diversity of potential faces and angles from which to view the face. The mirror does not reflect an individual self, but the social faces of the self. By revealing the spot on your face, the mirror offers a glimpse at the current face as well as the ideal social face one uses the mirror to create. She finds a similar set of meanings in Shakespeare's plays. For Shakespeare, she argues, the mirror "is a trope of displacement that evokes the shifting shape of identity in modes of social exchange" (5). Hamlet's quest for a stable interiority is mocked by the multiplicity of Hamlets he finds reflected back to him throughout the play. If, as Kelly argues, the mirror presents not a stable self, not an inside but various outsides, then it cannot depict an inside. Yet, discussions with the self in the mirror suggest there is non-visible information being ascertained by the dialogue with the reflection.

Rayna Kalas posits a connection between an economic system that is fixed and stable like the steel mirrors and one that is increasingly incontinent and temporal like the crystal glass mirrors. In looking at George Gascoigne's satiric verse *The Steele Glas*, Kalas finds that the shift in the trade and craft of the mirror's production reflects the shift in mirror technology. For Gascoigne, the new mirrors were a fanciful conceit from another country, providing a suspiciously easy reflection in a non-substance. "Whereas the steel glass is identified with the estates of the realm, with land and domestic resources, with social custom and degree, the crystal glass is identified with mercantile trade, with fluid and artificial value, with sudden social mobility" (528). For Kalas, the mirror reflects a changing social and economic structure. Again, the mirror is used as a symbol for something else with a questionable sense of what the object or its reflection is or means. Kalas points out that part of Gascoigne's critique of the glass mirror resides in the seamlessness of its object and reflection: "Gascoigne's punning language demonstrates how, in the all too perfect reflections of a glass mirror, the material composition of the instrument drops away, leaving the viewer to a mere impression of the image in the glass" (526). Without the need to polish the steel prior to use and with glass's materiality more mysterious and invisible, the reflection becomes divorced from the object that produced it. Kalas does not question how "the material composition of the instrument drop[ped] away" nor does she investigate what Gascoigne's impression was of that "image in the glass."

For David Scott Kastan, the mirror is significant in its production of a copy, as separated from the original. In "'His semblable is his mirror' *Hamlet* and the Imitation of Revenge," Kastan examines the idea of imitation in *Hamlet* in light of the mirror. He argues that the revenge in *Hamlet* is only "a desperate mode of imitation" (113) and that Hamlet searches for an original act. From the Mousetrap to the ghost, Kastan sees the reflections in *Hamlet* as copies or imitations underlining the fundamentally flawed reasoning of "avenging wrongs with wrongs" (113). His reading of mirrors, copies, and imitations highlights the disanalogies between a thing and its semblable. Kastan's analysis subsumes the mirror under a larger category of imitation and though the connection is useful, it obfuscates the very particular uses of the mirror blend in *Hamlet*. The proliferation of different mirrors during the early modern period enables critics to see what they want to in the many reflecting surfaces.

Katherine Eisaman Maus and John Jeffries Martin are two critics interested in troubling the backward-look on subjectivity in the early modern period. Eisaman Maus argues against those theorists who believe that inwardness and a subjective sense of self did not exist in the Renaissance and instead sees an anxiety about the difference between, the management of, and the political import of a hidden interior and a published or social exterior. The writings of the time exhibit a heightened interest in the possibility of hypocrisy, deception, and equivocation and a separation between the inner truth, which cannot be questioned or verified, and the outward show, which can never be trusted. Her interest here is in the epistemological

question of how one person can know another and how this epistemology is articulated at the time. Her reading of this question does not escape the language of inwardness, however.

While not the focus of his work, the container image schema is a necessary casualty of Martin's deconstruction of "individualism." In *Myths of Renaissance Individualism*, he looks at how the Renaissance viewed the self, arguing against both Burckhardt, who saw the Renaissance as the birth of the individual from the group, and Greenblatt, who saw the self as a cultural artifact fashioned from social forces. Martin would like a more complicated view, one that sees multiple models of identity during the period. Further, he locates much of the tipping point around the shifting notions of what is an internal self and what is an external self. In articulating the corporal permeability experienced at the time, he does not question the conception of the self as a container as the right one, just one that was not established at this period. The boundary between the inside and outside was a site of danger, he argues, because it could be crossed: "There were demons and witches because the Renaissance self was not yet individualized, not yet predicated on the assumed existence of an ego safely and securely ensconced in a protective container of skin" (86). While contemporary selves may be thought to be "ensconced" in the self's container, they are not viewed as secure. Our language exposes an anxiety over permeability of the self: "I'm out of my mind," "she was possessed," "His heart stopped and he's gone," "I don't know what's gotten into her."

The critical discussion around the early modern interiority suggests that the plays of Shakespeare, in particular, stage a self that appears closer to the self we envision for ourselves. As Crane argues: Shakespeare's plays are a site of a construction of interiority. In this way, the plays are constructing an interiority that they then reflect. To argue that language and performance has this kind of power requires evidence from disciplines outside of the humanities. The humanities have always thought that art and literature had power. In future chapters I turn to research in psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive linguistics to find new language to defend this claim. Before moving backward in time to find other examples of the mirror/Mirror, I introduce two strands of research that shed light on our understanding of the self.

Lakoff and Johnson posit that an "essential self" idea came about to explain discrepancies between actions and intentions. If we do something that does not come from this "essential self," we can say "that wasn't the real me." This construction generates the self as a container: "Metaphorically, our Inner Self hides inside our Outer Self" (1999, 282). Lakoff and Johnson give examples from Japanese showing that while the Japanese have different metaphoric conceptions of self and other, the way they conceive of the self is similar. Examples such as "It is important to get out of yourself and look at yourself" versus "he pulled himself together" (285) and "I was disappointed in myself" versus "I disappointed myself" (288) evidence a lack of cohesion or singularity in our conception of the self.

In reporting how the language structures the self, however, they refer to "the structure of our inner lives" without probing that metaphoric conception of the self as having an inside and an outside. What is inside me is almost exactly the same thing as that which is inside you. An autopsy would not reveal differences to explain my aversion to seafood or your memory of cut grass. We could just as easily break the body into upper half and lower half, or left and right. While the skin provides a layer, it does not need to define a container.

Neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran's work on phantom limbs and synaesthesia offers a biological study of what we think of as the self. Though his language also repeats without questioning the body as container metaphor—he calls the body "a shell that you've temporarily created for successfully passing on your genes to your offspring" (62) —his research takes apart assumptions about the limits of self and perception. In chapter five I examine how his research on phantom limbs engages with performance theory and our sense of self, since, if the body can perceive the self where it is not, perhaps we need a different idea of self and other. Ramachandran's recent work on synaesthesia found that it is a genuine perceptual phenomenon, such that one sense is linked to the other. His theory is that synaesthesia is produced through hyperconnectivity between the color area of the brain and the number area. To those who have argued that synaesthetes are crazy or have a penchant for metaphor, Ramachandran states that synaesthesia is not just metaphor but it might help to explain metaphor, as metaphors involve "cross-activation of conceptual maps" (2001, 17). For some people seeing "the thisness of

a that, or the thatness of a this" (to use Kenneth Burke's description of metaphor's role, 503) may not be creative but immediate.

an aye of you ~ an I of you: the rear-view mirror

Shakespeare evokes a mirror that does not impartially reflect what is placed before it, as our common contemporary mirrors do. We must be told, on our rear-view mirrors, that "objects in mirror may be closer than they appear" because we assume that light bounces off the surface of the mirror at the same angle it strikes it and the image reflected appears to be the same distance behind the mirror as the reflected object is in front of the mirror. Mirrors made before the fifteenth century, however, were rarely this precise. The type of mirror brought in to England by the Romans was convex and did not reflect all of the light that entered it, creating a dark and shadowy reflection. While the technology of the mirror changed during this time, the economics and fragility of the larger glass mirrors made them rare and mysterious; few people would have had experience with a reflection of more than their face.

Glass mirrors date back no further than the third century AD, but these remained convex and small until, in the fifteenth century, the glass-houses of Venice developed a new technique for making mirrors that allowed them to make larger mirrors with less distortion. It was not until 1460 that the glassmakers of Italy had perfected their technique into a clear glass mirror. By 1569 the glassmaker industry was so large, the *specchiai*, or mirror makers, established their own guild (Goldberg, 140). Glass makers became highly-paid craftsmen and their fragile products were

shipped throughout Europe. In her exhaustive book on the changing technology of the mirror and the concomitant change in its role in society, Sabine Melchior-Bonnet finds that despite the larger flat mirrors that the Venice technology made possible, the dangers of shipping made them relatively uncommon[20] (at least in England) until later in the seventeenth century.

Illustration 2: *Self-Portrait* (1646) by Johannes Gumpp

Smaller convex mirrors circulated in the social presentation of face, were worn on outfits to check one's appearance throughout the day, and were associated with vanity, narcissism, flattery, and the deceitfulness of women. From "Farce Joyeuse et Récréative," Melchior-Bonnet cites a poem that equates adultery with the mirror: "Beware of being cuckolded / By a woman painting her face / Whose thoughts are far from her marriage / Carrying a crystalline mirror" (21). Presumably, these women's thoughts are on the face she sees in the mirror, not unlike Hamlet's claim that women use make-up to create two faces: "I have heard of your paintings

[20] Venice was notoriously proprietary about its mirror technology—moving the glass houses from Venice to the island of Murano for easier protection against espionage. This fear of espionage was well founded, as both England and France tried to import some of the artisans to start glass houses of their own.

well enough. God hath given you one face and you make yourselves another" (3.1.144-45). Henry Peacham's *Minerva Britanna* (1612) includes a mirror as a representation of self-love (*Philantia*) and one in the hand of female beauty, stating that the mirror here signifies: "how we by fight are mooued to loue."

Illustration 3: *Arnolfini Wedding Portrait* (1434) by Jan Van Eyck

Prior to the middle of the seventeenth century, the mirrors reproduced in paintings were small and almost always convex. These mirrors reflect allegorically, not optically. When not in the hands of a naked or bathing woman, these mirrors

become symbols of the world outside of the painting, a world that contrasts and constitutes the subject of the painting. In Jan Van Eyck's *Arnolfini Wedding Portrait* (1434) an ornately framed convex mirror hangs on the wall behind the couple. In *Reality in the Mirror of Art*, Lise Bek argues that the symbolism of everything in the room works together to create the "temporal-legal act, suggested by the arriving witnesses reflected in the mirror with the artist's signature above it, and with the matrimonial fidelity represented by the dog" (236). In this way, the mirror is a legal stamp, since the mirror brings into the recording of the Arnolfinis union, the witnesses and the painter.

Illustration 4: *The Moneychanger and His Wife* (1514) by Quentin Metsys

In *The Moneychanger and His Wife* (1514) by Quentin Metsys the convex mirror reflects in miniature the window and the world outside, capturing and containing by the artist the space far away and unattainable by the indoor workers who deal with money gained from the outdoor traders and explorers. Next to the mirror is a book of paintings the woman is paging through. The mirror, like the book, symbolizes the exterior world seeping in, reminding the couple and the viewer

of both worlds in the image of one. The couple inside is constituted by that which is not in the room with them.

Illustration 5: *Hans Burgkmaier and his Wife* (1527) by Laux Furtenagel

In *Hans Burgkmaier and his Wife* (1527) by Laux Furtenagel the mirror reflects back to the couple standing in front of it, not their likeness, but their skeletons. The inscription reads: “This is what we looked like—in the mirror, however, nothing appeared but that” (Goldberg, 122). The artist tells the viewer that the mirror, not the artist, editorialized, reflecting a feature of the couple before the mirror (their eventual old age and death) not the couple themselves. Larger flat mirrors do not begin showing up in paintings until Johannes Gumpp’s *Self-Portrait* of 1646 or Velásquez’s *Las Meninas* in 1655. As opposed to the way the convex mirror contains and miniaturizes the outside world, the life-size reflection of the king and queen of Spain in *Las Meninas* creates a mise-en-abîme and a power in

their absence made present, as Michel Foucault and Peggy Phelan have seen. Different tools for seeing produce different ways of knowing.[21]

I spent a day looking through the files at the Victoria and Albert Museum in London trying to find mirrors from the early modern period. While they had one convex mirror on display (which was barely recognizable as reflective), most of their collection was in storage, accessible only through the images and descriptions in the files. After four hundred years, what remains is usually just the frame. This collection of frames, however, suggests that the frame was no small part of the mirror's meaning. Each frame was more ornate than the last, and many were attached to copies of descriptions in *Ancient Furniture and Woodwork* (1874) by John Hungerford Pollen. More than once, Pollen begins his description with "This piece is remarkable for its frame." One frame, thought to have belonged to Lucrezia Borgia, spells out MALVM (evil) down one side and BONVM (good) down the other, the one side the "mirror image" of the other. [see appendix a] In *A Grand Design* (1997), the Victoria and Albert Museum's book about the collection, the

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[21] Anamorphic art of the period, such as Hans Holbein's *The Ambassadors* (1533), also call attention to the method of looking. David Castillo argues that anamorphic art makes "us more aware of the fact that 'what we see' is to a certain extent a function of 'our way of seeing' and, consequently, of 'who we are and/or want to be'" (10). He begins his book *(A)Wry Views: Anamorphosis, Cervantes, and the Early Modern Picaresque* with a quotation from *Richard II*: "Like perspectives which, rightly gaz'd upon, / Show nothing but confusion, --ey'd awry, / Distinguish form!" He argues that the proliferation of these images during this period related to an idea of an absolutist state represented by an omnipresent king (11). He posits that the work of Cervantes (among others) can be seen as anamorphic in its layers of meaning, challenging well-established views about the world by exposing an alternate reality within the anamorphosis and threatening the stable epistemology of early modern viewers. Looking at these works straight on reveals nothing strange, the world as it is supposed to be, but a change in perspective reveals something dark and different. While a full exploration of anamorphosis is beyond the scope of this project, it feels germane insofar as an attention to how perspective and seeing impact knowing troubles the basic-level metaphor TO SEE IS TO KNOW so foundational in any use of the Mirror.

description of the piece suggests that the value of the object comes from the infamous owner, "a character with a legendary reputation for wickedness and extravagant vices." The frame, then, is deciphered with Borgia's image imposed on the mirror's surface.

Along with the letters are various icons of either virtues or vices: "On the right of this figure [the letter Y] is that of a woman draped and kneeling. Over her is a dragon representing sin or evil, against which she is defending herself. Following to the right of this direction are various animals representing virtues, to which the kneeling figure stretches her hand" including a unicorn ("typical of virginity"). Whatever Lucrezia Borgia saw *in* her mirror, that which surrounds it loudly, if allegorically, suggests the two ways her image will appear to the world: good or evil. However, in the Museum's book, the editors suggest that perhaps this reading was wrong:

> The frame has always been prized for the quality of its carving and abundance of symbolism, ranging from allegorical beasts to the Pythagorean "Y," signifying the choice between good and evil. However, so attached have furniture historians been to the idea of the mirror belonging to Lucrezia Borgia that they have overlooked the significance of the Virgin and Child on the other side. Recent research by Peter Thornton and Kent Lydecker on fifteenth-century Italian interiors and inventories, coupled with the moralising nature of the frame, suggest that the object served originally not as a mirror but rather as a religious icon or ancona, which would have hung in the chamber of Lucrezia's husband, Alfonso.

An analysis of the frame is predicated on who was reflected in its surface. Not unlike Erving Goffman's definition of primary frameworks as those that render

"what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful" (21).

If what one sees in the mirror is ambiguous, the Mirror tended to polarize the meaning like the Borgia mirror: good or bad. In *The Mutable Glass: Mirror-Imagery in Titles and Texts of the Middle Ages and English Renaissance*, Herbert Grabes argues that the manuals of correction that used the Mirror in their titles presented for the reader either an ideal image or a warning against which to check one's own behavior or virtue: "a normal domestic mirror facilitates adjustment of external appearance: correspondingly, anything that facilitates improvement of the soul can be termed metaphorically a 'mirror'" (137). This, however, assumes an "objective" mirror that does one thing for all people; it assumes there was a common "domestic" mirror at the time,[22] and it does not question how mapping the "internal" soul onto the "external" qualities shown on the mirror's surface or in the words of the metaphoric mirror books facilitates improvement. How can removing the spot on your face make your virtue spot-less?

To say that the mirror is a metaphor is only to scratch its surface. While complete and taxonomic in his excavation of the history of mirror titles at the time, Grabes does not exhume the metaphor of the mirror: "Strictly speaking, of course, a mirror does not present something new so much as re-present something already in existence, so these mirror-titles seem to be applying the metaphor in somewhat imprecise way" (63). Either the application of the metaphor is imprecise or mirrors

[22] According to Melchior-Bonnet, such domestic mirrors were in fact uncommon prior to the second half of the seventeenth century (22).

at the time did not "re-present something already in existence;" either way, the shifting conception of the mirror in these Mirrors evidences a shifting object the reflection in which yielded a shifting referent.

The writers of these tracts generally explained how they expected their readers to use their Mirrors. *The Mirror for Magistrates*, printed several times in the second half of the sixteenth century, tells noblemen's (his)stories in order for other noblemen to learn from example. In the dedication, William Baldwin writes: "For here as in a loking glas, you shall see (if any vice be in you) howe the like that bene punished in other heretofore, whereby admonished, I trust it will be a good occasion to move you to the soner amendment. This is the chiefest ende, whye it is set furth, which God graunt it may atayne" (Campbell, 49). Jim Ellis argues that *The Mirror for Magistrates* writes the doom of the men on their bodies, externalizing internal sins in its attention to the details of the—often gruesome—deaths. Grabes examines the mirrors in these titles as vehicles of meaning and says that he wants to avoid "the pitfalls involved in seeing literary figuration as merely the outward and generally ornamental garb of thought" (10); yet he privileges the more "literary" metaphors and dismisses others (such as the one used by Hamlet) as "anything but original" (103). If the use of the Mirror is not to be dismissed as simply an "ornamental garb of thought," than the supposedly "unoriginal" uses should receive the most attention, not the least.

What remains unexamined is how the Mirror operates as an "inner" molder of thought in the unoriginal as well as the literary uses of the metaphor. Grabes

argues that in *The Mirror for Magistrates* tragedies occur due to both "'mundane irrationality' and 'mundane retribution'" and this creates a "double mirror:" "though both serve as warning examples to the reader, they warn of different things" (173). While the title applies to all the noblemen's histories, some of them are Mirrors of one part of nature (unpredictability and irrationality—chance) and some reflect another part of nature (divine justice, retribution, fortune). Just like Hamlet's Mirror, it is capable of multiple reflections.

Mould of form: different mirror, different Mirror

While all mirrors vary slightly, few mirrors in contemporary life reflect allegorically as the early modern Mirror so often did. In the paintings cited above the mirror pulls something very specific from the outside into the picture in order to change the meaning of the image. The image in the mirror gains meaning because they are not in the picture, but they are placed in counter-point. What is in the mirror is not what is in the picture but what is in the picture is in some way constituted by the image in the mirror: the Arnolfinis are married by virtue of the witnesses recorded in the mirror and the artist's signature by the mirror. In Shakespeare's plays, the Mirror most often reflects the meaning one might expect from a convex mirror: an idealization and miniaturization of many examples into one. In this, the Mirror operates like a blend: it compresses vital relationships into a unique identity for the purposes of comparison and contrast. However, emerging over this time period is a new blended Mirror space. While examples of the Mirror in the literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are legion, below I focus on a series of

examples from Shakespeare's plays as well as from King James's writing. Through tracing the focal length suggested in these Mirrors, I argue that a different mirror technology yields more than just a different reflection of the self; it yields a different Mirror.

In *Henry VI, part 1*, Lord Talbot compliments Salisbury by calling him the "mirror of all martial men" (1.4.78)[23] and the Chorus in *Henry V* similarly praises Henry as "the mirror of all Christian kings" (2.0.7). This Mirror is like the one Ophelia uses to compliment Hamlet ("the glass of fashion and the mould of form"), not like the one Hamlet uses to compliment Laertes ("his semblable is his mirror and who else would trace him his umbrage, nothing more"). In one, the mirror presents an ideal; in the other, the mirror creates a duplicate of that which stands before it. In order to imagine an ideal image in the mirror, it is necessary to project information from a convex mirror mental space. A convex mirror will present an editorialized version of that which stands before it, since it reduces that which is in focus. This highlighted feature of that which is in front of this mirror, came to be understood as an ideal—like the Bible or manuals of correction—or a warning—the deaths of noblemen in *The Mirror for Magistrates*. A mirror capable of such focus must have a different focal length than one capable of reproducing Laertes more clearly than his shadow.[24] The convex mirror instructs; held up to nature it will differentially reflect certain elements, seeming to prioritize relevant elements within

[23] Oxford Shakespeare, 1914.
[24] Indeed, until mirrors improved toward the end of the 16th century, images in (usually convex) mirrors were shadowy.

nature. The other mirror creates a mirror-image of that which stands in front of it—important for its differences as well as for its similarities—placing the responsibility for judging with the person reflected. This assessment takes the form of a dialogue with the duplicate, granting the image access to an unseen truth.

Sometimes Shakespeare uses the mirror as Hamlet does to Gertrude, capable of seeing an inside on an outside. A glass wherein one might see "the inmost part" of him or her self, creates a conception of depth on the surface of its metaphoric glass. These are the mirrors Cassius desires to find for Brutus in *Julius Caesar:* "such mirrors as will turn / Your hidden worthiness into your eye / that you might see your shadow." This Mirror does not focus external information on its surface, like the convex mirror. It projects information onto the surface from the interior of that which it reflects. Richard II calls for such a mirror when he has lost his nobility: "Let it command a mirror hither straight, / That it may show me what a face I have, / Since it is bankrupt of his majesty" (4.1). Without the crown on his head, he is bereft of majesty internally. This change, he assumes, will be evident in the reflection of his face. In *Winter's Tale*, Polixenes sees in the outward change of Camillo the inner change he perceives in himself: "Good Camillo, / Your changed complexions are to me a mirror / Which shows me mine changed too (1.2.442-3).[25] This blend, in opposition to the blend created from the convex mirror, depicts a self in dialogue with the self in order to gain information about an internal self. In *Cymbeline* when Cloten uses the image of a man talking to himself in his own

[25] From Oxford Shakespeare, 1914.

mirror as a justification to articulate his own strengths, he is presuming the ability of the mirror to operate as an object that separates the self in order to reflect the self. He argues that "I dare speak it to myself—for it / is not vain-glory for a man and his glass to confer / in his own chamber" (4.1.4-5).[26] For a man and his glass to confer, the "glass" must be blended with the reflection of the man. In order for the reflection to have information to share with the man, it needs to contain information projected in from parts of the man he cannot normally see: his insides.

Before I move to King James's many uses of the mirror blend, I wish to blur the subject of Shakespeare's plays and King James's rhetoric with the example of a Mirror that does not fit any of the above blends. When the witches show Macbeth the line of kings of which he will not be a part, the line is depicted as going on forever in a glass held by the last: "What, will the line stretch out to th' crack of doom? / Another yet! A seventh! I'll see no more. / And yet the eighth appears, who bears a glass / Which shows me many more;" (4.1.117-20).[27] The glass held by the eighth king (perhaps King James) could be a concave mirror, one capable of defusing the singular into the many. Or it could be a kind of time telescope, using the projection operation used to create a singular king out of "all Christian Kings" to find in the mirror the future of all Christian Kings.

The writing of King James contains many different uses of the Mirror. For King James, the Mirror was the exemplar to follow, the warning of bad behavior, the tool of seeing, and the embodiment of that knowledge. James exhorts his son to

[26] From Oxford Shakespeare, 1914.
[27] From Signet, 1963.

know the Bible, since: "seeing in him [god], as in a mirrour, the course of all earthly things, whereof hee is the spring and onely moouer" (13). Here James's Mirror shrinks and reflects salient features from all "earthly things" like the convex mirrors in the fifteenth century paintings discussed above. King James hopes his son will see in God an image of ideal behavior. In the scriptures: "there shall yee see your selfe, as in a myrrour, in the catalogue either of the good or the evill kings" (15); looking at the self in the mirror, like reading the Bible, provides a way of assessing the self through mapping "good" qualities and "evill" qualities from the reflection of the self (or the scriptures) back to the king in front of the mirror. In this conception, the king's reflection is blended with the scriptures, since both are seen as capable of providing self-correcting information. This Mirror provides the king with corrective material by comparing himself to the image he sees in the Bible.

Once James has set up this blend, wherein the king is looking into the Mirror of God for self-correcting material, he then suggests the king should be the scriptures, or mirror, for others: "let your owne life be a law-booke and a mirrour to your people; that therein they may read the practise of their owne Lawes; and therein may see, by your image, what life they should leade" (34). Here the king is the middle man: the reflection of God on earth for imitation by those below him. Again, describing for his son how to set an example he says: "And as your company should be a paterne to the rest of the people, so should your person be a lampe and mirrour to your company: giving light to your servants to walke in the path of vertue, and representing vnto them such worthie qualities, as they should preasse to

imitate" (42). Just as Shakespeare uses the mirror to describe theatre, James uses the mirror to describe a guide for imitation.

In a 1609 speech to Parliament, James uses the Mirror as something that provides a tool for seeing: "So haue I now called you here, to recompence you againe with a great and rare Present, which is a faire and a Christall Mirror; Not such a Mirror wherein you may see your owne faces, or shadowes; but such a Mirror, or Christall, as through the transparantnesse thereof, you may see the heart of your King" (179). Here it is the looking *through* the mirror, not *into* the mirror that counts. Through this Mirror, Parliament can see his heart. At the end of the speech, he says that the mirror *is* the heart and they should treat this gift with the care they would treat a mirror:

> Yee know that principally by three wayes yee may wrong a Mirrour. First, I pray you, looke not vpon my Mirrour with a false light: which yee doe, if ye mistake, or mis-vnderstand my Speech, and so alter the sence thereof. But secondly, I pray you beware to soile it with a foule breath, and vncleane hands: I meane, that yee peruert not my words by any corrupt affections . . . lastly (which is worst of all) beware to let it fall or breake; (for glasse is brittle) which ye doe, if ye lightly esteeme it, and by contemning it, conform not your selues to by perswasions. (203)

James's Mirror becomes the embodiment of all the knowledge gained from the use of the Mirror.

In the blends used by Shakespeare and King James, as well as the authors of the period's mirror-titled books, we can see images, mental spaces, and assumptions that can illuminate the fabric of blends that make up *Hamlet*. In *Shakespearean Negotiations*, Greenblatt argues that Hamlet's Mirror, being more like a seal or

signet ring in its creation of an impression "should signal to us that for the Renaissance more is at stake in mirrors than an abstract and bodiless reflection. Both optics and mirror lore in the period suggested that something was actively passing back and forth in the production of mirror images, that accurate representation depended upon material emanation and exchange" (8). The exchange seen here in the production of mirror images occurs in our blending of different ideas of the Mirror to construct that which we envision as "in" the mirror.

His umbrage: the long shadow of Hamlet's Mirror

Just as we do not see the mirror when we look into the mirror, critics seem to use the Mirror to express their ideas without examining how they are holding or operating the source of reflection. Weimann calls Hamlet the "mirror of representivity" (2000, 165) without noting that the type of mirror that creates a prototype or exemplar is a convex mirror. He does not need to, as it seems we are familiar with the Mirror being used differently from our own mirrors. From simple metaphor of duplication to complicated blend of proliferation, the mirror shows up in the writings of almost every single critic I have read. Sometimes the mirror is recognized as an unstable trope while being used confidently anyway. Stephen Orgel acknowledges that the mirror was a contradictory symbol in the renaissance, suggesting vanity and pride as well as the way to self-knowledge and self-improvement. Still, he describes masques, known for privileging spectacle over mimesis, flattery of the monarch over unmediated reflection, as "expression of the monarch's will, the mirrors of his mind" (45). In *Renaissance Minds and Their*

Fictions, Ronald Levao argues that in the Vice plays "theatrical trickery mirrors political trickery" (268) by which he means not a reflection but a miniaturization of its subject matter: "The play itself is a typological mirror, as 'the interpretour' tells us about midway through the action, truly representing the global struggle between good and evil" (272).

In "Performance as Metaphor" Bert States looks at the argument that theatre is a repetition of our actions in everyday life, not, as Richard Schechner suggests, some original act, but repeated things we then repeat on stage. "Theatre is, in a sense, the quintessential repetition of our self-repetitions, the aesthetic extension of everyday life, a mirror, you might say, that nature holds up to nature" (5). Echoing Hamlet, States seems to suggest that nature disassociates itself from nature in order to hold a mirror up to itself through repeating what was already repeated. In *Great Reckonings in Little Rooms*, the mirror is blended with what it reflects: "The point is that when nature is the subject of poetry in Shakespeare, it is not perceived as threatening or beautiful in itself but as a mirror image of what is threatening or beautiful in a single soul or in the body social" (64).[28] Like King James's evocation of King/God/Subject, States's mirror is a link that connects and separates poetry, nature, a soul, the body social, and the threatening or beautiful qualities that both cause and affect them.

In separate works, new critics Rudolf Stamm and Hereward Price write

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[28] To be fair, as discussed above, a "mirror image" is a different blend, where the image in the mirror is blended with what is in front of the mirror and rather than compress the identities, they remain distinct such that "mirror image" highlights the differences between the two spaces while connecting them in a cause and effect chain, such that the mirror is seen as both the cause and the effect of the differences.

about the “mirror scenes” in *Hamlet* and other plays as if the depth of the play is depicted in miniature on the surfaces of the scenes. Price insists that the scenes: “bring everything into focus” (104), which only makes sense if he is referring to a convex mirror, which would bring diffuse things into focus in a miniaturized reflection on the surface. Price goes on to involve what seems to me to be another type of mirror in his language: “Like the mirrors in the Palace of Fun they exaggerate grotesquely. In these plays all is interconnected and there are no loose ends” (106). Mirrors that exaggerate would be concave, since he has already assumed a convex mirror that miniaturizes would pull into focus rather than spread out “grotesquely.” I can only make sense of the second part of the quotation if I again think of a convex mirror, which will eliminate ancillary stimuli in its tightened focus thereby removing any “loose ends.”

Stamm uses a different sense of mirror in his definition of the mirror scenes. He argues that the scene in which Ophelia discusses Hamlet’s insanity offers the reader more than meets the eye: “We are looking at him as through a magnifying glass” (24). While the use of the mirror metaphor would suggest projection of a surface onto another surface, in the magnifying glass, the surface is seen in enlarged detail through the glass. The magnifying glass is figured as something to look *through*, whereas the mirror is something we say we look *into*, as if it were not a surface but a container. Though a magnifying glass metaphor here may seem more literal, he does not mean this literally, as this magnifying glass functions more like Hamlet’s mirror held up to nature, in that it finds features in an enlargement that had

gone unnoticed looking at the subject unaided. Stamm's magnifying glass here seems to combine some features of Hamlet's mirror, projecting from the magnifying glass input space the concentrated attention to a singular feature and from the "Hamlet's mirror" input space the inclusion of the holder of the object, choosing important information to angle the object at, and the social interaction blend that reads information about insides on the surface.

Hamlet's mirror seems to have had more of an impact on our mental spaces than our contemporary embodied experience with mirrors. Bloom insists that although his critics call attention to his pulling Hamlet out of *Hamlet*, what is important is not the art but what it reflects: "There is no 'real' Hamlet as there is no 'real' Shakespeare: the character, like the writer, is a reflecting pool, a spacious mirror in which we needs must see ourselves" (401). Bloom's mirror here (figured here as the conflated character/writer) gains more structural information from the handbooks of correction than with contemporary experience with mirrors. It is as if Bloom—and the other critics I have read--has spent more time with Hamlet and his anatomizing and editorializing mirror than he has with the mirror in Bloomingdales which show him how the blazer makes him look fat or the mirror that tells him that there is a car changing lanes behind him. Bloom is not the only one to use the mirror in Hamlet's blended fashion. Like the "nebulous infection" described by Greenblatt, Shakespeare's language of reflection seeps through our experience as powerfully as--more powerfully than—the mirror we see while brushing our teeth.

The mote in our eye: conclusion

In *The Literary Mind*, Turner suggests that a "blend can reveal latent contradictions and coherences between previously separated elements. … Blends yield insight into the conceptual structures from which they arise" (84). The blends that make up Hamlet's Mirror evoke convex mirrors—both their functional role as sartorial accoutrements as well as their artistic function as symbol makers; a social presentation of self and reading of other, figured like the interacting self and self in the mirror-gazing model; the mirror as the projection of God from the scriptural understanding of seeing in the Bible (as "through a glass darkly") the path to heaven; and the mirror as exemplar or warning spelled out in manuals or handbooks. While using the blend to illuminate theatre's role in societal correction, Shakespeare masks in the blend the invisible holder of the mirror, responsible for choosing the angle of reflection. Understanding the spaces blended to create the Mirror applied to the self, the Bible, or the theatre is key to understanding exactly what is being said about the self, Bible, or theatre.

Following Hawkes, I would argue that we cannot help reading *Hamlet* backwards, and part of what creates our blindspot—the mote in our eye—is our understanding of the mirror as defined by Shakespeare's language. Critics are so seeped in the blend of meanings in Hamlet's Mirror, even before reading *Hamlet*, they cannot read the blend without relying on it as an input space. Which begs the question, is there a time before reading *Hamlet*? If so many of our entrenched

blends rely on mental spaces infected and blended before by Shakespeare, than perhaps to speak English is to know *Hamlet*.

Chapter three - Staging the mirror's surface: *Hamlet* onstage and on screen and that which remains

> …if Shakespeare's form is observed, an audience is still held; if it is not observed, the audience's attention strays and strays very quickly. So Shakespeare lives. And if an actor understands a speech and expresses its meaning through the form, the audience will understand also, even if they might not understand if they read the speech through once to themselves. (Peter Hall, Prologue)

From the rise of the curtain to the bow of the actors, theatre prompts for blends. Hamlet walks onstage and the space that is "Hamlet" has already been blended with the input spaces of the actor playing the role, the character, and the character's role in the play that bears his name. Fauconnier and Turner depict dramatic performances as blends articulating an experience I have had in the theatre:

> The character portrayed may of course be entirely fictional, but there is still a space, a fictional one, in which that person is alive. We do not go to a performance of *Hamlet* in order to measure the similarity between the actor and a historical prince of Denmark. The power comes from the integration in the blend. The spectator is able to live in the blend, looking directly on its reality. … The importance and power of living in the blend would be hard to overestimate (266-267).

In order to live in this blend where Kevin Kline or Peter Stormare[1] is the most famous dramatic character in theatre history, an audience member can (but may not) forget how much she paid for her seat or whom she is sitting next to or what happens next onstage. While the body onstage playing Hamlet is already a blend, *Hamlet,* the play, prompts for a blend, since theatrical representation necessarily

[1] Played Hamlet in Ingmar Bergman production at BAM in 1988.

must blend that which is being represented (Hamlet's story of revenge) with people on a stage speaking lines.

Shakespeare's language is meant to be staged, not read. In order to understand how the language of the mirror and the object of the mirror operate onstage, I turn to two contemporary productions of *Hamlet*. Through this specific examination of Shakespeare's play as it took form in 1986 under the direction of Livliu Ciulei and in 1988 under the direction of Ingmar Bergman, the relationship between the object and the language becomes complicated and what is revealed is the power of the network of associations that make up the idea of the mirror to speak more clearly onstage than the object itself.[2] Next, turning the gaze to filmic representations of *Hamlet* catches the slipping of the mirror's relationship to that which it reflects and unveils he who holds the Mirror up to nature: the director. Finally, through analyzing performance in both modes, I hope to reveal the scaffolding that structures meaning, a meaning that remains. In this way, conceptual blending theory allows me to intervene in the debate regarding whether or not performance remains.

Speaking Swedish: a cognitive linguistic performance analysis

Not unlike the trickster agency found in the mirror's artistic representation discussed in the previous chapter, in performance the meaning of the Mirror slips. Any set designer could explain the practical difficulties of designing with mirrors onstage—unlike the mirror described by Hamlet, a mirror onstage indiscriminately

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[2] I will follow convention established in the previous chapter of referring to the mirror concept or blend as Mirror and the physical object as mirror.

reflects what is before it, often diffusing light meant to focus the audience's attention, reflecting characters or offstage business not meant to be seen, and/or reflecting the audience itself, bringing them onstage. What is more, a mirror onstage complicates the relationship between actor and character, surface and depth. Below I trace the use of the mirror onstage and investigate how new meaning emerges with the object in performance.

Ingmar Bergman brought his filmic star-power to a theatrical production of *Hamlet* that came to the Brooklyn Academy of Music in 1988. In Swedish, Bergman's *Hamlet* was well received by the critics. Even without speaking Swedish, the BAM audience recognized the places where Bergman shifted the staging to alter the play. Ophelia and the ghost haunt many scenes; in half-light they watch as Hamlet talks to Rosencrantz and Guildenstern or as he plots with the player king. At the end, Fortinbras's army arrives like the Marines, carrying the bodies upstage and tossing them into a mass grave. For Bergman, Hamlet's attempt to examine, to anatomize the facts before taking action, is a form of action and only a knife's edge separates thought, feeling, and action. His production visualizes the image schema that undergirds the English text we know so well.

Bergman literalized the Mirror with the reflecting side of a stage knife. Hamlet's anatomizing knife is first used during his advice to the players. He picks up the players' stage knife and holds it up when he talks about a mirror that can "show virtue her feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure" (3.2.22-4). Hamlet's gesture again calls attention to the

knife's reflective abilities and its trick nature: it retracts like a fake stage knife. Soon after peering into it as the theatrical mirror, he demonstrates it as a representation of a knife in a passionate stabbing of the player king meant to seem strangely serious. As Hamlet's emotions get the better of him, and he begins plunging the knife into the player king's back, the audience is reminded of why stage knives are used in the first place: passion or carelessness aside, a fake knife will not hurt. A stage knife represents a knife without actually being a knife; a stage knife represents a thing that can "kill" by being decidedly something that cannot kill. Bergman's use of the stage knife as mirror allows him to represent a mirror with an object already notable for its privileging of the representational by denying the actual.

Bergman creates the image of a mirror onstage through the use of symmetry in his staging. [See image in appendix b] The Mousetrap occurs up on a long table, with Gertrude and Claudius sitting in chairs upstage of the actors on the table and Hamlet and Ophelia sitting on the floor downstage of the performance. As the Player King and Queen perform a silent courtship, they do indeed form the mirror that Hamlet suggests theatre should be, with a watching couple on one side of them being reflected in the couple on the other side of them. The players are placed midway between the King and Queen and Prince and Ophelia, exactly where a mirror would need to be to reflect the image of one to the other. While the reflection is clear in the staging, it is left open who is assessing whom in the reflection being performed. And the play within the play is already a mirror within a mirror, since the audience is either reflected in the performance of Claudius and Gertrude

watching the players, Hamlet and Ophelia watching the Claudius and Gertrude watching, the players watching the courtiers, or all three, seeing our watching in the watching we are watching.

Bergman also stages the coronation scene and the final fencing match symmetrically, duplicating members of court in a mise en abîme of red-robed men or reflecting the image of Laertes with sword drawn in the image of Hamlet with sword drawn. In the duel example, the mirror becomes a scale, held in balance only as both remain on either side of the mirror [see image in appendix b]. As Laertes and Hamlet go back and forth in their parry and thrust, our eye notices the court that also balances on each side of the mirror. It is actually Gertrude's drinking of the poison that upends the balance reflection and begins the fatalities on both sides of the mirror. Through the doubling of images, Bergman locates the mirror onstage in an absence, in the place equidistant between the doubles where the reflecting occurs. In this way, he is able to stage a Mirror in the lacuna between images.

The one time an actual mirror is used onstage, it is used to communicate through symbolism, rather than reflection. The closet scene begins with Gertrude holding a small hand mirror up to her face. The audience does not see the mirror or the reflection, but Gertrude's pose (her bent right arm holding the mirror, tilted head, long dress, and outstretched left arm) immediately suggests classic images of vanity.[3] Hamlet subsequently holds a knife up to Gertrude when he talks about the

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[3] In Henry Peacham's *Minerva Britanna* (1612), there are three representations of mirrors: one for self-love (Philantia), one in the hand of female beauty (signifying: "how we by fight are mooued to loue"), and one representing the power of pride to cause fires (the sun shines through it, like a magnifying glass). While its connection to Narcissus suggests the danger in vanity, its connection to

glass capable of reflecting her inner parts. Neither Gertrude nor Hamlet looks into either of the reflecting surfaces, satisfied with the idea of the reflection rather than the specific image reflected. This representation of a mirror conveys the idea of reflection without being big enough to actually show Gertrude (or the audience) enough to shatter the idea of reflection in the actuality of reflection. The knife also suggests the kind of threat such an invasive examination would be, making Hamlet's Mirror a scalpel capable of beginning an autopsy.[4] While Bergman rarely uses an actual mirror onstage, he unpacks the Mirror blend and stages the spaces that make up our conception of Mirror.

Bergman uses many different representations of a Mirror, rather than just an actual mirror, to tell the story of *Hamlet*. Reviewing the production, Mel Gussow claims that although Bergman's *Hamlet* is entirely in Swedish, with no subtitles, "our familiarity with 'Hamlet' leads us to think that we know some Swedish."[5] Bergman representational mirror helps an audience understand Swedish by physicalizing the main image schema of the play. He does this by playing with the liminal space between representation and real as exhibited through the mirror and through symmetry that creates a mirror at the place of duplication. Though we may

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the Bible conveys the self-knowledge gleaned from examination of the self in the "glass" of the Bible. As discussed in the previous chapter, different mirrors convey different Mirrors, but here I argue that Bergman uses the staging of Gertrude and her mirror to evoke the Mirror associated with vanity.

[4] The use of the mirror to suggest self-examination or inquiry, discussed in chapter one, began to give way in the seventeenth century to the language of the autopsy or anatomy.

[5] This is interesting given the fluency with which I believe we all speak *Hamlet*: Gussow claims that we know *Hamlet* so well our fluency is transferred to Swedish. Knowing *Hamlet* means speaking any tongue; as if the text of *Hamlet* was the Rosetta Stone of modern languages. Bergman himself said in an interview about the Swedish production: "You know with 'Hamlet,' my God, there can't be any problems" (qtd in Babski).

not be conscious of the degree to which mirroring structures the language of the play, Bergman's production is proof that a rich and varied representation of the structuring metaphor can teach an audience to hear *Hamlet* in Swedish.

In 1986, Livliu Ciulei directed Kevin Kline in a production of *Hamlet* at the New York Shakespeare Festival Public Theater. Ciulei's production was dark and politically charged—Gussow called it "Bismarckian – more German than Danish"—turning the focus away from Fortinbras and the dangers from without to the corruption within. Ciulei used a vanity mirror in several scenes to focus attention on the troubled surface--the outward presentation of self that one perfects while sitting in front of a vanity, applying make-up or fixing hair--and the corruption within the state of Denmark. Kline uses it to put on clown make-up while he instructs Horatio to watch his uncle's reaction to the play and also as he begins his advice to the players. Here Ciulei's mirror focuses attention on the masks put on to generate and circulate power.

As Clifford Geertz suggests in his influential essay "Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbols of Power," the performance of power is also a masking of the making of power: "The very thing that the elaborate mystique of court ceremonial is supposed to conceal—that majesty is made, not born—is demonstrated by it" (153).[6] Greenblatt pursues Geertz's argument in *Shakespearean*

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[6] Geertz explicates Weber's idea of "charisma" in terms of how three different rulers in three different cultures create charisma through a marking of center. Using analogy and allegory, these rulers perform power in moving from center to periphery and back, both physically and sociologically. Geertz's argument is predicated on the hope that understanding the construction of power might shake the "inherent sacredness of sovereign power" (151). The paradox of charisma

Negotiations, particularly in "Invisible Bullets" wherein he argues that the creation of courtly charisma occurs through exposing and then repairing a charismatic center.[7] Similarly, Louis Montrose explores the "performativity of sovereignty" (1996, 39) of the Elizabethan court and the power of performance, both within and outside of the theatre. Ciulei's mirror, it would seem, seems situated to reflect contemporary theories of power, corruption, and performance during the Elizabethan period. As opposed to the Mirror Hamlet hopes to use on Gertrude to expose her inward spots, however, an actual mirror has a slippery reflection onstage and does not communicate a single meaning.

At center stage, Hamlet prepares for his role--as trickster clown, perhaps—while the actors prepare on stage left and the court prepares stage right. Ciulei stages Kline and his mirror as the mirror of one preparation for the other, suggesting that the performance of the role of performer is similar to the performance of the role of audience. Of course, this underlines the flaw in Hamlet's logic about the exposure of Claudius's guilt: if everyone is creating a performative mask prior to the performance, there's no reason to believe that Claudius's face will be free from masks--and thus display his internal feelings of guilt--during the performance. Gussow finds this scene particularly effective: "In one of the director's most vivid images, while the players don their costumes for their performance, on the other half of the stage the members of the court dress to play their roles in the theatre of life.

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being that it is rooted in the center but found most often in those at the periphery who would like to be closer.

[7] This leads him to the subversion/containment argument: "Thus the subversiveness that is genuine and radical…is at the same time contained by the power it would appear to threaten" (30).

Anchoring both halves is Mr. Kline's mesmeric Hamlet. Instructing the players, he puts clown makeup on his face and then acts as interlocutor for 'The Murder of Gonzago'" (2). In Gussow's description, Kline and the mirror are located at the vanishing point of both reflections. Placed between two sets of actors performing identical tasks, Kline's interlocutor physicalizes the Mirror he hopes the coming theatrical presentation will be.

The vanity also appears in the closet scene, though Kline does not refer to the mirror when he mentions finding his mother a mirror to show her inward spots. In fact, the mirror is not used or touched by either of them. Upstaging Gertrude and Hamlet, the mirror takes on a charged meaning, despite, and maybe because, it is not used by the actors. The mirror is angled down, as if Gertrude sat at the mirror to see her stomach. The angle seems chosen for its ability to avoid reflecting the lights or the audience, rather than its usefulness for Gertrude. Unlike the magical x-ray mirror proposed by Hamlet, this mirror can only show what is below; it only reflects a different angle on what can just as well be seen without it.

A vanity mirror (as opposed to a full-length mirror, for example) is used to reflect the face that cannot be seen without a mirror. As discussed in chapter two, the reflected face is simultaneously blended with the face in front of the mirror ("that's me" rather than "that's my reflection") and also separated in order to associate the face with an internal self interacting, sharing information with the other. Gertrude's vanity suggests the type of mirror evoked in the manuals of correction discussed above, however, only if it reflects the face; angled at her

stomach, the mirror does not suggest interaction or an internal examination. While the symbol of the vanity mirror in the scene seems meant to communicate Gertrude's duplicity—like the performative masks of the Mousetrap scene or Hamlet's remark that women create a second face where God only gave them one—the actuality of its reflection onstage undermines this interpretation. Perhaps it is there to represent the spying eye of Polonius, blinded by angle or perspective. Located upstage center, Ciulei's mirror here is charged with importance, yet angled at the stomach, the mirror suggests fruitless looking.[8] Both loaded and impotent, the mirror calls attention to itself as object, rather than as symbol.

Ciulei's attempt to manage the reflection in the mirror calls attention to the star playing his Hamlet. In his review, Gussow comments that "Mr. Kline has not settled for one face of Hamlet, but offers a variegated version – devoted son, avenging angel, devious actor." Though Gussow means that Hamlet's character also contains a "devious actor," it is also true that Kline's Hamlet deviously puts forth the face of the film star playing him. While Hamlet's application of another face in the Mousetrap scene calls attention to the performativity of state and the corruption and masking within this Denmark, this reading breaks down after a minute or two as the mirror communicates differently in performance. Ciulei stages the scene so that the audience is shown Hamlet's face as it transforms with the clown makeup, but not the reflection of his face in the mirror. Though the audience watches the character apply stage make-up, the mirror calls to mind the actor, not the character.

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[8] Quite literally "navel gazing."

A character can apply makeup, but in order to judge its application, it requires an actor. Since only Kline can look into the mirror, only Kline can be reflected in the mirror. The performance of the mirror onstage does more than signify, it isolates and amplifies. Since Kline cannot see Hamlet's reflection but only his own, the audience is forced to see Kline in Hamlet through the use of the mirror onstage.

As several of the commentaries and reviews of this production note, Kevin Kline is the face that launched the production, the film star surrounded by actors "not in his solar system" (Gussow, 1986). As is often the case with productions of *Hamlet*, the star gets better lighting, special placement onstage, and often carte blanche for upstaging other actors. The first scene where the guardsmen encounter the ghost is practically not lit at all and the second scene gets brighter only when Hamlet enters. Ciulei gives Kline a special entrance at the beginning of the court scene, having him enter before the King and receiving the bowing and deference by courtiers onstage that we would associate with the King. Since this is Kline's first entrance, Ciulei and Kline can be forgiven for assuming that the entrance would occasion applause. Kline's Hamlet takes in the honor with surprise and humility, allowing Kline to project the same to the applauding audience. Ciulei stages the entrance so that both Hamlet and Kline can take their time receiving the adoration from both audiences. The moment disconnects the identity of the actor and character, so the audience sees him as both. Like the mirror that reflects an editorialized version of what stands before it, Ciulei's production of *Hamlet* doubles Hamlet into character and actor, using the star power of one to comment on the star

power of the other. From the start, the face of the star and the face of the character are welded together; not merged, but rather combined--Janus-faced--separate but equally visible.

Talking about dogs, children, and working clocks, Bert O. States suggests in *Great Reckonings in Little Rooms* that such things onstage provide a moment when "the floor cracks open and we are startled, however pleasantly, by the upsurge of the real into the magic circle where the conventions of theatricality have assured us that the real has been subdued and transcended" (34). In Ciulei's staging of *Hamlet*, the real has not been subdued, but rather transcends and upstages the theatrical by way of foregrounding the star-power of the actor's face in the character's makeup.

While the practicality of the mirror onstage necessitates the creative solution found by Bergman, on film such technical difficulties should be moot. On film, a director can use the image without reflecting an external world of lights or audience members. The rupture between character and actor, representation and real, that happens onstage, then, should allow for a less complicated representation of the mirror image on film. On film, the mirror can reflect exactly what the director wants it to; this control, however, calls attention to the camera and the director who aims it. Through the mirror in film productions of *Hamlet*, the audience sees the director, and the vanity of the mirror is transferred to the vanity of the cinema.

Screen / Play I: the mirror in the camera lens

While the mirror on film does not expose the conventions of theatricality that it does onstage, it does call attention to the film medium itself. The camera can

capture the mirror, and the actor looking into the mirror, without catching its own reflection, but by doing so it foregrounds its presence, its power to capture and control looking.[9] Thus, the irrepressible duality between the real and the represented is still reflected in the film's Mirror; it is just that, on film, the camera is the Mirror, peering into the inmost part of the medium of which it is a part. Looking at the use of the mirror and the medium in three film versions of *Hamlet* exposes how the director angles the camera to reflect the self and celebrity and the self through celebrity. The language of the Mirror in the play's text is staged in the relationship between the celebrity available on (and through) film and the authenticity available through relationship with Shakespeare's play.[10] The translation between worlds is the Mirror that reflects Hamlet's—and even more clearly, the director's—self.

In 1948, film was Hollywood's medium, viewed with perhaps as much awe and opprobrium as the mirror was in 1603. The practical monopoly that Hollywood had on film making in 1948 is not unlike the monopoly on mirror making held by Italy in the 1500's. Laurence Olivier, England's stage hero, brings Hamlet to the screen, combining the authenticity and status of England's greatest contribution to the arts, Olivier's dyed blond good looks, and the glamour and artistry of

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[9] While any film analysis must acknowledge the influence of Laura Mulvey's powerful explication of the male gaze on film and the use of lack to control the watching, her work is difficult enough to untangle from its psychoanalytic perspective that it is only of limited use to me.
[10] For an exploration of the expanding "text" and "authority" of *Hamlet*, see Hopkins and Reynolds, "The Making of Authoriships."

Hollywood cinema.[11] Olivier's *Hamlet* must have been a balm on the post-war British sense of self.

Olivier's Hamlet captures the performances of a theatrical Hamlet.[12] The actors all mouth the verse aggressively, as might be needed to convey meaning and emotion in a large theatre but which seems inappropriate for this medium. He uses few close ups, relying instead on middle and long shots, giving the film's audience the same view they would have in a small theatre.[13] When he does give a close up of Bernardo's face before the ghost arrives, it is to capture the fear on Bernardo's face; but Bernardo is acting for the theatre and his look of fear seems meant to project to the back row. Onstage, the emotional quality of the entry of the ghost would be communicated on the actors' faces (and body postures), so this is how Olivier does it in the film. The exaggerated facial expression on the actor's face is a theatrical close-up, not a filmic one, since onstage the only way to make the audience closer is to make the actor appear bigger. In using a theatrical strategy on film, however, Olivier's camera fractures the emotional moment, since the out-sized emotional expression makes it appear distorted, as in a fun-house mirror.

Despite not giving himself screenwriter credit, Olivier removes Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and alters the film to focus on the psychological reading made

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[11] Jean Chothia reminds us that "no recontextualisation of Shakespeare, however seemingly depolitised, is devoid of ideological implications" and argues that the money and acclaim garnered by Olivier's Hamlet placed it in the mainstream of Hollywood films (127). In a separate anthology of Shakespearean filmic appropriations, Ariane Balizet argues that films such as *10 Things I Hate About You* and *Romeo + Juliet* "make the subtle but significant leap from 'popular' to 'pop'" and thus place films such as Olivier's in a category of "classic and authoritative" (123).

[12] For a psychoanalytic reading of Olivier's *Hamlet*, see Starks.

[13] As Jim Carmody pointed out, Olivier's film does rely on extremes of angle and light and dark, evoking the filmic strategies of German Expressionism.

popular by Freud. Eileen Herlie, who plays Gertrude, was born thirteen years after Olivier, making her less of a mother figure than young love interest. In the closet scene Olivier foregrounds the bed to suggest an Oedipal entanglement that motivates the rage and the delay.[14] Olivier omits Fortinbras to accentuate the internal psychological rot in Denmark. As Lisa Starks suggests: "Olivier's adaptation self-consciously responds to post-World War II existentialist thought, which was deeply enmeshed in psychoanalytic theory" (171) Even though he grants Shakespeare full writing credit, Olivier adapts Shakespeare's *Hamlet* to be his *Hamlet*.

Olivier's camera captures the play as theatrical event; his interest is in recording on film his portrayal of *Hamlet* the play. The film begins with a slide giving the setting ("Scene-Elsinore"), a quotation from the play in voice over ("So oft it chances in particular men / That through some vicious mole of nature in them, / By the o'ergrowth of some complexion / Oft breaking down the pales and forts of reason, / Or by some habit grown too much; that these men - / Carrying, I say, the stamp of one defect, / Their virtues else - be they as pure as grace, / Shall in the general censure take corruption / From that particular fault...."), and then Olivier adds a director's note ("This is the tragedy of a man who could not make up his mind"), as if filming the program he once handed to theatre-goers. Olivier transfers the role of theatre director to film by changing the light on Horatio's face while he

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[14] The young Gertrude trend continues in Zefferelli's *Hamlet*, with Glenn Close to Mel Gibson's Hamlet; Gibson, six years younger than Close, strains the believability of Gertrude's early procreativity.

speaks. The camera, held as ’twere a mirror up to Hamlet, captures the theatrical roots and the cinematic ambitions of the director’s self.

From the title to the credits, filmed adaptations of Shakespeare’s plays create a collision between the language and history of film and the language and history of theatre. Kenneth Branagh includes Shakespeare’s name in the title of his film, and most film versions separate the writing credit into “play” and “screenplay”. The writer of the screenplay is presumably responsible for specifying, as Branagh does, that the camera capture a rising sun where the playwright simply wrote “But look, the morn, in russet mantle clad, / Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastward hill” (1.1.190) and a theatrical director might call for a light cue to change the color on the actor’s face. Branagh films some of the dialogue during the coronation scene as whispered among the family, rather than shared publicly. Shakespeare did not write these passages as asides, which he could have if he wanted to convey that Gertrude says something just for Hamlet’s ears, but Branagh as screenwriter does suggest this.

Kenneth Branagh’s four-hour *Hamlet* (1996) is a comparable attempt to create himself at the place where film and theatre, England and America, art and celebrity meet.[15] Olivier’s film uses fog and shadows to convey a haunted night, while Branagh’s film uses jump cuts, extreme angles, and post-production special effects. Where Olivier is still primarily telling the story through the words, theatrically, Branagh transfers the story telling to the medium of film. Branagh uses

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[15] Branagh made an American name for himself by doing this first with *Henry V*, a text even more ideally situated to charge into the breech between American and English cinema.

filmic techniques and references to establish Shakespeare and mock the medium he is using to stage Shakespeare. In using the length of the film as a selling point—bringing to the screen an "uncut" *Hamlet*[16]--Branagh never mentions the textual instability of *Hamlet* or the debate over which version was meant to be performed; he suggests that if it is written down somewhere as a part of Shakespeare's play, than by golly we should watch it. Only Branagh's must be "complete"; the others are cut for convenience or with artistic license. While any adaptation of a Shakespeare play grants an authorial privilege to the director, Branagh pretends not to take such liberties by advertising that he is recording "the whole" *Hamlet,* as if there is such a thing. Moreover, Branagh's use of flashbacks (to Hamlet and Ophelia in bed, for example) and simultaneous scenes of Fortinbras and Laertes in the midst of characters' speeches "add" to Shakespeare's play. Branagh's camera reflects the text without omission yet with addition, not unlike the mirror held up to nature: commenting through angle and reproduction. Branagh establishes his artistic importance by denying his artistic license in a film that uses Shakespeare as badge of authority.

Branagh's film stages several scenes in a grand ballroom or great hall with mirrored doors on all sides. During the nunnery scene, Branagh has Polonius and Claudius hide from Hamlet behind one of the doors, and watch him through the one-way mirror while Hamlet sees multiple images of himself. Hamlet ends up in front of this particular door midway through 'to be or not to be' and holds his knife up,

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[16] Maslin's review suggests that the play is "presented here in its convoluted, Machiavellian entirety."

the edge touching the mirror with Claudius on the other side. The one-way mirror stages Hamlet's homicide and suicide, as the knife is pointing at different men from different angles. When Claudius enters a confession chamber to pray after the Mousetrap, Hamlet is on the other side of the confessional, unseen to Claudius and yet seeing. The screen between them divides them like the one-way mirror in the nunnery scene, except reversed. Again, Hamlet holds his knife up to the screen, and the audience actually sees the knife forced into Claudius's ear in a dream sequence. Mirrors here are locations of seeing, a way to spy unseen. Behind the one-way mirror, Branagh's camera can even see inside Hamlet's head to the fantasies of regicide at work.

One of the few examples of the mirror used as an uncomplicated reflecting device is during Hamlet's advice to the players. As Branagh reaches the final third of the speech, he stands surrounded by players with a large framed mirror behind him, dimly reflecting his back and suspenders. Compared to the foregrounded reflections elsewhere,[17] this reflection is almost unnoticeable. The reflection is foggy and angled to add no new information to the film frame but Branagh's back. Here, almost by accident, Branagh films a mirror that undercuts his hero; as the players watch the confident prince pontificate on acting, the film viewers can see the other side of the orator. While not quite upstaged, Branagh's Hamlet vies to articulate a Mirror in words that conflicts with the actual mirror behind him. Unlike

[17] When Ophelia comes in at the end in a straight jacket, she delivers many of her lines leaned up against the same mirror/door that Hamlet shoved her against during the nunnery scene. She sits next to a mirror in the hall while singing and touches its edge, seen now as imperfect, with discolored blotches on the edge. During the final duel, the fight is reflected in the mirrors, seeming to multiply the participants.

the mirror held up to nature that editorializes the content to focus our attention on virtue, form, and pressure, this mirror indiscrimanently reflects the back of the man that stands before it. This mirror reflects not as a symbol, as the other mirrors in the film, but as an object. Or, conversely, Branagh means to remind his audience that where Hamlet may be wrong in his description of theatre and mirrors, Branagh the director is completely in control of the nature held in the camera's reflection.

Branagh tells his story with film and also through film. Unlike Olivier's film, Branagh's camera sweeps up to the exterior of a dark castle (Blenheim Palace, home of the Duke of Marlborough who plays Fortinbras's General in this film) at night and uses quick cuts to create unease. Janet Maslin's review notes: "this film has earthquake special effects and a horror-film look when its ghost arrives." While Branagh's title situates the film in Shakespeare's theatrical world and Blenheim Palace places it in England, the actors locate the film in Hollywood. Branagh starts his film by finding on the grounds of this British castle a clear representative of old Hollywood. Marcellus, one of the first characters filmed, is played by Jack Lemmon, with a terrified face of an unnerved castle guard. From Osric (Robin Williams) to the player king (Charlton Heston) and even an added scene between Priam (John Gielgud) and Hecuba (Judi Dench), Branagh uses the star power of his actors to tell the story with and through their celebrity.

With his dyed blonde hair, Branagh nods toward the famous blond Olivier *Hamlet*, making Hamlet more matinee idol than brooding intellectual[18] and forcing a

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[18] Blondes neither brood nor think.

comparison with Olivier's landmark production. Branagh gestures to other movies, other celebrated Hollywood heroes, and in so doing positions himself as the heir to the history of British stage actors turned Hollywood leading men. The first shot of Branagh's Hamlet-- standing still, behind the coronation scene--recalls Clarisse Starling's first sight of Anthony Hopkins[19] as Hannibal Lector, the modern-day thinker temporarily incapable of acting. During his duel with Laertes, Branagh's Hamlet swings across the ballroom on the chandelier, suggesting Errol Flynn's famous sword fight with Basil Rathbone in *The Adventures of Robin Hood* (1938). Branagh's "*William Shakespeare's Hamlet*" speaks to an audience more familiar with Hollywood's Shakespeare than Shakespeare's *Hamlet*.

Dench and Gielgud serve as an index or prompt for the source, the inspiration for Heston's player king's poor imitation. Heston suggests the filmic equivalent of the kind of overacting Hamlet is concerned about; as Moses in *The Ten Commandments*, Heston famously out-Herod's Herod.[20] Billy Crystal is the Gravedigger and yet many of the actors are theatre actors, unknown to American audiences. In this, Branagh speaks simultaneously to both audiences: those for whom Crystal's presence in the movie ensures that--whatever he is saying--it must be funny, and those who recognize the second gravedigger as Simon Russell Beale, celebrated British theatre actor. Filming celebrity, Branagh's camera reflects not just

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[19] Now Sir Anthony Hopkins.
[20] Indeed, Heston hosted "Saturday Night Live" in 1987 and 1993, spoofing his broad acting style.

the face that we know so well,[21] but the network of associations connected to that face. While much has been said about the use of celebrity in film and onstage (and I will be adding to this in Chapter 5)[22], I hope to suggest here only that Branagh carefully casts his film to position himself, the Mirror, as equally capable of reflecting Hollywood as West End.

Olivier's *Hamlet* is set in the Elizabethan period and yet is steeped in the issues and psychology of its own period. Branagh's *Hamlet* is set in the 19th century, yet authenticates itself through filming the "whole" text. Michael Almereyda's *Hamlet* (2000) is set in a postmodern New York City; it irritates many critics through its anachronisms, and stars Ethan Hawke, a young actor better known for films such as *Reality Bites* (1994) and for his marriage to Uma Thurman than for classical stage acting. While seemingly the least faithful to Shakespeare's play, Almereyda's film privileges the ideas and metaphors that drive the play, rather than the details surrounding a notion of original intent. Almereyda clearly links the Mirror to the camera, creating a link between watching, creating, and the self.

In Almereyda's *Hamlet*, the Mirror proliferates the watching of others. As Hamlet, Ethan Hawke stares into the reflecting mirrors of Ophelia's eyes on his video screen to understand her motivations and delivers his "How all occasions do inform against me" soliloquy into the mirror on the plane to England, explaining to

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[21] Scientists have recently found that in our facial recognition area of the brain we actually have a unique cell for many celebrities, much the way we do for close friends and relatives. In addition to a cell that fires when one sees her mother, there is a cell that fires when she sees Jennifer Aniston.
[22] Starks argues that by casting Glenn Close as Gertrude, Franco Zefferelli relies on the "intertextual meanings generated by Close's other roles, in such films as Adrian Lyne's *Fatal Attraction*" and that these associations, the traces of these past performances on Close's current production, "contributes significantly to the cultural and ideological meanings of the maternal in Zefferelli's *Hamlet*" (171).

the self he sees in the mirror that it is time for action and "bloody" thoughts. Almereyda's camera is able to control what is reflected in these mirrored surfaces, being the invisible holder and revealer that Hamlet's players cannot be. When Gertrude tells Hamlet to "let thine eye look like a friend on Denmark," both characters wear dark sunglasses and the camera angle is such that we see neither their eyes nor the reflection in their sunglasses, but rather the blank, reflective windows in the buildings behind them. The windows of the buildings reflect more than the windows of their souls. This changes when Gertrude gets into the limo and her sunglasses suddenly depict what she is looking at. When Claudius tells Hamlet that a return to Wittenberg is "most retrograde to our desire," Almereyda cuts to the tinted window descending to show Gertrude's mirrored eyes. The reflective surfaces of the glasses and the window allow only a silhouetted image (the "umbrage") of her son and husband. For Almereyda, the reflecting surfaces proliferate the force of perception in his panoptic Elsinore.

The mirrors capture and the camera records. During the "fishmonger" scene with Polonius (Bill Murray), Almereyda films part of the scene as if viewed through the security camera in the Elsinore Corporation headquarters. Instead of flowers and herbs, Ophelia hands out photograps. Almereyda cuts "the play's the thing / Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king" from his screenplay because he cuts the play. Instead, the Mousetrap is a short film made by Hamlet, who is a filmmaker. The fiction that ensnares through fabrication, the Mirror held up to

nature, is here an art-house movie. The camera, linked to the Mirror on which it dotes, situates the invisible hand of the mirror's holder with the film director.

Shakespeare's brooding student of Wittenberg has not been made the type of director responsible for action adventure movies, such as the one playing on the T.V. screens at Blockbuster as Hawke browses and delivers the "to be or not to be" speech in voice over--or *Rebel Without a Cause* (1955)--studied by Hamlet during his "o what a rogue and peasant slave am I?" speech. This Hamlet creates films that are "caviare to the general." Hawke's Hamlet spends much of the movie in the process of watching, recording, and replaying. Just as he delivers his "bloody thoughts" soliloquy into the airplane's bathroom mirror, he stares into his own eye—dark enough to reflect the "live" Hawke—on the screen and films himself speaking. His bedroom is filled with video screens, cameras, and editing consoles, suggesting that while Hamlet may be rich enough to afford his own equipment, he is not successful enough to have a production company to do the work for him.

Almereyda uses the camera to capture and comment on the star power of its celebrity actors. Bill Murray as Polonius underplays Polonius's traditionally over-blown pomposity and verbosity, since his most famous roles, on *Saturday Night Live*, in *Ghostbusters* (1984), and *Caddyshack* (1980), so powerfully "ghost" his performance that the comedy is projected from the mental space we have for the actor. Almereyda casts Sam Shepard as the ghost, borrowing his playwright/rebel/unwitting film star persona to tell the story. Just as the ghost seems grieved to find himself a ghost, Shepard seems trapped in his good looks, using his

grudging film persona as a way of communicating his real pull toward the elevated status of playwright that he has only temporarily abandoned. Moreover, since Shakespeare was thought to have played the ghost, in Almereyda's film, Sam Shepard becomes the modern actor/creator hybrid. Almereyda's *Hamlet* rewards the kind of close reading theorists enjoy giving papers on. Unpacking the blend created through his casting of Shepard as the ghost, creates a richer understanding of the meaning and an appreciation for how it operates without requiring critical exegesis.

Screen / Play II: the blend unpacked

One of the most common criticisms leveled at blending theory is that it cannot predict the exact blend constructed from any given set of evoked mental spaces. Fauconnier has argued that while any particular blend might vary from individual to individual, the network of spaces prompted in a given situation is more powerful as a process in flux, a series of variables, than simply a final blend. Almost by design, a complete description of the spaces within a network built by a blend is impossible, since there are an infinite number of possible associated spaces. The value of applying conceptual blending theory to performance does not lie in its taxonomic abilities, but rather in how it maps the likely spaces and uncovers connections not immediately apparent but maintaining power even in dormancy. Since an attempt to track the spaces and blends evoked by the Polonius/Hamlet exchange quickly runs into a dramatic lack of information about the early modern performances of and actors in the productions of *Julius Caesar* and *Hamlet*, I would

like to use the network of spaces evoked in Almereyda's casting of Sam Shepard as the ghost to explore what blending theory can reveal about performance.

In "The Ghost of Anyone's Father," Mark Turner counters Greenblatt's claim that the ghost in Hamlet is unlike any other ghost. Just like all ghosts, Turner avers, the ghost of King Hamlet conforms to the same "ghost physics" commonly understood to control other ghosts. Ghosts share some properties with the living (they move, talk, think) and some properties with the dead (they cannot talk, move, die). Since a ghost is "a concept for which there is no referent, no evidence" (1) it is created through blending. He looks at the blend that has given human beings a soul, which comes from "our most familiar conceptual frames, called 'Caused Motion'" (19) wherein that which does the motion is seen as separate from that which motivates it. Since the body, conceived of as a container, requires a force to cause motion, there must be a soul that resides in a living body and out of a dead body. That which causes the body to move, separated from the body, can then be understood as another version of the self, the soul:

> since a person appears to have a body that is identical to the body we see after the death of the person, we can make a blend in which the disanalogy connection between the person and the body is compressed to create an *absence* in the blend of the cause of the movement and the sensation. In this blend, the human body becomes a *corpse*—that is a *lifeless* human body, a body whose animation is *absent*. (19)

This blend yields emergent structure that can be seen in many of the ways death and self are manifested in language as well as in the plots of Shakespeare. If the soul, a nonthing created through blending, is present in the person and absent from the

corpse, then: “when the soul is absent from the body, it is because it is present somewhere else; that the soul is in single space-time location; that death is the departure of the soul from the body as it journeys to another place” (21).

These constraints drive the “ghost physics” wherein the ghost maintains elements of the dead King (his appearance, his memory, his intentions), but not others. The ghost takes the shape of the body it once resided in, but not its physical materiality: “In the same figure, like the King that’s dead” (*Hamlet* 1.1.53). It can talk and walk, but cannot effect material change directly; that is, the ghost cannot get his own revenge. In the table below I piece out how the ghost blend mental space contains information from “dead” mental space and information from the “alive” mental space, making it both and neither.

Table 1: Mapping from “Dead” to “Alive” to create the Ghost Blend

Dead	**Ghost Blend**	**Alive**
Soul-less body	Soul w/o physical body	Soul and body
Can’t talk	Can talk	Can talk
Can’t move	Can move	Can move
Has no memories	Has memories	Has memories
Can’t move through other physical objects	Can move through physical objects	Can’t move through other physical objects
Can’t die	Can’t die	Can die

Although I find Turner’s unearthing of the ghost blend helpful, as a reading of *Hamlet*, it falls short in that it fails to account for the performance conditions that required the ghost to be played by an actor who had to conform to real physics, not ghost physics. In other words, the actor playing the ghost (thought to be

Shakespeare himself) needed the trap to get through the floor. Embodied by an actor, the network expands.

Not unlike the ghost blend above, Hamlet is also a blend; without an actor, "Hamlet" is just words on a page, unable to walk or talk. Embodied in the actor's body (Burbage, Olivier, Hawke), "Hamlet" can become Hamlet. The actor is never invisible, never wholly subsumed by the identity of the character—despite what some acting teachers might preach.[23] As Fauconnier and Turner argue in *The Way We Think*: "While we perceive a single scene, we are simultaneously aware of the actor moving and talking on a stage in front of an audience, and of the corresponding character moving and talking within the represented story world" (266). I cite Fauconnier and Turner to stress that while Sam Shepard as the ghost of King Hamlet might be a blend, it is first and foremost a network of spaces, primed by the directorial choices of Almereyda, so that the audience is aware of more than just the actor and his character. To understand the performance of Shepard as the ghost of Hamlet's father, an audience member imports the blend he/she has for "Sam Shepard."

Almereyda's film becomes more resonant because of the Shepard/Ghost blend. Because of the confluence and clashes between the mental spaces, Almereyda tells a rich story of high and low art, dead and alive, father and son, film and video, stage and screen, in an instant. In the tables that follow, I have attempted to outline the blends at work in Almereyda's casting of Sam Shepard as the Ghost of

[23] For more on character and actor, see chapter five. Chapter four discusses suspension of disbelief given conceptual integration networks.

Hamlet's father. I start with the blend created by Shakespeare's words and Almereyda's images. Whereas Shakespeare writes that Old King Hamlet was a well-liked King, the "majesty of buried Denmark" (1.1.61), Almereyda's film translates Elsinore into a large corporation and makes Hamlet's father the last CEO.

Table 2: Mapping of Actor's personas with Shakespeare's characters

"Reality" mental space	**Almereyda's Hamlet mental space**	**Shakespeare's story mental space**
Sam Shepard	Old Hamlet a king-like CEO	Old King Hamlet
Ethan Hawke	Grungy, arty, New York videograher.	Brooding Wittenberg intellectual

This omits more than it includes, of course, but begins to illuminate just what is missing. With Shepard as the CEO father that Hawke is supposed to avenge, it is no longer ambiguous whether or not Hamlet is mad for being passed over for succession. [24] With Shepard as Hawke's father, the complexity and pain in the father/son relationship is clear. With Shepard as the dead father returning to seek revenge from his dawdling son, there is a pathos to the disappointment. How this information is conveyed through casting requires more unpacking of the blends involved in, among others, "Shepard," "Shakespeare," "Hamlet's Father," "Absent," "Present." Before examining how Shepard comes to generate so much meaning in a

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[24] What this makes explicit that the play (at least to contemporary audiences) does not, is that Hamlet—here a grungy video artist—does not wish to follow in his father's footsteps. This set-up relies on cultural (or folk) models of the father/son relationship wherein if they are not alike, they are at odds. Coulson cogently explains frames as "hierarchically structured attribute/value pairs that can either be integrated with perceptual information or be used to activate generic knowledge about people and objects assumed by default." When frames are shared socially, such that such assumptions can be drawn upon to read or communicate a given situation, these are called "cultural models." See Coulson (2005) pg. 2-3.

small part, it is important to lay the Sam Shepard "reality" blend evoked by his presence.

In his 1994 *Movie Encyclopedia*, Leonard Maltin opens his short biography of Shepard with a description of his talents: "While his rugged good looks, sinewy frame, and pleasant drawl seem to make this actor an all-American hero in the Gary Cooper mold, Shepard's background renders him something more than that. He is also a highly regarded playwright who won the Pulitzer Prize for his 1979 play 'Buried Child.'" For those unfamiliar with Shepard's playwriting career, his evocation of the "Gary Cooper mold" might suggest Marshal Will Kane from *High Noon* (1952), or simply the cliché of the strong, silent type. If one is only familiar with Shepard from *The Right Stuff* (1983), his ghost will remind one of Chuck Yeagar. If, however, the audience is familiar with Shepard's literary output, they might think of him as "the elusive cowboy of American theater" (Berger) or as the anatomizer of family disfunction who favors San Francisco's Magic Theatre over Broadway. There are an endless number of possible inputs to the Sam Shepard mental space; a star's value, however, comes from limiting the likely associations.[25]

Though each casting choice carries meaning based on the elements of the actor automatically brought to the screen with him (age, race, physical type, vocal mechanics), not all actors come with such precise personas. Shepard's biography is free of roles or details that conflict with the image above.[26] Watching Ethan Hawke

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[25] This is why companies have to pay actors so much to be the face of their products and why celebrities lose endorsement deals when their image changes (Kobe Bryant, Kate Moss, etc.).

[26] Berger refers to Shepard as "elusive" and "mysterious" which seems an important strategy for creating such an unwaveringly stable persona. Even his relationship with Jessica Lange—devoid of

play Hamlet, an audience member might project information about Hawke's relationship to Uma Thurman or his past roles in *Reality Bites* or *Great Expectations* (1998) into this Hamlet blend, but Almereyda can be less certain of how each audience member will use their past knowledge to fill out (or "ghost" or "stand in for")[27] this Hamlet. Particularly for a smaller role like the ghost, where audiences are not given the same amount of time with or information about the character, casting Sam Shepard is casting that persona.[28] Casting a star with a concise persona allows a director to enrich a small part by strenuously projecting information from the star's real life onto the character. It also allows actors to reify their persona by playing their persona in a movie. Sam Shepard as the ghost of Hamlet's father prompts a wide network of possible associations.

Table 3: Mapping of Shepard as Old Hamlet blend

Sam Shepard	**Shepard as Old Hamlet**	**Old King Hamlet as CEO**
High-brow status through disdain of fame and continued work in theatre	Has status of artist, a CEO who doesn't just puppet party line, since Shepard is also a playwright, not just an actor.	Successful at easily maligned position, still liked.

tabloid rumors or red carpet appearances—and his ranch in Montana substantiate the dominant image of Sam Shepard.

[27] To use the language of (respectively) Carlson and Bruce Wilshire.

[28] This is probably why the phenomenon of the cameo has achieved such resonance. Playing a small role in a film should not be attractive to a star, accustomed to being the star or the lead. But actors get to use cameos to shore up their personas (Robin Williams as slightly foppish comedian with a strenuous language sense) and directors cast them as short hand. Just as Jack Lemmon brings his Old Hollywood history to his brief screen time as Marcellus, in the disanalogy between his status as star and his character's status, the viewer views the director's status in getting the star to play a non-star. The power of the blend is more clearly articulated in these roles because the performance depends on so much more information from the "actor" space to build the "character" space.

Table 3: Continued

Strong, silent type	Circumstances must be grave to lead him to need son's help.	Despite success and strength, Hamlet's father was killed by his brother and now pleads for his son to avenge his murder.
Has written about his father's alcoholism and absent fathers from sons' perspective	Has an alcoholic father and brother; is now an absent father in need of a son.	Abstained from Danish drinking custom that Hamlet accuses Claudius of indulging in.
Mysterious, elusive man	Mysterious and elusive in life and now in death	Absent father figure

In the table above, I examine some of the possible ways a viewer might create the blend of Shepard as Old Hamlet. Of course, the more information one has about Shepard and Shakespeare's play, the richer this blend becomes. For example, Shakespeare is thought to have played the Ghost of King Hamlet and Shepard is both a playwright and an actor. With these mental spaces evoked, Almereyda's King Hamlet is the spectre of greatness temporarily walking in the shoes of a bit player. Familiar with Shepard's work as a playwright and his reputation for preferring the Magic Theatre in San Francisco over more commercial theatres in New York, Almereyda's King Hamlet has been felled by his brother's commercialism and his son's preference for videos over theatre. Almereyda does more than just cast Shepard, he primes these associations through how he films him.

Almereyda could have filmed Shepard's ghost as a disembodied voice or bellowing spirit. These choices would have primed ghost representation spaces (Caspar, horror movies, history of ghosts in Shakespeare plays). By presenting

Shepard full bodied and not ghostly, the camera can concentrate on his Shepard-ness, not his ghost-ness. Almereyda has Shepard's ghost disappear by walking through a Pepsi machine, which does convey the "ghost physics" controlling Shepard's character, but also primes the corporation responsible for such product placements, and therefore Shepard's persona as outsider, moving through, as if by magic, the constant imposition of commodity capitalism. Shepard's ghost smokes in a long leather trench coat, recalling the Marlborough man cowboy type Shepard has played in the past. Almereyda juxtaposes Shepard with Hawke and thus foregrounds thematic elements in the relationship between Hamlet and his father. When Shepard first appears to Hawke, he charges him, intimidates him, and silences him. Sam Shepard is the strong cowboy to Hawke's disaffected Gen X intellectual. Shepard is action and Hawke is talk. Shepard made it to the moon and Hawke sat on a couch and tried to get his band a gig. Shepard does the unglamorous work of theatre and Hawke makes movies. The "Hamlet and his Father" blend created by Almereyda's film derives much of its power from the "reality" space the audience has for his stars.

Casting Shepard as the ghost of Hamlet's father, Almereyda is able to translate the terrifying quality of the dead to a modern audience. Shepard's ghost is the specter of disappointment that floats over all of us.[29] He is the great American hero, the wronged son who does right. He does not sell out and yet succeeds. He is

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[29] It is interesting to imagine whether Shakespeare had a similar effect as the ghost. Or if the story of his playing the ghost gained currency because it matched our idea of the great paternal figure we have all managed to disappoint. Similar to the *Julius Caesar* moment, Shakespeare (as ghost) giving Burbage (as Hamlet) direction that Burbage then ignores is not unlike Hamlet giving the Player King directions to do only that which is set down for him and then having to witness the dumb show.

the outcast whom everyone wants to join. As the ghost of Hamlet's father, Shepard is the death of theatre, replaced by a video artist who rents old movies to understand how to feel. He is crying for revenge to a son who we know will only disappoint him. He is the old west and high art looking to disaffected New York arty intellectual for salvation. He is the Greatest Generation left homeless by the apathetic, postmodern Gen X'er that followed him. Sam Shepard is only on screen for a few minutes, yet based on the mental spaces he evokes, he tells the story without speaking a word.

The net / work: the cognitive power of dispersed authority

An embodied theory of language suggests that there is a link between our experience of our body interacting with our environment and the concepts, metaphors, and blends that shape how we think and talk about our world. The mirror comes to represent a tool for seeing that which is hidden or internal because of how we use it physically and then how that use is blended with other mental spaces for seeing, self, depth, etc. Both Bergman's and Ciulei's productions of *Hamlet* stage the language of the play's mirror metaphor. How they do so shifts the meaning of the language. How we understand the mirror in the poetry is impacted by information gained in the staging of the play. In Ciulei's *Hamlet*, the mirror's impotence reflects the power of the star's presence to upstage the character; in Bergman's *Hamlet*, the mirror—present representationally while absent practically—reflects the poetry's ability to communicate through the indirection of its images. Film versions of *Hamlet* capture images with more control than their

theatrical counterparts, allowing the mirror to reflect what the director chooses and no more. This control, further exhibited in the inclusion of the offstage personas of the film's stars, foregrounds the film director and locates in the mirror's reflection the film director's singular authorial voice

Almereyda situates himself as the modern equivalent of Hamlet's players, "the abstract and brief chronicles of the time. After your death you were better have a bad epitaph than their ill report while you live" (2.2.1597). The dispersed authority of the players--to write, comment, and report--is now located in the single authority of the film director. Modern directors of Shakespeare on film borrow Shakespeare's cultural capital and the fame of their stars' personae to stage their own authority.

This singularity of authorial authority is un-Shakespearean. In *Authority and Representation in Early Modern Discourse*, Robert Weimann suggests that meaning expands as locations of authority expand: "There is a link (which, I suspect, is of unique cultural potency) between the decline of given, unitary locations of authority and an unprecedented expansion of representational discourses" (8). He adds to this that "contemporary critical concepts" such as negotiation, transgression, and rehearsal, are used because of a need to understand the expanding representational and authoritative sites. (8). The slipping monopoly on meaning came from the Reformation that created a "bifurcation in the authorization process that provided an unprecedented springboard for cultural change in and through diverse representational forms and practices" (11). The hidden hand holding the mirror in Shakespeare's words is hidden because it is many—text, playwright, actors, or

audience; in film, the director's hand holding the mirror is what is reflected in the mirror.

The indeterminacy of meaning in Shakespeare's texts has received exciting critical attention. To Weimann's 1996 question "Could it be that there was a link between the instability of a Shakespearean text like *Hamlet* and its openness to altogether diverse standards in poetics, performance, and production?" (22), the answer seems to be a resounding yes. In *Shakespeare and the Popular Voice*, Annabel Patterson probes the relationship between writing and performance in terms of the many layers of dialogue between actors and audience. She finds in Hamlet's interaction with the players both different types of plays and playing (elite and popular) and the "ghostly presence of multiple audiences to which these different texts may witness" (16). For Patterson, Shakespeare's plays evidence a masterful ability to create and dissolve different audience groups and through this the rich quilt of meanings.[30]

Ellen Spolsky argues that Shakespeare was permanently of two minds and that skepticism in the early modern period was helpful. As she shows through a

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[30]These ideas are comparable to those of W.B. Worthen In *Shakespeare and the Authority of Performance*, Worthen describes how the text and performance of Shakespeare are construed as vessels of authority. For Worthen, to perform "Shakespeare," is an "invocation of stable authority" which suggests an "authentically Shakespearean meaning" (3) and yet any performance of the text, including a reading, will be a "new representation of the work" contingent on the "intervening practices of production" (21). Though the stamp of "Shakespeare" hopes to convey a high-brow authenticity, the medium of production must be figured within the system of meanings within the vanishing "original" of a Shakespearean text. As Worthen suggests, "All productions betray the text, all texts betray the work" (21). To figure the relationship as one of betrayal, however, seems to assume a "stable" relationship to begin with. Marvin Carlson argues that meaning in performance is ghosted by performances in the past. His *Haunted Stage* is an acute study of the specific practices of theatre and the accumulation of meaning over time. Bryan Reynolds calls this "Shakespace," and argues that Shakespeare has come to be an ideologically powerful and semantically rich code.

careful study of the paintings of the *Incredulity of Thomas* and Shakespeare's plays *Coriolanus* and *Othello*, this skepticism is not disbelief but rather a comfort with the ambiguity of knowledge.[31] She links the skepticism of the early modern period to the Reformation and shifts in the reliability of the church, particularly when it came to rituals such as the Eucharist and ideas such as salvation. Spolsky argues that creativity in the early modern period compensated for a frustration and a realization of a lack of complete knowledge:

> In a cultural production of this difficult period, artists and writers can be caught in the act of skepticism: they can be seen to be worried about the inevitability of the gap between (say) words and images, between the comforts of familiar church ritual and individuals' newly awakened anxiety about salvation. My focus here is the skepticism engendered by a sometimes catastrophically sudden awareness of the gaps. (8)

The awareness of the "gappiness of the brain's architecture"(4) led to new neural connections, she suggests, generating a particularly prolific and creative period. The stories [plays] and analogies told to cover up the gaps, to understand what is not clear, allow us to track an idea from the specific to the abstract and from the abstract to the specific. Thus, for Spolsky, Shakespeare's plays were written as tools,

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[31] Peggy Phelan's beautiful explication of "The Incredulity of St. Thomas" focuses on the absent. In *Mourning Sex*, Phelan argues that the "endless looking for an interior beneath the surface of the bodies and images with which we are forever ensnared is the catastrophe of living (in) skin" (42). Her ocular proof, here and in *Unmarked* where she explores the similarity between the vanishing point and the viewing point, focuses on the "centrality of the single perception . . . is fortified *through* the experience of its loss, just as the endless process of establishing psychic identity is punctuated by its loss" (25). While her work is not counter to the cognitive reading that I prefer, her language continually returns to loss and desire which privileges a psychological response to absence rather than an examination of our cognitive perception of absence, which I find more compelling.

enabling early modern minds to "expand their control" and keeping them "flexible and ready to meet new experiences" (7).[32]

Ramachandran and Hirstein's work audaciously explores how and why the brain responds to art. They articulate "Eight laws of artistic experience" used by artists to "titillate the visual areas of the brain" (17). They posit that visual metaphors in art are powerful because the act of connecting the analogized image with the referent stimulus is pleasurable because our brains reward the establishment and cross-referencing of categories as it helps it store and code information more economically. The evocation of the limbic response often happens prior to the full comprehension of the metaphor, suggesting that metaphor comprehension might be something the brain rewards for its "economy of coding" (31).

In a specific study of how performative practices helped to "write" the plays we know of as "Shakespeare's," Tiffany Stern's *Making Shakespeare: From Stage to Page* examines the ways the physical world of early modern England, cultural censorship, rehearsal practices, printing, and other forces shaped the way Shakespeare's plays were written, performed, and rewritten. For Stern, areas of the stage take on meaning in one production and carry it forward into the next, such as the trap: "The trap presumably came to represent a cumulative evil. Much in the theatre, props particularly, worked in this way, borrowing their natures partly from the collective character they had built up through use in many plays" (26). For

[32] For more on Spolsky's work in comparison to the conceptual blending theory applied here or to theorists such as Crane, see chapter one.

Stern, this impacts the reception of the ghost of King Hamlet: since his voice is heard below and he (presumably) used the trap, the audience would associate him with hell and the devil.[33] Stern suggests, as others have, that certain characters in the plays bear the marking of the actor used to play him, such as the clown roles written for Robert Armin versus those written for Will Kempe. Like the trap, "actors may have had a series of composite character types built up over years of performance which affected every play they were in by every author" (73). Not surprisingly, the meaning of the text is complicated by the meanings evoked through performance. Though Stern does not use the language of blending or conceptual integration networks,[34] she articulates an accretion of meaning that can be explained using blending theory.

Andrew Sofer's *The Stage Life of Props* looks at the accretion of meaning around specific stage properties as they moved across the stage and into different plays. He insists on the "vitality" of props onstage and that:

> Theater colonizes reality for its own ends, and in the case of the prop it does so by appropriating the object's prior symbolic life. As a result of this theatrical appropriation, each prop I discuss revises or attempts to revise the way objects signify for spectators. (ix)

Tracing the handkerchief from early liturgical drama through to Othello's ocular proof, Sofer shows how Shakespeare used the accumulated meaning to his

[33] Much the way contemporary audiences at a horror movie shout "don't go out there" at the screen when the young couple say they are going to "take a walk" after a few drinks in the old house near the lake, Stern's argument makes me think the groundlings at *Hamlet* would likely shout: "of course he is!" to Burbage when he wonders: "The spirit that I have seen / May be a devil" (2.2.1673).

[34]Nor does she refer to any of the theorists that discuss comparable ideas in a different language, such as those referred to above. For more on the relationship between these theories and the conceptual blending theory pursued here, see chapter one.

advantage. Sofer's position that "The Elizabethan playwrights who wrote for a nascent commercial theatre were eager to exploit the rituals of the old religion" (63) relies on the assumption that the rituals of the old religion would transfer from church to theatre and that the objects associated with the rituals would maintain their meaning.[35] Sofer counters Greenblatt, who argues in "Shakespeare and the Exorcists" that Shakespeare appropriates religious symbols and rites for the stage to both empty them of actual power and give them representational power in a struggle to "redefine the central values of society" (95). For Sofer, Shakespeare had more to gain by maintaining the religious impact of the bloody handkerchief and adding to the meaning accreted from past theatrical uses, such as in Thomas Kyd's popular *The Spanish Tragedy*.

The network or blend required to construct the meanings of a particular casting choice (Armin as gravedigger, for example) constantly gestures beyond the play to an extratextual dialogue. Stern examines the moment in *Hamlet* when Hamlet asks Polonius about his "enacting" of Julius Caesar and Polonius responds: "I did enact Julius Caesar; I was kill'd i' th' Capitol; Brutus kill'd me" (3.2.1985). Shakespeare could have had Polonius refer to a role not included in the plays of his own writing. Perhaps Polonius could have played Herod or Agamemnon; but then Shakespeare would have been referring to another text, not just another performance. If, as is assumed, Burbage played Hamlet in 1600 and Brutus the year

[35] Sofer's account of how the cloth from the early liturgical drama became associated with Christ even though a symbol of His absence deserves further explication given theories of cognitive linguistics, which I will not indulge here.

before, Polonius is simultaneously speaking to both Hamlet and Burbage. Burbage, onstage in 1600 as Hamlet, cannot completely slip the roles he has played in the past; in fact, Stern recounts Burbage's elegy which states that he was so important to the roles he played that they died with him: "No more young Hamlett, ould Heironymoe / Kind Leer, thee greved Moore, and more beside, / That lived in him; have now for ever dy'de" (quoted in Stern, 72). Stern argues that: "In making one play gesture towards another, Shakespeare upsets the difference between one separate text and another" (74). Stern's argument views this gesturing as an example of a kind of contingent meaning, where a full understanding of the moment depends upon an understanding of the performance history of *Julius Caesar*. Blending theory provides a method of mapping the mental spaces and projections involved in the richly coded moments in Shakespeare.

This dog my dog: the cunning of the scene

In his popular 1583 tract, *The Anatomie of Abuses*, Phillip Stubbes worried that cross-dressing could "transnature" the self, arguing that pretending shapes being: "Their curiosity, and nicenes in apparell…transnatureth them, makinge them weake, tender and infirme." This was not the first nor the last time a debate was waged over the potential impact of "seeming." From the "real" Slim Shady singing about gay bashing or the National Anthem sung in Spanish, contemporary America still fears the words that shape our mouths. The fear rests on the power of the words to shape the mouth long after the words have left our lips. While there are different perspectives within cognitive linguistics on the power of language to create

"emergent structure" in our brain, there is general agreement that language shapes and facilitates some conceptual leaps while inhibiting others.

In *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Moonshine introduces himself by articulating the world as Theseus and the rest of the audience should see it: "All that I have to say, is, to tell you that the / lanthorn is the moon; I, the man in the moon; this / thorn-bush, my thorn-bush; and this dog, my dog."(5.1.238).[36] Moonshine, and theatre in general, claim the power to reassign meanings and transnature what is onstage. By saying the lantern is the moon, a player can alter an audience's lantern mental space for the period of the play. The question that has troubled philosophers and moralists since Plato is, how long does this association, this transnaturing, last? What is the role of the performance of speech in creating or changing a thing? And what does it mean, even if just for the two dark hours in the theatre, to believe that a lantern is the moon?

As Joel Altman explores in *The Tudor Play of Mind*, the pedagogical theory of Erasmus--that recommended students write orations from the perspective of different historical and fictional characters—shaped the thinkers of the early modern period. He argues that sixteenth century plays were structured as questions and asks what effect this had on fashioning the minds that were fashioned by these dramas. His book looks at both the dramaturgy of the plays and the rhetoric used within the drama to arouse wonder and thus thought. Renaissance students were trained to argue *in utramque partem* (on either side of an issue) and this facility with argument

[36] From Oxford Shakespeare, 1914.

— leading to a facility with taking different perspectives —engaged the emotions and encouraged the student "to imagine himself in circumstances utterly unlike his own and to see with eyes other than his own; in formal terms this meant composing according to the decorum of person, audience, and matter, but psychologically it involved a systematic expansion of the imagination beyond its usual subjective limitations, and fostered an awareness of other human realities" (45).[37] It was just this kind of power that had the early modern antitheatricalists worried.

The antitheatricalists argued that the performance of sin either was a sin in itself or could lead to sin. Originally published in 1587, Rankins's invective against the theatre, *A Mirrour of Monsters,* is subtitled: "Wherein is plainely described the manifold vices and spotted enormities, that are caused by the infectious sight of Playes, with the description of the subtile sights of Sathan, Making them his instruments." In *Playes Confuted in Five Actions* (1582), Stephen Gosson argues that plays "are the doctrine and inuention of the Deuill" (B3). John Greene's *A Refutation of the Apology for Actors* (1615) provides a telling anecdote of what happened to one woman when she went to the theatre:

> She entered in well and sound, but she returned and came forth possessed of the Diuell. Wherevpon certaine Godly brethren demanded Sathan how he durst be so bould, as to enter into her a Christian. Whereto he answered, that *hee found her in his owne house*, and therefore took possession of her as his own. (44)

[37]Altman goes on to show how this can be seen in the plays in their intellectual curiosity and emotional exploration through their structure, exposing the audience to an experience that enriched as it entertained.

Contemporary critics such as Jonah Barish, Joel Altman, Louis Montrose, and Bryan Reynolds find a compelling argument for the power of the theatre in the words of the antitheatricalists. Montrose cites a letter from Edmund Grindal, bishop of London, arguing that plays cause "infection;" and notes "The language of the letter suggests that the act of playgoing is itself the material source of the 'contagion,' that the youthful auditors quite literally take their 'infection' from the 'impure mouths' of the players. For Grindal, playing and plague are synonymous" (47). As Reynolds argues, "Early modern antitheatricalists ascribe to the theater, as an open terrain where the imagination runs wild, a devilish power to alter transgressively the minds and wills of men and to foster demonic possession" (Reynolds 2006, 91).

Hamlet--dramaturg, director, theatre critic—would agree with the antitheatricalists that theatre makes one vulnerable: "I have heard / That guilty creatures, sitting at a play, / Have by the very cunning of the scene / Been struck so to the soul that presently /They have proclaim'd their malefactions" (2.2.424-9).[38] Hamlet not only uses theatre to expose his uncle's guilt, but views it as more

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[38] It is appropriate here that Shakespeare uses the word "cunning" to describe the scene capable of moving an audience member to confession. The OED lists three definitions for cunning that also contain examples from Shakespeare's works. Under definition 2a, "possessing practical knowledge or skill," it cites *Twelfth Night*: "And if I thought he had been valiant and so cunning in fence" (3.4.312). Under definition 3, "possessing magical knowledge or skill," it cites *2 Henry VI* "A cunning man did calculate my birth, And told me that by Water I should dye" (4.1.34). And under definition 5a, the pejorative sense most commonly used today "skillful in compassing one's ends through covert means," it cites *Henry V*: "Whatsoeuer cunning fiend it was That wrought upon thee" (2.2.111). In the three examples cited above, "cunning" describes a person who either has or wields a particular skill either for good or ill. In *Hamlet*, it describes a theatrical scene, as if the scene—by which he might mean the dialogue or the performance of dialogue, or the situation of dialogue—itself acquires the agency necessary to plot or manipulate. Not unlike the mirror held up to nature, capable of being both didactic and nonpartisan at the same time.

permanent than the carved marble at the grave: "Good my lord, will you see the players well bestowed? Do you hear, let them be well used, for they are the abstract and brief chronicles of the time. After your death you were better have a bad epitaph than their ill report while you live" (2.2.518-22). In its abstraction and brevity, the players' chronicle will live on in the language. As Annabelle Patterson argues in *Shakespeare and the Popular Voice*, this definition of players and playing "admits that theater was accountable to others. In its very brevity and abstraction the phrase mimics its own blunt suggestion, that dramatic fictions reproduce their own historical environment in condensed and densely signifying metaphors" (29). Dense and abstract language, i.e. metaphors or blends, remain, just as Hamlet's formulation of the theatrical mirror lives on unquestioningly in so many works on theatre, acting, and playing.[39]

Transversal theory argues that early modern theatre had the transversal power to generate an "affective presence" – defined as the combined material, symbolic, and imaginary existence of a concept/object/event—capable of materializing the imagined presence. In "The Devil's House or Worse," Reynolds argues that the antitheatrical tracts of Stubbes, Rainoldes, and Gossen were right about the theatre: it was a "composite of everything commonly and ominously associated with it. It was bacchanalia, criminality, the Devil, the unspeakable, the unthinkable, 'or worse'" (151). It was a "sociopolitical conductor" that encouraged

[39] As Montrose argues Hamlet is not *Hamlet*: "*Hamlet* incorporates Hamlet's desire for the drama to be ethically unequivocal in its purpose and force, and his wish that its actual performance proceed exactly as scripted, but *Hamlet* also continually and ironically undermines Hamlet's wishes and expectations. The playwright's perspective on the purpose of playing is more capacious, popular, and equivocal than that of the Prince" (43-4).

"transversal movements," new becomings, and transformations of "subjective territory." The antitheatricalists conceptualize identity as being subject to role-playing. The antitheatricalists, as first transversal theorists, depict a powerful, threatening, and subversive theatre. In *Becoming Criminal*, Reynolds expands on this theme, showing how criminal culture within sixteenth-century England used this transversal power to affect and infect the minds of the citizenry. Here, Reynolds traces the connection between the theatres and the criminal culture that surrounded it. He connects the role of the audience within a theatre to its role within the mechanics of sound distribution as a way of explicating the spread of energy in a theatre (135). He argues that the antitheatricalists were themselves affected by the transversal power of theatre through their study of it. Reynolds playfully argues that one can "be all that they aren't" through transversal movements across identity spaces.

For a child, being all that he is not is part of becoming whom he will become. Psychologists such as Paul Harris have shown how the pretend play of children is pivotal in the development of other cognitive and emotional skills. Harris argues that the ability to imagine alternate realities begins in children's pretend play; creative, non-logical or realistic thinking is not a primitive early mode of thinking which is then later suppressed and replaced with reality-based thinking (which was what Freud and Piaget posited). A child's ability to conceive of alternate realities, project perspective, suspend objective truth in the service of a fictional narrative, evoke and modulate emotions in this alternate space, and process relationships

between a real world and an imaginary one, is a sophisticated and important development that relies on the same imaginative faculties adults use when making sense of fiction or processing the performance of an actor or con man. What Harris's work suggests is, as the antitheatricalists feared and as Altman, Montrose, Reynolds and others have argued in different ways about early modern theatre, that pretend play creates new faculties of discernment and perception. While this does not speak to how long the lantern remains the moon in the audience's mind, it does illuminate a link between performance, imagination, and cognition.

The history of literary theory is full of examples of how other disciplines have been included in and used to pry open literary criticism. The anthropological investigation into performance in social settings provided a new lens through which to look at the construction of identity, reality, and authority in literature. Anthropologists have investigated how the performative in everyday life impacts the construction of our reality. Victor Turner defines performance as "to carry out" and to bring to a completion wherein "something new is generated. The performance transforms itself" (1980, 156); this transformation occurs partially through the role of the ludic in generating new meanings. He describes the liminal nature of ritual in that it transforms someone from one place or phase to the next. In *The Ritual Process*, Turner discusses the state of liminality as "frequently likened to death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to the wilderness, and to an eclipse of the sun or moon" (95). Liminal people, half way between one state or social status and another, are reduced to nothing, passive, humble, and near naked

(95-96); they are between two states and yet share properties with neither. In his influential *Frame Analysis*, Irving Goffman suggests that spiritual things are similarly two things at once: “sacred relics, momentos, souvenirs, and locks of hair do sustain a physical continuity with what it is they commemorate” (300).[40] The anthropological lens of Turner and Goffman shaped important literary theory and performance theory at the end of the twentieth century.

Performance theory has defined performance as the moment of action onstage that cannot be contained or maintained. It is disappearing and at the vanishing point.[41] Through this formulation, theorists such as Peggy Phelan and Herbert Blau seek to separate performance from the study of the material or the document. Even if performance is elusive or absent once past, its effects can be studied. Rebecca Schneider argues that Phelan’s definition of performance as that which “becomes itself through disappearance” risks ignoring other ways of knowing, other ways of remaining and argues for a housing of memory in the body, on the flesh that does remain and yet is not archivable. “remains, but remains differently” (102). If theatre/performance studies are at a moment of looking at the traces of performance—as evidenced by Joseph Roach’s examination of effigy and Phillip Auslander’s study of Glam Rock, among others—it is important to question the intention of such a study, as well as the desired result.

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[40] Conceptual blending theory might be just as interested in the differences between the sacred and that which they are called upon to commemorate. For example, a gold cross around the neck is marked both by its analogy to Jesus Christ’s cross and its disanalogy to it; certainly wearing the actual cross upon which Jesus Christ was crucified around one’s neck under a tank top would not send the kind of social signals the wearer hopes.

[41] See Peggy Phelan’s *Unmarked: The Politics of Performance* (1993) and Herbert Blau’s *Take up the Bodies: Theater at the Vanishing Point* (1982).

José Esteban Muñoz opened up the question of the academy's privileging of the documented and argued that it works to maintain the hegemony in that documentation is always controlled by the powerful. He wants "queer acts" to "*contest and rewrite the protocols of critical writing*" (7). Muñoz's definition of ephemera takes up the argument about what remains when the lights come up by suggesting that "alternate modes of textuality and narrativity like memory and performance" do remain after a performance; for Muñoz, ephemera are "a kind of evidence of what has transpired but certainly not the thing itself" (10). He hopes to reconfigure performance studies by focusing on the result of performance rather than the meaning of performance: "Performance studies, as a modality of inquiry, can surpass the play of interpretation and the limits of epistemology and open new ground by focusing on what acts and objects do in a social matrix rather than what they might possibly mean" (12). Performance does something, Muñoz insists, and what it does should be studied. His argument takes for granted, however, that assessing what a performance does is possible. Muñoz's political goal would seem to benefit from a clear explanation of how one knows where performance has happened and how to identify the marks of what it did.

In "Archives: Performance Remains," Rebecca Schneider asks: if performance is defined as that which does not remain, does it reify the power of the archive, identified as white, male, and western. Performance counters the logic of the archive because it negates the very idea of an original: "In performance, *as* memory, the pristine sameness of an 'original', so valued by the archive, is rendered

impossible-or, if you will, mythic" (102). Schneider hopes to turn attention to the immateriality of that which remains in performance as a kind of flesh on bones, a body knowledge that is transmitted: "flesh memory might remain" (105). For Schneider, even the archive must be viewed in terms of how it performs on the body. Again, I find it persuasive as far as it goes, but it seems to beg the question of knowledge and memory; how can we discuss the transmission of body knowledge through memory without defining what we mean by transmission, body, knowledge, or memory?

D. J. Hopkins and Justin Blum connect the debate on performance to the Shakespeare studies that theorize based on (not despite) the textual instability of Shakespeare's texts.[42] Since a performance of a Shakespeare play and an edited text both contain the marks of time, history, fashion, audience, etc., then, they argue, it can be said that, pace Schneider, "Shakespeare remains." The instability of both suggests "in neither form of Shakespearean production can archive and repertoire be fully extricated from each other" (13). Though I agree with Hopkins and Blum that performance and text must be read together and with Reynolds that there is an ideological power to the subjunctive territory of "Shakespace," my interest here lies in how Shakespeare remains and through what cognitive structures we can see the power of performed language.[43]

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[42] See, for example, Leah S. Marcus, *Unediting the Renaissance: Shakespeare, Marlowe, Milton*.
[43] According to a recent article in the New York *Times*, the debate about directorial ownership of staging is making it more difficult to view performances at the Lincoln Center Library. Not that it is easy right now: it is challenging to stay focused on Ingmar Bergman's BAM production of *Hamlet* with the person in the next seat laughing uproariously at Whoopi Goldberg in *A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum*, but since permission took a week to receive from BAM and

Air to flesh: the ritual and the curse

In the last twenty years, science has contributed exciting work on the impact of the ephemeral. Though similarly plagued by questions of documentation, prediction, and methodology, the cognitive linguistic theory of Fauconnier and Coulson, for example, offers a powerful paradigm for understanding how performed language might remain. Conceptual blending theory provides evidence of our ability to project information from one sphere of experience to the next, from one mental space to a blend of different mental spaces. A cognitive linguist interested in the performance of rituals and what they reveal about the way we think and behave, Eve Sweetser sees ritual as an embodied metaphor. Her article "Blended Spaces and Performativity" begins with the idea of performativity in language as defined by Austin and Searle and treats it as a form of mental space blending, "wherein structure is transferred from a representing space to the space represented" (305). She argues that performativity has been over-used and returns to a definition more closely aligned with linguistics. She defines it as the phenomenon "whereby an apparent *description* of a speech act 'counts as' a *performance* of the relevant speech act" (306). She uses examples from rituals such as carrying the baby up the stairs and from representation such as the French cave paintings. These things are done to bring about good luck in life or the hunt, not to describe such good luck. The performance of the action—drawing hunted buffalo on cave walls or carrying a

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they do not allow repeat viewings, one must not be distracted by the togas. Despite the incredible imposition of viewing restrictions and conditions, in order to analyze Shakespeare's language it is imperative to examine performances of the text in addition to the text.

newborn baby up stairs—does not signify a successful hunt or the elevation of status, it creates it.

Sweetser analyzes the ritual of carrying a newborn baby up a flight of stairs as a metaphoric mapping of GAINING STATUS IS RISING. This metaphor structures how we think and talk about status, as being "higher up the corporate ladder" or "he's below you," but in the case of the newborn ritual, the performance is an attempt to bring the metaphor into being: "By changing relations in the source domain (height), the relations in the target domain (status) are to be changed" (312). Ritual can both represent and create the reality it believes in: "Does kneeling to a divinity metaphorically represent the already extant differential in power and status between worshipper and god (a depictive use), or help to bring the worshipper into the right state of humility (a performative use)" (314). Of course, both. Whatever one feels about the person he kneels in front of on the way down, on the way back up, he will discover that the performance of submission has altered his perception.

Fauconnier and Turner argue that such rituals are blends like time clocks: certain physical spaces stand in for concepts, anchoring an abstract idea like "3 o'clock" to a certain place on a circular dial. Here, the idea of the baby's elevated status comes from blending information from present and future (the baby's elevation now corresponding to a social position later), physical location and social location (higher up the stairs the more important socially), movement and change (to move up the stairs is to change positions and therefore change is understood as being caused by movement), and cause and effect (a mother can walk a baby

upstairs but cannot cause the child to escalate the social ladder). In this way, Sweetser's conception of a performative use of the kneeling ritual is comparable to Fauconnier's articulation of emergent structure as that which is available once the network creating the blend is constructed. "The complexity lies in the construction of the entire network, i.e. in building links, projections and compressions from familiar inputs to novel but simple ones. This shows in turn that when we speak of 'emergent structure' we don't mean the structure of the blended space by itself, but rather the dynamic structure of the entire network, and in particular the compressions and projections that link the input mental spaces to the novel blended spaces" (7). The network creates a new set of associations, problems, and equivalences that transfer through time and space.

A network of associations linking "Macbeth" with a string of famously infelicitous productions of *Macbeth* has made saying the word in the theatre bad luck. In his *Superstition Onstage*, Richard Huggett attributes the curse of *Macbeth* to Shakespeare's writing actual encantations for the witches to speak. Like Alleyn wearing garlic under the Faust costume to protect himself from his calling upon the devil, Shakespeare's witches actually cannot perform magic without doing magic. Even if theatre practitioners might find such an argument dubious, they most likely know that to say "Macbeth" in a theatre is to bring certain doom upon the production being rehearsed. The bad luck courted by this utterance is brought specifically against the production, not on the particular actor's chance of getting a ride home that night or winning the lottery. The bad luck, then, is a blend: the

consequences of past productions of *Macbeth* can be projected to the current production—even when the current production is not *Macbeth*—by saying the word. Saying the word in a given context links the production with a history of performances that have had bad luck and presages the same future on the current production. Any thing bad that happens over the course of the run will then be read in terms of the network of associations tying "Macbeth" to bad luck.

There is also a counter-curse, a ritual performed to protect the current production against the bad luck in case someone mistakenly says the word. Huggett explains how an actor might protect himself and the show from the curse:

> What he must do is to perform a simple ritual or exorcism which is traditionally thus: to go out of the dressing room, turn around three times, spit, knock on the door three times, and beg humbly for readmission. The alternative is to quote a famous line from *The Merchant of Venice* … . *The Merchant* is a lucky play, and its text has a traditional exorcising effect on *Macbeth*. (179)

The utterance of the word in the theatre creates the future of the current production; performing the counter ritual can undo the past and protect the future. One must not question, only counter by calling forth a different network of blends more fortuitous to performance. I am not trying to point out that superstitions or rituals are illogical, rather that the illogic, the projection of information from space to space to create a man in the moon or a lucky sock, construct and define more of our world than we might imagine. The evidence that we think (as well as speak) metaphorically, or in blends, is that we believe and behave that way as well. The research of Eve Sweetser illustrates how things come into being at an ephemeral moment of

performance and continue to ghost our understanding long after the curtain has fallen, the ritual has been completed, the gesture faded.

Conclusion: the remains

This chapter began with a study of performances of *Hamlet.* Ingmar Bergman's use of symmetry and a small stage knife communicates the complicated web of meaning suggested by Hamlet's "mirror held up to Nature" more clearly than Livliu Ciulei's mirror onstage. While this may be immediately apparent to anyone viewing the two productions, conceptual blending theory explained why. A cognitive analysis of staging might provides a practical method of applying cognitive linguistics to studies of performance, design, and directing.

It is not necessary to believe that saying Macbeth in the theatre brings bad luck: saying "Macbeth" in a theatre brings the network of associations that will then alter the reception of events such that finding bad luck is almost inevitable. Science can reanimate the debate about performance disappearing. If *Hamlet* cannot be understood outside the context of performance, we must alter our conception of ephemera as in conflict with the archive. If the brief and abstract—Fauconnier and Turner would call them compressed—blends in plays open up into a rich understanding of a complex idea that goes on to shape future thinking, then what remains is part of who we are.[44]

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[44]Embarrassing personal anecdote: When I was a senior in high school, my AP English class was hearing a report on *Hamlet* by a fellow student. She closed by saying that *Hamlet* is about inaction and indecision and I began to push her on this summation. I insisted that *Hamlet* was about more than just inaction, that it had a different sense of action. She, understandably defensive, said: "I bet you didn't even read the play." I looked appropriately incredulous, but, indeed, she was right. While my laziness and astonishing chutzpah should not be countenanced, I would argue that perhaps the

Hamlet I knew from the brief and abstract quotes I had heard so often—"the purpose of playing," "what's Hecuba to him or he to Hecuba," and "to be or not to be"—was just as rich as my fellow high school student's reading of the play. Like a caricature that in its omissions depict the person, the details I did have about the play evoked such a strong network of blends on action, emotion, and life, that I felt I had enough of the play inside to offer this student a counter-theory. Without having read the play, I believed that I could speak *Hamlet*.

Chapter four - Staging nothing: exploding suspension of disbelief and redefining theatre's evocation of emotions

> Nothing, thou elder brother even to shade,
> That hadst a being ere the world was made,
> And (well fixed) art alone of ending not afraid.
>
> Ere time and place were, time and place were not,
> When primitive Nothing Something straight begot,
> Then all proceeded from the great united--What?
>
> Something, the general attribute of all,
> Severed from thee, its sole original,
> Into thy boundless self must undistinguished fall.
>
> Yet Something did thy mighty power command,
> And from thy fruitful emptiness's hand,
> Snatched men, beasts, birds, fire, air, and land.
>
> Matter, the wickedest offspring of thy race,
> By Form assisted, flew from thy embrace,
> And rebel Light obscured thy reverend dusky face.
>
> With Form and Matter, Time and Place did join,
> Body, thy foe, with these did leagues combine
> To spoil thy peaceful realm, and ruin all thy line. …
> ("Upon Nothing," by John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester)

Cognitive linguistics challenges a stable definition of nothing, illuminating the things from which no things spring. In three important plays, *Hamlet*, *Henry V*, and *King Lear*, Shakespeare's conception of nothing structures the meaning of the play by pointing to the negotiation between nothing and something for the definition and existence of "nothing." In performance, the destabilization of an understanding of "nothing" is further complicated by the embodied voice of the actor in relation to

the text. The voices and bodies of these actors enrich and shift the meaning of the text, as the text and staging veil and disclose particular parts of the actors' bodies. While the entrenched theory of a suspension of disbelief suggests that an audience's perception of the actor's body is suspended, I argue that "belief" and "suspension" are a misleading and incomplete depiction of what occurs in the theatre. I engage with a recent debate in *SubStance* about the processing of fiction, and reconceive an emotional relationship to theatrical experience given twenty-first century theories of emotion.

Birthed by thought, nothing is something made "so" by thinking: nothing does not exist; we have no material proof of it; we must therefore construct it. Conceptual blending theory unpacks the seemingly stable idea of nothing and exposes it as a blend of multiple mental spaces,[1] with an emergent structure capable of begetting a lineage of thoughts specific to the particular some-things blended into nothing. Fauconnier and Turner argue that this articulation of a gap is more than just a function of language; it is evidence of how we construct blends by projecting information from two or more mental spaces into a blended space and then are able to use what was a nonthing as a thing:

> Inside the blend, this new element can be manipulated as an ordinary thing, and the usual routines of language for referring to things can be deployed. In the case of 'the missing chair,' the missing chair is a thing in the blend that, viewed from the outside, is a nonthing. It can be pointed to and takes up physical space. It inherits its physical characteristics of being a gap from the 'actual' input, in which there is not a chair in the corresponding position. We suggest it is no accident that expressions like 'nobody,' 'nothing,' and 'no luck' are

[1] For an explanation of mental space theory, see chapter one or Fauconnier (1994).

> ordinary noun phrases for picking out things in a space. That is why it is easy to get them in all the normal places in grammatical constructions: 'He was seen by no one,' 'I had no money,' 'No brains is your problem,' 'I expect no one to understand me,' 'He has a no-nonsense attitude.' (241)

Once we have created the blended space that is nothing, it can take on many of the characteristics of something, just as "missing chair" has many of the characteristics of "chair." This is its emergent structure; nothing takes on a powerful meaning by the selective projection of absence from the place of a particular substance.

In discussing the case of "zero," Fauconnier and Turner refer to the invention of zero; though initially a place holder for the absence of number, it became a number in its own right and was used in the same mathematical functions as other numbers.[2] This is the same powerful nothing that the Chorus references at the start of *Henry V*, capable of standing in for a million in the right space: "since a crooked figure may / Attest in little place a million, / And let us, ciphers to this great account, on your imaginary forces work" (Prologue, 15-17). A zero in one place may be a cipher, but it only takes six of them placed after a one to make a million.

A crooked figure

Shakespeare's language in this famous passage about the powerful "crooked figure" provides a useful introduction to the idea of emergent structure. The Chorus blends the idea of nothing, or zero, with the number of one million, written out as 1,000,000. To understand the figure, one must blend information regarding the

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[2] See Fauconnier and Turner, 244. For a book-length study on how cognitive linguistics illuminates the development of something as "literal" as mathematics, see Núñez and Lakoff. They argue that mathematical concepts are all products of the human mind and the language necessary to express them; these concepts do not exist separately but are rather "seen" through shifts in perception.

placement of each number with the number itself: the one digit is in the million place and it is followed by zeros in the other places. The zeros here do not suggest nothing, but rather are place-holder digits, representing a quantity of hundreds, for example. Reading the figure, we see it denoting size because of the number of places to the left of the decimal, not because of the numbers listed to the left of the decimal. The emergent structure in the blend of 1,000,000 is “one million” which can then be elaborated on; understood now not as a one and zeros but rather as a large number, “one million” evokes power, force, and size. Shakespeare’s Chorus makes the zeros the “flat, unraised spirits” (actors) who dare to tell this epic tale of a famous English king. Blending them with the mental space of zero continues Shakespeare’s debasement of their power until he reminds us of the “million” blend, which links “zero” in a new integration network, one in which zeros in the right place can make a million and therefore just might be able to do the “work” on our imagination required to tell this story.

Fauconnier and Turner identify emergent structure in language as structure or meaning that does not come from any of the input spaces (digit “0” or two spaces to the left of a decimal, for example). Although mental spaces are evoked and blends generated “on the fly,” emergent meaning can become entrenched, remaining to shape future conceptions about power, space, and numbers, for example. Blending can “compress diffuse conceptual structure into intelligible and manipulable human-scale situations in a blended space”[3] and is often simple and

[3] See Fauconnier’s “Compression and Emergent Structure,” 1.

easy to grasp, despite a seeming complexity to the network of blends required to yield the final blend.

As Fauconnier explores in "Compression and Emergent Structure," the novel ideas, creative leaps, and powerful associations come not from the blend itself but from the way it links up a network of spaces. Complex numbers, he argues, are simple in themselves—what took hundreds of years to figure out is how they connect to past theories of numbers, space, and math.[4] The network, rather than the blend alone, contains the power of the novel idea:

> The complexity lies in the construction of the entire network, i.e. in building links, projections and compressions from familiar inputs to novel but simple ones. This shows in turn that when we speak of 'emergent structure' we don't mean the structure of the blended space by itself, but rather the dynamic structure of the entire network, and in particular the compressions and projections that link the input mental spaces to the novel blended spaces. (7)

Returning to the Chorus' powerful zeros, then, the emergent structure is not the idea of a million, but rather the way Shakespeare's language displays the network that created the blend.

When antitheatricalist Phillip Stubbes worried that a man's clothes on a woman would "transnature" her into a man, he was railing against a kind of

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[4] Herbert Blau, though not discussing blending theory, examines the discovery of zero in much the same way—and also returns to Hamlet: "in the disturbing process of taking things away from each other—they came upon the concept of zero, lifting the round figure at the end of a row of digits and giving it another use. The importance of that idea was recognized by the Arabs in one of the most incisive remarks in the history of mathematics: 'When nothing is left over, then write the little circle so that the place does not remain empty.' That they had something against emptiness may be a bit of good fortune. Could the zero itself be the vatic inscription of a possible meaning? That is, I suppose, what one finally means by taking nothing for granted. That nothing is, through the determining negation of the cosmos, not only the source of play but the incursive symbol of a revolving chance, the wheel of fortune—like the pirate ship circling a zone of indifference and, to keep the Plot going, bringing Hamlet back" (1982, 142-3).

blending that has, he feared, a tremendous power. As discussed in the previous chapter, the potential "transnaturing" power of ephemeral theatre depends on the emergent structure of blends. Shakespeare's language in performance can illuminate the network of blends integrated to form assumptions, ideology, and belief, since the ideas found in one blend prime or recall mental spaces linked to other blends and mental spaces. Through the flash of recognition—"a million is made up of zeros," for example—it can challenge the audience to reimagine, to reblend. Shakespeare's language—his zero that takes on extraordinary power in the right place at the right time—works to destabilize, from the beginning of the play, our idea of who, or what, is nothing.

The night before the battle, Henry disappears into the multitudes, the zeros, listening to them and trying to pass as "one" of them. Shakespeare walks the king among the men, as if to spotlight the bodies at stake in the coming fight. Henry does not spend the night talking strategy with his noble commanders or dreaming of retribution for his past sins; King Henry, Shakespeare dramatizes, takes the measure of his men by lowering himself to them. Shakespeare, somewhat strangely, gives three of the common men full names: John Bates, Alexander Court, and Michael Williams.[5] These are three of the ciphers capable of turning a battle fought by England into a battle fought by a brotherhood of men. Henry then begins his powerful "happy few" speech by insisting that he does not wish for one more man

[5] In his footnote to the New Cambridge edition of *Henry V*, Andrew Gurr calls the stage direction naming the three men by their full names "unique" in Shakespeare (153).

to fight on their side, since the "fewer men, the greater share of honour" (4.3.22). They are great, he assures them, because they are *not* many.

Of course, the other element to the "million" blend is the role of the one, the leader who empowers and is empowered by the zeros. Shakespeare ends the scene with Bates, Court, and Williams by calling attention to Henry's status as a king. When William doubts Henry's claim that the King shall not be ransomed, they agree to exchange gloves to identify each other in order to settle their disagreement after the battle. The audience knows that at that point Henry will address him as the king, and William's status as a zero will be highlighted. The gloves will not equalize them then. Though Henry can mask his high status temporarily, William will not be able to mask his low status later. The performance conditions of the play mirror this status inequality, since the role of Henry will be played by the biggest name, the brightest star, the most visible leading man. Though the play provides many great roles for character actors, King Henry is the only role for a leading man. Unlike *Julius Caesar* or even *Hamlet*, Shakespeare does not give powerful, dramatic poetry to anyone in the play but King Henry; he rallies his troops with a powerful oration,[6] he bravely fights the battle, captures France, and takes home the princess. Shakespeare's potential subversion of the king's power, through his elevation of the status of the men that fight the war and tell the story, is simultaneously contained by the presence required of the figure of the one necessary to make the zeros into a million.

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[6] Holinshed notes that King Henry "calling his captains and soldiers about him, he made to them a right grave oration, mooving them to plaie the man" (qtd. in Gurr, 166).

Shakespeare's unpacking of the "million" blend at the beginning of the play is not just a lovely turn of phrase or complicated metaphor; it relies on an evocation of mental spaces that go on to link and accrue meaning throughout the play. Cognitive theory unveils how metaphoric language conveys more than the sum of its parts; Shakespeare's images accrete meaning by being framed by his initial image of the crooked figure attesting a million in the right place. The emergent structure of that image is the scaffolding on which the play's reverberant themes are built.

A chasm

King Lear begins with a famous evocation of nothing: Cordelia's response to the king's request for an encomium. Lear suggests she rephrase, since "nothing will come of nothing," and the subsequent thirty-two references to nothing in the play answer or evoke this splitting of the atom of nothing in the second scene. Mary Thomas Crane, in her tracing of the language of nothing, infinity, and matter in light of debates circulating at the time of atomism and divisibility, argues that the language evidences the folk theories, or "intuitive physics," of these concepts and unveils a shift in the epistemology of the time. Around 1600, the Aristotelian notion that what is visible behaves similarly to what is not visible began to give way, through questions about condensation and evaporation, to theories of atomism that posited invisible forces. She compares this "intuitive physics" with the "basic image schemas" of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, wherein our language system reflects our experience-based concepts of physics; for example we refer to

something causing something to happen in terms of a force exerted on it because this is how we experience physical bodies propelled into motion. Therefore, the language of *King Lear* is understood in light of an "epistemological rupture" (3) where the breakdown of Aristotelian physics calls into question basic mental concepts of weight, space, divisibility, and existence. Though in different ways than I am arguing, Crane similarly locates an understanding of the play in the consequences of Shakespeare's negotiation between nothing and something.

Crane argues, in this and in *Shakespeare's Brain*, that poetry "will necessarily be shaped by the poet's interactions with the physical world, and his or her models for how it works. Imagery and metaphor convey these models, so that the models are woven into the fabric of poetry and provide a kind of structure or frame that supports plot, characterization, and theme" (Crane 2004, 17). Crane's thesis is that the mental models created through the embodied mind of the poet become as important a tool for analysis of a play as plot, characterization, and theme. Or, put a different way, any attempt to understand plot, characterization, and theme, is done through the image schemas of the poet; if these are different from our own, the meanings of the other three terms will be different. Her argument suggests a kind of scientific new historicism which foregrounds the mind/body/brain of the playwright. The theatrical context of the poetry she is referring to, however, necessitates further an appreciation for the role of the actor, audience, and performance conditions, which embody, translate, and impact the meaning and resonance of the words spoken.

The theme of nothing in *King Lear* has been readily observed by a number of scholars. However, *Hamlet* has almost as large a presence of nothing, which has not received the attention it merits. In *Hamlet*, nothing is always in relation to something; never nothing, it is always defined by context. Nothing comes up thirty times in *Hamlet*. Nothing is seen by the watchman Barnardo at the start of the play.[7] Nothing lies between Ophelia's legs. Nothing makes the player king weep for Hecuba.[8] Nothing is the thing that makes up the king.[9] The presence of nothing in the text calls attention to the absence that nothing is supposed to stand for. Shakespeare uses the same word to structure very different meanings. Unpacking Shakespeare's evocation of "nothing" in one scene of *Hamlet* illuminates the web of meanings that then go on to scaffold and structure the understanding of the play. Though an audience may not perceive all the aspects of the close reading I provide, Shakespeare works to prime associations that may take on resonance only later in the play. Moreover, Shakespeare's language is inseparable from the performance of it, and he layers in meanings available only once his words are embodied onstage.

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[7] Asked by Horatio if he has seen the ghost on his watch, Barnardo answers "I have seen nothing" (1.1.25).

[8] In his soliloquy after the player has performed Aeneas' speech to Dido about Priam's slaughter and Hecuba's grief, Hamlet is stunned that the actor could exhibit the emotions for a fictional event. Though I will come to this later in the chapter, here is the relevant passage: "Is it not monstrous that this player here, / But in a fiction, in a dream of passion, / Could force his soul so to his own conceit / That from her working all his visage wann'd, / Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect, / A broken voice, and his whole function suiting / With forms to his conceit? and all for nothing!" (2.2.545-51).

[9] In his wordplay with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern about the location of Polonius's body, Hamlet quips "The body is with the King, but the King is not with the body. The King is a thing— " and when Guildenstern asks "A thing, my lord?" Hamlet responds "Of nothing" (4.3.26-28).

A fair thought

During the badinage before the Mousetrap, different shapes of nothing surface between Hamlet and Claudius and Hamlet and Ophelia. With Hamlet's typical word-play, Claudius's question about how Hamlet is doing becomes a question about how he is eating, and Hamlet responds that he is eating the nothing that he is being fed: "I eat the air, promise-crammed. You cannot feed capons so" (3.2.93). Claudius responds that he has "nothing with this answer, Hamlet. These words are not mine" (3.2.95), as if Hamlet's words, hurled at him, missed their target, and Claudius failed to catch them. Claudius declares the answer "nothing" since it is not something to him. Hamlet, out-blending Claudius, insists that the words, once spoken, defy proprietary control: "No, nor mine now" (3.2.97).[10] Hamlet gives shape and meaning back to the nothing of his words by locating them apart from the speaker or hearer, like the "missing chair" evoked in reference to absence. Shortly after, "nothing" recurs with a very different network of meaning.

> Ham. Do you think I meant country matters?
> Oph. I think nothing, my lord.
> Ham. That's a fair thought to lie between a maid's legs.
> Oph. What is, my lord?
> Ham. Nothing. (3.2.115-19)

In the "country matters" exchange quoted above, Hamlet establishes a genital frame for the exchange from which he does not let Ophelia escape. When Ophelia attempts to dodge his request to lie in her lap—she has been told by her father to avoid giving Hamlet any kind of romantic encouragement—Hamlet

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[10] According to Jenkins, Shakespeare may be referring here to a quote by Johnson: "A man's words, says the proverb, are his own no longer than he keeps them unspoken" (293).

suggests that she must have misheard his request in a lewd manner: "Did you think I meant country matters?" Here Hamlet uses the sound of the word "country" to increase the eroticization of their discourse; onstage "country" will be heard as "cunt-ry."[11] Particularly sexualized through the sound of the word, country matters evoke the lack of decorum or polish of country folk as well as the genre-specific association of the country as a place nobles went to escape the morals and strictness of the city. In the drama of the period (as well as in such pastoral literature as Spencer's *Arcadia*) when characters went to the country, audiences could expect them to fall in love. The country was also a place where power relations slipped, and the noble learned from the fool. Hamlet's "country matters," then, potentially embarrasses Ophelia by calling attention to her genitals as well as by evoking the country space where the differences in their status might not matter.

Ophelia dodges Hamlet's question about "country matters" by echoing Claudius's retort to the petulant prince: "I think nothing, my lord" (3.2.116). Again, Hamlet manipulates "nothing" into something, calling Ophelia's nothing "a fair thought to lie between a maid's legs." Ophelia tries to use nothing as indicating that she is not thinking anything, but Hamlet pretends to misunderstand her as

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[11] Shakespearean audiences spoke of going to "hear" a play, with the attention on the aural information conveyed, rather than the spectacular focus of most of today's theater. The Chorus of *Henry V*, for example, ends their prologue by asking the audience for their patience "Gently to hear, kindly to judge our play" (Prologue 33). See Bruce Smith's *The Acoustic World of Early Modern England* for a study of the role of sound in the drama and culture of the period. Additionally, Smith's study of "Hearing Green" in the early modern period suggests that there were different ways of hearing, which impacted what was heard. To hear "green" was to hear with longing, with passion; hearing green "dissolves words, not into other words, but into nonsemantic sound. It does not just break down words into phonemes that can be recombined with other phonemes in new and interesting ways; it *liquefies* words. That potential is enabled by a physiology of knowing in which the passions 'hear' sensations before reason does. The sensations circulate throughout the body as an aerated fluid on which reason's imprint is always insubstantial" (168).

suggesting that she is thinking about the "nothing," or vaginal O, between her legs. Thomas Pyles suggests that Burbage made the "nothing" symbol with his thumb and forefinger to make sure that the audience got the joke; however Shakespeare's audience would have understood without the gesture: "Hamlet's *nothing* […] is unquestionably yonic symbolism, a shape-metaphor intended to call to mind the naught, or O, which is elsewhere in Shakespearean, if not in modern, 'bawdy' a symbol of pudendum muliebre" (322).[12] In Hamlet's dextrous use of words, nothing is suddenly the genital space, and Ophelia's nothing must be viewed through the mental space of the penis' thingness. Compared to Hamlet's thing, Ophelia's is absent, but both are made mentally visible through Hamlet's language. Hamlet has now evoked the genitals of both sexes. And, by returning to the word "lie" established earlier, he has combined his previous association with lying between her legs, with the sexual things lying together between her legs. In front of the whole court, his language copulates them.

What becomes of Ophelia's nothing when it is embodied onstage? Hamlet's language disrobes Ophelia by drawing the audience's attention toward what is or is not between her legs. But disrobed, out of costume, Ophelia must be the actor portraying her, since Ophelia requires the loan of an actor's body to become corporeal. In Elizabethan England, the theatrical convention of the boy player adds

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[12] Jenkins suggests that, in addition to the "yonic symbolism," Hamlet's nothing here could be an allusion to her virginity, which is another blended space for a non-event. Hamlet also makes this joke about the nothing of virginity with the boy player, hoping that his voice not be "cracked i' the ring," suggesting the drop in value that occurs when a coin's exterior ring is cracked, or when a woman's cipher-ous O is penetrated. Neither critic, however, points out the lack of actual vaginas on Shakespeare's stage.

another layer of the blending that occurs: the actor playing Ophelia did not have "nothing" between his legs. The theatrics of the language on the page call to a reader's mind the genitals of the characters; embodied onstage, the theatrics of the language call to mind the genitals of the actors. The eroticization of boys dressed as women, things masquerading as nothings, was one of the main concerns of antitheatricalists of the time. Shakespeare breaks the illusion of Ophelia's sex because in performance it is more powerful that he/she is both. Shakespeare's "nothing" exposes a presence in a space designated as empty. This presence *in* absence is the emergent structure of *Hamlet*'s nothing.[13] The performance of language onstage changes the dynamics of meaning through the networks of spaces evoked and blended in the process of understanding.

Written across the wide body of scholarship on cross-gender casting is the story of the political implication of the cross-dressed body. Laura Levine finds that the antitheatricalist fear of the boy-players on the Elizabethan stage suggests an anxiety over the stability of gender; if it needs to be upheld and performed, it must not be fixed. Jean Howard agrees with Levine, seeing cross-dressing, particularly off the stage, as threatening the normative social order. Whether modern critics sees such cross-dressing in early modern period as containing transgression through limited release or actually posing a fugitive threat,[14] the body they discuss is that of the performer, not the character. Yet, the antitheatricalists focus on the power of the character to transforms the performer and how this transformation marks the

[13] Like the gunshot that is the silent "rest" at the end of the play.
[14] For examples of the latter, see Howard and Reynolds.

spectator. In *The School of Abuse* (1579), Stephen Gosson argues that even reasonable men are "overthrowne" (34) by the theatre's seduction, and in *Th' Overthrow of Stage-Playes* (1600) John Rainoldes insists "that *senses are mooved, affections are delighted, heartes though strong and constant are vanquished by such players*" (18). At issue is not what cross-dressing does to those who do it, but rather what cross-dressing does to those who watch it. The antitheatricalists are not seeing the body of the actor or the body of the character: they are seeing both, and it is this hybrid, this blend that is threatening to the sexuality and spirituality of the "*Christian comon weale.*"[15]

Keir Elam argues that antitheatricalists were wrong to erase the distinction between the actor's body and the represented body of the character. His proposal is to fix this split by looking at the actor's body, but he does not suggest how the actor's body can be seen separate from the character's body. Just as the character's body cannot be read out of the context of the performer embodying him/her, an actor's body gets read based on information projected from past associations with characters the actor has played. Elam's semiotics aims to underline the signs and their significations, but he does not address how signification is constrained or primed. Blending theory suggests a way the network of spaces combines to contribute to meaning construction. The Mousetrap scene sets up layers of meaning in the language of "nothing" in the dialogue before the play begins; these layers contribute to the rich drama unfolding before the audience. As explored in chapter

[15] See Gosson 1582, B3.

three, the director and actors then stage the scene in ways that illuminate some layers while obscuring others. Played by a boy player in early modern England, Ophelia's genital space might be erotically put in play as both/and. Played by Sharon Stone or Nicole Kidman, actresses who have famously exposed their vaginas on film or stage, Ophelia's nothing would take on different meaning. Shakespeare's language evokes the space and the director's/actor's work influences the nuances of the embodied meaning.

Though we cannot know precisely what early modern playgoers thought about the presence of boy players in female roles, there is ample evidence that they did not simply "suspend disbelief" about the actor's sex. Playwrights relied on the audience's awareness of the actors' sex when the plot calls for them to cross dress back to boys, a plot device very common in early modern comedies. Playwrights often wrote jokes dependent on the readability of the boys in the characters of females. In *The Devil is an Ass*, for example, Jonson sets up a comic scene by reminding his audience that the actor playing the Spanish Lady in the coming scene is a particularly tall male actor (Dick Robinson). As Reynolds and I argue elsewhere, the comedy of the scene is dependent on the audience perceiving a number of different sets of realities at the same time: "entertaining a situation in which one person can be many things at once: actor, character, man, and woman."[16] Suspension of disbelief suggests that there is a single belief necessary for processing fiction or drama; this formulation seems insufficient and inaccurate.

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[16] See Reynolds and Cook, 94.

Our belief in belief

Despite the growing wave of exciting work in literary studies to incorporate research from the sciences into examinations of literature, so far there has been very little work done within theatre or performance studies to use the cognitive sciences to put pressure on our understanding of plays in performance.[17] From understanding that the man onstage reciting "to be or not to be" is simultaneously an actor, a character, and a historical figure, to feeling moved by Hamlet's death but not moved to jump onstage, theatrical blends illuminate some of the same cognitive illusions used in our daily life. Onstage everything is a hybrid: part representation, part the thing itself. When Shakespeare writes "Who's there," it is fiction; when the actor says it onstage, it is partially fiction and partially a real question asked by a real man in a real situation. He is neither completely one nor the other, and this both/and status gives him a particular power.

Coleridge introduced the idea of a "willing suspension of disbelief" to explain the power that unreal events and people can have evoking real emotions; theatre theory, performance analysis, and reviews rely on this metaphor to discuss the phenomenology of theatre. Theatre, good art or fiction, causes audience to willingly suspend their disbelief so that what is happening on stage is believable enough to evoke emotions.[18] This is meant to explain why the heart races as the

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[17] For applications of cognitive science in literary exceptions to the silence within the theatre field, see chapter one.

[18] While not all theater aims to evoke emotions through believability—Brecht and feminists such as Jill Dolan famously critiqued the role of realism in manipulating what an audience thinks by controlling what it feels—it remains true that most theater in America today, and most productions of Shakespeare, aim for the audience to match the identity of the actor on the stage with the character being portrayed on the stage. Radical casting decisions that cast against type, race, or gender, for

murderer approaches the victim or why the eyes tear up when the lovers are reunited. Suspension of disbelief assumes that thinking and feeling are separate mechanisms: to feel "real" emotions about "unreal" events we have to suspend or turn off the thinking that assessed the events as unreal. Suspension of disbelief also assumes that we process information first and foremost according to truth value. Suspension of disbelief has become the predominate narrative of theatre theory, and yet it is untenable given current cognitive linguistic theory and research in emotion. This chapter will now engage with the scientific work of Fauconnier, Turner, Lakoff, Ramachandran, and Damasio to explore suspension of disbelief and the emotions evoked in the theatre.

In *Great Reckonings in Little Rooms*, Bert States argues that "The presentational basis of theatre rests upon a double pretense: the play pretends that we don't exist (the fourth wall convention) and we pretend that the play does (the willing suspension of disbelief)" (206). This formulation sees theatre as rising out of denial; it emerges from nothing. To suspend disbelief creates disbelief as a presence that haunts our reception of theatre; the logic goes that in order to enjoy fiction we must hold in abeyance the knowledge that it is not true. This allows us to feel in reaction to what is happening onstage, but not to act based on what is happening on stage. Suspension of disbelief remains a defining feature of how we speak of being "carried away" or "transported" by a successful narrative. Though many genres of

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example, illicit much commentary because the assumption is that an actor should be "right" for the part, that the presence of the actor's body should not distract from the "suspension of disbelief" necessary for the audience to believe, for example, that Kevin Kline is Hamlet or Jamie Foxx is Ray Charles.

theatre eschew this goal and many critics and scholars have lambasted this direction of theatrical practice, theatrical reviews, taken as an arbiter of a theatrical mainstream, rely on the language of suspension of disbelief. To believe the performance is to be moved, to be captivated, to be drawn in.

Considering how central this idea of suspension of disbelief is to an understanding of fiction, it is astonishing how little interrogation it has received. Most scholarly pressure placed on "suspension of disbelief" relies on an assumption that thinking and feeling are separate mechanisms and that engagement with fiction is a special state, requiring a special interruption of normally functioning mental assays capable of determining truth value. The argument of Tooby and Cosmides, whose debate with Spolsky about the evolutionary value of fiction and is discussed in chapter one, depends on just such a separation between fiction and non-fiction: "Most especially, fiction when communicated is not intended to be understood as true—as literally describing real events in the world accurately" (12). As Spolsky points out, however, plenty of people mis-apply fiction to reality:

> One can think not only of King Lear and his daughters, but of the conflict faced by a young man who needs (according to one of his cultural stories) to drink beer of an evening, even though, according to another story, he needs to drive his date safely home. If only there were an evolved mechanism that would inform the fellow that the first story is a local, cultural fiction, and the second a matter of fact. […] the evidence is that humans *do* confuse the two [fictional worlds and real worlds] frequently, subject, as they are, to powerful stories and their powerful interpreters. (187)

According to Tooby and Cosmides, suspension of disbelief suggests that we have a way of bracketing our reception of fiction such that cognitive input during a

fictional event is not confused with the truth. Spolsky argues that bits of information within stories are projected differently into different situations—with fictional information often being projected to nonfictional situations—which is how we can know that there is truth in *King Lear* without *King Lear* being true. Spolsky does not pursue within her article the implications of this statement, but it seems to have significant bearing on an understanding of suspension of disbelief. The conceptual blending theory of cognitive linguistics challenges our belief in suspension of disbelief and makes way for a new understanding of the nothing that makes the player king weep for Hecuba and makes the play the thing to catch the conscience of the king.

Two theoretical interrogations of suspension of disbelief are Eva Schaper's complication of our definition and Norman Holland's work applying neuroscience to the phenomenon, though neither work sufficiently challenges the assumptions on which the concept is based. Schaper investigates the relationship between suspension of disbelief and emotions, suggesting that without the first, "we could not avoid the puzzle resulting from being moved by what we do not believe ever really happened or ever existed" (31). She cannot discount the experience of emotions in response to a fictional world, but is similarly troubled by the assumption that either what we are reacting to is illusory or how we react is illusory: "Suspension of disbelief, whatever it may amount to in detail, gains plausibility only if we assume that there is a requirement that being genuinely moved presupposes holding beliefs about the object of such emotions, and the notion of suspension of

disbelief meets that requirement" (34). She begins to dismantle suspension of disbelief, arguing that belief may be more nuanced than "suspension" suggests. She nonetheless does not question the assumption that in order to feel something we have to believe that the stimulus that causes the emotion actually exists.

It is not necessary to believe that Horatio literally held Hamlet in the chambers of his heart—miniaturized, presumably—in order to be moved by Horatio's reaction to Hamlet's dying plea,[19] just as it is not necessary to believe that Hamlet or Horatio actually exists. When our best friend reports that she has "reached a dead-end" in her career or that her end is near, we do not need to believe that her life is literally a path or that time is literally located in space to understand—and react emotionally to—her concern that she is not progressing or that she does not have much time left to live. If it is not necessary to understand the sentence literally in order to understand it emotionally, then why insist that disbelief is suspended when something is spoken onstage? Why are we so committed to the belief that we believe?

Holland follows up his earlier use of psychoanalysis to explain suspension of disbelief with an application of neuroscience research.[20] He argues that when we stop paying attention to our bodies, our plans, etc., as we do in a theatre or when

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[19] On his deathbed, Hamlet asks Horatio: "If thou didst ever hold me in thy heart, / Absent thee from felicity awhile, / And in this harsh world draw thy breath in pain / To tell my story" (5.2.351-54).

[20] Psychoanalysis, he originally argued, sees suspension of disbelief as a "regression to the stage in infancy when, according to psychoanalytic theory, the child feels the boundaries between itself and mother as blurred, uncertain, and permeable" (2-3). In conclusion, however, he seems to move to use neuroscience to complement his earlier psychoanalytic reading, hoping, apparently, that the two may not be contradictory but that perhaps neuroscience may provide some empirical proof of psychoanalytic theories: "The willing suspension of disbelief takes us back to a time when our limbic systems had begun to function, infancy" (6).

reading a book, we cut off the connection between our emotions and our prefrontal cortex. We still feel the emotions, but they no longer go to the prefrontal cortex for reality testing and planning. The planning that is done in the prefrontal cortex requires that we "imagine a future and a past for an object, neither of which is true now… And as long as we do not plan to move while reading a book or watching a play or movie, we do not test the reality of what we are perceiving. Thus, we willingly suspend disbelief. The minute we do plan to move, we, as we say, break the spell" (4). Holland's language is informative: theatrical appreciation, here, relies on a magical spell that holds the planning and thinking of the frontal cortex at bay while the audience remains enchanted. His formulation explicitly expands suspension of disbelief, arguing that it is the same thing that occurs when we imagine hypotheticals or counterfactuals. To suggest that the state is a "spell" wherein we have willingly suspended disbelief is to underestimate the power and ubiquity of this particular state.

Holland's summation that "we can feel real emotions toward unreal fictions, because two different brain systems are at work" (6) continues what I see as a false dichotomy between real and unreal in emotions and situations. To argue that normal situations which evoke emotions are reality tested is to presume that "reality" is important to emotions. We do not process information first and foremost according to its truth value. When someone cries because she did not receive an expected call from her boyfriend, she, like the player king, is crying over nothing, since the lack of a call suggests nothing in and of itself. Her emotions are not less real for not

matching the reality of the situation. The fictional world wherein such a lapse hints at betrayal or lack of interest is not reality tested either. The truth or fiction of information used to construct an account of a situation does not impact the emotions we experience as a result of this account.

This dichotomy between factual events inspiring real feelings and fictional ones requiring a suspension of disbelief in order to inspire real feelings is unnecessary in theories of embodied cognition, since the brain is seen as constantly composing narratives to function and make sense of its environment. Ramachandran isolates an anomalous brain condition that, he argues, points to how the brain tells itself "the truth" in an undamaged state. Ramachandran reports on cases of anosognosia, wherein patients do not believe that they have suffered the injuries that they have—usually paralysis due to stroke or other cerebral damage impacting the right hemisphere of the brain. These patients concoct extraordinary stories to explain away the evidence of their paralysis or to avoid providing evidence. They will say that they lifted a tray with a paralyzed arm even though the doctor witnessed that the arm did not move, or they will deny a request to move the arm claiming that, rather than paralysis, their denial comes from preference. Ramachandran suggests that key to understanding this syndrome is its relationship to hemispheric differences between the right and left brain. The left hemisphere, he suggests, is responsible for creating a "'belief system,' a story that makes sense of the available evidence" (134), and the right hemisphere collects potentially contradictory information and then periodically forces a revision of the script to fit

the latest collected data. If the right hemisphere sustains damage, he argues, the left hemisphere need not revise its story because the right hemisphere is no longer recognizing contradictory data. Ramachandran's story of a hemispheric "devil's advocate" may seem spectacular, but his research on patients with anosognosia suggests that strict adherence to the idea that we feel real emotions only about what we believe to be real fails to explain the every day impact of "fictional" stories ("I'm fat" or "Cordelia must not love me") or the extraordinary impact of hemispheric damage.

While Ramachandran's theory explains a severe case of brain damage, Fauconnier and Turner's theory of "living in the blend" explains cognitive and linguistic leaps in articulation and comprehension which happen every day. Like Holland's elaboration of suspension of disbelief, living in the blend explains being "carried away" at the theatre; unlike Holland, Fauconnier and Turner speak of *living* in the blend, with the assumption that both thinking and feeling are requisite for living. Although similar to Erving Goffman's conception of the "operating fiction"[21] used to process and understand a given situation, Fauconnier and Turner's reformulation does not tie the process to "fiction" or "belief." The use of the term "fiction" suggests a kind of controlling agent to the "operation" and presupposes a factual set of terms with which the fiction deals. This is an assumption that "living in the blend" avoids because it relies on the conceptual process that constructs

[21] See Goffman, 26.

temporary matrices for understanding anything. The degree of truth is irrelevant to what makes a blend useful or emotionally evocative.

Fauconnier and Turner discuss a severe case of depression studied in Berlin in the 1980s. Sufferers had purchased lottery tickets for “fun,” rather than with any real hope of winning, yet then felt crippling depression when they lost. Their symptoms were like those who had lost loved ones or a house, and so it seemed to interpreters that, since purchasing the lottery tickets, the lottery hopefuls had been living in a fantasy of having won. When the reality of not winning destroyed their fantasy, it also took away what the fantasy had brought them: “The amazing thing is that the fantasy world seems to have had profound effects on the psychological reality of the real world, given that the patients had no delusions about the odds of winning, and said so clearly” (231). The woman who sent the note to Burbage after his performance of *Richard III* asking that he “come to her” by the name of Richard, was hoping to continue to live in the blend.[22] When Pavlov’s dogs salivated as a result of the bell, they were living in the blend that the bell represented the food it preceded. Women and girls who fight to catch the bride’s bouquet have blended the bouquet with a husband, living in the blend that to catch one is to procure the other. The limits of these blends differ; while it would not be uncommon for the bridesmaid to feel happy at the captured flowers, it would be cause for concern if she began sending out invitations with only the ritual flowers as fiancé.[23]

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[22] See Sorlien, 10.
[23] For more on blending and performativity, see chapter three and Eve Sweetser’s “Blended Spaces and Performativity.”

Fauconnier and Turner's formulation of "living in the blend" does not restrict itself to fiction but allows room for the extensive and powerful experience—both linguistically, conceptually, and emotionally—of what has fallen under the misleading and restrictive category of "suspension of disbelief."

To live in the blend that Burbage is Shakespeare's Richard III might work well for sexual fantasy but will not provide dramaturgical insight, performance analysis, or historical perspective. Blends can seduce with their compressed drama; the insight they provide can stun with its simplicity. The danger of living in the blend, it seems to me, is that being blinded to the network of meanings, associations, assumptions, and spaces outside of--yet pivotal to--the blend is anti-intellectual and conceptually vulnerable. Just as voters fail to see the whole picture when they live in the blends politicians construct for them—believing, as President Bush suggested, that Kerry's health care plan was a "takeover," and therefore military, disruptive, unnecessary, and unwanted,[24] viewers miss key intellectual, analytical, and emotional experiences when simply "living in" the theatrical blend.

Not only can living in the blend obscure analysis of input spaces and linkages, it also reifies the same troublesome binary between thinking and feeling. To live "in" the blend suggests that one is contained within the blend and unable to see or experience the blend, or the network of spaces that generate the blend, from any distance. The concern may just be a semantic one, but as I have been arguing, such semantic constructions shape and constrain thinking so that once the language

[24] For an explanation of this example and the relationship between blending theory and political soundbites, see chapter one.

insists on containment or suspension, thinking on the phenomenon necessarily remains defined by these paradigms.[25] To find a different metaphor for the phenomenon might be to expose a different conception of what is happening to the minds/bodies watching a play.

Moreover, it might illuminate other off-stage performances to which we react emotionally and analytically. Cognitive scientist Seana Coulson and Esther Pascual outline the profound argumentative power of constructing blends that obscure some of the illogical projections within the network, finding that "serious argumentative points are often made via the construction of unrealistic blended cognitive models."[26] Compression allows speakers to frame controversial issues strategically, omitting access to contradictory or challenging mental spaces. These blends also evoke emotions helpful to the argument. Coulson and Pascual look at anti-abortion rhetoric as framing the debate in terms of murder and the aborted fetus as a "full-blown human agent;" this framing forces us to view the issue in terms of someone doing the killing, an ending of life, and a life that is ended. Coulson and Pascual note that this argumentative technique is not new; Aristotle spoke of the

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[25] In *Making Truth: Metaphor in Science,* Theodore Brown argues that scientific thought is inseparable from the metaphors used to model and talk about the science. He talks about models as metaphors (25) and how they are a mapping of information from a verbal expression of an idea to a 3D representation of that idea. The model then is used in conducting future experiments, motivating thought experiments, and envisioning future elaborations. Metaphor theory helps to see that while the similarities exposed in metaphor use can also be similarities *created* by metaphor use. Similarly, metaphors hide dissimilarities and ways the two do not fit together. In addition to leading to certain experiments or assumptions suggested by the model, "Attachment to a particular model can inhibit thinking in other, possibly more productive ways about the system being studied" (26).
[26] See Coulson and Pascual, 1.

power of *energia* or the "bringing before the eyes" accomplished in certain forms of rhetoric.

The drama of the early modern period reflects an interest in the power of rhetoric to contain and persuade in politics. *Richard III* traces Richard's ascent to the throne through a series of theatrical uses of rhetoric which manipulate those around him into perceiving him as the wronged friend or retiring religious figure. Richard's language generates conceptually altered political reasoning.

Chris Hasel Jr. reads the play in light of Machiavelli's work on the power of speech to motivate in war and argues that Richard's loss to Richmond at Bosworth Field is foreshadowed in the comparative power of the different motivational speeches of Richard and Richmond. While Hasel's point is that Richard loses because he is the worse orator, blending theory can suggest what makes a successful oration. Machiavelli's thesis that a good speech "taketh awaie feare" (qtd in Hasel 74)[27] depends on language's ability to prompt what Coulson calls "frame shifting," wherein a given circumstance is suddenly re-configured in light of new information. That is, a speech can re-frame the pending battle in such a way as to exile any doubt or fear. Richard fails because his language frames the battle in terms of what will happen if they lose, rather than what will happen if they win. While Richard fills their minds with images of their wives and children being harmed by their enemies, Richmond tells them that winning will provide immortality through progeny: "If you do free your children from the sword, / Your children's children quits it in your

[27] Quintilian's *The Institutio Oratoria* also argues for the performative power of speech (implicitly metaphoric speech) to evoke an emotional reaction and thus sway a judge, jury, or audience.

age" (5.3.262). Richmond's vision depends on his soldiers first calling up the mental space of a threat to one's children (which is where Richard's vision ends) and blends that with the space of future children of the threatened children. In the blend, children rescued from the sword produce children who are able to repay their life's debt.[28] In this blend, the soldiers are alive, well, and comforted by grandchildren: an image much more likely to take away fear than an image of raped wives and daughters. Before he has raised a finger in battle, Richmond's rousing rhetoric moves his soldiers to "plaie the man" where Richard's rhetoric does not.

If a speech successfully "taketh awaie feare," perhaps the relationship between the emotions and the mind/body is different than "suspension of disbelief"--or "living in the blend," for that matter—suggests. To investigate a position both in and out of the blend, a position where emotions need not be separate from analysis, I turn to Hamlet's curiosity about the player's passion and current scientific research on emotions.

Drowning the stage

Ham. Is it not monstrous that this player here,
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,
Could force his soul so to his own conceit
That from her working all his visage wann'd,
Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect,
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting
With forms to his conceit? and all for nothing!
For Hecuba!
What's Hecuba to him, or he to her,
That he should weep for her? (2.2.545-54)

[28] This is one of several places in the play where the value of sons to secure one's future is used as a primary motivating factor.

Hamlet's concern that the player weeps for Hecuba while he, with "the motive and the cue for passion," does nothing suggests an interesting relationship between emotions and fiction. Hamlet sees his own reality as more likely to prompt real feelings (and, he assumes, actions) and he is outraged that he is not drowning the stage with tears. As Hamlet rages about being dull and "unpregnant of my cause,"[29] Shakespeare crams the speech with extra syllables and interrupted lines, contradicting Hamlet's claim that he is "muddy-mettled" and says "nothing":

> Who calls me villain, breaks my pate across,
> Plucks off my beard and blows it in my face,
> Tweaks me by the nose, gives me the lie i' th' throat
> As deep as to the lungs—who does me this?
> Ha! (2.2.567-71)

The first three lines above begin with a spondaic and then trochaic feet, shifting the usual rhythm of the iambic foot which stresses the second syllable to a rhythm that stresses the first syllable. The third line interrupts the iambic rhythm further, shoving extra unstressed syllables into the line with a troche in the first, third, and fourth foot. While "Ha!" can be printed on the same or following line, either option forces the actor into the emotion of the moment, either giving him (or her) a gap or pause of nine syllables before continuing with "'swounds" or creating a spondaic first foot with "Ha! 'swounds" and then ending on a feminine ending with "be." Hamlet's soliloquy expresses and exposes his own emotions; finding himself moved by the player's performance of emotions, he transforms the "nothing" of his

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[29] Being "unpregnant" is an interesting counterfactual blend like the "nothing" between Ophelia's legs. To be unpregnant is not just to be empty, but it is to be empty of a specific something. To think of Hamlet as being unpregnant exposes his inability to be pregnant in the first place (unless played by Sarah Bernhardt), much the way Ophelia's nothing exposes the genitals of the actor playing her.

response into a plan. The fiction of the theatre, he decides, is the way to capture the truth of the King's guilt. Emotion, like the "direction" best discovered through "indirection," is best assayed through the performance of emotion.

The performance of emotion is not necessarily the same thing as emotion. The player king performs emotions in reaction to a story of a woman's emotional reaction to her husband's death. While he clearly shows the biological effluvia of emotions--he cries, turns pale, etc.--we do not know whether he *feels* the emotions he shows. Similarly, while Shakespeare expresses Hamlet's emotions in verse and the actor performs Hamlet's emotions in performance, the audience of *Hamlet* does not know whether or not the actor playing Hamlet actually feels the emotions he conveys. When an actor cries onstage, an audience may or may not notice the seeming virtuosity of the actor capable of crying for the emotions of his character. Again, this returns to the question of what information about the actor's body gets projected into an understanding of the character onstage. Certain biological responses—crying, for example—might call our attention to the body of the actor less than others—an erection, for example. Tears can be shed for Hecuba, but an erection for Hecuba is an altogether different thing. As with Duse's famous blush, blood flow is expected to be not under our conscious control and therefore outside the actor's toolbox. If it cannot be accessed at will, then presumably the actor must feel the necessary emotion in order to evoke the concomitant biological response.[30]

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[30] In "Performance and Participation: Desdemona, Foucault, and the Actor's Body," Anthony Dawson counters what he sees as the "primacy of discourse" (29) insisted upon by the literary and cultural critics and attempts to put attention back on the body not as simply a canvas for meaning but as a maker of meaning. He notes that looking at performance makes things more difficult for theory

Elly Konijn studied empirically whether actors experience the emotions that they convey their characters to be feeling. She finds that the emotions experienced onstage are motivated by the "situational meaning-structure of the performance situation, rather than by the emotions of the character" (65); i.e., onstage, actors feel the emotions associated with acting in front of an audience (challenge, nervousness, concentration, tension, etc.), regardless of what emotions the character is supposed to be feeling or the emotions the actor is performing. This is true, she finds, regardless of whether or not the actor considers him/herself to be "method" and mimetic in style, or presentational and detached. The emotions experienced by the actors relate to the task at hand for them, not to the experience being had by their characters: "During a *performance*, however, the demands of the actual context of acting – in front of an audience – will prevent the actor from losing himself in character-emotions" (78). The actor and character have different feelings, merged perhaps by an expression of feeling; the emotional goal of theatre--the experience that suspension of disbelief is called upon to explain—is the ability of an audience member to have the same feelings as the character, midwifed through the performance of the actor. Konijn's study is from the perspective of the actor, not the

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yet also makes it richer. Dawson's argument, however, presumes an elision between the actor's body and that which it represents, since it is the actor's body exciting tears in the audience. He also continues the theoretical separation between real and unreal in emotions as related to a separation between the real and the represented: "As audience members, we shed real tears on account of what we recognize as unreal feelings; that is, we separate out the actor's body from what it represents and the character's 'body' from what it means" (37). This posits a rather unnecessarily complicated cognitive process given that the actor's body had to be first connected to what it represents before the audience could separate it. The formulation of embodied cognition and the cognitive linguistics of Fauconnier, Turner, Lakoff, and others that sees all meaning as shifting construals, makes such steps redundant.

audience, and she does not articulate a theory of emotion and emotional evocation that explains what they are or how an audience receives emotions. In order, then, to understand how this could possibly be the case, it is necessary to complicate our understanding of emotions.

Emotions, Aristotle argued, are the key ingredients in tragedy, since any dramatic narrative must contain events arousing pity and fear in order for the audience to experience catharsis. The scholarly debate on catharsis has been cacophonous, but few theatre theorists have asked what "pity and fear" are. They can be forgiven since, until recently, even neuroscientists privileged "reason" over the seemingly messy study of emotions. When emotion was studied as part of the brain, it was seen as part of "the lower neural strata associated with ancestors whom no one worshiped."[31] The limbic system, the general term for the emotional centers of the brain, was thought to act alone, deep in the brain. The forebrain understands math and the "reptilian brain" gets afraid.

In *Descartes' Error*, Damasio defines emotions as a "collection of changes in body state that are induced in myriad organs by nerve cell terminals, under the control of a dedicated brain system, which is responding to the content of thoughts relative to a particular entity or event" (139). Sensory input is sent directly to the thalamus which is responsible for shunting any potentially alarming information to the amygdala, the body's alarm mechanism. Emotional stimulus is sent directly from the thalamus to the amygdala, which prepares a physical response, as well as

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[31]See Damasio 1999, 39.

being sent to the sensory cortex where the information is assessed. Once the sensory cortex has assessed the stimulus, it will send inhibitory or excitatory information to the hypothalamus, which is responsible for sending and receiving messages to and from the rest of the body. The messages involve neurotransmitters and hormones to alter the body state in reaction to the stimulus. These changes or emotional symptoms include sweaty palms, dry mouth, a heart rate change, flushing or pallor, constriction of the stomach, and relaxation or tension of muscles. These responses occur in order to protect, as, for example, a change in heart rate will be necessary if the organism needs to flee from the stimulus evoking this response. The hypothalamus monitors the effect of the physical changes on the body and communicates this to the cortex, which continues to assess the information and excite or inhibit the body's reaction via the hypothalamus. Emotion happens in the entire system.

A racing heart, however, could mean panic, rage, or love. Although there may be subtle differences between panic and love in the overall chemical changes in the body, Damasio argues that the primary difference lies in the assessment of the body state by the cerebral cortex. The assessment, which he calls the feeling, is defined as the experience of the emotion in the body juxtaposed to our images, memories, and knowledge of the experience and the stimuli that initiated it. The physical reaction of the body is not specific to a feeling; for the feeling to register to the person, the specific mix of bodily changes must be assessed in light of other information. The racing heart and constricted stomach is assessed as love because of

the candlelight and the dilated eyes of the man across the table. In another situation, the same experience feels like food poisoning. Whereas emotions generally can be perceived by a bystander, feelings are internal and private mental states evoked by the physical reaction of emotions.

Damasio's studies of patients with particular emotional deficits in *The Feeling of What Happens* illuminate the powerful impact of emotions on the mind/body/brain system as a whole. Due to calcification of the amygdala, one woman had no fear: "It was as if negative emotions such as fear and anger had been removed from her affective vocabulary" (65). When asked to name the emotions represented by facial expressions in others, she could not recognize fear: "At a purely intellectual level she knows what fear is supposed to be, what should cause it, and even what one may do in situations of fear" (66) but she does not experience fear. But Damasio's work goes on to radically question the existence of a "purely intellectual level." After surgery to remove a tumor in his frontal lobe, Elliot lost his ability to perceive his emotions, despite performing normally on all intelligence tests. While Elliot knew what emotional reaction a certain stimuli used to generate, he no longer felt or sensed this reaction, and this caused a drastic impairment in his reasoning and ability to plan and behave socially. For Damasio, Elliot's case demonstrated the profound interdependence of reason and emotion. Thus, a discussion about the impact of emotions in the construction of meaning—whether through rhetoric, performance, or embodiment—must not be separated from a discussion of meaning. Hamlet's emotional reaction to the player's performance

leads him to grant extraordinary power to the "nothing" that generated the display of emotion by the player.

Humans do not need to experience something in order to have an emotional reaction to it. A spectator might experience fear when seeing Oedipus walk onstage with bleeding eyes or hearing the cry of pain from offstage; the stimulus resembles those patterns that require immediate physical response and therefore the amygdala is alerted. The emotions could also be aroused by the mere expressions of the actors. The amygdala is highly attuned to expressions of fear in others, with one part devoted to assessing facial expressions and one to tonal shifts in voice.[32] Perceiving emotion in others can be enough to generate them in the spectator. One study exposed subjects to another person making an expression of disgust; when the expression registered intense disgust, the subjects' own brains registered disgust, exciting the same neurons in the brain that become active when disgusted.[33] There is a growing body of evidence that humans are not a closed system; we react emotionally to expressions of emotions in others.

Damasio calls this the "as-if body loop" and argues that witnessing suffering in a loved one can evoke a similar biological response as actually experiencing the suffering being watched. The body loop is the system for circulating information through the body, both hormonal and electrical, to alter the state of the body under certain circumstances—fear, arousal, etc. The cognitive representation of the body's state recognizes changes as if they are going on in the body, even if they are not.

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[32]See Carter, 85.
[33]See Phillips.

This is necessary, Damasio argues, because it facilitates simulation; it allows us to experience emotions separate from the stimulus that initiates them, such as in memory. Memory does not recall an exact replica of the person or event remembered, but rather an interpretation or version of the original.[34] This imitation of the memory is enough, however, to arouse the emotions associated with the original. A picture of mother evokes the emotions associated with mother.

Theatre depends upon the brain's ability to reconstruct the emotions associated with certain events. In its imitation of a character's action on stage, theatre creates an imitation of the actor's action in the spectator's brain which in turn creates emotion. Just as Aristotle's tragedy is an imitation of an action, so to memory recalls an imitation of the original event or stimulus which then evokes real emotions in response to the representation. The fear and pity Aristotle associated with a reaction to tragedy onstage are mimetic just as pity and fear in the spectator rely on mimesis in reaction to "real" events onstage. If every feeling is a mental story created to explain a biological reaction or emotion, then the feeling evoked by Hecuba need not be any different from the feeling evoked by remembering our mother. Both are reactions to representations.

In *Emotional Contagion*, Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson argue that emotions are best understood as a "package" of events orstates. that shape an emotional experience or behavior. They see emotions relationally, in that they can be caught and spread and are determined by stimulus from the outside or the inside:

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[34]See Damasio 1994, 100.

“an important consequence of emotional contagion is an attentional, emotional, and behavioral synchrony that has the same adaptive utility (and drawbacks) for social entities (dyads, groups) as has emotion for the individual” (5). What this suggests is that we are not separate and contained individuals; we are porous and seeping. According to emotional contagion theory, we “synchronize facial expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of another person and, consequently … converge emotionally” (5). Based on the speed with which their studies show that this occurs, this is not a conscious attempt to reflect or match the feelings of another but rather an automatic mirroring. This influential book was written before the explosion of mirror neuron research that confirms the results of their behavioral studies on the level of the neurons.

Research into the mirror neuron system in humans begins to shed some light on the power of theatre to initiate an emotional reaction in the audience in response to performed emotions onstage. While Damasio’s work is based on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans of patients with various brain abnormalities or damage, electroencephalographic (EEG) and magnetoencephalographic (MEG) readings of normal human brains suggest a system of mirror neurons that react to specific actions in others. Rizzolatti and Craighero discuss findings that humans show an activation of the premotor cortex when watching someone perform an action on an object as well as when watching

someone perform a meaningless gesture.[35] Other studies have shown that activation of the mirror neuron system occurs when subjects witness actions suggesting an intended action, for example reaching for the phone in order to answer it. Both of these studies indicate that not only do humans have a similar mirror neuron system as discovered more directly in monkeys,[36] but that ours is actually more advanced and probably plays a large role in our ability to communicate with and imitate others. Research on mirror neurons is beginning to show that there is a system in the brain set up to facilitate learning, compassion, and connection between others.[37] Our traditional ideas about why we are moved by theatre or by the fictional or truthful stories of others must begin to take into consideration the work being done within the sciences.

Not nothing

> Ger. To whom do you speak this?
> Ham. Do you see nothing there?
> Ger. Nothing at all; yet all that is I see. (3.4.131-33)

Hamlet asks if Gertrude sees nothing and she confirms that she sees nothing; they are in agreement: Hamlet points to nothing and she sees it. Gertrude's insistence that "all that is I see" makes nothing part of all that is, something *Hamlet* insists on throughout the play. Onstage, of course, Hamlet is not pointing to nothing, he is pointing to the ghost, embodied by an actor—perhaps Shakespeare in the original—

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[35]This information seems to call into question the assumption of suspension of disbelief, cited by Tooby and Cosmides, that "fictional worlds engage emotion systems while disengaging action systems" (8).
[36] See Kohler et. al and Rizzolatti (2001).
[37] For more on the impact of the mirror neuron system to an understanding of theatre, see chapter five.

which he calls nothing and which the audience definitely sees. “Nothing” is there, onstage, and has the power in its ghostly absence to provide the cue for passion and to motivate bloody thoughts. Using blending theory to see Shakespeare’s poetry illuminates the network of mental spaces primed and operating within his play. It allows us to find content previously obscured by the blends that construct seemingly literal meanings. Any application of science in theatre theory should furthermore recognize the powerful effect that the embodied actor has to alter and play with the meaning of language as it comes off the page onto the stage. As a character, Ophelia might have nothing between her legs, but onstage she has something very particular between her legs.

Moreover, cognitive linguistic theory complicates and challenges traditional theories of suspension of disbelief and clear distinctions between truth and fiction. When nothing takes the stage, those lines get blurred. To base our theory of fiction on a division between fact and fiction, something and nothing, is to reify binaries between literal and metaphoric, thinking and feeling, which current scientific research does not bear out. Many of the witnesses of the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center began their description by saying “it was like a movie.” The real thing had to be compared to a fictional world in order to be understood. We could argue that this means that suspension of disbelief is required for belief, but this explodes the term out of usefulness while acknowledging that belief is not necessary for belief. If my brain is wired to react to intended gestures in others, and my emotions can be triggered by events not happening to me directly, than watching

Hamlet react to the player's story of Hecuba mirrors our reaction to Hamlet's determined seeing of nothing. It feels as if it were there, so it must be there. The truth of the ghost or the thing—nonthing—between Ophelia's legs is all in the mind of the beholder. Theatre teaches us to see and feel for nothing, and that is something.

Chapter four, in part, has been submitted for publication of the material as it appears in *SubStance* (2006), Cook, Amy; "Staging Nothing: Hamlet and Cognitive Science." The dissertation author was the primary investigator and author of this paper.

Chapter five - Pulling our selves together, or: seeing the wholes

> But I am very sorry, good Horatio,
> That to Laertes I forgot myself;
> For by the image of my cause I see
> The portraiture of his (5.2.75-78).

Scientists studying the deficits of autism shed light on the power and importance of a facility with theatre, with performance, with pretend. Research into phantom limbs and the rubber hand illusion provides a different way of thinking about embodiment in theatre, the mystery of theatrical incarnation. Neuroscience has discovered a section of cells in the brain responsible for imitation and learning; these cells have been called—by scientists—a "potential bridge between minds."[1] These cells, these mirror neurons, could prove to be the glass held up to nature that Hamlet hoped to find in the theatre. When I look at the research conducted in these three areas, it is clear to me that an intervention from within theatre, or at the very least engagement with theatre, is imperative and has so far been missing. Through the lens of these exciting new studies into the brain, I see shades of *Hamlet* and the phenomenon of theatre that Hamlet believed would expose the King.

I begin with a question raised in chapter three: when Kevin Kline (or any actor) looks into the mirror onstage, whom does he see? I said before that I believe unequivocally that he sees Kevin Kline, not Hamlet. Without arguing otherwise, I would like to complicate and question my perspective on perspective. Theatre

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[1] See Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, Perrett (2001).

theory requires a constant taking and shifting of perspectives; talking about "house right" or "Polonius's line" encodes perspective into discourse immediately. Directors work to shape a performance from the protagonist's perspective, while ensemble actors color their performance to expose their characters' backgrounds and perspectives. For method actors (and therefore most of contemporary American actors), at least, the goal is to bring as much individual perspective to each character, as if only through a stage full of perspectives can the audience see the whole. Focusing on the story of a production of *Hamlet* in a maximum security prison, I show how, despite an assumption of difference between self and other, the ability to take on multiple perspectives breaks down that distinction, enables us to understand each other's parts, and makes us feel whole.

The distance between paw and hand, or: "I am Laertes. I am. I am"

It always slightly troubled me that my favorite music to work out to requires me to sing lyrics such as "… so we start lookin' for the bitches with the big butt, like her, but she keeps crying 'I got a boyfriend' bitch stop lying! Dumb ass hooker aint nothin' but a dyke. Suddenly I see some niggas that I don't like." This song, *Gangsta Gangsta* by NWA, tells the exciting tale of police killing, assault, and female intimidation, if not rape; its protagonist declaims himself "the type of nigga that's built to last," which is not the first or the last time I notice that the song is definitely not written from my point of view. I am neither a nigga nor built to last. The distance between my perspective and the perspective of the singer is part of my joy, part of the power of my experience of the song. Just as most black men in

America are decidedly not "built to last," my lack of connection to what I was singing actually created the power in the transversal leap into becoming a powerful outlaw, confident that any threat could be met with a stronger counter threat.

Put another way, if *Gangsta Gangsta* was a play, I would be cast as the "dumb ass hooker," not the "nigga that's built to last." Onstage, my whiteness and feminine characteristics would cause the audience to question the very thing I question: how can I possibly take on the perspective of one when I am so clearly the other? Without getting into identity politics, the importance of race or gender, essentialism, or any of these legitimate areas of examining perspective, I would like to examine how we project perspective onto actors and characters in the theatre as well as how science discusses perspective without reference to any of the issues above. Examining the ubiquity and power of perspective shifting in the theatre calls attention to the metaphors we use to discuss characters and acting. Within the image schema of the container metaphor, a character is something an actor gets "into" and "lives in," seeing the play from the "character's perspective." Like all metaphors, it entails further metaphors of acting (feeling the character's feelings, for example) and obscures other experiences (letting the emotions come from one place, the body from another, for example). To interrogate perspective in acting and our metaphors of performance, I turn to actors with a unique perspective on *Hamlet*.

Jack Hitt's "Act V" story for NPR's *This American Life* follows the rehearsals and production of *Hamlet*'s Act V within a maximum security prison in Missouri. Ira Glass, the host of *This American Life*, introduces the story by asking

what any of us can relate to in *Hamlet*; Hitt then suggests that there is much to learn about *Hamlet*, a play about a man contemplating a violent crime and its consequences, from people who have committed such a crime and are currently living with the consequences. Despite very little education and no acting training, these inmates make sense of Shakespeare's play because of where they have been, what they have seen. The hour-long piece tracks the perspective of the actors as they attempt to "get into" their characters and argues that their individual perspectives, their crimes and victims, were powerfully present *in* their performance. While the story is enchanting and their insights into the play refreshing, Hitt's argument that their perspectives make them uniquely qualified to perform this play seems less persuasive to me than the idea that their backgrounds make their performance deeper or more interesting to an audience. It is not surprising that Derrick "Big Hutch" Hutchison found it so easy to slip in and out of his character of Horatio; what is surprising is how hollow Horatio is without Big Hutch.

Big Hutch is one of the stars of Hitt's piece. He is the "killer whale," the top of the prison hierarchy, in an acting company composed mostly of "minnows." Hitt describes him as "the type of guy that if you met him you would think 'he's probably serving 120 years for armed robberies,' and that would be correct." Hitt's tape punctuates Big Hutch's comments with Hitt's laughter in the background; Hitt sounds so affected by the size and threat of this actor that his respect for Big Hutch's "literary criticism" seems tainted by the slightly patronizing surprise that someone so physically threatening could also provide insight. That being said,

however, Big Hutch does give Hitt a compelling reading of Horatio, his own character:

> I think he's a chump for real … I mean, he's supposed to be cool with Hamlet, and they're best friends, but I think Horatio's somebody that … a sounding board for Hamlet. I mean a majority of his lines is 'eh my lord … yes my lord.' I mean if we're friends, we're going to communicate better than that. I mean, you're going to tell me your deepest secrets. You know, I wanna know what you and Ophelia did last night.

In addition to picking up on one of the longstanding mysteries about *Hamlet*—what *did* Hamlet and Ophelia do last night?—Big Hutch's rumination on Horatio and Hamlet's relationship exposes the ease with which Big Hutch is able to be Hutch, Horatio, and Hamlet all in the same sentence.

The first thing he says is that he sees his character as a "chump," defined by urbandictionary.com as "Someone who does not understand the basics of life on earth. Confused easily" and "A sucka that tries to act cool, but is really a fool and tries to act tough, but really isn't."[1] Most actors (at least American-trained actors) avoid judging their characters objectively like this, since they are taught to get "inside" the character and view the character's perspective from within and such criticism might "block" identification with the character. Big Hutch looks squarely at Horatio from the distance required to assess a friendship that seems to him unequal and disconnected; he's judging his character as a character in a play,

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[1] Urbandictionary.com is a website that compiles definitions of slang words or phrases submitted by people who (ostensibly) use them. The order of definitions is decided upon by users who click the definition they find the most useful and accurate. I chose the first two, as the first one seems to convey what Hutch is saying about Hamlet and the second one conveys the disdain in the assessment. "Chump" is defined by *The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition (*2000) as "A stupid or foolish person; a dolt."

serving the plot, rather than requiring a back story, inside, and feelings. However, as soon as Big Hutch speaks a couple of Horatio's lines—even if they are "eh my lord" and "yes my lord"—he switches perspective. He goes on to refer to Hamlet and Horatio as "we," now speaking from Horatio's perspective.

In a smooth and effective rhetorical move, he then puts Hitt, the interviewer, in the perspective of Hamlet: "I mean, you're going to tell me your deepest secrets. You know, I wanna know what you and Ophelia did last night." Big Hutch has prompted Hitt to create a blend where Big Hutch and Hitt are friends talking about Hitt's sexual escapades with Ophelia. Convict and interviewer are now in Shakespeare's play, navigating secrets and friendship. Hitt's tape again includes his laughter, and it is unclear to me if he is laughing at Big Hutch's casual reference to the Hamlet/Ophelia mystery, the idea of his being Hamlet and having such a secret, or the idea of Big Hutch—the killer whale, the violent criminal—rhetorically establishing a friendship with Hitt, the NPR journalist and scholar. Though Hitt credits him for his "gift for literary criticism," suggesting that having such intelligence brings out his "inner minnow,"[2] Big Hutch seems most impressive in his rhetorical skills.

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[2] The subtextual drama throughout this story is of the pondering journalist coming in to an ocean of dangerous fish who have acted, who have abjured the moral debate Hamlet spends the play questioning in favor of the swift action that has put them in prison. Hitt also positions himself as Hamlet, asking "the question" to a group of prisoners. Hitt simultaneously glorifies their intelligence and acting skill and also associates Shakespeare, intelligence, and morality with the "minnows" of the sea, since Hutch goes from killer whale to minnow at moments of intellect or insight. I am reminded here of the idea of a "Shakespearean loser" postulated by Hopkins, Ingman, and Reynolds borrowing Richard Burt's appropriation of "loser" to evoke a culturally equivocal position of the academic "setting, even raising standards as well as ignoring them" (cited in Reynolds 2003, 141). Their "Shakespearean Loser" revels in the contradictions, feeling aggrandized by the number of

Big Hutch then moves to an analysis of Hamlet's problem. Where Hitt praises the astute reading that he says he had never heard before, I want to focus on the shifting perspectives in Hutch's tracking of the issues:

> I don't see the conflict. I don't see what Hamlet is dealing with, man. 'I should kill the king now … I shouldn't kill him now.' Nah…you knew that once your father said revenge him, you knew you was going to do this. So what's the hubbub about? That's the same way I couldn't see someone raping my daughter or something and just sitting around … nah nah nah nah nah. I got to do you man, and that's just … you done. That's why I think Hamlet's an old minnow too.

Here Big Hutch has trouble taking Hamlet's perspective, and that difficulty helps to communicate the incomprehensibility of Hamlet's problem to Big Hutch. He interrupts his attempt at speaking from Hamlet's perspective ('I should kill the king now … I shouldn't kill him now') and quickly makes Hitt take the perspective of the wavering son. He tries again by analogy with his own daughter and again cannot complete the thought without returning to Big Hutch's perspective. Despite his facility with perspective and blends—or because of it—he refuses to articulate Hamlet's inability to act.

Big Hutch then creates a corollary to Hamlet's dilemma by placing Hamlet in Big Hutch's situation, where revenging the death of a friend in prison could result in losing parole and thus a longer prison term. Here Big Hutch starts with Hamlet and moves at the end to talking about himself in the third person: "if he [meaning Hamlet as prison inmate] let that killing go, he have the roughest three years of his

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disparate elements, historical clues, in-jokes, and theories that may be introduced but can never be subsumed in any interpretation of Shakespeare or his plays.

entire life … so I mean, he got this dilemma. Will he be strong enough to survive that, to get out there and … Hutch wouldn't. I ain't going to lie … Hutch ….” As his voice trails off, thinking about what Hutch would do from the perspective of the dramaturg/director he is playing in his conversation with Hitt and projecting Hutch onto the role of Hamlet, he sounds moved by his clear-eyed assessment of the type of man Big Hutch is. Hutch would kill the murderer of his friend, losing parole but protecting his status. In this last rhetorical formulation, Hutch is not Hamlet and is not Horatio; he is being not-Hutch in order to see Hutch.

Renaissance students were trained to argue *in utramque partem* (on either side of an issue), and this facility with argument — leading to a facility with taking different perspectives — can be seen in the plays. The plays pursued this intellectual curiosity and emotional exploration through their structure, exposing the audience to an experience that enriched as it entertained. The early modern interest in the power of rhetorical perspective shift to change minds has been examined before.[3] In *Renaissance Minds and Their Fictions*: *Cusanus, Sidney, Shakespeare,* Ronald Levao traces the interest in and anxiety over poetic fictions in the Renaissance period, particularly in the work of Sidney, Spencer, Shakespeare, and Nicholas of

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[3] Mary Crane's book *Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England* looks at the popularity of books (such as Hamlet's “tables”) to collect sayings and aphorisms during the early modern period and how they created “a central mode of transaction with classical antiquity and provided an influential model for authorial practice and for authoritative self-fashioning” (1). She traces how the rise of the monarchy and the collapse of Catholicism created a need for new ways to establish authority in language. In *Hamlet in Purgatory*, Greenblatt argues that Catholics created the idea of purgatory through fictional accounts meant to shift the perspective of the listener. See also my article with Bryan Reynolds, “Comedic Law: Projective Transversality, Deceit Conceits, and the Conjuring of *Macbeth* and *Doctor Faustus* in Jonson's *The Devil is an Ass*” which argues that Jonson used comedy and ironic intertextuality to educate his audience and improve their abilities to judge his plays.

Cusa. He sees in Shakespeare's work particular tension between the fictions onstage and the reality off stage. Levao argues that Hamlet's mousetrap is "Hamlet's reality played as fiction" (347) and that Hamlet is excited after the play because he has finally found a "vantage point" (347) from which to read what is going on. In *The Tudor Play of Mind*, Joel Altman argues that sixteenth-century plays were structured as questions and asks what effect this had on fashioning the minds that were fashioned by these dramas. His book looks at both the dramaturgy of the plays and the rhetoric used within the drama to arouse wonder and thus thought. Drama encourages perspective shifting, the kind of discovery process Big Hutch engages in. This, in turn, constructs a sense of self as that which is and is not the perspectives taken on temporarily in the blend.

Brian MacWhinney's "perspective hypothesis" argues that communication is fundamentally a process of "mutual perspective taking" and that rather than playing a secondary role in communication, perspective taking is "at the very core of language structure and higher-level cognition" (3). MacWhinney could be describing Big Hutch when he says "When language is rich in cues for perspective taking and perspective shifting, it awakens the imagination of the listener and leads to successful sharing of ideas, impressions, attitudes, and narratives" (3). Perspective taking is evidenced in the perception of direct experience, space/time deixis, plans, and social roles. For MacWhinney, direct experience means that, for example, our understanding of "banana" refers to our perspective when holding, touching, tasting, peeling, and seeing a banana, or, for example, that we project our

body image onto a clock to understand it as having a face and hands. Space/time deixis means that in order to understand location in space or time, we create a "here" which can be defined within an egocentric frame (based on self location), an allocentric frame (based on a particular object referent), or a geocentric frame (based on a land mass, such as a mountain or lake).

MacWhinney sees evidence of perspective shifting in the way we comprehend and discuss social roles, seeing in a simple word like "libel," for example, a drama played out among the person who perceives that a rumor has been spread, the person spreading the rumor, and the society that the victim assumes will be reading the allegedly false information. In order to understand what libel means, one must be able construct a scenario that involves multiple perspectives. MacWhinney notes that while primates can take on some elements of perspective taking (imagining their own bodies, paying attention to a mirror, tracking goals of others, for example), "without a more powerful system of representation and storage [i.e., language], they cannot manipulate chains of social implications and construct larger representations of social structure" (38). Language facilitates perspective taking and perspective taking enables conceptual leaps. MacWhinney finds the core of our language ability in perspective taking, seeing from another vantage point—in essence, role-playing.

He separates perspective taking into two modes, the depictive and the enactive. The depictive allows attention to be focused on the subject of the sentence, but does not activate the listener to put herself in the perspective of the subject, as

the enactive mode does. Some sentences can be heard with either mode, such as "the cat licked her paw," for example. On its own, the sentence does not require the enactive mode in order to understand or see the cat licking her paw; however, once it is preceded with a long description of the cat seeing a bird, crouching in the grass, tensing her muscles, raising her paw, etc., the listener is induced to take on an enactive perspective: "The longer and more vivid our descriptions, the more they stimulate enactive processes in comprehension" (8). As the story of the cat's adventure unfolds, the listener sees the bird through the grass, feels the muscles in the arms tense as if they were preparing to strike, etc. The listener begins to project information about the cat's body onto her own, diminishing distance between paw and hand.

MacWhinney's hypothesis stems from what he calls an "emergent consensus" around the idea of embodied cognition, one of the key points of which is the growing research into the role of mirror neurons in humans and primates. The mirror neurons, first found in the F5 area of a monkey's premotor cortex which discharge when the monkey takes an action (grabs a banana) as well as when he watches another monkey perform the same action, have been shown to exist in humans as well and play an important role in action imitation. Rizzolatti and Craighero lay out the important findings about mirror neurons, both in understanding action and in learning through imitation. While they acknowledge that "direct evidence for the existence of mirror neurons in humans is lacking" (174), they list a wide-range of studies using neurophysiological and brain-imaging

experiments that suggests that a similar system exists in humans. They see a link between language and the mirror neuron system (MNS), since mirror neurons fire due to an interaction between the body (hand or mouth) and an object, not just the object or not just the hand/mouth, and because two classes of mouth mirror neurons were distinguished, one correlating with ingestion and one with communication (171). Rizzolatti and Craighero conclude that the studies indicate that not only do humans have a MNS similar to monkeys', but that ours is actually more advanced and probably plays a large role in our ability to communicate with and imitate others.

MacWhinney sees the position of the cells as providing evidence of their role in perspective taking: "sitting as they do at the end of the dorsal stream of visual-enactive processing, these neurons indicate the extent to which this stream operates in terms of perception-motor linkages" (13). Within the enactive mode, then, neurons fire in the motor cortex when the listener sees the cat's paw stretch out within the grass. For MacWhinney, research into the MNS suggests that speech that activates such a link between the body or actions of another and oneself will engage even more of the brain of the listener in the comprehension—and enaction—of what is being said.

The mirror neuron system provides scientists with a way of conceptualizing a "potential bridge between minds"[4] by allowing us, on the most basic level, to experience a gesture by seeing a gesture. Through language or performance, we can

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[4] See Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, Perrett (2001).

connect our perspectives, our bodies, our selves. Scientists see links between the MNS and Theory of Mind and argue that having our neurons fire at another person's gesture gives us a way of knowing the intention of the other, of their goal, which facilitates a representation of the mind state of the other.[5] While the research is exciting and does show such expansive potential, it is also important to keep in mind that talking about putting the self in the place of the other extrapolates the whole of the body, of the self, from one part or one gesture. This is to say both that the parts are not the whole and that they seem to have tremendous power in and of themselves. I will return to the impact of the discovery of MNS on our understanding of theatre later in the chapter, but first I want to return to the language of acting and the phenomenon of the actor/character nexus.

Early on in his documentary, Hitt claims that what makes "a good actor is the exact emotional opposite of what it takes to be a good inmate. Rather than close off all emotional feeling and look tough, you have to open your vulnerable self up." This reading of acting is determined by the metaphor of the self as container: an open self is transparent, exposing the emotions and the feelings of the inside to the audience, and a closed self protects the "vulnerable self" from the probing eyes of watchers. But this ignores the impressive feats of acting that he documents in his story. The actors in the prison *Hamlet* are not good because they are emotional or vulnerable or opened up. They are good because they can take on the perspective of others, because they can seem, cross over boundaries that the rest of us might think

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[5] See Wilson and Knoblich (2005) and Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, Perrett (2001).

indecorous or inappropriate. What is impressive is their ability to capture the imaginations of the audience members, prompting each member to construct a blend of character and actor that makes Shakespeare's character more compelling than he was before.

At the final performance of Act V, Hutch "nails" his final speech to Hamlet, overcoming what Hitt calls his Jack Nicholson syndrome, wherein the "actor's persona is bigger than any role he might play," and in this performance "Horatio has Hutch under control and the audience in his hand." Underneath the cliché of a good performance that stipulates that the audience be reduced in size, swept up by the performers, held in their hands, Hitt intimates that part of what made the performance powerful to him was the blend of Big Hutch and Horatio that Hitt saw in the performance; Hutch manages to "nail" the ending because he cedes it to Horatio. In Jean Paul Sartre's conception of the actor's role, the inability ever to be the character is the virtuosity of acting:

> Kean acts being what he is not and what he knows he cannot be. So each night he recommences a metamorphosis which he knows will stop on the way, always at the same point. And it is from this very incompletion that he draws his pride in the fact that he would not be admired for 'being' the character so well unless everyone, starting precisely with himself, knew that he was not. (165-66)

The audience does not come to the theatre to see Horatio; it comes to see Big Hutch's Horatio.

Hitt's language, and much of the language of acting theory, attempts to deny this: the performance was good because Horatio won, because the character was more important than the actor. But the character does not exist without the actor

from which he came. We admire the distance traveled, not the proximity or ease of impersonation. States suggests that an attention to mimesis and transparent realism can obscure the value of virtuosity in assessing a performance: "…there ought to be a word, or a way of isolating, something as powerful as the pleasure we take when artistry becomes the object of our attention" (2002, 26). The artistry States refers to is in the traveling between the "authentic self" of the actor and the "character." Of course, this conception insists on seeing the self and the character as containers located in space with art being the disembodied movement between one form of embodiment (self) and another (character).

Hitt's language reflects the container metaphor that structures so much of acting and performance theory: the character is a container which the actor enters. Ben Kingsley expresses his experience of playing Hamlet this way: "I had to mine my own growth as a personality, examine and explore my own fears and my own inspirations…. They are the molten metal that you pour into a mold—and that mold is called Hamlet" (qtd in Rosenberg x). Hamlet shapes the Kingsley material put into Hamlet; what is forged onstage is both Kingsley and Hamlet. This merged entity is also evident to the audience, as is clear reading critics and reviewers who often glide in and out of referring to actor and character. Talking about Claudius, Rosenberg shifts referents so that both actor and character are evoked by the same pronoun: "Claudius drinks partly because he likes to: but also often in the theatre because it manifests something happening within his character, as the duel of opposites goes on" (62). At the beginning of Rosenberg's comment, Claudius, the

character, drinks because of something in his character; but the second part of that sentence gives the character an actor-ly desire to manifest something, as if Claudius is interested in using his own drinking in a symbolic way. Presumably, the actor wishes to use the drinking to exhibit something of Claudius's character and Claudius drinks because of something in this character; Rosenberg's sentence conflates the actor and character.

In Hitt's "Jack Nicholson syndrome," the actor is too big for the container he is asked to enter, and so the character as container must give way to the actor as container/performer. Hitt's language unfolds a series of container metaphors: in order to have Hutch "under control," Horatio must get bigger to contain him. Once Horatio is big enough to contain Hutch his hands become big enough to contain the audience. In *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason* (1987), Mark Johnson argues that the image schema of the container, a structure with an inside and an outside, comes from our experience of bodies that take in food and excrete waste. This schema then gets projected to understand many other experiences every day, from "working out" a problem to "getting into the mood." The image schema of container then structures our understanding of concepts as well as space. Lakoff argues that "image schemas (which structure space) are mapped into the corresponding abstract configurations (which structure concepts)" (1987, 283). The work Lakoff and Johnson have done (along with other cognitive linguists) to explain concepts, image schemas, metaphors, in terms of our embodied experience in the world is important because it opens a space where other

conceptualizations are possible. While it might be useful to project our image schema for container onto our understanding of acting, it may be obscuring elements of the phenomenon of performance.

Hitt's actors do not seem to think of themselves as containers for characters or their characters as containers for them. For them, the rehearsals make them feel "sane" and "human," despite the strip search required before and after each rehearsal:

> When I go in there, and have to take my clothes off, get butt naked, bend over, and spread my butt cheeks so some man can look up my butt … all the humiliating things that they do to us in here … and when she [the director] comes in and does what she does … for that minute, for that two and a half hours … […] I at least can feel human, in here.

In this other room, this other container, the actors/prisoners have experiences that do not match Hitt's attempt to articulate them in terms of containment. While one actor does refer to the rehearsal process as an opportunity to "get into something else," and Hutch describes another actor as being "in it" during performance, they do not speak of getting into "someone" else or being "in" character. These actors speak of the rehearsal process as an alternate space to be themselves. The language the actors use to talk about acting continually refutes the typical language of acting that Hitt uses.

Not trained in acting, these actors are able to articulate a far more useful theory of acting. When Hitt asks James Word, who plays Laertes: "Do you feel like you can be Laertes because so much of Laertes is inside James Word?" Word responds, after a pause: "I am Laertes. I am. I am." Word does not say that Laertes

is inside him or that he can understand him or that he channels him; Word says that he is Laertes. Hitt describes Danny Waller, who plays the ghost, as an actor who heard the voice of the man he killed in the ghost's lines and then "used his part to help understand his past" and, while I agree that this may be true, Hitt again seems to project onto the prisoner/player an image schema of container that provides an alternate perspective, or viewing place, to see (and thus to know) one's past. What is far more interesting is how Waller describes his experience in counter-distinction to the language Hitt uses to formulate and ask the question. Hitt asks him: "who's talking when you say those lines?" and Waller responds: "I'm the body up there the words are coming from…uh…William Pride, the man that I killed—he's mostly the one talking." This is not an actor "getting into character" or even an actor who has learned from his character; this is an actor who views his body and his talking as separable parts, an actor capable of associating with different parts, different selves. He is not a container; he is an assemblage of parts.

Mr. Potato Head, or: an eye of you

Perhaps Kevin Kline does not see Kevin Kline or Hamlet, but a similar assemblage of parts: the curl in his hair, babied into that position to evoke Hamlet for him; the muscle strain in his left eye which is connected to the call from his cousin about house seats for Friday's show, the sound coming from his mouth, trained by Julliard and annunciating words that remind him of being twenty years old. The audience sees something like this too: as the actor applies makeup in front of the mirror, delivering some of Shakespeare's most famous lines, the audience

might be reminded of the scene in *The Big Chill* (1983), when Kline's character dances to Motown music with his screen wife (and one-time real-life girl friend Glenn Close), or the high school drama teacher who thought it inspiring to deliver Hamlet's advice to the players before each rehearsal. Maybe the audience notices the confluence of parts onstage: the movie star onstage being stared at by an audience as he stares at himself in the mirror, and the part of the famous character, watched throughout the play for signs of madness, applying makeup as he prepares to watch a play. What the audience witnesses is the combination of parts that make up a role, a performance, a play.

This is not a new idea. Many critics have talked about the phenomenology of performance in terms of illuminating the parts we see and the parts that go into a rich theatrical experience. The semiotic reading of the Prague School breaks down performance into 1) elements of the performers' personal characteristics, 2) the immaterial dramatic character in the audience's mind, and 3) the stage figure, the combination of signs shaped by the actor, director, costume designer, etc.[6] In his *Dictionary of the Theatre*, Patrice Pavis begins his entry on "Character" with: "In theatre, the character easily takes on the features and voice of the actor" (47). He goes on to show how the history of Western theatre brought the actor and character closer and closer together such that "the character took on the illusion of being a human being," particularly after the bourgeois dramaturgy bound the character to an idea of "a mimetic substitute for its consciousness." Although he parses the sign

[6] See Quinn, 155.

system of the character on stage within a play, he does not articulate what part(s) of the actor get placed in the service of the character and what part(s) remains the separate domain of the actor. He says that the staged character provides an excess of information and that "we must therefore abstract the relevant features and consider them in relation to the text, in order to choose the interpretation that seems right and simplify the complex stage image we receive in a process of abstraction" (51). His reading foregrounds the audience's interpretation as well, but his formulation fails to suggest how an audience makes this interpretation. The equation that meaning equals a sum of performer, dramatic figure, and stage figure misses the very complexity it attempts to capture.

Each of those ideas—mental spaces—contains a multitude of different parts. The fact that meaning is created through a blend of projected elements and structure from all three is where the discussion should begin, not end. My goal is not to parse the specific meaning but to illuminate the process of meaning making in the theatre. Blending theory allows us to see meaning as a rich web of spaces that may not always make sense, but seem to help the play to work. Critics have not failed to notice the importance of disparate information on the construction of meaning, though generally the goal of their work is to show what that meaning is based on the sum of the parts they have chosen to analyze.[7] The fact that the meaning is

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[7] Two important critics overtly question the ability or desirability of coming to final conclusions through analysis: Louis Montrose argues that "a historical criticism that seeks to recover meanings that are in any final or absolute sense authentic, correct, and complete is in pursuit of an illusion" (16) and Bryan Reynolds advances his (and collaborator James Intrilagator's) i.e. mode or "'investigative-expansive mode of analysis' … that first dismantles the subject matter under investigation into its constituent parts and then relates them to other forces, both abstract and

untranslatable, that *Hamlet* cannot be reduced to a sum of its parts—either on the page or on the stage—is what contributes to its impact. It will always mean a different assemblage of parts. Knowing the pieces, reading how this critic reads that scene by the light of this mental space and that one through the lens of this one, is exhilarating; the power of theatre, it seems to me, is in how those separate parts show up suddenly and take on such vibrant life.

The players in *Hamlet* do not belong in the rotten world of Denmark created by Shakespeare up to that point. They are commenting on the theatrical moment in London contemporary with the first performance of the play. Shakespeare's use of ironic anachronism occurs again before the Mousetrap, when Hamlet asks Polonius about his acting past. Polonius says "I did enact Julius Caesar. I was killed i'th' Capitol. Brutus killed me" and Hamlet responds: "It was a brute part of him to kill so capital a calf there" (3.2.101-4). Jenkins notes that the original actors of Hamlet and Polonius probably played Caesar and Brutus in the 1599 production of *Julius Caesar*. As Tiffany Stern argues in her account of the way props, stage areas, and actors accrued meaning through performances, leading all performances to be an amalgam of past performances: "In making one play gesture towards another, Shakespeare upsets the difference between one separate text and another" (74). Joseph Roach cites Farquhar commenting upon a performance by Betterton: "Yet the whole Audience at the same time knows that this is Mr. Betterton, who is strutting upon the Stage, and tearing his Lungs for a Livelihood. And that the same

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empirical, extending beyond the immediate parameters" and which "resists any predetermination or circumscription" (2003, 6).

Person shou'd be Mr. Betterton, and Alexander the Great, at the same Time, is somewhat like an Impossibility, in my Mind" (1996, 80). It is exactly like an impossibility in his mind, since an impossibility is a counterfactual blend: it is a thing defined in relation to its relative possible-ness. Shakespeare plays with the similarities—the same "Globe," the same actors—while the audience puts the similarities together with the differences. These multiple understandings—he is an actor strutting on a stage and Alexander the Great—are held up together to form a constellation of things that define what is being watched.

Meaning is found in the web of spaces. In his account of the power of sound in early modern England, Bruce Smith argues that the voice was the primary source of dramatic power, though he also finds it dispersed throughout the spaces:

> It was perhaps, the heard dimensions of dramatic impersonation, rather than the actor's visible presence, that most powerfully caused early modern audiences to 'interiorize' characters. Character is a function of performance in general, but of voice in particular. It is located not in the actor onstage, or even in the audience's imagination, but somewhere between the two—in the air, within the wooden [o:] (279-80).

In "Performance and Participation: Desdemona, Foucault, and the Actor's Body," Anthony Dawson counters what he sees as the "primacy of discourse" (29) insisted upon by the literary and cultural critics and attempts to put attention back on the body not as simply a canvas for meaning but a maker of meaning. He looks at comments about early performance of *Othello* and how Desdemona in death was given credit for moving the audience. The commenter suggested that "she" "implored" the audience in death--not just dying powerfully, but being an evocative

corpse. At that moment, her body, not her voice or words, was eloquent. As Dawson notes, the body described is a blend of the character's gender and the actor's vitality, since Desdemona could not beg in death and the actor playing her could not be a she (35).[8] Desdemona, granted life in death by the actor playing her, has the richness of Hutch's Horatio; the one is always present with the other.[9]

The actor has a life outside the world of the play, and he brings this onstage with him and the character. This is particularly salient in a star-vehicle play like *Hamlet*. States suggests that "'classical' plays… seem to charge the theatrical event with the electricity of competition between actor and character" (2002, 25). This competition is often incomplete without the celebrity status of the actor. Sartre comments that while "Kean may offer his being to Hamlet, Hamlet will never offer Kean his" (164-65) and States notes that "We always recognize Olivier in Hamlet or Olivier behind the dark paint of Othello. But this is not what is meant by artist-presence; this is simply actor-presence" (26). In "Celebrity and the Semiotics of Acting," Michael Quinn argues that this actor-presence is always a part of dramatic performance: "There is something about dramatic performance that causes spectators to seek information about the personal life of the performer, to cast that life in the mould of celebrity" (154). According to Quinn, when the actor is a

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[8] Dawson does not articulate it as a blend, but rather views the strange combination as an example of the body as a site of meaning creation in the theater.

[9] This is not necessarily true in literary studies of dramatic texts. Literary scholars can talk about the character on the page without including a thorough investigation into the impact of the actor who played (or will play) the character. I was stunned to read literary criticism of *Henry V* that spoke of its subversion, its critique of tyrannical monarchy, when the impact of performance—the handsome man pronouncing powerful poetry—was not considered. I am not arguing that *Henry V* does not contain a critique of the monarchy, only that this critique is mitigated by the blend of performer, actor, voice, and language that occurs onstage in performance.

celebrity, “The intrusion of celebrity displaces the authority from the creative genius of the author (or the interpretive genius of the director), so that the bid for absolute authorial presence in that ideal of romantic creation and/or imagination is consequently subverted” (157). Here Quinn envisions an actor-container so big that he unseats both the character and the author (or director). For Quinn, this presence is not creative, it is distracting.

The problem with his argument is that it is based on a false dichotomy between a creative act and an accident of celebrity. What about the creativity of the casting choice? While Big Hutch may not be an obvious choice for Horatio, the director’s choice works because of what information from the Big Hutch mental space and the Horatio mental space gets projected into the blend onstage. He distinguishes the “referential function” of acting from the “expressive mode” of acting. In the first, “Reality is observed, described, criticized, transformed in the context of an artistic code that pretends to be more or less objective, conventionally separated from the real world and similarly protected from intruding acknowledgments of the real event of performance” (155). This creates “good art,” but the “expressive mode” of acting creates a “collision with the role” since the celebrity status “keeps them from disappearing entirely into the acting figure or the drama” (155). His neo-Platonic formulation of the binary between the real and the referential does not cohere with an embodied conception of cognition nor does it explain the alleged difference between the two. What constitutes the “artistic code”

that translates “reality” into art? And why does the “real event of performance” endanger art?

Moreover, his language depends on a character as container into which a “normal” actor could disappear. While he sees this disappearance as more “objective” or more “real,” I would argue that it confirms assumptions based on an already constructed idea of who that character should be. What actor would he view as “disappearing” into the role of Horatio? To argue that an actor could ever disappear into a role is to suggest that a role comes complete with the body, voice, tears, and breath that an actor brings to it. This is not the case; all roles require and showcase the bodies of the actors that play them. While it is true that some actors project less information into the actor/character blend, no actor is “covered” completely by the role. Ethan Hawke’s Hamlet might highlight Hawke’s persona less than Sam Shepard’s Ghost highlight’s Shepard’s, but if the context changed (Hamlet in the Old West) or other casting changed (Gertrude played by Uma Thurman) the audience might include more information about Hawke into their Hawke/Hamlet blend.

How the meaning is constructed between the actor and character is an important element of any study of performance. Barbara Hodgdon studied the impact of celebrity on performance in Al Pacino’s *Looking for Richard* (1996) and in Ian McKellan’s *Richard III* (1995) and argues that the meaning of the actors’ bodies powerfully defines the meaning of the Richards that they play. In this way, she argues that the audience must read the performances through the lens of the

actors' bodies as well as through the perspective of the characters. Hodgdon looks at how McKellan's body comes pre-coded as gay while Pacino uses his body as "a lever to decenter, though not discard, the text-based core of Shakespeare studies" (210). Here, Hodgdon seems to be looking for the tools blending theory can provide her. Hodgdon argues that this is not a subversion of meaning, but a creation of meaning: "both Pacino's and McKellen's Richards offer ample evidence not only of how particular actors' bodies trouble that relation [between character and actor] but also of how each reiterates 'Shakespeare's Richard' by means of his own body. Both, in other words, direct attention away from 'Shakespeare' and toward themselves as re-authorizing authorities, though in rather different ways" (224). Of course, her reading depends on the presence of McKellan's homosexuality in his body, the presence of Pacino's New York "street" persona in his and the visibility of this information to the audience while other information about the actor's bodies (neither of them are actually misshapen in any way, for example) is less visible.[10]

Recent work by Joseph Roach and Marvin Carlson expand this line of investigation outwards in theoretically important ways, arguing that memory and absence should be examined as powerful presences in any performance. In *Cities of the Dead*, Roach looks at the relationship between memory and history in performance studies. He uses the idea of "effigy," meaning "to body something

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[10] Part of Hodgdon's argument is actually that it is the space of the misshapen body that renders the "other" elements of McKellen's and Pacino's body visible. In other words, viewing Richard's story of other-ness and of his desire to overcome his outcast status through the bodies of McKellen and Pacino, the audience finds the ways the actors' bodies articulate a similar story. The director and actor trust that within the context of the film, alienation from heterosexual culture or alienation from academic culture will be projected into the collection of elements imported to construct the meaning of the play.

forth," and argues that its "similarity to *performance* should be clear enough: it fills by means of surrogation a vacancy created by the absence of an original" (36). Roach examines the importance of performing effigies as a way of perpetuating an idea, an identity, a space of continual presence claimed by the absent.[11] The meaning in the effigy, then, depends upon and reestablishes a conception of the original. Though Roach would question the possibility of a stable "original," his formulation sets up a binary between presence and absence--even though his idea of presence is defined by absence and absence by presence.

Though his notion of effigy is powerful, his playful language continually turning in on itself threatens the stability of theory. For example, his idea of community identity depends on the metaphor of the container: "By means of such risky alarums and excursions at the outer gates, brushes with death and difference, communities imagine themselves into illusory fullness of being by acting out what they think they are not" (78). For a community to be "full" it must have a boundary, a separation between what it is and what it is not such that there can be a "full" or "less full" community. The idea of "acting out what they think they are not," follows from the container structuring the idea of community: by acting *out* something it is not, the community reestablishes that which it views as *in* its container and that which it sees as *outside* its container.

Carlson argues that performance is a constant ghosting or haunting of the present with the past. Theatre, according to Carlson, has always been interested in

[11] Reynolds and Hedrick describe this as a particular subjective territory, "Shakespace."

ghosts, and that "haunting has been an essential part of the theatre's meaning to and reception by its audiences in all times and places" (15). Carlson articulates the shadow spaces mixed or "infected" (to use Roach's term) with what is on the stage to constitute the full constellation of meanings. For Carlson, this presence of the past in the present is particular to theatre: "There appears to be something in the very nature of the theatrical experience itself that encourages, in this genre more than others, a simultaneous awareness of something previously experienced and of something being offered in the present that is both the same and different, which can only be fully appreciated by a kind of doubleness of perception in the audience" (51)[12]. What Carlson is at pains to prove is that meaning is generated through a complicated web of references, ghosts, texts, intertexts, and visual cues.

Carlson's use of "doubleness" to refer to the nature of perception in the theatre echoes Farquhar's description of Betterton's performance, and, indeed, Carlson adds to Roach's analysis, claiming that though Betterton was too old to play the role he was in, "the ghost had a greater performative visibility than the body it haunted" (58) and thus the age of Betterton's ghost was more salient in the reading of the role than the age of the actual body onstage. Here Carlson is able to pin-point a specific part of the Betterton/ghost performance that illuminated the varied "performative visibility" of the actor and his ghost.

[12] Sartre suggests that the actors have this double knowledge as well: "every dramatic work is phantasmagoric; however deeply the player is committed to his role, he is never wholly unaware that his character is unreal" (159).

Against Quinn, Carlson explores what he views as the exciting possibilities of the ghosts present in celebrity performance through an example of witnessing an understudy (Blumenfeld) take Nathan Lane's role in *Laughter on the 23rd Floor*:

> Thus, at this moment we witnessed Blumenfeld ghosted by Nathan Lane ghosted by Sid Caesar ghosted by Marlon Brando playing Brutus ghosted by his interpretation of Stanley Kowalski. The wave of laughter and huge outburst of applause that was stimulated by this sequence provided clear evidence that the audience not only recognized but also vastly enjoyed this complex web of intertextual acting references. (77)

The reaction of the audience suggests that the more ghosts, the better, since each of the actors played a part in constructing the role witnessed at that night's performance. The more parts are brought to bear on an audience's reading of a performance, the more mental spaces are evoked in a complex blend of meanings, in the web of references that are incomplete on their own. This web generates meaning and pleasure in the theatre audience.

Bodiless Creations, or: finding our hands on the table

> If Shakespeare and his fellows could convince their audiences that the *theatrum mundi* metaphor was both accurate and useful—if all the men and women were, indeed, merely players—then people might go to the playhouses to learn, from experts, how to play. (Montrose 1996, 211)

The image of meaning created at the interstices of a web of clues is not unlike the research into how we identify and unify the parts of our own body. How do we know what parts constitute self and which constitute other? Is the analysis of each so different? Ramachandran's work with phantom limb patients illuminates the mind's ability to re-write its idea of the body, suggesting a more expansive notion of

where we stop and start. Ramachandran's conclusion to his chapters on phantom limbs sketches out the implications to our notions of self found through his research:

> For your entire life, you've been walking around assuming that your 'self' is anchored to a single body that remains stable and permanent at least until death. Indeed the 'loyalty' of your self to your own body is so axiomatic that you never even pause to think about it, let alone question it. Yet these experiments suggest the exact opposite—that your body image, despite all its appearance of durability, is an entirely transitory internal construct that can be profoundly modified with just a few simple tricks. It is merely a shell that you've temporarily created for successfully passing on your genes to your offspring. (61-2)

This shell, this too too sullied flesh, is constructed at the intersection of visual and tactile stimuli and genetic body maps; it is open to negotiation and alteration. Moreover, despite Ramachandran's use of the shell/container metaphor, the body is not a whole structure, it is a composite of parts linked together by memory.

Phantom limbs are common in patients who have lost a limb; although the arm (for example) is no longer there, the patient hallucinates its presence, sometimes using it to gesticulate and other times suffering from pain stemming from the missing appendage. Ramachandran's research into phantom limbs countered the standing assumptions within medicine that phantom limbs are "wishful thinking" (23) or a by-product of withered neuromas at the site of amputation. He built on research conducted on monkeys by Tim Pons that showed that years after the monkeys had their nerves severed between arm and brain, the brains had re-wired so that cells in the brain corresponding to the arm (which was incapable of sending signals to the brain) would fire when certain areas of the face were touched. Pons and his colleagues reasoned that the region of the brain registering signals from the

arm had been “invaded” by the face region. Ramachandran tested whether this might shed light on phantom limbs by blindfolding a man who had lost his arm and touching his face with a Q-tip. The man reported feeling the sensations in his missing arm. Like Pons’s monkeys, Ramachandran reasoned that the brain had rewired so that the area once reserved for registering sensory input from the missing limb had been “invaded” by the area reserved for the face. Every time the patient’s face is stimulated, the brain receives stimulation in the area of the brain it still associates with the arm and creates an arm that could justify the experience of those signals, despite the lack of signals coming from visual or muscular-skeletal systems from that area. Ramachandran concludes that phantom limbs come from an interplay of genetic and experiential variables. The sense of “self” can re-build because it is was a projection all along.

After weeks wearing a fat suit for rehearsals and performances, one actress I know said she began feeling sensations in her large padded breasts. Similarly, she would wake up in the middle of the night to go to the bathroom and feel as if she were still in the suit, thinking that a trip to the bathroom was just too difficult in her (character’s) body. Ramachandran’s research suggests that “highly precise and functionally effective pathways can emerge in the adult brain as early as four weeks after injury” (31). After four weeks of rehearsing and performing with a prosthetic body or nose or even walk, an actor’s brain could begin to project self onto the various added character parts. The construction of a “whole” contained self happens

in the brain and is just as much an illusion as the pain caused by a phantom limb, or by Hecuba.

Ramachandran and others have done research into the brain's ability to project sensation to objects that are not a part of the body. In the "rubber hand" illusion, subjects place their hand behind a curtain so that they cannot see it, and a rubber hand is placed where it is clearly visible. The researcher then touches the rubber hand and the real hand at the same time with the same strokes. After a period,[13] subjects claim that they can "feel" the rubber hand and that they experience it as belonging to themselves. Botvinick and Cohen verify the rubber hand illusion, quoting several subjects as saying: "I found myself looking at the dummy hand thinking it was actually my own." They argue that the illusion reveals a "three-way interaction between vision, touch and proprioception, and may supply evidence concerning bodily self-identification." Ramachandran claims that "The illusion illustrates, once again, how ephemeral your body image is and how easily it can be manipulated" (60). Tsakiris and Haggard conduct a number of experiments to test the correlation between the illusion's effect and the placement of the hand. They argue that the illusion does not support Ramachandran's claim that body image can be so easily over-written, but that "the concurrent visuotactile inputs are integrated within a preexisting representation of one's own body" (90). While their constrictions on Ramachandran's claims are persuasive, research does suggest that

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[13] Ramachandran says that the effect can occur within "seconds" but a study by Botvinick and Cohen (1998) reported the effect after 30 minutes of synchronous stimulation.

our sense of our own body can be altered by a confluence of sensory information and that the boundary between self and other may be more porous than we think.

Ramachandran used galvanic skin response (GSR) ratings to show that our brains have a changing sense of which parts are our own, which parts need to be protected. Before a hammer is brought down onto a subject's hand, the subject's brain will send off signals to prepare for the blow; the visual system, seeing the hammer poised to slam, will tell the heart to pump more blood and the skin to release extra heat in sweat. Researchers can measure the alarm system—measured by the GSR—with a machine that perceives changes in the skin's conductivity. Shown a picture of a table or a cat, subjects do not have a GSR; shown a picture of a table about to fall on their foot or an erotic image, subjects register a large GSR. After experimenting with the rubber hand illusion, Ramachandran tried with a table top instead of a rubber hand. In this case, the subject is not even looking at something that resembles a hand, and yet he will begin to feel the strokes as emerging from the table even though he knows it is impossible. To test the degree to which subjects were identifying with the table top, Ramachandran measured their GSR, after establishing the illusion through the synchronous hand-table stroking, as he struck the table top with a hammer. Subjects measured a huge change in GSR, similar to if Ramachandran's hammer had landed on their fingers.[14] Once the confluence of sensory information had convinced the brains that the table was a part

[14] When he measured GSR after striking the table without doing the synchronous touching first, there was no GSR change.

of the whole, the brain's map of the body under its protection changed to include the table.

The language we use to talk about acting, performance, and theatre fails to capture the magnitude or subtlety of what happens cognititively. Phillip Zarrilli argues that our discourses about acting are constructed narratives, not expressions of "truth," and puts pressure on an unquestioning use of "believability" and "honesty" in talking about acting. He criticizes acting theory for not taking into consideration the union of body and mind, for following rather the Cartesian binary of mind and body, a body controlled by the mind. The Stanislavsky system views the mind as controlling the body, containing emotions which then get poured into performance (10-11). Zarrilli's concern with the focus on "truth" and "believability" is that they are immeasurable. This is true, but more importantly for my argument, they obscure the parts that work in an effort to come to a final judgment about the whole. States describes the phenomenon of acting in terms that capture its complex shifting of the audience's perspective, of its self: "The actor acts out our way of referring to the things of the world. Or, translated into the terms of our perception of his art: he does this by becoming, in part, a thing himself, in part by doing a thing, and in part by sharing it –that is, allowing us briefly to live another life, peculiarly inserted into our own, which produces an entelechial completion, dimly like the effect of an out-of-body experience" (39). His language, however, is so steeped in the idea of actor and character as containers, that he fails to unpack the many parts that get inserted into "our own" experience. While the image of an out-of-body experience is a popular

and powerful one, it assumes a binary separation between self and body while ignoring the many different parts of self and the many different parts of body. Our language fails to account for the power of the parts.

Hamlet is a play of parts. When Barnardo asks, “Say, what, is Horatio there?” Horatio responds: “A piece of him” (1.1.21-22), and they go on to discuss the ghost in terms of its effect on their eyes and ears. The ghost asks to be “re-membered” and Hamlet writes down that a smile might still indicate villainy. Hamlet parses himself and others into their parts: he refers to his hands, eyes, head, his fingers and thumbs, his mother’s “inmost parts” and Ophelia’s country matters. There are thirty-six references to eyes, twenty-seven references to ears, twenty-six references to heads, thirteen to minds, twenty-nine to hands, six to arms,[15] one to legs, and twenty-five references to “part” or “parts”. In the end, of course, he gives his voice to the strong arm of Fortinbras and his story to Horatio, separating himself forever. It is the work of 400 years of readers, playgoers, critics, actors, and scholars to put Hamlet back together again. Perhaps he is more valuable in the space created between the parts, in the scaffolding between voice and story; perhaps time is only visible when it is out of joint. Blending theory allows us to focus on the both/and, the meaning created in the space, for example, between time and its joint.

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[15] There are an additional seven references to arms in the military sense. Given the importance of Fortinbras (“strong arm”) to the play, one could argue that Shakespeare is playing with the metaphor of military strength being an extension of the body, another part, if you will.

"Pull yourself together!" or: double knowledge

Where meaning is constructed is a key question to literary scholars of the twentieth century: the re-readings of Shakespearean texts provided by new historicism breathe life into the plays by seeing the backstage of the historical moment on the stage of the transhistorical play. The new historicist project views the construction of meaning at this intersection as politically and ideologically powerful. Within a few years of the publication of "Invisible Bullets," new historicism had become such a powerful movement that universities specified "new historicist" in job listings.[16] Greenblatt's tale of the presence of the state on the stage and the stage in the state[17] shook Shakespeare studies and provided new angles of scholarship. I wish to interrogate the role of paradox and double knowledge in new historicist work in light of conceptual blending theory.

In his important 1980 book *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, Greenblatt posits that "any achieved identity always contains within itself the signs of its own submission or loss" (9) and while *Shakespearean Negotiations* fills out the call to arms of this early articulation of new historicism, the tension in the binary attributed to self becomes a defining feature of later work: a work can be both subversive and controlling, there can be an articulation of sexuality that defuses sexuality, a staging of religion that empties religion of power. Greenblatt sketches a rich portrait of meaning in the blended space of two opposing mental spaces. In *Hamlet in Purgatory*, Greenblatt suggests that the ghost of Hamlet's father recalls a not-so

[16] I am indebted to Bryan Reynolds for this information. He heard it from Greenblatt.
[17] Echoed in Montrose's more helpful but similarly playful discussion of "the historicity of texts" and the "textuality of history" (6).

distant Catholic past, one that borrowed the tools of fiction to create the idea of purgatory that it then used to collect money and adherence from the living. Returning to the lovely paradoxical statements of his past work, Greenblatt suggests that through *Hamlet*, "Shakespeare achieves the remarkable effect of a nebulous infection, a bleeding of the spectral into the secular and the secular into the spectral" (194). Greenblatt consistently locates his readings at the blended site of two contrary spaces.

Other scholars continue this interrogation into Shakespearean meaning at the point of anxiety between two spaces. Stephen Orgel reads Caliban against images of cannibalism from the new world and argues in *The Illusion of Power* that Ben Jonson's masque *Neptune* creates a positive version of King James's recent failed attempt to negotiate a marriage between his son and the Infanta Maria. In both performances, the meaning is constituted at the site where offstage information bleeds through the fiction, and anxiety is allayed by articulating the danger (cannibalism in new world, an unmarried prince) but then constructing a blend that masks the danger while projecting different key information into the blended space (Prospero controls Caliban, King James is Neptune, god of the sea). Robert Weimann examines the "unique cultural potency" (8) of the split between a unitary location of power in the state and the representational authority found on the stage. He finds the roots of this historically in the Reformation, which created a "bifurcation in the authorization process that provided an unprecedented springboard for cultural change in and through diverse representational forms and

practices" (11). In order to understand performance, Weimann looks to the ways official dogma and representational play interact to define or authorize in conjunction.

In *The Purpose of Playing*, Louis Montrose criticizes the reductionism of the "subversion/containment" debate within new historicism but works within the methodologies of new historicism to illuminate Shakespeare's texts through an examination of other texts of the time period. Through the allusion to offstage transition rites, concerns, and debates, Shakespeare stages debates, using "cognitive and ideological dissonance" (39) to enrich theatrical meaning. Montrose concludes that "Elizabethan drama-in-performance also had the capacity to work as cognitive and therapeutic instrument" (40); though he does not articulate how this might happen biologically, his argument is grounded in the idea that Shakespearean performance staged a tension between different parts of the state, the culture, the family, that the audience was asked to compress into a whole.

While the work of new historicists is unquestioningly one of the most important movements in literary scholarship of the twentieth century, the story of its popularity also deserves attention. Like Shakespeare's most popular line, "To be or not to be, that is the question," the new historicists' arguments rely on a bringing together of seemingly incompatible ideas, and though they sketch and illuminate what the confluence might mean, it is the impossibility of true resolution which seems to add to the power of the argument. To make bullets invisible is to empower other elements of an unseen world while simultaneously to challenge the power of

bullets—if they are unseen, can they really kill? This is not to suggest that Greenblatt's argument in "Invisible Bullets" is unstable or coy, rather to examine how the articulation of the idea becomes a part of its popularity. To be or not to be can be asked over and over again, with each respondent creating her own balance in the answer. A bifold authority can always be re-measured, its meaning re-examined. The sound bite—in this case, probably the troublesome "subversion/containment" paradigm—encapsulates in all its irreducibility the drama of the whole without specifically detailing all of the parts.

The power of new historicist work to suggest and invoke the pieces in order to re-envision the whole demands a theatrical mind that can play out the sides of the debate, the conflict between the counter-terms. This delights the minds of Shakespearean scholars because it is precisely the kind of mind they must have to understand "to be or not to be" or "Now is the winter of our discontent." To understand Shakespeare's most beautiful, quotable, vital images, the listener must be capable of maintaining a representation of the character's mind, perceiving the emotional content of images, focusing with the character on a particular object or stimulus, and understanding a fictional world. This seemingly banal ability to enjoy and perceive fiction becomes terribly important when its deficit leads to the chain of social dysfunctions that characterize autism.

There is a wide range of symptoms and behaviors that fall under the category of autism, but scientists seem to agree that autistics show dysfunction in executive planning capabilities, in their ability to perceive the emotions or mind

states of others, and in imitation and play. In their important 1985 study, Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie, and Uta Frith found that a lack of intelligence was not enough to explain social impairments in autistic kids and argued that autistics lack a "Theory of Mind," understood as a facility with metarepresentation, or the ability to impute beliefs to others and to predict their behavior. They also found that autistics show a striking poverty of pretend play. One "Theory of Mind" (ToM) study conducted by Frith and Francesca Happé involved telling two different stories to subjects as their brains were imaged by a PET scanner. When normal subjects were asked questions that required that they infer a character's state of mind, an area lit up in the prefrontal cortex. Subjects with Asperger's syndrome[18] took much longer to answer the question than did the normal subjects and the same area in the prefrontal cortex did not light up. The area that did light up was an area associated with general abstract reasoning. Frith and Happé reasoned that the Asperger's patients had to deduce the answer whereas the non-Asperger's subjects could imagine the answer.[19] Although this work generated intense study within ToM and autism research, scientists challenged this theory on the basis that autistic signs and deficits can be seen prior to the development of ToM.[20] They began looking for possible sources of the problems earlier in the developmental process, upstream in the chain of cognitive abilities. Imitation and play, because they are early and

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[18] Asperger's patients have autistic qualities but normal or high IQs.
[19] See Carter, 141.
[20] It is generally believed that full ToM capability is not present until about age four.

because they are related, are proving to be the most exciting areas of research into the autistic mind.

Imitation, which can begin immediately after birth, is defined by Sally Rogers and colleagues as “the purposeful reproduction of another’s body movements, whether novel or familiar” (3). Newborns can imitate facial expressions of their mothers, a form of communication and shared experience that is believed to correlate with speech development, emotional synchrony, the “cultural transmission of skills and knowledge” (Rogers et. al, 2), later symbolic play (Piaget 1962), and acquiring mental state understanding (Meltzoff and Gopnick 1993). This early imitation, as well as the chain of functions that follow, is impaired in autistic children. It follows, then, as studies have begun to show, that autistics exhibit a decreased involvement in areas associated with the mirror neuron system. If areas of the infant’s motor cortex do not resonate when he sees his mother stick out her tongue, as they do in non-autistic infants, in order to imitate his mother, the infant will have to process the information visually and map it to his motor cortex. This decreases the sense of union with the mother as well as the play associated with such games. A child who does not share the feeling associated with this joint play is likely to have difficulty later with symbolic play, communication, and joint attention.

Symbolic play is what Moonshine is doing in act five of *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* when he announces to his audience “All that I have to say, is, to tell you that the / lanthorn is the moon; I, the man in the moon; this / thorn-bush, my

thorn-bush; and this dog, my dog." His articulation of the symbols and the stand-ins, should not be necessary, of course, which is why it is a funny moment. The audience understands the role of symbolic play in the theatre: one thing is always standing in for something else.[21] Rogers and her colleagues define symbolic play as play in which "absent elements are represented through objects, gestures, and language" (18). To pick up a banana and use it as a phone is to initiate symbolic play; a person watching must then recognize that the missing phone is represented through the banana and that projected onto the banana are some characteristics of a phone but not others. For example, the banana might emit pretend voices from one end, like a phone, but may not start beeping loudly if kept off the hook for too long. Some information comes from the banana and some comes from the phone, the blended space is where it is both banana and phone. Fauconnier and Turner would equate this with the blending necessary to understand or construct a sentence like "the purpose of playing is to hold the mirror up to nature." In her 1981 paper, McCune-Nicholich calls this "double knowledge," an ability to hold two representations in mind: the primary and the pretend identity.[22] While some later studies have found that autistic children have a greater problem with generating

[21] In *Role Playing and Identity*, Bruce Wilshire describes how theatre, beginning (for him) with the Greeks "compressed and summarized in the 'world' of the play the wide content of sense which is the world itself; it was the absent given presence, articulation, and precision through theatrical proxy. The 'world' stood in for the world" (46). Even in the dramaturgy, Wilshire sees plays as staging a substitution, wherein characters struggle to stand in for a missing brother against a king standing in for authority (*Antigone*, for example) and "each of these characters is represented by an actor who stands in for them on the stage" (45).
[22] Carlson also describes this as a "kind of doubleness of perception" (51), though it seems to me there are far more than two representations to hold in mind.

pretend play than with understanding it, a deficit in this area certainly seems to be an obstacle to future language and social skills. And the research supports this.[23]

There are some early but exciting studies on the links between mirror neurons and autism, suggesting that autistics show a decrease in function in areas of the brain associated with mirror neurons. The mirror neurons allow visual information to resonate immediately in the motor cortex, making "the portraiture" of Laertes's action, for example, initiate a series of firings within the part of Hamlet's brain responsible for moving Hamlet. A deficit in the MNS makes it less likely that Hamlet will imitate Laertes's immediate actions (like jumping in the grave, for example), and that he will have fewer instances of deferred imitation (which requires holding a representation in the brain of a past action and imitating it later).[24] If autistics are shown to have a deficit in their mirror neuron system, then the collection of symptoms that constitute autism—admittedly a diverse and changing constellation of issues—provide a "mirror image" (in the sense of a counter example) of brains with working mirror neurons. As opposed to the brains of autistics, normal brains are capable of creating and understanding a wide variety of symbolic language, play, emotion states, fictional stories, and performance. If mirror neurons are at the head of a stream of developmental steps that make one

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[23] See McCune-Nicolich (1981) and Baron-Cohen (1987) for specific findings and Rogers et al. for an excellent overview of research.

[24] My use of Hamlet as an example is convenient but slightly misleading, since as an adult, Hamlet will exhibit different symptoms than a one-to-one correspondence between the MNS deficit and a lack of imitation. The research into the correlation between the MNS and autism focuses on specific ages, as the symptoms of autism develop over time and though an initial problem with the MNS can lead to imitation deficits which can lead to other problems, many factors can mitigate the dysfunction or mask its symptoms.

person able to understand the player's story of Hecuba, know why he weeps for her, and finally feel emotion for Hecuba through the embodiment of the actor, then perhaps mirror neurons could provide the glass through which we can see our inmost spots, the mirror held up to our nature. Mirror neurons could constitute our theatrical selves.

It is precisely this theatrical part of the brain that makes Shakespeare's sound-bites so appealing: they require a varied firing of neurons,[25] initiate perspective taking, and facilitate blending between mental spaces, encouraging us to take this dog for my dog and to understand that parts of Ian McKellen are relevant to this portrayal of Richard while other parts of him are not. Through these mirrors, the power of Greenblatt's "new historicism" is unveiled as a seductive marriage of two parts that will continually reflect but not disrupt the other—containment and subversion, self and other. Not unlike Hamlet's mirror, the mirror neurons do not map the entire other onto the entire self: they map part onto part. As one monkey grabs a banana, another monkey perceives a connection between the gesture of the other's hand and his own. While the language used to describe the impact of the mirror neuron system often relies on the metaphor of the self as container—"put yourself in the place of the other" or "a potential bridge between minds"—what

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[25] See chapter two for a discussion of the operation of metaphors and blends on the brain, particularly Coulson and Van Petten's (2002) "Conceptual Integration and Metaphor: An Event-Related Potential Study" which recorded Event Related Potentials (ERPs) from people reading sentences that either completed literally ("He knows that whiskey is a strong intoxicant"), metaphorically ("He knows that power is a strong intoxicant") or with a literal mapping condition ("He used cough syrup as an intoxicant")--which they argue is an intermediate step between the two. They found that the metaphoric sentences were read no more slowly, but called upon more parts of the brain, suggesting that processing is more difficult, not more time consuming.

these mirrors do is put the other's hand in place of one's own. The other does not become the self, but his hand might become a part of what one experiences as one's own. Just like Hamlet's mirror which selectively reflects a part of nature rather than the whole messy category, the mirror neurons depict us as a system of parts, looking for connections, alive in the scaffolding between self and other, visual and motor, banana and phone, Hutch and Horatio.

Infinite space, or: a conclusion

In his 1982 book on theatre, *Role Playing and Identity: The Limits of Theatre as Metaphor*, Bruce Wilshire's argument that selves are constituted at the theatre imagines a science that would support his claim, long before the research arrived to do so. Wilshire posits that

> bodies biologically human learn to become human persons by learning to do what persons around them are already doing. The learning body mimetically incorporates the model; it comes to represent the model and to be authorized by it …. The actor models modeling, enacts enactment, and reveals it. I think it plausible to hypothesize that since behavior and identity were laid down bodily, mimetically, and together their recovery and recognition may very well be achieved only bodily, mimetically, and together—in the theatre, for example. (16)

The cognitive linguistic theory of blending and perspective shifting and the neuroscience of phantom limbs and autism find the self between the spaces, a decidedly theatrical space. Both Roach and Carlson turn to theatrical metaphors to expand our ideas of what happens in the theatre, and both metaphors enable a more variegated understanding of what happens to an audience in the theatre and how the mirror held up to nature invariably pulls offstage/backstage onto center stage. This

reading of what happens on stage through and with what was happening offstage also forms the basis of the new historicist work. Greenblatt and Montrose both historicize what is onstage because the context is always visible in the theatrical content. Blending theory provides a useful tool for paving a path of integration between a focus on the text popularized by structuralism, new criticism, and post-structuralism, and the focus on the context, politics, history, and ideology of new historicism and cultural materialism.

The possibilities of the "infinite space" within Hamlet's brain and Shakespeare's Globe are endless in light of the work on the mirror neuron system. Cells firing in me if I do something or you do something suggest that the difference between us is one of parts, not wholes. An intention to lift a cup, thought to exist "inside the container" of the self, is registered by the witness and "external" show expresses "internal" intent. The links being discovered between the mirror neuron system and the language area of the brain suggest that performed poetry just may have more of an impact on the brains of the audience members than the antitheatricalists feared. Integrating what scientists are learning about imitation, play, and language into performance and theatre theory has the potential of proving what many of us experienced long ago watching *Annie*, *Long Day's Journey Into Night*, *Arcadia*, *Black Rider*, or *Hamlet*: theatre shapes and transforms our parts into our wholes.

Chapter six – Conclusion

Every time I watch a performance of Shakespeare I am struck by the phenomenon of comprehension; language that one moment seems to fly over the heads of most of the audience will suddenly cohere into language that unites an audience into reaction. It might make them smile, cry, or laugh, but the language suddenly comes alive in their minds like some kind of time-release explosion. During these moments, I am reminded that theatre can, to paraphrase Olivier, make up our mind.

As our understanding of the body and brain change, so must our theories of theatre, poetry, performance, and acting. The paradigm shift in meaning construction posited by Lakoff, Fauconnier, Turner, and others in cognitive linguistics provides a radical new way of reading classic texts. The study of performance is ideally situated to apply the scientific work to our theoretical paradigms of meaning, aesthetics, and the evocation of memory and emotions. Theatre provides an illusion of depth in a network of stories and truths. The language of the mirror exposes this conception of depth on the surface of its metaphoric glass. Research on imitation, language use and comprehension suggest that performance shapes our construction of the self. The current research on emotion provides exciting pressure to theatrical theories of "moving" an audience and suspension of disbelief. Blending and perspective shifting, the neuroscience of

phantom limbs, and research on autism find the self in the theatrical space between locus and platea, part and whole, self and other.

The research on mirror neurons so far is pretty contained. While it is tempting to see it as illuminating this possible alternate space where humans are both self and other, and I believe it is our responsibility as theorists to envision these spaces to return pressure on the sciences to expand their studies and re-imagine their dominant metaphors, it is equally important to maintain the links between our expansive theories and the research. Even if tenuous, our imaginings should continue to grasp the limits, as well as the possibilities, of the research being cited. If we cannot show that our work understands what the research shows and does not show, we run the risk of closing off dialogue with the sciences and building unsupported castles in the air.

The sciences should be used to challenge our assumptions and theories as much, if not more, than it is cited as evidence for what we already believed. By including research from other disciplines in my work I do not want to suggest that one discipline has the ability to prove or disprove the other. Working in concert science and art, theory and practice, and the abstract and the concrete, can open up questions, answers, and visions impossible to see without leaving the safety of our field, jargon, and journals. The "bard-ering" I suggest works only if all sides are willing to let go.

My research aims to understand the experience I have found rewarding in the theatre, from rehearsals to closing. I believe that theatre is the perfect

field to unite theory and practice, science and art. At the crossroads of disciplines, it brings together in a cathartic “aha” experience, information, education, and emotions from different parts of our lives, bodies, and brains. Where I stand, in this vivid world of performance and cognitive science, certain things make sense that do not through any other lens I have found. As a teacher and practitioner of theatre, any theory must provide insight into the classroom and the rehearsal room. As a scholar, the research I do must engage with the other academic disciplines. I must answer to both.

Science provides a new method of seeing the pieces, perceiving the power of Hecuba, and understanding the phenomenon of a performance that can catch the conscience of a king. There can be a path of integration between the sciences and literary and theatre theory. Language in performance can illuminate the connection and seams between body and language, actor and character, fact and fiction. Cognitive science can unveil Shakespeare’s textual theatrics and spot lights blind spots in theatre and performance theory.

APPENDIX A

Register No. 7694-1861

Negative No. 66011

1985 rephotographed HE 1601

CT 13878

JD 2174

Date of Receipt

From whom received

How acquired

Registered papers

Condition

Measurements Diameter 1ft 7ins

Description MIRROR FRAME

ITALIAN: about 1440-50

Burnished metal in a frame of walnut wood, carved in relief with an angel, a skeleton, and various animals, each accompanied by a capital letter in gold. These letters form the words 'Bonum' and 'Malum'. Below is a large letter Y from which the various emblems spring.



APPENDIX B

Claudius (Borje Ahlstedt) begins the duel between Hamlet (Peter Stormare) and Laertes (Pierre Wilkner). Courtesy of BAM; Photo by Bengt Wanselius.

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