

UC Berkeley

Reports

Title

Transitioning to Peace: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes About Social Reconstruction and Justice in Northern Uganda

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4ch1z6zp>

Authors

Vinck, Patrick
Pham, Phuong N

Publication Date

2010-12-01

Peer reviewed

TRANSITIONING TO PEACE

A POPULATION-BASED
SURVEY ON ATTITUDES
ABOUT SOCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION AND
JUSTICE IN
NORTHERN UGANDA

DECEMBER 2010



HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER
University of California, Berkeley
School of Law

PHUONG PHAM
PATRICK VINCK

This survey was conducted by the Initiative for Vulnerable Populations, a project of UC Berkeley School of Law's Human Rights Center.

The **INITIATIVE FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS** conducts research in countries experiencing serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Using empirical research methods to give voice to survivors of mass violence, the Initiative aims to ensure that the needs of survivors are recognized and acted on by governments, UN agencies, and nongovernmental organizations.

The **HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER** promotes human rights and international justice worldwide and trains the next generation of human rights researchers and advocates. More information about our projects can be found at <http://hrc.berkeley.edu>.

This report was made possible by grants from the United States Agency for International Development's Northern Uganda Transitional Initiative, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and Humanity United. The information provided and views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of these funding agencies.

Other reports in this series include:

Vinck P, Pham PN (2010). *Building Peace, Seeking Justice: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Accountability and Social Reconstruction in the Central African Republic*. Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley.

Pham PN, Vinck P, Balthazard M, Hean S, Stover E (2009). *So We Will Never Forget: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia*. Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley.

Vinck P, Pham PN, Baldo S, Shigekane R (2008). *Living with Fear: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice and Social Reconstruction in Eastern Congo*. Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley; Payson Center for International Development, Tulane University; International Center for Transitional Justice, New York.

Pham PN, Vinck P, Stover E, Moss A, Wierda M (2007). *When the War Ends. A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice and Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda*. Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley; Payson Center for International Development, Tulane University; International Center for Transitional Justice, New York.

Pham PN, Vinck P, Wierda M, Stover E, di Giovanni A. (2005). *Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based Survey of Attitudes about Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda*. International Center for Transitional Justice and the Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley.

To download these and other reports, visit <http://hrc.berkeley.edu/publications.html>.

COVER ART BY AUSTIN MCKINLEY

TRANSITIONING TO PEACE

DECEMBER 2010

A POPULATION-BASED
SURVEY ON ATTITUDES
ABOUT SOCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION AND
JUSTICE IN
NORTHERN UGANDA

PHUONG PHAM
PATRICK VINCK

**HUMAN
RIGHTS
CENTER**
UNIVERSITY
OF
CALIFORNIA
BERKELEY

BerkeleyLaw
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary	1
Findings.....	2
Recommendations	4
Introduction	7
Background	8
The Study	11
Research Design and Sample	11
Research Instruments	12
Data Collection and Analysis.....	13
Limitations	14
Respondent Characteristics	15
Peace and Reconstruction	17
Transitioning to Peace.....	17
Definition and Means for Peace.....	17
Priorities and Livelihood.....	19
The Peace, Recovery and Development Plan.....	20
Security	21
Violence	21
Improving Security.....	22
Resettlement and Services.....	24
Resettlement.....	24
Health Services	26
Other Services	27
Post-War Disputes and Unity.....	27
Types of Disputes and Disputes Resolution.....	28
Disputes over Land	28
Domestic Violence	29
Former Combatants.....	30
Unity.....	31

Government and Elections	32
Contact and Perception of Authorities	32
Elections	34
Access to Information	35
The Road to Justice	39
Accountability and Justice	39
Accountability	39
Justice	40
International Criminal Court	41
Knowledge and Perception of the ICC.....	41
The Uganda International Criminal Court Act.....	44
Measures for Victims	44
Measures for Victims and Reparations	44
Truth-Seeking and Memorialization	46
Recommendations	47
Authors and Acknowledgement	49

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

DRAMATIC CHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN NORTHERN UGANDA since the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a notoriously brutal rebel group, withdrew its forces in 2005. The displacement camps that previously hosted up to 90 percent of the population, some for over a decade, have been dismantled and people have returned home. They are rebuilding their houses and cultivating their land. From a devastated and dangerous region with little or no economic activity, northern Uganda is beginning to revive. But recovery from decades of conflict takes time, commitment and resources. Much work remains to reach sustainable peace, to develop the economy and establish essential services. The needs and priorities of the people remain largely unknown. At the same time, the LRA has not disbanded. From its current base in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic, it continues to perpetrate serious human rights violations and remains a shadow over the region.

This report presents the results of a large-scale population-based survey about peace, justice, and social reconstruction in northern Uganda intended to capture community views on matters that affect ordinary people and the recovery after twenty years of conflicts. The survey was carried out between April and May 2010 in four districts (the Acholi districts) of northern Uganda: Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader. The findings are based on a total of 2,498 interviews with adults in various locations, including home villages, resettlement sites, and former camps. They provide results that are representative of the adult population in those four districts.

This is the third large-scale survey conducted in this region by the Initiative for Vulnerable Populations at the University of California, Berkeley's Human Rights Center. The previous surveys were conducted in 2005, while the war with the LRA continued, and in 2007 when peace negotiations were underway. This survey was designed to allow comparison with earlier surveys among the Acholi districts. It also responds to the post-conflict context by including more questions about development and reconstruction.

Interviews were conducted anonymously and confidentially, using a standardized questionnaire about respondents' demographic profiles, their current priorities, their access to services and information, their concerns about resettlement, and their views on social cohesion, security, violence, peace, justice and accountability. It is hoped that these findings will be of use not only to the Government of Uganda but also to development partners and institutions designing programs for the reconstruction of the region and addressing the crimes of the past.

Detailed results provided in the report reveal a picture of communities in a time of transition, optimistic about the future, concentrated on rebuilding their lives and renewing livelihood activities, and demanding more accountability from government. At the same time, people have not forgotten the war and are concerned about holding perpetrators (including government forces) accountable, reintegrating

combatants, and assisting victims. It also reveals that many of these close-knit communities in northern Uganda remain isolated, with little access to news and information (although this is somewhat improved from 2007), little engagement in government programs that affect them, and little contact with authorities or communities outside of their locales.

Findings

Specific highlights of the findings are as follows:

- ***Security:*** Security in the Acholi districts has improved dramatically since 2007. Incidence of violence is low. Respondents, perceiving this improvement in security, are now moving around freely and no longer fear abduction or ambush. Four out of five respondents reported feeling “safe” or “very safe” when walking at night (80%), going to the nearest village (88%), sleeping at night (89%), or going to work, collecting water, or firewood (90%).
- ***Livelihood:*** Although security has improved, people in the region continue to face numerous challenges, particularly those returning from displacement camps. Some of the socio-economic indicators show little or no change since the 2007 survey. The average cash income was estimated at 7,700 Ugandan Shillings (approximately US\$ 3.50) in the week prior to the survey, similar to the average income reported in 2007.
- ***Basic needs:*** Respondents’ priorities have shifted from peace and security (in 2007) toward sustenance and fulfillment of basic needs, such as food (28%), agriculture (including access to land and inputs such as seeds or fertilizers - 19%), education (15%), and healthcare (13%). Basic services in return areas are lacking and the majority of respondents had negative perceptions of access to health care services, water, food or education. The difficulty in accessing such services threatens returnees’ ability to rebuild their communities fully.
- ***Disputes:*** One in five respondents (20%) indicated having experienced a dispute within the six months prior to completing the survey. Disputes over land were found to be both the most common (63% of all disputes), and the most intractable: Less than half of the disputes over land (48%) had been resolved by the time of the survey, compared to over 75 percent of other disputes. Other common sources of dispute included theft of goods or food (16%), and domestic disputes (16%). The village local council (LC1) was reported to have resolved most disputes (83%), and 81 percent said they would call on the LC1 if they experienced theft or threats of violence.
- ***Performances of the national government:*** A majority of the population judged positively (well or very well) the government’s performance in improving security, including reducing crime (64%), protecting human rights (65%), and maintaining peace (79%). However, few judged positively the government’s record on social issues: just one third said the government was handling “well” or “very well” the fight against corruption (30%), uniting the south and north of Uganda (30%), increasing employment (32%), reducing poverty (35%), or involving the

population in decisions (36%). Some of the respondents also considered uniting the country and reducing poverty as necessary to ensure that peace lasts. Less than half of respondents said the government performed well on providing social services (45%), or ensuring free elections (47%). Another 47 percent felt the central government delivers services inappropriately, and 39 percent that it was unlikely the government would respond if they reported their needs; inversely 33 percent said the government was likely to respond to their needs.

- **Local government:** Regarding local government, a majority of respondents felt local authorities were neither helping families in need (72%), nor helping build infrastructure (70%). However, most also said local officials helped provide security and fight crime (72%), and solved conflicts and disputes (78%).
- **Elections:** Most respondents (93%) planned to vote in the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2011. Almost all (96%) believed their vote would matter, mainly because, in their words, “every vote counts.” One third (32%), however, did not believe the 2006 presidential elections were free and fair.
- **Accountability:** In respect to dealing with crimes committed during the conflict between the LRA and the Ugandan government, most respondents (84%) saw accountability as important, and more than two-thirds said the government should be among those held accountable for the violence. Regarding LRA members responsible for the violence, respondents most frequently said they should be persuaded to “come out of the bush” (24%), and that they should be pardoned and/or given amnesty (23%). At the same time, one in three respondents wanted to see them either arrested and put on trial (16%) or captured (13%).
- **Formal justice system:** When asked about the national formal justice system, one in three respondents (33%) said it was corrupt. However, 24 percent viewed it as working well. Another 19 percent gave no opinion, (possibly because they were among those who said they did not know anything about it). Finally, 11 percent said that the formal justice system was for the rich and educated. Just one in four (24%) viewed the system as good or very good.
- **Transitional Justice Mechanisms:** When given the option of four transitional justice mechanisms, namely amnesty for perpetrators, prosecution of perpetrators (trials), a truth commission, or traditional ceremonies, the highest percentage of respondents favored peace with amnesty (45%) over peace with a truth-seeking mechanism (32%), peace with trials (15%), and peace with traditional ceremonies (8%). When given options only for the preferred method of prosecuting the perpetrators, the highest proportion favored trials held in Uganda by Ugandan courts (35%) over trials abroad by an international court (28%), trials in Uganda by an international court (22%), or no trials at all (15%). Results for both questions are consistent with the 2007 findings.
- **Traditional Justice Mechanisms:** While few respondents chose traditional ceremonies over amnesty, truth seeking or trials when forced to choose between transitional justice mechanisms, about half the respondents (53%) viewed such mechanisms as useful to deal with the LRA combatants and ex-combatants. A majority of respondents said such ceremonies helped the

community reconcile (39%) and forgive the wrongdoer (25%). However one in three (31%) said they did not change anything.

- **Truth-seeking:** Respondents highly value truth-seeking. In order to ensure that future generations remember what happened, a majority of respondents proposed that books be written (42%), children be educated (26%), and monuments built (13%) to commemorate the victims of the conflict.
- **Reparations:** Almost all respondents (97%) said reparations should be granted to victims, usually because, according to the respondents, they are poor and need it (49%), but also as a form of acknowledgement or recognition of their suffering (24%) and to help them forget (19%). In addition, respondents said most frequently that reparations should be given individually (46%), while 32 percent said they should be given at the community level, and 20 percent said reparations should be given both individually and at the community level.
- **International Criminal Court:** Just 59 percent of the population in the Acholi sub-region had heard of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and only 6 percent ranked their knowledge of the Court as being good or very good. Among those who had heard about the court, 36 percent believed it had had an impact (negative and/or positive), most citing it had helped chase the LRA away (38%) and that it contributed to physical security (30%). Seven percent said it brought attention to the conflict, while 6 percent said it hindered the peace process. A follow-up question showed that many respondents believed the ICC had helped the general situation in northern Uganda (43%), but many also felt it had no effect (40%) or that the Court had hindered the situation (10%).

Recommendations

The report discusses the above results in great detail and also includes findings on violence, access to information and media consumption, and perception of ex-combatants. Based on these findings, the following steps are recommended to the government of Uganda and the international community:

1. **Reconstruction and development:** Continue to incorporate the changing priorities expressed by survey respondents into a multipronged strategy that promotes peace-building, socioeconomic development, justice, and poverty-reduction in the north. Additional efforts must be undertaken to provide essential services, including rehabilitating and building new schools and health centers closer to communities. Increase awareness of these programs through systematic and strategic outreach and communication activities. The population must become more involved in the recovery effort and the development and implementation of recovery efforts.
2. **Reparations:** Develop a reparation program that is financially realistic and addresses the needs of survivors. Such a program must be perceived as a form of reparation rather than another assistance project. While memorials may have a role to play, they may not be desired by all survivors. Ownership and participation in reparation efforts must be promoted.

3. **National dialogue:** Hold a national dialogue about the root causes, the dynamics and the effects of the conflict in northern Uganda. The dialogue should also aim at improving understanding and communication among all regions of Uganda. Such a program could include promoting regional travel and exchanges.
4. **Regional security:** Continue efforts to reestablish a sense of security for communities, including fostering a regional approach to cross-border security threats such as the LRA. Ensure that government forces continue to protect civilians' rights and physical integrity. Strengthen existing collaboration with the Congolese and Central African governments to apprehend Joseph Kony and his commanders.
5. **Leadership:** Build the capacity of local authorities such as the village leader (LC1) and elders to resolve local disputes. Establish a mechanism for the LC1 to refer complex cases, such as land disputes, to the parish level and / or other avenue.
6. **Police and justice:** Develop a criminal justice and civilian police system in northern Uganda that is responsive to community needs. In addition, ensure that women are represented in this system and that specific units for dealing with vulnerable victims, such as former abductees, women and children who have been victims of gender-based violence, are created.
7. **ICC outreach:** Reevaluate the ICC outreach strategy for northern Uganda, noting that awareness of and knowledge about the institution remain relatively low. This may be due in part to the fact that, so far, the warrants of arrest have not been executed. The ICC should develop a strategy to manage expectations and explain the process of arresting the LRA until they are apprehended.
8. **Elections:** Ensure that the upcoming 2011 Presidential election is free and fair and without violence. It is important to establish a plan for independent monitoring of the election campaign and the ballot count, and to allow opposition leaders to campaign freely without interference. The government must be perceived as legitimate in order for its recovery efforts to be successful.

INTRODUCTION

AFTER MORE THAN 20 YEARS OF WAR between the government and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), dramatic changes have taken place in the war-devastated northern part of Uganda. In late 2005, the LRA withdrew from Uganda, and signed, in 2006, a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement with the Ugandan government. The squalid displacement camps, which previously housed up to 90 percent of the population of northern Uganda, have been dismantled. Hundreds of thousands have returned to their villages or found new settlement sites and have started rebuilding houses and cultivating their land.

The peace remains uneasy – an absence of violence with no resolution to the conflict that led to the killings, mutilations and abductions of tens of thousands of children and adults. The LRA did not agree to a final peace agreement, and talks collapsed in April 2008. The LRA thus remains active and continues to perpetrate massive human rights violations from its new base in Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).¹ But it has not sought to return to northern Uganda.

In this context, recovery from decades of conflict is challenging. Much remains to be done to promote sustainable peace, social reconstruction, and development in northern Uganda. This report presents the results of a survey designed to improve understanding of the needs, views and priorities of northern Ugandans during this time of transition to peace and security. It provides results that are representative of the adult population in four districts: Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum and Pader.

The survey was conducted in April and May of 2010. The authors conducted similar surveys in northern Uganda in 2005 and 2007.² For comparison purposes, the methodology and objectives of the study are similar to the previous two studies in northern Uganda as well as to other Initiative for Vulnerable Populations studies conducted in Cambodia, the DRC, and the Central African Republic (CAR). However, the questionnaire and methodology of this survey also reflect the specific situation and concerns prevailing in northern Uganda in spring 2010. The research findings are aimed at supporting nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), government and international agencies, and local and international courts in promoting reconstruction and development for the Acholi people. The United States Agency for International Development's Northern Uganda Transition Initiative (USAID's NUTI) provided support for the survey, as did the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and Humanity United.

¹ See for example Human Rights Watch (2010). *Trail of Death*

² Pham PN, Vinck P, Stover E, Moss A, Wierda M (2007). *When the War Ends. A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice and Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda*. Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley; Payson Center for International Development, Tulane University; International Center for Transitional Justice, New York.

Pham PN, Vinck P, Wierda M, Stover E, di Giovanni A (2005). *Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based Survey of Attitudes about Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda*. International Center for Transitional Justice and the Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley.

BACKGROUND

SINCE 1987, THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA), a violent rebel group, has been fighting the Ugandan government in the northern part of the country.³ This uprising resulted from the longstanding political divide between the north and south of Uganda, and was a direct response to President Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) and its efforts to consolidate control over the northern part of the country.⁴ An earlier insurgency, Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement, had garnered popular support in the north, but was defeated in 1987.⁵ The LRA then emerged, headed by Joseph Kony, a former commander in the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) with little formal education. Kony saw himself as a messenger of God and a liberator of the Acholi people. He had his own belief system and set of rituals, drawn from a mixture of Christianity, Islam, and animist traditions.

Joseph Kony, however, failed to garner popular support and was rejected by the population and local leaders.⁶ Kony increasingly turned against the civilians, accusing them of aiding the government in seeking his defeat. The conflict in northern Uganda escalated and resulted in large-scale killings, mutilations, abductions, and massive displacement.⁷ Civilians also suffered abuses committed by the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), the national army charged with protecting them.⁸

Several attempts have been made to end the conflict, either militarily or through dialogue. Military actions such as Operation North in 1991, and Operations Iron Fist I and II in 2002 and 2004 failed to weaken the LRA significantly. Each time the LRA managed to escape and regroup, responding to the military operations by carrying out massive attacks on civilians. By 2002 the LRA had spread the conflict east into the non-Acholi districts of Lira and Soroti, claiming large numbers of victims in these areas. Various peace talks with the LRA also failed, allowing the LRA to regroup and launch attacks.

³ The following is a summary and update of the background to the conflict in northern Uganda. Additional details are provided in a previous reports. Pham PN et al. (2007) at n2

⁴ Under colonial rule, the northern ethnic groups dominated the military while the southern groups dominated the administration. This division continued in post-colonial history, fueling a series of conflicts. See Horowitz D (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press

⁵ The LRA was originally called the Holy Spirit Movement II, but was later renamed—first as the Lord’s Salvation Army, then as the United Christian Democratic Army, and finally to its present name in 1992. Doom R and, Vlassenroot K, Kony’s message: A new Koine? The Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda, *African Affairs* 98 (1999), 22.

⁶ *ibid*, p23.

⁷ The violence and the Government’s response to the rebellion forced the majority of the population into camps for internally displaced persons (IDP), where they were subjected to extremely poor humanitarian conditions. Refugee Law Project (2004). *Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda*. Working Paper No. 11, Kampala: Refugee Law Project, Faculty of Law, Makerere University.

⁸ See the Report of the Secretary General on internally displaced persons, Francis M. Deng, Addendum, Profiles in Displacement: Mission to Uganda, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/77/Add.1 (3 March 2004).

In 2006, the Ugandan government and the LRA began a new round of negotiations, known as the Juba peace talks, mediated by the President of South Sudan, Riek Machar. The LRA declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities and, within a month, representatives of the Government of Uganda and the LRA signed a formal Cessation of Hostilities Agreement as a first step toward a mediated settlement.⁹ South Sudan had been a traditional base for the LRA, with support from Khartoum, and it is possible that political changes in Sudan (i.e., the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan) prompted the LRA to enter the negotiations. It is also possible that the LRA entered the negotiations to avoid criminal prosecution by the newly established International Criminal Court (ICC).¹⁰

The new peace talks offered the first significant prospect for peace. The LRA withdrew its forces from northern Uganda, assembling in Garamba National Park in the DRC. With the guidance of the mediation team, the parties created a five-item agenda: (1) Cessation of Hostilities; (2) Comprehensive Solutions to the Conflict; (3) Accountability and Reconciliation; (4) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; and (5) Formal Ceasefire. The government conducted a large-scale public consultation about measures for justice and reconciliation, but after several crises with walk-outs by the LRA, the peace process ultimately collapsed.

In response to Kony's refusal to sign the final peace agreement, the Ugandan government, together with the United Nations, the governments of Sudan and the DRC, supported by the U.S. government, undertook a joint military operation against the LRA. Operation Lightning Thunder, with significant support from the U.S. government, sought to neutralize the LRA leadership from Garamba National Park, in eastern DRC, and dislodged the LRA in December 2008.¹¹ Once again the LRA evaded the attack and regrouped but now the conflict had become regional, with the LRA operating mainly in the DRC and the CAR.

The ICC arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and his commanders remain to be executed and the involvement of the Court has been controversial.¹² Critics have pointed to the lack of prosecution of government actors as a sign of partiality, and argue that the ICC arrest warrants threatened the peace process. Conversely, supporters of the ICC's intervention have argued it has put renewed focus on the conflict, that the arrest warrants have placed pressure on the LRA to seek a negotiated settlement, and that the involvement of the ICC has created incentives for an agreement that includes accountability measures. At the same time, the Ugandan Parliament passed the International Criminal Court Act on March 9, 2010, to make provision in Uganda's law for the punishment of the international crimes covered by the Rome Statute: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.¹³

⁹ For background on the Juba Peace Process, see International Crisis Group report No. 124, *Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace* (26 April 2007).

¹⁰ In January 2004, President Museveni referred the situation in northern Uganda to the ICC at a joint press conference with Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo in London, and in July 2004 the ICC formally opened an investigation. In October 2005, the Pre-Trial Chamber unsealed arrest warrants against LRA commanders Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Dominic Ongwen, Raska Lukwiya, and Okot Odhiambo.

¹¹ Human Rights Watch (2009). *The Christmas Massacres*

¹² For an in-depth study on the issue, see Allen T (2006). *Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army*. London: Zed Books.

¹³ Because of the date of the signing of the bill, the International Criminal Court Act only goes into effect June 25, 2010, and is prospective. Thus, the Ugandan prosecutors cannot retrospectively charge individuals for alleged crimes committed before the entry-into-force date of June 25, 2010. Experts still believe there will be local trials for individuals involved in crimes committed in northern Uganda, but the legal basis as to date is still unclear.

For now, the LRA continues its operations outside of Uganda. The Ugandan army is conducting joint operations in both DRC and CAR, and on May 13, 2010, the U.S. Congress passed the “Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act” which will fund efforts to apprehend the LRA leadership and provide humanitarian assistance to affected communities for a six-month period. However, in the same way it responded to previous military operations, the LRA is now taking revenge on the population, killing and abducting civilians. Thousands, mainly in DRC and CAR, have been killed, and, at a minimum, several hundred abducted.¹⁴ Northern Ugandans know too well the type of violence their neighbors now experience. But the LRA has withdrawn from northern Uganda and, for the first time in decades, the population enjoys peace, or at least the absence of violence. Civilians have resumed their lives. At the time of the survey, about 81,000 people (or 8% of the population) remained in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Acholi districts while about 920,000 had returned home.¹⁵

¹⁴ Human Rights Watch (2010) at n1

¹⁵ Computed from UNHCR’s April 2010 population movement matrix.

THE STUDY

THIS REPORT IS BASED ON A SURVEY of adult residents in four administrative Acholi districts in northern Uganda: Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader.¹⁶ The survey was designed to evaluate the needs, views and priorities of northern Ugandans during this period of transition to peace and security. The specific objectives were to:

- Identify and measure changes in overall priorities, exposure to violence, and sense of security among the population of northern Uganda;
- Capture attitudes about peace and plans for social reconstruction and recovery, including access to services, resettlement plans and the resolution of disputes emerging from the transition;
- Capture attitudes and opinions about specific transitional justice mechanisms and, more generally, access to justice; and
- Evaluate reconstruction interventions implemented to date.

Research Design and Sample

The Acholi districts in northern Uganda have been the most affected by the violence, although civilians in neighboring districts were also affected. Thus in the 2005 and 2007 surveys, representative data were also collected for the neighboring districts of Oyam, Lira, Amuria, and Soroti. In 2010, however, the scope and resources for the survey necessitated limiting geographic coverage. Specifically, the survey included a component to examine differences between areas for which USAID's Northern Uganda Transition Initiative (NUTI) program provided support, and areas with no support, requiring a larger sample size per stratum. Budget and time constraints meant that areas outside of the Acholi districts could not be included in the survey while maintaining the same level of detail. The present report focuses on the Acholi districts level analysis. Comparison with earlier surveys are made for the Acholi districts only.

Within each district, two strata were created depending on NUTI's intervention sites. NUTI has programs in four sub-counties in Amuru District (Attiak, Pabbo, Alero, and Purongo), two sub-counties in

¹⁶ Since 2005 and the first northern Uganda survey conducted by the authors, districts have evolved. The original district of Gulu was divided into the districts of Amuru and Gulu. In July 2009, Lamwo district was carved out of Kitgum district. For the present survey, Gulu and Amuru were treated as separate strata. The more recent division of Lamwo and Kitgum districts was not taken into account in order to reflect the 2007 survey design. Both districts are considered as one stratum – the former district of Kitgum. Since the completion of the survey, Amuru district is now split into Amuru and Nwoya districts and Pader into Pader and Agago districts.

Gulu District (Odek and Awach), three sub-counties in Kitgum (Agoro, Kitgum Matidi, and Namokora), and one sub-county in Pader District (Lira Palwo). NUTI selected these 10 sub-counties based on the political situation, community need, and strategic advantage for success. In each of the 10 sub-counties, we randomly selected six populated places; for the sub-counties where NUTI does not operate, we randomly selected a total of 22 populated places.¹⁷ The selection of populated places was made randomly, using a systematic procedure. Because existing population figures were unreliable at the populated place level, population size was assessed during the survey.

Within villages, interviewers were assigned to zones where they selected every other household in a randomly chosen direction, starting from the center of the zone. In each household (defined as a group of people normally sleeping under the same roof and eating together), interviewers randomly selected one adult to be interviewed from a list of all eligible adults. Three attempts were made to contact a household or individual before replacing them with another.

A total of 148 sites were selected. At these sites, 2,600 households were approached for interviews, and 2,498 agreed to participate (96% participation rate). Within these 2,498 households, a total of 2,525 individuals were approached, and 2,498 participated in the interview (99% participation rate, with one individual selected per participating household). The final sample size is therefore 2,498 individuals.

Both the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology reviewed and approved the study protocol. Approval to conduct interviews was also obtained from local authorities at each survey site. Oral informed consent was obtained for each selected participant; neither monetary nor material incentives were offered for participation.

Research Instruments

Interviews were conducted using a standardized semi-structured questionnaire covering (1) respondents' demographics, (2) priorities and services, (3) access to information, (4) resettlement, social cohesion and community relations, (5) health, (6) security and conflict resolution, (7) domestic violence, (8) peace, (9) justice and accountability, (10) the International Criminal Court, (11) non-judicial measures for victims and reparations, (12) exposure to violence, and (13) psychological impact of the conflicts. The questionnaire was developed by a team with expertise in this type of research after consultation with local experts. Response options based on pilot interviews were provided to the interviewer for coding but were not read to study participants with the exception of questions employing a scaling format (e.g., Likert scale). An open-ended field was always available to record complete responses. The questionnaire and consent documents were first developed in English and then translated into Acholi, the primary local language spoken throughout the four selected districts. An independent back-translation and pilot surveys were used to finalize and validate the instruments.

¹⁷ Populated places include villages, urban neighborhoods, new resettlement sites, and former camps.

Once the questionnaire was finalized, it was programmed into a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) using KoBo, our custom data collection package.¹⁸ The use of PDAs allows enumerators to enter the data directly as they conduct interviews. The forms contain a built-in verification system that reduces the risk of skipping questions or entering erroneous values, resulting in higher quality of data. Daily synchronization with a central computer allows the lead researchers to check data for consistency and outliers during data collection.

FIGURE 1: PDA AND SOLAR CHARGERS



Data Collection and Analysis

Data collection took place over six weeks during April and May 2010. Four teams of four men and four women (a total of 32 interviewers), implemented the study under the guidance of the lead researchers and four field supervisors. The interviewers were university students or professionals with research experience. Prior to collecting the data they participated in a seven-day training workshop that explained the objectives and content of the study, survey and interview techniques, use of the PDA, troubleshooting, and solving technical problems.¹⁹ The training included mock interviews and pilot-testing with randomly selected individuals at non-sampled sites.

At the survey sites each interviewer was expected to conduct four interviews per day, each lasting an average of one hour and ten minutes. One-on-one interviews were conducted anonymously in a confidential setting. Due to the sensitivity of some questions, the interviewers were assigned to same-sex respondents. Upon selection of study participants, oral rather than written informed consent was obtained because of the high illiteracy rate in northern Uganda. After data collection, the data were imported for analysis with the Stata version 11. All results presented here accounted for the complex sampling methodology and weight factors.

¹⁸ Since 2007, the Human Rights Center has been developing KoBo, a set of tools to facilitate electronic data collection based on Open Data Kit. The tool was first piloted in northern Uganda and bears the Acholi name, KoBo, which means “transfer” in the local language.

¹⁹ The PDAs are designed to be used by interviewers with little or no computer experience.

Limitations

Several limitations are inherent to the method and context of this study. The sample was designed to be representative of the districts under study, not the whole of northern Uganda, since only the Acholi districts were included in the survey. In addition, the researchers had no control over NUTI's selection of intervention sites because the programs were implemented prior to the researchers' involvement in the project. Hence, a randomized control study in which intervention and control would be randomly assigned could not be implemented. Thus the existence and effect of confounding factors are uncertain. Some villages, households, and individuals had to be replaced, and it is unknown how the individuals replaced might have differed from those interviewed. In addition, it is possible that responses were influenced by inaccurate recall, social desirability, and concerns over safety in areas affected by armed conflict.


Comparisons with results from the 2005 and 2007 are possible at the district population level for the Acholi population. In 2005, however, Pader was not surveyed. In addition, it is possible that population movements across districts affect the comparison. However, most of the population was generally displaced within their district of origin.

The training, use of a consent form, anonymous interviews, confidentiality, supervision, and quality control were all designed to reduce biases and errors. Constructs and terminology used for this study were not defined or explained to the participants, to avoid influencing them. As a result, they were free to interpret those concepts based on their own understanding. To address this limitation, we asked respondents to define key concepts (e.g., peace, justice), and throughout the questionnaire, we carefully chose phrasing and translation that would avoid misunderstanding.

RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS

FOR THE 2010 NORTHERN UGANDA SURVEY, a total of 2,498 interviews were conducted in a total of 154 villages distributed throughout the four districts.

FIGURE 2: SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION



The dark marks show the distribution of the sample

The sample comprised an equal proportion of men and women. Only adults above the age of 18 years were selected for interview. The average age of respondents was 39 years, and 60 percent of respondents self-identified as the head of the household. Most respondents were in a marital or partner relationship (76%). The average household had 6.6 members. Reflecting the ethnic profile of the selected districts, 94 percent of respondents identified their ethnicity as Acholi.

The respondents' average levels of education and literacy were lower than the Ugandan national average. While nationally the ability to read and write (literacy) is estimated at 67 percent of the population aged 15 or above, our survey suggests a figure of 53 percent in the selected districts of northern Uganda. This is consistent with the 2007 findings. One third (35%) of the respondents reported

having no formal education and 40 percent had some, but incomplete, primary education. Less than 4 percent of respondents had completed secondary education or above.

The average household cash income was estimated at 7,700 Ugandan Shillings (approximately US\$ 3.50) in the week prior to taking the survey. However, cash income can vary over time, and households may depend on non-cash resources, such as their own agricultural production, to support their livelihood. We therefore also included a measure of asset ownership to estimate poverty.²⁰ The results suggest that respondents in Gulu District are, on average, better off than those in the other districts. Average asset ownership was lowest in Amuru, but the average income was the second highest. The average income was lowest in Pader, followed by Kitgum.

TABLE 1: RESPONDENT SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, 2010 SURVEY

		Gulu	Amuru	Kitgum	Pader	Total
	Sex (% women)	50.3	51.7	49.6	49.7	50.3
	Age (average)	39.1	37.9	39.0	38.6	38.6
Matrimonial status	Married, partner	69.4	75.6	77.3	79.3	76.0
	Single, never married	11.4	6.5	5.2	7.5	7.4
	Divorced	5.7	7.3	6.2	2.2	5.1
	Widowed	13.6	10.4	11.0	11.0	11.4
Education level	None (%)	23.8	34.9	39.1	37.0	35
	Primary incomplete (%)	44.0	39.6	33.9	42.4	40
	Primary complete (%)	12.3	11.1	11.7	6.4	10.0
	Vocational (%)	3.1	0.9	3.2	4.6	3.1
	Secondary incomplete (%)	11.3	7.2	9.5	7.4	8.6
	Secondary complete or above (%)	5.5	6.2	2.5	2.2	3.9
Literacy	Read/write (% yes)	59.4	48.7	51.8	52.8	52.8
Ethnicity	Acholi (%)	89.1	97.8	99.4	89.5	93.9
Poverty	Average income last 7 days*	13,105	9,642	6,503	4,043	7,716
	Average income per week*	23,157	16,935	10,976	6,442	13,259
	Poorest asset quintile (%)	14	27	22	17	20
	Average number of assets	3.9	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.1

* In Ugandan Shillings. At the time of survey, 1 US dollar was traded for about 2000 Ugandan Shillings.

²⁰ We assessed ownership of 8 items, with a resulting score ranging from 0 (no items owned) to 8 (all items owned). Asset poor are defined here as the households among the lowest quintile of asset ownership. Note that the definition is useful for comparison across districts, but it does not allow for comparison with other studies or countries because the set of assets may vary.

PEACE AND RECONSTRUCTION


BUILDING A LASTING PEACE is a challenging task. First and foremost, it requires a guarantee of security and protection from violence and political instability. Without a minimum level of security, civilians cannot return to their homes, work or tend to their fields, or move freely to access essential services. However, a lasting peace is more than the absence of violence. It is also an ability to build a life; civilians must have homes they can return to or places where to resettle. They must be able to resume their livelihood activities, which means the ability to access land in the primarily agricultural Acholi districts. People must also learn to live with former combatants and find new, peaceful ways to resolve conflicts. In this section, we discuss survey findings about the peace and the improvement in security resulting from the shift in the conflict since 2005. We explore people’s views about ways to build a lasting peace, as well as to improve security. Experiences with and perceptions of several contributing factors to peace-building, including dispute-resolution mechanisms, provision of services, and rebuilding confidence in institutions, are also explored.

Transitioning to Peace

Definition and Means for Peace

While northern Uganda experienced a decline in violence related to the conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army in recent years, this absence of violence does not mean the community either perceives peace exists or believes that the current peace will last. While many respondents to this survey in fact did believe there is peace in northern Uganda (85%), less than half believed the situation to be permanent (44%), while about the same percentage (40%) believed it to be only temporary.


FIGURE 3: PEACE



Those who stated that they did not believe peace existed currently most frequently explained their response by stating that the LRA still exists (45%), and they fear the LRA may return (45%). Nevertheless, respondents generally were optimistic that lasting peace was possible. Eighty-two percent of the survey population believed it is possible for all the people of northern Uganda to live together in peace. Slightly fewer (74%) believed all people in Uganda could live together in peace.

A series of questions then sought to clarify respondents' understanding of "peace" and how they believe it can be achieved. Most associated peace with freedom (73%), the absence of violence (38%), no longer living in fear (38%), and no longer worrying about abduction (24%). Fewer respondents defined peace in terms of development (18%) or reconciliation (14%). However, when asked what was needed to achieve lasting peace, respondents' answers went beyond providing security, to include also socio-economic development, political reconciliation, and accountability for past crimes. Respondents proposed most frequently a need to unite the people of Uganda (32%), provide social services to the community (31%), reduce poverty (28%), pardon the LRA leader (18%), unite political leaders (16%), educate the youth (16%), compensate victims (15%), hold peace talks (12%), and hold accountable those responsible for the violence (12%). (Several answers could be recorded for each respondent.)


FIGURE 4: DEFINITION AND MEANS TO ACHIEVE PEACE*



* Due to the range of responses, only those provided by at least 10 percent of respondents are presented.

Respondents were asked specifically what both the district and national levels of government should do to ensure peace in northern Uganda. The responses were similar to the general suggestions given above, although respondents emphasized more frequently the need for social services such as health and education, and the need to reduce poverty. They directed these suggestions particularly to the central government.

FIGURE 5: WHAT SHOULD THE DISTRICT AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DO TO ACHIEVE PEACE?



Priorities and Livelihood


The 2010 study reveals that as the dynamic of the conflict has shifted from violence to physical peace and recovery, respondents' priorities have changed. In 2005 and 2007, peace, security, and returning home were among respondents' top priorities. In 2010, although respondents recognized the need for social reconstruction (e.g., building unity) and holding perpetrators accountable, they prioritized fulfillment of basic needs and provision of services higher. This is understandable given that as security has improved, people have started to return and resettle. Priorities in order of importance to respondents were food (28%), agriculture, including access to land and seeds (19%), education (15%), and health services (13%). Food, the highest ranked priority, was most frequently mentioned in Kitgum and Pader. This likely reflects higher levels of food insecurity in parts of eastern Kitgum and Pader districts where inadequate 2009 rainfall limited household cultivation, resulting in low harvests.²¹

We also asked respondents if the government should give higher priority to any particular task or sector than it was doing at the time of the survey. Almost all respondents (95%) proposed answers. Again, respondents could provide more than one response. The respondents most frequently wanted the government to give more priority to education programs (45%) and health services (44%). Many also mentioned providing water (39%), economic development, including money (29%), and employment (22%), as well as food (21%) and resettlement assistance (21%). As this wide range of responses

²¹ UGANDA Food Security Update, March 2010, Famine Early Warning Systems Network, www.fews.net/uganda

illustrates, while provision of basic needs remains important to people, many would like to see the government put more emphasis on recovery and reconstruction.

FIGURE 6: RESPONDENTS' TOP PRIORITIES



Agriculture's place as a top priority for respondents reflects the occupational patterns of the survey population. The survey results show that 90 percent of the respondents' households depend on agriculture as their main source of livelihood. Most households cultivated cash crops (88%), and sold at least part of their harvest (89%). Most of the respondents (91%) were themselves involved in "digging."²² Most (90%) further found digging to be acceptable work for the long term. However, only 81 percent of those aged 30 or below, and 73 percent of those who had at least some secondary education or vocational training, found it an acceptable occupation. Those who did not find digging to be an acceptable long-term form of work said it did not generate enough income (28%), that it was too hard (24%), or that better job/income opportunities were available.

The Peace, Recovery and Development Plan


Among the Government of Uganda's most prominent measures to support transition to lasting peace in northern Uganda is the creation of a comprehensive peace-building and development plan for the region. This plan, the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) was launched in October 2007 and implemented in July 2008. It has four core objectives: (1) consolidation of state authority; (2) rebuilding and empowering communities; (3) revitalization of the northern economy; and (4) peace building and reconciliation. The PRDP calls for investment of up to \$600 million over a period of three years in the region and all stakeholders, including government agencies and development partners, are expected to align their activities and programs to the PRDP. The plan, therefore, has the potential to shape significantly the recovery and development of northern Uganda, and address the priorities identified by the people.

²² In Uganda, people often use the term "digging" to mean cultivating or farming.

For this reason, the survey sought to gauge the community’s awareness and understanding of the PRDP more than two years after it was launched. It found that roughly two out of five respondents had heard of the PRDP (42%). Respondents in Gulu district were more likely to know of it (54%) than those in the other districts (34% in Pader, 37% in Kitgum, 48% in Amuru). Among those who had heard of the plan, however, knowledge was limited. They were frequently unable to say who was responsible for it (44% don’t know), while 27 percent mentioned the Central Government, 14 percent mentioned various local levels of government, and 4 percent mentioned NGOs (national and international). Most (87%) felt insufficiently informed about the plan.

When further asked what had been accomplished under the PRDP, 45 percent either “did not know” or had no response (35%), or said that the PRDP had done nothing (11%). One in three respondents said it had built infrastructure such as roads, schools, health centers. Fewer said it had assisted with IDPs return and resettlement (10%) and/or provided resettlement packages (8%), improved education services (8%), supported the local government (8%), improved livelihoods (6%) and improved health services (6%). Considering the wide-ranging goals of the PRDP, the proportion of respondents that mentioned activities beyond building infrastructure was relatively low. It is also possible that respondents did not know that other projects had been carried out under the PRDP. However, few respondents (7%) said they or their household had directly benefited from development programs overall.

FIGURE 7: PEACE, RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN (PRDP)



Security


Violence

The physical and mental impact of conflict in northern Uganda has been described in our previous reports and elsewhere.²³ The 2010 data confirm the extent of the violence during the two decades of conflict.

²³ Pham et al. 2007 at n2; Pham et al. 2005. at n2

Some potentially traumatic events affected most respondents, including displacement (88%), theft or destruction of goods or property (86%), destruction of a home (77%), feeling threatened with death (68%), and witnessing violence (67%). A large number of respondents also reported the death of a household member due to the conflict, and nearly half (49%) reported having experienced direct physical violence in the form of beating by armed groups. Abduction has been an important aspect of the LRA's strategy, both as a means of recruitment and instilling fear. In the four districts, 45 percent of the adult population reported having been abducted, and 41 percent reported having been forced to carry loads for armed groups. In-depth work in 2007 suggested that while over 40 percent of adults in the Acholi districts reported abduction, a lower proportion (28%) had been abducted for at least a week. This suggests that many of the self-reported abduction are possibly short term "arrests," with immediate release or escape. The small percentage of abduction in the last year may reflect arrests by the military and/or recent release. Overall, the survey results confirm earlier findings that the scope and frequency of abduction is much higher than previous figures, with a conservative estimate of 54,000 to 75,000 abductions.²⁴

FIGURE 8: VIOLENCE*



* Incidence reflects events experienced in the one-year period prior to the survey. For displacement, it reflects the proportion of respondents who still considered themselves displaced at the time of the survey.

Improving Security

The decrease in reported violent events points to an overall increase in physical security since the first survey in 2005. This is confirmed by measures of the sense of security among respondents. Over two in

²⁴ Pham PN, Vinck P, Stover E. The Lord's Resistance Army and Forced Conscriptioin in Northern Uganda. *Human Rights Quarterly* 2008; 30:404-411; Pham PN, Vinck P, Stover E. Returning home: forced conscription, reintegration, and mental health status of former abductees of the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda. *BMC Psychiatry* 2009; 9 (23); Blattman C, Annan J. (March 2008) *On the nature and causes of LRA abduction: What the abductees say* (forthcoming book chapter).

three respondents judged the situation in northern Uganda to be secure or very secure (69%), and nearly four out of five respondents judged the situation in their village or community to be secure or very secure (78%). At least four out of five respondents further felt “safe” or “very safe” when walking at night (80%), going to the nearest village (88%), sleeping at night (89%), or going to work, or collecting water or firewood (90%).

In 2007, security had already improved compared to 2005, following the withdrawal of the LRA to Garamba National Park in the DRC. By 2010, the sense of security has further increased for all of the proposed situations, except meeting former LRA commanders, and talking to UPDF soldiers. At the district level, the data suggest that the sense of security has increased the most in Kitgum and Pader, while it stayed similar or even decreased in Gulu. This perception of insecurity is possibly due to the urbanization and increased commercial activity in Gulu town, the main urban center.

FIGURE 9: SENSE OF SECURITY 2007 / 2010

	Gulu		Amuru		Kitgum		Pader		Total	
	2007	2010	2007	2010	2007	2010	2007	2010	2007	2010
(% safe or very safe)										
Walking at night in your village	78	76	65	75	69	86	67	81	70	80
Going to your work, collecting water, wood	93	89	86	89	78	91	71	91	82	90
Sleeping at night	92	85	87	88	85	92	83	90	87	89
Going to the nearest village	85	88	91	87	82	90	73	87	83	88
Meeting strangers	39	62	52	53	45	60	40	63	44	60
Meeting LRA abductees	59	65	62	59	56	60	52	61	58	61
Meeting former LRA commanders	53	54	61	50	56	53	52	55	56	53
Talking to the authorities	74	88	76	87	84	85	81	92	79	88
Talking to UPDF soldiers	71	64	72	60	74	66	78	81	73	69
Complaining when victim of a theft	76	86	77	80	86	85	84	89	80	85
Complaining when victim of violence	76	85	78	81	87	84	86	88	81	85

In addition, the 2010 survey found, as expected, that the incidence of violence has dramatically declined. Respondents reported whether violent events due to armed groups had occurred in the one-year period prior to the survey. The event that continued to affect the majority of respondents was displacement (8%), although it was not new displacement, but rather people who had yet to resettle and were still displaced at the time of the survey. Each of the other events was reported by less than 2 percent of the respondents over the one-year recall period prior to the survey, and many reported none (household member killed, forced to carry loads, forced to commit violence, sexual violence). Two percent reported abduction, which may reflect arrests by the military and/or other armed groups.

The results of the survey suggest a vast improvement in security since 2005. A majority of respondents were further confident that security will continue to improve (75%), while 10 percent said it will worsen. Still, the improvement in security is not necessarily attributed to the state. One in five respondents (21%) replied that only they, their community, or God provide security. UPDF soldiers were mentioned by 30 percent of respondents, and the government by 35 percent. Respondents provided a wide range of responses when asked what needed to be done to improve security. They most frequently mentioned building the capacity of the UPDF (30%) and the police (25%). They also proposed social measures, including reducing poverty (26%), uniting the people (20%), educating the youth (19%), and providing social services to the community (15%).

Resettlement and Services

Resettlement

Possibly the most striking change in northern Uganda since the LRA withdrew its forces has been the ability of civilians to leave displacement camps and return home or resettle. At the height of the conflict, over 90 percent of the population were displaced and living in squalid camps, some for over a decade. In 2007 the majority of the population continued to live in major camps (62%), while 27 percent lived in smaller transit camps, or new sites, nearer to their villages of origin, and 11 percent lived in urban centers.²⁵ In 2010, based on the random selection of populated places, a majority of respondents lived in villages (83%), while 9 percent lived in former transit camps or new sites, 5 percent lived in urban areas, and 4 percent lived in former camps. Not surprisingly, it was in resettlement sites and former camps that the highest proportion of respondents reported being currently displaced (respectively 32% and 42%), while less than 5 percent of respondents in villages and urban areas did so.

Resettlement is a challenging process requiring capital and assets to rebuild dwellings and resume livelihood activities. However, among the population, only 7 percent of those who were no longer displaced said they received assistance to resettle. For those still displaced, the main obstacles to resettlement were the lack of a house or money to build one (15%), or the fact that their house was destroyed (14%). Other reasons for not yet resettling included fear (14%), a need for further preparation for the move back to their village (e.g., building huts and clearing land 14%), and disputes over land (11%). A majority of respondents identified the Local Council (LC1, 35%), Resident District Commissioner (32%), and Chief Administrative Officer (28%) as being responsible for arranging their return.

²⁵ Vinck P, Pham PN. Peace-Building and Displacement in Northern Uganda: A Cross-sectional Study of Intentions to Move and Attitudes towards Former Combatants, *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 2009; 28 (1): 59-77.

FIGURE 10: RESETTLEMENT

	Urban Area	New Site	Former Camp	Village	Total
Location (% of respondents)	5%	9%	4%	83%	
% currently displaced	3%	32%	42%	4%	8%
% returnees who received assistance	5%	2%	9%	8%	8%
% planning to move	16%	35%	46%	6%	11%

While 8 percent of the population considered themselves displaced, a slightly higher proportion (11%) planned to move in 2010. This suggests there may be some population movement among non-displaced individuals, including those living in villages, municipalities, and new settlement sites. One in three individuals (67%) currently displaced planned to move in 2010, compared to 6 percent among those who were not currently displaced. As would be expected, the proportion of those planning to move was highest in new sites and former camps. Most of those planning to move (82%) were planning to return to their home village, while 9 percent planned to move to a town.

The 2007 Uganda data suggested that IDPs, like refugees, based their decisions to move, in part, on a cognitive comparison of conditions at their current places of residence with conditions at other potential locations.²⁶ In 2010 we asked respondents what they thought was good and bad about their current location. Respondents in villages most frequently said what they valued about their place of settlement was the ability to dig (77%), freedom (67%) and security (48%). The same advantages were associated with new settlement sites, albeit a little less frequently. Digging was seldom mentioned among respondents in urban areas, but security and freedom were still frequently mentioned among the good aspects of settling there. Of all the settlement types, it was in former camps that the highest proportion of respondents found nothing good about the place (34%). Inversely, looking at what respondents found to be bad about their place of settlement, respondents in villages most frequently said inadequate access to water (44%) and health care services (31%).

Negative perceptions of health care, access to water, and access to food or education most likely reflect the lack of basic services in return areas. These gaps, in turn, threaten the ability of returnees to rebuild their communities fully, and grievances may arise if these concerns are left unaddressed. Additional questions were included in the survey to explore the perception of services.

²⁶ Vinck P, Pham PN, 2009 at n25

FIGURE 11: COMPARATIVE PERCEPTION OF SETTLEMENT


(% respondents)	<i>What is good about this place?</i>					<i>What is bad about this place?</i>				
	Urban	New site	Former camp	Village	Total	Urban	New site	Former camp	Village	Total
Nothing	4	13	34	6	8	28	12	9	13	14
Digging	30	69	38	77	73	15	23	37	14	16
Freedom	69	62	30	67	65	3	9	10	2	3
Security	54	38	32	48	46	6	8	7	2	3
Access to food	19	22	11	25	24	5	14	24	20	19
Density of population	13	14	1	21	19	3	9	17	2	4
Access to land	4	20	3	18	17	4	9	30	6	7
Proximity to family, clan	2	6	5	16	14	3	5	8	1	2
Health care	27	7	7	8	9	4	29	29	31	30
Access to water	7	9	11	6	7	35	41	28	44	43
Education / schools	22	6	11	5	6	5	15	9	16	15
Job, employment	8	3	6	3	3	8	10	13	12	12
Living conditions	6	1	1	1	1	11	14	5	12	12
Roads	0	0	0	0	0	14	17	12	16	16
Other	4	9	2	10	10	15	14	17	14	14

Health Services

Only half (47%) the respondents reported their health to be “good” or “very good,” and 58 percent reported having had an illness that prevented them from conducting their normal work for at least one week during the six months prior to the survey. Over that same period, 63 percent indicated having sought medical assistance, most frequently from a local hospital (54%) or clinic (37%).

Access to health care remains problematic; 47 percent judged their access to health care to be “bad” or “very bad,” and only 12 percent judged it “good” or “very good.” Quality of health services was also a challenge; about half the respondents also found health services to be of “bad” or “very bad” quality, while 21 percent judged the quality of health services to be “good” or “very good.” Respondents from Pader district least frequently ranked their access to and quality of health services to be “good” or “very good.” More generally, these findings about perceptions of current services may explain why 44 percent of respondents felt the government should invest more in health services (see section on priorities).

FIGURE 12: ACCESS TO AND QUALITY OF HEALTH SERVICES



Other Services

The survey asked respondents to rank a series of services and their access to basic needs from “very good” to “very bad.” The results confirm findings that former camps provide good access to services and amenities; compared to other settlement types, a higher proportion of respondents in former camps reported “good” or “very good” access to water and health services. However, just 43 percent ranked access to land positively, compared to 80 percent among village residents.

For all items, except access to land, a higher proportion of respondents felt positive about services and access to basic needs in the district of Gulu compared to other districts. Although many residents of Pader reported good access to land, overall it is in that district that the lowest proportion of respondents reported a “good” or “very good” quality of life (14%). Access to health services, police, and markets were ranked positively significantly less often than elsewhere.

FIGURE 13: PERCEPTION OF SERVICES

Rank “Good” to “Very good” (% of respondents)	Gulu	Amuru	Kitgum	Pader	Total	Urban	New Site	Former camp	Village
Housing	33	29	25	31	29	37	30	20	29
Access to water	40	31	36	28	33	36	24	49	33
Access to food	26	20	13	14	17	22	14	15	18
Opportunities to find work	5	4	4	2	4	5	4	5	4
Access to land for farming	58	64	85	87	75	43	67	43	80
Education services	53	37	48	50	47	59	50	44	47
Health services (access)	35	21	23	12	21	55	18	62	19
Health services (quality)	39	20	22	11	21	64	19	19	19
Roads	28	15	33	20	24	36	24	21	23
Police	17	11	19	4	12	16	12	27	11
Markets	25	18	15	1	13	51	5	26	12
Overall quality of life	26	26	20	14	21	26	26	20	14

Post-War Disputes and Unity


Many local disputes may arise in a post-conflict environment such as the one in northern Uganda. As internally displaced persons and families return to their villages, they may dispute ownership of and access to abandoned or occupied land, destroyed housing, or control of limited resources. Further, the ability of families and communities to live in peace may be challenged, for instance, by the return of former combatants to their communities.

One in five respondents (20%) indicated having experienced a conflict within the six months prior to the survey. Conflicts were most frequently reported in Gulu (25%) and Amuru (24%). The survey sought to understand better which types of disputes were arising, and whether and how they were being resolved.

Types of Disputes and Disputes Resolution

In all four districts, land was the most significant source of disputes at the local level; 63 percent of those who reported a dispute described it as a land dispute. Other disputes involved thefts (16%) and domestic disputes (16%). Among the households reporting a dispute, 60 percent said it had been resolved. Most were resolved by the LC1 (83%), and 81 percent said they would call on the LC1 to resolve conflicts over small thefts or threats of violence. Few (8%) mentioned the police. However, land conflicts were least frequently resolved; less than half of the conflicts over land (48%) had been resolved, compared to 81 percent of the domestic disputes, and 76 percent of the disputes over small thefts.

FIGURE 14: LOCAL CONFLICTS




Disputes over Land

Given the importance of land to resettlement and livelihoods in northern Uganda, the survey included specific questions to assess access to and use of land. Among the four districts, 91 percent of respondents reported their household currently had access to land. Among them, the most common form of land access was communal and/or at the clan level (79%). Thirteen percent of those with access to land reported having a title or owning their land; this was most frequently the case in Gulu (28%) and Amuru (22%).

One respondent in three (35%) reported having experienced a conflict or quarrel over who owns or can use land since the LRA and the government signed the cessation of hostilities agreement in August 2006. The three most common disputes were the boundaries of plots (34%), the land being taken by someone else (32%), and competing claims to ownership (32%). The types of disputes did not vary greatly across districts, although disputes were least frequent in Kitgum (23%), with disputes being more frequently over boundaries (41%) rather than ownership of the land.

FIGURE 15: TYPES OF DISPUTES OVER LAND



A majority of respondents who experienced land disputes (82%) had approached someone to solve the problem. The levels of authority most frequently contacted were the LC2 (43%) and LC1 (33%). Traditional leaders and the elders were also approached to resolve conflicts by, respectively, 20 percent and 12 percent of respondents.

Domestic Violence

The link between war and domestic violence needs to be examined closely. Domestic disputes were reported by 16 percent of the respondents who had experienced some sort of conflict during the six months prior to the survey. This represents three percent of all respondents. However, when asking directly about acts of violence in the home, the survey found that 19 percent of respondents had been physically slapped or beaten violently by their spouse or partner (28% of female respondents). For two-thirds of those (64%), the abuse occurred in the year prior to the survey. The main reasons for beatings were alcohol (32%), infidelity (21%), and family issues, such as disputes over children or money (18%). Domestic violence was not limited to spousal abuse. Five percent of respondents reported having been physically beaten violently by another household member, most frequently by a brother or sister (36%) over money (31%).

While 19 percent of respondents reported having been physically abused, just 6 percent acknowledged having meted out physical abuse to a spouse or partner. Those who did cited most frequently a disagreement (20%), meals being late (17%), coming home late (15%), and money (14%). The responses suggest that many respondents were not acknowledging perpetrating domestic violence, possibly because they know it is not acceptable. Nevertheless, the figures suggest that domestic violence needs to be addressed.

Former Combatants

In general, respondents did not mention major problems with the reintegration of former combatants in their communities. However, our previous work in northern Uganda suggests that many former combatants face difficulties, including disputes and tensions with the community, when returning home. The 2007 survey found that 39 percent of former LRA abductees reported problems upon returning to their home communities. Former LRA abductees who spent six or more months with the rebels reported problems more frequently (68%) after returning home than those who stayed for less time. Among them, the most frequently reported problems were difficulty with school or work (20%) and stigmatization (18%).²⁷ Although not all combatants are former abductees, one can assume that former combatants face similar challenges returning home.

The 2010 survey did not ask as many questions about the reintegration of former combatants as earlier surveys. However, to allow for comparison between surveys, a series of questions was asked to measure respondents' level of comfort in the presence of former LRA leaders in a range of common social situations. As was the case in 2007, the results are encouraging; a majority of respondents is comfortable in all the situations, including living in the same community (69%) or as close neighbors (72%). Nonetheless, comparison with the 2007 data shows that, overall, attitudes toward former LRA leaders have not improved. In eight out of ten hypothetical situations, the percentage of respondents being comfortable was lower compared to 2007.

FIGURE 16: ATTITUDES TOWARD FORMER LRA LEADERS

(% respondents comfortable)	Gulu	Amuru	Kitgum	Paderu	Total (2010)	Total (2007)
Living in the same community	69%	65%	65%	76%	69%	72%
Living as close neighbors	72%	68%	70%	77%	72%	76%
Living as household members	64%	59%	62%	74%	66%	68%
Sharing meals in your home	75%	71%	73%	76%	74%	84%
Working with them	75%	75%	75%	79%	76%	78%
Going to the same market	84%	85%	83%	83%	84%	90%
Sharing a drink (alcohol) together	59%	59%	64%	70%	64%	62%
Going to the same church	86%	88%	88%	85%	87%	93%
Marrying a family member	63%	58%	59%	69%	63%	63%
Attending the same school as your children	83%	85%	83%	83%	83%	82%

²⁷ Pham PN, Vinck P, Stover E, (2009). at n24

Unity

Respondents indicated a broader need for the people of Uganda to learn to live together peacefully, as well as reintegrating specific groups such as former combatants. Indeed, as mentioned previously, uniting the people of Uganda was the most frequent answer to how to achieve peace. Several questions in the survey sought to capture respondents' perceptions of current social interactions within the selected communities, as well as participation in decisions affecting the community.

In general, a majority of respondents viewed positively (“good” or “very good”) their relationships with their family (87%), neighbors (87%), and the wider community (91%). Similarly, 76 percent said they trusted people in their village “a lot” or “extremely.” Practical support at the local level also appears to be high, with over half of respondents indicating they seek help from their neighbors at least on a weekly basis (59%), and 63 percent saying they provide help to their neighbors at least on a weekly basis. Such interactions, however, appeared to be less frequent in Kitgum and Pader.

The findings, overall, suggest strong social bonds but at a very local level. Over half of respondents (56%) said they never interacted with civilians from other districts in northern Uganda, and 77 percent never interacted with people from districts outside of northern Uganda. This is explained in part by the lack of mobility of much of the population. At the same time, about half of respondents had the perception that people in the South do not understand Acholi people (54% agreed with the proposition). Nonetheless, most supported the proposition that the government cares about the Acholi people (51% agree), and only a third believed the Acholi people are being marginalized by the central government (30% agreed with the proposition).

FIGURE 17: COMMUNITY RELATIONS

(% respondents)	Gulu	Amuru	Kitgum	Pader	Total
Relationship with family (% good - very good)	87	84	85	90	87
Relationship with friends / neighbors (% good - very good)	91	83	87	88	87
Relationship with community (% good - very good)	92	90	91	91	91
Trust people in village (% a lot - extremely)	75	68	77	81	76
Seek help from neighbors (% > 1 / month)	61	56	74	86	71
Provide help to neighbors (% > 1 / month)	63	61	81	91	76
Interact with people in other districts in northern Uganda (% > 1 / month)	13	13	10	14	13
Interact with people in districts out of northern Uganda (% > 1 / month)	6	4	3	3	4
Seek help from clan (% > 1 / month)	7	7	6	3	5
Participate in clan-related activities (% > 1 / month)	12	12	18	13	14
Seek help from traditional leaders (% > 1 / month)	3	6	4	2	4
Participate in activities organized by traditional leaders (% > 1 / month)	8	10	7	2	6
Are member of an association (%)	52	50	57	53	53

The findings further suggest that most social interaction and support are channeled through community/neighborhood structures or through associations, rather than through their clan or from traditional leaders. A majority said they never sought help from their clan (61%) or did so less than once a month (27%). Five percent did so more than once a month. At the same time, just 14 percent said they

participated in clan-related activities more than once a month. Similarly, a majority of respondents never or rarely sought help from traditional leaders (71% never, 25% once a month or less, 4% more than once a month), and 87 percent never or rarely participated in activities organized by traditional leaders. Just 4 percent did so more than once a month. However, 47 percent of respondents were members of an association, most frequently farmers' associations (57%) and women's associations (10%).

Finally, respondents were asked directly about their involvement in a list of 11 activities or events. Most (82%) had participated in at least one of them. The most common activities or events were the participation in farming group or association activities (52%)

FIGURE 18: PARTICIPATION IN EVENTS / ACTIVITIES

(% respondents)	Gulu	Amuru	Kitgum	Pader	Total
Farming group or association	44	55	59	50	52
road or infrastructure construction	25	19	36	23	26
Community members mobilization for different activities	20	20	27	21	22
Ker Kwaro Acholi-led Wang Oo ceremonies*	11	11	20	18	16
Business activities	13	12	13	17	14
Music, dance and drama competitions	10	11	15	15	13
Return process assistance	10	11	18	12	13
Home improvement campaign	13	9	12	7	10
Ker Kwaro Acholi-led cleansing and re-burial ceremonies	9	7	9	9	9
Sport competition	5	10	9	6	8
Cultural gala	6	4	6	6	5
None of the above	20	17	13	21	18

* evening fireplace ceremonies and storytelling


Government and Elections

Contact and Perception of Authorities

Peace-building requires rebuilding relationships among individuals, communities, and the state. Considering the long standing divide and history of conflicts between the North and the South, it is an important challenge in Uganda. Our previous studies suggest that for social reconstruction to be effective, the government should be perceived as legitimate, should not impose measures on communities without their input, and should manage expectations of its development programs. Failure to do so may renew tensions that could undermine the prospect for a lasting peace.

The first finding of the 2010 survey regarding the relationship between northern Ugandans and the state is that respondents have only limited contact with authorities, especially above the Local Council level 1 (LC1). Respondents were asked how often they contacted a list of authorities to ask for help with a problem or to give their views in the six months prior to the survey. Two out of three respondents (62%) had contacted a religious leader at least once a month during that period and about half (49%) had contacted the LC1. However, significantly fewer had had contacts at least once a month with an LC3, a higher level local council (21%), or a government official (18%). Even fewer had contacts with a traditional leader (14%).


FIGURE 19: CONTACTS WITH AUTHORITIES ONCE A MONTH OR MORE



Focusing on local government officials, a majority of the respondents felt that the authorities were not helping families in need (72%) or helping build infrastructure (70%). However, most said local officials had helped improve security and fight crime (72%), as well as solve local conflicts (78%). About half (47%) felt the central government was not delivering services appropriately, and the central government was unlikely to respond to their needs if they reported them (39%); however, 33 percent said the government was likely to respond to their needs.

When asked how they perceived the government’s performances on a range of topics, only about one-third of respondents said it was handling “well” or “very well” the fight against corruption (30%), uniting the south and north of Uganda (30%), increasing employment (32%), reducing poverty (35%), and involving the population in decisions (36%). Respondents had also mentioned uniting the south and north of Uganda and reducing poverty as essential to peace-building. Less than half the respondents said the government performed well on providing social services (45%) and ensuring free elections (47%). The only topics for which a majority of the population ranked the government’s performance positively were security-related, including reducing crime (64%), protecting human rights (65%), and maintaining peace (79%).


FIGURE 20: RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE



Elections

Presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled in Uganda for 2011. For those living in the north, these elections will be the first to take place in a time of peace for over 20 years and will be essential for increasing the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of these communities. However, a divide between north and south Uganda endures. Many respondents believe that northern and eastern Uganda have been marginalized under Museveni's rule. In this context, almost all respondents (93%) said they planned to vote in the upcoming elections because it was their duty (28%), a new president needed to be elected (24%), or they wanted to exercise their rights (18%). The few that did not plan to vote (7%) mainly said they believed it was useless (59%).

FIGURE 21: ELECTIONS



Those figures are encouraging and suggest that the population will eagerly participate in the presidential elections. Results from a series of questions about the 2006 presidential election show that participation at that time was also high. Three out of four respondents indicated they had registered (77%) and voted (72%). The main reasons for not registering were that the respondents: 1) were too young at the time (39%); 2) did not know how to register (14%); 3) were away from home or sick (13%); or 4) did not want to register (12%). However, one third of the respondents (32%) did not find the elections to be free and fair. The results suggest that lack of confidence in the electoral process is not a major constraint to voting. Nevertheless, for the upcoming elections, as many as 96 percent of respondents believed their vote would matter, mainly because, in their words, “every vote counts” (45%).

Access to Information

To succeed, peacebuilding efforts must be seen as legitimate and must manage the expectations of the population. How the population perceives those efforts, therefore, is crucial. Much of the first part of this report explored perception and attitudes about social reconstruction needs and efforts. Perceptions and opinions are shaped not only by the nature and characteristics of particular reconstruction programs, but also by the information that individuals receive. The 2010 survey included a series of questions to capture individuals’ access to information and media consumption.

For most of the conflict period, northern Uganda was reportedly “thoroughly inimical to information seeking and use” by the local populace, with the population having limited access to media and the local leadership failing to relay information to IDPs in the camps.²⁸ Even now, as in the rest of Uganda, the press may be considered only “partly free.”²⁹ The publication of information deemed to be contrary to the government’s view may result in warnings, arrest, harassment, assault, court proceedings and even imprisonment by the government.³⁰ This history of media isolation and current limits on the press has hindered the ability of media actors to hold the ruling government to account and promote peace building.³¹ However, over the last few years, several projects have sought to strengthen media infrastructure and programming, especially radio. At the same time, the resettlement of the population outside of camps toward less densely populated areas may have changed how individuals access and use information. Therefore, several questions were intended to capture media consumption habits.

Recent programs to develop media and communication facilities in the war-affected area appear to have improved information dissemination; 83 percent of respondents found their access to information to have improved compared to that during the conflict. This may also reflect respondents’ greater ability to travel. However, about one in three respondents (35%) said they were “not at all” or just “a little bit” informed about what happens in their community, and even more reported to be uninformed about what

²⁸ Sturges P, Information and Communication in Bandit Country: an exploratory study of civil conflict in northern Uganda 1986—2007, *Information Development* 2008; 24 (3) 204-212.


²⁹ Freedom House, Press Freedom 2009, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2009> (accessed August 2010).

³⁰ Acayo C and Mnjama N, The Print Media and Conflict Resolution in Northern Uganda, *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 2004; 4 (1) 27-43.

³¹ Ibrahim M, Rebel voices and radio actors: in pursuit of dialogue and debate in northern Uganda, *Development in Practice* 2009; 19 (4 & 5) 610-620.


happens in northern Uganda (65%) and in Uganda as a whole (79%). These results suggest that access to information remains a challenge. On average, respondents in Gulu reported being the most informed about events in northern Uganda and Uganda. The respondents in Gulu were also the most likely to report an improvement in their access to information.

FIGURE 22: INFORMATION



Access to media is challenging, and radio remains the primary source of information. For over half of respondents (55%), radio was the main source of information, while friends and family were the main sources of information for one in three respondents (33%). For 8 percent it was local leaders and authorities. Less than 1 percent mentioned newspapers.


FIGURE 23: MAIN SOURCE OF INFORMATION



Access to radio was further explored. While 55 percent considered radio to be their *main* source of information, four out of five respondents (79%) reported listening to the radio at least occasionally (slightly more than in 2007). About half of respondents listened to the radio everyday (similar to 2007), while another 39 percent listened to it at least once a week. Regarding popular stations, Mega FM, a government-sponsored station, had the widest audience, with 83 percent of respondents mentioning listening to the station. Even the LRA leadership has occasionally contacted the radio to make points and

dispute what they have heard.³² The next most frequently cited station was Radio Rupiny, mentioned by one in three respondents (36%). Over 60 percent of those listening to the radio in Gulu and Amuru reported Radio Rupiny among the stations they mainly listen to, while about 10 percent mentioned Radio Rupiny in Kitgum and Pader. Other differences across districts include: in Pader Luo FM was widely listened to (78%), as well as Rappa FM (33%) and Piwa FM (30%), but those stations were seldom mentioned elsewhere. In Kitgum, Pol FM and Mighty Fire were mentioned by 52 percent and 39 percent of the radio users, respectively, compared to 7 percent or less in the other districts.

FIGURE 24: RADIO STATION AUDIENCES*




* Only radio stations mentioned by at least 25% of the respondents in at least one district are reported here.

Respondents reported listening to a wide variety of programs but cited news programs the most (80%). Other popular types of programs included music/entertainment (44%), programs on social issues such as health, education, agriculture (43%), debates (34%), and peace, recovery and development programs (28%). In addition, the survey assessed the audience for a series of NUTI-sponsored programs on peace and recovery. Over half the respondents indicated having listened to a radio drama about return and resettlement called “I’ll strengthen my knees, the trumpet of the hunter” (55%) and to a public information campaign called “Disseminating information on the return process” (70%). The results reiterate that radio is an effective medium to reach the population. Only 7 percent of respondents had never listened to any of the programs.

In addition to the radio programs, about three of every five respondents had heard about NUTI’s field and community-based programs: “Peace and Love in our Homes” (59%), “Peace and reconciliation through music, dance and drama competition” (66%), and “Rebuilding our homeland” (55%).

³² Paul Sturges, 2008

FIGURE 25: NUTI'S SPONSORED PEACE AND RECOVERY PROGRAM OUTREACH RATE



In contrast to radios, newspapers are seldom available outside of the main cities: less than 1 percent considered newspapers to be their main source of information, and only 12 percent reported reading a newspaper at least occasionally. Newspapers were considered prohibitively expensive (i.e., between 1000 to 1500 Ugandan Shillings per issue). This may explain why most respondents who read a newspaper only read it once a week or less (80%). The most read newspapers are Rupiny (57%), New Vision (51%), and Daily Monitor (42%). As with access to radio, newspaper readership was most frequent in Gulu (19%) compared to less than 10 percent in Kitgum (9%), Pader (9%), and Amuru (4%). Among those reading a newspaper, the proportion of respondents who read the newspaper at least twice to six times a week was highest in Gulu (34%), compared to less than 17 percent in all of the other districts. Finally, just 6 percent of respondents reported watching television occasionally, most frequently in Gulu (12%).

The survey further assessed respondents' perceptions of press freedom and journalists. As outlined previously, several sources suggest the press is only partially free and faces pressure from the government. The survey responses supported those opinions, with 45 percent of respondents stating that the broadcast and print media are "not at all," "a little bit" or only "partially" free from government influence. (This is a slight improvement from the 2007 survey, when over half of the respondents said journalists and broadcasters had "no" to "moderate" freedom to report openly and honestly on social and political issues in northern Uganda.) Nearly one-third of respondents (31%) said the media were "quite a bit" or "totally free" to report what they want. But as many as one in four (25%) reported that they did not know how much freedom the media enjoy in their reporting. Nevertheless, 59 percent trusted "quite a bit" or "extremely" what is broadcast on the radio, and 32 percent trusted "quite a bit" or "extremely" what is printed in newspapers.

THE ROAD TO JUSTICE


Accountability and Justice

Accountability

Previous studies by the authors of attitudes toward justice in Uganda, Iraq, the DRC, and the CAR show that respondents' views are context-specific and may change over time. Changes in views are especially likely to occur in a place such as northern Uganda where the situation has evolved dramatically between 2005 and 2010. In all three surveys, we asked whether accountability was important. The affirmative responses varied from 77 percent in 2005, to 67 percent in 2007, and 84 percent in 2010. The lower percentage in 2007 may be explained by the fact that the peace process was ongoing at that time, and respondents may have feared that demands for accountability would put it in jeopardy. The three surveys further asked who should be held most accountable for violence during the conflict. The proportion of respondents implicating the government has increased significantly. The government was mentioned by 64 percent of respondents, while 19 percent mentioned the LRA leadership only, and 5 percent mentioned all of the LRA. This does not suggest that respondents do not want to see the LRA held accountable. However, only the group whom respondents wanted most to see held accountable was recorded (one answer).

The most appropriate mechanisms to hold perpetrators accountable, according to respondents, are the ICC (29%), Ugandan courts (28%), the Amnesty Commission (25%), and traditional mechanisms (8%). These statistics are similar to the 2007 results for the Acholi districts (ICC, 25%; Ugandan Court, 28%; Amnesty Commission, 25%; and traditional mechanism, 4%).

FIGURE 26: MEASURES DEALING WITH THE LRA




Focusing on the LRA, the survey asked what should happen to LRA members responsible for the violence in northern Uganda. Respondents most frequently said they should be persuaded to “come out of the bush” (24%) and be pardoned and/or given amnesty (23%). At the same time, one out of three respondents wanted to see them arrested and put on trial (16%) or captured (13%).

These responses suggest that a majority of respondents favor seeing the LRA reintegrating with the community over seeing them arrested and/or punished. When asked directly whether the respondent has already forgiven the LRA, about three quarter (73%) said “yes.” Among those who did not forgive the LRA, 22 percent said “nothing” could be done to help them forgive the LRA, 16 percent said the LRA must be punished before it can be forgiven, and 14 percent said LRA members must apologize. Most respondents (87%) further said it should not be possible to prosecute former combatants who have received amnesty.

Justice

Before further exploring accountability and justice questions, the survey asked respondents what justice meant to them. Most defined it in terms of holding wrongdoers accountable (29%), holding trials (25%), being fair (18%), and reconciling (9%). In other words, most attached procedural and institutional concepts to the idea of justice. Few respondents, however, indicated having been themselves, or their household, in contact with the formal justice system. This low percentage may explain why nearly half of respondents (49%) said they had no knowledge at all about Uganda’s formal justice system and another 29 percent knew “very little” about it.

FIGURE 27: KNOWLEDGE OF JUSTICE SYSTEM




Regardless of whether respondents had had contact with or knowledge of the formal justice system, the survey asked for their views. One in three respondents (33%) said they thought the justice system was corrupt. However, one quarter (24%) viewed it as working well. Another 19 percent had no opinion, possibly because they were not familiar with it. Finally, 11 percent said that the formal justice system was for the rich and educated. Just one in four (24%) viewed it as “good” or “very good.”

Traditional justice mechanisms, such as ceremonies, have been advanced as a way to deal with LRA combatants. About half of respondents (53%) viewed such mechanisms as useful for this purpose. A majority of respondents said such ceremonies helped the community reconcile (39%) and forgive the wrongdoer (25%). However one in three (31%) said it did not change anything. Among all respondents, 47 percent further said they had participated in such ceremonies at least once. They most frequently identified “Slaughtering of the Goat” (21%), “Stepping on the Egg” (14%), “Mato Oput” (13%), and “Cleansing of the Land” (11%).

Considering the range of accountability mechanisms available, the survey asked respondents to choose their preferred mechanism. First, we asked respondents to choose one of four options: amnesty, trials, a truth commission, or traditional ceremonies. The highest proportion favored peace with amnesty (45%) over peace with a truth-seeking mechanism (32%), peace with trials (15%), or peace with traditional ceremonies (8%). Second, we asked respondents specifically about options for trying perpetrators. The highest proportion favored trials in Uganda by Ugandan courts (35%), over trials abroad by an international court (28%), trials in Uganda by an international court (22%), or no trials at all (15%). Results on both questions are consistent with the 2007 findings.

FIGURE 28: ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRIAL OPTIONS



Overall, these results show that, while many see accountability as important, most believe also that LRA leaders could be pardoned for their actions and persuaded to stop fighting. This may reflect their desire to move on, their acceptance of local reconciliation mechanisms, or the fear that seeking prosecution could hinder peace. At the same time, many respondents wanted to see the government held accountable for its actions during the conflict.

International Criminal Court

Knowledge and Perception of the ICC


The ICC was established to bring the perpetrators of the worst crimes against humanity to justice and deter future commission of such crimes. The first arrest warrants issued by the ICC were for leaders of the LRA to face allegations of international crimes committed in northern Uganda.³³ This move, made in

³³ In December 2003, President Museveni of Uganda referred the situation in northern Uganda to the Prosecutor of the ICC. Nearly two years later in October 2005, while standing next to President Museveni, the Prosecutor unsealed the arrest warrants against the five top LRA commanders: Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen and Raska Lukwiya. Currently Kony, Odhiambo, and Ongwen are still at large. The Pre-Trial Chamber

October 2005, was highly controversial. Some commentators insisted the LRA should be held accountable while others worried it would hinder peace negotiations. The 2005, 2007 and 2010 surveys all included questions about perceptions and knowledge of, and attitudes toward, the ICC among community members in northern Uganda.

The 2005 survey, carried out a few months prior to the Prosecutor’s announcement of the warrants, found that around 27 percent of the Acholi population had heard of the ICC. By 2007, the percentage had significantly increased to 70 percent of people in the Acholi region. The current survey, however, suggests that just 59 percent of the Acholi population has heard of the ICC. Since so many other 2010 indicators yield results that are consistent with the previous surveys, the change is unlikely to be due solely to the research design. However, it is possible that the results are affected by the change in sampling method (i.e., in previous surveys almost all respondents were in a few camps, while in 2010 they were mainly in villages). It is also possible that because respondents’ priorities had shifted toward fulfillment of basic needs and resettlement, many may no longer be interested in news about the conflict and have forgotten about the ICC. Finally, it is also possible that respondents had been hearing news about the ICC less frequently as the lively debate that existed in 2005 and 2007 has somewhat subsided. In addition, radios may have been broadcasting debates and opinions about the ICC less frequently. The latter possibility is supported by the finding that respondents appeared uninterested in obtaining more information about the ICC; only 6 percent of those who heard about the ICC stated that they actively sought information about the Court, and just 6 percent ranked their knowledge of the Court as being “good” or “very good.” In comparison, a recent survey representative of selected areas of the Central African Republic found that 32 percent had heard of the existence of the ICC, but 42 percent ranked their knowledge as “good” or above, and 51 percent indicated they had looked actively for information about the Court.³⁴

FIGURE 29: KNOWLEDGE AND AWARENESS ABOUT THE ICC



terminated the case against Lukwiya after receiving strong evidence confirming his death. Vincent Otti is also believed to be dead but his case remains open pending evidence to prove this.

³⁴ Vinck P, Pham PN (August 2010). *Building Peace, Seeking Justice: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Accountability and Social Reconstruction in the Central African Republic*. Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley.

Interviewers asked the respondents who had heard of the ICC a series of follow-up questions to judge their knowledge and perception of the court. *The following results refer only to the 59 percent of respondents who indicated having heard of the ICC.*

Most respondents relied on radio as their most frequent source of information about the ICC (88%) in accordance with general patterns of access to information described earlier.³⁵ Others received information mainly through informal channels such as family and friends (7%), local leaders (3%), and other media (2%). Just 3 percent of respondents had participated in a meeting that discussed the ICC. Those meetings were organized by local leaders (36%), NGOs (32%), or the ICC (26%). Finally, although few learned about the ICC primarily from friends and family (7%), one in four respondents (27%) talked about the ICC with their informal network of friends, family, and neighbors, at least occasionally.

A majority of respondents (66%) described their knowledge of the ICC as being “bad” or “very bad.” Further questions about factual information on the ICC confirm that knowledge is relatively low. Regarding the creation of the Court, only 6 percent of those who had heard of the Court accurately stated the year it was created,³⁶ while 48 percent did not know who had established it, and 7 percent thought it was established by Uganda. Just 53 percent knew that the ICC was not set up only to investigate serious crimes committed in northern Uganda. When asked about other countries under investigation, participants mentioned Sudan (48%), the DRC (12%), Kenya (8%), and the CAR (6%).

Few respondents knew where the ICC headquarters are located. Although 16 percent said they knew, just 56 percent of those correctly identified the Hague, or the Netherlands. Six percent mentioned Europe, and 25 percent the United States. A larger percentage knew the ICC had an office in Uganda (39%), and among them, that it was located in Kampala (61%). Overall, the study suggests that factual knowledge of the ICC is relatively low. This lack of knowledge might create misunderstanding of the Court’s work, and in turn affect how the population views the Court.

Among those who had heard of the Court, just 36 percent believed it had an impact (negative and/or positive), most of those citing that it had helped to chase the LRA away (38%) and contributed to physical security (30%). Seven percent said it had brought attention to the conflict, while 6 percent said it hindered the peace process. A follow-up question showed that less than half of respondents believed the ICC had helped the general situation in northern Uganda (43%). About the same proportion felt it had no effect (40%) and some believed that the Court hindered the situation (10%). Those who said it hindered the situation most frequently said that Kony would not surrender and so the rebels still exist. Those who said it helped the situation mentioned that it had brought peace and security (40%), forced negotiations (35%), and brought more attention to the situation in northern Uganda (17%).

³⁵ Among those who had heard about the ICC on the radio, 46 percent believed it was from the radio host that they heard about the ICC, 18 percent from government officials, 8 percent from local leaders, and 7 percent from an ICC representative

³⁶ Five percent said 2002, the effective creation date, and 1 percent said 1998, the year of the signing of the Rome treaty on the creation of the ICC.

The Uganda International Criminal Court Act

In July 2008, the Ugandan government established a War Crimes Division of the High Court, and two years later, the Parliament passed an International Criminal Court Act. Both moves created a legal framework to prosecute serious international crimes in Uganda. The 2010 survey examined respondents' awareness of and attitudes toward the ICC Act, finding that only a minority (5%) had heard about it. Among them, 45 percent believed that anyone who committed a mass atrocity should be tried under the ICC Act and 31 percent specifically mentioned the LRA commanders should be held accountable under the Act.

Without referring to the Act, the survey briefly asked respondents their opinions about capital punishment and age of criminal culpability, two heavily debated topics during the drafting of the ICC Act. A majority (68%) agreed that, if a court finds a person guilty of a grave crime such as murder or rape, the person should receive the death penalty (be killed). Similarly, a majority agreed that minors (under the age of 18 years) should be held accountable if they commit a grave crime such as murder or rape.

Also without referring to the Act, we further asked respondents who, in their opinion, should be in charge of prosecuting Kony and his top commanders. Among those who were aware of the existence of the ICC, a majority said it should be the ICC (70%), while 28 percent said it should be the Ugandan court system. In-depth interviews revealed the ICC is perceived more frequently as neutral and less corrupt than the Ugandan courts.

These responses should inform the ongoing debate about Uganda's ICC Act, and whether the ICC should turn over its cases against Kony and his three top commanders to the Ugandan Courts. At the very least the responses suggest that the population needs to be further informed about and engaged in the discussion.

Measures for Victims

As well as asking about accountability and justice, we also asked respondents about what should be done for victims and about truth-seeking and memorialization.

Measures for Victims and Reparations


The 2010 survey repeated questions from previous surveys about what needed to be done for victims. Respondents could provide more than one response and most frequently identified providing cattle (74%), financial compensation (66%), housing (44%), food (38%) or education (38%). These measures, mainly forms of direct compensation to individuals, reflect respondents' own priorities outlined previously in this report. They defined "victims" in broad terms, including the Acholi people (59%), all people of northern Uganda (35%), children (23%), women (20%), and everyone (20%). Almost all respondents (98%) considered themselves to be victims of the conflict.³⁷

Almost all respondents (97%) also said victims should receive reparations, most often because they are believed to be poor and need it (49%), as a form of acknowledgement or recognition of their suffering

³⁷ The question was asked last to avoid creating expectations and influencing responses.


(24%), and to help them forget (19%). In addition, respondents said most frequently that reparations should be given individually (46%), while 32 percent said they should be given to the community, and 20 percent said they should be given to both the individual and the community.

FIGURE 30: MEASURES FOR VICTIMS



A majority of respondents (82%) said they would accept only community-level (and not individual) reparations if this was the only choice. Most (82%) were also willing to accept only symbolic reparation, such as an apology or a monument. However, fewer (36%) would accept victims receiving no reparations at all.

FIGURE 31: REPARATIONS



Truth-Seeking and Memorialization

The 2010 survey results about truth-seeking and memorialization are consistent with previous survey results. They demonstrate that respondents highly value truth-seeking (89%) and for a variety of reasons. The most common reason, for respondents who supported truth-seeking, was that knowing what happened during the war is important for historical purposes. Other reasons were so that people would not forget (33%), so that the truth would be known (30%), or so that the history would be known (17%). Some also valued truth-seeking for identifying those responsible (15%). Those who did not support a truth-seeking process about the war most frequently said it was better to forget (35%), it would bring back bad memories (28%), or it was useless (19%).

Similarly, a majority of respondents (93%) believed it was important for future generations to remember what happened in northern Uganda. Only a minority viewed remembrance negatively, most frequently saying it would bring bad memories (42%), it was better to forget (28%), and it was useless (21%). To ensure that future generations remember the conflict, respondents proposed writing books (42%), teaching children (26%), and building monuments (13%). With respect to monuments, one in three respondents said they had already visited a monument or memorial for war victims, but most (90%) found such monuments important so that people do not forget (67%) and to pay respect to victims (19%). Such monuments, they said most frequently, should be built on the sites of violence and massacres (61%) and take the shape of a plaque with the names of victims (42%), a building for the community (29%), or a sculpture (16%).

RECOMMENDATIONS

BASED ON THE FINDINGS OUTLINED IN THIS REPORT, the following steps are recommended to the government of Uganda and the international community:

1. **Reconstruction and development:** Continue to incorporate the changing priorities expressed by survey respondents into a multipronged strategy that promotes peace-building, socioeconomic development, justice, and poverty-reduction in the north. Additional efforts must be undertaken to provide essential services, including rehabilitating and building new schools and health centers closer to communities. Increase awareness of these programs through systematic and strategic outreach and communication activities. The population must become more involved in the recovery effort and the development and implementation of recovery efforts.
2. **Reparations:** Develop a reparation program that is financially realistic and addresses the needs of survivors. Such a program must be perceived as a form of reparation rather than another assistance project. While memorials may have a role to play, they may not be desired by all survivors. Ownership and participation in reparation efforts must be promoted.
3. **National dialogue:** Hold a national dialogue about the root causes, the dynamics and the effects of the conflict in northern Uganda. The dialogue should also aim at improving understanding and communication among all regions of Uganda. Such a program could include promoting regional travel and exchanges.
4. **Regional security:** Continue efforts to reestablish a sense of security for communities, including fostering a regional approach to cross-border security threats such as the LRA. Ensure that government forces continue to protect civilians' rights and physical integrity. Strengthen existing collaboration with the Congolese and Central African governments to apprehend Joseph Kony and his commanders.
5. **Leadership:** Build the capacity of local authorities such as the village leader (LC1) and elders to resolve local disputes. Establish a mechanism for the LC1 to refer complex cases, such as land disputes, to the parish level and / or other avenue.
6. **Police and justice:** Develop a criminal justice and civilian police system in northern Uganda that is responsive to community needs. In addition, ensure that women are represented in this system and that specific units for dealing with vulnerable victims, such as former abductees, women and children who have been victims of gender-based violence, are created.

7. **ICC outreach:** Reevaluate the ICC outreach strategy for northern Uganda, noting that awareness of and knowledge about the institution remain relatively low. This may be due in part to the fact that, so far, the warrants of arrest have not been executed. The ICC should develop a strategy to manage expectations and explain the process of arresting the LRA until they are apprehended.
8. **Elections:** Ensure that the upcoming 2011 Presidential election is free and fair and without violence. It is important to establish a plan for independent monitoring of the election campaign and the ballot count, and to allow opposition leaders to campaign freely without interference. The government must be perceived as legitimate in order for its recovery efforts to be successful.

AUTHORS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Phuong Pham and Patrick Vinck led both the survey design and the data collection in northern Uganda, and wrote this report.

PHUONG PHAM is Director of Research at UC Berkeley's Human Rights Center, Visiting Associate Professor at UC Berkeley, and Adjunct Associate Professor at Tulane University's Payson Center for International Development.

PATRICK VINCK is Director of the Initiative for Vulnerable Populations at UC Berkeley's Human Rights Center, Visiting Associate Professor at UC Berkeley, and Adjunct Associate Professor at Tulane University's Payson Center for International Development.

At the Human Rights Center, Program Officer Melissa Carnay was instrumental to the logistical and administrative organization of the survey. She also contributed to the field supervision. Mobile Technology Specialist Neil Hendrick contributed to the field supervision and programming of the PDAs for data collection. Eleanor Taylor-Nicholson, Rotary Peace Scholar at UC Berkeley, Jennie Sherwin, and Roger Sherwin of Tulane University provided editorial comments on the manuscript. Eric Stover and Camille Crittenden at UC Berkeley contributed additional proof-reading. Liza Jimenez provided administrative assistance. Austin McKinley provided the original illustration on the cover.

We would like to thank the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Humanity United, the United States Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives and Casals & Associates for their support throughout this project.

We are most grateful to the thousands of respondents who agreed to share their experiences of war and reconstruction. We hope that this report reflects their views, needs and hopes to build a lasting peace in northern Uganda. Their voices would not have been heard without the help of the interviewers who worked tirelessly with us. For confidentiality reasons, individual acknowledgements will not be listed here. However, this report would not have been possible without their support.



COVER ART BY AUSTIN MCKINLEY, 2010

**HUMAN
RIGHTS
CENTER**
UNIVERSITY
OF
CALIFORNIA
BERKELEY

HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER
University of California, Berkeley
460 Stephens Hall, # 2300
Berkeley, CA 94720-2300
Phone: (510) 642-0965
hrc@berkeley.edu
<http://hrc.berkeley.edu>

BerkeleyLaw
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

BERKELEY LAW
University of California, Berkeley
215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
Phone: (510) 642-1741

THIS REPORT WAS SUPPORTED BY



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE



Casals & Associates
A DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL COMPANY

**MacArthur
Foundation**



**HUMANITY
UNITED**

ISBN 978-0-9826323-5-2



9 780982 632352