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**THE STRONG ARM OF CAPITAL: PROTECTING U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY**

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of

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in

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by

Cesar Estrella
June 2022

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ABSTRACT

The Strong Arm of Capital: Protecting U.S. National Security

Cesar Estrella

As a guiding thread for U.S. domestic and foreign policies, the protection of U.S. national security has long shaped the world. During the post-war era, the U.S. conceptualized the country's protection in terms of securing and leading the so-called "free world." This framing has led to the global expansion of a particular version of civilization based on western liberal values and the construction and reproduction of who and what needs security and against whom. Decades of continuous military growth, the erosion of civil liberties, numerous interventions in foreign countries, and the militarization of domestic law-enforcement agencies have been some of the direct consequences of U.S. national security doctrine. Why has U.S. national security policy remained consistent even in right-leaning republican and left-leaning democratic administrations since the Cold War? How does the U.S. understand, rationalize, and legitimize the protection of its national security both domestically and internationally?

This project analyzes the development, bipartisan articulations, and expansion of U.S. national security doctrine through its discursive, knowledge, and policy production from the Cold War through the so-called "end of history" period (i.e., the 1990s). Through a genealogical-historical and institutional approach, this study delves into hundreds of national security documents—declassified and leaked—to examine the national security establishment's own processes of meaning-making,

problematization, and rationalization. It argues that American national security doctrine catalyzes bipartisan consensus to promote profit-driven geopolitical interests and normalize non-democratic practices domestically and internationally. By tracing U.S. national security's ideological roots and bipartisan articulations, this study shows how existential threat narratives and the pursuit of civilizing missions (e.g., the exportation of freedom and democracy and trade liberalization) have legitimized the global expansion of U.S. capitalism as a matter of national survival. In the midst of a global pandemic, climate change crisis, and growing socioeconomic inequalities, this project offers an innovative analysis of U.S. national security for more thoroughly understanding the lasting consequences of past practices and engaging with the challenges that this doctrine has posed for world peace and global democracy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Para Gabriela.

Y a la Memoria de Laura Elena.

1. Introduction

> The United States, as it reaches its present position of world leadership, is learning, like other world powers before it, that the problem of national security is not intermittent but continuous, that it is not a secondary aspect of normal government activity but (as the authors of the Constitution clearly realized) a primary one, coloring and in many ways controlling nearly every other aspect of Government.
> —The Committee on the National Security Organization, 1949

> I had a little trouble when I got here, but I'm determined by the time I leave that we will see economic policy as a part of our national security and we will have a bipartisan economic policy, the way we had to have a bipartisan foreign policy in the cold war. We have got to do it, and expanding trade has got to be a part of it.
> —President Bill Clinton, 1993[1]

> Both sides need to grow up and put America's interests first—and that means doing what's right for our economy, our national security, and our public safety.
> —Donald J. Trump, *Time to Get Tough: Making America #1 Again*, 2011

1.1. Scope and Objective

Increasingly, the language of national security has become prevalent in political discourse worldwide. In July 2019, Japan stopped selling much-needed chemicals to South Korea's electronics industry, citing national security concerns.[2] In South America, various countries have been expelling Venezuelan refugees from their territories in the name of national security.[3] The agreement for the formation of the World Trade Organization, operationalized in 1995, has a national security exception

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[1] Clinton, W. (1993). *Remarks on endorsements of the North American Free Trade Agreement, November 9, 1993* [Transcript]. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-endorsements-the-north-american-free-trade-agreement-0.

[2] Dooley, B. (2019, July 15). Japan cites 'national security' in free trade crackdown. Sound familiar? *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/business/japan-south-korea-trade-war-semiconductors.html?searchResultPosition=1.

[3] See, for instance, Masiva migración venezolana se está convirtiendo en un tema de seguridad nacional. (2008, August 15). *TVPeru*. https://www.tvperu.gob.pe/noticias/politica/masiva-migracion-venezolana-se-esta-convirtiendo-en-un-tema-de-seguridad-nacional.

(GATT Article XXIII)[4] that allows member countries to bypass their contractual obligations under international law by invoking reasons of national security. For governments across the planet, the term has become a flexible buzzword that grants them the power and legitimacy to implement exceptions to well-established human rights protections, international agreements, laws, customs, and norms without much explanation and accountability.[5]

Historically, there have been world-altering consequences to the way "national security" has been understood and has been put into practice. In 1945, to protect its national security, the United States dropped two atomic bombs on civilian populations in Japan, ending World War II. Fast-forwarding to our century, in July 2019, at a congressional hearing on immigrant family separation, a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer could not decide if Sofi, a three-year-old immigrant from Central America, was either a criminal or posed a national security threat to the country for entering the country illegally (U.S. Congress, 2019). In our current era, the rise of racist, xenophobic, authoritarian, and nationalist political movements in countries with a long tradition of liberal governments also force us to ask what national security is and

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[4] World Trade Organization (1947). *The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947). Article XVIII: Governmental Assistance to Economic Development*. https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXXI.

[5] In Mexico, the current government of Manuel Lopez Obrador, in a document, titled "*La nueva política económica en los tiempos del coronavirus*" (México, Presidencia de la República, 2020) has revealed the expenses that prior governments had been making under the guise of "national security." For example, the document points out that government officials have used government-owned planes and helicopters to go shopping and play golf. As the document describes: "Agrego que el Estado Mayor Presidencial manejó una partida presupuestal que preveía dos mil millones de pesos solo para gastos de operación; para colmo, esos recursos se consideraban 'erogaciones para la seguridad nacional', y esta excusa los eximía de la obligación de comprobar los gastos en lo específico y les permitía hacerlo bajo el rubro de estimaciones generales" (p. 17).

whom it actually represents, serves, and defends. Whose security is the state concerned about? What exactly does the national entail? Who is included and excluded in the national security imaginary?

Throughout its history, the United States has been one of the primary users of the "national security" discourse, even institutionalizing it in 1947 through the National Security Act.[6] National security, particularly after 9/11, has become part of our daily vocabulary. For example, President Donald Trump constantly used it on Twitter—one of his preferred ways of communicating with the American public—to refer to a vast range of topics[7] and to justify his policy decisions.[8]

Invoking "national security" has historically allowed the U.S. government to systematically implement non-democratic measures and authoritarian solutions and has led to an ever-growing concentration of executive power in the development and implementation of national security policies (Hong, 2012). For example, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the discretionary power to prohibit the Office of the Inspector General "from carrying out or completing any audit or investigation" against DHS to "preserve the national security."[9] Also, the Federal

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[6] The National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 235 of July 26, 1947; 61 STAT. 496).

[7] Just three days after his inauguration, President Trump tweeted that he was having a "Busy week planned with a heavy focus on jobs and national security. Top executives coming in at 9:00 A.M. to talk manufacturing in America." In Trump, D. [@RealDonaldTrump]. (2017, January 23). Twitter. https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/823495059010109440.

[8] During his first week in office, President Trump signed three executive orders that his administration deemed urgent to protect U.S. national security: "Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States" (January 25, 2017), "Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements" (January 25, 2017), and "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States" (January 27, 2017).

[9] As established in the "Code of Laws of the United States of America," Title 5, "8I. Special provisions concerning the Department of Homeland Security."

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the power to send "national security letters" requiring businesses to release customer data without warrants or even probable cause.[10]

However, what is national security? What does it mean to declare that a particular issue is a national security threat to the United States? What are the criteria? In his analysis of security discourse, renowned linguistics scholar Paul Chilton (1996) asks why the English tradition has historically favored the noun "security" as opposed to the verb or adjective "secure." His answer is that the noun security "makes possible to avoid reference to the 'arguments' of the predication" (p. 22).

The aim of this dissertation, paraphrasing the title of Raymond Carver's famous short-story,[11] is to analyze what the United States talks about when it has talked about "national security." That is, it seeks to examine, paraphrasing Chilton, the arguments of the U.S. national security predications. This dissertation is not primarily concerned with what semantically "national security" is. Instead, it seeks to examine how U.S. national security doctrine has served to reproduce, recalibrate, and advance U.S. capitalist hegemony in the midst of ever-changing geopolitical contexts and, domestically, even with continuous transfers of governmental power between the republican and democratic parties.

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[10] The 2001 USA Patriot Act expanded the authority of the FBI on national security issues. Through the use of national security letters (NSL), the FBI, as explained by the ACLU's National Security Project, "can compile vast dossiers about innocent people and obtain sensitive information such as the web sites a person visits, a list of e-mail addresses with which a person has corresponded…The provision also allows the FBI to forbid or 'gag' anyone who receives an NSL from telling anyone about the record demand." In National Security Letters. *American Civil Liberties Union*. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.aclu.org/other/national-security-letters.
[11] The title of Raymond Carver's short story is: "What we talk about when we talk about love."

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Using a decolonial and cultural political economy approach, this dissertation analyzes the roots and continuities of U.S. national security doctrine from the Cold War through the so-called "end of history" period (i.e., the 1990s). The latter declared the triumph of Western liberal democracy as the final form of government for all nation-states and consolidated the role of the U.S. as the protector of the global liberal order. This dissertation argues that examining the ideological underpinnings of this period helps understand the continued growth and expansion of U.S. national security doctrine—and its "apparatus"—in our present day. Specifically, I analyze the building of bipartisan, ideological common ground through master narratives of civilization[12] (e.g., the exportation of American-style "freedom" and "democracy") and the construction of existential threats (e.g., the fight against what this project later defines as "transnational Calibans") to advance U.S. capitalism and legitimize non-democratic practices domestically and internationally.

Scholars have generally analyzed America's pursuit of global capitalism in four ways. One approach poses that, since the founding of the republic, global trade liberalization was deemed vital to the nation's development and prosperity. From Marxist-inspired perspectives, the global expansion of the U.S. economy is understood as an inevitable consequence of capitalists' pursuits of profits. Another approach explores how corporate interests have historically captured U.S. foreign and domestic policy to advance their interests. Finally, a culturalist approach frames the discussion

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[12] The notion of "grand narrative" was popularized by Jean-François Lyotard in his work *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1979) in order to criticize its use as a "metanarrative apparatus of legitimation" (p. xxiv) of norms, conducts and knowledges.

in terms of the myth of American exceptionalism with its inherent duty to lead the so-called "free world." Recognizing the relevance and limitations of these analytical approaches, this study analyzes how U.S. national security doctrine has framed imaginaries and rationalities that legitimize the global expansion of U.S. capitalism as a matter of existential survival.

Moreover, there are important studies that have analyzed the growth of the U.S. national security establishment after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil. Taking as a point of departure this world-altering event, these studies have demonstrated how a security logic has been gradually dominating U.S. and global politics. Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (2005) is one of the most representative figures of this approach. Agamben has shown, for instance, how 9/11 created what he defines as a "permanent state of exception" in detriment of Western liberal democratic values. This dissertation, however, focuses on the period from the conception of U.S. national security doctrine to the Clinton years.

This dissertation argues that while 9/11 might have provided further legitimization for the implementation of exceptional measures, an analysis of the genealogical evolution of national security doctrine is key to understanding current securitizing trends. Of course, 9/11 accelerated the pace of these trends as it legitimized the need to expand the U.S. national security apparatus by "taking," as President Bush described in his 2003 State of the Union address, "unprecedented measures to protect

our people and defend our homeland."[13] Just a year before the 9/11 attacks, the neoconservative Project for a New American Century (Kagan et al., 2000)[14] had already argued that the process of strengthening U.S. military defenses and U.S. global leadership "is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor" (p. 51). The terrorist attacks in New York City accelerated this process.

However, this dissertation will show that the U.S.—and global—securitizing trend had already been taking place, particularly through the Clinton administration and its inclusion of non-military, non-existential issues into the realm of national security governance. Despite the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the triumph of Western liberal democracy as "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution" (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 4), with its tropes, among others, of "freedom," "democracy," "the individual," and "property rights" has needed, as this project will argue, a strong security apparatus to support it.

Christos Boukalas (2019), when analyzing the United Kingdom's counterterrorism program and its repressive features, has pointed out that the "constitutive paradox is obvious: counter-extremism destroys liberalism by protecting

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[13] Bush, W. G. (2003*). State of the Union Address to the 108th Congress the United States* [Transcript]. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
[14] Established in 1997, the "Project for a New American Century" promoted U.S. global leadership and active U.S. military interventions which required, according to them, the building of an even stronger military. In 2000, they published a report titled: *Rebuilding American defenses: Strategy, forces and resources for a new century* where they urgently argued for U.S. military global hegemony. As the report points out: "Since today's peace is the unique product of American preeminence, a failure to preserve that preeminence allows others an opportunity to shape the world in ways antithetical to American interests and principles" (Kagan et al., 2000, p. 73). Some of its members, including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz, served in the administration of George W. Bush.

it" (p. 478). However, this dissertation will argue that the liberal project is also a security project with the intrinsic ability to implement so-called "exceptional measures" to defend itself. In this respect, liberty and security can be understood as two sides of the same coin, working in tandem at various levels and adapting to specific contexts to protect and advance the Western liberal order.

1.2. Project Significance

Throughout the years, U.S. government funding has boosted academic programs, technological innovations, and scholarly work to expand the national security establishment. For example, post-9/11, there has been a rapid growth in academic programs in national security studies that have served, for the most part, to reproduce U.S. national security doctrine (Giroux, 2007; Neocleous, 2008). Moreover, both STEM fields and the social sciences have benefitted from U.S. national security funding. They have actively participated in developing and implementing national security policies both domestically and internationally. For example, there is a long-documented history of the participation of psychologists[15] and anthropologists (Price

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[15] For example, during the fifties, the U.S. government created the so-called "Project Camelot" (Methods for Predicting and Influencing Social Change and Internal War Potential) which actively recruited U.S. social scientists to further U.S. national security objectives, particularly in Latin America. The project was cancelled in 1965 after its existence came to light. Nonetheless, in December of that year, a congressional report by the House of Representative's Committee on Foreign Affairs titled *Behavioral Sciences and the National Security* on "Winning the Cold War: the US ideological Offense" called for the establishment of a similar program. It argued that "to do their job in assisting the nations defending themselves against Communist subversion, U.S. military personnel—and the people who are being aided—must understand the motivations of the enemy, its weak points and its strengths. Behavioral sciences research helps to provide this basic information." (U.S. Congress, 1965, p. 5).

2016) in advancing the objectives of the U.S. national security apparatus. The U.S. government has also funded the establishment of "area studies" at the university level to advance U.S. national security interests (Yudice, 2003).

Moreover, and despite the neoliberal discourses on the marvels of the free-market and private innovation, many U.S. products have been developed with public funding, in what has been termed as "military Keynesianism." For example, with public funding, the U.S. Department of Defense's DARPA project (The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), created in 1958, has been responsible for some of the greatest technological innovations that the world now enjoys (Mazzucato, 2013; Weiss, 2014), such as the GPS, the internet, and even the MRNA technology that made the COVID-19 vaccine possible.[16]

Throughout the years, academia has played a key role in the growth of the national security apparatus. As Mark Neocleous (2008) points out, "the social sciences have not only ended up operating within the same discursive practices that constitute an unreflective apology for the national security state and its imperialist drive, but they have often been forged by the national security state for that very purpose" (pp. 160-161). Despite these historic shortcomings throughout U.S. academia, UCSC's interdisciplinary field of Latin American and Latino Studies (LALS), with its emphasis on power structures and from a "Global South" and decolonial perspective, has helped to broaden this dissertation's approach (later explained in chapters 2 and 3). It has given

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[16] Sonne, P. (2020, July 30). How a secretive Pentagon agency seeded the ground for a rapid coronavirus cure. *The Washington Post.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/how-a-secretive-pentagon-agency-seeded-the-ground-for-a-rapid-coronavirus-cure/2020/07/30/ad1853c4-c778-11ea-a9d3-74640f25b953_story.html.

this project the tools to develop a critical perspective of U.S. national security doctrine. What does protecting U.S. national security mean when changing the analytical lens to those at the receiving end? Latin America, often depicted as the U.S.' backyard, has been subjected to numerous U.S. interventions throughout history.

Why is this project focusing on understanding U.S. national security? After World War II, the U.S. became one of the two global powers. With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. became the sole global power, with an unmatched military. It has been estimated—since the information is classified—that the U.S. has approximately seventy military bases in at least eighty countries (Vine, 2015). The U.S. controls the international financial system, and the U.S. dollar is the global currency, an arrangement that, as argued by Michael Hudson (2021), "has enabled" the U.S. "to draw on the resources of the rest of the world without reciprocity, governing financially through its debtor position, not through its creditor status" (p. 422), particularly since the U.S. abandoned the gold standard in the seventies.

Moreover, the country has veto power over the most important transnational governance institutions (e.g., the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization). The U.S.' influence in shaping the world we live in is undeniable. As Gindin and Panitch (2012) have argued, "it took an empire of a new kind, founded on US capitalism's great economic strength and centered on the capacities of the American state, to make global capitalism a reality" (p. 331).

In this respect, this dissertation argues that an analysis of U.S. national security doctrine can provide important clues to help understand current securitizing trends. After all, a "doctrine," is an established "truth," supported by ideological underpinnings, which translate—in a governance framework—into specific policies. And, those policies are implemented through specific practices. All of them are shaped by what this dissertation defines as the "U.S. national security apparatus," explained in detail later on. There are, of course, different levels of analysis. This dissertation argues that to understand U.S. national security practices (e.g., military interventions, control of the global financial system), it becomes essential to analyze how U.S. national security doctrine has guided U.S. domestic and foreign policies.

By questioning hegemonic narratives and longstanding policies, this project provides a critical analysis of U.S. national security for more thoroughly understanding the lasting consequences of past practices and engaging with the challenges that this doctrine has posed for world peace and global democracy. Will the pandemic, climate change, or growing inequalities prompt a reformulation of what it means to protect U.S. national security? Will they challenge the dominant doctrine of national security and its long history of non-democratic practices? While difficult to predict, the future may depend on radically rethinking U.S. national security doctrine.

1.3. Methodology

In his comprehensive study about U.S. national security policy, Michael Glennon (2015) asks: "Why does national security policy remain constant even when

one President is replaced by another, who as a candidate repeatedly, forcefully, and eloquently promised fundamental changes in that policy?" (p. 3). Glennon argues that since the institutionalization of U.S. national security in 1947, the country has moved towards a sort of parallel governmental structure (what he refers to as "double government") divided between "Madisonian institutions" (i.e., the visible—democratic and representative—three branches of governmental power) and a "Trumanite network" reminiscent of what French scholar Didier Bigo (2002) has labeled, the "professionals of security" (p. 64).

Glennon (2015) argues that it is the "Trumanite network" who, in a secretive, non-accountable, and non-democratic fashion, make and remake U.S. national security policy, justifying both their power and legitimacy on technocratically urgent life and death discourses (what some call "the deep state," or the "military-industrial complex"). After all, according to Glennon, no politician "wants to place himself (or a colleague or a potential political successor) at risk by looking weak and gambling that the Trumanites are mistaken" (p. 61). In Glennon's assessment, the Western liberal democratic order has somewhat been overpowered—and even corrupted—by an increasingly dominant security logic.

This dissertation argues that another approach to analyze the bipartisan articulations and consensuses in U.S. national security policy is by adopting a cultural political economy and decolonial approach to U.S. national security and its interconnection to the expansion of U.S. capitalism. The two research questions that guide this dissertation are: (1) Why has U.S. national security policy remained

consistent even in right-leaning republican and left-leaning democratic administrations since the Cold War?; and (2) How does the U.S. understand, rationalize, and legitimize the protection of its national security both domestically and internationally?

In *Imagining the State* (2003), international relations scholar Mark Neocleous ponders the following question: "If the state can be imagined in terms of the body, can it also be imagined in terms of the mind?" (p. 39).[17] That is to say, and for the purposes of this dissertation, is it possible to analyze a state institution—in this case, the U.S. national security apparatus—from what decolonial scholar Walter Mignolo (2000) has referred to as its "locus of enunciation"?[18] Is it possible to analyze the U.S. national security apparatus to understand its own processes of meaning-making, rationalization, legitimation, and consensus-building? This dissertation argues that one avenue to undertake this enterprise is by studying the U.S. national security apparatus' discursive, knowledge, and policy production and by providing specific examples of its resulting implementation to illustrate the process.

Catherine Ramirez (2020), in *Assimilation: An Alternative History,* undertakes a genealogical excavation to challenge long-established understandings of assimilation processes in the U.S. context. Ramirez's focus is on identifying "what (or who) is missing in conversations about assimilation" (p. 17) to analyze how certain absences

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[17] As Neocleous (2003) explains: "The state not only constitutes the social body, fabricates order and controls a territory, it also occupies an epistemological space. It is in this sense that the statist political imaginary encourages us to think of the mind of the state. The idea that the state knows and can reason is used by the state to legitimize its power over civil society and circumvent attempts to impose limits on its power vis à-vis its own subjects" (p. 46).

[18] Ramon Grosfoguel (2007) defines the locus of enunciation as the "geo-political and body-political epistemic location in the structures of colonial power/knowledge from which the subject speaks" (p. 213).

also produce meanings and help broaden our understanding of assimilation as a "key element of the US nation-making project" (p. 144). Drawing on this approach but reversing the exploratory focus, this project seeks to identify what and who is included in U.S. national security doctrine to analyze how specific presences—i.e., threats and objectives—produce meanings and define the boundaries of who and what needs protecting and against whom (i.e., the arguments of the national security predications).

The United States has a long history of national security legislation, discourses, and practices, even if that exact term has not always been employed.[19] While "national security" is an elusive and hard concept to analyze, this dissertation uses an institutional genealogical methodological analysis to examine the term's continuities, changes, and articulations, focusing from its formalization through the 1947 National Security Act up to the so-called "end of history" period (i.e., the 1990s). Specifically, this dissertation provides an analysis of the legitimization and common-sense problematization of U.S. national security in policy-making and everyday life through what this project refers to as the U.S. national security apparatus.

Following the works of Michel Foucault and others (Foucault, 1995; Castro Gomez, 2010), by genealogy, I refer to a critical historical analysis and interpretation of discursive and non-discursive practices that have helped shape our present situation

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[19] Words like "safety" and "survival" have also been used in the sense of protecting the United States—as a whole— and ensuring its continuity (i.e., U.S. national security). For example, on April 6, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson issued "Proclamation 1364: Declaring that a State of War Exists between the United States and Germany," where he specifically declared the need to protect the "safety of the United States." In National Archives and Records Administration. Office of the Federal Register. 4/1/1985- *Presidential Proclamation 1364 of April 6, 1917, by President Woodrow Wilson Declaring War Against Germany.* https://catalog.archives.gov/id/299966.

by establishing regimes of truths[20] which, paraphrasing decolonial scholar Walter Mignolo, restrict both the terms and content of the conversation (2000). And, for this project, the usage, institutionalization, and legitimization of "U.S. national security" in domestic issues and international relations worldwide to advance a specific cultural political economy agenda.

Foucault (1995), when explaining his desire to write a history of disciplinary prison, reflectively asked: "Why? Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means writing history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present" (p. 31). In that respect, this dissertation's concern is not to elucidate the semantics of the term "national security" or to provide an account of its historical trajectory, but to analyze and understand the power dynamics, articulations, consensuses, and the cultural political economy (Jessop, 2010)[21] that has systematically made possible both its sustainability, reproduction, and expansion in our present world, with a special emphasis on what this project refers to as the U.S.-Latin American geopolitical corridor (see Chapter 2). This dissertation argues that the period before the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil will help elucidate the growth and expansion of the U.S. national security apparatus in our present day.

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[20] As Foucault (2008) explains: "When I say regime of truth I do not mean that at this moment politics or the art of government becomes rational….I mean that the moment I am presently trying to indicate is marked by the articulation of a particular type of discourse and a set of practices, a discourse that, on the one hand, constitutes these practices as a set bound together by an intelligible connection and, on the other hand, legislates and can legislate on these practices in terms of true and false" (p. 18).

[21] As explained by Bob Jessop: "Cultural political economy is an emerging post-disciplinary approach that highlights the contribution of the cultural turn (a concern with semiosis or meaning-making) to the analysis of the articulation between the economic and the political and their embedding in broader sets of social relations" (2010, p. 336).

Why is this dissertation favoring a genealogical analysis over other methods such as a traditional historical periodization? This dissertation is not going to undertake the history of U.S. national security. Instead, this research project asks why and how this object, or, in Foucauldian terms, "truth"—the protection of U.S. national security against what it deems as ever-present and ever-growing existential threats—has been reproduced since the Cold War era through an apparatus (i.e., *dispositif*) to legitimize a specific cultural political economy agenda. For Foucault, a genealogy is a method that allows an analysis of mechanisms of power and how these power dynamics, throughout different contexts, create and recreate processes of domination and normalization.

As Santiago Castro Gomez explains, the genealogical method allows to not only diagnose why and how specific subjectivities have been constituted, but it also contributes to denaturalize those same subjectivities (2010). Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation's genealogy of U.S. national security is to critically analyze its rationalities, technologies of power, bipartisan articulations, and why and how it has operated to legitimize specific practices and to build consensuses amidst changing contexts. In this respect, this project embarks on a genealogical periodization to better analyze the processes of meaning-making, articulations, and consensus-building efforts in the reproduction of the U.S. national security apparatus since the Cold War through the "end of history" period. I also borrow from Colombian anthropologist Arturo Escobar's method of "institutional ethnography," the purpose of which is to "unpack the work of institutions and bureaucracies, to train ourselves to see what culturally we

have been taught to overlook, namely, the participation of institutional practices in the making of the world" (1995, p. 113).

In this respect, an institutional genealogical analysis of national security can provide a critical understanding of how the United States has utilized the term as well as its importance in present-day discourses and practices, taking into particular consideration the hegemonic role of the U.S. within the capitalist world-system. As history has already taught us, the protection of U.S. national security has not only shaped our world but continues to have a profound impact on peoples across borders, genders, races, and generations, as shown, for instance, in President Trump's 2017 travel ban targeting Muslim countries and the incarceration of asylum seekers from Latin America in a direct violation of U.S. international obligations.[22]

My primary sources are U.S. laws, policies, reports, legal decisions, presidential speeches, newspaper articles, as well as think tanks' and international organizations' official texts, primarily the United Nations and its affiliated agencies. In particular, U.S. national security documents provide an excellent resource to analyze, in detail, national security trends. Since 1986, through the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act,[23] the U.S. government, specifically its executive branch, is required to submit written national security strategies to Congress every year. While

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[22] For example, article 33 of the United Nations' Refugee Convention (UNHCR 2010), ratified by the United States in 1968, clearly states that "The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence."

[23] The Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Pub.L. 99–433) was signed into law on October 1, 1986.

not every president has complied with the law yearly,[24] a textual and genealogical analysis of these documents offers the possibility to trace and connect national security rationalities and practices.

Moreover, there is a wealth of national security documents that also enable a comprehensive comparison and analysis. Some national security documents have been declassified, while others have been obtained thanks to the work of whistleblowers. While different administrations have attempted to include their unique signatures to the themes—and even names—of national security documents,[25] the challenge is to examine the discursive narratives and the real-life practices that produce meanings (meaning-making),[26] articulations, and continuities within the U.S. national security apparatus in both republican and democratic administrations. As Escobar reminds us: "Documentary practices are…embedded in external social relations and deeply implicated in mechanisms of ruling. Through them…the internal processes of organizations are linked to external social relations involving governments, international organizations, corporations, and communities" (1995, pp. 108-109).[27]

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[24] There has been a total of seventeen national security strategies: 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2015 and 2017. President Trump did not issue a national security strategy for 2018, 2019, and 2020. This dissertation will reference them in the text as "NSS," together with the corresponding year. In the bibliography chapter (9), they will be referenced as "The White House. National Security Strategy," and will include the full citation.

[25] Among these documents, there are: National Security Action Memorandums (Kennedy-Johnson: 1961-69); National Security Decision Memorandums (Nixon-Ford, 1969-77); National Security Study Memorandums (Nixon-Ford, 1969-77); National Security Division Directives; (Reagan, 1981-89); Presidential Policy Directives (Obama, 2009-16), etcetera.

[26] As Bob Jessop (2010) explains, "in emphasizing the foundational nature of meaning and meaning-making in social relations, CPE [Cultural Political Economy] does not seek to add 'culture' to economics and politics as if each comprised a distinct area of social life; nor, analogously, does it aim to apply 'cultural theory' as a useful tool in policy analysis. Instead, it stresses the semiotic nature of all social relations" (p. 337).

[27] While conducting interviews does not play a salient role in this dissertation's analysis, the data obtained through an institutional genealogical analysis of national security will be complemented by

Some scholars have argued that while U.S. national security strategies (hereinafter, NSSs) allow comparative analysis, they also present analytical challenges since they do not follow the same methodology and use differentiated language. For example, scholar Aaron Ettinger (2017) has argued that: "Ultimately, interpretation of continuity and change through the NSS document is a matter of interpretation" (p. 116). While this project utilizes NSSs for its analysis, they will be accompanied by an examination of other national security documents, discourses, policies, legislation, and practices to broaden the analytical (i.e., genealogical and institutional) scope.

After all, it is worth noting that, from its locus of enunciation, President Ronald Reagan's 1988 NSS argued that: "While it is commonplace to hear that U.S. National Security Strategy changes erratically every four to eight years as a result of a new Administration taking office, in reality there is a remarkable consistency over time when our policies are viewed in historical perspective" (p. 1). The document adds that U.S. national security's main interests and objectives "have changed little since World War II" (p. 1).

Of course, one can make the argument that the 1988 NSS pointed out the obvious since, throughout the Cold War, there was a general bipartisan consensus that the Soviet Union represented the biggest existential threat to the United States. What purpose did the Soviet Union serve in the U.S. national security apparatus' attempts to create a U.S.-led capitalist world order? Have there been other objectives, existential

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interviews with government officials in the U.S. Latin America. During 2019, I conducted a total of twenty-nine interviews.

threats, and civilization narratives that have prompted bipartisan national security articulations and consensuses during and after the Cold War? This project will argue in chapter three that a decolonial and cultural political economy approach can shed light on both the consistency and articulations of U.S. national security doctrine, even after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

1.4. Plan of Dissertation

Besides the introduction and conclusion (chapters one and eight, respectively), six chapters comprise this dissertation. Chapter two discusses the most relevant theoretical approaches for this dissertation: (1) security studies and (2) decolonial studies. It also identifies and defines the key concepts and terminology that this dissertation will focus on, namely "national security," "neoliberal globalization," and "the U.S.-Latin American geopolitical corridor." Building on that discussion, chapter three proposes a cultural political economy and decolonial approach to analyzing U.S. national security, focusing on the relationship between liberalism and security.

Following this dissertation's institutional genealogical methodological analysis, a periodization has been created to examine U.S. national security doctrine. In the fourth chapter, I explore the precursors of the U.S. national security discourse by focusing on the creation of a civil organization called the National Security League in 1914. In the fifth chapter, this project provides an overview of the institutionalization of the U.S. national security apparatus during the Cold War, the construction of the

Soviet Union as the "existential enemy other," and its interconnection with the need to spread U.S. capitalism to the world to protect U.S. national security.

In the eighties, the decade that signaled the rapid decline of the Soviet Union, chapter six focuses on the Ronald Reagan administration and its utilization of civilization narratives of "freedom" and "democracy" and the construction of existential threat narratives beyond the so-called "red scare" to expand U.S. capitalism through its national security apparatus and promote neoliberal policies around the world. In the seventh chapter, with the fall of the Soviet Union, this dissertation examines the celebratory tones of a "new world order" and the "end of history" during the 1990s based on U.S. hegemony and global free trade. In this context, it discusses the renewed importance of the U.S. national security apparatus to safeguard the global economic order both domestically and internationally and its construction of new existential threats and civilization missions to expand its reach.

Finally, this dissertation will end with a conclusion chapter that summarizes the main findings of this research project. Moreover, it will discuss the implications and consequences of the interconnection between protecting U.S. national security, U.S.-led global hegemony, and the spread of U.S. capitalism both domestically and internationally in its neoliberal phase.

2. U.S. National Security: Overview and Theoretical Considerations

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part provides an overview and critique of the two most relevant theoretical approaches for this dissertation: security and decolonial studies. The second part discusses the key concepts and terminology for this dissertation: "national security," "neoliberal globalization," and "the U.S.-Latin American geopolitical corridor." By providing both an analysis and critique of these theoretical approaches and concepts, this chapter aims to set the stage for a subsequent explanation—detailed in chapter three—of this project's utilization of a cultural political economy and decolonial approach to analyzing U.S. national security.

2.1. Theoretical Background

Security Studies

In traditional security studies, realist and neorealist interpretations have analyzed state behavior in terms of selfishness and competition in an anarchic and dangerous world (Booth, 2007). Under this logic, the United States' support of right-wing military dictatorships in Latin America during the Cold War, to give an example, was an attempt to protect its national security by preventing the Soviet Union from having any type of influence over the U.S. geopolitical backyard. Following the same vein, the so-called Global War on Terror has been a direct—and, according to a realist interpretation, even a natural—response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. From a culturalist approach, historian Ernest May has argued that security policies are conditioned by what he calls the nation's nightmares of the past (1973). In this logic, the attacks on

Pearl Harbor and U.S. continental soil on 9/11 have prompted the United States' urgent need to prevent attacks and to be able to enter a war at a moment's notice to protect itself and its interests.

National security scholar and former Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Clinton administration Graham Allison, in an article with Gregory Treverton (1992), have argued that from the period between the end of World War II to the early nineties, Americans "knew what national security meant: protection against the overarching threat of the Soviet Union" (p. 16). That is to say, for the general public, U.S. national security was about the military existential threat that the Soviet Union posed to the country and the need to prepare for a nuclear attack.

Academia, for the most part, followed suit.[28] For example, during the Cold War, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) funded and organized many events, committees, and working groups to discuss how academia could support the pursuit of U.S. national security.[29] Reporting on a "Conference on National Security Policy: Problems of Research and Teaching," a 1957 SSRC newsletter linked—and constrained—U.S. national security to military preparedness and response in the

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[28] Historically, there has been a close interconnection between academia and the U.S. national security apparatus. One significant example is the emergence of the interdisciplinary field of "area studies," a product of the Cold War to advance U.S. interests (Yudice, 2003). Additionally, as Linda Weiss (2014) has argued, the U.S. national security apparatus has had a profound impact in the development of new technologies through providing research funding to American universities.

[29] After all, and as it will be later discussed, Pendleton Herring, one of the architects of the institutionalization of national security in the United States, became president of the Social Science Research Council in 1948. His tenure at the SSRC lasted twenty years. Between 1942 and 1946, Herring was the chairman of the Committee of Records of War Administration which supported the growth and centralization of U.S. military power. According to Douglas Stuart (2008), "the most important contribution that Herring made to the post–World War II debate about institutional reform was his emphasis upon the concept of 'national security' as a more appropriate and reliable guide to foreign and defense planning than the traditional concept of national interest" (p. 27).

context of a bipolar world. It even pointed out that some scholars were hesitant to get involved in the developing academic field of national security studies because of their "lack of knowledge of military strategy and weaponry to undertake to teach courses in this general field" (p. 31).[30]

In the early nineties, however, Ole Waever (1993) challenged the traditional understanding of security studies in international relations that restricted the framework to existential threats of a military type, generally between nation-states, in what has come to be known as the "Copenhagen School of Security Studies." The school broadened the security agenda to what its members defined as five security sectors: (1) military (i.e., existential threats to the state and its capacity to govern); (2) environmental (i.e., the survival of the species in an ever-hostile natural environment); (3) economic (i.e., economic crises that affect the well-being of the state and its population); (4) political (i.e., non-military threats that can cause chaos and disorder such as massive protests); and (5) societal (i.e., as Waever (1993) explains, the "ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats" (p. 23), such as the arrival of international migrants who do not share the "essential character" of the receiving society.

Building on the works of Carl Schmitt during the 1920s, the Copenhagen school is based on the "logic of exemption," that is, the need to prevent and counteract exceptional threats through exceptional measures (Waever, 1993; Huysmans, 2006).

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[30] Wood, B. (1957). Report on the Conference on National Security Policy: Problems of Research and Teaching. *Social Science Research Council Items*, volume 11, number 3, September 1957, pp. 29-32. https://issuu.com/ssrcitemsissues/docs/items_vol11_no3_1957?e=24618429/35321723.

The School's approach focuses on the (1) top-down processes by which security threats—military and non-military—are presented to the public (i.e., what the School calls "the audience") through "speech acts"[31] (Buzan et al., 1998) in order to securitize certain issues (what the School refers to as the "securitization move"); and (2) the securitization process, which finalizes with the targeted audience's acceptance (i.e., consent) of the securitization of a particular issue.

The Copenhagen School has been mainly criticized for placing too much emphasis on the power of discourse without analyzing if that discourse has actually translated into specific policies and practices. Also, measuring the levels of acceptance of the audience—and identifying who the audience is—becomes problematic (Bigo, 2002). In addition, the school has been criticized for its "top-down" statist/elitist approach. For example, Roxanne Doty (2007), when analyzing civilian border patrols (e.g., the Minutemen) in the United States, shows that securitization practices (i.e., the "securitization move") can also emerge from non-state actors who are able to exercise pressure on governments "from below" and have a direct negative impact on the (perceived) threat itself, in this particular case, international migrants from Latin America.

Traditional security scholars have criticized the school, fearing that expanding the security agenda would cause a distraction in the identification and efforts of states

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[31] As Thierry Balzacq (2005) explains, "In essence, the basic idea of the speech act theory is simply expressed — certain statements, according to Austin, do more than merely describe a given reality and, as such, cannot be judged as false or true. Instead these utterances realize a specific action; they 'do' things — they are 'performatives' as opposed to 'constatives' that simply report states of affairs and are thus subject to truth and falsity tests" (p. 175). Waever (1995) even claims that "by definition, something is a security problem when elites declare it to be so" (p. 54).

to counteract military threats (Booth, 2007). However, and as I will discuss later on in this dissertation, the Copenhagen School has lined up with the "other threats" that the U.S. national security apparatus has been identifying since the disappearance of the Soviet Union, such as organized crime, international migration, narcotics, the environment, threats to the economic order, among others. In this respect and from a critical approach, Ken Booth (2007) has argued that the Copenhagen School does not represent "a call for a radical rethink of security theory as much as a call to mainstream analysts to broaden the security agenda of states away from their overwhelming concern with military power" (p. 162).

From the perspective of this dissertation in its analysis of U.S. national security, there are limitations in the Copenhagen School's approach. As I will argue later, U.S. national security needs to be understood not only in terms of its discursive powers but also in terms of a self-functioning Foucauldian *dispositif* (i.e., apparatus) composed of a wide variety of actors united by a specific cultural political economy agenda. Also, an analysis of U.S. national security has to take into consideration the unique geopolitical power and global reach of the United States, which significantly differs from that of other countries. Moreover, while it is important for the U.S. national security apparatus to legitimize its actions (i.e., securitizing moves) before American and international audiences, it does not need their approval to finalize the securitization process. The U.S. national security apparatus is also able to function through the rationality of "reason of state," (see Chapter 3) that is, it has been empowered to make

emergency decisions and utilize exceptional measures to protect U.S. national security bypassing democratic processes.

In contrast to the Copenhagen School, the Paris School of Security Studies argues that securitization is not necessarily a top-down speech act. Drawing primarily from the works of Michel Foucault, the School developed the concept of the "governmentality of unease" to explain the dynamics by which a certain issue is securitized and reproduced through technologies of power (i.e., narratives, surveillance, biometrics) in order to discipline and control populations. As Didier Bigo (2002) explains when analyzing the securitization of international migration: "[it] is, thus, a transversal political technology, used as a mode of governmentality by diverse institutions to play with the unease, or to encourage it if it does not yet exist, so as to affirm their role as providers of protection and security and to mask some of their failures" (p. 65).

According to this school, the securitizing process is mainly fueled by the interactions, tensions, and struggles among politicians' fears and their need to control populations, the day-to-day practices of bureaucrats who create a sense of insecurity through technocratic discourses, and alienated citizens who have lost ground due to neoliberal dislocations (i.e., unemployment, precarity, inequality). The most salient critique of this school is that, under the "governmentality of unease" framework, it becomes difficult to identify who the securitizing actor is and why and how the securitizing need emerged in the first place (Bourbeau, 2011). While the analysis that this dissertation proposes is closer to the Paris School, there are still differences,

particularly with the inclusion of geopolitical asymmetries and unique U.S. hegemonic agendas. In this respect, this dissertation will try to answer in the following chapter how a decolonial and a cultural political economy approach can be useful to study the particularities of U.S. national security.

To conclude, it is worth pointing out that in the expansion of security issues since the 1980s, Academia, just as it did during the Cold War, has intimately accompanied these new—and growing—security priorities since then. To give an example, in the United States, after 9/11, there has been a rapid growth in undergraduate and graduate programs in homeland and national security studies that have served to reproduce and legitimize non-democratic practices worldwide.

Historically, the U.S. government has provided generous funding for universities to advance its national security agenda (Neocleous, 2008). One of the recommendations of the 1945 congressional report titled *Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Post War Organization for National Security*—which served as a basis for the development of the 1947 National Security Act—explained that "Educational institutions and scientific laboratories can serve as channels of communication between the military and civilians. An arrangement with the universities and with industrial and scientific laboratories by which skilled men move back and forth between Washington and their own principal employment is needed" (Eberstadt, 1945, p. 16).

As Henry Giroux (2007) has demonstrated, from its inception, academia was deemed as an integral part of the military-industrial complex. For example, the U.S.

Fulbright Program is one of the largest fellowship providers to conduct research abroad. As the U.S. Department of Education's website states, one of the program's objectives is to "advance national security by developing a pipeline of highly proficient linguists and experts in critical world regions."[32]

Decolonial Studies

The decolonial approach emerged primarily in Latin American scholarship, taking as a point of departure Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system theory (1974), but from a different epistemological positioning and going beyond economic determinism. Wallerstein's initial formulation argued that the world was interconnected through unequal economic relations dominated by a capitalist core.[33] Decolonial thinkers sought to challenge Eurocentrism and the global epistemological and structural order in place by adding to world-systems theory an analysis of the racial, ethnic, gender, and cognitive global hierarchies set in place for the benefit of the dominant powers and the reproduction of the capitalist world order. In addition, they provided an alternative interpretation of the role of the Americas in the constitution of the world-system and the emergence and consolidation of the West as the dominant power on the planet (Dussel, 1993; Escobar, 2007).

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[32] U.S. Department of Education. *About OPE - International and Foreign Language Education*. https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/iegps/index.html.
[33] Immanuel Wallerstein has later expanded his theories in order to include a decolonial approach that also takes into consideration the specific role of the Americas in the constitution of the world-system. He has even collaborated with Anibal Quijano in the production of scholarship work around these issues (Quijano & Wallerstein, 1992).

A central idea of the decolonial perspective is the interconnection between modernity and coloniality as "two sides of the same coin," which has also been referred to as the "modern/colonial world-system" (Mignolo, 2000, p. 53). Modernity, according to this view, did not originate in Northern Europe in the times of the reformation, enlightenment, the French Revolution, or the industrial revolution, as most European authors have argued, but with the conquest of the Americas and exploitation of that continent which allowed the West (nowadays referred to as the "Global North") to gradually become the hegemonic power of the world by displacing other cultures to the periphery of the world-system and by imposing its ways of life and modes of governance onto other civilizations (Escobar, 2007).

An important concept to understand the decolonial approach is the term "coloniality of power." It was coined by Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano (2000) to describe the global imposition and continuity of the hierarchical order that was established more than five hundred years ago through European expansion and the colonization and exploitation of other cultures. According to this perspective, even though colonization has formally ended in most parts of the planet, the Eurocentric structures of racial and ethnic classifications and the division of the world into superior and inferior cultures established at the time of the conquest continue to have a profound negative impact on non-western(ized)/non-white populations by reproducing similar patterns of domination, exploitation, oppression, and subalternization.

In terms of the role of the Americas in relation to the West and the modern/colonial world-system, Mignolo (2000) has argued that the continent—from

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the time of its so-called "discovery"—has been considered an extension of Europe (the West) and not its opposite/other (p. 130). As the Argentinian author explains: "The Occident, however, was never Europe's Other but the difference within the sameness: Indias Occidentales (as you can see in the very name) and later America, was the extreme West, not its alterity. America, contrary to Asia and Africa, was included as part of Europe's extension and not as its difference" (p. 58). This particular location of Latin America as a racially and culturally inferior extension of the West—and not its other—has subalternized Latin America in a very particular way, that is, in an unequally dependent modern/colonial relationship.

Similarly, Roberto Fernandez Retamar, in his famous essay "Caliban: Notes towards a Discussion of Culture in Our America," published originally in the 1970s, argues that the symbol of Latin America is Caliban, the racially and culturally inferior savage in Shakespeare's famous play, *The Tempest*. As Fernandez Retamar (1989) explains: "Prospero invaded the islands, killed our ancestors, enslaved Caliban, and taught him his language to be himself understood" (p. 14). And, Prospero taught Caliban his language and culture because he needed Caliban to accept his subordinate place in the new world order and serve his interests, as the white/Western magician of the island himself admitted: "We cannot miss him: he does make our fire" (Shakespeare et al., 2003, p. 8).

In a similar manner, Latin America has provided raw materials, natural resources, and a legion of cheap, flexible, and disposable workers for capital accumulation—a sort of "transnational Caliban"—for the benefit of the Global North.

With the emergence of the United States as the world's superpower—what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2001) has termed the "European American Century"—the geographical location of Latin America to the South of the United States has been transformed into a geopolitical imaginary that reinforces the North/South hierarchical divide and the notion of Latin America as the United States' backyard, hence, its extension.

The epistemological influence of the Global North over the Global South is enacted through what Walter Mignolo (2002) has defined as the "geopolitics of knowledge production." It is a process that transforms Western subjectivities and epistemologies into objective scientific universals on how to see, analyze, understand, and classify the world through what Santiago Castro-Gomez (2008) has named "the hubris of zero degrees."[34] While Global North local imaginaries continuously become global designs, the local imaginaries of those subalternized have been silenced—or pushed to the periphery—within the modern/colonial world-system because they are considered inferior. Since Western knowledge production has become hegemonic, theories from the West (i.e., the Global North) are privileged over others. However, as

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[34] The hubris of zero degrees, as Castro-Gomez (2008) explains, refers to: "a form of human knowledge that entails the pretense of objectivity and scientificity, and takes for granted the fact that the observer is not part of what is being observed" (p. 282) pointing out that, from this Western perspective, "all human knowledge is arranged on an epistemological scale that goes from the traditional to the modern, from barbarism to civilization, from the community to the individual, from tyranny to democracy, from the individual to the universal, from East to West" (p. 283). The term "hubris of zero degrees" closely resembles Donna Haraway's (1988) concept of "situated knowledges." As the author explains: "This is the gaze that mythically inscribes all the marked bodies, that makes the unmarked category claim the power to see and not be seen, to represent while escaping representation. This gaze signifies the unmarked positions of Man and White, one of the many nasty tones of the word 'objectivity'" (p. 581).

Arturo Escobar (1995) reminds us, "the understanding of the world is much broader than the Western understanding of the world" (p. 16).

The geopolitics of knowledge production and the coloniality of power within the modern/colonial world-system have had a profound influence on national and global public policy and academic debates, shaping laws and forms of governance and promoting a common-sense understanding of the way forward for the entire world. As a concrete example, Arturo Escobar (1995) points out that the current popularity of the "development" discourse can be traced back to the success of the Marshall Plan through the aid that the United States provided to Western Europe to rebuild that particular region of the world in the wake of the second world war. That is to say, a Western European (local) problem/history—and success—became the root of the all-encompassing (global) development discourse/design for the third-world,[35] leading to the creation of academic programs on the subject, thousands of books and articles written and, perhaps more importantly, a common-sense understanding of the idea of development, which continues to shape public policy at the local, national, regional and global levels.[36]

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[35] As Escobar (1995) explains: "As Western experts and politicians started to see certain conditions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a problem—mostly what was perceived as poverty and backwardness—a new domain of thought and experience, namely, development, came into being, resulting in a new strategy for dealing with the alleged problems" (p. 16), pointing out that "patriarchy and ethnocentrism influenced the form development took. Indigenous populations had to be 'modernized,' where modernization meant the adoption of the 'right' values, namely, those held by the white minority or a mestizo majority and, in general, those embodied in the ideal of the cultivated European" (p. 43).

[36] The UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDG), adopted in 2015 (United Nations, 2015), promotes—to mention a few examples—the model of industrial growth. As Goal 9 of the SDG declares: "Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation." In addition, and following the precepts of neoliberal globalization, the SDG also promotes

As I will show later on, development theory has served the purposes of U.S. global designs of attempting to create a U.S.-led global capitalist order to protect U.S. national security. In her analysis of the rise of the development mantra, María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo has argued in her *The Revolutionary Imagination in the Americas and the Age of Development* (2003) that, during the Cold War, the "'free' capitalist world, and particularly the United States, countered the rise of communism in the decolonizing spaces not only militarily but also dialectically, with the birth of a new field and a new regime of subjection" (p. 44). And, the development regime of subjection, promoted through global institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, has served, since their creation, "as a method for maintaining colonial surveillance, political influence, and economic control over countries on the verge of national independence" (p. 275). For this reason, it is not surprising to learn that prominent members of the U.S. national security apparatus, such as Robert S. McNamara (U.S. Defense Secretary from 1961 to 1968) and Paul D. Wolfowitz (labeled as the architect of George W. Bush's war on Iraq),[37] have both served as presidents of the World Bank.

Paradoxically, Western subjectivities and the geopolitics of knowledge production also penetrated the revolutionary utopias of movements that were supposed to liberate the Third World from Western hegemony. Saldaña-Portillo (2003) has argued that anti-colonial, leftist, and nationalist revolutionary movements in Latin

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export-oriented growth (Goal 8) and the ending of trade restrictions (Goal 2). For a critique of the UN's development goals and achievements, see Hickel 2016.
[37] Schmitt, E. (2005, March 17). Paul Dundes Wolfowitz. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/17/politics/paul-dundes-wolfowitz.html.

America also adopted the development mantra in their quest for liberation from capitalist and imperialist domination. As Saldaña-Portillo (2003) points out: "From Pinochet to the Zapatistas, this promise of full productivity, this horizon of political evolution, this discourse of development, has seduced the Right and the Left in Latin America for more than forty years" (pp. 109-110).

In this respect, Grosfoguel (2011) encourages us to analyze the inner-workings of the coloniality of power at the global level, that is, the "continuity of colonial forms of domination after the end of colonial administrations" (p. 14), which he refers to as a "regime of global coloniality" (p. 15). According to the Puerto Rican intellectual, the political economic system of the world, the global capitalist order, has been imposed and reproduced by the United States through world-reaching institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Pentagon. This project argues that the U.S. national security apparatus should be added to that list since it plays an important—and active—role in the reproduction—and defense—of the global economic order.

To summarize, the decolonial approach is important to this dissertation for the following five reasons. First, it allows this project to frame, analyze, and interconnect the local imaginary of protecting U.S. national security against ever-present, ever-growing existential threats to its attempts to expand its hegemony to the entire world. That is to say, the decolonial approach allows for an examination of the role of the U.S. national security apparatus in the maintenance and reproduction of the global coloniality of power. Secondly, it helps this dissertation explore how the United States,

as the hegemonic bearer of the Western tradition, is able to use civilization narratives—
and find an approving audience, even in the Global South—to legitimize its reach
around the world. For example, in 2017, Brazil's Foreign Minister, Ernesto Araujo
(2017), published an essay titled "Trump e Ocidente" (Trump and the West), in which
he not only praised Trump as the savior of Western civilization but also included Brazil
as part of the Western tradition.

The U.S. national security apparatus' defense against what it deems as
uncivilized existential threats (e.g., undomesticated "transnational Calibans"), also
inspires the construction and promotion of essentialized American values (a national
ethos) that must be protected if the U.S. is to survive. Consequently, it is not surprising
that the very first U.S. National Security Strategy (1987)—after the 1986 Goldwater–
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act standardized the process—
explained that its main objective was to ensure the "survival of the United States as a
free and independent nation, *with its fundamental values and institutions intact*
[Emphasis added]" (p. 4).

Thirdly, a decolonial lens prompts an analysis of why and how the U.S. national
security governance model has been able to expand beyond its geographical borders
with the acquiescence of sovereign countries, particularly in the Global South.
Fourthly, in terms of U.S.-Latin American relations, this lens allows this dissertation
to frame the discussion in terms of geopolitical power asymmetries and understand the
importance of Latin America in the protection of U.S. national security as an extension
of the United States, that is to say, as its backyard and, therefore, as its first line of

defense. Finally, since a decolonial approach to the U.S. national security apparatus engages with geopolitical asymmetries, modern/colonial world-system relations, and civilizational (i.e., Westernizing/Universalizing) missions, it encourages this project to move to "an other logic" (Mignolo, 2000, p. 211) to be able to challenge not only the practices of the U.S. national security apparatus but also its rationalities.

2.2. Key Concepts and Terminology

National Security

> I like your words: "national security."
> —Senator Edwin C. Johnson, 1945

At the 1945 hearings before the U.S. Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Navy Secretary James Forrestal surprised his audience—and gained Senator Edwin C. Johnson's approval—by repeatedly using the phrase "national security" when arguing the need to reorganize the government to protect the United States against existential threats (U.S. Congress, 1945). Nowadays, very few people would be surprised if they hear the term. While traveling in the U.S. and Latin America, I conducted a total of twenty-nine interviews with government officials from the United States and Latin America.[38] I had the opportunity to ask nineteen of them what they thought "national security" truly meant. While I received various—and sometimes lengthy—responses, every one of them was aware of the term and was confident about their understanding of its meaning. In their responses, the common thread among my interviewees was the

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[38] These interviews were conducted in the U.S. and Latin America during 2019. While ethnographic research does not play a key role in this dissertation at this time, the data collected may be revisited for a future project.

notion that national security was intrinsically connected to the survival of their respective countries.

In their comprehensive study of the evolution of international security studies, Buzan and Hansen (2009) point out that many scholars have argued that the term "national security" should really be labeled "state security" since governments dominate the national security agenda and their focus is on protecting and expanding their political power. However, as these scholars have pointed out when describing the context of the Cold War, national security has also implied "a fusion of the security of the state and the security of the nation: the nation supported a powerful state which in turn reciprocated by loyally protecting its society's values and interests" (p. 11). In this sense, national security involves the survival and preservation of the nation-state, that is, both in terms of governmental sovereignty and its imagined national identity (Anderson, 1994).

In the United States, international relations scholar Douglas Stuart (2008), in his study titled: *Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law That Transformed America*, argues that the 1947 National Security Act articulated U.S. national security ideology and practices for the years to come. However, while the Act mentions the term "national security" numerous times, it does not define it once. Subsequent national security laws such as the Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 do not define the term either. This repeated absence led renowned international relations scholar

Arnold Wolfers (1952) to argue that national security was an "ambiguous symbol," with no "precise meaning at all" (p. 481).

To illustrate this point, Democratic Senator James Exon, in his arguments to propose an amendment in 1991 to prevent foreign mergers of certain U.S. companies on national security grounds, pointed out that:

> National security is intentionally a flexible term. The statute gives the President broad latitude to determine what is and is not within the realm of national security. I have frequently said in a somewhat humorous view, that if the President determined that tiddily winks were critical to the morale of our troops, he could stop a takeover of an American tiddily wink manufacturer in the name of national security (U.S. Congress, 1991a, p. 1474).

However, the vagueness of the term is probably its biggest strength because it can function as a floating signifier subjected to processes of meaning-making. It can be translated and adjusted to formulate and implement domestic public—and foreign—policies according to specific contexts, needs, as well as cultural and racial sensitivities and biases—e.g., President Trump's labelling of Muslims as terrorists and Mexicans as "rapists," "murderers," and "bad hombres" (De Genova, 2017)[39]—, particularly for the building of national security consensuses among the population and the international community. However, if there is no exact meaning to the term, can we at least infer its

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[39] As Nicholas De Genova points out when referring to Latin American migration in the Trump era: "What is particularly striking, for present purposes, is that the racialized figures of Mexican 'rapists,' drug smugglers, disease, and criminality, in general, are amplified in Trump's discourse to encompass all of Latin America. Thus, the mobility of Latino migrants itself is implicated in the spectacular discourse that conjures an image of migration as a destabilizing 'unwelcome' intrusion and a corrosive 'unwanted' presence" (2017, p. 23).

scope? Is "national security" about survival, as the government agents I interviewed claimed?

One of the first documents produced by the National Security Council,[40] titled *NSC-7: The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet Directed World Communism* (NSC-7, 1948), identified the Soviet Union as the biggest national security threat to the U.S. As the title of NSC-7 already hints, the document argues that the Soviet Union has embarked in a project of conquering the entire world. If the United States does not rise up to the challenge, the document argues, "national suicide" would be a consequence. A few years later, *National Security Council Paper 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*" (NSC-68, 1950), while also identifying the Soviet Union as the biggest existential threat to the country, stated that the national security objective of the United States was to "foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish."

Jumping to the last two decades of the twentieth century, NSSs 1987, 1988, 1991, and 1993 used—with some slight variations—a similar language to frame their primary objective, which they defined as: "the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and

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[40] The U.S. National Security Council was created through the National Security Act of 1947 to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." It held its first official meeting on November 26, 1947. Since then, it has produced a large amount of policy documents that have had an enormous impact on U.S. foreign and domestic policy. For example, regarding the 1950 Report 68 titled: "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" (NSC-68) Michael Hogan (1998) points out that "NSC-68 can claim to be the bible of American national security policy and the fullest statement to that point of the new ideology that guided American leaders" (p. 12).

people secure" (NSS-1988, p. 3). The foreword of the first report of the 1998 U.S. Commission on National Security for the 21st Century (USCNS/21), signed by co-chairs Democratic Senator Gary Hart and Republican Senator Warren Rudman, explained that "the survival and the security of the United States remain our priority" (1999, p. iv). As these documents demonstrate, while the exact meaning of national security might be elusive—or ambiguous—, its intrinsic character is about the survival and preservation of the U.S. nation-state.

Another approach to attempt to make sense of the scope of U.S. national security is by comparing it with terms such as "public safety," "general welfare," or the "public good." On April 6, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson issued "Proclamation 1364: Declaring that a State of War Exists Between the United States and Germany." He was particularly worried about Germans living in the United States, which the proclamation labeled "enemy aliens." However, he made a clear distinction between "enemy aliens" who might commit crimes against the "public safety" (understood as crimes against people) and "enemy aliens" whose actions might be a danger to the "safety of the United States," such as directly aiding an enemy power to conduct a military attack against the country.[41] Decades later, on September 19, 1995, and after meeting with then-Attorney General Janet Reno and then-FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, both *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* decided to publish the

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[41] In National Archives and Records Administration. Office of the Federal Register. 4/1/1985-
Presidential Proclamation 1364 of April 6, 1917, by President Woodrow Wilson Declaring War Against Germany. https://catalog.archives.gov/id/299966.

Unabomber's manuscript for "public safety reasons."[42] While the Unabomber had the power to harm individuals, he did not have the ability—or power—to bring down the United States.

In another example, President Ronald Reagan, in 1986, declared international narcotics a national security threat to the United States. In his National Security Decision Directive 221 (NSDD-21),[43] titled *Narcotics and National Security*, Reagan made a clear distinction between what he referred to as a "societal problem" and a "national security threat." Said directive explained that: "While the domestic effects of drugs are a serious societal problem for the United States and require the continued aggressive pursuit of law enforcement, health care, and demand reduction programs, the national security threat posed by the drug trade is particularly serious outside U.S. borders."

According to the Directive, international narcotics became a national security threat because this illegal business had been destabilizing foreign government allies of the U.S. throughout the Western Hemisphere. The fact that millions of people became addicted to drugs in the U.S. and that there was a rapid increase in the prison population, fueled by the criminalization of petty drug-dealing activities and drug possession for personal use primarily in low-income neighborhoods (Mauer et al., 2007), were deemed as societal problems and not part of the U.S. national security agenda.

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[42] Kurtz, H. (1995, September 19). Unabomber manuscript is published. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/unabomber/manifesto.decsn.htm.
[43] National Security Decision Directive 221 (NSDD-21). *Narcotics and National Security* (April 8, 1986). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-221.pdf.

The United States Supreme Court has also made a distinction between national security and societal problems. In a 1956 case involving the firing of Kendrick Cole when the Food and Drug Administration determined that his employment was a risk to U.S. national security under the Internal Security Act of 1950,[44] the Supreme Court made a clear distinction between "national security" and the "general welfare" (i.e., the "public good" or "public safety"). The Court's final decision stated that: "national security is used in a definite and limited sense and relates only to those activities which are directly concerned with the nation's safety, as distinguished from the general welfare."[45] The public might demand from the government more security, but that does not necessarily imply that the public's specific fears and complaints (e.g., car thefts, house robberies) represent issues that involve the survival of the nation-state (i.e., national security).

In the seventies, the Nixon Watergate affair brought about a questioning of both executive power (and privilege) as well as the meaning—and scope—of national security. President Richard Nixon invoked reasons of "national security" to stall the Watergate investigations and, later on, to prevent the release of the so-called "Nixon White House Tapes." Interviewed by *The New York Times* on the Nixon affair, Democratic Senator Edward M. Kennedy complained that "it is hard to get people to take real national security issues seriously when that term is used to cover a host of

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[44] The "Internal Security Act of 1950" allowed the U.S. government, among other provisions, to dismiss employees "in the interest of national security." The Act does not define the term "national security" and grants discretionary powers to those making the decisions on which employees constitute a national security risk to the United States. The Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987 (Public Law 81-831).

[45] Cole v. Young (1956) No. 442 Argued: March 6, 1956. Decided: June 11, 1956.

matters that aren't remotely related." Moreover, Republican Senator Charles H. Percy, explained that "the very use of the term now evokes cynicism and distrust, which is dangerous, because our real national security needs are as valid as ever."[46]

In a landmark case, the U.S. Supreme Court, while acknowledging that the president had executive privilege over national security affairs, stated that that power was limited,[47] forcing Nixon to release the tapes. Former White House aid Egil Krogh Jr., in the sentencing for his participation in the Watergate affair, abandoned, as reported by *The New York Times*, the "national-security justification and pleaded guilty…The words 'national security,' he said, 'served to block critical analysis' in his own mind."[48] However, judging by the current widespread use of the term "national security" and the growth of executive power over national security matters, it appears that the questioning of the term during the Watergate Nixon affair did not amount to a critical analysis—and a real challenge—of the national security *status quo* or even a change in processes of accountability, transparency, and decision-making.

As I will discuss later on in this project, the national securitization of particular issues—that is, the transmutation of certain matters into the national security agenda— has been increasingly falling within the eyes—and power—of the government beholders. For example, President Trump, in a speech about the 2019 mass shootings in Texas and Ohio, while condemning "racism, bigotry, and white supremacy" declared

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[46] Gelb, L. (1974, May 16). Watergate case viewed as peril to concept of national security. *The New York Times*. http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1974/05/16/91440409.html.
[47] United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
[48] Lewis, A. (1977, November 6). The class conflict: Helms case is rule of law vs. 'national security'. *The New York Times*. https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1977/11/06/167920532.html.

mass-shooters "a grave risk to public safety," but not a threat to U.S. national security.[49]

In contrast, President Trump has unequivocally labeled international immigration a

national security threat, even including it in his administration's 2017 NSS.[50]

Historically, there has been a distinction between protecting the United States

as a nation-state (i.e., national security) and protecting the people of the United States

(i.e., public safety; societal problems; public good; general welfare; security of the

people[51]), and this separation has prompted different discourses and responses.

However, and as this dissertation will discuss later on, this distinction has been

gradually blurring in the midst of neoliberal globalization. To conclude, the term

"national security" is indeed about survival and preservation of the nation-state.

Beyond semantics, the question for this dissertation is how the U.S. national security

apparatus understands the need to protect the United States in a real-life context. What

does it mean to protect U.S. national security?

Neoliberal Globalization

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[49] Trump, Donald (2019). *Remarks by President Trump on the mass shootings in Texas and Ohio* [Transcript]. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-mass-shootings-texas-ohio/.

[50] As President Trump's 2017 National Security Strategy states: "strengthening control over our borders and immigration system is central to national security" (p. 9).

[51] For example, in his annual message to Congress on January 3, 1934, Franklin D. Roosevelt stated that criminals are a threat to the security of citizens of the United States: "Returning to home problems, we have been shocked by many notorious examples of injuries done our citizens by persons or groups who have been living off their neighbors by the use of methods either unethical or criminal.…crimes of organized banditry, cold-blooded shooting, lynching and kidnapping have threatened our security." (Roosevelt, 1934, p. 6). As flamboyant as criminals such as Bonnie and Clyde, John Dillinger and others of the time might have been, they did not pose a national security threat to the U.S.

In the early eighties, the ascendancy of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher as leaders of two of the most powerful nations in the world marked a big push for the gradual implementation of neoliberal policies around the globe (Harvey, 2005). In the United States, the neoliberal project has taken different forms depending on democratic and republican administrations, labeled by scholars either as the "third way" (Giddens, 1999), "neoliberal multiculturalism" (Hale, 2002), or "progressive neoliberalism" (Fraser, 2019). However, in terms of the implementation of economic neoliberal policies, there has been a bipartisan line since the 1980s that has promoted, among others, the reduction of the Keynesian welfare state in favor of a doctrine of personal responsibility for successes and failures in a competitive free market, global trade liberalization, the deregulation of state power in favor of private interests, and the privatization of state enterprises (Harvey, 2005; Brown, 2015; Fraser, 2019).

Much debate has centered on the new role of the state under neoliberalism, with some scholars arguing that, in the midst of economic globalization, there has been an erosion of state powers through the notion of the self-regulating market. However, as Bob Jessop (2018) has argued, state powers have not necessarily been lost but have relocated and shifted to other forms of government and governance, and, in this respect, the state continues to play a key role. As Jessop explains, "the state is actively involved in developing new accumulation strategies, state projects, and hegemonic projects based on the discourses of globalization and structural competitiveness. New governmental rationalities and subjects of governance are also required to sustain changed articulations of government and governance" (p. 15). Following this line of

thought, the neoliberal state, as Ronaldo Munck (2013) points out, "is both subject to global discipline and itself a pivotal element in ensuring internal discipline" (p. 136). In this scheme, the U.S. national security apparatus, as this dissertation will argue in chapter three, can be understood as a non-democratic appendage of state power that attempts to ensure both internal and external discipline for capital accumulation.

For the purposes of this project, the use of the term "neoliberal globalization" is based on Raúl Delgado-Wise's (2014) "southern perspective," which argues that neoliberal globalization "rests on the ideology of the free market, the end of history, representative democracy, and, more recently, the war on terror, but (b) that in actual practice neoliberal globalization promotes the interests of large corporations and a single, exclusive mode of thought that nullifies pluralist alternatives" (p. 652).

The U.S.-Latin American Geopolitical Corridor

To illustrate the functioning of the U.S. national security apparatus, this dissertation will mainly utilize examples derived from what it refers to as the "U.S.-Latin American geopolitical corridor" and the role that Latin America has played to advance and expand the national security objectives of the United States. This project defines the "U.S.-Latin American geopolitical corridor" as a discursive, relational, and geopolitical construct subjected to continuous forms of transnational coloniality and transnational governmentality for wealth extraction and capital accumulation.

Historically, the U.S. has considered Latin America as an expanded line of defense and as a provider of natural resources and cheap labor (De Genova, 2017). In

1823, through the Monroe Doctrine, the United States gave itself the authority to intervene throughout the region in the event a European power attempted to regain control of any of the newly independent countries of the Americas. Years later, President Theodore Roosevelt expanded the doctrine—in what became known as the Roosevelt corollary—to protect U.S. private investments throughout the region in case a country in the Americas threatened them.

In the 1960s, the so-called Mann Doctrine condoned military coups in the Americas as long as those regimes were useful to U.S. interests (Walker, 2009). And, in a 2019 speech before the Bay of Pigs Veterans Association in Miami, then-National Security Advisor John Bolton declared the Monroe Doctrine "alive and well"[52]—196 years after its proclamation—to justify more economic sanctions against Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua.[53] All three countries have been declared national security threats

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[52] Former Secretary of State John Kerry, in a 2013 speech before the Organization of America States, declared that the "era of the Monroe Doctrine is over," pointing out that U.S.-Latin American relations should not be "about a United States declaration about how and when it will intervene in the affairs of other American states." In Kerry, J. (2013). *Remarks on U.S. Policy in the Western Hemisphere* [Transcript]. https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/217680.htm. However, President Barack Obama never made Kerry's declaration official through an executive order or presidential declaration.

[53] Bolton, John (2019). *Ambassador Bolton remarks to the Bay of Pigs Veterans Association – Brigade 2506* [Transcript]. https://cu.usembassy.gov/ambassador-bolton-bay-of-pigs-veterans-association-brigade-2506/.

to the U.S.[54] and, in a turn of phrase reminiscent of George W. Bush's "axis of evil," Bolton even labeled them "the troika of tyranny."[55]

At the supranational/Western Hemisphere level, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), signed between most countries in Latin America and the U.S. in 1947, was the first international agreement that the United States pursued in its strategy to stop the spread of communism—the so-called "policy of containment"[56]—, two years before the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO)[57] came into effect (Boron, 2013). In a nutshell, the TIAR agreement states that a military attack on one of the signatory countries by a foreign state will be considered an attack on all. However, the agreement also has loose provisions that could allow military interventions in other cases if agreed by the member states.[58]

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[54] In 2015, President Obama declared Venezuela a U.S. national security threat through Executive Order 13692: *Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela* (March 8, 2015). In November 2018, President Trump declared Nicaragua a U.S. national security threat through Executive Order 13851: *Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Nicaragua*. Since the sixties, Cuba has been repeatedly declared a national security threat to the U.S. During his second term, President Obama attempted to improve U.S.-Cuban relations by softening some U.S. sanctions against the island. However, President Trump, through National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM–5): *Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba* (June 16, 2017), not only reinstated U.S. national security policy towards Cuba but also hardened its provisions.

[55] Bolton, John (2018). *Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador R. on the Administration's policies in Latin America* [Transcript]. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-administrations-policies-latin-america/.

[56] The strategy of containment, credited to U.S. diplomat George Kennan, sought to actively prevent the spread of Soviet influence—and communism—to the word.

[57] As its preamble states, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, by the United States, Canada, and several Western European nations to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples" against the Soviet Union. In North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (1949). *The North Atlantic Treaty*. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

[58] For example, article 9 of the TIAR states that "The Organ of Consultation may determine that other specific cases submitted to it for consideration, equivalent in nature and seriousness to those contemplated in this article, constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of American States or this Treaty." In Organization of American States. (1947). *Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance*. http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-29.html.

Seventy-two years later, President Donald Trump, in a 2019 speech delivered at a meeting in New York about Venezuela, invoked the TIAR to encourage Latin American member countries "to prosecute any regime member involved in drug trafficking, human rights violations, and corruption,"[59] thus preparing the ground for a future military intervention in that South American country. In 2022, President Biden, in what appears to be an attempt to distance his administration from the interventionist rhetoric—and actions—of previous administrations, explained that "we used to talk as a young man in college about America's backyard, but it's not the backyard, I think south of the Mexican border is America's front yard."[60]

That is to say, whether in the front or in the back, Latin America is considered an intrinsic part of the U.S. The Biden administration has continued President Trump's policies toward Latin America, including the strengthening of the embargo against Cuba and preventing Latin American immigrants from reaching the United States. The bulk of these actions and the long history of U.S. interventions in Latin American affairs led historian Ernest May (1976) to argue that the Monroe Doctrine should not be studied through the lens of international relations but as part of U.S. domestic policy.[61]

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[59] Trump, D. (2019*). Remarks by President Trump in a Multilateral Meeting on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in New York* [Transcript]. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-multilateral-meeting-bolivarian-republic-venezuela-new-york-ny/.
[60] Wilson, G. (2022, January 19). Latin America 'is not the backyard, it is the front yard of the US', says Biden. *24 News Recorder*. https://24newsrecorder.com/world/93527.
[61] Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.S. National Security Advisor from 1977 to 1981 under the Jimmy Carter administration, published in 1997 a very influential book in international security studies titled: *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives.* The book discusses the challenges that the U.S. faces as the world's hegemon after the end of the Cold War. Even though the book examines each region of the globe in relation to the U.S., it neglects to even mention "Latin America." Argentinian Marxist scholar Atilio Boron tells the anecdote that he attended one of the

From the decolonial and cultural political economy approach that this project is undertaking, with the emergence of the United States as the world's superpower after World War II—what Boaventura de Sousa Santos has termed the "European American Century" (2001)[62]—the geographical location of Latin America to the south of the U.S. has been gradually transformed into an asymmetrical geopolitical imaginary that reinforces the North/South hierarchical divide and the notion of Latin America as the United States' backyard (or, in Biden's rhetoric, its front yard), hence, its extension. Even comedian Bill Maher, often criticized by right-wing groups as a leftist liberal pundit, urged the Trump administration during an episode of his HBO show to invade Venezuela to prevent Russian interference in that country by fierily declaring, "this was the Monroe Doctrine! This is our backyard!"[63]

Historically, the U.S.-Latin American geopolitical corridor has functioned as a U.S.-led transnational space subjected to continuous forms of wealth extraction and U.S. capitalist expansion. As Nicholas De Genova (2017) argues when analyzing the role of Latin American immigrant workers in the United States: "The people of the Americas are not only 'here' (in the United States), now, but have always been 'here' – at the center of the political economy of global capital accumulation, a constitutive vital

presentations of Brzezinski's book and asked him why Latin America was not included in the study. According to Borón, Brzezinski replied that he did not include Latin America because it is part of the domestic policy of the United States. Subsequent editions of the book—up to 2016—have continued to exclude the Latin American region.

[62] As Boaventura de Santos (2001) explains: "the European American century carries little novelty; it is nothing more than one more European century, the last one of the millennium. Europe, after all, has always contained many Europes, some of them dominant, others dominated. The United States of America is the last dominant Europe" (p. 108).

[63] This episode of "Real Time with Bill Maher" aired on HBO on January 25, 2019.

force in the production of the modern world" (p. 26). Going beyond May's assertion that Latin America should be studied through the lens of U.S. domestic policy, De Genova (2017) argues that "we must have the intellectual audacity to conceive of the United States as inextricable from and, indeed, part of Latin America" (p. 33).

3. Towards an Analytical Approach to U.S. National Security

The aim of this chapter is to propose a cultural political economy and decolonial approach to analyzing U.S. national security. It also seeks to explain its use of the Foucauldian toolbox (Walters, 2011) to be able to frame the discussion of U.S. national security in terms of an apparatus (i.e., *dispositif*).

3.1. A Cultural Political Economy Approach to U.S. National Security

> Government has no other end than the preservation of property.
> —John Locke, 1689

> To hinder, besides, the farmer from sending his goods at all times to the best market is evidently to sacrifice the ordinary laws of justice to an idea of public utility, to a sort of reasons of state; an act of legislative authority which ought to be exercised only, which can be pardoned only in cases of the most urgent necessity.
> —Adam Smith, 1776

> We're sometimes faulted for a naive faith that liberty can change the world. If that's an error, it began with reading too much John Locke and Adam Smith.
> —George W. Bush, 2003

Thomas Hobbes (1953), in the classic political treaty *Leviathan*, argued in favor of the establishment of a powerful state able to provide security for its citizens in exchange for their liberties. According to Hobbes, since human beings are in a perpetual condition of war of everyone against everyone, the state must possess the monopoly of force to provide order and security to its citizens. However, as history has already taught us, the state has been one of the largest producers of insecurity for its own citizens, as exemplified by the U.S.-backed genocidal dictatorships that plagued Latin America during the twentieth century and the systemic, institutionalized abuse of African-Americans in the United States during the Jim Crow era. When analyzing

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Hobbes' commonwealth, Hannah Arendt (1976) has argued that the legitimacy of the state primarily rests on "the delegation of power, and not of rights," where security "is provided by the law, which is a direct emanation from the power monopoly of the state" (p. 141). That is, law and force work in tandem in the name of security where the latter is legitimized by the former in detriment of individual and collective rights.

As such, Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has argued that the relationship between the state and its citizens is not a Hobbesian liberty/security compromise or even the constant pursuit of a balance between the two (1998; 2005; 2015; Prozorov 2017). In his interpretation of Hobbes, Agamben points out that the state (i.e., the sovereign) seeks to provide security by defining the borders of the normal and the abnormal (i.e., "the exception") within the commonwealth (2005; 2015). In its fight against what it deems as the abnormal, the state is constantly in pursuit of more power by advocating and promoting a sense of constant insecurity and urgency, gradually stripping citizens of their rights and reducing those considered abnormal to a condition of "bare life,"[64] that is, a life with no rights, all in the name of the pursuit of an impossible-to-reach absolute security (Agamben, 1998). In this scheme, exceptional (abnormal) threats require the need for exceptional measures beyond normal laws to legitimize the use of state violence and the suspension of rights.

German jurist and Nazi party member Carl Schmitt (1985) famously argued that all political systems—even liberal ones—must have the possibility to act outside

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[64] In his interpretation of Agamben's concept of "bare life," Nicholas De Genova (2016) explains that it is "what remains when human existence, while yet alive, is nonetheless stripped of all the encumbrances of social location and juridical identity and thus bereft of all the qualifications for properly political inclusion and belonging" (p. 128).

the normal law when prompted by an existential crisis in order to save the nation-state. Schmitt called this temporary suspension of the law the "state of exception," in which the sovereign then has the power to return the nation-state to a state of normalcy once the crisis is over. However, it is worth noting that the possibility of suspending the (normal) law is inscribed within the legal framework itself. That is to say, it is legal to suspend the (normal) law in times of emergency. Therefore, the so-called "state of exception" does not necessarily go against the rule of law, but it is actually part of it.

History has proven Schmitt right since nation-states do possess a legal order that allows the suspension of that same order both at the international and national levels. In the Americas, to name a few examples, the 1969 American Convention of Human Rights (i.e., the Pact of San José) allows the suspension of basic guarantees in "time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party" (Article 27).[65] Similarly, the Constitution of the United States establishes that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it" (U.S. Const. art 1, § 9). Meanwhile, article 37 of the Peruvian Constitution states that the president can declare a state of emergency with the approval of the government ministers that he himself selected.

Building on the works of Schmitt, Agamben argues that the "state of exception" gradually becomes permanent, while at the same time reducing citizens to a condition

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[65] Organization of American States. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1969). *American Convention on Human Rights*.
https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic3.american%20convention.htm.

of "bare life" (2005). Once the "state of exception" is implemented, even a return to normalcy after the emergency changes the character—and relationship—of the nation-state to its population (so often referred to as "the new normal"). Analyzing the post 9/11 national security measures implemented in the U.S., scholars such as Hardt and Negri (2004) and Agamben (2005) have argued that 9/11 has prompted a "permanent state of exception," pointing out that the "normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a government violence that—while ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception—internally—nevertheless still claims to be applying the law" (p. 87). For example, the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act[66] contains a provision that authorizes the indefinite military detention of persons that the government suspects of involvement in terrorism—including U.S. citizens—without *habeas corpus*. However, some scholars have questioned the exceptionality of the "state of exception" since, historically, it appears to have been an integral part of the normal management of affairs (Neocleous, 2008; Boukalas, 2014a).

One approach to understanding this conundrum is by analyzing the project of security under global capitalism and its Western liberal order. Mark Neocleous (2008) has argued that liberalism is not really about "liberty" but "security." And, specifically, it is primarily about the protection of property rights, the capitalist world order, and the defense of individual self-interests. Karl Marx (1968), in *On the Jewish Question,*

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[66] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Public Law 112–81—December 31, 2011. Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/112/plaws/publ81/PLAW-112publ81.pdf.

makes a similar argument when analyzing the so-called "rights of man"—derived from the French revolution—, by pointing out that security is "the supreme conception of bourgeois society" (p. 75). According to Marx, security only exists to "guarantee to each of its members the maintenance of his person, his rights, and his property…By the conception of security, bourgeois society does not raise itself above its egoism. Security is rather the confirmation of its egoism" (p. 76).[67]

In this respect, Neocleous (2008) points out that "security is the ideological justification for 'civilisation' (that is, capitalism) as opposed to 'barbarism' (that is, non-capitalist modes of production)" (p. 31). The capitalist project of security brings with it not only a particular vision of the world and the core—and essentialized—characteristics of human behavior based on Western liberal values such as individuality, property rights, and self-interest,[68] but also of a legal (normal) order, civilization narratives, and a "rule of law"[69] to secure that same world.

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[67] As Marx (1968) explains: "Above all we must record the fact that the so-called rights of man...are nothing else that the rights of the member of bourgeois society, that is of the egoistic individual, of man separated from man and the community" (p. 73). A similar argument has been made about the contested universality of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which seems to favor a very specific conception of life based on Eurocentric values (e.g., individualism, capitalism and the nation-state as a mode of political and social organization). For example, article 17 declares that owning private property is a universal, inalienable right of human beings. Article 15 establishes the universal right of possessing a nationality. The declaration's eurocentrism has led many movements, including the Zapatistas, and scholars to argue for the need to revise it, even calling to replace it for a "pluriversal declaration" (Fregoso, 2014).

[68] Decolonial scholar Enrique Dussel, in his *16 Tesis de Economía Política* (2015), argues that the capitalist order promotes the notion that capitalism is natural to the human condition since, according to this view, human beings are driven by individualism, selfishness and self-interest. As Dussel explains, capitalism has been in existence for a little more than 500 years while human beings were community/collective-oriented hunters and gatherers—and, in some cases, continue to be—for a much longer time.

[69] Various scholars have studied the way the so-called "rule of law" has been used to advance and secure capitalist relations (Anghie, 2005). For neoliberal thinker Friedrich Hayek (1978), the "rule of law" functions as a sort of moral doctrine based on (western) tradition: "The rule of law is therefore not a rule of the law, but a rule concerning what the law ought to be, a meta-legal doctrine or a political

In the liberal imaginary, the protection and defense of "civilization," "freedom," "liberty"[70] and the "rule of law" are therefore understood as the establishment of modes of governance to secure the capitalist world order. Abnormalities that pose a danger to that order (i.e., the exceptional) therefore represent an existential threat to the security of the free market, individual self-interest, and private property that must be fought against. Neocleous (2003; 2008) shows how liberal thinkers such as John Locke, Adam Smith, and Thomas Paine advocated the need to implement exceptional measures to counteract crisis, defend private property, and protect the functioning of markets.

In his 1690 *Second Treatise of Government*, John Locke (2021), the father of classical liberalism, argued that "government has no other end than the preservation of property." Fast-forwarding to our century, while 9/11 might have provided further legitimization for the implementation of exceptional measures (and the theoretical framework of the "permanent state of exception"), the liberal project has historically also been a security project enshrined with the ability to legally implement exceptional (i.e., authoritarian) measures to defend—and expand—the capitalist world order.[71]

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ideal" (p. 206). The United Nations even has a resolution, approved by its member states, on the so-called "rule of law" (United Nations, 2012). The declaration establishes, among others, "the importance of fair, stable and predictable legal frameworks for generating inclusive, sustainable and equitable development, economic growth and employment, generating investment and facilitating entrepreneurship" (Article 8). It also urges member states "to refrain from promulgating and applying any unilateral economic, financial or trade measures not in accordance with international law" (Article 9), that is to say, no measures that will go against the capitalist world order and the rules of trade liberalization established by the World Trade Organization.

[70] There has been much debate about the difference between "freedom" and "liberty." In the political realm, both words are often used interchangeably. However, and as political theorist Hanna Fenichel Pitkin (1988) has argued: "Liberty seems to connote something more formal, rational, and limited to freedom; it concerns rules and exceptions within a system of rules….in other words, although liberty means the absence of (some particular) constraint, at the same time, it implies the continuation of a surrounding network of restraint and order" (p. 543).

[71] As the Fraser Institute's Human Freedom Index (Porčnik, & Vásquez, 2019) explains: "Like the rule of law, security and safety are thus important in safeguarding overall freedom. (Indeed, the provision

If the liberal project is also about security, it is worth asking what function the mantra of "national security" is currently serving the neoliberal project. There has been much debate about neoliberalism's authoritarian tendencies, particularly after the 2008 global financial crisis. While some scholars argue that neoliberalism has been an authoritarian project from its inception (Slobodian, 2018), others contend that it has entered an authoritarian phase (Bruff, 2014) in order to control the dislocations it has been gradually causing in Western first-world countries[72] (e.g., increasing job precarity, income inequality and the fraying of the middle-class). Wendy Brown has argued that neoliberalism has been "undoing the demos" by economizing all aspects of society and transforming human relations into capital interactions (2015) in detriment of democratic governance.

In *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*, Quinn Slobodian (2018) traces the rationale behind neoliberalism to the 1920s, and the world that neoliberal intellectuals envisioned based on the free market, private property, and governments ruled under a common—and binding—supranational normative framework[73] that do not intervene in the economy. According to Slobodian, democracy

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of domestic and national security is a service that most classical liberals consider a proper function of government)" (p. 21).

[72] The implementation of neoliberalism in Chile and Argentina through right wing-dictatorships in the seventies provides two examples that the Global South has been aware of neoliberalism's authoritarian tendencies for a long time. Now that neoliberalism has created dislocations in Western first-world countries, there is much talk about neoliberalism's authoritarian phase. From a decolonial perspective, now that the local history of authoritarian neoliberalism is affecting the West, it has finally become a topic of discussion—and analysis—for the entire world.

[73] Slobodian (2018) argues that neoliberals imagined a world order "managed by a supranational state that could override national sovereignty to protect global free trade and free capital flows" (p. 95). And, defending the need for a supranational (capitalist) order, Friedrich Hayek (2007) argues in his seminal work *The Road to Serfdom*, that "the small can preserve their independence in the international as in the national sphere only within a true system of law which guarantees both that certain rules are

was a problem for some neoliberal thinkers since politicians usually caved to social demands in their quests to win elections. For neoliberal intellectuals, as Slobodian explains, "[a] strong state—resistant to the pressures of democratic influence—would be necessary to safeguard the economic constitution of the world" (p. 117). While it is beyond the scope of this project to even attempt to participate in this debate, it will analyze the functioning of the U.S. national security apparatus to secure the capitalist world order and, in its current phase, advance the neoliberal project.

Beyond the neoliberalism/authoritarianism debate, Greek intellectual Nicos Poulantzas provides a path forward for this project. In his 1978 *State, Power, Socialism* (2014), he argued that capitalism had entered into a phase of "authoritarian statism" to counteract the Keynesian welfare state crisis. Poulantzas described authoritarian statism as an "intensified state control over every sphere of socio-economic life combined with a radical decline of the institutions of political democracy and with draconian and multiform curtailment of so-called 'formal' liberties" (pp. 203-204).

According to Poulantzas, liberal democracy could no longer play its role in mediating the relationship between the dominant and dominated classes for capital accumulation through "social fracturing-individualization" (p. 65) and "disorganizing-dividing" (p. 141) techniques such as universal suffrage and representative democracy, and by providing provisional compromises (e.g., labor rights, minimum wage increases) to reproduce the capitalist world order. For Christos Boukalas (2008; 2014b),

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invariably enforced and that the authority which has the power to enforce these cannot be use it for any other purpose" (p. 234).

authoritarian statism has become a key feature of our U.S. hegemonic current world, where the U.S. government has amplified its surveilling and punishing powers for capital accumulation under the guise of protecting the nation after 9/11 and by legitimizing its technocratic expertise on national (i.e., homeland) security matters.

This project will not be tackling directly the issue of the "state," but rather the exercise of state power through the United States' national security apparatus. Having said that, some clarifications are still called for in terms of this project's understanding of this challenging concept. Historically—and across disciplines—there has been much academic debate regarding the question of the nature of the state. While traditional state theory offers significant avenues for research, one runs the risk of "taking the state for granted as an analytical object" (Jessop, 2016, p. 46), thus focusing on the centralized, top-down, unitary, and sovereign aspects of the state's functioning within territorial borders and specific populations. Instead, and borrowing from the works of Antonio Gramsci (1972) and Nicos Poulantzas (2014), later advanced—and enhanced—by Bob Jessop (2016), this project understands the state as a complex social relation, that is, as a site of contestation, organization, and consensus-building where different—and competing—actors (e.g., the public and private sectors, civil society) seek to advance their respective agendas in ever-changing contexts.

In particular, the focus of this project is on the capitalist state, an entity socially, politically, and juridically organized through a liberal market economy and built to meet—and constantly pursue and promote—the requirements of capital accumulation (Poulantzas, 2014; Jessop, 2016). As Poulantzas (2014) explains: "the State is neither

the instrumental depository (object) of a power-essence held by the dominant class, nor a subject possessing a quantity of power equal to the quantity it takes from the classes which face it: the State is rather the strategic site of organization of the dominant class in its relationship to the dominated classes" (p. 148). In this respect, the U.S. national security apparatus can be considered one of the capitalist state's "appendages of power" (Poulantzas, 2014, p. 45) to regulate and discipline both domestic and international class struggle as well as periphery-center asymmetrical power relations to protect private property and advance capital accumulation.

The state has not only the legal monopoly of force but also the authority and legitimacy to define what the national security priorities are and to decide how to confront challenges and threats. The power of the state in establishing the security agenda has led Buzan et al. (1998) to argue that the process of securitizing a particular issue "can be studied directly; it does not need indicators. The way to study securitization is to study discourse" (p. 25). Against this approach and following the works of Michel Foucault, this project argues that studying discourses is only part of the equation. Security discourses—and, more specifically, national security discourses—need to be understood as part of an apparatus—a *dispositif*—that constitutes and is constituted by a set of practices from above and below that serve a specific cultural political economy agenda deployed for the remaking and reordering of the global capitalist order.

On the latter, Michel Foucault (2003), in *Society Must be Defended*, argues that the "bourgeoisie does not give a damn about delinquents, or about how they are

punished or rehabilitated…On the other hand, the set of mechanisms whereby delinquents are controlled, kept track of, punished, and reformed does generate a bourgeois interest that functions within the economic-political system as a whole" (p. 33). That is to say, it generates the need for political and cultural power (i.e., the non-economic determinants for wealth extraction) to develop, implement, and manage said set of mechanisms to control populations and expand capital accumulation.[74]

For example, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ramped up immigrant detention under the Trump Administration by establishing that international migration—and, in particular, the U.S. southern border—had become a national security threat to the country. The rapid growth of immigrant detention and the ever-increasing privatization of the U.S. national security apparatus has significantly been benefitting for-profit prison corporations with generous federal contracts.[75] Not only were those corporations Trump donors, but General John Kelly, one of the architects of stronger immigrant detention policies during his tenure in the White House, joined the Board of Directors of Caliburn International right after he departed from the Trump administration. Caliburn International is one of the companies that operate private

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[74] Hannah Arendt (1976) explains that "the bourgeoisie turned to politics out of economic necessity; for it did not want to give up the capitalist system whose inherent law is constant economic growth, it had to impose this law upon its home governments and to proclaim expansion to be an ultimate political goal of foreign policy" (p. 126). Going even further, Arendt argues that "imperialism must be considered the first state in political rule of the bourgeoisie rather than the last stage of capitalism" (p. 138).

[75] Altschuler, G. (2019, August 12). For-profit immigration detention centers are a national scandal. *The Hill*. https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/457067-for-profit-immigration-detention-centers-are-a-national-scandal.

shelters for unaccompanied migrant children and has been one of the largest recipients of federal contracts.[76]

Renowned scholar Daniel Yergin, in his seminal work, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (1977), has argued that the National Security Act of 1947 created what he refers to as a "national security state" by institutionalizing, merging, and establishing national security agencies such as the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency (1977). Some scholars have adopted the "national security state" framework for their own research (Hogan, 1998; Stuart, 2008; Walker, 2009; Weiss, 2014) to analyze its creation, growth, and expansion. As Jessop (2016) points out, states and state power are "polycontextual" (p. 45), that is, they vary, respond, and adapt to specific contexts. This helps explain, according to Jessop (2016), why some scholars have chosen to use "different adjectival descriptors" (p. 44) such as the "administrative state," the "patriarchal state," or the "security state" to emphasize—and analyze—specific state traits.

Instead, this project understands U.S. national security as a permanent Foucauldian apparatus—a *dispositif*—strategically deployed and functionally designed to respond to specific capital accumulation needs according to changing social, political, cultural, and economic contexts (Castro-Gomez, 2010). While the U.S. national security apparatus is inscribed within heterogenous state power relations and

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[76] Rizzo, S. (2019, May 4). John F. Kelly joins board of contractor running shelter for migrants. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/john-kelly-joins-board-joins-board-of-contractor-running-shelter-for-migrant-teens/2019/05/04/e28000fc-6e87-11e9-a66d-a82d3f3d96d5_story.html.

discursive and non-discursive practices, it is bound by a specific rationality[77]—i.e., the protection of U.S. national security—that not only legitimizes but expands said practices to calibrate and recalibrate systems of domination within the liberal order.

A *dispositif*, according to Foucault (1980), is "a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions" (p. 194). As explained by Agamben (2009), it has "the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings" (p. 14). While the U.S. national security apparatus is legitimized and reproduced through its own rationality—i.e., the protection of U.S. national security—in order to build national security consensuses and legitimize its practices, the question is how the *dispositif's* rationality has been developed, articulated, and implemented to serve a larger hegemonic project. In this respect, instead of focusing on examining the authenticity and veracity of the *dispositif's* rationality—i.e., whether or not the United States is under a permanent state of existential danger and in constant urgent need of protection—this project's analysis is centered on its use as a political technology.[78]

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[77] As Santiago Castro-Gómez (2010) points out: "el concepto de racionalidad es utilizado por Foucault para referirse al funcionamiento histórico de prácticas que se insertan en ensamblajes de poder. Tales conjuntos de prácticas son 'racionales' en la medida en que proponen unos objetivos hacia los cuales debe ser dirigida la acción, la utilización calculada de unos medios para alcanzar esos objetivos y la elección de unas determinadas estrategias que permitirán la eficaz articulación entre medios y fines o, en su defecto, el uso de los efectos imprevistos para un replanteamiento de los propios fines" (p. 34).

[78] That is to say, this project does not analyze whether or not the U.S. national security apparatus' rationality is, indeed, "rational"—in the logical and reasonable sense of the word. Instead, it analyzes how that rationality has been used to recalibrate systems of domination and serve a larger hegemonic project both inside and outside the United States.

Here, I borrow from Fernando Leiva's (2019) definition of "political technology," as "specific political apparatuses or dispositifs conceived and deployed to stabilize and renew capitalist hegemony" (p. 133). In its quest to build consensuses, a political technology attempts to bring together the broadest web of actors as possible (e.g., government officials, business elites, academia, NGOs, the media) in order to "*institutionalize, legitimize, renew, and re-embed the neoliberal system of domination* [Emphasis in original]" (p. 133). The building of U.S. national security bipartisan consensuses encompasses a diversity of actors, practices, and discourses that have served as a shield to resist and repel criticism—albeit limited—to justify its non-democratic, non-accountable practices and to expand its power domestically and internationally.

Wondering why the U.S. government allows open criticism of their national security policies, scholar Harry Harootunian (2007) argues that, post 9/11, it is possible that "the state has reached a point of confidence it had not known or achieved before, and its competence is no longer an issue" (p. 14). After all, who could be against efforts to protect U.S. national security, and who could challenge decisions based on national security technocratic discourses? This non-accountable, non-democratic concentration of power has led Neocleous (2008) to argue that "any revival of fascism would now come through the mobilization of society in the name of security" (p. 9). And, in the name of "national security," that possible revival begs the question of who will be included in the "national" and what type of "security" will be deployed to protect it.

For this project, one of the challenges is, therefore, to interconnect why and how the U.S. national security apparatus has been historically deployed for capital accumulation and expansion and, in its current form, for the promotion of neoliberal globalization.[79] For example, the official designation of Iraq under Saddam Hussein as a national security threat to the United States[80] led not only to the so-called "liberation of Iraq" through a costly war and thousands of deaths but also to the neoliberalization of the oil-rich Middle Eastern country. Paul Bremer, the U.S.-appointed head of the 2003 Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, rapidly implemented political and economic reforms to neoliberalize the country, transforming it, in the words of Wendy Brown (2015), into a "new playground of world finance and investment," particularly for the benefit of transnational corporations (p. 142).

The *dispositif's* constituting practices can be discursive and non-discursive and can come from different material[81] and non-material actors. For example, the U.S. border agents I interviewed as part of this project's ethnography explained that they had been very vocal about what they saw as the national security threats at the Southern border since long before 9/11. They were "happy" that President Donald Trump finally

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[79] As Santiago Castro-Gómez (2010) argues: "se hace la genealogía y la arqueología de las tecnologías de gobierno para poder diagnosticar por qué nos conducimos hoy como lo hacemos, por qué somos gobernados de esta forma en particular" (p. 49).

[80] The law that authorized U.S. intervention in Iraq stated that the objective of the war was to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq." Said authorization was very broad and general in its justifications and did not provide much explanation for labelling Iraq a national security threat to the United States. In Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002. (Public Law 107–243, 107th Congress). Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ243/PLAW-107publ243.pdf.

[81] Can Mutlu explains that the material turn: "looks at the co-productive relationship between the origins and everyday functioning of objects while tracing the transformation of their purpose and justification" (2013, p. 173).

listened to their national security concerns and did something to defend the U.S.-Mexico border against what they urgently referred to as an "ever-growing invasion" of immigrants.

Meanwhile, in Peru, migration officers told me that thanks to new equipment and technology donated by the U.S. government, they were now able to conduct intelligence analysis on most airline passengers. In this case, the material object has prompted the development of a system of national security surveillance and discourses to support its implementation. A few months after the interview, a law was enacted to justify the operation of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) registry system to protect Peru's—and the United States'[82]— national security.[83]

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[82] The United States has been actively encouraging governments to adopt the PNR system. As reported in the U.S.'s *2018 Country Reports on Terrorism*: "In December, the United States launched an initiative at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to adopt a standard for passenger name record data – a key screening tool that the United States has used for decades and that UN Security Council Resolution 2396 made mandatory for all UN members – by the end of 2019" (U.S. Department of State, 2019, p. 11). Also, the U.S. has been signing international cooperation agreements with various countries to share intelligence information on foreigners. For instance, on June 18, 2018, the United States and Peru signed a memorandum of understanding to exchange information on alleged terrorists. In U.S. Embassy Lima (2018, June 22). *The United States and Peru sign memorandum of understanding on the exchange of terrorist screening information*. U.S. Embassy in Peru. Retrieved from https://pe.usembassy.gov/memorandum-signing-on-exchange-of-terrorist-screening-information/.

[83] The law was published on the Government of Peru's official diary—*El Peruano*—on January 19, 2019. The title of law N° 118-2019-IN is "Requisitos acerca de la información remitida a través del Registro de Nombre de Pasajeros – PNR." The PNR system stores the personal information of passengers, among them, passport biographic information as well as payment and billing information. Recently, national governments have been forcing private airlines to share this information with them through specific laws, as explained by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security: "U.S. law requires airlines…to provide the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)…with certain passenger reservation information, called Passenger Name Record (PNR) data, primarily for purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting terrorist offenses and related crimes and certain other crimes that are transnational in nature. This information is collected from airline travel reservations and is transmitted to CBP prior to departure." In Department of Homeland Security (n. d.). *Passenger Name Records Reviews.* Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/publication/passenger-name-record-privacy-policy.

In his farewell speech, President Eisenhower warned Americans about a predictable outcome of the growth and expansion of what he referred to as the "military-industrial complex": the rise of national security technocrats, experts, bureaucrats.[84] In 1947, the U.S. government created a national security apparatus consisting of laws, government agencies, generous budget allocations, public-private partnerships, and a world-reaching military to defend U.S. national security against what it labeled as the Soviet existential threat. Strengthening the state to expand U.S. national security interests and fight national security threats, however, has not been enough.

The defense of U.S. national security has also required a population (i.e., the Copenhagen School's "audience") willing to accept the permanent existence and growth of the U.S. national security apparatus. While many attempts have been made to unite the American nation through the assimilation of immigrants and minorities into a white, Christian, English-speaking, western culture (Jacobson, 1998; Ngai, 2004), it has become more effective—from a national security consensus-building standpoint— to utilize master narratives of civilization, the rule of law, democracy, the free-market, liberty, and the continuous construction of existential threats to build hegemony amongst a diverse population instead of trying to democratically agree on what the U.S.

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[84] National Archives (n.d.). *President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Farewell Address (1961).* https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/president-dwight-d-eisenhowers-farewell-address. In President Eisenhower's words: "we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific technological elite. It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system."

national security priorities should be or if such apparatus should even exist in the first place.

By hegemony, I refer to processes of domination through consent and coercion to legitimize practices and discourses in the reproduction of the capitalist world order (Gramsci, 1972). Since hegemony is never completely achieved and is constantly challenged, it needs to be continuously reassessed and adapted to changing contexts and audiences. In this respect, the creation, recreation, and institutionalization of national security threat imaginaries and their characterization as existential to the U.S.—as a whole—has served to expand the U.S. national security apparatus domestically and internationally.

While the U.S. national security enemy may be replaced or added to the mix of existential threats to take the form of the communist, the Latin American drug dealer, the terrorist, the rogue state, and the Muslim or Latino immigrant, its core and connecting characteristics usually stay the same. At a minimum, the enemy is a foreigner, has an alien ideology diametrically opposed to U.S. essentialized values— i.e., Samuel Huntington's (2004) "American creed"[85]—, and is uncivilized (i.e., a non-Westernized Caliban). Under this logic, confronting the foreign existential enemy is about fighting for survival with every resource at the disposal of the U.S. against a barbaric powerful enemy.

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[85] As argued by Samuel Huntington (2004), the "American creed" stems from Anglo-Protestant culture and it is based, among others, on principles of liberty, individualism, and private property.

In this vein, scholar Saldaña-Portillo (2016) uses the figure of the "indio bárbaro" to illustrate how the United States has constructed foreign existential others who represent a threat to the essentialized values of the country. According to Saldaña-Portillo, from the U.S' perspective, the indio bárbaro "has traveled far afield from its original home to present-day Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, central Mexico, Honduras, and beyond, signaling again and again a threat to the very form of the nation-state and presaging a need for ever-greater militarization and joint actions across the globe" (p. 235) to combat this ever-present "indigenous foreign terrorist" (p. 239). Saldaña-Portillo concludes that under the motto of protecting the U.S. nation-state, "U.S. imperialism initiates and extends its life under the shadow of the indio bárbaro" (p. 258).

The Cold War, which gave rise to the U.S. national security apparatus, was not just about protecting the U.S. against a military attack from a competing superpower. As the 1950 National Security Council Report number 68 titled: "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" explained: "the issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself." Decades after the end of the Cold War, President Bush's 2002 NSS echoed these existential threats by representing Muslim terrorists as "the enemies of civilization" (p. 4). And, most recently, President Trump, in his 2017 NSS, pointed out that "the scourge of the world today is a small group of rogue regimes that violate all principles of free and civilized states" (p. 26).

No matter the enemy, the defense of U.S. national security has been equated

with a defense of civilization as a whole. However, that begs the obvious question of

what the U.S. national security apparatus understands by civilization. International

security scholar Mark Neocleous (2016) argues that, in the Western liberal conception,

"the bourgeoisie sees itself as the guardian of civilization and democracy, law and

order, peace and security. But, it also likes to present itself as the guardian of the whole

humanity" (p. 10). As I will examine throughout this project, there is an interconnection

between the U.S. national security apparatus and its discourses, promotion, and

practices on, among others, the "rule of law," "freedom," "democracy," and the notion

of the "indispensable nation"[86] to justify and legitimize U.S. intervention around the

globe for the continuous expansion of U.S. capitalism.

Thus, the protection of U.S. national security has become an all-encompassing

common-sense[87] shared national objective that frames its discourses and practices as a

permanent worldwide effort to save the U.S. nation-state—and civilization as a

whole—from endless and ever-increasing barbaric existential threats and ensure its

survival. It has prompted the rapid growth of the U.S. national security apparatus, not

only in terms of numbers, technology, actors, and budget allocations but also by

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[86] In February 1998, then-Secretary of State Madeline Albright used that phrase to defend U.S.
sanctions against Iraq. Specifically, she stated that "if we have to use force, it is because we are
America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the
future, and we see the danger here to all of us." The phrase was originally coined by Sidney
Blumenthal, a political journalist who was trying to explain that the U.S. was the only country in the
world who had "the power to guarantee global security." In Zenko, M. (2014, November 6). The myth
of the indispensable nation. *Foreign Policy*. https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/the-myth-of-the-
indispensable-nation/.
[87] As Ken Booth (2007) explains, Antonio Gramsci understood "common sense" as ideas, values,
norms, and practices that are "imposed, absorbed passively, or are socialised from the past.
Importantly, they are 'lived uncritically'" (p. 240).

legitimizing military and non-democratic practices at the domestic and international levels in the name of protecting U.S. national security. It is, therefore, no coincidence that threats labeled as national security have historically prompted war-like languages and emergency (i.e., exceptional) measures.[88]

In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan declared the "war on drugs,"[89] which led to the incarceration of thousands of people in the U.S. as well as numerous direct and indirect military interventions throughout Latin America (Youngers & Rosin, 2005). In 2001, President Bush declared the "war on terror," which has prompted a permanent state of war against military and civilian actors ever since, and the rapid growth, expansion, and normalization of the U.S. national security apparatus both domestically (i.e., the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) and internationally.

President Eisenhower, in his farewell speech, also alerted Americans about the threats that the ever-increasing power of the military establishment, fueled by the national security anti-communist discourse of the time, posed to a democratic society. To offset the growing power of the military, he pointed out that "only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security

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[88] The 1976 National Emergency Act—currently in effect—was a Congressional attempt to limit the powers of the President to declare national emergencies. However, the Act does not define what constitutes a national emergency and does not set specific criteria. Subsequent presidents have taken advantage of this loophole and have declared national emergencies in a wide range of issues, including international terrorism, immigration, and to implement country-specific sanctions.

[89] Although mentioned in many discourses during the seventies, the so-called "war on drugs" was institutionalized in the eighties during the Reagan Administration through numerous laws, international agreements—particularly with Latin American countries—, and budget allocations that legitimized U.S. interventions (Morales, 1989). President Reagan's 1988 NSS explained that the U.S. is "deeply involved in the struggle throughout Latin America against the menace of drug production and trafficking" (p. 26).

and liberty may prosper together."[90] After decades of continuous military growth, the militarization of domestic law-enforcement agencies, the violation of human rights and civil liberties (Klein, 2007; Stuart, 2008; ACLU, 2014), and the privatization of the U.S. military-industrial complex (Stanley, 2015; Bureš & Carrapiço, 2018) particularly after 9/11,[91] it is worth questioning if there really can be a balance between the pursuit of liberty and the need for security.

In 1998, the U.S. Commission on National Security was given the mandate to review the challenges to U.S. national security for the twenty-first century.[92] Phase two of their second report, published in 2000, explained that "freedom is the quintessential American value, but without security, and the relative stability that results there from, it can be evanescent. American strategy should seek both security and freedom" (p. 6). President Barack Obama, in a 2013 speech made at the National Defense University right after the Edward Snowden leaks,[93] pondered "the challenges involved in striking

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[90] National Archives (n.d.). *President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Farewell Address (1961)*. https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/president-dwight-d-eisenhowers-farewell-address.
[91] While it is true that the U.S. Department of Defense has historically relied on the private sector—even before the Cold War—for diverse activities, the national security public-private partnership has exponentially grown after 9/11 (Stanley 2015; Bureš & Carrapiço 2018).
[92] The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21), co-chaired by U.S. Senators Gary Hart (Democrat) and Warren Rudman (Republican), was given three tasks: "First, to analyze the emerging international security environment; Next, to develop a U.S. national security strategy appropriate to that environment; Finally, to assess the various security institutions for their current relevance to the effective and efficient implementation of that strategy, and to recommend adjustments as necessary" (1999, p. vi). The Commission released its final report on February 2001.
[93] The Obama Administration started a fierce persecution of Edward Snowden, forcing him to seek asylum in Russia. The Trump Administration continued that persecution. In a response to a petition to pardon Edward Snowden signed by approximately 160,000 people, the Obama Administration responded that: "Mr. Snowden's dangerous decision to steal and disclose classified information had severe consequences for the security of our country and the people who work day in and day out to protect it," adding that the "balance between our security and the civil liberties that our ideals and our Constitution require deserves robust debate and those who are willing to engage in it here at home." In The White House (2013, June 9). *A Response to Your Petition on Edward Snowden*. https://petitions.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/petition/pardon-edward-snowden/. However, neither

the right balance between our security and our open society."[94] However, he went on to unequivocally state, "As Commander-in-Chief, I believe we must keep information secret that protects our operations and our people in the field." Can liberty and security "prosper" together, as Eisenhower had hoped? Can there be a "right balance" and "stability," as Obama and the U.S. Commission on National Security claimed?

In Western liberal democracy's pursuit of the balance between liberty and security, renowned neoliberal economist Friedrich Hayek (2007) argued in his seminal work *The Road to Serfdom* that

> individual freedom cannot be reconciled with the supremacy of one single purpose to which the whole society must be entirely and permanently subordinated. The only exception to the rule that a free society must not be subjected to a single purpose is war and other temporary disasters when subordination of almost everything to the immediate and pressing need is the price at which we preserve our freedom in the long run (p. 213).

What happens, however, when the crisis—or, to use Hayek's words, "the immediate and pressing need"—is not temporary but permanent? Since its institutionalization in 1947, the apparatus' rationality has been that U.S. national security is under a permanent and existential attack from ever-present, ever-growing, and ever-changing

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the Obama nor the Trump Administration have explained how the leaks have impacted U.S. national security. A 2016 U.S. House intelligence Committee report on the activities of Edward Snowden blamed him of causing "tremendous damage to national security" (p. i) while, at the same time, recognizing that the "full scope of the damage inflicted by Snowden remains unknown" (U.S. Congress, 2016, p. ii).

[94] Obama, B. (2013). *Remarks by the President at the National Defense University* [Transcript]. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.

existential dangers. In that sense, the protection of U.S. national security has become a "single purpose" to which not only U.S. society, but the entire world must be increasingly subordinated to.

Returning to the question if liberty and security can prosper together or if there can be any type of trade-off, compromise, or right balance between the two, the answer really depends on how both "liberty" and "security" are defined. President George W. Bush's 2002 NSS declared that the end of the Cold War marked a "decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise" (p. iii). Moreover, President Bush, in a 2003 speech in London, defended U.S. military interventions around the world by arguing that "we're sometimes faulted for a naive faith that liberty can change the world. If that's an error it began with reading too much John Locke and Adam Smith."[95] That is to say, liberalism and security working in tandem to protect, advance, and secure a global order based on private property, individual self-interests, and capitalist exchanges. As I will analyze in this dissertation, capitalism has been equated with freedom and democracy, and, under this logic, promoting the former automatically translates into protecting and advancing U.S. national security worldwide.[96]

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[95] Bush, W., G. *President Bush discusses Iraq policy at Whitehall Palace in London* [Transcript]. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031119-1.html.

[96] As Hayek (2007) argued in the mid-1940s: "It is now often said that democracy will not tolerate 'capitalism.' If 'capitalism' means here a competitive system based on the free disposal over private property, it is far more important to realize that only within this system is democracy possible. When it becomes dominated by a collectivist creed, democracy will inevitably destroy itself" (p. 110). Despite numerous examples that have proved that there is no direct correlation between democracy and capitalism (e.g., the dictatorships of Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Honduras in the seventies and China nowadays), this is the mantra that has become hegemonic in our days.

This study adopts a cultural political economy analytical approach to examine how the US national security establishment has framed imaginaries and rationalities that legitimize the global expansion of U.S. capitalism as a matter of existential survival. Cultural political economy is an emerging field that examines the processes whereby discourses and ideas are constructed and disseminated to build consent and advance strategic agendas. It focuses on analyzing how social reality is constituted in the political and economic realm. A cultural political economy approach, for the purposes of this dissertation and as Sum (2010) explains, "focuses on the production of hegemony in the (re-)making of capitalism. This process-oriented perspective illuminates the strategic-discursive moments in the (re-)fashioning of neoliberal hegemony" (p. 47).

What is the U.S. national security apparatus—as the United States' appendage of state power—protecting when it claims to protect U.S. national security? What are the master narratives of civilization that the U.S. national security apparatus has employed to create an image of itself as the defender of the world? How has it legitimized the need to spread its power domestically and internationally? To paraphrase Sum, this dissertation's institutionally-oriented and genealogically-oriented analysis from the locus of enunciation of the U.S. national security apparatus will shed light on the bipartisan articulations and consensuses since the Cold War to advance the capitalist world order. Additionally, by recognizing the intrinsic relationship between liberalism and security as two sides of the same coin, this project has been able to examine the role of the U.S. national security apparatus as the strong arm of the liberal

order ready to act when Western-style democracy is unable or unwilling to build consent through less forceful methods.

3.2. U.S. National Security Local Imaginaries and Global Designs: A Decolonial Approach

In attempting to understand the manner in which Western civilization has been able to impose itself onto the rest of the world, decolonial scholar Walter Mignolo has argued that the Global North, because of its dominant position, has been able to transform its local knowledges, experiences, and imaginaries into what he refers to as "global designs" applicable to the entire world (2000).[97] Translating his framework into this dissertation, it can be argued that the local imaginary of protecting U.S. national security has become a global design—a world-reaching U.S. national security apparatus—which has had a profound influence on shaping laws, modes of governance, discourses, and forms of military and non-military interventions at different levels (e.g., local, national and international) through a constellation of actors (e.g., government, the private sector, international organizations[98]), particularly for the growth and expansion of U.S. capitalism.

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[97] In a similar argument, Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2001) explains that globalization is "the process by which a given local condition or entity succeeds in extending its reach over the globe and, by so doing, develops the capacity to designate a rival social condition or entity as local….what we call globalization is always the successful globalization of a given localism" (p. 4).

[98] The Ronald Reagan Administration's 1986 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-2/86) titled *Soviet Initiatives in International Economic Affairs* blatantly admits the westernized—and pro-western—character of these global institutions when it points out that "the United States must respond firmly to Soviet attempts to join the most important functional Western economic institutions, the GATT and IMF/IBRD. The fundamental importance of these institutions to the United States and the functional inability of the Soviet Union to play a constructive role in their work makes it imperative for the U.S. to block Soviet membership." Retrieved from https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smof/nsc-

In this light, Mignolo presents us with a decolonial approach by encouraging us to think beyond the totalizing effects of global designs through what he has defined as a process of provincialization (2000). Paraphrasing the Argentinian scholar for the purposes of this dissertation, to provincialize U.S. national security would mean to "take it as one more local history, without forgetting (how could one?) its hegemonic role in the modern/colonial world system" (p. 211). That is to say, to be able to analyze how the United States understands, legitimizes, and implements the protection of its national security. What does U.S. national security mean when analyzed from its locus of enunciation? What role does the U.S. national security apparatus play in the maintenance and reproduction of the global coloniality of power (i.e., the defense of a particular version of "civilization" and the domestication of—or fight against—non-Westernized transnational Calibans or "indios bárbaros")?

Of course, when analyzing the U.S. national security apparatus from its locus of enunciation, one runs the risk of reproducing—and even legitimizing—the apparatus' rationality. For example, during the Trump Administration, Democrats vociferously denounced the incarceration of immigrant undocumented children and

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internationaleconomicaffairs/danzansky/r12/40-733-R12-035-2019.pdf. And, as scholar Mark Neocleous (2006) argues: "we can also read the Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, as part and parcel of the security project…The key institutions of 'international order' in this period invoked a particular vision of order, with a view to reshaping global capital as a means of bringing social order and thus security– political, social and economic – from the communist threat" (p. 378).

family separation as cruel.[99] However, albeit some exceptions,[100] they did not question the national security/international migration rationale that legitimized these practices.

In critical—and decolonial—studies, it is not enough to analyze and criticize the discourses and practices of the *status quo*, but it also becomes essential to question the rationale of the *status quo* itself. In this case, that means to critically engage with the U.S. national security apparatus and its local imaginary of urgently—and obsessively—protecting U.S. national security against what it portrays as ever-present and ever-growing global existential threats. As Mignolo (2000) explains: "Macronarratives from the perspective of coloniality are precisely the places in which 'an other thinking' could be implemented, not in order to tell the truth over lies, but to think otherwise, to move toward 'an other logic'" (pp. 69-70).

The protection of U.S. national security has necessarily implied the fabrication of a particular version of civilization, one based on the universalization of Western liberal values (Mignolo, 2000) and the construction and reproduction of who and what needs protecting and against whom. Samuel Huntington (2004) has argued in his controversial *Who are We?: The Challenges to America's Identity* that "national interests derive from national identity. We have to know who we are before we can know what our interests are" (p. 10). Does national security follow the same logic?

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[99] Sacchetti, M. (2020, October 29). House Democrats call Trump's family separations 'reckless incompetence and intentional cruelty'. *The Washington Post.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/family-separations-house-democrats-report-cruelty/2020/10/29/047ea38c-196a-11eb-befb-8864259bd2d8_story.html.
[100] Among those exceptions, Senator Bernie Sanders, in his presidential plan, explicitly declared that "immigration is not a threat to national security." In Bernie Sanders (n.d.). *A Welcoming and Safe America for All*. Retrieved from https://berniesanders.com/issues/welcoming-and-safe-america-all/.

Does the U.S. also have to know who and what it is to decide who deserves protection and security? According to Neocleous (2008), "The fabrication of national security goes hand in hand with the fabrication of national identity, and vice versa…the ideology of security also serves as a form of identity-construction, a construction which in turn reinforces the security measures enacted in its name" (p. 107).

For example, during the Cold War, the U.S. national security apparatus fabricated national identity in opposition to the Soviet Union (Walker, 2009). NSC-68 (1950) argued that the U.S. had the "responsibility of world leadership," prompting Patricia Dunmire's (2015) keen observation that this new thinking has led to the United States' "transition from 'sanctuary' to 'powerhouse'" (p. 297). As Dunmire explains: "The powerhouse metaphor transforms America from being a place to which people retreat to being the site from which something is generated and disseminated to places beyond itself" (pp. 297-298).[101] Of course, U.S. expansionism did not start here. There is a long prior history of U.S. colonization and imperialism as exemplified, for instance, in the 1846-1848 Mexican-American War, in which Mexico was forced to cede an important part of its territory. It is also exemplified in the 1898 Spanish-American War, by which the U.S. took control of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine islands.

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[101] The notion of "American exceptionalism" and the envisioned role of the United States as the leader of the world and the promoter of freedom and democracy has played an important role in U.S. local imaginaries and global designs. Even immigrants were deemed as vessels for the projection of U.S. civilization to the entire world. Randolph Bourne, in a 1916 essay titled, "Trans-National America" criticized U.S. nativists because, according to him, they neglected to see "the cosmopolitan significance of this migration. It is to ignore the fact that the returning immigrant is often a missionary to an inferior civilization" (p. 95).

Local imaginaries such as Thomas Jefferson's "Empire of Liberty"—which argued that the U.S. had the responsibility to bring liberty to the entire world—and "Manifest Destiny"[102]—which justified U.S. expansion as a natural and divine right—were used at the time to legitimize the annexation of foreign territories (West, 2014). While the U.S. national security apparatus has also incorporated these local imaginaries to legitimize its actions,[103] this project argues that the local imaginary of protecting U.S. national security against ever-increasing existential enemies since the Cold War (i.e., the transnational Calibans or "indios bárbaros" of the world)—and its 1947 institutionalization—is a political technology implemented through a *dispositif* that has been deployed to expand U.S. global designs.

As this dissertation will show, the local imaginary of protecting U.S. national security has gradually become the global design of expanding U.S. capitalism to the entire world in the name of a very specific version of civilization based on western liberal capitalist narratives of, among others, freedom, liberty, democracy, property rights, and the rule of law. In this respect, U.S. national security local imaginaries and global designs have implied the intermingling between domestic and foreign policy, the spread of U.S. capitalism, and the development of discourses and practices to

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[102] In his study on the links between American Exceptionalism and Christianity, John Wisley (2015) explains that the term "manifest destiny" was based on the "the notion that God has chosen the United States to bring civilization" (p. 76) to the world.

[103] For example, President George W. Bush has repeatedly echoed Jefferson's "Empire of Liberty" when justifying the Global War on Terror. His 2002 NSS states that: "in pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them" (p. 3).

legitimize the continuous expansion of the U.S. national security apparatus both at the domestic and international fronts.

3.3. National Securitization as Problematization: The Foucauldian Toolbox

Michel Foucault has explained that his intellectual production can be taken as instruments and tools that scholars can adapt, change, or modify according to their own needs, interests, and goals (Walters, 2011). For Foucault (1980), an apparatus (i.e., *dispositif*) is "a sort of – shall we say – formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function" (p. 194). Combining Foucault's understanding of the formation of an apparatus with a realist interpretation in the field of security studies, an argument can be made that the U.S. national security apparatus was strategically created in a historical moment where the United States needed to protect itself from the Soviet Union.

However, and as this dissertation argues, while a given historical moment and a very specific threat might have legitimized the need to create the U.S. national security apparatus, it can also be understood as a political technology that continues to serve the larger hegemonic project of advancing U.S. capitalism and securing the capitalist world order. In this respect, this dissertation argues that the U.S. national security apparatus can be understood as a permanent non-democratic appendage of state power that functions and is reproduced through both consensus-building efforts and the "reason of state" rationality of protecting U.S. national security.

Framed like this, the U.S. national security apparatus' identification—and institutionalization—of existential threats at different historical moments does have a dominant strategic function of building consensuses and legitimizing non-democratic practices domestically and internationally. Both the 1947 National Security Act and the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 give government bureaucrats the legal authority "to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States…in the interest of national security" (1947)[104] and to define the "worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security" (1986)[105] respectively.

While the problematization of U.S. national security might also emerge from the network of non-state actors that are part of the apparatus (e.g., transnational corporations, lobby groups, think tanks, academia), they still need to partner with the U.S. government since the latter has the power to legitimize national security discourses and act accordingly. In this respect, the protection of U.S. national security is supported by an apparatus that not only serves as a catalyst to legitimize specific discourses, knowledges, and policies (i.e., national security threats, interests, concerns, strategies, reports, objectives) but also has the power to implement them through both consent[106] and coercion (i.e., "reason of state").

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[104] National Security Act of 1947. Public Law 235 of July 26, 1947; 61 STAT. 496. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ic-legal-reference-book/national-security-act-of-1947.
[105] The Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Public Law 99-433 of October 4, 1986. Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/99th-congress/house-bill/3622/text.
[106] For example, in terms of the U.S. national security apparatus seeking the consent of the population, Matthew Alford and Tom Secker in their study: *National Security Cinema: The Shocking New Evidence of Government Control in Hollywood* (2017) demonstrate how the CIA and Pentagon have

The Copenhagen School of Security Studies argues that issues are securitized through top-down speech acts. According to the School, the remedy to "securitization" is "desecuritization," that is, "the shifting of issues out of emergency mode into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 4). According to the School's proposal, securitized issues need to be brought down to where they can be debated, following the tenets of Western liberal democracy. When analyzing modes of governance in the liberal order, Foucault (2008; Castro Gomez, 2010) pointed out that the function of security *dispositifs* was to manage and regulate populations and to conduct their conduct through what he referred to as "biopolitics." However, that does not mean that other forms of government—or, to use Foucault's term, "governmentality"—were abandoned.

Nancy Fraser (2003) argues that neoliberal globalization applies a sort of "segmented governmentality," which effectively translates into "responsibilized self-regulation for some, brute repression for others" (p. 169)—i.e., biopolitics and anatomopolitics (consent/coercion) working in tandem at different levels and adapting to specific contexts. As Santiago Castro Gomez (2010) explains in his analysis of Foucault's concept of governmentality, the French intellectual distinguishes three levels in the exercise of power: a micro-level (i.e., the individual and society); a meso-level (i.e., the modern state) and a macro-level (i.e., transnational/supra-national governance). Against hierarchical top-down explanations, Castro-Gomez (2007)

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promoted the U.S. national security agenda by directly intervening in the content of more than eight-hundred Hollywood films and over a thousand network television shows.

argues that, while capitalism and the coloniality of power are exercised differently at each level, they also constitute each other in a heterarchical relation.[107]

For example, at the macro-level, President Trump threatened the Mexican government with tariffs to force that country to stop Central American migrants before they reached the U.S. (i.e., to "force the conduct"). At the same time, the United States has provided generous international cooperation schemes through trainings, equipment, and monies to "conduct the conduct" of the Mexican government to use it as a first line of defense to prevent migrants from reaching American soil. At the meso-level, the Mexican government has decided to use its recently created *Guardia Nacional* ("National Guard," Mexico's new militarized police) to persecute Central American migrants. At the micro-level, from the perspective of immigrants, they will be either subjected to various forms of discipline and punishment (e.g., incarceration, state violence), or they will not migrate at all or take different—and even more dangerous— routes to reach the U.S. (i.e., to conduct the conduct).

Therefore, the U.S. national security apparatus does not necessarily need to build consensus to be able to function. It can also operate through the doctrine of "reason of state," the non-accountable, non-transparent, and non-democratic exercise

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[107] Santiago Castro Gomez (2007) points out that one of the methodological shortcomings in post-colonial studies has been to focus its analyses on hierarchical representations of power. Following Foucault, Castro Gomez argues that a heterarchical theory of power is better suited to analyze power dynamics within the modern/colonial world-system. As the Colombian thinker explains: "las heterarquías son estructuras complejas en las cuales no existe un nivel básico que gobierna sobre los demás, sino que todos los niveles ejercen algún grado de influencia mutua en diferentes aspectos particulares y atendiendo a coyunturas históricas específicas" (p. 170).

of state power.[108] And, as this dissertation has argued in a previous section, the liberal world order, in its endless quest for absolute security of private property and capitalist market relations, legitimizes the doctrine of reason of state through so-called "regimes of exception" that have been inscribed within the normal (liberal/neoliberal) rule of law. In this scheme, the Copenhagen's School notion of "desecuritization" through political, transparent, and democratic dialogue falls short when confronted by the inner workings of the liberal order itself with its not-really-exceptional "regimes of exception," and the U.S. national security apparatus, the non-accountable and non-democratic appendage of state power.

In this respect, a key concept that has helped this dissertation analyze the incorporation of certain issues into the national security agenda is Foucault's use of the term "problematization." This framework allowed Foucault to study why and how certain issues become a problem (i.e., why and how certain issues are problematized) in specific historical moments and particular contexts. As Foucault (1997) explains, "What must be grasped is the extent to which what we know of it, the forms of power that are exercised in it, and the experience that we have in it of ourselves constitute nothing but determined historical figures, through a certain form of ***problematization*** [emphasis added] that defines objects, rules of action, modes of relation to oneself" (p.

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[108] As Neocleous (2003) explains when analyzing the implementation of the United States' Global War on Terror: "Regardless of the Geneva Conventions and liberal hand-wringing, US policy would be decided on the basis of a political doctrine first formulated in the sixteenth century: reason of state. Put simply, reason of state 'tells the statesman what he must do to preserve the health and strength of the State'. For each state at each particular moment there exists one ideal course of action, one ideal reason of state (ratio status, ragion di stato, raison d'État, razón de Estado). The statesman's role is to discern this course. As such, raison d'État is 'the fundamental principle of national conduct, the State's first law of motion'" (p. 40).

318). Reframing "problematization" as "national securitization," allows this dissertation to analyze why and how specific issues—such as "international migration" or "international narcotics"—have been incorporated into the U.S. national security apparatus and to examine their role in the larger hegemonic project of advancing U.S. capitalism and securing the capitalist world order.

A question remains for this dissertation on who and what is part of the U.S. national security apparatus. Centered around executive power and privilege, this dissertation understands the U.S. national security apparatus as a public-private appendage of state power that advances U.S. capitalist hegemony and thrives to secure the capitalist world order.[109] The institutionalization of U.S. national security has brought into existence a network of discourses, practices, modes of governance, experts, think tanks, university academic programs, and corporations that constitute, reinforce, reproduce, and expand this field of intervention since 1947.

For instance, it has become the norm for establishment news channels (e.g., CNN, Fox News, NBC) to present the commentaries of what these networks refer to as national security experts, analysts, or correspondents. Moreover, critical security scholars have also studied the aggressive involvement of corporations in the national security field, either as providers of technology (e.g., Amazon, Google), directly managing U.S. national security through privatization schemes (e.g., private military

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[109] U.S. government documents have also referred to the national security establishment as an "apparatus," but without defining it. For example, the 1998 U.S. Commission on National Security/ 21st Century (2000) explained that it "was chartered to be the most comprehensive examination of the structures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus since the core legislation governing it was passed in 1947" (p. 1).

companies such as Blackwater), or by lobbying to promote their interests by providing model legislation (Bureš & Carrapiço, 2018).

It is also worth pointing out that, historically, many government officials who have worked in the national security field have either come from the corporate sector or have secured jobs there after their government tenure (i.e., the so-called public-private revolving door). This dissertation understands the U.S. national security apparatus as a heterogeneous public-private constitutive network. However, its primary focus is on analyzing it as a non-democratic appendage of state power and the functions that it performs domestically and internationally to legitimize the defense and expansion of U.S. capitalist hegemony.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that liberalism and security are two sides of the same coin. While liberalism proclaims that it is about individual rights and individual freedoms, they both stem from—and are primarily rooted in—the absolute defense of private property and capitalist market relations. They are also based on Western epistemologies of legal rights, freedom, and democracy, which have been gradually imposed onto the rest of the world. As pointed out before, Marx saw the intrinsic interconnection between liberalism and security as two sides of the same coin.

Other Western scholars, even when adopting a critical stance against security governance, seem to believe in the democratic representative promises of what I may call the "softer side" of the Western liberal order (e.g., elections, representative

government, freedom of speech). Agamben's "regimes of exception" is one example that argues that the Western liberal order has been somewhat corrupted by securitizing trends. Others argue that the liberal project, in its current neoliberal form, has entered an authoritarian phase (Bruff, 2014). Under this interpretation, the solution would appear to be to advocate for a return to the more liberal—softer—side of the Western liberal order. The Copenhagen School, with its notion of "desecuritization," also operates within the confines of the liberal framework.

In contrast, Poulantzas presented a more refined analysis that saw the interconnection—and complicity—between liberalism and authoritarianism. When representative liberal democratic governance cannot successfully mediate between the dominant and dominated classes, then various forms of securitizing governance intervene. As Wendy Brown (2019) has shown, Friedrich Hayek, one of the staunchest defenders of liberalism, was very aware of the tensions between liberalism and democracy. Brown points out that for Hayek, "democracy and liberalism have radically different opposites. Democracy's opposite is authoritarianism, concentrated but not necessarily unlimited political power. Liberalism's opposite is totalitarianism, complete control of every aspect of life. This makes authoritarianism compatible with a liberal society" (p. 72).

This dissertation understands the liberal project as an inherently security project where liberal and securitized forms of governance coexist and are implemented accordingly to respond to different contexts. As this dissertation argues, the U.S. national security apparatus plays a key role in the maintenance and reproduction of the

liberal order. For example, President Biden, going even further than the Trump administration, has labeled "Domestic Violent Extremists," among others, those "who oppose all forms of capitalism, corporate globalization, and governing institutions," which, according to his administration, "are perceived as harmful to society," and those who oppose "perceived economic, social, or racial hierarchies" (p. 4).[110]

As the unclassified 2021 document explains, freedom of speech, a core value of liberalism, is not even guaranteed in the U.S. national security apparatus' defense of the liberal (capitalist) order: "mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics **may not** constitute violent extremism, and **may be** constitutionally protected [Emphasis added]" (p. 4). With ever-growing economic inequalities, it is not surprising that the security side of the liberal order has gradually been overshadowing its liberal,—and at the very least rhetorically—softer side.

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[110] Office of the Director of National Intelligence (March 1, 2021) *Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021*. Retrieved from https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/UnclassSummaryofDVEAssessment-17MAR21.pdf.

4. Precursors of the U.S. National Security Discourse

I am convinced, and intent to convince you, that our National Security is in graver peril today than at any time in the past.
-Stanwood Menken, National Security League, 1919

This chapter traces the precursors of the national security discourse in the U.S., focusing on the creation of a civil organization called the National Security League in 1914. Through an analysis of the League's work and discursive production,[111] I examine the organization's construction of civilization narratives and ever-present, ever-growing domestic and foreign existential threats to advocate the need for foreign interventions, the growth of the military, the erosion of civil liberties, and the promotion of its pro-business, anti-worker agenda, all in the name of protecting U.S. national security.

4.1. Protecting Civilization: The Work of the National Security League

The institutionalization of "national security" in the United States occurred in 1947 through the National Security Act. Of course, that does not mean that the term— or similar ones representing ideas of survival and preservation at the nation-state level[112]—was not used prior to that date. Security scholars such as Daniel Yergin (1977) and David Jablonsky et al. (1997) have argued that the term "national security"

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[111] Most of the data collected for this chapter comes directly from the National Security League's publications such as speeches, awareness raising campaigns, bulletins, and annual reports.
[112] For example, the U.S. constitution, in its preamble, states that it aims to "provide for the common defence…and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Alexander Hamilton uses the term "national security" in *The Federalist Papers* numbers 29 and 70 when arguing the need to defend the country against domestic and foreign threats.

was not popular in U.S. political discourse before 1947. However, as I will discuss in this chapter, this was not precisely the case, particularly with the emergence of an organization called the National Security League in 1914, which promoted the urgency of protecting the United States against what it deemed as ever-present and ever-growing domestic and foreign existential threats through direct action and by lobbying its national security agenda with the U.S. government (Ward, 1960).

In a 1992 article, "National Security in American History," Ernest May analyzed presidential speeches to classify the national security priorities of the United States. He argues that from the 1790s to the 1870s, they were primarily concerned about protecting international borders and preserving the union. A July 9, 1861, *New York Times* editorial titled "Increase of the Regular Army"[113] seems to agree with May's assessment by pointing out that a reduction of the regular army after the end of the Civil War would not be beneficial to the "national security of the country" against foreign and domestic threats. From the 1880s to the 1930s, and in line with the Monroe Doctrine, May points out that U.S. presidents focused on the need to protect the entire Western Hemisphere from foreign powers in order to defend the United States. Before the Cold War, "national defense" was the institutional term mostly used to describe how the United States approached the protection of the country, that is, mainly in terms of a self-defense reactive military force.

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[113] Increase of the regular army. (1861, July 9). *The New York Times.*
https://www.nytimes.com/1861/07/09/archives/increase-of-the-regular-army.html?searchResultPosition=4.

As renowned political commentator Walter Lippmann explained in his 1943 influential work *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, with militarily weak neighbors to the south and the north, the United States had historically enjoyed a geographical sense of protection by being separated from Asia and Europe by two oceans. In Lippmann's assessment, this illusion led Americans to believe that "the foundations of national security, with arms, with strategy, and with diplomacy, was beneath our dignity as idealists" (p. 49). This self-delusion of protection—which, according to Lippmann, "diverted our attention from the idea of national security" (p. 52)—was challenged during the first quarter of the twentieth century by the might of the so-called "Imperial German Navy" which could potentially reach the coasts of the United States, thus posing an existential threat to the country.

World War I brought major existential concerns about the need to prepare the United States for a war against Germany. In 1914, Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge introduced a joint resolution before the sixty-third Congress to create a "National Security Commission" in charge of making "full investigation…onto the question of the preparedness of the United States for war, defensive or offensive" (U.S. Congress, 1914, p. 7). In December of that same year, a non-profit organization called "The National Security League" was founded and included a broad spectrum of figures from the private sector, politicians, and the military (Ward, 1960).[114] It also received support from figures such as former President Theodore Roosevelt, who encouraged

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[114] The National Security League received large contributions from millionaires such as Cornelius Vanderbilt, Mortimer Schiff, George W. Perkins, Bernard Baruch, Henry C. Frick, and Simon Guggenheim (Ward, 1960).

the League to focus on Americanization efforts, particularly of immigrants.[115] Senator

Henry Cabot Lodge also addressed the League to explain the deficiencies in the United

States' system of defense, urging its members to pressure Congress to take action.[116]

Although it lasted a little less than thirty years, ending amidst internal conflicts, the

League influenced the thinking about "national security" and its subsequent

institutionalization in the United States.[117]

Based in New York, the National Security League snowballed and established

chapters all over the country (Edwards, 1982). While its exact membership is unknown,

the League claimed to have between 100,000 to 150,000 members by the late-1910s

throughout the United States.[118] The League's articles of association stated that it was

created to "promote patriotic education and national sentiment and service among the

people of the United States, and to promote recognition of the fact that the obligation

of universal military service requires universal military training." (U.S. Congress,

1919, p. 5036). However, five years after its founding, at the League's 1919 Annual

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[115] In 1917, President Roosevelt sent a letter to the National Security League's Congress of Constructive Patriotism where he explained that "there can be no real preparedness in this country unless this country is thoroughly Americanized; for only a patriotic people will prepare; and there can be no deep national feeling for America until we are all of us Americans through and through" (National Security League, 1917a, p. 8).

[116] In the conclusion of his speech, Senator Lodge told the members of the League that "you must demonstrate to the Representative or the Senator that the people who send him here want this thing done; and when the American people make it clear to the House and Senate that they are in earnest about national defense you will have it, and you are not likely to get it much sooner in a proper and sufficient way" (Lodge, 1916, p. 10).

[117] A rivaling republican-based organization called the "American Defense Society" was founded in 1915. It strongly advocated against Germany and Bolshevism. Among its aims was the "Defense of America within"—by punishing spies and interning all enemy aliens—and the "Defense of America without"—by joining the war against Germany and encouraging universal military training. They preferred to use the term "national defense" to distance themselves from the National Security League. However, they lost that battle and the organization eventually faded away.

[118] As reported in the *National Security League Bulletin*, Vol I. No. 3, June 1918 (National Security League, 1918/1919).

Meeting, its Chairman, Stanwood Menken, urgently proclaimed that "so far as our main purpose is concerned—the obtaining of absolute National Security for these United States—we have failed" (National Security League, 1919, p. 5).

This sense of urgency to protect U.S. national security led not only to the organization's growth but also to a definition of what protecting national security actually meant for the League and a characterization of who the existential threats to the country were. The League's national security priorities were reflected in the names of their numerous publications and campaigns. For example, the League developed national security conscious raising publications such as *Why the United States is at War* (1917), *Democracy and Compulsory Service* (1917), *Americanization Service; What you can do for America through Americanization of the Foreign-Born* (1918), and *A square deal for the public: a working program for crushing the radical menace to support its objectives* (1919). It also led to the implementation of nationwide activities, which included campaigns for "universal military training," "national preparedness," "patriotic education," "home defense leagues," "Americanization," "make the United States a one language nation," and "combatting the menace of radicalism and bolshevism" (National Security League, 1916).

Besides advocating for the strengthening of the United States land and navy defenses, the League also promoted improved coordination between the U.S. defense forces through "a central body with unlimited authority,"[119] a proposition that, as will

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[119] As National Security League President Stanwood Menken argued, "the war should be conducted by a War Council, appointed by the President, with functions of direction superior to the Cabinet, whose Secretaries should be executives, carrying out the plans of the higher authority. This suggestion means a revolution in the methods of American life" (National Security League, 1917b, p. 7).

be later explained, has been realized through the gradual institutionalization after World War II of the U.S. national security apparatus. In 1915, a *New York Times* editorial supported the National Security League's army reform campaign, although warning that some of the League's speeches were "extravagant" and some of its members were "overzealous."[120]

Promoting the war against Germany was the National Security League's main foreign affairs objective. Preluding what years later the U.S. national security apparatus would frame during the Cold War as the "fight between good and evil" and the defense of "civilization as a whole,"[121] the National Security League portrayed the War against Germany as the "struggle between Democracy and Autocracy —between Prussia and Civilization" adding that the conflict was "the greatest struggle between the forces of good and evil that the world has ever known" (National Security League, 1918, p. 7).

Between 1918 and 1919, only four years after its foundation, the League was subjected to a gruesome congressional investigation (U.S Congress, 1918)[122] because of its activities and, in particular, its aggressive tactics, as well as its sources of funding,

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[120] Preparation is Essential. *New York Times*. (1915, June 16). https://www.nytimes.com/1915/06/16/archives/preparation-is-essential.html?searchResultPosition=1.
[121] For example, the 1950 National Security Council Report number 68 titled *United States Objectives and Programs for National Security* (NSC-68) explained that: "the issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself." Also, in March 1983, President Ronald Reagan delivered what has been colloquially referred to as his "evil empire speech" before evangelicals in Florida. In the speech, Reagan named the Soviet Union "the focus of evil in the modern world," calling the Cold War "a test of moral will and faith." In Reagan, R. (1983). *Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals* [Transcript]. https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/50919/remarks_annual_convention_national_association_ev angelicals_030883.pdf.
[122] The 1918-1919 Congressional Hearings was charged with investigating and "make report as to the officers, membership, financial support, expenditures, general character, activities, and purposes of the national security league, a corporation of New York, and of any associated organizations." (U.S. Congress, 1918).

particularly from corporate America and, especially, from the munitions industry (Ward, 1960). While the League's honorary president, national guard Colonel Charles Lydecker reiterated at the congressional hearings that the organization was "non-political," it was heavily involved in pressuring the U.S. government to follow its national security agenda (U.S Congress, 1918, p. 10).

For example, the League developed and distributed a chart describing how members of Congress had voted in what the organization identified as the "eight principal preparedness and war measures"[123] against Germany. It concluded that of the 340 members of Congress, "only 47 voted in all eight measures." In addition, the League sent a "Loyalty Test Questionnaire" to all incoming members of Congress to ask them "for an expression of their war views." The League actively encouraged Americans to vote for office "only such men as, independent of party affiliations, will support a vigorous prosecution of the war"[124] against Germany.

In order to support the enforcement of both the 1917 Espionage Act (still in effect) and the 1918 Sedition Act—which seriously threatened liberties and freedom of speech—, the League established "Home Defense Leagues"[125] nationwide to denounce what it deemed as suspicious activities. In a nutshell, through both acts, the U.S. government could prosecute anybody who criticized the war against Germany and the

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[123] In *National Security League Bulletin*, Vol I. No. 4, September 1918 (National Security League, 1918/1919).
[124] In *National Security League Bulletin*, Vol I. No. 5, November 1918. (National Security League 1918/1919).
[125] In *National Security League Bulletin*, Vol I. No. 1, November 1918. (National Security League 1918/1919).

U.S. government.[126] As the League proudly stated in its December 1918 bulletin: "The League has fought all forms of Sedition. It was instrumental in organizing seventy-six Home Defense Leagues within its branches and it has repeatedly supplied the Government with valuable information. This has been done as a duty and without publicity."[127] Inevitably, these informal—and illegal—surveilling activities led to abuses, prompting the American Civil Liberties Union to ironically call the League "unpatriotic," as reported by *The New York Times* on July 26, 1927, in an article titled "Sees our Liberties Slowly Vanishing."[128]

During World War I, the League heavily advocated the need for universal military training and service and promoted the need for patriotic education. Among its many initiatives, the League developed what they called "The Lawrence Plan for Education in Citizenship" as "an effort to solve the problem of making the schools a force for patriotism" (National Security League, 1918, p. 8). Reproducing the trope of American exceptionalism, the Plan explained that "the good citizen realizes that the United States is, on the whole, the best form of government that ever existed." As the war against Germany started to wane down, the National Security League turned its efforts to the domestic front, and they actively advocated against bolshevism,

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[126] Among its provisions, the Sedition Act punished those who "when the United States is at war, shall willfully utter, print, write or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States or the Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute, or shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish any language intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the United States."
[127] In National Security League Bulletin, Vol I, N. 1, February 1918. (National Security League, 1918/1919).
[128] Sees our Liberties Slowly Vanishing. (1927, July 26) *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1927/07/26/archives/sees-our-liberties-slowly-vanishing-hays-calls-security-league.html?searchResultPosition=1.

radicalism, and what they labeled as "un-American doctrines"[129] such as syndicalism, communism, and socialism.

A December 1918 Bulletin detailed the eight principal future activities of the League, which ranged from recognizing the wounded soldier to campaigning for the use of the English language. However, at the Congressional Hearing on the National Security League, the organization's sixth activity, "creating a greater regard for representative government as distinguished from mass administration; protecting our National Legislature from dangerous proletarians" (U.S Congress, 1918, p. 143), caught the attention of Democratic Representative from Arkansas, Thaddeus H. Caraway. The Congressman asked League's President Lydecker what a proletarian was. Lydecker replied that he did not know what a proletarian was, but he knew that "a dangerous proletarian is a man who is an ignorant demagogue" (p. 144). And by that, he meant somebody who might be prone to be governed "by mass rule or mob… which appears at present to be the curse of Russia" (p. 144).

Preoccupied with the social unrest and labor strikes of that period when workers demanded better pay and labor rights, the League launched a program called "A square deal for the public, for labor and for employers."[130] According to the League, the core problem was that there was a minority—largely foreign, unassimilated immigrants—who did not understand America's core values and principles and who were trying to introduce foreign—and un-American—doctrines into the country. Anticipating mid-

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[129] In *National Security League Bulletin*, Vol II. No. 2, May 1919. (National Security League, 1918/1919).
[130] In *National Security League Bulletin*, Vol II, No. 4, December 1919 (National Security League, 1918/1919).

20th century neoliberal discourses on competition, individualism, and losers and winners in a competitive free market (Brown, 2015), the League pointed out that "the cloak of altruism…choke [sic] all channels of competition and turn the survival of the fittest into the aggrandizement of the slacker and the unfit, stifle ambition and stunt the progress of the human race." In this respect, they praised what they referred to as loyal American workers who believed in the "fundamental principle of individual effort and opportunity" and respected the principles of "law and order." Therefore, anyone who did not conform or adapt to these values, according to the League, could not "be an American,"[131] thus posing a national security threat to the United States.

As explained by the League in its numerous informational campaigns, the idea of America has been defined by the notions of liberty and freedom, words that have been repeatedly used—and redefined— throughout American history (Foner, 1998). To achieve freedom, the League promoted what they called "manhood," which they defined as "ambition, self-denial, thrift," which, according to them, naturally sprang up "from the protection of personal liberty and the right of property."[132] That is to say, the freedom to compete in the market needed a strong security framework to make it possible. As I argued in Chapter 3, capitalism—with its liberal order—is not really about "liberty" but "security." Specifically, it is primarily about the protection of property rights and the defense of individual self-interests in the so-called free market.

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[131] In *National Security League Bulletin*, Vol II, No. 4, December 1919 (National Security League, 1918/1919).

[132] In *National Security League Bulletin,* Vol II. No. 4, December 1919 (National Security League, 1918/1919).

The National Security League also placed a strong emphasis on Americanization and education, particularly for immigrants. It argued that immigrants should not be allowed to enter the country based on economic factors but on their "adaptability to American principles and ideals of Government and of life."[133] Curiously enough, in 2008, a governmental report commissioned by President George W. Bush titled *Building an Americanization Movement for the Twenty-First Century* made a similar argument when it called for the renewal of the Americanization movement of the early 1900s in order to meet the challenges brought about by legal immigrants[134] who are coming "from different countries of origin and settling in communities that lack a long history of receiving immigrants" (Task Force on New Americans, 2008, p. 1). The 2008 report uses the term "patriotic assimilation" to refer to the objective of "unifying civic identity that respects diversity, including individual religious and cultural traditions but does not use these elements to define the identity of the political community" (p. 42). In this scheme, immigrants have to embrace the principles of American democracy and communicate in English to become American patriots in the process or what, almost one hundred years before, the National Security League defined as "100% Americans."[135]

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[133] In *National Security League Bulletin*, Vol I. No. 3, June 1918 (National Security League, 1918/1919).

[134] It is worth pointing out that the report is very keen on constantly emphasizing the term "legal immigrants." It appears that the recommendations of the report do not apply to irregular immigrants since, under their logic, there is no need to Americanize/assimilate them.

[135] In *National Security League Bulletin*, Vol I. No. 3, June 1918 (National Security League, 1918/1919).

4.2. Conclusion

The National Security League's main objectives were to preserve and defend the "national integrity" (U.S. Congress, 1918, p. 92) and "sustain the idea of America,"[136] which they defined as freedom, liberty, a free-market capitalist economic order, and a government that promoted and protected these objectives. They identified and heavily promoted the need to create a strong army—and better coordination between the governmental branches—to defend the country against foreign existential threats such as Germany during both world wars and, later on, the Soviet Union. On the domestic front, they heavily persecuted what they defined as "un-American" doctrines, placing a strong emphasis on the dangers that immigrants represented to America's essentialized values and on laborers (i.e., "dangerous proletarians") who demanded any type of labor rights and redistributive policies.

Why is the National Security League's work significant for this dissertation? Even though the League was a civil organization, its pro-business agendas, discourses, and non-democratic practices do bear some resemblances to the manner in which the U.S. national security apparatus would later operate and legitimize its actions. To advance its objectives, the League made use of civilization narratives and the construction of existential threats—foreign and domestic—to protect a very specific "idea of America"[137] based on pro-capitalist values. In doing so, it constructed the war

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[136] In *National Security League Bulletin*, Vol II. No. 2, May 1919 (National Security League, 1918/1919).

[137] As the League explained: "Our determined purpose has been to sustain the idea of America. What we mean by that can best be described in the words of Theodore Parker: 'There is what I call the

against Germany as a battle between good and evil, portraying the United States as the beacon of freedom and democracy and the protector of civilization.

On the domestic front, anybody who did not conform to their "idea of America," according to the League, not only did not belong in the country but was also a national security threat. While immigrants were heavily targeted, the League also turned its attention against American citizens who, as the Sedition Act established, dared to criticize, among others, "the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag of the United States." Moreover, the League's strong pro-business orientation made them suspicious of American workers and, especially, labor unions.

Of course, the National Security League, as a civil organization, did not have the reach or power that the institutionalization of U.S. national security would later have. In order to carry out its actions, the League needed either public support or to lobby the U.S. government to adopt its agenda or to take advantage of existing legislation—such as the Espionage Act and the Sedition Act—to make itself relevant. At the same time, the manner in which the League represented the protection of U.S. national security against ever-present domestic and foreign existential threats to not only the U.S. government but also to their "idea of America," do share some commonalities with our current world. In this scheme, an immigrant or a U.S. citizen who shared what the League labeled as "un-American doctrines"[138] represented a

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American idea, for shortness sake I will call it the idea of Freedom.'" In *National Security League Bulletin*, Vol II. No. 2, May 1919 (National Security League, 1918/1919).

[138] As the *National Security League Bulletin*, Vol II. No. 2, May 1919 explained "Internationalism, syndicalism, communism, socialism, are the antitheses of Americanism. Americanism means the best

similar existential threat to the United States as the mighty Imperial German Navy or the nuclear power of the Soviet Union once did.

The Daily Worker was a New York newspaper published by the United States Communist Party. Naturally, it was attacked by the National Security League. During the 1920s, the paper denounced that "the American Legion, the Keymen of America, the National Security League, the American government have combined to destroy Labor's fighting paper,"[139] prompting its readers to get involved in the labor movement to save it. The Daily Worker accused the National Security League of being "a group of Allied agents and American munition makers, representing the Morgans, duPonts [*sic*] and other monopolists."[140] It added that the League "was the main propaganda agency that helped put the United States into the war in 1917 for the glory and profits of the House of Morgan."

In 1936, the U.S. Senate's Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry presented its final report to Congress. The work of the National Security League was mentioned in the hearings, which lasted almost two years. Also known as the Nye Committee after its Chair, Republican Senator Gerald Nye, it was charged with investigating the corporate, profit-driven interests of the U.S. arms industries worldwide (United States. War Industries Board, 1935, p. 12).[141] After an extensive

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in the ideals of the peoples of all the world, the best of human ideals manhood. Manhood means ambition, self-denial, thrift" (National Security League, 1918/1919).

[139] February 24, 1928 (page 4). (1928, Feb 24). *The Daily Worker* (1924-1958) Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1980104774?accountid=14523.

[140] The Daily Worker April 1, 1941 (page 6). (1941, Apr 01). *The Daily Worker* (1924-1958) Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1922197760?accountid=14523.

[141] Among the companies investigated were "E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co," "Federal Laboratories, Inc.," "American Armament Corporation," and "Colt ' s Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Co."

investigation, the Committee found that there was an "unhealthy alliance" between the U.S. government and these industries "which operates in the name of patriotism and satisfies interests which are, in large part, purely selfish" (p. 11). The Committee documented many instances of corruption, particularly the bribery of public officials, as well as these industries' quest to perpetuate conflicts worldwide by intensifying "the fears of people for their neighbors" to use them for "their own profit" (p. 8). At the time, these industries were even referred to as the "merchants of death." (Engelbrecht & Hanighen, 1935).

To avoid these practices and to advance peace efforts, the Nye Committee went as far as to recommend "Government ownership of facilities adequate for the construction of all warships…also all gun forgings, projectiles, and armor plate, and of facilities adequate for the production of powder, rifles, pistols, and machine guns necessary for the United States War Department" (United States. War Industries Board, 1935, p. 15). The same year of the report's presentation—1936—, a Gallup Poll found that 82% of Americans agreed that the manufacture and sale of war munitions for private profit should be prohibited.[142] Additionally, another Gallup Poll found that 69% of Americans favored government ownership of the war munitions industries.[143] Despite public support, the Nye Committee's recommendation was not only not taken

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[142] Gallup Organization (1936). Gallup Organization Poll: January 1936, Question 2 [USGALLUP.030836.R04]. Gallup Organization. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.
[143] Gallup Organization (1936). Gallup Poll # 1936-0060: Relief Expenditures/Government Ownership of Businesses/Politics, Question 6 [USGALLUP.36-60.Q06]. Gallup Organization. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

into consideration but went into the opposite direction with the ongoing privatization of U.S. national security to this date.[144]

As I have outlined in these pages, there was a clear interconnection between the pro-business agenda of the League, its corporate funders, its construction of foreign and domestic existential threats, its attacks on organized labor, and its "pro-capitalist education programs" (Zeidel, 2020, p. 168), with the organization's aggressive promotion of foreign military interventions, the growth of the military establishment, and the exercise of non-democratic practices at home. Domestically, the League considered any deviation from the capitalist order an existential threat to their "idea of America." By the 1940s, the National Security League had lost its influence and was in its final years, mainly due to internal conflicts (Ward, 1960). Despite the League's rapid decline, the U.S. government started a reorganization process to institutionalize U.S. national security to protect the country against what it deemed as existential threats. How would these threats be constructed and legitimized? What does the institutionalization of U.S. national security set out to protect and advance?

In our present world, and as I will discuss later on, there has been a gradual attempt in the midst of neoliberal globalization to blur—and redefine—the line between what the U.S. national security apparatus considers foreign military threats and non-military threats. For example, the Trump Administration attempted to designate Antifa

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[144] Less than ten years later, the 1945 congressional report titled: *Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Post War Organization for National Security* argued that "an important objective of military organization must be the maintenance of close relations between the military services and the industrial establishments," adding that the armament "for national security in the future will probably have to be manufactured in large quantities on short notice…To accomplish this, industrialists must be currently informed of military needs" (Eberstadt, 1945, p. 21).

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as a domestic terrorist organization[145] and sent the Department of Homeland Security to deal with Black Lives Matter protestors.[146] Moreover, in a turn of events reminiscent of the 1918 Sedition Act, Republican Representative Andy Biggs from Arizona introduced on July 2020 a resolution to condemn Democratic Representative Ilhan Omar of Minnesota for expressing "anti-American sentiments" and for advocating a "Marxist form of government" and "Marxist policies"[147] (i.e., the National Security League's "un-American doctrines").

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[145] In 2019, President Trump tweeted that "The United States of America will be designating ANTIFA as a Terrorist Organization." In Trump, D. [@RealDonaldTrump]. (2019, May 31). Twitter. https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1267227532455219200.

[146] On June 26, 2020, President Trump, through an "Executive Order Executive Order on Protecting American Monuments, Memorials, and Statues and Combating Recent Criminal Violence" authorized the Department of Homeland Security to "assist with the protection of Federal monuments, memorials, statues, or property." While the Order does not explicitly mention the Black Lives Matter movement, it explains that "anarchists and left-wing extremists have sought to advance a fringe ideology that paints the United States of America as fundamentally unjust and have sought to impose that ideology on Americans through violence and mob intimidation."

[147] In U.S. Congress (2020). *H.Res.1047 — 116th Congress "Condemning the statements of Representative Ilhan Omar of Minnesota*." https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/1047?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22Condemning%22%5D%7D&s=5&r=7. The resolution is in response to remarks made by Representative Omar where she argued that: "We are not merely fighting to tear down the systems of oppression in the criminal justice system. We are fighting to tear down systems of oppression that exist in housing, in education, in health care, in employment, in the air we breathe."

5. The Cold War and the Institutionalization of U.S. National Security

> The conception of national security does not mean dictating to other peoples. From the beginning of our life as a nation we have looked upon the United States as part of a world community of peoples who are both independent and interdependent. Our Constitution has no place for imperialistic arrogance in dealing with other peoples.
> -Harold Lasswell, 1971

This chapter provides a historical overview of the institutionalization of U.S. national security during the Cold War through an analysis of the rationales behind the nascent ideology of national security. In addition, it analyzes the construction of the Soviet Union as the existential enemy other and its interconnection with the need to spread U.S. capitalism globally to protect U.S. national security. Following this dissertation's approach, instead of analyzing if the Soviet Union was an existential threat to the U.S., I interrogate how the construction of this existential threat served to advance U.S. capitalist hegemony, legitimize non-democratic practices, and expand the U.S. national security apparatus worldwide.

5.1. Institutionalizing U.S. National Security

The end of both World Wars brought about a national conversation on the mistakes made by the United States during both military conflicts and the need to prepare the country for future wars. After many studies and congressional debates, a law was passed in 1947 that not only reorganized the entire U.S. government but also moved the country from a bipartisan consensus on the need for military defense to the broadening doctrine of "national security." The National Security Act of 1947

institutionalized, merged, and established national security agencies such as the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, transforming the scope from military self-defense against foreign armies into a proactive and preemptive force both domestically and internationally.

Even more than that, the National Security Act produced a civil-military apparatus centralized under the leadership of the executive branch. In the name of protecting U.S. national security, it has increasingly concentrated power and has given rise to a non-accountable, non-democratic establishment. Despite the recommendations of the Nye Committee (see Chapter 4), it has also opened the door for the private sector's active participation in national security matters, particularly in academia and corporate America (Isenberg, 2009).

The protection of U.S. national security, as the 1949 Hoover Report explained,[148] is "not intermittent but continuous" and "in many ways controlling nearly every other aspect of Government" (Committee on the National Security Organization 1949, p. 28), a trend that has continued to this date. Said report urged Americans to understand that national security doctrine went beyond military defense and "must embrace all our national resources of every kind—human, material, industrial, scientific, political, and spiritual" (p. 28).

In his 1977 study of what he refers to as the "national security state," renowned scholar Daniel Yergin has argued that U.S. national security thinking postulates that

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[148] Led by former President Herbert Hoover, the "Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government," as per Public Law 162, approved July 7, 1947, was charged with conducting a comprehensive study of the operation and organization of executive functions, including that of national security.

"developments halfway around the globe are seen to have automatic and direct impact on America's core interests…Thus, desirable foreign policy goals are translated into issues of national survival, and the range of threats becomes limitless" (p. 196). If existential threats are, indeed, both limitless and global, then the growth and expansion of the U.S. national security apparatus worldwide—and imperialistic arrogance, as political scientist Harold Lasswell worried— was a very predictable outcome.

When analyzing the development of the 1947 National Security Act, history Professor Michael J. Hogan, in his 1998 study *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954,* argues that national security ideology was a byproduct of War World II and the subsequent need to prepare the nation for a total war at any time. In the enactment of the 1947 Act, Hogan documents the battles between the proponents of this new ideology and those who represented the American anti-statist, anti-militarist, isolationist tradition, fearing that the country could potentially turn into what Harold Lasswell called in the 1940s "a garrison state" (1941; 1951; 1971) with the gradual erosion of democracy, civil liberties, and economic freedoms in the name of security. Arguing against military interventions abroad, Lasswell (1971) worried that "it is, I think, clear that if we permit a garrison state to exist under our authority abroad, long after the ending of hostilities, we increase the likelihood of it at home" (p. 51).

After 1945, Hogan (1998) argues that the new position of the United States as the world's leader and the existential threat that the Soviet Union represented to the country eased the tensions between those who favored and those who were against the

growth of government. Throughout American history, as Hogan maintains, these tensions have typically resulted in compromises between all sides ever since. Thus, the triumphantly national security ideology, according to Hogan, has acted as a sort of "check and balances" that has prevented the implementation of a garrison state in the United States. At the same time, it has brought about an understanding that "it was no longer possible to separate the defense of American liberties from the defense of liberty everywhere" (p. 465), thus legitimizing not only the growth and expansion of the U.S. government in national security matters but also U.S. interventions worldwide.

When analyzing how national security ideology was articulated and institutionalized in the U.S., scholar Douglas T. Stuart, in his 2012 study *Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law That Transformed America,* mostly agrees with Hogan's analysis. However, Stuart places a stronger emphasis on the lessons that the country learned in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attacks. According to Stuart, "Pearl Harbor convinced the American people that preparing for the next sneak attack was everybody's business, all the time, at home and abroad" (p. 3).

With an increasingly bipolar world and technological improvements that shortened both time and geographical distance, Stuart argues, the American public understood that the country was vulnerable to surprise attacks from different parts of the world. In this context, a permanent national security establishment focused on the strengthening of the military, the gathering of intelligence, the prevention of military aggression, and the ability to launch an attack at a moment's notice became part of the nascent national security ideology and convinced the American public to support it. In

1945, a poll found that 81% of Americans thought that the United States should maintain the largest defense forces in the world, even after the end of World War II and even if an international organization was created to promote and advance world peace.[149]

Both studies undertake a detailed analysis of the leading ideologues of U.S. national security doctrine, primarily Pendleton Herring, James Forrestal, and Ferdinand Eberstadt. However, less importance is placed on the pro-free market, imperialist, and anti-New Deal agenda, as well as the corporate connections of the framers of the nascent national security ideology. As Walker (2009) points out, "the managers of Truman's national security state came more from large corporations, the banking community, and Wall Street law firms than they did from either the Department of State or the U.S. military," (p. 127) a trend that has continued to this date. Even less emphasis is placed on the civilization narratives and the construction of ever-present existential threats to legitimize the need for U.S. interventions worldwide and the growth of the U.S. national security apparatus.

As Pendleton Herring argued in his 1941 *The Impact of War: Our American Democracy Under Arms*, "war and the threat of war may bring the conditions that will insure the continuity of our culture and values in a time of rapid social change. Threat of external dangers may serve to maintain loyalty to our institutions and ideals" (pp. 254-255). Herring was a political scientist and a Harvard professor who held several

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[149] Office of Public Opinion Research, OPOR Poll # 1945-042: Roosevelt Survey # 42, Question 3, USOPOR.45-042.Q03, Office of Public Opinion Research, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1945).

government positions in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations and served as director of the United Nations Atomic Energy Group in 1946. He also served as president of the Social Science Research Council from 1948 until 1968 and the Woodrow Wilson Foundation after that, where he promoted U.S. national security ideology. As this dissertation discusses, existential threats have served to articulate bipartisan consensuses, expand the U.S. national security apparatus, and legitimize a wide variety of authoritarian solutions domestically and internationally in the name of protecting U.S. national security.

In his study, Stuart points out that Pendleton Herring was a significant contributor in the institutionalization of national security in the United States "as a more appropriate and reliable guide to foreign and defense planning than the traditional concept of national interest" (p. 27) or even the term "national defense."[150] Herring argued in 1941 that the rise of totalitarian regimes and technological developments, particularly in the arms industry, prompted the need for a more centralized system of government preparedness and response to protect U.S. national security.

Contrary to Lasswell's concerns, Herring argued that the growth of military strength was not, in and of itself, a threat to liberal democracy since it would not only serve to protect U.S. "culture" but also to "maintain over large portions of the earth's surface the values of Western civilization" (p. 20). That is to say, a strong military can

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[150] As Navy Secretary James Forrestal pointed out during the 1945 Congressional Hearings on the reorganization of the military forces: "I am using the word 'security' here consistently and continuously rather than 'defense.'" Forrestal's argument was that the word "security" should be used in the future as it better described the need to expand the protection of the United States beyond military defense and the U.S. territory, taking also into consideration the new position of the United States in the modern/colonial world system (U.S. Congress, 1945, p. 99).

help maintain and expand the Western liberal order. The challenge for the United States, according to him, was to be able to manage "military affairs through democratic institutions" (p. 23).

From 1942 to 1946, and under the auspices of the U.S. Committee on Records of War Administration,[151] Herring led a study on the mobilization of the Federal Government to administer the war, with an emphasis on the civilian aspects of this endeavor. The final report of the study titled *The United States at War; Development and Administration of the War Program by the Federal Government*, while acknowledging errors made during the war, concluded that the "organization and leadership of a free people" (U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 1947, p. 518) was more effective than that of a dictatorship in times of military conflict. According to the study, one of the keys to success during World War II was opening the doors to businesses and administrative personnel from the private sector to aid in the war effort.

It is worth pointing out that public confidence in the free market and the so-called "American business creed" (Suton, 1956)[152] in the post-great depression period had decreased.[153] At the same time, however, the corporate class that developed the

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[151] As explained by Harold D. Smith, Director, Bureau of the Budget: "This study, along with accounts being prepared by many of the executive agencies and establishments, has grown out of the suggestion made by President Roosevelt in March 1942, that I appoint a committee to help in the task of 'preserving for those who come after us an accurate and objective account of our present experience.'" (U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 1947, p. iv).

[152] Francis Suton, in his 1956 *The American Business Creed,* describes the positive status that businessmen have historically enjoyed in the United States and how Americans have looked up to them. However, the policies of the New Deal and government intervention in the domestic economy during the World War II worried American capitalists. As Friedberg (2000) points out: "by the late 1940s, adherents of the 'American business creed' believed that their society stood 'on the edge of [a] fateful line' between capitalist freedom and statist slavery" (p. 49).

[153] Worried about these trends, Harvard scholar William Yandell Elliott argued that "if recovery is to come by capitalist methods, capitalism must be given a chance. A capitalist economy requires the

national security establishment had an immense disdain for government intervention in the economy (i.e., the New Deal) and promoted paths through which American businesses could permeate and influence national security policy (Dorwart, 1991). Since the institutionalization of national security, the mantra of the effectiveness of public-private partnerships has been reproduced in the inner-workings of the U.S. national security apparatus despite the recommendations of the Nye Committee (see Chapter 4) to limit the participation of the private sector in the national security field.

The report also argued that the active participation of the United States in world affairs would be essential for the "maintenance of world peace" (U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 1947, p. 469). What did that participation in world affairs entail? To understand Herring's position, his 1941 *The Impact of War: Our American Democracy Under Arms* does shed some light. Herring's world of peace is a Western-led global market open for business and oriented towards economic interdependence. However, Herring had no illusions about the natural workings of Adam Smith's invisible hand of the free market, which he referred to as "the fairy wand of laissez faire" (p. 243).

What the United States needed to do, according to Herring (1941), was to undertake "the imposition of world controls in accordance with our own ideas of justice. This is merely another way of saying that the assertion of ideals of justice, no less than the braggadocio of a master race, is dependent upon military might" (p. 254).

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possibility of real profits and an ultimate adjustment of economic forces by the play of the market" (1935, p. 47). Moreover, as Paul Nitze (1989) recalls in his autobiography about this period: "Roosevelt had thoroughly alienated the American business community. His basic political strategy throughout the 1930s had been to paint American business—and particularly Wall Street—as malefactors of great wealth and to depict himself as the defender of the common man" (p. 6).

He argued that a new world order of free trade and economic interdependence would very unlikely be achieved through diplomacy but the use of "force" (p. 243). In his concluding remarks and resembling the proposals of neoliberal thinkers for a Western-led market-based supranational world system (see Chapter 3), Herring offers "the concept of federalism" (p. 274), which he envisioned as a world of economic interdependence and Western-led centralized controls (i.e., a rule of law designed to sustain and reproduce the capitalist world order) enforced by U.S. military power and ready to protect U.S. businesses interests abroad.[154]

A similar position was advanced six years earlier by Herring's Harvard colleague, William Yandell Elliott. In 1935, anticipating governmental debates on the adequacy of the term "national security" during the 1940s to better reflect the new positioning of the United States in the modern/colonial world system (i.e., Boaventura de Santos "the European American century"), Elliott published a book titled *The Need for Constitutional Reform: A Program for National Security.* In it, he argued in favor of the need to modernize the U.S. government—and strengthen executive powers—to better respond to an ever-changing, ever aggressive world. A pro-business fierce critic of the New Deal and labor strikes,[155] he argued that "unless we are to fail in our national

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[154] Of course, the use of the military to protect U.S. business interests had a long history before Herring's writings. For example, Charles Beard (1913) in his *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, after reviewing documents such as *The Federalist Papers* and President George Washington's speeches, concluded that the framers believed that "the army and navy are to be not only instruments of defence [sic] in protecting the United States against the commercial and territorial ambitions of other countries; but they may be used also in forcing open foreign markets" (p. 173). In addition, General Smedley D. Butler, in his 1935 book *War Is a Racket,* also documents how the U.S. military has been used to secure and expand geopolitical profit-driven interests.
[155] Elliot (1935) argued that "strikes and lockouts must be forbidden until a board of inquiry or a conciliation commission has made its recommendation. After that a strike may be permitted, though under the strictest protection of property and of persons from violence or intimidation by either side.

mission and renounce our heritage, we cannot forego that education in personal responsibility which is the painful price of democracy and constitutional government in favor of a free economy" (p. 208).

In his 1950 *Western Political Heritage*, Elliott divided the world in terms of the battle between good against evil, civilization versus barbarism, arguing that "to defend our own, it may not be merely enough to save ourselves. The rest of the world is an open arena for this tremendous conflict for the human soul" (p. 974). Reporting on Elliott's death in 1979, *The Washington Post* pointed out that he "sometimes spoke with evangelistic fervor" and "he regarded communism as the chief evil."[156] It is worth pointing out that Elliot served as a government consultant in both Republican and Democratic administrations and became a national security advisor for presidents Kennedy and Nixon. Henry Kissinger, a heavily influential national security establishment representative during the seventies who has been accused of devising U.S. military interventions, CIA covert actions, and supporting dictatorships around the world (Hitchins, 2001), considered Elliott one of his mentors (Ferguson, 2015).

James Forrestal and Ferdinand Eberstadt actively pushed for the reorganization of the U.S. government under the framework of the nascent ideology of national security. While serving as the Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal recruited his long-time friend, Eberstadt, to produce a report on the best ways to coordinate military efforts.

Surprise strikes, frequently repeated, on the lines of the I.W.W. tactics, must be outlawed equally with sudden lockouts" (p. 134).
[156] Smith, J. (1979, January 12). William Y. Elliott dies. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1979/01/12/william-y-elliott-dies/71e404b8-d42d-456c-97c2-5ca975aff883/.

After reading Herring's work, Eberstadt recruited him to assist in this endeavor (Dorwart, 1991). The 1945 report titled *Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Post War Organization for National Security* (Eberstadt, 1945) argued for the need to rethink the protection of the U.S. beyond military defense. The military, according to the report, was but "one part of a much larger picture encompassing many elements, military and civilian, governmental and private, which contribute to our national security and defense" (p. 5). It also added that because of the U.S.' new position of global leadership in the post-war era, the country needed to conceptualize the protection of its national security "in terms of world security" (p. 17). The report strongly argued that the U.S. needed to implement its own "ideals for world order with the use of force against aggressor states" (p. 16).

With a strong background in the private sector and the banking industry, the participation of both Forrestal and Eberstadt in influencing national security ideology and its institutionalization through the 1947 National Security Act coincided with what some authors have called the rise of a managerial, technocratic, and corporate class in the U.S. government, particularly during the New Deal (Burnham, 1960; Katznelson, 2013). Both were part of a cohort of American businessmen that came into government in the 1940s to help prepare the United States for war.[157]

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[157] As Samuel Huntington (1967) points out: "The expansion of the domestic agencies during the New Deal period was handled by the movement to Washington of program-oriented professional workers, academicians, lawyers, and others. To perform its wartime activities the government attracted business and professional men through the double appeal of the temporary nature of its employment and the patriotic duty of government service" (p. 359).

As military historian Jeffery M. Dorwart points out in his 1991 study titled *Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909-1949*, they both "idealized corporate business practice and scientific management, with its emphasis on efficiency" (p. 9). For them, the alliance between American businesses and the government was essential to protect U.S. national security by opening new markets around the world. Dorwart concluded that the Forrestal and Eberstadt partnership "created national security organization in their own image and in that of their 'Good Man' corporate world" (p. 180).[158] After a vigorous debate in Congress that, as well-documented by Hogan (1998), mostly concentrated on fears of government power and fights among the military establishment for more administrative control, President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act into law on July 26, 1947.

5.2. Building Consensus: Global Capitalism and U.S. National Security

In 1947, the so-called Truman Doctrine started the Cold War and advanced the United States' policy of containment. In his famous March 12 speech before Congress, Truman declared that in the post-war period, "the foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved."[159] Truman pledged to provide direct assistance

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[158] As Dorwart (1991) explains: "Eberstadt and Forrestal believed that the nation's progress and prosperity lay in the hands of expert managers and organizers" (p. 7). That is, mainly technocrats from the private sector, which they labelled "good men." Eberstadt even made a list of future recruits. Dorwart points out that "the occupational profile of the men on Eberstadt's list revealed more about the Good Man concept. Nearly 75 percent of the men belonged to Wall Street law, investment, and banking firms. The remaining 25 percent held top management positions in the largest electrical, aviation, chemical, and communications companies" (p. 8).

[159] Truman, H. (1947). *President Harry S. Truman's address before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947* [Transcript]. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp.

"to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," even if the conflict did not militarily affect the United States directly. Reproducing the trope of American exceptionalism and its natural duty to lead the world, Truman added that "the free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms." He warned that if the U.S. does not get involved in global affairs: "we may endanger the peace of the world -- and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation." These statements beg the obvious question of what Truman meant by "peace," "freedom," and "free peoples of the world."

Only six days earlier, Truman gave a speech at Baylor University on the United States' foreign economic policy, where he unequivocally declared that peace, freedom, and world trade were "inseparable."[160] Truman promoted the creation of an International Trade Organization[161] that would establish and supervise a "code of good conduct in international trade" and insisted on the need to reduce trade barriers. In his speech, he explained that "there is one thing that Americans value even more than peace" and, that was, according to him, "freedom of enterprise." Truman warned that if the global trend of implementing protectionist trade policies after the end of World

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[160] Truman, H. (1947). *Address on foreign economic policy* [Transcript].
https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/52/address-foreign-economic-policy-delivered-baylor-university.

[161] Heavily promoted by the Truman Administration, the International Trade Organization (ITO) was a failed attempt during the late 1940s to create a world-reaching supranational organization to promote and regulate trade among nations of the world. The U.S. Congress rejected the idea despite the Executive Branch's sense of urgency. A 1947 Office of International Trade Policy memorandum argued that failure to produce an ITO Charter would be "a severe diplomatic setback" for the U.S., the United Nations and, in particular, capitalism and free-enterprise since the ITO represented the "very embodiment of economic liberalism in the international realm" (p, 825). In *Memorandum by the Economic Adviser, Office of International Trade Policy (Coppock) to the Acting Director of the Office of International Trade Policy (Brown). Washington, December 30, 1947* (U.S. Department of State, 1976a).

War II was not reversed, the United States would "fight for markets and for raw materials."

One of the initial drafts of Truman's March 12 speech provides a more dire picture of the interconnection between free enterprise, trade liberalization, and the survival of the country. If the United States "permits free enterprise to disappear in other nations of the world,"—the draft warned that—"the very existence of our own economy and our democracy will be gravely threatened."[162] In the final version of the speech, the interconnection between global trade liberalization and the survival of the country was erased as well as all references to "free enterprise," shifting instead the emphasis on the United States' "natural" role in protecting and leading the so-called free nations of the world. As history professor Joan Hoff (2008) points out, "American leaders have repeatedly incorporated buzzwords like liberty, democracy, freedom, and self-determination into their diplomatic rhetoric – words that masked or disguised the fact that the country had any material or ideological self-interests other than moral purity" (p. 11).

In 1959, historian William Appleman Williams published a controversial book titled *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* Through a historical analysis from the Spanish-American War through the first decade of the Cold War, Williams challenged the idealized historiography of the United States as the defender and spreader of freedom and democracy to the world by showing the economic motives that dominated

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[162] Truman, H. (1947). Draft of speech, March 10, 1947. In Harry S. Truman Library & Museum (n.d.). *The Truman Doctrine, President's Secretary's Files.* https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/draft-speech?documentid=NA&pagenumber=10.

American foreign policy during that period. Williams (1991) argued that, since the Open Door Notes of the 1900s,[163] there has been a broad consensus on the need to expand the U.S. economy to the entire world "in order to sustain democracy and prosperity in the United States" (p. 210). Williams demonstrates how even anti-imperialists agreed that the U.S. needed access to foreign markets to sell their products. As Williams shows, even the so-called "New Dealers," with their progressive agenda, deemed the global expansion of the U.S. economy as "essential to domestic prosperity and political welfare of the United States" (p. 174) in order to avoid another depression and secure the United States' standing in the world economy as the emerging industrial superpower.

According to Williams (1991), the opening of markets and rapid access to raw materials became a fundamental pillar of U.S. foreign policy, turning the United States into an "informal empire" (p. 309) since the country did not establish traditional colonies and colonial administrations. At the same time, the United States' aggressive pursuit of expanding its economy and expecting foreign governments to accept American policy has created unequal empire-like geopolitical relations ever since.[164] In this respect, Williams (1991) argued that one of the biggest tragedies of U.S. foreign policy is that it has not resulted in the "equitable development of the areas into which America expanded" (p. 291), thus intensifying tensions and conflicts with other parts

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[163] Written by then-Secretary of State John Hay, the notes led to the United States' Open Door Policy toward China. Hay advocated the need for open international trade and for the commercial expansion of the United States to promote the country's well-being.

[164] As Williams (1991) argues: "When an advanced industrial nation plays, or tries to play, a controlling and one-sided role in the development of a weaker economy, then the policy of the more powerful country can with accuracy and candor only be described as imperial" (p. 55).

of the world. Williams urged the U.S. to abandon this economically motivated expansionist foreign policy, arguing that the country can very well "function even better on the basis of equitable relationships with other people" (p. 309).

As this dissertation argues, not only has the United States not abandoned economic expansionism as part of its foreign policy, but it has also incorporated it into its national security policy and its ever-growing national security apparatus. That is to say, the U.S. not only framed the international expansion of the U.S. economy in terms of the welfare and prosperity of the nation, but it also transformed the imposition of a global capitalist order into an existential fight for the survival of the country. Despite their good intentions, the so-called anti-imperialists of the time did not understand that an international expansion of the U.S. economy necessarily required countries of the world to become part—by choice or by force, as Herring and Eberstadt argued—of a U.S.-led global capitalist order.[165]

In this scheme, the threat of the Soviet Union, as Williams decried at the time, served to legitimize U.S. economic expansionism worldwide. Williams went as far as to claim that the United States was largely exaggerating the threat that the Soviet Union represented to the country and was to blame for the escalation of the conflict between the two nuclear superpowers. In his study, Williams focused on the global expansion

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[165] As Williams explains: "The Open-Door Notes took the substance out of the debate between the imperialists and the anti-imperialists. The argument trailed on with the inertia characteristic of all such disagreements, but the nation recognized and accepted Hay 's [Open Door] policy as a resolution of the original issue" (p. 51). Walter Hixson (2008), in his *The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, goes even further to argue that one of the main problems is that even progressives embraced the myth of American exceptionalism. As Hixon points out: "Like the anti-imperialists at the turn of the century—and liberals generally throughout U.S. history—the progressives ultimately failed because of their unwillingness to call into question" (p. 131) this myth.

of the U.S. economy as part of U.S. foreign policy. It is worth pointing out that, at the time of the writing of the book, most national security documents were still classified.

For example, Williams did not have access to the 1950 National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) titled *United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*, which became the cornerstone of American national security policy during that period, since the document was not declassified until 1975 (May, 1993). Regarding the Soviet threat, NSC-68, in its concluding paragraphs attempting to convince President Truman to adopt its recommendations, presented a doomed scenario by warning that: "The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake."

5.3. The Cold War and the Existential Enemy Other

Throughout the Cold War, technological advances and the fear of the "bomb," which could be launched remotely with devastating existential consequences, legitimized increasing the power of the U.S. national security apparatus. On the domestic front, fears of infiltration and boycotts from foreign enemy powers also became part of the national security agenda. In this context, the rise of the Soviet Union set the basis for the construction of macro-narratives of not only the destructive force and evilness of the existential enemy-other but also of the intrinsic character and values of the United States as well as its assigned role in the world's stage.

Following the approach of this dissertation, instead of analyzing if the Soviet Union was an existential threat to the U.S., I interrogate how the construction of this country as an existential threat has served to advance U.S. capitalist hegemony and expand the U.S. national security apparatus. A 1992 *Washington Post* opinion piece by U.S. diplomat Karl "Rick" Inderfurth argued that historically, the National Security Council had "focused its greatest attention on traditional foreign policy and military concerns. Economic matters have rarely been an integral part of NSC deliberations."[166] While the firsts National Security Council reports (from now on NSC) give credit to Inderfurth's assertions,[167] later NSCs provide a different picture.

Diverse scholars have pointed out the importance of NSC-68 (1950) in establishing U.S. national security policy—and thinking—for the years to come (Yergin, 1977; Hogan, 1998; Stuart, 2008). The document was produced under the direction of Paul H. Nitze, a wealthy Wall Street investment banker who at the time was in charge of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. While the document has been criticized for its lengthiness (more than sixty pages long), hyperbolic language, logical inconsistencies,[168] and for exaggerating the Soviet threat (Williams, 1991;

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[166] Inderfurth, R. (1992, June 21). Abolish the National Security Council. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1992/06/21/abolish-the-national-security-council/f275e650-c7eb-4c3b-b663-2cb521a50bbd/.

[167] For example, National Security Council 7 (NSC-7) *Report by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism* (1948) and NSC-20 "Note by the Executive Secretary on U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR To Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security" (1948) both pointed out that the biggest security threat to the U.S. was "soviet-directed communism," whose ultimate aim was "the domination of the world." According to both NSCs, the U.S. must develop and maintain the necessary military capabilities to defeat this existential enemy.

[168] For example, commenting on NSC-68, the Bureau of the Budget pointed out that the report "deals with this problem as being one involving 'the free world' and 'the slave world'. While it is true that the USSR and its satellites constitute something properly called a slave world, it is not true that the U.S.

Cardwell, 2011), it does capture—and makes use of—the different local imaginaries that have permeated American history to justify the global design of U.S. capitalist expansionism. The trope of American exceptionalism with its natural duty to protect and lead the so-called "free world," civilization narratives, the construction of existential threats, and the need to expand U.S. capitalism to the entire world are found throughout the document.

Paul Nitze was a key figure of the national security apparatus, serving in national security issues across party lines almost without interruptions from the Truman to the Reagan Administrations. In 1989, he published an autobiography titled: *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision*, which provides elements to understand U.S. local rationalities and its global designs. In it, Nitze poses a question that he considers to be "the fundamental question of national security: How do we get from where we are to where we want to be without being struck by disaster along the way?" (p. 95). Describing how NSC-68 (1950) came about, Nitze explains that "to preserve world civilization and western culture" (p. 159)—which he views as one and the same—military buildup, the creation of a "just international order" (p. 159) based on the protection of economic freedom, and U.S. leadership was needed.

A 1960 article titled: "The Recovery of Ethics: Our Task is to Discover a Framework that Commends Itself to the Modern Mind" provides more clues on Nitze's

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and its friends constitute a free world. Are the Indo-Chinese free? Can the peoples of the Philippines be said to be free under the corrupt Quirino government? Moreover, what of the vast number of peoples who are in neither the U.S. nor the USSR camp, and for whom we are contesting? By and large, by our standards, they are not free" (p. 300). In *Memorandum by the Deputy Chief of the Division of Estimates, Bureau of the Budget (Schaub) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay), May 8, 1950* (U.S. Department of State, 1977, p. 300).

values and worldview. In it, he equates the values of Western civilization with the "free world" and "mankind" (p. 6), celebrating that the West has been spreading to the world the "accumulated experience, insight and wisdom of the Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman and European cultures" (p. 6). Building on his argument on the superiority of Western culture and the United States, Nitze divides the world into an existential battle between (civilized) "us" versus (barbaric) "them."

Defending the Department of State's actions in the post-NSC-68 world and reproducing civilizing narratives, Nitze (1960) argues that "if the thesis is accepted that a principal task of United States foreign policy is today the construction and defense of a world system of order to replace that shattered in the two world wars, then the values to be pursued by the Secretary of State include those associated with a 'we' group virtually coterminous with mankind as a whole" (p. 5). Reflecting on his participation in elaborating NSC-68, Nitze (1994) explains that the drafters of the document "pledged our efforts toward the creation of a world in the mold of the best that Western culture had to offer, with full freedom of others to participate in its benefits if they wished to cooperate" (p. 9). However, what if "them" did not want to cooperate in the construction of this Westernized U.S.-led capitalist world system?

Mirroring but also going deeper than prior NSC documents, NSC-68 portrays the Soviet Union as the evil antithesis of the United States. NSC-68 describes the "evil men" of the Soviet Union who have "evil designs" and who are ready and willing to do "evil work" against civilization. Among the binaries employed, it depicts the fight between the "slavery and oligarchy of the Kremlim," "the slave state," and the

"totalitarian dictatorship" against "freedom," the "free society," "democracy," and the "individual." And, perhaps most importantly, it points out the existential risk of "the destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself."

At the same time, however, NSC-68 (1950) unequivocally states that the overall objective for the national security of the United States is to "foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish…*even if there were no Soviet threat* [Emphasis added]." While previous NSCs (e.g., 7 and 20) had placed the emphasis on the need to build a national strong economy and a political system to withstand a war against the Soviet Union, NSC-68 also provides guidance for constructing "a successfully political and economic system in the free world."

What would that world look like? As the document explains, the U.S. has embarked on an endeavor to "reestablish an international economy based on multilateral trade, declining trade barriers, and convertible currencies (the GATT-ITO[169] program, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program,[170] the IMF IBRD[171] program, and the program now being developed to solve the problem of the United States balance of payments)."[172] That is to say, the construction of a world opened for

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[169] The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a multilateral treaty signed in 1947 to promote free trade and reduce tariffs. While it failed in its efforts to create the International Trade Organization (ITO), it eventually succeeded with the establishment of the World Trade Organization in the nineties.

[170] The Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934 gave the president the authority to negotiate trade agreements with other countries to reduce tariffs. It is considered to be a stepping-stone in U.S. efforts for global trade liberalization (Haggard, 1988).

[171] These acronyms refer to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IRBD). They are both international lending organizations originally created to support the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. They have expanded their missions—and scope of intervention—ever since.

[172] History professor Curt Cardwell undertook a detailed analysis of the relationship between NSC-68 and the implementation of a postwar global capitalist economy in his 2011 study *NSC 68 and the*

U.S. transnational companies and the promotion of the U.S. dollar as the hegemonic currency of the world.

The European Recovery Program (ERP), commonly known as the "Marshall Plan," provides a good example of the U.S. global design of establishing a worldwide liberalized economic system to advance its national security. NSC-68 (1950) identifies the need to provide aid to Western Europe not only as a strategy to contain the Soviet Union but also to solve "the problem of international economic equilibrium, notably the problem of the dollar gap." The Foreign Assistance Act of 1948—which funded the ERP—stated its main objectives as the "expansion of foreign trade, the creation and maintenance of internal financial stability, and the development of economic cooperation, including all possible steps…to bring about the progressive elimination of trade barriers" (p. 137) among countries.[173]

A 2018 report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service (Tarnoff, 2018) concluded that thanks to the ERP, the balance of trade, the so-called "dollar gap" and trade liberalization greatly improved. After all, and as Yergin points out: "The Marshall Plan had two basic aims, which commingled and cannot be really separated – to halt a feared communist advance into Western Europe, and to stabilize an international

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Political Economy of the Early Cold War. Cardwell demonstrates the importance that the so-called "dollar gap" represented to the framers of the national security establishment. As Caldwell explains, "the dollar gap referred to the fact that in the postwar era the demand for U.S. exports far exceeded the world's capacity to pay for those exports" (p. 61). He argues that "the great problem that the dollar gap posed was this: If the dollar gap could not be closed at a level of international trade sufficient to maintain the high level of U.S. exports necessary for free market capitalism to function at home, then the open, global, capitalist economy Truman administration officials were determined to create in the postwar era had next to no chance of succeeding" (p. 65).
[173] Foreign Assistance Act of 1948: Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, 80th Congress, 20 Session, Chapter 169 April 3,1948. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1948-04-03b.pdf.

economic environment favorable to capitalism" (p. 309). Although initially reluctant for its high costs, the American public eventually supported it. A 1948 Gallup Poll found that 57% of Americans had a favorable opinion of the Marshall Plan.[174] In relation to the dollar gap, a 1946 poll found that 74% of Americans believed—and understood—that the United States needed to "buy goods from other countries, in order to sell goods to them."[175]

On the domestic front, NSC-68 (1950) also warned that the Soviet Union's preferred technique of attack was to "subvert by infiltration and intimidation," pointing out that labor unions were one of its prime targets (i.e., the National Security League's "dangerous proletariats"). The same year that the National Security Act was enacted (1947), a legislation that has tremendously weakened labor unions and has curtailed workers' rights ever since under the guise of communism—the Labor Management Relations Act (still in effect)—was also passed.

During his 1948 presidential campaign, *The New York Times* reported that former Vice President Henry Wallace denounced the Act, pointing out that "under the guise of alleged threats to the national security, [it] is being used to hamper legitimate wage demands by workers."[176] That is to say, the U.S. national security apparatus at the service of capital accumulation to repress workers' demands at the domestic level

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[174] Gallup Organization (1948). Gallup Poll # 1948-0412: Politcs/Defense, Question 52 [USGALLUP.030348.RT07C]. Gallup Organization. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[175] National Opinion Research Center (NORC) (1946). NORC Survey # 1946-0243: Foreign Affairs, Question 27 [USNORC.460243.R14]. National Opinion Research Center (NORC). Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[176] Wallace continues foreign policy fight. *The New York Times*. (1948, April 14). https://www.nytimes.com/1948/04/14/archives/wallace-continues-foreign-policy-fight.html.

in the name of protecting U.S. national security, a trend that has not only continued but has also grown in our days.

5.4. U.S. National Security and the Free World

When Dwight D. Eisenhower became president, his administration attempted to organize and reassess U.S. national security strategy through recurring periodic documents titled "Basic National Security Policy." One of the first ones, NSC-162/2 of October 30, 1953, while also identifying the Soviet Union as the biggest existential threat to the U.S., was also concerned with avoiding "seriously weakening the U.S. economy or undermining our fundamental values and institutions" (p. 6).[177] Eisenhower's approach was termed "The New Look" since it sought to have a better handling and control over national security spending to counteract NSC-68's calls for a continuous military build-up.[178] There were, however, other cultural political economic considerations in Eisenhower's approach to protecting U.S. national security.

In line with NSC-68 (1950), NSC-162/2 (1953) reaffirms not only the responsibility of the United States for protecting the so-called "free world" but also rationalizes the protection of U.S. national security in terms of the security of the world. As the document states: "The assumption by the United States, as the leader of the free

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[177] NSC-162/2 *Basic National Security Policy* (October 30, 1953). Retrieved from: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-162-2.pdf.

[178] A March 18, 1954, *New York Times* explained that Eisenhower's approach was "an attempt to deter aggression and avert a new war by fitting our defense structure into a worldwide and economically bearable collective security system." The 'New Look.' (1954, March 18). *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1954/03/18/archives/the-new-look.html?searchResultPosition=8.

world, of a substantial degree of responsibility for the freedom and security of the free nations is a direct and essential contribution to the maintenance of its own freedom and security" (p. 9). Moreover, NSC-162/2 started a trend in these documents—repeated throughout Eisenhower's basic national security policy documents—that went even deeper into connecting the expansion of the U.S. economy with the security of the so-called "free world." As the document warns:

> The United States must maintain a sound economy based on free private enterprise as a basis both for high defense productivity and for the maintenance of its living standards and free institutions. Not only the world position of the United States, but the security of the whole free world, is dependent on the avoidance of recession and on the long-term expansion of the U.S. economy. Threats to its stability or growth, therefore, constitute a danger to the security of the United States and of the coalition[179] which it leads (p. 14).

Under this rationale, threats to the global expansion of U.S. capitalism automatically became an existential danger not only to the United States but also to the security of the free world.

In terms of domestic U.S. economic policy, NSC-162/2 (1953) advocated for policies that, according to the document, would unleash the potential of private enterprise by "minimizing governmental controls and regulations" (p. 23)—what

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[179] As NSC-162/2 (1953) explains, the so-called "coalition" refers to "those states which are parties to the network of security treaties and regional alliances of which the United States is a member (NATO, OAS, ANZUS, Japan, etc.) or otherwise actively associated in the defense of the free world" (p. 10).

neoliberal economists would later refer to as "deregulation"—and by lowering taxes. As NSC-162/2 argues, also replicating neoliberal rationales: "repressive taxation weakens the incentives for efficiency, effort, and investment on which economic growth depends" (p. 15). As I will discuss in the next chapter, the U.S. national security apparatus's recommendations for domestic neoliberal economic policies started to be implemented during Ronald Reagan's presidency.

The Eisenhower administration also provided a more explicit definition of what fundamental values and institutions of the United States the U.S. national security apparatus set out to protect. During the previous administration, NSC-68 (1950) was not shy in using tropes such as "liberty, "the free world," "freedom and democracy," as well as assigning the U.S. "the responsibility of world leadership." As NSC-68 explained: "A more rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength and thereby of confidence in the free world than is now contemplated is the only course which is consistent with progress toward achieving our fundamental purpose."

And, as the document points out, the "fundamental purpose" was "to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual." While economic freedoms were not explicitly mentioned in NSC-68 (1950), the report argues that the "strengthening of the free world" involves policies to build "an international economy based on multilateral trade, declining trade barriers." As I have argued before, the building of a capitalist world order played an essential part for protecting U.S. national security. However, during the Eisenhower

administration, the discussions over the final draft of NSC-5501 *Basic National Security Policy* (approved January 6, 1955), offer a more telling story of its importance.

As it is customary in national security strategies, the draft of NSC-5501 (1955) started the document by using the often-used phrase which describes that "the basic objective of U.S. national security policy is to preserve the security of the United States, and its fundamental values and institutions."[180] However, the Treasury Department member and the Budget adviser of the Planning Board suggested the following addition (shown here in brackets): "and its fundamental values and institutions [without seriously weakening the U.S. economy]." As reported in the Memorandum of the January 5, 1955, meeting of the National Security Council, President Eisenhower called the suggestion "superfluous" since, according to him, "the U.S. free economy was obviously one of the fundamental values and institutions referred to" (p. 10).[181]

NSC-5501 (1955), similarly to NSC 162/2 (1953), makes the case that a "strong, healthy and expanding U.S. economy is essential to the security and stability of the free world." However, going further than NSC-162/2, it states that international trade is essential for the protection of U.S. national security and, following that rationale, the country would "continue to press strongly for a general reduction of trade barriers" seeking "the continuing expansion of the U.S. economy under a free enterprise system" (p. 56).[182]

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[180] NSC- 5501 *Basic National Security Policy* (January 7, 1955): In *(Document 6) NSC- 5501: Basic National Security Policy* (U.S. Department of State, 1990).

[181] In *(Document 5) Memorandum of Discussion at the 230th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 5, 1955* (U.S. Department of State, 1990).

[182] Is free enterprise, as Eisenhower argued, an intrinsic part the fundamental values and institutions of the United States? As will be discussed in the next chapter, this has been a very contested idea

At the domestic level, NSC-5501 (1955) follows NSC-162/2 (1953) in advocating for fewer taxes and the deregulation of private businesses to encourage "private enterprise to develop natural and technological resources," even nuclear power (p. 57), against the recommendations of the Nye Committee. While later basic national security policy documents (i.e., NSC-5602/1 and NSC-5707/8) insist on these same ideas, they also outline the dangers that so-called "less developed areas" represent to "free world stability." For the U.S. national security apparatus, the "two basic problems in the economic field" between industrialized and less developed areas were that the former needed "further economic growth and expanded trade" and the latter needed to "develop and modernize their economies and must also maintain a substantial volume of exports of primary products."[183]

To insert themselves into the free world, less developed countries not only needed to trade with Western powers, but also implement "changes in traditional habits and attitudes and for greatly expanded training in administrative and technical skills."[184] Additionally, the document called for the utilization of private investment

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throughout American history. The Constitution makes no explicit reference to it. Ronald Reagan even attempted to pass, in 1987, a constitutional amendment to add economic freedoms to the already granted freedoms of speech, press, religion, and assembly. In 1913, renowned historian Charles Beard, in a study titled *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* provided a different—and controversial—interpretation of the Constitution. By delving into hundreds of documents of the time, Beard argued that the constitution was drafted as a document to protect the property and wealth of the elites against the masses. As Beard concludes: "The Constitution was essentially an economic document based upon the concept that the fundamental private rights of property are anterior to government and morally beyond the reach of popular majorities" (p. 324). The book was largely contested throughout the 20th century but has been now largely forgotten in favor of an idealized interpretation of the Constitution based on its mantras of freedom, equality, etcetera.

[183] In *(Document 66). NSC 5602/1 Basic National Security Policy, March 15, 1956* (U.S. Department of State, 1990).

[184] In *(Document 120). NSC 5707/8 Basic National Security Policy, June* 3, 1957 (U.S. Department of State, 1990).

and experts to modernize these less developed countries, adding that "local capital will have to be supplemented by the provision of capital from abroad." For example, NSC-144/1 *United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America* (March 18, 1953), stated that the U.S. must encourage "Latin American governments to recognize that the bulk of the capital required for their economic development can best be supplied by private enterprise and that their own self-interest requires the creation of a climate which will attract private investment."[185]

Were less developed countries also part of the free world in the Eisenhower administration's imaginary? Eisenhower's diaries (1981) are very telling in this respect since he claims that capitalism is "essential to democracy" (p. 143). And, when defining democracy, Eisenhower argues that it "means a faith in men as men (essentially religious concept) and practice of free enterprise" (p. 137). Eisenhower points out that international trade with no obstacles is "absolutely essential to the future of the free world" (p. 143). However, he warns that "unless the free world espouses and sustains, under the leadership of America, a system of world trade that will allow backward people to make a decent living…then in the long run we must fall prey to the communist attack" (pp. 244-245).

This distinction between the "free world" and "backward people" may help explain why certain national security documents during the Eisenhower administration

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[185] At a meeting of the National Security Council to approve the draft of NSC-144, President Eisenhower, Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, and Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks agreed that U.S. business men needed to become "ambassadors" to the U.S. throughout the region and the Department of State needed to "strongly" back up their private investments. In *(S/S -NSC Files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 144 series), Memorandum of Discussion at the 137th Meeting of the National Council on March 18, 1953* (U.S. Department of State, 1983).

framed the existential battle during the Cold War in terms of Western civilization[186]

(the so-called "free world"[187]) and the Soviet system. So-called "backward countries,"

in this imaginary, could potentially "make a decent living" by providing much-needed

raw materials to the industrialized free world. For example, NSC-5613/1 (September

25, 1956), *Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy toward Latin America* stated that one of

the U.S. national security primary objectives in relation to the region was to "obtain

adequate production of and access to materials essential to our security."

During the Eisenhower administration, the Christian God also entered the

language of national security policy documents. For example, both NSC-5602/1 (1956)

and NSC-5707/8 (1957) state, in their preamble, that "the genius, strength and promise

of America are founded in the dedication of its people and government to the dignity,

equality and freedom of the human being under God." When making its case for

defending democracy and individual freedom, NSC-68 (1950) did not make any direct

references to religion,[188] supporting the country's greatness on the ideas of the

Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. As scholar Kevin

Kruse has argued in his 2015 study *One Nation Under God: How Corporate America*

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[186] For example, *NSC-5501: Basic National Security Policy (1955)*, the 1955's *National Intelligence Estimate: World situation and Trends (NIE 100-7-55)*, and *NSC-5602/1: Basic National Security Policy (1956)* make use of the term "Western Civilization" when describing the contenders in the Cold War. (U.S. Department of State, 1990).

[187] One can also speculate that Eisenhower's "free world" consisted of what he described in his diaries as the "enlightened areas of Western Europe, Britain, the United States, and other English-speaking peoples" (1981, p. 245). A report titled "National Intelligence Estimate" (NIE-80-54) of August 24, 1954, on the Caribbean republics, stated that most of the population of these countries were "socially and politically inert, illiterate, and poverty stricken. Substantial segments of the population are virtually untouched by Western civilization." (U.S. Department of State, 1983, p. 382).

[188] In fact, NSC-68 (1950) uses the idea of the totality of God to criticize the Soviet Union by pointing out that the communist "system becomes God, and submission to the will of God becomes submission to the will of the system."

Invented Christian America, the Eisenhower administration signaled a "national religious revival" (p. 86). During Eisenhower's administration, the phrase "under God" was added to the Pledge of Allegiance. Moreover, the phrase "In God We Trust" was added to paper money, and, in 1956, it became the nation's first official motto.[189]

Kruse argues that the idea of the United States as an intrinsically Christian nation was borne out of the business class's opposition to the New Deal. As a strategy to counteract New Deal redistributive policies and regulatory legislative frameworks for private businesses, the corporate class enlisted the help of religious leaders to redefine and interconnect the tropes of faith and freedom to free enterprise.[190] While Eisenhower fully embraced this agenda, conservatives were disappointed that his administration did not "lead to tangible reductions in the welfare state" (p. 87).

Nonetheless, Eisenhower heavily promoted the interconnection between faith, freedom, democracy, and capitalism, even incorporating these tropes in his administration's national security documents. In this respect, protecting the "fundamental values and institutions" of the United States through its national security apparatus became about securing the expansion of U.S. capitalism, interconnecting freedom and democracy to free enterprise, promoting global trade liberalization and deregulation, and defending—and spreading—Western civilization and the Christian god not only against the Soviet Union but also against "backward" others.

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[189] As Kruse (2015) explains: "The addition of the religious motto to paper currency was particularly important, as it formally confirmed a role for capitalism in that larger love of God and country. Since then, every act of buying and selling in America has occurred through a currency that proudly praises God" (p. 125).

[190] Kruse argues that, in this rationalization, Christianity and capitalism operate under a similar logical framework. If a person does good, he goes to heaven. If a person does good, he becomes rich.

As a case in point, while much has been written about the role that the U.S. played to foment a *coup d'etat* in Guatemala in June 1954 to secure the United Fruit Company's economic interests in that country,[191] it is worth analyzing how the U.S. national security apparatus legitimized this intervention. During the 10th Inter American Conference held in Venezuela in March 1954, the United States pushed for a regional agreement declaring communism a threat to the Americas (Resolution 93).[192] A few months later, NSC-5419/1 (May 28, 1954) *U.S. Policy in the Event of Guatemalan Aggression in Latin America* used Resolution 93 to legitimize a military attack against Guatemala under the Rio Treaty.[193]

One year before the *coup d'etat,* a June 1, 1953, secret report titled *Effect on National Security Interests in Latin America of Possible Anti-Trust Proceedings* (U.S. Department of State, 1983a), prepared by the National Security Planning Board, provides a better understanding of the relationship between protecting U.S. national security and U.S. private corporations. In its investigations, the Department of Justice had repeatedly concluded that the United Fruit Company (UFC) had violated U.S. anti-trust laws and sought to file a lawsuit against the company.

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[191] See Schlesinger et al.,1984 and Chapman, 2007.

[192] "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against International Communist Intervention" (Resolution 93). Only Guatemala voted against it. Retrieved from https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam10.asp. Analyzing the results of the conference, *The Third Progress Report in NSC-144/1* (May 25, 1954), stated that the U.S. "achieved its primary objective of obtaining a clear-cut policy statement against communism and laid the groundwork for subsequent multilateral action against communism in Guatemala" (U.S. Department of State, 1983, p. 45).

[193] The Inter-American Treat of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty of 1947) signed amongst most countries in the Americas stated that an attack on one country will be considered an attack on all. By explicitly turning communism into a regional security threat through Resolution 93, the U.S. National security apparatus turned communist governments in the Americas into a national security threat to the United States.

In fact, the Department of Justice, on many occasions since 1908, had recommended suing the company, but no action had been taken. The report concluded that anti-trust legal action against the UFC "would adversely affect our national security interests" (U.S. Department of State, 1983, p. 192). It argued that action against the company would legitimize Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz' efforts for agrarian reforms, which would probably set a trend throughout Latin America. In addition, it pointed out that the UFC had "control of the largest communication and transport network in the area" (p. 193), which the report deemed strategic to U.S. national security.[194] The National Security Planning Board recommended the Department of Justice postpone the filing of the lawsuit or seek alternative remedies. The National Security Council, at a meeting dated June 4, 1953, accepted this recommendation.[195]

On August 19, 1953, a report prepared for the National Security Council on Guatemala stated that American private companies in that country were under attack.[196]

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[194] It is worth pointing out that the United States government provided funding for the construction of the Pan-American Highway, benefitting UFC operations in Central America. NSC-144/1 *United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America* (March 18, 1953), stated that the U.S. must continue "a limited economic grant program in Latin America, including such projects as the Inter-American and the Rama Road" to protect U.S. national security (U.S. Department of State, 1983). On November 5, 1953, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John M. Cabot sent a confidential memo to the Director of The Bureau of the Budget, Joseph Dodge, to urge the appropriations of funds for the section of the Inter-American Highway in Central America. Cabot explained that "the highway will benefit the United States as well as the cooperating Countries of Central America. It will promote economic progress and political stability in those relatively underdeveloped countries" and it will deter "the spread of Communist ideas" (U.S. Department of State, 1983, p. 202). Negotiations for the Guatemalan section of the highway halted during the Arbenz government and resumed after the coup d'état.

[195] In *Memorandum of Discussion at the 148th Meeting of the National Council on Thursday, June 4, 1953* (U.S. Department of State, 1983).

[196] In *Draft Policy Report in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, August 19, 1953* (U.S. Department of State, 1983).

The report argued that "the loss of these enterprises would be damaging to American interests and prestige throughout Central America, and a severe setback to programs for economic development in the hemisphere through private capital investment" (p. 1074). After the Guatemalan *coup d'etat,* a 1955 progress report on NSC-5432/1 *United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America* (September 3, 1954)[197] celebrated that, in that country "a government favorable to the U.S. came into power" (U.S. Department of State, 1983, p. 89). Among is primary objectives, NSC-5432/1[198] had stated that the creation of an "orderly political, military and economic development in Latin America" (p. 81) would make the countries of the region "increasingly important participants in the affairs of the free world" (p. 82). Were Eisenhower's "backward peoples" from Latin America finally becoming part of the free world for the U.S. national security apparatus?

5.5. Backward Peoples, U.S. National Security, and the Free World

To answer this question, the arrival of a key player in the administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson to advise on national security issues might provide clues: the economist Walter W. Rostow.[199] By the time he entered government in 1961, Rostow had already acquired fame for the publication of *The*

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[197] In *Progress report on NSC-5432/1: United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America, January 19, 1955* (U.S. Department of State, 1983).

[198] "NSC-5432/1 *United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America* (November 1, 1955). In U.S. Department of State, 1983.

[199] From 1961 to 1969, Rostow served as deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs; director of the State's Department Policy Planning Council; and special assistant to the president for national security affairs.

Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960). Similar to Marx's

linear and evolutionary conception of history—but going in the opposite direction—,

Rostow argued that human progress—and the development and modernization of so-

called backward societies—went through five stages: (1) traditional society (e.g.,

subsistence farming); (2) preconditions to take-off (e.g., improvements in agriculture);

(3) take-off (e.g., manufacturing industry); (4) drive to maturity (e.g., technological

improvements); and (5) the age of high mass consumption, with its ever-increasing

consumer spending (Saldaña-Portillo, 2003).[200] For Rostow, so-called backward

countries would play an important role in a future defeat of the Soviet Union and the

protection of the national security of the United States if the latter was able to bring

underdeveloped areas into the free world.

  With the incoming Kennedy administration, Rostow undertook the task of

reassessing U.S. national security policy and prepared numerous drafts for discussion.

For example, a draft paper outlining *U.S. Basic National Security Policy* of December

5, 1961, explained that the U.S. needed to create a world environment where a

"community of free nations" would be able to "promote their progress and security,

without losing their freedom in the process" (p. 222).[201] In line with Rostow's

modernization theory, the very first task that the document outlined for the United

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[200] As Saldaña-Portillo (2003) explains: "Thus Rostow and Marx share a structural resemblance as vying theories of the stages entailed in the development of a universal history, that is, as vying theories of the first modality of developmentalism," adding that "just as Marx formulates communism as a social formation in which humanity is universally liberated from 'antagonism,' so too does Rostow suggest that the age of 'high mass consumption' brings an end to antagonism through universalized purchasing power" (p. 37).

[201] In *(Document 62) Basic National Security Policy - 62. Draft Paper prepared by the Policy Planning Council - December 5, 1961* (U.S. Department of State, 1996).

States was the use of governmental tools such as "diplomacy, military aid, programming guidance and technical aid, capital assistance and trade policy" to help less developed countries "achieve evolutionary modernization" (p. 223).

Regrettably, most of Rostow's national security policy drafts are not available to review. Nonetheless, a June 22, 1962 draft of the same document included Rostow's modernization theory as part of U.S. national security policy. The document argued that the U.S. needed to increase ties with less-developed nations to bring them out of the influence of the Soviet Union and to start a process of building a U.S.-led "evolving international community" (p. 1) with supranational rules and "institutions and organizations that transcend the independent powers of the nation-state" (p. 2). Economic aid played a major role in this development scheme to "encourage and reward progress towards modernization."[202]

As Arturo Escobar has argued in his 1995 *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, the development/modernizing discourse not only brought Third World countries into the capitalist world order but also served to universalize the cultural, economic, and political mantra of the superiority of Western civilization. Furthermore, Saldana-Portillo (2003) has argued that the development/modernization mantra served as a "management strategy" that was used to control and actively intervene in the Third World to serve "the ends of a Cold War containment" (p. 45).

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[202] In *Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. National Security Files. Subjects. Basic national security policy*, July 1962-February 1963. JFKNSF-294-003. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. Retrieved from https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKNSF/294/JFKNSF-294-003.

Saldana-Portillo (2003) identifies Rostow's modernization theory as the "apex" of the popularity of the development discourse. As Saldaña-Portillo points out, Rostow's theories even influenced leftist revolutionary movements throughout the Third World that could not epistemologically escape the Western construction of the traditional (i.e., backward)/modern (i.e., developed) dichotomy. For example, when analyzing the ideas of Guatemalan revolutionary leader Mario Payeras, Saldaña-Portillo points out that the guerillas in that country became "the Robinson Crusoes of the Guatemalan jungle, introducing an imperial narrative of progress—era, invention, discovery, art, navigation— to a jungle constructed as awaiting their historical agency" (p. 96).

In this respect, the "development" discourse—nowadays rebranded as "sustainable development"—and the progressive implementation of neoliberal economic policies throughout the third world—mainly under the supervision of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—can be traced back to a U.S. post-World War II global design of influencing and shaping the political economic system of the world. Rostow's modernization theory and its inclusion in U.S. national security policy can be seen as part of this trend. However, it is worth noting that so-called backward nations did not get the same type of support that countries considered by the U.S. part of the free world (i.e., Western civilization) received. Escobar reminds us that the "Third World was not deserving of the same treatment. Compared with the $19

billion received by Europe, less than 2 percent of total U.S. aid, for instance, went to Latin America during the same period" (p. 33).[203]

Throughout the seventies, concerns about less developed countries and their path toward modernization continued to play an essential part in U.S. national security policy. Modernization would not only bring less developed countries into the orbit of the Free World and its free enterprise system, but it would also result in structural changes in the political, social, and cultural values of those nations to gradually resemble those of developed and modern countries (i.e., Western civilization). Moreover, the incorporation of the Third World into the U.S.-led global capitalist system would provide the United States with access to much-needed raw materials and new markets.

Less than one month after he took office, President Nixon, through National Security Study Memorandum 16, directed the preparation of a report on U.S. trade policy for the National Security Council.[204] Said report was analyzed by the National Security Council on April 9, 1969.[205] The report examined how domestic and international forces were trying to prevent the U.S. from continuing to pursue its global trade liberalization efforts. Conscious of the fact that international trade liberalization

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[203] This trend has continued to this date. In our current era of neoliberal globalization, Saskia Sassen (2014) points out that debt is being used as a technology of discipline and control to implement neoliberal policies: "Generally, the IMF asked poor program countries in the 1980s and 1990s to pay 20 to 25 percent of their export earnings toward debt service. In contrast, in 1953, the Allies cancelled 80 percent of Germany's war debt and only insisted on 3 to 5 percent of export earnings for debt service. They asked 8 percent from central Europe countries in the 1990s" (p. 90).
[204] National Security Study Memorandum 16: "U.S. Trade Policy" February 5, 1969. Retrieved from https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_016.pdf.
[205] In *(Document 192) Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff: NSC Meeting of April 9, 1969, 'Trade'* (U.S. Department of State, 2002).

would negatively impact domestic industry and labor, the report recommended the U.S. government take certain measures to provide relief to both sectors.

Regarding less developed countries, President Nixon directed the National Security Council to study the issue of tariff preferences for these countries to aid their path towards modernization (i.e., insertion into the capitalist world order).[206] After much discussion, National Security Decision Memorandum 29 (1969) approved a system of tariff preferences for less developed countries. Nonetheless, it established that, as a condition for receiving U.S. preferential treatment, "developing countries should eliminate reverse preferences which discriminate against the United States" (p. 566).[207]

In 1974, the National Security Council, under the direction of Henry Kissinger, produced a report titled *Implications of Worldwide Population Growth* (NSSM-200).[208] Said report argued that the increasing rates of population growth in less developed countries could become a potential national security threat to the U.S. As the document claimed,

> rapid growth, internal migration, high percentages of young people, slow improvement in living standards, urban concentrations, and pressures for foreign migration are damaging to the internal stability and international

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[206] In (*Document 198) National Security Study Memorandum 48. April 24, 1969. 'Tariff Preferences for Less Developed Countries'* (U.S. Department of State, 2002).

[207] In *(Document 218) National Security Decision Memorandum 29. October 31, 1969. 'Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries'* (U.S. Department of State, 2002).

[208] National Security Study Memorandum 200 (NSSM-200) *Implications of Worldwide Population Growth* (April 24, 1974). Retrieved from: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nssm-nixon/nssm_200.pdf.

relations of countries in whose advancement the U.S. is interested, thus creating

political or even national security problems for the U.S. (p. 8).

Specifically, the U.S. was concerned that much-needed raw materials were in

these countries, and political instability due to population growth pressures could

potentially disrupt U.S. access to these natural resources. The report argued that there

was a link between development, modernization, and lower fertility rates.[209] However,

the report concluded that the U.S. could not afford to wait until

development/modernization policies succeeded and needed to take actions to

encourage less developed countries to reduce population growth to protect U.S.

national security.[210]

In that same vein, NSSM-200 (1974) also argued that rapid population growth

in Third World countries would also bring about another problem for the United States:

increasing Global South-Global North migratory flows in detriment of the economic,

social, cultural, and political stability of the U.S. domestically. On the international

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[209] NSSM-200 (1974) argued that development policies should focus "on improved health care and nutrition directed toward reduced infant and child mortality; universal schooling and adult literacy, especially for women; increasing the legal age of marriage; greater opportunities for female employment in the money economy; improved old-age social security arrangements; and agricultural modernization focused on small farmers" (p. 53). Samuel Huntington (2006) would argue that "at the psychological level, modernization involves a fundamental shift in values, attitudes, and expectations" (p. 32), adding that "demographically, modernization means changes in the patterns of life, a marked increase in health and life expectancy, increased occupational, vertical, and geographical mobility, and, in particular, the rapid growth of urban population as contrasted with rural" (p. 33).

[210] President Gerald Ford endorsed the recommendations of the study through National Security Decision Memoranda 314 (NSDM-314) *Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for US Security and Overseas Interests* (11/26/75) pointing out that "an examination should be undertaken of the effectiveness of population control programs in countries at all levels of development, but with emphasis on the LCD's [less developed countries]" to better direct funding. Retrieved from https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0310/nsdm314.pdf.

front, it worried that increasing migratory flows would bring about "future disruptions in foreign relations" (p. 57). For example, the report argued that with rapid population growth in Mexico, "the numbers of young people entering the job market each year will expand even more quickly. These growing numbers will increase the pressure of illegal emigration to the U.S., and make the issue an even more serious source of friction in our political relations with Mexico" (p. 63).

Notwithstanding the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, prior to 9/11, international migration had not been a predominant element of the governance realm of the U.S. national security apparatus. Before the operationalization of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, international migration had been largely managed by the Department of Labor and the Department of Justice.[211] Of course, that does not mean that international migrants, particularly from certain regions of the world, have not been perceived as dangerous to the country. Throughout American history, different actors have treated immigrants as a threat to the United States, mainly in terms of competition for jobs, cultural identity, racial homogeneity, and crime (Ngai, 2004; Zolberg, 2006; Chebel, 2012).

During the Cold War, the U.S. national security apparatus predominantly analyzed and dealt with international migration through the lens of U.S.-Soviet competition for global dominance. Consequently, U.S. immigration laws reflected the

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[211] The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) became part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2003. Before that, the agency in charge of international migration was the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). From 1933 to 1940, it was an agency of the U.S. Department of Labor from and, from 1940 to 2003, it was transferred to the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Justice.

national security priorities of this period which could be summarized in three main components: (1) fears of communist infiltration inside the country; (2) the recruitment of foreign experts in different fields; and (3) an attempt to use people fleeing communist countries for propaganda purposes and for the creation of a diaspora that would exercise political pressure on the native (communist) country.

On the international front, the U.S. played a major role in the drafting of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, which defined a refugee as somebody with a "well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" (UNHCR, 2010) worthy of international protection. It is worth noting that only twenty-six governments participated in the drafting of this document, mostly the U.S. and its allies. The Soviet Union did not participate in the drafting of this document. Since then, and in line with Western liberal thought, a refugee is considered as such if his civil liberties (e.g., identity, beliefs) have been violated or are under threat. Under the terms of the UN convention, state parties have the legal obligation to protect refugees.

In the management of the international movement of people, this framing has created two categories of people on the move: the deserving refugee in need of protection and the (economic) immigrant who has left his native country voluntarily. After all, and following neoliberal rationalities on the capitalism/democracy nexus— explored in more detail in the next chapter—fear cannot exist in a capitalist "free" country. Moreover, under this logic, in a capitalist/democratic country, there is an abundance of opportunities for economic success and political participation for people

who are willing to work hard. In this sense, the "common sense" understanding is that whoever leaves a capitalist country does so under his own will and does not deserve the right to legally immigrate to another nation-state.[212]

As migration scholars Loescher and Scanlan have argued in their *Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America's Half Open Door, 1945-Present* (1986), "it is not accidental that over 95 percent of all the special admissions permitted between 1948 and the present have involved individuals fleeing Marxist regimes. Nor is it accidental that many of those we have turned away—Chileans, Salvadorians, Korean dissidents—have been labeled as 'left wing' troublemakers" (p. 213). After all, the United States' Refugee Relief Act of 1953 defined—and legally restricted—refugees as those who "fled from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or other Communist, Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied area of Europe including those parts of Germany under military occupation by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and who cannot return thereto because of fear of persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion."[213]

Regarding the U.S.' fears of domestic communist infiltration, migration scholar Aristide R. Zolberg (2006), when analyzing the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (i.e., The McCarran-Walter Act), points out that "in keeping with the emerging

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[212] This global(ized) immigration and refugee management regime recognizes the sovereign right of nation-states to admit or reject immigrants into their territories as established, for example, in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 13 of the declaration grants the individual the right to leave and return to his country of nationality but doesn't give him the right to enter a country other than his own.

[213] The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 (PL 203, 83rd Congress). Retrieved from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-67/pdf/STATUTE-67-Pg400.pdf.

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Cold War climate, the McCarran bill also placed unprecedented emphasis on national security considerations, providing for tighter regulation of naturalization as well as more draconian procedures for denaturalization and deportation" (p. 312). Moreover, the U.S. also granted resident visas and citizenship to scientists whose expertise would help the United States get ahead in its arms and space race with the Soviet Union. For example, the U.S., through a secret national security program called "Operation Paperclip," brought to the country more than one thousand Nazi scientists. Among them was Nazi party member Wernher von Braun, who became instrumental in NASA's successful trip to the moon (Crim, 2018).

In fact, President Truman started, in the early fifties, an "escapee program" to encourage people residing in the Soviet Union and its so-called "satellites" to leave those countries for propaganda purposes.[214] Additionally, the program sought to recruit them for military purposes.[215] A July 1952 progress report detailed that the program was providing generous financial assistance for the successful resettlement of escapees in Western Europe and the United States, mainly through western-controlled international organizations such as the Provisional Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe.[216] This organization would later become the International

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[214] In *PSB D–18/a Washington, December 20, 1951, Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees: (No. 63) Paper Prepared by the Psychological Strategy Board Panel on the Escapee Program* (U.S. Department of State, 1988).

[215] In *Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council (Washington, August 19, 1952): Status of United States Programs for National Security as of June 30, 1952* (U.S. Department of State, 1988).

[216] In *Progress Report to the Psychological Strategy Board on Psychological Operation Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees—Phase "A" (PSB D-18a), Paper Prepared by the Staff of the Psychological Strategy Board, No. 67, WASHINGTON, July 31, 1952* (U.S. Department of State, 1988).

Organization for Migration (IOM) which, from its inception in 1951 until 2018, only had U.S. citizens as director generals.

At a March 1953 NSC meeting, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge argued that escapees can "give the U.S. the initiative in psychological warfare, and can be the biggest, single, constructive, creative element in our foreign policy."[217] During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the U.S. national security apparatus even attempted to create a "Volunteer Freedom Corp" composed of "stateless, single, anti-communist young men, coming from countries behind the iron curtain."[218] While unsuccessful due to budgetary and jurisdictional concerns, as well as Western Europe's distrust—and lack of support—for such a program (Carafano, 1999), the U.S. national security apparatus has undertaken numerous clandestine operations with the active participation of foreigners around the globe (Bevins, 2021).

Cuba, under the Castro regime, provides a good example of the U.S. national security apparatus' attempts to use refugees to destabilize countries deemed national security threats to the United States. At the 478th Meeting of the National Security Council held on April 22, 1961, President Kennedy directed his government to improve its support for Cuban refugees and to train Cuban volunteers as soldiers for a potential military invasion of that country. When analyzing this period, Loescher and Scanlan (1986) point out that: "President Kennedy inherited from President Eisenhower not

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[217] In *(No. 76) Record of Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on NSC 143, Friday, March 27, 1953* (U.S. Department of State, 1988).
[218] In *Memorandum by the President to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) (No. 70) Washington, 14 February 1953. NSC143. Subject: Proposal for a Volunteer Freedom Corps* (U.S. Department of State, 1988).

only an invasion plan but also two correlative beliefs: that Castro could be overthrown with the help of Cubans in the United States, and that once he was overthrown, those Cubans would—as they often so publicly claimed—return home" (p. 63). President Kennedy's directive became official U.S. national security policy on April 25, 1961, through National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM) 42 *Assistance to Cuban Refugees*, and NSAM-43 *Training to Cuban Nationals*.[219]

The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis did not change the U.S. policy of granting special status to Cuban refugees to advance the U.S. national security objective of destabilizing the Castro regime. As Loescher and Scanlan (1986) explain, "it was believed that or at least argued as late as 1970 that a generous U.S. refugee immigration policy might encourage continued resistance to communism in Cuba" (p. 75). Following this logic, the U.S. government, in 1966, granted work permits and permanent residencies to any Cuban who settled in the United States for at least one year through the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act.

Despite the U.S. national security policy of opening the doors of the United States to people fleeing communist countries, the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act was highly restrictive, mainly due to its national origin quotas. As documented by Fitzgerald and Cook-Martín (2014), the Soviet Union, in their public opinion campaign, stressed the racist nature of U.S. immigration policies. President Truman, who had opposed the bill, created a Commission on Immigration and Naturalization to

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[219] In *Record of Actions at the 478th Meeting of the National Security Council (167). Washington, April 22, 1961* (U.S. Department of State, 1997).

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reform the McCarran-Walter Act right after the enactment of the bill into law. The Commission's final report, *Whom We Shall Welcome*, presented in 1953, complained that "present immigration law causes large areas of the world, of greatest importance to our national security and welfare, to resent us and view us with growing distrust" (p. 70).[220]

The report served as a basis for the drafting of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, also known as the Hart–Celler Act. This law eliminated the much-criticized national origin quotas. At the signing of the bill, President Johnson pointed out that "for over four decades the immigration policy of the United States has been twisted and has been distorted by the harsh injustice of the national origins quota system," adding that "this system violated the basic principle of American democracy—the principle that values and rewards each man on the basis of his merit as a man."[221] However, in line with U.S. national security policy, the 1965 law also created a special category to favor those who, "because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion they have fled (I) from any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area."[222]

While granting refugee status to people fleeing communist countries became a staple of U.S. national security policy during this period, the U.S. national security

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[220] *Whom We Shall Welcome: Report of the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization* (1953). U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015042850498.

[221] Johnson, L. B. (1965). *Remarks on Signing the Immigration Bill* [Transcript] https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-signing-the-immigration-bill-liberty-island-new-york.

[222] The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (H.R. 2580; Pub.L. 89–236, 79 Stat. 911). Retrieved from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-79/pdf/STATUTE-79-Pg911.pdf.

apparatus, through the 1974 National Security Study Memorandum 200, *Implications of Worldwide Population Growth*, started to identify migratory flows as a potential national security threat to the U.S. As I will discuss in the following chapter, President Reagan not only ramped up his support for people fleeing communist countries, but he also deemed the increasing arrival of so-called economic migrants as threats to the United States.

5.6. Conclusion

By the time of Jimmy Carter's presidency, the U.S. national security apparatus had increased its size and power despite the criticisms during the Nixon administration of unwarranted executive control over national security matters. In fact, during his tenure at the White House, Henry Kissinger was successful in making changes that concentrated even more power on national security decisions on the executive branch (Walker, 2009). President Carter, who arrived to the presidency gesturing changes in U.S. foreign interventions and favoring a pro-human rights stance,[223] reassessed U.S. national security policy in 1977 (PD/NSC-18) by pointing out that U.S.-Soviet Union relations would be in the future characterized by "both competition and cooperation."[224] And, in terms of U.S. influence in other countries, the document

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[223] In his inaugural address, Carter pointed out that "we have already found a high degree of personal liberty, and we are now struggling to enhance equality of opportunity. Our commitment to human rights must be absolute, our laws fair, our natural beauty preserved; the powerful must not persecute the weak, and human dignity must be enhanced." Carter, J. (1977). *Inaugural Address* [Transcript]. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-20-1977-inaugural-address.
[224] Presidential Directive/NSC-18 *U.S. National Security Strategy* (August 24, 1977). Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp97m00248r000400660001-4.

argued that the U.S. should pursue a "commitment to human rights and national independence."

Drawing heavy criticism from conservatives for these changes,[225] the following year, President Carter went even further and enacted Presidential Directive/NSC-30 *Human Rights* (1978)[226] where he espoused that one of the primary objectives of the U.S. was "to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world." The document warned that the U.S. would not provide material or financial support to "governments engaged in serious violations of human rights." While the language of human rights became popular in this administration's discursive production during this period, Carter's record in this realm was unsuccessful. The Carter administration continued the standard U.S. national security policy of seeking the country's most benefits, even if U.S. actions directly contradicted the administration's pro-human rights stance (Smith, 1986). Were these shortcomings leading to Lasswell's (1941; 1951; 1971) prediction of the construction of a garrison state in the U.S.?

Aaron Friedberg, an international relations scholar who served as a national security advisor for the George W. Bush Administration and was one of the signers of the neoconservative Project for the New American Century, published in 2000, a book titled *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War*

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[225] For instance, Ronald Reagan, in his acceptance speech, stated that "Americas defense strength is at its lowest ebb in a generation, while the Soviet Union is vastly outspending us in both strategic and conventional arms." Reagan, R. (1980). *Republican National Convention Acceptance Speech, 1980*. [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/republican-national-convention-acceptance-speech-1980.
[226] Presidential Directive/NSC-30 *Human Rights* (February 17, 1978). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd30.pdf.

Grand Strategy. Similar to Hogan's (1998) arguments, Friedberg claims that the United States' anti-statist tradition prevented the country from becoming a garrison state during the Cold War. A staunch defender of the implementation of U.S. national security policy and its continuation and expansion after the Cold War, Friedberg views the U.S. national security apparatus as a positive—and necessary—appendage of state power. He argues that, in the United States, "some of the appendages to the state that sprout in a crisis may live on, but the persistence of underlaying anti-statist attitudes ensures that they will eventually be subject to impassioned efforts to cut them back or to excise them altogether" (p. 32). This is a prediction that has actually gone the opposite way with the continuous growth and expansion of the U.S. national security apparatus.

Going beyond Hogan's analysis, Friedberg credits the American private sector with the success of the United States in the Cold War since, according to him, they provided innovation, economic growth, creativity, and resourcefulness. To those who argue that the private sector exercised pressure on the U.S. government to escalate the Cold War to increase its profits, Friedberg argues that escalation was necessary to win the Cold War. According to him, in their lobbying efforts for the continuation and escalation of the Cold War, the private sector provided a counterbalance to those "forces favoring reduction, retrenchment, and a premature 'settlement' with the Soviet Union" (p. 345). Friedberg even hypothesizes, following the tenets of Adam Smith's invisible hand of the market, that "perhaps, after all, as they pursued their own interests, the much-reviled members of the 'military industrial complex' did good by doing well" (p. 345).

How much influence has the corporate world had on the development, implementation, and continuous growth of the U.S. national security apparatus? Unfortunately, traditional social science research methods have been unable to provide a definite answer. In social science methodology, it is customary to establish a cause-effect relationship through the use of dependent and independent variables. Generally, the criteria are based on (1) Temporality – the cause happened before the effect; (2) Patterns of cause-and-effect relationships; and (3) The cause-effect relationship cannot be primarily explained by other causes (Ruane, 2016). If I were to apply this model to the question posed at the beginning of this paragraph, the independent variable (i.e., the cause) would be—or could be framed as—the profit motive of the corporate world. The dependent variable (i.e., the effect) would be the expansion of the U.S. national security apparatus domestically and internationally. How can this relationship be measured objectively, taking into consideration the secretive nature of the U.S. national security apparatus?[227]

Friedberg seems to be aware of these shortcomings, and his defense of the participation—and influence—of the private sector in the U.S. national security apparatus is framed not in terms of cause-and-effect relationships but on his own unproven hypotheses. For example, he claims that the "big American defense firms

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[227] There are, of course, other approaches to the analysis of the relationship between U.S. corporations and U.S. military interventions worldwide. For example, Hixson (2008) argues that U.S. interventions are intrinsically connected to the country's belief in its worldwide superiority and its duty to advance civilization and lead the world. In this respect and using the example of access to oil supplies, Hixon contends that "the United States sought to exploit Middle East oil supplies because it had the right, as the most advanced and 'free' country in the world, not because corporate oil executives pulled the strings of national policy behind closed doors" (p. 228).

probably [emphasis added] played as small a role in perpetuating the Cold War as they did in starting it" (p. 295). Offering an intuitive counterargument, he claims that a similar attack could be launched against the agency and motives of the national security establishment and its "large, deeply entrenched public bureaucracy with nowhere to go but out of business" (p. 295) if peace with the Soviet Union occurred before it actually did.

Missing from this claim, however, is that the national security bureaucracy is not only public but also private, and there has been a constant rotation of national security "experts," "specialists," and "scholars" between both sectors that have continued to construct existential threats and use civilization narratives to expand the public-private U.S. national security apparatus to this date. Friedberg himself is an example of the public-private revolving door in the national security field. He became part of the W. Bush administration as a national security expert.

To conclude, this chapter has not attempted to measure the private sector's influence in shaping U.S. national security since this dissertation believes that it is an impossible task. At the same time, what this chapter has shown is that the U.S. national security apparatus' construction of existential threats—in the case of this chapter, the Soviet Union—and its utilization of civilization narratives of bringing "democracy," "liberty," and "freedom" to legitimize U.S. interventions around the world do benefit corporate agendas. It opens other countries to corporations, provides them with a pool of cheap workers and raw materials, reduces democratic accountability processes, and defends and promotes geopolitical profit-driven interests.

In this scheme, protecting U.S. national security was not just about defending the country against existential threats. This helps explain why the term "national defense" was dismissed during the debates for the enactment of the 1947 National Security Act since it did not capture the scope of national security doctrine. As the U.S. national security apparatus's own documents show, protecting U.S. national security has involved pro-active efforts to shape the world to expand and secure a U.S.-led capitalist global order.

Defending his claim that the U.S. anti-statist tradition prevented a garrison state, Friedberg asks his readers to imagine "how the United States might have acted in the absence of anti-statist influences" (p. 75). One way to reframe this question for the purposes of this dissertation is to ask how the United States might have acted in the absence of corporate, profit-driven influences. A second way to reframe the question is to imagine how the United States might have acted in the absence of ideas of "American exceptionalism" as well as civilization missions based on the standards of Western civilization and the construction of ever-present and ever-growing (backward) existential threats. And yet another way would be to ask what would have happened had the U.S. national security apparatus not framed the protection of U.S. national security in terms of expanding U.S. capitalism and imposing a U.S.-led capitalist world order throughout the globe. Would the U.S. national security apparatus even exist in such imagined world?

6. Reagan's National Security: Democracy and Global (Economic) Freedom

> Government's first responsibility is national security, and we're determined to meet that responsibility. Indeed, we have no choice.
> —President Ronald Reagan, 1981[228]

> Our policy begins by recognizing that a strong American economy is the cornerstone of our national security.
> —Secretary of State Alexander Meigs Haig Jr., 1981

Recounting the Reagan administration's pro-democracy efforts throughout Latin America, a 1987 report from the State Department titled, *Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Promise and The Challenge*, explained that during the Carter administration "support for human rights was the guiding principle. During the Administration of President Ronald Reagan, the emphasis shifted toward a policy championing the broader values of democracy" (U.S. Department of State, 1987, p. 7). In the Reagan administration, advancing the cause of freedom and incorporating more countries into the "free world" through democracy promotion gradually became a central component of U.S. foreign policy and its national security apparatus. Reagan's emphasis on democracy promotion marked a distance from Carter's human rights approach and even displaced modernization theory as the Third World's guiding development principle. Reagan's conceptualization of freedom had a strong economic pro-capitalist component, which he saw as intrinsic and inalienable to the notion of democracy that his administration sought to defend, promote, and secure throughout the globe.

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[228] Reagan, R (1981) *Address to the Nation on the Program for Economic Recovery*. [Transcript]. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-program-economic-recovery.

Reagan's first national security strategy—NSDD-32 of May 1982—paid very little attention to democracy efforts and, following the thread of previous administrations, reaffirmed the objective of promoting economic development (i.e., incorporating third world countries into the free world through trade liberalization) throughout the world to protect U.S. national security.[229] However, by January 1988, democracy promotion had become a central component of the Reagan administration's last national security strategy. For example, Reagan's 1988 NSS, when explaining its active role in Latin America, stated that "our national interests, as well as our political principles, have led us to promote democracy and economic progress throughout the hemisphere" (p. 25). It expounded that the Reagan administration was confident "that a world composed of free, sovereign democracies will be a safer, more stable world" (p. 11) to advance U.S. national security.

As previous presidents, Ronald Reagan had no hesitation in interconnecting the protection of U.S. national security with the need to expand U.S. capitalism to the entire world. Unlike previous presidents, however, Reagan did not hesitate to openly incorporate what he defined as a more realist approach to his national security policies. Reagan's critics described his administration as the arrival of neoconservatism to power and the subsequent implementation of "hawkish" foreign policies to protect U.S. national security. While previous presidents also implemented so-called "hawkish policies" worldwide, they usually attempted to disguise them under grand discourses

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[229] National Security Decision Directive 32 (NSDD-32) *U.S. National Security Strategy* (May 20, 1982). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-32.pdf.

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of liberty and freedom. While Reagan also used these discursive tropes, he was unapologetic in advancing U.S. national security through the pursuit of global hegemony. In February 1983, Secretary of State George Pratt Shultz, when explaining U.S. security and economic policy, argued that realism had become a guiding principle of the Reagan administration. He pointed out that "if we are to improve the world, we must first understand it –the good and the bad"[230] to develop and implement U.S. national security policies accordingly.

During Reagan's administration, the Cold War continued to serve as an umbrella for the fight against the Soviet Union, not only for the survival of the United States but also for world supremacy and the spread of U.S. capitalism. After all, the administration's 1982 national security strategy had already warned that "the decade of the eighties will likely pose the greatest challenge to our survival and well-being since World War II" (NSSD-32, 1982, p. 3). In this life-threatening, consensus-building existential context, Reagan's revolution, colloquially known as "Reaganomics," started the trend in the implementation and promotion of neoliberal policies both in the United States and in the entire world (Harvey, 2005)[231] to promote, as the Administration's 1988 NSS stated, the "growth of human freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies throughout the world" (p. 3).

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[230] In *(Document 72). Address by the Secretary of State (Shultz) Before the Southern Center for International Studies, Atlanta, February 24, 1983. U.S. Security and Economic Assistance Policy* (U.S. Department of State, 1985, p. 228).

[231] Although, as Naomi Klein (2007) and David Harvey (2005) have demonstrated, the first neoliberal experiments were conducted in Chile and Argentina during the seventies when the dictatorships of Pinochet and Videla ruled each country, respectively.

Close to the end of his presidency and reflecting on his unfinished project to put an end to the Keynesian Welfare State (Harvey, 2005), Reagan argued that, in the United States, the "freedom to compete in the marketplace is essential to our concept of liberty,"[232] pointing out, by the end of his Administration and in line with neoliberal rationalities of individualism and personal agency—and resilience[233]—(Dardot & Laval, 2013; Brown, 2015), that the "return of responsibility and authority to the individual American is now leading to a virtual renaissance in America of liberty, productivity, prosperity, and self-esteem."

On the international front, the Reagan administration viewed global trade liberalization as essential for protecting U.S. national security. Early on in his administration, Reagan decided to create a new cabinet-level group, called the "Senior Interdepartmental Group- International Economic Policy (SIG-IEP)" through National Security Decision Directive (from now on, NSDD) Number 48[234] to provide specific advice—and expertise—to the National Security Council on U.S. international economic policy. One of its first reports, on how the U.S. should deal with the international debt problem, was adopted by the National Security Council through

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[232] Reagan, R. (1988). *Legislative and Administrative Message: A Union of Individuals* [Transcript]. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/12488e.

[233] Sarah Bracke (2016) traces what she refers to as the "rise of resilience" precisely to the 1980s as a strategy of neoliberal governmentality. As she argues: "In terms of subject formation, resilience seems to have become a constitutive characteristic—a requirement even—of subjects in neoliberal times. This is where the connection with agency becomes clear: the 'good subject' of neoliberal subject formation is the one who is able to act in resilient ways. Resilience becomes the very stuff of which agency is made off in neoliberal times: structural pressure, including oppression, is expected to be met with individual elasticity, rebounding and adaptation" (p. 851).

[234] National Security Decision Directive 48 (NSDD-48) *International Economic* Policy (July 23, 1982). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-48.pdf.

NSDD 96.[235] It outlined that the U.S., with the International Monetary Fund's help, should encourage private markets and trade liberalization worldwide while actively discouraging any type of protectionist measures.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores the meanings of freedom and democracy that Reagan's national security apparatus sought to promote and secure domestically and internationally. It also analyzes the relationship between U.S.-led democracy promotion and the protection of U.S. national security. The second part examines the validity of the capitalism/democracy/(economic) freedom nexus and its use to build consensus politics for the expansion of U.S. capitalism. Finally, the third part of this chapter explores the U.S. national security apparatus' construction of existential threats beyond the so-called "red scare" to legitimize the apparatus' continuous growth worldwide.

6.1. Realism, Economic Freedom, and U.S. National Security

To understand the Reagan administration's realist approach and its relationship with economic freedom and democracy promotion, I will begin by sketching the criticisms against modernization theory and Jimmy Carter's human rights approach in relation to U.S. national security policy. While modernization theory had a large share of critics, the United States' failures in the Vietnam War brought to the forefront criticisms of its shortcomings to protect U.S. national security. After all, among its

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[235] National Security Decision Directive 96 (NSDD-96) *U.S. Approach to the International Debt Problem* (June 9, 1983). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-96.pdf.

strategies, the U.S. had attempted to develop Vietnam through loans, expert assistance, and financial aid programs to ease its internal conflict and eventually turn the country into a U.S. ally (Klinger, 2019). After the Vietnam debacle and growing criticism against U.S. military interventionism around the globe, President Jimmy Carter arrived at the presidency committed to making the U.S. the leader in the global promotion of human rights (Smith, 1986).

In 1968, Samuel Huntington published the *Political Order in Changing Societies*, where he criticized modernization theory's hope of westernizing so-called backward countries through economic development. What was needed, according to Huntington, was to first build political authority in these countries. Since economic improvements bring about structural changes in a society's social, political, and cultural landscape, Huntington argued that strong political institutions were needed to ease these tensions and promote stability. This approach was termed the "authoritarian transition." According to Huntington, "to cope successfully with modernization, a political system must be able, first, to innovate policy, that is, to promote social and economic reform by state action" (2006, p. 140). In his view, the U.S. needed a more realist approach for its engagement in world affairs.

At that point, Huntington had already criticized what he saw as the shortcomings of American liberalism to protect U.S. national security in a 1957 book titled *The Soldier and The State.* According to Huntington (1967), the United States "has tended to make every war a crusade, fought, not for specific objectives of national security, but on behalf of universal principles such as democracy, freedom of the seas,

and self-determination. Indeed, for the American a war is not a war unless it is a crusade" (p. 152). In this respect, while American liberalism may proclaim pacifism and the pursuit of world peace, Huntington ironically pointed out that "the liberal will normally support a war waged to further liberal ideals. War as an instrument of national policy is immoral; war on behalf of universally true principles of justice and freedom is not" (p. 91).

In Huntington's assessment, conservatism could better provide a realist interpretation of world affairs to protect U.S. national security. However, from a decolonial perspective, it is worth pointing out that in both American liberalism and American conservatism, the need to actively intervene in global issues to protect U.S. national security has rarely been called into question. In our current era, the same ideological fight in the U.S. has continued, but it has been framed in terms of "globalists" versus "nationalists." While both differ in some aspects (e.g., the current "culture wars"), they both promote active U.S. global involvement in the name of protecting U.S. national security.

In the late seventies, political scientist Jeane Kirkpatrick built on Huntington's arguments to criticize both Jimmy Carter's human rights approach and modernization theory in a 1979 article titled "Dictatorships and Double Standards." In it, Kirkpatrick argued that the Carter administration's approach to protecting U.S. national security was failing "not for lack of good intentions but for lack of realism" (p. 44). According to Kirkpatrick, the Carter administration was hoping for a "happy ending" in world

affairs, in which the U.S. would lead "a brave new world of global politics and interdependence" (p. 39).

In what later became known as the "Kirkpatrick Doctrine" and arguing against the Carter administration's efforts to attempt to penalize human rights violations, she (1979) contended that since "right-wing autocracies do sometimes evolve into democracies" (p. 37), the United States needed to act according to its own interests and support them. Moreover, and following Huntington's arguments, Kirkpatrick contended that strong political institutions were needed to facilitate these countries' (authoritarian) transition into modern capitalist economies. Reagan recruited Kirkpatrick—a long-time democrat—for his presidential campaign, and she subsequently became part of his administration.

Formed just three days after Carter's inauguration, a conservative group called the Committee on the Present Danger, led by NSC-68 (1950) drafter Paul Nitze, launched similar attacks against the Carter administration (Tyroler & Committee on the Present Danger, 1984). Since the Committee's inception, Reagan had a close connection to the group, and some of its members later became part of his Republican administration. The Committee promoted a more aggressive and realist involvement of the United States in the world to counteract what they saw as an ever-growing, world-expanding Soviet existential threat. They advocated for continuous military buildup and active involvement in the Third World "to create a just and progressive world economy," which they rationalized as "the necessary condition of our own prosperity and that of the developing nations and Communist nations as well" (p. 3).

In constructing a capitalist world order, the Committee argued that "national security and economic well-being are concurrent, compatible and, indeed, interdependent ends" (p. 178). Reproducing the trope of American exceptionalism with its inherent duty to lead the world, they claimed that "America is more than a superpower. The idea of the United States is a living part of Western civilization, with a compelling and altogether special history which belongs to all who cherish human liberty" (p. 173). According to the Committee, the Carter administration was failing to protect U.S. national security and needed to adopt a more aggressive—and realist—national security policy.

In terms of Latin America, the Committee of Santa Fe promoted a sense of existential urgency in U.S.-Latin American geopolitical relations, which gradually shaped Reagan's national security policies throughout the region (Walker, 2009). Formed as an advisory group for the Republican party in the seventies, the Committee published in 1980 a manifesto titled: *A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties* (Tambs, 1980), where they not only criticized Carter's policies towards the region as "weak and indecisive" (p. v), but they also urgently warned that the American continent was "under attack" (p. 3).

Arguing that Latin America was vital for the national security of the United States, they proposed a comprehensive plan for the region ranging from military to social and economic policies. On the latter, they urged the U.S. to "promote a policy conducive to private capitalism, free trade, and direct local and foreign investment" (Tambs, 1980, p. 33). They also called on the Carter Administration to "cease targeting

its [U.S.] allies with its present inequitably applied human rights program" (p. 37). In line with these recommendations, a leaked internal memo from the State Department obtained by *The New York Times* during the first year of Reagan's presidency argued that U.S. policy needed to "move away from 'human rights' as a term, and begin to speak of 'individual rights,' 'political rights' and 'civil liberties.'"[236] The stage was therefore set for Reagan's aggressive—and realist—approach to protecting U.S. national security.

In the fight-for-survival decade that the Reagan Administration had predicted at the start of his presidency in his 1982 NSS, the term "national security" served as an all-encompassing common-sense strategy to build consensuses and limit opposition. As *The New York Times* pointed out during the first year of Reagan's presidency in its weekly *The Nation in Summary*: "in the philosophy of the Reagan Administration, no concept is more solemn than 'national security' - words invoked last week to cover a range of decisions, actions and proposals that were quickly condemned by environmentalists and antinuclear activists."[237] By 1983, renowned philosopher Sissela Bok, in an opinion piece in *The New York Times*, complained of the rapidly increasing levels of secrecy and control—which according to her assessment, were unlike any

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[236] Willaim (1981, November 5). Essay; Human rights victory. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/05/opinion/essay-human-rights-victory.html?searchResultPosition=1

[237] The Nation in Summary: In the name of national security. (1981, March 8). *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/08/weekinreview/the-nation-in-summary-in-the-name-of-national-security.html?searchResultPosition=207.

other times in American history—that the Reagan administration was exercising "in the name of national security."[238]

The strong emphasis on the protection of U.S. national security through the strengthening and global expansion of U.S. capitalism constantly appeared in Reagan's rhetoric and in the construction of a very specific image of the world based on U.S. leadership, values, and the expansion of the international market (Walker, 2009). Additionally, it was based on a very specific notion of "freedom" centered on market exchanges and individual responsibility. In a 1980 speech before veterans in Chicago titled: "Peace: Restoring the Margin of Safety,"[239] Reagan called on his incoming administration to "do a better job exporting Americanism." In the quest for global hegemony, he explained that the U.S. could help the entire world develop and reduce the number of refugees fleeing communist countries through the promotion of free-market economies throughout the world, pointing out—using often repeated U.S. civilizing missions—that "I believe it is our pre-ordained destiny to show all mankind that they, too, can be free without having to leave their native shore."

Very early on and fulfilling campaign promises, the Reagan Administration presented its so-called "White Paper" on international trade. It laid out the construction of a strong U.S. economy based on global trade to guarantee, as the 1982 NSS explained, rapid—and easy—"access to foreign markets, and to ensure the U.S. and its

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[238] Bok, S. (1983, February 23). Secrecy versus security. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1983/02/23/opinion/secrecy-vs-security.html?searchResultPosition=139.
[239] Reagan, R. (1980). *Peace: Restoring the margin of safety* [Transcript]. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/8-18-80.

allies and friends access to foreign energy and mineral resources" (p. 2).[240] As U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador William E. Brock argued before a 1981 congressional hearing on U.S. trade policy, "one of the principal requirements of a strong U.S. economy is the maintenance of open markets both at home and abroad. The United States is more dependent on the international trade than at any time in recent history" (U.S. Congress, 1981, p. 9). Following that logic, the Administration's 1982 NSS sought to "promote a well-functioning international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investment" (p. 2) to protect U.S. national security.

In its fight against the Soviet Union, the 1983 NSDD-75 titled *US Relations with the USSR* clearly stated that "U.S. policy must have an ideological thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade unions, free enterprise, and political democracy over the repressive features of Soviet Communism" (p. 3).[241] In this respect, the Reagan administration promotion of "freedom" is one of the keywords to understand the so-called "Reagan Revolution" and its interconnection to the spread and global expansion of U.S. capitalism to protect U.S. national security. As Reagan proudly claimed in the concluding paragraphs of his administration's 1987 NSS: "I believe that our most important thrust in the National Security Strategy area has been to restore the image of the United States as the light of freedom throughout the world" (p. 41).

Renowned scholar Eric Foner (1998) has argued that "freedom" has been one

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[240] National Security Decision Directive 32 (NSDD-32) *U.S. National Security Strategy* (May 20, 1982). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-32.pdf.
[241] National Security Decision Directive 75 (NSDD-75) *US Relations with the USSR* (January 17, 1983). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-75.pdf.

of the most contested words in American history. In his seminal study titled: *The Story of American Freedom* (1998), Foner demonstrates the changing meanings and understandings of freedom throughout American history. In line with his quest to diminish the Keynesian welfare state, Reagan's definition and connotations of freedom were set in direct opposition to Franklin D. Roosevelt's "new deal freedoms."

Throughout his presidency, Roosevelt promoted his so-called "four freedoms," which his administration characterized as "freedom of speech," "freedom of religion," "freedom from fear," and "freedom from want."[242] It is the latter, explained in more detail in Roosevelt's proposal for a Second Bill of Rights in 1944,[243] which presented a special problem for Reaganomics since it was premised on the idea of economic security for the population (i.e., the right to work and a livable wage, housing, medical care, and education).

Foner described Reagan's conceptualization of freedom as "conservative"—a combination of economic liberalism with social conservatism based on Eurocentric Judeo-Christian values[244]—pointing out that, during his presidency, the "'free market' took its place alongside the free world as the essence of freedom" (p. 321). Before

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[242] President Roosevelt announced the so-called "four freedoms" in his state of the union address on January 06, 1941. In Roosevelt, F. (1941). *January 6, 1941: State of the Union (Four Freedoms)* [Transcript]. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-6-1941-state-union-four-freedoms.

[243] President Roosevelt made this proposal in his state of the union address on January 11, 1944. In Roosevelt, F. (1944). *January 11, 1944: Fireside Chat 28: On the State of the Union* [Transcript]. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-11-1944-fireside-chat-28-state-union.

[244] As Wilsey (2015) argued in his study titled *American Exceptionalism and Civil Religion: Reassesing the History of an Idea*: "Before, during and after his presidency, Reagan described American history, government, society, people and the military in terms of purity and uprightness. Reagan was perhaps the most civil religious president since Abraham Lincoln" (pp. 153-154).

Reagan, Foner (1998) argued that the Cold War had already created a version of freedom that was set in direct opposition to the Soviet Union's portrayal as "totalitarian" and the "slave state" whose primary objective was to destroy civilization as a whole. In addition, and as Foner explains, "Cold War freedom did have a strong economic content. In the 1950s, freedom became fully identified with consumer capitalism, or, as it was now universally known, 'free enterprise'" (p. 262).

Through the implementation of neoliberal policies, Reagan furthered this new connotation of freedom as mainly "economic" and tried to aggressively expand it to the entire world. Instead of the "economic security" and its "freedom from want" for the working class proposed by Roosevelt, Reagan's freedom was centered on the possibility—and not necessarily the "ability"—to buy and sell private property, make investments, accumulate wealth, and look (compete) for a job in the market. As Foner pointed out in a 2013 article, "Today, at least in terms of political policy and discourse, Americans still live in the shadow of Reagan's revolution" (p. 280). In this respect, protecting U.S. national security gradually became about defending, securing, and expanding Reagan's (economic) freedom throughout the globe.

In 1982, Reagan delivered one of his most well-known speeches before the British parliament. In the speech, he famously announced the "march of freedom" which, according to him, will leave "Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history,"[245] and individuals free from government overreach, particularly in the economy. By 1987,

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[245] Reagan, R. (1982). *Address to Members of the British Parliament, June 8, 1982* [Transcript]. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/60882a.

he proposed an "Economic Bill of Rights"—a constitutional amendment—that would have declared economic freedoms "as sacred and sacrosanct as the political freedoms of speech, press, religion, and assembly."[246]

Even though the so-called Founding Fathers did not explicitly mention economic freedoms, Reagan argued, in his attempt to change the U.S. constitution, that they knew very well that "without economic freedom there can be no political freedom."[247] In a direction opposite to FDR (i.e., jumping from "freedom from want" to "freedom to want"), Reagan characterized freedom as the possibility to work (i.e., to try to sell your labor power in the market);[248] the possibility to enjoy the fruits of one's labor; the possibility to own and control one's property; and the possibility to participate in a free-market economy. In the Administration's 1987 NSS, Reagan went as far as declaring his understanding of economic freedom a universal right: "In short, our international economic policy is built around the belief that economic freedom is not the sole possession of a chosen few, but the universal right of all people" (p. 12).

Freedom conservatives argue that government is the enemy and, in line with neoliberal logic, push for free-market economies and its tenets: individual responsibility, privatization, deregulation, and liberalization (Harvey, 2005; Dardot &

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[246] Reagan, R. (1987). *Remarks announcing America's Economic Bill of Rights* [Transcript]. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/070387a.

[247] Reagan, R. (1987). *America's Economic Bill of Rights.* Ronald Regan Presidential Library & Museum. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/070387b.

[248] However, against Reagan's approach and according to data from the World Values Survey, most Americans have considered "job security" an important element in society. The Survey's Wave 1 (1981-1984) found that 72% agreed that job security was important; the same number was repeated in Wave 2 (1990-1994); 75% in Wave 3 (1995-1998); and 72% in Wave 4 (1999-2004). Data is available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp.

Laval, 2013; Brown, 2015). In this line of thought, the Reagan Administration's 1986 NSS[249] explained that its international economic policy was based "upon the principle that economic growth is one of the free world's greatest strengths" (p. 11). And, the source of wealth, according to the document, is "individual creativity expressed through the marketplace" (p. 12) that can only emerge with the promotion of an "environment in which growth can occur through domestic economic policies that minimize government interference in markets" (p. 12).

However, while Reagan was constantly declaring his enmity to "big government," he aggressively pushed for the buildup of his administration's national security apparatus (Walker, 2009). As scholar Philip Mirowski (2013) has shown, neoliberals knew perfectly well that they needed strong government intervention both domestically and globally to push for a global free market. As scholars have also demonstrated, neoliberals are not against government intervention in the economy or even the so-called "big government" (Brown, 2015; Slobodian, 2018). What they dispute is the type of intervention that governments should have in the economy as protectors, enablers, and facilitators of the market and corporate America, enforcers of private contracts, and providers of security.[250]

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[249] National Security Decision Directive Number 238 (NSDD-238) *Basic National Security Strategy* (September 2, 1985). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-238.pdf.

[250] As Wendy Brown (2015) explains: "Neoliberal states thus depart from liberal ones as they become radically economic in a triple sense: The state secures, advances, and props the economy; the state's purpose is to facilitate the economy, and the state's legitimacy is linked to the growth of the economy — as an overt actor on behalf of the economy, the state also becomes responsible for the economy. State action, state purpose, and state legitimacy: each is economized by neoliberalism" (p. 64). Or, as Milton Friedman argued in his seminal *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962): "The existence of a free market does not of course eliminate the need for government. On the contrary, government is essential both as a forum for determining the 'rules of the game' and as an umpire to interpret and enforce the rules decided on" (p. 15).

In March 1983, in a speech about defense and national security, Reagan complained that Congress had refused to approve his defense budget. Appealing to the existential threat that the Soviet Union represented to the U.S., according to his national security technocracy and his own inflaming rhetoric,[251] he urgently—and sarcastically—claimed that "the calls for cutting back the defense budget come in nice, simple arithmetic. They're the same kind of talk that led the democracies to neglect their defenses in the 1930s and invited the tragedy of World War II."[252] As argued by the Reagan administration, there should be no spending limits to protect U.S. national security and no anti-statist counterarguments for the growth of "big government" in the national security arena. Prior to 9/11, Reagan's tenure represented the most significant military buildup in American history during peacetime, the gradual erosion of civil liberties, and more concentration of power in the executive branch in national security matters (Koh, 1990; Weiss, 2014).

Following the Kirkpatrick Doctrine and in terms of U.S. foreign interventions, Reagan framed his support for right-wing forces abroad as an existential need to protect U.S. national security through helping other countries to become "free," and hence, capitalist. As Pitkin (1988) keenly pointed out when analyzing this period of time: "our

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[251] Also, in March 1983, Reagan delivered what has been colloquially referred to as his "evil empire speech" before evangelicals in Florida. In the speech, Reagan named the Soviet Union "the focus of evil in the modern world," calling the Cold War "a test of moral will and faith." Reagan, R. (1983). *Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals* [Transcript]. https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/50919/remarks_annual_convention_national_association_ev angelicals_030883.pdf.

[252] Reagan, R. (1983). *Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security* [Transcript]. https://www.reaganfoundation.org/ronald-reagan/reagan-quotes-speeches/address-to-the-nation-on-defense-and-national-security/.

government and the American right speak of antirevolutionary mercenaries in Central America and Africa and of rebellious groups in Eastern Europe as 'freedom fighters,' presumably an analogy with capitalist 'free enterprise' and the 'free world'" (p. 544). Reagan even praised Guatemalan genocidal dictator Efrain Rios Montt, calling him a "man of great personal integrity and commitment" who wants to "restore democracy" in Guatemala.[253]

The promotion of democracy abroad became an intrinsic component of the Reagan administration and its national security apparatus as a strategy to implement capitalist-oriented political institutions all over the world. In his 1982 speech before the British Parliament, Reagan announced his administration's efforts to promote his understanding of democracy by arguing that "if the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom and democratic ideals, we must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy."[254]

In the coming months, the administration worked on a proposal to be presented before Congress with the hopes of gaining bipartisan support. Reagan's national security apparatus, through NSDD-77 titled *Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security* of January 14, 1983, formally adopted the democracy promotion project. It established an "International Political Committee" within the National

[253] Reagan, R. (1982). *Remarks in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, following a meeting with President Jose Efrain Rios Montt of Guatemala* [Transcript].
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/120482f. Efrain Rios Montt was convicted of genocide in 2013.
[254] Reagan, R. (1982). *Address to members of the British Parliament* [Transcript].
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-members-british-parliament.

Security Council in charge of developing efforts "to build up the U.S. Government capability to promote democracy" around the world.[255]

In February 1983, Secretary of State George Pratt Shultz presented the democracy project before Congress. Shultz's testimony did not directly define what the administration meant by "democracy." However, the democracy-capitalism nexus was very evident in his speech. In the following months, there was much debate about the need for such a program, particularly due to its ambiguousness. Operationally, Shultz had defined it as a public-private network composed of the government, private businesses, NGOs, academia, etcetera (U.S. Department of State, 1983b).

A few weeks after Shultz's presentation, Senator William Fulbright, expressing some doubts about the project at the Committee on Foreign Relations, pointed out that "Project Democracy is a very difficult concept. There are many different concepts of what is democracy or a democratic government" (U.S. Congress, 1983, p. 36). Democratic Senator Tsongas also pointed out that some critics had labeled it "Project Right-Wing Democracy" (p. 26). He voiced his concern that "Project Democracy" would be dominated by U.S. national security objectives, thereby losing its primary purpose of actually promoting democracy around the world.[256] The bipartisan congressional solution was to create instead a government-funded, non-governmental institution called the "National Endowment for Democracy" (U.S. General Accounting

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[255] National Security Decision Directive: 77 (NSDD-77) *Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security* (January 14, 1983) Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-077.htm.
[256] At the congressional hearings, Senator Tsongas questioned Charles Wick, director of the United States Information Agency (USIA), about the possible involvement of the CIA in the democracy project.

Office, 1984). As President Reagan proudly explained, the Endowment was "more than bipartisan; it is a genuine partnership of Republicans and Democrats, of labor and business, conservatives and liberals, and of the executive and legislative branches."[257]

The National Endowment for Democracy was established in November 1983. Carl Gershman, a former aide to Jeane Kirkpatrick, became the Endowment's first and only president, serving in that position for more than thirty-five years thus far. One of the Endowment's core institutions, the "Center for International Private Enterprise"—which also became affiliated with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—is very telling to understand the type of democracy based on capitalist values that the Endowment has sought to promote from its beginnings. As Michael Samuels, the representative for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, argued at the congressional hearings, "Americans have many different ideas about democracy and democratic institutions. What we can all agree on is the vital importance of a private enterprise system" (U.S. Congress, 1983, p. 269) to promote democratic governance.

Summarizing the hearings and the importance of promoting Reagan's democracy abroad to protect U.S. national security, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Republican Senator Charles Percy argued that "when we consider that 80 percent of all the raw materials used by our factories and an increasing proportion of our exports and jobs depend upon international trade, we can recognize that a stable, peaceful world, a prosperous world, is absolutely essential to every single

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[257] In (*Document 131) Statement by President Reagan, December 16, 1983* (U.S. Department of State, 1985, p. 367).

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American" (U.S. Congress, 1983, p. 270). Since its creation, the National Endowment for Democracy has actively participated in the destabilization of foreign governments and has been accused of being a tool of the national security establishment to further U.S. interests around the world (Bandeira & Guimarães, 2017).

Latin America provides a good example of how democracy promotion was rationalized under the Reagan administration and its national security apparatus. At a 1987 National Security Council meeting, Ronald Reagan, reflecting on the importance of Latin America for his administration, shared that "I know it is no secret to most of you that I have a vision of a democratic Western Hemisphere where the United States has warm and solid relations with all the countries of the hemisphere."[258] What did that vision entail? The 1984 Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (also known as the Kissinger Commission) does provide important clues. On July 19, 1983, Reagan created a national security commission headed by Henry Kissinger to "study the nature of United States interests in the Central American region and the threats now posed to those interests."[259]

The Commission argued that the Soviet Union and Cuba's influence in the region posed a national security threat to the U.S. It went on to say that Latin America was a significant trading partner, and there were important U.S. private investments throughout the region at stake. To counteract the Soviet-Cuba threat, the Commission proposed a comprehensive plan for the region based on U.S. leadership and Central

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[258] National Security Council (1987). *National Security Council Meeting March 13, 1987, South American Democracy*. Retrieved from https://www.thereaganfiles.com/870313.pdf.
[259] In *Executive Order: National Bipartisan Commission on Central America* (National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 1984).

American countries' adoption of "democratic forms appropriate to its own conditions" (National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 1984, p. 62.) Those democratic forms were primarily based on the "development of strong and free economies with diversified production for both external and domestic markets" (p. 51) through social and political modernization.

The Reagan administration adopted the Kissinger's Commission recommendations through NSDD-124 of February 7, 1984, titled *Central America: Promoting Democracy, Economic Improvement, and Peace*.[260] Following the Kirkpatrick doctrine, the U.S. strengthened its support of right-wing dictatorships throughout the region to protect its national security and to promote Reagan's vision of a free-trade pro-capitalist democratic Western Hemisphere. Defending its actions throughout Latin America, a 1987 report from the State Department argued that:

> many believe that the United States has sacrificed democratic principles and even encouraged repressive military regimes in the pursuit of containment and stability at any price. This critical view ignores the role that U.S. assistance programs and support for free trade, to take just two examples, have played in the fundamental socioeconomic transformations that have contributed to the democratic transition (U.S. Department of State, 1987, p, 14).

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[260] National Security Decision Directive124 (NSDD-124) *Central America: Promoting Democracy, Economic Improvement, and Peace* (February 7, 1984). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-124.htm.

6.2. The Capitalism/Democracy/(Economic) Freedom Nexus

To build consensus, promoting the idea that economic freedom and democracy are intrinsically interconnected has historically been a central mission of the capitalist project. After all, what is the U.S. national security apparatus protecting, advancing, and securing? For example, the Heritage Foundation's 2019 Index of Economic Freedom, while acknowledging the controversies surrounding the evidence to support the economic freedom/political freedom nexus, confidently argues that "the positive relationship that exists between economic freedom and democratic governance is undeniable" (p. 29). In addition, the Cato Institute's 2019 Human Freedom Index (Porčnik & Vásquez, 2019) contends that there is a strong correlation between freedom and democracy.[261]

In 1962, Milton Friedman—who became an informal advisor to Reagan's presidential campaign and served on the President's Economic Policy Advisory Board (Ebenstein, 2007)—published his very influential *Capitalism and Freedom*. In it, Friedman (2002) argued that economic freedom is "an indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom" (p. 8). Friedman explained that the so-called free market promotes "political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other" (p. 9).

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[261] Despite using the all-encompassing term "human freedom," half of the weight of the index is concentrated on "economic freedoms." Specifically, the index is divided between personal freedoms (i.e., "Legal Protection and Security" and "Specific Personal Freedoms" such as freedom of movement and religion) and economic freedoms (i.e., "Size of Government;" Legal System and Property Rights;" "Sound Money;" "Freedom to Trade Internationally;" and "Regulation").

In the years that followed this book's publication, one of the major shortcomings of Friedman's argument on the capitalism/(economic) freedom/democracy nexus was that it had remained an unproven hypothesis.[262] Right-wing think tanks such as the Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Fraser Institute embarked on a project to prove this relationship. In 1996, the latter published an economic freedom index (Gwartney et al., 1996) titled *Economic Freedom of the World 1975-1995* with a foreword by Milton Friedman in which, despite the report's contradictory results, he insisted on his belief that "free societies have arisen and persisted only because economic freedom is so much more productive economically than other methods of controlling economic activity" (p. vii). The book is an index with 17 components[263] to measure economic freedom based on what the authors define as its central elements: "personal choice, protection of private property, and freedom of exchange" (p. 12).

However, the economic freedom index findings brought about strong contradictions in the interconnection between economic and political freedoms. According to the Fraser Institute's historical analysis, Honduras—a country ruled by military dictatorships since 1963—was ranked, in 1975, the second freest economy in the world, topped only by Hong Kong, an authoritarian government. In 1980,

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[262] Even though the economic/political freedom nexus was an unproven hypothesis, it did not stop people from believing it. From 1976 to 1983, Cambridge Report asked U.S. citizens if a free-market economy was essential to personal liberty and democracy. Most U.S. citizens believed it was: 1976 (59%); 1977 (60%); 1979 (59%); 1980 (70%); 1981 (66%); 1982 (65%); and 1983 (64%). Retrieved from Cambridge Reports/Research International. (1983). Cambridge Reports/Research International Poll: April 1983 (Version) [Dataset]. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[263] As the study explains, these 17 components were "allocated to four major areas: (1) money and inflation, (2) government operations and regulations, (3) takings and discriminatory taxation, and (4) international exchange" (p. 14).

Guatemala—another military dictatorship—made it to the world's top five freest economies. According to the economic freedom index, in 1985, 1990, and 1995, Hong Kong and Singapore, yet another authoritarian regime, achieved the highest economic freedom rankings, even surpassing the United States—Reagan's "light of freedom throughout the world"—which was ranked in the sixth, third, and fourth place, respectively.

How was this possible? How could authoritarian governments be ranked so high—even higher than the U.S.—in the economic freedom index? It is worth pointing out that in 1986—almost a decade before the Economic Freedom Index—with its worldwide historical analysis—was published, Milton Friedman admitted at a Fraser Institute symposium that "I have no doubt that the best of all forms of government is benevolent dictatorship. I am not going to quarrel with that at all, and we have had some examples in history of good, benevolent dictatorships, as in Hong Kong, in Singapore with Lee Kuan Yew—he's been a benevolent dictator" (Walker, 1988, p. 78).

Milton Friedman's mentioning—and praise—of Lee Kuan Yew, who ruled Singapore from 1959 to 1990, achieving a very high ranking on the Economic Freedom Index during that period, highlights the contradictions in the capitalism/democracy nexus. Reagan considered the authoritarian leader an "old friend"[264] and, in a 1985 ceremony welcoming the then-Prime Minister visit to the U.S., praised Singapore's

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[264] Reagan, R. (1985). *Ronald Reagan's White House Diary Entry of Tuesday, October 8, 1985.* https://www.reaganfoundation.org/ronald-reagan/white-house-diaries/diary-entry-10081985/.

economic success and growing commercial ties with the U.S.[265] In line with his neoliberal freedom rhetoric, Reagan attributed that country's economic success to its free-market policies and Lee Kuan Yew's commitment to the "great experiment in enterprise and freedom." In his speech, Reagan also praised the authoritarian leader for his defense of "democratic government, human rights, and international peace."

Ironically, that same year, the Reagan Administration's own Department of State published its "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1985," where it warned that Lee Kuan Yew's government "acts arbitrarily through the use of its discretionary powers" (U.S. Department of State, 1986, p. 868).[266] Moreover, the U.S. government-funded Freedom House published its "Freedom of the World Index 1985-1986,"[267] which measured civil liberties and political rights. The report labeled Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore a "partly-free authoritarian state" and denounced the government's treatment of opposition leaders (p. 366). Summarizing the Reagan presidency and its close relationship to Lee Kuan Yew, the 1989 Human Rights Watch Report criticized the Administration's response to Singapore's human rights violations throughout its tenure, even describing it as "meek."

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[265] Reagan, R (1985). *Remarks at the welcoming ceremony for Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore* [Transcript]. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/100885a.
[266] Moreover, the report also highlighted that the government monitored opposition parties under the pretext that "communists might participate in elections and candidates might make libelous statements" (p. 820), pointing out that the Lee Kuan Yew's government has made use of the courts against his political opponents.
[267] Freedom House (1986). *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1985-1986*. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_1985-1986_complete_book.pdf.

Beyond the "Kirkpatrick Doctrine" and Huntington's "authoritarian transition," Reagan's strong support for any type of regime that would implement neoliberal policies and Friedman's admission that a "benevolent dictatorship" was the best form of government do give credence to the argument that neoliberalism has been an authoritarian project from its inception. As analyzed by scholars (Mirowski, 2013; Brown, 2015; Slobodian, 2018), the problem with democracy, for neoliberals, is that it opens the possibility for social demands that would limit the power of the so-called invisible hand of the free-market and would open the possibility for more government—or rather, the wrong type of government—intervention in the economy.

In this respect, and to provide an example, Friedman's support of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile (Klein, 2007) and his advice for the implementation of neoliberal policies in that country are in tandem with his core—and seemingly contradictory—beliefs. In this logic, by providing economic freedoms to the Chilean population under an authoritarian regime (i.e., the "Kirkpatrick Doctrine" and Huntington's "authoritarian transition"), they would gradually gain political freedoms. But, if they gain too many political freedoms, the population might demand redistributive anti-neoliberal policies. Hence, Friedman's oxymoron of "benevolent dictatorship," as the best form of government, since it would be able to resist socioeconomic demands by restricting—once again—political freedoms.

The idea that the main problem of democracy is precisely the fact that it is democratic is not new in U.S. political discourse. In the mid-seventies, Samuel Huntington, when analyzing the U.S. context for the Trilateral Commission (Crozier,

Huntington & Watanuki, 1975)[268] and seemingly shocked by the growing participation—and demands—of minority groups in the U.S. political arena, argued that: "some of the problems of governance in the United States today stem from an excess of democracy…needed, instead, is a greater degree of moderation in democracy" (p. 113). According to this rationale, that moderation could very well be achieved through Friedman's "benevolent dictatorship." These inconsistencies in the economic freedom/political freedom nexus did not seem to matter to the Reagan Administration and its national security apparatus.

During this period, one salient example was Reagan's support for the so-called Contras in Nicaragua, which almost cost him his presidency amidst accusations that his administration had illegally funded this counterrevolutionary group in what became known as the Iran-Contra scandal (Koh, 1990). According to the Economic Freedom Index, when Nicaragua was ruled by the Somoza dynasty's brutal dictatorship (Grossman, 2005), it was ranked—in 1975—the eighth freest economy in the world. In its historical analysis and with the triumph of the Sandinista revolution, the report complained that Nicaragua's "rating, however, fell from 6.4 in 1975 to 3.6 in 1980. By 1985, Nicaragua's rating had declined to 1.8, third lowest among the more than 100 countries in our study" (p. 63).

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[268] Originally funded by David Rockefeller and as its webpage explains "The Trilateral Commission was formed in 1973 by private citizens of Japan, Europe (European Union countries), and North America (United States and Canada) to foster closer cooperation among these core industrialized areas of the world with shared leadership responsibilities in the wider international system." In 1975, it produced a report titled: *The Crisis of Democracy: On the Governability of Democracies* where it analyzed the state of democracy in Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. Samuel P. Huntington wrote the chapter on the United States.

In line with his capitalism/democracy/(economic) freedom nexus rhetoric, Reagan referred to the Contras as "freedom fighters," even going as far as to name them the "moral equal of our Founding Fathers."[269] Since the Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua, the United States took different measures—including covert operations and boycotts[270]—to overthrow the regime (Grossman, 2005).[271] In 1985, through Executive Order 12513, Ronald Reagan declared Nicaragua, a small Central American country with no nuclear weapons, "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."[272] Thus, following this logic, the need to intervene to promote Reagan's democracy and freedom in Nicaragua became an existential matter to protect U.S. national security.

As with Watergate, the Iran-Contra scandal brought about a questioning and criticism of the United States' national security apparatus and the way it operated (Koh, 1990). In its pursuit to continue to provide funds to the Contras, the Reagan

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[269] Reagan, R. (1985). *Remarks at the annual dinner of the Conservative Political Action Conference* [Transcript]. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/30185f.

[270] For example, the Central Intelligence Agency (1985) developed a manual called, *The Freedom Fighter's Manual* that distributed throughout Nicaragua. It claimed to be a "practical guide to liberating Nicaragua from oppression and misery by paralyzing the military-industrial complex of the traitorous Marxist state without having to use special tools and with minimal risk for the combatant."

[271] In 1984, the Republic of Nicaragua filed a case against the United States before the International Court of Justice, charging that the latter had engaged in "military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua" (1986, p. 16). The International Court of Justice ruled in favor of Nicaragua and ordered the United States to pay the amount of 370,200,000 United States dollars in reparations. The United States refused to honor the Court's judgement.

[272] Executive Order 12513 "Prohibiting trade and certain other transactions involving Nicaragua" (May 7, 1985). Retrieved from https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12513.html. As the International Court of Justice explained in its ruling against the United States: "Thus the finding of the President of the United States on 1 May 1985 that 'the policies and actions of the Government of Nicaragua constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States', even if it be taken as sufficient evidence that that was so, does not justify action by the United States previous to that date" (International Court of Justice, 1986, p. 141).

administration bypassed Congress and violated laws—specifically, the Boland Act—enacted to prohibit funding to this mercenary group. A 1986 Gallup poll found that 79% of Americans disapproved of the military support to the Nicaraguan Contras.[273] Moreover, a 1987 CBS News/New York Times poll found that 52% of Americans believed that the Iran-Contra affair was as serious as the Watergate scandal.[274] Congressional and executive committees were created to investigate the affair.[275] While some government officials were subsequently convicted, and recommendations were made to improve the decision-making process in national security matters, the U.S. national security apparatus, as with the Watergate scandal, did not suffer any significant blows. In fact, a few years after the scandal, the U.S. Congress resumed its funding to Reagan's "freedom fighters"[276] to bring democracy and (economic) freedom to that country to protect U.S. national security.

6.3. Beyond the "Red Scare": Expanding U.S. National Security

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[273] Newsweek Magazine (1986). Gallup/Newsweek Poll # 1986-86297: Ronald Reagan, Question 47 [USGALNEW.86297.R08]. Gallup Organization. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[274] CBS News/New York Times (1987). National Survey, April 1987, Question 9 [USCBSNYT.87APR.R06]. CBS News/New York Times. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[275] The President's Special Review Board (the "Tower Commission") was formed on December 1, 1986. The "House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran" and the "Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition" were created in early 1987.

[276] Weinraub, B. (1989, March 25). Bush and Congress sign policy accord on aid to Contras. *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/25/world/bush-and-congress-sign-policy-accord-on-aid-to-contras.html.

Reagan not only ran his presidential campaign on the need to stop the Soviet existential threat but continued to spread that message throughout his presidency with the help of his administration's national security apparatus. The Soviet existential threat had provided legitimacy to U.S. interventions worldwide and for the Administration's national security apparatus' buildup. In 1983, a CBS/New York Times survey found that 64% of Americans believed that the Soviet Union represented a "real, immediate danger to the United States."[277] However, by 1989, that same survey found that this belief had decreased to 26%.[278] By 1990, only 20% of Americans believed that the Soviet Union was interested in world domination.[279]

As the Soviet existential threat started to wane down in the court of public opinion during that decade, correspondingly, public support for increases in the defense budget reflected a similar declining trend. In 1980, an NBC News/Associated Press poll found that 63% of Americans favored increases in the defense budget.[280] By 1984, however, 55% of Americans agreed that the national defense budget should be cut by 10%.[281]

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[277] CBS News/New York Times (1983). CBS News/New York Times Poll: Plane 83 Survey, Question 15 [USCBSNYT.091583.R6]. CBS News/New York Times. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[278] CBS News/The New York Times (1989). CBS News/The New York Times Poll: May 1989, Question 21 [USCBSNYT.051589.R21]. CBS News/The New York Times. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[279] Americans Talk Security Project (1990). National Security Survey 13, Question 76 [USMS.ATS13B.R063]. Market Strategies, Inc.. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[280] NBC News/Associated Press (1980). Associated Press/NBC News Poll: January 1980, Question 11 [USNBCAP.52A.R11]. NBC News/Associated Press. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[281] USA Today (1984). USA Today Poll # 1311, Question 7 [USGBUSA.84FEB.R07A]. Gordon S. Black Corporation. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

Throughout the decade that the Reagan Administration had labeled "the greatest challenge to our survival and well-being since World War II" (NSS-1982, p. 3), its national security apparatus had been gradually identifying another existential threat to the United States: the trafficking of illicit drugs. In the seventies, President Nixon declared the so-called War on Drugs, and, in the early eighties, Nancy Reagan led her "Just Say No to Drugs" campaign. During those years, the Reagan Administration ramped up drug enforcement efforts domestically.

However, in 1986, through NSDD-221,[282] Reagan took a step further and declared international narcotics a national security threat to the United States since its impact could be, according to the document, "potentially destabilizing" to U.S. allies. That same year, an ABC News poll found that 55% of Americans believed that nuclear war was a smaller problem than the illegal use of drugs.[283] By 1988, "drugs" was deemed the most important problem facing the United States.[284]

However, the U.S. national security apparatus was not primarily concerned with the impact of drug use in American society, which it deemed a "societal problem" that must be solved through "the continued aggressive pursuit of law enforcement, health care, and demand reduction programs" (NSDD-221, 1986). Its national security concern was with helping preserve "the integrity of democratic governments worldwide" by intervening globally "to halt the production and flow of illicit narcotics"

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[282] National Security Decision Directive Number 221 (NSDD-221). *Narcotics and National Security* (08 Apr 86). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-221.pdf.
[283] ABC News (1986). ABC News Poll: Drugs, Question 57 [USABC.866638.Q064F]. Chilton Research Services. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.
[284] ABC News (1988). ABC News Poll: Nightline, August 1988, Question 2 [USABC.091388.R01]. Chilton Research Services. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

before they reach the United States (NSDD-221). This framing legitimized the expansion of the U.S. national security apparatus, particularly throughout Latin America (Morales, 1989; Paley, 2014).[285]

Another important construction of a new U.S. national security existential threat during this period—which has had an enormous impact since then—came in the form of the "terrorist." Scholars have pointed out that Ronald Reagan was the precursor of George W. Bush's so-called "Global War on Terror" (Wills, 2003). International terrorism officially entered national security discourse in the Reagan Administration's 1982 NSS with a very timid mention of the problem of "increasing terrorism" (p. 3). The previous NSS, President Jimmy Carter's 1977 national security strategy,[286] focused on the conflict with the Soviet Union and did not even mention the issue. From NSS-1982 on, the Reagan Administration's subsequent national security strategies escalated the discourse on international terrorism.

The 1986 NSS called for the creation of special operations forces to combat international terrorism and "broader cooperation with other governments" (p. 11). The 1987 NSS unequivocally stated that "the evidence of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the growth of worldwide terrorism is now conclusive" (p. 6), blaming that country for directly and indirectly supplying support for terrorist groups worldwide. And, the Reagan Administration's last NSS (1988) pointed out that

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[285] As scholar Waltraud Morales (1989) points out: "the war on drugs has been most effective as a principle of public legitimation within the USA. The average US citizen, whether he has accepted the official ideological linkage of drugs with terrorism as a global communist conspiracy or as a valid national security threat in its own right, is mobilised against international drug trafficking" (p. 167).
[286] Presidential Directive-18 (PDD-18) *US National Security Strategy* (August 24, 1977). Retrieved from https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/directives/pd18.pdf.

"intelligence collection and special operations by agencies of the U.S. government to protect against international terrorism and international narcotics activities will remain a high priority" (p. 23) for the years to come.

In 1984, through NSDD-138,[287] the Reagan Administration declared international terrorism a U.S. national security threat, calling for the "pre-emptive neutralization of anti-American terrorist groups which plan, support, or conduct hostile terrorist acts against U.S. citizens, interests, and property overseas" (p. 4). As with the case with the fight against communism and international narcotics, this framing legitimized the need for U.S. interventions abroad in the name of protecting U.S. national security.

In 1986, Reagan delivered an address to the nation on terrorism, accusing terrorists of being "the enemies of democracy."[288] He also used the opportunity to make a distinction between his so-called Nicaraguan "freedom fighters"—which were often accused of committing terrorist acts (Washington Office on Latin America, 1986)— and what his administration understood as "terrorists." While Reagan acknowledged that his (right-wing) "freedom fighters" might have gotten carried away in their actions due to "problems arising from passion and conflict," according to him, they did not "terrorize a population into submission," and their primary objective was to "liberate their citizens from oppression."

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[287] National Security Decision Directive-138 (NSDD-138) *Combatting Terrorism* (April 3, 1984). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-138.pdf.
[288] Reagan, R. (1986). *Radio Address to the Nation on Terrorism* [Transcript]. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/53186a.

Since the U.S. national security apparatus has not provided a specific definition for "international terrorism," the term has become—similar to "national security"—a floating signifier subjected to processes of meaning-making,[289] which has even been used to silence, among others, protests against environmentally hazardous projects inside the United States.[290] Starting in 1985 through the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Congress mandated the Department of State to produce an annual report on terrorism, initially called *Patterns of Global Terrorism* and later—2005—changed to *Country Reports on Terrorism*. This report is used as a basis for the State Department's designation of specific countries as "state sponsors of terrorism" subjected to U.S. government sanctions. By late 1986, an ABC News/Washington Post poll found that 72% of Americans approved Ronald Reagan's handling of the problem of terrorism.[291]

During Reagan's tenure, the growing number of immigrants arriving in the country and the economic crisis of this period placed immigration at center stage. The

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[289] NSDD-138 (1984) provides the following definition: "International terrorist activity, as referred to in this directive, includes conspiring about; planning for or conducting terrorist acts by trans-national groups, whether the activity occurs in the U.S. or abroad. (p. 1). The 2018 *Country Report on Terrorism* defines it as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents (U.S. Department of State, 2019, p. 331).

[290] As James F. Jarboe, FBI Domestic Terrorism Section Chief, Counterterrorism Division, explained before a congressional hearing: "The FBI defines eco-terrorism as the use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentally-oriented, subnational group for environmental-political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature." In Federal Bureau of Investigation (n.d.). *Testimony James F. Jarboe, Domestic Terrorism Section Chief, Counterterrorism Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the House Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, Washington, DC, February 12, 2002*. https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/the-threat-of-eco-terrorism.

[291] ABC News/Washington Post (1986). National Poll, September, 1986, Question 84 [USABCWP.866678.QA4]. Chilton Research Services. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

need to protect the border from "illegal aliens" and to limit the number of immigrants became a national concern. In 1981, an NBC News/Associated Press poll found that 65% of Americans wanted less immigration into the country.[292] That same year, in an opinion piece in *The New York Times*, journalist James Reston shared that, in an interview, the Attorney General had revealed "that the integrity of our borders is now out of control."[293] The media also did its part in elevating the immigration issue to the national security agenda. For example, a 1983 cover from *U.S. News & World Report* decried an "Invasion from Mexico: It just keeps growing," pointing out that this "surge occurs at a time of the highest American unemployment in four decades and as governments at all levels are hard pressed to provide even for citizens."[294]

At the 1985 hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, Attorney General Edwin Meese III explained that "regaining control of our borders is an essential goal of any true immigration reform. We cannot fairly speak of ourselves as a sovereign nation if we cannot responsibly decide who may cross our borders" (U.S. Congress, 1986, p. 4). After years of debate for immigration reform, the Reagan Administration was able to enact, in 1986, The Immigration Reform and Control Act (also known as IRCA or the Simpson–Mazzoli Act).

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[292] NBC News/Associated Press (1981). NBC News/Associated Press Poll: Reagan/Politics, Question 36 [USNBCAP.69.R35]. NBC News/Associated Press. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[293] Reston, J. (1981, September 16). Washington; Forgotten questions. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1981/09/16/opinion/washington-forgotten-questions.html?searchResultPosition=3

[294] Invasion from Mexico: It just keeps growing. (1983, Mar 07). *U.S. News and World Report, 94*, 37. Retrieved from https://www.proquest.com/magazines/invasion-mexico-just-keeps-growing/docview/1298455158/se-2?accountid=14523

While the act provided amnesty for millions of undocumented immigrants, it also strengthened border control and immigrant enforcement schemes such as detentions and deportations, popularizing the category of "illegal alien," particularly from Latin America, as a threat to the nation (Chavez, 2008).[295] As Gonzales (2016) points out, while IRCA "created gains for immigrants…it also laid the groundwork for many of the key components of the homeland security state" (p. 91). And, for the purposes of this dissertation, this period created the conditions for the gradual transmutation of international immigration into the realm of the U.S. national security apparatus.

Under President Carter, the Iran Hostage Crisis had already brought about a questioning of U.S. immigration policy after the American public learned, in the midst of the nationalistic anti-Iranian fervor of the time, that Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) did not have a clear knowledge of how many Iranians resided in the United States (LeMay, 2006). Responding to these concerns, the Carter administration requested Iranian students in the U.S. to register and began to review their migratory status for deportation. Furthermore, in April 1980, President Carter issued Executive Order 12211 "Further prohibitions on transactions with Iran" which, among other provisions, directed the State Secretary to regulate the "departures from and entry into

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[295] As Ngai (2004) explains: "Immigration restriction produced the illegal alien as a *new legal and political subject*, whose inclusion within the nation was simultaneously a social reality and a legal impossibility—a subject barred from citizenship and without rights" (p. 4).

the United States in connection with travel to Iran by citizens and permanent residents of the United States."[296]

Referring to this episode, the 1981 U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy explained in its final report that the "disturbances by Iranian nonimmigrants have pointed out to many the inadequacy of U.S. deportation laws regarding temporary visitors who abuse the privilege of being in this country" (p. 230).[297] The Commission recommended greater statutory power for the Attorney General to facilitate the expulsion of foreigners. This recommendation was realized through the enactment of IRCA, which facilitated the expedited removal of convicted aliens—both documented and undocumented—starting a trend that has intensified in subsequent legislation to include petty crimes and even misdemeanors (Inda, 2013).

Also in the late seventies, with the economic crisis that plagued the world during that time, immigration to the United States, particularly from the so-called Third World, started to increase. Specifically, Cubans, Haitians, and migrants from Indonesia and China started to arrive in large numbers in the United States, prompting a backlash against their admittance into the country. A 1979 NBC News/Associated Press poll found that 66% of Americans did not want any more Asian refugees to enter the

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[296] Executive Order 12211 "Further prohibitions on transactions with Iran" (April 17, 1980). Retrieved from https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12211.html. President Carter, through Executive Order 12170: "Blocking Iranian Government Property" (November 14, 1979), had already declared that "the situation in Iran constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat." Retrieved from https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12170.html.

[297] The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, formed in October 1978, was charged with studying the immigration issue to make recommendations for policymaking. They presented their final report to President Reagan in March 1981.

country.[298] In addition, another poll found that 73% agreed that it was wrong for the U.S. "to let so many Cubans and other refugees into this country when we are having real economic troubles at home and unemployment is on the rise."[299]

Backlash against refugees also came at the governmental level despite President Carter's human rights approach and the "Cuban/Haitians Entrant Program." The latter gave the Attorney General discretionary power to admit Cuban and Haitian immigrants on humanitarian grounds. However, a 1980 *Washington Post* article analyzed documents from the Immigration and Naturalization Services to discover that, for the previous two years, the agency had secretly "set up a program aimed at speedy, wholesale deportation of Haitian refugees" over fears of an "invasion."[300] Also, to operationalize the "Cuban/Haitians Entrant Program," the government set up detention camps to house these migrants due to security concerns with the involvement of the FBI and the CIA to help the INS determine if Cubans and Haitians would be allowed to remain in the U.S.

At a 1980 congressional hearing on this program, Victor Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, admitted that "the President has made clear that the intention is to have the exclusion proceedings for those who are deemed to be a threat

[298] NBC News/Associated Press (1979). Associated Press/NBC News Poll: July 1979, Question 34 [USNBCAP.43.R34]. NBC News/Associated Press. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[299] Louis Harris and Associates/ABC News (1980). ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates Poll: June 1980, Question 37 [USABCHS.071780.R2B]. Louis Harris and Associates/ABC News. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[300] Sinclair, W. (1980, April 20). U.S. formulated a Haitian refugee 'solution' 2 years ago. *The Washington Post.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/04/20/us-formulated-a-haitian-refugee-solution-2-years-ago/351b5265-1d02-4f76-ad3f-616c0f2781fd/.

to our country, to have those proceedings accelerated and to pursue every available means of getting them returned to the place they came from" (U.S. Congress, 1980, p. 101). At the same time, David Crosland, Acting Commissioner of the INS, explained at the hearings that "the Cubans may be asked more as to their communist affiliation. They're screened more closely as to whether they are a security risk in this country. The FBI interviews the Cubans; they don't interview the Haitians because Haitians haven't been considered a security threat" (p. 226). Unfortunately for Haitian migrants, not only did the INS under Carter sought to rapidly deport them but with the arrival of the Reagan presidency, they were not deemed deserving of refugee protection in the U.S.

Referring to the migratory influx before taking office, Reagan pointed out in a 1980 speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention that "today some of us are concerned by the latest influx of refugees, that boat people from Southeast Asia and from Cuba all fleeing from the inhumanity of Communism. We worry about our capacity to care for them. I believe we must take a concerted effort to help them, and that others in the world should share in the responsibility."[301] During his administration, Reagan ramped up U.S. national security policy of supporting people fleeing communist countries for propaganda purposes and to attempt to destabilize those countries. Through NSDD-93 (1983), Reagan even created a "Senior Interagency Group for Refugee Policy" to advise him "given the important foreign policy, political,

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[301] Reagan, R. (1980). *Peace: Restoring the margin of safety* [Transcript]. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/peace-restoring-margin-safety.

security and financial implications associated with refugee issues."[302] In addition, he also ramped up immigration enforcement against so-called "economic migrants."

Once he took office, the Reagan administration encountered a recently passed law titled "The Refugee Act of 1980." This law provided a new—and broader—definition of a refugee. In line with the UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR 2010), the Act no longer favored those who came from communist countries but included those who fell under the UN definition. However, while the law expanded the definition to include those who had to escape from non-communist countries for fear of persecution, it kept the distinction between deserving-of-protection refugees and undeserving economic migrants, such as Haitians arriving in the U.S.

At the 1979 hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, which led to the approval of the 1980 Refugee Act, Leo Cherne, Chairman of the International Rescue Committee (IRC), argued that "those who flee from Haiti are political refugees, not economic migrants" (U.S. Congress, 1979, p. 180). However, he lamented that, even with the proposed new definition aligned with the UN Refugee Convention, the INS would probably continue to question if Haitians "are economic migrants seeking to improve their standard of living or fleeing a totalitarian country," adding that, in his view, "Haiti is a totalitarian country" (p. 180).

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[302] National Security Decision Directive-93 (NSDD-93) *Refugee Policy and Processing Refugees from Indochina* (May 13, 1983). https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd93.pdf

Nonetheless, in the Reagan administration's imaginary, since Haitian migrants were leaving a right-wing dictatorship aligned to U.S. national security interests—the Jean-Claude Duvalier regime, also known as "Baby Doc"—, they were deemed not deserving the status of refugees. As a response to the increasing number of Haitians trying to reach the U.S. by boat, on September 29, 1981, President Reagan, through Proclamation 4865, declared—without naming any specific country—that "the ongoing migration of persons to the United States in violation of our laws is a serious national problem detrimental to the interests of the United States."[303]

To operationalize this proclamation, President Reagan also issued an executive order where he directed the U.S. Coast Guard to "stop and board defined vessels, when there is reason to believe that such vessels are engaged in the irregular transportation of persons or violations of United States law."[304] This measure, referred to as "migrant interdiction," gradually became a U.S. practice—and policy—of stopping migrants before they reach the United States, that is, outside the legal territorial jurisdiction of the country.[305]

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[303] Proclamation 4865: "High Seas Interdiction of Illegal Aliens" (September 29, 1981).
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/proclamation-4865-high-seas-interdiction-illegal-aliens
[304] Executive Order 12324: "Interdiction of Illegal Aliens" (September 29, 1981).
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/executive-order-12324-interdiction-illegal-aliens.
[305] The U.S. has a long history of attempting to influence other countries to change their migration laws for its own benefit. For example, prior to 1947, the "Dillingham Commission"—created in 1907 to investigate increasing migratory flows in the U.S.—sent a special convoy in the beginning of the twentieth century to Europe to negotiate agreements to restrict these flows. (United States, 1911). Also, Dorothee Scheneider (2007) has shown how the United States shaped European emigration policies during the first decades of the twentieth century in response to the growing new waves of racially and culturally different migrants arriving to the United States. The U.S. government even tried to extend U.S. border control schemes inside Europe. Additionally, Erika Lee (2003) has demonstrated how the United States exercised its influence over Canada and Mexico to stop the arrival of Chinese immigrants into the U.S. during the years of the Chinese Exclusion Act.

In addition, as reported by *The New York Times*, the Reagan administration also signed an agreement in September 1981 with the Haitian government which allowed the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept any type of boat (e.g., privately owned, non-American) if U.S. officials suspected that Haitian migrants were on board.[306] The agreement allowed the U.S. government to return to Haiti those migrants deemed as not admissible to the U.S. According to a Congressional Research Service report, "From 1981 through 1990, 22,940 Haitians were interdicted at sea. Of this number, INS considered 11 Haitians qualified to apply for asylum in the United States" (Wasem, 2011, p. 5).

Earlier in 1981, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy had presented its final report to President Reagan. They projected that, due to poverty and political upheaval around the globe, the number of refugees and economic migrants was expected to rise. According to them, since migration was an international problem, it required "international measures of cooperation" (p. 26). The U.S.-Haiti agreement for migrant interdiction is an example of how the management of international migration has also allowed the U.S. national security apparatus to intervene in other countries. Post 9/11, with the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. has intensified its policy of conducting immigration control beyond its territorial and jurisdictional borders to protect U.S. national security through international cooperation agreements with both sending and transit countries.

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[306] Crossette, B. (1981, November 9). U.S. to redesign its aid program for Haiti despite rights problem. *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/09/world/us-to-redesign-its-aid-program-for-haiti-despite-rights-problem.html.

Despite the broadened definition of a "refugee" enacted through the 1980 Refugee Act, the Reagan administration disproportionally favored those arriving from communist countries such as Cuba and the Soviet Union. People fleeing political violence in countries where the Reagan administration ramped up its fight against communism by supporting right-wing dictatorships or reactionary forces, such as El Salvador or Guatemala, were deemed economic migrants and rendered "illegal aliens," (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986) or after 1990, "temporary."[307] In addition, Reagan also used the increasing number of people arriving in the U.S. for anti-communist propaganda purposes and to request additional funding for his so-called "freedom fighters."

As a case in point, in a 1984 speech, Reagan pointed out that he understood that "concerns about the prospect of hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing Communist oppression to seek entry into our country are well-founded."[308] However, he explained that it was in the U.S.' interest to continue to support Central America, adding that it was "morally…the only right thing to do." Reagan went on to say that his "administration has done its work" by submitting a proposal to Congress for funding. While waiting for "action by the Congress," he warned the American public that "evidence mounts of Cuba's intentions to double its support to the Salvadoran guerrillas

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[307] In 1990, the George H. W. Bush Administration instituted the Temporary Status Program (TPS) through the Immigration Act of 1990 (Public Law 101–649, 104 Stat. 4978). TPS provides temporary resident status to nationals of certain countries living in the U.S. if the U.S. government has considered that their return to their countries of origin would put them at risk. TPS does not provide a path to permanent residency or U.S. citizenship. The program initially benefited migrants from El Salvador.
[308] Reagan, R. (1984). *Address to the nation on United States policy in Central America* [Transcript]. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-united-states-policy-central-america.

and bring down that newly-elected government in the fall. Unless we provide the resources, the Communists will likely succeed."

There are many factors that could explain the migration/refugee influx to the U.S. that started in the late seventies. Weighing exactly how much each one of those factors contributed to that influx is a difficult—if not impossible—task. However, it is safe to argue—at least in the U.S.-Latin American geopolitical corridor—that the global economic crisis, development/modernizing schemes that pushed people out of rural areas, and the implementation of neoliberal policies played a major role. We may also wager that Reagan's unwavering support of brutal right-wing dictatorships, his backing of reactionary forces, and his attempts to destabilize countries not aligned to the U.S.' idea of "freedom" and "democracy" played a major role in fueling the influx of migrants into the United States. Ironically, Reagan used the immigration crisis that his own administration was at the very least partially responsible for to intensify those same policies and practices that the U.S. undertook throughout Latin America to protect its national security.

After 9/11, immigration became part of the governance realm of the U.S. national security apparatus to protect the country against dangerous aliens or, as George W. Bush argued in a 2006 speech to the nation, to gain "full control of the border" and to close it to "illegal immigrants as well as criminals, drug dealers, and terrorists."[309] Ronald Reagan was not only the precursor of the Global War on Terror, but he also

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[309] Bush, W. G. (2006). *Address to the nation on immigration reform* [Transcript]. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-2006-05-22/html/WCPD-2006-05-22-Pg931.htm.

preceded Bush in interconnecting international migration to the protection of U.S. national security. Not only did Reagan strengthen border control and immigrant enforcement schemes, but he also pushed the discursive trope of immigrants—especially those undocumented—as possible criminals, terrorists, and drug dealers who could harm the whole nation.

For example, in February 1985, the Reagan administration closed the U.S.-Mexico border and used the military for border control after a Mexican drug cartel abducted a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agent in Mexico.[310] Moreover, as reported by *The Washington Post*, Reagan, attempting to pressure Congress to get more funding for his Nicaraguan "freedom fighters," declared in a 1986 speech while visiting the Texas border that Nicaragua "was 'a privileged sanctuary for terrorists and subversives just two days' drive from Harlingen, Tex.'"[311]

The writer of the piece pointed out that Managua is 2,028 miles away, wondering "what kind of car President Reagan drives" to be able to make that kind of trip in just two days. However, it did not matter if such trip could not be made in that time. What matters, for the purposes of this dissertation, is that immigration and the border, in this decade, became intrinsically connected to the U.S.' fight against communism, crime, terrorism, international narcotics, and the safeguarding of the sovereignty of the nation to protect U.S. national security.

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[310] Meislin, R. (1985, February 25). Border checks in kidnapping case anger Mexico. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1985/02/22/world/border-checks-in-kidnapping-case-anger-mexico.html?searchResultPosition=4.

[311] Maraniss, D. (1986, March 16). Reagan has a Texas-sized sales job. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/03/16/reagan-has-a-texas-sized-sales-job/2f4c484d-223e-416c-90be-31a860c7c639/.

6.4. Conclusion

In May 1986, amidst criticism for its unwavering support of right-wing dictatorships, *The New York Times* reported that the Reagan Administration had announced that it would oppose dictatorships of every kind to promote human rights. However, the administration quickly clarified that the policy statement did not mean an abandonment of the Kirkpatrick doctrine. While arguing that right-wing dictatorships were not as bad as left-wing dictatorships, the Administration pointed out that the U.S. had the right to act according to its national security interests.[312] In this line, the Reagan Administration's 1988 NSS openly admitted that: "this Administration's strong support for an open and expanding world economy and trading system reflects a fundamental national interest" (p. 2) to ensure, as repeated continuously by the Administration's national security strategies 1982, 1986, 1987 and 1988, access to foreign markets and natural resources for the benefit of the U.S. and its friends and allies. The Reagan Administration's support of right-wing dictatorships was a steppingstone to achieving the goal of a U.S.-led global market economy to protect U.S. national security.

The high rankings of authoritarian governments in economic freedom indexes have not impacted the U.S. national security apparatus's continuous promotion of the

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[312] Gelb, L. (1986, March 14). U.S. vows to resist despots of right as well as of left. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/14/world/us-vows-to-resist-despots-of-right-as-well-as-of-left.html.

economic freedom/democracy nexus. Subsequent administrations have continued to promote this trope even though, as I have shown before, the economic freedom/democracy nexus is dubious at best. While it is beyond this dissertation's scope to analyze the importance of indexes in the recalibration of neoliberal socioeconomic imaginaries and the legitimization of the capitalist project, the contradictory results in the interconnection between economic and political freedoms warrant some thoughts.

Sum and Jessop (2014) explain that the popularity and widespread use of modes of calculation (such as indexes, statistics, and benchmarks) serve to constitute socioeconomic common-sense realities, sustain the capitalist hegemonic project, and "limit the pursuit of contrary or antagonistic imaginaries, activities or technologies" (p. 167). For example, historically, both Hong Kong and Singapore have been ranked very high in right-wing economic freedom indexes. At the same time, they have been historically deemed authoritarian governments. Freedom House's "Freedom of the World 2020" index considers both countries as "partly free."[313] Additionally, in its 2020 report on the state of democracy, the V-Dem Institute has labeled Hong Kong as a "closed autocracy" and Singapore as an "electoral autocracy"[314] respectively.

The Cato Institute's 2019 Human Freedom Index (Porčnik & Vásquez, 2019), which measures—and disaggregates—personal and economic freedoms, gives Hong

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[313] Freedom House (2020). *Freedom in the World 2020: A leaderless struggle for democracy.* Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/FIW_2020_REPORT_BOOKLET_Final.pdf.

[314] V-Dem Institute (2020). "V-Dem Codebook v10" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Retrieved from https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/f0/5d/f05d46d8-626f-4b20-8e4e-53d4b134bfcb/democracy_report_2020_low.pdf.

Kong a ranking of 27/162 in personal freedoms and a ranking of 1/162 in economic freedoms. Singapore's economic/personal freedom disparity is even more pronounced. The country is ranked 61/162 in personal freedoms and 2/162 in economic freedoms. The authors of the study justify the contradictions of their own findings as "outlier" (p. 8) results. On the other hand, the Fraser Institute's 2019 Economic Freedom of the World, while continuing to insist on the causal relationship between economic and political freedom, half-heartedly admits, in the face of the contradictory results, that: "While democratic rule certainly correlates with greater economic freedom across the globe (and we believe this correlation is causal), it is a mistake to equate democracy with economic freedom, and these results highlight that fact" (p. 197).[315]

The capitalist hegemonic project, even when the measuring results do not favor its constituting-reality-narrative, still finds a way to either dismiss the results as "outliers" (i.e., The Cato Institute), lowers the expectations (i.e., The Fraser Institute), or doubles-down on the economic/political freedom interconnection (i.e., The Heritage Foundation).[316] The latter promotes the discourse that there is a gradual—and, it seems, inevitable—merging between economic and political freedoms even though both Hong Kong and Singapore—according to these right-wing indexes—have been ranked very low in political freedoms for a very long time. In light of these results, it is worth asking how long Kirkpatrick's and Huntington's authoritarian transitions to democratic rule are supposed to last.

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[315] The Fraser Institute. (2019). *Economic freedom of the world: 2019 annual report*. Retrieved from https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/economic-freedom-of-the-world-2019-annual-report.
[316] As the Heritage Foundation (2019) explains: "Pursuit of greater economic freedom is thus an important stepping-stone to democratic governance" (p. 16).

In his 1961 farewell speech, President Dwight Eisenhower called for an alert citizenry to prevent abuses from the ever-growing, public-private, military-industrial complex "so that security and liberty may prosper together."[317] Can Reagan's understanding and promotion of (economic/neoliberal) freedom, democracy, and U.S. national security also prosper together? Through its national security apparatus and continuous support of pro-U.S. right-wing authoritarian forces, Reagan expanded U.S. capitalism to other parts of the world. By framing domestic and foreign policy in terms of protecting U.S. national security against existential enemies and promoting his (economic/neoliberal) understanding of "freedom" and "democracy" around the world, the possibility of meaningful debate was severely limited during Reagan's administration.

For instance, complaining that Democrats in Congress had initially refused to fund the so-called Nicaraguan "freedom fighters," then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger pointed out at a National Security Council meeting that "we need to take the offensive against Democrats in Congress. We need to hold them accountable for not providing the resources needed to defend democracy."[318] It is worth noting that Weinberger was convicted for his participation in the Iran-Contra affair but was later pardoned by President Bush in 1992.

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[317] National Archives (n.d.). *President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Farewell Address. (*1961). https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/president-dwight-d-eisenhowers-farewell-address.
[318] National Security Council (1984). *Minutes of the National Security Planning Group Meeting; Subject: Central America. June 25, 1984*. Retrieved from https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/22302-01-nsc-national-security-planning-group-minutes.

Close to the end of his presidency, at a 1988 Radio Address to the Nation on the Canadian Elections and Free Trade, Reagan proudly claimed that "the expansion of the international economy is not a foreign invasion; it is an American triumph, one we worked hard to achieve, and something central to our vision of a peaceful and prosperous world of freedom."[319] In the Summer 1989, a few months after Reagan left the presidency and with the gradual collapse of the Soviet Union, political scientist Francis Fukuyama (in)famously—and triumphantly[320]—announced, "the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (p. 4).

By the end of the Cold War and in its attempt to construct a unipolar capitalist world, the Reagan Administration's national security apparatus started to identify other existential threats to the country's survival, prosperity, and world leadership—such as international terrorism, international narcotics, and international migration. The agenda was therefore set for the continued expansion of the U.S. national security apparatus around the world to protect U.S. national security. On the domestic front, Lasswell's

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[319] Reagan, R. (1988). Radio address to the nation on the Canadian elections and free trade [Transcript]. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/112688a.

[320] As Jacques Derrida (1994) argues when criticizing Fukuyama's triumphalism: "For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neoevangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the 'end of ideologies' and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, never have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth" (p. 106).

fears of a garrison state (1941; 1951; 1971) started to resonate as the language of national security started to become part of U.S. political discourse in discussions to enact domestic policies.

For example, during the eighties, Democratic then-Senator Joseph Biden, in his attempts to harden the domestic crime bill, argued at a Congressional Hearing that he was "convinced that drug abuse and crime are as grave a threat to our national security as any foreign threat we face" (U.S. Congress, 1982, p. 26489). He even claimed that because of criminals and drug-users, Americans were "at as much jeopardy in the street as you are from a Soviet missile" (p. 26530), paving the way for the incorporation of national security doctrine—and authoritarian practices—into U.S. domestic policy.[321] In the years to come, the protection of U.S. national security would not be limited to foreign policy, particularly with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 and the incorporation of a wide variety of issues into the realm of national security governance.

As American journalist Vincent Bevins has shown in his study *The Jakarta Method: Washington's Anticommunist Crusade and the Mass Murder Program that Shaped Our World* (2021), the globalization of the Western democratic liberal order— i.e., the so-called "end of history"—has been built through blood, interventions, and

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[321] The implementation of national security practices into the domestic realm of the U.S. and against U.S. citizens has a long history. For example, the 1975 so-called Church Commission (i.e., The United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities) showed the illegal activities of national security agencies inside the United States. However, they were usually directed towards groups and individuals labelled as communists, whistleblowers—for example, the FBI's Counter Intelligence Program, (COINTELPRO)—or those deemed a threat to the U.S. government. In Biden's imaginary, a neighborhood drug-dealer represented the same threat as a soviet nuclear missile.

war. And, as this dissertation argues, the local imaginary of protecting U.S. national security has rationalized and legitimized the global design of spreading U.S. capitalism throughout the world by any means necessary. In this respect, the "end of history" and its U.S.-led world democratic (capitalist) liberal order not only needed a strong U.S. national security apparatus to achieve it but also to sustain it. In light of the spread of capitalism in its neoliberal form globally, the gradual erosion of the Keynesian welfare state, and the ever-expanding growth of the U.S. national security apparatus, it can be argued that Reagan's (economic/neoliberal) freedom and national security have, indeed, prospered together.

7. The New World Order: A U.S. National Security Third Way?

> Today we have the chance to do what our parents did before us. We have the opportunity to remake the world. For this new era, our national security we now know will be determined as much by our ability to pull down foreign trade barriers as by our ability to breach distant ramparts.
>   —President Bill Clinton, 1993[322]

Throughout the nineties, the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought about both celebratory tones and dire warnings about the future role of the United States in world affairs. In a 1990 speech before Congress, President George H. W. Bush declared that, despite the new military conflict in the Persian Gulf, the world was moving towards "an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony."[323] He went on to explain that a "new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle."

That is, the construction of a global system ruled by a supranational—and Westernized—legal framework able to advance a specific cultural political economy agenda. In Bush's imaginary, the so-called "rule of law" would guide the actions of countries and transform (i.e., Westernize) the Calibans of the world.[324] International law, as critical law studies professor Antony Anghie (2005) argues, has historically

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[322] Clinton, W. (1993). *Remarks on the Signing of NAFTA* [Transcript]. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-8-1993-remarks-signing-nafta.

[323] Bush, H. W (1990). *Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit* [Transcript]. https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2217.

[324] Despite Bush's rhetoric and the long history of U.S. interventions around the world, a 1992 national survey found that 52% of Americans believed that President Bush did not have a clear idea of what he meant when he talked about a new world order. Louis Harris & Associates (1992). Louis Harris & Associates Poll: July 1992, Question 18 [USHARRIS.081192.R2]. Louis Harris & Associates. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

served to further a very specific version of civilization based on Western, pro-capitalist values against what it has deemed as the "rule of the jungle."

As this dissertation has discussed in previous chapters, U.S.-led global trade liberalization has been a primary objective of the U.S. national security apparatus. With the gradual demise of the Soviet Union, the decade of the nineties appeared to foretell the realization of the U.S. global design of constructing a U.S.-led capitalist world order to protect its national security. In 1993, as the above epigraph shows, Democratic President Bill Clinton echoed Bush's celebratory sentiments at the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States (NAFTA). The NAFTA agreement, an initiative launched by President Ronald Reagan, signaled a bipartisan consensus not only in terms of U.S. domestic and international economic policy but also on the role of the U.S. national security apparatus in the post-Cold War period.[325] As this chapter will show, throughout the nineties, advancing neoliberal economic globalization and securing a U.S.-led capitalist world order became a clear bipartisan staple of U.S. national security policy.

Other voices, however, were not as confident of the prospects of a unipolar world based on U.S. leadership and the universalization of Western (capitalist) liberal democracy. In 1993, Samuel Huntington published an article in *Foreign Affairs* titled "The Clash of Civilization?" where he questioned Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis. Huntington viewed as naïve the project of universalizing Western values and predicted

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[325] President Ronald Reagan, through National Security Decision Directive 300 (NSDD-300) *U.S. Policy Towards Mexico* (February 11, 1988) directed the Economic Policy Council to "examine prospects for building upon the U.S.-Mexico Framework Agreement toward a special trade and investment relationship with Mexico." Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-300.pdf.

a future of civilizational conflicts in the years to come. Huntington would later expand these ideas in a 1996 book titled *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the New World Order*. Against the post-Cold War celebratory tones with its project of building a U.S.-led unipolar world, he argued that "the principal responsibility of Western leaders"—and the U.S. in particular, since "it is the most powerful Western country"—was not to "attempt to reshape other civilizations in the image of the West…but to preserve, protect, and renew the unique qualities of Western civilization" (p. 313).

In 1994, Robert D. Kaplan published an article in *The Atlantic Monthly* titled: "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of our Planet." In it, he argued that the post-Cold War period was going to bring many conflicts between those who were enjoying economic prosperity and "Western enlightenment" (p. 72) and those who did not. He contended that, in the so-called "end of history" period, the world had been mainly divided into two groups of people: "Hegel's and Fukuyama's Last Man, healthy, well fed, and pampered by technology. The other, larger, part is inhabited by Hobbes's First Man, condemned to a life that is 'poor, nasty, brutish, and short'" (p. 60).

According to Kaplan's thesis, the so-called First Man (i.e., the Calibans of the world) would become a source of violence and anarchy. Moreover, and replicating the findings of Kissinger's NSSM-200 (1974) *Implications of Worldwide Population Growth*, (see Chapter 5), Kaplan predicted that inhabitants of Third World countries (i.e., whom he understood as "first men") would desperately migrate to the places

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where his so-called "Last Man" lives, harming the stability of receiving countries. What role would the U.S. national security apparatus have in both securing a U.S.-led new world order while protecting the United States against existential threats in the post-Cold War era?

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part discusses how the U.S. national security apparatus framed its new global role by attempting to reshape that of the United Nations in the post-Cold War era. The second part examines the Clinton years and the relationship between Democratic third-way neoliberal economics and the protection of U.S. national security in the building of a new world order. Finally, the third part of this chapter explores the U.S. national security apparatus' construction of new existential threats to legitimize the inclusion of national security governance in both domestic and foreign policies in the midst of the push for global economic neoliberalization.

7.1. The U.S. and the UN: U.S. National Security in the Post-Cold War Era

For more than forty years, the U.S. national security apparatus had deemed the Soviet Union the biggest existential threat to the U.S., prompting a bipartisan consensus in national security policy and the legitimization of interventions worldwide. In 1991, Bill Clinton, at the speech where he announced his presidential candidacy, declared that "the collapse of communism requires a new national security policy."[326] Clinton

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[326] Clinton, W. (1991). *Announcement speech* [Transcript].
http://www.4president.org/speeches/billclinton1992announcement.htm.

warned that "the end of the Cold War is not the end of threats to America," pointing out that the "world is still a dangerous and uncertain place." Reciting the national security discursive tropes of U.S. presidents, he declared that the most important "obligation of the president is to keep America strong and safe from foreign dangers, and promote democracy around the world."

Throughout the nineties, both President Bush and President Clinton continued the Reagan administration's focus on democracy promotion to protect U.S. national security. After all, the fall of the Soviet Union vindicated Reagan's policies and his administration's approach of playing down both economic modernization and the promotion of human rights. Moreover, it is worth noting that the bipartisan consensus on the project to promote democracy had strong public support. A 1989 national poll found that 75% of Americans agreed that the U.S. should be involved in promoting democracy around the world.[327] In regard to the Soviet Union, by early 1991, a Gallup poll found that 56% of Americans believed that the Cold War was over.[328]

The U.S. national security apparatus announced in the Bush Administration's 1991 NSS that the "bitter struggle that divided the world for over two generations has come to an end," ushering in an era of "great hope" (p. 1). President Bush titled his preface to NSS-1991 "A New World Order." He argued that, in the post-Cold War era, the United States had the opportunity to "build a new international system in

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[327]ABC News/Washington Post (1989). National Poll, February, 1989, Question 30 [USABCWP.89JAPN.R32]. Chilton Research Services. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[328] Gallup Organization (1991). Gallup News Service Poll: February Omnibus, Wave 1, Question 32 [USGALLUP.020691.R5]. Gallup Organization. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

accordance with our own values and ideals" (p. v), a U.S. national security primary objective since Herrings', Forrestal's, and Eberstadt's times (see chapter 5). In this context, the United Nations became a key player in the building of this U.S.-led new world order.

Throughout the Cold War, the United Nations faced many difficulties in building consensus politics because of the conflict between the two superpowers. Reflecting on this period, Paul H. Nitze (1994) lamented in a 1993 speech before the National War College that "because of continuing opposition from the USSR and frequent use of its veto power in the U.N. Security Council, the United Nations had become largely a forum for public debate and had generally lost influence on matters where East and West disagreed." After all, the United Nations was deemed a central component of U.S. national security policy to serve the country's interests.

A 1950 Department of State policy statement on the United Nations explained that, despite what they referred to as "Soviet obstructionism," the UN and U.S. principles were aligned. In the creation of a U.S.-led new world order, it pointed out that the "UN is a means to an end rather than an end in itself".[329] Would the fall of the Soviet Union finally prompt the United Nations to serve as a transnational vehicle to achieve the United States' national security objectives?

President Bush was committed to that end. In a 1990 address to the United Nations, he pointed out that the role of this international organization was to help move

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[329] In *Department of State Policy Statement Regarding the United Nations, September 18, 1950* (U.S. Department of State, 1976b, p. 30).

countries "towards a new world order and a long era of peace."[330] Bush's vision was a world of "democracy," "freedom," "open trade," and a "new partnership of nations" under the umbrella of the UN global system. By the time of the speech, the Bush administration's national security apparatus had already started a process of incorporating the then-struggling Soviet Union into the U.S.-led new world order.

Early in the year and a few weeks after the Malta Summit, the U.S. had directed its agencies to prepare for negotiations with the Soviet Union on "trade agreement, investment treaty and GATT observership" through National Security Directive 35.[331] Incorporating the former existential enemy into the new world order was deemed vital to its success. At the international level, the 1991 G7 London Summit deemed "essential" the development of a free-market economy in the Soviet Union.[332] The Clinton Administration continued this policy. In his 1993 address to the United Nations, he pointed out that "a thriving and democratic Russia not only makes the world safer, it also can help to expand the world's economy."[333] Clinton's 1995 NSS reiterated the free-market/democracy nexus and pointed out that it was in the U.S.' "interest to do all that we can to enlarge the community of free and open societies, especially in areas of greatest strategic interest, as in the former Soviet Union" (p. 2).

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[330] Bush, H. W. G. (1990). *Address to the United Nations* [Transcript]. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/october-1-1990-address-united-nations.
[331] National Security Directive 35 (NSD-35) *U.S.-Soviet Economic Initiative* (January 24, 1990). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd35.pdf.
[332] G7 Information Centre. (1991). *London Summit Economic Declaration: Building World Partnership, London, July 17, 1991*. Retrieved from http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1991london/communique/index.html.
[333] Clinton, W. (1993). *Address by President Bill Clinton to the UN General Assembly* [Transcript]. https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207375.htm.

The 1990-1991 Gulf War provided the Bush Administration with the opportunity to test both U.S. leadership at the United Nations and the future role that this international organization could play to advance U.S. national security objectives in the post-Cold War era. After all, only a year before, the UN had delivered a diplomatic blow against the U.S. On December 29, 1989, the UN General Assembly voted 75 to 20—albeit with 40 abstentions—to condemn the Bush administration's invasion of Panama as "a flagrant violation of international law."[334] The representative of the Soviet Union even challenged the idea that Panama represented a national security threat to the United States after U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering claimed that his country had "acted in Panama for legitimate reasons of self-defence and to protect the integrity of the Canal Treaties."[335]

Domestically, in contrast, the Bush administration received majority support for invading Panama in the name of protecting U.S. national security. Even though Bush did not properly consult Congress before taking military action, he received bipartisan congressional support after the fact. Moreover, an ABC News poll found that 88% of Americans believed that the reasons that Bush gave for invading Panama were convincing.[336] And, 77% of Americans believed that Bush's decision to invade Panama

[334] United Nations. "Items Related to Panama." Retrieved from https://www.un.org/fr/sc/repertoire/89-92/CHAPTER%208/AMERICA/item%2013%20_Panama%20-%203%20items%20-%20consolidatedtext_.pdf.

[335] United Nations Security Council. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Nine Hundred and Second Meeting." (S/PV.2902, 23 December 1989). Retrieved from https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.2902.

[336] ABC News (1989). ABC News Poll: Panama 1, Question 8 [USABC.89PAN1.R08]. Chilton Research Services. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. In a nutshell, President Bush justified the Panama invasion as an effort (1) to protect the lives of Americans living in Panama; (2) to ensure that the Panama Canal treaty between the U.S. and Panama was not

was legal.[337] As analyzed by American journalist Colman McCarthy, the most important newspapers in the U.S. also supported the invasion.[338] A few weeks after General Manuel Noriega was captured, the U.S. started a program of economic liberalization for Panama through private sector initiatives, loan programs, and by encouraging "trade and investment" as directed through the Bush administration's NSD-34 (1990) *Partnership with Panama: Action Plan to Foster Economic Recovery*.[339]

By the time of the Gulf War, the global balance of power had quickly changed, prompted by the rapid decline of the Soviet Union. In late 1989, through NSD-26 (1989), the U.S. had already declared that "access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security" and warned that it was ready to use military force to protect its interests throughout the region.[340] A few weeks after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the U.S. implemented sanctions against Iraq and

violated; (3) to turn control of the government of Panama over to those leaders who won national elections; and (4) to take away all of Noriega's power over the country.

[337] ABC News (1989). ABC News Poll: Panama 1, Question 7 [USABC.89PAN1.R07]. Chilton Research Services. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. By early January 1990, 81% of Americans approved of President Bush's handling of the situation in Panama. ABC News/Washington Post (1990). ABC News/The Washington Post Poll: Omnibus-January, 1990, Question 12 [USABCWP.373.R37]. Chilton Research Services. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[338] Colman McCarthy. (1989, December 31). Lock stepping media military. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1989/12/31/lock-stepping-media-military/56ec1b31-92f9-4ab6-ad85-dc45f96dadeb/.

[339] National Security Directive 34 (NSD-34) *Partnership with Panama: Action plan to foster economic recovery* (January 24, 1990). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd34.pdf.

[340] National Security Directive 26 (NSD-26) *U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf* (October 2, 1989). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf.

demanded the withdrawal of all military forces from that country through NSD-45 *U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait*.[341]

In an attempt to avoid another diplomatic blow, the U.S., before the start of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, actively worked with the United Nations to secure a UN Security Council Resolution to approve military action against Iraq. On November 29, 1990, the UN authorized member states to "use all necessary means…to restore international peace and security in the area."[342] This time, the U.S. received the full support of a weakened Soviet Union.[343] On January 15, 1991, through National Security Directive 54, the U.S. authorized military actions against Iraq "in accordance with the rights and obligations of the United States under international law, including UN Security Council Resolutions."[344] Military combat started two days later.

In his speech to announce to the American public that military conflict with Iraq had begun, Bush highlighted that his administration's actions had been "taken in accord with United Nations resolutions and with the consent of the United States Congress."[345]

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[341] National Security Directive 45 (NSD-45). *U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait* (August 20, 1990). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd45.pdf.

[342] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 678. (November 29, 1990). Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/102245?ln=en.

[343] Eduard Shevardnadze, representing the Soviet Union at the UN Security Council, even praised the United States for playing "an active role in countering aggression" (p. 88) from the very beginning of the Persian Gulf crisis. In United Nations Security Council. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the Nine Hundred and Sixty-Third Meeting" (S/PV.2963, Thursday, 29 November 1990). Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/105331?ln=en.

[344] National Security Directive 54 (January 15, 1991) *Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf.* Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd45.pdf.

[345] Bush H. W., G. (1991). *Address to the Nation on the invasion of Iraq* [Transcript]. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-16-1991-address-nation-invasion-iraq. There was some dissent, particularly against the claim that Iraq was a national security threat to the U.S. For example, Democratic Representative James McDermott made the following point: "In fact, before the August invasion, Iraq and Kuwait supplied less than 4 percent of our demand for oil. Are we to believe that our national security and our way of life are threatened to the point of war

He predicted that after victory in Iraq, the U.S. would "have a real chance at this new world order, an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the U.N.'s founders."[346]

However, the military conflict was not carried out by a UN mission, but by the United States leading a coalition of countries under the umbrella of UN Security Council Resolution 678.[347] A few weeks later, Bush declared that the end of the Gulf War was "a victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law, and for what is right."[348] A few days after Bush's speech, an ABC News/Washington Post poll found that 86% of Americans believed that the Gulf War was worth fighting.[349] Was Bush's U.S.-led new world order finally starting to take shape?

Bush's attempts to implement a new world order through the United Nations also coincided with the election of a new UN Secretary-General in December 1991. Although initially reluctant, the U.S. supported the appointment of Egyptian diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali who came into office echoing Bush's vision of a new world

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because less than 4 percent of our oil supply was temporarily disrupted?" (U.S. Congress, 1991, p. 578).

[346] Bush, H. W., G. (1991). *Address to the Nation on the Invasion of Iraq* [Transcript]. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-16-1991-address-nation-invasion-iraq.

[347] Regarding the importance of U.S. leadership at the UN, Republican Representative Robert J. Lagomarsino explained that "while the coalition against Iraq is a multinational one, because we are a superpower that is looked up to by most, we naturally play a leadership role. But, if we are unwilling to back the U.N. resolutions and our own national security interests, we signal that we are a weak leader and the coalition, therefore also the effectiveness of sanctions and diplomacy, crumble" (U.S. Congress, 1991, p. 1061).

[348] Bush H. W., G. (1991). *Address on the end of the Gulf War* [Transcript]. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/february-27-1991-address-end-gulf-war.

[349] ABC News/Washington Post (1991). ABC News/The Washington Post Poll: Cease Fire, Question 96 [USABCWP.429.R42]. Chilton Research Services. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

order.[350] In January 1992, the UN Security Council[351] met to discuss the UN's role in the post-Cold War era under the theme "The Responsibility of the Security Council in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security."

In his address, the newly elected Secretary-General pointed out that "there has hardly been a stage more critical in modern history" (p. 8). While acknowledging that "the contours of the global order to which it will lead are not yet clearly perceivable" (p. 8), the end goal, according to his assessment, was "new norms of international life" (p. 9).[352] The UN Security Council agreed to empower the UN for the building of a "safer, more equitable and more humane world" (p. 2) since, according to the member countries of the UN Security Council, "the world now has the best chance of achieving international peace and security since the Foundation of the United Nations" (p. 5).[353]

Five months later, at the request of the UN Security Council, Boutros-Ghali prepared a report titled "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). In it, he pointed out that the post-Cold War era was finally giving the UN the opportunity to maintain "international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting" social progress and

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[350] The U.S. had initially backed Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney for this post. However, the Secretary-General position usually rotates among continents, and it was Africa's turn. Mulroney withdrew his name for consideration on late October 1991.

[351] The permanent members of the UN Security Council are the United States, Britain, France the Soviet Union, and China. Each one of them has veto power. Ten non-permanent members are added on a rotating basis every two years.

[352] United Nations Security Council: "Provisional Verbatim Record of the three thousand and forty-sixth Meeting." (S/PV.3046, 31 January 1992). Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/196999?ln=en.

[353] United Nations Security Council: "Note by the President of the Security Council," (S/23500, 31 January 1992). Retrieved from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PKO%20S%2023500.pdf.

better living standards worldwide. Among others, the report identified "barriers to trade" as a source of international insecurity. Mirroring the U.S. national security apparatus' democracy promotion efforts, the report outlined the role of the UN in supporting "the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions," particularly in post-conflict countries (i.e., mostly former communist countries).

That same year, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) published its third Human Development Report (1992),[354] where it emphasized that the "world has a fresh opportunity to create a new global order—an order based on mutual respect among nations, on greater equality of opportunity for their people and on new structures of peace and security" (pp. 87-88). It pointed out that the world will no longer be divided between conflicts among the East and the West but "between industrial and developing countries" (p. 88), that is, the Global South and the Global North. Replicating the mantra of the U.S. national security apparatus, the report pointed out the connection between political freedoms and economic development.[355] It advocated

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[354] The Human Development Report was first launched in 1990 centered on what the UN promoted as a people's and human security approach. It is based, among others, on the ideas of Indian Nobel laureate Amartya Sen and his so-called "capabilities approach." Sen has been criticized for promoting liberal (Western) values and for prioritizing individual (economic) liberties and the (economic) freedom to choose over social solidarity and community life. As Julio Boltvinik (2020) points out: "Sen concibe la *capability* como algo que se deriva de la posesión de bienes, como *capability* económica. Es una concepción alienada de las capacidades humanas, donde la única capacidad es la de poseer mercancías. Es una teoría de capacidades sin capacidades" (p. 42).

[355] In regard to the democracy/capitalism nexus, it is worth noting that the UN claims that it "does not advocate for a specific model of government but promotes democratic governance as a set of values and principles that should be followed for greater participation, equality, security and human development." In United Nations (n.d.). "Democracy." Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/democracy#:~:text=The%20UN%20does%20not%20advocate,equality%2C%20security%20and%20human%20development. However, the UN's 1994 "An agenda for Development," (UN. Secretary-General, 1994) drafted under Boutros-Ghali's leadership, explained that "the link between development and democracy is intuitive" (p. 22). What form of development was the report advocating

for the need to liberalize the global market "to accelerate global growth and to ensure much better distribution of this growth" (p. 90).

The 1992 Human Development Report also advocated for the need to create an "international trade organization" based on the GATT and to strengthen the UN "to create new structures of peace and security in the post-cold-war world" (p. 73). In addition, the report pointed out that countries in the Global South needed to improve their institutional capacities to achieve development with the support of the United Nations. As Arturo Escobar (1995) has argued, the United Nations and its affiliated agencies provided legitimacy to the development mantra since it had constructed "the moral, professional, and legal authority to name subjects and define strategies" together with the "international lending organizations, which carried the symbols of capital and power" (p. 41).[356]

The Bush Administration's 1993 NSS—published only twenty days before he left office—provides a better picture of how the U.S. national security apparatus envisioned the role of the UN in the building of a U.S.-led new world order. NSS-1993

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for? Arguing that "the laws of economics cannot be changed," it pointed out that "structural adjustment remains a necessary prescription to remedy serious economic imbalance" (p. 20). Moreover, resembling the economic prescriptions of neoliberal pundits, it added that "since most jobs in the near future are likely to be created in the private sector, well-designed incentive structures have an important role to play in attracting and channelling private investment for employment growth" (pp. 20-21), pointing out that "direct foreign investment can have a positive effect on the technological pool available to countries for development" (p. 28). In the post-Cold War era, the report celebrated that "private enterprise is increasingly recognized as a positive factor in providing solutions to problems previously thought to be the special province of public authorities" (p. 28).

[356] It is worth pointing out that both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are an integral part of the United Nations system. As the UN clearly pointed out in its 1994 "An Agenda for Development" (UN. Secretary-General, 1994), "The Bretton Woods institutions, as specialized agencies, are an integral part of the United Nations system. They are important sources of development finance and policy advice" (p. 42).

praised "the renewed effectiveness of multinational organizations, particularly the United Nations" (p. 6). In his preface, Bush pointed out that thanks to U.S. global leadership, "people and nations are introducing democratic and free market institutions and values" (p. i) worldwide. In this effort, NSS-1993 deemed the United Nations "a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and the preservation of peace" (p. 7). It even called on the U.S. government to "pay all arrearages to the U.N. as planned and ensure timely payment of future assessments" (p. 7). Initially, President Clinton followed the same path when he took office. In his 1993 address to the UN, President Clinton committed to strengthening this international organization and adapting "U.N. peacekeeping for the 21st century."[357]

In a very short time, however, UN-U.S. relations took a sharp turn, particularly after the debacles of Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia.[358] Boutros-Ghali started to clash with the Clinton administration over priorities and the role of the U.S. in this international organization. In his all-telling memoir, *Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga* (1999), Boutros-Ghali complained that the Clinton Administration tried to control his actions and use the UN for its own purposes. He defended his defiance to comply with U.S. wishes by explaining that his "responsibility was to promote multilateralism; the emerging U.S. policy was unilateralism, with multilateralism providing a fig leaf as needed" (p. 143). In an unprecedented move, the Clinton Administration vetoed

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[357] Clinton, W. (1993). *Address by President Bill Clinton to the UN General Assembly* [Transcript]. https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207375.htm.

[358] In Somalia, U.S. forces participated in an UN-led initiative to provide humanitarian relief to the country. In October 1993, eighteen Americans were killed in what became known as "The Battle of Mogadishu." During those years, genocides were also taken place in both Rwanda and Bosnia.

Boutros-Ghali 1996 reelection bid as UN Secretary-General even though he had already received the support of the other permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The U.S. national security apparatus' frustration with Boutros-Ghali had been gradually growing. The rapidly changing U.S.-UN relation was put into national security policy in 1993 through PRD/NSC-13 *Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations*.[359] While it was a secret document, it was leaked. Boutros-Ghali (1999) even revealed that then-U.S. Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright showed it to him. The document limited U.S. participation in UN missions and asked if "the trend toward multilateral peacekeeping undermine in an undesirable manner our ability to act unilaterally." One year before, Collin Powell's 1992 *National Military Strategy of the United States* pointed out that, in the building of a U.S.-led new world order, the U.S. should "emphasize multinational operations under the auspices of international bodies such as the United Nations" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1992, p. 6). At the same time, however, the strategy warned that the U.S. "must retain the capability to act unilaterally when and where US interests dictate." (p. 6)

PRD/NSC-13 was expanded a year later through PDD/NSC-25 *U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*."[360] This national security document outlined that the U.S. would participate in multilateral operations "when UN involvement represents the best means to advance U.S. interests." It also pointed out

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[359] Presidential Review Directive/NSC-13 (PRD/NSC-13) *Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations* (February 15, 1993). Retrieved from https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36558.
[360] Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25 (PDD/NSC-25) *U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* (May 3, 1994) Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-25.pdf.

that, in multilateral operations, the U.S. president "will not relinquish command authority over U.S. forces." Reflecting on PDD/NSC-25, Boutros-Ghali (1999) lamented that the document "dealt a deadly blow to cooperative multilateral action to maintain peace and security" (p. 134). He added that "it was one thing for the United States to place conditions for its own participation in UN peacekeeping…it was something else entirely for the United States to attempt to impose its conditions on other countries" (p. 135).

In the November 1994 U.S. mid-term elections, Republicans took control of the House of Representatives and went even further to limit UN-U.S. relations. As part of their "Contract on America,"[361] they enacted on February 16, 1995, "The National Security Revitalization Act," which, among others, cut U.S. payments to UN peacekeeping operations. In the congressional debates to pass this law, Republican Representative Benjamin Gilman argued that the purpose of the bill was not "to destroy U.N. peacekeeping" (U.S. Congress, 1995, p. 1781). At the same time, however, he explained that "because the U.S. taxpayer foots the largest share of the bill, we must ensure that it is only undertaken when it serves our interests" (p. 1781). Boutros-Ghali (1999) denounced that a campaign was launched to discredit his work and that of the UN. That year, a national poll found that 58% of Americans believed that the U.S. was spending too much money on UN peacekeeping operations.[362]

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[361] Led by Newt Gingrich, "The Contract on America" was a legislative agenda that the Republican party used as a campaign slogan for the 1994 Congressional elections. It was premised on the idea of lowering taxes, balancing the budget, and promoting the "free market."
[362] Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland (1995). Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland Poll: April 1995, Question 70

While the UN and the U.S. were aligned on the agenda of implementing a new world order based on market globalization, the UN resisted U.S. efforts of complete dominance of this international organization. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. national security apparatus believed that it would be able to fully control the UN for its own purposes. In this scenario and under U.S. leadership, the UN would serve as an unconditional vehicle—what the U.S. Department of State referred to as a "means to an end"—in the construction of a U.S.-led new world order. As I have discussed in the previous paragraphs, this scenario did not come to full fruition.

However, despite the rocky relationship between the U.S. and the UN, the U.S. was still able to exercise enormous influence on this international organization during this time. And, when collective UN decisions did not favor U.S. interests, the U.S. national security apparatus had already established that it had the right to act unilaterally. The 1995 National Security Revitalization Act gave the President the power to act without UN support if "the activity is of such importance to the national security of the United States that the United States would undertake the activity unilaterally if it were not authorized by the United Nations Security Council."[363]

With U.S. support and after vetoing Boutros-Ghali's reelection bid, Ghanaian diplomat Kofi Annan was elected UN Secretary-General in 1996 and reelected in 2001. In a statement on the selection of Kofi Annan, Clinton praised the newly-elected Secretary-General and explained that Annan shared the U.S.' commitment to reform

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[USUMARY.95UNO.R72]. Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.
[363] *National Security Revitalization Act.* U.S. Government Printing Office. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/BILLS-104hr7eh.

the UN "to meet the challenges of the 21st century." Unapologetically, Clinton declared

that this was the reason "why I decided we needed a new Secretary-General. I knew

this would be a controversial decision, but it was the right thing to do."[364] Ironically,

seven years later, Kofi Annan was the UN Secretary-General when the U.S. decided to

invade Iraq without UN support by declaring that the middle eastern country

represented a national security threat to the United States.[365]

7.2. Neoliberal Globalization and National Security: Clinton's Third Way

> Over the past year I have tried to speak at some length about what we must do to update our definition of national security and to promote it and to protect it and to foster democracy and human rights around the world. Today, I want to allude to those matters, but to focus on the economic leadership we must exert at home and abroad as a new global economy unfolds before our eyes.
> –Bill Clinton, 1993[366]

> In the post-cold-war world, our national security depends on our economic strength.
> –Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, 1993[367]

With the Cold War over, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the mantra

of a U.S.-led "new world order," the arrival of Bill Clinton to the U.S. presidency

prompted the bipartisan consensus of fully integrating U.S. neoliberal policy into

national security doctrine. Clinton's wing of the democratic party, described as the

"New Democrats," marked a decisive shift in both the new deal policies and rhetoric

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[364] "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton" (December 13, 1996) [Page 2207] https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1996-book2/html/PPP-1996-book2-doc-pg2207.htm.

[365] The "Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002" (Public Law 107–243, 107th Congress) stated that the objective of the war was to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq."

[366] Clinton, W. (1993). *Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration* [Transcript]. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-american-university-centennial-celebration.

[367] U.S. Congress, 1991, p. 10.

of previous democratic administrations by fully embracing U.S.-led neoliberal globalization while also attempting to waken, following neoliberal discourses on competition, individualism, and losers and winners in a global free market (Brown, 2015) an "entrepreneurial culture" (Giddens, 1998, p. 52) among the population.[368] As explained by its proponents, the Clinton administration promoted a "third way" to the so-called "invisible hand of the market" and Keynesian interventionism as an "alternative to both the liberal call for administrative programs and the conservative call for government to stay out of the marketplace" (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 284).

Renowned sociologist Anthony Giddens, working with Tony Blair's wing of the United Kingdom's Labor Party, became one of the key promoters of third-way politics during this time. In 1998, Giddens published a study—a sort of manifesto— titled *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy,* where he argued in favor of the rise of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively, as representatives of a "new politics" (p. 53). In it, Giddens defined third-way politics as a "new mixed economy" that pursued the "synergy between public and private sectors, utilizing the dynamism of markets but with the public interest in mind. It involves a balance between regulation and deregulation, on a transnational as well as national and local levels; and a balance between the economic and the non-economic in the life of the society" (p. 52).

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[368] As Bill Clinton pointed out: "We offer our people a new choice based on old values. We offer opportunity. We demand responsibility." In their own words; Transcript of speech by Clinton accepting democratic nomination (1992, July 17). *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/17/news/their-own-words-transcript-speech-clinton-accepting-democratic-nomination.html.

Giddens pushed back against leftist critiques, which labeled third-way politics as "warmed-over neoliberalism" (p. 19). While arguing that third-way politics "should take a positive attitude towards globalization," Giddens pointed out that it should not provide "a blanket endorsement of free trade" which, according to his assessment, should always be "scrutinized" to prevent excesses (p. 37). Did third-way politics achieve the balance between neoliberal economic globalization and the public interest? Was it able to "scrutinize" neoliberal globalization, as Giddens hoped for?

In his 1993 State of the Union Address, President Clinton pledged to "end welfare as we know it."[369] A year later, the Clinton administration passed the then-Senator Biden-led "Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994" bill (also known as the "Biden Crime Bill"), which gradually led to mass incarcerations, particularly among low-income minorities for petty crimes, and the privatization of the penal system (Murawaka, 2014). During the congressional debates to pass this bill, Biden's arguments are very revealing of the new trends set by third-way democratic politics:

> Let me define the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is now for 60 new death penalties…The liberal wing of the Democratic Party has 70 enhanced penalties…The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for 100,000 cops. The liberal wing of the Democratic Party is for 125,000 new State prison cells. The liberal wing of the Democratic Party

[369] Clinton, W. (1993). *State of the Union Address* [Transcript].
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/state-of-the-union-address-1993/.

is not the old wing I knew. So if that is what he [referring to a Republican senator] defines as the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, then I suspect I would like to see the conservative wing of the Party (U.S. Congress, 1994a).

In 1996, following the trend set by the Reagan administration, Clinton declared that the "era of big government is over,"[370] except, just like Reagan, in the area of security, as I will discuss in the next section. For example, the Clinton administration's 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) allowed surplus military equipment to be sent to law enforcement agencies "for use by the agencies in law enforcement activities, including counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities."[371] Known as the "1033 Program" (Section 1033 of the 1997 NDAA), it has been growing ever since in subsequent Republican and Democratic administrations and has led to the gradual militarization of the police (ACLU, 2014).

Progressively, the cultural political economic results of these policies, as explained by Nancy Fraser, "hollowed out working-class and middle-class living standards while transferring wealth and value upward—chiefly to the 1 percent, of course, but also to the upper reaches of the professional-managerial classes" (2019, p. 10). By increasing poverty, inequality, job precariousness, and demolishing the social safety net, neoliberal globalization boosted the need for more domestic security as reflected by the 1994 Biden Crime Bill. Wacquant (2012) points out that while

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[370] Clinton, W. (1996). *State of the Union Address* [Transcript].
https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/other/sotu.html.
[371] *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997*. Public Law 104–201—September. 23, 1996. Retrieved from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-104publ201/pdf/PLAW-104publ201.pdf.

neoliberalism "is uplifting and 'liberating' at the top…it is castigatory and restrictive at the bottom, when it comes to managing the populations destabilized by the deepening of inequality and the diffusion of work insecurity and ethnic anxiety" (p. 74).

Was the U.S. national security apparatus aware of these possible future trends during Clinton's implementation of neoliberal policies? In 1997, The US Space Command (USSPACECOM) published its *Vision for 2020* where it advocated the need of "dominating the space dimensions of military operations" (p. 10) to protect "US national interests and investment" (p. 11). Regarding future trends, the document argued that the "globalization of the world economy will also continue, with a widening between 'haves' and 'have-nots'" (p. 6). A subsequent USSPACECOM 1998 report titled *Long Range Plan: Implementing USSPACECOM Vision for 2020*, contended that "other nations, and possibly multi-national corporations, will challenge the United States," pointing out that "the growth and influence of multinational corporations, will blur security agreements" (United States Space Command, 1998, p. 2).

In 1999, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (hereinafter, USCNS/21), co-chaired by U.S. Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, published its first report where it argued that with economic globalization, the U.S. would likely face different threats in the future, including from those people who have not benefited from these global economic trends. The report—following neoliberal rationalities of winners and losers—argued that the latter "are unlikely to blame their own lack of social capital; they are more likely to sense conspiracy and feel resentment" (1999, p. 26).

Moreover, the report acknowledged that "global economic trends, in particular, may contribute to a worsening of income inequality in the United States" (p. 124), arguing that "an American economic underclass will not disappear and may even grow" (p. 125). Additionally, when analyzing the consequences of neoliberal policies and the growth of transnational corporations, the report even predicted the future crisis of Western liberal democracy: "Could it be that the liberalization of commerce on the global level will undermine and not support the spread of democracy…? Quite possibly, yes" (p. 37).

Nancy Fraser (2019) has argued that while neoliberalism is commonly associated with the presidency of Ronald Reagan, it was "substantially implemented and consolidated by Bill Clinton" (p. 10). What role did the U.S. national security apparatus play in this implementation? One of the first presidential directives enacted by Clinton was PDD/NSC-2 (1993) *Organization of the National Security Council*.[372] It expanded the National Security Council (NSC) to include the Secretary of the Treasury and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy. Five days later, through Executive Order 12835, Clinton created the National Economic Council (NEC), charged, among others, with coordinating "the economic policy-making process with respect to domestic and international economic issues."[373]

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[372] Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-2 (PDD/NSC-2) *Organization of the National Security Council* (1/20/1993). Retrieved from https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12736.
[373] Executive Order 12835: "Establishment of the National Economic Council" (January 25, 1993). Retrieved from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-1993-02-01/pdf/WCPD-1993-02-01-Pg95.pdf.

As explained by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the interaction between the NSC and NEC "were to be achieved by having the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy also sit on the NSC, supplemented by assigning staff to support both councils. The goal was to ensure that the economic dimensions of national security policy would be properly weighed in the White House decision-making process" (Lowenthal & Best, 2011, p. 27). A few months later, at the Export-Import Bank Conference, Clinton pointed out that, in the new world order, "the old ways of doing business simply don't translate into reality today. One of the first things I did when I became President was to establish a National Economic Council…We had a National Security Council that met with the President on a regular basis to deal with security issues, but a great deal of our security is in the economic area."[374]

Clinton's determination to improve the interaction and coordination between economic and national security policy was consistent with the bipartisan consensus of building a post-Cold War U.S.-led new global order. As the CRS report explained, "with the end of the Cold War, it was widely acknowledged that there was a need for closer integration of national security policy and international economic policy" (Lowenthal, & Best, 2011, p. 20).

Reflecting on the fall of the Soviet Union, Bill Clinton, in his 1991 announcement speech, pointed out that "the events in the Soviet Union in recent months teach us an important lesson: National security begins at home. For the Soviet Empire

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[374] Clinton, W (1993). *Remarks to the Export-Import Bank Conference* [Transcript]. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg576.pdf.

never lost to us on the field of battle. Their system rotted from the inside out, from economic, political and spiritual failure."[375] For this reason, Clinton pointed out that while "a Clinton Administration will defend our national interests abroad," it "cannot build a safe and secure world unless we can first make America strong at home."

Two years later, when advocating the importance of NAFTA and reflecting on the opposition he faced from Republicans and even members of his own party,[376] Clinton explained that he was "determined by the time I leave that we will see economic policy as a part of our national security and we will have a bipartisan economic policy, the way we had to have a bipartisan foreign policy in the cold war. We have got to do it, and expanding trade has got to be a part of it."[377] What did the Clinton-led incorporation of economic policy into national security entail? How was this bipartisan effort rationalized? Some national security documents provide important clues on this bipartisan post-Cold War consensus.

For example, before Clinton took office, the 1992 Bush administration's *National Military Strategy of the United States*, developed under the direction of Collin

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[375] Clinton, W. (1991). *Announcement speech* [Transcript].
http://www.4president.org/speeches/billclinton1992announcement.htm.
[376] It is worth pointing out that the House of Representatives approved NAFTA by a vote of 234 against 200. Only 102 Democrats voted in favor. In the Senate, the vote was 61 against 38. Only 23 Democrats in the senate support it. At the November 1993 Senate Hearings, Republican Senator Phil Gramm pointed out that he was "grateful for the support for NAFTA from Democrats." However, he argued that NAFTA "is a Republican agenda. Ronald Reagan first came out for NAFTA. I introduced a North American Free-Trade Agreement bill in the Congress in 1986. I am proud of the fact that 75 percent of the Republican Members of the House of Representatives voted for NAFTA, while only 40 percent of the Democrats did. I believe that we are going to come close to 90 percent of our Republican colleagues in the Senate voting for NAFTA" (U.S. Congress, 1993b, p. 30931).
[377] Clinton, W. (1993). *Remarks on Endorsements of the North American Free Trade Agreement* [Transcript]. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-endorsements-the-north-american-free-trade-agreement-0.

Powell, then-Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, pointed out that with the end of the Cold War, "the United States must maintain the strength necessary to influence world events, deter would-be aggressors, guarantee free access to global markets, and encourage continued democratic and economic progress in an atmosphere of enhanced stability" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1992, p. 2). How would the U.S. military support this goal? According to the document, through a combination of a "base force/total force" which provides a "diverse spectrum of military options" during peacetime and wartime "encompassing all the instruments of national power (diplomatic, political, economic, and military) to clearly demonstrate US resolve" (p. 12).

President Bush's last national security strategy (NSS-1993), published only days before he left office, emphasized the interconnection between domestic and international economic policy and the security of the United States. It explained that "the distinction between domestic economic policy and international economic policy is disappearing," pointing out that the "United States' economic strategy must be global rather than national" (p. 9). In this context, according to the document, the U.S. must convince "others that free trade offers greater prosperity" (p. 10), and it should "strengthen the international financial and economic institutions" (p. 10)—such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the GATT—to support "the private sector and developing sound market-based policies" (p. 11). As NSS-1993 argued, a "top national security priority today must be to strengthen economic performance at home and economic leadership abroad" (p. 9).

As pointed out in previous paragraphs, Clinton echoed these efforts as a presidential candidate and took immediate steps towards this end as soon as he stepped into office. One of his administration's first initiatives was the development of the United States' first National Export Strategy (NES) in September 1993. The strategy directed the U.S. government to actively support U.S. private businesses to sell their goods and services overseas by, among others, providing financial support and by actively advocating on their behalf to help them win "more major projects and procurement opportunities overseas" (U.S. Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, 1993, p. 30). As Ronald H. Brown, Secretary of Commerce explained in the National Export Strategy's foreword: "America's future depends on our ability to compete successfully in the international marketplace. Our position as the world's undisputed economic leader, our national security and the livelihood of millions will turn on how well the businesses, workers, and government of the United States respond to this challenge."

The active intervention of the state in helping transnational corporations secure businesses overseas can be deemed a contradiction of a competitive global free market. However, as some scholars have demonstrated (see Chapter 3), the neoliberal state actively acts as protector, enabler, and facilitator of private-led accumulation strategies. The major difference is that the United States, when compared to other countries, has had the resources and military capabilities to support U.S. businesses abroad. While this private-public partnership started way before Clinton took office, his administration made it explicit.

Also in September 1993, Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, gave a speech at Johns Hopkins University titled "From Containment to Enlargement." In it, Lake argued that with the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. needed to abandon its Cold War mentality and actively engage with the world to promote "democracy and market economies." That is to say, instead of simply "containing" communism—or whatever existential threat the U.S. national security apparatus identifies at the time—, the U.S. should actively "engage" with the world in order to "enlarge,"—as so-often repeated by previous administrations (see earlier chapters)—, the "world's free community of market democracies."[378]

According to Lake, "to the extent democracy and market economics hold sway in other nations, our own nation will be more secure, prosperous and influential, while the broader world will be more humane and peaceful." Under this rationale, the protection of U.S. national security depends on the implementation of a U.S.-led (neoliberal) global market economy. He explained that the U.S. needed to "give democratic nations the fullest benefits of integration into foreign markets, which is part of why NAFTA and the GATT rank so high on our security agenda."

In this scheme, and following core neoliberal principles of privatization, liberalization, and deregulation, Lake pointed out that "private firms are natural allies in our efforts to strengthen market economies." This emphasis became known as the "Clinton Doctrine," and it was incorporated into U.S. national security policy in the

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[378] Lake, A. (1993). *From Containment to Enlargement* [Transcript]. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html.

Clinton administration's first national security strategy (NSS-1994). Even though Lake argued that this doctrine was "not a democratic crusade," it closely mirrored the Reagan administration's democracy promotion efforts and the rationalization of the capitalism/democracy/(economic) freedom nexus (see Chapter 6).

How would the national security strategy of engagement and enlargement be operationalized? According to Lake, through four components: (1) by strengthening "the community of major market democracies" (what previous administrations referred to as the "free world"); (2) by fostering and consolidating "new democracies and market economies;" (3) by countering "the aggression — and support the liberalization —of states hostile to democracy and market;" and (4) by pursuing the U.S.' "humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid, but also by working to help democracy and market economics take root." These components were included in NSSs 1994, 1995, and 1996 under the title "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement." Under the Clinton administration, trade protectionism and countries that opposed Western-style market democracy replaced communism as the biggest existential threat to the United States. As President Clinton argued, "it is time for us to make trade a priority element of American security."[379]

In October 1993, the Defense Department concluded what it called a "Bottom-Up Review." It was, as then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin explained, "a comprehensive review of the nation's defense strategy, force structure, modernization,

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[379] Clinton, W. (1993). *Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration* [Transcript]. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-american-university-centennial-celebration.

infrastructure, and foundations" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1993b, p. iii), taking into consideration the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union. While the document incorporated the Clinton administration's tropes of "engagement and enlargement," it was basically a continuation of Collin Powell's 1992 Military Strategy.

The report argued that "there is promise that we can replace the East-West confrontation of the Cold War with an era in which the community of nations, guided by a common commitment to democratic principles, free-market economics, and the rule of law, can be significantly enlarged" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1993b, p. 2). At the same time, however, the document warned that the U.S., in the building of this new world order, would need "to act proactively to protect and enhance its national security. We must seek not only to counter threats to our security as they arise, but to prevent them from occurring in the first place" (p. 71).

Moreover, and following President Bush's lead, President Clinton's first national security strategy (NSS-1994) also placed a strong emphasis on the interconnection between the implementation of neoliberal policies and the protection of U.S. national security. It explained that "a central goal of our national security strategy is to promote America's prosperity through efforts both at home and abroad. Our economic and security interests are increasingly inseparable. Our prosperity at home depends on engaging actively abroad" (p. 15).

In line with the Clinton Administration's 1993 National Export Strategy, NSS-1994 added that U.S. "economic strategy views the private sector as the engine of economic growth. It sees government's role as a partner to the private sector —acting

as an advocate of U.S. business interests; leveling the playing field in international markets; helping to boost American exports" (p. 15). In this context, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as the document explained, "marked a decisive U.S. affirmation of its international engagement" towards the creation of a linked global economy. What did NAFTA represent in the construction of a U.S.-led new global order and the bipartisan national security consensus on the promotion of neoliberal economic policies to protect U.S. national security?

On November 23, 1993, only five days after Congress passed NAFTA, the Heritage Foundation published a report titled "The North American Free Trade Agreement: Ronald Reagan's Vision Realized" where it pointed out that Ronald Reagan was the first to propose a trade agreement with Mexico during his 1980 presidential campaign. Although the international agreement passed during a democratic administration, the Foundation pointed out that "the NAFTA win is a great victory for free trade conservatives."[380]

President Bill Clinton, despite majority opposition from members of his own party who voted against the agreement, fully embraced NAFTA as a stepping-stone in the consolidation of U.S. global leadership and the protection of U.S. national security in the post-Cold War era.[381] As a presidential candidate, Clinton supported the

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[380] Wilson, M. (1993). The North American Free Trade Agreement: Ronald Reagan's vision realized. *The Heritage Foundation*. https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-north-american-free-trade-agreement-ronald-reagans-vision-realized.

[381] At the signing of NAFTA, President Clinton explained that "this whole issue turned out to be a defining moment for our Nation. I spoke with one of the folks who was in the reception just a few moments ago who told me that he was in China watching the vote on international television when it was taken. And he said you would have had to be there to understand how important this was to the rest of the world, not because of the terms of NAFTA, which basically is a trade agreement between

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agreement and explained in a speech on the interconnection between trade, prosperity, and American jobs that "whether the North American Free Trade Agreement is a good thing for America, is not a question of foreign policy. It is a question of domestic policy."[382] Once in office, Clinton even urged the American public to get involved in advocating for the agreement and asked them to "please personally contact the Members of Congress about this, whether Republican or Democrat," insisting that the passing of NAFTA "is not a partisan issue, this is an American issue."[383]

The congressional hearings and debates surrounding NAFTA provide important clues on the bipartisan consensus on the need to pass this agreement to secure both U.S. survival and its hegemonic role in the U.S.-led new world order. In a demonstration of bipartisanship politics, the North American Free Trade Agreement was signed by President George H. W. Bush on December 17, 1992. It was approved by Congress on November 20, 1993, and it was signed into law by President Clinton on December 8, 1993. Of course, there was also strong resistance to the agreement, where a coalition of protectionist conservatives, leftist labor activists, environmentalists, and new deal democrats opposed it.

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the United States, Mexico, and Canada, but because it became a symbolic struggle for the spirit of our country and for how we would approach this very difficult and rapidly changing world dealing with our own considerable challenges here at home." He added that "for this new era, our national security we now know will be determined as much by our ability to pull down foreign trade barriers as by our ability to breach distant ramparts," calling "for further progress on GATT." In Clinton, W. (1993). *Remarks on the Signing of NAFTA* [Transcript]. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-8-1993-remarks-signing-nafta.

[382] Clinton, W. (1992). *Expanding trade and creating American Jobs: Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton* [Transcript]. https://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-science/speeches/clinton.dir/c151.txt.

[383] Clinton, W. (1993). *Remarks on endorsements of the North American Free Trade Agreement* [Transcript]. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-endorsements-the-north-american-free-trade-agreement-0.

For instance, at the 1991 congressional hearings, Democratic Senator Fritz Hollings warned that the United States was "still at war—a trade war, an economic struggle that is eroding our standard of living and threatening our national security" (U.S. Congress, 1991b, p. 12379). While Hollings expressed his desire to see Mexico's President Salinas succeed and promote stability in that country, he said that he did not "want to pay for it with American jobs" (p. 12381). At the 1993 hearings, Democratic Representative Major R. Owens blatantly asked: "Are we going to move into a New World order where a dozen or more multinational corporations will control the plants and factories all over the world?" (U.S. Congress, 1993b, p. 29334).

The Republicans and Democrats who were in favor of the NAFTA agreement rationalized the implications that it had for U.S. national security and the construction of a U.S.-led new world order. For instance, at the 1991 congressional hearings, Republican Senator Mitch McConnell acknowledged that NAFTA was indeed a trade vote. However, he pointed out that "the debate is about more than just trade. It is about the economic structure of the new world order and the role the United States will play in shaping that structure" (U.S. Congress, 1991b, p. 12454).

Republican Representative Jim Leach, arguing in favor of President Bush's new world order and the interconnection between democracy and free markets, claimed that NAFTA "will strengthen the ongoing paradigm shift in the world affairs toward the classically liberal vision of a peaceful world order based upon free peoples, free markets, and collective security, in short the President's bold vision of a new world

order" (U.S. Congress, 1991b, p. 12250). That is to say, the gradual implementation of Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis through an international free trade agreement.

The 1993 congressional hearings on NAFTA took on similar tones, but with more Democratic support. For instance, Republican Representative Peter T. King argued that the vote for NAFTA "will define America's role in the post-cold war world…I support NAFTA for the same reasons that our predecessors supported NATO and the Marshall plan and the space program—our national security and our Nation's future demand it." (U.S. Congress, 1993d, p. 29855). Across the aisle, Democratic Representative Charles Stenholm claimed that a NAFTA vote defeat "would represent a threat to the American economy and national security" (p. 29808).

Going even further, Democratic Representative Anthony Beilenson urged his colleagues to vote in favor of NAFTA "for the sake of the economic well-being of our people, our national security, and our leadership in the world" (U.S. Congress, 1993d, p. 29899). Despite these urgent life and death discourses, it is worth pointing out that the American public did not support the agreement. That year, a national poll found that 55% of Americans believed that only big companies would benefit from NAFTA.[384] The same poll found that 74% believed that American manufacturing jobs would move to Mexico.[385]

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[384] Wall Street Journal/NBC News (1993). NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll: Health Care, Question 76 [USNBCWSJ.93SEPT.R16A2]. Hart-Teeter Research Companies. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.
[385] Wall Street Journal/NBC News (1993). NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll:, Question 99 [USNBCWSJ.111593.R14B3]. Hart-Teeter Research Companies. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

Under the Clinton administration, NAFTA not only became a stepping-stone in the construction of a U.S.-led global market, but also helped reaffirm U.S. hegemony in its so-called "backyard," that is, Latin America. NAFTA also helped push the trend, which started during the seventies—and consolidated during the nineties through the so-called "Washington Consensus"[386] (Harvey, 2005)—of implementing neoliberal policies throughout Latin America.

At the 1993 congressional hearings on NAFTA, Democratic Representative Michael Andrews pointed out that "the vote on NAFTA is also the symbol of our leadership in developing the markets of Latin and South America" (U.S. Congress, 1993d, p. 29911). Republican Senator John McCain argued that "what NAFTA asks of us is to take counsel of our enduring aspirations, and not our fears, and by so doing help fulfill the promise of the New World—the promise of a hemisphere of free, democratic, prosperous nations, at peace with one another, and serving as the model for the entire world" (U.S. Congress, 1993e, p. 30671).

In 1994, the Clinton Administration enacted PDD/NSC-28 *U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean*, where it outlined its goals and objectives for the region. Among them was the creation of "open, dynamic economies providing rising living standards to their peoples and expanding export markets for U.S. products and services."[387] The document explained that the "continuation of market-based economic

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[386] The Washington Consensus was a set of neoliberal economic policy reforms disseminated during the nineties throughout Latin America with the help of the IMF and the World Bank. It included the core tenants of neoliberalization: liberalization, privatization, and deregulation.
[387] Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-28 (PDD/NSC-28) *U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (September 8, 1994). Retrieved from https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/pdd/pdd-28.pdf.

reforms in Latin America is key to U.S. interests." As part of its "market-oriented restructuring" efforts throughout Latin America, PDD/NSC-28 outlined the need for the promotion of "deregulation" as well as "economic liberalization, such as privatization and reduction of barriers to trade." The document mentioned the importance of the U.S. hosting the "Summit of the Americas" later that year as an opportunity to push these neoliberal-oriented reforms.

The very first "Summit of the Americas" took place in Florida in December 1994. Its final declaration, approved by all thirty-four participating countries—Cuba was not invited—agreed to "construct the 'Free Trade Area of the Americas' (FTAA), in which barriers to trade and investment will be progressively eliminated."[388] The Summit of the America's Plan of Action, following neoliberal tenets, directed governments to work on the "modernization of the state, including deregulation, privatization" and to "endorse full and rapid implementation of the Uruguay Round" (i.e., the GATT/WTO).[389]

Despite the Clinton administration's efforts, a free trade area in the Americas did not come to fruition. The second report of USCNS/21, published in 2000, insisted that the U.S. should continue to expand NAFTA to other countries in the region to protect its national security. Equating democracy with free trade, the document argues that "whatever the merits of 'exporting' democracy, there can be little doubt that helping to bolster democracies where they have come to exist of their own exertions

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[388] Organization of American States (1994). *First Summit of the Americas "Declaration of Principles."* http://www.iin.oas.org/DECLARACIONES/primera_cumbre_ingles.htm.
[389] Organization of American States. Department of International Legal Affairs. (1994). *First Summit of the Americas: Plan of Action.* http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/PlanI.html.

should be high on the list of U.S. priorities. Nowhere is such an effort more important than in the Western Hemisphere" (p. 12).

A year after NAFTA was approved, the World Trade Organization (WTO) was created in 1995, taking as a basis the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In late 1994, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate approved the "Uruguay Round Agreements Act" to implement WTO commitments in the United States. Commenting on the WTO, the 1995 NSS explained that the Clinton administration "intends to continue its efforts in further enhancing U.S. access to foreign markets. The World Trade Organization will provide a new institutional lever for securing such access" (p. 21).

Highlighting these trends, the 1995 US National Military Strategy celebrated that the "community of democratic nations and free-market economies is growing throughout the world — a trend consistent with important US interests" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1995, p. 3). It warned that the U.S. would "assist in efforts to defend against threats to democratic and economic reform in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere" (p. 3). Additionally, Clinton's 1996 NSS pointed out that U.S.-led global trade liberalization "has reaped significant accomplishments for the betterment of the American people. It continues to take advantage of remarkable opportunities to shape a world conducive to U.S. interests and consistent with American values — a world of open societies and open markets" (p. 9).

Just like the Reagan administration, Clinton promoted the interconnection between democracy and free markets as a scientific fact. The Clintonian wing of the

Democratic party (i.e., "the New Democrats"), despite outlining their politics as a "third way," embraced Milton Friedman's argument that economic liberalization inevitably leads to (Western-style) political (liberal) freedoms (see Chapter 6). Besides U.S. efforts in Latin America, another clear example of this belief was the Clinton administration's push for the incorporation of China into the World Trade Organization on national security grounds. Throughout his tenure at the White House, President Clinton repeatedly argued that the incorporation of China would protect U.S. national security by making a potential adversary a U.S. partner. Repeating this rationale, in 1996, another Friedman, this time Thomas L., an ardent believer in U.S.-led neoliberal economic globalization, argued in an opinion piece that "no two countries that both had McDonald's had fought a war against each other since each got its McDonald's."[390]

In a 1997 speech on "China and the National Interest," Clinton pointed out that the incorporation of China into the WTO "is our best hope, to secure our own interests and values and to advance China's in the historic transformation that began 25 years ago, when China reopened to the world."[391] In 2000, when advocating for the China trade partnership, Clinton resembled Milton Friedman when he argued that "membership in the WTO, of course, will not create a free society in China overnight or guarantee that China will play by global rules. But over time, I believe it will move China faster and further in the right direction and certainly will do that more than

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[390] Friedman, T. (1996, December 8). Foreign affairs Big Mac I. *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/08/opinion/foreign-affairs-big-mac-i.html/
[391] Clinton, W. (1997). *Remarks by the President in address on China and the national interest* [Transcript]. https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/html/19971024-3863.html.

rejection would."[392] On May 24, 2000, the U.S. House of Representatives voted 237 to 197, in favor of the "China Trade Bill"[393] to restore trade relations with China, thus paving the way for the incorporation of that country into the WTO in late 2001.

In May 2000, at the Congressional debates to pass the "China Trade Bill," Republican Representative Bill Archer argued that the normalization of trade relations with China would open that country's "borders to the enterprising superiority of American workers, American businesses, and American farmers" (U.S. Congress, 2000, p. 8925). He added that this bill would serve "two critical American interests: first, it creates potentially hundreds of thousands of new higher-paying jobs for American workers; second, it helps our children and our grandchildren to live in a more peaceful world and enhance our national security" (p. 8925).

Since then, China has been growing steadily and has become a major challenger to U.S. hegemony. Despite Archer's perceived U.S. superiority, American workers have increasingly lost ground since the implementation of neoliberal globalization (Fraser, 2019). Moreover, China has not embraced, as the Clinton administration predicted, Western-style liberal democracy.[394] Despite the fact that both countries have

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[392] Clinton, W. (2000). *Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies* [Transcript]. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-paul-h-nitze-school-advanced-international-studies.

[393] The bill's full title is: "To authorize extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations treatment) to the People's Republic of China, and to establish a framework for relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China." https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-bill/4444/all-info.

[394] In a 2022 China-Russia joint declaration, both countries argued that "there is no one-size-fits-all template to guide countries in establishing democracy. A nation can choose such forms and methods of implementing democracy that would best suit its particular state, based on its social and political system, its historical background, traditions and unique cultural characteristics." Moreover, without mentioning the U.S., they complained that certain states try to "to impose their own 'democratic standards' on other countries, to monopolize the right to assess the level of compliance with

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McDonald's, in 2018, President Trump issued "Memorandum on Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation of China's Laws, Policies, Practices, or Actions Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation" where he accused China of unfair trade practices and placed punitive tariffs against that country.[395] In 2021, the U.S. intelligence community declared China the biggest threat to the United States due to its push for "global power."[396]

7.3. New Global Threats: Protecting U.S. National Security

> The end of the Cold War is not the end of threats to America.
> —Bill Clinton, 1991[397]

Despite the celebratory tones regarding the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the apparent real prospect of building a U.S.-led new world order, the U.S. national security apparatus has continued its growth ever since. How has a country with almost no military threats from any nation been able to expand its national security doctrine, even domestically? How has this been possible? While it could be

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democratic criteria, to draw dividing lines based on the grounds of ideology, including by establishing exclusive blocs and alliances of convenience, prove to be nothing but flouting of democracy and go against the spirit and true values of democracy. Such attempts at hegemony pose serious threats to global and regional peace and stability and undermine the stability of the world order." In *Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development*, February 4, 2022.

[395] "Memorandum on Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation of China's Laws, Policies, Practices, or Actions Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation" (March 22, 2018). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201800180/pdf/DCPD-201800180.pdf

[396] Office of the Director of National Intelligence. *Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*. (April 9, 2021). https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf

[397] Clinton, W. (1991). *Announcement Speech* [Transcript]. http://www.4president.org/speeches/billclinton1992announcement.htm

argued that some countries already had nuclear capabilities by this time, President Bush's 1992 National Military Strategy boasted that the U.S. was "the only nation with the military capability to influence events globally" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1992, p. 4). Moreover, President Clinton's 1995 National Military Strategy even revealed that "today the United States faces no immediate threat to its national survival" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1995, p. 2).

In the post-Cold War period, U.S. global hegemony became essential to construct, as Bush's preface to the 1991 NSS argued, "a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals" (p. v). A year later, *The New York Times* published a leaked draft document from the Defense Department that stated that, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. must "insure that no rival superpower is allowed to emerge in Western Europe, Asia or the territory of the former Soviet Union."[398] The document pointed out that the U.S. must prevent other countries "from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order."

A few months after the document leaked, *The New York Times* reported that then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, after backlash, revised the document and issued a new one "with far more diplomatic language." According to the newspaper, the new document "forsakes any goal of preventing the emergence of 'any potential future global competitor' and stresses the importance of strengthening international

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[398] Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. strategy plan calls for insuring no rivals develop," *The New York Times* March 8, 1992. https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/us-strategy-plan-calls-for-insuring-no-rivals-develop.html. The leaked documents are available at the National Security Archive's project *Prevent the Reemergence of a New Rival: The Making of the Cheney Regional Defense Strategy, 1991-1992* available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb245/.

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organizations like the United Nations for resolving disputes."[399] Despite this diplomatic rhetoric, U.S.-UN relations went sour in the years to come since this international organization resisted the U.S.' attempts of complete domination, as the first section of this chapter described.

However, just before the Bush administration left office, the Defense Department—still under Cheney's leadership—issued its *Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy*. Albeit using softer language, the document insisted that a major U.S. goal was to "preclude any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against the reemergence of a global threat to the interests of the United States and our allies" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1993a, p. 3). In the post-Cold War era and in the building of a new world order, the maintenance of U.S. hegemony became essential for the survival of the country.

Although the Soviet Union started its decline during the eighties, the period that started the implementation of neoliberal policies saw the emergence of other powers challenging U.S. hegemony, particularly in terms of global trade. Throughout the eighties, the U.S. had already been involved in a trade war with Japan. Western Europe—especially West Germany—was also challenging the U.S. dominant position in the global economy. In 1984, the Reagan administration issued NSDD-154 *U.S.-Japan Trade Policy Relation*s, which pointed out that "trade policy issues constitute

[399] Tyler, P. (1992, May 24). Pentagon drops goal of blocking new superpowers. *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/24/world/pentagon-drops-goal-of-blocking-new-superpowers.html.

our most important bilateral economic problem with Japan and are a major problem in Japan's economic relationship with the rest of the world."[400]

A year later, and after much U.S. pressure, Japan—along with West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—agreed to devalue the dollar to make U.S. exports more attractive to their domestic consumers in what became known as the "Plaza Accords." Although this agreement signaled a U.S. victory, the American public continued to worry about threats to the U.S. economy. In November 1991, a Gallup national poll found that 77% of Americans considered that Japan represented an economic threat to the U.S.[401] Trade started to become a major U.S. national security issue in the years to come. Clinton turned it into an essential component of his U.S. national security strategy.

As then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton explained in a 1991 speech: "A little more than a generation ago, the world was a far simpler place. We could support free trade and open markets and still maintain a high wage economy because we were the only economic super-power."[402] Moreover, at the 1991 hearings on NAFTA, Democratic Senator Joe Lieberman complained that despite the U.S. winning the Cold War, "new superpowers are emerging now—economic superpowers—and we are at risk of losing trade wars in the competitive global marketplace because of our failure

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[400] National Security Decision Directive 154 (NSDD -154) *U.S.-Japan Trade Policy Relations* (December 31, 1984). Retrieved from https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-154.pdf.

[401] Gallup Organization. Gallup News Service Poll: 50th Anniversary of Pearl Harbor, Question 26. USGALLUP.1191W4.R25. Gallup Organization. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1991. Web. Nov-09-2012.

[402] Clinton, W. (1992). *Expanding Trade and Creating American Jobs: Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton* [Transcript]. https://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-science/speeches/clinton.dir/c151.txt.

to pursue effective export strategies" (U.S. Congress, 1991b. p. 12453). The Clinton administration's 1993 National Export Strategy—discussed in the previous section—was one of the answers to Liberman's plead. The strategy justified its push for active U.S. government involvement in helping the private sector by pointing out that "thirty years ago, US business dominated world markets and did not need government support to succeed" (U.S. Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, 1993, p. 36).

Gradually throughout the nineties, barriers to trade and challenges to the U.S.-led neoliberal economic system increasingly became national security threats. President Bush's 1990 NSS explained that the U.S. must "ensure that market forces are free to operate at home and abroad, and that trade expands" (p. 22). At the same time and preluding the Clinton administration's strong national security focus on trade and economic issues, it argued that the country must address "the protection of intellectual property, trade-related investment measures, and market access" (p. 22).

By 1998, President Clinton's NSS went even further by seeking to "prevent criminal exploitation of international trade by interdicting illegal technology exports, preventing unfair and predatory trade practices, protecting intellectual property rights" (p. 17). The second report of USCNS/21, published in 2000, established five specific criteria for when the U.S. must "be prepared to act militarily," among them, "when access to resources critical to the global economic system is imperiled" (p. 13).[403]

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[403] The other four criteria are: "when U.S. allies or friends are imperiled; when the prospect of weapons of mass destruction portends significant harm to civilian populations; when a regime has demonstrated intent to do serious harm to U.S. interests; when genocide is occurring."

The U.S. national security apparatus's inclusion of economic issues as threats to the neoliberal economic order expanded its scope of intervention. Fighting issues like barriers to trade, property rights theft, and setting a goal of preventing illegal activities which "impede rational business decisions and fair competition in a market economy" (NSS-2000, p. 26) became part of national security governance. Thus, "preventing" national security threats—particularly at source nations—turned into another rationalization for direct U.S. intervention everywhere. As the Clinton administration's 1993 Defense Bottom-Up Review argued, "the new dangers and opportunities of the post-Cold War world require the United States to act proactively to protect and enhance its national security. We must seek not only to counter threats to our security as they arise, but to prevent them from occurring in the first place" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1993b, p. 71).

Another important shift that has helped expand the U.S. national security apparatus since then has been a global redefinition of nation-states' security issues from military to non-military. In 1992, the UN Security Council met under the theme "The Responsibility of the Security Council in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security." It issued a statement, echoing Bush's quest for a new world order, where it pointed out that "the ending of the Cold War has raised hopes for a safer, more equitable and more humane world" (p. 1).[404] However, the statement warned that the "absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace

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[404] United Nations Security Council. "Note by the President of the Security Council," S/23500, 31 January 1992. Retrieved from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PKO%20S%2023500.pdf.

and security" (p. 3). Expanding the security scope, it advised that "the non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security" (p. 3).

Another key moment in the global broadening of the security concept came about through the United Nations Development Programme's 1994 "Human Development Report." Complaining that "the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states," relating "more to nation-states than to people" (p. 3), the report introduced the concept of "human security," which has come to dominate developing and modernization Western-led global governance paradigms ever since.[405] In a nutshell, the document claims that "human security" is a concept that is universal, common to all mankind, and is centered on people instead of the needs of nation-states. Resembling neoliberal attacks on the primary functions of the state, it "stresses that people should be able to take care of themselves" (p. 24) and that "universalism implies the empowerment of people" (p. 13).

Advocating for "equality of opportunity, not equality of income" (p. 14), the report praises the "development" promises of a linked global economy. In this respect, according to the document, "the new design of development cooperation must be broadened to include all the international flows, not just aid" since "the most significant non-aid flows are private investment, labour and international trade and finance" (p.

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[405] In 2012, the UN General Assembly adopted the human security framework through resolution A/Res/66/290. In 2022, the UNDP published what they called a "special report," titled: *New threats to Human Security in the Anthropocene: Demanding Greater Solidarity* (Morrissey, & Morrissey, J. 2022), where it argued that "the concept of human security provides a unique perspective that is both insightful and fruitful in suggesting how to advance human development with less insecurity" (p. 14).

61). Resembling neoliberal thinkers such as Milton Friedman, the report argues that "in a liberal trading regime, most parties gain: markets are positive-sum games" (p. 64), urging that, in the building of a new world order, it was "now time to make a transition from the narrow concept of national security to the all-encompassing concept of human security" (p. 24).

While the document admits that the "list of threats to human security is long, it groups them into seven sectors: (1) Economic; (2) Food; (3) Health; (4) Environmental; (5) Personal; (6) Community; and (7) Political. The list of threats is indeed long and, according to the report, it includes trade barriers, "unequal access to global market opportunities" (p. 35), migration pressures, drug trafficking, and international terrorism. Albeit centered on people, the report argues that "threats to human security are no longer just personal or local or national. They are becoming global: with drugs, AIDS, terrorism, pollution, nuclear proliferation" (p. 2). If threats are indeed "global" and the needs and wants of people are indeed "universal," the responsibility inevitably falls on nation-states and international institutions to combat those threats to protect and enhance "human security."

In this respect, Voelkner (2013) argues that if we view human security as a form of governmentality, it "gives rise to security practices that reconstitute existing forms of political subjectivity including the state and sovereignty, the human and international order, engendering new iterations of the latter" (p. 203). Despite its people-centered approach, the same year when the UN General Assembly unanimously agreed to "discussing and defining the notion of human security" (article 143), it also adopted

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the "responsibility to protect (R2P)" framework.[406] R2P directs nation-states with the responsibility to "protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (article 138) and the international community with helping "to protect" (article 139). That is to say, more security powers to nation-states and international organizations to promote and empower "human security."

Throughout the nineties, in the so-called "end of history period," academia also got on board with expanding the security concept to include non-military threats through what became known as the "Copenhagen School of Security Studies" (see Chapter 2). The school broadened the security agenda to five sectors: (1) military; (2) environmental; (3) economic; (4) political; and (5) societal. Moreover, in the decades that followed, academia has embraced the human security concept, thus providing theoretical support to expand the security powers of nation-states and Western-led international organizations.

Criticizing the human security framework, Mark Neocleous (2008) focuses on the 1994 UNDP report's emphasis on the need to provide "protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of our daily lives—whether in our homes, in our jobs, in our communities" (p. 3). As Neocleous argues, this framing turns "all human being and social interaction into a security problematic (neatly handing them over, of course, to the institutions which like to claim the power and right to secure)" (p. 6).

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[406] United Nations General Assembly. "Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005" A/RES/60/1 24 October 2005. Retrieved from
https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/1.

The 2022 UNDP Development Report (Morrissey, & Morrissey, 2022) boasts that "many national governments and international organizations, as well as civil society and academia, have devoted considerable energy and resources to making human security a central part of the debate on international cooperation" (p. 25). The report points out that "a review of the academic literature on human security shows that the first and most obvious success of the human security approach was the fundamental challenge it represented to traditional security" (p. 36).

The U.S. national security apparatus was on board with these trends. The 1992 Military Strategy cautioned that, in the post-Cold War era, "the real threat we now face is the threat of the unknown, the uncertain" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1992, p. 3). President Bill Clinton, in his 1998 preface to the NSS, pointed out that, while globalization provides "an unprecedented opportunity to build new bonds among individuals and nations," (p. iii), the document added that it also "enables other states, terrorists, criminals, drug traffickers, and others to challenge the safety of our citizens and the security of our borders in new ways" (p. 2). Under this rationale, the emergence of "unknown" threats, in the midst of neoliberal globalization, becomes limitless. Consequently, the U.S. national security apparatus must expand to respond to these new challenges.

Among the "known"—and older—threats, the Clinton Administration continued Ronald Reagan's designation of drug trafficking and terrorism as U.S. national security threats. However, Clinton placed more emphasis on the prevention of these illegal activities in source countries. Regarding drug trafficking, the U.S. national

security apparatus focused most of its actions on Latin America. In late 1993, the Clinton administration issued PDD/NSC-14 *U.S. Policy on International Counternarcotics in the Western Hemisphere*. The document pointed out that, in the fight against drug trafficking, the U.S. would "engage in a gradual shift of emphasis for our own activities from the transit zone to the source countries" (p. 3).[407]

Regarding terrorism, in 1995, the Clinton Administration issued PDD/NSC-39 *U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism*. The document outlined that the U.S. would "endeavor to prevent or pre-empt terrorists acts," (p. 5) "whether they occur domestically, in international waters or airspace or on foreign territory" (p. 1).[408] For example, the so-called Plan Colombia, signed into law by President Clinton in 2000, has allowed the U.S. national security apparatus to combat both drug-trafficking and leftist guerrillas at the source, among others, through military equipment and training.

As part of the new transnational threats brought about by globalization, the Clinton administration placed a special emphasis on (1) rogue/failed states, (2) international organized crime, and (3) international migration. According to NSS-1996, rogue states are those "whose policies are consistently hostile to the United States" (p. 24). It even argued that "the destructive forces we face inside our borders often have their origins overseas" (p. 13), i.e., Saldaña-Portillo's (2016) "indios bárbaros," or what this project refers to as "transnational Calibans."

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[407] Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-14 (PDD/NSC-14) *U.S. Policy on International Counternarcotics in the Western Hemisphere* (November 3, 1993). Retrieved from https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/pdd/pdd-14.pdf.
[408] Presidential Decision Directive /NSC-39 (PDD/NSC-39). *U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism*. (June 21, 1995). Retrieved from https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/pdd/pdd-39.pdf.

The strategy asserts that so-called "free and open societies" are more threatened by these regimes since, in the globalized economy, "money and people can move rapidly and easily" (p. 12). As Jessop (2016) argues, "the label 'rogue state' serves to denigrate states whose actions are considered by hegemonic or dominant states, notably by the United States, to threaten the prevailing international order" (p. 222). That is to say, the U.S.-led capitalist world order.

The label of "failed states" has been generally applied, as NSS-1998 explains, to those who are "unable to provide basic governance, services and opportunities for their populations." That is, those countries that have been unable to successfully implement neoliberal policies and western governance frameworks. For example, under this rationale, the fight against corruption became an important national security concern. The Clinton administration's 1994 NSS asked how the U.S. could "help consolidate and enlarge democracy and markets" (p. 19) in third world countries. According to the document, by helping "these nations strengthen the pillars of civil society, improve their market institutions, and fight corruption and political discontent through practices of good governance" (p. 20).

A few months after the publication of NSS-1994, the Clinton administration issued PDD/NSC-28 (1994) *U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean*, which identified "corruption" as a major obstacle in the "liberalization" and "deregulation" of the region's economies and the stabilization of democracy.[409] At the

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[409] Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-28 (PDD/NSC-28) *U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (September 8, 1994). Retrieved from https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/pdd/pdd-28.pdf.

end of that year, the Summit of the America's Plan of Action, while arguing that corruption "weakens democracy" committed to the "modernization of the state, including deregulation, privatization and the simplification of government procedures" to reduce "the opportunities for corruption."[410]

Almost forty years later, the Biden administration, using similar arguments, established the fight against corruption "as a core United States national security interest"[411] (2021) both domestically and internationally. According to the directive, corruption distorts markets, widens inequality, and threatens democracy. Under this rationale, it is not the economic system that has caused these problems; it is poor governance that has caused the global economic disparities and the growing mistrust in Western-led liberal democracy.

With the expansion of the security agenda during the nineties, the fight against "international crime" also became part of the U.S. national security apparatus. In October 1995, the Clinton Administration issued PDD/NSC-42 *International Organized Crime*, where it made the case that criminal enterprises, due to the international openness brought about by globalization, "are not only a law enforcement problem, they are a threat to national security."[412] Among its directives, this national

[410] Organization of American States. Department of International Legal Affairs. (1994). *First Summit of the Americas: Plan of Action.* http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/PlanI.html.
[411] The White House. (2021). "Memorandum on Establishing the Fight Against Corruption as a Core United States National Security Interest." (June 3, 2021). https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/06/03/memorandum-on-establishing-the-fight-against-corruption-as-a-core-united-states-national-security-interest/.
[412] Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-42 (PDD/NSC-42). *International Organized Crime* (October 21, 1995). Retrieved from https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/pdd/pdd-42.pdf.

security document instructed the U.S. national security apparatus to "cooperate with, assist and encourage other nations" to fight organized crime.

In June 1998, the Clinton administration issued its "International Crime Control Strategy," where it directed the U.S. government—among eight goals—to "extend the first line of defense beyond U.S. Borders" (goal 3) and to "foster International Cooperation and the Rule of Law" (goal 7).[413] This framing, as in the cases of drug trafficking and terrorism—has helped the U.S. to legitimize its interventions around the world in the name of protecting U.S. national security.

Moreover, goal five of the Clinton administration's "International Crime Control Strategy" was the prevention of "Criminal Exploitation of International Trade." Among the five priorities that the Clinton administration identified for this goal was the protection of "Intellectual Property Rights" and the prevention of "Unfair and Predatory Trade Practices in Violation of U.S. Criminal Law." Since international crime had already been identified as a national security threat to the U.S. through PDD/NSC-42 (1995), fighting what the U.S. national security apparatus considered "international trade crimes" became part of the U.S. national security agenda. Furthermore, preventing these national security threats and fighting them at source countries became a priority.

In 2000, the Clinton administration established the "National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center" (IPR Center) under the jurisdiction of the now-

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[413] The While House (1998). *International Crime Control Strategy*. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/iccs/iccstoc.html.

extinct United States Customs Service. At the 1999 Congressional Hearings, where the creation of the IRP Center was announced, Lieutenant General Gordon Sumner, who was called as an expert witness on intellectual property theft, stated that he couldn't "think of a subject that is more important, not only to the country but to the national security of the country than this subject today…the wealth of this Nation is not found in the smokestacks in the industrial base; it is our intellectual property" (U.S. Congress, 1999, p . 24).

Post 9/11, the IRP Center became part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency. After all, Bush's 2002 NSS had already established that "terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose" (p. 6). In this vein, Neocleous (2016) argues that "the cry of 'piracy!' is a capitalist expression of fear, and whenever capital articulates a new fear new forms of police power are usually created" (p. 133) to protect and advance capital accumulation. However, as Neocleous points out, "if piracy means using the concepts and ideas of others without their permission, then the history of every form of creative industry is part of the history of piracy" (p. 132). The fight against piracy has given transnational corporations monopoly power globally over many products, as demonstrated, in our days, by the enormous profits that they have earned through the COVID-19 vaccines.

Throughout the nineties, international migration increasingly became part of the U.S. national security agenda. During the years of both the Reagan and Bush

administrations, large waves of non-European immigrants arrived in the United States. These migratory waves continued to grow throughout the nineties, particularly with the implementation of neoliberal policies and free trade agreements like NAFTA, which have caused the expulsion of millions of people worldwide ever since (Delgado-Wise, 2014; Sassen, 2014). The mediatic images of non-Europeans trying to enter the United States, coupled with the gradual disintegration of the Keynesian welfare state, placed immigration onto the national agenda.

Throughout the nineties, concerns about the survival of the U.S., based on cultural grounds, became part of the push against immigration. Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996) was perhaps the most academically articulated—and commented—study on what he deemed as the future dangers for Western civilization during this time. According to Huntington, immigration, particularly from third-world countries, was part of those threats to the so-called West.

However, there were other works—such as Kaplan's (described in this chapter's introduction)—that also made an impact during this time. For example, in 1990, conservative writer Lawrence Auster published *The Path to National Suicide: An Essay on Immigration and Multiculturalism* where he argued that if the U.S. and Europeans "continue the openness to Third World immigration, we may be witnessing the beginning of the end of Western civilization as a whole" (p. 63).

In October 1994, Democratic Senator Richard Shelby—who switched to the Republican party a month later—read into the congressional record an essay by Dan

Stein, executive director of the Federation for American Immigration Reform, titled: "Population, Migration and America: Is Immigration a Threat to National Security?'" In it, Stein argued that while there were large migratory waves before, "immigrant groups came primarily from Northern European nations, with the Enlightenment traditions of Western Civilization." According to his assessment, if immigration is not controlled, "national cohesion will evaporate" and the U.S. "will cease to be a nation" (U.S. Congress, 1994b).

The New Democrats' answer to these migratory waves was punitive escalation and the criminalization of international migration, in what Murakawa (2014) has referred to as the "era of big punishment." Moreover, the Clinton administration increasingly placed international migration into the realm of the U.S. national security apparatus. In 1993, President Clinton issued PDD/NSC-9 *Alien Smuggling* to counteract the growing number of immigrants arriving in the U.S. The document was issued twelve days after Chinese immigrants drowned when the freighter Golden Venture ran aground on a beach in New York.[414]

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[414] During this time, the fight against "human trafficking" also became part of the governance realm of the U.S. national security apparatus. Increasingly, the figure of the "human trafficker" has allowed the U.S. government to blame human traffickers and smugglers for endangering the lives of immigrants attempting to cross the U.S. border. Under this logic, structural problems that force migrants to risk their lives to improve their socioeconomic conditions and U.S. restrictive migration laws and militarized border enforcement schemes do not play a part (Salazar Parreñas et al., 2012; De Genova, 2015). For example, in 2017, ten immigrants died of heat inside a truck after crossing the U.S. border illegally. Responding to this tragedy, then-DHS Secretary John F. Kelly quickly blamed smugglers by pointing out that "this tragedy demonstrates the brutality of the network of which I often speak. These smugglers have no regard for human life and seek only profits." In Statement by Secretary John F. Kelly on Texas Smuggling Incident (July 23, 2917). Department of Homeland Security, Archived Content. https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/07/23/statement-secretary-john-f-kelly-texas-smuggling-incident. Moreover, Walters (2011) has also shown how the discourse of humanitarianism and protecting human rights has also served to further militarized the border. In 2019, the Trump administration framed its efforts to ramp up border enforcement schemes not only in terms of protecting U.S. national security but also to protect "minors and families at extreme risk of being

PDD/NSC-9 (1993) directed the government to "take the necessary measures to preempt, interdict and deter alien smuggling into the U.S.,"[415] thus turning these efforts into national security policy. Among others, it charged the Department of Defense with supporting the U.S. Coast Guard in interdiction efforts and making its military facilities available for the incarceration of undocumented migrants. In line with the Clinton administration's emphasis on "prevention" and combatting national security issues at source nations, the document pointed out that the U.S. "will deal with the problem at its source, in transit, at our borders and within the U.S." As in the case with drug-trafficking, international crime, trade issues, and terrorism, this framing expanded the scope of U.S. interventions abroad on national security grounds.

Facing mounting pressure, the Clinton administration issued in 1994 a report titled: *Accepting the Immigration Challenge: The President's Report on Immigration*, which outlined his initiatives to fight illegal immigration (Clinton, 1994). In his foreword, Clinton blamed previous administrations by arguing that he "inherited a difficult problem—a legacy of more than 3.5 million illegal immigrants, uncontrolled movement across the Southwest border, and growing concern about the State and local fiscal impact of illegal immigration" (p. iii).

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exploited by traffickers, human smugglers, gangs, and other nefarious actors seeking to profit at their expense." In Humanitarian and Security Crisis at Southern Border Reaches 'Breaking Point' (March 6, 2019). Department of Homeland Security. Archived Content. https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/03/06/humanitarian-and-security-crisis-southern-border-reaches-breaking-point.

[415] Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-9 (PDD/NSC-9) *Alien Smuggling* (June 18, 1993). Retrieved from https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/pdd/pdd-9.pdf.

The report, using as an example the isolated incident of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, directly linked international terrorism and crime to foreigners manipulating the U.S. immigration system. But even more than that, the Clinton administration also viewed the control of migratory flows as part of his security agenda to promote neoliberal globalization. The report argued that the U.S.' "ability to lead in the post-Cold War world community demands the border integrity that will support new international economic initiatives such as the North American Free Trade Agreement. As a first principle of our immigration system, border integrity involves a proper balance between controlling movement and facilitating exchange" (Clinton, 1994, p. 8).

During this time, the Clinton administration passed laws such as the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, and the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. These bills, taken together, increased budgets, strengthened border control, provided more policing powers to diverse agencies, facilitated the imprisonment and deportations of immigrants, and created new partnerships between local police and the Defense Department. Regarding the latter, *The New York Times* reported that Rahm I. Emanuel, a White House aide who handled immigration policy, commented that the joint actions of the armed forces and law enforcement officers at

the Southern border were "'consistent with their mandate in protecting national security.'"[416]

In their final report, USCNS/21 (2001) also deemed controlling immigration and managing the border part of national security governance. In fact, they recommended that border and immigration control should become part of a new homeland security agency. Alden (2008) points out that USCNS/21, in terms of border security, proposed that the U.S. "needed to push its borders outward…the United States needed to work with foreign countries to analyze potential threats before they arrived at American shores. The actual border would serve as a last line of defense rather than as the first and only line" (p. 39).

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, immigration management became part of the U.S. national security apparatus. Its functions were transferred from the Department of Justice and the Treasury Department to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). On October 29, 2001, President George H. W. Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2 *Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies*,[417] which directly made the link between international migration, international terrorism, and the so-called 'War on Terror." In a bipartisan fashion, DHS has been gradually extending the U.S. border overseas.

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[416] Pear, R. (1996, January 13). U.S. strengthening patrols along the Mexican Border. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/13/us/us-strengthening-patrols-along-the-mexican-border.html.
[417] Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2: "Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies" (October 29, 2001). https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011030-2.html.

Former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security under the Obama administration, Janet Napolitano, in her 2019 *How Safe Are We?: Homeland Security Since 9/11*, offers important insights on the development of these trends. As Napolitano explains: "pushing out to the borders was the principle we extended from the Bush years to better secure the homeland. Another helpful thing about this concept was that it applied just as well to illegal immigration as to terrorism prevention" (p. 96). As an example, she boasted that during her tenure, DHS "worked with authorities in Mexico to secure their southern border with Guatemala. That way, we established a first line of defense to stem the migrant flow from countries that did not even share a border with the United States" (p. 97).

In the growth of the U.S. national security agenda, the Clinton administration made another important contribution that set the course for the expansion of the U.S. national security apparatus into the domestic sphere. Since its inception, the protection of U.S. national security had been generally understood by the American public as a guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy. However, even as a presidential candidate, Clinton had insisted that "national security begins at home."[418] Furthermore, the 1994 NSS pointed out that "the line between our domestic and foreign policies has increasingly disappeared." The protection of the "homeland," that is, the inclusion of national security doctrine as a guiding principle of U.S. domestic policy, became institutionalized during this time. According to Christos Boukalas (2014), "the term

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[418] Clinton, W. (1991). *Announcement Speech* [Transcript]. http://www.4president.org/speeches/billclinton1992announcement.htm.

'homeland' made an inconspicuous appearance in 1995, in a report by the Senate Committee on the Armed Forces" (p. 117).

In 1998, the Clinton administration issued PDD/NSC-62 *Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas*, which pointed out that because of the U.S.' global military dominance, "potential enemies, be they nations, terrorist groups, or criminal organizations are increasingly likely to attack us in unconventional ways."[419] Echoing PDD/NSC-62, the first report of USCNS/21 argued that "America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military superiority will not entirely protect us" (1999, p. 141).

In Phase Three of their report, the Commission went as far as to say "that the security of the American homeland from the threats of the new century should be the primary national security mission of the U.S. government" (2001, p. 9). As part of their conclusions, the Commission recommended the creation of a "National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security" (2001, p. 14). The report, seeking Western Liberal democracy's balance between liberty and security, noted that this new agency must "rest firmly within the array of Constitutional guarantees for civil liberties" (2001, p. xiii).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil legitimized—and sped up—the institutionalization and implementation of such agency with bipartisan majority

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[419] Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-62 (PDD/NSC-62). *Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas* (May 22, 1998). Retrieved from https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/pdd/pdd-62.pdf.

support. In 2002, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established, initiating the most extensive restructuring of the federal government since another national security law, the 1947 National Security Act, prompted such reorganization (see chapter 5). Only nine senators voted against the bill.

DHS has been curtailing civil liberties and advancing the neoliberal project in the name of protecting U.S. national security ever since (Boukalas, 2014; Gonzales, 2016). It is worth pointing out that USCNS/21 (1999) acknowledged that, with economic globalization, "problems of income distribution within the United States could become significant" (p. 123) and that "an American economic underclass will not disappear and may even grow" (p. 125) in the years to come.

In this respect, when analyzing the U.S. homeland security project, Boukalas (2014) points out that homeland security has become "the support mechanism of neoliberal social organization and accumulation. It has reshaped the state and law, endowing them with the ultimate solution to social antagonism: a legal, ideological, and military mechanism designed for open warfare against social opposition, actual and anticipated" (p. 221). For example, as reported by *The Guardian,* leaked documents showed that the Department of Homeland Security was involved in countering the 2018 Keystone XL protests, which sought to stop the construction of the oil pipeline and prevent its negative effects on Indigenous lands.[420]

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[420] Parrish, W., & and Levin, S. (2018, September 20). Treating protest as terrorism: US plans crackdown on Keystone XL activists. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/sep/20/keystone-pipeline-protest-activism-crackdown-standing-rock.

7.4. Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the U.S. national security apparatus rationalized the need to consolidate U.S. global hegemony to protect its national security in the post-Cold War period. In the advancement of U.S.-led neoliberal globalization, economic issues rose to the forefront of national security doctrine during this time. Consequently, the nineties witnessed the worldwide promotion of neoliberal principles of trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, with the required cultural political economic changes that these policies implied at the individual, societal, and transnational levels.

Among them, advancing Western liberal democracy as the "right"—and civilized— form of global governance (i.e., the "end of history"), furthering neoliberal economics as the only possible system (i.e., TINA),[421] and diminishing the Keynesian welfare state. Gradually, nation-states' priorities became promoting and securing the so-called "free market." At the individual and societal level, Margaret Thatcher's famous quote best summarizes these essential neoliberal changes: "there's no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look after themselves first."[422]

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[421] TINA refers to Margaret Thatcher's famous quote: "There is No Alternative," when defending the implementation of neoliberal policies.

[422] As Thatcher explained in yet another famous quote: "Economics are the method: the object is to change the soul."

Since the nineties, securing U.S.-led neoliberal globalization became a central component of the U.S. national security apparatus regardless of which party held executive power. Was the U.S.' bipartisan pursuit of global hegemony, free-market globalization, and the westernization of the world new issues for the U.S. national security apparatus? As this dissertation has shown in previous chapters, they were not. However, these issues, while very present in the U.S. national security agenda, were somehow overshadowed by the Cold War, at least in the public's eyes.

With the decline of the Soviet Union and the weakening of the U.S. economy both domestically and internationally, public perceptions started to change. For example, the American public, when a national poll asked them in March 1991 if the biggest threat to the country was the military threat from the Soviet Union or the economic threat from Germany, 54% responded that the latter.[423] Taking advantage of these trends, it was a democratic president, Bill Clinton, who placed economic issues at the forefront and made them explicit in the national security agenda.

Domestically, it was also President Clinton, under the banners of "third-way politics" and a "new mixed economy," which ended "welfare as we know it,"[424] a project that had been historically led by the Republican party. Regarding the rise of the New Democrats, Clinton explained in his 1992 acceptance nomination speech that: "the choice we offer is not conservative or liberal; in many ways it's not even Republican or

[423] Business Week Magazine (1991). Business Week Magazine Poll: March 1991, Question 16 [USHARRBW.040191.R09]. Louis Harris & Associates. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[424] Clinton, W. (1993). *State of the Union Address* [Transcript]. https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/state-of-the-union-address-1993/.

Democratic. It's different. It's new."[425] Was the so-called third-way "different"? Was it, indeed, "new"? Another Thatcher's quote provides great insight into how different and new the third-way really was. Twelve years after she left office, when asked what her greatest achievement was, Thatcher replied: "Tony Blair and New Labour. We forced our opponents to change their minds." Can the same be said about New Labour's special partners, the New Democrats?

Nancy Fraser (2019) has argued that the election of Bill Clinton started an era of what she terms "progressive neoliberalism." That is, the full implementation of neoliberal economic policies, coupled with promoting the inclusion of minority and subaltern groups into the neoliberal market. As Fraser explains: "The progressive-neoliberal bloc combined an expropriative, plutocratic economic program with a liberal-meritocratic politics of recognition…the classes that led this bloc aimed to liberalize and globalize the capitalist economy" (p. 9). The New Democrats, according to Fraser, drew "on progressive forces from civil society, they diffused a recognition ethos that was superficially egalitarian and emancipatory. At the core of this ethos were ideals of 'diversity,' women's 'empowerment,' LGBTQ+ rights, postracialism, multiculturalism, and environmentalism" (p. 10).

Subsequently, under the New Democrats and in the years that followed, class struggle became the struggle to be included in the neoliberal market regardless of sex, sexual orientation, gender, race, and/or nationality. Since then, mainstream American

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[425] In their own words; transcript of speech by Clinton accepting Democratic nomination. (1992, July 17). *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/17/news/their-own-words-transcript-speech-clinton-accepting-democratic-nomination.html.

society has celebrated that certain private and public leadership positions, such as Secretary of Defense or CEO of a major corporation, are now occupied by minorities. However, these figures not only do not represent a challenge to the neoliberal cultural political economic system, but they also serve to advance it. Echoing Gramsci, Indigenous scholar Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (2010) has argued that by incorporating— i.e., including—minority groups into the mainstream, the neoliberal state is able to reduce conflicts and advance its project. She has defined this strategy as "*cambiar para que nada cambie*" (p. 62).

The implementation of neoliberal policies started a trend of poverty, inequality, concentration of power, the growth of transnational corporations, and the fraying of the middle-classes both in the Global North and in the Global South. As Clinton's national security apparatus argued throughout this time, challenges to U.S.-led neoliberal globalization became national security threats that must be fought against. Moreover, the losers of the new economy needed to either improve their so-called "human capital" or face the securitizing domestic trend established in this period, which took the form of, among others, more imprisonment, more police, militarized law-enforcement techniques and equipment, and a weakening of the safety net.

The U.S. national security apparatus played an important role not only as the "strong arm of capital," but also in rationalizing the need for U.S. world hegemony in terms of the nation's survival and the protection of the "homeland." The addition of the "homeland" to national security doctrine was another important contribution that the Clinton administration made during its tenure. This inclusion does not mean that

national security doctrine had not permeated the domestic realm before Clinton. There is a long-documented history of national security practices inside the U.S., as exemplified by the findings of the 1975 Church Commission. At the domestic level, the Commission's final report provided specific details, among others, on the clandestine espying of U.S. citizens, the manipulation of the media, and even human experimentation.

Moreover, as this dissertation has argued in previous chapters, while national security doctrine was perceived as a guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy, the end goal, as constantly repeated by previous presidents regardless of their party affiliation, was "the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure" (NSS-1988, p. 3). President Clinton explicitly incorporated national security doctrine into the domestic realm without much opposition. How was the Clinton administration able to expand the U.S. national security apparatus when it no longer had the existential threat that the Soviet Union represented to the country?

As this chapter has shown, Clinton continued a process initiated by previous administrations, which started to gradually incorporate more issues into the realm of national security governance. Clinton effectively used the U.S.' weakening economy to place economic issues at the forefront of national security doctrine. It is under this rationale that the passing of the North American Free Trade Agreement became a crucial objective of the U.S. national security apparatus. The arguments in favor of NAFTA were framed in terms of protecting and advancing U.S. national security.

NAFTA would not only improve the U.S. domestic economy but was also seen as a symbol to advance neoliberal globalization for the prosperity of the country. During the Clinton administration, the economic well-being of the U.S. became intrinsically tied to U.S. global leadership, the implementation of neoliberal policies worldwide (i.e., the "enlargement" of market economies), and actively combatting threats to the political economic order.

Moreover, while the Clinton administration promoted to the American public the wonders of a linked global economy, it also warned that globalization also brings about "transnational" threats—a word that entered U.S. national security lexicon during this period—that "challenge the safety of our citizens and the security of our borders in new ways" (NSS-1998, p. 2). As NSS-1996 argues, "transnational problems which once seemed quite distant, like environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, rapid population growth and refugee flows, now pose threats to our prosperity and have security implications for both present and long-term American policy" (p. 1).

These transnational threats must therefore be fought against domestically and internationally. Following this rationale and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil, the 9/11 Commission (2004) argued that "from terrorism to global disease or environmental degradation" (pp. 361-362),[426] threats to the U.S. "have become transnational rather than international" (p. 362). "It is in this sense," the document claimed that "the American homeland is the planet" (p. 362). However, it was not

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[426] The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (2004). *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.* https://9-11commission.gov/report/.

enough to fight these transnational threats at home and abroad. Threats must also be "prevented" at source, a rationale that the subsequent Bush administration not only adopted but also expanded through the doctrine of "preemptive war."

Despite the Clinton administration's expansion of the U.S. national security apparatus, the American public regarded republicans as better on defense and crime. During the Bush versus Gore presidential elections, the American public, to the question: "Regardless of your choice for president (in 2000), who do you think would do a better job of providing a strong military defense--George Bush or Al Gore?" 62% answered in favor of Bush.[427] Moreover, and despite the toughness of Biden's crime bill, 51% of Americans believed that Bush would be better at handling crime, against the 30% who answered Gore.[428] Republicans also criticized the Clinton administration's apparent lack of commitment to deal with national security issues.

In 1997, a neoconservative think tank called the Project for a New American Century was formed, and it included figures such as Dick Cheney, Elliot Abrahams, and Francis Fukuyama. In 2000, they issued a report titled: *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century* (Kagan et al., 2000), which closely resembled Cheney's 1992 leaked Defense Department document published by *The New York Times*. Arguing that they were concerned with what they assessed as "the decline in the strength of America's defenses" (p. i), they called for a

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[427] Los Angeles Times (2000). Los Angeles Times Poll # 2000-445: Presidential Election/Core Campaign Issues, Question 34 [USLAT.092700.R41]. Los Angeles Times. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

[428] Harris Interactive (2000). Harris Interactive Poll: October 2000, Question 12 [USHARRIS.110300.R2A]. Harris Interactive. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

"larger framework of U.S. national security strategy, military missions and defense budgets" (p. 50).

According to the document, in the post-Cold war period, U.S. military strength was necessary to maintain a unipolar U.S.-led world and a "pax americana" to defend the homeland and to "preserve an international security environment conducive to American interests and ideals" (p. 2). What were those interests and ideals? Just like the Clinton administration, the report pointed to the "spread of American principles of liberty and democracy" (p. 1). It also pointed out that, with the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. military's main objectives were to "secure and expand the 'zones of democratic peace'" and to "deter the rise of a new great-power competitor" (p. 2). The 9/11 terrorist attacks provided the necessary resources, both in terms of the consent of the American public and limitless funding, to advance these goals and to continue the growth and expansion of the U.S. national security apparatus in our present day.

8. Conclusion

> Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all.
> –Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, 1776

> The survival of the Soviet system depends to a significant extent upon the persistent and exaggerated representation of foreign threats, through which it seeks to justify both the subjugation of its own people and the expansion of Soviet military capabilities well beyond those required for self-defense.
> –U.S. Basic National Security Strategy, 1986[429]

> Let's get this straight: How would it be if the United States were viewed by the rest of the world as interfering with the elections directly of other countries, and everybody knew it?
> –President Joe Biden, 2021

In late 2020, despite the partisan divide, mediatic fights, and hyperbolic language that characterized the Trump administration, Republican and Democratic senators joined forces to override President Trump's veto of the 2021 defense bill. Also with strong bipartisan support, President Biden has increased the budgets of the subsequent 2022 and 2023 NDAAs. What prompts such bipartisan support? Why does the U.S. need to maintain the largest military forces around the world? Why has it meddled, as confirmed by leaked and declassified national security documents, in other countries' internal affairs? This dissertation, through a genealogical analysis of U.S. national security, has shown how existential threat narratives and the pursuit of civilizing missions (e.g., the exportation of freedom and democracy and trade

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[429] National Security Decision Directive Number 238 (NSDD-238). *Basic National Security Strategy*. (September 2, 1986). Retrieved from https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-238.pdf.

liberalization) have legitimized the global expansion of U.S. capitalism as a matter of national survival.

Despite the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security apparatus has continued its growth and expansion ever since. Once understood as a guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy, this project has shown that, at its core, national security doctrine is an essential component of U.S. domestic strategy to protect the country's well-being. This dissertation has also argued that "security" is an intrinsic part of the U.S.-led Western liberal project. While the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil do help to understand the securitizing trends of the past twenty years, this dissertation has focused its analysis on the origins of U.S. national security through the Clinton years. In doing so, this project has shown that U.S. securitizing trends had already been taking place before 9/11 despite the U.S. having no existential enemy in sight.

A genealogical analysis of the roots and bipartisan articulations of U.S. national security doctrine has helped to shed light on the rationalities that have prompted an expansion of the U.S. national security apparatus and the cultural political economic agenda behind these rationalities. The local imaginary of protecting U.S. national security has been intrinsically tied to a larger, hegemonic project. That is, the U.S. global design of advancing capitalism and securing a U.S.-led global order to ensure the country's survival. This project argues that the Clinton years helped to consolidate the project that the U.S. national security apparatus developed since its inception. Defense—that is, defending from something, reacting to a threat—was not enough for

the framers of national security doctrine. The U.S.' "national security" project became about securing a domestic and global environment that has sought to serve and advance U.S. domestic interests and priorities.

The Clinton administration embraced Reagan's agenda of U.S.-led neoliberal globalization to protect U.S. national security. The so-called New Democrat's "third way" effectively translated into a closer—and explicit—partnership between the U.S. government, U.S. transnational corporations, and the Republican party. Clinton also expanded the U.S. national security apparatus' efforts to impose American-style free-market capitalism and Western liberal democracy through the active "engagement" of the U.S. in world affairs and the "enlargement" of free-market economies. The "civilized" world became those who followed and advanced these tenets. Threats to the U.S.-led post-Cold War neoliberal order became part of the U.S. national security agenda as they were deemed "existential." Protecting and advancing the neoliberal order and ensuring the survival of the United States became intertwined.

Since then, challenges to the cultural political economic neoliberal system have been pushed to the periphery as the political spectrum has moved more to the right. The "New Democrats" abandoned the party's traditional quest for achieving—at least rhetorically—a gentler form of capitalism and have actively pursued neoliberal globalization. Ironically, in mainstream America, the "left" has become the progressive neoliberals' "New Democrats," nowadays represented by Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Joe Biden. Senator Bernie Sanders and Representative Alexandra Ocasio-

Cortez, who essentially advocate for a return to a sort of new deal capitalism—the "old" Democrats—have become the "radical left."

In the past decades, class struggle has been gradually reduced to a struggle for neoliberal market access coupled with a politics of recognition under a cultural political economic system that restricts both the terms and content of the conversation—what Fisher (2009) has defined as "capitalist realism." The U.S. national security apparatus has embraced this trend. For example, Raytheon Technologies, one of the largest recipients of defense contracts, boasts about its "diversity, equity, and inclusion"[430] programs that contribute, according to them, to "meaningful change" in society. A 2020 Department of Defense "diversity and inclusion" report recommends the preparation of courses "aligned to warfare specialties that are underrepresented" (p. 64).

The CIA is also recruiting more minorities since the agency points out that "our national security mission demands a broad range of perspectives, ethnicities, backgrounds, and experiences,"[431] just like certain immigrants have also served the same purpose. A 1997 U.S. government report argued that immigration could also have positive effects in advancing U.S. national security. Immigrants, the report argues, can be "a valuable source of intelligence…they can fundraise and supply opposition political movements supported by the United States and in the extreme case, such as the Bay of Pigs, provide the personnel for military action or covert operations against

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[430]Raytheon Technologies, "Diversity, Equity & Inclusion Progress." https://www.rtx.com/social-impact/diversity-equity-inclusion/diversity-equity-inclusion-report#:~:text=Raytheon%20Technologies%20is%20on%20par,our%20percentage%20in%20both%20areas.

[431] Central Intelligence Agency. "Diversity and Inclusion." https://www.cia.gov/careers/working-at-cia/diversity/.

U.S. enemies" (Franzblau & U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997, p. 4). As President Biden's 2021 Interim National Security Guidance points out, the U.S. "will modernize our national security institutions and processes, while ensuring we take advantage of the full diversity of talents required to address today's complex challenges" (p. 6).[432]

Enmeshed in ever-growing cultural wars that provide no real structural challenge, the West and its satellites (e.g., Latin America) have appeared to validate Thatcher's TINA assertion (i.e., "There is no alternative"). However, as the 21st century has shown us, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis, there are always alternatives. One alternative has been the rise of neofascist movements, particularly in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere, who exploit people's discontents by directing their frustrations onto immigrants, minorities, or anything that does not conform to a traditional—and idealized—image of the "nation." Another alternative to deal with neoliberal dislocations has been the strengthening of security apparatuses, police militarization, the growth of executive power, and the frequent use of national security laws to advance economic agendas.

There are many examples of these growing trends, ranging from U.S. immigrant enforcement schemes to the violent way the Colombian government handled its 2021 social protests against a proposed tax hike that exempted the upper classes.[433] Or, El

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[432] United States. (2021). *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
[433] Schmidt and Durán (2021, December 15). Colombia's riot police need 'profound transformation,' U.N. rights agency says. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/12/15/colombia-un-police-deaths/.

Salvador's 2022 presidential declaration of a "state of exception" to deal with gangs, but which has also been used to suppress voices[434] against President Bukele, the self-declared "world's coolest dictator."[435] In 2011, President Lula's government—one of the figures of the so-called "Pink Tide"—even used a law enacted during Brazil's dictatorship (i.e., Suspensão de Segurança) to advance the Belo Monte Hydroelectric project against Indigenous opposition under the guise of advancing Brazil's national security.[436]

Most recently, in late 2021, Mexican President Manuel Lopez Obrador decreed that Mexico's infrastructure projects are national security priorities.[437] One of the projects that fall under national security protections is the much resisted—particularly by Indigenous populations—"*tren maya*," due to its negative environmental impacts. In the 21st century, national security governance has become a key feature, a trend set in motion, as this dissertation has pointed out, after the so-called triumph of Western liberal democracy as "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and…as the final form of human government" (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 4). Ironically, national security

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[434] Human Rights Watch (2022, March 29). El Salvador: Amplio "régimen de excepción" facilita graves abusos. https://www.hrw.org/es/news/2022/03/29/el-salvador-amplio-regimen-de-excepcion-facilita-graves-abusos.

[435] Youkee, M. (2021, September 26). Nayib Bukele calls himself the 'world's coolest dictator' – but is he joking? *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/26/naybib-bukele-el-salvador-president-coolest-dictator.

[436] Brum, Eliane (2019, Octubre 24). Lula livre, sim, mas sem fraudar a história. *Diario El País.* https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2019/10/24/opinion/1571924140_406343.html.

[437] As published by *El Diario Oficial de la Federación*, the official goverment publication of Mexico, on November 22, 2021: "Acuerdo por el que se instruye a las dependencias y entidades de la Administración Pública Federal a realizar las acciones que se indican, en relación con los proyectos y obras del Gobierno de México considerados de interés público y seguridad nacional, así como prioritarios y estratégicos para el desarrollo nacional." Retrieved from https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5635985&fecha=22/11/2021.

governance, as an urgent life and death "reason of state" rationality, closes the possibility of democratic debate—a core value of Western liberal democracy—through the use of authoritarian solutions, if necessary, to advance a country's national security priorities.

Building on the Reagan administration's capitalism/democracy nexus and the triumphalism of the "end of history" thesis, the Clinton administration argued that economic globalization benefits all and promotes democracy around the world. As NSS-1994 contended, "the more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world…the safer our nation is likely to be" (p. 2). Democracy promotion—that is, Western liberal democracy—became a bipartisan staple of U.S. national security policy. The "end of history" project has required a U.S. national security apparatus that actively promotes and advances it. As Huntington (1991) argued, after the Cold War, "if the United States is to promote its interests in the new world, a first requirement is to create the institutional means to develop a more comprehensive approach to national security policy, to pull together what is foreign and domestic, and what is military and economic" (p. 15). As Chapter 7 has shown, Clinton integrated these aspects into the U.S. national security apparatus.

The Clinton administration also warned that globalization brings with it new and unknown threats, particularly from so-called "rogue" and "failed" states, that is, those who have not adopted Western liberal democracy as the only and right form of government or have failed to do so in the process. Moreover, during the nineties and with no real enemy in sight, the U.S. national security agenda was expanded to include

non-military, non-existential threats. As this dissertation has shown, for the most part, the international community and academia have supported these developments. Unsurprisingly, the construction of more threats has necessarily required the implementation of more security mechanisms and the consequent growth of the U.S. national security apparatus.

President Clinton continued George H. W. Bush's vision of constructing a U.S.-led new world order to protect U.S. national security. And, H. W. Bush pursued that same vision, shared, as this dissertation has shown, by previous U.S. presidents, at least since Truman. With the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. capitalism fully embraced its neoliberal phase. Before that, there was a general consensus, at least in the West, that the Keynesian welfare state was necessary to contain the excesses of the capitalist system. In the post-Cold War period, with the strongest military in the world and no enemy that could match it, implementing U.S.-led neoliberal globalization, with the cultural political economic changes that it entails (e.g., the spread of Western civilization, the promotion of individualism, the destruction of the welfare state, Western-led transnational instruments of governance), became a bipartisan component of U.S. national security doctrine.

Another President Bush, this time W., continued the bipartisan consensus on the integration of neoliberal economic policy into national security doctrine. President W. Bush's first national security strategy, NSS-2002, established that "free markets and free trade are key priorities of our national security strategy" (p. 23). Subsequent administrations have continued this bipartisan U.S.-led neoliberal globalizing trend,

particularly with the military power—and ever-growing defense budgets—that the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil have gradually provided for the U.S. national security apparatus ever since. However, as well documented by economic historian Michael Hudson (2021), "the U.S. position on liberalizing world trade has involved a double standard. America has insisted that other countries adhere to fixed principles of free trade, modified only by international agreements on tariffs and import quotas, while it alone is permitted to abrogate those principles and agreements unilaterally" (p. 285).

In the U.S., the implementation of neoliberal policies has resulted, among others, in the deepening of inequalities and the fraying of the middle-class. In this respect, and as political scientist Harold Lasswell (1971) feared, the U.S. has become a "garrison state," with the gradual erosion of civil liberties in the name of security to protect the cultural political economic order in place. Similar effects can be seen in other parts of the world, such as Europe and Latin America. Inevitably, to control these left-over populations (i.e., the losers of the system), the security side of Western liberal democracy has been gradually overshadowing its "liberal" (softer, consensus-building) side.

Greek intellectual Nicos Poulantzas identified these trends decades ago as he assessed how liberal democracy could no longer play its role in mediating the relationship between the dominant and dominated classes for capital accumulation. He argued that capitalism had entered an "authoritarian statism" phase, recognizing it even before neoliberal globalization became hegemonic and even before both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher took office in the U.S. and the United Kingdom,

respectively. As Poulantzas (2014) points out, "the paradox lies in the fact that authoritarian statism is not simply the means with which the State equips itself to tackle the crisis, but the response to a crisis which it itself helps to produce" (p. 212).

The implementation of neoliberal globalization has resulted in crisis after crisis all over the world. Perhaps the most salient global crises of our time—thus far—have been the 2008 Financial Crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. Western liberal democracy—with its endless quest to defend private property and capitalist-market relations—responded to the former by providing bailouts to banks to rescue the capitalist system and by throwing people who could not pay their mortgages out of their homes.

The COVID-19 crisis is still upon the world at the time of writing and its effects are not fully yet understood. Suffice to point out, to illustrate Western liberal democracy's limitations, that despite a global pandemic that has caused millions of deaths worldwide, it has refused to make the vaccines patent-free to protect corporate profits. The irony, of course, is that these vaccines have been developed—at the very least partially—with public money.

In yet another example (and irony), Western liberal democracy's answer to so-called anti-vaxxers has been to repress a core liberal value: freedom of speech. Blaming and repressing anti-vaxxers for their individual behaviors is much easier than asking why so many anti-vaxxers exist in the first place. That question, at the very minimum, would require an analysis of structural conditions, which could very well lead to

challenging the cultural political economic system that Western liberalism continues to defend and promote.

The U.S. national security apparatus' desire to create a U.S.-led new world order based on trade liberalization, Western-led transnational governance frameworks and the universalization of Western liberal values (i.e., Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis) was met, as Samuel Huntington (1996) had predicted, with civilizational clashes. It also met with "Global North" and "Global South" political, cultural, and economic power imbalances, which, despite many attempts, could not be resolved through Western-led consensus-building international forums such as the United Nations. In 1941, Pendleton Herring, one of the intellects behind U.S. national security doctrine, predicted in 1941 that, "men have longed for a new world order brought about by the general realization of mankind's economic interdependence. History holds little warrant for such hope reaching fulfillment by peaceful means" (p. 243).

However, as this dissertation has shown, a world order of economic interdependence is not exactly what the U.S. has set out to promote. Since the design of its national security doctrine, the U.S. has sought to construct a U.S.-led global capitalist world order rooted in Western liberal values and, as Herring (1941) pointed out, through "the imposition of world controls in accordance with our own ideas of justice" (p. 254). Or, as the 1945 *Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Post War Organization for National Security* report contended, by "implementing our ideals for world order with the use of force against aggressor states" (Eberstadt, 1945, p. 16).

In that same vein, Bush's 1991 NSS argued in favor of the U.S.' imperative to "build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals" (p. v) to protect and advance U.S. national security. Years after, President Trump's 2017 NSS declared that "America First foreign policy celebrates America's influence in the world as a positive force that can help set the conditions for peace and prosperity and for developing successful societies" (p. 37). That positive influence, according to the document, requires an unmatched world reaching military since it "strengthens our diplomacy and permits us to shape the international environment to protect our interests" (p. 28).

In this respect, it can be argued that protecting U.S. national security has historically been an "America First" project. Whether republicans versus democrats, whether liberals versus conservatives, or even whether "globalists" versus "nationalists," U.S. global hegemony has been conceived as essential for the country's survival. In its attempts to construct a U.S.-led global capitalist order, the U.S.' long history of unilateralism and attempting to impose its own policies—and its own version of "civilization"—onto other countries in the name of protecting U.S. national security has had a profound impact on our planet. As long as national security doctrine continues to guide U.S. foreign and domestic policy, the perspectives for a just, democratic, and decolonial world are a distant horizon to reach.

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