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Publication Date

2006-08-24

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# Two-Sided Matching and Spread Determinants in the Loan Market

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August 24, 2006

## Abstract

Empirical work on bank loans typically regresses loan spreads (markups of loan interest rates over a benchmark rate) on observed characteristics of banks, firms, and loans. The estimation is problematic when some of these characteristics are only partially observed and the matching of banks and firms is endogenously determined because they prefer partners that have higher quality. We study the U.S. bank loan market with a two-sided matching model to control for the endogenous matching, and obtain Bayesian inference using a Gibbs sampling algorithm with data augmentation. We find evidence of positive assortative matching of sizes, explained by similar relationships between quality and size on both sides of the market. Banks' risk and firms' risk are important factors in their quality. Controlling for the endogenous matching has a strong impact on estimated coefficients in the loan spread equation.

KEYWORDS: Two-Sided Matching, Loan Spread, Bayesian Inference, Gibbs Sampling with Data Augmentation

## 1 Introduction

Bank loans play a unique role in corporate financing. They are important not only for small businesses, which often lack access to public debt markets, but also for large corporations, which depend on them as a reliable source of liquidity helping to insulate them from market shocks (Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999; James and Smith, 2000). Furthermore, bank lending is an important conduit for monetary policy and is closely linked to investment and macroeconomic activity (Kashyap and

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Stein 1994). Not surprisingly, empirical researchers have long been interested in the pricing of bank loans. For example, loan spreads (markups of loan interest rates over a benchmark rate) are regressed on characteristics of banks, firms, and loans to examine the relationship between collateral and risk in financial contracting (Berger and Udell, 1990), and to provide evidence of the bank lending channel of monetary transmission (Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia, 2002). However, the non-randomness of the bank-firm pairs in the loan samples is typically ignored. In this paper, we argue that banks and firms prefer to match with partners that have higher quality, so banks choose firms, firms choose banks, and the matching outcome is endogenously determined. We show that because of the endogeneity, the regressors in the loan spread equation are correlated with the error term, so OLS estimation is problematic. We develop a two-sided matching model to take into account the endogenous matching, and show that controlling for the endogenous matching has a strong impact on the estimates.

Both firms and banks have strong economic incentives to choose their partners. When a bank lends to a firm, the bank not only supplies credit to the firm but also provides monitoring, expert advice, and endorsement based on reputation (e.g. Diamond, 1984 and 1991). Empirical evidence suggests that those “by-products” are important for firms. For instance, Billet, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) and Johnson (1997) show that banks’ monitoring ability and reputation have significant positive effects on borrowers’ performance in the stock market.

The size of a bank—the amount of its total assets—also plays an important role in firms’ choices. First, a larger bank is likely to have better diversified assets and a lower risk, making it more attractive to firms. Second, the small size of a bank may place a constraint on its lending, which is undesirable for a borrowing firm, since its subsequent loan requests could be denied and it might have to find a new lender and pay a switching cost. Third, large banks usually have more organizational layers and face more severe information distortion problems than small banks, so they are generally less effective in processing and communicating borrower information, making them less able to provide valuable client-specific monitoring and expert advice. Fourth, Brickley, Linck and Smith (2003) observe that employees in small to medium-sized banks own higher percentages of their banks’ stocks than employees in large banks. As a result the loan officers in small to medium-sized banks have stronger incentives and will devote more effort to collecting and processing borrower information, which helps the banks better serve their clients. Thus the size of a bank has multiple effects on its quality perceived by firms and those effects operate in opposite directions. Which bank size is most attractive is determined by the net effect.

Banks' characteristics affect how much benefit borrowing firms will receive, so firms prefer banks that are better in those characteristics, e.g., banks with higher monitoring ability, better reputation, suitable size, and so on. Banks are ranked by firms according to a composite quality index that combines those characteristics.

Now consider banks' choices. In making their lending decisions, loan officers in a bank screen the applicants (firms) and provide loans only to those who are considered creditworthy. Firms with lower leverage ratios (total debt/total assets) or higher current ratios (current assets/current liabilities) are usually considered less risky and more creditworthy. Larger firms also have an advantage here, because they generally have higher repaying ability and better diversified assets, and are more likely to have well-documented track records and lower information costs.

However, the large size of a firm also has negative effects on its attractiveness. Because larger firms have stronger financial needs, the loan made to a larger firm usually has a larger amount and accounts for a higher percentage of the bank's assets, thus reducing the bank's diversification. Since banks prefer well diversified portfolios, the large size of a borrowing firm may be considered unattractive. In addition, lending to a large firm means that the bank's control over the firm's investment decisions will be relatively small, which is undesirable.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the size of a firm also has multiple effects on its quality perceived by banks, and which firm size is most attractive depends on the relative magnitudes of those effects. Firms are ranked by banks according to a composite quality index that combines firms' characteristics, such as their risks and their sizes.

The above analysis shows that there is endogenous two-sided matching in the loan market: banks choose firms, firms choose banks, and they all prefer partners that have higher quality. Consequently, firms with higher quality tend to match with banks with higher quality, and vice versa.

In our model banks' and firms' quality are multidimensional, but to illustrate the implications of the endogenous matching, we assume for a moment that a bank's quality is solely determined by its liquidity risk, and that a firm's quality is solely determined by its information costs. Further assume that banks' liquidity risk, firms' information costs, and non-price loan characteristics such as maturity and loan size are determinants of loan spreads. The spread equation is:

$$r_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \kappa L_i + \lambda I_j + N'_{ij} \alpha_3 + \nu_{ij}, \quad \nu_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma_\nu^2), \quad (1)$$

where  $r_{ij}$  is the loan spread if bank  $i$  lends to firm  $j$ ,  $L_i$  is bank  $i$ 's liquidity risk,  $I_j$  is firm  $j$ 's

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<sup>1</sup>See Rajan (1992) for a discussion on banks' control over borrowers' investment decisions.

information costs, and  $N_{ij}$  is the non-price loan characteristics.

Liquidity risk and information costs are not perfectly observed, and the bank's ratio of cash to total assets and the firm's ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) to total assets are used as their proxies, respectively. Assume

$$L_i = \rho C_i + \eta_i, \quad \eta_i \sim N(0, \sigma_\eta^2), \quad \text{and}$$

$$I_j = \sigma P_j + \delta_j, \quad \delta_j \sim N(0, \sigma_\delta^2),$$

where  $C_i$  is bank  $i$ 's ratio of cash to total assets, and  $P_j$  is firm  $j$ 's ratio of PP&E to total assets. Now equation (1) becomes

$$\begin{aligned} r_{ij} &= \alpha_0 + \kappa(\rho C_i + \eta_i) + \lambda(\sigma P_j + \delta_j) + N'_{ij}\alpha_3 + \nu_{ij} \\ &= \alpha_0 + \kappa\rho C_i + \lambda\sigma P_j + N'_{ij}\alpha_3 + \kappa\eta_i + \lambda\delta_j + \nu_{ij}. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Note that the error term contains  $\eta_i$  and  $\delta_j$ , the unobserved quality. Because of the endogenous matching, the characteristics of the partner of a bank or a firm are correlated with the bank or the firm's unobserved quality. As a result, the regressors in the spread equation are correlated with the error term, so OLS estimation of the equation is problematic.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, since any variable that influences the matching affects the error term through the unobserved quality, the method of instrumental variables (IV) is not applicable here.

To take into account the endogenous matching, a many-to-one two-sided matching model in the loan market is developed and estimated. The model is a special case of the College Admissions Model, for which an equilibrium matching always exists (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). The two-sided matching model is applied to markets in which agents are divided into two sides and each participant chooses a partner or partners from the other side. Examples include the labor market, the marriage market, the education market, and so on. There are a few studies on two-sided matching in financial markets. Sorensen (forthcoming) studies the matching between venture capitalists and the companies in which they invest. Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005) study the matching between firms and their underwriters.

We obtain Bayesian inference using a Gibbs sampling algorithm (Geman and Geman, 1984; Gelfand and Smith, 1990; Geweke, 1999) with data augmentation (Tanner and Wong, 1987; Albert

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<sup>2</sup>The endogeneity problem that comes from the use of proxies in the matching context is recognized in the literature. For example, Akerberg and Botticini (2002) describe the endogeneity problem introduced by the use of proxies in analyzing the matching process of agricultural contracts.

and Chib, 1993). The method iteratively simulates each block of the parameters and the latent variables conditional on all the others to recover the joint posterior distribution. It transforms an integration problem into a simulation problem and overcomes the computational difficulty of integrating a highly nonlinear function over thousands of dimensions, most of which correspond to the latent variables. The method is applied to the estimation of the optimal job search model (Lancaster, 1997) and the selection model of hospital admissions (Geweke, Gowrisankaran, and Town, 2003), among others. Sorensen (forthcoming) is the first study that uses the method to estimate a two-sided matching model, and is the paper closest to our study.

Our empirical analysis uses a sample of 1,369 U.S. loan facilities between 146 banks and 1,007 firms from 1996 to 2003. We find that positive assortative matching of sizes is prevalent in the loan market, that is, large banks tend to match with large firms, and vice versa. We then show that for agents on both sides of the market there are similar relationships between quality and size, which lead to similar size rankings for both sides and explain the positive assortative matching of sizes. Banks' risk and firms' risk are important factors in their quality. The Bayesian estimates of the loan spread equation are markedly different from the OLS estimates, indicating that controlling for the endogenous matching has a strong impact on the estimates.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the specification of the model, Section 3 presents the empirical method for Bayesian inference, Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 presents and interprets the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Model

The first component of our model is a spread equation, in which the loan spread is a function of the bank's characteristics, the firm's characteristics, and the non-price characteristics of the loan. A two-sided matching model in the loan market supplements the spread equation to permit non-random matching of banks and firms.

### 2.1 Spread Equation

We are interested in estimating the following spread equation:

$$r_{ij} = \alpha_0 + B_i' \alpha_1 + F_j' \alpha_2 + N_{ij}' \alpha_3 + \epsilon_{ij} \equiv U_{ij}' \alpha + \epsilon_{ij}, \quad \epsilon_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma_\epsilon^2), \quad (3)$$

where  $r_{ij}$  is the loan spread if bank  $i$  lends to firm  $j$ ,  $B_i$  is a vector of bank  $i$ 's characteristics,  $F_j$  is a vector of firm  $j$ 's characteristics, and  $N_{ij}$  is the non-price loan characteristics.

Prior studies, such as Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) and Coleman, Esho and Sharpe (2004), suggest that the bank's monitoring ability and risk, as well as the firm's risk and information costs are important determinants of the loan spread. Those characteristics are not perfectly observed, so we follow the literature and use proxies for them in the spread equation. Because estimation of our model is numerically intensive, we focus on a parsimonious specification to keep estimation feasible.

**Bank's Monitoring Ability.** According to the hold-up theory in Rajan (1992) and Diamond and Rajan (2000), a bank that has superior monitoring ability can use its skills to extract higher rents. Moreover, Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984, 1991) and Allen (1990) show that banks' monitoring plays an important role in firms' operation and provides value to them. Therefore, we expect a bank that has higher monitoring ability to charge a higher spread.

A bank's salaries-expenses ratio, defined as the ratio of salaries and benefits to total operating expenses, is a proxy for its monitoring ability. Coleman, Esho and Sharpe (2004) show that monitoring activities are relatively labor-intensive, and that salaries can reflect the staff's ability and performance in these activities.

**Bank's Risk.** A bank's risk comes from two sources: inadequate capital and low liquidity. Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) suggest that a low capital-assets ratio reduces the bank's ability to extract repayment, therefore lowering the recovery rate in default and forcing the bank to charge a higher spread. Furthermore, a bank that has higher liquidity (or lower liquidity risk) is better able to meet the credit or cash needs of its borrowers, so it charges a higher spread.

A bank's capital-assets ratio is a proxy for its capital adequacy, and its ratio of cash to total assets is a proxy for its liquidity risk. The size of a bank (its total assets) is also a proxy for its risk, since a larger bank is likely to have better diversified assets and lower risk.

**Firm's Risk.** Proxies for a firm's risk include the leverage ratio (total debt/total assets), the current ratio (current assets/current liabilities), and the size of the firm.

Risk is positively related to the leverage ratio, so a firm that has a higher leverage ratio is charged a higher spread, all else being equal. On the other hand, a firm with a higher current ratio is considered less risky, so it is typically charged a lower spread. Due to the diversification effects of increasing firm size, firm risk is negatively associated with firm assets, and a larger firm can usually get a loan with a lower spread.

**Firm’s Information Costs.** In general smaller firms pose larger information asymmetries and are associated with higher information costs, because they typically lack well-documented track records. So the size of a firm is also a proxy for information costs.

Another proxy for a firm’s information costs is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) to total assets, which indicates the relative significance of tangible assets in the firm. A firm with relatively more tangible assets poses smaller information asymmetries. Consequently it can borrow at a lower spread, all else being equal.

**Non-Price Loan Characteristics.** Non-price loan characteristics are included on the right-hand side of the spread equation as control variables. They are maturity (in months), natural log of the loan facility size, purpose dummies such as “acquisition” and “recapitalization”, type dummies such as “a revolver credit line with duration shorter than one year”, and a secured dummy. The definitions of these variables are presented in Section 4.

## 2.2 Two-Sided Matching Model

To take into account the endogenous matching, a two-sided matching model is developed to supplement the spread equation and address the sample selection problem resulting from the non-random matching between banks and firms:

$$r_{ij} = \alpha_0 + B'_i\alpha_1 + F'_j\alpha_2 + N'_{ij}\alpha_3 + \epsilon_{ij} \equiv U'_{ij}\alpha + \epsilon_{ij}, \quad \epsilon_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma_\epsilon^2), \quad (4)$$

$$Q_i^b = B'_i\beta + \eta_i, \quad \eta_i \sim N(0, \sigma_\eta^2), \quad (5)$$

$$Q_j^f = F'_j\gamma + \delta_j, \quad \delta_j \sim N(0, \sigma_\delta^2), \quad (6)$$

$$m_{ij} = \text{I}(\text{bank } i \text{ lends to firm } j), \quad (7)$$

where  $Q_i^b$  is the quality index of bank  $i$ ,  $Q_j^f$  is the quality index of firm  $j$ , and  $\text{I}(\cdot)$  is the indicator function.  $r_{ij}$ ,  $N_{ij}$  are observed iff the match indicator  $m_{ij} = 1$ .  $\eta_i$  and  $\delta_j$  are allowed to be correlated with  $\epsilon_{ij}$ .

In the two-sided matching model, whether  $m_{ij}$  equals one or zero is determined by both banks’ choices and firms’ choices, and the outcome corresponds to the unique equilibrium matching (defined later), which depends on the  $Q_i^b$ ’s and the  $Q_j^f$ ’s.

Note that in the loan market, the two-sided matching process between banks and firms takes place before loan spreads are determined. For example, Miller and Bavaria (2003) and Yago and McCarthy (2004) document that in the second half of the 1990’s, “market-flex language” became



common in the loan market, which lets the pricing of a loan be determined after the loan agreement is made. Because of this institutional feature, during the matching process banks and firms do not know what the loan spreads would be. They take into account the expectation of the spreads, which is a function of the characteristics of the agents. As long as those characteristics are linear in expected spreads, the spread consideration is reflected in the quality indexes and the indexes can be viewed as “spread-adjusted” quality indexes.

**Agents, Quotas and Matches.** Let  $I_t$  and  $J_t$  denote, respectively, the sets of banks and firms in market  $t$ , where  $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$ .  $I_t$  and  $J_t$  are finite and disjoint. The market subscript  $t$  is sometimes dropped to simplify the notation.

In the empirical implementation of our model, a market is specified to contain all the firms that borrow during a half-year and all the banks that lend to them. In our sample the vast majority of firms borrow only once during a half-year. In such a short period of time, it is likely that a firm’s financial needs can be satisfied by a single loan, whereas borrowing multiple loans would increase the administrative costs, such as the costs associated with the negotiation process. Therefore it is reasonable to model that a firm matches with only one bank in a given market.

On the other hand, a bank often lends to multiple firms during a half-year. A bank’s lending activity is restricted in two ways. First, loan assessment, approval, monitoring, and review processes are relatively labor-intensive, and a bank’s lending activity is restricted by the amount of resources that is available for these processes, e.g., the number of its loan officers. Consequently, the number of loans that a bank can make during a given half-year is limited.<sup>3</sup> Second, the total amount of loans a bank can make may be constrained by the availability of deposits, the primary source of funds for bank lending (Jayaratne and Morgan, 2000). Jayaratne and Morgan (2000) find evidence that the deposits constraint on bank lending operates only on small banks whose assets are less than \$100 million, and that larger banks are unconstrained because they have better access to capital markets. In our sample less than 1% of the banks have assets lower than \$100 million, so the lending constraint posed by inadequate deposits is less of a concern. In our study we take the limit on the total amount of loans as non-binding and take the limit on the number of loans as binding to simplify the empirical implementation and make the model tractable.

In market  $t$ , bank  $i$  can lend to  $q_{it}$  firms and firm  $j$  can borrow from only one bank. The model is a special case of the many-to-one two-sided matching model, also known as the College

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<sup>3</sup>In the long run, the limit on the number of loans that a bank can make during a half-year can change, since the bank can hire or lay off loan officers if needed.

Admissions Model (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).  $q_{it}$  is known as the *quota* of bank  $i$  in the matching literature, and every firm has a quota of one. We assume that each agent uses up its quota in equilibrium.

The set of all potential loans, or *matches*, is given by  $M_t = I_t \times J_t$ . A *matching*,  $\mu_t$ , is a set of matches such that  $(i, j) \in \mu_t$  if and only if bank  $i$  and firm  $j$  are matched in market  $t$ .

Let  $\mu_t(i)$  denote the set of firms that borrow from bank  $i$  in market  $t$ , and let  $\mu_t(j)$  denote the set of banks that lend to firm  $j$  in market  $t$ , which is a singleton. We then have

$$(i, j) \in \mu_t \iff j \in \mu_t(i) \iff i \in \mu_t(j) \iff \{i\} = \mu_t(j).$$

**Preferences.** The matching of banks and firms is determined by the equilibrium outcome of a two-sided matching process. The payoff firm  $j$  receives if it borrows from bank  $i$  is  $Q_i^b$ , and the payoff bank  $i$  receives if it lends to the firms in the set  $\mu_t(i)$  is  $\sum_{j \in \mu_t(i)} Q_j^f$ . Consequently, each bank prefers firm  $j$  to firm  $j'$  iff  $Q_j^f > Q_{j'}^f$ , and each firm prefers bank  $i$  to bank  $i'$  iff  $Q_i^b > Q_{i'}^b$ . The quality indexes are assumed to be distinct so there are no “ties”.

In our model there is vertical heterogeneity on both sides of the loan market: all banks have identical preference orderings over the firms and all firms have identical preference orderings over the banks. Consequently there is perfect sorting in the market. Vertical heterogeneity is assumed in many economic applications. For example, Wong (2003) assumes that in the marriage market, men and women are ranked by the other side of the market based on their “marriage indexes”. Therefore, all women have a common preference ordering over men, and all men have a common preference ordering over women. Other examples of vertical heterogeneity appear in the market for lawyers in which they are ranked by law firms according to their quality (Spurr, 1987), the market for workers in which they are ranked by firms according to their productivity (Oi, 1983), and so on. Vertical heterogeneity on both sides of the loan market guarantees that the equilibrium matching is unique. We discuss that issue later.

Note that the joint surplus for the pair of bank  $i$  and firm  $j$  is

$$\begin{aligned} s_{ij} &= Q_i^b + Q_j^f \\ &= B_i' \beta + F_j' \gamma + \eta_i + \delta_j \\ &= B_i' \beta + F_j' \gamma + \omega_{ij}. \end{aligned}$$

Two features of the joint surplus are worth mentioning. First, the error term  $\omega_{ij}$  consists of  $\eta_i$

and  $\delta_j$ . As a result,  $cov(\omega_{ij}, \omega_{ij'}) \neq 0$  and  $cov(\omega_{ij}, \omega_{i'j}) \neq 0, \forall i \neq i', j \neq j'$ . Therefore the  $\omega_{ij}$ 's are not independent variables.

Second, in our model the joint surplus depends on bank characteristics and firm characteristics. A more general model will include pair-specific surplus that depends on pair characteristics, such as the bank's expertise in the borrower's industry and the distance between the agents' headquarters, and the division of the pair-specific surplus between the pair can be endogenous.<sup>4</sup> Due to data limitations and tractability concerns, we are unable to include pair characteristics in our model. In the more general model, as long as the magnitudes of the pair-specific surplus are not large enough to change the preference orderings, we will still have vertical heterogeneity on both sides of the market. For example, if the quality indexes are distinct integers and the pair-specific surplus have absolute values smaller than 0.5, then the preference orderings are still determined entirely by the quality indexes.

**Equilibrium Matching.** A matching is an equilibrium if it is stable, that is, if there is no blocking coalition of agents. A coalition of agents is blocking if they prefer to deviate from the current matching and form new matches among them.

Formally,  $\mu_t$  is an equilibrium matching in market  $t$  iff there does not exist  $\tilde{I} \subset I_t, \tilde{J} \subset J_t$  and  $\tilde{\mu}_t \neq \mu_t$  such that  $\tilde{\mu}_t(i) \subset \tilde{I} \cup \mu_t(i)$  and  $\sum_{j \in \tilde{\mu}_t(i)} Q_j^f > \sum_{j \in \mu_t(i)} Q_j^f$  for all  $i \in \tilde{I}$ , and  $\tilde{\mu}_t(j) \in \tilde{I}$  and  $Q_{\tilde{\mu}_t(j)}^b > Q_{\mu_t(j)}^b$  for all  $j \in \tilde{J}$ .

The above stability concept is group stability. A related stability concept is pair-wise stability. A matching is pair-wise stable if there is no blocking pair. In the College Admissions Model, Roth and Sotomayor (1990) prove that pair-wise stability is equivalent to group stability and that an equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, Eeckhout (2000, Corollary 3) shows that in a one-to-one two-sided matching model, the equilibrium matching is unique if there is vertical heterogeneity on both sides of the market. Appendix A shows that this sufficient condition for uniqueness also applies to the many-to-one two-sided matching model. Therefore in our model there exists a unique equilibrium matching.

Similar to Sorensen (forthcoming), the unique equilibrium matching here can be characterized by a set of inequalities. These inequalities are constructed based on the fact that there is no blocking bank-firm pair for the equilibrium matching. Consider an arbitrary matching in market

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<sup>4</sup>See Stomper (forthcoming) for a discussion on banks' industry expertise and Coval and Moskowitz (2001) for a discussion on the importance of physical distance for information gathering.

$t, \mu_t$ . Suppose bank  $i$  and firm  $j$  are not matched in  $\mu_t$ .  $(i, j)$  is a blocking pair iff  $Q_j^f > \min_{j' \in \mu_t(i)} Q_{j'}^f$  and  $Q_i^b > Q_{\mu_t(j)}^b$ . So  $(i, j)$  is not a blocking pair iff  $Q_j^f < \min_{j' \in \mu_t(i)} Q_{j'}^f$  or  $Q_i^b < Q_{\mu_t(j)}^b$ . Equivalently,  $(i, j)$  is not a blocking pair iff  $Q_j^f < \overline{Q}_{ji}^f$  and  $Q_i^b < \overline{Q}_{ij}^b$ , where

$$\overline{Q}_{ji}^f = \begin{cases} \min_{j' \in \mu_t(i)} Q_{j'}^f & \text{if } Q_i^b > Q_{\mu_t(j)}^b \\ \infty & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

and

$$\overline{Q}_{ij}^b = \begin{cases} Q_{\mu_t(j)}^b & \text{if } Q_j^f > \min_{j' \in \mu_t(i)} Q_{j'}^f \\ \infty & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Now suppose bank  $i$  and firm  $j$  are matched in  $\mu_t$ . Bank  $i$  or firm  $j$  is part of a blocking pair iff  $Q_j^f < \max_{j' \in f(i)} Q_{j'}^f$  or  $Q_i^b < \max_{i' \in f(j)} Q_{i'}^b$ , where  $f(i)$  is the set of firms that do not currently borrow from bank  $i$  but would prefer to do so, and  $f(j)$  is the set of banks that do not currently lend to firm  $j$  but would prefer to do so. These two sets contain the feasible deviations of the agents and are given by

$$\begin{aligned} f(i) &= \{j \in J_t \setminus \mu_t(i) : Q_i^b > Q_{\mu_t(j)}^b\}, \text{ and} \\ f(j) &= \{i \in I_t \setminus \mu_t(j) : Q_j^f > \min_{j' \in \mu_t(i)} Q_{j'}^f\}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, neither bank  $i$  nor firm  $j$  is part of a blocking pair iff  $Q_j^f > \underline{Q}_{ji}^f$  and  $Q_i^b > \underline{Q}_{ij}^b$ , where  $\underline{Q}_{ji}^f = \max_{j' \in f(i)} Q_{j'}^f$  and  $\underline{Q}_{ij}^b = \max_{i' \in f(j)} Q_{i'}^b$ .

Let  $\mu_t^e$  denote the (unique) equilibrium matching in market  $t$ . The above analysis leads to the following characterization of the equilibrium matching:

$$\mu_t = \mu_t^e \iff Q_i^b \in (\underline{Q}_i^b, \overline{Q}_i^b), \forall i \in I_t \text{ and } Q_j^f \in (\underline{Q}_j^f, \overline{Q}_j^f), \forall j \in J_t, \quad (8)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \underline{Q}_i^b &= \max_{j \in \mu_t(i)} \underline{Q}_{ij}^b, \\ \overline{Q}_i^b &= \min_{j \notin \mu_t(i)} \overline{Q}_{ij}^b, \\ \underline{Q}_j^f &= \underline{Q}_{j, \mu_t(j)}^f, \text{ and} \\ \overline{Q}_j^f &= \min_{i \notin \mu_t(j)} \overline{Q}_{ji}^f. \end{aligned}$$

This characterization of the equilibrium matching is used in the Bayesian inference method in the next section.

### 3 Estimation

Two-sided matching in the loan market presents numerical challenges when it comes to estimation. Maximum likelihood estimation requires integrating a highly nonlinear function over thousands of dimensions, most of which correspond to the latent quality indexes. Instead we use a Gibbs sampling algorithm that performs Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations to obtain Bayesian inference, and augment the observed data with simulated values of the latent data on quality indexes so that the augmented data are straightforward to analyze. The method iteratively simulates each block of the parameters and the latent variables conditional on all the others to recover the joint posterior distribution. It transforms a high-dimensional integration problem into a simulation problem and overcomes the computational difficulty.

#### 3.1 Error Terms and Prior Distributions

Estimation of the quality index equations is subject to the usual identification constraints in discrete choice models, so  $\sigma_\eta$  and  $\sigma_\delta$  are set to one to fix the scales, and the constant and market characteristics are excluded to fix the levels.

To address the correlation among the error terms, we work with the population regression of  $\epsilon_{ij}$  on  $\eta_i$  and  $\delta_j$ :

$$\begin{aligned}\epsilon_{ij} &= \kappa\eta_i + \lambda\delta_j + \nu_{ij}, \nu_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma_\nu^2), \\ \text{cov}(\eta_i, \nu_{ij}) &= 0, \\ \text{cov}(\delta_j, \nu_{ij}) &= 0.\end{aligned}$$

Thus  $\text{cov}(\epsilon_{ij}, \eta_i) = \kappa$ ,  $\text{cov}(\epsilon_{ij}, \delta_j) = \lambda$ , and  $\sigma_\epsilon^2 = \kappa^2 + \lambda^2 + \sigma_\nu^2$ . The signs in the two-sided matching model are identified by requiring  $\lambda$  to be non-positive, consistent with the belief that firms with higher unobserved quality (lower unobserved risk or unobserved information costs) are charged lower loan spreads, everything else being equal.

The prior distributions are multivariate normal for  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$ , normal for  $\kappa$ , and truncated normal for  $\lambda$  (truncated on the right at 0). The means of these prior distributions are zeros, and the variance-covariance matrices are  $10I$ , where  $I$  is an identity matrix. The prior distribution of  $1/\sigma_\nu^2$  is gamma,  $1/\sigma_\nu^2 \sim G(2.5, 1)$ . The above are diffuse priors that include reasonable parameter values well within their supports. We try larger variances and other changes in the priors and the estimates are left almost unchanged. For any parameter, the variance of the prior distribution is at

least 233 times the variance of the posterior distribution, showing that the information contained in the Bayesian inference is substantial.

### 3.2 Conditional Posterior Distributions

In the model, the exogenous variables are  $B_i$ ,  $F_j$ , and  $N_{ij}$ , which are abbreviated as  $X$ . The observed endogenous variables are  $r_{ij}$  (the loan spread) and  $m_{ij}$  (the match indicator). The unobserved quality indexes are  $Q_i^b$  and  $Q_j^f$ . The parameters are  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$ ,  $\kappa$ ,  $\lambda$ , and  $1/\sigma_\nu^2$ , which are abbreviated as  $\theta$ . In market  $t$ , let  $X_t$ ,  $r_t$ ,  $\mu_t$  and  $Q_t^*$  represent the above variables, where  $\mu_t$  embodies all the  $m_{ij}$ 's and  $Q_t^*$  denotes all the quality indexes.

The joint density of the endogenous variables and the quality indexes conditional on the exogenous variables and the parameters is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
p(r_t, \mu_t, Q_t^* \mid X_t, \theta) &= \mathbf{I} \left( Q_i^b \in (\underline{Q}_i^b, \overline{Q}_i^b), \forall i \in I_t \text{ and } Q_j^f \in (\underline{Q}_j^f, \overline{Q}_j^f), \forall j \in J_t \right) \\
&\times \prod_{(i,j) \in \mu_t} \phi \left( r_{ij} - U_{ij}' \alpha - \kappa(Q_i^b - B_i' \beta) - \lambda(Q_j^f - F_j' \gamma); 0, \sigma_\nu^2 \right) \\
&\times \prod_{i \in I_t} \phi(Q_i^b - B_i' \beta; 0, 1) \times \prod_{j \in J_t} \phi(Q_j^f - F_j' \gamma; 0, 1), \tag{9}
\end{aligned}$$

where  $\mathbf{I}(\cdot)$  is the indicator function and  $\phi(\cdot; \mu, \sigma^2)$  is the  $N(\mu, \sigma^2)$  pdf. To obtain the likelihood function for market  $t$   $L_t(\theta) = p(r_t, \mu_t \mid X_t, \theta)$ , we need to integrate  $p(r_t, \mu_t, Q_t^* \mid X_t, \theta)$  over all possible values of the quality indexes. Due to endogenous matching in the market, the bounds on each agent's quality index depend on other agents' quality indexes, so the integral can not be factored into a product of lower-dimensional integrals. The Gibbs sampling algorithm with data augmentation transforms this high-dimensional integration problem into a simulation problem and makes estimation feasible.

To keep our study tractable, we model the markets as independent, so the product of  $p(r_t, \mu_t, Q_t^* \mid X_t, \theta)$  for  $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$  gives the joint density  $p(r, \mu, Q^* \mid X, \theta)$  for all the markets. From Bayes' rule, the density of the posterior distribution of  $Q^*$  and  $\theta$  conditional on the data is

$$\begin{aligned}
p(Q^*, \theta \mid X, r, \mu) &= p(\theta) \times p(r, \mu, Q^* \mid X, \theta) / p(r, \mu \mid X) \\
&= C \times p(\theta) \times p(r, \mu, Q^* \mid X, \theta) \tag{10}
\end{aligned}$$

where  $C$  is a generic proportionality constant and  $p(\theta)$  is the prior densities of the parameters.

Successful application of the Gibbs sampling algorithm requires simple conditional posterior distributions of the quality indexes and the parameters from which random numbers can be

generated at low computational costs. We obtain those distributions by examining the kernels of the conditional posterior densities. For example, if parameter  $\pi$  has density  $p(\pi) = C_1 \times \exp[-\frac{1}{2}(\pi' M \pi + 2\pi' N + C_2)]$  where  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  are constants, then  $\pi \sim N(-M^{-1}N, M^{-1})$ . The conditional posterior distributions are described in Appendix B. They are truncated normal for  $Q_i^b$ ,  $Q_j^f$ , and  $\lambda$ , multivariate normal for  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , and  $\gamma$ , normal for  $\kappa$ , and gamma for  $1/\sigma_\nu^2$ .

### 3.3 Simulation

In the algorithm, the parameters and the quality indexes are partitioned into blocks. Each of the parameter vectors ( $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$ ,  $\kappa$ ,  $\lambda$ , and  $1/\sigma_\nu^2$ ) and the quality indexes is a block. In market  $t$  the number of quality indexes is equal to the number of agents,  $|I_t| + |J_t|$ , so altogether we have  $\sum_{t=1}^T (|I_t| + |J_t|) + 6$  blocks. In each iteration of the algorithm, each block is simulated conditional on all the others according to the conditional posterior distributions, and the sequence of draws converge in distribution to the joint distribution.<sup>5</sup>

Bayesian results reported in Section 5 are based on 20,000 draws from which the initial 2,000 are discarded to allow for burn-in. Using Matlab 6.5, these iterations took 52 hours on a computer running Windows XP with a 1.3 GHZ Intel Pentium M processor. Visual inspection of the draws shows that convergence to the stationary posterior distribution occurs within the burn-in period. Convergence diagnostics from the Geweke test (Geweke, 1992) do not reject the hypotheses of equal means between draws 2,001  $\sim$  3,800 (the first 10% after burn-in) and draws 11,001  $\sim$  20,000 (the last 50% after burn-in). Additionally, the Raftery-Lewis test (Raftery and Lewis, 1992) using all the draws shows that a small amount of burn-in (6 draws) and a total of 8,700 draws are needed for the estimated 95% highest posterior density intervals to have actual posterior probabilities between 0.94 and 0.96 with probability 0.95, indicating that reasonable accuracy can be achieved using the draws we have.

## 4 Data

We obtain the data from three sources. Information on loans comes from the DealScan database produced by the Loan Pricing Corporation. To obtain information on bank characteristics, we match the banks in DealScan to those in the Reports of Condition and Income (known as the Call Reports) from the Federal Reserve Board. To obtain information on firm characteristics, we match

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<sup>5</sup>The sufficient condition for convergence set forth in Roberts and Smith (1994) is satisfied.

the firms in DealScan to those in the Compustat database, a product of Standard & Poor's.

## 4.1 Sample

The DealScan database contains detailed information on lending to large businesses in the U.S. dating back to 1988. The majority of the data come from commitment letters and credit agreements in Securities and Exchange Commission filings, but data from large loan syndicators and the Loan Pricing Corporation's own staff of reporters are also collected. For each loan facility, DealScan reports the identities of the borrower and the lender, the pricing information (spread and fees), and the information on non-price loan characteristics, such as maturity, secured status, purpose of the loan, and type of the loan.

We focus on loan facilities between U.S. banks and U.S. firms from 1996 to 2003, and divide them into sixteen markets, each containing all the lending banks and all the borrowing firms in a same half-year: January to June or July to December.<sup>6</sup> Data on banks' and firms' characteristics are from the quarter that precedes the market.

A loan facility is included in the sample if the following criteria are satisfied: (1) Data on characteristics of the loan, the bank, and the firm are not missing. (2) If there is more than one lender, one and only one lead arranger is specified.<sup>7</sup> (3) The firm borrows only once in the given market. (4) The bank is matched to one and only one bank in the Call Report, and the firm is matched to one and only one firm in the Compustat database.

The sample consists of 1,369 loan facilities between 146 banks and 1,007 firms.<sup>8</sup> Figure 1 plots the number of banks and the number of firms in each market. The number of banks in each market is relatively stable, while the number of firms exhibits a slightly upward trend. The number of firms in each market is also the number of loan facilities in each market, since each firm borrows only once in a given market.

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<sup>6</sup>Changing the market definition from one half-year to one year or one quarter leaves our findings largely unaffected.

<sup>7</sup>When there are multiple lenders, the characteristics of the lead arranger are the most relevant for our analysis and we take the lead arranger as the lending bank. Angbazo, Mei and Saunders (1998) show that in syndicated loans, the administrative, monitoring, and contract enforcement responsibilities lie primarily with the lead arranger.

<sup>8</sup>Some banks and some firms participated in more than one market. The numbers of banks in the markets add up to 455, and the numbers of firms in the markets add up to 1,369.



## 4.2 Variables

Information on loan spreads comes from the All-In Spread Drawn (AIS) reported in the DealScan database. The AIS is expressed as a markup over the London Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR). It equals the sum of the coupon spread, the annual fee, and any one-time fee divided by the loan maturity. The AIS is given in basis points (1 basis point = 0.01%). Since several exogenous variables in our study are expressed in percentage points, we divide the AIS by 100 to obtain  $r_{ij}$ . Figure 2 plots the weighted average loan spread in percentage points for each market.

The matching of banks and firms ( $\mu$ ) is given by the names of the matched agents recorded in our loan facilities data.

The right-hand side of the spread equation includes a constant, year dummies, and three groups of exogenous variables. The first group includes the following bank characteristics: salaries-expenses ratio (salaries and benefits/total operating expenses), capital-assets ratio (total equity capital/total assets), ratio of cash to total assets (cash/total assets), and four size dummies. Each size dummy corresponds to one fifth of the banks with the cutoffs being \$5 billion, \$13 billion, \$32 billion, and \$76 billion in assets. The size dummy for the smallest one fifth is dropped. The size dummies enable us to detect nonlinear relationships between sizes and loan spreads.

The second group includes the following firm characteristics: leverage ratio (total debt/total assets), current ratio (current assets/current liabilities), ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) to total assets (PP&E/total assets), and four size dummies. Each size dummy corresponds to one fifth of the firms with the cutoffs being \$65 million, \$200 million, \$500 million, and \$1,500 million in assets. The size dummy for the smallest one fifth is dropped.

The third group includes the following non-price loan characteristics: maturity (in months), natural log of facility size, purpose dummies, type dummies, and a secured dummy. The loan purposes reported in DealScan are combined into five categories: acquisition (acquisition lines and takeover), general (corporate purposes and working capital), miscellaneous (capital expenditure, equipment purchase, IPO related finance, mortgage warehouse, project finance, purchase hardware, real estate, securities purchase, spinoff, stock buyback, telecom build-out, and trade finance), recapitalization (debt repayment/debt consolidation/refinancing and recapitalization), and other. The purpose dummy for “other” is dropped. There are three categories of loan types: revolver/line < 1 year (a revolving credit line whose duration is less than one year), revolver/line  $\geq$  1 year, and other. The type dummy for “other” is dropped. A secured dummy is also included, which equals

one if the loan facility requires a pledge of assets as collateral, and equals zero otherwise.

The right-hand side variables in the quality index equations are bank characteristics and firm characteristics, respectively. Bank assets, firm assets, and facility size are deflated using the GDP (Chained) Price Index reported in the Historical Tables in the Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2005, with the year 2000 being the base year. All ratios are expressed in percentage points. Table 1 provides the definitions and sources of the variables, and Table 2 presents summary statistics.

## 5 Findings

In this section, we first present evidence that positive assortative matching of sizes is prevalent in the loan market, that is, large banks tend to match with large firms, and vice versa. We then show that for agents on both sides of the market there are similar relationships between quality and size: after controlling for other factors, the medium-sized agents are regarded as having the highest quality, followed by the largest agents, and the smallest agents are at the bottom of the list. Consequently there are similar size rankings on both sides, which explain the positive assortative matching of sizes. Banks' risk and firms' risk are important factors in their quality. The Bayesian estimates of the loan spread equation are markedly different from the OLS estimates, confirming that controlling for the endogenous matching has a strong impact on the estimates. Finally, the effects of bank characteristics, firm characteristics, and non-price loan characteristics on loan spreads are examined.

### 5.1 Positive Assortative Matching of Sizes

It is recognized in the literature that large banks tend to lend to large firms and vice versa. See, for example, Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) and Berger et al. (2005). To verify this positive assortative matching of sizes, two OLS regressions using the matched pairs are run: the bank's size on the firm's characteristics and the firm's size on the bank's characteristics. The results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. It is shown that the bank's size and the firm's size are strongly positively correlated. The coefficients on partners' sizes are both positive and have  $t$  statistics at about 20, indicating that there is indeed positive assortative matching of sizes.

Figure 3 provides further evidence. It depicts the proportion of loans for each combination of bank-firm size groups. For example, the height of the column at (2,3) represents the proportion

of loans between banks in the second bank size group (with assets between the 20th and the 40th percentiles) and firms in the third firm size group (with assets between the 40th and the 60th percentiles). A clear pattern is observed: the highest columns are mostly on the main diagonal (from (1, 1) to (5, 5)), whereas the columns far off the main diagonal (e.g., (1, 5) and (5, 1)) are rather short. The figure illustrates that most of the loans are between banks and firms that have similar size positions on their respective sides.

## 5.2 Quality Indexes

Table 5 reports the posterior means and standard deviations of the coefficients in the quality index equations (5) and (6).

**Sizes of the Agents.** All the size dummies have positive coefficients and most of them are significant, indicating that on both sides of the market, the group of the smallest agents—the omitted group—is considered the worst in terms of quality.<sup>9</sup> On the lenders’ side, the smallest banks suffer from severe lending constraints and low reputation associated with their small sizes. On the borrowers’ side, the smallest firms are considered the least creditworthy because they have low repaying ability and less diversified assets, and lack well-documented track records to convince the lenders.

A closer look at the coefficients reveals that on both sides of the market, it is the medium-sized agents who have the highest quality. Banks with assets between the 40th and the 80th percentiles (group 3 and group 4) and firms with assets between the 40th and the 60th percentiles (group 3) are the most attractive. The largest agents are less attractive than the medium-sized ones, but are better than the smallest ones.

As the size of a bank increases, it has lower risk and greater lending capacity, making it more attractive. On the other hand, larger banks typically have more severe information distortion problems, and their loan officers have weaker incentives in collecting and processing borrower information. For the group of the largest banks, these negative effects outweigh the banks’ advantages over the medium-sized banks in terms of risk and lending capacity.

Similarly, as the size of a firm increases, its repaying ability grows, its assets are more diversified, and it can better provide information that is needed to prove its creditworthiness. However, the

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<sup>9</sup>Here and henceforth statistical significance of Bayesian estimates is taken to mean that zero is not contained in the corresponding highest posterior density intervals.

group of the largest firms are less attractive than the medium-sized firms because lending to the largest firms means that the bank's assets will be less diversified and that its control over the firms' investment decisions will be weaker, and these disadvantages of the largest firms dominate their advantages over the medium-sized firms.

Note that the negative effect of a firm's large size on its quality is likely understated, since in our model the limit on the number of loans a bank can make is binding and the limit on the total amount of loans is non-binding. If we take into account that sometimes the binding limit is on the total amount of loans, then lending to a large firm should be less attractive: the size of the loan will typically be large, which means that the bank may have to sacrifice more than one lending opportunity elsewhere in order to lend to this large firm, impairing the bank's assets diversification.

The size rankings for both sides of the loan market are similar. From the highest quality to the lowest quality, the size ranking is 4-3-2-5-1 for the banks and 3-4-2-5-1 for the firms, where the numbers represent the size groups. All else being equal, the medium-sized agents have higher quality than the largest ones, which in turn have higher quality than the smallest ones. That explains the positive assortative matching of sizes. Medium-sized banks lend to medium-sized firms because both groups are the top candidates on their respective sides. Among the remaining agents, who face restricted choice sets, the largest banks and the largest firms are the top candidates, so they are matched. Finally, the smallest banks and the smallest firms have the lowest quality, and they have no choice but to match with each other.

**Other Factors.** On the banks' side, the coefficient on the ratio of cash to total assets is positive and significant, reflecting the negative impact of banks' liquidity risk on their quality. The coefficients on the salaries-expenses ratio and the capital-assets ratio are both positive, consistent with the hypothesis that banks with higher monitoring ability and/or higher capital adequacy are more attractive. These two coefficients are insignificant, suggesting that in our sample the influence of these two ratios on the banks' quality is weak.

On the firms' side, the current ratio has a positive and significant coefficient, supporting the view that a firm's quality is negatively related to its risk, for which the current ratio is a proxy. The other two variables both have the expected signs. The coefficient on the leverage ratio is negative, indicating that firms with higher leverage ratios are less attractive because they are riskier. The coefficient on the ratio of PP&E to total assets has a positive sign, suggesting that firms with relatively more tangible assets have higher quality because they pose smaller information

asymmetries. The fact that these two coefficients are insignificant indicates that in our sample these two ratios are not important concerns of the banks when they rank the borrowers.

**Marginal Effects.** For interpretation of the coefficients, Table 5 also reports the marginal effects of the variables. The marginal effect of a variable is defined as the marginal change in an agent's probability of being preferred to another agent due to a unit difference in the variable. The probability that bank  $i$  is preferred to bank  $i'$  is

$$Prob(B'_i\beta + \eta_i > B'_{i'}\beta + \eta_{i'}) = Prob(\eta_{i'} - \eta_i < B'_i\beta - B'_{i'}\beta) = \Phi\left(\frac{B'_i\beta - B'_{i'}\beta}{\sqrt{2}}\right),$$

where  $\Phi(\cdot)$  is the standard normal cdf. The probability that firm  $j$  is preferred to firm  $j'$  is obtained analogously. Consider a firm's choice between two banks. If the two banks have no difference in their observed characteristics, then the choice is completely determined by the unobserved quality, and the probability of each bank being preferred to the other is 50%. Now suppose one of the banks is in the smallest group and the other is in the second smallest group, then the probability that the larger bank is preferred to the smaller bank is 61.32%, representing a marginal increase of 11.32%. Table 5 shows that banks' ratios have much larger marginal effects than firms' ratios, and that all the size dummies have noticeable marginal effects. For instance, everything else being equal, a bank in the middle size group is preferred to one in the smallest group with probability 64.54%, and a firm in the middle size group is preferred to one in the smallest group with probability 58.13%.

### 5.3 Loan Spread Determinants

The covariance between the error terms in the loan spread equation and the bank quality index equation,  $\kappa$ , is found to be significant (Table 5). That is evidence that the matching process is correlated with the loan spread determination and can not be ignored. To see that the  $m_{ij}$ 's are correlated with the  $\epsilon_{ij}$ 's, rewrite the spread equation as follows, noting that each firm borrows only once in a market:

$$r_j = \alpha_0 + m'_j B \alpha_1 + F'_j \alpha_2 + N'_j \alpha_3 + \epsilon_j \quad (11)$$

$$= \alpha_0 + m'_j B \alpha_1 + F'_j \alpha_2 + N'_j \alpha_3 + \kappa m'_j \eta + \lambda \delta_j + \nu_j, \quad \nu_j \sim N(0, \sigma_\nu^2), \quad (12)$$

where  $r_j$  is the spread that firm  $j$  pays,  $m_j = (m_{1j}, m_{2j}, \dots, m_{Ij})'$  is the vector of match indicators,  $B = (B_1, B_2, \dots, B_I)'$  is the matrix of bank characteristics,  $N_j$  is the non-price loan characteristics of the loan firm  $j$  borrows, and  $\eta = (\eta_1, \eta_2, \dots, \eta_I)'$  is the vector of error terms in the bank quality

index equation. If  $m_j$  were in fact independent of  $\epsilon_j$ —as it would be if firms were randomly matched to banks—then  $m_j$  would be exogenous in equation (11). However, a significant  $\kappa$  shows that  $m_j$  is correlated with  $\epsilon_j$ . Because the regressors are correlated with the error term, OLS estimation of the equation is problematic. Furthermore, since any variable that influences the matching also affects  $\epsilon_j$ , the method of instrumental variables (IV) is not applicable here.

The Bayesian estimates (Table 6) and the OLS estimates (Table 7) of the loan spread equation are markedly different. The average absolute percentage difference, defined as the average of  $\left|(\hat{\theta}_{OLS} - \hat{\theta}_{Bayesian})/\hat{\theta}_{Bayesian}\right|$  across all the variables including the year dummies, is 23%, where  $\hat{\theta}_{OLS}$  is the OLS estimates and  $\hat{\theta}_{Bayesian}$  is the Bayesian estimates. The average absolute percentage difference for the eight variables that are significant in the quality index equations is 39%, signifying the impact of controlling for the endogenous matching on the loan spread equation estimates. Table 8 compares the two sets of estimates side by side for those eight variables. The absolute percentage differences range from 7% to 175%. For instance, the spread differential between a bank in the smallest size group and a bank in the middle size group is overstated by 46% when the endogenous matching is ignored.

**Directions of the Differences.** The unobserved quality of banks has two components that affect the loan spreads in opposite directions: unobserved monitoring ability and unobserved risk. If the first component dominates, then the unobserved bank quality will be positively correlated with the loan spreads, because banks with higher unobserved monitoring ability have higher unobserved quality and will charge higher loan spreads, all else being equal. On the other hand, if the second component dominates, then the unobserved bank quality will be negatively correlated with the loan spreads, because banks with lower unobserved risk have higher unobserved quality and will charge lower loan spreads, all else being equal. The positive sign of  $\kappa$  shows that the unobserved monitoring ability dominates the unobserved risk to be the main component in banks' unobserved quality. The result is an indication that the proxies for banks' risk do a better job than the proxy for banks' monitoring ability.

The unobserved quality of firms has two components that affect the loan spreads in the same direction: unobserved risk and unobserved information costs. Firms with either higher unobserved risk or higher unobserved information costs have lower unobserved quality and are charged higher loan spreads, all else being equal. The negative sign of  $\lambda$  is consistent with this relationship.

Given the signs of  $\kappa$  and  $\lambda$ , the directions of the differences between the OLS estimates and

the Bayesian estimates of the loan spread equation are as expected. Five variables have significant coefficients in the bank quality index equation: the ratio of cash to total assets and the four size dummies. All these variables positively affect banks' quality. Now take the ratio of cash to total assets for example. Suppose all firms are identical except that they have different unobserved quality, and consider two banks that differ only in their ratios of cash to total assets. The bank with a higher ratio has a higher quality, so it matches with a firm that has a higher unobserved quality. Since  $\lambda$  is negative, the higher unobserved quality of the firm means that the spread charged by this bank has a smaller unobserved component. In an OLS regression of the loan spread equation, the effect of that smaller unobserved component on the loan spread is incorrectly attributed to the difference in the ratio, resulting in underestimation (downward bias) of the ratio's coefficient. Similarly, the coefficients on the four bank size dummies are all underestimated in the OLS regression.

In the firm quality index equation, three variables have significant coefficients: the current ratio and two size dummies. All these variables positively affect firms' quality. Since  $\kappa$  is positive, by an analogous argument, the OLS regression of the loan spread equation would result in overestimation (upward bias) of the coefficients on all these variables. That is exactly what happens.

We now analyze the loan spread determinants according to the Bayesian estimates.

**Bank Characteristics.** The salaries-expenses ratio has a positive and significant coefficient, showing that banks with superior monitoring ability indeed charge higher loan spreads. The coefficients on the capital-assets ratio and the ratio of cash to total assets are insignificant, suggesting that in our sample, banks' capital adequacy risk and liquidity risk do not have a significant impact on loan spreads. The coefficients on the bank size dummies are all negative and most of them are significant, supporting the view that larger banks are likely to have better diversified assets and hence lower risk, so that they charge lower loan spreads. As expected, these coefficients exhibit a downward trend. Compared to banks with assets below the 20th percentile, banks with assets between the 20th and the 60th percentiles charge loan spreads that are about 15 basis points lower, whereas banks with assets above the 60th percentile charge loan spreads that are nearly 30 basis points lower.

**Firm Characteristics.** Two firm ratios have significant coefficients: the leverage ratio (positive) and the current ratio (negative). A higher leverage ratio or a lower current ratio represents a higher borrower risk, so the signs of the coefficients confirm that firms with higher risk are charged

higher loan spreads. The coefficient on the ratio of PP&E to total assets is insignificant, suggesting that the ratio does not substantially affect borrowers' costs of funds. On the other hand, all the firm size dummies have negative and significant coefficients, consistent with the hypothesis that larger firms are charged lower loan spreads because they are less risky and are associated with lower information costs. The coefficients on the firm size dummies also exhibit a downward trend. For example, compared to firms with assets below the 20th percentile, firms with assets between the 20th and the 40th percentiles are charged loan spreads that are 22 basis points lower, whereas firms with assets above the 80th percentile are charged loan spreads that are 46 basis points lower.

**Non-Price Loan Characteristics.** Three non-price loan characteristics have significant coefficients: the natural log of facility size, the revolver/line $\geq$ 1 year dummy, and the secured dummy.

The negative and significant coefficient on the natural log of facility size is likely due to economies of scale in bank lending. The processes of loan approval, monitoring, and review are relatively labor-intensive, and the labor costs in these processes increase less than proportionally when the size of the loan increases. As a result, a larger loan has a lower average labor costs and is therefore charged a lower loan spread.

The dummy for revolving credit lines whose durations are greater than or equal to one year has a negative coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. Since that type of loans are by far the most common, accounting for 67% of all loans, the negative coefficient may reflect that other types of loans are non-standard or even custom-made, and are charged higher loan spreads to compensate for the banks' extra administrative costs resulting from the loans' non-standard nature.

The secured dummy has a positive and significant coefficient. An unsecured loan is also called a character loan or a good faith loan, and is granted by the lender on the strength of the borrower's creditworthiness, rather than a pledge of assets as collateral. The positive coefficient on the secured dummy shows that a higher loan spread is charged if the borrower is below the lender's threshold for an unsecured loan.

## 6 Conclusion

We have the potential to learn a lot about financial markets and the effects of monetary policy by investigating the pricing of bank loans. For example, empirical evidence on determinants of loan spreads can provide insights into risk premiums in financial contracting and transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. This paper demonstrates an issue that suggests care in those



efforts. We show that there is endogenous matching in the bank loan market, and that OLS estimation of the loan spread equation is problematic when some characteristics of banks or firms are not perfectly observed and proxies are used. To control for the endogenous matching, we develop a two-sided matching model to supplement the loan spread equation. We obtain Bayesian inference using a Gibbs sampling algorithm with data augmentation, which transforms a high-dimensional integration problem into a simulation problem and overcomes the computational difficulty.

Using a sample of 1,369 U.S. loan facilities between 146 banks and 1,007 firms from 1996 to 2003, we find evidence of positive assortative matching of sizes in the market, that is, large banks tend to match with large firms, and vice versa. We then show that for agents on both sides of the market there are similar relationships between quality and size, which lead to similar size rankings for both sides and explain the positive assortative matching of sizes. Banks' risk and firms' risk are important factors in their quality. The Bayesian estimates of the loan spread equation are markedly different from the OLS estimates, confirming that controlling for the endogenous matching has a strong impact on the estimates. We find that banks with higher monitoring ability charge higher spreads, and larger banks charge lower spreads. On the other hand, firms with higher risk are charged higher spreads, and larger firms are charged lower spreads.

Not only does the two-sided matching model address the endogeneity problem in estimation of the loan spread equation, but it also provides a way to gauge agents' quality. The latter can be an important feature to include in analyses of various two-sided markets. For instance, in an empirical study of academic achievements or job outcomes of college students (or students in graduate programs, etc.), a two-sided matching model can provide estimates of the colleges' quality and the students' ability as useful "by-products". Other examples include the matchings between teams and athletes (in NBA, for instance), corporations and CEOs, firms and underwriters, and so on. Furthermore, the two-sided matching model enables us to identify the factors that contribute to agents' quality, which can point the way for agents who try to improve their standing, such as colleges that want to attract better students. This suggests that understanding the quality indexes can play an important competitive role in such markets. We view those issues as interesting avenues for future research.

## Appendix A. Uniqueness of Equilibrium Matching

The model described in Section 2 is a special case of the College Admissions Model, for which the existence of an equilibrium matching is proved in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). A new feature of our model is that there is vertical heterogeneity on both sides of the market: all banks have identical preference orderings over the firms and all firms have identical preference orderings over the banks. Eeckhout (2000, Corollary 3) shows that in a one-to-one two-sided matching model, the equilibrium matching is unique if there is vertical heterogeneity on both sides of the market. Below we show that this sufficient condition for uniqueness also applies to our many-to-one two-sided matching model.

Re-index the banks and the firms according to the preference orderings, so that  $i \succ_j i', \forall i > i', \forall j$ , and  $j \succ_i j', \forall j > j', \forall i$ , where  $i \succ_j i'$  denotes that firm  $j$  prefers bank  $i$  to bank  $i'$  and  $j \succ_i j'$  denotes that bank  $i$  prefers firm  $j$  to firm  $j'$ . Let  $q_{it}$  be the quota of bank  $i$ . The following  $J$ -step algorithm produces the unique equilibrium matching, in which there is perfect sorting. In step 1, firm  $J$  matches with bank  $I$ . In step 2, firm  $J - 1$  matches with bank  $I$  if  $q_{It} \geq 2$ , otherwise it matches with bank  $I - 1$ . In step 3, firm  $J - 2$  matches with bank  $I$  if  $q_{It} \geq 3$ , otherwise it matches with bank  $I - 1$  if  $q_{It} + q_{I-1,t} \geq 3$ , otherwise it matches with bank  $I - 2$ . And so on.

First,  $\mu$  is an equilibrium matching. Suppose not, then there exists at least one blocking pair  $(i', j')$  such that  $i' > \mu(j')$  and  $j' > \min\{j : j \in \mu(i')\}$ . That is a contradiction, since by construction if  $i' > \mu(j')$  then  $j'' > j', \forall j'' \in \mu(i')$ , so  $j' > \min\{j : j \in \mu(i')\}$  can not be true.

Second, the equilibrium matching is unique. Suppose not, then there exists  $\tilde{\mu} \neq \mu$  such that  $\tilde{\mu}$  is also an equilibrium matching. There is at least one match that is in  $\mu$  but not in  $\tilde{\mu}$ . Now consider the first step in the algorithm that forms a match that is not in  $\tilde{\mu}$ . Call that match  $(i', j')$ . It follows that  $\min\{j : j \in \tilde{\mu}(i')\} < j'$  and that  $\tilde{\mu}(j') < i'$ , since all the matches formed in the earlier steps are in both  $\mu$  and  $\tilde{\mu}$ . Therefore  $(i', j')$  is a blocking pair for  $\tilde{\mu}$ , a contradiction.

## Appendix B. Conditional Posterior Distributions

We obtain the conditional posterior distributions by examining the kernels of the conditional posterior densities. The conditional posterior distribution of  $Q_i^b$  is  $N(\hat{Q}_i^b, \hat{\sigma}_{Q_i^b}^2)$  truncated to the interval  $(\underline{Q}_i^b, \overline{Q}_i^b)$ , where

$$\hat{Q}_i^b = B_i' \beta + \frac{\kappa \sum_{j \in \mu_i(i)} [r_{ij} - U_{ij}' \alpha - \lambda(Q_j^f - F_j' \gamma)]}{\sigma_\nu^2 + \kappa^2 q_{it}}, \text{ and}$$

$$\hat{\sigma}_{Q_i^b}^2 = \frac{\sigma_\nu^2}{\sigma_\nu^2 + \kappa^2 q_{it}}.$$

The conditional posterior distribution of  $Q_j^f$  is  $N(\hat{Q}_j^f, \hat{\sigma}_{Q_j^f}^2)$  truncated to the interval  $(\underline{Q}_j^f, \overline{Q}_j^f)$ , where

$$\hat{Q}_j^f = F_j' \gamma + \frac{\lambda[r_{\mu_t(j),j} - U_{\mu_t(j),j}' \alpha - \kappa(Q_{\mu_t(j)}^b - B_{\mu_t(j)}' \beta)]}{\sigma_\nu^2 + \lambda^2}, \text{ and}$$

$$\hat{\sigma}_{Q_j^f}^2 = \frac{\sigma_\nu^2}{\sigma_\nu^2 + \lambda^2}.$$

The prior distributions of  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$ , and  $\kappa$  are  $N(\bar{\alpha}, \bar{\Sigma}_\alpha)$ ,  $N(\bar{\beta}, \bar{\Sigma}_\beta)$ ,  $N(\bar{\gamma}, \bar{\Sigma}_\gamma)$ , and  $N(\bar{\kappa}, \bar{\sigma}_\kappa^2)$ , respectively. The prior distribution of  $\lambda$  is  $N(\bar{\lambda}, \bar{\sigma}_\lambda^2)$  truncated on the right at 0. The prior distribution of  $1/\sigma_\nu^2$  is gamma,  $1/\sigma_\nu^2 \sim G(a, b)$ ,  $a, b > 0$ .

The conditional posterior distribution of  $\alpha$  is  $N(\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\Sigma}_\alpha)$ , where

$$\hat{\Sigma}_\alpha = \left\{ \bar{\Sigma}_\alpha^{-1} + \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{(i,j) \in \mu_t} \frac{1}{\sigma_\nu^2} U_{ij} U_{ij}' \right\}^{-1}, \text{ and}$$

$$\hat{\alpha} = -\hat{\Sigma}_\alpha \left\{ -\bar{\Sigma}_\alpha^{-1} \bar{\alpha} - \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{(i,j) \in \mu_t} \frac{1}{\sigma_\nu^2} U_{ij} (r_{ij} - \kappa(Q_i^b - B_i' \beta) - \lambda(Q_j^f - F_j' \gamma)) \right\}.$$

The conditional posterior distribution of  $\beta$  is  $N(\hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma}_\beta)$ , where

$$\hat{\Sigma}_\beta = \left\{ \bar{\Sigma}_\beta^{-1} + \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{i \in I_t} \frac{\sigma_\nu^2 + \kappa^2 q_{it}}{\sigma_\nu^2} B_i B_i' \right\}^{-1}, \text{ and}$$

$$\hat{\beta} = -\hat{\Sigma}_\beta \left\{ -\bar{\Sigma}_\beta^{-1} \bar{\beta} + \sum_{t=1}^T \left[ \sum_{(i,j) \in \mu_t} \frac{\kappa}{\sigma_\nu^2} B_i (r_{ij} - U_{ij}' \alpha - \kappa Q_i^b - \lambda(Q_j^f - F_j' \gamma)) - \sum_{i \in I_t} Q_i^b B_i \right] \right\}.$$

The conditional posterior distribution of  $\gamma$  is  $N(\hat{\gamma}, \hat{\Sigma}_\gamma)$ , where

$$\hat{\Sigma}_\gamma = \left\{ \bar{\Sigma}_\gamma^{-1} + \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{j \in J_t} \frac{\sigma_\nu^2 + \lambda^2}{\sigma_\nu^2} F_j F_j' \right\}^{-1}, \text{ and}$$

$$\hat{\gamma} = -\hat{\Sigma}_\gamma \left\{ -\bar{\Sigma}_\gamma^{-1} \bar{\gamma} + \sum_{t=1}^T \left[ \sum_{(i,j) \in \mu_t} \frac{\lambda}{\sigma_\nu^2} F_j (r_{ij} - U_{ij}' \alpha - \kappa(Q_i^b - B_i' \beta) - \lambda Q_j^f) - \sum_{j \in J_t} Q_j^f F_j \right] \right\}.$$

The conditional posterior distribution of  $\kappa$  is  $N(\hat{\kappa}, \hat{\sigma}_\kappa^2)$ , where

$$\hat{\sigma}_\kappa^2 = \left\{ \frac{1}{\bar{\sigma}_\kappa^2} + \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{i \in I_t} \frac{q_{it} (Q_i^b - B_i' \beta)^2}{\sigma_\nu^2} \right\}^{-1}, \text{ and}$$

$$\hat{\kappa} = -\hat{\sigma}_\kappa^2 \left\{ -\frac{\bar{\kappa}}{\bar{\sigma}_\kappa^2} - \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{(i,j) \in \mu_t} \frac{(r_{ij} - U_{ij}' \alpha - \lambda(Q_j^f - F_j' \gamma))(Q_i^b - B_i' \beta)}{\sigma_\nu^2} \right\}.$$

The conditional posterior distribution of  $\lambda$  is  $N(\hat{\lambda}, \hat{\sigma}_\lambda^2)$  truncated on the right at 0, where

$$\hat{\sigma}_\lambda^2 = \left\{ \frac{1}{\bar{\sigma}_\lambda^2} + \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{j \in J_t} \frac{(Q_j^f - F_j^f \gamma)^2}{\sigma_\nu^2} \right\}^{-1}, \text{ and}$$

$$\hat{\lambda} = -\hat{\sigma}_\lambda^2 \left\{ -\frac{\bar{\lambda}}{\bar{\sigma}_\lambda^2} - \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{(i,j) \in \mu_t} \frac{(r_{ij} - U_{ij}^f \alpha - \kappa(Q_i^b - B_i^f \beta))(Q_j^f - F_j^f \gamma)}{\sigma_\nu^2} \right\}.$$

Let  $n = \sum_{t=1}^T |J_t|$  denote the total number of loans in all the markets. The conditional posterior distribution of  $1/\sigma_\nu^2$  is  $G(\hat{a}, \hat{b})$ , where

$$\hat{a} = a + \frac{n}{2}, \text{ and}$$

$$\hat{b} = \left[ \frac{1}{b} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{(i,j) \in \mu_t} (r_{ij} - U_{ij}^f \alpha - \kappa(Q_i^b - B_i^f \beta) - \lambda(Q_j^f - F_j^f \gamma))^2 \right]^{-1}.$$

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**Table 1. Variable Definitions and Sources**

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>DEFINITION</b>	<b>SOURCE</b>
<b>Dependent Variable</b>		
Loan Spread <sup>1</sup>	All-In Spread Drawn above LIBOR/100	DealScan
<b>Independent Variables</b>		
<u>Bank Characteristics</u>		
Salaries-Expenses Ratio <sup>1</sup>	Salaries and Benefits/Total Operating Expenses	Call Reports
Capital-Assets ratio <sup>1</sup>	Total Equity Capital/Total assets	Call Reports
Ratio of Cash to Total Assets <sup>1</sup>	Cash/Total assets	Call Reports
Bank_Size2	Dummy = 1 if the bank has \$5 billion to \$13 billion assets	Call Reports
Bank_Size3	Dummy = 1 if the bank has \$13 billion to \$32 billion assets	Call Reports
Bank_Size4	Dummy = 1 if the bank has \$32 billion to \$76 billion assets	Call Reports
Bank_Size5	Dummy = 1 if the bank has more than \$76 billion assets	Call Reports
<u>Firm Characteristics</u>		
Leverage Ratio <sup>1</sup>	Total Debt/Total Assets	Compustat
Current Ratio <sup>1</sup>	Current Assets/Current Liabilities	Compustat
Ratio of Property, Plant, and Equipment to Total Assets <sup>1</sup>	PP&E/Total Assets	Compustat
Firm_Size2	Dummy = 1 if the firm has \$65 million to \$200 million assets	Compustat
Firm_Size3	Dummy = 1 if the firm has \$200 million to \$500 million assets	Compustat
Firm_Size4	Dummy = 1 if the firm has \$500 million to \$1,500 million assets	Compustat
Firm_Size5	Dummy = 1 if the firm has more than \$1,500 million assets	Compustat
<u>Non-Price Loan Characteristics</u>		
Maturity	Loan Facility Length in Months	DealScan
Natural Log of Facility Size <sup>2</sup>	Log(Tranche Amount)	DealScan
Acquisition	Dummy = 1 if specific purpose is Acquisition	DealScan
General	Dummy = 1 if specific purpose is General	DealScan
Miscellaneous	Dummy = 1 if specific purpose is Miscellaneous	DealScan
Recapitalization	Dummy = 1 if specific purpose is Recapitalization	DealScan
Revolver/Line < 1 Yr.	Dummy = 1 if the loan is a revolving credit line with duration < 1 year	DealScan
Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr.	Dummy = 1 if the loan is a revolving credit line with duration ? 1 year	DealScan
Secured	Dummy = 1 if the loan is secured	DealScan

<sup>1</sup> Expressed in percentage points.

<sup>2</sup> Deflated using the GDP (Chained) Price Index.



**Table 2. Summary Statistics**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Number of Observations</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
Loan Spread	1369	1.8883	1.1953	0.15	10.80
Salaries-Expenses Ratio	455	24.6241	8.5873	3.1698	58.8139
Capital-Assets ratio	455	8.5533	2.5788	4.6505	32.2950
Ratio of Cash to Total Assets	455	6.9896	4.3929	0.0033	44.2286
Bank Assets (\$ Million)	455	72311	124220	15.9774	625256
Leverage Ratio	1369	25.8408	23.1567	0	194.7757
Current Ratio	1369	226.0087	229.2540	7.7253	3167.5310
Firm Assets (\$ Million)	1369	1807	6327	1.0579	172828
Ratio of PP&E to Total Assets	1369	31.0707	25.2299	0	95.7851
Maturity	1369	32.9094	22.9736	2	280
Facility Size (\$ Million)	1369	192.5351	491.9396	0.1954	10202
Acquisition	1369	0.0964	0.2953	0	1
General	1369	0.4624	0.4988	0	1
Miscellaneous	1369	0.0446	0.2064	0	1
Recapitalization	1369	0.2871	0.4526	0	1
Revolver/Line < 1 Yr.	1369	0.0599	0.2374	0	1
Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr.	1369	0.6698	0.4704	0	1
Secured Status	1369	0.6560	0.4752	0	1

**Table 3. OLS: Bank Size on Firm Characteristics**

<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>
Constant	8.1109	0.1815***
Leverage Ratio	0.0037	0.0022*
Current Ratio	-0.0002	0.0002
Ratio of PP&E to Total Assets	-0.0053	0.0020***
Natural Log of Firm Assets	0.5039	0.0263***

1. The dependent variable is the natural log of the bank's total assets.
2. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

**Table 4. OLS: Firm Size on Bank Characteristics**

<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>
Constant	1.1664	0.3757***
Salaries-Expenses Ratio	-0.0326	0.0051***
Capital-Assets ratio	0.0330	0.0218
Ratio of Cash to Total Assets	0.0009	0.0117
Natural Log of Bank Assets	0.4699	0.0236***

1. The dependent variable is the natural log of the firm's total assets.
2. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

**Table 5. Bayesian Inference: Quality Index Equations**

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Marginal Effect
<b>Bank Quality Index</b>			
Salaries-Expenses Ratio	0.0017	0.0058	0.05%
Capital-Assets ratio	0.0031	0.0189	0.09%
Ratio of Cash to Total Assets	0.0258	0.0117**	0.73%
Bank_Size2	0.4070	0.1496***	11.32%
Bank_Size3	0.5275	0.1461***	14.54%
Bank_Size4	0.5380	0.1495***	14.82%
Bank_Size5	0.3009	0.1466**	8.42%
<b>Firm Quality Index</b>			
Leverage Ratio	-0.0005	0.0013	-0.01%
Current Ratio	0.0003	0.0001**	0.01%
Ratio of PP&E to Total Assets	0.0002	0.0012	0.01%
Firm_Size2	0.1140	0.0830	3.21%
Firm_Size3	0.2902	0.0867***	8.13%
Firm_Size4	0.1654	0.0873*	4.66%
Firm_Size5	0.1134	0.0880	3.20%
$\kappa$	0.1717	0.0876**	
$\lambda$	-0.1034	0.0848	
$1/\sigma_v^2$	1.5131	0.0593***	

1. The dependent variables are the quality indexes.
2. Posterior means and standard deviations are based on 20,000 draws from the conditional posterior distributions, discarding the first 2,000 as burn-in draws.
3. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate that zero is not contained in the 90%, 95%, and 99% highest posterior density intervals, respectively.
4. Marginal effect is defined as the marginal change in an agent's probability of being preferred to another agent due to a unit difference in the variable.

**Table 6. Bayesian Inference: Loan Spread Equation**

	Mean	Std. Dev.
Constant	1.6019	0.2072***
Salaries-Expenses Ratio	0.0183	0.0033***
Capital-Assets ratio	0.0151	0.0119
Ratio of Cash to Total Assets	0.0015	0.0068
Bank_Size2	-0.1757	0.0986*
Bank_Size3	-0.1414	0.1060
Bank_Size4	-0.2685	0.1007***
Bank_Size5	-0.2785	0.0845***
Leverage Ratio	0.0091	0.0011***
Current Ratio	-0.0004	0.0001***
Ratio of PP&E to Total Assets	-0.0007	0.0010
Firm_Size2	-0.2211	0.0799***
Firm_Size3	-0.3240	0.0968***
Firm_Size4	-0.2696	0.1072**
Firm_Size5	-0.4579	0.1315***
Maturity	0.0002	0.0011
Natural Log of Facility Size	-0.1978	0.0250***
Acquisition	0.0415	0.1068
General	0.0250	0.0896
Miscellaneous	0.2008	0.1345
Recapitalization	0.0555	0.0950
Revolver/Line < 1 Yr.	0.1626	0.1057
Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr.	-0.1126	0.0585*
Secured	0.8834	0.0570***

1. The dependent variable is the loan spread.
2. Posterior means and standard deviations are based on 20,000 draws from the conditional posterior distributions, discarding the first 2,000 as burn-in draws.
3. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate that zero is not contained in the 90%, 95%, and 99% highest posterior density intervals, respectively.
4. Dummies for years 1997-2003 are included on the RHS of the spread equation.

**Table 7. OLS Estimates: Loan Spread Equation**

	<b>Coef.</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>
Constant	1.6721	0.1985***
Salaries-Expenses Ratio	0.0183	0.0031***
Capital-Assets ratio	0.0153	0.0113
Ratio of Cash to Total Assets	-0.0011	0.0061
Bank_Size2	-0.2078	0.0893**
Bank_Size3	-0.2065	0.0928**
Bank_Size4	-0.3391	0.0838***
Bank_Size5	-0.3184	0.0755***
Leverage Ratio	0.0089	0.0011***
Current Ratio	-0.0004	0.0001***
Ratio of PP&E to Total Assets	-0.0007	0.0010
Firm_Size2	-0.2097	0.0789***
Firm_Size3	-0.2826	0.0929***
Firm_Size4	-0.2465	0.1056**
Firm_Size5	-0.4416	0.1308***
Maturity	0.0001	0.0011
Natural Log of Facility Size	-0.1947	0.0255***
Acquisition	0.0296	0.1081
General	0.0269	0.0906
Miscellaneous	0.2024	0.1346
Recapitalization	0.0451	0.0958
Revolver/Line < 1 Yr.	0.1628	0.1063
Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr.	-0.1105	0.0588*
Secured	0.8957	0.0569***

1. The dependent variable is the loan spread.
2. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
3. Dummies for years 1997-2003 are included on the RHS of the spread equation.

**Table 8. OLS vs. Bayesian: Loan Spread Equation**

	<b>OLS</b>	<b>Bayesian</b>	<b> \Delta% </b>
Bank's Ratio of Cash to Total Assets	-0.0011	0.0015	175.36%
Bank_Size2	-0.2078	-0.1757	18.25%
Bank_Size3	-0.2065	-0.1414	46.03%
Bank_Size4	-0.3391	-0.2685	26.29%
Bank_Size5	-0.3184	-0.2785	14.35%
Firm's Current Ratio	-0.0004	-0.0004	6.94%
Firm_Size3	-0.2826	-0.3240	12.76%
Firm_Size4	-0.2465	-0.2696	8.59%
		Average	38.57%

1. The dependent variable is the loan spread.
2. Only the variables that are significant in the quality index equations are reported.
3.  $|\Delta\%|$  is the absolute percentage difference.

Figure 1. Number of Banks and Number of Firms




Figure 2. Weighted Average Loan Spread in Percentage Points




Figure 3. Proportions of Loans in Different Combinations of Size Groups

