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Exploiting the Old Empire: Korean and Taiwanese Literature and Film in
Semicolonial China, 1923-1943

A dissertation submitted in a partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy

in

Literature

by

Inhye Han

Committee in Charge:

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2014

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

2014

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Exploiting the Old Empire: Korean and Taiwanese Literature and Film in
Semicolonial China, 1923-1943

by

Inhye Han

Doctor of Philosophy in Literature

University of California, San Diego, 2014

Professor Ping-hui Liao, Co-Chair
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This dissertation examines the inter-colonial aesthetics of diasporic Korean and Taiwanese artists who engaged Chinese audiences as well as those in their native lands. Their works were far from consciously pursuing antinationalism or internationalism. Yet, their aesthetic fluency in multi-nationalist issues across East Asia unwittingly challenged colonial and semicolonial nationalism. By aesthetic fluency, I mean that diasporic literature or film freely allies itself with other national issues and also separates from them with the same freedom. The issues ranged from China's discursive movements of imbuing its people with "national spirit" and Korea's inner schism around anticolonial principles, to Taiwan's trauma of failed anticolonial uprisings and a Japanese massacre. I argue that the model of fluency or

flexibility, not that of identity, illuminates how inter-colonial aesthetics was differentiated from both nationalism and antinationalism.

While analyzing the intersection of colonial art and political struggles, this dissertation also investigates the structures of feeling in literature and film that conflict with the political orientation of writers. Diasporic artists from colonized Taiwan and Korea boldly suggested that their audiences strategically dissociate from the idea of nation-salvation, and meditate on the authentic needs of their lives that political change cannot bring about.

Chapter One illustrates the political contexts where the formation of an ideal inter-East Asian alliance was circumscribed. In Chapters Two through Five, I examine various forms of aesthetic fluency, which include reviving Daoist discourses, romanticizing anticolonial struggles, reconfiguring political matters into modern women's issues, and appealing to communist sympathy. By looking at these examples, this project provides a hermeneutical model that analyzes imbrication and incommensurability between aesthetic and political practices, semicolonial and colonial sensibilities, and a nation and an individual subject in colonial East Asia.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decades, Japan had the territorial disputes with both China and Korea, which led up to a more intense political tension in recent years. Japan's current Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo's jingoist nationalism provoked fierce responses in China and Korea. Behind the island disputes do lie more fundamental issues of colonial pasts among these countries, including war crimes of mass murder and mass rape, "comfort women," the Nanjing Massacre, the Japanese army's secret biological warfare unit of Unit 731, which used its prisoners—mostly Chinese, Koreans, and Soviets—for biological experiments, and so on.¹ During a question-and-answer session in the Diet in April 2013, Abe questioned, "whether Japan had actually committed "aggression" against anyone during the war. "The definition of aggression has yet to be established in academia or in the international community," Abe said. The policy chief for Abe's Liberal Democratic Party later said that Abe also disagreed with the allied tribunal that found 14 wartime leaders guilty of war crimes."² Upon this remark, Park Geun Hye, President of South Korea of far-right nationalist inclination, immediately cancelled a Korean foreign minister's visit to Tokyo.

The East Asian conflict became even more complicated as Obama reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Japan's security at the joint press conference with Abe in April 2014. Obama's diplomatic support for Japan brought about an intense response from Xi Jinping's regime: "A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said that China had "indisputable sovereignty" over the islands and that "the so-called Japan-US alliance"

¹ See Louis Perez, *Japan at War: An Encyclopedia* (Santa Barbar: ABC-CLIO, 2013) 458.

² Kirk Spitzer, "Sorry, But Japan Still Can't Get the War Right," *Time* 20 May 2013: Web.

should be careful not to impinge on China's territorial rights.”³ The US-Japan alliance turned the East Asian political tension into a transpacific problem that only intensified the problems of East Asian and international political relations.

Following the end of World War II, nationalism and jingoism have been hegemonic ideologies of independent states across the globe. Due to the world history of the second-half of the twentieth century, it is challenging for us to imagine the world order or a different mode of an international interaction that can effectively unsettle nationalist discourses and narratives that ranged from moderate to extreme ones. Against the backdrop of the postwar and Cold War histories, this dissertation shows the inter-colonial aesthetics between semicolonial China and colonial Taiwan or Korea in the 1920s and 30s provided alternative models that made the best use of the binary tension between nationalism and antinationalism in East Asia.

I examine aesthetic strategies of diasporic Korean and Taiwanese artists who engaged Chinese audiences as well as those in their native lands. Their works were far from consciously pursuing antinationalism or internationalism. Yet, their aesthetic fluency in multi-nationalist issues across East Asia unwittingly challenged colonial and semicolonial nationalism. By aesthetic fluency, I mean that diasporic literature or film freely allies itself with other national issues and also separates from them with the same freedom. The issues ranged from China's discursive movements of imbuing its people with “national spirit” and Korea's inner schism between nationalists and socialists to Taiwan's trauma of failed anticolonial uprisings and a Japanese massacre.

³ Justin McCurry and Tania Branigan, “Obama says US will defend Japan in island dispute with China” *The Guardian* 24 Apr. 2014: Web.

This dissertation argues that the aesthetics to dissociate a nation from an international ally was as crucial as the aesthetics of association especially for Korean and Taiwanese artists, only to the extent that a return to the nation challenges a sacrifice of a powerless nation in international alliances. My analysis also shows that diasporic artists practiced the aesthetic strategy of dissociation not only in a nation-to-nation relation but also in a society-to-an individual one. I further argue that the model of fluency or flexibility, not that of identity, illuminates how the inter-colonial aesthetics was differentiated from both nationalism and antinationalism.

In December 20, 1923, the Chinese anarchist magazine *Scholarly Collection* (*Xuehui*) announced that the new anarchist magazine *Equality* (*Pingping Xunkan*) would be published in January 1924. While scholar-activists of Nanfang University in Shanghai took a central role in its publication, several (*shuren*) Taiwanese and Korean comrades also participated.⁴ The first issue of *Equality* was published in Shanghai on April 1, 1924, a few months later than planned. *Equality* was published every ten days until June 21, 1924. Hence nine issues were published in total. The Equality Group (*Pingshe*) consisted of Chinese, Taiwanese, and Koreans; the contributors included Japanese thinkers as well—most notably, Sano Manabu (1892-1953), a crucial figure in the Japanese Communist Party in the 1920s and 30s.

Unlike the description of *Xuehui* and other Chinese sources,⁵ *Japanese Government-General Record*, wrote that diasporic Taiwanese and Korean activists in Shanghai gathered at the residence of Chinese communist, Ba Huo, and worked on the

⁴ “Jieshao xin zhu” *Xuehui* Dec 20 1923.

⁵ Saga and Sakai note that the Chinese magazines *Social Groups in May Fourth Period* (vol. 4) and *Spring Thunder* (*Chunlei*) (May 1924) categorized *Equality* as an anarchist periodical.

publication of *Equality*.⁶ Saga Takashi and Sakai Hirobumi, who compiled Chinese anarchist materials in the Republican era, annotate that *Equality* fails to squarely fit into an anarchist magazine. I agree with Saga and Sakai due to the following reason. *Equality* includes a critique on the Russian revolution and the translation of Kerkeзов, who condemned Marx's *Communist Manifesto* for plagiarism and *Capital* for theoretical fallacies. Kerkeзов's criticism provided contemporary anarchists with theoretical grounds to refute Marxists. *Equality*, however, added an editorial note, where it questioned an objective quality of Kerkeзов's article.

Equality's preface of its first issue begins by highlighting the anarchist ideas of mutual aid (*bici buzhu*) and mutual care (*huxiang qinai*). More careful reading of *Equality*, however, disproves the anarchist claim. The preface reads: "The contemporary economic system makes the rich richer the poor poorer, which resulted in this extortive society. We seek to eliminate the causes of this system. Firstly, the economy should be liberated [from the capitalist's hands] so that a single class cannot monopolize the economy. Moreover, economic rights should be given to masses. These are our common goals, and the following are our methods."⁷ Their first goal was to eradicate colonial power in subjugated countries. The Equality Society pursued independence and welfare of all the nations. Secondly, they called for equality between women and men. Thirdly, they called for unity and solidarity (*gongtong fangyu gongtong jienshe*) of laborers of the colonized with an unyielding spirit.

⁶ *Fragment On Anarchist Propagandic Movement*, however, records Ba Huo as anarchist who introduced anarchism to Zhang Jing about in 1920, and later he organized the anarchist group, called the Light Society (*Guangshe*).

⁷ "Fakan ci" *Pingping Xunkan* 1 Apr. 1924; 1.

Despite their aspirations, there were several obstacles in their path. Firstly, Indian civil disobedience made it hard to radically bring about a change of its national destiny. Secondly, the Taiwanese still wanted to live under an emperor's (*tianhuang*) rule. Moreover, Koreans still suffered from Prussia's pressure. Foreign capitalists also exploited China. In order to overcome these four issues, “we should not discriminate sects (*menhu*), nations (*zhulei*), and sex. All the oppressed [or the colonized] should be solidified in one spirit; they should be united for liberation and reformation movements (*jiefang gaizao yundong*).”⁸

Equality was not the first magazine where all Korean, Taiwanese, and Chinese united for an intra-East Asian alliance and anti-colonialism. Its origin can be traced back to *Asian Discourse* (*yaxiya gonglun*), which was published for two years (1922-23) by East Asian students in Tokyo.⁹ The Japanese colonial era witnessed the formation of numerous international anti-colonial groups, which included not only East Asians but also Vietnam, Burma, Indochina, Philippines, and India. It was rare that they issued magazines that included an extensive range of writing—political critiques, travelogues, essays, short novels, poems, plays, interviews, and reprints—from different nationals as *Equality* did.

To track inter-colonial relationship is to extricate colonial aesthetic practices from Cold War historiographies of East Asia that emerged following World War II. To put it briefly, anticommunist states took over both Taiwan and South Korea

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ See Ono Hiroshi'akira, “Shokumin chi ki chōsen taiwan minzoku undō no ni kansuru ichi shiron” *Fumirin* 94(2) : 35-68 (269-302)

following their independence from the Japanese empire. The intense conflicts with communist regimes and the surge of Cold War nationalism—oftentimes jingoism—impeded scholarly excavation of inter-colonial traces among East Asian artists. However, recent studies from scholars, such as Ping-hui Liao, Zhang Longzhi, Yun Haedong, Yonetani Masafumi, and Nishikawa Nagao, to name a few, challenged nationalist ideology and U.S. neo-imperial influences underlying previous colonial and postcolonial studies on East Asia. This project details the ways in which Taiwanese and Korean artists associated with other national issues, and split from the alliance mode by returning back to their own national problems, and continued to be fluent and flexible around different national issues.

While analyzing the intersection of colonial art and political struggles, this dissertation also investigates the structures of feeling in literature and film that seem to be at odds with writers' political orientations. Zhang Wojun, for example, was devoted to countering Japanese colonialism and restoring cultural continuity between China and Taiwan. His novel *Mrs. Bai's Tragic Story*, however, insinuates that there are dimensions of human lives that reformation of political practices and success of anticolonial revolutions cannot touch upon. This novel portrays a Japanese wife as a victim and a Chinese husband as a wife abuser, lecher, and corrupted government official. Diasporic artists from colonized Taiwan and Korea boldly suggested that their audience and readers *politically and strategically* take a break from the idea of nation-salvation, and meditate on authentic needs of their lives that can alleviate grief, remorse, anxiety, and doubt. Sakaguchi Ango (1906-1955), one of the most iconoclastic writers in the history of Japanese literature, also pointed out that even

radical and revolutionary changes in political terrain failed to bring true freedom to Japanese civilians because “Politics and social systems cast only the coarsest of nets over the world, and humans are the type of fish that will forever slip through the holes.” Sakaguchi continues:

At a basic level I am all in favor of some sort of World Federation, and I agree with Gakudō’s argument that there is no such thing as a Japanese bloodline worth protecting. That being said, on the question of whether or not that federation is the key to human happiness, I would have to insist that happiness lies elsewhere. An authentic lifestyle would not arise under those conditions. It is not that the Japanese are unable to become citizens of the world; in fact, that could be accomplished rather easily. But that would not eliminate the competitions between humans, the tensions between units. These will be with us for all time, and an authentic human lifestyle is predicated upon their existence. Life cannot be affected by World Federations or communism or anything else that denies that simple fact. Furthermore, souls rooted in such authentic lifestyles find their voice in literature. Literature, at every turn of the road, is an act of rebellion against the establishment, against politics. It is an act of revenge worked by humans on systems of all sorts. Paradoxically, in its rebellion and revenge, literature is complicit with politics. The revolt is itself a form of complicity. It represents a certain affection. Such is the fate of the literary act; literature and politics exist in just such an eternally unchanging relationship.¹⁰

To paraphrase Sakaguchi’s insight on the relationship between literature and politics in Marxist terms, literature is a reminder of the insufficiency of political revolution and necessity of a total praxis. As Henri Lefebvre argued, the total revolutionary praxis is supposed to transform not only man’s relationship with an external world, but also that with himself. Lefebvre writes:

Man's relations *with himself* have not been essentially transformed.
These relations have changed much less than man's relation with the

¹⁰ Sakaguchi Ango. “A Personal View of Japanese culture” *Literary Mischief* ed. James Dorsey and Doug Slaymaker trans. James Dorsey (NY: Lexington Books, 2010), 194.

external world, which has fallen increasingly under the control of an ever more powerful technicity. Man's appropriation of his own nature (desire and sensual satisfaction) and the radical transformation of everyday life (prefigured by morality or art) were part of the initial Marxist programme for a total praxis, but they have not been achieved. ... Therefore, transformative action and radical critique have lagged behind the productive forces and the possibilities for transformation they harbour, and they are deflected from that goal.¹¹

Previous studies interpret feelings of hesitation, self-doubt, agony, and so on, in colonial narratives within a nationalist framework; loss of one's country and helplessness of intellectuals caused the feelings. My approach, however, interprets them, not as a symptom of given politico-historical situation, but as a literary strategy of overcoming political practices, in Gramscian terms, for the purpose of approximating a total praxis. That is to say, uncertainty, angst, and grief reminded contemporary audiences that political change failed to be enough for the true transformation of their lives.

In sum, this dissertation examines the literature and film that emerged out of semicolonial Chinese and colonial Taiwanese or Korean interactions. The inter-colonial art did not explicitly refute nationalism or endorse internationalism. Yet, its aesthetic adeptness in catering to other countries' national issues made the inter-East Asian art differentiated from ethno-nationalism. Moreover, some diasporic artists at times boldly split from their alliance with other nations, and turned back to national matters. For these writers, a movement between association and dissociation was indeterminable and unbounded. Secondly, this project tracks how diasporic colonial art registered human suffering, which remained immune to political change. This

¹¹ Henri Lefebvre, *Introduction to Modernity* (NY: Verso, 1995), 229.

dissertation provides a hermeneutical model that analyzes both imbrication and incommensurability between aesthetic and political practices in colonial East Asia from the margins of the empire.

(1) East Asia, Nation, and History

The term “East Asia,” which I use throughout this dissertation is by no means a purely geographical category. As Tanaka’s *Japan’s Orient* has illuminated, the Orient (*toyo*)—the prototerm of East Asia (*toua*)—is “essentially a twentieth-century Japanese concept,” whereby Meiji Japan relegated the rest of Asia as the inferior to Japan, and ultimately established modern Japan’s equivalence with Europe.¹² Tanaka critiques that Said’s *Orientalism* fails to discuss the dependence of the subject on its object. He points out that not only did Japan’s Oriental history define and manage China (*shina*), but Japan also depended on its own discourses. This insight is crucial to discern influences of the subjugated on the subjugator despite their powerlessness and failed attempts of anti-imperial resistance. It was not until the 1920s that the term East Asia replaced the Orient as the major geocultural category in Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and China.¹³ Japanese scholars also led the shift of the geocultural term, which developed into the idea of Great East Asia (*dai toua*) in the 1930s and 40s. Stressing ideologies of modern historiography of Japan, Tanaka points out, “In this context, the historian is not just a recorder, but one who creates or affirms a single truth through

¹² Stefan Tanaka, *Japan’s Orient*, 4.

¹³ See Chen Weifen, “You ‘dongyang’ dao ‘dongya’, chong ‘rujiao’ dao ‘ruxue’” *Taiwan Dongya Wenming Yanjiu Xuekan* 2004, 1(1): 201-232.

use of objective facts, a truth that eliminates the contention over meaning and gives the sign its uniaxential character.”¹⁴

As Tanaka demystified uniaxential historiographies of Meiji Japan, Duara also suggested a way of conceptualizing a counter-Enlightenment heterologous history in *Rescuing History from the Nation*. Posing an antithesis between transmitted pasts in a linear fashion and dispersed pasts in space and time, he foregrounds a “bifurcated” conception of history, which recuperates dispersed pasts.¹⁵ Rather than analyzing how the entity of a nation and the narratives of History functioned as ideological tools of domination, Duara investigates the ways of reappropriating the categories of a nation and history to his end of establishing an alternative historicity. He views a national identity within a set of subject positions that interact and interchange with other kinds of identity, such as gender, religious, and ethnic identities. Duara’s approach provides a way of conceptualizing a national identity that is not subsumed by Enlightenment History.

While offering an optimistic picture of overcoming a nation as the subject of History, Duara takes a perspectival approach that simultaneously stresses the practical and realistic power that a nation exerts on us. Firstly, he points out the impossibility of a radical rupture from a nation as the locus of history. Secondly, he argues, “the powerful, repressive, and appropriative functions of national History need to be continually challenged.” That is to say, to maintain the strategic tension between

¹⁴ Stefan Tanaka, *Japan’s Orient*, 11.

¹⁵ Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History From the Nation*, 5.

nationalist History's appropriation and our reappropriation of a nation and a dispersed time. Duara continues:

Much of the political, intellectual, and moral challenge to History in Asia centered on the idea that I have expediently designated as "culture." The moral authority of the discourse of culture derived often from universalist and redemptive yearnings such as can be found in the telos of *Datong* or Gandhi's *Ramrajya*. This universalism ironically authorized a particular space of irreducible difference (the nation) from which one could resist assimilation into History. ... But the simultaneous commitment to the nation among these advocates of transcendent values and spiritual culture enabled the nation-state to appropriate this space, drain its redemptive universalism, and subvert its critical function. As the space of irreducible difference, culture has been invoked to authorize the subordination of women and political and economic rights within a nation.¹⁶

Rather than seeking a radical rupture from the Historical narratives, Duara endorses the strategy of making gradual changes of old signifiers—such as, revolution, self-governance, *zu*, and Great Unity (*datong*). After all, Duara argues that bifurcated histories and polyphonic histories will debilitate the politics of cultural authenticity, which privileges boundaries of the nation as a unified category.

One of the merits of Duara's historiography is to wrest provincial narratives away from the centralizing, monologic voice of the Nation. The local stories—such as Ou Qujia's "small nationalism" (*xiao minzuzhuyi*)—constitute a historical polyphony not because they argued for separatism from the central government. On the contrary, they reproduced the teleology of nationalist Histories. Despite the nationalist character of federalism and provincialism, federalist stories of the nation dislodged the myth of

¹⁶ Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History From the Nation*, 233.

a unified national tradition by enunciating heterogeneous substances and forms of the nation. Modeled upon Tanaka's and Duara's historiographies, this dissertation attends to multiaccultural histories that conditioned literature and film.

In understanding the dynamic landscape of modern Chinese literature and Chinese semicolonialism as the context of this project, Shih Shu-mei's *The Lure of the Modern* provides the most critical insight. Her book illuminated the fractured, informal, and indirect character of semicolonialism, as well as its multi-layeredness. *The Lure of the Modern* spells out the uneven colonial relations between the Chinese and the multiple imperialisms—British, French, American, and Japanese—in China. It further traces how the Chinese perception of those powers varied over time and in different cities. Shih writes, “Reflecting the incomplete nature of colonial domination, then, reactions to colonial reality were equally fragmented, allowing neither the development of a coherent, consistent, and comprehensive discourse of anticolonialism nor the formation of a coalition among the disparate camps of intellectuals.”¹⁷

For Chinese intellectuals, Shih argues, the issue of upholding nationalism failed to be as crucial as that of attaining cosmopolitan and global attributes in Chinese literature. During the May Fourth period (1917-1927), the Chinese pursuit of Enlightenment and cosmopolitanism prompted the learned to “invent a cosmopolitan subjectivity that did not take the nation-state or the ethnos as the sole boundary marker of identity, as they could establish a transnationally mediated identity in the global

¹⁷ Shih Shu-mei, *The Lure of the Modern* (Berkeley: California UP), 2001.

terrain.”¹⁸ By temporalizing the idea of the modern and the relationship between the West and China, the May Fourth Occidentalism relegated Chinese tradition and convention to backwardness. The May Fourth decade privileged time over space, endorsing the concept of linear temporality and the evolutionist idea of progress. The works of Lu Xun, Guo Moruo, Yu Dafu, and Tian Han reflect anti-traditional, Occidental, and teleological ideals as a strategy of nation-salvation.

Toward the last half of the 1920s, Chinese writers and thinkers, such as Zhou Zuoren and Zhang Guangqian called into question the Occidentalist rejection of Chinese tradition and the reified hierarchy between the West and China, embedded within the notion of the modern as progress. The critical reflection of Occidentalism opened up the path of reviving tradition, especially Confucianism. Instead of striving to emulate the West, post-May Fourth intellectuals turned to Chinese tradition as a new ground of pursuing modernity. Moreover, the neotraditionalist turn prompted Western anti-Enlightenment modernists to engage in Chinese tradition. Whether modernist orientation is Occidentalist, or neo-traditionalist, or stateless socialist, Chinese modernization revolved around the idea of cosmopolitanism throughout the Republican era. While Chapter One further examines the complicated picture of Chinese nationalism and cosmopolitanism, I want to emphasize Shih Shu-mei's point that the discursive status of nationalism in China differed from that in Taiwan and Korea, where attaining cosmopolitan standards failed to be an urgent or imperative issue.

¹⁸ Shih Shu-mei, *The Lure of the Modern*, 50.

(2) Taiwan's Experience of Colonial Era

Ping-hui Liao's study on colonial Taiwan has challenged the oppressor versus the oppressed paradigm of colonial studies by unearthing examples of Japanese imperial subjects, who culturally and academically aided the colonized Taiwanese, and Japanese newspaper media, which exposed Taiwanese masses to cosmopolitan culture and knowledge. Liao specifically accentuated transcolonial and transnational experiences of colonial and imperial subjects, who reconfigured the limitations that the Japanese empire imposed. Wu Rwei-ren's work traced how Taiwanese nationalism, as opposed to Chinese nationalism, emerged during the colonial era. Zhang Longzhi, on the other hand, revealed how political concerns of postwar and contemporary Taiwan determined historiographies of the colonial period. In so doing, he stressed the utterly present and contemporary nature of colonial memories in Taiwan. Similar to Chang, Asano Toyomi's excellent study explicated the deep political tension in Taiwan between pro-independence and pro-unification groups underlying divergent interpretations of colonial experiences. Asano suggested that new sets of discourse on colonial Taiwan should be able to provide a counter-national model of accounting colonial experiences.

In *Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945*, Ping-hui Liao points out that previous studies on the Japanese colonial era "have seldom discussed colonialism and modernity in the region [East Asia] from a transnational perspective and have focused instead on Japan's southward advance or on Taiwan as the site in which Japan

forged its colonial and oriental scholarship.”¹⁹ Rather than drawing on postcolonial concepts, such as hybridity, catachresis, conviviality, etc., Liao suggests that colonial studies investigate specific cases of individuals who were constituted by and constitutive of historically specific cultural institutions by travelling across national borders. “The dynamics of travel and cultural translation is not necessarily played out in the form of an ambivalent chronotopical lag between metropole and colony, of tension between the often polarized discursive positions of dwelling and traveling (or, to follow Edward W. Said’s terminology, of the “potentate” and the “traveler”).”²⁰ Liao’s approach provides us with especially crucial insights on how to understand the colonial history and culture beyond the dichotomy between the oppressor and the oppressed, and beyond the schematic framework of resistance, or collaboration, or acquiescence. His studies excavate the historical examples of Taiwanese and Japanese artists, which unsettle homogeneous pictures of the colonizer and the colonized. By differentiating these categories, Liao reveals how the colonizer unwittingly benefited the colonized, and how the colonized not only exploited self-rupturing moments of the empire, but also suggested an alternative modernity for Taiwan that was modeled neither upon Chinese nor upon Japanese.

In *Writing Taiwan*, David Wang accentuates the divergence between Taiwan and China. He writes, “Between the sixteenth century and the late nineteenth, when China was undergoing a final dynastic cycle and setting into an increasingly confused stagnation, the island had already diverged onto a fateful path of its own.” He

¹⁹ Ping-hui Liao, “Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945: History, Culture, Memory,” *Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945* (NY: Columbia UP, 2006), 3.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.

continues, “In many ways, it [modern Taiwan literature] surpasses the mainland tradition when one pays attention to such matter as theoretical complexity and polemical intensity.”²¹ Wang argues for the self-sufficiency of Taiwan literature as an independent category—not as a subcategory of Chinese literature—because Taiwan literature realized modernization in unprecedented forms and in unanticipated ways. He contends that some feats of Taiwan literature were unseen in coeval China. It is crucial to note his call for the hermeneutical strategy of discerning forms of modernity in literature that has no European precedents.

Wu Rwei-ren’s “The Formosan Ideology: Oriental Colonialism and the Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism, 1895-1945,” delves into the issue of colonial nationalism in Taiwan’s history. Tracking the emergence of “ideas of Taiwanese that were *essentially* Han but not Chinese,” Wu adroitly disentangles Taiwanese nationalism from Chinese nationalism.²² Wu proves that until the late 1910s, the Japanese empire employed a differential incorporation policy, which disallowed Taiwanese to become full Japanese citizens. In 1914-1915, the Taiwanese attempted to attain the franchise by proving their loyalty to the empire. Groups of Taiwanese mobilized a pro-Japanese campaign, the *Dōkakai* movement, which endorsed Taiwan’s radical assimilation to Japan and demanded suffrage of the Taiwanese in return. The colonial state, however, simply suppressed the movement and its demand. The failure of the *Dōkakai* movement and the consequent awakening to the liminal status of Taiwanese in the empire—neither completely foreigners to the empire nor entirely Japanese—prompted

²¹ Ibid., vii.

²² Wu Rwei-ren, “The Formosan Ideology: Oriental Colonialism and the Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism, 1895-1945,” Ph.D. Diss. Chicago Univ. 2003; 4.

Taiwanese intellectuals to conceptualize a way to overcome the liminal status. As a result, Wu argues, Taiwanese nationalism emerged in the beginning of the 1920s. Instead of seeking to belong to either China or Japan, anti-colonial Taiwanese came to think, “Taiwan must be the Taiwan of Taiwanese.”²³ Wu explains that although Taiwanese nationalism emerged in 1920, it was not until the early 1930s that it was substantialized as the sophisticated form of a national ideology, “which imagined Taiwanese people as an oppressed “weak and small nation”(*jakushō minzoku*) that possessed its own distinctive national culture and was entitled to self-determination.”²⁴ The maturity of Taiwanese nationalism in the 1930s was intertwined with the development of New Taiwan Literature movement.

Wu argues that Taiwanese nationalists employed Western and modernist discursive strategies to critique Japanese colonial discourses and to build Taiwanese national subjectivity. Here he poses an antithesis between European modernist and Japanese colonial discourses. Through the lens of nationalism, Wu illuminates the moment of divergence between the modern and the colonial in contrast to previous studies that conflated the two. Taiwanese nationalists reclaimed modernity from colonizers by refuting that Japan brought incomplete modernity to Taiwan. The nationalists demanded independence or the right to self-determination and the right to cultural self-determination. Overall, Wu’s study differentiated the Taiwanese Han from the Chinese Han by examining how Taiwanese appropriated nationalism as a means to counter colonialism in both political and cultural terrain. Whereas Wu

²³ Ibid., 43.

²⁴ Ibid., 43-44.

highlighted the roles of European modernism, as opposed to Japanese modernism, in forming Taiwan's nationalist discourses, I discuss how Taiwanese writers appropriated Chinese thought and literature into Taiwan's end of advancing the new literary movement.

Zhang Longzhi's studies critically lay out issues, methodologies, and their ideological implications underlying historical studies of Taiwan from the 1980s to date. He details many strands in the field of colonial Taiwanese history in a fairly impartial manner. For example, he fully recognizes the contribution of the pioneering Taiwanese historian, Dai Guohui (1931-2001), who was educated in Japan. Dai traced the origin of Taiwan's capitalism and modernization back to the late Qing. Dai Guohui illuminated Taiwan's late Qing period under Governor Liu Mingchuan, when comprador capital emerged in Taiwan, and capital began to be accumulated due to international trade of Taiwan's sugar, tea, and camphor. Also, a small-scale rental right (*xiaozhuquan*) and a parasitic landlord system (*jisheng dizhu zhi*) were established before the colonization. Since Taiwan opened its ports to the world empires in 1860, it was exposed to modern medicine and Western religions. Dai highlights the late Qing's Foreign Affairs Movement (1861-1894, *yangwu yundong*; also known as Self-Strengthening Movement); Qing imported Western arms, battleships, and telegraph and mail systems to Taiwan. The movement also resulted in establishing a modern educational institution, such as the Western School (1890; *xi xuetang*), in the island. Under Liu's governorship, the first railroad of Taiwan was constructed between Taipei and Keelung, and nine Europe-made locomotives were in service in 1891.

To repeat Dai's history is to directly repudiate Yang Bichuan's theory of colonial origin of modernization. It was not that the Japanese empire modernized Taiwan, but that the empire was built upon the already existing modern infrastructure to a fuller degree. Dai's study also refuted Yang's self-derogation of Taiwanese people—who, Yang wrote, were chicken-hearted, crazy about money, and obsessed with saving their face—the characteristics of which Japanese took advantage for colonization. In a similar vein, Weng Jiayin challenged the historical premise that the bandit issue (*tufei*) had emerged in the early colonial period by excavating Taiwanese Han's long tradition of mass uprising (*minbian*) against officials in the Qing era. The studies of Dai and Weng, therefore, stressed a continuity, rather than a rupture, between the pre-colonial history and the colonial phenomena in Taiwan.

Zhang Longzhi notes that in the 1990s, postmodernism arose, unveiling the specific historical context and the ideological orientation of modernity discourses. That is to say, the cold war politics and the expansion of American world hegemony undergirded and reinforced the modernity-as-progress framework. Following the postmodernist trend, Tani Barlow came up with the idea of colonial modernity, as a counter-concept of the Enlightenment model of modernity. Zhang categorizes previous studies of colonial modernity into five models: variations of universal modernity, contradictory modernity, governmental modernity, hybrid modernity, and alternative modernity. Instead of selecting one of these, Zhang suggests, colonial studies should draw on multiple approaches from them in order to clarify multifaceted experiences of the modern in colonies. Despite Barlow's contribution to East Asian colonial studies, Zhang argues that her definition of colonial modernity lacks historical

specificity and politico-economic contexts. In the case of Korean history, Michael Robinson and Gi-wook Shin adopted the idea of colonial modernity to examine the Korean case. Zhang comments, however, that their emphasis on the uniqueness of Korean colonial experiences betrays that a national history framework determined their vantage point. “[Robinson’s study] is unequipped with knowledge of a broader East Asian history and with comparative perspectives on colonialism. Also, his definition of modernity, colonialism, nationalism, etc, revolves around the analysis-units, such as Korea (*Chaoxian*), Japan, West, and the like,” Zhang further notes. In conclusion, he suggests that future studies on modern Taiwan take a perspectival, or comparative, or psychological approach to delve into the issue of colonialism.

Asano Toyomi’s “Historical Perceptions of Taiwan’s Japan Era” provides one of the most critical assessments of the interlocked nature of colonial history and contemporary politics in Taiwan. The two temporalities are deeply imbricated to the degree that an interpretative standpoint of colonial Taiwan becomes a crucial marker of allies or enemies in contemporary politics in Taiwan, China, and Japan. As Zhang Longzhi noted, Taiwan’s colonial history is very much current and present in political and everyday lives of Taiwan.²⁵

The debates on Taiwan’s history began around 1984 between historians Dai Guohui and Yang Bichuan. In regard to Qing’s rule of Taiwan (1683-1895), Dai and Yang viewed it as sinicization by the Han Chinese and nativization of the Han Chinese, respectively. The framework of nativization, first, employs the history of foreign

²⁵ See Zhang Longzhi, “Zhimin xiandaixing fensi yu Taiwan jindaishi yanjiu,” Ed. Wakabayashi and Wu, *Kuajie de Taiwanshi yanjiu*, 133-160.

“presence” in Taiwan’s soil—Holland, Spain, Qing, and Japan—to highlight multiethnic and multicultural characters of Taiwan, where continental and oceanic civilizations intersect. The idea of nativization, second, turns Taiwanese people from passive victims of foreign invasion to subjects of their history. Finally, this kind of history concentrates more on everyday practices, including trade, education, and enactment of political system, than on anti-foreign resistance movements.

Asano traces back the origin of the nativist perception of colonial Taiwanese history to Wang Yude (Ong Ioktek; 1924-1985), an exile in postwar Japan, who opened up a new hermeneutical path of extricating Taiwan from China. Whereas Taiwan Independence groups of Wang’s contemporaries, such as Liao Wenyi, foregrounded a Taiwanese nationality, Wang Yude argued, “anyone could become Taiwanese through naturalization as long as he accepted *freedom and democracy*.”²⁶ Instead of drawing on nation- or ethnos-specific values, Wang innovatively built a Taiwanese subjectivity upon universal values. In order to argue that Taiwanese as people embodying universal values, it becomes critical to contend that colonial history brought to Taiwan an opportunity to autonomously modernize its societies and people. Hence Wang’s historiography underscores Japanese colonial education, whereby Taiwanese were allegedly enlightened to modern, progressive civilizations.

In this vein, Lee Teng-hui, the first Taiwan-born president (1988-2000), also stressed the values of democracy and freedom over ethnic or national values. By arguing the uniqueness of colonial experience of Taiwan, Lee put forth the ideas of

²⁶ Asano Toyomi, “Historical Perceptions of Taiwan’s Japan Era,” 308; here Asano cites Mori Yoshio, *Taiwan/ Nihon rensa suru koroniarizumu* [The Colonialism That Joins Taiwan and Japan] (Tokyo: Inpakuto shuppankai, 2001).

“the new Taiwanese people” and “the two states theory” despite the recognition of legacies of Chinese tradition in Taiwan. Asano notes that both of the independence faction and the unification faction in Taiwan ascribed the economic development and the state of democracy to Taiwan’s colonial history. Cross-Straits relations politically had reached an impasse, and economically have suffered from tremendous imbalance. Hence the terrains of culture and history become the decisive battlegrounds for Taiwan to assert independence from China against the backdrop of the shared language, customs, and religious beliefs. Within Wang’s model, attaining international recognition and support, especially from the U.S. and Japan, is indispensable. This policy of Taiwan dovetailed with the hegemony expansion of the U.S., or the “Empire of Democracy.”²⁷ Asano comments, “They [Taiwanese] appeal to American public opinion as a “poster boy” for a faithful project of democratization.”²⁸

In contrast to Taiwan Independence groups, China accentuates the shared historical experience—anti-Japanese movements and anti-imperial wars—during the colonial era. China condemns colonial education as enslavement education, which robbed Taiwanese of their subjectivity. From the Chinese perspective, semicolonial powers impaired China’s autonomous modernization. Here we see the diametrically opposite interpretations between China and Taiwan in regard to the relationship between colonization and modernization. Whereas the Taiwan Independence contends that Taiwan managed to autonomously modernize the colonial state despite

²⁷ Asano refers to Fujiwara Kiichi, *Demokurashii no teikoku* [Empire of Democracy] (Tokyo: Iwanami shinsho, 2002).

²⁸ Asano Toyomi, “Historical Perceptions of Taiwan’s Japan Era,” 315; Wakabayashi Masahiro’s statement in *Aera* 16. Feb. 2004.

colonization, China argues that it was precisely the colonial domination that undermined autonomous modernization.

Asano discusses two main political groups in Japan, which are opposed to each other in terms of understanding Japan's national history around modernization. Asano calls them the Ethno-Nationalist Conservative and the Citizen Solidarity factions. The first group asserts, "Japan's modernization extended to colonial Taiwan as well, even if only in its effect." Due to this vantage point, it privileges Japan's establishment of legal, educational, and physical infrastructures in Taiwan, including "urban planning, agricultural irrigation, hygiene facilities, railroads, waterways, [and] electrification." This group, as Asano points out, stresses unintended yet beneficial results or effects of colonial modernization over colonial motives or means that the empire took in the process. In this regard, the Japanese Ethno-Nationalist and the Taiwanese Independence groups share the common interpretative ground of the colonial history. Taiwanese residents in Japan further facilitate collaboration between the two. Asano takes the example of Kō Bun'yū, a main figure in the Japan Office of the League for the Construction of an Independent Taiwanese State. In *Japanese People Made Taiwan*, Kō alleges, "'the Japanese homeland (*naichi*) was extended to include Taiwan, just as it did Kyushu and Shikoku," and that Taiwan "was not a colony of Japan.'" Asano comments, "There can be no historical approach more convenient to a shared history between Japan and Taiwan."²⁹ This vantage point provides the rationale of "self-confidence" to Japan and that of distinct Taiwanese subjectivity to Taiwan.

²⁹ Kō Bun'yū, *Taiwan wa Nihonjin ga tsukutta*, Qtd in. Asano, 325-6.

The Citizen Solidarity group, on the other hand, foregrounds the concept of “colonial modernity.”³⁰ This group argues that modernization under a colonial regime inevitably entails the loss of human dignity. “They perceive the modern era as fundamentally negative, characterized by “management” of private life in all its spheres, by skilled “control” of society, and by suppression of human rights.”³¹ Critiquing irrational passions of Japanese citizens, the Citizen Solidarity group refutes nationalism and the persistent imperial consciousness even after Japan “lost” Taiwan, Korea, and other occupied territories. Its ultimate goal is to discover “true universal values and the restoration of human dignity thereby.”³² Whereas the Ethno-Nationalist links colonial education with modernization, this group underscores the deep-rooted racial discrimination underlying the education system and all the other colonial structures. Historical studies of the Citizen’s Solidarity unveil inequality and injustice that Taiwanese underwent despite the nominal rights to self-rule, election, education, and others. Due to its stance of countering nationalism, however, the group does not exalt the national resistance against colonialism in Taiwan’s history. For the same reason, this faction neither opposes to nor actively supports Taiwan’s independence. The agendas of a national independence and military sovereignty simply are not their priority. Another crucial point to be noted is that this group argues for the compatibility between Taiwan’s colonial status and the independent entity of

³⁰ Asano refers to Wakabayashi and Wu’s *Kua jie de Taiwan shi yanjiu* (Taipei: Bozhongzhe Wenhua, 2004); as for the case of Korea, see Robinson and Shin ed. *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Mass: Harvard UP, 2001).

³¹ Asano, 328.

³² Ibid.

Taiwanese society. The last point coincides with the Ethno-Nationalist's position. Critiquing the politics that relies on foreign support, this group alternatively endorses the values of citizens' solidarity and human dignity. Furthermore, this faction argues that Japan should take responsibility for war crimes in former colonies and occupational territories.

Asano then moves onto the Chinese perspective of modernization. Although socialism proper lost its ground for decades, it still functions as the primal principle to construe history and the world. Within the Chinese historical standpoint, the idea of progress is inseparable from that of mass's resistance. Hence if modernization involved any progressive and affirmative changes in any aspect of human lives, people achieved it through revolution against capitalist empires. Likewise, the Chinese view contends that it was Taiwanese anti-imperialist resistance that brought about Taiwan's modernization. Taiwan's revolutionary history attests to the unifying tradition between China and Taiwan.

Upon examining the controversies around Taiwan's colonial history, Asano suggests that Taiwanese should "historicize Taiwan's demand for nativization of the universal values of "democracy" and "human rights" from a regional point of view, while respecting the values of a "nationality.""³³ While recognizing that the Citizens Solidarity's approach to modernity provides us to conceptualize historical realities, Asano points out that its utter anti-nationalism deprives itself of effective means to intervene in international politics. Asano argues that we ought to invent a historical framework that discerns and tackles both a regional history and a national history.

³³ Ibid., 332-3.

Only by doing so, he writes, “Taiwanese history can serve as the ideal site for understanding history in a framework that transcends the national histories of each country.”³⁴ To interpret Taiwan’s colonial history is crucial not only for its own international politics but also for Japan and China’s understanding of war responsibilities.

Asano’s study tells us that we need a perspectival approach to Taiwan’s colonial history that overcomes previous fallacies—first, the suppression of Taiwan’s regional history and the privilege of anti-Japanese revolutions where Taiwanese and Chinese fought together, second, the inflation of the effects of colonial education and modernization by obscuring the exploitative motive and the racist and atrocious process, and finally a reliance on foreign recognition. Based upon Asano’s critique and Duara’s study, I aim to provide a new interpretative model of reading colonial Taiwan literature that tackles both a regional history and a national history in a way that makes the nation as a meaningful category to a regional history. That is to say, to transcend Chinese national Histories is to coopt and bifurcate them instead of circumventing them. My standpoint, in this sense, may echo David Der-wei Wang’s stance on Taiwan literature; “writing Taiwan is a way of rewriting China.”³⁵

(3) Through the lens of Korea

Andre Schmid tracked the trajectory of subjugation of modern Korea from China’s tributary to Japan’s protectorate, and then to Japan’s colony. His discussion detailed that Japan’s dominant discursive power, as well as economic and military,

³⁴ Ibid., 334.

³⁵ David Der-wei Wang, “Preface,” *Writing Taiwan* (Durham: Duke UP, 2007) x.

over Korea brought about the desinicization process in Korea. Yun Haedong's study on colonial Korea discerned how Korean collaborators—especially bourgeoisie—unintentionally disrupted Japanese colonial rules for the sake of their capitalist profits. Yun calls this ironic “resistance” of collaborators a “grey zone” of colonial Korea. Hanscom's study on modernist literature in colonial Korea challenged the binary between modernism and realism, which previous studies assumed for decades. He argues that under the colonial censorship of words and thoughts, modernist literary strategy was an alternative way to be realist, far from escapist gestures of the pure art. Henry Em investigates how the empire employed the notion of national sovereignty to legitimize its colonial domination of Korea, and how Korean intellectuals reappropriated it to counter colonization.

Schmid's *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919*, examines the formation of national consciousness of Korea as a particular and independent entity against the backdrop of the discursive and political hegemony of universality and capitalist imperialism. He argues that the emergence of Korean national consciousness traces back to the end of the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895, when the Qing court proclaimed Korea's independence from the centuries-long Chinese tributary system. In 1905, Chosŏn agreed upon the Protectorate Treaty, and in 1910, Japan finally annexed Korea. First, Schmid argues that breaking away from sinocentrism—or in his words, “the decentering of the “Middle Kingdom [China]”—was essential to form consciousness and knowledge of the Korean nation. Second, Koreans conceptualized Korea through Japanese vantage points—the Europe-originated and Japanese-translated concepts of civilization and enlightenment—, and also through Japanese

writings of Korean history. Unlike other colonies, Schmid notes, Korean national consciousness emerged before an official annexation by the Japanese empire. Japan, however, appropriated the values, which it disseminated as a way of desinicizing Korea, in order to legitimize the protectorate status of Korea. In other words, Japan's rationale of enforcing the treaty was to civilize and enlighten Korea. Due to the imperial cooptation of Korean nationalism, Korean intellectuals, such as Pak Ŭnsik and Shin Ch'aeho, alternatively foregrounded the ideas of the national soul or the national essence (kr: *kuksu*; ch: *guocui*; jp: *kokusui*), which countered European modern concepts. To analyze the process of national knowledge in these formative years, Schmid examines newspapers and journals, with a focus on their editorials. While drawing on both of Anderson's and Chatterjee's methodologies, he looks at differentiated contents of nationalist ideology in the pre- and early colonial period.

Yun Haedong's *Colony's Grey Zone* also challenges the dualist framework of modernization versus exploitation as a defining concept of assessing effects and results of colonization of Korea. By a colonial grey zone, Yun means an ambivalent space where colonial subjects both collaborate with and resist against colonial domination. For example, Yun details how Korean capitalists, from 1937 to 1942, abused their economic privileges, given to them in return for collaboration, to produce more profits. The abuses oftentimes entailed breaching colonial economic laws, such as excess of fair prices, coemption of products, and manipulation of distribution networks of daily necessities. The colonial police accused them of "anti-national crimes" under the total war regime. Korean capitalists' insubordination to colonial laws was profit-driven yet counter-colonial. With the concept of the colonial grey

zone, therefore, he sheds light on the dual qualities of colonial collaboration. Due to this reason, he opposes the concept of pro-Japanese, which presumes a binary distinction between collaboration and resistance. Yun critiques that the category of the pro-Japanese also subsumes collaborative practices under apolitical terrains, obscuring its public characters. Since the 1920s, despite the colonial rule, public realms for Korean subjects were continually expanded through limited suffrage and semi-autonomous local governing systems. He argues that the public loci of colonial subjects were spaces of antinomy as public and political voices are disciplined and appropriated into colonial discourses. Pointing out theoretical limitations of Barlow's colonial modernity, Yun suggested that colonial studies should discern how collaboration and resistance converged and intersected.

Hanscom's *The Real Modern: Literary Modernism and the Crisis of Representation in Colonial Korea* challenges the previous literary criticism that posed a dichotomy between realist literature of socialists and modernist literature of aesthetes. Against this binary framework, as the title of his book indicates, Hanscom investigates the intersection of the real and the modern in 1930s colonial Seoul. Beyond articulating the convergence of the two, he further argues that the 1930s modernist literature of Korea was even more real—with his own words, “the presentation of...a *realer real* in attempting to overcome this crisis of representation.”³⁶—than any other literary strand. Within a colonial context, this book reveals, the relationship between signifiers and referents operates differently because

³⁶ Christopher Hanscom, *The Real Modern* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2013), 6.

“language itself is colonized.”³⁷ When censorship of written words and public speech became highly strict, Hanscom pinpoints, a language becomes a flawed medium to refer to objects. For example, significant numbers of modernist works portrayed tormented psychology of colonized intellectuals. Whereas previous studies interpreted it as the retreat from a real world and an escapist gesture, Hanscom construes them as the modernist strategy to challenge a censored language and “to render language “thing-like” in order to reproduce an effect or reality.”³⁸ In so doing, *The Real Modern* uncovered political qualities of modernist literature in colonial Korea.

Henry Em’s *The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea* examines historicity of sovereignty and competing discursive practices around the notion of sovereignty. Em discusses crucial roles of imperial historiographies in authorizing colonization; for example, the stagnation theory of Korea, the common ancestor theory between Japan and Korea, and the restoration history that claims Korea and southeastern China as the ancient Japanese territories. He tracks how the Japanese empire foregrounded the idea of sovereignty in order to legitimize its colonial domination, yet Korean intellectuals challenged imperial appropriation of national sovereignty throughout the colonial era. By the 1930s, there were three major historiographies in Korea: nationalist, Marxist, and positivist. The last strand faithfully succeeded Meiji’s Oriental history, which, Tanaka’s *Japan’s Orient* has revealed, provided justification for Japan’s imperial ideology.

³⁷ Ibid., 13.

³⁸ Ibid., 14.

The Great Enterprise further points out how postcolonial politics, or U.S. neocolonial intervention, in the Korean peninsula complicated representation of the colonial period, which is homologous to Taiwan's situation. The U. S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) took over the south of the peninsula from September 8, 1945, to August 15, 1948, while nullifying the de jure sovereignty of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, based in China from 1919-1948. Em notes that the USAMGIK ignored the public demands to eradicate colonial legacies by maintaining colonial administrative structures, including educational institutions. For instance, "academics who had actively collaborated in support of the Japanese Empire would be included in the faculty [of Seoul National University]." As North Korea rejected the UN proposal to hold the UN-supervised general election in May 1948, only South Korea held the election, and established the Republic of Korea. Due to the extreme anticommunist characters of the regime, Em points out, socialist historians in South Korea had to recast their interpretations as nationalist discourses. Kim Yong-söp and Kang Man-gil, for example, revived the Marxist internal dynamic theory, which traces the origin of capitalism and modernism back to the late Chosön period in order to oppose the colonial stagnation theory. Em also touches upon the deep schism between leftist and rightist historians. Whereas leftist scholars condemned cold war historiographies and the UN-sponsored separate elections in 1948 as subservient, toadist, and most importantly antinational acts, rightist refuted that Korean Marxists "dangerously distorted" modern history from socialist vantage points. In the 1980s, the so-called New Right coopted the postcolonial critique of nationalism to discredit socialist history. The anticommunist regimes of South Korea,

therefore, brought to Korean academy the deeply ironical controversies on modern historiography—rightist accusation of leftist for its nationalism. It was not until the final period of Chun Doo-hwan’s dictatorship that Marxist scholarship critiqued anticommunism in direct and rigorous manner. In comparison to Taiwan, socialist discourses have sustained its momentum in Korea, albeit only underground for the lengthy period. Socialist nationalism and rightist reactionarism, however, indeed obscured traces of intra-East Asian interactions, especially with Chinese.

(4) Colonial Era Through Japanese Perspectives

Young and Uchida investigated governing practices of the empire with a focus on non-government sectors of Japan. Thornber has detailed, by foregrounding Pratt’s idea of transculturation, how critics and translators of empire and its colonies not only passively consumed but also appropriated and negotiated with each other’s literature. In so doing, she accentuated the reciprocity of cultural contact between metropole and colony. Fujitani took a comparative approach, what he calls “trans-pacific studies,” to articulate similarities and dissimilarities between the U.S. and Japanese empires in terms of their racial policies. Yonetani, on the other hand, took an intra-East Asian approach to illuminate the radical traces of interaction between imperial and colonial thinkers.

Louise Young, in *Japan’s Total Empire*, sheds light on the roles of nongovernment sectors and the masses in Japan—such as leftist and rightist intellectuals, women’s groups, chambers of commerce, agrarian population, etc.—in undertaking an imperial project in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945. As Yoshimi

Yoshiaki's earlier work, *Fascism at the Grass Roots*, and Oe Shinobu's edited volumes, *The Flow of People in an Expanded Empire* and *Colonies Within Culture*, demonstrated, to build an empire, especially in domestic crises, involved popular imperialism. In order to stress mass-mobilizing, all-encompassing, and all-consuming characters of establishing Manchukuo, Young looks at a process of cultural practices, as well as military, economic, and political, of signifying and idealizing Manchukuo. In the 1930s, the "new land" of Manchukuo took an essential part to resolve domestic discontents and unrest of the agrarian population, engendered by the industrial capitalist development in Japan.

Young compellingly argues that expanding the empire involved mobilizing popular support at home by exploiting mass culture and making discourses and narratives on Manchukuo as an integral part of daily life in Japan. Furthermore, Young points out that the Manchukuo project in the 1930s and 40s was built upon new imperial strategy that coopted opposing voices, rather than suppressing them. As a result, the Manchukuo project included the unprecedentedly wide spectrum of organizations and individuals, such as labor unions, chambers of commerce, "right-wing officers, reform bureaucrats, and revolutionaries of left and right."³⁹ By tracking how Manchurian colonization grew into a nationwide movement, *Japan's total empire* illuminates the dialectical relationship between state, society, and empire.

"Manchurian colonization represented a new level of state involvement with rural

³⁹ Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 15.

society on one hand, and a new level of rural involvement in the empire on the other.”⁴⁰

Jun Uchida’s *Brokers of Empire* critiques the historiography that reads colonial history through official policies of the Government-General Office. She investigates specific local histories where colonial power was actually enacted, practiced, reinforced, and at the same time decentralized; these settlers ranged from entrepreneurs, educators, and religious leaders to political fixers, social reformers, and other non-governmental actors.⁴¹ By 1945, over 700,000 Japanese civilians and 300,000 army personnel had settled in Korea.⁴² She illuminates the fact that the interests and aspiration of the Japanese state and those of its citizens only imperfectly entangled in Korea. On the one hand, Japanese settlers—not only aggressive aspirants but also ordinary settlers of different priorities—indeed served the imperial project of making Korea as a colony of settlement, “civilizing” Koreans, and facilitating the assimilation policy. On the other hand, Uchida argues, “settlers not only developed a sense of solidarity vis-à-vis Koreans, but also modes and ideologies of expansion quite different from those of their own government—a recipe for conflict with the state.”⁴³ *Brokers of Empire* reveals that Japanese settlers fail to squarely fit into the model of settler as state’s servants. Instead of blindly following government policies, Uchida reveals “settlers developed their own ideas about how best to govern and develop Korea,” and furthermore there was deep schism within settlers’ communities. For

⁴⁰ Ibid., 19.

⁴¹ Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire*, 5.

⁴² Ibid., 3.

⁴³ Ibid., 10.

example, settlers took a dual stance on the relationship between Korean and Japanese imperial economy by supporting both assimilation and autonomy of Korean industry. Japanese settlers also held ambivalent standpoints toward the colonial state as well as the metropole. They constantly intervened the official policy of Korean accommodation, and also resisted the idea of ethnic unity and also of Korean elites' sharing power.

Thornber's *Empire of Texts in Motion* traces transculturated Japanese literature evident in semicolonial China, occupied Manchuria, and colonial Korea and Taiwan. Yet, despite the traces of interplay among Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese literature and criticism, Thornber argues that circulation and consumption of Japanese literature in its semicolony and colonies simply outnumbered other intra-East Asian textual contacts. She concludes, "Even more striking was how eagerly Chinese, Koreans, and Taiwanese devoured Japanese literature: by most estimates, they read more Japanese drama, poetry, and prose during the first decades of the twentieth century than their predecessors had in the previous thousand years combined."⁴⁴ In order to assert the voluntary and active character of (semi-) colonial subjects' consumption of literature, Thornber looks at statistical materials on regulations of print materials. "For most of the colonial period, cross-cultural currents were created willingly by enthusiastic Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese readers and writers; before the outbreak of total war with China in 1937, the Japanese government did little to impose Japan's literature on other Asians."⁴⁵ Although she notes that beginning early in the colonial period of

⁴⁴ Karen Thornber, *Empire of Texts in Motion*, 9

⁴⁵ Ibid., 18.

Taiwan and Korea, the Japanese built hundreds of colonial libraries, and circulated hundreds of thousands of Japanese books, including tens of thousands of creative texts, she writes, “The Japanese did not force them to read these literary works.”⁴⁶ Thornber continues to assert the non-coercive character of Chinese, Taiwanese, and Korean’s consumption of Japanese literature.

After Japan took over Manchuria in 1931, Japan strictly precluded any import and circulation of Chinese materials within Manchuria and distributed numerous Japanese print materials to libraries, bookstores, and myriad organizations and public spaces. Moreover, expatriate Japanese communities staged Japanese plays and employed Japanese literature “to attempt to inculcate colonial and semicolonial peoples with “Japanese values.””⁴⁷ Thornber claims, however, “Yet these projects, including the March 1919 Kabuki initiative in Korea, were market-driven, not compulsory.”⁴⁸ Only in her endnote, does she cite Brandon’s *Kabuki’s Forgotten War*, which details that kabuki writers penned more than 150 plays, which propagated imperial ideology.⁴⁹ “Also, it is important to remember that throughout the Japanese empire there was no shortage of Western literature in translation for those eager to read foreign texts. For most of the imperial period, reading Japanese literature outside of school, much less transculturating it, was almost always a deliberate choice.”⁵⁰ Throughout the book, Thornber strenuously claims the clear distinction between the

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 19.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ See Ibid., 398; the endnote no. 66.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 19.

political practices of the colonizer and the reading practices—in a broad sense—of the colonized, which is coercive and noncoercive, respectively. On the other hand, drawing on Mary Louise Pratt's concept of transculturation, she underscores the process in which the colonized and the colonizer negotiate with and ultimately transform one another's literature. Later chapters of this dissertation refute Thornber's assumption that situates literary consumption outside political spheres.

Fujitani's *Race For Empire* traces the homologous structure between the Japanese and the U.S. empires during total war of WWII by examining two empires' racial politics onto Koreans and Japanese, respectively. Due to the expediency of waging the total war and mobilizing volunteer soldiers, the two empires denounced racism, turning to 'inclusive' racism. Due to the official disavowal of blatant racism against Koreans, Korean males in the metropole attained suffrage in 1925, of which even Japanese women were deprived then. Moreover, universal manhood suffrage in 1925 underwent revisions in favor of Koreans; in 1930, the Home Ministry approved the use of Korean syllabary. In 1934, the Lower House Election Law shortened the residency requirement from a year to six months. The Korean Christian socialist Kagawa Toyohiko won the 1930 general election—the only successful Korean candidate--, and Pak Ch'ung-gŭm was elected to the Diet in 1932 and 1937.⁵¹ "In 1942 no fewer than 6 ethnic Korean candidates ran for the Lower House of the Diet and 108 ran for local elections."⁵² These were the unintended consequences that the official disavowal of racism entailed in the Japanese empire. *Race For Empire* brings

⁵¹ Takashi Fujitani, *Race For Empire*, 24.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 28.

into focus lesser known historical examples, discussion of which was suppressed due to postwar nationalist ideologies. Fujitani illustrates that the shift from ‘exclusive’ racism to ‘inclusive’ racism—or with his terms, from “vulgar racism” to “polite racism”—, which the total war regime necessitated, brought about the new strategy of the empire to its colonized subjects, who were considered to have rights to health, education, suffrage, and pursuit for happiness. Under the ‘inclusive’ racist system, Fujitani highlights, the empires trained newly incorporated national subjects to regulate themselves, based upon “self-knowledge and reflection,” rather than directly imposing colonial force on them. That is to say, the new racial regimes governed self-governing of new national subjects.⁵³

For the comparative purpose between Japan and the U.S., *Race For Empire* stressed mainly the impact of the total war and racial policies as a decisive factor that shifted the relationship between the Japanese empire and Koreans, and the U.S. empire and Japanese Americans. In contrast, Yonetani Masafumi’s studies, illuminates the multiple factors—including imperial wars and the U.S.-Japan relationship—that overdetermined changing trajectories of the empire-colony relationship. Anticolonial, anti-imperial, and nationalist movements in Korea, Taiwan, and China, despite their failure, instigated self-reflection on the part of the Japanese empire, and pushed Japanese further to reform the empire as a serious response to demands of the (semi-) colonized.

Yonetani Masafumi’s *Asia/Japan* traces the wide spectrum of Japanese imperialism, especially the strands that conceptualized Asia in more progressive terms

⁵³ See Ibid., 27.

beyond national or ethnic hierarchies: such as, Katsu Kaishū (1823-1899), Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), Ōi Kentaro (1843-1922) in the late nineteenth century, and Yoshino Sakuzō (1878-1933) and Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961) in the interwar years, and Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945) and Ozaki Hotsumi (1901-44) during World War II. Although the standpoints of these thinkers had limitations, their theories reveal that demands for reformation of the empire that refuted coercive and assimilating imperial policies toward its colonies, emerged within the metropole.

Yonetani stresses the following points in restructuring the Japanese empire. First, the American new imperialism—the empire without colonies—decisively influenced Japan’s revision of its imperial policies. After World War I, the U.S. rapidly expanded and substantiated its world hegemony by endorsing the right to self-determination and the principle of democracy, and also proclaiming liberation of all the colonies from imperialism. (127; 116) (157) It was such a shock for Japanese intellectuals to witness the rise of the U.S. empire, which expanded its hegemony by endorsing colonies’ right to self-determination. The success of the U.S. neo-imperialism prompted Japanese thinkers to significantly modify their colonial policies of domination and strategies of hegemony. Second, sociopolitical changes in China—forms and extents of anti-Japanese movements—crucially affected Japanese imperial policies, at least, in discursive levels. Especially, anti-colonial and nationalist movements across (semi-) colonial states toward the late 1910s inspired Japanese thinkers to consider Korea, Taiwan, and China as its partners to be allied, not as backward colonies to be controlled. Third, despite limitations, there were meaningful interactions of solidarity between Japanese intellectuals and those of (semi-) colonial

states. Finally, ever since Japan was forced to open its ports to the West in the nineteenth century, theories on intra-East Asian alliance maintained its discursive force throughout the entire imperial period.

In 1918 and 1919 Yoshino Sakuzō and Li Dazhao—the cofounder of the Chinese Communist Party—published each other’s articles in their magazines, *Dawn* and *Weekly Critique*, respectively.⁵⁴ Condemning the collusion between Chinese warlords and Japanese military colonizers, both Yoshino and Li argued for alliance between Chinese and Japanese masses by interlinking the momentums of Chinese May Fourth Movement and the Japanese democracy movement. In *Japan’s Orient*, Stefan Tanaka also has pointed out that by 1930s Japanese intellectuals became critical about the Meiji framework of the Orient (*toyo*) and its derogating concept of China (*shina*). Within Japan, scholars challenged the historiography that relegated other parts of East Asia to a fixed position inferior to Japan. Tanaka writes:

Indeed, many were aware by then of the growing separation between China and Japan's understanding of *shina* and sought to restore a sense of difference, of variability within and among cultures, events, and ideas. Moreover, they increasingly recognized that *shina* facilitated some of the contradictions between Japanese history and contemporary Japanese society.... During the 1930s the quest for better relations with China led a few people to realize that the problem lay in the very name that was being used, *shina*.⁵⁵

Tanaka further notes that in 1936, Takeuchi Yoshimi and his colleagues sent the twelve-page inaugural issue of their magazine *Chugoku bungaku geppo* (Chinese Literature Monthly), which used the term *chugoku* instead of *shina*, to their Chinese

⁵⁴ Yonetani Masafumi, *Asia/ Nihon*, 119-120.

⁵⁵ Stefan Tanaka, *Japan’s Orient*, 276-277.

counterparts. Chinese, in return, sent their journal to Takeuchi to show their appreciation.⁵⁶

After the outbreak of the March First Independence Movement, Yoshino suggested that the Japanese empire should abolish the following colonial policies in Korea: ethnic discrimination, stratocracy, assimilation policy, and press censorship. Yonetani argues that not only the Japanese empire conditioned the lives of semicolonial China and colonial Korea and Taiwan, but forms and contents of anticolonial movements in the three states directly reshaped Japanese thinkers, such as Yoshino, who interacted with Li Dazhao in China and Yŏ Unhyŏng in Korea. Yoshino engaged in serious dialogue with Chinese and Korean thinkers recognizing the validity—even partially—of anticolonial critiques from China and Korea. In contrast to China, Yoshino found it hard to compromise with Korea as it persistently demanded the independence from Japan. When Yŏ Unhyŏng visited Japan in fall, 1919, and Yŏ had a meeting with Koga Kenzou, Secretary of Colonial Expansion, and then with Yoshino. When Yŏ Unhyŏng unyieldingly demanded Korea's independence from Japan, Yoshino wrote "On the so-called Yŏ Unhyŏng Incident," in which he commented that Yŏ's argument indeed incorporates a cardinal voice on justice, which should not be dismissed, despite its "illegal" pursuit for independence. Yoshino wrote, "If Japan ultimately intends to truly cooperate with Korea at a spiritual level [as well], it ought to win key figures [of pro-independence] over to its side. Hence I argue the following point: in order to fundamentally resolve the Korean problem, Japan should

⁵⁶ Ibid.

cooperate/negotiate first and foremost with the most radical anti-Japanese Koreans.”⁵⁷

By examining the meaningful interactions between metropole and (semi-) colonies as well as the Japanese intellectual history of radical thinkers, Yonetani revealed how anti-colonial movements in East Asia transformed Japanese not merely for effective domination but for an East Asia “that preserved loyalty, harmony, and communality,” which East Asian thinkers originally sought to attain.⁵⁸

This dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapter One lays out historical and political contexts where inter-East Asian relations were built upon unequal power structures between Taiwan and China, or Korea and China. Instead of romanticizing an international alliance, I look at the Chinese political situations that circumscribed the formation of an ideal alliance. The situations included Sinocentrism, the Chinese Communist Party’s incapacity to mobilize a revolution, and the Nationalist Party’s collusion with imperial powers.

Chapter Two discusses the Korean auteur, screenwriter, and actor, Chŏng Kitak (1905-37), who made films in Korea, Japan, and China. He had the most successful career in Shanghai from 1928 to 1934. His movies range from lowbrow martial arts films to classical melodrama and historical genres. Chŏng’s first film *National Spirit* adapted a true story of a Korean nationalist terror into a narrative of a Sino-Korean militia movement against Japanese colonialism. Previous studies concluded that the popularity of *National Spirit* proved the Chinese appreciation of Chŏng’s political message of an inter-Asian alliance. I, however, argue that Chŏng’s

⁵⁷ Yonetani Masafumi, *Asia/ Nihon*, 92

⁵⁸ Stefan Tanaka, *Japan’s Orient*, 19.

other cinematic devices—inclusion of diverse genres, directing of performances, and the use of the camera—as crucial as political themes to engage an emerging, unstable Chinese mass public. In the Republican Chinese film market, to address nationalist issues required more subtle tactics so that a film could appeal to heterogeneous viewers. By doing so, Chǒng’s *National Spirit* was able to engage not only politically conscious but also politically unconcerned audiences in Republican China.

Chapter Three discusses two diasporic authors, Zhang Shenqie (1904 -65) and Chang Chirak (1905–38), who had engaged in Chinese revolutions, yet broke their alliance with China for a while and produced literature on national issues. Even after the political and aesthetic secession, however, they returned back to Chinese political and literary movements. By tracking the politico-aesthetic trajectories of Zhang and Chang, I examine another form of inter-colonial literature that sought the absolute right to split from as much as to associate with China during the colonial era. As any decision of alliance or disaffiliation was impermanent in Zhang’s and Chang’s lifetime, our reading of their “national” literature requires a new interpretative tool to construe the meaning of nationalism in the 1920s and 30s diasporic context. I argue that Zhang and Chang reappropriated the nation as an antidote to the tyranny of an unequal international alliance.

Chapter Four examines the Taiwanese writer, Zhang Wojun (1902-55), one of the core members of Taiwan New Literature Movement and also avid translator of Japanese literature and criticism into Chinese. At the rise of Taiwan New Literature Movement, he argued that Taiwan should adopt the Chinese vernacular language for

its modern texts, rather than inventing a new writing system from Taiwanese spoken languages. In so doing, he strived to restore cultural proximity or continuity between China and Taiwan, which was interrupted by the Japanese colonial rule. Yet Zhang's critical works pronounced a political position that opposed both Sinocentrism and Japanese colonialism. He saw the task of colonial Taiwanese art as reconciling China with Japan politically and culturally. Writing in the Chinese language for Taiwanese audiences and his translation of Japanese works for the benefit of Chinese readers were also in the context of building a harmonious intra-East Asian community. Ultimately, my analysis of Zhang Wojun's novels highlights how his literature unceasingly points to insufficiency of political practices and necessity of reformation in everyday practices and sensibility.

Chapter Five investigates Korean writer and auteur, Li Kyöngson (1905-77), who wrote one play and directed one film in Shanghai. Li co-wrote the play *Taiwan* with the famed Korean-Chinese actor Kim Yöm (C. Jin Yan). It was the first literary work in the Chinese language that was based on a real Taiwan's 1928 Zhushan Incident. My analysis stresses the fact that this colonial co-authorship of Korean and Chinese artists brought about a historical play *Taiwan*, which neither author belongs to or even visited. I argue that *Taiwan* exemplifies the model of aesthetic fluency in different national issues, whereby a diasporic author gives voice to silenced revolution of a nation that is neither his own nor big powers.

CHAPTER ONE: Historical Backgrounds

This chapter consists of five parts. Part I traces how the success of the First United Front in China attracted East Asian activists, which led to the formation of inter-East Asian alliances. Part II looks at unequal power structures underlying the East Asian alliance, which demanded a sacrifice on the part of Taiwanese and Koreans. It also touched upon the Nationalist-Communist schism that circumscribed organizing a radical international alliance. Part III discusses the limitations of the Chinese Communist Party in the Republican era, which is another factor that hindered East Asian alliances. Part IV talks about the Japanese Discord-Provoking Policy that undermined alliances. Finally, Part V details Koreans and Taiwanese who participated in Chinese revolutions and acted out of Chinese nationalism. Despite radical aspects of inter-East Asian alliances, this chapter highlights limitations and predicaments underlying political unions between Taiwan-China and Korea-China.

1. Historical Background: Demand of Alliance

The 1924 First Nationalist-Communist Alliance (or the First United Front) in China was the historically monumental alliance due to its trans-ideological character. The First United Front was politically groundbreaking enough to convince a significant number of Taiwanese and Koreans that by taking part in Chinese revolutions they could advance an end of colonial oppression in their native lands.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ See Kim San and Nym Wales, *Song of Ariran* (SF: Ramparts Press, 1972); Zhang Shenqie, *Zhang Shenqie Quanji* vol. 2 (Taipei: Wenjing she, 1998); Xie Xuehong, *Wo de Bansheng ji* (Taipei: Yangcuihua, 1997); Zhang Xiuzhe, *Wu wang Taiwan Luohua meng* (Taipei: Dongfang, 1947); Lin Qingzhang, *Rizhi Shiqi Taiwan Zhishi Fenzi Zai Zhongguo* (Taipei: Wenxian Weiyuanhui, 2004); Lee, Chong-Sik, and Hak-chun Kim. *Hyŏngmyŏnggadŭl Ŭi Hangil Hoesang* (Seoul: Minŭmsa, 1988).

Koreans organized the Korean Alliances for Chinese Revolutions (*cuchenghui*) in five cities--Beijing (Oct 1926), Shanghai (Mar 1927), Guangdong (May 1927), Wuhan (Jul 1927), and Nanjing (Sep 1927). The approximate number of members in each city was 40, 150, 170, 150, and 30, respectively. In November 1927, representatives of the five cities gathered in Shanghai, and inaugurated the Association of Alliances.⁶⁰ The Taiwanese also established youth groups in alliance with Chinese revolutions, in Shanghai (1924; 1925), Minnan (1924; 1925), and Guangdong (1927).⁶¹

On 1 April 1927, the Taiwanese group published the magazine *Taiwan Pioneer* (*Taiwan Xianfeng*) in Guangzhou, around 2,000 copies of which were sent to Taiwan in the same month (See Figure 1.1 below). In early May 1928, when the Jinan Massacre broke out, Taiwanese from the Guangzhou Revolution Youth Group (*Guangzhou Geming Qingninan Tuan*), the Taiwanese Comrades in Shanghai (*Taiwan Liuhu Tongzhihui*), and the Taiwanese Anti-Japan Alliance (*Taiwan FanRi Tongmenghui*) issued a manifesto. It argued that outcomes of Chinese revolutions would determine the future of other revolutions in the world.⁶² The Taiwanese Comrade's manifesto condemned Japan's Jinan Massacre, and said that if Chinese revolutions failed, Taiwanese had absolutely no hope for a national liberation. The manifesto reads, "We [Taiwanese] want to further the idea of Great Reconciliation

⁶⁰ Han-Chung Kyoryu Yŏn'gu Chungsim, *Chungguk Esŏŭi Hangil Tongnip Undong* (Seoul: Koguryŏ, 2000) 24-77.

⁶¹ Wakabayashi Masahiro, *Tai Wan Kang Ri Yun Dong Shi Yanjiu* (Taipei: Bo chong zhe chuban, 2007) 167-285.

⁶² Zhang Shenqie, *Zhang Shenqie Quanji* Vol. 4 (Taipei: Wenjing, 1998) 95.

(*datong*), and therefore respond to the call for Chinese revolution,”⁶³ accordingly urging also other colonized nationals to participate in Chinese revolutions. Looking back on the civil war period, Zhang Xiuzhe (pen name: Zhang Yuecheng, 1905 - ?)—a Taiwanese anticolonial activist—wrote that the success of the Chinese Northern Expedition in overthrowing warlords was partly due to devoted assistance of other Asian nationals.⁶⁴



Figure 1.1 Magazine Cover of 1927 *Taiwan Pioneer*, published in Guangdong

Chang Chirak (1905-38), a Korean Marxist and CCP member, also highlights the significance of a Chinese role in order to achieve the independence of Korea. In Wale’s interview with Chang, he said, “When the Great Revolution failed Koreans felt as if the world was broken. “God [Heaven] has given up the Koreans,” they said, but if

⁶³ Zhang Shenqie, *Zhang Shenqie Quanji* Vol. 4, 105.

⁶⁴ Zhang Xiuzhe, *Wu wang Taiwan Luohua meng* (Taipei: Dongfang, 1947) 29.

the Chinese revolution continues we can go back to Korea and organize a movement too. No Koreans supported Chiang Kaishek and stayed in Nanking even though starving. This is the Korean character.”⁶⁵ The failure of the Great Revolution here refers to the breakdown of the First United Front due to the Shanghai massacre on 12 April 1927 when Jiang jieshi betrayed the CCP, and brutally murdered communists with the support of capitalists in Shanghai. Chang Chirak stressed that only the success of Chinese revolution would allow Koreans to have definite political directions and hopes for revolution. Chang Chirak continues, “Koreans become very good internationalists then because their whole life is bound up with Japan, China and Soviet Russia. Dialectically, imperialism creates internalism, together with geography and political background.”⁶⁶ While recalling the hardships that Chang and his Korean comrades underwent due to their foreigner status in China, he says, “Koreans were the first to introduce Leninism into the Far East in 1918, and they will always be in the front ranks [of international movements], for our country is the victim of many international circumstances and has no hope except in the success of the international revolution.”⁶⁷

Sun Yat-sen also endorsed alliances between China and other Asian countries. In his last book *Three Principles of the People*, Sun Yat-sen argued that China ought to assist nationals of the oppressed countries (*buzhu ruoxiaominzhu*). To assist

⁶⁵ Nym Wales, *Notes on Korea and the Life of Kim San* (Madison: s.n., 1961) 4; This volume records interviews of Kim San which were not included in the book, *Song of Ariran: A Korean Communist in the Chinese Revolution*.

⁶⁶ Nym Wales, *Notes on Korea and the Life of Kim San*, 40.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 58.

powerless and small nations was one of the catchwords of the Revolutionary Army during the First United Front period (1924-27).⁶⁸ Sun Yat-sen discussed how many Asian territories that China had lost for the past hundred years, which traced back to the early twentieth-century.

The territories that we [China] lost recently are Weihaiwei, Lushun, Dalian, Qingdao, Jiulong, and the Guangzhou bay. ... The terrains that were lost earlier are Korea, Taiwan, and Peng Hu. ... What we lost even earlier than this is Burma and Vietnam....Even earlier did we lose Heilong River area and Wusuli. The land lost even earlier than those is the Yili River area. Moreover, there are small countries, such as Okinawa, Siam, Borneo, Sulu, Java, Ceylon, Nepal, and Bhutan that China lost. These were all for a long time the tributary states of China.⁶⁹

He pointed out that the powerless and small countries around China were still afraid of China due to the pre-modern history of subjugation. “This time, our KMT holds a meeting, Mongolia dispatched representatives to see that the foreign policies of our southern government still maintains any imperial intent. After the delegation arrived here, they see the platform of our meeting is ‘to endorse powerless ethnicities’ (*fuchi ruoshao minzu*), and therefore there is no imperial scheme of the meeting.”⁷⁰ Sun raised the question that which would be better between to be ‘stateless slaves’ (*wangguo nuli*) of one empire, such as Koreans or Vietnamese, and to be that of many countries, such as Chinese. He pointed out that the master and slave relationship in a colonial context exempted the colonized from certain kinds of duty whereas it was not

⁶⁸ Zhang Xiuzhe, *Wu wang Taiwan Luohua meng*, 29.

⁶⁹ Sun Zhongshan, “Sanminzhuyi. Minzuzhuyi” *Sun Wen Xuanji*. Vol. 1 ed. Huang Yan (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 2006) 129.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

the case for Chinese. Sun Yat-sen claimed the semicolonial situation of China was more tragic than that of any colonized country. From this vantage point, Sun's coinage of a 'sub-colony' (*cizhimindi*), the political status of which is even lower than a colony, properly describes the China's situation of his time. Not only Sun's idea of Chinese revolution but also the communist ideal of proletariat internationalism furthered the demand of inter-Asian alliance. The Great Anti-Imperial Alliance of Shanghai, for example, issued the pamphlet "Manifesto for August First Protest" in July 1930, which argued that Chinese should support revolutions in other colonies. It exhorted people to participate in strikes at work and school, and to gather at the Nanjing Road to endorse armed struggles in colonized countries and to denounce nationalism and "toadies of imperialists," such as the Nationalist and the Social Democratic Parties.⁷¹

Historical records and activists' recollections attest to the fact that the Chinese government provided financial and educational supports to foreigner activists in China. Yu Cha-myŏng (1894-1985), a Korean anarchist recalled in his autobiography how China assisted Koreans throughout anti-imperial wars. Upon Japan's successful attack of Shanghai on 28 January 1932, Japan held the congratulatory ceremony on April 29 in Hongkou Park in Shanghai. Yun Bong-Gil, a Korean nationalist, assassinated Shirakawa Yoshinori (C. Baichen Yize), the commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and joint leader of the Japanese Forces. In the terrorist attack, other Japanese cadres were also severely injured. Yu Cha-myŏng argues that this incident decisively impacted the Chinese standpoint on Korea in terms of Korea's

⁷¹ Shanghai Municipal Police File (hereafter SMP) D-8-677. Shanghai Fan-Di Datongmeng, "Wei Haozhao Ba Yi Shiwei Xuanyan."

strategic significance for Chinese anti-imperial revolutions. It was not until the incident that China officially acknowledged the Korean provisional government in Shanghai. The terror was hailed as the monumental anticolonial incident by Chinese media, and the Chinese government established the special class at the Luoyang Military Academy to train Koreans.⁷²

In order to understand the enthusiastic responses from China on this terror, we should look at the 1932 Sino-Japanese conflict, or the so-called January 28 Incident (the First Shanghai Incident). Due to Japan's fabricated incident in Shanghai, which was a pretext to invade the city of an immense capitalist potential, Japan broke out a war that lasted from January 28 to March 3, 1932. Despite the devoted fight of the Chinese 19th Route Army as well as Chiang Kai-shek's army, the Japanese Imperial Army simply far surpassed the Chinese military power. Upon the defeat, China could hardly maintain its police in the city whereas several units of the Japanese army stationed there. Yun's success of the terror on April 29, therefore, significantly compensated for Chinese's frustration over the defeat at the January 28 Incident. Since then, the Chinese government financially supported the Korean provisional government with two thousand *yuan* every month.⁷³ Yu Cha-myŏng recalled that in 1940 the Chinese government subsidized living expenses of a hundred Koreans in Chongqing—one thousand *yuan* a month.⁷⁴ Chinese Nationalist Government sustained

⁷² See Yu Ja-myŏng, *Na'ŭi Hoe'ŏk* (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chuban, 1984) 95-116.

⁷³ Yu Ja-myŏng, *Na'ŭi Hoe'ŏk* (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chuban, 1984) 130-1.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 141.

support for Korean activists, especially for nationalists and anarchists, although the financial aid was far from being sufficient to live by.

Reuter's Pacific Service Section reported on 13 April 1940 that around 300 Koreans and 100 Formosan volunteers fought in the Chinese army against Japan, specifically in Beijing, Tianjin, Taiyuan, Xinjiang, Qingdao, and Jinan. The article mentioned that the Formosan activist Li Youbang led Taiwanese groups, which included three medical and three pharmaceutical service corps. Two medical corps were in Zhejiang; two of pharmaceutical service corps were in Fujian and one in Zhejiang.⁷⁵

2. Historical Backgrounds: Other Side of Alliance

The materials above indicate, however, that it took more than a decade, thirteen years for the Korean provisional government in China to be officially acknowledged as an ally by the KMT government. Given that Lenin supported Korean communists early in November 1921, funded them five times more than what Koreans asked for, the Chinese support for Koreans from 1932 seemed to be late. The rest of the chapter illustrates difficulties that Taiwanese and Korean intellectuals and activists faced in Republican China.

Zhang Xiuzhe (pen name: Zhang Yuecheng, 1905 - ?)'s *Do Not Forget Taiwan*, deplored that Chinese had no will and desire to recover Taiwan back from the Japanese empire. Zhang's accounts in the book highlighted the distance between the Taiwanese perception of China and the Chinese perception of Taiwan of the time. In Guangzhou, Zhang discussed with Lu Xun on Chinese indifference to Taiwan's issue.

⁷⁵ U-38-2-1378. "Chaoxian zai hua kangri de qingkuang jianba"(1938. 9. 07 - 1940. 10. 19)

In Lu Xun's written response to Zhang in April 1917, he recollected Zhang's saying, "Chinese seems to forget entirely about Taiwan, and no one wants to bring up the issue in a serious manner."⁷⁶ Lu Xun commented that what Zhang observed was untrue as Chinese only momentarily put aside the Taiwan issue to cope with other numerous impending matters at stake. While living in China, Zhang realized that contemporary Chinese perceived Taiwan as if they were two different countries. While Lu Xun appeared to disagree with Zhang Xiuzhe's observation, his response verified Zhang's point that the retrocession of Taiwan, or Taiwan's independence, failed to be the imperative political issue for contemporary China.

Xie Xuehong (1901-70), a Taiwanese Marxist, also discussed the unconcerned attitude of Chinese toward Taiwanese political situations in her autobiography *Record of the Half of My Life* (*wo de banshengji*). When she was active as a communist in Shanghai, she realized that to liberate Taiwan from the Japanese empire was hardly an issue for Chinese. Although Xie was illiterate, with help of her comrades, she wrote one letter to the *Zhejiang Daily* (*Zhejiang Ribao*). In the letter, she pointed out that China never took actions for retrieving Taiwan although China struggled for retrieving the territories of the concessions and the International Settlement as well as the sovereignty for customs and jurisdiction. The next day, the *Zhejiang Daily* published Xie's article, which stressed that China should not forget the urgent situation of Taiwan, a part of their country.⁷⁷ From that point on, her Taiwanese comrades

⁷⁶ Zhang Xiuzhe, *Wu Wang Taiwan Luohua Meng* (Taipei: Dongfang, 1947) 44.

⁷⁷ Xie Xuehong, *Wo de Banshengji* (Taipei: Yangcuihua, 1997) 169.

intentionally included the slogan of “Retrieving Taiwan” on newspapers, pamphlets, and wall newspapers, and small flags for a street demonstration.

Although Chinese were aware of the importance of an international alliance, China’s actual support for colonized countries was far from being ideal. For example, Chang Chirak, a Korean communist and member of the Chinese Communist Party, recounted how activists and refugees from Indochina were marginalized in China, rather than incorporated into Chinese revolutionary groups.⁷⁸ Chang described wretched situations of Indochina, which were not only due to the French colonial oppression, but also due to its failure to form alliances with other (semi) colonies; “The culture is very low, even the CP [Indochina’s Communist Party] has no theoretical ground. ... Revolution is very hard to take place in Indo-China because Yunnan is near and backward. When they escape to China, they are treated as beggars if they ask for help. They get no support from China. In 1927, one Indo-China comrade in Canton committed suicide in the water.”⁷⁹ Moreover, France’s strict surveillance on Indochina made it almost impossible for Chinese activists to cross the border to train Indochinese people of a Chinese origin.

Serious internal problems with both Nationalist and Communist Parties also caused adverse circumstances for foreign activists. First, since 1927, the KMT leader, Chiang Kai-shek, prioritized suppressing and eradicating communism over fighting against imperialists, Japanese as well as others, claiming that communists ideas caused

⁷⁸ Indochina is the former name of a region of Southeast Asia, which was a colony of France from 1887 to 1954. Its territory consisted of Vietnam, Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Laos. For more details, see Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hemery. *Indochina: An Ambiguous Colonization, 1858–1954* (Berkeley: California UP, 2010), 190.

⁷⁹ Nym Wales, *Notes on Korea and the Life of Kim San*, 60.

more serious harm to China than the Japanese empire did. While the KMT waged civil war, Japan rapidly expanded its political power and capitalist markets in China, and exploited resources for munitions and heavy industries. Against the KMT, the Shanghai Anti-imperialist League distributed the pamphlet “Appealing to Shanghai People on April 3rd Incident” on April 6, 1930. The league denounced the KMT for assisting Japanese and British imperialists by subjugating Chinese laborers to colonial industries—workers in egg factories—in Nanjing.⁸⁰ This incident resulted in ten casualties. It prompted students and workers in Nanjing and other cities to be allied against imperial forces. Accordingly, Chinese people demanded that the two parties cease the civil war and establish a united anti-imperial leadership. In the process, the Xi’an incident broke out in December 1936, due to which the Second United Front was formed in July 1937.

It took ten years for the two parties to be allied again after the break of the First United Front. Foreign activists in China were inevitably involved with the whirlwinds of Chinese factional conflicts, which significantly hindered the development of the anti-imperial movement in their native lands. The Korean CCP member, Chang Chirak, also notes, “Exiles become pathologically sensitive; their daily life is abnormal and always difficult. Our constant political troubles abroad have come from being a tiny minority in alien lands, where we are pulled Right and Left and around in circles by rapidly changing conditions beyond our control and not directly related to our central

⁸⁰ D6-5-667. Shanghai Fandi Datongmeng, “Sisan Can’an Gao Quan Shanghai Qunzhong Shu” 6 Apr 1930.

problem. Therefore, it is difficult to agree upon a correct analysis of any given situation in its relation to the Korean revolutionary movement.”⁸¹

3. Limits of the Chinese Communist Party

Until the Second United Front, the CCP's power had decidedly less power and resources than the KMT, which was due to the collusion between the KMT and the Japanese and British empires. Besides the external situations, the CCP also faced serious problems in deploying communist strategies in terms of mobilizing mass movements. First, the party failed to respond to mass demands in a timely manner. Chang Chirak condemned the fact that the CCP missed crucial chances of being to be immersed into the grass roots. Chang Chirak argued that there were decisive political and historical junctures whereby the CCP could have thrived as the representative party for the entirety of China and the proletariat, but the party failed to do so. It was less the problem of principles than that of tactics. One of the examples Chang takes is the Manchurian Incident (*liutiaohu shijian*), which broke out on September 18, 1931. The Japanese empire fabricated the incident as a pretext to invade Manchuria. This incident influenced all the classes, except investment bankers, in China that include even landlords and other non-proletarian masses, were aspired to resist the imperial Japan. The CCP, however, failed to make the most of the masses' unarticulated passion for anti-Japanese revolution and also failed to guide them under the communist ideals and tactics. Although the CCP waited for this kind of historical moment for nearly two decades, Zhang points out, the party's tie to the Chinese

⁸¹ Nym Wales. *Notes on Korea and the Life of Kim San*, 58.

masses was too weak.⁸² Zhang says, “The mind and body of the revolution was separated, also the party and the masses, also the leadership and the party - this is the fault of the Orient.”⁸³ In another interview, Zhang said to Nym Wales, “Sometimes a man is arrested at two o’clock and a mass arrest is made one hour later after he betrays - in China. This is because there are wavering elements in the party; they are intellectuals, not proletarians and have half counter-revolutionary tendencies. Those who merely follow the leader easily betray. The leader also betrayed because they were never connected with the mass and thought themselves high leaders.”⁸⁴ Chang Chirak stresses the severely shaky ground of the CCP of the time in comparison to the communist parties of Korea and Japan.

When the 19th Route Army under the Nationalist Army broke out the Fukien Uprising in November 1933 against Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party, the insurrection severely undercut the legitimacies of the KMT. Upon establishing its own government in Fujian, the 19th Route Army urged the CCP to form an alliance against the KMT, which the CCP refused. The CCP disapproved the polity of the Fujian government as its ally, denouncing the 19th Route Army as merely the third party that is neither communist nor nationalist. In other words, the CCP was lacking enough political and ideological capacities to incorporate the so-called third parties into its own side.

⁸² Nym Wales. *Notes on Korea and the Life of Kim San*, 33.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 6.

The materials below on the Chinese masses during the semicolonial period attest to the politically highly capricious nature of Chinese laborers and the city poor, who were potentially revolutionary masses, yet unhesitatingly turned to the opposite side with no justification. Since the early twentieth century, the Chinese agricultural economy rapidly collapsed, which forced bankrupted farmers to move to big cities. If one had no special skills or training, rickshaw pulling was one of the most common jobs that they could get. As the number of rickshaw men far surpassed that of rickshaws, rickshaw-pullers were exploited.⁸⁵ In 1922 the National Bible Society of Scotland, which operated under the Chinese Foreign Famine Relief Committee, published a report on the mercy mission on rickshaw men. It reads, “Ricksha men are the poorest class in the community, and in the nature of things, the very men liable to be influenced by forces making for disorder in the settlement.”⁸⁶ As a way of quelling a potential unrest, the Scottish Bible Society suggested that the relief committee provide them public rickshaws. The municipal committee, however, rejected the proposal.⁸⁷

It was not until 1934 that the Shanghai Municipal Council embarked on undertaking a survey on rickshaw-pullers in order to establish famine relief policies. In 1934 five city officials started the survey, the number of rickshaw pullers in Shanghai amounted to more than 80,000, and that of rickshaw vehicles 24,309. At first,

⁸⁵ Furthermore, as rickshaw-pulling is such a heavy labor, a puller’s average lifespan was seven and a half years.

⁸⁶ U1-3-1959. “Shanghai Huayang Zhenhui Tongguo Guanyu Yaoqiu Gongbuju Buzhu yi Weizhi Shanghai Binku de Renli Chefu de Jueyi” Chinese Foreign Famine Relief Committee, National Bible Society of Scotland, 1922.

⁸⁷ The reply from the headquarter, however, wrote, “the public ricksha men are come-and-go class, and no great number of them make ricksha pulling their profession. I do not think the ownership of a public ricksha would appeal to many of the coolies.” It also notes that if the society had any fund, it should be given to Mr. G. Matheson’s Ricksha Mission, instead to laborers directly.

rickshaw men refused to cooperate with public officials, saying “we don’t want you [the municipal government] to help us.”⁸⁸ At this response, the municipal report criticized them for their low intellectual level and naïve thinking. Other reasons why rickshaw-pullers were uncooperative included schedule conflicts and public doubts of a real intention behind the municipal relief work. One of hearsays, for example, was that the survey was in fact for a future conscription.⁸⁹

What it took to get them to participate in the survey, however, were only two bars of soap, two sets of bath towels for each person, and long chats of persuasion. This way municipal officials were able to conduct the survey on Shanghai rickshaw-pullers. It indicates that the poorest Chinese laborer class were neither cautioned against conciliating gestures of the government nor predisposed to anticapitalist or socialist ideas. Within a purely theoretical framework, the proletariat in dire poverty are politically uncompromising and ethically just, which qualifies them as true leaders of a communist revolution. The given picture of the rickshaw-men, however, is highly contrary to the model of proletariat in classical communist theories. While the rickshaw pullers appeared to be critical on almsgiving from the government, they easily succumbed to immediate material compensation and cajoling. Chinese communists during the semicolonial period struggled to have realistic and theoretical grounds for tackling defection of the proletariat within its framework. Without a successful rise of mass movements within the domestic land, the CCP’s assistance of other nations was much less likely to attain. Thus, in terms of mobilizing mass

⁸⁸ Y4-1-794. “Shanghai shi Renli Chetu Shenghuo Zhuangkuang Diaocha Baogaoshu Mulu” Oct 1934; 3.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 6.

movements, the CCP failed to provide to foreign activists hopeful visions on inter-East Asian communist revolutions.

4. Japan's Discord-Provoking Policy

Due to Japanese imperial interventions, the Chinese also turned hostile against Koreans and Taiwanese. It was a part of Japan's discord-provoking schemes (*lijian zhengce*), which strategically formulates antagonism between the colonized and the semi-colonized. Xie Xuehong, for example, recollected in her autobiography *Record of the Half of My Life* that the Japanese empire strategically and systematically let harmful groups of people in Taiwan, such as gangsters and people of criminal records, emigrate to coastal cities in China. Japan assisted them to start business in gambling, dealing drugs (especially opium), and other similar kinds, which involved fraudulent and illegal means, and which were ultimately detrimental to Chinese society. Their misdeeds in China include incendiarism and murder. Due to the regulations of the consular jurisdiction and the extraterritoriality, the Chinese legal systems had no means to punish them. While repatriated to Taiwan, the imperial court rarely punished them, and sent them back to China for a short period of time. As Japanese imperialists targeted, the presence of Taiwanese miscreants in China, who were exempted from legal punishments, produced enormous hostility against Taiwanese. Xie recalls that in 1925, due to the anti-Taiwan sentiments in the mainland, even people in many other fields, such as academia and medicine, dared not identify themselves as Taiwanese in China.⁹⁰ When Sun Yat-sen passed away, the Taiwanese communist group offered their condolences to China in the name of the Taiwanese Youth Group. Xie recalled

⁹⁰ Xie Xuehong, *Wo de Banshengji* (Taipei: Yangcuihua, 1997), 165.

that it was a challenging and daring task for the group, given the Chinese prejudice against the Taiwanese.

The Japanese empire successfully provoked discord between China and Korea as well, using the tensions between Chinese and Korean farmers in Manchuria. The enforced antagonism between the two rose above the surface in 1927, and then turned into the Wanbaoshan Incident in 1931. Out of the incident, 91 Chinese, who lived in Korea, were killed by the enraged Korean masses; the Chinese killed several Koreans near the Korean-Chinese border in retaliation. This incident occurred due to the Japanese manipulation of one Korean journalist, Kim Yisan (C. Jin Lisan) of the *Chosŏn Daily* (C. *Chaoxian ribao*), whose articles were false, misleading, and sensational representations of the Korean and Chinese conflicts in Manchuria. Maneuvered by the imperial narrative, which the colonized subject ventriloquized, Chinese and Koreans became extremely hostile to each other. Although intellectuals and activists urged the masses not to be deceived by imperial schemes, the hostility significantly hindered alliance between China and Korea. Zhang also recounts that the Japanese constantly intervened in the Chinese and Korean allying endeavors, and “after 1932, the Korean nationalist independence movement cut relations with the Chinese”⁹¹ despite communist efforts to counter the hostile split between them.

The skepticism of a Chinese-Korean alliance in the 1930s ranged from moderate critiques to radical ones. The former opposed Koreans’ direct participation in the Chinese revolution while only partially acknowledging the importance of Chinese revolution in liberating colonized Asian countries. The latter, on the other

⁹¹ Nym Wales and Kim san, *Song of Ariran*, 236.

hand, disbelieves that success of Chinese revolutions necessarily leads to independence of Korea. Chang Chirak, for example, discusses the latter's view, which claims, "enough Korean blood has been run in China and what do you get? The Korean C.P. [communist party] forgets its own revolution and only understand the Chinese revolution."⁹² Furthermore, toward the mid-1930s, nationalists and communists, including Chang Chirak, critiqued Koreans' sacrifice for Chinese revolutions. Zhang says, "To have one Korean here and one there in the Chinese Party was of little use. We decided that we must join together for common action and safeguard the Korean Revolution instead of sacrificing only for China directly. Since 1932 the Korean Communist Party and our Manchurian Communist party had been independent, for the Chinese did not study the Korean problem and had little understanding of it."⁹³ Zhang's account tells us that, despite Taiwanese, Korean, and other Asian foreigners' devotion and sacrifice for the CCP, it failed to become, theoretically and practically, an important agenda for the CCP to embrace anti-imperialist issues of other Asian countries into those of Chinese revolutions.

5. Koreans and Taiwanese in Scenes of Chinese Revolution

Since the CCP and the KMT formed the First United Front in January 1924, both parties agreed upon establishing a military academy that would train Chinese and other nationals in anti-imperial theories and tactics. The First United Front prioritized the anticolonial demands and the recovery of the state sovereignty over any other revolutionary tasks of the time. In June 1924, the Huangpu Military Academy

⁹² Nym Wales, *Notes on Korea and the Life of Kim San*, 3.

⁹³ Nym Wales and Kim san, *Song of Ariran*, 311.

(*Huangpu lujun junguan xuexiao*) was established, and in October 1926 another campus was established in Wuhan. From 1924 to 1949, about 50,000 graduated from the academy, and the school played indispensable roles in advancing anticolonial and anti-feudal revolutions in China.⁹⁴ Out of 1297 students who entered the academy in January 1925, 1197 students graduated.⁹⁵ The academy's graduates' records indicate that one Taiwanese and five Koreans finished the program during this period.⁹⁶ Students whose origins of birth were unidentified amounted to four.⁹⁷ And around four percent of the total (45 students) were already the CCP members before they entered the academy. The class of the fourth enrollees started in March 1926, and 2686 students graduated in October of the same year. The graduates include two Taiwanese and twenty-four Koreans.⁹⁸ The school military documents state that, however, twenty students out of all the Koreans were awarded only diploma, and the rest were unfound on the official military appointment records. Three Koreans were in charge of arranging collaboration among different units (Ro Kŏn; C. Lu Jian), directing brigades (Pak Hyosam; C. Pu Xiaosan), and teaching students (Pak Kŏnung; C. Pu Jianxiong), respectively. Kim Yaksan (C. Jin Ruoshan; real name: Kim

⁹⁴ Lin Jiayou, "Introduction" *Fengyun Jihui: Huangpu Junxiao DiSanQiSheng Yanjiu*, ed. Chen Yuhuan (Guangzhou: Zhongshan Daxue Chubanshi, 2008) 7.

⁹⁵ Chen Yuhuan, *Fengyun Jihui* (Guangzhou: Zhongshan Daxue Chubanshi, 2008) 3.

⁹⁶ The Taiwanese student's name is Huang Jiying, and the Koreans are Yi Yiltai (C. Li Yitai), Yi Bin (C. Li Bin), Chang Sŏngch'ŏl (C. Zhang Shengzhe), Yu chŏlsŏn (C. Liu Tiexian), and Ch'a Yŏnxin (C. Che Yanxin).

⁹⁷ Chen Yuhuan, *Fengyun Jihui*, 82.

⁹⁸ The two Taiwanese students' names are Zhang Kemin and Liao Wuliang. For more details, see Chen Yuhuan, *Xiongguan Mando: Huangpu Junxiao DiXiQiSheng Yanjiu* (Guangzhou: Zhongshan Daxue Chubanshi, 2009) 262.

Wonbong; C. Jin Yuanfeng; 1898-1958) held a higher position than a military rank.⁹⁹ The rest of twenty Koreans were awarded only diploma, and the school did not have specific records on them.

The First United Front broke down on 12 April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the alliance by initiating the anti-communist coups d'état in Shanghai, where more than 12,000 communists were killed. As a way of seizing the power and uprooting communists, Chiang took a subservient position to imperial forces as well as to the bourgeoisie in Shanghai. In November 1927, Chiang signed a secret pact in Tokyo with Tanaka Giichi, then Prime Minister of Japan. The pact secured Japan's economic rights in Manchuria and to suppress anti-Japanese movements in return for Japan's cutting the tie with Zhang Zuolin (1875-1928), the warlord of Manchuria, and also Japan's cooperation in destroying the communist party. At the secret meeting, Chiang said to Tanaka, "I also believe that Japan's benefits and security in China is equal to China's own benefits and security of well-being of Chinese people. The purpose of the revolution of the Chinese army is to benefit China and imperial powers (*lieqiang*)."¹⁰⁰ The KMT and Japan cooperated under the agreement until 1937.

After Chiang Kai-shek's coups d'état in 1927, the CCP waged antinationalist wars, which continued until the Second United Front in 1937. On 11 December 1927, communists broke out the Guangzhou Revolution, which, however, failed. The party lost key communist figures. Due to Chiang Kai-shek's turn to imperial powers, a significant number of foreigners at the Huangpu Military Academy, who had no

⁹⁹ Chen Yuhuan, *Xiongguan Mando* (Guangzhou: Zhongshan Daxue Chubanshi, 2009) 266.

¹⁰⁰ "Dui Hua Waijiao Guanxi Yijian" Riben Waiwusheng Waijiao Shiliao Guanzang. A.1.1.0.10.

definite ideological disposition beforehand, turned to the CCP. The Guangzhou Municipal Archives include the recollection of devotees of the Guangzhou Revolution, which recounted activities of foreigners, such as Koreans and Vietnamese. For example, Du Junhui, the wife of Kim Ch'ungch'ang, detailed the Koreans' dedication to the 1927 Guangzhou Revolution.¹⁰¹ All the members of one unit (either the first or the third) of the Core Troop (*jiaodaotuan*) were Koreans, and the number amounted to around 200. Kim Ch'ungch'ang was the leader of the unit. As Korean participants of the revolution, Du Junhui named "Pak Kŏn'ung (C. Pu Jianxiong; a graduate from the Huangpu Military Academy), Chang Chirak (a student of Zhongshan Univ. at the time), Kim Wonpung (C. Jin Yuanfeng; a graduate from the Huanpu Military Academy, but later betrayed the communist party), Choe Yongkŏn (C. Cui Yongjian; an instructor of the Core Troop)"¹⁰² in her recollection. She also wrote that when the CCP held the representatives' strategy meeting, Kim Ch'ungch'ang and seven or eight other Korean members also participated. Only three days after the CCP took over the power of the city, the nationalist party quelled the communist members and citizens with the formidable amount of armament. Thereupon, Koreans had to flee to Haifeng, Lufeng, and Hong Kong. Du Junhui and Kim Ch'ungch'ang also left for Hong Kong to escape the nationalist persecution of communists.

In "The Committee Member, Choe Yongkŏn (C. Cui Yongjian), visited the Chinese Revolution Museum, and raised the issue of Korean comrades' participation

¹⁰¹ Du Junhui. "My View on Comrade Jin Kuiguang's Participation in Guangzhou Revolution" *Guangzhou Qiyi Ziliao*, ed. Guangdong Geming Lishi Bowuguan (Beijing: Guangdong Bowuguan, 1985) 105.

¹⁰² Ibid.

in the Guangzhou Revolution,” an unidentified author writes that when the Huangpu Military Academy established the Special Unit, the number of its members amounted to 200, and 150 of them were Koreans. The majority of them were sacrificed at the Guangzhou Revolution. Although they successfully destroyed Shahe in Guangzhou, they were not given a clear direction from their superior afterwards. While they were lost, the army of the reactionary group besieged and killed most of them. The rest of Koreans escaped to Wuhan after the 1927 Guangzhou Revolution failed. It says, “the Wuhan campus of the Huangpu Military Academy was established, and about 150 Koreans joined it.”¹⁰³

Following the failure of the 1927 communist revolution in Guangdong, Shanghai became more important as the strategic space for foreigners to develop anti-imperialist movements. Shanghai was also the birthplace of the communist party of Korea in 1921, of China in 1921, and of Taiwan in 1928.¹⁰⁴ The *Japanese Police Record of Colonial Korea* describes Shanghai as “the center of propaganda of radical communists in East Asia.”¹⁰⁵ Not only communism but also any kind of radically progressive thoughts, Western and Japanese, were circulated and disseminated in Shanghai, which opened up the critical space of resistance for imperialized subjects.

One Shanghai Police File in 1929 on the anti-imperial movements, for example, records the list of communist handbills and related materials that were found at no.

¹⁰³ Unknown. “The Committee Member, Choe Yongkōn (C. Cui Yongjian), visited the Chinese Revolution Museum, and raised the the issue of Korean comrades’ participation in Guangzhou Revolution” *Guangzhou Qiyi Ziliao*, 308.

¹⁰⁴ The official title of the Korean Communist Party then was the Koryō Communist Party.

¹⁰⁵ Chōsen Sotokubu Keimu Kyoku, *Taishō 11 nen chōsen chain Jōkyō*, 363.

362 of South Chengtu (Chengdu) Road. The list includes twenty-five copies of the manifesto entitled “The Revolutionary Youth & The Oppressed Proletariat,”¹⁰⁶ issued on 27 October 1929 by the Formosan Youth Group. The manifesto reads:

In their last five minutes of agony, the international imperialists are adopting more vigorous measure towards Soviet Russia--the leader of the world revolution and emancipator of weak and small nations. They are also adopting more drastic measures towards the Chinese revolution. The Japanese imperialists who are worse than brutes have recently arrested a large number of Formosan, Chinese, Japanese and Korean students at Tokyo and other places. This is not only a display of brutality by the Japanese imperialists but also a surrender of the Kuomintang to the imperialists and its oppression of students. After the Chinese revolution of 1921, the Kuomintang commenced its pro-foreign and reactionary activities. The imperialists, under the protection of the Kuomintang, are attacking China daily and are oppressing with bared teeth and claws. The Kuomintang government is the enemy of the Chinese revolution and has become an important factor in international reactionary influence. It has massacred Formosan revolutionary youths in Kwangtung [Guangdong] and Fokien [Fujian] and assisted the Japanese Consulate at Shanghai to arrest Formosan revolutionarists [sic]. Our slogans are as follows: -

Let the Formosan, Japanese, Chinese and Korean revolutionary peoples unite.

Down with imperialism, especially Japanese imperialists.

Overthrow the Kuomintang administration and establish a labour and peasant government.

Oppose the war amongst militarists; oppose a great world war.

Oppose the attack on Soviet Russia.

Give armed support to Soviet Russia and the Chinese revolution.

Rescue the arrested revolutionaries.

We must have liberty to strike, to suspend studies, to demonstrate, to hold meetings and freedom of speech and publication.

Long live the Chinese labour and peasant revolution.

Long live the accomplishment of the independence of Formosa.

¹⁰⁶ In the same file, however, the translation of the title of the manifesto reads “To revolutionary youths and all oppressed peoples.”

Long live the accomplishment of world revolution.¹⁰⁷

In the same file, the list of arrested people and groups includes one Taiwanese, Zung Chao-jen (Zheng Chao-Ren), and the Taiwan Youth League. The pamphlet above indicates that Taiwanese communists understood their anti-imperialist task in the East Asian context and also in accordance to the call of the Comintern. As Moyun (pen name: Xu Naichang, 1906-75), a Taiwanese communist, already argued in “Taiwan at its Dawn”(1924), the Taiwanese liberation movement had progressed beyond the stage of a national revolution whereas China was still entrapped within the nationalist framework. Qu Qiubai (1899-1935) commented on this article in the “reporter’s appendix”(*jizhe fuzhi*) section that “Taiwan moved beyond simply undertaking the proletariat revolution, and the Taiwanese proletariat embarked on the “people’s revolution” (*guomin geming*) that resists ordinary oppression and lead the entire oppressed class [in Taiwan and in Japan] under the guidance of the Comintern, the CCP, and JCP.”¹⁰⁸ In terms of a vision of the world revolution and the mass revolution, Taiwanese communists were more radical than Chinese of the time due to its political liminality.

The Shanghai Municipal Police File on “Communist Leaflets Distributed Among Local Japanese Troops” writes, “Towards the end of last year [1932] signs were not wanting that the Shanghai Korean branch of the Chinese Communist Party had recovered from its inertia and was again showing renewed activity.”¹⁰⁹ This report

¹⁰⁷ SMP, D-637. 1929. Nov 18.

¹⁰⁸ Qu Qiubai. *XinQingnian*, Dec 1924.

¹⁰⁹ SMP, D-4301. 1933. Mar. 21.

mentions the article from the *Shanghai Nichi-Nichi* newspaper, where communist pamphlets, issued by the Shanghai Korean branch of the Chinese Communist Party, were distributed in the Hongqiao district. Those handbills exhorted imperial laborers and soldiers to be allied against the capitalist empire and, more importantly, not to kill Chinese brethren. Japanese marines frequented the district, and the Japanese pamphlets included the phrase, such as “Smash the [phrase censored here] anti-communist propaganda of the Imperialists,” or “We oppose discriminating treatment.”¹¹⁰ These pamphlets were found folded in the bottom of matchboxes that many Japanese soldiers purchased. For example, one handbill reads:

The Shankaikwan Incident has become serious. Let us oppose the massacre of Chinese labourers and farmers. Dear Sailors, our brethren, The Japanese Government of capitalists and landowners which occupied Shankaikwan is attempting to make you kill Chinese farmers and labourers in the Shanghai area. The emergency call which started three days ago is nothing but preparation for the massacre. Soon your leave will be prohibited. Prepare yourselves discussing with men of all squads and companies ways and means to oppose this order. Do not kill the Chinese brethren. Oppose the war of the capitalists and landowners. Submit demands to officers. Let us join the Sailors Kyogikai [Council].

The Third Fleet Sailors Kyogikai.¹¹¹

It tell us that Korean and Communist communists tried to embrace Japanese soldiers and civilians in Shanghai to its side by differentiating them from capitalists, statesmen, and others who directly benefited from imperialist enterprises. This leaflet, hidden in matchboxes, urges Japanese soldiers and civilians to refuse the imperial war and join the Chinese-Japanese laborers alliance.

¹¹⁰ SMP, D-4301. Apr. 22. 1933.

¹¹¹ SMP, D-4301. Feb 4. 1933.

On 9 January 1933, the Shanghai Municipal Police found copies of another leaflet “We Oppose Discriminating Treatment” in the Hongqiao Park. It reads:

Dear Sailors,

Do not be deceived by such words as “For the sake of our homeland” and “For our nationals”. In our country our aged parents are suffering from cold by being robbed of their supporters. For whose sake are we staying in Shanghai? Do not the landowners and capitalists squeeze our comrades, labourers and tenant-farmers? We still continue to live a life of slavery even in Shanghai. Our work is worse than that of miners. If we make a slight mistake punishments will be freely imposed on us in such a cruel manner as if dealt to animals. How can we bear such cruelty without a complaint? We demand our six-hour duty and oppose punishment. When on shore leave we are watched by patrols and permitted only to enter authorised restaurants. Abolish the systems of authorised restaurants. Abolish patrols.

.... Oppose discriminating treatment between officers and men.

Our brethren in Japan have already commenced a movement to oppose the capitalists and landowners. We must therefore unite ourselves firmly under the banner of the “Soldiers Conference [Council]” in order to oppose officers.

The Third Fleet Sailors Conference [Council]¹¹²

This propaganda bill repudiates nationalism while foregrounding the class-consciousness of laborers, including soldiers and farmers, across Japan and China against exploitation of imperial capitalists. According to Kim Ch’ung-ch’ang (C. Jin Kuiguang), the CCP oftentimes assigned Koreans propagandic tasks, rather than actual combats, due to the Korean’s fluency in Japanese.¹¹³ Kim’s undertone here is rather critical of the CCP for limiting Korean’s participation primarily in propagandic affairs.

¹¹² Shanghai Police File. No. D. 4301. 1933.

¹¹³ Kim Söngsuk, Jang Könsang, Jöng hwa’am, and Yi Kanghun, *Hyugmyungkatül üi Hang’il Hoesang* [Revolutionaries’ Recollection on Anti-Japanese Movements] (Seoul: Min’üm-sa, 2005).

Despite the limited power of imperial Japan in the International Settlement of Shanghai, the Shanghai Municipal Police Files show that Japan exerted its juridical power over its colonial subjects who were active in the French Concessions. Upon Japanese imperial abuse of extra-territorial rights, the colonized of Taiwan and Korea also invented ways to circumvent the imperial legal systems. One of the 1933 police files documents that the reorganization of the Intelligence Staff of the Japanese Consular Police in Shanghai. It says, “the Formosan Section of the Second Section (Intelligence Office) of the Consular Police Department have been increased by one Inspector and two Constables who arrived here from Formosa on May 1, 1933.” The Hongkew (Hongkou) Park Bomb Incident in April 1932 prompted the Japanese government to increase the number of its officials at the Japanese Consulate from eight to forty people. They targeted to regulate “the rising tide of subversive activities in the Far East” in a more effective manner. In September 1932, the Intelligence Office was renamed as the Second Section of the Consular Police Department, and 27 staffs were appointed as below.¹¹⁴ The 1933 file on the Fokien (Fujian) Secession Movement also recorded this in its miscellaneous section, which cited one article from

¹¹⁴ SMP, D-4812. 1933. May. 8

¹¹⁴ CHIEF OF THE SECTION CONSUL

¹¹⁴ Assistants 1 Chancellor, 1 Clerk

¹¹⁴ General Office 1 Inspector, 1 sergeant, 3 constables

¹¹⁴ Chinese Section 1 Inspector, 3 sergeants

¹¹⁴ Russian Section 1 Inspector, 1 sergeant

¹¹⁴ Japanese Section 1 Inspector, 1 sergeant

¹¹⁴ Korean Section 1 Vice-Consul, 1 Sub-Inspector, 1 sergeant and 3 constables

¹¹⁴ Formosan Section 1 Vice-Consul and 1 sergeant

¹¹⁴ Inspection & Censorship 1 Inspector and 2 constables

the *Shanghai Daily* (*Shanghai Nichi Nichi*): “The officers of the Korean section and the Formosan section of the Special Branch of the Japanese Consular Police have been assigned to observe the movements of Koreans and Formosans during the new year holidays.”¹¹⁵ In 1933, the Shanghai Police arrested participants at the Labor Day protest, and one police file wrote that a twenty-five years old Taiwanese, named Sun Bun Lai (Sun Wen Lai), claimed to be a Japanese subject and demanded to be extradited to the Japanese Consulate.¹¹⁶ As a communist was hardly acquitted in the early 1930s within the Chinese legal system, Sun seemed to choose strategically to be transferred to Japanese authorities. In so doing, Sun could not only earn time until he was re-interrogated by the Japanese police, but also could allege that the second-handed information, the Japanese police gained from the Chinese, was incorrect. By blaming fallacies and prejudices of the Chinese state police, imperial subjects could endeavor to bypass the Japanese legal systems. This strategy sometimes succeeded, as we will see later in this chapter, which helped Taiwanese and Korean revolutionaries to return to Chinese revolutions.

Although naturalization was one of anti-imperialist strategies, it failed to be effective as Japan frequently violated jurisdiction of naturalized colonial subjects. The Court Agreement in Shanghai stipulated that any arrested Chinese in the Concession and the International Settlement ought to be brought to the Shanghai Second Special District.¹¹⁷ Thus, the French Police should not hand any Chinese over to Japanese

¹¹⁵ SMP, D-5501. 1933. Dec. 30.

¹¹⁶ SMP, D-4801-2. 1933. May. 14.

¹¹⁷ SMP, D - 6577. 1935. Apr. 8.

authorities. In practice, however, when the French Police arrested naturalized Chinese of Korean or Taiwanese origins, it transferred them to the Japanese Police. For example, the Eastern Anti-Imperial Alliance of the Oppressed issued the pamphlet in July 1929, titled the “Manifesto for Lü,” where the Alliance deplored the fact that Japan in collusion with Britain apprehended Lü Yunheng (1886-1947), a naturalized Chinese of a Korean origin. The manifesto condemns that Chinese authorities failed to take a more assertive stance in the process of the release negotiation, and also that Chinese media was devoid of a conscientious passion to awake public consciousness on this case. At the time of the arrest, Lü Yunheng served as a teacher of Fudan University in Shanghai. Before then, he visited the colonized countries of Southeast Asia in order to propagandize the anti-imperial alliance among the oppressed nations in Asia. In Philippine, for instance, Lü gave a speech on anti-imperial movements at the welcoming rally of the Philippine Labor Party, due to which he was expelled from the country.¹¹⁸ Lü was, therefore, such a crucial figure not only in Korean independence movements but also in Asian anti-imperial alliances. Another example is Kim Chŏl, who the French Police arrested and extradited to the Japanese Consulate in October 1933.¹¹⁹ Again in 1935, a Korean activist, Cai Ying Xin (alias Li Mingyu), assassinated Li Yonglu, who was a leader of the Korean pro-Japanese clique in Shanghai. Although he was a naturalized Chinese of a Korean origin, two lawyers failed to negotiate with the French Police to extradite him to the Chinese Court. The French Police instead handed Cai over to the Japanese Consulate on March 26,

¹¹⁸ D6-8-827. “Dongfang Bei Yabo Minzu Fandi Datongmeng Choubai hui wei Lü an Xuanyan” 1927. Jul 20.

¹¹⁹ SMP, D -6577. 1935. Apr 8. “Afternoon Translation of Shun Pao and other local newspaper.”

1935.¹²⁰ One Shanghai local media denounced the imperial breach of China's sovereignty, which consequently hindered the anti-imperial alliance between China and Korea: "In the past, Koreans have been always willingly naturalized to Chinese citizens because they are in sympathy with any revolutionary movement to make the two nations prosperous. Yet China is not even in a position to afford them [Koreans] the least protection whilst they are living within her territory."¹²¹ For colonized subjects, therefore, attaining a Chinese citizenship failed to be an effective strategy to avoid an imperial incarceration.

The two of the main sources that I drew on in Chapter One in order to historically situate the relationship between the semi-colonized and the colonized are police records and political pamphlets. Whereas police sources included handbills, newspapers, scores and lyrics of revolutionary songs, summary of radical literature, parts or entirety of original literary texts, and so on, they hardly represented authentic voices of revolutionary individuals and groups who produced those materials. I argue that political pamphlets and manifestos are highly formulaic; most of manifestos start with condemning imperial atrocities, and repeat political slogans, and urge people to join uprising, strikes, and demonstration. For anticolonial groups, issuing pamphlets seem to be a formality, rather than a serious strategy that propagates new ideas and sensations to the masses. Based upon the political contexts, the next chapters look at works of diasporic writers and auteurs that reconfigured the relations between Korea and China, or Taiwan and China, in different ways from activists and politicians

¹²⁰ SMP, D -6577. 1935. Mar 28. "Afternoon Translation of China Evening News and other local newspapers."

¹²¹ SMP, D -6577. 1935. Apr 8. "Afternoon Translation of Shun Pao and other local newspaper."

CHAPTER TWO: Chǒng Kitak: Korean Auteur in Republican Shanghai

This chapter discusses the Korean auteur, screenwriter, and actor, Chǒng Kitak (C. Zheng Jiduo, 1905-37), who made films in Korea, Japan, and China. Chǒng had the most successful career in Shanghai. From 1928 to 1934, during the golden era of silent film, he directed eight films, and starred in ten films. In five movies, he co-starred with Ruan Lingyu (1910–35), one of the most celebrated actresses in Chinese film history. Ruan played a lead character in Chǒng's last film *Goodbye, Shanghai* (*zaihuiba Shanghai*).¹²² His movies range from lowbrow martial arts films to classical melodrama and historical genres. Chǒng's first movie *National Spirit* (*aiguo hun*), the first-ever Chinese film directed by a Korean, brought him significant fame in China.¹²³ One limitation of studying *National Spirit* is that only film stills and its plot summary are extant.

United China Magazine's (*lianhua zazhi*) article in 1934 provides the most detailed account of Chǒng's careers in three different countries. It writes that he participated in the March First Independence Movement in Korea when he was sixteen, and was arrested by the Japanese police. He was, however, soon released as

¹²² When Ruan Lingyu committed a suicide, even Lu Xun wrote the elegy-article, "Discussing the Proverb, 'Hearsay Is Detestable.'" See, Lu Xun, "Lun 'Renyan Kewei.'" in Dai Yan ed. *Yige Zhenshi de Ruan Lingyu*. (Beijing: Dongfang Chubanshe, 2005) 285-311.

¹²³ I follow Yoshizawa's translation of *aiguo* as nationalism rather than patriotism. He notes that in the formative years of nationalism, the most often used term in Chinese print materials was *aiguo* (K. *aeuk*; J. *aikoku*), the literal translation of which is to love one's nation. See Yoshizawa Seiichiro, *Aikoku shugi no sōsei : nashonarizumu kara kindai Chūgoku o miru* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003) 18-19.

he was under age. Due to the involvement with the March First Movement, he was expelled from his high school. After graduating from another school, he went to Japan, and entered the Tokyo Music Institute. After he graduated, he went to Shanghai, and stayed for one year, where he was exposed to the flourishing Shanghai film culture. Upon returning to Korea, he started working as a film-producer and actor.¹²⁴ Chŏng had a wealthy family background, and his father helped him to establish the film production company, Chŏng Kitak Production. Although Chŏng enjoyed fame as an actor, all of the movies from his production company failed to attract many viewers. In 1926, Chŏng attempted to export the film *Crown of Phoenix* to Shanghai, but it turned out to be unsuccessful.¹²⁵ Moreover, the Japanese colonial government implemented the new film censorship law in July 1926, which disallowed artists to create movies of any anticolonial implication.¹²⁶ Due to the failure of his production company and the exacerbation of censorship, he decided to leave for Shanghai in 1928. Upon Chŏng's arrival in Shanghai, Yŏ Unhyong (C. Lü Yunheng, 1886-1947), a renowned Korean anticolonial activist, who was later naturalized as a Chinese citizen, introduced him to one of the major Shanghai movie companies, Great China & Lily Cooperation

¹²⁴ Korean newspaper articles tell us that Chŏng Kitak was under the surveillance of the Japanese colonial police even before he enjoyed significant fame in Shanghai. The *Dong-A Daily* on June 19, 1923, reported that the Seoul Chongno Police obtained information that the members of the Korean anarchist organization in Shanghai, Ŭi-yŏl Group (*yilie tuan*), infiltrated Korea via Japan. The police suspected that Chŏng Kitak, who returned from Shanghai, and Hwang Jŏngsu, who had studied in Tokyo, were the members of the group. However, the police found no evidences to arrest Chŏng and Hwang.

¹²⁵ See “bonghwang ŭi myŏllyuguan shanghae e suchul” [Exportation of the movie *Crown of Phoenix* to Shanghai]. *Dong-A Ilbo* 6 Nov. 1926.

¹²⁶ For the film censorship during the Japanese colonial period, see Chōsen satoshi toku fu keimu kyoku hen, *Katsudō shashin fūirumu kenetsu gaiyō*. (Chōsen satoshi toku fu keimu kyoku, 1931); On October 26, 1926, the *Dong-A Daily* wrote that Chŏng Kitak was involved with music and sports activities in Shanghai for four years, and that he was determined to devote his life to acting in cinema.

(*dazhonghua baihe*).¹²⁷ In the same year, Chǒng made his directorial debut with *National Spirit*, which he also wrote and starred in. *United China Magazine* writes that *National Spirit* “opened up the nouvelle path for the Chinese cinema of the time.”¹²⁸ From 1928 to 1930, Chǒng worked for Great China & Lily.

When Great China & Lily Co. underwent restructuring in 1931, he left for Japan, where Chǒng directed the movie *March Song of Shanghai* (*Shanghai jinxing qu*) at Imperial Cinema Cooperation (*diguo yinghua gongsi*). When Chǒng completed less than a half of the film, the company disallowed him to continue shooting it because *March Song of Shanghai* sympathized with China's boycott of “enemies’ goods” including the Japanese.¹²⁹ As the company forced him to stop filming, he came back to Shanghai. Although he tried to produce a new movie, he failed due to the lack of capital. In 1932, United China Cooperation (*lianhua yingye gongsi*) embarked on the new project of vitalizing domestic films, and it invited Chǒng to direct movies. Two months after he joined United China, he completed the film *A Way Out* (*chulu*; 1933), which *United China Magazine* described as “an extraordinarily beautiful and exquisite work.”¹³⁰ The article wrote that Chǒng then was working on the new movie, *Goodbye, Shanghai*. This article especially stressed that all of Chǒng’s movies were built upon his “will and aspiration” (*zhiyuan*), as opposed to commercial interest. The article, however, fails to articulate specifically what his non-capitalist artistic pursuits

¹²⁷ After Yǒ was naturalized, he received more sympathy and support from Chinese revolutionaries as well as more attention from the Chinese media.

¹²⁸ *Lianhua Magazine*, 1934, 3(6).

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

were.

The earliest study that examined Chŏng Kitak's works is Yi Yŏng-il's article, "Works of Exiled Film Artists in Shanghai around 1930."¹³¹ More recently, there were An's master thesis and Zhang's article on Chŏng's films, written in Korean and Chinese, respectively.¹³² By excavating and tracing the artistic paths of lesser known Koreans in semicolonial Shanghai, Yi and An made significant contributions to the field of Korean film studies. Yi and An, however, look at relevant Chinese sources only partially, and therefore their arguments of Chŏng's contribution to the Chinese Republican cinema are based upon speculation, not upon historical and textual analysis. Zhang's article briefly sketches the history of Sino-Korean interaction in the film industry before 1949. Hence Zhang mentions Chŏng's works in the context of listing Korean artists' movies that were produced and circulated in Republican China. Yi, An, and Zhang failed to do an in-depth textual analysis. Although An's thesis categorizes Chŏng's and other diasporic Koreans' movies with detailed summaries, it fails to situate their aesthetic and political implications within specific socio-historical contexts. Yi and An concluded that the popularity of *National Spirit* proves that Chŏng's Chinese audiences fathomed and appreciated the political message of his movie.

I, however, argue that directorial intension and underlying political, social discourses alone fail to explain how Chinese audiences actually received and enjoyed

¹³¹ Yi Yŏng-il, "1930 nyŏndae jŏnhu sanghai mangmyŏngpa yŏnghwa'yin dŭl ũi chakpum hwaldong" [Works of Diasporic Film Artists in Shanghai around the 1930s] *Yŏnghwa Yesul* Mar. 1995: 50-55; Apr. & May. 1995: 50-58; Jun. 1995: 50-59.

¹³² An T'aegŭn, "Ilje Kangjŏmki ũi Sanghai pa Han'guk Yŏnghwa'yin Yŏn'gu." MA Thesis, Han'guk Oekukŏ Taehakkyo, 2001.

National Spirit. As Miriam Hansen noted, filmic discourses are intrinsically heterogeneous, and a thematic concern is only one part of a movie. There are simply many more indispensable elements in films that affect viewers' appreciation: "their mise-en-scene and visual style, their formal strategies of narration, including modes of performance, character construction, and spectatorial identification, and the films' address to and function within a specific horizon of reception."¹³³ Moreover, the stylistic hybridity of *National Spirit*, which included diverse genres of historical drama, action, and romance in one film, afforded multiple aesthetic spaces that engaged a heterogeneous mass public. By reading films reviews in Chinese media and magazines, I demonstrate that Chinese masses, journalists, and critics responded to actors' performance and its love story as enthusiastically as—at times, even more so—to the political purport of the movie.

Hansen's article on Shanghai silent cinema illuminates the extremely dynamic, heterogeneous, unstable, yet active spectatorship of Chinese audiences in the 1920s and 30s. Hansen's excellent and nuanced analysis illustrates how Chinese viewers of the time consumed movies and mediated Hollywood's and other foreign modernism into Chinese vernacular forms. She stresses both reciprocity and distinction between cinema and other cultural media, such as literature, painting, graphic art, and architecture, in terms of expressing experiences in modernity and modernization. Despite a close inter-media relationship, she argues that the cinema is "the single most inclusive, *public* horizon in which both the liberating impulses and

¹³³ Miriam Hansen. "Fallen Women, Rising Stars, New Horizons: Shanghai Silent Film as Vernacular Modernism" *Film Quarterly* 54.1 (2000): 13.

the pathologies of modernity were reflected, rejected, or disavowed, transmuted or negotiated, and it [the cinema] made this new mass public visible to itself and to society.”¹³⁴ Hence Republican cinema offered a reflexive horizon for heterogeneous experiences of a Chinese mass public.

Hansen underscores, “By the 1920s and 30s, ...Chinese culture had modernized in ways that exceeded the purview of literary and intellectual modernism.” Second, Hansen points out the aesthetic flexibility of the Shanghai silent cinema that were open to diverse genres of its canonical form and also to plural readings of a film. In order to address various needs and fantasies of heterogeneous audiences, “films have to be at once robust and porous enough to allow for multiple readings... In other words, Shanghai cinema must have allowed its viewers to come away from the film and imagine their own strategies of survival, performance, and sociality, to make sense of living in the interstice of radically unequal times, places, and conditions.”¹³⁵ Against this backdrop of the 1920s and 30s Chinese spectatorship, I analyze Chōng’s Shanghai film *National Spirit*.

National Spirit (1928) is based upon the true story of An Chung-gŭn’s assassination of Itō Hirobumi (C. Yiteng Bowen, 1841-1909), who was then the first Resident-General of Korea and four-time Prime Minister of Japan from 1885 to 1901. For the terror, there were three other Koreans who assisted An Chung-gŭn: U Dōksun (1880-1950), Cho Dosŏn (1879-?), and Yu Dongha (1892-1918), all of whom, including An, were the members of the nationalist anticolonial group, Seven People’s

¹³⁴ Ibid., 12.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 20.

League (K. *chil'in dongmaeng*; C. *qiren tongmeng*).¹³⁶ On October 26, 1909, at the Harbin Railway Station, An Chung-gŭn shot Itō Hirobumi to death, who arrived there for a meeting with Vladimir Kokovtsov, Russian Secretary of the Treasury in Manchuria.¹³⁷ An Chung-gŭn was immediately arrested by the Russian police and later sent to the Japanese police. Incarcerated in the Lüshun prison in Dalian of the Liaoning province, An was sentenced to death on February 14, 1910. The sentence was executed on March 26. In the prison, An wrote the book, *Theory for Peace in Asia* (K. *dong'yang pyunghwa lon*; C. *dongya pinghe lun*), which was left unfinished. U Dōksun, Cho Dosŏn, and Yu Dongha, who cooperated with An, were sentenced to one and a half years of imprisonment in December 1910.

Before analyzing Chōng's films, I briefly discuss the history of Chinese silent film in order to contextualize his works and to shed light on his contribution to semicolonial Chinese cinema. I illustrate the main trend of the Chinese silent films when Chōng entered into the Shanghai movie industry in the late 1920s. Second, I examine the political and aesthetic inclination of *Great China & Lily*, where Chōng directed the majority of his films.

1. Chinese Silent Film in the 1920s

The Chinese film industry rapidly rose in the 1920s from the investment of Chinese speculative fund. After the May Fourth Movement in 1919, the Chinese

¹³⁶ They formed the group in 1909 in the Jilin Province. See Chae Gŭnsik, *Muchang Tongnip Undong Milsa* (Taehan Minguk Gongbochŏ, 1946); Hwang Jaemun. *An Chung-gŭn Pyŏngjŏn*. (Seoul: Han'gyŏre, 2011)

¹³⁷ See Donald Keene, *Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852–1912*. (NY: Columbia UP, 2002), 662–667.

national capital was highly centralized in speculative business. In 1921 alone, around one hundred and forty stock exchanges were established in the country.¹³⁸ The phenomenon, however, impeded investment in industrial business, which caused the Chinese native economy to stagnate. This in turn exerted detrimental impacts on the stock market. As a result, in March 1922, only twelve stock exchanges survived. Failed speculators turned their eyes to different kinds of business in order to redeem their loss at the stock market, and the movie industry was one of their options. In March 1923, a group of speculators founded Star Motion Pictures (*mingxing*), which released the movie *An Orphan Rescues His Grandfather* (*gu'er jiu zu ji*) in the same year. It achieved tremendous commercial success, which motivated other speculators to invest in the film industry. In 1925, in a couple of major cities in China, around 175 film companies were established, and in Shanghai alone, 141 companies were located.

Cheng Jihua argues that not only Chinese capitalists but also the general public then regarded the film industry as a kind of speculative business or a stock exchange with the mask of art.¹³⁹ Despite differences in extent, the Chinese movie industry of the time unexceptionally belonged to capitalist or feudalist power. From 1921 to 1931, approximately 650 feature films were produced. It was the Saturday School of Mandarin Ducks and Butterflies (*yuanyang hudie pai*) that created the majority of films during the period. Cheng illustrates that the Saturday School's works catered to the conservative tastes of the feudal class, which endorsed either traditional forms of Confucian values or the decadent propensity of Western imperialist art. The Saturday

¹³⁸ Cheng Jihua, *Zhongguo Dianying Fazhanshi* [The Development History of Chinese Films]. (Beijing: Beijing Dianying Chubanshe, 1998), 53.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 54.

School's writers privileged the entertaining and escapist function of literature, while obscuring its critical and edifying roles.

Great China Pictures (*Dazhonghua yingpian gongsi*) was founded in January 1924. Great China's major directors, including Lu Jie, Gu Kenfu, Cheng Shouyin, and Bu Wancang, were intellectuals who received an education in Europe or America. These artists consciously tried to include Western elements in their works. After Great China Pictures produced two movies, it merged with Lily Pictures (*baihe yingpian gongsi*) in 1925, which suffered from financial crisis. Wu Xingzai, a businessman in the dye industry, was the main investor of Lily. Lily Pictures' first film was an adaptation of *Mulberry Picking Woman*, the novel of the Saturday School. Lily's films were mainly feudalistic and didactic, which romanticized and reiterated outmoded sets of Confucian values, such as a woman's subjection to a man, people's subordination to their political leaders, and a wife's obedience to her husband. The founder of Lily Pictures was Zhu Shouju, who was in charge of the Shanghai Film Research Institute. Zhu was also the Saturday School novelist, screenwriter, and director. Zhu Shouju later played a crucial role for Chǒng in paving his acting career in Shanghai by starring Chǒng in his movies.

One of the representative directors of Great China & Lily was Shi Dongshan (1902-55), whose works foreground apolitical aestheticism in a way that privileges making *mise-en-scène* and satisfying sensory pleasure of the audience over delivering critical or progressive messages. Seen from the major works and artists of Great China & Lily, its political and cultural pursuit was far from inspiring Chinese audiences with anti-feudalist and anti-capitalist consciousness. Cheng notes that conservatism, which

cherished outdated forms of Confucian ideas, was the hegemonic trend of the 1920s Shanghai cinema. For example, Tianyi Motion Pictures, one of the major Shanghai film companies, explicitly advocated the conservative position, which, Tianyi claimed, served to advance Chinese culture and to prevent Europeanization of China.¹⁴⁰

It, however, was not the case that all the movies of Great China & Lily reflected the feudalistic conservatism. In 1927 it released one of the Chinese Communist Party's documentary films of the Northern Expedition *Record of Completion of Northern Expedition*. In 1928, Great China & Lily exhibited the documentary of Chiang Kai-shek's inauguration ceremony, which Great China & Lily filmed, along with Chōng's *National Spirit*. Great China & Lily's release of the CCP's documentary was not due to its alignment with the CCP, but due to its support for the Northern Expedition (1926-1928).¹⁴¹ The overall ideological and political propensities of Great China & Lily were traditionalism and nationalism.

Another crucial factor that impeded the development of Chinese indigenous film was the colonial domination of the Chinese movie industry.¹⁴² In the 1920s and

¹⁴⁰ *Tianyi Motion Pictures*. Oct. 1925.

¹⁴¹ When the Northern Expedition climaxed in 1927, and when its army reached the Yangtze River, the momentum of the anti-feudalist revolution also instigated the Chinese to boycott British goods. The boycott movement severely hit the Chinese cigarette market. Due to the great economic loss, therefore, British American Tobacco shut down its film department. Moreover, on March 21, 1927, when Shanghai industrial laborers joined the Northern Expedition Army, the CCP produced documentary films that recorded the history of Chinese mass revolutions. For more details, see Zhou Jianwun. "Wusa Can'an hou zhi zhongguo dianying" [Chinese films after the May Fifth Movement] *Mingxing Tegan* 1927: 3.

¹⁴² British American Tobacco Co. held hegemony in the Chinese film industry as well as in the cigarette market. In 1923, the year when the first Chinese movie *An Orphan Rescues His Grandfather* hit the market, BAT established the film department in Shanghai, which took charge of making commercial movies. The immense success of *An Orphan Rescues His Grandfather*, therefore, attracted not only Chinese national capital but also Western imperialist capital to the film industry. By inviting the British cameraman, William H. Jansen, to shoot films, BAT sought

30s, American movies completely predominated the Chinese film market.¹⁴³ Moreover, by April 1925, British American Tobacco (BAT) owned five main movie theatres in Shanghai, which were Zhabei, Daying, Xinfang, Baoxing, and Ziyou. The company strictly banned screening Chinese native movies in those theatres, showing only foreign films. In 1925, there were around 100 film theatres in China, and foreign capitalists owned most of first-class theatres, which exhibited exclusively non-Chinese movies.¹⁴⁴ The majority of Chinese-run theatres were either second- or third-tiered. For Chinese movie companies, the market was highly limited—either few theatres in a metropolis or a small number of theatres in the countryside. Due to the crucial impact of distribution networks on a commercial success of a movie, the Chinese movie industry was simply unable to compete with Western and Japanese companies.¹⁴⁵

Although Chinese cinema artists produced more than ten million-feet films every day,

to dominate the Chinese film market with English-style movies and commercials. Despite the vast investment to producing film, BAT's primary purpose was to advertise its products and to make profits from selling more cigarettes. In 1923, American-Oriental Pictures Co., Japanese Donghe Theatre, and the Britain-sponsored China Film Production also embarked on and competed for making films. With aggressive marketing and immense investments, Western and Japanese imperialists dominated the Chinese screen distribution networks.

¹⁴³ For more details, see Zhang Yingjin ed., *Cinema and Urban Culture in Shanghai, 1922-1943* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999); Leo Ou-fan Lee, *Shanghai Modern* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999)

¹⁴⁴ Cheng, *Zhongguo Dianying Fazhanshi*, 125.

¹⁴⁵ European and Japanese imperialist films also competed with Hollywood cinema for the market. Soviet film, furthermore, was also shown in Republican China. Tian Han (1898-1968), the most important playwright in semicolonial China, once acclaimed Eisenstein's film, *Battleship Potemkin* (1925), for its new cinematic form of mise-en-scène and for its powerful and aesthetic techniques of conveying political messages. Unlike a typical cinematic narrative, it has no protagonists, but the unnamed mass lead the story throughout the film. Although Tian Han critiqued excessive instigating impulses of the Soviet cinema, he commented that *Battleship Potemkin* epitomized the beauty and the power of the resisting masses. Soviet cinema, however, had much less impact than American, European, and Japanese films did vis-à-vis the Chinese audience. Due to the admitted radical and agitating characters of the Soviet film, the Chinese Nationalist Party disallowed its public screening in 1927. Soviet movies, therefore, were mostly circulated underground.

hyperbolically speaking, “there was not even one inch of territory where they could be exhibited.”¹⁴⁶ Except a few major film companies, such as Star Motion Pictures, which owned their theatres, the majority of native productions found it highly difficult to release their movies.

After the rupture of the First United Front between the Chinese Nationalist and Communist Parties in April 1927, the martial arts genre (*wuxia pian*) became the most popular and hegemonic type of movie in Republican China.¹⁴⁷ Apart from the popularity of the genre among the Chinese masses, the low production cost was also attractive to filmmakers. As Zhou Jianwun writes, it usually took only ten and a half days to complete one martial arts movie, and the total cost of making an entire film was less than thirty-five *yuan*. Furthermore, making a martial arts film obviated the use of high-tech devices and special background settings. From 1928 to 1931, there were around 40 film companies, and approximately 400 movies were made, 60 percent of which fell under the category of martial arts.¹⁴⁸ In short, when Chǒng’s *National Spirit* was in theatre in 1928, the majority of Chinese films fell under the

¹⁴⁶ He Weixin, “Zhongguo dianyingjie de jue da weiji” [Absolute Crisis in Chinese Film] *Dianying Chunqiu* Apr 1925 (6).

¹⁴⁷ The first martial arts movie that achieved enormous commercial success was *Burning Red Lotus Temple* (*huoshao honglian si*) in 1928. Its success prompted other directors to produce films of the same genre, whose titles also start with “burning,” in a way that explicitly engage with the plot and the aura of *Burning Red Lotus Temple*. These trendy movies were coined “burning pieces” (*huoshao pian*), and Great China & Lily also joined the main trend. In 1929, for example, it produced approximately thirty films in total, the half of which was the martial hero genre. Within the genre, however, Great China & Lily persistently included minor details that reminded the audience of Euro-American culture. For example, characters in a movie wore clothes and hats of American cowboys; male and female characters were occasionally half-naked; on a background wall of one movie hung an art piece with a futurist inscription. Even Chinese directors, who had educational or professional training in Europe or America, were unhesitant to compromise with the traditional martial arts genre, instead of boldly foregrounding Euro-American styles in their works.

¹⁴⁸ Cheng, *Zhongguo Dianying Fazhanshi*, 133.

martial arts category. *National Spirit* was released about a year and a half after the rupture of the First National Front in April 1927, and its distributor, Great China & Lily, was pro-nationalist.

2. Nationalism and Chinese Response to An Chung-gŭn's Political Death

2-(1). Chinese Nationalism

Chōng's film title *National Spirit* as well as the film's main motif of a political death was at the core of contemporary Chinese political discourses. Yoshizawa Seiichiro's *Formation of Ideas of Nation-Love: Analysis of Modern China through Nationalism* provides us with crucial insights to understand Chinese nationalism from the late Qing to the Republican era. He critiques the diachronic standpoint that links Chinese nationalism to the manifestation of Chinese tradition. It was Japan's successful formation of its nation-state and empire that prompted China to pursue the cohesion of its nation.¹⁴⁹ Yoshizawa sheds light on the distinction between China and imperial countries in terms of formation of nationalist consciousness and sentiments. In western and Japanese empires, central governments of empires systematically carried out policies of making modern nationals. In contrast, discursive repetitions of a centralized nation engendered the image of united China. National spirit (*guohun*) along with a nation and a national was the crucial concept that Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Group (*gemingpai*) imbued contemporary Chinese through discursive movements.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ See Yoshizawa Seiichiro, *Aikoku shugi no sōsei : nashonarizumu kara kindai Chūgoku o miru*, 18-19, also see endnotes 19-20.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 183.

As Schmid points out, “Like so much of the new conceptual vocabulary of the nation, this [the national soul (*guohun*) or the national essence (*guocui*)] was a language shared by nationalists throughout East Asia.”¹⁵¹ Schmid highlights that in Korea as well as in China, instilling Koreans with the idea and sensation of the national soul was the crucial issue for a group of intellectuals from the late nineteenth- to the early twentieth-century. Hence Chǒng’s film title *National Spirit* epitomizes what was at the heart of political debates in China and Korea in a few decades earlier than the movie came out.

Yoshizawa illustrates that Chinese nationalism and provincialism reciprocally substantiated each other. Local cities and provinces suffered from the schism among people of different places of birth (*benji*). The justification of nationalism, however, effectively overcame local tensions, which decidedly contributed to the development of provincial governments and trade chambers (*shanghui*). For example, during the national boycott period, the Su Province Trade Chamber was established; moreover, the self-government of Shanghai was institutionalized. Yoshizawa writes, “Even for simply local issues, Chinese foregrounded the whole China [nation] to discuss them. This way nationalist discourses gradually diffused across China.”¹⁵² Aside from the true intentions behind employing the idea of nation-love or nation-salvation, Chinese repeatedly employed and consequently substantiated nationalist ideas in their discourses and narratives although the actual power of the Beijing government declined.

¹⁵¹ Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919* (NY: Columbia UP, 2002) 15.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 85.

The rise of nationalist consciousness, however, failed to undermine or eclipse provincial identities because two mutually sustained one another. Yoshizawa's other crucial argument is that the Chinese nationalist movement positioned itself against mass culture underlying the Boxer Uprising, which was considered as "ignorant and uneducated." Urban elites differentiated their nationalist movements from a mass uprising because "whether China exists or perish depends on keeping up with the world-tides of more advanced and universal civilization."¹⁵³ In so doing, Chinese nationalism served urban elites in forming the sense of superiority and overcoming factionalism within local communities.

Yoshizawa points out that discourses and practices of death for a nation played a crucial role in inspiring Chinese nationalist consciousness and sentiment. Due to the long-heralded Confucian notion of loyalty to one's monarch (*zhong*), before the modern period did scholar-officials or soldiers died for their monarchs or dynasties. It was, however, not until the end of the Qing dynasty that a death for the abstract entity of a nation emerged. Memorial tributes, literature, and rituals on a 'national martyr' (*lieshi*) prompted more people to sacrifice willingly themselves for a nation.

Below I examine Chinese literature on An Chung-gŭn, which came out before *National Spirit*. Between the terror in 1909 and the movie *National Spirit* in 1928, a number of *Shanghai News* articles touched upon issues related to An Chung-gŭn. By looking at these materials, I illustrate how Chinese artists and media recollected, and at times appropriated, the anticolonial history of An Chung-gŭn before Chŏng Kitak made *National Spirit*.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 86.

2-(2). Chinese Response to An Chung-gūn's Terror Prior to *National Spirit*

The earliest Chinese literature, based on An Chung-gūn's assassination, traces back to the Evolution Group (*jinhuatuan*)'s play, *An Chonggen Assassinates Itō* (*An Chonggen ci Yiteng*), in 1911. From winter 1910 to fall 1912, the Evolution Group was one of three major drama groups in Shanghai that pursued modern forms and contents of drama. The wife of Zhou Enlai (1898-1976), one of the core leaders of the CCP, also played a character in the *An Zhonggen Assassinates Itō*.

Even after the Evolution Group was disbanded in fall 1912, the play continued to be performed in China throughout the colonial era. On April 21, 1924, one article of the *Shanghai News* reviewed performances of each different *xiaosheng*—an actor who plays a young male character in theatre—in a few *yue*-plays, which includes *An Chonggen Assassinates Itō*. The *yue*-play is a genre of Guangdong local drama, which uses a Guangzhou dialect in its performance. The article indicates that by the mid-1920s, the play *An Chonggen Assassinates Itō* was staged not only in Shanghai but also in other cities of Guangzhou. While discussing performances of various *xiaosheng* actors, the review wrote, "The play, *An Chonggen*, became a hot issue among people. When An Chonggen gets arrested after killing Itō, he shouts out one phrase. The audience's heart will ache upon hearing it."¹⁵⁴ Stimulating readers' curiosity by not telling what the phrase is, the article urged readers to go to see the play. On May 8, 1925, the *Shanghai News* reported that Junior's Propaganda Group (*shaonian xuanjiang tuan*) scheduled to perform *An Assassinates Itō* on May 9.

¹⁵⁴ "ping yue ling xiaosheng zhujue." [Comments on the Notable Actors in Cantonese Opera] *Shenbao* 21 Apr. 1924.

On July 12, 1927, another *Shanghai News* article documented that the Nanjing municipal government organized a large-scale entertainment program for the North Expedition soldiers. The program included modern drama (*xinju*) performances, one of which was *An Assassinated Itō*. It was scheduled to stage on July 14. On July 31 and August 5, 1927, for example, the *Shanghai News* reported that the Union for Severance of Economic Relationship with Japan organized various propagandic activities. The southern city district of Shanghai staged a couple of plays, and one of them was *An Chonggen Assassinated Itō*.

The *Shanghai News* paid close attention to An Chonggen's family even much after An's assassination took place in 1909. One *Shanghai News* article on March 6, 1924, wrote on the speech on “detailed history on overseas Chinese.” Mr. Zhao, the principal of Zhenru National Jinan School invited Ms. An Xiansheng--the daughter of An Chonggen--, Mr. Ji--the Chinese-Thai journalist--, and others to the school to give speeches. The article addressed An as the “national martyr An”(*lieshi* An). One of the teachers there explained An’s assassination, and An’s daughter gave a talk on the martyr An’s life. The article reads, “After her talk, the principal Zhao said that the [national] culture of Korea belongs to the Chinese culture” because the nationalist idea that people can sacrifice to save their nation, the principal claims, originated from the Chinese culture. The principal continues:

Miss An was able to succeed her father's aspiration, and by doing the best in her study, she will be able to contribute to save China. And the principal said the Martyr An's loyalty and justice owes to what Chinese culture inspired him. “I consider that everywhere in Southeast Asia and also all over the world, there is no place on which Chinese culture failed to have influence. The development of the

entire Western civilization, for example, owes to sailing techniques. A compass that people use for sailing was the invention of one of the Chinese emperors. Japanese culture is also Chinese culture that Japan directly obtained through Korea.... I hope all of you assure that developing Chinese culture is the only way to save the country [China].”¹⁵⁵

The principal also mentioned the long-heralded legacies of Chinese culture in Thailand and Burma. The principal's speech here strongly echoes Sun Yat-sen's stance on the relationship between China and other Asian countries on its periphery. Rather than perceiving them as allying partners of an equal status, both Sun Yat-sen and the principal constantly invoked the past when China subjugated other Asian states. The Sinocentric nostalgia for the premodern Chinese empire underlies the call for the “development of Chinese cultures” that the principal suggested.

The next day, on March 7, 1924, one article added more detail on An Chonggen's family, reporting that An's mother and his daughter had wandered around Shanghai with no financial basis to settle down. Thereupon, the principal of the National Jinan School, Zhao Zhengping, decided to support An's daughter as a token for respecting patriots' descendants. The Nanjing Jinan Women's College, the school for training teachers, accepted An's daughter, and waived her tuition. On September 13, 1926, the opinion column (*ziyoutan*) reported that An's daughter, An Jiansheng, studied at Shanghai Nanfang University, together with the daughter of the Chinese revolutionary martyr (*lieshi*), Wang Canzhi. The two articles on July 18 and 21, 1927, informed that An's mother, who was called by her catholic name, Maria, passed away on July 15. Father Xianyou provided the funeral service at St. Joseph's Church in

¹⁵⁵ “Speech of New Era: Detailed History of Overseas Chinese.” *Shenbao* 6 Mar. 1924.

Shanghai, where foreign revolutionaries from India, Mongolia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other countries also attended. The Chinese attendees include Wu Shan and Huang Jingwan.¹⁵⁶

3. *National Spirit*

Chōng Kitak originally titled the movie *An Chonggen*, which is the Chinese pronunciation of An Chung-gŭn. When he completed the production, newspapers in Shanghai reported that Chōng finished making *An Chonggen*, and that it would be released soon. Upon hearing the news on the movie, however, the Japanese authorities in the Shanghai International Settlement demanded the Chinese government to forbid its exhibition. Thereupon, Chōng Gitak and Chōn Ch'anggŭn (C. Quan Changgen) revised the protagonist's name from An Chonggen (安重根) to Yan Zhongquan (晏仲權). Both names are pronounced differently in Chinese, but the pronunciation in Korean is the same. However, it still failed to resolve the censorship issue. Chōng, therefore, had to revise the title again to *National Spirit*. When the Nationalist Government authorities censored the film, they cut out many scenes that explicitly condemned Japanese colonialism.¹⁵⁷

In *National Spirit*, Chōng Kitak focused on a series of events that took place before Itō's assassination, rather than the terror as such. Through the events, An Chung-gŭn forms such a firm comradeship with revolutionaries across China; the two

¹⁵⁶ See "Mrs. Zhao, An Chonggen's mother passed away in Shanghai." *Shenbao* 18 Jul. 1927; "An Chonggen's mother passed away yesterday." *Shenbao* 21 Jul. 1927. It wrote that she passed away due to a stomach cancer.

¹⁵⁷ Beijing Daxue Chaoxian Wenhua Yanjiusuo, *Yishu shi* [History of Art] Zhongguo Chaoxian Minzu wenhua chi da xi (3) (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1994) 763-768.

main characters, one Korean and one Chinese, fall in love with each other's sisters. The Chinese characters and the romantic plots are the fictional touches that Chǒng strategically intertwined with the true story. For example, Yan Zhongquan goes to Shanghai to meet the Chinese revolutionary, Zhu Hanlong, and Zhu instantly joins the assassination plan without hesitation. Zhu has one sister, Ailan, who falls in love with Yan Zhongquan. Upon Zhu's assent, Yan and Zhu come to Seoul to embark on their plan. One night when they converse with two other comrades—Zhu and Ha—about the assassination, one servant eavesdrops on them. The servant reports the group to the colonial police. The police shot Ha to death, and arrested Yan. Overwhelmed by the guilt, the servant attempts to commit suicide. Zhu and Pak, however, spot him, and save his life. Regretting his past collaboration with the Japanese colonizers, the servant joins Yan's group.

Zhu, Pak, and the servant break into the prison for Yan, and Yan successfully escapes. While they flee, however, guards kill the servant. The three subsequently visit Yan's mother and his sister. Yan's sister wants to join them, and his mother decides to enter a Buddhist monastery. Four of them arrive at the River Tu, and stay at their comrade, Zhang Yicheng's home. However, the Korean army follows them after identifying their whereabouts. The army wages a battle against Yan and his comrades, during which Zhang Yicheng is significantly injured. With no hope of recovery, Zhang asks his son and Yan to run away without him. Yan's group escapes to Hong Kong with Zhang's son. Zhu and Yan's sister fall in love. Without a common language, Zhu and Yan's sister communicate through writing. While Yan's group stays at Liu Dongxia's home in Hong Kong, Zhu's sister in Shanghai, days and nights,

long for Yan's returning. She gets ill due to the lovesickness. One night, she sees Yan in her dream, which gives her momentary relief. A few days later, however, she dies.

At the Haigang area, Yan's group organizes a militia, which consists of thousands of people. After a period of training, they come to the Tu River. One day, Yan, his sister, Zhu, and Pak cross the river in order to spy on the Korean/ Japanese army's movements. The army discovers them, killing Pak and capturing Zhu on the spot. The enemy pokes Zhu's eyes with a heated iron stick, making him blind. Yan, however, rescues Zhu from a prison. Although Yan's militia plans to cross the river to attack the Japanese colonial army, Liu Dongxia informs Yan that Itō Hirobumi is to arrive at the Harbin Railway Station. Upon hearing this, Yan asks Zhu to take well care of his sister, and leaves for Harbin. Only toward the end of the movie, does the actual assassination take place. Yan has awaited this day for years, and he is finally successful in assassinating Itō Hirobumi. Thereafter, the Japanese police arrests Yan, and he is sentenced to death. When Yan is executed, however, he is utterly calm and proud of what he did. And the film ends.

Although *National Spirit* is based upon the celebrated An's true story, Chōng Kitak only loosely weaves An's terror into the plot of the film. Whereas An's Russian connection was crucial in the real story, Chōng's adaptation shifts the main background from Russia to China, spanning Guangdong (Hong Kong), Shanghai, Hebei, and Manchuria. Two Chinese comrades in the movie—Zhu Hanlong and Zhang Yicheng—who provide indispensable assistance to Yan, are fictional figures. Zhu, a Chinese revolutionary in Shanghai, joins Yan at the beginning of Yan's anticolonial undertaking. Yan and Zhu encounter as an individual and an individual, as

opposed to a national representative or a devotee of any political group. Out of pure passion for anticolonial revolution, Yan and Zhu build comradeship, which become stronger and stronger with the development of the story. Similarly, another Chinese revolutionary in Manchuria, Zhang Yicheng, even forsakes his life while helping Yan's group with the struggle against the Japanese colonial army. Although Zhu and Zhang are fictional characters, Yan's other Chinese comrades in Hong Kong, Liu Dongxia, is modeled upon Yan's real friend from the Seven People's League, Yu Dongha. The Chinese characters of both names are the same, so Liu Dongxia is the Chinese pronunciation of Yu Dongha. Chŏng Kitak, however, strategically adapted Yu Dongha's character into a Chinese, so that all the major characters in the movie, except for Yan Zhongquan and his sister, are Chinese. By creating the new Chinese characters and altering the nationality of the existing character, Chŏng Kitak dramatized the nationalist Korean history into a narrative of the Sino-Korean alliance against Japanese colonialism.

Another crucial fictional element in *National Spirit* is the story that Yan and his Chinese allies organize and train the militia that consists of thousands of Chinese people. The militia comes to the Chinese-Korean border to fight against the Japanese colonial army. In reality, An Chung-gŭn was involved with militia movements in Northern Korea from 1907 to 1908. An Chung-gŭn also attempted to mobilize a militia in Vladivostok, which turned out to be unsuccessful.¹⁵⁸ Although Chŏng Kitak opted for a terror, not a militia's war, for the ending of *National Spirit*, the choice

¹⁵⁸ Hwang Chaemun, *An Chung-gŭn Pyŏngchŏn* [Bibliography of An Chung-gŭn] (Seoul: Hangyŏre, 2011).

seems to be inevitable in order to define his movie as the cinematic rewriting of An Chung-gŭn's life. Rather than the ending itself, however, I want to call attention to the part where the militia of thousands Chinese and Yan's group trained themselves to fight against the Japanese colonial army in Korea. Furthermore, they actually reached the Chinese-Korean border to wage an anticolonial war. By inserting the episode of the Chinese militia toward the end, I argue, Chŏng's *National Spirit* reconfigured not only the nationalist Korean story into a Sino-Korean narrative, but also the terror of a few individuals into the attempted anticolonial war of thousands civilians.

4. Chinese Reception of *National Spirit*

I look at two major newspapers in Shanghai, the *Shanghai News* (*Shenbao*) and the *News* (*Xinwenbao*), as well as literary and film magazines to discuss how Chinese media and critics responded to *National Spirit*. The *Shanghai News*, which was published from 1872 to 1949, had the largest circulation in Shanghai, which made it highly influential in shaping the public opinion on social and political issues.¹⁵⁹ Whereas the *Shanghai News* was the comprehensive paper, the *News* focused on business and economic news.¹⁶⁰

In the *Shanghai News* article on September 13, 1928, Wuwei Anzhu, a Chinese Buddhist scholar, memorialized two national martyrs (*lieshi*), one Korean and one Chinese. He praised that the fact that An Chonggen, an ordinary man, assassinated

¹⁵⁹ It was originally established by a British businessman, Earnest Major, and later sold to Xi Zipei (1867–1929), its former Chinese comprador. Xi Zipei owned Shanghai Publishing Company.

¹⁶⁰ In February 1893, an English entrepreneur, Dennis Condor, established the *News* in partnership with Chinese capitalists in Shanghai. Soon after, however, Chinese investors withdrew, and Condor solely owned *News*. In November 1899, Condor sold the company to an American entrepreneur, John C. Ferguson (1866–1945), who significantly developed the company.

then the most powerful figure of the Japanese cabinet. He remarked that An sacrificed himself for justice (*chengren*), with which the whole world as well as smaller and powerless countries sympathized. The article also talked about An's family after the assassination. An had two younger brothers. The youngest brother, An Honggen, said that even after the execution of An, the Japanese police closely surveilled An's family, which enforced Honggen to leave for a foreign country. The author cites Li's words, which acclaims An's martyrdom as worthy of honor from the whole world and also of memory throughout the history.¹⁶¹

On October 19, 1928, the *Shanghai News* had two articles on *National Spirit*. The first article of the theatre section acclaimed performances of the actors as “sophisticated and profound.”¹⁶² The article commented that the actors played the roles so professionally that viewers could hardly imagine any gaps between the actors and the characters. The second article indicated that it was written two months after *National Spirit* was first released. It pointed out that the plot of the film is exquisite and noble, and that the vicissitudes of lives in the story produce the compelling and touching narrative by weaving politico-military affairs with a romance. It also talked about the psychological quality of the cinema that “dovetail human mind,” and that quality made audience absorbed into the movie.¹⁶³ The review touched upon many

¹⁶¹ “jianying daoguang zhuang guoshang.” [Sword's Shadow, Falchion's Light, Heroic National Martyr] *Shenbao* 13 Sep. 1928. Wuwei Anzhu wrote only the last name of the author he cites. The article details that the youngest brother of An Chung-gūn went to Germany, and pursued his study there. Upon graduating from college, he got a job in Germany. The other brother of his became wealthy, but he did not live in Shanghai. At that point, An's mother passed away, and An's daughter was in college in Shanghai.

¹⁶² “juchang xiaoxi.” [Theatre News] *Shenbao* 19 Oct. 1928.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

underlying messages throughout the film, saying that the audience should think and rethink those meanings in order to fully appreciate them. Furthermore, it discussed the excellence of directing skills in terms of structuring the story cinematically. While illustrating the plot and the main theme of the film, the article commented that even small details, such as facial expressions and body gesture of the actors, cohesively intertwined with other parts of the cinema. The review called the movie a “masterpiece.”

As Jason McGrath notes, acting styles in film drastically differed from those in Chinese opera, due to cinematic technologies of close-ups, variable shot distances, and magnification.¹⁶⁴ Whereas Chinese opera and other traditional shows operated by conventions, formula, and codes of acting, film simply obviated the conventions due to its camera and editing technologies. Acting in a film, therefore, rendered exaggerated body gestures, facial expressions, make-ups, and use of props that stand for something else in premodern Chinese plays unnecessary. Instead, actors in a film pursued authenticity and verisimilitude, which also corresponded to the realist trend of Chinese literary modernism. Hence watching the entirely new style of acting in contemporary cinemas, which expresses even subtle feelings of characters without dialogues, brought new experiences of sensation to Republican Chinese spectators. The emergence of the unprecedented acting style in the new media of film illustrates detailed comments on actors’ performances in most of the newspaper reviews on *National Spirit*.

¹⁶⁴ Jason McGrath, “Acting Real: cinema, stage, and the modernity of performance in chinese silent film” *The Oxford Handbook of Chinese Cinemas*, ed. Carolos Rojas and Eileen Chow (NY: Oxford UP, 2013), 401-420.

One review article on October 20 wrote that the movie achieved the astonishing box office record. It noted that all the aspects of the movies were excellent. The aspects include the plot, the actors' performance, the background settings, the props, and the directing skills. In order to attract the audience to the film, the article brought the entertaining aspect of the movie into focus. I, however, want to highlight that the article misread the military action scenes of the movie as the embodiment of "righteous spirit of a martial master" (*wuxia jingshen*).¹⁶⁵ Whereas *National Spirit* has no relevance to the martial arts genre, the article conflated the two together in a way that obscured the call for a Sino-Korean alliance and the anticolonial message.

On the other hand, another article on October 24 commented that its story was "noble and pure" in that the film was distinguished from the typical martial arts genre and the traditional fantasy genre, or the "genre of the supernatural and the uncanny" (*shenguai pian*).¹⁶⁶ With no recourse on excessively provocative and sensational elements of the traditional drama, the review stressed, the film's storyline alone drew as much enthusiasm from the audience as other conventional cinemas did. It detailed specific scenes that deeply affected and stirred viewer's feeling. It also praised the performance of the actors and the actresses, which expressed the essential mood (*qi*) of the film so that audiences could sympathize and identify themselves with the characters. The *Shanghai News* article on November 4 talked about the excellence of the shooting technique of the film. It remarked that a large audience, which ranged

¹⁶⁵ "Juchang Xiaoxi Er." [Theatre News II] *Shenbao* 20. Oct. 1928.

¹⁶⁶ "Juchang Xiaoxi." [Theatre News] *Shenbao*. 24 Oct. 1928.

from the lowbrow to the highbrow, watched the film, and it proved its popularity.

On November 7, 1928, the *News* advertised *National Spirit* on its second page (see Figure 1.1 below). The advertisement stressed that this movie was a sharp contrast to a typical martial arts film (*wuxia*), the most popular genre of the time. The advertisement reads, “[*National Spirit*] makes an outcry (*yi ku*) on behalf of the people who were oppressed by [imperialist] powers all over the world. ... the film serves to develop wisdom of the people... Philosophical thoughts underlie the movie.”¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, it wrote that *National Spirit* had politically provocative and aesthetically stimulating elements in it, even more than David Griffith’s and Rex Ingram’s movies did. In so doing, “the film could awaken the audience’s [political] consciousness.”¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ Advertisement. *Xinwenbao*. 7 Nov. 1928: 2. Print.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

the *News*, which reads, “[*National Spirit* is] an unprecedented movie that concerns

nationalism and romance. The film politically alerts the entire world (*jingshi*).”¹⁶⁹ The commercial compares *National Spirit* with Griffith's and Ingram's movies, which were acclaimed for their political qualities.¹⁷⁰ And it emphasized that Chǒng's movie had even better instigating and awakening qualities. While deploring the decadent atmosphere of the Chinese society, the piece wrote that *National Spirit* would critically impact the mind of the Chinese. “The social circumstances worsen day by day, and people's mind (*renxin*) also tilts toward dangerous things.” *National Spirit* was contrasted to them due to the noble intent to edify, awaken, and, alert the Chinese masses. It commented that Chǒng Kitak and Chǒng Ilsong were the respectable Korean youths who have noble aspirations; and that Chǒng Kitak was a director with a deep knowledge on film (see Figures 2.2.A and 2.2.B below).

¹⁶⁹ Advertisement. *Xinwenbao*. 7 Nov. 1928: 23. Print.

¹⁷⁰ “Juchang Xiaoxi.” [Theatre News] *Shenbao*. 11 Nov. 1928. It noted that the movie would be in the Great Central Theatre (*zhongyang da xiyuan*) for four days, November 7 to 10, and it would be in the Suzhou Park Theatre for four days starting November 15. The *Shanghai News* reported that the New Central Theatre (*xin zhongyang*) screened it from November 11 to 13. See “Juchang Xiaoxi.” [Theatre News] *Shenbao*. 11 Nov. 1928.

[illegible][illegible]

A B

Figures 2. 2 (A) Advertisement on Nov. 7, 1928 (B) Advertisement on Nov. 8, 1928

It is crucial to note that the *News* advertised that from November 8, Great China & Lily showed *National Spirit* along with the documentary-news film (*xinwen*

pian) of Chiang Kai-shek's inauguration ceremony. Upon the success of the North Expedition, the Chinese Nationalist Party held the grand ceremony on October 10, 1928, adorning Beijing with lanterns and festoons.¹⁷¹ Great China & Lily described that the whole city was in frenzied excitement during the ceremony. The advertisement stressed that viewers of *National Spirit* would be able to watch the record of the whole inauguration ceremony as a bonus.

On November 11, the *News* reported that it would stimulate audience's sentiments and would incite the consciousness of vigorous political action.¹⁷² Both the film as well as the review article used the rather uncommon term "Liguo" to refer to Korea, instead of the official or better-known titles, such as Chosŏn (*chaoxian*) or Koryŏ (*gaoli*). It seems to be Chŏng's strategic choice or dramatic detour in order not to directly provoke Japanese authorities in the Shanghai International Settlement.¹⁷³

The November 29 *Shanghai News* article introduced *National Spirit* as the "excellent art piece that can stimulate national spirit (*guominxing*)."¹⁷⁴ The *Shanghai News* article on December 4 wrote that remarked that the success of *National Spirit* was rare in the

¹⁷¹ On November 10, 1928, the *News* wrote it was the last day of screening at the Grand Central Theatre, and the advertisements underscored that the movie was not the kind of an uncanny film with absurd and nonsensical stories and no meaningful contents.

¹⁷² The *Shanghai News* article on November 11 reported that due to its successful box office record, the New Central Theatre (*xin zhongyang xiyuan*) also would exhibit the movie for three days, from 11 to 13. The same day, the second article illustrated the national and historical backgrounds of the movie; in July 1909, the Japanese cabinet decided to annex Korea, and a couple of Korean officials collaborated with the Japanese to facilitate the process.

¹⁷³ "Juchang Xiaoxi." [Theatre News] *Shenbao* 11 Nov. 1928.

¹⁷⁴ "Juchang Xiaoxi." [Theatre News] *Shenbao* 29 Nov. 1928; On November 29, the theatre section of the *Shanghai News* wrote that the Empire Theatre (*enpaiya yingxiyuan*) would exhibit *National Spirit* from December 2. In order to promote the film, the theatre gratuitously offered the two European and American entertainment programs to the audience who watched the movie; one was a dance show, and the other a variety show (*jingren jichang*).

Chinese film history as it achieved both the commercial success and the critical reputation.¹⁷⁵

In 1928, the magazine *New Movie Star* pointed out that *National Spirit* dramatized a real assassination story of An Chonggen, who killed Itō Hirobumi. The magazine introduced the titles of Chǒng's previous Korean movies, *Pioneer* (*gaituozhe*)¹⁷⁶, *Crown of Phoenix*, and *Long Mourning Dream* (*chang hen meng*), which adapted the celebrated Japanese novel *Golden Demon* (*C. jinse yecha*; *J. konjiki yasha*). It further mentioned, "Chǒng's *National Spirit* has different colors in comparison to other domestic [Chinese] films."¹⁷⁷ The caption described that all of Chǒng's Korean movies brought about sensations in Korea. This description, however, exaggerated Chǒng's career as an actor and film producer before he came to Shanghai because all the movies above failed to draw significant responses from Korean audiences.

The articles I have detailed so far, tell us that the *Shanghai News* and the *News* reviewed *National Spirit* from different stances. The *News* highlighted the political implications of the movie whereas the *Shanghai News* primarily discusses the plot, the

¹⁷⁵ December 4 was the last day of screening the *National Spirit* and *Hot-blooded Mandarin Ducks*, both of which were Great China & Lily's works; On December 3, 1928, the *News* publicized that *National Spirit* was in the Empire Theatre, where audience also could watch the performance of the Euro-American woman dancers as well as a circus. It wrote that the Empire Theatre would screen the movie for three days. The theatre was located in the French Concession, which seemed to affect the shift in the focus of the advertisement. Instead of highlighting the politically critical contents of the movie, it more stressed the complimentary performances of the dance and the circus. The article on December 17 advertised that the World Great Theatre (*shijie da xiuyan*) would start screening *National Spirit* the same day.

¹⁷⁶ The *New Movie Star* misspelled the title although the two titles sound same when pronounced in Korean.

¹⁷⁷ The caption of Chǒng's picture. *Xin Yinxing* [New Silver Star] 1928(3); 33-34.

performance of the actors, and the directing techniques.¹⁷⁸ It was not until 1931 that the *Shanghai News* introduced the writing, which illustrated *National Spirit* in a political context.¹⁷⁹ The article on September 4, 1931, talked about the fifth volume of the *Magazine China* (*zhonghua zazhi*), the circulation of which has rapidly increased since its fourth volume. The fifth volume included the articles on the infamous Wanbaoshan Incident, the tragic bloodshed affair between Chinese and Korean civilians in 1931, as well as other Sino-Korean conflicts and Jing Wan's biography of An Chung-gŭn.¹⁸⁰ In one of the articles, an unidentified author drew on *National Spirit* and other sources "in order to urge Koreans to reflect deeply on the incident."¹⁸¹ Instead of critiquing the Japanese colonizer, who schemed the incident behind the scene to provoke hostility between Chinese and Koreans, the author admonished Koreans for the Sino-Korean conflict. I argue that it is a striking example of the Chinese appropriation of *National Spirit* for moralizing Koreans. Whereas Chŏng Kitak deployed and adapted An Chung-gŭn's assassination story for the Chinese audience to imagine a Sino-Korean alliance, the *Magazine China's* author used it for blaming Koreans about not being able to emulate An Chung-gŭn.

On October 21, 1931, the *Shanghai News* published Xu Jie's article, "Outdated Method of Annexing Korea." The article begins with the highly nationalist and

¹⁷⁸ The *Shenbao* article on November 7 is the only article that touched upon the fact that the movie reflected the tragic national fate. The article, however, mentioned it very briefly and tangentially.

¹⁷⁹ Between *Patriotic Spirit* (1928) and the Wanbaoshan Incident (1931), there were no *Shanghai News* articles on An Chung-gŭn.

¹⁸⁰ "zhonghua zazhi wu qi chuban"[Publication of Volume V of Magazine China] *Shenbao* 4 Sep. 1931.

¹⁸¹ The volume five of *Magazine China* is non-extant, so there is no way to identify the author's name and more detailed content of his article.

ethnocentric remark, "Korea has been my country's tributary state."¹⁸² Xu Jie delineated how Korea was colonized by Japan in order to caution Chinese readers that Korea's tragic history foreshadowed China's political future. He illustrated how the Koreans resisted the Japanese oppression; for example, forming sundry kinds of anti-colonial groups, both public and underground, destroying railroads, and cutting electronic cords of public facilities of the colonial government. Xu Jie claimed, however, all those efforts turned out to be fruitless. He continued, "Only An Chung-gŭn (An Chonggen)'s assassination in Harbin, however, was the passable resistance (*chaqiang renyi*)."¹⁸³ He stressed that China would take the same path as Korea. At the end of the article, he commented, "Although I have described the fall of the Korean nation-state, I have no time to lament for them."¹⁸⁴ Detailing all the struggles of the colonized Koreans makes a sharp contrast to refusing to sympathize with them. The disparity entails the rhetorical effect that associates Xu Jie's seeming indifference to Koreans with actual antagonism against them.

It should be noted that Xu Jie had the article published after the Wanbaoshan Incident in 1931. The incident could have possibly affected his apathetic stance on the tragic situation of colonized Korea. Xu Jie's article exemplifies how a Chinese critic could isolate and disjoin the Korean political and historical affairs from the Chinese by disavowing the statehood of Korea and evoking a nostalgic sentiment for the premodern Chinese empire. Moreover, Xu devalued Korean anti-colonial movements,

¹⁸² In Chinese, it reads, "chaoxian woguo zhi shudi ye." See Xu jie. "Outdated Method of Annexing Korea." *Shen Bao* 21 Oct. 1931.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

assessing An's terror as "passable," as opposed to heroic or inspiring. Finally, the author explicitly refused to sympathize with the Koreans, employing the Korean example only for reminding what they ought not to be.

On December 11, 1932, the *Shanghai News* reported on a ninety-three year old gentleman, Ma Xiangbo, who wanted to support the militia in Northeast China. The militia fought against the Japanese puppet regime in Manchuria. Mr. Ma listed seven ways that four hundred and seventy million Chinese could donate to the militia. The seven methods of donation ranged from providing entertainment, quitting drugs, and reducing consumption of luxurious goods as well as cigarettes and alcohol, to conducting Buddhist and Daoist rituals and practices. Ma suggested that Chinese do any of these day by day throughout the year. While exhorting Chinese people to join Ma, he critiqued the Chinese government, "Our China, since the ancient times, it was government officials that collected money, and it was people that paid money." By condemning both ancient courts and the modern government, Ma argued that it was not political leaders who had built the Chinese history. It was the "Heaven," the "Quan fei" (or Yihetuan), and the "Master of Eight Countries" (*baguo zhi chi*) that determined crucial junctures of the world history. While tracing the Chinese history from the Daoist stance, Ma broached An Chung-gün's assassination of Itō Hirobumi. Ma's article quoted An's words:

My country's enemy is also China's enemy. I killed Itō for the relationship of our two nations and also for (*dashi*) of the East. The Chinese people should fathom what is at the heart of my political path, and they should deeply think the fate of the two nations together. In so doing, [we] should save twenty million people of my country and four hundred million of China, who were amidst

suffering (*shuihuo zhi zhong*). I now have words to tell. Before Korea achieves independence, the Chinese will not have high-pillowed [carefree] days.¹⁸⁵

Underlining An's view, Ma Xiangbo denounced the Japanese empire's invasion of the world. In order not to be subjugated by the Japanese colonial power, Ma argued that it was more urgent that every single household in China supported the militia of the Northern Expedition. While drawing on An Chung-gŭn's words to highlight the urgency of an anticolonial war, Ma failed to bring attention to the Sino-Korean political tie that An accentuated.

In comparison to Chinese media, articles on Chŏng in Korean media were relatively few after *National Spirit* was released. On October 5, 1928, the *Chosŏn Daily* reported that Chŏng's *National Spirit* was exhibited all over China, and it imbued the Chinese people with the anti-Japanese consciousness. The author wrote that the movie showed a real picture of An Chung-gŭn's brothers and family, and therefore the Japanese police in Shanghai rigorously investigated where the director obtained the picture.¹⁸⁶ Without much information, the article made a brief and general statement of the Chinese reception of *National Spirit*. However, the article tells more about what Koreans wished the Chinese audience to think about the movie, rather than how the Chinese audience actually responded to it. In the same year, there were no other newspaper articles on *National Spirit*, which was due to the exacerbated colonial censorship of Korean media.

¹⁸⁵ Ma Xiangbo. "quanmu yiyong juan." [Urging Chinese to Donate for Militia] *Shenbao* 11 Dec. 1932.

¹⁸⁶ "Han mal An Chung-gŭn ūi Itō jō kyō han yŏnghwa" [Movie on An Chung-gŭn's Assassination of Itō in Late Chosŏn] *Dong-A Ilbo* 5 Oct. 1928.

On January 21, 1930, Yi Pil-u's short commentary of contemporary Shanghai films appeared on the *Chosŏn Daily*. Yi remarked that Chŏng Kitak's directing skills were better than other Chinese directors', yet there were technical aspects that Chŏng could improve upon. Furthermore, Yi mentioned that Yi and Chŏng Kitak made the sound movie *March Song of Shanghai* (*shanghai xingjinq*) in Tokyo together. After the completion of Part One of the movie, Yi and Chŏng planned to return to Tokyo later to finish the second part although it failed to happen.¹⁸⁷

5. Conclusion

Chŏng's directorial debut with *National Spirit* in Shanghai was a bold and daring decision because Hollywood movies and Chinese martial arts films predominated the Chinese movie markets in the late 1920s. *National Spirit* dramatizes a Korean nationalist, An Chung-gŭn's anti-Japanese terror and his political death, which occurred in 1909 in Northeast China. Chŏng adapted it to a story of a Sino-Korean alliance, which involved camaraderie and romance between Korean and Chinese anticolonial activists. My analysis highlighted that Chŏng's movie envisioned the formation of an anticolonial militia, where thousands of the Chinese voluntarily gathered together. More importantly, in *National Spirit*, the militia endeavored to cross the Sino-Korean border to wage a war against colonial Japan in Korea. Previous studies concluded that a Korean's national martyrdom inspired Chinese audiences with anticolonialism, which led to the popularity of the movie. The close reading of

¹⁸⁷ "chung-gu ŭi yŏnghwa: sanghae rŭl chungsim ŭro" [Chinese Cinema: With Focus on Shanghai] *Chosŏn Ilbo* 21 Jan. 1930; Yi wrote that a Japanese actress from the East Asia Cinema (*dongya cinema*) starred in the film. The first character of the Japanese actress's name is illegible, which appeared as "x 川ろり子."

Chinese responses to the movie, however, proved that its commercial success was due to more complex reasons. The Chinese audiences, who were unconcerned about political issues, were still attracted to actors' performances, action scenes, and romance in *National Spirit*. Chǒng's *National Spirit* successfully engaged in the Chinese movement of making the national spirit by catering to heterogeneous needs of Chinese spectators and to the specific horizon of reception in Republican China.

CHAPTER THREE: Zhang Shenqie and Chang Chirak

This chapter discusses two diasporic authors, Zhang and Chang, who had engaged in Chinese revolutions, yet broke their alliance with China for a while and produced literature on national issues. Even after the political and aesthetic secession, however, they returned back to Chinese political and literary movements. By tracking the politico-aesthetic trajectories of Zhang and Chang, I examine another form of inter-colonial literature that sought the absolute right to secede from as much as to associate with China during the colonial period. This chapter analyzes literature of Zhang and Chang that were written between their first and second alliances with Chinese revolutionaries and literati. As any decision of alliance or disaffiliation was impermanent in Zhang's and Chang's lifetime, our reading of their "national" literature requires a new interpretative tool to construe the meaning of nationalism in the 1920s and 30s diasporic context. I argue that Zhang and Chang reappropriated the nation as an antidote to the historical claim of an unequal international alliance.

1. Zhang Shenqie

Zhang Shenqie (1904 -65) was a Taiwanese writer, who led political and literary careers in both sides of the strait. He had been educated in Japan since the age of thirteen. In his autobiography, he recalls that at first he naively hoped to become a Japanese citizen. This perspective, however, had been drastically changed through his experiences of ethnic discrimination in Japan. Zhang realized that, irrespective of his

will and qualification, he was merely a subject of Qing Dynasty, or a Chinese, or a Taiwanese—after all, a person with no mother country to the eyes of the Japanese.¹⁸⁸

When the Great Kantō earthquake broke out in 1923, in the whirlwind of extreme social unrests, the number of xenophobic persecution of foreigners has rapidly increased. Upon witnessing the violent chaos at the heart of the Japanese empire, Zhang decided to go to China to serve his father country. In the same year, he arrived at Shanghai, where he were acquainted with Taiwanese activists, such as Cai Huiru, Peng Huaying, Cai Xiaoqian, and so on. In 1924, Xie Xuehong, Cai Xiaoqian, and Zhang Shenqie as well as other Taiwanese activists organized the Taiwan Self-Governance Association (*Taiwan zizhi xiehui*), which pursued the independence of Taiwan as well as the sovereignty of self-governance in the island.

Since his father discontinued a financial support, Zhang was forced to come back to Taiwan in October 1924. He went back to Shanghai in 1926, but, this time, his purpose was to start a business. Upon its failure, however, Zhang moved to Guangdong, and he and forty or so Taiwanese comrades established the Taiwan Revolutionaries Youth Group (*Taiwan geming qingnian tuan*) in early March 1927, which was formerly Taiwanese Student Association in Guangzhou (*Guangzhou Taiwan xuesheng lianhehui*). The group was forcibly dissolved in late June as the Japanese colonial police inaugurated the large-scale roundup of the Taiwanese who were active in China in 1927.

¹⁸⁸ Zhang Shenqie. “Chuxing” in *Zhang Shenqie Quanshu: Lichengbei*. vol.1. (Taipei: Wenjing Chuban, 1998) 156.

In April 1927, Zhang returned to Taiwan to raise fund for the Taiwanese in Guangdong. At the same time, he took a crucial part in mobilizing an anticolonial student movement in Taizhong. Due to his leading role in this anti-Japanese resistance, Zhang was arrested and sentenced for two years. Upon being released in 1930, he became committed to literary movements in Taiwan, especially theatre movements. Since the war regime of the colonial government in 1937, the colonial police surveillance and censorship regulations became extremely strict in Taiwan. To escape the intensified oppression on writers, he went to Beijing, where he was active as an editor of *Chinese Literary Art* (*Zhongguo wenyi*). Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army, Dōnowaki Mitsuo (C. TangzhiXie Guangxiong) sponsored the magazine. While resuming his writing career in Beijing, he was unable to get most of his writings published in the mainland due to the censorship and other semicolonial systems of surveillance. Those writings were collected after he returned to Taiwan, and he had them published into the volume *Me and My Thoughts*. Upon Japan's surrender to the Allied Forces in 1945, he returned to Taiwan, and resumed theatre movements, and wrote dramas and movie scenarios as well as literary criticism until 1965.

Previous studies of Zhang Shenqie examined his works drawing on the concepts of colonial modernity, nationalism, and a national identity. Jian Suzheng employed the framework of enlightenment and colonial modernity to interpret Zhang Shenqie. He argued that Zhang thoroughly pursued enlightenment ideals in a way that encompasses Eastern and Western traditions as well as Taiwanese, Chinese, and

Japanese modernities.¹⁸⁹ Wang Shen, on the other hand, traced Zhang Shenqie's cultural identities while he was a chief editor of the Beijing-based magazines *Chinese Art* and *Art and Literature Magazine*. Wang discussed Zhang's difficulties of having a national identity due to the liminal status of Taiwan. Overall he defined Zhang's intellectual engagement for liberation of China as the homecoming-consciousness.¹⁹⁰ Chen Fangming argued in *New Literary History of Taiwan Literature* that a national consciousness (*minzu yishi*) lies at the heart of Zhang Shenqie's literature and criticism.¹⁹¹ I, however, argue that Zhang works exceeded nationalist- and identity-frameworks.

1-1. Critical Works

In the "Reaction of Reaction" of *Me and My Philosophy*, Zhang Shenqie writes, while he committed himself to Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People from 1923 to 1924, his actual experiences of the mainland from 1925 to 1926 led him to be skeptical on Sun's philosophy. Since then, he made his mind to be an "independent outsider (*yeren*)," with no adherence to any ideology or party, who upholds the liberation of his motherland and his people from the imperial subjugation as the only cardinal principle. Whereas Zhang Shenqie participated in the 1927 Guangzhou revolution, he as well as his Taiwanese comrades refused to be involved with any factional party movements.¹⁹² In another piece of *Me and My Philosophy*,

¹⁸⁹ Jian Suzheng, "Rizhi shiqi Qimeng Sixiang de wu ge mianxiang," diss., Furen U, 2007.

¹⁹⁰ Wang Shen, "Lunxian shiqi luping Taiji wenhuaren de wenhua huodong yu shenfen biao-shu," diss., Beijing U, 2010, 11-36.

¹⁹¹ Chen Fangming, *Taiwan Xinwenxue shi* (Taipei: Lianjing Chubai, 2011) 126-7.

¹⁹² Zhang Shenqie. "Fandong de Fandong" *Zhang Shenqie Quanjie: Wo yu Wo de Sixiang* vol. 3; 79.

“Sifting Out Old Thoughts in My Head,” he traces how his philosophy has underwent one crucial change. He recalls that it was not until his imprisonment that he had a chance to seriously read religious works. Before then, he writes, many philosophers—Marx, Kant, Hegel, Sun Yat-sen, Tolstoy, Kropotkin, Arishima Takeo, and so on— Influenced on the formation of his worldview. After he delved into series of religious works in prison, however, he distanced his stance from the modern philosophies, and the core part of his new thoughts consisted of religious ideas, especially those of Laozi, Zhuangzi, Shakyamuni Buddha, and Jesus. He writes, “While people take a new path, I take an old path, which also had a dense religious color.”¹⁹³ Amongst these religious ideas, he acknowledges, the Daoist influence was especially profound; “Ever since I roughly understand Laozi, my philosophy, will, worldview, and everyday habit have been changed.”¹⁹⁴ In prison, he refused to sign the defection statement of the imperial Japan, saying that he was neither Marxist nor any kind of ‘--ist,’ and therefore he believed in no ideology that he should turn against. I particularly focus on the fact that Zhang Shenqie embraced the ancient Chinese philosophy of Daoism as the exemplar anticolonial literary strategy despite immense influences of modern Western literatures of his time, such as the literary group of new sensationalist, new romanticist, proletariat, anarchist, and so on.

While Zhang laid the basis for the idea that Daoism should be the cardinal anti-imperialist strategy in Taiwan during his prison years (1928-30), he further substantiated this idea during his Beijing years (1937-45). Then Zhang argued for, as a

¹⁹³ Zhang Shenqie. “Taotai Naoli de Jiu Sixiang” *Zhang Shenqie Quanj: Wo yu Wo de Sixiang* vol. 3; 97.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

way of countering the Western eclipse of the Chinese mind, the renaissance of Chinese tradition. The revival movement demands his contemporaries' ability to discern where "life-veins of tradition" stretch toward and to renew and revitalize them. One essay in *Me and My Philosophy*, "Significance of Reviving Chinese Culture," well illustrates Zhang's point on the renaissance of Chinese tradition. Here Zhang Shenqie critiques the idea of "Eastern mind with Western skills" (*dongdao xiqi*), which suggests that only in regards to technologies should China learn from Westerners while upholding Eastern spirits. The idea, therefore, highlights the urgencies of maintaining the 'Chinese-ness' in the realms other than sciences and technologies. Critiquing this claim, however, Zhang argues that to accept Western technologies necessarily entails to embrace its mindset and cultural disposition that underlie Western sciences. Despite the designatory distinction between science and mind, Zhang stresses, those two fails to operate separately in reality. Zhang likens the relationship between the material and the spiritual to that between a thing and a shadow. Without one, the other is non-existent. He further contends that material culture is a symbol of spiritual culture. In the same vein, he argues that it is not until spiritual culture develops that material culture progresses.¹⁹⁵ Zhang's standpoint, therefore, challenges the materialist assumption. Given that it was ineluctable to import Western technologies, it was also apparent that Western minds would necessarily exert influences on Chinese societies. Whereas the idea of "Eastern minds with Western skills" assumes that espousing the Eastern mind is the matter of choice,

¹⁹⁵ Zhang Shenqie, "Zhenxing Zhongguo Wenhua de Wenyi" *Zhang Shenqie Quanjī: Wo yu Wo de Sixiang*, vol. 3: 163-69.

Zhang argues that to endorse the Chinese mind is a mode of struggle, and, due to this reason, the Chinese should mobilize the renaissance movement of Chinese traditions (*fugu yundong*).

In “One Suggestion for Direction of New Taiwan Literature,” Zhang Shenqie foregrounds Daoism as a model of literary ethics, which he argues should be established in order to develop New Taiwan Literature. In the process, he makes a point that to take up an existing literary line is incompatible with to found new literary ethics in Taiwan. Zhang Shenqie lays out all kinds of literary sects that flourished in his time. Tracing the development of literature in Taiwan, he highlights the trend of new literature began with importing “new literatures” from Japan, which started with translating and imitating mostly European, sometimes American, modern literature. Amidst of the flood of European literary sects—neo-romanticism, (neo-) realism, naturalism, intellectualism (*youzhizhuyi*)—, Japanese literary circles of the time were divided into the pure literature group, the new sensation group, the ordinary literature group (*putong wenyi pai*), the detective literature group, the mass literature group (*dazhong wenyi pai*), the popular literature group (*tongsu wenyi pai*), the proletariat literature group, and so on. What Zhang Shenqie highlights is that all these factions influence each other, and every second, without cessation, they go through changes under each other’s influences. He writes, “Right turn to left, and left turn to right. All changes, and they are never permanent.”¹⁹⁶ Even bourgeois and proletariat literatures,

¹⁹⁶ Zhang Shenqie, “Dui Taiwan Xinwenxue Luxian de Yi Ti’an” Chen Fangming et al. *Zhang Shenqie Quanji* vol. 11: 175.

therefore, incessantly affect each other, and within the left, one sub-sect counters another, and it is same for the right.

As examples of literary ethics, Zhang discusses European and American models of humanism and class ethics, both of which, he says, fail to be ideal. Zhang points out, “humanism is too abstract, idealist, and one dimensional (and the subjective humanism is same, too individualist, non-social, and non-scientific). As for the class ethics, it is too one-sided, mechanical, idealist, and parochial.”¹⁹⁷ Zhang writes that students of medicine will learn only biology and hygienics, and astronomers will study only about the sun, the moon, and the stars. In contrast, writers or critics should study not only beautiful words and phrases but also all the creatures and phenomena in the world (*senluowanshang*). Zhang Shenqie continues:

We don't believe the sayings that ‘a benevolent person is not rich’, or ‘a rich person is not benevolent,’ which are no more than abstract and idealist words. We have to use scientific common knowledge and the “empty mind” (*xuxin*), and go forward and see through an inside of society and mankind. Just as how the literary style (*bifa*) of *Spring and Autumn* [Annals] works, from a vast standpoint should we tackle a small situation. Just as how the “empty mind” (*xuxin*) from *Daodejing* [Book of the Way] works, we should go forward and discern a society and mankind, and we don't have to be bound to extant forms, contents, topics, and descriptions. We should let our ‘pen-power’ (*bifeng*) and the ethics of the “empty mind” (*xuxin*) advance and progress freely and unobstructedly (*ziyouzizai*). This is the New Literature's path that I truly want to endorse.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷ Zhang Shenqie, “Dui Taiwan Xinwenxue Luxian de Yi Ti'an” Chen Fangming et al. *Zhang Shenqie Quanji* vol. 11: 179.

¹⁹⁸ Zhang Shenqie. “Dui Taiwan Xinwenxue Luxian de Yi Ti'an” in Chen Fangming et al. *Zhang Shenqie Quanji*. vol. 11: 180-1.

Here Zhang foregrounds the Daoist idea of the “empty mind” as the core of his ethics. To look at the sequel of this article together helps us to understand Zhang’s point on the ethics of the empty mind more clearly.¹⁹⁹ In the sequel, he quotes the beginning part of *Daodejing*, which he notes epitomizes the essential idea of the whole text.

Dao could be called as Dao, but it [the name of Dao] is not permanently Dao. A name could be the name, but it is not permanently that name. Without naming [it Dao], it is the origin of the heaven and the earth, With naming [it Dao], it is the mother of all (the universe). If one does not desire to name it, one will see the subtlety [of the origin of the heaven and the earth]; if one does desire to name it, one will see a rim [of Dao]. Both come from the same origin; what is different are [only] their names. They are same in being abstruse. One is abstruse, and the other is also abstruse. So Dao is the gateway of all the subtleties [of the origin of the heaven and the earth].

Zhang’s exegesis of *Daodejing* draws on Miao Ershu’s annotation, highlighting that Dao as the origin is one, De (meaning ‘virtue’ or ‘ethics’ in Chinese) is countless. Miao glosses that the Buddhist idea of the “emptiness”(kong)—the insight on the radical interrelatedness of all the phenomena in the world—could be substituted for that of Dao. With the celebrated Buddhist metaphor of a lucid mirror that represents the principle of the codependent origination, as opposed to that of causality, Miao employs the teaching of the emptiness to understand Daoism. A mirror reflects everything that faces it whereas it is none of reflected objects. Likewise, De reflects Dao whereas multiple De are nonidentical to Dao. Within the Daoist teachings, Dao is the quintessence of the universe, and Dao proper is invisible and also non-fixable with

¹⁹⁹ Zhang Shenqie. “[Xupian]Dui Taiwan Xinwenxue Luxian de Yi Tian” *Taiwan Wenyi* vol. 2 issue. 4. Apr 1935.

any name. De is manifestation and actualization of Dao. De as such discriminates the good from the bad. Dao and De are distinct, yet De emanates and flows from Dao. The qualities of fluidity and continuity define the relationship between Dao and De.

From Dao does emerge the universe, and through De does the universe progress. Zhang explicates, “Without materials, Dao fails to exist, and without proceeding, Dao fails to exist.”²⁰⁰ The Daoist “empty mind” (*xuxin*) emerges from the realization that Dao is the source of De, but not in the noumenal sense, but in the immanent sense. In this vein, Zhang endorses ethics, first, in order to study forms of the unreal (*jia*) and to reach the origin of the real;²⁰¹ second, to be fully responsive to a rapidly changing reality. Zhang re-stresses that in a way that upholds a certain set of principles, one is unable to engage promptly and properly with such an unpredictable changes of the world. As Jullien points out the key idea of Daoism, “the important thing is not to become so attached to a position as to remain trapped by it” and therefore to be constantly alert to changes.²⁰² Zhang Shenqie writes:

Only in order to carry through with the virtues of ‘truth and sincerity’ (*zhengcheng*), if they strive wholeheartedly to maintain the effort to do so, and only in order to discern ‘the good and the evil’ [Daode, or ethics], if they study and delve into matters, if they maintain to do this, [the fate of] Taiwan literature will naturally depend on somewhere with no literary lineages [of foreign origin], and after then we will establish an exactly apt literary lineage [of our own]. In conclusion, what I argue is that Taiwan literature has to be built, not upon any extant lineage, but upon the line of Taiwan’s own ‘truth and

²⁰⁰ Zhang Shenqie. “Dui Taiwan Xinwenxue Luxian de Yi Tian” in Chen Fangming et al. *Zhang Shenqie Quanji*. vol. 11: 179.

²⁰¹ Originally published as “[Xupian]Dui Taiwan Xinwenxue Luxian de Yi Tian” *Taiwan Wenyi* 2(4). April. 1935.

²⁰² Francois Jullien, *Vital Nourishment: Departing from Happiness* (NY: Zone Books, 2007), 31.

sincerity' (which comes from scientific analysis) of everything. Neither immersed nor separate, we should make progress and more progress *pari passu* with Taiwan's social situations, and we should move forward and forward *pari passu* with history. This will be the right way.²⁰³

I argue that Zhang understood that anti-imperialization or human emancipation is to his contemporary literary and philosophical practices what Dao is to De. Just as looking at merely any one kind of De fails to illuminate the whole aspect of Dao, any practice that examines only one specific element of reality—whether it is a class, or a style of writing, or a literary form—fails to relate itself closer to the source of human liberation or anti-imperialization. I further argue that what is at stake here is to realize and to be alert to the insufficiency and incompleteness of any single kind of literary or political practice that a revolutionary is currently engaged with. It is not until this realization that anti-imperialist movement comes to be fully awaken and sensitized to new demands and subtle changes around. Zhang repeatedly stressed that to remain faithful to changes demands a revolutionary's will and practices not to be impeded by extant or imported literature and philosophy, Western and Japanese, and also to engage ever more closely with social phenomena, whose relationship to the source of human emancipation is yet unknown and unarticulated. In this context, Zhang exhorts his contemporaries to embark on establishing a new Taiwanese literary lineage of their own through the renaissance of Daoism.

²⁰³ Zhang Shenqie. "Dui Taiwan Xinwenxue Luxian de Yi Tian" in Chen Fangming et al. *Zhang Shenqie Quanji* vol. 11: 181.

In the article on Taiwanese activism in Guangdong, Zhang Shenqie states that the group was disengaged with any factional or ideological propensity. Due to this, he recalls that the Guangdong period represents one of the most earnest and purest revolutionary spirits in Taiwan's history of anti-imperialism. Owing to the absence of partisan characters of Taiwanese Revolutionary Youth Group in Guangdong, they were safeguarded from factious struggles in China. On April 15, 1927, three days after Chiang Kaishek's reactionary coups d'état, the nationalist party began to purge communists, Chinese and foreigners, in existing revolutionary groups. As Zhang Shenqie notes in "Characteristics of Taiwan's Revolution at Each Stage," when Korean, Vietnamese, and Indian activists were at risk of being liquidated by Chiang Kaishek, they joined Taiwanese Revolutionary Youth Group in order to avoid KMT's bloodshed eradication of communists.²⁰⁴

In May 1935, Zhang Shenqie published another critical essay, "Mission of the Journal of *Taiwan's Literary Art*." Zhang Shenqie reminds readers that Taiwan had no literary tradition and history of its own (*jicheng wenxue*). It was not until 1921 that the so-called history of Taiwan literature began, when the journal *Taiwan Youth* (*Taiwan qingnian*), which was later re-titled as *Taiwan*, was published. He estimates, in practical terms, how influential literature can be to the general public of his time. The number of intellectuals amounted to around forty percent of the population, which is about two million, and people who could read literary works in the level of *Drama of Three Kingdoms* (*sanguo yanyi*) amounted to, at least, one percent of the whole

²⁰⁴ Zhang Shenqie. "Gejieduan Taiwan Geming Yundong de Tese" *Zhang Shenqie Quanjī*. vol. 4: 99

population, which is around 50,000. People who read newspapers on a regular basis were around 100,000. Zhang points out that the journal *Taiwan's Literary Art* had the circulation of 1,000 only although there was the sufficient intellectual ground for Taiwanese literary culture to be developed. This attests to the distance between literary works—the new art—and the general masses, which, Zhang Shenqie argues, was due to the lack of propagandic activities of literary circles. Zhang critiques that, despite the increase in the number of magazines published in the 1920s and 30s Taiwan, the literary movements were limited to a few groups of intellectuals, and that the movements developed with no clear theoretical guidance. As a way to popularize New Taiwan Literature, Zhang also argues that Taiwanese writers have to look at traditional Chinese literature and also Russian new formalist literature. He critiques that the contemporary writers are predisposed to blindly pursue the Japanese portraitist (*miaoxiezhuyi*) style, so subordinated to trends of Japanese literary circles, which further hinders the popularization of literature in Taiwan.²⁰⁵

As the main difficulties of Taiwanese writers faced, Zhang Shenqie discusses three issues; one is the disagreement between a speaking and a written languages in Taiwan. Second is texts of New Literature fails to meet the standard tastes of the masses. Third is the number of intellectuals are small, and the qualities of works of New Literature groups fails to be fine enough to call attention from the masses. In order to solve these problems, he suggests, first, writers should invent ways to incorporate the local Taiwanese vernacular into literary texts. Second, Taiwanese literary circles ought to awaken the masses' interests in New Literature Movements.

²⁰⁵ Zhang Shenqie, “*Taiwan WenYi de Shiming*” *Zhang Shenqie Quanj* vol. 11: 192-3.

Zhang proposes that the Taiwanese Writers Association hold lectures, discussion meetings, and other propagandic activities, whereby writers should discern and study tastes of the masses. Zhang Shenqie accentuates that to accord with preference of the masses is neither to be immersed into nor to be separate from the contemporary world, yet it is to guide the masses to good virtues. Lastly, Zhang suggests that Taiwanese writers should work on short pieces that will correspond to people's liking and demands. He notes that his contemporaries enthusiastically respond to sensational stories, such as *Dramas of Three Kingdoms* (*Sanguo Yanyi*) and *Legend of Lakeshore* (*Shuihuzhuan*), and *Stories of Numerous Countries in Eastern Zhou* (*Dongzhou Lieguo zhi*). Given this scene of literary preference, Zhang Shenqie argues, it is Taiwanese writers' obligation to compose similar kinds of sensational works to meet popular demands. Otherwise, from Zhang's standpoint, Taiwanese writers would fail to serve Taiwanese readers.

To better understand the critical quality of Zhang's argument on the writer-and-reader relationship, I compare his view to other literary circles'. Marxist or proletariat literary groups, for example, highlight heuristic roles of literature, wherein the primary aim of literature is to imbue laborers with class-consciousness and the will to armed revolution and to proletariat dictatorship. Anarchist literary groups, in contrast, critique the Marxist vantage point for limiting literature merely as ideological tools with no due consideration of its autonomous artistic power beyond delivering political messages. The anarchist stance on literature emphasizes the political

ineffectiveness of touching stories, shocking images, and novel arrays of words.²⁰⁶

Although any serious literary texts make political and ethical calls for action, it simply has no power to enforce them. As anarchist critic, Kim Hwasan (C. Jin Huashan) writes, "Enforcement and order are outside artistic realm. Art that consciously pursues propagandic effects fails to have any impact on actual political terrain."²⁰⁷ Literary art invites, rather than orders, readers to be politically conscious and conative. Anarchists highlight that literature, even at its most accomplished level, constitutes only indirect and mediated protest against the state of things. Ōsugi Sakae (1885-1923), for example, who is the cardinal figure in East Asian anarchist history, warned artists not to be subservient to any ideology, not even to that of Marx and Kropotkin.²⁰⁸ Endorsing the autonomous domain of literature, anarchists contend that good literature is the kind that contributes to advancing anti-authoritarian spirit and human liberation in both collective and individual levels.

Given this literary debate between Marxist and anarchist, Zhang Shenqie's position appears to be closer to the anarchist rather than the Marxist. For Zhang, however, the entertaining function is one of the most crucial conditions in order to subvert the old literature.²⁰⁹ Zhang stresses that Taiwan New Literature should be equipped with both social and entertaining functions, where, I argue, does lie

²⁰⁶ See Akiyama Kiyoshi, *Anakizumu bungakushi* [History of Anarchist Literature], (Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2006).

²⁰⁷ Kim Hwasan, "New Development of Theories on Class Art: Comment on Communist Art-Critics" *Chosŏn Wendan* Mar 1927; 20.

²⁰⁸ Ōsugi Sakae, "Kojin Teki Shisaku" Ōsawa Masamichi, ed., *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* I (Tokyo: Sekai Bunko, 1963).

²⁰⁹ Zhang Shenqie, "Taiwan WenYi de Shiming" in Chen Fangming et al. *Zhang Shenqie Quanji* vol. 11: 195.

Zhang's unique stance of literary aesthetics. In other words, for Zhang, to amuse the masses is as pivotal as to inspire people to certain political orientations in non-coercive and non-authoritarian ways. Zhang writes that writers would probably think that working on those kinds of popular texts is to betray their conscience as artists, and that it is neither worth to do nor worth to acknowledge. Unless artists undertake this obligation to entertain the public, however, Zhang argues, their literary art will be separated and distanced from the masses all the time.

1-2. Literary Works

Zhang's short novel *Final Extinction* (*Zhongmie*; 1925) portrays one couple who detest the society that they live in, and who discuss the ways to transcend this world.²¹⁰ A slightly derisive tone dominates the whole text, which induces the alienation effect to readers, and two characters in the novel have rather naive conversations throughout the story. Upon thinking of ways to transcend (*chaoyue*) this world, the couple considers, first, Buddhism as a possible option. One of the couple interprets the Buddhist teaching as a transcendental philosophy that views the secular world merely as "a piece of emptiness and nothingness."²¹¹ Responding to this, the other brings up Tolstoy, and says, "although I very much dislike Tolstoy, insofar as he spells out the issue of extrication (*jietuo*) from life [this worldly realm], I absolutely agree with him. Tolstoy said that although our perception on life as an emptiness and a void makes us desire to break away from this life right away, to pursue this kind of extrication (liberation) and to find anxiously one's true self is the life itself. Due to this,

²¹⁰ Originally published in *Yingchao* vol. 10. Nov. 1. 1925.

²¹¹ Zhang Shenqie, "Zhongmie" *Zhang Shenqie Quanj*. vol. 11: 64.

no matter what, there is no way to escape from this world.”²¹² But the partner still believes there should be some way to break away from this life and to find an otherworldly “Garden of the Peaches of Immortality (*shiwai taoyuan*).”²¹³ While coming up to think of living a primitive life in Huayanshan, the legendary mysterious mountain, they believe that they could build a utopia on the mountain and live a natural life (*ziran shenghuo*).

They soon realized, however, that it accompanies too much inconveniences, such as difficulties of making fire and finding a decent dwelling; and they do not know how to deal with their house after they leave this world. Here the couple, who discusses how to transcend the human world, turn out to be more concerned about rather trivial everyday issues than liberation as such. Upon encountering minor issues, they decide to go for a walk, and “they will once again see pitiful people who are just so busy with earning money in order to make a living.”²¹⁴ For this couple, this society seems to be a kind of a castle occupied by rebels, and only they are right and just people and (allegedly spiritual and intellectual) winners in the city. They, however, have no way to explain why they still have to seek ways to transcend the world. The end of the novel writes that one of the couple is, in fact, the richest in the entire Taiwan due to a vast inheritance from his father. Despite this, “he has extreme antipathy to the human world.”²¹⁵ In this text, Zhang highlights that the idea of

²¹² Ibid., 65.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 67.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 68; whereas the note of the text says the novel is to be continued, Zhang has not published its sequel.

transcendence at times bears on self-justified superiority over others as well as aversion to this world. Although one's hostility toward the world has something to do with experiencing injustice or discrimination within a given social structure, this fails to be the case for *Final Extinction*. The main character of the novel actually turns out to be the richest person in the country, which seems to be an unusual condition to transcend this world. Zhang's *Final Extinction* calls readers' attention to the affinity between the politically critical mind and the detestation of one's contemporaries and society.

Zhang Shenqie's play, *Luoyin* ("luo" literally means to fall, and "yin" usually refers to a shade, but here it means the world of the dead), written in 1935, well represents religious practices, especially Daoist, in the 1930s Taiwan. To discern *luoyin* (*guan luoyin*) is a Daoist skill, whereby a Daoist master makes spirit of a living leave his body and travel to the other world—the world of the dead. One, who mourns loss of family or the beloved, would count on the guidance of a *luoyin* master to "see" them again. While people close their eyes, a *luoyin* master speaks hypnotic words, such as "you are approaching to the bridge to the other world," or "Now I will call your father. He will appear before your eyes at any time."²¹⁶ The perlocutionary effect of these *luoyin* speeches is to make Daoist devotees believe that they can communicate to the dead.²¹⁷

²¹⁶ Liu Huanyue, *Taiwan Minjian Xinyang Xiao Baike: Lingmei juan* (Taipei: Taiyuan Chuban, 1994) 181.

²¹⁷ Many stories or travelogues on the other world in Taiwan bear on the Daoist practice of discerning *luoyin*. As Taiwan has especially the long-heralded and strong tradition of Daoism, Taiwanese religious groups, Daoist and indigenous, oftentimes take trips to discern *luoyin*. See Suzuki Seiichirō, *Taiwan Jiuguan Xisu Xinyang* (Taipei: Zhongwen Tushu Gongsu, 1978) 68-69.

The background of drama is one small village in the countryside of Taizhong on January 12, 1935. There are four main characters in the novel. One is Ye Qingwei, a teenage girl—seventeen or eighteen—with numerous scars on her face that she got while working in a sugar cane field. The scars indicate that the girl severely suffers from strenuous farming labors. Another is her late mother in her fifties; and there is also Ye Qingwei's stepmother in her forties, who has a dreadful appearance. The other is a *luoyin* master, Jiang Jinyi, in his mid-forties. In an opening scene, Master Jiang is performing a simple rite, burning incense, bowing, and reciting prayers. Upon the girl's appearance on a stage, Master Jiang asks her whether she brought money or not. Taking one of her shoes off, she takes a few bills from the bottom of the shoe. While farmers at the monastery say that the amount of money she brings is insufficient, they noticed that she saved some out of such a low wage in order to come to see the *luoyin* master. Taking a solemn attitude, the master first burns incense, having Ye Qingwei sit on a chair of discerning *luoyin*. Reciting some Daoist phrases, the master hypnotizes her. When images of the hell as well as the "bridge to the world of the dead" (*nai he qiao*) appear at the background of a stage, the first act ends.

The second act begins with the scene where Ye Qingwei gets to see her mother flying across the bridge. She holds fast her mother's legs and starts crying aloud. Telling her mother that her life is miserable, Ye cries more and more bitterly to the degree that she appears to be insane. While the master urges her not to cry, she continues to do so. From a backstage, suddenly, some voice is heard, "There is a

shadow [of the living] that reaches the world of the dead.”²¹⁸ Then Ye stops, and the master asks her to come back. She, however, refuses to do so, and insists that she stay right there to be around her mother, no matter what it would cost. Again, the faceless voice is heard, which urges her to go back to where she belongs. The master attempts to scare her, saying the “bull grandpa”(*niu 'ye*) and the “horse grandpa”(*ma 'ye*) are right there, close to her. Unless she hurries to come back, they will take her to an unknown world as a punishment for breaching the boundary between the living and the dead. The “bull grandpa” and the “horse grandpa”, also called, the “general bull” and the “general horse,” are originally the figures from Buddhism. Later Daoism appropriated these figures into Daoist traditions, where the “general bull” and the “general horse” became subordinates of King *Yanluo*, or the king of hell. They guard the right and the left sides of the bridge that leads to the world of the dead. If there are any people trying to cross the bridge, they will push those people off the bridge. Ye Qingwei, however, still refuses to go back to the world of the living, saying that to be captured by the “bull grandpa” and the “bull grandma” is rather a comfort for her than to return to the reality. She, furthermore, asks the *luoyin* master back, “How could it be an offence to want to stay close to my own mother?”²¹⁹ As Ye Weiqing refuses to make any move, the “bull grandpa” and the “horse grandpa” hold tridents up, taking a posture to strike her down. Frightened by this, she hastily leaves the bridge, and comes back to this world.

²¹⁸ Zhang Shenqie, “Luoyin” *Zhang Shenqie Quanj* vol. 11: 203.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 204.

Upon returning to this world, Ye Qingwei faints. The master and other village people at the sanctuary are busy with helping her to regain consciousness. Amidst these noises, the background of a stage is shifted back to that of the first act. When the master sprays ‘talisman water’ (*fuzishui*) on her, she wakes up. Sitting back on the chair at the sanctuary, however, she keeps crying. All of sudden, however, she stands up and reads her fortune, which surprises everyone. The master sprays talisman water again on her, which he finds useless. Thereupon, he throws and breaks away a bowl. Ye Qingwei now gets half-conscious. Whereas the master could help people to discern *luoyin*, he has no skill to get one’s spirit back (*huihun*). One farmer comforts the master, saying that the farmers there promise to say nothing as to what happened even if she fails to wake up. As the master, however, will be in serious trouble if she dies while practicing Daoist rites, the farmer suggests that he should bring a doctor. Another farmer, on the other hand, worries about unexpected situations a doctor might bring to. In the meantime, the master notices that Ye’s hands and feet get colder, and also their color has changed. The master gets panicked, and one farmer says the master should burn incense and talk to the king of the hell to handle the situation. In the middle of the fuss, Ye suddenly wakes up just as a sleepwalker does. She seems to want to go back home, and reluctantly moves her steps. In a few steps, however, she cries out “mama”, and again keeps crying. Ye runs toward the chair of discerning *luoyin*, crying out “mama”, saying that her life is so miserable.

To discern *luoyin* is the uniquely Taiwanese Daoist practice. The Daoist religion, as opposed to the Daoist philosophy, exerts significant influences on Taiwan societies even up to the present. As Zhang explicitly says in the appendix of the text,

the main purpose of the play is to awaken the Taiwanese from the superstitious Daoist beliefs of the time. Religious authorities are, in theory, supposed to provide essential knowledge and strategies of salvation to the masses. *Luoyin* points out that Daoist masters during the colonial period merely temporarily reduced intensities of pain, rather than tackling sources of suffering. The Daoist practice of seeking solace by “seeing” the deceased is rather the escapist strategy that undermines revolutionary potentials of the masses to challenge the colonial structure that exploits Taiwanese peasants, just like Ye Qingwei in the play. The catharsis function of “seeing” the deceased less prompts Taiwanese masses to resist the Japanese empire than substantiates the imperial economic and social structures. By portraying the uniquely Taiwanese religious practices, Zhang’s *Luoyin* reminded its Taiwanese readers of Taiwan’s own sensibilities that only New Taiwan Literature could touch upon.

2. Chang Chirak

Chang Chirak (1905–38) was a Korean Marxist and writer, and he was a devotee of the Chinese Communist Party for most of his life. He was born in northern Korea, and witnessed the March First Independence Movement in 1919 when he attended a middle school. In the same year, he went to Tokyo to study abroad. In 1920, however, upon being influenced by socialist circles in Japan, he decided to go to Moscow to study Marxism and anarchism. In *Song of Ariran*, he recalls that then he was unaware of differences between communism and anarchism. The warfare of the Allied intervention in Siberia, however, hindered him from crossing the continent. Chang thereupon went to south Manchuria instead to attend the Korean Nationalist Military Academy. From 1920 to 1922, he joined the Korean anarchist organization,

Ŭi'yŏldan (*yilietuan*). From 1922, Chang studied Marxism under the guidance of a monk-turned-to-Marxist, Kim Ch'ungch'ang (known as Jin Kuiguang to Chinese), and in winter 1923 he became a member of the Communist Youth in Beijing. From 1923 to 1935, he was an official member of the CCP. Chang was one of the head committees of the Guangzhou revolution in 1927 and in Haifeng and Lufeng revolutions in 1927 and 1928, respectively. After surviving the successive defeats of these revolutions, Chang served the underground activities of the CCP. At the interview with Nym Wales, Chang said, "After the Peking Incident in 1929, I went to Manchuria. In Peking I was Secretary of the C. P. Committee and also on the Pei Fang[beifang] Organization Committee (North China Committee). I went to Manchuria in spring 1929."²²⁰ In November 1930 and April 1933, the Chinese Nationalist Police arrested Chang Chirak, and handed him over to the Japanese Police. Each time, he was released in a relatively short period of time, due to which the CCP suspected that Chang was a Japanese spy. Upon his returning to the party after the discharge, the party excommunicated him. Without any proper title, however, Chang continued to serve the party activities, such as teaching peasants and laborers communist thoughts, and training them with practical combat skills.

On the first Sunday of December 1935, the Korean League for Emancipation was held in Shanghai, and Chang was one of the leading members of the league. In 1937, Chang said to Nym Wales, "I came here in 1936 as a delegate of the Korean Emancipation League of the Korean Communist Party."²²¹ Toward the mid-1930s,

²²⁰ Nym Wales, *Notes on Korea and the Life of Kim San*, 4.

²²¹ Nym Wales, *Notes on Korea and the Life of Kim San* (Madison: [s.n.], 1961) 42.

Chang Chirak identified himself as a Korean delegate, rather than a CCP member, the transition of which I discuss below. Although Chang went to Yan'an in 1936 in order to discuss issues on Chinese-Korean alliances with Mao Zedong, Mao never gave Zhang a response to it. In 1938, Kang Sheng, who returned from Moscow to join the CCP as secretary of underground organizations, ordered his subjects in the safeguard unit (*baoweibu*) to purge Chang secretly (*mimichujue*).²²² Chang Chirak was tragically murdered by his comrades of the CCP, to which he devoted himself. In 1983, however, the Central Committee of the CCP officially acknowledged the CCP's accusation of Chang as a Japanese spy was the false charge, and the party restored Zhang's CCP membership.

Without Chang's encounter with the American journalist, Nym Wales (the real name; Helen Foster), in early summer of 1937, his life story would have not known to later generations. Nym Wales and her husband, Edgar Snow, the author of *Red Star Over China*, participated in the December Ninth Students' Movement in 1935 against the Japanese puppet regime in Manchuria. In so doing, Wales and Snow built a unwavering comradeship with Chinese communists, and the couple could interview the core and legendary communist leaders, including Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai. During Wales's stay in Yan'an, she noticed that at the Lu Xun library, one CCP member consistently checked out dozens of English books and journals, and it was Chang Chirak. Upon Wales' persistent requests to interview Chang, he finally agreed

²²² Cui Longshui. "Jiechu de chaoxian gemingjia zhang zhile" *Zhongguo Chaoxianzu Zuji* vol. 3. (Beijing: Beijing Minzu Chubanshe, 1992) 211; Cui Longshui, the late professor of the Central Party Academy of Chinese Communist (*zhonggong zhongyangdangxiao*), was able to access the party's official document of the 'secret purge' command with Kang Sheng's signature on it. The CCP, however, disallows the document to be disclosed to the public.

upon meeting her. Wales initially planned to include Chang's interviews as a part of a volume on Chinese revolutions. As interviews continued, she realized that Chang's story should be written as an independent text on a Korean revolutionary.

In the preface of *Song of Ariran*, she highlights that the book ought to be taken as Chang's own voice with no fictional accounts. I argue, however, not in terms of the factuality of details, but in terms of the focus of editing, Wales's *Song of Ariran* had certainly inflected Chang's verbal accounts. This becomes clearer when carefully reading Wales's interview notes of a significant length that were not included in *Song of Ariran*.²²³ The reason of the exclusion was partly due to her own choice, and also partly to the publisher's decision. In either case, if the notes were included to the book, it would undoubtedly give highly critical and detailed observations of Chang on Chinese communists as well as Chinese masses in general. Chang Chirak's narrative shed light on lived truth on Chinese revolutions that a Korean communist experienced. By leaving out those parts, *Song of Ariran* accentuates Chang's dedication and loyalty to the CCP, suppressing Chang's critical and ambivalent stance of the CCP. Given Wales's career as a war correspondent and writer as well as her deep sympathy for the CCP, the editorial stress on Chang's allegiance to the CCP seems to be reasonable. My reading of *Song of Ariran* reveals Zhang's ambivalent stance on Chinese anticolonial revolutions and the Chinese Communist Party.

In *Song of Ariran*, Chang Chirak recollects what it meant for an activist from a small colonized country to live through Chinese revolutions. In 1929, the CCP dispatched Chang to Manchuria in order to urge Korean communists in Manchuria to

²²³ See Nym Wales, *Notes on Korea and the Life of Kim San*, (Madison: [s.n.], 1961).

be allied with the CCP. He recalls, “We Koreans decide that it was a mistake to have directed our fight in Manchuria only against Japanese imperialism and never against the Chinese ruling class or landlords. There were a million Korean farmers in Manchuria oppressed by the Chinese feudal class and working mostly for Chinese landlords. ... So we organized a new “Korean-Chinese Peasants’ Union.””²²⁴ The eighty members from Korean Communist Party attended to ratify this new alliance between the CCP and the KCP (Korean Communist Party), the process of which awakened Zhang onto a new direction of a Chinese-Korean alliance. Chang says:

It was my first experience of a mass movement led by the Korean Communist party, and it had a very deep influence on me. ... I recognized for the first time the full potentialities of the Korean mass movement in Manchuria—our key revolutionary area today. Though I was still absorbed in the Chinese problem as the leading revolutionary task in the Far East, my faith in Korea revived immeasurably, and I felt a hope for my country I had never known before.²²⁵

Chang’s stance in 1929 represents one of two competing views of the time on the issue of to which extent Koreans should be engaged with Chinese revolutions; that is, Koreans should take part in Chinese revolutions as if they were revolutions of Korea’s own. In another part of the interview, he recounts that “I have always thought China more important than Korea, and the Koreans often call me a traitor for this reason.”²²⁶ Since the Sixth Congress of the Comintern adopted the “theses on the revolutionary movement in colonial and semicolonial countries” in 1928, which stipulates that

²²⁴ Nym Wales and Kim San, *Song of Ariran: A Korean Communist in the Chinese Revolution*, 329.

²²⁵ Ibid., 232.

²²⁶ Ibid., 48

Korean communists should take a radical leftist line and isolate nationalists, instead of cooperating with them for a national revolution. In accordance to the theses, the Korean communists cut the ties with anticolonial nationalists, which, however, resulted in the dissolution of the Korean Communist Party. The Manchuria Branch of the KCP also declared its dissolution in March 1930, and thereupon Korean communists had no official parties to belong to. Some of former Korean communist members joined the CCP, not as Korean delegates, but simply as foreign individuals.²²⁷ Although there were critical voices on the KCP members' joining the CCP this way, as seen in Kim Ch'ungch'ang's (C. Jin Kuiguang) account, the former KCP failed to take those critiques seriously.²²⁸

From the summer 1933, Chang's stance, however, turned toward the political line that demanded a proper status of Koreans in Chinese revolutions. The CCP's excommunication of him from the party in 1933, based upon the false charge of a Japanese spy, prompted him to rethink critically on what could be the political good after all for a colonized foreigner to be devoted to the CCP. Chang points out that Chinese lack of will to have knowledge on Korea hindered the development of alliance between the two countries. "To have one Korean here and one there in the Chinese party was of little use. We decide that we must join together for common action and safeguard the Korean revolution instead of sacrificing only for China directly. Since 1932 the Korean Communist party and our Manchurian Communist

²²⁷ The Japanese Branch of the Korean Communist party declared the dissolution in October of 1931, and some of Korean members in Japan joined the JCP.

²²⁸ Kim Söngsuk, Jang Könsang, Jöng hwa'am, and Yi Kanghun. *Hyugmyungkatül üi Hang'il Hoesang* [Revolutionaries' Recollection on Anti-Japanese Movements]. (Seoul: Min'üm-sa, 2005) 90.

party had been independent, for the Chinese did not study the Korean problem and had little understanding of it. “We can no longer afford to lose ourselves like salt in water,” we agreed. “We must join China as one force to another, not as lost individuals. We must bend our energies quickly toward building and preparing the Korean movement for action in future, for Japanese imperialism is moving very fast.”²²⁹ In 1935, in Shanghai, Chang Chirak, Kim Ch’ungch’ang, and other Korean activists in China without the official CCP membership, organized the Korean National Liberation League (*chaoxian minzhu jiefang tongmeng*), which include anarchists and nationalists as well as communists. Whereas acknowledging the importance of Chinese revolutions in the process of liberating Asia from imperial incarceration, the Korean National Liberation League stressed that Koreans should take a leadership in revolutions against Japanese colonialism.

During the interview, Chang discussed mainly two kinds of hardship he underwent in the Chinese Communist party. One was due to his foreigner status, and the other concerned the party’s decision-making process on what kind of tactics and strategies to employ. In 1932, “Many in the party were thinking along the same lines and saw the necessity of changing the local tactics from armed uprising to open democratic struggle for the farmers and workers and intellectuals together. ... The committee said we were rightists and that we were on the road to Trotskysim and from there to Nanking. ... First I was called a Li Li-sanist for no reason, then a rightist, and now a Trotskyist. I said it was time they examined the situation for a change and stopped throwing epithets around indiscriminately. The only one left was to call me a

²²⁹ Nym Wales and Kim San, *Song of Ariran*, 311.

Korean and be finished with it. I privately felt that this one underlay all the others, though I hate to admit it even to myself.”²³⁰ Chang’s account tells us that foreign members in the CCP had to confront the shaky ground between theory and experience, that is, the proletariat internationalism and Chinese nationalism. Second, due to the hierarchical structure, that is one of the chronic problems of a communist party, the CCP was unable to meet popular, urgent, and long-overlooked demands in a timely manner, as to which the imported theory of Leninism had no proper solutions. Despite the participation of foreign communist members from all over the Asia, therefore, the CCP failed to develop any groundbreaking, progressive theories as such on inter-Asian alliances.

Song or Ariran tells us Chang had several literary works published in Chinese literary magazines, the income from which was sometimes the sole financial source that he lived by. Other than writing literary texts, Chang Chirak also translated Japanese socialist books into Chinese. Under the pseudo-name Zhang Beixing, he translated two books, Sano Manabu(C. Zuoye Xue, 1892 –1953)’s *Proletariat and Atheism*²³¹ and Honjō Kasō(C. Benzhuang Kezong)’s *Marxism and Religious Theories*.²³² The titles of Chinese translations are *Atheism, Standpoint on Life of Feuerbach, Marx, and Lenin*²³³ and *Marxism and Religion*, respectively. When Wales met Chang Chirak in Yan’an in 1927, he was working on one novel *Shadows of the While-Clothed People* (*baiyi tongbao yingxiang*), which deals with the life of a Korean

²³⁰ Nym Wales and Kim San, *Song of Ariran*, 282-3.

²³¹ Sano Manabu, *Puroretariāto to mushinron* (Tokyo: Nansō Shoin, 1927).

²³² Honjō Kasō, *Marukusu shugi to shūkyō riron* (Tokyo: Tōhōsha, 1928).

²³³ This rendition was published by Fuhuo Publisher in Beijing in 1932.

exile in Manchuria.²³⁴ Like his first novel, the protagonist of his second novel also was modeled on his best friend and anarchist-turned-to-Marxist, O Sŏng-ryun (C. Wu Chenglun; 1898-1947). Although he completed his second novel except one chapter in summer of 1937, the text is non-extant. Its plot and main idea are, therefore, unknown to us. Zhang told Nym Wales that he also had written a drama before; “I wrote short stories too and now many want me to become a writer. I have written a play in Paoting [Baoding] about religion.”²³⁵ Unfortunately, however, only a few poems and one short novel of his are extant.

Chang’s short novel *Strange Arms (qiguai de wuqi)*, is based on the real anarchist terror occurred in 1922, and his text was published in the magazine *New East (xindongfang)* in 1930. The incident occurred in March 1922 in Shanghai, where three Korean anarchists attempted to assassinate the general of the Japanese imperial army, Tanaka Giichi (C. Tianzhong Yiyi, 1864-1929), who was to arrive at one port in Shanghai. The three anarchists were, Kim Ik-sang (C. Jin Yixiang; 1895-1943), Yi Chong-am (ch: Li Zhongyan; years unknown), and O Sŏng-ryun (C. Wu Chenglun; 1898-1947). O was one of two closest friends of Chang Chirak.²³⁶ Upon their failure of assassination, all of them were arrested. Later O, however, succeeded in escaping a prison by the assistance of Japanese inmates and one Japanese lady. She was a family of one Japanese inmate. In the second half of the novel, Zhang details O’s escaping process with a fictional touch, whereby the cooperative inmate was described as an

²³⁴ Nym Wales and Kim San, *Song of Ariran*, 51.

²³⁵ Nym Wales, *Notes on Korea and the Life of Kim San*, 6.

²³⁶ The other closest friend is Kim Ch’ung-ch’ang, known as Jin Kuiguang to Chinese.

anarchist. When Chang Chirak had this novel published under the pen-name, Yan Guang, he was an ardent Marxist, who had been a leader of the monumental communist revolutions in Guangzhou, Haifeng, and Lufeng from 1927 to 1928. Given his path of the ideological conversion as well as the first-hand experiences in communist uprisings, his choice of the anarchist terror as a literary topic complicates the political and ethical standpoint of the story. Unlike many other anarchist narratives, *Strange Arms* is a Marxist's fictional account of a real anarchist terror.




Figure 3.1 Chang Chirak, “Strange Arms” *Xindongfang* 1(4), 1930.

Strange Arms starts with an imaginative and almost atemporal description of the rise of imperial capitalism in the world. Instead of drawing on historical details, Chang employs a metaphor of a “vicious dragon” to portray atrocities of imperialism

and colonialism. Three Korean youths—Kim, Yi, and O—cross the Chinese border and arrive at Shanghai in order to advance anticolonial movements. While they fail to find specific ways to do it for a while, they organize the Korean anarchist group with more Koreans in Shanghai. It was called *Ŭi'yŏldan* (*yilietuan*). The novel employs a third-person point of view, detailing the characters' thoughts and feelings at the time of its establishment. "When this organization was established, they thought it is indeed the weapon for a national revenge. By training this group with bombing power, they wanted to bomb the entire Japan, and disallow Japan to exist again on earth. We ought to kill all the people who wear Japanese clothes. // Only after then, they will feel less resented, and then they will be able to tell that our revenge succeeds."²³⁷ Here hints at the author's critical stance on blind hatred of the three anarchists. Upon reading the news that Tanaka Giichi is to arrive at Shanghai, the group plans an assassination. On the day of Tanaka's arrival, Kim, Yi, and O set an ambush near the Huangpu River. At the sight of Tanaka, O shoots him. Kim also throws a hand grenade at him, which, however, a British marine immediately kicked away to the river. One American lady, who happens to walk right next to Tanaka, gets shot instead. Tanaka falls down on the street, pretending to be dead. Mistaken that the assassination succeeded, the anarchists retreat, but Japanese soldiers arrest them.

While detained at the Office of International Settlement (*gongbuju*), one Vietnamese guard shows respect to the Korean anarchists for their terrorist acts, and laments the wretched lives of the colonized Vietnamese, deploring that the Vietnamese are unable to fight against the French empire as Korean anarchists do.

²³⁷ Chang Chirak, "Qiguai de wuqi" *Xindongfang* 1(4), 1930: 164.

Although working for the International Settlement, the guard sincerely urges the Koreans to escape there by all means. Later on, Kim and O are transported to different prisons, and O is jailed at the top floor of the Japanese consulate. The top floor is fenced with barbed-wires, at the center of which there is another smaller fenced space. When O arrives there, three Japanese were confined in a larger fence, and O is jailed at the center.

Extremely dismayed to find out the assassination has failed, O hates the whole of Japan even more. In the midst of deep despair and anger, he thought, “At that time, O thought that any Japanese, man or woman, old or young, is evil, and all of them are unforgivable enemies. If he could break out of the prison, he thought he would shoot with a pistol any Japanese that he runs into.”²³⁸ The slightly distanced tone on the utmost detestation of Japanese foreshadows a radical change on this consciousness in the plot. By representing the anarchist aversion as the irrational kind, *Strange Arm* suggests that this blind repulsion, even against innocent masses of the imperial country, is unintendedly homologous with the imperial ‘discord-provoking scheme’ (*lijian zhengce*). One of revolutionary forces that an empire is most alert to is any kind of alliance between the oppressed across national borders. As imperialists precisely aimed, O abhors the entire Japanese, even those who are subjugated and oppressed, which excludes any revolutionary possibility of alliance between the two countries.

After a few days passed in the prison, O realizes that two of the Japanese inmates are anarchists, and especially one of them, whose name is Kato, expresses deep respect to O for his terrorist attack. As they do not have a common language to

²³⁸ Ibid., 169.

communicate, Kato often raises his thumb to O. One day, he listens to some flute tune from the outside, and intuits that the melody signals something to the inmates. It turns out that the playing lady is Kato's sister and the other anarchist's wife, hovering around the consulate.

One day the Japanese lady goes up to the rooftop of the building, across from the consulate, to have a view of the prison. She looks at O and smiles. O was completely disarmed by her gaze and smile. "And that moment, one young lady, wearing kimono and geta, with a white-toned makeup, was looking into his eyes and smiling at him. Although O' head was full of gloom and agony for the whole month, at the sight of this beautiful smile, he was absorbed into a resplendent world, sensing that he would feel dizzy soon."²³⁹ And then she and the Japanese inmate talk to each other. Although O is unable to understand a single word of their conversation, its sounds completely steal his mind. While listening to the sounds, O becomes absent-minded. With the appearance of this Japanese lady, O encounters an entirely new phase of his prison life. She brought a couple of pears for her husband and her brother, but Kato and other Japanese inmates had no idea how to bring them in. O manages to make some tools to do it, and he finds a razor that the lady sent with the pears. He secretly keeps it for himself.

The Japanese consulate encourages inmates to take a "sacred bath" every evening to cleanse a body with sacred water of grace. They are taught that only by doing so can they enter the kingdom of Heaven. O refuses, however, to be tamed by this idea: "God's mercy impress only lazy people. O, who has been strong-minded

²³⁹ Ibid., 173.

since he was born, and who is acutely conscious of his own sins, bathed for a long while. In the end, however, he wanted to turn against the whole idea of a sacred bath.”²⁴⁰ One night when the inmates are taken to this routine bath, he feigns illness, so left alone. Using the razor that O kept to himself, he succeeds in unlocking his cuffs and a shackle.

On the next day, while other inmates take a “sacred bath,” he makes a fake gun with a leather belt, a comb, and a chopstick in order to threaten anyone who would confront him when escaping. When other inmates come back from the sacred bath, he scares them with a razor in one hand and a fake gun in the other. To make them assist him, he lies that hundreds of members of the Korean anarchist group, *Ŭi’yŏldan* (*yilietuan*), surround the consulate, planning to bomb it in case O fails to escape. Since the Japanese are supposed to be imprisoned only for a short period, they prefer to remain, rather than jeopardizing the sentences. One prisoner, who used to be a carpenter, helps O break the fence. When it succeeds and the inmates face outdoor breeze, all of them are tempted to escape. O allows, however, only Kato to escape with him. It should be noted that Chang Chirak creates the fictional anarchist characters who provide O the indispensable help to escape the prison whereas the inmates who helped O had nothing to do with anarchism in reality.

In so doing, *Strange Arms* adapted a real story to a fiction where anarchists of different nationalities cooperate with each other. Given the imperial law of the time, any colonial subject who attempts assassination was sentenced to death. Without Kato’s help, O would have been executed in prison. I think that despite the critical portrayal

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 179.

of anarchists throughout the text, the novel fails to entirely dismiss anarchism as a valid anticolonial strategy for an international alliance.²⁴¹

On the next day, every single newspaper in Shanghai releases O's picture, and the Japanese Police search for him in the Korean district of the French Concession. Thereupon, O decides to leave for Germany. "All the press in Shanghai disclosed not only his picture but also the strange arm that he left in the Japanese consulate prison. Although people knew that what it is, but they could never figure out how it could happen."²⁴² Unsatisfied with his training in Germany, however, O left for Moscow, the "stronghold of the world revolution," to be disciplined in revolutionary thoughts and practices. As Chinese revolution gains an immense momentum in 1926, O felt anxious about not being able to be present there.

He thought that any revolution, Chinese and Korean, is for overthrowing imperialism, and any national movement is a part of the world revolution. // *If you want to be devoted to revolution, you have to partake in movements in any place, in any nation.* // Especially, revolutions of the present time emerge only from the conflict between the oppressor and the oppressed [not that between one nation and another]. A national boundary is merely the legacy from feudal

²⁴¹ During the interviews with Nym Wales, Chang acknowledges the influence of Tolstoy throughout his career. From 1921 to the Guangdong commune in 1927, he always carried in his pocket a Japanese translation of Tolstoy's book, *Wise Thoughts for Every Day: on God, Love, Spirit, and Living a Good Life*, and read it nearly every day. (Its Japanese title is *Reader of Humanity (Rensheng Duben)*.) Chang Chirak says, "I still like Tolstoy, as one loves an old teacher." He explains why he oftentimes contemplated upon Tolstoy's literature and philosophy even after he turned against anarchism. From Chang's perspective, "Tolstoy's characters are always in struggle, never reaching agreement and resolution. Every book he wrote is a study of such dialectical forces. His mind was open and objective, receptive to every fact and change. ... I think he would have turned to revolution had he not died too soon. He was always seeking solutions, but was too honest to create them when the reality around him had not yet demonstrated their validity." Nym Wales and Kim San. *Song of Ariran*, 322.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 185.

societies, it therefore has to be destroyed by all means (my emphasis)²⁴³

O's thought on the world revolution here seems to intimate the communist standpoint on international revolution as the most ideal anticolonial strategy. The stance that defines a revolution only in class terms, not in national terms, also validates the legitimacy of struggles of Koreans who are devoted to Chinese revolutions.

O also recalls, with deep remorse, the years around the Tanaka terror, when he thought he had to kill all the Japanese, including the low class, out of his irrational rage against Japanese imperialism. It reads:

What he ought to do now is to awaken all the subjugated races and classes and organize them as an allied group, and to enact the full-scale attack against the imperial oppressor-class. Only by doing so, we will be able to overthrow each imperialist one by one and to liberate all the oppressed classes. Also, in so doing, all the subjugated races and all the low classes can establish, with no hindrance, a new society grounded upon liberty and equality. Thinking this way flamed his heart with passion for revolution, which was latent in his heart, and it drove him to participate in Chinese revolutions.”²⁴⁴

Although the anti-nationalism as such fails to be the idea of communists own, the way that O imagines the most ideal world revolution centers around the notion of class as well as organized mass movements, as opposed to direct actions in the anarchist sense. This communist vision at O's mind at this stage represents a rather theoretical and ideal vision, not a practical one that is firmly situated within Chinese socio-economic contexts.

²⁴³ Ibid., 186.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 187.

Towards the end of the novel, the narrative distances itself from the communist standpoint as well. The last paragraph of the text concludes the story in a condensed and rather hasty manner. Although O was active in Chinese revolutions, later on, for “puzzling reasons,” he carried a reclusive life at a small, old place in Shanghai. Upon the Japanese army’s endeavor to capture him, O returned to Korea to be involved with revolutionary movements there. The ending intimates that the narrative pursues neither the heroic depiction of a revolutionary nor the apologetic representation of communism.

“For puzzling reasons,” communism as well as anarchism fails to be the ideology of permanent recourse for O. *Strange Arms* ends where O retreated from communist revolutions although the text does not explain the reason why. Also it ends where O returned from China to Korea. The novel was written while the nationalist-communist conflicts significantly undermined Chinese anticolonial momentum. The deep and self-destructive schism between nationalists and communists must have made foreigners rethink, if not dis-believe, on the premise that Chinese revolutions advance and prefigure emancipation of other Asian countries. Likewise, even before Chang Chirak had explicit problems with the party due to his imprisonment records, he seemed to question the assumption that Chinese communist revolutions sought to liberate the oppressed masses in the entire East Asia. It, however, should be noted that Chang Chirak wrote this novel in Chinese for Chinese readers. While splitting from Chinese revolutions in a way that resist a sacrifice of Koreans, Chang still opened up the possibility to critically returning back to a Korea-China relations by addressing this issue to the Chinese audience.

CHAPTER FOUR: Zhang Wojun and New Taiwan Literature

Zhang Wojun, the father of New Taiwan Literature, was one of the colonial Taiwanese artists, who wrote for both Taiwanese and Chinese readers during the colonial era.²⁴⁵ Unlike many Taiwanese writers of the time, he did not receive a higher education in Japan although he had a good command of Japanese. Zhang Wojun was the first generation Taiwanese who studied abroad in China. He was the first Taiwanese who majored in Chinese national studies (*guoxue*). As Qin Xianci's study details, there were forty Taiwanese students who entered colleges in Beijing in the 1920s.²⁴⁶ In 1922, the Taiwanese Youth Group in Beijing (*Beijing Taiwan qingnian hui*) was established.²⁴⁷ The group strived to study Chinese culture and to communicate and encourage each member's academic and political vision.²⁴⁸ While publishing its bulletin *Newsletter (Huibao)*, they worked closely with the artists and activists of the Association for Taiwanese Culture (*Taiwan wenhua xiehui*). When the bulletin was reissued in 1927, after the three-year hiatus due to the Japanese surveillance, Zhang Wojun was its chief editor. In the meanwhile, Zhang participated in the rally in 1924 in Shanghai, held by the Taiwanese Youth Group. They denounced

²⁴⁵ Well-known Taiwanese artists who were active in semicolonial China include Liu Na'ou (1905-40), Jiang Wenye (1910-83), Hong Yangqiu (1899-1980), Qiu Niantai (1894-1967), Zhong Lihe (1915-60), and Zhang Shenqie (1904-65).

²⁴⁶ See Qin Xianci, "Zhang Wojun ji qitongshidai de Beijing Taiwan liuxuesheng" in Peng Xiaoyan, *Piaobo yu xiangtu: Zhang Wojun shishi sishi zhounian jinian lunwenji* (Taipei: Zhongyangyuan, 1996) 66-75.

²⁴⁷ One of its five founding members was Fan Benliang, the most famed Taiwanese anarchist.

²⁴⁸ Eminent Chinese thinkers and writers, such as Cai Yuanpei, Liang Qichao, and Hu Shi, were its honorary members.

the Japanese colonial government's arrest of the Taiwanese in 1923, who participated in the Taiwanese Parliament Establishment Movement.

Zhang Wojun was also an avid translator of Japanese literature and criticism, which significantly benefited lay readers and intellectuals in Republican China. Su's study notes that Zhang translated 19 books and 44 texts that were written in Japanese into vernacular Chinese during the colonial period.²⁴⁹ The 63 translations include naturalist, White Birch (*shirakaba*), and Marxist works. The numbers of rendition of these strands are twelve, five, and four, respectively.²⁵⁰ Translated works also range from aestheticism and realism to new rationalism (C. *xin lizhi pai*) and the New Thoughts group (J. *shin shicho*; C. *xin sichao pai*) although its numbers are a few. Beside literary works, he translated texts on history, anthropology, Chinese classics, archeology, a play script, economics, and contemporary social issues.²⁵¹

While engaging in activism and translation in China, Zhang Wojun published a significant number of articles and creative works in Taiwan in order to introduce the Chinese vernacular literature movement to the Taiwanese public and to establish the New Taiwan Literature movement. As Peng Xiaoyan notes, in the 1920s and 30s, there were heated debates around the reformation of written languages in Taiwan. The absence of an indigenous writing system in Taiwan raised the question of how to invent a modern writing system that can best textualize the spoken Taiwanese. First,

²⁴⁹ Su Shichang, "zuixun yu huigui: Zhang Wojun ji qizuopin yanjiu" MA Thesis. Zhongxing Univ. 1998, 168-176.

²⁵⁰ Yang Hongying ed. *Zhang Wojun Yiwenji, I & II* (Taipei: Haixia Xueshu Chubanshe, 2011).

²⁵¹ Deng Hui-en, *Rizhi shiqi wailai sichao de yijie yanjiu: yi Lai he, Yang Kui, Zhang Wojun wei zhongxin* (Tainan: Tainan shili dushuguan, 2009), 202.

Zhang Wojun suggested that Taiwanese should utilize vernacular Chinese—more precisely, the vernacular of Beijing people—as the new writing system.²⁵² Second, Lai he, Yang Shouyu, Cai Qiu, and Yang Kui argued that a new writing system should be able to mirror the vernacular Taiwanese proper. Finally, “some writers proposed a mixed language system of Chinese, Japanese, and Taiwanese, which directly uses Japanese vocabularies.”²⁵³ The debates led to the controversies of Taiwan’s nativist literature (*xiangtu wenxue*) in the 1930s.

Zhang's sensational essay, “Messy Literary Field in Taiwan,” (1924; *zaogao de Taiwan wenxue jie*), condemns the Taiwanese literati, who upheld the classical Chinese poetry as the only form of literature. Zhang critiqued that the contemporary Taiwanese literature has only poetry works with no novels or dramas. Zhang wrote, “Taiwan’s literary field is just like a mute.”²⁵⁴ When literature becomes voiceless, it is reduced merely to a tool for passing time. Until the emergence of modern national literature, Classical Chinese poetry was the standard literary norm that Japanese and Korean intellectuals should be versed in. In this sense, Classical Chinese poetry was the lingua franca for medieval and premodern East Asian intellectuals. Japanese colonizers, however, appropriated the intra-East Asian literary tradition as a means to be rooted and immersed into a Taiwanese society. Via classical poems, first, Taiwanese and Japanese were able to communicate with each other without

²⁵² See Kawahara Isao, *Taiwan Xin Wenxue Yundong de Zhankai: yu Riben Wenxue de Jiedian*, trans. Mo Suwei (Taibei: Yanwen Chubun, 2004) 115-154; Chen Fangming, *Taiwan Xin Wenxue Shi I* (Taibei: Lianjing Chubun, 2011) 71-76; Faye Yuan Kleeman, *Under an Imperial Sun* (Honolulu: Hawai‘i Press, 2003) 150-154.

²⁵³ Peng Xiaoyan, *Piaobo yu xiangtu: Zhang Wojun shishi sishi zhounian jinian lunwenji* (Taibei: Zhongyangyuan, 1996) 182.

²⁵⁴ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanjì*, 6.

translation. Second, one can fully understand meanings of classical poetry only within complicated systems of allusion, and therefore enjoying classical poems were elitist and exclusive in its nature. The Government-General Office regularly invited Taiwanese writers with classical literature backgrounds and awarded those collaborative literati. In so doing, the colonial government reinforced the practice of writing old poetry that was drained of critical political implications. By privileging the shared literary tradition, therefore, the policy of promoting classical poetry obscured the unequal power structures in the political, economic, and cultural terrain. Zhang Wojun critiqued those literati of the old literature who willingly relied on the social status and the financial support that the colonial government granted them.

In “Appeal for alliance in order to expel the collapsed and outdated shrine overgrown with weeds” (1924), Zhang wrote, “Taiwanese literature is a branch or a tributary of Chinese literature.”²⁵⁵ After the colonial government enforced the integration policy, it disallowed Chinese books to be circulated in Taiwan. Resisting the colonial endeavor of severing Taiwan’s tie to China, in *Taiwan People’s News*, Zhang delineated Hu Shi’s “Eight Do-Nots” for literary revolutions, which was in line with the Chinese vernacular literature movement. In the same newspaper, on March 1, 1925, Zhang published, “Must-Read Books for Study of New Literature.” He categorized it into eleven sections: literary history, literary theory, art theory, art history, aesthetics, grammar, new poetry, short novels, long novels, translation, and journals. The titles of eight short novels on the list are: *Shout*, *Depravity*, *Autumn of the Lake Turtle*, *Manluo Collection*, *Super human*, *[Short] Novel Collection*, *Fire*, and

²⁵⁵ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun QuANJI*, 15.

Gap. The Shanghai Taidong Books published the first four and the Shanghai Commercial Print (*Shanghai shangwu yinshuguan*) published the latter four.

In another article on August 26, 1925, “Significance of the New Literature Movement,” Zhang continued to argue for establishing a New Taiwan Literature. He wrote that there were two key points of the literary movement: to establish a vernacular literary tradition and reform the Taiwanese language. Here Zhang discussed the skeptical view that questioned the possibility of New Literature in Taiwan, and refuted it:

“We [Taiwanese] cannot speak [vernacular] Chinese. Then how could we even write a poem in Chinese? If classical Chinese is not good for current Taiwan, why don’t we discard the vernacular Chinese and the mixed style [of the classical and the vernacular]?” Although this could sound reasonable, we need to rethink this question. Is it ultimately impossible for a person who cannot speak Chinese to write a Chinese poetry? It is not! It is not! This is simply an unnecessary concern!²⁵⁶

By the time Zhang wrote this article in the mid-1920s, Japanese was the first language for most Taiwanese intellectuals. If the Taiwanese intended to pursue their studies or partake in political and cultural movements in China, they had to take vernacular-language courses in China. By the 1920s and 30s, Taiwanese used either the Taiwanese or Japanese for a verbal communication, and the primary written language was Japanese. Hence Taiwanese were unfamiliar to the Chinese-language, both classical and vernacular. Zhang, however, made a radical argument that Taiwanese should write a new literature even without verbal fluency in the vernacular Chinese.

²⁵⁶ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 53.

He comments that Chinese-language literature by Taiwanese writers would be different from that by Chinese. Zhang contends that the difference between them should not hinder Taiwanese from writing in the Chinese-language.

In the 1920s and 30s, there were three main types of literary discourses that conceptualized Taiwanese literature in terms of its relation to a foreign literature. These discourses defined Taiwanese literature, first, as a tributary of Chinese literature—to which Zhang’s criticism belongs—, second, as a part of stateless proletariat literature, and finally as a variant of Japanese literature, or literally “exterior literature” (*waidi wenxue*). The last vantage point reflects the imperialist view, which demarcates Japan as the center and Taiwan as a periphery in a way that privileges differences in experiences and sensibilities between Japanese and non-Japanese. Japanese Marxists, however, demanded the second stance from Taiwanese writers. As Peng points out, Japanese leftists critiqued any nationalist, conservative, and pro-bourgeoisie propensities in Taiwan’s literary practices of the colonial era. Japanese Marxist writers sought to imbue the Taiwanese with the class-consciousness of the proletariat, and their paramount goal was to eradicate nationalism in Taiwan literature. They condemned Taiwan’s exclusive nationalism as excessively narcissistic and subjective, and paradoxically aimed to assist the Taiwanese to firmly establish the unique tradition of Taiwanese art. The unique Taiwanese art, however, “neither excludes foreignness nor represents self-righteousness. What we [Marxists] pursue is to present literary art that is very close to masses, and to encourage them to respond to

and critique artists.”²⁵⁷

Liao’s studies on colonial Taiwanese literature and culture provide crucial insights on how to understand the colonial history and culture beyond the dichotomy between the oppressor and the oppressed, and beyond the schematic frameworks of resistance, collaboration, and acquiescence. His studies excavate the historical examples of Taiwanese and Japanese artists, which unsettle homogeneous pictures of the colonizer and the colonized. By differentiating these categories, Liao reveals how the colonizer unwittingly benefited the colonized, and how the colonized not only exploited self-rupturing moments of the empire, but also suggested an alternative modernity for Taiwan that was modeled neither upon Chinese nor upon Japanese.

In “Print culture and the emergent public sphere in colonial Taiwan, 1894-1945,” Liao pinpoints the deconstructive moment of the imperial newspaper *Taiwan Daily News* (*Taiwan nichinichi shinpo*). This paper was printed in Taiwan and circulated in Japan and Taiwan, ostensibly to represent the imperialist voice. By drawing on Lacan’s concept of anamorphosis, Liao demonstrates that the *Taiwan Daily* deconstructed the empire’s discursive project in two ways. Firstly, the *Taiwan Daily* reported on the schism between Tokyo imperialists and Kyoto radicals within the Japanese empire. The two groups were keenly opposed to each other on many political issues, including the occupation of Taiwan, which was a financial burden for Japan in the early period of colonization. Moreover, Japanese officials in Taiwan had competitors and opponents in Japan, who constantly questioned and tested the political

²⁵⁷ Peng Xiaoyan, *Piaobo yu xiangtu: Zhang Wojun shishi sishi zhounian jinian lunwenji* (Taipei: Zhongyangyuan, 1996) 174.

competencies of statesmen in the colony. *Taiwan Daily*'s articles of the inner political conflicts of the empire, therefore, exposed the "inside-out structure of the gaze" of the colonizer on the public media, which the colonized Taiwanese consumed every day.

Furthermore, the *Taiwan Daily*'s political cartoons and columns highly satirized and harshly critiqued corruption of the colonial regime. Instead of parroting the imperialist ideology and disseminating the colonial spirit, therefore, "the transnational or transcolonial character of the news media thus brought about anamorphic visions of seeing colonizers seeing themselves and of envisioning the colonized seeing their "masters" exposed by their colleagues from afar."²⁵⁸ Where some previous studies impose a binary relationship between the *Taiwan Daily* of the colonial government and the *Taiwan People's News* of the colonized, Liao's analysis highly complicates the schematic picture.

Liao further argues that *Taiwan Daily*'s international news on a wide range of topics and regions unintentionally induced the modernization process by providing the Taiwanese with a cosmopolitan knowledge of the modern world. Even before the establishment of the counter-colonial *Taiwan People's News* in 1923, he argues that since 1896 the *Taiwan Daily* had prompted Taiwan's modernization process with its "transnational, anamorphic, and cosmopolitan (albeit discrepant or uneven) character."²⁵⁹

In "Travel in Early-Twentieth-Century Asia: On Wu Zhuoliu's 'Nanking Journals' and His Notion of Taiwan's Alternative Modernity," Liao investigates the

²⁵⁸ Liao Ping-hui, "Print Culture and the Emergent Public Sphere" in Liao Ping-hui and David Der-wei Wang Ed. *Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule 1895-1945* (NY: Columbia UP, 2006)

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 93.

Taiwanese journalist and writer, Wu Zhuoliu's travelogue of China which recounts his experience of Nanjing from 1941 to 1942. By comparing Wu's text with two contemporary Japanese intellectuals' travelogues—Akutagawa's and Yokomitsu's—, Liao highlights Wu's unique stance, which was neither the imperialist condescending view of China nor the sinocentric standpoint of China. Witnessing the naked truth of everyday lives of Chinese made Wu feel “both repulsed and attracted.” On one hand, Wu was dismayed by the backwardness of China in almost every aspect of their lives. On the other hand, however, he discerned “the unfathomable vitality of the nation in dismal reality”²⁶⁰ Although contemporary China was behind in the modernization process, Wu was astonished by “its ability to sustain all historical changes while still maintaining its integrity.”²⁶¹ In this sense, Wu's travels to China and his firsthand experiences in his “fatherland” awakened him to the realization of the in-between status of Taiwan with loss of the sense of national belonging. Critiquing Said and Clifford, Liao argues that narrative identities are both formed and unformed through travel narrative in a way that disrupts the cosmopolitan myths of modern empires. Wu's travelogue, therefore, exemplifies the emergence of an ethnically centrifugal consciousness, which refuses to belong to neither of the great powers while recognizing the profound legacies and autonomy of Chinese tradition and the socio-economic power of the Japanese empire.

On the one hand, Zhang Wojun is similar to Wu Zhuoliu in that Zhang

²⁶⁰ Ping-hui Liao, “Travel in Early-Twentieth-Century Asia: On Wu Zhuoliu's 'Nanking Journals' and His Notion of Taiwan's Alternative Modernity” in David Wang and Carlos Rojas Ed. *Writing Taiwan* (Durham: Duke UP, 2007) 289.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.* 296.

distanced colonial Taiwan from both of imperial Japan and semicolonial China, cautioning the contemporary Taiwanese not to be exploited by either Japan or China. On the other hand, I argue, Zhang tenaciously upheld the idea of a harmonious intra-East Asian community, especially in the literary and aesthetic level, whereas Wu developed Taiwan's orphan consciousness.²⁶² In the rest of the chapter, I situate Zhang Wojun's works in the context of the 1920s' reformation debates of the Japanese empire with an emphasis on Yoshino Sakuzō's theory. Against the backdrop of the neocolonial discourses, I, first, investigate Zhang's criticism, and then examine three short novels, published between 1926 and 1929. My analysis of *The Tragic Story of Mrs. Bai* draws on both the 1927 and 1929 editions, published in Taipei and Shanghai, respectively. *The Complete Works of Zhang Wojun*, published in 2002 in Taipei, omitted the 1929 edition in the volume, and previous studies discussed *The Tragic Story of Mrs. Bai* based only on the 1927 edition. This chapter, therefore, is the first study that excavates the 1929 Shanghai edition. In order to examine critical and radical qualities of Zhang's works, I draw on Nishikawa Nagao, Yonetani Masafumi, and Gayatri Spivak.

1. Reformation of Empire: Toward the Multi-Cultural Empire

As I detailed in the Introduction, after the outbreaks of the Korean March First Movement and the Chinese May Fourth Movement in 1919, Japanese intellectuals and politicians, such as Ishibashi Tanzan, Yoshino Sakuzō, and Yanaihara Tadao suggested that the Japanese empire should undertake reformation in order to tackle anticolonial movements across East Asia. From 1919 onwards, Japanese politicians

²⁶² Ibid. 298.

critiqued the existing governing system of the Japanese empire, which colluded with collaborators of its colonies—warlords in China, bureaucrats in Korea and Taiwan, and capitalists in all three states—while oppressing resistance against colonizers. The reformists, however, stressed that the empire should invent ways to convert the pro-independence Koreans and Taiwanese to national self-determinism, instead of quelling their resistance. In order to convince the colonized to abandon the principle of independence, for example, Yoshino argues that the empire of Japan also should reform itself forgoing some of its imperial privileges in the colonies. Yoshino envisioned a “liberal empire” that realizes “universal justice,” where multi-ethnic groups in the Japanese empire build symbiotic relationships, based upon their own distinctive cultures. As Yonetani Masafumi notes, Yoshino’s new liberal project proposed a “multicultural empire.”²⁶³ When Taiwanese students in Tokyo—Cai Peihuo, Lin Chenglu, Huang Chengcong, and etc.—published *Taiwan Youth* in September 1920 in order to instigate the Taiwan’s cultural movement, Yoshino wrote a congratulatory message in its first issue. It reads: “The basis of every cooperation is [cultural] independence. Cooperation without [cultural] independence is blind obedience and subjugation. We, Japanese people, do not want the existence of those submissive nationals [within our empire]. Before Taiwanese, as Japanese nationals, cooperate with Japan in legal terms, we first demand that Taiwanese become culturally independent nationals.”²⁶⁴ Yoshino’s theory of the multicultural empire shows one way that Japanese scholars dealt with the resistance against the colonial assimilation

²⁶³ Yonetani Masafumi, *Asia/Nihon* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006) 93-97.

²⁶⁴ Yoshino Sakuzō, *Selected Works of Yoshino Sakuzō. Vol. 9*. Quoted in *Asia/Nihon*, 94.

policy, and how the imperialist policy moved toward its second phase of the integration policy.

Tracking the historical context where the imperial multiculturalism and cultural movements of the colonized emerged, Yonetani points out the close association between the notion of culture and national ideology. In respect to the political origin of the concept of culture, Nishikawa Nagao provides more detailed accounts. It was not until the eighteenth-century that the words of civilization and culture as the binary terms, were widely used.²⁶⁵ Upon the rise of modern nation-states, however, the two terms began to denote values of the new classes of the modern capitalist Europe. Britain and France, which embarked early on the process of modernization and colonization, foregrounded the notion of civilization. Germany, Poland, and Russia, which later joined the world competition of colonization, championed the idea of culture instead as the defensive and self-assertive strategy vis-à-vis Britain and France. Whereas the idea of civilization centered on the ideas of universality and progress, that of culture was grounded upon those of specificity and tradition. Stefan Tanaka has demonstrated that Meiji intellectuals also privileged difference and tradition in order to claim an independence from a Western universal.²⁶⁶ Nishikawa also notes, “the central value of the Japanese society shifted from civilization to culture during the second decade of the Meiji period.”²⁶⁷ In this

²⁶⁵ In 1757, Marquis de Mirabeau, French aristocrat and scholar, used the word civilization for the first time in a noun form. Although the term of culture has existed since the medieval era, then it was used only in agriculture-related contexts.

²⁶⁶ See Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History*, 107-114.

²⁶⁷ Nishikawa Nagao, *Chikyu Jidai no Minzoku=Bunka Riron: Datsu 'Minzoku Bunka' no tameni* (Tokyo: Shin'yōsha, 1995), 201.

context, Nishikawa accentuates the fundamentally ideological and nationalist nature of cultural practices and (multi-) culturalism during the entire colonial era. He pinpoints the limits of cultural critique, “since the concept of ‘culture’ was identical to that of a ‘national’ (C. *minzu*; J. *minzoku*) or ‘national polity’ (C. *guoti*; J. *kokutai*), they [liberal democrats and socialists] could not resist their ‘nation’ by the means of ‘culture.’”²⁶⁸

In the same vein, Harumi Befu also has argued that any cultural theory, including cultural theories of Japan, has an ethnocentric character.²⁶⁹

Yoshino’s theory of the multicultural empire was neither adopted by the government nor developed in more practical forms. It reveals that the practice of articulating Taiwanese or Korean culture in the 1920s imitated the nationalist path that Meiji Japan took against the West in the late twentieth century. On the one hand, the concept of the multicultural empire discloses the limits of cultural politics, especially during the Japanese colonial period. As Nishikawa argued, despite different forms and logics of culture, a limited set of concepts defines our notion of culture; such as, “purity (or its opposite, hybrid), tradition (that is to say, something old), depth (past; J. *shinsou*), uniqueness (usually national traits), originality (contempt for imitation), harmony, unity, identity, and the like.”²⁷⁰ As long as we think of culture with these terms, any cultural practices operate within the logics of ideological empire apparatuses. On the other hand, as Sakaguchi Ango’s works show, cultural practices had ambivalent qualities even during the colonial era. Sakaguchi Ango, an iconoclastic

²⁶⁸ Ibid, 178.

²⁶⁹ See Harumi Befu, *Ideorogī toshite no Nihon bunkaron* (Tokyo : Shisō no Kagakusha, 1987).

²⁷⁰ Nishikawa Nagao, *Chikyu Jidai no Minzoku=Bunka Riron*, 119-120.

writer who fiercely condemned the ethnocentric ideology of imperial Japan, foregrounded the idea of culture as the ability of constant reconfiguration across national borders.²⁷¹ In this context, I discuss how Zhang Wojun's literature and criticism provide an alternative literary practice that deconstructed and reinscribed the imperialist logic of culture.

2. Criticism

Zhang wrote the political article, "Anti-Japanese Policy in Southern China," in Japanese. It was published in the Tokyo-based magazine *Taiwan* in 1923. The primary purpose of the article is to set forth that the Japanese empire took advantage of Taiwanese for the colonial invasion of China. In the beginning of the article, Zhang traces the modern history of conflict between Japan and China. When China lost the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), China signed the Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895, which stipulated that the Qing Dynasty cede Taiwan to Japan, and that the Fujian province was subjugated to the 'Great Japan's Sphere.' In 1915, furthermore, the Japanese empire imposed the Twenty-One Demands on Yuan Shikai's weak government. The demands, however, brought about fierce resistance from Chinese in Fujian, where the population of Taiwanese was highest due to the proximity of Taiwan.

In order to suppress the Chinese opposition, the Japanese used Taiwanese in Fujian, especially who collaborated with the Japanese empire. Publicly, the Japanese government blamed a group of Taiwanese in Fujian for participating in Chinese anti-

²⁷¹ Sakaguchi Ango the term *bunka benyou* (C. *wenhua bianrong*), which is usually translated as acculturation. I, however, the term "acculturation" fails to highlight the core idea of Sakaguchi Ango's cultural politics.

Japanese activities. The Japanese consulate, on the other hand, provoked Taiwanese to cause trouble with the Chinese by means of violence. The colonial government in Taiwan transported Taiwanese criminals to Fujian using them to incite hostility between Chinese and Taiwan. This Discord-Provoking Policy (*lijian zhengce*) was so successful that the Chinese in Fujian became highly antagonistic and inimical to Taiwanese in China. Zhang Wojun deplored the prevailing anti-Taiwanese sentiments in contemporary China. The city of Xiamen suffered the most from exported Taiwanese criminals, who were both controlled and protected by the Japanese empire. The number of Taiwanese inhabitants in Xiamen exceeded seven thousand in 1923. Although the Taiwanese included salaried workers, teachers, and a small number of legal merchants, the majority of them made a living out of gambling, drug-dealing, prostitution, and other unlawful means.

Zhang Wojun illustrated that some of the Taiwanese even formed gangs, armed with guns and knives, committed robberies, and threatened innocent citizens. Accordingly, Chinese came to think of Taiwanese as such a harmful group of people, and they refused to interact with any Taiwanese, even with those of decent jobs and no criminal intention. Despite Chinese accusation of Taiwanese' crimes, Japanese authorities refused to arrest them by invoking the extraterritoriality of Japanese subjects. In so doing, Japanese and cooperative Taiwanese in Fujian disrupted the Chinese legal orders. As the anti-Taiwanese sentiment among Chinese escalated, the bloodshed incident broke out in Fuzhou in 1922. Due to the incident, Taiwanese also perceived Chinese as their enemy. As the Japanese "Disguise Policy" (*bianxiang*

zengce) and the “Obscurantist Policy” (*yu 'nong zengce*) succeeded in southern China, Zhang argues, the momentum of anti-Japanese movement was undercut since then.

Although the Taiwanese Association in Japan argued that Taiwanese should be united with Chinese and wage an armed struggle against the Japanese empire, Zhang Wojun disagreed. Zhang argues that Taiwanese ought not to be exploited by either Japanese or Chinese. He further demanded that the modernization policy should replace the colonial obscurantist policy; and the non-violence policy the violence policy. Ultimately Zhang sought a Sino-Japanese rapprochement (*rihua qinshan*), which Taiwanese in China should instigate and develop in economic and cultural terrains. Zhang argued that the pursuit of a Sino-Japanese reconciliation would bring a peaceful phase to the anti-Japanese movement in China. Even though Zhang vehemently accused Japanese colonizers of inciting Taiwanese to violence, he remained faithful to the principle of a Sino-Japanese *détente*.

In 1930's article, “From Revolutionary to Proletariat Literature,” Zhang wrote that there was no doubt that creating ‘revolutionary literature’ (*geming wenxue*) was the most crucial issue for contemporary Chinese writers. There were immense demands on a genre of literature that specifically described, reflected, and diagnosed past and current revolutions because numerous revolutions broke out in Republican China. By the time he wrote this piece, seven to eight years had passed already since literature on revolution became the prevailing issue in literary criticism. Zhang, however, argued that revolutionary literature functioned as an umbrella term with neither a clear denotation nor a definite direction pursuit. As long as a writer claimed his work as a revolutionary literature, despite its counter-revolutionary content, the

text received an enthusiastic response from the literary circle and lay readers.

Likewise, if an author failed to identify his work as a revolutionary literature, despite its apparently revolutionary content, critics and writers would refute it. Zhang further contended that he saw this kind of oddity not only in the literary circles, but also in the political, social, and other realms in contemporary China.

Zhang Wojun, therefore, called into question the definition of revolutionary literature. He wrote that the early nineteenth century's romanticism and the late nineteenth century's naturalism in Europe were all revolutionary literatures. He commented that Romantic literature was especially revolutionary. In China, Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi established the basis of Chinese revolutionary literature. In the 1920s, critical debates have focused on inventing new literary forms, rather than elaborating and reassessing the meaning of revolutionary ideas in literary art. Zhang stressed, “the core of revolutionary literature, however, lies in contents or philosophy of works.”²⁷² In a broad sense, revolutionary literature refers to any texts that challenge outmoded ideas, ideological state apparatuses, and all kinds of oppressive conventions.

While undergoing a series of revolutions and wars in the 1920s and 30s, critics and intellectuals began to demand a unifying ground for revolutionary literature. At the same time, in association with fervor in proletariat activism, the proletariat literature movement rapidly arose. “People came to think that only proletariat literature is the true revolutionary literature. This is certainly a progress of the literary

²⁷² Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 140.

field.”²⁷³ Whereas acknowledging social merits of associating revolutionary literature with proletariat literature, Zhang not only problematized this stance, but also suggested that not to use the term “revolutionary literature” should be the best to avert its vagueness. He argued that vulgar proletarian art delimited the genre simply as the literature that reflected lives of the oppressed and the poor. “The heart of proletariat literature lies, not in the labor class’s lives, but in psychology of characters that should be told through the proletariat’s positions.”²⁷⁴ In order to do so, first, a laborer himself could recount his story. Second, a writer from the intellectual class could narrate a story on behalf of the proletariat. Third, an activist, who is actually involved in social revolutions, could write literary texts in order to propagate revolutionary ideas and to urge masses to participate in revolutions. Besides these main methods, there could be other ways of portraying the psychology of the oppressed. Zhang discusses two main positions on the class-consciousness within the proletariat literature debates; one is the natural origination and the other is the purpose consciousness. Tackling this issue, Zhang disputes Aono Suekichi’s (1890-1961), a Japanese Marxist and literary critic. Aono writes:

Political and economic struggle of the proletariat rapidly grows along with radicalization of class struggle. Radicalization necessarily entails consciousness-raising and structuration of class struggle. Entering this stage, the proletariat became clearly conscious of the purpose of liberation of the proletariat. Toward the completion of the purpose of its class struggle, the proletariat intensively strives in political, economic, and structural realms. Proletariat art grows out of this [class] struggle... Hence proletariat art makes a progressive

²⁷³ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 140.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.* 142.

movement to the art built upon the consciousness to achieve the proletariat's goal.²⁷⁵

Zhang critiques Aono as his vantage point reduces literature as a secondary tool for propagandizing “ultimate” political goals.

Diametrically opposed to this, the stance of art for art's sake endorses pure art that is independent of a political orientation. In order to rethink this issue, Zhang introduces Hirabayashi Hatsunosuke's (1892-1931)—Japanese Marxist writer and activist—literary criticism. Hirabayashi writes that if literature is socialist, it is neither bad nor good for literature proper. Excellence of literature is entirely irrelevant to necessity of political struggle. The fact that socialist literature has never produced a masterpiece, like that of Zola or Tolstoy, is the *raison d'être* of socialist literature. Hirabayashi contends that the absence of masterworks by Marxist writers never undercuts the status of socialist literature.

While refuting the thesis that the function of literature is to imbue the proletariat with class-consciousness, Hirabayashi accentuates the historicity and class specificity of literary texts. He explicates any kind of ideology or social thoughts—such as nationalism, Marxism, and anarchism—are based upon material conditions of texts. Whether it is literary socialism or purism, he argues, historically specific social conditions precede texts. In conclusion, Zhang Wojun writes that Hirabayashi resolved the difficult issue of the relationship between politics and literature. Within this context, he critiques neither socialist art nor literary purism as such. What is at stake is less to tackle the antithetical relationship between political and nonpolitical

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

arts, than to overcome the weakness of socialist writers and critics through studies of literature and philosophy. After all, to create a masterpiece that holistically reflects its age is the most urgent task for writers of any ideological camp.

In his 1943 article, “Reappraisal of Japanese Culture,” Zhang critiques the Chinese stance vis-à-vis the Japanese culture. Zhang points out that the Chinese people are indifferent toward Japanese culture. He argues that this is due to three reasons. First is the problem of Chinese students who study abroad in Japan. They take this chance merely as a means to become a high-status bureaucrat in China and, more importantly, to accumulate wealth, using the status. Second is the political antagonism between China and Japan, which interrupts unbiased understanding of each other and academic research of Japanese culture. Third is the Chinese condescension of Japanese culture. The contemporary Chinese presume that all of pre-modern Japanese culture came from China, and that modern Japanese culture is merely an imitation of Euro-American culture. Hence knowing the Euro-American culture is enough to understand modern Japanese culture. The case of lay Chinese is even worse because they are simply ignorant of Japanese culture.

Zhang argues that Japan had its unique culture before it was influenced by Chinese tradition and culture. He stressed, “Moreover, Japanese formation of ethnic groups, its geographic condition, and its historical tradition are all different from ours.”²⁷⁶ By taking this stance, the contemporary Chinese can not only understand Japanese culture but also better fathom China’s own culture. Zhang suggested that Chinese should learn especially how Japanese intellectuals and artists appropriated

²⁷⁶ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 199.

Euro-American cultures in a way that benefited Japanese material civilization. It was the Japanese feat, Zhang remarked, that Japan employed and exploited advanced material culture, which used to belong exclusively to the West. Furthermore, Zhang pinpoints the fundamental problem as sinocentrism—in his own word, “self-aggrandizement (*zida*)”²⁷⁷—not only against Japan but also against the entire world. Contemporary Chinese assumed that all other foreign cultures already existed in ancient China, and therefore there was nothing new, or extraordinary, or special to other cultures. Refuting this position, Zhang emphasized that Japanese culture was unique and unparalleled. The Japanese culture, furthermore, sustained parts of Chinese tradition, which were perished in the past Chinese history. Tracing the overlapping yet independent trajectories of the two cultures, he ultimately underscored the brotherhood, not a hierarchy, between Japan and China in every aspect of their lives.

3. Short Novels

Zhang’s second short novel *Tragic Story of Mrs. Bai* first appeared in *Taiwan People’s News* (*Taiwan Minbao*), serialized from February to May in 1927. The entire novel reappeared in the Shanghai-based magazine *Lady’s Magazine* (*funü zazhi*) in 1929. Whereas the 1927 edition consists of ten chapters, the 1929 version has nine chapters. The use of the Chinese-vernacular in the 1929 edition is more sophisticated than that in the 1927’s. Also, despite the same plot, Zhang Wojun significantly supplemented details of characters in terms of their personalities and past backgrounds. For example, in the 1927 edition, the narrator writes that she met Mrs. Bai only once, and she is neither her relative nor a friend. The narrator, however,

²⁷⁷ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 201.

constantly thinks about the tragic life of Mrs. Bai, and laments her life and death. Although she feels odd about feeling so much sympathy for someone she barely knows, she cannot help it. She thinks that recounting the entire life story of Mrs. Bai is the only way to relieve her grief at Mrs. Bai's tragic death. The 1929 edition, however, adds more detail to the narrator's motive for telling Mrs. Bai's story, which is the narrator's sense of guilt for not comforting Mrs. Bai enough before she died. Likewise, the Shanghai edition supplements more contexts that support the plausibility of the storyline. More crucially, the ordering of events in Shanghai edition differs from Taiwan's. There are no records, however, which could prove why Zhang revised the Taiwanese edition, and whether Zhang had assistance from a native Chinese for the revision. *The Complete Works of Zhang Wojun*, published in Taiwan in 2002, includes only the 1927

edition.²⁷⁸



Figure 4.1 *Lady's Magazine (Funü Zazhi)* June 1929

²⁷⁸ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji* [Complete Works of Zhang Wojun] (Taipei: Renjian Chubanshe, 2002)




Figure 4.2 *Tragic Story of Mrs. Bai* in *Lady's Magazine*

In the Shanghai edition, the third chapter starts by explaining that 1918 was Mr. Bai Rushui's sixth year in Tokyo. That year he returned to China with a bachelor degree and also a nineteen-year-old wife, whose Japanese name is Suiden Kako (C. Shuitian Huazi). Before their marriage, Mr. and Mrs. Bai dated for one year after a few months of acquaintance. Mr. Bai is from Sichuan, and he is more than ten years older than Mrs. Bai. The novel describes him as a spirited and promising man. It writes, however, that he has a sly and sinister aura. Mr. Bai has a dark skin and his teeth are not pretty. People thought it is odd that a man with such appearance was able to date and

even marry a "woman who is like a fresh flower."²⁷⁹ From the third chapter, the Shanghai edition takes a different point of view from the Taiwanese; the former is an omniscient point of view, and latter an observer's. In the Taiwanese edition, the narrator meets Mrs. Bai only once, and therefore she draws on Mrs. Bai's journal to tell her life story. The Shanghai edition, however, describes inner thoughts and feelings of the main characters as well as those of the people around them.

In 1918, Mr. and Mrs. Bai leave Tokyo, and go directly to Beijing without visiting Mr. Bai's hometown. It is partly because Mrs. Bai wants it that way and his friend has helped him to get a job in Beijing, but mainly because he dares not. The text does not clarify the specific reason here. Although the couple does not live a luxurious life, Mr. Bai's income—about two hundred *yuan* a month—is enough for them to enjoy a pleasant life. When a season changes, Mr. Bai buys new clothes and accessories for Mrs. Bai, which satisfies her enough. Within a half year after their arrival at Beijing, Mrs. Bai has visited all the famous historical sites in the city. The couple frequently goes to see operas and movies, and walk around parks in Beijing. For the first three years, they have such a happy marriage life. Mrs. Bai thinks that to be loved and cared by a man is the supreme happiness that a woman can ever have. Due to the omniscient point of view, the text directly describes Mrs. Bai's feeling and thought, instead of having readers imagine them. In this sense, the direct representation of the character's psychology makes crucial differences between the two editions.

²⁷⁹ Zhang Wojun, "Bai taitai de aishi" *Funu Zazhi* (1929, Jun): 15.

The landlady of their house, a new character in the Shanghai edition, very much covets Mrs. Bai's happy marriage life. One day, she says to Mrs. Bai, "Mr. Bai treats you genuinely very well!"²⁸⁰ And Mrs. Bai replies that Mr. Bai was even better in Tokyo. Back in Japan, Mr. Bai did whatever Mrs. Bai wished to do. Moreover, he bought a watch and a ring for her, and took her to watch expensive performances a couple of times. Mrs. Bai tells the landlady that those kinds of examples are innumerable. Mrs. Bai could feel his sincerity from all of the nice gifts and his attitudes, so she agreed to marry him. This insinuates Mrs. Bai's simple, innocent, and naïve character. The landlady becomes more envious of Mrs. Bai as she knows that it is not the kind of life she could have.

In the Taiwanese edition, however, Mrs. Bai's journal was the only source the narrator—I—draws on in order to recount her life. By the time the narrator looks at Mrs. Bai's journal, more than ten years have passed since she wrote it in Tokyo. The journal entry reads that she did not give Mr. Bai a definite answer yet about being engaged to him because a marriage is such a crucial matter that should be very carefully considered. She thinks that the clothes, the watch, and the ring with a ruby that he bought for her, as well as all the movies and good restaurants he took her are the proofs that he loves her. Based upon his attitudes, she has no doubts that he will love her even more after a marriage. Another entry of the journal reads that she feels very lonely because she has neither parents nor any family member of her own. Whenever she sees lovers being together, she cannot envy them enough. Due to the utter loneliness, she often sheds tears, and she thinks that a solitary life is meaningless.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 16.

Although she came to Tokyo to study and to find a job, she thinks to marry him. So she decides to be Mr. Bai's wife.

There is one critical reason though for her to be hesitant to give him a definite answer. His friends told her that Mr. Bai always used deceitful (*yinyou*) means even to his friends in order to gain what he wanted, and that he was extremely licentious. Moreover, she is told that Mr. Bai has his own child back in his hometown, who is already ten years old. When Suiden brings up these issues to Mr. Bai, he says that those are all lies that his friends made up out of jealousy. He even swears that if those are true, he will be hit by thunderbolts, and that the heaven will punish him. She thinks that an educated man must not curse himself unless he tells a truth. Hence she believes in Mr. Bai's words instead of his friend's. When she tells him her decision, he is utterly exhilarated. The following fourth chapter in the Taiwanese edition briefly describes that the couple lead a happy life in Beijing. Three years later, however, Mrs. Bai's tragic life begins. Chapters Three and Four in the Taiwanese edition were combined to Chapter Three in the Shanghai edition.

Chapter Five of the Taiwanese edition and Chapter Four of the Shanghai edition are almost same except a few differences. It tells the beginning of Mrs. Bai's tragedy. The narrator explains that there are three things that Chinese governmental officials could not do without; they go to brothels, gamble, and drink plenty of alcohol. Without doing these three, public officials have no ways to establish connections with important political figures and to survive the competition of other officials in the 1920s Beijing. Due to Mr. Bai's own interest in those three, and also due to his social status as a government official, he unwittingly becomes immersed in

the indecent entertaining culture of Beijing bureaucrats. After three years in Beijing, Mr. Bai's income and political power significantly increased. As his income increased, so did his visits to brothels; he also became more distant from Mrs. Bai.

In the beginning, Mr. Bai secretly went to red-light districts, but later on he did not hide it from Mrs. Bai. His cold attitude towards her makes her incensed. She recalls Mr. Bai's pledge of love in Tokyo as well as such a warm care for her in the past, she often begs him not to be changed. Although time and again she entreats him not to go to brothels, realizing he does not listen to her, now she curses him. They frequently fight. What starts as a bitter argument usually ends up with Mr. Bai battering her. The novel writes, "Japanese ladies are the most submissive women. Mrs. Bai endured being insulted and cudgelled, yet she still did not tell it to anyone. Actually, she barely has friends in Beijing who she could tell her suffering."²⁸¹ Also she dares not tell her situation to others because being Mr. Bai's wife is the only comfort for her. She mourns her miserable life alone, and she finally gets ill.

Chapter Four of the Shanghai edition inserts a direct quote when Mrs. Bai recalls her happy years with Mr. Bai. In Tokyo, he said to her, "love surpasses a national boundary, an age difference, and all the other [obstacles]."²⁸² Mr. Bai got down on both knees, swearing to Mrs. Bai—Suiden Kako then—that if she married him, he would unfailingly love and protect her. The new edition also adds a small detail that Mr. Bai uses even broken furniture to batter Mrs. Bai. The landlady often hears them fighting. The quarreling and beating noises scare little kids in the same

²⁸¹ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 258.

²⁸² Zhang Wojun, "Bai taitai de aishi," 17.

building, and they burst into cries. Mrs. Bai sometimes flees to the landlady's place when Mr. Bai starts battering her. And then she returns home in the middle of the night. When she gets there, however, Mr. Bai would usually start beating her again. Whereas the Taiwan edition writes that Japanese women are most submissive, the Shanghai edition rephrases it with a more moderate tone. It writes, "One of the characteristics of Japanese women is to be submissive [to men]."²⁸³ Although the following description of how Mrs. Bai handles the situation is same as that of the first edition, the narrator's undertone of the new edition is different. The Shanghai edition stresses that it is due to Mrs. Bai's choice—neither the Japanese woman's trait nor the foreign environment—that she does not tell anyone of her pain. Mrs. Bai reminds herself that the marriage was her decision. Mrs. Bai, therefore, suffers alone in Beijing.

Chapter Six of the Taiwanese edition and Chapter Five of the Shanghai edition, with no crucial differences, describes a new phase of their marriage life. In March 1923, the Great Kantō earthquake broke out, which caused innumerable casualties and the enormous chaos in the Japanese society.²⁸⁴ The text describes Mrs. Bai's psychological state, "Ever since Mrs. Bai lost her husband's love for her, she has felt being flung to another world. In her dreams, she saw landscapes of her mother country, and she especially missed her friends. Upon thinking of all the cajoling words of Mr. Bai's before their marriage, she cannot help but call him a vicious man of no

²⁸³ Zhang Wojun, "Bai taitai de aishi," 17.

²⁸⁴ In reality, the Great Kantō earthquake broke out on September 1, 1923.

conscience (*sangjin tianliang*).”²⁸⁵ The Taiwanese edition reads, “Mrs. Bai is passionate and simple-hearted. Her personality and the first-time experience of being heartbroken make her indignant and distressed. All of these lead up to her illness.”²⁸⁶ And the Shanghai edition stresses that Mrs. Bai suffers from some illness that is hardly curable.

While she lives such a painful and grievous life, she hears about the earthquake. She is determined to return to Japan, first, to see her close friends. Second, she thinks that her visit to Tokyo could be an opportunity to treat her illness. Third, it occurs to her that a temporary separation might be helpful for recovering their previous relationship. Mr. Bai unhesitatingly allows her to take a trip to Tokyo. At that moment, Mr. Bai feels sorry and sad about the fact that Mrs. Bai proudly came to Beijing, but pitifully leaves there. A few days before she leaves, he is very warm and kind to her, which he has not done for the past one or two years.

Chapter Seven writes that half a year has passed since Mrs. Bai came to Japan. Although she hates Mr. Bai, they are, after all, a husband and a wife. She thinks that even his inveterate habit of going to a brothel is not something absolutely unfixable, so Mrs. Bai’s thoughts often go back to Mr. Bai and Beijing. One day, she receives one letter from Mr. Bai, which reads, “Kako (C. Huazi), my dear wife: After you left for Japan, I feel as if one day is as long as three autumns. ... I know that now you hate me, but I also know that you can forgive everything and me. I may have done wrong things to you before, and I have regretted it. I have corrected myself, and now I am a new

²⁸⁵ Zhang Wojun, “Bai taitai de aishi,” 17.

²⁸⁶ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 259.

person. So you must be able to forgive me. Don't you?"²⁸⁷ Following this, he begs her to come back, and encloses a fifty-*yuan* bank draft for travel expenses. When Mrs. Bai reads the letter, she is full of joy and hope, immediately forgetting all the bitterness and hatred she had before. With no hesitation, she leaves for Beijing, anticipating a happy, peaceful, and sweet home. In the Shanghai edition, Mrs. Bai's response to the letter is rather different from the first edition. After reading Mr. Bai's letter, more than half of her bitter and hateful feelings were gone. In contrast to the Taiwanese edition, the new edition implies that Mr. Bai's single letter fails to completely heal her pain. In other words, Mrs. Bai returns to Mr. Bai because of his apology and promise although she still feels tormented to some degree.

Chapter Eight of the Taiwanese edition writes that shortly after her arrival at Beijing, not only does her old ordeal repeat, but also she learns about a shocking truth. Due to this, she becomes ill again. The story returns to the moment when they first moved to Beijing, Mr. Bai was hired by one director of some government bureau to be a section head. The director and Mr. Bai are from the same hometown, and both of them studied in Japan. They, therefore, maintained a good relationship, and Mr. Bai often visited the director's place. Mr. Bai, however, ended up having an affair with the director's concubine. It is hard to know when the affair started, but three or four months after Mrs. Bai left for Japan, they became unafraid of being seen in public. The concubine went to see Mr. Bai even in the daytime several times. The director found out their affair about four months after Mrs. Bai left Beijing. He immediately found some excuse to fire Mr. Bai, and grounded the concubine.

²⁸⁷ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 259.

Mr. Bai simply could not bear the sense of loneliness. First, there was no way that he could see the concubine again. Second, he could not afford prostitutes after losing his job. Finally, even his wife was out of the country. Realizing this situation, he very much regretted what he did to Mrs. Bai. He finally thought that his wife was the only woman that he could permanently rely on. Only after the failed affair, the loss of his job, and remorse that ensued from an unbearable solitude, he wrote the letter to Mrs. Bai. Upon her returning, he tells her that he was fired, but he dares not confess that it was due to his affair. He, however, assures Mrs. Bai that he has other means to support his family, and that she will not have any difficulties. Mrs. Bai comforts him with encouraging words. A few days later, however, Mrs. Bai's friend tells her about his affair, and she suddenly realizes, “‘How could I have any desire for this brutal and hypocritical man? There is absolutely no hope; this is the life that lies before me. My future is also utterly dangerous.’ The bitter, grievous, depressed, painful, and hurt feelings dominated her mind, and she gets ill again.”²⁸⁸ Chapter Seven of the Shanghai edition is identical to this.

Chapter Nine writes that no one knows exactly what kind of illness Mrs. Bai suffered from. And this time, her condition is more serious than the first time she was ill. Whenever she has an argument with Mr. Bai, she has a fit. Certainly due to Mr. Bai's infamous affair, the couple's life cannot be like before. The only reason why now Mr. Bai neither goes to a red-light district nor steals other's concubine is a lack of money. Mr. Bai merely vents his anger on Mrs. Bai. The "ordinary, tasteless, and poor

²⁸⁸ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 261.

life" has continued for two years since Mrs. Bai returned to Beijing.²⁸⁹ In the meantime, Mrs. Bai seems to get better to a certain degree. Mrs. Bai, however, soon faces an appallingly shocking incident, which, the novel writes, determines her fate.

It is the early summer of 1926 that one eighteen- or nineteen-year-old married woman shows up at Mr. Bai's home. That day, Mr. Bai left home early to see his friend, and only Mrs. Bai and one maid of her age are at home. Mrs. Bai asks the young lady who she is, and she answers that she is one of his family from Sichuan. Even without asking Mrs. Bai's permission, however, the lady asks a rickshaw man to move her luggage inside. As the lady is one of Mr. Bai's family, Mrs. Bai lets her maid help with unpacking the guest's luggage, bringing her some tea, and etc. Mrs. Bai and the lady have a conversation in Chinese and Japanese, and they understand approximately a half of what each other's words. Mrs. Bai, however, finds out that who the lady is: the wife of Mr. Bai's first son. Her reason of coming to Beijing is to enter a girl's school. Mr. Bai's daughter-in-law says that Mr. Bai has three sons and one daughter, and his first son is already twenty years old. The first son graduated from a teacher's college in the previous year, and he currently teaches at a primary school. Mr. Bai's wife in Sichuan is thirty-eight years old in good health. The daughter-in-law also says, "Two years ago, Mr. Bai's wife already knew that Mr. Bai had some Asian mistress."²⁹⁰ Upon hearing this, "Mrs. Bai" feels as if she is sentenced to death.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 262.

Without making an effort to know further details, she locks the door of her room, crying out of heartrending grief. When Mr. Bai returns home, he sees his daughter-in-law. Although he has not seen her before in person, he has seen her picture. The daughter-in-law gave him a letter from his family. Mrs. Bai refuses to eat anything. In the middle of the night, she says to Mr. Bai, “I have been your mistress for the whole time after all! What did you tell me in Tokyo? It is a shame that I did not listen to what your friends told me. I just blame myself for being blind [to love].”²⁹¹ And then Mrs. Bai starts crying again. Mr. Bai is speechless, merely sitting in front of the bed and asking her to forgive him.

Chapter Eight of the Shanghai edition adds more details to the Taiwanese edition. It writes, for example, that Mrs. Bai's illness is certainly due to many years of depression (*jiyu*). Whenever Mr. Bai vents his anger on her, she asks, “In Tokyo, didn't you say that your family owns some properties, which is worth a couple of ten thousand [*yuan*]? Why don't you write a letter to your family and use some of them?”²⁹² Every time when she asks him this innocent question, Mr. Bai gets more furious. The old edition writes that it has been *already* two years that his family knew about his “Asian mistress.” The new edition, however, rephrases that it was *not until* two years ago that his family found that out. It also adds, in the scene where Mrs. Bai recalls her Tokyo years, direct quotes from Mr. Bai's friends, who warned Mrs. Bai of Mr. Bai's lewd and dishonest character. They told her that he was not serious about his study in Tokyo, and that he had a wife and a ten-year old child back at home. Those

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Zhang Wojun, “Bai taitai de aishi,” 19.

friends gave her the sincere advice not to be deceived by his cunning means and sweet talk.

Chapter Ten writes that since Mr. Bai's daughter-in-law came, Mrs. Bai has become seriously ill. Mr. Bai takes care of her very well. He, however, is unable to find a proper job whereas now he should also bear his daughter-in-law's expenses. His family gets so poor that Mrs. Bai cannot even afford her medicine. Mrs. Bai occasionally gets better, but her condition generally declines. Moreover, the fact that Mr. Bai supports the daughter-in-law makes Mrs. Bai enraged. At first, she got better, and tried hard to talk to her friends to vent her feelings. From December of the lunar calendar, she lies down on her bed for the whole day everyday. After the lunar new year, it gets even worse, and she cannot eat proper foods. Instead of three meals, she has only fruits or opium.

On the full moon festival, Mr. Bai has some schedule, so he cannot take care of Mrs. Bai after lunch that day. He asks his daughter-in-law to nurse Mrs. Bai. While she says she will, all she cares about are the festive events on the street. So she goes out at four and does not come back until nine. Mrs. Bai gets very upset, so says a few words to her. The daughter-in-law gets indignant, so scolded and insulted Mrs. Bai with abusive words. Due to this, Mrs. Bai faints right at the moment Mr. Bai returns home. He immediately calls a doctor, who helps her to recover her consciousness. The cure, however, extends only a few more hours of her life as she dies at four in the morning on the next day. Mrs. Bai does not leave her last words at the deathbed. Instead, she asks Mr. Bai to bring a mirror to her and to reflect her face on it. The novel ends with her words to Mr. Bai: "Mr. Bai! When I married you, was I this

skinny just like a ghost? For ten years or so, you ended up making me change like this. Is this due to the evil drama of my fate? Or is this due to cruelty of the mankind?”²⁹³

The last chapter of the new edition is basically same as the old edition.

Zhang wrote four short novels in his lifetime, and three of them were published between 1926 to 1928, and the last in 1944. For a comparative purpose, I briefly discuss Zhang's other two novels. His 1928's novel *Temptation* describes in-depth psychology of a young poor writer who has to financially support his family. The first chapter begins with the scene where the protagonist listens to some piano music from his neighborhood on a rainy day. The piano music leads his thoughts to a cute modern woman, which then leads to the thought of money, which finally leads to that of despair. In order not to get despondent, he goes to a place he usually dares not go-- especially a bustling place with many women. That day, he goes to a café in a park with many beautiful young ladies. He gets a table, drinking a cup of tea and smoking a cigarette. He can do this because today he has twenty *yuan* in hand.

He has been jobless for a several months. His mother complained about it, and his siblings grumbled at him, which hurt and offended him. For that period, however, he was patient and paid much effort to find work, with which he is completely satisfied. On the one hand, he wants to pursue his own dream, abandoning his family. On the other hand, he is aware that the only realistic option is to sacrifice his dream for the sake of his family. Moreover, he has to pay debts that his late father owed.

At the cafe, every seat is taken except one, the table behind him. He hopes a single, modern cute woman will take the table. Later, a party of two very modern

²⁹³ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 263.

styled women and three men sit at the table. The protagonist very sensitively observes them; listening their laughter and conversations, and smelling alcohol, cigarette smoke, and strong perfumes and cosmetics that the ladies wear. “While he gets extremely excited, a kind of despairing grief impolitely and courageously occurs to his mind! His mind scolds the man [at the table behind], ‘you enjoy all the privileges due to your [wealthy] ancestors and social institutions; you come into your inheritance that is purely evil. You do not have even a father, but you have two women!’ He gets so excited that he starts smoking cigarettes.”²⁹⁴

He drinks two glasses of beer, and all of his sorrow, despair, and fury seem to vanish at once. Soon, however, he feels solitary and void inside. Due to the lonesome feeling, he decides to go to his friend B's place. When he arrives at B's place around eight in the evening, B, B's wife, and two other single women—both are single—are playing Mahjong (*Majiang*). At the beginning, he merely wants to see them playing it, but later on he cannot help but join them. Sitting at the table, the hands of two ladies occasionally touch his. When he loses a game, however, he is reminded of his family who relies on his income. His friend, B, wants to play the second round, and one lady suggests he should play again. Due to her words, he joins them again. And the story continues that it was his first time to be that close to a woman. At the second round, he unintentionally touches hands and legs of one lady. He loses again, and pays three *dayang*. They play the third round, and he again loses two and a half *yuan*. He has never lost this much money in one night. No matter what kind of woman he accompanies, he dares not look, smell, or touch anymore. He just leaves the place.

²⁹⁴ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 267.

On the way back home, recalling what happened today, he realizes what he did is totally meaningless. Twenty *yuan* is far from being enough to support his whole family, but he already spent eight *yuan*. He thinks that all the money that he spent was due to the women. Amidst remorseful and resentful thoughts, he comes to the conclusion that without his family, all of his current worries are unnecessary. He thinks, “Such an evil institution of family! The institution should be abolished.”²⁹⁵ Seconds later, he thinks, “But after all, women, especially modern women, are lovable! Moreover, I spent money, so what is the point of regretting it? Money is what a man can earn. After tomorrow, I will try harder, and within a few days, I could earn back the amount that I lost!”²⁹⁶ With these thoughts, he immediately feels comforted. Upon returning home, he is unable to fall asleep. On his bed, he again recollects sounds, scents, and images of the modern women as well as the man he hated. The novel ends with the short comment that he has been in rapture since that afternoon.

Zhang's first novel, *Buying Lottery Tickets*, portrays in detail the psychology of one study abroad student--presumably Taiwanese--in Beijing. The protagonist, Chen Zhesheng, studies abroad in Beijing. It is a weekly routine that two to three friends of his come to his place on Saturday after lunch, chatting over numerous things until late night, and hanging out together until Sunday lunch. One week, however, his group of friends does not show up, and instead other two friends from his hometown, called Lin and Li, visit him. Lin and Li, unlike him, have financial support from their wealthy families. Wasting money and idling around in Beijing, they neglect their studies. Lin

²⁹⁵ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 272.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

tells Chen that in the previous week, he gambled away two hundred *yuan*, furthermore wasting money at some brothel for several days. As the weather gets cooled down, he “had to” have two pairs of pants tailored on credit. Lin pities himself for not being able to pay it by cash. Li, on the other hand, suggests that they go to an entertainment park, which Chen politely rejects. While two of them decide to go to the park anyway, they want to return to Chen’s to spend the night. And Chen takes them in.

While the two friends went out for fun, Chen feels troubled. He is unable to focus on anything; neither read a book nor to write a love letter. Thinking of his innocent lover, he is sad for being away from her, and sheds tears. At that moment, he is reminded of a letter from his family. That tells him that the family almost spent all the money he sent to them. His mother suggests that he should write a letter to Mr. L, “a benevolent man who is involved with charity works,” in order to ask Mr. L to help Chen with tuition. She told him “to write entreating words” to Mr. L. Chen, however, thinks that saying those words is merely an “panderer,” a literal Chinese translation of which is to beg pity by waving a tail. Considering it subservient behavior, he thinks, “I absolutely will not do it!” He is, however, unwilling to leave Beijing where his lover lives. “I thought that the importance of being in love cannot be surpassed by anything in the world. Moreover, I thought, being in love could bring the sense of comfort to my tough life, and also could further my self-improving effort (*xiangshang xin*).”²⁹⁷ In midst of many troubling thoughts, he dozes off.

Around midnight, Chen hears Lin and Li return. After opening the door for them, Chen goes to bed before them. Unable to fall asleep, however, Chen thinks that

²⁹⁷ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 248.

these two take advantage of him to save some fare from the park to their place. If they had enough money, they would definitely spend the night in a red-light district. Chen becomes annoyed by their presence. Lin and Li, in the meantime, are chatting and helping themselves to a cup tea, which Chen did not even offer. Because they are in the same room, Chen overhears their conversation. Lin suggests to Li that they should buy a lottery ticket because they might win up to some million *yuan*. Lin also says that he asked his family for money, lying that he suffers from serious illness. Even though his father did not believe it, his mother secretly sent him three hundred *yuan*. It, however, will take more than two weeks for him to receive it. In the meantime, he wants to buy a lottery ticket. While pretending to be asleep, Chen inwardly curses and scolds them for wasting that much money and still dreaming about hitting a lottery. “Upon thinking of a lottery ticket, he intuitively one *contemptible character of Chinese*, which is to aim to gain a great fortune, at once, not with hard work but with a single lottery ticket. It is detestable that Chinese want to earn money while doing nothing” (my emphasis).²⁹⁸ Then he fell asleep.

After Lin and Li leave the next day, he keeps thinking about buying a lottery ticket. Then he legitimizes what would be a good side of purchasing one. He thinks, “To buy one is shameful. ... If I, however, could win the lottery, is not it that I could earn a million *yuan* right away?”²⁹⁹ Also he can pursue his studies in Beijing, and he does not have to be away from his lover. Upon these thoughts, he goes to a lottery shop, but he hesitates. There he rationalizes his behavior again. “Although buying a

²⁹⁸ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji*, 250.

²⁹⁹ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji* 250.

lottery ticket is dishonorable, it does not harm people. Moreover, it is a million times better than begging for pity from wealthy people. Also, the reason it is so disgraceful [purchasing lottery tickets] is due to love and study, which are most important in life!”³⁰⁰ Justifying his motivation, he buys two tickets. Returning home, he imagines numerous joyful things that winning a lottery can bring about although he knows that it is probably a daydream.

The lottery number is to be announced two days later. That day, Chen goes to the shop early in the morning. When he gets there, the shop has not announced the number yet. He returns home, and waits another two to three hours after lunch. And then he goes to the shop again. He is, however, surprised to see that there is no one around the area. He hesitates to ask the shop owner when he would announce. Returning home, he again imagines what he can do if he wins the lottery. Next day, he runs to the shop early in the morning. From a distance, he can tell that they already announced the winning numbers. He soon realizes that his numbers fail to match. After he comes back home, he finally decides to return to his hometown. Chen is aware that the “evil king of money”³⁰¹ is indifferent to the fact that he does not want to leave his lover. Once he prepares money for the trip to his hometown, he will quit school and move away from Beijing and the woman that he loves the most.

4. Conclusion

In *Temptation* and *Buying Lottery Tickets*, the protagonists critique contemporary social issues, such as privileges of the bourgeoisie, hereditary properties,

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Zhang Wojun, *Zhang Wojun Quanji* 252.

hardships of studying abroad, and the institution of the family. On the other hand, the protagonists are irresistibly seduced by what they condemn—gambling and buying lotteries—, and finally try them. The result of their trials, which is the loss of money, makes them instantly regret what they did. In *Temptation*, furthermore, even after the reflection, the protagonist is still preoccupied with modern women at the end of the novel. Rather than pointing to any definite direction, the characters of Zhang Wojun's novels constantly switch around different sets of value. This strategy reminds us of, what Spivak terms, "Culture alive." Spivak argues:

Now in this situation the word culture is a kind of inchoate critique of that rationalist claim. The word culture is used to mark a name, the place from where the individual gets motives and ways of acting that are beyond individual reason. It marks the name, that group's idea, the identity. With this word therefore, what is happening is the negotiation of this complex strategic problem. It has rather little to do with whatever culture might be. Culture alive is not something that you can catch. Culture alive gives you the ground of self-evidence. Culture alive is not something you think about. This kind of *use* of the word culture is, as I say, the name of a complex strategic situation in a particular society.³⁰²

In the same context, *Tragic Story of Mrs. Bai*, first, critically portrays patriarchal, unethical, and violent traits of a Chinese man, who deceives an innocent, young Japanese woman who has no family. Its literary depiction of the abusing Chinese husband and the abused Japanese wife contrasts with Japan's semicolonial domination of China in real life. Moreover, the Japanese woman in the story is a contrast to modern Chinese women in *Temptation*. Zhang Wojun's novels are, however, more than critiquing patriarchal Chinese men, or patriarchal Japanese and Chinese women,

³⁰² Gayatri Spivak, "Culture Alive" *The Australian Feminist Law* 5 (1995), 7-8.

or the contemporary (semi-)colonial reality. By refusing to be interpellated and acknowledged as given categories, I argue, Zhang's literature constantly dislocates and disarticulates the so-called Taiwan-ness in a way that counters the imperialist and nationalist logic of culture. In so doing, he reminds his readers of the dimension of a human life that even a nation-salvation and a radical political change cannot transform.

CHAPTER FIVE: Li Kyŏngson's Play *Taiwan*

Li Kyŏngson (1905-1977) was a theatre-director, playwright, film-director, and film critic. In the 1920s, he was one of the most respected artists in theatre and cinema in Korea. Yet the movies he directed successively failed in the market. Li recalled in his memoir that the financial situation of film productions and the colonial censorship system disallowed him to create movies in a way that he intended.³⁰³ Chŏng Kitak, who had a successful career in China, urged him to come to Shanghai. After a few failed attempts to cross the Sino-Korean border, he succeeded in arriving in Shanghai in 1928. In Shanghai, he wrote one play *Taiwan* (1930) with the assistance of the Korean-Chinese actor, Jin Yan, and made one film *Yangtze River* (1930). When the Shanghai Incident broke out in 1932, he left for Thailand with his Thai comrade. He lived in Bangkok for the rest of his life.

Kim So'yŏp published a short memoir, "Li Kyŏngson who I knew during Shanghai Years," in 1932. Kim befriended Li, and it was shortly after he completed the movie *Yangtze River* (1930). Kim recollected that Li was uncertain of the aesthetic qualities of *Yangtze River*. Li then planned to shoot another film based upon his adaptation of the Chinese novel *Romance of Theatrical Society* (*liyuan yanshi*). Kim also highly praised Li's knowledge on literature, and at the time Li worked on translating Zhang Ziping's *Last Happiness*. Kim noted that Li was famed and respected among intellectuals and artists due to his films as well as his novel *People in*

³⁰³ Li Kyŏngson, "Musŏng Yŏnghwa Sidae ūi Chachŏn" *Sindong'a* 4 (1964): 320-349.

White (baiyi ren).³⁰⁴ Right before they lost the contact, Li published an article, "Splendor and Ordeal of Chinese Leftist Writers," in the *Chosun Daily*. While Li stayed in Shanghai, he continued to write articles on contemporary Chinese literature and criticism in Korean newspapers.³⁰⁵

Li's *Taiwan* was published under the pseudonym, Niubu (lit; ox's step). Li wrote in his memoir that he and Jin Yan (K. Kim Yŏm; 1910-83) co-authored the play for a couple of weeks because Li did not have a good command of Chinese. Jin Yan was a Korean-Chinese movie star, who was selected as the "Emperor of Cinema" in 1934 by the film magazine *Sound of Movie (Diansheng)*. Li verbally wrote *Taiwan* in Korean, and Jin wrote it down in Chinese.³⁰⁶ As a member of the Left League of Chinese Artists (*zuolian*), Jin Yan had a close relationship with famed leftist Chinese writers, such as Tian Han, Xia Yan, Bu Wancang, and Hu Ping.³⁰⁷ It was neither the case that Li or Jin had been to Taiwan, nor that they had any Taiwanese comrades or acquaintances. It is unclear specifically why Li and Jin dramatized the colonial revolutions of Taiwan. Li wrote the play, based upon what he read at the personal

³⁰⁴ Kim So'yŏp, "Li Kyŏngson who I knew during Shanghai Years" *Dongguang* Nov. 1932: 91.

³⁰⁵ Li Kyungson serialized translation of Zhang Ziping's novel *Last Happiness* in the literary magazine *Zhongyang* over 17 times from January 1933 to March 1935. The novel was originally published by Modern Times (*xiandai shuju*) in 1927 in Shanghai. In the translator's introduction, Li wrote that Guo moruo and Zhang Ziping were the representative poet and the novelist of contemporary China, respectively. Both of them were the members of the Creation Group (*chuangzaoshe*). Li was unhesitant to say that Zhang Ziping was the best Chinese novelist of his time. Li also assessed that despite the conflicts between rightist and leftist writers since 1929, none of leftist novels are as superb as Ziping's. Within one year that *Last Happiness* came out, the publisher printed its tenth edition, which showed its immense popularity to Chinese readers.

³⁰⁶ Li Kyŏngson, "Sanghae Imchŏng Sidae ŭi Chachŏn" *Sindong'a* 10 (1965): 289.

³⁰⁷ See Kim Ch'ang-sŏk, *Chung'guk Yŏnghwa Hwangje Kim Yŏm* (Pukkyŏng: Minjok Ch'ulp'ansa, 2011); Pak Kyu-wŏn, *Sanghae oldŭ deisŭ* (Seoul: Minŭmsa, 2003); Cho Pong-nye, *Sanghai e p'in kkot : 1930-yŏndae yŏnghwa Hwangje Kim Yŏm* (Seoul: Churyusŏng, 2004).

library of Tian Han, the most influential Marxist playwright in Republican China.³⁰⁸

Tian Han also provided Li and Jin a writing space in his house so that they could complete *Taiwan*. Li used the pseudonym, Niubu, to circumvent the censorship of the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Japanese authorities in Shanghai. Although Zhang Guangci, the editor of *Pioneer*, agreed with Li's using a pseudonym, he mentioned that the author was Korean in the editor's note.³⁰⁹ Li's memoir noted that it was very clear from the beginning that he and Jin Yan wanted to write an anti-imperialist literature.³¹⁰ I think that Jin Yan took a significant role in composing this text due to two reasons. His second wife recalled in her interview with Suzuki Tsunekatsu that Jin Yan had a deep yearning for the unification of Taiwan and China for his whole life.³¹¹ More importantly, the political inclination of the text is explicitly communist, which echoes writings of the Left League, especially those of Tian Han.

Tian Han is an outstanding figure in the history of Chinese drama and cinema in terms of political and aesthetic contents of his films. In 1921, he published the magazine *Southern Country Fortnightly* (*Nanguo banyuekan*) at his own expense. From the second issue, he published a supplementary issue, the *Southern Country Newspaper* (*Nanguo Xinwen*), which focused on introducing and discussing various genres of art, including drama, film, literature, and literary criticism. After the fourth issue, however, the publication of the magazine discontinued. He had his first drama published in 1919, but he considered his second drama *One Night at the Café* (1920)

³⁰⁸ Li Kyŏngson, "Sanghae Imchŏng Sidae ŭi Chachŏn" *Sindong'a* 10 (1965): 289.

³⁰⁹ Zhang Guangci, "Bianji shi Xiaoxi" *Tuohuangzhe* 4&5 (1930): 6 (or 1807).

³¹⁰ Li Kyŏngson, "Sanghae Imchŏng Sidae ŭi Chachŏn" *Sindong'a* 10 (1965): 289.

³¹¹ Suzuki Tsunekatsu, *Tārū: Chōsenjin no Shanhai den'ei kōtei* (Tokyo: Shinsensha, 1994).

as his true debut work (*chushizuo*). After the outbreak of the May Thirtieth Movement in 1925, Tian Han embarked on the project to write the trilogy *Historical Drama of Three Yellows* (*sanhuang shiju*). The trilogy portrays three Chinese revolutions: the Guangzhou Uprising in 1921, the Wuchang Uprising in 1921, and the May Thirtieth Nanjing Street Incident in 1925. Tian Han had the Act One of *Yellow River* (*Huanghuagang*), which dramatized the first of the three revolutions, published on the *Southern Country (Nanguo) Special Issue*.

Tian Han grappled with the issue of being immersed into the masses' lives, expressing their instinctive consciousness and sentiments, and ultimately accelerating their outbreak of revolutions.³¹² His plays sought to raise mass consciousness that resists the inertia of the masses, the deferential instinct, and the inferiority complex.³¹³ Consciously stimulating the collective action of the people, his literature foregrounded political aims of mobilizing the mass movement and socialist revolution.

Li's play *Taiwan* was published in the Shanghai-based magazine *Pioneer* (*Tuohuangzhe*) in May 1930. Until 1935, it was the only Chinese-language literature that adapted the 1928 Zhushan incident in Taiwan. During the colonial period, two more literary works were published on the incident. The Japanese leftist writer, Itō

³¹² See Xiaomei Chen "Tian Han and the Southern Society phenomenon" *Literary Societies of Republican Era*, Ed. Denton and Hockx (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008) 241-279.

³¹³ Tian Han's first movie that Tian Han was *Approach to Mass*, which adapted the Japanese poem of the same title, written by Ishikawa Takuboku (*Shichuan Zhuomu*; 1886-1912). The original poem describes the story of Russian revolutionary intellectuals, who had petty bourgeoisie backgrounds. Despite their fervent works to be immersed into peasants' lives, they failed to convince peasants to partake in the Russian revolution. Due to despair and dismay, the Russian intellectuals reoriented their tasks to be heroes of the masses who, from their stance, should be enlightened by the educated. The elite called this new project the path movement. When that movement also fails, they were committed to undertaking terror and assassination to overthrow the czar regime. In the end, however, they finally compromised on the emperorship and the status quo of Russia.

Einosuke's (1903-59) *Barbarians in Plain* (*pingdi fanren*) was published in the *Central Discourse* (*zhongyang gonglun*) in December 1930 soon after Li's *Taiwan*.³¹⁴ Although both Li and Itō had not been to Taiwan in their lifetime, these Korean and Japanese writers dramatized Taiwan's anticolonial incident before any Taiwanese writer. In 1932 the Taiwanese socialist writer, Yang Kui (1905-85) fictionalized the incident in his Japanese-language novel *Paperboy*. Although the government-general office prohibited the serialization of *Paperboy* in the *Taiwan People's News* 1932, it was awarded the second prize of the Japanese literary magazine *Bunkaku Hyouron* in 1934. Among these three texts that adapted the 1928 event, only Li's *Taiwan* touched upon Taiwan's 1902 incident as well. In the latter incident, Japan massacred nearly 300 Taiwanese militia.

The play consists of six acts and seven scenes, and its background is August 1921 in Zhushan. Zhushan is located in the central west of Taiwan, and its size is approximately 247 square kilometers. In Act One, five characters appear: the main character Lin, his wife, his son, his father, and his friend. The name Zhushan in Chinese literally means a bamboo mountain.

³¹⁴ Itō Einosuke, "Pingdi fanren" *Zhongyang Gonglun* (12) Dec 1930: 68-90; As for a study on Itō's works, see Lin Weiru, "Diguo zhuoyi yu Taiwan Shuxie" M.A. Thesis. Zhengzhi Univ., 2009.

台 灣

——全六幕八景——

牛 步

第 一 幕

時 一千九百二十一年 八月末

地點 台灣 竹山郡林杞埔 竹林前之村 莊

人物

林慶興	二十九	(竹林農人)
沈興順	二十六	(其妻)
林貴男	九 歲	(其子)
林正源	五十三	(林之父)
陳玉奎	三十一	(林之友)

背景 農家之內部

Figure 5.1 Li Kyöngson's Play *Taiwan*

The *Taiwan* begins with the scene of one family—a father, a mother, and a son—who are about to have dinner. The father character, Lin, is a 29-year old farmer of the bamboo forest in Zhushan. At the dinner table, the wife brings up that Japanese officials came to look around the forest, saying the qualities of bamboos were excellent. The couple senses that the Japanese contrives to extort the bamboo field from farmers, which they are determined to resist. Lin's father is portrayed as an adversary of the play. Lin's father goes downtown almost everyday, which is a shame to Lin's family. Lin's father, in her fifties, has a twenty year-old lover in downtown.

Moreover, Lin's father tries to earn a significant amount of money at once, due to which the couple thinks that he may sell a portion of the bamboo field to any interested party. Lin's wife assumes that the father-in-law's frequent visit to the downtown is solely due to the lover. Lin, however, thinks that it is not only because of the woman, but also because of the father's servile desire to fawn over colonial officers. With no hesitation, Lin criticizes that his father is just a little better than a traitor.

His wife blames him for being too harsh on his father. Then Lin opposes her, saying the Farmer's Union (*nongmin lianmenghui*) should give lectures to women in order to edify them. The wife says that she has already taken their lectures, and that she has graduated from the course. She further adds that, despite her lack of education and ignorance, she can do whatever Lin asks her to do. She says that if she is asked to kill a Japanese, she has a way to do so. Lin mentions what Mr. Pu from the Farmer's Union taught him—the principle that “For the sake of the greater Justice (*Yi*), one must annihilate kin bonds (*dayi mieqin*).”³¹⁵ Based upon this, Lin stresses that even filial or conjugal love should not hinder people from pursuing the justice, in this case, a defeat of the Japanese empire in Taiwan. From the beginning of the drama, readers can tell that the characters, and by extension, Zhushan peasants, are well armed with the anticolonial spirits, and that the communist Farmer's Union successfully trained peasants in the area.

Lin's friend, Chen, appears on a stage with the news that the Japanese police sent out an official notice to every peasant in the area. The notice informs all the

³¹⁵ Niubu, “Taiwan,” *Tuohuangzhe* 4&5 (1930): 7 (or 1489).

peasants who cultivate in the bamboo field should bring their stamps to the colonial office. Lin first thinks that the colonial government intends to increase a tax. Chen points out that the notice conveniently does not explain the reason of convening, which attests that the so-called “self-governance system” in Taiwan is merely nominal. Chen points out that although the number of Taiwanese is several hundred times more than that of Japanese, Taiwanese councilors are only seven or eight. This call for gathering with no statement of due reasons foreshadows a conflict between the colonizer and Taiwanese farmers.

In three districts of Linqi-area, there are at least thirteen hundred farmers who own parts of the bamboo field. And Lin recalls that two Japanese officials at the hall (the text used the derogatory term “wo’nu,” literally meaning slavish Japanese) have come to the field before. And Chen thinks that the colonial office possibly plans to make the bamboo field a national property. Lin says that native farmers have cultivated the bamboo field for more than two hundred years, and that sixteen thousand people live by that land. He adds that even a very stupid and gullible person would not let others steal his means of living.

Chen says that all of these problems are what the Independence Party (*dulidang*) brings about. Who let Japanese be naturalized to Taiwanese? When Japanese actually conquered and settled in Taiwan, it was the Japanese that shot everything dead. For example, in the middle of the night, combat planes dropped bombs to a recalcitrant Taiwanese village, which was completely destroyed. In the history of mankind, there never will be again this brutal oppression of eradicating the defiant colonized (*buliang fenzi*). Chen also told Lin the story of the Beidou village.

Japanese colonizers forced the Beidou villagers to accept the lowest price of sugar cane only after they completed the delivery to a Japanese company. Chen comments that the Farmer's Union of his village would definitely disallow that kind of exploitation to take place. They continue to talk about other cases where the empire's capitalists abused powerless Taiwanese peasants. Whoever protested against Japanese rules was arrested under the pretext of quelling 'harmful members' or 'problematic people' (*bu'an fenzi*). Lin and Chen deplore the fact that the colonizer has exploited the production of sugar canes and bananas. Chen says, "It is simply same as transporting the blood of Taiwan to the inside of their country [Japan]. Although they say that they spent thirteen million *yuan* for the sake of Taiwanese culture, Japan gained at least eleven times more benefits than what they invested!"³¹⁶

Chen agrees with what Lin brought up earlier. Chen mentions that people would not sell away the means of living that have been heralded down from their ancestors. "There could be one or two who would sell it, but the colonial government would not be able to force us to do so in the presence of collective power of the masses." Lin's father comes back, and Chen leaves. Lin's father says that he is full because he had plenty of food and alcohol with government officials in downtown. Informing his father that the government asked farmers to gather at the municipal hall in downtown, Lin says that the government-general office possibly will try to buy the bamboo field at an unreasonably low price. His father responds, "If I have to sell, I will just sell. If I don't have to, I just won't."³¹⁷ Upon hearing his apathetic response,

³¹⁶ Ibid., 11-12 (or 1493-1494).

³¹⁷ Ibid., 14 (or 1496).

Lin gets indignant. And his father naively says that there must be reasons (*daoli*) for Japan's asking them to sell the land. They end up arguing with each other. Lin confronts his father, asking why he goes to downtown almost every day, which is the gossip for the whole village. His father answers that it is because he tries to figure out how to inherit his entire fortune to Lin. Lin's father stresses that his intent to sell the land to the colonial office is also for the sake of Lin, not for himself. Upon getting upset at his son, he does not want to stay with Lin. He tells Lin that he will stay in downtown starting the next day.

Lin keeps arguing with his father, saying that he knows that the father has a place to live for some woman, and therefore he has another family. He continues that selling away the bamboo land is rather better than selling opium. Here Lin assumes that his father has sold opium for making money. Lin says that he will not and cannot stand up with his selling drugs to Taiwanese. After broaching this, Lin sheds tears. And Lin blames his father for prompting farmers to work for the colonial Guard Group (*baowei tuan*), due to which his father was granted the patent to sell opium to Taiwanese.

Lin points out to his father that small-size groups of villagers, which the colonizers established, such as the Guard Group (*baowei tuan*) and the Robust Youth Group (*zhuangding tuan*), are merely the governing tools that make the colonized watch and distrust each other. For the colonized, therefore, those groups are self-destructive. The surveillance mechanism on the part of the colonized destructs the most essential structure of the Taiwanese society, which is a kinship. Lin describes to his father that the colonizer-manipulated groups systematically and structurally force

their members to inform on one's relatives to the police. His father, however, obstinately claims that the Government-General must not give an order without a good reason. Moreover, his father is unwilling to yield his privilege to anyone. Countering Lin's words, the father takes out a paper that the regulation of fourteen articles of the Guard Group. The top of the articles reads, "No discrimination, Purification and Assimilation. Lead and Guide [to a right direction]."³¹⁸ While his father reading this out, Lin shouts, saying stop reading it, and he starts crying aloud. And the father says this is all due to what the couple learned from the Farmer's Union. The father tells them to get rid of "those extreme ideas" from their heads. His father leaves home, and Lin's wife says, "Your father's thoughts are outdated."³¹⁹ And Lin responds that old ideas are still all right, but what is lamentable is that he cannot beat his father. All he can do is merely to cry over this situation. Here the first act ends.

The drama refers to the historical Taiwanese uprising against Japanese colonizers. It took place on May 25, 1902, in central Taiwan's six villages, all of which are adjacent to each other. In 1902, a militia (*yimin jun*) successfully waged a guerrilla war against colonizers, and they were about to conquer the stronghold of the Japanese military. Upon this crisis, Japanese officials manipulated collaborative (*yuyong*) Taiwanese officials and the district chief of Douliu to conciliate the militia with a deceptive means. The collaborators convinced the militia to stop the war as the government-general office was willing to negotiate with them. Although the militia was suspicious about why the colonial government suddenly changed its position, they

³¹⁸ Ibid., 18 (or 1500).

³¹⁹ Ibid., 19 (or 1501).

believed the Taiwanese collaborators' words. The leaders, including Zhang Dayou, Zhang Lüliang, Liu Rong, decided to cease the anticolonial war, and came down from mountains and nominally "surrendered" (*guishun*) to the colonizer.³²⁰ Although it was the surrender in its formality, it was not the militia's ineluctable succumbing to the colonial power, but its voluntary choice to negotiate with colonial officials. The government-general office held the surrender ceremony. Ten days before then, Minister of Civil Affairs, Goto Shinpei (1857- 1929), issued the order to massacre the whole body of the militia (*jiti tusha*). On May 25, 1902, the ceremonies were held at the aforementioned six areas simultaneously, and in total, 266 people attended. After the ceremony finished in each area, Japanese officials and the Taiwanese collaborators hastily left the place, and then with a sound of the signal gunshot, the ambushed Japanese soldiers shot all the remaining surrendered Taiwanese to death. After the massacre, the Taiwanese local officials who collaborated with the Japanese, such as Liao Jingchen and Zhang Shuiqing, were also arrested and prisoned on the false charge of contacting spies. Instead of being compensated for assisting the colonial oppression, the collaborators were beaten to death shortly after being jailed even without a trial.

³²⁰ Wang Shilang, *Riben zhimindi tizhi xia de Taiwan* (Taipei: Zhongwen Tushu Gongsì, 1980) 88-102.

面 裏	面 表
元 某 堡 某 街 (庄) 番 戶 住	契 昭 和
現 時 某 堡 某 街 (庄) 番 地	歸 順 年
某	印 月
某	之 證
四 寸 五 分	四 寸 五 分
年	日 下 付
齡	某 某 辦 務 署

Figure 5.2 Taiwanese Militia's Document of Surrender To the Government-General Office. Wang Shilang, *Riben zhimindi tizhi xia de Taiwan*, 97.

The first scene of Act Two starts with more people at the courtyard of the municipal hall of Kantoucuo, which is one of the six areas where the 1902's massacre occurred. The second act's characters are Sakamo—the head (*tingzhang*) of

Kantoucuo—, the head of Linqibu, Lin's father, Chen Yukui—Lin's friend—, an old man whose surname is Zhu, Jin Zhangyuan—Chen Yukui's friend—, a Japanese police officer called Qiteng (J. Saitou), other fifteen or so policemen, and around fifty farmers from Zhushan. The place where people gathered originally belonged to Taiwanese. It, however, was converted to the colonial government office. Around a stage is set as a courtyard, and a stage as a colonial police office. The sign on the facade of the building reads, “Regard all with equal benevolence” (*yishitongren*) “Purify and Assimilate” (*chunhua ronghe*).³²¹ The phrase that “Regard all with equal benevolence” represents the ethical value of long-heralded Confucianism that a king and officials of a medieval court sought to attain in order to lead masses. Hence the phrases at the colonial office intensify the sense of irony.

One of the farmers there asks a question, "Why are there so many police here?" Another says that colonial offices of other areas, such as Douliu-mian and Xiaomei-zhuang, also summoned farmers. Sakamoto starts a speech:

Taiwan was, originally, an uncivilized small island with neither culture nor goods. Since the Great Japan annexed Taiwan in Meiji 28 [1895], the systems of administration, culture, and economic production have finally developed. It was not until then that this country could position itself in the world as Great Taiwan. Due to the grace of Great Japan, there is no way that we could not thank His Majesty the Emperor of Japan. In current Taiwan, there are schools and transportations everywhere. The railroads were constructed both vertically and horizontally across the nation just like a spider web. In terms of security, officials and native people harmoniously cooperate like one party. Therefore, there is not a bit of dissatisfaction.³²²

³²¹ Niubu, “Taiwan,” *Tuohuangzhe* 4&5 (1930): 20 (or 1502).

³²² *Ibid.*, 22 (or 1504).

While farmers wonders what Sakamoto's real intention is behind his long speech, he announces that the Japanese Government-General Office designated the Zhushan bamboo field as the model forest of the country. And Sakamoto says that the Office would like to subsidize farmers in order to prize the superb cultivation works that they have done since their ancestors and, also, to encourage them in future. The head of Forest Department asks each farmer to stamp the document that proves farmers' agreement of being subsidized by the colonial government. Zhu, excited to hear about the subsidy, is naïvely about to stamp it.

Jin Zhangyuan, however, speaks out that the so-called “designated model forest” is merely the mask of colonizing and usurping Taiwanese properties. Lin Zhenghuan blames Jin for questioning the government authority. He says the Office wants not only to financially support farmers and but also to take care of the bamboo field on behalf of them. Lin asserts that there was a similar case before, so this is not unusual and suspicious. Thereupon other farmers also say that what could be wrong about accepting the subsidy, and that everything else should be all right as long as the bamboo field is not taken away from them. Chen Yukui, however, tells them that the subsidy is the price they get for yielding the land to the colonial government. Then, other farmers say that it should not happen. Chen, thereupon, wants to voice his opinion to the colonial police. Even before he says anything, however, simply the fact that a Taiwanese farmer dares suggest something to the office provokes the head of the Forest Department. The head accuses Chen of agitating the mass. And Sakamoto asks how it could be possible that Taiwanese people reject any subsidy from the majestic Government-General (*zongdufu gexia*), blaming Chen for not obeying the

government-general's order. Jin, however, refutes that landowners, not the colonial government, should have a right to decide what to do with their proprieties. Hence Jin asks the officers to give them time to make a decision. Sakamoto, however, says that farmers are disallowed to say much, and if they refuse to stamp the document, they will be inhibited from returning home. Chen raises an objection to it, and the head of the department orders the police to arrest Chen under the charge of breaching peace.

Upon Chen's arrest, Jin says that it is extremely absurd. And other farmers are also agitated. The department head orders the police to lock the main gate of the municipal hall. After then, Sakamoto threatens the farmers, saying that to stamp the document is the Government-General's order, not a choice. The farmers, however, still hesitate to stamp. Sakamoto more fiercely threatens them, saying the reluctant attitude reveals their potential for committing high treason. Due to the intimidation, the old man, Zhu, says he wants to stamp. And the majority of farmers think that stamping must be better than being jailed. Lin's father also wants to follow the order of the office, saying that young people tend to respond immoderately due to lack of their experiences. Lin's father asks the department head to consider what he has done for Japanese officials and to forgive other farmers.

Jin Zhangyuan, however, insists that the farmers of Zhushan should talk directly to the Government-General Office. He says, "In case the farmers have the obligation to stamp it, the farmers and I will. Otherwise...."³²³ Before Jin finishes his words, Sakamoto orders the police to arrest him. Amidst the turmoil, Lin's father urges

³²³ Ibid., 27 (or 1509).

other farmers to stamp. While dragged by the police, Jin tells the farmers not to stamp the colonial document at all costs.

The head gives the farmers two options: either to stamp or to be accused of plotting high treason. And the colonial police surround the municipal hall so that the farmers cannot leave there before signing the document. Sakamoto says that in case any of them tries to escape the place, the police are allowed to shoot them. Even if they are shot dead, he adds, the police will not take any responsibility for it. The farmers blame Zhu and Lin as traitors, and Scene One ends.

Scene Two begins in one room of the municipal hall. The characters of the scene are Chen, Jin, the head of the Forest Department, Saitou--a Japanese police officer--, and two other officers--Fujiwara and Matsuda. The room is a dark and dirty storage space, and there are no props but only actors on a stage. The head is sitting on a chair, and other police hold bamboo clubs in their hands. Chen's body is entirely tied up, and his face and clothes are bloodstained.

Despite violence and threat of the Japanese police, Chen says, "Even at the cost of my life, I will not betray my own people."³²⁴ Upon Chen's resistance, Saitou starts beating him. The bamboo club is broken, and Chen vomits blood. While Chen vehemently resists, the police searches his clothes, pulling out his stamp and setting the seal. The officers think that once they show the stamp marks of Chen and Jin on the document to the rest of the farmers, they will be convinced to follow the order. Chen, however, persistently resists against them, saying, "Do you think you could

³²⁴ Ibid., 30 (or 1512).

forever impose these oppressive means on us?"³²⁵ And then the police drag Jin to the stage. Chen and Jin, upon seeing each other, start crying aloud. And the head asks the police to bring Chen to a court. Saito mentions that Jin has received education and training to be a teacher. When asked whether he wants to be jailed or to stamp, Jin answers, "Do you think I would be ever afraid of being jailed? You Japanese deceived the entire Taiwan and depredated it with a military power. And are you still unsatisfied [with what you have already gained]...?"³²⁶

After the head left, Jin tries to talk to the police in order to awaken them to the oppressive essence of imperialism, which also applies to Japanese nationals. Although the Japanese police believe that they are privileged to serve the Japanese empire, Jin challenges the superiority consciousness of the Japanese by pointing out what the police actually benefited from sacrificing themselves for the mother country. What the colonial policed received in turn were the wages that are only twenty to thirty *yuan* more than what average Taiwanese earn, a fifty percent discount of a train ticket, frequent overworks without rest and compensation, their living environment that is just same as the Taiwanese police's. Jin questions whether they could call all of these as true grace from the empire for their committed people. Their emperor, however, leisurely enjoys all sorts of delicacies for every single meal, and his storages are full of gold, which is piled up as high as a mountain. Wherever the emperor goes, near or far, he uses his luxurious car. Every time he visits Taiwan, the police should guard him with their lives. Jin questions whether this could be called the emperor's grace for his

³²⁵ Ibid., 31 (or 1513).

³²⁶ Ibid., 32 (or 1514).

devoted nationals? High-class Taiwanese live much better lives than the Japanese police do. The Japanese police's duties include committing genocide upon an order of their superior. Despite all the atrocities that they have to undertake, the imperial government will award only eight *yuan* to the police who have dependents. Could it be truly called the imperial grace for its own people?

Saito responds, "Who would not know it? Who on earth are you trying to lecture?"³²⁷ And Fujiwara says, "He [Jin] argues on behalf of us, and, furthermore, what he says is true!"³²⁸ And Saito tells Fujiwara that everyone already knows what Jin told us, and that all he cares about is to memorize the Comprehensive Volume of Six Laws so that he can be promoted next year. Saito says that being loyal to the system, not calling it into question, is their fate. On the one hand, Fujiwara agrees on what Saito says that turning against one's fate is merely one's own loss. On the other hand, it comes across Fujiwara's mind that being loyal to the empire for fifty or sixty more years would merely get him to become a chief of some local office. And Jin interrupts their conversation, cursing them that their children will not live for more than six months, or that they will be miscarried. And the same will be the fate of the Japanese empire. Fujiwara says that Jin's words sound like a prophecy that a scholar of insight and prescience would say. And Saito responds that even thinking about the curse is truly painful, pointing out that now even Taiwanese farmer ridicules that they are just police. Saito says that although Fujiwara and he could be laughed at for being the police, the Great Empire of Japan will not collapse just because Jin mocked it. Jin,

³²⁷ Ibid., 34 (or 1516).

³²⁸ Ibid.

however, argued that the empire actually has deceived and inveigled the police despite their sacrifice of moving to this small island. Jun further stresses that the police do not know anything about the whole situation, including the evil mechanism of the empire. By the time the police are finally awoken to the truth of the whole situation, Jin continues, “the Great Empire of Japan will have putrefied and collapsed just like branches of a withered tree.”³²⁹ Upon Jin's stubborn resistance, Saito says, "Although what you said makes a little bit of sense, any continuing verbal challenge will get you charged of *lese majeste*."³³⁰ But Jin says to Saito and Fujiwara, "Do you think that good words are unpleasant to hear? Isn't it that you are afraid of pursuing justice? Unite! If you also want to fight for justice!"³³¹

Saito says that he is determined to defend the Great Empire of Japan, living or dead. What Saito truly wants is to be a chief of a local office so that he can completely destroy the Independence Party of Taiwan. And Jin mocks the police, saying that all three will meet again when those two are promoted to a position with the salary of 120 *yuan*. Provoked by Jin's words, Saito kills Jin with a sword, cutting him from his shoulder to the pitch of his stomach. While spilling blood, Jin shouts, “Hurrah, all the people of the oppressed states, Hurrah....”³³² Without finishing the sentence, Jin collapses. Fujiwara suggests to Saito that Saito should justify himself by telling the department head that Jin's blasphemy against the royal family of Japan made Saito kill Jin.

³²⁹ Ibid., 35 (or 1517).

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Ibid., 36 (or 1518).

And then the head appears on a stage, saying that all the other farmers have stamped the document. Saito imputes his murder of Jin to Jin's curse at the royal family. He says that he will take all the responsibilities that would ensue due to the murder. The head replies that Saito should not worry about Jin and other arrested Taiwanese because "they are merely two to three Taiwanese!"³³³ When the head checks the dead body of Jin, he comments that Jin's eyes seem as if he wants to say that he is a victim of injustice, and that he is wrongly accused. In order to deal with this case, the head orders Saito and Fujiwara to find a weapon at Jin's place so that he can sentence Jin for ten years. A while later, the head will inform his superior of Jin's death in prison. At the end of Scene Two, the head and the police are resolved again to be loyal and devoted to the Great Empire of Japan. Although Li wrote, in his memoir, that his whole play—six acts and eight scenes—was published on one issue, the rest of the play is unfound in any issues of *Tuohuangzhe*.³³⁴

Li's life-time career epitomizes a diasporic writer's fluency in multi-national issues: the Japanese colonial oppression of Taiwanese farmers and militia in *Taiwan*, China's class conflict in *Yangtze River*, and Korea's peasant issues in *People in White*. Li's *Taiwan* represents the especially radical mode of intercolonial literature because Chinese and Korean artists cooperated together to unveil a silenced history of Taiwan to which neither author belonged. In comparison to subsequent Japanese-language and Chinese-language literatures on the 1928 Zhushan incident, *Taiwan* is more politically

³³³ Ibid., 37 (or 1519).

³³⁴ Li Kyŏngson, "Sanghae Imchŏng Sidae ūi Chachŏn" *Sindong'a* 10 (1965): 289.

critical in the pursuit of imbuing readers with anticolonial, inter-East Asian, and class consciousness.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation cast light on Korean and Taiwanese inter-colonial aesthetics, which engaged Chinese audiences in the 1920s and 30s. As Anderson's study on anarchism and anticolonialism shows, the origin of interregional movements against imperial powers traces back to the final decades of the nineteenth-century. Anderson writes, "Natives of the last important remnants of the fabled Spanish global empire, Cubans (as well as Puerto Ricans and Dominicans) and Filipinos did not merely read about each other, but had crucial personal connections and, up to a point, coordinated their actions—the first time in world history that such transglobal coordination became possible."³³⁵ He further points out that Chinese nationalists, through newspapers, enthusiastically followed anticolonial movements in Cuba and Philippines and also the Boer nationalist struggle against Ukranian imperialists. By doing so, Chinese tried to learn how to resist colonial powers from them. In 1901 Liang Qichao translated a Filipino novelist, Rizal's final poem into Chinese, and there have been almost forty other Chinese translations of it.³³⁶ Also, Mariano Ponce, a Filipino patriot, was in touch with Chinese "reformists" as early as November 1898.³³⁷ Hence interregional liaisons and solidarities, explicit or implicit, across China, Philippine, Cuba, and other national borders took place even before the twentieth-century. These interactions

³³⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination* (NY: Verso, 2005) 2.

³³⁶ Ibid., 231.

³³⁷ Ibid., 232.

partly owed to the invention of the telegraph, the inauguration of the Universal Postal Union, and the extensive operations of steamships and railways.

It, however, was not always the case that anarchists endorse unconditional alliances among the colonized around the globe. For example, Liu Xu (or Liu Shuren), the key anarchist figure in colonial East Asia, argued that only countries under the same imperial power would be able to form an effective and equal intercolonial alliance. In *Strategies of Revolution for Powerless and Small Nations* (*Ruoxiao Minzu de Geming Fanglüe*), Liu wrote, “Who would not want to form a united front of the whole colonized nations?”³³⁸ Despite the aspiration for an alliance across the world, Liu contended that differences in the intensity of class-consciousness and also in social circumstances made an equal alliance impossible. Hence he critiqued the communist vision of a global proletariat revolution, where a proletariat revolution of a powerful country was prioritized over that of a powerless one. On the other hand, Liu argued that Taiwan and Korea would be able to form an equal and radical alliance because their political situations were same, and they were oppressed by the same colonial power.³³⁹ Liu opposed to the idea of a global alliance or a world revolution,

³³⁸ Liu Xu, *Ruoxiao Minzu de Geming Fanglüe* (1929) 33.

³³⁹ Liu Xu condemns the idea of ethnic-nation (*minzu*), which, he points out, underlies capitalist imperial logic of expansion. Privileging the notion of nation merely interrupts a formation of class-consciousness that is the quintessence of proletariat revolution. The proletariat, Liu Xu argues, ought not to be allied with the capitalist, not even of the same country and not even for national liberation. The ultimate goal of socialist revolution lies, not in retaliation against the colonizer, but in liberation of the whole mankind. Critiquing middle class’ achievement mentality (*chengjiuxing*), economically and socially, he points out that the middle class is lack of unreserved determination and fortitude of revolution. Despite the plenty of theories on revolution of the colonized in his time, they all stemmed from imperial countries. Thus, he argues, the colonized should have theories of revolution emerged out of their own soils and voiced through their own experiences.

which implied a sacrifice of states of less power and a restriction of freedom of those states.

Although Anderson offered us a rather romantic picture of anarchist interactions across national borders, this project, similar to Liu Xu, shed light on a different side of an interregional alliance in colonial East Asia. Chapter 1 emphasized a politically radical yet unequal structure of an inter-East Asian alliance, where Korean and Taiwanese artists and activists struggled due to Sinocentrism, the Chinese Communist Party's incapacity to mobilize a revolution, and the Nationalist Party's collusion with imperial powers.

This dissertation highlighted the art of separation as well as association between colonial and semicolonial states in both political and aesthetical terrains. For Koreans and Taiwanese, the strategy of dissociating themselves from China was as powerful and crucial as that of allying themselves with Chinese audiences, artists, and revolutionaries. I stress that the inter-colonial aesthetics in the works of Zhang Shenqie and Chnag Chirak that I examined was not a matter of choosing either alliance or split, but that of opting for both. That is to say, diasporic artists engaged with whichever nation, and break any alliance, and could associate back with the nations they disassociated from. They could repeat this process at their will and needs.

Chǒng Kitak's film *National Spirit* engaged in the Chinese movement of making the "national spirit," yet it employed cinematic strategies—inclusion of diverse genres, performances, and new directing skills—that could attract a

heterogeneous Chinese mass public.³⁴⁰ The cases of Zhang Shenqie and Chang Chirak strategically moved between alliance and separation. My analysis focused on literature written when both writers were most disengaged from Chinese revolutions, and turned to national literature. Zhang Wojun, furthermore, took the strategy of taking a break in both national and individual levels. He suggested that the Chinese and Taiwanese people boldly split from the idea of nation-salvation, and they reflect on their authentic desires that even political change cannot bring about. Finally, Li Kyöngson dramatized Taiwan's anticolonial resistance, which had not been fictionalized before. By unveiling a silenced anti-Japanese resistance of Taiwan, with which he had no personal or public ties, he exemplified the model of aesthetic fluency in different national issues.

To advocate the right to separate from allied nations and one's own society is far from pursuing individual utopianism. As Proudon argued, entirely unrelated individualities cannot enjoy unlimited freedom. It is because they cannot resolve the problem of common interests.³⁴¹ Even free individuals should have collective power and organic connection that they can use at the time of demand. This insight also works in international relations. That is to say, it is critical to maintain a tension between an individualist and a socialist, or an allied and a seceded. The Korean and Taiwanese diasporic artists that this dissertation examined successfully engaged heterogeneous, unstable audiences across national borders through aesthetic fluency in

³⁴⁰ His later works, such as *Goodbye Shanghai* (*zaihuiba Shanghai*) and *Path of Life* (*guangming zhi lu*), more deeply engaged in Chinese social issues on women and the lower class.

³⁴¹ See Daniel Guérin, *Anarchism: From Theory to Practice*. Trans. Mary Klopfer (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1970) 31.

different national issues and also through a strategic split from any alliance or association. These examples of inter-colonial aesthetics tell us how Korea and Taiwan at the margins of the empire were able to make the best use of, or exploited, an inter-East Asian alliance with no cost of sacrifices or subjugation to China.

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