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The Imperfect Promise of *The Gift*

Unlike Bronislaw Malinowski (in the United Kingdom) or Franz Boas (in the United States), Marcel Mauss was never a field anthropologist. His understanding of what were then called “archaic” societies came entirely second hand, and the classic essay on *The Gift* is, first and foremost, a work of remarkable erudition, almost equally divided between footnotes and text. In the academic context of Third Republic France, it came across as the felicitous marriage of encyclopedic reading and sharp analytical skill in a system that rewarded both.

Mauss was born into a family of small embroidery manufacturers in the Vosges region, in the Eastern part of France. After attending the *lycée* in Epinal, he joined his uncle Émile Durkheim, who was then teaching at the University of Bordeaux and had taken a keen interest in his nephew’s education. Mauss enrolled in philosophy, and attended Durkheim’s classes on pedagogy and sociology. He then prepared for the *agrégation* exam (the higher teaching qualification) in Paris, and passed it in 1895. Armed with a doctoral fellowship, he registered at the *École Pratique des Hautes Études*, where he devoted himself to the study of philology and planned a doctoral thesis on prayer, which he never finished.¹ By that time, he had been drawn into socialist circles and the French cooperative movement, on the one hand, and his uncle’s research activities, on the other.² Known as a voracious reader and an eclectic mind, he was offered a chair in “the religion of primitive and uncivilized people” at the *École Pratique*.³ His students there and at the *Institut d’Ethnologie* (which he helped found) marveled that “Mauss knew everything” and *The Gift* comes across first and foremost as an extraordinary accumulation of empirical facts—from Scandinavia to Melanesia, from North America to New Zealand, from Siberia to Polynesia.⁴ More than any other writing, the essay sealed his reputation as the true heir of Durkheim and led him on the path to a position in sociology at the *Collège de France*—the pinnacle of French academic life—where he was appointed in 1931.

The Gift is also a—somewhat clumsy and ambivalent, but at times forceful—political text. It argues that solidarity, not exchange, is the social glue that keeps societies together. And solidarity is achieved by wealth sharing, not by the pursuit of self-interest. The essay thus situates redistribution, and its entanglement with moral obligations, as a fundamental—or sociologically natural—component of social life.⁵ But it also shows that sharing is not easy, and more often than not sets in motion agonistic and power dynamics that will destroy, rather than enhance, solidarity.

Solidarity

The Gift, which Mauss published in 1925, is in many ways a continuation of the Durkheimian project, and more specifically of Durkheim’s critique of Enlightenment

philosophy in *The Division of Labor in Society*.⁶ The social contract may be a useful conceptual fiction, but from a sociological point of view the idea that social cohesion is dependent upon individuals implicitly or explicitly agreeing to surrender their freedom to the collective (or its representative) is an aberration. Durkheim famously posited that society is always *sui generis*. In other words, it is the individual that is the result of the social process, not the other way around. Still, his articulation of what he called the “non-contractual element in the contract”—the collective sentiments that hold people together—was always somewhat vague. *The Gift* can be read as an effort to give interactional and empirical depth to precontractual solidarity, and elaborate on the *kinds of practices* that forge and give substance to it. In other words, the social bond comes first; its purpose and motives for individuals come in second—as we will see, the motivation for giving or reciprocating is never wholly clear to those who engage in it.

What we observe in practice and across “archaic” social groups is a seemingly spontaneous “quasi-contract,” a form of social cohesion rooted in reciprocity—specifically, in cycles of gift exchange.⁷ Modern social life, too, contains the remnants of this primitive impulse. We see it, for instance, in the myriad small favors that strangers or acquaintances will routinely do for each other. Free assistance is part of everyday life, whether it is picking up a hitchhiker, finding a coin for the person who says she ran out of money for the bus, or holding a spot in a waiting line for a perfect stranger. So are bigger favors: we give hospitality, help each other move in and out of houses, watch each other’s children, and cover for each other at work. These favors present themselves as gifts, freely bestowed and with no explicit expectations of return except for normal gratefulness. In practice, however, such actions create small relational imbalances that call for their own corrections: anonymous favors will be paid forward to another stranger, taking the form of a generalized kind of reciprocity; direct ones will, at a minimum, elicit expressions of gratefulness; often they will spawn counter-favors, though those are never exactly commensurate and never immediate. The accomplishment of justice and the strength of social bonds both depend on these structural features.

If there is a natural “moral economy” for Mauss, this is it. Favors given and returned, credits and debts, feelings of obligation and gratitude, this is what stitches together the social fabric—this *is*, indeed, the social fabric. Mauss describes gifting, or the system of “total *prestations*” that bind people together in ever-repeated cycles of gift exchange, as the “bedrock” upon which humanity’s primeval moment was built, a “source of eternal morality”—what Claude Lévi-Strauss will later call a *structure*. Social institutions (most prominently money) have grown out of such reciprocity, but we forgot their origin. Since we are born into these mechanisms, we take them for granted. We take offense at an invitation not returned and are troubled by unshared wealth, but we do not ask ourselves where the inchoate feeling of injustice or insult comes from. We oddly prefer to believe that human beings are moved to action by self-interest, rather than by the structural imperative to create and maintain social relationships. And yet, the pervasiveness and obligatory character of gifts across societies shows that both may be true *at the same time*. We are all part egoists and part communists.⁸

Obligations

Mauss begins the essay with a series of quotes from the Hávámál, an old Scandinavian collection of proverbs written in poetic form. Many of the verses, Mauss remarks,

emphasize the centrality of presents between persons and groups to the formation and maintenance of social ties. Gifts are how friendships are made to last, the Hávámál commends. They build goodwill and foster conversation; they help share emotions and hide unpleasant feelings. Giving is good for the soul, too: givers radiate self-pride and confidence, partly because the process of giving allows them to accumulate social honor and authority. Last but not least, gifts are an alternative to war, especially when practiced between strangers; they allow people and groups who might otherwise kill each other to coexist peacefully. Indeed, Mauss remarks, it is often distant clans that exchange in this way.

Yet beneath this altruistic veneer stands a social reality of profound complexity. What puzzled Mauss was the prevalence, across a wide range of societies if not all of them, of the custom of reciprocal, compulsory, and often ceremonial gifting (of things, sentiments, people). How can this apparent oxymoron be? How can gifts both seem to express individual autonomy when seen from the inside and obligation when seen from the outside? Alain Caillé reminds us that its obligatory character was for Durkheim the central feature of the social fact but “it was Mauss’s stroke of genius to reintroduce a share of freedom and individualism within Durkheimian holism.”⁹ What makes this middle ground possible—what allows transactions to both be and not be *free gifts*—is the performance of disinterest on both the giver’s and the receiver’s part: everything happens “as if” one was giving without external compulsion and “as if” the receiver was under no obligation to accept.¹⁰ And yet both obligations are usually reaffirmed in practice. But the uncertainty is what allows the Maussian gift to be suspended somewhere between holism and individualism, coercion and freedom, present and future.

To Give

Mauss famously disaggregated the coercive element in the gift into three parts, analytically distinct, yet inextricably bound in practice: the obligation to give, the obligation to accept, and the obligation to reciprocate.¹¹ In many ways, the *obligation to give* or the social necessity to freely offer courtesies, tributes, women, hunting catches, or material possessions is the foundation of social life. It is a solidaristic move, an affirmation of one’s membership in the group, a search for recognition from the group, and an extension of peace. But it is also a competitive move, which inevitably puts one’s *position* in the group at stake. The risk of material loss in case the gift is not reciprocated is insignificant compared to the symbolic risk that one’s actions—and thus one’s place in the group—will not be recognized. The imperative to invite others—usually the community at large—to share in any great dispensation of one’s wealth has this dual character of expressing a desire to both bond oneself to the group and to distinguish oneself from it. In fact, the rich (or simply the better off) are usually under a moral obligation—a social duty, really—to part with at least a chunk of their fortune to benefit the community, or risk losing face. The glorious benevolence of the Roman aristocracy, the lavish forms of patronage practiced by Medieval families, and the ethical valorization of charity in religious ethics are all examples of the imperative to give; we can also think of present-day philanthropy as a modern remnant of these “noble expenses,” which both bind society across class boundaries *and* reaffirm the social order.¹²

The burden on the upper echelons of society is not trivial. Because sumptuary expenses

and assistance are so intimately linked to the management of social ranks and hierarchies, the sense of obligation that accompanies them must appear to be genuine. Importantly, and even if it is, generosity should not appear to be *motivated* by the fact that it will reflect positively on the giver: otherwise a gift is nothing but an expression of egoism, a perverse trick to anchor one's social position and oblige others toward oneself.¹³ Indeed, Mauss argues toward the end of his essay, "the rich must come back to considering themselves—freely and also by obligation—as the financial guardians of their fellow citizens."¹⁴

To Accept

People are perceptive enough about the double-edged character of the gift economy, which is why they are often hesitant to accept gifts that seem too large to repay. *The obligation to accept* a gift is perhaps the most sensitive of all, because it is precisely in the moment that the gift is received that the social relationship is put to the test. Not accepting or discrediting a gift is tantamount to rejecting the social connection it is meant to index. Depending on the manner in which nonacceptance comes about, it might result in humiliation for the giver or an admission of inferiority by the recipient, or both. In any case, it is a decidedly antisocial move, sometimes akin to a declaration of war. A gift that would not or cannot be repaid is a contradiction in terms.

In practice, though, the reason that all gifts cannot be accepted is that they signal the beginning of a debt relationship and the creation of a social imbalance between giver and gifted. "A present given always expects one in return."¹⁵ No wonder, then, that gifts are at once embraced and feared. A student recently told me about her mother's policy of not accepting certain dinner invitations, because "then you would have to return them." She preferred to reject the relationship than find herself in debt to someone who did not (yet) mean much, or was not deemed worthy of her friendship. Social relations, in fact, often begin with gifts bestowed, and they often end with gifts not returned. In her foreword to the English version of Mauss's text, Mary Douglas cautions philanthropic foundations against confusing "their donations with gifts." Charity—which is premised on the notion that it *cannot and will not* be returned—is humiliating: "The recipient does not like the giver, however cheerful he be."¹⁶ The moral debt that comes with a donation is permanent; the inability to reciprocate creates an asymmetry. It introduces an intractable element of domination. (This insight alone should give pause to the kind of philanthropic goodwill that has thrived in the cracks and failures of the welfare state, in the United States especially). As Didier Fassin points out in his contribution to this issue and elsewhere, the same kind of asymmetry makes humanitarianism a morally fraught relation.¹⁷

To Reciprocate

The obligation to reciprocate seems to suggest that gifts are, in fact, nothing but a disguised expression of self-interest well understood. After all, a gift is a form of credit extended through apparent generosity. And yet the sentiments, beliefs and practices that surround gifting are very different from the explicitly self-interested motivations that sustain barter or trade: the affectation of gratuitous generosity, the denegation of calculation, and the special aura afforded to the things given. It is because of the need to perform these intentions and these beliefs, often in highly public and exaggerated ways, that the gift is

what Mauss calls a “total social fact,” all at once political, religious, aesthetic, legal, and economic.

Unlike commodities, which we can freely part from, gifts are fundamentally inalienable. For Mauss, everything happens as if something of the personality of the giver (the soul of the thing given, or the *hau*) permeated the objects gifted, silently calling for a way to return home. Thus while commodity exchange creates no enduring social obligations, a gift is always attached to a social relation, indexing it and committing parties to lasting cycles of reciprocity.¹⁸ As Mauss puts it, in an unmistakable critique of utilitarian interpretations of the Trobriand Kula ring: “It is indeed something other than utility that circulates in societies of all kinds . . . the clans, the generations, and the sexes generally—because of the many different relationships to which the contracts give rise—are in a perpetual state of economic ferment and *this state of excitement is very far from being materialistic.*”¹⁹ Mauss thereby opens up the possibility of an economy—a system of exchange oriented to the circulation of objects and services—that is regulated by something other than self-interest. The point is that while gifts often involve some form of gauging, they are lived and experienced as not being about calculation. What animates the gift economy, instead, is expressive in nature: it is the feeling, produced by the performance, that the gift is freely bestowed onto a meaningful counterpart. This is also why Mauss preferred the obscure term of *prestation*, or *total prestations*, which captures the ceremonial aspect of the action in a way that “gift” does not. The word *prestation* is meant to index the associated symbolic work (i.e., the gestures, words, rites, beliefs . . .) that gives the exchange its social gravitas and infuses the gift with spiritual force, or “dividuality.”²⁰ And it is because of this work that a gift is lived—phenomenologically—not as a spot transaction but as the acknowledgement of a social relationship, as a transfer without any immediate expectation of return; structurally, it is the means by which this relationship is perpetuated. As such, gifts channel and generate social energy in a way that commodities do not. Mauss describes public giving, in particular, as a joyful act.²¹

Moral Economy

Pierre Bourdieu discusses this very point—the relationship between the economy of giving and its experienced reality—at length.²² Standing Mauss back-to-back with Levi-Strauss, Bourdieu remarks that while the temporal calibration of the cycle of exchange is essential to its interpretation as gift, it is also essential in obfuscating the gift’s real, material function, which is exchange (even if that exchange is purely sumptuary).²³

It is the lapse of time between the gift and the counter-gift that makes it possible to mask the contradiction between the experienced (or desired) truth of the gift as a generous, gratuitous, unrequired act, and the truth that emerges from the model, which makes it a stage in a relationship of exchange that transcends singular acts of exchange. [. . . The gift] is a lie told to oneself. . . . We might coin the term *common misrecognition* to designate this game in which everyone knows—and does not want to know—that everyone knows—and does not want to know—the true nature of the exchange.²⁴

Importantly, precisely because the lie to oneself is misrecognized, it is not fungible into self-interest. Instead, it is experienced as a deep disposition toward generosity, a moral constraint, “the only thing to do.”²⁵ In other words, the institutions that sustain exchange help inculcate a *habitus*. When market exchange fosters calculating dispositions rooted in self-interest, gift exchange may foster solidaristic ones rooted in honor.²⁶ In other words, the need to gift, and to perform gift-appropriate sentiments, mobilizes *and produces*, through verbal and bodily performance, a certain kind of moral being.²⁷ As Durkheim remarked, we do the things we do not only because society compels us to, but also because they appear good to us, they interest our sensibility, they have a certain *appeal*.²⁸ Hence, moral acts are often performed with *élan* and enthusiasm. Psychology and sociology converge. “The mental and the social are one and the same.”²⁹ The sentiment of honor can have a productive role by obliging to give, which fosters social connection. The same is true of the sentiment of guilt, which always accompanies a debt and provokes the need for reciprocity. (In Bourdieuan terms, the *habitus* is adjusted to its social conditions—people make virtue of necessity.)

What are, then, the moral possibilities offered by the gift economy? Mauss published his *Sociological Assessment of Bolshevism* the same year as *The Gift*. Astute commentators have remarked that this was no coincidence—the two essays are “two legs of the same intellectual project,” as Graeber puts it.³⁰ The failure of the Soviet experiment and the implementation, by Lenin, of a measured return to the market in 1921 (under the NEP) were very much on Mauss’s mind as he was pondering the modern possibilities for socialism. If the market could not be done away with, it had to be put in its proper place. If the Soviet state had to use coercion and violence in order to deliver socialism, then something was wrong with it, too. The point of *The Gift* was, first, to demonstrate the widespread empirical existence of quasi-communist practices throughout a wide range of societies and alongside the market—for example, groups and individuals sharing their livelihood, physical beings, and wealth through the cultural imperative of the open-ended gift/counter-gift cycle. It was to show a way forward for those who still believed in the socialist ideal. All at once free and obligatory, situated between self-interest and generosity, individualism and communism, gift-based reciprocity offered a moral foundation beyond the sterile opposition between the market and forced collectivization. As an ardent proponent of a decentralized kind of socialism and an “active propagandist” for the French cooperative movement, Mauss also thought that society could be “knit together” through myriad “individualist communisms,” and in an atmosphere that would be rewarding emotionally, moved by “the pleasure of generous expenditure.”³¹ In other words, solidarity practices will beget solidarity feelings.

But even as he celebrated decentralized communism as an essential component of social solidarity, Mauss was not naïvely idealist about the potential of scaling up this model as a superior kind of moral economy. His analysis of the North-American potlatch was a powerful reminder that the moment one shares one’s wealth (or assets, or feelings) is a moment of deep, often destructive, social competition no less immune to power and exploitation dynamics than market exchange (and, perhaps, more). “Noblesse oblige,” or even the peaceful model of balanced yet fuzzy reciprocity described in the *Hávámál*, are rarely how the moral economy of gifting asserts itself in practice. Both exist in a state of precarious equilibrium. Gifts are always on the verge of slipping into utilitarian exchange

if the returned gift is exactly equal to the original one (which also amounts to erasing, or refusing the social relationship) or into hierarchy if the returned gift vastly exceeds or trails the original one (which damages the extension of solidarity). The explicit or implicit measurement of gifts against one another establishes the ranking of social positions, feeds into people's social mobility efforts, and sublimates real-life power and violence into a symbolic struggle of forms. In the agonistic versions of gift exchange, of which Mauss found an example in the North American potlatch described by Franz Boas, gifting was about establishing one's superiority through disproportionate expense or repayment, with a constant ratcheting up of social pressure. And, indeed, social life is replete with stories of families and individuals starving or ruining themselves in order to impress one another, or to return someone else's unwanted extravagance. As Laurence Fontaine has shown in her work on the Old Regime, aristocratic gifts that looked incommensurable, such as an introduction to the king, routinely put bourgeois beneficiaries into eternal financial debt toward their noble patrons.³² Ashley Mear's ethnography of the VIP service industry describes the systematic exploitation of girls' sense of obligation after their brokers shower them with gifts and perks.³³ And I have suggested in my own work on digital capitalism that the business model of the free service, exemplified by Google, Facebook, and others' munificent gifts to the world, has been one of the main sources of these firms' social and economic power—a strategy I call “accumulation by gift.”³⁴ The morality of giving and sharing can be brutally manipulative.

The Imperfect Promise

In the same way that the market economy was once “left,” promising the erasure of social privileges, the enhancement of social relationships, and the rise of democratic egalitarianism, there is a “right” side to the gift economy, fueling social competition, humiliation, and exploitation rather than social cohesion.³⁵ So what is the solution? Because competitive gifting is materially and psychologically onerous, pulling the gift relationship closer to utilitarian exchange may in fact offer some relief.³⁶ Perhaps this is why gifts in market societies are increasingly fungible (in the form of gift cards or “earmarked” cash payments for instance), and quite finely matched to the relationships they serve.³⁷ But if that is the case, then the gift loses much of its joy and much of its solidaristic promise. A more satisfactory possibility, cautiously discussed by Mauss toward the end of his essay, may be to blur the boundaries between giver and gifted. Mauss thought that social insurance legislation, in particular, could be thought of as a sort of collective gift (from the community back to the community). Rather than a form of charity toward a specific population (the poor), employers' contributions to social insurance should be understood as a collective debt, the obligation to repay workers for their efforts and lifelong commitments, which wages alone will never make whole. They have given themselves to the nation, and the nation must give back.³⁸

For Mauss, the moral economy (although he did not use this term) is not *sui generis*. But certain kinds of moral feelings arise when societies cultivate, simultaneously, a sense of the collective and a sense of freedom. Developing the former without the latter will make social contributions or taxes look like a form of confiscation and social insurance look like charity. Fostering the latter without the former will make both seem unnecessary or counterproductive. Affects always circulate alongside money and things and thus it is

essential to frame social policy around ongoing relationships of economic interdependency. Embedded in this kind of “metapragmatics,” the gift would be performative, nurturing social solidarity by eliciting feelings of reciprocity, both within the community at large and toward the state, which represents it.³⁹ In the end, there may be no special ethical promise in the gift as such: rather, any promise will be dependent upon the broader social structure in which the concrete, actual practices of gifting take place—especially one that sustains the language and intersubjective commonsense of moral obligation.

NOTES

I am grateful to Didier Fassin and Webb Keane for their comments on an earlier version of this text.

1. Marcel Mauss, *La prière* (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1909).
2. Mauss’s work for his uncle included, most notably, the background research for Durkheim’s *Suicide* and editorial work for the review *Année Sociologique*.
3. By then, Mauss’s publication of the essay “Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function” (published in 1898 with his historian friend Henri Hubert) had made his academic reputation.
4. Alain Caillé, “Préface à *L’Essai sur le don* en chinois,” *Revue du MAUSS*, no. 39 (2012): 429–42.
5. Incidentally, the insight helps explain communism’s visceral appeal at the time of Mauss’s writing: it simply agrees with what societies are fundamentally about.
6. Mauss wrote various fragments of what would become *The Gift* around 1923–1924, as a reflection on a set of practices that share a structural similarity. The full study was published as a long article in the *Année Sociologique* (a review whose editorship he had taken up after Durkheim’s death) in 1925. Marcel Fournier, *Marcel Mauss: A Biography* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: The Free Press, 2014).
7. Archaic here refers both to ancient societies but also to small, tribal groups. Mauss followed closely the method laid out by Durkheim in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, which consists in analyzing religion in small, noncomplex societies to get at the essence of the phenomenon. The book also contains an implicit account of historical development, whereby the total social fact of the gift gets disaggregated and simplified into distinct spheres (religion, economy, politics, etc. . . .) and discrete individuals, as opposed to collectives. Jonathan P. Parry, “The Gift, the Indian Gift and the ‘Indian Gift,’” *Man* 21, no. 3 (September 1986): 453–73.
8. Mauss, like Durkheim and arguably Weber, was trying to find a third way between communism and laissez-faire capitalism.
9. Alain Caillé, *Anthropologie du don: Le tiers paradigme* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 2000), 19–20.
10. Parry, “The Gift”; James Laidlaw, “A Free Gift Makes No Friends,” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 6, no. 4 (December 2000): 617–34.
11. Claude Lévi-Strauss argues against the disaggregation between the three obligations: gifts are nothing but a special case of a universal phenomenon, a deep structure common to all human societies—the principle of generalized exchange. (However, the *display* of generosity is essential to the gift performance.) Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), 47.
12. Cihan Tugal, *Caring for the Poor: Islamic and Christian Benevolence in a Liberal World* (London: Routledge, 2017). Alain Caillé contests this interpretation: The gift has “nothing to do, at least at the beginning, with generosity or charity or altruism.” “Préface à *L’Essai sur le don* en chinois,” 439.
13. David Graeber, “Marcel Mauss Revisited,” in *Toward An Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001), 161.
14. Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: The Form and Reason of Exchange in Archaic Societies* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), 69.
15. Hávámál, cited in Mauss, *The Gift*, 2.
16. Mary Douglas, “Foreword: No Free Gift,” in Mauss, *The Gift*, viii; also see Mauss, *The Gift*, 65. Although for Mauss, alms and charity are different from gifts in that they do not comprise an obligation of reciprocity; they are related to it in the sense that both require sacrifice and renunciation.
17. Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).
18. James Carrier, “Gifts, Commodities, and Social Relations: A Maussian View of Exchange,” *Sociological Forum* 6, no. 1 (March 1991): 119–36.
19. Mauss, *The Gift*, 72 (emphasis added). This obviously builds on Durkheim’s concept of collective effervescence. Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 218.
20. Strathern uses the term “dividual” to refer to the partibility of persons that inheres in the evolving nature of social relationships. Marilyn Strathern, *The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with Society in Melanesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
21. *Ibid.*, 69.

22. See, for example, Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997).
23. For instance, a gift must not be reciprocated too quickly, or it will be perceived as an insult. A gift reciprocated too late verges on theft and forces a “bitter reckoning of accounts.” See Webb Keane, “Market, Materiality, and Moral Metalanguage,” *Anthropological Theory* 8, no. 1 (March 2008): 33.
24. Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 191–92.
25. *Ibid.*, 193.
26. Pierre Bourdieu, “Making the Economic Habitus: Algerian Workers Revisited,” trans. Richard Nice and Loïc Wacquant, *Ethnography* 1, no. 1 (July 2000): 17–41.
27. Webb Keane, “The Value of Words and the Meaning of Things in Eastern Indonesian Exchange,” *Man* 29, no. 3 (September 1994): 605–29. This is what Bourdieu calls the “twofold truth” to the gift: the necessity to hold together analytically “the point of view of the agents who are caught up in the object and the point of view on this point of view, which the work of analysis enables one to reach.” Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, 189.
28. Émile Durkheim, “The Determination of Moral Facts,” in *Sociology and Philosophy*, ed. Émile Durkheim (New York: The Free Press, 1974), 35–62.
29. Lévi-Strauss, “Introduction,” 21.
30. Graeber, “Marcel Mauss Revisited.”
31. Fournier, *Marcel Mauss*, 206; Graeber, “Marcel Mauss Revisited”; Mauss, *The Gift*, 69.
32. Laurence Fontaine, *The Moral Economy: Poverty, Credit, and Trust in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
33. Ashley Mears, “Working for Free in the VIP: Relational Work and the Production of Consent,” *American Sociological Review* 80, no. 6 (December 2015): 1099–122.
34. Marion Fourcade and Daniel Kluttz, “A Maussian Bargain: Accumulation by Gift in Digital Capitalism,” *Big Data and Society* (January–June, 2020).
35. Elizabeth Anderson, *Private Government. How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don’t Talk About It)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).
36. Graeber, “Marcel Mauss Revisited.”
37. Viviana Zelizer, *The Social Meaning of Money* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Viviana Zelizer, “Payments and Social Ties,” *Sociological Forum* 11, no. 3 (September 1996): 481–95.
38. Sylvain Dzimira, “Don, science, morale et politique: Contribution pour une gauche nouvelle,” *Revue du MAUSS*, no. 27 (2006): 252–68.
39. Keane, “Market, Materiality, and Moral Metalanguage,” 33.