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### **Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society**

#### **Title**

Explanation in Category Learning

#### **Permalink**

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3qr069xf>

#### **Journal**

Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 28(28)

#### **ISSN**

1069-7977

#### **Authors**

Chin-Parker, Seth

Hernandez, Olivia

Matens, Murray

#### **Publication Date**

2006

Peer reviewed

# Explanation in Category Learning

Seth Chin-Parker, Olivia Hernandez, and Murray Matens

(contact [chinparkers@denison.edu](mailto:chinparkers@denison.edu))

Department of Psychology, Denison University  
Granville, OH 43023 USA

## Abstract

In this study, we examine how explanation can be implicated in category learning. We asked participants to explicitly state what they considered to be important in explaining the category membership of individuals in novel social groups. We examine these explanations, focusing on how prior knowledge was integrated with the empirical information gleaned from the learning examples. We also compare the learning outcomes of explanation learning with those of classification learning. The explanation learners developed an understanding of the categories that was more knowledge-based than the classification learners. We discuss how it is important to consider category-learning paradigms like explanation learning to better understand how prior knowledge affects category learning.

**Keywords:** category learning; classification; explanation

## Introduction

Outside my window, people walk across the academic quad. Some of them are students, some are faculty, and some are staff. Somehow, I have acquired the knowledge necessary to identify and interact with these various categories of individuals. The issues related to how I succeed at such tasks are of interest to philosophers, psychologists, and computer scientists.

In this paper, we consider two points. First, category learning is a rich and multifaceted activity, but this is not necessarily reflected in the basic research being done in cognitive psychology. Several lines of study have investigated unsupervised learning (e.g. Love, 2003), indirect learning (Minda & Ross, 2004), and inference learning (e.g. Yamuachi & Markman, 1998), but the primary focus of the field has been on the classification-learning paradigm (see Markman & Ross, 2003). Second, prior knowledge is important to category learning (see Murphy, 2002, for a review), but the theoretical framework available to understand its influence is not fully developed. These two points are not independent—we argue that in order to study how prior knowledge is implicated in learning we have to utilize different learning paradigms than those typically used. The study presented here is intended to offer another means of assessing how prior knowledge can be implicated in category learning.

The primary focus of this study is on the role that explanation plays in category learning. We certainly do not claim this is a new idea. Developmental psychologists have been working with this idea for decades (e.g. Carey, 1985). Also, roughly 20 years ago, the machine learning literature

was teeming with ideas of how explanation-based learning (EBL) could be used to resolve critical problems that intelligent systems face when learning (a useful overview is provided by Ellman, 1989). The basic idea of the approach was that by providing an intelligent system with a set of constraints and connections, the prior knowledge, the system is better able to identify relevant features of an example and thus be able to develop a generalization of the example.

However, this work has not had a strong impact on work examining category learning. Notable exceptions include Schank, Collins, and Hunter's (1986) attempt to redirect the study of category learning away from strictly inductive learning. Ahn, Brewer, and Mooney (1992) provided a useful and insightful study about how EBL could account for certain learning situations, specifically how people can learn to generalize from a single example of a domain when appropriate prior knowledge is available. Pazzani (1991) possibly went the furthest in integrating the ideas of EBL with evidence from basic psychological studies. However, the role that explanation plays in category learning has not been fully appreciated or developed.

An important paper by Murphy and Medin (1985) inspired some research into the role of prior knowledge in category learning (e.g. Murphy & Allopenna, 1994; Rehder, 2003; Wisniewski, 1995). However, much of this work has been done firmly within parameters established by the dominant classification-learning paradigm (e.g. Medin & Schaffer, 1978). In this learning paradigm, a participant learns about categories by classifying items into (typically) two categories and receiving feedback about those classification decisions. The reliance on this learning paradigm in psychological research has been recently questioned (e.g. Markman & Ross, 2003). In this study, we hope to show the constraints of the classification-learning paradigm can limit the use of prior knowledge during learning.

We introduce the paradigm of *explanation learning* as a form of category learning. In this learning paradigm, the participant is presented with examples from experimenter-defined categories and is asked to generate an explanation as to why the presented item should be considered a member of the specified category.

This explanation-learning paradigm is interesting since the participants do not receive any feedback during the learning. We predict that prior knowledge will provide sufficient constraint on the learning to guide the development of appropriate representations of the

categories even in the absence of explicit feedback. Our basic idea of the mechanisms and processes involved are similar to Thagard (2000) in that explanations will develop from and be constrained by the knowledge participants bring to the learning task. In the current study, these constraints will affect how the different types of features used to describe the category members are integrated into the explanations and thus the category representations available for making later category-based decisions.

We developed categories comprised of features that varied in their relevance to the underlying sense of the categories as well as how often the specific feature value occurred across the category members. For instance, the *relevant features* are informative with regard to prior knowledge and are relevant to the category membership, but the specific instantiation of these features is unique to each category member. Thus, they should allow the learner to integrate prior knowledge into his or her representation of the category, and this integration should be illustrated by explanations that use more abstract components to explain the specific feature values of each individual. The *meaningful irrelevant features* are informative, but they are not relevant to the category membership. So, they may be mentioned in the explanations, possibly even abstracted to some extent because of their informativeness, but we predict they will not become as central to the participant's understanding of the category. Finally, the *diagnostic irrelevant features* are not related to prior knowledge within the domain of social groups, but the features are perfectly predictive of the category membership of an item. These features may be mentioned in the explanations, but there should not be any integration with prior knowledge because of their lack of informativeness. As a result, we predict these features will not be central to the participants' understandings of the categories.

For the participants that learn about the categories through the classification-learning paradigm, we make very different predictions. Since the diagnostic irrelevant features are perfectly predictive of the category membership, they should become the focus during the learning. Also, since the other features vary in their specific instantiations across the category members, the classification learners should have difficulty appreciating their relationship to the underlying category structure (Yamauchi & Markman, 2000).

The current study is intended to provide two contributions to the study of human category learning. First, we examine explanations used by participants as they learn about categories of social groups, a domain in which they have prior knowledge. Second, we provide a comparison of the learning outcomes of explanation learning and classification learning.

## Experiment

**Participants** Twenty-six undergraduates from a small Midwestern liberal arts college participated in the study in

exchange for \$10. Participants were randomly assigned to a learning condition. All participants signed an informed consent and were fully debriefed.

**Design** The study consisted of two parts. The first part of the study was an examination of explanations generated during the course of learning about two novel social categories. The purpose was to determine what information was being used in the explanations. The second part of the study consisted of a comparison of the learning outcomes between participants that learned by explanation and those that learned by classification.

**Materials** The learning items consisted of descriptions of fictitious individuals that belonged to two experimenter-defined social clubs. The social clubs were labeled as the "Blue Club" and the "Purple Club." The Blue Club consisted of four individuals that could be described as "social." The Purple Club consisted of four individuals that could be described as "caring."

Each individual was presented to the participants as a description that consisted of four features. The specific values that instantiated the features were chosen based on pretesting. One group of undergraduates came up with characteristics that they associated with several different personality types. These features were then rated by a different group of undergraduates in order to determine the general strength of the associations between the characteristics and the personality types and the level of agreement of those ratings across individuals. For instance, the feature value "visits a friend in the hospital" was rated as being strongly associated with a "caring" person, and there was perfect agreement across raters. The same feature value was rated as being weakly related to a "social" personality type, and negatively related to an "aggressive" type.

Two of the features within each description were relevant features (see Table 1 for an abstract rendering of the category structure). These features were directly related to the underlying category essence, either social or caring. The specific values for the relevant features were unique to each individual. Even though each feature value appeared only once across the category members, the relevant features all pointed to the category essence. The other two feature values were not related to the category essence, but they appeared more consistently within the category members. The meaningful irrelevant features were related to a cautious personality type in both of the categories. Each meaningful irrelevant feature value was shared by two of the four items within each category. The final feature type was the diagnostic irrelevant feature; prior rating found the feature values that instantiated these features, "Drinks Pepsi" and "Owns a laptop", to be unrelated to any specific personality type. The diagnostic irrelevant feature value was the same for all four items within each category.

The descriptions of the individuals in each category were printed on 3" by 5" note cards. Four sets of the note

Table 1: Abstract Category Structure

<u>Blue Club</u>	<u>Purple Club</u>
B <sub>1</sub> B <sub>2</sub> MI <sub>1</sub> D <sub>1</sub>	P <sub>1</sub> P <sub>2</sub> MI <sub>3</sub> D <sub>2</sub>
B <sub>3</sub> B <sub>4</sub> MI <sub>1</sub> D <sub>1</sub>	P <sub>3</sub> P <sub>4</sub> MI <sub>3</sub> D <sub>2</sub>
B <sub>5</sub> B <sub>6</sub> MI <sub>2</sub> D <sub>1</sub>	P <sub>5</sub> P <sub>6</sub> MI <sub>4</sub> D <sub>2</sub>
B <sub>7</sub> B <sub>8</sub> MI <sub>2</sub> D <sub>1</sub>	P <sub>7</sub> P <sub>8</sub> MI <sub>4</sub> D <sub>2</sub>

Note: “B” and “P” indicate relevant features for each category, “MI” indicates meaningful irrelevant features, and “D” indicates the diagnostic irrelevant features. The subscripts denote the specific feature values.

cards were made, and the features of each fictional person were ordered differently across the cards within each set. This was done to vary the order of the feature values across the participants.

The testing items consisted of three types. The *old items* were the same eight descriptions of individuals the participants had seen during learning. The *conflict feature pairings* consisted of only two features; a relevant feature from one category was paired with a meaningful irrelevant or diagnostic irrelevant feature from the other category. There were 16 conflict feature pairings. The *novel items* were six descriptions of individuals, three for each category, that were structurally identical to the learning items but used novel feature values. The relevant features and meaningful irrelevant features had the same relationship to the personality types as the learning items.

**Procedure** Participants received instructions about the learning task they would be completing. Explanation learners were informed that they would see descriptions of individuals who belonged to one of two social groups. The task was to verbally explain why that person belonged to the club that the experimenter indicated. The explanation learners were informed that their explanations would be recorded for later evaluation. During each learning trial, the experimenter presented a card, and then placed it on a sheet of colored paper that had the appropriate category label. The participant provided his or her explanation for that trial – no feedback was provided by the experimenter. Classification learners were informed that they would be shown individuals who belonged to one of two social clubs and their task was to classify each individual. The experimenter presented one card each trial and placed it between the sheets with the category labels, and the participant was asked to classify the person described on the card. Following each classification decision, the experimenter provided feedback and placed the card onto the correct sheet, so the participant could study the description before moving onto the next trial. Participants in both conditions completed two learning blocks.

The testing session was the same for both groups. They first classified the old items. The second test consisted of classifying the conflict feature pairs. The final test was the

novel item classification test. Each testing trial consisted of the experimenter presenting a testing item and the participant classifying that item. The order of items within each task was random. Participants received no feedback during any of the tests.

## Results

**Generated Explanations** The explanations generated by the participants were analyzed using a fairly simple coding scheme. A research assistant who was blind to the main purpose of the study did the coding. The data for one participant were lost due to experimenter error, so we report the data for 12 of the explanation participants.

The recorded explanations were coded as to what information was used by the participant. The mention of a specific feature value (whether relevant, meaningful irrelevant, or diagnostic irrelevant) was noted. These will be referred to as *concrete* components of the explanations. Also, the explanations were coded for both *hierarchical* and *abstract* components (adapted from Wisniewski and Medin, 1994). A hierarchical component is one that relates to a specific feature value (a concrete component), but goes beyond it in scope. For example, the item on a given trial might contain the feature value, “Volunteers at the hospital,” and the participant might say in his or her explanation, “This person helps those in need.” Since helping is directly related to volunteering, and we often think of those in a hospital as being “in need,” this component was considered hierarchical. An abstract component of an explanation is a general personality trait that is not directly tied to the concrete feature values present during a given trial. For instance, if the participant said, “This person is caring,” the explanation was coded as having an abstract component.

We also wanted to assess the focus of the participant during the explanation process. We counted the number of inferences that the participants made about the individual, as well as about the group. These inferences were related to the hierarchical and abstract components mentioned above. The purpose of this coding was to allow us to ascertain whether the participant was using the explanation to develop an understanding of the individual or the group. We also coded whether the participants were comparing the information about an individual with others in the same group or between the two groups.

There were several questions that we hoped to answer by means of evaluating the explanations. Did the meaningfulness of the features have an effect on their use in the explanations? How were the participants using the specific feature values to create more hierarchical features? What kind of abstract components were included? Were the participants using the explanations to map the specific feature values to the individual or the social group? Were comparisons being made between members of the same group, or were the comparisons being made between the

two groups? The analyses that follow provide some answers to these questions.

Table 2: Explanation Components by Feature Type

	Explanation Component	
	Concrete	Hierarchical
Relevant	0.47 (0.23)	0.30 (0.20)
Meaningful Irrelevant	0.38 (0.31)	0.32 (0.30)
Diagnostic Irrelevant	0.55 (0.32)	0.09 (0.15)

Note: Mean proportion of trials (and standard deviation) that included these components reported.

*Did the meaningfulness of the features have an effect on their use in the explanations?* We determined the mean number of times within each trial the explanations contained the various concrete components (see Table 2). We adjusted the relevant feature proportion, dividing it by two, since there were two of those feature values in each item and one each of the meaningful irrelevant and diagnostic irrelevant feature values. We used a repeated-measures ANOVA to compare the proportional use of relevant, meaningful irrelevant, and diagnostic irrelevant features in the concrete components. There was a non-significant difference in the number of times the participants used the different types of features as concrete components,  $F(2, 22) = 2.836$ ,  $MSE = 0.009$ ,  $p = 0.08$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.21$ .

*How were the participants using the specific feature values to create more hierarchical features?* We determined the use of the different feature types as the basis for hierarchical components within the explanations. We again adjusted the calculated proportion of relevant features. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant difference in which feature types were used as the basis for hierarchical components,  $F(2, 22) = 7.699$ ,  $MSE = 0.186$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.84$ . Post-hoc comparisons between the three feature types showed no difference between the use of the relevant and meaningful irrelevant features,  $t(11) = 0.22$ ,  $p > 0.20$ , but large differences between the use of relevant and diagnostic irrelevant features,  $t(11) = 5.18$ ,  $p < 0.01$ , and meaningful irrelevant and diagnostic irrelevant features,  $t(11) = 3.65$ ,  $p < 0.01$ .

*What kind of abstract components were included?* The explanations included many abstract components, with varying degrees of relationship to the personality traits we used to construct the two groups. The analysis here focuses on how the abstract components relate to the types of features used in the items. We found no evidence that any abstract component was related to a diagnostic irrelevant feature in any explanations generated. However, 41.70% of the trials ( $SD = 22.80$ ) contained an abstract component related to the relevant characteristics, and 7.30% of the trials ( $SD = 13.30$ ) contained one related to the meaningful irrelevant feature. The use of these feature types to generate abstract components was significantly different,  $t(11) =$

4.89,  $p < 0.01$ . We did not adjust the relevant feature use for this analysis because it is impossible to determine whether an abstract component was related to one or both of the relevant feature values present. The adjusted use of the relevant feature ( $M = 20.83\%$ ,  $SD = 11.40$ ), is still significantly larger than the meaningful irrelevant feature.

*Were the participants using the explanations to map the specific feature values to the individual or the social group?* The participants could generate their explanations with regard to the individual or the group being considered. For instance, a participant could say, “She is kind for volunteering at the hospital,” or “She is in the blue group because they are kind.” We determined the number of times per trial on average each participant made the two types of connections. The participants used both connections to the individual ( $M = 1.53$ ,  $SD = 0.71$ ) and the group ( $M = 0.36$ ,  $SD = 0.34$ ) in their explanations. However, the individual was more often the focus of the explanation,  $t(11) = 5.43$ ,  $p < 0.01$ .

*Were comparisons being made between members of the same group, or were the comparisons being made between the two groups?* For each participant, we determined the number of times per trial there was a comparison made to another “person” within the social group being considered, and the number of times per trial the comparison was to the other social group. For instance, the participant might say, “She volunteers at the hospital. That’s like the one who helped sell Girl Scout cookies,” or “She volunteers at the hospital unlike the Purple Group people who just party.” On average, participants made more within-group comparisons ( $M = 0.48$ ,  $SD = 0.34$ ) than between-group comparisons ( $M = 0.17$ ,  $SD = 0.15$ ),  $t(11) = 2.95$ ,  $p = 0.01$ , but did make some of each type.

### Explanation versus Classification Learning Conditions

There were three measures of interest in this portion of the study: classification of old (learning) items, classification of conflict feature pairings, and classification of novel items. For the old items, we determined each participant’s accuracy, and then calculated the mean of both groups. For the conflict feature pairings, we determined the proportion of responses by each participant that indicated he or she was classifying the feature pairing according to the relevant feature value. We separated these data also by whether the conflicting feature was a meaningful irrelevant or diagnostic irrelevant feature and determined the mean for each type of item for each condition. The novel items were analyzed in the same manner as the old items.

There was no difference in the ability of the groups to classify the old items. Every participant in the study perfectly classified the set of old items.

The data from the conflict feature pairings (see Table 3) were analyzed using a mixed 2 (classification/explanation learning) X 2 (meaningful/diagnostic irrelevant) ANOVA. There was a main effect of learning,  $F(1, 24) = 91.421$ ,  $MSE = 4.674$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.79$ , showing that the explanation learners classified the pairings more often

Table 3: Results of Conflict Feature Pairings Test

Learning	Conflict Feature	
	Meaningful	Diagnostic
Classification	0.41 (0.28)	0.08 (0.18)
Explanation	0.81 (0.15)	0.88 (0.22)

Note: Mean group proportion (and standard deviation) of classifications according to relevant feature reported.

according to the relevant feature compared to the classification learners. The analysis also revealed a main effect of item,  $F(1, 24) = 5.546$ ,  $MSE = 0.224$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.18$ , and an interaction between learning and item,  $F(1, 24) = 12.552$ ,  $MSE = 0.506$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.34$ . The classification learners were primarily responsible for the main effect of item. They classified the pairings according to the relevant feature only 8% of the time when it was paired with the diagnostic irrelevant feature but 41% of the time when it was paired with the meaningful irrelevant feature. The explanation learners showed a less dramatic difference, but one that was in the opposite direction. They classified the items according to the relevant feature 88% of the time when it was paired with the diagnostic irrelevant feature and 81% of the time when it was paired with the meaningful relevant feature. This difference between the groups was the cause of the significant interaction in the analysis.

The analysis of the novel item test showed the accuracy of the explanation learners ( $M = 0.92$ ,  $SD = 0.09$ ) was higher than the classification learners ( $M = 0.64$ ,  $SD = 0.32$ ),  $t(24) = 3.08$ ,  $p < 0.01$ . The explanation learners were above chance (50% correct) in their performance,  $t(12) = 17.64$ ,  $p < 0.01$ , while the classification learners were not,  $t(12) = 1.60$ ,  $p > 0.10$ .

### General Discussion

This study had two aims: to describe how explanations are used in category learning and to compare the learning outcomes of explanation and classification learning.

The analyses of the explanations generated by the explanation-learning group were insightful on several accounts. We found no difference in the specific use of the various feature types in the explanations. We had predicted that participants would use the relevant features predominantly in the explanations, but that was not the case. Possibly, the participants felt it was important to use all the information present in the items. Also, the adjustment we made to the proportion of relevant features used might have been more conservative than we intended. Neither of these reasons is theoretically interesting, but it is noteworthy that even though the feature type did not moderate the concrete components of the explanations, it influenced how the information was used in both the hierarchical and abstract components.

In the hierarchical components, the relevant and meaningful irrelevant features were used similarly, but the diagnostic irrelevant features were not used often. Both the

relevant and meaningful irrelevant feature values were related to prior knowledge people have about various personality types (cautious, caring, and social), while the diagnostic irrelevant feature values were arbitrary and uninformative about personality type. Since participants rarely used the diagnostic irrelevant features to generate hierarchical components, and not at all to generate the abstract components, it appears that the informativeness of a feature affects how it is used in the explanation. When a feature is related to prior knowledge, it allows for the successful integration of that knowledge into the category representation. This fits nicely into the relevance framework of Medin, Coley, Storms, and Hayes (2003).

The cause of the differential use of the relevant and meaningful irrelevant features in generating the abstract components of the explanations is less clear. It is possible that the participants noticed that both groups had “cautious” characteristics (the meaningful irrelevant features), and those became less important since they were not informative as to how to differentiate the groups. This would be evidence that diagnostic information is privileged in the category representation. Another possibility is that the presence of two relevant features in each item allowed the participants to more clearly see the underlying sense of the category. Or the differential use could reflect some combination of these factors. Further study of explanation learning can help to answer these types of questions.

The analysis of the explanations was also informative as to how the participants used the explanations to develop their knowledge about the categories and the individuals that made up the categories. The focus during the learning seemed to be primarily on how the specific feature values present in that individual related to one another in terms of prior knowledge. The focus on the category itself seemed secondary, and there was less thought given to the contrasting category in the explanations. Some of this might be best explained by task demands. However, a focus on the individual, and secondarily the category of interest, might be the most efficient way to incorporate prior knowledge. For each item, the participant was able to generate the explanation that focused on a constrained set of information, the feature values seen specifically in the individual. Later explanations would be similarly focused, and as a result of repeated interaction with certain prior knowledge, the category representations themselves would come to be more “knowledge-based”. This study did not examine what ultimately happens to the item-specific information once the more general understanding of the category is formed, but that is an interesting issue to consider.

The pattern of results found across the three classification tests provides an interesting glimpse into the learning outcomes of both classification and explanation learning. Both groups were perfect when classifying the items they encountered during learning. However, when the results of the conflict feature pairings are considered, it is obvious that this equivalence in performance is not due to the fact that the participants in the two groups acquired the same knowledge about the categories. The explanation learners focused on the relevant feature to guide their classification

of the feature pairs. The classification learners did not. The classification learners showed a strong preference for classifying the feature pairs according to the diagnostic irrelevant feature when it was available, and then showing no real preference as a group otherwise. This would seem to indicate that the classification learners were focused on the highly diagnostic feature to the exclusion of other information (see Chin-Parker & Ross, 2004). This would make sense since it would be the most efficient learning strategy available to the classification learners. However, one could argue that focusing on the diagnostic irrelevant feature would also be the most efficient strategy for the explanation learners (“This person is in the blue group because she owns a laptop.” – could be the explanation for every member of that category.) Interestingly, the explanation learners showed a slight avoidance of the diagnostic irrelevant feature. Possibly, the explanation learners realized those feature values were uninformative (irrelevant) with regards to their understanding of the categories and so they were purposely not used during this task. The explanation learners mentioned the diagnostic irrelevant features during the learning, so it is not the case that they simply didn’t know about them. The forced-choice nature of the task also would have emphasized the differential reliance on the relevant features.

The results of the novel item classification task underscore a critical difference in the knowledge acquired from the two learning tasks. The explanation learners were very accurate when classifying the items that shared the abstract sense of the categories specified by the learning items but none of the specific feature values. The explanation-learning task allowed the participants to develop an understanding of the categories that went beyond the instantiations of the features seen during learning. This indicates that the explanation learners were able to develop a more knowledge-based representation of the categories. The classification learners were unable to classify the novel items because they had been focused on the occurrence of specific features during the learning. Their representations of the categories were more sparse, less connected to available prior knowledge, and, we would argue, less useful for later tasks such as predicting missing features or communicating about the categories.

### Acknowledgments

This work was supported by a Hughes Early Research in the Sciences summer scholarship awarded to O. Hernandez and an Anderson Summer Research scholarship awarded to M. Matens.

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