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Factional Alignment Among the Minnesota Ojibwe, 1850-1880.*

REBECCA KUGEL

Political factionalism in Native American communities has long proven a topic of interest to scholars. An observation by Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., suggests one compelling reason for this enduring fascination. "[N]o student of Indian societies," he writes, "doubts the ubiquity nor the importance of factions in Indian affairs past or present." As a political phenomenon, factionalism is central to much of Native American history. It occurs in numerous Native societies, at various points in time, and under a variety of social, political and economic conditions. Yet, as Berkhofer laments, "the study of . . . factionalism is little advanced beyond the superficial description given . . . in 1936." Factionalism, it seems, has been as poorly understood as it is important.¹

One significant cause of the unsatisfactory understanding of factionalism is to be found in the theoretical framework with which scholars initially approached the study of factions. In their earliest formulations, scholars theorized that factions were a uniquely post-contact development. Edward H. Spicer, in summarizing this position, argued that Native American societies, their processes and principles of governance rooted in consensus decision-making, did not expect "as a constant feature of community life any basic differences of viewpoint." The permanent presence of Europeans or Euramericans "almost immediately introduced a serious issue for dissent." Simply by their presence,

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these outsiders introduced a second set of cultural alternatives to which Native peoples had to adjust. This challenge to cultural and political consensus struck Native societies at their weakest point. Native societies fractured over which European-derived elements they wanted to accept, or the degree to which they wished to become involved with the newcomers as trading partners or military allies. The one condition Native societies could not handle was diversity; the sustained presence of Europeans or Euramericans forced them into just this untenable situation. Factions erupted inevitably from this unresolvable dilemma.²

The idea that factions were solely a post-contact phenomenon has sparked considerable scholarly debate. Studies by David H. Brugge and P. Richard Metcalf have uncovered evidence hinting strongly at pre-contact factions, and Berkhofer himself has noted the durability of factions over centuries. James A. Clifton and Nancy Oestreich Lurie have speculated on the uses to which Native societies put factional divisions, whether their origins were pre- or post-contact. In spite of wide-ranging debate, however, the idea that factions came into existence, or at least greatly intensified in response to the challenges brought by Europeans or Euramericans, has still, at least implicitly, shaped many analyses of factionalism. Among them is Berkhofer's own pioneering *Salvation and the Savage*. Although Berkhofer acknowledged factions might exist prior to the establishment of Christian missions within Native communities, his emphasis on the Christian/Pagan division as it exacerbated factionalism implies this outsider-introduced issue soon predominated over any other possible earlier basis for division. Indeed, as David H. Brugge has observed, factions are generally identified by names "such as progressive versus conservative, friendlies versus hostiles, Christians versus Pagans" that reflect their relationship to Europeans or Euramericans, not to other members of tribal societies.³

This perception has tended to distort analyses of factions in a significant way. Because most scholars have viewed factionalism as precipitated by outsiders, they have not examined the internal political workings of Native societies for possible insights into factional development, continuity, or composition. P. Richard Metcalf, attempting such an Indian-oriented analysis, has argued that pre-contact antagonisms are central to understanding factionalism. He indicates that no hard and fast lines separate pre- and post-contact issues. Indeed, pre-contact issues continued to

be the "central concerns" of Indian peoples well into the contact era. "[T]here was a period of transition," he writes, "between first white contact and total orientation to white-provoked issues." Furthermore, he argued that such European-introduced concerns "as 'Civilization' or 'Christianity' . . . were ingredients added to earlier political divisions . . . that had nothing to do with white contact."⁴

This examination of factional alignments within the several Ojibwe communities of the Mississippi River region in central Minnesota takes as its point of departure Metcalf's concern with the importance of the pre-contact political environment of Native communities. First emerging in the 1850s, the Ojibwe divisions endured into the 1880s. Analysis of the schism supports Metcalf's claim of the importance of the pre-contact split. Antagonisms from the pre-contact period are central to the Ojibwe factional alignment of the mid-nineteenth century. Additionally, the composition of the Ojibwe factions uncovers a remarkable alliance between social groups usually identified in the literature as 'Progressives' and 'Traditionals' and generally considered opponents of one another. The analysis thus sheds light on the complicated process of factional formation, and on the composition of factions as well.

The Mississippi Ojibwe villages, although politically distinct and autonomous, nevertheless remained linked by extensive kinship ties, as well as much shared historical experience. They formed military alliances with one another, and their leaders met, evidently at regular intervals, to discuss mutual political concerns. They enjoyed particularly close social and political relations with those villages in closest physical proximity: Leech Lake, Cass Lake and Lake Winnibigoshish to the north and west, with ties to Leech Lake being the strongest. The Mississippi communities' connections to other Ojibwe in Minnesota and throughout the wide stretch of territory occupied by their congeners were more tenuous. Geographical distance seemed an important determinant of social distance. The closer a village existed in physical space to the Mississippi communities, the closer were the social and political ties. The more distant a village, the more tenuous the connections. The response of other Ojibwe communities to the initial factional split in the 1850s supports this assessment. The Leech Lake people also took sides in the schism. The peoples of Cass Lake, Lake Winnebigoishish and Red Lake, each to

varying degrees in the vicinity of Leech Lake, showed keen interest in the goings-on, but distanced themselves from any real participation. Peoples at communities such as Fond du Lac, Vermillion Lake, Rainy Lake and Pembina, who had few dealings with the Mississippi villages, showed minimal interest in the dispute.⁵

Contemporaneous Euramericans living in Minnesota who were familiar with the Ojibwe recognized that a split existed within the Mississippi villages. However, these Euramericans, for the most part local government officials or Episcopalian missionaries, misunderstood the division. They cast it in terms that reflected both their commitment to American Indian policy and their specific cultural perception of the development of types of human societies. These Euramericans were convinced that their own society represented the pinnacle of human achievement and civilization. They therefore viewed as 'progressive' those Ojibwe who expressed an interest in the two institutions Euramericans believed to be the foundations of their own society—an agrarian subsistence base and the Christian religion (preferably of a Protestant denomination).⁶ They singled out for praise "every good industrious farmer Indian," i.e., those who were "good men & lived as GOD [*sic*] wants you to live." These Ojibwe particularly delighted the Episcopalian missionaries by frequent affirmations of their desire "to immetate [*sic.*] the good white man," "to improve ourselves and make us prominent homes & farms."⁷ Having identified the Progressive Ojibwe, it was an easy matter for Euramericans to define an opposition: those Ojibwe who showed no interest in the desired cultural elements, "who never did a stroke of work, whom no inducement could prevail upon to plant even one potato . . . who would scalp every white man in existence if [they] had the power." These Ojibwe articulated their position every bit as clearly as the 'progressives'; they "did not want to be civilized, to have missionaries, or teachers among them."⁸ Euramerican observers, particularly the missionaries, branded these opponents of agriculture and religion as 'hostiles,' or 'conservatives,' or 'traditionalists.'

Yet closer examination of the Hostiles or Traditionals reveals that they were a composite group, a set of allies, and many of the members of the alliance were not people generally regarded as Traditionalists. An Indian agent in 1865 invidiously described the Traditionals as "halfbreeds with a few Indians they are able

to influence who for years have been accustomed to grumble." The agent's characterization is of more than passing interest. Repeatedly during the years between 1850 and 1880 the members of the Traditional faction were described as a coalition of "the old fur traders . . . half breeds and some evil disposed Ind[jan]s." There was little question that those Ojibwe who were affiliated with this coalition were Traditional in orientation; nor was it doubted that they particularly opposed efforts to introduce an agricultural subsistence base. Their alliance with bicultural people, many of whom were in fact of mixed ancestry, and with the 'old fur traders' was facilitated by this mutual antagonism to economic change.⁹

That the fur traders should oppose Ojibwe efforts at self-sufficient agrarianism is not as paradoxical as it might seem. The traders realized that once the Ojibwe settled on farms, they would have neither the time nor the need to trap. By the 1850s, the traders had also discovered there were large sums of money to be made from treaties and land speculation, in addition to the profits from the fur trade. With wealth came political power, and the traders had ties to the pre-eminent wing of the Minnesota Republican party. Any change in the lucrative cycle of treaty negotiations, land sales and bidding wars to furnish annuity goods would be detrimental to their interests. The traders saw both their prosperity and their political ambitions threatened by the Ojibwe Progressives' farming program.¹⁰

The bicultural mixed-bloods shared the traders' dependence on the traditional Ojibwe hunting-trapping economy. Many still worked in the fur trade as laborers, clerks, and independent small outfitters. Heirs to a culture and lifestyle built around their intermediary position, they resisted changes they perceived as detrimental to their interests. Like the traders, these bicultural mixed-bloods had prospered from the expanded opportunities the treaty-making and treaty-fulfilling processes afforded. They, along with other Ojibwe, were eligible for individual yearly payments and had extracted lucrative special considerations at several treaty negotiations as well—one-time lump sum cash payments, for instance, or rights to choose 80-acre plots of land. Besides monies awarded directly through treaties, the mixed-bloods discovered new and profitable ways to expand their traditional role as bicultural mediators and so partake of the treaty bounty. They acted as interpreters and guides, rented equipment

to annuity contractors, trucked goods to obscure distribution points and peddled small stores of merchandise (often supplied them by their trader friends) at the payment grounds. The civilization program of the 'progressive' Ojibwe, with its promise of social and economic assimilation, made no favorable impression on the bicultural mixed-bloods. Their own economic survival was dependent on the Ojibwe continuing to adhere to the hunting-trapping lifestyle. While their perceptions of their needs would change over time, during the mid-century years the mixed-bloods clearly saw no advantage in a program of agricultural activities. Their natural community of interest during these years was with those Ojibwe who also opposed economic changes, the so-called Hostiles or Traditionals.¹¹

The Ojibwe who joined with the traders and bicultural mixed-bloods in opposition to agricultural experiments certainly shared their allies' distaste for farming. Yet these Traditional Ojibwe cannot be understood only in terms of their hostility to a proposed economic innovation. Important as that opposition was, other issues were more important in bringing these Ojibwe into an alliance with the fur traders and mixed-bloods. Uncovering these other issues in fact reveals that the Ojibwe factions at mid-century were not those of Traditionals and Progressives, as defined by their interest in or opposition to agriculture, though this was what Euramericans believed. The dynamic underlying the mid-century factions involved crucial issues of public policy and the legitimate exercise of political power within Ojibwe society. Specifically, the Ojibwe were divided over how best to deal with the growing American presence, and this division of opinion both reflected and sustained a long-standing aboriginal political division: that between the civil leaders and the warriors.

Interestingly enough, Euramericans involved in Indian affairs, both at the local and national levels, did recognize the existence of the two types of Ojibwe leaders. They distinguished between the elderly civil leaders, whom they denominated 'chiefs,' and the "head men, or warriors, as they were called," in the words of one mid-century Indian agent. Federal government officials involved in treaty negotiations with the Ojibwe also recognized the two types of leaders, and carefully identified the signers of the treaties of 1837, 1842, 1847, and 1854 as 'chiefs' or 'head men.' In spite of their recognition of the leadership duality, no Euramericans seem to have recognized its importance in the factional division of mid-century. That division Euramericans un-

derstood in terms of Ojibwe receptivity or hostility to American Indian policy.¹²

This leadership dualism was not unique to the Ojibwe; it was common among Woodlands Native American peoples. The bifurcated leadership pattern specific to Ojibwe society has been discussed in detail by the anthropologist Harold Hickerson. Hickerson notes that the "interplay of the civil authority and the military segment, the warriors," was multi-faceted and complex. He characterized the relationship as "simultaneously one of solidarity and opposition." Warrior opposition to the civil leaders' policy decisions was most likely to arise when issues "relating to war and peace" were involved. Generally, the civil leaders counseled peace, and the warriors, frequently referred to in historical sources as the 'young men,' advocated continuing hostilities. Descriptions in the documentary record of this pattern, Hickerson notes, "are legion." Yet the warriors did not form a permanent political opposition, "a genuine political faction," within Ojibwe communities. In addition to their role as warriors, these men had other, equally important, social roles that integrated them into their communities, provided recognition and prestige, and gave them shared interest with the civil leaders in community survival. The warriors were also hunters, the "chief providers" for their villages; they were enmeshed in family and kinship networks; often they were heads of households. These multiple roles, Hickerson argues, mitigated divisive tendencies and encouraged solidarity between warriors and civil leaders based on an overarching mutual interest in community survival.¹³

Hickerson does not explore the reasoning that lay behind the Ojibwe's leadership duality, noting that "there was no absolute reason for different kinds of leadership to be invested in different men." However, in his discussion of the civil leader/warrior opposition he suggests an important consideration. Commenting upon the numerous instances of the civil leaders advocating peaceful solutions and the warriors pressing for military action, Hickerson speculates that this "patterned behavior" reflected Ojibwe expectations of elders and youths in their society: "wisdom was the obligation of the older civil leaders, and recklessness the prerogative of the young." Indeed, the Ojibwe not only had different expectations of the two groups; they recognized two distinct leadership styles.¹⁴

The Ojibwe believed the natural leaders of their society were

the mature and deliberative elders, men who had the experience of a lifetime and the objectivity of age to guide them. These elders were expected to exemplify in their political actions a sterling commitment to the Ojibwe political ethos, to consensus decision-making, to group cooperation, and to a non-coercive, non-authoritarian political style. The warriors, on the other hand, were perceived with considerably more ambivalence. They were young, rash, hot-headed, and inclined to be combative and coercive in interpersonal relations. Their behavior was in many ways completely opposite that of the civil leaders. Their rough and abrasive leadership style was considered appropriate to the realities of wartime, when lengthy, reasoned discussions of the options were obviously impossible. Such a leadership style was just as obviously undesirable in a village, however, where people sought group solidarity based on amicable interpersonal relations and avoided aggressive confrontations.

Although ideally subordinate to the civil leaders, the warriors were extremely popular with their fellow Ojibwe. They were the village defenders and risked their lives for others. They were the ones who stepped forward at critical times, when drastic measures were called for. The warriors' ability to rally popular support within the villages made them a formidable challenge when they mounted an opposition to the civil leaders. In the difficult years of the 1850s, the issues of strategy and leadership that had often been in contention between the civil leaders and the warriors proved explosive and Ojibwe communities fractured. The warriors and their supporters argued that desperate times called for desperate measures and pushed for political parity with the civil leaders. Other Ojibwe continued to believe that the warriors could not be brought into the decision-making process without destroying the very society they sought to save. These Ojibwe resisted the warriors' efforts and threw their support behind the civil leaders.

The 1850s were indeed a decade of crises for all the central Minnesota Ojibwe. Although they had sold tracts of land as early as 1837, in 1855 the Mississippi villagers, jointly with the Leech Lake and Lake Winnibigoshish peoples, signed a treaty by which they ceded the bulk of their land in Minnesota. Ojibwe country no longer comprised an unbroken stretch of territory; it was now fragmented into several small reservations. This was particularly the case for the Mississippi area villages, whose reserved lands

were scattered at the several village sites of Gull Lake, Rabbit Lake, Sandy Lake, Rice Lake, Pokegama and Mille Lacs. This situation magnified social ills that the Ojibwe had known previously, but had been able to control while still in relative physical isolation. Now they could no longer avoid fairly regular contact with Euramericans. This increased contact exacerbated old problems, such as alcohol abuse and the spread of European-derived diseases, while fostering new opportunities for violent encounters between resentful Ojibwe and contemptuous yet fearful Euramericans. Game animals fled as Euramerican lumber companies began logging operations in the ceded country. Although the Ojibwe yet retained hunting and trapping rights in their former territory, the diminishing animal populations made it impossible for them to support themselves. Increasingly, they relied on annuity payments provided by treaties to fill the gap. To their dismay, they learned that annuities were anything but a reliable source of subsistence. A shocking amount of their goods and monies ended up in the hands of Indian agents, agency employees or "other white persons about the Agency." Furthermore, many Ojibwe who complained of agency corruption had their annuities withheld, a form of punishment coercion the economically hard-pressed Ojibwe found difficult to resist.¹⁵

A serious political issue compounded these social and economic problems. The Treaty of 1855 had proven hotly controversial. Many Ojibwe opposed it and believed that the men who had signed it, although they were respected civil leaders (many of whom had signed treaties before), had accepted bribes from the United States government; they had sold out their people. This was a stinging criticism to make of men whose paramount duty as civil leaders was to look to the welfare of their people and give no thought to selfish gain. The warriors spearheaded the popular opposition. At Leech Lake, "some of the young men had . . . become dissatisfied . . . when they first heard of the execution of the treaty . . . and laid in wait to kill" the village's premier civil leader because he had signed the controversial document. Contenting themselves with a graphic symbolic gesture, the "young men . . . killed the horse on which he rode from Leech Lake." Feeling about the unpopular treaty was equally intense in the Mississippi villages. Two years after ratification, "their chiefs . . . have had to conceal themselves from the assaults of their own people." Ironically, at the very time when the civil

leaders sought to contain the threat of warrior domination, their own integrity and ethical conduct was seriously tarnished by the ill-fated Treaty of 1855.¹⁶

The civil leaders' authority and prestige weakened further in the following years. They were humiliated and made to appear powerless by their continued inability to solve the escalating problems of impoverishment, alcohol abuse, violence and disease. This is not to say the Ojibwe leadership did not try, for they certainly did. They sent letters of protest to state and Federal officials and paid visits of state as well. Risking reprisals from Indian agents—both in the form of withheld annuities and (sometimes) in the form of physical violence—they testified at government investigations. They assessed the declining standard of living their people endured and developed a plan for dealing with it.¹⁷ From their perspective, the primary cause of Ojibwe decline was the eroding subsistence base. Unable to support themselves by hunting and trapping, the Ojibwe had turned to annuities and now found themselves dependent upon and vulnerable to manipulation by the United States. The civil leaders well understood that it was in the United States's interest to "keep us in ignorance . . . that they may be enriched by our degradation." Seeking a subsistence alternative, the civil leaders advocated that their people become farmers. They explicitly linked increased reliance on agriculture with political autonomy: "We have made up our minds to live [in] a different man[n]er," the "Mill Lac [*sic.*] chief," Shah-bash-kong, informed the agent in 1862, "if you withdraw our scanty annuity you can do so—we can live by our industry." Shah-bash-kong concluded his remarks by assuring the agent that he had been selected by "[t]he principal chiefs . . . from all parts" of the central Minnesota area to act as their spokesman, to "answer" for them.¹⁸

It was the civil leaders and their supporters who in the 1850s so delighted the small cadre of Episcopalian missionaries by their interest in agriculture. As early as 1852, the civil leaders of Gull Lake had taken steps toward implementing the civil leaders' shared goal. The Gull Lake leaders had, "in council, invited" an Episcopalian missionary, James Lloyd Breck, to "come amongst them." "In a general council" they assured Breck of "their firm intention to adopt the civilized life." Delighted, the Episcopalians founded their first mission in Minnesota Ojibwe country at Gull Lake and named it St. Columba. "The principal chief," Bad Boy,

and a second influential civil leader, Whitefisher, were enthusiastic supporters of the St. Columba mission. The Episcopalians pointed to this fact with pride, and attributed much of their early success to the encouragement of the "chiefs."¹⁹

In fact, the St. Columba experiment did prosper at first. "The success we met with for the first three years was very remarkable," Breck recalled.

Men . . . went to work with the axe[,] the hoe and other implements used in agriculture. . . . Women rapidly learned sewing, cookery, washing and ironing. . . . Houses were built and as many as *thirty five children* . . . [were] admitted . . . for education.²⁰

Bad Boy articulated the Ojibwe perception of the mission's benefits: "We are very poor but we are very thankful that you have sent us a teacher," he informed the Minnesota Episcopal bishop's convention in 1860. He continued by noting that until the villagers had established themselves on a firm agricultural base, they would be unable to take full advantage of the program the missionaries offered. "[W]ant compels us to roam about," he explained. Breck's emphasis on teaching the Ojibwe Euroamerican agricultural skills (and the corresponding female sex role of 'housewife') mirrors Bad Boy's concern with farming and suggests an important reason for the early mission success. Although Breck did actively seek to convert the Gull Lake people to Christianity, he focused primarily on imparting the agricultural skills the civil leaders wanted to acquire. The civil leaders evidently were able to satisfy their missionary and his colleagues with ambiguous statements such as Bad Boy's observation that "I am better informed of the Religion of the white man than what I was heretofore," and threw their energy into developing the secure agrarian subsistence base they sought. As further evidence of this, it is significant to note that Bad Boy did not convert to Christianity until 1860 and the documentary record strongly suggests that Whitefisher, who died at some point during the 1860s, never converted.²¹

As Breck's recollections indicate, however, the early promise of the St. Columba mission went unfulfilled. Breck accurately identified the cause of the decline as the Treaty of 1855. "The lands . . . had become ceded, and the whites had access in their length and breadth saving the here and there small Reservation,"

he wrote. The problems of growing poverty, social demoralization and violent encounters with incoming Euramerican lumbermen, settlers and the soldiers sent to police the borders were enormously magnified by the land sale which had reduced and fragmented Ojibwe country. Breck specifically blamed "fire-water" and general frontier lawlessness for the failure of the mission, but he hinted at a far more significant cause.²²

In spite of the civil leaders' assurances of support for the mission program, an opposition existed within the Gull Lake community. The civil leaders' supporters regularly found their Euramerican-style houses "broken up" and their farms "plundered." Bad Boy referred to "the present troubles" that prevented him from attending the Bishops' convention in the spring of 1860. In the winter of 1861-62, in the weeks before the council at which Shah-bash-kong reiterated the civil leaders' commitment to agriculture, their supporters' "gardens were mostly destroyed" by people Breck's Native Ojibwe assistant and interpreter, John Johnson Enmegahbowh, characterized as "the wild ones." Sha-bash-kong's remarks take on added significance in light of this evidence of an aggressive opposition. Clearly, there were some Ojibwe who rejected the civil leaders' agrarian strategy and expressed their hostility by harassing those villagers who supported the agricultural experiment. An Indian agent in 1857 identified these troublesome "wild ones" as "the boys," that is, as the young men, or the warriors.²³

As the civil leaders grappled with the problems facing their people, the warriors advanced their own solution. They argued that the civil leaders' policy had failed, that their efforts to co-exist peacefully with the Americans, adopting agriculture and accepting Christianity, were futile. The United States did not respond to Ojibwe grievances, the warriors argued, because the United States felt the Ojibwe were too weak to refuse any demands made of them. The United States needed to be reminded that the Ojibwe sought peaceful co-existence from a position of strength, not because they were too intimidated to resist. And traditionally, of course, the warriors had been the ones to demonstrate Ojibwe strength. Increasingly, when the civil leaders were unable to obtain results by peaceful means, the warriors took matters into their own hands. "The boys" harassed lumbermen, hounded settlers, broke into government warehouses and distributed stockpiled supplies to needy Ojibwe and countered Euramerican violence with their own. As the 1850s progressed, the

Ojibwe looked more often to the warriors to redress grievances that the civil leaders had failed to remedy.²⁴

Two centers of warrior power emerged. One, not surprisingly, was at Leech Lake, where the warriors had long been a force to be reckoned with. Among the hard-pressed Ojibwe of the Mississippi River region, a second and more volatile power base coalesced around the canny and resourceful Hole-in-the-Day the younger, of Gull Lake. An astute and capable politician, young Hole-in-the-Day utilized a far-flung network of relatives and friends, Ojibwe, mixed-blood and Euramerican, to operate effectively in both the Ojibwe and Euramerican worlds.²⁵

In the rising popularity of the warriors, the civil leaders perceived a growing threat to their own individual positions of leadership and, more seriously, to the traditional balance of power within Ojibwe communities. Among the Mississippi area villages, young Hole-in-the-Day exemplified the civil leaders' apprehensions. Born into the warrior-dominated Bear Clan, descended of a famous warrior father, Hole-in-the-Day the younger sought to expand the political role of the warriors in the 1850s by involving himself in civil government. From the early 1850s until his death in 1868, he not only dominated meetings with United States officials, but he was a powerful force in intra-Ojibwe affairs. His entrance into Ojibwe politics without renouncing his warrior background or his warrior supporters deeply troubled the civil leadership. In the rising popularity of the warriors, the civil leaders perceived a threat to Ojibwe life every bit as critical as deteriorating relations with the United States.²⁶

The troubled decades of the 1850s and 1860s provided the warriors with the perfect opportunity to demonstrate the superiority of their strategy of armed resistance. At several points during these years, they declared themselves at war with the United States and embarked on raids against carefully chosen targets—missions were a special favorite, as was the Indian agency at Crow Wing. This strategy of selective confrontation was very successful, and the warriors were able to achieve objectives long sought fruitlessly by the civil leaders. War leaders, particularly Hole-in-the-Day, competed with civil leaders to demonstrate their concern for the well-being of the Ojibwe people and, to the civil leaders' chagrin, were able to substantiate their claims very well indeed. Throughout the 1850s and '60s, the two leadership groups vied for the allegiance of the Ojibwe people.²⁷

It is in this context of intratribal political competition that the traditionalist warriors' alliance with the fur traders and bicultural mixed-bloods takes on an added dimension. The warriors had deliberately made themselves indispensable to their allies. It was the warriors who, at treaty negotiations, pressed for special funds earmarked "for the use of their half-breed friends." When the Federal government abandoned a credit system favored by the traders, Hole-in-the-Day used his personal connections to lobby for its reinstatement. In short, the warriors permitted themselves to be used as the channel through which the traders and bicultural mixed-bloods maintained their access to Ojibwe resources. The warriors gambled that they were so valuable to their allies that the traders and mixed-bloods would be forced to take their side in any confrontation with the United States, thereby considerably strengthening the warriors' hand. If the warriors seemed likely to lose a contest, their allies would be compelled to rescue them, to protect their investment, as it were.²⁸

The best known of the warriors' confrontations occurred in the summer of 1862. As the events of that dramatic summer unfolded, the factional split within the Mississippi communities was revealed in all its complexity. The warriors' alliance with the fur traders and bicultural mixed-bloods was also highlighted, and as the situation developed, it appeared that the warriors had indeed calculated their value to their allies correctly.

Ironically, the upheavals of 1862 did not begin in Ojibwe country, but in southern Minnesota, in the country of the Ojibwe's hereditary enemies, the Dakota. On August 17, 1862, four young Dakota warriors killed several Euramerican settlers, igniting the conflict that has become known as the 'Sioux Uprising.' The Dakotas' recent experience of land and annuity fraud, of frustration and humiliation, reflected in intensified form the Ojibwe's own dealings with decline and unwanted culture change. The Dakota struck furiously. In the initial days of the war, they ambushed a company of soldiers marching to the defense of the embattled agency, besieged nearby Fort Ridgely and the town of New Ulm, and inflicted heavy casualties in all encounters. Stunned and terrified, the Euramerican populace of Minnesota demanded "a war of extermination" against the Dakota. Simultaneously engaged in fighting the Civil War, they accused Southerners of plotting to inflame the Northern borders with Indian wars. "[T]he Rebels are at the bottom of this," E. G. Gear,

the Episcopal chaplain at Fort Ripley near the Ojibwe agency, declared.²⁹

Beginning the next day, August 18, allied warriors mostly from Leech and Gull lakes conducted concerted raids against selected targets in Ojibwe country. The coincidental timing of hostilities was too much for the reeling Euramerican population to accept. Rumors of complicity, of a war conspiracy between Ojibwe and Dakota, abounded, based on and given a large measure of their credibility by a well-publicized meeting between Hole-in-the-Day and the leader of the Dakota warriors, Little Crow, which had taken place in St. Paul the previous summer.³⁰

Like the Dakota, the Ojibwe warriors focused their attacks on the most detested symbols of the Euramerican presence. They threatened to attack the agency, killed cattle, looted farms, and sacked the mission complex at Gull Lake. The Native assistant missionary, Enmegahbowh, was shocked at the intensity of the violence directed against the mission. Both the missionaries' quarters and the church building "are all smash[ed] to pieces and . . . even the Font is broken," he reported in awe. In a final gesture of their hostility and contempt, the warriors stabled their horses in the ruins of the church. The Leech Lake warriors focused on another offensive symbol of Euramerican encroachment: the registry office in the nearest town of Otter Tail, where settlers filed their land claims. The safe in which these papers were stored was "broken to atoms" and the claims papers "have been destroyed," according to Enmegahbowh.³¹

After several days of raiding, the warriors, "armed and painted," gathered at Gull Lake, where they constructed "A Large Lodge Called a War Lodge," for meetings and general sleeping quarters, stationed "Picketts out for some ways from their camp," and, conducted themselves "strictly on a War Basis." "Hole in the Day was the Spokesman," an eye-witness, a petty trader, remembered. When this trader and the Indian agent attempted to meet with the warriors, "they would not speak to us," insisting that all negotiations should be held with "the Cheif [sic.] of the Warriors," Hole-in-the-Day. The war leader at once demanded a meeting with Federal officials to discuss the long-standing grievances that had brought the raids about. Fortuitously, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, William P. Dole, was in Minnesota, attempting to negotiate a treaty with the Red Lake and Pembina peoples, the only Ojibwe in the state

without a treaty and still in possession of a great deal of land. Instead, Dole found himself traveling to the Ojibwe agency at Crow Wing to negotiate with Hole-in-the-Day.³²

The negotiations did not go well. Dole attempted to surround Hole-in-the-Day's party with his own troops and capture the war leader when he came to parley. Hole-in-the-Day anticipated the ploy, and stationed about 200 warriors around the meeting ground. Dole found himself "completely surrounded" and "out-generated by the wily Indian." Angered by the Commissioner's duplicity, for all he had apparently expected it, Hole-in-the-Day broke off the talks.³³

The warriors' fortunes continued to decline. Seizing the opportunity that the end of negotiations and consequent warrior demoralization offered, the Leech Lake civil leaders, "the old men," held "a Council unbeknown to Hole-in-the-Day" and tentatively arranged a separate peace.³⁴ Meanwhile, the Mississippi village civil leaders mobilized. A large delegation from Mille Lacs hastened to Crow Wing to declare their opposition to Hole-in-the-Day and their continued loyalty to the United States. They assured Dole that they had "condemned the movements of Hole-in-the-Day, in council, and told their young men, if any of them joined him, they should never be permitted to return to the band again." Significantly, it was Sha-bosh-kong, "the principal chief," who headed the delegation. In addition to the Mille Lacs party, "large numbers of the Sandy Lake and Cass Lakers" also journeyed to Crow Wing where "they cleared themselves from any complicity with Hole-in-the-day . . . and declared their friendship for the whites."³⁵

Other Mississippi village leaders, less confident of their abilities to sway their warriors from Hole-in-the-Day's cause than the Mille Lacs leadership, personally disassociated themselves from the Gull Lake resistance. Crossing-the-Sky, "the chief" of Rabbit Lake, warned Ottmar Cloeter, the lone Lutheran missionary and the Episcopalians' only competition in the field, "to leave at once." He explained that "a number of Indians had left headquarters at Gull Lake yesterday with the intention to kill" the missionary family, and volunteered "to hold them back until you are gone."³⁶ Bad Boy, "who opposed Hole-in-the-Day's action in council," fled Gull Lake when the warriors and their supporters from other villages began to gather. Acting in concert with Enmegahbowh, he warned settlers in the vicinity of the

agency of the impending trouble. Jointly, the civil leaders of Leech Lake and the Mississippi villages assured Euramericans that Hole-in-the-Day's supporters were a disreputable minority, "scalawags who listen to bad talks."³⁷

At this inauspicious moment, the warriors' allies, the fur traders and bicultural mixed-bloods, made their influence felt. Although Dole had talked with many civil leaders, he had been unable to re-open negotiations with the warriors, and on September 12, he left for Washington with the Ojibwe situation yet unresolved. Tensions still ran high in the state, for the Dakota remained active in southern Minnesota. In the wake of the Commissioner's departure, the Minnesota state legislature met in special session. The legislature, dominated by the wing of the Republican Party with which the fur traders were aligned, authorized a state commission to travel to Ojibwe country and try to effect a settlement with Hole-in-the-Day.³⁸

The men who composed this state commission are of special interest. One commissioner, Henry M. Rice, in 1862 a United States Senator, was a former fur trader. Of the four remaining commission members, three had clear ties to the traders and bicultural mixed-bloods. First was the governor of Minnesota, Alexander Ramsey, a long-time political supporter of the traders, who headed the commission. Second was David Cooper, a prominent judge who had begun his law career handling legal business for the bicultural Ojibwe mixed-bloods. The third commission member was Frederic Ayer, a former missionary to the Ojibwe who, in recent years, had run a private school where many of the mixed-bloods sent their children. Not surprisingly, the business interests of these men included the fur and provisioning trades, and they speculated heavily in land.³⁹

The commission arrived at the council ground on the 14th of September and only one day later, on the 15th, announced that a settlement had been reached. The state commission agreed to the warriors' demands for an investigation of annuity fraud and a new treaty to rectify problems encountered under earlier agreements. In return, the warriors agreed to disband and return to their home villages. The civil leaders were outraged and demanded that the warriors be punished for their raids. It was clear to them that Hole-in-the-Day's allies, his bicultural mixed-blooded relatives and the fur traders, had engineered the state negotiations. "The traders," Enmegahbowh observed, "have

been very busily engaged settling it in [their] own way." The Episcopal chaplain, E. G. Gear, concurred. "[T]he traders, who will loose their vocation, if not large sums of money if [Hole-in-the-Day] is punished," he wrote, "will endeavor to assist him out of this difficulty." As the civil leaders watched in frustration, the warriors and their allies maneuvered, turning a potential disaster into a victory.⁴⁰

The successful conclusion of the 1862 confrontation could only rebound to the warriors' credit. Their popularity soared. They had faced United States troops and emerged victorious on all counts. First, they had achieved an Ojibwe policy objective dating back seven years, to the ill-fated Treaty of 1855. They were promised a new treaty, which in fact was negotiated during the following winter of 1862-63. The civil leaders had been trying to win such a concession from the Federal government since 1855, always without success. Second, the warriors were able to substantiate their claims of concern for the well-being of their people on a more immediate level. The negotiators—both state and Federal—had authorized the issuance of substantial amounts of food and clothing to the Ojibwe, both as a gesture of good will and in the hope it would dissipate support for the warriors. The hard-pressed Ojibwe could not fail to notice that the United States' willingness to open the warehouse doors was directly linked to Ojibwe displays of armed strength. "We live high, plenty beef, flour and pork during the Hole-in-the-day trouble," they remarked to one another. Thirdly, and of course closely tied to this perception, the warriors had scored a major triumph for their strategy of armed resistance. Confrontation clearly got results. With the timely aid of their allies, the fur traders and bi-cultural mixed-bloods, the warriors had scored a triumph. From the warriors' perspective, their allies had performed just as desired. In exchange for this kind of support, the warriors were more than willing to advance their allies' interests at treaty councils.⁴¹

As this brief analysis indicates, the factional alignments that emerged among the Mississippi Ojibwe of the mid-nineteenth century were part of a deep-seated leadership rivalry in Ojibwe society. Although that rivalry was exacerbated by the pressures of contact, it was nonetheless firmly rooted in an aboriginal political context. In this manner, the Ojibwe example does indeed lend support to Metcalf's assertion that pre-contact issues continued to be important in the post-contact era. Yet the Ojibwe

case also allows an examination of the complexity of the issues that came to be embroiled in the dispute. It suggests that just as scholars are reconsidering the origins of factionalism, they should also re-examine the composition of the factions themselves.

Although Euramericans understood the two opposing Ojibwe groups as 'progressives' and 'traditionalists,' these terms are clearly inadequate. They do not reflect the Ojibwe's own perception of the problem. Both the warriors and the civil leaders pressed for some social changes and resisted others. The warriors remained committed to the traditional hunting-trapping economy but challenged the traditional political system. The civil leaders resisted the political changes the warriors sought, and tried to implement economic innovations that the warriors opposed. The warriors' ability to foster an alliance with other groups who shared their commitment to the hunting-trapping economy, bicultural mixed-bloods and the fur traders, the former in particular a group generally associated with 'progressive' factions, reinforces the inadequacy of the terms 'progressive' and 'traditional' for understanding Ojibwe factionalism. Both the civil leaders and the warriors saw themselves involved in a struggle to preserve Ojibwe autonomy in the face of the growing presence of the United States. Their means differed, but their end goal was the same.

The Ojibwe were not the first nor the only Native people to divide along the ancient civil leader/warrior cleavage. At the turn of the nineteenth century, for instance, the Shawnee in Ohio were grappling with a similar warrior challenge, spearheaded in that case by the brothers Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa.⁴² Like the Ojibwe, the Shawnee divided over tactics and means, not ends. The fact that many Native American peoples, under the pressures of contact, split along an already existing social division is of great significance. It suggests a new and profitable direction for studies of Berkhofer's "ubiquitous" problem of Native American political factionalism.

NOTES

1. Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., "The Political Context of a New Indian History," *Pacific Historical Review*: XL (August, 1971): 356-382: 374, 373.

2. Edward H. Spicer, *Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533-1960* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962), 492-493.

3. David H. Brugge, "Pueblo Factionalism and External Relations," *Ethnohistory* 16 (Spring, 1969): 191-200; 191; P. Richard Metcalf, "Inside the Hoop: A Study of Native American Politics," Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1974, and "Who Should Rule At Home? Native American Politics and Indian-White Relations," *Journal of American History* 61 (December, 1974): 651-65; James A. Clifton, "Factional Conflict and the American Indian Community; The Prairie Potawatomi Case," in Nancy Oestreich Lurie and Stuart Levine, eds., *The American Indian Today* (Deland, FL: Everett Edwards, 1968), 115-32; Nancy Oestreich Lurie in Introduction to *The American Indian Today*, 38; Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., *Salvation and the Savage; An Analysis of Protestant Missions and American Indian Response, 1787-1862* (New York: Atheneum Press, 1976), 125, 158-59, 134-43, and *passim*. The literature on factionalism is quite extensive. Studies include Edward P. Dozier, "Factionalism at Santa Clara," *Ethnology* 5 (April, 1966): 172-185; Florence Hawley Ellis, "An Outline of Laguna Pueblo History and Social Organization," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 15 (1959): 325-47; William N. Fenton, "Factionalism in American Indian Society," in *Actes du IVe Congres International des Sciences Anthropologiques et Ethnologiques II* (IV Vols. Wien, FGR: Verlag Adolf Holzhausens Nfg., 1955): 330-40 and "Factionalism at Taos Pueblo, New Mexico," Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology *Bulletin Number 164*. Anthropological Papers, Number 56 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1957); David French, "Factionalism at Isleta Pueblo." Monographs of the American Ethnological Society, Number 14 (New York: J. J. Augustin, 1948); Nancy Oestreich Lurie, "Two Dollars," in J. B. Watson and S. T. Kimball, eds., *Crossing Cultural Boundaries* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1972), 151-61; Bernard J. Siegel and Alan R. Beals, "Pervasive Factionalism," *American Anthropologist* 62 (June, 1960): 394-417 and "Conflict and Factional Dispute," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 90 (January-June, 1960): 107-17; Mischa Titiev, *Old Oraibi; A Study of the Hopi Indians of Third Mesa*. Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Volume 22 (Cambridge, MA: The Museum, 1944); Deward E. Walker, Jr., *Conflict and Schism in Nez Perce Acculturation; A Study of Religion and Politics* (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1968); Leslie A. White, *The Pueblo of Santa Ana, New Mexico*. American Anthropological Association Memoir Number 60 (Menasha, WI: George Banta Company, Inc., 1942) and William Whitman, "The San Ildefonso of New Mexico," in Ralph Linton, ed., *Acculturation in Seven American Indian Tribes* (New York: Appleton-Century Company, 1940).

4. All quotations from Metcalf, "Who Should Rule At Home," p. 653.

5. Harold Hickerson, *The Southwestern Chippewa: An Ethnohistorical Study*. American Anthropological Association Memoir 92 (Menasha, WI: George B. Banta Co., Inc., 1962), 36-38; 49-50.

6. Berkhofer's *Salvation and the Savage*, especially pp. 1-15, provides a classic discussion of Euramerican perceptions of the superiority of their society and how those perceptions influenced Euramerican efforts to Christianize and 'civilize' Native peoples.

7. Joseph A. Gilfillan to Henry B. Whipple, March 21, 1877, Henry Benjamin Whipple Papers, Box 13, Minnesota Historical Society [hereafter Whipple Papers, MHS]; Henry B. Whipple to "the Chiefs of the Chippewa [sic.] of White Earth Reservation," September 9, 1870, Whipple Papers, Box 42, Vol. 7, MHS;

Men e do waub, Ga ge bish, *et al.* to William McAvoy, July 11, 1856. Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81. National Archives Microfilm Publications, Record Group 75, Microcopy 234, Roll 151, 0099-102, 0101, 0100 [hereafter NAM Publications, RG 75, M234].

8. "Subject Files: Reminiscences, Emily J. West," p. 8, Protestant Episcopal Church, Diocese of Minnesota Papers, Box 13, MHS. [Hereafter PEC Papers.]

9. Edwin Clark to Dennis N. Cooley, October 28, 1865, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 154, 0170-71, 0171; Sela Goodrich Wright to Henry B. Whipple, August 19, 1868, Whipple Papers, Box 5, MHS. It should be noted here that the term 'mixed-blood' refers to a cultural orientation, and is not a genetic or racial categorization. Many people of genetically mixed ancestry were considered by themselves and others to be 'full-blooded' because culturally they lived as Ojibwe.

10. See the letters of E. G. Gear to Henry B. Whipple, September 14 and 16, 1862, Whipple Papers, Box 3, MHS, for an early assessment of the traders and their political allies, and Lewis Stowe to Henry B. Whipple, October 12, 1877, Whipple Papers, Box 12, MHS, for a later discussion of their continuing influence.

11. Cf. Article 3 of the Treaty of July 29, 1837, which awarded \$100,000 "to the half-breeds of the Chippewa nation;" Article 4 of the Treaty of August 2, 1847, which "stipulated that the half or mixed bloods . . . be allowed to participate in all annuities;" and Article 6 of the Treaty of February 22, 1855, which granted eighty-acre plots of land to "such of the mixed bloods as are heads of families, and now have actual residences and improvements in the ceded country." Quotes are from Charles J. Kappler, ed. and comp., *Indian Affairs; Laws and Treaties II* (2 Vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), 491-93, 492; 567-69, 68; 685-90, 689. For examples of the mixed-bloods' economic activities, see John S. Watrous to Alexander Ramsey, November 12, 1851, March 4, 1852 and May 1, 1855, Charles W. Borup to Luke Lea, November 4, 1852, Alexander Ramsey to Luke Lea, January 31, 1853, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 149, 0127, 0255, 0017, 0097, 0299; David B. Herriman to Willis A. Gorman, July 18, 1854; Willis A. Gorman to "the Commissioner of Indian Affairs" [George W. Manypenny], September 14, 1854, and the "Deposition of Joseph W. Lynde," March 10, 1855, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 150, 0105, 0109, 0207-09; "Receipt of George Bunga," "Receipt of Leon Bertrand," and "Receipt of Remi Marotte," 1870, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 159, 0051, 0052, 0054.

12. "Nor Chief Nor Myth: Indian Agent in 1865 Sheds Light on the Chippewa Controversy." Article in the St. Paul *Pioneer Press*, August 22, 1914, in "Moosomonee, Chippewa Chief, Biographical Data, 1873-1915," MHS; Kappler, *Indian Affairs; Laws and Treaties*, II, 491-93, 543-45, 567-69, 569-70, and 648-52.

13. Hickerson, *The Southwestern Chippewa*, 54, 52, 53.

14. *Ibid.*, 47, 53.

15. "Affidavit of J. Ross Brown," March 2, 1855, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 150, 0166-67, 0166. For the provisions of the Treaty of February 22, 1855, see Kappler, *Indian Affairs; Laws and Treaties*, II, 685-90. References to increased alcohol abuse include: Sherman Hall to Selah B. Treat, December 31, 1853, American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions Papers, Box 6,

MHS [Originals at the Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts]; John Johnson Enmegahbowh to Henry B. Whipple, November 29, 1862, Whipple Papers, Box 3, MHS; "The Chippeway Mission, 1854-62," by George C. Tanner. Un-numbered manuscript. PEC Papers, Box 22, MHS; Henry M. Rice to James W. Denver, July 2, 1857; George C. Whiting to George W. Manypenny, February 20, 1856, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 151, 0278, 0153. For evidence of renewed disease epidemics, see Willis A. Gorman to [George W. Manypenny], April 14, 1854, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 150, 0068-69; Dr. T. T. Mann to Willis A. Gorman, April 20, 1854; Dr. Jonathan Letherman to George W. Manypenny, May 10, 1854; William McAvoy to George W. Manypenny, June 4, 1855, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 150, 0089-92, 0032, 0246-47; William J. Cullen to James W. Denver, January 15, 1857; J. W. Lynde to William J. Cullen, January 1, 1859, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 152, 0081, 0087. Violent confrontations between Ojibwe and Euramerican are detailed in Willis A. Gorman to George W. Manypenny, July 6, 1854; R. McClelland to Charles E. Mix, July 13, 1855, Willis A. Gorman to George W. Manypenny, June 28, 1855, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 150, 0098, 0195, 0199-200. Civil leaders complained of annuities being withheld in Mah yah che wa we tong, Ke be dwa ge shick, *et al.* to "His Excellency the President of the United States, the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and the Commissioner for [sic] Indian Affairs," December 24, 1855 and Mah yah che wa we tong, Ke be twa ge shick, and Kah yah ge wa skung to "Our Father" [President Franklin Pierce?], December 26, 1855, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 150, 0325-30, 0331-34.

16. George C. Whiting to George W. Manypenny, February 20, 1856, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 151, 0147-152; 0158, 0159; James Lloyd Breck to William Chauncey Langdon, September 30, 1857, PEC Papers, Box 46, Vol. 42, MHS.

17. Letters protesting agency corruption and alleging annuities were withheld from people who attempted to reveal abuses include: Mah yah che wa we tong, Ke be dwa ge shick, *et al.* to "His Excellency the President of the United States, the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and the Commissioner for [sic] Indian Affairs," December 24, 1855, and Mah yah che wa we tong, Ke be twa ge shick, and Kah yah ge wa skung to "Our Father" [President Franklin Pierce?], December 26, 1855. In their letter of December 24, 1855, the civil leaders not only protested annuity fraud, but affirmed their willingness to testify at an upcoming investigation. The letters of Major G. W. Patten to Colonel S. Cooper, September 5, 1855, and of David B. Herriman to Major G. W. Patten, September 5, 1855 describe the kinds of physical harassment the civil leaders were subject to when they protested the state of agency affairs. All letters are to be found in NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 150, 0325-30; 0331-34; 0346; 0347-48.

18. Mah yah che wa we tong, Ke be dwa ge shick, *et al.* to "His Excellency the President of the United States, the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and the Commissioner for [sic] Indian Affairs," December 24, 1855, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 150, 0325-30, 0328; John Johnson Enmegahbowh to Cornelia Wright Whipple, January 1, 1862, Whipple Papers, Box 2, MHS.

19. All quotations from James Lloyd Breck to William Chauncey Langdon, September 30, 1857, PEC Papers, Box 46, Vol. 42, MHS.

20. *Ibid.*

21. Bad Boy to "the Bishop & clergy," June 8, 1860, Whipple Papers, Box 2; "Confirmations, St. Columba," March 11, 1860, Whipple Papers, Box 37, MHS. See Box 37, *passim*, for evidence Whitefisher did not convert.

22. James Lloyd Breck to William Chauncey Langdon, September 30, 1857, PEC Papers, Box 46, Vol. 42, MHS.

23. James Lloyd Breck to William Chauncey Langdon, September 30, 1857, PEC Papers, Box 46, Vol. 42, MHS; Bad Boy to "the Bishop & clergy," June 8, 1860, and John Johnson Enmegahbowh to Cornelia Wright Whipple, January 1, 1862, Whipple Papers, Box 2, MHS; Francis Huebschmann to James W. Denver, May 6, 1857, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 151, 0235-36, 236.

24. Indian agent David B. Herriman complained at length about the warriors breaking into government warehouses. See David B. Herriman to Willis A. Gorman, December 25, 1855, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 151, 0073. For a representative sample of claims by settlers, lumbermen and government surveyors, see "Claim of Dexter C. Payne vs. Chippewa Indians *Mill Lac Bands* [sic.] . . . , May 21st 1859," "Claim of Samuel C. Donnell against Pillager & Lake Winnebogoshish [sic.] Chippewa Indians, October 29th 1859," "Claim of Sheldon C. Moses vs. Mississippi bands Chippewas, [n.d.]," and Josiah P. Harrison vs. Chippewa Indians, [n.d.]," enclosed with the letter of William J. Cullen to William P. Dole, May 1, 1861, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 152, 0226-27, 0229-37, 0238-39, 0240-41; and George W. Jones to George W. Manypenny, February 4, 1856, "Affidavit of John Doyle," February 22, 1856, "Affidavit of James Elliott," November 3, 1855," November 3, 1855, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 151: 0045, 0048, 0050.

25. Hickerson, *The Southwestern Chippewa*, 54-57, provides information on the active warrior presence at Leech Lake. William Whipple Warren, "History of the Ojibways, Based Upon Traditions and Oral Statements," *Minnesota Historical Society Collections*, 5 (1885), 23-394; 256-59, discusses the Leech Lake warriors' frequent visibility in political affairs.

26. William Whipple Warren, "History of the Ojibways, Based Upon Traditions and Oral Statements," 47-49; Alfred Brunson, "Sketch of Hole-in-the-Day," *Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin*, 5 (1868), 387-99; Lyman C. Draper, "A Note on Hole-in-the-Day," in *Ibid.*, 401.

27. The warriors' hostility to missions is remarked upon in John Johnson Enmegahbowh to Henry B. Whipple, September 29, 1862, E. Steele Peake to Henry B. Whipple, September 19, 1862, Whipple Papers, Box 3, MHS; and in "Reminiscences of Gull Lake Mission," n.d., in "Subject Files: Peake, E. S. Notes." PEC Papers, Box 13, MHS. An earlier example of a confrontation between the warriors and the United States occurred in 1857. See William J. Cullen to James W. Denver, September 3, 1857; David B. Herriman to William J. Cullen, August 31, 1857; Solon G. Manney to E. G. Gear, August 20 and 23, 1857; and E. Steele Peake to Samuel Medary, August 21, 1857. NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 151, 0210, 0211, 0213-14, 0217-18, 0214-16.

28. Alexander Ramsey to William P. Dole, April 21, 1864, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 154, 0046; Hole-in-the-Day to "the Commissioner of Indian Affairs [A. B. Greenwood]," January 7, 1860, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 152, 0195-96.

29. Abby Fuller Abbe to Lizzie Fuller, September 14, 1862, Abby Abbe Fuller

[sic.] and Family Papers, Box 1, MHS [hereafter Fuller Papers]; E. G. Gear to Henry B. Whipple, August 27, 1862, Whipple Papers, Box 3, MHS. See William Watts Folwell, *A History of Minnesota* (IV Vols., St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1926), II, 109–301, for a historian's discussion of the "Sioux Uprising," and 374–82, for his account of the Ojibwe raids.

30. "Remarks and Reminiscences of Mrs. Abby Fuller Abbe on Hole-in-the-Day and the Sioux Outbreak, 1862," [1863], Fuller Papers, MHS; the Augustus Aspinwall Reminiscence, February 7, 1902 (hereafter Aspinwall Reminiscence). Copy at the Minnesota Historical Society; original owned by Mrs. Leonard W. Nelson, Spokane, Washington; E. G. Gear to Henry B. Whipple, September 11, 1862, Whipple Papers, Box 3, MHS.

31. John Johnson Enmegahbowh to Henry B. Whipple, September 29, 1862, John Johnson Enmegahbowh to James Lloyd Breck, October 3, 1862, Whipple Papers, Box 3, MHS; "Reminiscences of the Gull Lake Mission," n.d., in "Subject Files: Peake, E. S. Notes." PEC Papers, Box 13, MHS.

32. All quotations from the Aspinwall Reminiscence, February 7, 1902, MHS. Also see George W. Sweet, "Incidents of the Threatened Outbreak of Hole-in-the-Day and Other Ojibways at Time of the Sioux Massacre of 1862." *Minnesota Historical Society Collections* 6 (1894), 401–408, and Stephen P. Hall, "The Hole-in-the-Day Encounter," *Minnesota Archaeologist* 36 (1977): 77–96.

33. Sweet, "Incidents of the Threatened Outbreak of Hole-in-the-Day," 407. Also see Hall, "The Hole-in-the-Day Encounter"; E. G. Gear to Henry B. Whipple, August 27, 1862 and John Johnson Enmegahbowh to James Lloyd Breck, September 6, 1862, Whipple Papers, Box 3, MHS.

34. "Affidavit of Arthur Gardner," September 3, 1862, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 153, 031–02; Aspinwall Reminiscence, February 7, 1902, MHS.

35. E. G. Gear to Henry B. Whipple, September 5, 1862, E. Steele Peake to Henry B. Whipple, September 10, 1862, E. G. Gear to Henry B. Whipple, September 14, 1862, Whipple Papers, Box 3, MHS.

36. "An account of the flight of the Rev. Ottmar Cloeter and his family from Gabitaw'egama Mission Station to Fort Ripley during the Indian uprising in 1862," October 15, 1936, Ottmar Cloeter and Family Papers, MHS. [Hereafter Cloeter Papers]. Crossing-the-Sky or Crossing Sky is identified by name in Hall, "The Hole-in-the-Day Encounter," 87. Also see "Affidavit of O. Webber [sic.], Missionary at Rabbit Lake," September 1, 1862, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 153, 0297–98.

37. Hall, "The Hole-in-the-Day Encounter," 87; John Johnson Enmegahbowh to Henry B. Whipple, September 10, 1868, Whipple Papers, Box 5, MHS. See also "Remarks and Reminiscences of Mrs. Abby Fuller Abbe on Hole-in-the-Day and the Sioux Outbreak, 1862," [1863], Fuller Papers, MHS.

38. Folwell, *A History of Minnesota*, II, 374–83; Hall, "The Hole-in-the-Day Encounter," Aspinwall Reminiscence, February 7, 1902, MHS.

39. Folwell, *A History of Minnesota*, II, 378, identifies the above-named four men, plus a Major Edwin A. C. Hatch. For information on the political careers of Ramsey and Rice, and of Rice's earlier career as a fur trader, see the Alexander Ramsey and Family Papers, MHS, *passim*. and the Henry M. Rice and Family Papers, MHS, *passim*. Judge David Cooper's involvement with Ojibwe and mixed-blood legal affairs is documented in D. Cooper to Caleb B. Smith,

March 2, 1862, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 153, 0029. Also see the letter of Charles E. Mix to William P. Dole, June 6, 1863, in *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1862* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1864), 328. Frederic Ayer's lifework is described in Elizabeth Taylor Ayer to "Messrs Oakes and Russell," 1872, Elizabeth Taylor Ayer Papers, copies at the Minnesota Historical Society, originals owned by Emma R. Taylor, Avon, Illinois. Also see Alexander Ramsey *et al.* "to the Prudential Committee of the Am. B. C. F. Missions," February 6, 1852, ABCFM Papers, Box 6, MHS, for further information on Ayer's school.

40. John Johnson Enmegahbowh to James Lloyd Breck, September 6, 1862, and E. G. Gear to Henry B. Whipple, August 27, 1862, Whipple Papers, Box 3, MHS. For the civil leaders' protests, see John Johnson Enmegahbowh to Henry B. Whipple, August 25, 1862, Whipple Papers, Box 3, MHS; and Bad Boy and John Johnson Enmegahbowh to William P. Dole, October 15, 1862, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 153, 0025-26.

41. John Johnson Enmegahbowh to William P. Dole, October 15, 1862, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 153, 0025-26, 0025. Also see "Affidavit of Augustus Aspinwall," September 6, 1862, NAM Publications, RG 75, M234, Roll 153, 0306.

42. R. David Edmunds, *The Shawnee Prophet* (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).

