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CHAPTER 7

**TYPOLOGIES:
FORMING
CONCEPTS AND
CREATING
CATEGORICAL
VARIABLES**

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1. INTRODUCTION

TYPOLOGIES—understood as organized systems of types—make a fundamental contribution to concept formation and to the construction of categorical variables. Although some scholars might see typologies as part of the qualitative tradition of research, in fact they are also employed by quantitative analysts. This chapter provides an overview of these multiple contributions of typologies and presents numerous examples from diverse subfields of political science (Table 7.1).

Given our concern with the role of typologies in conceptualization and measurement, the discussion here necessarily focuses on “descriptive” typologies. In such typologies, the cells correspond to specific types or instances of a broader concept. These can be contrasted with “explanatory” typologies,¹ in which the rows and columns are explanatory variables, and the cells contain hypothesized outcomes. Both descriptive and explanatory typologies can, in addition, be used to classify cases.

This distinction between descriptive and explanatory typologies is by no means intended to suggest that descriptive typologies—as with any other form of measurement—are not connected with the formulation and testing of explanatory claims. The contrasting types contained in a particular typology may be the outcome to be explained in a given study, or they may be an explanation that is being formulated and evaluated by the researchers, as we will see in many examples below.

This chapter proceeds as follows. We offer a framework for working with multidimensional typologies, reviewing the building blocks of typologies and showing how the cell types constitute categorical variables. We then consider the role of typologies in concept formation, the source of the concepts and terms in the cells of the typology, and the role of ideal types. Finally, we examine the contribution of typologies to mapping empirical and theoretical change and to structuring comparison in empirical analysis—with this latter contribution including their role in quantitative as well as qualitative research. We conclude by suggesting norms for the careful use of typologies.

2. THE STRUCTURE OF TYPOLOGIES

This section provides a framework for working with multidimensional typologies²—in other words, typologies that involve the cross-tabulation of two or more dimensions to form analytic types.

2.1 The Basic Template

Multidimensional typologies may be understood in terms of several components, which we illustrate with reference to Matland’s (1995, 160) conceptualization of policy

¹ See Elman (2005) and Bennett and Elman (2006, 465–68). George and Bennett’s (2005, ch. 11) discussion of “typological theory” is an important variant of this approach.

² These may be contrasted with unidimensional typologies, which are categorical variables organized around a single dimension. See, for example, Krasner’s typology of the capacity of national states to shape the formation of international regimes, involving “makers, breakers, and takers” (1977, 52). We focus here on multidimensional typologies given their distinctive contribution to conceptualization and measurement. However, many ideas about multidimensional typologies also apply to unidimensional typologies.

Table 7.1. Inventory of Multidimensional Typologies

Political Regimes	
Bicameralism (Lijphart 1984)	Russian Elites' Perceptions of Borrowing (Moltz 1993)
Commitment to Democracy (Bellin 2000)	Social Policy (Mares 2003)
Democracy (Lijphart 1968)	State Economic Strategies (Boix 1998)
Democracy (Weyland 1995)	State Intervention in the Economy (Levy 2006)
Democracy, Defense against Internal Threats (Capoccia 2005)	State Role in Economic Development (Evans 1995)
Democracy, Pathways to (von Beyme 1996)	Strike Activity (Hibbs 1987)
Democracy, Transitions to (Karl 1990)	<i>International Relations</i>
Democratization (Collier 1999)	Adversaries (Glaser 1992)
Dictatorships, Personalist. (Fish 2007)	Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Schweller 1992)
Leadership Authority (Ansell and Fish 1999)	Governance in Trade (Aggarwal 2001)
Regime Change (Leff 1999)	Great Power Conflict Management (Miller 1992)
Regimes (Dahl 1971)	Human Rights Policies (Sikkink 1993)
Regimes (Fish 1999)	Organizational Forms of Information Systems (Dai 2002)
Regimes (Remmer 1986)	Realists (Talliaferro 2000–2001)
Regimes in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1997)	Sovereignty (Krasner 1999)
Regimes, Authoritarian (Linz 1975)	Soviet Strategies (Herrmann 1992)
Regimes, Postcommunist (McFaul 2002)	State Behavior in the International System (Schweller 1998)
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986)	Wars (Vasquez 1993)
<i>States and State-Society Relations</i>	American Politics, Public Policy, Public Law, and Organizational/Administrative Theory
Context of Contentious Politics (Tilly and Tarrow 2007)	Decentralization (Leonard 1982)
Corporatism; Policies towards Associability. (Schmitter 1971)	Effect of Foreign Policy Issues on Elections (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989)
Corruption (Scott 1972)	Issue Voters (Carmines and Stimson 1980)
Ethnofederal State Survival (Hale 2004)	Policemen (Muir 1977)
Incorporation of Labor Movements (Collier and Collier 1991)	Policy (Lowi 1972)
Incorporation of the Working Class (Waisman 1982)	Policy Decision-Making (Kagan 2001)
Informal Politics (Dittmer and Wu 1995)	Policy Feedback (Pierson 1993)
Interest Representation/Aggregation (Schmitter 1974)	

- Military Service (Levi 1997)
 Nation-States (Haas 2000)
 Nation-States (Mann 1993)
 National Unification, Regional Support for (Ziblatt 2006)
 Outcomes of Social Movements (Gamson 1975)
 Revolutions, Agrarian (Paige 1975)
 Separatist Activism (Treisman 1997)
 State Power (Mann 1993)
 States (Ertman 1997)
 Transnational Coalitions (Tarrow 2005)
 Union-Government Interactions (Murrillo 2000)
Parties, Elections, and Political Participation
 Electoral Mobilization, Targeting of Rewards for (Nichter 2007)
 Market for Votes (Lehoucq 2007)
 Party Regimes (Pempel 1990)
 Party Systems (O'Dwyer 2004)
 Political Mobilization (Dalton 2006)
 Political Parties (Levitsky 2001)
Political Economy
 Economic Transformations (Ekiert and Kubik 1998)
 Factor Endowments (Rogowski 1989)
 Financial Regulatory Systems (Vitols 2001)
 Goods (Mankiw 2001)
 National Political Economy (Hall and Soskice 2001)
 National Welfare State Systems (Sapir 2005)
 Political Economies (Kullberg and Zimmerman 1999)
 Regulatory Reforms (Vogel 1996)
 Reregulation Strategies (Snyder 1999)
- Policy Implementation (Matland 1995)
 Political Relationships (Lowi 1970)
 Rational Administration (Bailey 1994)
 Rule Application (Kagan 1978)
 Rural Development (Montgomery 1983)
 Voting Behavior (Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, and Rohde 1992)
 White House-Interest Group Liaisons (Peterson 1992)
Gender Politics
 State Responses to Women's Movements (Mazur 2001)
 State Feminism (Mazur and Stetson 1995)
 State Feminism (Mazur and McBride 2008)
 Women's Policy Agency Activity (Mazur 2001)
Theory and Methodology
 Explanations of Action (Parsons 2006)
 Possible Outcomes of a Hypotheses Test (Vogt 2005)
 Survey Questions (Martin 1984)
 Approaches to Comparative Analysis (Kohli 1995)
 Theories of Modernization and Development (Janos 1986)
 Theories of Political Transformation (von Beyme 1996)
 Time Horizons in Causal Analysis (Pierson 2003)
 Typologies (Bailey 1992)
 Western Scholarship on Russia (Fish 1995)
Social Relations
 Norms (Barton 1955)
 Social Environment (Douglas 1982)
 Sociality, or Individual Involvement in Social Life (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990)

Table 7.2. Matland's Typology of Policy Implementation

		Conflict	
		Low	High
Ambiguity	Low	Administrative Implementation	Political Implementation
	High	Experimental Implementation	Symbolic Implementation

Source: Adapted from Matland (1995).

implementation (Table 7.2). While these building blocks might seem straightforward, scholars too often limit the analytic potential of their typologies by failing to follow this basic template. In this example, Matland conceptualizes policy implementation by differentiating between level of conflict and level of ambiguity in the implementation process. The elements of his typology are:

- (a) *Overarching concept*: The concept that is measured by the typology—in this case, “policy implementation.”
- (b) *Row and column variables*: These variables are cross-tabulated to form a matrix. In this example the row variable is “ambiguity,” because its component categories define the rows, and the column variable is “conflict.”
- (c) *The matrix*: This cross-tabulation creates the familiar 2×2 matrix. Alternatively, more than two categories may be present on each variable, and/or more than two variables can be incorporated, thereby yielding still more cells.
- (d) *Types*: The four types located in the cells are the different kinds of policy implementation. These have substantively meaningful labels: administrative, political, experimental, and symbolic. These types give conceptual meaning to each cell, corresponding to their position in relation to the row and column variables.

2.2 Cell Types as Categorical Variables

The cross-tabulation of two or more variables generates four or more cells, thereby creating a new categorical variable that may be nominal,³ partially ordered,³ or ordinal. These typology-based categorical variables are conceptualized in terms of two or more dimensions, and thus help to address the concern that the variables employed in a given analysis may hide multidimensionality (Blalock 1982, 109; Jackman 1985, 169; Shively 2005, 32).

Matland's typology, for example, creates a *nominal scale*. The two dimensions of policy implementation—conflict and ambiguity—are ordered in the sense that both

³ See Davey and Priestley 2002, ch. 1.

are given high-low values. Yet the four cells in the typology do not form a scale that measures greater or lesser degrees of policy implementation. The four categories are collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive, but not ordered. Hence, they are a nominal scale.

By contrast, Dahl's (1971, ch. 1) famous typology of regimes creates a *partially ordered* scale. He builds the typology around the dimensions of public contestation and participation, yielding four basic types. Among the four types—polyarchy, competitive oligarchy, inclusive hegemony, and closed hegemony—polyarchy is the most “democratic,” and closed hegemony is the least so. Yet there is no inherent order between the other two types, competitive oligarchy and inclusive hegemony. Hence, this is a partial order.

Finally, the cells in Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida's (1989, 136) typology of issue voting constitute an *ordinal scale*. The authors tabulate (1) small-versus large-issue differences between candidates, against (2) low-versus high-salience and accessibility of the issues. Here, one cell corresponds to a low effect, while a second cell corresponds to a high effect of opposing issues on the vote. The other two cells are given the same value: “low to some effect.” Thus, a three-category ordinal scale is created.

In all three examples—in which the cell types constitute a nominal, partially ordered, or ordinal scale—the same point remains valid. Regardless of the resulting level of measurement, the two or more dimensions around which the typology is organized are the foundation for the cell types that constitute the scale.

2.3 Mutually Exclusive and Collectively Exhaustive Categories

If typologies are to meet the norms for standard categorical scales, the cells should be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive (Bailey 1992, 2188). For the purpose of classification, it is essential that these dual criteria be met; otherwise a given observed case might fit in more than one cell, or might not fit in any cell.

However, some well-known typologies do not meet the standard of mutually exclusive categories. For example, Hirschman's (1970) “exit, voice, and loyalty” has provided a framework for conceptualizing the response to decline in different kinds of organizations. Yet as Hirschman himself points out (1981, 212), these are not mutually exclusive categories. Voice, in the sense of protest or expression of dissatisfaction, can accompany either exit or loyalty.

Hirschman's typology can readily be modified to create mutually exclusive categories. Thus, the initial cell types can be adapted to define the row and column variables in a new 2×2 matrix. One dimension would be exit versus loyalty, and the other the exercise versus non-exercise of voice. Two of the cells would be loyalty with or without voice, and the other two would be exit with or without voice. This would produce a new typology which could be used for unambiguously classifying cases. These steps—converting the cell values into categories on one or more dimensions in a revised typology—may be seen as a general solution to the problem that the cells in a typology are not mutually exclusive.

With other typologies, the question arises of whether the categories are collectively exhaustive. This might occur when a typology developed for one set of cases is extended to additional cases. For example, in studies of Latin America, Levitsky (2001, 37) constructs a 2×2 typology to identify four types of political parties: personalistic-electoral, electoral-professional, mass-populist, and mass-bureaucratic; and Murillo (2000, 146) identifies four types of union-government interactions: cooperation, opposition, subordination, and resistance. These cell types appear to be collectively exhaustive for the cases under analysis. But if these typologies were applied to a wider range of cases, it seems likely that cases would be encountered that did not fit into these cell types. This should hardly lead to the conclusion that these are failed typologies. Rather, the idea of collectively exhaustive categories must, at least initially, be understood in relation to the domain for which the typology was constructed.

3. CONSTRUCTING TYPOLOGIES

To understand the construction of typologies, we must focus on the basic task of concept formation, the issue of where the concepts and terms come from, and the role of ideal types.

3.1 Concept Formation

Various frameworks have been proposed for systematizing concept formation in political science. Among them, that of Sartori (1970; 1984) has been highly influential and provides a useful point of departure here. Sartori challenged scholars to (1) devote careful attention to concepts, in part because they yield the basic “data containers” employed in research; (2) understand the semantic field in which their conceptual reasoning is situated—i.e., the field of concepts and meanings that frame their research; and (3) recognize that concepts can be understood as having a hierarchical structure, involving what has variously been called a ladder of abstraction or a ladder of generality. This recognition helps both with situating concepts in relation to one another, and with adapting them to different domains of comparison. For the present discussion, we use the more self-explanatory label “kind hierarchy” for this structure.⁴ An obvious example: a parliamentary democracy is a kind of democracy, which is a kind of political regime.

⁴ Sartori (1970) called this a ladder of “abstraction,” and Collier and Mahon (1993) sought to clarify the focus by calling it a ladder of “generality.” We are convinced that it is more self-explanatory to call it a kind hierarchy, a label that fits all of the examples discussed in these earlier studies. For example, Sartori offers the example of staff (in Weber’s sense), bureaucracy, and civil service as involving a ladder of generality, but clearly it is also a kind hierarchy; and Collier and Mahon’s example of Weberian types of authority likewise constitute a kind hierarchy.

Typologies directly address these three tasks. First of all, scholars who construct typologies necessarily are working systematically with concepts. Moreover, if they employ these typologies to classify cases, then the cells in the typology are, indeed, data containers. Second, typologies focus specifically on the relationships among concepts. We have used the term “overarching concept” to refer to the overall phenomenon measured by the categories in a typology, and we have treated the categories in a typology as a categorical measure of this overarching concept. Explicit discussion of concepts and sub-types, as in a typology, is an important step in mapping out the semantic field.

Finally, the overarching concept and the categorical variable that measures it are related as a kind hierarchy. Let us illustrate this claim with examples already presented in this chapter. Obviously, in Matland’s typology, administrative, political, experimental, and symbolic implementation are *kinds* of policy implementation. In Dahl, polyarchies, inclusive hegemonies, competitive oligarchies, and closed hegemonies are *kinds* of political regimes. In Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida’s typology of the effect of foreign policy issues on elections, the scale contained in their typology provides an ordered characterization of the *kinds* of effects deriving from foreign policy: low, “low to some,” and large.

A kind hierarchy may of course have more than two levels. In Collier and Collier’s analysis, their typology (1991, 166–7) distinguishes between two *kinds* of incorporation periods: state incorporation and party incorporation. Party incorporation is in turn differentiated into three *kinds*: radical populism, labor populism, and electoral mobilization by a traditional party.

To conclude, scholars who work with typologies can thereby address the basic priorities of concept analysis entailed in a framework such as Sartori’s. We thus find a convergence between these two alternative perspectives.

3.2 Where the Concepts and Terms Come from

A key feature of a typology is the specific cell types it establishes—i.e., the concepts located in the cells and the terms to which they correspond. How do researchers select the concepts and terms for each cell?

For some typologies, the analyst simply labels the cells with terms that repeat the corresponding values on the row and column variables. Tilly and Tarrow’s (2007, 56) book on contentious politics characterizes contexts of contention by cross-tabulating governmental capacity and regime type. They establish four types of contexts, the names of which simply repeat the categories of the row and column variables: high-capacity undemocratic, high-capacity democratic, low-capacity undemocratic, and low-capacity democratic.

Similarly, Rogowski’s (1989, 8) study of commerce and coalitions distinguishes among four main constellations of factor endowments according to whether they involve a high or low land–labor ratio and an advanced or backwards economy. The four cells basically repeat the information presented in the rows and columns so that,

for example, a high land–labor ratio and advanced economy corresponds to a cell with abundant capital and land but scarce labor. On the other hand, a low land–labor ratio and backward economy correspond to a cell with abundant labor but scarce land and capital.

More commonly, scholars draw terms and concepts from other studies in the particular domain of research. Typologies serve to systematize the meaning of these terms, sometimes by providing a new definition that the researcher finds analytically productive.

For example, Weyland's (1995, 129) typology of democracies borrows common terms from the study of Latin American politics—populism, liberalism, concertation, and *basismo*⁵—and places them within Schmitter and Karl's (1992, 67) dimensions of democracy. These dimensions concern whether the locus of political power is to a greater degree in the state or in society, and whether the dominant principle of aggregation involves numbers (as in the electoral arena) or intensity (as might be the case with powerful elites). Weyland's goal in developing this typology is to provide a framework for understanding opportunities and constraints in pursuing “equity-enhancing reform” in Latin America. He focuses specifically on the opportunities and risks associated with the four types, according to the degree of policy gradualism and the kind of support base that characterize each type. Weyland's example thereby illustrates how a typology can be used to adapt already established dimensions and relatively standard types to a specific analytic purpose.

Researchers may also borrow existing terms, but develop a new meaning for them that helps advance a particular research program. Schmitter's (1974) widely cited typology of interest representation (or intermediation) situated the concept of corporatism in relation to pluralism, monism, and syndicalism. He seeks to persuade scholars that corporatism should be taken seriously as a specific type of interest representation that can be analyzed—based on a large number of dimensions—within a shared framework vis-à-vis these other types. Correspondingly, he advocates treating corporatism as a form of political structure rather than a political ideology, as some other scholars had done. Schmitter's typology played a notable role in refocusing a much wider literature on interest group politics.

Other scholars borrow from pre-existing conceptualizations in a less direct way, synthesizing various existing theoretical approaches in order to coin new and useful terms. Kagan (2001, 10) proposes the concept of “adversarial legalism” to describe policy implementation procedures that are both formal and participatory. In developing this concept, he draws on the notion of an “adversarial system,” which has been used for several centuries to characterize Anglo-American modes of adjudication, as opposed to the Continental/civil law tradition. Further, he builds on the traditional distinction between legalistic and informal modes of governance. Kagan thus joins these two separate theoretical approaches into a single typology focused on modes of policy implementation.

⁵ I.e., “bottom-up” political relationships.

These several examples show why the terms and concepts presented in the cells of typologies must be understood in relation to the evolving literature in the given field. Typologies can systematize the meaning of these terms and concepts in novel and analytically productive ways.

3.3 Ideal versus Classificatory Types

Scholars sometimes refer to their analytic categories as ideal types, suggesting that these categories are broad abstractions that may not consistently serve to classify empirical cases. Examples are found in the writings of Schmitter, Luebbert, Weyland, Hall and Soskice, and Levy.⁶ However, in these studies the scholars proceed with the classification of cases, such that they are at the same time working with classificatory types.

For instance, in his analysis of political-economic regimes in interwar Europe, Luebbert (1991, 3) states that he is working with ideal types, and then goes on to argue that his categories are valuable for sorting regimes. He states that although “the extent to which the societies corresponded to the idealized model of the regime varied,” “it is seldom difficult to locate interwar European societies” in his three categories of liberal democracy, social democracy, and fascism. Schmitter (1974, 94), in conjunction with his elaborate definition of corporatism, makes a similar point about the interplay between abstraction and the concrete utility of his types: “Obviously, such an elaborate definition is an ideal-type.” Yet while “no empirically extant system of interest representation may perfectly reproduce all these dimensions, two which I have studied in some detail (Brazil and Portugal) come rather close.”⁷

Relatedly, Collier and Collier (1991, 17) frame the discussion in terms of “analytic categories” rather than “ideal types.” They emphasize that the kinds of “incorporation periods” they analyze should be thought of as analytic categories, and not as “perfect descriptions of each country” that is placed in a particular category. In their analysis, focused on pairs of countries, they state that

obviously, the two countries within each category are not identical in terms of the defining dimensions, but they are far more similar to one another in terms of these dimensions than they are to the countries identified with the other categories. (1991, 17)⁸

This argument points to one possible reason for evoking ideal types. In some cases these analysts are perhaps not drawing heavily on the Weberian tradition, as might

⁶ Schmitter (1974, 94), Luebbert (1991, 3), Weyland (1995, 128 n. 8), Hall and Soskice (2001, 8), and Levy (2006, 387).

⁷ For other examples of type concepts that are initially labeled as ideal types, but then used as classificatory types, see also Weyland 1995: 128 n.8; Hall and Soskice 2001: 8; Levy 2006: 387. Relatedly, Rogowski 1989: 6, as well as Mares (2003), refer to a process of simplification in the generation of dimensions and types, without using the label “ideal type.”

⁸ Relatedly, both Rogowski (1989, 6) also Mares (2003) refer to the process of simplification entailed in the generation of dimensions and types, without using the label “ideal type.”

appear to be the case. Rather, they may be indirectly expressing the unease that readily arises when one seeks to fit cases into any scheme of classification. This unease may derive from the recognition that the cases grouped together in any one category usually cannot be understood as perfectly “equal.” Rather, the claim is that they do indeed fit in a particular category, and not in another. The resolution here may be a simple recognition that categorization necessarily entails a process of abstraction.

4. PUTTING TYPOLOGIES TO WORK

Careful work with typologies gives structure to empirical comparison and maps change. Typologies also provide a useful bridge between qualitative and quantitative research.

4.1 Structuring Comparison

Well-executed analysis and comparison requires carefully constructing an appropriate analytic framework. Typologies make a valuable and direct contribution to achieving this. For example, Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky (1990, 8) employ the grid-group typology, originally developed by Mary Douglas (1982, 191), in their book on cultural theory. Working with the five types generated by the grid-group framework—fatalists, hierarchists, individualists, egalitarians, and hermits—these authors focus throughout their analysis on how individuals in the five categories respond to issues such as apathy, blame, religion, risk, and scarcity.

A further example is found in Mazur (2001, 22), who seeks to understand the interactions between women’s social movements and the public sector. Borrowing from Gamson (1975, 29), she distinguishes four types of state response to women’s movements: dual response (i.e., achieving both “descriptive” representation and “substantive” representation), co-optation, pre-emption, and no response. In their study, Mazur and her collaborators carry out a sustained application of their typology to eight national cases, and to the European Union, focusing especially on the conditions under which the dual response occurs.

Finally, Collier and Collier (1991, 504)—as noted above—present a typology of the “initial incorporation” of the labor movement in Latin America. Their goal is to differentiate cases according to the interplay between state control and different forms of popular mobilization. Throughout their analysis, alternative constellations of control and mobilization are a central point of reference, and the initial differentiation among cases identified in the incorporation period is explored through the full period under investigation.

In these three studies, the typology specifies an overarching concept—(political culture, state responses, and initial incorporation), differentiates each overarching

concept into analytic categories, and sorts cases accordingly. These typologies thereby provide a systematic basis for organizing key concepts, as well as for comparing cases and framing arguments, and the distinctions contained in the typologies are carried through the entire analysis.

4.2 Mapping Empirical and Theoretical Change

Typologies contribute to conceptualizing and describing new empirical developments. For example, in the literature on party organizations, Duverger (1954) proposes an initial (and very influential) distinction between “mass” and “cadre” parties, a distinction that revolves around three organizational dimensions: (a) broad versus narrow or non-existent party membership (pp. 62–90); (b) extensive versus weak efforts to educate potential voters about politics and economics (p. 63); and (c) financial cultivation of a broad base of relatively modest contributions versus reliance on a small set of wealthy individual contributors—in Duverger’s words, “a few big private donors, industrialists, bankers, or important merchants” (pp. 63–4). Hence, of the eight possible types of parties—derived from dichotomous values on each of the three dimensions—Duverger suggests that only two are empirically significant. The distinction between them grows out of Duverger’s immersion in the history of political parties in Europe, where many of the earliest parties had an elite-dominated character notably absent from more recent ones, particularly socialist and communist parties.

Subsequently, Kirchheimer (1966, 184–92) observes that in the 1960s many European parties move away from the organizational pattern of the mass party, without the reliance on social elites that Duverger sees as characteristic of cadre parties. These new parties differ from mass parties in that they shift their ideological appeals from narrow class interests toward policies of potential benefit to majorities within society. At the same time, they seek electoral and other resources from ad hoc coalitions of interest groups, rather than from a mass base or wealthy individuals (1966, 192–5). To capture this configuration, Kirchheimer identifies a new category on the dimension of financial support: support derived from these organized groups. Kirchheimer thus adds the “catch-all” party to previous types.

More recently, Katz and Mair (1995) conclude, through a systematic analysis of party organizations throughout Western Europe, that newer parties have turned away from financial reliance on private individuals (whether wealthy or not) and likewise no longer seek funding from interest groups. Instead, parties obtain financing directly from the state (1995, 15–16). This pattern of funding can encourage cooperation among parties as they jointly seek to establish stable state support that extends beyond the incumbency of one or another party (1995, 17), leading Katz and Mair to designate the emergent organizational pattern as that of the “cartel” party.

In sum, given this understanding of party types in terms of three dimensions, it is specifically the appearance of novel patterns on one of the dimensions—the source

of financial support—that yields the emergence of new types. The use of typologies thus helps bring into sharper focus this area of organizational change.

Scholars have also used typologies to capture change over time in the political economy of advanced industrial countries. Since the 1980s, the state's role in the economy has been substantially transformed, and considerable scholarly effort has been devoted to characterizing this transformation. Against the backdrop of prior research by other scholars, Levy (2006, 386) presents a new typology that synthesizes earlier approaches to national political economies, as well as his own perspective on recent patterns of change. Levy characterizes as “market direction” the more comprehensive state role characteristic of the earlier, post-Second World War period, as opposed to “market support,” which is more characteristic of economies in the contemporary period. He also introduces a second dimension: the distinction between the authoritative exercise of state power and the use of infrastructural power by the state.

The 2×2 typology derived from these dichotomies allows Levy to compare more sharply the characteristics of the earlier versus later state role in the economy. In the earlier period, the cases characterized by an authoritative form of state power were “developmental” states, which engaged in planning, sectoral industrial policy, nationalizations, and selective protectionism. By contrast, the earlier cases characterized by infrastructural state power are labeled “corporatist,” involving distinctive forms of cooperation and coordination with societal actors. He classifies post-war France and Japan as developmental states, and post-war Germany and Sweden as corporatist states. However, he suggests that for the more recent period, which corresponds to the categories of “corrective” state and “constructive” state, the assignment of entire countries to the two cells is not meaningful, given the high level of within-country heterogeneity across different policy areas. Instead of focusing on entire countries, Levy classifies specific policies within these two cells. This asymmetry in the unit of analysis within the typology serves to capture what Levy sees as a key shift in the appropriate level of aggregation.

Typologies can also play a role in efforts to reshape scholarly thinking about political realities that evolve *less* than had been anticipated. For example, in conceptualizations of regime types, post-Second World War Spain plays a prominent role in driving an analytic reorientation of this kind. Although many observers interpreted the Spanish fascist regime as being in transition toward democracy, it retained a surprising degree of stability for three decades. This divergence led Anderson (1970, 3) to observe that “the conventional interpretations of Spanish politics should be embarrassing to students of comparative politics.” Anderson's own analysis builds on the innovative conceptualization of Linz (1964), who proposes a revision to earlier frameworks that had emphasized the distinction between democracy and totalitarianism, treated either as a dichotomy or a continuum. Linz argues that Spain could not be understood in those terms, and he adds authoritarianism as a distinctive regime type. He defines an authoritarian regime in terms of four dimensions: as a political system with limited pluralism; distinctive mentalities rather than a guiding ideology; limited political mobilization, except potentially at certain points in its development;

and an exercise of power within ill-defined, but in fact quite predictable, limits (Linz 1964, 297). Subsequently, Linz (1975, 278) draws on three of these four dimensions to construct a general typology of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.

Thus, starting with a specific case that called into question a prior analytic framework, Linz develops a new approach to non-democratic regimes, based on a much more elaborate, multidimensional framework.

4.3 Typologies and Quantitative Analysis

Far from being incompatible with quantitative research or offering a methodologically inferior form of analysis, typologies play a role in many quantitative studies. In a given piece of research that is predominantly quantitative, a typology—and the categorical variables upon which it is constructed—may help to overcome an impasse in the analysis, to identify a subset of cases on which the researcher wishes to focus, or to draw together the conclusions. In other instances, researchers may use quantitative analysis to assign cases to the cells in a typology.

In Hibbs's (1987, 69) analysis of strikes in eleven advanced industrial countries, a 2×2 typology is introduced at a point where quantitative analysis can be pushed no further. Hibbs creates a data set of strikes in order to analyze long-run trends in their size, duration, and frequency. He uses bivariate correlations to demonstrate that increases in the political power of labor-based and left parties are associated with lower levels of strikes in the decades after the Second World War and hypothesizes that the role of public sector allocation serves as an intervening factor. Hibbs argues that as labor-left parties gain more political power, the locus of distributional conflict shifts from the market place to the arena of elections and public policy, thereby making strikes less relevant for trade union actors.

However, the multi-collinearity among his variables is so high that—especially given Hibbs's small number of cases—it is not feasible to sort out the causal links. He therefore shifts from bivariate linear correlations to a 2×2 typology that cross-tabulates the level of state intervention in the economy against alternative goals of this intervention. For the period up to the 1970s, Hibbs identifies a subset of cases that manifest three patterns: relatively high levels of strikes directed at firms and enterprises (Canada, US); high levels of strikes which serve as a form of pressure on the government (France, Italy); and a “withering away of the strike” that accompanies the displacement of conflict into the electoral arena (Denmark, Norway, Sweden). Using this typology, he analyzes the outcome in terms of three non-ordered categories—in contrast to his overall argument about change in strike level that comes out of the standard correlational treatment.

Vasquez (1993, 73) likewise introduces a typology to resolve what he sees as an impasse in quantitative analyses—in this case, of the causes of war. Using the Correlates of War data, he observes that the literature has produced inconsistent findings in explaining the incidence of war, and argues that such inconsistencies arise because war is being analyzed at too high a level of aggregation. He identifies eight types of

war by cross-tabulating three dimensions: (1) equal versus unequal distribution of national power among belligerent states, (2) limited versus total war, and (3) number of participants. Vasquez uses this typology to focus on a subset of cases, i.e., wars of rivalry. He draws on findings from a wide range of qualitative and quantitative studies to address such questions as why some wars between rivals are limited while others are total, and why some wars of rivalry involve two players while others include more.

Typologies may also synthesize the findings of a quantitative analysis. Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989, 136), in their study of the impact of foreign policy platforms on US presidential candidates' vote share, use a typology in this way. Analyzing survey data, they explore the degree to which campaign messages from presidential candidates have resonance with voters: specifically, the degree to which the campaign issues are (1) "available," in the sense that an opinion or position on a given issue is understood, and (2) "accessible," or perceived as relevant by voters. Whereas much of the article employs probit analysis to predict the victory of specific candidates, in the conclusion the authors seek to characterize broader types of elections. They employ a 2×2 matrix that classifies presidential elections according to whether there are small versus large differences in candidates' foreign policy stances, and according to the low- versus high-salience/accessibility of foreign policy issues raised in the each election.

Finally, other studies employ quantitative tools, including probit analysis, to place cases in the cells of a typology. Carmines and Stimson (1980, 4) posit a distinction between "easy" issue voting, in which citizens have a deeply embedded preference on a particular issue, and "hard" issue voting, in which citizens' issue preferences depend on a complex decision calculus, typically involving interactions and tradeoffs among issues. To test this hypothesis, the authors construct a 2×2 typology to describe different types of voters, based on whether, in making a given electoral choice, the voter was swayed by easy versus hard issues. This yields a typology in which the cell types are non-issue voters, easy-issue voters, hard-issue voters, and constrained issue voters. The authors build on probit analysis to place respondents in these four cells, and they use this typology to show how easy- versus hard-issue voting are fundamentally different processes.

5. CONCLUSION

Typologies serve important goals in social science research. Good typologies depend on careful and substantively grounded conceptualization, and they are a basic tool for organizing and analyzing data. The use of typologies is strongly connected to the qualitative tradition of research, yet they play a role in quantitative analysis as well.

Drawing together the discussion above, we propose some guidelines for careful work with typologies. First, the presentation of typologies should be clear and readily understandable, involving either an explicit matrix, and/or careful discussion in the text. We have mapped out the building blocks of a good typology, which centrally involve identifying the overall concept being measured, organizing the row and column variables, and establishing the cell types. Typologies that fail to follow this template may end up confusing rather than sharpening the analysis.

Second, the construction of cell types has special importance. Employing vivid names for the types enhances scholarly communication. More fundamentally, careful work with cell types pushes the researcher toward better conceptualization. Furthermore, the cell types, taken together, provide a new variable that measures the concept around which the typology is organized. Scholars should note carefully the level of measurement entailed in this variable. We have discussed three levels that are relevant here—nominal, partially ordered, and ordinal scales. Understanding the substantive content of the typology, and how the categories can be employed, requires a clear grasp of these alternatives.

Third, drawing on conventional discussions of categorical variables, we argue that the criterion of establishing mutually exclusive categories provides a useful norm in constructing typologies. Yet not all analytically interesting typologies meet this standard, and we have shown that a simple reorganization of such typologies can bring them into conformity with this norm.

Fourth, coming back to the distinction between descriptive and explanatory typologies noted at the beginning of this chapter, it is crucial to recognize which is which. One must distinguish carefully between cell types that provide a more differentiated descriptive characterization, as opposed to those that denote explanatory outcomes. Confusion about this distinction distorts the information contained in a typology.

Fifth, we must emphasize once more that this distinction between descriptive and explanatory typologies does not mean that descriptive typologies—again, as with any form of measurement—play no role in formulating and evaluating explanations. In some instances, the categories contained in the typology are the explanatory variable. For example, Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky use the categories in the grid-group typology as they seek to explain apathy and perception of risk. Similarly, Dahl introduces his typology of regime types with the central objective of distinguishing alternative trajectories in the movement toward polyarchy. His goal is to explore the hypothesis that different trajectories, as defined in relation to the categories in his typology, have important consequences for long-term regime outcomes.

In other instances, the typology is the outcome to be explained. Among alternative state responses to women's movements, Mazur's typology highlights the pattern of dual response, and she proceeds to consider the conditions under which this particular response occurs—as opposed to the others delineated in the typology. Relatedly, the typology can contribute to a disaggregation of the dependent variable, a disaggregation that the researcher sees as necessary for the explanatory enterprise to proceed. Thus, Vasquez argues that formulating and testing explanations of war

cannot advance without a more differentiated conceptualization of war. His typology distinguishes one particular type, on which he then focuses in evaluating alternative explanations.

Thus, among these several guidelines for careful work with typologies, an important priority to keep clearly in view is their contribution to wider goals of formulating and evaluating explanatory claims.

Finally, more broadly, we have argued that typologies can play a critical role in comparative analysis, and this role should be recognized. Typologies provide the basis for sharpening the theoretical types being investigated in a given study and clarifying the meaning of these types vis-à-vis related concepts. Typologies serve to compare concrete cases, both cross-sectionally and over time, and—as just emphasized—can be critical in the formulation and evaluation of explanatory claims. The adoption of clear norms for using typologies facilitates careful comparative work and helps scholars draw conclusions that are both conceptually sound and analytically productive.

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