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Typologies of Party Finance Systems: A Comparative Study of How Countries Regulate Party Finance and Their Institutional Foundations

David L. Wiltse, Raymond J. La Raja, Dorie E. Apollonio

ABSTRACT

This study catalogues party finance laws in multiple countries and identifies institutional factors that correspond to laws countries choose to adopt. Using data from international sources, we assessed differences in the regulation of money in elections in over 120 states. We classified countries into four types of party finance regimes along two axes: one that reflects regulations affecting party income and a second that reflects rules intended to make party finance more transparent. We found that two institutional factors are associated with the extent of government regulation in financing politics: the type of legal system and the use of proportional representation. Our study provides a new conceptual framework to categorize party finance regimes based on various types of regulations and the linkages between institutional factors and the extent of regulation. This conceptual typology offers a method to assess relationships between finance systems and political outcomes.

Keywords: political finance, comparative party finance, money in elections

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INTRODUCTION

States have experimented with various regulations to avoid the worst excesses of money in politics, or at least show they are making efforts to address public concerns. Research has rarely sought to understand the nature and scope of these rules across a large sample of countries (but see van Biezen 2010; Norris and Abel van Es 2016). With limited exceptions, studies consist of single-country case studies and heavily emphasize public finance laws in Western Europe (Alexander and Federman 1989; Burnell and Ware 1998; Eisenstadt 2004; Ewing and Issacharoff 2006; Fisher and Eisenstadt 2004; Gunlicks 1993; Heidenheimer and Alexander 1970; Malamud and Posada Carbó 2005; Williams 2000; Norris and Abel van Es 2016). A classification system for these laws would make it easier to organize cross-national data to evaluate how states vary in dealing with the common challenge of financing democratic politics. Most importantly, a solid typology of party finance systems could be used to assess associations with political parties, party systems, corruption, and governance, providing a common framework for analyzing whether and how variation in party finance systems matters for political outcomes.

Additionally, this article explores the relationship between political institutions and party finance regulations. The vast majority of existing campaign finance narratives tend to look at short-term factors, particularly the presence of scandals, which help reform-minded political entrepreneurs push through new laws and regulations (see for example, Clift and

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Fisher 2004; Scarrow 2004, 2007; Zelizer 2004). Although scandals may trigger reforms, they do not explain why governments institute particular kinds of reforms or impose reforms at all. This study is an attempt to shift from "when" to "what" of political reforms. In other words, rather than explain the timing of reforms, we seek to understand the underlying structural factors associated with specific kinds of reforms (see for example, Hopkin 2004; Johnson 2008; Poiré 2006; Van Biezen 2004).[1] Although institutional factors are not the sole explanations for the content of party finance laws, historical institutional approaches have proven powerful in identifying contemporary patterns of political organization (e.g., Pierson 2000; Skocpol 1979) and providing reasonable footing on which to build broader models of political reform. Our study cannot make causal claims about the development of finance laws because we lack time-series data to evaluate the sequencing of reforms. We cannot rule out multiple and endogenous pathways to reform. Nonetheless, the analysis rests on reasonable assumptions about the relationship between the type of political institutions in a state and the adoption of party finance laws.

Despite a considerable amount of research on party finance, the field (unlike the study of electoral systems) lacks an agreed upon set of concepts, frameworks, and theories to advance comparative research. As one scholar put it, "In spite of the long fascination with money and politics, for a long time the study of political finance remained an under-theorized one, with few scholars making systematic efforts to find causal relationships or to make cross-national generalizations" (Scarrow 2007).[2] With the accumulation of cross-national data this is changing. Recent comparative research uses data from western European states to explain how particular laws emerge (Koss 2008, 2010; Scarrow 2007). Such studies allow for in-depth and rich analysis cannot make broader generalizations about reform in other regions.

With the advent of more comprehensive data on political party laws across multiple states and regions, scholars have begun to create typologies of finance systems based on the contours of regulations. Party finance regimes are highly heterogeneous and context specific (Casas-Zamora 2005). At the same time, however, identifying common features across units of analysis is essential to constructing broad theoretical claims to advance knowledge. Two studies in particular have exploited new data to construct dimensions that describe different types of party finance regimes and to systematically evaluate the formation of laws. Van Biezen (2010) offered a conceptual model built on three dimensions: contribution/spending limits, transparency, and subsidization. This model, however, has not been subjected to multivariate empirical testing to evaluate whether these dimensions are the most effective measure of party finance regimes or whether particular outcomes are associated with them. Abel van Es (2016) offered an index of intervention that combined disclosure requirements, contribution limits, spending limits, and public financing on a single dimension. However, this unidimensional conceptual framework assessing only the intensity of regulation makes it hard to differentiate among regulatory regimes and risks collapsing distinctive aspects of regulation and obscuring the possibility that states have divergent approaches to regulating money in politics.

The debate over how to conceive party finance systems remains unresolved. In this article we argue that party finance regimes are best captured along two dimensions: (1) interventions to regulate income and spending and (2) requirements to disclose sources for the purpose of transparency. This work largely supports previous conceptual work (van Biezen 2010) by demonstrating empirically a coherent typology of party finance regimes. It goes further by contributing to an understanding of how reform might develop. We challenge prior work that considers only short-term explanations, as well as recent models (Abel van Es 2016) that

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[1]We are not implying that the timing of the reform does not matter to the substance of it. Indeed, reforms may be inextricably linked to the nature of scandals that precipitate reform, as well as the contemporary social, economic, or political context (e.g., rise of labor unions, emergence of the Internet, party competition, etc.). Our goal in this analysis is to illustrate that institutional antecedents are associated with different approaches to reform, even as these institutional roots interact with the context of the political moment.

[2]Some past efforts constructed explicit comparative frameworks to distinguish among political finance systems. For example, one study distinguishes normatively between funding regimes that are "plutocratic" or "grassroots" (H. E. Alexander and Nassmacher 2001) while another employs three categories, claiming that funds can be from internal sources (e.g., party dues), external (business firms, unions) and/or state funding (Von Beyme 1985). None of these frameworks, however, draws explicitly on formal rules that institutionalize the contours of regulation.

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risk multi-collinearity and endogeneity. We focus on a limited range of institutional variables that have both theoretical leverage and that tend to exist prior to the formation of party finance laws. While limitations of data preclude strong causal claims, our findings reveal that the types of *political institutions* are associated with how states intervene in party finance when they have incentives to do so. States with a French legal tradition tend to regulate the flow of money in politics the most, while states with proportional representation systems tend to require considerable disclosure of party finances.

We explicitly chose not to address whether countries *enforce* the rules they promulgate since this inquiry would entail a massive investigation of administrative performance that is beyond the scope of this project. Identifying the content of laws is an important starting point for understanding the institutional development of party finance regimes, making it possible to develop further research assessing the causes and consequences of political regulations (Scarrow 2007).

CONCEPTUALIZING PARTY FINANCE REGIMES

To make comparisons across a large sample of states we focus only on interventions directed toward political parties. Many state regulations only apply to political parties, while others regulate candidates, other political actors (such as interest groups, corporations, labor unions, and independent actors), and parties. Party finance may encompass both funds for election campaigns and ongoing organizational activities, but does not include broader categories of regulation on interest groups and lobbyists. While "party" and "campaign" finance are conceptually distinctive, they are related. Having organizational funds in off-election seasons is necessary for recruiting candidates, developing policy proposals, and developing donor/voter lists. Our decision to measure and study party finance this way allows us to include as much data as possible about laws in states while also maximizing the size of the sample.[3]

Building on previous research, we advance the understanding of party finance in two ways. First, we clarify the dimensionality of finance laws by constructing a classification scheme based on two dimensions: (1) government intervention on income and spending and (2) transparency of finances. Using these two dimensions we classify four different types of party finance regimes internationally and situate states within each of these regimes. Second, we identify associations between the emergence of particular laws and commonalities between states using factors that are exogenous to these laws. Previous work includes various measures of corruption, democratization, and economic development to explain laws. These factors appear highly endogenous to the process. One recent study included a range of variables (Abel van Es 2016), many of which appeared highly correlated, raising concerns about biased estimates. We propose a more parsimonious approach given that many complex and interacting factors may be associated with reform. Rather than including a large number of variables that could be endogenous or highly correlated, we focused on the potential impact of political institutions. Given our reliance on cross-sectional data, our model assesses institutional variables, which measure characteristics that typically exist prior to the emergence of party finance laws. This approach lays the groundwork for future research that might exploit panel designs (as data is collected over time) to untangle the effect of factors that are exogenous to outcome variables.

Classification scheme for party finance regimes

We define "party finance regime" as the configuration of national laws and rules that regulate the finances of parties in a given state. This is the overarching concept we unpack and organize through our typology (see Collier et al. 2012). The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), which collects the data, organizes political finance laws into four categories: spending limits, contribution limits, disclosure requirements, and public funding. We make the conceptual and empirical case for thinking about party finance along two dimensions.[4]

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[3]The trade-off in our approach is that we cannot say much about how states regulate candidate and interest group financing in states where such groups are highly active.

[4]Abel van Es (2016) conceptualizes the degree of state intervention based on a single dimension, ranging from laissez-faire regimes to regimes with state interventions in virtually all aspects of campaign finance. As van Biezen (2010) conceptualized, important distinctions between the types of interventions and regulations emerge between states that reflect aspects of political culture, as well as institutional and economic arrangements.

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The first dimension reflects the degree in regulating party *income*. We view government efforts to restrict the flow of money into electoral politics as a financial intervention in the marketplace of political funds. The assumptions underlying restrictions on party funding sources are to level the playing field for competing political parties and to relieve them from their dependence upon a narrow band of private sources. This dependence is often viewed as having a corruptive influence upon policymakers, or at least unequal influence on the political process (Lessig 2011; van Biezen 2010). The intent of both limits and subsidies is to alter and diffuse the sources of political money (Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2006; Masket and Miller 2015; Albert 2018). Many governments place constraints on party financing from a variety of funding sources: bans are often enacted on foreign, corporate, union, and anonymous donors. Many states also limit the amount of donations that parties receive both inside and outside election periods.

Another way to regulate income is to provide various forms of public subsidies to different political actors. These subsidies include free access to broad media, cash subventions, as well as indirect subsidies, including tax relief for parties and donors, provision of physical space for party functions, subsidized postage, and transportation. Finally, states may choose to limit party spending as a means of equalizing resources and taming the demand for money. Limiting spending is another way to limit income because it imposes ceilings on how much money a party will have (Scarrow 2004). At one end of the spectrum are governments that impose many limits on contributions on a variety of sources and caps on spending. At the other end of the spectrum are governments that do none of this. Be it contribution limits, subsidies, or spending caps, the intent of these laws is to limit money to parties as a way of addressing a variety of ethical concerns about the political system, which might include preventing corruption and promoting equality and fairness. We label all of these interventions as attempts to regulate party income.

The second dimension of party finance regimes concerns *transparency*. Governments vary considerably in the extent to which they make information available to the public about the sources and uses of political funds. A finance system is "open" if the public can easily observe who donates money and how it is spent. A system is completely "closed" if none of this information is made available to the public. Governments differ on requirements for who must disclose finances and what transactions they must disclose. Disclosure requirements are meaningless unless there is an enforcement mechanism and technology to make information accessible, comprehensible, and timely, so people and civil society organizations can act on the information. Given that implementation is difficult to measure, we took the existence of regulations requiring some level of transparency as a statement that governments view disclosure as relevant to controlling the perception of political corruption. We anticipated that governments signal to citizens that they are dedicated to fighting corruption by creating laws, even if they fail to implement or enforce them adequately.[5]

Our arguments for a two-by-two typology, rather than other configurations, are conceptual, empirical, and practical. Conceptually, we view two different actions the state can take in regulating party funds. First, it can focus on the democratic values of transparency and accountability by requiring disclosure of finances. Second, it can encourage democratic values of fairness and equality by trying to manage how much money is available for financing politics. Note that both dimensions contribute to anti-corruption concerns. From an empirical perspective, we chose to combine contribution limits, spending limits, and subsidies into one dimension for regulating income, rather than create a third dimension for subsidies, as some others have done. Prior research supports our decision, demonstrating how contribution limits (Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2006), spending limits (Scarrow 2004), and subsidies (Masket and Miller 2015; Albert 2017) all affect the amount of income available to candidates and parties. Finally, from a practical perspective, we sought to develop a parsimonious model that broadly reflects complex processes and messy data, without ignoring the essential differences. In future research, a two-by-two matrix can

[5]In theory, we might have included a third dimension called quality of enforcement (strong-weak), but the data are monumentally difficult to gather for such a large sample. But more importantly, we do not think "enforcement" reflects a conceptual subcategory of party finance regimes. Rather, it likely reflects a measure of concepts outside the scope of our focus, such as administrative power and the effectiveness of state control over matters in civil society.



FIG. 1. Party finance regimes.

be applied more easily than typologies with more categories as independent or dependent variables.

Combining the income and transparency dimensions along an X- and Y-axis created four types of "party finance regimes," which is the overarching concept in our analysis (as displayed in the title of Figure 1). The concept is disaggregated into row and column variables to capture the most salient elements of variation in the concept (see Collier et al. 2012). As shown in Figure 1, we refer to these regimes as: (I) market-based, (II) public utility, (III) state-coopted, and (IV) unregulated. When we measured the regulations of each state along each of the dimensions (as explained in the methods section) we were able to situate the states within one of these four party finance regimes. We made the variables continuous based on the assumption that additional legal requirements (on income or transparency) have increasing impact on party behavior. This is, in fact, the stated justification by reformers for expanding the scope of these policies.

(I) Market-based. In a market-based regime the interventions into party finance are relatively limited. States with this regime type tend to place fewer restrictions on the size and source of contributions, if any, than those with a public utility regime. Importantly, however, the state has a regulatory agency in place to monitor transactions and enforce penalties. All markets are created and maintained by government, simply by acknowledging property rights or charters of existence, e.g., corporations, political parties, etc. (Polanyi 1944). What makes markets more or less "private" is the degree of control the state imposes on the choices made by the regulated entity. In the scope of party finance regimes, the state is less likely to constrain how political parties seek their funding or spend their resources. However, the essential regulatory feature is compelled disclosure of financial records. An underlying assumption is that transparency of transactions will enable the electorate to hold politicians accountable for how they raise and spend money, presumably by punishing political parties in elections when they violate norms of financing politics, such as taking large sums from corporations or wealthy donors. In this regime, parties tend to be viewed primarily as private associations with the legitimacy to manage their affairs internally. Market-based regimes include some states where policy-makers choose to provide direct subsidies to parties. However, in these instances, the parties are treated as private associations and thus afforded a wide berth to operate in an environment free of most other income interventions. The market regime appears especially representative of liberal values that focus on free speech rights for individuals or groups, while simultaneously putting faith in the capacity of enforcement agencies and the electoral system to temper regulatory violations (however few rules exist) and perceived improprieties of party finance.

(II) Public utility. A public utility regime is characterized by heavy regulation of party income. Generally, public financing is made available and private contributions are restricted in size and source.

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Additionally, the state may impose limits on political spending. These regimes also tend to require a high degree of transparency for political funds, though the quality of information may vary greatly. The key point is that the state endorses extensive forms of public control over party finances, with an underlying assumption that the party is providing a public good that must be monitored. Since parties have considerable power and consequence in the political system, the state needs to constrain party organizations to prevent rent-seeking and private-regarding behavior. Epstein (1986) applied the term, public utility, more broadly to explain how the state regulates political parties in a range of areas, including party nominations and organizational structure. Parties as public utilities are viewed as quasi-governmental agencies rather than private associations. While the term is not a perfect fit, because parties do not necessarily have monopolistic power (although some party systems may appear as duopolies or cartels), the claim is that the public has a compelling interest to justify state control over private associations. Since the state has a legitimate interest in avoiding corrupt politics and maintaining the equality of the vote, it has legitimate authority to regulate party financial activity.

(III) State-coopted. Countries with state-coopted regimes intervene in the financing of parties in a variety of ways, yet do not provide public information about party and candidate financing. The key distinction is that the state appears willing to constrict income to parties, but without any transparency about financial transactions. Parties might be subsidized by state funds and/or allowed increments of private sources of financing. The electorate, however, has little capacity to evaluate the sources and uses of political resources. This dynamic tends to make the political parties dependent on the goodwill of the state for its finances and enforcement (or lack thereof). The state can withhold funds or dole them out based on factors that may not be transparent to the wider public. At the same time, state regulators can ignore or enforce breaches of the rules when political parties seek illicit financing. Regardless, these regimes tend to put parties at the mercy of the state. Additionally, lacking transparency while imposing party income regulations creates a high risk that incumbent politicians might rely on state resources to promote themselves—using not only funds dedicated to campaigns, but governmental resources such as mail services, government-controlled broadcasting systems, or patronage. This type of regime reflects a system with high deference to, or insulation of, political elites, often creating a situation that could be called a political cartel or oligarchy. The subsequent analysis reveals that only a handful of states in our sample—and no liberal democracies—fall into this category.

(IV) Unregulated. In an unregulated regime, there are few state interventions in party finance and few transparency requirements. At the extreme, politicians can receive political contributions in any size and from any source. In addition, the public has no way to learn about such transactions. Given that there is limited information provided about the way that politics is financed, it cannot be considered a transparent market since voters have minimal capacity to view information that might enable them to make informed decisions and to hold politicians accountable for potential corruption or excessive influence of donors. In this context, political parties are understood as purely private entities in which the state has few legitimate claims for intervening in organizational affairs. It is a regime in which the state must assume that parties have internal accountability mechanisms to stifle corrupt behavior but, unlike market-based regimes, the state has few ways of auditing party affairs should parties violate public norms. In new democracies, the absence of regulations might reflect the state's weak institutional capacity or legitimacy to intervene in party affairs. In this sense, this kind of regime reflects the "Wild West" of party finance with limited or nonexistent state oversight.

With this conceptual framework in place, we turn to the underlying institutional factors associated with states' placement along each of the two dimensions, and within party finance regimes.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PARTY FINANCE REGIMES

We draw on comparative analysis to understand party finance reforms based on three institutional factors: (1) legal systems, (2) governmental systems, and (3) electoral systems. The analysis assesses the degree to which these factors covary with the two dimensions that defined regime types: income and transparency. While we cannot claim to generate a causal theory of party finance reform, we can begin to illustrate patterns of association between political

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institutions and approaches to regulating party finance. These patterns might be evaluated in subsequent research using time-series, panel data as it becomes available.

Political theories emphasize that institutions are created to allocate resources based on who has power. Rather than efficiency, the goal is to build institutions that allow those in power to retain their positions and allocate resources based on either their own preferences or the interests and values of their supporters (March and Olsen 1995). Political theories typically emphasize the importance of "founding moments," meaning points in time where power is assigned to particular groups with lasting effects (Clift and Fisher 2004; March and Olsen 1995; Panebianco 1988). Founding institutional moments shape present and future preferences related to power, ideas, and values, and founding institutions such as constitutions or legal systems set the table for future developments. Previous work has focused on institutional change in political finance by expounding on three theories about self-interested motives, evolutionary shifts in the environment, and the need for legitimacy (Clift and Fisher 2004). We similarly argue that founding moments might have important downstream effects on political reforms. We should be able to observe different reform trajectories associated with unique political institutions. Importantly, given our reliance on cross-sectional data, we choose to focus analytically on relatively stable features of political systems that may affect, in a path dependent manner, the development of party finance regimes. In contrast, prior work using similar cross-sectional data (Abel van Es 2016) has included economic factors and democratic indicators (perceptions of corruption, democracy scores, etc.), which often are in place prior to the implementation of reform.

Historical legal system

We applied understandings about foundational political institutions to the development of party finance laws, starting with constitutional systems and legal systems (David and Brierley 1978; La Porta et al. 1999). We anticipated that states with a continental "statist" constitutional tradition, such as France, would be more likely to use state power to regulate political activity, including party finance when faced with a corruption scandal or any other trigger of campaign finance reform. Clift and Fisher (2004), for example, show that scandal "evoked a response from the powerful *etatiste* dimension of the French republican tradition," (690) with comprehensive state financial interventions. In contrast, states with an Anglo constitutional tradition would be more likely to have classically liberal party finance laws that are rooted in traditions of private property rights and individual rights (Ertman 1997; Finer 1997). Therefore, the state would be less likely to intervene in regulating private contributions to political organizations. In sum, states that have adopted the Napoleonic code law tradition are more likely to regulate party income, which includes limits on contributions/spending and public subsidies, than those under a common law or hybrid legal tradition (Abel van Es 2016, 216). On the second dimension of transparency, we did not expect any differences between continental statist and Anglo traditions with respect to disclosure rules. Both traditions plausibly view an important role for the state in financial disclosure—the Anglo tradition because it relies on individuals to make rationally informed decisions based on information about party activities, while the continental statist tradition might view disclosure as a mechanism that permits the state to monitor organizations, which provide a public good.

Presidential governing system

There are countervailing theories to explain the relationship between presidentialism and party finance restrictions. On the one hand, studies that show presidential systems have multiple veto points, which would make it harder to pass reforms that might upend the status quo for important interests (Binder 1999; Moe and Caldwell 1994; Tsebelis 1995). Related, presidential systems, with separation of powers, may thwart the effort of cartel parties to exploit state resources, such as party subsidies, for their own benefit (Abel van Es 2016). Separation of powers also tends to produce weaker parties (Mainwaring 1991), which gives rise to candidate-centered campaigns requiring more money and thereby weakens incentives for restrictions. Finally, it could be argued that presidents who rely on corrupt spoils of office may not desire party finance reform.

On the other hand, several theories suggest that presidential systems would be *more likely* to have

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party finance restrictions than parliamentary regimes. First, perceptions of public corruption are greater under presidential systems (Gerring and Thacker 2004), which would heighten public demand for anti-corruption reforms. Second, presidents, as directly elected executives by a national constituency (Cheibub et al. 2014), would be especially attuned to majoritarian demands for popular political reforms given this vertical accountability compared to the legislature (O'Donnell 1998). Third, presidents have relatively less to fear electorally than members of legislative parties from passing such reforms. Compared to legislative incumbents, presidents can rely more on state resources from the executive branch to reward potential supporters (Berry et al. 2010; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000; Hudak 2013; Kriner and Reeves 2012) and publicize themselves in anticipation of reelection due to the salience and status of the office (Charnock et al 2009; Doherty 2012). In this way, political spending by presidential incumbents likely matters less per vote, and they may be more amenable to restrictions on party contributions and spending. Indeed, such restrictions may give them advantages by suppressing the capacity of lesser-known rivals to campaign robustly.

These competing theories and findings make explanations about the relationship between presidential systems and party finance laws difficult. On balance, we expect that states with presidential systems are more likely to have restrictions on party income than states with parliamentary or semi-presidential systems, largely because presidential incumbents appear less reliant on party finances to win reelection. However, given strong arguments in the other direction, we would not be surprised to observe parliamentary systems intervening more, or no difference at all. Certainly, for the transparency dimension, we have no expectations in either direction about whether we will observe more rules requiring transparency.

Proportional representation electoral system

Proportional representation (PR) systems tend to introduce more political parties to the political system. This dynamic can create pressure for more equitable distribution of resources and publicity, as well as a consensus for the inclusion of public funding (Koss 2010). Research shows that PR systems tend to support greater redistributive social welfare policies (Austen-Smith 2000; Crepaz 1998; Iverson and Soskice 2006). The same logic can be applied to political finance (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002). We expect pressure, particularly from smaller parties, for a fair distribution of resources, which would mean greater restrictions on major parties and/or public subsidies for minor parties so they compete with larger parties. An alternative theory of cartel parties is that the major parties might use the party finance system to stifle the ability of other parties to compete effectively (Katz and Mair 1995, 2009; though see Scarrow 2006). In other words, political parties may attempt to contain the success of political challengers through self-serving subsidies and onerous restrictions on private financing of rivals. The outcome may depend on allocation mechanisms, which cannot be determined based on the data available. We cannot adjudicate whether pressure for subsidies and restrictions in PR systems is based on norms of equality and fairness, or whether it reflects the desire of dominant parties to design a system in their favor even if it appears fair on paper. Regardless, we expect that PR systems are more likely to have income interventions in the party finance system (Koss 2010).

We also believe that PR systems are more likely to put pressure on the state for disclosure of party finance. PR systems tend to produce multiple parties, which have a common incentive to hold rival parties accountable. In multi-party systems, however, there is a collective action problem in pursuing mutual accountability. It is costly for a party to expend its resources to investigate other parties. The hope is that another party will do the investigative work, which leads to the free rider problem. Having a disclosure system in place lowers the cost of investigation for all parties. Even if cartel parties have gamed the regulatory system to control resources, they have little to fear from agreeing to disclosure of financing if they follow rules that tend favor them. In sum, we expect that states that use some type of proportional representation system to elect legislators are more likely to enact laws requiring disclose of political money than states that use a majoritarian system.

Regime stability

Finally, we include one non-institutional control variable that we believe affects the adoption of rules. States that have enjoyed longer lived constitutional orders are more likely to have developed

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strong norms of behavior that often substitute for formal rules (Clift and Fisher 2004). Through institutionalization, they have created a degree of "social capital" making the formal adoption of campaign finance laws less necessary. Newer regimes, that have had fewer years of stable governance by less established and institutionalized parties, may lead policy makers to seek ways to stabilize the party system As Karvonen (2007) posits, new democratic regimes "use the law to counteract lingering anti-democratic tendencies," largely to avoid consolidation of power by actors of the former regime (450). One such option is by financially supporting parties and ensuring greater transparency. Moreover, as van Biezen has argued (2004, 2010), newer democracies are often established in a context where international norms or "best practices" in the financing of parties are seen as key instruments to provide equity among the new parties. States with longer lived constitutional orders will be less likely to adopt party finance interventions of any kind than states with shorter constitutional orders.

DATA AND METHODS

Data

We surveyed and analyzed party finance laws and factors potentially associated with them across countries using an observational cross-sectional design. Our data were drawn from multiple sources, specifically:

- Party finance law data collected by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (Falguera et al. 2014; Ohman 2012).
- Data on government characteristics archived by the ACE Project, Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2014), the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the Quality of Government Dataset (QoG) (Teorell et al. 2016).
- Data on executive formation is sourced from Elgie (2014).

Our measures of regulation variables were (1) income intervention in party finance and (2) transparency regarding money in politics. IDEA provided detailed information regarding laws in these areas (Falguera et al. 2014; Ohman 2012). IDEA defined its population with the inclusion criterion of countries that were United Nations (UN) member states, and exclusion criteria of (a) countries that ban political parties, (b) countries where parties are not allowed to register candidates, and (c) countries that had not held elections in 30 years (Ohman 2012). Its dataset contained 180 countries and had 90% coverage of all measured variables.

We created additive indexes that identified the two dimensions we used to classify party finance regimes: the regulation of party income and transparency. IDEA specifically included measures of the existence or absence of certain restrictions, such as bans on donations to political parties by corporations or unions, as well as providing detailed qualitative descriptive data on measures such as the maximum contribution limit that applied to each type of contributor (assuming that a country had established contribution limits). Given the complexity of these laws, their efforts to summarize these details were incomplete. As a result, we relied on bright-line measures such as the existence or absence of certain types of laws in our analysis. The "income intervention" variable was constructed by equally weighing count variables of three types of interventions: (1) limits on funding to parties, (2) state subsidies to parties, and (3) limits on party spending. The variable ranges from 0 to 1. Each component is presented in Table 1, along with the percentage of states that employ a particular regulation. The "transparency" variable was similarly constructed. A count of different transparency regulations was aggregated, and the variable was scaled from 0 to 1. Each of the components is presented in Table 2, and a full description of both variables (with examples) is found in Appendix A.

The choice to rely on additive indices reflected the baseline assumption that the items within each category had equal analytical weight; we had no theoretical or empirical justification to adjust the weights unequally.[6] For example, with the transparency scale, requirements of making donor names public and full disclosure of finances were assumed

[6]We can think of no strong theoretical arguments or empirical evidence to overweight particular rules on party finance rules; nor can we think of theoretical argument to weight subcategories (contribution limits, spending limits, subsidies) differently in our overall measure for income regulations. In the absence of strong theory or empirical research, we believe counting regulations into an index requires the fewest assumptions and is intuitively appealing.

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Table 1. Income Interventions in Campaign Finance

Type of intervention	*Percent*
Ban on foreign donations	67.5
Ban on corporate donations	24.7
Ban on corporate donations from government contractors	49.4
Ban union donations	26.3
Ban anonymous donations	54.9
Limit on donations outside of election period	32.2
Limit on donations during election period	38.9
Public financing—regularly	55.4
Public financing—for election	31.6
Free or subsidized media	69.6
Indirect public funding	67.7
Limits on spending	29

Percentages are of all states found in the IDEA dataset.

to be equally politically relevant. The application of summary scores is most appropriate (relative to factor analysis) in cases where measures are untested and exploratory of the concept, and when seeking to preserve variation in the original data; both these circumstances applied for these data, which apply previously untested scales to understand an understudied area (DiStefano et al. 2009; Hair et al. 2006; Tabachnick and Fidell 2001).

Additionally, as others have pointed out (Abel van Es 2016), many states combine multiple, seemingly contradictory array of rules (e.g., they have spending limits without contribution limits). Rather than try to make sense of these various configurations or try to treat each type of regulation separately, we choose to view these regulations as "more or less" interventions into regulating party income. Our approach to measuring the two dimensions using additive indices, with implied intervals, rather than nominal or ordinal categories means that it is entirely possible for states with very different mixes of laws to be placed in the same regime. For example, a state that has a high score on "limits on contributions," but low score on "limits on spending," could be placed in the same regime as one that has the opposite configuration.

Table 2. Transparency Requirements

Type of requirement	*Percent*
Reports of general finances	73.3
Reports of campaign finances	54.9
Reports of finances publicly available	62.8
Names of donors always public	42.6
Enforcement of finance laws by public agency	75.8
Other public agencies share in oversight	49.7

Percentages are of all states found in the IDEA dataset.

Underlying institutional types fell into three categories: (a) *legal system*, coded as 1 for states that follow the French code law tradition, otherwise 0; (b) *presidential system*, coded as 1 for states that vested executive authority in an elected president (semi-presidential regimes inclusive) as opposed to parliamentary systems coded as 0; (c) *electoral system*, coded as 1 for an electoral system that used some kind of proportional representation systems for choosing legislators, otherwise 0.

As a control, we included a variable recording the number of years since regime change (an integer).

A list of the variables included, distinguished by type and source, is provided in Table 3.

Methods

We first organized countries by their scores on income intervention and transparency. We placed cut-points on each of the dimensions at their means to separate countries on each axis. We used mean cut-points rather than an absolute standard because we had no theoretical or empirical justification for placing the axis at any particular point. Thus, the typology is necessarily a relative comparison across nations. However, we highlight polar types that most clearly reflect conceptual typology by highlighting the states in the top corners of the two-dimensional space (Collier et. al 2012). Those that do not fall within these areas are considered more intermediate types within the regime category. Each state's classification is presented in Appendix Table B1. This allowed us to characterize the nature of each country's party finance regime into one of our four types. We then identified laws about income intervention and transparency. Our analysis relied on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to separately model income intervention and transparency, and multinomial logistic regression to identify associations with party finance regime type. The analysis was completed using Stata (Long and Freese 2014).

RESULTS

Data were collected between 2012 and 2015; depending on the analysis, we were able to include between 118 and 126 countries. Variation in case numbers is due to case-wise deletion of missing data. Based on using the mean score as a cut-point we identified 64 states in the category of public

Table 3. Variable Definitions and Sources

Variable group	*Variables*	*Source*
Dependent variables		
Income interventions	(1) Funding limits: bans for foreign, corporate, union, contractor, state, and anonymous donations and limits on amount of contribution; (2) Public funding: regular and electoral funding of parties, media subsidies, and other subsidies; (3) Spending limits: political party expenditure limits	IDEA
Transparency	Party financial reporting; reports of parties and candidates are available to the public; donor names are public; outside institutional oversight	IDEA
Independent variables		
Political institutions		
Electoral system	Proportional representation in the legislature	ACE Project
Legal traditions	Common law; civil law	US CIA
Regime age	The number of years since the most recent regime change.	Polity IV
Presidential system	Presidential and semi-presidential; parliamentary	Elgie 2014

utility, 34 as market-based, 39 as unregulated, and only 5 as state-coopted. Figure 2 shows the relative position of each state on the two dimensions and their classification under our scheme (marked with the appropriate International Organization for Standardization [ISO] abbreviation, with darker markers indicating polar types). A slim majority of states fall into the public utility regime; almost half of them could be described as "polar types" fitting into the upper right corner of the matrix. In contrast, the lack of data in the upper left corner suggests that market-based regimes appear to lack "pure" forms of the regime type. Nigeria (NG) and Kazakhstan (KZ) appear to be states closest to the polar type, regulating income very little, while requiring a high amount of transparency. The other states in the quadrant choose to lightly or moderately regulate income. States in the unregulated regime tend to be developing democracies, except for states like Denmark (DK) and Switzerland



FIG. 2. Party finance regimes. Note: Darkened ISO (International Organization for Standardization) abbreviations are polar type cases.

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(CH). In the lower left quadrant, the polar types were Dominica (DM), Iraq (IQ), Marshall Islands (MH), Nauru (NR), and Swaziland (SZ). Finally, we had very few states in the state-coopted regime, which suggests that few states choose to regulate income without also requiring transparency. Guatemala (GT) is the outlier in choosing to have many restrictive laws on income but with less than average transparency. Similarly, the Philippines (PH) and Jordan (JO) have lax requirements on transparency even as the laws attempt to restrain party income. The spread of data in the 2 x 2 matrix suggests that having restrictive income rules is associated with greater transparency.

Assessing the dimensions of the classification scheme

We evaluated the extent to which our two-dimensional categorization scheme, based on the level of income regulation (Dimension One) and the level of transparency (Dimension Two), was associated with regime categories. Given that these dimensions are scaled to produce interval level measurements, our estimation relied on OLS multivariate regression. Table 4 contains two columns listing variables along these two dimensions and two columns listing the anticipated directions of association.

The regressions show association with the level of income intervention, including measures of subsidies, donation limits, and spending caps. Overall, approximately 15 percent of the variation could be accounted for by the variables we include in the model. This share of variation was limited by both the small number of cases (n = 126) and a range of country-specific influences that were not included in this analysis (including short-term factors such as political scandals) that could influence the probability of a nation choosing to enact specific party finance reforms. The measure most closely associated with the level of government regulation was a statist tradition. As expected, states that utilize the Napoleonic code were more likely to intervene than common law or hybridized legal systems. On the other hand, presidential systems, proportional representations, and regime durability were not associated with income intervention.

Turning to measures associated with the enactment of transparency requirements, we find that nations that employ proportional representation were more likely to have adopted stronger transparency laws when the other factors were held constant. Nations that use code law tended towards transparency as well, although this finding failed to reach standard thresholds of statistical significance, in both one and two-tailed tests. Neither presidential systems nor longer lived constitutional orders showed any relationship to transparency laws. These findings show that different institutional factors are associated with either interventions or transparency, which suggests that we are observing different dimensions of party finance systems.

Understanding the factors underlying party finance regimes

We used a multinomial logistic regression to identify the associations between various regime classifications using the same institutional variables (see Table 5). The unregulated regime serves as the reference category as it represents policy inaction on both dimensions. The results largely echo the modelling of the dimensions separately. We find a strong association between code law states and the

Table 4. OLS Regressions of Income Intervention and Transparency

	Income b/se	*Predicted*	*Transparency b/se*	*Predicted*
Code law	0.181***	+	0.080	+
	(0.049)		(0.051)	
Presidential system	−0.070	+	−0.039	?
	(0.052)		(0.053)	
Years since regime change	−0.000	–	0.000	?
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Proportional representation	0.057	+	0.116*	+
	(0.052)		(0.054)	
Constant	0.421***		0.593***	
	(0.065)		(0.064)	
Number of cases	128		126	
R-square	0.171		0.106	

*p|t| < .10 two-tailed; ***p|t| < .01 two-tailed, entries are coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 5. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Regime Type

	Market based b/se	*Predicted*	*Public utility b/se*	*Predicted*	*State coopted b/se*	*Predicted*
Code law	−0.133	+	0.983*	+	.320	+
	(0.611)		(0.540)		(1.163)	
Presidential system	0.286	?	−0.435	+	0.326	+
	(0.662)		(0.569)		(1.355)	
Years since regime change	0.005	?	0.002	–	−0.007	–
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.025)	
Proportional representation	1.438**	+	0.812	+	1.293	?
	(0.627)		(0.541)		(1.297)	
Constant	−1.105		0.018		−2.911	
	(0.800)		(0.663)		(1.720)	
Number of cases	119					
Pseudo R-square	0.069					

*p |t| < .10 two-tailed; **p |t| < .05 two-tailed, entries are coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis.
Multinomial logistic regression, unregulated regime as reference category.

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public utility category relative to unregulated states. Proportional representation was associated with market-based policies (and their emphasis on disclosure) relative to states with unregulated regimes. These results mirror the results of the regressions modelling the dimension separately, suggesting robustness to these institutional factors.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Our study relied on an extensive international dataset, combining information from a range of sources, to provide new insights into the ways that countries regulate political finance. We developed a conceptual framework to categorize party finance regimes and evaluate the historical institutional bases for the design of these regimes. Our results suggest that there are consistent, stable factors associated with adoption of particular sets of laws and regimes. Previous qualitative research, with a few recent exceptions, has largely focused on short-term factors, especially political scandals and related issues of legitimacy, or changes in the political environment. Such findings provide important nuance about proximate events that lead to institutional change, but they are difficult to replicate in a large-N study. More importantly, they do not allow us to generalize about the kinds of reforms adopted across states. Some exceptions include Scarrow (2007; 2011) and Koss (2010) who illustrate political and economic circumstances that make certain kinds of reform more likely when scandal emerges. Our study focuses primarily on longer-term institutional features of states that may lead to certain kinds of finance regimes. Our results suggest a complementary narrative that helps explain why governments, in the face of scandals that trigger campaign finance reforms or pressure from international aid organizations, choose specific kinds of rules rooted in underlying structural features. Although our findings do not explain all of the variance inherent in party finance laws, we identify key associations between party finance systems and underlying institutional characteristics.

At the outset, we identified two fundamental dimensions of a party financing system: (1) regulatory interventions that affect income (via contribution and spending limits, and subsidies) and (2) the breadth of transparency laws. These two dimensions generated four distinctive types of party finance regimes: market-based, public utilities, state-coopted, and unregulated regimes. A majority of states fell into the public utility regime with its combination of heavy restrictions on income and lots of transparency. While many states were market-based regimes, few of them were polar "pure" types since most imposed at least a few constraints on income. The second largest number of states fell into the unregulated regime; most are considered developing rather than advanced democracies. The state-coopted regime with its heavy restrictions on income and little transparency did not include many states. Overall, the pattern of regulations suggest that strong regulations on income tend to covary with disclosure requirements (the correlation is .65). Not without reason, it appears that once a state begins to regulate on one dimension, it starts to regulate on the other.

We then identified institutional features associated with whether states embraced aspects of either

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dimension of reform, which would place them into one of these four regimes. Most importantly, we found that income interventions appear strongly linked with systems that embrace a more active and strong state, as embodied in French-style code law. It should not be surprising that such states pursue interventionist policies in party finance in ways they do in other policy domains. These states tend to fall into public utility regimes because they heavily regulate the sources and uses of party financing, while also requiring some transparency.

We did not identify an association between presidential systems and income interventions. We expected that the nature of electoral resources and incentives of incumbent presidents would imply that presidential systems were linked with denser regulations on party finance. To the degree that presidents exploit the resources of the state in illegitimate ways for reelection, it suggests they have little incentive to push for reforms with any more frequency than parliamentary legislatures. The absence of any association suggests that more research is needed to compare party finance systems in presidential and parliamentary systems. Comparing these systems, we would want to know more about how money is raised, the relative importance of political parties in financing politics, media coverage of politics, and which kind of candidates benefit the most from additional spending. Any of these variables may tell us the relative importance of money in the political system for different actors and incentives for reform.

Regarding the effect of proportional representation, we expected that such states would have robust income interventions and stronger transparency requirements. We found that PR systems were associated with greater transparency but not greater interventions in regulating the flow of money. We posited that PR systems could provide stronger incentives for states to adopt better transparency rules to address the collective action problem of holding multiple parties accountable for their finances. Regarding income interventions, previous work has tried to assess whether political parties in PR systems regulate money to equalize the playing field or to create cartels. We cannot adjudicate these opposing dynamics in this analysis, and the fact that either pathway seems plausible, depending on the context, suggests the need for more analysis on patterns of reform under PR and non-PR systems. Additional research should focus comparatively on the choices made by PR systems by testing factors we did not include here, such as the number of political parties, or relative size of different parties in the legislature at the time of passing reforms. This kind of study may illustrate whether mainstream parties under PR systems confer advantages on themselves by promulgating particular sets of finance rules (Katz and Mair 1995).

We found that most states were classified as public utility regimes, which was associated with having a statist tradition. In contrast, states that were regulated markets tended to have PR systems and emphasize promotion of transparency rather than income interventions. We were not able to distinguish between states classified as unregulated and state-coopted regimes except to note that a handful of advanced democracies, including Denmark and Switzerland, appeared to be unregulated systems in which neither one restricts funds significantly or makes transactions readily transparent (see Appendix Table B1).

This study deepens the puzzle for those who study political finance in the U.S. context. Based on our findings, it seems unlikely that the U.S. would have a comprehensive system of interventions or even a presidential public financing system. A reading of U.S. political finance law indicates there are many rules on the books, even if it appears to be the “Wild West” of political finance. We suggest that a challenge to passing robust political reforms in the U.S. is that the institutional context is not fertile for intense interventions given that the U.S. lacks a continental statist tradition. Progressive-inspired reforms have been weakened consistently as they pass through the constitutional lens of the courts. Based on institutional theories we would expect the U.S. to be situated as a market-based or unregulated regime; however, our measures classify it as a public utility regime. This is likely due to a Progressive “statist” tradition, which some have likened to a second founding (Milkis and Mileur 1999; Milkis 2009). This second tradition will inevitably rub against an older Madisonian tradition of limited government intervention, and we speculate that this dual tradition explains the Jekyll and Hyde dynamic of U.S. reforms.

The institutional relationships appear to apply reasonably well to several advanced democracies. France, for example, is a classic statist nation that has created a thickly regulated system of political finance since its reforms in 1988. It is clearly a public utility regime. Although the French state was a latecomer to political reform, particularly compared to the United States and the United Kingdom (Clift

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and Fisher 2004), our analysis is not about the timing of reforms so much as the regime approach, given that reforms have passed. Australia's path of reforms is typical of market-based regimes. It went through two major rounds in 1918 and 1983, and in both instances it stopped well short of the major interventions into party income that we see in public utility regimes. Though its current regime allows for a degree of state funding (similar to a few other market regimes) and limits the amount of anonymous donations, these are comparatively light. The Australians rely primarily on a set of transparency laws that are on par with most other states in the IDEA database to provide for public accountability, without a heavy state hand in regulating the flow of money into the party and electoral system.

One purpose of this article was to develop a taxonomy of systems that could be used to explain important political outcomes. When states design and implement political financing rules, they seek several goals, including some or all of the following: avoiding corruption, reducing the influence of wealthy donors, promoting fairness among political parties, and enhancing electoral competition. The typology we offer might be used in future analysis to evaluate which kinds of systems advance any of these goals. Previous work (van Biezen 2015) has offered a three-dimensional typology (financial restrictions, subsidies, transparency), which creates as many as eight regime types. While conceptually helpful, it is challenging to link so many regime types to political outcomes. We argue that collapsing income interventions and subsidies makes sense conceptually, empirically, and as a practical manner, in developing regime types for future research. Other measures that use a single dimension to measure the intensity of regulations (Abel van Es 2016) do not adequately capture the distinctive approaches to party finance reforms.

The typology we propose can also be applied to study other campaign-related questions that, in theory, are implicated in the design of finance rules, such as whether any particular political finance system tends to heighten campaign costs, mobilize more voters, or complicate matters of enforcement. These longstanding questions have not been addressed adequately. Policymakers would also benefit from understanding the trade-offs of selecting from various approaches to campaign finance reform even if, as we suggest here, there is a path dependency to what kinds of regimes states tend to adopt.

In conclusion, this exploratory analysis offers guidance to understanding current regimes and can be elaborated and strengthened in future research. Given the cross-sectional research design we were not able to assess longitudinal changes in party finance systems, and hewed closely to the potential impact of long-term institutional factors to explain reform. Our analysis explicitly did not assess the implementation of laws, instead focusing on the existence of particular laws. Identifying the existence of such laws provides critical information regarding what governments perceive to be important and how they signal their intentions; further analysis could usefully build on these findings by assessing whether and how these regulations are enforced. Although our findings explained only a portion of the variance in outcomes, we know from case studies research that many contextual variables may contribute to the design of party finance rules. Other information, including data on factors such as past political scandals, and more detailed country-specific information, would strengthen the analysis. Nonetheless, this large sample study advances both theoretical understandings of political reform and conceptual coherence in seeing how different states approach the thorny dilemma of regulating money in politics.

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(*Appendices follow* →)

Appendices

APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The index for intervention is additive and is composed of three equally weighted count variables that are scaled to range from 0 to 1: limits on the inflow of money, public financing, and limits on expenditures. The limits count variable contains: ban on foreigner contributions, ban on corporate contributions, ban on government contractor contributions, ban on union contributions, ban on anonymous contribution (an outright ban earns a single point, a limitation earns half a point), a ban on "other" contribution, individual contribution limits to parties out of the election cycle, and individual limits to parties in the election cycle. The public financing count variable is composed of: regular party funding, party funding in campaign cycle, media subsidy, and "other" subsidies. Finally, the spending limits component is from a single variable (v31 of IDEA) that indicates a limit on party spending either in the election season, out of election season, or both. Let us use the example of Slovenia, a state with a highly interventionist campaign regime. Slovenia has enacted bans in all categories of the donations in the scale (foreign, corporate, contractors, unions, and "others"), and it limits anonymous donations (but does not ban them outright). As such, Slovenia's funding limit component yields 7.5 points and scaled down to .9375 (7.5/8). In regards to public funding, Slovenia has regular funding of parties, media subsidies, "other" subsidies, but it does not award election specific grants; thus it yields a count of 3, scaled to .75 (3/4). Slovenia also limits the spending amount of parties as defined by IDEA, giving a scaled count of 1. These counts are then weighted equally on a scale of 0 to 1, giving Slovenia a score of 0.896.

The transparency index is also a count variable scaled from 0 to 1. It is composed of the following binary measures: regular finance reports required, campaign finance reports required, reports being public, donors being public (.5 point for "sometimes," often small donor names are not public), enforcement agency assigned, and an additional agency given enforcement authority. Again, consider the case of Slovenia, which is a very transparent system. It counts 5.5, yielding a transparency score of .92, since it has all the above transparency requirements, except for making all donor names public.

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Appendix Table B1. Country Classifications

Market Based	Public Utility	State Coopted	Unregulated
Afghanistan - AF	Albania - AL	Guatemala - GT	Antigua and Barbuda - AG
Andorra - AD	Argentina - AR	Jordan - JO	Belarus - BY
Angola - AO	Armenia - AM	Philippines - PH	Botswana - BW
Australia - AU	Austria - AT	Congo (Brazzaville) - CD	Burkina Faso - BF
Bolivia - BO	Azerbaijan - AZ	Turkey - TR	Cambodia - KH
Burundi - BI	Bangladesh - BD		Cameroon - CM
Ivory Coast - CI	Belgium - BE		Central African Republic - CF
Congo, Dem Rep of - CD	Benin - BJ		Denmark - DK
Costa Rica - CR	Bhutan - BT		Dominica - DM
East Timor - TL	Bosnia & Herzegovina - BA		El Salvador - SV
Estonia - EE	Brazil - BR		Gabon - GA
Fiji - FJ	Bulgaria - BG		Honduras - HN
Finland - FI	Canada - CA		Iraq - IQ
Germany - DE	Chile - CL		Jamaica - JM
Ghana - GH	Colombia - CO		Lebanon - LB
Guinea-Bissau - GW	Croatia - HR		Lesotho - LS
India - IN	Cyprus - CY		Liechtenstein - LI
Indonesia - ID	Czech Republic - CZ		Madagascar - MG
Ireland - IE	Ecuador - EC		Malawi - MW
Kazakhstan - KZ	Ethiopia - ET		Mali - ML
Libya - LY	France - FR		Malta - MT
Maldives - MV	Georgia - GE		Marshall Islands - MH
Netherlands - NL	Greece - GR		Mauritius - MU
Niger - NE	Guinea - GN		Micronesia - FM
Nigeria - NG	Hungary - HU		Monaco - MC
Norway - NO	Iceland - IS		Morocco - MA
Papua New Guinea - PG	Israel - IL		Nauru - NR
Sierra Leone - SL	Italy - IT		Nicaragua - NI
South Africa - ZA	Japan - JP		Pakistan - PK
Sudan - SD	Kenya - KE		Palau - PW
Sweden - SE	Korea, Republic of - KR		Saint Kitts and Nevis - KN
Uganda - UG	Kyrgyzstan - KG		Saint Lucia - LC
Ukraine - UA	Latvia - LV		Seychelles - SC
Venezuela - VE	Liberia - LR		Swaziland - SZ
	Lithuania - LT		Switzerland - CH
	Luxembourg - LU		Turkmenistan - TM
	Macedonia - MK		Yemen - YE
	Mexico - MX		Zambia - ZM
	Moldova, Republic of - MD		Zimbabwe - ZW
	Mongolia - MN		
	Montenegro - ME		
	Nepal - NP		
	New Zealand - NZ		
	Panama - PA		
	Paraguay - PY		
	Peru - PE		
	Poland - PL		
	Portugal - PT		
	Romania - RO		
	Russian Federation - RU		
	Rwanda - RW		
	Serbia - RS		
	Slovakia - SK		
	Slovenia - SI		
	Spain - ES		
	Taiwan - TW		
	Tajikistan - TJ		
	Tanzania - TZ		
	Thailand - TH		
	Tunisia - TN		
	United Kingdom - GB		
	United States - US		
	Uruguay - UY		
	Uzbekistan - UZ		

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