Title

Foundations of Latino Party Identification: Learning, Ethnicity and Demographic Factors Among Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans and Anglos in the United States

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The ethnic composition of the United States population is undergoing rapid change. The 1990 census reports that, in terms of numbers, the numerically fastest growing ethnic/racial segment of the population was the "Latino" or "Hispanic." Social observers speculate that it is just a matter of time before Latinos will have a major impact upon our social and political systems. Demographic projections forecast Hispanics will become the largest ethnic minority in the US sometime between 2005 and 2010. Analysts commonly assume that this portends a parallel, if not commensurate, increase in the political influence of Latinos.

While the predicted political changes may occur, the suppositions are often only vaguely specified and are only indirectly supported by any empirical data or analyses. There has been, for example, little empirical data of national scope on the political orientations or behaviors of Latinos. Over the past few years, the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS) has provided some baseline information on basic identities, political values, ideologies and behaviors of the three largest Latino groups (de la Garza, et al. 1992; de la Garza, et. al 1996). Much is still unknown or unreported.

One largely unexplored area in studies of the politics of Latinos in the United States is their relationships to US political parties. Attitudes about political parties are some of the most important of all political orientations. Indeed there is near consensus on the strong assertion that partisanship is "the most important single influence on political opinions and voting behavior. Many other influences are at work on voters in our society, but none compare in significance with partisanship" (Flanigan 1972:37). This is so not only because partisan identification, a subjective feeling of attachment to a political party, is significant in itself, but also because it is one of the best psychological indicators of many other political attitudes and opinions, as well as behaviors (Abramson 1983:67-131). "Party identification shapes perceptions and transmits values to the attitudes and beliefs that, in turn, lead to the individual's choice at the ballot box" (Miller 1991b). Since political parties are arguably our most important political organizations, there is considerable interest in how the great numbers of current and future citizens of Latino origin will relate to them. In addition to academics' interest in understanding the operation of our political system, practicing politicians--public officials, party activists and candidates--are curious about how Latinos' party-related attitudes may affect their prospects and positions. Both major parties have made explicit claims for the affiliation of Latinos, and as the Latino population increases, the likelihood is that they will increasingly be the targets of blandishments by Republicans and Democrats.

Although several studies of party attachments of Latinos have been published over the past few decades (Cain and Kiewiet 1984; Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner 1991; de la Garza and Brischetto 1982; Welch and Sigelman 1993; Kosmin and Keysar 1995), they have either not

been nationally representative or have otherwise been limited in generalizability. Some have focused on only one national origin group; some have lumped together any number of national origin groups under an unspecified "Latino" or "Hispanic" aggregate label; some have been based on very small subsamples of larger national samples; others are case studies focusing on specific electoral situations in one particular locality; some sample only English-speakers. Their limitations notwithstanding, these studies have provided some clues regarding the party attachments of Latinos and have evoked many questions related to this topic.

Using national survey data from the LNPS, this paper provides baseline, nationally representative data on the demographic bases of party identifications among the three largest Latino national origin groups in the US -- Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans and Cuban Americans. We will compare them with each other as well as with members of the "Anglo" core culture.

Substantial attention has been paid in the literature to the formation, stability, and change in party identification. Certain characteristics of the Latino population, such as the high numbers of immigrants, permit us to use these data to address general questions about partisanship.

After discussing our data, we present basic descriptive information on partisan preference of Latinos in these different groups. We then turn to a discussion of the theories of partisan identification and elaborate the theoretical complexities presented by Latino partisanship. The following section contains the core of our analysis, with the use of these theories to guide consideration of the factors associated with partisan choice. We then turn to an assessment of the impact of these factors on the intensity of partisanship.

Data

The data presented here are from the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS). Based on the 1980 census of the US mainland, LNPS utilized a national, multi-stage, clustered area probability design to sample three Latino national origin groups--Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans(2)-- as well as an Anglo population. The "Anglos" are white, European origin, non-Latinos who reside in areas from which the Latino sample was drawn. They do not represent Anglos residing in states or areas with a combined Latino population of less than 5 percent (or in some cases 3 percent). (The Appendix discusses the LNPS methodology and sampling issues in more detail.) The Anglo sample is therefore not representative of the national Anglo population, which could be a disadvantage. The balancing advantage is that it is representative of those Anglos who live in the same areas as the sampled Latinos and, as indicated by the threshold, these areas include many with small Latino populations.

The sampling strategy recognizes the distinctiveness of the many Latino national origin populations (Bean and Tienda 1987: 2) and does not accept an *a priori* aggregation of these groups under a single label such as "Hispanic" or "Latino" that assumes cultural homogeneity or political unity. The sample was limited to these particular Latino groups for three reasons. First, they are the largest and politically most significant Latino populations in the nation. Together, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans represent approximately 85% of the "Spanish origin" population of the United States. Second, because each of the other national origin groups is also distinct, we rejected combining them into a residual "other Hispanic" category. Third, the costs of drawing representative national samples of any of the other Latino groups were prohibitive.

Basic Pattern of Latino Partisan Preferences

A few Latino partisanship patterns are fairly well established. Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans have a loyal and long-standing identification with the Democratic Party (de la Garza and Brischetto 1983; Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner 1991; Jiron and Jenkins-Smith 1991; Welch and Sigelman 1993). One purported reason for this is the more activist stance of the Democrats with regard to governmental assistance and support programs. Such public assistance is most welcome to groups that have been and continue to be socially and economically disadvantaged. Since the New Deal, the Democratic Party has been perceived as that major party most likely to espouse the cause of the underprivileged. In addition, ethnic groups found an organizational base in the Democratic Party at the time it was a minority party prior to the New Deal. Since it needed to expand its electoral base, the Democratic Party reached out to incorporate new immigrants as potential future supporters. With the coming of the New Deal in the 1930s, the Democratic Party became the majority national party and racial/ethnic groups such as African Americans and Mexican Americans became major elements comprising the Democratic Party's base. In contrast, and reflecting a predisposition shaped by a different history, Cubans tend to identify as Republicans (Brischetto 1987). In the early 1960's, Cubans had given some support to the Democratic Party. Cubans who immigrated before Castro took power in January 1959 had no direct experience of Communism. As large numbers of Cubans left in the 1960s in direct response to the revolution, the balance of partisanship changed. Many Cubans became alienated by the lack of intensity with which Democratic administrations pursued anti-Castro policies (Moreno and Warren 1992). This transfer of partisan allegiance was institutionalized for two reasons. One was Republican militant anti-Communism. Second was the absence of a strong extant Republican infrastructure in Miami. This allowed Cubans to enter the organizational ranks of the party, to enjoy electoral success, and to gain prominence within the party quickly. Emigration from Cuba dropped markedly during the 1970s, but picked up dramatically in 1980 when Castro relaxed restrictions (e.g., opening the port of Mariel) (Portes and Bach 1985:84-90). Many of these later émigrés had substantially lower educational and occupational levels than the earlier immigrants, and correspondingly different experiences in the US. The stance of Cubans towards communism may well have become more complex with the breakup of the USSR and various openings to Cuba (such as the Pope's 1998 visit), but our data were collected in 1989-90 and thus predate these changes.

The overall patterns of party preference described above are reflected in our data. All LNPS respondents were asked: "Do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or something else?(3) The results are presented in Table 1. The association between

TABLE 1. Political Party Identification of All Respondents (Citizens and Non-Citizens), by National Origin (%)

Group	Democrat	Independent	Republican	Total N=
Anglo	43.0	28.3	28.7	442
Mexican	51.3	29.0	19.7	1318
Puerto Rican	60.8	25.9	13.3	579
Cuban	18.3	15.7	65.9	616
Total N=	1331	754	870	2955

Chi2= 543.6* (6 df) Lambda=.180* Cramer's V=.303*

national origin and party identification is substantial. The bivariate distributions on these initial identifications generally validate earlier if less firmly based reports of the relationship between Latino national origin and partisan identification.(4) Six out of ten Puerto Ricans and more than half of the Mexicans identify themselves as Democrats. Conversely, almost two-thirds of the Cubans express affiliation with the Republican Party; they are also the least independent of the four groups. Anglos are the most closely divided between the two major parties.

Only citizens were asked a series of standard follow-up questions to assess strength of identification, among partisans, and direction of leaning, among independents. Partisan respondents were asked whether they were "strong" or "not very strong" Democrats or Republicans, while those citizens who responded to the initial query that they were "independent or something else" were asked whether they thought of themselves as "closer" to the Republican or Democratic Party, with "neither" as an option. A five-point scale of party identity and strength was produced for citizens, with the Independents--leaning or not-- grouped together between the initial partisan identifiers. This five-point scale of party identity and intensity is displayed by ethnic/national origin grouping in Table 2.

TABLE 2. Political Party Identification of Latino (and Anglo) Citizens, by National Origin (%)

Ethnic Group	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Independent	Weak Republican	Strong Republican	Total N=
Anglo	17.6	25.6	28.3	13.1	15.4	442
Mexican	29.3	27.1	28.5	11.0	4.2	861
Puerto Rican	35.4	25.4	25.9	6.9	6.4	579
Cuban	14.4	5.4	16.7	16.3	47.1	312
Total N=	580	510	572	244	288	2194

Chi2=480.8* (12 df) Lambda=.092* Cramer's V=.270*

Six out of ten Puerto Rican citizens and almost as high a proportion (56.3%) of Mexican American citizens identify with the Democratic Party. Only 15.2% of the Mexican citizens and 13.3% of Puerto Rican citizens prefer the Republican Party. Both of these Latino groups of citizens are substantially more Democratic than are their Anglo counterparts. The Mexican-American and Puerto Rican citizens are not only more Democratic in their party self-identification, but they also are markedly more intense in the identification. Almost three out of ten Mexicans and more than one-third of Puerto Ricans consider themselves "strong" Democratic partisans. Only 17.6% of the Anglos identify as strong Democrats. In marked contrast, more than six out of ten Cuban citizens (63.7%) identify most closely with the Republican Party and almost half are "strong" Republicans. The "Anglo" group is less partisan and more bipartisan than any of the Latino groups, identifying itself as 43.0% Democratic, 28.7% Republican, and 28.3% Independent or "something else."

TABLE 3. Political Party Identification of Latino Non-Citizens, by National Origin (%)

Latino Group	Democrat	Independent	Republican	Total N=
Mexican	41.7	30.1	28.2	458
Cuban	17.1	14.8	68.1	304
Total N=	243	183	333	762

Chi2=120.3* (4df) Lambda = .147* Cramer's V = .281*
* Significant at .000

The non-citizen Latinos among the LNPS respondents were asked the basic party identification question but not the follow up "intensity" questions that were asked of the citizens. The party self-identification of Mexican and Cuban non-citizens is reported in Table 3. (All Puerto Ricans are citizens of the United States and there were extremely few Anglo non-citizens.) The basic pattern is the same as for Latino citizens. The Mexicans are much more Democratic than they are Republican, although there are more Republicans among them than among Mexican-American citizens, as well as more independents. Cuban non-citizens are overwhelmingly Republican and are even more so than citizens. They are also, contrary to the usual expectations for non-citizens, slightly less likely to be independents.

These three Latino groups identify in the direction that accords with our expectation. Their members are also more partisan than are Anglos. There is a lower proportion of independents among two of the three groups of these Latinos than among Anglos, and all Latinos are more likely to be strong in their partisan identifications.

Although we have suggested some historical roots to account for the general direction of party choice, we have yet to assess why some identify as Republicans while others do as Democrats. In order to examine the individual factors associated with partisanship, we need to take a detour through the theoretical literature on party identification and then use our data to examine the effects of some key factors.

Theories of Partisanship

Party Identification in the General Population

Demographic correlates of partisanship among the general electorate in the United States are thoroughly documented (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Kamieniecki 1985; Knoke 1976; Ladd 1981; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1948; Miller and Shanks 1996; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979; Shafer and Claggett 1995). Democrats tend to have lower incomes and less education than Republican identifiers. They also are more likely to be Catholic,(5) members of distinctive racial and ethnic groups and in lower status occupations. Gender differences are minimal, with women being slightly more Democratic than men are. The effect of age on partisanship is unclear, with the effects of life cycle and generational experience confounding age's relationship with party affiliation. Since Latinos have not been adequately sampled in most other major national studies of the general electorate, the knowledge of Latino party identification has had to be gleaned from more limited studies, such as those cited earlier and below. It remains to be seen, in the analysis which follows, to what extent the standard demographic correlates apply to these Latinos.

The literature offers alternative, but we argue complementary, theories of why an individual would choose to identify with one party rather than another. The classic *American Voter* analysis (Campbell et al. 1960) emphasized parental socialization or other early sources of affective attachment and the concomitant resistance of partisanship to change, including that caused by policy or other short-term forces.(6) Parental socialization to a party was documented by, among others, Jennings and Niemi (1968) and, more recently, Cassel (1993). Subsequent "revisionists" argued that party was less stable than the classic picture implied; for example, Jackson (1975) and Page and Jones (1979) found that short-term forces (issue and candidate evaluations) could alter partisan preference. Rational choice models characterize partisanship as

the current evaluation of the parties based on the sum of received information. Popkin et al. (1976) developed this view with explicit reliance on Downs (1957) and in direct contrast to the earlier presumed stability of party. They emphasized the rational voter's use of party identification to reduce the cost of information. Fiorina's (1977, 1981) influential formulation incorporates early socialization and later responsiveness to political events into a single model of party identification. People begin with biases towards and against the parties based upon parental influence and other pre-adult experience. Their subsequent political experiences (specifically, in Fiorina, retrospective evaluations of party performance) constitute information that modifies the initial preference. Fiorina assumes that some experiences carry more weight because they are perceived as more important than others are. More universally, experiences are presumed to affect partisanship more if they are more recent; they are discounted as they recede into the past. Franklin (1984, 1992) and Franklin and Jackson (1983) operationalize new information by policy preferences and find a similar dynamic responsiveness of party identification, for both young and old. Franklin does agree (1984:473-474) that socialization provides a starting point for the partisan identity of the young, and that past party preference carries more weight for the old (that is, for those who have accumulated more experience). Niemi and Jennings (1991) emphasize that both of the following processes occur: parental preference strongly influences party choice, but partisanship then shifts in response to later information. Sears and Valentino (1997:61) argue, based on a study of adolescents and their parents, that "periodic leaps in crystallization of party identification through the first half of the life cycle and . . . considerable stability thereafter" reflect the cumulative effects of political experience (especially when both affect and cognition are engaged). They explicitly argue that experience, not maturation, produces this result. They claim that the periodic leaps in partisanship begin early (during adolescence) and lead to substantial stability of partisanship by mid-life.(7)

Although various authors disagree with the revisionists and emphasize the stability of party identification, arguing that there is little evidence for adult change in direction (e.g. Miller 1991a) a substantial body of theory argues for the updating of party identity (including Miller and Shanks 1996). Thus, the direction of partisanship is the cumulative product of political experiences (whether retrospective evaluations of party performance, evaluations of parties' issue positions, or other perceptions). Children develop subjective partisan attachments at very young ages, typically reflecting parental socialization. Very importantly, people enter the political world in the context of their own particular socioeconomic and sociocultural context; that demographic environment significantly structures their learning experiences. There are differences in opinion as to how readily people change their party identity as they age, and for how long, although there seems to be agreement that party identification becomes more stable with age (or experience). For most people, we would expect experience to reinforce the parental partisan direction because of the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status (SES), attitudes, and values, but the correlations are far from perfect. Moreover, the theory predicts more responsiveness to new issues by the young. However, there is no prediction as to whether people with more experience would tend to become Democrats versus Republicans; given the wide variety of evaluative standards, the same actions by the parties will be interpreted by one person as supporting a Democratic identity and by another as supporting a Republican one.(8)

There is a powerful alternative hypothesis that needs attention, however. Abramson (1976, 1979, 1983) claims that differences which are observed among persons of different ages reflect generational cohort differences rather than life cycle processes. Age, or even time in the US, may reflect not experience but cohort differences. Someone who was 65 years old in 1989

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not only had over 40 years of adult political experience but also came of political age shortly after the New Deal realignment and during World War II. It is impossible with a single cross-section to disentangle the effects of age and cohort (as many have noted, including Converse 1976). However, short of panel data, anything that separates age from experience (such as a change in the party system or arrival as an immigrant) facilitates distinguishing between these effects.

Strength of partisanship generally increases with length of affiliation under each of these theoretical perspectives. The *American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960; also Converse 1976) suggested that the strength of party identity increases with age. If partisanship is stable, and if it provides a perceptual screen for the political world, then over time it will be reinforced, rather in the manner of a habit. When Converse (1969) examined partisanship in countries with disrupted party systems, he clarified that "age" is associated with stronger identity only insofar as "the passage of years in chronological age" or "sheer time" provides a measure for length of exposure to a particular political environment. Where it does not, then length of exposure is associated with strength of party identity. Cassel applied Converse's model to US whites and finds increases in party strength over the life cycle, which she characterizes as "a developmental process related to experience voting for a party" (1993:678). Fiorina's model is consistent with the conclusion that longer affiliation is associated with stronger partisanship, but only when and if an individual accumulates consistent experiences with the parties. As he points out, if the parties behave inconsistently, or if people experience changed circumstances, then there may be no relationship. However, where there is consistency, his model provides an account for why older people - as a proxy again for experience - would be stronger partisans. The cohort view again presents an alternative, with the suggestion that strength remains stable over time in a given individual but that apparent life cycle effects in the aggregate reflect differences between cohorts. Depending upon the cohorts' experiences, a cross-section could show any relationship between age and intensity.

Ethnicity and Partisan Identification

These models of partisanship acquisition and strength were developed for the general population. The particular experiences of Latinos in the contemporary United States suggest caution in applying the models, as these populations differ on some of the key independent variables. At the same time, those differences allow us to examine parts of the models that are usually hard to distinguish.

The first important characteristic that affects application of these theories is the fact of immigration; almost half of the Latino population is foreign born (US Bureau of the Census 1997). Immigrant populations allow us to pull apart chronological age from extent of experience with the US political system. For the US born, these two are highly correlated. For an immigrant, experience with US politics will reflect the length of time they have been in the US. Second, parental socialization plays a major role in the theories as a source of initial partisanship, and it must function differently for immigrants. Immigrants who arrived as adults receive little or no US partisan socialization from their parents. Those who arrived as children may receive some, but quite probably not much unless their parents become partisans very quickly. The effects may well persist into the first US-born generation depending upon parental political involvement. Thus, immigrants will have a more varied source of starting positions for partisanship in the US context. The prevailing partisanship of their neighbors and other primary contacts is one

probable source. Most clearly, the starting point for their partisanship will be less structured than for persons born in the US (for whom parental socialization will be stronger). Since the starting point will be less likely to reflect preferences, corrective experience (turning up as age or US residence effects) will be more important than for the general population. Third, for political experience to have an impact upon partisanship, people must have enough information to transform their experiences into an evaluation of which party better meets their interests. For the general population, that is more likely with age and with education. For immigrants, it also depends upon how much they know about US politics, which in turn is likely to be related to how long they have been in the United States. On its face, the ability to use English should also be associated with greater information about US politics. However, English language use may also indicate movement away from the culture of origin and thus altered preferences. Thus, its effects may be ambiguous and hard to predict. As for strength of partisanship, immigrants are the classic example of persons for whom age is a poor proxy for experience or exposure to the party system; some measure of time in the US works better.

The second characteristic that leads to systematic differences in the process of partisan updating among Latinos (at least the Mexicans and Puerto Ricans; see below for a discussion of the Cubans) is substantial homogeneity with respect to positions on issues related to a cleavage between the parties. The partisan experiences used to evaluate the parties are likely heavily to include experiences with an ethnic component, such as experiences with discrimination or perceived attacks or defenses of their cultural characteristics. Other experiences likely to affect evaluations are those that happen to be frequent for members of these groups because of their other demographic attributes, such as social and economic disadvantage. This leads to the dominance of the Democratic Party and the existence of a set of policies and issues that support that identity. As noted in an earlier theoretical section, for the general population, age may be associated with partisan stability or strength but has no relationship to Democratic versus Republican identification. For Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, the agreement on basic issues that distinguish the parties would lead to interpretation of their political experiences in the same partisan direction. We expect that cumulative experience will increase identification with the Democrats. Thus, unlike the case for the general population, we expect to find a specific direction of partisanship increasing with age. Note that this is not a prediction about intensity (although that, too, may increase) but a prediction that larger proportions of each cohort will identify as Democrats as they acquire experience.

Cubans present a somewhat different case, since their dominant identification is with the Republican Party, presumably based on historical roots in attitudes towards communism and their early experiences in the US as welcomed political refugees from Communism. If their political experiences in the US reinforce this positive link, then experience will be related to Republicanism. However, if it does not, that is, if their US party experiences are not relevant to this dimension or more so if the dimension itself is a residue of earlier generations' experiences, then age or experience will not reinforce the Republicanism. To the contrary, to the extent that they share the issue concerns and/or treatment of other Latinos on basic issues separating the parties, experience will lead to increasing identification with the Democrats.

As noted above, we cannot distinguish in our cross-section between age effects due to cohort phenomena and those reflecting life-cycle changes. However, the immigrants in the LNPS sample provide some leverage on the problem, since their effective political age differs from their chronological age. Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner (1991) tackled this problem in their analysis of partisan acquisition among Asian-American and Mexican-American immigrants in California.

They found that the Mexican Americans were more likely to be Democrats, and to identify more strongly, the longer they had been in the US. They concluded that a learning, or experience, model more plausibly accounted for these results than did a cohort model. As we will show below, the same appears to be true among Latinos nationwide.

Let us more explicitly put these theoretical ideas together with the specific politics of Latinos. We assume that the Mexican-American and Puerto Rican attachments to the Democrats formed during the New Deal era replicate themselves in later generations through parental socialization. In terms of the revisionist model, these serve as an initial party preference against which a person measures later experience. Building on this transmitted foundation of support, the continuing activist, pro-social services stance of the Democratic Party likely reinforces and continues the affinity of disadvantaged groups like Mexicans and Puerto Ricans for the Democratic Party. Thus, to the extent that these Latinos are relatively less well off, their political experiences would tend to reinforce support for the Democrats. Adding to the reported support of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans for the Democrats has been the more "liberal" position the party has taken on civil rights, providing a basis for issue evaluations to increase support for the Democrats. With the exception of the southern wing of the party, the Democratic Party has been more likely to propose civil rights planks in its platforms and to propose and support policies enhancing equal rights than has the Republican Party. Recent attacks on affirmative action, bilingual education, and immigrants' rights have been associated more with the Republicans than the Democrats. Thus, even relatively better off Mexicans and Puerto Ricans face policy experiences that could reinforce a preference for Democrats. In fact, those with more education would be better equipped to understand and respond to party differences in policy.

In similar fashion, Cuban-American identification with Republicans formed by anti-Communist sentiment gets transmitted from parent to child. To the extent that Republicans are perceived as still more strongly anti-Communist, those with more experience will learn that and reinforce Republican identity. Those Cubans most tightly tied into the cultural enclave might be expected to hold these nationality-specific attitudes most strongly; hence those whose religion or status have pulled them away would be those most likely to be mavericks on party as well. Because of their status as refugees, Cubans have been insulated from various policies directed against immigrants. They have also at various times received certain preferences, independent of affirmative action programs. Therefore the economic and affirmative action experiences that reinforce Democratic attachment among Mexicans and Puerto Ricans operate more weakly for Cubans. If the Democratic Party is "better" for Mexicans and Puerto Ricans because it is supportive of their economic and civil rights interests, then we would expect to see more - and stronger - support for the Democrats among those who had more opportunity to learn this. We would thus expect to see more Democrats among those who were older, whose families had been in the US for more generations and, for immigrants, among those who had been in the US longer. For any amount of experience, those with more education are more likely to learn which party supports what. (However, the learning effects of education are confounded by its relationship with social class.) Among Cubans, immigrants are more likely to learn that Democrats support the economic interests of the less well-off and civil rights issues the longer they have been in the US.

Examining Latino partisanship, then, will engage us in distinctions between age and experience that are difficult to observe separately in the general population. It also permits more substantive predictions about the effects of age than the general population supports.

Direction versus Intensity of Party Identification

Analyses of partisanship typically use a five- or seven- point scale, ranging (in US studies) from Strong Democrats at one end, passing through Weak Democrats, Independents (with leaners divided out or not), to Weak Republicans, and ending with Strong Republicans. This scale combines a measure of the intensity of attachment to a political party (e.g. "weak" versus "strong" versus "none") with a measure of the direction of partisan preference (e.g. "Democrat" versus "Republican). However, in light of the historical circumstances which have produced overwhelming attachment to Democrats by Mexicans and Puerto Ricans and to Republicans by Cubans, the combined scale obscures more than it illuminates. If we use the standard scale for a dependent variable, then we confuse factors that lead a person to defect from their group's dominant identification to those which lead them to feel more or less strongly attached to their party of choice. Especially in circumstances where the social expectation of a certain direction of partisanship is so strong, it appears unwise to presume that these two processes are equivalent.

The standard scale also treats as elements of the same continuum the distinction between having a weak versus a strong party attachment and having some versus no party attachment. The process involved in acquiring some party attachment may well differ from that in intensifying an extant identity, and those differences are likely to be more prevalent among persons for whom the US political system is new and possibly not too relevant - such as immigrants.

To permit separate examination of these processes, we use three different dependent variables. We first examine the factors that affect the choice of party (Democrat versus Republican) among persons who do have a major-party preference. Most of our inquiry is focused on this. We then turn to an examination of the factors that distinguish weak from strong partisans, both within the dominant party and within the minority party. Finally, we examine the factors that distinguish independents from those who have formed some partisan attachment.

For rather different reasons, Miller (1991a) argues that direction and intensity of attachment should be separated; he refers to direction as "party identification" and reserves "partisanship" for measures incorporating intensity. Miller uses the distinction to argue against the "revisionist" view of party identification, discussed above, and to address the literature on realignment. His reasons for making the distinction, however, are sound and reinforce our arguments; it is the party identification measure that captures the "basic sense of the political self" (Miller 1991a: 559). By separating direction from intensity in the analyses below, for reasons reflecting the experiences of Latinos, we will also provide evidence for the usefulness of distinguishing these concepts versus combining them. If the models do not differ even in this population, then the distinction may add little. If, however, they do, then one might consider adopting the separation more generally. Note that in what follows we will not follow Miller's terminology and instead use party identification and partisanship interchangeably; we will use "direction or preference" and "intensity or strength" to signify which dimension we are examining.

We turn first to a simple description of the basic partisan direction and intensity among the three Latino groups in our sample and the "control" group of Anglos. We will then turn, in later sections, to an assessment of which of these explanations give us any leverage in understanding those preferences.

Explaining the Direction of Party Identification

We have seen that the basic major indicator of ethnicity--national origin--produces distinct partisan patterns. Puerto Ricans and Mexicans are the strongest Democrats, and Cubans the strongest Republicans. Anglos fall between these poles. However, within each group, some individuals identify with each party. What factors lead an individual to identify with the Democrats rather than the Republicans? In the previous section we discussed some of the general theory about partisan choice and some of the specific characteristics of Latinos. In this section we explore that choice for those who do identify with one of the two major parties. (Independents or those attached to some other party are excluded from this analysis.) Are the determinants the same for each of the three Latino groups, and are they the same for any or all of them as for the Anglos?

This analysis focuses on socioeconomic or "demographic" variables to explain partisanship. One group of variables includes such traditional demographic factors as gender, religious affiliation, household income, education, employment and age. A second group of variables reflects our interest in ethnicity and issues raised by the large numbers of immigrants in these Latino samples: national origin, nativity (foreign or US born), and language usage.

Ethnicity is rooted in objective conditions such as national origin, even though it is essentially a subjective phenomenon (Barth 1969).(9) Furthermore, ethnicity may exist independently of cultural traits such as maintenance of "home" country language, and it may develop and recede in response to changing circumstances (Smith 1981; Yinger 1985). The ethnic indicators used here tap key objective and subjective dimensions typically associated with Latino ethnicities. *National origin*, the most basic of our measures, identifies an individual's historical or ancestral nationality, as directly assessed by questions about their and their parents' and grandparents' places of birth. *Nativity* specifies whether persons are born outside or inside the United States mainland and is central to understanding how ethnicities evolve (Alvarez 1984; Portes 1984). *Language competence* is the cultural characteristic considered by some to be most central to ethnic maintenance and reproduction (Keefe and Padilla 1987).(10) The language spoken by a people is one of the most obvious and distinguishing features of ethnicity and a significant element in their sociocultural milieu. As immigrants become incorporated into the core culture of their new nation, over generations they typically lose their native language and adopt the language of their host country. Second generation immigrants are typically bilingual; by the third generation of residence in the US, Latinos are predominantly English speaking.

We are particularly interested in measures that indicate the extent of a person's US political experience and those that indicate the extent of their attachment to a distinct ethnic community. Political experience produces partisan updating, and we have argued that for Latinos that is likely to take a specific direction. Those persons who are least integrated into the ethnic community (for example, non-Catholics, non-Spanish speakers) might have quite different preferences and experiences, leading to support for another party than that dominant for the group.

Our theoretical and historical discussion above suggests the following predictions:

1) Those who are better off are more likely to be Republicans; those who are economically disadvantaged are more likely to be Democrats.

2) Latinos with more experience with US politics will be more likely to be Democrats because of that party's record of support for minorities and the disadvantaged. For the US born, this will be reflected in an association between increased age and Democratic identification.

Those whose parents were born in the US may be more likely to be Democrats. For the foreign born, the association will be with some combination of age and time in the United States.

3) Those Latinos who are more educated are more likely to understand which party is "better" for their group and be more supportive of the dominant party.

4) Those Latinos who are more culturally integrated into their group (e.g. Spanish-speaking, Catholic) are more likely to identify with the party dominant for their group.

5) For Cubans, those who left before Castro are more likely to be Democrats because they had no firsthand experience of the revolution; those who left after Mariel are more likely to have a party preference affected by economic concerns.

6) Partisanship of the Anglos in the LNPS sample will reflect the usual factors found for the overall US population.

The LNPS data permit us to assess these predictions by examining the contribution of each of these factors to choice of party. Many of these factors are related to each other, so examining them one at a time in a bivariate analysis may be misleading. Instead, we look at their effects upon choice of party while controlling for each of the other variables. To cleanly assess the choice between Democratic and Republican parties, we exclude from the first estimations all independents, identifiers with other parties, and others who decline to select either a Democratic or Republican attachment. Moreover, we separate direction of party preference from intensity of identification and examine only the former in these analyses. While we estimated models with everyone included in an attempt to assess whether national origin matters, we do not report those results here as they clearly showed that the models vary substantially by national origin. We thus discuss choice of party separately for each national origin group.

In all cases the dependent variable is the same; it is coded 0 for Democratic Party identifiers and 1 for Republicans. Thus, negative coefficients indicate a greater likelihood of identifying with the Democrats; a positive coefficient indicates greater likelihood of identifying with the Republicans. Because the dependent variable is binary, the estimations are done with logit (using the STATA program).

Table 4 reports the results of the logit estimations. Income and education are continuous variables, the former measuring family income in thousands of dollars and the latter education in years of schooling. "Bilingual" and "Spanish-speaker" are dummy variables with the value "1" for people who, respectively, speak both English and Spanish and those who speak primarily Spanish and zero for other respondents. They therefore measure differences from the third group, the English-speakers. "Unemployed," "Protestant," "foreign born," and "male" similarly have the value "1" for respondents with the characteristic and "0" for those without. "No religion" is coded "1" for people who are neither Protestant nor Catholic, some of whom profess other faiths, and "0" for Protestants and Catholics. Significant positive values on any of these coefficients mean that people with the characteristic are more likely to be Republican while those with the other characteristic (e.g. Catholic in the case of religion, or born in the US, for nativity, or female, for gender) are more likely to be Democrats. "Age-immigrant" and "age-native" both measure age in years but split separately for, respectively, those born outside the US and those born in the mainland US. Finally, "Percent life in US" measures, for those born abroad, the proportion of their life they have been in the US. For example, a thirty year-old who immigrated at age 20 would have a value of 0.67 on this variable. It is left at zero for the native born so that they do not enter into estimation of its coefficient. Significant positive coefficients mean that as these variables increase they are more likely to be Republicans; negative coefficients mean that larger values go along with a preference for the Democrats.

Results

The measures of socioeconomic status, income and education, relate to party choice in the way usually reported for the US population only for Anglos - better educated and wealthier Anglos are more likely to identify as Republicans. Income is irrelevant for all three Latino groups, and education is either irrelevant or, in the case of the Mexicans, is associated with a propensity to identify as a Democrat. The relationship holds for Mexicans whether education is measured by years of schooling, as in the estimation reported here, or by a series of dummy variables for different levels of completed education. For Puerto Ricans, an analysis using dummy variables shows that education has a curvilinear association with a greater propensity to be Republican. Persons who have over 9 years of education but no high school degree have the highest proportion identifying as Republican, with a spike upwards for those with college degrees. This pattern is investigated further below. Unemployment is related to SES as well; unemployed Mexicans are more likely to be Democrats, as we would expect. We have no explanation for the propensity of unemployed Anglos to identify as Republicans, beyond noting that income is already controlled and significant for them.

We have three measures of extent of exposure to US political life: percent life in the US for the foreign born and age, entered separately for the foreign born and the mainland US born. These are irrelevant for Anglo choice of party. For all three Latino groups, however, increased exposure is associated with a greater propensity to identify as a Democrat, consistent with the learning model. For Mexicans, all three are highly significant. Experience, whether measured by age, for both the US and the foreign born, or by experience in the US for the foreign born, increases the propensity to be a Democrat. The positive coefficient on foreign born is consistent with the youngest foreign born Mexican Americans who have lived in the US the least proportion of their life being more likely to be Republican than the native born. Puerto Ricans who were born on the island are more likely to be Democrats the greater the proportion of their life they have spent on the mainland, while those born on the mainland are more likely to be Democrats if they are older. US born Cubans are also more likely to be Democrats as they get older, consistent with the learning effect we have seen for the other Latino groups. Foreign born Cubans have a different pattern; they are more likely to be Democrats than the US born with a slight (not quite significant) tendency to be more Republican if they are older. Investigation of generation and enclave effects will clarify this pattern, below.

As in the general literature, Catholics tend to be more likely to be Democrats than persons of other religions, but significantly so only among Anglos and Puerto Ricans. In a model estimated only for the US born Mexicans, Catholics are more likely to be Democrats than Protestants are. Among foreign-born Mexican Americans, the direction is reversed: the Catholics are more likely to be Republican than the Protestants, holding all else constant.

Gender predicts party choice only among Puerto Ricans; Puerto Rican men are significantly more likely to identify as Republican than Puerto Rican women.

Language makes no difference for Puerto Rican party choice. Among Mexicans and Cubans, however, English facility is associated with "minority" party affiliation while speaking at least some Spanish (or, for Mexicans, predominantly Spanish) is associated with sharing the group's dominant party choice - Democrat for Mexicans and Republican for Cubans.

As noted, some of these results led to further investigations, for which we report the results without listing the coefficients. In order to provide a stronger operationalization of integration into the ethnic community, for each of the Latino groups we estimated the models

TABLE 4. Logistic Regression of Choice of Party (Democrats 0, Republicans 1) for Citizens and Noncitizens

Predictors	Anglos	Mexicans	Puerto Ricans	Cubans
Income	**0.017**	-0.002	0.003	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Education	**0.207**	**-0.107**	0.083	0.017
	(0.063)	(0.029)	(0.053)	(0.037)
Unemployed	**1.157**	**-1.130**	0.197	-0.343
	(0.662)	(0.459)	(0.482)	(0.505)
Foreign born	-2.232	**1.172**	-0.425	**-5.961**
	(2.057)	(0.621)	(1.568)	(1.551)
% life in US		**-1.984**	**-1.830**	-0.238
		(0.681)	(0.764)	(0.620)
Age - immigrant	0.033	**-0.056**	0.002	0.011
	(0.031)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Age - native	0.002	**-0.065**	**-0.092**	**-0.158**
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.053)	(0.040)
Protestant	0.408	0.327	**1.118**	0.436
	(0.331)	(0.255)	(0.328)	(0.362)
No religion	**0.973**	-0.146	0.625	0.309
	(0.417)	(0.293)	(0.490)	(0.499)
Male	0.357	0.131	**1.017**	-0.122
	(0.270)	(0.179)	(0.306)	(0.234)
Bilingual		0.231	-0.320	**0.991**
		(0.232)	(0.498)	(0.523)
Spanish-speaker		**-0.709**	-0.114	**1.465**
		(0.368)	(0.641)	(0.548)
Constant	**-4.353**	**2.259**	-1.622	**5.125**
	(0.938)	(0.552)	(1.529)	(1.570)
N of cases	285	854	409	500
LL at 0	-191.4	-498.1	-183.3	-271.1
LL at conv.	-169.19	-429.75	-156.69	-238.44
Chi2 (df)	44.5 (9)	136.7 (12)	53.3 (12)	65.3 (12)
pseudo R2	0.116	0.137	0.145	0.12

Logit coefficients (s.e.) **Bold underlined** significant at .05 or better. **Bold** significant at .10 or better.

separately for those respondents who speak Spanish and are Catholic from those who may be Spanish-speaking or Catholic or neither, but not both (in contrast to just including the variables in the overall estimation). For the Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, this exercise produced no change in the conclusions. Splitting Cuban respondents in this way, however, clarifies the story. The Spanish-speaking Catholics (298 cases in estimation) identify with the dominant (Republican) party; age is irrelevant for the US born, and immigrants are more strongly Republican if they are older. Because of this group's religion and language, its members will be exposed to relatively little information from outside their own ethnic community. However, those who are less tied to the community (202 cases in estimation), that is, those who either speak some English or who are not Catholic, exhibit experience effects similar to those seen for Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. These Cubans are more likely to identify as Democrats as they get older, both for the US born and the foreign born, and as they have lived longer in the US, if they immigrated. These Cubans are more likely to be exposed to information that could support "learning" in a direction that leads to a Democratic identity.

The curvilinearity in the effects of education among Puerto Ricans prompted an analysis centered on the distinction between "light" and "dark" Puerto Ricans. This distinction is of some significance in Puerto Rican communities, both on the island and on the mainland, with advantages accruing to the "light." The LNPS asked respondents for their racial self-classification, with "white" "black" and "other/Hispanic" available as options. The interviewers were also asked to assess the respondents' skin color on a five-point scale from very light to very dark. We repeated the logit analysis of party preference separately for those Puerto Ricans who self-identify as "white" and who the interviewer classified as "light" or "very light" and for those who self-identify as "black" or "Hispanic" and who were classified as "medium" or darker. The results for the "light" group (124 cases in the estimation) retain the curvilinearity for education. Among these light Puerto Ricans, however, language and religion now do both matter, with those most involved in the ethnic community most likely to share the dominant party identification. Catholics and Spanish-speakers are Democrats; Protestants and English-speakers are Republicans. Of more interest, the estimation for the "dark" Puerto Ricans (136 cases in the estimation), produced results very similar to those found for Mexicans. Most notably, both increased education and increased age among the island-born are clearly associated with greater propensity to identify as a Democrat. Higher income is associated with Republicanism, unlike the case for Mexicans and like that of Anglos. We place most significance on the fact that the experience measures increase Democratic identity among the "dark" Puerto Ricans. These are the Puerto Ricans most likely to be affected by the civil rights and related issues that we believe form the core learning experience for Latino increases in Democratic affiliation.

The discussion of the influence of parental socialization on party identity suggested that the effects might be stronger for persons whose families had been in the US for more generations. We can only test this conjecture for the Mexican respondents; the other Latino groups do not have enough individuals whose families have been in the US long, and the Anglos were not asked the necessary questions to determine generation. Generation in the US has some effect, but only in the third generation. Mexican Americans who have at least one grandparent who was born in the US are more likely to be Democrats than those whose families immigrated more recently. Within each generation, people who are older are still more likely to be Democrats.

The earlier discussion of the historical experience of Cuban Americans suggests that the cohorts formed by the time of emigration from Cuba might well differ politically. Unlike Mexican and Puerto Rican immigrants, the decisions of Cubans to leave their homeland were predominantly marked by revolution and by restricted access to emigration. Some of the Cuban immigrants came before Castro came to power in January 1959. Since they had no first-hand experience of communism, we would expect attitudes to communism to figure less importantly in their choice of party. Emigration was fairly high in the first few years after the revolution, but then Cuba greatly restricted egress. Persons who managed to leave during this period needed to make a great effort to do so and frequently carried very negative attitudes towards the regime that they left. Finally, beginning in 1980, notably with the "Mariel boat lift," Castro liberalized egress. Many of the émigrés in this last group were fleeing economic hardships (Portes and Bach 1985). We thus asked whether persons in these different cohorts, marked by time of entry to the US, varied in their choice of party or its determinants. We find, in analyses not shown here, that the pre-Castro cohort is significantly more likely than either later immigrants or the US born to identify with Democrats, controlling for the fact that English-speakers are also more likely to identify with Democrats. They are also somewhat more likely to be Republican if they have

more income. Age does not matter for these immigrants. For both cohorts of those who came to the US after the revolution, however, attachment to the Republican Party is associated with being older - and perhaps learning to associate Republicans with anti-communism.

Conclusions on Choice of Party

First, the differences in determinants of party choice between the three Latino groups and between each of them and Anglos shows that a single unified model for undifferentiated "Latinos" would mask more than it reveals about party identification.

      The pattern for Mexicans supports a learning model of acquisition of party identification. The measures of experience all increase the propensity to identify as a Democrat. Education also increases Democratic Party affiliation, which we interpret here as reflecting knowledge more than class. That interpretation is reinforced by the absence of a relationship between income and party choice (in contrast to Anglos), except for the preference for Democrats among the unemployed. Gender has no effect. The cultural attachment variables tend to work in the expected direction: Spanish-speakers are more likely to be Democrats, as are Catholics among the US born.

      The Puerto Rican pattern is distinctive. Several of the ethnic factors and other sociodemographic variables contribute differently to partisanship than they do for Mexicans. Time on the mainland does lead to Democratic preference, but the use of the Spanish language has no effect, except among the "light." The religious factor for Puerto Ricans is more like that of Anglos than of Mexicans, with Protestantism contributing to more Republicanism. Unlike Mexicans, for Puerto Ricans unemployment has no relationship to partisanship. Like Mexicans, income is also unrelated for those who are "light," but like Anglos, it is associated with Republican identity for those who are "dark." In contrast to Mexicans, education tends if anything to contribute to Republican, not Democratic, identification, for the "light." However, for the "dark" Puerto Ricans, education operates the same as it does for Mexicans, contributing to a propensity to identify with the Democrats. Finally, gender is a significant variable only for the Puerto Ricans among Latinos, as women are significantly more Democratic.

      The roots of Cuban party identification also form a unique configuration--one in which most traditional demographic variables are of little or no significance and ethnic factors predominate. Education, income, unemployment, and religion do not help explain Cuban partisanship. The ethnic variables of nativity and language usage are important. Being born in the United States and being Spanish-speaking both contribute independently to Cubans' greater identification with the Republican Party. Those born on the island who arrived before the revolution are, however, more likely to be Democrats. In one respect the Cuban pattern does match those of the other two Latino groups: persons born in the United States are more likely to be Democrats if they are older.

      We note again that the Anglo pattern is quite distinctive from that for these Latinos. Among Anglos, higher income and education are strongly associated with a greater propensity to identify with the Republican Party.

      Although the patterns vary among Latino groups, there is nonetheless evidence from all three groups of a learning process, consistent with the Fiorina model of party attachment. As people acquire more political experience, they are more likely to identify with their group's dominant party. One reason we do not see this process among the Anglos in this sample is that there is no clear dominant party; presumably some Anglos' interests are such that experience

supports Democrat identification while for others it supports a Republican one. The fact that greater education tends to increase the identification of Mexicans with the Democrats we interpret as another component of the learning model.(11) The very different pattern for Anglos presumably reflects the association in the general population between higher socioeconomic status and Republican partisanship. The relationship between indicators of ethnic culture and party are mixed; there is some indication that Spanish-language and Catholicism, that is, close ties to culture of origin, are linked to affiliation consistent with the group's dominant choice. This is most clear for the light Puerto Ricans and for Cubans when we consider language and religion together.

Our Predictions

How, then, do the predictions with which we began this section on the explanation of the direction of partisanship stack up against the multivariate analysis of our data?

(1) The first one, that those with more income would be Republican, holds clearly only for Anglos and also for "dark" Puerto Ricans. The greater Democratic attachments of unemployed Mexicans and Republican attachments of better-educated "light" Puerto Ricans are consistent with this, but on the whole this prediction does not explain much about Latino partisanship.

(2) Our second prediction, that Latino experience with US politics will contribute to Democratic identification, is clearly supported for the US born by the increase in Democratic identity with age and for the foreign-born Mexicans and Puerto Ricans by the effects of age and/or time on the mainland. Among Cubans, the most isolated, that is, the Spanish-speaking Catholics, are more Republican with age, while those more open to the non-Cuban culture follow the same pattern as the other Latinos, that is, increasing likelihood of being a Democrat with age and/or years in the US. Overall then, this prediction is well supported.

(3) Our third prediction, that the greater information brought with education would increase Democratic identification among Latinos, holds very strongly for Mexicans and also for "dark" Puerto Ricans.

(4) Our fourth prediction, that those Latinos more integrated into their ethnic culture will be more likely to identify with the party dominant for their group, is supported. Religion is the more important component for Puerto Ricans, language the more important one for Mexicans and the combination of language and religion is important for Cubans.

(5) Our fifth prediction, that the pre-Castro Cubans would more likely be Democrats, is supported.

(6) Our last prediction was that Anglo partisanship would reflect the usual patterns for the general population, and that holds up well, even though these Anglos are representative only of the population living in areas with some Latino residents (rather than of the total US population.)

Explaining Strength of Party Identification

The analyses above just address the partisan choices of individuals who do identify with a party. Are there any systematic factors that account for choosing a party at all, versus remaining politically independent? And, for those who do choose a party, can we explain why some identify strongly while others say they do not? From the literature, we expect that persons who are better educated will be stronger partisans; persons who are older will be stronger partisans, as will those immigrants who have been in the US longer. Because they have more information

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about the United States, we expect those Latinos who are English dominant to be the most intense in their partisanship. In light of the large variations across groups we found in direction of partisanship, we will do these analyses separately by national origin group as well.

TABLE 5. Independence (0) versus Partisanship (1)

Predictors	Anglos Indep vs. Rep	Anglos Indep vs. Dem	Mexicans Indep vs. Dem	Puerto Ricans Indep vs. Dem	Cubans Indep vs. Rep
Income	**0.032**	0.005	0.002	-0.004	0.011
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Education	**0.173**	-0.040	**0.156**	**0.139**	**0.120**
	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.023)	(0.044)	(0.035)
Unemployed	0.623	0.309	**-0.584**	0.058	-0.656
	(0.667)	(0.781)	(0.240)	(0.398)	(0.410)
Foreign born	2.055	4.699	0.564	**-1.940**	**-2.689**
	(3.100)	(2.895)	(0.489)	(0.870)	(1.098)
% life in US			**1.245**	0.619	0.889
			(0.488)	(0.678)	(0.656)
Age-immigrant			**0.040**	**0.053**	**0.027**
			(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Age - native	**0.019**	0.011	**0.081**	0.013	-0.033
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.035)
Protestant	**-0.797**	**-0.888**	-0.238	**-0.718**	0.468
	(0.440)	(0.378)	(0.205)	(0.284)	(0.365)
No religion	**-1.349**	**-2.154**	-0.315	**-0.668**	-0.354
	(0.451)	(0.445)	(0.207)	(0.322)	(0.363)
Male	0.059	-0.292	-0.037	-0.339	-0.059
	(0.289)	(0.268)	(0.137)	(0.227)	(0.217)
Bilingual			-0.016	**0.761**	**1.515**
			(0.194)	(0.289)	(0.493)
Spanish-speaker			-0.065	**1.293**	**1.904**
			(0.287)	(0.475)	(0.557)
Constant	**-3.318**	1.378	**-3.897**	-1.256	-1.099
	(0.972)	(0.982)	(0.460)	(0.748)	(1.243)
N of cases	241	284	1186	462	502
LL at 0	-167	-191.2	-816.9	-277.2	-291.2
LL at conv.	-143.9	-168.5	-672.9	-253.8	-267.9
Chi2 (d.f.)	46.3 (9)	45.5 (9)	288 (12)	46.7 (12)	46.5 (12)
pseudo R2	0.139	0.119	0.176	0.084	0.08

Logit coefficients (s.e.) **Bold underlined** significant at .05 or better. **Bold** significant at .10 or better.

Results

To separate direction from intensity of preference, we consider two different sets of dependent variables. The first set, reported in Table 5, contrasts those who identify with the party dominant for their ethnic group with those who have no partisan affiliation (including those who say they don't know if they identify). For Anglos we contrast independents with those who identify with either major party since neither is dominant. These models can be estimated for everyone. The second set, reported in Table 6, examines only those who identify with a particular party

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(whether Democrat or Republican) and contrasts the weak to the strong identifiers. These models can only be estimated for citizens, as non-citizens were not asked about partisan intensity. Table 6a reports strength among the partisans of the dominant party for each group (both parties are included for Anglos) while Table 6b reports strength among Latinos identifying with the minority party. In each of the national origin groups, some of the factors that distinguish Democrats from Republicans, as reported in Table 4, also distinguish independents from partisans and strong from weak identifiers, but the differences in the models stand out more than the similarities.

Anglos Since Anglos identify in substantial numbers with both parties, we report in Table 5 the results of two estimations: one contrasts independence with identifying as Republican and the other contrasts independence with identifying as a Democrat. Just as Anglo partisans with more money and education were more likely to be Republicans than Democrats, so too they are more likely to be Republican than independent (and the unemployment effect disappears). When we turn to the Democratic side, however, money and education do not distinguish identifiers from independents. For both contrasts, Catholics are more likely to be partisans than those who are not Catholic. Unlike the choice between parties, where age was irrelevant, younger people are more likely to be independent than to be Republican.

Table 6a reports the factors that distinguish between weak and strong partisans within each party. Consistent with several of the theories, older identifiers in both parties are more likely than younger ones to term themselves "strong." Although higher education is associated with preference for Republicans, the better educated who are Democrats are stronger partisans than those with less education. Education is not related to strength of Republican partisanship (beyond the lower education level associated with independents than with Republicans). Those unemployed persons who are Republican are weaker partisans, as are men. Republicans who are neither Catholic nor Protestant are stronger identifiers.

Mexicans For Mexicans, Table 5 reports just the contrast between independence and Democratic Party identification. For this group, the factors that distinguish between Democratic versus Republican Party choice are similar to those that distinguish Democratic partisans from independents. Higher education, unemployment, more years in the US, and being older (whether US born or an immigrant) are associated with having a Democratic Party identification rather than being independent, just as they were associated with being a Democrat instead of a Republican. Speaking Spanish or having been born abroad are not, however, significant in distinguishing identifiers from independents (although they had mattered in choice of party).

Table 6a indicates the factors associated with strong versus weak Democratic Party affiliation. Older people are stronger partisans, as was the case for being a partisan at all and for choice between parties, and as was the case for Anglo strength of partisanship. Unemployed Democrats are weaker partisans, although they were more likely to be Democrats to begin with. Although Spanish-speakers are more likely to be Democrats than Republicans, they are more likely to be weakly-identified Democrats. Immigrants who have spent more of their life in the US are weaker Democrats, in contrast to their greater proclivity to be Democrats to begin with, in comparison with either independence or being Republican. As indicated in Table 6b, the only factor that accounts for party strength among Mexican American Republicans is religion, with Protestants being stronger identifiers.

Puerto Ricans For Puerto Ricans, Table 5 reports the contrast between independence and Democratic Party identification, only. As with the choice between parties, Protestants are less likely to be Democrats; they are more likely to be independents than are Catholics. Those who

are neither Catholic nor Protestant are also more likely to be independents. In contrast to the curvilinear effect of education on the choice between party, when the estimation is limited to Democrats and independents, those with more education are more likely to be Democrats while those with less are more likely to be unaffiliated. Language had no effect on choice between parties, but those who speak some Spanish are more likely to be Democrats, while the English speakers are more likely to be independents. Neither being born on the island nor age for the island-born affected party choice, but they do affect being a partisan; the island born are more likely to be independent, but as they get older are increasingly likely to be a Democratic partisan. Two factors that did distinguish between Democratic and Republican identification-gender and age for the mainland born-are not significant predictors of Democratic identification versus independence.

TABLE 6A. Strong (1) versus Weak (0) Partisanship Among Identifiers With Dominant Party

	Anglo Democrats	Anglo Republicans	Mexican Democrats	Puerto Rican Democrats	Cuban Republicans
Income	-0.012	0.002	-0.011	0.004	-0.003
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Education	**0.283**	0.157	-0.024	0.006	-0.039
	(0.091)	(0.105)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.076)
Unemployed	0.501	**-2.326**	**-1.461**	0.008	-1.203
	(1.227)	(1.088)	(0.519)	(0.409)	(0.734)
Foreign born	4.749		2.501	**2.194**	1.282
	(3.158)		(1.715)	(1.067)	(2.003)
% life in US			**-3.435**	-0.055	**-3.929**
			(1.810)	(0.731)	(1.623)
Age - immigrant	-0.007		**0.060**	0.020	0.027
	(0.045)		(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.023)
Age - native	**0.054**	**0.036**	**0.043**	**0.090**	-0.034
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.028)	(0.042)
Protestant	0.644	0.440	-0.434	0.014	-0.689
	(0.443)	(0.595)	(0.321)	(0.323)	(0.653)
No religion	1.116	**1.144**	-0.372	-0.210	**-1.289**
	(0.693)	(0.652)	(0.385)	(0.403)	(0.622)
Male	**1.066**	**-1.174**	-0.004	0.063	-0.164
	(0.381)	(0.463)	(0.211)	(0.250)	(0.399)
Bilingual			0.086	-0.093	-0.948
			(0.232)	(0.358)	(0.940)
Spanish speaking			**-0.933**	-0.076	-0.887
			(0.496)	(0.510)	(1.022)
Constant	**-7.270**	**-3.382**	-1.118	**-2.527**	3.055
	(1.579)	(1.446)	(0.684)	(0.988)	(1.970)
N of cases	164	119	477	331	191
LL at 0	-109.8	-82.2	-330.3	-222.7	-108.8
LL at conv.	-89.9	-66.5	-284.6	-211.6	-85.4
Chi2 (df)	39.8 (9)	31.3 (7)	91.4 (12)	22.3 (12)	46.7 (12)
pseudo R2	0.181	0.19	0.138	0.05	0.215

Logit coefficients (s.e.). **Bold underlined** significant at .05 or better. **Bold** significant at .10 or better.

Again Table 6a indicates the factors that distinguish between strong and weak identifiers with the Democrats. Older people are stronger identifiers, whether born on the island or on the mainland. Although the island born are less likely to identify at all, if they do, they are stronger partisans than the mainland born. Although education, religion, and language distinguished between independents and Democratic partisans, and religion and gender distinguished Democratic from Republican identifiers, they are not related to strong versus weak Democratic partisanship. Table 6b reports similar results for strength of partisan identity among Republicans. Income does matter; the wealthier Republicans identify more strongly. Income does not have any effect on strength of partisanship for any other group or party, and only for anglos is it related to the contrast between independence and partisanship (Republican). Age increases strength of identification among the island born, as it did among the Democrats. Finally, both Catholics and Protestants are stronger identifiers than those with no or other religion.

TABLE 6B. Strong (1) versus Weak (0) Partisanship Among Identifiers With Minority Party

	Mexican Republicans	Puerto Rican Republicans	Cuban Democrats
Income	-0.005	**<u>0.075</u>**	-0.001
	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.021)
Education	0.096	0.157	-0.012
	(0.100)	(0.130)	(0.102)
Unemployed	-0.927	-2.119	0.158
	(1.759)	(1.367)	(1.790)
Foreign born	0.382	-0.878	2.380
	(7.069)	(4.293)	(3.809)
% life in US	-7.892	-0.659	-1.569
	(7.685)	(1.650)	(2.499)
Age - immigrant	0.160	**<u>0.085</u>**	0.006
	(0.110)	(0.036)	(0.029)
Age - native	0.029	0.002	0.027
	(0.021)	(0.150)	(0.045)
Protestant	**1.130**	-0.242	0.286
	(0.603)	(0.738)	(0.876)
No religion	1.319	**-3.179**	*
	(0.815)	(1.635)	
Male	-0.056	-0.012	0.203
	(0.527)	(0.799)	(0.666)
Bilingual	0.886	1.592	-1.559
	(0.569)	(1.417)	(1.233)
Spanish-speaker	1.041	2.745	-1.305
	(1.266)	(1.745)	(1.359)
Constant	**<u>-3.778</u>**	-6.897	0.649
	(1.488)	(4.601)	(2.686)
N of cases	112	75	63
LL at 0	-67.3	-51.6	-35.8
LL at conv.	-56.6	-33.6	-33.6
Chi2 (df)	21.3 (12)	36.1 (12)	4.52 (11)
pseudo R2	0.158	0.35	0.063

Logit coefficients (s.e.). **<u>Bold underlined</u>** significant at .05 or better. **Bold** significant at .10 or better.
*variable omitted because of collinearity

Cubans For Cubans, Table 5 reports the factors that contribute to the contrast between independence and Republican Party identification. Similar to the choice between parties, those who are foreign born are less likely to be Republican (Democrats in the earlier results and independents here) while those who speak at least some Spanish are more likely to be

Republicans. Increased education and age, for the foreign born, were not relevant to the choice between parties but do go along with a greater propensity to be Republican instead of independent. In contrast, the older native born were more likely to be Democrats, among the partisans, but are no more or less likely to be Republicans than independents, when Democrats are excluded from the estimation.

Results not shown here indicate that immigrants who left Cuba after Castro came to power but before Mariel are more likely to be partisans; those who left earlier or later are more likely to be independents. That result suggested a possible relationship between anticommunist sentiment and an inclination towards partisanship. Although this paper has focused upon demographic factors, it is worth noting that strong anticommunists (as measured by a feeling thermometer) are more likely to be partisans, and less likely to be independents. Surprisingly, this relationship holds for both parties. Both in the contrast between independence and Democratic identity and that between independence and Republican identity, anticommunist sentiment is associated with partisanship. This result is not a simple artifact reflecting an underlying relationship between both anticommunism and partisanship on the one hand and a propensity to express opinions, on the other hand. If the relationship were spurious for that reason it would hold for the other national origin groups as well, and it does not. The final possible surprise is that having anticommunist opinions is not related to the direction of partisanship (the choice between Democratic and Republican parties).

As the results in Tables 5a and 5b indicates, very few of the examined factors are related to strength of Republican partisanship and none are related to strength of Democratic partisanship. Among Republicans, immigrants are stronger partisans the less of their life they have been in the US and are weaker partisans if they are neither Catholic nor Protestant.

Conclusions on Strength of Partisanship

Latinos and Anglos are more likely to be partisans, rather than independents, if they have more education. Anglos again present a contrast in the roles of socioeconomic variables, as income matters only for them, with the wealthier being more likely to be partisan. The greater propensity of unemployed Mexicans to be independent is a related effect. Consistent with much literature, older people tend to be partisans while younger cohorts include more independents, among US born Anglos and Mexicans and among immigrants for all three Latino groups. In addition, among Mexicans, immigrants are more likely to be partisans the more of their life they have spent in the US, while immigrant Puerto Ricans and Cubans are less likely to be partisan than those born in the US. These results support the view that experience of US politics strengthens partisanship. Finally, ethnicity variables matter for the Puerto Ricans and Cubans, with Spanish language in both cases and Catholic religion for the Puerto Ricans being associated with having a partisan identity with the dominant party. Among Anglos, as well, Catholicism is associated with partisanship (for either party).

The patterns for strength of partisanship among identifiers with the dominant party are more mixed. For Mexican Democrats, the factors look similar to those distinguishing partisans from independents - older and employed people are stronger partisans, as are those who are

bilingual or English-speaking. Age is also associated with stronger partisanship for Puerto Rican Democrats. In all three Latino groups, the foreign born are more likely to be independents. However, if they do identify with the dominant party for their group, they are either more likely than the US born to be strong partisans or they are more likely to be strong partisans the less of their life they have spent in the US, or both. Religion shows up as a factor for strong versus weak party strength among dominant party identifiers only for Cubans, where those with no religion are weaker identifiers.

There are fewer systematic factors associated with strength of identification with the minority party. Among Mexican Republicans, Protestants are stronger identifiers than Catholics. Both Protestant and Catholic Puerto Rican Republicans are stronger identifiers than those of other or no faith. Puerto Rican Republicans are more likely to be strong identifiers if they have more money. None of these factors account for variations in strength of identification among Cuban Democrats.

The associations between religion and strength of partisanship suggest that the relationship between religion and strength of Republicanism relates more to the particular party than to dominant versus minority party status within each group. A fuller investigation would take account of the differences between types of Protestantism, notably evangelical versus other denominations.

Summary and Observations

Overall, these Latinos and Anglos differ both in their partisanship and in the factors that shape their partisan identities. Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans are much more likely to be partisans than Anglos, and they are more intensely partisan as well. Among partisans, compared to Anglos, Cubans are much more Republican, and Mexicans and Puerto Ricans are more Democratic.

Significantly, conventional socioeconomic measures do not explain these Latinos' partisanship well, nor are their effects comparable across all the groups. Although higher socioeconomic status, as indicated by income and education, are associated with Republican party identification for Anglos, they are either close to irrelevant for Latinos or, in the case of education for Mexicans, associated with a Democratic identification. The other sharp contrast between Anglos and Latinos is in the relationship between *age* and partisanship. Age has no impact upon Anglo choice of party, but it is associated with greater attachment to the Democrats in all three Latino groups. The Puerto Ricans stand out from everyone else in the significant impact of both religion and gender upon partisanship; Anglos are the only other respondents for whom *religion* (or lack thereof) is related to choice of party.

Ethnic characteristics also have some unexpected and varying effects on partisanship. Most significantly, as has been noted, national origin divides Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban partisanship from that of Anglos. Concerning nativity, for all three Latino groups, foreign-born individuals are more likely to be Democrats the longer they have been in the mainland US (although the effect is too small to be significant for Cubans). With regard to language, among Mexicans and Cubans, Spanish-speakers are more likely to affiliate with the party dominant for their group than are the English-speakers. These patterns underline a primary and basic fact that repeatedly bears emphasizing. To speak of Latinos or Hispanics as an undifferentiated, homogeneous group is risky and sometimes misleading. As with other political attitudes and behaviors, the party affiliations of the three major national origin groupings of Latinos differ

significantly. Moreover, the socioeconomic foundations of these partisan identifications also are unique for each cultural group.

This observation about the unique configurations underlying Latino orientations toward political parties also emerged in our analysis of the strength of party identifications. Although for all groups increased age contributes to partisanship, income matters only for Anglos. Strength of Mexican partisanship is most affected by increased age or length of lifetime in the US, education, employment and speaking English--all related to increased incorporation into US society. For Puerto Ricans, partisan intensity is likewise related to education; however, being more rather than less "ethnic" seems to increase strength of identification. The strongest identifiers are those who are Catholic, Spanish-speaking and born on the island. For Cubans, especially the dominant Republicans, party identification also seems stronger among those who are the most "ethnic" -- speaking Spanish and having spent less time in the US.

Some implications and speculations are evoked from these findings. Since we have data from only a single time point, we cannot establish whether the relationships we have found for age reflect a cohort phenomenon or a life-cycle effect. We have argued for the latter when we point to a learning process and a similar impact for the foreign born of time in the US. However, if these age effects reflect a cohort process instead, then they portend some shift in identification patterns among Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans from the Democratic to the Republican Party and a strengthening among Cubans of Republican identity. If this is a cohort process, then the greater propensity of young US born Latinos, compared with their elders, to identify as Republicans would persist as they age and replace the older, Democratic cohorts. Given that this pattern is independent of income and education, it may that for younger Mexicans, the political socialization they experienced during a period of Republican ascendancy overpowered any parental transmission of Democratic partisanship. On the other hand, if the age differences in partisanship do reflect the "life-cycle" effect of learning through experience, then we would not anticipate any overall shift in these Latino groups.

A countervailing pattern that may lead to partisan shift can be discerned among Cubans. To date, Cuban partisanship has been explained almost completely by their experience as political refugees. The fact that Cubans who speak English are significantly more likely to be Democrats than the Spanish-speakers may reveal a trend for the future.

While this analysis has revealed some interesting and hitherto unknown demographic foundations of Latino partisanship, its findings may be more revealing about past rather than future Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban partisan preferences. Although we find some ethnic and demographic factors that are clearly associated with choice of party, the fact remains that much of the variance in choice remains unexplained. When we combine all of our respondents, national origin group still accounts for much of the difference in partisanship, even after taking account of these other factors. The best explanation for this seems to be that, until recently, each of these groups had a distinct but essentially uniform experience. For Mexicans, this has been an historical experience defined by *de jure* and *de facto* discrimination and exclusion; for Puerto Ricans it has been an experience combining circular migration, presumed temporary residence in the United States and discrimination; for Cubans, it is the refugee experience. These ethnic group-wide conditions have been more significant than differences in individual characteristics. Moreover, as discussed in the first section, each group faced a different strategic partisan situation.

Now, as these conditions are less uniformly shared, and Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans encounter a wider range of socialization experiences in the United States, demographic

and ethnic differences are more likely to affect partisanship more systematically. Psychological indicators of ethnicity may become particularly important under these circumstances. If Latino immigration and policies such as bilingual education and affirmative action continue to be topics of major controversy, the salience of Latino ethnicity will increase. Reactions to such issues and the resultant behaviors and attitudes engendered by these may affect how Latino individuals think and act politically. As the circumstances of individual Latinos vary more widely, so, too, likely will their reactions and attitudes. As a result, these will probably be more significant in predicting their behavior than such measures as national origin, nativity and perhaps even racial identification and language ability. The partisan positions associated with these issues will continue to impact Latinos' identification with the parties as individuals learn more about them and are affected by them.

Appendix

LNPS generated 1,546 Mexican, 589 Puerto Rican and 682 Cuban origin respondents. Each of these samples represent 91%, 90.2%, and 91.5%, respectively, of each of these populations in this nation. For purposes of this study, a respondent is a member of one of these populations if he/she has at least one parent or two grandparents who were solely of Mexican, Puerto Rican or Cuban ancestry. A total of 40 primary sampling units (PSUs) were designated for the sample. These include the 28 metropolitan areas having at least a ten percent Latino population. The other 12 were randomly selected from all other PSUs based on geography and concentration of Latinos. A total of 12,187 households were screened, and 4,390 persons were eligible for the survey. After households were randomly selected, interviews were conducted with eligible persons 18 years of age and older.

The sample was specifically designed to include Latinos from across the social spectrum. Thus, one-fourth of these Latino respondents came from low density areas (areas in which Latino households of all national origins comprise between 5% and 20% of the population), one-fourth from areas with 20% to 49% Latino household density; and half reside in majority Latino population areas. The non-represented populations include those residing in states (including Washington, DC) with combined Latino populations of less than a combined total of 5% of the three groups, and those within states who reside in areas with less than a combined minimum percentage (usually 3% but sometimes 5%) of these groups. The sample also includes 456 Anglos who are representative of Anglos residing in the areas from which these Latino-respondents were drawn. Also, the LNPS Anglo population's characteristics closely match those calculated from the 1987-88 National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), a national probability sample of 9417 self-identified Anglos who represent the non-institutionalized United States white population age 19 and older.

Over 97% of all LNPS interviews were completed between August 1989 and February 1990.

These Latino respondents had the choice of being interviewed in English or Spanish, and 60% chose Spanish. The English language interviews averaged 83 minutes, while those in Spanish ran 91 minutes. Anglo interviews used a shortened interview schedule and averaged 59 minutes. The overall response rate was 74% for Latinos and 56% for Anglos.

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Endnotes

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2. While recognizing that our respondents are residents of the United States and are of Mexican, Puerto Rican or Cuban origin, for convenience we often refer to our three Latino populations simply as "Mexicans," "Puerto Ricans," and "Cubans." Similarly conveniently, although inaccurately, we use the term "Anglos" to refer to white European-ancestry non-Latinos.

3. Those who said they considered themselves Democrats were asked: "Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?" Republicans were asked the equivalent question. All other citizens were asked: "Do you now think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or closer to the Democratic Party?" with "neither" as an option.

4. Kosmin and Keysar (1995) report figures in the same ballpark, if one compares their percentages for Florida (25% Democrat, 27% Independent, 46% Republican) to ours for Cubans. In the other states, the split runs approximately one-half Democrats and one-quarter each Independents and Republicans. They do not report national origin. They also interviewed only in English, which can account for discrepancies in our results.

5. In the 1988 American National Election Study data, 52% of Protestants are Republican in contrast to 26% of Jews and 40% each of Catholics and those with "other" religious leanings. Half of the Catholics are Democrats, versus 38% of the Protestants, 55% of the Jews, and 39% of the others.

6. Of course here, as in so many places, the argument was far more subtle and nuanced in the original than in its retelling; chapter 10 (Campbell et al. 1960) is titled "The Formation of Issue Concepts and Partisan Change" and includes the claim that those who conceptualize at lower levels are most susceptible to change.

7. The main thrust of their article is the episodic nature of relevant political experience. In particular, partisanship takes leaps during campaigns rather than changing in a more continuous fashion.

8. Some early work (e.g. Campbell et al., 1960, 166-167) hypothesized that older people become more conservative and more Republican - a life cycle effect - but that suggestion has been largely discredited.

9. While we recognize the importance of subjective identity, that will be examined in a subsequent paper.

10. Language competence is measured by combining the responses to two questions asking: (a) what language is usually spoken in the home, and (2) the respondents' self-reported ability in English and Spanish. Respondents are classified as dominant English-speaking, Spanish-speaking, or bilingual.

11. Our data support anecdotal observations about the politicizing experiences of Mexican-American university students, for example.